

**FIFTY YEARS
OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**

**Some Administrative Experiences
of U. S. Voluntary Agencies**

By
EDWIN A. BOCK

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FOREWORD

In connection with its national and international program, Public Administration Clearing House has had continuous interest in the problem of better briefing for technical assistance experts who have been chosen to work in cultures which are new to them. This monograph summarizes the rich experience of representatives of many American voluntary agencies which were operating in every quarter of the globe for half a century before the phrase "technical assistance" became current.

The monograph is an expansion of a working paper contributed by Public Administration Clearing House to a Conference on the Social Aspects of Technical Assistance Programs for Economic Development, held in New York in April, 1953, under the joint auspices of the United Nations and UNESCO. The working paper, to be useful as a conference document, was brief. It was well received by the headquarters and field staffs of United Nations agencies and also by leaders in voluntary agencies in the United States, some of whom urged that the material collected be made available in more detail. Public Administration Clearing House accordingly commissioned Mr. Edwin A. Bock of its New York office, who had prepared the working paper, to write this more extended report of his interviews with leaders in the work of the voluntary agencies.

We take this means of expressing our thanks publicly and jointly to the several score persons who gave generously of their time for interviews and whose experience and judgment are here summarized. We are unable to do so severally because they were promised anonymity in order to make frank replies possible and because many of the conclusions stated are composite judgments which cannot be specifically attributed to any one expert.

We wish also to record our special thanks for their cooperation to Dr. Wynn Fairfield, chairman, Miss Charlotte Owen, Executive Director, and Mrs. Elizabeth Reiss of the staff of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service. The Council's Committee on Technical Assistance and Projects provided several members who counselled with Mr. Bock at many stages; thanks are due to Miss Lillian Espy, Miss Eileen Egan, Mr. Morris Laub, and Mr. Irving Barnett. It should be made clear, however, that the responsibility for this report is that of the author, and in no way that of the Council, of any of its members, or of any

of the persons who contributed information, many of whom are not associated with the Council.

In publishing this monograph Public Administration Clearing House is aware of many differences in aims, methods, limitations, and levels of operation between technical assistance programs of voluntary agencies and those carried out on a government-to-government basis by the United Nations or the United States. Nevertheless, we believe that the experience summarized herein will prove useful to governmental and intergovernmental bodies and to representatives of private institutions and firms preparing to send representatives abroad. Whether those who make policy and conduct training for such programs are already convinced of most of the administrative principles herein presented or disagree with some of them, there is still reason to think that they will welcome this written testimony gleaned from the experience of these wise persons, some of whom have been engaged in this kind of work for more than fifty years.

HERBERT EMMERICH
Director

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Introduction

This study is based largely on interviews with fifty-five persons who have had long experience in technical assistance in less-developed countries under the auspices of thirty-one voluntary agencies based in the United States. These agencies include missionary societies and religious organizations, secular service committees related to religious bodies, and nonprofit corporations and private foundations conducting technical assistance programs.

The activities of these voluntary agencies include literacy, vocational training, higher education, public health, social work, agriculture, farm credit, and multipurpose community development. The annual technical assistance budgets of the agencies whose personnel were consulted range from \$150,000 to \$37 million. (The larger figure is an estimate of the combined expenditure for overseas technical assistance of the major U.S. Protestant denominational groups in 1950.) By comparison, the budget of the United Nations' Expanded Technical Assistance Program for 1952 was a little less than \$23 million. The U.S. Congress has appropriated \$122 million for technical assistance for the fiscal year 1954.¹

Experience of Consultants

The fifty-five experienced persons who were interviewed are designated throughout the following pages as "consultants," referring to the fact that they served as consultants to the author and to Public Administration Clearing House in the preparation of this study. As used here, the term "consultant" does not mean that the persons interviewed invariably functioned as consultants in their work abroad either to governments or to other organizations. Actually, the fifty-five persons have played various roles carrying out technical assistance abroad. What they have in common is that they have acted or are acting as organizers, directors, or administrators—either of single project operations, or, as is the case with the majority, of programs which encompass several projects.

The average overseas experience of the consultants is eighteen

¹ Professor Walter Sharp, one of the best informed authorities on governmental technical assistance programs, estimates the total UN budget for all forms of technical assistance for 1953 to be between \$40 and \$45 million. This includes technical assistance items in the regular UN budget and in the budgets of the specialized agencies. Walter R. Sharp, "The Institutional Framework for Technical Assistance," *International Organization*, August, 1953, p. 342.

years. The most experienced consultants began their work in less-developed areas between 1900 and 1910. The geographical areas of experience include the Far East, the Near East, South and Central America, and Africa. Eighteen consultants have had experience in more than one area. One consultant has not worked for voluntary agencies but has gained his experience by assisting privately the development programs of a foreign government. With this exception no person was interviewed who had been employed by an agency with less than seven years' operating experience in long-range technical assistance, as distinguished from emergency relief. The persons consulted were approached as individuals and spoke in an individual capacity and not as representatives of their voluntary agencies.

Focus of the Study

The questionnaire which was used as the basis for interviewing was drawn up after preliminary consultation with several highly experienced persons. Questions were organized under headings which coincided with the agenda of the United Nations-UNESCO Conference on Social Aspects of Technical Assistance Programs for Economic Development for which the views of consultants were originally collected. During the interviews (some consultants were interviewed more than once), each consultant was encouraged to raise any points he considered important, even though they did not appear to relate to the questionnaire. Reports, records, or books of the consultants or their agencies were studied along with general technical assistance literature to supplement the information gained through interviewing.

Anonymity was offered to all consultants in order to obtain the frankest possible expressions of judgments and experiences. Almost all consultants availed themselves of this offer, so that in only a few instances is it possible to identify the source of a particular statement.

The report seeks to present the views and wisdom of the consultants in a coherent manner, unobstructed by frequent quantitative nose-counting. The terms: "all consultants," "most consultants," "many consultants," "a majority of consultants," "some consultants," and "few consultants" are the descending orders of magnitude which are used in place of a numerical roll call.

Purposes and Limitations

The aim of this study is to present experiences, ideas, and judgments which may be useful to persons responsible for the administration of technical assistance programs of governments or

private agencies. This is not a comprehensive study or an evaluation of the work of voluntary agencies in technical assistance, nor does it seek to be representative of the principles or policies of the many voluntary agencies, experienced and inexperienced, now engaged in technical assistance.

The scope and methods of the technical assistance projects carried out entirely under the auspices of voluntary agencies differ considerably at points from governmental programs such as those sponsored by the United Nations and the United States. For example, although both U.S. and United Nations programs include rural demonstrations and extension work, the experts sent abroad under these programs deal predominantly with central governmental officials in the receiving country in planning programs for large-scale, long-term action. On the other hand, only a small—albeit a very significant—proportion of the work of U.S. voluntary agencies has been carried on by working directly with or through foreign governments. The bulk of the work of voluntary agencies—particularly of missionary agencies—has been carried on in the rural village or the urban neighborhood.

The agencies and persons consulted in the preparation of this study are not representative of voluntary agency experience because the persons interviewed and the data culled from interviews were selected with an eye to their relevance to technical assistance work in general, including governmental programs. However, some caution is urged in applying this material, since governmental programs on the one hand and voluntary agency programs on the other each have certain unique aims, methods, advantages, and limitations. Not all the judgments derived from experience in one type of program will apply equally well to the other.

This report is possible only because the consultants, working separately and in different parts of the world, have arrived at some common principles and techniques in organizing and conducting technical assistance programs and projects. The study concentrates on these general principles. It necessarily ignores many operational experiences which apply only to one particular country or one particular field of activity such as health or agriculture. This is one reason why the report gives greater emphasis to the earlier stages of project operation than to later stages, where experiences become more particular.

A report pitched at this general level may irritate the reader by its air of cumulative didacticism, which is always a risk in presenting what a group of people know rather than what they do not know. On the other hand, care has been taken to present the important unique views and dissenting judgments of the consult-

ants, and advantage has been taken of the high spirit of professional self-criticism of the consultants to indicate areas where the consultants themselves believe knowledge is lacking or improvement needed.

Importance of Administration in Technical Assistance

Before describing successive stages of program operation, it will be useful to summarize the general reasons why our consultants attribute great importance to the administrative and organizational aspects of technical assistance.

For one thing, voluntary technical assistance is a field in which almost everything is in short supply, and it is of critical importance that the scarce resources available be deployed and administered with the utmost efficiency and effect. Voluntary agencies usually operate on limited budgets.¹ Even when there is sufficient money, suitable personnel, who can effectively carry out technical assistance, are scarce both in the U.S. and abroad. There is also the fact that each project abroad uses a relatively higher proportion of the receiving country's scarce resources than it would in the United States. It has even been suggested that some less-developed countries are close to the limit of their capacity to absorb and implement technical assistance from the outside. Our consultants are concerned with administration, then, first because of the pressing need to make the most of resources and opportunities which are in short supply.

A second general reason why our consultants are concerned with techniques of administration is that they have learned that the means whereby technical assistance is carried out—apart from affecting the success of a project—may indirectly cause more lasting and significant changes for better or worse than the actual substantive achievements of the project. There are, thus, two broad criteria of good administration in technical assistance: projects must remedy conditions which cause depressed levels of living as speedily as possible; this result must be achieved, however, by using means which have good, not harmful, long-run secondary effects on the social, moral, or political lives of the people. It is also true, of course, that a well-administered project will serve as a demonstration which will encourage honest, efficient, and humane administration abroad. The reader will find that these general considerations underlie much of the material presented in the following pages.

¹ Ironically, the limited budgets of some agencies sometimes result in administrative inefficiency, some consultants report. For example, the need to keep administrative overhead to a bare minimum makes it difficult to maintain a staff which can plan the best use of resources or provide effective backstopping for men in the field.

Chapter One. Selection and Formulation of Projects

Consultants state that skillful field improvisation cannot produce a successful project if the project has been badly and haphazardly selected and formulated in the first place. In the process of selecting a project and making initial arrangements, many major questions of goals, strategy, and priority are settled, either by conscious decision or by default. Lack of careful, hardheaded thinking and planning in the first stage may waste the limited resources of the sponsoring organization and may create conditions which make it impossible for field operators to succeed in aiding indigenous people.

ARTICULATING GOALS

The major goals that the sponsoring organization seeks to attain in its technical assistance program will be the first criterion used to decide which projects will be undertaken. These goals should be articulated after full discussion not only in order to aid in selecting projects but so that the larger goals of the projects may be fully understood by the persons who will administer them overseas. Field workers frequently have to modify plans of action in order to adapt projects to changing local conditions and to the states of mind and degrees of skill of local people. Unless the goals and priorities of the sponsoring organization are clearly understood by field personnel, overseas programs are apt to degenerate into a series of unrelated *ad hoc* projects which exert no cumulative lasting force for continuing development.

Unless the goals of projects are fully articulated, it will be impossible to evaluate the degree to which the projects have succeeded or failed. Without such evaluation, past errors may be perpetuated, and it may be impossible to use lessons of previous experience in selecting and shaping future programs.

Substantive Goals

In describing the goals of their projects, all consultants mention that their agencies seek to attain some specific form of im-

proved levels of living either directly, as by increasing agricultural production, or indirectly by teaching indigenous people new skills. The degree to which these substantive goals are attained can usually be measured (increased rice crop, fewer deaths, number of persons trained to read and write, etc.). (See Chapter Five.)

Development Goals

If project goals are limited to the attainment of immediate improvements in levels of living, there is no difference in principle between such projects and emergency relief activities. The distinctive feature of technical assistance projects, consultants say, is that they have larger, more long-term purposes. Their general aim is to help in the long-term development of a country or region and to secure continuing and lasting improvement in the levels of living of the people. Immediate relief and succor are of less importance than remedying the conditions which obstruct continuing development and improvement.

Development goals require that projects be selected and shaped so that maximum continuing, long-term improvement may be obtained for the limited amount of money that sponsoring organizations have to spend.

A majority of those interviewed point out that as soon as one recognizes that one's goal is to bring about lasting, continuing improvement carried on by the people themselves, one must pursue the related goal of encouraging modifications in the attitudes of indigenous people so that they will be willing to carry on by themselves. Thus, projects should be selected, organized, and carried out so that indigenous people themselves will develop not only the skills and techniques but also the initiative and the self-confidence necessary to carry on continuing improvement by themselves. Many consultants state that their organizations regard the *development of a spirit of self-help and initiative* as a major goal of their projects. Similarly, many state that one of their major development goals has been to institutionalize new skills and favorable attitudes in local organizations which will carry on enduring development work. In the words of one man: "Any project which leaves nothing more lasting behind it than a lot of vaccinated people is a bad project."

Some missionaries mention the goal of spreading the teachings of their faith in addition to the goals already described. Some men from voluntary agencies mention the additional goal of developing the concept of voluntary cooperation or of strengthening counterpart voluntary organizations overseas.

Broader Social Goals

Substantive goals and development goals are inextricably related to broader social purposes. Most consultants state that they have learned by experience that introducing improvements or creating attitudes receptive to innovation are insufficient by themselves as goals for work in less-developed areas. Single-minded pursuit of substantive improvements without consideration of social conditions or of the social impact of the results, or of the means used to obtain the results, may do more harm than good to indigenous people and may sharply limit the acceptance, retention, or humane use of improvements or innovations.

Social consequences are apt to be overlooked in the pressure to solve the many operational problems arising in technical assistance, unless social considerations are embodied in the major goals of the program from the very beginning. Consequently, along with such substantive goals as improving levels of living or raising agricultural production, and along with such development goals as encouraging a spirit of self-help and initiative, many consultants set broader social goals such as the following:

Helping to make life spiritually and emotionally more rewarding for the people in terms of their own culture and of their own personal values.

Encouraging greater appreciation and revitalization of local traditions.

Helping to obtain a flowering of cultural life in the community.

Creating greater and more effective community solidarity and cooperation.

Encouraging a sense of human equality and dignity and of the potentiality of the human being.

Finding ways of imbedding improved practices in the local society without causing too sharp a change in the existing spiritual, cultural, or social frameworks which give meaning, satisfaction, or security to the people.

The draft agreement for one project now under way—one that involves much practical, “dirty-hands” work—states the following objectives:

- “(1) Humanitarian—to improve the living conditions of the . . . villagers and to give them a more satisfying life.
- “(2) To develop initiative and self-help activities among the villagers.
- “(3) To reduce tensions and foster understanding between groups.”

Some regard broader goals of this type as ends in themselves, along with more practical achievements; others, as means which are so essential to the successful attainment of substantive and development goals that they deserve the rank and weighting of goals.

ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES

Almost all consultants warn that the means used to attain project goals may have greater and more lasting significance for indigenous people than the achievement of the goals themselves. For example, several persons describe areas where the people have lost faith in any development efforts because they have seen many short-term, "hothouse" projects fall into disuse. Cases are frequently cited of exaggerated publicity methods raising the aspirations of people beyond all reason, only to leave them permanently disillusioned by meager results.

Even what project personnel do in their off-duty time may have important consequences. An extreme example is cited by one consultant of a small private project among a mountain tribe in Asia, which was inspired to revolt against the central government partly by watching over a period of years the enthusiastic Fourth of July celebrations of the small body of U.S. project personnel. The consultant observes that people are by no means passive agents in absorbing new ideas from outsiders. They are apt to see in outsiders what they want to see and to absorb from the range of new practices and ideas presented by foreign project personnel, both off and on duty, those innovations which suit their own larger purposes.

In order to avoid social dislocation, anxiety, cultural or spiritual rootlessness, attitudes of overdependence, or other unanticipated but harmful secondary consequences, many consultants say that their agencies will not undertake projects in which they will have to use means likely to produce such consequences. Conversely, they state that their agencies insist on conditions which experience has shown to be essential to the attainment of substantive goals, development goals, and social goals: conditions which permit the use of methods with neutral or intrinsically constructive social consequences. Some of the more important of these preconditions are described in the following paragraphs.

Felt Needs

According to the consultants, some agencies will not undertake projects unless they can limit innovations to those which an-

swer existing felt needs of the people:—not that the people must express a need for a specific innovation; rather, the innovation must answer a felt need. For example, it is not necessary that villagers feel a need for an inexpensive water filter, but it is necessary that they feel a need for greater health or less typhoid. One principle underlying this approach is that technical assistance which does things for people is less valuable than technical assistance which helps people to do things for themselves. Response to felt needs is stated by some to be the best way—and by some others to be the only way—to create receptivity to change and to secure the willing participation of indigenous people in development programs. It is stated to be the best way to avoid increasing attitudes of subordination and dependence, which may occur if improvements are planned and carried out for people by outsiders. Finally, this approach offers an automatic control on the degree of social dislocation that can be caused by innovation. Confining himself to answering felt needs, the outside expert is less likely to destroy any conditions or relationships or objects which for the local people have goodness, beauty, or justness.

Consultants differ in the rigor with which they limit their work strictly to satisfying felt needs. Strict practitioners of the method say that it develops trust and cooperativeness; that when people see small improvements that answer their needs, they look at their environment with a more critical attitude and are less apt to accept poor conditions with fatalism. In this way, the satisfaction of one or two small felt needs leads to the recognition of larger, more important needs and to an ever-growing momentum for self-improvement and innovation.

Other consultants limit innovations or improvements strictly to those which answer needs felt at the beginning of their projects. Once trust, cooperation, and a favorable attitude toward change have been achieved, it is possible and desirable to suggest innovations or to help the people articulate needs which are felt but only vaguely formulated. A few consultants state that it is sometimes necessary for the outsider to provide the initial impetus and direction for innovation, whether the outsider can detect specific felt needs or not.

Whether one adheres to the felt needs approach strictly or loosely, one does not attempt to satisfy any felt needs that exist in an area. The project administrator should not abdicate his responsibility for wise guidance. He seeks to encourage the people to articulate those felt needs that he believes are important for their welfare and development. He seeks to respond only to those felt needs the satisfaction of which is compatible with the larger in-

terest of the country. Sometimes such decisions are difficult. Some persons interviewed state, for example, that it is unwise to respond to insatiable felt needs for curative medicine since such a program allows little time for preventive health measures which will be more beneficial in the long run. At the same time, curative treatment may be necessary to obtain the trust, cooperation, and belief required for successful preventive medical programs.

Most consultants consider response to felt needs as a flexible operating method. In their view it is more important to recognize constantly that innovations should be related to existing local needs rather than that they be determined largely a priori by the outside expert on the basis of his experience in his own home country. Social dislocation and other harmful social consequences are more apt to result if the people themselves do not have at least an equal share in deciding the general pace and direction of innovation. One man notes that the art of project administration is to convert such shared general decisions into a program of specific work targets and deadlines which will maintain a tempo of accomplishment to hold the enthusiasm and loyalty of the people and which will at the same time reflect the urgency felt by project administrators.

Availability of Suitable Personnel

It is the common view of consultants that successful technical assistance depends largely on good human relations and that it is better not to operate a project at all than to operate without suitable personnel. (See Chapter Two.)

Sufficient Time for Success

Consultants are not unmindful of the urgent needs which exist and which ought to be speedily answered. They do not feel, however, that short-term, speedy projects are apt to remedy these needs effectively. On the contrary, they believe that high-pressure, short-term projects are apt to create serious problems in the long run.

Short-term projects or projects in which the sole emphasis is on quick results may lead to ways of dealing with local people that will have harmful consequences. Foreign personnel are apt to do most of the work themselves, or they will tend to order cooperation rather than to work for it. Foreign personnel will not have the time to develop a knowledge of the receiving country or sufficient affection for it to temper their daily actions by consideration of the long-term interest of the country or its people. In addition, if in-

novations must be introduced too quickly and on too broad a front, there is insufficient time to win the trust and affection of the people and consequently less likelihood that they will modify their attitudes and adopt innovations permanently or develop the initiative and self-confidence to carry on improvements by themselves. Finally, there is less time for the people to adjust their thinking and their social relationships to the new situation.

On the other hand, consultants state that long-term projects will fail if they lack tempo and if leaders have no sense of urgency. One consultant emphasizes that results can be obtained quickly in a long-term project without the harmful consequences described above. He points out that long-term projects will never enlist the enthusiastic cooperation of local people if some relatively spectacular results are not produced in the early stages. Some early tokens of achievement may also be necessary to win cooperation from local officials.

Prospect of Cooperation and Success

Many state that a project should not be undertaken unless there is a good prospect of success. This is an important consideration even in pilot projects. The impact of failure on the receptivity to change of indigenous people and of their government leaders and other influential persons outweighs the importance of establishing that projects can succeed even under the least propitious local conditions.

Along with physical and economic criteria, a key criterion of likelihood of success is the prospect of genuine local cooperation. The first element in assessing likelihood of cooperation is an invitation from the government or some group in the receiving country which is genuinely interested in development work. Without this, most consultants state that their agencies will not undertake a project. Long preliminary negotiations are sometimes necessary to obtain such an invitation without high-pressure salesmanship and extravagant promises. Occasionally only one or two indigenous persons may express a desire for a project. Some consultants then encourage (or assist) these persons to organize committees or groups to act as project sponsors. It is essential to have a sponsoring or inviting group in the receiving country, although an invitation from the village or neighborhood of operation is not always essential.

Consultants who work at village levels make a point of obtaining approval and cooperation of governmental officials and other key professional leaders before starting. Some emphasize that if

projects are to be continued by indigenous groups, advance consultation with official and professional leaders is essential and that the long-term plans of the government or of professional leaders should be taken into consideration in determining the size and location of the project.

Consultants report that some agencies go to great lengths to determine the prospect for cooperation in areas where they are considering operations. Previous high-pressure technical assistance projects may sometimes have encouraged feelings of dependence, passivity, and "Santa Claus" attitudes toward outsiders which make it unlikely that genuine local cooperation and initiative can be achieved. Some men will undertake projects only where it is agreed at the outset that the indigenous group will bear a portion of the cost or the leadership responsibility, or provide labor, local skill, or other requisites. At the same time, consultants note that some outside help—either from the U.S. agency or from the receiving government—can spur the morale of villagers or of local organizations by making them feel that their efforts at improvement are recognized and supported.

Some consultants carefully study existing social conditions which affect likelihood of success. One states that his agency has been asked for eight years by an indigenous group in a Latin American country to send a mission to a certain town. It has studied conditions in this community year after year and has consistently refused the invitation on the ground that the existing hostility of the people to outsiders would make cooperation impossible. It has, however, stationed a man in a neighboring area. Part of his mission is to attempt to reduce local hostility to foreigners in the first town in the spare time from his work in the second one. Some men make a point of ascertaining tensions and community solidarity in local areas before deciding where to locate projects. They state that there is little likelihood of cooperation or of continuation of the project locally where internal rivalries and antagonisms are so severe that if half the community works with the project, the other half will automatically oppose it. However, many point out that every community in every country has its factions and its tensions. It would be unrealistic to refuse to undertake a project merely because the village or local organization is not socially monolithic.

Some consultants will not undertake programs for the training of specialists or for scholarships unless the government or some indigenous institution guarantees that the person will be suitably employed on completion of his training. Sometimes the trainee, himself, is asked to sign an agreement that he will return to a specified job.

Benefits for the People

Some consultants state that their agencies carefully investigate local conditions to avoid selecting projects in which corrupt leaders or middlemen, already relatively wealthy, will absorb most of the benefits. People at local levels will not risk innovation or make efforts to improve conditions unless they expect to share in the resulting benefits. Farmers, for example, have little incentive to sow improved seed if the increased yield goes largely to landlords or moneylenders.

Conservation of Limited Resources of the Country

Even the effort to receive and entertain a visiting mission may strain a Ministry's budget or drain much of the available short supply of local housing or of scarce indigenous professional talent. Similarly, agricultural demonstration areas may use up limited supplies of manure, land, seed, or personnel in an effort by outsiders to show people what can be grown under perfect conditions which exist only in the demonstration area.

The receiving government, organization, or community must always be fully apprised of the complete cost to it of any proposed project, visiting mission of experts, or of the acceptance of any equipment or installations which require careful maintenance and repair.

Coordination with Other Programs

Some men state that their agencies make a policy of consulting with the government and with all other indigenous or foreign groups conducting development programs in a less-developed country before selecting and formulating any project in that country. Their agencies believe that projects will achieve maximum effectiveness only if they are related to the long-term development plans of the government or fit into a coordinated effort at development with other governmental and nongovernmental projects. A few consultants warn that there is a real danger that too large a proportion of a less-developed country's resources may be drained by the uncoordinated operation of governmental and nongovernmental technical assistance programs. Several report that lack of coordination between technical assistance programs has resulted in competition for scarce skilled and semi-skilled persons capable of carrying out project work.

Orderly Progress

Many consultants state that their agencies carefully examine project proposals to insure that proposed innovations or improvements will fit the level of development of the receiving country and not constitute costly anachronisms. In some instances requests from less-developed countries may be motivated by prestige or professional pride rather than by strict considerations of maximum usefulness. For example, one man's organization was asked to assist in the construction of a modern hospital. It even was to have electric-eye doors, which had been justified on the ground that nurses could carry trays through them without setting the trays down. However, a study of local conditions revealed that the priority need of the country was to train nurses so that there would be someone to go through the doors.

Simple Equipment and Modest Budgets

Free spending and the use of large or elaborate machinery are apt to widen the gap in understanding between the people and foreign project personnel; they render more difficult a sense of equality and of equal participation and are apt to create attitudes of overdependence and to obstruct the development of local self-confidence and initiative. Some men will not undertake projects involving elaborate equipment or free spending.

Optimum Size of Projects

Some consultants state strongly that small-scale projects are preferable to large-scale projects even if the large-scale projects are equally effective (though they seldom are). These consultants point out that success in technical assistance depends on relatively delicate human relations and on adaptability of work programs; neither of these conditions is as easily attainable in large-scale projects as in small ones. Individuals in less-developed areas may feel dwarfed in the face of large-scale projects, so that it is more difficult to enlist their full personal involvement in the operation of the project.

On the other hand, some consultants state that the technical assistance personnel of voluntary agencies have paid insufficient attention to the development of methods of administration which would make it possible to operate effective projects on a mass basis, as the needs of the times require. They emphasize that scattered small-scale projects cannot achieve the results or the total impact for improvement that can be attained in large-scale projects.

Reproduction and Self-Multiplication

Consultants—including those who prefer small-scale projects—state that it is uneconomic to select and formulate projects where benefits will be forever confined to the small project area. Some state that their agencies will not undertake projects which have no potentiality for spread or self-multiplication beyond the immediate area. To achieve self-multiplication, projects must use only equipment and skills that will be available to indigenous people not serviced by foreign personnel. This is another reason for avoiding large budgets, large staffs, and elaborate mechanical equipment.

Possibility of Withdrawal and Integration

Most consultants state that their agencies will only undertake projects which can ultimately be taken over by local people for permanent operation and administration. In addition to the consideration of small staffs and the use of means locally available, this precondition requires that the projects selected afford sufficient time within which to develop the required skills, local leadership, and, where necessary, indigenous sponsoring organizations in which new skills and attitudes favorable to continued development can be imbedded. This organization may sometimes be the local village itself. If integration is to be achieved, projects involving heavy maintenance costs should be avoided, unless it is certain that some governmental or private organization can afford these costs when it assumes operating responsibility.

Some men state that their agencies will not undertake projects unless they have the assurance from an indigenous group that it will maintain them. Others report that their agencies insist that initial contractual arrangements with indigenous groups specify a terminal date when outside support will be withdrawn. Some project agreements provide for progressive decrease in foreign aid and progressive increase in local support. Such arrangements act as a spur to the people and counteract at the start any possible "Santa Claus" attitudes of overdependence. Such arrangements are also necessary to correct the tendency of sponsoring U.S. agencies to linger on, elaborating projects to the point of perfection, rather than undertaking development work in more needy areas. Several consultants state that their agencies make it a rule never to purchase property in less-developed areas in order to make it clear to indigenous people and to their own field personnel that the aim is to prepare indigenous people to carry on the work that the sponsoring agencies are helping to initiate.

STRATEGY IN SELECTION AND FORMULATION OF PROJECTS

The goals and prerequisites described above are general criteria which may be applied in selecting and formulating projects in every field of technical assistance. Within the limits set by the goals and prerequisites it is still necessary for the sponsoring organization to decide what type of project activity to undertake and in what country to undertake it.

Obstacles to Perfect Selection

An ideal selection process would result in directing limited resources for technical assistance to those areas and to those types of projects where the limited resources would produce maximum continuing uplift. But consultants cite some of the practical obstacles which make it impossible to attain perfect selection and formulation of projects:

LACK OF INFORMATION. In many less-developed countries there are insufficient data describing existing conditions and needs on which to base an orderly strategy of development. Indigenous governments themselves may have no development plans or policies, partly because they themselves lack the necessary information on which to base programs or from which to construct a series of priorities for development. Lack of a formal or informal coordinating body may make it impossible even to obtain a list of all technical assistance projects under operation in the country. The cost of gathering the information necessary for perfectly rational selection, or of maintaining a staff of sufficient size to analyze all the data from countries where statistics are available, is beyond the resources of most voluntary agencies. Some consultants assert that collecting such data and formulating over-all strategy for long-term development are properly the duties of governments. If governments do not act to carry out these responsibilities or if they are unwilling to help outside voluntary agencies to select projects wisely, it is necessary for the agencies to proceed as best they can with limited data. In this event, the agencies must rely on their own previous experience, on their own limited surveys, and on consultations with knowledgeable official and private leaders of the country. Under such limitations, it is difficult to construct a program based on priority needs or to determine what form of assistance will produce the greatest and most continuing uplift.

On the other hand, some consultants state that many voluntary technical assistance programs could be improved if sponsoring

organizations made better use of whatever data *are* available on economic and social conditions. They point out that even where governments have constructed genuine and realistic long-term development programs, not all voluntary agencies attempt to relate their projects to these larger plans.

Many men state that in the absence of accurate data on needs, conditions, and long-term programs in each country, it is virtually impossible to compare conditions of all countries in order to locate programs in those countries or regions where limited resources for assistance will produce maximum uplift.

SPECIALIZATION. In practice the alternatives considered in selecting projects are narrowed by the specialization of interest of the sponsoring organizations in particular types of activity and in one country or region. Sometimes this is necessary because of limited funds or because the organization was created and is financed for relatively specific purposes. Also, by concentrating on a country or specializing in a field of activity, the sponsoring organization can operate more efficiently and can accumulate knowledge and develop policies and traditions which embody wisdom and skills learned in previous operations.

Some consultants point out that when sponsoring organizations persist in doing only what they know they can do well in areas where they know they can do it well, the apparent advantages may be offset by rigidity in selection and an unwillingness to experiment in new forms of technical assistance which may be more effective or more suited to changing needs and conditions. One man states that personnel in his agency are so conscious of the many trials and errors that were necessary to develop good operating policies for projects in one country that they naturally recoil from suggestions that the agency undertake projects of a slightly different type in another area of the world; they feel that it would be like starting all over again.

FORTUITOUS CONDITIONS. Many fortuitous conditions limit the choice of alternatives in selection, making it difficult to frame coherent and strategic programs of development. Agencies which operate on small budgets may have to undertake projects which commend themselves less on grounds of strategy and priority than because they offer the best use for a small amount of money.

Consultants state that alternatives are further limited because their agencies undertake projects only in response to requests or invitations from governments or private organizations in indigenous countries. Once an agency has developed a good reputation in a country by operating projects successfully, the number of re-

quests for additional projects may increase, giving the organization the opportunity to build a strategic program of coordinated individual projects all aimed at long-term development. This possibility is cited as a further justification for concentrating efforts in one country or region, at least at the start.

Establishing World Wide Priorities

Some of our consultants are employed by U.S. agencies which are national units of international voluntary organizations. Others report that their agencies participate with parallel agencies of other countries in international conferences or steering committees. In either event, these organizations seek to coordinate their technical assistance work with that of foreign voluntary organizations in terms of global strategy and priorities.

One aspect of international planning of technical assistance mentioned by consultants is the assignment of priorities to different regions of the world. Some international organizations draw up global budgets which allocate totals for each less-developed region and, in one organization, for each less-developed country. In some organizations, such budgets are used to obtain a balanced program in all regions rather than to assign priorities.

Two consultants state that their organizations use international planning and budgeting in order to prevent overburdening the economies of less-developed countries already overloaded with technical assistance projects. One says that the international coordination in which his own agency participates encourages statesmanship in the administration of technical assistance. He cites as an example the warning by the international policy committee of his organization against initiating further development projects in certain less-developed areas on the ground that the people in these areas are already undergoing severe tensions and social disorganization as a consequence of overintensive development efforts and introduction of innovations. Several men state that the international discussions through which coordination is achieved are useful checks on possible tendencies of technical assistance administrators to conduct programs solely in terms of the standards and practices which prevail in their home country or in their own national organization.

Selecting the Most Useful Type of Activity

The relative usefulness of specific types of projects may be measured in terms of the needs and conditions of the country or area. Since our consultants worked in many different countries, it

is not possible to combine their comments into a common evaluation of the relative usefulness of the many different types of projects that will be applicable to conditions in any one country.

“GRASS ROOTS” PROJECTS AND “ELITE” PROJECTS. Projects described by consultants may be divided into two categories reflecting differing approaches to the goal of lasting, long-term development. One class of projects attempts to raise levels of living of the people by working directly with the people themselves. The other class of projects, while having the same ultimate aim, concentrates on raising the skill or ability of professional or administrative leaders, the elite, in order that these leaders may in turn improve conditions in their own country.

These two classes of projects are not mutually exclusive. Both are required for the full development of any country. Indeed, consultants are mindful that if the direct or indirect consequences of one's development efforts are to widen the gap between the general population and the elite in any country, one is undermining the social and political cohesiveness upon which the success of full, long-range development depends. However, since voluntary agencies have limited funds, they must usually choose one class of project or the other.

Consultants with experience in projects dealing directly with the common people offer a number of strategic considerations justifying priority for such projects. They point out that most of the population in most less-developed countries are poor people who make their living by farming. If there is to be any general improvement in living conditions or any capital accumulation, it can only come by raising the productivity, health, and education of the mass of the people and by stimulating their desire for self-improvement.

Several consultants state that many elite programs have been a waste of effort because highly trained indigenous persons are usually reluctant to give up prestigious desk jobs and to forsake urban comforts in order to work in development programs in primitive rural areas. A senior consultant, who has worked with the Salesian Order in less-developed areas for over 50 years, states also that in both regions of the world in which he has worked he has seen an increase in political democracy and a slow growth of the power and influence of the common people over their leaders. Because of this, he states that priority should be given to raising the levels of living of the common people and to raising their levels of education in order that they may use their growing influence more wisely. He adds that projects which earn the appreciation of the common people are more likely to be retained in the future.

MULTIPURPOSE PROJECTS. Once it is decided to work directly with the people, many types of projects are available for selection. The three major fields of technical assistance of U.S. voluntary agencies have been health, education and literacy, and agriculture. There is less dispute today over the priority to be given to one or another of these types of activity in a country. Most consultants state that disease, illiteracy, and low agricultural productivity form a cycle of mutually reinforcing forces which act to perpetuate low levels of living in many less-developed areas. To deal with one force alone is frequently futile. Success depends on attacking on all fronts at the same time.¹ This conclusion does not justify the uncoordinated, helter-skelter array of diverse projects of different types found in some less-developed countries.

The majority of consultants favor multipurpose development projects in which a coordinated attack is made on all the important conditions which perpetuate low levels of living. However, multipurpose projects cannot succeed if there are barriers between specialists in agriculture, education, health, and other fields, so that each specialist conducts a small separate project of his own. Some men state that multipurpose projects are most effective if they have one focal goal, with activities in other fields serving to advance toward this goal. The great danger is that the multipurpose project will lose impact by lack of concentration. The focus of concentration must be decided on the basis of local needs and on the basis of what the project can hope to accomplish with the limited skills and supplies at its command. Many consultants state that increasing agricultural productivity is the best focal activity with which to start in most less-developed areas.

TRAINING SEMISKILLED WORKERS. Many consultants would give priority to projects for training semiskilled workers. It is not unusual for less-developed countries to have as many educated professional and administrative leaders as they need, or even a surplus. Between these highly educated persons and the great mass of the population, there is a void which must be filled by semiskilled workers who can implement and translate into action the plans of the top-level elite. A major limiting factor to carrying out development programs is the lack of such persons possessing middle-range skills as village-level workers, district-level workers who have special knowledge in health or agriculture, practical nurses, foremen, lower-range executives, primary-school teachers, tractor drivers, and semiskilled mechanics. Consultants from agencies which spe-

¹It may be recalled that Gunnar Myrdal suggested a similar strategy for improving conditions of American Negroes in *An American Dilemma*.

cialize in vocational training report that there is an enormous unsatisfied demand all over the world for programs which can develop these middle-range skills.

Dr. Harold Allen of the Near East Foundation, one of our consultants, has pioneered in breaking this bottleneck not only by formal training programs but by on-the-job training. Dr. Allen discovered in the twenties that an effective way to obtain the teachers, practical nurses, agricultural workers, and other workers needed in rural development programs was to train them on the job. For example, if the rural school offered only four years of primary education and there was a shortage of teachers, Dr. Allen's solution was to employ the most able fourth-grade graduate as a teacher and to train him as he went along. This is one method by which a less-developed area may raise itself by its bootstraps. Several other consultants support Dr. Allen's statement that new skills are learned much faster when the learner needs the skills to do his job well.

FARM CREDIT AND LANDLORDS. Since farmers have little incentive to sow improved seed or undertake other innovations if the increased yield goes largely to landlords or moneylenders, some consultants urge the importance of supervised farm credit or cooperative credit projects. Although supervised farm credit projects have proven successful in South America, some consultants raise the question that supervised farm credit may be less practicable in countries where holdings are smaller, farm income lower, farms more widely dispersed, and banking systems less extensive. They point out that cooperative credit requires considerable prior group organization and education if loans are to be repaid.

A third and rather unusual method of raising the incentives of farmers is suggested by one man. When carrying on agricultural projects he attempts to persuade local landlords or moneylenders to lower their interest rates. He reports success in about one-eighth of his attempts. He says that this way of passing on more benefits of innovation to tenant or debtor farmers is worth a year's work in agricultural demonstration.

RELOCATING FAMILIES. There are areas where the combined effects of high taxes, debt, poor land, sickness, illiteracy, and social apathy make it impossible for any development project to succeed. Ordinarily preliminary surveys would lead an agency to refuse to undertake a project in such an area. Two consultants with experience in this work state that where the government has made a better area available and where there is so much misery, apathy, and

social disorganization that there is no sense of community which binds families to the original area, a solution is to relocate families in that new area where they may start afresh.

PROJECTS IN URBAN AREAS. Some consultants call attention to the need for technical assistance to improve the condition of the growing numbers of urban poor in less-developed countries. Consultants state that development problems are more difficult in city areas. In addition to sickness and illiteracy, it is necessary to cope with unemployment and rootlessness.

Although industrial employment is not usually available to soak up the rootless unemployed in cities, such persons are usually more free from the traditions which hamper occupational mobility in rural areas and so may constitute a pool from which the semi-skilled workers necessary for development work may be recruited. Because they are rootless and needy, they may be more receptive to change. Hence, several consultants emphasize the need for vocational schools in these urban areas.

The need is stressed for projects which will create a sense of community or of neighborhood among the rootless urban needy. One consultant is certain that "the sixty-four dollar question of technical assistance today" is whether the multipurpose community-development project, which has proven so successful and adaptable in rural areas, can be applied to urban areas where there is no sense of community to start with.

ELITE PROJECTS. Consultants state that the condition of the most needy may sometimes best be improved by programs that train upper-middle-class persons—the elite. Where professional leaders or members of the upper or middle class are more immediately responsive to the need for change and innovation and may be more easily trained, such programs may be a desirable first step. Some consultants point out that their resources for technical assistance programs are sufficient only to serve as a catalyst to start people in less-developed countries on the boundless road of self-development. Continuing initiative, guidance, and administration must come from leaders in the receiving country. Some of the men interviewed say that innovations are more likely to be blended harmoniously with existing standards if the blending is done by indigenous leaders. Unless it is channeled through local leaders and local organizations, a possible indirect consequence of technical assistance may be the loss of influence of these leaders and organizations. Technical assistance may thus become a force for social,

political, and administrative disintegration.¹ Faced by a real or imagined loss of influence, existing leaders may become hostile to specific technical assistance projects or set their faces against innovation in general.²

Consultants warn, however, against regarding elite training and educational programs as ends in themselves. They also recognize the danger that higher education, professional training, or travel fellowships may educate local trainees away from willingness to work in rural areas. The dangers are also noted of creating rootlessness or a class of unemployed intellectuals by not relating elite training programs to job openings.

Working Closely with Governments

Some consultants state that their agencies usually undertake only those projects which can be carried out through the administrative machinery of indigenous governments or which will be nominally operated by governments in collaboration with the agencies. One reason these men give is that, in the long run, widespread improvement can come about only through the action of governments. Separate, privately operated projects may help some people to help themselves, but they can never achieve the degree of self-multiplication and mass application possible when projects are carried out by governments. By operating projects through the government administration or in close collaboration with government departments one achieves the double benefit of creating some immediate improvement in levels of living *and* training government personnel to carry on the development activity.³ Some men believe that these twin benefits may be obtained even if one operates projects privately, so long as one maintains close and good contact with government officials. Other consultants make it a matter of principle to carry out their projects apart from indigenous governments, although they favor working through other indigenous organizations. Some say that it is as important to develop voluntary

¹ For a fascinating warning of the disruptive possibilities of technical assistance which is reminiscent of the thinking of Edmund Burke, see J. van Baal, "The Nimbora Development Project," in the journal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration, *South Pacific*, VI (December, 1952), pp. 495 ff. The author warns against using *ad hoc* teams for technical assistance, favoring the use of the existing governmental administrative machinery. He fears that uncontrolled introduction of innovation may undermine the political and social foundations of order in a country.

² See Harold Lasswell, "Religion and Modernization in the Far East—Commentary" in *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VII (February, 1953), pp. 163 ff. Also: Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, II (October, 1953), pp. 161 ff.

³ Some consultants specifically except non-self-governing areas from this statement.

or private organizations which can carry on improvement as it is to improve governments.

Some consultants state that they have no objection in principle to working with governments. They point out, however, that the governments of less-developed countries differ greatly in their concern for improving conditions of the people and in their standards of administration. In some countries the political leaders may lack genuine interest in improving conditions and may seek to use assistance programs for selfish ends. It is not uncommon for the people of less-developed countries to regard their governments with distrust, hostility, and fear. Anyone believed to be associated with the government is suspect and is less likely to gain the trust and cooperation of the people. In some countries there may be no neutral civil service, and political leaders and administrators alike may be turned out of office when a new political party attains power. Such conditions make it difficult to secure continuity of operation of projects sponsored by governments. Further, political opposition may be so intense that projects supported by the party in power may be automatically opposed by the party out of power.

Consultants who favor working through governments are aware of these limitations, and they add that the governments of some less-developed countries are first-rate by any standards. The only way to remedy the difficulties cited is to work with the indigenous government and not to run away from it. These consultants point to countries where the work of their agencies has helped to create or has supported the growth of a competent, neutral, career staff of civil servants who remain in office to carry on projects, whatever party comes to power. In some countries the projects of these agencies have aroused leaders of all political parties to an appreciation of the advantages of development work and have occasioned the first demonstration of bipartisan support.

Those who favor working through governments state that governments occupy a role of such crucial importance in achieving lasting development that it is short-sighted not to formulate technical assistance projects so that they will directly or indirectly increase the ability of governments to carry on this role effectively. It is generally admitted, according to these consultants, that technical assistance programs, with other factors, are greatly accelerating the rate of change in all spheres of life in less-developed countries. The consequence of these changes may be far-reaching, and it is of highest importance that governments be equipped to exercise both initiative and statesmanship in coordinating these changes in terms of the long-term national interest. Bypassing governments in the conduct of technical assistance may make effective coordination impos-

sible, further lessen the confidence of the people in their government, and create conditions which obstruct and hamper the small and overburdened civil service. In short, these consultants state that voluntary agencies should devote as much solicitude to the possible political and administrative impacts of their projects as they devote to possible social ramifications.

Consultants with both points of view agree that it is important to convince leaders and officials of the benefits of relating development programs to the felt needs of the common people. Consultants describe cooperative projects that have progressed to the point where foreign personnel are no longer needed and the projects are ready to be turned over to local committees or groups; but these local groups will have to deal with regional civil servants of the national government accustomed to securing obedience by authority rather than by discussion and cooperation. Such official attitudes may set back the local initiative and self-reliance that the projects have developed. Other consultants stress that proper training of government officials can make governmental requests for United Nations or bilateral technical assistance more effective.

SELECTING THE FORM OF ORGANIZATION

Working Through Indigenous Organizations

Consultants seek to imbed techniques and attitudes favorable to development in indigenous organizations which can carry on when foreign project personnel withdraw; they favor working through indigenous organizations from the start wherever possible. Where projects are carried out initially by *ad hoc* teams unrelated to any indigenous group, they run the risk of overshadowing and stultifying those groups which might ultimately take over the projects. Some consultants state that their agencies follow the sequence of first building or solidifying indigenous voluntary organizations and then sending U.S. personnel to work under, or in conjunction with, the leaders of the organization.

In working through indigenous organizations (including governments) it is often difficult to decide what status to give U.S. personnel. If U.S. personnel are attached simply as advisers, they may exercise little influence and become something of a fifth wheel. If their advice is followed, they may be regarded with hostility by regular administrators because they exercise influence without taking responsibility. If their advice is not followed, the advisers themselves become discouraged and tend to lose enthusiasm. On the

other hand, the temporary status of U.S. personnel sometimes makes it difficult to incorporate them into indigenous organizations as regular administrators. Because they are temporary and somewhat special, they may either be bypassed or overloaded with decisions, whatever their formal position in the chain of command. Some consultants state that it is essential to come to a clear understanding of the specific responsibilities of U.S. personnel in the initial arrangements. On the other hand, two men with long experience of working with governments warn that formal responsibilities may handicap the outsider in establishing contact with a wide range of officials. Jurisdictional barriers may justify or reinforce the natural reticence of officials in dealing with foreigners.

Creating New Organizations

There are conditions under which it is desirable to depart from the maxim that it is always best to work through existing organizations. Large projects may be beyond the scope of existing organizations. Sometimes existing organizations may have strong traditions and rigid procedures which make it impossible to carry out effective and genuine development work under their sponsorship. It is utopian to leave one or two highly-trained and dedicated local personnel in such organizations, expecting them to reform the organization and at the same time carry on effective technical assistance. A new organization, on the other hand, has no negative traditions or rigidities to encumber it. It can make its own budget, enforce its own personnel policies, and develop traditions and policies of its own which are appropriate to development needs. Personnel can be more effectively trained and inspired in such an environment, organizationally insulated to some extent from prevailing forces in the society which oppose the development of a professional sense of dedication, integrity, and self-criticism.

Consultants state that one should only create new organizations in which direction and leadership are shared with local people. Most organizations described by consultants provide for joint-sponsorship or control. Thus, the Board of Directors of the new organization may be composed of approximately equal numbers of indigenous and foreign members. Under the Board, the managing director and the department heads are usually all foreign at the start. The duties of each U.S. staff member include training a local counterpart. As the project develops and as personnel are trained and up-graded, the proportion of U.S. administrative leaders narrows until finally the entire organization is managed and directed by local leaders.

Community Development Projects

Many of the persons interviewed state that the most useful form of organization for conducting multipurpose programs in rural areas is the Community Development project. The outlines of this form of organization have emerged separately in different parts of the world as field workers in rural areas have tried to obtain maximum spread from limited resources and small staffs of specialists. In general, Community Development projects attempt to encourage development in a group of villages using a small staff of specialists in education, health, agriculture, and possibly sociology at the administrative center. Most of the contacts in the villages are maintained by village-level workers who have been selected and trained by the team of specialists. The central staff provides continuing direction, inspiration, training, and technical support for the village-level workers. The driving force that the Community Development project seeks to unleash is the communal desire of the village people to help themselves. By spreading over a group of villages and by using a multipurpose attack, the Community Development project provides the opportunity for strategic and orderly development in terms of the needs of the whole area. Consultants state that Community Development projects require fine coordination and great care in administration if they are to realize the inherent potentialities of the method.

Among the pioneers in Community Development projects, two or three are frequently singled out by consultants: Dr. Harold Allen, Dr. and Mrs. William H. Wiser, and Mr. Albert Mayer. Dr. Allen, working in Macedonia for the Near East Foundation in the late twenties and early thirties, evolved a method of imbedding development in rural communities through using outside specialists and local area-supervisors who encouraged and supported persons or groups in villages who were responsive to innovation. In India, Dr. and Mrs. Wiser, after many years of rural work, evolved the Indian Village Service in which paid village-level project workers were given back-stopping by project specialists. Building on these and other experiences and on their own insights, the team of Albert Mayer, Rudra Dutt Singh, and Horace Holmes conducted the Etawah project in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India, with an administrative self-consciousness that has given the Community Development form greater precision and effectiveness and greater potentialities for spread.

Consultants warn, however, that Community Development is in danger of being regarded by the general public as a quick panacea for all development problems. What is sometimes forgot-

ten is that any single project requires top personnel of a high order. Not enough such persons are available. Also, the public sometimes does not notice that successful Community Development takes a relatively long time.

One man warns that if Community Development projects are ultimately to be incorporated in indigenous governmental programs they must be organized so that the project area coincides with existing governmental administrative areas or jurisdictions.

Permanent Foreign Institutions

Consultants state that some agencies set up relatively permanent institutions such as hospitals, colleges, demonstration farms, etc. While recognizing that institutions of this kind have made excellent contributions, many men assert that they and their organizations have become increasingly aware of the pitfalls which attend this form of organization.

One danger mentioned is that the sponsoring agency will tend to retain ultimate control of the institution. The foreign staff of the institution may come to think of the institution as an end in itself. Out of their devotion to the institution and out of an exaggerated desire for professional perfection, foreign administrators may sometimes be slow to relinquish control to local professionals. Again, the institution may initially provide a wall behind which trainees can develop professional standards and skills, protected from the discouragements which prevail outside; but the protecting wall may later encapsulate the professionals, preventing frequent contact with the public and lessening responsiveness to changing needs. Several consultants state that the usefulness of permanent institutions is limited, since the most needy usually live in rural areas from which travel to the institution is extremely arduous.

Consultants do offer examples of outstanding permanent institutions which have avoided the pitfalls described. They point to institutions which have overcome inherent immobility by organizing comprehensive extension services which carry improvements to the people.

Chapter Two. Personnel

“Once you find out what you want to do, you have to get and keep men who can do it. This is the most important part of all,” is the thumbnail summary of technical assistance given by a veteran public health administrator.

REQUIREMENTS

The Kind of Person Needed

It is the view of our consultants that the success of technical assistance depends largely on the quality of personal relationships. The following requirements necessary for success in the field were frequently mentioned:

—Personnel must be technically competent in a practical sense. They must have something to contribute to the community so that their purpose and their usefulness is evident to the people. They must be willing and able, where necessary, to teach and inspire others by doing work themselves rather than simply by giving advice.

—They should have rugged health, so that they are able to live and work with the people.

—Where possible, they should be old enough to carry weight in societies that give deference to age.

—They should have a sense of humility and willingness to learn from local people (and from their own mistakes). They must be capable of affection for, and identification with, the people of any area. A sense of humor will often be a saving quality.

—The outsider must deal with the people in a spirit of complete equality. People will look for signs of assumed superiority. It is doubtful whether persons who do not really feel this sense of human equality will succeed in appearing to have it. Consultants state that villagers have great acuteness in detecting sham or hypocrisy.

—Local people are often predisposed to suspect outsiders of selfish motives which will be satisfied at the villagers' expense. A person who displays selflessness and a spirit of dedication is more apt to win respect and willing cooperation. By the same token,

opulent living, seeking publicity for oneself for local efforts, or fussing about the discomforts of rural living or rural plumbing are all apt to convince the local people that their initial suspicions are well founded. Given the predisposition of people everywhere (including co-workers) to suspect outsiders, even the genuinely dedicated man must be on constant guard against actions or remarks which will be misinterpreted. This extends to his public utterances when he comes home. Picked up by a clipping bureau and printed out of context in the less-developed country, statements made on returning to the United States may undo whatever trust has been won.

—Personnel should be willing to stay in the area for a long time—a few consultants say for life, others say for at least three to five years. There are several reasons. A majority of consultants state that it is unlikely that a man will contribute anything effective to a program in a foreign country until he has lived there for a year. The narrowest estimate is that a highly capable person with suitable personality traits and attitudes can learn enough about the country to operate effectively after three months residence. Another reason is that personnel need to have a feel for the country. Intellectual knowledge of local customs, social forms and groupings, and religious practices is not useful without emotional understanding.

—Personnel should have emotional security and balance, self-confidence and self-esteem. If they do not, they will not have the judgment or the leadership required, and it is doubtful whether they will have the necessary skill and sensitivity in human dealings. The man who is so insecure that he is overeager to obtain local recognition and who does everything himself in order to win such recognition may kill initiative or become a toy of the people.

—Personnel must have the strength to take calculated risks and to retain their balance in the face of unanticipated consequences or mistakes. Consultants state that technical assistance is delicate work. The able and experienced field operator recognizes that there is always the possibility that some chance occurrence or some unforeseen reaction will set back what progress has been made. He does not let mistakes or appreciation of possible difficulties cripple his capacity to act.

—Personnel should know the customs, social forms and groupings, and religious practices prevalent in the receiving country.

—They should know the language, and, in village projects, preferably the local dialect. Speaking it, however badly, is a courtesy and a sign that one is willing to meet the people on their own ground. Many consultants have experienced trouble by having to

rely on interpreters. Interpreters may not be capable of rendering the nuances which mean so much in personal relationships. Sometimes they may attempt to profit by their strategic position, collecting bribes from villagers, etc. Whatever the fact, the suspicion that one's interpreter is not transmitting faithfully may lessen the operator's sense of security and his general effectiveness.

Ability to Work on a Team

An additional requirement is that personnel be able to work together successfully as a team. Some consultants state that their agencies send men abroad only in teams. Teams provide mutual encouragement and stimulation and keep alive the sense of purpose that motivated the project at the start. Team loyalty is essential in multipurpose projects if barriers of specialization are to be overcome so that each specialist willingly relates his work to the work of others in order to achieve the common goal. Without good personal relations among team members, the work of the project will lose direction and tempo. Its positive impact will be less because it will lack focus. Separatism among team members—not to mention rivalries or jealousies—will confuse local people. Most important of all to some consultants: it is less likely that project personnel—including indigenous workers—will deal with local people in a spirit of equality and sympathy if they feel irritated, thwarted, or unappreciated because of poor relationships with one another.

Mr. Albert Mayer, who has called attention to this problem in his writings, and several other consultants consider good teamwork so important that it should be the focus of all the major personnel procedures, including recruitment, selection, training, briefing, and the handling of personnel in the field.

Several men report that their agencies insist on detailed *job descriptions* before filling positions on project teams. Mr. Mayer points out that job descriptions and definitions of responsibility are needed to prevent jealousies and jurisdictional rivalries arising among members of a multipurpose project team. On the positive side, job descriptions and definitions of responsibility are necessary if each team member is to feel a sense of personal responsibility and thereby become fully committed emotionally to the success of the total project operation.

SELECTION AND RECRUITMENT

The techniques of selection and recruitment should result in obtaining men who meet the requirements described above and should prevent employing men who do not.

One difficulty is that technical assistance apparently attracts certain types of people quite unsuited for the work. Some persons are attracted by the possibility of earning larger salaries or obtaining higher professional responsibility than they could at home; these persons are unlikely to have the outlook and the motivation necessary for success in field operations. In addition, large salaries encourage personnel to live in a manner remote from the people. Even where pay is not high, some persons may be attracted to technical assistance by the better quarters or troops of servants that are sometimes available to foreigners in less-developed countries.

Consultants also warn of the need to screen out persons who seek psychological satisfactions not available to them at home. Some persons enjoy living in foreign areas in a "colonial" atmosphere where, whatever their abilities, they are "top dogs." Some are attracted by the desire for power or sense of superiority gained by bossing indigenous people around or by feeling that they are responsible for the destiny and salvation of indigenous people. Consultants also warn against persons who are attracted by the desire to start a new life and against highly emotional "do-gooders" who see technical assistance in exaggerated heroic or sacrificial terms. Such persons seldom last long in the field. At the same time, it is agreed that an unromanticized sense of mission and spirit of dedication are necessary in technical assistance. Persons who cannot develop identification with their own country are unlikely to be able to identify with a foreign country.

In general, consultants prefer to recruit field workers from among men who have had some sort of extension experience in rural areas in the United States. For advisory missions, they state that men with previous teaching experience are usually more effective than men whose forte has been research. The former are more sociable and make friendships more easily.

A CAREER SERVICE. Some consultants believe that better personnel would be attracted to technical assistance if more agencies would set up permanent career staffs. They recall that it is best for projects to be conducted by persons who will spend enough years in a country so that they can understand it and so that they will not sacrifice long-term goals in order to accomplish something quickly before they leave. Relatively few well-qualified men are

willing to leave their work at home for longer than a year, fearing that they will lose contacts and occupational status if they are away longer. In addition, the prime object of the technical assistance worker should be to work himself out of a job by training and inspiring local persons who can replace him. He is less likely to exert himself to achieve this objective if he does not have an assurance of continuous employment. Some consultants argue strongly that a career service for technical assistance workers is the only condition of employment which answers both the need for good men willing to spend long periods abroad and the need for men who will work themselves out of a job.

Considering the need for a career service raises the much-debated problem of the use of young American university graduates in technical assistance. Some favor their use partly because young men are more adaptable and partly because good field workers are hard to come by, a shortage that could be remedied by apprenticeships for young men.

However, the majority of consultants state that openings for young university graduates are limited and for good reasons. They report that it is exceptional for a recent college graduate to have the poise and emotional maturity needed for successful field work in a strange society. Again, inexperienced college graduates usually have no trade or skill that will be immediately useful to less-developed peoples. For these two reasons, several men responsible for extensive project operations prefer to recruit professionals who have had practical experience in the United States, preferably in a less-developed State. "The more his experience and his skill, the less apt he is to be thrown off balance by going to a new country," one consultant says. When another decided to look for an exceptional recent graduate, the principal qualification he mentioned in addition to emotional balance was willingness to act as a subordinate to an indigenous project supervisor: "He's got to be thankful to sit at the feet of our Arab director and learn from a master."

Consultants also state that it is more valuable in the long run and more efficient in the short run to train indigenous young men for the positions which American college graduates would be hired to fill. Most of those with experience in village-level work believe that trained local people are certainly much more effective in stimulating villagers to undertake improvement projects than are foreigners.

SELECTION TECHNIQUES. Some consultants state that they rely heavily on previous occupation in selecting candidates because

occupations such as agricultural extension require personal qualities and skills similar to those required in technical assistance. One weakness of this method is that it does not separate resourceful men from men whose minds have become hardened by occupational routine. An important reason for stressing previous occupation and work experience, however, is the difficulty of assessing the personality of candidates. Few men are satisfied that they have discovered a satisfactory set of procedures for estimating with accuracy the relevant personality strengths and weaknesses of candidates.

Consultants describe several techniques used by their agencies in selecting men with suitable personalities for overseas work. Information may be obtained from the candidate himself and from his past employers by questionnaires. Some agencies have extensive contacts through which they seek to obtain frank assessments of candidates from persons who have known them well. Finally, candidates are interviewed. Some men state that their organizations use personality tests to assess emotional maturity and balance. Two report that their organizations give Rorschach tests to candidates. One of these organizations uses Rorschachs only if interviews, questionnaires, and handwriting analyses indicate possible emotional instability.

Perhaps the most thorough selection process occurs in some missionary orders where candidates must undergo a long period of apprenticeship and training during which their strengths and weaknesses are noted and unsuitable candidates are weeded out. Of more applicability to other organizations are the "performance" tests which are part of the apprenticeship in some missionary orders. One consultant in a missionary order states that in their first three months as novitiates candidates are required to scrub floors and do other menial tasks. Such tasks have discouraged many temporary "do-gooders," he says.

Wives of team personnel can undo whatever cooperation their husbands have achieved, by their public actions or by their thoughtless expressions before servants. Some consultants say that their agencies interview the wives of male candidates who are being considered for overseas work. Consultants have discovered that husbands are unlikely to retain a sense of dedication to the job if this is not shared or appreciated by their wives.

BRIEFING AND ORIENTATION

The term "briefing" is employed here for programs of preparation which are carried out in the United States. The term "orien-

tation" is used for similar programs carried out in the country or region of action.

Briefing

The views presented here are limited to those which supplement the extensive report of Sayre and Thurber, *Training for Specialized Mission Personnel*.¹ In common with some of Sayre and Thurber's informants, our consultants generally regard briefing as of lesser importance than careful selection of personnel, the difficulties of selection notwithstanding. If a person does not have the personality traits necessary for effective field work, neither briefing nor long orientation and local residence will remedy the defect.

It is stated that briefing is not an adequate substitute for orientation on the ground: time to live in the country and learn its ways, its tempo, and its feel; time for the outsider to acquire that genuine affection for the country which indigenous people so quickly sense and which is a most important condition for securing their cooperation and friendship.

On the other hand, most consultants agree that while briefing is not a panacea, it is an essential feature in any successful program. Effectively done, briefing can lessen the strain on the future field worker; it can make the time he spends in the country more productive by providing a framework of knowledge to help him to understand more quickly what he sees. A good briefing, it is said, can arm the outsider with knowledge so that he can talk sensibly and more sensitively with indigenous people at all social levels. Briefing should include information about etiquette, cultural achievements, social rankings, economic and political conditions, and biographies of influential persons and their relationships to one another. One consultant believes that one of the best forms of briefing is reading the important works of the great men of the country.

Briefing and training programs can achieve important initial psychological effects necessary for the successful operation of projects. Some consultants state that their agencies seek to awaken a sense of interest and curiosity about the country in the new staff member. One observes that the briefing she herself received led her to a sense of intellectual humility, a willingness to learn more, and an initial intellectual and emotional involvement in the country and the progress of its people.

¹ Wallace S. Sayre and Clarence E. Thurber, *Training for Specialized Mission Personnel* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952). See especially Chapters Four and Five.

Some consultants state that their agencies conduct briefing on a *team basis*, so that the shared experience can be the foundation for cooperation and high morale within the project team. Men who emphasize the importance of team work in projects stress the need for briefing by seminars or group discussions to afford the greatest opportunity for team members to work their way through to a common understanding of project goals and of the value of other team members. The duties and responsibilities of each team member should be described in detail and discussed so that ambiguities can be eliminated at the start. At the same time, seminar discussions can demonstrate to team members the intellectual excitement and the practical advantages that can be gained when men with different specialties work together. Several consultants regard team briefing sessions as an opportunity for developing good personal relationships between team members in a period of comparative calm before the throes of early field operations. Some of the briefing may be conducted by the leader of the team, who is apt to have had the most experience and who has probably returned from making the initial arrangements and surveys in the foreign country.

Consultants also point to the need for briefing to help new men to see their job in perspective and to understand clearly the goals, policies, traditions, and work procedures of the sponsoring organizations. There should be an opportunity for the future field worker to become acquainted with the headquarters personnel with whom he will be in continuous communication when he is abroad. Similarly, some consultants in organizations with relatively large headquarters staffs make a point of briefing headquarters personnel about the project, either separately or in joint sessions with the project team. The wives of field men are also included in some briefing sessions.

If briefing programs are to accomplish some of the positive results described, they must be carefully organized. Successful briefing takes time. The agencies with greatest advantages in this respect are missionary groups and orders. Some of them have training and briefing programs which last for five years or longer, including, of course, theological training and training in specific skills as well as indoctrination into the aims and spirit of the order. Such programs are effective because they have both an intellectual and an emotional effect.

In one missionary order, candidates are trained in a pervasive atmosphere of the culture of the area in which they are to serve. The buildings and furnishings are in the styles of the region. The men live with veteran field workers who have returned for furlough or retirement. In the library are the accumulated journals

and reports of field workers of the past sixty years. The goals, policies, and traditions of the organization are slowly absorbed through every pore and what is learned is made personal and vivid through informal conversations and discussions as well as through practical work. Such training and briefing programs are, of course, of an entirely different order from those at the other extreme, where field workers are given a few lectures on the foreign country and a list of books to read en route.

Some men suggest that briefing should not be confined to technical assistance personnel but that efforts should be made to brief officials, leaders, or villagers in the receiving country before the outside personnel arrive. Many damaging incidents and misunderstandings can be prevented if indigenous people are briefed in advance about some of the peculiarities and customs of personnel from the more developed countries.

Orientation in the Country of Action

Some consultants state that their agencies provide short briefing programs in the United States and allow from three months to a year for their field personnel to live in the receiving country and to adjust themselves before assuming operating responsibilities. Several advocate the use of this time to learn the local dialect of the project area.

In general, orientation should include visits and conferences with local leaders in one's professional field and in the project area and with local and foreign persons already engaged in technical assistance in the country. Specialists must be given the opportunity to study the unique local conditions in their field so that they will know how much of what they learned at home is inapplicable.

Several consultants report provision in the orientation period for bringing about continuity of contacts; the person who made the initial arrangements for the project introduces field workers to the indigenous persons with whom he has worked and whom he has come to know. It is most desirable, however, that the person who makes the initial arrangements be the project team leader, since friendships are not transferable. Some men who have operated multipurpose project teams state that after common briefing in the United States, the orientation of each team member in the receiving country should be personally guided by the project team director, who will be in a better position to assist the new man in his individual adjustment to the country.

Some missionary groups which do not send men out in teams orient young men by assigning them as apprentices to experienced missionaries.

Several consultants state that orientation will be more successful if project personnel travel by ship rather than by airplane. Ocean travel allows more time for adjustment and may provide the opportunity for the first contact with people from the less-developed country away from the field worker's home grounds.

INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL

Consultants favor employing indigenous personnel wherever possible, particularly in positions of project leadership. The difficulties of finding indigenous specialists willing to work directly with the needy in rural areas often make it necessary for the project to develop its own leaders from local persons starting as subordinates on the project or as village-level workers.

The same care must be given to the selection and training of indigenous personnel as to choosing and training U.S. specialists. The most important requirements are a willingness to work with the people in rural areas and the ability to secure their confidence. Few city-bred persons can meet these requirements. One man says that the key quality to look for is patriotism. If the candidate genuinely wants to help his country, he is apt to be a good field worker. On the negative side, consultants warn against selecting personnel who are outcasts or aberrants in their own society. Such persons may be the first to offer themselves as project workers partly because they have no friends. These persons may be the most receptive to change, having nothing to lose by a renovation of the existing order, but they will not win the respect and confidence of the people in the project area, and they are less apt to act in accordance with the social goals described in Chapter One.

Some consultants select field workers after a week of performance-tests which demonstrate the willingness of the applicant to work with his hands and his ability to understand and convince the local people. Care must be exercised in conducting such tests not to create an attitude of subordination which may make it difficult later for successful candidates to feel that they are equal members of the project team.

After selection, personnel should be trained in skills, improved practices, and techniques for enlisting the cooperation of village people. The operating policies and goals of the project are explained, and the first efforts are made to get personnel to feel that they are equal members of the project team with a full share of responsibility. Since personnel who will work directly with the people must have many of the qualifications mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, and since the entire atmosphere of techni-

cal assistance may be strange to them, considerable time must be spent in training. Some are firmly of the opinion that at least six months are required to do this job satisfactorily and that there should also be yearly refresher courses. Other consultants devote less time to initial training but follow it up with on-the-job training and supervision and off-season refresher courses. Consultants who have operated projects with large indigenous staffs emphasize the need for team training and seminars to help new personnel to work together effectively.

After indigenous personnel have demonstrated a potentiality for leadership, they may be sent out of the area for specialized training which will equip them for positions of higher responsibility. Some are very hard-headed about this. They say that only the most dedicated and able workers should be sent to universities or schools out of the project area. Too much training or merely living in a city may cause the person to lose his desire for rural work and lead him to search for a city desk job where he will not have to work with his hands. On the other hand, these consultants have developed and trained outstanding leaders whom they have helped to climb from positions of project leadership to positions in government where their abilities and attitudes can be of even broader influence.

MAINTAINING MORALE IN THE FIELD

Sources of Difficulty

The morale of the U.S. project staff member affects the manner in which he deals with indigenous people. Even the best selection, briefing, and orientation will not alone maintain morale and effectiveness in the field. The difficulty and importance of maintaining morale may best be conveyed by drawing a composite picture of some of the strains described by consultants and some negative patterns of reaction to strains.

Along with discomfort from living in rougher conditions the field worker is subject to loneliness because he is no longer in his own society and at the same time is not part of the indigenous society. The poverty and illness he sees everywhere about him may overwhelm him. There are so many needs that bringing about any general improvement seems hopeless. The enormity of the needs and bewilderment at local customs and attitudes make it difficult to imagine where to start. The sense of accomplishment that might bolster his morale is denied him by the difficulties of getting the most simple things accomplished. The need for improvement is

so great, while progress seems so slow, that he feels frustrated and thwarted. Petty obstacles may delay work for weeks. After weeks of persuasion and preparation the people may turn out for a project or demonstration only to find that some necessary simple tool promised for delivery has not arrived. Sometimes he feels that he spends most of his day just getting from one village to another. Larger obstacles appear in the form of traditions, religious practices, or time-consuming forms of courtesy.

As frustrations accumulate, all considerations except the need for getting something accomplished quickly may fade from his mind. Larger, intangible goals seem less important. With this outlook, the U.S. staff member may begin using the most authoritarian methods to get co-workers and local people to carry out project activities. Ironically, in the light of his mission, he may even begin to dislike local people for their slowness and caution. Or he may try to do everything himself, calling into use elaborate machinery or equipment far beyond the capacity of the people to maintain. By spending freely, he may try to buy the cooperation of local people.

Sometimes the sense of frustration at not being immediately useful creates attitudes of defeatism and resignation. The U.S. worker may surrender completely to local limitations, cancel long-term plans, and become a time-server until his contract expires. He may spend more and more time in the city associating with other foreigners, and may end by isolating himself completely from the indigenous civilization, living in a large western-style house, seeing no local people except his servants. It is hardly necessary to add that the short-term field worker is more prone to these negative reactions.

The Team as a Device

Consultants state that teams are useful for maintaining morale. By keeping alive the original purpose of the project they provide some protection against defeatism. To the field worker, who is really in between two societies, the team constitutes a small intermediate society to which he can belong. Members of the team can bolster, stimulate, and succor one another. While the project itself is encouraging village people to modify their attitudes, within the project team foreign specialists and indigenous members may develop new, modified standards of performance in terms of which they appreciate themselves and their colleagues. From this appreciation may come the continuing satisfaction and security necessary for patient, understanding relationships with people outside the project team.

The usefulness of the project team for maintaining morale depends largely on recognition by the project director of the importance of morale for the success of the project operation. He may encourage an attitude of equality and equal responsibility among members of the team. Regular meetings to discuss suggestions and plans are of great importance. Equally essential is recognition of accomplishment by praise or promotion. Promotion or pay raises are particularly vital for encouraging project workers. Some consultants have learned to set initial pay scales low enough to afford regular increases to promising or able men.

Finally, consultants believe there should be opportunities for equal social intercourse between all levels of project personnel.

Refreshers and Furloughs

Many consultants state that their agencies make some provision for the need of U.S. personnel to withdraw from field operations periodically to relax. Whether they work in rural or urban areas, field personnel are in a sense always "on stage." Like any strangers anywhere, they are closely observed by local people. Their responsibility to maintain the trust and the affection of local people means that they can never completely relax. Even field workers whose success is based on their genuineness and spontaneity in personal relations with local people must constantly consider how the people will interpret their words and actions. One of the most common features of living in the field in some less-developed areas is having numbers of children or adults looking into one's house at any time of day. Field workers need a place to which they can retire periodically and relax completely from such tensions. Some missionary orders provide rest centers for their field personnel.

Almost all consultants state that their agencies have furlough policies. Field workers need furloughs to renew their freshness and to learn needed additional skills. Some missionary agencies permit men on a year's furlough to take specialized training of their choice at any university in the United States at the expense of the agency. Furloughs are also useful as preventives against attitudes of superiority and superciliousness which field workers sometimes acquire living in less-developed areas. In the words of one consultant, "It's good for us to come home for a while where we will be just another rider on the subway."

Visits, Inspections, and Discharge

Several consultants report that their agencies send out experienced persons from headquarters to visit field workers and discuss

their problems with them. Such experienced visitors can often give shrewd advice. Perhaps their greatest usefulness, however, is to offer a sympathetic ear to the harassed field worker. The value of such visits for morale purposes is higher if the experienced visitor is not also an inspector or evaluator who reports back to agency headquarters, although some consultants describe individuals who have successfully combined both roles.

At the same time, it is recognized that regular evaluation of personnel is necessary. Because so much depends on successful personal relationships, consultants urge the need for speedy transfer or discharge of unsuitable field personnel. Several persons whose agencies operate through indigenous organizations advocate arrangements whereby U.S. personnel are sent for a definite term, such as two years. At the end of the term, the indigenous organization may ask for the assignment of the same person or of a new one for the next term, so that a change may be made without embarrassment.

Chapter Three. Operations

Some consultants who have operated multipurpose village projects distinguish three successive stages in the conduct of projects. It seems useful to present all the views about project operations in terms of these three stages, although they are really steps in a continuous process.¹

THE FIRST STAGE: INITIATION

The objectives of the initial stage are usually: to educate project leaders about local needs and conditions; to secure the trust and confidence of the people; to dispel attitudes of fatalistic acceptance of existing conditions; to create by successful action an awareness that betterment is possible; and, while this early work is in progress, to formulate a long-term action program out of the goals one started with and out of what one has learned about local needs, conditions, and limitations. Additional objectives in the first stage include: obtaining reliable information about local techniques, local leadership, and local resources (both physical and spiritual) that might be used in development projects; determining what outside techniques and innovations can best be adapted to local conditions; and selecting and training indigenous personnel who will be used as supervisors or extension workers.

Initial Resistances and Attitudes

Local people in any country are initially suspicious of outsiders, particularly if they are complete foreigners and if there is no obvious reason why they are there. It is not always easy for outsiders to appreciate the depth of suspicion created by their arrival or the closeness with which their every action is observed as village people attempt to categorize them. The staff of a village-development project currently under way in an Asian country made a survey of forty villages to find out what the local people thought of the newly arrived project personnel. The survey was conducted

¹ Dr. Harold Allen, whose work in Macedonia has already been mentioned, was the first to analyze development projects into three stages. (See his book, *Come Over Into Macedonia*.) Other consultants not familiar with Dr. Allen's work also use a three-stage analysis in describing their operating experiences.

by a rural sociologist who had been brought up in the area. These were some of the statements made about the project team:

Some say we will acquire the best lands of the area and start a farm.

Some say we will change the caste system and make everybody equal. We will change the religion of the people.

Some say we have acquired the area from the government as it could not pay off the loan taken from the American government for the purpose of constructing the large dam nearby. We are permanently settling here and will rule them.

Some say we are very high officers delegated by the government to settle and rule the people of this area. If this is not a fact, then the government . . . would not have built buildings for us and the great officers would not have come to us to pay homage to us. (The visit of high government officers to us makes them believe we are concerned with the government and makes us higher in position than those who visit us.)

Some believe we are going to change the way of life from individual families to community living. Under the conditions of community living we will ask them to have a common kitchen regardless of caste, creed and nationality, and they will have to live under one roof. They need no longer take care of their children as their children will be taken care of by us in our maternity center. As soon as a child is born in the village, the parents will be asked to hand it over to us.

Some believe we will not allow the leper patients to live in the area. We will either shoot them or take them away from this area.

Some say we have come here to influence the people politically in order to gain votes.

The suspicion of outsiders may be heightened by unpleasant or unproductive experiences with other outsiders who came before. The local people may have seen a number of high-pressure innovators, salesmen, or reformers come and go. They may have developed techniques of acquiescence and politeness to deal with visiting, short-term "improvers" in such a way that the outsider can leave convinced that he has improved conditions and the people can go back to the traditional practices that they know will work.

Moving In

In view of the initial suspicion of outsiders, some men attempt to prepare villagers in advance of their arrival. Sometimes con-

sultants have conferred with local leaders previously in gathering information to determine what projects should be selected. In that event, the people will know outsiders are coming. One man who operates alone has a simple notice put up in the village a few days before he arrives, stating his name and the skill he can make available. A missionary agency with some sixty years' experience tries to counteract shock or wild rumors in its operations in South America by giving accurate information about its work and purposes to steamboat captains months before it extends operations into villages further up the river. Other consultants locate projects near market towns or cross-roads wherever possible not only to obtain greater spread for improved techniques but so that travelers will prepare outlying villages for the visits of project members.

Some consultants state that it is wise to begin activities as quickly as possible after entering a new village or project area so that the people can get a realistic idea of one's purpose. This does not mean that the team should immediately put into operation a full-scale program. The preparation of such a program is in fact one of the objectives. What is advocated is that project personnel should undertake some useful actions to demonstrate their work or skills as early as possible and not simply remain in the village without any apparent purpose.

Some men advocate introducing project members in stages so that villagers will not suddenly be overwhelmed by a large group of strangers, indigenous or foreign. This method is helpful for another reason. The likelihood of mistakes or embarrassing *faux pas* is less if new personnel come in one or two at a time after earlier arrivals have learned the ropes.

Housing and Equipment

Consultants warn that unless care is exercised in the selection of housing accommodations and project buildings (as, for example, those with unusual architecture), a lasting gap may be created between project personnel and local people. Rural people in many countries regard city people, wealthy people, and officials as though they lived in an entirely different world. Having a large house, living in a special area, using elaborate equipment, or spending freely is oftentimes enough for village people to assign the outsider to the world of the rich and the official. If the outsider cannot break out of this category he will seem, in a way, unreal; his advice will be judged inapplicable to local conditions, and even his example will carry little weight. By inoculating himself he may demonstrate that he remains free from sickness, but this will not con-

vince the villager, who knew all along that the certainties of his own existence never applied to people who lived in big houses.

Preliminary Surveys

Some say that it is wise to begin at once to meet small felt needs that the project team can identify even before surveys are conducted to get reliable information on conditions and needs. Others believe that information on local conditions, needs, and attitudes should be obtained first. Several consultants report that preliminary surveys and questioning may increase the suspicion of local people unless some beneficial action has preceded the surveys to demonstrate their purpose. Local people frequently suspect that questioning has something to do with tax collection. It is considered wise to have surveys made by indigenous personnel, if possible by persons who have lived in the area.

In general, one is less likely to learn the felt needs of the people by asking them directly than by observing them, talking with them informally, and approaching the subject indirectly.

Early Operations: Introducing New Techniques

Whatever the differences of opinion about the importance of preliminary surveys, there is agreement that the way to impress local people that improvement is feasible is to undertake improvements in answer to felt needs as soon as possible. Some consultants state that it is justifiable to do things for villagers at this stage. Others say that even first improvements should be limited to those in which local people do part of the work themselves. Innovations or improvements attempted at this early stage should be ones of proven effectiveness in local conditions and ones which will produce speedy and visible results. Mistakes at this stage may make ultimate success impossible. Improvements or innovations attempted in early stages should involve little or no risk for the local people affected.

Toward the end of the first stage it is desirable to add one other criterion in the selection of felt needs for action: the felt need should also be strategic—a spearhead which may open the way to other types of improvement. An example is an improvement which will increase the income of a farmer, lessening his sense of futility and enabling him to purchase improved seed. In areas where many people are landless, the introduction of poultry is a strategic starting point; another is kitchen gardening. Where people own their own land, cattle-breeding programs may be good starters.

USING LOCAL IDEAS AND METHODS. Some consultants state that many techniques currently most suitable for extensive use in a country have already been developed by indigenous professional leaders or the common people. The first task of the outside expert is to familiarize himself with what has been done or invented by the local people, by local specialists, or by other outsiders already engaged in technical assistance. It is unwise to ignore or to fail to tap the practical wisdom of the people. Frequently a village has traditions of better practices which have been abandoned because of poverty or because the means for implementing them are no longer available. Many men make a point of talking with older villagers to find out what better practices are already in the storehouse of village tradition. One consultant in Asia was able to reclaim a large area of potentially fertile land by the use of a traditional method last used a hundred years before. Under existing local conditions, no other method could be used. What was lacking was the incentive and the ability to mobilize village labor to carry out the program. These the consultant was able to supply.

Some consultants say that locally developed techniques generally fit the local needs and conditions more precisely, are more willingly adopted, and involve less social dislocation. It is often wise and more economical to build upon what has already been done or discovered locally than to begin with completely new techniques that must be slowly simplified and adapted by trial and error to fit local conditions. At least a start can be made by revitalizing useful traditional practices while the completely new techniques are tested and adapted experimentally.

One value of revitalizing useful traditional practices rather than introducing new ones is that in many societies a traditional practice in one field is linked by an elaborate and comprehensive network of social institutions with many other practices in other fields. It is often impossible to pick out one existing practice from the network and replace it with a new one without affecting or possibly undermining the fundamental spiritual and social values of the society.

One saves time by consulting indigenous scientists, experimental or demonstration groups sponsored by universities, or other local professional leaders. Improved practices frequently require long initial experimentation and development. It takes a long time, for example, to develop improved seed. Building on what has already been done may save the foreign expert years of such development.

Some consultants emphasize the need to introduce simple and inexpensive innovations if acceptance is to be obtained and if some

improvement is to be achieved relatively quickly. Improved seed, elementary drainage, poultry raising, inexpensive sprays, or two-month training courses for practical nurses are examples of the level of innovation sought at first. The village-help primer of Dr. Ira Moomaw, *Education and Village Improvement*, remains in the minds of some consultants an outstanding account of the practical innovations and techniques which can help people raise their level of living.

CULTURAL OBSTACLES. Many consultants have experienced difficulties in adapting improved techniques to fit existing cultural or religious practices or traditions. One example is the necessity for a consultant in Africa deliberately to bitter a bland medicine to secure its acceptance as an effective remedy. Another example is the rejection of an improved strain of livestock because its color had religious significance. These experiences are so specific to local environments that it is not fruitful to elaborate them in a general study. A useful means of anticipating and solving such problems of adaptation is to set up local advisory committees or to take local people into the project team with full status as co-planners. One man asks local committees to screen all literacy materials for usefulness and possible harmful social impact before they are translated and printed for local distribution.

The lack of high levels of education and of a scientific-rationalistic tradition in many countries conditions the degree of complexity of innovations that can be successfully introduced in early operations. One consultant attempted to test the effectiveness of new antibiotic drugs in combating a local type of trachoma virus. The local assistants carrying out this program had been trained professionally but nevertheless failed to keep accurate, objective charts. They did not want to record that the drugs were ineffective because they knew that the foreign project personnel hoped that the drugs would work. The local assistants assumed that protecting U.S. personnel from losing face was more important than scientific objectivity.

Early Operations: Gaining Acceptance for Improved Techniques

If one has exercised care in selecting improved techniques which will be suitable to local conditions, the techniques will commend themselves to the people because of their usefulness and profitability. People will not be long in adopting improved techniques if they see neighbors or friends obtaining practical benefits from them. The difficulty in early stages is getting some local peo-

ple to try the new techniques first before the practical benefits are apparent.

One solution is for the project personnel to conduct demonstrations of their own to prove the effectiveness of the new method or technique. However, many men have made the mistake of relying too greatly on the persuasiveness of demonstrations. Consultants with experience in widely different parts of the world tell stories of the same genre as that of one who demonstrated to skeptical people in a Caribbean country that early weaning would kill neither his cow nor his calf. They saw but were not convinced. Their reply was: "Yes, but it is your cow. It would not work with our cattle."

Consultants agree that demonstrations are most effective if they are carried out on the land or with the facilities of a local resident and if the local resident himself demonstrates the new technique. Many find that landlords and other prosperous persons are usually the first to agree to experiment or demonstrate improved practices. Consultants state that one must frequently start innovations with these relatively well-to-do local residents, but that one's aim must always be to use the leadership of such persons as a means of making the relatively poor majority of the people willing to undertake improved practices.

Efforts at persuasion through public information programs using mass media are frequently ineffective because of differences in tradition and the level of education. An obvious but not unique example is a Disney antimalaria cartoon, which, according to several consultants, has aroused amusement but has gone unheeded by local people in almost every part of the world. The people believe that in the United States insects are literally the size of the mosquitoes they see projected on the screen. Films and posters made locally and portraying local scenes and people are always more effective.

Consultants agree that the most effective means to bridge the gap between standards of proof and belief and to obtain belief and cooperation before the practical benefits of innovations speak for themselves is to win the personal respect and affection of the people. In the last analysis, the people will be willing to gamble on an outsider's suggestions at first only if his suggestions appear to fit local conditions and if they trust him or like him. Taking the time to gain this personal trust at first may seem to be an indirect way of getting things done, yet several consultants state that all early operations should be conducted in this way. One man states that his agency would discharge a public health visitor who advised families what to do. The visitor is expected to call on a family

frequently, win their confidence, help when asked, but to wait with advice until her talks impart in the family a sense of cause and effect in some simple matter such as the relation between certain foods and gas pains. Once the first cause and effect relationship is appreciated, she is expected to guide the family unit slowly into recognition of more complex relationships and thus gradually to induce new attitudes toward hygiene and health.

Selecting and Training Indigenous Personnel

An important task in the first stage of operations is the selection and training of indigenous personnel who will carry on the bulk of the person-to-person work in the villages. This training must be begun early if the project is to have the personnel necessary for the full operation of the second stage and the trained leadership necessary for the third stage, when the project is gradually turned over to indigenous people. The views of consultants concerning the selection and training of indigenous personnel have been presented in Chapter Two.

Formulating the Long-Term Program

By the end of the first stage, which may last as long as two years in an extensive and ambitious project, the project director and his staff should have learned enough about local needs, local ways, and practical techniques and operating methods to be in a position to map out attainable long-term objectives and a rough timetable scheduling the achievement of these objectives.

However complex the project, the first stage usually has a degree of flexibility which is essential if project personnel are to adapt sufficiently to local felt needs and local conditions to secure the trust and the necessary self-awakening of the indigenous people. Neither the local people nor the project personnel are ready in the early stage for any major efforts. At the same time project personnel must maintain some sense of pace and of the larger goals of the project, even though they are probing and seeking to adapt to local needs and conditions. Whatever is done must be done with sufficient precision to provide meaningful lessons.

The flexibility necessary in the first stage requires patience also on the part of the headquarters personnel and of the financial contributors to the organization sponsoring the project. Some consultants point out that this is the greatest obstacle to the success of projects conducted directly by governments. To a large degree, the project team must be free from headquarters control during the first stage. This factor is inconsistent with two characteris-

tics of governmental operation: annual financial accountability through detailed budgets, and close supervision and control by the headquarters administrative staff of the sponsoring government department.

Gradual Start

To begin a program as described in this first stage takes longer than early full-scale operation. However, a gradual start is a necessary preliminary to later acceleration which will in fact outstrip programs begun more hastily. Consultants are sure also that a gradual start will produce more lasting results. One reports that his agency operated two similar programs in two different areas. In one, U.S. personnel were used for all posts and a quick start was made. In the other, indigenous personnel were selected and trained. It took some time before they fully absorbed the idea of the program and its methods. Two years later, however, the second program had overhauled the first, and at present the second program is much more successful.

THE SECOND STAGE: OPERATIONS

The objectives of the second stage of operations include: introducing more important and long-run innovations; creating community participation and initiative; developing local leadership; and maintaining a high sense of participation and good morale among project workers.

Most of the work of the project will be accomplished during the second stage. If the first stage has succeeded, the local people are more responsive to innovation. They are more self-confident and self-reliant. They may have more income and greater ability to take what are to them risks in trying new techniques. Lengthening acquaintance and experience of improvement have probably developed greater trust in project personnel and possibly even respect and affection. Project personnel are still regarded as outsiders, but they are familiar ones: strangers who have become fixtures of village life. For their part, members of the project team may have a greater self-confidence and sense of potency as a result of having learned about local conditions. They feel more at home, and they have a clearer idea of their function and their usefulness.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION. For some consultants the most important general objective in the second stage is to help build deeply into the village society attitudes favorable to collective action for improvement. To do this it is desirable to foster the con-

fidence of the people in their ability to achieve improvement by working together. Hence, efforts are made to obtain widening community participation in project activities. Community activities do not monopolize the program in the second stage; services and efforts at innovation are still directed at individuals and at families. But more ambitious projects are undertaken which give local groups the sense that they are working for their own improvement. Later it is sometimes possible to carry out—in addition to regular on-going programs—mass-participation projects such as road-building, or irrigation, which benefit the community and not merely individuals.

CULTURAL ACTIVITIES. Mr. Albert Mayer stresses the value of community activities. These may have no direct bearing on the focal activity of the project, but they stimulate village consciousness and quicken interest in village life. Meetings, entertainments, bulletin boards, and recreational activities may raise the tempo of village life and increase people's sense of their individual and collective potentialities. More directly useful to project activities are tours to visit other village projects or demonstration areas.

Several consultants attempt to get local people to feel an emotional attachment for development work by linking project activities to traditional activities about which the people feel strongly. In the Etawah project it was possible to effect a subtle link between hygiene activities and traditional plays by having villains always appear dirty or slovenly. Other men have arranged demonstrations or contests on the day of local religious festivals in cooperation with local priests. Linking project work with traditional activities can be very effective provided project officials are sufficiently ethical and are familiar enough with local customs so that people are not offended by opportunistic, iconoclastic huckstering.

DEVELOPING LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONS. During the second stage consultants also concentrate on developing local leadership and local organizations capable of continuing development work after foreign personnel withdraw. There are two aspects to this task: first, encouraging volunteer village leaders and small private organizations such as rural cooperatives or maintenance committees; and, second, building a permanent organization staffed by indigenous professionals which will replace the foreign project team. At the village level a frequent objective during the second stage is to encourage the development of younger men whose potentialities for leadership have been noted in community activities, demonstrations, or informal advisory groups. In some cases it is desirable to rely less on landlords and other wealthy per-

sons whose readier response to innovations made them the logical persons to work through during the first stage. This is because such leaders may quench village initiative in the long run because they use authoritarian methods and because they are more feared than respected by most of the people.

Voluntary village organizations and leaders cannot by themselves guarantee continuing improvement. As one man points out, even in the United States a permanent agricultural extension service and permanent public health services are necessary. Consultants therefore advise that great attention be paid in the second stage to developing local professionals so that they can slowly assume greater leadership responsibilities inside the project administration itself when U.S. personnel withdraw. It is a mistake to regard any local staff member as a person who is simply hired to do a job. He should be regarded as a person on a scholarship, a person who is there to become a skilful and inspired leader in the continuing development of his country.

One must begin in the second stage to integrate the project organization and its work with the work of the government or of whatever local organization will provide the organizational nucleus for project work when the foreign personnel withdraw. Visits by national leaders should be encouraged, so that they become interested in the work. Some consultants expand to cover larger numbers of villages during the second stage and experiment with administrative and organizational forms which make it possible to integrate the project's work with the work of the government or of other important national groups. During this period it is a cardinal rule that local organizations and local leaders should be given all the credit for project accomplishments.

NEED FOR FOCUS AND TARGETS. If multipurpose projects are to be sufficiently understandable to local people to arouse their interest and a general sense of group participation, it is necessary that they have one focal activity as a goal. If projects have several goals of equal importance, interest is dispersed and the people are less likely to feel that they are working together for the same purpose.

Several consultants point out that good administration in the second stage requires setting quantitative targets and target dates. Such targets and timetables should be worked out in consultation with the local people and after full consultation with all members of the project team. Targets and timetables are necessary to give shape to project activities and to prevent the project from losing tempo. They enable both villagers and members of the project

team to measure their progress and are useful for maintaining the interest and enthusiasm of interested villagers as well as of members of the project team.

DECISIONS BY CONSULTATION. Consultants emphasize the need to arrive at decisions concerning project activities by consultation rather than by fiat. Since the object of the project is to have its activities and methods become a continuing part of local life, the practice of deciding programs from the top down is self-defeating. In large projects this means that there must be full, two-way consultation within the project team. Directors and specialists in projects which cover many villages cannot make good decisions without the advice of field workers who are in daily contact with the people. Further, village-level workers are more likely to deal with the people in an equalitarian and democratic manner if their project superiors treat them in the same way.

Some men have found that it is difficult to ascertain the views of the people affected by a project because of their caution and politeness. Similar difficulties may be encountered among indigenous workers on the project staff. Frank expression of views is encouraged if project leaders themselves demonstrate frankness and a spirit of equality in their relationships with indigenous people. The willingness of project leaders to work with their hands alongside villagers or junior staff members is an important aid to get them to talk straight from the shoulder.

IMPORTANCE OF SUPPLY LINE. The importance of maintaining the supply line is frequently underestimated. It is important to the morale of all persons participating in project activities that projects not be delayed because essential supplies have not arrived at the right time or in sufficient quantity.

RESISTANCES. As they expand in the second stage, projects are apt to run into hard-core resistances. If care has been taken, the early resistances caused by suspicion, fatalism, or lack of economic ability to undertake risks may have considerably lessened. Resistances in the second stage are apt to come from landlords, officials, or specialists who feel threatened or overshadowed by project activities. The country's specialists or officials may sometimes feel that the success of a project reflects inadequacy on their part. Overburdened, underpaid, and lacking resources and equipment, they are naturally nettled when relatively well-supplied outside projects score gains which they would like to have brought about themselves.

Many men enlist the cooperation of local specialists and officials in advance, asking advice from them, sympathizing with their

difficulties, and even shaping project activities to aid them in their work or to enable them to share in the accomplishments. In one project, a consultant started a public sowing of improved seed in a demonstration plot with the equally public assistance of the medicine man. He had arranged in advance that they should combine their several magics and credit was shared by both. Sometime later the medicine man, secure of his status, admitted publicly that it was the outsider's seed which was more responsible for the increased yield. In another instance, Buddhist priests became the key members of a public health committee in a project of a Protestant mission. These and similar stories indicate that it is possible to effect innovations without arousing the resistance of functionaries whose institutions will be affected by these innovations, so long as their personal status is not jeopardized or threatened.

A difficult type of resistance frequently encountered comes from indigenous specialists and professionals who are not accepted for limited employment or training opportunities. In the words of one consultant, "When you have to separate the sheep from the goats, it is wise to make some provision for the goats, or they will gang up on you." One consultant set a minimum standard for acceptance of doctors in a training hospital. Instead of ignoring those who were not selected, he instituted external training courses so that those rejected would have the opportunity to improve their skill and gain admission later. Methods such as this are useful to convince rejected specialists that one bears them or their family no personal grudge, in countries that are unfamiliar with the practice of employing solely on the basis of skill and ability.

THE THIRD STAGE: WITHDRAWAL

The third stage of operations involves gradual withdrawal of foreign personnel by the sponsoring agency as local leaders develop and as they are promoted to top project leadership. A final objective is turning over the project completely to an indigenous organization.

Consultants agree that identifying the right time for local people to take over the project is the most difficult question of judgment. Key determining factors are the spirit of self-help among people in the project area, the maturity of local leaders and project administrators, the degree to which attitudes favorable to substantive activities are deeply fixed, and the existence of a suitable institution or organization to which the project can be turned over.

Finding a group to assume responsibility for the support of

the project, once the foreign agency departs, usually requires much advance preparation. There appear to be three alternatives: the government, some local committee or cooperative organization, or some large nongovernmental institution such as a university. Whatever the choice, early effort is required to induce the organization to assume the responsibility.

If it is hoped at the outset ultimately to imbed the project in the administration of the indigenous government, consultants usually confer with government officials before the project is organized, not only about its ultimate place and how it might best serve national needs, but also about civil service status for indigenous project leaders. As noted in Chapter One, it is most desirable that such projects be organized in congruence with existing administrative areas. Otherwise administrative leaders may be reluctant to take over projects on the grounds that they will have to revise their normal administrative procedures.

Men who follow the policy of turning projects over to governments assert that during the second stage of the project a continuing effort should be made to convince Ministers and officials of its value and to arouse their enthusiasm for it. Facts and figures may be convincing which show how much more the project has added to the national income than the cost of its operation. Inviting Ministers and officials to visit the project and give advice is another useful method.

Sometimes it is useful for one foreign member of the project to keep in continuing touch with the project or to remain as a member of the managing committee. Continued identification of foreign agencies with projects sometimes protects projects from corrupt practices or efforts to use projects for selfish political purposes. (This protection is unnecessary in some countries.)

Consultants experienced in different fields agree that the professional status of indigenous project personnel and of persons trained in certain specialties may be protected after the sponsoring agency withdraws by the formation of "Alumni Associations" with which the sponsoring agency maintains close contact.

Several men point out that one of their early mistakes was turning over projects without any provision for maintenance of equipment. They state that maintenance of equipment does not come naturally to people in less-developed countries because they are not accustomed to machinery. They tend to wait until equipment breaks down before making repairs. Roads, dams, and irrigation ditches also require maintenance. It is necessary to organize local maintenance committees and to create habits of maintenance before turning projects over or before withdrawing.

Chapter Four. Experts and Short-Term Missions

An important form of technical assistance by the United Nations and the United States government is sending experts or short-term visiting missions to advise indigenous governments or to provide specialized training to professional or administrative leaders. Some of our consultants have had experience as visiting experts or have participated in short-term visiting missions. Their comments on the administration of such programs form the basis of this chapter.

Early Contacts

The influence of visiting experts is usually limited because they have only a relatively short time in which to build the trust and friendship necessary to inspire indigenous leaders to respect and carry out their advice. Consultants state that the creation of good working relationships with indigenous leaders begins long before the expert arrives, in the negotiations which lead those leaders to ask for assistance. The visiting expert cannot be expected in his short stay to salvage the cooperation of leaders if advance arrangements, involving overselling, overpromising, or overpaying, have created defensive or resentful attitudes.

One consultant says that the local leaders should always be permitted to designate the expert they want or to select the man they want from a list of available experts. They will then have a greater initial sense of responsibility for the reception of the expert and for cooperation with him. Some consultants state that at first only advisers of outstanding ability should be sent to the receiving governments. Men of this caliber, it is stated, are more apt to gain the trust and confidence of officials; they can then aid the officials to determine where and in what way further assistance can be of most use.

Some men with long experience as advisers to governments state that once the adviser or expert has arrived in the country, he should offer no advice until he knows more about the local conditions affecting his particular field than the officials with whom he deals. Persons with experience ranging from malaria control to social work agree that local conditions are always different from

the conditions in home countries where the experts have learned their specialty.

Achieving Good Working Relations

Consultants state that much of the usefulness and effectiveness of outside experts or advisers lies in their *neutrality*. The outsider should listen and observe without making judgments or suggestions too quickly. If the outsider maintains neutrality and acquires a reputation for discretion and sympathetic understanding, his usefulness will be greatly increased. Officials will feel that they have someone to whom they can speak frankly on matters which they would not want to discuss with their colleagues who are potential competitors or with their expert subordinates. Working cooperation will be greater if the outside expert shuns publicity and lets indigenous leaders receive credit for any innovations or improvements. The outside expert will be more influential if he manifests a selfless devotion to his work and his project.

Sometimes officials are suspicious of outside experts partly because they feel that the outsiders lack an understanding of cultural traditions or local political conditions and are therefore apt, even with the best of intentions, to cause political difficulties or to work in a spirit alien to the traditions or aspirations of the country. At the very least, the outsider should demonstrate a thorough knowledge and a sensitive appreciation of local conditions, if this suspicion is to be lessened. An open expression of awareness of this problem helps to build sound relations, according to some consultants.

Another barrier is the fear that the outside expert may want to earn his pay by "showing up" the local official or specialist. Also, even the most favorably disposed local officials may have an ambivalent attitude toward the most trusted and admired outsider. There is a natural embarrassment that outside assistance should be necessary at all and that an outsider should have to look at the worst features of one's country or one's culture. Some consultants doubt whether these barriers can ever be wholly overcome except through long personal friendship.

Consultants state that outside experts will accomplish more if they understand the limitations and difficulties which affect the attitudes of officials. One man suggests that suitable initial preparation on this score would be to have the expert attempt to get some innovations adopted by his own home government. This would teach him that governmental delays cannot always be eliminated and are not limited to less-developed countries. In dealing with the

higher civil service, the outsider should remember that he remains but a relatively short time, while the civil servant depends on his superior for promotion. A lone civil servant, however sensitive or well trained, cannot be expected to overcome existing institutional attitudes and policies. The low salary scales which frequently force officials to take outside jobs in order to provide bare necessities for their families should be recognized as a possible reason for delays, lack of heroism in pushing innovations, or slowness in reciprocating hospitality.

At the Ministerial level consultants state that a great barrier is sometimes an attitude of defensiveness. This may be partly motivated by national pride and an unwillingness to let it appear that something has been left undone which should have been done. It may also be motivated by the fact that the politically appointed Minister is usually an expert in law and politics and has little time to master the substantive details of the work of his Ministry. Consultants state, again, that Ministers in any country may fear to display ignorance before the specialized knowledge of their subordinate technicians. The Minister may simply transfer to the visiting expert the same defensive attitudes and vaguenesses that protect him from his own specialists. Two men report that they have used these motivations to the advantage of their mission; they have been able to act as unofficial technical advisers to Ministers who, they state, fear loss of face in asking questions of their subordinates and who welcome neutral, discreet technical advice.

Some men suggest means for overcoming these defensive attitudes. It is said that where visiting experts come as a team, group discussions by the team with indigenous officials or specialists offer a good opportunity to demonstrate that questioning, differences of opinion within the team, or even being proved wrong by a colleague on a technical matter are in the professional tradition and do not involve loss of face or vocational shame. Consultants agree that personal friendship is the most effective way to dissipate defensive attitudes. This usually comes about only if the visiting expert demonstrates a genuine affection for the country and a genuine desire to be of help.

Limitations

Almost all consultants question the value of short-term advisory or visiting missions, partly because they do not usually provide visiting experts with the time to learn enough about local conditions to make their comments useful and helpful. Several of the most experienced men state that it is preferable for govern-

mental agencies to have full-time career technical staffs so that they need not recruit private experts who can leave their regular jobs only for short periods.

On the positive side, it is said that careful administration and planning can make visiting missions more effective. The specific task of the mission should be thoroughly delimited and explored in advance negotiations. It is frequently possible to furnish mission-team members an advance list of specific questions or subjects on which they will be called upon to express opinions. They can then consult the most expert opinion at home before departing.

The provision of an administrative assistant, preferably a national of the country to be visited, can do much to free team members from unnecessary detail and irritations and to maximize the time available to them for communicating information and advice. Advance planning can reduce the many banquets and social functions that lessen the time available for learning about local conditions and for communicating information. Advance arrangements for local counterpart persons to act as personal hosts have also proved effective in the practice of voluntary agencies.

Chapter Five. Evaluation

PURPOSES AND NEEDS

Almost all consultants assert the usefulness of evaluation. Few are satisfied that they have perfected adequate sets of criteria and adequate techniques. According to one consultant, evaluation is the real terra incognita of technical assistance today. Most state that there is a pressing need for the development of adequate and practicable evaluation methods.

In acknowledging the need for better evaluation, consultants actually refer to several needs. It appears that these needs reflect separate purposes and that the scope of the evaluation operation—as well as the choice of criteria and methods—will differ depending on the purposes for which the evaluation is to be used.

One purpose of evaluation is to improve on-going technical assistance projects. This type of evaluation is the most specific and focused. Even within this category, however, evaluation may vary in scope from examining the consequences of the entire project to assessing the effectiveness of a particular operating method in relation to its cost. A second purpose of evaluation is to draw lessons from on-going projects in order to reshape the goals or policies of the sponsoring agency and to improve the selection and operation of new projects. A somewhat similar purpose is to measure the success of projects in order to justify additional appropriations or extension of programs. Several consultants warn that evaluation undertaken for this purpose is seldom useful for anything else and should, where possible, be conducted by separate personnel.

A third purpose of evaluation is to discover how the consequences of a project relate to the larger plans of the government of the country. In particular, projects may satisfy important felt needs of local people, but the satisfaction of these needs may in turn create new needs with an important effect on the economy of the country. One consultant points out, for example, that projects which have successfully taught improved agricultural methods may lead to an increased demand for fertilizer or for metal for steel-tipped plows. The added income gained from successful innovations may raise the demand for consumer goods. Evaluation should

be made of new needs created by projects and of the ways in which these needs are related to the long-term economic development plans of the indigenous government.

A fourth purpose of evaluation is to determine the total long-term impact of a project or program on the people of the country. Some consultants state frankly that preparing a full list of criteria to be used in such a thorough evaluation is too complex a task for them to attempt, and several express doubt that any thorough and yet accurate evaluation of the long-term consequences of technical assistance is possible. A complete evaluation of this type would have to consider long-term consequences far beyond the scope of most project goals, including indirect and unanticipated consequences in many fields. Notwithstanding the difficulties, many consultants state that efforts at assessing the larger consequences of projects should be undertaken. One man with forty years' experience cites this example: In his judgment, technical assistance has benefited the people in his area in many ways. However, it has been one force among others, which, in the process of creating better living conditions has largely destroyed attitudes stressing genuine courtesy, consideration, and open demonstrations of affection for friends and neighbors. The consultant states that this negative result could not have been anticipated thirty or forty years ago, but that it makes life much less rewarding for the common people in the area today and should, therefore, properly be considered in assessing the total consequences of technical assistance.

Systematic evaluation by agencies must usually be limited to evaluation which seeks to improve on-going programs or to derive lessons useful in the selection and shaping of new programs. The cost of an intensive evaluation would use up the limited funds that most voluntary agencies have available for project operations. Hence consultants emphasize the urgency of developing inexpensive but effective evaluation methods. A second constraining factor is that the evaluation process, if not limited in scope, will encumber field workers with a large headquarters staff, sheafs of report forms, and the appearance of excessive prying and investigation.

Although our consultants, on the whole, appear to be self-critical of their work, several regard evaluation in principle as a valuable corrective to delusions of success, to which, they say, field workers are particularly susceptible. These men emphasize that the field worker must maintain his own self-confidence in the face of many obstacles and uncertainties if he is to inspire self-confi-

dence in the local people. He is thus prone to self-deception and the belief that his work has been more successful than it was in fact. Evaluation is also useful for giving a renewed sense of direction and perspective to the project worker, who may become submerged in petty obstacles and day-to-day worries.

CRITERIA

Consultants state that working criteria for evaluation should be the degree to which the project has attained the tangible and intangible goals which should have been articulated in selecting the project at the start. (See Chapter One.) Where these goals have been translated into action programs at the end of the first stage of operations (see pages 46-47), the objectives of the action programs provide more specific criteria.

Broader social, political, or ethical consequences of projects should not be ignored in evaluation simply because they are difficult or impossible to measure quantitatively. Some men point out that evaluation criteria should include not only the degree to which tangible and intangible goals have been achieved but also the degree to which these achievements *spread* beyond the project area and *persist* after the project staff itself has departed.

In addition to criteria already suggested, some consultants apply a form of "investment" criterion, which is in essence a criterion of effectiveness and efficiency. The cost of the project is compared with the economic value of the benefits obtained. This test can be applied fairly readily to agricultural projects; one man has applied it in vocational training programs; and it appears to be applicable to public health programs by measuring the value of man-days of work no longer lost because of illness. One consultant, who uses this criteria with others, feels that his project has been badly chosen or ineffectively operated if it does not produce a return to the people of fifty-to-one for what was spent on the project.

Some consultants also evaluate their projects in terms of standards of achievement or efficiency which they have developed through experience in previous projects. Other consultants state that it is possible to evaluate projects in comparison with similar projects in the same country or region. Finally, it was noticeable that many consultants in the interviews evaluated the accomplishments of their projects continually in terms of the total needs of the people in the area which remain unanswered.

TECHNIQUES OF MEASUREMENT

Bench Marks

A prerequisite for successful evaluation is to know and record the conditions existing in the project area before project operations begin. Initial surveys and studies made in order to decide whether to undertake a project may provide some of the necessary data. The more detailed surveys made in the first stage of project operation may also be useful in the construction of the first bench mark from which progress may be measured. The limiting factors which restrict the collection of this information are the same as those which condition any other survey: first, the survey itself must not arouse suspicion and irritation, and, second, the mere presence of the information-gatherer may itself materially change the conditions which he is attempting to describe.

Quantitative Methods

Several consultants emphasize that the maximum use should be made of quantitative measurement in evaluation. They state that accurate statistical records of accomplishment may provide a useful check against subjective judgments of progress, which may be skewed by the emotional needs of project members to exaggerate accomplishment. The tangible accomplishments of some types of technical assistance may be measured quantitatively, and meaningful statistics may be obtained for such items as mortality and disease, literacy, increased farm production, and income. As has already been noted, some consultants have attempted to construct ratios of return to project cost. Quantitative targets and timetables of planned progress provide useful quantitative and objective standards against which actual progress may be compared. The need for such targets and timetables for effective project operation has already been discussed in Chapter Four.

Quantitative methods may also be used to evaluate project achievement in fields other than health, agriculture, and education. For example, Dr. Allen of the Near East Foundation set a target of twenty-three improved practices of home hygiene and sanitation which his project was to introduce in ten families in a Macedonian village over a period of four years. The same principle could be applied to larger numbers of people and to a wider range of innovations. Such comparative figures may also be useful for evaluating the relative acceptance of different innovations and the relative success of project personnel in obtaining cooperation.

Quantitative Measurement of Social Progress

One of the knottiest evaluation problems is to devise meaningful and objective quantitative indexes of social and morale achievements or failures. Few of the consultants are familiar with the modern methods by which academic social scientists attempt to measure social or subjective phenomena. Nevertheless, several men have attempted to measure social and morale accomplishments quantitatively. Attendance of villagers at evening classes, entertainments, or committee meetings is recorded as an aid in measuring community solidarity and enthusiasm for group cooperation.

One consultant points out that quantitative measurement of tangible accomplishments may provide data that indicate the enthusiasm and cooperativeness of local people. Comparisons of rates of tangible accomplishment in different project areas may give a rough warning of the existence of social or morale problems. One man has made a practice of maintaining statistics on crime, juvenile delinquency, and votes in village meetings to help him assess social changes in his project area.

Qualitative Data

Quantitative data alone are insufficient for the evaluation of projects, particularly of the larger social consequences of project activities. Several consultants state that they have found sociologists or anthropologists of great value in assessing the current social impact of projects, as well as in the conduct of substantive project activities.

Perhaps the most valuable evaluation data are those obtained from living with the people and talking with them. In addition to maintaining personal relationships necessary for project work, many consultants make a practice of attending community meetings, social or recreational affairs, and informal gatherings in order to find out directly how the lives of the people have been affected by project operations. Some men warn that impressions gathered in this way are of great value only if they are accurately retained and systematically analyzed. The mere collection of random impressions, however well acquainted the observer is with local people, is subject to distortion in the mind of the observer, particularly when he attempts comparisons over relatively long periods of time.

Qualitative evaluation data may be obtained in a systematic way even if they are not susceptible to quantification. For example, one man reports that his agency makes systematic efforts to evaluate

social consequences by interviewing regularly a few families initially chosen at random from those in the area. These regular intensive interviews provide continuing case histories of the ways in which these families have been affected by project operations over the years. It is expected that the interviews will be continued annually or biennially after the foreign project personnel withdraw.

One consultant states that after establishing friendship with the local people, he set up a small movie camera in an inconspicuous spot overlooking a central village square. He has exposed a roll of film at the same hour, the same day of the week, every half a year and believes that the film record will be invaluable for evaluation purposes.

WHO SHOULD CONDUCT EVALUATION?

Evaluation by the Project Staff

Evaluation may be conducted by members of the project staff or by outsiders (who may or may not be members of the sponsoring organization) or by both. Many consultants emphasize that it is part of the regular duty of the project director to evaluate the work of the project and make necessary modifications and improvements. Each member of the project staff has the same responsibility for his field of activity.

Members of the project staff are in the best position to gather data for evaluation and to put into practice quickly the lessons they learn from their evaluation. Several men believe that evaluation by the project staff will be more effective if one member of the staff is assigned the duty of collecting evaluation data as an aid to the project leader, who should naturally consider evaluation as one of his continuing responsibilities.

Meetings of members of the project staff, including village-level workers, are used by Mr. Albert Mayer and other consultants to encourage criticism and evaluation as well as to map out targets and work plans for future activity. Some men point out that the project leader may encourage evaluation at these meetings by calling attention to the larger goals of the project and inviting suggestions and criticisms. By encouraging two-way communication between all levels of the project staff, the local people themselves may be enlisted in evaluation work, their suggestions and criticisms being reported either directly at village meetings or indirectly through village-level workers.

Evaluation by Outsiders

It is usually desirable to have an independent observer visit the project to conduct evaluation in addition to the continuing evaluation by the project staff itself. Many consultants report that their agencies require periodic written reports to the home headquarters and that these reports are used partly for evaluation by the home headquarters staff or directorate. Experience indicates that the usefulness of written reports for evaluation is quite limited, beyond the accurate reporting of quantitative accomplishments.

Daily diaries, which some organizations require from village-level workers or from project leaders, may give a good notion of progress and of obstacles, but they are at best only useful supplements to evaluation data provided by actual visits to the project site. Usually the usefulness of a report to staff at headquarters in the United States depends not only upon the writer but upon the artfulness of the recipient in reading between the lines in the light of his own field experience. Headquarters staff members can encourage meaningful reporting and aid the morale of field workers by replying promptly and by showing interest in the major points raised in reports.

While consultants agree that on-the-spot visits are the best way for outsiders to obtain sufficient data for thorough evaluation, they question the value of brief visits or inspections, particularly if these are taken up by formal dinners and lectures. Several men state that it would be most desirable for outside evaluation personnel to remain in the project area for several months to a year. At the very least, visiting inspectors or evaluators ought to remain in the project area for at least two weeks to observe the work, to talk with the local people, and to see how project personnel get along with the people and with one another. Three consultants state that their agencies make it a policy to see that each of their overseas personnel is visited every two to five years by someone from central or regional headquarters. In one organization, the visiting supervisor lives with the project personnel at each administrative echelon for periods of a week to a month. During this period he is able to evaluate both the project work and individual project personnel.

Several men emphasize that evaluation should be carried out wherever possible by neutral persons not operationally involved in the project either in the field or in the headquarters of the sponsoring organization. Such neutrality is stated to be the best assurance of accurate and unbiased evaluation of project work. At the same time, consultants state, evaluators should have the experience

and the personal ability to establish sympathetic understanding with project personnel. One person observes that the only persons who should be sent out on relatively short-term evaluation missions are persons who already know enough about the area and about the type of project activity so that they could write four-fifths of the evaluation report before leaving the United States to see the project in operation.

Some consultants suggest that sponsoring organizations should appoint advisory committees of experienced persons to make independent evaluation of overseas projects and of the general direction and success of the total organizational program. One man reports that his organization, which operates extensively throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East, has relied on such a permanent advisory committee of experts for several years. The sympathy of the experts is assured by the fact that they are contributors to the organization. They are not, however, employed by the organization in any capacity. These advisory experts have full access to all staff documents and reports at headquarters. Each year, one or two experts in a particular field spend three months or more visiting overseas projects. Their evaluation reports, the consultant states, have been extremely valuable. In addition, by pooling their knowledge, the experts as a group are able to give helpful and realistic guidance to the headquarters staff concerning the over-all balance and direction of the organization's total program.

Many consultants encourage visits to their projects by experienced persons such as indigenous specialists or professional leaders and persons who have had other experience in technical assistance. Evaluations and comments by such visitors provide an added check against unconscious self-deception on the part of the project staff, consultants state. Some men point out that periodic conferences of technical assistance workers in a country or area should be encouraged partly so that they may be helped to develop standards by which to evaluate their own work.

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