

FINAL REPORT  
SEMINAR ON  
URBAN & REGIONAL ANALYSIS  
IN CENTRAL AMERICA  
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA  
FEBRUARY 16-17, 1978



PLANNING CONCEPTS INCORPORATED

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"Urban and Regional Analysis (URA) in Central America" was the subject of a seminar in San Jose, Costa Rica on February 16-17, 1978. The participants discussed experience in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama using Guidelines prepared by Richard E. Rhoda of AID's Office of Urban Development.

The first day participants discussed the depth and scope of analysis appropriate for URAs. The conclusion was the three experiences were so different that generalization was not very helpful. However, there was clearly a gap between the URA and well-designed projects to improve the welfare of the poor.

The second day was much more lively than the first. Workshops discussed how each URA could have been improved and the discussion was much more concrete about problems and ideas for improvement.

Section III presents three papers prepared after the seminar on how to improve URAs.

Appendix B includes three thoughtful papers about URAs prepared before the seminar to stimulate thinking about the experiences in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.

The participants evaluated the seminar favorably as follows using scales from "plus two" for strongly positive to "minus two" for strongly negative:

1. "The issues I considered important were treated (1.00)."
2. "The seminar took sufficient advantage of my ideas and experience (.43)."
3. "I learned something valuable in the seminar (1.24)."
4. "My general evaluation of the seminar (1.06)."

Complete results from the evaluation appear in Appendix D.

SECTION I  
INTRODUCTION & ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

On February 16-17, 1978, 28 people met in San Jose, Costa Rica to discuss the Urban and Regional Analyses (URA) conducted in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama during 1976 and 1977. They included eight USAID Mission representatives, eight analysts from these countries, four foreign project advisors and eight other participants; i.e., observers from Colombia (2), Nicaragua (1), Washington (4) and the AID Regional Office for Housing in Tegucigalpa (1). The participant list and agenda appear in Appendix A.

The purpose of the conference was to improve the methods for conducting Urban and Regional Analysis, based on the experience of the previous two years, using the Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analysis, referred to hereafter as Guidelines.\*

The seminar was intended to:

- Review and evaluate experiences from the URA's in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.
- Identify and discuss the relationships between URA analysts and the users responsible for policy formulation, strategy development, programming and funding.

The background of the seminar including pre-seminar preparation is summarized in Appendix A. Section II describes the deliberations at the seminar, including the participants' evaluation of the seminar and conclusions and recommendations formulated during the seminar. Section III presents some additional thinking triggered by the seminar about the next steps for improvement of URA.

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\* Rhoda, Richard E., Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analysis: Types of Analyses Applicable to AID Activities. Office of Urban Development, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Agency for International Development, U.S. Dept. of State. (Washington, D.C., October 1976).

SECTION II  
THE SEMINAR

FIRST DAY: IMPROVING THE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

The seminar was opened by OFIPLAN (Office of Planning of Costa Rica) and Dr. Lawrence D. Posner of Practical Concepts Incorporated with words of welcome, introductions, announcements, and a review of the conference objectives. Each URA was described briefly focusing on the current status and plans to provide a common set of facts for discussion in workshops. Mr. Joslyn Fearon spoke for Panama; Drs. Roger Montiel and Guillermo Perez spoke for Nicaragua; Drs. Vinicio Gonzalez and Jose Antonio Calvo spoke for Costa Rica. Summaries of the Costa Rica presentation appear in Appendix D.\* The group divided into workshops and subsequently reported to the plenary the results summarized below.

Group A: Improving the Technical Analysis: Depth and Scope of Analysis of the Target Group

Group A submitted that the characteristics of the poor identified by the URA provided valuable information for policy planning, particularly by identifying the location of the poor. The Guidelines contributed little, however, for identifying specific projects or filling the gap between national policy planners and project managers. The URAs tended to be descriptive and cast little light on cause and effect relationships about poverty.

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\* There was no summary from Panama. The Nicaraguan summary was an excellent, 85 page, Spanish language document which is available at cost from PCI to participants in the seminar. Circulation is limited at the request of the Government of Nicaragua.

During subsequent discussion in plenary, many agreed with the opinion expressed by Dr. Herrick that the URA and the Guidelines were not intended to be a tool for identifying projects. It was argued that project identification was the responsibility of a different set of people with their own methodologies who needed the URA as an input.

Dr. Perez and others felt the Guidelines focused too much on the poor and did not take sufficient account of "non-poor" factors which also affect poverty.

Dr. Gonzalez argued for establishing clearer hypotheses about the cause and effect relationships affecting the poor and the desirability of the Guidelines meeting that need if and when they are revised. Only then could a rational basis be formed for identifying projects designed to redress poverty. We lack methodologies, information, and analysis in general for knowing the causes of poverty. The consensus was that Guidelines did make a significant contribution but it was not enough.

Dr. Hernan Gutierrez disagreed, supported by Dr. Hudson and others arguing that additional studies, like many past studies, were likely to contribute little towards helping the poor. The main beneficiaries of the new studies would be those who conduct them rather than the target group. They argued that there exists at present a sufficient basis upon which to move ahead. Mr. Fearon added that URA should be thought of as part of an on-going process rather than a prerequisite which needed to be "completed" before a project could begin. Several people concurred including Dr. Gonzalez; they pointed out that Panama had been working since 1972 on URBE and related studies; Costa Rica too had done several studies before the URA.

Group B: Improving the Technical Analysis: Depth and Scope of Analysis of Factors Influencing the well-being of the Poor.

Group B reported it had addressed many of the same issues raised by Group A including whether there was a need for a URA-type analysis before "action programs" can begin.

Most people agreed that there was a gap between the URA and identifying interventions but three distinct points of view emerged:

1. Additional analysis is not necessary as a prerequisite for "action programs" (Boyce and Benjamin), and perhaps it is even undesirable (Hudson and Gutierrez).
2. Additional analysis is necessary before "action programs" to avoid costly mistakes. As a minimum, countries should be viewed as systems with the linkages identified (Velasco). When there is a disagreement of the experts in planning "action programs", they should be deferred until there has been additional analysis.
3. Analysis and "action programs" are parallel and complementary processes; there is a need for analysis and also for "action programs". More "Action Programs" are needed and also more URA but "Action Programs" must not be delayed for additional URA. (Fearon)

Dr. Perez noted that national planning and budgeting was a cyclical process (five year plans, yearly appropriations, quarterly reviews, etc), but that URA's should not be linked to the cycles. Furthermore, the cycles vary from one country to another so the Guidelines should not try to fit any particular national planning and budgeting system.

Group C: The Scope and Depth of Analysis for Project Identification in URA.

Group C took the gap between analysis and projects and other types of intervention as a given, and proposed a systems model for problem

solving as a way of bridging the gap. According to this model, on-going research and analysis (of which the URA is an important part) would be a continuous process, while further in-depth studies would be undertaken on a project by project basis.

Subsequent discussion of this presentation focused on Dr. Gonzalez's earlier question about the extent to which the URA should cast light on cause and effect relationships affecting the poor and should such cause and effect analysis be a prerequisite to project identification even at the prefeasibility stage.

Dr. Herrick was skeptical about finding ultimate causes since "one person's 'causes' are likely to be another person's effects" and the failure to recognize this would lead to superficial agreement initially but confusion and ambiguity later.

At the final session of the first day's deliberations it was concluded that more value could be anticipated from the conference if the discussions became more specific instead of the high level of generality that had characterized the first day. It was decided that the topic for the second day should be changed from "Improving Coordination between Analysts and Users" to "What could have been done better in each URA?"

#### SECOND DAY: WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE BETTER IN EACH URA?

Three workshop groups were formed the second day to discuss the Costa Rican, Nicaraguan and Panamanian URA's.

Most of the morning was spent in workshops and the remainder of the day devoted to presentations in plenary session.

#### Costa Rica: Presentation and Discussion

The Costa Rica group presented ten points discussed in the workshop.

The list neither exhausted all of the lessons learned, nor was there necessarily agreement among all of the members of the workshop on each of the ten points.

1. The URA in Costa Rica should have been more focused on intervention strategies and policies to benefit the poor.
2. In order to focus more closely on policy formulation, the team of analysts should have included policy decision makers in addition to "technicians".
3. Attempts at objectivity should have been tempered earlier by real political (and therefore policy) constraints.
4. The Guidelines do not adequately provide for political/policy considerations.
5. Although flexible in principle, in practice with the Guidelines were taken to be rigid for complying with AID funding.
6. Clarification is needed about the issue of whether the URA is an AID requirement and part of a Washington "new directions" (with emphasis on the rural poor, etc.) or whether it is intended to contribute to on-going strategies and efforts within Costa Rica. It appeared to the Costa Rican Team to have been part of AID's new directions.
7. More communication between OFIPLAN and AID would have revealed this earlier and the scope of work could have been modified accordingly.
8. The URA in Costa Rica should have built on the experience of some of the existing projects or already developed proposed projects to provide a necessary and useful focus.
9. Other studies that were already available could have been better used.
10. Given the timing of the completion of the report about three months before the installation of the new government, more care should have been given to leaving options open for the new government.

Subsequence discussion emphasized the need for clarity in defining the objectives for which a URA would be conducted (Fearon). Most important is the URA an AID funding requirement that must be compiled with (thus limiting the flexibility of the Guidelines and the URA itself)? Or, is it intended, as the name Guidelines implies, to supplement similar or related efforts taking place in a country?

In Costa Rica and Panama the Guidelines were generally perceived to be an AID funding requirement, but in Nicaragua they were perceived to be an offer of help to be used or not used as needed.

If AID intends the Guidelines to be a procedure for getting AID funds then the Guidelines must be more specific about the information AID wants. If the Guidelines are intended to be an aid to the borrower countries, they can be more general, thus lending themselves more readily to adaptation and application in a variety of settings and for a variety of needs. The sense of the group was that AID should help URA's and not lock in a specific set of procedures for everyone.

Recommendations for improvement in the Guidelines included: more about linkages (Fearon), greater emphasis on analysis as opposed to conducting the URA (Velasco), integration of the disjointed sections, methods for disaggregate analysis, and clear linkages between URA analysis and the impact expected from projects designed to benefit the poor, etc.

Gutierrez argued the preceding types of analysis would create more analysis work without helping the poor. He suggests more attention to participation of "the poor" in any future analysis of their problems.

#### Panama: Presentation and Discussion

Macroeconomic studies began in Panama in the 1950's but it

wasn't until about 1972 that a policy of regional development was adopted by the government. Since that time, numerous studies have been conducted. In 1976, AID asked for a better study of the characteristics of the poor and those who would be the beneficiaries of regional development efforts. It was within this context that the AID assisted URA was conducted using the Guidelines.

The time constraints imposed by AID funding requirements forced much of the URA effort into meeting deadlines at the expense of generating new information that was missing from earlier studies. The problem in the URA in Panama was not inadequacy of the Guidelines but inadequate time to generate data and analyze it.

The Panama group recommended reducing the number of sections in the Guidelines and integrating related sections.

Subsequent discussion dealt with bureaucratically imposed time constraints and those imposed by the nature of the problem itself; i.e., there is always more that can be known regardless of the time available. Even arbitrary, bureaucratically imposed time limits can help assure that periodically some closure is made on the subject. Hudson suggests a "half-way" report; others suggest development and use of short-cut methods for conducting studies in, say, a week (Boyce).

This was followed by a brief discussion on the need to identify the factors that interfere with the natural tendency of the poor "not to be poor". (Boyce)

#### Nicaragua: Presentation and Discussion

The URA conducted in Nicaragua provided the information they were seeking. The Guidelines proved both flexible and helpful. (As noted earlier, the URA was not perceived in Nicaragua to be

a requirement for AID funding). The primary difficulties were encountered in the coordination of agencies that were to have provided manpower for the URA. Some did not come through with the people they had promised. This pointed to the need for including all interested parties in the early stages of planning for the URA (Benjamin). However, there was nothing unique about this problem which is encountered in many projects that require inter-agency coordination. The Guidelines and the URA did not solve it but they did not create it either.

Recommendations specifically related to the Guidelines in addition to others reported earlier in this report included the desirability of methods for integrating the results of the different types of analysis presented separately in the Guidelines. In planning a URA, it was recommended that provisions be made for sharing the results with other governmental institutions not directly involved in the URA itself. Since the completion of the URA in Nicaragua, many other government institutions expressed interest in using the URA as a direct input into their own decision making processes.

#### SURVEY RESULTS ON THE GUIDELINES

On the basis of the survey that was conducted at the seminar, it appears that the respondents found the Guidelines to be a valuable aid to conducting urban and regional analysis. The results of that survey are summarized in Exhibit 2-1.

The consensus of those expressing opinions was as follows:

1. The techniques were not too complicated;
2. A clearer explanation is needed on the relationship among the different types of analysis;
3. Necessary data can be obtained;
4. Too much attention is being paid to AID rules;

5. There was no concensus on whether the techniques are responsive to the problems of poverty;
6. There was a slightly positive response to the adequacy of Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analyses.

Dr. Perez of Nicaragua recommended that another seminar be held in one year to follow-up on the progress of the three URA's and their implementation. There was concensus that the URA was not the end product, the implementation was the important thing. The problems of implementation would presumably be the topic for the follow-up seminar in 1979.

### SECTION III

#### NEXT STEPS FOR IMPROVING URBAN AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS

PCI requested three papers on next steps to improve URA's. The intent was to build upon what was said in the Seminar and go beyond it to stimulate further thinking. The papers were prepared by Dr. Bruce Herrick, Dr. Barclay Hudson, and Dr. Lawrence Posner. Other participants who have ideas to contribute are encouraged to communication with Dr. Posner at PCI and/or with the AID Office of Urban Development.

Urban Analysis versus Project Identification:

Bridging the Gap

Barclay Hudson  
for  
Practical Concepts, Inc.  
February 21, 1978

Conclusions from the "Seminario Sobre Analisis  
Urbano y Regional (AUR) en America Central"  
Hotel Torremolinos  
San Jose, Costa Rica  
16-17 Febrero 1978

## Background

This report is a postscript to the "Torremolinos Conference" on Urban and Regional Analysis, convened to compare the experiences of Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama in applying the AID Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analysis.\*

On the second day of the conference, an attempt was made to get beyond generalizations and look more deeply into the special character of each country's own conclusions about the usefulness of the Guidelines. Conference participants divided into country-by-country workshops, each involving host government users of the analysis, foreign consultants, and representatives of the analysis team itself.\*\*

In Costa Rica, the Guidelines had been applied to the design of an Urban Sector Assessment on San Jose, which had been carried out in 1977.\*\*\* During the two-hour workshop on Costa Rica, considerable attention was given to the question of how much the Urban Sector Assessment had actually contributed to the identification of practical projects and programs for poverty intervention. The sense of the group was: Not much. Project identification had not been helped much by the analysis, or by any subsequent reading of the Final Report. Of course, it may have been too early to tell at the conference, but five months had passed since delivery of the report, and the general feeling was that practical suggestions for taking action had not risen to the surface, either in the Final Report itself, or in the minds of others who may have been stimulated by reading it.

This in itself was not astonishing: analysis and planning documents are often filed and forgotten. But Costa Rica was supposed to have been different, and so were the Guidelines. The Urban Sector Assessment was promoted by AID/Washington to serve the very practical purposes of its own resource allocation and programming, as well as that of host country counterparts. The Guidelines themselves were an attempt to take a vast literature on urban and regional planning from academic sources and convert it to the language, problem solving tasks, and working context of people engaged in the everyday operations of technical assistance and foreign aid. Those in the Torremolinos workshop, however, felt that analysis had not led to policy, due to

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\*"Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analysis: Types of Analysis Applicable to A.I.D. Activities." Richard E. Rhoda, author. Office of Urban Development, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C. 20523. October 1976.

\*\* The Costa Rica contingent at the seminar included Edward Butler, Jose Antonio Calvo, Mario Delgado, Daniel Driver, Vinicio Gonzalez, Hernan Gutierrez, Bruce Herrick, Barclay Hudson, Carlos Montero, Emilia Rodriguez, and David Straley. Most but not all of these participated in the special two-hour workshop on Costa Rica.

\*\*\* "Urban Assessment of San Jose, Costa Rica: Focus on Poverty." San Jose, September 21, 1977.

either the Guidelines, or the way they were applied in Costa Rica, or the way the analysis itself was carried out, or the way it elicited response. Participants in the workshop sought the reasons, and reasons soon became apparent. They are listed below--ten of them.

Three things have to be made clear about this summary. First, the problems below were perceived problems, and not necessarily the real ones or the most important ones. Some of them involved misperceptions of other people's intentions. Some were the result of special circumstances surrounding the Sector Assessment in San Jose, while others reflected the classic and unavoidable dilemmas of technical assistance. Nevertheless, some of the perceived problems listed are undoubtedly real, and capable of being corrected in future efforts to carry out policy analysis aimed at poverty intervention.

Second, the problems listed here do not necessarily represent perceptions by the group as a whole, but in some cases represent minority opinions, or the perception of one person. I have tried to render accurately the variety of views expressed by workshop members. Nevertheless I have gone considerably beyond mere reporting, in order to present views and interpretations of my own, based on my 1977 experience in Costa Rica as foreign consultant working on the Urban Sector Assessment, and evaluator of the Guidelines' adaptability to the Costa Rican context.

Finally, the "ten points" need to be read keeping in mind the basic issues: Why did the Urban Assessment fall short in specifying policy interventions for Costa Rica; and why they were vague, especially when it came to defining the distinctive needs of the poor. This is a double issue, really: the practicality of the analysis regarding project identification; and the adequacy of the analysis in focusing on poor people as beneficiaries of any project, programs, or policies proposed.

The Ten Points: Gaps Between Analysis and Project Design to Serve the Poor.

1. The problem of superimposition. (The academic bias; the problems of integrating diverse frames of reference.)

The Guidelines were an heroic effort to convert a somewhat sterile and unconvincing literature on regional development into a vital statement of cause-effect linkages that decision-makers need to consider in programming resources. The Guidelines continue the best traditions of PPBS, MBO, and logical framework applications, in attempting to relate means and ends, to make narrow resource allocation decisions sensitive to a larger vision of consequences, and to help create a greater sense of shared context for individual actions. The Guidelines, like these other approaches, ask simple, important questions.

But like PPBS, they ask "organization men" to think in terms of a larger, different (and in some ways threatening) frame of reference for decisions. They are being asked to adopt a viewpoint originating outside their own agency, and having policy implications operating at cross-purposes with their own. (If the Guidelines did not have this effect in changing people's sense of mission, they would not be fulfilling their basic purpose.) Nevertheless, the superimposition of any new viewpoint is often met with mistrust, resistance, and attempts (often unconscious) to insulate decisions from the implications of new directives. This is a common, almost universal pattern, that is well documented in reviews of experience with implementing PPBS in federal, state and local agencies in the U.S.; and it is fully predictable from theories of organizational development.

To summarize: the Guidelines have attempted to bridge the gap from academic models, methods, and language, to more traditional organizational frames of reference for decision-making. As might have been expected, the new ideas were difficult to integrate with the more established ones. Although there was no overt resistance, attempts to integrate different perspectives were half-hearted. As usually happens with externally-imposed planning requirements, the analysis tends to remain somewhat of a facade, or mask.\*

As footnote to this discussion, there exists a useful body of literature on the problems of forcing or assisting an organization to become more sensitive to its larger environment. A central thesis of this literature is as follows: that in a "dynamic" environment (comprising new demands for responsiveness, new technological opportunities for response, new scientific methods for treating problems), organizations facing such conditions must actively promote highly differentiated viewpoints within their own staff. Consequently however, they must also make extreme efforts to re-integrate these different problem perspectives when it comes to formulating policy.\*\* In the Urban Sector Assessment of San Jose, no such "extreme effort" was attempted. On the contrary, as work pressures grew with the impending deadline for delivery

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\* See Faber and Seers, The Crisis In Planning, 1972.

\*\* This theory, often identified with the work of Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch (1967) has been summarized and applied to technical assistance problems in Hudson, Davis et al, 1976, Chap. 3.

of the final report, the analysis team became increasingly fragmented, as divisions of labor were worked out in order to get the product completed.

Another footnote is deserved, regarding "superimposition" of Guidelines. The academic tradition which provided the analytic framework for the Guidelines was characterized above as "sterile" and "unconvincing." Not all would agree with that judgment but the following points should be noted: (a) Much of the existing theory of urban and regional development is too abstract to have recognizable fit to any particular setting, and is therefore unreliable for generating policy implications; (b) theories derived from one setting often prove "wrong" when applied elsewhere. They have limited transferability; (c) the literature cited in the Guidelines makes little reference to Latin American conditions, or theories developed in Latin America, even though there is a long and strong Latin tradition of urban and regional planning (beginning several hundred years before textbooks began appearing on the subject in the U.S.); and (d) there is a growing feeling among U.S. analysts and planners that the traditional models are seriously flawed by a bias toward preserving political-economic structures that are themselves the cause of urban regional problems, at least as they affect the poor and powerless. (See pp. 30-33 in the Final Report on the San Jose Urban Sector Assessment.)

## 2. Analysts as technicians rather than policy-makers.

Although the Urban Sector Assessment in Costa Rica was housed in the National Planning Office (OFIPLAN), the Assessment team itself had little perspective on national policy. Most saw themselves in technical roles without policy formulation or project identification responsibilities. Most felt that policy-making would come at a stage subsequent to the analysis itself, and would be left up to others. Policy implications were added to chapters at a late stage of drafting the Final Report, but without systematic consultation with Costa Rican policy-makers. (AID officers, however, did take a hand in this, being more aware of the need for links between analysis and program design in areas of foreign aid for which they were themselves responsible.)

In fact, tentative policy directions had already been specified in advance, emphasizing housing and employment generation projects. The Urban Sector Assessment could have been used to systematically explore, critique, modify and/or reaffirm the design of these earlier policy formulations. This was not done and in my own view, it was a badly missed opportunity from the standpoint that broad analysis of the type suggested by the Guidelines is only useful when it can be sufficiently focused, for example by examining the pros and cons of a definite but malleable plan of action set out at the beginning, in accordance with local political realities, and reinforcing efforts already underway.

## 3. Foreign technical assistance: a "tender trap."

Project identification was not a central mandate either of the Guidelines or the Urban Sector Assessment in Costa Rica. In each case, the broad scope of analysis considered "minimum" more than exhausted the time and energy available, and this ruled out serious attention to more "peripheral" concerns, including project identification.

In theory, the Guidelines and Sector Assessment both provided sufficient flexibility for analysts to seize initiative and make them more pragmatically oriented toward action implications. In practice, however, this was not a

real option: (a) time pressures reduced scope of work to the minimum absolutely required. (b) The definition of "minimum" was itself negotiable in theory, but in practice analysts were aware that the scope of analysis had been originally defined by AID (in the Guidelines) and had already been re-negotiated (in the Urban Sector Assessment "Project Agreement"). (c) There was a strong reluctance to press AID/Washington or AID/Costa Rica for further changes, given that this might jeopardize either the timing or amount of funds poised for release on projects already identified. (d) There was no overt threat of this kind, so far as is known. The danger was simply a perceived one, reflecting a normal (and otherwise productive) attempt to "look between the lines" of stated intentions. It was felt, perhaps, that doing anything different than the "minimum" - which meant doing less than the "minimum" as previously negotiated - would be seen as "irresponsible" in Washington. The fact that more than the minimum would have also been carried would not offset the Washington's disappointment. After all, it was AID's study - designed by them, supervised by them, and analytically cast toward sectors which Washington was interested in funding (housing and employment). The flexibility that was there in principle was ruled out by the context of implicit expectations.

#### 4. Political flux.

The Urban Sector Assessment was completed in Costa Rica five months before the national presidential elections, and at a time when leadership was changing within OFIPLAN itself. Uncertainties about the political context also inclined the analysis team to remain unspecific about the kinds of projects implicated by the Sector Assessment. The less said, the more free hand was left for the emerging new leadership.

The same might be said about the political context in Washington. None of the analysts was completely sure about the degree of consensus or scope of divergent opinion in Washington regarding key determinants of project identification: how to define "the poor;" how closely projects had to serve U.S. economic interests; how much tolerance there was for politically risky programs, such as community organization for self-help development. Uncertainty of this kind reflects in part the newness of the Carter Administration; but also the normal (and healthy) divergence of thinking within AID/Washington.

#### 5. The bias toward "objectivity"

There is a pervasive belief that analysis can be more "objective" if it avoids a preconceived idea of policy conclusions that might result from it. Some observers (including this writer) would disagree, pointing out that: (a) it was already too late to ignore "preconceived" solutions in Costa Rica, where housing and employment had already been identified as focal sectors for AID intervention; (b) implicit biases always exist toward some projects anyway, and these can only be overcome by making the biases explicit and subjecting them to systematic critical analysis. (This can be approached through the "assumptions" column of the logical framework; or by a fortiori analysis, in connection with other types of sensitivity analysis; or by dialectical scanning.)

On the other hand, the analysis team in Costa Rica attempted to avoid biasing the analysis of urban problems toward preconceived solutions. For

example, an attempt was made to conceptualize poverty in a variety of ways, some of which were clearly not likely to support the choice of projects in housing and employment generation. In striving for this breadth of viewpoint, the analysts sought to avoid pre-mature closure on the "poverty problem." The Final Report of the Sector Assessment did not undermine the logic of housing and employment projects as appropriate projects; but it did suggest in important ways that poverty was not going to be solved by these programs alone. It also suggested that the policies needed to complement housing and employment generation would require both (a) political support of a type not yet articulated in Costa Rica, and (b) a different vision of "economic and social development" than the traditional view incorporated into the Urban and Regional Analysis Guidelines (see Final Report, pp. 30-33). In this context, the analysts were not able to go very far in identifying projects other than those already contemplated in the housing and employment sectors.

#### 6. Avoiding duplicative efforts.

The Urban Sector Assessment put little emphasis on project identification in part because there was a parallel study already in progress (also AID-sponsored) which was designed to do just that. The Urban Environment Analysis, focussing on housing and employment strategies, was being carried out with participation of some of the same AID-provided staff who had a hand in the Sector Assessment, and definition of projects in both studies must have seemed redundant.

The sense of "going over the same ground" may have been felt even more acutely by those familiar with earlier studies (both AID- and Costa Rican-financed), dealing with the overall problems of poverty, regional development, and urban strategy coordination. Those earlier studies were alluded to in terms of their existence, but scarcely in terms of their substance, at least for their bearing on policy. Had the Guidelines' intentions been realized in providing a genuinely innovative approach to policy analysis, and transcended the traditional, sector-by-sector framework of policy analysis, the sense of deja vu might have been overcome. Housing and employment policies might have been approached with a fresh appreciation of inter-sectoral linkages, indirect effects, and unrealized opportunities: how to get the poor employed in delivering solutions to their own problems? How to ensure that the poor benefit as suppliers of the biggest single item in "poverty budgets" - food? Based on findings from previous analyses of agriculture and nutrition in Costa Rica, what would it take to develop urban-based agriculture in San Jose, along the lines of large-scale experiments elsewhere? The Final Report was explicit in acknowledging that such issues are not likely to be treated within the analytical framework proposed by the Guidelines.

#### 7. Not by projects alone.

Yet another reason why the Urban Sector Analysis "failed" to specify projects was a feeling that this may not have been as important as specification of policies. For example, a policy might consist of working through community organizations, or strengthening the stabilized territorial identity of upwardly mobile groups, or developing appropriate salary guidelines to attract marginal workers into the labor force, or incentives to encourage appropriate technology. These could have a strong and pervasive impact going beyond the scope of any particular project or set of investments. They would be especially relevant to

ensuring that subsequent projects, however chosen, would be selectively beneficial to the poor; and this might be more important than the selection among projects themselves.

8. "Selective Outreach" to the Poor: Projects without clear distributional impacts.

Here the question shifts from neglect of project identification to neglect of their distributional impacts. One reason why the analysis fell short in addressing the distinctive needs of the poor reflects the apriori choice of focus on "urban infrastructure." Can a street be said to serve the poor? Can a new factory serve the poor, if the most qualified applicants are well above the poverty line?

It turns out that this problem of concentrating benefits on the truly poor is especially challenging in Costa Rica. As the Urban Sector Assessment itself revealed, poverty is not very spatially concentrated in San Jose. Three quarters of the "poor" (defined by subsistence-level income poverty lines) live outside slum areas. The slums themselves show a remarkable intermixing of rich and poor. Consequently, the focusing of anti-poverty programs on slum areas is not likely to be very selective in reaching the poor, unless accompanied by the other measures to reach people truly in need. Costa Rica has taken major strides in developing selective out-reach to the poor, through its family assistance program (asignaciones familiares). The Urban Sector Assessment perhaps gave too little attention to the unique opportunities to build on Costa Rican experience in selective outreach programs of this type, as part of any project design or policy formulation effort designed to reach the poor.

This discussion is especially important from a Washington perspective, given the general disillusionment with models of development that assume "trickle down" of benefits from rich to poor; and given the increasing congressional concern with poverty groups as "targets" of international aid; given also the increased world-wide concern with "basic needs" (rather than aggregate GNP) as the object of development strategies; and given the tendency for Costa Rica to be viewed as a relatively "well-off" country without need for foreign aid--an illusion perpetrated by the failure to pull out the threads of poverty from the heterogeneous fabric of statistical averages applying to this country.

9. Problems in defining poverty, and derived problems of appropriate policy.

Another gap between analysis and project identification also bears on "selective outreach to the poor." Success will depend greatly on how one conceives of "poverty." According to one view, poverty might derive from lack of capital and income, reflected in local economic conditions and physically deteriorated real estate. If "poverty" is conceived in these terms, solutions logically follow in housing and employment-generation programs. Another theory, however, conceives of poverty as a state of mind; one version is summed up as a "culture of poverty;" another as the "culture of wealth" inflicted by the pernicious addictions of mass consumption. Other concepts of poverty allude to multi-national monopolies over the means of production, and the dominance of inappropriate technologies; or "dependency theory" regarding core-periphery relationships within national boundaries.

Each theory depicts its own spatial field of poverty processes and consequent "action-space" for poverty intervention; each theory sees the substance of poverty differently; each theory uses different analytical methods to describe poverty and weigh its significance; each theory uses a different epistemology to understand the phenomenon of poverty--some grounded in empiricism, others in experiential contact with the poor, others in ideology (for example, consciousness-raising about the interdependence of poverty and moral responsibilities of the analyst). Substance, action-space, methodology, epistemology are closely linked, and perhaps inseparable.

The Final Report of the San Jose Urban Sector Analysis listed seven different concepts of poverty, and acknowledged that only a couple of them fit within the scope of analysis laid out by the Guidelines. The resulting analysis was therefore quite modest in scope. The very idea of defining "project identification" as the ultimate outcome of the analysis could be interpreted as a highly restrictive mandate, insofar as some theories of poverty implicate the need for political-economic reforms of structures going far beyond mere "projects."

10. No new projects needed, but reinforcement of ongoing efforts.

The lack of projects identified by the analysis has a final explanation: the attempt may have been seen as counterproductive. There are already many imaginative and far reaching projects underway, some well-proven, others experimental. Among these, some clearly meritorious programs are starving for support. Foreign aid selectively allocated among these existing programs could help assure that funds will be well spent, through administrative channels already mounted, and yielding benefits whose results (and relative focus on poor groups) can already be evaluated from past experience.

This assumes that (a) the most critical variables affecting success are not to be found in imported theories, but local conditions which dictate how successfully good ideas can be adapted to specific absorptive capacities for outside aid; (b) fresh new ideas are not the missing ingredient, but reinforcement of older, well-established efforts that have proven effective; (c) implementation efforts are tough enough without the additional problems of satisfying new analytical requirements to qualify for foreign assistance; (d) analysts rarely have enough field experience in poor communities to feel confident in evaluating the merits of existing programs; consequently their analysis is almost never oriented toward building on the best of ongoing efforts: instead, there is a pervasive bias toward "fresh starts." To people who have been struggling first-hand with problems of poverty in Costa Rica over the years, "fresh starts" may well appear ineffective and even threatening, insofar as new programs will end up competing for resources and political support. "Fresh starts" are likely to be derived from urban and regional analysis guidelines, not just because these guidelines provide a "broader perspective" on poverty problems, but also because the "expert" is relatively ignorant of local conditions, local successes, and local support for programs already underway.

To the extent this is true, and to the extent analysts recognized their ignorance in this respect, they may well have been wise in hesitating to draw policy implications from their own work.

### Tactics for Project Identification: Uses of Short-Cut Analysis

There are no simple solutions for the range of problems cited above. In light of the previous discussion, however, two general suggestions are offered:

1. Identification of concrete projects should come at the beginning and mid-point of analysis, and not just at the end. (a) The projects initially proposed should be treated as a "null hypothesis" to be critically examined, modified, accepted, or rejected in favor of other options as the analysis proceeds. (b) Halfway through the analysis a mid-point report should be submitted\* and this should include recommendations on the need for revision of the initial "null project," based on analytical findings to date. (c) The final stage of analysis should further confirm or revise the "mid-point project" but in this later stage, the methods, scope and style of analysis should shift from the framework used earlier, in order to incorporate new viewpoints, acknowledge deficiencies in earlier assumptions, and correct some of the biases of a purely scientific, objective knowledge base in weighing the merits of policy options.

2. Alternative styles of analysis, beyond the tradition of urban and regional studies cited in the Guidelines, should be systematically catalogued and made available to all those concerned with designing and evaluating projects jointly sponsored by AID and host governments. Emphasis here should be on short-cut methods.

The first suggestion--identification of "null projects" and "mid-point projects"--has the following points in favor:

1. It helps orient new policies toward the much-neglected possibilities of building on the best of programs already operating locally.
2. It helps avoid re-inventing the wheel: potentially useful projects are obvious, especially if programs are intended to serve the poor and focus on basic needs. Employment and housing are natural candidates--and were indeed major policy targets in Costa Rica. But one could ask, why was food production not identified, especially as a potential employment sector for the urban poor, given the very high proportion of income that goes to food purchases among the poor, and given the high proportion of this cost that goes to middlemen? (There may have been good reasons why urban agriculture for and by the poor might have been rejected as a policy alternative; but was it ever seriously considered?)
3. Identification of projects in the beginning helps to make explicit the political considerations that dictate focus on some options and rule out others. This prior step avoids subsequent wasted effort on the part of analysts in considering politically meaningless options. (For example, in Costa Rica, how politically feasible would it have been to consider projects that tended to make the economy independent of U.S. or Central American economic interests?)

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\* See Final Report recommendations of Barclay Hudson for Practical Concepts, Inc., December 1977.

4. Early identification of projects allows analysts to explore options in greater depth, and to do so with more critical insight, because the analysis can focus on specifics. For example, in close inspection of housing projects, one can ask: What is the history of success and failure of such projects in the country, and in other countries? What facts are problematic and need special analytical attention? What value premises are problematic? What cause-effect assumptions are problematic? What secondary impacts, both negative and positive, are involved, and what is their general magnitude, as a context for evaluating direct and intended effects? What other documents, reports, analyses, or expert opinions should be integrated into the weighing of pros and cons?
5. The Guidelines are explicit about the kinds of general analytical models and procedures available, but they can say little about studies and research previously done in any specific country on any specific problem. Nor can the Guidelines say anything about incorporation of specific evaluative studies of interventions reflecting a particular country's experience. This was a major shortcoming in the Costa Rica Urban Sector Assessment. These resources of experience and local knowledge and experience can never be incorporated into any analysis unless one starts by investigation the pros and cons of specific policy options.
6. Another advantage of beginning with concrete options is that it allows the analysts to go directly into the communities destined for assistance, and test the recipients' own reactions to the proposed projects. (Of course, one could simply ask people, "What do you want?" but such a broad question can be disorienting and may be greeted with suspicion, perhaps well-founded.)
7. The use of a "null-project" and "mid-point project" helps guide the analysts in their choice of their methods and data. The definition of a mid-point project can also help insure delivery of a mid-point report, which is useful in itself. The mid-point report can constitute a demarcation line, albeit arbitrary, between the "core" tradition of urban analysis as contained in the Guidelines, and alternative styles which also deserve attention, as outlined below.

This leads to the second suggestion: provision for a "more appropriate technology" of project analysis, not to replace the Guidelines, but to complement them. Emphasis here is on short-cut methods, consistent with the general finding at Torremolinos that there was not enough time to undertake the range and depth of analysis sought by more traditional methods. Emphasis is also on methods that drew on intuition, acquired expertise, experience with the host country setting, or experience with proposed solutions in other settings. Less importance is given to strictly scientific criteria for presenting findings. The goal is more to sensitize policy makers to the overall shape of a problem, in terms of qualities that may be elusive to objective measurement, but subjectively shared and socially powerful in determining the significance of one proposal against another.

The following list is merely illustrative of alternative styles for evaluating urban projects. Most would be designed, carried out, or supervised by a team of experts, much as the Guidelines are presently interpreted

and implemented. The composition of expertise within the team would likely be shifted, however, to include an anthropologist and a spokesperson for the recipient community, represented either by a service delivery agent or neighborhood council official from a representative area. Under most circumstances, it would also be desirable to include specialists in the particular types of interventions proposed (labor economists, housing experts, cooperative agents, urban administration, community development professionals --depending on the nature of key constraints to project implementation). The economic and geographical perspectives stressed in the Guidelines would also need to be represented, but in lesser proportion on this team of, say, five to seven persons.

### Short-cut Qualitative Analysis: Some Illustrations

1. Delphi analysis applied to the "assumptions" column of the logical framework. These are fairly standard techniques, the logframe drawing on planning and programming skills, and Delphi drawing on substantive expertise relating to ad hoc problem solving.
2. Systems analysis: schematic diagramming of strong links between policy interventions, goals, and indirect effects, mediated by environmental factors and strategy design variables. As a short-cut, qualitative methodology, systems analysis constitutes a heuristic technique rather than algorithm: links are specified by theory and judgment, not just empirical data (as distinct from operations research); multiple outcomes are considered simultaneously (as distinct from most optimization procedures); uncertainties are made explicit, including disagreements about facts, values, and cause-effect relationships (non-convergent opinions can be treated through sensitivity analysis in an "if...then" format); strategy elements are taken to include redesign of the system, or consideration of environmental factors as potentially malleable variables.
3. Field interviews with intended beneficiaries. These may be structured (participant observation, PADCO formats, links with existing outreach programs, special forums through neighborhood councils), or relatively informal (investigative journalism, photo-journalism, interviews with service agents, projective interpretation of photos by residents). Distinct findings are likely to emerge from structured vs. unstructured techniques, verbal information vs. visual images, outside observers vs. inside knowledge, individual views vs. opinions derived from groups. This does not mean the techniques are invalid, but it does mean that a mix of approaches is probably desirable, and the biases of each should be taken into account when selecting methods and interpreting results. (The same is true for supposedly "objective" analysis, whose biases are usually unrecognized unless juxtaposed with other methods.)

Note: involvement of beneficiary communities in project selection helps keep pressure on politicians to follow through with implementation. Another point to consider: the poor are among the foremost experts on poverty. They were not consulted, however, in the Urban Sector Assessment in Costa Rica, and the Guidelines give little attention to this option.

4. Tapping local knowledge networks. Examples: local neighborhood councils; DINADECO field agents; local newsheets; local banks that may be promoting "seed credits" (very small-scale loans in poor areas to identify good risks subsequently eligible for larger scale credit); voluntary agencies; family allowance administrators. The nature of "local knowledge networks" will vary greatly from one country to another. It is precisely this diversity--which makes them hard to generalize about--that also makes them sensitive to special local conditions affecting appropriate project design.

5. Selective injection of theory. One criticism of the Guidelines voiced at Torremolinos was that they were "too theoretical, not practical." But theory is practical, when it is relevant to understanding the effects of proposed interventions. It is a short-cut alternative to learning old lessons over again through trial and error. It is an alternative to lengthy ad hoc analysis in the sense that it makes hypothetical statements that can be verified or criticized by knowledgeable people drawing on accumulated experience (local or otherwise).

In Costa Rica, selective expertise could have been used on key questions of the Urban Sector Assessment, that would have greatly contributed to the evaluation of proposed projects in housing and employment: an expert on alternative theories of poverty; an expert on typologies of communities, with respect to their differing absorptive capacity for assistance (PADCO has begun to develop schemata for this in connection with housing programs); experts on urban economics (as opposed to laymen attempting to applying Guidelines derived from unfamiliar academic theories); experts on national politics, or the history of particular communities (not all experts are professionals); experts in the theory and practice of investigative journalism (the Peace Corps has used this approach in self-evaluation of field projects).

Two important points regarding selective injection of theory into project analysis and design: first, much depends on the confidence one can place in the individual expert, as to his/her personal qualities of sensitivity to decision-making as a mixture of technical and political considerations. Second, selective short-term use of "visiting experts" (whether from abroad or from the beneficiary community) requires the expert to learn quickly about the specific decision-making context at hand; and this is best accomplished by starting with "null projects" and tracing out their ramifications and uncertainties, rather than starting with an unfocussed overall assessment of "the situation."

All this would require basic changes in the way the Guidelines are applied: it calls for tentative project identification preceding analysis; greater mix of analytical techniques; greater commitment to sustaining current programs rather than superimposing untried new schemes; more face-to-face contact with the beneficiary communities; more emphasis on learning from local experience. With these provisions, both the Guidelines and ad hoc use of "visiting experts" can be better trusted, because the context for judging their validity becomes a more explicit and concretely defined frame of reference for judging the applicability of newcomers' ideas.

6. PASO and EMERALD. These are short-cut procedures for project selection and design, starting with a "null project" and focussing on points of uncertainty in evaluating costs and effects. PASO is a procedure for systematically scanning the pros and cons of tentative proposals, using a concise graphic display of arguments on each side. The setting can be a public hearing, a workshop of experts, a design team, or policy forum. Points of contention based on differences of factual understanding are pursued by one type of research agenda (project re-design, or intensive short-term investigation); debatable cause-effect assumptions are treated through other means, such as advocacy hearings among experts, reference to earlier program evaluations on similar projects, incorporation of experimental monitoring procedures and contingency plans as part of project design, Delphi analysis, or other systematic convocation of informed judgment. Some points of contention may also revolve around differing value premises, which PASO procedures can help clarify, avoiding the pitfalls of confusion between political and technical dimensions of policy analysis.

Basically, PASO seeks to keep crucial program elements and outcomes in view, keeping an explicit record of views expressed, forcing attention to concrete actions and outcomes, compressing the time of analysis, focussing subsequent research on the critical unknowns that most affect policy choices, while drawing on the richness of common sense, informed opinion and past experience.

EMERALD is an optional follow-up procedure, providing a bridge between PASO and more conventional analysis. It incorporates a variety of "short-cut" methods, such as those listed earlier.



DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024  
March 3, 1978

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Urban analysis conference,  
San Jose, Costa Rica  
16 - 17 February 1978

Dear Larry:

Following our meeting in San Jose, I'd like to share what seem to be the most important reactions to urban analysis voiced at the conference, as well as some reflections stimulated by the proceedings themselves.

#### I. Reporting Conferees' Reactions

A number of interesting similarities and differences among the three countries (Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama) emerged that affect their urban and regional analysis efforts. Among the more noteworthy are:

- Scope of urban and regional analysis. The scope differed in each country. In Panama, responding to an explicit policy favoring decentralization, the analysis dealt exclusively with areas outside the capital. In Nicaragua, following extensive physical damage of the 1972 earthquake, the analysis emphasized areas near the capital but outside its immediate metropolitan boundaries. Finally, the Costa Rican analysis centered in the capital's metropolitan area and did not consider other urban districts.
- Regional planning. In all three countries, regional planning efforts have been made formal. One manifestation of the institutionalization of regional planning is the official division of each country into planning zones. In Nicaragua, eight zones have been distinguished; in Costa Rica, six; and in Panama, four.
- Continuing analysis. In each country, the urban analysis is a continuing process. The time necessary for completion in Panama was estimated, at the time of the conference to be six more weeks; for Costa Rica, four weeks. Past performance might lead us to some skepticism about these estimates. In Panama, the process has gone on for five years; in Costa Rica, "one more month" has been the estimated time necessary for completion since August 1977.
- Governmental change. All policy activities, and urban policies in particular, depend on the government in power. Uncertainties exist at present in at least two of the three countries. In Costa Rica, the February 1978 elections defeated the party that had been incumbent since 1970. Because the elected president is the leader of a loose coalition of political groups rather than heading a formal and long-lived party, it is difficult to anticipate the directions that policies might take. At the same time, in Nicaragua, mounting instability of the Somoza government leads to policy inaction until that situation is more clearly resolved.

- Primate city. Each of the three countries is, on a world scale, small. Each is governed from a primate city, i.e., from a city more than ten times as large as any other urban agglomeration in the country.
- Project background for analysis. Each of the urban analyses was the result of interest in a particular project, rather than being spontaneously generated by more general interest. In Nicaragua, earthquake reconstruction stimulated the analysis; in Costa Rica, housing; and in Panama, secondary cities. At least one study-team leader said that the urban analysis would not occur without outside funding. If so, this underscores the nature of the analysis as an activity imposed from outside, rather than one that is likely to gain its own momentum and on-going domestic finance.
- Flexibility of guidelines. The Rhoda guidelines were seen by all three countries as flexible rather than fixed. Some topics suggested in the guidelines were discarded in some cases; in others (Nicaragua), new topics were inserted.
- Office space. Problems of obtaining physical office space were reported by at least two of the study teams. This can be interpreted as another manifestation of the lack of enthusiasm for the analysis of the "cooperating" national planning organization.

Besides these similarities and differences in the process of urban analysis noted among the three countries, other analytical aspects deserve reporting here.

Cottage Industry. At least one study team commented very favorably on the attractions of what can be called, using language from the eighteenth and nineteenth century English industrial revolution, cottage industries. Their low requirement for urban infrastructural investment was emphasized. If workers work and live at the same site, needs for public transport, electricity, gas, water, sewerage, industrial park sites, etc. are diminished. Cottage industry is likely as well to be labor intensive, although paradoxically, it may use more capital per unit of output than more "modern," capital-intensive activities.

Plan coordination. The conference made abundantly clear the necessity for coordination, at some appropriately high level, of the plans and projects of the various ministries and autonomous agencies. Urban and regional planning, in particular, is likely to involve the activities of a wide variety of a country's public service agencies as well as private companies. This variety, in turn, led to the desire for overall coordination.

Foreign advisers. The discussion concluded that the best technical assistance to an urban and regional analysis from foreign advisers, was methodological, emphasizing research design and interpretation, and bringing news of state-of-the-art methods. Short-term advisers should leave behind sets of instructions. Language capabilities also play a large role in their effectiveness. If no terms of reference exist for a consultant, the discussants noted the variability in the effectiveness of his participation. Contracts, they suggested, ought to be drawn by the Ministry involved, and a national counterpart established. A try-out visit of, say, one week by the proposed adviser would act as an insurance policy. It would serve as an audition for the visiting expert, who could in principle be rejected after this short try-out.

Bottom-up planning. Bottom-up planning would recognize explicitly the notion of a culture of poverty and, in the words of one participant, would seek to "respect the poor as human beings and stop worrying about whether they'll become Communists." However, the same speaker who stressed respecting the poor also emphasized the possible role of adult education among them. That education, however, rather than underscoring the survival values built into their own culture, would transmit a set of largely middle-class values whose contribution might be more de-stabilizing than helpful in the lives of the poor. And the education -- or, more accurately, psychological conditioning -- that many of them have already received lead them to conceive of solutions to poverty as being handed down from above (from government, the grace of God, blind luck or fate, etc.). Involving people previously conditioned in this fashion in their planning process ("bottom-up planning") is difficult at best. We're not talking only of the poor here. A conditioned fatalism can be present as well among the municipal officials into whose hands project execution may fall.

## II. Reflections

In addition to reporting some of the most noteworthy results of the discussion, I should like to record the following reflections that were stimulated by the conference. At least some of these reflections are the outcome of post-conference discussions with PCI personnel and other consultants.

Inter-institutional cooperation. The AID and government agency personnel present emphasized the necessity of cooperation among institutions, largely because many, if not most, of their working hours are spent in trying to ensure just that. The Nicaraguans had one concrete suggestion in this regard. They suggested that part-time "help" from other agencies was likely to prove unsatisfactory as an administrative arrangement. They concluded either that full-time persons should be used in the analysis, lent by other agencies if desirable and available, or that contributions from other agencies should be forgone.

Use of statistical indicators. All countries based their analyses on the statistical indicators available. The methodological implication was clear: what can be measured can be considered; what can't be measured may be neglected or ignored. If our measurements were perfect, both in concept and execution, this approach would be appealing. But we know in fact that we can't measure everything and that urban measurements we make are sometimes flawed. As a result, a great deal of room ought to be left for impressionistic judgments, despite their absence of scientific purity.

Use of maps. Maps were used by all countries, in part as guides to the urban and regional analysis. Maps are visual devices, but they don't (can't) explain some of the changes associated with social development, i.e., with social processes. Social processes of interest in urban analysis are frequently micro-economic in scale and cannot therefore be spatially differentiated using maps as an analytical tool.

The filing cabinet of previous studies. Every country has a pile of old studies, e.g., rural development studies, educational analyses, etc., that bear on urban and regional analysis. Why do study teams generate wholly new studies, rather than simply using older studies and extending them where necessary? The answers are many, some substantive, others procedural or organizational:

1. Costliness of information retrieval from previous documents. It may take more time to read and digest data previously generated for other purposes than to make a new study. Technically speaking, this is a question of the costs of systems of data storage and retrieval.
2. New studies automatically achieve a more precise focus on the problem in question than research done for other purposes. Each agency may have its own system of planning. The studies of each may therefore not be compatible with the others, requiring a new study for the urban and regional analysis.
3. New studies are more up-to-data than older ones.
4. A researcher may receive more professional recognition for leading a new study than for pulling together some strands from a variety of older works.

Time requirements. An infinite amount of time could be used in the urban analyses. It's therefore difficult to know how to interpret complaints about there being too little time. At least in part, the question of the optimal period of time desirable for performing such studies is associated with the amount of professional experience of the members of a study team. If they are not used to working under time pressures and if they lack the experience of bringing studies to closure, then they are likely to feel unusually pressed for time, and to whimper (or squeal) accordingly. Yet if no deadlines were imposed, the process of urban and regional analysis could easily drag on for years without yielding any usable concrete results.

Revision of guidelines. The most easily remediable flaw in the guidelines as they stand is the lack of articulation among the different sections. Less easily subject to easy revision are the guidelines' emphases on:

- education and supply of services, rather than project execution
- development indicators rather than theories of the origin and maintenance of poverty
- fairly conventional economic geography, rather than the politics of power, an element that probably affects strongly the ultimate distribution of income and wealth
- analysis rather than planning, project management, or inter-institutional cooperation

One need not (and I do not) conclude that the guidelines' emphases "ought" to be converted in the ways indicated above. At the same time, it is useful to understand what the guidelines do and what they do not do.

Urban migration influences urban poverty, but the directions of that influence are far from clear. Migrants demand public services, but they also generate output and pay taxes. If one were to try to discourage migration, the "problem" resulting from their demands would not be avoided. Its site would merely be changed.

Migrants and economic policy. While it is true that migrant-nonmigrant comparisons fail to indicate completely the impact of migration on urban environments, the comparisons are nevertheless valuable. They allow us to avoid incorrect policy recommendations that would, without foundation, orient some policies directly toward migrants, presumed to be particularly needy or indigent. The comparisons show migrants not to be selectively needy as a group, and permit a focus on poor people rather than on migrants as somehow exemplifying a group of the poor.

Multiplicity of users. It bears repeating that the urban analysis has many users, not all of whose performance criteria are congruent. Such multiplicity creates problems for analysts and outside consultants. Among the clients for urban and regional analysis are the following users:

- AID/Washington
- AID missions in the field
- Government planning ministries and autonomous agencies
- The public in low-income countries, as distinct from the official agencies
- AID contractors such as Practical Concepts Inc.
- Other international agencies concerned with technical assistance and economic development, such as the World Bank
- The international community of social scientists and planners

At any given moment, it's easy to focus on one or two of these users and to neglect the others, but in the longer run this will lead to an undesirable narrowing of the field of inquiry.

Concentration on projects. When AID managers concentrate on projects, development policies that don't require project approaches may be neglected. Such policies may, however, be as important for development as are projects. For example macroeconomic recommendations about wage policy may be as important as project identification of, say, a credit subsidy program for small scale industry. Concentration on projects is understandable in terms of career evaluations: advancement is based, in part, on "moving the money," something that's possible only with projects.

Problems with generalizations. Countries, even in Central America, differ widely in size, income, level of development, and future prospects. In addition to knowledge of a general theoretical background, successful analysts must, it appears, be conversant with a great deal of country-specific detail. Generalizations, even for the three countries represented at the conference, are difficult for persons whose knowledge includes (or is cluttered by?) this degree of detail.

Dr. Lawrence Posner  
March 3, 1978  
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Causes and symptoms. Admonitions that analysts ought to treat causes of poverty, rather than dealing only with symptoms, may be empty. Given the difficulty, and indeed, the impracticality of finding ultimate causes, a more realistic framework would recognize that one person's list of "causes" would likely be another's list of mere "symptoms." Failure to recognize this possibility leads to superficial agreement on the importance of localizing "causes," which masks the deeper methodological (epistemological) confusion and ambiguity about the differences between them.

To resolve the matter, one must specify the level of generality at which the analysis will be conducted. This avoids discussions in which one discussant takes an overall view and another treats micro-level phenomena. Income generation, some of it connected with employment, is an example of one level. Focus on individual government agencies and their potential responses to specific client needs is another.

\* \* \* \* \*

Sincerely yours,

*Bruce*

Bruce Herrick, Ph.D.

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PRACTICAL CONCEPTS FOR  
IMPROVING URBAN AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS

By

Dr. Lawrence D. Posner,  
Practical Concepts Incorporated

A. INTRODUCTION

The question that kept surfacing throughout the San Jose Seminar<sup>\*</sup> was: What type of analysis is necessary to derive a useful strategy for urban and regional development that AID will assist? There was consensus that AID-assisted projects and other interventions should be "grounded" or "anchored" in a strategy that reflected a broad perspective on the nature of urban poverty, its causes, and alternative approaches to improving the situation. The participants concerned about the high cost of analysis and the potential delays in project approval that could result from making large scale Urban and Regional Analysis (URA) a prerequisite for AID funding. They requested clarification whether the Guidelines and the URAs were intended to be aids to the host country for its analysis or alternatively if they were the requirements to get AID funding. If the Guidelines were an optional aid, the participants welcomed more materials. On the other hand, if the Guidelines were destined to

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<sup>\*</sup>"Seminar on Urban and Regional Analysis in Central America,"  
San Jose, Costa Rica; February 16-17, 1978.

become AID requirements, the preference was to integrate the pieces, sharpen the focus on a core of essential items, and minimize the bureaucratic requirements that might not fit the diverse situations where URAs were potentially applicable.

B. SOME CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS

The participants were frustrated by a gap between URA and development of interventions to help the poor. The planned interventions were not readily derivable from the URA. In Panama and Costa Rica, the interventions were identified before the URA and the de facto function of the URA was to demonstrate that the chosen interventions meet AID requirements regarding the neediness of the target groups and the degree of documentation of that need. In Nicaragua the URA was done first and interventions have yet to be developed from it; in the meantime there has been heavy investment in the reconstruction of Managua. The gap in Costa Rica and Panama appeared to be bureaucratic. In Nicaragua the risk was that insulation of the technocratic planners from the political and bureaucratic decision-makers might result in the plans never influencing important decisions.

Spatial analysis shares the strength and weakness of traditional economic analysis for designing poverty programs. The concepts and techniques of analysis are oriented to description, explanation and perhaps optimization for society as a whole. It is assumed that political processes and transfer payments can compensate any losers out of the gross benefits to the winners. Consequently, a spatial analysis can focus on where industry should be located and how land should be used to achieved efficiency. Unfortunately, benefits tend to go to the groups with property, capital, and skills who are prepared to take advantage of the

opportunities that come with change; the transfer mechanisms often don't work for the poor. The economic analysis usually does not treat the transfer process and the political and bureaucratic determinants of the distribution process are never analyzed systematically. There are easy cases where interventions yield important benefits for the poor as well as the non-poor, e.g., an industrial park in a poor area providing unskilled jobs and training. However, often there are hard cases where the unequal competition for benefits may yield nothing to the poor, e.g., agricultural wholesale markets in Northeast Brazil may have improved profits for wholesalers and retail grocery chains while leaving food producers no better off and poor urban consumers worse off to the extent they buy through traditional retail outlets. In a chain of intermediaries, the best-organized group may capture all the benefits instead of benefits disseminating to all parties. This line of reasoning suggests that analysis of global efficiency is inadequate where the objective is to improve the welfare of the people.

An alternative approach is greater attention to analysis of poverty, its determinants, and alternative interventions to improve the situation. More attention would go to distribution of income and wealth, economic and social power, transfer processes, evolutionary strategies where the interest of the poor conflict with the non-poor, (e.g. minimum wages; labor rights, subsidized social benefits). The analysis of "hard" situations will involve sensitive subjects where the interests of the intended beneficiaries may conflict with the perceived interests of the analysts, the users of the URA, the "establishment" of the host government and the perceived interest of the USA, e.g., nationalization or confiscatory taxation of foreign investments, tariff protection, etc. These problems are immediately apparent.

1. The analysis is less familiar to social scientists who do UKA-type work. The results are likely to be more polemical and less scientific, at least in the short run until the techniques for objective analysis of conflict situations are refined. (I may be overly pessimistic on this point.)
2. Marxist and radical spokespersons have pre-empted this field in analyzing the causes of poverty through exploitation, dependency, and unequal exchange. As a result, non-Marxists and analysts who strive to be politically neutral are reluctant to become labeled as communist ideologues, and reluctant to break ranks with their colleagues (and superiors) who want to do value-free work and may not like the implications of the work even when the methodology is acceptable. Implementing the poverty-oriented programs may also create some strange bedfellows in many developing countries (and in the USA).
3. There is a risk that the poor people in the target group may end up worse off as a result of explicit analysis and clear statements \* of the results from managed interventions. The logic of this position is that the "establishment" of non-poor only tolerates poverty programs because of the vagueness about the real redistribution impacts that will emerge; fuzziness is a kind of lubricant for reconciling conflicting interests in getting approval from voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and analysts. If vagueness leads to poorly managed programs that only deliver a quarter of the loaf promised to the poor, explicitness may deliver nothing at all!

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\*

This argument is attributed to Lindbloom.

C. THE PRACTICAL CONCEPTS FOR IMPROVING URBAN AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS

There are practical approaches to breaking down the insulation around URA planners. The objective is more realism about planned interventions that will be (1) realistic with respect to political and bureaucratic constraints on change, (2) appreciated by the poor, and (3) feasible with respect to the participation of the poor.

1. Analysis of the "Dynamics of Change"--What is Politically and Bureaucratically Viable?

Political and bureaucratic realities could be introduced into URAs using the "dynamics of change" approach. PCI managed a national health sector assessment in the Dominican Republic with a section on "dynamics of change" in the health sector. Analysis was led by a sociologist and focused on the historical pattern of important changes. What were the sources of new initiatives? What groups supported change? What groups opposed change? What was the style of interactions? (e.g., lobbying, negotiation, subtle subversions, intimidation, confrontation, physical conflict, coup d'etat, etc.?) What were the roles of key institutions? (e.g., the legislature, universities, the medical establishment, industry, agriculture, military, foreign governments, etc.)

"Dynamics of change" analysis provides insight into the political and bureaucratic viability of managed interventions. It should be possible to document what happened fairly objectively, leaving room for more subjective interpretations about causal relationships. The planners should see more clearly the perspectives of the real world actors who must be influenced for "managed interventions" to succeed. As a minimum, planners should be able to separate "easy cases" from some "hard cases" where extraordinary efforts will be

necessary for success. A question that arises immediately is what to do with the analysis that is too "hot" to publish. The response is not to publish it but at least force planners to think about political and bureaucratic viability and be realistic about their plans, their strategy and tactics for getting approval, and their resources allocations and time estimates for implementations

"Dynamics of Change" analysis for URAs in Central America would probably focus more attention on the relationship between the central government and decentralized municipalities or regional governments. There has been a marked trend toward national agencies to operate functions (at least outside the primate cities) that could be operated in a decentralized fashion--education, health, police, water, electric lighting, sewers, roads, telephones, etc. The revenue from some services and the power involved in their operation are controlled from the national level. Talented people gravitate toward the institutions with money and power. The extent of the trend toward national agencies can be documented objectively for specific situations and the advantages or disadvantages economically are calculable. The political and bureaucratic significance of the trends will require careful interpretation in designing projects that will succeed.\*

2. Analysis of Values and Attitudes: What will be Appreciated by the Poor and the Non-Poor?

Emilia Rodriguez gave an eloquent anecdote about the need to analyze values and attitudes. In the San Jose neighborhood of Villa Esperanza, she observed the women were stable and the men

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\*

Julio Cordoba Collinet called my attention to the trend in Central America and its significance for political viability of organizations, like INFOM in Guatemala and IFAM in Costa Rica to strengthen municipalities.

were transitory. Her interpretation was that programs dependent on the men investing in the neighborhood would fail. However, there was a good chance for success for programs oriented to women in the area, providing employment or services in the area and compatible with child-raising.

Emilia Rodriguez argues the methods of the anthropologist and sociologist are the key to understanding attitude and values. She does not demand a year-long ethnography and a comprehensive academic analysis; she pleads for one day to sit in the central square of a community to observe and listen. I suspect that more time would be useful, too. Her point is that values and attitudes can and should be analyzed on a non-academic basis to produce useful insight.

### 3. Analysis and Participation by the Poor

Shifting analysis to the community level changes the planners/managers problem. Poor people instinctively understand their own "felt needs," aspirations, and constraints (although this does not deny the usefulness of surveys to provide a broader perspective for setting priorities). The poor typically lack valid information about alternative interventions to make the situation better, and the implications for their communities. They may naively underestimate the amount of work and money and energy to get tasks accomplished. They may naively overestimate the obstacles to change. The community may have no experience to judge the pitfalls and the payoffs from project ideas that have never been tried there before.

One approach is to identify local successes and build on them. The implied strategy is to capitalize on a selection process that has already taken place in this community. The success of the

first activity is taken to be the best foundation for generating further success. Community organizers using this approach emphasize the importance of morale, generating success models that are quickly visible, and creating a process that will be cumulative.

Appropriate planning and management systems can be developed to support management by the poor or by decentralized communities. PCI has helped develop a health information and planning system (HIPS) that appears effective in small Nicaraguan communities near Esteli. The system provides a simple process for communities to diagnose their problems, articulate strategies, judge resource adequacy, make realistic plans, monitor progress and plan as appropriate. In two years, the communities have undertaken different projects and their systems have evolved somewhat differently. However, they have displayed maturity in their choice of activities and impressive results in improved health practices. One approach to assistance is identifying and cataloging some successful experiences (and unsuccessful ones), dissecting them, and disseminating ideas about what works and pitfalls encountered elsewhere. This can become the basis for a central information system oriented to serving decentralized users, reversing the normal procedure of collecting information at the periphery for use in decisions by a central government office. The challenge is for planners and government ministries to provide information to decentralized planners without usurping responsibilities or being manipulative. The management system should be helpful for getting resources needed for decentralized projects but even more important, to help with implementation and replanning after projects are launched.

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APPENDIX A

BACKGROUND AND PRE-SEMINAR PREPARATION  
PARTICIPANT LIST  
AGENDA

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APPENDIX A  
BACKGROUND AND PRE-SEMINAR PREPARATION

AID's Office of Urban Development sponsored the development of the Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analysis and published it in October of 1976.

The Guidelines were circulated to facilitate good analysis of urban programs to be assisted by AID. Guidelines summarizes ten types of analysis germane to urban and regional analysis. It identifies each technique, its relevance to AID activities, typical questions for that kind of analysis, data sources, data analysis examples and a brief bibliography of the relevant literature.

Guidelines were translated into Spanish and tested in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama. The Office of Urban Development provided foreign advisers to participate in these URA's and to provide the Office of Urban Development thoughtful feedback about the utility of Guidelines including suggestions on how to improve Guidelines for a broader audience. The Costa Rican analysis was focused on the San Jose agglomeration, i.e., the primate city of San Jose and the nearby urbanized area. The Panamanian analysis focused on the URBE Project, north and west of the City of Panama, a conscious effort to stimulate the region and to decentralize activity in Panama. In Nicaragua, the analysis was national, considering the linkages of Managua to the rest of the country. The three analyses were still in process at the time of the seminar but the advisers had finished their part and had submitted their critiques of Guidelines to the Office of Urban Development. The Costa Rica critique was the basis of a meeting in Washington, D.C. on December 1, 1977 to discuss Guidelines with people from AID/Washington, the World Bank, and other consultants involved in URA work.

The San Jose "Seminar on Urban and Regional Analysis (URA) in Central America" was conceived, funded, and supported through the Office of Urban Development of AID. The concept of the seminar was to bring

together the parties who had been involved in the three tests of Guidelines so they could share experiences in Spanish, including lessons learned for future URA's.

Richard Rhoda traveled to Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama and found substantial interest in a seminar. PCI was contracted to manage the seminar, made arrangements to use Hotel Torremolinos in San Jose, Costa Rica and arranged for logistic support, secretarial assistance, etc.

The seminar was organized to achieve explicit objectives that could be evaluated at the end of the seminar. The intention was that all participants should leave the seminar with specific activities planned that they considered to be substantially improved as a result of the seminar.

1. The participants who were analysts should be better able to complete their URA or to plan complementary work.
2. The participants who were "users" of URA's for the national government or AID should leave with specific actions that they would take to improve the usefulness of the URA.
3. Participants who would have responsibility for future URA's either as analysts or users, were expected to leave with specific actions to improve future analyses and/or execution of urban plans.

The seminar materials sent to each of the participants included background material, a preliminary agenda and questionnaires to elicit from the participants what they wanted to discuss. Forms for evaluating the Guidelines were included.

Two key topics were chosen around which to organize the seminar:

1. Improving the technical analysis.
2. Improving coordination between analysts and users.

These were further divided into sub-topics for discussion in workshop groups.

## DISCUSSION TOPICS

### Day One: Improving the Technical Analysis

- a. Depth and scope of analysis of target group.
- b. Depth and scope of analysis of the factors influencing the well-being of the target group.
- c. Depth and scope of analysis of alternative interventions.
- d. Depth and scope of analysis of indirect effects.\*

### Day Two: Improving Coordination between Analyses and Users

- a. Communications needed from users to analysts.
- b. Communications needed from analysts to users.

For each topic, "workshop starters" were developed to provoke and facilitate fruitful discussion of substance.

The workshop starters (Appendix B) were prepared by Drs. Barclay Hudson and Bruce Herrick, Dr. Julian Velasco, and Dr. Thomas Eighmy, based on their participation in the URA's in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama respectively.

The basic format for each day was to begin with short plenary sessions for reporting progress-to-date on each of the three URA's (Day 1), and the results of the instrumented questionnaires and evaluations that were administered (Day 2). Most of the day was reserved for groups, and plenaries for presenting and discussing the work done in the workshops.

Each day ended with a synthesis of the deliberations of the day focusing on the lessons that had been learned.

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\* Workshop D was dropped for lack of interest.

Twenty-eight people participated in the conference including analysts and users from Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama, foreign advisors, USAID representatives, AID/Washington, PCI staff, and observers from Colombia, Nicaragua and the AID Regional Housing Officer for Central America (based in Honduras). The list follows in Appendix A.

The Agenda is enclosed in Appendix A.

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URBAN AND REGIONAL ASSESSMENT SEMINAR

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

Agenda

Wednesday, February 15, 1978

Arrival of Participants

Registration at Hotel Torremolinos

Hospitality Suite Open -- Reception 5:30 -8:00 pm

10:00-12.00

Dinner -- 8:00 - 10:00 pm

URBAN AND REGIONAL ASSESSMENT SEMINAR

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

Agenda

Thursday, February 16, 1978

THEME OF THE DAY: Improving the Technical Analysis

Breakfast

8:00 - 8:15

- Welcome
- Presentations
- Collection of Questionnaires
- Objective of Seminar
- Schedule
- Possible Site Visits

9:00 - 10:30

Highlights of Experience in Nicaragua,  
Costa Rica, Panama: Verbal Presentations  
Discussion and Questions

10:30 - 10:45

Coffee Break

10:45 - 12:30

Workshops on Topics for Improving  
Technical Analysis.

- A. Depth and Scope of Analysis of  
Target Group
- B. Depth and Scope of Analysis of the  
Environment focusing on causes of  
poverty and influences on inter-  
ventions to aid the poor.
- C. Depth and Scope of Analysis of  
alternative Intervention
- D. Depth and Scope of Analysis of  
Indirect, Secondary Consequences,  
Implications of Interventions.

12:30 - 2:30

Lunch

Thursday, February 16, 1978 Continued

- |              |  |
|--------------|--|
| 2:30 - 4:30  | Presentation by Workgroups and<br>Plenary Discussions              |
| 4:30 - 5:00  | Coffee Break   |
| 5:00 - 6:00  | Rapporteur Summary of Results of the<br>Day and Program for Friday |
| 6:00 - 8:00  | Free for Participants - Hospitality<br>Suite open                  |
| 8:00 - 11:00 | Dinner-Chalet Suizo  |

URBAN AND REGIONAL ASSESSMENT SEMINAR

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

Agenda

Friday, February 17, 1978

Breakfast

9:00 - 9:45

Workshops

Nicaragua -- Suite 305

Panama -- Room 2

Costa Rica-- Room 1

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

10:15 - 11:45

Costa Rica - Plenary

11:45 - 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 3:00

Nicaragua - Plenary

3:00 - 3:30

Coffee Break

3:30 - 5:00

Panama - Plenary

5:00 - 6:30

Closing

8:00 -

Dinner

Saturday, February 18, 1978

Breakfast

Site Visit to two communities in San Jose.

Participants depart

Practical Concepts Incorporated

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APPENDIX B

WORKSHOP STARTERS PREPARED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSULTANTS:

Dr. Thomas H. Eighmy

Dr. Barclay Hudson

Dr. Bruce Herrick

Dr. Julian Velasco-Arboleda

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COMMENTS FOR SEMINAR ON URBAN AND REGIONAL  
ANALYSIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA \*

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January, 1978

I. REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF EXPERIENCES GAINED FROM THE URBAN  
AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS IN COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, AND PANAMA \*\*

A. What Knowledge Was Gained from the Analyses?

It is probably too much to expect an original contribution to "knowledge" as it is generally defined in academic circles, to emerge from applied analyses in support of government planning operations and AID sector or project papers. If any such advance can be claimed for the Panama analysis, it is in the extension of the "poverty line" concept. The extension has taken three forms:

- (1) For analysis purposes, poverty is treated as a continuously distributed variable such that degrees of poverty can be noted and analytical techniques based upon a continuous distribution can be used. At the end of the analysis for purposes of programming, a poverty line may be superimposed to break up the continuous distribution into people above or below the line, but the artificial tag of "poor and non-poor" does not precede and constrain the analysis.

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\* These comments are based upon Seminar Objectives Central America Urban and Regional Analysis Seminar DS/UD, December, 1977.

\*\* See Thomas H. Eighmy and Agustin Garcia, Mapping the Poverty Line in Western Panama, December 1977, 123 pp.

- (2) Poverty is defined in terms of observable and verifiable indicators which can serve as a project baseline or for later project evaluation purposes. A second advantage is that poverty is defined in terms which can be the subject of specific sectoral projects (housing, education, farm-to-market, roads). At the conclusion of analysis, these verifiable observable indicators are related back to monetary values in a manner which utilizes both census data covering the entire population of the country and expenditure survey data covering a small sample of this population. The method involves census and survey data aggregated at different levels of spatial detail, several principal components analyses and curvilinear regression estimates. The approach helps to avoid problems of poor quality income data and the cost of large surveys.
- (3) A degree of spatial detail is developed in contrast with national or metropolitan area aggregates. This is possible because of the use of census as opposed to survey data which does not have a large enough sample to develop small area estimates. In the Panama case, where the project population is spread

over a large area including both urban and rural designations with a strong semi-subsistence component, this spatial detail is a necessary and distinguishing characteristic of regional analysis.

If "knowledge" is defined more simply to mean new insights and more systematic and quantifiable ways of looking at urban and regional problems, we would expect that all the analyses would make such a contribution.

B. What Additions, Changes, or Improvements Should Be Made to the DS/UD "Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analysis" in Light of the Experiences Gained in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama? \*

Each of the analyses resulted in a critique and analysis of "Guidelines." It is certainly a primary function of this seminar to draw these conclusions together. Based upon the Panama experience, parallel experience in other countries, and such prior contact with the analyses in Costa Rica and Nicaragua as were available, I would suggest that the following responses would be fairly typical for all three analyses:

- (1) The problem of the audience. Inevitably, much of "Guidelines" is outside of the experience of many of the intended "target group" of readers within

\* This section draws upon "A Critique and Test of 'Guidelines for Urban and Regional Analysis' " prepared earlier.

the countries involved, the AID Missions and AID/Washington. At the same time, for many others, "Guidelines" represents a review of known materials and concepts. "Guidelines" of necessity seeks a middle ground.

- (2) The problem of time and exhaustiveness. A full analysis is simply too exhaustive to be carried out in any reasonable time frame and level of effort consistent with most single project preparations. This problem is handled by division into sub-types of analysis. I would further suggest that the DAP may be an appropriate place for urban and regional analysis. The analyses could then present a common data base and framework for analysis which specific projects could draw upon.
  
- (3) The problem of adaptation. The requirements needed to adapt "Guidelines" to individual country conditions and individual project designs are stringent. What emerges may bear little resemblance to the outline presented in "Guidelines." I think a rigid check list approach in each country is neither desirable nor possible.

As noted, I think the above three problems would represent a minimal common grouping of experiences in three countries. I would add, these problems are inevitable and are not intended as a criticism of "Guidelines" or of the author who, after all, put them together in a rather constrained time period as a preliminary document. In terms of providing a common basis of discussion between officials of the governments involved and Mission personnel, I think "Guidelines" have made a very good contribution. Principles of social science analysis are now being applied to what were previously largely administrative documents with a very generalized level of verbal descriptive analysis. The sections on relevant questions were especially useful.

"Guidelines" cannot be expected to act as a course in urban and regional analysis. Any revision of "Guidelines" would benefit by an inclusion of representative maps, data coding matrices and diagrams illustrating, for example, central place functions and linkages analysis. If a concern for space and spatial analysis is to be one of the guiding principles, then the prospective reader must be presented with an opportunity to think spatially through the incorporation of such maps and diagrams. Secondly, parallel elements need to be combined to show the degrees to which different types of analyses are inter-linked and draw upon a common data base. The suggestion

made by Julian Velasco in this respect seems to be a worthwhile step toward simplification, reduction, and conceptualization of the different types of analyses. Finally, as part of any type of revision, I suggest that basic materials in Spanish be included in the libraries of the AID Missions and of the implementing authorities. In this respect, perhaps the "Pan American Review of Geography and History" might be one useful vehicle. Reduced parts of the three analyses could be published along with a review article and translations of key documents as part of a special issue. The AID Development Studies Program could be another vehicle.

C. What Important Elements Were Overlooked in the Analyses? What Elements Were Included Which Might Better Have Been Reduced or Eliminated? If The Analyses Were to be Done over Again, What Would/Should Be Done Differently?

In the case of Panama, Section II-A, "National Policy of Urban and Regional Development" was already quite well-advanced within the Ministry of Planning. It basically did not have to be covered in the regional analysis. Items B - (the distribution in characteristics of the poor) and C - (the distribution of development and underdevelopment) were essentially combined in the Panama regional analysis as I think they could be in other analyses of this type both at the regional and urban scales. Item D, (the system of central place service centers), had also been rather well-established in the existing Ministry of Planning documentation. Conceptually,

it is extremely important to the development of the URBE Project, but, the hierarchal system had already been described and the service centers already selected. Thus, from a data analysis point of view, Section D did not need to be the object of considerable data analysis. The development of a composite hinterlands for each of the selected urban growth and service centers however was a part of the regional analysis. Section E, (Migration Analysis), was included in a descriptive sense since reduction of metropolitan migration is a goal of the URBE Program even if not included in the URBE-AID project. Migration is one response to a spatially differentiated system, and could perhaps be subsumed under Section D, (The System of Central Place Service Centers), or Section F, (Analysis of Key Urban Rural Linkages). The latter was given a good deal of attention in the Panamanian analysis as it would be in any regional, as opposed to urban analysis. The necessity of finding surrogates for flow data and the description of related problems in the Panamanian analysis I suspect are fairly common. It should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule, that fine-grained origin and destination data for goods, passengers, messages, or funds will be available in the country. When they are, they are seldom available at the same level of analysis as other data sets. Quantitative analysis of flow data involving network structure and capacity and the characteristics of the generating and receiving places requires a level

of sophisticated technique which may not be appropriate for AID project paper preparation. Sections G, H, I, and J essentially dealt with urban analysis as opposed to integrated urban-rural spatial analysis over a large territory. Social analysis of the poor including studies of aspirations, for example, are going to be sensitive issues more often than not in most countries. This was going to be handled by University of Panama social researchers.

D. What Are Appropriate Organizational Arrangements for Conducting such Analyses?

It is doubtlessly useful if the analyses have an institutional home. But, urban and regional analyses are by their nature cross-disciplinary, and must have links with the Ministry of Planning, the relevant Central Statistical Office, line ministries, and, to the degree that such urban and regional analyses are parts of AID Mission sector or project papers, some foot in the AID Mission as well. This multi-disciplinary--multiinstitutional stance can stretch the responsible people quite thinly. This is especially true if there are different understandings of the project within and between the AID Mission and the host-country institutions, and if the project team members frequently shift. I am not certain that there is any set answer to the question of the appropriate organizational arrangement. This clearly depends upon which organizations are active in the project development, what

institutions are capable and interested in supporting the analysis, and what line ministries are apt to be most closely involved in the analysis. In this sense, the appropriate arrangements for the Panamanian regional analysis tied to a specific project loan paper, and an urban sector analysis as conducted in Costa Rica, and apparently Nicaragua, will not necessarily be the same.

E. What Has Been the Reaction to the Analyses by Ministries of the National Governments? By AID Missions? By AID of Washington?

Here I would have to defer to the people involved. It might be said of the Panamanian analyses, however, that a great deal of descriptive and prescriptive work on individual urban sites had already been carried out by the Ministry of Planning. The development of the URBE Project had stretched over several years and thus there was a tendency to regard the regional analysis as "just another paper hoop for the host-country government to jump through." I think this situation was somewhat unique to URBE and Panama coming as it did after a good deal of previous analysis and in the uncertainty of the lengthy treaty negotiation process.

F. What Is the Appropriate Depth of Analysis? How Much Data Is Needed? Can Previously Collected Data Be Used? When Is the Survey Justified?

Again, there is no simple answer to these questions. However, experiences in the Panama case have a broader applicability.

A completed household survey involves among other things, Interview Schedule Design, Pretest, Revision and Printing; Sample Selection (usually in stages with some type of stratification and/or clustering) and Cartographic Work in conformity with the Sample Design; Design of Dummy Tables; Specification and Testing of Data Processing Procedures and their total coordination with Schedule Design; preparation and printing of Training, Field Supervisor, and Interview Manuals; hiring and training of Supervisors and Interviewers; Field Interviewing and Quality Control Interviewing and Follow-Up; office coding, data entry and machine editing; data processing including, at least, tabulations and cross-tabulation for each variable at the desired level of spatial aggregation (e.g., Nation, Province, or District) and finally, study, analyses and incorporation of results in reports.

There is often a tendency to underestimate the time and cost of such operations, and to overestimate the quality and benefits of results. A correlative danger involves drawing attention away from existing alternate data sources while diverting time, money and effort to issues which are important but not crucial to project preparation. The situation where surveys are completed too late to be useful in project development and operation is so common that it is more a rule than an exception. The further people are away from the realities

of survey operation and the existing data sources, the greater is the temptation to suggest a survey. There is also a common tendency to make the survey instruments lengthy and complex. This is a natural response since surveys are often intended to be multi-purpose. Once the fixed costs in terms of time, money and effort are made to go ahead with a survey, the temptation is to try to get as much possible out of the effort and to increase the length of the survey instruments. However, in my experience, the relationship between questionnaire length and additional effort is an exponential rate of increase in the latter rather than a linear increase. As questionnaire length goes up, the required training and data processing operations increase greatly in complexity, interviewer and respondent fatigue increase, and the quality of information declines. If surveys are part of pre-project analysis, there is a tendency during the life of the project to disregard the results as part of an easily forgotten bit of pre-project documentation. At the same time, project preparation, already a lengthy operation under current AID programming requirements, becomes even longer. One alternative is to make surveys part of ongoing project operations and so enlist the active participation of project staff during the life of the project. This serves to transfer some of the massive pre-project analysis effort to the project itself. However, some AID personnel have noted a corresponding disadvantage which is a tendency

for pressure to build up for loan disbursement in advance of careful analyses of needs and priorities which to some extent are dependent upon survey results. Whatever course is taken, someone can and usually does say "You should have asked about..." Others will observe that "A survey only quantifies the obvious at great cost." And yet others will note that "Alternatives such as key respondent interviewing and small-scale but lengthier unstructured observations and interviewing is essentially a different approach from a properly conducted sample survey, relying heavily on the personalities involved and providing little basis for generalizing results."

Is there a way out of these dilemmas? Fortunately, there usually is. Field trips are useful to both the Mission personnel or consultants and to the counterparts since they tend to free each from preconceived notions. Field trips should be taken fairly early in project preparation, but after agreement has been reached on important project design issues. They should ideally include discussions with both knowledgeable officials in the public and private sectors and with the prospective participants and beneficiaries of the project, the rural-urban poor. Secondly, there needs to be a careful and thorough review and analysis of existing data. One key here is not to give up on the first attempt. In every country I have ever worked in, more exists than first meets the eyes.

Initial meetings with personnel of census-survey organizations are usually of a courtesy and familiarization nature. These officials will not usually understand the needs or depths of commitment to utilization of existing results at the first meeting. Subsequent meetings with operating as opposed to administrative staffs are required, but these, of course, must be cleared at higher levels. In my experience, most census and survey organization people have spent a great deal of time in preparing the information, but feel, often correctly, that their work is unappreciated and unutilized. They are usually delighted when someone actually takes the time and effort to understand and use their results. A second point is that only a variable proportion of material actually collected is usually published, and then only at high levels of aggregation (e.g., the nation or province). Unpublished data and tabulations at smaller levels of aggregation are usually available either in manual or computerized form. Correct use of census and survey data also requires an understanding of definitions used and a detailed examination of the interview schedules, the interviewer and supervisor training manuals, the coding books, the cartographic base for census and surveys, and the sample selection procedure in the case of surveys. It is often useful to review these documents before spot interviewing on field trips such that the AID personnel, consultants and counterpart staff can improve their feel for the information

available. The combined operation of field trips and familiarization with data sources often has fortunate spin-offs beyond immediate project preparation. There is a general tendency for planning and line ministries to underutilize the results of their own country's census and survey results. For example, the census and survey results may be consulted on an ad hoc basis when the population of a town is required. Once personnel in the planning and line ministries understand the extent of existing data, the means of accessing it, and the complexity of the operations needed to acquire it, they are more apt to use it actively in project planning.

Once the field trips and thorough familiarization with existing data have been completed, it is possible to make informed decisions on the question of whether there should be a survey at all, the cost and time estimates, the sampling operations and, probably most important, the questionnaire content.

As AID programming requirements become more stringent, the time required to get a project into the field increases. Surveys in support of preproject analysis add significantly to this time lag. Ad hoc decisions in favor of survey also can overburden host-country census and survey organizations which must schedule their own work load. In the long run, the best solution

to the relationship between surveys and AID project design, operation and evaluation is that the census and survey operations conducted by the host-country as part of its regular operations more and more should be sufficient for AID project design. In this sense, technical assistance, especially in the data processing field, by AID for the host-country organizations can serve the best purposes of both parties.

G. What Can Be Done to Assure that the Analysis Is Grounded in Real World Conditions as Opposed to Being a Paper Exercise? What Can Be Done to Insure that Grass Roots Inputs by Poverty Groups Are Included in the Analyses?

In studies involving project preparation and evaluation, it is sometimes claimed that reliance on census and survey data masks human characteristics and loses the "flavor" of individual realities in aggregates. But, even impressionistic data from spot interviews or observations is at some point statistically aggregated or verbally generalized. Censuses and surveys represent the accumulated results of thousands of interviews or observations with, among others, the target groups of participants and beneficiaries of AID projects. Properly conducted censuses and surveys provide a scientific base on which to make generalizations. How do we know our impressionistic data is representative or not? Some might even say we do not care as long as such data is "real and first-hand"

but, such unreplicable observations can lead to very wrong impressions if generalized. The impact on project design, implementation and eventual success can obviously be serious. How do we weight our free floating observations except by comparison to the general trend represented by census and survey results? And what about interviewer bias and interviewer-participant dynamics? "Common sense," "experience," "intuition" and commitments to particular theories or paradigms of development no matter how au courant and humanistically based, do not provide the same empirical base for professional quality analysis as does intelligently analyzed, scientifically collected census and survey data. This is not to say that spot interviewing of poverty groups, and participant observation have no place in project design and evaluation. It does say that when a country has a well developed census and survey organization, the data base should be explored and utilized, not brushed aside in a rush for spot interviewing or a time consuming and costly ad hoc survey.

II. TO IDENTIFY AND DISCUSS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN URBAN/REGIONAL ANALYSES AND POLICY FORMULATION, STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND PROGRAMMING

A. How Can the Linkages between Analysis and Strategy Formulation Be Strengthened?

Again, no concrete answer can be provided but it is certainly more appropriate that analysis condition our

our strategy than vice versa. However, that statement is too simple and casts analysis into the disabling "deductive versus inductive" dichotomy. No analysis will be totally deductive or totally inductive. It would seem to be rather difficult to develop a strategy if you haven't defined the problem and the dimensions of the problem are defined through analysis. Analysis, in isolation of a sense of problem, cannot help but be unfocused. Strategy conditions analysis to the considerable extent that time, budget, manpower and data constraints fortunately serve to focus analysis upon some topics more than others. In Panama, income distribution provided the focus. Probably the most general suggestion is that the concerned parties have some agreement prior to detailed analysis on what needs to be known.

- B. What Types of Analysis Are Needed to Answer Important Questions Concerning Development Strategy and Project Design? How Much Data and How Much Analysis Is Enough?
- C. What Can/Should Be Done to Insure Proper Sequencing of Urban/Regional Analysis and Project Identification?

The questions are simply too broad to answer concisely (see IB, IF above). In the case of Panama, the regional analysis was only part of complex project preparation. The end product was not to be a regional or sectoral analysis but inputs to a general program to fortify small urban growth and service centers in the largely rural area of western Panama.

The URBE Program is concerned with developing: (1) small-scale agriculturally-based industrial and service enterprises; (2) infrastructure projects to strengthen urban-rural linkages (transport terminals, markets, and small-scale industrial parks); and (3) low cost housing investment. These investment categories were further divided into subprojects, each requiring a more sectorally defined feasibility analysis.

Properly conducted, each of these analyses takes time. Often, they take more time than the host-country or the Mission wish to invest. Project momentum can be lost and key staff, both within AID and the host-country, are shifted to new assignments. Yet development itself is a lengthy process which multisectoral projects such as URBE attempt to foreshorten. Perhaps the most concrete suggestion is to make urban and regional analysis a periodic effort (e.g., every five years) tied to AID's periodic DAPs and Host-Country Census and Survey Operations as much as possible. Individual projects (or subprojects in the case of URBE) then draw upon these analyses allowing sectorally defined feasibility analyses to proceed in a timely manner.

## WORKSHOP STARTERS

by

Drs. Barclay Hudson and Bruce Herrick

### TOPIC A: ANALYSIS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TARGET GROUP

1. What alternatives were considered regarding the depth and breadth of analysis? Outline the key choices.

An initial focus on urban poor was modified to a focus on those living in poor neighborhoods ("tugurios") in and around the capital. That is, the emphasis became one on the association between low incomes and physically deteriorated housing. As subsequent research revealed, however not all the urban poor live in neighborhoods of poor housing, and not all those living in such neighborhoods are themselves poor.

Data sources on the characteristics of the target group (i.e., the urban poor) included principally the 1972 population census and a special sample survey of tugurio neighborhoods performed in San Jose in May and June of 1977. These data sources provided statistics on the numbers and demographic composition of the target population, their rates of increase, occupations and incomes and various measures of unemployment.

2. What was done? Why was the particular depth and breadth of the analysis chosen?

The 1972 census tabulations for tugurio neighborhoods, available through computer analysis from the University of Florida, were supplemented by a sample survey carried out of the Oficina de Informacion of the Ministerio de la Presidencia. Such data collection was possible within the limits of time and allotted to the urban and regional analysis. More ambitious surveys, and greater depth of analysis of the data gathered, would have taken more time than that readily available to the Costa Rican study team.

3. With the benefit of hindsight, what choices should have been different?

The focus on the population and labor characteristics mentioned above still seem best. The study could, however, have easily expanded to

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TOPIC A CONTINUED

include more attention to the population at the fringes of the San Jose metropolitan area. In general, other cities in the republic were not included. A complete urban and regional analysis would have to consider population centers outside the capital.

4. What should be done now to improve the situation?

Sample survey data unanalyzed in September 1977 when the study team was disbanded, are presumably still available for analysis. Ministry of Labor personnel remain knowledgeable about labor force survey and their interpretations.

5. Is there a more general recommendation for improving future Urban and Regional Assessments?

The recommendations for improvement are more closely associated with the organization and effective management of the study team's efforts than with the specific aims of the study (characteristics of the urban poor) as such.

## HUDSON/HERRICK WORKSHOP STARTERS

### TOPIC B: FACTORS AFFECTING WELFARE OF THE POOR (SAN JOSE)

1. Analytical alternative considered
2. Analysis carried out

Main consideration was given to pure description, using census-type statistics on housing, income and employment.

Other descriptive categories were not emphasized, given the apriori focus on employment and housing interventions.

Other non-statistical ways of depicting problems of employment/income/housing conditions were also de-emphasized, given (a) the emphasis put on survey method, (b) social science bias toward statistical method, (c) AID and social science belief in "objectivity" as both desirable and feasible way of portraying reality.

Explanation of poverty conditions was consistently given second place to description. Expanation taken theory as well as data, and theory is hazardous from the standpoint of its ideological content, its reference to factors beyond AID/GOCR control, its lack of conciseness, and its likely confrontation with opposing theories.

The Final Report of the San Jose Urban Assessment included reference to theories explaining poverty and pverty interventions, and also gave reasons why alternative analysis to illuminate these relationships had not been carried out.

3. Hindsight
4. What is needed now.

- More attention should have been given to poverty as a process not contained in delimited spatial entities (tugurios). That assumption severely restricted the view of factors affecting welfare.
- Both impressionistic and structured observation of field sites should be an absolutely mandatory feature of urban analysis.
- Specific effort should have been made to depict in diagrammatic form the variety of factors affecting welfare of poor groups. Many such factos were considered but omitted from analysis because there was no single place to record random (but often accurate) thoughts and observations in systematic manner. The San Jose Final Trip Report refers to the nature of these strong connections (page 9). These connections need to be depicted and inventoried, and their strength and inter-relationships noted, without necessarily undertaking the extensive analysis needed to validate the assumptions made in this regard.

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TOPIC B CONTINUED

5. Future needs.

- Assumptions analysis (see above): there are easy but systematic ways of carrying out assumptions analysis--for example the PASO/EMERALD approach.
- Field site visits (absolutely essential). Systematic debriefing of field site visits is essential--otherwise analysis falls back on more traditional data. (Conventional urban and regional analysis gives little weight to data derived from seeing things with one's own eyes.)
- Also needed: more systematic critical review of specific poverty interventions and their limits, including historical analysis of "successful" programs. This will help reveal other factors affecting the welfare of poor populations. (This was done with respect to housing, employment generation, and nutrition policies in Costa Rica, but findings were not well integrated into the Final Report.)

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### TOPIC C: DEPTH AND BREADTH OF ANALYSIS FOR PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

1. What alternatives were considered regarding depth and breadth of analysis? Outline the key choices.

Note initially that policy recommendations can include project identification (e.g., urban employment service extension), but they need not (e.g., macroeconomic wage policy recommendations). The urban and regional analysis performed in Costa Rica was only indirectly aimed at ultimate project identification, and project identification itself was specifically avoided by the study team. Instead, the urban and regional analysis was seen as the stage preceding project identification.

2. What was done? Why was this depth and breadth chosen?

The lack of emphasis on project identification by the urban analysts reflects simply the notion of specialization of research tasks and division of labor. Other interested persons and groups used results of the urban analysis as input data for their own project identification activities.

3. With the benefits of hindsight, what choices should have been different?

Project oriented analysts want all analysis to focus on project identification and evaluation, ignoring the possibility that policy can take forms other than project, as noted above. The concern of the Costa Rican urban and regional analysis with a broader rather than a narrower focus was justified, in my opinion.

4. What should be done now to improve the situation?

Maintain the desirable separation between those doing urban and regional analysis and those interested exclusively in moving foreign aid dollars into projects as such.

5. Is there a more general recommendation for improving future Urban and Regional Assessments?

From my own perspective, the present division of labor is optimal.

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### TOPIC D: INDIRECT EFFECTS OF PROPOSED INTERVENTIONS (COSTA RICA)

NOTE: This topic could be discussed in very narrow terms, given the very limited interventions proposed (see TOPIC B) and the limited treatment given other factors affecting poverty (TOPIC C). In Costa Rica the analysis, "Indirect effects and broader implications" of poverty intervention strategies were mainly addressed (a) in documents not explicitly referenced in the Final Report and (b) in regard to policy interventions which AID/GOOCR were not apparently interested in. (See Final Report, pp. 30-33.)

- { 1. Alternatives considered  
2. What was done

- Members of the OFIPLAN team suggested looking at broad models of long-term social and economic development as context for evaluating proposed interventions (e.g., "El Modelo Mundial Latinoamericano," as developed by the Bariloche Foundation). This was discouraged, in favor of purely descriptive analysis. (See remarks under TOPIC B.)
- Field observations and interviews with poor people themselves would have revealed more about indirect effects of proposed interventions. This was not done, although PADCO has suggested practical ways to do this.
- More use could have been made of existing critical analysis of indirect and counterproductive effects of past interventions (minimum wages, housing subsidies, nutrition supplements). This literature was largely ignored in the San Jose Final Report.

### 3. Hindsight

No systematic attempt was made to consider the indirect effects and broader implications of proposed interventions, despite that in Costa Rica, it would have been possible to so given the early identification of housing and employment as key strategies.

Starting with a few key strategies could have been valuable: without this preliminary focus, no consideration of "indirect effects and broader implications" is possible. Nevertheless, once these initial proposals were identified, more effort should have been made to examine them critically. A simple list of pros and cons of particular strategies is a good place to start.

### 4. To be done now

A specific policy should be selected for in-depth evaluation, starting with a simple listing of pros and cons, leading to identification of

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TOPIC D CONTINUED

issues on which experts (including client population representatives) may disagree, thus allowing specification of a research agenda on points of disagreement. If this is done, other "background information" will probably turn out to be irrelevant.

5. Future Assessments

Short-cut analysis of basic assumptions underlying specific intervention proposals should be developed, or existing methods identified, and catalogued in the form of a field manual for analysts.

## TOPIC E: COMMUNICATIONS FROM USERS TO ANALYSTS

Both actual and potential users should be identified. They fall into a number of distinct categories, each of which has its own ends to serve and each of which may be guided by separate constituency.

Among the most easily identifiable user groups are the following:

- a. AID/Washington, especially the Development Support/Urban Development Office.
- b. AID/Costa Rica.
- c. OFIPLAN, the ministries, and the autonomous agencies.
- d. The Costa Rica public, as contrasted with the official agencies.
- e. Practical Concepts Incorporated.
- f. Other international technical assistance and economic development agencies, e.g., the World Bank.
- g. The international social science and planning community.

Each of the questions suggested for discussion in Topic E could be answered for each of the user groups identified above.

1. What guidance was provided to the analysts at the beginning of the analysis?

- a) Decision to be made based on the analysis:

Since the scientific quality and political persuasiveness of the analysis could not be perfectly foreseen at the outset, user groups in general could not specify in advance exactly what decisions would be based on the analysis.

- b) An explicit objective for users of the urban and regional analysis. What is needed for the analysis to be satisfactory?

The most readily generalized objective was that the analysis be of a quality sufficient to form a foundation for policy measures to alleviate urban poverty.

- c) Methods for data collection, analysis and presentation.

Some user groups cooperated with analysis in preparing census tabulation and surveys, as further detailed in TOPIC A.

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TOPIC E CONTINUED

d) Time and Budget

Thirty worker-months by the Costa Rican study team, together with about 3 worker months by foreign consultants were budgeted by AID. The Costa Rican ministries commissioned surveys and seconded personnel to help in the analysis and in project-related studies.

2. What problems developed as a result of inadequate communications or information or guidance from users to analysts?

There were constant delays in getting data from cooperating Costa Rica offices, whose fortunes were not notably tied up with the study's outcome. As a result of these data gaps, the conclusions that could be drawn from the study were weaker.

3. With the benefit of hindsight, what could have been done to avoid problems or reduce their seriousness? Does anything need to be done now?

Success with the urban and regional analysis will be greater when cooperating agencies see their own activities advanced by the potential outcome of the study. If ministries are bludgeoned into cooperation without an obvious payoff, the amounts of effort that will be required to complete the study are much greater.

4. Is there a more general recommendation for improving future analyses?

Explicit recognition of the number of user groups and of their disparate goals and modes of organization may allow a more highly focussed effort. Such an effort would explicitly emphasize the needs of some and ignore or neglect, with equal forethought, the demands of others.

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### TOPIC F: COMMUNICATIONS FROM ANALYST TO USERS (COSTA RICA)

#### 1. What did users expect?

- a) & b) This was not clear. The Mandate of the URA seemed to call for objective description, not policy recommendations. Hence dialogue on analysis implications was limited. There was missed opportunity to focus analysis on specific policy options, in view of the "urban environment" analysis that ran parallel to the URA.
- c) Constraints. See TOPIC B, parts 1 and 2.
- d) Heavy emphasis was put on the survey and census analysis. As mentioned previously, this should have been supplemented by other forms of analysis (See TOPIC D.)
- e) Time and budget were not constraints on using other forms of analysis, although they were perceived as constraints. Much depends on acknowledging the existence of "short-cut" forms of analysis--and using them. (See TOPIC D, part 5, recommendations.)
- f) Briefing of analysts was quite thorough and useful. But see comment 5 below.

#### 2. Changed expectations

Much of the early analysis was based on the assumption that poverty was a condition localized in tugurios. The data showed this to be false assumption, and this decreased the relative value of the survey, which looked at poverty exclusively in the tugurios. The survey results were delayed and for this reason they only partially incorporated into the final report.

- 3. Problems
- 4. Hindsight

Communication between users and analysts was not a major problem. It is probably not useful to separate discussion of user-to-analyst from analyst-to-user communications, since each communication should consist of dialogue rather than one-way information flow.

The major communication gap was between analysts and government users on the one hand and poor people (the ultimate client) on the other. See recommendations made in TOPICS B and D.

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TOPIC F CONTINUED

5. Recommendations

It is easy to communicate about methodology, especially (in the Costa Rica case) given the very useful AID/GOCR Project Agreement, which greatly facilitated dialogue on initial understandings and modifications of analysis.

There were communication breakdowns (as happens in all technical assistance projects) regarding tacit assumptions about the ultimate purposes of foreign aid, the processes of social and economic development, and the degree to which fundamental processes can (or should be) the object of policy intervention (e.g., market mechanisms, community organizations, spatial organization of rural/urban forms, ideological commitments, appropriate technologies).

Basic assumptions can be analyzed by fairly simple methods. In many cases, however, both analysts and users may prefer to keep basic assumptions unstated.

TOPICO A - CARACTERISTICAS DEL GRUPO - OBJETIVO

1.- En lo que respecta al Grupo-Objetivo -los marginados urbanos, el problema consistía en definir quienes eran y donde estaban ubicados, principalmente. Para responder a lo anterior se requería analizar la distribución del ingreso y la propiedad, acceso a los servicios básicos, participación popular y otras variables indicativas de pobreza relativa o marginalidad. Las alternativas a las que se enfrentaron los analistas en Nicaragua, ordenadas según el mayor o menor alcance del análisis, fueron las siguientes:

- a.- Analizar todos los grupos en todas las regiones a fin de poder establecer comparaciones que permitieran identificar las características de los grupos marginados respecto del resto de la población.
- b.- Analizar todos los grupos socio-económicos en una o unas pocas regiones, lo que suponía una decisión anterior acerca de cual región debía tener prioridad.
- c.- Analizar solo el grupo de menores ingresos en todas las regiones, lo que implicaba que el grupo-objetivo ya estaba identificado y ubicado.
- d.- Analizar con la mayor profundidad un grupo de marginados en una región determinada, con miras a conocer sus características, requerimientos, necesidades.

2.- La alternativa seleccionada fue la primera: abarcando todo el país y todos los grupos pues el Gobierno de Nicaragua buscaba sentar las bases para una estrategia integral de desarrollo regional y urbano. En esta etapa el análisis debía realizarse a nivel global para luego, una vez que se adopte la estrategia nacional, sean realizados estudios más detallados sobre ciudades y grupos poblacionales específicos. Por otra parte, la casi inexistencia en Nicaragua de información sobre variables indicativas de la marginalidad, hubiera exigido estudios de campo, encuestas, etc, en caso de que se hubiera optado por una alternativa diferente de la primera.

3,4.- Creo que la decisión tomada fue la adecuada, como parte de un proceso que debe culminar en una serie de estudios a nivel micro, enmarcados en una estrategia global. Sin embargo, parece que algunos de los usuarios consideraban que el Análisis debía llegar a generar proyectos específicos, desde esta primera etapa mientras que, de acuerdo a lo previsto, solo se debiera llegar a lineamientos generales y programas. El próximo paso es político y consiste en la adopción por parte de las autoridades de Nicaragua de una Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano, en base al Análisis Regional y Urbano y a sus recomendaciones.

5.- En el futuro, todos los usuarios deben ponerse de acuerdo con los analistas y entre ellos mismos, sobre la profundidad y extensión del análisis y las implicaciones en tiempo y dinero, en cada caso. Igualmente, convendría una labor de divulgación sobre las relaciones urbano-regionales con otros sectores (agricultura, educación, etc.), entre los usuarios que no estén familiarizados con la dimensión urbano-regional.

TOPICO B - FACTORES QUE INFLUYEN EN EL BIENESTAR DEL  
GRUPO - OBJETIVO

1.- Las alternativas consideradas se relacionaron con los factores económicos, sociales, institucionales y políticos que caracterizan o determinan la marginalidad. Las siguientes opciones, no todas mutuamente excluyentes, fueron tenidas en cuenta:

- a.- Enfatizar el análisis de las características cuantitativas y cualitativas de la dotación de infraestructura física y de servicios sociales.
- b.- Enfatizar el análisis de las características económicas de la población en especial, niveles y estructura del ingreso, distribución de la riqueza, tenencia de la tierra, etc.
- c.- Enfatizar el análisis de las características sociales de la población: niveles de educación y alfabetismo, mortalidad, morbilidad, tasas de crecimiento, nutrición, etc.
- d.- Enfatizar el análisis de los niveles y tipo de participación popular y de los organismos de base.
- e.- Enfatizar el análisis de las estructuras de poder y de sus efectos sobre la marginalidad.

2.- Por decisión del Gobierno de Nicaragua, se adoptó una combinación de las primeras tres alternativas. Aunque se quiso profundizar mas en el análisis de b), "Niveles y estructuras del ingreso y distribución de la riqueza", no fue posible ya que la información disponible es casi nula a nivel nacional e inexistente a nivel local.

3,4.- Con miras a futuros estudios, sería recomendable introducir preguntas sobre los niveles de ingreso, tanto individuales como familiares, en los futuros Censos Nacionales de Nicaragua. También sería de gran ayuda el que otras agencias del

Gobierno pudieran tener acceso a la información de Catastro sobre Propiedad Raíz y de la Dirección Nacional de Ingresos, sin violar la reserva tributaria pues en ambos casos sería con fines puramente estadísticos.

5.- Si se desea enfrentar con éxito el problema de la marginalidad o pobreza extrema, se debe enfatizar más en investigar , con fines a eliminarlas, las causas de la pobreza, que en tratar solo sus efectos.

TOPICO C - IDENTIFICACION DE PROYECTOS

1,2,3.- La sola identificación de proyectos no es suficiente para sustentar acciones tendientes a elevar el nivel de vida de los marginados, si no está enmarcada en políticas y estrategias nacionales. Ante la falta de una Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano en Nicaragua, el Análisis Urbano-Regional en este país fue orientado a sentar las bases para que las autoridades políticas adoptaran políticas y estrategias en dicho campo.

El Análisis Urbano-Regional de Nicaragua presenta conclusiones y recomendaciones de las que se pueden inferir programas y proyectos pero no identifica explícitamente proyectos. Es conveniente repetir que, sin un marco general de referencia aceptado por el Gobierno en forma integral, los proyectos identificados podrían, no contribuir a alcanzar los objetivos deseados y en especial, a mejorar la situación de los marginados.

4,5 Los siguientes pasos a seguir deben ser:

- a.- Adopción formal por parte del Gobierno de Nicaragua de una Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano, sustentada en el Análisis Urbano Regional terminado en Octubre de 1977.
- b.- Llevar a cabo las reformas institucionales y adoptar las disposiciones requeridas para implementar la estrategia que se adopte.
- c.- Iniciar los estudios específicos necesarios y actualizar los existentes con el fin de identificar proyectos de inversión, dentro de la estrategia, una vez esta sea aprobada.

Gobierno pudieran tener acceso a la información de Catastro sobre Propiedad Raíz y de la Dirección Nacional de Ingresos, sin violar la reserva tributaria pues en ambos casos sería con fines puramente estadísticos.

5.- Si se desea enfrentar con éxito el problema de la marginalidad o pobreza extrema, se debe enfatizar más en investigar, con fines a eliminarlas, las causas de la pobreza, que en tratar solo sus efectos.

TOPICO E - COMUNICACIONES DE LOS USUARIOS A LOS ANALISTAS

1.- La orientación a los analistas provino de tres fuentes principales: a) Por parte del Gobierno de Nicaragua, los lineamientos generales sobre descentralización urbana compilados en el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo; b) Por AID-Washington, las orientaciones técnicas contenidas en la "Guía de Análisis regional y urbano de R.Rhoda; y c) Por AID-Nicaragua, las condiciones y descripción del trabajo especificadas en los acuerdos de asistencia técnica firmados entre la Misión de Aid y la Dirección de Planificación Nacional.

Por el origen múltiple de las orientaciones, estas no podían ni debían ser muy precisas; sin embargo, las directrices resultantes procuraron satisfacer los requerimientos de los tres principales grupos de usuarios antes mencionados.

2.- La comunicación fue frecuente y continua entre los usuarios y los analistas, lo que contribuyó a clarificar muchos puntos oscuros. Sin embargo, las ciencias regionales están todavía en su período evolutivo, por lo que no era posible establecer pautas muy rígidas para el análisis. A esto se agrega la gran escasez de información cuantitativa que hacía que fueran cambiadas las metas iniciales de las investigaciones, con más frecuencia de lo conveniente.

3,4.- Con base a las experiencias de Costa Rica, Nicaragua y Panamá, así como a investigaciones realizadas por otros organismos en el campo urbano-regional, en América Latina, podrían establecerse lineamientos más precisos aunque siempre suficientemente flexibles.

TEMA "F" -- COMUNICACIONES DIRIGIDAS DEL ANALISTA A  
LOS CONSUMIDORES

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1. Qué resultados pensaban obtener los consumidores (o sea el gobierno y las agencias internacionales) del análisis al comenzar el proyecto?
  - a) Decisiones que estarían influenciadas?
  - b) Las metas de los consumidores para el AUR (qué se necesita para que el AUR sea satisfactorio?).
  - c) Limitaciones de las recomendaciones.
  - d) Métodos para la recolección de informes, análisis y presentación.
  - e) Tiempo y presupuesto
2. Qué ocurrió cuando el AUR intentó cambiar las metas originales de los consumidores?. Cómo se enteraron del cambio los consumidores?.
3. Qué problemas surgieron a raíz de un sistema de orientación/información/comunicación erróneo dirigido de los analistas urbanos y regionales hacia los consumidores?.
4. Teniendo en cuenta el beneficio que podría tener un examen retrospectivo, qué se podría haber hecho para evitar problemas o reducir la seriedad de los mismos? Queda algo por hacer ahora?
5. Existen recomendaciones más generales para mejorar AURs futuros?

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APPENDIX C

REPORT ON THE URBAN AND REGIONAL ASSESSMENT IN COSTA RICA  
(in Spanish)  
INFORME DEL A.U.R. DE COSTA RICA

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## INFORME DEL A.U.R DE COSTA RICA

Los apuntes siguientes constituyen un gui3n o breviarario de las actividades y de los principales resultados alcanzados en la elaboraci3n del documento "Urban Assessment" en Costa Rica.

De acuerdo al formato indicado por los organizadores del presente seminario, los puntos que se incluyen son los siguientes:

### 1.- Objetivos del An3lisis Urbano (AUR) de Costa Rica.

- a) Contribuir a definir el contexto dentro del cual se llevar3n a cabo el Proyecto de "Desarrollo Urbano" del gobierno en Costa Rica, cuyo objetivo b3sico de 3ste 3ltimo, es el mejoramiento de los niveles de ingreso y las condiciones de vida de los residentes de los tugurios m3s pobres de la aglomeraci3n metropolitana de San Jos3.
- b) Identificar los tipos y grados de pobreza, caracter3sticas de los grupos objeto del proyecto en los tugurios m3s pobres.

### 2.- Etapas de desarrollo del an3lisis urbano. (Se adjunta cronograma)

### 3.- Estado actual del documento

- a) Documento en ingl3s "Urban Assessment of San Jos3 Costa Rica. Focus on Poverty"; terminado; y virtualmente aprobado por OFIPLAN y A.I.D.
- b) Documento en espa3ol, "Pobreza y Desarrollo Urbano en Costa Rica": Se encuentra en la fase final de redacci3n. Se discutir3 a principios de Marzo en OFIPLAN.

4.- Resultados de mayor significación

A) Desde finales de la época colonial la mayor parte de la población de Costa Rica se encontraba asentada en un espacio que ocupa la séptima parte del territorio nacional. Tal concentración sin embargo, se ha modificado en períodos de tiempo sucesivos, generando procesos de atracción y expulsión de población sui generis. Del trayecto de tales procesos destacan actualmente tres fenómenos demográficos que conviene indicar:

- 1) La concentración de población en el Valle Central (espacio anteriormente aludido) ha crecido a ritmos relativamente inferiores a los que denotan otras regiones del país. Ello supone una expansión de la población nacional hacia otras zonas fuera del Valle Central, sin que se haya producido una disminución sustantiva en la densidad demográfica de esta región.
- 2) Dentro de la región del Valle Central se ha producido una concentración de población en el sub-espacio geográfico que constituye el área metropolitana de San José, cuyo crecimiento demográfico ha sido uno de los más altos del país hasta mediados de la década de los años sesenta.
- 3) Dentro de la región del Valle Central y rodeando prácticamente el área metropolitana, se ha formado un "cinturón" geodemográfico, cuyo ritmo de crecimiento acelerado se venía insinuando desde los años cincuenta, pero que no alcanza altos niveles sino hasta el comienzo de la presente década.

B) Las formas adoptadas por el crecimiento de población y su ubicación geográfica reciente permiten incorporar las nociones de "cinturón" y "aglomeración" al concepto de Area Metropolitana, a fin de localizar el espacio físico y económico en donde se encuentran las mayores densidades de población y en donde se ubican los segmentos de población en situación de pobreza. Dentro de la aglomeración metropolitana, el "cinturón" constituye la zona de mayor interés para la planificación del Desarrollo Urbano, por cuanto sus orígenes y su trayecto de desarrollo no sólo ha sido el producto de la concentración aludida, sino que además, de la expulsión de población del área metropolitana hacia su periferia (sub-urbanización).

C) En el crecimiento demográfico de la aglomeración metropolitana, las migraciones del Valle Central y del resto del país hacia el área y cinturón metropolitanos ha desempeñado un papel de primera magnitud, en un doble sentido:

a) Incrementando el volumen de población en forma aditiva y a ritmos crecientes desde 1950, según puede ilustrarse con las siguientes tasas geométricas por mil habitantes:

	1950-63	1963-73	1968-73
Area Metropolitana	10.0	14.9 ,	17.1
Cinturón del Area	4.3	8.6	10.0
Aglomeración Metropolitana	3.9	12.3	13.9

b) Potenciando el crecimiento vegetativo de la población, en virtud de las mayores tasas de fecundidad que reporta el caudal femenino de las corrientes migratorias, no obstante que la fecundidad general para la aglomeración metropolitana

en conjunto ha descendido.

- D. Las relaciones de causalidad entre movimientos migratorios y pobreza urbana no se manifiestan en forma directa ni se comprenden únicamente comparando algunas características socio-económicas entre migrantes y no migrantes, sino que se expresan como fuerzas sociales que modifican la composición y densidad demográfica de una región al margen de su condición de pobreza, pero al modificar tales parámetros, re definen las condiciones sociales de oferta y demanda de bienes y servicios, alteran do los esquemas de distribución establecidos y creando nuevas situaciones de movilidad económica y social que se articulan con los tipos de pobreza objeto de estudio.
- E. La comprensión de los movimientos migratorios de orientación campo-ciudad y dentro del radio de acción de la aglomeración metropolitana desde 1950 a la fecha, permite aprehender las diferencias que muestran los asentamientos de la pobreza urbana y detectar las posibilidades de acción para su superación. Entre los aspectos más relevantes de diferenciación de tales asentamientos, destacan los siguientes: Dimensiones de los asentamientos en forma "circunscrita", "diseminada" y "focal"; edad y duración del tipo de asentamiento; composición familiar, situación ocupacional, condiciones de organización interna, condiciones de subsistencia y de existencia etc. El análisis depurado de la información censal por segmentos específicos y de la encuesta efectuada a mediados de 1977 en esos mismos segmentos censales, muestran la pertinencia de la diferenciación aludida. Su demostración estadística sin embargo, está pendiente aún de realización.

- 5 -

- F) Aproximadamente el 20% de la población del área metropolitana se encuentra en el nivel de subsistencia (1.300¢ de ingreso); y el 36% en el nivel de pobreza (¢2.000). La concentración de la pobreza es mayor en la área de tugurios (32% en el nivel de subsistencia)
- E) Menos de una cuarta parte del total de la población pobre de San José vive en tugurios. Las otras 3/4 partes están distribuidas a lo largo del area metropolitana. Sin embargo los programas y políticas para ayudar a los pobres deben orientarse hacia los tugurios y deben ser finalmente volcados hacia las necesidades familiares e individuales.
- H) Las características demográficas, de empleo e ingreso de los pobres no varían mayormente entre los pobres de tugurios y de no tugurios.
- I) Los tugurios de Costa Rica están relativamente bien organizados y tienen capacidad de movilización por acciones colectivas. Además, unas 2/3 partes de las personas entrevista-as indicaron que podrían recurrir a los gobiernos locales o a canales políticos para acciones de justicia y reivindicación.
- J) Los programas de desarrollo de la comunidad deben engranarse (o montarse) como expresión de las necesidades de la comunidad y deben involucrar un considerable

- K) La situación de empleo en los tugurios está empeorando, especialmente es seria cuando se le compara con el ARea Metropolitana en conjunto, en donde la tasa de desempleo ha descendido (gradualmente) entre 1973 y 1977. Las tasas de desempleo alcanzó 25% y las de desempleo femenino 11% para los pobres del ARea Metropolitana.
- L) Solamente una secta parte de los residentes de los tugurios pueden ser clasificados como parte del sector de empleo informal, en , en donde el empleo es transitorio y el auto-empleo común. Por otra parte, las pequeñas empresas fueron como un importante fuente de empleo regular para los residentes de los tugurios.
- M) La mayor parte de los trabajadores ocupados (empleados) encuentran empleo por medio de la información informal, más que por medio de anuncios o servicio de empleo. Tal forma de acceder a la ocupación sin embargo, ha sido producido de una fuerte expresión de interés, y para muchos una expresión de necesidad, para sobrellevar un entrenamiento de trabajo adicional.
- N) Hay un número considerable de políticas de empleo que el gobierno puede usar para estimular la Demanda de trabajo (regulando el factor de precios, la tecnología intermedia al servicio público de empleo para el fuerte núcleo de mano de obra no calificada, y apoyando la intensificación de empresas de trabajadores propietarios), y el Suministro (oferta) de trabajo (fortaleciendo el servicio de empleo, instrumentando el aprendizaje en cursos cortos, y subsidiando el entrenamiento en servicio)
- Ñ) Nuevos mecanismos para la coordinación entre agencias de planificación y la localización de autoridad (por ej. devolución del poder efectivo para movilizar e integrar los recursos políticos con los recursos técnicos) se necesitarán para el desarrollo de los programas de pobreza urbana. Las lecciones pueden ser aprendidas

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SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

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en la extensa experiencia en las áreas rurales. Los nuevos mecanismos deben centrarse en la percepción de las necesidades de la pobreza de acuerdo a la máxima participación local.

- o) El problema de vivienda de los sectores pobres de nuestro país no se reduce únicamente a satisfacer una necesidad de techo y abrigo, sino que solo se puede enfrentar dentro del marco de una política socio-económica global que lo ataque desde todos los ángulos. Es indispensable tomar en cuenta una serie de características microsociales ligadas al hábitat o medio ambiente en que se desenvuelve la vida de los seres humanos: situación laboral y acceso a las fuentes de trabajo; nivel de ingresos, condiciones de vida y capacidad de ahorro, composición familiar y universo socio-cultural, posibilidades y acceso a servicios de educación capacitación, asistencia médica, transporte y comercio, facilidades ambientales, topográficas y de dotación de servicios de infraestructura, de los terrenos a urbanizar.
- p) El estado y condición de vivienda mejoró considerablemente durante el período inter-censal 1963-1973, siendo el Area Metropolitana la que se encuentra en mayores condiciones. Sin embargo, la situación de deterioro de los barrios marginales es muchísimo mayor, siendo el porcentaje de viviendas en mal y regular estado de un 68%, mucho más alto que el del Area Metropolitana en 1973, que fue de 35.1%.
- q) En lo que respecta al abastecimiento de los servicios públicos básicos la situación de los barrios marginales es muy similar a la que prevalece en el Area Metropolitana. Las diferencias significativas se encuentran en el disfrute individual o colectivo del servicio. Por ejemplo, en los barrios

marginales el 21% de las viviendas comparten su servicio sanitario, mientras que en el Area Metropolitana esta situación solo se da en el 8% de los casos.

4) El principal obstáculo que enfrenta Costa Rica para la adecuada atención del problema habitacional de los sectores pobres de nuestra población radica en la pésima distribución de los recursos financieros e institucionales que actualmente se invierten en el rubro de vivienda y no tanto en el monto de los mismos. El Programa Nacional de Vivienda que regirá para el quinquenio 1978-82, propone una tasa de crecimiento del sector vivienda, en términos reales del 8.3%, lo cual no significa un alza muy brusca con respecto a la tasa de crecimiento del quinquenio anterior, que fue del 5.4%. Sin embargo, los cambios importantes que este programa propone no se refieren tanto a una expansión financiera, sino a una total distribución de los recursos existentes y de la participación de las instituciones vivendistas en las soluciones habitacionales de bajo costo, de forma tal que se atiendan en forma prioritaria las necesidades habitacionales de las clases bajas y medias-bajas.

9) El suministro de una vivienda adecuada para los sectores de menores ingresos es solo una de las facetas de su situación de pobreza. En estos niveles el problema habitacional debe ser atacado desde todos sus ángulos, y para ello se propone toda una nueva política en los programas de vivienda que sustituya paulatinamente a las precedentes que básicamente se limita-

ba al suministro de una vivienda "mínima" con una subvención parcial o total; proceso en el cual la comunidad notaría la más mínima participación. Actualmente se está tratando de fortalecer un programa que lleva el nombre de PROVIS (Proceso Integrado de Vivienda de Interés Social) y que no cubre a familias aisladas, sino a grupos previamente organizados. El objetivo fundamental ya no se limita en dotar de albergue a las familias involucradas, sino que pretende ofrecerles, a través de un proceso de autoconstrucción y de ayuda mutua: a) la oportunidad de definir la solución habitacional que desean y de participar en la misma; b) la posibilidad de mejorar su situación económica mediante un proceso de capacitación en las técnicas de construcción, lo cual abrirá a algunos de sus miembros nuevos mercados de trabajo; c) los instrumentos indispensables para analizar la motivación inicial generada por la necesidad de vivienda, hacia otras actividades de interés comunal, promoviendo así el desarrollo de la comunidad antes, durante y después del proceso de construcción.

6) Las soluciones habitacionales <sup>HAN incluido</sup> ~~incluyen~~ pequeños y abruptos cambios en la vida de los residentes, ~~como se ve en el~~. En particular el mejoramiento de las estructuras existentes ha sido preferido sobre la demolición, transfiriéndose hacia nuevas áreas, o la construcción de grandes y nuevos proyectos habitacionales, los cuales no tienen la riqueza social y económica presentes en la auto-creación de los residentes. De ahí que constituya una necesidad establecer en una institución nacional de vivienda, un mecanismo de rehabilitación creciente para la extinción del tugurio y para el desarrollo de las soluciones mínimas habitacionales.

5.- PROBLEMAS ENCONTRADOS Y CAMBIOS EN LA PLANIFICACION ORIGINAL

- a) Extensión de contenido del AUR y escasa disponibilidad de tiempo. Aunque en condiciones óptimas, varias de las secciones aisladas del documento podrían haber sido elaboradas fácilmente (por ejemplo la sección I, tal cosa no ha sido posible si se querían alcanzar los objetivos establecidos por el AUR. De manera que el tiempo disponible resultó ser demasiado escaso, no solo por que consideramos que todas las secciones deberían converger, sustentar o explicar los rasgos de la pobreza en el Area Metropolitana y la Aglomeración Metropolitana (y en consecuencia, dependían de alguna manera de nueva información, ordenada en forma distinta a la que se encontraba en las publicaciones conocidas), sino además porque el abordaje científico de la temática nos exigió considerar la condición de pobreza en forma relativamente desagregada (en donde la pobreza no se aborda como un simple problema natural y homogéneo, cuyas características sólo se diferencian por los rasgos urbanos o rurales de los asentamientos humanos, sino que se le enfoca como una resultante del proceso de desarrollo de la sociedad costarricense, en el que existen varios tipos de pobreza que se superponen a la clásica diferenciación urbano-rural y que hipotéticamente corresponden a ciertos cambios dentro del proceso general).
- b) La conciliación entre un déficit de tiempo y el abordaje científico de la temática nos condujo a la decisión de elaborar dos tipos de documentos. El primero (ya terminado) responde a los requerimientos del Convenio entre la AID y el Gobierno de Costa Rica para efectuar el AUR, siguiendo en la medida de lo posible, la orientación taxonómica de Richard Rhoda, y bajo la supervisión de

Los Asesores Bruce Herrick y Barclay Hudson. El segundo, (aún no editado), corresponde a una interpretación más exhaustiva de las características de la pobreza, sus aspectos condicionantes de mayor significado explicativo y las posibilidades de acción para su control y mejoría.

- c) Aunque ambos documentos no se contraponen en los aspectos fundamentales, el segundo de ellos modifica algunas de las apreciaciones del primero, en lo referente a la demostración empírica de las funciones de la ciudad, los procesos migratorios y la diferenciación de los tipos de pobreza en las zonas deterioradas, objeto del análisis.

El segundo documento, por lo demás, incluye un amplio anexo estadístico de nueva información, cuyo contenido será objeto de análisis sistemático y de aplicación de ciertos modelos oportunamente.



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APPENDIX D

EVALUATION COMMENTS ON THE URBAN AND REGIONAL ASSESSMENT SEMINAR  
(in Spanish)

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EVALUACION DEL SEMINARIO SOBRE

ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL

San José, Costa Rica, 16-17 Febrero 1978

1. Qué opina Ud. sobre el Seminario en cuanto a las características siguientes:

	FUERTE- MENTE POSITIVO	+1	0	-1	FUERTE- MENTE NEGATIVO	SIN COMEN- TARIO
	+2				-2	
1.1. Los asuntos que yo considero importantes fueron tratados						
1.2. El Seminario a - provechó lo suficiente mis ideas y experiencias						
1.3. Aprendí algo valioso en el Seminario						
1.4. La evaluación mía en cuanto al Seminario, en general						

2. a) Cuáles fueron los aspectos de mayor provecho del Seminario.

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The scales run from plus two for strongly positive to minus two for strongly negative. "No comment" responses have been omitted. The responses of a Nicaraguan observer (-2, +2, -2, -2) have been excluded from the averages since his frame of reference was distinctly different from the seminar's intended outcomes. His comments are included in the Appendix.

b) Cuáles fueron los aspectos menos provechosos del Seminario?

3. Cuáles aspectos de análisis urbano y regional merecen mayor consideración?

4. a) Qué aprendió en el Seminario, que considera importante?

b) Qué piensa hacer diferente a raíz de haber asistido al Seminario?

## EVALUACION DEL SEMINARIO SOBRE

### ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL

#### 2.a. CUALES FUERON LOS ASPECTOS DE MAYOR PROVECHO DEL SEMINARIO?

1. Conocer las experiencias de otros países en los que se ha efectuado o efectuara el A.U.R.
2. Conocer las opiniones entre uso práctico del A.U.R. y necesidad de profundización.
3. Conocer las opiniones en torno al proceso de generación de orientaciones para la cooperación internacional y los requerimientos de cada país, objeto de ayuda.
4. Hasta el punto que se hizo, la discusión de experiencias específicas de cada país, y posibles soluciones a los problemas surgidos.
5. Lograr mayor flexibilidad por parte de AID para elaborar guías y solicitudes de crédito.
6. Presentaciones de los países.
7. La oportunidad de reunirse e intercambiar ideas.
8. La confirmación de que muchos de los problemas en general son comunes en los tres países respecto a los diferentes enfoques.
9. Los contactos personales entre los participantes.
10. El consenso de que debe considerarse a los guías con mucha flexibilidad y tratar de adaptar y adecuarlo a las necesidades particulares de cada país.
11. La forma franca y abierta como se trataron temas no siempre tocados.
12. La exploración exhaustiva de todos los temas.
13. Conocer y hablar con los participantes.
14. El conocimiento de otras experiencias en campos similares y los aspectos concretos que se lograron de la discusión de los 17 puntos.
15. El trabajo de grupo (por país) en el segundo día del Seminario.
16. La discusión en plenaria del trabajo realizado en el segundo día.

## Evaluación del Seminario

No. : 2

17. Coordinación interagencial.
18. Uso final del análisis.
19. Adaptación de las Pautas.
20. Involucración de los usuarios en el proceso de planificación.
21. Continuación del proceso al regreso al país de origen.
22. Conocer que los problemas particulares son compartidos por otros individuos.
23. Comprender que cada equipo de los países representados tuvieron problemas con la coordinación interinstitucional que en sí causa la preocupación.
24. Comprender que los planes no están basados en la realidad.
25. Comprender que en estos trabajos hay que : a) Involucrar a las agencias ejecutoras en el proceso. b) Hablar con el grupo subjetivo para conocer la realidad que ellos están viviendo. c) Canalizar y enfocar el plan hacia intervenciones específicas y constructivas, y d) Seguir el proceso de planificación mientras está ejecutando los proyectos siempre evaluando el ambiente cambiante y las actividades.
26. Intercambio personal de ideas y experiencias con varios de los participantes en momentos informales.
27. Divulgación de material técnico.
28. Conversaciones sobre aspectos técnicos por los subgrupos de los diversos países.
29. El intercambio de experiencias vividas en cada uno de los países, y la diferencia de enfoque de un o unos problemas comunes en Centro América : desequilibrios regionales, marginalidad, el desempleo, y la falta de una filosofía del desarrollo, o sea, del mejoramiento del nivel de vida tanto del campo como de la ciudad.
30. La oportunidad de conocer las diferentes experiencias.
31. La oportunidad de discutir en detalle el proceso de desarrollo urbano/regional llevados a cabo por otros países en años recientes.
32. Problemas encontrados, opciones seguidas, selecciones posteriores.
33. Estructura de gobiernos nacionales vs. desarrollo urbano/regional.

Evaluación del Seminario

No. : 3

34. Utilidad de varios tipos de análisis.
35. Enlace con planeamiento y problemas en sí.
36. El beneficio secundario de conocer un cierto número de personas con las que se puedan intercambiar ideas y/o pedir asistencia.
37. Demostración de que el Método o Guía Rhoda no puede ser discutida en el abstracto, pero solamente con respecto a circunstancias de países particulares.
38. Demostración de que las guías deberían ser o estar escritas parcialmente en contextos particulares.
39. Confirmación de que el diálogo con los pobres es deseable, también de que lo anterior posiblemente nunca sucederá con U.R.A., a menos que guías modificadas sean escritas haciendo métodos "no-tradicionales" como este mandatorios.

## EVALUACION DEL SEMINARIO SOBRE

### ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL

#### 2.b. CUALES FUERON LOS ASPECTOS MENOS PROVECHOSOS DEL SEMINARIO?

1. No centrar la discusión en uno o dos temas fundamentales, tales como la continuidad del proceso de análisis futuro.
2. No escuchar las observaciones de Rhoda.
3. El marco de referencia para la discusión del primer día, el cuál fue muy confuso.
4. Falta de enfoque esporádicamente.
5. El desenfoque en la consideración de los temas que se rprodujo el primer día.
6. La aparente confusión en el alcance de estudios y análisis urbano-regionales y la participación de la población más marginada.
7. Desorientación del primer día.
8. Poca oportunidad para aprender más y en detalle, del análisis de tres países (limitación de tiempo).
9. Deficiencia en la preparación del Seminario reflejada en las sesiones del primer día.
10. En la práctica, los informes sobre las experiencias de los países participantes solo se consiguieron el segundo día.
11. Demasiada discusión de problemas de los Asesores.
12. Demasiada discusión de la profundidad del análisis.
13. Desconocimiento del objetivo del Seminario.
14. Notoria falta de comunicación entre los edificantes del proyecto y los beneficiarios.
15. Poco aprendizaje sobre los diagnósticos de Panamá y Costa Rica.
16. El Seminario debió haber sido más estructurado para facilitar no solo el debate sino el flujo de información.
17. El numeroso grupo evitó fomentar el debate por un tiempo prolongado.
18. Falta de visión global en algunos enfoques.

## Evaluación del Seminario

No. : 2

19. Sectorialismo.
20. No se comprendió la intensión del análisis urbano-regional.
21. Falta de claridad en la especificación del concepto del propósito y de necesidades dentro del Seminario.
22. Falta de planeación del primer día.
23. Las preguntas para los grupos de trabajo fueron pobremente definidas conduciendo a discusiones sin sentido.
24. Los grupos de trabajo estuvieron mejor constituidos en el segundo día de reuniones, produciendo una provechoza "mezcla" de técnicos y de instructores.
25. Poca participación o exposición de la experiencia colombiana.
26. Sugerencia : envió de material a participantes con anterioridad al Seminario.
27. Demasiada descripción de los acontecimientos de cada país, y escasez de planeamiento para la actualidad.
28. Excesivo enfoque en problemas sectoriales, sin miramiento a inter-relaciones entre problemas - el cuál constituye la idea de U.R.A. (una visión analítica/ecológica de sistemas) .
29. El problema básico del tema de la pobreza y el diseño de soluciones.
30. El uso del Seminario por otros participantes como ocasión para dar "sermones" y exhortar a otros participantes a acciones de cuyo valor ya se tenía conciencia con anterioridad.
31. El uso del Seminario por varios participantes para desplegar or relucir su propia imagen, entre estos : Científicos, Humanistas, Planeadores con orientación en acción, etc.

## EVALUACION DEL SEMINARIO SOBRE

### ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL

3. CUALES ASPECTOS DE ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL MERECE MAYOR CONSIDERACION?
  1. Medios para una mejor participación inter-istitucional y mayor grado de participación de grupos.
  2. Mayor consideración de las dimensiones políticas del desarrollo dentro del contexto del país de objeto vs. planeamiento urbano/regional.
  3. Metodología para integrar en una forma útil los resultados de múltiples clases de análisis llevados a cabo en desarrollo urbano/regional.
  4. El objeto del análisis mismo : naturaleza y características de la pobreza y las posibilidades efectivas de disminución.
  5. El grado de asistencia técnica que A.I.D. debe invertir en un análisis (mínimo) y el grado hasta el cuál el análisis debe expresar los valores, deseos y esfuerzos de los países.
  6. Definirse en cuanto a : inducir cambios en los modelos de desarrollo, en lugar de enseñar a convivir con los problemas a costos muy elevados y que se tornarán incosteables en el futuro.
  7. Sistemas de Financiación.
  8. Papel del sector privado.
  9. En cuanto a las Pautas, integrar en capítulos más comprensivos aquellos aspectos que tienen mayor afinidad.
  10. Elaborar y anexar alternativas metodológicas o sugerencias en cuanto a cómo integrar las diferentes análisis identificados en las Pautas en un análisis integral y especialmente relevante.
  11. Los análisis intraurbanos tales como mercados de la tierra y la vivienda, sector informal, etc.
  12. Analizar las causas de la pobreza en cada país, más de las características externas de ésta.
  13. La relación con los documentos de A.I.D. y el proceso de planificación de cada país.
  14. En cada país se tienen situaciones especiales, lo cuál no permite hacer generalizaciones.
  15. Profundidad en los estudios e investigaciones.

Evaluación del Seminario

No. : 2

16. La necesidad de un intercambio periódico de experiencias.
17. El estudio de las contradicciones entre la teoría y la práctica.
18. La coordinación y cooperación entre las diferentes entidades.
19. Coordinación interagencial.
20. Uso final del análisis.
21. Inclusión de beneficiarios en el proceso de planificación.
22. La comunicación o "feedback" entre beneficiarios y planificadores, entre los gobiernos y los que esbozan el plan y los que lo ponen en acción.
23. Los tipos de intervenciones específicas y el impacto potencial de estos proyectos.
24. Las prioridades, deseos y necesidades del grupo objetivo.
25. El análisis del sistema de regiones de cada país.
26. Consideración del grado de desarrollo de cada país.
27. Estudio de las causas de la migración y sus efectos en el desarrollo urbano-regional.
28. Revista de teorías de causas de pobreza.
29. Breve inventario de ejemplos de exitosas intervenciones en casos de pobreza, tanto a nivel mundial, como en cada uno de los países estudiados.
30. Las teorías de orígenes y mantenimiento de pobreza urbana.
31. La pregunta de por qué nosotros pensamos que sabemos lo que sabemos acerca del fenómeno (epistemología, pero no necesita que se le llame por ese nombre repulsivo)
32. Los problemas de medidas asociados con estadísticas regionalmente desagregadas.

## EVALUACION DEL SEMINARIO SOBRE

### ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL

#### 4.a. QUE APRENDIO EN EL SEMINARIO, QUE CONSIDERA IMPORTANTE?

1. El descubrimiento de que muchas de mis inquietudes e intereses son compartidos por otros y merecen estudios más profundos.
2. La idea de la continuación del análisis.
3. El desarrollo práctico de la comunicación entre técnicos y autoridades de agencias.
4. Muy poco.
5. Que no todas las cosas son perfectas, y que, aun en A.I.D., con grandes recursos técnicos y financieros, cometen errores.
6. Que hay confusión a veces entre los papeles de planificadores nacionales, asesores, agencias internacionales, respecto al propósito de un diagnóstico urbano.
7. Que muchos de los problemas se repiten en varios países, pese a sus diferencias.
8. Detalles y estrategias diferentes de los tres países.
9. Los debates que se dieron en torno a las experiencias de cada país, clarificaron dudas existentes. También abre nuevas oportunidades para el seguimiento de nuevos estudios, puesto que la planificación es un proceso.
10. Profundidad en los estudios e investigaciones.
11. La necesidad de utilizar las Pautas de la Agencia que financiará los proyectos.
12. La necesidad de la participación de la comunidad en las labores de identificación de sus problemas.
13. El valor de marcar claramente la diferencia entre el análisis regional y el estudio por un proyecto específico, o sea la profundidad de la investigación no debe ser igual.
14. La importancia de la coordinación inter-institucional.
15. Que no hay un proceso o Pauta ideal para llevar a cabo este tipo de diagnóstico.
16. Algunos aspectos muy específicos y bastante técnicos en respecto al proceso de planificación urbano-regional en Panamá.
17. Es necesario hacer los análisis urbano-regionales en cada país centroamericano, independiente de algunos sectores ya anali-

Evaluación del Seminario

No. : 2

dos, para tener una inter-relación sectorial, socioeconómica para llegar a mejores soluciones.

## EVALUACION DEL SEMINARIO SOBRE

### ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL

#### 4.b. QUE PIENSA HACER DIFERENTE A RAIZ DE HABER ASISTIDO AL SEMINARIO?

1. Iniciar discusiones en la Misión y GOP superando varios aspectos y considerando otros tipos de análisis que pueden ser empleados útilmente; discutir la posibilidad de grupos de desarrollo regional -para disminuir la tendencia fuerte a planeamiento central.
2. Continuar elaborando problemas y proposiciones en torno a esta temática, para profundizar en la construcción de una tipología.
3. Esperar que A.I.D. o Washington indique sus intereses acerca del proceso de investigación (interesa o no interesa?)
4. Probablemente nada.
5. Dar fuerza o crear una unidad en mi institución, para aprovechar el estudio urbano-regional elaborado en Nicaragua.
6. Recomendar claras definiciones de política, estrategia, proyecto, etc.
7. Nada.
8. Cuando participe en otro estudio análisis-regional, enfatizar mas los analisis socio-antropológicos!
9. Continuar la concientización de funcionarios de gobierno para que ellos mismos apoyen y generen nuevas inquietudes. Crear un comité de trabajo interagencial a fin de intercambiar ideas que ayuden a agilizar la generacion de nuevos proyectos y su futura implementación.
10. Continuaría en la misma forma.
11. Nada : he reforzado mis ideas de hacer más participativa a la gente objetiva.
12. Seguir en el esfuerzo de fomentar la cooperación entre las entidades del gobierno Nicaraguense a nivel interdisciplinario, además tratar de hacer lo mismo en la Misión de AID.
13. Continuar la implementación de los lineamientos encontrados a través de una coordinación interagencial del Gobierno de Nicaragua.
14. Seré mas conciente y sensitivo a los conceptos prácticos que envuelven al U.R.A. y a la poca simpatía hacia la "teoría" expresada por los usuarios.

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GLOSARIO

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## ANÁLISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

### GLOSARIO\*

<u>ESPAÑOL</u>	<u>INGLES</u>
alimentación y vivienda	food and shelter
análisis sectorial	sector analysis
Análisis Urbano y Regional(AUR)	Urban and Regional Analysis (URA)
asentamiento de precaristas	squatter settlement
asignaciones presupuestarias oficiales	government budget allocations
-----	
bienes de capital	capital assets
bienes puestos a la venta	commodities
-----	
censo	census
centros de crecimiento y servicio	growth and service centers
Centro Internacional de Programas Estadísticos de la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU.	International Statistical Program Center of the U.S. Bureau of Census (ISPC)
coeficiente de gastos ingresos	expenditure to collection ratio
comportamiento social	social behavior behavior patterns
consumo proteínico	protein intake
-----	
demanda mínima	minimum (threshold) demand
desarrollo	development
Documento de Identificación Previa al Proyecto (PID)	Project Identification Document (PID)
-----	
emigración	out-migration

\*Palabras de Fautas para el Análisis Urbano y Regional por Richard Rhoda

ANÁLISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

GLOSARIO\*

<u>ESPAÑOL</u>	<u>INGLÉS</u>
emigrantes	migrantes
empleo urbano	urban employment
encuestas muestrales de unidades familiares	household sample surveys
espacial, dimensión	spatial dimension
evaluación de la pobreza urbana	urban poverty assessment
expectativa de vida	life expectancy
-----	
fuentes de datos	data sources
-----	
gastos públicos	government expenditures
-----	
indicadores sociales urbanos	urban social indicators
índice de alfabetización	literacy rate
Informes de Proyectos	Project Papers (PP)
informes oficiales	government reports
Informe Sobre Examen de Proyecto	Project Review Paper
ingreso per capita	per capita income
ingresos	revenues
inmigración	in-migration
-----	
Ley de Ayuda Exterior	Foreign Assistance Act
Línea pobreza	poverty line
-----	

\*Palabras de Pautas para el Análisis Urbano y Regional por Richard Rhoda

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## ANÁLISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

### GLOSARIO\*

<u>ESPAÑOL</u>	<u>INGLES</u>
mano de obra	labor
materias primas	raw materials
multirregionales	multiregional
-----	
normas mínimas	minimum standards
-----	
ocupaciones de bajos ingresos	low-income occupations
Organización Internacional de Trabajo (OIT)	International Labor Organization (ILO)
-----	
pautas	guidelines
Plan de Asistencia para el Desarrollo	Development Assistance Plan (DAP)
polos de crecimiento	growth poles
productos	outputs
programas integrados de desarrollo regional	integrated regional development programs
promedio	average
pueblos de servicio rural	rural service towns
-----	
renta nacional	national income
-----	
subempleo	underemployment
sectorial, el método	sector approach
sequía	drought
Sistema Nacional Uniforme de Clasificación Industrial	Uniform National Industrial Classification System

\*Palabras de Pautas para el Análisis Urbano y Regional por Richard Rhoda

ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

GLOSARIO\*

ESPAÑOL

INGLES

tasas de fecundidad

fertility rates

tendencias de la pobreza

poverty trends

territorios circundantes

rural hinterlands

vecindarios

neighborhoods

vínculos

linkages

\*Palabras de Pautas para el Análisis Urbano y Regional por Richard Rhoda

ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

GLOSARIO\*

<u>INGLES</u>	<u>ESPAÑOL</u>
capital assets	bienes de capital
census	el censo
commodities	los bienes puestos a la venta
-----	
data sources	fuentes de datos
development	desarrollo
Development Assistance Plan (DAP)	Plan de Asistencia para el Desarrollo
drought	sequía
-----	
fertility rates	tasas de fecundidad
food and shelter	alimentación y vivienda
Foreign Assistance Act	La Ley de Ayuda Exterior
-----	
government budget allocations	las asignaciones presupuestarias oficiales
government expenditures	gastos públicos
government reports	informes oficiales
growth and service centers	los centros de crecimiento y servicio
growth poles	polos de crecimiento
guidelines	pautas
-----	
hinterlands, rural	territorios circundantes
household sample surveys	las encuestas muestrales de unidades familiares
-----	

\*Palabras de Pautas para el Análisis Urbano y Regional por Richard Rhoda

ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

GLOSARIO\*

<u>INGLES</u>	<u>ESPAÑOL</u>
in-migration	inmigración
integrated regional development programs	los programas integrados de desarrollo regional
International Labor Organization (ILO)	Organización Internacional de Trabajo (OIT)
International Statistical Program Center of the U.S. Bureau of Census (ISPC)	El Centro Internacional de Programas Estadísticos de la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU.
-----	
labor	mano de obra
life expectancy	la expectativa de vida
linkages	vínculos
literacy rate	el índice de alfabetización
low-income occupations	ocupaciones de bajos ingresos
-----	
migrants	emigrantes
minimum standard	las normas mínimas
minimum (threshold) demand	la demanda mínima (umbral)
multiregional	multirregionales
-----	
national income	renta nacional
neighborhoods	vecindarios, barrios
-----	
out-migration	emigración
outputs	productos
-----	

\*Palabras de Pautas para el Análisis Urbano y Regional por Richard Rhoda

ANALISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

GLOSARIO\*

<u>INGLES</u>	<u>ESPAÑOL</u>
per capita income	ingreso per capita
poverty line	la línea pobreza
poverty trends	la tendencias de la pobreza
primate city	la ciudad principal
Project Identification Document (PID)	Documento de Identificación Previa al Proyecto
Project Papers (PP)	Informes de Proyectos
Project Review Papers (PRP)	Informe sobre Examen de Proyecto
protein intake	el consumo proteínico
-----	
ratios of expenditures to collection	coeficiente de gastos ingresos
raw materials	materias primas
revenues	ingresos
-----	
sector analysis	análisis sectorial
sector approach	el método sectorial
Shelter Sector Analysis	Análisis Sectorial de Vivienda
social behavior patterns	comportamiento social
spatial analysis	análisis espacial
spatial dimensions	dimensión espacial
squatter settlement	un asentamiento precaristas
-----	

\*Palabras de Pautas para el Análisis Urbano y Regional por Richard Rhoda

ANÁLISIS URBANO Y REGIONAL SEMINARIO

GLOSARIO\*

<u>INGLES</u>	<u>ESPAÑOL</u>
towns, rural service	pueblos de servicio rural
-----	
underemployment	subempleo
Uniform National Industrial Classification System	el Sistema Nacional Uniforme de Clasificación Industrial
Urban and Regional Analysis (URA)	Análisis Urbano y Regional (AUR)
urban employment	empleo urbano
Urban Poverty Assessment	Evaluación de la Pobreza Urbana
urban-social indicators	los indicadores sociales urbanos
-----	
well-being	bienestar
-----	

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