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COMMITTEE PRINT

**SURVEY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS**

**THE POLITICAL ASPECTS**

**A STUDY**

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE  
**SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS**

BY THE STAFF OF THE  
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**  
**UNITED STATES SENATE**



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## FOREWORD

This is one of a number of studies which are being prepared for the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations in connection with the subcommittee's survey of the Alliance for Progress. This survey was undertaken in the spring of 1967 in an effort to determine where the Alliance stands after 6 years and what, if any, changes are indicated in U.S. policies toward Latin America.

This first study, which deals with some of the long-term political aspects of the current Latin American scene, was prepared by Pat M. Holt of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is published solely as the basis for discussion and further inquiry. The points of view expressed do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the subcommittee or of any member thereof.

WAYNE MORSE,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs.*

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# SURVEY OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

## THE POLITICAL ASPECTS

### I. INTRODUCTION

The first of 12 stated goals in the Alliance for Progress, signed at Punta del Este, August 17, 1961, is "to improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people."

In article 5(b) of the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá, May 2, 1948, there is reaffirmed the principle:

The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.

The preamble of the summit declaration, signed at Punta del Este, April 14, 1967, reaffirms the "intent to strengthen democratic institutions."

One could recite a long list of other inter-American agreements which call for the strengthening of democratic institutions. This *political* emphasis runs through the whole history of inter-American relations, but in practice, it has generally been applied too cynically, too naively, or not at all. The purpose of this paper is to explore, hopefully with realism, the national interest of the United States in the political development of Latin America, the problems attendant thereto, and what, if anything, can be done.

From the end of World War II until the summer of 1960, the Latin American policy of the United States was based on the premise that the problems of the area were essentially economic and that they could be solved by massive private investment (assuming the Latins created the proper climate), by hard loans from the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and by a modicum of technical assistance.

The adequacy of this policy was increasingly questioned in the late 1950's, and on July 11, 1960, in a statement at the summer White House in Newport, President Eisenhower signaled a change. The new policy, which culminated the following year in the Alliance for Progress, was based on the premise that the area's ills were primarily social and could be cured by reform—land redistribution, progressive income taxes honestly collected, housing projects, educational programs, improved health facilities, and the like.

At the Summit Conference in Punta del Este in April 1967, mainly in response to Latin American initiatives, the emphasis seemed to shift again, this time to the premise that the road to salvation lies through regional economic integration as the best, if not the only, way to bring about sufficient economic growth to support social reform.

These approaches, of course, are not inconsistent. But taken either separately or together, they do not reach the heart of the

problem, and therefore they are not adequate policies. Neither are they totally ineffective. Vitamin pills will not cure pneumonia, but they may have some peripheral benefit in strengthening the patient's general constitution.

The real interest of the United States in Latin America is neither economic nor social; it is political. Even if one takes a narrow view which emphasizes the strategic or economic interests of the United States, it is apparent that these interests can be solidly protected over the long run only by political means—that is, by the growth of governments south of the Rio Grande which are oriented in the same general way as the United States. This leaves room, of course, for great diversity, and there is no intention to imply that Latin American governments should be made over in the image of the United States. But for reasons ranging from the grand strategy of national defense through the economics of U.S. trade and investment to the bread-and-butter question of votes in the United Nations, the United States needs governments in Latin America which see things more or less like we do. Such governments can only arise from a set of reasonably well-rooted, stable, democratic political institutions.

Past and present U.S. policies toward Latin America have been justified in major part on the grounds that economic development and/or social reform would facilitate the development of this kind of political institutions. The argument is that a general improvement in standards of living combined with a restructuring of the social order will remove some of the causes of discontent and thereby reduce the strains on political institutions.

This is a valid argument, but it deals with only a part of the problem. It could just as reasonably be argued (and the United States did so during the period of emphasis on private investment) that political stability is a prerequisite to economic growth. Support for this argument is found in the fact that Mexico's remarkable economic progress followed its political development while the economic woes of Argentina (a country with many more economic advantages than Mexico) are traceable in major part to its political weaknesses. On the other hand, the Government of Bolivia collapsed in 1964 despite a highly satisfactory economic growth rate finally achieved after years of large U.S. assistance.

Since the beginning of the Alliance for Progress, there have been 13 cases of the overthrow (perhaps collapse would be a better word) of governments in Latin America: Ecuador (November 1961), the Dominican Republic (January 1962), Argentina (March 1962), Peru (July 1962), Guatemala (March 1963), Ecuador again (July 1963), the Dominican Republic again (September 1963), Honduras (October 1963), Brazil (March 1964), Bolivia (November 1964), the Dominican Republic for the third time (April 1965), Ecuador for the third time (March 1966) and Argentina again (June 1966). There is no need at this point to examine this dreary record in detail. Some of these coups were arrogant power plays on the part of the military; some were a result of the unwillingness of conservative elements in the country concerned to tolerate reformist left-of-center governments; some were the result of the ineptitude of the government which was overthrown; and some were the result of alarm over the growth of Communist influence.

Frequently it has seemed that the United States has been caught in the painful dilemma of choosing between *caudillos* (military strong men) and Communists. Neither choice is at all satisfactory.

The trouble with Communists is, or should be, obvious. In Punta del Este in January-February, 1962, the OAS Foreign Ministers declared the principles of communism to be incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system. In effect, this reaffirmed, and built on, an earlier declaration made by the Foreign Ministers in Caracas in 1954. But aside from the ideological aspects involved, the experience with Cuba since 1959 shows that a Communist state in the Western Hemisphere, plugged into the Soviet power system, can lead to missile crises and the brink of nuclear war. The Cuban experience also shows that Communist states are expensive in economic terms with their expropriation of private investments and their disruption of longstanding trade patterns.

The trouble with *caudillos* is that they do not allow for political development because they see a threat to themselves in such development. They do not provide for a succession. The consequence is that when they go, as they inevitably must, what follows is either chaos, as in the Dominican Republic after Trujillo, or communism, as in Cuba after Batista. Neither is in the interests of the United States.

Both Communists and *caudillos* are offensive to human rights and to generally accepted, though infrequently observed, standards of human decency.

Both also share another characteristic in the impact they have beyond the borders of the country where they are in power. In the case of Communists, this takes the form of open encouragement of subversive forces in other countries. In the case of *caudillos*, it is more subtle, but there is no doubt that *coups d'etat* are infectious. When the armed forces get away with a *coup* in one country, their comrades in arms in other countries are encouraged to do likewise.

Thus, the true national interests of the United States lie in helping Latin America find a middle way between *caudillos* and Communists—and in recognizing this middle way when it is found. One of the iniquitous things about *caudillos* is that they tend to justify their own actions by exaggerating the strength of the Communists. U.S. diplomacy has not always been adequate to the admittedly difficult task of making clear, hardheaded assessments in these situations. As a consequence, the United States has sometimes wrestled with a *caudillo*-Communist dilemma where none existed.

## II. THE BASIC PROBLEM—SOCIETIES IN FLUX

In this last half of the 20th century Latin America finds itself in a process of historic transition from traditional to modern societies. The United States did not start this process, and the United States cannot control it. The challenge it presents to U.S. foreign policy in this generation is how it may be influenced, and one should recognize at the beginning that it can be influenced only marginally, if at all.

At bottom, what is happening in Latin America is the result of the impact of a delayed industrial-technological revolution on nonindustrial societies, an impact which is intensified by the world's highest population growth rates. Industrialization and population growth—

and their consequences—are putting a severe strain on political and social institutions which were designed for other circumstances.

Latin America's traditional institutions and social values were largely inherited from 16th century Spain and Portugal. (In some areas, particularly parts of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Guatemala, traditional Indian societies persist; but in important respects, especially paternalism, these are similar to the Spanish heritage.) For approximately 400 years, from the arrival of the *conquistadores* to the arrival of the industrial revolution, these traditional institutions and social values were in tune with the economic, social, and political structure and life of Latin America. They are in tune no longer—primarily because of industrialization and population growth—and that is the explanation for Latin America's current political turbulence.

From the early 16th to the middle 20th centuries, Latin America had an economy based essentially on agriculture and mining. This economy was a peculiar mixture of mercantilism and subsistence. Gold, silver, sugar, and later other commodities were exported to Europe. A great deal of the proceeds stayed in Europe, but some also paid for the import of grand pianos, furniture, fine laces, and perfumes. The *hacienda* (a rough equivalent of the *ante bellum* plantation in the Southern United States), produced its own food, everyday clothes, and other necessities. All the while, a great many of the people of Latin America lived, as they continue to do, outside any money economy on subsistence agriculture on small tracts of land, title to which usually was, and is, obscure.

This particular heritage was both cause and effect of a set of cultural attitudes and social values, which were appropriate to the *milieu* in which they were held. Of course, there was gross maldistribution of wealth and income and a great deal of social injustice, but scarcely more than existed in 19th century England or the United States and perhaps no more than exists today in Latin America. For all its faults, the saving grace of the traditional Latin American system was that it operated in a framework which provided a high degree of psychological stability. This framework, and the psychological stability which went with it, is now being resoundingly shattered. In different circumstances an analogous process may be discerned in the United States in the effects of the mass migration of Negroes from the rural South to the urban North.

#### A. THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

The industrialization of Latin America began at different times in different countries (in some, it has scarcely yet begun at all), but it generally acquired major momentum in the late 1930's and early 1940's as worldwide depression and war cut off Latin America from many of the manufactured goods which it had previously imported. In the beginning, this industrialization was not planned; it simply occurred, as investors, both local and foreign, saw a way to make money. It has since become the subject of elaborate planning mechanisms and foreign aid programs, but its basic momentum is largely beyond the control, though not the influence, of governments.

The traditional Latin American way of life is incompatible with industrialization, and this has produced a mass psychological dilemma. People want the products of an industrial society—automobiles,

television sets, hair curlers, refrigerators—but they do not want the kind of social organization and habits of life which industrialization implies. This is a dilemma which they have to resolve for themselves, and it is not for the United States to lecture them about the presumed relative merits of different scales of social values. It is appropriate, however, to examine the implications of these different scales so as to clarify the choices that have to be made.

Traditional Latin American society may be briefly described as hierarchical, paternalistic, and family oriented. There is a strong sense of individualism and dignity—in a Latin, not an Anglo-Saxon, sense. Social prestige attaches to philosophers rather than to mechanics, to poets rather than to merchants.

There is very little vertical mobility. Unwritten but thoroughly understood rights and obligations extend to the class above and to the class below. If the peasant, for practical purposes, is bound to the land, the *patrón*, or landowner, is also bound to the peasant. If the peasant is supposed to work 3 days a week for the *patrón*, the *patrón* is supposed to see to it that the peasant gets a certain amount of free liquor on *fiesta* days and that his wife and children get decent burials.

This kind of paternalism will not work if the *patrón* is a corporation; the essential personal element is lost. This is one reason why Latin American labor relations are frequently so chaotic and why Latin American labor unions and labor legislation put so much emphasis on fringe benefits and social welfare measures. It is a perhaps subconscious effort on the part of workers to find a substitute for the *patrón* in the corporation or in the government (an effort which has sometimes been encouraged by opportunistic politicians who hope to use workers' organizations for their own ends). The *patrón* could not banish a *campesino* from the *hacienda*; why, then, should a corporation be allowed to fire a worker who has given long and faithful (after his fashion) service? The *patrón* took care of his workers (again after his fashion) in sickness and death, on feast days, and in family emergencies; why then should the corporation or the government (the maximum *patrón* of all) not be expected to do likewise?

This set of attitudes inhibits, to put it mildly, the development of institutionalized labor-management relationships based on arm's-length collective bargaining between economic equals.

Latin America's hierarchical social structure and paternalistic attitudes, which are consistent with and reinforced by the Catholic religion (as it has been taught and practiced in Latin America), mean that there is very little room for a middle class. The owner of a *hacienda* has his administrator, and there are a certain number of artisans, but in traditional Latin American society there are no foremen or middle management people of the type who make the North American industrial machine go.

A Latin American's loyalties run strongly to his family, which is close-knit and extended to include cousins and godfathers. The family will unite against any outside threat to the interests of any member, and it is extremely rare that any outsider breaks into the family circle.

This strong family orientation inhibits the development of impersonal management in both business and government. Far from being a scandal, nepotism is a social duty. The scandal occurs if one does not take care of his wife's second cousin.

Outside the family, an individual's loyalties run most strongly, not to an institution such as a church, a political party, a labor union, or a trade organization, but to another individual. This is the basis of the *personalismo* which has been the curse of Latin American politics. The individual who is the object of these personal loyalties either has to retain all power in his hands or see all power slip away from him. In the Latin American environment, the delegation of power—or the refusal to use it—is frequently the beginning of political suicide. Just as there is a reluctance at the top to delegate authority, there is a reluctance below to accept responsibility.

Latin Americans are extremely individualistic—in a Latin sense which often strikes North Americans as paradoxical. Latin Americans will tolerate what seems to North Americans the grossest abuse of freedom of speech and political action, while they pay not the slightest attention to traffic regulations or no-smoking rules in theaters which North Americans take for granted.

"Individualism" and "dignity" are inadequate translations of the Spanish "*individualismo*" and "*dignidad*." These qualities are extremely personal and are closely related to Latin concepts of the inner being or the soul. Every person, no matter how low his social state, has a right to his *dignidad*, and few things are worse than offending that *dignidad* or attempting to breach the protective covering of a person's *individualismo*.

This particular Latin brand of individualism inhibits the development of cooperative community action. Innumerable Peace Corps volunteers have seen a wave of initial enthusiasm for a community project. A committee is organized, officers are elected, maybe even letterheads are printed; and then nothing happens. When the agreed-upon day comes to work on the school, or the water system, or the health center, nobody shows up—they forgot, or they had to do something else, or they thought it might rain, or it was simply *inconveniente*.

One reason nothing happens is that people are accustomed to vertical lines of action in their society; the idea of horizontal cooperation is alien. The school ought to be built by the central government (or the rich Americans). Granted, the central government has been there for 400 years without building the school; maybe it would move faster if the rich Americans made a loan, or sent some materials. The idea of taking things into one's own hands and building the school anyway is accepted only slowly and reluctantly.

The peculiar combination of individualism, paternalism, and personalism also contributes to the absence of a sense of enlightened self-interest and of a social consciousness, as North Americans use that term. When Latin Americans help somebody else, they want to do it on a personal, rather than an institutional or a community, basis. The rich are more likely to give money to build a hospital than to staff or operate it. The hospital will be a physical monument to their largess, but how do you put a plaque on the check that is written to cover an operating deficit? Even so, it is still easier to write a check than to involve oneself personally in the organization that makes the hospital, or whatever, work.

Traditionally, among upper class Latin Americans, there has been a preoccupation with philosophical rather than materialistic problems. The sons of upper class families typically went into law, the priesthood,

or the Army. Although admiring the political system of the United States, and particularly the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, they drew a sharp distinction between this and North American society, which they found gross, materialistic, and lacking in *cultura*. The contrast is perhaps most sharply made in "Ariel," a long allegorical essay by the great Uruguayan writer, José Enrique Rodó. Written in 1900, "Ariel" has become one of the Latin American classics and has had a profound influence on several generations of Latin American students. In it, Latin America is Ariel, the blithe, free spirit, while the United States is Caliban, the deformed, materialistic slave to industrialism. The contrast is not flattering to the United States. There is implicit here an attitude of smug cultural superiority. This is in part a natural result of a scale of values which has traditionally ranked poets above shopkeepers. In recent years especially, it has probably also been reinforced by a psychological defensive mechanism. Some Latin Americans feel so far behind the industrialization of the North that they react by adopting an attitude that an industrial society is no good anyway.

There is a heavy strain of fatalism in the Latin psyche. *Que será será*—what will be will be—said a popular song a few years back. *Si Dios quiere*—if God wills—is a phrase heard at least once a day. The Spanish language is full of convenient circumlocutions to say that something happened without assigning responsibility for it—thereby implying that it happened through divine or occult predisposition. If a maid drops a cup, she doesn't say "I dropped the cup." She says, in literal translation, "The cup fell itself" (*La tasa se cayó*). If you forget the keys, you don't tell your wife "I forgot the keys." You tell her "The keys forgot themselves to me" (*Las llaves se me olvidaron*). If God intends for a machine in a factory to break down, it will break down, regardless of the maintenance work that has been done on it. If God does not so intend, the machine will keep on working. Hence the highways of Latin America are strewn with broken-down trucks and buses.

Holidays and the long lunch hour are taken very seriously. Although the practice in this respect varies from country to country, there may be anywhere from 10 to 20 holidays a year, and if a holiday falls on any day except Wednesday, it is usually turned into an excuse for a 4- or 5-day weekend—in the Spanish phrase, one makes a *punte* (bridge) over the intervening workdays.

The long lunch hour does not result in fewer hours worked, because shops and offices stay open later. It is a heritage from more leisurely times on the *hacienda* when people ate their main meal in the afternoon and took a nap (*siesta*) afterward. But in an urban industrializing society, efficiency is greatly diminished by the sheer logistical chore of getting everybody home for lunch and then back to the office or factory 2 or 3 hours later. A city has four traffic jams a day instead of two. Commuters expend more energy, not less. But they are nonetheless addicted to the old ways of doing things. There was a public outcry of opposition when President Frei tried to abolish the long luncheon in Chile and when President Belaunde sought to reduce the number of holidays in Peru.

Finally, quite apart from these cultural factors, it should also be noted that the problem of adjustment to industrialization is more difficult for Latin Americans than it was for people who passed through

the industrial revolution earlier. This is because of the exploding rate of technological progress: The industrialization of Latin America begins at a high level of sophisticated technology which was reached more gradually in Europe and the United States.

Accelerating technology not only means that the pace of change is faster and that adjustment to change is therefore more difficult. It also means that disparities are increased both between Latin America and the United States, and within Latin America. The gap between Bolivia and Argentina, or between the Peruvian Andes and Lima, or between the northeast of Brazil and São Paulo is of roughly the same proportions as the gap between Latin America as a whole and the United States. Further, although data are sketchy and inexact, there is evidence to suggest that these intra-Latin American disparities are increasing. One of the impacts of industrialization, for example, is a form of technological unemployment—factories put handicraft and cottage industries out of business. This phenomenon has been observed elsewhere, but it is more acute in Latin America because it is happening faster and on societies which have had less experience with it.

#### B. THE IMPACT OF POPULATION GROWTH

This and all the other impacts of industrialization are seriously compounded by high rates of population growth. In 1950, all of Latin America had a population of 158 million; in 1965, the figure was 238 million. At that rate, by the year 2000, the population would be the incredible total of 740 million.

This growth has come about, and is continuing, mainly through sharply decreased death rates, while birth rates have remained relatively stable. (An exception should be noted: In southern South America, particularly in Uruguay and Argentina, birth rates have also shown a substantial reduction.) The reduction in death rates has been due, in important part, to improvements in environmental sanitation and to the introduction of antibiotics. In both of these developments, the U.S. foreign aid program has played a major role, while for a variety of reasons it has not achieved comparable results in increasing food production. Here is another example of how technology introduces strains and distortions in a society.

The way in which the population increase in Latin America comes about introduces a marked distortion in the age distribution of the population. One-half of all Latin Americans are less than 20 years old; more than four out of 10 are less than 14 years old. This extreme youth of the population has several implications:

The ratio between the productive and nonproductive sectors of the population is unfavorable. The relatively few people in the productive age groups have to produce enough to support the relatively many people in the nonproductive age groups. But more is required than simply supporting them; investments have to be made in them. These masses of children not only have to be fed, clothed, and housed (after a fashion). If they are eventually to become productive themselves, they have to be educated and to be provided with health services—that is, not only kept alive, but kept healthy and trained to do something economically or socially useful. This is quite beyond the capacity of a country with a per capita income in the range of \$200 to \$400 a year. The Alliance for Progress was supposed to eradi-

cate illiteracy in the decade of the 1960's; but Latin America will be lucky if illiteracy does not in fact get worse. This is the great fallacy in the frequent argument that people are a country's greatest resource. They are *potentially*; but if a sufficient investment is not made in their education and health, they are a burden rather than a resource, a liability instead of an asset.

A very youthful population also means that a country's rate of economic growth must be accelerated much beyond what would otherwise be acceptable. This is not only to keep per capita incomes from declining; it is, perhaps even more importantly, to provide jobs for the large and growing numbers of people who enter the labor force every year as they reach working age. Although some are bad and some are worse, every country of Latin America has a severe problem of unemployment and especially of underemployment or disguised unemployment, and in the foreseeable future these problems are likely to get worse rather than better. Further, as industrialization progresses, it requires higher skills (which require more education) and fewer people to produce the same amount of goods—another of the ironies of Latin America's entrance into the industrial age at a high level of technology.

Thus the children of Latin America are reaching maturity—in a chronological if not an emotional or an intellectual sense—poorly educated, if at all; without adequate economic opportunities; oppressed with a great sense of frustration; and susceptible to any demagog who comes along. The wonder is not that the Latin American political structure is cracking; the wonder is that it has not long since collapsed.

The impact of the population increase is further intensified by a concurrent movement to the cities, many of which have more than doubled in population in the last 15 years. This movement is in part a reflection of the population increase in rural areas where the pressure of population on an inadequate, or inadequately developed, resource base is driving people to the cities. (In some countries, notably Colombia, rural terrorism is also involved.)

The cities of Latin America are quite unprepared to cope with this kind of growth. There is not enough housing, schools, hospitals, water, sewers, electricity, firemen, policemen, public transportation—anything. Nor are many of the new urban residents prepared for any but the most menial jobs, let alone prepared for the social adjustment to urban living. Hence, the miserable slums, the beggars, the street peddlers selling contraband razor blades and cigarettes one at a time; the ruffians; the thieves—and most heartrending and ominous of all, the abandoned children sleeping in doorways, begging, stealing, and growing up to become gangsters or prostitutes.

True, there have always been people like this in Latin America and elsewhere. What is new in Latin America is that there are so many of them. This has never happened on such a scale. It can accurately be called a process of social decomposition.

Many North Americans, and increasing numbers of Latin Americans, looking at this dismal population problem, conclude that the only solution is a massive birth control campaign. But in the way of such a campaign, there are formidable inhibitions.

Not the least important of these, especially so far as the United States is concerned, is Latin American nationalism. Some Latin

Americans already have the idea that the United States is worried about Latin American population growth, not because it threatens the area's social development, economic growth, and political stability, but because it threatens the hegemony of the United States. The Yankees, according to this view, do not want Latin America to have a growing, thriving population, because this would make Latin America better able to assert its rights and better able to resist Yankee imperialism. This is, of course, nonsense, but it implies a policy of extreme wariness on the part of the United States with relation to population.

Even without anti-Yankee overtones, nationalism inhibits programs of family planning. Many Latin Americans, especially in the bigger countries, tend to relate population to international prestige. They argue that their countries are not in fact overcrowded; that on the contrary, they need more people to settle the vast open spaces. Some of them even argue that underpopulation accounts for underdevelopment—if they had more people, they would have a bigger internal market for their products.

Aside from nationalism, there are three other inhibitions on family planning. In no particular order of importance, they are the *machismo* complex, the Catholic religion, and the twisted economics of poverty.

*Macho* is the Spanish word for "male." It has strong connotations also of vigor, robustness, masculinity, and sexual prowess. To say of a man that he is *muy macho* is one of the highest compliments. To say that he is not *macho* is a sure way to get a fight, because no Latin American man can keep his self-respect, his *dignidad*, if he doesn't prove that he is *macho*, once that has been questioned. The *machismo* complex—a term which has entered the psychiatric literature in Mexico—is excessive preoccupation with establishing that one is *macho*. One of the harmless manifestations of *machismo* is the addiction of so many Latin American men to mustaches. One of the more serious manifestations is the fathering of numerous children.

The Catholic Church, as the dominant religion—or more accurately, the dominant religious institution—in Latin America, has long preached the sinfulness of so-called artificial methods of family planning. The Church seems now to be reconsidering this doctrine, at least to the extent of recognizing that a problem exists, but it is a very long way from the Vatican to a rural priest in Latin America and news travels slowly.

Finally, in rural Latin America, children are viewed as economic assets. From an early age, a child is an additional source of unpaid labor—working the fields, carrying water, gathering wood, looking after animals. He is little distracted by school. Sometimes even when a school is available, his father forbids him to go because he is needed—or thought to be needed—at home. Further, the more children one has, the more likely one is to be provided for in his old age.

Against this set of inhibitions, there are some factors working in favor of family planning. Although some Latin American women enjoy the reflected glory of having a *muy macho* husband, many of them are distinctly less enthralled by *machismo* than are their spouses. At the same time, Latin American women are more devout than Latin American men, and are less willing to disregard the teachings of the Catholic Church. Limited experience to date, however, indicates that Latin American women generally are more receptive than men to family planning advice and assistance.

This in part is a reflection of slowly but broadly changing attitudes throughout Latin American society. Despite the nationalistic, religious and cultural objections to family planning, more and more Latin Americans, including some highly placed government and Church officials, are realizing that population growth is a problem and that something must be done about it. This growing awareness offers the best hope over the long run, if the problem does not become unmanageable over the short run.

### III. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The complicated forces at work, as described in the previous section, not only affect Latin America's adjustment to an industrial society; they also importantly affect the political development of Latin America and they heavily influence the world view of Latin Americans—how they see themselves, the world, and especially the United States.

One of the important factors here is what might be called the reality gap, or the tendency to think that something is done when it is written. This has deep roots. In the mid-16th century, the Spanish Crown promulgated a series of laws to protect the rights of Indians in Latin America. The *conquistadores* were horrified and coined a saying—*se obedece pero no se cumple*, which freely translated means "we will pay lipservice but we won't really do anything." Since that time, there have been thousands of words written in Latin American constitutions and statutes about the rights of man, the rights of labor, social security, and so forth, very few of which have been observed. Colombians make this into a cynical joke on themselves in the story that Bogotá was destroyed by a natural disaster and that 10,000 years later archeologists dug up the ruins and concluded, on the basis of the laws they found, that Colombia had had the most advanced civilization the world had ever known. This is one explanation of the shortfalls of the Alliance for Progress. There is formal acceptance of its requirements, but inaction in implementing them—*se obedece pero no se cumple*.

Related to this is a formalistic view of law. More deference is paid to the forms and procedures of the law than to the substance of what is being done. This has been the source of frequent North American frustrations in the OAS as Latin Americans have haggled over what seem to North Americans to be essentially meaningless differences between the powers of the Council of the OAS, the Council acting as a provisional meeting of consultation, and a Foreign Ministers meeting. It has also been the source of rationalization for what would otherwise look like illegal changes of governments or violations of human rights. In the Latin view, these violations are perfectly proper if the legal forms are observed—if, for example, they are committed under a state of siege which gives the President, or a military junta, extraordinary powers. Thus, one constantly finds Latin American governments trying to legitimize themselves or their actions through some constitutional or political legerdemain.

This in part accounts for the cynicism which is so pervasive in Latin American politics. Not without some justification based on the historic record, few Latin Americans believe anything a politician says. The credibility gap is not limited to Latin America; but a

fundamental difference between Latin America and North America is that most North Americans are indoctrinated beginning in about the third grade to believe that through political or other civic action they can change something they don't like in their communities. Whether well founded or not, this belief is a part of the North American *mores*; it is conspicuously absent in Latin America.

In its politics, Latin America has always been torn between centralization and decentralization, between the forms of democracy and the practice of personalism. The Latin American concepts of *individualismo* and *dignidad* are basically democratic. By force of geography, if nothing else, most Latin American countries have lived—until fairly recently anyway—with a high degree of regional autonomy. In the colonial era, there was established the institution of the *cabildo*, or municipal council, which shortly before and during the period of the wars of independence gave some promise of expressing a kind of grassroots democracy—a rough Latin equivalent of the New England town meeting.

The *cabildo* never developed into a strong institution of local self-government because it ran head on into the Latin propensity for centralization, into the fact that if one does not have all the power, he does not have any. The *cabildos* of Latin America were the engines of revolution in the early 19th century; but these were upper-class revolutions, inspired and directed by *criollos* (persons born in Latin America of European parents) against misgovernment from Spain.

There is a parallel here with the American Revolution. Latin America was powerfully influenced by the intellectual ferment and the political upheavals of the late 18th century in France and North America. The Latin Americans not only bought the ideology of the French and American Revolutions; they also attempted to import the forms of the American Constitution. Most of the many constitutions which have been promulgated in Latin America since the wars of independence are based on the Constitution of the United States rather than on any European system. They provide for the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers instead of a parliamentary system. They include bills of rights (though with a good deal of small print about how these rights can be suspended). One of the ironies of U.S. post-World War II policy toward Latin America has been that the United States has tried to sell an ideology which was bought a long time ago, but has neglected to provide any helpful hints on how to make the system work. It is like an appliance salesman continuing to tout the advantages of his product after he has made the sale but not providing an adapter for the particular kind of electric current the appliance is going to be plugged into. The ideology of democracy may be of universal application, but the institutions which make it work vary according to the soil in which they take root. What is lacking in Latin America is a set of deeply rooted broadly based institutions.

One reason they are lacking is that until recently the times did not demand them. Until the 20th century, the political system of Latin America was very comfortably adapted to the social system described above. It was centralized, paternalistic, and personalistic. It was based on three dominant institutions—the Army, which had physical power; the landowners, who had economic power; and the Catholic Church, which had moral power (and no little economic

power as well). This triumvirate provided a remarkable degree of stability—a stability which was essentially unshaken by the wars of independence in the first quarter of the 19th century or by the century of political turmoil which followed. This turmoil in fact produced very little change. Governments came and went in a succession of palace revolutions in which one *caudillo* replaced another from whom he was virtually indistinguishable.

These political systems, which served Latin America reasonably well by its standards for roughly four centuries, were adequate only for stable societies; they are quite incapable of dealing with social change on the scale which is now occurring. The preeminent problem for Latin America is how to evolve a new set of political institutions which will be capable of dealing with social change. The preeminent problem of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America is how to influence Latin American political development in ways not incompatible with the national interest of the United States—and always remembering that the degree of U.S. influence is marginal at best.

Latin Americans have a love-hate complex toward the United States. In part, this is a perhaps unavoidable result of the gross discrepancy in wealth and power and of the almost overwhelming presence of the United States. In part, it is the result of the conflict symbolized in "Ariel" between esthetic and materialistic values. Latin Americans see much to admire in the United States, including some of its esthetic values; but they also see much which they find gross and ugly. They revel in much of the superficial culture of the United States (movies, popular music and dances, soft drinks), but they don't want their own culture to be drowned. They would like to be more free than they think they are to pick and choose.

They admire North American efficiency and technical competence, and at the same time are a little frightened by it. This ambivalence is reflected in their attitude toward foreign, especially United States, investment. They want the economic development which foreign investment brings, but they do not want to be inundated by briskly competent North American engineers and industrial managers remaking *their* countries. They want to see their countries remade—economically, anyway—but they would like to have more to do with it themselves. They see themselves unable to compete and thereby gradually losing control of their own countries. (This is one reason why the most successful U.S. companies in Latin America, generally speaking, are those which blend most imperceptibly into the Latin American background and which have fewest North Americans in evidence.)

This Latin American attitude is a reflection, of course, of a lack of self-confidence and of a kind of inferiority complex. Nationalism is one of the manifestations of these phenomena. Another is the tendency to blame somebody else for one's troubles, and in Latin America, the United States is the most convenient target for such blame.

One of the notable results of the economic and political development which Mexico has enjoyed over the last generation has been a corresponding growth in self-confidence on the part of Mexicans. Indeed, this self-confidence is one of the most striking respects in which Mexicans differ from most other Latin Americans. It is undoubtedly an important factor in the improvement in United States-Mexican relationships, and it results not from anything the United States has done

but from what the Mexicans have done—namely, prove to themselves that they can manage their own affairs.

In this connection it is worth pointing out the seeming paradox that Mexico is the country in Latin America with which the United States has the best relations and which is also the stubbornest holdout in any kind of collective action against Cuba. Further, Mexico, is the only country in Latin America which has refused, as a matter of principle, to sign an investment guarantee agreement with the United States, and it is one of the most attractive places for U.S. investment. It is the only country in Latin America which does not have a military assistance agreement with the United States (again as a matter of principle), and it is one of the few Latin American countries where there is unquestioned civilian control of the Armed Forces. This seeming paradox can be explained only in terms of Mexico's political development and of the tacit recognition of that development by U.S. investors and the U.S. Government.

Finally, mention should be made of the political problems of integrating different cultures. The United States has recently become aware of this problem, as manifested in Newark, Detroit, and elsewhere, but it is perhaps even more acute in Latin America, especially in the countries (Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia) with large Indian populations.

Latin Americans typically pride themselves on their lack of racial prejudice, and in fact they do not—very often, anyway—discriminate among themselves on the basis of race. But they do discriminate on the basis of class, and they typically confuse race with class. Whether one is considered an Indian in Peru, for example, does not depend on one's parents but rather on whether one wears shoes instead of sandals and speaks Spanish instead of Quechua. This is cultural, rather than racial, prejudice; but it is prejudice all the same, whether one is dealing with Indians, in Peru or Negroes in Brazil—where most of the population has some Negro blood but where the color of the patrons in the expensive nightclubs of Copacabana is noticeably lighter than the color of the workers on Rio's docks.

The process of integration is aided by the pervasive nationalism. One of the most useful functions of the Peruvian Army is that it teaches Indian draftees to wear shoes, speak Spanish, and think of themselves as Peruvians. But on discharge from the Army, these same draftees tend to migrate to Lima or other urban centers, thereby not spreading the things they have learned to their home communities. Another useful function of Latin American armies is to provide a route of social mobility. In some countries, a military career is the only way a son of the lower middle class can reasonably expect to get into the upper middle class.

It has also been demonstrated that a culture shock is produced by the sudden introduction of democracy to people with authoritarian backgrounds. This is observed most dramatically in rural areas where *hacienda* lands are divided and the *patrón* is withdrawn. Not only is production likely to suffer, but the *campesinos* suffer in a psychological sense. This is not to argue against the introduction of democracy or land reform; it is only to point out that the process is a good deal more complicated than writing a new set of rules, and that the cause of political stability is served by the fact that all the Indians are not coming out of the mountains at once.

## IV. THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

As the term "political development" is used here, it means the growth of the institutions and processes through which people organize themselves to carry on their political activities—the day-to-day work of government and the way in which changes in governments and in public policy come about. The goal of political development is the growth of stable political systems in which there is broad popular participation and which are generally responsive to the wishes of the people. This encompasses a great deal more than elections and political parties. It includes civic and economic organizations—pressure groups—of all kinds.

It involves not only participation, but a sense of participation. One of the roots of Argentina's political difficulties, for example, is that Perón gave labor, for the first time in Argentine history, a sense of participation, and no successor government has been willing to do so. In point of fact, Perón used labor for his own ends, but he made labor think it was participating. In so doing, he let the genie out of the bottle and all the army's tanks from Campo de Mayo have not been able to put it back in.

The forms of a political system have an important bearing on the way the political process works and on the political institutions which result from it. For example, most Latin American governments are highly centralized, the result of the fact that in the Latin American environment one has usually had to have all the power in order to keep any of it. Administratively, it is much more difficult to operate a centralized government than a decentralized one, and competent public administrators are in extremely short supply in Latin America. This is one reason, among many others, why some Latin American governments have difficulties enforcing their authority, but these very difficulties make them even more reluctant to relinquish any of it. More freedom in the popular election of local officials is frequently prescribed as one of the first steps to take toward political development. But sometimes instead of encouraging grassroots democracy, this proves to be a disruptive force as a community tears itself apart in family rivalries.

The role of legislative bodies—their powers, organization, rules, and relationship to executives—has received very little attention. One reason for this may be that, on the part of both the United States and the several governments of Latin America, foreign policy is carried out by executive branches talking to each other, frequently in terms of how to bring pressure to bear on their Congresses or how to maneuver around obstinate or obstructive Congresses.

The mechanics of the electoral process are also important. How are candidates selected? How are they elected? How are the elections themselves conducted? It is frequently the case, for example, that all of the congressional representatives of a given department or state are elected at large within that state. Systems of proportional representation are widely used. This has the advantage of limiting the opposition's losses—something which is thought to be important in a culture where authority is traditionally centralized and where a system which permitted the winner to take all might well sound the death knell for the loser. The practical value of this presumed advantage may be questioned in the light of the benefits it has conferred on the opposition

in, say, Nicaragua and Paraguay, which guarantee the opposition one-third of the seats in Congress but which remain two of the hemisphere's more authoritarian governments.

A disadvantage is more readily apparent. If a given department or State is to elect, say, 12 representatives to Congress, all at large and by a system of proportional representation, the individual voter casts his ballot, not for an individual candidate, but for a slate of 12. The situation is further complicated by the widespread use of a system of *suplentes*, or alternates. Without a requirement that a candidate reside in the department he seeks to represent, a slate may be headed by a well-known national figure who has no intention of taking the seat if he wins; he will turn it over to his *suplente*. Thus, the individual voter has no idea whom he is voting for, successful candidates feel no special ties or responsibility to any specific constituency, and fixing political responsibility becomes impossible.

In many Latin American countries, elections for President and for Congress are held at different times. This prolongs the agony and increases the chances for stalemate between President and Congress. On the other hand, it sometimes provides a period for political maneuver, for compromise, and for adjustment.

The effects of such details of the electoral process have been studied very little; yet it seems apparent that the effects may well be more far reaching than is generally supposed. A change in political mechanics might well result in a change in political structure as parties and other political institutions change so as to adapt themselves to the new mechanics.

In this connection, however, it should be noted that politicians are frequently among the groups most resistant to political change, and for the same reasons that the oligarchy is resistant to socioeconomic change—they have been successful under the prevailing system and they don't want to take their chances with a new one.

Political parties are, of course, the organizations most directly involved in the political process. The cause of political stability and growth is likely to be better served to the degree that these parties are based ideologically rather than personalistically, and broadly rather than narrowly. The PRI in Mexico, Acción Democrática in Venezuela, and the Christian Democrats in Chile are good examples; and the PRI, especially, proves that ideology can cover quite a range. This, indeed, is one of the greatest political advances which Mexico has made relative to the rest of Latin America where parties typically fragment over relatively insignificant questions of policy.

But political parties are only a part—perhaps not the most important part—of a country's political institutions. There are a wide variety of other organizations which day in and day out provide a means for popular participation. These include, literally, just about everything—professional societies, labor unions, business groups, trade associations, women's organizations, cooperatives, farm groups, civic groups, and so forth. In their totality, they tend to cushion a society from abrupt or violent shocks and to lessen the effect of these shocks when they occur.

Finally, political development importantly involves attitudes. A prerequisite of political development is that people want to participate in the political process, not only in the narrow sense of voting and engaging in party activities, but also in the broader sense of taking

part in cooperative projects in the community. Another prerequisite is that people think that through such participation they can change something—that through a rural community development effort they can build a school where none existed before; or that through an urban study group of upper middle class women, they can improve garbage collection. One of the signs of success in community development projects is the willingness of peasants or urban slumdweller to talk to Government officials as equals. On the limited scale on which it has operated, this has been one of the great contributions of the Peace Corps, whose volunteers have brought with them a healthy lack of awe of officialdom.

The main point with respect not only to community development but also to the total range of civic groups is that through such organizations people get used to the idea of working together for a common end. As pointed out earlier, this idea, which is taken for granted in the United States, is alien to Latin American culture; but it is basic to a democratic society and a liberal free enterprise economic system. The economic dividends of such activity, which are frequently the stated goal, are in reality only fringe benefits. The real objective is, or should be, the development of a new institution and a new feeling of self-reliance and community cooperation in place of the traditional paternalism and Latin kind of individualism.

This is self-help in its most basic sense. Self-help is frequently measured in terms of a government's efforts to raise revenue, or the way in which it spends the revenue it does raise. But what is more important—and more difficult—is to get across to people to whom the idea is completely alien the notion that they can help themselves in simple, specific ways by working together. The absence of self-help in this sense is due not so much to laziness as to a cultural block.

## V. CURRENT POLITICAL TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA

Most of the countries of Latin America are trying in one way or another, with varying degrees of intensity and success, to stabilize and institutionalize their political systems. Space precludes a comprehensive country-by-country review, and this section will be limited to an examination of some of the more salient features of the current scene.

### A. MEXICO

The great contribution of the Mexicans to political development is the PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*) which for a generation has brought the country peace, steady economic growth, and orderly governmental transition.

What is so ingenious about the PRI is the way in which it accommodates the Latin American temperament with the demands of a modernizing society. The PRI is centralized, authoritarian, and paternalistic. The President of the Republic is the undisputed *jefe*, leader, *caudillo*. He selects or approves PRI candidates for Congress, for Governor, for mayor. The Mexican Congress has never been known to say him nay, or even to delay very long in doing his bidding.

At the same time, the PRI is eclectic and broadly representative of diverse interest groups. Its members cover an ideological spectrum ranging from conservative to near-Marxist. The party holds this

disparate collection together through being responsive to trends of public opinion, through memory of the chaos which afflicted Mexico in the days before the PRI, through the practical difficulties of achieving political success outside the PRI framework, and at times through old-fashioned, hard-nosed party discipline—those who don't go along, at least up to a point, don't get along. For those who do go along, and who assess the prevailing winds correctly, the PRI provides opportunity for political and economic advancement.

Further, one of the foundation stones of the Mexican revolution—the principle of no reelection—insures that there is a constant turnover among political leaders. In the Mexican context, this has two great advantages: (1) It means that there is always room for the advancement of new, young talent; and (2) it means that no administration can perpetuate itself in power. As Frank Brandenburg has put it in a perceptive comment, "Mexicans avoid personal dictatorship by retiring their dictators every 6 years."<sup>1</sup> Mexicans tolerate as a lesser evil the fact that this also intensifies graft toward the end of an administration, because the ins know that they have to get it then or not at all. Mexican ex-Presidents join a select group of the revolutionary family—an extralegal council of elders whose most important function is selecting the Presidential successor. Incoming Mexican Presidents are thus obligated to all of their living predecessors. Although incoming Presidents bring their own team to power with them, there is not a complete change in the second and third echelons of PRI leadership. The constitutional prohibition of reelection applies only to the office which one is holding at a given time. Thus, one may switch from House to Senate in Congress, from Congress to a Governorship, or vice versa. Care is usually taken, however, to see to it that enough jobs open up to keep new blood flowing in.

#### B. CUBA

Just as the PRI in Mexico represents an attempt (in this case successful) to accommodate the Latin temperament to the demands of a modern society in a democratic framework, Castroism in Cuba represents an attempt to accommodate communism to the Latin temperament. This is seen most clearly in the emphasis on *personalismo*. At a time when official Soviet doctrine has been denouncing the cult of personality and experimenting with collective leadership, Castro has raised charisma to levels of which Stalin and Mao Tse-tung never dreamed. At the same time, he has been moving somewhat tentatively to institutionalize his revolution through organizations of all kinds, principally of labor, *campesinos*, students and teachers, and a new thoroughly purged Communist Party. He has also moved to a foreign policy that can only be described as nihilist.

Such success as Castro has had to date is attributable less to his own abilities or to the appeal of his particular brand of Communist ideology than to the weakness of the preexisting political structure of Cuba. Faced with what was initially a very feeble challenge indeed, this structure simply collapsed, leaving a void which almost anybody could have filled. The tragedy of Cuba is that nobody except Castro was available to fill it.

<sup>1</sup> Frank Brandenburg, "The Relevance of Mexican Experience to Latin American Development," *Orbis*, vol. IX, No. 1 (spring 1965), p. 104.

There has rarely been a more dramatic demonstration of the old political axiom that you can't beat somebody with nobody.

A separate paper in this series of studies is being prepared on the nature and degree of the Castro-Communist threat elsewhere in the hemisphere. The point to make here is that this threat exists not so much because Castro-communism is strong as because the political structures against which it is directed are weak. From this, it follows that the correct policy is to devote more attention to strengthening these other political structures even if this means some deemphasis of a policy of "fighting communism."

#### C. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Within the last decade, Christian Democratic parties have become important in Chile, Venezuela, and Peru, and have established nuclei with promising growth potential in a number of other countries. They are ideological, as distinguished from personalist, parties. They are left of center, in tune with the recent papal encyclicals. Their political ties run more to the Vatican and to the liberal Catholic parties of Western Europe than to the United States, and many of them more or less openly receive subsidies from their European counterparts. Their reformist views and programs are consistent with the Alliance for Progress.

North Americans differ about Christian Democratic ideology and programs. Some find the Christian Democrats too far to the left, too European oriented, too willing to lean over backward (toward the Soviet bloc) to follow an "independent" foreign policy. Others see in Christian Democracy the wave of the future and the best, perhaps last, hope for Latin American salvation. But from the point of view of Latin America's political development, the important thing about the Christian Democrats is that they offer a militant ideology as an alternative both to communism and personalism and they also provide a broadly based organizational framework. If they keep up their work at the grassroots, and if they do not fragment over personalities or questions of doctrine, they can provide a democratic outlet for much of the presently unharnessed political energy of Latin America.

#### D. VENEZUELA

The recent Venezuelan experience is significant for students of political development primarily because of the success *Acción Democrática* (AD) governments have had in establishing civilian control of the military. This is all the more remarkable given the history of Venezuela, a country which has been cursed to an unusual degree with a succession of old-fashioned military dictators.

Like the Christian Democrats, AD resembles a political party in North American or European terms to a greater extent than is usually the case in Latin America. It is ideologically based (left of center), and it pays meticulous attention to organization—the hard, unglamorous work in the precincts which has been the secret of so many political successes.

Under the leadership of Rómulo Betancourt, AD won free elections following the overthrow of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958. During his 5-year term and while carrying out a program of liberal

economic and social change, Betancourt enforced civilian authority over the armed forces through a series of astute maneuvers and unrelenting personal attention. He always considered the views of the military while making it clear that his was the ultimate authority and responsibility. It would be a public service if Betancourt left in his memoirs a detailed account of precisely how he accomplished this.

It is perhaps too soon to say with confidence that this control will last, but the progress that has already been made is grounds for satisfaction—and for further consideration of the relevance elsewhere of the methods used.

#### E. EFFORTS TO CONTAIN POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

One of the weaknesses of Latin American political systems lies in their propensity to tear themselves apart over doctrinal or personal differences. Mexico has solved this through providing in the PRI a single party broad enough to encompass most points of view, centralized enough to develop a unified view, and disciplined enough to enforce it.

Colombia has approached the problem through an arrangement whereby the two traditional parties alternate the presidency and divide equally between them the seats in Congress as well as other government positions. In effect, each party gave up its chances to win an election in exchange for a guarantee that it could not lose one. Since 1958, Colombia has been trying to make this system work and has so far succeeded. The price of success has been a fragmentation of the traditional parties (if they can't fight each other, they will fight among themselves). The principal dividend of success has been a measure of political stability and a reduction in rural violences. The constitutional provisions for this system expire by their own terms in 1974 if they are not modified sooner. What will follow is obscure, but one can be sure that Colombian politics will not revert to the *status quo ante*.

Meanwhile, in Honduras, some opposition (i.e., Liberal) party leaders are talking of copying the Colombian format in their country.

In the Dominican Republic, the problem of containing political differences has been met in part through the *de facto* exile of some of the more extreme opposing political leaders. For example, General Elías Wessin y Wessin and Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó, who were on opposite sides during the 1965 civil war now find themselves, respectively, military adviser to the Dominican Mission to the United Nations and naval attaché in London.

In Brazil and Argentina, the problem has been met by pretending that such differences do not exist. These two countries are so diverse in so many ways that parallels between them should not be carried too far. But recent political history in each country does have a good deal in common.

Both countries are now governed by military regimes in alliance with the oligarchy. In both countries, these regimes came to power following a breakdown of civilian political institutions, a breakdown which occurred largely because the established order was unwilling to allow the effective exercise of political power by radical, labor-based, popular movements—the heirs of Vargas in Brazil and of Peron in Argentina.

The breakdown in Brazil was more complete, and by the time the military-oligarchy alliance moved to seize power on March 31, 1964, the country was about as close to anarchy as an organized society can get. It has been widely alleged that the country was also close to communism, and certainly Communist activity was viewed with more official tolerance than it has been since; but one does not need to make a judgment on the degree of the Communist menace to conclude that by almost any standard the Goulart government (which was deposed by the 1964 revolution) was thoroughly incompetent.

The case was much less persuasive in Argentina, where there was no imminent threat of either communism or chaos (where indeed the civilian government of Dr. Arturo Illia was doing a better job at political and economic stabilization than had its military predecessor), but only a prospective threat of a resurgence of Peronism.

The overthrow of Goulart, in which the prescribed constitutional forms were followed as carefully as the essential objectives of the revolution allowed, came in March-April 1964; the overthrow of Illia, which was a bald military *coup d'état*, happened in June 1966. In each case, the successor authoritarian governments have moved with some success (still inconclusive) to bring about economic recovery. Each has also attempted, with much less success, to reorganize its country's political structure.

In Brazil, this has been done in two stages. In the first stage, the political rights of some hundreds of persons were canceled for 10 years; in effect, a substantial part of the country's political leadership was simply banished from public life. In the second stage, two new political parties—one of the government and one of the "opposition"—were brought into existence by decree. The theory seemed to be that since the half-dozen or so traditional political parties, many of them no more than the personal followings of individual politicians, had been unable to make the political system work, the government itself would impose a two-party system which would be allowed to function initially within carefully prescribed limits and which would hopefully evolve over a long period of time into a responsible and workable mechanism of government. The evolution has not yet proceeded very far, to put it mildly.

In Argentina, the new Government at first simply abolished all political parties, forbade organized political activity, and announced that it would persist for 10 years if necessary until "reasonable" political institutions could be created.

The most striking similarities in these approaches are artificiality, naiveté, and contempt for traditional politicians and political parties. It seems quite unrealistic to think that a two-party system can really be created by government fiat. A government can abolish political parties, and it can—if its police are efficient enough—prohibit political activity. But how long can this last, and what is going to follow it?

#### F. A NEW MILITARY?

A separate paper in this series will deal with the Latin American military. It suffices here to take note of suggestions that the Latin American military is changing, that it is becoming more a force for change and less an instrument for preserving the status quo. Until there is additional evidence, one would do well to receive such sugges-

tions with skepticism. However, this does seem to be happening in El Salvador where military men are operating through the party system and are trying, with some success, to civilianize the Government. The current President of El Salvador, Col. Fidel Sánchez Hernández, and his predecessor, Col. Julio Rivera, both won free elections (though Rivera originally came to power through a *coup*). Nor do they govern with the support of the economic oligarchy; on the contrary, their efforts at moderate reform have alienated the oligarchy.

## VI. U.S. POLICY

It must be recognized that Latin American politics covers a much broader spectrum than that to which North Americans are accustomed. The balance is unquestionably on the left, in North American terms; but at the same time, the far right in Latin America has not been seen in the United States in this century, except for what is commonly regarded as the lunatic fringe. The right has a disproportionate share of political and economic power; it also has a disproportionate number of people who are bilingual in English and "pro-American." The Alliance for Progress, which is about as interventionist and revolutionary program as one could conceive, frightens these people.

North Americans should recognize the risks involved in the Alliance. In seeking to remake the established order, it is helping to unleash powerful and unpredictable forces with no assurance that these forces can be controlled or even guided. Yet the Alliance is a gamble that has to be taken, because the question is not whether there is going to be change in Latin America, but what kind of change. With the Alliance, there is some hope of influencing the nature of the change; without the Alliance, there is no hope.

This is the real purpose of title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act. This title, which was added to the act in 1966 on the initiative of Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota, reads as follows:

In carrying out programs authorized in this chapter, emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.

There is nothing here that was not already in the act, either implicitly or explicitly, but title IX, together with its legislative history, served to give a new emphasis to programs and problems of political development.

Any consideration of how the United States might implement title IX and help Latin America through its painful period of transition has to start from the premise that U.S. influence is severely limited. The institutions which people devise to make their societies work are peculiarly and intimately a matter of domestic concern. If they are to be practical, they have to evolve out of a people's own experience, and what works in one set of circumstances is unlikely to work in another. Outside advice is likely to be mistaken and certain to be rejected.

Yet the United States cannot very well wash its hands of the basic problem of the hemisphere. In a thousand ways from the export of American movies to the negotiation of balance-of-payments loans, the United States is already deeply involved. The question is not whether to intervene, but how and for what purposes.

It is rather a curious thing that although the United States has taken a reasonably long-term view in its economic and social policies toward Latin America (the Alliance for Progress was originally conceived as lasting a decade; the creation of a Latin American Common Market is now projected for 1985), U.S. political policies have been dominated by short-range considerations.

The United States needs a long-term strategy of political development in Latin America, and it needs to relate its economic and its short-term political policies to this strategy. This involves, of course, some painful choices.

For example, Latin America urgently needs to increase its production of food. This can be done most quickly by capital investment in large-scale agriculture—something which exaggerates the already lopsided social structure. Land colonization programs are more likely to be successful if they are carefully organized, guided, and directed—something which further inhibits the growth of a spirit of self-reliance and grassroots cooperation on the part of the colonists. In industry, it is easier and cheaper and produces faster results to help a few big enterprises modernize their plants and expand their production; but this doesn't do anything to build a class of small entrepreneurs and may even interfere with this process.

(It might be noted here parenthetically that in many respects, and particularly in carrying out aid—especially technical assistance—programs, the United States is a prisoner of the past. Once a project or activity is started, it is difficult to start new projects, simply because the money and people are not available. Program analysis and planning have become more refined and sophisticated over the years, but new concepts and insights are difficult to implement because of the deadwood of the past—they always depend on phasing out something else.)

All of this having been said, however, there are some things which can usefully be done.

The process of political development is poorly understood. More research is needed, and the results of that research would presumably be enlightening to Latin Americans as well as to ourselves.

Along with intensified research on these questions, more of AID's money for education might well go into university contracts for the development of departments of political science in Latin American universities and especially for the study of comparative government. Students in country A, for example, might learn more about their own country through the study of the politics of country B than through limiting their studies to their own country—or, what is more usually the case, to political theory.

It would be useful to sponsor more third country travel, more regional seminars, and training programs. Democratic labor leaders fighting Communist control of unions in Chile could usefully be sent to see how this problem has been attacked in Colombia; the experience would at least be more relevant to them than coming to the United States to observe how collective bargaining works in the automobile industry. It would be a good thing to expose radical Bolivian students to the way in which the left-of-center Venezuelan Government gets along with—and is not exploited by—the presumably wicked imperialist U.S. oil corporations.

The military training program might well make use of civilian educational institutions in the United States. One of the purposes

of this program is said to be to civilianize the Latin American military and expose it to North American concepts. Why couldn't this be better done, and why couldn't a Latin American junior officer acquire skills which would be more useful both to himself and his country, at, say, Purdue, than at Fort Leavenworth?

There is a wide range of economic and civic institutions which have political implications and which the United States can encourage in one way or another. These include the rudimentary organizations which result from community development projects, cooperatives, labor unions (especially through the training of leaders), savings and loan associations, and women's groups, among others. Some of this is now being done, but the political objectives need more explicit recognition. Adult literacy programs particularly offer a useful base for civic education—not through comic books on how bad Castro is, but on how the garbage gets collected, who is responsible for fixing the streets, et cetera. If Jefferson made such an impact on Latin America in the 19th century without really trying, it is hard to see why L.B.J. can't do it in the 20th century when he has the whole apparatus of the U.S. Information Agency at his disposal.

In the early 1960's, a program was started to train Foreign Service officers in counterinsurgency. This is important, but it is at least equally important to train them and their colleagues in AID, USIA, and other agencies in the techniques of political development. Much of the U.S. role in political development in Latin America has to be indirect—a casual remark "Have you thought of this?"—and those who implement this role need to be sensitively attuned to it so as neither to let an opportunity pass nor to grasp one too heavily.

By no means all of this needs to be done through governmental programs. Much of it is better done by private instrumentalities, and more attention needs to be given to encouraging private groups—without involving the CIA.

If we have the wit to be sufficiently subtle and indirect about it, we can help to clarify for the Latin Americans the choices that confront them. For example, they can enjoy the psychological security of paternalism or they can have the economic advantages of a strong and independent labor movement, but they can't have it both ways.

We have to remember, however, that the choices in all of these matters are up to the Latin Americans. We can help clarify the factors involved, but the future of Latin America is going to be determined in Latin America, not in Washington—or in Moscow either, for that matter.

We also have to remember that it is going to take at least another generation for this transitional process in Latin America to work itself out; that at best the process is not going to be easy; and that we can expect a good many more disturbances of one kind or another to the south. Communists and demagogues of whatever variety can be expected to take advantage of these when they occur. The politics of Latin America is unquestionably moving leftward. We cannot change that fact, but we might have some influence on whether the movement is directed by indigenous radicals with whom we can eventually come to terms, as in the case of Mexico or Bolivia, or whether it is directed by Moscow, Havana, or Peking Communists.