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Issue Theme:

**Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and
Political Alignment, 1789-1989**



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
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About this Issue

This issue of *Presidential Studies Quarterly* has as its theme, FOREIGN POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT, 1789-1989. The April 30th Bicentennial of Washington's inaugural, the July 14th Bicentennial of the French Revolution, and the recent tragic events at Tienanmen Square in Beijing, China, have inspired this issue theme and the 1789-1989 time frame. Reflecting on recent events Michael Ruby observed in the June 19, 1989 issue of *U.S. News & World Report*: "Historians need time to untangle the past, give context to the present and provide guidance for the future. But their raw material now plays before our eyes, and we are awestruck by the sights and sounds. Let's see: How would 1789 have looked if it had been covered by minicams?"

"The People's Liberation Army is supposed to love the people," sadly observed a Beijing University professor after the killing of 3,000 and the wounding of 10,000 other freedom demonstrators. This is but the most grisly event seeking to check freedom on the march in long repressed Communist lands, China, the Soviet Union, and the East European Soviet satellites. As the German philosopher Hegel analyzed the forces of history nearly two centuries ago we are witnessing "none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom."

One of the Center's Board members, John C. Whitehead, offered some startling observations in accepting the Center's highest award, its Distinguished Public Service Medal, on June 21, 1989. In doing so he not only had the vantage point of the past four years as Deputy Secretary of State but also from a life-time of service in the cause of freedom through such organizations as the International Rescue Committee. "For the first time since World War II," he declares, "the bitter, dangerous confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, a confrontation which dominated world affairs and threatened peace and security and stability everywhere, has all but disappeared." However, the American people have difficulty comprehending the victory which has been won with Soviet Communism. Now we must formulate a new agenda, confronting "problems of the environment, of drugs, of terrorism, of refugees and immigration. . . . These," he concludes, "are the challenges of today." It is vital that we confront them.

Clearly the long repressed China, Soviet Union, Poland and the other Soviet satellites will never be the same again. One President, Jimmy Carter, who nurtured human rights for those repressed people, has to date not been fully appreciated for his efforts. From a unique vantage point Dr. Friedbert Pflüger, Press Secretary to the President of West Germany, in the next essay re-examines President Carter's human rights policies. As Dr. Pflüger observes, "In China, the Soviet Union and in East Germany, in South Africa and Poland, in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, in Ethiopia and Chile-everywhere the force of the idea of human rights is making itself felt-moving repressed and repressor alike." The leadership of such democratic nations as France and West Germany was taken aback by the vigor of Carter's human rights statements

regarding Eastern Europe. Moreover, while in part focused on Communist Eastern Europe, he did not spare the rightist dictatorships in other parts of the world. According to Dr. Pflüger, "Before Carter many observers in the world identified the United States with rightists dictatorships; his policies broke down many such views." Pflüger credits President Carter for advancing human rights in many Latin American nations, including Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Peru. However, Carter was unable to achieve national consensus regarding his foreign policy goals. Indeed, many of his critics charged him with lack of coherence, and some with undermining the friendly government in Iran and Nicaragua. They also indicated his human rights statements were too strident, and he toned them down.

Pflüger concludes that while Reagan changed the strategy for pursuing human rights goals, he did continue the human rights pursuit, only more diplomatically and privately than his predecessor. Pflüger finds American idealism praiseworthy and concludes with a quotation from Carter's farewell address: "Our common vision of a free and just society is our greatest source of cohesion at home and strength abroad, greater even than the bounty of our material blessings."

A far more pessimistic portrayal of American foreign policy than that of Whitehead and Pflüger is presented by Professor Charles W. Kegley, Jr. He portrays continuity in American foreign policy since the beginnings of the Cold War in 1945. Whereas there is general agreement on that fact, he suggests that the Bush Administration is not prepared to change those policies. Despite such changes as reductions in defense spending and troop reductions overseas, Kegley portrays an administration unresponsive to new opportunities, paying lip service to the end of the Cold War, but not believing it. Kegley seems to contest the wisdom of the Bush view: "Trust, but verify *first*." He acknowledges the Bush concern for certain new agenda items such as the environment, but he contends that the central focus remains on the Soviet threat. He refuses to accept the Bush assertion that "containment worked," and it is "now time to move beyond containment." He suggests this is mere rhetoric. He quarrels with the view that deeds are more important than words in judging Soviet policy; he criticizes Bush's "plodding deliberations," and contends that Bush will make no basic changes in the foreign policies he has inherited from his predecessors. We shall in future issues invite additional points of view.

Following the Whitehead, Pflüger and Kegley essays, we go back 200 years to 1789, the year in which France made a dramatic break with its past, launching a revolutionary process with the motto "Liberty, Fraternity, Equality." The United States had already had its own revolution of a different character, primarily to establish itself as an independent nation. But its first years of independence had been that of a loose alliance of 13 states. National authority, including guarantees of individual liberty, remained to be put into place. Washington had hoped this could be accomplished without party faction. But that is not the way it happened. The creation and carrying through of Washington's agenda gave birth to political parties, the Federalists, led by Washington and Hamilton, and the Republicans, antecedents of the Democrats today, led by Jefferson and Madison.

Dr. Glen A. Phelps, in his essay "George Washington and the Paradox of Party",

portrays these developments. As he notes, "The first President would have a unique opportunity to shape not just the executive branch, but also political attitudes and behaviors that would become part of a broader constitutional tradition. Washington appreciated the importance of the stage on which he was about to enter."

The one thing above all which Washington sought to avoid was party factions. Madison in *Federalist* #10 had concluded that by human nature factions or parties were inevitable. In his First Inaugural Address Washington pledged that in his administration there would be no "party animosities. . . ." A few weeks into office he assured James Wilson he would be "an impartial . . . magistrate." He recognized from the beginning that Jefferson had his own political followers. But he believed that by bringing him into the administration he could achieve harmony and unity. By 1793, however, when he accepted Jefferson's resignation as Secretary of State, he was convinced that to bring an opposition member into his administration would be "political Suicide."¹

Phelps concludes, "The characterization of Washington as a kind of referee in the great Hamilton-Jefferson struggle lacking any strong ideological convictions of his own, simply is not true." Washington was a staunch Federalist. "He was," Phelps concludes, "our first partisan President."

The ensuing series of articles further illustrate the issue theme, "Human Rights and Political Alignment." In the first of these, that by Lawrence Spinelli, President Harding's goal for a strong merchant marine is confounded by the moralist prohibitionist forces in the Nation. The 18th Amendment prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcoholic beverages in the United States had gone into effect in 1920. Did this preclude American passenger ships from selling liquor on the high seas? The issue came to dominate merchant marine policy and involve prominent persons. Albert Lasker, who headed the United States Shipping Board, believed that outside the three mile zone of coastal waters liquor could be sold. But August Busch, who headed the nation's largest brewery, sought to prove the fallibility of the 18th Amendment. Hence he argued against consumption on any American vessels anywhere. President Harding and Attorney General Daugherty proved hapless in the face of the strongly organized prohibitionists. As a result American passengers flocked to foreign ships. The issue proved disastrous for Republicans in the November 1922 Congressional election. Dr. Spinelli concludes, "By the Spring of 1923, President Harding was forced to accept the fact that the prohibitionists had triumphed. The Eighteenth Amendment had emerged as an unexpected complication in the effort to build a merchant fleet that reflected the new international stature of the United States." The dries were simply too strong, even after the Supreme Court ruled that American ships could sell liquors beyond the three mile limit. Shortly thereafter Harding took this defeat, as he did with so many issues, to his grave.

Dr. Mark Stern contributes two parallel essays regarding civil rights, the first on Eisenhower and the second on Kennedy. In the former he first presents a discerning portrayal of the considerations which prompted Eisenhower's decision to run for the Presidency in 1952. Like that other great military leader, Washington, Eisenhower came to be a leader of his party. Indeed, his decision to run, according to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., was, in part, predicated on the importance of restoring a strong two party

system. Not since Hoover in 1928 had a Republican been elected President. Dr. Stern quotes this editor in concluding that Eisenhower became "the most skilled politically of the modern presidents with the possible exception of FDR."

In the area of civil rights Eisenhower moved with caution, determination, and skill. He carried through desegregation of all United States military facilities and in all facilities in the District of Columbia. He also created a non-discriminatory Committee on Government Contracts, with Vice President Nixon as Chairman. Nixon invited Martin Luther King to visit him in his office. In 1953 Eisenhower appointed Governor Earl Warren as Chief Justice, describing him as having "middle of the road political philosophy," a term he used to describe himself. He appointed Warren realizing full well that the desegregation issue in schools would soon come to the Court. On May 17, 1954 the Court handed down its *unanimous* landmark decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, barring segregation in public schools. The following day Eisenhower asked the District of Columbia Commissioners to begin desegregation in the D.C. schools. Also in 1954 Eisenhower appointed John M. Harlan III, a liberal on race relations, to the Supreme Court. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, Eisenhower went on to secure in 1957 the passage of the first civil rights act since that of the 1875 post-Civil War reconstruction period. Ironically he did so despite the opposition of Senators Kennedy and Johnson.

With skill Eisenhower accomplished much in the civil rights area, far more than he is given credit for. Moreover, he realized the need of support in the South for the Republicans to survive as a national party. Stern concludes, "Eisenhower's stewardship as party leader and President . . ." was "a very successful and a well crafted balancing act of party building and policy leadership."

In the sequel to his Eisenhower essay, Professor Stern addresses "John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights: From Congress to the Presidency." Even Kennedy's staunch supporter, Theodore Sorensen, concludes, "As a Senator he simply did not give much thought at all to this subject." What he gave was dictated by his quest for the presidency. The young Senator had been at odds with the liberals. They never forgave his failure to join in the 1954 censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy. His 1956 volume, *Profiles in Courage*, had brought him considerable national fame. That year he had considerable white southern support as the Democratic candidate for Vice President. The following year he opposed the Eisenhower supported Civil Rights Act, much to the distress of the NAACP. By contrast Vice President Nixon, who as the presiding officer in the Senate had aided the legislation, gained the support of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other black leaders. How then did Kennedy in his 1960 election contest with Nixon gain the black vote which was vital to his closely contested victory? The crucial incident was when two weeks before the election Martin Luther King was jailed for picketing in Atlanta. Kennedy's brother-in-law, Shriver, convinced Kennedy to call Coretta King to express empathy for her husband. By contrast Nixon remained silent. This led Martin Luther King to brand Nixon "a moral coward." Stern concludes, "The black vote shifted overwhelmingly into the Democratic column and was a major factor in Kennedy's carrying several key states. . . ." However, in May 1961 when Representative Cellar and Senator Clark introduced the legislative candidate

Kennedy had called for the previous summer, the White House replied, "The President has made it clear that he does not think it necessary at this time to enact civil rights legislation." Stern concludes that Kennedy's "public position on civil rights was, almost always, simply a reflection of his perception of its strategic value to him in his pursuit of office."

In a very real sense, as is pointed out in the next essay by Dr. Henry Z. Scheele, the Republican opposition to the Kennedy Administration was an extension of Eisenhower's leadership. Indeed, the day he left office, January 20, 1961, Eisenhower met with the Republican Congressional leaders to formulate an opposition voice. He proposed a new policy-making group, the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership. As an adjunct he proposed that after its weekly meetings it "put out the news," through the Senate Minority Leader, Everett Dirksen, and the House Minority Leader, Charles Halleck. So began the inimitable "Ev and Charlie" 64 press conferences attended regularly by more than 100 media representatives from 1961-63. Guest appearances were made by both Eisenhower and Nixon.

According to Scheele, it was the liberal Democratic *New York Times* correspondent, Tom Wicker, who first labeled the conferences the "Ev and Charlie Show." Good naturedly Dirksen retorted, the label "doesn't offend me at all, any more than when you refer to some of the great duos in American life, like corned beef and cabbage, ham and eggs, the Cherry sisters, and Gallagher and Sheean."

Federal expenditures headed the items most discussed, followed by the farm problem, federal taxation, and nuclear weapon testing. Professor Scheele concludes, "The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership press conferences emerged as a significant vehicle for political dissemination and served as an effective communicative response to the Kennedy administration."

This issue of *Presidential Studies Quarterly* is rounded out by Book Reviews, Letters to the Editor, News Notes, and the Annual Index of articles and book reviews.

With what we hope is understandable pride we share with you in the News Notes the letter dated June 20, 1989 from the President of the United States. He concludes, "For more than two decades, the Center for the Study of the Presidency has promoted greater understanding of democratic government and, in so doing, has strengthened it. The Center's lectures, conferences, fellowships, and publications have earned a deserved reputation for excellence and have provided great inspiration for our future leaders. Barbara and I applaud the Center for its outstanding record."

R. GORDON HOXIE
Editor, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*
June 30, 1989

Note

1. R. Gordon Hoxie, "The Cabinet in the American Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XIV, 2, Spring 1984, p. 214.

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The Place of the United States in The World Today*

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Thank you very much, Ambassador Farkas. I'm very proud to accept this award from the Center and particularly proud to be included in the distinguished company of Brent Scowcroft and Bob Strauss. Brent has always been my ideal of what a public servant should be—quiet, wise, experienced, dedicated, self-effacing. As for Bob Strauss, he's been out of office so long that no one can quite remember what qualities he brought to public service, but he remains everyone's favorite Democrat and my very good friend.

I'm a great admirer of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and particularly of its singular leader, Gordon Hoxie. Gordon is the leading entrepreneur of the non-profit world. His programs for bringing to Washington young people from all over the country are the best around. His publications are always solid and to the point. He deserves a medal more than we do—and at least a big hand from tonight's audience.

And now, if I may take advantage of the presence of such a distinguished audience, I'd like to say a few serious words about our foreign policy, or, more specifically, about the place of the United States in the world today.

When we read the morning papers or watch the evening news on television, we see a steady stream of bad news from around the world—riots and death sentences in China, violence and bloodshed on the West Bank, starvation in the Sudan, floods in Bangladesh, super-inflation in Argentina, to mention just a few of the recent horror stories—and we get the impression that the world is in chaos, that impossible problems loom everywhere, and that our very survival is in doubt.

But I am convinced that this perception is not reality. I am convinced that, almost without our knowing it, a very positive sea change is taking place in the world. For the first time since World War II, the bitter, dangerous confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, a confrontation which dominated world affairs and threatened peace and security and stability everywhere, has all but disappeared.

Let me remind you of some of the specifics. An arms control treaty to reduce the number of nuclear weapons has been completed with the Soviets and is now being implemented and a second treaty is well on its way toward completion. Rather than wait for negotiations on a conventional arms treaty, the Soviets have announced unilateral dramatic substantive arms reductions and we have responded positively ourselves. The Soviets have cooperated in reducing regional tensions around the world. They have finally withdrawn their troops from Afghanistan. They have helped to bring the Iran-Iraq war to an end. They have influenced their friends in Cuba to agree to withdraw

Cuban troops from Angola. They have influenced their friends in Vietnam to withdraw Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. There is every sign that Soviet expansionism has come to an end, that they have stopped bullying their neighbors and that they are no longer feared or even respected anywhere in the world as they once were.

Let me quickly say, lest you think I am some kind of a fuzzy-headed naive idealist, that I don't for a minute think that the Soviets have done any of this out of the goodness of their hearts. Not at all. They did it because they had to do it. They had no alternative. Their system was and is a complete failure. It did not bring a better life for their people, not politically and not economically. And the people knew it. And the leaders knew it. And they knew they had to change it. And they are trying to change it, as rapidly as they can, to a system like ours, with a political democracy and an economic system which they will never *call* capitalism but which will be as much like it as they can make it.

The simple truth is that we have won the battle with Soviet communism. And they have lost the battle and are retreating in embarrassing disarray. They have thrown in the towel. And all the world knows it. The results of free elections in Poland and Hungary and indeed in the Soviet Union itself are there for all to see. And 1,000,000 demonstrators in Beijing will surely not long be silent.

But somehow we in the United States are having difficulty accepting victory. We may choose not to gloat about our success but surely there is no good reason for us to fail to recognize it. For more than 40 years the battle against Soviet communism has been the principal concern of our foreign policy. Winning that battle is the biggest and best news for America since World War II.

It frees us now to face up to other world problems which we have had to put on the back burner during the years of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, problems which require multinational solutions. Whether we like it or not, we are the undisputed leading nation of the world. Others around the world look to us for leadership. They expect us to offer solutions. But where is our plan for solving the problems of the environment, of drugs, of terrorism, of refugees and immigration, all world-wide problems, requiring world-wide solutions. These are the challenges of today. The Soviet problem was yesterday's problem. If we are to keep our position of leadership in the world, if we are to make the most of our success, we must get on with the new agenda of today's problems.

* These remarks were delivered by Mr. Whitehead at the 1989 Awards Dinner of the Center for the Study of the Presidency on June 21, 1989 at the J. W. Marriott in Washington, D.C.

Human Rights Unbound: Carter's Human Rights Policy Reassessed

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In China, the Soviet Union and in East Germany, in South Africa and Poland, in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, in Ethiopia and Chile—everywhere the force of the idea of human rights is making itself felt—moving repressed and repressors alike.

Scarcely a multinational conference takes place today without touching on the issue of human rights, whether at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the debates of the United Nations, or the Organization of American States (OAS). Scarcely a credit is granted, or foreign aid approved, without a previous check of the human rights situation. Scarcely an infringement of human rights takes place without being greeted by vigorous protests from Amnesty International or even governments. World opinion has been sensitized. Since the middle of the nineteen-seventies the idea of human rights has steadily gained in importance.

To attribute this to a single person or a particular policy would be an exaggeration. But it was President Jimmy Carter, from the moment of his oath of office on January 20th, 1977, who began to use that office to propagate the idea of human rights throughout the world. The unleashing of human rights as a topic on the agenda of international politics will thus remain bound to the name of Jimmy Carter.¹

While pursuing admittedly honorable goals, he mostly failed to realize them politically. Carter's naivete and inconsistency, according to many analyses, ultimately cost America its claim to leadership in world affairs.²

However, much suggests that historians will one day regard Carter with greater fairness. In four years he brought about the Camp David agreement, pushed through the Panama Canal treaty, took up diplomatic relations to the People's Republic of China, and signed the Salt II treaty with the Soviet Union. Especially with his policies on human rights, though, Carter restored a sense of domestic self-confidence and foreign credibility to an America shaken by Vietnam and Watergate.

Carter's human rights policies emerged as the antithesis to Henry Kissinger's realpolitik. America's horrendously ill-directed moralism led Kissinger to the conclusion that it was imperative to deideologize the country's foreign policy altogether: ". . . imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the necessity of peace."

Over the long term, however, this was not enough for the American public. Beginning around 1973 Kissinger was faced with increasing criticism from a public deploring a "moral vacuum" at the center of American foreign policy. To many Americans the Republican administration seemed incapable of overcoming the United States' in-

ternational humiliation through the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and revelations about CIA participation in covert operations abroad. The impression arose that calculations of power and self-interest were the only determining factors of government actions. Many mourned the lack of idealistic principles which they felt was necessary to restore the United States' moral authority.

The backlash from Vietnam, Watergate and realpolitik made the nation long for a moral foundation of America's foreign policy.

As is often the case the changed mood was first reflected in Congress. Led by Representative Donald Fraser, Congress held numerous hearings on the human rights situation in all parts of the world. In 1973, it began linking development and military aid to the human rights situation in recipient countries. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Angola and Ethiopia were faced with considerable cutbacks in aid.

But this new approach was not restricted to the Third World. The 1973/74 Jackson-Vanik Amendment made the Soviet Union's most favoured nation status contingent on Moscow's undertaking to permit certain numbers of Jews to emigrate. Eventually, this led to the abrogation by Moscow of its trade agreement with the USA, dealing a considerable blow to Kissinger's détente policy.

The Ford Administration found itself increasingly on the defensive, especially due to considerable strengthening of Congress in the wake of the Watergate affair. While the Nixon era was labelled an "imperial presidency" the nation now spoke of an "imperial Congress". Extensive human rights legislation narrowed the president's scope of action, particularly regarding economic and military aid for the Third World.

In July 1975 President Ford's refusal to meet in the White House with Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn resulted in a nation-wide uproar. Henry Kissinger's effort to maintain equilibrium in foreign policy had lost its balance at home.³ Americans had allowed themselves to be lulled for a time by "Metternissinger's virtuosity" (Gordon Craig), before returning to their traditional suspicion of realpolitik and its endless juggling with balances of power.

The ground was thus prepared for Jimmy Carter. In his inaugural speech he declared: "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clearcut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights."

While the Ford and Kissinger foreign policy featured key concepts such as stability, equilibrium, status quo, security, and interest, the peanut farmer, "born-again" Christian, and ex-Governor of Georgia spoke primarily of freedom, human rights, morality, the spiritual strength of the nation, and the aristocracy of ideas. Traditional American idealism moved back into the White House.

Jimmy Carter began his incumbency with a veritable fireworks display of human rights declarations. Six days after his inauguration, the State Department protested publicly against the persecution of the Charter 77 human rights group in Czechoslovakia, a group of intellectuals, which demanded compliance with "basket three" of the Helsinki final act. One day later the State Department published a second declaration, in which Washington openly took the side of a Soviet dissident: "All attempts

on the part of Soviet authorities to intimidate Mr. Sakharov will not silence legitimate criticism within the Soviet Union and stand in contradiction to internationally recognized norms of behavior."

A short time later, in Moscow, Andrei Sakharov published a letter from President Carter which contained a promise of future efforts toward the release of political prisoners: "Human rights," wrote Carter, "are a central concern of my administration." Henceforth the entire world showed intense interest in the fate of Sakharov and his colleagues.

Even this, however, was not enough. Washington supported other dissidents as well, and began to lodge complaints with the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. On March 1, 1977, Carter met with the exiled Russian Vladimir Bukowski in the White House.

Despite the general sensation caused by Carter's policy, his "departure" conformed to the familiar pattern of American policy following a change of occupancy in the White House. Almost every new American administration starts with similar elan in its first hundred days, talks of an all-embracing new beginning, and does its best to set itself off from its predecessors. But experience shows again and again that these unconventional actions soon begin to irritate friend and foe alike. Allies and opponents proceed to plead for continuity, and after a time the new President begins to muffle his rhetoric, adapts to world political realities, and distinguishes himself only gradually from his predecessor.

This was precisely the path that Carter took as well. Valérie Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt expressed concern about his campaign.⁴ The Europeans were afraid that the human rights initiative might endanger East-West relations. Carter's "global policy with fanfare" (Marion Gräfin Dönhoff) met with sharp criticism in Moscow as well. Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke of a "poisoned atmosphere," and in March 1977 he dismissed his American colleague Cyrus Vance without having seriously examined the Secretary of State's new arms control proposals. Even if this was largely due to the substance of the new and far reaching proposals themselves, Carter soon recognized that tension existed between aims of human rights and the desire for détente. The President thus decided to abandon the explosive campaign of his first week in office and to incorporate his human rights initiative into a web of other foreign policy objectives. As early as May 1977, *The New York Times* acknowledged that Carter's approach had become "more conventional, careful, and diplomatic."

Regardless of this, considerations of human rights continued to play an important role in the period following this decision, a process exemplified by the CSCE follow-up-conference in Belgrade. At the same time Carter was determined not to let this impair SALT II negotiations. Strategic arms control, Carter noted, was an issue of its own. "No linkage" became the motto used by Carter to isolate SALT from general East-West relations, even in the face of increasing insistence that he should break off the arms control negotiations over the sentencing of the dissidents Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Sharanskij, and Alexander Ginzburg in the summer of 1978. What appeared to human rights activists as a paradox, was in fact merely the attempt to establish a more pragmatic connection between human rights policies and détente. Carter's

public declarations on human rights in Eastern Europe became rarer. He shifted the emphasis to "quiet diplomacy." But, in his opinion, such forms of diplomacy could never be allowed to become another word for inactivity, for moral indifference.

Carter's administration ultimately succeeded in negotiating the SALT II treaty, as well as pursuing the combat against oppression in Eastern Europe. Although the agreement was never ratified by the Senate, both superpowers stayed expressly within the limits for strategic systems set by the treaty—at least until November 1986. Carter's rhetoric in his first weeks of office unquestionably placed a strain on the East-West climate; the collapse of détente at the end of the nineteen-seventies stemmed not from it, however, but from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter's thesis of the possibility of the coexistence of détente and human rights policies was not refuted.

Carter responded to the charge that his human rights initiative had hurt the "code of détente" by pointing out, and not unjustly, that he had merely corrected an existing asymmetry.

While the Soviet Union, in the first half of the nineteen-seventies, had expressly continued its ideological competition with the West despite détente, in the United States a policy had triumphed which regarded human rights policies as an irritation of East-West relations. Carter's approach—his supporters maintained—had revised the unilateral "ideological disarmament" of Washington. Carter's policies served as a reminder that détente had begun as a dynamic process with the long-term goal of the peaceful attainment of freedom in Eastern Europe. Why should the Soviet Union itself, Carter asked, be excluded from this process?

Carter's human rights policies were, from the outset, not limited to Eastern Europe. His criticism included rightist dictatorships in all parts of the world. Building on the human rights legislation already created by Congress, the Carter administration availed itself of bi- and multilateral foreign and military aid in order to document its recognition or criticism of the human rights situations of individual states and, where possible, to bring about improvements. Roughly 30 countries were punished for human rights infringements during Carter's time in office, including Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, but also the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea, as well as Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Ethiopia, and Angola. These actions often helped little to foster the human rights conditions, but sometimes led to significant disgruntlement on the part of the receiving countries, especially when the governments affected by cuts in aid included a number which expressly regarded themselves as allies of the United States.⁵ Brazil, for example, as a direct response to cuts in military aid, terminated a long-standing mutual-assistance pact with Washington. Did the human rights policy endanger proven security alliances?

The same dilemma appeared in other parts of the world: Carter wanted more attention to human rights from the Shah of Iran or President Marcos in Manila. At the same time he was aware of the strategic importance of a stable Iran and the two American military bases on the Philippines.

Was it possible to criticize human rights violations without jeopardizing the national security of the United States? Awareness of this problem led Carter to speak

out increasingly against dogmatic application of foreign aid using the laws passed by Congress and to prefer a more flexible posture related to each specific situation. Only a "case-by-case" approach of this type would enable support of human rights while at the same time taking into account the interests of national security and the cultural givens of individual countries. This approach induced Washington to behave differently towards individual countries. President Ferdinand Marcos was simply more important to the United States than his colleague Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay. This varying treatment of countries equally guilty of human rights violations provided the basis for subsequent accusations of double-standard, and hypocrisy. Critics were demanding a more rigorous human rights policy towards countries like the Philippines, Indonesia or South Korea. How could the Administration pursue the cause of human rights and at the same time—for security reasons—praise the Shah's Iran as an "island of stability"?

Upon closer examination, however, this alleged fickleness revealed itself as an attempt to come to terms with a complex international environment using solutions related to the specifics of each case. Precisely because the Carter administration did not concentrate one-dimensionally on a single foreign policy objective, and was constantly searching for compromise among various objectives, results could not always be repeated. Different goal priorities at different times in different situations can hardly be regarded as inconsistent per se. Otherwise every foreign policy claiming to take a complex environment into account would be automatically inconsistent as well, and only rigid fixation on a single goal would meet the requirements for consistency defined in such terms.

Only in a few cases was Carter able to exert direct pressure on the countries involved, since increased investment by American private companies and banks, increased export by Western European countries, and the increasing self-reliance of some developing and threshold countries (incidentally within the military area in particular) often reduced the possible "levering effects" of sanctions. And yet, human rights policy often had significant effects, particularly because the United States thus distanced itself from state terror and oppression and improved its standing in world opinion accordingly. Before Carter many observers in the world identified the United States with rightist dictatorships; his policies broke down many such views.

Beyond this, however, there were cases of genuine progress in the human rights situation of certain countries, particularly in Latin America. Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic witnessed transitions to democratic forms of government or, at the very least, substantial liberalization. In hundreds of cases political prisoners were released or their prison conditions improved, as was true of the Philippine opposition figure Benigno Aquino, who was allowed to emigrate to the United States but was assassinated following his return to the Philippines.

Certainly, there were limits to short term progress in the human rights situation. A lack of solidarity among the western countries as to the implementation of human rights rhetoric, important security interests of the United States and most of all the resistance of dictatorships against pressures from abroad and again led to set-backs.

But nevertheless all over the world the repressed felt encouraged and the repressors felt discouraged by the human rights policy. Not later than 1978, the International League of Human Rights, in its annual report, contended that interest in questions of human rights had increased world-wide—much of this due to the policy of the Carter-administration.

Carter not only strengthened world-wide awareness of human rights, but also served the interests of the USA. Claudio Orrega, member of Chile's opposition Christian Democrats, evaluated U.S. human rights policy thusly: "Never before did such a widespread feeling of friendship and warmth toward the United States exist throughout the continent."⁶ The same could be witnessed in Europe, especially among young people and on university campuses. The United States of America was no longer identified with Vietnam, Watergate and CIA, but once again with freedom and human rights. Can one seriously claim that Carter's human rights policies did not serve Washington's interests in the Western hemisphere better than his successor's support for the Nicaraguan "contras?"

Carter failed, however, to fulfill his own expressed aim: the creation, by means of his human rights policy, of the basis for a new, durable foreign policy consensus in the United States. Some criticized the threat to détente, while others spoke of a lukewarm response to human rights violations against the background of the SALT negotiations. Several observers charged that Carter, despite his rhetoric, still maintained close security to several dictatorships in the Third World: other commentators, in contrast, regarded the President's policy as an undermining of friendly governments such as Nicaragua and Iran. Thus Carter's policy remained controversial.

When he finally proved unable for months on end to solve the hostage crisis in Iran, which deeply damaged America's self-confidence, the President suddenly found himself alone. His attempts to create respect for human rights, disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and honesty in dealings among nations no longer fit the political climate. America had decided to let its past, in the form of Vietnam, sink into oblivion. Americans wanted to "be someone" again, not constantly suffering from a bad conscience. The new thinking privileged power over morality: the rest of the world should not be given the chance to "push America around" again.

The Reagan administration's first decisions on human rights policy seemed to confirm this impression: Ambassador Robert White was recalled from El Salvador, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the most outspoken critic of Carter's human rights policy was appointed ambassador to the UN, the administration discontinued its aid for Nicaragua and asked that the ban on military aid to Argentina be lifted and, finally, President Reagan received South Korea's President Chun Doo-hwan as his first state visitor and "friend" in the White House.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig elaborated the emerging new policy line in a fundamental speech delivered on 31 March 1981. He saw the main threat to human rights in the expansion of totalitarianism. As a result, he said, the human rights cause would best be served by containing the spread of extremist forces. In doing so, he deemed it quite possible that the USA might in some cases support the "lesser evil," i.e., assist allied authoritarian regimes in warding off Soviet aggression. He stressed

that it would be of little use to improve the lot of a few if this were to result in even worse repression for many.⁷

The administration thus gave the containment of communist expansion priority over human rights. In the long term, Washington expected containment to have a much greater effect in promoting liberty in the world. This approach enabled the administration to label all measures aimed at containing the expansion of Soviet influence as human rights policy. Combating the “main enemy” of human rights was seen as tantamount to promoting the cause of liberty. The shift of emphasis in the human rights policy to censure of communist states, the priority given to containing Soviet influence and differentiation in assessing the “dangerousness” of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have numbered among the most conspicuous changes in the human rights policy since Ronald Reagan assumed office. But those who assumed that the new priorities would spell drastic changes in all aspects of Washington’s human rights policy were soon proved wrong. One of the reasons for this was certainly the strong “human rights lobby” in Washington.

A whole network of organisations, research institutes and church groups promoting human rights was formed in the USA in the 1970s. There was also a strong Congressional lobby urging an active human rights policy along Carter’s lines. The influence of these groups became conspicuously evident when Ernest Lefever, Ronald Reagan’s nominee as head of the State Department’s Human Rights Bureau, had to withdraw his candidacy under pressure from Congress and the public.

Lefever’s defeat signalled Reagan, the Congress and large segments of the public were not prepared, following Carter’s election defeat, to entirely sacrifice the human rights policy to the containment concept. Even the Republicans in the Senate were evidently not willing entirely to write off the Carter era’s human rights drive. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Percy, repeatedly stressed the necessity of a “credible and effective human rights policy.”

Reagan could not simply ignore such statements, and this became obvious a few months later when he appointed Elliott Abrams as the head of the Human Rights Bureau. Abrams saw human rights as having to be “in the absolute center of our foreign policy.” Prior to his nomination, he had secured assurances that his Bureau would retain its important status within the administration. Moreover, he had drafted a memorandum on human rights policy that even met with the approval of Secretary of State Haig. The paper provided for a renewed emphasis on human rights as part of Reagan’s foreign policy. This policy was to receive added credibility by Washington’s censure of human rights violations even in “friendly” non-communist states. Even though the Soviet Union remained the prime target of the human rights policy, the paper stressed that it was still necessary to work towards the observation of human rights in rightist dictatorships as well — if necessary by curtailing credits to those countries. As far back as October 1983, Abrams was so satisfied with Washington’s stance on the human rights issue that he told *The New York Times* that the differences between Carter’s and Reagan’s approach to the issue were “surprisingly hazy” and that there were fewer differences than many observers had expected.

A closer look at the Reagan Administration’s policy f.e. towards El Salvador bears

this out—at least in some areas. Initial fears that Reagan would drop José Napoleon Duarte's reform government and promote a rightist military regime were unfounded. Moreover, there has been no letup in the Reagan Administration's demands for economic, social and democratic reforms. Reagan continued to support Duarte's rural reform programme and his bid to bring about free elections.

Prior to the presidential election in El Salvador in March 1984 and the subsequent runoff on 6 May 1984, Washington made it quite clear that it favoured Duarte over his contender, the right-wing radical, Major Roberto d'Aubisson. Duarte's election victory, though with 53.5 per cent of the vote less incisive than had been expected, was also a success for Washington. *Newsweek* described Duarte's inauguration, which was attended by Secretary of State Shultz, as the Reagan Administration's finest achievement in the region.

Even disregarding El Salvador, Washington's policy seemed in many ways similar to Carter's stance. In a widely noted address to the Organization of American States, Reagan showed sensitivity for the "misery and repression in Latin America." He said that the USA wanted to help solve the problems of the continent using neither violence nor tutelage but economic aid. To this end, the president announced a special initiative for the Caribbean Basin with free access for Caribbean products to the USA as its focal point. Reagan's speech culminated in the statement that the only alternatives open to Latin America were either the establishment or reestablishment of moderate constitutional governments coupled with economic growth and improved standards of living or a further spread of violence from the extreme right or extreme left.⁸

Quite apart from this address, human rights have been a permanent topic of discussion within the OAS. As a result, the Reagan Administration was constantly confronted with this issue. Human rights also played a crucial role during Reagan's five-day tour of Latin America in December 1982. Shaw Smith, who was in charge of Latin American affairs at the State Department, was therefore quite right in saying that the difference between Carter's and Reagan's human rights policies was "not all that dramatic."⁹

There was much talk in Washington and abroad about Reagan's "Turnaround on Human Rights."¹⁰

Even so, there were naturally some clear shifts of emphasis. Reagan's greater willingness to lend military assistance and his somewhat more emphatically stated determination to do all that is necessary to contain communist influence in the American hemisphere soon became obvious. The Reagan Administration's policy towards Nicaragua f.e. differed markedly from Carter's approach.

In the very first days of his term of office, Reagan discontinued economic aid for Managua while his predecessor had hoped until the very end that such aid would reduce Nicaragua's dependence on Cuba and strengthen the political moderates by such moves as low-interest loans to small and medium-sized business and the private agricultural sector.

As opposed to Carter, Reagan always regarded Nicaragua as already "lost." In his view, the country was already under Cuban influence, supported guerrilla movements in El Salvador, Honduras and Grenada and militarily jeopardised or threatened

the stability of the whole region, thus challenging the USA in its traditional sphere of interest. Reagan regarded the Sandinist leaders as Marxist-Leninists who, emulating Castro, were determined from the very beginning to hold onto absolute power in the country in order to realise their political ideas without regard for the wishes of the people and for human rights.

The Reagan Administration therefore soon decided not to remain passive but to support the anti-Sandinist "counterrevolution" through more or less (in the latter stages increasingly less) covert actions. This assistance ranged from military training for the "Contras" via arms supply all the way to helping with the mining of Nicaragua ports.

Shortly before his unexpected death, Senator Frank Church had criticised the Reagan Administration saying that it was wrong and futile to uphold US interests in Central America with military means. He said the administration overestimated the communist threat in the Third World and underestimated the social causes of revolutions there. Instead of being guided by an unwarranted fear of Marxism, Reagan should keep out of Central America, learn to live with the region's revolutions and trust that the natural superiority of the American social and economic system would gain the upper hand there in the long run.¹¹

Arthur Schlesinger also openly criticised Reagan's Nicaragua policy. He said that the administration's ideological approach, governed by anticommunism, had blinkered it for the local causes of the revolution and that it therefore wrongly pinned the blame for every uprising on Moscow and Havana. He averred that due to Reagan's ideological prejudice towards the Sandinists they had had no choice but to become Marxists. Schlesinger had maintained that due to the administration's a priori decision that the revolution in Nicaragua was a Soviet-Cuban plot, Washington left the Sandinists no alternative but to seek Cuban and Russian support.¹²

There is much that speaks in favour of this argument. At the time, this was the main reason for Carter's wish to support the revolutionary movement in Managua immediately after it came to power. The idea was to contain the Cuban influence. Frank Church's arguments can also not be rejected out of hand because there is evidence of a certain discrepancy between Reagan's sweeping freedom optimism on the one hand and, on the other, his incredible fear of any radical influence on reform movements.

It is still open how the situation in Nicaragua will finally develop and if the Arias-plan for peace in the region will have a long term chance. Can support of the "Contra" really gain the administration friends in Central America?

Notwithstanding all the public attention Reagan's policy towards Central America has received at home, the administration's drive in the area of human rights has essentially been centered on the Soviet Union and its East European allies. The CSCE follow-up meetings in Madrid and Vienna, which had to monitor the implementation of the final act of the Helsinki-agreement of 1975, were used by American diplomats as a forum to propagate human rights and to attack the Soviet Union ideologically.

Jimmy Carter too had been well aware of the significance of the competition of political systems and the real power of ideas. He was equally aware of the function

of the human rights policy as a "strong weapon in our continuing competition with Soviet ideology." Under Ronald Reagan, this motivation for the human rights policy became pivotal and, at times, it seemed to overlay the drive to achieve human easements in concrete individual cases. For Carter, the chances of the human rights policy lay primarily in a relaxed East-West atmosphere. As a result—following an initial overzealousness—he repeatedly made a point of not jeopardising progress in such areas as arms control by excessive toughness in lambasting human rights violations. Reagan, on the other hand, has often conveyed the impression that his human rights policy toward the Soviet Union is no more than a sub-function of his general containment concept vis-a-vis Moscow aimed at restoring America's strength in all areas: military, economic and ideological.

During his first administration, Reagan had been considerably more willing than Carter to seek ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union and, in doing so, to support dissidents in Moscow's sphere of influence. It is self-evident that this attitude severely irritated the Soviets and was thus not exactly conducive to an easing of East-West tensions in the security sector. In his second administration, however, with his dramatic 1987–88 negotiations eliminating intermediate and short range ground launched ballistic missiles world-wide on the part of the U.S. and the Soviets, he made a dramatic breakthrough in reducing tensions.

Active human rights policy is always the expression of the element of idealism in foreign policy. Notwithstanding the great differences between Carter's and Reagan's human rights approaches, America's traditional idealism—the very idealism Congress revived in the early 1970s as a counterweight to Kissinger's *realpolitik*—is evident in both. Even if Reagan's idealism took on a more anti-communist hue and owed less to America's guilt complex resulting from the Vietnam War, his and Carter's idealism seem to have similarities: America epitomises the "good" in the world and has been charged by destiny with playing a central role in the global dissemination of human rights and liberty.

In June 1982, Ronald Reagan urged a "crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation . . . Let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny."¹³ In another speech in April 1984, Reagan expressly avowed America's "idealism:" "All Americans share two great goals for foreign policy: a safer world; and, a world in which individual rights can be respected and precious values may flourish. As 'faithful friends of democracy', Americans should go ahead in the firm conviction that 'the tide of the future is a freedom tide.'"¹⁴ This was exactly Carter's rhetoric!

The realization of idealism under Carter and Reagan has come under sharp criticism time and again, especially in Europe. The dangers of an idealistic foreign policy are obvious. Such a policy can easily slide into ideology and dogmatism. What threatens to prevail is not the many-faceted reality but manichean thought patterns with a constant tendency to selfrighteousness and the overestimating of one's own prowess. The Vietnam War has shown that good intentions can lead to disastrous results and that certain political and military means with which to achieve a noble end can discredit this very end. Even so, idealism will always remain a significant element of U.S. for-

ign policy because any country's foreign policy is largely determined by its political development, historic experience and geographic situation. It is of little use to deplore the dangers of American idealism. What matters is to explain it in the light of the nation's history, to understand it and learn to make it calculable.

As opposed to the European countries, the American nation has neither a centuries-old past nor ethnic homogeneity. Instead, it has been created by a deliberate act of people of differing national, political and cultural origins. The true American character is therefore not marked by a common past of the nation's citizens but by common ideals: personal liberty, human rights and democracy.

While Europe engaged in foreign policy even before the term "sovereignty of the people" was coined—and to this day too much citizen participation in foreign policy decisions is seen as detrimental to the affairs of states—the United States has never had a foreign policy uncoupled from the concept of democracy. This is why it is more difficult in the United States to pursue a foreign policy that does not reflect the values of the American Revolution—if only in the rhetoric of those in government.

What influences America's foreign policy even more is the fact that the United States' geographic situation has spared it the complicated power structures, changing alliances and innumerable wars that have been part and parcel of Europe for centuries. The USA, by contrast, has always been protected by two oceans and has never had to fear incursions by its neighbours to the south and to the north. As a result, terms like *realpolitik* or "balance of power" have far less significance for the Americans than for the Europeans for whom a balance of power in the Continental concert of nations has often been—and today most assuredly is—a genuine question of survival.

The type of *realpolitik* the USA pursued under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford would probably not have been possible had it not been for the experience of the Vietnam War and the outstanding personal prowess of that policy's advocate, Henry Kissinger. But in general the United States will always tend to pursue a basically idealistic policy. In his farewell speech on January 14th, 1981, Jimmy Carter declared: "We may be tempted to abandon some time-honored principles and commitments . . . We must never yield to this temptation . . . Our common vision of a free and just society is our greatest source of cohesion at home and strength abroad, greater even than the bounty of our material blessings."

* Dr. Pflüger is expressing his private opinion.

Notes

1. See my book: Friedbert Pflüger, *Die Menschenrechtspolitik der USA*, München/Wien 1983
2. See for example the study: Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade*, Hamilton Press, New York/London 1986
3. As far back as 1972 Stanley Hoffmann, in an article, raised the question: "Will the Balance Balance at Home?", *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1972, p. 60
4. From the very beginning, Helmut Schmidt belonged to the strongest critics of Carter, see his new book: *Menschen und Mächte*, Berlin 1987
5. The problems of this policy and the necessity to "fine-tune the leverage-based policy" is discussed by Alan Tonelson, "Human Rights; The Bias We Need", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1982/83

6. Claudio Orrega, "Basic Human Rights and Political Development. 15 Years of Experience in Latin America", Lecture at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Advanced Scholars, 15 January 1981 (mimeographed manuscript), p. 60
7. Alexander Haig, Address to the Trilateral Commission, Washington, 31 March 1981
8. Ronald Reagan, address to the OAS, Washington DC, 24 February 1982
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The Bush Administration and the Future of American Foreign Policy: Pragmatism, or Procrastination?

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"The really surprising thing about [the United States] has been the basic stability of American foreign policy [since World War II]. There has been a continuity that no one could have predicted."

—Henry Brandon, 1983

Today, more so than at any time since the Truman Doctrine set the course for postwar American foreign policy, the orthodox assumptions underlying that world view are being challenged. Rapidly changing times, in the meaning of the Chinese ideogram, pose a *crisis* for American foreign policymakers: they create both opportunities and dangers.

Has the time arrived for reconsideration of the foreign policy axioms of the last half-century? In the twilight of the twentieth century, George Bush's assertions about the need to look over the horizon and prepare for the year 2000 suggest conceptual stocktaking has become fashionable and have raised expectations that fresh approaches might be framed. As Bush put it in March (unless otherwise noted, this and all subsequent policy statements will refer to pronouncements made in 1989), "The essential question today is, what are we doing to prepare for the new world that begins eleven short years from now? That is what my agenda is all about."

Such pronouncements imply recognition that past policies may no longer be appropriate, that possibly what "was once a reasoned policy [had] become a conditioned reflex,"¹ and that construction of a new vision may have now become imperative.

Yet, even if emergent circumstances seem to cry for new foreign departures, observation of the new administration's words and deeds during its first half year in office suggests that only superficial, remedial modifications of the postwar vision were contemplated and that basic foreign policy reorientations were not under consideration. Even though pressures for policy change mounted, what surfaced was repetitious pronouncements of the need for deliberation and deferral of choice. *Pragmatism* and *prudence* became favored words in the administration's rhetoric. The test of a policy style is whether it works. Was hesitation and deliberation truly pragmatic and prudent? Or did the championed principles mask indecisiveness and procrastination?

The Setting for Presidential Policymaking in 1989

In his campaign for office, and as president, George Bush sought to project an image of himself as a pragmatically-oriented decision maker. To convey an impression of professional competence, experienced policymakers skilled in management were appointed to Washington's key policy-making positions. The Reagan presidency's ideological pontification was replaced by a declared commitment to detached policy *planning*. The Bush administration thus pictured itself as an able group inspired more by the desire to rationally forge effective policies than by the desire to crusade for ideological causes. A businesslike approach sought to elevate prudence and a focus on the long-haul to principles of policymaking. "President Bush obviously decided to proceed at a deliberate speed. . . . His Administration's main theme [was] not ideology but pragmatism: prudent approaches carried out by skilled practitioners, without polemics or militancy, and—critics would add—without vision."²

But pronouncements are not policies, and a posture is not a program. Neither a coherent, comprehensive plan nor a purposeful design were presented, and many hard decisions were dismissed as premature. The lines between deliberation and delay, caution and aimlessness are intrinsically blurred, and it is difficult to discern whether Bush's avowed preference for pragmatism concealed an inability to frame positions and avoid procrastination.

Nonetheless, a capacity to make necessary adjustments was shown by alterations made of several aspects of the Reagan policy legacy, as, for example, with respect to defense spending, troop reductions overseas, and Third World debt. As shall be argued, however, these changes "didn't add up to any fundamental shift of course for the nation."³ George Bush represents an extension of the Reagan era, and the approach of his administration derives much of its character from it.

The extraordinary opportunities for policy innovation that had opened at the time of Bush's entry into office were not welcomed, and, as the review that follows will illustrate, the administration returned to conceptualizations that had been formulated decades earlier. The tune was a mere variation on a tried and tired melody sung often before, after many rehearsals; the new performers read from old sheet music.

The grip of old beliefs on the definition of the available options appeared to propel American foreign policy under Bush within the confines of a very conventional path: to carry out the goals of globalism, anticommunism, containment, military might and interventionism⁴ in ways that only tinkered with moderate adjustments at the margins.

Indeed, the Bush regime's diplomatic performance in its formative stage suggests that procrastination has prevailed over pragmatism, as U.S. policymakers fumbled with profound uncertainties as to how to proceed. The drift discloses the absence of consensus about the longterm corrective action required to position the country for the threshold of the next century.

Let us briefly examine the Bush administration's policy posture as revealed in its public statements and actions⁵ during its first half-year in order to demonstrate the extent to which its muted response conformed more than it diverged from the established pattern.

Globalism

From the beginning the Bush administration repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to a global role for the country. Priority was given to projecting American power abroad and to demonstrating the nation's resolve to protect its interests everywhere. Unlike Jimmy Carter and many others who had preached that the nation's ability to manage developments in an interdependent world had eroded, Bush maintained that global disengagement was not acceptable. Preeminence was to be preserved.

The administration's advocacy of global diplomacy was captured in Bush's attack in August, 1988, on the positions of his rival for office, Michael Dukakis, which he called "a rejection of America's role as a world leader and a repudiation of the Truman Doctrine and the vision of John Kennedy." To emphasize his faith in that vision, he described the United States as an agent morally responsible for directing global affairs. As Bush noted on October 14, 1988, ". . . I think we're facing a real opportunity for world peace, . . . and it's a question as to whether the United States will continue to lead. You see, I don't believe any other country can pick up the mantle."

George Bush's globalist outlook undoubtedly stemmed from the *realpolitik* tutoring he had received; and for those schooled in this philosophy assertive American leadership was a given. Accordingly he tacitly endorsed former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's belief that the American "commitment to international affairs on a global scale [had] been decided by history [and could] not be undone, and the only remaining relevant question is what its form and goals [would] be."⁶ Isolationism was not seen as an option. Secretary of State Baker's pledge on April 14 was indicative: ". . . we're going to affect the future substantially, whether we do so deliberately or not. We can . . . be a force for freedom and peaceful change unlike any country in the world."

The Bush administration's internationalism represented an implicit attack on the view that American splendor was mortal.⁷ During the 1970s and 1980s a neoisolationist mood had arisen, punctuated by talk of suspending the U.S. commitment to allies to protect their security and of "decoupling" Europe, as well as by a vigorous, vocal attack on multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and UNESCO. Under President Reagan, the "internationalist ethos" supporting international law and organizations had ceased to be "significant outlets for political idealism in the United States [and instead had become] the objects of derision and contempt."⁸ That mood and America's go-it-alone policy⁹ was fed by American frustration with its loss of influence. A contraction of the scope of America's global involvements had appeared to many to be inevitable, and the challenge had become how to accommodate the nation to the reality of this deteriorating circumstance without jeopardizing U.S. security. Lost was any confidence about recovering the omnipotent power that the country had possessed at the end of World War II.

Like the Reagan administration in which he had served, Bush rejected the view that the United States was "overcommitted"¹⁰ or that its global reach suffered from "overstretch,"¹¹ and he denied the need for disengagement that such a disparity between ambitions and resources implied. The Nixon Doctrine, which had acknowledged he diminished capacity of the United States to either control global developments

everywhere or to assume responsibility for them, was repudiated. The need for a globalist foreign policy was reaffirmed, and John Kennedy's pledge to pay any burden was often quoted approvingly.

Anticommunism

Throughout the postwar period discussions of American national interest often have been couched in the language of ideology—of opposition to communism's presumably evangelical global impulses. Indeed, diplomatic pronouncements by American statesmen since the late 1940s indicate that communism had become, as President Carter once described it, "an inordinate fear" and an "obsession."

The hold of anticommunist thinking was hardly ever stronger than during Reagan's occupation of the White House. His administration viewed nearly every international development through the prism of anticommunist ideology; all events disrupting the global status quo, such as terrorism, were traced to the revolutionary activities of a supposedly coordinated communist front.¹² Communism, seen as an ideological scourge, was proclaimed "the focus of evil in the modern world," and confronting that evil seemed to energize American foreign policy throughout most of the Reagan presidency; only in the last phase did a more pragmatic approach gain acceptance.

As a self-described pragmatist Bush succeeded in separating its conduct from the hysterical extremes of Reagan's ideological interpretation of the threat, but stopped short of suspending its ideological definition of global issues. Anticommunist rhetoric did recede in an era where many people in the communist world were aggressively experimenting with economic and political reforms, openly encouraging free enterprise, introducing "profit motives" into their vocabulary and policies, and voting in elections to repudiate Communist party candidates. In the late 1980s it appeared that "the communist experiment [had] failed both in communist countries and in developing countries [and that] the model it represented for development [had] lost its influence everywhere."¹³ In this atmosphere, strident opposition to an ideology that was undergoing rapid mutation, deviation from its core principles, and loss of influence seemed irrelevant. Bush recognized the new climate and accordingly his attack on communism became less vocal and vehement, muted even. But that did not mean that anticommunism was forgotten, or that it ceased to influence policy thinking. To declare, as did Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter, that "communism has proven to be a false god," and to attribute communism's retreat to the success of Reagan's militant opposition to it and conclude that the menace had been defeated,¹⁴ did not mean that the anticommunist mentality was dead. The "inordinate fear" may have become dormant, but clearly a Cold War orientation continued to color the U.S. interpretation of unrest in the Third World and to reinforce the penchant to view global issues in terms of their implications for the East-West rivalry.

The probability that the fear was latent but not dead was intimated by Bush's acknowledgement on May 21 that whereas "an ideological earthquake is shaking asunder the very communist foundation, . . . it is clear that Soviet 'new thinking' has not yet totally overcome the old." The war, to him, was not yet over, even if its end was in sight: "We are now approaching," Bush reported on May 12 "the conclusion of

a historic postwar struggle between two visions—one of tyranny and conflict, and one of democracy and freedom . . . [My administration's review] outlines a new path toward resolving this struggle." But clearly, a struggle for a worldview to replace the entrenched one founded on anticommunism had not been undertaken. Had ideology prevailed over pragmatism?

Containment

The abiding relevance of the focus of American diplomacy on the control of the Soviet Union has been challenged by the U.S.S.R.'s failure to compete in the modern world, the careening bankruptcy of the Soviet economy, the withdrawal of the Soviet presence outside its borders and concentration on "perestroika" or restructuring at home, and by the rise of important new global issues which either do not involve the Soviet Union directly or require cooperation with it. Arms control, multiple North-South issues, energy and food security, drug-trafficking, balance-of-trade and payments deficits, foreign debt and investment, protectionism, economic competitiveness, pollution, immigration, resurgent Third World nationalism, and other global problems have all demanded attention and, in the view of some, have rendered anachronistic the Russo-centric focus of postwar American foreign policy.

The Bush administration did not dismiss these challenges and new issues, and ought to bring some of them (for example, environmental degradation) into the national spotlight. But the fact that it chose to expand the foreign policy agenda should not obscure its continued emphasis on the Soviet threat. Although President Bush readily recognized that collaboration with the Soviet Union was possible and could pay dividends at home and abroad, he consistently made clear his view that the relationship of the United States with the Soviet Union remained inherently competitive. "The Cold War is not over," he declared in 1988, and maintained that whereas the United States "must be bold enough to seize the opportunity of change," it must at the same time be prepared for "protracted conflict." The president's pronouncement (May 12) that "containment worked" and it was "now time to move beyond containment" was betrayed by his practices, which continued to pursue the old goal through old methods. Containment remained the cornerstone of his policy.

The Bush administration dismissed as premature what appeared to most observers to be unprecedented opportunities to collaborate in areas where American and Soviet interests intersected, and responded negatively to Mikhail Gorbachev's dramatic series of pacific initiatives (for which the Soviets scored great public relations victories). Secretary of State Baker captured the administration's deep mistrust and hand-wringing caution on April 14, when he counseled: "I think it is too soon to conclude that the Soviet policies most troubling to the West are in fact, gone forever." Underlying the administration's hesitation was dismissal of the view that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was less threatening than it was at the height of the Cold War—a precept publicly expressed by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, who in March predicted that Gorbachev and the reforms he was masterminding would not succeed. This comment raised doubts as to whether the administration truly wanted Gorbachev to

succeed—suspicions which Bush belatedly sought to dispel when he announced on May 12 that “our goal [is] integrating the Soviet Union into the community of nations.”

Declaring May 31 that “we’re at the end of one era, and at the beginning of another,” and that it was “now time to move beyond containment, to a new policy for the 1990s,” observers worldwide could not help wonder when the movement would begin. Bush’s reluctant reaction also raised another doubt: would not a true pragmatist aggressively seek a more constructive relationship when the opportunity presented itself?

The announced goal of moving beyond containment was followed by the qualifications that “many dangers and uncertainties are ahead” and that “we are only at the beginning of our new path”—which made the announcement appear less than sincere. The paths followed—the means selected to deal with the Soviet Union—likewise were unoriginal and suggested that the administration was really interested in pursuing the old goal of containment. Two strategies were outlined. First, the administration tacitly revived Henry Kissinger’s linkage strategy that sought to tie U.S. behavior toward the Soviet Union to Washington’s assessment of Moscow’s activities elsewhere in the world; cooperation on arms control, trade expansion, technology transfer, cultural exchanges and the like would be contingent on the Soviet Union’s adherence to Washington’s code of conduct. The administration asserted that it would distrust words and respect only Soviet deeds, and laid down “‘tests’ to be passed before the Kremlin can ‘earn’ a better relationship.”¹⁵ Second, it proposed to contain Soviet influence by confronting the adversary with preponderant military strength, and committed itself to preserving a favorable strategic advantage in the military balance.

Linkage was resurrected in spirit because the new dialogue that had opened between the superpowers made reciprocated concessions across linked issues a critical part of the bargaining process. Bush conveyed his acceptance of the strategy in his pledge on May 12 that “we will match their steps with steps of our own.” But from the start the strategy was inconsistently applied, and, at that, only in reluctant response to the upstaging concessions Mr. Gorbachev daringly announced, such as his unequal acceptance of concessions in the intermediate-range nuclear force treaty, unilateral disarmament, and the removal of 500 warheads. Gorbachev’s spectacular peace offensive was, at heart, perceived to be offensive. Bush’s pledge to “move beyond the era of containment” arguably was motivated primarily by the ascending need to assuage the fears of America’s allies that the United States alone clung to the perception that the military threat from the East was as dangerous as ever.

In part to counter Gorbachev’s popularity, negotiations eventually did proceed on reducing intermediate and strategic nuclear forces and troop strength in Europe. To comply with what public opinion worldwide strongly endorsed, boundaries defining linkages were expediently blurred, as illustrated by Bush’s decisions in May to subsidize the export of massive quantities of wheat to the Soviets at cut-rate prices without insisting, in return, on reciprocated policy changes, and to consider a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanek trade restrictions if the Soviets liberalized their emigration. In addition, negotiations explored linking U.S. restraint in Eastern Europe in exchange for a Soviet agreement to cease meddling in Central America. Bush also signalled

he was prepared to drop the 'no exceptions' technology export standard imposed in response to the Afghanistan intervention in return for further concessions.

Besides linkage, the second strategy for containing the Soviets was to confront them militarily. At the root of this orthodox deterrence strategy was deep, unmitigated distrust of Soviet motives. This mistrust was reinforced by the same kinds of "worst case" analyses on which previous Cold War confrontational policies had been based. Paul A. Nitze, for a brief period Bush's Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, captured the realpolitik basis for inherent bad faith: "we must always remember to base our security policies on Soviet capabilities and behavior rather than on hopes or expressed intentions."¹⁶

Bush's emphasis on rhetoric toward the containment of Soviet influence followed a worn script. However, faced with the necessity of making difficult choices, the administration's practice disclosed its preference to steer a middle course between pursuit and avoidance of opportunities for cooperation. The consequence was resistance to decisive action and acceptance of the status quo. The administration's time-consuming review of Soviet policy during the first four months in office set the posture and pace: "We have the initial results from the study," Brent Snowcroft, President Bush's national security advisor, commented in April "and it's probably not surprising that the future looks a lot like the present in a straight line projection."

Evidence did not indicate that the administration truly sought to construct a new strategy to replace containment. A vision of a world without the Soviet Union as a threatening enemy was not evident; possibly, to the administration it was inconceivable. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. observed, ". . . this confronts us with what for governments is the most painful of necessities—fresh thought and new policies. So naturally we downgrade the significance of the Gorbachev revolution and fall back into the comfortable platitudes of the old Cold War . . . One has the impression that [George Bush], a man of unimpeachable good will, is the prisoner of a bunch of foreign policy hacks whose idea is to greet every new problem with old clichés."¹⁷

The foreign policy brain trust composed of Reagan holdovers on which Bush relied sought to preserve containment because "they [saw] the world as Washington had seen it for four decades, through the prism of the familiar East-West power game."¹⁸ Hence, the opportunities to escape the confines of the Cold War may be missed.

Military Might and Interventionist Means

As the foregoing suggests, like its predecessors the Bush administration placed great emphasis on military power, and tacitly accepted a familiar tactic: substitute defense policy for foreign policy.

The contours of Bush's military conception of foreign policy were signalled by the extravagant commitment made to defense spending in an era of declining resources, staggering deficits and debts, and Soviet retrenchments in their military presence and profile. For fiscal year 1990, the president requested \$309 billion for defense spending, or approximately 28 percent of the federal budget, and even higher levels for the following years. The steep increases in defense spending institutionalized in the "buy

everything” Reagan era were not challenged, even though their practicality was questionable given the unavailability of enough money to pay for what had been ordered.

The criteria governing how this defense allocation was to be distributed evolved very slowly. The administration first placed primary emphasis on its desire to upgrade the land-based missile leg of the nation’s strategic triad. Bush proposed in April spending \$1.2 billion in 1990 to place 50 MX missiles (10 warheads on each) on rail cars, and another \$100 million as a first installment on a \$25 billion program to build a truck-based Midgetman missile by 1997. The Reagan administration’s proposal to ban all mobile missile systems was dismissed in June (even though administration spokesmen continued to advocate such a ban in Geneva). Support also continued to be voiced for the costly and technologically unproven “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative. The doctrine known as “competitive strategies,” which seeks to exploit U.S. strengths in high-tech, highly accurate munitions or so-called “smart” weapons, was also enthusiastically endorsed, even though experts claimed Bush ignored their serious problems—“high” cost, questionable reliability, effort of weather, and, most important, enemy counter-measures.”¹⁹ Furthermore, Bush announced in June that he planned to go ahead with the Stealth bomber program—potentially the most expensive in the Pentagon history, with a price tag for 132 bombers at \$70 billion—even though Secretary of Defense Cheney had expressed reservations about the program’s cost and quality, and despite the resumption at the same time of negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of nuclear warheads, bombers and missiles in each nation’s arsenal. In addition, Bush opposed a test-ban on nuclear weapons while at the same time he confessed in May that “The fact of the matter is we have a massive survivable nuclear deterrent right now.” “The question for Mr. Bush,” noted Gerald F. Seib, “is whether he ever met [a weapons system] he didn’t like.”²⁰ Unwilling to sacrifice any strategic programs, Bush pledged to also strengthen conventional capabilities: “What we don’t have is the kind of strong conventional defense capability we must have, and that is going to be my top priority as president.”

Nor did the administration look with disfavor on the postwar propensity²¹ to engage in military intervention. Mr. Bush pledged to continue supporting anti-communist rebels,²² thereby reaffirming his faith in the Reagan Doctrine. As one careful student of presidential character, James David Barber, predicted on the day of Bush’s inauguration, “Turning to a military cause, even beyond the dimension of the Grenada invasion that Mr. Bush helped to orchestrate, is . . . going to be a temptation for this President.”²³

The president’s pronouncements made clear the martial thrust of the policy. The capacity to wage extended conventional war worldwide was defined as important; a renewed concern was voiced for developing enhanced counterinsurgency and counterterrorist capabilities; the Carter Doctrine, which pledged the use of military force if necessary to maintain a free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf region, was reaffirmed; and signals were sent to communicate the impression that the CIA was licensed to test many restraints that Congress had earlier placed on its covert activities abroad. In addition, an increasing proportion of the economic aid package was targeted to the Third World in the form of security-supporting assistance, and arms sales abroad

were again perceived as an acceptable policy instrument. In all of these ways the Bush team sought to dispel doubt that the United States had become averse to the military exercise of influence. No one had to read Mr. Bush's lips to infer his faith in military might.

If we put aside the restraint displayed in the Bush administration's actual diplomatic practice, its posture can be classified as an unambiguous reaffirmation of a cluster of enshrined beliefs: strength produces peace, the capacity to destroy is the capacity to control, weapon superiority can both deter and compel, the price of military preparedness is never too high, and political problems are susceptible to military solutions. A centrist George Bush showed little inclination to depart from the center of a beaten path. By clinging to conventional strategies in the face of unconventional circumstances, preference appeared to prevail over pragmatism.

Explaining Continuity in American Foreign Policy: The Sources of Presidential Conduct

What forces reinforced so strongly the Bush presidency's embrace of the same postwar tenets on which his predecessors relied in the postwar era? Are those pressures so potent as to preclude the possibility of reorienting American foreign policy in a world undergoing profound transformation?

To probe these questions and make predictions, we must categorize those forces of influence. For economy of presentation, the forces and factors that collectively shape American foreign policymaking are classified in a typology consisting of five simultaneously interacting categories. These are both internal and external, as defined by James N. Rosenau's well-known "pre-theory" of foreign policy²⁴ and later redefined²⁵ to analyze the determinants of change over time in the foreign policy of the United States. The categories distinguish the personal predispositions of the *individuals* who occupy the White House, the *roles* (behavioral expectations and norms associated with each major position within the policymaking system) that shape the conduct of the individuals holding them, the organization and structure of the *governmental* agencies and bureaucracies that manage U.S. foreign affairs, the attributes of American *society* and behaviors of those non-governmental actors within it that seek to influence foreign policymaking, and the stimuli received from the *external* environment of the United States (the evolving trends and issues in, and characteristics of, the international system that define the global setting of American foreign policy). The impact of each of these five categories or sources of American foreign policy shall be considered sequentially, in order to illuminate the influences on Bush's procrastinated practice of pragmatic policymaking that inhibit his capacity to pragmatically engineer policy changes.

Consider first the manner in which any administration's foreign policy reflects the *individual* or idiosyncratic qualities of the man sitting in the Oval Office. This impact, often magnified in the public mind, is actually more marginal than most citizens imagine. For this reason historians typically have portrayed many presidents as compromising chameleons whose capacity to lead ultimately was compromised by the compromises they felt it necessary to make.

The Bush presidential experience during his first half year illustrates the limits

to presidential power and the policy inertia that personal predispositions can create. In George Bush we have a president whose personality disposes him strongly to seek public approval, to back away from domestic confrontation, and to seek compromises. We also have in him an individual with a history of adherence to precedents and an instilled inclination to make decisions piecemeal; his long-time associate, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, described his decisionmaking as shaped “. . . out of a lifetime of dealing with problems on a one-by-one basis.”²⁶ Throughout Bush’s long career as a public servant he has exhibited a compulsion to take the middle road, to wait for events to hit his desk and to let them set his agenda. Bush’s overwhelming desire to keep options open has reinforced “the tendency to postpone hard choices on issues that may cry out for action.”²⁷ Far more reactive than proactive, with a propensity “to allow” situations to dictate to him rather than the reverse,²⁸ important decisions have been delayed until time-consuming reviews have been completed. Paralysis by analysis has been symptomatic.

The president himself seemed to be aware of the potential problem of missed opportunities for lasting superpower harmony and mindful of the danger of protracted delay when in January he observed, in the context of his snail-pace reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev’s overtures, “What I don’t want is to have it look like foot-dragging, or sulky refusal to go forward . . . [But] I would be imprudent if I didn’t have our team take a hard look at everything.” Subsequently, on May 21 at Boston University Bush reiterated the basis for his slow, passive response: “I believe in a deliberate, step-by-step approach to East-West relations, because recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet Union is dramatic, it is not yet complete. . . . in an era of extraordinary change, we have an obligation to temper optimism . . . with prudence.” “I know,” he added, “that some are restless with the pace I have set . . . but I think it is the proper pace. We have time.”

The consequence of this decisional style: George Bush’s personality is not likely to be a force for policy change, and under him only marginal policy adjustments and *ad hoc* reactions to surfacing problems are likely to be witnessed. As Larry Speakes put it, “With Bush, the popular image may be accurate: That he does not have a strong philosophical base, that he is not decisive, that he is not willing to take stands on the big issues.”²⁹

Another influence on American foreign policy under Bush are the policymaking *roles* that govern decisionmaking. A president is not the personification of the state, and Bush’s capacity to move in new directions is also restricted by the prior commitments and policies of his predecessors, the actions and preferences of the individuals appointed to implement policy, and his own conception of how he is expected to perform the role of president. In this context, it is important to note that Bush’s advisors are almost entirely veterans of previous Republican administrations. Lawrence Eagleberger, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Richard Cheney, Nicholas Brady, Ronald Lehman, and Bush himself are products of the habits of mind developed in the formative stage of their careers, habits strengthened by the similar coaching they received as understudies from their mentors (among whom Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger are highly influential). They carry with them well-worn conceptual baggage.

Managers who have been insiders before and who agree on the fundamental policy questions, their consensus assures that they will respond to many decisions from a common perspective shaped by Cold War precepts.

Even a homogenous, team-oriented administration is prone to turn the policy-making process into a battleground. As an experienced policy maker, Bush was well aware of the propensity of bureaucrats to resist presidential directives that threaten their agencies' interests. To overcome potential bureaucratic intransigence, Bush practiced a relaxed but "almost secretive style"³⁰ and selected key personnel on the basis of their ability to be loyal team players. But loyalty to the president's formulations of the national agenda did not prevent struggles for power or disagreement about the most pragmatic positions on key issues. The differences between Secretary of Defense Cheney and National Security Advisor Scowcroft on choices regarding the MX and Minuteman missiles were illustrative (although the friction paled in comparison with that which ignited between Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Carter administration and between George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger under Reagan). Nonetheless, these differences compromised the day-to-day effectiveness and coherence of the country's foreign policy and demonstration of purpose the administration wished to make. In a climate of diminishing resources, intense struggles over their distribution are to be expected. Policy innovation is not a characteristic product of such conflict-ridden processes. Compromise and delay are. As before, bureaucratic struggles are likely to restrain policy innovation.

Implementation of new policy initiatives also has been circumscribed by the *governmental* structure Bush was elected to run. For this task Bush sought to create a coalition presidency. But the elaborate, overlapping organizational machinery of the foreign affairs government is resistant to management and coordination, and coalitions tend to be fragile. To a considerable extent, the governmental machinery is beyond presidential control:

Presidents operate on the brink of failure and in ignorance of when, where, and how failure will come. They do not and cannot possibly know about even a small proportion of government activity that bears on their failure. They can only put out fires and smile above the ashes. They don't know what's going on—yet they are responsible for it. And they feed that responsibility every time they take credit for good news not of their own making.³¹

A system of checks and balances inhibits change and promotes policy momentum.

An independent-minded Democratic-controlled Congress with a propensity to act as a brake on pragmatic policy changes also poses an obstacle. Bush's stress on bipartisanship was initially medicinal, but the polarizing forces within Congress in the long run are likely to destroy even his best efforts to preserve good will on Capitol Hill. The fact that he was the first newly elected President to have a Cabinet choice (John Tower, nominated as Secretary of Defense) rejected by the Senate attested to the strength of these obstacles.

Ultimately, a new president's ability to work his will in Congress will be influenced by the support his policies enjoy among the American people. Indeed, the

potential influence of *societal* forces in a globally interdependent world is especially potent, for under such circumstances foreign policy is often little more than an extension of domestic policy. Many groups within American society have great incentives to influence foreign policy. Although efforts were made to curtail their clout, single-issue special-interest groups and political action committees will continue to press their causes, and may be expected to mobilize against the president when costly budgetary commitments threaten their welfare. The status quo, accordingly, is preserved by the cross pressures exerted by contending groups in a pluralistic American society. The paradox exists that whereas the American public clearly desires and rewards presidential leadership, the fragmented American political system thwarts the exercise of presidential leadership. The President will be tempted under these conditions to take foreign policy positions primarily for their public impact. Politics does not stop at the water's edge.

Bush's 1988 presidential election was a personal victory without a mandate, and the American electorate, opinion polls revealed, was not responsive to Bush's pleas for prudence and patience. The public appeared more receptive to seizing the opportunities presenting themselves that the President seemed to resist.

But public opinion, always potentially fickle, does not dictate the course of policy. The public "mood," moreover, is prone to cyclical oscillations between internationalism and isolationism and between idealism and realpolitik. Together these discordant rhythms, both evident in the 1980s,³² point toward potentially divergent future paths as the relative costs and benefits of options are weighed. Some will find the interventionist thrust that the Reagan administration advocated palatable; others will recoil from it. Regardless of the direction in which public opinion swings in the 1990s, however, it is unlikely that that opinion will mobilize permanently around a conception of U.S. national interests sufficiently radical to pull American foreign policy outside the boundaries within which it has fluctuated since the end of the Second World War.

The American public's definition of national priorities is also likely to be driven by parochial concerns about the economic foundations of national prosperity. Bush will have to confront the intense domestic debate over the basic question whether military spending and economic prosperity can be simultaneously pursued.

The Reagan administration's efforts to increase military spending without incurring deficits, and its utter failure in that endeavor, speaks to the inherent impracticality of a guns and butter goal. Reagan was forced to compromise on one of his most cherished beliefs—U.S. influence around the world could be promoted by military spending. Reagan succeeded in making America stand tall—by standing on a mountain of debt. Bush cannot continue that approach. But this indecision about the best way to deal with this dilemma suggested greater procrastination than pragmatism. The inertia and ambivalence displayed may signal fundamental confusion and uncertainty about the policy choices that can best serve American national interests.

How peace and prosperity are best protected and promoted is, of course, a matter of opinion. Some nations in the *external* environment of the United States do not share its global vision, and their growing count may serve as a catalyst to revision in American foreign policy thinking.

But at a time when interdependence among nations was growing rapidly and Japan and a uniting Europe had become viable economic competitors to the United States, the administration seemed indifferent to and unaccepting of other countries' professed definitions of the global agenda. Instead, ignoring these vulnerabilities, Bush followed the path blazed by the author of the Reagan Doctrine.

This defiant posturing has been taken at a point in history when the relative decline of American power is readily apparent. It is, nonetheless, a reality that has been denied. Rather, the Bush administration ostensibly has accepted the Reagan administration's belief that "a strong reassertive America could make the world adjust to Washington."³³

The United States *does* maintain unmatched military strength, and doubtless continues to exercise disproportionate influence over international affairs. The retreat of America can be easily exaggerated.³⁴ But the decline of the physical resources of the United States relative to others, however measured, is not imaginary. The erosion of its economic output, productivity, and competitiveness has made it increasingly difficult for the United States to exercise political leverage. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig underscored the predicament on February 18, 1985, when he observed that "The idea that the United States, acting alone in an interdependent world, can somehow renew the mythical golden era of the immediate postwar years when [the United States] seemed invulnerable to international political or economic developments is a dangerous illusion."

Clearly many of the challenges of the 1990s do not fit well with a foreign policy designed for the circumstances of the late 1940s. A post-World War II vision is not very suitable to a post-Cold War system.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson once noted that "there are fashions in everything, even in horrors . . . and just as there are fashions in fears, there are fashions in remedies." To the extent that that telling aphorism is true, global trends can be expected eventually to distance American foreign policy from the approach it has relentlessly pursued for nearly five decades, and move it toward a more complex conception of national security. But Bush has displayed resistance to acceptance of new fashions. Acheson's famous tongue-in-cheek policy advice seemed to characterize the Bush administration's posture toward change: "Don't just do something—stand there." With the passing of time, what at first appeared to be professional detachment is looking more and more like "a tenuous grasp of reality."³⁵ Will the Bush administration live up to the lofty standard it has set for itself, and pragmatically adjust its policy approach to the world taking shape in 2000?

Prospects for the Problematic Future

Ultimately, the pragmatism championed by the Bush administration as a yardstick of its policy performance will be tested by how well the priorities he sets position the country for the next century. Bush himself in April asked to let history evaluate the wisdom or folly of his method: "the proof will come when we look back from the year 2000."

The consequences that surface at the advent of the new millennium surely will

determine how future generations will judge Bush's decisional style and worship of the elusive³⁶ principle of pragmatism. Whether his practical diplomacy and plodding deliberation work or fail will be tested by time.

The method of presidential choice, of course, is only one determining element in the outcome. As noted, many conditioning factors collectively drive the policymaking process, and the process, more so than presidential preference, gives the policy its direction. Indeed, the process parents the policy.

The process will allow some room and time for Bush to readjust policy thinking to cope effectively with the new problems of a new century. But it will also place enormous constraints on his ability to implement the design chosen. "All of [the nation's past presidents], from the most venturesome to the most reticent, have shared one disconcerting experience: the discovery of the limits and restraints—decreed by law, by history, and by circumstance—that sometimes can blur their clearest designs or dull their sharpest purposes."³⁷ "I have not controlled events, events have controlled me" was a telling lament that President Lincoln expressed.

It is unlikely that prevailing circumstances will permit America's forty-first president, George Bush, to be an exception. The obstacles facing the next U.S. President will be extraordinary, the power of policy inertia overwhelming. The inclination to look to the future with a vision inspired by the past, and to postpone the awesome task of developing a comprehensive policy response to the profound changes that have recently transpired, will be compelling. It will prove difficult to depart from the policy thinking that consistently has defined American foreign policy for almost fifty years. The temptation to reach for temporizing tactics and let rhetoric disguise inaction will remain difficult to resist.

The assumptions made by American policy makers in the immediate aftermath of World War II have proven to be remarkably resilient ever since, even in the face of turbulent global changes. Perhaps our changing times call for a new American foreign policy different from the strategy formed almost five decades ago for a different set of challenges. But past policy has the awesome force of momentum behind it. The outlines of American foreign policy are therefore unlikely to be redrawn by George Bush.

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George Washington and the Paradox of Party

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Abstract

It is widely held that George Washington was a very successful President—that he achieved many of the goals of his political agenda. Yet, despite his passionate protestations, Washington saw partisanship and the “spirit of faction” develop and intensify during his administration. His presidency witnessed the origins of an “idea of a party system.” How then, can one explain the rise of party feeling during a presidency so dedicated to being “above party?” Two explanations emerge. (1) The ideals of Republican ideology, which condemned party spirit as corrupting and disharmonious, had long ceased to describe the dynamic factionalism of colonial and American politics. (2) Washington was, despite a concerted effort at establishing an impartial magistracy, this country’s first partisan President.

The constitutional tradition in American politics owes much to George Washington. Certainly the political theory of the Constitution has had more thoughtful advocates and more lucid explicators—Madison, Hamilton, James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, to name just a few. But words and idea alone do not a constitution make; this is especially true with a document as ambiguous as the Federal Constitution. The founders knew well that a constitution draws its life not merely from the explicit words of the written document, but also from the deeds and understandings of subsequent generations.¹ Founding was thus an ongoing process in which customs, practices and institutions about which the Constitution was silent would later bring specific meaning to the outline of 1787.

This “fleshing-out” process was particularly necessary for the new presidency where, as Ralph Ketcham so aptly puts it, “far from everything being settled, virtually nothing was.”² The first President would have a unique opportunity to shape not just the executive branch, but also political attitudes and behaviors that would become part of a broader constitutional tradition. Washington appreciated the importance of the stage on which he was about to enter. In a letter to several cabinet members and advisors in the spring of 1789 Washington noted, “many things which appear of little importance in themselves and at the beginning, may have great and durable consequences from their having been established at the commencement of a new general government.”³

The presidential powers and responsibilities that Washington bequeathed to his successors were substantially more settled than when he took the oath in 1789. Many practices and usages of the Washington presidency became custom, and, eventually,

part of the constitutional tradition that both empowered and delimited the modern executive branch. The numerous accomplishments of George Washington as President have been more thoroughly documented elsewhere⁴, but they include a number of noteworthy developments in constitutional practice. Among them are the definition of executive privilege, the use of the presidency as a national symbol, a method for appointing federal officials that allows for presidential prerogative *and* senatorial courtesy, the custom of a two-term limit (which became so much regarded as a part of the constitutional tradition that it became a part of the textual Constitution with the 22nd Amendment), the ascendance of the President as principal agent of American foreign policy, as well as a bevy of protocols between the President and Congress, the States, and foreign nations, many of which serve quite well for our far less intimate contemporary institutions.

One institution that has become embedded in our constitutional tradition, however, had no part in Washington's agenda. Indeed, he railed passionately and occasionally bitterly against it having *any* legitimate role in the American politics. This dreaded institution was the political party. Its even more despised companion was the "spirit of party" or factionalism. Washington's correspondence before, during, and after his term as President warned all who would listen of the "baneful effects of the spirit of party."⁵ In his personal pantheon of political evils parties and factionalism ranked with paper money and the machinations of European nations as the greatest threats to the still-adolescent American republic.

The legacy of the Washington administration regarding partisanship and parties, however, presents a curious paradox. Despite his passionate pleadings to refrain from factionalism Washington's presidency served, with the exception of the first two years (an early example of a "honeymoon" period?), as a lightning rod for partisanship—partisanship of a virulence that might well astonish modern-day Democrats and Republicans.⁶ While Washington loathed the formation of political parties his years in office saw the "idea of a party system" gain credibility.⁷ Thus, while President Washington hoped to establish a political environment of impartiality and unity in the national interest, what emerged by 1797 was a national politics immersed in parties and factions—a developing constitutional tradition that Washington very much regretted. This paradox is the subject of this essay.

Republicanism and Parties in 1789

What accounts for Washington's deeply-felt opposition to political parties? Why the antipathy toward faction? How could he be so profoundly fearful of political elements that we today assume are intrinsic in a liberal constitution? His answers to these questions drew from two sources. First, the tenets of republican ideology as Washington received it and understood it viewed party spirit and factionalism as evil—an evil that could tear asunder any republican constitution and undermine the quest for the good society. Second, Washington's ordeal as commander in chief during the Revolution had given him a first-hand look at factionalism at work. He needed no Trenchard or Bolingbroke to instruct him on how factionalism could obstruct great

public achievements. He could see in the field confirmation of what his ideology predisposed him to believe. For Washington theory and experience validated each other.

Washington was not alone in believing *and* seeing the dangerous effects of party. Like many Americans of the late 18th century (and nearly all of those who supported the Revolution) George Washington was a “republican.” But in 1789, to say that someone held republican sentiments was to say both much and little about that person. Republicanism was a coat of many colors and much of the passion in the politics of the period, especially after 1793, was directed toward determining who were the “true” republicans and who were the false prophets.

Some values were common to all those who claimed for themselves the label, “republican.” Self-government was essential and nearly everyone agreed that some degree of popular involvement in the structure of government was necessary. Most believed that “consent of the governed” could be satisfied through representative forms. Property, whether real or landed, was considered a prerequisite for citizenship as it gave persons a stake in the community and its public affairs. Government power, both as to ends and means, was to be constrained by the rule of law. Beyond these core values republicans exhibited a broad spectrum of beliefs. However, most can be classified as either “classical” republicans or “Whig” republicans.

If one idea were to exemplify “classical” republican thinking it would be “virtue.” The virtuous society was a concept with a lineage tracing back through Machiavelli to Cicero and Aristotle.⁸ Each of these epochs offered slightly different meanings for virtue, but by 1789 certain virtuous qualities were well understood. The virtuous man was above all else public-spirited. Qualities such as frugality, honesty, industry, and liberality were valuable as private virtues. A community without them had little chance of becoming a republic. But the highest achievement, the noblest aspiration, of a republican was to serve his fellow citizens in a public capacity. Serving the community in a disinterested, even self-sacrificing, manner was the way to demonstrate one’s virtue. The successful advancement of the ends of the republic was the only avenue to fame and glory, qualities for which private life offered no analogy.⁹ Virtue could only be attained by pursuing the public good. This implied that there was something called *the* public interest identifiably different from selfish and parochial interests. Harmony not conflict, unity not diversity, characterized the classical republican vision of society and mixed government was the glue which cemented the republic. Parties, because they represented interests of the particular rather than the general, were an obstacle to virtue. Indeed, to the extent that it prevented the community from attaining harmony and unity partisanship was equated with lack of patriotism.

“Whig” republicans were no less critical of parties, but their reasons differed somewhat from those of the “classical” republicans. If virtue was the end of a classical republican society, liberty was the ideal for Whigs.¹⁰ Governments ought to be limited in their powers, preferably by written constitutions. Good constitutions, however, were constantly threatened by the tendency toward aggrandizement for the benefit of those few who held political power, or “the Court” in Whig ideology.¹¹ Parties, in particular, attempted to influence government to use its power for selfish purposes.

The scope of government power would then expand to the detriment of citizens not similarly organized. This was the corruption and decay most feared by Whigs because it threatened to unbalance the constitution and, by increasing the powers of the Court, imperil the liberties of free men.

Thus, whether one was a classical republican or a Whig (and one ought not make too much of this distinction because many Americans, including George Washington, drew upon both traditions) made little difference regarding one's attitude toward partisanship. It was noxious to both. Not every American held this anti-party view. James Madison had already recognized in his remarkable *Federalist #10* that factions were the inevitable outcome of human nature. As such it was futile to try to suppress the party spirit. Instead, factionalism should be controlled and directed by new constitutional instruments. A few Americans had even gone so far as to adopt Edmund Burke's view that parties promoted, rather than impeded, republicanism. Nevertheless, most American republicans held to the view that parties were clearly evil.

From the standpoint of this prevailing republican ideology Washington's intense dislike of partisanship and faction can easily be explained. But his attitudes did not derive from ideology alone. Ideology was reinforced by experience. For Washington, the most immediate, most relevant, most galvanizing experience was as commanding general of the Continental Army in the Revolutionary War. If he was unsure of the undesirability of faction before 1775, the War quickly hardened his views. Successful prosecution of the War required one thing above all else to Washington—unity. Any wavering, any hesitation in commitment to the great national goal of independence, any show of disharmony would prolong the military struggle. In this context it is no wonder that the General's war-time letters are filled with fears of factionalism and divisiveness among Americans. One source of faction was obvious—the Loyalists. He was suspicious of their "diabolical acts and schemes" intended to "raise distrust, dissensions and divisions among us."¹² Washington was reluctant to execute Loyalists or even to confiscate their property. He was too much the social conservative for that. But he did on several occasions attempt to relocate them or otherwise segregate them so that their ability to influence or subvert the revolutionary cause could be minimized.

A more troublesome source of faction, however, was not in the enemy camp, but in his own. It was during the War that Washington developed his deep suspicion about the states.¹³ He believed that the state governments repeatedly interfered with the prerogatives of national command and thwarted the goals of Congress. To Washington the states seemed willing to support the common cause only when it also served local needs. One of the clearest expressions of his concerns about the fate of classical republican aspirations in an environment of state factionalism can be found in a letter to Philip Schuyler in 1777:

prejudices and jealousies have prevail'd where those of different states have acted together, notwithstanding every possible exertion on my part, to get them to harmonize, consider themselves as the same people engaged in the same noble struggle and having one common, and general interest to defend, to bury and lay aside all attachments and distinctions of a local and provincial nature.¹⁴

The Impartial Magistracy

It was no surprise, then, that when George Washington took the oath as first President, he brought with him a loathing of the spirit of party. He wanted to be, and he wanted the office to be, "above party."¹⁵ To Congress in his First Inaugural Address he noted,

I behold the surest pledges, that as on one side, no local prejudices, or attachments; no separate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage of communities and interests . . .¹⁶

Today, the mantle of head of party comes with the office of President. Washington, however, sought to create a presidency whose primary function was to be a chief magistrate, impartial and inured against the demands of any special faction or interest. He could hardly expect to build the "national character" that he was so concerned about if he fell victim to partisanship in his own conduct. So to James Wilson he wrote in the first weeks of his Presidency,

I presume it will be unnecessary for me to say that I have entered upon my office without the constraint of a single engagement, and that I never wish to depart from that line of conduct which will always leave me at full liberty to act in a manner which is befitting an impartial and disinterested magistrate.¹⁷

In what sense did Washington believe he had to be "impartial?" From what did he have to distance himself? These questions can best be answered by examining Washington's views on the source of faction. Many founders saw class cleavage as the root cause of conflict in American politics. Even Madison, who tried to attribute the causes of faction to many impulses, concluded that the "most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property."¹⁸ Washington had little sympathy for debtors and even less for efforts at alleviating their distress by legislation. Yet a search of his voluminous personal correspondence finds few references that suggest that class differences were, for him the principal source of faction.

The spirit of party arose, instead, from two other sources. First, Washington's revolutionary experience had highlighted the salience of sectionalism and localism as continuing threats to national unity. The Convention and subsequent ratification process only reinforced his belief that many factions derived from the pursuit of local interest. He had long pleaded with the state governments and with anyone else who would listen to "forget their local prejudices and policies," "make those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity," and "to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the Community."¹⁹

Washington viewed personalism as the other principal source of faction. He had witnessed it in his own Virginia, where figures like Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and George Mason could attract a coterie of followers and cause difficulties for the administration of government. In the Continental Congress Washington felt the breath of conspiracy at his back constantly and believed that combinations of particular delegates

pursuing their own personal interests were the cause. These “personality factions,” or cliques, were especially odious to Washington because they often relied on demagogic appeals for popular support. He perceived Shays’s Rebellion, for instance, not as an indication of genuine class conflict, but rather as a symptom of factional dispute among Massachusetts elites: “there are surely men of consequence and abilities behind the curtain who move the puppets; the designs of whom may be deep and dangerous.”²⁰

If localism and personalism were the two primary threats to national harmony, Washington’s actions as President went far toward minimizing those prejudices. He sought to minimize sectionalism in the national government in a number of ways, not the least of which was the example of his own behavior. His self-perception, and indeed the perception of most everyone, was as an American President who happened to be from Virginia, not a Virginian President of the United States. He took extended tours of the nation making sure to visit each state. He even visited Rhode Island shortly after its admission into the Union, despite his repeated criticism of its “anarchistic” politics. By presenting himself this way Washington hoped to employ his own character, which attracted near-reverential awe everywhere he went, as an instrument for forming a national spirit and for minimizing sectional jealousies toward the federal government.

His opposition to sectionalism was more than symbolic, though. He took great care, even if not always successful, to appear impartial in his advocacy and administration of policy. In 1792 Congress submitted a bill which reapportioned seats in the House of Representatives in conjunction with the results of the first census. Using the constitutionally-endorsed prescription of one representative per 30,000 persons, Congress had applied a formula that rewarded several extra seats to those states with the highest remainder after the factors of 30,000 had been taken out. Nearly all of these extra seats went to northern states. Washington was convinced early on of the unconstitutionality of the bill, but was distressed that it had become a North-South issue. This put him in a painfully awkward position because, as he confided to Jefferson, “He feared that he should be thought to be taking sides with a southern party.”²¹ He did eventually veto the bill (the first veto under the new Constitution), but gave a carefully worded list of objections to Congress that addressed constitutional doubts only, and made no reference to sectional concerns.²²

He showed his desire to defuse sectional conflicts on numerous other occasions as well. In the spring of 1790 his friend David Stuart warned that “a spirit of jealousy which may become dangerous to the Union, towards the Eastern States, seems to be growing fast among us.” Washington’s response was that a diversity of interests were represented in the Union. Accommodation and compromise in the national interest were to be the watchwords of his administration. Impartiality meant that some Virginians would have to be disappointed from time to time.²³

Further evidence of his efforts at sectional impartiality can be seen in his pattern of executive appointments. Washington had something of a “stock” letter which he used in response to dozens of inquiries about appointments. Typical were his remarks to Robert Livingston:

I have . . . uniformly declined giving any decisive answer to the numerous applications which have been made to me; being resolved, whenever I am called upon

to nominate persons for those offices which may be created, that I will do it with a sole view to the public good, and shall bring forward those who, upon every consideration . . . will in my judgment be most likely to answer that great end.²⁴

And what specifically were the “considerations” which Washington took into account in the appointment process? Some are obvious: competence to do the job in question, a level of public confidence in the nominee, a preference for men with experience in the Revolutionary struggle, and assurance of the nominee’s political reliability (had he been a supporter of the new Constitution?). One other concern, however, had nothing to do with the individual qualities of the candidate. Washington considered *where* the nominee was from. One way to minimize sectional jealousies was to assure that each state was represented in the executive branch. No state should have grounds for claiming that the presidency was the private domain of Virginians or Pennsylvanians or New Yorkers. To this end Washington saw geography as a valid “political consideration” in the appointment process. In 1795, for example, he wrote in his own hand a list of the important executive positions he had filled. The list is intriguing because he categorized his appointees by state—clearly an effort to determine whether or not he was maintaining a proper geographical balance (See figure 1).²⁵

The second great source of faction that Washington feared was the possibility of party cliques coalescing around prominent personalities. Competition between these personal factions could easily fragment the political harmony that Washington desired. To prevent these cliques Washington adopted a strategy of cooptation and democratic centralism. He was, for example, well aware that Jefferson’s political ideas and conception of the Constitution did not conform to his own. And he did not have the same affectionate feelings toward Jefferson as he had toward Hamilton and Knox. Why then was Jefferson so heavily lobbied by Washington for inclusion in the first cabinet? In part he was responding to Madison’s entreaties. However, cooptation provides another answer. Jefferson already had a substantial personal following, especially in the Southern states. What better way to undermine an alternative center of gravity than to invite him into the administration? Washington attempted the same strategy with other persons who might serve as the focal point for faction. The case of Patrick Henry is an interesting example. Henry, who was a controversial figure in his time, nevertheless, had accumulated a substantial political following over the years. At first an ardent antifederalist his opposition had cooled somewhat as the new government implemented the Constitution. When Jefferson left the cabinet Washington took the opportunity to invite his old rival to be Secretary of State—an obvious attempt to coopt the loyalty of Henry *and* his supporters. Henry declined but was never again a serious critic of the administration.²⁶

Washington’s strategy of cooptation was made effective by his organizational style as chief executive. Harking back to his days as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, Washington insisted on harmony and loyalty within his own staff. Frank discussion of policy questions was encouraged; Hamilton disagreed with Jefferson and Madison on numerous points at the very outset of Washington’s administration. The President was little concerned with these disputes at first. He was, after all, only trying

FIGURE 1
GEORGE WASHINGTON'S LIST OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS

[March, 1795.]

States	Offices	Officers have been	Officers Now are
New Hampshire	Commr. settling accts. between U. S and Individl. St.	Woody. Langden Nichs. Gilman
Massachusetts	Secy of War	General Knox
	Judge S. Court	Wm. Cushing
	Minister Hold.	Jno. Adams Junr.
	Post Mastr. Genl.	Saml. Osgood
	Indn. Commr.	Benj Lincoln
	Treasr. Mint	Tristm. Dalton
Rhode Isl
Vermont
Connecticut	Ministr. Port	David Humphreys
Maryland	Judge Sup Court	Robt. H. Harrison
	Commr. Fedl. Dlatt.
	Ditto	Do	Danl. Carroll
	Ditto	Do	Gusto. Scott
Virginia	Secy. of State	Thos. Jefferson
	Ditto	Do	Edmd. Randolph
	Atty. General	Edmd. Randolph
	Ministr. France	James Monroe
	Ditto	Spain	Willm. Short
	Auditor of Accts.	Richd. Harrison
	Register	Joh. Nourse
	Indn. Commr.	Beverley Randolph
	Commr. Fedl. Dists.	David Stuart
No. Carolina . . .	Judge Sup. Court	Jas. Iredal
	Govr. So. Wn. Terry.	Wm. Blount
So. Carolina	Judge Sup Court	Jno. Rutledge
	Minr. G. Britain	Thos. Pickney
	Comptroller	Nichs. Eveleigh
	Comr. U. S and In S	John Kean
Georgia and Kentucky
New Hampshire
Connecticut	Commr. Indns.	David. Humphreys
	Auditor	Olivr. Wolcot
	Comptroller	Olivr. Wolcot
New York	Secy. of Treasury	Alexr. Hamilton
	Chief Justice	John Jay
	Ministr. France	Govr. Morris
New Jersey	Judge S. Court	Wm. Patterson
Pennsylvania	Judge S. Court	James Wilson
	Attorney Genl.	Wm. Bradford
	Postmr. Genl.	Tim Pickering
	Director of Mint	D. Rittenhouse
	Commr. Revenue	Tench Coxe
	Govr. No. W. Terry.	Arthr. St. Clair
	Treasur. U.S.	Saml. Meridith
	Accomptt. W.D.	Joseph Howell
	Judge No. Wn. Tery.	Geo. Turner
	Comr. in chief A:	Anthy. Wayne
	Brigr. General	Jams. Wilkinson
	Qr. Master, General	OHarra
	Comr. Accts. U.S. & In: S	Wm. Irvine
	Indian Comr.	Timy. Pickering
	besides Subordinate Characters in the Mint
Maryland	Judge Supe. Court	Thos. Johnson
	Ministr. in Spain.	Wm. Carmichael

to elicit good advice. However, Washington insisted on a kind of democratic centralism—that is, once the President had decided on policy it was incumbent on the members of his administration to hew to the party (presidential) line. Indeed, for the first few months Hamilton and Jefferson clearly went out of their way to bend their own views to the President's will once Washington had decided on policy.

When the Hamilton-Jefferson conflict began to spill over into Congress, however, Washington saw the ugly specter of party on the horizon. In long very personal letters he pleaded with both men for a compromising attitude—one which would provide for at least the outward appearance of solidarity and harmony. For a while it worked. Jefferson soon sensed, though, that he could not continue to join in the President's policy agenda, nor could he in good conscience carry out the government's policy. Both British and colonial politics offered numerous examples of cabinet government where internal factional struggles were tolerated and even in some cases promoted.²⁷ Indeed, much of Bolingbroke's criticism of Walpole's administration was directed at Walpole's politics of inclusion—of building a coalition from numerous competing interests.²⁸ Jefferson, though, knew the President's character. He knew that Washington, both out of commitment to republican ideology and out of personal vanity, could not tolerate disloyalty. Moreover, he was already forming his own party. So Jefferson at the beginning of Washington's second Administration in 1793 left rather than commence to conduct guerrilla warfare from within the administration. That he was wise to do so can be seen in Washington's treatment of Edmund Randolph, Jefferson's successor as Secretary of State. Randolph was forced to resign under a cloud for actions arguably less factious than many committed by Jefferson. But the mere appearance of disloyalty, of a willingness to act counter to stated policy of the administration, was sufficient grounds for Washington to question Randolph's honor.²⁹

Washington and the Paradox of Party

George Washington was a stalwart anti-party man. His ideology demanded that view, and his actions as President, whether by deflection of sectionalism or by cooptation of potentially competing centers of political gravity, consistently sought to bring about the national harmony he so earnestly desired. In most other respects Washington was a remarkably successful President. By his retirement in 1797 he had accomplished most of his personal political agenda. Yet national government was riven by partisanship within months of his inauguration; and that party spirit only escalated during his eight years as President.³⁰ Why, then, did Washington fail here, when elsewhere he was so successful?

The answer to that paradox must address at least two fundamental flaws in Washington's presidential vision. One was a failure to recognize the realities of American political life in his time. The second was a failure to perceive his own political character.

Washington remained true to his republican principles throughout his presidency. He was unable to recognize, however, that he was attempting to implement an ideal of republicanism that no longer described American politics—if it ever had. His emphasis on consensus and harmony, and his perception of the political community as

an organic whole were hopes, not realities. Factionalism, not unity, had characterized colonial and national politics at least since the beginning of the 18th century.³¹ Again, Washington's own experiences help to explain why he considered antipartyism both admirable *and* possible. Virginia politics in the 1750s and 60s (when Washington was participating in politics for the first time) was, although factional, the least contentious of all the colonies.³² The Revolution enabled Washington to pursue the single-minded objective of national independence. Yet the harmony of purpose which Washington presumed to exist during the War was illusory. Revolutionaries were revolutionaries for diverse reasons; what they hoped to see as the outcome of that struggle varied greatly.³³ We may recall Carl Lotus Becker's classical observation in 1909 that the political conflict was not just about home rule, but also (and perhaps more importantly) about who should rule at home.³⁴ Washington was not unaware of the character of state politics. As noted earlier he railed constantly against local prejudices and self-interest. Yet he retained the quixotic view that *national* politics could rise above party. He believed that national government was sufficiently continental in scope that, in combination with his own extraordinary popularity, a "national character" could be shaped on republican principles. His own experiences with the Congress under the Confederation should have convinced him otherwise, as that body was no less factional than any other American legislature.³⁵ But Washington simply refused, in contrast to Madison, to adapt his republicanism to accommodate parties—an attitude that was doomed to failure from the outset. By 1789 classical republicanism was already a politics of nostalgia and was being replaced by the dynamics of liberalism.³⁶ Ideology would later catch up to the changed reality of interest group politics. But the Washington presidency is a useful signpost to indicate the inability of republican ideology to contain the new American politics.

Washington ironically contributed to the factionalism of the 1790s by some of his own behavior as President. He was quite public about his desire to be an "impartial chief magistrate" (the phrase is a recurring one in his letters) and in many ways he sought to act out that ideal. But Washington was *never* really nonpartisan in the sense of being neutral on public questions of the day. The characterization of Washington as a kind of referee in the great Hamilton-Jefferson struggle, lacking any strong ideological convictions of his own, simply is not true.

Washington was a committed federalist at the outset and maintained similar enthusiasm for the Federalist agenda throughout his presidency. As early as the struggle over ratification he exhibited a strong "us-them" mentality. He characterized many antifederalists as "unprincipled" and "malignant." He cheered the election to office of friends of the Constitution and thought it appropriate to encourage any maneuvers that would prevent the election of antifederalists.³⁷

Several scholars have pointed out the ideological nature of the early national parties, suggesting that they divided over policies rather than over sectionalism or personality.³⁸ Washington was never impartial as to policy goals. He did not become a Federalist in 1793 when compromise with the Jeffersonians was no longer possible. Granted Alexander Hamilton's persuasive role, Washington did not need the perceptions of Hamilton to guide him into the Federalist camp. He held those sentiments before,

during, and after his presidency. Yet he could never understand the criticisms of his Jeffersonian opponents because he could not recognize his own partisanship.

In addition, for all of his sentiments on the invalidity of self-interest or localism as standards for the making of public policy there is ample evidence that he was not immune to those forces himself. He was a prime mover in an attempt to build a canal between the Potomac and Ohio Rivers. Washington always assembled figures to show that such a route was clearly the most reasonable alternative for opening up navigation to the West. For example, he pointed out that it would be 168 miles shorter than a canal to the St. Lawrence and 126 shorter than one to the Hudson.³⁹ Yet he also noted that an inland canal was inevitable and that Virginia should look to its own interest. A canal would be good for the nation, Washington thought, but it would be particularly good for Virginia. That such a canal would also make his own western lands more valuable can be deduced from letters to his manager. In this instance public and private benefits seem to have been indistinguishable for Washington.

On these and other occasions Washington had commented upon the "spirit of commerce" possessed by most Americans. He did not find this "avidity for making money" to be a virtue. But he believed that it could not be suppressed. That being the case he thought this commercial spirit could be used to public advantage and his plans for the Potomac Canal reflected this. Inland navigation was absolutely essential for obtaining the political loyalty of the Western settlers. Commerce for them should be

rendered as free and as easy as possible. This in my judgment is the *best*, if not the *only* cement that can bind those people to us for any length of time.⁴⁰

Self-interest could be made, then, to serve public purposes. For a man who despised parochialism and localism as a permanent threat to his nationalistic republicanism this was a startling strategy. This was, in fact, an admission that Madison's view of factions was closer to the reality of American politics than this own vision.

Ralph Ketcham has argued that Washington was characteristic of early Presidents in that he sought, for the most part successfully, to be a President above party.⁴¹ If Ketcham is correct, then the development of highly factional, emotion-charged politics during Washington's administration is a cruel paradox.

Yet Ketcham's analysis misses the larger contradictions of Washington and his presidency. First, it overlooks the gap between Washington's ideal view of American society and the much different reality that he confronted. Washington tried to rescue a vision of classical republicanism, based on consensus and harmony, that no longer existed in an increasingly diverse nation. He refused, with only a few exceptions, to recognize the lesson of his own experiences—that faction was an inevitable part of the "national character" he so earnestly wanted to shape.

Second, Ketcham's analysis overlooks the distinctions between style and substance in Washington's presidency. I believe that Washington was quite sincere in his desire to be an impartial magistrate. His self-image as a champion of republicanism meant much to him, and I have noted numerous examples of his efforts to appear as a neutral magistrate.⁴² But his style of impartiality and aloofness could not contain his obvious enthusiasm for Federalist policies. He listened to the criticisms of Jefferson and Madison

and Mason, but his interpretation of "accommodation" was that Federalist policy (*his* policy) and the national interest should be seen as one and the same. One strains to find examples of this President "above party" using his impartiality for the benefit of Jeffersonian aims.

Finally, Washington perceived the tenets of republican ideology (which were held by nearly *all* factions) as an endorsement of Federalist policies. Since there could only be unity and harmony on behalf of the one true national interest, opposition was antirepublican and illegitimate. But the link between republicanism and Federalism was not at all self-evident. There was nothing inherently "virtuous" in Hamilton's funding and other economic programs. There was nothing unquestionably "honorable" in Jay's Treaty. "Liberality" was not necessarily to be found in the excise tax and in no other alternative. These were all policies about which good republicans could, and did, disagree. This, of course, is nothing new. American Presidents have always tried to cloak their substantive goals in the rhetoric of "national interest." That is the inevitable outcome of their role as both head of state and head of government. In this sense, Washington was much more like modern Presidents than Ketcham believes. In the end, there was only a paradox of party in Washington's mind. There was no paradox in his actions. He was our first partisan President.

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Sailing Into Dry Dock: The Harding Administration's Shipping Policy and National Prohibition

LAWRENCE SPINELLI

Press Secretary to Representative Thomas J. Downey

Abstract

In 1921, President Warren G. Harding embarked on a difficult campaign to create a merchant fleet which would reflect the new post-war power of the United States. But despite his bold declaration of a vision of "America First," Harding quickly encountered an unexpected obstacle. American prohibitionists, equally determined to safeguard their own agenda, attacked the sale of liquor on American passenger ships. Only a year after the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, national prohibition had emerged as a significant issue in the Harding administration's shipping policy.

This article assesses the impact of national prohibition on the Harding administration's ship subsidy proposal. The prohibition factor entered the shipping debate when it was revealed that the United States Shipping Board was openly selling liquor on its passenger vessels. The ensuing public outcry and the Harding administration's inadequate response provided subsidy opponents with a new weapon. This controversy fatally delayed the subsidy legislation and ended Harding's hopes for a new shipping policy.

This study concludes that Harding's inability to recognize the political necessity of addressing the issue of liquor sales on American ships contributed to the delay and defeat of the subsidy legislation which was the cornerstone of the administration's shipping policy. It also highlights the inherent weakness of Harding's leadership, his failure to harmonize competing domestic pressures and the serious schism within his administration which hampered the decisionmaking process. This study is based upon primary sources in both the United States and Great Britain.

On January 10, 1920, Warren G. Harding, the Republican junior senator from Ohio and candidate for the presidency, spoke before the Ohio Society in New York. Outlining his political beliefs, Harding proclaimed a nationalistic devotion "To safeguard America first . . . To prosper America first . . . To exalt America first." When he became the Republican party's presidential nominee seven months later, Harding elaborated on his plan for the achievement of these lofty objectives. "I believe in a great merchant marine," Harding declared, "I would have this Republic the leading maritime nation of the world" and he committed his new administration to expanding the scope of national pride by creating a shipping fleet which mirrored the post-war stature of the United States. In securing this goal, Harding recognized the difficulty

of overcoming both the obstacles of a reluctant Congress and Great Britain's dominance of international shipping. But what he did not anticipate was the impediment created by these same patriotic impulses in the form of national prohibition. Unexpectedly, the Eighteenth Amendment and its supporters would occupy a pivotal role in deciding the final destination of the Harding administration's shipping policy.¹

Even before Harding's election as President in 1920, the foundation was established for the strengthening of United States shipping. World War I provided the catalyst for this undertaking, exposing the inability of the American mercantile to provide adequate transportation for the exploitation of new markets and the futility of any war preparedness without a vital merchant fleet. Shipping proponents had capitalized on this to secure congressional approval for the creation of a United States Shipping Board (U.S.S.B.) and Emergency Fleet Corporation in 1916 which provided the framework for direct government involvement in the purchase and construction of ships to protect national interests.² Although this was essentially a wartime measure, the intensity of the British conviction, as expressed at the Paris Peace Conference, to protect their shipping dominance served to counteract the demand within the United States that the government extricate itself from the private shipping sector once the wartime emergency ended. A renewed sense of American confidence emerged, endorsing the idea that the United States should now take its place as a leading maritime power.³

The result of this nationalistic fervor was the passage of legislation in 1920 to extend the life of the Shipping Board and provide it with funds to encourage both ship purchasing and construction. To guarantee an American presence in all major sealanes, congressional supporters included a provision authorizing the U.S.S.B. to designate essential trade routes which it could operate directly if no private carrier established operations.⁴ But within a year, the American challenge to British shipping hegemony encountered serious difficulties. Because of pre-war shipbuilding and the addition of former German vessels, the shipping Board controlled a fleet of 1,502 ships, which included outmoded vessels of limited value, at a time of recession in international trade. This glut in world shipping hit the fledgling American fleet the hardest and 35% of the vessels were idle. There was little private purchasing of ships and the government was responsible for operating the bulk of American shipping lines, either directly or through management contracts. Of the inherited wartime fleet, 78 vessels were passenger ships, involving the Shipping Board in passenger service to Europe, South America and the Orient and the charter rate for a transatlantic voyage declined from \$10.00 per deadweight ton per month in 1920 to \$1.10 in 1921.⁵ The efforts of the United States Mail Steamship Company to operate a transatlantic passenger service with ex-German liners and war-built troopships was a complete failure and the Shipping Board was forced to create the United States Lines to continue the service. The U.S.S.B. suffered from administrative mismanagement; there was little incentive for profitability and when President Harding was inaugurated in March 1921, the United States Shipping Board was a financial and bureaucratic nightmare.⁶

The difficult task of resolving these problems rested with Albert Lasker, President Harding's appointee to the chairmanship of the U.S.S.B. Lasker, former cam-

paign adviser and advertising wizard, was the President's fourth choice for the job. He was also intemperate, cloaked his arguments in the banner of patriotism and had no previous experience in shipping.⁷ But Lasker shared Harding's belief in the need for a viable merchant marine and when it became apparent that the problems at the Shipping Board were insurmountable, he began to develop a new plan for shipping. Lasker proposed the establishment of a fund to provide subsidies as an incentive for the private purchase of U.S.S.B. vessels. All American ships involved in foreign trade would receive a subsidy, determined by the speed and size of the vessel, which would end as the line reached an established level of profitability. Lasker predicted the costs would not exceed \$30 million a year for subsidies, rather than the \$15 million a month for direct government operation. Impressed by the promise of greater economy and a revitalized mercantile, President Harding submitted the ship subsidy proposal to Congress in March 1922. Albert Lasker, rallying the shipping community and exploiting American anglophobia, embarked on an intense campaign to convince Congress that the Harding administration's subsidy plan was the only hope for defending the merchant marine against the onslaught of Great Britain's shipping threat.⁸

While Congress considered the subsidy plan, Lasker had already initiated a zealous effort to fulfill President Harding's directive for a strong merchant marine. A major focus of his attention was the North Atlantic passenger trade where the Shipping Board operated twelve passenger vessels through its control of the United States Lines, and Lasker made the development of this premier international sealane a leading priority. Losing money in competition with the larger and faster British liners, Lasker had continued the service to maintain an American presence in the North Atlantic and because it offered a symbolic shortcut to his goal of raising the stature of American shipping.⁹ Significantly, the Shipping Board was committed to the notion that large passenger vessels were an essential part of a merchant fleet and had authorized the reconditioning of the seized German liner *Vaterland*, the second largest in the world, into the *Leviathan* which Lasker believed would be "a powerful factor in the trans-Atlantic fleet so necessary for the development of an American merchant fleet."¹⁰ The U.S.S.B. Chairman was also attracted by the changing business environment in the transatlantic service in the post-war period. The decline in immigration traffic sailing to the United States, encouraged by the passage of the Emergency Quota Act in 1921, led to the conversion of empty third class cabins into a new tourist class. Affluent Americans exhibited a growing enthusiasm for taking the European "grand tour," suggesting the potential of this untapped market. Albert Lasker was determined to capture a share of this trade and demonstrate the future profitability of the passenger lines he hoped to return to private shippers under the subsidy plan.¹¹

But if carriage was out and comfort was now the accepted standard of travel, a well-stocked liquor supply was an essential ingredient in providing shipboard amenities. For thirsty Americans, an impressive wine list on a transatlantic voyage was an appealing attraction, making liquor the new weapon in the transatlantic competition.¹² And here, Albert Lasker and President Harding confronted a serious obstacle in achieving their goal of establishing the competitive strength of American passenger shipping. On January 16, 1920, national prohibition had become a reality of Amer-

ican life. Utilizing a highly effective organization, the “dry” forces secured a stunning victory which they were determined to maintain. The ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the subsequent passage of the Volstead Act made the manufacture, sale and transportation of intoxicating liquor of certain alcoholic content illegal in the United States.¹³ What remained uncertain, because of the vague language of the law, was the exact geographic boundaries of the Eighteenth Amendment. Did prohibition prevent all ships, under any circumstances from carrying liquor in United States waters and did the Volstead Act extend to American passenger vessels wherever they sailed? This was not simply a question of legal abstractions; it raised the possibility that prohibition enforcement and the expansion of passenger shipping might be political contradictions.¹⁴

Prior to the implementation of the Volstead Act, Albert Lasker’s predecessors at the Shipping Board had begun to consider the future ramifications of the pending law on American shipping. They appreciated that the transatlantic passenger trade centered on amenities, not solely transportation, which included a full complement of distilled beverages and wines during a crossing. Unlike prohibitionists, Board members entertained few illusions about the naive expectation that morally inspired Americans would flock to ships without liquor. At the same time they recognized that the enactment of national prohibition would make it both inconsistent and politically inexpedient for an agency of the United States government to operate “wet” ships and defy the powerful “dry” lobby.¹⁵ In October 1919, the Board’s executive operating committee requested the legal department to prepare an opinion on the legality of liquor on American ships after January 1920. The assistant general counsel concluded it would probably be legal for ships to sell liquor on the high seas and bring these supplies, under seal, into American territory. But on his recommendation, the Board requested the Attorney General to provide a more authoritative ruling. Until this was received, all liquor would be barred from U.S.S.B. ships after prohibition became effective.¹⁶

Awaiting a reply from the Justice Department, U.S.S.B. chairman John Barton Payne was increasingly pessimistic over the future of American passenger shipping. Discussions with Senator Wesley L. Jones, a key shipping supporter, and other congressional leaders convinced Payne that even if liquor was allowed under the law, Congress would act immediately to prevent government operated vessels from sharing this benefit.¹⁷ At the December meeting of the Board, Payne announced plans to sell the former German liners the U.S.S.B. had acquired after World War I, admitting that “the Shipping Board could not compete with private firms, because of the fact that private firms could serve wines and liquors.¹⁸ The Board made a determined effort to sell its passenger service, but the worldwide shipping slump dampened any serious private interest in the vessels. When Admiral William Benson became chairman in 1920, the U.S.S.B. remained saddled with a passenger fleet that was destined for unprofitability unless the sale of liquor on ships was legally acceptable.

This possibility was eliminated when Acting Attorney General William L. Frierson ruled that prohibition applied to American ships wherever they sailed. Private American shippers appealed the decision at a Treasury Department hearing, arguing against the issuance of regulations to enforce Frierson’s ruling. “The threatened enforcement

of prohibition," J. Parker Kirlin of the American Steamship Owner's Association testified, "is a force of overwhelming effect in deterring investors from embarking upon private ownership of property that is certain to be so hampered by it as to be unprofitable in operation."¹⁹ Shipping proponents in Congress introduced legislation that would allow liquor to be sold on American ships. But with the Anti-Saloon League, the powerful prohibition lobby, opposed to the legislation, the "dry" forces in Congress stalled any consideration of the bill.²⁰ Although the Treasury Department failed to issue any regulations to enforce the Justice Department ruling, providing a loophole by which privately owned American vessels continued to carry liquor, U.S.S.B. officials regarded the Frierson ruling as definitive. Admiral Benson reasserted that there would be no alteration in the Board's liquorless policy.²¹

Compounding the prohibition burdens on the Shipping Board's passenger fleet was the relative position of foreign shipping under the Eighteenth Amendment. After the Volstead Act was adopted, foreign passenger ships had followed State Department guidelines which allowed shipboard liquor to enter American waters if it was placed under seal at the three mile limit.²² But prohibitionist groups within the United States were displeased by the continued flow of liquor into American territory, however restricted, and they argued that the Eighteenth Amendment was intended to prevent all distilled spirits from entering the United States. In the final weeks of the Wilson administration, Acting Attorney General Frank Niebecker had bowed to "dry" pressure and unexpectedly announced that intransit liquor could no longer be carried legally, even under seal, in United States territory.²³ In the wake of diplomatic protests over Niebecker's failure to hold a formal hearing, the new Harding administration agreed to suspend the enforcement of this restriction until Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty reconsidered the decision. Following a meeting with foreign shippers, Daugherty announced in June 1921 that the initial ruling was valid.²⁴ The foreign shippers, led by Great Britain's Cunard Company, requested and were granted a temporary injunction preventing the enforcement of Daugherty's ruling. While the matter was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon reassured foreign shippers that the suspension of transshipment restrictions would remain in effect. Until the Supreme Court's ruling, foreign passenger liners could continue to serve liquor, while the Shipping Board's vessels remained officially "dry" and competitively disadvantaged.²⁵

This was the situation Albert Lasker inherited when he assumed the leadership of the Shipping Board in June 1921. It handicapped Lasker's ability to create a sound merchant fleet and as the new chairman formulated his subsidy plan, liquor emerged as an unwelcome complication. The argument for rebuilding a profitable passenger fleet through subsidies was meaningless if the absence of liquor prevented the equalization of competition.²⁶ Without seeking the approval of his fellow commissioners, Lasker decided to reinstitute the sale of liquor on Shipping Board vessels.²⁷ This was an audacious decision considering the Harding administration's legal responsibility to enforce prohibition and the previous policy of the Board. Lasker's task was not an easy one. He had to prevent any public debate over the new policy while making it known that U.S.S.B. ships now carried liquor. The chairman and his subordinates

proved equal to the challenge and advertisements in the Paris edition of the *New York Herald* quietly proclaimed that the United States Lines carried "the choicest wines and liquors."²⁸ When the Board received several complaints about the ads, Lasker deflected the rumors with vagueness and the Board's Advertising Manager, D. E. Brundage, calmly reassured the Justice Department that "of course, the shipping Board is unalterably opposed to the sale of liquors on American ships."²⁹ As long as Albert Lasker avoided any widespread public exposure of the liquor sales, it would remain the best kept "non-secret" in Washington.

Ignoring the inherent conflict between prohibition and passenger carriage, Lasker was playing for high stakes and gambling the future of the ship subsidy proposal on his unorthodox strategy. Lasker, deluded by an unrealistic perception of both the problem and his own abilities, believed he could successfully sidestep this contradiction. For eleven months, skill and good fortune aided Lasker in stifling public awareness of the liquor sales. Letters from passengers protesting the selling of liquor on government vessels went unanswered and staff members were instructed not to respond to press inquiries on the subject.³⁰ But despite the Board's official policy of silence, the rumor of "wet" ships was gaining credence. In May 1922, the *Chicago Tribune*, *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat* and the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* all published reports claiming that liquor was sold on U.S.S.B. passenger ships. The Anti-Saloon League received a growing number of complaints about shipboard liquor and on June 1, its Legislative Director, Wayne Wheeler, wrote to Lasker requesting a public denial of these allegations.³¹ Before Lasker could respond, the liquor issue came to a crashing climax, demonstrating that Lasker's only success was in postponing the inevitable day of reckoning.

Ironically, the public challenge to the Board's liquor policy did not come from the prohibitionists. It was initiated by Augustus Busch, president of the Anheuser-Busch Brewery and a vocal opponent of the Eighteenth Amendment. Sailing to Europe on the United States Lines *George Washington*, Busch discovered:

The Shipping Board vessels are the 'wettest on the ocean.' Never before have I crossed the Atlantic and found so much liquor sold as on this ship . . . I learn that passage on this ship has been sold with a positive money-back guaranty that the bars for the sale of intoxicating liquors will be thrown wide open as soon as they pass outside the three mile coast line. This makes the United States incomparably the biggest bootlegger in the world.³²

Perceiving his discovery as a powerful indictment of prohibition's failure, Busch instructed his son Adolphus to make this information public. Anheuser-Busch officials carefully planned their attack and on June 8, Adolphus Busch sent President Harding a letter denouncing the Shipping Board's policy. This was followed by the publication of a pamphlet which included all the Busch letters, the Paris *New York Herald* advertisements, a copy of a letter from Munson Line officials claiming liquor was sold on all South American routes and the reproduction of the *George Washington* wine list. On June 14, copies of this pamphlet were sent to every member of Congress and to all major American newspapers.³³

The irrefutable nature of this damaging evidence made it impossible for the Harding

administration to deny the charges. Instead, Albert Lasker attempted to shift the responsibility for the liquor sales by overlooking the facts. In a reply to Adolphus Busch which was released to the press, he acknowledged that liquor was sold on U.S.S.B. ships. Lasker maintained, however, that this was merely the continuation of a Shipping Board policy established before he became chairman, a claim that he did not and could not support with the official record. Lasker contended that the sale of liquor was financially necessary and essential to the establishment of a strong merchant marine and it was continued because "so long as Great Britain, Japan, France, Germany and other maritime nations continue to serve liquor . . . I am ashamed to state that my experience leads me to believe that there is a sufficient number of Americans . . . who would divert their trade to foreign flags." Recognizing that the Busch revelations made his former position indefensible, Lasker switched tactics and announced that he would gladly accept prohibition on all ships entering American waters as a method of equalizing the shipping competition. The chairman concluded by attacking the Busch family's German heritage and warned that Busch's action would not "displease your German friends whose greatest hope of a restored German merchant marine is in a hurt to America's newborn merchant marine."³⁴

Regardless of this rationalization, Adolphus Busch had precipitated a controversy that even the artful Lasker could not escape. The clear acknowledgment by the chairman of the United States Shipping Board that liquor was a valuable part of American maritime policy unleashed an immediate public furor. In a bold headline, the *Chicago Daily Journal* proclaimed that the Busch revelation "Links Harding to Rum Sales" and the *Washington Daily News* condemned the chairman's duplicity "as failure of some companies to make profits in operating shipping board steamers has been attributed to the belief that liquors were banned from them."³⁵ Lasker succeeded in arousing both dedicated "drys" and unenthusiastic supporters of prohibition who believed that, whatever the shortcomings of the Eighteenth Amendment, it was a gross inconsistency for a government charged with enforcing the Volstead Act to serve as a major liquor salesman in the North Atlantic. The White House was overwhelmed by a barrage of vitriolic letters demanding Lasker's dismissal. Some private citizens suggested that Lasker should be prosecuted under the law as a common bootlegger.³⁶

However, beyond the emotion of opinion, the Busch-Lasker controversy provided a more immediate and serious problem for the Harding administration. President Harding's ship subsidy proposal had encountered strong congressional opposition from agricultural interests and opponents of government aid when it was introduced in March. Citing the legislation as a top priority, the President announced he would call a special session of Congress in the summer if the bill was not considered before the July recess.³⁷ But if the prospects for congressional approval were not overly favorable in early June, the Shipping Board liquor revelations threatened to doom the measure to certain defeat when it was finally debated. Lasker's assertion that American passenger shipping needed liquor to operate publicly exposed the link between prohibition and shipping and suggested that the subsidy legislation was superfluous without liquor. It was now difficult to be both a "dry" and a supporter of shipping interests, providing the anti-subsidy forces with an exploitable issue. As the maritime journal,

Nauticus concluded, law abiders were placed in the “awful dilemma of either supporting the merchant marine and countenancing the existence of demon rum under government auspices, or refusing to compromise with Satan and give up the ships.”³⁸ The lines were clearly drawn as the anti-subsidy forces welcomed the prohibitionists’ determination to transform the subsidy battle into a debate over the continued sale of liquor on American ships.³⁹

The wider impact of the liquor controversy was immediately evident in Congress where Albert Lasker was condemned on the floor of the House and the Senate. Congressman John G. Cooper argued that the “lawbreaker and bootlegger in our own land will be encouraged to carry on his work by reason of the policy of the Shipping Board, for it placed the government in the position of admitting its inability or unwillingness to enforce its own laws.”⁴⁰ Senator Frank B. Willis of Ohio, a “dry” and shipping supporter, announced that he would not support any subsidy plan which allowed liquor on ships.⁴¹ When the Busch allegations were published, the subsidy bill was under consideration in the House Merchant Marine Committee, suggesting that Adolphus Busch’s liquor revelations were neither spontaneous nor solely intended to expose the liquor sales. On June 15, the “drys” on the committee attempted to amend the legislation to prevent subsidy payments to any passenger liner selling liquor, but this was defeated. Congressman George Edmonds offered a compromise measure to eliminate the American disadvantage by imposing fines on any vessel selling liquor on a voyage that began or ended in an American port. Opponents argued that this would only drive shippers to Canada. In the end, the committee was unable to reconcile the “wet” and “dry” positions and reported out the original bill, pushing the thorny issue onto the full House of Representatives.⁴²

In the midst of this crucial debate, Treasury Department officials released regulations for foreign ships carrying liquor into American waters. The foreign passenger lines had continued their legal challenge to Attorney General Daugherty’s ruling barring liquor shipments and on May 15, 1922, the Supreme Court ruled that the transshipment of liquor through American territory was illegal. But the decision raised more questions than it answered, leaving unresolved the legal status of liquor stores which were sold to passengers and placed under seal at the three mile limit.⁴³ Reflecting both colossal bad timing and the lack of coordination within the Harding administration, the Treasury Department guidelines issued on June 17 reflected a narrow interpretation of the court’s decision. Transshipments of liquor in bond and the transfer of sealed liquor cargo in port, which the court specifically addressed, would be illegal. However, liquor properly listed as passenger seastores was exempted. To the consternation of prohibitionists and American shipping proponents, the Treasury Department had made it possible for foreign passenger shipping to remain untouched by American prohibition and exacerbated an already bitter controversy.⁴⁴

Considering his strong support for the subsidy legislation, President Harding was curiously silent throughout the Busch-Lasker furor. Lasker had left him with few options and he faced the difficult dilemma of choosing between unpalatable alternatives: a prohibition clause in the subsidy bill doomed passenger shipping to unprofitability and bolstered the argument against subsidies; unrestricted liquor sales would

encourage the “drys” to support subsidy opponents in defeating the bill and any direct attack on foreign shipping might redirect commerce to Canadian ports and invite retaliation. Yet, time was running out on the subsidy legislation as Congress prepared for its summer recess. The Treasury regulations convinced the “dry” forces to increase their efforts to keep liquor off American ships and Harding needed to act. The Republican leadership in the House of Representatives demanded presidential guidance as Republican defectors joined forces with the shipping bill opponents.⁴⁵ But Harding did not know what to do, so he did nothing. Finally, under congressional pressure, he agreed to a postponement of the subsidy debate, warning that if the shipping legislation was not considered when Congress returned in August, he would call a special post-election session in November. This forcefulness was hollow rhetoric. Harding had already given up the advantage to the ship subsidy opponents by failing to address the Busch-Lasker controversy and the questions it raised.⁴⁶

The deferment of congressional action on the subsidy bill gave President Harding an opportunity to prepare his response to the public debate that followed the release of the Busch letter on June 14. However, the President remained silent, even though delay was a politically hazardous course to follow, hindered by his own indecisiveness and a paucity of guidance from responsible administration officials. Although Albert Lasker continued his own efforts to salvage the subsidy proposal and informed Wayne Wheeler at the Anti-Saloon League that he would support any plan that extended liquor restrictions to foreign shipping, Harding doubted that this would resolve the shipping stalemate and he offered little support.⁴⁷ Attorney General Daugherty, Harding’s chief legal and political adviser, was the logical official to clarify the administration’s position. But Daugherty refused to enter into the debate, seriously misjudging the importance of the issues raised by Adolphus Busch. Daugherty would only acknowledge that he personally stood by his earlier ruling, offering no further explanation and blithely reassuring Wayne Wheeler that “in the end everything will come along all right.”⁴⁸ He immediately departed for Ohio, unconvinced that the matter required his attention. Failing the President as both political adviser and leading law enforcement officer, Daugherty encouraged Harding’s unrealistic belief that the liquor issue would resolve itself.

Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon was not as confident that the storm of protest over liquor on ships would quickly subside. Long a favorite target of prohibitionist criticism, Mellon’s release of the generous foreign shipping liquor regulations in June had engendered a new intensity of bitterness in “dry” attacks.⁴⁹ This fierce reaction surprised the Treasury Secretary who began to doubt the wisdom of this strict interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the middle of the controversy over liquor on American ships. To remove his department from the center of this debate and transfer the burden of responsibility for its outcome, Mellon publicly suggested that the Attorney General reconsider the entire liquor question. Without prior consultation, the Treasury Secretary requested that Daugherty rule on whether or not the Eighteenth Amendment extended to American ships wherever they sailed and whether the Volstead Act outlawed all liquor, including passenger ship seastores, entering the United States.⁵⁰

Secretary Mellon's unplanned and uncoordinated action forced the Harding administration to confront a problem it was attempting to avoid. Justice Department officials would not acknowledge that they intended to reconsider the liquor question, but privately the department was already preparing for this possibility.⁵¹ Mellon's adroit action succeeded in focusing "dry" pressure on the Justice Department which was besieged with letters, petitions, briefs and requests to testify on the Shipping Board's liquor policy. On July 6, department officials sent Daugherty an urgent telegram, suggesting the political importance of holding a public hearing on the Treasury Department request and recommending that the Attorney General interrupt his Ohio trip.⁵² Daugherty immediately returned to Washington and on July 13, he convened a hearing on the geographic boundaries of the Eighteenth Amendment. Although Albert Lasker was not present, he had worked behind the scenes to prepare the case for American shipping representatives. The prohibitionists dominated the hearing, with testimony from the National Temperance Bureau, National Reform Society, Women's Christian Temperance Union, and Wayne Wheeler used this forum to condemn the Treasury Department and foreign shipping. At the close of the three hour meeting, Daugherty promised to give the issue careful attention.⁵³

The Justice Department hearing did not elicit any new arguments on either side of the prohibition versus shipping dispute. However, the meeting served to solidify a general consensus among the protagonists that the problems of American passenger shipping were directly linked to the inequity of foreign commerce enjoying a benefit denied to United States vessels. Whatever the fate of the subsidy legislation, the hearing confirmed the need for the Harding administration to offer some solution to this nagging problem. By the following week, Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt presented Daugherty with a draft ruling on the liquor issue. The draft reflected both the impact of the hearing and the recognition of the political limitations the Attorney General confronted. Willebrandt recommended that American ships, wherever they sailed, should be governed by the prohibition laws. Acknowledging the unfair competition this would create, she concluded that foreign shipping must be prohibited from bringing any liquor into American territorial waters.⁵⁴

Unfortunately for the Harding administration, Daugherty failed to seize this opportunity to offer decisive leadership. The Attorney General, overwhelmed by the sequential eruption of national strikes in the coal and railroad industries, neglected to approve the draft ruling.⁵⁵ Without any guidance from Daugherty, President Harding was still unprepared to offer any leadership on the prohibition aspect of the subsidy plan when the House of Representatives reconvened in August. Harding's reticence continued to frustrate supporters of the bill as the industrial unrest and pending legislation further delayed consideration of the subsidy proposal. Many eastern congressmen were now forced to remain in their districts, engaged in primary campaigns, and without their key support House Republican leaders would not begin the shipping debate.⁵⁶ Harding reluctantly agreed to another postponement until November. In a letter to the Republican leadership, the President publicly acknowledged for the first time that the Busch-Lasker revelations had affected the shipping debate, admitting that it "would be folly to ignore the development of the prohibition issue which came up so unex-

pectedly." But Harding was still inclined to let someone else resolve the problem and he concluded that "we must face the fact that the friends of the bill must harmonize their views to accord with both the constitutional amendment and public opinion on this subject."⁵⁷ When Congress recessed in late August, the liquor controversy remained unsettled.

Within five weeks, President Harding was forced to follow his own advice and harmonize policy with political reality as the administration finally recognized the damage caused by the Busch-Lasker conflict. The enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment had emerged as a major issue in the upcoming midterm congressional elections and the Shipping Board's liquor policy provided powerful ammunition for critics who charged that the Harding administration was "soft" on prohibition.⁵⁸ In Ohio, where Attorney General Daugherty was coordinating campaign efforts, both the governorship and a United States Senate seat were being contested and the outcome of these races in Harding's home state offered a test of the President's popularity. But the strength of "dry" support in Ohio was considerable and the Busch revelations had forced Republican Senator Frank Willis to repudiate the subsidy legislation. Recognizing the need to diffuse prohibitionist charges and prevent the possibility of major losses in November, Daugherty quickly returned to Washington.⁵⁹

On October 3, Daugherty met at the White House with President Harding, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and Treasury Secretary Mellon to discuss the Justice Department's draft ruling on the geographic limits of the Volstead Act. Although Daugherty did not specify when the draft would be released, he suddenly announced his decision three days later. Daugherty ruled that the prohibition laws applied to all American vessels, wherever they sailed, and prevented foreign ships from carrying all liquor, including passenger seastores, in American waters.⁶⁰ President Harding immediately ordered the U.S.S.B. to remove liquor from all ships in home ports and on ships at sea once they docked. Albert Lasker, who was in New York, had expected the President to discuss the decision before its publication and that same day he informed Daugherty that there were several new suggestions regarding liquor on ships he wished to share with Harding.⁶¹ But despite Daugherty's failure to warn him, Lasker vigorously carried out the President's directive. Instructions were issued to the entire U.S.S.B. fleet to stop the sale of liquor and within two days, the Shipping Board's vessels were "dry".⁶²

However, the Attorney General's announcement had not resolved the liquor problem; it only created unexpected complications. Daugherty's failure to inform his colleagues of the timing of his ruling created a serious schism within the Harding administration. Secretary of State Hughes had objected to the draft and its rigid interpretation of the prohibition laws. Concerned with the diplomatic ramifications of this attack on foreign shipping, Hughes planned to secure an amendment to the Volstead Act which would allow sealed liquor on foreign ships to enter the United States and which would separate this issue from the controversy over liquor on American ships. But Daugherty's surprise action precluded this option and an irate Hughes disclaimed any State Department responsibility for the ruling.⁶³ Concurrently, Hughes was in the midst of delicate negotiations with the British government to secure cooper-

ation in smuggling enforcement, an undertaking which Daugherty now jeopardized. Hughes was determined to weaken the impact of the liquor ruling and he persuaded the President to extend the deadline for the foreign liquor ban until October 21 to allow a reasonable time for compliance.⁶⁴

Daugherty had also not anticipated the reaction of the international maritime community. For foreign shippers, the delay of the new liquor restrictions did little to moderate the need for prompt and decisive action. There were few practical alternatives and representatives of the foreign passenger lines met in New York and agreed to join in a cooperative effort which would challenge the liquor ban. Attorneys representing all the foreign shippers requested the United States District Court to issue a permanent injunction against the enforcement of any restrictions on liquor seastores because of the economic hardship this would create.⁶⁵

With Daugherty's ruling scheduled to begin in four days, this legal challenge created a serious problem. Harding administration officials were divided over the wisdom of issuing regulations while it was still uncertain if the courts would uphold the Attorney General's opinion. Secretary Hughes and Treasury Secretary Mellon feared that premature action would have diplomatic repercussions and might make the United States liable for any financial losses suffered by the shippers. With this formidable opposition, Daugherty was forced to announce that foreign ships could continue to carry sealed liquor stores until formal regulations were issued at an unspecified future date. But this announcement was unnecessary. On October 27, the District Court, although ruling in favor of the Attorney General, extended the injunction against enforcement until the foreign shippers' announced appeal was considered by the Supreme Court.⁶⁶

It was clear by early November that Daugherty's ruling was disastrously ill-timed. Failing to learn from his earlier experience, the Attorney General had forced the Harding administration into an untenable position. With the 1922 elections only two weeks away, legal entanglements guaranteed that foreign ships would continue to carry sealed liquor into American ports. President Harding found himself in a political straitjacket, unable to risk the political fallout if he rescinded the announced liquor restrictions on the U.S.S.B. fleet.⁶⁷ Albert Lasker had the unwelcome satisfaction of receiving overwhelming evidence that he was correct in assuming Americans preferred "wet" ships. Reports from all operating managers of Shipping Board passenger vessels confirmed a mass exodus of passengers quickly abandoning the government's liquorless vessels. The general manager of the United States Lines reported over 100 cancelled reservations on the transatlantic service and "the impression among our booking clerks, and those of our competitors, is that the 'booze rule' is the cause of this."⁶⁸ Lasker pleaded with Harding for some suggestion, "we are beginning to feel the prohibition ruling at every turn," but the President could offer no guidance.⁶⁹

The results of the November 8 election did little to justify all the hardship caused by the politically inspired liquor ruling. The losses far exceeded the most pessimistic predictions and *The New York Times*, citing prohibition enforcement as a leading factor in these results, concluded that "the demonstration of disapproval of the Administration was unmistakable."⁷⁰ Contrasted with the normal swing in midterm elections,

the Republicans suffered an unparalleled defeat, which included many of the President's friends, and there was even speculation that Harding's own renomination in 1924 was in jeopardy. In the House of Representatives, the Republicans lost 163 seats and in the Senate, a 59-37 majority was reduced to 51-43. Democrats and anti-administration progressives captured a majority of the governorships contested and Carmi Thompson, Harding's personal choice for governor of Ohio, was soundly defeated.⁷¹ The election results also underscored the impact of the Busch-Lasker controversy on the subsidy legislation. By delaying congressional consideration of the bill until after the election, the liquor issue placed a restrictive timetable on the debate and Harding's ability to maneuver was now limited. The results strengthened the power of the progressive forces in Congress and encouraged them to lead a final assault against the subsidy legislation.⁷²

Harding did not let this diminish his determination to press for action on the subsidy proposal and he addressed a special post-election session of Congress, arguing that national prestige demanded approval of the plan. Although Congressman Edmonds agreed to expand the mail payment provisions of the bill to offset the losses created by the liquor ban, Albert Lasker was concerned that the liquor issue would still hamper the legislation. He met with Wayne Wheeler and persuaded him that with Daugherty's ruling in effect on Shipping Board vessels and the issue in the courts, it was no longer necessary to include a liquor clause in the subsidy bill.⁷³ Despite this private agreement, the House of Representatives approved an amendment which prohibited subsidy payments for any voyage in which liquor was sold. Wayne Wheeler, fearing that the Supreme Court might regard this action as a defacto acceptance of sealed liquor on foreign ships, rallied the "dry" bloc and the liquor amendment was deleted from the final version of the bill by a lopsided vote of 227-21. With the outstanding difference between "wets" and "drys" eliminated, the subsidy legislation was approved by 24 votes on November 29.⁷⁴ But President Harding continued to be haunted by his earlier indecisiveness in the Busch-Lasker controversy and the subsequent delay. In February 1923, anti-subsidy senators began a filibuster in the final days of the congressional session and on February 8, President Harding withdrew the proposal and announced that he would not resubmit it to the new Congress.⁷⁵

There was one remaining hope for salvaging some future for American passenger shipping. Following the suspension of enforcement regulations in October, foreign passenger ships openly served liquor and "dry" Shipping Board vessels sailed with a declining roster of passengers as the Supreme Court considered the legality of Daugherty's ruling. On April 30, 1923, the court announced its opinion on the appeal. The Supreme Court declared that Daugherty's definition of the Eighteenth Amendment's boundaries was incorrect and prohibition did not extend to American vessels beyond the three mile limit. However, the court also maintained that a merchant ship voluntarily entering the waters of another country subjected itself to that state's laws and ruled that the Attorney General had the authority to bar all liquor from entering American waters.⁷⁶ But this was a bittersweet victory. With the subsidy legislation defeated and the strength of the "dry" forces undiminished, the Harding administration was compelled to continue the liquor ban on all U.S.S.B. ships.⁷⁷

By the spring of 1923, President Harding was forced to accept the fact that the prohibitionists had triumphed. The Eighteenth Amendment had emerged as an unexpected complication in the effort to build a merchant fleet that reflected the new international stature of the United States. Harding's plan for revitalizing American passenger shipping through government support was seriously damaged by the liquor issue and the delay caused by the Busch controversy contributed to his failure to secure congressional approval of the subsidy plan. The political clout of the "drys" made it necessary to maintain liquor restrictions on government operated vessels and to continue this disadvantage. With profitable passenger shipping and prohibition seemingly incompatible goals, the prohibitionists had secured a victory for their cause, demonstrating the influential role they occupied in American political life.

Yet the "dry" forces did not achieve this success without assistance; the Harding administration proved to be a valuable ally. Although Albert Lasker succeeded temporarily in his daring ploy to sell liquor, his deceptive tactics provided the prohibitionists with valuable evidence of official duplicity and subjected the Harding administration to charges that the prohibition laws were not being enforced. By making the subsidy proposal and the sale of liquor inseparable issues, Lasker alienated both moderate "drys" and shipping advocates. His offer to accept parity with foreign shipping came too late to salvage the subsidy proposal. After nearly a year of half-truths and rumors, the prohibitionists had gained the tactical advantage.

The poor judgement and inadequate leadership of Attorney General Daugherty also aided the "dry" cause. Daugherty's initial ruling in 1921 on the geographic limits of the Eighteenth Amendment encouraged the belief that the administration would resolve this problem. But while raising the issue, the Attorney General was unwilling to retain control of a question that the "drys" were determined to press to a full conclusion. As the President's chief legal and political adviser, Daugherty failed to comprehend the intricacies of the policy process. His assumption that Congress would resolve the difficult dilemma created by the Busch revelations was unrealistic and fatally delayed a settlement of this critical issue. In announcing his second ruling only five weeks before the 1922 elections, Daugherty exhibited a sophomoric understanding of the deliberate pace of judicial review.

However, the "drys" leading benefactor was President Harding. Clearly, reconciling the goals of a competitive passenger service and adherence to the Eighteenth Amendment was a difficult task. But the resolution of this problem was possible at the time of Daugherty's 1921 ruling, long before the congressional elections. The Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to establish the geographic boundaries of prohibition if presented with a precise argument. With the full weight of the court in 1921, Harding could have weathered the storm of "dry" protest by presenting himself as the impartial defender of judicial action in keeping liquor on U.S.S.B. ships and consequently, protected his subsidy plan. Harding's personal and decisive intervention into the Busch-Lasker controversy would have encouraged the congressional supporters of a compromise and diluted the strength of the prohibitionist attack.

Instead, the handling of the liquor problem and the Busch affair was an extraordinary example of bureaucratic mismanagement and political blundering. Harding

trusted Lasker, relied upon Daugherty and continued to ignore the persistent nature of the shipping-prohibition conflict. When Lasker and Daugherty did not offer any feasible solution to the administration's dilemma, Harding, unable to play the role of conciliator, was incapable of asserting his own leadership. Paradoxically, Harding failed both as nationalist and internationalist. His inability to prevent the ill-timed release of the Treasury Department's liquor regulations further crippled American shipping. Fearing the political influence of the "drys," the President accepted Daugherty's attempt to equalize this competition by sacrificing foreign shipping. When prohibition threatened his dream of a formidable merchant fleet, Harding faltered badly. Although the Supreme Court offered a possible solution in 1923, the fate of the Shipping Board's passenger fleet was already preordained by the President's inadequate defense.

Four months after the Supreme Court's ruling, President Harding was dead, leaving behind an uncompleted agenda. The American maritime challenge was derailed and it would be another five years before Congress approved any direct aid for shipping. The competitive position of American passenger shipping was handicapped and this was compounded when Secretary Hughes negotiated treaties with the leading maritime nations which allowed their passenger liners to carry liquor in American waters in exchange for anti-smuggling assistance. Without liquor and the incentive of subsidies, the U.S.S.B. was forced to continue operating its transatlantic passenger service until the line was finally sold in 1929. Harding had not built the "great merchant marine" he envisioned. His only legacy was that the Shipping Board's passenger vessels were placed firmly in "dry" dock where they would remain for the next ten years.⁷⁸

Notes

1. *Address of Senator Harding Before the Ohio Society of New York*, New York, January 10, 1920; *The New York Times*, July 23, 1920. For a background to Harding's "America First" philosophy, see Robert K. Murray, *The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration* (Minneapolis, 1969), 265-66, 287, 293; Andrew Sinclair, *The Available Man: Warren Gamaliel Harding* (New York, 1965), 84-91.
2. Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915* (Princeton, 1961), 137-61; Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916* (Princeton, 1964), 339-41; Arthur C. Walworth, *America's Moment: 1918* (New York, 1977), 241-42; Carl P. Parrini, *Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy 1916-1923* (Pittsburgh, 1969), 44-45, 70; Jeffrey J. Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy 1913-1921* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1978), 169-97, 224-28.
3. The 1916 legislation was scheduled to expire five years after the end of the war. Murray, *Harding Era*, 280; Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy*, 221-23; Paul M. Zeis, *American Shipping Policy* (Princeton, 1938), 115-16; *New York Journal of Commerce*, February 26, 1919. For a discussion of the impact of the war on British shipping see Great Britain, Board of Trade, *Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries After the War: Reports of the Departmental Committees* (London, 1918); T. Lawrence Babcock, *Spanning the Atlantic* (New York, 1931), 200; Francis E. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973* (London, 1975), 170.
4. Zeis, *American Shipping Policy*, 115-23; Safford, *Wilsonian Maritime Policy*, 221-23; U.S. Senate, 66th Cong., 1st. Sess., Committee on Commerce, *Establishment of an American Merchant Marine: Hearings* (Washington, D.C., 1920).
5. John H. Kemble and Lane C. Kendall, "The Years Between the Wars: 1919-1939," in Robert A. Kilmarx, ed., *America's Maritime Legacy: A History of the United States Merchant Marine and Ship-*

- building Industry Since Colonial Times* (Boulder, Colo., 1979), 151–55; Burl Noggle, *Into the Twenties* (Urbana, 1974), 59; John G.B. Hutchins, “The American Shipping Industry since 1914,” *Business History Review*, XXVIII (June, 1954), 111–13; “Financial and General Facts in Regard to the U.S.S.B.,” United States Shipping Board, November 21, 1922, Box 15, Albert Lasker Files, Records of the United States Shipping Board, Record Group 32, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as Lasker Files, NA.
6. Frederick Emmons, *The Atlantic Liners* (New York, 1972), 56; John D. Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy 1921–1933* (New York, 1960), 61; Zeis, *American Shipping Policy*, 95–114.
 7. Zeis, *American Shipping Policy*, 125; Eugene P. Trani and David L. Wilson, *The Presidency of Warren G. Harding* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1977), 75; John Gunther, *Taken at the Flood: The Story of Albert D. Lasker* (New York, 1960), 126–45; Albert Lasker to Frank Munson, July 12, 1922, Box 15, Lasker Files, NA.
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 9. Albert Lasker to Martin B. Madden, January 17, 1922, Box 14, Lasker Files, NA; T.H. Rossbottom to Albert Lasker, October 13, 1922, Box 22, Lasker Files, NA; T.H. Rossbottom to Albert Lasker, February 9, 1923, Box 5, Lasker Files, NA; T.H. Rossbottom to Albert Lasker, February 26, 1923, Box 22, Lasker Files, NA; Babcock, *Spanning the Atlantic*, 200; Emmons, *Atlantic Liners*, 11.
 10. Albert Lasker to Samuel Gompers, February 18, 1922, Box 9, Lasker Files, NA; Albert Lasker to Paul Stephens, June 6, 1922, 580/2707/Part III, RG 32, NA.
 11. T.H. Rossbottom to Albert Lasker, February 14, 1922, Box 22, Lasker Files, NA; Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, 171–72; Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, February 6, 1922, A1133/1133/45, General Political Correspondence of the Foreign Office, Foreign Office 371, Public Record Office, Kew, London. Hereafter cited as PRO. Board of Trade to Foreign Office, June 30, 1922, A4201/1133/45, PRO; Foreign Office to George Harvey, August 28, 1922, A5222/1133/45, PRO; “Foreign Office Minutes,” September 7, 1922, A5487/1133/45, PRO.
 12. Babcock, *Spanning the Atlantic*, 201–203; U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, *Hearing in the Matter of the Application of the National Prohibition Act to the Sale of Intoxicating Beverages on American Vessels on the High Seas* (Washington, D.C., 1920); American Steamship Owners Association to Albert Lasker, July 10, 1922, Box 14, Lasker Files, NA.
 13. For a background to the prohibition movement see Norman H. Clarke, *Deliver Us From Evil* (New York, 1976); Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade* (Urbana, 1963); Charles Merz, *The Dry Decade* (Garden City, 1930); Andrew Sinclair, *Prohibition: The Era of Excess* (Boston, 1962); K. Austin Kerr, “Organizing for Reform: The Anti-Saloon League,” *American Quarterly*, XXXII (Spring, 1980), 37–53.
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17. John Barton Payne to Charles F. Riordan, December 10, 1919, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA; Wesley L. Jones to John Barton Payne, December 20, 1919, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA; John Barton Payne to Major Cushing, December 22, 1919, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA; U.S.S.B., "Minutes of Conference of Executive Heads of Operations," January 27, 1920, RG 32, NA.
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19. Treasury Department, *Sale of Intoxicating Beverages on American Vessels: Hearings*; William Frierson to Treasury Department, November 1, 1920, copy in 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA; Justice Department, "Memorandum of Hearing," December 22, 1920, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA.
20. Andrew J. Volstead to William Benson, January 17, 1921, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA; *The New York Times*, January 6 and January 19, 1921; William Benson to Andrew J. Volstead, February 23, 1921, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA.
21. Edward Hyzer to William Benson, December 14, 1920, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA; William Benson to Frank B. Ferris, November 5, 1920, 580/129/Part I, RG 32, NA.
22. Bainbridge Colby to Auckland Geddes, April 22, 1920, 811/114/Great Britain/5, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as RG 59, NA. Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, May 4, 1920, A2776/1002/45, PRO.
23. Anti-Saloon League, "Notes on Power to Regulate Liquor in Transit Through the United States Destined for Foreign Countries," May 4, 1921, Office of the General Counsel and Legislative Superintendent, Anti-Saloon League, Series VIII, Microfilm edition of Temperance and Prohibition Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited as Series VIII, League Papers. Frank K. Niebecker to United States Shipping Board, February 4, 1921, 600/7, RG 32, NA; *The New York Times*, February 22, 1920.
24. The British led this effort, with Ambassador Auckland Geddes lobbying the State Department, and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes pressured the Justice Department to hold the hearing. Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, April 5, 1921, A2388/1069/45, PRO; Lucius H. Beers to Henry D. Fletcher, March 24, 1921, 811/114/469, RG 59, NA; Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, April 8, 1921, A2463/1069/45, PRO; State Department, "Memorandum," May 13, 1921, 811/114/500, RG 59, NA.
25. This ruling did not include liquor seastores used on passenger liners. The injunction arose from the attempt by New York Customs officials to seize whiskey loaded on an Anchor Line vessel and transferred in New York to another Anchor Line ship. Treasury Department to State Department, June 3, 1921, 811/114/Great Britain/2, RG 59, NA; Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, July 7, 1921, A4955/1069/45, PRO; Treasury Department, "Bulletin," August 13, 1921, copy in 811/114/597, RG 59, NA; *Grogan v. Walker* and *Anchor v. Aldridge*, U.S. District Court, Southern District, New York, 275 Fed 373; State Department, "Report," October 21, 1921, 811/114/590, RG 59, NA; Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, October 26, 1921, A7916/1069/45, PRO. Prohibitionists were furious with the Treasury Department decision. Wayne Wheeler to Harry M. Daugherty, January 5, 1922, 23/1866/10X, Classified Subject Files of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives, Suitland, Maryland. Hereafter cited as RG 60, NAS.
26. J. Parker Kirlin to Elmer Schlesinger, July 15, 1921, 580/129/Part II, RG 32, NA; H.H. Raymond to U.S.S.B., July 15, 1921, 580/129/Part II, RG 32, NA.
27. U.S.S.B., "Board Minutes," July 5, 1921, 10/3897, Minutes of the United States Shipping Board, Records of the United States Shipping Board, Record Group 32, National Archives, Washington, D.C., John J. Flaherty to W.G. Stevens, July 5, 1921, 600/7, RG 32, NA.
28. Walter Ballinger to Warren G. Harding, October 21, 1921, copy in 580/129/Part II, RG 32, NA; D.E. Brundage to Walter Ballinger, November 2, 1921, Box 10, Lasker Files, NA; Wesley L. Jones to Albert Lasker, November 7, 1921, Box 10, Lasker Files, NA; James W. Boring to W.J. Love,

- March 27, 1922, 1/E, Emergency Fleet Corporation, Executive Office, Division of Operations (1/E), Records of the United States Shipping Board, Record Group 32, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
29. D.E. Brundage to Mable Walker Willebrandt, October 29, 1921, Box 11, Lasker Files, NA.
 30. J.B. Smull to A.F. Mack, June 2, 1922, Box 22, Lasker Files, NA; Le Baron B. Colt to Albert Lasker, April 19, 1922, Box 6, Lasker Files, NA.
 31. *The Chicago Tribune*, May 6, 1922; *St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat*, May 30, 1922; *Public Ledger* (Philadelphia), May 28, 1922; *Newark Evening News* (New Jersey), May 26, 1922; Wayne Wheeler to Albert Lasker, June 1, 1922, Box 37, Lasker Files, NA.
 32. Augustus Busch to Anheuser-Busch Board of Directors, May 15, 1922, copy in Box 22, Lasker Files, NA.
 33. Adolphus Busch to Warren G. Harding, June 8, 1922, Box 3, Lasker Files, NA; "Prohibition Afloat," June 13, 1922, Box 22, Lasker Files, NA; George Christian to Albert Lasker, June 13, 1922, Box 3, Lasker Files, NA.
 34. Albert Lasker to Adolphus Busch, June 13, 1922, Box 22, Lasker Files, NA; Elmer Schlesinger to Albert Lasker, June 13, 1922, 600/7, RG 32, NA; Adolphus Busch to Albert Lasker, June 14, 1922, Box 3, Lasker Files, NA.
 35. *Chicago Daily Journal*, June 14, 1922; *The Washington Daily News*, June 14, 1922; *The Columbus Citizen* (Ohio), June 15, 1922; Walter H. Newton to Albert Lasker, June 14, 1922, Box 16, Lasker Files, NA.
 36. For examples of the letters received see Box 22, Lasker Files, NA; 580/129/Part III, RG 32, NA; File 75, Roll 168 (75/168), Warren G. Harding Papers, Microfilm edition, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited as Harding Papers.
 37. Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy*, 61; Trani and Wilson, *Presidency of Warren G. Harding*, 76; Murray, *Harding Era*, 288-89; Warren G. Harding to Frank Mondell, June 1, 1922, 1282/176, Harding Papers; Frank Mondell to Warren G. Harding, June 12, 1922, 1320/176, Harding Papers; Edward G. Frederick to Warren G. Harding, June 13, 1922, 1311/176, Harding Papers.
 38. "The Man on the Bridge," *Nauticus*, XVII (June 17, 1922), 4; Albert Lasker to John T. Flynn, June 15, 1922, Box 3, Lasker Files, NA.
 39. Frank Mondell to Warren G. Harding, June 16, 1922, 1420/176, Harding Papers; *The New York Times*, June 15, 1922; *The Chicago Tribune*, June 16, 1922; Kermit Roosevelt to Albert Lasker, June 19, 1922, Box 19, Lasker Files, NA.
 40. *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 15, 1922), 8777 and 9187; Clyde Kelly to Albert Lasker, June 14, 1922, Box 3, Lasker Files, NA.
 41. Frank B. Willis to Allen L. Walton, June 19, 1922, Box 17, Papers of Frank B. Willis, MSS 325, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited as Willis Papers. *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 15, 1922), 8750-52; *The New York Times*, June 15, 1922.
 42. *The New York Times*, June 16, 1922 and June 17, 1922; Albert Lasker to W.J. Conners, June 16, 1922, Box 5, Lasker Files, NA; "H.R. 12062," copy in Box 3, Lasker Files, NA; U.S. House of Representatives, 67th Cong., 2d. Sess., Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, *American Merchant Marine: Report* (June 16, 1922); U.S. House of Representatives, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess., Committee on the Merchant marine and Fisheries, *Minority Views: The Subsidy Bill* (June 28, 1922); George J. Duraind to Albert Lasker, August 26, 1922, Box 7, Lasker Files, NA. Duraind claimed that Busch was the "front" for subsidy opponents.
 43. The Supreme Court's 6-3 decision was based on the probable intent of Congress to forbid transshipments, but it did not address the broader application of this beyond the narrow focus of the Anchor Line suit. *Grogan v. Walker and Anchor v. Aldridge*, 259 U.S. 80; Quincy Wright, "The Prohibition Amendment and International Law," *Minnesota Law Review*, VII (1922-23), 28-39; Jessup, *Law of Territorial Waters*, 216.
 44. Treasury Regulation 3350, June 17, 1922, V/B/3, General Records of the Prohibition Unit, Treasury Department, Record Group 58, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Wayne Wheeler to Warren

- G. Harding, June 2, 1922, 732/168, Harding Papers; Rowland Sperling, "Foreign Office Minutes," June 30, 1922, A4048/239/45, PRO: Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, June 30, 1922, A4048/239/45, PRO.
45. Albert Lasker to Norman B. Beecher, June 22, 1922, Box 1, Lasker Files, NA; *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d Sess. (June 21, 1922), 9107-9108; *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 22, 1922), 9187; *The New York Times*, June 21, 1922.
 46. Harding agreed to a postponement until the pending tariff bill was considered. Warren G. Harding to Frank Mondell, June 20, 1922, 602/219, Harding Papers; *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 26, 1922), 9456-58; *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 29, 1922), 9720-23; "The Man on the Bridge," *Nauticus XVII* (June 24, 1922), 3.
 47. Wayne B. Wheeler to Warren G. Harding, June 13, 1922, 1039/151, Harding Papers; Warren G. Harding to Wayne B. Wheeler, June 23, 1922, 1038/151, Harding Papers.
 48. Harry M. Daugherty to Wayne B. Wheeler, June 16, 1922, 23/2829/6, RG 60, NAS; *The New York Times*, June 16, 1922; *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 15, 1922), 8750.
 49. Wayne Wheeler to Harry M. Daugherty, June 13, 1922, 23/2829/6, RG 60, NAS; Wayne B. Wheeler to Warren G. Harding, June 22, 1922, 1041/151, Harding Papers.
 50. Wayne B. Wheeler to Harry M. Daugherty, June 22, 1922, 23/2829/31, RG 60, NAS.
 51. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, "Memorandum for Attorney General," June 28, 1922, 23/2829/Part I, RG 60, NAS. In this preliminary opinion, Willebrandt concluded that prohibition did not extend to ships beyond the three mile limit.
 52. Letters were overwhelmingly against the liquor sales. For examples see 23/2829/19x, 24, 26, 40, 43, 63x and 70, RG 60, NAS; Wayne Wheeler to Mabel Walker Willebrandt, June 22, 1922, 23/2829/Part I, RG 60, NAS; Warren F. Martin to Harry M. Daugherty, July 6, 1922, 23/2829/63, RG 60, NAS; Harry M. Daugherty to Warren F. Martin, July 7, 1922, 23/0517x, RG 60, NAS.
 53. American Steamship Owners Association to Albert Lasker, July 11, 1922, Box 14, Lasker Files, NA; Kermit Roosevelt to Albert Lasker, July 11, 1922, Box 19, Lasker Files, NA; Albert Lasker to Harry M. Daugherty, July 13, 1922, Box 11, Lasker Files, NA; "Transcript of Liquor on Ships Meeting," July 13, 1922, 23/2829/142, RG 60, NAS; Wayne Wheeler, "Statement Before the Attorney General, July 13, 1922, Folder 23, Roll 3, Series VIII, League Papers.
 54. This reversed her earlier draft. Significantly, Willebrandt received all the liquor sale protests sent to the Justice Department and the White House. Mabel Walker Willebrandt to Harry M. Daugherty, July 20, 1922, 23/2829/Part I, RG 60, NAS.
 55. For a discussion of the industrial unrest, see Murray, *Harding Era*, 243-62; Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy*, 69-73; Trani and Wilson, *Presidency of Warren G. Harding*, 97-101.
 56. *Congressional Record*, 67th. Cong., 2d. Sess. (August 16, 1922), 11459; Frank Mondell to Warren G. Harding, August 1, 1922, 609/219, Harding Papers; Albert Lasker to Warren G. Harding, August 18, 1922, 1516/176, Harding Papers.
 57. *The Washington Post*, August 23, 1922; Warren G. Harding to Frank Mondell, August 23, 1922, 68/230, Harding Papers.
 58. *Literary Digest LXXIII* (June 17, 1922), 12-14; *The New York Times*, October 7, 1922.
 59. Harry M. Daugherty to Guy D. Goff, September 20, 1922, 60/10/5/20, RG 60, NAS; Jess W. Smith, "Memorandum for E.S. Rochester," October 17, 1922, Folder 2, Harry M. Daugherty Collection, MSS 271, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited as Daugherty Collection. Frank B. Willis to Allan L. Walton, June 16, 1922, Box 17, Willis Papers; *The Columbus Citizen*, June 16, 1922, November 6 and November 7, 1922; Harry M. Daugherty, "Memorandum for Solicitor General," September 26, 1922, 23/0/540, RG 60, NAS; Lowell Fess to Lehr Fess, October 5, 1922, Box 19, Papers of Simeon D. Fess, MSS 283, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited as Fess Papers. Warren G. Harding to Simeon D. Fess, October 26, 1922, Box 19, Fess Papers.
 60. Harry M. Daugherty to Warren G. Harding, October 3, 1922, Folder 20, Harry M. Daugherty Papers, MSS 668, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Hereafter cited as Daugherty Papers. Harry M. Daugherty to Andrew Mellon, October 6, 1922, 23/2829/Part I, RG 60, NAS.

61. Albert Lasker to Harry M. Daugherty, October 6, 1922, Box 30, Lasker Files, NA; Harry M. Daugherty to Albert Lasker, October 7, 1922, Box 30, Lasker Files, NA; Albert Lasker to J.M. Patterson, October 13, 1922, Box 4, Lasker Files, NA.
62. Warren G. Harding to Albert Lasker, October 6, 1922, 998/151, Harding Papers; Albert Lasker to Warren G. Harding, October 7, 1922, 993/151, Harding Papers; Albert Lasker to U.S.S.B. Staff, October 7, 1922, 580/129/Part IV, RG 32, NA; Albert Lasker to Warren G. Harding, October 9, 1922, 995/151, Harding Papers. Lasker's orders were issued to the United States Lines, Munson Line, Pacific Mail Steamship Company, Pacific Steamship Company, Los Angeles Pacific Navigation Company, A.H. Bull and Company, Mallory Transport Lines, Clyde Steamship Company and Mississippi Shipping Company.
63. Charles Evans Hughes to Harry M. Daugherty, October 5, 1922, "Daugherty" folder, Box 9, Charles Evans Hughes papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as Hughes Papers. Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, October 7, 1922, A6200/1437/45, PRO.
64. Hughes was awaiting a reply to his June request for smuggling assistance in the Bahamas. "Memorandum of Meeting with Auckland Geddes," October 7, 1922, Folder 76b, Box 175, Hughes Papers; *The New York Times*, October 8, 1922; Auckland Geddes to Foreign Office, October 9, 1922, A6233/1437/45, PRO; Warren G. Harding to Andrew Mellon, October 13, 1922, 1071/151, Harding Papers; State Department, "Memorandum," October 25, 1922, 811/114/1032, RG 59, NA.
65. "Bill of Complaint," *Cunard Steamship Company v. Andrew Mellon and International Mercantile Marine Company v. Henry Stuart*, October 17, 1922, copy in 23/4002/3, RG 60, NAS.
66. Justice Department, "Memorandum," October 25, 1922, 23/2829, RG 60, NAS; *The New York Times*, October 25 and October 28, 1922.
67. Wayne Wheeler to Warren G. Harding, October 20, 1922, 898/168, Harding Papers; Justice Department to William Hayward, October 18, 1922, 23/4002/2x, RG 60, NAS; Anti-Saloon League, "Memorandum," undated, Folder 66, Roll 10, Series VIII, League Papers.
68. T.H. Rossbottom to W.J. Love, October 31, 1922, 1/E, RG 32, NA; R.M Semmes to W.J. Love, October 11, 1922 and October 17, 1922, 1/E, RG 32, NA; T.A. Graham to W.J. Love, October 12, 1922, 1/E, RG 32, NA; Frank Munson to W.J. Love, October 11, 1922, 1/E, RG 32, NA; T.H. Rossbottom to W.J. Love, October 17, 1922, October 20, 1922 and October 27, 1922, 1/E, RG 32, NA; Joseph E. Sheedy to Albert Lasker, November 15, 1922, Box 18 Lasker Files, NA; W.J. Love to Albert Lasker, October 13, 1922, October 18, 1922, October 19, 1922, October 24, 1922, October 28, 1922, November 23, 1922, December 11, 1922 and December 19, 1922, Box 18, Lasker Files, NA.
69. Albert Lasker to Warren G. Harding, October 31, 1922, 517/151, Harding Papers.
70. *The New York Times*, November 9, 1922.
71. *The Washington Post*, November 9, 1922; Irani and Wilson, *Presidency of Warren G. Harding*, 80; Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy*, 88-89; Francis Russell, *The Shadow of Blooming Grove: Warren G. Harding and His Times* (New York, 1968), 551.
72. Senator Robert La Follette, leader of the progressives, invited progressives to meet with him in Washington in December. Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy*, 89.
73. George W. Emonds to Albert Lasker, November 10, 1922, Box 7, Lasker Files, NA; Albert Lasker to Carl R. Chindblom, November 14, 1922, Box 6, Lasker Files, NA; *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 3rd. Sess. (November 21, 1923), 9-11.
74. *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 3rd. Sess. (November 28, 1922), 359-60; *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 3rd. Sess. (November 29, 1922), 413-14, 429; *The New York Times*, November 29, 1922 and November 30, 1922.
75. *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 4th. Sess. (February 7, 1923), 3213-14; *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 4th. Sess. (February 22, 1923), 4226-68; *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 4th. Sess. (February 27, 1923), 4731-72; *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 4th. Sess. (February 28, 1923), 4834-37; *The New York Times*, February 24, 1923; Irani and Wilson, *Presidency of Warren G. Harding*,

- 77; Murray, *Harding Era*, 325. See also *Congressional Record*, 67th Cong., 4th. Sess. (February 19, 1923), 3935.
76. The Supreme Court began hearing arguments on January 4, 1923. Under the general heading of *Cunard v. Mellon*, the court actually considered twelve similar appeals, ten from foreign shippers and two from private American shippers. *Cunard v. Mellon*, 262 U.S. 100; *The American Journal of International Law*, XVII (July, 1923), 504-507; *Yale Law Journal*, XXXIII (November, 1923), 72-78; Jessup, *Law of Territorial Waters*, 217-20.
77. U.S.S.B., "Press Release," July 10, 1923, 1/E, RG 32, NA.
78. Murray, *Harding Era*, 395-97; Kemble and Kendall, "The Years Between the Wars," in Kilmarx, *America's Maritime Legacy*, 160-62; Emmons, *Atlantic Liners*, 56; Hutchins, "The American Shipping Industry since 1914," *Business History Review*, 114-15; Robert L. Jones, *The Eighteenth Amendment and Our Foreign Relations* (New York, 1933).

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Presidential Strategies and Civil Rights: Eisenhower, The Early Years, 1952-54*

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Abstract

The paper examines the strategic-political concerns of Dwight D. Eisenhower as he grappled with the black civil rights issue during his first presidential campaign and early years in office. The concerns of black and white civil rights advocates and southern whites, resistant to their efforts, are juxtaposed with Eisenhower's concerns for the issue and his need for electoral and legislative coalition building.

In early years of his Presidency, up to the period ending with the announcement of the Brown decision, Eisenhower took a generally supportive position for the recognition of black rights in areas under Federal jurisdiction. He pleaded with his southern friends and allies to accept the Brown decision and lead their constituents to acceptance of gradual desegregation. He perceived himself as engaged in a political balancing act between pro and con forces, and between his own beliefs on what could have been, and what he felt he had to do as President. Generally, during this period, Eisenhower's civil rights position was viewed in a positive manner by black rights advocates, and in a more critical manner by their opponents.

Historical revisionism of Dwight D. Eisenhower's Administration is now a flourishing cottage industry. Murray Kempton's brief 1968 article on "The Underestimation of Dwight Eisenhower," presented the thesis that the former President was a master of deception, manipulation, and deft strategy in the pursuit of political ends.¹ Garry Wills argued in 1969 that Eisenhower was "a political genius." To Wills, it was "no mere accident that he remained, year after year, the most respected man in America."² In 1962 Richard Nixon argued that Dwight Eisenhower "was far more complex and devious a man than most people realized."³ But these were isolated writings drowned out in the flood of paper that proclaimed the mediocrity and amateurish nature of the Eisenhower Presidency.

In the 1970's, however, newly released material from the Eisenhower Library created a new consensus which is rather consistent with the Kempton-Wills-Nixon appraisals. This new consensus is reflected in the views of Vincent P. De Santis: Eisenhower "now appears to be a more astute and more sophisticated politician, a stronger and more concerned chief executive, a more successful president both in domestic and foreign affairs, a more prescient and imaginative leader and a more energetic, perceptive and compassionate person."⁴ Even Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a staunch New Deal liberal and

renowned castigator of the Eisenhower Presidency revised his views in light of the new evidence: "the Eisenhower papers . . . unquestionably alter the old picture . . . Eisenhower showed much more energy, interest, self confidence, purpose, cunning and command than many of us supposed in the 1950s."⁵

We now have an image of a President fully in charge of his administration,⁶ who knew what he was doing,⁷ and deftly guided his administration in pursuit of his goals.⁸ He was a calculating President who used others to "front" for unpopular decisions, and to keep his options and his decisions under control to the maximum extent possible.⁹ His press conference blunders were more often than not quite deliberate, as he tried to obfuscate and lead the Press down an alleyway that he wished to go, rather than the path that they wished to pursue.¹⁰ President Eisenhower's political strategies were deliberate, controlling, consistent and often hidden to all but himself.¹¹ He was a novice to party politics, but an expert in the politics of bureaucratic and government infighting. His days as an army staff general and as a chief of staff who dealt with the Byzantine relationships among the allied commanders and the allied governments served him well as a political apprenticeship.¹² Eisenhower, said George Reedy, Jr., "was a master politician. I did not think so at the time . . . Lord it is funny how different things look a few years later."¹³

An argument directed to his political instincts helped firm up Eisenhower's decision to make a run for the presidency. Many American leaders came to NATO headquarters to talk Eisenhower into running for the presidency. "Many times," wrote Eisenhower, "I would almost laugh aloud at their arguments since all too often they would ascribe to me marvelous, almost unique, qualifications and traits."¹⁴ But, when Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., came to visit him on September 4, 1951, "he was different in that he said he was reflecting the known views of numerous large groups, many of whom now wanted to start organizing a nationwide movement to present my name before the 1952 Republican convention." Eisenhower continues, "Thinking to put him on the defensive at once, I asked, 'You are well known in politics; why not run yourself?' Without pause his answer came back, 'Because I cannot be elected,' and he went on with his argument." But, it was not only his electoral appeal that persuaded Eisenhower to run, it was also the argument that unless the "one-sided [Democratic] partisan dominance could be reversed, the record presaged the virtual elimination of the two-party system, which we agreed was vital to the ultimate preservation of our national institutions."¹⁵

Lodge also impressed upon Eisenhower the "gradual but steady accumulation of power in Washington, increased 'paternalism' in government's relations with the citizens, constant deficit spending, and a steady erosion in the value of our currency." Lodge went on, "corrective measures could not even be started unless we had a Republican victory in 1952." And, "'You,' he said flatly, 'are the only one who can be elected by the Republicans to the Presidency. You *must* permit the use of your name in the upcoming primaries.'" Eisenhower replied he would "think the matter over." Eisenhower mused, "as I look back on that incident, my promise, indefinite as it was, marked a turning point. For the first time I had allowed the smallest break in a regular practice of returning a flat refusal to any kind of proposal that I become an active participant."¹⁶

Lodge went back to the states and entered Eisenhower's name as a candidate for the Republican presidential primary to be held in New Hampshire on March 11, 1952. Ike assented to the move when he gave corroboration to the press that he was a Republican. This was a major news item. In 1948 there had been serious discussion of Eisenhower as a Presidential candidate, but no one knew his political party affiliation. He had never registered as a voter! Despite his lack of participation in the primary campaign effort, Eisenhower carried the New Hampshire election with a large plurality victory. This was followed by an overwhelming write-in vote in the Minnesota primary on March 18. On April 11, 1952 the General tendered his resignation from the NATO command and returned to the states for the 1952 presidential campaign.¹⁷

Eisenhower was the outsider to party politics but he adapted quickly to the calling. However, publicly and often even privately, he downplayed his role in the hurly-burly world of partisan politics. As a result, some of his closest aides, as well as some of the most astute contemporary journalists, were misled by his lack of open partisanship before and after his election as President. Sherman Adams, a confidante of the President's, believed that "As a candidate and as President of the United States Eisenhower had a strong aversion to engaging in partisan politics."¹⁸ But, Eisenhower knew how to use the skills of politics, and he did use them when needed. Recent scholarship concludes that Eisenhower was "a pragmatic and tenacious party politician. . . ."¹⁹ R. Gordon Hoxie, who had known Eisenhower since 1948, concludes, he may well be "the most skilled politically of the modern Presidents with the possible exception of FDR."²⁰

Eisenhower's view of his role as party leader was that he had to act cautiously. "I have never had the luxury of being head of a majority party" he wrote. "Perhaps the leader of such a party can be uniformly partisan. But the leader of a minority party has a different set of references. To win, he and his associates must merit the support of hundreds of thousands of independents and members of the opposition party. Attitudes, speeches, programs and techniques cannot be inflexibly partisan."²¹ He was an active fundraiser and he was active in the development of leadership cadres within the G.O.P. But he kept these efforts quiet. He did not want to portray himself as an overt partisan in the face of the Democratic majority in the electorate and in both houses of the Congress after 1954.²²

Eisenhower wanted the Republican party to become the new majority party. But, the way for the party to achieve this status was through being a "moderate" party. As he wrote to one partisan, "If we could get every Republican committed as a Moderate Progressive, the party would grow so rapidly that within a few years it would dominate American politics."²³ He told his long-time army colleague and political advisor Lucius Clay, the Republican party had to "be known as a progressive organization or it was sunk."²⁴ Yet, Eisenhower as party leader and President took an essentially conservative stance on domestic issues.²⁵ His private views on these issues appeared to be more conservative than those of President Taft.²⁶ But neither legislative nor electoral success appeared to be on the horizon for a party that espoused pre-New Deal Republicanism. As Eisenhower succinctly put it in a letter to his brother, Edgar:

“Should any political party attempt to abolish social security and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party in our political history.”²⁷

Recent scholarship has examined Eisenhower’s civil rights policies.²⁸ In general, his approach to civil rights is perceived as a reflection of his innate domestic conservatism.²⁹ One recent study summed up the Eisenhower record in this area: “To say that Dwight Eisenhower was a hesitant supporter of civil rights would, if anything, understate the degree of his reluctance.”³⁰ Eisenhower’s press secretary, James C. Hagerty, believed that the President was too firm a believer in states’ rights concepts for him to allow himself to conceive of the use of Federal intervention in this area.³¹ Eisenhower writes “I did not agree with those who believed that legislation alone could institute instant morality, [or] who believed that coercion could cure all civil rights problems.”³²

A major speech writer for the President, Emmett J. Hughes, conjectured that, “this determination *not* to act reflected a positive belief. In civil rights, as in congressional relations, his political faith rested on the slow, gradual power of persuasion.”³³ Eisenhower was born in Texas and was raised in the border state of Kansas. This combined with his many postings to the South, and his ties to many southern born and bred military cohorts gave him continual exposure to the southern point of view on the civil rights issue. As one black White House staff-aide saw it: “I knew when I was talking with this man about the plight of the Negroes that he was sympathetic . . . But it was always my feeling that when he went home at night to play bridge or whatever he did with his southern friends, some of whom were always there, I always had the feeling that whatever it was they might have accused him of being a traitor to the cause or whatever, and that would make him waver.”³⁴ What came through to the South, privately and publicly, was Eisenhower’s reluctance to deal with the issue and his sympathy for their—that is, the white South’s—plight.³⁵

Yet, his concern for the white South’s sensitivities may reflect more than just personal ties and sympathies. It may reflect the President’s view of the practical politics of the situation.³⁶ The strategic political concerns that Eisenhower had as Presidential candidate, President, and party leader were of paramount concern as he dealt with the issue of civil rights. The strategic environment in which Eisenhower found himself as a Republican leader and President was a profoundly different environment from that encountered by the last Republican President, Herbert Hoover.

The Republican party had been the party of the black voter from the years following the civil war until the early 1930s.³⁷ By the mid 1930s the black vote had moved solidly into the Democratic column. But neither the Democrats nor the Republicans were sure of its remaining a Democratic vote. In November of 1947, Clark M. Clifford, a key political adviser to President Harry Truman warned his chief: “That the northern Negro is today ready to swing back to his traditional moorings—the Republican Party.”³⁸ By 1950, a majority of the black population lived outside the South. Eighty-seven percent of the non-South blacks lived in the urban areas of seven states that were not only populous but also highly competitive in presidential elections: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and California.³⁹ And, unlike in the South, where by and large they could not vote, in the North they

were an integral part of many urban political machines. In 1948, for the first time in the twentieth century, the black vote played a significant role in determining the outcome of a presidential election.⁴⁰

It was not only the black citizen, but also the white citizen of the South that represented a changing element in the political dynamics that faced the Democrats and the Republicans in the 1950s. Half of the Mississippi delegation and all of the Alabama delegation walked out of the 1948 Democratic National Convention upon passage of a liberal civil rights platform.⁴¹ During the ensuing presidential campaign, the Dixiecrat bolters ran their own "States' Rights" ticket. Truman backed the Democratic platform, and openly pursued black votes with a pledge to push for the implementation of the recommendations of his Committee on Civil Rights.⁴² Truman won the election but for the first time since the end of Reconstruction, four deep South states defected from the party of Andrew Jackson.

In 1952, the Democratic presidential election strategy was fraught with concern about the persistence of the southern defection from the party. Georgia's Senator Richard Russell, a man with strong political ties to the Dixiecrat faction, was a serious candidate for the Democratic nomination, and a constant reminder of the southern possibilities.⁴³ For the G.O.P., the presidential election strategy was centered on the possibilities of Dixiecrat voters and urban, economically conservative voters casting their ballots for the party of Abraham Lincoln.⁴⁴

Eisenhower's position on the issue of civil rights was an unknown quantity at the outset of his Presidential campaign. Walter White, the Executive Director of the N.A.A.C.P., wrote in a letter of May 16, 1952: "The most unfortunate episode in the General's record with respect to racial matters is his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1948 . . . [he] expressed the opinion that segregation in the Armed Services could not be abolished for a long time." But, White reserved his opinion on Eisenhower. "Everything depends in my opinion," he continued, "upon the stand which he takes when he returns to the United States and takes off his uniform to discuss this and other basic issues."⁴⁵ During the general election campaign Eisenhower told E. Frederic Morrow, one of his few black aides, that he had based his testimony mainly on the advice of his mostly southern-born commanders, and that he had been wrong.⁴⁶ At a press conference held on June 5, 1952, following his return to the states, Eisenhower said that he favored civil rights for blacks, but that he opposed a federally enforced Fair Employment Practices Commission [FEPC].⁴⁷ In a nationally syndicated column following the press conference, White indicated his concern over Eisenhower's position on the FEPC. But, again he reserved final judgment, "until Mr. Eisenhower has the opportunity to think through more thoroughly the basic issues of the campaign."⁴⁸

The Democrats raised similar concerns for the NAACP leader. Walter White wrote to Frank McKinney, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee: "We are gravely disturbed by the reports from Chicago that you are using your influence . . . to work out a 'compromise' plank on the party platform . . . by eliminating specific reference to FEPC and other civil rights measures." White explicitly made clear his position as to the effect such a compromise would have: "There will be wide-

spread repercussions among Negroes and other liberal voters against yielding to those who would perpetuate second-class citizenship for Negroes and other minorities." The Democratic Chairman's response was not exactly enlightening. He mentioned there would be open hearings before the convention and at that time the Democratic party "will welcome the views of all organizations and individuals, and it will appreciate the assistance of your organization in drafting this most important statement."⁴⁹

Before the G.O.P. platform was finished Eisenhower's long time friend, "Swede" Hazlett wrote the General of his concern that if Eisenhower comes out in favor of civil rights then "all our plans will fall flat." Eisenhower's reply was indirect, "As you know, we are devoting particular attention to the southern front in our planning just now, and we believe we will work out the problem satisfactorily."⁵⁰

In 1952, the liberal wings of both major political parties caved in to the drive for the Southern white vote.⁵¹ Truman won the Democratic nomination and Presidential election in 1948, but the southern walk-out at the National Convention and the ensuing intraparty split, was a cost that the Democrats did not want to bear in 1952. On the other hand, the Republicans saw the 1948 Democratic split as providing them an opportunity to get Southern votes in 1952. The civil rights planks of both parties were weaker in 1952 than they were in 1948. There was neither a Thomas Dewey of New York, with his good credentials on the issue, nor a Harry Truman from Missouri and the White House, with his fighting spirit tied to the Northern vote, at the top of either party ticket. The Republican platform promised the return of the Tidelands oil basin to the southern gulf states, in order to strengthen the push for the South in the general election. During the Republican convention Eisenhower promised the Texas delegation that "the state—like other gulf states—should enjoy the right to the oil under the Gulf of Mexico, out of the state's historic boundary."⁵²

On the Democratic side, soon after the national convention was over, the nominee, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, met with Governor Allen Shivers of Texas. Stevenson refused to support the Texas claim for the Tidelands oil. The next day the Texas Governor announced he would not support the Democratic presidential ticket.⁵³ Shivers put together the Texas Democrats for Eisenhower organization in reciprocity for the General's generosity. Tidelands oil had become a major issue in the campaign.⁵⁴

Further evidence of Eisenhower's direct involvement in the 1952 Republican drive for the Southern vote, is that he alone made the "significant decision to include the Southern states in nationwide campaigning, [even though this] was flatly opposed by men far more experienced than I."⁵⁵ Herbert Brownell, the 1948 Dewey campaign manager, was the strategist for the Eisenhower nomination drive. He was also a key member of the Eisenhower general election drive. But Dewey, like Sherman Adams, the chief general election planner and supervisor, came out of the northeastern wing of the Republican party. They had strong ties to the civil rights tradition of the party, and few ties to the South. The party pros, according to Eisenhower, "argued that to try to influence voters in the South was a waste of time, effort and money, all of which could be used more profitably in areas where 'there was some chance of

winning.” Eisenhower, the outsider to party politics, but the insider to the South, made the decision to go to the South.⁵⁶

A swing through the South, including stops in Georgia, Florida, and Arkansas marked the first trip of Eisenhower’s 1952 election campaign. In the 1948 Presidential campaign Truman spent five days in the South, all of them in Texas; Dewey did not even bother to go into the former Confederate states. In the 1952 campaign, Stevenson spent a total of four days in the states of Florida, Tennessee, and Texas; Eisenhower spent six days in the South and went into every state of the old Confederacy except Mississippi.⁵⁷

The Eisenhower campaign strategy paid off handsomely. Governor Shivers of Texas was joined by Governor Robert F. Kennan of Louisiana and Governor James F. Byrnes of South Carolina in open support of the G.O.P presidential effort. Senator Harry Byrd, proprietor of the political machine of Virginia, proclaimed his open neutrality—leaning toward Eisenhower.

While publicly singing “Dixie” did wonders for the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket in the white South, it did little for blacks. Morrow complained to Sherman Adams, “There is a feeling of complete frustration and indignation [among Republican black activists] because of [an] apparent lack of interest on the part of the county and state committees in the Negro vote.”⁵⁸ Another black, Milton Taylor, head of the National Civic and Political Council for Eisenhower, wrote to Fred Seaton, Adams’ campaign deputy, that he had not seen a picture of Eisenhower with any black leader, and there were but two weeks left until election day.⁶⁰

Yet, the Democratic ticket did not offer a much better alternative for black rights advocates. John Sparkman of Alabama was Stevenson’s choice as a running mate in his effort to unite the party. While recognized as a relatively liberal southern Democrat, this liberalism did not extend to his voting record on black rights. Soon after the convention was over, Sparkman met with Clarence Mitchell, the chief NAACP political operative in Washington, D.C., and told him, “he supports the platform fully and believes that good civil rights legislation will pass because of it. . . .”⁶¹ Still, the NAACP was not too trusting of Sparkman. Henry Lee Moon, an NAACP political analyst, wrote to one loyal NAACP member: “What disturbs us about Senator Sparkman is that he at no time deviated from the Dixiecrat line on civil rights. As you know there have been Southerners who have occasionally defied regional provincialism and indicated by their votes a desire to improve conditions; notably Maury Maverick, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, Claude Pepper of Florida, and others.”⁶² The NAACP was unhappy with Sparkman and was not too sure of Stevenson.

At a July 31 press conference, the recently chosen Democratic Presidential nominee, Adlai Stevenson, did not ingratiate himself with the Administrator of the NAACP. “Governor Stevenson [gave] the disquieting impression that he does not intend to be bound too closely by the provisions of the 1952 Democratic platform [dealing with a Federal FEPC]. . . .” Roy Wilkins continued: “Unless Governor Stevenson clarifies his stand with speed those in the civil rights camp who felt, uneasily, that they might risk a Sparkman accompanied by a Stevenson backed up by a good platform plank, may conclude that they dare not gamble with the Democratic Party even a little bit.”⁶³

On August 4, Stevenson publicly defended the Democratic party's civil rights record and argued, "I can hardly see why the Negro vote would find any refuge in the Republican party."⁶⁴ After meeting with Stevenson in Springfield, Illinois on August 7, Wilkins reported, "Stevenson seems to be definitely our man . . . He is one with us on the *substance*; he may part with us occasionally on *tactics*."⁶⁵

But, Wilkins still had questions about Stevenson as well as Eisenhower. A September 8, 1952 memorandum from Wilkins to the NAACP Board of Directors, discussed the post-nomination interviews he held with each of the two candidates. Concerning Stevenson, "I was disturbed a little by the Governor's expressed belief that the South would 'go along' with a civil rights program and would do something to improve [Negro] conditions within the Dixie states." He continues, "I advanced the opinion that Southerners had demonstrated by past actions that they were merely obstructionists in Congress and never came forward with any proposal that really changed the old order. After considerable discussion he remained of the opinion that some progress could be made, even with Southerners. I . . . left him with a warning to examine most closely any so-called 'compromise' offer brought forward by the Southerners."⁶⁶ Two weeks after his interview with Wilkins, Stevenson wrote to Governor John Battle of Virginia, "[as] to the civil rights business . . . I am convinced that the sledge-hammer approach has been all wrong . . . I think that there is much we can do without any compulsory FEPC. . . ."⁶⁷

Eisenhower, in his August 26 discussion with Wilkins, made it clear that he would not support a "compulsory" Federal FEPC. "General Eisenhower thought a commission to study employment patterns and get the facts, expose the conditions, and advise the states would be the thing to establish . . ." On the other hand, "Mr. Eisenhower vigorously declared himself in favor of ending segregation in the District of Columbia, saying that it should be wiped out in the capital of the nation. He said he was not clear on just how the Congressional committees on the District and the District Commissioners would work out the problem, but reiterated that he wanted it done." The General pledged "that if elected he will eliminate discrimination wherever it exists in federal employment under his control." He also mentioned his opposition to the poll tax and to lynching and stated, "he was opposed to filibusters, but he could not promise to do anything about changing the Senate rules. General Eisenhower is friendly and gracious. He appears honest and sincere in his declared opposition to discrimination, but he speaks always in general terms."⁶⁸

Thus, both candidates were reluctant debutantes in the civil rights struggle, and their campaigns reflected their reticence. The NAACP gave its endorsement to Stevenson in early September. But after Labor Day, neither candidate made a major speech dealing with specific civil rights issues. The soporific nature of Eisenhower's reference to civil rights in Wheeling, West Virginia aptly sums up the tenor of the debate: "We seek in America a true equality of opportunity for all men. I have no patience with the idea of second class citizenship."⁶⁹ Only Harry S. Truman, the "give 'em hell" orator of '48, stepped forward to the public with the issue in 1952. In late September Truman started his campaign tour for Stevenson. He whistle stopped to make 211 speeches

in 18,500 miles of rail travel. He first confronted the civil rights issue on October 9 in Buffalo and kept pounding at it for the rest of the campaign.⁷⁰

In late October, Daisy Lampkin, a long-time NAACP activist and Democrat, wrote an open letter of dissent to the NAACP Stevenson-Sparkman endorsement.⁷¹

I find it impossible for me to support John Sparkman of Alabama. Sparkman and his record stand opposed to everything I have fought for in my 18 years as Field Secretary of . . . the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

For 20 years the government running the District of Columbia has been headed and dominated by Democrats. Discrimination and segregation in the nation's capital still exist. Although Negroes constitute one-third of the population of the nation's capital, not a single Negro has ever been appointed a District Commissioner. . . .

Don't let's be fooled any longer by the claims the Democratic party makes . . . what could we hope for with John Sparkman as Vice President and presiding officer of the United States Senate?

On the other hand, almost every black newspaper in the country agreed with the NAACP and endorsed Stevenson.⁷² Although 73 percent of the black population cast their votes for Stevenson and Sparkman, the great majority of the nation voted for Eisenhower and Nixon. The G.O.P. presidential nominee won a higher percentage of votes in the South than any Republican had won since Reconstruction.⁷³ Eisenhower not only carried the four states of Florida, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia, generally running way ahead of the 1948 Dewey inroads in the metropolitan South, but also ran ahead of the state Republicans in many of the black belt counties. Generally, Eisenhower and Nixon did well in the deep South where Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright did well as Dixiecrats in 1948.⁷⁴ White, in a letter written to Robert Ming, an NAACP attorney, expressed his amazement at the scope of the Eisenhower victory. "I trust that you have recovered a little from the avalanche. Although I had no belief in an overwhelming victory by either man, I was reasonably confident that the Governor would squeeze out in the close race. I became generally apprehensive when the Chicago Democratic leaders had communicated with New York to round up some money to do the necessary work on election day. I think that I was prepared then for defeat although not in the proportions that developed."⁷⁵

Eisenhower had indeed won a smashing victory and, against the wishes of some of his key advisers, he had gone into the South and had made it a part of the G.O.P. victory. He also lost more black votes than any other presidential candidate in Republican history. Throughout the campaign Eisenhower played his role almost perfectly. He not only had going for him a public that was ready to throw the Democrats out because of "communism, corruption, and Korea," but also he remained the American hero-general. He was the expert politician strategist for the campaign season. He only said and did that which rebounded to the benefit of his campaign.⁷⁶ Civil rights did not trip him up—it was not even much of an issue in 1952. Stevenson was not willing to push the issue and Eisenhower was perfectly willing to keep the lid on the matter

in so far as possible. This General made a peaceful march into the South and came out of the region with a campaign chest full of electoral college votes. His losses for the venture were slim. He was a "natural" at the craft of election Politics. Now the form and substance of politics and policy were his domain. The supporters and opponents of black rights awaited the new Administration's actions.

Eisenhower noted that the two previous Democratic administrations "had exerted the bulk of their effort on securing civil rights legislation . . . which habitually met defeat from the Democratic party itself." He decided that the best tack in the civil rights area would be "to see first that the federal house itself was in order. Executive order and executive pressure would be his method to remove discrimination in the armed forces, in federal offices, and in the District of Columbia."⁷⁷ The District would become the exemplar for the rest of the nation.⁷⁸ The key to success, according to Eisenhower, was to do this "quietly . . . to avoid making an open issue of things."⁷⁹ Soon after the election was over Republican Majority Leader Senator Robert A. Taft warned the President to stay away from civil rights legislation.⁸⁰ To bring civil rights legislation before the Congress would be to bring out the reflexive opposition of the Southern legislators. It would revive the traditional southern enmity towards the G.O.P. and undermine the electoral gains that had just recently been achieved by the party. From either a political or a personal perspective Eisenhower could find little benefit from starting a row over civil rights.

Early in the legislative session, Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois introduced a bill to create a committee to investigate black voting problems in the South. He told the President that his intention in introducing the bill was to remove "this very knotty problem from instant controversy" and ensure "credit to the Republican Party."⁸¹ Democratic Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota had already introduced a similar bill. Some Republicans obviously believed that it was important to deny sole credit to the Democrats on this issue.

The Republican liberals on the civil rights issue had close connections to the President. His Press Secretary, James Hagerty, Jr., had been the Press Secretary to the 1948 G.O.P. standard bearer, Thomas Dewey. The key political strategist for the Eisenhower campaign was Herbert Brownell, Dewey's 1948 campaign manager. He was the national political strategist of the Republican party.⁸² To Eisenhower, "he had become a close friend," and was to be his trusted Attorney General.⁸³ Sherman Adams, who was to become Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, wrote, "[Eisenhower] had more confidence in Brownell's political advice than he had in anybody else's."⁸⁴ In the months immediately following the election, the President-elect's closest advisers on cabinet and other appointments included Brownell, Adams, and Lucius Clay.⁸⁵ Eisenhower asked Val Washington, the Republican National Committee's Director of Minority Affairs, to provide Brownell with a list of blacks qualified for government positions.⁸⁶ Brownell was at the center of the Administration's efforts to deal with black needs at the outset, and he was to remain a key figure dealing with some of the Administration's toughest civil rights decisions. Maxwell Rabb, a former assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., functioned as the administration advisor on race matters.

He had no prior experience in civil rights matters but that did not matter to Eisenhower as "he did not think that there should be a special minorities man as such . . . [Negroes] should not be singled out with a caretaker in charge of them."⁸⁷

The Republican conservatives on civil rights were also represented in the administration. The plight of E. Frederic Morrow, a black Republican who was brought into the Presidential campaign by Eisenhower, reflects the civil rights tugs and pulls on the Administration. Morrow resigned his position as a C.B.S. executive after he was advised by Adams that there was a position waiting for him in the White House. Six months later he was told there "just isn't any spot here for you." In the Fall of 1954, he received an appointment as a business affairs adviser in the Commerce Department. Several years later he found out that "some of the President's closest friends were awe stricken that [Eisenhower] should take such liberty as to invite a black man on his personal staff. And one of his friends [General Persons of Alabama] suggested that the day I arrived, he would certainly walk out with all the secretaries and female clerks." As a result, Morrow received the Commerce appointment.⁸⁸ Later, in July of 1955, Morrow was appointed to the President's staff as Administrative Officer for Special Projects. On January 27, 1959 he took the oath of office for the appointment. The President was not present for the ceremony. As Morrow put it, "The White House is a little embarrassed about me."⁸⁹ In his memoirs Eisenhower proudly notes the Morrow appointment, as well as several other top level black personnel appointments.⁹⁰ The drift and uncertainty over Morrow's situation never made it into the President's writings.

Before assuming office Eisenhower let liberal Republican Senator Clifford Case know that he intended to "wipe out every vestige of segregation" in the District of Columbia.⁹¹ The President contacted leaders of non-government groups in the District to enlist their support for the effort.⁹² White House aides even advocated District home rule legislation as a means of attracting black voter support. They were keenly aware of recent black defections at the polls.⁹³

Black leaders were not at all sure how to deal with the new Republican administration. Roy Wilkins began a memorandum to the NAACP Executive Secretary, "I wonder just what our strategy and procedure is going to be . . ." The basic problem, as he saw it was as follows:⁹⁴

It seems to me that two broad courses of action are open to us (a) to sit tight on the civil rights bills that have been sponsored and pressed principally by Democrats in the last few years and work closely and predominantly writing off the Taft leadership as hostile, and (b) taking the Republican declarations and promises, both in the platform and from Mr. Eisenhower, and going to the Republican leadership in Congress and in the White House with requests for action and offers of assistance . . . I think if we give the impression that we regard the Republican promises as mere words and the Republican leadership as completely hostile to our objectives we either will be shut out completely or they will ignore us and proceed to . . . enact the kind of program they desire, leaving us in the frustrating role as mere opposition.

The black association with the liberal wing of the Democratic party was very strong. The 1948 election reinforced the ties forged by the New Deal. But many Republicans in the Northeast and Midwest industrial belts had extensive ties and support within the black community. The black situation was this: could they successfully develop ties to the new Republican national administration or would they be doomed to wander in the political wilderness until the Democrats returned to power?

On January 26, 1953 the Republican Congressional leadership met at the White House with the President, the Vice President, Sherman Adams and General Persons. The President stated that he intended "to do away with segregation in the District of Columbia and in the Armed Forces." Eisenhower and his Senate Leader agreed that they wanted "to avoid a battle in the Congress over the District of Columbia segregation issue." The President brought up the issue of "increasing the number of District Commissioners from three to five, as he would like to see wider representation on this Commission." The leadership agreed with the President on the need for expansion and the need to consider District home-rule "at a later date."⁹⁵

The day after the leadership meeting an outside expert asked by the President to develop proposals to end segregation in the nation's capital without resort to legislation, advised the White House that he was ready to bring forward his recommendations. The President's Acting Secretary set a February 5 meeting for this discussion.⁹⁶ The President was moving quickly and publicly on the District desegregation issue. On some other civil rights matters the President moved but little.

In the previous two Administrations blacks had direct and relatively easy access to the President. This pattern did not continue during the Eisenhower years. Early in the Administration black leaders requested a meeting to discuss their agenda. The Eisenhower White House was not about to have the President directly and publicly involved with the black leadership. The request was turned down because of the President's "extremely crowded" schedule.⁹⁷ The President's schedule remained too busy for a meeting with black leaders until June 23, 1958. This was the one and only time that the President allowed himself to meet with the black leadership.

The basis of Eisenhower's sensitivity on this matter can only be speculated upon. It may well be that the President saw any public meeting with black leaders as undercutting his pursuit of the South. Desegregating federally controlled areas was not a critical issue even for some of the staunchest Southern advocates of segregation. Here he could gain black favor with minor political fall-out from the South. But, major black leaders openly consulting with the President was another matter. This could be taken as a sign of his turning away from a conciliatory and understanding posture towards the South. There had been an infamous southern reaction at the turn of the century when Theodore Roosevelt had Booker T. Washington to the White House. Or, on the other hand, it may just be that Eisenhower wanted to go as far as possible in his plan to desegregate federal facilities, and that he did not wish to bring blacks to the White House and raise the issue of black influence in the matter. A quiet but steady attack on the problem was what the President said he wanted. Downplaying the black leadership's role would help to keep the southern defections over the issue to a minimum.

On March 10, 1953 Brownell's Department of Justice went into Federal Court to argue in a "friend of the court brief" that the Court should uphold an 1872 statute banning mandated segregation in the restaurants of the capital.⁹⁸ In the previous Administration the Department had started to file "friend of the court" briefs on behalf of black rights. Many staff members, including Philip Elman, the Department spokesman, were Truman Administration holdovers. At an April 1 meeting with the Attorney General, the Director of the NAACP Washington Bureau, Clarence Mitchell, was pleased with Brownell's pledge to "take action to strengthen the Civil Rights Section of the Department." Brownell also "promised that he would try to arrange a meeting" between black leaders and the President.⁹⁹ The meeting with the President did not occur, but the Attorney General did move on the other pledge.

The White House continued to move to end segregation in the District and in the armed services. On March 19, 1953 the President made a public pledge to end discrimination "where ever direct Federal funds are expended for anything. . . ."¹⁰⁰ In response to prodding from Harlem, New York Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Maxwell Rabb met with the Secretary of the Navy and other top military officials to push for the total elimination of discrimination at the Charleston, South Carolina and Norfolk, Virginia navy bases. The result of the meeting, as Rabb summarized it for Adams, was that the military "are now prepared to change their approach."¹⁰¹

At the end of June, 1953, Walter White publicly praised the President for desegregating military bases, public schools on the bases, and post facilities for civilians. He also thanked the Department of Justice for its efforts in the District desegregation case.¹⁰² Desegregation in the capital moved on a broad front. Prominent District leaders thanked the President for his support of these efforts. The President's new appointee to the District Commission, Samuel Spencer, served as a bulwark of support for the desegregation efforts.¹⁰³

In May of 1953 the President moved to deal with discrimination by government contractors. Maxwell Rabb consulted with Jacob Seidenberg, a former member of Truman's Contracts Committee, on the setting up of a new committee. The new Committee on Government Contracts got under way on August 13, 1953. The Committee was circumscribed in its powers: (1) it was to be only advisory, with no coercive powers; (2) no enforcement recommendations from the Committee were to come before the President—this would only "serve as an embarrassment to the President because he can't carry them out;" and (3) as per the explicit instructions of the President to the Chairman of the Committee, Vice President Richard Nixon, "within the Federal government itself, however, tolerance of inequality would be odious."¹⁰⁴ The Committee's power stemmed from the power of publicity and the skill mustered by its Chairman.¹⁰⁵ The black leadership was delighted with the committee. "The highlight of the summer," declared Clarence Mitchell: "was President Eisenhower's action establishing a new committee . . . headed by the Vice President." The Bureau Director crowed that he received "a pen used by the President to sign Executive Order No. 10,479 creating the new Committee."¹⁰⁶

Congressman Nixon had opposed legislation for a compulsory Federal FEPC. But, Vice President and Committee Chairman Nixon favored a strong role for the

President's Committee. He worked hard and successfully to promote equal employment by government contractors, especially in the District of Columbia. In 1946 Nixon was a dues paying member of the local NAACP branch in his California Congressional District. During the late 1940s the Congressman was a fair-haired boy of conservative Republicanism given his role in the anti-communist investigations. But, by the 1950s, as Vice President, his constituency broadened. He was a national party figure in the 1950s, and national Republicans still looked for the return of the black vote to their party. In 1956 Nixon made an "appreciable cash contribution" to the NAACP Freedom Fund. In 1957, he introduced himself to Martin Luther King, Jr., in Ghana, where the two men had gone to participate in the Independence Day festivities. He readily invited the Montgomery boycott leader to visit with him at the White House. The invitation was accepted and, at the time, a friendship developed between the two men.¹⁰⁸ The Nixon of the 1950s was an advocate of black civil rights, and the Committee bore out that role.

The President boldly addressed the contracts issue with Governor Byrnes of South Carolina. Then, as he felt the Governor's rising concern, he gave reassurances to him as to the narrowness of the committee. The day after the Committee on Government Contracts got underway he wrote to the Governor, "I feel that my oath of office, as well as my own convictions, requires me to eliminate discrimination within the definite area of Federal responsibility. There is one of these areas . . . where my efforts may run counter to the customs in some States. This is the area involving nondiscrimination clauses in Federal contracts." The President asked Byrnes for help in this matter. "I feel that if there should be any trouble at the [Charleston Navy] yard in enforcing the non-discrimination regulations, you as Governor could clearly announce that since this is clearly a Federal matter beyond state jurisdiction, compliance should be complete and cheerful."¹⁰⁹

In reply, Governor Byrnes acknowledged, "There will be differences of opinion as to the wisdom of your action, which not even President Truman deemed necessary at such installations, but everyone realizes and must admit the power of the federal government to promulgate such rules . . ." The serious concern the Governor expressed in his letter, was with the nature and extent of the activities and powers of the Committee on Government contracts.¹¹⁰ The President wrote to Nixon conveying the Governor's qualms with the Committee. He instructed his Chairman to assure the Governor that his committee was going to operate in a very limited range of activities. Eisenhower repeated his position on the FEPC: "The Federal government has a duty to insure equality in all areas [under Federal] jurisdiction," but, on the other hand, he "never agreed with the wisdom of enacting a so-called Federal FEPC. . . ." But this new Committee "can be helpful in assisting progress in economic and political equality regardless of race."¹¹¹ Eisenhower laid down anew the parameters of the Federal role as he saw it. He also backed away a bit and mollified the South Carolina Governor by having the Vice President provide him with reassurance of the limited scope of the Committee's powers.

The President's balancing act between white Southern concerns and the concerns of blacks and their supporters met one of its toughest tests in the aftermath of the

May 17, 1954 Supreme Court decision declaring segregated public schools to be unconstitutional. The ensuing imbroglio lasted throughout the remainder of Eisenhower's Presidency and on into the 1980s. The Administration knew the *Brown* decision, no matter how it was finally written, was going to cause an uproar. The Department of Justice had filed a brief under the Truman Administration, and the Court had requested a supplemental brief from the Eisenhower Administration. Deputy Attorney General William Rogers reflected the somber mood of the Justice team that met to plan the new brief: "Jesus, do we really have to file a new brief? Aren't we better off staying out of it?"¹¹² They may have been better off "staying out of it," but the Court request was in effect an order for a brief.

The Administration received direct warnings from its Southern friends to stay out of the case. Southern leaders were now worried about the position the Administration would take in this matter, as well as in legislative matters related to civil rights. At a July 20, 1953 lunch with James E. Byrnes, the President was concerned about the Governor's being "very fearful of consequences in the South" that may result from the Court ruling in favor of desegregation. The Governor stressed the distinct possibility of Southern states closing their public schools, and he also mentioned his fear of riots and open defiance of the Court. The political warning the Governor gave the President at the lunch struck directly at his concerns. Eisenhower noted, "the Governor was obviously afraid that I would be carried away with the hope of carrying the Negro vote . . . and as a consequence take a stand on the question that would forever defeat any possibility of developing a real Republican or 'Opposition' Party in the South." Eisenhower did not tell Byrnes his opinion of the case, but spoke to him of his concern that the localities deal with the issues and that, "I do not believe that prejudices, even palpably unjustified prejudices, will succumb to compulsion. . . ." He also conveyed to the Governor his fear that if a State-Federal conflict of police powers arose over this issue it "would set back the cause of progress in race relations for a long time."¹¹³

The NAACP and its allies were generally pleased with the Administration record. Walter White wrote, "it has by and large adhered to its pre-campaign pledges in the field on [sic] civil rights . . . As a candidate, President Eisenhower gave his assurance that he would use his executive power to eradicate racial discrimination and segregation in all areas under federal jurisdiction . . . On the record it is evident the administration is trying to live up to this commitment. . . ." White specifically praised the Administration's efforts in: (1) the Committee on Government Contracts; (2) the Attorney General's *forthcoming* brief in the desegregation cases; (3) the abolition of segregated schools and other facilities at military bases; (4) the elimination of segregated restaurants in the capital; and (5) the appointment of Negroes to high government positions.¹¹⁴ The President had direct knowledge and played a major role in most of these events. Max Rabb was pleased with the NAACP public pronouncement and he let Sherman Adams know, "it looks as though our efforts are making inroads into the Democratic ranks."¹¹⁵ But it was not all sweetness and light between the Administration and the black rights advocates. There were complaints from the civil rights liberals, especially about the lack of Administration support for civil rights legisla-

tion.¹¹⁶ On the whole, the black rights advocates were very pleasantly surprised by the Administration.

The Brown case, however, now had to be faced. On August 19, 1953 the President told the Attorney General that he should "provide a factual brief," and not give a substantive "opinion on the matter to the Court. . . ." Eisenhower wanted a circumscribed brief that would limit the inevitable outcry from the white South. At about the same time that he was discussing the brief with Brownell, he wrote another memorandum, "Subject: Party Organization in the Southern States." The latter memo dealt with setting up a "Committee of Southerners" to determine "what should be our next and succeeding [political] moves in that region."¹¹⁷

The original reargument for the desegregation cases was postponed to December 7, 1953 on the basis of a July request of the Department of Justice to the Court. Wilton B. Persons, head of the Congressional liaison staff, and Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey argued that the brief had to be written with consideration in mind for the need to attract Southern Democrats into the Republican fold. The Attorney General and J. Lee Rankin, his Assistant who was going to argue the case before the Court, favored a strong and direct brief in favor of desegregation. The disagreement had to be ironed out before the Administration could proceed in Court.¹¹⁸

In the interim period Eisenhower made a recess appointment of Earl Warren to the Supreme Court. In his diary Eisenhower wrote, Warren "is very deliberate and judicial in his whole approach to almost every question. He is middle-of-the-road political philosophy. . . ." ¹¹⁹ Eisenhower often described his own political philosophy with just those words. He wrote his brother, Milton Eisenhower, that Warren "represents the kind of political, economic, and social thinking that I believe we need on the Supreme Court. Finally, he has a national name for integrity, uprightness and courage. That, again, I believe we need on the Court."¹²⁰ The courage Eisenhower referred to may have been just what was needed in a Chief who was going to take his Court into overruling the southern way of race relations. That is, in effect, to overrule the Southern way of life. Brownell kept abreast of the Justice desegregation brief as it was written. His Assistant Attorney General, J. Lee Rankin, supervised the writing which was actually done by Philip Elman.¹²¹ This was a "supplemental brief" to the previous Truman brief which had also been written by Elman. The earlier brief argued decisively for desegregation. The supplemental brief urged a "reasonable time" for the desegregation process to be worked out, and suggested that the lower Federal Courts should supervise the process.¹²² On November 5, Brownell let Eisenhower know that the Department, if asked at the oral argument, would take the position of opposing legally mandated racial segregation in the public schools. During the oral argument, when Rankin was asked by Justice William O. Douglas if the Administration had a position on the substantive Constitutional issue, he responded: "segregation in public schools cannot be maintained under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." ¹²⁴

On November 16, the President called his Attorney General to ask his advice concerning what to say about the case to Governor Byrnes. The Attorney General responded that to appease the Governor the President should tell him that if the Court declared segregation invalid, "it would be a period of years [before integration took

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place] and he wouldn't have to 'declare war' so to speak." Brownell reassured the President that education would remain primarily a state function and that "in ten to twelve years the states would work out the problem of integration."¹²⁵ At a press conference held several days after this conversation with the Attorney General, Eisenhower acknowledged that he was "regularly" meeting with Brownell and discussing the desegregation brief. This White House was still leaning towards the black rights advocates and was apparently quite willing to take at least some criticism on the issue from the South.¹²⁶

Letters from two Southern Governors, Robert F. Kennon of Louisiana and James Byrnes of South Carolina, came to the White House criticizing the President.¹²⁷ Eisenhower's December 1 reply to Governor Byrnes tempered his public statement:¹²⁸

the questions asked of the Attorney General by the Supreme Court demanded answers that could be determined only by lawyers and historians. Consequently, I have been compelled to turn over to the Attorney General and his associates full responsibility in the matter. The Attorney General had to act according to his own conviction and understanding.

The President blandly disassociated himself from the writing of the brief by his Department. He goes on, however, to set up the Governor for what he now expects will be the Court's decision.

We further agreed that no political consideration of any kind was to be given weight whatsoever—and that no matter what his *legal* conclusions might be, the principle of local operation and authority would be emphasized consistent with his legal opinions. What ever the outcome, I hope that all of us may work together so as to insure the steadiness of progress toward justice for all in the United States.

The President knew that the supplemental brief, which was filed with the Court by the time he wrote the above letter, asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment called for "complete equality of all persons under the law and . . . forbade all legal distinctions based on race or color."¹²⁹ Eisenhower also knew that if the Court followed the recommendations of the Justice brief, then the goal toward which they would all "work together" would be the elimination of legally segregated schools. The day after he wrote the letter to Byrnes, the President called the Attorney General to discuss the content of the letter. During the conversation, "Brownell said [the] Chief Justice had told him last night that [the] brief on [the] segregation cases was outstanding."¹³⁰ The President may or may not have been pleased with this news, but it was a substantial indication of where the Court might go with the issue.

In February of 1954, Val Washington, the black adviser for minorities at the Republican National Committee, told Rabb that the South would need, "understanding and solid helpfulness" in dealing with the desegregation decision. He urged the Administration to consider legislation that would provide federal funds for school construction assistance to aid desegregating school districts.¹³¹ At an NAACP function on March 10, the President reiterated his pledge: "Wherever Federal authority clearly

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extends, I will do the utmost that lies within my power to bring into larger reality the expression of equality among all men."¹³² The Brown case was not mentioned, but it was utmost on everyone's mind. Was the President now going to press school desegregation as he had desegregation in other areas? That was the question that was yet to be answered. But, one may well take the first answer to have been given by implication in the President's NAACP talk. Val Washington was quoted in the next day's *New York Times* as saying that other Presidents "talked more about civil rights but President Eisenhower has done more, quietly and without fanfare."¹³³

On May 17, 1954 the Court announced its decision in the case of *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*. On May 31, 1955 the Court issued its implementation order for the desegregation of the public schools, often referred to as Brown II.¹³⁴ Between the time when the first Brown decision was handed down and the announcement of the Brown II decision, the President took a series of actions that were to affect the public perception and the Court's action on the second ruling.

The day after the Court handed down the original Brown decision, the President invited the District of Columbia Commissioners to the White House and asked them to immediately begin to desegregate the District schools. Once again the District would serve as a model for the nation, this time for school desegregation.¹³⁵ By mid-September of 1954 desegregation of the District schools was well underway. There were some white student boycotts, but the Administration plunged ahead. Nixon's children attended a boycotted public school, and they went to school while the Vice President called for public order and calm. The President was pleased with the progress in the capital.¹³⁶ On October 18, 1954 the Justice Department filed a brief with the Interstate Commerce Commission opposing segregation on interstate transportation.¹³⁷ Perseverance in the pursuit of equality appeared to be the Administration by-words.

Soon after the death of Justice Robert H. Jackson in October of 1954, the President announced the nomination of John M. Harlan III as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Harlan was a liberal on race relations. He was the grandson of the lone dissenter in the 1896 case that established segregation, *Plessy v. Ferguson*, and had a distinguished law career, including a position on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. After prolonged debate and only eleven negative votes, nine of which were cast by Southern Senators, he was confirmed on March 16, 1955. On November 20, 1954 the President met with Simon E. Sobeloff, an outspoken opponent of racism who as Solicitor General was charged with the writing and the presentation of the implementation brief for Brown II. The President altered the original draft to tone down the aggressiveness and immediacy with which the Court was asked to pursue desegregation. Eisenhower changed the wording from asking the Court to move as "prompt as possible," to "as prompt as feasible." All references to rapid or speedy desegregation were eliminated by the President. Finally, the President inserted wording into the brief that "the decision in these cases has outlawed a social institution which has existed for a long time . . . psychological and emotional good will in the alterations that must now take place in order to bring about compliance with the Court's decisions." On February 1, 1955 the President submitted to Congress a proposal for Fed-

eral aid for school construction. Roy Wilkins informed the Chief Executive that the NAACP would do all it could to "make certain that Federal funds are not appropriated to subsidize school systems in states which refuse to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court opinion." Congressman Adam Clayton Powell regularly attempted to amend all Federal school construction legislation to conform to the NAACP view. The President publicly and repeatedly denounced this proposal.¹³⁸ Eisenhower wanted to defuse the desegregation issue, not to inflame it by denying Federal funds to Southern schools on the basis of racial discrimination.

The day after the original decision was handed down, the President met with Adams and Hagerty to discuss the response he would give on *Brown* at a press conference scheduled for the next day. Hagerty noted the President's tactics and concerns in his diary. The President, "said that he would simply say that the Supreme Court is the law of the land, that he had sworn to uphold the Constitution and that he would do so in this case. The President is considerably concerned, as are all of us, on the effect of the ruling. There is a strong possibility that some of the Southern states will virtually cancel out their public education system. . . ."¹³⁹ At the press conference, when asked if he had any advice for the South, the President responded, "Not in the slightest." He mentioned a statement by Governor Byrnes, for everyone to stay calm and be reasonable. He finished his response by saying, "The Supreme Court has spoken, and I am sworn to uphold the Constitutional process in this country. And I am trying—I will obey." When asked about the link between the Court decision and Republican party fortunes in the South, the President snapped back, "The Supreme Court . . . is not under any Administration."¹⁴⁰

Eisenhower became more conciliatory and understanding of the white South's problems with desegregation at future press conferences. Consistent with his belief in federalism, he stated, "The Federal government should act only when the states show their inability or their refusal to grapple with the problem." At one point he urged understanding on the basis that, "from 1896 to 1954 the school pattern of the South was built up in what they thought was absolute accordance with the law, with the Constitution of the United States, because that's what the decision was, equal but separate. . . ."¹⁴¹ At a press conference in 1959 he reiterated the position he took two days after the *Brown* decision was announced. He also gave a justification for his position. He stated, "I do not believe it is desirable for a President to express his approval or disapproval of any Supreme Court decision. His job, for which he takes an oath, is to uphold the law of the land."¹⁴²

After leaving the White House Eisenhower wrote, "I definitely agreed with the unanimous [Brown] decision," and, "there can be no question that the judgement of the Court was right."¹⁴³ But, privately, during his Presidency Eisenhower was critical of the decision. On more than one occasion he stated that he believed, "the decision was wrong." He "vehemently" told his speech writer, Emmett John Hughes, "I am convinced that the Supreme Court decision set back progress in the South at least fifteen years . . . Feelings are deep on this, especially where children are involved." Before the original *Brown* decision was handed down, the President lobbied the Chief Justice at a White House stag dinner. "These are not bad people," he said. "All that

they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big, overgrown Negroes."¹⁴⁵

The President had other, political concerns that stemmed from the desegregation decision. In 1956 he told Emmet John Hughes: "You take the attitude of a fellow like Jimmy Byrnes. We used to be pretty good friends, and now I've not heard from him once in the last eighteen months—all because of bitterness on this [Brown] thing. . . ." The friendship and the support of a host of Southern leaders were being lost to Eisenhower and to the G.O.P. "because of bitterness on this thing." The President's hope was that the "Court will be very moderate and accord a maximum of initiative to local courts [in its implementation decision]."¹⁴⁷

Brown II allowed the South a maximum of leeway to come to terms with the desegregation of its public schools. The decision permitted the local courts to supervise the manner in which desegregation would be carried out. The Court set a time limit that permitted desegregation to proceed with "all deliberate speed." This, of course, meant that there was no real time limit specified. The Court was looking for good faith behavior on the part of the South. So was Eisenhower.

From the black perspective vindication of their rights and of their struggle appeared to be on the horizon. The NAACP 1954 Annual Convention stated the matter succinctly: "The Supreme Court has stated in bold and simple terms what our conscience has told us is true all along."¹⁴⁸ The white Southern reaction to this "progress" was one of "aggressive political action to forestall public school integration."¹⁴⁹ On July 11, 1954 the first White Citizens Council was formed in Indianola, Mississippi, the heart of the black belt. By the end of 1955 there were 268 local Councils across the South with a claimed dues-paying membership in excess of 200,000. The avowed purpose of the Councils was to stop integration by stopping black access to the ballot box.¹⁵⁰ White violence against blacks escalated, as did economic and political intimidation. From 1955 through 1957, 120 pieces of racist oriented legislation was introduced in Southern state legislatures. On May 19, 1954 Richard Russell of Georgia, the dean of the Southern Senate delegation denounced the Brown decision on the floor of the Senate. On May 27, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi made the Southern position very clear. "I know," he said, "that Southern people, by and large, will neither recognize, abide by, nor comply with this decision." He continued, "I know that there will be no compromise."¹⁵²

The Court produced a moderate decision, but the South of Eisenhower's hopes, ties, and political future, produced a highly immoderate reaction to the coming of age of black rights. Dwight D. Eisenhower needed to come to grips with this problem or else all could be lost in his pursuit of the creation of a resurgent Republican party.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was a politician. He was also a Republican and a President of the United States. As a politician, Eisenhower knew the craft of persuasion, the art of political stealth, and the delicate balancing of accounts that must take place between the costs and benefits of pursuing alternative political strategies. He understood the trade-offs inherent in garnering support for his political needs. He also understood that election to office preceded the power of office.

As a Republican, he was eminently concerned with the need to build a majority

party coalition out of the pieces of a Republican party that had been decimated by the New Deal Democrats. From Teddy Roosevelt through Herbert Hoover, Eisenhower's twentieth century Republican Presidential predecessors had visions of creating a national political party—a party that had a strong, white Southern presence. The closest that the Republican Party had come to recognizing that dream previous to the Eisenhower Presidency had been when Al Smith, an anti-prohibition, big city, Catholic, ran against Hoover in 1928. That year, Hoover won the Southern states of Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. But it was a fleeting victory whose elements were lost to the Republican coalition in the wake of the New Deal. The glimmer of a nation-wide Republican party was set in the eyes of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican party leader.

As President of the United States, Eisenhower pursued a civil rights policy that was a continuous balancing act between his pursuit of the Southern white vote and the traditional Republican need for the Northern and Midwestern big city black vote. Some of his most trusted Republican colleagues oftentimes pushed and prodded him in the direction of a more positive civil rights stance. Quietly, and most importantly with the constraints of his own vision of a limited Federal role and the need to avoid inflaming the passions of the white South, Eisenhower moved to aid the black rights cause. He argued with his southern white friends and pleaded with them to accept the changes that were occurring. He temporized and commiserated with his southern friends as they bemoaned their fear of the Negro tide. But he moved primarily in a positive direction in civil rights policy during the first years of his administration. So much so that the black community was increasingly impressed and increasingly supportive of his administration. The Southern reaction to *Brown* had not yet broken out in full force, and the balancing act between black and Southern white within the Republican party appeared to be working. There were problems here and there, but overall, Eisenhower's stewardship as party leader and President appeared to be a very successful and a well-crafted balancing act of party building and policy leadership.

* *The Southern Regional Education Board, The Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, The National Endowment for the Humanities and the University of Central Florida all helped provide funding for this project.*

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John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights: From Congress to the Presidency*

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Introduction

This study examines John F. Kennedy's position on the civil rights issue during his campaign for the presidency. The analysis suggests that Kennedy's treatment of the issue was primarily as a strategic problem in the context of his goal of the presidency.

Interpretations of John F. Kennedy's handling of civil rights as a candidate and a President cover a spectrum that spans from a perception of Kennedy as a believer and advocate of civil rights, to Kennedy as a reluctant participant in an inevitable movement. Most notably, Theodore Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. argue John Kennedy was a friend of civil rights who needed to wait until the time was ripe, in the Spring of 1963, before he could boldly move on civil rights.¹ Carl M. Brauer in *John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction* concludes "Kennedy both encouraged and responded to black aspirations and led the nation into its Second Reconstruction."²

Herbert Parmet argues that the civil rights movement "overwhelmed" a President who was "caught up in a revolution." To critic Parmet, Kennedy delayed often and "he had to be pressed too hard, but when the time came he provided the leadership that the struggle for equality had always needed in the White House."³ Harvard Sitkoff argues that "the Kennedys saw the struggle against racism as a conundrum to be managed, not a cause to be championed."⁴ To Bruce Miroff, the Kennedy civil rights policy was one of attempting to manage a series of situations that were threatening to overwhelm the administration's "pragmatic politics." Miroff felt the Kennedy policy led to civil rights advocates having their hopes raised and dashed repeatedly as deeds failed to follow the words of administrative encouragement: "Pragmatic illusions" of control and response became betrayal to those who believed in ideals.⁵ Garry Wills found John Kennedy loosed a rhetorical barrage upon the nation, and his "encouragement of the civil rights issue was largely inadvertent, when it was not the result of good public relations work by people like [Harris] Wofford."⁶

Civil rights, a major domestic issue, strained the Democratic Party coalition in the 1950s and 1960s. Candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination were confronted by an irreconcilable position on the civil rights issue by several powerful elements within the Democratic Party: the white South and the blacks and Northern liberals. The New Deal put together a disparate conglomerate of interests constituting

a majority of the voters, but the issue of black rights constantly threatened to split it apart. The white South wanted to be left alone; this was the only politically relevant population of the South, as blacks were effectively disfranchised in most of the region. The blacks and their allies wanted, above all, to reshape the civil rights issue in the South.⁷ But they lacked the political power of the white South. Capitol Hill was a bastion of Southern power and no Democrat in the twentieth century had won the presidency without capturing a majority of the Southern vote.

A repeat of the Dixiecrat bolt of 1948 frightened most of the Democratic leadership. Truman carried most of the South in 1948 despite the Dixiecrat bolt, but this was generally conceded to be a fluke result. Candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination found their every move on civil rights watched, courted, and reported by the opposing sides.⁸ If candidates had strong issue preferences on civil rights, they expressed such preferences knowing that there would be a strong reaction to them. Taking a civil rights stand was often a painful issue for Northern Democratic presidential aspirants—they had to either be willing to go against the white Southern position, and thus risk the loss of Southern nomination and general election support, or mute their support for black rights and alienate northern blacks and their white liberal supporters on the issue. This was the context in which John F. Kennedy conducted his drive for the presidency.

Liberalism and Civil Rights

When John Kennedy first ran for Congress at the age of twenty-nine, he was not sure what he believed. “Some people have their liberalism ‘made’ by the time they reach their twenties,” he said. “I didn’t. I was caught in crosscurrents and eddies.”⁹ As Kennedy explained, “in my family we were interested not so much in the ideas of politics, as in the mechanics of the whole process. Then I found myself in Congress representing the poorest district in Massachusetts. Naturally, the interests of my constituents led me to take the liberal line.”¹⁰ He was, by and large, a nonideological, bread and butter liberal, and on many issues he was somewhat to the centrist side of the liberal spectrum. Kennedy remarked once during the fifties, “I’m no liberal at all. I never joined the Americans for Democratic Action or the American Veterans Committee. I am not comfortable with those people.”¹¹

The 1954 Senate censure vote of Joe McCarthy placed Kennedy at odds with the liberal Democratic mainstream. He was first elected to the Senate in 1952 and now he was the only Democrat who would not go on record in favor of the censure. During the vote Kennedy was in a hospital recuperating from a critical, but elective, back operation. Although he could not cast a roll-call vote on the McCarthy censure he could have placed himself on the record as to how he would have voted if he had been present.¹² To liberal Democrats, and to Eleanor Roosevelt, the matriarch of the liberal believers, the McCarthy issue was the litmus test of liberalism.¹³ Jack Kennedy failed this test.

In a 1956 interview Senator Kennedy frankly let it be known that there were two underlying reasons for his silence on the censure: opposition to McCarthy, he believed, would be political suicide for a Senator from a heavily Catholic state like

Massachusetts, and his family had strong personal ties to Joseph McCarthy.¹⁴ Robert Kennedy served as assistant counsel to Senator McCarthy's Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, and Joseph Kennedy, Sr., contributed money to the Wisconsin Senator's campaigns, and invited him to family social affairs. Before he could run for the Presidency Jack Kennedy first had to run for reelection to his Massachusetts Senate seat. Therefore, during the mid-nineteen fifties, Kennedy's first concern was that of his family and his Massachusetts constituency.

Despite the McCarthy issue, during his first decade in public office and political campaigns, Jack Kennedy's record was generally innocuous when it came to issues. Neither personally nor legislatively was he a Congressman or a Senator of first rank stature.¹⁵ Justice William O. Douglas, a Kennedy family friend dating back to the New Deal years, sums up the J.F.K. congressional record: "when he reached the House he really did nothing of importance;" and, "as Senator he was as nondescript as he had been as a Congressman."¹⁶ But, in the mid-1950s, Kennedy's congressional record changed: his roll-call votes started to look more in the mainstream of liberalism, more like those votes cast by most northern, Democratic Senators.¹⁷

Black civil rights was not of great concern to JFK. His trusted friend, Theodore Sorensen, recalls: "As a Senator he simply did not give much thought at all to this subject." Sorensen continues, "In fact, when he talked privately at all about Negroes in those days, it was usually about winning Negro votes."¹⁸ That was the concern of Kennedy the Senator.

In the 1950's Kennedy became concerned with Southern votes, Democratic convention votes and electoral college votes. While the presidency was the ultimate goal, along the way, in 1956, the young Senator made a brief try for the vice presidency. To attain his objectives the South had to be wooed. John Kennedy's 1956 book, *Profiles in Courage*, won him national fame, a Pulitzer Prize and widespread white Southern approval. The Senator's account of Reconstruction and the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson was sympathetic to the Southern view. Radical Republicans imposed a costly and onerous carpetbagger era on a prostrate South. "The Reconstruction Period," he wrote, "was a black nightmare the South never could forget."¹⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt commented publicly on the Senator and his book after he asked for her support in the 1956 contest, "[you are] someone who understands what courage is and admires it, but has not quite the independence to have it."²⁰ To her, the important thing that mattered about John Kennedy was his lack of courage on the McCarthy issue. To the South, the important thing that mattered about John Kennedy was that he understood a time of Southern torment. This was a valuable entree to the white Southerners who felt their cause was sorely misunderstood by most Northerners.

Adlai Stevenson gave the 1956 Democratic convention the right to select his running mate in an open ballot. The big city organizations were anti-Kennedy because they feared a Catholic on the ticket would mean certain defeat. The Southern delegations were anti-Kefauver because they regarded the Tennessee senator as a traitor to their cause. Kefauver refused to sign the "Southern Manifesto" and he openly campaigned on a platform to uphold the 1954 school desegregation decision, *Brown v. Board of Education*.²¹ It was a wide-open contest. Kefauver eventually won the nomina-

tion, but the New Englander who made it a race earned a reputation as a vote-getter in the South. He ran second to Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee as the South's first ballot choice for Vice President. JFK secured 250.5 of the 332 ballots cast by the South on the second round of voting. The Senator's ties to the South were clear as he gathered open endorsements from its leaders. Southern votes were rounded up. Before the convention began Senator George Smathers of Florida had been asked by the Kennedy forces to talk to some Southern Governors. At the convention Mississippi Governor J. P. Coleman helped swing Texas to Kennedy.²²

Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson made a seconding speech on behalf of the "fighting sailor from Massachusetts." In the Congress after the 1956 elections, Johnson helped first-term Senator Kennedy get a seat on the coveted Foreign Relations Committee, overriding the request of the more senior Senator, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. "All of a sudden, Joe Kennedy bombarded me with calls, presents, and little notes telling me what a great guy I was for going with Jack during the vice presidential fight," recounts Johnson, "But I knew all along that there was something else on his mind, and sure enough one day he came right out and pleaded with me to put Jack on the Foreign Relations Committee, telling me that if I did, he'd never forget me for the rest of my life." Joe Kennedy wanted his son to have the prestige and national exposure the Foreign Relations Committee appointment could afford; Lyndon Johnson was after Joe Kennedy's largess. The bargain was made because, as the Texan tells it, "I kept picturing old Joe Kennedy sitting there with all that power and wealth feeling indebted to me for the rest of his life, and I sure liked that picture."²³

The Pursuit of the South

Jack Kennedy was off and running for the 1960 Democratic Presidential nomination as the 1956 presidential election was underway. He lost little and gained much through his aborted try for the vice presidential nomination. In Fall 1956 he provided this assessment of his "failure" to his friend, David Powers: "With only about four hours of work and a handful of supporters, I came within thirty-three and a half votes of winning the Vice Presidential nomination. If I work hard for four years, I ought to be able to pick up all the marbles."²⁴

Others took positive notice of the young Senator's role at the 1956 convention. He made an impressive nominating speech for Adlai Stevenson. After the convention was over Adlai Stevenson wrote Kennedy, "[you left] a much bigger man than when you arrived. If there was a hero, it was you."²⁵ Governor Marvin Griffin of Georgia wrote: "While I regret you lost the nomination for Vice President, you won respect from party leaders all over the country and can look forward to greater things in the future."²⁶

It was "to greater things in the future" that John F. Kennedy looked as he campaigned tirelessly across the country for the Stevenson-Kefauver ticket.²⁷ In 1956 he made his first campaign foray into the South. He spoke in Florida, Texas, North Carolina, Virginia, and Louisiana.²⁸ Southern support for a Democratic presidential ticket was considered essential in the general election. Southern support or, at least, acquies-

cence would be necessary for Kennedy in seeking a presidential nomination. The young presidential aspirant was no stranger to the South in ensuing years. In 1957 he talked in every southern state except Louisiana and Tennessee. In 1958 he spoke in Florida and Texas. In 1959 he spoke in Louisiana, North Carolina and Tennessee, then visited Florida and Virginia.²⁹

While campaigning in the South, and seeking to retain his base in the North, as a sitting Senator JFK also had to deal publicly with the contending issues related to passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. The 1957 Act was the first black rights legislation enacted since the end of Reconstruction. The fight over the 1957 Civil Rights Act placed Kennedy in opposition to black rights advocates on two critical votes. First, he supported a Southern move to refer the proposed bill to the Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator James Eastland of Mississippi. Nearly every proponent of the bill opposed this, as it was a certainty that once the bill entered Senator Eastland's domain he would do all within his power to keep it off the Senate floor.³⁰ When two Boston NAACP leaders balked at Kennedy's vote, he rationalized it through the need to follow accepted Senate procedures, and he assured them of his devotion to civil rights.³¹ Second, after making sure that he had enough legal experts to back up his position, Kennedy also voted with the Southerners to add a jury trial amendment to the proposed bill. This amendment effectively gutted any attempt to penalize individuals who violated the law, since it would require offenders to be tried before a jury of (white) Southerners. On the same day the senator wrote a Boston NAACP constituent a letter defending his vote, he also wrote to several Southern leaders to assure them that he took their advice on the vote.³²

The ever-loyal Sorensen noted in a memorandum that on these votes "Northerners divided into men of reason and men of anti-southern prejudice." Kennedy, "as well as all southern Senators and reasonable Northerners," voted correctly on both counts.³³ Of the four major 1960 Democratic presidential contenders, only Lyndon Johnson joined with Kennedy on these votes; Stuart Symington of Missouri and Herbert Humphrey of Minnesota voted with other unreasonable Northerners. Among some of his stalwarts the Senator's 1957 civil rights votes lacked vision and courage. James McGregor Burns, the author of an in-house Kennedy campaign biography, refers to the Senator's 1957 performance as, "a profile in caution and moderation."³⁴ In marked contrast Eisenhower took particular pride in the 1957 Civil Rights Act as one of the major accomplishments of his administration, despite the Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson opposition.³⁵

The Senator's "caution and moderation" reflected the position of a would-be Democratic presidential nominee who needed Southern support in his bid. He also had to deal with the problem as a Massachusetts Senator facing reelection; he needed support in a state that was a traditional stronghold for black civil rights. Satisfying both his White House ambition and his need for reelection to the Senate while voting on issues related to the 1957 Civil Rights Act was a difficult, but necessary, task for Kennedy. No matter what he did his positions were bound to attract a reaction from some clientele group members and party activists who felt strongly, pro or con, about

the issue. Not everyone believed in the reasonableness of the Senator's position, even if they understood his dilemma.

Among black advocates the Senator's performance was a source of outrage. In April 1958, the year the Senator was up for reelection, Roy Wilkins, the Executive Secretary of the NAACP, went to Pittsfield, Massachusetts, to denounce Kennedy's Southern flirtation. The next month Kennedy wrote Wilkins: "I ask you in all seriousness whether you believe my civil rights record over the past twelve years—or even over the past year—warrants such an attack in my home state. . . ."36 In mid-May the NAACP leader again attacked Kennedy in a letter to a Massachusetts NAACP activist.³⁷

In our business we understand clearly the realisms [sic] and particularities in politics. We know that most Democratic aspirants to the presidency feel that their strategy must be such that outright opposition to them is not generated in the Southern states, particularly prior to the nominating convention. However we must be pardoned for exhibiting some alarm at the apparent wooing of Southern support three years before the nominating convention.

The Southern states have declared open war on Negro Americans. They cannot win this war by themselves. The only way they can make any showing at all is through the assistance they receive from outside the South. We do not believe that Senator Kennedy is committed, either intellectually or morally to the . . . Southern philosophy. We continue to hope he will disassociate himself from them in an unmistakable manner.

Later that month Wilkins wrote the Senator: "that since the Southern record on the denial of the vote was so flagrant, and so shameful, and of so long a duration . . . [we] should have had the non-quibbling support of non-Southern [Senate] members." He went on to point out, "you are hailed by Dixiecrat leaders of South Carolina, Georgia and Mississippi, which, with Alabama, are the 'worst' states on the Negro question." Finally, he asserted, Negroes "feel uneasy over this apparent entente cordial between Kennedy of Massachusetts and Griffith, Timmerman, Talmadge, Eastland, et al., of Dixie."³⁸ On June 6 Kennedy replied: "I have not asked them [the Southerners] for support—I do not ask for your support. I am simply running for reelection to the Senate from Massachusetts, and I have every reason to believe that my record and views will be supported at the polls by those acquainted with them, regardless of race."³⁹

Of course, the Senator's plaintive reply was somewhat disingenuous. He was not "simply running for reelection to the Senate from Massachusetts." He was also running for the presidency. He needed, and wanted, a big reelection victory to boost his presidential prospects. On July 14 the Senator wrote a constituent of Alabama's Governor John Patterson: "I certainly appreciated th[e] opportunity to meet with Governor Patterson . . . Governor Patterson on his return to Alabama saw fit to make an announcement in behalf of my possible [presidential] candidacy."⁴⁰

At the July, 1958 NAACP convention, Clarence Mitchell, the head of the NAACP's Washington, D.C., lobbying effort, launched an attack on Senator Kennedy's civil

rights record. Kennedy, hearing about the speech, was exasperated with Wilkins and the NAACP. He quickly contacted Wilkins:⁴¹

I think the time has come for you and me to have a personal conversation about our future relations. I expect to be in and around Washington for a long time, and I know you and Clarence Mitchell do also. I think that you would agree that it would be most unfortunate if an 'iron curtain' of misunderstanding were to be erected between our two offices.

It seems to me it would be important to you and your organization to lay to rest the suspicion current among many liberal Senators that I have been singled out for political reasons. Certainly the evidence supports this. You came to Pittsfield in the middle of my campaign for reelection to say that my record . . . did not deserve the support of Negro voters while, according to the local press, treating comparatively lightly the record of my Republican colleague. . . . More recently, Mr. Mitchell, whose association with Mr. Nixon is well known in Washington, was quite outspoken against me at the NAACP convention in Cleveland. . . .

I can not believe that the NAACP, with whom I have had a long and friendly association, would want to be involved by two of its leaders in a partisan candidate-picking gamble of this kind at this time; and that is why I think it is urgent that you and I have a discussion, perhaps with Mr. Mitchell also, on your next visit to Washington.

The NAACP leadership was hitting Kennedy where it could hurt: in his political future. Everyone assumed that the Senator would win reelection, but the victory margin would be important to his presidential prospects. He had to look like a big winner. Most observers also assumed that the black vote still leaned towards the Democrats nationally, but that Vice President Nixon would be a formidable challenger for that vote in 1960. Nixon, as presiding officer of the Senate, made several rulings during the debate over the 1957 Civil Rights Act which clearly favored the proponents of the bill. The Vice President was praised for the manner in which he chaired the President's Committee on Government Contract Compliance. He sent his children to public school in Washington, D.C., and he publicly backed efforts to make the District a national model for school desegregation. In the 1950s, Richard Nixon was a friend of the civil rights forces.⁴² Not only was it rumored throughout Washington that Clarence Mitchell was a "quiet" Nixon ally, but Martin Luther King, Jr., considered him a personal friend, although he was cautious in his support of Nixon:⁴³

I was strongly opposed to Vice President Nixon before meeting him personally. . . . I must admit that my impression has somewhat changed. I have frankly come to feel that the position and world contacts of the Vice President have matured his person and judgement.

I am coming to believe that Nixon is absolutely sincere in his views on [civil rights]. His travels have revealed to him how the race problem is hurting America in international relations and it is altogether possible that he has no basic racial

prejudice. . . . I also feel that Nixon would have done much more to meet the present crisis in race relations than President Eisenhower has done.

Finally, I should say that Nixon has a genius for convincing one that he is sincere. When you are close to Nixon he almost disarms you with his sincerity. . . . And so I would conclude by saying that if Richard Nixon is not sincere, he is the most dangerous man in America.

The Presidential election, and what JFK believed would be the inevitable confrontation with Nixon, was two years away; of more immediate concern to the Senator was the NAACP threat to his 1958 victory margin. Kennedy allies with ties to the NAACP leadership rallied to his defense and pushed for a change in Wilkins' stand.⁴⁴ In mid-October, Wilkins was brought around to the position of providing the Senator's allies with a carefully crafted letter of support. The letter was read at a testimonial dinner given for the Senator by the Massachusetts Citizens Committee for Minority Rights. "Senator Kennedy did vote for the jury trial amendment to the 1957 civil rights bill and we disagreed on this and still regret his choice." Wilkins explained, however, "The Senator's record, taken as a whole, and including his forthright and repeated support of the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954 [*Brown v. Board*] . . . must be regarded . . . as one of the best voting records on civil rights and related issues of any Senator in the Congress."⁴⁵ Wilkins notes in his autobiography, "The headlines the next day were predictably favorable, and Kennedy's letters once again became friendly."⁴⁶

The Wilkins letter paid off for JFK. Kennedy won 73.6 percent of the total votes cast, and he won most of the black wards by an even larger margin. Wilkins wrote the Senator, "I am glad our evaluation of your civil rights record was useful."⁴⁷ The NAACP leader made the Senator, and other Democrats, mindful that blacks had political leverage. But, it was limited leverage—very limited. Wilkins did not want to cut his ties to a major Democratic presidential contender, and he would not look the other way as Northern White House contenders worked out their expedient strategies. But in the end, Wilkins, not Kennedy, retreated in this instance. It was, however, a high-stakes, never-ending game, and immediate victories did not necessarily presage long-term success.

John Kennedy never turned his attention from the South during this period, and after his reelection was secured the South became an ever more central concern to him. Harry S. Ashmore, a Pulitzer Prize-winning editor of the *Arkansas Gazette* and political adviser to Adlai Stevenson, wrote on December 31, 1958, "Southern leaders have cut themselves off from the possibility of meaningful debate; they have whipped their followers into a mood where any man who yields to any degree on the segregation issue invites immediate retaliation."⁴⁸ Sorensen was receiving mail exhibiting concern for a new southern bolt from the Democratic party.⁴⁹ The Kennedy presidential campaign maintained its ties to the South's leaders in the hope of avoiding such a move, and in the hope of achieving at least some southern convention support. In 1959 the Kennedy camp calculated that at least some southern first ballot support would be needed for a successful nomination drive, and this vote would have to be expanded to if a second ballot was needed.⁵⁰

Maneuvering the Liberals

Spring 1960 was not a time of joy for liberals. In the primaries, the major liberal contender for the Democratic nomination, Minnesota Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, was soundly defeated by Kennedy in West Virginia. Adlai Stevenson, the liberal presidential mainstay of the 1950s, never entered the 1960 primaries. As a result, JFK became a viable, if not highly preferred, alternative candidate. Many liberals considered the two major contenders for the Democratic nomination, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson of Texas, too conservative.⁵¹ In the legislative arena, on March 10, the defeat of a motion to close debate on a Southern filibuster of a proposed civil rights bill ended any attempt to get a strong civil rights statute enacted prior to the 1960 elections. A watered-down 1960 Civil Rights Act, which mainly allowed judges to appoint federal voting registrars under very selective conditions, passed under the leadership of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and was signed into law on May 6.⁵² The liberals had little to be pleased about.

Improving relations with liberals and blacks was, on the other hand, a problem that Kennedy had yet to deal with in 1959. Marjorie Lawson, a respected, black Washington, D.C., political veteran, was hired as a Kennedy aide in 1957, but the Senator distanced himself from the black rights issue.⁵³ Both John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, who served as his brother's campaign manager, did not know much about black civil rights or black problems in general.⁵⁴ In the spring of 1959 Robert Kennedy approached Harris Wofford to work for the Kennedy campaign. Wofford was the first white male graduate of Howard University law school. He was a world traveler with a deep feeling for the emerging "third-world" nations; he had a special devotion to Gandhian non-violence. When approached by Kennedy he was counsel to Father Hesburgh on the Civil Rights Commission, and he had accepted a position at the Notre Dame Law School to help establish a center for the study of civil rights. Wofford turned the Kennedy offer down.

In September 1959 Father John Cavanaugh, a former President of Notre Dame, told Wofford of a 'request' made by Kennedy senior. As Cavanaugh paraphrased the elder Kennedy, "If his son needed someone for his campaign, then Cavanaugh should tell Hesburgh to forget the moral obligation [to work at Notre Dame] and get that fellow on the first plane to Washington."⁵⁵ Wofford agreed to work part-time for the campaign during the 1959-60 academic year.

JFK now turned his attention to the "black problem." In May 1960, John Kennedy told Wofford that he regarded the black problem as a "political problem." The Senator asked Wofford which black leaders he should consult to get a better "political feel" for the problem. "Shortly after Bob Kennedy called me and said that they concluded that they were in trouble with the Negro vote and he wanted me to come down to his office and work full-time on that subject."⁵⁶ Robert Kennedy told him that he understood, "We've been dealing outside the field of the main Negro leadership and we have to start from scratch."⁵⁷ Wofford informed his friend, Martin Luther King, Jr., he was going "to join Kennedy's staff full-time for the duration of the campaign."⁵⁸

To entice the liberals into his convention vote column, Jack Kennedy started taking a strong anti-Taft-Hartley position before union audiences.⁵⁹ The Kennedy forces also started to circulate the story that JFK would seriously consider Hubert Humphrey as his running mate. Humphrey's career was, from its beginning, built upon liberalism. He almost single-handedly created the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party out of the remains of the moribund Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota. Progressivism, rural populism and urban liberalism were tied together successfully under Humphrey's leadership.⁶⁰ He came to national prominence in 1948 as the Minneapolis Mayor and Americans for Democratic Action firebrand who pleaded eloquently for a strong civil rights plank in the national Democratic platform. His bona-fides as a liberal were reinforced in the 1950s by his continued advocacy on the floor of the United States Senate, for union issues, civil rights, farm support, and other liberal causes.

In late April of 1960, John Bailey, a major Democratic party leader and close Kennedy political ally, discussed with Humphrey the possibility of his coming on the ticket.⁶¹ As he left a June 9 fund-raising lunch, John Kennedy approached Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., and asked him if they could share a taxi-ride back to the Capitol to discuss mutual concerns. Rauh, a national leader of the Americans for Democratic Action and a long-time Humphrey ally, expressed hope that Humphrey would get the second slot on a Kennedy ticket. He also expressed concern that Lyndon Johnson not be given a place on the ticket. Johnson was viewed as the Senate Leader who compromised and watered down issue after issue that the liberals backed. The Senator responded: "It will be Hubert Humphrey or another Midwestern liberal." As for Johnson, "There's no need to fear."⁶² On June 16, 1960, Schlesinger, Jr., who was close to the Kennedy camp, wrote to his long-time friend Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy's "choice for the Vice Presidency is still Hubert; and he hopes and thinks Hubert will take it."⁶³

The courting of the liberals started to pay off, and on June 17, sixteen well-known Stevenson backers signed a public letter of support for the Kennedy candidacy. The statement, entitled, "An Important Message of Interest to All Liberals," was addressed to "Dear Fellow Liberals," and straightforwardly discussed why its signees decided to back Kennedy:⁶⁴

The purpose of this letter is to urge, now that Senator Humphrey has withdrawn from the race and Mr. Stevenson continues to stand aside, that the liberals of America turn to Senator Kennedy for President.

We are as determined as you that the Democratic Platform of 1960 meet the issue of the day head-on. We are convinced that Senator Kennedy shares this determination. In particular some of us have discussed the question of a strong civil rights plank with him and he has assured us that he favors pledging the Democratic Party to Congressional and Executive action in support of the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions and to whatever measures may prove necessary to make voting a reality for all citizens.

The time has come, we suggest, to unite behind John Kennedy as the candidate of the liberal movement and to work with him to defeat Nixon [!] in November.

The Kennedy campaign for black support was also getting off the ground. To get a “better feel” for the black perspective, and, hopefully, heal some wounds, Harris Wofford arranged a private breakfast meeting between John Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. King was one of the most popular and visible black leaders in the United States. The two men had never met before, and King was not a Kennedy enthusiast.⁴⁵ He remembered Kennedy’s 1957 civil rights votes and he never responded to a perfunctory letter of introduction Kennedy sent to him in 1959.⁶⁶ But the May meeting went well and King wrote to Chester Bowles, a Kennedy supporter and friend of Wofford’s, “I was very impressed by the forthright and honest manner in which he discussed the civil rights question. I have no doubt that he would do the right thing on this issue if he were elected President.”⁶⁷ King said that when he “specifically mentioned the need for strong civil rights legislation to guarantee the right to vote and to speed up school segregation. . . .” the Senator “agreed with all of these things.” JFK also told King, “many of the developments during the sit-in movement pointed up the injustices and indignities that Negroes were facing all over the South”.⁶⁸ The Senator needed black support, and King wanted the Senator to support black rights. Kennedy was seriously bidding for support from at least one major black leader.

Soon after his discussion with King, JFK went further in his pursuit of liberal and black support. He told the New York Liberal Party that he did not need Southern support to get the Democratic nomination, and he did not want Southern support if it meant compromising black Americans’ rights. “Moral persuasion” by the President, he argued, was the key to ending racial discrimination. At another meeting he publicly supported the student sit-in movement by saying, “it is in the American tradition to stand up for one’s rights—even if the new way is to sit down.”⁶⁹ As the convention date approached, the cautious politico of 1957 sounded like the moral leader of 1960.

Not all liberals or blacks were convinced by the new Kennedy rhetoric. As the July 14 Democratic National Convention got under way, John Kennedy, according to Theodore White, “was the *least* popular among Negroes of all Democratic candidates. . . .”⁷⁰ The Sunday before the convention opened, Roy Wilkins and Martin Luther King, Jr., led a march of 2,500 black rights supporters to the convention site. Paul Butler, the convention chairman, met with them and was cheered as he said: “We dedicate ourselves to the elimination of all discriminatory practices at the earliest possible moment. . . . No, no. Now—not later.” That evening, Humphrey, Symington and Kennedy addressed a mass black rally at the Shrine auditorium. Only Kennedy was roundly booed.⁷¹

The black rights advocates were strong enough to maneuver through the convention the boldest civil rights plank since 1948. Robert Kennedy, JFK’s campaign director, did not see the final draft of the civil rights platform before it went to the convention floor, but okayed an earlier draft from Harris Wofford.⁷² Paul Butler, the convention Chairman, and Chester Bowles, the Platform Committee Chairman, provided the leadership that enabled the convention to endorse “the peaceful demonstrations for first-class citizenship which have recently taken place in many parts of this country. . . .” In addition, the platform committed the Democrats to “support

whatever action is necessary to eliminate literacy tests and the payment of poll taxes as requirements for voting." The platform also committed the candidate to support legislation for a Fair Employment Practices Commission, and legislation to empower and direct the Attorney General "to file civil injunction suits in Federal Courts to prevent the denial of any civil right on grounds of race, creed, or color."⁷³

Although the Kennedy forces believed they had the nomination in hand when the convention began, the liberals took hope from events on the convention floor. Adlai Stevenson now supported a movement to give him a third try for the presidency. Eleanor Roosevelt, a devout Stevenson ally, a staunch black rights supporter and close friend of the black leadership, as well as a determined Kennedy foe, flew to Los Angeles in a last ditch effort to aid the Stevenson candidacy.⁷⁴ The liberals were strong, but they were not strong enough to keep the young Massachusetts Senator from his long-sought goal. Kennedy won a first ballot nomination with 806 of 1521 ballots cast. His nearest competitor, Lyndon Johnson, won 409 votes, but only 57.5 of Johnson's votes were cast by delegates from outside of the border or the southern states. Adlai Stevenson only counted 79.5 votes cast for his candidacy.

In Quest of a National Victory

The nomination secured, the Kennedy team turned its attention to a running mate. A first concern was to hold the South in the Democratic column come November. Many Southern delegates were angry over the civil rights plank. As a portent of things to come, Mississippi cast its 23 nomination ballots for its home-grown segregationist Governor, Ross Barnett. In 1948, the States Rights ticket captured the electoral college votes of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina. In addition, the Eisenhower candidacy captured Florida, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia in 1952. The popular Republican president won these states again, plus Louisiana in 1956.

Prior to the presidential balloting liberal forces remained concerned about the possibility of Kennedy putting Johnson on the ticket. Robert Kennedy reassured Joseph Rauh, "It is not Johnson. You can tell them officially it is not Johnson."⁷⁵ Kenneth O'Donnell, a member of the Kennedy mafia, believed: "The liberals I knew would not stand still for Lyndon Johnson."⁷⁶

But, quietly, shortly before the convention began, John Kennedy moved to set the stage for a Johnson vice presidency. On June 29, 1960, Theodore Sorensen prepared a memorandum for his boss that placed Johnson at the top of a list of potential running mates. Johnson's strength with "farmers, Southerners and Texas" was the need met by putting Johnson on the ticket.⁷⁷ In fact, feelers had been sent out. J.F.K. told Chester Bowles, shortly after the West Virginia victory, that Johnson would be the "wisest" choice for Vice President. He also discussed the possibility of a Johnson choice with Governor J. Lindsey Almond of Virginia.⁷⁸ On July 16, four days before the convention began, John Kennedy, "seemingly idly, remarked to *Washington Post* publisher Philip Graham, that if he thought Johnson would accept the Vice Presidency he might offer it."⁷⁹ Graham was a Johnson confidante and, of course, repeated the Kennedy comment to the Senate leader. Two days later JFK again spoke with

Graham. This time Graham brought along political insider Stewart Alsop. Kennedy told them he would offer the second position on the ticket to Johnson.⁸⁰

The day before the balloting for the Presidency was to take place, Tip O'Neill, a Kennedy supporter, met with Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn and told him Kennedy had the nomination locked up. Rayburn told O'Neill, "if Kennedy wants Lyndon as his running mate, Lyndon has an obligation to this convention to accept it. You tell Kennedy that if he wants me to talk to Lyndon, I'll be happy to do it. . . ." O'Neill contacted Kennedy and spoke to him about the Speaker's offer. "Of course I want Lyndon," Kennedy told him. "But I'd never want to offer it and have him turn me down. Lyndon's the natural choice, and with him on the ticket, there's no way we could lose. Tell Sam Rayburn I'll call after the session tonight." The wheels were greased. The call to the Speaker was made, and the ensuing convention chaos made national headlines.

The black leadership was, with the exception of Roy Wilkins, appalled. Clarence Mitchell said of the Johnson selection, "I was not only surprised, I was pained." Mitchell explains, "I thought he [Kennedy] needed on the ticket somebody who was closely identified and would act as sort of a bridge between us and the White House. It seemed to me that [with] Mr. Johnson taking that position . . . the chance of Senator [Richard] Russell and others getting in to tell their story would be increased."⁸² James Farmer, The National Chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), regarded the Johnson nomination as "most unfortunate, probably . . . a disaster because of his southern background and voting record on civil rights."⁸³ Wilkins' viewpoint was that of a minority of one among his black brethren:

I felt that he was not a visceral segregationist, his behavior and votes appeared to be dictated more by Texas political considerations than by any ingrained racial hatred. . . . he had not often seen eye to eye with us, but he had been honest, telling us what he intended to do and keeping his word when deals were possible. He was the shrewdest legislative fox I had ever seen.

As an afterthought Wilkins added, "he could provide the legislative experience Kennedy so obviously lacked."⁸⁴ Many of the white liberal leaders were up in arms over the Johnson selection. Leonard Woodcock, a vice-president in the politically powerful United Auto Workers Union, believed "Kennedy had betrayed us all. Well, I very frankly, was shocked, because our whole theme had been to unite behind Kennedy to stop Johnson."⁸⁵ To reassure the liberals, Johnson wrote a letter to the Michigan delegation pledging his support of the party platform. But, many of the Michigan liberals were still outraged. Word went out that Joe Rauh and the District of Columbia delegation would back a move by Michigan Governor G. Mennen Williams to put Orville Freeman's name up for the vice presidency. The Kennedy forces arranged with Florida Governor LeRoy Collins, the convention Chairman, to have John McCormack go to the platform when the Massachusetts delegation was called on the vice presidential roll and move that Lyndon Johnson be nominated by acclamation.⁸⁶ The Michigan delegation was never called for its vote and the possibility of a floor fight

over the Vice Presidency was eliminated. The Democratic party remained intact, but the rumblings, Southern and liberal, were audible.

On the other side of the partisan divide, the Republicans met in Chicago July 25–28, to place the mantle of party leadership on heir-apparent Richard Nixon and heal the breach between the liberal and the conservative wings of the party. In 1952 and 1956 Nixon was the conservatives' vice presidential nominee. His role in the Hiss-Chambers affair cemented his ties to the fervent anti-Communist wing of the G.O.P. Now he moved to mollify the liberal wing of the party and bring them into a united effort for the fall campaign. Liberal Republicanism was a traditional advocate of black rights, and in 1960 Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York was regarded as one of the leading spokesmen for this viewpoint. Rockefeller threatened to conduct a convention floor fight over what he considered to be a weak civil rights plank and a weak defense commitment in the proposed party platform. Nixon went to Rockefeller's New York City residence and the two leaders worked out a compromise. The final G.O.P. platform contained a bold, Rockefeller inspired declaration: "We reaffirm the constitutional right to peaceable assembly to protest discrimination in private business establishments."⁸⁷ The Nixon-Rockefeller civil rights plank was adopted by the G.O.P. convention without change. The result, as a *New York Times* editorial stated, is that a comparison of the two parties' positions showed the Republicans' pledge as, "on balance somewhat more realistic and more specific."⁸⁸ After the Presidential nomination was secured by Nixon, he first offered the Vice Presidency to Rockefeller, who turned him down. The second position then went to Henry Cabot Lodge, a well-known Massachusetts liberal. The NAACP was pleased with both the G.O.P. standard bearer's record and the record of his running mate.⁸⁹

Roy Wilkins recognized that, "For the first time both parties have put themselves on record unequivocally as favoring the elimination of segregation and other forms of discrimination from all areas of community and national life." The Republicans, he believed, "went farther than anyone expected, probably due to both the Rockefeller pressure on Nixon and, I am convinced, the presence of Lyndon Johnson on the Kennedy ticket. In fact," Wilkins continued, "Lyndon did better for us than he intended. His candidacy helped the Democrats adopt a strong civil rights plank because his followers could not afford to oppose the plank and still hope to recruit votes for Johnson outside the South. Then with Kennedy the winner on the first ballot and Johnson a surprise Vice Presidential candidate pledging support of the Democratic platform, the Republicans *had* to come up with something strong on civil rights, in order to stay in the running among the Northern independents they need to add to their conservatives. They did not know at the time the South will [sic] feel so strong about Kennedy's religion and about the Democratic civil rights platform or they might have 'sat tight' on the soft civil rights platform that the Nixon forces had outlined in advance of the Chicago convention [prior to the Nixon-Rockefeller agreement]."⁹⁰ The drive of the parties for votes, in Wilkins' analysis, was the elixir of hope for black rights supporters.

The Republican candidate and his convention committed themselves to the pur-

suit of the black vote. The moderate South, the South carried by Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 would, they hoped, still go again with the G.O.P.

John Kennedy was not about to let the Republican initiative for the black vote go unchallenged. In August 1960, he talked with Harris Wofford as he drove to Capitol Hill. "Now," he said "in five minutes tick off the ten things a President ought to do to cleanup this god damn civil rights mess."⁹¹ Wofford suggested that the president could issue an Executive Order banning discrimination in federally assisted housing. In addition, Wofford told the nominee, he should move quickly to exercise Executive action on the programs mentioned in the Democratic platform. On August 8, Kennedy issued a statement in which he urged that "by the stroke of a presidential pen" the President could sign an Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing." He added, "I have supported this proposal. . . . A new Democratic administration will carry it out but there is no need to wait another six months. I urge the President to act now."⁹²

The words sounded right, but they were not ardent enough for many liberals. The liberals were still profoundly disappointed by the Johnson nomination. Kennedy had made too many promises to the contrary and it left the liberals with feelings of distrust and concern. They were not sure they believed in him. At the end of August, Schlesinger wrote Kennedy, "the campaign thus far has failed to elicit the all-out support of the kind of people who have traditionally provided the spark in Democratic campaigns. These people," he noted, "are the liberals, the reformers, the intellectuals . . . they care deeply about issues and principles." Schlesinger went on, "The number directly involved may be small. But these are the kinetic people and their participation or non-participation profoundly affects the atmosphere and drive of a Democratic campaign." These Democrats, Schlesinger warned, need to be enthused. "To develop enthusiasm we have no choice but to give the enthusiasts something to believe in." That was a key element missing in the Kennedy campaign.⁹³

After Schlesinger returned from the Americans for Democratic Action National Board meeting, he again wrote JFK. He told the Presidential nominee that the tone of the discussion at the meeting was, "As someone put it, 'We don't trust Kennedy and we don't like Johnson; but Nixon is so terrible that we have to endorse the Democrats.'" The ADA refused to endorse Johnson. Kennedy got the endorsement, but not before the following sentence was eliminated from the proposed statement: "In the critical fields of human concern—foreign affairs, economic and social policy, civil rights—he has shown himself the aggressive champion of creative liberalism." The majority of the Board "simply refused to believe these things about you." As sharply as he could, Schlesinger told the young candidate to move quickly and pointedly to reassert himself with the liberals.⁹⁴

JFK moved to get the civil rights advocates on board his campaign. On September 1, Kennedy officially kicked off his campaign with a speech that included a call for Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania and Representative Emanuel Celler of New York to "prepare a comprehensive civil rights bill, embodying our platform commitments, for introduction at the beginning of the next session [of Congress]."⁹⁵ In mid-September, he again met with King. The Reverend was impressed that Kennedy had a better grasp of civil rights than at their earlier meeting. Kennedy wanted a

joint public appearance with King. Discussions about a possible joint appearance continued over the next few weeks, but foundered over King's conclusion that he had to invite Vice President Nixon to any public appearance he would make with the Massachusetts Senator. Kennedy would not agree to this condition.⁹⁶ At the end of the meeting, King recalled, "I said, 'but something dramatic must be done to convince the Negroes that you are committed on civil rights.'" King continues, "I did not feel at that time that there was much difference between Kennedy and Nixon."⁹⁷

A Critical Campaign Decision

Although Kennedy mentioned the need for executive action during his first televised debate with Nixon, civil rights remained on the sidelines through much of the campaign. Then, on October 19, Martin Luther King, Jr. was arrested for picketing an Atlanta department store and the subsequent series of events probably changed the outcome of the election. On October 22, through the intervention of Atlanta Mayor Bill Hartsfield, King was let out of jail. He was immediately rearrested for violation of a parole agreement stemming from a conviction of driving with an Alabama license while being a Georgia resident. He was sent to a rural Georgia prison for a four month term at hard labor. Mrs. King panicked. She called Wofford and cried, "They're going to kill him. I know they are going to kill him."⁹⁸ Wofford called Sargent Shriver who was in Chicago where Kennedy had been campaigning. He told Shriver of the pregnant Mrs. King's near-hysteria.

Shriver, a Kennedy in-law, headed the Catholic Interracial Council of Chicago and, during the Montgomery bus boycott he introduced King to his first mass audience in the Windy City. Shriver was the active liberal Kennedy clan member. Wofford told Shriver, "The trouble with your beautiful, passionate Kennedys is that they never show their passion. They don't understand symbolic action." Shriver listened and agreed to go over to JFK at O'Hare Airport and try to persuade him to make a telephone call to Mrs. King. The two of them also agreed that Shriver would have to wait to talk with him alone. The campaign staff would get into a great debate on the subject if it was brought up for their consideration, and the call would possibly never be made. The staff could see it as too risky, given the possibility of a Southern white backlash vote. Shriver caught up with JFK at the airport and, when he was alone with the candidate, Shriver told him of King's arrest and Mrs. King's condition. "Why don't you telephone Mrs. King and give her your sympathy," Shriver recalls telling J.F.K. And then he made his case: "Negroes don't expect everything will change tomorrow no matter who's elected. But they do want to know whether you care. If you telephone Mrs. King they will know you understand and will help. You will reach their hearts and give support to a pregnant woman who is afraid her husband will be killed." Kennedy's spur-of-the moment response to Shriver was, "That's a damn good idea. Get her on the phone."⁹⁹

No adviser discussed the matter or intervened with the candidate between the time Shriver made the suggestion and the moment the call was made. The conversation between Kennedy and Mrs. King was brief. As Coretta King recalls, J.F.K. said: "I want to express to you my concern about your husband. I know this must be very

hard for you. I understand that you are expecting a baby, and I just want you to know that I was thinking about you and Dr. King." He closed the conversation by indicating, "If there is anything I can do to help please feel free to call on me."¹⁰⁰ The next day Robert Kennedy expressed his concern about King's plight to the judge who was handling the case. King was soon released from jail.¹⁰¹

John Kennedy had done something dramatic, and there was concern within the leadership of both parties as to how it was going to affect the election outcome. Robert Kennedy and Louis Martin, a black publisher and a member of the Democratic National Committee, both worried that the loss of Southern white votes that would result from the Kennedy intervention could offset any gain in black votes.¹⁰² John Kennedy's call was not a planned out strategic move by the candidate. It was, however, a move that was deliberately planned by Harris Wofford and Sargent Shriver to be a spur-of-the-moment act by JFK. Concerned about Mrs. King, they wanted the candidate to call her. They also believed that neither the candidate nor the rest of the campaign staff understood the black voters' intensity and depth of concern with the issue.

Nixon would not get openly involved in the affair. It was clear to many observers that, as his campaign progressed, Nixon's strategy shifted. An early campaign swing through Greensboro, Atlanta and Birmingham demonstrated to the candidate that there were large numbers of Southern white voters willing to support him if the right appeal could be made. Nixon explained his position to reporter Theodore H. White: "I think it is time for the Republican candidate to quit conceding the South to the Democratic candidates. . . ."¹⁰³ But, Lodge created consternation in the Nixon camp as it pursued its Southern strategy. On October 12, in New York's black Harlem, the Bay State liberal stated: "there should be a Negro in the Cabinet. . . . It is part of our program and it is offered as a pledge." The next day, on orders from Nixon, he publicly withdrew his pledge.¹⁰⁴

When the King affair occurred the Vice President responded to queries with a terse: "No comment." The Republican nominee wanted the White House to release a statement in support of King. Eisenhower refused to get involved—this was Nixon's campaign. E. Frederic Morrow, the only black on the Nixon campaign staff, implored Nixon over the objections of all his other advisers, to contact Mrs. King and offer "to use his good offices to ameliorate the situation with the mayor or governor." Other black Republicans outside the campaign staff, most notably former Brooklyn Dodger baseball star and corporate executive Jackie Robinson, also asked the Vice President to intervene on behalf of the jailed minister. "The Negroes were waiting in the wings waiting to see which one of the candidates was going to make some specific pronouncements . . .," recalls Morrow. "Mr. Kennedy did an excellent job and did the very thing that I suggested to Mr. Nixon." Morrow's advice was not taken. Nixon remained silent on the issue. The day after the candidate made the decision to stay silent Morrow left the campaign train.¹⁰⁵

Martin Luther King, Jr. issued this public statement: "I want to make it patently clear that I am deeply grateful to Senator Kennedy for the genuine concern he expressed in my arrest." He continued, "Senator Kennedy exhibited moral courage of a high order."¹⁰⁶ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote to Kennedy that at this point in the

campaign even Eleanor Roosevelt “expressed herself with absolutely unprecedented enthusiasm about you.” He also wrote to Kennedy that Mrs. Roosevelt said, “I don’t think anyone in our politics since Franklin [Roosevelt] has had the same vital relationship with crowds. . . . his intelligence and courage elicit emotions from his crowds which flow back to him and sustain and strengthen him.”¹⁰⁶ There was enthusiasm and there was movement in the liberal camp.

Nixon, on the other hand, showed neither courage nor concern when King needed him. King had kept his neutrality in the campaign despite repeated entreaties from the Kennedy camp, and he was now furious: “Nixon just decided he would say nothing. . . . It indicated the direction this Presidency, this man, would take if he became President.” King seethed over Nixon’s silence. “He had been supposedly close to me, and he would call me frequently about things, getting, seeking my advice. And yet, when this moment came it was like he never heard of me, you see. So this is why I really considered him a moral coward.”¹⁰⁸

The *Atlanta Constitution*, *The New York Times*, and other newspapers picked up the Kennedy-King story. Robert Kennedy was concerned that the story could cost his brother the election. He understood the campaign civil rights group maneuvered the situation and he did not want any more of this type of maneuvering. He told them to close up shop.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, as Wofford saw it, “We now had the ammunition and we were going to use it. That was precisely what we weren’t supposed to do, according to Bobby.” Louis Martin and Harris Wofford convinced Sargent Shriver that “Negro voters don’t read *The New York Times* or the *Constitution* and we’ve got to get this to them.” Shriver agreed, “We’ve got to use these wonderful quotations of Mrs. King, Martin Luther King, Jr., and his father. That’s not propaganda it’s just reporting what has been said. Bobby couldn’t object to that.” Initially, the civil rights team printed 100,000 copies of a brief pamphlet, “The Case of Martin Luther King, Jr.,” with one bold captioned phrase on the cover page: “‘No Comment’ Nixon versus a Candidate with a Heart, Senator Kennedy.” Wofford and Martin wrote the text of the piece and by the end of the campaign nearly two million copies were distributed in black communities across the nation.¹¹⁰ Robert Kennedy never spoke about the document to any member of the civil rights team.

In 1960, black civil rights was perhaps the most potentially divisive political issue for the Democrats. John Kennedy’s decision was to strike a precarious balance between the white South and the civil rights supporters. Johnson of Texas was his draw to the South; and Johnson waged an effective campaign throughout the South. A strong civil rights plank and, more especially, his actions in the King episode were his draw to the blacks and their liberal allies. The decision to call Coretta King was bold stratagem by a committed civil rights campaign group—even if it was foisted on a candidate who reacted on the spur-of-the-moment.

On the other hand, Nixon moved the Republican Party in a different direction as he grappled with the presidential election politics of 1960. He first went for the Northern-based alliance with a strong civil rights platform and a liberal Vice Presidential nominee; but then he went for the Southern partnership with his repudiation

of Lodge's pledge and his silence during the King affair. His silence reflected a deliberate, but ill-fated, strategic gamble.

The 1960 election outcome was extremely close. Kennedy won by a margin of less than one percent of the popular vote. He was elected by only a plurality of the vote and his opponent received four percent more of the total white vote. In the South, only Florida, Tennessee and Virginia went Republican. Six Alabama electors and one Oklahoma elector joined all of the Mississippi electors to cast their electoral college votes for the States' Rights candidate, Harry F. Byrd of Virginia. Economic conservatism and racial reaction formed the basis of defection from the Democratic South.¹¹¹ The black vote shifted overwhelmingly into the Democratic column and was a major factor in Kennedy's carrying several key states, such as Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Texas.¹¹² Blacks moved massively into the ranks of regular Democratic voters.¹¹³

The Strategy of a President

After the election, John Kennedy's perspective shifted. His concerns moved from election to governance and, on a more distant horizon, reelection. Given the division within the Democratic Party, Kennedy laid out his strategy of governance with the avoidance of civil rights battles as a first priority in mind. "Within ten days of his election," recalls Wilkins, "came word that he was not going to advocate any new civil rights legislation because he did not want to split the party."¹¹⁴ In his first State of the Union Address to the Congress the young President devoted one innocuous sentence to civil rights: "The denial of constitutional rights to some of our fellow Americans on account of race—at the ballot box and elsewhere—disturbs the national conscience and subjects us to the charge of world opinion that our democracy is not equal to the high promise of our heritage."¹¹⁵

On March 8, 1961, the President was asked at a news conference, "Do you feel that there is a need now for legislation in this area . . .?" His response: "When I feel that there is a necessity for a congressional action, with a chance of getting that congressional action, then I will recommend that to the Congress."¹¹⁶ On May 10, 1961, Representative Cellar and Senator Clark introduced the legislation called for by candidate Kennedy the previous summer. The White House responded: "The President has made it clear that he does not think it necessary at this time to enact civil rights legislation."¹¹⁷

The President now had other legislative matters to deal with. As one aide said, "We knew that there were several Senators who might hold our program hostage, that was our primary consideration in delaying the bill. . . ." Another aide also summarized the administration position, "We believed that civil rights had to wait until we could strengthen our hold in Congress."¹¹⁸ Of course, the President came to office with both a slim popular majority and a shaky majority of Democrats willing to back his programs in the House and the Senate. The first major legislative battle of his presidency, the House vote to enlarge the Rules Committee to give the leadership a working majority, left him shaken. JFK argued: "With all that going for us, with

speaker Rayburn's own reputation at stake, with all the pressure and appeals a new president could make, we won by five votes. That shows you what we are up against."¹¹⁹

His remarks to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a sympathetic student of the Kennedy years, reveals much of the civil rights problem as perceived by the young President. Kennedy told the historian, "There is no sense in raising hell, and then not being successful. There is no sense in putting the office of the Presidency on the line on an issue, and then being defeated."¹²⁰ "He had at this point [in early 1961], I think, a terrible ambivalence about civil rights," recalls Schlesinger, Jr. "While he did not doubt the depth of the injustice or the need for remedy, he . . . concluded that there was no possible chance of passing a civil rights bill." Schlesinger, Jr., further argues that "a fight for civil rights would alienate southern support he needed for other purposes. . . . And he feared that the inevitable defeat of a civil rights bill after debate and filibuster would heighten Negro resentment, drive the civil rights revolution to more drastic resorts and place a perhaps intolerable strain on the already fragile social fabric."¹²¹

The perspective of the liberals outside of the White House differed from the perspective of those inside the administration. "It had been too much, perhaps, to expect that the Administration would press for the far-reaching, hard-hitting [civil rights] bill" stated one ADA report. "It was not unrealistic to hope that the White House might be benevolently neutral. Its blunt statement of disassociation [from their proposed civil rights legislation] . . . struck Clark and Cellar like a dash of cold water. . . ." ¹²² The NAACP's Roy Wilkins publicly blasted the administration. He termed the President's call for executive action rather than support for legislation, "an offering of a cactus bouquet to Negro parents and their children. . . ." ¹²³

Summary and Conclusions

At a February, 1961, press conference, when asked "What do you call yourself politically and how do you define your political philosophy?" President Kennedy responded, "Well I don't call myself anything except a Democrat who's been elected President of the United States and I hope I am a responsible President."¹²⁴ Kennedy amplified this point to a White House group in 1962 when he remarked:¹²⁵

"Most of us have been conditioned for many years to have a political viewpoint, Republican or Democratic—liberal, conservative, moderate. The fact of the matter is that most of the problems, or at least many of them, that we now face are technical problems, are administrative problems. They are very sophisticated judgments which do not lend themselves to the great sort of 'passionate movements' which have stirred this country so often in the past."

Was civil rights a "technical" problem or a problem of a "passionate movement?" There is scant evidence that during his pursuit of the Presidency Kennedy treated civil rights as anything other than a problem of vote-optimization. James Reston, of *The New York Times* relates an episode that reveals much of President-to-be Kennedy's view of issues. "I once asked him in a long, private talk at Hyannis Port what he wanted

to achieve by the time he rode down Pennsylvania Avenue with his successor. He looked at me as if I were a dreaming child. . . . It was only when I turned the question to immediate tangible problems that he seized the point," recounts Reston, "and he rolled off a torrent of statistics about the difficulty of organizing nations at different levels of economic development."¹²⁶ A conception of issues as ideas, and the pursuit of office to implement deeply held commitments was not the stuff of which John Kennedy was made.

"He had no ideology" said Harris Wofford, "and, if anything, was put off by too far-reaching ideas."¹²⁷ Wofford goes still further, "John Kennedy was the candidate of reason in politics, not passion in politics."¹²⁸ Theodore Hesburgh, a member of the United States Civil Rights Commission and later its Chairman, says of John Kennedy, "he felt sincerely about the issue [of civil rights] . . . and the fact that we ought to do something about it. But it wasn't a great crusade with him."¹²⁹ When a reporter from *Time* magazine asked John Kennedy why he sought the Presidency, the candidate responded, "Because that's where the power is."¹³⁰

In his campaigns for office John F. Kennedy dealt with the civil rights issue as if he were in Anthony Downs' world of political parties in a democracy and as if he were also a thoroughly convinced student of Joseph Schlesinger's ideas concerning the role of the nuclear party and ambition in politics.¹³¹ The key assumption of Downs' work is that politicians and voters act with instrumental rationality in a manner analogous to a free-market economy: political candidates are sellers of issue positions among which voters choose in exchange for their votes. Politicians, Downs argues, "act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which comes from being in office."¹³² Downs succinctly argues that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies."¹³³

Joseph Schlesinger's concept of the "nuclear party organization" complements the Downs approach to political party analysis.¹³⁴ Schlesinger demonstrates that in the contemporary political party setting of the United States, the candidate has essentially become the political party's center. It is the candidate who defines party policy. Furthermore, it is candidate motivation for future office that directs a politician's issue-attention and actions. As Schlesinger aptly summarizes his thesis: "our ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win tomorrow."¹³⁵ Thus, the candidate's issue positions reflect the electorate of the next office that must be won, rather than that of the office presently held. For the ambitious politician, issues are merely a vehicle used to move up in politics.

Kennedy's civil rights positions reflected the strategic considerations he found necessary to deal with the political pressures of each constituency and electorate that he faced. He constantly shifted his position on the civil rights issue as he faced different electorates—in Massachusetts, in the presidential primaries, at the nominating convention, and in the presidential general election. From this perspective, the often contentious scholarly debate over John F. Kennedy's personal commitment to black civil rights misses an essential political reality. Whether he was for or against the issue

in his heart was almost irrelevant to how he dealt with the issue as a politician. His public position on civil rights was, almost always, simply a reflection of his perception of its strategic value to him in his pursuit of office.

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Response to the Kennedy Administration: The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership Press Conferences

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Abstract

This paper explores the form and substance of sixty-four press conferences conducted by the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership between March 2, 1961 and November 21, 1963. Suggested by Dwight D. Eisenhower, the serial news conferences reflect the reactions of the political opposition during the thirty-four months of the Kennedy administration. The 851 page transcripts are a chronological, verbatim record which provide a rare opportunity to observe a presidential administration from the viewpoint of its opposition party leaders. Unique in American political annals, the press conferences attracted wide media attention and became known to the general public as the "Ev and Charlie Show."

Historically, political leaders have exchanged messages through various modes of communication. The most widely known and perhaps most frequently studied form of political communication has been the public speech. In recent decades, especially with the advent of television, press conference speaking has become a familiar method of political communication. The presidential news conference is an imposing instrument of communication and has emerged as an impressive American institution. Every president since Franklin Roosevelt has utilized the press conference to his distinct advantage.¹ "The Presidential press conference," observed Harry W. Sharp, "is a unique institution of American political life, unprecedented in our colonial history, unsanctioned in our Constitution, and unparalleled among governments elsewhere."² No regular national or international event "attracts so many political correspondents or is the source of so much political reporting."³ However, TV press conference speaking, an important mode of communication for political leaders, has received relatively little attention from communication scholars.⁴

The advent of television has been the most important change in American political life since World War II.⁵ One year before Harry S. Truman's victory over Thomas E. Dewey, fewer than one percent of American homes had television. In 1950 fewer than ten percent of American households had access to the medium. By 1960 some eighty-seven percent of American homes had television; today almost every home has one or more television sets.⁶ The American electorate regards television as its major news source.⁷ Americans are more likely to believe what they see on TV than what

they read in the newspaper or hear on the radio.⁸ In our society mass communication has become the center stage for major political events. The media play a major part in the selection of our political agenda and determine which issues will receive attention. "Although the media may not be powerful enough to tell people what to think," claim Trent and Friedenber, "they are powerful enough to tell us what to think about."⁹

Encouraged in part by his television success in the Kennedy-Nixon debates of 1960, John F. Kennedy was the first president to have his press conferences broadcast live on television. An estimated 65 million people in 21.5 million homes viewed his first press conference.¹⁰ Press Secretary Pierre Salinger claimed the President's news conferences were "an immediate and continuing success."¹¹ Kennedy's audience averaged 18 million viewers for his sixty-two meetings with the press.¹² These press conferences were one of Kennedy's most revelatory and effective means of communication; they became "a primary communications arm of the Presidency."¹³ The charismatic Kennedy emerged as "the first television President," and made the electronic medium an art.¹⁴

In our two party system of government it was not unexpected that Republicans would seek a comparable media forum to respond to President Kennedy. This paper is designed to provide some insights into the nature of the press conferences conducted by the party out-of-power. Specifically, the purpose of this article is to explore the form and substance of a series of sixty-four press conferences conducted by the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership between March 2, 1961 and November 21, 1963. The press conferences selected for analysis featured Senator Everett M. Dirksen (R. Ill.) and Representative Charles A. Halleck (R. Ind.) and covered the entire Kennedy period. Since the press conferences were held in large part as a reaction to the Kennedy administration, valuable insights into this contemporary political period can be obtained by examining the statements and impressions of the opposition leaders.

Press Conference Setting

When John F. Kennedy defeated Richard M. Nixon for the office of president in 1960, and GOP found itself out-of-power in the White House, the Senate and the House, the Republicans had to alter their methods of communicating party principles and positions to the American public. GOP leaders could no longer communicate party philosophy through presidential press conferences, nor could they continue their practice of expressing party principles through weekly televised reports on the White House steps following consultations with President Eisenhower. Republican leaders decided to develop a new method of expressing party positions for the political group out-of-power.¹⁵

President Eisenhower met with the Republican congressional leaders on the day he left office, January 20, 1961, to discuss the problem of formulating a unified opposition voice.¹⁶ Upon the President's recommendation it was decided that the GOP would create a new policy-making group to be called the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership. Originally composed of nine congressional leaders, the joint group was to hold weekly meetings when Congress was in session to discuss important legislative matters and formulate party policy.¹⁷ It was decided that following most leader-

ship meetings a press conference would be held for the newspaper, periodical, and TV and radio correspondents to "put out the news."¹⁸

Eisenhower recalled that when the GOP had been out-of-power in the past the party floor leaders in the Senate and House of Representatives assumed the role of party spokesmen.¹⁹ Therefore, Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen and House Minority Leader Charles Halleck were selected to appear jointly in the press conferences which were designed to provide Republicans with an effective opposition voice.

Press Conference Format

The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership meetings, presided over by the Republican National Committee chairman, preceded the press conference by about one hour.²⁰ These leadership meetings, claimed Senator Dirksen, were designed to "coordinate Republican House and Senate efforts and to pinpoint criticisms of administrative policy, which after careful consideration, we deem to be fully justified."²¹

The press, radio-TV and periodicals were notified in advance that a leadership meeting and the press conference would be held. Usually forty or fifty, sometimes over a hundred members of the mass communication industries attended those sessions which were held in the Old Supreme Court Chamber, the Senate Conference Room or any appropriate meeting place in the Capital Building.²²

During the three year period of the Kennedy administration sixty-four press conferences were held: twenty-two in 1961, twenty-three in 1962, and nineteen in 1963 before the President was assassinated.²³ The press conferences ranged between fifteen and thirty minutes in length with approximately twenty-two minutes representing the average.²⁴ Senator Dirksen and Representative Halleck were the regular press conference participants during this period but on occasion they shared the spotlight with other Republican guests, including Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon.²⁵

The first three press conferences held during March, 1961, were conducted in a relatively informal manner. Dirksen and Halleck appeared before the cameras with reportedly little preparation and, according to one midwestern newspaper, they "grappled with each other for the microphone."²⁶ The candid, spontaneous remarks of the congressional leaders and the novelty of the press conferences, unique in American political annals, attracted wide attention. Tom Wicker of *The New York Times* promptly labeled the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership press conferences the "Ev and Charlie Show."²⁷

Aroused in part by the "prairie conservatism" articulated by Dirksen and Halleck, and by the novel contrast of their speaking styles, some newspapers vigorously criticized the congressional twosome and created the impression that the Republican spokesmen were political comedians. Disturbed at the efforts on the part of some to inject levity into the press conference, Halleck retorted, "I'm no clown and I just don't care to be cast in that character. If you read the transcripts of the things we've been talking about you will find they certainly are on the serious side."²⁸ Dirksen was less vehement and claimed that the "Ev and Charlie" label "doesn't offend me at all, any more than when you refer to some of the great duos in American life,

like corned beef and cabbage, ham and eggs, the Cherry sisters, and Gallagher and Sheean."²⁹

As a result of the experience gained during the first few weeks, the GOP hired Robert Humphreys, a veteran newspaperman and magazine editor, to provide the press conferences with better aim and design.³⁰ A research staff was added and commencing with the March 23, 1961, press conference, Dirksen and Halleck read brief prepared policy statements on significant domestic and international issues before submitting to reporters' questions.

Topics for the prepared statements read at the outset of each press conference were usually suggested by Dirksen and Halleck or another member of the leadership group. Usually the turn of events determined an appropriate subject. On occasion, the press conference participants selected a policy position adopted by the Senate or House Republican Policy Committee on Legislation and re-emphasized the GOP stand.³¹

The development of the prepared statements was the responsibility of Robert Humphreys and his staff. Mr. Humphreys prepared the initial drafts and submitted them to Dirksen and Halleck for revisions. Other members of the leadership group were often consulted and encouraged to make suggestions. By the eve of the leadership meeting and press conference, a draft adopting the appropriate suggestions was again submitted to Senator Dirksen and Representative Halleck. It was this version, as amended by them, that was brought before the joint leadership the next morning.³²

At the morning leadership meeting Dirksen and Halleck privately read their drafted statements. An extensive discussion followed and frequently substantive and technical changes were made by the leadership group. The approved statements, which usually ran between 275–300 words in length, were retyped and photoduplicated copies were prepared for correspondents who attended the press conference. Within an hour after the press conference, mimeographed copies of the formal statements were distributed throughout the press operation in the capitol city. Additional copies of the brief formal statements were sent to every Republican member of the Senate and House.³³

Dirksen and Halleck mingled informally with reporters at the outset of most press conferences. When reporters and cameramen appeared ready for the press conferences to commence, the congressional leaders read their prepared statements. Reporters advanced questions after the formal presentations were completed. When members of the press exhausted their supply of questions, the press conferences were terminated.

Official typewritten transcripts of the entire press conference proceedings were made by the Thomas Transcription Service from tapes provided by Gus J. Miller of The Republican National Committee. These transcripts, consisting of 851 pages for the three year period, were employed for the following analysis.³⁴

Press Conference Substance

An examination of the official transcripts revealed that approximately one hundred domestic and foreign issues were discussed during the sixty-four conferences held between March 2, 1961, and November 21, 1963.³⁵ The press conference participants at times discussed as many as twenty issues during a single session. On three

TABLE 1
Major Issues in the Press Conferences and Their Frequencies

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Number of Press Conference Devoted to Discussing Issue</i>
1. Federal Spending	23
2. The Farm Problem	21
3. Federal Taxation	19
4. Civil Rights	18
5. Nuclear Weapons Testing	17
6. Federal Aid to Education	15
7. The Cuban Crisis	13
8. Medical Care for the Aged	12
9. Federal Budget	11
10. Foreign Aid	9

occasions the entire press conference was devoted to a single topic. Most of The press conference dealt with about seven or eight domestic and international issues.

Topics for discussion were introduced by both the congressional leaders and the reporters. Usually the initial questions raised by reporters were prompted by the remarks made by Dirksen and Halleck in their prepared statements. However, at times reporters raised questions at the outset and during the course of the press conferences on matters unrelated to the formal statements. Dirksen and Halleck, in one fashion or another, answered almost every question posed by reporters during the 1961-1963 press conferences.

The GOP leaders discussed the question of federal expenditures more than any other issue during the three year period. Twenty-three or about one third of the press conferences were partially devoted to a discussion of federal expenditures; twenty-one were devoted to the farm problem; nineteen to a discussion of federal taxation; eighteen to civil rights; and seventeen to nuclear weapons testing. Table 1 lists the major issues of the press conferences and reveals the number of press conferences in which each issue appeared. An examination of this table reveals that domestic topics were discussed more often than international questions. Five of the ten major issues discussed in the press sessions were domestic (the farm problem, federal taxation, civil rights, federal aid to education and medical care for the aged), three were international (nuclear weapons testing, the Cuban crisis, and foreign aid) and two were concerned with fiscal matters (federal spending and federal budget). In tallying the frequency of domestic versus international issues, it can be seen that among the ten most frequently discussed topics domestic issues were discussed eighty-five times while international issues were discussed upon thirty-nine occasions.

An analysis of the press conference transcripts for each of the three years of the Kennedy era provides valuable insight into the relationship between the political minority and the party in power. The following examination of press conference statements reveals the philosophy of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership and discloses their positions on the issues, their reasons for supporting and or opposing the President and their perception of the success or failure of the Kennedy administration.

During the first few months of the Kennedy administration, veteran leaders Dirksen and Halleck were relatively tempered in their criticism of the nation's new young leader.

Their responses sought a spirit of conciliation, especially on international issues. However, by midsummer of 1961, their press conferences became more critical of the administration and partisanship was clearly evident.

In their first press conference on March 2, 1961 Dirksen and Halleck were generally supportive of the Kennedy administration in efforts to introduce initiatives designed to remedy the nation's ills. The opposition leaders offered their cooperation to the President in pursuing a solution to the farm problem and in the development of civil rights and minimum wage bills.³⁶

During a mid-March press conference, the Republican leaders discussed the nation's economic situation. Halleck reported that economic experts believed the recession was taking a favorable turn. "The government's own statistics," reported the House leader, "indicate that the slump has probably hit bottom and things are on their way up again."³⁷ He expressed concern with the 5,700,000 unemployed and agreed that it was the disposition of his congressional colleagues to support legislation designed to alleviate the problem. He cautioned against remedying the recession with "big government spending and deficit financing," that "could severely impair the economic forces . . . at work . . ."³⁸ Dirksen noticed that the upturn in the economy had occurred before "substantive legislation dealing with the recession . . . hit the statute books."³⁹

Insights into the nature of communication between the congressional leadership and the White House were revealed in the statements advanced concerning the Peace Corps proposal. Dirksen reported that he had personally asked the administration's Sargent Shriver to visit with him to discuss the matter. He observed that the Peace Corps proposal was an imaginative idea, but not original as there had been projects of this type employed before.⁴⁰ He told the press that he had several questions and concerns about the proposal, but hoped that it would be a success. Halleck endorsed the Peace Corps concept with the qualification that "maybe a yellow light ought to be flashed to be very sure that every possible thing is done to make the program succeed."⁴¹

The GOP leaders gave their strongest support to the administration in the area of foreign affairs. This cooperation was well delineated after a reporter asked a question concerning the severity of the situation in Laos. Dirksen elucidated the GOP stance with:

While we may differ on domestic policy and sometimes on foreign policy and on precise and specific actions taken by the President, it must go out to the country as emphatically as we can say it, that he is the President; he does conduct the foreign policy; he is the Commander In Chief of our Armed Forces; and when situations of this kind arise, you must show cohesion and unity and a common purpose in dealing with them. So that, whatever the decision that is finally contrived, there must be a united country behind the President."⁴²

The congressional leaders were asked whether it was appropriate for former President Eisenhower to criticize the Kennedy administration. Dirksen replied that Eisenhower should not feel inhibited to speak out on any issue. "He is not only a restored

General," observed the Senate leader, "he is a citizen of the United States and as a citizen and as a former president with an extraordinary interest in the whole scheme of government, he can criticize very freely."⁴³

On May 1, 1961 former President Eisenhower was a guest of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership and participated in their press conference. Eisenhower firmly endorsed the leadership meetings and press conferences and urged that they be continued. When asked about the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, he was guarded in his remarks. He reviewed the history of the Cuban situation and said "the United States as a unit stands firmly behind the President in the effort to prevent the solidifying of a communist stronghold in this nation . . ." ⁴⁴ A reporter asked: "Mr. President, because Cuba in such a fiasco, do you think that a full and public post-mortem is coming to the American people of exactly why things worked out the way they did?" Eisenhower answered: "Well, I would say that one day history is going to tell the whole story. . . . Now, I do say, so far as the American public can be told as to what happened, why it happened, how they planned to do it; why I would be all in favor of it."⁴⁵ Like the GOP congressional leaders, Eisenhower was relatively protective of John F. Kennedy and the office of the presidency. He did say, however, in response to a question regarding the merits of the New Frontier programs:

I support the proposals that were made before I left the White House and they are very definitely different in their scope and cost and I point out again that no matter how much we like to say that we can afford to do anything we want to do, let us not forget that a sound currency is the first backstop to a free enterprise."⁴⁶

Dwight D. Eisenhower had set the tone for a change in the intensity level of criticism in the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership press conferences. Taking their cue from the former president, Dirksen and Halleck expounded on the theme that excessive government spending was undesirable and not fiscally responsible.

Throughout their press conferences the Republican leaders responded to various forms of presidential communications including: Kennedy campaign promises, public speeches, legislative proposals, presidential press conferences and presidential messages and communications proposing the New Frontier programs. Dirksen observed that Congress had been "deluged with presidential messages and communications proposing the so-called New Frontier programs."⁴⁷ He charged that these messages and communications were "vague and mysterious" in regard to costs, needs, and proposed duration.

. . . by taking the New Frontier's own minimum estimates, it appears likely that approximately \$60 billion additional will be spent by the federal government over the next five years. The calculation is that the federal budget will reach at least \$125 billion by 1965 if not sooner, compared to \$81 billion in President Eisenhower's last budget. . . . Our research convinces us that we are entering a jungle of unprecedented spending and loose fiscal policy. Never in the history of our country has any administration so blindly plunged into the future with so little thought or so little preparation.⁴⁸

After analyzing the probable costs of specific New Frontier programs, Halleck reported that Republicans would work diligently in the legislative branch to defeat many of these spending proposals.⁴⁹

Dirksen and Halleck became increasingly aggressive in their press conference statements and urged that the United States re-examine its position on nuclear weapons testing. The GOP leadership was concerned that some 296 negotiating sessions had been held at Geneva since October 31, 1958 with little result. "Because underground nuclear tests cannot be detected," claimed Dirksen, "this leaves that Russians free to continue this kind of testing if they wish while we have suspended our own efforts in this field."⁵⁰ Dirksen was concerned about the inspection issue related to nuclear tests and urged that President Kennedy "fix a time limit and so notify the Russians. We feel that this is not only essential to American prestige, but will make clear to the world the true intent of the Soviet Union."⁵¹ It was the fear of the GOP leadership that the Russians were testing while negotiations were going on and consequently gaining scientifically on the United States.

In June, 1961 the Soviet Union threatened to cut off access to the city of Berlin and a serious crisis was imminent. Kennedy sought to keep West Berlin open and free and Dirksen and Halleck used the press conference forum to pledge complete support to the President.⁵² "If differences should appear," said Dirksen, "they would be on *how* to uphold our Berlin commitments, not *whether* to uphold them." He added portentously: "We are all aware that the issue is not a city named Berlin, but free world unity."⁵³

In their final press conference of 1961, Halleck expressed his concern with the projected spending required for the President's foreign and domestic programs. He claimed that economists were predicting a record-breaking \$90 billion peacetime budget for the next congressional session.⁵⁴ He believed such a budget would be inflationary.

We saw the cost of living rise 48 per cent under the last democratic administration, due mainly to the loose fiscal policies of President Truman. Then we saw the cost of living stabilized by the Eisenhower administration because every effort was made to hold government spending strictly to essentials. . . . Additional defense spending necessitated by the Berlin crisis had already increased the tempo of the national economy. We say that reductions in proposed domestic spending are absolutely essential lest our whole economic structure be again subjected to the depleting effects of an inflationary cost-of-living spiral which, in the final analysis, does its greatest damage to those people least able to stand it.⁵⁵

Press Conferences: 1962

During the next congressional session the GOP press conference responses to the Kennedy administration developed a more partisan tone. A year had elapsed; Congress and the press, especially the opposition leaders, had had time to reflect upon the New Frontier proposals and formulate their reactions and demands for results.

Senator Dirksen opened the first press conference of 1962 with the remark: "The Kennedy administration has now had one year in office. It certainly has had ample

time to size up the mood of the country, but we can find little or nothing to indicate it has done so in either the State of the Union message or the proposed budget."⁵⁶ The Senate leader was concerned that the cost of government was going to increase to \$92.5 billion, an amount larger than three of the four World War II budgets.⁵⁷ For Halleck the New Frontier was "the same old story of more power for the White House, more spending, more debt and more taxes."⁵⁸ A more critical and more partisan tone was clearly evident.

However, in the area of foreign affairs the GOP continued to support a bipartisan approach.⁵⁹ Dirksen admitted that many followers felt Republicans should have converted the Cuban fiasco into political gain. "We thought—and we still think—to have done so with a new president in office would have only increased the enormous damage to American prestige which was caused by the incident."⁶⁰ The Senator added that the Republican leadership was deeply concerned with the Laotian situation, Vietnam and the Berlin crisis. He acknowledged that efforts would be maintained to pursue a bipartisan course whenever possible. "But it should be made unmistakably clear that when we have sufficient grounds to differ with the President in the best interests of the country, we intend to speak up without hesitation."⁶¹

In their press conference of February 20, 1962 the Republican leaders urged President Kennedy to re-examine the U.S. policy on nuclear weapons testing. Dirksen was concerned that on September 1, 1961, while negotiations were in progress, the Soviet Union "seized the initiative and began a series of 40 or 50 nuclear tests in the atmosphere."⁶² He and Halleck argued that the U.S. was losing valuable ground in nuclear weapons development by not conducting similar tests. The Republican leadership was also concerned with the loss of prestige among American allies. Dirksen asserted that the Kennedy administration's diplomatic conduct since taking office had produced an undesirable situation. He cited *The New York Times* to show that relations with NATO allies were "at the lowest point since NATO was created in 1949."⁶³ Reporters were quick to expose a possible inconsistency in the Republican leadership's desire to support a bipartisan approach to foreign policy. Dirksen denied an inconsistency existed and claimed that his criticism of Kennedy diplomacy was a justified means of "ventilating . . . views."⁶⁴

In the spring of 1962, President Kennedy objected to the increase in steel prices announced by the steel industry. He argued that the proposed six dollars per ton price increase would be inflationary and would increase the cost of living. The Republican leadership responded by claiming that the President was looking in the wrong place for the basic cause of inflation. The prime factor in inflation, according to the Republican leadership, was "excessive government spending."⁶⁵ Halleck, in analyzing the 1962 federal budget of \$93 billion, reviewed the increases of federal spending proposed for agriculture, education, health, labor, welfare, housing and community development, natural resources and general government and said:

Now add an increase of more than \$7 billion for national defense since fiscal 1961 and the total of these increases—mind you, just the increases—is greater than the entire cost of the federal government in 1940, only 22 years ago.⁶⁶

President Kennedy may have been successful in his effort to deny the steel companies their price increases, but the Republican leadership was not going to allow his inflation argument to go unchallenged.

Senator Dirksen opened the May 3, 1962 press conference with a reference to the arrest of Billie Sol Estes who had been charged with fraud. Estes had taken a reported \$30 million of federal money in various agricultural schemes covering several states. Dirksen announced that the members of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership believed that a congressional investigation into the Department of Agriculture was mandatory to prevent such scandals in the future.⁶⁷ Halleck remarked that Republicans had advised former President Eisenhower of their demand for a full-scale investigation and he had concurred.⁶⁸

Former President Eisenhower was the sole participant in the May 10, 1962 press conference. In a prepared statement Eisenhower expressed his concern with the Kennedy administration's efforts to increase the power of the executive branch of government. He said:

It has long been my judgment that the real threat to liberty in this Republic will not come from any sudden, calculated onslaught; rather, the threat to our liberties will be primarily found in a steady erosion of self-reliant citizenship, and in excessive power concentration, resulting from the lodging of more and more decisions in an ever-growing federal bureaucracy. . . . I believe that the problem of the presidency is rarely an inadequacy of power. Ordinarily the problem is to use the already enormous power of the presidency judiciously, temperately, and wisely.⁶⁹

Reporters were eager to ask the former President about his reactions to the Kennedy administration. Eisenhower acknowledged that there were a number of domestic issues where he differed radically from Kennedy and from his administration.⁷⁰ However, in the field of foreign affairs he felt that only the President had adequate background and information and consequently the people should follow his lead. He observed that Kennedy was showing "a growing firmness" in this handling of the nation's affairs with the Russians. "It's only through firmness," emphasized Eisenhower, "that we'll ever keep the peace."⁷¹

The former president was reluctant to comment on the steel crisis because he did not think he had all the facts. He did believe the Republican leadership was justified, however, in its position on the Billie Sol Estes investigation. When asked by one reporter whether he wished he were back in the White House, Eisenhower responded "at least one night I dreamed that the 22nd Amendment had been repealed . . . and it wasn't wholly a nightmare." After additional reflection, however, Eisenhower concluded that the two term limitation on the presidency was wise.⁷²

By late spring John F. Kennedy had been in office for nearly a year and a half, a period which was to mark the midpoint of his career as President. The Republican leadership used the press conference forum to examine his promises as a candidate and compare them to his performance as President. Halleck observed that in 1960 Kennedy was critical of unemployment, business failures, interest rates and the general

condition of the economy. Kennedy, he recalled, had promised to "get America moving again." The house leader argued that under Eisenhower in 1960 unemployment was 5.6% while it had averaged 6% since Kennedy had taken office.⁷³ Halleck reported that business failures had increased 11% in 1961 under Kennedy while mortgage foreclosures were up 40%, "the biggest one-year increase since the depression year of 1932."⁷⁴ Contrary to Kennedy's campaign promises to lower interest rates, Halleck announced that the Kennedy administration had failed to reduce interest rates of any type.⁷⁵ Similarly, concerning Kennedy campaign promises to balance the budget, Halleck declared that the Kennedy administration had had two successive deficits with a third pending. He charged that Kennedy "increased the cost of government to the highest point in peacetime history." He concluded that "Mr. Kennedy promises better than he performs."⁷⁶

Dirksen continued the partisan assault on the President. He attacked the Kennedy farm program charging that contrary to promises, the program cost more, parity ratios were lower and price supports less adequate than under Eisenhower.⁷⁷ He recalled that Kennedy had pledged that a major civil rights bill would be among his initiatives when Congress convened in January, 1961. "It is now May, 1962 and he has not even requested the legislation."⁷⁸ Dirksen enumerated several other Kennedy promises that had been advanced in the 1960 campaign and concluded ". . . what Mr. Kennedy says he will do and what he does are complete strangers to each other."⁷⁹

In a mid-June press conference Dirksen continued the partisan criticism by charging that the Kennedy administration had gotten America moving again — "but in the wrong direction." He observed that the United States was losing first place in industrial modernization to several countries in Europe and to Japan. He asserted that the Kennedy administration's policies of "increased government spending, bigger treasury deficits, bigger federal debt, and greater powers for the chief executive, do not modernize our industrial plant, don't make jobs, do not provide the money for wage increases." According to Dirksen, they had had the opposite effect and had discouraged plant modernization, expansion of the job market and profits.⁸⁰ He was concerned about the \$100 billion loss to investors in the stock market and blamed these losses in part on Kennedy's use of federal power to "force withdrawal of a price increase which the steel industry said was necessary to modernize its plant." Dirksen asserted that "since that fateful day the stock market had plunged \$75 billion more. As many experts see it Mr. Kennedy's action on steel triggered the plunge."⁸¹

To revive the economy, President Kennedy proposed a tax reduction program. Halleck responded by agreeing that tax reduction would be desirable. He reminded reporters that he had been the Majority Leader in the only two Congresses in the preceding twenty-eight years that had granted any substantial tax reduction. He said, "Nobody needs to twist our arm when it comes to tax reduction."⁸² He indicated that Republicans would support a tax cut if it were accompanied with commensurate cuts in federal spending.⁸³

By mid-July, 1962 it became apparent that despite a 2-1 majority of Democrats in the Senate and a 3-2 Democrat majority in the House, the New Frontier programs were encountering legislative difficulties. President Kennedy had sent twenty-seven

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messages and thirty-eight executive communications, totaling over 100,000 words to the Congress, but only two major legislative bills had been enacted.⁸⁴ Dirksen said, "It is doubtful that any session of Congress in the history of the republic ever spent so much time accomplishing so little." He added, "The case for the failure of the Kennedy legislative program is, we think, a simple one—it is not popular with the American people and it is not popular with Congress."⁸⁵

One reporter appeared puzzled by the large number of legislative victories scored against the administration's proposals by the Halleck-led forces in the House and asked:

Question: Mr. Halleck, the administration seems rather envious of the way you keep your Republicans in line; do you think you can let us in on your secret?

Rep. Halleck: Well, it's just that our boys and girls see these things the same way. We don't twist . . . we don't pressure anybody.

Senator Dirksen: There's no twist. (audience laughter)

Question: Mr. Halleck, you said no good could come of this Congress, but you've recited a lot of good things you have done. Any more good things you can do before you adjourn?

Rep. Halleck: Oh, we just passed that welfare bill today; we all voted for it. . . . We passed the Manpower Training Bill . . . I don't recall much else we've done, do you?

Senator Dirksen: I must remind you again what Gibbon said in that great historical work, *The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire*, . . . 'progress is made more often not by what goes on the statute books, but by what is taken off or kept off.' And so you see, that has a great value in a free, representative country like this.⁸⁶

In early September, 1962 the Soviet Union announced that it had increased its supply of armaments and technical specialists to Cuba. President Kennedy informed the American people that these shipments of armaments to Cuba had been increasing since July. The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership devoted the entire press conference of September 7, 1962 to a discussion of the Cuban missile crisis. Halleck claimed that Kennedy's statements and State Department information over a period of eighteen months made clear that "not only is the situation in Cuba serious, but . . . getting worse from the point of view of our vital interests and the security of this country."⁸⁷ He recognized that there was no easy solution to the volatile situation, but urged that the Congress, the Executive Branch and the American people "unite for a calm, considered approach to meet this problem. The time is at hand for effective and decisive leadership in the Cuban situation."⁸⁸

Senator Dirksen claimed that the delivery of Soviet arms and military technicians to Cuba constituted "a deliberate challenge to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947 and the Caracas Declaration of 1954."⁸⁹ He urged that Congress adopt a joint resolution similar to the Formosa-Pescadores Resolution of 1955 which had authorized the President of the United States to employ armed forces if necessary to protect the territory in question. He felt a similar resolution would "demonstrate to the world the firmness of this nation in meeting the problem."⁹⁰

The Republican leaders held their final press conference of the year on October

5. They chose the occasion to review the first two years of the Kennedy administration from their partisan perspective. With an eye toward the November congressional elections, Dirksen reported that the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April, 1961 had been a failure because President Kennedy "withheld air support and publicly advised the people of Cuba that we would not help any civilian insurrection."⁹¹ He argued that America's loss of prestige had "become more acute because of reported Soviet shipments of military weapons and military personnel in Cuba without any intercession by the United States . . ." ⁹² After reviewing U.S. relations with its allies, Dirksen concluded that in no part of the world could the United States point to a substantial gain in its position during 1961 or 1962, but, "on the contrary, we have weakened old and trusted alliances without gaining new ones."⁹³

Halleck compared Kennedy's domestic promises of the 1960 presidential campaign with his actual performance during his first two years in office. After discussing the unemployment rate, cost of living, business failures, mortgage foreclosures, farm parity ratio, stock market crash, and the gross national product, Halleck concluded that "the American economy has not moved forward under President Kennedy and his overwhelmingly Democratic congresses, but has actually slipped backward."⁹⁴

Press Conferences: 1963

With the Cuban missile crisis resolved and the congressional elections completed, the Joint Senate-House Republican leadership started its first conference of 1963 on February 28 with Senator Dirksen's announcement that the United States had engaged in 403 negotiating sessions over a five year period with the Soviet Union on a nuclear test ban. He expressed concern with the lack of progress during these meetings and voiced alarm over the number of apparent concessions granted to the Russians. "A policy of firmness, not concession," proclaimed Dirksen, was "the only course that produces results in dealing with the Soviet Union."⁹⁵

Halleck attacked the administration's record federal deficit. He announced that the President had proposed reducing taxes by \$10 billion while increasing federal spending by \$5 billion.⁹⁶ He said Republicans would establish a task force to propose cuts in the Kennedy budget.⁹⁷ Throughout the spring of 1963 the dominant theme emanating from press conference rhetoric was that the Kennedy administration's proposal to increase spending and decrease taxes would be inflationary. It was the position of the GOP leadership that the creation of jobs was the nation's most serious domestic need and that the "tax-and-spend" philosophy of the Kennedy administration would not solve that problem but would instead intensify it.⁹⁸

Dirksen opened the March 28, 1963 press conference by criticizing the Kennedy administration's news management. He charged that "millions of Americans believe that the government is not telling the whole truth." He cited the Bay of Pigs disaster and the "Tractors-for-Castro" project as examples where the administration withheld information from the public.¹⁰⁰ He recalled the "missile gap" issue of the 1960 presidential campaign and said "it was a Kennedy falsehood."¹⁰¹ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had admitted that the United States held an advantage in missile superiority over the Russians. Dirksen also pointed out that it was his colleague, Senator

Kenneth Keating (Rep., N.Y.), who had first alerted the American people to the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, "a fact which for weeks was denied by the Kennedy administration from the President down."¹⁰² Halleck added his criticism by saying that the President had claimed there would not be a blockade of Cuba, but later Secretary of Defense McNamara had told the press that any ship approaching Cuba which did not stop on U.S. orders, "would be shot out of the water."¹⁰³ "That is," emphasized Halleck, "a blockade." The Hoosier lawmaker charged that the American people were told by the administration that Kennedy denied Khrushchev's request for the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey but that Americans learned later that "in fact our missiles had been withdrawn from Turkey."¹⁰⁴

Domestic matters were the primary concern of the GOP leadership during the spring of 1963. Representative Melvin Laird (Rep., Wis.), a member of the task force of the House Appropriations Committee, participated as a guest in the April 9 press conference. Laird indicated that it was the goal of his group to cut \$10 to \$15 billion from President Kennedy's proposed \$108 billion budget.¹⁰⁵ Laird reported that the minority felt the number one priority for getting the country's economy moving again was in the area of tax reduction.¹⁰⁶ But Halleck took pains to clarify the Republican position by reporting that any tax cut should be preceded by a reduction in federal spending. "Otherwise . . . the tax cut could be self-defeating because it could well lead to inflation which, after all, is the cruelest tax of all."¹⁰⁷

By early summer of 1963 the clamor for strong civil rights legislation was heard throughout the nation. Reporters knew that Dirksen and Halleck had been conferring privately with President Kennedy at the White House and they wanted to know the progress of the conversations. Halleck revealed that the discussions dealt with various proposals for civil rights legislation and assured reporters that Republicans would fulfill their responsibilities in this area.¹⁰⁸ He made it clear that "the President of the United States had the primary responsibility . . . in this field to advocate and propose legislation."¹⁰⁹ Although reluctant to speak for all Republicans, Halleck did reiterate his position on civil rights legislation in the past. ". . . I have voted for civil rights proposals time after time after time. I have voted for anti-poll tax I don't know how many times." He added that he had voted for anti-lynching measures and voted for the "very comprehensive civil rights bill advocated by President Eisenhower and helped to bring it to passage."¹¹⁰

In their August 14, 1963 press conference, Senator Dirksen questioned the leadership ability of the young president. He reported that by July 31, 1963 the Kennedy administration had submitted 403 legislative requests to Congress and only nineteen had been enacted into law.¹¹¹ "The President's performance," reported Dirksen "was only 4.7 percent, an all time record low."¹¹² He cited the 2 to 1 Democratic majority in the Senate and the 3 to 2 Democratic margin in the House and asked, "Where is the dynamic leadership that was so glowingly promised in the 1960 campaign?"¹¹³ It was Dirksen's position that there was little public support for Kennedy's programs and little enthusiasm for the New Frontier in Congress.

On occasion the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership engaged in anticipatory argumentation with the Kennedy administration prior to a major presidential

address to the nation. Such a situation developed on September 18, 1963 when the Republican leaders, speaking through their press conference forum, urged the American people to resist Kennedy's proposal to cut taxes. They attempted to diminish the President's credibility to speak that evening on a tax cut measure by mentioning that when Kennedy was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, "he voted against a tax cut every single (five) time."¹¹⁴ Dirksen best expressed the minority viewpoint when he said:

We Republican favor a tax reduction. We have been the sponsors of the only two major tax reductions in modern times. We will vote for this proposed tax cut if Mr. Kennedy will join the members of Congress—Republicans and Democrats alike—in seeking a substantial reduction in planned outlays for existing federal programs and those authorized, but not yet started. Leading members of his own party in Congress favor it.¹¹⁵

It was more typical, however, for the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership to respond following messages delivered by the President. At their October 24, 1963 press conference, Dirksen responded to JFK's June 10 speech delivered at American University. The President had called for Americans to re-examine their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Dirksen opposed the coexistence theme of that address and challenged both the motives and the historical record of the communists. He cited the victims of communist military force or occupation: Poland, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba.¹¹⁶ "It took a war and 150,000 American casualties to save Korea," charged Dirksen, "and a full-scale war goes on today in South Vietnam."¹¹⁷ Dirksen suggested that if the communists were so eager for peaceful coexistence they should give the world "some concrete evidence of their desires by a cease-fire and withdrawal in South Vietnam . . ."¹¹⁸ Little previous mention had been made of Vietnam by reporters or by the GOP leadership in the press conference series during the Kennedy years.

The sixty-third press conference of the GOP leadership was held on November 7, 1963. Halleck opened the session with the opinion that when historians reviewed the 1963 legislative year, they would be "hard pressed to explain to future generations how a Kennedy administration which had promised so much accomplished so little with such overwhelming Democratic majorities in both branches of the 88th Congress."¹¹⁹ Halleck claimed that "No president in history ever had a worse record of legislative results in a single session of Congress."¹²⁰ With the exception of the college facilities bill, "the 88th Congress, 1st Session, will go into the record books without a single new major enactment . . ."¹²¹

The year's final GOP press conference was held on November 21, 1963: one day before the President's assassination in Dallas, Texas. Dirksen charged that President Kennedy had been guilty of two major blunders that had hindered his legislative initiatives. First, Kennedy proposed that taxes be cut while federal deficit spending was increased. This maneuver, according to Dirksen, generated considerable opposition in and out of Congress.¹²² Secondly, the President, after having promised major civil rights legislation in 1961, neglected to follow through on his pledge.¹²³ Dirksen indi-

cated that it was June 19, 1963 before Kennedy submitted a civil rights program," only after the crisis of demonstrations and violence forced his hand."¹²⁴ "Historically," observed the Illinois Senator, "the passage of civil rights legislation is a long, drawn-out affair. This is because many members of Mr. Kennedy's own political party are opposed to civil rights legislation."¹²⁵ Dirksen chided the President by suggesting that if he had kept his campaign pledges and had sent his proposal to Congress in 1961, "new civil rights statutes would have been on the books before demonstrations and violence were ever precipitated."¹²⁶

Halleck's comments during the sixty-fourth and final press conference of the Kennedy era were even more scathing as he delivered his critique of the administration's accomplishments. He challenged the Kennedy campaign statements calling for "strong leadership" and "the need to go forward with vigor." The Hoosier Republican said, "If we examine President Kennedy's handling of his legislative programs for his first three years, his 1960 campaign cries are more applicable today than three years ago."¹²⁷ Employing the rhetorical device anaphora to dramatize his case, Halleck continued his partisan attack with a series of charges:

Mr. Kennedy asked Congress for an Alliance for Progress authorization for Latin America, and Congress gave it to him. The program has never even gotten off the ground.

Mr. Kennedy asked Congress for a Trade Expansion Act to facilitate his 'Grand Design' for Europe, and Congress gave it to him. The 'Grand Design' collapsed over a year ago and has not been heard of since.

Mr. Kennedy asked Congress for depressed areas and retaining legislation to solve unemployment, and Congress gave it to him. Not even a dent has been made in unemployment.

Mr. Kennedy asked Congress for an Urban Affairs Department, social security medical care, massive federal aid to education and similar proposals. These the Congress has not given him. Why? For a number of reasons, but mainly because there has been no wide public support for them either in the Congress or in the country.

Together with the delayed tax cut and civil rights measures these legislative items and enactments have been the backbone of Mr. Kennedy's program. The lists adds up to almost total failure for what undoubtedly will be known as the Three Empty Years.¹²⁸

Conclusion

The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership press conferences were established at the suggestion of Dwight D. Eisenhower in January, 1961. They were a creation of the television age and provided a regular forum for articulating the political philosophies and positions of the party out of power. Unique in American history, these serial press conferences conducted by the highest elected officials of the party out-of-power were an important instrument of political communication. Their transcripts provide a rare opportunity to view, in an organized framework, the reactions and impressions of the political opposition. The Republican party meticulously or-

chestrated these events not only in an effort to respond to the Kennedy administration, but also to promulgate and disseminate GOP doctrine. These question and answer sessions, though ostensibly appearing to be somewhat informal to the observer or television viewer were in reality highly structured dual interviews in well chosen settings.

The press conferences featuring Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen and House Minority Leader Charles A. Halleck continued into the Johnson administration. In 1965 Gerald Ford replaced Charles Halleck as House floor leader and the "Ev and Charlie" show became the "Ev and Jerry" show in the eyes of the press and general public. When a Republican, Richard M. Nixon, was elected President in 1968 the congressional press conference format was dissolved.

Sixty-four press conferences were conducted during the Kennedy administration: twenty-two in 1961, twenty-three in 1962, and nineteen in 1963. The press sessions averaged twenty-two minutes in length and provided reporters with an ongoing opportunity to question the leaders of the Kennedy opposition.

Approximately one hundred domestic and foreign issues were discussed during the press conferences held between March 2, 1961 and November 21, 1963. Those topics most frequently discussed were: federal spending, the farm problem, federal taxation, civil rights, nuclear weapons testing, federal aid to education, the Cuban crisis, medicare, the federal budget and foreign aid.

The press conference transcripts reveal that about 98 percent of the substance of the news sessions consisted of serious discussion of the nation's domestic and international problems. The GOP leadership initially adopted a conciliatory stance toward the Kennedy administration, especially in the area of international affairs. Their comments and criticisms became more acute and more partisan as time progressed. On occasion Dirksen and Halleck shared the press conference forum with other GOP leaders including Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon.

The press conference procedure was used to respond to various forms of presidential communications including: Kennedy campaign promises, public speeches, legislative proposals, presidential press conferences and presidential messages and communications proposing New Frontier programs. Dirksen and Halleck chose to criticize the President for lack of initiative in proposing civil rights legislation and nuclear weapons testing agreements with the Soviets. They explained their opposition to New Frontier proposals on grounds of economics and perceived lack of popular demand in and outside of Congress. It was the Republican position that New Frontier proposals generally were unnecessary and if adopted would become inflationary. The opposition leaders agreed with Kennedy on the desirability of tax reductions, but only if harnessed with reduction of federal expenditures. They acknowledged the personal popularity of the President, but increasingly questioned the effectiveness of his leadership. The frequently criticized the Kennedy administration for its lack of productivity and legislative accomplishment.

Although the press conferences were a noteworthy communication vehicle, they were not without problems. An inherent limitation was the reactive role played by the congressional leaders. "Unless it contains a high degree of support," observed Robert

E. Denton and Gary C. Woodward, "a reactive response in politics is almost automatically perceived as negative."¹²⁹ By its nature Congress must respond to a legislative agenda established by the president.¹³⁰ Consequently, veteran lawmakers Dirksen and Halleck generated an obstructionist image and encountered, at times, criticism from the press. *The New York Times* reported that the GOP leaders were trying to compete for public attention with Jack and Jacqueline Kennedy and their daughter Caroline.¹³¹ In contrast to the presidential new conferences and frequently televised glimpses of the young, charismatic President and his family, the battle-scarred veterans from Congress seemed to appear harsh, pedestrian and graceless. Whereas the presidential press conferences were televised live by the major networks, only small, sometimes 60 second segments of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership press conferences were carried by the TV networks. Although one fifth of a typical evening TV news broadcast generally concerns presidential activity and politics, little TV attention is devoted to the Congress.¹³² However, by midsummer, 1962, Dirksen and Halleck won substantial amounts of newspaper space and television time and they achieved their objective of putting out the news.¹³³

As a political newsmaking technique, the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership serial press conferences fulfilled their purpose. The prepared statements at the outset of each press conference enabled the party spokesmen to control the flow of information. The news sessions achieved media attention and were regularly attended by the press. As in presidential press conferences, a symbiotic relationship between the opposition leadership and the media was established. As a result of the press conferences Republican views were kept before the public and party positions were periodically reinforced. The Joint Senate-House Republican leadership press conferences emerged as a significant vehicle for political dissemination and served as an effective communicative response to the Kennedy administration.

Notes

1. Harry W. Sharp, "The Kennedy News Conference," (Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1967), p. 290.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
4. For notable exceptions see: Charles Lowell Marlin, "Eisenhower Before the Press," *Today's Speech*, 1X (Apr., 1961), 23-25; Catherine Ann Collins, "Kissinger's Press Conferences, 1972-1974: An Exploration of Form and Role Relationship on News Management," *Central States Speech Journal*, 28 (1977), 185-93; and C. Jack Orr, "Reporters Confront the President: Sustaining a Counterpoised Situation," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66 (1980), 17-32.
5. Austin Ranney, *Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1983), p. 123.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
7. Dan Nimmo, *The Political Persuaders, The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigns*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 115.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
9. Judith S. Trent and Robert V. Friedenberg, *Political Campaign Communication: Principles and Practices*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 147.
10. Harold W. Chase and Allen H. Lerman, *Kennedy and the Press*, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1965), p. x.

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Sharp, "The Kennedy News Conference," p. 1.
14. Herbert Schmertz, "The Media and the Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI (Winter 1986), p. 12.
15. Personal interview with Charles A. Halleck, April 12, 1984.
16. *A Record of Press Conference Statements Made by Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen and Representative Charles A. Halleck for the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership*, (Senate Document, No. 63, 87th Congress, First Session, Washington, D.C.), p. 11.
17. *The New York Times*, 25 Jan. 1961, p. 20. The original members of the Joint Leadership group were Senate Min. Leader Everett M. Dirksen; Senate Whip Thomas H. Kuchel; Senator Styles Bridges, Ch. of the Senate Policy Com.; Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Ch. of the Senate Conference; House Min. Leader Charles A. Halleck; House Whip Leslie C. Arends; Repres. John W. Byrnes, Ch. of the House Policy Com.; Repres. Charles B. Hoeven, Ch. of the House Conference; and Repres. Clarence J. Brown, ranking Rep. member of the House Rules Com. In 1962 Sen. Bourke B. Hickenlooper replaced Sen. Styles Bridges. In 1963 Repres. Gerald R. Ford replaced Repres. Charles Hoeven. The Joint Leadership was increased from nine to eleven members in 1963 with the addition of Senator Thurston B. Morton, Ch. of the Rep. Senatorial Campaign Com. and Repres. Bob Wilson, Ch. of the Rep. Cong. Campaign Com. On June 10, 1961, Repres. William E. Miller succeeded Thruston B. Morton as Ch. of the Rep. Nat. Com. and presided over the Joint Leadership.
18. Thruston B. Morton, "Leadership Problems in the Opposition Party," *The Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1961; Brookings Lectures and Additional Papers*, ed. Paul T. David. (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 299.
19. Senate Document No. 63, *loc. cit.*, p. III.
20. Letter from Robert Humphreys, April 30, 1964. Mr. Humphreys served as Staff Consultant to the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership, 1961-1963.
21. Letter from Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, July 26, 1961.
22. *The New York Times*, March 1, 1963, p. 2. One of the most publicized press conferences was held May 10, 1962 at General Eisenhower's Gettysburg farm.
23. Letter from Robert Humphreys, April 1, 1964.
24. Letter from Gus J. Miller, April 8, 1964. Mr. Miller, a member of the Rep. Nat. Com., operated the tape recorder employed in preparing the official transcripts of the Joint Senate-House Leadership press conferences.
25. During the Kennedy admin. Dirksen and Halleck appeared with the following guests at the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership press conferences: Richard M. Nixon, April 20, 1961; Dwight D. Eisenhower, May 1, 1961; Thruston B. Morton, May 26, 1961; Gov. Clifford P. Hansen of Wyoming, March 28, 1963; Repres. Melvin R. Laird of Wis., April 9, 1963; Repres. Peter Frelinghusen of Penn., May 1, 1963; Repres. Robert Wilson of Calif. and Thruston Morton, May 9, 1963; and Repres. Robert Dole of Kansas, Aug., 22, 1963. Dwight D. Eisenhower appeared alone at the May 10, 1962, press conference.
26. *Chicago Tribune*, October 8, 1961, p. 3.
27. *Lafayette (Indiana) Journal and Courier*, March 20, 1961, p. 9.
28. Personal interview with Charles A. Halleck, June 20, 1961.
29. *The New York Times*, May 1, 1961, p. 21.
30. Senate Document No. 63, *op. cit.*, p. III-IV.
31. Letter from Robert Humphreys, April 30, 1964.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Mr. Miller recorded the press conferences on a portable tape recorder and the commercial transcribing service reproduced four copies. Dirksen, Halleck, staff consultant Humphreys and the Republican National Committee received official transcripts. The complete transcripts, totaling

851 pages, were not edited and remained "very accurate" despite the fact that some questions of the reporters were inaudible and were omitted from the transcripts.

35. Official transcripts, The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership press conferences, 1961-1963. Photo-duplicated copies of the sixty-four press conferences were obtained from the offices of House Min. Leader Charles Halleck and Staff Consultant Robert Humphreys. The author attended the June 15, 1961 press conference.
36. Press Conference of March 2, 1961, pp. 3-10.
37. Press Conference of March 16, 1961, p. 1.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
42. Press Conferences of March 23, 1961, pp. 8-9.
43. Press Conference of March 29, 1961, p. 16.
44. Press Conference of May 1, 1961, p. 12.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
47. Press Conference of May 26, 1961, p. 3.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
50. Press Conference of May 11, 1961, p. 1.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
52. Press Conference of July 13, 1961, p. 1.
53. Press Conference of July 27, 1961, p. 1.
54. Press Conference of September 15, 1961, p. 3.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
56. Press Conference of January 18, 1962, p. 1.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
62. Press Conference of February 20, 1962, p. 2.
63. Press Conference of March 1, 1962, p. 2.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
65. Press Conference of April 12, 1962, p. 1.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
67. Press Conference of May 3, 1962, pp. 1-2.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
69. Press Conference of May 10, 1962, pp. 1-2.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
73. Press Conference of May 28, 1962, p. 1.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
80. Press Conference of June 11, 1962, pp. 1-2.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

82. Press Conference of June 29, 1962, p. 9.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
84. Press conference of July 10, 1962, p. 1.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
86. Press Conference of July 19, 1962, p. 10. Note: Halleck replaced Joe Martin as House Minority leader in 1959 and immediately installed a much more aggressive and disciplined style of leadership. Reluctant colleagues were prodded and pushed into supporting the party line. The average *Congressional Quarterly* party-unity score for House GOP members rose from the 66% registered during the Eighty-fifth Congress to 77% for the first year of the Eighty-sixth Congress. See: "Chairman Halleck is Major GOP Spokesman in Congress," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, July 15, 1960, p. 1269. Halleck also revitalized the Republican-southern Democrat coalition. Coalition victories reached 91% under his leadership in the House compared with the 65% scored in the Senate. "It soon became obvious that the dominant figure in the House was not Speaker Sam Rayburn but Minority Leader Halleck." See: "Halleck Rides High," *New Republic*, December 14, 1959, p. 7. After President Kennedy's election, Halleck announced he planned to do business as usual with Representative Howard W. Smith (D. Va.), Chairman of the House Rules Committee and informal leader of the southern Democrats. Smith could rely on the support of at least half of the ninety-nine House members from the South. Halleck knew that 43 of Smith's conservative Democrats added to his 176 Republicans would give him a majority of one. "The fate of the Kennedy legislative proposals," reported Halleck, "would, in the final analysis, be decided on the House floor." See: *The New York Times*, November 21, 1960.
87. Press Conference of September 7, 1962, p. 2.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
91. Press Conference of October 5, 1962, p. 2.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 3. Note: On October 22, 1962 President Kennedy delivered his "Cuban Missile Crisis" speech in which he demanded that Soviet installed missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads be removed from Cuba. Soviet leader Khrushchev, after considerable diplomatic dialogue, removed the missiles. Many felt that this was Kennedy's finest achievement. It probably enhanced his party's position in the 1962 congressional elections. Although neither party made any real gains in the Senate or House, allaying the usual off-year election losses by the party in power was considered to be a "symbolic" victory for Kennedy. See: Theodore Windt, *Presidential Rhetoric: 1961 to the Present*, 3rd ed., (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 7-40.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
95. Press Conference of February 28, 1963, p. 2.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
98. Press Conference of March 19, 1963, p. 3
99. Press Conference of March 28, 1963, p. 1
100. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
105. Press Conference of April 19, 1963, p. 3.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
108. Press Conference of June 13, 1963, p. 5.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

110. Ibid., p. 4.
111. Press Conference of August 14, 1963, p. 1.
112. Ibid., p. 1.
113. Ibid., p. 1.
114. Press Conference of September 18, 1963, p. 2.
115. Ibid., p. 4.
116. Press Conference of October 24, 1963, p. 2.
117. Ibid., p. 2.
118. Ibid., p. 2.
119. Press Conference of November 7, 1963, p. 1.
120. Ibid., p. 1.
121. Ibid., p. 1.
122. Press Conference of November 21, 1963, p. 1.
123. Ibid., p. 1.
124. Ibid., p. 1.
125. Ibid., p. 1.
126. Ibid., p. 2.
127. Ibid., p. 2.
128. Ibid., p. 3. Note: Halleck was credited by his friend and former President Lyndon B. Johnson with rounding up the GOP votes needed to pass the historic 1964 Civil Rights Act. See: "Former House Power Broker Halleck Dies," *The Indianapolis Star*, March 4, 1986, p. 1.
129. Robert E. Denton, Jr. and Gary C. Woodward, *Political Communication in America*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 281.
130. Steven A. Shull, "The President and Congress: Researching their Interaction in Domestic Policy Formation," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XII (Fall 1982), p. 536. Note: Shull observes that Congress frequently has different predispositions from the president. It has numerous opportunities to approve, refine or reject presidential initiatives. "Congress is the ultimate decider of most domestic policies." See pp. 537-538.
131. *The New York Times*, March 12, 1961.
132. Fred Smoller, "The Six O'Clock Presidency: Patterns of Network News Coverage of the President," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, XVI (Winter 1986), p. 33.
133. Neil Mac Neil, *Dirksen, Portrait of a Public Man*, (New York: World Publishing Co., 1970), p. 201. Note: Mac Neil reported that Dirksen realized that the public attention received through the "Ev and Charlie Show" could not be bought. He believed that using television and press coverage to publicize the Republican case against the Kennedy administration was politically invaluable. "In time, he sensed, the criticism would wane, and he would be the better off for the national notoriety he was now receiving." See p. 189.

Book Reviews

ROBERT FREDERICK BURT, *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 287 pp. \$14.95 papercover (ISBN 0-87049-493-7).

Professor Burk, as he tells us in his preface, is concerned with testing whether the Eisenhower restrained leadership in a domestic area was as beneficial as "revisionism" has claimed it to be in international affairs. He finds in the negative and further concludes that the Eisenhower policy in the civil rights area of pursuing "legal symbolism" has placed a burden on the civil rights struggle ever since. Burk would have preferred a more result oriented approach and certainly a more forthright rhetoric and public posture on the part of the President. He has not written a book that is fair to Eisenhower or his administration.

The author has set about his task with admirable thoroughness. He has pursued primary and secondary sources, published memoirs, and some interviews. He has clearly read much of the voluminous literature that appeared after the civil rights revolution got under way, but his volume does not reveal knowledge of the American legal and racial caste system from 1901 to 1946—in short most of what the Eisenhower Administration faced when it sought change.

The book covers in great detail both the role of the President and that of his principal administrators in every civil rights matter that arose during the eight years. And what a large number they were! Subjects covered include: completion of the Truman initiated desegregation of the armed forces; Eisenhower's personal involvement in desegregating Washington public facilities after the *Thompson* decision and in desegregating Washington public schools after *Brown I* in 1954; The President's Committee on Government Employment and The President's Committee on Government Contracts; the Administration's initiatives in the intractable field of housing discrimination; the roles of the leading actors such as Maxwell Rabb, E. Frederic Morrow, J. Lee Rankin, Philip Elman, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Richard Nixon; the President's Chief Justice, Earl Warren; *Brown v. Topeka* and Eisenhower enforcement; Little Rock, Orval Faubus and *Cooper v. Aaron*; the President's relations with Adam Clayton Powell and the established black civil rights leaders; appointments to the Federal bench in the South; the civil rights acts of 1957 and 1960; the beginnings of the new Federal Civil Rights Commission and the new Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. The last two have been targets of the Reagan counter revolution in civil rights.

I am sure that when the average American thinks of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the amount of involvement in the civil rights struggle indicated by the above listing does not come to mind. The list, one feels, fits better the image of Jack Kennedy or Lyndon Johnson. The fact is, however, that what these two Presidents did was in part made possible by the changes in Constitutional Law and the electoral process

wrought under Eisenhower. The President's style was to appear conservative, conciliatory, cautious and understanding; to isolate the extremes; and to firmly put the fundamentals in place.

It bears repeating that Professor Burk is no friend of Dwight D. Eisenhower and his bias is evident throughout the book. Even when some major achievement is fairly recounted, there follows a criticism that any realist would find hard to understand. At the bottom of page 262 there is a statement of the President's achievements followed by a resounding condemnation on page 263.

Some examples may make plain the author's approach. He dubs the Eisenhower Administration's efforts before the Courts as "Constitutional Moralism" (p. 129 ff.) and its actions in getting the civil rights laws of 1957 and 1960 passed as "symbolic" and the resulting litigation as "symbolic legalism" (Cf. pp. 107-8, 130, 201, 249-50 & 253). It is reasonable to say that *Brown v. Topeka* provided a watershed in the racial and social history of the United States, but Professor Burk feels that the main credit should go to the Truman Administration which raised the issue of the abandonment of "separate but equal" in its brief for the 1952 hearing (pp. 151 & 261). He claims further that the Eisenhower Administration was reluctant to pursue the Truman initiative (pp. 135-37, 141). Several things are wrong with this interpretation. In the first place, Philip Elman who wrote the brief for the 1952 hearing was retained by Justice to write the 1953 brief. In the Truman brief, he proposed disposing of the case on either the separate but equal basis or by declaring that such a doctrine does not satisfy the equal protection clause. His language indicated a preference for the latter. In the Eisenhower brief he proposed only that the separate but equal doctrine be abandoned. That brief gives an elaborate answer to the Court's searching questions on "separate but equal" (Howard K. Beale had been of some assistance), and takes a strong anti-segregationist position not possible before the re-hearing in 1953. As to the method and timing of enforcement, there was no difference between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

The author sees nothing exceptional in the Eisenhower follow-up of the '54 decision although he recounts it fairly. It was the President's Chief Justice who produced the 9-0 decision. (Who save the author is now fooled by Ike's disingenuous disappointment in Warren?) Such a decision made it clear that there was little hope of modifying the Court's stand. Rogers and Brownell saw that the Federal bench in the South had good and fair appointees. The President, who the author insists impaired civil rights enforcement because of his belief in states' rights, became the first Chief Executive since reconstruction to send Federal troops into a southern state. By such action he put the issue of nullification behind us. In spite of the Southern Manifesto, the Courts would be able to handle interposition.

Activity in the field of fair employment, pursued so vigorously by FDR's FEPC, had come to a halt by the time of the Eisenhower Administration. Although legislation establishing a permanent FEPC passed the House of Representatives, President Truman refused to lift his hand against the Senate filibuster. The Russell amendment precluded the continuation of the wartime FEPC; Mr. Truman improvised with a Fair Employment Board which was in fact a coordinating committee for the work

of the departmental contract officers. Its only achievement was to make a study of the fair employment clauses in Federal contracts. FDR's FEPC had been so vigorous and when backed by the White House staff so effective that it had antagonized much of Congress. The Truman White House was so apprehensive of southern congressional reaction that it would not even appoint anyone who had worked for Roosevelt's FEPC, a policy that limited its expertise no end. After such a political history, the Eisenhower President's Committee on Government Contracts with Mr. Nixon in the chair was for that time a new departure. Most of the civil rights organizations expressed their satisfaction and support, but not Professor Burk who notes the ravages of Black unemployment in the recession of 1961 (see pages 89, 106-8). Fair employment and full employment are two different things and require different programs. The author's reading in FEPC literature leaves much to be desired (see pages 90-92).

Professor Burk spends many pages (77-87) on the published complaints of E. Frederick Morrow, the Black lawyer who served in the White House and, regardless of titles, advised on civil rights and maintained contact with civil rights leaders and organizations. Morrow's complaints helped maintain his bonafides with his civil rights clientele. He remained in the White House until the end of the Administration, maintained friendly relations with the President after his public term of office and had a distinguished career thereafter. The fact is that Eisenhower was the first President to have a Black man in the White House.

The author repeatedly claims that the Eisenhower principles with regard to Federal action became the accepted code for conservatives and set the framework for limited progress (see pages 262-3 & 266). It is not tenable to hold that the President who struck so many fundamental blows in the area of civil rights crippled subsequent action because of the outset of the civil rights process; he put his emphasis on the basic legal foundation: getting rid of the doctrine of separate but equal, taking Federal action against State nullification and interposition, and securing the right to vote. The fault lies not in what Eisenhower did, but in subsequent domestic politics and the limitations on budget caused by war. After the beginning of the Vietnamese war, there was a contraction of funds "to secure these rights," and shortly the emergence of a host of civil rights groups overwhelmed the political process for Black civil rights.

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RICHARD G. HUTCHESON, JR., *God in The White House* (New York: MacMillan, 1988), 267 pp. \$18.95 (ISBN 0-02-557760-3).

The premise of *God in The White House* is that religion and presidential politics are mixing more today than at any other time in the nation's history. Author Richard Hutcheson's efforts are directed not so much in documenting this assumed change

as they are in analyzing the forces responsible for it. His thesis is that the Vietnam and Watergate crises brought about a collapse of consensus on basic values creating a moral vacuum in public life deeply disturbing to Americans of all religious faiths. He argues that religion and morality are intractably connected in American thought, and that voters concerned with the collapse of a moral consensus were behaving quite rationally when they examined closely the personal character and religious faith of those who would lead the country. He believes questions regarding the type of personal and policy leadership a candidate would provide on moral issues are legitimate ones and will continue to be raised in national elections as long as the general perception continues that society's basic values are in disarray.

The focus of *God in The White House* is the presidencies of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, presidencies which the author sees as being strikingly more religious than those of earlier generations. According to Hutcheson, there was a general assumption until the sixties—"a gentlemen's agreement—that the presidency would be held by a conventional Protestant Christian, with no visible moral blemishes, practicing his religion . . . with gentlemanly moderation and enunciating the common religious verities on which all were in general agreement" (p. 33). As long as a candidate appeared to be able to meet these expectations, little more was asked of him. But after Watergate and the moral collapse that it symbolized, more did come to be demanded. Hutcheson argues that it was concern over reestablishing a religiously-rooted moral basis of public life which was a major factor in the selection of Ford, Carter, and Reagan.

It is not altogether clear on what basis Hutcheson concludes that the importance of presidential religion in recent years has been unprecedented. This is not a historical work and few details are given about presidential religion prior to the 1970s. The author does acknowledge a significant religious component to many earlier presidencies and singles out Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln and Wilson as particularly significant "Priests of the National Religion." But the overall pattern from Washington to Kennedy, he argues, was a consistent one of presidents keeping their own personal religious convictions out of the public spotlight.

In these earlier eras, the only religion presidents publicly proclaimed was the highly generalized public faith which acknowledged the existence of a Supreme Being and declared the nation's political tradition as one which had been inspired by Him, or at least one which had developed in accordance with a divine plan. Since religious diversity was proclaimed as a part of this divine plan, all religions were honored equally with presidents taking special care to avoid any action which might suggest that one faith was in any way better than another. This nondiscriminatory approach to religion was best captured in Eisenhower's oft-quoted remark that "America makes no sense without a deeply held faith in God—and I don't care what it is." Hutcheson defends this often ridiculed remark as reflecting an effort to bring recognition to the fact that the old Protestant hegemony had become outmoded and that the religious foundations of American culture now had to be viewed in more inclusive terms.

Civil religion is the term most often used to refer to the kind of religion in general which Eisenhower saw as undergirding American culture and politics. The status of

civil religion vis-à-vis the more traditional denominational faiths has never been clear, and has been the subject of considerable debate. In this analysis, Hutcheson relies heavily on Martin Marty's distinction between an ordering faith and a saving faith—faiths which serve two very different kinds of functions. The saving faith provided by denominational religions seeks to save souls and give people a sense of meaning and wholeness, while an ordering faith grows out of a people's common experiences and traditions and their agreement over the rules and basic moral code by which civil society is to operate. This distinction is a useful one to make when analyzing the president's religious role though Hutcheson blurs the distinction between the two concepts by suggesting the one depends upon the other. He describes civil religion as the "essential bridge between the various church religions of a multifaith society and the requirements of public order in a spiritually united nation" (p. 31). A president, he contends, can "authentically lead and articulate the ordering function of a civil religion . . . only from a firm base of a personal faith commitment" (p. 237).

In analyzing the cultural revolution which took place in the 1960s and 1970s, Hutcheson relies heavily on the analysis of Richard Neuhaus in *The Naked Public Square*. Like Neuhaus, he contends that the totally secular society pushed by the "new class" elites of government, academia, and the media simply cannot not work. But while arguing persuasively that America remains "insistently religious in its outlook," Hutcheson has only the most generalized prescription for the building of a common ordering faith from the pluralism of contemporary American society. In the closing chapter, presidents are urged to continue to sound "the unifying themes of the civil religion," stressing that such unity is not only compatible with, but is called for by, the denominational faiths of the republic" (p. 240).

Hutcheson's research convinced him that Ford, Carter and Reagan were all sincere Christians with a strong evangelical faith but that this faith manifested itself in very different ways. Ford is described as a devout Episcopalian with strong convictions against the mixing of religion and politics. Carter is portrayed as being sensitive to the pluralism of the Democratic Party in his appointments and policy recommendations, while at the same time continuing the witnessing and leadership activities which his church emphasized as being every Southern Baptist's responsibility. Reagan is described as a "self-taught Christian" who has a deeply held faith in God without much theological specificity" (p. 171), and who identified very closely with his evangelical constituency and its policy goals.

Jimmy Carter gets the greatest attention, in part because he was the one who broke the "gentleman's agreement" that a president should keep the specifics of his own personal faith well hidden. Hutcheson suggests that Carter's presidential leadership was probably weakened by his deep religious faith. "The sense of national malaise on the part of one who sees human sin as inevitable, and humility as the appropriate response, is theologically accurate. But it is politically treacherous, and perhaps even dangerous. Similarly, the ethical awareness which weighed heavily (and) carefully the moral ambiguities of policy decisions did not present what Americans usually perceive as strong and decisive leadership" (p. 234). Hutcheson believes that the major religious flaw in the Reagan presidency was the opposite of Carter's: "too little rather than

too much ethical discrimination; not enough awareness of moral ambiguities" (p. 234). But while Carter and Reagan had very different understandings of the demands of their faith, both made, according to Hutcheson, a serious effort "to fill the naked square with a religiously basic public philosophy" (p. 178).

Hutcheson stands clearly as an accommodationist rather than a strict separationist in his views on church-state relations. He believes that an institutional separation of church and state is desirable in a multifaith society, but that there must be a cultural integration of religion and society to produce a workable consensus undergirding "public virtue." While denying that either Carter or Reagan violated the principle of church-state separation, he acknowledges that each represented a different type of threat to this principle. With Carter, the danger came from his conspicuous denominational activities which adversely affected his ability to carry out his symbolic unifying role. In contrast, Reagan showed how a president could endanger his symbolic unifying role through too close an identification with a particular religious movement's political agenda.

God in The White House breaks no new theoretical ground but does provide an informative and well-written commentary on the religious faiths of Ford, Carter and Reagan, and how each president integrated private beliefs and public duties. The book's most valuable contributions are the insights of White House insiders into the ways in which a President's personal religious beliefs can effect their performance in office. Among those with whom Hutcheson conducted personal interviews were Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Patrick Buchanan, Jody Powell, Donald Hodel, Carl Anderson, Rev. John Huffman, Robert Maddox, James Wall, and the Rev. Donn Moomaw.

The author is Senior Fellow of the Center on Religion and Society, a Washington-based institute established in 1981 to focus attention on the positive relationship between democratic values and Judeo-Christian religion. He also served many years as a chaplain in the U.S. Navy before retiring as an admiral.

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FRED I. GREENSTEIN, ed., *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 430 pp. \$29.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-674-51854-3).

This marvelous volume gives a leadership portrait of each president who served beginning with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and ending with Ronald Wilson Reagan. Sophisticated readers can look forward to a scholarly rendering of how political conditions, historic events, and presidential personality interacted to produce unique manifestations of executive leadership. For the undergraduate (whose recollections of the presidency are limited to Carter and Reagan) each chapter vividly recalls the cast of political characters who made the key policy decisions during the modern era. This edition

would be a perfect supplement to any course on the American presidency, and I would hope that Harvard University Press will consider doing a paperback for classroom use.

In his chapter on "The First Modern President," William E. Leuchtenburg portrays Franklin D. Roosevelt as "a real *artist* in government." He gives a thorough accounting of why historians rank FDR second only to Lincoln among America's greatest presidents. Students of the presidency would readily agree that Roosevelt was the ultimate Machiavellian, but can we say that FDR's leadership anticipated the behavior of his successors? In many ways Roosevelt ought to be considered a "transitional" figure and so unique as to provide relatively few lessons for his contemporaries about how presidents exert leadership. The essay implicitly reminds us that the Roosevelt Revolution was accomplished by an heroic figure whose personalized style of governance cannot be duplicated today by presidents faced with government on a grand scale, an institutionalized presidency which barely existed during his day, and heightened public expectations about presidential leadership.

Harry S. Truman is characterized by Alonzo L. Hamby as a man driven by "Insecurity and Responsibility." By Roosevelt standards Truman was not an effective political leader; his domestic agenda failed given Republican congressional opposition and his popularity plummeted as the Korean War stalemated. But nonetheless Truman's imprint on the nation and his office was substantial: "The results—the institutionalization of the New Deal at home and a lasting recognition of the country's interests abroad; the preservation of a Democratic party built around the Roosevelt coalition; and a powerful presidency resting on something more than the personal resources of its holder—were all the work of a strong chief executive who somehow managed to look weak" (p. 75).

Truman remains an enigma, and many president watchers have yet to draw firm understandings about whether he reached for greatness or was encumbered by mediocrity. Hamby spends extraordinary time giving us a careful and sensitive biography of the "Man from Independence," and he doubts the "active-positive" categorization of Truman by James David Barber. His own biographical research leads Hamby to "to conclude that the call is even closer [to being an "active-negative"] than Barber believes. "Truman spent most of his life struggling to achieve a positive self-image. He was only intermittently successful, and even during his presidency he had a way of emitting negative apprehensions about himself that consistently undermined his claims to authority." In short, Truman was effective despite himself; his success rested "on a dogged determination to shoulder the burdens of responsibility and to achieve goals that he often felt were beyond his personal capabilities" (p. 44).

No such self-doubts haunted Dwight D. Eisenhower, the subject of Fred I. Greenstein's chapter on "Leadership Theorist in the White House." This essay is drawn from his seminal publication on Ike's peculiar brand of leadership. Greenstein has convinced me (with the help of the Bay of Pigs, Watergate, and other policy debacles which have occurred since) that modern presidents ought to follow his lead when developing an administrative strategy. By the (narrow) criteria of executive management, the Eisenhower model is most applicable to the modern presidency and his brand of Modern Republicanism was generally benign.

Greenstein elaborates on how Ike shaped his presidency according to the tenets of planning, organization, teamwork, delegation, and most importantly a “hidden-hand” style of leadership. Such a leader maintains the public image of being above partisan politics when, in fact, he is an astute political operative within the Washington community. But how can anyone other than an ex-Supreme Allied Commander utilize this style? And how are activists in the White House supposed to “go public” and rally the nation behind significant (and controversial) domestic or foreign policy objectives without, in fact, being political or partisan? In this context, the most effective political leaders of the modern era have been Roosevelt, Johnson, and Reagan, and they acted in ways opposite to the *modus operandi* of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The mystique of John F. Kennedy is captured by Carl M. Brauer’s essay on “The Endurance of Inspirational Leadership.” The lofty place of JFK in the histories of Schlesinger and Sorensen has been eroded by revisionist scholars who question the efficacy of his operating style and policy agenda. This essay gives an overview of politics and policies during Kennedy’s One Thousand Days, though most archival documentation is still not available to researchers. Perhaps no ordinary standards of leadership will ever be applied to a martyred president who is beloved in the public mind. Indeed this fact may be Kennedy’s greatest legacy, as Brauer explains: “His enduring popularity, despite best-selling exposes, critical biographies, unflattering docudramas, and defamatory publicity, suggests that there was more to Kennedy’s presidency than either orthodox or revisionist historians currently perceive” (p. 133).

In contrast, Larry Berman views Lyndon B. Johnson as a tragic figure in the chapter “Paths Chosen and Opportunities Lost.” “Thus, on July 28, 1965, when he decided to commit American ground forces to the war in South Vietnam, he launched a process of slow political suicide” (p. 135). Although President Johnson was chosen by one of America’s greatest electoral landslides and proceeded to enact an “unparalleled legislative record” during the 89th Congress, these events are treated in a couple sentences. The mainstay of Berman’s analysis is how the Johnson personality and governing style led to our deepening involvement in Vietnam, the acid test of political leadership which LBJ failed: “Notwithstanding all Johnson’s domestic legislative skills and successes, the Vietnam war exposed his weakness as a leader; by 1967 it had eroded most of his political credibility. Inevitably that conflict must be the ultimate standard by which LBJ’s presidency is measured” (p. 137). On March 31, 1968 President Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection; the nation turned rightward and elected Richard Nixon; and the Great Society was now in shreds. This political indictment of LBJ, though harsh, is undoubtedly accurate.

The analysis which Joan Hoff-Wilson brings to “The Corporate Presidency” may portend a new assessment of Richard M. Nixon. One cannot judge the Nixon record fairly, she argues, without considering the critical juncture when he was elected. It was a period analogous to the 1840s–1890s, and 1920s when the national consensus was undermined. Vietnam shattered the Cold War bi-partisanship in foreign affairs and disillusionment with the Great Society eroded public support for positive govern-

ment. But there is one major exception. Unlike the presidents who governed during those earlier transitional periods, Richard Nixon had a "proclivity for risk taking" which few people recognized until after he resigned.

The critics are wrong to blame Watergate on a maladjusted personality, says Hoff-Wilson, who forcefully argues the counter-thesis that "historical accident accounts in part for many of Nixon's unilateral administrative actions during his first term and for the events leading to his disgrace and resignation during his second." (p. 165) After reviewing his plans for comprehensive government reorganization and New Federalism, foreign policy, and a far-reaching domestic agenda, Hoff-Wilson finds much that is praiseworthy. And she concludes: "What Nixon lacked in charisma and honesty, he may in the long run make up for with his phoenixlike ability to survive disaster. . . . It is perhaps an ironic commentary on the state of the modern presidency that Richard Nixon's management style and substantive foreign and domestic achievements look better and better when compared with those of his immediate successors in the Oval Office" (p. 198).

"A Healing Presidency" is the thesis which Roger B. Porter uses to describe Gerald R. Ford, but he conveys the more powerful image of a decent man who organized a competent administration. Porter first assesses the "symbolic" actions taken by Ford to ease the transition from a president driven from office in disgrace to one who never obtained an electoral mandate. He then discusses the managerial style which President Ford adopted and specifically focuses on the national security, domestic, and economic policymaking apparatus. Ford was no Lincoln, but he did the right things for the right reasons: "During his relatively short tenure in office, Ford demonstrated that healing the nation's wounds from Vietnam and Watergate took priority over his own political fortunes. He left to future presidents a legacy of remarkable skill not only in building morale within the executive branch but also in adopting decision-making approaches . . . that skillfully took into account the strengths of the team he had assembled and the policy realities he had to address" (p. 227).

Erwin C. Hargrove previews his forthcoming book "The Politics of Public Goods" in his essay on Jimmy Carter. He begins by analyzing the Carter personality and belief system, moves on to evaluate domestic and foreign policymaking, and finally assesses Carter's political skills in policy development, congressional leadership, and as public leader and chief diplomat. In sum, Carter's "greatest deficiency as president and as a political leader was his inability to establish a bond with the public. It is not enough to make intelligent decisions. The public wants a president who is in command of his office and of events, or who at least appears to be in command. Carter seemed oblivious to such appearances" (p. 258).

This observation, more than an apt comparison with Mr. Reagan, reads like an indictment of democratic politics. We are asked to respect a Jimmy Carter who wanted comprehensive solutions to problems like welfare or a permanent Middle East peace (the engineer who believes in the one right solution to a technical problem!), which is why he eschewed normal political behavior and resisted making policy concessions with congressional democrats. "He attempted to do too much too soon in both domestic

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and foreign policy. As a result, he suffered more failures than was necessary. It is doubtful that he could have achieved more major successes had he been a better political strategist" (p. 258). I find the notion that President Carter should be judged on his own terms troubling. To me it begs the question of whether this argument is meant to be a revisionist history or simply a post hoc rationalization.

The essence of Ronald Reagan is defined as "The Primacy of Rhetoric" in the final essay by William K. Muir, Jr, clearly the most provocative chapter in the book. Many observers would agree that the ability of Ronald Reagan to translate a folksy conservatism into public policy underlay the strength of his political leadership. But few commentators ever accused The Great Communicator and The Teflon President of deep thinking. To convince us that Reagan engaged in serious political dialogue is Muir's task: "The key to the Reagan administration is its rhetorical character. It was organized to achieve a moral revolution—moral in the sense of affecting the character-shaping ideas of the American people, a revolution in the sense of returning the nation to its moral starting point" (p. 262).

This essay is not about public relations tactics, image building, media manipulators, or approval ratings. It is a philosophical tract which explains why the Reagan Administration answered three enduring questions—"how to relate to others, what affects the course of human events, and what constitutes a significant life"—with the words (1) partnership, (2) human imperfection, and (3) spiritual dignity. These concepts "justified the Reagan domestic and foreign programs, synchronized the personnel of the administration, and inspired the nation. In combination, they constituted the moral revolution of the Reagan years" (p. 266). All this may be true, and clearly the Reaganites hoped to engineer a political realignment in the minds and hearts of Americans, but it remains for somebody else to determine whether Reagan's thinking had any permanent impact on public opinion towards big government.

The cumulative wisdom of those sketches is summarized by Fred I. Greenstein in his concluding essay, "In Search of A Modern Presidency." The empiricists among us may be frustrated since no overarching theoretical design guides this collection of readings. Greenstein offers no common definition of presidential leadership, the resources of political power, or a prescription for right conduct though he noted that modern presidents differ from their traditional counterparts in four key ways (power to initiate decisions, role as chief agenda-setter, use of staff and advisers, and public visibility). The conclusion traces the evolution of the institutionalized presidency over these fifty years, the contribution of each incumbent to that development, and the resulting normative debate (triggered by Vietnam and Watergate) about the desirability of enhanced presidential power. I heartily recommend to all students this comprehensive overview of the intellectual currents which underlie the growth of the modern president.

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F. G. BAILEY, *Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 187+ pp. \$27.50 hardcover (ISBN 0-8014-2154-3). \$8.95 paperback (ISBN 0-8014-9487-7).

The title says it. But it doesn't say it all. Leadership, the headline trumpets, is part villainy. And indeed Bailey's book is nothing if not full of tales of how individuals, in order to get others to go along, must perforce indulge in trickery. But if the tales are the medium, the message is far more complicated than the allusion to the dark side of leadership would suggest. For Bailey's relatively slim volume is in fact a creative and richly textured investigation of the leadership process whole.

At the outset we are led to believe—is this Bailey's humbuggery?—that his interest in leadership is strictly functional. Indeed Bailey writes that his guiding question is not “What is a *virtuous* leader?” but rather “What is *considered* to be an *effective* leader?” But the man misleads for it is the matter of morality that drives him, and that triggers the intellectual odyssey that constitutes the book. What is on one level then a rather straightforward analysis of what happens when leadership takes place, is on another distinguished by the implicit comparison between what is and what ought to be.

That Bailey's training is as an anthropologist is to our advantage. His concern is with the human condition and thereby with verities about leadership that can be said with some confidence to transcend time and place. At the same time it is manifestly the *differences* among peoples that provide grist for the anthropologist's mill. Thus much of the color and wit of Bailey's presentation is derived from his story-telling, from anecdotes and impressions derived from fieldwork in India, Italy and the exotic “world of educational bureaucracies.” So we have a fortuitous mix here: one in which specifics are woven into a tapestry on leadership in general.

At a glance *Humbuggery and Manipulation* resembles other books on leadership. It has chapters on followers, on values and beliefs, on organizations and institutions, and on trust, as well as on some less familiar conceptions such as “disruptive” leadership and political “magic.” But the approach Bailey takes to even the proverbial topics is novel. By and large his work is divorced from the work on leadership that is increasingly visible in disciplines such as political science, psychology and organizational administration. Consider for example Bailey's three styles of leadership: numinous, familial, and disruptive. The numinous leader, who portrays “superhuman” qualities, is similar in important ways to Weber's charismatic leader; but the point is not made. By the same token the disrupter, the leader who is intent on making “the curve of life jagged and challenging,” is new to us as an archetype—albeit scarcely foreign to our experience of how the world really works.

Bailey's most important substantive contribution is in the distinction between leading the masses and leading the select few who comprise the entourage. To be sure, he is not the first student of leadership to point out that what works for one group may, or may not, work for the other. But because Bailey argues that the chicanery that undergirds the relationship between leader and the people must also be in-

voked with immediate staff, he is forced to delineate how exactly that notion applies. The message in any case is clear. Devotion does and has existed between leaders and some members of their inner circles—but only relatively rarely. “The greater part of a leader’s interactions with the members of his entourage must be in the instrumental mode—manipulation, intimidation, and bribery” (p. 146).

This instruction brings me to a final point. While Bailey claims to be merely an observer, and while he denies that teaching leadership is possible, in fact he is participating in the care and feeding of those who would turn us into followers. Let me put it this way: Machiavelli has a fellow traveler. In addition to the statement quoted just above, consider just two more: “It is in the interest of a leader, while himself requiring to be aware of the wide plurality of values, to restrict this awareness in the mass of his followers and so to define the situation for them that they see only those alternatives that are to his strategic advantage” (p. 37). And, “Leaders endeavor to create in the mass of their followers that nonspecific personal and direct form of trust which is akin to love and which prevents a close and impartial scrutiny and accounting of their performance, while not being seen openly to do so” (p. 82). In other words, it is impossible to read Bailey’s analysis of leadership without gleaning from it a tutorial on leadership.

This is not an easy book to read. While written with elegance and style, it is also dense and, as indicated earlier, divorced from the familiar. But for anyone with any interest at all in leadership, it is on the short list of books actually to own. How many authors do you know who start with a joke and end with a quote by Cavour?

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F. G. BAILEY, *Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 187+ pp. \$27.50 hardcover (ISBN 0-8014-2154-3). \$8.95 papercover (ISBN 0-8014-9487-7).

“Leaders are not the virtuous people they claim to be; they put politics before statesmanship; they distort facts and oversimplify issues; they promise what no one could deliver; and they are liars” (p. 174). With these words, F. G. Bailey approaches the end of an excursion into leadership that many, more charitably inclined students of the subject are likely to find distasteful at best. In so characterizing leaders, however, Bailey is not rendering a moral judgment. Rather, he is attempting to advance the thesis that “if they are to be effective, [leaders] have no choice in the matter” (p. 174). The qualities attributed to leaders, in Bailey’s judgment, are a matter of logical necessity. That is, if leaders are to lead, they must possess these qualities. How well Bailey succeeds in supporting his thesis is open to dispute, but whether or not

readers agree that the author has adequately argued his case, *Humbuggery and Manipulation: The Art of Leadership* is a thought-provoking and well-written treatise that challenges a great deal of conventional wisdom and previous scholarly discussion. On those grounds alone, the book is worthy of attention.

"Leadership," according to Bailey, "is the art of controlling followers" (p. 5). Whatever their motivation, what leaders seek to accomplish requires the assistance and support of others. In Bailey's scheme, "others" represent followers and members of a leader's entourage. To be successful in eliciting the necessary level of cooperation, one must somehow stand apart from others, as obeisance is not accorded simply on the basis of one's formal position in a group, organization, or other social structure. To exercise control, a leader must be seen as capable of extraordinary, or at least, unusual, achievement that works to the betterment of followers. The reality of such capability is beside the point. It is the illusion that counts. The means by which leaders create the desired impression are persuasion (rhetoric) and manipulation.

In developing his position, Bailey examines the characteristic styles leaders have historically exhibited (numinous, familial, and disruptive) in addition to the dispositions of followers, which he describes as apathetic, regimented, mature, and anarchic (autarkic). These dispositions fall at different points along a continuum roughly corresponding to susceptibility to influence based on how individuals see themselves in relation to leaders and particular sets of circumstances. Dispositions are plastic, however, and leaders adopt the styles that best allow them to move followers to states that are conducive to achieving desired ends. The possibilities are constrained by values and beliefs as well as organizational and institutional characteristics, but skillful leaders see constraints, not only as obstacles to surmount, but as opportunities to exploit.

The three general strategies of control on which Bailey focuses are the creation of trust, disruption, and the maintenance of uncertainty. Trust is created by means of incentives that appeal to fundamental motives of followers. Disruption serves to reinforce belief in a leader's commitment to the betterment of followers—both committed and prospective. In a peculiar, almost ironic, way effective leaders are seen as anti-heroes locked in continuous struggle with forces that, if left unchecked, will work to the detriment of followers, if not lead to their destruction.

Bailey's discussion of uncertainty deals more with a leader's relationship to the members of his or her entourage, that is, those individuals who enact directives, provide information about what is transpiring in the organization or outside, perform tasks essential to the achievement of the leader's goals, and maintain followers' illusions. Members of an entourage, because they have greater insights into a leader's weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and actual motives, can be dangerous. As a safeguard against the misuse of such knowledge, leaders deliberately keep their entourages in a state of uncertainty. To succeed, however, they need a few genuinely sympathetic members with whom they can be completely open and whose personal devotion is sufficient to excuse deficiencies, abuses, and the like, however significant they may be.

From Bailey's perspective, the behavior of leaders, as he has described it, is perfectly rational even if the content of their messages is not. Those seen as incapable

of working the sort of magic often attributed to, and expected of, leaders will not succeed. A failure to maintain the illusions created in the process of numenification in which leaders and their entourages are continually engaged can destroy the potential for influence and responding effectively to the unexpected situations leaders frequently confront. To lack confidence among followers that a leader possesses the capacity to control events is to preclude the possibility for decisive action. Whether a leader's goals are desirable is a matter of value and, in Bailey's opinion, unrelated to the rationality of his or her behavior. Rationality, he argues, has to do with the appropriateness of the means one chooses to achieve given ends, not the ends themselves.

Despite the fact that Bailey assembles an impressive array of illustrations from his own research on organizations and cultures, the presidency (particularly, F.D.R.'s), and world history, his argument suffers from a failure to adduce evidence of covariation. In other words, he cites no instances in which leaders not exhibiting the characteristics he imputes have proved ineffective. His position would appear to be that there are no such cases because leaders, by definition, are manipulative people and, of necessity, must be. But this leaves one in a logically untenable position. There can be no contradictory evidence. Bailey admits that no number of illustrations can prove his thesis and instead prefers to defend it as the necessary conclusion one is obliged to draw from an understanding of the conditions under which followers become susceptible to influence.

For the empirically minded, Bailey's assumptions are amendable to investigation, even though he would appear to believe the contrary. Inquiry along lines that enable one to determine whether non-manipulative individuals can be effective, admittedly, would be difficult to conduct. Without such effort, however, Bailey has only an interesting thesis that can provoke discussion, but otherwise does little to advance our understanding of either leaders or the process of leadership.

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MARK GARRISON and ABBOTT GLEASON, eds., *Shared Destiny: Fifty Years of Soviet-American Relations* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 167+ pp. \$16.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-8070-0200-3).

Soviet-American relations have experienced some highly significant changes in the recent past. But the value of this volume remains undiminished by recent events: it is a retrospective of the relations between the superpowers from 1933 to 1983. The nucleus of this fine book is four lectures delivered at Brown University by some of America's leading authorities on this supremely important topic, with additional articles provided by equally eminent specialists. The happy result is one of those rare

books that all educated people should read and ponder. It would be especially appropriate, moreover, for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses. But it would be a shame if such concise and insightful essays remained unknown outside the halls of academia.

The collection opens with Abbott Gleason's survey of the sources of Russian-American antagonism in the Imperial era. From the American view the Russians were guilty of anti-Semitism and the suppression of political freedom. The Russians responded that Americans were cynically pandering to the Jewish vote and were themselves racist. Nonetheless Russians also expressed a grudging admiration of America's "rationalism and sense of building a new world." There does not seem to have been any reciprocal American admiration for things Russian. In any case, Gleason rightly concludes that Russo-American relations were then of little importance to either nation.

George Kennan, arguably America's most knowledgeable specialist on the Soviet Union, next offers "A Participant's View." Kennan was posted in 1932 to Riga where he labored daily through the monotonous and fiercely anti-Western Soviet press. A revelation occurred for Kennan, however, in 1933 when he learned of a conversation between the new United States ambassador, William C. Bullitt and Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maksim M. Litvinov. At a lonely railway station in Poland, Litvinov remarked that he had never aspired to high political office: he had always wanted to be a librarian. This remark revealed to Kennan that the Soviet Communists were, after all, "flesh-and-blood people," who are "no more guilty than are we of the circumstances into which we all were born. . ." This is a lesson all Americans need to learn. The USSR does not consist of a gray mass of automatons marching blindly toward the communist millenium. Of course Americans often should disagree with Soviet policy, but they should nonetheless bear in mind that the Russians are people too.

Kennan also discusses his postwar efforts to convince America's leadership of the need for economic reconstruction as the primary means to contain communism. He feels that American politicians misunderstood his proposals and rushed headlong into a military buildup that he opposed. It is true that Kennan did put great emphasis on economic strength, but his famous "X" article of 1947 can also be interpreted as a call for military preparedness before the Soviet threat. Like all his writings, this short piece is elegant and sometimes wry, but it has a powerful message that is particularly relevant to anyone considering government service in Soviet affairs.

John Lewis Gaddis, a leading authority on the Cold War, offers an insightful overview of the Great Power relationship within a clearly defined analytical framework. Gaddis packs a lot into twenty pages and here it is possible only to touch upon his major points. Of great importance is the author's thesis that Soviet expansionism has usually flowed from Moscow's great insecurity and lack of self-assurance. The leadership came to power at a time of domestic chaos and foreign invasion. To this inauspicious beginning, the Soviets brought their rigid ideology that reinforced already existing fears and uncertainties. If this paradigm is accepted, it follows that it is foolhardy to expect unilateral Soviet restraint. And Gaddis offers an impressive list of Soviet initiatives in heating up the Cold War, from the absorption of eastern Europe to the destruction of KAL flight 007.

The USSR, however, is unlike Nazi Germany. When faced with the prospect of "countervailing power" the Soviets have shown restraint. In this instance, Gaddis points to Finland's maintenance of its independence (the Finns would fight for it and Moscow knew it) and to the recent non-intervention in Poland. Certainly the Russians seek to spread their influence and power, but that is the way "traditional practitioners of power politics" have always behaved.

So how should the United States react? First of all, with firmness: the historical record shows that excessive restraint and effusive professions of friendship only tempt Moscow to probe for further advantage. But Washington should also be flexible. When firmness creates opportunities for agreement, America should be willing to reciprocate in a spirit of mutual interest and mutual verifiability. But the United States can never even reach the point of negotiation if American policy lacks consistency. Gaddis rightly points out that Moscow is justified in its criticism that it is almost impossible to know who makes foreign policy in this country. Is it the President or Congress? The State Department or dock workers who refuse to unload Soviet ships? This is a serious problem and a solution is unlikely as long as politicians view the Soviet-American relationship as a means to boost their domestic popularity. Finally, Gaddis advocates a lowering of voices and a greater measure of civility. The United States can set an example by ignoring the transparently preposterous accusations against the United States that appear (although lately with decreasing frequency) in the Soviet press. As an exchange student at Moscow State University, I quickly learned that the majority of Soviet citizens either ignore the Kremlin's propaganda or marvel at its disingenuousness. So there is no good reason for Washington to raise a fuss over it.

Adam Ulam seeks to instruct the reader on "The High Cost of Illusions." Unlike the other articles, his focus is relatively narrow. Indeed, the bulk of his essay treats only the period from November 1958 to October 1962, when Soviet-American relations witnessed the "second Berlin crisis" and the even more dangerous 1962 confrontation over Cuba. In the Berlin episode, Ulam asserts that Khrushchev provoked the crisis because of anger at the West's rejection of the Rapacki Plan to create a nuclear-free central Europe, i.e., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanys. Khrushchev's main concern was a nuclear-free Germany (especially The Federal Republic) and he thought that his ultimatum of November 1958 could lead to a Soviet-American agreement on that issue. But Washington misread the situation as a dispute over the status of Berlin. What makes the episode ironic (if not outright bizarre) is that while Khrushchev tried to bully the United States over Germany, he tried to woo America into an agreement for a nuclear-free Pacific. This move was based on Moscow's fears of a resurgent and increasingly independent-minded China, fears that Khrushchev thought Washington shared.

Eisenhower failed to grasp the subtlety (or incoherence) of Moscow's policy and rejected a Pacific agreement. Khrushchev, therefore, placed Soviet missiles in Cuba as a bargaining chip for both a Berlin and a Pacific treaty. Again, Ulam asserts that the White House failed to understand Khrushchev's diplomacy, with near catastrophic consequences.

No one would deny that Adam Ulam is extraordinarily well-informed on Soviet foreign policy. And his interpretation of the events may well be correct. But one problem is an almost total lack of documentation for his argument. For example, on page 54, Ulam tells the reader what Khrushchev intended to say in a November 1964 United Nations speech but offers the reader no idea how he learned the Soviet leader's intentions. Nonetheless, Ulam's essay is a powerful reminder of the need to view specific Soviet actions in a global perspective, always searching for possible links between actions in widely separated areas.

Alexander Dallin returns to a more wide-ranging format in a discussion of "Some Lessons of the Past." And he finds many and none are very flattering for former American policy makers. For example, in 1918, Wilson was sufficiently alarmed over the appearance of the Bolshevik regime to sanction armed intervention even though Russia was unquestionably in a state of utter chaos. Far from a threat to anyone, the Soviet regime was scarcely able to defend itself. And in 1979 Washington erroneously saw the Afghanistan invasion as a Soviet thrust to the Persian Gulf.

On the other hand, one could argue that 1918 was the best time to destroy Bolshevism precisely because it was then so weak. And weak or not, few would deny that from the beginning the Bolsheviks had little but contempt and malice for the West. Concerning Afghanistan, perhaps the wisest course was to assume the worst, especially because Brezhnev had assured President Carter that the USSR had no plans for military intervention there.

Dallin also argues for an end to the perception of Soviet conduct as "ideology in power" with a "master plan" for "world conquest for communism." He feels that ideology is not applicable to "ICBMs, computers, outer space, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and garbage collection . . ." And if there is a "master plan" beyond the promotion of what is perceived to be Soviet national interests, it is hard to detect such a scheme in the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy since 1917. Finally, Dallin feels that the Sino-Soviet split should dispel the notion of a coordinated drive for communist world conquest.

A leading authority on Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy, Robert Dallek, discusses "How We See the Soviets." Again the picture is one of "distortions and illusions," which Dallek attributes more to American domestic affairs than to Soviet deception. Thus, the regime that Roosevelt recognized in 1933 was not all that different from the one American presidents refused to deal with from 1917 to 1933. Indeed, one could add that if anything the Soviet government in 1933 was worse than it had ever been, but that did not prevent Americans, deep in the Great Depression, from an unwarranted exuberance over the prospects for Soviet-American friendship and trade.

More serious were the effusive gushings of Americans during World War II. Wendell Willkie declared that the Soviets were becoming more like "us," while even Herbert Hoover publicly declared that the USSR was no longer communist(!). Dallek explains such wartime remarks by observing that the Russians were dying in droves and Americans therefore wanted to see them in the best possible light. And that meant seeing them as being like Americans.

These illusions, fostered by Roosevelt, came crashing into reality with the war's end. The Soviet Union became synonymous with Nazi Germany and therefore negotiations and concessions were wholly unacceptable. By the mid-1950s, despite a lowering of the Kremlin's anti-American rhetoric following Stalin's death, America's goals were

A unified Germany, militarized and safely within NATO; . . . a relaxed Soviet grip on . . . eastern Europe; and [arms control] with the United States retaining an unchallenged superiority of and supervision over nuclear weapons.

Again Dallek links such a utopian policy to America's domestic situation. Just as there was no room in the United States for "divisions or factional strife," so there was no place for real bargaining with the USSR. Dallek accepts completely that the Soviets were a threat to the United States; he rejects, however, the idea that every problem spot in the world was Moscow's creation.

The author's discussion of Ronald Reagan's policies is most interesting. He places President Reagan's early and vociferous anti-Soviet policies and speeches within a broader context: a general problem of "big government, atheism and relaxed moral standards." Reagan viewed these as among America's most serious domestic problems, and, in the world at large, the USSR embodied these evils. Thus, writing in 1983, Dallek saw little hope for real progress on the issues separating the superpowers. The past is not always a reliable guide for the future.

The final major selection is Hans Rogger's "How the Soviets See Us." This remarkable piece analyzes Russian perceptions of America from the late Imperial period (with little-known comments from Dostoevsky and Tolstoi) to the early 1980s. It is indeed a tour de force by one of America's most respected historians in Russia.

Not surprisingly, ambivalence is the best word to describe Russian and Soviet attitudes towards America before World War II. There were numerous Russian complaints about American materialism and lack of "culture," as well as the feeling that Americans must be doing something right if, as a Russian peasant observed in 1930, the United States is laden down with "cars, steam-heated houses, oranges and lemons."

As the Grand Alliance gave way to the Cold War, this ambivalence also yielded to unalloyed hostility. Echoing Dallek, Rogger explains this change in terms of Soviet domestic politics. Stalin and company were worried, and justifiably so, that the close alliance with the West would encourage an expectation of an "ideological softening and relaxation of controls. . . ." This anti-Americanism reached dimensions absurd even by Soviet standards: in the late 1940s every "saxophonist in Moscow was ordered to turn in his instrument."

After Stalin's death, a more balanced approach returned, but the Kremlin remained afraid of the West's cultural conquest of Soviet youth. In recent years, the leadership has actually started to seek concrete academic analyses, rather than more stereotypes of an America plagued by racial unrest, pornography and the like. The Institute for the U.S.A. has been in the forefront of this new and positive effort.

Mark Garrison offers a brief "Afterward" that reminds the reader of the potential for global annihilation in the event of a Soviet-American nuclear confrontation. To avoid such a catastrophe requires that "each people must find a way to surmount its

history, culture, fears and prejudices to arrive independently at the conclusion that there should be no higher priority [than preventing such a war]." True enough, but it is hard to imagine a more difficult task for two powerful and proud peoples.

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H. J. TOURYANTZ, *Search for a Homeland* (New York: self-published, 1987), 221 pp. \$9.95 papercover.

This unpretentious memoir will be a pleasant surprise to anyone who has followed the history of Soviet Armenia. It covers the period 1947 to 1965 and has useful information about everyday life, the academic world of Erevan, and the local operations of the MGB (KGB).

The author was born of Armenian parents in Cairo, Egypt. He graduated with a degree in economics from the American University of Beirut. In 1943 he joined in the management of a family-owned flour mill in Lebanon and married a daughter of the founder.

After World War II, full of patriotic emotion and influenced by his elder brother-in-law, Touryantz repatriated to Soviet Armenia with his wife. He had warnings and misgivings beforehand, and was disillusioned immediately after arrival. Fortunately he had college training in a field of practical interest and knowledge of foreign languages which made him useful, and after taking the requisite courses in Marxism-Leninism he received an appointment at the Armenian Academy of Sciences.

This degree of success for a repatriate was unusual, and it gave Touryantz the opportunity to observe the workings of one of the more prestigious sectors of Soviet Armenian society. He also had the opportunity to observe changes during the Thaw under Khrushchev. Once he got settled his lifestyle was comfortable, but by no means affluent.

What bothered Touryantz most about his experience were the efforts of the security forces to recruit him as an informer. Had his knowledge of Arabic been stronger, they might have recruited him, or tried to, for espionage in the Middle East. Touryantz reports on the pervasiveness of government spying in everyday life and the cleverness of those outside the security forces in outwitting them. This kind of information makes the current mass protests in Armenia both more interesting and more comprehensible.

Touryantz leaves no doubt that the academic world in Armenia has at least the same amount of envy and petty malice as anywhere else in the world. What is amazing is that any good work gets done. Touryantz had the greatest respect for a senior colleague who was purged under Stalin and rehabilitated under Khrushchev.

His decision to leave Soviet Armenia was influenced by his experiences in 1960

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during a group tour of Mainland China, Hongkong, and Japan. The contrasts between poor but socialist China and capitalist Hongkong and Japan showed him what he was missing behind the Iron Curtain. Now the father of a son, he had an added motive for escape.

The story of the escape of the Touryantz family in 1965 is suspenseful and very interesting. It was made possible by bribing a high level bureaucrat in the Foreign Office. A former MGB operative, he had been abroad and had come to despise the Soviet regime and admire the free world. In 1965 in Armenia, at least, if one had the right connections and enough money it was even possible to pass through the Iron Curtain legally.

The author leaves no doubt that he is an intelligent man. However, this book needs editing by a native speaker of English. The author does not maintain a strict chronological order, but skips from one topic to another regardless of timing. The unwary reader may miss changes in the historic context which influence the meaning of events.

The overall impression one gets of the Soviet regime in Armenia is of a tyranny tempered by corruption. Corruption there is not a wholly negative phenomenon, but allows for the operation of compassion and common sense in decision making. One also senses the Armenian adaptiveness through the centuries to regimes like this. Such adaptiveness is more typical than what we are seeing today in the mass demands for the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.

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MICHAEL J. BOSKIN, *Reagan and the Economy: The Successes, Failures, and Unfinished Agenda* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1987), vii-xvi, 301 pp. \$22.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-917616-80-4).

Underscoring the value of this volume is the fact that President Bush has selected the author to be the new Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Judgments and interpretations written when Professor Boskin was teaching at Stanford will suggest his line of advice to the Bush Administration.

Herbert Stein, a former Chairman of the Council, in a helpful foreword (valuable in orienting the reader) characterizes Prof. Boskin's approach as "sympathetic . . . but not idolatrous" (p. xvi). Facts should take precedence over politically motivated interpretation, hopes, and dreams. The book is rich in facts. Although the record was not complete when the volume went to press—late 1987—this book will serve long and well as a basis for understanding a period that was important for what happened and also for what the record will mean as an influence on the future.

Prof. Boskin summarizes and evaluates most elements (there is little on the ef-

forts to deregulate, inherently a vast and complex subject). The author is critical (analytical) in the best professional sense; he takes pains to remind us that what happens in a huge and varied country must result from myriads of forces only a few of which the President can modify. Important in what government does—easily exaggerated—are not only the Oval Office but also Capitol Hill, the thousands of offices of the civil service, the military, and the judiciary.

A striking fact of the book is how rarely the President appears directly—there are only two index references under “Reagan, Ronald (President).”

Chapter 3 presents a sophisticated, condensed, and understandable summary of fundamentals of approaches (demand-side, Keynesian; monetarist; supply-side, less than precisely defined) to macro-economic issues. The author’s position is sensibly eclectic.

Today (1989) it may be difficult to appreciate the concern about inflation—up from 6.3% in 1976 to around 9.0% at the time of the inauguration in 1981 (GNP deflator). Enormous increases! And no war! No one could be sure of the effects of policies that would reduce the speed. The Federal Reserve had initiated restrictive monetary policies a year before the election. Pres. Reagan supported the policies. A recession followed. Its costs were less than many economists expected (p. 102). One result was a shortfall of national income from that assumed in budget planning; the deficit was greater than anticipated. The experience showed that there is yet no painless way to get price level stability. In fact at the end of the eight years President Reagan left with inflation still at around 4% a year. Macro-economics calls for continuing study—of a somewhat new kind. “The single greatest achievement of the Reagan economic program probably has been to turn the debate about economic policy away from short-term management to broader, longer-term issues bearing upon the proper role of government in the economy. . . .” (p. 106), “. . . away from continual fine-tuning of short-term demand toward setting broad objectives in a framework that might increase the stability of monetary and fiscal policy, and thus the general economy” (p. 112–3).

Proposals for tax rate reduction had been urged, sometimes on a bipartisan basis, before 1981. President Reagan gave them, including those for the highest marginal rates, a sense of urgency. The tax changes in the eight years of the presidency (including three tax-increase laws) differed considerably from what Mr. Reagan proposed. The continuing prosperity of the economy—a most remarkable increase in the number of persons employed, and in good jobs—is consistent with a belief that reductions in high rates would improve incentives and encourage economic progress. But other factors were also operating. Overselling of a generally good idea must be expected. There was a populist element (p. 85). It can help to account for relatively large tax rate reductions in lower and middle brackets where incentive effects can hardly be huge but the revenue effects in total inevitably harmful to hopes for solving problems of budget deficits.

“Budget Policy,” Chapter 7, surveys a history with observations that reveal complexities of reducing the growth of spending. The White House fumbled a proposal (1981) to reduce the rate of increase of Social Security spending; as a result political fears of discussing the possibility of such restraint continue to affect approaches to

budget policy. The Grace Commission made many valuable proposals, only a portion of which have been accepted; several unrealistic suggestions tended to discredit the complete package to the country's detriment (pp. 130–32).

The Administration's general goal of "limiting redistribution to a social safety net" (p. 133) had merit but aroused opposition from many special groups and was only partially effective.

"Structural Tax Policy," Chapter 8, goes beyond tax rates. It shows, among other things, how complex the changes were. There is indication of what directions change should take; but five major laws in eight years represent instability that in itself is costly. The author is "cautiously optimistic . . . that common sense and good economics will eventually move us toward a more stable tax system with lower marginal rates, broader base and aids to saving and incentives to investment" (pp. 166–7).

Chapter 9, "Do Deficits Matter?," deals not only with the question but also presents a summary of recent history and economic and political considerations. ". . . panic claims" of inflation from continuation of deficits are unwarranted (p. 183). Six points about the effects of deficits require more than two pages of summary. They indicate interrelations among factors, including international aspects, the make for complexity (pp. 193–5), ". . . the dilemma is very much a political one" (p. 196). No economic crisis appears, and actions should represent considerations for the long-run, not primarily the near future.

An excellent chapter discusses the debate over, and the facts about, the fairness of the total program. (What emerged was not always what Mr. Reagan proposed.) Particular items will loom large to particular groups. An Administration's record, however, should be judged on the whole. (Ending of dozens of detailed grant-in-aid programs aroused criticisms at many points even though the total funds for broad programs embracing the specific groups represented increases.) The author concludes:

I believe that the Reagan Administration's primary goals of reducing the amount of social engineering in budget and tax policies and making transfer payment programs more cost-conscious and target-effective do not violate any reasonable definition of fairness. The rhetoric was much more provocative in this regard than the reality. A close examination of the evidence reveals that the effects on aggregate measures of economic income distribution, poverty, and other dimensions of fairness were quite minor, despite the fact that some specific individuals and groups fared poorly or were hurt by the policies (p. 217).

The chapter on long-term growth emphasizes technological advance and improvement in the quality of labor. More saving for investment is overwhelmingly desirable but not obviously obtainable by any policy government can readily establish.

Prof. Boskin is an authority on taxation, and his proposals for long-run change in structure are deserving of support. No politically attractive easy choices lie ahead.

Finally:

While Reaganomics has many accomplishments to its credit, it is important to make clear that it has not institutionalized either the basic principles upon which it stands or the continuation of its programs through enduring structural

changes in the budget process, monetary policy, or trade relations. . . . There is no guarantee that when the memory of double-digit inflation of the 1970s fades, future administrations or Federal Reserve Boards will not resort to inflationary monetary growth (p. 255).

There is an index. Some repetition appears—with the benefit, perhaps, of enabling individual chapters to stand alone. The author makes clear when he is presenting his judgments as against objective materials. Political aspects are distinguished from the more specifically economic.

My own appraisal may be indicated by recording my delight that the author has a key place in the Bush Presidency.

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KELLY, RITA MAE, ed., *Women and the Arizona Political Process* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1988), 188 pp. \$27.50 hardcover (ISBN 0-8191-6891-2). \$14.50 papercover (ISBN 0-8191-6892-0).

Women and the Arizona Political Process, edited by Professor Rita Mae Kelly of Arizona State University, represents a collection of research reports prepared by the Arizona State University Women's Studies Program as background material for the Second Arizona Women's Town Hall, sponsored by Soroptimist International of Phoenix.

The Arizona Women's Town Hall meets annually to discuss prepared reports on a particular topic and make recommendations based upon consensus. The documents upon which this Town Hall were based consist of seven articles describing various facets of women's political lives in Arizona; a final chapter containing the recommendations of the Town Hall are included in the volume.

The volume begins with a short introduction by Professor Kelly discussing one of the most interesting aspects of Arizona politics—the fact that this conservative state had produced women who have been national leaders in politics and has had higher than national levels of participation by women in politics. Following is a history of women in Arizona politics which highlights the role that the uneven sex ratio and the more democratic nature of living on a frontier had on the ability of women to enter public life in this state. This involvement began with temperance and community work in the 1870s and continued with an active suffrage movement coinciding with a statehood movement. Unlike many other states, women were active as candidates for public office and were elected to office in Arizona as soon as the right to vote was granted in that state, in 1912.

Other chapters describe the role that women have played in the Arizona State

Legislature, the Executive Branch, in the legal profession and judiciary, and at the local level. In each of these cases, the involvement of women since statehood is clearly and carefully documented—the numbers of women, who they were, and their party affiliation. In addition to this descriptive information, survey results comparing men, women, and their reasons for entering politics and on the relatively untouched topic of women in public administration at the state and local level are reported.

This aggregate and survey analysis is supplemented throughout by qualitative and historical documentation that examines the careers of prominent individuals more closely. Chief among these are the now familiar stories of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and current Governor Rose Mofford. However, the careers of lesser known politicians are also presented, in a good example of recapturing "lost" women in history, at least for those of us not from Arizona.

The remaining chapters focus not just on the mass electoral behavior of the female portion of Arizona's population, but on the voluntary activities that have been so crucial to women's involvement in public life.

Women and the Arizona Political Process represents a good example of the contribution that academics can make to governing in today's society. Throughout, the book provides a clear and accessible history and documentation of women in Arizona political life. It accomplishes this by blending basic theory, empirical findings of women's experiences at the national level and in other states, and a broad variety of quantitative and qualitative methods. Beyond this descriptive information, however, the authors also seek to understand the political behavior of men and women in Arizona politics through the use of case study and survey research methods.

In so doing, this book contributes not only to a broader understanding of women in Arizona politics but, because of the important role that women have played there, it also contributes to the political science literature by providing a comprehensive picture of women in political life in this state. Finally, this collection can also serve as an excellent model for other states involved in either a Town Hall or in achieving an understanding of politics in their state.

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CHARLES KENNEY and ROBERT L. TURNER, *Dukakis: An American Odyssey* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988), 260 pp. \$16.50 hardcover (ISBN 0-395-47089-7).

Few books lose their interest more quickly than campaign biographies of defeated presidential candidates, and such is the likely fate of *Dukakis: An American Odyssey*, by Charles Kenney and Robert L. Turner, reporters for the *Boston Globe*. Had the election turned out differently, one might have kept the book on the shelf as a kind

of reference work on the President's character. As it is, not many will have occasion to refer to this particular American odyssey again.

Dukakis: An American Odyssey was written before Dukakis won the Democratic presidential nomination, probably even before Susan Estrich became his campaign manager following John Sasso's departure. No doubt it was designed to make quick sales. But perhaps the authors had a more exalted purpose. They seem to believe that the kind of President a candidate will make can be foretold by examining his character from boyhood to maturity—a theory advanced by David James Barber of Duke University years ago to which the authors allude. If so, they may have hoped their book would help the American people make a wise choice.

In any event, Kenney and Turner state that their purpose is to "portray Michael Dukakis not as he or anyone else might wish him to be, but as he is," and they have made an honest effort to present him to the public "warts and all."

Based largely on interviews and their own observations drawn from covering Dukakis's career for twenty years for the *Globe*, their book is journalistic, of necessity hastily written, and yet not without merit. To their credit they have gone to some trouble to place Dukakis in the Progressive tradition of American politics, thereby lending some historical perspective to their work.

Beginning with his early childhood in a Greek immigrant household in Boston, the authors devote chapters to Dukakis's youth and schooling, his budding political interests, his first and second gubernatorial terms, his defeat and redemption in Massachusetts' politics, and his decision to run for the Democratic presidential nomination. What emerges from this account is the picture of a complicated, self-assured, brilliant, moralistic, thrifty, ambitious, energetic, somewhat arrogant and self-righteous, individual.

All these character traits were in evidence during his first campaign for Governor of Massachusetts and throughout his first term. Running as a reformer with strong rigid notions of right and wrong, he broke with friends and supporters who did not understand, took a rigid moralistic stand on welfare and taxes, and was so fearful of yielding to the corruption involved in political patronage he refused to permit a law firm in which one of his closest friends and supporters was a member to do business with the state.

Dukakis's defeat in his bid for reelection in 1978 and his retreat to the Kennedy School of Government, gave him time to ponder the possible error of his ways. Apparently chastened, he returned to the Governor's office in 1983, forgot about his strong stand on patronage, led the fight for welfare and tax collection reform, and supported a climate for the growth of business that helped lead the state to prosperity and himself to a national reputation.

But had he really changed? According to the authors his style had changed, but "the essential man remained true to his character." He remained, so the authors believe, part liberal part conservative, a secretive man who kept things to himself and wanted to do things by himself. And, indeed, it could be argued that his campaign for the Presidency suggested that he had retained many of the old character traits—a

certain arrogance, rigidity, and reserve—that Kenney and Turner had perceived in him throughout his career.

Such traits could be found among the Progressives leaders as well, and the authors place Dukakis in that reform tradition of the early 1900s. Among those Progressive leaders, the authors believe Dukakis most closely resembles Woodrow Wilson in character and thought. Although from far different backgrounds, both men were reformers, had a sense of mission and lofty ideals accompanied by an arrogant streak; both were moralistic, and somewhat self righteous; and both left a trail of shattered friendships.

But no comparisons are exact. Wilson was an excellent communicator and Dukakis was not; more important, as the authors note, Wilson was an historian, an intellectual, an idea man; Dukakis, instead, was more the pragmatic problem-solver. Of particular interest, however, is what this comparison between Wilson and Dukakis does to Barber's theory of predicting good or bad Presidents. Woodrow Wilson was one of Barber's prime examples of an "active-negative" personality presumably to be avoided. If he was right, what, then, should be said of Dukakis who seems to Kenney and Turner to closely resemble Wilson? Did the nation escape a bullet when it rejected him in the recent election?

Theories come and go. The more historians write and re-write the history of the presidency, the more naive appears the possibility of determining beforehand what kind of President any given candidate might make. When historians cannot even agree as to which Presidents were successful or unsuccessful—Wilson has usually been ranked among the great presidents, for example—it seems unlikely books like *Dukakis: An American Odyssey*, fine as they may be, can help, as Barber thought, to "cut through the confusion and get at some clear criteria for choosing Presidents."

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Senators WILLIAM S. COHEN and GEORGE J. MITCHELL, *Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings* (New York: Viking, 1988), 350 pp., including Notes and Index. \$19.95 clothbound (ISBN 0-670-82252-3).

We are still too close in time to the controversial Iran-Contra hearings to draw definitive conclusions, but the Cohen-Mitchell book adds one more piece of evidence to our information. Senator William S. Cohen of Maine, a moderate Republican who is widely respected, has joined Senator George J. Mitchell, also of Maine, newly elected Democratic majority leader in the Senate, in giving a joint account of the congressional investigators' side of the Iran-Contra hearings.

The authors candidly admit that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North skillfully employed television, along with counsel Brendan Sullivan, to get the pro-Contra view across to the American public. However, they also are troubled by some major under-

lying constitutional questions, including separation of powers and executive versus legislative powers in foreign policy.

The authors draw six major conclusions:

(1) "The intensity of partisanship in the House of Representatives, not likely to diminish in the near future, makes joint hearings undesirable. . . ."

(2) "Congress must not seek to exploit for political advantage the Executive's mistakes or improprieties it is investigating. . . ."

(3) "Congress must guard against attempts to witness or their attorneys to seize control or manipulate the proceedings. . . ."

(4) "Setting fixed deadlines for the completion of congressional investigations should be avoided. . . ."

(5) "Congress should recognize that, as long as it investigates activities that involve allegations of criminal wrongdoing, it will be entwined in continuing tensions with the Justice Department or an independent counsel. . . ."

(6) "Congress must take into account the power of television and yet resist (as the Committee did) the pressure to conform its behavior to television's demands. . . ."

A more general conclusion of the two senators is that:

"Somewhere between lives and lies, between compliance with and defiance of the law, there is a place for the truth, for national security, and for bipartisan formulation of foreign policy.

"Twice in the past fifteen years our government has been virtually paralyzed because rules were stretched, laws broken, and policies twisted in an effort to avoid complying with restrictions thought by presidents to be either unwise or unconstitutional . . . [The power struggle between executive and legislative branches] is destined to continue. But that struggle, inherent in a system of calculated checks and balances, must be waged in a spirit of good faith, one that recognizes that the responsibilities of each require mutual accommodation, and sometimes compromise. . . ." (p. 311)

A few sample quotations may provide a bit of the flavor of this important book:

". . . Succumbing to the temptation to argue the merits or morality of the Contra cause would reduce the Committee to debating the Contra-aid program while ignoring the means used by North and others to support it." (p. 98)

"Like the sale of weapons to Iran and the continuation of financial and military assistance to the Contras, the White House view that the Boland Amendments did not cover the NSC was kept covert. In fact, [Bretton] Sciaroni's legal opinion was stamped 'classified' . . ." (p. 123)

"Many Americans do not have cable television service. Because they saw primarily sympathetic witnesses and only highlights of the other testimony, a disjointed and fragmentary portrait of our investigation emerged. Reducing a complex story to thirty-second 'sound bites' was the equivalent of taking snapshots from a moving train. Much of the landscape was missed . . ." (p. 140)

"Oliver North and the Committee had gone eyeball to eyeball [over the question of North's immunized testimony], and the Committee had blinked. It was the prologue to what was to come . . ." (p. 149)

"[Oliver North and Daniel Inouye] were unlikely adversaries. Both short and erect. Both decorated war heroes. Both deeply devoted to his country . . ." (p. 154)

Senator Mitchell recounts his decision to speak to North rather than to question him. His speech included this quotation, repeated twice: ". . . [I]n America, disagreement with the policies of the government is not evidence of lack of patriotism . . ." (p. 171)

Besides accounts of the testimony of Oliver North and secretary Fawn Hall, the authors give individual opinions on certain matters and they describe testimony by Secretary of State George Shultz, former NSC advisors Bud McFarlane and Admiral John Poindexter, arms dealer Albert Hakim, General Richard Secord, Contra leader Adolfo Calero and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, among others.

The book deals with the dispute over what to do about the unsatisfactory War Powers Act, attacked as unconstitutional by presidentialists and opposed as too compliant to the President's wishes by congressional advocates. The senators quote the 1981 opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in *Dames and Moore v. Regan* which states that "when the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, 'his power is at its lowest ebb' and the Court can sustain his actions 'only by disabling the Congress from action on the subject.'"

This volume is an accurate portrayal of the views of Senators Cohen and Mitchell and an important contribution to this ongoing debate.

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ROBERT N. ROBERTS, *White House Ethics: The History of the Politics of Conflict of Interest Regulation* (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1988), 224 pp. \$37.50 Hardcover (ISBN 0-313-25934-8).

Roberts' study comes at a time when stock-taking of White House ethics, particularly the problem of conflict of interest regulation, is sorely needed. Although the volume appeared in print before President Reagan's 1988 veto of the latest round of ethics legislation, Roberts offers the reader a balanced and comprehensive assessment of how Washington has attempted to deal with executive branch misconduct and why adequate legislation has proven so elusive.

Roberts casts his net widely, preferring not simply to focus on post-Watergate developments but to understand the attempts to grapple with the problem of executive branch misconduct from a more encompassing historical perspective. In the first chapter, he traces the historical antecedents of the present debate over conflict of interest regulation back to the early days of the Republic and then, in broad sweep, carries the discussion up to the Truman presidency. Although his analysis is perhaps

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a bit too brief for such a large swath of history, it nicely sets the stage for the detailed chapters on regulatory efforts by the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations, which are individually covered in successive chapters.

Roberts' work can be read at a number of levels. At perhaps the most basic level he offers a useful descriptive discussion of the key cases of possible misconduct that arose in particular administrations and how each administration chose to deal with them, both individually and in crafting proposals for general regulation. Although other works (e.g., Dunar on Truman and Frier on Eisenhower) provide more detailed discussions of ethics violations during previous presidencies, Roberts nicely ties particular cases of purported malfeasance to the administration's efforts—failures in some cases—to develop and enforce rules of conduct.

Roberts' analysis can also be read at other, more ambitious levels. Here his work is suggestive but far from complete. Roberts' implicit point, for example, that recognition of the problem of conflict of interest was initially quite limited in scope—e.g., officials assisting, in return for payment, private parties in claims against the government—and developed only incrementally is especially interesting. It serves as an important reminder that what we take (or fail to take) to be ethical conduct must be seen in the context of the times and judged accordingly.

That ethical standards are often unclear at the time and require discussion and resolution seems especially important in light of current controversies. The call for legislation to regulate the “appearance” of impropriety suggests, for example, that greater political discussion is needed about what we mean by “appearance” and whether its regulation requires a too exacting toll on bureaucratic routine. Similarly, demands for more detailed financial disclosure call for more direct debate about possible trade-offs with individual rights or privacy.

Roberts' subtitle to the book promises a “history of the politics of conflict of interest regulation.” In a purely descriptive sense, he delivers on the promise: Congress' legislative response to administration proposals and Congress' own initiatives are thoroughly described. However, Roberts might have asked a bit more of his descriptive data. There is much material in Roberts' book, for example, that might have been used to explain how (and how well) Congress has responded to the problem of conflict of interest, especially in comparison to Congressional responses to other policy initiatives, to changes in the workings and behavior of Congress over time, and to Congress' own and often simultaneous attempts to grapple with problems of congressional conflicts of interest.

Roberts' analysis is especially useful in forcing more attention to the organizational effects of stricter degrees of regulation. Demands for complete financial divestment and lengthy post-employment prohibitions, for example, may discourage otherwise qualified candidates from serving in the public sector. Furthermore, few administrations have been able to muster the organizational resources and devise the mechanisms necessary for effective and uniform enforcement.

Although Roberts does not address many of these critical issues underlying conflict of interest regulation, he is not to be faulted. That his analysis at least prods

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a reader to raise them attests to the importance of his work as a welcome addition to scholarship on the presidency.

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HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States*, Fifth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 534+ pp. \$16.95 paper-cover (ISBN 0-19-505516-0).

This is the revised fifth edition of what is probably the oldest and still one of the best textual summaries of the Supreme Court's work on civil liberties and civil rights. As with earlier editions, the author has focused on "line-drawing"—how and where the Court has struck a balance between individual rights and those of society. Though the overall analytic focus does not carry much beyond this theme, the long-term development of civil liberties and rights, its advances and retreats, is exceptionally well set out. Commentary on individual cases is both thorough and sharp, quickly getting to the heart of the problems the Court faces not merely in drawing immediate lines but also in maintaining its institutional role in a constitutional democracy where individual rights are of a very high, if not invariably the highest, order.

Professor Abraham is particularly insightful about the historical context of the Court's work and the effect of the personality and character of individual Justices on constitutional interpretation. And, no surprise to readers of his other work, the writing here is lively and enormously readable; the documentation, scholarly and extensive. In this regard, Chapter 3 on the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states, alone is worth the price of the book. In several chapters, important cases are also compiled analytically in chronological tabular form. A thoughtful and lengthy bibliographical note and an appendix of statistical data on the Justices complete what is a model presentation of information.

The fifth edition in all areas is up to date through the Court's decisions of June, 1988. In all, the edition is almost a third longer—144 pages—than its predecessor, though some of this is accounted for by a larger type size. Text additions include discussions of recent free exercise and Establishment clause cases, those involving *Miranda* rules, Fourth Amendment rights, school busing, interpretation of the Voting Rights Act of 1982, discrimination by private clubs and schools, and both race and gender discrimination in the workplace. *Roe v. Wade* and later abortion cases, unaccountably neglected in the preceding edition, receive elaboration.

Added also is a discussion of the "double-standard-within-a-double-standard"—tiers of judicial review within the already greater judicial review given to non-economic rights—and the rationale for the basic distinction itself between the latter and economic-proprietary rights.

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One might have wished for a more extended treatment of these last questions, particularly since Professor Abraham wisely does not assume that the Court exists simply to maximize rights at every opportunity. Today's politically more conservative Court and the prospect of a perhaps still more conservative one in the future, remind us again that judicial review is also a form of social control. But not everything can be done in a single book. *Freedom and the Court* has informed an entire generation of scholars and students since its first appearance in 1967. The fifth edition is a very welcome addition.

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J. RICHARD SNYDER, ed., *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1988), 160 p. indexed. \$29.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-8420-2297-X).

The historiography of the Kennedy era has fluctuated wildly during the past twenty-five years. Early assessments of the Kennedy administration, particularly by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Theodore Sorensen, Pierre Salinger, and William Manchester, celebrated Kennedy the man and the accomplishments of his administration. In the wake of the president's tragic death, scholars lamented the passing of the age of Camelot and ranked Kennedy as one of the greatest presidents in the nation's history. Most writers, deeply influenced by the emotion and trauma which followed Kennedy's assassination, pictured the Kennedy era as a golden age, tragically shortened by the president's violent death in Dallas. By the early 1970s, however, scholars began to attack Kennedy, and his administration, with a vengeance. Led by Victor Lasky, Nancy Cager Clinch, Bruce Miroff, Richard J. Walton, Henry Fairlie, and more recently by Garry Wills, Peter Collier, and David Horowitz, scholars focused on Kennedy's personal weaknesses, his mistresses, his limited achievements in domestic reform, and on a failed foreign policy which risked nuclear annihilation and escalated American involvement in Vietnam. During the past several years, however, more balanced, and less emotional, works have begun to appear. Recent studies of Kennedy by Herbert Parmet and David Burner, for example, find both strengths and weaknesses in Kennedy and his presidency.

The various interpretations which have emerged during the past twenty-five years are well represented in the most recent book on the Kennedy era, *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, edited by J. Richard Snyder. The book is a collection of essays by scholars from a variety of disciplines who gathered at the University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse in October, 1986, to assess the Kennedy years. The book, as the editor suggests, is particularly useful for scholars who may wish to restructure their thinking about Kennedy and his presidency.

The essays included in the book can be divided into three basic categories: those

which focus on narrowly defined subjects relating to the Kennedy era; those which suggest psychohistorical models to study Kennedy; and those which attempt to provide a broad interpretative framework for understanding Kennedy and his presidency.

Essays in the first category include an essay by Mary Ann Watson, which explores the relationship between the development of the television industry and Kennedy's use of the media; Henry Z. Scheele's study of the Republican Party's efforts to counter Kennedy's domination of the media by sponsoring a forum, primarily featuring Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen and House Minority Leader Charles Halleck, to present the opposition's point of view; an essay by Ardith L. Maney, which studies the Kennedy administration's surplus food distribution program; an analysis of the 1962 congressional elections by Philip A. Grant, Jr.; and an essay by Ian J. Bickerton on Kennedy's relations with the American Jewish community and his foreign policy towards Israel. None of the essays provide new interpretative frameworks for understanding the Kennedy years, but each provides useful information which expands our knowledge of various aspects of Kennedy's days in the White House.

The essays which call for new psychological studies of Kennedy provide more food for thought. Bruce Mazlish rejects as simplistic previous psychohistorical studies of Kennedy which argued that Kennedy was driven by a will to dominate others because of the Kennedy family's insatiable drive for power. Using the tools of the psychohistorian, Mazlish explores the development of the Kennedy myth and concludes that studies of Kennedy's struggles with his father, his battle with illness, his indecision, and Kennedy's personal charisma are themes which historians should study further to develop a better understanding of the man and the myth. In another essay Peter Charles Hoffer suggests that to understand Kennedy scholars must relate Kennedy's psychological development, particularly in overcoming illness and in his experiences as a father, to his presidency. Hoffer concludes, in a sympathetic appraisal, that as Kennedy matured personally he developed a father's concern about problems facing the nation. At the time of his death Kennedy, according to Hoffer, had become a concerned public official, a father figure for his countrymen, and a thoughtful and responsible national leader.

The final category of essays, which attempt to provide broad assessments of the Kennedy years, include an interview with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and essays by four distinguished historians, William E. Leuchtenburg, William Chafe, Allen Matusow, and Thomas Patterson. Schlesinger, to his credit, now admits there were many weaknesses in the Kennedy presidency, but still celebrates Kennedy as a man of reason whose mistakes were primarily the result of inexperience and youthful enthusiasm. Leuchtenburg surveys previous studies of the Kennedy era and catalogs the strengths and weaknesses of the administration. His comparison of the historiography of the Kennedy period with the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt is especially helpful in placing recent scholarship on Kennedy into a meaningful historical perspective. Chafe, who focuses on the civil rights movement, concludes that Kennedy seemed to be more interested in style than substance and largely neglected civil rights issues during his first two years in office. His ultimate commitment to civil rights, Chafe argues, came only after the president was forced to react to events that were beyond his control. Still

he concludes that Kennedy's ultimate commitment to the Black community was important for the Civil Rights movement. Allen Matusow analyzes Kennedy's efforts to maintain American leadership against rising foreign competition by preserving the liberal free trade model which structured the world economy after the Second World War. Much of Matusow's essay, however, focuses on the 1970s and 1980s instead of the Kennedy years. Patterson, in the most provocative essay in the book, is generally critical of Kennedy's leadership in foreign affairs. Rejecting interpretations which defend Kennedy by suggesting that he was misled by the CIA, that he was forced by right-wingers to take a hard line against communism, or that he was forced by events to respond with exaggerated and even belligerent forcefulness, Patterson concludes that Kennedy's blunders in foreign affairs were the inevitable result of Kennedy's style and his outdated commitment to cold war ideology.

The recent remembrance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the assassination of John F. Kennedy suggests that the Kennedy presidency will continue to fascinate the general public, as well as scholars, for years to come. Questions raised in this book, particularly in the essays by Leuchtenburg, Mazlish, and Patterson, will be explored, and perhaps answered, by students of the Kennedy presidency in the future. Historians, however, must not only examine the realities of the Kennedy era, they must also explain the continuing impact of the Kennedy mythos on the popular imagination. In spite of what recent scholars have written, Kennedy is still rated, as he was during the first years following his death, as one of our greatest presidents by the general population. Studies of the Kennedy legend and the romantic attachment of the American population to the Kennedy myth will tell us much about the recent American past.

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BERNARD F. HALLORAN, ed., *Essays on Arms Control and National Security*, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 123 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 395 pp. paperback.

This volume, commemorating the 25th year of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, consists of seventeen essays spanning more than thirty-five years by distinguished contemporary strategic thinkers. The mostly familiar essays (all but three were previously published, nine in *Foreign Affairs*) together serve as a primer on the political and military uses of atomic weapons and on reducing their dangers; as a stimulant to rethinking and stock-taking; and as a stunning display of the output of civilian strategic analysts, who have in unparalleled fruitful fashion studied and reflected upon military problems without the aid of the uniformed armed services.

The essays may be roughly grouped into five categories. The earliest, by Bernard Brodie and William Kaufmann, deal with the conceptual foundations of nuclear de-

terrence. A second group, by Raymond Garthoff, Andrei Sakharov, and Robert Tucker, address Soviet and American attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons as deterrents. Another set, by Henry Rowen, Robert McNamara, and Albert Wohlstetter, is concerned with the need to wage war between nuclear powers without making mutual annihilation inevitable. The largest group of contributors, including Fred Iklé, Paul Nitze, Aaron Friedberg, Richard Burt, Joseph Nye, Kenneth Adelman, and Thomas Schelling, discuss problems in negotiating and implementing superpower arms agreements. Finally, George Kennan and James Schlesinger deal in different ways with the problem of assuring strategic stability without depending on nuclear force levels.

This volume is a curious exception to the tendency of public agencies to tout their own performance. Burt writes in his 1982 contribution to this volume that "In retrospect, the creation of the ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] may have been a mistake. By its very existence and role in the interagency process, the agency reinforce the idea that negotiations offer an alternative path to international security." Because ACDA's reason for existing, he wrote, was unrelated to force planning or threat assessment, it had "little reason to get involved in the difficult trade-offs between arms control and unilateral military flexibility." On the other hand, faced with growing arms control expertise in other Washington agencies, ACDA in order "to justify its existence . . . has had to become ever more doctrinaire in its adherence to the primacy of arms control," he writes, recommending that it be brought "back into the mainstream of the policy process." This could be accomplished, he suggests, if its Deputy Director were a serving military officer, bringing "an operational military perspective to senior levels of the agency and [giving] military officers a deeper insight into arms control."

Criticism of overaggressive efforts to seek negotiated agreement on armaments has been shared by Adelman, ACDA's Director for much of the Reagan era. An alternative to such efforts, "to me the most promising of innovative thoughts," Adelman writes in his 1984 contribution, "is arms control through individual but (where possible) parallel policies: i.e., arms control without agreements (treaties, in particular)." This view, along with other writings in the collection by Friedberg, Schelling, and Nitze critical of the SALT I and SALT II negotiated arms agreements, opposes ACDA's traditional commitment toward facilitating such agreements. This inclusion, and the omission from the volume of the case for negotiation as a means of contributing to mutual security, suggests that the volume is designed in one-sided fashion to legitimate the recent transformation of ACDA since 1980 from advocate to critic of superpower arms agreements.

Still more remarkable, perhaps, is that President Reagan's unexpected determination to forge strategic arms agreement with the Soviets belies the views of many of his top personnel (including Adelman), and of virtually all the contributors to this volume (with the exception of Kennan, who writes of the nuclear bomb as being "the most useless weapon ever invented"). Entirely unanticipated by this volume, in fact, was Reagan's determination at his 1986 Reykjavik summit conference with Mikhail Gorbachev to abolish nuclear weapons, without reference to Pentagon plans and needs or to the conventional wisdom of arms control analysts. From the beginning

of their thinking on this subject in the late 1950's, the latter group concluded that nuclear disarmament would imperil deterrence of attack and increase its risks. The president's initiative was undoubtedly farther from the "mainstream of the policy process" than any ACDA position, because ACDA officials were continually informed by the need to strengthen nuclear deterrence.

The reader must be urged, therefore, not to overestimate the impact of these essays on the policy process. He must also be advised that the work of examining in the *public* literature (at least) the trade-offs between arms control and unilateral military flexibility has hardly begun. For example, Soviet-American agreement to reduce strategic forces to much lower levels, as sought and accepted by both superpowers in principle, will not assist the goal of unilateral military flexibility. In his essay, Garthoff notes that negotiating agreed-upon restraints in arms is both the best and the most difficult way to support mutual deterrence. The clash between the ideal and the feasible—which is, after all what foreign policy is primarily about—is not at all reconciled in this volume.

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ROBERT S. ALLEY, ed., *James Madison on Religious Liberty* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1985). 338 pp. \$22.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-87975-298-X).

In *James Madison on Religious Liberty*, Robert S. Alley has brought together a valuable collection, partly of Madison's own writings on the relationship of religion to government, but largely of essays which examine Madison, his thought and legacy. Alley's purpose in this is to revive the study of Madison, the so-called "Father of the Constitution." He would return the nation to the original understanding of the place of religion in public life so that America may, in the words of contributor Senator Sam Ervin Jr, "cherish the First Amendment and thus keep religious freedom inviolate for its people as long as time shall last."

Among the many worthwhile inclusions there is grist for the novice and scholar alike. After a short political biography of Madison by A. E. Dick Howard, Alley provides a handy collection of Madison's writings on the subject at hand. A few background papers cover the problems surrounding the phrase "church and state," the thought and influence of Roger Williams and the important distinction between religious toleration and religious liberty. Others cover the events and importance of the Virginia Assessment Debate, Madison's religious views, the First Amendment, the *de facto* departure from Madison's principles during the religious revival of the nineteenth century and a number of reflections upon Madison's legacy.

John W. Baker supplies an able introduction to the Free exercise clause. A. E. Dick Howard in "The Supreme Court and the Establishment of Religion" provides

a very helpful overview of the cases and debates which pertain to this question. In an outstanding paper on Madison's religion, Ralph Ketcham identifies Madison as a churchgoer but not a church member and as "interested in logical and metaphysical speculations, yet . . . not devoted to any particular dogma" (p. 176). His religious beliefs combined the theological rationalism which was popular among Anglicans at the time and the Scottish "Common Sense" philosophy of his Presbyterian instructor, Rev. John Witherspoon. From these perspectives, personal liberty of conscience and governmental non-involvement become crucial to a people's religious life. Ketcham thus observes "an intimate and fruitful relationship between Madison's religious views and sympathies, and the signal contributions he made to the philosophy of religious liberty in a free society" (p. 192). This remark, however, invites one to ask whether one who espouses a theology other than Madison's, perhaps one more orthodox, can with consistency support his views on religious liberty.

Donald L. Drakeman distinguishes himself in his very sober paper on Madison's relationship, as both framer and president, to the First Amendment, touching the important cases and literature on the subject along the way. He concludes by reminding us that:

. . . issues of church and state are extremely complex. Even Madison admitted the difficulty of tracing "the line of separation between the rights of religion and the Civil authority" in a time essentially free of income taxes, public schools, and the other complications of twentieth-century American life. Every contemporary Constitutional issue simply cannot be put in an eighteenth-century pigeon hole (p. 243).

Dick Howard returns to this point in his essay on "Establishment." He cites Donald Giannella (p. 284) in explaining that,

. . . the founding fathers expected religion to play a part in the established social order but also assumed that the state would play a minimal role in forming that order. In our own time, his argument runs, the question of how to treat religious groups and interests "has become a fundamentally different one" from that confronting the founders.

With this observation in mind, the libertarian "strict separationist" attitude appears both unjust and unfaithful to the spirit of the constitution. These contributors allow more latitude to religious expression in American public life than some of the others could comfortably abide.

With rare exceptions, the editor and contributors seem generally unaware as to the most immediate obstacle to the resurrection of Madisonian principles in our day. Alley and associates see the great threat to the First Amendment principles in what they consider to be recent attempts at a Christian Reformation of America. "Advocates of various forms of 'Christian America' argue against the Jeffersonian wall," writes Alley in his introduction. "This is a fundamental shift to which citizens should be alerted" (p. 16). Henry Steele Commager harangues against the religious conservatives in the final paper. But to identify religious advocates of a "Christian America"

as the only or chief threat is shortsighted. Such crusaders have always managed to sustain alongside their puritan zeal an incompatible yet sincerely held patriotic devotion to Madisonian principles however imperfectly applied.

The real threat to the liberty which Madison bequeathed to us is that which undermines its foundation. In his preface, Alley identifies Madison's principles as "principles of natural rights and freedoms" (p. 11). He later also recognizes Madison's project to be "anchored in natural rights" (p. 258). Yet, there is no chapter taking up the question of modern natural right, the current rejection of it and the theoretical and political consequences of that rejection. Dick Howard hints at the problem (p. 323) when he writes:

His political theory securely anchored in the concepts of natural rights, Madison espoused classical liberty interests, chief among them freedom of conscience and expression. Insofar as they interpret such constitutional language as the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, the modern cases owe much to the political theory of Madison and his generation. Current cases, however, go well beyond Madisonian assumptions, ploughing ground not so evidently part of Madison's theoretical terrain.

A departure from this doctrine of natural right, understood by Madison and his contemporaries and by many today to be true in all times and circumstances, cannot but undermine the security of the liberties which rest upon it. The theory of "the living constitution," for example, corrodes belief in natural right because it understands the liberties guaranteed in the constitution to be not of a fixed but of a supposedly "evolving" nature, "unfolding values" the contents of which correspond to current notions of human dignity. But "unfolding values" present a foundation of shifting sand. What if values were to "unfold" in a way that is hostile to religious liberty? The book seems to have been inspired by a fear that precisely that is happening.

This objection notwithstanding, the book is a worthy addition to the interested student's library.

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DONALD R. WHITNAH and EDGAR L. ERICKSON, *The American Occupation of Austria*, Contributions in Military Studies, No. 46 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), xiv, 351+ pp., index, bibliography. \$39.95 hardcover (ISBN: 0-313-24894-X).

The American Occupation of Austria is a serious, well documented account of an important phase of postwar history. The four-power occupation, while excessively long-drawn-out, was in many ways a success. It ended with the achievement of the State Treaty in 1955.

American leadership, from the first struggles with the Soviets to secure dependable access to Vienna and airfields, was impressive.

The negotiations about the zones for stationing the troops were complex. They required approximately two years. The book devotes 200 pages to this part of the story. While some of the conflicts and difficulties could be attributed to inadequate planning, one should recall the many uncertainties—how far would the Soviets advance? Where would the armies in Italy be? Would the Nazis fight in the redoubt in Austria? How much would the war with Japan cost? There were other perplexing questions.

By May 1945 the Soviet armies had penetrated deep into Austria and Germany. The brutal seizure of land and property was indicative of later problems. There were ravages that destroyed much of the economic systems under occupation. It is surprising that the Soviet leaders considered the Austrian Dr. Karl Renner an acceptable President. They did not realize the nature of his democratic convictions. The troops continued looting and harassing the people of Austria. The Soviets permitted free elections in November and were surprised by the outcome. Their top political officer told an allied diplomat that they expected to win 25 percent of the vote. In the event, the Communists won less than 5 percent; they had “already conclusively lost Austria.”

Meanwhile, the Americans in the control council devised the strategic advantage of the “veto in reverse.” This gave the Austrians the legal right to put into effect any measures not unanimously overruled by the four powers.

The Soviet commanders, treating Austria as a defeated enemy, seized machinery and other property and lived off the land. Thus the economy was severely hampered. In the first months, the Washington view was pessimistic. As narrated in this chronicle, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration provided a “slow starvation diet.” This was supplemented later as large war-surplus supplies in Germany were made available.

The book does not mention the \$10 million loan from the Export-Import Bank in Washington, which came as the United States revised its early estimate of Austria's viability. The authors do discuss the Marshall Plan aid that came later and the currency measures that were adopted as the deutschemarks were retired and the Austrian schilling launched. This major financial accomplishment in late 1945 was possible as the Russians first approved, then denied, then finally agreed to the program.

There was a debate in the American element as to how to evaluate Soviet behavior. Finally, a decision was made by the American political advisor, John Erhardt, and a strong report went to Washington to describe Soviet obstruction and the impossibility of successful compromise. This political assessment came before the Berlin blockade.

In 1948, there was fear of the isolation of Vienna when the roads to Berlin were blocked. However, the Russians did not obstruct roads to Vienna and traffic flowed as usual except for a few hours of interruption.

Throughout the occupation, the black market was rampant and hampered economic progress.

The valiant stand of Chancellor Figl of the conservative Volkspartei, of Adolf

Shaerf of the Socialist Party, as well as Karl Gruber, the foreign minister, Dr. Karl Renner, the President, and others is well reflected as they fought for recovery and a new democratic state.

"Why did the Russians suddenly agree on the Austrian State Treaty? . . . Several reasons come to mind." The authors say, for instance, there was exhaustion over prolonged negotiations. Another element was the desire to ease international tensions. A third motive was to show what Germany might get if it stayed out of NATO. After 379 difficult negotiating sessions, the change of position was a real concession. The Russians had lost Austria.

I remember a talk in 1955 with my brother Foster Dulles about the Geneva meeting. He said that the request for "deeds not words" at a time when Khrushchev was maneuvering to take over power from Bulganin and Malenkov had borne fruit.

We recall many episodes of the period and remember the "third man" movie as we read of the murder of Irving Ross an economic officer in October 1948. We note the violence and kidnapping, continued even to the later years: The attacks occurred in spite of cooperation in the unique patrol—four soldiers, one from each element, patrolling the city in a jeep. This arrangement reminds us how often fragile threads of agreement keep precarious relations intact.

The story unfolds in a convincing manner, particularly the account of the rehabilitation. Considerable economic and political detail is interesting to students of the period.

As we follow the narrative, a number of characters stands out for their notable roles: John G. Winant, Generals Mark Clark, Jessie Balmer, Lester Flory and Minister (later Ambassador) Jack Erhardt among others.

The American record is good.

ELEANOR LANSING DULLES

LLOYD C. GARDNER, *Approaching Vietnam: From World War II through Dienbienphu* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 353+ pp. \$22.50 hardcover (ISBN 0-393-02540-3).

Since the release of the Pentagon Papers scholars have explored the multitudinous aspects and phases of the United States' longest military conflict and most tumultuous period since the Civil War. Interpretations of the American experience in Vietnam range from the quagmire thesis, to world order politics, to neo-conservative revisionism. A large majority of such studies have been concerned primarily with the wartime phases of buildup and escalation during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies through the slow withdrawal of the Nixon administrations. Most have been informative and useful analyzes, albeit present-minded. In the process, America's early, and most crucial phase of involvement in Vietnam, has often been given less attention.

Scholars, however, are beginning to fill that gap with recent works concerning the region history of Southeast Asia and with diplomatic histories that focus on the

complex commitment origins of the United States during the 1940s and 1950s. To this new and badly needed phase of Vietnam scholarship, Lloyd C. Gardner, Rutgers University's Charles and Mary Beard Professor of History, makes an insightful contribution by placing the origins of the protracted Vietnam conflict within the context of America's World War II and Cold War global strategies and power politics.

Gardner presents a straightforward chronology of the saga from 1941 through 1954 and makes clear that the French defeat at the colonial fortress of Dienbienphu in 1954 was not the beginning of America's involvement in Vietnam. Throughout, the cast of American policymakers and their Allied cohorts—Roosevelt, Churchill, Mendes-France, Bevin, Eden, Truman, Acheson, Eisenhower, Dulles, and many others—reveals how the postwar West's perceptions shifted from self-determination and decolonization to containment and intervention when faced with the perceived threat of international communism. The results for Vietnam were the restoration of French authority and the recognition of pro-Western nationalistic leaders, under the guiding auspices of the United States.

Gardner presents three themes as key factors in America's changing policies toward Vietnam; themes that evolved and led to what he contends were the "inevitable" and tragic consequences of war in Southeast Asia. First, the application of containment in Indochina by "drawing the line" after the 1949 Chinese Communist revolution. Second, the "liberation" of United States' foreign policy from onerous colonialism that threatened the development of world anti-communist nationalism. And, third, "holding the center" through a systematic process of nation-building that would establish global peace and prosperity.

After examining the three themes the reader may agree or disagree with Gardner's hypothesis that the early stages of American involvement in Vietnam made war itself "inevitable." But there is little doubt that the policy decisions implemented from the administrations of Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower were flawed, self-interested, and oftentimes knee-jerk responses to the perceived threat of monolithic international communism.

From 1941 through 1945, President Roosevelt had quietly made plans to form an international trusteeship over Indochina as a means by which the colonial outpost could develop self-determination. Increasingly, from 1945 on, as Allied world-power unity was formulated and America's postwar European requirements took precedence, Roosevelt was urged to rethink his plans for Indochina.

During the Truman Administration, Vietnam trusteeship was postponed further, the French slowly regained hegemony in Indochina, and Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The question for Truman and his policymakers became "not whether France should return to Indochina, only whether it was capable of playing a proper role" (p. 57). Nevertheless, "what disturbed American planners the most," Gardner asserts, "was that a Japan isolated from the Asian continent would be drawn closer and closer economically to the Sino-Soviet bloc" (p. 81). In addition, British concerns over the destabilizing effects of an insurgency movement in Southeast Asia and its impact upon the colonial interests, Commonwealth markets, and the general European recovery led them to launch a "full-scale campaign to encourage a strong American policy in Southeast Asia" (p. 84).

American diplomatic recognition of former Indochinese Emperor Bao Dai followed in 1950. American actions and those of her allies by that time added Vietnam to the Cold War.

Within months after Bao Dai's government received United States' approval, the Korean war came to dominate American policymaking. "Korea was impossible to win," Gardner points out, "making it impossible to accept defeat in Indochina" (p. 92). The new Eisenhower Administration's policy of "unilateral concerted action," an integral component of the New Look strategic policy, did not prove to be the alternative to containment in Asia. And the 1952 election's Republican battlecry of "Liberation," which proposed the dismantling of worldwide colonialism, succumbed to an effort of "united action" in Indochina that included the British and the French.

When the Korean war finally reached a negotiated settlement in July of 1953, the great powers convened the Geneva Conference. Geneva's agenda included both Korea and Indochina, and its declarations in July of 1954 called for national elections and the partition of Indochina. Instead of endorsing the final accords, the Eisenhower Administration began to coordinate Project Vietnam and administer to its puppet government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. Gardner contends that Project Vietnam was a liberal form of "low-cost colonialism," a form of nation-building that attempted to export the material and spiritual premises of Western democracy. In reality, he maintains, it was Old World diplomacy with a new twist. The long-term commitments of nation-building strained America's resources, accorded weak analytical policy decisions, and made it impossible for the United States to disengage from Vietnam.

By examining the so-called First Vietnam war—a war of world power politics and diplomacy from afar—Gardner had shed new light on the Cold War complexities, executive strategies, and White House "insider politics" that established an American pattern of foreign policy formulation for many years ahead. Although Gardner does not claim to answer all questions about the origins of American involvement in Southeast Asia, *Approaching Vietnam* proves to be an illuminating study and fascinating reading of diplomatic processes and geopolitical global strategy gone awry. Indeed, if there are lessons to be learned from America's war in Vietnam, they may well rest with the first diplomatic phase of the 1940s and 1950s.

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ROBERT E. DENTON, JR., *The Primetime Presidency of Ronald Reagan: The Era of the Television Presidency* (New York, Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1988), 107 pp. including Index. \$29.95 clothbound (ISBN 0-275-92603-6).

Although this is an excellent monograph, there are a few minor criticisms one can make. It is certainly commended to students of presidential communication.

Professor Denton, head of the Department of Communication Studies at Vir-

ginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, explains that since the 1970s, public attention to the media for information and guidance in selecting presidents has been a growing concern. It has come to dominate both campaign politics and White House public relations.

The following topics are dealt with in this fine volume: (1) President Reagan's successful use of television for shaping images as well as governing, using rhetorical analysis; (2) social power of the media, media and politics, and media and campaigns; (3) the role of television in presidential politics, including TV's impact on political information, participation, and presidential governing; (4) defining and detailing the ways in which Ronald Reagan's Presidency was a model for the fully developed prime-time Presidency, and (5) speculation on the future of the Presidency in the age of television.

Some sample comments from the Denton volume follow:

“. . . (T)he news industry looks for and shares 'news that wiggles.' However, the more in-depth the coverage the less 'wiggle.' Thus the elements of action and movement are stressed over more cognitive elements. Emotional responses are the ones the public remembers and help define future reactions to people and events” (p. 52).

“Reagan's staff, as media professionals, recognized that the public has less and less of a historical memory. This requires a daily concern, rather than a long-term perspective for impression management. They also recognized that the mass media expected a steady and constant 'din' from the White House. And, as [Roderick] Hart [in *The Sound of Leadership*] confirmed in a recent study, just 'talking' provides a president with media access and coverage . . .” (p. 69).

“Ronald Reagan is our first true television president. His persona, messages, and behavior fit the medium's requirements in terms of form, content, and industry demands. Reagan surrounds himself with professionals of the modern communications technology. They make sure the settings are correct and the messages clear. Reagan as a television actor delivers the lines and gestures to ensure the desired response—agreement through empathy. Dramatic expressions mix reality with fantasy . . .” (pp. 76, 77).

“The notion that the U.S. presidency is a product available for public consumption is certainly not new. What is new is the degree to which the office has been personalized and separated from the daily issue and policy concerns of the incumbent. Specific product features and attributes are largely ignored while emphasizing generalized or even idealized product benefits and consequences . . .” (p. 88).

Professor Denton does an excellent job of synthesizing the literature on White House communication. He suggests that since 1980, a new era has occurred which has had as its theme the intensification of the influence of television (with cable and satellite technology and other vast technical improvements). He also quotes such well known names in the literature as Dan Nimmo, Kathleen Jamieson, Marshall McLuhan, Harold Lasswell, Christopher Arterton, William Adams, James Combs and Frank Kessler.

The author appears to argue that style has replaced substance of issues as a governing theme in presidential communication. The counter argument may be made

that since sound bites tend to reduce issues to symbols, there is still more issue content than he perhaps visualizes. That the trend is in the direction of style, it is hard to argue with.

In brief, then, Professor Denton's book is an important book, almost a landmark book, which all media specialists and other interested persons should read. It is quite well executed.

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JOSEPH D. DOUGLASS, JR. and NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE, *America The Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare* (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Company, 1987). 187 pp.+ \$19.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-669-12080-4).

For over forty years the American people have been repeatedly subjected to nightmarish scenarios about nuclear war. Recent examples of this genre include ABC's production of the movie, "The Day After," Jonathan Schell's book, *The Fate of the Earth*, and Carl Sagan's article describing a hypothetical "nuclear winter." The threat of nuclear war has been culturally implanted in the consciousness of most Americans, including our governmental leaders. All postwar Presidents have proposed disarmament or arms control schemes designed to lessen this threat.

It is this very preoccupation with the nuclear threat that has helped blind most Americans to the equally dangerous threat of chemical and biological (C/B) warfare. The authors of *America the Vulnerable* lament the fact that "this nation is almost entirely defenseless against chemical, biological, and toxin weapons of mass destruction." Their purpose is to awaken America and its leaders to the nature and extent of the C/B weapons threat, and to suggest ways to effectively combat this threat.

Douglass and Livingstone present an informed technical analysis of C/B weapons and warfare in the context of international terrorism and Soviet global strategy. They divide current C/B weapons into three broad categories: "chemical agents," which consist of gases, liquids or solids that affect a person's blood, skin or nerves; "biological agents," which include viruses, bacteria and rickettsia; and "toxins," which are poisonous by-products of microorganisms, animals and plants. Future C/B weapons include diseases and mutagens manufactured by genetic tinkering, and psychochemical agents capable of inducing profound behavioral change. C/B weapons are attractive to terrorists and their Soviet sponsors because they are cheap; they can be produced quickly and with little difficulty or danger; only a small amount presents a great threat; almost any target is vulnerable; and they have a high degree of reliability.

Potential targets of C/B weaponry include a nation's leadership, diplomats, soldiers, foodstuffs, water supplies, livestock and crops. The authors provide an appendix

which lists thirty-two C/B attacks carried out by terrorists and other nonstate actors. In addition, they present thirteen realistic scenarios involving the use of C/B weapons against various Western targets.

The most enlightening and alarming part of the book is the authors' discussion of the role of C/B warfare in Soviet global strategy. Relying on information supplied by East bloc defectors and emigres, especially Jan Sejna, a former member of the Czechoslovakian Defense Council, the authors reveal that "the massive use of C/B weapons was formally incorporated into all Warsaw Pact operational plans in 1967." Soviet military strategists assign C/B weapons a variety of tasks, including the destruction, incapacitation or sabotage of military and industrial targets; the poisoning of areas where enemy forces might land; and the assassination or liquidation of the enemy's political elite. The physical and psychological effects of C/B attacks are to be exploited by "follow-on-assaults to capture land, forces, or facilities." Interestingly, the authors include "Soviet-directed narcotics trafficking," via Cuba, Nicaragua and Bulgaria, as another aspect of C/B warfare designed to undermine and demoralize the West.

In the final chapter, Douglass and Livingstone advocate the creation of a Biochem Advisory Council, a C/B warfare Crisis Response Team, and a Covert Strike Force, as well as efforts to improve intelligence and internal security, increase C/B research and development, and intensify the war against illegal drugs. Recent allegations about a Libyan chemical weapons plant and evidence that Colonel Muammar Qaddafi is or will soon be equipped for C/B warfare add increasing urgency to this dangerous problem. President Bush should require every person on his national security team to read this important book.

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JOHN M. BELOHLAVEK, *"Let the Eagle Soar!": The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson* (Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), x, 328 pp. \$28.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-8032-118702).

As students of the Jacksonian era know, Robert Remini and Edward Pessen do not often agree. Yet both of them—and others as well—have recognized for some time the need for greater study of Jacksonian foreign policy. Although neither book deals exclusively with the Jackson administration, William H. Goetzmann's *When the Eagle Screamed: The Romantic Horizon in American Diplomacy, 1800-1860* (1966) and Paul A. Varg's *United States Foreign Relations, 1820-1860* (1979) have served as convenient introductions as we waited for others to take up the theme in more detail. In the last few years, John M. Belohlavek has published several significant articles on this too often neglected subject, including one in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (1980);

and now, with the publication of his book, he goes considerably further toward filling a void.

This scholarly void existed in the first place because of several fundamental assumptions that were not altogether valid. The conventional wisdom among American historians for a long time was that the United States largely turned its back on world affairs after the War of 1812. A century of relative peace in Europe, it was said, afforded Americans the luxury of increased isolation during much of the nineteenth century, during which period the nation preoccupied itself to a great extent with domestic issues, economic development, peopling the continent, and internecine strife. In short, there was at this time supposedly only a little American diplomacy to be chronicled. And besides, Jackson himself was thought to have had precious little interest in the whole area of foreign relations. Thus there was allegedly even less *Jacksonian diplomacy* than there was antebellum American diplomacy in general.

Belohlavek's greatest contribution is his forceful, well-documented reminder of just how much diplomatic activity there actually was in the Jackson presidency. After giving some introductory material on Jackson's background, vision, and presidential style and on the overall diplomatic goals of the administration, the author concentrates, in a workmanlike fashion, on a region-by-region treatment of the major areas of American diplomatic concern in these years, namely Western Europe, the Mediterranean world, Asia, South America, Mexico and Central America. Each of his chapter-length area studies is ably researched and well written and will be of enduring value as a reference work.

Belohlavek's attempt to make Jackson almost as masterful a diplomat as Remini says he was a politician, however, is not entirely convincing. We may well agree that Jackson pursued "positive and aggressive relations with Europe that stimulated American commerce, travel, and interest" (p. 52), but the text of the book as a whole makes one wonder if it is really true to say that "Jackson registered an amazing string of victories" (p. 53) in the diplomatic arena. Much of the data that the author himself presents seems to contradict some of his more sweeping judgments as to the President's overall sagacity and effectiveness. For example, Belohlavek contends that America's volume of trade with Spanish Cuba meant that Madrid was thought of as *the* most important American diplomatic assignment after St. James's, and yet a Jackson who was supposedly diplomatically adept sent to that important European capital one Cornelius P. Van Ness, who had only "marginal diplomatic skills," one William T. Barry, "a poor choice" who died en route, and one John H. Eaton, who "proved as difficult for the State Department to manage as Van Ness had been" (pp. 79-80). At other places in Belohlavek's book we are told that diplomatic successes with Portugal were modest, that the choice of John Randolph of Roanoke to be American Minister to St. Petersburg was a poor one, that commerce with the Ottoman Empire did not materialize to the extent hoped for, that Edmund Roberts could not open up Japan, that Jacksonian foreign policy in South America was only limitedly successful, and so on.

In sum, while Belohlavek's study is a serviceable and important one, it does not appear from reading it that Andrew Jackson the diplomat was anything like the equal of Andrew Jackson the general or Andrew Jackson the politician. Given the operation

of an undeniable pendulum effect in historical interpretation, the danger has always been that the scholar who set about to modify the old assumptions about Jacksonian diplomacy would go too far in the opposite direction. And, in some senses, Belohlavek has in this significant volume.

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NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., *In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of Thomas Jefferson* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 414 pp. \$24.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-8071-1375-1).

Only a few people in all of American history—one thinks of Lincoln, Washington, and possibly Jackson—have had as many biographers as Thomas Jefferson has had. Understandably, then, when yet another purportedly “new” biography of the Sage of Monticello appears, the curious reader finds himself almost instinctively looking for something that is really new. One would like to encounter completely new facts, of course; but, realistically, one can hardly expect to do so in this particular case. Since Thomas Jefferson meticulously preserved his incoming correspondence as well as copies of most of the some eighteen thousand letters that he himself wrote, most of the basic facts of Jefferson’s life that are historically knowable at all have been well-known for a long time now. Upon occasion, previously unknown Jefferson documents do still turn up, but by and large these tend merely to further substantiate what was already fairly clear before.

At this late date in Jefferson historiography, therefore, both Jefferson scholars (of whom there are many) and Jefferson buffs (of whom there are many more) are likely to evaluate any recently published Jefferson study by asking questions related not so much to the facts per se as to the author’s methodology, degree of insight, and overall interpretation.

Methodologically, there is not much that is new here. Basically, this is a well-researched, well-documented, and well-written, if somewhat old-fashioned and predictable, political biography. It focuses upon Jefferson the public man, Jefferson the man in power. Even when due allowances are made for the relative paucity of materials documenting Jefferson’s earliest years, for example, only the scantiest attention is given to that “formative” (and thus, in some ways, most important) part of our story. Indeed, Cunningham devotes more pages to the Genet Affair of 1793 than to the entire first quarter of Jefferson’s life. Although the Genet matter was one of the more vexatious problems that Jefferson had to deal with as Washington’s secretary of state, there still seems to be a considerable imbalance in all of this. To be sure, Cunningham does not entirely neglect Jefferson the private man, Jefferson the multifaceted man, Jefferson the family man, and Jefferson the non-political, apolitical, and even anti-political man,

but these important dimensions of the real Jefferson are unduly subordinated to the story of Jefferson the politician. Nonetheless, the obdurate fact remains—that nearly one-half of Jefferson's long and eventful life was spent outside the political arena. In addition, Cunningham underemphasizes the Jefferson who did not like politics very much, who often denounced politics, and who sometimes resigned office and even more often threatened to resign. In other words, the author downplays that Jefferson who said that nature had meant him for the student and not the man of political affairs, that Jefferson, in short, who was often haunted by the sense that he had missed his true calling and consequently had misspent a considerable portion of his life. Thus the author seems to miss much of the inner tension and the inner drama of Jefferson's life, the inner dilemma of a man who could not easily extricate himself from politics nor feel entirely happy or free while involved therein. One wonders just how much more there is to be learned about Thomas Jefferson as a whole person until his biographers achieve a better balance of the political and non-political aspects of his nature and of his life. As we must recall, Jefferson left the presidency on March 4, 1809 feeling, as he himself said, like a prisoner newly liberated from his chains. Now, that may just be one of the most important and most revealing of all of Jefferson's images. The image is certainly of potential methodological significance for the biographer, for it could suggest a very different approach from that of Cunningham and the other rather conventional chroniclers of Jefferson's political career.

Matters that are mainly methodological have a way of leading us to matters having to do with insight into Jefferson's character. Although Cunningham knows the Jefferson period of American history extraordinarily well, as his previous writings attest, this biography provides us with surprisingly little additional insights into Jefferson the flesh-and-blood person. In part, this results from Cunningham's failure to sufficiently exploit some of Jefferson's own words, to analyze them, to mine them, to prove their profounder meaning. Jefferson may say thus and so, but what do these words of his really mean? For example, there is a well-known letter of Jefferson to Madison written from Philadelphia on June 9, 1793. In it, Jefferson, who is eagerly looking ahead to his resignation as secretary of state, pores out his very soul to his dearest friend and thus reveals himself to a much greater degree than he usually does. He even writes parts of this truly remarkable letter in the mode more of poet than of the politician. But while Cunningham cites this letter in his footnotes, he does not seem to be fully appreciative of its real significance. There are, elsewhere in Jefferson's vast correspondence, other documents that could lead us as readers to a fresher and much better comprehension of our very talented but still very human subject if only our biographers would squeeze Jefferson's words a little harder to make them relinquish the deeper meaning they yet retain even after all these years.

Perhaps the biggest questions of all have to do with Cunningham's overall interpretation of Jefferson as a man slavishly dedicated to a life of reason. As a man of the Enlightenment, Jefferson liked very much to project that image of himself—to project it to himself, to his contemporaries, and to posterity. His letters are often filled with such projections, some of them seemingly rather calculated. Clearly, Jefferson wants Cunningham to believe that Jefferson is a man of reason above all else; and,

just as clearly, Cunningham wants us to believe that too. But is it really true? Or is the real Jefferson far more complex than that? To what degree can the whole of Jefferson's life (or anyone's life, for that matter) be tightly woven around a single theme? Is this the rational Jefferson or some other who forces his nine-year-old daughter Polly to leave Virginia and to come to Paris quite against her will? Is this the rational Jefferson or some other who returns from Paris with seventy-eight large crates of furniture and other acquisitions that he could not afford? Is this Jefferson really rational who, when fifty-three years old and deep in debt, begins yet another extensive remodeling project for a house that he has already been working on for almost three decades? Just how rational is it for any man in any age to live as much beyond his means as Jefferson did for substantial portions of his life? It is very understandable, this love of fine things. It is very human. *But rational?* In the end, Cunningham's thesis, which is mostly just a repeat of a very old thesis, simply will not contain enough of the known facts. Jefferson loved reason. There is no doubting that. But he was also very complex and very human, probably more complex than he himself knew and certainly far more complex than most of his biographers have thus far portrayed him as being.

In sum, Cunningham's book is, at one level, a fine retelling of a quite familiar yet still intriguing story. And that, in and of itself, is no mean accomplishment. But what is even clearer is that the Jefferson theme in American historiography is an old, old theme now in dire need of some fresher approaches.

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DAVID BURNER, *John F. Kennedy and a New Generation* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown College Division, 1988), ix + 189 pp., \$16.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-673-39810-2).

The author of this little book was himself a young man back in the 1960's, and he writes about that time, especially the civil rights movement of the age, with both insight and discernible passion. But David Burner is also an able historian who refuses to glorify unduly either his subject or the subject's era. Consequently, this is a warts-and-all biography, but one that remains remarkably sensitive to the complexities of the human condition. Some of the inveterate Kennedy groupies who are still around may well be put off by it, but basically it is very fair.

For almost a decade after the death of JFK, polls ranking presidents put him ahead of FDR in the American pantheon. But what about the facts? Just how much credit does Kennedy himself really deserve—and for what? As Burner reminds us, it was Nikita Khrushchev who proposed the Moscow-Washington hotline, Hubert Humphrey and others who had dreamed of a peace corps, Bobby Kennedy who engineered the arrangement that peacefully ended the Cuban missile crisis, and speech-

writer Theodore Sorensen who actually wrote both Kennedy's Pulitzer Prize winning book *Profiles in Courage* and his truly memorable inaugural address. What, then, did Kennedy on his own accomplish? Not very much. Or so, at times, Burner seems to be saying. Burner's Kennedy is often contradictory, vacillating, and indecisive. He may come into the presidency with boundless energy and a reputation for a ready wit, but he largely lacks any clear and specific vision of what can be accomplished or even what it is that he himself wants to accomplish. At times like these, Burner writes as though he agreed with the old quip that Kennedy, who did not author the *Profiles*, would not have been a fit subject for inclusion therein either. For example: "Withdrawing from Vietnam would have taken the kind of political courage this pragmatic president so much admired yet so rarely demonstrated" (p. 113). There are, to be sure, at least some instances when the author does credit his subject with courage and solid achievement.

But there is another important side to all of this—the symbolic dimension of Kennedy—and Burner treats this phenomenon with considerable perspicacity and appropriate sensitivity. "The legislative work of a generation," he writes, "was accomplished in about three years under a Kennedy-Johnson coalition founded on the symbolic memory of John Kennedy" (p. 118). In other words, though often making distinctions between facts and myths, Burner does not merely stop there. Instead, he sees the profound cultural reality of both. Thus while the Joseph P. Kennedy clan did everything it could, using mostly fair means but sometimes even foul, to promote John's political ambitions, at another level it was almost as if the spirit of the age itself had landed on John Kennedy and made him its symbol. Coming to the fore was a new and restless generation, one eager to test its mettle and to prove its worth. Mere facts are simply too limiting, it would appear, especially at a time when human spirits need so to soar.

Even newer generations have now come upon the American scene, of course, generations having no personal recollection at all of John F. Kennedy or his times. For these, David Burner has done an admirable job of helping to extend our culture's collective memory by using the historian's vicarious means. However, perhaps there is one thing in Burner's book still insufficiently explored. Perhaps the entire Kennedy story, almost as much as any story in our history, needs to be set in the context of the highly symbolic nature of American leadership in general. Did Washington really deserve all the adulation he received in his day? Did the victorious Jackson? Or the martyred Lincoln? If it is true, as these and other historical examples would seem to suggest, that the spirit of the age can somehow, mysteriously coalesce around one man, then that man perforce loses his true identity as the man and the movement magically merge. Perhaps that is the profoundest meaning of Kennedy, of his place in his own generation, and of his role in American history and culture generally.

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WILLIAM J. CASEY, *The Secret War Against Hitler* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988), 304 pp. \$19.95 hardcover (ISBN: 0-89526-563-X).

That Bill Casey was a devoted, ardent American patriot can scarcely be denied. His dedication to his country's welfare persisted from the time when, as a young man in his early thirties, he helped manage the highly secret OSS operations in World War II, and soon thereafter he served as Associate General Counsel of the Marshall Plan. Later he became Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, President of the Export-Import Bank, director of the Reagan presidential campaign and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. These were positions which required a high level of knowledge and ability, not mere political appointment.

His moderate fortune came from his skill as a lawyer, writer and publisher. He eschewed emoluments and honoraria, and despite many personalized attacks from opponents, inspired by political intrigue, he always came through the tribulations unscathed and unbowed.

This book, published posthumously, while not intended to do so, shows the necessity for covert operations in this constantly disturbed, dangerous world. The necessity for clandestine, often dirty, operations are properly deplored by some well-meaning people living in a world of pink, pleasant dreams where nations behave and co-operate unselfishly to make a better world for all, East, West, North and South.

But World War II was a battle for actual survival against a monster and his forces, and we were losing that battle when America entered the war. There was an immediate need for Intelligence operations and the Office of Strategic Services, under Wild Bill Donovan, was created to do those things, whatever they were, which would provide information helpful to the war effort. These always dangerous operations are described in distinct detail by Mr. Casey. At the outset there was resentment and polite lack of co-operation on the part of not only the British but American military commanders as well. However, an urgent need to obtain information from behind the lines in Germany and Italy, plant operatives in strategic spots to infiltrate the enemy population, and set up, supply and direct resistance groups, plus the need to know the location and movement of important units of the German army brought belated acceptance.

This was not a simple matter. It involved the recruitment of brave men, fluent in French and German, jumping from planes in the middle of the night and merging into the general population where they could meet, direct and advise the resistance. Observing the maneuvers and travel direction of the enemy troops and relaying this information outside the country into the ears of the Allied Forces without being discovered are the things movies are made of, but this was the real thing, full of peril and the danger of imminent discovery.

Mr. Casey, with the thoroughness which characterized his life, explores in great, exciting detail this secret war against Hitler. He describes the clandestine activity leading to the easy landings in Morocco and Algiers and the vast preparations preceding the successful invasion of Normandy. Disinformation provided and accepted by the Germans led them to believe that the main thrust would be in the Pas de Calais and not Omaha

Beach. The hiding of 5,000 ships, 9,000 planes, 23,000 parachutists, 176,000 assault troops and 20,000 vehicles was an amazing achievement. Within days after the invasion, OSS trained resistance teams made more than 1,000 rail and communication cuts to hinder German transport of troops to the invasion site. This complicated adventure marked the beginning of the end for Hitler, and relief for the beleaguered Russian army.

There are many intriguing stories on diverse fronts, all described in exacting detail. The imminent production of a German atom bomb was thwarted by Allied forces bombing the discovered plant in Norway producing the essential heavy water required in the process and by the Norwegian underground sinking German convoys carrying nuclear supplies across the Baltic. Casey recounts the scenes behind the scenes in the liberation of France, the penetration of Germany, the temporary stalemate, the Battle of the Bulge and the desperate struggle for agreement within the Allied Forces.

The book is an excellent resource for World War II buffs, because it recounts not just the battles, the generals and the politics, but goes beyond them to furnish fascinating behind the scenes information.

The necessity for and success of these OSS covert operations during the terrible war should lead the reader to review in his mind the need for a CIA, however undesirable it may seem. Perhaps a more strongly supported CIA might provide means of controlling a Qadhafi, a Khomeini, and terrorists of various persuasions, and somehow, by some means, bring our unfortunate hostages home. Standard diplomacy has not worked and perhaps in the interest of world peace and world decency other measures must be taken. The efficacy of the OSS in World War II has been proven. Perhaps the CIA, the successor to the OSS, should be given the resources to meet today's challenges.

Bill Casey, despite his departure, still has had his say, and his inferences are worth listening to. His remarkable career is worthy of a distinguished biographer.

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FRANCES HOWELL RUDKO, *Truman's Court: A Study in Judicial Restraint* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1988), 162+ pp. \$37.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-313-26316-07).

One of a president's most important and highly publicized duties is to nominate members of the Supreme Court. This was true of Harry S. Truman, who appointed a chief justice and three associate justices to the nation's highest tribunal. In general, scholars have not dealt kindly with the so-called Truman Court and particularly his appointees to it. There are basically two reasons for this: the Truman Court's self-restraint as a force in government and the characteristics of the men whom Truman appointed.

Now comes attorney Frances Howell Rudko to review the works and motives of the Truman Court. In this slender volume, Rudko views the Supreme Court essentially as a judicial instead of a political or de facto legislative institution as has become fashionable in most quarters. Her approach, though perhaps overdone, is useful, given the judicial nature of the Supreme Court and especially the Truman Court's characteristics. Moreover, Rudko speaks with authority, bringing to her study legal training and experience and research into a wide range of sources.

For Rudko, the Truman Court, dated roughly from 1946 to 1957, was one in which judicial restraint, not conservatism, liberalism, or personal political views reigned. In this, she holds, the Truman Court was of a piece with the Franklin Roosevelt Court of 1937-1946. The Supreme Court from 1937 to 1957 was thus distinguished from the conservative activist court that preceded it and the liberal activist court that followed it. During those twenty years, the court's restraint was based on the usual respect of its majority for state and federal authority. This stemmed largely from the majority's suspicions of the conservative activism of the pre-Roosevelt Supreme Court and of any legal philosophy that would substitute the will of the justices for that of elected representatives. On the Truman Court, this was buttressed by the fact that none of Truman's appointees was a legal scholar or brilliant and that all of them had substantial political or governmental experience. What they sought was a predictable law based on legal precedents that were attuned to the interests of all Americans as determined by legislation. In this and their pragmatism, the Truman justices were representative of the sociological school of jurisprudence. This explains the Truman Court's great concern with procedural questions, its general support of the state in loyalty-security and alien rights cases, and its usual upholding of the rights of racial minorities. After all, proper procedure was essential to good law and judicial restraint; loyalty-security and alien rights cases represented a challenge to the state and thus to the people's best interests; and the protection and extension of the rights of racial minorities were consonant with state policy and the people's interests.

The bulk of Rudko's volume deals with the questions of how and why judicial restraint characterized the Truman Court, especially in the chapters on Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson and Associate Justices Harold H. Burton, Thomas C. Clark, and Sherman Minton. This is reinforced in the rest of her book, especially the chapter on "Judicial Restraint versus Judicial Activism" in which she introduces Justices Felix Frankfurter, who influenced the Truman justices regarding judicial restraint, and Hugo Black, the court's exemplar of activism. There is also a fine concluding chapter in which she discusses the values of judicial restraint and the problem of its being individually determined and applied. Of particular interest to the readers of this quarterly is Rudko's chapter on the reasons for Truman's appointments of Vinson, Burton, Clark, and Minton and his expectations of them. Personal acquaintanceship and political concerns probably outweighed merit and representativeness among the president's criteria. Certainly, he expected his appointees to be supportive of his policies and restrained in their decisions. Although Truman was occasionally disappointed with them, Vinson for not keeping down dissents and Burton and Clark for their independence, they did serve him reasonably well as devotees of restraint and Vinson was an able judicial administrator.

Rudko is more favorably disposed toward Truman's four justices than most other scholarly analysts have been. This is partly because she goes into greater depth in studying the four men as a group and partly because she believes that a restrained court can serve a valuable purpose in a representative democracy. We know where Rudko stands, but one wishes that she had analyzed the biases of those scholars who favor an activist Supreme Court. One can also argue with her playing down the political and legislative aspects of the Truman Court, for they were there along with its exaltation of judicial institutionalism. It would certainly have been useful had Rudko done more to compare the bases of the court's restraint in the 1937-1946 and 1946-1957 periods and to study the Truman Court justices in addition to the president's four appointees and Frankfurter and Black. Yet, all considered, Rudko has produced in this book a well documented and thoughtful contribution to knowledge about the court and the Truman presidency.

DONALD R. MCCOY

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DAVID E. HARRELL, JR., *Pat Robertson: A Personal, Religious, and Political Portrait* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 246 pp. \$15.95 papercover (ISBN 0-06-250380-4).

As the title implies, *Pat Robertson* is divided into three parts which describe his background and delve into the religious and political facets of his personality. This convenient, if unorthodox, division allows religion historian David Harrell to fashion an essentially campaign biography shortly before the 1988 election. Harrell's intention is "to make Robertson's views understandable" by letting the Christian broadcaster—not his critics—speak. He succeeds in this purpose; but for this reason and others the biography is ultimately unsatisfying.

Marion G. "Pat" Robertson came to the 1988 Republican presidential race by a circuitous and ultimately logical route. His austere, conservative father was Democratic Senator A. Willis Robertson of Virginia, who first offered him a ringside political seat as a two-year-old. After breezing through prep school and Washington & Lee University, Pat Robertson suffered a prolonged period of personal trials. To a significant degree, he brought these troubles upon himself. In the 1950s, Robertson fitfully pursued careers in law and business, married to shield an unplanned pregnancy, and entered a Baptist seminary. Encouraged by his religious mother and pentecostal minister Harald Bredeson, Robertson found a spiritual home in the charismatic Christian movement which emphasizes supernatural powers.

Felt led by God, Robertson crossed his religious rubicon in 1960 when he bought a bankrupt television station in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Working closely with evangelist Jim Bakker, Robertson fashioned what became the country's most financially successful religious programming. They patterned the daily hour-long "700 Club"

program after Johnny Carson's "Tonight Show" and financed the Christian Broadcasting Network through periodic telethons for regularly monthly contributions. Robertson pioneered the ingenious concept of television ministry by creating a prayer counseling center for distressed viewers. Of course, this tied viewers even closer to Robertson and proved economically rewarding. CBN also established a university and law school to train Christians in their chosen careers. The glue that held this cable television and educational empire together was the ever-genial but shrewd Robertson.

Robertson's race for the presidency grew out of his political roots, his perception that America was morally sick, and his conviction that he alone was called to lead the country in 1988. The televangelist-turned-politician parlayed his extensive television exposure into an electronic pulpit for a deeply conservative socioeconomic ideology and millions of dollars that underwrote his campaign. But in ways that Harrell minimizes or ignores, Robertson's virginal political race was doomed from its inception despite his fervent appeals to 60 million evangelical Christians. Harrell is on more familiar and surer ground in treating the evangelical movement of which Robertson is a part.

Pat Robertson serves as an informative introduction to the man. The book is not definitive, however, because it largely overlooks Robertson's subterranean political and economic motives. It relies too heavily on his inner circle for judgments about his intelligence and integrity. Finally, the author takes the usual pratfall when a historian gazes into a crystal ball. For example, Harrell described Robertson as a "formidable populist candidate" (p. 224) who could make a "stunning impact" (p. 161) on the 1988 election. In hindsight, this optimistic forecast was sadly mistaken as Robertson withdrew months before the Republican party's convention. At the end of the book, we are told that Robertson will be a "political name to be reckoned with" (p. 232) through the year 2000. Historians—Harrell included—are usually better off examining historical figures and events than in making political prognoses.

BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD

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ROBERT E. LEVIN, ed., *Democratic Blueprints: 40 National Leaders Chart America's Future* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 544+ pp. \$19.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-87052-466-6).

The Democratic Party would have been better served with a shorter, more diverse campaign document. Actually, there are 47 contributors and Part One, "Where the Democrats Stand," includes every primary entrant. The voices are harmonious but some make the same points better than others. For instance Bruce Babbitt writes of "The Democratic Workplace" but Charles Robb says it better in "Democratic Capitalism." The editor, founder of an economic policy forum in New York City, tried to impose a theme: How can the party, given the opportunity, expand and enrich

the economy? With few exceptions the book is aimed, not at the hearts and minds, but at the pocketbooks of America. Within this context some good points are scored. Jesse Jackson exposes the seamy side of multi-national corporations and the Reagan version of free trade. There are lucid treatments of economic enterprise and American business by Robert Reich and Alice M. Rivlin. Articles by William Gray, Ernest Hollings, Bill Bradley, Charles Schumer, and Pat Choate make a good crash course in fiscal policy and international trade. Jim Hightower says sensible things about family farming. Yet the independent voter or "glad-to-be-back Democrat," to use Michael Sonnenfeldt's theme, will expect something more inspiring under the heads of "Goals and Principles of the Democratic Party" (Part Two) and "America's Agenda for the 1990s" (Part Three).

Not all important political issues are found in the purse and a few contributors make the point. Raymond Dalio poses a historical theory of "the life cycle of a country" (pp. 482-4) within an otherwise technical economic piece, "The Decline of the American Empire." Norman Lear says that corporate business has replaced the family, schools, and churches as institutional molders of society. "America has become a game show," he writes. "Winning is all that matters" (p. 437). We are, he says, "a business-oriented society run amok" (p. 441). Sally Ride's "Leadership and America's Future in Space" is a refreshingly clear technological argument.

Given the issue's expected prominence in the campaign of 1988, it is surprising to find so little on national defense. Patricia Schroeder looks at the U.S. Army in Europe and the Far East but evaluates the problem of force levels purely from the standpoint of cost. Gordon Adams does much better with "The Reagan Legacy and Defense Requirements for the 1990s." But there are no papers on SDI or the erosion of conventional forces. There is little on farm and environmental policy, either, perhaps expected in a book that features five big-city mayors. Nor is education or the problem of street crime adequately treated, though they are serious urban problems.

One is tempted to dismiss this book as an artifact of the late presidential campaign. There is much here, however, to elicit fruitful discussion during the Bush administration. Even Republicans could read it to understand essentially nonpartisan economic problems.

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MELVIN SMALL, *Johnson, Nixon and the Doves* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 322 pp. \$35.00 hardcover (ISBN 0-8135-1287-5). \$12.00 paper-cover (ISBN 0-8135-1288-3).

Not too long ago I was in Washington while some fifty thousand anti-abortion marchers made their way down Pennsylvania Avenue. I asked a friend in a Congress-

sional office if the many marchers had affected in any way his or his boss's view of the issue. What march? was his only response.

Historian Melvin Small asks one central question in his fascinating and thoroughly researched study of the Vietnam years: did the anti-war movement have a significant effect on the Johnson and Nixon administrations and in particular, did the protest movement affect presidential direction of the war itself? As anyone who has tried to track or affect the relationship between public opinion and public policy—especially foreign policy—knows, Small is tackling a very difficult topic. Small knows it, too.

Small begins his study with a thoughtful rejection of “social-scientific models of public opinion formation and submission.” According to Small, “public opinion is what government officials thought it was,” and not what a model “proves” it to be. So in his historical account, Small looks at how anti-war opinion actually got to Nixon, Johnson and some of their top advisors. He then shows as specifically as he can how that opinion did or did not affect specific policy decisions. Based on interviews with most of the major players (alas, not Nixon), a critical reading of a great many of the available White House documents, and a scholar's control of a host of relevant primary and secondary sources Small argues that the protests did have a significant effect on the way the Vietnam war was waged and on the course of the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

Such a discovery will not surprise some. Still, Small's well documented account stands against the claims of a number of researchers and Johnson and Nixon administration officials who have argued that the anti-war movement was not much more than an irritant and had little—other than strengthening the resolve of Hanoi—to do with the course of the Vietnam war.

In some ways, Nixon and Johnson reacted similarly to the increasingly fierce efforts of the anti-war movement. Both, inaccurately, very much tried to believe, as long as they could that protesters were communists, dupes of communists, or marginal Americans and thus that their opinion counted for little. Both, and from their perspective not inaccurately, attacked the movement as counter-productive, as aiding and abetting the enemy. Small effectively shows how much more focused and successful Nixon—who unlike Johnson had no problem with making and having enemies—was in using counter-attacks to rouse and create his own “flag and country” constituency. Both Johnson and Nixon, with Johnson far the more sensitive, were also made to feel deeply embattled and even besieged by the movement. Small argues, breaking no new ground, that this feeling of besiegement led to Johnson's decision not to run for reelection and to Nixon's Watergate debacle.

Small also argues that the protests had a direct bearing on how the war itself was both portrayed to the public and even fought. Convincingly, for example, he reveals how the Pentagon demonstration of October 1967 caused the Johnson administration to oversell the public and opinion leaders on American battlefield successes in late 1967 and early 1968. It is this “spin” exercised by the Johnson administration in reaction to the anti-war movement that causes the Tet offensive to become perceived by so many as a major blow to American efforts.

Less persuasively, Small concludes that the October 1969 national anti-war Moratorium "helped to convince Nixon that Americans would not accept the savage blows envisaged in Operation Duck Hook." This claim is not backed up by any direct evidence, though Small does create a reasonable scenario to support his conclusion.

What Small is able to do most successfully is show how the general public discourse on the war was increasingly set by the anti-war movement. Even when Nixon was orchestrating his "silent majority" campaign, Small shows how much it was in direct reaction to the anti-war movement, and that there was a clear quality of "he protesteth too much" to Nixon's ever angrier announcements that the anti-war protests had no bearing on his Vietnam decisions. Part of Nixon's problem, caused largely by Johnson, was that even as he was successfully rousing the "silent majority," the anti-war movement had already "stole[n] the moral issue from the administration." As a result, in part, Nixon had to forge his arguments on the war around de-escalation and "peace with honor" which limited his options, though the Christmas bombings and Cambodian incursions suggest that Nixon was not without his own wild cards.

Public opinion is a slippery subject. As Small shows, "it" reaches the president in so many ways, ranging from hard but constantly changing survey data to the casual remarks of cabinet officers' kids. And, as Small reveals in often fascinating detail, the piece of the public opinion pie to which presidents and their staffs decide to react is far from predictable.

Small, ex-anti-war protester, takes heart in this often irrational process: "What this means is that those who exercise their rights as citizens to gather, protest and petition in comparatively small numbers have more of an impact on their leaders than one would expect." Of course, one does wonder if Small would be so sanguine in his conclusion about the power of activists in our generally somnolent democracy if his story revolved around the aforementioned anti-abortion marchers of, let's say, business lobbyists.

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ROBERT S. McELVAINE, *Mario Cuomo: A Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), xiv, 449 pp. \$19.95 hardcover (ISBN 0-684-18970-4).

This biography of Mario Cuomo is undergirded by important assumptions: First, "vast number of Americans" regard Cuomo as "the most intriguing figure in American public life today. It is widely believed that he has a good chance of becoming president of the United States at some point in the not too distant future." Secondly, given "the long series of less than wholly satisfactory presidents during the past two decades, . . . it is desirable to know as much as possible about potential national leaders

before we elect them." If these two assumptions are not compelling enough for many readers, consider Cuomo "a fascinating person who has had a major impact on American politics," thus deserving of a biography apart from his presidential ambitions (p. ix).

With these informing assumptions in mind, Robert S. McElvaine, Professor of History at Millsaps College, has written an engaging account of Cuomo's life and political career. Single-word chapter headings signal the major dimensions of the biography: enigma (why has one with so much popularity rejected the beckoning call of the Democratic party to run for the presidency?); heritage: urban, working class Italian American; youth: born June 15, 1932, inculcated to work in his father's grocery store, excellent student, talented baseball player; Catholic: a puritan who is religious as opposed to one who merely practices religion; competitor: enjoys winning only if it means victory not for himself alone; family: a concept that embraces interdependency of the human race; conciliator: a role Cuomo discovered and practiced in the sixties and seventies; natural: with the character, intelligence, and oratorical power to become a positive force in politics; loser: the New York City mayoralty to Edward Koch in 1977, a fortunate outcome because the office is a political dead end; winner: Lt. Governor of New York in 1978, Governor of the state in 1982; Governor: champion of affirmative government to meet the needs of the middle class and the poor; leader: whose democratic vision for the interrelatedness of Americans thrust the New York governor into the national limelight with his moving keynote address at the 1984 Democratic National Convention and whose record secured his re-election in 1986 by an unprecedented margin of 1.3 million votes. The concluding chapter takes the measure of the man.

Not surprisingly, McElvaine's Cuomo is remarkable for his beliefs, his abilities, and values. As a self-described progressive pragmatist who blends social liberalism with fiscal conservatism, Cuomo believes in affirmative government that balances the needs of all people, especially the poor, in the spirit of the New Deal of the 1930s and Catholic theology as exemplified by Pope John XXIII. His greatest ability lies in communicating his vision of the interdependency of the human family to audiences as diverse as a classroom of school children to millions of Americans via televisions. While his belief in himself is tempered by self-doubt, his many admirers sense the elusive quality that gives him charisma.

McElvaine's assessment of the qualities of Cuomo and the needs of the nation makes it imperative in his view that the New York governor seek the presidency. He acknowledges that two factors could cause difficulty for a national Cuomo campaign. "One is the proven corruption of several people whom Cuomo has been associated in the past. The other is the whispering campaign that some member of his family might have been involved with . . . the Maifa" (p. 406). McElvaine explains away the first factor by pointing out that Cuomo has dealt with corrupt politicians through necessity, not choice, and when some of his appointees turned corrupt, he quickly took appropriate action. On the second charge of ties to the Mafia, McElvaine notes that investigators and opponents have turned up nothing to link Cuomo to the underworld.

How objective is this biography, based largely upon interviews with Cuomo,

his family, friends, and associates, as well as the governor's personal diary? McElvaine insists that admiration for his subject has not gotten in the way of uncovering and presenting Cuomo's imperfections. We learn that Cuomo is a workaholic who spends much time away from his family, capable of being nasty in a campaign, tends to be vindictive with a volatile temper, among other traits. Yet McElvaine has not pushed his research and analysis far enough on certain critical points. For example, he settles for the explanation that Cuomo was not conscripted during the Korean War because scholarship students received deferments. This is surely one area that will be scrutinized more carefully if Cuomo subsequently decides to seek the presidency.

Indeed, the ultimate value of this book may rest upon the future course of Cuomo. If he decides to run for president, this biography will be an informative starting point for his supporters and opponents alike. If Cuomo stays on the political sidelines or returns to private life, the book remains a revealing study of a second generation urban Italian American Catholic who came to political maturity when liberalism was at its nadir nationally.

FRANKLIN D. MITCHELL

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JAMES DAVID BARBER, *Politics by Humans: Research on American Leadership* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 517 pp. \$59.50 hardcover \$19.95 papercover (ISBN 0-8223-0837-1).

JEAN BLONDEL, *Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1987), 216 pp. \$35.00 hardcover (ISBN 0-8039-8036-1).

This review is being written twelve days before the 1988 presidential campaign finally reaches its denouement. It has been a process more exhausting than exhilarating, one that by collective consent no longer works well enough. Predictions are the numbers will confirm the obvious—the numbers, that is, of those who will stay home, who will chose to register their anger, dissatisfaction, alienation or boredom by not in any way participating in this most fundamental of our political rites.

What is perhaps most remarkable about this perceived decline in the quality of our political life—of which presidential leadership is more than ever the focal point—is that it is by now old hat. For at least fifteen years now we have sensed that something was wrong, but have been, with all, unwilling or unable to remedy what ails us. This general malaise spawned what is by now the conventional wisdom: There is in late 20th century America a “crisis of leadership.”

To be sure, exactly what is meant either by “crisis” or by “leadership” is never made clear. Are we, as the word crisis would suggest, in a state of national emergency, one in which we can be saved only by the proverbial man on the white horse? Or is it rather that those in positions of power and authority have too meager a character to take charge in the aggressive manner we profess to want? For the purpose at hand

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one point in any case stands out: The *Zeitgeist* is right for those who would address, from any angle that makes any sense, the matter of leadership. We are obsessed with the subject in a manner that befits those caught in the vise of a paradox—those who are on the one hand disenchanting, and on the other mesmerized by their own response.

The two books under review are, in altogether different ways, generally welcome additions to what can finally be labeled the growing body of literature on leadership. In fact, after eons of neglect, leadership is rather in vogue just now—to the point where publishers/authors are prone to stick the word in the title even when it is only peripheral to their content. I doubt, for example, that ten years ago the collection of essays by Barber would have been subtitled “Research on American Leadership.” For the fact of the matter is that the pieces in this volume are, if anything about leaders rather than leadership and, at that, they are more far flung in their conception than a focus on individuals would suggest. (The disjunction between leaders and leadership is of no mean importance. To write about leaders is to hone in on a few key people; to write about leadership is to follow a process in which leaders, followers and context must, by definition, be given equal time.)

Barber’s book is nothing so much as slices of the man’s work life. It is diminished somewhat by petty problems. These include chapter titles that give hardly a hint of the topic at hand; few clues as to when what was written and where it first appeared; and an organizational arrangement that left me befuddled rather than enlightened. Moreover the many in number who have made it a point to read what Barber wrote over the past twenty plus years will necessarily find much of the turf familiar.

But this brings me to the main point: The reason we know so much of this man’s work is that it is by and large first rate—albeit not in any conventional sense. In fact appreciating James David Barber’s contribution is to acknowledge at the outset that he is, thank heavens, a political scientist with a difference. He straddles disciplinary boundaries, drawing on history and psychology to put flesh on his findings. He is drawn to rather than repelled by what might loosely be termed popular culture, those mediums—newspapers and television in particular—by which the body politic is educated (or not) to our political life. He is comfortable in our past, and in territories other than the one he inhabits. And, finally, by God this is one social scientist who can write. Through the skillful use of narrative and language Barber breathes life onto the printed page.

Politics by Humans is divided into four parts. The first focuses in different ways on the American president; the second, elusively titled “Perception Shapes Power,” consists of older selections, written mainly in the 1960s when Barber’s research was on personal politics in the state of Connecticut; the third is devoted to explorations of how the media “mediates” leadership; and the fourth contains a single concluding essay. The pieces are, in the main, worth reading, and even re-reading if only dimly remembered from years ago. The better ones are as lively as they are innovative. And the very best stand out.

For example “Roots of Genius,” a brief, bold attempt to tie Franklin Roosevelt’s early life to the “political artistry” of his adulthood, forges a developmental logic out of what would be in other hands little more than a string of facts. Moreover Barber

educates us about this meaning-making process, which, I should add, he considers key to the evaded but nevertheless critical task of predicting performance in the White House. "The gap problem," he writes, "will arise in every Presidential biography. The most important dimension of the problem is not literary but political, not retrospective but prospective. In politics, what his past has to say about his future is crucial in judging a candidate" (p. 179).

This, of course, is a leadership matter. In fact, one might reasonably argue that if we paid Barber heed rather than lip service in this regard we would, by assessing likely outcomes, mitigate the crisis of leadership. But if what you're looking for is a book about political leadership per se, one that is broadly theoretical rather than grounded in specifics pertaining to the American experience, Blondel's volume will be the more welcome.

Political Leadership, we are told, is intended to "provide a general framework for the systematic study of leadership." (inside jacket) By that measure, it falls short. It by no means provides a carefully developed, overarching model that others might apply to their own work; nor does it even persuade us that such a systemic approach is possible. What it does offer is an excursion of sorts over terrain that has come to be known as Leadership Studies (including a useful bibliography).

Much of that terrain has been covered before. Blondel's comments on the study of leadership both in classical political theory and in contemporary political science; his discussions of power and position; his reflections on the legacy of Max Weber; his comparisons between the effects of personal characteristics and institutions on political leadership—all of these are more familiar than foreign.

Blondel does however depart from past practice in two ways. First, he easily assumes a comparative perspective. References are made throughout the text to different leaders in different political cultures, and to how such variations impact on what actually happens. Consider, for example, his brief but illuminating discussion of how difficult it is to translate the word "leader" (p. 12). In French, for instance, there is no direct equivalent, "Chef" implies someone who is quite autocratic; "decideur" is closely related to decision making behavior and is, therefore, too narrow; "guide," for all of De Gaulle's reputed preference for the word, is simply not used very much; while "dirigeant," which is in fact in vogue just now, applies primarily to those working in a collective context.

The second element that distinguishes Blondel's book is his attempt to actually assess the impact leaders have on the societies they rule. He employs two dimensions of analysis: "one distinguishes the 'great' leaders among themselves, depending on the extent to which they are concerned with maintenance or change in the society; the other helps to differentiate between 'great' leaders and policy-makers by assessing the scope and range of intervention" (p. 94). The notion of assessing leaders according to these two measures is an intriguing one which is, however, developed in this volume to only a very limited extent.

Both the Barber and Blondel books, then, have their strengths and a few weaknesses. Moreover by focusing on leadership both authors inevitably till soil that has for too long lain fallow. But *Politics by Humans* is vintage Barber and therefore not

to be missed by anyone unfamiliar with his work. *Political Leadership*, on the other hand, is for the collector, for those among us who stockpile even those volumes on leadership ultimately deemed not required reading.

BARBARA KELLERMAN

Dean of Graduate Studies and Research
Fairleigh Dickinson University

JAY STUART BERMAN, *Police Administration and Progressive Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New York* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), Contributions in Criminology and Penology, Number 19; xvi, 151 pp. \$32.95 (ISBN 0-313-25554-7).

Jay Stuart Berman, who is Chairperson of the Department of Criminal Justice at Jersey City State College, has written a book that needed to be written: a detailed study of Theodore Roosevelt's tenure as President of the Board of Police Commissioners of New York City. All biographies of TR, of course, include a chapter or two on TR's time as "top cop" of New York City; but Berman has produced the first monograph on TR's police commissionership. Theodore Roosevelt was President of the Board of Police Commissioners of New York City from May 6, 1895 to April 19, 1897, a period of only about two years. But during this brief tenure, according to Berman, Roosevelt revolutionized and galvanized the New York City Police Department.

Berman's book shows us that TR was responsible (by this reviewer's count) for some sixteen reforms, changes, innovations, and new policies in the NYPD. TR adopted the European Bertillon system of identification; extended the use of the new technology of the telephone; founded the NYPD's famous bicycle squad; brought in the use of horse-drawn patrol wagons; broadened the use of specialized squads for more effective crime fighting; standardized weapons (he adopted the Colt .32 calibre double action revolver with four-inch barrel) used by the policemen; and replaced the NYPD's old rowboats with lightweight naphtha-powered launches. TR founded the NYPD School of Pistol Practice, which evolved by 1909 into the present New York City Police Academy. TR instituted the civil service system (he had been, 1889-1895, a U.S. Civil Service Commissioner in Washington), replacing political appointment. TR brought centralized control to the NYPD, especially through the Central Detective Bureau, thereby decreasing precinct power, which had fostered corruption through the influence of local politicians. Roosevelt worked to limit and define police functions, improved discipline, and printed and distributed to all officers a manual of rules and regulations. TR brought to the NYPD what Berman calls "a legalistic style of law enforcement" (p. xv). In other words, the Commissioner set out to enforce the laws in a city where selective nonenforcement was a source of graft. TR began a policy of aggressive recruitment for the force, and set new and professional standards for cops, such as height and ability to do basic arithmetic. And Roosevelt extended em-

ployment opportunities in the NYPD to women. "Roosevelt created a sensation when he named Minnie Gertrude Kelly to the \$1,700 per year position of clerk to the President of the Police Board, marking the first time a woman was appointed to an administrative position in the department's history" (p. 77).

Do pistol practice schools, written rules and regulations, and physical and written exams for police applicants sound basic? Berman says that when TR began the NYPD School of Pistol Practice, there was only one other formal police training program in the U.S.; that manuals of rules and regulations were not standard for police forces until the 1970s; and that set admissions standards for police were not universal until the 1940s. In short, TR professionalized and modernized the NYPD.

Berman says that TR's policies got results. Berman's book includes detailed charts on gambling and liquor busts, arrests for violations of ordinances, and other police activities under TR. Berman shows, for instance, that in 1894, the year before TR assumed command, there were 483 arrests for keeping gambling houses, while in 1895 under TR such arrests rose in number to 1,059. Of course, vice was popular with many New Yorkers. And many disapproved of the Sunday closing law for saloons, previously unenforced and the source of much graft. TR replied that if the people did not like some law, then the people should repeal that law.

TR's time with the NYPD was marked by defeat and frustration as well as success. TR was unable to obtain legislation for vital administrative and political reform in the NYPD, and many politicians and voters had turned against him by 1897, when TR reached a virtual dead-end in terms of what he could accomplish in the city. TR retreated to the job of Assistant Secretary of the Navy in Washington, and soon the grafters were back in power in New York City. But TR had left an important legacy. Berman tells us: "The impetus for reform in American law enforcement, which had its origins during the period of Theodore Roosevelt's administration as police commissioner of New York, continues to the present day. The concepts and practices comprising the professional model, fostered in infancy by Roosevelt and other progressive era police reformers, remain as the ideal of police administration in the twentieth century" (p. 122).

JOHN ALLEN GABLE

Theodore Roosevelt Association

JAMES P. PFIFFNER and R. GORDON HOXIE, eds., *The Presidency in Transition* (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1989), 514+ pp. \$30.00 hardcover (ISBN 0-938204-00-9). \$20.00 papercover (ISBN 0-938204-01-7)

In light of the recent insensitive, superficial press criticisms of the new Bush administration for lacking a "sense of direction" and agenda, this remarkable volume warrants careful reading. Edited by James Pfiffner, author of the *Strategic Presidency* (1988 and numerous other works on the president and the budget) and R. Gordon Hoxie, President of the Center as well as author, editor and contributor to more than

a dozen volumes on the administration of the White House, it provides readers a framework within which to compare and prepare this and future administrations' transitions with those of their predecessors.

The transition process is not limited to the pre-inaugural period. It is continuous over time. The editors have carefully selected a well leavened mix of respected scholars and practitioners who generate not only historical frames of reference but also suggestions for making transitions as smooth as possible. Sections include discussions of: the staffing of the White House and prescriptions for effective management; planning and implementation of transitions; a new president's dealings with the ongoing bureaucracy; taking the reins of national security and foreign policy; dealing with a fluid economy; making decisions in a science and high technology age; communicating with the electorate; dealing with Congress; using the vice presidency; and disability, succession, and issues related to long range planning.

In his preface, Gordon Hoxie points out, "One of the clear messages from this volume is the need not only for good people but also sound administration." President Gerald Ford, from the unique perspective of having to put together a transition under pressure of wondering whether he would in fact become president, suggests in the Foreword that a "small permanent secretariat be established which could provide a valuable counsellor memory for future presidents" (p. xxiv).

In a perceptive overview to the volume, its co-editor, James Pfiffner, who has served as both practitioner and outside analyst, discusses how presidential transitions have evolved over the past three decades including the elaborate frameworks of the 1970s and '80s, effective components of each of the transitions, and the need to moderate some of the "excessive centralization" of the modern presidency. He notes that 10–11 weeks for transition is hardly enough time (p. 9); and sees several potential staffing patterns for the 1990s including a: (a) small informal FDR-style staffing arrangement, (b) heirarchical Nixon-like staff system, or a (c) tightly controlled Chief of Staff (COS) system comparable to the Don Regan arrangement in the Reagan years. After examining cabinet consultation, political appointments, and National Security Council relations with the bureaucracy, Pfiffner admonishes future presidents to: (a) make sure that the staff is well organized to "present issues" to the president which are well staffed out, (b) give the White House personnel office leadership in all presidential appointments with agency consultation, and (c) see that the NSC assistant position be made lower profile (p. 18). The selection of Brent Scowcroft by the Bush administration would certainly be a step in this direction especially after the problems of that operation evident in the Iran-Contra fiasco.

Part one finds Bradley Patterson, who served 14 years in the White House; Robert Merriam, former Deputy Directory of the Budget (Eisenhower) and Chair of the Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations (ACIR); Donald Rumsfeld, former White House Chief of Staff (COS) and Defense Secretary (Ford); Ben Heineman, Jr., Assistant Secretary of HEW in the Carter years; and Ralph Bledsoe, Special Assistant to the President for the Domestic Council under Reagan making suggestions on how staffers interact with their new boss. Rather than proposing a cadre of senior executives who would stay aboard from administration to administration, Patterson

proposes that more realistically, incoming administrations should seek to initiate “White House transitional conversations” with the outgoing personnel regardless of party affiliation. Eisenhower had initiated this in 1960, as Merriam recalls. Merriam provides a number of timelessly useful suggestions for any incoming staffers, as does former key Ford staffer, Don Rumsfeld (“Rumsfeld’s Rules”). Both of them advance the Brownlow committee principles that good staffers are people with a “passion for anonymity.” Rumsfeld also reminds staffers to, among other things, be honest, be willing to bring bad news as well as good, and to avoid the regal “we” in interactions with the bureaucracy outside the White House. Heineman, taking principles from his book, *Memorandum to a President*, makes suggestions aimed at lessening conflict within a staff, early in the game, via clear presidential statements about the operative pecking order (p. 53). Bledsoe reminds presidents that leadership often boils down to a balance between proposing new directions and reacting to specific demands (p. 58). He commends his former boss, Ronald Reagan, for being open to multiple sources of information, quite in contrast to the “detached” president described in the Tower Commission Report on Iran-Contra.

Section two begins with an insider account by former Ford White House Counsel, Philip Buchen. He lays out the scenario of planning for the Ford transition within the awkward context of the Nixon resignation; and reminds the reader how common transitions by vice presidents have been (p. 68). Professor Kate Smith of Wake Forest follows with a discussion of transitions from a more comparative perspective providing lessons learned. She suggests that effective transitions seem to be coordinated by “a few able individuals close to the president with no direct personal stake in the advice being offered” (p. 88). In one of the most insightful articles in the volume, former Attorney General and White House staff honcho and transition chief in the Reagan years, Edwin Meese joins with Associate Professor Edwin Wright (United States Air Force Academy) to advise any incoming administration to “hit the ground running.” These two authors also point up a too often overlooked problem of transitions that the campaigner role involving frantic racing from crisis to crisis gives way to “analytical and deliberative focus” on policy objectives, program objectives, program initiatives, and future personnel considerations (p. 91). While the Bush administration was “out of the starting block” slower than Meese and Wright recommended, several of their other prescriptions appear to have been taken by the new administration. The Bush transition seems to have adopted the Meese/Wright prescription that new administrations should “if possible defer appointments and changes of status (non-career to career) and postpone all policy programs and regulatory decisions that are not urgent during the first 2½ months of the president’s new term (p. 95). Brookings’s scholar, Stephen Hess, noted for his earlier treatises on organizing the presidency, proposes a “New Presidential Selection Timetable.” He contends that 10 weeks between election and inauguration is too long and makes the innovative, albeit admittedly unsaleable suggestion that we amend the Constitution to: (a) move presidential election day to the last Monday in May (better weather/larger crowds); (b) move Congressional elections to June 29; and (c) use July 4 as inauguration day to shorten the transition even more. Peri Arnold, University of Notre Dame, author of the *Making of*

the Managerial Presidency and editor of the *Journal of Policy History* neatly juxtaposes the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter transitions concluding that Presidents like Eisenhower who use transitions as a vehicle for working more effectively with the bureaucracy have more success than Presidents like Nixon and Carter who tried to ride herd on self-serving bureaucracies (pp. 125–26). As Professor Nathan wrote in his classic on administration in the Nixon years, the plot failed.

Two chapters by Shirley Anne Warshaw (Gettysburg College) and Margaret Jane Wyszomirski (Federal Executive Institute) examine the often touted concept of “Cabinet Government” (Warshaw) and the Cabinet’s miniscule role as a body in the Presidential Advisory system (Wyszomirski). Warshaw argues cogently using the Nixon through Reagan administrations, that the White House staff should be large enough to guide the departments without being so large as to be a bureaucracy in itself (p. 148). Scholars will find the Wyszomirski’s analogy between the politics of the White House and that of academic institutions innovative, insightful, and disarmingly candid. Bert Rockman, recent Neustadt Award winner for his book on leadership in the presidency, reminds the reader that the distance between senior career officials and department secretaries is very large; and is cavernous between them and the White House (p. 169). He says that softball from the White House will, as Peri Arnold suggested, work better than hardball (p. 182); and seems to disagree with Meese/Wright’s “hit the ground running” strategy because of the future penchant for guerilla warfare it could engender within bureaucratic circles. In a subsequent chapter California State Fullerton’s Professor Alana Northrop notes that effective administration depends not so much on the staff and bureaucracy as on the president, his worldview, the quality of his appointees, and whether he/she is pro-active or re-active (p. 191).

Readers of the Tower Commission Report on the Iran/Contra scandal, will find much to peruse in the chapters on the NSC, on its organization and historic evolution (by R. Gordon Hoxie, President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and author and editor of numerous volumes on transitions and organizing for National Security) and the value of the Eisenhower NSC system as a decision facilitating instrument (p. 201). Reagan NSC Assistant Colin Powell discusses the Council and its revamping in light of the Iran scandal (p. 207), admonishing staffers to stay out of operations. Reagan’s 1987–89 Defense Secretary, Frank Carlucci, calls for presidential leadership to support a defense policy based on strength, realism, cohesion in our alliances, and bi-partisan consensus (p. 241). Charles Z. Wick, the Reagan USIA Director, makes a major contribution to foreign policy and presidential leadership responsibilities in his discussion of public diplomacy in our communications age. Wick notes the importance of consensus among the allies in the coming decade of the 1990s and suggests, among other things, that policy considerations should include discussion of how U.S. policy will be perceived by media and opinion leaders overseas (pp. 249–50).

Part V of this volume is devoted to economic management and the role of the U.S. in our economically interdependent world. Charles H. Zwicker examines the development and evolution of the Council of Economic Advisers. Raymond J. Saulnier, Eisenhower’s Chairman (1956–61), Council of Economic Advisers, provides valuable, albeit brief, personal insights on how the transition from the Eisenhower to Kennedy

Councils was designed and how it worked. Richard Rose, author of numerous respected works on the presidency, including his most recent award-winning work *The Post-Modern Presidency*, draws on some of the intriguing themes of that work to examine the relationship between electoral popularity and the buoyancy of the national economy. He warns incoming presidents that they "must find time to formulate a political strategy for directing the economy in the weeks between winning the election and arriving in office to find bills for past borrowing already due and bills for promises made in the campaign (p. 287). Readers familiar with books by Jeff Fishel, Samuel Kernell, and George Edwards on presidential promises, rhetoric and the public relations presidency will find Rose's views a welcome addition to that literature.

This entire volume is important not only for the quality of the individual articles, but for the breadth of coverage. Issues of importance as the presidency moves into the 21st century in areas of economic interdependence and public diplomacy get much needed airing. In these days of SDI, super conductors, possible fusion in test tubes, and competition with the Japanese for other technological innovations, R. Gordon Hoxie and William Golden, Science Advisor to President Truman, have provided presidency scholars valuable insights into the world of science advice to the president. Hoxie provides an analysis of the role of science advisors to the presidents and the politics of their location in EOP rather than WHO. Among his well reasoned suggestions for the future Hoxie includes: (a) that the science advisor's primary area of advice be in national security, and (b) that science advisor be involved with OMB in the formulation of R & D budgets across the government. Golden compliments the Hoxie chapter with his suggestion that there be a separate technology advisor to go along with the science advisor for handling the domestic component of technological innovation. Golden is, with his efforts beginning in 1950, the author of the president's science advisory program. He writes cogently and persuasively.

Section seven addresses communications as a tool of presidential leadership in an electronic and print media age. Martha Joynt Kumar and Michael Grossman co-authors of a book titled *White House and the News Media* as well as numerous papers and articles on communications policy at the White House, examine the transition between the Carter and Reagan communications apparatuses. They argue convincingly that "Decisions relating to communications demonstrate how the two administrations understood and dealt with political and governmental needs of establishing those administrations" (p. 306). Kumar and Grossman also provide some comparative typologies to internal and external governmental transitions, personnel choices a president makes and the communications policy particular presidents might adopt along with the implications of those directions. William Spragens, author and editor of books on presidents and press relations and public perceptions of the presidents, looks at the development of the role of press secretary (1933-81). He blends in-depth interviewing with some principles in the JFK and LBJ, Ford and Reagan White Houses in analysis of communications policy for these administrations. Thomas Griscom, former Reagan assistant for communications, points out that if the president is to shape outcomes using communications as a tool, he must be intimately involved in development of the philosophical underpinnings, and the content in these areas.

Former Reagan White House Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein and Professor David Kozak, author and editor of works on Congress and the presidency, offer the incoming administration suggestions on how to get the most out of White House liaison with Congress. Calling for bi-partisanship and compromise mentality, they suggest, among other things, that the president should: "hit the ground running," have a limited well-focused agenda, and be personally involved in liaison with the Hill. In a chapter on inter-branch consultation in foreign policy, Attorney Chris J. Brantley, and Professor in the School of International Service (American University), Duncan L. Clarke show some major impediments to consultation, and posit wide-ranging, albeit somewhat optimistic recommendations for changing the relationship of executive dominance in these areas.

Other chapters focus on the much-neglected vice presidency. One by Ronald Moe of the Congressional Research Service examines the evolution of the modern "institutional" vice presidency which he traces back to the Eisenhower years. Marie Natoli, author of *American Prince, American pauper* as well as papers, reviews and other work on the vice presidency, examines the vice presidency as a springboard to party nomination for president; and the difficulties it creates for electability. White House Counsel, C. Boyden Gray, cogently illustrates Bush's role.

The final section includes intriguing articles on the presidential disability, long planning at the White House, points of reference for the incoming occupant of the Oval Office. In the first, Kenneth Thompson, director of the Miller Center (University of Virginia) provides a fascinating account of the need for the 25th Amendment in light of the health problems during the Reagan years; and implications of the wording of the amendment. Next, Perry M. Smith, former Commandant of the National War College, provides explanations for unwillingness to plan among leaders, and 15 "laws" of long range planning. Unfortunately, such planning might remove political flexibility for any future incumbents, and so planning might well be viewed warily by future incumbents. The book concludes with a "what to expect when you get there" for future presidents, from a man who ought to know, former Vice President Walter Mondale.

As is usually the case of volumes of this type written under the auspices of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the issues discussed are critical and the insights are both from scholar and practitioner authors. Serious students of American Institutions, including those in the media, will find *The Presidency in Transition* a most worthwhile addition to their libraries. Members of the Bush administration, including the Cabinet, the Chief of Staff, the economic, security, and science advisors, the Counsel, the Vice President and the President himself may well continue to read and contemplate this landmark volume. Future administrations would likewise profit, assuredly through the balance of this century and beyond.

FRANK KESSLER

Professor of Political Science
Missouri Western State College

Letters to the Editor

February 1, 1989

Dear Dr. Hoxie:

Just a word to thank you for being so fast off the mark with a review of my book, *Wind over Sand*. The review itself was, of course, gratifying. But I especially appreciate the speed with which it was produced. Your organization never ceases to amaze me!

With every best wish for 1989.

Yours truly,

FREDERICK W. MARKS III
112-20 72nd Drive
Forest Hills, N.Y. 11375

February 2, 1989

Dear Mr. Hoxie:

Thanks so much for your help in preparing this issue of *Update*. Your comments were very helpful for the story that begins on page 18.

Sincerely,

LEAH ESKIN
Associate Editor
Scholastic, Inc.
730 Broadway
New York, NY 10003

April 17, 1989

Dear Gordon:

Thanks for a great evening. In addition to your writing, editing and speaking talents, you have a catalytic gift for creating great programs. The eight of us who came—students and colleagues alike—agreed on the value of the panel.

It reminded me of how long I've been a Center fan. I remember one minibus load of us who trekked to Reston for one of your symposia back in the 70's.

You have done a real service to Presidential scholarship with *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, the Center's volumes, and your many panels and programs. See you soon.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR J. HUGHES, PH.D.

Chair, Department of History

Political Science & Social Studies

St. Francis College

180 Remsen Street

Brooklyn Heights, New York 11201

April 28, 1989

Dear Gordon:

I write to congratulate you on your forthcoming honorary degree, Doctor of Humane Letters, to be presented by Wesley College. I have been invited to attend and deeply regret I cannot attend because of my duties here at Courtland College. I know of no more worthy choice than a man who, in my judgement, has done more than any other to promote the serious study of the Presidency. I have written to President Stewart applauding Wesley's choice. I will be thinking of you—and again my congratulations.

Sincerely,

JUDITH A. BEST

Distinguished Teaching Professor

Department of Political Science

State University College at Cortland

P.O. Box 2000

Cortland, New York 13045

May 16, 1989

Dear Dr. Hoxie:

I enjoyed meeting you recently at the Conference on The American Presidency: A Bicentennial Evaluation held at Heidelberg College. I thought the talks were fascinating. I am certain that those of us who were on the panels appreciated your efforts to tie the various political strands together.

As I discussed with you, the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Li-

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brary at the University of California, Berkeley has worked since 1969 on the documentation of the history of California state government and politics. Separate segments of this documentation effort have covered the administrations of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight, Edmund G. Brown, Sr., and Ronald Reagan.

I am enclosing copies of some of the interviews lists which pertain to the Reagan Era project. I do not have a complete list unfortunately. I will, however, write to Mrs. Willa Baum, who is the long-time director of the Regional Oral History Office, and ask that she send you a comprehensive list of the Reagan Era volumes.

I hope we get to work together again in the near future.

Best regards,

SARAH L. SHARP

Asst. Prof. of History

Bowling Green State University

Bowling Green, Ohio 43403

May 23, 1989

Dear Dr. Hoxie,

Robin Haukey is a good friend indeed! Thank you for sending the correspondence.

I am notifying my editor, Jim Mairs, at Norton, to suggest that he inform his London office so that, in case Dr. Zara Steiner or perhaps someone else whom Mr. Barnett might suggest, is moved to review my book, Norton will supply a copy.

Thank you for your persistent interest. May you be rewarded by a review worthy of the *Presidential Studies Quarterly*.

I've been a Center member for some years and I think my dues are paid up to date. If not, please let me know.

Sincerely,

ARTHUR WALWORTH

865 Central Ave. E-206

Needham, Ma. 02192

May 25, 1989

Dear Gordon:

Bob [Robert H. Malott, Chairman FMC Corp.] forwarded to me your good letter, and what a flood of happy memories it brought to me.

At age 90, I am no longer able to get to New York. Sorry, as I'd love to revive old times. I never thought you could possibly do what you have done with the once-feeble "Center for the Study of the Presidency."

Eleanor joins me in our best wishes—and again Happy Memories of you at Long Island University.

Cordially,
DEANE W. MALOTT
President Emeritus
Cornell University
322 Wait Avenue
Ithaca, New York 14850

June 12, 1989

Dear Gordon:

As a newcomer to the Center, I found it both interesting and encouraging to participate in what seems like a “family” of intergenerational members committed to the stewardship and preservation of both lofty ideals and realistic activism in both government and academia. As I was talking with the Zwickers at dinner, we looked at the last 20 years of the Presidency through the eyes of a “child” of the 60s, and recognized how critical the leadership derailment my generation has witnessed is. And now I see some of the same confusion in my own teenager, and know that we have a very important mantle to pass on—a heritage that befits the office and our country.

Perhaps it is those thoughts and ideas which are exciting about the Center and are generated through you and the members. As with the Boston meeting, the most interesting part was meeting the members. I particularly enjoyed speaking with Pam Gwin and Theresa Elmore-Behrendt, and of course the Zwickers.

I have sent my membership registration under separate mailing and if there is need for additional participation on the newly created public affairs committee, I would be glad to volunteer some time.

Thank you again for your graciousness and personal invitation to the meeting and dinner. I look forward to seeing you again at the Center's activities.

Sincerely,
TONI WHITMORE
Maritime Development Project Manager
Massport
Ten Park Plaza
Boston, MA 02116-3971

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Dear Dr. Hoxie:

I have just received published copy of the first prize essay on the Presidency at 200 years. In a *Paradox of Power*, Daniel Rittenhouse, the Fordham University student, has written a strong, meaningful piece. He displays both depth and breadth of ideas in his brief composition. Unlike David Broder, Daniel Rittenhouse understands fully that President Bush is not showing weakness by seeking bipartisan cooperation between President and Congress.

One has the feeling that this alert student could develop his essay into a doctorate dissertation at a later date. I commend his scholarship and skilled brevity in producing a significant, timely document. If convenient, please forward this note to him.

Very truly yours,
ROY W. WILSON
Court Commissioner
Wilson, Broadnax & Owens
711 West Capitol Drive
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53206

June 12, 1989

Dear Mr. Hoxie:

On behalf of the New York City Commission on the Bicentennial of the Constitution, we would like to thank you for your part in our symposium: "The Presidency in the 90's."

This truly was an outstanding program and was one of the highlights of our commemoration of the 200th anniversary of George Washington's inauguration.

We greatly appreciated your taking the time to share with us your professional insights, as well as your personal thoughts, regarding the Presidency.

Please accept the enclosed gift as a token of our appreciation and thank you again.

Sincerely,
EDWARD I. KOCH
Mayor

JOSEPH H. FLOM
Chairman

New York City Commission on the
Bicentennial of the Constitution
City Hall, NYC 10007

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June 19, 1989

Dear Mr. Hoxie:

The Political Science department is pleased to announce the 1989 winner of the second annual University of Louisville Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order. It is Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Dr. Keohane will be honored at a black tie dinner in mid-October.

The prize of \$150,000 may be given for ideas in journal articles as well as books. Indeed this year judges will be looking for excellent articles, publications by foreign experts, and for ideas somewhat beyond the scope of political science.

The process for making nominations is explained in the accompanying brochure. Editors of journals may make nominations directly, and we encourage you to do so. Deadline for nominations is October 1, 1989.

We shall be aided greatly if you will also make this award known to your readers. We shall respond quickly to any questions or suggestions that you have.

Sincerely,

PAUL J. WEBER

Chair, Political Science

Executive Director

Grawemeyer World Order Award

University of Louisville

Louisville, Kentucky 40292

News Notes

A. 1989-90 Center Fellows and Counsellors

From among the more than 700 participants in the Center's 20th Annual Student Symposium (March 17-19, 1989) the following 23 undergraduate students were selected as Center Fellows for the 1989-90 academic year:

Mr. Paul A. Bellis	The College of Wooster
Mr. Jason A. Blavatt	Gettysburg College
Ms. Teresa Ann Brode	College of Saint Elizabeth
Ms. Susan R. Caine	Occidental College
Mr. Timothy J. Kane	United States Air Force Academy
Ms. Heather MacNeil	Smith College
Mr. Don Minton	United States Military Academy
Mr. Brian P. Murphy	Oakland University
Mr. Paul O'Sullivan	Marist College
Ms. Kelly M. O'Toole	Duquesne University
Mr. John H. Parmelee	James Madison University
Ms. Debra E. Rectenbaugh	Buena Vista College
Ms. Brandy Reeves	The University of the South
Mr. Robert G. Rudolph, Jr.	Henderson State University
Ms. Melody Shanaberger	Saint Leo College
Ms. Elzbieta Barbara Sochacka	Wayne State University
Mr. Stewart Sommerville	Marist College
Ms. Debra Sutphen	Northern Arizona University
Ms. Toni Swierenga	California State University, Fullerton
Ms. Suzanne J. Vargo	Mount Mary College
Mr. Everett Ware	Tufts University
Mr. Kelly John Warren	Abilene Christian University

Most of the above noted students will be in their senior year. They were selected on the basis of academic record, character, leadership, and service. A major requirement in the fellowship year will be to write a significant research paper. In many instances the paper has served as a senior honors thesis. The theme for their fellowship year is the Presidency of the 1990s. They will have an opportunity to study both foreign and domestic policy issues and will have a series of White House, Congressional and Supreme Court briefings. They will participate in the 20th Annual Leadership Conference in Los Angeles and will help plan and participate in the 21st Annual Student Symposium in Washington, D.C.

Several of the fellowships are memorial in character, including those named for William J. Casey, Maureen Dobbin, Gordon Gray, and DeWitt Wallace. Others have corporate support including Kellogg, Kraft, Pillsbury, Schering-Plough and Texaco.

From among the 1988-89 Center Fellows the following were named as Center Counsellors to work with the Fellows:

Ms. Julie Hamilton

Mr. Jerome P. Hoynes

Mr. John G. Zimmerman, III

University of Wyoming

Brown University

Gettysburg College

B. Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, National Advisory Council and Board of Editors

On June 8, 1989 the Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, National Advisory Council and Board of Editors convened at the University Club in New York City. Newly elected to the Board of Trustees were David Eisenhower and John C. Whitehead. In placing David Eisenhower's name in nomination, Center Founder and President R. Gordon Hoxie, recalled the inspiration of David's grandfather, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in the Center's founding and the role of his grandmother, Mamie Doud Eisenhower, as honorary chairman until her death. She, in turn, was succeeded as honorary chairman by David's great uncle Dr. Milton Eisenhower, then President-Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University. David, a distinguished writer, is completing a three volume work on his grandfather. Volume one, recently published, has drawn high praise. He is also co-authoring a volume with his wife Julie, daughter of President and Mrs. Richard Nixon. David has participated in many Center programs.

John C. Whitehead is recognized as one of the Nation's foremost business statesmen. He was a principal architect in making Goldman, Sachs one of the world's most respected investment banking firms. From 1985-89 he served as the United States Deputy Secretary of State. Presently he is the Chairman, Board of Overseers, Harvard University. Mr. Whitehead has been a member of the Center for many years, has been a generous contributor to its fellowship program, participated in its Annual Student Symposium, and written important essays for *Presidential Studies Quarterly*.

Elected to the Center's National Advisory Council is Wayne D. Collins of the prestigious law firm, Shearman and Sterling. As a senior undergraduate Wayne D. Collins had participated in the Center's Third Annual Student Symposium in French Lick, Indiana March 30-April 1, 1973. Among the Center Fellows participating on that occasion John F. Lillard and Anthony Mohr are also members of the National Advisory Council and are also attorneys.

At the Annual Meeting Margaret M. W. Kinsey was elected Vice Chairman of the Center's Board, succeeding Mackenzie deB. Strathy. Mrs. Kinsey has recently been honored by the National Council of Christians and Jews, the Young Women's Christian Association (Y.W.C.A.) and the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution. She has been outstanding in her support for the Center, including its student and publication programs.

Further at the Annual Meeting Theresa Elmore-Behrendt was elected as Chairman of the National Advisory Council succeeding Susan Stautberg. Mrs. Behrendt served at the White House during the Reagan Administration. Jeffrey Hooke, Vice President, Shearson Lehman Hutton, was elected Vice Chairman and Daniel Nalven, an insurance executive, was elected Secretary of the National Advisory Council.

Following the Annual Dinner Dwight Ink, who had served in policy positions in every presidential administration from Eisenhower through Reagan, gave a favorable assessment of the Bush Administration. Mr. Ink is president of the Institute for Public Administration. A member of the National Advisory Council through the years, he has participated in many Center programs including the above noted Third Annual Student Symposium in which so many present younger members of the National Advisory Council participated as students. Mr. Ink was then Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget.

C. Conference Honors Professor Davison

In honor of Professor Kenneth E. Davison, an original member of the Editorial Board of *Presidential Studies Quarterly* and the *Quarterly's* first History Book Review Editor, a major conference, *The American Presidency: A Bicentennial Evaluation* was convened in Fremont and Tiffin, Ohio May 4-6, 1989. Center for the Study of the Presidency co-sponsored the conference with the Rutherford B. Hayes Library and Heidelberg College. Professor Davison conceived and directed the conference which brought together scholars on every president from Washington through Bush. Center President, R. Gordon Hoxie, moderated all of the sessions on the 20th century presidents. This is the second major conference which Professor Davison planned with the Center; the first was the Center's Fifth Annual Leadership Conference, October 18-20, 1974 in Fremont, Ohio, which Professor James MacGregor Burns keyed.

Professor Davison retired in June 1989 as Chairman, Department of History and American Studies, Heidelberg College. Dr. Davison had served at Heidelberg since 1952. As Dr. Hoxie observed, "The years 1952-1989 represented by Professor Davison's inspiring teaching and writing encompassed presidencies beginning with Truman and concluding with Bush. Dr. Davison interpreted all of them with great insight. He is also a recognized bibliographer on the Presidency. His *Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes* (1972) is a classic, and we anticipate his forthcoming volume on Gerald R. Ford will likewise be outstanding. Moreover, the Center for the Study of the Presidency has derived great benefit from his services and fortunately will continue to do so."

D. Twenty-Fourth Anniversary Award Dinner

Center for the Study of the Presidency conferred its Distinguished Public Service Medal on Brent Scowcroft, Robert S. Strauss, and John C. Whitehead. Chaired by Dwayne O. Andreas, Chairman, Archer Daniels Midland Company at the J.W. Marriott in Washington, D.C. June 21, 1989, there were more than 600 participants. President Bush chaired the Honorary Committee which included his Cabinet and former Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. In his message for the occasion, President Bush stated:

It is a pleasure to greet everyone gathered for the Annual Awards Dinner of the Center for the Study of the Presidency. Barbara and I only regret that we cannot be with you in person tonight as you honor Brent Scowcroft, John Whitehead, and Bob Strauss.

These three men have demonstrated exceptional devotion to our country. Working tirelessly to promote the well-being of their fellow Americans while advancing freedom and self-government around the world, they bring honor to public service. I'm fortunate to count all three of them as friends, and I am delighted to join you in recognizing their many contributions to our Nation.

This dinner occurs at a very special time in our Nation's history—the 200th anniversary of the three branches of our Federal Government, an arrangement of powers that Jefferson rightly called “the wisest ever yet presented to men.”

In April, I had the honor of witnessing a reenactment of George Washington's inauguration as the first President of the United States. It was an exciting moment, and a vivid reminder that our system of government ushered in a new era in human history. Our Constitution wisely instituted a system which sought to control the passions of men with the limited government and individual liberty that have made the United States a shining beacon to all nations.

For more than two decades, the Center for the Study of the Presidency has promoted greater understanding of democratic government and, in so doing, has strengthened it. The Center's lectures, conferences, fellowships, and publications have earned a deserved reputation for excellence and have provided great inspiration for our future leaders.

Barbara and I applaud the Center for its outstanding record, and we wish all of you a wonderful evening.

Center President, R. Gordon Hoxie, presented General Scowcroft for his award. General Hoxie expressed especial appreciation not only for General Scowcroft's services for the Nation, but also for the Center, including its publications and student programs. Allen H. Neuharth, Dinner Co-Chair, described Ambassador Strauss as the wisest of presidential counsellors who would have been a great President of the United States. In presenting John Whitehead, whom she described as a “statesman of the highest order,” Dr. Ruth Farkas, Chair, the Center's Board, expressed her pleasure that Whitehead was now a member of the Center's Board.

The citation for General Scowcroft noted:

For more than four decades Brent Scowcroft has served the Nation with great distinction in national security affairs. A brilliant scholar and strategic planner, he is the only person named by two Presidents as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Indeed, with the late Gordon Gray, he is regarded as the role model in that important position. His service as a member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control; President's Commission on Management; President's Special Review Board on the Iran/Contra Affair; and as Chairman, President's Commission on Strategic Forces all were of the highest character of statesmanship.

During the years 1976 to the present, despite his major responsibilities, he has on many occasions given outstanding support to the programs and publications of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, giving especial inspiration to the

student participants. Indeed, this great teacher recognizes the vital relationship between the Nation's security and the young people who will beyond the 1990s become the Nation's leaders.

In his response General Scowcroft declared:

"Thank you very much. It's a great honor for me to receive this award from one of the outstanding public service institutions of this country and from a man, Gordon Hoxie, whose dedication and hard work over these years have built the Center into the outstanding institution that it is. I am very grateful.

"You will be relieved to know I am not going to make a speech. From many years in Washington I have learned one thing, when you are on the program with Bob Strauss get off the podium as fast as you can! Let me just say though, we all have one thing in common and that is a great interest in the presidency; this is true whether we are practitioners, or whether we are scholars.

"The American government is in itself a unique experiment in the process by which man strives to govern himself and to live in peace and harmony. And in that unique institution the presidency is a vital element. Indeed, the continuity of the presidency and the richness and diversity of the presidents make it a fascinating study for all of us.

"The Center is especially to be commended for providing the background, the course of studies, the sort of integrating elements to which we can all turn, either to learn from or contribute to, or both. Best of all is the work that the Center does for the students, for the young people who will grow up to take the place of most of you in this room and into whose hands the presidency will one day be entrusted.

Thank you very, very much."

The citation for Ambassador Strauss stated:

For more than four decades Robert S. Strauss has practiced law with great distinction in the firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. For more than two decades he has given wise counsel and leadership to the Democratic National Committee, rising to the position of Chairman, bringing much needed reform in the electoral process and leading the party to victory in the 1976 Presidential election. From 1977-79 he served with statesmanlike skill as the President's special representative for trade negotiations with the rank of ambassador and from 1979-81 as the President's personal representative in vital Middle East negotiations.

Robert S. Strauss has contributed significantly to organization, management, and policy for both Democratic and Republican Presidents, recognizing as he expressed it, when Presidents "have been too immersed in detail" and when they have not. He has earned the reputation described in this Center's studies as "wise and talented" and as the "highly valued . . . advisor," providing "much needed political education." He has not limited that education to Presidents and their senior staffs; he has given most generously of his talent and time to students of all ages in schools and colleges throughout the Nation, and in this Center's Annual Student Symposium. Truly he is one of the Nation's most respected counsellors.

In responding Ambassador Strauss observed:

"More than you know I thank you Dr. Overby for reading this resolution and those who passed it. I assure you, while I'm not quite as wise as the references would indicate, I am wise enough not to take them too seriously. I am wise enough also not to make a lengthy speech.

"However, I would like to make a comment or two with respect to the presidency and this splendid Center. What makes this organization so uniquely important is that of all the offices in the land and of all the titles in the land probably none is misunderstood as much or less understood as much as the presidency of the United States. Strange but true.

"People describe the presidency as this majestic, all powerful office and they see our president as this majestic, all powerful man. The truth of the matter is that just the contrary is true, and a moment's reflection helps put things in perspective. You think back just how little power our president has and what power he does have comes only from the *people* and from them on a day to day basis. You look back: we think of this powerful, magnificent President Kennedy. We forget those pictures of a lonely, brooding man, with the problems he was having with the Congress; the difficulty he had with the Bay of Pigs. We tend to forget and lose perspective of the problems of the presidency. We think of Lyndon Johnson who succeeded him, who reached a stage in that all-powerful majestic job that he could hardly go out among the people. He had difficulty with public appearances, bound up in the wounds of Vietnam. And Richard Nixon who succeeded him could not overcome his own mistakes of Watergate and was driven from the office. Why? Because he lost his consensus. He lost the people, just as Lyndon Johnson had before him. President Kennedy certainly hadn't, but he was having difficulties governing the Nation.

"President Ford, this marvelous man, so well equipped to be President of the United States, never really could overcome with the American public the pardon of Richard Nixon who he succeeded. President Carter was driven from office by a senile old man in Iran, who contributed more than anyone else to his loss of public consensus, loss of political support. Ronald Reagan, who succeeded him, had his own troubles with Irangate and was weakened and crippled by it; uniquely he was able to regain and maintain his political consensus.

"So it is that I say to you that our presidency that so many see as this all powerful position really is a position that has its power on a day to day basis flowing from the American people, who are deeply intertwined in the political process of this country. Politics and government, the consensus to govern, flows in the people.

"So it is that this distinguished Center for the Study of the Presidency under whose auspices we all are here tonight makes a major contribution to this Nation, and I cannot tell you how proud I am to be a recipient of the Center's marvelous award. I thank each of you, the members of the Board, the National Advisory Council, the Board of Editors, and all those of you who attended.

Thank you very much."

The Whitehead citation declared:

For more than four decades in peace and war John C. Whitehead has served the Nation with great distinction. As a young naval officer in World War II he had participated in the invasions of Normandy, Southern France, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. His outstanding academic record, Phi Beta Kappa at Haverford, MBA with distinction at Harvard, had been a harbinger of 38 brilliant years at Goldman, Sachs, where he was an architect of national and international institutions which have contributed to the Nation's economic growth and stability. From his earliest years at Haverford, he determined to help freedom aspiring peoples. Subsequently he served as President of the International Rescue Committee, traveling extensively throughout the world on behalf of political refugees.

From 1985-1989 he served as the United States Deputy Secretary of State contributing importantly not only to the sound management of the Department and to the formulation of the Nation's foreign policies, but also most significantly to the fulfillment of the aspiration of freedom-seeking peoples throughout the world.

Business leader, humanitarian, statesman, he has also found time now for more than a decade to serve the Center for the Study of the Presidency, contributing most inspiringly to its programs and publications and to making, as one Center member recently wrote, "the idealism contained in the Preamble of the Constitution . . . a vital part of our government and our lives."

Dr. Hoxie described Dwayne O. Andreas' role as Dinner Chairman as "exemplary and outstanding."

J. Willard Marriott, Jr., Chairman, Marriott Corp., and J. Richard Munroe, Chairman, Time Inc., served as Dinner Co-Chairs. The 50 Vice-Chairs included such business and philanthropic leaders as Katherine Graham, Chairman, *The Washington-Post* Company; Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Chairman, *The New York Times*; Paul Mellon; David Rockefeller; and from Great Britain, Sir Gordon White, Chairman, Hanson Industries.

E. Twentieth Annual Leadership Conference To Convene in Los Angeles

The 20th Annual Leadership Conference of the Center for the Study of the Presidency will convene at the Hyatt Regency Los Angeles the weekend of October 27-29, 1989. It will have as its theme, "The Presidency of the 1990s." It will not only examine the Presidential office for the last decade of this century but also the major domestic and foreign policy issues facing the Nation. Particular attention will be given to relations with Pacific Rim nations. Featured on policy issues will be Vice President Quayle; Counsel to the President, C. Boyden Gray; former Director of the United States Information Agency, Leonard Marks; (pending) U.S. Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh; and Senate leaders.

A distinguished Host Committee is arranging special tours both on Friday, Oc-

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tober 27 and Saturday afternoon, October 28th. The conference begins with the Friday evening reception, dinner, and keynote address. Thursday evening hotel accommodations will be available for persons desiring to participate in the Friday optional tour activity.

The Hyatt Regency Los Angeles has just been reopened after having been completely refurbished. It is now described as one of the Nation's premier hotels. American Airlines is offering special reduced fares for the conference participants, as is Continental. For American call toll-free: 1-800-433-1790 and give StarFile number: S-10 O94G. For Continental call toll-free: 1-800-468-7022 and give EasyAccess number: 10BP31.

For further information regarding this important conference you may write:

Maria Rossi
Conference Coordinator
Center for the Study of the Presidency
208 East 75th Street
New York, NY 10021
or call: (212) 249-1200

F. Dirksen Congressional Center Awards

Seventeen scholars received grants from The Dirksen Congressional Center (Pekin, IL) this spring. The grants, which in 1989 ranged from \$500 to \$2,000, help fund studies of the U.S. Congress and its leaders. Six of the grant recipients are graduate students at colleges and universities across the country.

The Dirksen Congressional Center gave its first research grant in 1975 for a bibliographic survey of resources on Congress. Since then the Congressional Research Grants Program has grown steadily. The Center now awards between \$20-\$25,000 each year. The grant program is funded by the James S. Kemper Foundation of Long Grove, Illinois, and the Everett McKinley Dirksen Endowment Fund.

Anyone with a serious research topic may apply for a grant. Typically, grants go to journalists, historians, and political scientists, but The Center has also supported projects which helped develop curriculum resources for the classroom.

The Dirksen Congressional Center is a nonpartisan, nonprofit educational institution located in the hometown of the late Senate Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen. The Center offers educational enrichment through an exhibit hall, scholarships and grants, research, and educational programs about the U.S. Congress and its leaders.

For more information about the Congressional Research Grants Program, contact the Dirksen Congressional Center, Broadway and Fourth Street, Pekin, Illinois, 61554. (309) 347-7113.

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