War Destroys, Peace Nurtures

Somali Reconciliation and Development

Edited by
Richard Ford
Hussein M. Adam
and Edna Adan Ismail

RSP

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The Red Sea Press, Inc.

Publishers & Distributors of Third World Books

11-D Princess Road
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648

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First Printing 2004

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Cover design: Roger Dormann

Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from Library of Congress

ISBN 1-56902-186-4 (Hardcover)
ISBN 1-56902-187-2 (Paperback)

In Memoriam

We pay particular respect to two presenters during the 8th Congress, both of whom passed away over the last year. His Excellency President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, President of the Somaliland Republic, opened the congress on July 4, 2001. The date was exactly 225 years to the day after Thomas Jefferson and others signed the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia. That declaration opened a new chapter in governance models that has had far reaching impact on millions, perhaps billions of people across the centuries and across the globe. In like manner, President Egal's brief opening address called for the combined wisdom of the assembled greater Somali community to focus attention on solving problems of the current decade. He cited the border difficulties with Djibouti at the time and described how a delegation was being assembled to solve the problem. The border was reopened four months later, after the delegations had met and resolved their differences.

New chapters are opening in Africa's 21st century. Three decades ago, visionaries were calling for a new post-colonial style of PanAfricanism. Two decades ago African governance was defined as a combination of African nationalism and African socialism. Policies in the 1990s shifted to a move toward increased privatization.

What will be the common themes of the first decade of the 21st century? Some suggest that it will be new and creative forms of decentralization, not necessarily cast in European federalism or confederalism, but instead, thinking about forms of decentralization that combine the wisdom of traditional institutions such as clan elders, sheiks, chiefs, and local councils with newer visions incorporating women, the landless, minorities, and immigrants. Questions of suffrage, accountability, separation of powers, checks and balances, and due process can follow.

President Egal took the first steps in the bold experiment of leading the Republic of Somaliland toward some of these principles. Though his vision is still evolving and his dreams cut short in May 2002, his precedents of listening to the people, initiating an unprecedented national referendum (May 2001), and establishing succession procedures that have worked as peacefully as any nation in the world will not be lost on the molding of African governance in the 21st century.

Delegates of the SSIA lost a second colleague. Ahmed Yusuf Farah was one of the most eminent Somali anthropologists of his generation. A student of the venerable I. M. Lewis, Ahmed Farah had toiled in the field of anthropology with an eye to the meaning of his discipline for the people. He was, for years, an advocate for finding alternative modes of governance that were compatible with African values. He devoted the last ten years of his professional career to a search for modes of reconciliation that were consistent with the attitudes and cultural beliefs of the Somali people. He was part of the now famous Naivasha Conference (1994) in which alternative models of decentralization were explored. The meeting resulted in the often-referenced "menu" for different approaches to bring peace with justice to Somalia. He was not satisfied with simply describing models and choices to carry forward his research. He moved beyond theory and was constantly looking for practical applications of his work. His research with the Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development is reflected in his contribution to the 8th Congress (Chapter 8, "Assessing Reconciliation Initiatives by the Transitional National Government After the Arta Peace Process").

In the readings and addresses in this volume, the words of President Egal and Ahmed Yusuf Farah appear as they were presented at the 8th Congress in July 2001.

Foreword

War Destroys: Peace Nurtures (*Colaad Waa Lagu Dhintaa: Nabad Waa Lagu Dhaqmaa)* presents selected papers from the 8th Congress of the Somali Studies International Association, held in Hargeisa, Somaliland in July 2001. The papers represent responses from academics, government officers, Somalis from all parts of the former Somalia as well as from the diaspora, international agencies, and development practitioners to the themes of the Congress: Peace, Governance, and Reconstruction for all Somalis. Topics range from poetry to HIV/AIDS, economics to engineering, and women's issues to clan politics.

The Congress was special in many ways. It was the first major international conference to be held in Somalia/Somaliland since the collapse of the Siyad government in 1991. While it was a challenge to host the 400 delegates (100 from outside Hargeisa), the logistical details and local arrangements worked extremely well, in part due to the gracious hospitality that the Hargeisa hosts provided. Second, most focused on one or another aspect of the unprecedented challenges facing the Somali people to restore peace and rebuild the infrastructure.

Several themes emerged as the Congress progressed. The title of this book, based on an old Somali proverb, *Colaad Waa Lagu Dhintaa: Nabad Waa Lagu Dhaqmaa*, represents the mood of the delegates. War does destroy; peace does nurture. Raising children in an atmosphere of war leads to attitudes of clan retribution and confrontation - both values that have had catastrophic results for the Somali people. Raising children in a climate of peace enables them to think about and learn skills for livelihood enhancement, language, creativity, and caring for human well-being.

Another persistent topic is decentralization. The previous decade has taught virtually all Somalis that they do not wish to return to a strong centralized government. What is less clear is what type and structure of decentralization will provide optimal and effective governance and enable all Somalis to live in peace.

Still another theme probes the nature and shape of the years ahead. Will diaspora Somalis come home again and, if so, how will they integrate into the new Somali society? Will those now in refugee camps be able to

rebuild the lives they left behind a decade ago? What will become of the old cultural values and traditions in the new Somali society? What will be the role of women? How will institutions of accountability take hold? And how will social and human services be managed? At present there are at least three experiments in governance underway – the Transitional National Government (TNG), Puntland, and Somaliland. What lessons do these experiences teach that will enable all Somalis to lead productive, secure, and culturally meaningful lives in the years ahead?

A final theme is one of translating theory into action. While many congresses such as this one invest much time talking, there are not always opportunities to focus on taking action. In the 8th Congress, several presentations dealt with putting theory into practice and taking action. From agriculture to livestock to health to community participation to conflict mediation to women's enterprise, there was considerable attention to sharing experiences on what had worked well in recent years and how lessons might be drawn from these experiences.

These chapters offer no blueprint about what may transpire in the years ahead. Rather, they assess the recent past and suggest questions to consider and policies to evaluate for the future.

Acknowledgments

The Somali Studies International Association (SSIA) is grateful to many, many friends and colleagues who made the remarkable 8th Congress possible. We must start by expressing both our thanks and respect to the late H.E. President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal for hosting the 8th Congress in Somaliland. He helped with costs of local arrangements and hosted a state banquet for international delegates. We extend our appreciation to the many government offices, ministries, and agencies that provided assistance.

We next wish to thank the University of Hargeisa for providing a meeting facility and technical support for communications, a small clinic, meeting rooms, and a site for leisurely exchanges among delegates. No less helpful was Amoud University for giving its technical support and for its assistance with the field trips, for hosting a luncheon, and for providing key presentations and interventions during the congress itself.

We wish to express profound gratitude to the members of the Preparatory Committee as well as to Hargeisa individuals and institutions for their generosity in contributing time and effort to assure the success of this congress. The Committee met regularly and frequently to work out details for local arrangements including lodging, meeting rooms, flight arrivals, shuttle transport in town, field trips, visas, special receptions and banquets, program planning, and other details to make the congress a success. The Committee benefitted considerably from staff made available from Project Hope as well as the wonderful group of student nurses from the Edna Adan Hospital. To all of these individuals, we say thank you.

We also wish to extend our thanks to the many local artists and performers who did so much to make evenings enjoyable for the delegates. Acrobats, dancers, singers, and also those who prepared the food deserve special mention for the many hours they spent looking after our needs at the splendid cultural programs and presentations. We also are indebted to the poets, featured in Section One of this book. Their sessions were by far the best attended of the entire congress and the camaraderie that followed from their panels memorable.

We cannot fail to pay special tribute to many local businesses that contributed renovations for the meeting rooms, transport to and from the

airport, briefcases for each delegate, shipping and discounted airfares for the travelers, and telephones for the steering committee. These companies have brought great energy to the revival of the local economy and are a major part of the rehabilitation underway in the private sector. They include: Aerolite, Dahabshil, Barakaat, Damal Airlines, Soltelco, STC, Star Pharmacy, and Daallo Airlines.

We must also mention several of the local NGOs that provided direct financial assistance, such as International Cooperation for Development, or indirect assistance by way of loaning equipment, preparing reports and presentations, and loaning vehicles.

In closing, we take a special moment to thank the United States Agency for International Development (US-AID) for the technical and financial support that has made this congress possible. Their assistance enabled many delegates from the Horn to travel to the congress, helped paint and renovate the meeting rooms, covered costs of communication and preparation, and subsidized costs of this publication. Without their help, it would have been very difficult to conduct the congress.

For these many types and levels of assistance, and on behalf of the entire membership of the congress, we say thank you.

Edna Adan Ismail, President, SSIA
Richard Ford, Committee member
Hussein Adam, Founding President, SSIA

Table of Contents

In Memoriam iii

Foreword v

Acknowledgments vii

Table of Contents ix

Introduction xvi

Opening Address: H. E. President Mohamed Egal xviii

Convener's Address: Chair of the Somali Studies International Association, Minister Edna Adan Ismail xx

Section One: Language and Literature 1

1. Poems of Peace and Reconciliation – Poets 3

2. A Somali Dictionary – Salah Hashi Arab 35

3. Somali Syntax: Some Common Features – Mohamed Haji Rabi 41

4. Towards the Paremiological Minimum of the Somali Language – G. Kapchits 59

5. A Comparison of the Oral Poetic Styles of Performance Between Somali and Mande Traditions – John William Johnson 71

Section Two: History and the State **89**

6. Analysis of Election Procedures – Honorable Abdilqadir Haji Ismail Jirdeh 91

7. Choosing Democracy: Institutional Alternatives for Somalia – Matt Bryden 99

8. Assessing Reconciliation Initiatives by the Transitional National Government After the Arta Peace Process – Ahmed Yusuf Farah 117

9. Traditional Leaders in Political Decision Making and Conflict Resolution – Abdurahman A. Osman - Shuke 147

10. Somaliland's Quest for Recognition – Jama Sweden 169

11. Reflections on Somaliland and Africa's Territorial Order – Ian S. Spears 179

Section Three: The War **193**

12. The Siyad Barre Regime's Genocide of the Somaliland People – H. A. A. Aideed 195

13. Landmines and Landmine Policy in the Horn of Africa – Ahmed H. Esa, 203

14. Violence and Humanitarian Aid in Southern and Central Somalia – Joakim Gundel 211

Section Four: Refugees and the Diaspora **229**

15. The Role of Diaspora Communities in Homeland Development – Lee Cassanelli 231

16. Two Interdependent Global Problems: Refugees and Environment – Tiina Salmio 239

17. Quests for Refuge, Quests for Therapy – Debra A. Budiani 251

18. Identity Constructions and Living Conditions of Somali Refugees in Egypt – Gudrun K. Kroner 261

19. Diaspora and Everyday Islam – Marja Tiilikainen 269

Section Five: Education and Islam 279

20. Education in Somaliland – Ahmed Yusuf Duale 281

21. Investing in Teachers and other Professional Educators – Jama Musse Jama 285

22. Professional Association Contributions to Post-War Reconstruction – Idris Abdilahi Ibrahim 293

23. The Role of Islam in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution in Somalia – Khalif H. Farah 301

24. Islamization and Democratization of Somaliland Politics – Jama Gabush 315

Section Six: Reconciliation and Development 325

25. Reconciling Integration With Development – Abdulkadir Osman Farah 327

26. Participatory Tools for Peace Building – Richard Ford and Adan Abokor 341

27. The Livelihoods Gap – Andre LeSage and Nisar Majid 367

28. Can Clan Representation Contribute to Rebuilding 21st Century Somalia? – Fowsia Abdulkadir 391

29. Background Information on the Bantu Community in Somalia – Hussein M. Muse (Bantu) 397

Section Seven: Women's Roles 403

30. Women's Roles in The Economy: Informal Sector Activities in Hargeisa – Hawa I. Koshen 405

31. Rights for Women and Children – Fatima Saeed/Ibrahim 423

32. Women's Rights in Somaliland and Their Role in Reconciliation and Peace Making – Nagaad 429

33. The Negative Impact of *Qat* on Somali Society – Qania Aden 435

Section Eight: Environment 445

34. The State of the Somaliland Environment – Mohamed Muse Awaleh 447

35. How Safe Are Somali Water Sources? – Noah Arre 453

36. The Environmental Impact of the Somali Livestock Ban – Mowlid Mohamoud Ibrahim 461

37. An Integrated Approach to Food Security in Somaliland – S. Benedettelli, V. Vecchio, M Manzelli, Ali Ismail, and L. Cavestro 465

Section Nine: Health and Well-Being **463**

38. HIV and TB Co-infection in Borama TB Hospital, Somaliland – Ahmed Omar Askar and Abdisalaam Jama Ibrahim 475

39. Gynecological and Obstetrical Complications of Female Genital Mutilation in Somaliland – Edna Adan Ismail 481

40. Practicing *SAAR* – Student Nurses 493

41. Human Development in Somalia 2001: An Overview – Mark Bradbury and Ken Menkhaus 497

Notes **515**

#1.Comments on the Work of Horn of Africa Relief and Development Organization 515
#2. Comments on the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy 517
#3 Miracles of Adult Literacy 519

References and Bibliography 521

Index **541**

Introduction

The Somali Studies International Association (SSIA) is among the oldest and most durable professional societies in tropical Africa. Founded in 1978 in Baltimore (USA) at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association (ASA), the SSIA has held congresses at regular intervals for almost 25 years.

The first congress took place in Mogadishu (1980), the second in Hamburg (1983), the third in Rome (1986), the fourth in Mogadishu (1989), the fifth in Worcester, Massachusetts, USA (1993), the sixth in Berlin (1996), an extraordinary congress at Turku, Finland (1998), the seventh in Toronto (1999). The eighth (July 2001) was held in Hargeisa, Somaliland. Proceedings from most of these congresses have been published, some of which are still available.

It is helpful to recall the goals of the SSIA, as set out in the Baltimore meeting that led to the establishment of the association:

- to promote scholarly research, both within and outside Somalia, in all areas and disciplines within the social sciences, natural sciences, and humanities;

- to encourage international cooperation and to facilitate the exchange of ideas among scholars engaged in research on Somalia and the Horn of Africa;

- to organize international congresses on Somali studies and periodic panels at meetings of national and international associations and organizations;

- to provide the general public with information on historical, cultural, and contemporary issues in the Horn of Africa.

Given the events of the last decade, goal number 2 (to encourage international cooperation) has received more attention than in earlier years.

For example, during the 8th Congress:

- a delegate from Mogadishu reported on preserving books from a university library in Mogadishu. He is establishing an archive of the events of Somalia's experience in the 1990s. As a result of the congress, he has linked up with an American professor who manages one of the world's largest archives of Somali cultural materials, poetry, and artifacts. A growing partnership now exists because of this 8th SSIA Congress;

- another American professor is expanding collaboration with several Somali colleagues and local NGOs through contacts established at the congress. The goal is to develop new tools of peace building and reconciliation among the many villages and pastoral communities in the region;

- a delegation came from South Africa to meet with colleagues from the Horn of Africa. They were able to compare experiences in reconciliation from these two different regions of Africa;

- women from the region and other parts of Africa read papers and shared their research findings about women mobilizing local groups and impacting policy and practice in micro-enterprise and peace building in many countries;

- still another series of contacts and potential alliances for research and action loom on the horizon in the important health fields of HIV/AIDS treatment as well as FGM.

For these and related initiatives, we are grateful. It is the hope of the SSIA that this publication will lead to more links between theory and action as well as a more stable and productive governance structure(s) for all the Somali people.

The Editors

Opening Address

Editor's note: *Less than a year after opening the 8th SSIA Congress, H. E. President Egal died of complications from an illness. We include his brief opening address, in part because he opened the Congress. But we also include it because his spirit of reconciliation is embodied in his remarks. Discussions with Djibouti did open shortly after the 8th Congress and in November, the border between Djibouti and Somaliland reopened. This action is a good example of how international gatherings such as the congress help to draw attention and focus activities on themes that the Congress Steering Committee had identified, in this case, reconciliation.*

Opening Address for the 8th Congress of the
Somali Studies International Association
H.E. President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal

Ladies and Gentlemen:

You are going to have your fill of speeches during your conference and therefore I am not going to burden you with a lengthy discourse about something which I know nothing about.

My task here is to welcome you all, to extend a warm welcome to those of you who came from abroad, and especially to extend an official and very, very warm welcome to Somaliland for all of the non-Somali participants of this conference.

It is beyond any doubt that the people of this country are capable of managing their own affairs, of living together with their neighbors in friendship, in peace, in understanding, and in cooperation, with the single exception of the Republic of Djibouti. We are trying to start an initiative of mending fences, of repairing damages, of replanting the cooperation and brotherhood which had existed between this country and Djibouti for a long time, and especially since achieving independence from colonialism. I have appointed a committee of elders who are ready and waiting for word from Djibouti in order to start this dialogue.

I wish all participants a pleasant stay in Somaliland and declare the 8th Congress of the Somali Studies International Association to be open.

Convener's Address

Edna Adan Ismail
President, Somali Studies International Association
Minister, Ministry of Family and Society

Fellow Delegates:

Yesterday we presented the goals of the conference and how we hoped that the presentations, informal meetings, and cultural events would lead to new visions and possibilities for Peace, Governance and Reconstruction for all Somalis. I have spent all of my life working in different aspects of the health sciences - nursing, hospital management, delivering babies, and working in international health organizations. I am now building a hospital in Hargeisa. In all of these years, I have learned that no one wants to be sick and that no one looks forward to being sick for a long period of time.

In like manner, no cultural or political group likes being sick or wants to be ill for a long period of time. The Somali people have had a difficult illness for the last two decades. It is an illness that no one enjoys or wants. It is a malady that for a few years became an epidemic throughout our land. Just as I have learned that good medicine, properly administered, can lead to good health, I also believe that there are tools that can help to achieve Peace, Governance, and Reconstruction more effectively and more sustainably. We already know that the cure will take some time. We already know that there is no single operation or pill that will solve all of our problems. We already know there are different tools and solutions for different parts of the illness. We also know that a culture, like the human body, has amazing resilience and can rise to an occasion to overcome its problems. This congress is designed to be part of this process of healing. It is organized to help delegates find and share information about new tools and apply them to different areas of need.

It is indeed a great privilege to have been honored with the responsibility of coordinating the preparations for this highly prestigious Somali Studies International Congress. It is even a greater honor for me, as a woman, to have been entrusted with the complex aspects of preparing for a conference of this importance that is being held in Somaliland for the first time.

When the participants of the 7th SSIA Congress in Toronto prompted me to extend an invitation for the 8th Congress to be held in Hargeisa, little did I know that I would be faced with problems as varied as fixing

photocopy machines to buying tarpaulins to setting up electronic mail with the rest of the world to ensuring constant electric power and to seeking the official approval and invitation of His Excellency, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, President of the Republic of Somaliland. My special thanks for his support and encouragement as well as his mobilization of national institutions that made it possible to welcome our guests.

While preparing for the 8th Congress, these past two years have been a time of learning because no international congress of this importance had ever been held in my country and no previous conference had attracted so many participants from so many parts of the world. I am deeply honored that we have today people who have travelled from as far away as Canada, South Africa, the United States, Europe, and Russia and from nearer home including Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. May I extend a sincere welcome to all Somalis and non-Somalis who have honored us with their presence today. I hope that their stay in Somaliland will be enjoyable and their participation in this Congress will be mutually exciting and fruitful. I could not end my speech without expressing a most sincere thanks to the United States Agency for International Development for having made this Congress possible, through their technical and financial support. On behalf of the Preparatory Committee, I would also like to express my very sincere gratitude and appreciation to companies who have provided assistance: Dahabshil, Barakaat, Daallo Airlines, Soltelco, Aerolite, Star Pharmacy, Monsour Hotel and STC. I am also greatly indebted to the University of Hargeisa and Amoud University.

Finally, I wish to thank the staff and the students of the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital, without whose support I could never have coordinated this important assembly.

SECTION ONE

Language and Literature

Introduction to Section One

At the core of the Somali psyche – of men and women, Darood and Isaaq, farmer and nomad, diaspora and local, even Somali-speaking and Bantu-speaking – lies language. Fundamental to a Somali's identity are the traditions of poetry, proverbs, folk tales, legends, and songs.

It is no surprise that the best attended sessions of the 8th Congress of the Somali Studies International Association were those offering poetry and language. The issue that unites a deeply fragmented people is language. Perhaps one reason why constitutional and political conferences in recent years that have created workable understandings and practical accords, most notably at Borama, have included major time for the poets and musicians to perform. Evenings, quiet times before meals or after prayers, and formally scheduled performances become times for sharing, remembering, and identifying with one of the oldest cultures in Africa.

Section One includes poems presented at the Congress, mostly by well-known and highly venerated poets. Topics range from the virtues of family unity – especially motherhood – to the tragedies and senselessness of the war, to the stability that Islam offers, to the brutality of female genital mutilation (FGM).

Other contributions present excerpts from a new Somali dictionary, lessons on syntax in Somali, proverbs and their relationship to a person's ability to speak the language – and therefore to the ability to identify as a Somali, and a professional's insight into the nature of 'written' oral poetry VS. improvization.

To those seeking to build alliances among many different parts of Somalia and the Somali people, there are lessons in these poems, lessons that suggest that discussions and negotiations about politics, economics, territory, and constitutions might best start and end with poetry and proverbs. Note that the poems are presented only in Somali to retain the flavor, nuances, and personality of the poet. In each case the poet is presenting his or her original work.

CHAPTER ONE

Poems of Peace and Reconciliation

Editors' note: Like English poems translated into Somali, Somali poems when translated into English may not convey the message adequately and effectively and in the process of translation, may also lose the taste and beauty of the original version. There is more to poetry then simply translating the words and stating the general theme. Since an English translation could never do justice, we have thought it wise simply to write a general explanation in English to introduce each poem.

Hadaba Deeqaay
Dagaalkani Maxuu Ahaa?

Mrs. Saado Abdi Toodhe

The poem is called "**Hadaba Deeqaay Dagaalkani Maxuu Ahaa**?" (*Deeqa, Could You Please Tell Me What This War Is All About?*)

The poet expresses her sorrow by letting us see how miserable were the inter-clan wars or civil wars that occurred between Somalilanders after the liberation wars against Siyad Barre's despotic regime. She states that there was a logical explanation for the sacred liberation war as it was a just cause.

However, what the poet cannot understand or explain are inter-clan or civil wars that broke out after the defeat of Siyad Barre's regime and the successful proclamation of the Sovereignty of the Republic of Somaliland. She wonders why should hatred develop among the people and why should this drive one clan to fight against another.

Finally the poet disapproves and condemns such disgraceful wars between kith and kin and expects every one to follow suit and, likewise, reject and refrain from such insensible bitter and devouring wars.

Intaan dacar leefay waabay durduurtayeey
Dabaasha anoon aqoon daad I qaadayeey
Dagaalkii hore biq kani iigasii daryeey
Illaahbaa daayin ahee daal lakorodhsayeey
Shisheeye haduu is dilo waabu kala durkaa
Marada labadeeda dacal baa dab ii qabsaday
Ee hadaba Deeqay dagaalkani maxuu ahaa?
Oo maxay daantaasi daantaa ku diidantahay?

Alla agoonkii daalanaa dib uga caymadyeey
Oo hooyadii weerku daashaday dibootayeey
Ragii ay luguhu duubmeen is damaqsayeey
Dubaaxdaydii waraabuhu durduurayeey
Dayo Cali mushxaradii ku daashayeey
Sammada haadkii dawaafaayey igu dagyeey
Shisheeye haduu is diloo wabu kala durkaa

Marada labadeeda dacaal baa dab ii qabsaday
Ee hadaba Deeqay dagaalkani maxuu ahaa?
Oo maxay daantaasi daantaa ku diidantahay?

Duqii Gacma Dheere iyo Lixloow daad na qaadayeey
Dagaalyahan Maxaamed Caliyoow dayawnayeey
Waar iilka dadan iyo qabriga dib ugu oydayeey
Naftiina kuwaad u daadiseen is diirta eey
Dadkani nabadaad la doonaysay daadiyeey
Dagalba dagalkii ku xigay daabcad kula kacyeey
Shisheeye haduu is diloo wabu kala durkaa
Marada labadeeda dacaal baa dab ii qabsaday
Ee hadaba Deeqaay dagaalkani maxuu ahaa ?
Oo maxay daantaasi daantaa ku diidantahay ?

Darwiishkii Aadan Shiniyo ragii la dilay
Ragyaw Axmed Dhagax miyaan diir idiinku ool?
Miyaan la dareensanayn Daahir ina Collow?
Iilka dadan iyo qabriga dib ugu oydayeey
Naftiina kuwaad u daadiseen is diirte eey
Dadkani nabadaad la doonaysay daadiyeey
Dagalba dagalkii u xigay daabcad kula kacyeey
Shisheeye haduu is dilloo waabu kala durkaa
Marada labadeeda dacaal baa dab ii qabsaday
Ee hadaba Deeqaay dagaalkani maxuu ahaa?
Oo maxay daantaasi daantaa ku diidantahay?

Illaahbaa daayin ahee ficilkuu kuu dul maray
Dadyohow Koodbuur miyaanu dooxa Herer u dhalan?
Miyaan dadkayagu ogaayn weraarkii la dilay?
Iilka dadan iyo qabriga dib uga ooyday eey
Dagalba dagalkii u xigay daabcad kula kacyeey
Shisheeye haduu is dilloo waabu kala durkaa
Marada labadeeda dacaal baa dab ii qabsaday
Ee hadaba Deeqay dagaalkani maxuu ahaa?
Oo maxay daantaasi daantaa ku diidantahay?

Alla dadyoow Alifdoon miyaanu dadkayaga ka dhalan?
Dadyoow Haragwaafi iyoo danabyadii halgamay
Madaahoow ina Saleebaan naftuu daldalay

Kumaankun dayoobayoo duurka bahal ku cunay
Miyaan la dareensanaayn dawladihii rogmaday?
Iilka dadan iyo qabriga dib ugu oyday eey
Dadkani nabadaad la doonaysay daadiyeey
Dagalba dagalkii u xigay daabcad kula kacyeey
Shisheeye haduu is dillo waabu kala durkaa
Marada labadeeda dacaal baa dab ii qabsaday
Ee hadaba Deeqay dagaalkani maxuu ahaa?
Oo maxay daantaasi daantaa ku diidantahay?

Wataad Waxbadan Daahiroow Dibada Taagnayde

Mrs. Saado Abdi Toodhe

This poem is called **"Wataad Waxbadan Daahiroow Dibada Taagneyde"** *(Dahir, Have You Already Forgotten How Long You Were Homeless and Without Shelter?)*

The poet reminds the people of the problems and difficulties as well as the genocide that occurred during the liberation war. She recites names of the heroes and mentions the loss of loved ones. She reminds us of the homes that were destroyed and the loss of precious properties. She reminds us of the hunger and the lack of shelter from the planes that took off from Hargeisa Airport and mercilessly bombed the civilians within Hargeisa town and its suburbs. She recalls the savage bombing of the weak, unprotected civilians who were fleeing the massacre carried out by Barre's soldiers who were indiscriminately shooting everyone within firing range of their machine guns. The poet urges that peace be maintained so that none of these cruel occurrences may ever happen again to our people who have at last found their pride, dignity, and sovereignty.

Wataad waxbadan daahiroow dibada taagneyde
Waakii dugaagii ina cunay duurka xulayaaye
Watii dhirtuna daadatee daysay ubaxiiye
Durdurkii biyaha saydhin jiray dawlis laga waaye
Dagaalkiyo colaadii xumayd dib uga qiirooda
Waar diinkiyo ugaadhaad cunteen dib uga qiirooda
Diilalyadiyo dhaxantii badnayd dib uga qiirooda
Diyaaradihii Hargaysiyo ka kacay dagalka xaabaale
Inta ay ka duulaan hadana dib u rushaynaayey
Dagaalkiyo colaadii xumayd dib uga qiirooda
Isna daaya maantaa dadkani darajo haystaaye

Hooyaalayeey Hoyalayeey Hooye...
Doqankaan walaal moodayooy maqal dabuubtayda
Darajada qabiil leeyahaan kuu dul maryaaye

Dacar iyo qadhaadh bay ahayd darajadiisiiye
Doobab haadku feentay ahayd darajadiisiiye
Duqay ololku leefay ahayd darajadiisiiye
Dumar weer cad qaatay ahay darajadiisiiye
Dumay iyo baroor bay ahayd darajadiisiiye
Mayd dibada yaalay ahayd darajadiisiiye
Gacal kala dibooday ahayd darajadiisiiye
Darxumada agoonkay ahayd darajadiisiiye

Damalkii agoonku hadhsanlaa wiil danlaa gubiye
Waar duufaan dalkeenii ka qarax daayina u maqan eh
Isna daaya maantaa dadkani darajo haystaaye

Jiilalka Oo Dheer Marbaa Dheri La Waayaa

Mrs. Saado Abdi Toodhe

This poem is called **"Jiilaalka Oo Dheer Marbaa Dheri La Waayaa"** *(When the Dry Season Persists, You May Not Find Any Food to Cook).*

The poet, Saado, takes as her example the harsh season of winter called "Jiilaal" in Somali. Winter usually brings thirst and hunger and then afterwards spring follows with the rainy season and a time of plenty when livestock reproduce and give much milk. In this case the sufferings and the hardships of winter become subsequently cured and obliterated by the joy of the good season (spring) that follows. Similarly, the mass-massacres, the hardships, and the sufferings experienced during the liberation war should become cured and kept in the historical archives when the freedom and sovereignty of Somaliland are regained. This invaluable reward that Allah has bestowed on the people needs to be preserved by maintaining the precious peace and stability that makes it possible for Somalilanders to join hands and live together as one united solid nation that enjoys the fruits of the sacrifices it had made in the past.

Jiilaalka oo dheer marbaa dheri la waayaaye
Dhulka oo abaaroobay baad dhacar ku raagtaaye
Adigoo dhibaataysan baa dhibicu hooraaye
Xoolahaaga oo kuu dhalaad dhiil u culataaye
Dhay iyo gadhoodh bad cabtaa boqol dharaaroode
Xornimaduna dheeg faaraxaw way u dhigantaaye
Waar yaynaan dhulkeenii helnaye mahad niqii dhaafin
Dhafanoow shabeelkaba hadii dhuuxa laga toogto
Dhudhumada hadii lagala helo qumac dhalaalaya
Isaguba dhiraha hoos galyoo dhaban caraaleeye
Mulacba leeb lagu dhuftaa dhiiriyoo kaca'ee
Dharaaraaba qayd lagu martaa xiidmo soo dhacaye
Dhutis baa geel lagu dhacshaa laguna dheelmaaye
Ma markaan dhulkeenii helnaan mahad niqii dhaafnay

Ma dhibaatadaad soo martaan kula dhanaanaanin
Ma adigoo wixii dhacay ogbaad dhabar tukaalaysay
Ma dhalaanka iyo naagahaad dhiiri galinwayday

Calanyahaw dadkii kala dhunbahay dhaqan walaaleeyey
Calanyahaw rasaas bay dhibtee dhiga yidhee tuuray
Calanyahaw wixii dhiig qulqulay dhaafa yidhi maanta
Calanyahaw ashaydaa dashaan dhiil u culayaaye
Calanyahaw in xoor laygu dhigo dhaab ila qaado
Inaan dhiig danbana laygu shubin adigu ii dhaaro
Ana inaan dhurwaagii ku cunay abud laguu dhiibin
Oon meel xun dhidibkaagu noqon aniga ii dhaarso

Nabadeey

Mrs. Saado Abdi Toodhe

This poem is called "**Nabadeey**" *(Oh Peace).*

It emphasizes the importance and pleasure of peace. She strongly proposes that the sole objective be peace, which is second to none. She hopes that the people realize and taste the sweetness of peace, feel it, enjoy it, and live with it. She asks ALLAH to imprint this in the minds of her people.

Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Roobka oo da'ay eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Duunyo iyo maal eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Damash xariireed eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Qaali iyo dahab eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Duciyo khayraad eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Dayrar ubaxeed eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Daadsanoow mayay eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Daabadoow faras eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Cudur dawayntii eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahaay
Dayr farxadi taal eh
Nabadeey dadkaygad u tahaay
Daal wax kaa tara eh

Dariiqyada habeenkii anoo daansha soconaaya
Aniga oo dugaag inu I cunno dhab u dareemaynin
Marka calankayga aan daawadaan sharaf dareemaaye

Nabadeey dadkaygaa ku jeceel
Daayin abudkaa eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Duciyo aamiin eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Doobi xoorweyn eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Deeqa geel dhalay eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Sida darmaanaha eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Luul la daawada eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Waxaan la daynayn eh
Nabadeey dadkaygaad u tahay
Dalaga beeraha eh

Waxaad tahay xasiid aan dubtooy duusho gaajaduy eh
Yacad duurka joogtaad tihiyo deero iyo cawl eh
Danbar iyo labeenbaad tihiyo duubanoow sixin eh

Nabadeey dadkaygaa ku jecel
Daa'in abudkaay eh
Dumarka iyo caruurtaa ku raba
Daa'in abudkaay eh
Ballaayoy wuxuun baad dishaa
Oo daalin baad tahay eh
Dumarkiyo caruurtaa ku yidhi
Durug balaayooy eh.

Anuun Baa Hooyada Ah

Waxa tiriyey Maxamed Ibraahim Warsame "Hadraawi"
29 kii Dul-xaja,1418, 26 kii Abril,1998 kii

This poem is called "**Anuun Baa Hooyadaa Ah**" *(I Will Always Be Your Mother) by Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame "Hadraawi."*

Composed on 26th of April, 1998 as a result of the shock he had when he witnessed the behavior of the Somali youth in the Diaspora. He was annoyed by the disrespectful way they responded to their mothers and their disregard of her demands or instructions.

The poet Hadraawi beautifully describes the value of 'mother' and her unparalleled affection and protection of her children, and also of the education that she incessantly imparts to them. She does her utmost to bring up her children to become heroic and useful members of society. The poem describes the pains and difficulties she endures to realize the successful accomplishment of her responsibilities.

The poet also describes the attitudes of the youth as indifferent and very different from the youth of the past. He mentions their failure to conform to the required norms the society expects from them.

In the poem, the mother strongly addresses her children and warns them of possible dangers of violating her rights as well as those of others. Yet she avoids cursing them though she is convinced that she would never get from them the proper treatment she deserved as a beloved mother.

Hunguri calafbaa xukuma
Hantina dhaqan baa shushuba,
Dadkana hidihiisa guud,
Wixii la hayaa dhex yaal.

Xaq iyo u halbuuxintiisa,
Haboonkiyo waalid tiisa,
Hilbiyo ku-arooridooda,
Siduu uga hawl yaraysto,
Halmaan laga yeelimaayo,
Hawiyo tumashooy dhashayda,
Ka daa gacan-haadiskaaga

Barbaar hano-qaad ku lexday,
Duciyo habaar qaadan waayay
Cir iyo heeguu noqdaa
Hadhaysa dhul aan aqoonne,
Hoygii madhan wiilashiisa,
Haween dumar baa ka sheegta,
Hablaha kacay baa u yeedha,
Haldhaa jecelbaa u qaybsan,
Inaan hadlo maan sugaynin,
Baxnaano na maan illoowin,
Hogeediyo xaajadayda,
Dareenka haloosigiisa,
Hugiisa inaan ka qaado,
Hayaanka fogaaday baa leh,
Markaan cid la'hiil ka waayey,
Naftayda halaanhalkeeda,
Waxaan huri waayay sheego,

Haantii lulataay dhegayso,
Hoobaanta agtaada taalla,
Hadhiinadu baadi weeye,
Hashii korisaa u ciilan,

Qof aad halab-saaridiisa,
Daryeelka horseeddadiisa,
Dedaallada heensihiisa,
Habbeena ka seexan weydey,
Ku-meel maray heegantaada,
Markuu hagar kuu baneeyo,
Dharaar ku haleeli waayo,
Hortaada waxaa yimaada,
Sidaad ugu heellanayde,
Harraad iyo wa kalkiisa,
Hillaac baxayoow dhegayso,
Siday talo kaaga hoostay,

Calooshu intay ku hoysay,
Hiyigu ku baxnaaninaayay,
Horaadka intaad jaqaysay,
Dhabtaydu intay ku hoysay,
Intaad huwanayd taftayda,
Hobeeyo hobey hobeyda,
Intaan dusha kuugu heesay,

Intaan Hanad kuugu yeedhay,
Hawraaraha kugu amaanay,
Intaan hubin kuu xanbaaray,
Dartaa u hogaansanaaday,
Hadhuubbada aan ku siiyay,
Hubniin adigoo ku diiday,
Intaan hanbo kuu daboolay,
Hamuun iyo gaajo qaatay,
Adoo haqo-beel ku seexday,
Intaan hurdo kuu illaaway,
Ilaashay hareerahaaga,
Hungaa I xasuusinaysa,
Hayaydana meel shishaa leh,
Hilowga naftaa aloosan,
Kashaa hinqanaysa goorba,
Hankaa I wareysanaaya,
Tolow Hebel mee ku foogan,
Anigiyo hirashaa is-weynay,
Higsiga noloshaa adkaaday,
Adduun iyo haybsigiisa,
Hangool-li'idaan ku daayay,
Waxaan ku hagaagi waayey,
Dhankaad ku hagaagsanayde,
Adoo ka han-weyn xagayga,
Qof kuugu han-weyn dantiisa,
Ciddaad ku halaysay mooyi,
Halyeynimadaada sheelan,
Habawgiyo dhiirintiisa,
Ayaan halis kuu tusayne,
Intaan kugu hawlo-daalay,
Intaan kugu hoodo-sheegtay,
Intaan Hebla kuugu faanay,

Hilaado fog bay lahayde,
Inaan hafarkaaga qaato,
Sidaad ku heshaa da'weyne,
Adiyo habigaaga mooyi,

Habaaska inaad cantuugto,
Adoo Hanadaan ka doortay,
Xagayga hibaan ku saaray,
Anigu ku habaari maayo,
Huq baase ku raadinaysa,
Hibaaq xalan maad ahayne,
Hufnaanta dhibtii abuurtay,
Inaanay hadhayn yiqiinso.

Hawaala Adduun Rabbaa og,
Dadkuna kala hoodo weeye,
Haddeer iyo tii haddeer,
Hadhow iyo tii hadhow,
Hoos iyo sare tii ku raacda,
Anuun baa Hooyadaa ah.

Badbaado

Waxaa Tiriyey Aabwaan
Maxamed Ibraahim Warsame "Hadraawi"
Waxay soo baxday 27/01/1996, oo ku began 7dii bisha barakaysan ee Ramadaan, Sannadka 1416 Hijra

*"**Badbaado**" by Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame "Hadraawi," was composed on the 27th January 1996, which happened to be the 7th day of the Holy Month of Ramadan. In this poem Hadraawi describes how a mother tried to protect her child and the measures she took to save it during a bad winter season when a drought prevailed. He describes how she made the child feel happy, sheltered him from the harsh weather, and lists the ways she tried to make the child have strength, courage, and confidence, while herself was under the threat of death from thirst and hunger.*

The poet explains how precious a mother is in her love for her child. The poet advocates for peace and describes how she fears conflicts lest her child get involved in it. Finally the poem concludes in the mother's advocacy for justice and the peaceful and fair co-existence she prays for.

Balliyada salkoodii
Iyo baaca webiyada
Marka boodh ka sara-kaco
Rahu boholo dheer galo
Biyo lagu haloosiyo
Dhulka oo basaasoo
Inta budul ku jiifsaday
Buska tarantarkiisii
Isha lagala soo baqay
Allihii galshiyo baad
Ku ballaadhin jirayoow.

Xaqa lagu bukoodiyo
Xaqa lagu bogsoodiyo
Inta laga badheedhiyo
Inta lagu badheehdiyo
Xumo loogo babac-dhigo
Nafta bedenbedkeediyo

Bog intii xasilisiyo
Inta baal ku ledi karo
Burjigiyo hubaalaha
Berri lagu halleeyee
Lagu sugo ma barideen
Bedad-guurka waayaha
Inta lagu baxnaanshee
Hiyi looga dhigo baan
Inta lagu bariistiyo
Inta lagu baraarugo
Inta baaca noloshiyo
Runta lagu bilkeedee
Xaqa lagu bidhaansado.

Inta baaxad dedan iyo
Inta taal bannaankee
Nin isbiday ka xoog weyn
Inta loo bal reebee
Nin ka baqay ku nabad galo.

Inta aan la burin karin
Inta aan la baran karin
Biligiyo awoodaa
Xejinaaya buuraha
Iyo badaha waaweyn
Barakada Qur'aankiyo
Bisha lagu xurmeeyiyo
Boqortooyadaadiyo
Boqolkaaga magaciyo
Bismillaahi keligaa.

Bulsho waxay cadhoowdaa
Ama baali noqataa
Marka ay buseelkiyo
Bud-dhiggeeda sharafkiyo
Inta aan la biimayn
Ka gumowdo bilicdiyo
In bisaylka lagu cuno.

Kol hadday baxdoobaan
Dadku bayda goostaan
Bido lahashadeediyo
Bohorada wax lagu rido
Lagu bulo samaantii
Isu booda-dhigashada
Sharka loogu beretamo
Naftu baylah weeyee
Biri waxay af leedahay
Marka baajinteedii
Belo lagu halleeyee
Inta badan la qaayibo.

Marka bidixda oo qudha
Lagu qoro run iyo been
Taladaa han-bururtoo
Laba baahiyoodbaa
Isku beegmi waayee
Nin bursaday hadduu jiro
Nin wax beelay baa nool
Nin badsaday haduu jirro
Ka la boobay baa qaday,
Allahayow bardaankiyo
Kala badhashadii guud
Barbar qudha in laga raro
Aragtida dannaysaa
Bunduqana samaysoo
Bani-aadminnimadii
Nin ka baadiyoobaa
Badhi furay wanaagoo
Dadku beerihiisay
Ka gurtaan bawaarkee.

Shilkan baahay aashii
Halisahan gun iyo baar
Bari iyo Galbeed yaal
Jidka lagu baqooliyo
Bilqashada dareenkiyo
Bara-kaca aqoontii
Dabinada is biirsaday

Nin baraystay falashada
Iyo buunka sixirrada
Iyo badalli-oogsiga
Bixisada la aaminay
Buhashaa ka salagloo
Beryo hore sidoodii
Ama beelihii Caad
Marka doobi buuxsamo
Burburkaa yimaadee
Boqorkaan rugtiisiyo
Baradiisu madhanoow
Kaan baahan jirinoow
Kii baahan jireybaa
Kuu baahan Adigee
Baryo waxay ku leedahay
Boholyowga garashada
Iyo baaqa hirashada
Allahayoow badbaadada
Iyo baydhka xilashada
Haku xidhin Bush iyo Joo
Iyo Booris Yaalsin
Iyo bacawda xoorka ah
Iyo gaal wax badawsada

Bohoyowga garashada
Iyo baaqa hirashada
Allahayoow badbaadada
Iyo baydhka xilashada
Haku xidhin billaawaha
Nimaan Adiga kaa biqin.

Boholyowga garashada
Iyo baaqa hirashada
Allahayoow badbaadada
Iyo baydhka xilashada
Haku xidhin nin beer adag
Iyo bahalo aan nixin
Bishmo lala haliiliyo
Carrab dhuux baraar jecel
Iyo buulka qalatada

Iyo haanta Bow-dheer.
Boholyowga garashada
Iyo baaqa hirashada
Allahayoow badbaadada
Iyo baydhka xilashada
Haku xidhin intii baas
Bakhti-yahan xalaal neceb
Iyo booli quutaha
Damac lagu balaysimey.

Boholyowga garashada
Iyo baaqa garashada
Allahayoow badbadada
Iyo baydhka xilashada
Haku xidhin bakhaylada
Nin bushaaro uga dhow
Balawaaska quustiyo
Babbisada adduunyada.

Boholyowga garashada
Iyo baaqa hirashada
Allahayoow badbaadada
Iyo baydhka xilashada
Haku xidhin bayuuraha
Bullashada wirteediyo
Baga iyo bagaaleey
Iyo lihi bar-kuma-taal.

Allahayoow badbaadada
Haku xidhin bah iyo reer
Biyo-dhiijin qolo qolo
Isu baanka digashada
Iyo sheeko baraleey.

Allahayoow badhaadhaha
Allahayoow barwaaqada
Ha ka dhigin baroor dumar
Iyo barada meyd yaal.

Aamiin

Nabdaado

Abwaan Maxamed Xaashi Dhama 'Gaarriye'
(1981)

"Nabdaado" *is a poem by another famous poet, Mohamed Hashi Dhama. He intelligently attempts to expose to the people the bitter results of enmity and proceeds to let the people understand the brutality and mercilessness of the ruthless blood-thirsty bully who is blind-folded by hatred and who possesses all kinds of dangerous weapons including, perhaps, nuclear warheads. Such an individual cares for nothing else except for his mere interest. As an example he mentions characters like Hitler and Mussolini whose ambitions devastated the world.*

The poet, therefore, warns the people of such personalities and asks every one to be vigilant against the threats posed by such war-mongers. The poet intends to raise the awareness of the people so as to avoid future conflicts leading to the outbreak of war and encourages them to sustain the stability that exists.

Waa maanso caalami ah. Waxay soo baxday markii tartanka hubka halista ihi gaadhay heerkiisii ugu sareeyey. Waxay ka digaysay inuu dagaal ka dhex qarxo labadii gaashaan-buurood ee Waarso iyo Nato.

Najayna najayna!
Najayna najayna!
Najayna ana leh
Nayruushkan hadeerto
Necawda dhacaysa
Hadii nabadiiba
Kor taal naxash maanta

Najayna najayna!
Najayna najayna!
Amaanka nuglaaday
Naxaasta sumaysan
Nacuudu bilaahi
Intuu dadku naaro
Niyuukliyer oo dhan.

Najayna najayna!
Najayna najayna !
Nitaakhada joogta
Jikraa ma-naxaanta
Nakhuudaha mawdka
Bamkaan laga nuuxsan

Sidii nurka roobka
Qaloombiga "naw" leh
Galdhiidhiga naarta
Nacaybka gadhoodhay.

Najayna najayna!
Najayna najayna!
Dagaal nuxur-goys ah
Laxaadsiga Naato
Nuuxnuusiga Waarso
Calool naxli dhaanshay
Dardaaran – naqeeda.

Najayna najayna!
Najayna anaa leh!
Hadii najis xoog li
Namruud muruqaystay
Ciddaan nacamaynin
Nafiif uga dhaartay.

Najayna najyna!
Najayna najayna!
Namiibiyo Shiine
Banaamiyo Noorway
Nebaalka ku meersan.

Waxaa nabadeey leh
Nabaadka baxaaya
Nagaadhkiyo xooga
Is-nuugta ugaadha
Dhurdaa nasan wayey

Waxaa nabadeey leh
Xamaamka nakhiilka
Kob uu nasligiisa
Negaansho u seexsho
Nudaa ku tidcaaya.

Waxaa nabadeey leh
Xataa ma-nafleeyda,
Dhadhaabtiyo niibta
Dix-naanida ciida.

Waxaa nabadeey leh
Nacuu Hitler biirey
Naftii Musaliini,
Fashiistiyo Naasi
Nasiib kaga doogtay

Waxaa nabadeey leh
Wixii nabarkeedi
Ka nool Heroshiima;
Jugtii Nagasaaki
Jabkii lagu naaftay.

Waxaa nabadey leh
Ilaa Nabi Aadan
Nalkii la shidaayey
Naqii tacabkeena
Naqwii dhaqankeena
Wixii lagu noogay
Nahdii laga tuujay.

Macaan nabad baa leh
Naruuro samaa leh
Nas baa igu taam ah
Nimcooy waxa maanta
Mindhaa nadigiisa
Natiijo ku raadsha
Dagaalna niyeeysta

Nin moog wixi gaadhay
Dhurwaagii nabnaaye
Intuu nacasoobay
Bishmaa nirig goostay
Dabadeed yidhi 'naa jaq'
Hal uu jarey naaska
Dibsoo nurusf-naarush

Gabay Ku Saabsan FGM

Waxaa Tiriyey
Muxumed Cali "Masmas"

*This poem,"**Gabay Ku Saabsan FGM**" is about female genital mutilation (FGM) and was composed by Mr. Muhumed Ali "Masmas." The poet reminds all the people who still practice FGM how Islam condemns the practice and what the Islamic religion says about this horrible tradition that has claimed the lives of so many women, handicaps those who are still alive, and that deprives them of the enjoyment of sex as Allah had intended them to.*

Mr. Masmas's message is for all who practice FGM and suggests that women stop practicing this crippling operation in the same way that most Islamic countries have done.

Gudniinkan fircooniga ah
Faafee laga doodayaa
Waxaan diintu noo fasaxin
Xaddiiskuna faafinayn,
Faa'iidana noo lahayn
Inaan falo waa dembiye
Inaan ka fogaano oo
Ka fiirsano oon jarnaa
Aniga wayla fiicantahay

Rasuulku (SCW) wuxuu na faray
Ficilna ugu sheegay gabadh
Falkaas shaqadeedu haa
Dhegaha furo oo I maqal
U fiirso waxaan ku odhan
Finkaasi ka dhiijiyoo
Findhicil wax ka wayn ha goyn
Haddaad farsamada du'doo
Adigu fasahaadisana
Faraha naar baad la geli

Illaahay qofkii fahmee
Wuxuu faray raacayaa
Foolxumo kaga baydhayee

Foojigo ma ahee ogow
Maxaa qofka oo fayow
Falaadhaha Loogu ganay?
Maxaa farxadii aroos
Fiintii uga qaylisaa
Maxaa fooshiyo dhalmada
Dhib kale loogu sii fura

Fasalba fasalbaa bedelay
Markii Faraw hooyadeed
Filkii hablahee kacaba
Fadhiisiyay ay lahayd
Inay faral gudatay bay
Ku faantooy moodeysee
Feedh bay uga leexatee
Hadduu dhaqankani fogaa
Hadaa fursad loo helee
U fuli sida ugu habboon.

Dhacdo Layaableh
oo hordhac u ah gabayga 'Hilib Dad'

Waxa Qoray Abwaan
Cali Mooge Geedi
1991

*This poem was composed by Ali Mooge Geedi. It is called "**Hilib Dad**" (Human Flesh). In the Somali tradition, the hyena is described as a cowardly and lowly scavenging animal. In order to describe how war benefits only those who have no scruples, the poet presents the picture of the destruction of the city of Hargeisa by the army of Siyad Barre during the liberation war against Barre's regime. He expresses how Hargeisa turned out to become one huge graveyard as well as the best feeding center for hyenas.*

The city, which was littered with unburied bodies, attracted scores of beasts in the region. The hyenas had their fill of meat and bones at anytime they wished. Not only did these animals relish the taste of human flesh, but the city also became the most suitable breeding habitat for these beasts.

Mr. Geedi explains the joy of the hyenas when they conquered the deserted city in which they found shelter and more food than they had ever dreamt about. The poet precedes his poem with a narrative explaining how the story came about and how the hyenas conquered Hargeisa.

Cali Mooge Geedi, isaga oo jooga magaalada Jabuuti ayuu tix qaylo dhaan ah udiray aqoon yahanadii Soomaalida taas oo uu ku dalbanayo, leeyahayna waa markay ugu dhimasho badnayd, waa kolkay ugu naafo badnayd, waa markay xoolay yaboohin jirtaye ugu dad yaboohin badnayd.

Hadaba dagaalkan qarnigan labaatanaad sideebaan magac bixin ugu helaa?

Kadib wuxuu Cali waraysi is daba joog ah layeeshay firxadadii miidaan socodka ku yimid Jamhuuriyada Jabuuti oo markaas ahayd meesha keliya oo uu madax yahay nin Soomaali ah, oo maamul la aqoonsan yahay ka iftiimayo, inkastooy qoomiyado ay walaalo yihiin talada dalka la wadaagaan.

Nasiib wanaag waxa Cali gurigiisa timid inan layidhaahdo Xaawa Cabdi oo sheeko uu aad ula yaabay u sheegtay, waxay tidhi waxaan wax

ka dhayi jiray dhaawicii Geed Deeble, rushaynta dayuuraduhuna joogto ayey nagu ahayd.

Waxase ka yaab badnayd ayey tidhi: aniga abtigay oo layidhaahdo Cabdilaahi Sulub oo ka mid ahaa saraakiishii tababarka u lahayd hubka culculus ayaa habeenkii dagaalkii u horeeyay ka qarxay isaga oo xeradii jooga ayaa aammin la'aan qorigii uu ridayey lagu katiinadeeyay, muddo dheerna sidaas ayuu wax ku waday. Waxa kaga sii darnayd markuu Taliyihiisii weydiistay inuu gurigiisii soo eego, bal inay ubadkiisii dadka guryuhu ku jiifaan kamidyihiin iyo inay ka qaxeen.

Taliyihii laba askari intuu raaciyey ayuu ku yidhi soo tusa oo soo celiya markuu gurigii in yar u jiro ayuu askartii ku yidhi, "Oo aqalkii albaab iyo daaqad midna kuma jiree" askartii baa u celisay, "Waar soco aqalada magaaladuu la mid yahaye, oo waataa wada haawanaysee." Albaabkii markuu isagoo didsan ka soo galay ayuu isha ku dhuftay sedex Waraabe oo yaryar oo daaradii ku ciyaaraysa dabadeed caruurtii Reer Waraabe markay arkeen dadka hoygoodii u gu soo galay ayey laba u yaacday xagii cunto kariyaha midna isagoo sasay ayuu ragii soo jiidhay oo albaabka la boobay.

Ninkii qoyskiisa meesha laga bedelay ayaa isaga oo argagaxsan askartii ku yidhi waar meeshaba Waraabe mooyaane dad wax loo gartaaba ma joogaan. Askartiibaa tidhi 'Waar malaha kii weynaana sariirtuu hurdaaye yaanu meesha bahalku inagu raamsanine inaga soo erya!'

Cali Mooge ayaa yidhi imika ma waxa aad ileeday qarnigan labaatanaad ayuu magaalo madax Waraabe ka taliyaa? Xaawi waxay tidhi 'Hadaad been iga moodayso markii uu ka soo baxsaday askartii, wuxuu tegay qaxoontiga Dulcad ee Itoobiya halkaas oo loogu sheegay xaaskiisii, bal warqad udir ha inoo soo jawaabee dabadeed. Cali wuxuu halkii ku diyaarsaday qalab war doon oo isugu jira maqal iyo muuqaal. Waxaanuu heenseestay dayaaraddii "REER" Abwaan ee shidaalkeeduna ahaa garabsalaaxda iyo gaadiidka murtida.

Markay lasoo caga dhigatay qaxoontiyadii martida u ahaa Itoobiya, isla markiiba waxa Cali loogu yeedhay ninkii gurigiisa waraabuhu ku dhalaamo korsaday. Wuxuu ku yidhi 'Walaal dhacdadaasi ma sidaasay Hargeysa kuugu qabsatay mise waxbaa lagu dardaray?' Cali Mooge Geedi, isaga.

Ninkiibaa intuu madaxa tiiraanyo lulay ayuu uceliyay 'Ma dhacdayba hay odhane wax dhab ah weeyaan. Ee adigu ma dagaalkaad wax ka ururinaysay waadigan qalabka sita eh?' Cali wuxuu yidhi 'Haayoo kolhadii halkay maatidu ku hadhsan jirtay maati dugaag ku hadhgashay,

maxaad dagaalkan qarniga labaatanaad magaciisa u bix lahay cid kaaga xog ogaalsani ma jirtee,?' Ninkii baa yidhi 'Waar waad war la'dahaye siday mawjaduhu isu dhirbaaxeenba maalinbaan gurigaygii soo eeg is idhiyoo waraabaa iga soo celiye. Dee waxaabaan ku odhan lahaa hadaad magac dagaal doonayso bahalkaasaa iga war galeensane orodoo sii warayso hadaad afgaranayso.' Cali isagoon Waraaba la hadal ahayn ayuu ku calool adaygay inuu magaaladii Hargaysa isku miidaamiyo. Goor cadceedu gaabantahay habeena soo fool yeeshay ayuu Cali caga dhigtay magaaladii. Waxa kahoryimid waraabihii oo sanqadh dhagaysi ah oo intuu gibasha hayo aad moodiid ciidan dhoola tus samaynaya,

Cali oo caguhu dhulka u qaban kari waayeen kurbasho awgeed ayuu Waraabihii ku yidhi, 'Soo soco imika cid ku cunaysa gaajoonaysaa ma jirte, e kolay bakhaarada kaydkaa lagugu dari doonaaye.'

Cali wuxuu u celiyey, 'Waar anigu meesha kumaan soo amban inaad I cuntana umaan imane waxaan ahay nin joornaaliis ah oo waxaan maqlay Waraabaa magaalo madax qabsaday, bal si uun iigu taliya.' Isagoo Waraabihii u ciil qabay idaacadaha af Soomaaliga ku hadla ee wararka ka hagraday, ayaa intuu Waraabihii aad u farxay ayuu yidhdi, 'Kaalay, intii naga dhinayd ayaad sidaaye aad hor-u-marka aanu gaadhnay sawirada ku taariikh geliside.

Iyadoo Cali Waraabihii galbinayo ayuu cabaar kula kaftamay Biriishka Hargaysa dushiisa, waxaanu Waraabihii ku yidhi 'Xili imika laga joogo labaatan sanadood ayaad 'HAL' Waraabe oo waagii uga beryey halkan ka rideen.'

Maalintaa dumar sariibad ma tegin, carruurina Iskuul may idiin tegin, dadkana Boolis baa kala horayey, siday naftaa go'day u daawan lahaayeen.'

'Cabdi Malow Tixduu ka tiriyey koley maqashay, nasiib wanaag bal maantana eeg waxaanu kaa ilaalinaynaa inaad adigu didmadayada biriishka kaga dhacdo.' Cali hadal uma furayne isagoo Ilmo-dhiglaynaya waxay u kexeeyeen carwada Timacade oo markaa ahayad bahala galeen.

Markii xaruntii salka loo yara fadhiistay hadalna we li bilaabmin, waxaa si kadis ah illinka uga soo galay unug waraabayaal ah, Cali waraabayaal uma kala soocna'e wuxuu ku war helay markii laysla oogsaday kalgacayl awgeed Iyadoo xagii Cali cidiba eegin ayaa waraabihii socotada ahaa yidhi: waxaanu maqalnay degmooyinkii aad ku noolaydeen inaad horumar ka gaadheen ood ku wadhwadhateen mid ka wanaagsan kii laynaga celin jiray.

Degmooyinkayagiina barwaaqo lama filaanaa ka dhacdayoo magaalo Madaxdan aad joogtaan tii shan goor ka weynayd ayaa hilib gogla isugu biyo shubataye, hadaad hortaayo wax kala basriseen bi'i waaye waxaad nagu caawisaan guuto Waraabe ah illeen waatii la yidhi 'Waraabe dhergay baa walaal xasuusta e,' waar waa hagaagsan tihiinoo horana umaynaan lahayn tallo xumo odhanaysa libaaxba waa ku tuludiiye, annakaa wixii naga go'itima idinka soo daba diraynee ninkan oo joornaaliste ah ayaanu warbixin siinaynaaye sidaas ku nabad gala.' Kii kalaa yidhi 'Oo ninka waanu arkaynaye waxaanu moodaynay mid aad rabaysanaysaane haduu wax qoraayo anakana noo soo dira warka hanaga sii qaadyee.'

'Waaryaa Weriye, bal aan taxanaheenii sii anba qaadnee waraabaa magaalo degey ma ka baahi baxday?'

Cali: 'Sidaa aad u tidhi hadal lagu labeeyaa afba kuma yaal. Haddaba dhegeyso waxaad ku abshirtaa dagaalka magiciisi wuxuu isugu soo gororay "Waraabe Ka Qosliye," waxaa intaa noo raaca maahmaahyo badan oo aanu ka gilgilanay in dib naloogu yidhaahdo:

- Waraabe naftiisna uma roona laf guri taalana uma roona
- Waraabe ayaa nasiib ku waayay dammeer macaa biyihiisii sita.
- Waxaa ka danbeeyay ninkii dameerku ka lumi lahaaba waxaanu ku dhex cunay magaalo biyo-xidhkeedii wadata.
- Nebi Yuusuf Calayhi Salaam, markii laygu daniyey waan ka dhaartay, haduu isagu nafkeliya ahaa, maanta intaan Aadame ka cunay tirro koob waanu u waynay, cid mag nagu soo oogtana kama cabsi qabno.
- Waraabe ciilna haw qabin callalna haw tuurin taasna waxa badaley cadkiinii.
- Hadday waraabe iyo walaalkii dhidar foolxumaayeen, facaad qarnigan labaatanaad u eekaaten ayey foolxumo fadhiisatay.'

Ka rog oo hadana saar bal imikana gabaygan oo magaciisa la yidhaahdo **"Hilib Dad"** waxaanu kaga aargoosanaynaa Timacade oo idinku waanin jiray Waraabaha qadiya ee wadeecayseen ku wiirsigayagii ah waana kan.

Hilib Dad

Waxaa tiriyey Abwaan Cali Mooge Geedi

Dhurwaaguba markuu didi jiraad, – Duuda ku ogayde,
Markay dirir sokeeye ay dhacdee – Lays ummulo dooxay
Dalandoolka maatidu kolkay, – Daaf walba u yaacday
Magaalooyinkii dagal noqdeen, – Maxastu daaqaysay
Fadhato aan la meel dayin markii, – Boobka lagu duugay
Dacalkayga waataan ka galay, – Deeqdi ii timiye,
Dahab iyo hadii lacagta iyo, – Diric la boobaayey
Dad baan bililiqaystaye ma cunin, – Duunyo xoolo ahe
Markaan daadka dhiiga ah cabeen – Laqanyadii daacay
Ama mayd duleedada wadhnaa, – Daan walba u jiiday
Dabyar anigu maanshidin haddaan – Daarihii galaye
Mahadhooyin duugoobin baa – Ii diwaan galaye,
Kuwa iga danbeeyaan u dhigi – Buug aan daabacaye,
Da'da gabay markaad Timacadow, – Ugu dardaar maysay
Waanadaadii kaa dile dadkina, – Habar dugaagawye
Daacuun kama layn intay – Ii dubaaxeene
Dul ahaanba sheekadu anay – Derejo ii tahaye
Soomaalaa Waraabaha u daran, – Iigamay darine
Bal daankayga maqal raamsashadu – Hilib dad weeyaane
Digashana bagaan kula dul imi, – Waa godkaan degaye
Hadii aad ka diirtiyo hadaad, – Digigixoonayso,
Nin wadkiisi dilay baad taho – Debedi kaa dheere
Waxba aniga hay dudinanaa – Doorkan maanta lehe
Adna iilku yuu kugu dummine – Dayso luxudkaaga,

Afartaa Waraabaha dalacay – Sharaf dugaageed dheh
Durdurada dareen bahal wax cunay – Dararacdiisii dheh
Gabaygana duruufaha wakhtiga – Diga roggaygii dheh

Adna wiilka igu soo degow – Doodu kuu furane
Mar horaan kuu dawdami lahaa – Sida dadkiiniiye
Kuuma dixan dixoonine waxaan – Maanta kugu daayey
Dalxaw iyo sidaad weere tahay – Deris walaalkay ah
Martiqaadka doorka ah waxaan – Kuugu damaleeyey
Inaad ani war iga duubtid baan, – Daaya kuu idhiye
Ii celi jawaab diiran oo, – Madaxa deeqaysa.

Su'aal

Inkastoon didmada jidhidhicada – Wada dubaaxaayo
Inkastoo dibnaha hadalka iyo – Daamanku is waayay
Inkastoo habeen ii daraa – Doorkan igu beegay
Inta micida lay dari lahaa – Igu dul gawdiidda
Ii dalliili sheekada waxay – Dihatay laabtaadu

Jawaabtii

Nin abaal ka duugoobinoo – Door xulaad tahaye
Deyo Cali kolaan kuu dhisana – Deeqi kuu maqane
Adigaa diyaarado watoon – Socod ku daalayne
Inta duni idaacado jirtaan – Kuu dirsanayaaye
Waraabaa dal gebigii qabsaday – Geli diwaankooda
Inaan daar cad ubadkayga dhigay – Geli diwaankooda
Ilaaqaadna yaan laygu gabin – Geli diwaankooda
BBCna waxaan doonayaa – Inaan dacweeyaaye
Dadkuun bay waraysani taqaan – Darta Buush House eh
Hadday daacad tahay faaladaa – Laygu dari laaye
Waa qabyaalad lay degay waxa – Laygu duudsiyayye
Dakanada dhurwaa loo qabaa – Laygu dedayaaye
Waxaad tidhaa dudmadu yeelkadiin – Dawlad baan ahaye
Afartaa waraabaha dalacay – Sharaf dugaagee

Halkaasuu ka sii arooriyay

CHAPTER TWO

A Somali Dictionary

Salah Hashi Arab

Introduction

It is a great honor for to me to present a completed Advanced Somali Dictionary of 45,000 words and a short briefing of the main fundamental regulations on Somali word study.

The Somali language is classified as an Eastern Cushitic tongue and is spoken along the arc of the Horn, where it is believed to be one of the richest languages of the African continent. As with any language, there are slight differences in Somali dialects. In spite of these regional variations, Somalis speaking different dialects can easily understand one another. There is no language barrier of oral communications between Somalis who may live as much as one thousand miles apart.

As early as the first quarter of last century, the concept of writing the Somali language had entered the minds of many Somali educators. Due to discouraging colonial policies as well as limited facilities and lack of coordination of the invented scripts (like the Osmania - 1922), the idea did not catch on immediately. The lack of appropriate utilization of the existing international scripts further delayed developing written forms of the Somali language.

The controversial question arose in 1960 about what script should be used. It was finally decided in October 1972. With massive national support from a large section of the young intellectuals, the script of the Somali language was agreed to be the Latin alphabet (with Arabic pronunciation). Immediately after the declaration of the Somali script, the adopted script became the official language of the country. In the same year, the military government mobilized all available facilities for an adult literacy campaign. In that same year, an educational syllabus for primary, intermediate, and secondary schools was translated, adopted, and implemented as a required part of the school curriculum..

Subsequent droughts, wars, and political unrest of the country severely hindered the development of the fragile adopted script and it's progressions. For example, in the last 26 years, the first Somali dictionary (of 15,000 words) which had been published in 1976, by Dr. Yassin Osman Y. Kenadid (1924 -1986), remained the only available Somali dictionary until now.

Having in mind the diminishing resources due to the aging and death of older generations, who are the only available reference of the Somali vocabulary, and the lack of supportive academic institutions to fill the gap that the language needs, I volunteered to create a dictionary. It was over taxing for the last seven years, as it took from the light of day to midnight darkness, using only faint kerosene lamps.

To write a Somali dictionary is not an easy task, especially for a person like me whose educational background is not sufficient for this major project. Even so, I decided to go forward and began my work in 1994. I traveled from region to region, especially where I expected to find essential elements of the language including verb forms, idioms and local expressions, unusual vocabulary, and local phrases. During my travels I met with elders and others who were considered knowledgeable in proverbs, stories, poetry, and other uses of the language. Because there have been no academic records or resources preserved from previous governments and its institutions, the task of reclaiming what has been lost and to restore the development of the Somali language is not easy. Figure 1 explains the details of these visits. I went to all parts of Somalia/Somaliland/Puntland, Djibouti, and the Somali speaking areas of Ethiopia. I was unable to travel to Kenya.

Figure 1
Regions Visited and Elders Interviewed

Dates	Regions Visited	Number of Elders Met
1994-96	Puntland	186
1996-97	Zone 5 of Ethiopia	168
1997 (4 months)	Djibouti	45
1997-98	Southern Regions of Somalia	269
1998 - present	Somaliland	321

In the first year of my research I realized there were uncountable alphabetical deficiencies in the existing Somali script. To overcome this loophole that prevented me from fulfilling all linguistic objectives that a modern, comprehensive, advanced dictionary needs, I was compelled to establish and, at the same time, adopt the following fundamental linguistic regulations on the gender and derivational structure of the Somali word.

Consonants "D" and "d"

After intensive research in the phonetic style of the Somali alphabet, I found that the letter "D" of the selected script represents two phonetically different sounds. They can be seen in the words below.

Xarafka "D.d"	*Xarafka "ȡ,δ"**
daa, dam, daan, deeb,	*δaδ, δaaδ, δan, δaab,*
ded, deeg, deg, dim,	*δeel, δeeq, δir, δiir,*
dil, dim, dig, doog,	*δiir, δib, δiif, δoor,*
dug, doog, dul, duul,	*δuδ, δub, δuur, δul,*
hawd, deyn, deyr, dowr,	*δayf, δayr, δaw, δabayn,*
duul, dud, doon, daar.	*δuul, δüδ, δoon, δaar.*

* *"ȡ,δ" this character represents the new consonant.*

If you read the above listed words carefully, you could easily differentiate the phonetical differences between the two consonants.

Vowels

The vowels of the Somali language are different from the way they were presented in the adopted script. I believe that the natural vowels of the Somali phonetical soundings could be correctly presented in the script as naturally divided into:

feminine vowels: *a, e. i, o, u and aa, ee, ii, oo, uu, and*

the masculine vowels: *á, é, í, ó, ú, and áá, éé íí, óó, úú.*

I believe that the laws on articulation and pluralities, which I found in my research and used in the manuscript, would make a positive addition to the present script of the Somali language. Now, the manuscript that I have the honor to present is about 45,000 words and constitutes one of the largest compendia ever collected of Somali vocabulary.

The dictionary is a constituent of all Somali sounding words, regardless of any segregating or confining factors such as regions, states, and frontiers. As much as the dialect is concerned and very different from the previous dictionary, I considered the two main dialects of the Somali language. This dictionary will safeguard the inherited cultural, social, and traditional respects of the Somali people in general, and those who are interested in learning Somalis and Somali language in particular.

The beneficiaries of this book could exceed millions in the future in expectation, but for the moment, raising funds and technical support is initially the most important task to achieve its publication.

Figure 2
Shaoallada Iyo Dhalankood

Dhalanka	**Tooxin-Codaynta Iyo Caynta Dhalankooda Shaqallada**		
	Gaaggaaban	**Dhexe**	**Dhaadheer**
Lab	a e i o u	ay aw ey ow oy	aa ee ii oo uu
Dhaddig	á é í ó ú	áy áw éy ów óy	áá éé íí óó úú

Figure 3
Tus: Falgalka Shaoallada

war-ka *wár-ta*	*ey-ga* *éy-da*	*dhig-ga* *dhíg-ta*	*gob-ka* *gób-ta*	*dul-ka* *dúl-sha*
laydh-ka *láydh-dha*	*weyhl-ka* *wéyl-sha*	*cawl-ka* *cáwl-sha*	*gows-ka* *guluukóws-ka*	*qoys-ka* *qóyn-ta*
daan-ka *dáán-ta*	*beer-ka* *béér-ta*	*diin-ka* *díín-ta*	*dhool-ka* *dhóól-sha*	*zuur-ka* *xúúr-ta*

F.G.
Sumadda astaynaysa dhaddignimada eraygu waa (′) oo dul saran shaqalka dhaddig oo aan u bixshey (tíf) iyo markay labo Yihiin (′′) oo aan u baxshey (tiiftiif).

Figure 4
Sample Page

daah[1] *(f): **1** ilaxidh u yeel; ishsha wax ka xeji. **2** raag; dib u dhac. **3** (xanuum) (ka soo ~) ka bogsood; rayso. >~* ***íd***[1] *-da: (m) daah u yeelíd; ilaxidhíd; daahis. >~****íd***[2] *-da: (m) raagíd: dib u dhicíd; daahís. >~****íd***[3] *-da: (m) (ka soo ~) madaxqaad; cudur ka kicíd; diif cudur ka muuqdo. >~****ís*** *-ta: (m) K daahíd. >~****ítaan*** *-ka: (m) K daahíd.*

daah[2]*-ha: (m) ilaxidh laga sammeeyey dhar ama shiraac ama wax kale oo lagu xidho albaabada iyó daaqadaha, iwm. ama qolalka lagu kala gooyo; ilaxidh.*

daaho *(f): daah u yeel. >~****an*** *- (t) ilaxidh loo yeelay; daah leh. >~****ashó*** *-da: (m) daah u yeelashó.*

daahi *(f): dib u rid; raaji. >~****ín*** *-ta: (m) dibudhigid; raajín; daahís. >~****is*** *-ka: (m) K daahís.*

daahsii *(f): dib ú rid; raaji. >~* ***íín*** *-ta: (m) dib u riditaan; raajín; daahsiis. >~****iis*** *-ta: (m) K daahsíín.*

dar[1] *(f): 1 (wax meel ku jira oo dareere ah) weel ama wax kale dhexgeli oo wax kaga qaad. 2 (ku ~) ku kordhi; ku biiri. 3 (ka sii ~ ama ka soo ~) (xumaanshó) sidii hore ka sii liido. >~**id**[1] -da: (m) weel, biyo ama wax kale, dhexgelín oo wax kaga qaadíd. >~**id**[2] -da: (m) (ku ~) ku kordhín; ku biirín; ku daris. >~**íd**[3] -da: (m) (ka sii ~ ama ka soo ~) xumaansho; sidii hore ka sii liidashó; ka daris. >~**ís** -ta: (m) K darid. >~**itaan** -ka: (m) (wax meel ku jira oo dareere ah) wax dhexgelin oo wax kaga qaaditaan; darniin. >~**niin** -ka: (m) K daritaan.*

dar[2] *-ka: (m) weelka xoolaha lagu shubo mid ka mid ah oo ka sammaysan harag weyn oo wareegsan oo gadaw leh; naadh.*

dar[3] *-ka: (m) meelo dhisan oo loogu talogalay in biyuhu ku soo ururaan ama lagu shubto; qabaal; berkéd.*

dar[4] *-ka: (m) dad; duul.*

dar[5] *-ta: (m) daraad; aw.*

darso *(f): (wax meel ku jira oo dareere ah) weel ama wax kale dhexgeli oo wax kaga qaado. >~**ad** -ka: (m) K darsasho. >~**asho**[1] -da: (m) (weel biyo, iwm.) dhexgelin oo wax kaga qaadashó. >~**asho**[2] -da: (m) (xanuun, xaaláád, iwm.) (soo ~ ama sii ~) xumaansho; ka soo (ama ka sii) daríd; darsad. >~i -ga: (m) K darsashó.*

CHAPTER THREE

Somali Syntax: Some Common Features

Mohamed Haji Rabi

Introduction

The syntactic features of the Somali language are distinctive and complex, like any other language. This paper chronicles nine of them that can be easily detected in the surface structures of the language. For a foreigner who needs to learn Somali, some of these features pose special problems because few Somalis can explain them. Four sentence particles are the first items to be recognized. In their absence, a Somali sentence becomes ungrammatical except the perfect aspect of declarative sentences. Second, the feature, definite, is marked for two meanings: visible (within sight or proximity) versus invisible (out of sight or beyond proximity). Third, case suffixes, appended to verbs, signal the relationships between verbs and nouns in sentences.

Word classes, the fourth, in a Somali sentences are three: nouns, verbs, and particles (sometimes called structural words). Word order, the fifth feature, varies between restricted (one order is grammatical) in intransitive sentences to unrestricted (every order is meaningful) perfect

aspect of declarative sentences. The sixth feature, intensive versus extensive, transforms a Somali sentence into two distinct forms of similar meaning. Negation, the seventh feature, is expressed in the particle *ma* and *aan*. It can also be doubled. Restrictive versus non-restrictive, the eighth feature, is marked with the particles *ee* and *oo* respectively. In recasting, the ninth feature, a Somali sentence evokes the word *waxa* (it, a noun substitute) in both extensive and intensive sentences.

The word common in this paper means features that are present in basic as will as non-basic sentences. A basic sentence in Somali is a declarative sentence and by nature is non-reducible. Deleting any one of its words renders it either incomplete or ungrammatical. In Somali, these sentences are basic as well as declarative:

1a. Nin waa kan.
Man SP.† this.
This is a man.

1b. Laf weeye tani.
Bone SP. this.
This is a bone.

1c. Naag ayaa heesaysa.
A woman SP. singing.
A woman is singing.

1d. Nin baa dab shidaya.
A man SP. fire making.
A man is making a fire.

1. Sentence Particles (SP.†)

The above sentences are declarative. The underlined particles *baa, ayaa, waa,* and *weeye* are a common feature of Somali syntax. Deleting these sentence particles produces ungrammatical strings of words:

*2a. *Ninkan.*
Man-this.
This man.

*2b. *Laf tani.*
Bone-this.
This bone.

*2c. *Naag heesaysa.*
Woman singing.
A woman singing.

*2d. *Nin dab shidaya.*
Man fire making.
A man making a fire.

After SP. deletions, the ungrammatical strings of words become NPs with modifiers. They can be made grammatical by adding a predicate with sentence particles. All the underlined are subject NPs with modifiers:

* *ungrammatical sentences* † *see last page of chapter for abbreviations*

3a. Ninkani waa agaasime.
Man-this SP. director.
This man is a director.

3b. Laftani geel weeye.
Bone-this camel SP.
That bone is from camel.

3c. Naag heesaysa ayaa taagan.
Woman singing SP. standing.
A singing woman is standing.

3d. Nin dab shidaya baa hadlaya
Man fire making SP. speaking.
A man making a fire is speaking.

Non-basic sentences by contrast are reducible to basic ones. Deleting one or more of its words does not necessarily render it incomplete or ungrammatical. The underlined words in each of these sentences can be deleted but each sentence stands out still as a complete sentence:

4a. Nin waa kan meesha jooga.
Man SP.† this place-the stay.
This is man who stays here.

4b. Laf weeye tani aan maanta arkay.
Bone SP. this I today saw.
This is a bone I saw today.

4c. Naag ayaa Meesha ka heesaysa.
Place woman SP. from singing.
A woman is singing in the place.

4d. Mar dhawayd, nin baa dab shidayay
A man SP. fire making.
A man is making a fire.

Each one of these underlined groups of words can be expanded into a basic sentence with a little modification, by adding to them, for instance, a sentence particle:

5a. Kan ayaa meesha jooga.
This SP. place-the stays.
This (he) stays the place.

5b. Laf baa aan maanta jebshay.
Bone SP. I today broke.
I broke a bone today.

5c. Meesha ayaa Cali ka hadlay.
Place-the SP. Ali from spoke.
Ali spoke from here.

5d. Mar dhawayd baa wiilku yimid.
When near SP. boy-the came.
The boy came a while ago.

Sentence particles have other syntactic functions. For example, the particles *baa* and *ayaa* mark noun phrases (NPs) while *waa* and *weeye* mark verb phrases (VPs). Waa and weeye do not govern subject NPs; they are part of the predicate while *baa* and *ayaa* govern the subject and topic NPs. Thus, subject NPs in the former are marked and those in the latter are unmarked. By moving subject NPs to the end of the sentences

(6a. to 6f.), therefore, sentences with particles *waa* and *weeye* remain grammatical while sentences with baa or ayaa are ungrammatical:

6a. Waa agaasime ninkani.
SP.director man-this.
This man is a director.

6b. Geel weeye laftani.
Geel SP. Bone-this
This bone is from camel.

*6c. *Ayaa heesaysa naag.*
SP.singing woman
SP.singing a woman

*6d. *Baa dab shidaya nin.*
SP.fire burning man
SP.fire burning a man.

*6e *Ayaa taagan naag heesaysa.*
SP.standing woman singing.
A standing woman standing.

*6f. *Baa hadlaya nin dab shidaya*
SP.speaking man fire making.
A speaking man making a fire.

In addition, *waa* and *weeye* can occupy the position of the verb 'to be' (7a. and 7b.), while sentences with *ayaa* or *baa* always have verbs (7c. and 7 d.). In underlined predicates (7a. and 7b.), *waa* always comes before the subject compliment (7a.), whereas *weeye* occupies after (7b.):

7a. Ninkani waa agaasime.
Man-this SP. director.
This man is a director.

7b. Laftani geel weeye.
Bone-this camel SP.
That bone is from camel.

7c. Naag ayaa heesaysa.
A woman SP. singing.
A woman is singing.

7d. Nin baa dab shidaya.
A man SP. fire making.
A man is making a fire.

Some questions and exclamations, but not imperatives, also accept some of the sentence particles:

Questions

9a. Ma nin baa yimid?
Qp man SP. come.
Has a man come?

9b. Waa immisa nin?
SP. Qw† man.
How many men are there?

9c. Shan qof weeye miyaa?
Five person SP. Qw.
Are they five persons?

9d. Ma naag ayaa heesayasa?
Qp† woman SP. singing.
Is a woman singing?

Exclamations

10a. Col baa soo socdaay!
Enemy SP. towards coming
An enemy is coming!

10b. Waa mas ee dilaay!
SP. Snake and kill.
Kill, it is a snake!

10c. Tuug weeye ee qataay!
Thief SP. and catch
Catch! It is a thief.

10d. Bahal ayaa soo dhacayaay!
Wild animal SP. toward barn.
In the barn, a wild animal is!

In exclamation, the verb form is changed from *10a. socda, 10b. dila. 10c. qabta,* and *10d. dhacaya* to *socdaay, dilaay, qabtaay* and *dhacayaay* to substitute for the exclamation mark in Somali oral discourse.

Imperatives

They are formed by deleting the topic/subject and the SP. from a declarative sentence: declarative sentence ➽ imperative sentence.

11a. Cali baa magaalada tegaya ➽ tag magaalada.
Ali SP. going town. Go town.
Ali is going to the town. Go to the town.

11b. Wiil waa (uu) cabayaa caanaha ➽ cab caanaha.
Boy SP. (he) drinking milk-the. Drink milk-the.
A boy is drinking the milk. Drink the milk.

11c. Copulative particle ➽ non-imperative structure.

11d. Naag ayaa heesayasa ➽ hees.
Woman SP. Singing sing.
A woman is singing sing.

Sentence particles are, then, a basic feature in Somali syntax. Without them, declarative sentences are transformed into ungrammatical structures *i.e.* words, phrases, or dependent clauses.

2. Definite VS Indefinite

Somali nouns are either masculine or feminine. There is no neuter. When indefinite, a feminine subject is marked and the masculine is unmarked or rather the markedness is covered when *waa* is in the sentence *i.e.* 12a. and b. below (*naagi ..., nin....*). Both the feminine as well as masculine are marked when *weeye* is in the sentence *i.e.* 12c. and d. (*tani.., kani..*). And both are unmarked when *baa/ayaa* is in the sentence *i.e.* 12e. and f. For example:

12a. *Naagi waa tan.*
Woman SP. this.
This is a woman.

12b. *Nin waa kan.*
Man SP. this.
This is a man.

12c. *Tani naag weeye.*
This woman SP.
This is a woman.

12d *Kani nin weeye.*
This man SP.
This is a man.

12e. *Naag baa joogta.*
Woman SP. stay.
A woman is here.

12f. *Nin ayaa jooga.*
Man SP. stay.
A man is here.

When definite, an NP is expressed in two forms: one for within proximity or visible (13a. to 13f.) and the other for beyond proximity or invisible (13g. to 13l.). For example:

13a. Ninku waa (uu) heesayaa.
13c Ninku agaasime weeye.
13e. Ninka ayaa/ baa heesaya.
13g. Ninkii waa (uu) heesayaa.
13i. Ninkii agaasime weeye.
13k. Ninkii ayaa/baa heesaya.

13b. Naagtu waa (ay) heesaysaa.
13d. Naagtu agaasime weeye.
13f. Naata ayaa/baa heesaysa.
13h Naagtii waa (ay) heesaysaa.
13j. Naagtii agasime weeye.
13l. Naagtii ayaa/baa heesaysa.

Moreover, subject NPs in 13a. and 13d. are marked because of the particles *waa* and *weeye.* Others are unmarked.

The concept of marked VS unmarked goes beyond feminine VS masculine. Whether feminine or masculine, definite subject NPs are marked in *waa* and *weeye* sentences with *i, u,* or *aa* and moving the subject NP to the end does not make the sentence ungrammatical (14.a.i. and 14.b.i.):

14.a.1.

Wiil)
Wiilku)
Wiilka gaabani) *waa (uu) jooga.*
Wiilka hadlayaa)
Wiilka dabka shidayaa)

14.a.2.

Boy)
Boy-the)
Boy short) *SP. (he) staying.*
Boy talking)
Boy fire burning)

14.a.3.

A boy)
The boy)
The boy who is short) *is here.*
The boy who is speaking)
The boy who is making the fire)

14.a.4

(wiil.
(wiilku.
Waa (uu) joogaa *(wiilka gaabani.*
(wiilka hadlayaa
(wiilka dabka shidayaa.

14.b.1.

Lafi)
Laftu)
Laftani) *geel weeye.*
Laftan cadi)
Laftan fiixaysaa)

14.b.2.

Bone)
Bone-the)
Bone-this) *camel is.*
Bone white)
Bone having pain)

14.b.3.

A bone)
The bone)
This bone) *is a camel's.*
The white bone)
The painful bone)

14.b.4.

(lafi
(laftu
Geel weeye (lafta
(laftan cadi
(laftan fiixaysaa

In addition, *waa* and *weeye* do not cluster with their subject NPs to form a nucleus. The NPs can be placed at the end of the sentence (14a.4 and 14b.4).

On the other hand, sentences with *baa/ayaa* (14c.1.) are unmarked and the positions of their NPs cannot be altered because the NPs and *baa/ayaa* cluster to form a nucleus, hence 14c.2 and 14c.3 are ungrammatical:

14.c.1.

Wiil)
Wiilka)
Wiilka gaaban) *baa/ayaa jooga.*
Wiilka hadlaya)
Wiilka dabka shidaya)

14.c.2

(wiil)
(wiilka)
**Baa/ayaa (wiilka gaaban*) *jooga.*
(wiilka hadlaya)
(wiilka dabka shidaya)

14.c.3

(wiil
(wiilka
**Baa/ayaa joogaa (wiilka gaaban*
(wiilka hadlaya
(wiilka dabka shidaya

3. Case Suffixes

These are another feature of Somali syntax. They mark some of the relations a noun has with the verb. All Somali verbs, however, do not mark all the case relations in the language. Some do, some do not. This variation extends from zero to five suffixes. Few verbs accept four to five, but one to three suffixes are commonly attached to many verbs:

15a. Inanta ayaa magaalada tagtay. (bfv^{t}tag + zero case suffix)
girl - the SP. town-the went.
The girl went to the town.

15b.1. Taajirka ayaa lacagta bixiyey. (bfv, bax + i causative suffix)
Trader-the SP. money-the paid.
The trader paid the money.

15b.2. Ninka ayaa gadhkiisa caseeyey (bfv, cas + ee causative suffix).
Man - the SP. beard - his redden.
The man tinted his beard red.

16. Ardayga ayaa qalinkii qaatay.(bfv, qaad + o autobenefactive suffix).
Pupil-the SP. pen-the took.
The pupil took the pen.

17a. Jidkii ayaa xidhmay. (bfv, xidh + an ergative suffix).
Road - the SP. closed.
The road is closed.

17b. Xamaalka ayaa alaabta gaadhigacanka qaadsiiyay.(Bfv, qaad + sii enabling causative suffix)
Porter-the SP. goods-the cart-the made carry.
The porter made the cart carry the goods.

18. Labadan wiil ayaa ultamay. (Bfn^{t}, ul + tan reciprocal suffix)
Two-these boy SP. beat stick.
These two boys beat each other with sticks.

19. Martidii waa ay qaadqaadatay cuntadii. (Bfv, qaad + qaad$_1$ + o$_2$ + repetitive + autob. suffixes).
Guests-the SP. pronoun they take-taken food-the.
The quests ate the food sparingly.

Five case suffixes can cluster at the end of few verbs, but these are rare *i.e. doordoor$_1$ ran$_2$ sii$_3$ s$_4$ an$_5$, or loollool$_1$ lan$_2$ sii$_3$ s$_4$ an$_5$.*

4. Word Classes

The words in a Somali sentence can be classified into three major groups: nouns, verbs, and particles (structural words). Adverbs group with nouns because they can function as topics and accept some determiners *e.g.* demonstratives (20a) and articles (20b):

20a. Mantadan ayaa (uu) wiilku yimid.
Day-this SP. (he) boy came.
Today, the boy came.

20b. Dhakhsaha uu u yimid ayaa aan ka yaabay.
Swiftness-the he to come SP. I from surprised.
I was surprised with how quickly he came.

Similarly, adjectives group with verbs because they accept tense among other criteria of verbs *e.g. weyn* (big), *weynaadaa* (gets bigger), *weynaaday* (got bigger), *weynaanayay* (was getting bigger), *weyneeyey* (was making it bigger), *weyneynayaa* (is making it bigger). All forms of Somali verbs can be used as adjectives as well *i.e. nin weyn* (a big man) is just like *nin hadlaya* (a speaking man* ⇒ a man who is speaking). All the above tense forms of *weyn* can be used to modify *nin* in the same way.

A quick scan through a quarter of a page in *Al-Jamhuuriya*, a Somali daily, reveals that the word classes in the selection are about 57% nouns, 22% verbs, and 21% particles. Thus, content words (CW) in Somali make about 79% of its word-stock. That is to say that content and structural words (SW) particles are at a ratio 4:1. A similar count of *The Republican*, a weekly translation of the Somali daily, reveals also that there are twice as many English content words as there are particles 66.67% and 33.33%, a ratio of 2:1.

Figure 1 notes that the Somali text consists of 13% (79 - 66) more content words than the English text whose structural words exceed at about the same percentage (33 - 19 = 14%) over the Somali text, a clear indication where the differences lie between the two languages.

Figure 1: Comparative Text Use



5. Word Order

At the surface, Somali word order varies from a restrictive (linear) to non-restrictive (free) order:

21a. Nin waa kan.
Kani waa nin.
Waa nin kani.

21b. Laf weeye tani.
Tani laf weeye.
Laf tani weeye.

21c. Naag ayaa heesaysa.

21d. Nin baa dab shidaya
Nin baa shidaya dab.
Dab nin baa shidaya.

21e. Nin shid dab. (perfect aspect - all variations are grammatical)

In 21c, of the six possible word orders, only one is correct (sentences with intransitive verbs). But of the six possible orders in 21a. and 21b. (copulative structures), three make sense. Here also *waa* is always before the subject complement while *weeye* is after it. Of the 24 possible orders in 21d. (transitive verbs), only three are meaningful. In 21e. (perfect aspect of transitive verbs), however, all the nine possible word orders are correct. What is then the underlying basic word order?

In languages that have various word orders in a sentence, there is an underlying, basic word order. That basic order of the words surfaces when

the nouns in a sentence are replaced with pronouns. That is subjects and objects are replaced by subject and object pronouns respectively. In 22a. and 22b., the italicized words are pronouns:

22a. Cali baa *i* salaamay.	22b. Waa *uu i* salaamay.
Ali-SUBJ† SP. *me*-OBJ†.	SP. *he*-SUBJ *me*- OBJ
greeted-VERB	greeted-VERB.
Ali greeted *me*.	He greeted *me*.

In transitive verbs, like *salaamay*, when subjects and objects are replaced with pronouns, the word order becomes SOV.† In Somali, therefore, regardless of the surface (examples 21, the underlying word order is as shown in example 22a. and 22b.

6. Intensive VS Extensive

In Somali sentences, all verbs in the present (simple and continuous) have two distinct forms and indicate the same meaning:

23a. Naag baa heesta/heesaysa.	*23b. Naagi waa (ay) heestaa/ heesaysaa.*
Woman SP. sings/ is singing.	*Woman SP. (she) sings/ is singing.*
A woman sings/ is singing.	*A woman sings/ is singing.*
23a. Nin ayaa dab shida/shidaya.	*23b. Nin waa (uu) dab shadaa/shadayaa.*
Man SP. fire burns/burning.	*Man SP. (he) fire burns/burning.*
A man makes/ is making a fire.	*A man makes/ is making a fire.*
24a. Adiga ayaa i salaama/salaamaya.	*24b. Adigu waa (aad) i salaantaa/salaamaysaa.*
You SP. me greet/greeting.	*You SP. (you) me greet/greeting.*
You greet/are greeting me.	*You greet/are greeting me.*

Andrzejewski (and perhaps others) regard 'a' sentences as intensive and 'b' sentences as extensive. It is possible that they have pragmatic uses that underlie their surface similarities *i.e.* 'discoursal' and 'non-discoursal.'

7. Negation

In Somali, negation is expressed by the particles *ma* (NP_1) and *aan* (NP_2). *Ma* always occurs immediately before the verb while the particle *aan* occurs immediately after the sentence particles:

25a.	*Kani waa nin.* ➛ *This SP. man.* *This is a man.*	*Kani nin ma aha.* *This nin np_1† is.* *This is not a man*
25b.	*Laf weeye tani.* ➛ *Bone SP. this.* *This is a bone.*	*Laf ma aha tani.* *Bone np_2 is this.* *This is not a bone.*
25c.	*Naag ayaa heesaysa* ➛ *Woman SP. singing.* *A woman is not singing.*	*i. Naagi ma heesayso.* ➛ *Woman np_1. singing.* *A woman is not singing.*
	ii. Naag ayaa aan heesayn. *Woman SP. np_2 singing.* *A woman is not singing.*	
25d.	*Nin baa dab shidaya* ➛ *Man SP.fire making.* *A man is making a fire.*	*i. Nin dab ma shidayo.* *Man fire np_1. making.* *A man is not making a fire.*
	ii. Nin ayaa aan dab shidayn. *Man SP. np_2 fire making.* *A man is not making a fire.*	*iii. Nin ma shidayo dab.* *Man np_1 making fire.* *A man is not making a fire.*

In the above examples, sentences 25a. and 25b. lack verbs, but the *aha* (verb to be) appears when the sentences are negated. In sentences (25c. and 25d.) though they are both in the same tense form, they show different endings, *heesayo/heesayn, shidayo/shidayn.* The first verb is for the negation of main clauses and the second for dependent clauses. This means that negation affects Somali verbs. The two particles, *ma* and *aan*, affect the verb differently. For instance, in the four common endings for a Somali verb, it is the simple present and the present continuous where *ma* affects the verb differently. In all other instances, *ma* and *aan* affect the verb the same way:

26a. Naag ayaa *(heesta.* - Simple Present
(heesaysa. - Present Continuous
(heestay. - Simple Past
(heesaysay. - Past Continuous

i Naagi ma *(heesto.*
(heesayso.
(heesin.
(heesayn.

ii Naag ayaa aan *(heesin.*
(heesayn.
(heesin.
(heesayn.

There is also a difference between *ma* and *aan* in the negation of main and dependent clauses. For instance, using the rule of relativization deletes one of the identical noun phrases. Collapsing *Naag ayaa heesaysa* with. *Naag ayaa joogta* gives *Naag ayaa heesaysa (Naag ayaa joogta)* or *Naag ayaa joogta (Naag ayaa heesaysa)* and is rewritten as *Naag heesaya ayaa joogta* or *Naag joogta ayaa heesaysa* by deleting one of the identical noun phrases with the particle. This forms relative clauses. Thus, *Naag ayaa joogta* is the main clause in the former and *heesaya* after *naag* represents a dependent clause whose subject of an intransitive verb has been deleted. By negating the main clause, sentence 27a. is obtained. Negating the dependent clause results in sentence 27b:

27a. Naagi ma joogto.
Woman np_1 *staying.*
A woman is not staying.

27b. Naag aan heesayn ayaa joogta
Woman np_2 *singing SP. staying.*
A woman is not staying.

Changing the negative particles renders 27c and d ungrammatical.

*27c. *Naag aan joogayn.*
Woman np_2 *staying.*
A woman not staying.

*27d. *Naag ma heesayso ayaa joogta.*
Woman np_1 *singing SP staying.*
A woman not singing SP staying.

The Somali language allows double negative in its syntax and in sentences that accept the double negative, the particle *ma* affects the verb, perhaps because *aan* clusters with the subjective pronoun:

28a. *Naag ayaa heesaysa.* ➻ *Naagi ma aanay heesayso.*
Woman SP.singing. *Woman np_1. np_2-she singing.*
A woman is singing. *A woman is not not singing.*

28b. *Laft weeye tani.* ➻ *Laf ma aanay ahaanayso tani.*
Bone SP. this. *Bone np_1 np_2-he being this.*
This is a bone. *This is not not a bone.*

28c. *Naag ayaa heesaysa.* ➻ *Naagi ma aanay heesayso.*
Woman SP. singing. *Woman np_1. np_2 -she singing.*
A woman is singing. *A woman is not not singing.*

28d. *Nin baa dab shidaya* ➻ *Nin dab ma aanuu shidayo.*
Man SP. fire making. *Man fire np_1. np_2-she making.*
A man is making a fire. *A man is not making a fire.*

8. Restrictive VS Non-restrictive:

The particles *ee* and *oo* are used to express restrictive (defining) and non-restrictive (non-defining) structures in Somali syntax. When the head of a noun phrase has a definite article or a determiner, adding words of the same grammatical status introduces *ee* to the NP. Similarly adding words of the same grammatical status to the head of a noun phrase without a definite article or a determiner introduces *oo* to the NP:

29a.1. *Waa nin weyn oo cas.*
SP. man big and red.
It is a big and red man.

29a.2. *Waa ninka weyn ee cas ka aan arkay.*
SP. man-the big and red the one I saw.
It is the big, red man I saw.

29b.1. *Qof gaaban oo madaw weeye kaasi.*
Person small and black SP. that.
That is a small and black person.

29b.2. *Qofkan gaaban ee madaw weeye kaasi.*
Person-the small and black SP. that.
That person is small and black.

29c.1. Naag cayaaraysa oo sacabinaysa ayaa heesaysa.
A woman dancing and clapping hands SP. singing.
A woman who is dancing and clapping is singing.

*29c.2. Naag*taas *cayaaraysa ee sacabinays ayaa heesaysa.*
Woman-that dancing and clapping hands SP. singing.
That woman who is dancing and clapping hands is singing.

29d.1. Nin biyo sita oo fooryaya baa dab holcaya oo dhinbiilo leh shidaya.
Man water carrying and whistling SP. fire flaming in full and having embers making.
A man who is carrying water and whistling is making a fire which is flaming in full with embers.

29d.2. Ninkan biyaha sita ee fooryaya baa dabkeer holcaya ee dhinbiilaha leh shidaya.
Man-this water carrying and whistling SP. fire-that (on the side) which is flaming in full and having embers making.
This man who is carrying water and whistling is making a fire which is flaming in full with embers.

29e.1. Naag guriga joogta oo cunto karinaysa ayaa heesaysa.
Woman staying in the house and cooking food SP. singing.
A woman who is staying in the house and cooking food is singing.

29e.2. Naagtiisa guriga joogta ee cunto karinaysa ayaa heeaysa ayaa heesaysa.
Woman-his staying in the house and cooking food SP. singing
His woman who is staying in the house and cooking food is singing.

In some southern dialects, this distinction is not clear enough; *ee* and *oo* seem to have equal status in most of the above structures.

9. Recasting (Heralding)

In Somali, nouns can be replaced by *waxa*, a noun substitute, as well as three other types of personal pronouns: *Adiga* (2nd person) in place of

topics, *aad* (2nd person) in place of subjects, and *ku* (2nd person) in place of objects:

30a. *Adiga ayaa jooga.*
You SP. stay.
You are here.

30b. *Maanta ayaa aad timid.*
Today SP. you came.
You came today.

30c. *Ninka ayaa ku salaamay.*
Man-the SP. you greeted.
The man greeted you.

Recasting example 30, the following sentences are formed:

31a. *Waxa jooga adiga.*
Thing-the stay you.
Who stays is you. Or
You are staying.

31b. *Waxa aad timid maanta.*
Thing-the you came today.
Who came today is you. Or
You came today.

31c. *Waxa ku salaamay ninka.*
Thing you greeted man-the.
Who greeted you is the man. Or the man greeted you.

When the subject/topic NPs in intensive and extensive sentences are recast or heralded. The two merge into one form, a and b becoming c:

32a. *Ali ayaa heesaya (intensive).*
32b. *Ali waa (uu) heesayaa (extensive).*
32c. *Waxa heesaya Ali.*

Conclusively the particles *ayaa* and *baa* function as noun phrase (NP) markers. They are part of it, while *waa* and *weeye* mark the verb phrases. The particles *baa* and *ayaa* also cover subject-noun phrases, while *waa* predicates sentences as well as occupying the place of the verb 'to be.' *Weeye* substitutes for the verb 'to be' marking the subject noun phrases as well. Definite nouns express two meanings: within proximity or visibility and beyond proximity or invisible. A Somali verb can accept one or several cases. That is between zero to five suffixes *i.e.* tag (zero suffix) ..... *loolloollansiisan* ($loollool_1$ lan_2 sii_3 so_4 n_5).

There are about twice as many nouns as there are verbs and particles on a page of Somali text. But in terms of content words VS structural

words, particles constitute less than one-third. At the surface, Somali word order varies. The basic (underlying) word order is, however, Subject + Object + Verb (SOV). Somali syntax is a double-barreled communicative machine. Thus, *nin baa hadlaya* (a man is talking) or *nin waa (uu) hadlayaa* (a man is talking), though different in form, seem to express the same meaning. An attempt to explain the difference labels the first as intensive and the second as extensive. When negating a Somali sentence, the norm is to use *ma* at the main clause and *aan* at the subordinate clause and double negative at either level. The particle *ee* introduces a defining element for a sentence and similarly *oo* introduces a non-defining one. Recasting introduces *waxa* to the sentence merging extensive and intensive forms into one.

Abbreviations

Bfv	*basic form is verb*
Bfn	*base form is noun*
CW	*Content Words*
Np	*Noun Phrase*
NP	*Negative Particle*
SOV	*Subject + Object + Verb*
SP	*Sentence Particle*
SUBJ	*Subject*
OBJ	*Object*
Qp	*Question Particle*
QW	*Question Word*

CHAPTER FOUR

Towards the Paremiological Minimum of the Somali Language

G. Kapchits

Parermiological minima of the most frequently used phraseological units of the national languages should now be established... W. Mieder[1]

Introduction

The compound term placed in the title of the paper seems to need deciphering. *Paremia* is a Greek word which means "saying parable." *Paremiology* refers to the philological branch of science dealing with proverbs, proverbial phrases, and so on. The paremiological minimum is a minimal set of proverbs, sayings, and other paremias, the learning of which is necessary for the understanding a native or any foreign language. The fact is that paremias not only decorate speech, but also serve as a

convenient means of expressing typical, real, or thinkable situations and serve as the signs and models of what they represent.[2] That is why proverbs are used so readily.

I have already had occasion to talk about what bearers of different languages do when they come across the necessity to describe a situation. For example, it is common to meet with a situation in which, "If a man acts alone, he cannot do much, or his efforts will not be effective." A Somali, as a rule, recollects a proverb *Far keliya fool ma dhaqdo (One finger cannot wash a face),* an Oromo; *One finger cannot catch a fly,* a Russian; One man on the battle-field is not a warrior.[3] Knowledge of popular proverbs is a sign of a *cultural literacy*, which, as has been justly mentioned by Mieder, goes hand in hand with the paremiological minimum.[4]

The list of the best known proverbs can be established by means of a special experiment, the theoretical grounds and methods of which have been elaborated by the outstanding Russian folklorist, G. Permjakov (1919-1983).[5] The experiments he conducted in the mid-1970s revealed the Russian paremiological minimum which, as it turned out, consists of 300 proverbs, sayings, and comparative phrases of the type of by-words.[6] Later on, research directed at establishing a paremiological minima of different cultures became a special (and the most important) part of the youngest branch of the science about proverbs, *empirical paremiology,* that operates statistical methods of analysis.[7]

At the end of the 1980s, a group of German researchers (R. Baur, P. Grzybek, and Ch. Chlosta) initiated a project to discover the commonly known German and Croatian proverbs.[8] In the 1990s, F. Schindler[9] and A. Thotné-Litovkina,[10] attempted to establish paremiological minima for the Czech and Hungarian languages, respectively.

The Somali paremiological experiment, sponsored by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinshaft (The German Research Society), took place in two stages: at Humboldt University in 1999, and at the Free University in 2001. The experiment had two goals:

> ... to discover how many proverbs and which of them are still widely used in Somali culture
>
> ... to find out what the proverb knowledge of the Somalis depends upon.

Organization of the Experiment

To achieve the first goal, it was necessary, to compile *an experimental corpus*, which would include the potentially known proverbs in the quantity acceptable for the work with the informants. The importance of this stage of the project may be well illustrated by a Syrian proverb: *What you put in the pot you will have in your spoon.* In the "pot" of the experiment was *Qaamuuska Maahmaahyada Soomaaliyeed (The Dictionary of Somali Proverbs)*,[11] which contains more than six thousand paremias and their variants. They had been collected from more than one hundred sources and borrowed (with all necessary references) from 25 books, booklets, and articles, starting with the classical *Die Somali-Sprache,* by Leo Reinisch, published in 1900. It also included my first collection *Maahmaahyo Soomaaliyeed,* issued in 1983, and concluded with *Murtidu aa Hodantinnimo*, by Abdurahman H. Aden, which appeared in 1995. These sources (written and oral) often contain the same proverbs (or their variants). The dictionary therefore indicates the frequency of their usage. It suffices to look, for example, at two neighboring proverbs that affirm (each in its own way) that "there is no use in verbosity:"

Hadal haamo lagama dhaansho. T, Y and
Hadal haan ma buuxsho. 1,3,101
Hadal haan ma buuxiyo. P,7,
Hadal haamo ma buuxsho.101
Hadal haamo lagama buuxsho.V,W
Hadal bilaale ma buuxsho.Y
Hadal badan haan ma buuxsho.T
Hadal badani haan ma buuxsho.4
Hadal badani koob ma buuxsho.N

Note that the first one is accompanied by two letters, meaning that it was taken from two publications and, therefore, is known to at least two authors. The second proverb is supplied with indices and is followed by variants, which also have indices referring to the sources from which they were taken. The addition of the indices shows that the second proverb, together with its variants, is known to at least twelve people. In other words it was clear that *Hadal haan ma buuxsho* was more popular than *Hadal haamo lagama dhaansho*, which was finally confirmed by the test.

But let us review the experimental corpus. To expose it, we prepared two lists: A and B.

In List A, three thousand proverbs that occupied the first lines of the entries and which I regard as "standard variants" (which had to be confirmed or disproved by the experiment) were included. For example, a proverb affirming that "Many words cannot fill a pitcher," entered the list in the form of *Hadal haan ma buuxsho* because this particular form was found in the majority of our sources. Copies of List A were handed out to six Somali experts in folklore with the request to mark those proverbs that they did not know.

List B was made out of those proverbs in the dictionary that had been received from two or more sources. As a result of combining List A (with the marks of the experts) and List B, another list emerged: List C. It yielded 1,000 proverbs, scored from 7 to 30 points, as empirically ascertained by 7 to 30 Somalis. These particular proverbs formed the experimental corpus, the list of proverbs for the questionnaires, which were to be distributed among some members of the Somali community in Berlin. But before doing this, it was necessary to take one more step, to cut off from every proverb the words which were beyond the limits of its first modelling part, that is, to leave only the beginnings of proverbs in the questionnaires:

Aabbahay baa xoolo lahaan jirey
Aabbe, kan yar iga celiyoo
Aan hadalno waa
Aabaal nin gala waa la arkay
Abaal raaga rag baa leh

and to ask the respondents to add the missing endings. This ingenious method of testing, invented by Permjakov and successfully applied to all the subsequent experiments, allows those proverbs to be revealed which are *actively* used in *contemporary* culture.

One thousand proverbs of the main types,[12] of which the Somali paremiological stock consists, including the so-called *tiroley* (proverbs based on numbers, which are traditionally attributed to proverbs) were inscribed in the questionnaires. Besides this, to get an idea about the factors influencing proverb knowledge, which was the second aim of the experiment, the questionnaires asked about the age, sex, education, place of living in Somalia (city/village/nomadic area), mode of life till 18 years (nomadic/settled), and the year of emigration of the respondents.

Forty five of approximately 250 Somalis who live in Berlin, men and women of three age groups (from 20 to 30, 30 to 40, and over 40) agreed to participate. The questionnaires were anonymous, which assured sincere answers and helped some of the informants to agree to be tested in spite of, according to their opinion, "a poor" knowledge of proverbs that would inevitably reveal itself.

However, soon after a pilot group of seven subjects, accompanied by the instruction to act independently, set out to fill in the questionnaires, it became apparent that it would take more time and energy than they were ready for. Therefore, I was obliged to cut the number of proverbs by one third at the expense of the lower (the less known) part of the experimental corpus. In the end, the beginnings of 656 proverbs remained in the questionnaires.

Completed questionnaires were returned by 43 of the 45 participants. Thirty nine documents were recognized as valid (among those rejected, two had skipped pages, the other two had been filled in with one and the same hand). The data from 39 questionnaires, that is all completions of the 656 truncated proverbs, have been thoroughly evaluated, registered, and organized in List D. Here is one of its fragments (a proverb *Soomaalidu been waa sheegtaa, beense ma maahmaahdo* (Somalis can lie, but their lie will never become a proverb):

574. *Soomaalidu been waa /sheegtaa, beense ma maahmaahdo.*
2,4,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,26,28,29,30,31,32,34,35,36,37,38,39
...*sheegtaa, laakiinse kuma maahmaahdo.*4,39
...*sheegtaa, been kuma maahmaahdo.*5
...*sheegtaa ee been ma maahmaahdo.*6,7,16,17,34
...*sheegtaa, beense kuma maahmaahdo.*10,14,23,31
...*sheegtaa ee been kuma maahmaahdo.*15
...*sheegtaa, laakiin been ma maahmaahdo.*18,24
...*sheegtaa, se ma maahmaahdo.*19
...*ku hadashaa, laakiin been ma maahmaahdo.*21,38
...*sheegtaa, laakiin been ma ku maahaahdo.*22
...*hadashaa, beense ma maahmaahdo.*26
...*sheegtaa, laakiin been kuma maahmaahdo.*28
...*sheegtaa, laakiin ma maahmaahdo.*29
...*sheegtaa ee kuma maahmaahdo.*30
...*sheegtaa ee been ma maahmaahdo.*35

The number before the proverb is its ordinal (according to the Somali alphabet) number in the questionnaire. The oblique stroke after the focus marker *waa* shows that it concluded the first part of the proverb, which figured in the questionnaires. The sequence of numbers that follow the proverb are the numbers of questionnaires in which the beginning of the proverb was correctly completed. The quantity of numbers indicates the number of respondents who demonstrated an active knowledge of this proverb. Here their number is 32. Set below are the variants of the second part of the proverbs added by the participants of the experiment. The numbers after each variant show the number of informants who know the proverb in this form. As was justly assumed by Grzibek and Chlosta, theorists of empirical paremiology, "the most frequent form(s) filled in by the informants can be regarded as the contemporary standard variant(s)."[13] In the case under discussion such a variant is the expected form from the experimental corpus, because it was confirmed by eight respondents, by much more than any other form.

Results Of the Experiment.

Analysis of the summary List D has allowed the establishment of 226 proverbs actively known by the majority (from 51.28% to 100%) of the informants. It is the search for these generally known paremias that was the main goal of the experiment. Here are some of them:

Known to 100% of respondents:

> *Aabbe, kan yar iga celiyoo kan weyn igu sii daa.* (Oh, father, save me from the small one, the big one I shall manage myself.)

This proverb is used when somebody is unable to solve a small problem, but thinks he can deal with a big one, or when somebody is trying to palm off on to someone else the solution of a problem he cannot solve himself. This goes back to a story about a boy who was often set upon by other boys of his age. One day the boy and his father encountered one of his attackers, who had a bigger fellow with him. The victim, realizing that if it came to blows he would not be able to beat the boy of his own age, but that the big fellow would scarcely want to fight with him, pronounced these words, which became a proverb.

This single proverb, which is known to all the participants of the experiment, belongs to the not very numerous type of Somali paremias,

the so-called *non-divided sentences.* They are proverbs without immediate motivation of the general meaning, which stem neither directly nor through an image from the meaning of their components, but are determined by the context from which these proverbs were originally taken and which they recall. Among the most popular proverbs there are some other specimens of this kind.

Known to 97.43% of respondents:

> *Allow, nimaan wax ogayn ha cadaabin.* (Oh Allah, do not punish a man who sins through ignorance.)
>
> *Hubsiimo hal baa la siistaa.* (To know something for sure, one would even part with a she-camel.)

Known to 94.87% of respondents:

> *Af jooga looma adeego.* (Do not speak for [lit: do not serve for] a mouth that is present [i.e. one should not speak on behalf of a person who is present].)
>
> *Naftu orod bay kugu aammintaa.* (The soul tells you to run as fast as you can [*i.e.* to save your life with all your might].)
>
> *Nin tuur lihi siduu u seexdo isagaa yaqaan.* (A hunchback knows how he should sleep [i.e. every man knows better than you what he needs].)
>
> *Shimbirba shimbirkiisuu la duulaa.* (Each bird flies only with birds [lit: bird] of its own kind. And so on).

The list of the most popular Somali proverbs I do not call a paremiological minimum. Establishing the minimum requires a more scaled experiment, though of course, *It is not necessary to drain the sea to find out that its water is salty* (a Korean proverb).

Those proverbs, which adjoin the lower boundary of the list, may drop out of it. On the other hand, the paremias that failed to cross it by only a few points will probably manage it with a widened staff of informants. It is certainly true that the minimum may increase due to the extension of the experimental corpus. The destiny of the short proverbs,

such as *Dani waa seto (*Gains are like a hobble on one's legs*)* and *Dani xishood ma leh (*Gains are shameless, *i.e.* in striving for gains a man loses all sense of shame*)*, the two initial words of which in the questionnaires either contain not enough information (the first case) or more than enough (the second case) should be decided by additional tests. The proverbs that differ from one another only by one word: *Fuley wax ka qoryo badan (*Nobody arms himself as heavily as a coward*)* and *Fuley wax ka daymo badan (*Nobody glances behind as often as a coward*)* will need special attention.

But his is a question of the future, probably of the remote future, since organization of field experiments is troublesome and hard work, and scaled experiments need substantial financing (the lack of which, by the way, stopped the German and Croatian minimum finding experiments which had been started so brilliantly).

The 226 proverbs, which are widely used in contemporary Somali culture, will be published as a separate book. It would be useful to include them in Somali dictionaries, school programs, and in university courses of Somali as a foreign language, as well as to introduce them to the growing Somali diaspora, the proverb knowledge of the young generation of which, as the experiment revealed, leaves much to be desired.

The thorough fixation of all the variants found in the questionnaires has allowed the exposition of the standard forms of the commonly known proverbs. It turned out that more than a dozen are now in use, though not in the same form they have in the majority of sources. For example, *Dab munaafa shiday* ***m'min*** *baa ku gubta (*A fire lit by a sinful man [lit: a hypocrite] burns a sinless man [lit: a good Muslin]*)*, but not *Dab munaafaq shiday* ***muslin*** *baa ku gubta; Nin tuur lihi siduu u seexdo isagaa yaqaan (A* hunchback knows how he should sleep *[i.e.* every man knows better than you what he needs]*)*, but not *Nin tuur lihi tab uu u seexdo ma waayo; Miro gunti ku jira* ***kuwo*** *geed saaran looma daadiyo (*One does not throw away fruit in the pocket for the sake of fruit on the tree*)*, but not *Miro gunti ku jira* ***miro*** *geed saaran looma daadiyo* and so on.

In general, the multivariation of Somali proverbs requires a lot of understanding. Two explanations lie on the surface: the dialectal diversity of the Somali language and the absence of language standards, which take shape in the course of the development of the written language. But it is possible that there are other reasons the discovery of which is a challenge to researchers of the Somali folklore.

An amazing fact is that not one of the 226 proverbs which turned out to be known to the majority of the participants was completed in one and the same way. This applies to the shortest proverbs, as well as to the longest ones, and seems not to depend upon the usage of the alliteration or other artistic means. For example, 24 out of the 26 informants who know the proverb *Dhar magaalo intii laga xirto waa dhowdahay, dhal magaalse intii laga noqdo waa dheer tahay (*One can quickly put on town clothes, but it takes a long time to become a town man*)* introduced their own variants. It could well be an urban proverb, presumably a young one, and therefore, may be not "settled" yet. But in the neighborhoods there is a proverb that for sure reflects the experience of nomads: *Dhar aand lahayni dhaxan kaama celiyo* (Somebody else's clothes do not warm you) It comes in many different forms: ... *dhaxan kaama cesho, ...kuma dhaxan tiro, ...feero kuuma daboolo, ...dhaxan kaama dado, dhaxan kaama reebto* and even ... *futo kuuma qariyo*!

The 135 pages of List D integrated all of the data from all 39 questionnaire and will be published on the Paremiological site in the Internet (http://www.utas.edu.ua/docs/flonta) for further folklore, philological, linguistic, and other researches.

And now, some statistics, which are not approved by Germans who affirm that one can prove anything by their means, but are respected by Americans (There is safety in numbers) and are adored by Somalis *(Xisaabi xil ma leh* – To count [money, things] is not shameful). Since the maximum number of 39, I have operated so far, is to be divided into smaller components in accordance with age, sex, education, etc. of the informants, the following data are relevant only to the particular group of the Somali Berliners that participated in the experiment.

Twenty six male (66.66%) and 13 female (33.33%) subjects completed the questionnaires. They represent three age-groups: >40 years (9 subjects or 23.08%), 30-40 years (18 subjects or 46.21%) and 20-30 years (12 subjects or 30.17%).

One of the striking peculiarities of the information derived is their high educational standard: 10 subjects (25.64%) had finished intermediate school (8 years of study); 19 subjects (48.72%) finished secondary school (12 years of study); and 10 subjects (25.64%) had graduated from university.

Another peculiarity which distinguishes this set of respondents from the virtual "ideal sa mple" is that before emigration, the majority (32 subjects or 82.05%) had lived in cities, with only three subjects (7.69%) in villages and four subjects (10.26%) in nomadic areas. Thirty one

participants (79.49%) of the experiment had spent their childhood and youth in cities, 8 (20.51%) in nomadic areas. Seventeen subjects (43.59 %) emigrated from Somalia more than 10 years ago, 21 subjects (53.85%) less that ten years ago, and one subject (2.56%) did not answer the relevant question.

The preliminary examination of the bivariate relationships between the above mentioned variables and proverb knowledge (the number of correctly filled in proverbs by every participant had been calculated by a special computer program) has brought the following results:

... Males know more proverbs than females, but their advantage is relatively small (respectively 50.60% and 49.40%)

... The 30-40 year respondents know more proverbs than others (37.51%). Approximately the same level (37.43%) is demonstrated by the respondents over 40 years (37.43%). The knowledge of the 20-30 year old respondents is much worse (25.06%)

... The higher the level of education, the higher the knowledge of proverbs (224,5, 255,2 and 287 proverbs are known to the mean representatives of the groups with intermediate, secondary, and higher education respectively)

... The respondents with nomadic background know more proverbs than others (365,2 proverbs per person); the respondents from villages know more proverbs than those from cities (323 and 235,3 proverbs per person respectively)

... The participants who had grown up among nomads demonstrated substantial superiority over those who had spent their young years in cities (341,4 and 233,3 proverbs per person respectively)

... The respondents with less than ten years record of emigration know fewer proverbs than those who emigrated more than 10 years ago (237,7 and 264,9 proverbs per person respectively). This paradox may be explained by the fact that the first group consists of much younger Somalis than the second one.

According to the presented calculations, all the variables seem to have some impact on the knowledge of proverbs. These results should be compared with the corresponding calculations of other researchers involved in the statistics of paremiology.

The analysis of interrelated variables, such as age and education, age and sex, age, and time of absence from Somalia, age, sex and residence before the emigration seem to need the application of more elaborated statistical methods, such as for example, the linear multiple regression model. In conclusion I would like to express my gratitude to Sheila Andrzejewski for her help in reading this paper and checking my English.

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CHAPTER FIVE

A Comparison of the Oral Poetic Styles of Performance Between Somali and Mande Traditions: Toward a Unified Theory of Oral Poetic Composition

John William Johnson

During the past half century, a number of important and provocative theories concerning the composition of oral poetry have emerged from scholars who have distinguished themselves by conducting fieldwork to gather hard evidence in support of their suppositions. Using tape recorders and similar earlier devices, these scholars actually collected the poetry verbatim from the reciters during performance, and came to their conclusions based on findings that, in some cases, contradicted previous theories concerning how oral poetry was composed. Moreover, a confusion between composition and recitation sometimes clouded the

issue of the actual creation of oral poetry during performance. In this paper, I wish to survey three major theories of oral composition that have inspired students of oral poetry in this important debate. I want to draw attention to some of the history of these theories, to describe the main conclusions which led scholars to construct them, and finally, drawing upon my own fieldwork in two unrelated areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, I wish to offer my own contribution to this debate in the form of a more unified theory of oral composition, which I hope will help us better understand how oral poets go about the process of creating their poetry.

Main Theories of Oral Composition

No one can deny the importance and the impact of the theory of oral poetic composition first introduced by Milman Parry and later perfected by A. B. Lord. Lord's book *The Singer of Tales*, first published in 1960, has had a lasting effect on thinking in this area. Indeed, the *oral-formulaic* thesis made a great impact on a number of disciplines, not the least of which was folkloristics. Parry and Lord explained how it was possible for a bard to sing vast amounts of poetry for long periods of time without stopping, through the structural use of linguistic formulas and narrative themes. The impact of this thesis was so powerful that it produced a certain degree of intolerance for other theories concerning oral composition. Lord often used the terms *oral poetry* and *oral-formulaic poetry* synonymously. An academic feud arose between him and Ruth Finnegan over the question of memorization in oral poetry. Finnegan argued for a broader perspective, which would allow memory a place in oral composition. For her argument, Finnegan relied upon my research and that of such European scholars as my teacher and mentor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, B. W. Andrzejewski. Andrzejewski studied the oral poetic tradition among the Somalis in the Horn of Africa, which laid claim to unique composition of specific poems and verbatim memorization of the same in their oral tradition, even differentiating between poets and memorizers, the latter being skilled at memorizing vast amounts of oral poetry composed by other people. Lord never seemed to want to allow for the claim of memorization among oral poets, but he did concede that there was something different from oral-formulaic poetry in Somalia. He once referred to the Somali poetry I was studying as "written literature without writing."

This debate over memory and formula continued between scholars

of the American school of oral literature, headed by Lord, and the European school of oral literature, with scholars mainly in Britain and France. Later, yet another player emerged on the scene, whom I feel has never received proper recognition for his contributions. In 1983, Jeff Opiand published a book on Xhosa oral poetry of southern Africa. His thesis became the third major theory in this great debate, stating that neither oral-formulaic composition, nor verbatim memorization was involved in the composition of the Xhosa *izibongo* praise-poetry of southern Africa. I propose to call this method of composition free-style. In the early 1980s, Opiand went on tour in the United States with an *imbongi* praise-poet demonstrating how this variety of oral poetry was composed and recited at the same time, but unlike oral-formulaic poetry, did not contain the tell-tale repetition so characteristic of the latter. Nor did it rely upon a characteristic set of themes always present in oral-formulaic traditions.

Opiand's method of presenting this thesis to his audience on this tour was first to lecture on this form of composition, describing its nature and occurrence among the Xhosa people, and then to introduce his companion on tour, who was an *imbongi*. The praise-poet would finish the evening's presentation by singing an extended poem to the audience in Xhosa while Opiand tape recorded the performance. During the rest of the evening, and often far into the night, the two colleagues would transcribe and make a rough translation of the poem into English in preparation for a seminar which they held the next morning for a smaller group of graduate students and faculty. After these sessions, they were off to the next city on their planned tour. Opiand proved his theory to my satisfaction by the hard evidence of these performances. Repetition and thematic structures were absent in this presentation; yet each poem was topically concerned with the audience and context of each performance site.

Having conducted fieldwork in two unrelated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in which different composition styles were attested, I decided to investigate the issue of memory for myself, utilizing a methodology that I described to Lord in a telephone conversation in 1986. He approved of the approach. I needed no convincing about the oral-formulaic mode, since I had already collected and analyzed the Epic of Son-Jara, the national epic of the Mande peoples of West Africa, and found this form of composition to be the norm there. But there were a number of problems with the Somali claims of verbatim memorization. I could not be sure that published Somali poetry had been collected in a reliable manner. As a volunteer in the United States Peace Corps, before

my training as a folklorist, I had worked with my beloved teacher, a Somali scholar renowned among Somalis as the foremost expert on their oral poetry, Xaaji Muusa Xaaji Ismaaciil Galaal. Muusa's interest in Somali poetry was mainly social, historical, and political, although he spent a great deal of effort collecting all kinds of oral literature.

He was also not trained as a fieldworker in folklore, though he had worked with Andrzejewski in the latter's research into both Somali linguistics and oral literature. There was also the problem of collecting materials during performance with tape recorders, so that the exact words of the performer could be caught and transcribed without alteration. Muusa was not adverse to changing the line of an oral-dictated text if it did not scan properly, or if it was "corrected" by another memorizer or poet of Muusa's acquaintance, who knew the same poem. In short, he readily altered the transcribed text when he thought it was necessary.

Andrzejewski also altered texts when Somali poets or memorizers told him a line was incorrect in their view, or for some other reason. In his seminal study *Somali Poetry: An Introduction* (Oxford, 1964), for example, he disconnected the contractions in the transcriptions of his collected data, because it was the custom of the day for linguists who wanted to assist their readers in understanding the grammar of the languages they studied. When prosodic rules of Somali poetry finally became clear in later years, it was fairly easy to reconnect the contractions, because they are necessary to the meter.

Andrzejewski also made it a practice to use a different poem each time he utilized a verse to exemplify a linguistic rule or a literary concept. In this manner, he said, more poetry by more poets would be published for the record. Both these practices were a problem for the folklorist needing authentic texts and wanting to compare variants of these texts, if indeed they existed as unique compositions by a single poet, memorized by others for public performance. Lord confirmed my intention to collect as many variants as I could, both from different reciters and from the same reciter at different times. I was fortunately successful in doing this in my field trip to Somalia in 1987.

So, the research problem was to test the waters in Somalia, to determine how Somalis composed their poetry, and mainly to see if they did compose it once and allow it to be memorized for later performance by multiple reciters in numerous contexts. I was hopeful that my methodology would prove this thesis once and for all, but I was surprised by what I actually discovered. I went hunting for goldfish and found not only goldfish, but koi as well. I found two methods of composition in

Somalia and was able to conclude that both forms of poetic composition in Somalia are related. Let me outline my findings.

Memorized Poetry

Somalis use poetry in almost every social setting in society, and poems are particularly necessary in political discourse. Though these poems are not of epic length, like epic bards, Somali reciters memorize thousands of lines, because they remember scores of poems. Field data proves to my satisfaction that classical poetry (*gabay, jiifto, geeraar,* and *buraambur*) as well as some of the more complex mat-weaving poems of women, all belong to a variety of Somali poetry which is memorized. With this type of poetry, composition, and recitation represent separate skills. For both poet and memorizer, the mastery of a very complex prosodic template is essential. The poet must also be talented in the creative use of language. On the other hand, the memorizer must have a powerful memory, which he or she cultivates over years. I have observed memorizers correct poets who were singing their own poetry into my tape recorder, and it is not uncommon for a skilled poet to have a poor memory, especially in his senior years. It is equally common for a person with little talent for composition to be possessed of a remarkable memory and to specialize in singing other people's poetry. Some men like Xuseen Diqle, the official memorizer of state poetry for the Dervish Movement in Somalia during the first two decades of the last century, were renowned for their skills of memory but did not compose much or any poetry of their own. Memorized poetry in Somalia is characterized by very complex meter. I would suggest that the degree of complexity in the prosody of Somali genres is directly proportional to the degree of memorization that is characteristic in such poetry.

I have also observed that the alliteration rule is so taxing for poets of classical genres that some specialize in only a few consonants. One of the traits that made the Sayyid Maxamed Cabdille Xasan so renowned as a poet was that he did not limit himself to any particular alliteration, but instead, composed with most consonants as well as with the vowels. He also composed in a number of genres besides innovating with the music and strophic structures of the most prestigious poem, the *gabay*.

Given these limitations in how Somali poetry had been collected and published in previous years, if I was to test memorization in classical poetry, it was necessary in my own fieldwork to get the same poem from different reciters and the same poem from the same reciter at different

times. I was able to do this for a number of poems, one of which I should like to refer to today.

Baabuulle (Lion's Mane)
Samatar Baxnaan (composer)

1a. Isagoo burhaan lagu ogaa, boqor hadduu diido,
1b. Isagoo burhaan loo yiqiin, boqor hadduu diido,
1c. Isagoo burhaan loo yahay, boqor hadduu diido,
1d-f. OMITTED.

2a. Koi hadduu bahdiis iyo xigtada, baaddil kula joogo,
2b. Mar hadduu bahdii iyo xigtada, baaddil kula joogo,
2c. Ee uu bahdiis iyo xigtada,baaddil kula joogo,
2d-f. OMITTED.

3a-b. Isna sadada kaga beegan yaa, lagala baydhaa ye,
3c. Isna sadada kaga beegan baa, lagala baydhaa ye,
3d-f. OMITTED.

4a&c. Kob uun buu dadka kaga soo baxaa, bahal wax qaataa ye,
4b&e-f. OMITTED.
4d. *Kol uun wax (dadka) kaga soo baxaa, bahal wax qaataa ye,

5a&d-f.Buuhoodle Weyniyo Shaxdii, baabullaa degay e,
5b. *Buuhoodle iyo Shiil-cas, baabullaa degay e,
5c. Buuhoodle iyo Shiil-caskii, baabullaa tegay e,

6a. Baraagaha halkii laga qoday, yuu ub, yuu, bowd u joogsaday e,
6b-c. Baraagaha halkii laga qoday, beeg u joogsaday e,
6d. OMITTED.
6e-f. Baraagaha halkii laga dhisay, beeg u joogsaday e,

7a. Bushimaha markuu kala dhuftaa, loo baraarugay e,
7c. Bushimaha markuu kala dhuftay yaa, loo baraarugay e,
7b&d-f. OMITTED.

8a. Buntuq iyo rasaas laguma ridin, balale maadhiin e,
8b&d. Buntukh iyo rasaas laguma ridin, balale maadhiin e,

8c. Buntukh iyo rasaas laguma ridin, balale maadhiin e,
8e-f. OMITTED.

9a. Isagoo balaayo u dhashay yay, bohol ku tuureen e,
9b-d. Isagoo balaayo u dhashay yay, budhadh ku tuureen e,
9e-f. OMITTED.

10a-b.Bedenkiyo markuu laabta iyo, booca ka higgooday,
10c. Bedenkii iyo markuu feedhaha iyo, booca ka higgooday,
10d. OMITTED.
10e. Markuu bedenka iyo laabta iyo, booca ka higgooday,
10f. Markuu baadilka iyo laabta iyo, booca ka higgooday,

11a-b.e-f. Ee uu bulxamay looga yaac, labada baallood e,
11c. Oo uu bulxamay looga yaac, labada baallood e,
11d. OMITTED.

12a-b. Buulada ninkii aqal ugu yiil, bacadlihii saar ye,
12d. OMITTED.
12e. Tuulada ninkii buul ka yiil, bacadlihii saar ye,
12f. Tuulada ninkii aqal ka yiil, bacadlihii saar ye,

13a. Goortay baqdeen yay qabteen, bari Nugaaleed e,
13b. Bari iyo waxaa looga qaxay, banan Nugaaleed e,
13c. Bari iyo waxay uga qaxeen, banan Nugaaleed e,
13d-f. OMITTED.

14a. Nimankii galbeedka u badnaa, waa bidhaan eri ye,
14b. *Identical, but transposed to position after line 12.*
14c. *Nimankii galbeedka u badnaa, waa bidhaan eri,
14d. OMITTED.
14e-f. Bogox-Geed Quwaaxii fadhiyey, waa bidhaan eri ye,

15a. Bogcaddii buulka ba Aadan baa, booliyey keligiis e,
15b-f. OMITTED..

16a.Baznan iyo dhufaan buu ka dhigay, bood..., baarashuudyada ye,
16b-f. OMITTED.

17a-b. Baasee xigaalkaan lahaa,	hayga baandhayn e,
17c-f. OMITTED.	
18a. Iyadoo la kala booday yaan,	baaqigii imi ye,
18b. Iyadoo la kala booday yaan,	baaqigii imid e,
18c. Isaga oo la kala booday yaan,	baaqigii imi ye,
18d-f. OMITTED.	
19a&d. Bullaalaha fardaha maalintii,	bederka loo jeedio,
19b. *Bullaalaha fardaha maalintii,	beder (la) jeedlaayo,
19c. Bullaalaha fardaha maalintii,	beder la jeedlaayo,
19e-f. *Boqoolaha fardaha maalintii,	beder (la) jeedlaayo,
20a-c. Birta jilicsan iyo yaadhka ways,	kala baqoolaa ye,
20d-f. Birta jilicsan iyo yaarka ways,	kala baqoolaa ye,
21a&e-f. Nin badheedhay iyo waa maquus,	waxaa barriijaa ye,
21b-c. Nin badheedha iyo waa maquus,	waxaa barriijaa ye,
21d. *Nin badheedhay iyo waa buquf,	waxaa barriijaa ye,
22a-d. Wuxuu dunida baalka u gashaday,	bookh intaan jiray e,
22e-f. OMITTED.	
23a. Balfin maayo anigaa bartayoo,	biirabiiruhu ye, (?)
23b. Balfin maayo waa kaan bartoo,	biirabiiruhu ye,
23c. Balfin maayo waa kaan bartay oo,	biirabiiruhu ye,
23d. Balfin maayo anigaa ogoo,	biirabiiruhu ye, (?)
23e-f. Balfin maayo oo waa aqaan,	biirabiiruhu ye, (?)
23Ae-f. Ogow belababeladii xigtaa,	laysku beegaa ye,
23Be-f. Biixida tagoogada xigtaa,	lagu baduugaa ye,
24a,d&e-f. Annagaa bardooddami jirree,	iiga wada beydha.
24b-c. Annagaa bardooddami jirray e,	iiga wada beydha.

This poem, composed by the renowned Dholbahante poet Samatar Baxnan, is part of a *silsilaad*, a 'chain' of poems concerned with a specific topic in which poets of equal rank reply to each other in the genre of the first poem in the series, and all of which are to be composed in the same alliteration.[1] I collected this poem from five reciters, including the poet

himself, and I was able to collect it from one of the reciters twice, the second performance over eight months after the first. The results were revealing and significant in the debate concerning how oral poetry is composed. None of the reciters sang a poem absolutely identical to any of the others. In fact, the reciter from whom I collected the poem twice, Cabdi Axmed Faarax 'Dhega Weyne,' also sang it differently the second time. Let me outline the main differences among these poems.

A few principles held true for all poetic performances and variants. For example, all variants strictly conformed to the rules of prosody and alliteration. I have written extensively on these very complex structures, and there is no time to review all the rules in this paper, but a few rules must be described in order to make sense of the variants.[2] Somali prosody is not based on stress, as stress is predictable in the language and is thus nonphonemic. Long and short vowels mark differences in the meaning of words, and it is the recurrent patterns of these long and short vowels that constitute the rhythmic meter in Somali verse. Two structures are most important, the monoseme (a metrical slot in which only a short vowel may be sung) and a diseme (a metrical slot which can hold either a long vowel or two short ones). Whatever differences may be observed among reciters, the variant must scan properly. Also, there is no doubt when comparing these variants of the same poem that memory sometimes fails the reciter. There is also evidence that reciters may 'improve' on a poet's lines, either recomposing it to fit the meter, or by adding one or more lines possibly not composed by the original poet, or borrowed from a different poem altogether.

Some of the more common differences among the variants of Somali poems were reflected in the six variants I compared:

> **Line addition/omission**: evident when lines which occur in one variant are added to (or omitted from) another. Dhega Weyne omitted twelve lines from the poet's version (which I assume is the original poem) but he added a pair of his own. Lines 23A and 23B appear only in his two versions. They are not sung by any other reciter, including the poet himself. Other reciters omitted a number of the poet's original lines as well.
>
> **Line interpolation**: evident when lines which are identical or similar occur in differing order in two (or more) poems.

Quasi-synonymous pair: evident when two words or phrases have nearly the same or similar meanings, but sound different. *Koi* and *mar*, synonyms for 'when' are used on line 2, for example. And again in line 10, *feedho*, 'rib cage,' and *laab*, 'chest,' make a quasi- synonymous pair. Dhega Weyne actually errs with a quasi-synonymous pair on line 12 of his variants:

12e. *Tuulada ninkii buul ka yiil, bacadlihii saar ye,*
12f. *Tuulada ninkii aqal ka yiil, bacadlihii saar ye,*
12e. Any man who has a *buul* in the village, loaded it upon a burden camel (and fled away).
12f. Any man who has an *aqal* in the village, loaded it upon a burden camel (and fled away).

A *buul* is a smaller version of the nomadic house, *aqal* in Somali. The surviving parent of a nuclear family often lives with his/her son's family and occupies the *buul*. The error involves using *aqal* for *buul*. Although both words fit the prosody, the poem alliterates in "B."

Quasi-nomophonous pair: evident when two words or phrases sound similar but have different meanings. *Degay,* 'settled,' and *tegay*, 'went,' are examples in line 5.

Dialectal/free variation pair: evident when two words have exactly the same meaning and are the exact same grammatical form, but are pronounced differently in different dialects of Somali. In line 20 one finds a clear example of a more northern pronunciation *(yaadh)* and a southern pronunciation *(yaar)* for 'bridle.' Other variations indicate simple free variation, such as in *buntuq*, and *buntukh*, 'rifle,' in line 8.

Permutations, a syntactic pair evident when words (unbound and bound morphemes connected together) are rearranged within a given line of poetry. The same morphemes are employed in two different variants, but their order may be different, as we observe in line 10.

Bedenk'iyo markuu laabta iyo, booca ka higgooday,
Markuu bedenka iyo laabta iyo, booca ka higgooday,

Permutational phrasal pair: evident when one of the two hemistichs in a variant is identical (or nearly identical) with the same hemistich in another variant, but the remaining hemistich is different. Line 14 exhibits this trait, where the first hemistich of two of the variants is completely different, but the last hemistich is identical.

> *Nimankii galbeedka u badnaa, waa bidhaan eri ye,*
> *Bogox-Geed Quwaaxii fadhiyey, waa bidhaan eri ye,*
> The men mainly from the West, are being chased on sight (by the lion).
> The *Geed-quwaax* people encamped at *Bogox*, are being chased on sight (by the lion).

Prosodic Error: evident when a line does not scan properly. In this case, the reciter sings a line which does not scan properly, as we see in line 5, where a diseme has been left out of the line. Other variants fill in this diseme with the article adjective (*-kii*).

> **Buuhoodle iyo Shiil-cas (kii),baabullaa degay e,*

There are other variations that occur when different reciters sing the same poem or when the same reciter sings the same poem at different times, such as strophe interpolation, addition, and omission, but the above examples cover the main variations I have observed. The important thing to note here is that all these variations involve problems with memory. They are not reconstructions based upon a formulaic paradigm. Clearly, the different reciters are struggling with retention of the line they heard in the past and have stored in their memories. I have been told that some reciters are capable of reciting long poems after hearing them only once. I have not had opportunity to test this claim. Even so, one thing remains certain. Whereas absolute duplication of the line, morpheme-by-morpheme, is very common, it is not always accomplished when reciters sing these poems. The memorization mode differs from the oral-formulaic mode in that the goal of verbatim memorization is always attempted. The reciter or poet is not recalling a linguistic abstraction and filling in the blank spaces in the prosody between formulas. He is recalling lines that fit into a prosodic template so complex as to eliminate most major variations possible in changing the original line. Variations that do occur are related to faulty memory and are easily discerned as such.

Free-style Poetry

There is another large body of poetry in Somalia, which at first encounter, appears to be formulaic. The prosody is simple, but repetition characteristic of formulaic poetry is missing, except in refrains, which tend to be reproduced verbatim. Moreover, there is no reliance on themes as structural units. This type of poetry is similar to that of the Xhosa *imbongi* described by Jeff Opiand. Work poetry, such as camel, cattle, and caprine watering and herding songs, as well as grain pounding and milk churning songs are examples. Dance poetry in Somalia is of this variety. Each poem is unique and is, like formulaic poetry, composed and recited during performance. I have collected from poets in performance at festivals in Somalia who will occasionally sing about me collecting their poetry as they are singing it. There was no way the poet could have known beforehand that I would be attending the festival, and there is no way to collect variants of topical free-style poetry that is sung only once. Amazingly, these poets teach refrains in some of their poems to a chosen few in their audience who accompany them during the performance!

Refrains in these dance poems help define the template of the meter, and are sung antiphonally by choruses of men or women or both between the lines of poetry composed by the lead singer. It is also common for a poet to change the rhythm of the template midstream to a dance rhythm, and to control how long people are permitted to dance by returning to the original prosody. Though the soloist's prosody remains stable, it is easy to lose it in his rapid-fire singing and 'enjambment.' Taping and transcribing the poem, however, reveals that the poem scans perfectly throughout. This type of poetry, often referred to under the Somali generic designation of *dhaanto*, can go on for hours, and involves solo/ chorus performance, and dancing to the rhythm of hand clapping and singing. Again, the prosodic patterns of this type of poetry tend to be simple, and the topical content of each solo strophe may be completely independent from the previous and following solos. Free-style poetry in Somalia resembles formulaic poetry, but again there is no reliance on themes and very little repetition outside the refrains, which are reproduced verbatim by the choruses.

Memory in Oral-formulaic Poetry

Students of the oral-formulaic method tend to under-emphasize duplicate lines of poetry in this mode. In my experience, such lines tend

to be more prevalent in simpler prosodic templates in epic poetry. In the Mande Epic of Son-Jara, for example, there are three modes or meters: the narrative, the praise-proverb, and the song modes. The narrative mode is oral-formulaic in nature, and makes up the bulk of the lines of the epic. The praise-pro-verb mode is a sort of interlude between themes, and the song mode is used to celebrate important events in the plot, rather like the recitative, overture-and-interlude, and aria modes in grand opera. The song mode is also interesting in that the melody sung by the singer and the melody in the accompaniment are identical. This does not happen with the other pair of modes. The prosody of the song and praise-proverb modes is always much simpler than that of the narrative.

Line interpolation is the most prevalent difference among variants of the songs in the Epic of Son-Jara, yet the morphemic structure of the lines is almost always identical and they often appear in couplets. Differences in the praise-proverb mode appear to be subject to the same variation one finds with Somali poetry. For example, the praise-names of villages Son-Jara founds after his defeats at the hand of his antagonist Sumamuru.

Kukuba and Bantanba
Nyani-nyani and Kamasiga

appear in another variant as four succeeding generations in the family of the Kuyate bardic family.[3]

Kukuba
Bamtamba
Nieni-Nieni
Kambassia

Similarly, a praise-name for the culture hero Tira Magan Tarawere in the Fa-Digi variant I collected in Mali may serve as an example. Fa-Digi's variant, Susare-jon, 'Slave of the Tomb,' was sung as Suu-Saare-Jong, 'Horse-Burying Man/Man Who Rides Horses to Death,' by the Gambian bard Bamba Suso.[4]

I do not see how we can ignore the obvious use of memory in the reproduction of the song and praise-proverb modes with the oral-formulaic epic. Proverbs are by their very nature frozen linguistic structures. Birds of a feather always flock together. They never fly or congregate together. Proverbs are reproduced in a speaker's discourse through verbatim memory. In summary, hard evidence shows that even

the oral-formulaic method of oral composition involves the use of memory, which brings me to the conclusion of my paper.

A Unified Theory of Oral Composition

My findings suggest that the real difference between oral-formulaic composition and the unique composition of poetry combined with a goal of verbatim memorization, together with the intermediary freestyle composition, all represent a continuum in the process of composing oral poetry. Rather than suggesting that memory plays a strong role in formulaic composition, I suggest that memory is intrinsically a part of that mode. Rather than suggest that memory dominates verbatim composition, I would suggest that formula-like behavior is a trait of complex prosody assisting the poet who composes in this mode. Fieldwork reveals that when Somalis are children, they learn simple prosodic templates such as the penta-semic dimeter of the churning poem:

two feet of *daa-daa-da,*

and its semic variations of:

da-da-daa-da,
daa-da-da-da, and
da-da-da-da-da.

They hear their mothers sing line after line of free-style poetry to this simple meter, which they, like oral-formulaic poets, internalize, even memorizing many of the lines. When they begin to churn their own milk, girls reproduce these memorized lines and later expand their repertoire and compose their own lines, like an actor in a Shakespearian play, who forgets some of the lines and simply fills in the iambic pentameter spontaneously without pausing before falling back into the next memorized lines they do remember. Indeed the more talented the Somali poet, the more spontaneous lines they are able to compose. When they falter, they dip into a store of memorized lines or repeat the previous line, which gives them some 'temporal space' to compose the next line. Outside the compound, children begin to listen to the free-style poetry of the camel-watering and caprine-herding songs composed by their fathers, mothers, and older siblings. Young girls listen to the grain-pounding and churning songs of the women in their compound and to the lullabies their

mothers sing to lull them to sleep. Both generic template and memorized lines of poetry become stored bodies of lore, which they can later recall during the performance of work involving physical repetition. Somalis utilize a metrical template, which they can build on to create their own verses. As they grow into youth and some into middle age, and become more skilled at language use, a smaller number of talented poets 'graduate' into the composition of more complex dance poetry performed in front of audiences, which are more demanding of creativity and less tolerant of error. Here, although the prosodic templates are still fairly simple, singing continues for much longer periods of time, and many more topics may be included in their compositions that do not get repeated verbatim ever again after a single performance, although they may become fond of certain lines or phrases which they commit to memory. From middle age on, some sooner than this, an even smaller number of gifted poets reach their height of skill with language and poetic ability and can isolate themselves for days at a time to work through the complex structures of *gabay* prosody, sometimes even soliciting help from friends when they stumble over particularly difficult lines. This complex poetry is then sung in public where skilled memorizers commit it to memory, diffuse it rapidly, and may even change it in a finite number of ways allowed by the prosodic template. Changes occur from reciter to reciter and even from performance to performance by the same reciter, in a manner related to faulty memory and sometimes may even be deliberate. I know of one case when a famous poet left lines out of one of his compositions he was ordered to sing in front of the president of the Somali Democratic Republic in order to avoid potential imprisonment. He was later ridiculed for lack of courage.

The hard evidence of my research into the oral poetry of Somalia and Mali leads me to the conclusion that the differences among the oral-formulaic, memorization, and free-styling modes of oral composition may be of degree and literary requisite and not of mentality. These modes represent ways of solving intellectual problems. The metrical templates of classical Somali poetry are so complex that they tend to eliminate all but the most predictable minor variation based on faulty memory and sometimes the 'corrective' manipulation of a reciter/memorizer. Add the range of acceptable topics for any given genre, and a musical structure which sometimes actually participates in the meter, and one is able to understand how the goal of verbatim memorization becomes the norm of this tradition. Given the complexity of plot, Mande poets have, like many peoples who also sing epics, developed intricate formulas and themes

with which to remember their lines and memory is not the dominating factor in longer, narrative poetry. Given simpler metrical templates for other kinds of oral poetry, both societies solve the problem of oral composition in a similar way, not so differently from the Shakespearian actor mentioned earlier. What I am proposing, then, is a broader theory of oral composition representing a continuum of oral tools and skills among all these modes of oral composition running along an axis from free-styling in simple meters to the use of memory in more complex meters on one hand and the use of formulas and themes in complex plots on the other.

Endnotes

1. This poem was originally performed more in jest than in a real political struggle. At first, there was a challenge between the poets Aadan Carab and Axmed Dirir. When Axmed Dirir composed the original poem, he tried to get Aadan Carab' s support because they are in the same lineage. Aadan Carab refused to support him. Cumar Cigaal, an other poet, accused Aadan Carab of not being loyal to his lineage and that Aadan Carab was unreliable. Many poets joined Cumar Cigaal's accusation and composed poems against Aadan Carab. When Samatar Baxnaan realized that Aadan Carab was alone in this struggle, he joined the silsilaad with this poem. He was on the one hand obeying a Somali trait of evening up the sides in an argument regardless of the lineage affiliations or the issues, and on the other hand, along with many other people, respecting Aadan Carab as a great poet. In this poem, Samatar Baxnaan compares Aadan Carab to a fierce lion whom youngsters are unable to face off. Samatar claims that he is the right person to face Aadan Carab, because Samatar is the only poet great enough to face him, which is his way of saying that he admires Aadan. The poem is, then, a mock challenge, because Samatar is really praising Aadan with his verse. More than ten other poems followed Samatar Baxnaan's, because it angered others and caused them to want to respond.

2. For a full description of Somali prosody, readers may refer to the following articles:

> "Set Theory in Somali Poetics: Structures and Implications," in *Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Somali Studies*, ed. Annarita Puglielli (Rome: II Pensiero Scientifico Editore, 1988): 123-33.
>
> "Somali Poetry," in *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (Third Edition), ed. Alex Preminger and T.V.F. Brogan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993): 1164-1165.

"Musico-Moro-Syllabic Relationships in the Scansion of Somali Oral Poetry," in *Language and Culture In the Horn of Africa: Essays In Honour of B.W. Andrzejewski*, ed. I.M. Lewis and Richard Hayward (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1996): 73-82.

"Music and Poetry in Somalia," in *Garland Encyclopedia of World Music, Volume I Africa* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997): 610-21

3. See Camara Laye, *The Guardian of the Word: Kouma Lafolo Kouma* (Glasgow, Fontana, 1980), p. 72.

4. See Gordon Innes, *Sunjata: Three Mandinka Versions* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1974), p. 69, 644, and note, p. 617.

SECTION TWO



History and the State

Introduction to Section Two

Section Two, History and the State, explodes with provocative and insightful articles. The opening presentation describes the unprecedented turnout and support for the May 31, 2001 referendum on the Somaliland constitution. Those registered numbered 1,188,746 of whom 1,187,833 actually voted. This turnout was little short of amazing; and of those voting, 1,148,940 voted in favor. Given the style of elections in many other parts of the continent (and for that matter, the rest of the world), this accomplishment was a triumph that put flesh on the title of I.M. Lewis' classic study: *Somalia: A Pastoral Democracy*. While the jurisdiction of the referendum was confined to Somaliland, it suggests that allowing the Somali people to express their opinions is a sound precedent for the rest of the former nation.

Chapter Seven explores options for Somali governance, describing the present structure as an 'uncentralized' state. The article explores several models, especially the Arta framework that culminated in creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) that is currently seeking to establish itself in Mogadishu.

The chapters build cumulatively with the third article examining prospects for the Arta peace process. While there have been many reasons to be hopeful for reconciliation through the TNG, the author judges that overall, hopes are limited. The conclusion suggests that the flaw with Arta as well as with more than a dozen previous Somali peace conferences has been the externality of the initiatives. All have been held beyond the borders of Somalia and convened by outsiders. "External efforts, however well intended, often disrupt local initiatives."

The final three chapters explore different dimensions of the nation state and ask how applicable western institutions such as 'the nation state' are functioning to meet the challenge of Africa's emerging governance. If this book contained only these six chapters in Section Two, the volume would still be worthy of detailed, thoughtful, and introspective consideration.

CHAPTER SIX

Analysis of Election Procedures

Honorable Abdilqadir Haji Ismail Jirdeh

Introduction

The Somaliland National Referendum Committee, given the mandate to plan the country's first national referendum in 40 years, faced and largely overcame numerous obstacles. The primary challenge of extending suffrage to all eligible Somalilanders was complicated by a number of factors: widespread illiteracy, a large population of nomadic and semi-nomadic citizens with no voting experience, a myriad of logistical difficulties, lack of accurate census data, and the overwhelming costs of holding a national referendum in accordance with generally accepted standards (particularly given that many international organizations that the Somaliland government approached for assistance refused because Somaliland is not recognized internationally). Despite these obstacles, the government did an admirable job designing procedures that were simple but fair, widely understood by the first-time voters of Somaliland, and easily implemented consistently and uniformly by regional officials in the six regions of the country.

As an indication of its seriousness, the Somaliland Parliament allocated almost five percent of its annual revenues, a sum of more than $650,000, to carry out the referendum. The procedures, modeled on national elections elsewhere, were drawn by government appointed experts and formally approved by both Houses of Parliament in March 2001. During the debate on the procedures, Parliament voted to change the color of the ballot boxes from red and green to black and white, fearing that red and green, both prominent colors of the Somaliland flag, would confuse voters. Moreover, black and white were the colors of the ballot boxes used in the 1961 referendum uniting Italian Somalia with British Somaliland (that was defeated in the Somaliland region, though passed due to the large Somalia population in the south). The parliament's decision to reuse these colors seemed appropriate and fair.

Eligibility

Voter eligibility and Somaliland citizenship are determined by paternal lineage according to the pre-independence colonial borders separating Italian Somalia and British Somaliland Protectorate. The election law gives voting rights to anyone over the age of 18 who descends from people residing in Somaliland prior to June 26, 1960, and who is not certified insane or serving a prison sentence. The Somaliland National Referendum Committee considered providing voters with photo identification cards, but dropped the idea when the expense was determined. Given the lack of voter identification and the absence of prior voter registration, the procedure gave clan elders the authority to determine citizenship through specific questions to ascertain inclusion in one of Somaliland's handful of recognized clans. Unregulated and in the absence of qualified cultural anthropologists, such a system invites the possibility of politically motivated decisions that could unjustly exclude certain citizens from voting. However, the delegation from the Initiative and Referendum Institute (hereafter referred to as the Institute) found no evidence or complaints that the provision was misused in any way to exclude potential voters. Many Somalilanders stated that eligibility could be easily determined through accent or dialect alone. Additionally, voters were allowed to present to the polling station chairmen witnesses to attest to their age and citizenship. On the whole, the system seemed to work relatively well, with few problems reported. In the future, it may be wise to create a system of voter registration that would allow voters to verify

their eligibility to the election and to cast a provisional ballot subject to verification of their eligibility.

Polling Stations

Unsurprisingly, the allocated number and location of polling stations were two of the most contentious issues in the months leading up to the referendum. They served as a rallying cry for disparate groups opposed to the vote. In the 1961 referendum, there were only 150 polling stations in the Somaliland region. For the 2001 referendum, Parliament requested 700 polling stations but the Minister of Finance, citing fiscal constraints, scaled back the number to 600. Most regions requested more stations than the number allocated.

The final distribution was decided by having the six members of the Somaliland National Referendum Committee, one from each of the six regions, allocate what they felt was a fair distribution of ballot boxes, and then taking an average of all six. Parliament approved this scheme only on the condition that it not become the basis for future elections, such as the presidential race. From the limited information provided to the Institute delegation about the population distribution in Somaliland, the compromise and distribution of stations seemed reasonable. However, the Institute agreed with members of the Somaliland National Referendum Committee who feel that, ultimately, 1,000 polling stations would be a more appropriate number if the financial considerations could be addressed in the future. An additional consideration would be to use the turnout from the 2001 referendum as a basis for ballot box distribution in future elections.

Materials

The voting materials and procedures were adequate and simple. Printed ballots from a sequentially numbered pad were stamped with the number of the polling station and distributed to each eligible voter to be deposited in either a white "Yes" box or a black "No" box. The materials arrived at each station in a locked box containing sealed envelopes of ballots and supplies. There were no reports of tampering and only a few scattered reports of inadequate supplies (including an insufficient number of ballots when more voters showed up than expected).

Voting for the Constitution or Voting for Independence?

In discussions with Somaliland people at polling stations throughout the country, there was a wide consensus among the Institute delegation that the referendum was more of a vote on ratifying independence and separation from Somalia than a vote on the various articles of the Constitution itself. It was clear in reports of referendum observers that there was widespread voter support for approving their independence, but little debate or discussion regarding the separate articles of the Constitution or the appropriate from and structure of government. The government devoted a limited effort to foster substantive debate or discussion on the separate articles of the Constitution or the ramifications and responsibilities of independence, and largely distilled its educational campaign into short, simple, easily understood platitudes on the importance of voting, self-determination, and patriotism.

To be fair, given that Somaliland is an aspiring democracy with little or no tradition of representative government, and given that it has a largely unsophisticated and undereducated electorate that was formerly governed through traditional clan structures, the government's methods were understandable, if not entirely appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, with very scarce resources available to fund a comprehensive educational campaign, the government's effort to encourage voting, while also providing easy access for individuals to read and discuss the constitution, proved that, in spite of the country's financial limitations, it was money wisely spent.

Turnout: Proof of the Pudding

The government's educational efforts seem to have been quite successful at generating a high voter turnout. The government expected the around 60 percent of those eligible to participate, but after the referendum, the turnout appeared to be more than 66 percent of the estimated voting age population. That is a remarkable turnout, given that Somaliland is largely nomadic and during a very hot season of the year that may have kept some people living in the cool mountains from coming down to vote in the hotter cities, particularly in Berbera. Indeed, some opposed to the constitution or independence may have expressed their opposition by simply *not* voting at all. But with 97 percent of those voting approving the Constitution, this solid turnout of nearly two-third of the adult population only reinforces the country's overall support for

the constitution and independence. Similarly, threats aired on the BBC by southern Somalis from Somalia and Puntland that the referendum could lead to war seems to have had little or no effect at keeping people away from the polls, even in the Sool and Sanaag regions that border Somalia.

Election Observers

Election observers from the Initiative and Referendum Institute, Washington DC:

1. M. Dane Waters, President and Founder (Initiative and Referendum Institute)
2. Dennis Polhill, Chairman Of the Board

Observers:

3. Sasha Bruce
4. David Byrd
5. Derek Cressman
6. Scott Kohlhaas
7. Alexander Mundt
8. Allison Puranik
9. Stacie Rumenap
10. Adrian Schmid
11. David McCuan

THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND
SUPREME COURT

MS/GMS/G-7/134/2001

SUBJECT: Decision Relating to the Approval and Declaration of the Outcome of the Vote on the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland

THE COURT:

HAVING SEEN: Article 125 of the Interim Constitution of Republic of Somaliland, which authorizes the promulgation of a law that will enable the holding of a referendum.

HAVING SEEN : Article 130 of the same Constitution, which makes it clear that the implementation of the Constitution shall begin after the outcome of the referendum has been approved.

HAVING SEEN: The copies of the Registers set out in Article 40(4) and Article 42(3) of the Law of the Referendum on the Constitution, NO: 16/2000 of 12/11/2000; and the fact that no complaints have been received.

HAVING PROPERLY: Examined and concluded that, on the whole, the voting activities of the Referendum in the districts of the Republic of Somaliland conformed to the above-mentioned Articles of the Referendum law.

HAVING CONCLUDED: That the total of the Referendum results of the districts was:

1. The total number of persons who registered themselves = 1,188,746
2. The total number of persons who voted in the Districts was = 1,187,833
3. The number of proper votes cast =1,183,242
4. The number of improper votes cast = 4,591
5. The total number of votes, which approved of the Constitution (YES) = 1,148,940.
6. The total number of votes, which rejected the Constitution (NO) = 34,302.

HAVING SEEN: The discussions and the detailed examination of the results of the Referendum and its related activities.

HAVING CONSIDERED: Article 46 of the law of the Referendum on the Constitution and the above-mentioned matters.

HAS DECIDED :

1. That the result of the Referendum on the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland shows clearly that the Somaliland nation has indicated its wish to approve the Constitution by a vote of **1,147,949,** which equates to **97%;** with the number of votes rejecting the Constitution being = **34,302,** which equates to **3%.**

2.That in view of the Referendum held on 31/05/2001, the interim Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland shall, as from 13/06/200, be approved formally and shall be implemented forthwith in the Republic of Somaliland.

3.This decision was promulgated today, Wednesday, 13/06/2001, at 11:00 am

THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT

1. Osman Hussein Khayre — Chairman
   Signed
2. Sheikh Mohamed Hassan Dualeh — Member
   Signed
3. Shawqi Elmi Ali — Member
   Signed
4. Mohamed Yussuf Ainan — Member
   Signed
5. Sheikh Mohamed Abdi Naleye — Member
   Signed

CHAPTER SEVEN

Choosing Democracy: Institutional Alternatives for Somalia

Matt Bryden

State Collapse and Political Reconstruction in Somalia

Since its collapse in 1991, Somalia has come to represent the archetype of a 'failed' state, a state that has for some reason imploded and now lacks the political and social coherence to put itself back together. But terms like state 'failure' and 'collapse' are comfortably generic. They imply no notion of agency or cause. To understand why the Somali Republic disintegrated, it would be more accurate to describe it as having been a toxic state, one that so threatened the welfare and survival of its own people that they purposefully and comprehensively dismantled it. During the peak decade of repression and violence, the 1980s, holding Somalia together required roughly $450 million per year. When Cold War patronage faded, Somalia's institutions became impossible to sustain. In the absence of great power interest, they have since proven equally difficult to reconstruct.

The legacy of the Somalia 'toxic state' – state-sponsored violence, institutionalized repression, authoritarian and corrupt leadership – has left its mark on the political dynamics of the country ever since. Seeking to guarantee that past patterns of abuse will not be repeated, Somalis have so far resisted national solutions, instead establishing smaller, weaker, and more accountable political arrangements in what some have termed 'uncentralized' political reconstruction.

Through this uncentralized process, considerable progress was achieved between 1997 and 2000 towards the return of peace and governance. By early 2000, close to two-thirds of Somali territory had achieved relative security, stability, and functional or incipient administration:

- In Somaliland, peace was restored in late 1996 after nearly two years of civil strife; the administration subsequently broadened and deepened its ambit, despite severe fiscal pressures arising from a ban on livestock exports to the Arab peninsula

- In July 1998, the Puntland administration was established in northeast Somalia. The region embarked on an unprecedented period of economic and political development

- In southwest Somalia, the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) expelled occupying Habar Gidir militia and took initial steps to establish an administration in Bay and Bakol regions

- In Mogadishu, political leaders made a promising – albeit unsuccessful – attempt to install a unified administration for the city in late 1998. Following the collapse of the 'Banadir' administration in early 1999, a loose coalition of business leaders and Islamic courts afforded a degree of security and stability unprecedented since the collapse

- In the Juba valley and parts of central Somalia, community and political leaders took stock of developments elsewhere and began to explore the prospects for local administrations in their own areas.

Taking note of these positive developments, international support for a phased approach to political reconstruction began to emerge. The UN system began to describe Somalia in terms of recovery, transition, and crisis zones. In 1999, the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, meeting in Rome, endorsed a 'peace-dividend, bottom-up' approach to reconstruction intended to consolidate gains in stable regions and encourage less settled areas to follow suit. More commonly known as the 'building block' approach, its association with alleged Ethiopian designs on Somalia rendered it a topic of some controversy and subsequently disqualified it from official diplomatic usage. But the term 'building block' was less an 'approach' than a statement of fact – a recognition of people-driven political process and the functional, responsible authorities they had produced.

These sub-national dynamics evolved separately, in parallel, and on an *ad hoc* basis. The design of appropriate national institutions remained the greatest single challenge to be addressed in restoring peace and government to Somalia.

The Arta Process

In this context, the President of Djibouti announced a new political initiative for Somalia. During 2000, this initiative gradually took shape in the form of a peace conference to be held at Arta, Djibouti. It would be the third Djibouti-led peace initiative for Somalia since the collapse of the Barre government in 1991. In August 2000, it resulted in the declaration of a transitional government for Somalia, including a president, parliament, and transitional charter. These new, central institutions did not include the emerging sub-national political entities, and indeed competed with them for the loyalty of their constituents.

At least officially, international consensus has settled on the Arta process as the most viable route to a Somali peace settlement. But the Arta process has made little headway on the ground and its future is uncertain. Since the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in August 2000, Somalia has experienced intensified violence, the destabilization of peaceful areas, and the renewed internationalization of the Somali dispute. The country is used as a transit point for arms, drugs, and other contraband, and provides a platform for cross-border rebel groups and militant Islamist organizations. Sub-national polities such as Somaliland, Puntland, and (to a lesser extent) the

administration of the Rahanweyne Resistance Army in Bay region, continue to describe political arrangements in much of Somali territory with greater meaning and authenticity than the notion of a transitional national government. In sum, the Arta process has transformed Somalia from a 'failed state' to a 'quasi-state,' a state that possesses international juridical status, but empirically exists only in name.

Recognition of at least some of these failures provided the official justification, in October 2001, when the Transitional National Assembly (established at Arta) voted to dissolve the interim administration on charges of corruption, economic mismanagement, failure to restore security, and lack of commitment to national reconciliation. A new prime minister was nominated in November 2001, but there is no sign that these cosmetic adjustments alone can bring about an appreciable improvement in the Somali situation.

At issue are not the qualitative merits or demerits of the TNG and its leadership, but rather the need to rethink the whole system of government of a future Somali state. The choice of appropriate and sustainable political institutions will be the pivotal factor in deciding whether a peace initiative succeeds or fails, and whether or not stable, democratic government evolves over the long-term.

Institutional Options

To a certain extent, the contours of a future Somali state enjoy broad consensus among Somalis. This is not to deny the existence of alternative points of view, nor to endorse these features as representing the best institutional choices for Somalia, but simply an attempt to describe a common denominator:

- a constitutional republic enshrining Islam as the state religion and the *Shariah* as the basis of law
- a high degree of decentralization, probably within a federal framework
- a democratic system of government characterized by some form of proportional representation and regular, competitive elections
- a semi-presidential (possibly presidential) executive.

Unfortunately, the points of contention far outnumber these few points of consensus – including the issue of whether or not the Somali

Republic should be reconstituted as a single state. Having described these few commonalities, I will attempt in the following section to describe the principal institutional options promoted by political elites from different clans and territorial affiliations. Such a categorization is necessarily simplistic, but it helps to describe the broad parameters of the debate.

Option I: The Arta Framework - *Federal or Decentralized Unitary Structure, Devolutionary Process*

The framework developed at Arta, embodied in the transitional charter, assigns responsibility to transitional, national (read: "central") institutions for the leadership of the national reconciliation process and the drafting of a federal constitution. The TNG has yet to articulate its vision of a federal Somali state, although more than one third of the transitional period has already elapsed.

The TNG represents an integrative approach to reconciliation, encouraging the formation of political alliances across lines of conflict within centralized transitional structures. Although the Arta process has been largely successful at securing participation from most main regions and clans, in so doing it has sacrificed meaningful representation, political influence, and administrative control.

The Arta process posits an approach to future institutional arrangements that is devolutionary and distributive: during the interim period, sovereignty and authority are vested in centralized institutions, which will subsequently devolve specified powers to subordinate regions. The distribution of posts, territorial/ administrative boundaries, executive responsibilities etc. will be centrally defined. Although the transition charter proposes a federal Somali government, such a process might *de facto* produce a decentralized unitary state. Opposition to this approach is one of the few things over which all other *de facto* Somali authorities can agree.

Option 2: Building Blocks - *Federal Structure, Multilateral Associative Process*

This approach has primarily been advocated by Puntland's leadership, but has at times been associated with the Rahanweyn and also with Darood groups in the Juba valley. The 'multilateral' or 'building blocks' approach proposes a federal government comprising a limited number of states (probably four or five).

The principal difference between this approach and the Arta framework is that the Arta framework emphasizes a federal outcome, while the 'building blocks' approach requires a federative process. In other words, the 'building blocks' approach proposes that *de facto* Somali authorities come together to establish a new central government. The powers and responsibilities of the national government would be negotiated between the federating entities, not devolved from the center.

One obvious drawback of this approach is that *de facto* authorities only exist in some parts of Somalia, not all. Another is that the definition of the internal boundaries of a federal state could become a major bone of contention within the peace process.

Option 3: Re-unification - *Confederal Structure, Bilateral Associative Process*

This approach represents an implicit proposal of the current Somaliland leadership and probably represents the minimum set of conditions through which Somaliland might be peacefully persuaded to accept continuing political association with Somalia.

This approach implies a confederal union of two sovereign entities: Somaliland and Somalia. The rationale for this approach is based on Somaliland's current *de facto* sovereign status and its prior existence as an independent state. Essentially, this approach represents an attempt by the Somaliland leadership to renegotiate an association of Somaliland and Somalia on more favorable terms than those agreed to in the failed 1960 union.

This approach is unpopular both within Somaliland, where it is perceived as a betrayal of Somaliland's aspirations to international recognition, and also in southern Somalia where it is perceived as awarding to Somaliland political importance and prerogatives disproportionate to its population and territory.

Option 4: Secession - *Unilateral or Negotiated Dissolution of Union*

This platform is associated only with Somaliland. No other Somali political entity aspires to independence from Somalia.

Proponents of this view typically argue that Somaliland has *de facto* already exercised its right to self-determination: dissolution of union was effected by the 1991 declaration of independence and subsequently reiterated at the conferences of Borama (1993) and Hargeisa (1996). The

referendum of May 31, 2001, technically speaking, was not a plebiscite on the question of independence, but a vote in favor of a new constitution that reaffirms Somaliland's sovereign status.

A variation of this position acknowledges that achievement of *de jure* international recognition may be expedited by a negotiated settlement between Somalia and Somaliland: for example, were a friendly southern Somali government to recognize Somaliland or were attempts to negotiate a new confederal union to fail. Secession might address the issue of Somaliland but would leave the larger Somali problem unresolved.

Option X

No single option described above can provide an institutional solution for Somalia. A combination of alternatives, or some other creative arrangement, would have a better chance of accommodating Somalia's diverse political preferences. Defining 'Option X' should be the primary objective of a future Somali peace process.

Transitional Considerations

Appropriate institutional arrangements constitute a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a lasting political settlement in Somalia. This section will suggest some other issues that will need to be addressed if Somalia is to complete a successful transition to democracy.

Reconciliation

Although peace has been achieved throughout most of Somali territory, reconciliation will take much longer. Left unresolved, some critical issues could yet undermine the force of a negotiated settlement:

- ***Restoration***: This is particularly important in urban centers where homes have been forcibly appropriated or squatted by people other than the rightful owners. The issue of compensation for stolen or damaged property may also be a consideration in certain cases. In major towns, failure to provide for restoration will leave unresolved tensions between communities. In Mogadishu, where the problem is most pervasive, restoration will be critical in

restoring consensus on the city's eligibility as the national capital.

- ***Withdrawal from occupied land***: military occupation of land obtains principally in areas of Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba (especially Kismayo), although it may exist elsewhere on a limited scale. A settlement that leaves land under military occupation will lack force among certain groups. This is particularly true where the occupiers are associated with the interim authorities – as is the case in both Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba.

- ***Compensation***: Compensation for loss of life and/or property is a primordial component of Somali customary law, and multifarious claims and counterclaims will require resolution in the aftermath of conflict. However, in instances of prolonged and large-scale killing between rival groups, it is common for them to agree that their claims cancel one another out. While compensation may still be relevant in local disputes, it is likely to be of only secondary importance in a national settlement.

Electoral Systems

The type of electoral system selected for a future Somali state will be critical. An appropriate electoral system will contribute much to the perceived legitimacy of elected leaders. An ill-conceived system may bring about the disengagement of disaffected groups from the democratic process and ultimately a return to armed conflict.

Given the 'segmentary lineage' character of Somali society and the extreme importance assigned to clan representation in political institutions and the civil service, a system designed to produce an inclusive form of proportional representation will provide a degree of stability in the transitional period that majoritarian systems cannot deliver, and is more likely to contain political competition within agreed, non-violent parameters.

Transitional Justice

Like most conflicts, the Somali civil war has witnessed war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. These may be broadly divided into three categories:

- Acts perpetrated by forces of the former Somali government prior to 1991
- Acts perpetrated by factional militias
- Acts perpetrated by international forces in Somalia between 1992-1995

Numerous organizations have made the case for transitional justice arrangements , including Africa Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Somalia. Possible strategies for coping with the past remain ill-defined, and are complicated by the involvement of senior officials of the Barre regime and alleged war criminals in the leadership of most Somali factions and administrations.

In practice, *de facto* Somali political authorities have so far practiced undeclared amnesty of alleged war criminals. In the long term, however, amnesty could undermine the legitimacy of future government by failing to satisfy a sense of justice among certain groups. Failure to bring known war criminals to account might also tarnish the moral authority of the new leadership and threaten democratic consolidation.

Calls for establishment of an international criminal tribunal have come from a variety of quarters. The case has been made most vociferously in Somaliland where the discovery of mass graves has drawn attention to the abuses of the Barre regime in northwest Somalia prior to its collapse. Government forces were also implicated in abuses, albeit on a smaller scale, in northeast Somalia in 1978-9. Factional militia have been accused of war crimes during the early 1990s, notably in Bay region, Kismayo, and Mogadishu. A case has also been made for investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed by international forces between 1992 and 1995, in which hundreds of Somali civilians were killed or wounded.

The criminal prosecution of alleged war criminals in national courts would potentially undermine the reconciliation process, since the judicial system is presently too weak to be considered impartial. Disqualification ("lustration") of certain categories of officials of the former government, or of faction leaders, might accomplish many of the same objectives as criminal prosecution with fewer risks of destabilization, but is nevertheless likely to encounter widespread resistance

A truth commission, with no powers of prosecution or punishment, could meet with greater political acceptance than more assertive strategies for coping with the past, but - like an amnesty - it may fail to satisfy the desire of aggrieved communities that justice be done, diluting the potency of the peace process.

Rule of Law: Legislatures, Legal Traditions, and the Judiciary

The number, nature, and composition of legislative bodies in Somalia will be a function of the system of government and the definition of an electoral system (or systems). However, there seems little prospect that existing legislatures (in Somaliland, Puntland, or Mogadishu) will be dismantled to make way for new structures during the transitional period.

Broadly speaking, existing legislatures lack both understanding of their role and functional capacity. Legal expertise for drafting legislation is inadequate, access to legal library resources virtually non-existent, parliamentary procedures poorly defined and/or poorly understood. Since legislatures are the principal forum for the management of political competition in a democratic society and represent a powerful instrument for ensuring the accountability of the executive, their further development – before and after a comprehensive Somali peace settlement – will be crucial to a future democratic order.

Likewise, Somali judicial structures are poorly developed. Trained judges and court personnel are virtually non-existent and there are no significant training programs. Most courtrooms lack the resources to function adequately, and corruption is endemic. The problem is exacerbated by the existence of parallel, often contradictory legal

traditions: elements of the Somali, Italian, and British civil and criminal codes, customary law (*xeer*) and *Shariah* law.

Military, Security, and Police Forces

Given the record of abuses and atrocities perpetrated within Somalia by the military and security forces, the reconstitution of these institutions is especially sensitive. In addition to the many factional, commercial, and freelance militia around the country, Somaliland, Puntland, and the TNG all possess standing military and police forces. A political settlement must accommodate concerns about clan and regional balance, integration of regional security forces, and civil-military relations.

The United Nations

The United Nations engages Somalia politically both directly through the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and indirectly through development assistance programs. Limitations of space require that this paper concentrate on direct political engagement only.

The UN Political Office's mandate is technically limited to observing and reporting on the situation in Somalia to the UN Secretary General. In practice, however, the UN disposes of a formidable range of instruments of political engagement. These exercise the considerable authority of the Secretary-General's office in a number of ways:

- political leadership within the UN system on Somalia
- reports and analysis via the Department of Political Affairs to the Office of the Secretary-General, the UN General Assembly, and the Security Council
- briefings of the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB), the IGAD Partner's Forum, and visiting donor missions
- diplomatic influence on Somali leaders, foreign missions, and concerned governments
- public statements.

Given its limited mandate, the UN has tended to play down its official political role in Somalia, while nevertheless asserting its considerable influence in other ways. The potential of this "soft" diplomacy should not be underestimated. The remainder of this section

will examine briefly how this influence has been applied with respect to peace-building and democratization in Somalia.

Dialogue, Reporting, and Analysis

Over the years, the Somali peace process has been characterized by irregular, urgent spurts of dialogue in high-pressure conferences – the timing for which is arbitrarily decided by their international sponsors. Such meetings are not terribly different from inviting Somali leaders to enter a dark room, switch on lights, and strike a deal with whomever else they find there. Inevitably, critical issues are addressed inadequately, if at all, and agreements fail to take hold. For example, the fundamental issues of occupied territory (RRA), federalism (Puntland), and self-determination (Somaliland) have never been adequately addressed, undermining the force and durability of agreements reached.

In between these high level conferences there is minimal diplomatic activity in support of the peace process, except for occasional fact-finding missions and visits by diplomats based elsewhere in the region. Visits to the field by UN political officers are rare. Over the past 12 months, they can best be measured in days rather than weeks. Security restrictions account for the infrequency of visits by UN political officers to the city of Mogadishu, but not to other parts of Somalia.

Instead, UNPOS relies largely on information obtained from sources available in Nairobi: political entrepreneurs, drop-in visitors, Mogadishu-based newssheets (UNPOS has discontinued the translation and circulation to the diplomatic community of newspapers from elsewhere in the country), and from the Internet. Although some Somalia-based political leaders make use of telephone contacts with the Political Office, others are unable or unwilling to do so. The combined limitations of mandate and field presence have undermined the UN's capacity for direct observation and political analysis, and have sharply curtailed opportunities for the kind of regular face-to-face contact with political leaders required to build confidence and advance dialogue.

Institutional Options

One consequence of its analytical limitations is that the UN has tended to emphasize reconstitution of the Somali state without sufficient regard for a future system of government – a prescription that has repeatedly failed to produce a functional national authority. In so doing

it has served as a more effective advocate of externally-driven solutions to the Somali crisis than a meeting place for diverse Somali visions of the future.

Exploration of possible institutional options for Somalia has therefore been left to non-UN initiatives like the European Commission's 1995-6 'Menu of Options' program, and the Swiss government's low-key constitutional consultations of 2001-2.

Far from encouraging debate over Somalia's institutional options, the UN has exhibited great conservatism in its approach to the subject. Indeed, UNPOS has consistently interpreted its mandate in favor of conventional, centralized, and demonstrably unworkable governance arrangements. In practice, the Political Office has rewarded Somalis who share its political inclinations with praise and political support. Somalis who prefer alternative arrangements have been objects of UNPOS criticism and negativism. This has damaged the UN's relationships with some key Somali leaders and has undermined its role as an honest broker.

Selective Support for Democratic Processes

The UN's mandated bias towards state-oriented outcomes rather than people-oriented solutions has led it to be selectively tolerant of democratic processes in Somalia. Where it has disagreed with the purposes or the outcome, UNPOS has even denied the intrinsic value of democracy.

In the absence of internationally accepted democratic processes, such as elections or referendums, there are few grounds upon which the UN can assess the legitimacy of rival Somali authorities. The conferences that established the TNG, Puntland, and Somaliland all involved approximately 700 delegates and over 1,000 non-accredited participants; each lasted over three months; all involved a blend of traditional leaders, political leaders, 'civil society' delegates, professionals, and returnees from the Somali diaspora. The political structures established by these respective conferences assert mutually exclusive claims to representation and sovereign rights over territory. Process alone, therefore, cannot usefully be used to assess the quality of these structures. More meaningful measures of political legitimacy in the Somali context are empirical sovereignty (*i.e.* control of population and territory without need for coercion) and durability.

On the assumption that clan conferences can be described, at least within limits, as democratic, the UN has nevertheless associated itself

only with some democratic processes and not others. It ignored both the Borama (1993) and Garowe (1998) conferences but provided support to the Arta conference (2000). It has solicited international support for interim arrangements in Mogadishu, but has made no such appeal in support of constitutional, electoral, or legislative processes in Puntland or Somaliland. The obvious implication – that some of these processes have been more democratic than others – does not stand up to serious scrutiny.

The UN's discomfiture with democratic politics in the Somali context is perhaps best illustrated in reference to Somaliland's constitutional referendum of 31 May 2001. It was the first recognizably democratic process, by international standards, to have taken place on Somali territory for over thirty years. The referendum's official results recorded a large majority in favor of the new constitution and – by extrapolation – of Somaliland's independence. Over one million votes were cast (out of an estimated voting population of 1.6 million) in a process described by international observers as free, fair, and consistent with international standards and favorably reported in the international media.

UNPOS, which chose not to observe the referendum, has played down the significance of the vote in its reports and analysis, inadvertently sending the message to those who voted that the democratic process will not be rewarded. Whether or not this will persuade disillusioned voters and their leaders that they should abandon their political agenda, or that they should rather embrace non-democratic means to continue their struggle, remains to be seen. But the episode clearly challenges the UN to develop more sophisticated ways of reconciling its mandate to preserve Somali unity with its corresponding commitment to democratization.

Lack of Support for Transitional Justice Arrangements

The UN's attachment to eventual reconciliation and national unity has persuaded it to be conspicuously cautious with respect to transitional justice. During the course of 2001, UNPOS has quietly and informally discouraged the investigation of war crimes or the establishment of an international tribunal.

Successive reports by a UN Independent Expert for Human Rights on human rights abuses, including mass killings in Hargeisa and Baidoa, have yet to receive visible follow up from UN headquarters or in the Security Council. A local office of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was established in 1999, but has no

investigative authority and its efforts to mobilize interest in an international tribunal for Somalia seem to have carried less weight than short-term political considerations.

The question of transitional justice is too important to the reconciliation process to be subordinated to short term political considerations. The UN needs to accept that justice must be done – and be seen to be done. At issue is only the form (or forms) that transitional justice should take.

Recommendations

The experience of political reconstruction in Somalia provides critical 'lessons learned' upon which future UN engagement can build. Some of these lessons have become so sharply defined that they might serve as a set of 'first principles' in pursuit of a durable, 'positive' peace and a democratic system of government.

Make Greater Use of Independent Research and Analysis: The UN's capacity to provide objective reports and analysis from the field is compromised by a number of factors: the diplomatic responsibilities of UN representatives, contradictory mandates or instructions of the organization, and restrictions on in-country travel, to name a few. Better use of independent research and analysis could help to compensate for deficiencies in the UN's own reporting from the field. Possible measures might include:

- regular consultation in the field and at headquarters level with research organizations such as WSP, ICG, LPI, and academic institutions
- require the Political Offices to include reports/analysis from select non-UN sources in their reports to HQ
- provide the Political Offices with modest budgets for commissioning of independent reports/analysis.

Integrate the Definition of Appropriate Institutional Arrangements into the UN's Approach to Peace-building: The definition of appropriate institutional arrangements, electoral systems, and instruments of justice is essential to lasting peace and functioning democracy. In Somalia, the UN should exercise its mandate to preserve Somali unity and territorial integrity without prejudice to

the future structure of the state or its system of government. Instead, it should solicit different views, elaborate options for Somalis to consider, and within the limitations of its mandate, facilitate or support deliberation of issues pertaining to democracy.

Promote a Federative Process: Broad consensus exists that Somalia's future system of government will be federal (or confederal). The TNG Charter proposes it and Puntland insists on it; the only hope of peacefully reuniting Somaliland with Somalia depends on it. But the final form of Somalia's government is less important than the process through which it comes together. In other words, Somalia needs a federation less than it needs a 'federative' process in which the founding members collectively transfer a limited amount of power to a jointly established central authority. The TNG's commitment to an integrative process, through which a central authority will somehow devolve authority and responsibility to subordinate districts and regions, is unacceptable to other *de facto* Somali authorities.

Maintain Impartiality: The UN must not be perceived to favor one actor over others or to endorse a process that threatens to subvert key political actors. Since the Arta Conference, the UN's potential as a peacemaker in Somalia has been compromised by its perceived alignment with the TNG, whose claims to national leadership and ownership of the Arta process represent an obstacle to dialogue. The TNG leadership must be encouraged to see itself as part of the solution, not as the whole solution.

Invest in Pre-negotiation: In order for serious dialogue to be engaged, leaders must be convinced that it is in their interest to come to the bargaining table. This will require considerable investment in pre-negotiation in order to allow the Somali principles to develop a mutually acceptable agenda and mechanism for dialogue.

Adopt an Incremental Approach: It is unrealistic to seek, in a single agreement, full and simultaneous accord on all aspects of the Somali crisis. The ambitious objectives of previous peace initiatives have inadvertently imposed an 'all-or-nothing' logic on the process, tackling reconciliation, sovereignty, constitutional arrangements, and power sharing all at once. The failure of such comprehensive accords

negates what limited progress may have been achieved on specific issues. A future peace process needs to be flexible enough to accommodate incremental or interim solutions such as staggered engagement of Somali leaders, phased implementation of an agreement, or asymmetrical sovereign arrangements.

Tackle the Problem in Three Dimensions:

- ***Time***: Previous initiatives have lasted for several weeks or at best several months. Resolution of the Somali crisis will require sustained engagement over longer periods, as in Burundi, Western Sahara, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East

- ***Depth***: A successful process must engage the broadest possible participation at all levels of Somali society, not just political and civic 'elites,' in order to ensure that agreements and decisions are deliverable. Public opinion in different regions must be accommodated within the process, not confronted *ex post facto*.

- ***Breadth***: Previous accords have been of a general nature, postponing negotiation of specific issues (*e.g.* occupied land, war crimes, compensation) until later. Their resultant superficiality has rendered them fragile, and of short duration. Future processes should take the form of parallel negotiations on multiple issues. The agreements reached on specific issues could then eventually be conflated in a single umbrella accord.

Together, the above principles suggest a path by which democratic institutions, practices, and beliefs could be built and strengthened in Somali society, and the development of a system of government in which competition and conflict are managed through established institutions and procedures rather than through resort to force. Lasting peace will require more than the momentary goodwill and determination generated in the heat of high-profile conferences. It will require the patient, painstaking restoration of trust of Somalis in one another, and in the institutions of government they will inevitably create.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Assessing Reconciliation Initiatives by the Transitional National Government (TNG) After the Arta Peace Process

Ahmed Yusuf Farah

Introduction

This paper begins with a general introduction that reconstructs major developments in peacemaking and political reconstruction in the decomposed Somali Democratic Republic in the post-Barre period. The introduction ends with a brief discussion on the underlying differences in the level of peace and stability in north and south Somalia since the ousting of the Barre regime in January 1991.

This is followed by part two, which deals with the theme of the study, that is examination of Somali peace initiatives after the Arta peace process (Somali National Peace Conference) and relocation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) to Mogadishu in October 2000. Part two examines and analyzes dynamics and prospects of the so-far-elusive reconciliation between this new political actor, TNG, and opposed factional groupings formed in Awassa, Ethiopia in March 2001, the Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC). SRRC is made up of the notorious Mogadishu-based 'warlords,' faction leaders from south Somalia, and the Puntland State of Somalia.

Peace Keeping and Governance in Somaliland and Puntland[1]

The ten-year-old breakaway Republic of Somaliland in Northwest Somalia (former British Somaliland), and the three year old Puntland State of Somalia in Northeast Somalia (comprising Northeast regions of Bari, Nugaal, and North Mudug plus Las Anood region, Buuhoodle district of Togdheer, and eastern parts of Sanaag),[2] have crystallized out of the ruins of the Somalia state. Somaliland unilaterally seceded from the former Italian Trust Territory in south Somalia. In contrast, Puntland rejects secession, espouses a federalist political platform. The self-governing regional administration is considered as an interim arrangement that looks after the interest of "Puntlanders" until such time as similar entities emerge out of the rest of Somalia to form a federal system of government for a united Somalia in the future. These two self-governing and relatively peaceful northern entities together constitute a significant proportion of the total population in Somalia.

Both Somaliland and Puntland have shown an encouraging degree of initiative in securing peace and stability and in political reconstruction in their respective entities, mainly on self-effort and without the benefit of much international assistance. The relatively more constructive experience of Somaliland in peacemaking and governance in the post-military period, as well as its multi-ethnic composition, makes it an interesting case to watch by leaders in less stable areas in south Somalia where restoration of peace and stability and development of representative administrations still remain to be realized.

Somaliland has adopted a system of governance that is anchored in the pervasive clan-based political culture of the still dominantly nomadic northern Somali society. In this system, all-clan conferences attended by representatives of local clans and in which traditional authority plays a

central role, *shir beeleed*, have been instrumental in peacemaking and political decision-making process. This inclusive and participatory approach to peace and governance allowed development of broad-based transitional administrations in Somaliland. Participation of non-Isaaq clans in these representative political forums, in which successive representative administrations were installed, has the effect of dispelling the endemic fear of reprisals by the dominant Isaaq family of clans against Dir and Harti clans that were associated with the fallen regime during the decade-long struggle against the regime by the Isaaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM).

A culture of a locally based reconciliation process also evolved in Somaliland in the prolonged transition period. The Somaliland *Guurti* (supreme council of lineage leaders) played a critical role in securing internal stability and in the development of institutions of governance. For example, a series of peace conferences spontaneously organized by the Somaliland *guurti* over a period of two years successfully resolved the first round of fighting in Somaliland in Burao and Berbera (1992-1993) and led to the all-clan conference in Borama at which a peace charter and interim charter were produced in the middle of 1993.

Propelled to the center of the political stage by decomposition of centralized rule and the inability of current political elites to resurrect centralized authority of public administration, traditional leaders in both Somaliland and Puntland have emerged as paramount political actors in the post-military period. In Somaliland, the *guurti* have been politicized since 1993 when they formally became one of two chambers of parliament, informally known as the "upper house," in the governance structure formed at Borama. The Interim Charter for Puntland, however, failed to legislate a similar status for the *Isimo*, who themselves have played a similar role in Northeast Somalia, securing internal stability and driving the grassroots political process that culminated in the all-clan conference in Garowe at which the Puntland State of Somalia was established on 1 August 1998.

Remarkable peace and stability founded upon cultural and political harmony (clan-exclusiveness, dominated by Majeerteen, related Harti, and relatively small allied Darood groups) has prevailed in Northeast Somalia since 1991, outside the war-ravaged frontier region of Gaalka'cayo town and its surroundings in central Somalia. This has created conditions favoring development of working institutions of government. Nevertheless, key political actors there, such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the *Isimo* (titled clan and sub-

clan heads and lineage leaders) have achieved little progress in the area of political rebuilding since the ouster of the military regime in 1991. Indeed, the process of building basic institutions of governance remained 'frozen' in a kind of 'permanent' and uncertain transition prior to the declaration of Puntland State of Somalia on 1 August 1998. In the absence of formal authority in the former Northeast Somalia (Bari, Nugaal, and North Mudug regions), the SSDF informally administered for most of the transitional period the economic life of this region, Bosaso port, and in conjunction with the *Isimo,* preserved law and order and governed matters of common interest.

Somaliland's experience in peacekeeping and governance has been relatively non-violent and marred by only two rounds of violent internal power struggles (1992-1993;1994-1996). Northeast Somalia has witnessed domestic stability at the cost of political stagnation. Internal power struggles within the SSDF have often been between prominent leaders in the official corps, who dominated the administration of this relatively militaristic organization in the period of armed insurrection and after the ouster of the military regime. Unlike in the Somali National Movement (SNM) of Somaliland, competition for control of the organization and local administration did not degenerate into internal conflict but it did split the organization into two rival factions, which had the effect of paralyzing political reconstruction in Northeast Somalia.[3]

Shir-beeleed administrations have certainly contributed to the rather fragile peace and stability secured in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as development of a favorable environment for the private-sector-driven economic development and emergence of new private agents in the delivery of basic social services. Apart from endemic institutional weakness, marked by tendencies of over centralization o f power and reluctance to decentralize and devolve authority to local structures of governance, both entities have ended up with a large security force in the task of building regional administration. Over ninety percent of government revenue has to be spent on security and administration in the form of salary for the large number of security forces created out of ex-combatants and clan militias (more than 15,000 in Somaliland and over 5,000 in Puntland) and relatively large number of government employees.[4] Over-concentration of efforts and resources in security and peacekeeping in Somaliland and Puntland has reduced to a minimum the actual contribution of the administrations in these two entities to economic and social reconstruction.

At the time of writing, Somaliland and Puntland administrations were struggling with an attempt to move from stalled *shir-beeleed* transitional administration to a multi-party system of democracy – a stormy transitional process mired down in a with constitutional crisis. The mandate of the first *shir-beeleed* administration in the Puntland State of Somalia had expired on 30 June 2001. Following a proposal by a faction of the Puntland traditional elder's council (*Isimo*), organized and funded by the administration, the parliament approved extension of the mandate of the administration for a period of three years and accordingly made changes to articles in the transitional charter for that purpose. Presidential candidates and opposition leaders, and most importantly the Chairman of the Supreme Court, Yusuf Xaaji Nuur, challenged this outcome. Yusuf denounced the extension as unconstitutional and a violation of the laws of Puntland, and according to the transitional charter, declared himself a caretaker president for one month, with the constitutional mandate to prepare the second *shir-beeleed* to elect a new representative administration that would hold a referendum on the draft constitution and prepare the ground for multi-party democracy.

President Abdullahi Yusuf gave several reasons for delaying a referendum on the provisional constitution: limited financial resources, insufficient time, a difficult political environment, and inability to conduct a census that is instrumental in deciding on the issue of political representation and the organization of free and fair elections. In addition to the constitutional crisis of extending the tenure of the present administration, President Abdullahi is also accused by the opposition of neglecting internal affairs and having wasted effort and resources in meddling with factional alliances against the Transitional National Government. Poor performance of the administration in delivering basic functions of the state and inability or indifference to contribute meaningfully to the reconstruction process unfolding in Puntland, notwithstanding dictatorial tendencies shown by the President, added additional grounds for criticism of President Yusuf.

Given the limited time to prepare a second *shir-beeleed* and wary of the reaction of the formidable administration, the caretaker president approached and requested traditional leaders (mostly those who absented themselves from the preceding meeting) to resolve the political deadlock – offering his assurance in advance that he will accept their decision. They called President Abdullahi Yusuf and asked his administration to follow the caretaker president and accept mediation and also promise in advance that he will honor their verdict on the political deadlock.

President Abdullahi rebuffed the elders mediation initiative and totally denied the *Isimo* any political or constitutional role in the political deadlock. He claimed that his administration is legitimate and anyone who had a constitutional complaint should submit his case before the constitutional court. In response, the *Isimo* concluded on July 25 a consultation held in Garowe (18-25 July 2001) over the constitutional crisis with a declaration of Yusuf Xaaji Nuur as interim President. Yusuf was given forty days to convene a second *shir-beeleed* mandated to form a new interim administration until 31 August 2001.

The support and legitimacy received by the caretaker president strengthened the guardians of the constitution (opposition) against the administration. This set the ground for competition between the administration and the *Isimo*-led opposition for control of the strategic and revenue generating facilities at the commercial capital, Bosaso – the port and the airport. The ensuing split of the security forces controlling the port and airport degenerated into a fight between supporters of the rival presidents on 5 August 2001 at the airport at which the forces of the administration were driven from the airport.

The controversial three year extension granted to the Puntland administration, the president and vice president, the parliament, and the executive (the entire cabinet with the exception of two new ministries) appears to be a replica of Somaliland's leadership tendency to hang on to power as long as circumstances allow – using central institutions of government created by the *shir-beeleed*. President Egal's tenure in office has been extended two times in ambiguous legal circumstances. The first came in 1995 when the first two year mandate given in Borama in 1993 had expired. This action was to prevent a political void in the midst of second round of the internal power struggle (1994-1996). The second extension came in the third *shir-beeleed* in Hargeisa in October 1996-February 1997.[5]

The prolonged transition to multi-party democracy in Somaliland has been inaugurated with approval of the referendum on the provisional constitution by 97 percent of the voters on 31 May 2001. This will be followed by general elections for local government in which political organizations, not political parties, will be allowed to contest for municipal elections before the end of 2001. Any organization that wins at least 20 percent of the vote in municipal elections in at least four out of the six regions in Somaliland would qualify and be registered as a national political party. The transition to multi-party democracy will be completed with a contest between political parties in the general election

for parliament towards the end of 2001 and presidential elections to be held in early 2002.

The long delay in drafting the constitution could be attributed to a protracted difference between the executive and the parliament, the former favoring a presidential system and the latter a parliamentary system of democracy. The referendum was also marred by expired deadlines and postponements, accusations by the Reformed SNM (Isaaq-based Somali National Movement) led opposition on technical shortfalls *e.g.* limited time given to preparation in the conduct of the referendum, a widespread sense of the process being rushed at the last minute after several unexplained postponements, confusion as to whether the actual purpose was a vote on the constitution as advocated by the government only or in addition it also served as a vote on the self-declared independence of Somaliland. The opposition claimed that a referendum on independence is the most important thing and should precede rather than follow the referendum on the constitution..

The referendum took place peacefully throughout Somaliland and this surprised many people who feared accompanying violence and instability. The most perplexing referendum-related events turned out to be rather disturbing and provoking actions by President Egal's administration in the run up to the referendum. Given below are examples of such actions:

- confiscating and burning 3,030 cartoons of cigarettes in Berbera on 12 April 2001, valued at roughly $800,000. The consignment was said to belong to 'Cabdira'xmaan Boore, a Djiboutian tycoon accused of being a close associate of Djibouti President Geelle, an architect of the Arta peace process, and staunch supporter of the TNG. This angered Jaamac Oomaar, the Somaliland agent for Boore, and it stirred unrest in his constituency, Gabiley, and led to detention of some of his supporters.

- arrest and detention of Suleymaan Gaal (contested for presidency against Egal in 1997) upon return to Hargeisa from an international trip on so far unproven charges of high treason, *e.g.* meeting with President Geelle and Boore in Djibouti; suspicion of masterminding destabilization aimed at disrupting the

referendum. A communiqué sent to the President by the senior clan leaders from Suleymaan's constituency in East Burao, described the arrest as unconstitutional, politically motivated, and a premeditated plot intended to criminalize and rally the clan (East Burao) against other clans in Somaliland. The communiqué demanded immediate and unconditional release of Suleymaan. The elder's firm protest offended the President and he tersely responded by dismissing the elder's claim of Suleymaan's innocence as both 'Bedouin' and 'idiotic.'

- creation of a corruption investigation team with powers to arrest. This decision was received with public applause because it raised premature hope that the administration might finally address rampant corruption and poor administration that had crept into public institutions of government. This went into full gear with the arrest and detention of the incumbent Mayor in Hargeisa, ('Cawl 'Cilmi) and his predecessor ('Cabdira'xmaan 'Cadami).

Soon after the referendum, the administration back-pedaled and reversed most of the actions stated above. Suleymaan was released on bail, the Mayors were also released from detention without trial, and 'Cawl was unexpectedly reinstated in his position as Mayor of Hargeisa. The corruption investigation team was suspended once the investigation arrived at the President's constituency, Berbera customs and port, which are considered as a bastion of corruption and embezzlement of public funds. The issue of burned cigarettes has not been resolved and is still pending, as is the ensuing closure of the border and the Djibouti air embargo on Somaliland. [*Editor's note: The border was reopened in November, 2001.*]

The above actions have been interpreted by critics as a premeditated sinister ploy, with the aim of creating an atmosphere of generalized instability in order to abort the referendum and avail the president with justification and a short cut for another extension of his tenure in office – the president has the constitutional right to consult the (loyal) *guurti* on the transition process under circumstances of instability and difficulty to conduct elections. The holding of the referendum disqualified this

assumption. Others interpreted it as a sign of desperation on the part of the president and his unpopular administration. This claims that Egal had deliberately tried to force the public, who are wary of recurrence of past violence, vote yes for the referendum by creating tension and uncertainty.

Egal's increasing but disorganized opposition leaders representing the Reformed SNM party, newly established but not yet registered secular political parties and the Islamic party, all assembled in Burao from 15-18 July 2001 to give solidarity and support to the elders meeting there. The presence of Suleymaan Gaal and the avid interest shown by the opposition in the conference alerted the administration that had also fielded a large delegation at the time in Burao for promotion of government political organization (UDUB). Not unexpectedly, the administration called the conference unconstitutional and illegal and threatened to use force if it was not halted peacefully. The elders took no heed of this threat but defused tension and probably averted violence by distancing themselves from the opposition leaders and called the conference an exercise of traditional authority, with an agenda to discuss security of Somaliland and the way forward.

Except for the Harti and Sa'cad Musa sub-clan of the Habar Awal, titled clan leaders representing local clans in Somaliland are said to have attended the meeting at Burao.

To conclude, the cumulative effect of formidable obstacles in the transition to multi-party democracy in Somaliland and Puntland, raises the spectre of stormy transitions and likely destabilization along clan lines: increasing criticism and disillusion with bad and over-centralized administration, rampant unemployment, poor performance in delivering basic functions of central authorities, inexperience in multi-party democracy, constitutional crises linked to lack of trust in government institutions, and widespread economic hardship aggravated by the two year old ban on exporting livestock to the Gulf.

Less Stable Areas in South Somalia

The relatively stable autonomous political entities in Northwest and Northeast Somalia respectively, have been administered by *shir-beeleed* elected system of government since 1991 in Somaliland and in the last three years in Puntland. These two entities are presently engaged in a stormy transition to multi-party democracy and face uncertain political future. They are also designated as reconstruction zones in the technical

jargon of international aid, because reconstruction relies mainly on self-effort and with limited international assistance.

The rest of the country to the south of the frontier town of Gaalka'cayo in central Somalia is still entangled in a conflict situation as social harmony and the reconstruction process are fitfully disturbed by slow and sporadic fighting between armed rival factions. They compete for control over clan-based entities as well as for the bigger price relating to control over the ruins of the Somali state. To label such a wide geographical region, comprising different zones that are at diverse stages in the conflict to reconstruction continuum, as a conflict and humanitarian zone, does not reflect the actual situation on the ground. Describing this diverse region as a conflict zone treats unfairly sub-regions in this zone where the local population has kept law and order and created conditions favorable to self-reconstruction comparable to that unfolding in the relatively stable northern entities.

The homeland of Digil and Mirifle clans in Bay and Bakool regions in southwest Somalia and Hiiraan region in central Somalia, for example, have both enjoyed relative peace and stability, the former since the middle of 1999 and the latter much longer. Nonetheless, in this study, south Somalia is treated as a single conflict zone with an epicenter located at the capital city, Mogadishu. This is because political events, such as fighting that erupts in Mogadishu, directly impacts stability as far away as Gaalka'cayo town and its surroundings in central Somalia, a frontier area 750 kms north of Mogadishu and controlled by faction leaders with a power base in Mogadishu, namely 'Cismaan 'Cali 'Caato and 'Xuseen Aideed.

The capture of Baydhaba and Bakool regions, the homeland of the primarily agro-pastoral Digil and Mirifle clans by Aideed's USC/SNA militia (Hawiya based United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance) in 1995 blunted embryonic but prospective regional administrations emerging from this area. The Ra'xanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), created in response to the occupation of USC/SNA, finally succeeded in liberating this region from the occupying forces originating from central Somalia in the middle of 1999. Anticipated consolidation of self-governing regional administration in Bay and Bakool regions in south-west Somalia and probable emergence of other clan-based political entities in the remaining parts of south Somalia has been overshadowed by:

- the Djibouti sponsored Arta peace process, that produced the Transitional National Government relocated to Mogadishu in October 2000;

- active involvement of RRA in the Ethiopian supported opposition to the TNG, despite widespread support among the Ra'xanweyn for regional autonomy

Since its relocation to the treacherous city of Mogadishu, the overriding concern of the weak Transitional National Government has been to deal with rampant inflation resulting from large scale import of fake money printed by wealthy traders, some of whom support the TNG. The strategy of the TNG has been to restore law and order to the war-ravaged city, demobilize thousands of armed militias (clan militia, Islamic courts, and business class militias), and most importantly, seek national reconciliation and prepare the ground for representative national government. Welcomed with initial applause by the war-ravaged population living in the less stable south of Somalia and with great optimism in Mogadishu, the TNG has faced continued opposition 'war-lords' based in south Somalia, including Mogadishu-based faction leaders and the Puntland administration.

Somaliland and Puntland administrations both denounce the TNG as a common foe and see it as a threat to their survival. Nevertheless, the active engagement of the Puntland administration and its president in particular in the opposition to derives from the following historical link with and interest in south Somalia:

- as part of the former Italian Trust Territory, Northeast regions of Puntland State of Somalia is historically linked to south Somalia

- the Majeerteen clan in particular and the Harti clans living in Puntland State of Somalia in general have political and territorial interest outside their home region in the Northeast as significant Harti population live in the contested town of Kismayo

- Puntland State of Somalia borders unstable south Somalia and therefore faces a real threat of insecurity in the south Somalia spilling over to its territory

- the above factors tie Puntland to south Somalia and explain its political platform that advocates a federal system of government for united Somalia in which Puntland State of Somalia in one of the 'building blocks.'

The Arta framework is widely considered as a reasonable basis for building a comprehensive national reconciliation and political settlement for Somalia, in effect preparing the ground for a united national government. Therefore, the TNG has received a remarkable degree of regional and international sympathy and support, including roughly $18 million reportedly received as bilateral assistance from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The TNG has been allowed to participate in major events organized by the UN, OAU, LAS, OIC, and IGAD. In addition to this *de facto* recognition, a number of member states of these organizations have also bilaterally recognized the TNG. The ten year old self-declared Republic of Somaliland has not yet achieved international recognition in spite of the remarkable record it has realized in peacekeeping and governance, largely without international assistance.

The remarkable success the TNG has achieved in the international arena contrasts with its dismal record in fixing complex internal affairs of war-torn Somalia and its capital city. This internal malaise has generated an image about the TNG that is perpetrated by its adversaries. Critics tend to see the TNG as a hopeless bunch of self-serving leaders 'holed up' in cosy hotels in Mogadishu whose hands are tied. The image charges that the TNG lacks political will to confront complex challenges facing the country and is more interested in soliciting international assistance for their benefit and in replicating an aid-dependent and centralized Somali state.

Why Peace and Stability in the North and Chaos in South Somalia

It is pertinent to conclude this introduction to war-torn Somalia in the post-Barre period with an attempt to explain the reasons underlying the difference in the level of stability prevailing in the relatively peaceful North (Somaliland and Puntland) and the less stable south.

In the transitional period, Somaliland controled stampeding political leaders and factional antagonism, the driving forces of violent competition for control of central authority in Somaliland. This was made

possible in Somaliland by resorting to its cultural roots and clan-based mechanisms of reconciliation and governance. This helped Somaliland to resolve its violent internal power struggles (1992; 1994-1996) and in addition, it provided space to the formation of representative administrations. Second, widespread support of the largest group in the north, the Isaaq clan family, to the independence of Somaliland helped to bring about a common political agenda and so far elusive aspiration of building Somaliland as a better alternative to previous bad governance.

Compared to any other *de facto* political entity, Puntland experienced the least interrupted peace and stability in the turbulent transitional period. This has been underpinned by social harmony based on an exclusive clan character in this part of Somalia, which is controlled by the large Majeerteen clan and allied Darood and Harti clans. This social harmony has been reinforced by a common political platform and support for a federal system of government in the future. The development of the Puntland State of Somalia as a unit in a future united federal Somalia provides evidence to the common political platform of this entity. Before 1998, the Northeast regions of Bari, Nugaal, and North Mudug existed as independent political entities with a vested interest in the so-far-elusive national reconciliation and reconstruction of Somali governance. Lack of progress in national reconciliation disappointed the Northeast. Following the failure of the Cairo national reconciliation conference in 1997, the public put pressure on SSDF leaders in the formation of a self-governing entity to consolidate the fragile peace and facilitate socio-economic progress, until such time as the remaining insecure parts of the country are ready for reconciliation and formation of a united federal Somalia.

In both Somaliland and Puntland, secured peace and stability provided a favorable environment for the vital export and import trade with the countries in the Gulf. The proceeds from this trade and remittances from abroad promoted reconstruction activities and provided opportunities that contributed to internal stability.

In spite of UN support to the *status quo* and its objection to secession of Somaliland, south Somalia attracted militaristic external intervention and a large scale humanitarian relief operation due to:

- need for a humanitarian response to the drought and war-related famine in 1992

- the relatively resource-rich and more densely populated nature of the region, especially around Mogadishu.

Lack of external interest compared to that in south Somalia and intervention saved Somaliland and Puntland from the destabilizing affect of poorly targeted and managed large scale external aid and blunders that followed the attempt by the US led UN mission to 'remake' the fractured state. Competition for access to aid fueled conflicts in the south and empowered the notorious warlords who extorted money and goods in exchange for protection of relief agencies.

The relative success of local peacemaking and reconciliation processes that transpired in Somaliland and Puntland in the transitional period could be attributed to the relatively limited external interest and intervention. A continuing external interest in Somali reconciliation found the 'warlords' and faction leaders in south Somalia, together with Puntland administration and RRA leaders, as willing partners. This cooperation bestowed legitimacy on the faction leaders and enabled them to play a central role in national reconciliation. Externally sponsored and faction-centered reconciliation initiatives preceded the latest and more inclusive Arta process. These earlier efforts not only failed to produce positive results, they also delayed possible emergence of a national solution to the Somali crisis and the lawlessness and disorder affecting south Somalia.

In Somaliland and Puntland too, the presence of a large dominant group, the Isaaq and Majeerteen respectively, helped social harmony as the political platform of the largest group became the common political platform of the wider entity in both cases (secession in Somaliland and federal system of a national government in Puntland). In the case of Somaliland, the Isaaq-based guerrilla forces of the SNM liberated the Northwest in 1991 and, instead of engaging in feared reprisals against non-Isaaq clans associated with the Barre regime, invited them to be represented in the *shir-beeleed* in 1991. This meeting that included many non-Isaaq groups helped greatly to achieve participatory decision-making and reconciliation.

The nature of the conflicts that affected north and south Somalia in the transitional period are quite different. In Somaliland, except for localized land conflicts that occurred at border areas between the Isaaq and non-Isaaq groups, *e.g.* in 'Ceerigaabo (populated by mixed Isaaq and Harti clans) and at the border area between Borama and Gabiley districts (populated by Gadabuursi groups and Gibriil Abokor of the Isaaq), the two rounds of conflict that had shaken Somaliland in the transitional period (1992-1993, 1994-1996) were essentially about power struggles

within the elite of the Isaaq and competition between them for control of the central administration.

The nature of the conflict still raging in south Somalia is more complex. It involves both power struggle and competition between the elite belonging to different families of clans – Hawiya, Darood, Ra'xanweyn, Dir, and others for control of the future Somali state. It also involves land conflict between different clans and families, in particular the Hawiya and Darood, for control of prime agricultural land in the inter-riverine area.[6] The land conflict in south Somalia has been aggravated by large scale migration from central Somalia involving mobilized and armed Habar Gidir clansmen who settled and consolidated control over south Mogadishu and fertile agricultural lands between the two perennial rivers in south Somalia.

Control of the Habar Gidir in south Mogadishu incensed the other important local Hawiya sub-clans, causing sub-clan wars over control of Mogadishu and competition for control of the future Somali state. The occupation of fertile lands by Habar Gidir belonging to displaced Darood clansmen and the collapsed state instigated conflict engaging local clansmen. The resolution of property issues and large scale population movements into the historically 'frontier' region in south Somalia in the post-Barre period would be one of the greatest challenges any serious national reconciliation process has to address.

Organizational and cultural differences between the dominant pastoral Somalis in the north and central regions of Somalia with warrior traditions and the chiefly agrarian groups in the agricultural south of Somalia with relatively quiet and peaceful traditions, also sheds light on the complexity in the latter region and partly explains the severe impact the civil war has had in this region.

What the TNG Has Done in Peacemaking

The policy of the TNG and its constitutional mandate in the three year transitional period, starting August 2000, has been to search for national reconciliation and to engage in dialogue and negotiation with political actors outside the Arta framework. Lack of meaningful progress in national reconciliation and limited success in winning the cooperation of those factions hostile to the Arta framework accounts as the greatest failure of the TNG in its short life span of eleven months.

Of course countries in the greater Horn region and in Africa (Ethiopia, Egypt, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan) and Gulf states (Yemen,

Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates) all have interests and try to influence events unfolding in Somalia. Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt, and Yemen all sponsored national reconciliation conferences in their capitals. While the author acknowledges the importance of external factors in national reconciliation in Somalia, past experience shows the dismal record of externally sponsored reconciliation initiatives. However well intentioned, the record speaks clearly that external peace efforts tend to complicate the Somali crises.

To examine the limited success the TNG has realized so far in peacemaking, I start with the Arta peace process. It was a more inclusive process than the preceding dozen externally supported reconciliation efforts. This more participatory and inclusive process absorbed and neutralized some of the factional leaders engaged in antagonism and rivalry in Mogadishu and in south Somalia in general. Antagonistic factionalism practiced by ruthless faction leaders in a political void and in the absence of well established civil society structures caused externally-sponsored peace processes to fail in the past and continues to frustrate peace work by the TNG.[7]

Of the warlords who participated the Arta peace process and remain loyal to the TNG framework, the most famous is Ali Mahdi, an arch rival of the late General Aideed. Competition between these two leaders from the two main Hawiya rival sub-clans, Abgaal and Habar Gidir respectively, over control of Mogadishu and their competition for the presidency of future Somalia in 1991 –1992 devastated the capital city and its population.

At Arta, Ali Mahdi missed a chance to be the TNG president, but selflessly relinquished factional politics and chose to cooperate with the TNG as a member of parliament. Some might argue that Ali Mahdi had relinquished factional politics, not because of political will and to preserve his credibility, but because of pressure on him coming from a new "mini-warlord" emerging out of his Abgaal sub-clan, Muusa Suudi Yela'xow. The latter boycotted the Arta peace process and cooperates with the factional opposition. Many of the powerful faction leaders who are now opposed to the TNG attended the Arta peace process and are members of the assembly but later on defected to join forces with non-participating faction leaders in an opposition to the TNG.[8] Had these defectors showed statesmanship comparable with Ali Mahdi and remained to serve the TNG, the task of engaging the rest of the faction leaders outside the Arta framework would have been a lot easier. The fact that the TNG incorporated and disarmed some of the faction leaders who

otherwise might have continued antagonistic factionalism and violence in Mogadishu and in other less stable parts in south Somalia is itself a small achievement.

One cannot say with certainty whether relocation of the TNG to the more secure town of Baydhaba (socially harmonious and controlled by a single political group, the RRA) as a temporary seat for the new government, would have provided a better alternative to the treacherous city of Mogadishu. Relocating to Baydhaba might have consolidated the support of RRA to the TNG, especially if the TNG had addressed the serious issue of land alienation and continued occupation of parts of traditional territory claimed by the Ra'xanweyn. While this could be perceived as a missed opportunity to some observers, perhaps other factors led the TNG to prefer the battered city of Mogadishu as the seat of the new government.

First, important concessions given to the RRA (fairly represented in the assembly and the executive), fell short of resolving the internal power struggle for the leadership of the RRA. It is contested by the strong military man and leader of the RRA militia, Shaati Gaduud, and Deerow Isaaq, a civilian veteran of RRA and speaker of the parliament in the new government. Second, close links and military cooperation between the RRA and Ethiopia raises doubts about the independence of the RRA and the extent to which the organization can decide its cooperation or non-cooperation.

The elected president, 'Cabdulqassim Salaad, is part of the now splintered Hawiya clan that includes most of the powerful Mogadishu based 'warlords.' One might have thought he would use his office and the TNG to resolve disorder and lawless in Mogadishu.[9] As a matter of fact, Hawiya reconciliation would help a lot to restore normality to Mogadishu and therefore it should be addressed as a priority issue. This leads one to wonder why the reluctance on the part of 'Cabdulqaasim and the TNG in general to encourage and support peace and reconciliation among the family of Hawiya clans, using the more effective Somali traditonal means of diplomacy that worked in Somaliland and Puntland.

In spite of incessant acts of provocation from faction leaders based in Mogadishu, the TNG has followed a policy of non-violence and peaceful dialogue with opposing armed faction leaders. This aversion to engage open confrontation with the 'warlords' has been pursued in the face of intense pressure from the expectant masses in Mogadishu who are agitating for quick results and want to see an end to the devastating grip of the notorious 'warlords' over Mogadishu.

Since its relocation to Mogadishu, the TNG has faced no military threat from hostile faction leaders in south Somalia as the combined strength of the supporting Islamic court and business class militias remains far superior to any of the militias controlled by individual faction leaders.[10] A member of parliament from Hiiraan region and General Yuusuf Talan, chief of demobilization and social integration from Awdal region in the Northwest, were killed by hit squads associated with opposition factions, in an early attempt to scare away TNG officials.

In spite of sporadic skirmishes in Mogadishu between rival militias controlled by the political protagonists, militias supporting the TNG went into action on two major occasions. First, they went into action to rescue aid workers kidnapped in north Mogadishu, an area controlled by Muusa Suudi Yala'xow, on 27 March 2001. Second, in a more bloody incident (11-12 May), militias of the business community engaged Aideed's militias, and violently dislodged them from the port. The port has been closed since 1995 and Aideed's militias entered it unexpectedly. Both events happened soon after the return of the opposition faction leaders from the Awassa meeting in Ethiopia at which the formation of a political grouping for south Somalia, Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), was declared.

The kidnapping of aid workers, including four UN employees, had realized its stated purpose – declaring to the outside world the obvious point that the TNG does not control the entire city of Mogadishu. This violent action targeted vulnerable humanitarian workers in order to send a harsh message and a stern warning to the internationals that the TNG is not the sole political actor in Mogadishu. The SRRC should be treated on an equal footing. This incident peacefully ended with the release of the kidnapped workers. Nonetheless, it was seen in some quarters as proof that Mogadishu was not safe. This act influenced a decision by the UN that deferred a planned UN peace-building mission to the Somali capital until after security in the war-ravaged city improved.

The UN decision frustrated TNG hopes of attracting external actors to Mogadishu. More importantly, it had kept vital assistance away from the fledgling TNG by postponing a component of the planned UN peace-building mission in Mogadishu, a mission that was designed to bring financial and technical support for rebuilding the Somali state.

From a humanitarian perspective, the UN decision to withdraw its programs because of unstable security actually rewarded the terrorists who got what they wanted, scaring away international organizations that deliver essential assistance to war-ravaged people in Mogadishu. It also

ignored the wishes of peace loving constituencies at both local and international levels. It was, I think, tantamount to surrender to terrorism as it contradicts international standards that sanction resistance against all kinds of terrorism, including hostage-taking of humanitarian w orkers operating in a complex emergency such as Mogadishu.

Reluctance shown by the TNG to confront trigger happy faction leaders could be interpreted by expectant Somalis and opponents of the TNG as a sign of weakness. It could also be viewed as a gesture of good will and a deliberate policy designed to distance the TNG from the culture of violence and intolerance that has characterized faction leaders in the transitional period. It might also be interpreted as a quiet diplomacy and policy aimed at buying time until such time as the TNG builds sufficient centralized security forces that are able to restore law and order in Mogadishu. This peace approach enhanced the moral superiority of the TNG over the warmongering faction leaders whose support base has been declining to hard core support from the lineages of the respective faction leaders.

In spite of hostile relations between the TNG and opposition faction leaders, the former has invested much time and effort in continuous dialogue and negotiation with Mogadishu-based faction leaders in particular, with the exception of the recalcitrant Muusa Suudi Yela'xow. This peace work has so far realized modest success in Mogadishu by securing the support and cooperation of two out of the five relatively established faction leaders in Mogadishu. They are Mr. Mohamed Qanyare, chairman of the USC and one of most powerful faction leaders in Mogadishu as well as Mr. Hussein Bood. In exchange for their cooperation, the former was named as Fisheries and Marine Resources Minister. Close associates of the latter also joined the cabinet.

The post-Barre crisis encouraged growth and proliferation of antagonistic factions in south Somalia in a political void left behind by total collapse of the state infrastructure and basic public institutions of government. Deep suspicion and mistrust a mong antagonistic faction leaders hindered national reconciliation and development of local and wider political structures that are vital for consolidation of peace and political reconstruction. Disunity and endemic disorganization within the faction leaders, lack of vision, a political agenda other than a survival strategy founded upon fierce competition for power and control of economic resources, lack of credibility, and unreliability on the part of faction leaders together conspired against restoration of normality. The

obstructive power of such leaders continues to frustrate and hinder a breakthrough in TNG reconciliation with faction leaders.

The formation of the TNG and its relocation to the capital city apparently introduced a new political actor to Mogadishu (the power base of at least five major faction leaders) and a national presence as well. This certainly challenged the protracted tenuous power of faction leaders in the transition period as the TNG produced the first Somali-brokered Arta framework that acts as a new alternative to furthering peace and reconciliation.

The introduction of this new political actor provided fractious faction leaders with a common foe against which they could unite. However, they failed to organize themselves effectively. This presented the TNG with no option other than to pursue dialogue with the deeply divided faction leaders, not collectively as a group, but on an *ad hoc* individual basis. This approach is faulted for being:

- tardy and more complex than dealing with a united opposition as it involves entering parallel initiatives with five faction leaders controlling different parts of Mogadishu, and many more at the national level

- it is more expensive and time consuming than a negotiation process involving two parties, the TNG and opposition factional groupings

- in addition to direct or face to face talks, close associates of faction leaders have also been employed as mediators – an informal method that is less transparent

- while this piecemeal approach reflects the fluid political situation on the ground, entering separate dialogue with each faction leader is thought to promote factionalism in the opposition camp, in lieu of encouraging a united opposition

- it fails to address differences between faction leaders at first hand, as doing so might produce better results than piecemeal deals with antagonistic individual faction leaders

- cash might have been exchanged for the cooperation of the faction leaders who joined the TNG framework. This method of reconciliation could be interpreted as 'buying' cooperation and any rival actor who is antagonistic to the TNG could do the same and win them back with a better 'price.'

Rather unexpectedly, the TNG appointed on 6 May 2001 a 25 member Peace and Reconciliation Committee, chaired by 'Cabdirasaaq 'Xaaji Xuseen, former prime minister of Somalia and one of the few statesmen respected throughout Somalia and including 'Cabdulqaadir Soobe, a successful businessman and familiar politician as one of its Vice-Chairmen.[11] According to the TNG, the Peace and Reconciliation Committee was given two specific mandates. The first on peace entrusted the Peace Committee with completing the peace process, building upon the Arta outcome. The second mandate sought to address property issues and overseeing the return of property seized during the war to their owners.

The committee's unilateral announcement through the popular BBC Somali program instigated a protest from the chairman on two grounds. First, 'Cabdirasaaq criticized the TNG for trespassing, by announcing the formation of the Committee. He thought such an announcement was the prerogative of the chairman to launch the Peace Committee and publicize its formation through the BBC. Second, he challenged the TNG on the composition and actual mandate of the Peace Committee, arguing that the mandate was confined to peace and had nothing to do with the issue of property. In addition, the chairman also made enquiries about members of the committee included in the list without his consent. However, the chairman clearly stated that his disagreement with the TNG on matters regarding procedure and content was minor and would not deter him from leading the committee.

The formation of this committee appears to be an interesting idea since it could fill the obvious need for contact between the rival political actors shaping the present political landscape in Somalia. Nonetheless, opposition faction leaders, allied with the Puntland State of Somalia, dismissed it outrightly as a TNG tool. This confronts the committee with the formidable task of winning the trust of existing rival political actors. One way of attaining the acceptance of all parties is to engage them in a sustained consultation at which the concerns of the opposition are

identified and addressed. Launched immediately after the declaration of the SRRC at Awassa in Ethiopia in March 2001, the opposition saw it as an attempt by the TNG to bury their effort and a political gimmick designed to hoodwink the world that the TNG is serious about national reconciliation.

Three months after the controversial announcement, the Peace Committee hit a new snag. The chairman resigned at the end of July 2001, before the initiative even got off the ground. His reason for resignation was that the TNG had failed to respond to his enquires, including questions about members on the list of the Peace Committee who were inserted without his advice. It is too early to predict whether the resignation will kill this interesting initiative. Nonetheless, the chairman reported through the BBC, which read out his resignation, that he still believed the TNG has a much better chance than all preceding peace initiatives and deserves to be supported.

In its short life span, one month short of its first anniversary, the TNG could be credited with the following rather modest achievements pertaining to its peace-building mandate and national reconciliation:

- advocates and pursues a policy of non-violence and peaceful dialogue
- provides a framework for dialogue upon which to build complete national reconciliation and reconstruction of a government for united a Somalia
- provides an interlocutor to represent Somalia in international and regional forums
- neutralizes peacefully the destructive powers of some of the warlords who were either incorporated into the TNG framework from the very beginning in the course of the Arta process, or through subsequent dialogue and reconciliation
- challenged antagonistic faction leaders outside the Arta framework by coming up with an alternative. This encouraged the development of an organized opposition. In this sense, it created organization and

structure among the rival factions, as witnessed by the formation of the SRRC opposition group

- reversed the past tendency that looked abroad for solutions to the Somali conundrum and placed ownership of the peace process with Somalis

- empowered the peace loving constituencies in Mogadihsu in particular and the traditional authority in less stable areas in south Somalia by breaking up the control faction leaders have exercised upon peace and security issues.

The shortage of financial and material resources continues to hinder the TNG's peace work and national reconciliation. Nonetheless, the TNG could be criticized for failing to realize progress in the following areas:

- failed to restore law and order in Mogadishu as a prelude to opening up revenue-generating and symbolically important public facilities, the port and the airport. As a matter of fact, the credibility of the TNG hinges a lot on bringing central control over the treacherous city of Mogadishu and opening the port and airport which have been closed since 1995.

- made use of only limited channels in the search for national reconciliation through direct and indirect talks with individual Mogadishu faction leaders on an *ad hoc* basis

- concentrated efforts and resources to open dialogue with Mogadishu faction leaders and neglected its supporters in the regions

- missed opportunities, such as considering the proposed selection of Baydhaba as the seat of the new government in lieu of Mogadishu. Selection of Baydhaba might have offered a more secure environment for the TNG to consolidate its authority and gradually expand peace and governance structures

to other areas; and cement solid relations with the RRA

- on the one hand, the TNG has revived hope, honor, and self-esteem of Somalis living in war-ravaged areas. On the other hand, it has generated unrealistic expectations – widespread anticipation that the TNG would restore law and order in Mogadishu and other trouble spots in south Somalia and moreover develop functioning institutions of government that are able to facilitate the rebuilding process.

From NRC to SRRC - The Search for Unity Among Faction Leaders at 'Ceel Berde and Awassa Conferences

Successful reconciliation of two of the faction leaders in Mogadishu enhanced the prospect for a negotiated political settlement with the remaining factions. Indeed, the TNG reported progress in its continued negotiations with the remaining Mogadishu faction leaders, excluding Musa Suudi Yala'xow, the recalcitrant and most powerful. This confronted opposition leaders in south Somalia with one of the following options:

- all surrender peacefully to the TNG
- come up with an alternative arrangement and a national reconciliation program
- continue antagonistic factionalism and gradually wither away as their power base has declined over the years.

There is need to bury differences and develop a factional front that can confront or negotiate. For this purpose, and probably with the help of Ethiopia, opposition leaders coalesced around the second option and organized the first major opposition meeting in January 2001 in 'Ceel-Berde village, Bakool region. This meeting brought together political leaders from south and southwest Somalia and representatives of Puntland and their respective political organizations: RRA (hosting faction with close links to Ethiopia), SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), SNF (Somali National Front), and the SSNM (Southern Somali National Movement), and the Puntland State of Somalia (PSS).

The 'Ceel Berde meeting led to a new political grouping known as the National Restoration Council (NRC). This new opposition alliance reiterated support to the 'building blocks' approach and a federal system of government for Somalia as a common political platform. It also discussed setting up a new self-governing regional state for south Somalia modeled along existing self-governing entities in northern Somalia. The proposed autonomous regional state would be made up of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Shabeelaha Hoose, Jubbada Dhexe, and Jubbada Hoose.[12]

The conspicuous absence of Mogadishu-based Hawiya faction leaders from the 'Ceel Berde meeting gives a clue about the political objective of the meeting. The non-Hawiya probably wanted to split unilaterally the less stable south Somalia (starting from south of Gaalka'cayo town in central Somalia) into two self-governing 'building blocks.' One would be the Hawiya (USC) entity in central and Benadir region; the second would be the NRC non-Hawiya entity in south and southwest Somalia, controlled by the Ra'xanweyn, Darood, Dir, and some relatively smaller groups. This attempt at splitting south Somalia into two autonomous 'building blocks' without the consent of the Hawiya faction leaders opposed to the TNG could also be substantiated by reference in the agenda of the meeting on the need to address the security menace linked with foreign forces (Habar Gidir militias) occupying territories controlled by NRC. Unilaterally designed by one party of the opposition, this project might have created Hawiya solidarity and possibly cooperation of all Hawiya factions against the perceived threat of the proposed non-Hawiya grouping. The NRC initiative had the additional defect of totally ignoring the TNG which has been dismissed as ineffectual faction dominated by the Hawiya.

The key consultation process hosted by RRA at 'Ceel Berde had faltered and it did not achieve any of its intended purposes. As usual, the attending faction leaders focused on the difficult issue of power sharing and still again failed to agree on distribution of power over the proposed new self-governing region for south and southwest Somalia. The important objective again eluded the process. Seeking development of a functioning opposition block that could play an important role in national reconciliation in Somalia or build a power base and functioning regional administration would not emerge from the meeting. Faction leaders have little chance of realizing this goal until they address and resolve endemic mistrust and disorganization. This also highlights the difficulty the TNG has been facing in negotiating with deeply fractured opposition, leading

one to wonder how any actor could reconcile issues between groups when leaders are unable to reconcile issues among themselves!

Ethiopia quickly responded to salvage the discredited factional leaders by sponsoring immediately after the 'Ceel Berde meeting a new factional reconciliation conference in March 2001 in Awassa. Open support to the faction leaders clarified its allegiance to factional opposition of the TNG. The Awassa factional reconciliation meeting had benefited from the preceding conference as it properly addressed the issue of representation. To this purpose, it assembled the participants of the 'Ceel Berde meeting, and absentee leaders, Mogadishu-based faction leaders and those of the minority group (SAMO). Therefore, the Awassa conference was more representative of factions and faction leaders based in south Somalia and opposed to the TNG. The interim charter formulated at Awassa was signed by 16 faction leaders from south Somalia and the President of Puntland State of Somalia. The two successive conferences have also differed in scope. Awassa was a national gathering whereas 'Ceel Berde had a regional perspective to build a self-governing regional state for south Somalia.

Opposition faction leaders offered the following as the primary goals of the Awassa conference:

- address and resolve personal and political differences and build trust and confidence between divided faction leaders (a lesson from 'Ceel Berde and past peace conferences)

- establish a united opposition that could replace disorganized and antagonistic factionalism with basic structures and defined roles and responsibilities and therefore able to serve better the interest of the opposition

- institute a new framework mandated to organize national reconciliation conference attended by representatives of all the existing factions, including the TNG which is considered by the opposition as one of the factions, to form a representative national government for Somalia.

The Awassa factional meeting declared the formation of a new political alliance uniting the opposition, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). It also formulated a draft transition charter in which the SRRC has been described as "the supreme body entrusted with the overall national responsibility in Somalia up to the achievement of a general reconciliation and the establishment of an all-inclusive national government based on a federal system." A framework made up of a five member Presidential Council with a rotating chairmanship and an executive has also been produced. Thus, the SRRC replicated the TNG in all aspects and in theory made it redundant as it produced a national framework mandated to organize inclusive national reconciliation in which political differences are resolved, peace is restored, and preparations for development of a national government are undertaken.

Agreement on formulation and declaration of a new framework provided a common ground and a rallying cause for the opposition leaders. The major challenge relates to building a viable opposition out of fractured factional politics in war-devastated south Somalia. As a matter of fact, relevance of the Awassa initiative to national reconciliation in Somalia and the future political role of the opposition leaders who assembled there, very much depends upon the extent to which individual differences are resolved. Without internal reconciliation, it would be very difficult to establish organized and responsible opposition and implement programmes formulated at Awassa.

The leadership structure, built on the rotating chairmanship of a five member Presidential SRRC Council, reveals disagreement over leadership between members of the council. Perhaps this formula was finally accepted as a face saving compromise brokered at the last minute, after all efforts to elect a common leader came to no avail. On the other side, it could be considered as a democratic formula designed to promote equal distribution of power among the often antagonistic factional leaders.

Eight major factions, including the Puntland State of Somalia, attended the Awassa conference. Four were represented by one political leader (PSS, RRA, USO, SPM), suggesting harmony and a recognized leader. The remaining four factions (USC, SNF, SSNM SAMO) were represented by two or more splinter factions and corresponding multiple leaders, each styling himself as chairman of a splinter faction.[13] The multiple leadership of half the organizations present at Awassa indicates that antagonistic factionalism and competition for power between leaders opposed to the TNG is far from being resolved.

Intractable political and personal differences as well as endemic disorganization have distinguished faction leaders in the transition period and this has obstructed progress of meaningful development to be realized in national reconciliation. It will continue to hinder peace efforts by any actor, regional or national. Therefore, the author very much doubts if the new framework declared by the SRRC opposition alliance will survive beyond Awassa, without continued support of the host country, Ethiopia.

So far, the latest opposition alliance brokered at Awassa, the SRRC, has not been translated into political solidarity and cooperation between Mogadishu faction leaders. The author firmly believes that emergence of an organized political opposition with a national vision and agenda would facilitate rather than deter national reconciliation. The Awassa initiative, on the positive side, might contribute to national reconciliation if it brings about development of an organized opposition, as this would resolve the perennial problem regarding shifting political alliances affecting factional politics and would also reduce the task of national reconciliation to two parties, the TNG and organized political opposition. On the negative side, any regional or international actor might also use the SRRC or a similar grouping of factional leaders of its own design to undermine the TNG and keep Somalia in perpetual crisis.

As the data presented in this section illustrate, the development of the TNG has intensified efforts by factional leaders in troubled south Somalia to end their differences and create organized opposition. This in turn induced the TNG to increase its peace work. The point is illustrated by the continuing competition between the TNG and the Ethiopian-supported opposition for winning fragmented faction leaders languishing outside the Arta framework.

Considering the failure of externally sponsored past peace initiatives to produce positive results, external involvement in reconciliation in Somalia tends to complicate rather than assist the national reconciliation process. External reconciliation efforts, however well intentioned, often disrupt local initiatives and delay emergence of home-grown solutions to the Somali crisis. In addition, external initiatives underestimate the political will and ability of the TNG and its supporters in realizing their mandate of restoring peace and stability to war-torn Somalia. The time has come for the TNG to show its political will and produce results.

Endnotes

1. The data on peacemaking and governance in Somaliland has been drawn from "Political Actors in Somalias' Emerging Political Entities: Civil-military Relations in Somaliland and Northeast Somalia. A paper presented to a workshop on Civil-military relations in the Horn of Africa, organized by International Resource Group, Nairobi, 1998. The data has been updated to cover the stormy transition both Somaliland and Puntland are currently passing through.

2. Control of Laas'caanood region, Buuhoodle district and east Sanaag are contested by Somaliland and Puntland administrations.

3. One faction was led by Colonel Abdullahi Yuusuf, the other by General Abshir Muusa (a member of TNG Parliament).

4. The Civil Service Commission of Somaliland started to reduce the relatively large number of government employees by conducting qualifying examinations in 2000.

5. Many Somalilanders believe that the Hargeisa *shir-beeleed* was not an independent and neutral conference, like the second conference in Borama, and regard it as a government orchestrated political exercise – funded and controlled by the administration.

6. For analyses of the issue of land and resources as central elements in the politics of modern Somalia and in the events that preceded the civil war, see Catherine Bestman and Lee V. Cassanelli, 1996 (Ed.) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*.

7. For comparison between faction leader-centerd peace processes and the Arta peace process, see Farah A Y (2000) "Resolution of the Somali Conflict: Faction Reconciliation Process Versus Arta Peace Initiative. Paper presented to African Conflicts, Their Management, Resolution and Post Conflict Reconstruction, Organized by OSSREA, DPMF, 13-15 December 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

8. Those who attended the 'Carta peace process and later on defected include Shaati Gaduud of RRA, 'Cumar 'Xaaji Masalle of SNF, Moogran of the SPM, etc.

9. Why the coveted presidency should be given to a Hawiya candidate and not a candidate from another clan was discussed in Arta as part of the debate over the election of TNG leaders. This heated debate pitted those who thought that the Hawiya do not deserve the presidency since they are primarily responsible for

creating mess in Somalia and others who thought that the Hawiya should be given the presidency to take over the responsibility of clearing the mess.

10. From its relocation in October 2000 until June 2001 the TNG has deliberated the design, training and preparation of centralized new security forces under its direct control. It is only now beginning to make the security forces operational as witnessed in the launching of the new police force a major operation to clear illegal structures from Mogadihsu Tribuunka, Siyaad Barre parade ground. This successful operation which won the applaud and admiration of ordinary citizens in the capital prepared the ground to the 41 celebration of the independence of the Italian Trust Territory in south Somalia and unification with the British Protectorate in the Northwest to form the Republic of Somalia. A parade of the security forces, police and military forces, marked the celebrations.

11. Its other members include the prolific and successful Somali author, Nuuradiin Faarax, A'xmed Xaaji Du'caale, 'Cali Shiddo Abdi; Ma'xamad Buraaleh Ismaa'ciil, Aadan Amin 'Cawil, 'Xaaji 'A'xmed Raageh, Islaow Abukar So'dal, Abdi Mohamed Terrah, General A'xmed Jaama'c, 'Cali 'Cumar Sheego' 'Cabdullaahi Ma'xamad Hirad, Sheekh Ma'xamad A'xmad (Abba) and others.

12. IRIN, January 23 2001, Somalia: Preparations for Southern Autonomous Region.

13. For faction leaders who attended the Awassa meeting and respective organizations, see signatories of the transitional charter.

CHAPTER NINE

Traditional Leaders in Political Decision Making and Conflict Resolution

Abdurahman A.Osman-Shuke

Introduction

Before starting my presentation, I would like to define what the responsibility of the clan leaders is not. Clan leaders and elders are not trained or educated to become state leaders, intellectuals, political thinkers, government functionaries, or professional managers of a modern state. They do not write modern constitutions, elaborate penal systems, build sophisticated judiciary structures, or adopt democratic parliamentary procedures. They have their own legal system regulated by the clan *Xeer*, which is based on clan lineage culture, customary laws (*Xeer*), and traditional values, partially influenced by Islamic *Shariah*.

Historical Overview

Before the colonial conquest of Somalia (Italy, Britain, France, and Ethiopia), there existed in the territories of the Somali nation traditional political structures of different forms, styles, and levels of development.

Traditional leadership used to be rooted in the notion of "*Isim*" or sultan. Historically an *Isim* used to rule a vast area as a political figurehead of many sub-clans. The title of *Isim* varies from region to region and may include such titles as *Boqor, Suldaan, Islaam, Garaad, Ugaas, Beldaaje, Qud, Wobor, Malaaq*, and *Imam*. Under each *Isim* come sub-clan heads known as *Aqil, Oday*, and *Duq*. The *Isim* and his lieutenants or sub-clan heads are the legal traditional authority in their clan-inhabited areas, and are entrusted by the people to carry responsibility for political, social, and security affairs.

Introduction of the colonial system and application of laws based on foreign cultures and different political concepts diminished the roles of the traditional legal system. Colonial administration allowed elders to deal only with issues that did not violate colonial interests, law and order, or security in general, such as resolving clan disputes, administering *Diya* payment (blood compensation), sharing pasture and water, administering marriage, and other minor problems. During the colonial administration, the traditional leaders had also lost the political power and respect they had previously enjoyed. Instead they became salaried persons working to achieve the interests of the colonial administration. To further promote competition among elders, the colonial administrations graded traditional leaders, in terms of salaries and importance, according to loyalty that each showed to the colonial administration and the numerical strength of his clan. This policy further undermined the respect accorded to Somali elders.

The successive Somali governments (1960-1990) continued the same policies and structures as the colonial administrations. The traditional legal system (*Xeer*) continued to function where presence of the government authority was weak or was intentionally avoided. During elections, party candidates and other interest groups used to accord clan elders intensive courtship and money, offering to gain votes from pastoral communities in which elders had influence. The involvement of clan elders in party politics, which divided the clan, has greatly damaged the elders respect in the communities.

The military regime, October 1969 to January 1991, had further weakened the role of traditional leaders and sub-clan heads by formally

abolishing the titles of *Isimada* and sub-clan heads by replacing them with new names such as "*Nabadoon* (peace-seeker), and *Samadoon* (goodwill seeker). The new names produced only semantic significance as the elders continued to enjoy respect and leadership within their clans. The greatest act of the government's onslaught on the traditional system was the abolition of the collective payment of *Diya* (blood compensation) and the application of secular law to pastoral communities where customary laws had been functioning as the judicial system, carried out by clan elders. This policy worked remarkably well in the first decade of the regime, but gradually lost ground, and the old system reappeared as the regime began falling apart and losing power. After the war with Ethiopia, the so-called "Ogaden War Debacle," the government reinstated, unofficially, the traditional leaders and used them to contain challenges from new opposition groups of various clans. As the weakening of the regime assumed a dramatic downturn, the traditional leaders acquired more political power in their respective areas. The formation of clan-based militias to fight against the regime further enhanced the resumption of elders' political status within their clan territories.

The Civil War

When the Somali state collapsed in 1991 as a consequence of the civil war, the country fragmented into clan-held enclaves in which the only political structure that remained intact was the clan system. In the absence of any institution of government, it was obvious that titled leaders (*Isimo*) and sub-clan heads became the only sources of authority along with the anarchic clan-based militia that brought havoc to the country. Thus, in this context, the clan leaders had reclaimed and vindicated their lost power during the last hundred years by assuming multiple roles of political, social, economic, and security matters. It was with their effort and prompt intervention that Puntland and Somaliland administrations were established, though other sections of the society played supportive and invaluable roles. Without the effort and the wise decision of *Isimada* of Puntland and *Guurtida* of Somaliland, the formation of present political structures would not have been possible. The outcome of the failed political conference at Qardho in 1994, due to an internal power struggle among SSDF leadership, could have turned to a nasty civil war, if the clan leaders involved in that process did not build a political compromise that worked admirably until the creation of Puntland in July 1998.The same could be said of Somaliland's internal wars in 1994-1995

where the traditional leaders played a constructive and powerful role in ending that grisly violence in which many innocent lives were lost.

In 1998, traditional leaders took the lead to establish Puntland, complete with a constitution and three-branch government: (1) a house of representatives, 66 members including 5 women; (2) the judiciary with a three level structure; and (3) an executive consisting of a president, vice president, and nine departmental ministers. In this governmental structure, titled clan leaders and sub-clan leaders do not have any visible role, yet they have a strong say over many vital issues, including foreign relation, Somali reconciliation, and security, a s well as constitutional matters. Notwithstanding the existence of Puntland administration, it is the clan leaders/elders who maintain security, albeit with the backing of government, by using the traditional *Xeer*.

The mandate of this government expired on June 30, 2001. The Puntland Provisional Charter (Article 28) stipulates that within the mandate period (July 1988 - June 2001), the government should complete: (1) a population census; (2) a draft constitution whose draft is now tabled at the House of Representatives for discussion; (3) a referendum on the draft constitution; and (4) a law for holding the necessary elections. Unfortunately, the government failed to implement any of these covenants expect drafting a constitution that coincided with the termination of the time-mandate. As a result of this lack of action, a constitutional crisis surfaced. When such constitutional crises emerge, the Charter provides a clause for an *ad hoc* solution. The government and house of representatives are dissolved, and the chief justice assumes the presidency of a caretaker government for a period of 30 days, during which he organizes a constitutional conference similar to, or designed on the model of 1998 conference by which the Puntland government was established In such a scenario, the traditional leaders would again have the dominant role in making political decisions by forming a new government

In spite of this constitutional arrangement, the Puntland government opted to use a different approach by calling all titled leaders (*Isimada*) to attend a conference in Garowe (June 13) to decide on one of two options: (1) to extend the mandate of the government or (2) accept the dismantling of Puntland administration, which may lead to uncertain political and security situations. The government's argument to select proposal #1 was based on economic and financial justifications and lack of resources. In fact, the chairman of the parliamentary election committee argued in his report (June 14, 2001) that in order to hold political elections the resource

needed amounts to US$ 91million.

It is clear that this budget is grossly exaggerated and is beyond the administration's fiscal capacity. It seems, therefore, that the government's resource-based argument is simply directed to gain the sympathy of the population, and to put pressure on opposition groups to support the government's plan to extend its mandate. The *Isimada* then recommended extension of the government mandate to the House of Representatives. The latter accepted the clan leaders' proposal and extended the time for three years.

Proliferation (Inflation) of Clan Titled Leaders (*Isimo*)

In Puntland, the titled leaders have grown in number since national independence in 1960. In the pre-colonial era an *Isim* had political power over a large geographical area and many different sub-clans, such as in Bari region before the colonial conquest in 1927. The sultan of that time had enjoyed both political power and administrative authority over his subjects. Similar political structures existed in other regions of Somalia (for example, the sultanates such as Geledi, Bimal, Mogadishu, Hobyo, Warsangeli) and other minor sultanates or clan bases structures. The colonial administration reduced the social and political importance of *Isimada* or sultans and downgraded their position to one of mere clan heads, with little power. As a result, sub-clan heads received roles independent of their titled leaders by having direct contact with the colonial administration. This further eroded a sultan's posture and undermined his authority. As sub-clan heads acquired more independence from the titled leaders (sultans), many small sub-clans gained political ascendancy by nominating their own clan-heads, and later, with the help of Somali political leaders, anointing titled leaders of their own, thus becoming on a par with major sub-clans in terms of political participation and social status. This policy blurred the difference between the *Laan-dheere* (majority lineage) and the *Laan-gaab* (minority lineage). In Puntland, many tiny sub-clans (minorities), who never aspired to be involved in the clan's *Shir* (Assembly of Elders) now not only have their own titled (anointed) leaders, but also participate in the political process and acquire more capacity to raise their voice at clan's *Shir* and political gatherings at a higher level.

What Has Caused the Proliferation of Clan Elders?

Figure 1: Growth of Titled Traditional Leaders in Puntland

Year	1900	1927	1960	1990	2001
Growth	8	9	11	20	60 (+750%)

The reason for the proliferation of traditional titled leaders may be attributed to many factors, among them:

- weakened traditional *Xeer* during the colonial and post-colonial eras
- politicization clans by bringing clan politics to urban centers and to government institutions
- population growth and regional migration of sub-clans
- minor sub-clans seeking social recognition and political participation
- anarchy and absence of a national government due to protracted civil war
- economic factors and access to resources distribution.

Role of International Aid Agencies in Enhancing Clan Leader Roles

The international community has visibly mingled with the political and social affairs of Somalia by direct intervention (UNITAF-UNOSOM) or through emergency assistance and rehabilitation programs of UN agencies, international NGOs, regional institutions, and governments. These institutions have, in the past ten years, forged a fragile *modus vivendi* (as an *ad hoc* arrangement) to co-exist and cooperate with the Somali chaotic political structures. These structures include clans, civil societies, armed militia, and warlords that have served as interim institutions, while waiting for either a national government or, failing that, a regional administration/government, the so-called 'building blocks.'

Ever since the collapse of the Somali state and protracted factional fighting, foreign governments, international organizations, international media, and professional writers on Somali politics, culture, and tradition have (based on the anarchic situation in Somalia) concluded, even advocated, that the clan (as a political vehicle) could perhaps be a suitable

alternative institution to resolve the Somali conflict. The proponents of this framework argue that understanding the concept of nation-state or nationhood, democracy, and human rights, requires political and intellectual sophistication that is beyond Somalia's narrowly structured clan system. It is understandable, they argue, because 'we and they' as socially antagonistic relationships within the clan system may be more discernable to these pastoral communities than abstract laws and constitutions that do not define the clan's role and its power in state affairs. The high illiteracy rate, nomadic life style, and underdeveloped pastoral economy seem to justify the thesis of those who advocate the clan system for political leadership. Although this view may partially be swallowed as half true, the logic behind this thesis does not reflect the historical reality of Somalia. We may refer to how the pre-war political and administrative institutions functioned, as examples.

The truth is that the clan, as a socio-political institution, generally practiced in the pastoral/nomadic environment, did not play an effective role in the management of the Somali state. I said *effective role* because the clan was not recognized as a political entity, nor did it have influence in shaping government policies, parliamentary legislation, or judiciary practices during the colonial administrations, Somali civilian governments, or the subsequent military regime.

The clan leaders active involvement in the political process was sighted temporarily during elections (1960-1969) and was expressed through the elected members of parliament who would run for office via political parties and different interest groupings of various clans. Only the second decade of the military regime (after the debacle of Somali war with Ethiopia in 1977-78) did the clan appear as a political instrument in the administration, security, and economic matters. The use of the clan was the product of Siyad Barre's lack of confidence and trust in the Somali people. He instrumentalzed certain clans through political, economic, and financial favoritism in exchange for loyalty and support to the regime. He entertained these clans with a greater accommodation for a temporary (often shifting) political and military alliance.

Clan System Versus Democracy and Human Rights

Clan rule and democracy, as conceived by the West, are two incompatible institutions. In the tradition and culture of the Somali society, the clan as institution, has specific functions to perform in the pastoral communities. This is especially important when members of

Diya/Mag (blood compensation) paying groups adhere to customary law enforced by the clan's male members. Women are excluded from participating in decisions.

Three principles are required for this convention to be effective:

Group Cohesion in the face of any challenge. Such challenges might be political (elections), matters related to pasture and grazing land, water sharing with other clans, livestock rustling, raping of women, physical clashes between camel herdsmen, or a group's solidarity in facing external aggression;

Group Obedience of the clan *heer* (*Xeer* = unwritten customary law) governing conflict resolution among the groups and its external relation to other clans. There may also be specific treaties, accords, and agreements with different clans and families in the same pastoral area for sharing water, pasture, grazing land, procedures for *Diya* payment, transhumance, security matters, inter-clan marriage issues, and resolution of minor conflicts (*Qoon*);

Blind Acceptance by the community of the hierarchical authority endowed upon the group's traditional head and elders. The paramount chiefs and *Isimada (Boqor, Islaam, Ugaas, Garaad, Beldaajie, Qud* (titles used in Puntland) and their appointed sub-clan heads (*Duq, Aaqil* and *Oday*) sit jointly in *Shir* (conference/ meeting) and constitute the council of elders which is the highest body of a clan's political structure. The paramount chief (*Isim*) and his lieutenant and sub-clan heads enjoy full power delegated by the clan's male members to advocate on their behalf for all matters that affect and influence the clan's interest. The lower echelon of the clan's male members cannot challenge the leaders' decisions.

Woman's Role in the Clan System and its Relevance to Democracy, Human Rights, and Gender Equity

Women traditionally are excluded from all processes, whether in political decision making, *Diya* paying, or dealing with the clan's vital issues. The woman's role is to support men's views, ideas, and decisions without participating in the process. Women do not receive any share

from blood compensation, (even if the compensation concerns their children's death) nor do they contribute to the clan's *Diya* payment. In this matter, women are not on the list of contributors. When counting (enumerating) the strength of the clan's force, women are excluded in the clans demographic roster. The reasons for this aberration, include, *inter alia,* assumptions such as:

- women should not assume responsibility or obligation for the clan because they move from one clan to another for marriage or within the clan for the same reason. Therefore, their presence is temporary, and cannot be counted on

- women are not strong enough to take part in the fighting when the clan is confronted with external aggression or war against another clan, as they are physically weak

- women do not generally own property in the pastoral communities, yet they manage and take care of their husband's business or father's livestock. Thus, they do not have resources or property to contribute to the clan's obligation for blood compensation

- women's role is to bear and rear children and be housewives, which excludes them from taking part in the clan's political, economic, and military obligations.

The concept of democracy, human rights, and gender equality, as conceived in current international principles, has no place in this pastoral and nomadic environment. The men's attitude towards women is entirely influenced by two mutually reinforcing tenets, which are the Islamic precepts about women's roles and the conservative Somali custom, culture, and tradition.

Salient Features of the Clan System

- the paramount chiefs and appointed sub-chiefs enjoy uncontested authority over the clan and decide on their behalf for all matters

- the lower echelon of male members cannot challenge decisions taken by elders
- distribution of the blood compensation received from sub-clans is a prerogative of elders
- culpability for murder committed by a clan member is automatically transferred to all male members collectively, including a baby boy born a few minutes before or after the murder took place. Culpability is collective, not personal
- any sub-clan that refuses paying the *Diya* (blood compensation) should withdraw from the clan solidarity convention and the safety net arrangement, and should face paying the *Diya* alone without assistance
- each sub-clan has the right to use freely the clan's wells and grazing lands, without restriction or fear
- women cannot decide or speak on behalf of the clan, nor can they participate in meetings, *Shir,* or discussions in which vital issues are discussed
- nomadic women do not generally own property (livestock). When a woman is divorced, very often she leaves her children behind and takes away no asset with her. She comes back to her family alone
- if a woman married into another clan is killed, the blood compensation goes to *her clan's male members*, and not to her husband and her children. For the woman belongs to her clan or sub-clan by blood association. The clan system's absurdity is that children inherit their mother's property if she dies naturally, but they are denied to receive fair compensation if she is killed. *Shariah* law regulates the former case, the latter is regulated with culture and tradition.

Weakness in the Clan System

The clan's habitat is geographically limited and that restricts the transhumance and border crossing of the nomads to other clan territories. Because of the geographical limitation, the clan has no capacity to influence neighboring clan's political views, economic activities, and social customs. To cross over its unmarked territorial boundary to another clan's turf might generate conflict and confrontation, especially if there has not been an understanding or general consent worked out between the other clan about the rules governing transhumance. The real example is

the transhumance rigidity between North and South Mudug communities where border crossing to both sides is dangerous and almost impossible between the two communities to agree on sharing pastoral resources. The rainfall on one side is not available to the other community, even though the distance involves less than a half-day's travel (*Minqaad*) to reach the rainy area.

The clan's concept of a nation state is socially, politically, and economically limited within the confines of its habitat, that is to say, its nation's geography (space) is the clan's territory. The clan's relation to other clans is external. Therefore, the clan is territorial.

No clan has the capacity to exert economic influence, which might compel other clans to obey their superiority in material terms. The clan's territoriality inhibits any meaningful economic cooperation with other clans. For example, two clans living in contiguous areas never cooperate in digging wells for the benefit of their livestock and community, nor do they hold joint meetings to discuss shared environmental problems such as soil erosion, rain water harvesting, or protection of grazing land. The cooperation that a clan undertakes with another clan takes place generally through conflict resolution and peace making.

Mistrust mars inter-clan economic relations. If two neighboring clans have an unresolved case, then communication between them becomes tense until the case is settled. Trivial incidents and minor accidents could hold economic transactions at stalemate for many years.

Figure 2: Clan Political Structure



Unlike the farmers whose land constitutes a capital asset and family property, the nomad/pastoralists do not have defined concepts of land ownership as individual property because they regard land as an indefinable asset belonging to a larger group of people (clan) who have no responsibility for its distribution, protection, and care.

Xeer: A Tool For Resolving Conflict and Managing Clan Affairs

Clan elders adopt a set of rules and precedents as tools to solve complex issues, encompassing many areas of a clan's social, political, economic, and security affairs. *Xeer* is not written but transmitted by oral narration, dating back to pre-Islamic times. In addition, it is believed that various kingdoms, which supposedly existed in the Somali territories, had adopted pre-Islamic laws. Some of these kingdoms known in Somali legends are the Barrow kingdom that reigned in the Qaw area (Bosaso), Bucur Bacayr and Arraweelo kingdoms that are believed to have ruled part of northern Somalia, and Geedi Baabow kingdom in the Upper Juba. Some clan families such as Darood and Isaaq would insist that because they were formed after Islam, they did not experience the practice of pagan culture. In spite of such claims, there is no valid historical evidence to support this claim.

The *Xeer* developed and advanced through centuries by absorbing new elements and ideologies from Islamic teachings. However, residuals of pre-Islamic customs are still practiced in all Somali inhabited territories. Yet the *Xeer* had undergone dynamic evolution in tandem with the changing environment and in response to socio-economic growth and political changes. Since *Xeer* is transmitted orally, some of the earlier rules or important covenants might have been lost. Furthermore, as the foreign powers penetrated into the country and enforced the practice of European secular law, the *Xeer* diminished in status and its application was confined to the nomadic areas and less urbanized environment. The continuous urbanization process, which intensified during the post-colonial era, had also its impact on the efficacy of the *Xeer*.

Salient Features of *Xeer*

The Somali customary law (*Xeer*) has several characteristics that distinguish it from the other two legal systems (*Shariah* and secular laws) practiced in Somalia. These include:

- the customary law is unwritten and administered in oral form
- it is traditionally inherited and transmitted through generations and the memory of elders
- it has no formal structure (written constitution) or judicial system
- it is male dominated. Participation of women in the formulation and practice of *Xeer* is negligible, as they do not enjoy equal rights with men
- it is localized and has no universality in its application throughout Somalia
- application of its rules is flexible and varies from place to place depending on circumstances and situations. Its procedures are drawn on past decisions and precedent cases, so it has historical validity
- the *shariah* heavily influences *Xeer,* especially on blood compensation and family statutes issues.

The Position of *Xeer* on Gender and Human Rights

The Somali people are, by culture, a male-dominated society. *Xeer* does not allow women to participate as members of the clan's decision-making structure. Women's role in the society is to fulfill reproductive functions and household management. All other activities that women may undertake in the community are valued and appreciated as an additional input, seen through the prism of biological reproduction, raising children and managing household chores.

Main Functions and Rules of *Xeer*

Pastoralists, traditional farmers, fishers, and frankincense collectors use the *Xeer* to regulate their socio-economic and security relations. It is also used for conflict resolution and for fostering unity and mutual support of the sub-clan members. It is adopted to maintain peaceful co-existence and cooperation with neighboring sub-clans. The *Xeer* envisages protection of the environment and regulates in a loose, non-obligatory way the use of common resources such as water points, pasture, forests, and grazing-lands. As a result, the *Xeer* has legal (judicial) and socio-economical functions. The *Xeer* defines rules and regulations for perpetuating the sub-clan's organizational structure and

social order. These include rules and procedures on election, selection of sub-clan chiefs and sub-clan titled leader(s) (*Isim/s*), decision-making, sub-clan hierarchy, and nomination of sub-clan delegates (*Ergo*) to sub-clan assemblies (*Shir*).

Xeer is executed for mediation and arbitration to settle disputes and difficult issues. Its enforcement depends upon the respect and the moral weight that the elders carry. When settling disputes, representatives of the concerned parties are identified or selected and an arbitration/mediation panel is formed. Either of the disputing parties has the right to raise objections against inclusion of some members in the arbitration panel. Another important feature in the application of *Xeer* is the agreement by which the disputing parties have to accept, in advance, the ruling of the deciding elders on the case. The Somalis call this procedure of the *Xeer Qoor-dhiibasho* = meaning "unconditional acceptance of the arbitrators' decision." In this process, the two parties are given equal chance to present their case and to respond to questions or clarify further points if required. Provisions of *Xeer* as practiced in Puntland, may be divided into four categories:

Category One: All Xeer rules that carry a penalty (material and moral) or collective obligation of the clan could be called category one, and may comprise:

Collective Payment and receipt of *Diya* (blood compensation price).

- ***Dalool-Xoor***: reduction of one-third for physical body injuries: this rule of *Xeer* sanctions that one third of the incurred penalty be waived. But in Sool region this *Xeer*-rule is not obligatory while in Mudug the ruling has undergone further change, where the rule waives half of the penalty instead of one third *Dalool-xoor* (waiving one third of the compensation) is not a common covenant among the different clans living in different regions in Puntland.

- ***Theft and Banditry***: the rules for theft and banditry sanction a compulsory return of the stolen property or payment of an equivalent value with heavy moral punishment. The offenders would suffer social stigma

(shame) in the community. Very often they leave their community if they become repetitive offenders (recidivists).

- ***Rape***: in Puntland regions, rape is a serious physical and moral crime. History is full of stories of past rape incidents that provoked fighting between sub-clans. Rape is considered more serious than murder in people's perception. In addition to the normative verdict, the offender is often morally penalized. However, the *Xeer* penalty on rape is much milder than that of the *Shariah* and secular law. *Xeer* penalties vary depending on the location and gravity of the act and magnitude of the damage. There is no uniform or common application of *Xeer* rules on rape. For example, in Mudug and Nugaal regions, the *Xeer* sanctions payment of 44 head of sheep/goats or its equivalent in camels, if the offender committed sexual intercourse, while in Bari region the penalty is much higher and sometimes may rise up to the level of paying half of the women's blood compensation price (25 camels). Furthermore, the offender is liable to pay three million Somali Shillings if he undressed the woman by force but sexual intercourse did not materialize. If on the other hand, the girl becomes pregnant as a result of the rape, the penalty is for the offender to marry her and pay an inflated marriage price. If the raped girl was an engaged person with *Gabaati* (down payment) paid to her father, the case becomes more dramatic as the fall out would involve the suitor's clan, too. The victim's family has to repair the damage by either providing a suitable substitute bride or repay *Gabaati* to the suitor. If the raped woman is, on the other hand, not a virgin, then the penalty applied to the culprit is much lighter (morally and materially) than, say, the one applied on the virgin's case. Very often the raped girl is forced to marry the man who raped her. The woman's human right is a secondary issue as the family honor has priority over other considerations. In some communities, a raped girl may not find a husband. That is the reason why she is forced to marry the man who raped her. According to this arrangement, it is the man

who is punished, elders say, because the marriage proposal would usually come from the offending party to forestall severe sanction or violent revenge. The offender would pay also an inflated dowry, which is another punishment. The second option for her would be to emigrate to far away regions where her identity is not well known, and seek new prospects for marriage.

Figure 3: Involved Parties in a Rape Case of an Engaged Girl



- ***Protection of Relatives***: from the sister's or mother's side (*xigaalo*) and in-laws (*xidid*) who are guests of the in-laws or living in the territory of the host clan is an obligation that should be fulfilled and respected. Violation of such *Xeer's* moral imperative would entail punishment or may even occasion fighting among the host community. The same rules apply for the protection of individuals from a hostile clan, who are in the custody (*magan*) of kinsmen.

- ***Prior Consultation***: is required with the clan elders before pardoning capital punishment in exchange for blood compensation from a murder case by the family of the victim. This would mean that the family alone cannot exonerate the culprit from capital punishment, as the responsibility is collective, not personal.

- ***Physical Violence***: offending or publicly insulting traditional leaders is a grave moral crime. He who rejects the verdict of the traditional elders' jury, the *Xeer* penalty provides 'slaughtering' of the offender's burden camel. The burden camel and milking camel are the two most valued animals by the pastoralist/ nomad as he depends on them for the family's livelihood. Slaughtering the burden camel is considered to be a severe punishment.

Category Two: Xeer-rules that have cultural and moral values

- ***Sparing the Lives:*** of socially respected groups *(Biri-ma-geydo* = literally means: they are unmarriageable to iron) of the adversary clan during fighting is a *Xeer* rule. These groups are the aged, children, women, religious men, wealthy person, poets, and traditional leaders. Violation of this rule is morally wrong and it would be a great shame on the sub-clan that commits such criminal acts.

- ***Welcoming and Having Dialogue***: with the deputation (*ergo*) from an offended party/sub-clan is a rule of the *Xeer*. Violating such a fundamental *Xeer* is tantamount to opting for war. To accord courtesy (*qadderin*) and respect (*xushmo*) to the offended party is a universal principle. However, this would not necessarily mean that the two parties would agree on the issues at stake.

- ***Women Battering:*** Battering women is a bad behavior in principle but not punishable, unless the injuries wrought to the victim are so grave that they warrant revenge or claim for compensation by the woman's family. In most cases battering women is brushed off as simple disciplinary action taken on the part of the husband or other male who claims responsibility for controlling the woman (father, brother, and sometimes another male relative). In some communities, if battering of women becomes frequent and beyond the tolerable limit, then the woman's family could rightly initiate legal action, including asking for divorce.

Category Three: Rules about Statutes of Family

- ***Marriage Price:*** (dowry). This is mostly practiced in pastoral communities and in a minor form in urban areas. The price value for marrying a girl varies from clan to clan and is negotiated between the prospective in-laws. *Xeer* does not make a marriage price (dowry) compulsory as it is not a clan matter, but that of a family. However, it might involve the sub-clan elders in problems emanating from the marriage itself. Worsening of the couple's relation may cause the husband to claim the return of the dowry against conceding divorce. In such a scenario, the sub-clan leaders from both sides become automatically involved. The *Xeer* provides rules to settle such cases, which mostly end up in compromise.

- ***Marrying Widow:*** *(Dumaal* = probably from the Arabic-Thu-Maal-which means property owner). The brother of the deceased husband has the right to marry the widow. The uterine brothers have primacy over half brothers. In the non-existence of bothers, the first-grade cousin or even second-grade cousins may claim the right to marry the widow. If the woman rejects marriage to any of the male in-laws, *Xeer* of some communities provides a ruling by which the woman loses custody of her children and family property and may also suffer eviction, and a sanction barring her marrying outside inheriting families. In some communities, if she marries a non-inheritor, the penalty is five camels or an equivalent value leveled against the usurper husband. Religious leaders oppose such a forced action against a woman because they said it violates the *Shariah* and the woman's rights.

- ***Marrying Deceased Wife's Sister (Sororate):*** *(Xigsiisan* = literally meaning "second chance or getting closer"). The husband of the deceased wife may request his in-laws to arrange for him replacement of the lost wife by marrying her sister or a female cousin to continue relationship with the in-laws, and also to provide a second mother (*Habar-yar*) for the mother-orphaned children (if any). *Xeer*

considers *Xigsiisan* as strong cultural and material obligation upon the family of the deceased woman though it is not legally binding. Somali elders agree that *Xigsiisan* (replacement of deceased woman) is simply a courtesy (qadderin) but has also social value as it protects children's welfare. Religious sheikhs maintain that forced marriage is *Xaaraam* (illegal) and contrary to *Shariah.*

- ***Eloping With an Engaged Girl:*** *(La-bixid).* In some Puntland regions, *Xeer* rules provide a penalty varying from five to ten camels applied to the eloping man. However, the application of this rule may undergo internal variation from region to region. Engaging a girl is a prelude of relationship between families of future in-laws (*Xidid*=literally meaning: root) and by extension between two sub-clans. The process of the girl's engagement involves often down payment (*Gabaati* = meaning: pledge with advance payment) of a value either in cash or in kind pending the main dowry negotiation. Violation of the *Xeer* on this matter might even cause unnecessary fighting between the two clans or for that matter between the suitor and the eloper's families.

Category Four: Rules on Socio-economic Issues

- ***Common Property***: *Xeer* stipulates that the use of common resources (water, pasture, grazing land, and environment) is the foundation of the clan and family coexistence. Elders argue that according to *Xeer* the territories inhabited by some lineage clan families are common property in spite of hostilities that may occasionally flare up between sub-clans living in contiguous areas. Important elements in the common resource are water and grazing land. The *Xeer* does not clearly provide any punishment against those who abuse resources. If, for instance, a person sets fire to grasslands that are badly needed for maintaining livestock during the dry season, there is no provision in the *Xeer* to punish such an act. The only punishment mostly leveled against the culprit is to 'curse' him/ her. Hence the reprisal is

moral condemnation. The individualistic nature of the nomads/pastoralists makes it difficult to develop a concept of common ownership of resources or to think about public services as something that belong to all.

- ***Assisting Newly Married Couples:***(*Kaalo*). This is a very important moral and material support to the new household. It also cements the relatives and sub-clan solidarity in promoting the potential increase of the sub-clan numbers that would be generated by the new household offspring.

- ***Support to a Married Sister:*** (*Dhibaad* = literally: burdensome or solving problem) Help from her family is a moral obligation. Elders agree that this kind of assistance carries social value and strengthens relationships between in-laws. In the past, seeking *Dhibaad* involved traveling on foot many days for the woman to reach her family, which was a tiring enterprise. The volume of the gift received would raise or diminish the status and respect of the woman in the perception of her in-laws. Seen from this perspective, *Dhibaad* has a social value. At present, *Dhibaad* is decreasing as traditional or cultural (*Xeer*) and becomes less frequent than ever due to increasing urbanization and communication. A brother who remits dollars to his sister from abroad is not considered *Dhibaad* anymore, but a simple assistance. This indicates how the dynamics involved in the evolution of the *Dhibaad,* as a traditional custom, is dwindling or becoming less important.

- ***Lending Milking Animal*** (camel, cow, or goats) to relatives: (This is called *Maal* = literally meaning: 'lending milking animals.') However, the system becomes less frequent as road transportation increases and selling milk becames a major business to generate income for nomad households.

- ***Livestock Contribution:*** (*Xoolo-gooyo* = literally meaning: 'Giving away livestock'). When a family had lost

its livestock to natural calamities, the relatives contribute animals to rebuild the household's stock.

Impact of the Civil War on *Xeer*

The civil war did not penetrate deeply into Puntland. It was confined to the Galkayo front farther south. The rest of Puntland remained unaffected. However, the effects of the civil war that ravaged other parts of the country greatly impacted the region. Institutions disintegrated with the collapse of the national state in January 1991, paving the way for anarchy and unwarranted criminal acts. The rule of law was replaced by the rule of the gun. The ensuing anarchy put its mark on all walks of life: breach of the customary law, degradation of customs, and degradation of social and moral values. These include:

- increased rate of rape cases, which infringed the *Xeer* without punishing the perpetrators due to lack of authority
- erection of unlawful road check points by clan militia
- chaotic killing, looting, and banditry, which the application of *Xeer* could not handle due to intensity of the chaos and social upheavals
- murder of relatives from the mother's side (*Xigaalo*) and sister's (in-laws and relatives) which violated the basic principle of the *Xeer*
- increased prostitution and ever-expanding use and trade in drugs. The *Xeer* was unable to challenge such imported alien habits as it has no provision to control or even contain them
- compensation for injuries or deaths on road accidents was transferred to the clan. In the past insurance companies were liable to pay such compensations. As *Xeer* did not envisage compensation for road accidents, the matter became problematic to solve. So each region has devised its own value assessment system for paying
- road accident cases. Elders strongly complain over the road accident issues and hope the government will either establish rules on this matter or encourage insurance system to develop.

Extension of *Xeer* Application Beyond Puntland

- Payment of blood compensation price by the clan for murder cases committed by members residing outside Puntland *e.g.* Kismayo. Many people (Harti clan) originally residing in other regions of Somalia fled to Lower Juba regions particularly in Kismayo. Some sub-clans in Kismayo could not afford to pay *Diya*-price for murder committed by their militia. Members of the same clan in Puntland had to pay the *Diya to* avoid retaliation and revenge. This is the most unique phenomenon that the civil war produced in the application of the Clan-*Xeer*, hence geographical extension of the *Xeer* beyond sub-clan's territory.

- Participation of some businesswomen in the payment of blood compensation. Many women have raised their status in the clan because of their wealth. Sometimes they are asked to express their opinions on issues that they were never previously invited to talk about.

Future Role of *Xeer*

Puntland pastoralists and their traditional leaders adore and pay tribute to their *Xeer*. Clan elders highly recommend its adoption and preservation. Yet, upon careful scrutiny, it was found that some provisions of *Xeer* are in conflict with Islamic precepts and its *Shariah* law. When this issue was raised with clan elders, they instantly withdraw from their previous position and admitted that many *Xeer* provisions may be contrary to the tenets of Islam. They therefore urged that these elements of the *Xeer* be set aside or even abandoned. Islam, being a heavenly revelation, is not subject to change or alteration. The logic is, therefore, *that Xeer* should adjust itself to Islam. Moreover, a number of *Xeer* rules are also in contradiction to the secular law and human rights conventions.

The future of the *Xeer* much depends on its ability to adjust itself to other laws or for other laws to accept *Xeer* provisions. This process needs time and effort but the view of many prominent people is that steps in that direction should be taken.

CHAPTER TEN

Somaliland's Quest for Recognition: A Challenge for the International Community

Jama Sweden

Introduction

This paper presents the history of Somaliland from the time that Allah entrusted Somalis to live in this part of the Horn of Africa. They have shaped their own unique culture of traditional governance to administer the affairs of their day-today lives. When the colonizers arrived in the nineteenth century, the traditional elders did not allow them to set foot on the soil until treaties and memoranda of understanding had been signed. After gaining independence from the British, Somalilanders voluntarily united with UN trust territory of Somalia, a sacrifice that they made to create the unified state of Somalia in the Horn Africa.

The reward of this sacrifice became the root cause of the misery of the Somaliland people, as they became second-class citizens in the new nation. They immediately started struggling against the injustices of the civil regime of Somalia, as well as the suppression and barbaric genocide

of the loathsome military regime of Siyad Barre. A nationwide uprising in an armed battle, spearheaded by the SNM (Somali National Movement), reached it's full scale in the late 1980s. The struggle resulted in evicting the tyrannical regime and led the Somaliland people to reach their cherished goal in regaining their independence.

After the collapse of the Somali state, the Somaliland people have tightened their bootstraps, ended their civil war, and taken steps to put their house in order through traditional grassroots peace building and conflict management. All of this they did in an effort to heal the wounds inherited from the 'divide and rule strategies' of Siyad Barre.

In this endeavor, Somaliland communities acknowledge that living together in peace, cooperating in reconciliation, and establishing community-owned processes of peace building are filling the vacuum of the failed central government. This reconciliation has taken much work to achieve. When the brutal system of Siyad Barre's Somalia was committing genocide, the world did not speak out. International organizaations applied no external pressure or sanctions to scale down the enormous human losses. On the contrary, international funds and firearms became available that enabled the violence to flourish. When Somalilanders initiated their new chapter of peace and reconciliation, the world again turned its back and the international community neglected the prize stability of the people that is linking peace with development support, demobilization, integration, and rehabilitation of the country's devastated infrastructure.

Somaliland Traditional Governance

Since the end of the 9th century, historical records document how the people based their social and political institutions on two sources: tradition and Islam. Governance (*Heer*) and law enforcement as well as clan support enabled the people to develop decentralized administration and conflict resolution to meet the challenge of a harsh environment.

Somaliland developed a legacy of strong traditional institutions of *diya* paying systems (negotiated payments) by related lineages within a clan by means of a social contract. This contract explicitly stated the rights and duties of all members of the group with respect to the burdens of payment and the distribution of blood compensation, that is, distribution of camels or money received in payment for an injustice. A smaller but still substantial portion (the *Jiffo*) was received by the

relatively close kin of the deceased, that is, by an agnate group descended from a common ancestor three or four generations back.

In the case of offences requiring payment of a smaller compensation, sharing still occurred within the *diya*-paying group, but in minor cases the *jiffo*-paying group alone might be involved. Both *diya*-paying and *jiffo*-paying groups were important units of social and economic organization, aside from their stated purpose. They functioned as mutual aid groups in times of economic hardship or other emergencies. They also offered assistance in marriage called (*Kaalo*), provided help for those living in poverty, gave support when a relative lost wealth (*Xoologooyo)*, organized work groups to assist members of the community (*Guus*) especially the agricultural activities, collected large jars of milk for the guests (*Qaraamaad*), and offered support for a woman when she visited her relatives (*Diiqo*). These are some of the unique Somali cultural values that provided assistance that are still in place, and commonly practiced.

In the early eighteenth century, Somaliland became part of the Ottoman Empire and the rule of the Khedives of Egypt. Between 1884 and 1886 six treaties and three supplementary agreements of friendship and protection were signed with the British to provide fresh meat supplies to its garrisons at Aden. These treaties were symbols of friendship and commerce between the British and local sultans, elders, and clan representatives. At that point, Somaliland became a British protectorate.

A story illustrates the relationship of the sultans and the British. Mr. Sharmarke, one of the chief local authorities of Gabiley District, Somaliland, was once instructed to collect a fine levied against his clan. Sharmarke declined to do so as he felt the fine was unlawful. The British governor told him angrily to obey orders because Sharmake was receiving a salary to carry out the wishes of the British Crown. Sharmarke immediately went to his family and collected the money from savings he had accumulated from his British salary during his many years of service. Sharmarke had long ago suspected that his employment and payments from the British were a tactic to deprive him of his rights and make him a slave of the British Empire. He had therefore kept all his salary payments in a wooden vessel at his house, entering the amounts on a white sheet, month by month, spending not a single penny of it for personal or family needs. He returned the money to Governor in Hargeisa.

The Sharmarke story illustrates the extent that traditional elders would go to maintain their independence and liberty from British control. It was their way of protecting their rights and maintaining their

sovereignty as well as pride. In Somali culture, a person who acts against his culture and his people in exchange for money is viewed as a sell-out.

In 1957, the first executive and legislative councils were formed. Later, in 1959, as the overwhelming majority of the public spoke in favor of independence, the British promised an end of the protectorate. The seminal document of the twentieth century was the Act of Union that established Somalia as a separate state in 1960. The British government announced that British Somaliland would become independent on June 26, 1960. The Italian government later announced that the Italian trust territory would gain independence five days later, on July 1, 1960. These dates reflected the United Nations desire for a speedy and prompt granting of independence.

Somaliland, being independent for only five days without laying the legal foundations for the Union and few consultations between Somaliland and Somalia, found itself involved in a 'hasty Union.' Delegates from Somaliland and Southern Somalia were to sign an international treaty between the two states to form a union, after which the Southern Legislative Assembly was to approve the document. Subsequently, the National Assembly should have elected a Provisional President. On June 27, 1960, the day after its independence, Somaliland's Legislative Assembly passed the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law. Since the authorized representative of Southern Somalia never signed this treaty, it remained without binding force in the south. Instead, on June 30, 1960, the Legislative Assembly of Southern Somalia approved the Act of the Union in principle, which was significantly different from the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law. At midnight on June 30, 1960, the Italian Trusteeship Agreement expired and the President of the Legislative Assembly, acting in his capacity as the Provisional President of the Republic, proclaimed the independence of Somalia.

On January 31, 1961, the National Assembly proclaimed a new Act of Union, repealing the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law, and made the Act of Union retroactive as from July 1, 1960. The act of repealing, however, was not effective in all of Somalia. Further, since the South, in negotiation with Italian officials, drafted the constitution, Somaliland politicians could not make changes. The June 1961 referendum on the Constitution reflected Somaliland resentment of Somalia's power, and the result was that Somaliland people boycotted the referendum.

The merger never produced a perfect union. The Somaliland people, a bit less than the population of the south, found no sign of modern

economic activity. Somaliland became a junior partner in the state, a position it found hard to accept. A group of Somaliland military officers staged an abortive coup d'état on 11 December 1961, the first of its kind in Africa. Since then Somaliland has been a breeding ground for political dissidence. Somalilanders have expressed their dissatisfaction through songs, plays, and poetry, and lamented their lost independence. Among them was the prominent national poet Mr Abdillahi Sultan Timacadde, who expressed his concern in a stanza extracted from his many poems:

> We have not just came to join you,
> But our interest can't be divided,
> Having the House of the Parliament,
> And the port both in Hamar,
> In that case Berbera being empty,
> Even a single boat is not making its turn,
> A matter not we deserve as reward,
> Don't double these acts and many others,
> Think of reconsidering your decision.

In October 1969, the military regime, after introducing itself as the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), installed a brutal police state, complete with eastern bloc trained security troops and national security courts run by military officers. Among his first agenda items, Siyad Barre ruled Somaliland with an iron fist. He immediately sent military, whatever their titles or designations, as governors. For example, one was nicknamed by the Hargeisa people "the man with four pockets." The name was based on his ability to accept bribes when deciding cases. The judges, senior army and police officers, and the so-called administrators were devoid of human decency and compassion. Corruption, rape, looting, arbitrary arrests, detention without trials, torture, and killings became common practice. The overwhelming majority of all repressive government personnel, whether civilians or in the armed forces, were Southerners whom the people of Somaliland came to no longer see as co-nationals, but as an alien occupying force.

With the declared objective to overthrow the military regime by use of force, a group of Somalilander elites, based in London, formed the Somaliland National Movement (SNM), in April 1981. Within a few months, hundreds of Hargeisa professionals, business people, and students were rounded up, charged with what was termed as 'subversion'

by the National Security Court, and handed sentences that ranged from three years to life imprisonment. Their only crime was that they had formed voluntary associations to improve the conditions of the dilapidated government hospital in Hargeisa and other social and health service providers. Even more frustrating was that the military rulers interpreted that the professionals and business people's behavior was anti-government. Siyad saw their posture as a challenge to military rule. The immediate results were the radicalization of the students and others in Hargeisa. A consequence of all these was that the SNM accelerated its decision to establish bases in the border area in eastern Ethiopia. Preparation for a liberation war began in earnest soon thereafter.

In May 1988, when the two dictators of Somalia and Ethiopia made a peace agreement to take their forces away from the borders of the two countries, the SNM saw no alternative except to attack Burao and Hargeisa. In retaliation, the Somali Army determined to wipe out all traces of opposition by hiring mercenary South African and Zimbabwe pilots to bomb Hargeisa. The planes took off from the Hargeisa airport, concentrated their bombardments on the populated cities and urban centers, and tried to reduce SNM control so that the army could retake Hargeisa and Burao. Even when the civilian population fled to eastern Ethiopia as refugees, the aircraft chased and bombarded them at their new settlements inside Ethiopia, in mid-July, 1988.

With all the said atrocities going on, none of the international community spoke out against the violation of human rights and genocide of Somaliland and instead, provided tremendous support to the Somalia regime, in terms of arms and other support in developmental assistance. The last shipments of lethal U.S. military assistance included 1,200 M16 automatic rifles and 2 million rounds of M16 ammunition, plus 300,000 rounds of 30 caliber and 500,000 rounds of 50 calibre ammunition, valued at about $1.4 million. They were shipped on June 9, 1988, with approval of the Departments of State and Defense, to the Somalia army under the foreign sales program and arrived on June 28 at the port of Berbera. They were used by the government at a critical point in the conflict. Parallel to that was also other financial support flowing to Somalia's regime in the Berbera port faculty. In the private sector, royalties from the oil exploration companies were continuing up to the last minute. No sanctions were put in place and no monitoring of human rights abuses were provided. Such measures would have saved the lives of thousand and thousands of people who were massacred during Siyad's time of genocide.

During the course of the 1988 civil war, 50,000 people were killed and another 500,000 forced to flee to Ethiopia. Government forces laid over a million unmarked land mines in Somaliland. These acts deliberately violated not only international human rights but also humanitarian principles relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts.

Peace Building and Conflict Management

The Cold War has affected Somaliland more then any other country in the region. Huge arms shipments provided by the superpowers through Berbera, being the most strategic place in the Horn, added up to the unnecessary wars of Somalia against Ethiopia. The Cold War made Somaliland a strategic spot for Somalia to attach. The concentration of Siyad Barre's military to silence the uprisings of Somaliland was another source of firearms proliferation in the country.

The traditional governing bodies of the country were the only part of the governance community that Siyad's regime couldn't abuse. This institution had become a very important tool. It was a logical next step for the Somaliland elders to follow immediately after the collapse of the Siyad regime. The elders decided to initiate a reconciliation process among their communities. It was not a new idea. Even when Siyad was still in power, reconciliation was going on among the elders in order to avoid his divide and rule ploy. Since the Government of Somalia was antagonistic to Somaliland, elders were constantly turning to their own administrative system of governance. Lacking central authority was not a new phenomenon for the Somaliland people, after suffering for three decades in destruction, mass killings, and all kinds of humiliations.

After the collapse of the Somali government, the elders immediately started to organize conferences and in January 1991, when the Somali society had fallen apart and peace and reconciliation were the most immediate need, Somaliland traditional leaders, elders, and religious personalities organized themselves to fill the vacuum of no central authority.

The SNM, the sole movement in Somaliland that expelled the forces of Somalia, facilitated the first all-clan meeting in Berbera in February 1991. That meeting become the catalyst for the re-emergence of Somaliland. The importance of that meeting could be judged by the fact that the people who were at that time supporting opposing fronts started reconciling among each other. Therefore, retribution against the people

who had sided with the Siyad regime during the civil war, did not take place. The SNM that led the victorious struggle kicking the Siyad regime out of Somaliland accommodated the reconciliation efforts of the elders in solving their conflicts. It came at a time when the disunity among Somaliland clans was at its peak.

The community leaders, without prior publicity, worked in assembling the grassroots conference in Berbera, in February 1991. That conference demonstrated the skilfulness of the traditional elders in peace making and conflict management, a sign that confirms the richness of the peace making culture of Somaliland communities. It is particularly noteworthy because it came at a that time when there could have been considerable internal conflict. The groundwork established at Berbera created the foundation for confidence building and enabled the elders to convene the Burao conference on 18 May. Here the delegates took the decision to secede from Somalia or, stated another way, to return to the status quo before 26 June 1960. This was a grassroots meeting of traditional leaders and they were able to address the major issues needed to build peace and manage their conflicts from within. The Burao meeting also paved the way for the next major discussion, to the held at Borama.

The 1993 Borama conference represented an impressive coalition of people from Somaliland in general, put in order by the clan elders. They elected a president, a parliament, and a house of elders. The heavy-handed military intervention of the US and UN consumed four billion dollars, without furthering the cause of peace, and left no trace of development behind. Not a penny of these huge funds reached Somaliland. President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who has been elected through the mechanisms based on clan consensus, received a mandate to:

- provide the core concepts of governance, such as peace and stability, at this critical stage
- implement resolutions reached by the clans
- build government institutions
- carry out demobilization work by integrating the clan militias into a Somaliland army
- create institutions for law enforcement
- prepare a constitution to replace the national charter drafted in Borama
- establish a firm foundation for a democratic society.

A referendum of the constitution held recently on 31 May 2001 received affirmation from 97 percent of the eligible voters, 1,108,000 of its estimated three million population. In this democratic way, the voters endorsed the independence of Somaliland and ratified the process to create a constitution. This gives the Somaliland government the legitimate path to create a legal platform of government. Validity of the recognition of Somaliland is based on:

- Somaliland is meeting the criteria of state under international law, which notes that a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities

- Somaliland and its people existed as sovereign international persons until the Act of Union, at which time Somaliland sought unification with Southern Somalia. The unification effort, however, fell short of the legal requirements mandated by domestic and international law. With nothing more than the recognition of other states to testify to the existence of Somalia as a unified state, it is necessary to consider the legal grounds on which Somaliland can reassert itself on the international plane

- the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the International Bill of Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, recognizes the right to rebel against a government guilty of genocidal violations of human rights

- various international instruments enumerate international human rights. If the political establishment violates these rights on a genocidal scale, the people may claim a right to self-determination through secession

- in the case of political dislocation, international law allows creation of a state through self-determination

- the OAU doctrine seeks to preserve the boundaries left by the colonial powers in Africa. The present Somaliland boundaries are in conformity with that doctrine

- Somaliland independence in self-determination assists in resolving longstanding regional disputes of the Ethiopian, Somali, and the North Eastern Kenya territories where ethnic Somalis reside. In that connection, the emergence of Somaliland matches with the OAU policy and makes a high value contribution to much needed regional stability, cooperation, and economic development

- Somaliland people, in a very democratic way, endorsed their independence in the referendum of the constitution held recently on 31May 2001, through an affirmative vote of a majority in 97 percent endorsement from eligible voters.

A question randomly asked of Somaliland people is, "Why are the people still armed, though not openly, as the country is peaceful and stable?" Respondents often answer, "They stand ready to engage the firearms they possess for any pretext relating them back to Somalia, which they will fight without exception." This determines how the people of Somaliland are devoted to their independence that is irrevocable, another strong point to be considered.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Reflections on Somaliland and Africa's Territorial Order

Ian S. Spears

Introduction

On 31 May 2001, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland conducted a referendum on its future. In what has generally been regarded as an accurate reflection of public sentiment, Somalilanders voted heavily in favor of independence from Somalia.[1] The results were perhaps not surprising. For a number of years, Somaliland has been a 'state-within-a-state,' a political entity which had emerged out of a previously recognized state but which lacked formal recognition from the international community. Somaliland had already acquired many tangible features of statehood: government ministers and a president, a flag, an army, its own currency, vehicle licence plates and, perhaps most important, a sense of self. By comparison, the larger Somalia languishes in political uncertainty. As Virginia Luling has pointed out, Somalia outside of Somaliland had already become the prime example of a

'collapsed state,' a 'byword for anarchy.' Becoming 'another Somalia' she observes, was the outcome to be avoided by all other African states.

This bifurcated outcome thus presents a contradiction to the recent apocalyptic literature which speculates on the prospects of state breakdown.[2] While many of the existing territorial states in Africa remain fragile and prone to collapse, these conditions have not always given way to anarchy. On the contrary, in a few cases, the breakdown of large, arbitrary state units has given way to more coherent and viable (though not always more benevolent) political entities. The question remains to what extent these subunits represent alternatives which the international community should look to in a long-term effort to bring greater stability and security to peoples in Africa. This paper examines the phenomenon of states-within-states and offers tentative conclusions on the prospects and challenges associated with Somaliland's future recognition.

Contrasting Views on Reforming Africa's State System

Persistent violent conflict and economic insecurity in Africa has led a number of scholars and commentators to argue that it is time for the international community to reconsider the existing African state system. The motive is the perceived need to rationalize dysfunctional state units, and in doing so to alleviate the most relentless and violent conflicts. Many contemporary conflicts in Africa are assumed to result from incompatible ethnic groups that have been forced to live with each other to maintain Africa's arbitrary colonial borders. Africa's economic difficulties are also attributed to the fact that Europeans colonized Africa to serve colonial interests. There was never any intention to create economically viable sovereign countries. The subsequent commitment to colonial borders was articulated in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which repeatedly makes reference to the importance of maintaining Africa's 'territorial integrity.'[3] In a recent editorial, however, one African scholar contends that if democracy is to be realized in countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, partition is necessary. He argues that the dominant minority, the Tutsi, will not allow its interests to be jeopardized by the implementation of majority rule. "Just like Kosovar Albanians and Serbs," Makau Matua argues, "the Tutsi and the Hutu cannot live together or tolerate each other." He adds, "A real solution to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict ... would be for a United Nations

panel to redraw the maps of Burundi and Rwanda to create two wholly new states: one for the Hutu, the other for the Tutsi."[4]

Other scholars have echoed these sentiments and called for action to reverse Africa's political misery. Michael Chege argues that, "Where a people's allegiance to their own ethnic group supersedes that given to the state, it may be time to let them secede or fuse with another state. For what does a country benefit if it secures its boundaries yet suffers perennial bloodshed among its own people?"[5] While some urge redrawing of borders, others remain open-minded about the forms of political reorganization that might take place. Chege sees secession as an option which must be considered, though he favors federalism as a means of defusing autocratic power. Jeffrey Herbst also declares that alternatives to Africa's existing state system are needed, and proposes initiating this process by "publicly declaring that the international community is not blindly wedded to the current state system."[6] Somaliland's President, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, has expressed his own desire to achieve an 'interim status,' short of full and formal diplomatic recognition so that it could, at least for the time being, qualify for financial assistance from international lending institutions.[7]

While such options short of independence are domestic affairs and therefore not the direct concern of the international community, there is a reluctance to redraw African borders. Historically, even some of the most prominent proponents of national self-determination have subsequently reconsidered such a policy when the risks associated with such an endeavor became apparent. American President Woodrow Wilson, for one, developed reservations about the precedent of national self-determination when applied outside of Europe. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Wilson acknowledged,

> When I gave utterance to those words [that all nations had a right to self-determination], I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day. ... You do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as a result of many millions of people having their hopes raised by what I have said.[8]

It is not clear that substantive overall gains would be made in a general restructuring of the African state system. On the contrary, there are valid reasons to think that any sort of public declaration on self-

determination would be enormously disruptive. In regions where competition over scarce resources is fierce, the creation of separate Tutsi and Hutu states, for example, would almost certainly reorient the conflict from one fought along ethnic lines to one fought along an even more parochially-defined cleavage. In Rwanda, most of the participants in the 1994 genocide were Hutu but they were Hutus of a particular clan from a specific region (the Bushiru of Ruhengiri and Byumba). For example, Bruce Jones has noted, "the [President] Habyarimana regime was ... a clan-based northern Hutu regime that was as discriminatory against Hutus from southern Rwanda as against Tutsis."[9] Similarly, in Somalia, the fluidity of clan divisions complicates efforts to formalize new political structures. When individuals are competing for a slice of a finite pie, formalized division and redivision of states in an effort to reduce conflict may in the end be an exercise with doubtful benefits.

Indeed, other practical problems associated with national self-determination and economic viability would have to be considered. Who would decide which states are deserving and which deserving states would be viable? Is a community which has been oppressed by its own government and which might be judged economically unviable any less worthy of statehood than a similarly oppressed group which has a thriving industrial base? Would the possibility that most African states appear to be even less viable than other developing regions not invite accusations of a racist double standard? Would there not be an enormous reluctance by the international community to recognize new ever-more fragile states? As one political commentator put it, "The plain truth, never said out loud at the U.N., is that countries have been admitted to membership that cannot or will not take on the minimum responsibilities that they owe to the international community and to their own people. The very act of independence can make countries dependents of the world." He adds that "the U.N. could save the world a great deal of grief if it used its rights of accreditation to create a flexible waiting period between application for membership and acceptance. If a test is required to drive a car, why not one to drive a nation?"[10]

If the international community is to reconsider its approach to the African state architecture, it must be seen as a means to a tangible and realizable end: either to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict, or to generate states that are more democratic and supportive of economic development. In short, given the upheaval that would undoubtedly accompany any major restructuring of the international system, the

benefits must clearly outweigh the costs. To date, the experience of formally changing political borders has more often than not been a violent process and the international community has remained conservative on the issue of state recognition. Rather than risk the kind of public declarations that Jeffrey Herbst calls for, there is a need to adopt a more piecemeal approach to any restructuring of the African state system. This paper argues that some state entities, such as Somaliland, are empirically stronger than the juridically-dependent hosts from which they emerge. Given their potential viability, these states-within-states become prospective candidates for some sort of new federal arrangement, special status or even formal recognition by the international community. Efforts to challenge their sovereignty may only undermine some of the most promising examples of political reorganization in the developing world. The result would be even more conflict.

The Case of Somaliland

It is ironic that processes of state formation in Somalia should have undergone such a dramatic reversal since the time of independence in 1960. In superficial terms, given that its commonalities in language, ethnic identity, and religion make it unique among Third World states, Somalia might once have been regarded as one of the least likely African countries to experience state breakup.[11] This is not to say that Somalia's political leadership was satisfied with the colonial borders it inherited or that there is no regional variation among Somalia's peoples. On the contrary, the political and military energies of its leadership, particularly in the first two decades after independence, were more likely to be directed towards fulfilling irredentist, rather than secessionist, ambitions.

Many Isaaq, the predominant clan family in the northwest, argue that it was precisely the failure to achieve a broader unity among all Somalis in the Horn that led to a renewed desire to embrace a state based on the original colonial boundaries. The union in 1960 created the independent Somali Republic through linking the former British Somaliland in the north and Italian Somalia in the south. Somalis in the neighboring Ogaden region of Ethiopia, in Djioubti, and in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya did not join with the new nation. The failure to achieve the larger more ambitious objective of uniting all Somalis led some Somalilanders recently to embrace a more parochial state conforming to their Isaaq clan identity. According to one prominent Somalilander,

> the dream was that every Somali had to seek to bring the five parts together politically. And our union with the south was the first step in that direction. It was not a desired union *per se*. It was a means to an end. If you take away the end, why should the means be pushed together again. The international community has taken away the end.[12]

The reluctance of the great powers to accept Somalia's irredentist ambitions was most evident during the 1970s when the army of Mohamed Siyad Barre invaded eastern Ethiopia and was thwarted in its effort to incorporate Ogadeni regions into the existing Somali state. The Soviet Union rescued the Ethiopian regime in November 1977 and the United States warned against a feared subsequent Ethiopian invasion of Somali territory. The obverse message, however, was that neither the Somali nor Ethiopian regimes would be forced to appease their own restless populations. In other words, while extra-state ambitions would have to be set aside, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu were free to crush secessionist movements in Eritrea and Somaliland respectively. The willingness of Washington to underwrite the actions of an increasingly besieged and brutal Siyad Barre regime became an embarrassment in 1989 when the United States General Accounting Office observed that small amounts of military aid were being supplied to Mogadishu at the very moment that Hargeisa was being bombed by Somali government aircraft.[13] The brutality with which the Siyad Barre regime attacked centers in Somaliland has been well documented.[14]

More recently, scholars and politicians have re-emphasized the historical roots that distinguish Somaliland from the south. Some have decried the fact that so little attention is given to a more variel experience among Somalis. As M.J. Fox has recently argued,

> Somalia is presumed to have been colonized as an undifferentiated whole, an utterly shared historical experience. ... But the northern and southern areas of Somalia did not have a shared colonial or pre-colonial experience, and as such, were bound to manage subsequent events differently as well.[15]

Indeed, among other things, Somaliland's northern orientation, its proximity to the Gulf states, the trading patterns it consequently embraced, and its colonial history distinguished Somaliland from the

south. Not surprisingly, Somalilanders and sympathetic observers regard this history as a means of highlighting the region's distinctiveness. Government publications emphasize the pre-colonial origins of Somaliland and, consequently, that Somaliland was "not an entity which was born after the disintegration of the Siyad Barre dictatorship." Noted in particular are traces of "the ruined cities of Somaliland," evidence which conclusively proves "that in ancient pre-historic times a country existed in Somaliland which had its own identity and its own geographic contours."[16]

Somaliland's colonial history under Britain was clearly different from that of Italian Somalia under the Italians, a fact that is used to explain contemporary political advantages over their southern brethren. While noting that they governed their colonies with varying degrees of enthusiasm, Gerard Prunier observes that "British Somaliland, like southern Sudan, [belonged] to the no-government category." Since Britain was interested in Somaliland largely as a means of keeping other colonial powers out of the region, Somalilanders suffered only from Britain's 'benign neglect.' Consequently, Prunier writes that, "at independence in 1960, the territory was economically underdeveloped but blessedly untampered with at the level of native political institutions. The Somali system of peacemaking, vital in a conflictual nomadic society, remained largely intact."[17] Certainly, Somalis speak proudly of their more recent accomplishments in coping with internal conflicts at Berbera and Burao in 1991 and in Borama in 1993 at which time a relative peace was brought to the north. But while Somalilanders have achieved a measure of internal peace, this solidarity was very much a product of war.

War and the Creation of States-Within-States

Scholars have long emphasized the importance of violent conflict in European state formation.[18] War forced states to become more efficient in carrying out key tasks such as resource extraction and in creating more durable administrative structures. Warfare also tended to break down divisions between groups and generate domestic solidarity for the purposes of defeating another common enemy. Indeed, specific battles, ones which involved great victories or painful losses, helped to forge common identities which define the sense of nation for succeeding generations.[19] In this way, a war-prone environment tended to strengthen

some state structures and absorb other weaker territories into larger more powerful states.

The experience of European state formation, however, is regarded as unique and not likely to be repeated in the developing world. Most new states in Africa and elsewhere were not exposed to the demands of *inter*state warfare in ways that European states were. Indeed, prior to 1945, states with such weak administrative structures and divided populations would likely have been swallowed up by much stronger powers. Lacking the empirical qualities that were previously associated with statehood, these *quasi*-states were sustained during the Cold War through a combination of foreign aid, the provision of military hardware, and a benign international environment which now respected the norm of juridical sovereignty.[20]

Nonetheless, processes of state formation similar to those in Europe were important in generating and strengthening *sub*state units within these larger juridically-based states. While these political entities were rarely able to overthrow their host governments during the Cold War they frequently carved out portions of territory and some of them have since emerged to become potentially viable members of the international community. In the Horn of Africa, for example, it is possible to identify three different entities that emerged in this manner: one which has since achieved formal statehood (Eritrea), one whose political viability has yet to be achived as statehood (Somaliland), and one whose secessionist ambitions have been put into abeyance (Tigray). While central governments in *quasi*-states made (and persist in making) *pro forma* claims to all of their territory, these substate political entities have come closer to satisfying Weberian notions of statehood.[21]

Indeed, the comparative strength and solidarity of these units was largely a product of their respective wars with centralized governments. In Somaliland, for example, by the late 1980s the Siyad Barre regime had effectively lost much of the northern region to the Somali National Movement (SNM) that had established a rudimentary administrative authority of its own. Moreover, the SNM was increasingly well armed with weapons captured from government forces. Foreign medical personnel who treated SNM fighters noted that eight of ten gunshot wounds were frontal indicating that the level of motivation and discipline was extremely high. Today Somalilanders continue to make frequent reference to the sustained bombing of Hargeisa during the late 1980s. While few would dispute their ethnic links with their Somali 'brothers

and sisters,' the sheer brutality of the attacks has been burned into the collective memory and furthered the psychological gulf between north and south. As one resident of Hargeisa remarked, "We cannot understand how they could take off from the airport and bomb their own people. They came and cut down our trees. They poisoned the wells to kill the animals. How can the people ever forget that?"[22] In 1997 mass graves were discovered that have become a tangible reminder of atrocities committed by southerners against Somalilanders. As one prominent Somalilander stated,

> It's very important that we at least go and see those graves and feel sorry that this kind of thing can happen to human beings. ... The only crime they were guilty of was just being human beings who wanted to decide on their own destiny; who called themselves Somalilanders and wanted to live where they had always lived, Somaliland, and not be part of any other kind of administration. Because the union with our brothers in Somalia just ended up in aerial bombings, killings, and atrocities.[23]

Since so much of the Somaliland sense of self appears to be derived as a result of the war with the south, any serious effort to reintegrate the north and south becomes extremely problematic. The contradiction now is that Somalia is perceived as a potential threat to Somaliland's fledgling independence, and at the same time as a terminally unviable state whose recently established transitional government is unable to assert its authority in any meaningful way. As recently as 1997, the United Nations Secretary General reported that "member States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen as a 'black hole' where the absence of law and order is attracting criminals and subversives."[24] Nonetheless, the current composition of the Somalia government makes any future union extremely unpalatable for many Somalilanders. The Transitional National Government (TNG) President, Abdiqaasim, was Minister of the Interior during the attacks on Hargeisa in the late 1980s. Although not directly responsible for the bombing, he oversaw the security services that were active in the north. Other members of the TNG parliament (Generals Aden Abdillahi Nuur '*Gabiyo*' and Mohamed Siad Hersi '*Morgan*') were also directly implicated in atrocities committed by military forces in the north. Consequently, Somalilanders now speak

in apocalyptic terms about efforts to reestablish a united Somalia. The Vice-Speaker of the Somaliland parliament, Abdulqadir Haji Ismail Jirdeh, warned that,

> The TNG has been encouraged to claim sovereignty over other groups, territories, and entities that it does not control and thaqt it doesn't represent. ... They will try to re-arm themselves and try to reconquer by war. We will resist that. By whatever means we will resist that.[25]

It is clear that the on-going, seemingly futile, efforts of the international community to re-establish a central authority in Mogadishu will only deepen Somaliland's resolve. Jirdeh observes that "The immediate plan [of the international community] is to help the Somali people in their crisis. The intentions are good, but the road to hell is paved with good intentions. I have no doubt in my mind, this will lead to more war."[26] At present, however, Somaliland seems not to be a state-within-a-state but a state-*without*-a-state. The putative government in Mogadishu cannot indefinitely claim sovereignty over territory in which it is incapable of exercising authority.

In fact, many Somalilanders perceived the internal conflicts which infected Somaliland in the early 1990s as a central concern and likely only to jeopardize their ability to maintain their independence from the south. A series of popular assemblies (*shirs*) that tackled Somaliland's most pressing political issues, compared favorably with simultaneous UN-sponsored efforts taking place in the south and was a testament to Somalilanders' ability to employ their own grassroots approaches to conflict resolution. Since independence from the south was the over-riding objective, most Somalilanders preferred to rally around President Egal rather than risk an extended and divisive war that would have jeopardized this independence. Concerns over fears of southern interference in northern affairs has arguably been a contributing factor in the maintenance of Somaliland's traditional form of inclusive 'consociational' democracy during the 1990s. While Egal may lack varying degrees of legitimacy, his government clearly does not rule through coercion, corruption, patronage and he will likely continue to dominate Somaliland's political landscape for the foreseeable future. Finally, since its self-declared independence in 1991, Somaliland has become increasingly institutionalized and is in a transition to multi-party

democracy. In short, while these features of statehood may not yet amount to a political 'driver's licence,'Somaliland's prospects appear more promising than Somalia's.

Secession by Somaliland could set a dangerous precedent for other secessionist movements in the Horn. As some have noted, efforts towards secessionism are more likely to lead to violence when there are many other groups within the state who might take a secessionist route.[27] Given the fluid nature of Somali clan ties and the potential axes of division, a territorial state comprised of anything but all Somali-inhabited territory is likely to be contentious. However, Somaliland does have one key advantage: the willingness of Somalilanders to settle for the borders of British Somaliland, imperfect as they are, allows them to claim that they are continuing to respect the territorial integrity of Africa's colonial states and to conform to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

Conclusions

A recent editorial published by the United Nations *Integrated Regional Information Network* observed that, "A region of Africa that has produced an enormous refugee population, and a recipient of some of the largest humanitarian interventions in the world, the Horn of Africa has left donor governments with little enthusiasm for its evolving political experiments."[28] Ironically, the coincidence of the Cold War's end and an increase in political instability in Africa and elsewhere has meant that there is now *less* willingness to consider further changes to the international system. Apparently, little thought is given to the possibility that the existing state structure might also be a *cause* of this instability. State-like entities such as Somaliland are often more viable in terms of their ability to manage their own territory, to provide basic services, and in terms of their internal cohesiveness. In any other era, when the juridical nature of statehood did not have the prominence it has today, it would have been these more logical and viable subunits which formed the community of states. The argument is not that all states-within-states need to be formally recognized. But to the extent that recognition matters, the international community should look carefully at these emerging state units. It may be that they offer a more benevolent form of government which better meets the needs of Africans than the arbitrary states which have existed in Africa and much of the developing world.

Endnotes

1. See *Final Report of the Initiative and Referendum Institute's Election Observers for the Somaliland Constitutional Referendum held on May 31, 2001* (Washington D.C.: Citizen Lawmaker Press, July 27 2001). Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence from Somalia in Burao in May 1991.

2. See, for example, Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994), pp. 44-76.

3.Article III of the Charter, for example, states that member states pledge "their respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence."

4. Makau Matua, 'The Tutsi and Hutu Need a Partition,' *New York Times*, August 30, 2000. For a similar argument in the case of the former Yugoslavia, see Charles Krauthammer, 'Multi-Ethnic Folly," *Washington Post*, September 17, 1999, p. A25.

5. Michael Chege, "Remembering Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 1 (1992), p. 153.

6.. Jeffrey Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996/97), p. 133.

7. John L. Hirsch, "A Second Chance for Somaliland," (unpublished paper) (August 2, 2001).

8. Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and Self-Determination* (Crowell, 1970), pp. 64-65; cited in Crawford Young, "Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the African State System," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 321.

9. Bruce D. Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's Two Wars: Partisanship and Indifference," in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder eds. *Civil Wars: Insecurity and Intervention* (New York: Columbia, 1999), p. 121.

10. A.M. Rosenthal, "The Driver's Licence," *New York Times*, February 23, 1993, p. A21.

11. Most countries are multi-ethnic. According to Milton Esman, 90 percent of the world's countries have two or more ethnic groups within its borders; Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1994), p. 2.

12. Abdulqadir Haji Ismail Jirdeh, interview with the author, July 13, 2001.

13. United States General Accounting Office, *Somalia: Observations Regarding the Northern Conflict and Resulting Conditions*, Report to Congressional Requesters, May 1989.

14. See, for example, Africa Watch, *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People, Testimonies About the Killings and the Conflict in the North* (New York: January 1990).

15. M. J. Fox, "Somalia Divided: The African Cerberus (Considerations on Political Culture)," *Civil Wars*, vol. 2, no. 1. (Spring 1999), p. 11.

16. "Historical Background" *Official Government Statement* (Somaliland), Ref. # JSL/M/BD/103-01/497, April 23, 1997.

17. Gérard Prunier, "Somaliland Goes It Alone," *Current History* (May 1998), p. 225.

18. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 117-139; Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol eds. *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), pp. 169-191.

19. See, for example, Michael Howard, *War and the Nation State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 9.

20. The term "quasi-states" comes from Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990).

21. In Max Weber's classic definition, a state must, at the very least, "successfully uphold a claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order;" Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Talcott Parsons ed. (Glencoe: Free Press, 1947), p. 154.

22. Interview, July 14, 2001.

23. Interview, July 6 2001. Similarly, literature provided by the group "Volunteers Without Borders" also notes that its mission is to "preserve these mass graves for future generations as the prime exhibits of the crime of genocide committed against the innocent civilians of Somaliland."

24. *Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Situation in Somalia*, 16 September 1999, paragraph 62.

25. Jirdeh interview, July 13, 2001.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 4 (spring 1994), p. 17.

28. "A Question of Recognition," Integrated Regional Information Network (republished in *Jamhuuriya* "The Republican"), vol. 3, issue 169 (July 14-20 2001), p. 1.

SECTION THREE

The War

Introduction to Section Three

How does a society forget a civil war, especially one with heavy and deep clan overtones? The first paper in Section Three sets out to prove use of genocide. Statistics, sites, dates, and events are listed including references to many mass graves. As one considers 'ethnic cleansing' and related massacres in other parts of Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, ethnic and clan based conflicts are unfortunately increasing at an all too rapid rate, especially in the last decade of the 20th century.

A second presentation reviews another side-effect of local wars across the African continent and beyond. Landmines are among the most destructive after-shocks in postwar recovery. Their direct impact is killing and maiming innocent civilians. Their indirect impact is equally harsh as the hidden mines take agricultural land out of production, bar access to water systems, close roads to legitimate commerce and transport, and perhaps most imprtant, place every member of the society in a perpetual war mentality, even though the conflict may have subsided.

Section Three closes with a penetrating analysis of humanitarian aid during and shortly after the war. Food distribution agencies quickly learned that their 'charity' made them vulnerable. Savvy NGOs with food to deliver determined that the easiest way to get food to the starving Somalis was to buy 'protection' from the local warlords. Unfortunately, the protection money was converted overnight into more technicals, grenade launchers, automatic weapons, and ammunition. The charity that provided food for the starving also fueled escalation of the warlord's arms race. The irony was not lost on the part of the donors, the warlords, and the people. At present, there seem to be few solutions to this dilemma that may recur in other parts of the world as the events of the 21st century unfold.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Siyad Barre Regime's Genocide of the Somaliland People

H. A. A. Aideed

Introduction

Even before the civil war that started in 1988, the Siyad Barre regime had been committing human rights abuses such as torture, rape, detentions, mass arrests, restriction of movement, confiscation or destruction of property, and summary executions against the Isaaq. However, the worst crime (the genocide) occurred during the months of June, July, and August of 1988, during heavy fighting in the main towns of Hargeisa and Burao between the forces of Siyad and the opposing liberation movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM). The government authorities killed thousands of innocent civilians to exact revenge for the startling victories of the SNM over Siyad's forces. Those civilians not killed fled across the border to Ethiopia.

The *Observer* of Sunday 3 July 1988, wrote:

> Thousands of Somali refugees are fleeing into neighboring Ethiopia from a massacre in the north of the country... The refugees are from the northern provincial capital of Hargeisa, where according to Amnesty International and other outside agencies, Somali government troops have been carrying out a systematic massacre of the population. [Somali artillery and bombing is reducing Hargeisa] to rubble. A French technician, M. Jean Metenier[1] estimated that 1,000 people had been killed in Hargeisa alone and said he saw at least 150 bodies in the street. Rebel estimates put the number killed as 5,000.

The government was completely shocked by the decisive strike of SNM combatants on 27-31 May 1988 at military strongholds in Burao, Adadley, and Hargeisa. That strike knocked the government of Siyad Barre off balance for several weeks. Siyad's strategy for revenge had several elements. In part, he sought to enter into a peace treaty with Ethiopia in order to reduce Ethiopian assistance to the SNM. Second, he launched a full-scale and all out military attack on the Isaaq/SNM territories. Finally, he invoked the highest level of oppression against civilians to deter the Isaaq clan from supporting the SNM. The strategy only served to accelerate the transformation of the SNM guerilla war into a conventional one. In this conventional operation, the SNM inflicted heavy losses on government troops and established strong footholds inside the country. As a result the government lost tolerance and resorted to an all out war against the entire population. They attempted to exterminate the residents of entire cities and villages lest those who could be of help would join the SNM in the armed conflict.

The most unfortunate people, particularly in Hargeisa, were those civilians who lived near or tried to take refuge in government controlled areas. They were rounded up and brought to the 26th Sector Headquarters where they were systematically executed. Any Isaaq personnel in Siyad's army received the same treatment. There had been a general order to all units of the armed forces in the north by 26th Sector Command to disarm and bring to sector headquarters all Isaaq officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers.The soldiers and non- commissioned officers were among the first to be executed, while commissioned officers were spared. The justification was that if some officers were executed, the loyalty of the remaining ones to the government could not be guaranteed. They

therefore posed a potential danger of stabbing government troops in the back, or worse, that they might defect to the enemy.

The reason why the officers, with the exception of a few, were not killed was that the government had thought they were so valuable that they would be unable to train replacements for many years to come. The Isaaq officers might be of use in other parts of the country after the SNM rebellion was repressed. Another reason was that the government also recognized the great popularity of many of the Isaaq officers and the presence of external pressure to stop the genocide. In the case of civilians, their demise was prioritized according to their age and physical capability. The more able young men were chosen for death first. But the victims included people of all ages and both sexes.

"The reports we have received, both from independent foreign sources and from Somalis who have fled into neighboring Djibouti and Kenya, implicate government troops in massacres, summary executions, and indiscriminate killings in northern Somalia..." Foreign relief workers evacuated from Hargeisa spoke to reporters at Nairobi airport about government troops executing people in front of their homes.[2]

The people chosen for death were often bound together in groups of 4 to 190 persons by strong silk ropes or telephone wires, with each person's hands tied together at his back and then taken to a designated place to be killed by firing squads. Another way of killing people was to drain out their blood completely. The blood thus received was donated to wounded government troops. This happened at least to a group schoolboys, according to a reliable source.[3]

Apart from the thousands of people killed by firing squad, many thousands of others died through indiscriminate bombings and shelling.

> The Somali army responded to the SNM attacks in May 1988 with extreme force, inflicting heavy civilian casualties and damage to Hargeisa and Burao ... The Somali military resorted to using artillery and aerial shelling in heavily populated urban centers in it's effort to retake Burao and Hargeisa ... A majority of the refugees we interviewed stated that their homes were destroyed by shelling despite the absence of SNM combatants from their neighborhood... The US Embassy estimated that 70 percent of the city (Hargeisa) has been destroyed. Our rough visual inspection confirms this estimate.[4]

Note that most of the mass grave sites are located in areas that were never captured by the SNM until the last days of the war, in January 1991, particularly around the area of the 2nd Division and 26th Sector Headquarters. There, nearly 200 mass graves have already been identified.

What happened in Berbera during the summer of 1988 is worthy of mention. No fighting between the opposing forces had taken place there. Nevertheless the Isaaq living there met the same or even worse atrocities. Shortly after SNM's attack on Burao, government authorities in Berbera completely blocked the city and started to arrest hundreds of people. More than 700 experienced worse deaths than had occurred elsewhere in the region. They were killed by slitting their throats or strangled by wires, or had their necks cut at the back or severely disabled by beating with clubs before being shot. The victims included two groups of deportees from Saudi Arabia. In August 1990, a group of 20 innocent civilians were rounded up by the military and executed in reprisal for a military water tanker that was ambushed by SNM combatants in Dubar, near Berbera. The latter incident demonstrates that the genocide continued in Berbera longer than in other cities. Twelve mass graves are so far marked there.

Burao was relatively different in that most of the population had left the city during the first two to three days when it was under the control of the SNM. But when the government troops recaptured it, about 70 people were taken out of their homes and executed. An additional 250 others who had fled from the city because of the fighting were also killed in Wadhan and near Sheikh Ahmed's reservoir. In Burao eight mass graves have been located.

In El-Afwein and surrounding territory, over 300 persons were killed in October 1988 in revenge for the death of an army officer who was killed by a rebel-laid landmine. "Widespread massacres occurred after two soldiers were blown up with a landmine in El-Afwein District. In reprisal the Sanaag military commander ordered the death of 200 nomads. One hundred and three men, women, and children were slaughtered the following day," according to Community Aid Abroad (CAA) - an Australian agency operating in the Sanaag region.

In Erigavo, hundreds of people were killed soon after the outbreak of the fighting in the main cities, although SNM forces did not arrive in Sanaag until 1989. Again, following a brief capture of the town in 1989, about 60 Isaaq elders, who could not leave the town, were taken out of their homes by government authorities and shot by a firing squad against

a wall of the public relations office. A large mass grave was found in Erigavo in mid October 2000, and it is the first reported from that region. Residents believe that the skeletons in the mass grave are those of the 60 elders mentioned above.

From June 1988 through December 1990, the regime had been reinforcing government troops in the region and when it retook the main cities, it occasionally launched attacks on SNM controlled interior settlements such as Ballidhig, Balli-Alenleh, Odinleh, Tallabur, Haro-Sheikh, Lafta-Farawayneh, Alleybaday, and Balli-Gubadleh where thousands of innocent civilians were slaughtered and their villages burned.

In the countryside, government-armed Ethiopian refugees often rampaged through villages and nomadic encampments near their numerous camps and claimed the lives of thousands of others, mostly nomads.

> According to a foreign aid official who was in the north after the fighting broke out, the Siyad Barre government was so eager to arm the Ogaden refugees that it enlisted workers of the civilian National Refugee Commission – which administers the Ogaden refugee camps – to help distribute weapons... 'Now all the camps are heavily armed' an experienced western aid official said. Some of the camp's adult males are thought to have headed for the bush to avoid being drafted by the government... Many others are said to have accepted weapons from the government and left their camps in search of Isaaqs ... Recent travelers in the north add that many Ogaden Somalis from the UN refugee camps – and a fair number of another pro-government group, the Oromo, have been seen carrying American M-16 rifles. [5]

The Ethiopian refugees hunted civilians around Bioley, Adhi-Adais, Saba'ad, Las-Dhureh, Daamka, and Agabar refugee camps. In these cases, the victims were often left unburied to be eaten by wild beasts.

In Mogadishu, after a violent demonstration on 17 July 1989, which was triggered by the arrests of many religious leaders, the government targeted the Isaaq, of whom several hundred were taken out of their homes in the middle of the night of 19 July 1989. The regime, in pursuit of its old intrigue of engaging one clan at a time, was trying to avoid any

confrontation with the Hawiya clan. Therefore, it was the Isaaqs who had to take the government's retaliatory blow, partly because of their tireless resistance against the government in the north and partly because of their alleged encouragement of the Hawiya clan to rise against the government. Perhaps the largest of the government's motivation was because of the need to use such an operation as a message to the Hawiya who didn't learn, so far, the lesson they should have learned from the genocide and destruction in the north. Forty six selected persons, including university students, doctors, engineers, assistant lecturers, and businessmen were executed during the same night, near Jazeera Beach, because of their clan membership. Others were detained in Danane.

Besides applying its air and ground capability against the Isaaq, the government hired South African and Rhodesian mercenaries to fly and maintain Hunter bombers. Throughout the 26th Sector, inhabited mainly by the Isaaq clan, such atrocities were widely committed against the clan by those who should be protecting them, *i.e.*, their own government. A policy was adopted that any able-bodied Isaaq who could help the SNM had to be killed. Those who could be of financial help or influence to the SNM, because of social status, were to be put in prison. But commanders in the field often extended this policy to be applied to children or to send elders and businessmen to their death. As a result, more than 90% of the people killed were between the ages of 15-35 years.

Within the first three months of the war, the major cities of the north became devoid of their population. People were killed, imprisoned under severe conditions, forced to flee across the border, or became displaced in the far-off countryside.

Peter Kieseker, a spokesman for Community Aid Abroad describing government policies in the region, commented, "Genocide is the only word for it."[6] It is estimated that about 60,000 persons were killed in this genocide, more than 10,000 of whom are believed to have been buried in mass graves by government authorities.

Finally, in verification of the existence of mass graves, it has to be mentioned, that a team of forensic doctors sponsored by the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights visited here in December 1997. After excavating two randomly chosen mass graves in Hargeisa, each containing a minimum of six individuals and conducting an assessment examination, the team concluded that human rights violations were committed against those individuals. Perimortem injuries found on the bones of the victims, the ligatures used to bind them, and their

haphazard burial, constituted important forensic information. The doctors registered 116 mass graves in Hargeisa as actually being mass graves, since they have the same features with those excavated and examined, and 19 others with less distinct features as warranting future examination. The doctors have sent their reports to the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and to war crimes investigation commission as well.

Endnotes

1. Jean Metenier left Hargeisa for Nairobi a few days after the beginning of the fighting in Hargeisa and met reporters soon after his arrival.

2. *Le Monde*, June 6, 1988 and *The Independent* June 9, 1988.

3. A letter by Human Rights Watch to then president Mohamed Siyad Barre, June 28, 1989. pp. 1.

4. GAO report on northern Somalia conflict, May 4, 1989, pp 4 - 6.

5. Collin Campbell in the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, October. 6, 1988.

6. Alison Whyte "Human Crisis that Has Poisoned a Nation" in *The Independent*. February 13, 1989.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Landmines and Landmine Policy in the Horn of Africa

Ahmed H. Esa

Introduction

The countries of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan are collectively referred to as the Horn of Africa. With Uganda they belong to the regional organization (IGAD), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. These seven countries have an estimated population of 155 million. The region occupies a strategic position of global importance, lying on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden and the eastern coast of the Red Sea, through which significant world trade passes, especially oil. In addition, Uganda and Ethiopia are the source of the River Nile, which also passes through Sudan, before it reaches Egypt. Egypt, the second most populous nation in Africa, and Sudan, the largest country in Africa, are heavily dependent on the Nile waters.

Over the past three decades, all of the Horn of Africa countries except Kenya have been involved in international or internal wars and conflicts. Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war since 1955, a year before it gained independence as a sovereign state. For most of its independence, Uganda has been the scene of bitter civil wars. Armed insurrection by some rebel groups, such as the Lords Resistance Army, continues in the northern part of Uganda bordering on Sudan. Uganda's military is also involved in the conflict within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Ethiopia and Eritrea, after many years of conflict followed by several years of peaceful coexistence after Eritrea gained its full independence from Ethiopia, went back to war over a border dispute in May 1998. The two-year Ethio-Eritrean war has been one of the most intense and deadliest on the African continent, with more than 120,000 fatalities. Somalia, after a destructive civil war that started in the 1980s, disintegrated as a State in 1991 with the ouster by rebel factions of General Mohamed Siyad Barre. The factions failed to form a unified government, and most of Somalia, except the breakaway Republic of Somaliland and the northeastern autonomous region of Puntland, remains embroiled in civil war. Djibouti, the smallest of the Horn of Africa countries, gained independence from France only in 1977. It enjoyed relative stability until 1991 when a civil war broke out between the government of Djibouti and an opposition group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), formed primarily by the Afar ethnic group in Djibouti. The civil war in Djibouti lasted until 1994, when a peace agreement was signed between the FRUD and the government. However, a group within FRUD began armed insurrection in 1998 and 1999. A cease-fire was again negotiated between the government and the splinter FRUD faction on February 7, 2000.

Country-by-country surveys indicate that landmines pose a serious risk to the population of the Horn of Africa. The landmine problem can be described as serious in all but Kenya and Djibouti. Although it may not be possible to calculate accurately the number of mines buried in any country, the data in the following table reflect current estimates prepared by the United Nations, the United States Department of State, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which issues *the Landmine Monitor*. The data do not include landmines that may have been deployed in the conflict zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia during the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean conflict.

Figure 1: Prevalence of Landmines in the Horn of Africa

Nation	Major Mine Use	Estimated Number of Mines	Casualties	Estimated Amputees	#	# #
Eritrea	1963-1993 1998-2000	.5 million	2000 incidents during 1991-1999, 35000 - 80,000 victims since 1973	No estimates	N	N
Ethiopia	1963-1993, 1964, 1977/78 war with Somalia	100,000 AT 400,000 AP	100 + civilians died in northern Ethiopia in 1998-2000	4,200	Y	N
Djibouti	1991-1994 1998-2000 in the internal conflict with FRUD	No estimates available	23 fatalities and 56 injuries were recorded in 1999-2000	Not available	Y	Y
Kenya	Landmines used along northern borders by insurgents rfrom border countries	No estimates	Incidents reported in Kenya's northern frontier districts with Somalia and Ethiopia	No estimates	Y	N
Somalia/ Somalil'd	1964, 1977/78 border with Ethiopia, 1991 during civil war	Estimated 1 million mines in Somalia and Somaliland	Data not available for Somalia; 3,500 for Somaliland	No data Somalia; 1,000 - 5,000 Somaliland	N	N
Sudan	Landmines used in Sudan's 50 year civil war by government, SPLA, and others	2 million	70,000 since 1955; 122 incidents in Eastern Sudan; 57 injured in SPLA arrea	Not available	Y	N
Uganda	Recent use of landmines by the LRA. Uganda used mines in DRC	No estimates	No country-wide estimate, but new incidents are reported in northern regions	201 amputees registgered in one hospital	Y	N

= Mine ban policy signed
= Mine ban policy ratified

Note: Somalia has had no central government since the ouster of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. Somaliland, which declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, is not recognized diplomatically and cannot sign the Ban Treaty.

The data in Figure 1 indicate that all of the countries of the Horn are mine-affected. Four countries, Somalia/Somaliland, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea can be considered as especially heavily mine-affected. Uganda has a considerable landmine problem, while both Kenya and Djibouti face a small but a growing problem due to current or recent use. Landmines have been used in the Horn of Africa not only for direct military objectives, but also as weapons of terror against large civilian communities. In country after country, landmines have been planted in agricultural land, on civilian access routes, around water resources, and inside people's homes. For instance, in 1992 Physicians for Human Rights concluded that "Siyad Barre's forces deliberately mined wells and grazing lands in an effort to kill and terrorize nomadic herders whom the army viewed as protectors of the SNM." During Somalia's civil war, beginning in 1988 in northern Somalia, Siyad's army planted 100,000 landmines in and around the city of Hargeisa in just two years. These tactics are clearly unlawful under international law.

Most of Somalia is still embroiled in conflict. However, Somaliland, and more recently Puntland, have largely resolved all of their conflicts. Somaliland, the most heavily mine-affected of the two has over the past three years embarked on a robust mine clearance program that now involves a number of humanitarian mine clearance NGOs such as HALO TRIST, the Danish Demining Group (DDG), and the Santa Barbara Foundation. The United Nations has also helped establish and manage the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC) in Hargeisa, which coordinates mine action programs within the National Demining Agency. While landmine incidents have subsided over the past few years, landmine incidents continue to occur. According to SMAC, there were 228 landmine casualties between January and December of 2000. Both SMAC and mine clearance organizations now believe that Somaliland could be declared "mine-safe" within five to seven years. Landmines have also been planted largely without regard to recognized military norms, and without markings, mapping or records. Lack of systematic deployment magnifies the risk buried landmines pose to civilian population and makes the process of mine clearance difficult and costly. The countries of the Horn include some of the world's economically least developed populations. Health care, even during the best of times, is poor. Hospitals are poorly staffed and ill-equipped. In many communities there is just one doctor for every 20,000 inhabitants. In this environment, landmine victims face enormous challenges. Victims are

often rural pastoralists, nomads, or farmers, injured while working in remote areas. First aid is rarely available and it may take the injured many hours, or even days, before they are brought to hospitals. Even when they reach regional medical centers, adequate care may not be available. Post-operative care is only available in a few central locations, and therefore few victims are able to access these centers during the long period of recovery, rehabilitation, and physical therapy. In addition to the poor environment, conflict and frequent droughts and famines in the area have resulted in mass movements of refugees and internally displaced people. Movement of large numbers of refugees in mine-infested conflict areas increases the risk of accidents. It is also difficult to provide assistance to these populations through long term sustainable and permanent institutions or projects, including effective mine action programs. Moreover, the presence of landmines often prevents the return of refugees to their original land, impeding both reconciliation and the resumption of development, for many years after the conflict.

Despite the enormous difficulty communities in the Horn face, the governments have paid very little attention to providing adequate policies to the threat of landmines to their citizens or to the world-wide movement to ban landmines and to create a mine-free world. Only Djibouti, Uganda, and Kenya have signed and ratified the landmark Mine Ban Treaty. Eritrea has not even signed the treaty. To date 113 countries have fully ratified the MBT out of 139 signatory countries. Moreover, it has become clear from the country reports in *the Landmine Monitor 2000, towards a Mine Free World,*[2] that some of the Horn of Africa governments, and many armed non-state actors, have recently used or are currently deploying landmines. These allegations concern Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia as well as opposition groups active in these countries. Sudan and Ethiopia deny use of landmines by their armed forces. However, Eritrea admits to having used landmines in the recent war with Ethiopia and claims to have used landmines in accordance with accepted military practice [3]

The world community has now recognized that landmine use violates international norms, that there is no way that these weapons can discriminate between the footfall of a child playing many years after the conflict and that of a soldier in combat. Their use over the past several decades is causing havoc in many communities, maiming innocent civilians, and denying them the full use of their land resources. Many military leaders and scientific research studies have now concluded that

landmines have no or only marginal utility in warfare and that they do not affect the outcome of war. The International Committee of the Red Cross has studied 26 conflicts from 1940 to 1995 and concluded that landmine use did not change the outcome in any of the wars. Moreover, studies commissioned by the United States Department of Defense, conducted by independent research institutions, the Institute for Defense Analysis in 1994 and the Dupuy Institute in 1996, concluded that landmines were only marginally useful.

Well before the 1997 Ottawa Convention, the world community had realized the special nature of landmines, the risk they pose to non-combatants, and the havoc they unleash in many communities many years after cessation of hostilities. In 1980, the Landmines Protocol or Protocol II, was annexed to the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Protocol II (Protocol on the Prohibition or Restrictions of the Use of Mines, Bobby Traps and other Devices) was modified in 1996 to ban the use of mines in ways that "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or injury to civilians which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

In the two years since the Ban Treaty was signed in Ottawa, more than 50 countries have destroyed more than 22 million antipersonnel (AP) landmines. Twenty-one State Parties have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel landmine stocks. Countries that have already completed destruction of their stockpiles are Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland. Twenty-four State Parties or signatories to the Ottawa Convention, including Uganda and Yemen are in the process of destruction of AP landmine stocks. In addition, several non-signatory countries have destroyed significant number of AP mines. The United States has destroyed 3.3 million AP mines as part of its commitment to eliminate use of "dumb" mines everywhere but Korea. China destroyed 1.7 million mines, Russia destroyed 500,000 mines, and Belarus 5,000, mines that were not compliant with the requirements of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Finland has also destroyed non-CCW compliant mines, but has not revealed the number. The above data are summarized in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Stockpile Destruction

Country	Antipersonnel Landmines Destroyed (in millions)
A: State Parties Completing Destruction Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Hungary, and United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada,El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland	11
B: State Parties and Signatories with Ongoing Stockpile Destruction Albania, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Moldova, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Yemen	6.0
C: Non-Signatories Destroying Some Stocks	
USA	3.3
China	1.7
Russia	0.5
Belarus	0.005
Finland	Not Available

The world community has taken a laudable stand against landmines. Landmine use violates principles enshrined in humanitarian law of proportionality and protection of civilians. Landmines are not the only and not even the first weapons system to have been targeted for a total ban. In 1925, the international community banned the use of toxic gas. Twenty-five years before that the use of *dum dum* bullets, bullets that explode upon contact and cause unnecessary suffering, were banned. Just four years ago blinding lasers, which have not yet been deployed by any country, were banned.

It is unfortunate that governments in the Horn, many of which are headed by enlightened leaders, and many of the rebel movements in the region, have ignored the world's call for a total ban on landmines. Landmines threaten the lives of citizens and impair the recovery of

communities in the Horn. Lack of progress in eliminating use of landmines undermines advocacy efforts to focus world attention on the plight that they pose in the Horn. The governments of the Horn of Africa are, therefore, urged to join the world in banning antipersonnel landmines. The countries of Uganda, Djibouti, and Kenya, State Parties to the Ban Treaty, are urged to speed efforts toward local legislation and destruction of stockpiles. Sudan and Ethiopia are urged to ratify the treaty as soon as possible, and to ensure that landmines are not used in future conflicts. Eritrea remains the only country in the Horn that has yet to sign the treaty. Eritrea and its citizens have faced conflict for thirty years. Many observers have been impressed with Eritrea's indigenous demining effort. However, only a total ban and non-use of landmines can prevent future tragedies. We hope Eritrea will sign and ratify the Mine Ban Treaty now.

Many non-state actors have used landmines against central governments in the Horn. While their rebel groups cannot sign the ban, many rebel groups around the world have unilaterally joined the ban treaty. Rebel groups in the Horn use landmines in ways that are clearly unlawful under international law and violate the the CCW. We urge rebel groups in the Horn of Africa to declare their adherence to the Ottawa Convention and to stop the use of landmines. We also urge them to sign the "Deed of Commitment under the Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action." The SPLA in Sudan has signed this deed and we hope others will heed the call for a landmine-free world.

Endnotes

1. This article is an updated version of a chapter in "The Scourge of Landmines in East Africa," published in November 2000 by the Institute for Practical Research and Training and the Kenyan Coalition against Landmines.

2. *Landmine Monitor 2000, Toward a Mine-Free World*, The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, September 2000.

3. Statement of the Eritrean delegation to the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden States Conference on Landmines, 16-18 November 2000.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Violence and Humanitarian Aid in Southern and Central Somalia

Joakim Gundel

Introduction

Today, almost ten years after the international intervention (UNOSOM – United Nations Operations in Somalia) in the Somali tragedy, a new state has still not replaced the former Republic of Somalia. While it is the Somalis themselves that must bear the brunt of their quagmire, the difficulty of building any new political structure that encompasses the territories of the Somalis is also founded in sources of an external origin. Thus, one such source was the international humanitarian intervention in Somalia. While achievements in terms of saving lives in Southern and Central Somalia during the conflict from 1991 to 1995 was accomplished, the combined humanitarian assistance interventions unfortunately also contributed to an evolution of political structures of violence, which was not constructive for the effort at

reaching any new social contract in the post-civil war Somali polities. Instead humanitarian assistance contributed to the emergence of a mosaic of a multitude of local political constellations, consisting of various combinations of traditional authorities, local governmental institutions functioning as interlocutors to the international donor community, and militarized faction-leaders co-existing in different combinations of relative strength.

This assumption is based on the acknowledgment found within the critical debate on humanitarian assistance in conflict, which asserts that relief aid does have a capacity to support the structures of violence in conflicts. (Anderson,1999) Furthermore, another feature of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and conflicts is that the imperative of humanitarian access often makes the intervening agencies sub-ordinate to the politico-military actors, and hence making the notion of impartial and neutral humanitarian assistance impossible. (Jean, 1996) Instead it inevitably becomes political.

Thus, when humanitarian assistance is provided in the context of intra-state wars, it risks becoming integrated into its dynamics, and may indeed benefit the very structures that pursue violence as a political instrument. Humanitarian assistance also represents a substantial resource, which in the context of intra-state war and extreme scarcity can be subject to attack and predation. Thus, when humanitarian assistance is provided in the context of conflict, it cannot escape becoming part of the whole scenario. This paper identifies some of the main defining features and dynamics of the Somali conflict, which forms the context in which the humanitarian assistance interventions were provided. The linkages between the humanitarian operations and the political dynamics are examined through the following issues: 1) food aid distribution; 2) security arrangements; 3) diversion and externalities of aid resources, and 4) partnerships.

Features and Dynamics of the Somali Conflict

In order to grasp the dynamics of the Somali conflict, and hence the context in which humanitarian assistance was provided, drawing together the three concepts of 'structures of violence,' 'clannism,' and 'spoils politics' is helpful. The concept of political structure of violence is inspired by the much broader concept of structural violence, which Peter Uvin applies in his analysis of how the development enterprise had

become part of the problem in Rwanda. He defines structural violence as "the institutionalized inequalities of statuses, rights and power, which are not the result of freedom of choice by individuals and groups who are victimized, but rather are the consequence of the more powerful group's use of coercion, and which is institutionalized in the legal system, and justified through mythology, religion, ideology and history." (Uvin, 1998: 103-104) However, while structural violence focuses on the unequal life chances caused by structural injustice, discrimination, and marginalization, the term political structure of violence refers to the political configurations, workings, and dynamics, which reproduce structural violence. Thus, a structure of violence is the configuration of specific power relations and their internal dynamics of violence. Chris Allen recognizes that political violence in Africa can be attributed to local actors adaptation to the global economic and political processes, but he also emphasizes that "it is the internal dynamics of spoils politics that is at the root of political and social violence," and which "constitutes the structural violence to which...in its later stages..." it becomes "the dominant feature of political interaction and change." (Allen, 1999: 381) Thus, spoils politics is the dynamic element in a political structure where violence is endemic, and the prime means of action. (Allen 1999: 381) In Somalia, this phenomenon was in its ultimate form described with the term "warlordism." (Compagnon, 1998: 74) Warlords, in this terminology, are the leaders of clan-based factions, who can be described as 'political entrepreneurs' that are using clannism as an instrument for their own political aims.

According to I. M. Lewis, "the segmented clan system remains the bedrock foundation of pastoral Somali society and 'clannishness' – the primacy of clan interests – is its natural divisive reflection on the political level." (Lewis, 1961) In this sense, clannism is often seen as the most important constituent social factor in Somali politics, and is generally believed to be the core element for any explanation of Somali political dynamics. However, clannism is primordial only in terms of its basis in real kinship relations, language, and common cultural traditions. These traditions are based on the communal mode of production, which again is governed by the traditional cultural and political norms and institutions such as the *reer* and *xeer,* which both regulate intra- and inter-clan relations and conflicts.[1] Thus, while 'clannishness' pervades the political system in Somalia, the segmented nature of the clan structure together with its vulnerability to political manipulation, makes the system

potentially unstable and centrifugal in character. (Prendergast, 1997: 93) This means that a clan conflict easily can fragment further on the basis of sub-clans. However, clannism can only become centrifugal if it is subject to political entrepreneurship, as Daniel Compagnon points out. (1998: 83) Thus, clannism is not static, but a dynamic and workable phenomenon. Modern clannism matured, so to speak, with the imposition and evolution of the modern state-form by its political agents. However, clans are most susceptible to be manipulated when asymmetric inter-clan balances upset their traditional egalitarian nomadic values. Should that happen, then a struggle to re-establish a new balance is almost inevitable. In other words, it is the interplay between political entrepreneurship and clannism that is the dynamic behind factionalism in Somalia. But, it is the competition for spoils that is the motive for conflict between the factions. (Compagnon, 1998:85)

Chris Allen's (1995) notion of spoils politics is useful in this respect, since it describes the dynamics that emerges out of the conflicting relations between the Somali elite-groups and their clan-based networks, with the aim of positioning themselves most favorably within the Somali political entity. Spoils politics is competition between political actors for the goods (Allen, 1995), or booty, which can be derived from access or domination of public office or directly through warlord activity (Reno, 2000: 47). Spoils politics originates in clientelism, which is the personal networks of political dependants built up by politicians. Such networks became one of the basic forms of relationship between state and society after independence. (Thomson, 2000:111) They became ever more profound during the socio-economic crisis of the 1980's, because it produced a sense of social insecurity leaving people with no other option than to rely on their clan-based networks for both survival and enrichment.

The combination of clientelism and clannism in Somalia produced a regime characterized by being personalized and opportunistically corrupt. (Marchal, 1996: 26) The State was abused by elite networks, and eventually Somalia found itself in the midst of a clientelist crisis, which turned into spoils politics. The dynamics of spoils politics was characterised by 'a winner takes all' principle, which implies that the winning and dominant faction will try to deny all other factions access to resources. (Allen, 1995) Furthermore, corruption and the use of public office for private or factional (clan) gain is widespread. Growing competition within the political elite for the spoils leads to further

economic crisis and declining real income. Communalism (clannism) is used extensively and increasingly as a basis of political mobilization for factional activities. Ultimately, spoils politics can develop a new dynamic in which violence becomes endemic and may reproduce itself and thereby also its structures of violence. (Allen, 1999: 375) It is into this process that humanitarian assistance enters when it is provided to the victims of violent conflict. According to Francois Jean, (1996: 573-589) the possible impact of humanitarian assistance is based on the premise that it assumes the form of a key resource for both the legitimacy of armed politico-military actors (political resource function) and their military activities (economical resource function). Thus, aid tends to benefit the most influential actors in conflicts. The main premise that enforces this is that humanitarian agencies most often are subordinated the political and military actors, and relies on them for access, security, authority, and distribution of aid. (Jean, 1996: 566)

Linking Humanitarian Assistance with the Dynamics of Violence in Somalia

The following section departs from the above main premise and indicates the linkages between humanitarian operations and the political dynamics in Somalia through analysis of food aid distribution, security arrangements, aid diversion, and partnership with local actors.

The Competition for Food Aid Spoils

Food aid was considered the most important relief item in the first phase of the external intervention in the conflict from January 1991 to December 1992, because of the high intensity fighting resulting in mass displacements and famine, especially in the inter-riverine area. But, focus was primarily set on the perceived famine and not the causes of conflict. Unfortunately, food aid first commenced in early 1991 because of insecurity, with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as the main food provider. A few other international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) contributed as well, but the effort was insufficient. ICRC found that 40 percent of the population in southern Somalia were at risk from starvation by November 1991. (Milas, 1997:31) The food aid operations became subject to attack, diversion, and manipulation. Armed belligerents prevented shipments of food aid from discharging at ports.

Warehouses were looted, and militia forces and bandits hijacked convoys of food. Relief workers were killed while distributing food, making most agencies reluctant to handle food aid on the ground in Somalia. (Milas, 1997: 31)

Despite the famine, the international community did not respond to the Somali crisis before the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution (UNSC Resolution 733) on 23 January 1992. This resolution urged the parties to cease fire and facilitate humanitarian assistance. The United Nations plan to deploy 550 military peacekeepers and distribution of $23 million of humanitarian aid was a message of great interest to all those factions who could gain legitimacy from large flows of food aid into their areas of control. (Milas, 1997:35) After an agreement between General Aideed and Ali Mahdi was signed in March 1992 a cease-fire did take effect and UNOSOM was launched in April 1992 – more than one year after Siyad Barre was ousted. Relief aid was instrumental in achieving the cease-fire because both sides needed the supplies badly. Food aid could relieve pressure from the civilians, which the factions increasingly were unable to provide for. Thus, the UN launched a 90-day action plan in April 1992. The first World Food Program (WFP) food aid ship arrived on 3 May 1992, and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) began to operate the airlift in May 1992. ICRC, WFP and UNICEF delivered more than 80,000 tons of food during the first half of 1992. (Milas, 1997:37)

Still, the international assistance in this period was not appropriate. Funds did not correspond with the appealed amounts. Even more important, the cause of the famine was incorrectly attributed to drought rather than the armed conflict. (NDC, 1994: 72, 93) The UN performed badly in this phase, and except for UNICEF, did not maintain offices in Somalia. The WFP had by mid-July only delivered less than one third of the amount of food they themselves had pledged. ICRC had delivered three times as much. (African Rights, 1992: 9) This was one of the main elements of criticism that the UN Special Representative, Mohamed Sahnoun, launched against the UN system and which eventually led to his resignation. (Sahnoun 1998) However, Sahnoun did facilitate a meeting on 12 October 1992, between the donors, UN agencies, ICRC and INGOs in Geneva where a new one hundred-day plan for accelerated relief to Somalia was agreed. (United Nations, 1996: 92-93)

When the first food aid came in May 1992, it came in large quantities, and triggered large scale looting because it was the first food

in six months and the value was very high. There was a clear relationship between availability of relief items and the interest in looting them. For instance, when sorghum later became abundant, looting of that item ended while high value foodstuffs such as rice, pasta, and oil could end up in looting frenzies. (Milas, 1997:38) By flooding the market with low value food it was thought that both security and famine could be addressed simultaneously because food became so abundant that it lost its trading value. (Natsios, 1997:87) Nevertheless, the predation of humanitarian assistance did not end, and competition between factions and clans continued. This resulted in an exacerbation of conflict and an increased need for protection of relief operations.

The international response, to what would be the second phase of intervention in the Somali conflict lasting from December 1992 to March 1995, began with the replacement of UNOSOM with the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF). This was a military intervention under the leadership of the United States. The mandate of UNITAF was to protect the distribution of relief aid. When UNITAF was deployed, food could again be transported securely through safe corridors, which the American marines had established. However, UNITAF came too late to address the famine. In fact, immediately after UNOSOM II arrived, ICRC pulled out, because they found that the famine was over and had accomplished their mission. (NDC, 1994: 111-128) Thus, UNOSOM II, replacing UNITAF in May 1993, was given the responsibility of establishing a transitional government, and facilitating a better groundwork for humanitarian assistance. But, the new 'warlord' leaders did not pay any serious attention to the humanitarian emergency, and due to their preoccupation with capturing the state instead of transforming it, the Somali conflict was prolonged indefinitely. Bryden and Steiner found reason to state that "for Somalia's emergent warlords, government meant little more than access to state resources – principally those associated with international recognition and foreign aid." (1998: 15) Indeed, the UNOSOM II intervention became sucked into the conflict, turning the Somali crisis into a true 'complex political emergency.' UNOSOM II was withdrawn in March 1995 because of its failure in building peace. (Clarke and Herbst, 1997)

Outside UNITAF/UNOSOM II controlled areas, the predation of humanitarian assistance continued. Food could often not be delivered directly to the beneficiaries, and was often distributed indirectly through the militias that had looted it, or directly from the gate of the agencies.

The result was that the poorest, the really starving, seldom had any benefit from the food aid, especially when the factions controlled distribution. Often, they were also too exhausted to collect food at the gates of the agencies. Because of the unresolved security situation, humanitarian access remained a priority for the agencies and they simply had to find alternative ways of delivering aid. In an effort to prevent food aid ending up with the warlords, ICRC began to set up soup kitchens. This reduced looting because prepared food was not interesting to loot. Unfortunately, this tactic had, according to Andrew S. Natsios, (1997: 88) a disastrous effect on local agriculture, as well as displacing people to the immediate locations of the kitchens. Interestingly, most of the kitchens happened to be located in the areas of General Aideed's SNA militia, whereby he could gain an advantage over these populations as well as deny recruits to other warlords.

According to Daniel Compagnon, the rationality of predation, or in his words 'culture of loot,' stems from the spoils politics of the patrimonial Siyad Barre regime, because it served an important function in feeding clientelist networks of the regime. (1998:85) Hence, the army's diversion in the 1980s of humanitarian assistance destined for large refugee camps near the borders of Ethiopia fed into the client networks. (Maren, 1997) This practice did not end with the civil war, but was now practiced by the non-state actors of the contending clan-based factions instead of governmental officials, which was to have pronounced significance for relief aid in Somalia. Indeed, in the context of a collapsed society, this culture of loot even became a rational way of life, and the personalized networks of clientelist spoils politics erased in the peoples' minds the distinction between public and private goods. The direct implication was increased competition to loot before the 'others' did it.

The post-intervention period, which now has lasted since March 1995, was marked by the failure and frustrations of the 1992-1995 intervention leading to a reduction in aid. (UNDP, 1998: 13-14) Furthermore, all the international aid operations were now run from headquarters in Nairobi. Only the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in Northwest Somalia and the Puntland administration in Northeast managed to build durable administrations. Southern and central Somalia remained in a quagmire of fragmented political structures of violence.

In 1997, WFP decided to sub-contract its food deliveries to private Somali merchants.[2] This method involved a private Somali contractor who deposited an amount of money equivalent to the value of the food he

is to deliver. When the food is delivered, the deposit is returned together with payment for the transportation. The contractor is totally responsible for security and the delivery. In this way WFP and other food distributing agencies avoided the responsibility and negative associations that occur when a security incident hits a food convoy. In the beginning, the system seemed to work. However, the context in the South is different from in the North. Traditional authority and practice is not as strong, and the competition and fragmentation between business-groups, sub-clans, and warlords is more intense. Contractors use the traditional Somali nomadic means of communicating and securing a convoy into the countryside. (Marchal, 1996: 40) In spite of the new methods, incidents such as killings and fighting over food transport continued,[3] because they become focal points in the ongoing feuds between the clan-based factions.

Food aid does not in itself cause conflict. But, in Somalia it caused skirmishes. When food aid arrives in a conflict, it easily becomes one of the central objects of fighting. Thus, during the big famine and during UNOSOM, the massive influx of food aid caused more than localized skirmishes. Furthermore, food aid appeared to be a strategic resource that could legitimize the faction leaders and strengthen their military capacities for the next stages of conflict. The exception in the Somali context is Somaliland, which had established a new local authority structure that could reject damaging and inappropriate food aid. In the south the situation is different because the competition for spoils, especially among the dominating warlords in Mogadishu, was far more intense than in the northern parts of Somalia. In addition, the lack of new legitimate authorities and the availability of arms and the risk of looting is therefore much higher in central and southern Somalia. Indeed, when food aid came massively to the South it represented a major business opportunity, which the emergent warlords (political entrepreneurs) were swift in exploiting. (Prendergast, 1997: 123-124) UNOSOM and UNITAF, negotiating with them, ultimately legitimized their dominant position achieved through the barrels of the gun. Thus, the humanitarian agencies today continue to find themselves in an insecure environment and in a position subordinate to the factions, local authorities, and NGOs, which the political entrepreneurs control.

Security Arrangements

As Francois Jean asserts, insecurity and the humanitarian imperative of access to the victims makes agencies subordinate to the factions with whom they have to negotiate access and protection. (1996:566) Because of the complex, volatile, and insecure conditions in Somalia, all expatriate UN and INGO staff as well as diplomatic missions were evacuated in January 1991. (Refugee Policy Group, 1994: 14-15) Only Médicins sans Frontières (MSF) and ICRC returned. UNICEF was not authorized to reopen their office in Mogadishu until December 1991. However, a few relief agencies continued to work in Somalia under very difficult security conditions throughout 1991 and 1992.

The general insecurity that followed the civil war was supplemented with localized clan-conflicts and banditry accelerated by the easy access to small arms. All contributed to the difficulties faced by the humanitarian agencies. They were deliberately targeted by both faction militias as well as by gangs who in the absence of public security forces could loot them with impunity. Obviously, the agencies made themselves hostages of high value because of the resources they brought in the form of money, cars, expensive equipment, and scarce goods such as medicine and food. But, they also contributed to the difficulties themselves via negotiations with the warlords. This was required in order to get relief supplies through military checkpoints, or in order to hire 'technicals' (heavily armed pick-up trucks) to accompany relief convoys. Thus, the lack of security compelled the agencies to hire armed guards to protect themselves, their cars, and their relief items, most often from the very militias causing insecurity in the first place. ICRC hired armed protection for the first time in its history. These local security arrangements, or 'protection rackets' as Jean calls them, (1996: 574) became systematic and extortive. Thus, a substantial part of the agencies budgets went to secure relief provision and for the payments of safe access to the people in need. And all was negotiated with the factions, or their proxies. (Yannis, 1999)

UNITAF did create a secure space for humanitarian assistance during its three months of operation, but only in certain narrow transport corridors. It was also criticized for not disarming the Somalis right away as most Somalis actually expected them to do. (Refugee Policy Group, 1994) Security gradually worsened after UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF, which was partly due to unclear mandates and unclear

command structures. UNITAF was under the sole leadership of USA, while UNOSOM II was a multinational force without clear leadership. The Americans insisted on having a say in UNOSOM II, which antagonized them with several of the European contingents. Furthermore, the approaches of the military wings of UNOSOM II collided with the objectives of the humanitarian agencies. For instance the military intervention in Kismayo was counterproductive in solving the security problems MSF had in running the local hospital. Instead it further deteriorated the relations between the local population and the humanitarian agencies. (Clarke and Herbst, 1997: 239-250)

When UNOSOM II left in 1995, the security they provided for the aid agencies' operations was no longer there, leaving the international agencies with a security problem. The most common solution seemed to be to fall back to the pre-UNOSOM kind of security arrangements with local Somali militias or they found a local NGO (LNGO) co-partner that was on good terms with the local *de facto* authorities. Project managers, under pressure of the severe security conditions, felt compelled to give in to clan factions to hire their people, contractors, security arrangements, compounds, cars, or whatever one could think of. But, in the context of the very egalitarian Somali society, no group or clan would leave any goods for others without themselves making a bid for it. Thus the security arrangements in themselves could be another object for conflict. The spoils politics element contributed to extreme competition in this field as well. Either way, the combined dynamics of clannism and factional spoils politics meant that the INGOs had to respect these authorities and often they were even perceived to be 'owned' by the clans and the factions in the given place of their operations.

In particular, food, fuel, and vehicles created more insecurity in the context of extreme conflict. Although the INGOs learned to reduce or stop bringing in food, cars, and fuel, they still entered local se curity arrangements. In Somalia there was a trade off for security, and there still is in the south, where security is still a problem. Here the local security arrangements became an integral part of the vicious cycle of socio-political instability that regenerates community dependence on militias for security, but also for income when an international agency is the contractor. By just accepting conditions, and the pressure of local communities to hire security packages (usually you hire a package of four guards who come with the car that is needed), the agencies are contributing to such structures of violence.

The Externality Effects of Aid Diversion

The intra-state war in Somalia continued to be funded, in part, by rich local traders and by Somalis living abroad, although the former were no longer in a position to support the various militias as much as at the beginning of the conflict. New resources were needed, and they were provided by the international relief agencies. (Augelli and Murphy, 1995:346) Thus, the militias extracted resources from the agencies as bribes or direct payments, directly and indirectly, in exchange for letting them operate in their areas of control. (Augelli and Murphy, 1995:347)

Aid diversion techniques existed before the civil war. They were even utilized by the government. Later the political entrepreneurs (warlords) developed an interest in perpetuating conflict by diverting aid resources into buying land or building military capacities. (Compagnon, 1998: 86) The economical resources associated with humanitarian aid can free up resources for military use. (Keen, 1998) This is also called the substitution thesis. Other observers write about how humanitarian assistance may contribute to an artificial economy or about how it can become integrated into the war economy in a number of ways. (Prendergast, 1997; Jean, 1996)

The literature generally describes several aid diversion techniques, At least the following were in use in Somalia. The first and most primitive form is predation, that is theft and looting – often from roadblocks. (Anderson, 1999: 39) The second form, taxation, may be levied from roadblocks or landing fees (usually collected by armed militias). Taxation is almost as direct as predation, but is more 'regulated' by factions or local authorities. The third form, extortive security arrangements, was described in the previous section. There were also more sophisticated ways to extract revenue from the aid operations, which were derived from house-rents, car hire, and jobs. (Prendergast, 1997) I have chosen to term this form of diversion for the 'externalities' of humanitarian aid.[4]

The problem of 'negative' externalities exploded in Somalia as the military intervention generated highly inflated prices for labor, rents, vehicle hire, and other local services. Augelli and Murphy found that the factions appropriated "some hundreds of thousands of dollars a month in Mogadishu alone." (1995:347) Armed escorts were rented for protection. Relief transports had to pay militias to ensure protection from their own men. Agencies paid $2,000 per month for each security guard. An armed car, a so-called 'technical,' cost $300 per day. Offices and houses were

rented at high prices. During the UNOSOM period, rented houses cost between ten and twelve thousand dollars a month. Considering that at least 100 houses were rented and around 380 'technicals' were used each day in Mogadishu by the UN agencies and INGOs, business was thriving. Personnel were hired in greater numbers than needed and were overpaid. In 1994, UNOSOM spent more than $40 million in salaries and contracts, and employed roughly 17,000 Somalis. (Prendergast, 1997: 113) Food was transported in stolen trucks rented back from those who had stolen them. Levies were put on everything, including landing fees, cargo, and ships entering ports. Furthermore, between 40 and 80 percent of all food was estimated looted. In addition to that were the numerous service contracts with local Somalis. For instance, one notorious Somali became a millionaire by disposing of garbage from the UNOSOM compounds [5]

While it is not possible to find any statistics that indicate the magnitude of the externalities of relief aid, one can only produce estimates such as Augelli and Murphy did. It is also difficult to collect any entirely reliable figures of the total amount of aid provided to Somalia.[6] But the figures from the Refugee Policy Group provide an impression of the substantial rise in the amount of assistance from 1991 to 1992. In 1991 USA granted $29.6 million. This amount rose to $95.1 million in 1992. (RPG, 1994)

Today, the externalities of aid still represent the most direct type of spoils that can be achieved from the international agencies. For instance, Action Contre la Faim (ACF), operating in Mogadishu, estimate that they alone supported up to 10.000 people through the people they have hired and their security arrangements, including cars and guards.[7] These unfortunate externalities of humanitarian practice, both before and during UNOSOM, paved the way for many future security incidents and dependency on international aid agencies, which again led to serious problems of disengagement of the international aid community. (Yannis, 1999)

The dilemmas of delivering food aid, especially concerning security and respect for public assets, applies for other types of assistance as well. Food and seeds in the food sector, valuable drugs in the health sector, motorized pumps in the water and sanitation sector were looted in southern Somalia, and contributed to a culture of bribe and extortion. INGOs silently accepted these terms and continued operation.

Partnership

The insecure conditions resulting from state collapse were not conducive for finding appropriate partners. (Yannis, 1999)[8] However, the Somalis were not slow in exploiting a situation, where the international agencies were left in bewilderment about who they could interact with legally. Furthermore, the political entrepreneurs (warlords) did have an objective interest in entering partnerships with the international agencies. By positioning themselves as guarantors of relief, they could simultaneously elevate their popularity (legitimacy), maintain their clientelist network, and channel resources to their war capacities.

Thus, the factions that filled the vacuum used their newly acquired positions to negotiate access to relief aid with the INGOs and UN agencies. (Compagnon, 1998: 89) The warlords did not only value relief aid in terms of money, but also just as much in the human resource it represents. For instance, drugs and health-service equipment requires expertise and knowledge to use. If a warlord or a "politician" can attract health assistance of vital importance for survival, it may be an important leverage for his political legitimacy and ambitions. Since direct partnerships would be too obvious, the preferred strategy of the warlords was to access aid resources indirectly via LNGOs in their control. Still, in this process the ICRC and most of the INGOs perceived their role to be impartial and neutral, which also meant that they defined their role as having rights and obligations to collaborate with all local powers, including direct negotiations with warlords. This not only jeopardized their impartiality, it also caused friction with the UN, because it questioned who had the right or mandate to negotiate deals with the warlords. The agencies from the United Nations family had a different problem because they were used to dealing primarily with governmental institutions. The international NGO's were more accustomed to working with local partnerships, and as the notion of civil society and local participatory approaches using LNGOs as implementing partners spread within the international aid community in the beginning of the 1990's, they seemed to have an alternative to government. The UN embraced this idea by sub-contracting INGOs and LNGOs to carry out the relief tasks. This had another consequence. The substantial expenditures during UNOSOM II, together with sub-contracting policies, led to a wild proliferation of LNGOs in Somalia. (Abdillahi, 1998) It was business and they 'mushroomed' throughout Somalia. After UNOSOM II left and the aid flow shrank to below a quarter of what it was before, the

international agencies did become more critical in choosing partners. Many LNGOs turned 'stand-by,' and became nominal. The idea of strengthening civil-society though was not always an appropriate approach. For instance, a major INGO social-service provider in the water and sanitation sector may enter into a partnership with a 'nominal' LNGO. The implication may be that the INGO via the LNGO supports a political structure, which formally is vested in the regional council, but that in reality is little more than the puppet of the local politicians, warlords, and supreme elders. The consequence is that the local power structure is maintained and legitimized by the external agencies, because they function as the local authority's social welfare provider.

Unfortunately, many humanitarian agencies did not use traditional authorities as partners, and this is still not used unequivocally. It can be wise to address the local elders on all matters of doubt concerning rentals, hiring, and any aspect of operations. The elders can advise about preventing conflict, misunderstandings, and other trouble in advance. It is especially important that security arrangements are clarified with them. However, the trouble is that security arrangements usually play into the hands of the militias. Thus, if the elders do not have full control over them because they have lost their authority, then such arrangements may contribute to keeping the local communities in a gridlock under the domination of the factions. Furthermore, some elders are also political entrepreneurs who have used their personal attributes such as education, money, or trade to enhance their elder status. The resulting configuration of power of the various 'partnerships' seems to be vested in the odd constellation of warlord-political-entrepreneurs, certain elders, and the employees in local and international NGOs. This may be good, if we are dealing with people who possess a high level of personal integrity and morality. The problem with this is that the dependency on the flow of resources through the international agency reduces the sense of responsibility of the Somali leaders on one hand, and keeps the logic of spoils politics alive on the other. Thus, the involvement of INGOs may prevent the Somalis from establishing a local polity where the balances of power relies on, and is sustained by local sources of income and a stable local power balance.

Feeding Localized Structures of Violence

The political significance of humanitarian assistance should not only be seen in terms of its magnitude or in terms of saving lives, but in terms of the role it plays in the dynamics of the socio-political processes. Of course the importance of humanitarian assistance varies depending on what type of assistance we are talking about, which sector we are within, and by what is at stake between the belligerents. However, humanitarian assistance was a strategic resource in the first and second phases of the Somali emergency, and the factions speculated on how to get part of it either directly by predation or by exploiting the spoils of the externalities. The Somalis benefitted considerably from the vast resources of UNOSOM II to such an extent that southern Somalis today wish that UNOSOM II would return. Unfortunately, UNOSOM II also reconfirmed the Somali perception of international assistance as a source of competition, whereby the incentives for the very peace process it was supposed to promote were undermined. UNOSOM II is generally seen to have created and legitimized the Southern and Mogadishu based warlords. (Compagnon, 1998: 86-89) After UNOSOM II, the external resource-flow shrank, and so did the UNOSOM-dependent Somali economy. But, whenever new agencies move in today with money and resources, the chase for the spoils begins anew. In this context the 'Peace Dividend' approach launched after UNOSOM II by the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) did not provide sufficient leverage for peace in Somalia. Nor did it become a sufficient mechanism once the warlord syndrome had been created. In southern Somalia, in the context of relatively weak and highly fragmented local polities, international assistance had a significant impact on the type of formal political structures that the Somalis sought to establish, structures that mainly came to function as interlocutors to the international community. Thus, these structures often turned into the main arenas for political competition about the spoils of social and welfare services.

The impact of short-term instability is that it legitimizes the use of armed power and thus the rationality of structures of violence. Furthermore, by focusing on the faction leaders as 'legitimate' authorities with which to negotiate, a political structure was set for the future that expelled other local Somali groups and persons struggling for a different agenda from that of becoming warlords. These groups were left over to compete for junior positions within the humanitarian agencies operating in Somalia. If one of the troubling features of the Somali socio-political

culture is spoils politics, then the continuance of humanitarian assistance in the present form is not contributing to bring peace. Local security arrangements allowing for peaceful conflict resolution is a pre-condition for moving on towards rebuilding in war-torn societies. But, as long as external humanitarian assistance uncritically fuels spoils politics, then it will never do anything but help keep Somalia caught up in its structures of violence.

Endnotes

1. *Reer* is the smallest clan family unit. *Xeer* is a social contract between all the *reer*, which also outlines the size of "*diya*" payment. *Diya* means blood payment, which is the compensation that one clan pays to another for an offence committed by one of its members.

2. It is significant that the WFP Somalia today does not have an institutional memory that can explain how and why the changes in food aid delivery approaches took place.

3.According to several issues of the Integrated Regional Information Network newsletters 1999/2000.

4. Externality is a term borrowed from the discipline of economics and refers to the spillover effect of an economic activity on an external activity not directly related to it. An externality is when the activity of one agent affects the options, and activities of another agent.

5. Interviews with Somali national UN staff in Somalia, October, 1999.

6. Apparently it is not possible to retrieve meaningful figures from donors as well as implementing agencies. Even the Somali Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) in Nairobi does not have any statistics over the aggregate funds spend on Somalia.

7. Interview with ACF, Nairobi, October 1999.

8. The ICRC did not have this problem because they could use the existing network of the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS).

SECTION FOUR

Refugees and the Diaspora

Introduction to Section Four

Still another residual cost of war are the refugees. Those who can afford to flee join the ranks of the Somali diaspora abroad. Those with limited resources live in camps in Kenya and other nearby states.

What is the identity of the diaspora Somalis? What is their relationshiop to their adopted nation? What is the culture of the second generation and beyond? And perhaps most telling, what is their relationship to the home country? These and other questions form the core of Section Four. Intertwined with these questions are the continuing relations between different clans and sub clans of Somalis, between men and women, and between Islam and whatever the predominant faith of the adopted nation.

One presentation considers the impact of refugees and refugee camps on the local environment. Fuelwood collection, water use, waste disposal, and abuse of refugee women by other refugees as well as neighbors of the camp are among the major problems encountered in Kenya.

Another paper assesses the place of Somali refugees in Egypt. Ethnic discrimination, exclusion from employment possibilities, and relegation to the worst of the housing make life for Somalis in Egypt an almost unbearable experience Whereas one might have expected that the strong hmanitarian traditions of Islam would enable Egyptians to welcome their less fortunate 'brothers and sisters,' this seems not to be the case. The burden is too great, the numbers too large, and the international assistance too small. So Somali refugees in Egypt fare little better than those in the refugee camps in Kenya.

An example from Somalis in Finland concludes the section, with particular attention to Somali women. The numbers are smaller, the level of social services better, and the energy of many of the Somali women to learn Finnish exemplary. Yet residence in Finland is not a final solution. The clmate, religion, culture, and livelihood systems are all alien to the pastoral values of the Somalis. These experiences suggest that the best solution to the refugee problem is to prevent the wars that cause the problem.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

The Role of Diaspora Communities in Homeland Development: Some Historical Examples

Lee Cassanelli

Introduction

This paper is a very preliminary attempt to sketch out some patterns in the economic relations between diaspora communities and their homelands, particularly as they affect issues of economic and social development in the homeland. It draws on my own research on the Somali diaspora (Cassanelli, 1994, 2001) as well as on a sampling of the vast literature on other emigrant groups who have maintained strong links with their countries of origin. These include case studies from North America (Arthur, Gutierrez, Morawska, Winland), Europe, and the Maghrib (*e.g.*, Berriane and Popp), and South and East Asia. (Lessinger, Bolt). By taking a comparative approach, we can begin to identify the

kinds of opportunities and obstacles that might lie ahead in the diaspora/homeland relationship in Somaliland.

Most of the older scholarship on immigrant groups focused on the patterns and processes by which immigrants adapted or assimilated to their new host societies. Over the last decade, scholars have begun to talk about 'transnationalism,' and to stress the position of migrants or refugees as global actors who no longer identify themselves exclusively with any one country but rather operate in the spaces between their countries of origin and their countries of residence. Ewa Morawska, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania who has surveyed much of the literature on immigration to America, sees immigrants as engaging *simultaneously* in the affairs of their host *and* home countries. Which takes priority depends on a number of factors, such as motives for the original migration, levels of education and employment, length of time resident overseas, and the like. (Morawska, in Joppke, forthcoming) Moreover, the ideologies and policies of both home and host governments can affect the extent to which diasporas organize or mobilize their members for action vis-à-vis their homelands. In other words, there is something of a dialectical relationship between diaspora development and homeland development, and the two need to be considered together.

Let me suggest another set of considerations to help frame our discussion. In surveying the literature, I found at least three broad viewpoints regarding the potential role that diaspora communities can and might play in the political and social development of their homelands. One sees diasporas as educational and economic *assets* in the development process. Through the earnings, skills, and contacts they have acquired from living overseas, overseas migrants have the potential to accelerate the processes of economic and technical development in their homelands. Kofi Apraku, for example, argues that African emigrés represent an underutilized resource for development that most African governments have failed to utilize. (Apraku)

A second view sees diaspora communities as, at best, minor players in their home countries' development efforts. This viewpoint seems to suggest that the very status of being emigrés imposes severe *limitations* on the potential of diaspora groups to engage seriously in home country development activities.

A third perspective sees diaspora communities as potential *liabilities* in the national development process. This position is often taken by political analysts who study nation-building or international relations.

(see, for example, some of the case studies in Sheffer) They point out, for example, how diasporas often tend to reflect and reproduce factional, ethnic, or regional rivalries that exist in the homeland, and sometimes even exacerbate these cleavages by generating propaganda through printed and electronic media abroad. Because diasporas are *transnational* communities, they can potentially be used as tools in international politics by one country against another, or can operate in ways that erode national loyalties and ultimately undermine the nation-state. From this perspective, diaspora communities are seen as liabilities – or potential liabilities – for the homeland government.

In fact, there is no need to hold exclusively to one of these viewpoints. The comparative literature suggests that different overseas diasporas have played different roles in relation to their home countries at different points in time. Even a single ethnic diaspora over a period of years or decades can find itself in a different relationship to its homeland For example, there may be changes both within the emigré communities (progress toward assimilation and/or gainful employment in the host society or coming of age of a second generation) and within the homeland (regime changes, improved security, or economic growth) that can alter the attitudes and perceptions of both sides. And of course no diaspora is monolithic. Even at a single moment in time, emigré communities consist of individuals who maintain different educational, economic, and family circumstances that affect their opinions about and actions toward their countries of origin. We should be aware that the relationship that exists today between emigrés and homelanders may be different three years, or five years, or a decade from now. This is all the more reason to sketch out the variety of possible relationships that the comparative material reveals.

Four Models of Diasporas in Development

I wish to propose four models for diaspora involvement in home country national development. The models function at four different levels at which diaspora activities can operate and have an impact on their homelands. Activities or linkages at these four levels can be underway simultaneously. While these models focus on economic and social contributions, it is important to realize that all of them have political implications which, in a period of nation building, may be as important or more important than the strictly economic outcomes. I remind you that this is a very preliminary framework that derives from the handful of

selected cases with which I am familiar. Further research will almost certainly expand possible alternatives.

The Extended Family Network Model

Remittances of earnings to family members back home is the most common way that overseas migrants have contributed to their homeland economies. It is the way that most emigrant groups have historically returned wealth to their countries of origin. Economic remittances may well be the most efficient (and democratic) means of transferring wealth from developed economies to emerging ones. Indeed, the remittance system may be the only way for diasporas to contribute to homeland development where the homeland state is either weak or without widespread popular support. In such circumstances, remittances can be used in the home country to educate children, start small businesses, and enable rural dwellers to move to cities. Remittances can also serve to increase overall purchasing power in the home country and therefore stimulate a considerable amount of domestic commerce.

But because remittances go to and through extended family networks, this system reinforces (and often reinvigorates) kinship loyalties while doing little to promote national solidarity or to strengthen the homeland government's capacity to undertake national projects. Remittances are private assets directed to particularistic ends. They tend to enhance the capacities of sectional or parochial interests (frequently along lines of kinship) rather than those of the state or citizenry as a whole. This is still the primary way that overseas Somalis contribute to the economic and social well-being of Somaliland.

The National Citizenship Model

What I propose to call the national citizenship model entails private or individual contributions – or transfers of skills or investments – to the homeland state, usually through official government or consular channels. This system requires a relatively strong and efficient homeland state that enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of both its homeland and diaspora populations. Since it is the homeland government which is the recipient of the emigrés' contributions, this national citizenship model in theory directs private assets toward national goals. The homeland state often encourages such commitments by deliberately reaching out to its diaspora communities. Many European states in the first half of the 20th century

tried to appeal to the patriotic sentiments of their overseas nationals through educational and media campaigns abroad. (Morawska) China is perhaps the best example for the second half of the 20th century of "a state that has deliberately instituted policies to attract the resources of its diaspora in order to achieve rapid economic development."[1] If I understand it correctly, this is also the model that nearby Eritrea currently employs when it asks members of the Eritrean diaspora to contribute two percent of their overseas earnings to the state through consular offices in their countries of residence.

Diasporic contributions made directly to the homeland states – as opposed to those made through extended family networks – most typically occur during periods when patriotic sentiments run high. But to sustain such a system over several decades requires more than appeals to patriotism. The homeland government may need to create special economic incentives to attract the donations or investments of its overseas nationals. Or it may have to consider certain political incentives – such as the right of unlimited entry and exit, or the right to vote in homeland elections (as the Dominican Republic has done for its emigrés to the United States). Such measures give overseas migrants an ongoing means of participating in the national civic and economic life of the homeland, and hence a greater stake in its future.[2]

The Associational Model

In this system, organizations or associations of overseas immigrants help to mobilize their own diasporic communities to contribute to public projects or causes in the homeland. In many instances, of course, these organizations draw their memberships rather narrowly from emigrés that come from the same ethnic group or region in the country of origin. As a result, their contributions are predictably targeted to projects or needs in their home regions, so they remain particularistic in objective. However, because some of the larger or more professional overseas immigrant organizations are chartered or incorporated in the host country and tend to have constitutions and by-laws (which, for example, may open membership to all emigrés from a particular country living in a given city or state abroad), they frequently begin to acquire an associational identity that transcends family or sub-group loyalties. Morever, where such associational fund-raising efforts are directed toward *public* as opposed to private activities back home – such as the provisioning of equipment for eye clinics or donations toward restoration

of a homeland church or mosque – they can give rise to a sense of civic pride in both home and host societies, one of the ingredients essential for the health of civil society.

A good example of this type of overseas associational commitment to public projects in the homeland, even if they are still particularistic in objective, can be found in the Ghanaian immigrant associations of North America. (Attah-Poku) In the Ghanaian case, it appears that diaspora communities compete to see which association can do the most to help the development of its particular home district – the kind of friendly public rivalry that may actually help foster a sense of commitment to the homeland and give diaspora communities collectively a stake in the nation-building process.[3]

In the associational model of diaspora involvement, the homeland state need not take a leading role, but it must be willing tolerate the notion and practice of decentralized development. It must also be willing to provide the necessary security, property, protection, and (often) political guarantees that will give overseas immigrant organizations the confidence to mobilize its members resources as well as those of foreign friends of the country in question.

The Transnational Partnership Model

For want of a better term, I use the notion of 'partnership' to refer to diaspora involvements of several different types, all of which acknowledge the increasingly transnational nature of development in today's global economy.[4] The partnerships I have in mind may be those between citizens in the homeland state and their counterparts in the diaspora – that is, contemporary versions of older family businesses launched with the help of remittances, but now attentive to the development priorities of the homeland government. One can imagine public-private partnerships between homeland-based agencies and corporations and the diasporic community, aimed at projects that balance diaspora interests and home country objectives.

Another level of partnership that diaspora communities can initiate and cultivate perhaps more readily than citizens living in the homeland is one that promotes cooperation among skilled professional or business people who come from different national diasporas but who live or work together abroad. In this scenario, one can imagine, for example, emigrés from neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa launching cooperative ventures in such areas as communications and information technology,

transnational commerce and transportation, energy resource development, and environmental conservation and rehabilitatioin. In these areas, diaspora professionals from different countries may be able to take the initiative in promoting wider regional (that is, multi-nation) cooperation. They can thus help planners and professionals in the homeland to enlarge their strategic vision and work toward more integrated development agendas across broad regions of the continent.[5]

Conclusion

Historical and comparative evidence suggests that the involvements of various diasporas in their homelands can vary considerably over time. The nature and effectiveness of the involvement depends on both diasporic and homeland factors. The ability of diaspora communties to contribute to homeland development depends in part on their ability to organize themselves. Overseas emigrés need not speak with one voice to be effective educators to their host country governments and citizens, nor to involve themselves responsibly in local politics or lobbying. By taking these initiatives (as Cubans, Jews, and Irish immigrants to the United States have done – whatever one thinks of their ideologies), the diasporas can play a significant role in shaping international opinion and thus indirectly influencing homeland affairs.

Similarly, a homeland government's ability to mobilize the skills and resources of its overseas communities depends partly on its sensitivity to issues that matter to diaspora communities, but also partly on its ability to govern fairly and effectively. A vigorous and open homeland government can encourage members of the diaspora to invest both ideas and resources back home, and makes it easier for them to socialize their children, frequently born abroad and therefore subject to new ideas and identities, toward the same goals and values.

There is thus a dialectic between diaspora development and homeland development, and the reconstruction or renewal of one strengthens the possibilities for the reconstruction and renewal of the other.

Endnotes

1. One conservative estimate calculates that overseas ethnic Chinese invested $17.9 billion in China between 1979-91, representing two-thirds of all utilized foreign investment during this period. (Bolt, 468)

2. They may also, of course, produce resentment and generate tensions between diaspora citizens and those continuing to reside in the homeland.

3. The recent friendly rivalry between the new Somaliland universities at Amoud and Hargeisa – located in different parts of the country – seems a particularly interesting development in this regard. In a country where clan loyalties are preeminent, any such regional competition offers a welcome alternative focal point for diaspora/homeland cooperation as an intermediate step in the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction.

4. I have not found any historical examples of the model at work, though the process appears to have begun in several of the diasporas we have previously discussed.

5. One might note here the greatly improved relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland in recent years, in part a response to the return of diaspora Somalis and the increase in trade (and airline flights) between Addis and Hargeisa.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Two Interdependent Global Problems: Refugees and Environment - The Case of Dadaab Refugee Camps in Kenya

Tiina Salmio

Introduction

The paper focuses on several questions. In what ways are refugee and environmental problems interrelated? Which institutional actors participate in the governance of these two global problems? In what ways and with what purposes? What kind of policies and governance have emerged to deal with these two interdependent problems? How and why? Has governance been effective? The paper addresses these questions, based on assessments in the refugee camps of Dadaab in Kenya.

Governing Global Problems

Global problems pose new challenges to states, making them more interdependent on one another. Since the last century a growing number of global regimes[1] have formed and an increasingly complex set of rules and institutions have come to regulate international relations.[2] The role of states is changing, although they are still the main actors in international relations. Therefore, different forms of governance have begun to emerge in response to new sets of problems and challenges.

Stokke (1997, 58) notes that regime analysts emphasize norm-based coordination among states and state bureaucracies, while global governance scholars tend to highlight relationships between a range of sub-national and transnational actors. According to Young, (1997) global governance refers to "the combined categories of international, transnational, and mixed regimes." Members of international regimes are states, while the members of transnational regimes are non-state actors. However, real-world regimes are often mixed types.[3]

The UNHCR could be regarded as an international refugee regime that governs global refugee problems. However, it is rather the main actor in a refugee regime. Sovereign states have a central role in defining the policy of the UNHCR, but there are other actors that cooperate with it to solve refugee issues. In some areas, refugee and environmental problems are more strongly interrelated to each other than in others, and therefore refugee and different environmental regimes are more likely to overlap. However, knowledge about the problem interdependencies does not necessarily lead to cooperation, but also to conflicts.

There are emerging systems of global governance to deal with these two interdependent problems. Separate regimes deal with more limited issues. As a result, local regimes reflect the decisions and guidelines made by global governance. The local regimes are different, because the interplay of global governance and local regimes varies, being either top-down or bottom-up or, sometimes, combinations of the two. The case of Dadaab refugees illustrates the governance of refugee and environmental matters and the interplay of local regimes and global governance.

The Relationship of Refugees and Environmental Problems

In most of the sub-Saharan countries, migration within and between the countries has become a common feature. The main reasons to move include persecution, international or civil warfare, economic hardship,

environmental degradation, famine, expulsion, forcible resettlement, and nomadism.[4] Therefore, the traditional distinctions and the different operational approaches between refugees, returnees, displaced persons and drought victims are difficult to maintain.[5]

Large-scale movements of refugees fleeing fighting and persecution cause environmental problems such as land degradation, deforestation, soil erosion and depletion, and water pollution. Consequently, the quality of life of refugees and host communities worsens. Even though the influx of refugees often has a negative impact on the environment, the level of the damage also depends on how it is taken into consideration in refugee policy and how the problems are governed. For example, refugees are normally assisted in camps that are very hard places for people and unfavorable for the environment. However, when refugees start to move, camps are often the only way to help people. Nevertheless, environmental problems could be minimized by paying attention to factors such as the camp size, the camp location, and the distances between the camps.

Refugee Flows to Kenya

During the first half of 1991, Kenya's refugee population increased tenfold.[6] The hostilities in Somalia, Ethiopia, and southern Sudan gave rise to influxes of large numbers of refugees from those three countries. In 1992, at the peak of the refugee influx, the refugee population totalled about 420,000 as well as about 100,000 to 150,000 refugees and asylum-seekers living outside the camps.[7]

When Ethiopia and some areas of Somalia began to return to modest stability in 1993, people started returning home. However, continued lack of a political solution to the conflict in Sudan and Somalia, coupled with widespread drought and famine conditions, hindered prospects for mass voluntary repatriation.[8] In 2000 there were about 203,500 refugees in Kenya; 135,600 from Somalia, 54,600 from Sudan, and the rest from Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda.[9]

In 1992, there were 11 camps in Kenya and people were also assisted in six border sites.[10] The camps had to be established in a very short period in drought-stricken areas.[11] Nowadays there are three camps located around Dadaab in Garissa district and one camp in Kakuma in Turkana district. They are situated in semi-arid areas, which are traditionally populated by pastoral nomads with whom the refugees share scarce natural resources serving as a potential for a conflict.[12]

The Dadaab Camps

The Dadaab camps of Ifo, Hagadera, and Dagahaley were established in September 1991, March 1992, and June 1992. Dadaab town in Kenya's North Eastern Province is only about 70 km from the Somali border, 500 km from Nairobi, and 600 km from Mombasa.[13] The camps of Dadaab and Kakuma host refugees of different nationalities due to security reasons.[14]

There are about 126,000 refugees, of which about 95 % are Somalis, divided more or less equally between the three Dadaab camps. The refugees of Dadaab are mainly nomadic pastoralists, but there are also agriculturalists, former civil servants, and traders.[15] Refugees are dependent on aid, because they have limited access to markets to trade their goods and have practically no access to paid employment.[16]

The local Kenyan population of Dadaab town belongs to a Somali ethnic group of whom some are even related to the refugees.[17] The local population was initially about 4,000 people,[18] but as of June 2000, the number had swelled to about 15,000. However, it is hard to get the exact number of locals since pastoralists are constantly moving from one place to another, depending on the rains.

The Environmental Problems of Dadaab

Deforestation and soil erosion have made the life of the refugees extremely difficult and heavily dependent on assistance. It is claimed that the refugee population threatens to degrade a large area because of the fragility of the environment in Dadaab and the degraded area closed to the camps is increasing each year.[19] However, the extent of the damage and the potential for regeneration has never actually been estimated. [20]

The Dadaab camps are situated in a semi-arid area, characterized by low and unreliable rainfall slightly north of the equator in Kenya. The land is flat, soils sandy, and nutrients poor.[21] Daytime temperatures reach up to 40°C. The refugee camps are frequently subject to environmental disasters.[22] Exceptionally heavy rains associated with the El Niño phenomenon in Eastern Africa caused severe floods that seriously affected food production and distribution from late 1997 until the early part of 1998.[23]

The concentration of population and collection of natural resources such as fuelwood caused environmental degradation adjacent to the Kenyan refugee camps.[24] The environmental concerns are related mainly

to depletion of woody biomass resources for firewood, charcoal, and building materials. Refugees were also accused of using unsustainable cutting practices and putting excessive pressure on grazing areas and water resources with their animals.[25]

Conflicts and Security Problems

Kenyan authorities have neglected North Eastern Province (NEP) and Turkana District, where the refugee camps are situated. There is a long history of strife that has often resulted in violent confrontations between opposing ethnic groups, as well as between the Kenyan army and local armed groups in Turkana District and NEP. The NEP has been subjected to a virtually permanent state of emergency since independence until 1992.[26]

Nowadays violence occurs in and around Kenya's refugee camps. Jeff Crisp has found different categories of violence: domestic and community violence; sexual abuse and violence; armed robbery; violence within national refugee groups; violence between national refugee groups; and violence between refugees and local populations.[27] Sources of conflicts are partly connected to the environment such as livestock and firewood. Armed attacks along the Sudanese and Somali borders also heighten insecurity in and around the refugee camps.[28] Dadaab has also claimed to be center of arms trafficking. [29]

Governance of Refugee and Environmental Problems: The Dadaab Camps

The regime in environmental-refugee issues, originally created by the UNHCR, emerged to solve the problems in the Dadaab camps. It consists of various actors at different levels, even though there is one leading agency implementing the projects connected to the environment. It reflects the principles, rules, and decision-making procedures defined by global governance dealing with environmental and refugee matters. There is also interaction between local and global levels. At this stage of my study, however, it is difficult to say to what extent the local actors shape principles as compared to the principles that are established at the global level.

Kenya Lacks Clear Refugee Policy

There is no clear government policy on refugee issues[30] and the Government of Kenya has not yet enacted national refugee legislation.[31] Therefore, it has mainly a role of maintaining security, law, and order.[32] Crisp (1999, 2) has noted three features characterizing Kenyan refugee policy:

- a determination to resist the integration of refugees into the economic and social life of the country
- second, the maintenance of large refugee camps in remote areas, close to the refugees' countries of origin
- third, an assumption that pending their repatriation, responsibility for the refugees will be fully assumed by UNHCR and other members of the international community.

The government of Kenya handles various sectoral concerns through different ministries. On environmental matters connected to refugees, the focal point is not clearly defined. Therefore, environmental coordination in refugee-affected areas remains *de facto* the responsibility of the UNHCR.[33]

The UNHCR, the GTZ and Other Partners

The UNHCR is the leading agency providing assistance and co-ordinating refugee camp activities. In Dadaab, there has been a leading environmental agency, the GTZ (German Agency for Technical Co-operation), since 1994. It has been implementing and coordinating environmental projects, but also advising on environmental problems and monitoring environmental impacts. One of GTZ's projects is RESCUE (Rational Energy Supply, Conservation, Utilization and Education). According to the UNHCR report (1998) its results have been reduction in firewood demand as a result of the dissemination of energy saving woodstoves and other alternative energy devices. Attacks on women have decreased, partly because they do not have to gather firewood outside the camps as much as before. Other results include planting tree seedlings and trees as shelterbelts to prevent erosion and to improve the visual environment. Buffer belts have also been created by planting seedlings and rehabilitating seriously degraded areas.[34]

The UNHCR also cooperates with different actors on a global level, but it is difficult to identify the changes in the field caused by global cooperation. For example, the UNHCR office in Kenya is cooperating with the various UN agencies under the UNDAF (UN Development Assistance Framework), which seeks to harmonize the different programs in development activities.[35] The UNHCR has participated in theme groups of the UNDAF that have helped to draw attention of other UN agencies to the need for development activities in refugee areas.[36]

Local Empowerment

In 1995 the Environmental Working Group (EWG) started in Dadaab. Each camp has its own EWG. It is a forum for resolving conflicts over natural resources and a channel to express local views and concerns.[37] The stated aims of the EWG are "coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating natural resource management operations and raising awareness of environmental concerns with the host community."[38]

The EWG provides a forum for discussions and policy development concerning refugee use of natural resources. It makes recommendations and proposes suitable people to carry them out. The EWG consists of representatives of the host community, the refugee committee, the government, the UNHCR, and other implementing organizations. It empowers the local population in the management of natural resources.[39] The EWGs at various levels are taking stock of activities and their implications, and suggesting recommendations, involvement of host government, NGOs, and other UN agencies in the planning process.[40]

Through the EWG, actors interact at different levels: local, regional, national, international, and even global. Would the EWG also be necessary in repatriation programs to prevent conflicts between local populations and those who are repatriating? Or how should environment be taken into account in the planning and execution of repatriation programmes?

Effectiveness of the Environment-Refugee Regime of Dadaab

Young (1994, 143) identified six dimensions of effectiveness: problem solving, goal attainment, behavioral, process, constitutive, and evaluative. Here I evaluate the environmental-refugee regime of Dadaab, using the criteria of Oran Young.

Regime effectiveness could be defined in many ways. Therefore, one presented here gives one point of view to study the environmental-refugee regime of Dadaab. Regime effectiveness can be estimated, depending on how the regime operates in solving the problems that initially led to the formation of the regime in question. Furthermore, various members might frame the problems that a regime has defined differently or a problem might be redefined.[41] Therefore, evaluating the effectiveness depends on how and by whom the problem was defined. What kind of interests have the actors had in the problem defining process? In the case of Dadaab, the Kenyan Government, the international community and actors in the field raised concern over the environment. Nevertheless, in the case of Dadaab, the problem definition has been far from clear. The level of the destruction of the environment has been hard to judge because the environment was not evaluated before the refugees arrived in Dadaab. Under most refugee camp circumstances, there is often no time for an environmental assessment before the camps are established.

On one hand, the regime could be evaluated by stated goals. It seems that the goals of the environmental projects have been quite clearly stated. Yet they might not be sensible if the problems are not clearly defined. For instance, one UNHCR report evaluated the results of the project that disseminated energy-saving stoves and planted trees and seedlings, primarily on the basis of counting the number of trees planted and stoves distributed. But the evacuation made no attempt to assess changes in fuelwood consumption, largely because of lack of baseline data.

On the other hand, the regime could be assessed by unstated goals.[42] However, it is difficult to introduce the motivated goals not articulated, since the evidence might be gathered according to the observer's interests. In the case of Dadaab refugees, environmental and security problems are connected to each other. One of the unstated goals of the Kenyan government might be fear of the possible independent Somali movement in the camp areas. The Kenyan government could be worried about the possible demand of the ethnic Kenyan Somali community of seceding from Kenya and joining to Somalia, since they have little rights in Kenya.

The Kenyan Somalis have suffered discrimination from both the colonial and post-independence administrations. The British suppressed their voice in 1962 by refusing to respect the 1962 referendum in which Kenyan Somalis wanted to secede from Kenya. Therefore, refugees could partly be seen as a security threat increasing the Somali population in the area. The government expressed worries about the environmental problems, but in the background it is also worried about security. The

policy of integrating the refugees into the local communities in a larger area than that of the camps could be more suitable for the environment. However, the result could be that people are less likely to return and therefore, the Somali population would likely increase in Kenya.

Moreover, one could ask if the regime has altered its behavior and is operating under the jurisdiction of the regime members. The Dadaab regime has changed the behavior of its members to a certain extent, not only on a local level, but also on a global level.[43] On a global level, the Dadaab refugee-environmental regime has, at least partly, raised a question of the importance of the environment. It has also changed the behavior of the refugees to use natural resources in a sustainable way. However, it could be argued that the mostly nomadic Dadaab refugees had the knowledge to take care of the environment when they arrived. Even so, the form of refugee assistance and prolonged stay in the camps is unsustainable for the environment, no matter how much local knowledge and lore the refugees may possess.

According to Young (1994, 146) program effectiveness can be measured by "the extent to which the provisions of an international regime are implemented in the domestic, legal, and political systems of the member states as well as the extent to which those subject to a regime's prescriptions actually comply with their requirements." It is rather difficult to evaluate the process effectiveness with the empirical material I have. Nevertheless, it has been claimed that the resolutions of the EWG will be implemented for the whole district, not only around the refugee camp. If so, the process effectiveness could be considered rather high. It is also likely that the project ideas developed in Dadaab have been or will be used in other refugee operations.

In constitutive terms, the environmental-refugee regime could be seen as effective. Time, energy, and resources have been spent to solve environmental problems related to refugeeism. However, it could be claimed that too many guidelines and studies have been carried out compared to the real action on the field level.[44] Last but not least, one could evaluate a regime according to its ability to see things from the holistic point of view. Young (1994) writes about the evaluative effectiveness of management policies, referring to whether the regime "produces results that are efficient, equitable, sustainable, or robust."[45] Are the regime members capable of seeing the problems that the regime is solving in a wider context? This comes close to the problem definition since, from my point of view, in exemplary problem defining, the problem is studied as a part of the surrounding system.

Conclusions

On the basis of the preliminary observations concerning the relevant problem interdependencies, the importance of the environmental aspect in the returnee operations arises. The environmental problems serve as a potential for a new conflict. As the situation stabilizes in Somalia, large numbers of Somali refugees in Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia are likely to return home. As a result of refugee movements, problems of population concentrations and environment as well as conflicts might arise in the receiving society. Most of the refugees in the camps might return to the cities, even though they are originally nomads. One reason for that is the long-term residence in the closed refugee camps and the loss of cattle, causing life-style changes. Another reason is that refugees are accustomed to things such as education and health care, which were available on the refugee camps. The environment is an important part of the refugee operations, but so also is reconstruction and peace building, because environmental problems may cause other sudden and serious problems. The environment is as important in returnee operations as it is for refugee programs. One would argue that it receives scant attention because of a lack of resources. However, taking care of the environment is not necessarily expensive. Rather it is a question of good planning and utilizing local knowledge about the environment.

Endnotes

1. Stephen Krasner (1983, 2) defined a regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."

2. See e.g. Little (1998), 232, 234.

3. Young (1997), 283-284.

4. See e.g. Kibreab (1996), 18-19.

5. UNHCR Kenya Refugee Emergency Information Bulletin, November 20 (1992), page 5.

6. See e.g. Kenya – Taking Liberties (1991), 342.

7. UNHCR Kenya Refugee Emergency Information Bulletin November 20 (1992), page 2.

8. Country Report and Operation Plan 1998-2000, 1-2.

9. UNHCR Global Appeal (2001) Kenya Programme, 78.

10. See e.g. UNHCR Kenya Refugee Emergency Information Bulletin November 20, (1992).

11. See e.g. Berthiaume (1992), 26.

12. See e.g. Country Report and Operation Plan 1998-2000, 4

13. See e.g. Country Reports Kenya and Nepal (1998), 3.

14. UNHCR Global Appeal (2001) Kenya Programme, 78.

15. UNHCR Profile Dadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya, 1.

16. UNHCR Global Appeal (2001). Kenya Programme, 79.

17. See e.g. Country Reports Kenya and Nepal (1998), 5.

18. *Ibid.*, 9.

19. See e.g. Nyandiga (1996).

20. Country Reports Kenya and Nepal (1998), 35.

21. See e.g. *Ibid.*, 3, 5.

22. UNHCR Global Appeal (1999). East and Horn of Africa. Operations in Kenya.

23. See e.g. FAO/GIEWS, 5 of February (1998); RNIS, 25 March (1998); UNHCR Global Appeal (1999). East and Horn of Africa. Operations in Kenya.

24. See e.g. Country Report and Operation Plan 1998-2000, 54.

25. See e.g. *Ibid.*, 5, 9, 16.

26. Verdirame (1999), 61.

27. Crisp (1999), 1, 2.

28. See e.g. UNHCR Global Appeal 2001. Kenya Programme, 79.

29. See e.g. Redfern (2000).

30. UNHCR Global Report. Assessment of (1999) Operations. Country Operation Kenya, 2.

31. UNHCR Global Appeal (2001). Kenya Programme, 78.

32. UNHCR Global Report. Assessment of (1999) Operations. Country Operation Kenya, 4.

33. Country Reports Kenya and Nepal (1998), 6.

34. Country Reports Kenya and Nepal (1998), 9, 12-13, 36, 41.

35. UNHCR Global Appeal (2001). Kenya Programme, 81.

36. UNHCR Global Report. Assessment of (1999) Operations. Country Operation Kenya, 4.

37. See e.g. UNHCR Global Report. Assessment of (1999) Operations. Country Operation Kenya, 7.

38. *Ibid.*, 11.

39. See e.g. Nyandiga (1996) and Country Reports Kenya and Nepal (1998), 7.

40. See e.g. Country Report and Operation Plan 1998-2000, 55.

41. Cf. Young (1994), 143.

42. Cf. Young (1994), 144-146.

43. Cf. Young (1994), 144-146.

44. Cf. Young (1994), 148.

45. Young (1994), 149.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Quests for Refuge, Quests for Therapy: Forced Migrants, Illness, and Resort Strategies in Urban Egypt

Debra A. Budiani

Introduction

While literature about Somalis[1] and their Horn neighbors in the diaspora has paid considerable attention to experiences of displacement in the West (Berns-McGowen, 1999; Compton, 1998; Holtzman, 2000; Matsuoka and Sorenson, 1999; McSpadden and Moussa, 1999; Mohamed, 2001; Moussa, 1993; Tiilikainen, 2001), several scholars are working to extend this literature to include the experiences of these displaced persons within the region and other areas of the developing world. (Al-Sharmani, 1999; Cooper, 1992; Fabos, 1999; Kroner, 2001)

As over 80 percent of the world's refugees are in the Third World and arrive in host countries that have already overburdened social services — especially health resources, it thus becomes necessary to include these sites in our work to understand the experiences of suffering and consequences of displacement of Somalis.

The predicament of forced migrants is historically contingent upon the specific relationships that a host country has with the forced migrant's country of origin. The Middle East in particular has a long and complex history of relations with the Horn of Africa. It has long been in Egypt's interests to strive to be an important actor in Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan African domains and relations. Particularly under Nasser, Egyptian leaders, to varying degrees, have tried to emphasize Egypt's multiple identities. For example, Nasser often described his vision as a group of circles, with the Arab circle at the center, surrounded by an African circle and finally seeing Egypt embedded within a larger circle of Islam.

Egypt has greater strategic interests at stake in the Horn of Africa (and the other Nile-basin countries) than in any other region of Africa. At different moments in time, Egypt has tried to impose expansionistic campaigns in Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea that even later involved collaborative colonization with the Europeans such as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in Sudan.

As Somalis describe Egypt, particularly when speaking of the role Egypt may play in the livestock ban on Somaliland, "Egypt is the Nile, and the Nile is Egypt." Egypt has indeed long played a hegemonic role which implies subaltern discourses. Yet, Egypt has also been colonized and its subordinate role on the global stage, as described by Fabos, "affirms the scars of physical and psychological subjugation." (1999)

Egypt has had a host of constraints and has made inconsistent commitments to achieving its goal of playing a more dominant role in the Horn region. The need for outside assistance has been one of the main constraints in Egyptian policy, as enduring in its way as the strategic imperatives that have shaped Egypt's regional relations. Equally important as a source of policy continuity has been the persistent effort to maintain independence from the Gulf and great power patrons who have provided aid. (Lorenz, 1990:116) The inconsistent commitment to sub-Saharan Africa in dealing with these constraints, however, has challenged the legitimacy of Egypt's claim to an African identity. Many sub-Saharan Africans have become skeptical of Egypt's loyalty to sub-

Saharan Africa while, simultaneously, emphasizing and favoring its Arab identity. Indeed, Egypt's official state discourse and its policy transitions, especially since Nasser, have had deep implications for forced migrants from the Horn who seek refuge in Egypt.

Most notably, the deterioration of the Nile valley unity immediately following the 1989 coup in Sudan has led to strained Egypto-Sudanese relations. Egypt has retracted all previous privileges granted to the Sudanese in Egypt including the withdrawal of citizenship rights and social services. For various reasons Egypt has also revoked many privileges and assistance programs to other sub-Saharan African immigrants, Somalis included, especially in the past decade. These transitions have lowered the status of these immigrants and have produced notions that they are 'out of place.'

There is no question that Nasser's Egypt extended support to its sub-Saharan African neighbors, especially to leaders and regimes of African liberation. Egypt provided military assistance and advisors to Somalia and sold arms to African nations that agreed to use them only for national defense rather than for domestic control over their citizens. Somalis and Sudanese were permitted to enroll in special courses for officers at the Nasser High Military Academy. Some argue that this had great significance for Somalia as Egypt extended symbolic military assistance. In addition to military training, Egypt granted generous scholarships to students throughout the Horn.

In the decades following Nasser, official Egyptian accounts of these immigrants in Egypt assert that they are not 'like' other minority communities in Egypt due to their shared regional heritage and favored relationship to the Egyptian state and society. Yet, the increasingly precarious immigration status of these and other forced migrants from the Horn contradicts this dominant discourse and has made their daily lives in Cairo increasingly adverse. Forced migrants from the Horn are not able to attain Egyptian citizenship and have lost many of their previous legal and political privileges. Most importantly, they are no longer eligible for health care, education, and employment that some immigrants from the region enjoyed in the Nasser's era. It is common for immigrants to complain that Egyptians are more welcoming to rich foreigners from the West and Gulf countries. (Al-Sharmani, 1998; Fabos, 1999; Gubek, 1994; Nyoka, 1999, and personal interviews) Following the recent work of Fabos (1999) regarding Northern Sudanese, I argue that when assertions of unique circumstances, needs, and identities of these

immigrants are met with Egyptian indifference or denial, the contradictions within official state discourse and the daily lives of the immigrants become clear.

A Medical Anthropological Approach

Framed within the discipline of medical anthropology, my current research addresses the health concerns of forced migrants from the Horn of Africa[2] in Cairo. My goal is to investigate the meaning and causes that they ascribe to these concerns and their quests for restoring health in the context of war, flight and precarious immigration status in urban Egypt. Viewing healing systems as involving not only a set of procedures and treatments, but also the social relationships that legitimate them, I am conducting a historically informed ethnographic study to develop theories about how the interplay of immigration policies, rooted in political-economic instability within and between countries, and cultural constructs about displacement and the displaced, work to shape forced migrants' health concerns and their experiences with health services.

I am exploring the extent to which forced migrants from Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa rely on their own communities' healers, on relief services, and/or on public and private services found in Egypt's plural healing system. I am also exploring how these diverse immigrant communities are organized/mobilized to address members' healing needs and compare what is shared or distinct about their experiences of restoring health while displaced in Cairo.

Methodology

I began field work for this project with a pilot study in 1999 and returned in April 2001 for another sixteen months of formal dissertation field research.[3] From the start, the research benefited from the support of officials in the two principal clinics and affiliate hospitals and doctors' offices that handle refugee patients from the Horn of Africa. This association helped inform the research of much of the biomedical whereas households provided an understanding of the therapy seeking strategies more broadly.

The field sites, selected to address the range of healing strategies and experiences of these forced migrants, include doctor's offices, clinics, hospitals, surgical theaters, government offices, church and mosque organizations, and homes of Somalis and others from the Horn in Cairo.

The individuals in my sample include females and males from a wide variety of ethnic groups and educational and socio-economic levels. All of whom share the experience of being displaced and in search of refuge and therapy in Cairo.

Somalis in Egypt

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (UNHCR) after the Sudanese, the Somalis constitute the second largest group of forced migrants and refugees in Egypt. Although it is not possible to obtain accurate estimates, the population size ranges from 4,000 to 10,000, almost all of whom are forced migrants. The overwhelming majority of Somalis in Egypt are located in Cairo and come for temporary refuge and for perceived better chances of gaining asylum from the UNHCR's Cairo office than they might otherwise have from their home or other host countries. Yet Egyptian authorities prohibit them from obtaining a work permit and they do not have the right to apply for permanent residence or citizenship. Thus, the official refugees are offered temporary exile in Egypt, but are expected to leave the country eventually. Nevertheless, because of the difficulty of getting asylum in the West or in the Gulf, the so-called temporary stay of these forced migrants in Egypt lasts several years or, in some cases, even a lifetime.

Due to the civil war's heavy impact of fragmenting families, Somali households often consist of single individuals and women with children who co-habitate and offer each other meager forms of assistance. Unlike the Sudanese who tend to live in congregations in same neighborhoods (*i.e.* Maadi), these households are located in various neighborhoods throughout the city. (*i.e.* Madinet Nasir, Masir Gadida, Dokki, and the outskirts of Mohandasin)

Strategies of Resort

Multiple healing systems co-exist in Egypt and range from biomedicine, Islamic medicine, traditional medicine (*wasfat baladi*), and more recently, alternative medicine including Chinese acupuncture, homeopathy, and osteopathy. Yet, in this increasingly privatized landscape of urban health care services, many Egyptians still struggle to receive sufficient care from healers because much of the upper end of Egypt's health services are income and class biased. (Early, 1982; El-Adly, 1996; Inhorn, 1994; Morsy,1994)

Forced migrants have left their homes in order to escape the violence associated with political instability. Accordingly, in Egypt, they carry with them their own sets of health concerns and quests for healing. Faced with these obstacles, prohibition from employment, exclusion from social services, and a lack of familiarity with healing systems and practices in the host country, they must devise strategies for obtaining health resources. As mentioned, this situation is in stark contrast to previous Egyptian policies towards such immigrants from the Horn of Africa region.

I am convinced that against this backdrop, individuals and communities of these immigrants, while encountering constraining social and material contexts, maneuver within them to create itineraries for restoring health. (Giddens, 1984) This has in deed been the case for Somalis in Egypt. However, the strategies of these Somalis reveal just how very narrow their options are in the current historical moment in the complex urban setting of Cairo.

The only two relief clinics for refugees in Cairo are both affiliated with Christian organizations. Although officially welcoming refugees of all faiths, according to their qualifications as forced migrants, Somalis nonetheless appear to be disproportionally marginalized from receiving these services. For example, at the clinic that accepts only migrants not yet recognized by UNHCR as official refugees, Muslims constitute only 15% of the patient population – of which Somalis are a small fraction.[4] In addition to these clinics, Somalis in Egypt seek health services from a few other sources including Islamic clinics and, in urgent cases, the emergency rooms of public hospitals.[5] Unlike the Sudanese whose community consists of biomedical and more traditionally trained healers upon which the Sudanese rely for health services, the Somali community does not have such resources and must consistently reach outside its members towards relief and other Egyptian sources for care.

Medical Encounters

While the relief clinics for refugees are familiar with the political and social context of these forced migrant groups, the care provided to them outside of these clinics by Egyptian medical professionals demonstrates little awareness of the political instability in the Horn of Africa region and the ways in which these forced migrants may be subsequently implicated. Furthermore, doctors' understandings of these illness experiences often

gets constructed in terms that are ethnicized and biologically determined rather than embedded within their broader social context.

Somalis and other forced migrants from the Horn and Egyptian medical professionals are engaged in projects of constructions about the Self and Other. While some of these constructions may refer to shared aspects of their identity such as Islam, much of it serves to draw boundaries between them. Doctors working within the hospital that treats the largest number of patients from Horn communities, due to the hospsital's affiliation with one of the two relief clinics, express a sense that their experience with these patients enables them to speak knowledgeably. Of the various themes that emerge – constructions of tolerance for pain has been a point of departure in Egyptian doctors' understanding of these patients. One ObGyn stated:

> The black patients we see have an exceptional tolerance for pain. They often tolerate the pain of labor so long that their baby deliveries occur on the streets and in taxis on the way to the hospital. They also rarely express pain. This is unlike Egyptian or white women who scream and cry at the onset of initial labor pains. We are not sure why the black patients don't feel pain as acutely but it has been noteworthy in our observations. (Personal communication)

Egyptian doctors' constructions of these patients thus do not distinguish Somali from Sudanese or other sub-Saharan African patients and are often expressed in biologically reductionistic models that group these patients together in the category of 'black.' Rather than viewing suffering and the illness experience as an account of culture, history, and the political economy, these doctors often suggest that ethnic and biological factors have determined the distinctions to expressions of pain.

In addition to tales about Somali tolerance for pain, Egyptian medical professionals comment on stories about Somalis as victims of violence. The doctors often create further constructions about society's ability to inflict pain. After hearing detailed stories of rape and torture, these doctors repeatedly responded that, "we Egyptians are a very peaceful people and never fight and harm one another as they do to each other."

These constructions by medical professionals stand in stark contrast to Somalis' own views of self and tolerance for pain and suffering. As often told to me after a baby delivery or other conditions commonly

associated with pain, Somalis explained that expressions of suffering are taboo: "if we were to scream and cry and complain in such cases, we would be gossiped about for a long time in our communities."

Another Somali woman explains, such tolerance is strongly associated within a Somali sense of aesthetics. If we were acting lazy around the house, my grandmother and mother used to tell us, "don't act like a white woman, fair and weak, only sitting around to try to look pretty." Our models and poems of beauty always spoke of the beautiful woman as very dark, tall, slim and with black lips, black gums, and white teeth. We are not like the fair skinned people who so easily show their emotions who blush when they are shy, who are sensitive to the sun, show their blemishes, and all of their feelings right on their face.[6]

In addition to these cultural constructs about taboos of expressing pain, Somalis, like their other forced migrant counterparts, have a fear of "being sick" for the implications it may have on their refugee application status and opportunity for resettlement. The Somali community keeps each other well informed about believed strategies for gaining resettlement. The case of a man who applied and waited for several years to gain refugee status and a resettlement assignment to Australia is an example that looms large in the mind of these refuge seekers. The man suffered from a massive abdominal tumor until he could no longer tolerate the pain and went to a doctor at the relief clinic for medical care. The clinic's affiliation with UNHCR revealed his condition and his resettlement assignment was subsequently revoked as Australia has health status requirements that this man could no longer meet.[7]

Conclusion

Egypt receives more immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa than any other Middle Eastern country. Its struggle to provide sufficient health resources to its own population makes such resources even more scarce for forced migrants who no longer have rights or access to health services as they did in earlier eras. The options for obtaining health care for these forced migrants are indeed narrow and itineraries burdened with obstacles.

I am convinced that the experiences of these immigrants reveal unequal power relations, both in terms of Egyptian dominance in the region and the subordinate legal and social status of these displaced persons in Egypt. Beneath the surface of their interactions with Egyptian state and society is a resentment of their subordinate status in Cairo. (Fabos, 1999) The daily lives and ability to restore health of these

immigrants is indeed filled with the 'otherness' of displacement. Within the clinical domain, the constructions of Egyptian doctors of the pain that forced migrants experience define it as biologically determined rather than embedded within their broader social context. This perception works to reproduced further the feeling of 'otherness.' As one Sudanese refugee doctor working within the community stated, "the best medicine that I can suggest is for them to leave Egypt, and that I cannot prescribe."

Endnotes

1.Like many of the other scholars working with Somalis in the diaspora, I have not drawn a distinction between those from Somaliland and Somalia but instead refer to the Somali-speaking people as those coming from the region who identify themselves as Somalis.

2.The term the "Horn of Africa" includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti.

3. This paper was submitted in September 2001 after the initial stage of my research that is intended to continue until August 2002.

4. Further research is needed to understand this but it appears that Somalis tend to be less informed about these clinic options compared to other forced migrant groups.

5. The medical professionals who work in these hospitals unanimously explained to me that public hospitals are permitted to admit Egyptian citizens only. Emergency rooms in these facilities however, are prohibited from denying care to any urgent cases.

6.This same woman went on to explain however that these models of beauty were severely compromised when Somalis were defeated by white Europeans. She says that it is sad to see skin and hair bleaches growing popular amongst Somali women, thus deviating from traditional Somali beauty models.

7. In addition to these fears, Somali and many other forced migrants in Egypt are strongly influenced by rumors of organ theft that leads them to be horrified of staying alone in Egyptian hospitals. This fear operates so strongly that women often leave hospitals within an hour after delivering their infants.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Identity Constructions and Living Conditions of Somali Refugees in Egypt

Gudrun K. Kroner

Introduction

Already in the late 1960s, Barth (1969) emphasized the relational nature of ethnic boundaries. In the last few years, anthropological research on refugees and migrants has further developed this conception of shifting group and ethnic identities (Uehlig, 1998; Baumann, 1996; Hall, 1994, 1996; Krulfeld and Camino, 1994). This research has brought several factors into a sharper focus. Refugees are not without culture and history. Instead, they bring their culture into the host countries. As a consequence of this 'clash of localities' (Beck, 1997), the local cultures have to be redefined as well. Migrants and refugees also introduce new transnational activities in economic, political, and cultural kinds.

Nevertheless almost all countries consider refugees as a threat. They are often kept in refugee camps in remote areas as in Kenya or Ethiopia[1]

or they lack opportunities to establish a new life because host governments do not want them. In Austria and Egypt, asylum seekers have a long wait to request refugee status (most of them will be rejected). During this time (and in Egypt also when they are recognized refugees) they are officially prohibited from working. So they are condemned to wait, thereby losing the possibility to earn their own livelihood. This paper examines the coping strategies of the refugees and how and to what extent kinship plays a role within this situation. (Al-Sharmani, 1998)

Very important for the identity construction and the living condition is the host country's social and governmental attitude toward refugees. Here it is interesting to learn whether Muslim country differs from a Christian nation, such as Austria, in accepting Muslim refugees. One would expect Egyptians to perceive Somalis in a different way. In addition, the size and the composition of the refugee community plays a major role in identity construction and living conditions.

Social Situation of Somali Refugees in Egypt

Egypt has become a popular country for Somali refugees, on one hand, because the escape route is easier, compared to other countries and also because Egypt's resettlement numbers are said to be much higher than in most of the other African and Middle Eastern countries. Somalis are, according to UNHCR, after the Sudanese the second largest refugee population in Egypt. There are no accurate numbers of Somalis[2] in Egypt, but the estimates range from 4,000 to more than 10,000. Only 2,610 (UNHCR, 31.12.2000) are recognized as refugees and receive assistance and a chance for resettlement. Others wait for an appointment at UNHCR, were rejected and appealing, or were rejected and their file closed. This means no hope for recognition. Gilad (1990: 110) states,

> Countries of first asylum often permit a variety of living arrangements for refugees. In some other countries, there are special sanctuary plans and living arrangements, while in others there are none, and refugees are left to make do however they can, even illegally.

Egypt belongs to the second group. As there is almost no assistance from either the government, nor from aid organizations, the Somali refugees are forced to help themselves in order to survive. Although the Egyptian government signed not only the 1951 Geneva Convention, but

also the 1969 OAU Convention, the refugees are not given the rights to which they are entitled. Even the recognized refugees cannot obtain a work permit or cannot apply for permanent residence or citizenship.

Profile of Somali Refugees in Cairo

Since the start of the civil war, Somali refugees have been coming to Egypt. In the beginning, a high percentage received refugee status and many were resettled or sponsored by family members to go to the US, Canada, or Australia. Few of these people stayed in Cairo. In the last years there was a great influx of Somalis, coming directly from from Somalia as well as other counries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, or Kenya. Among the so-called newcomers were a lot of single-mother households with several children. Their husbands were, according to them, killed in the civil war or disappeared at a certain stage. The Somalis who came first had a higher educational background and were attending the *dugsi* and also high school. Some of them were even enrolled at university. (Al-Sharmani, 1998: 24) Others have only attended the *dugsi* and maybe some were going to one of the schools during the UNOSOM intervention. Most of the newcomers only speak Somali which renders their situation more difficult.

Krulfeld and Camino (1994: XII) claim that in additino to statuses and behaviors, gender models often undergo changes within the context of refugee existence. This can be seen within the Somali community in Cairo as well. Many women have to cope with a new life. They do not only have to fulfil their 'duties' in the household and to try to get money for survival, but also have representative tasks. Sometimes, although the husband is present, they have to do everything that a single mother does, as many of the men don't want to go to the agencies to get their monthly allowance, nor do they help within the household. In some Western countries Somali women don't accept the fact that the men neither fulfil their expected role as breadwinners for the family nor take over new tasks at home. These marriages often ended in divorce. (Kroner, 2000: 119) I did not hear about such cases in Egypt. But Asha,[3] for example, complains that life is harder since her husband arrived. "No, there are more problems after he came because the man is ill and he cannot work. I cannot move like before now. I have to stay more at home. ... No, he is not working in the household, my daughter is doing this."

In contrast to the Sudanese refugee community, (Fabos 1999) the Somalis are not well organized. They are scattered all over Cairo,

choosing areas to live because relatives already have apartments there. Many of them share one apartment with several other Somali refugees. It happens quite often that a family of ten lives in one room of a flat.

Networking Among the Somalis

The networking starts even before the flight. Without the help of others most of the Somali refugees would not be able to leave the country. Many of the newcomers come via Nairobi, like Hana.

> On the way I met my father's friend, then he asked me more about our lives and how it was and I explained what has happened. Then I told him how my father and my brother were killed, how I missed my mother and the rest of the family.

This friend took Hana to his home. When it was obvious that she could not get along with his wife he prepared arrangements including passport, ticket, and a visa for Egypt.

> So I got the visa, then they brought me to an airport out of Mogadishu, it was Balidogle... First I went to Nairobi... I was for some hours in transit in Nairobi, I was the only one, all the others were going to Nairobi. Then I arrived in Egypt

At the airport Hana met a Somali woman. This woman took Hana to her home. As Hana was recognized she received money from CARITAS. The woman let her stay for free until she was resettled for Australia. Before she left she asked another family if Hana could stay with them.

Another woman, Muna, who was injured was helped by a doctor to leave the country. He not only prepared a passport and ticket, but also gave her contacts for a relative in Cairo. Muna phoned this person in Cairo and she met Muna at the airport and let her stay in her apartment.

> I stayed with Lul and her husband and kids until they left for Australia in July 2000. ... Before Lul's family left, they told me about a place where a group of Somali men were staying. I could stay there for free if I would cook for them.

This networking before, during, and after the flight seems to work, but sometimes it is not enough. For example, Muna receives money from

her sister in Australia who sends US$50 every second month. But in special situations, mainly when somebody gets sick, especially a person from a non-recognized single mother household, the money is not sufficient. Only recognized refugees get medical assistance from the authorities in Egypt. Newcomers, who are less than six months in the country, can ask for assistance at a church clinic, which doesn't mean that medical care is assured (Budiani 2001). In these emergency cases, another network mechanism is used to help people, the so-called *Qaraan.*

Qaraan

Qaraan is a community donation. Al-Sharmani (1998: 33) claims,

> Giving *qaraan* to other community members is primarily seen as a cultural rather than a religious duty. It is distinguished from the religious duty of giving out alms, *zakaat.* In other words, it is seen as an integral part of what makes one a Somali. When asked subjects about their reason for giving or collecting *qaraan* a recurring answer was, 'it is our tradition. I have to save face. They are my people and I have to do my duty of helping them. I count on them and they count on me.'

Often the money is spent on single mothers. Some, like Nura, are really dependent on it. When UNHCR rejected her appeals, she went several times with other Somali women to the UNHCR building to complain about that decision. One day when she went there the security people came from inside and said, "If you don't leave now, we will call the police." A short time afterwards the police came and arrested her and three other Somali women, together with their children. First they were brought to a police station. Nura remembers, "they took us to the Doqqi police station. We stayed there one day and one night. If we stayed there another day, we would have died. There was no window, no toilet, no light, it was hell."

Nura, who came with all six children to UNHCR was imprisoned with four of her children, among them her handicapped son. Two of her children (10 and 2 ½ years of age) were able to escape from the police and after some time other Somali families took care of them. After her transfer from the police station to a prison, Nura had to stay four months. When she was released there was no money and she could not pay for food or rent. Nura says. " The people were making *qaraan* for me, if they

would not have done so, my children and I could not have survived."

But it seems that the *qaraan* is mainly made by Somalis who have been in Egypt for some years. They discuss at social events who is in need and who deserves money. Many of the newcomers were not aware that the *qaraan* system also exists in Cairo.

We and the Others: Identity Constructions

Krulfeld and Camino (1994: XII) claim that group boundaries and therefore identity constructions are more fluid than static and that group boundaries are more "permeable than rigid." Baumann (1996: 11) further states that, "community was a concept to be used and redefined contextually." Such identity construction that is bound to situations can be seen among the Somalis in Cairo:

Somalis and Egyptians: Religion connects Somalis to the majority of their host country's people. In certain situations, especially during *Ramadan*, there was a shared group identity of Egyptians and Somalis regarding being Muslims and fasting. The Somalis were invited by the Egyptians to have *iftar*[4] together. But beside the religion there are few interactions between the host country's society and the Somali refugees. The Somalis' hosts perceive them as Africans, a view that they themselves reject (Berns McGown, Geshekter, 1997). On the other side, the Egyptians refuse to see the Arabic identity in the Somalis. Many Egyptian say, "They don't belong to the Arab community." The Somalis also seem not to like the Egyptians very much. Some of them think that the Egyptians are too westernized and not real Muslims any more. Quite often I was advised not to trust any Egyptian, "because they are lying all the time." (Ali) Fatuma does not feel respected at all by Egyptian employers.

> Sometimes I go to Egyptian houses, I am cleaning and serving in houses. They give me 20 pounds. This is not my work, but I have to do it to eat. They are treating us like animals, when you are working as a servant in Egyptian houses. They treat us like *Habashi*.

The different conception of the 'other' as well as the economic misery in Egypt prevents the societies from becoming closer and also from having more interactions.

Somalis Amongst Themselves: In many countries where there are large Somali communities, clan disputes arise. In Egypt most of the Somalis claim that clan disputes do not exist, but the clan structure is only used for helping each other. Zahra said, "No, there are no clan problems here. This happened only in Somalia where there were fights. Here the clans are just used as links to help each other." Despite these contradictory claims, there is mistrust towards other Somalis in certain situations, which can be shown in the next quotation. This is what a Somali told me during a meeting. We had this meeting to establish a stronger linked Somali community and wanted to find some people who would act as representatives for the community at UNHCR.

> This meeting is not good. I think they didn't want me to come. You know that almost all of them are cousins.[5] They all want to be leaders, they don't want anybody else. ... And I don't want to talk because there are spies everywhere. They are listening to what the people are saying and then they report it to UNHCR. Even in this rooms there are some spies.

New Identity - I am "qoxoti": Being *qoxoti* is a new identity construction. When I asked about their identity, it showed that many Somalis mentioned beside being Muslim and Somali, being a *qoxoti*. One of the women defined the term as, "a person who has no home, no government, he doesn't even know where to sleep and he has no work." I claim that this term and the connotations are deriving from the circumstances in which the refugees live. If there are enough possibilities to establish a new life, the people would hardly consider themselves as refugees at first. But because of the conditions, a Burundi refugee said:

> They begin to educate us as refugees" (Malkki 1995: 222) and a person working for UNHCR in Kenya stated: "Refugees are part of a culture that has learned to be dependent and we taught them that. (Hyndman, 1997: 19)

These two people are talking about the situation in refugee camps, but the situation in Egypt is similar. They have the right to move, but are often afraid that they can be imprisoned like the Somali women mentioned earlier. There is no possibility of legal work and the education system is not sufficient.

Conclusion

The situation of the Somali refugees in Egypt shows how their lives and identity are shaped by internal and external factors. The examples cited support the views of Malkki and Krulfeld, that refugees are not passive *per se* but that circumstances like the asylum policy condemn them into passivity. The situation in Egypt produces refugee behavior ("I am *qoxoti*!") and prevents "autonomy and freedom of action" (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 91). That Somalis do not perceive Egyptians the same way they look at themselves produces a co-existence rather than living with each other. At the same time it strengthens the identity construction of 'being Somali.' This paper shows that in several situations, identity can be situational. Somali coping strategies in Egypt dramatically illustrate the assumption of such identities.

Endnotes

[1] The situation in Ethiopia is quite similar to the one in Kenya, where the Somalis are refugee *prima facie*. This means that they have an ID card issued by the UNHCR. This card allows them only to stay in the refugee camps. Almost all Somalis, who came to Kenya, cannot live legally outside the refugee camps and cannot get work permits. Markos (1997: 376) says, "For Somali refugees in Ethiopia, refugee status follows registration and restriction to camps follows registration which means the status of refugees results in confinement to camps."

[2] The vast majority of the Somalis are refugees. Most live in Cairo in areas of Medinet Nassr, Masr Gedida, Doqqi, and outskirts of Mohandessin.

[3] Names are changed in order to keep anonymity.

[4] Iftar is the breaking of the fast after the sunset during *Ramadan*.

[5] 'Cousin' is here used as a synonym for members of the same sub-clan.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Diaspora and Everyday Islam: Somali Women in Finland

Marja Tiilikainen

How do Somali diaspora women create their identities, especially female ways of being Muslim. What kinds of meanings do they give to their religion in a new environment? The paper argues that the complex historical, local, and global context in which Somali diaspora women reside challenges their identities. The data are based on ethnographic research carried out among Somali women in and around Helsinki.

> After I had just arrived in Finland, I lived in my friend's place. There I wondered where an earth I was. I did not understand anything and nobody talked to me anything. Later I understood that everything was all right anyway. I don't worry any more if people don't talk to me. Anyhow, it is peaceful in Finland. In the beginning I bought pork meat, because I believed that in Finland you did not eat pork meat either. It was Christmas Eve. I went for a walk. It was so silent, no people around - only many Father Christmases. *(Diaspora Women)*

These were some of the first impressions of Somali women after they had entered Finland as asylum seekers in the beginning of the 1990s. Most of them had never in their life planned to settle down in this cold, remote country situated in the Northern hemisphere. Things just went so. The first Somalis entering Finland were mostly young men, but the number of women grew, especially through the family reunification program. At the moment women number almost half of the Somali population in Finland, the total number of Somalis being around 6,000.

Since those first weeks, months, and years in Finland many things have changed. Two Somali women, both of them mothers, have just been elected as representatives to the city councils of two main cities, Helsinki and Turku. A Somali woman is regularly broadcasting in the Somali language at a local radio station in the metropolitan area. Another woman has published a book in Somali on the rights of a Muslim woman. (Mohamed Kassin, 1999) An anthology of Somali women's poetry, *Sagaal Dayrood* (Tiilikainen, *et al* 2001), has just been published. These are examples that show how powerfully Somali diaspora women have achieved in many fields, taken space for themselves in a new way, and have raised their voices. This is a great resource, but also poses a great challenge for reconstruction. Somali women returning back "home"are not the same women who left the country ten years earlier.

Many Somali women in Finland have become fluent in Finnish. They have acquired skills for postions such as nurse or assistant nurse. Many others have obtained jobs. Besides all this, they have continued to be mothers of often large families, keep the house, and bring up small children. At the same time, there are some who have not managed to learn Finnish in ten years, women for whom the time in Finland limited before returning to Somalia or Somaliland. Although many women share similar experiences of war or being refugees, there is also much variety among them and their everyday choices. This is also true within Islam.

In this paper, I shed light on the ways Somali women in the diaspora create their identities and specifically female ways of being Muslims. I regard Somali women as actors in their own social worlds, although they traditionally have not had access to economical or political power comparable with men. I show how Somali women make Muslim space in their everyday life, and what kinds of meanings the religion is given in their new environment. Hence, my interest is in Somali women's own religious interpretations and everyday practices instead of what we could call normative Islam. (see Waardenburg 1978) My data are based on

ethnographic field work, which I started in 1996 among Somali women living around metropolitan Helsinki, Finland, and which was carried on, in one way or another, until 2001.

Pain

In the earlier mentioned book *Sagaal Dayrood* (Tiilikainen *et al* 2001, 204), Hibo Garaad Ibraahin describes, in a *buraanbur* named *Cataw (Complaint)*, the pain the war and the death of her son:

> *Jabkii nagu dhacay haddaan jeebka kuugu rido / Wixii na qabsaday haddaan buugga kuugu qoro / Bariidana iigu imaanmaysid Baariyey Anoo daar waxaan dhisiyo duunyadii ka imi / Anoo duur cidla ah fadhiya oon dabkiina shidan / Dabayluhu ila tegeynoo dalkii ka tegey / Ayaan kaan daawanaayayna layga dilay / Yarkii aan daawanaayayna layga dilay*
>
> The catastrophe that befell us, if I put it in the pocket for you / What came our way, if I could put it into words in a book / Would you then come to me, even for a visit, my Baari? I who left behind the house I built and my herds / I who camp in an empty land, unable even to kindle my fire / A wind carried me away, my country I had to leave / And the one I admired was taken from me and killed / My son whom I admired was taken from me and killed

The few lines are moving, but as one of the collectors of the material, I know that they are only the beginning of a longer poem. The audience, the other women contributors of the book, interrupted her because it was too painful for them to listen to her story, too painful to remember.

In his latest book, *Yesterday, Tomorrow, Voices from the Somali Diaspora*, Nuruddin Farah (2000, 120) asks a Somali man living in Britain to define a refugee. The man answers:

> I recall one of my daughters asking her mother, my wife, what her first delivery was like. She replied that, being a stillborn birth, it was the worst pain she had ever experienced in her life, a pain so acute, she explained, that it pierced her body, entered the perimeters of her mind, numbing it. And when the pain was

> gone, what did it feel like our daughter wanted to know. The pain dissolved like burning gas vanishing in the air around it. If she woke up with the pain returning and lodging itself in her eternal memory, it was because she felt the loss of the stillborn, buried without her getting to know him. A pain for nothing, the pain we suffered. And the man continues: Because we set Somalia aflame, in pursuit of a personal gain, all of us have lost something. This collective loss, the nation's, is indescribable.

Somali diaspora refugees carry this pain with them, pain of losing one's nation, one's country, one's habituated position, and one's family. In addition, life in host countries has not always lived up to expectations. They experience marginalization, unfriendliness, racism, unemployment, and loneliness that become the core of what could be called the 'second assault.' (Williams and Holmes, 1981 in Winkler with Wininger, 1994, 254) In Finland, for instance, these negative responses are explicit in comments such as "Why did you escape from Somalia? In Finland, when we were in war, all the young men were in the front line." Or, "Why don't you work? You are living on the taxes I have paid." Or, "Why do these women have to dress up like that (referring to large veils) and don't they understand that they should not give birth to so many children?" In spite of the fact that Somali refugees have been awarded asylum, they don't live in a safe context. Negative responses and non-understanding from the Finnish authorities and ordinary people alike cause accumulated suffering, another trauma. In addition, the estrangement experienced by Somalis confronting Nordic culture, non-Muslim majority religion, and different child-rearing habits have been of great concern.

The Scene - Diaspora

A Somali woman in Finland says: "I always long for my homeland. Always I think, that if there is peace in Somalia, I will return immediately! Because it is always good to stay in one's own country."

According to Safran's (1991) classical definition, life in diaspora is characterized by a relation to an original homeland, which is regarded as a true, ideal home. Connections to Somalia, as well as transnational connections between relatives and friends in different diaspora countries, are maintained by means of modern technology – telephones, faxes, internet, and satellite antennas. Somali women and men visit their families in Somalia or elsewhere in the Horn. They may also send their

children to Somalia on holidays, or even to be raised there by the relatives if the conflicts between parents and children in Finland turn serious. In addition, traditional healers in Somalia have been consulted. Every now and then visitors from Somalia enter Finland and, for instance, give speeches to Somali audiences in seminars on Islam. Once, while I attended a women's *ciid* celebration in a mosque, a Somali sheikh gave a 15-minute speech over the telephone, all the way from Nairobi.

At the same time as immigrants live in a global world, their everyday life is linked to local social structures and experiences in their adopted host countries and neighborhoods. James Clifford (1997, 256-260) has underscored how diaspora consciousness is constituted not only negatively, but also positively. Experiences of losses and marginality coexist with survival skills, hope, renewal, and cosmopolitanism. As he states, diaspora experiences are also gendered experiences. In their everyday life in the diaspora, women mediate discrepant worlds in ambiguous pasts and futures. By doing this, they connect and disconnect, forget and remember, in complex ways. At the same time as a 'home' culture or tradition can be used selectively to empower women, their own community can also be a source of oppression.

In spite of suffering and many losses, Somali women's diaspora experiences can also have positive dimensions. For instance, women find opportunities to study important. The knowledge, whether occupational or religious, empowers women. In addition, many Somali women have been satisfied with the greater involvement of their husbands in household chores, such as taking care of children or attending at child-birth. Somali women's experiences in the diaspora are different from men's, and furthermore, their relation to religious matters is different. An example of these differences is the gendered Muslim space, and the way Somali women create and negotiate it in Finland.

Women's Everyday Muslim Space

In Somalia, the society and the Islamic community are one and the same. During sacred times such as prayer, *Ramadan*, and religious feasts, the society changes into a religious community. Among migrants, entering a religious community means withdrawal from the larger community. Religious relations are not automatically identical with economic, political and social relations. For many migrants, the religious community becomes a place of respect and esteem in contrast to the

larger community, where experiences of discrimination and humiliation are common. (Schiffauer, 1988)

During and after the civil war, religion has remained a unifying factor among Somalis in Finland, even though religious interpretations are diverse. Contrary to clans, religion can be discussed. It gives Somali women solace and hope – hope for peace, unity, and reconciliation. Religion symbolizes the good and moral things that are still left in this world. Further, Islam gives explanations to suffering and advice about how to alleviate it. Religion may form the basis on which to start rebuilding one's life. Some women have shown how their Muslim identity is even more important than their identity as a Somali. Through Islam it is possible to establish a global home outside Somalia, which has turned into a place of disorder and loss of dignity. Religious knowledge is also a source of authority within the Somali community – for women, too. There are Somali women who teach other women religion in neighborhoods or women's homes. Women, who know Islam well, lead the prayers in wedding parties appointed for women, and they may be turned to in case of a serious illness. In addition, they have been active in dialogues and discussions between Christian and Muslim women.

In Finland, Somali women create Muslim space with religious practices and decorations. For many women, the principal religious space is home. *Qur'aan* calligraphy, pictures from Mecca, and prayer timetables decorate the walls. Space inside the home is divided according to gender and age, the kitchen being the heart of the female space. Prayer times give order to the day and a sense of control over what one is doing rather than feel overwhelmed by new routines in changing social situations. (Jackson, 1998, 74) However, prayer is not restricted to the home environment. Especially in the evenings of *Ramadan*, many women visit mosques. Moreover, prayer can be performed in the corner of a shopping center or in a hair-dresser's salon.

Mothers send their children to *Qur'aanic* schools in mosques or special locations in the neighborhoods at weekends. They have also been active in finding localities where their children can spend time after school. They have arranged tutoring and leisure time activities, such as physical training for their daughters and sons, in separate groups. Somali mothers, together with other Muslim women in Finland, have been active in getting swimming opportunities and guidance for themselves and their daughters. This year they managed to get a separate swimming hour just for Muslim women and girls in a public swimming hall in Helsinki.

Making food is the responsibility of women. Some women interpret Islamic dietary regulations in the strictest sense: They use only ritually slaughtered *halal* meat and buy all the meat from the mosque. When they buy other foodstuffs from ordinary shops, they always check that no additional substances that might be prepared from pork have been added. Sometimes there have been problems even with vaccinations, which may contain gelatin made of pork. At the other end of the spectrum are those women who just refuse to eat pork and blood. Otherwise they buy food and all other meat from ordinary shops without checking any substances. Between these two styles we have many other combinations and alternatives, too.

Ramadan and pilgrimage time are important sacred times, which unite the whole community. Even those women who otherwise don't practice religion usually fast during the *Ramadan*. The sense of a religious community is further strengthened by television, through which it is possible to follow the celebrations in Arabian countries. Through television one can also hear the sounds and recitation of the *Qur'aan*. The loss of Islamic sounds is a particular absence in the non-Muslim environment (Metcalf, 1996, 8) such as Finland. In addition to satellite antennas and televisions, women listen to *Qur'aanic* recitation cassettes at home, and also outside. One of my friends used headphones while walking on the street.

In the underground it is possible to find a woman reading the *Qur'aan* or concentrating on her rosary. Veiling is one of the most visible markers of the Islamic space. Veiling is a multifaceted feature. The veil materializes as a public statement of personal commitment. Muslim women use it as a pragmatic strategy to increae their social mobility outside the home. For instance, the veil enables women to work outside the home and has become a symbol for the political strategy of Islamist movements (Ask and Tjomsland, 1998, 10-13).

Many Somali women began to veil themselves only after coming to Finland. The style differ from black *shuko* and *niqab* to *jilbaab* and more traditional scarves. Some women don't cover their heads at all. A young Somali woman described how Somali men in her class in high school frequently had advised her to cover her head. She told:

> They said, you have to put *hijab* when you want to study and there are men and this is our culture and our religion. A man asked me, do you have religion? Yes, yes, I told him. Then he

> said, why don't you put *hijab*? ... But then I told them after one month or two ... hey listen, this is none of your business and if I want to put *hijab*, I will put it. Not for you, just for my God. If you don't want to see me then, you should control your eyes. Actually, Islam says ... that is something you do by yourself, you have to control yourself, you have to control your eyes.

Another young woman who usually uses a large *jilbaab*, was very upset at her wedding eve. Some curls and part of her neck could be seen under her scarf and hat. Later she demanded that all the photographs and films of herself should be restricted to women-only viewing. She did not want men to see her dressed up like that.

Some Somali women connect veiling to their accelerated religious knowledge, others explain it with the necessity to preserve their own culture and identity. In addition, the veil gives women private space, protects them physically and mentally, and legitimates their social participation. To use a veil may also be a strategy to accommodate to collective expectations of other Somalis, a way to become accepted. For using the veil in Finland, Somali women give also many practical reasons, such as warmth and ease in the cold winter. Thus, situation, season, and fashion also influence a chosen style.

Contested Identities

Somali women's identities as Muslims are different. There are several ways of being and experiencing what it means to be Muslim (see Dassetto and Nonneman, 1996). According to Pierre Bourdieu, our habitus is our embodied history, the product of our past. The body enacts the past, inherited knowledge survives in the incorporated state (Bourdieu, 1990, 54-56, 73). In Somalia, women knew how to be in the world as Muslims. The history of Islam in Somalia, the knowledge of past generations, has been embodied through the cultural memory. Today, in rapidly changing social conditions in the diaspora and in the Horn of Africa, the previous certainties are being contested.

Islam in Somalia has traditionally been dominated by religious scholars affiliated with Sufi brotherhoods. In Northeast Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s a wider international movement for the revitalization of Islam influenced also the lifestyles of local Muslims. Side by side, socio-religious movements have emerged that direct their attention to development projects and charity. Some new political

Islamist movements, according to Lidwien Kapteijns, have turned their backs on the mystical tradition of Islam, have emerged. (Kapteijns, 2000, 242-245.) During the war, Islamic groups have gained further support. (Hussein, 1997, 187) It is evident, that these changes in Africa influence also the lives of Somali women in the diaspora. At the same time, we also have to take into consideration that Somalis in Finland are very young, for the most part under 35-years of age, and they represent the first generation of Somali immigrants. This has certain implications when we discuss traditions, continuities, and changes.

It is well known that Somali oral tradition is enormously rich in poetry, stories, proverbs, and songs. Women have sung lullabies, work songs, songs for independence, religious songs, and songs for spirits. Older Somali women in Finland, who have grown up and lived midst this rich tradition, still remember these traditional songs, also religious hymns called *sitaad*. A woman, for instance, told that she had just received a cassette from Somalia containing religious music. Younger Somali women do not necessarily know or appreciate the religious heritage of their parents. A 25-year-old Somali woman told that her grandmother in Somalia used to sing *nebi- ammaan* (religious hymns), but now she has received a cassette from her grandmother, where she told that she did not sing these songs any more. The young woman explained that according to Islam it was not good to praise sheikhs, since there should be no one between God and a human being.

Among Somalis in Finland, music and singing are often rejected as being against Islam. Some Somali families have, for instance, applied for exemption from music lessons at school. When Maryam Mursal gave a concert in Finland, it was a great happening for many Somali women who went to listen to her. Some of them told, however, that on their way to the concert there were a few religious Somali men who advised them not to go. And there were many women who did not want to go at all because of religious reasons. When we were editing the book *Sagaal Dayrood*, we did not give it the subtitle 'songs and stories of Somali women,' but 'prose and poetry of Somali women.' We decided to do so in order to avoid overt criticism. According to some religious interpretations, only traditional songs in private spaces are acceptable. For instance, *buraanbur* poems that women sing and dance at weddings, can be accepted as a cultural matter. As a religious Somali woman explained, "it is not singing, it is *buraanbur*!"

Women have now started to define their tradition anew along cultural and religious lines. In a curious way, to define something as 'cultural,' can be a reason to include or exclude some parts of the tradition. At the same time as *buraanbur* at weddings can be allowed because it is 'our culture,' other things, such as infibulation or spirit possession, can be rejected because they are seen as cultural matters which have nothing to do with Islam. From the point of view of Islamist interpretations, Sufi traditions or other local manifestations of African Islam are wrong knowledge that have to be purified with real Islam.

Due to the complex historical, local, and global context in which diaspora Somali women reside, they search for new and valid ways of being Muslims. Some of them appear to remain quite indifferent with regard to religious matters and, for some, religion appears to be mostly a cultural and social matter. In addition, there are women who emphasize the purity of Islam independent from it's cultural aspects. For these women, the Islamization of the self (Metcalf, 1996, 9) appears to be not a return to the tradition, but a vehicle to enter modernity. An accelerated knowledge of Islam, on the one hand, empowers these women as they try to find a place for themselves both within the Finnish and the Islamic community. For them, an Islamic identity is in accordance with education, equality between men and women, and social participation.

On the other hand, the women's habitus with cultural and religious memory may resist the change: The bodies still remember how to dance and sing, they remember the smells of the special perfumes, and the bodies still remember how to get possessed. This resistance is condensed in the image of a Somali woman, who is leaving a women's gathering before the others start dancing *buraanbur*, putting on her *niqab*, saying: "I am not interested in *buraanbur*, I am just interested in reading the *Qur'aan.*" After a while I hear women's voices and hands clapping. I see the same woman, behind other women, dancing and waving her heavy veil. Her eyes are glittering with joy. This single image reveals to me how important the past is to our understanding of today.

SECTION FIVE



Education and Islam

Introduction to Section Five

The section on Islam and Education touches two basic elements forming the character, culture, and values of Somali society. Several speak of the neglect of all schools – government, religious, and secular – in the Northwest under the Siyad regime. One author notes that even established independent schools in the north were disestablished in the 1970s because the Italian colonial regime had built nothing comparable in the South. The ministries are now hard at work correcting this flaw.

Training teachers and building professional capacities becomes a second tier focus, once the task of establishing a core network of elementary and secondary schools is in place. The section also touches on the recent founding of two new universities in the north, a precedent that is certainly of interest as the southern regions devise how they will rehabilitate their higher education institutions.

The two contributions on Islam assess how deeply immersed virtually all of Somalia has become in the faith that includes one fifth of the world's population. Islam is one of the few integrating factors (in addition to language, as noted in Section One) that offers promise to create a foundation upon which Somalis can rebuild their fractured society. Islam is examined as provider of peace, as adjudicator of disputes, as mobilizer of rural communities, and as a means to rehabilitate victims and former combatants in the civil war. A second offering on Islam examines the compatibility of Islamic principles and laws with those of democracy. The author concludes that they are mutually reinforcing as well as fundamental to the long-term rehabilitation of Somali culture and governance. Education and Islam are an important part of Somalia/Somaliland reconciliation and reconstruction. Their potentials are worthy of deep exploration and analysis.

CHAPTER TWENTY

Education in Somaliland

Ahmed Yusuf Duale

Introduction

Prior to the arrival of the British, after which the territory became known as British Somaliland Protectorate, education in Somaliland was the sole responsibility of the *Qur'aanic* teachers and Islamic scholars. While teachers moved with the nomads in their seasonal search for water and green pastures, the Islamic scholars carried out their duties in the mosques. The famous centers of Islamic learning were Zeila, Mogadishu, and Barawe (Brava), and at later stage Quluuquul, Hargeisa, and Jigjiga. Borders meant nothing to the devoted students who traveled from one center of learning to another. Who looked after students traveling from their homes to places where education was available? The Sheikh who taught the students would take students who were strangers in that center to a well-to-do family to feed and clothe a certain number of students who slept in mosques.

Somaliland or the Somali peninsula was no different from the rest of the Muslim world in this form of education. With the arrival of the colonial powers in the area, a new system of education was introduced. This new system led to serious cultural clashes, some of which turned

violent. Somaliland was no exception. After much negotiation between the British and Somali elders, the new system of education was introduced and the first class included, among others, Mr. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the current president of Somaliland and Dr. Ali Sheikh Ibrahim, who at present is the Vice Chancellor of the University of Hargeisa. A qualitative and effective system of education, which dug its roots deep in Somaliland, was established. It continued to grow gradually with the first secondary school opening in the late fifties. Before this school was opened the top students, who did not exceed four at a time, were sent to Sudan to continue their secondary education and later to the United Kingdom to pursue their post-secondary education.

After independence and union with the former Italian Somalia in 1960, this system of education was disrupted to an extent, and with the armed forces taking over power in 1969, the entire educational system of what used to be Somaliland collapsed. Mr. Abdirazak Abubakar, the first Minister of Education of the military government of Siyad Barre, will be remembered for closing down fifteen boarding schools in Somaliland for no reason other than the fact that similar schools did not exist in the south of the country (former Italian Somalia). This act was one of the first anti-Somaliland steps taken by Siyad Barre`s regime. Many more acts of oppression followed in all fields of life. An armed uprising by a sector of Somalilanders was the result of such unfair and inhuman atrocities. An entire decade followed when education and all other social services in Somaliland came to an end.

It was in early 1991 when the first attempts to open schools were made, after Somaliland had declared its independence as a state that no longer had ties with the rest of the former Somalia. Classes began in roofless classrooms or under the shade of trees. Children sat either on the ground or on empty milk cans that became stools when turned upside down. Learning material was scarce. After almost ten years I feel happy to head the Ministry of Education which now runs over 230 primary and secondary schools that host almost seventy thousand students, 18 family learning education centers with 1,573 students, a teachers training college in Hargeisa, and a national teaching force of about 2,000 teachers.

The Ministry's success in laying a firm foundation for basic education in Somaliland should not divert us from our commitment to the introduction of much-needed technical education as an important component of our educational goals in Somaliland. Adult education for generations who missed their educational chances during the years of struggle is another concern of the Ministry of Education. We are leaving

no stone unturned to find ways and means for the reintroduction of technical education in the country. The three eastern regions of the country should at least have one technical institute in Burao, while the three western regions of the country should have one in Hargeisa. Partial rehabilitation of the former Xalane Technical Institute has been completed while the Hargeisa former trade school is in progress, and the Ministry is engaged in finding funds for the physical rehabilitation of the former Burao Technical Institute. A student population of over 100,000 in Somaliland, including students in privately owned schools, is something to be proud of.

Since the job market in the private sector is growing almost by the day, the Ministry is duty bound to respond to this need in preparing a qualified labor force to fill vacancies in different trades. SOOYAAL and HAVOYOCO are both succeeding in creating a newly trained work force in different fields that fill vacancies in the job market. These private institutions show that they are fulfilling their mission.

The birth of two universities, Amoud and the University of Hargeisa, is the result of private efforts. They make a new addition to the list of our educational institutions. Both are trying to stand on their feet and are accepting graduates from our secondary schools. It is worth mentioning that a training school for 32 nurses was recently opened at the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital, the first training center for nurses in the last two decades. Edna's devotion to the art of nursing puts her second only to Florence Nightingale. Her hospital is a symbol of what an individual can do for her/his people and country. May Allah bless her and her wonderful efforts.

With every region enjoying a good number of primary schools, both lower and upper, as well as at least one secondary school, with higher education growing in the form of nurses and teacher training and two universities, and with plans for every region to have its share of technical or vocational training centers, we feel we have made a good beginning. Our two private universities, I hope, will become the pillars of higher education in Somaliland with our teacher training college establishing itself as one of the most prominent centers for teacher training in the Horn. I hope to live long enough to see the day when every Somalilander will be able to take advantage of her/his chance to attend school.

CHAPTER TWENTY ONE

Investing in Teachers and other Professional Educators: the Somaliland Case

Jama Musse Jama

Introduction

Considering alternatives to the recruitment procedures that embody assumptions about teacher educational backgrounds seems to be more compatible with the complex demands of (re)form of teaching in Somaliland. This paper advocates for a governmental education code that establishes, among other things, a balanced minimum state teacher salary schedule for public education professionals, and that guarantees on-site seminars and workshops for teachers. Such a code could attract professional, young, female teachers and create opportunity to assist veteran teachers who may need support in developing their content matter knowledge and their teaching experience.

The second part of the paper introduces ideas that seem specifically congruent with the above mentioned (re)form requirements. It proposes the formation of national leading organization (*i.e.* National Association

of professional educators) that aims to empower educators by providing the best possible know-how for the success of all learners. The NAPE will also promote the education and teacher training in Somaliland, and it will deal with the governmental authorities to safeguard the rights of the teachers and other professional educators.

Background

Education is emerging as the most efficient way through which a society can prepare for progress and well-being. Its need becomes more apparent when a society has to recover from a post-war situation. Conscious of the crucial role that education plays in the development processes, the Somaliland Forum is intensifying its efforts in this field. It is within this perspective that many of the Forum's recent discussions are specifically devoted to education.

Most developing countries are experiencing extreme economic difficulties resulting from inadequate or insufficient human resources in the most vital sectors of the social life. The formation of capable directing class is the base of the development for any society. Somaliland is not an exception.

The role of the good investment in teachers in the society is acknowledged by the simple fact that "if you do not have good trainers, you cannot train." The development of teachers who can guide successful creative talents is to be considered from both in-service and teacher training programs viewpoint. In the most developed countries, educating the educators is a continuing challenge that costs much money and effort. In Somaliland it is a must.

The most effective teachers are those who have good knowledge of the subject they are going to teach with wide repertoire of teaching skills and who have adequate income from their profession. The best way to ensure that teachers have good subject knowledge is to recruit educated teachers whose knowledge has been demonstrated through assessed performance. The most effective way to help teachers acquire teaching skills is to provide continuous in-service programs and to ensure that new teachers meet high professional teaching standards.

It is probably too early for Somaliland educational policy makers to apply these rules, provide adequate salary and in-service programs to all teachers, and then expect immediate results. However, trying to be practical and realistic, the first part of this presentation raises concrete

issues with which the decision-makers should deal. It first attempts to help the audience to identify the target group of this topic, "Educators in Somaliland." It then looks at the current difficulties related to the teaching profession in a philosophical, historical, political, and socio-economic and development perspective.

Educators in Somaliland: Who and How Many They Are?

The term "Professional Educator" refers equally to public, private, and *Qur'aanic* school teachers. The 1997/98 school year registered a total of 1,368 professional educators in the public and private schools (1070 in the elementary school, 37 in the secondary, 255 in the private schools, and six in the university. (Republic of Somaliland, 1999) According to a study conducted by UNDP in 1997 on Somaliland and several regions of Somalia, unfortunately, Somaliland registered the greatest gender imbalance in access of education and teaching profession. The lowest proportion of female teachers in the Horn of Africa: 15%. (UNDP, 1998) This proportion is worse if we consider the data available from the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports (MOEYS), that the average number of female teachers in the elementary schools in 1997/8 was only 10%. Awdal region (3.6%) is the worst case.

The majority of in-service teachers in Somaliland have no qualification to teach: 53% of the elementary teachers are untrained. The worst case is Togdheer region (62.9%), followed by Awdal (58.8%), Sahil (56.4%), Sanaag (56.1%), Northwest (50.7%) and Sool (41.7%). The ratio of students per teacher is approximately 31:1 for the elementary schools and 25:1 for secondary schools at national level (data for the 1997/8 schools year). For the elementary schools, this ratio ranges from the worst case in Northwest region (50:1) to Sool region (23:1).

The teacher growth rate is not following the same expansion as the student growth rate. Between 1994-1998, the number of students in the elementary schools, for example, grew from 13,243 to 33,004, while the number of teachers increased only from 911 to 1,070 (*i.e.* the number of students per teacher in 1993/4 was 14 and in 1998 it reached 31 students per teacher in the elementary schools).

Because of the lack of statistical data, it is difficult to quantify, with certainty, the number of *Qur'aanic* schoolteachers in Somaliland. In 1987, a UNICEF survey indicated that in Somaliland there was a *Qur'aanic* school within half a kilometer among the settled population.

(SDR-UNICEF, 1987) Most of these schools were single-teacher institutions with little or no or minimum teaching certification. Almost all of the teachers are men with little or no secular school background. Therefore, considering that 55% of the population lives a nomadic or semi-nomadic life, and that *Qur'aanic* teachers are omnipresent in these nomadic areas, and considering the high number of *Malcaamads* and *Madarasads* in the settled population, one can imagine the high number of the *Qur'aanic* teachers.

The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport (MOEYS) estimates need for 1,200 new primary and secondary teachers between 1999-2003. A draft document of the proposed National Educational Program reported "A 'crash,' emergency program will be necessary to educate 1,200 new teachers, requiring the determined commitment and resources of the Central Government and the development agencies." (RSL, 1999) Moreover the 1998-99 school year registered 75 secondary school teachers in the five secondary schools operating in Northwest and Awdal regions, and enrolment totaling 1,152. The MOEYS estimated the need of 95 secondary classrooms in the period of 1999-2003, hence at least 100 secondary school teachers. (The estimate of the number of secondary school teachers is the author's). Amoud University and the University of Hargeisa will recruit new teachers.

The above mentioned figures compel educational policy and other national decision makers to consider these professional workers as they consider other most needy professional national workers, such as the national army. There is basic need to plan new strategies for training the educators in Somaliland. It is within this perspective that this presentation first shall call attention briefly some of the teaching profession difficulties in Somaliland, and then it shall treat somewhat more practical by proposing the formation of a National Association.

Philosophical Consideration

Because of the nature of the art of educating, a teacher rarely considers his/her profession as profit-making. The same usually happens to the students and their parents. In fact, there is always a mutual respect and semi-parental relationship between the service provider – the teacher – and the client/customer – the student and family. A Brazilian educator and a mathematician described the art of educating as an act of love.

> We are concerned with the future. But not only the more immediate times. Our concern is the future that we will not see; the future that induces us to write, to produce art, books, and knowledge; the future in which we want our name be remembered with respect and affection and our person to be referred to as a good example. The same future that induces others to amass fortunes and build power. Among these concerns we find reasons for multiple for multiple driving forces in the life of every human being. As educator we have to go in other direction. We walk into future of our children, the new generations. Thus our concern is the future of our children, of our students and their children, of our grandchildren and their children. Hence, education is an act of love. (D'Ambrosio, 1997)

This mutual respect – and lovely relationship – sometimes tends to overshadow the accountability between the two parts. Good teachers do not receive the income they deserve from their professional work, or vice versa. Bad teachers are equally accepted, even when they fail to do what they were expected to do. Somaliland society is no different in this regard. However, the more losers in this case are the teachers. It is clear that Somaliland teachers are not receiving what they deserve from their professional work. The thesis of this paper is to propose greater transparency and accountability in the teaching profession.

Historical Consideration

The figure of 'teacher' in our society has been related to the *Qur'aanic* teachers who were volunteer men, omnipresent in every village and in the remote nomadic areas. Sending a child to *Malcaamad Qur'aan* (or to the *Wadaad* in the nomadic area) was mainly considered as a moral and religious obligation. The teachers of *Qur'aanic* schools were very respected because of "those who were doing their religious obligations" instead of "those who were providing invaluable professional service, and therefore deserved good salary." This situation continues, even today.

The *Malcaamad Qur'aan* teacher is not considered as a 'professional' worker. The government does not employ him. The families, whenever they go to pay the monthly fees for their children to

learn the *Qur'aan*, consider themselves as being 'good doers' for these 'poor men.'

Policy Consideration

A recent proposal for educational management for Somaliland is based in a decentralized system (the author refers here the outcome of a workshop to finalize the national education plan, held in the Curriculum Development Center, Hargeisa, August 1999). In that document it is cited "While central policy-making, co-ordination of planning, national curriculum development, teacher training, and national exams will be maintained at the central level, the system is designed to provide substantial autonomy to the regions and local communities in the planning, managing and financing of educational programs." (Republic of Somaliland, 1999) The policy-making and implementation procedures of this proposed system are subdivided in four levels.

Central Level: The role of policy making is reserved for the following organizations: National Assembly, the Government and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS). While the implementation role in this level is of the Minister of MOEYS; Direct General of the following departments of MOEYS (Basic Education; Post-Basic Education; Administration/Finance; Planning, Research, Supervision; and Education Development), Examination Board and Youth and Sport Commission.

Regional Level: Policy making is the responsibility of the Regional Education Committee and implementation is carried out by the Regional Education Officer; Regional School Inspector, and Administrator Assistant.

District Level: A District Education Committee heads the role of policy making. The implementation role is of District Education Officer; Administrative Assistant and Secondary School Head teacher(s).

Community Level: The policy-making role is the School Education Committee. The implementation role for primary schools lies with the head teacher and teachers.

One can easily observe the lack of teacher representatives (as an association) in all levels of this system. No one will specifically talk for this class of our society in the meetings where their future, among the others, is planned. The thesis of this paper is therefore to include an entity (for example association of teachers or committee of professional educators) in every level of the system.

Methodological Consideration

Specific study by MOEYS indicates failure of the in-service training courses provided for the teachers. It is states that "Regarding the quality of the in-service training provided, it was reported that in-service training was not planned, well prepared, nor evaluated." (MOEYS, 1999) The main reason may be the way these training courses originated. The international NGO or UN agencies, without prior consultation with teachers in Somaliland, choose the syllabus for these workshops and training courses. The Nairobi-based groups decide both the contents and the way to teach the teachers. The selection of the teachers who should participate in these workshops is not based, in the most cases, on the appropriateness of the teacher's educational background. The teachers go there because there are daily US$10 incentives.

This paper argues that teachers of Somaliland and educational policy makers need to be more selective with what the educators should be taught and who should teach them. In many cases these international NGOs hire people less qualified with respect of the some of the teachers in Somaliland to give the courses. Moreover, there should be similar in-service educational programs for *malcaamad Qur'aanic* school teachers.

Political and Economic Consideration

Somaliland education has mainly revived, since independence, through private initiatives of trained teachers, university undergraduate students, and people with sometimes limited, language, knowledge, secretarial and administration experience, or computer literacy. These volunteer men and women later opened the formal public school. A mass

of untrained teachers, mainly ex-secondary school and undergraduate university students who could not continue the schooling because of the war, joined later. Only in the 1996/7 school year did the Government begin to pay salaries to these teachers.

An EC primary education financing study estimated, in 1998, that the annual average cost of primary education per pupil is US$51. Of this, US$25 goes to teacher's remuneration. (Green 1998) These figures refer to Somalia and Somaliland. A 1998 study conducted by Development Solutions for Africa argued that the minimum salary for teachers should be US$55 per month. The same study also reported that primary teachers in private schools earned about three times the salaries of their counterparts in public, primary schools. The Somaliland government pays Somaliland Shillings 30,000 per month (less than US$10) to the teacher.

If we base the budget of the teachers on these figures, the teacher is still missing monthly more than half of the minimum salary (US$55). The thesis of this paper is to assure teachers to receive a minimum balanced governmental salary. This should be cleared as Governmental Act.

Conclusion

To succeed in preparing teachers for Somaliland, there is need for:

- ***Political strategies***: Policy should develop rules that safeguard the social and professional life of the teachers.

- ***In-service teacher development strategies***: To build teacher's capabilities. The policy should develop the knowledge, skills, and norms for a teaching career.

- ***Standard-based strategies***: There is need for curriculum reform in teacher training courses. In this regard the future educators will be prepared to be 'qualified' teachers.

- ***New strategies to reduce the gender gap***: The elementary schools should recruit capable young female teachers.

- ***Moral support strategies***: the policy should reward the teacher's individual work, and should create incentives and organizational conditions that support teacher's work.

CHAPTER TWENTY TWO

Professional Association Contributions to Post-War Reconstruction

Idris Abdilahi Ibrahim

Introduction

It is a recognized fact that the level of development that a country achieves hinges largely on the availability and proper utilization of its human resources. Somaliland, though an infant state, acknowledges need to strengthen its human resource infrastructure. This step would tremendously bolster the aspirations of its people to lead normal lives at their own pace. However, at present the skilled human resource base is not yet in place. The nation lacks sufficient numbers of its own citizens to contribute toward revitalizing Somaliland, once again, to step onto the world stage. Education has been almost totally lacking for the last decade. The brain-drain has been substantial as a result of the collapse of the Somali state, of which Somaliland was part.

This unfortunate event, which came in the form of armed confrontations between liberation movements and the then Siyad Barre's

dictatorial regime, has resulted in a major exodus by those who could afford it. Those who could not were left behind to absorb the brunt of the atrocities that wreaked havoc on the length and the breadth of the earth. Such a major exodus has skimmed off the cream of the society because a large number of this group belonged to the intelligentsia – people whose presence here would be making a big difference.

The brain drain, therefore, continues to stifle Somaliland as attempts to lure the best brains back home remain largely futile because the local infrastructure is unprepared to absorb them. One could reason this on the basis that the public sector, as a major employer, hardly attracts such brains because of the absence of the proper environment that would keep them. This does not mean that they are unwanted at this stage as they are welcome in every sense of this word for Somaliland to make use of their expertise in their respective fields.

In the absence of an attractive professional environment to harness them, the question arises: How would this group fit into the system in spite of the apparent lack of readiness on the part of both sectors (public and private) to embrace them and make use of their hard-won expertise? The answer to this question lies in the rationale that calls for the intelligentsia in the diaspora to organize themselves and form professional associations that represent their fields of expertise together with the locals so that these associations would run in parallel with the other sectors, not as competitors, but as complementary to the efforts aimed at rebuilding Somaliland.

This paper presents a brief history of professional associations in Somaliland and discusses the nature of a proposed cluster of associations to be established. It considers pros and cons and presents a set of recommendations on how to identify the major actors involved and to synchronize their efforts toward realizing a solid foundation upon which the proposed associations could grow.

A Brief History about Professional Associations in Somaliland

The idea of establishing associations in Somaliland originated with the British ColonialAdministration (BCA), particularly in the years that it established its seat of government in Hargeisa. Though few in number, these associations were not characterized as such for two reasons:these associations were intended to fill the vacuum in the transition process as British personnel were leaving because the clamor for independence was

becoming at fever pitch, and they were established to preserve the legacy and continuity of administration after the BCA pulled out.

In a sense, it was a dramatic move to instill a culture that could bring like-minded people belonging to the same profession together to prepare themselves to step in when the founder vacated. But being a colonial affair with a hidden agenda, it lacked the fervor and the necessary element of optimism that might result from the involvement of the locals in its formative stage. The plan was formulated on a truly BCA initiative and under its tutelage. There was little local ownership of the concept or strategy.

These associations served as a forum for mostly technocrats belonging to the public sector, as BCA was in possession of whatever employment opportunities existed. The BCA controlled available positions and managed the recruitment process to fill them. An association linked to BCA therefore could produce results – hiring professionals to fill positions. Such opportunities were open solely for those who had taken advantage of the educational opportunities then available. Under the British system, young people received enticements to go to school because of the prevailing mentality that the aim of school for locals was to convert them into Christians, against their will.

These associations included groups such as the Somali Officials Union or the Somali Teachers Union. They were all based in Hargeisa, the BCA seat of government, with no branches in the outlying districts although their membership was countrywide.

When Somaliland gained its independence from Britain in June 1960, the rush to unite with Somalia ensued and the prospects for developing these embryonic associations into full-fledged organizations diminished. Suddenly all political power resided in Mogadishu and Hargeisa institutions had little or no influence. The new leadership in the south had little interest in professional associations or in preserving the beginnings that the British had made in Hargeisa. After 1960, those groups founded through the BCA slowly withered and died, testimony to our inability to rule ourselves. The new government proceeded to downplay the idea of professional associations as an unsolicited but inevitable historical event with little or no recognition to their suitability to enter into the history books as an event worth recording.

Following the unification with Somalia, the amalgamation of the two systems under the colonial powers ruling Somaliland and Somalia took effect, under the auspices of the United Nations. This unification set the

stage for the creation of an integrated system of governance that should respond to the needs of the citizens from the two regions whose unity formed the former Somali Republic.

Despite the fact that the amalgamation process through which the two systems were harmonized narrowed, the gulf of misunderstanding between the elites of the two united independent regions continued. It was unclear how to synchronize their varying systems. One casualty of this gap between northen and southern styles were the professional associations.

History witnesses that the existing but latent organizations had run into difficulties catching up with the then political systems that favored clannism over ideology. Each and every member had deserted his affiliation to the professional organizations in order to join the clan-based party to which he belonged. This act of desperation on the part of members has caused these associations to flounder and slip into obscurity.

The few that survived were rendered nominal and inactive until the occurrence of the so-called Bloodless Revolution that brought Siyade and his cohorts to power. This regime instantly abrogated the laws under which these associations were operating, leading to a total ban.

Nature of Proposed Professional Associations

Before discussing the nature of proposed professional associations, a definition will be helpful:

> A professional association is defined as a group of people who pursue a career in the same profession and belong to the same organization through which they intend to realize a common purpose: enhancement of their professional status.

One can infer from the above definition that such an association is profession-specific and it cannot accept non-professionals as members. It is, therefore, important to note that the professional associations, the theme of this paper, will be treated as such throughout.

No precise statistics of professionals presently in Somaliland are available. Several organizations, both private and public, have attempted to draw up a roster of professionals in Somaliland but with little success. The few names of people listed and categorized under their professions have been collected through name-calling by which a spotted listee

presents the name of another person with whom, mostly, they belong to the same profession. This system of listing professionals resulted in the registration of a good number of people with different professions and served as a stepping stone to understand more about roles that professional associations could play in stimulating rural and urban development in Somaliland. The analysis also emphasized that members of most professions were in short supply.

In Somaliland, the absence of precise statistics as to the number of professionals implies that few or no professional organizations exist. If this is the case, it is then important to stress the fact that little or no development can be achieved without having professionals organized in associations. The association's role is complementary to other sectors, as partners in the efforts aimed at rebuilding Somaliland to a position of equal status with other independent states.

Certainly no profession as abundant as teaching can cover the demand for it. It appears that almost all professions are in short supply in the country and that needs for services greatly exceed the supply of professionals. But if the available professions are grouped into separate entities, functioning independently, would we not be able to make use of their expertise in their respective fields with great facility? I think *yes*, for the following reasons:

... every profession will be grouped under one entity, which can easily be located
... collective opinions will be sought from them in matters relating to their professions
... their services will be available on demand
... their existence will reduce tremendously the need for hiring the services of foreign experts
... their existence will boost the morale of the aspiring professionals at entry-level.

However, the idea of establishing a professional association is one thing and the task of managing it is another. In the context of Somali culture, managing an organization is the toughest part of the whole process of putting an organization in place.

Many organizations managed by Somalis have failed because of mismanagement or conflict of interests among the founders. Does this fact support the view widely held that Somalis are anti-institutional? My

answer to this question is yes and no. It is yes because of the nomadic behavior inherent in our culture which propels us to wander in search of food and water for our animals and that psychologically prevents us from being settled and wedded to a settled life. In other words, institutions appear to be inhibiting our free-wheeling and dealing up to a point that we might find these professional associations intolerable.

By saying no, I mean most of the organizations that end up in failure are ascribed to have their problems emanating from the lack of agreements over how the organization should be managed. Had such agreements existed, whatever failure that occurred could have been attributed to another factor (*e.g.* mismanagement or financial difficulties) other than the lack of records pertaining to the assent of the organization's founders on how their organization should be managed.

It is, therefore, essential to find a way out of this deep-rooted phenomenon relating to our indifference to establishing the proper groundwork upon which organizations should thrive. I personally subscribe to the idea that as organizations come into being, there are certain elements that ought to be borne in mind by the founders as a basis upon which their organizations can grow. These elements include:

... name of the organization
... type of organization
... organizational objectives, goals, missions, purpose, operational plans
... organizational structure, stakeholders, executive board, management team
... legal documents such as articles of association, government licences, etc.

These elements are rudimentary and every organization to be formed should be certain to have them. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, needs for professional associations are immense as every profession touches directly or indirectly the life of every citizen. Let me then move on to listing the professional associations that are deemed essential and whose formation is highly recommended. Professional associations are needed for medical doctors, higher education, teachers, agronomists, veterinary doctors, marine biologists, advocates, lawyers, and bankers.

Pros and Cons

In every human endeavor, one has to bear in mind that full consensus over the propriety or impropriety of an action is rarely achieved. The crux of the matter sometimes may sound as ambiguous as one could imagine. One may argue that another person's interpretation of a matter deserves to be considered, while another may insist upon his as the only valid point. It is an element that is inherent in human nature that people differ on their views. These differences can lead to a healthy environment if the persons in dispute cease to charge the atmosphere with emotional feelings and, instead, rely on rationale exchange. In developing this paper I have sought the divergent views that a few selected people held on the possibility of establishing professional associations that would thrive and have an impact on the social, political, and economic life of Somaliland. Here are their views on this issue:

Pros

- professional associations are social organizations that represent the top notch of a civil society
- professional associations will have a greater say in how developmental projects are carried out
- professional associations will play a greater role in formulating the rules and regulations through which their professions will be administered upon the request of the regulatory body (government)
- professional associations, whose members are expected to swell once established, will certainly bring in a substantial sum of tax revenue to the Government
- professional associations will reduce tremendously the need for hiring the services of foreign experts
- professional associations will serve as center of excellence for both current and aspiring members.

Cons

- professional associations will not be viewed as distinct from other social organizations such as NGO's or women's organizations

- policy-makers in the public sector will shore up their resistance to any involvement by these associations in the management of the projects they direct
- it is hard to think that professional associations will voluntarily participate in a plot aimed at restricting the freedom to practice their professions collectively
- without system to track down personal finances, it will be difficult to realize tax revenue from them
- foreign experts are hired external organizations, without concurrence of the relevant governmental body. Unless this practice is stopped, these associations will have a difficult time
- turning an association into a center of excellence entails good management, hard work, and stamina, which we lack at the moment.

Recommendations

Creating professional associations, organized among professions as a viable way to bring together people with similar professions would be helpful for: (a) synchronizing and streamlining their efforts to have a collective impact on the post-war reconstruction activities, (b) setting professional standards (code of conduct) for internal discipline and as a way to enhance the professional competence of the members, and (c) establishing a center of excellence to which people will turn for their professional opinions. I therefore recommend the following:

- the government authorize creation of professional associations reviewing the existing rules and regulations
- the founders of these associations should establish operating principles to avoid misfortunes (mismanagement or conflicts) that often cause organizations to flounder
- efforts should be made to ensure that these associations maintain their supposed complementary role so as to avoid conflicts of interest at organizational levels.

CHAPTER TWENTY THREE

The Role of Islam in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution in Somalia

Khalif H. Farah

Introduction

My paper does not intend to portray the *Wadadis* (the men of religion) as the "Dervish" of peace in Somalia nor does it exclusively attribute all peace efforts to them, but instead indicates their remarkable contributions of piecing together the Somalia's shattered society from grassroots level. The grassroots peace building, (*i.e.* mending conflicts at the village level), public orientation in the mosques, and breaking the walls of separation between communities divided by wars and clan hostilities through spiritual guidance is often an 'invisible' but important contribution toward long-term settlement of national conflicts and disputes. The political tourism and luxurious get-togethers of politicians and secular scholars in Addis, Cairo, Nairobi, and elsewhere has often overtaken and underestimated the role of *Wadadis* and, to some degree, the other civil society groups in peace building through bottom-up approaches. The world and the Somalia's secular school have not been

fair to the *Wadadis*. They 'labeled' them fundamentalists and terrorists. None of their positive contributions in peace building has been given fair attention. The notion that only the secular mentality of Somalia has the right answer to mend the social and political mess of Somalia is questionable. The Islamists claim they have shared the suffering with the people in the critical times during the civil wars, caring for the wounded, saving people stranded in hostile areas, mediating disputes, distributing relief aid, teaching Islam, establishing clinics and schools, and building mosques. They claim credit for all these while their secular colleagues have either fled the country or joined the factional politics that ravaged the country. They further argue that Islam cannot be separated from Somali politics as the majority of the Somalis today believe the final solutions to their problems can only come through Islam. They support their stance by arguing that post-independence democracy failed, the socialist ideology of Siyad Barre's regime followed suit, and finally the clan politics of the last ten years only added oil to a burning fire. "Islam has to be given its turn now," they argue.

When the civil war broke out in Somalia, the Islamic groups mobilized themselves to operate businesess and to propagate Islam beyond clan lines. This provided for the re-opening of the clan borders and subsequent reduction of tension and armed confrontation. The cross-border exchange of business and the spiritual preaching of *Wadadis* are among the most important factors that contribute to social intermingling and clan integration that is taking place in many parts of Somalia.

Today the Islamists are not only leading prayers in the mosques and teaching at *Qur'aanic* schools but also running formal schools, universities, businesses, and other institutions that are providing vital social services and have directly and indirectly contributed to consolidating the current relative piece in Somalia. You also find *Wadadis* are becoming religiously mature. They are open to critics and not isolating themselves from the rest of the people. They are ready to have academic exercise with the secular scholars. Their call for an Islamic state does not mean they will not accept compromise. For them an evil is of degrees and a Muslim would choose 'least evil' when confronted to choose between evils.

Departing from this Islamic concept, a tyrant leader (*Ja'ir*) is preferred to chaos and a state of anarchy. In many parts of Somalia the Islamic groups have even worked with the legitimate authorities for common settlement to conflicts in those regions. *Al-wuhda* group is in

close collaboration with Somaliland government whereas the religious groups in Mogadishu fully support the TNG despite their belief that these authorities are not practicing Islam in its true terms.

Background

Islam is a religion based upon the surrender to Allah who is One. The very name of the religion, ALISLAM in Arabic, means at once submission and PEACE, for it is in submitting to Allah's Will that human beings gain peace in their lives in this world and in the hereafter. Peace is one of the Holy names of Allah, the greeting of Muslims whenever they meet each other and the greeting of the angels to the people of paradise. Today, as the world is getting smaller and many people from different social and political backgrounds cannot avoid interacting with each other, there should be creative intellectual and practical remedies for the causes that lead to conflicts. The Holy *Qur'aan* is a source of peace and reconciliation between civilizations and communities. What is significant about the *Qur'aanic* approach to peace is that it does not just recommend peace and forbid conflict, it also initiates peace and protects it. Allah's orders to Muslims to initiate peace, and the universal nature of the Islamic message for peace constitute a unique guide for humanity. The concerned passages in the *Qur'aan* commit the readers to peace as a goal, means and responsibility.

The rule of Islam is peace. The laws of Allah seek to build and protect the infrastructure of peace. Allah says in chapter 10, verse 25, "Allah does call to the home of peace and does guide whom he pleases to a way that is straight." Because the rule in Islam is peace, Muslims are ordered in the *Qur'aan* not just to avoid conflict and keep peace, but also to take the initiative for peace. In chapter 23, verse 61, Allah describes Muslims as those "who hasten in every good work, and those who are foremost in them." This means that a Muslim should not wait until his enemy takes the initiative for peace, reconciliation, or dialogue. Let it be the contrary.

In the *Qur'aan*, conflict may exist but it can not be a rule of natural law. Conflicts, struggles, competition, and wars are considered by Islam as test for human beings. Whoever enjoys them is a loser and whoever uses them for any sake other than the sake of justice is a loser too. In chapter 7, verse 55, Allah orders man that he "must not do mischief on the earth after it has been set in order." Therefore, he ought not to use

power, unless it be for a just cause. In chapter 2, verse 190, Allah orders Muslims not to be transgressors and not to fight except for the sole just cause of Allah.

Islam does not recommend negative ideas. Nor does it seek conflict. Rather, Allah teaches his prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him) that Muslims should "hold to forgiveness; command what is right, and turn way from the ignorant."

Islam and Resolving Conflicts in Somalia's Historical Context

Where conflicts become prolonged and settlement difficult, the conflicting parties, whether tribes, groups, or individuals, always sought arbitration through religion as the last resort. Because religion is the only thing above the clan level that they can agree upon, the Somalis were comfortable with the Islamic rulings. For instance, when a person is killed inside clan territory and that clan denies killing him, the deceased clan would sue 50 of the most important figures of the suspected clan to swear of their innocence. This is called *Dhar Mod* and is according to *Shariah* law. In such a case, the *Dhar Mod* prevents bloody wars among the disputing clans. Similarly the disputes on inheritance of property or marriage would best be settled through Islamic rulings. The rulings of *Ulemma* or *Wadadis* in conflicts are, in most cases, respected as they are seen as neutral and unbiased to any of the conflicting parties. This is evidenced by the saying of '*Wadad* and *Waranle*.' The *Wadad* is not armed and as such is not part of any conflict. Rather, he serves the community by preaching, leading prayers, blessing the people and their livestock, counseling, arbitrating disputes, and performing marriages. On the other hand, the *Waranle,* meaning the 'armed warrior,' is responsible for clan defense and often engagesin war matters. Moreover it has been customary that the *Wadadis* would separate the warring parties waving white sheets and conducting religious congregations in the middle of the two warring groups.

The Role of *Wadadis* in Peace-Building at the Grassroots Level

Because Islam is a well-established and highly respected ethical system, a spiritual foundation for all Somali society, and cultural force that is beyond the clan, gender, and social class, it is and will be an important component of any peace initiative in Somalia. During the ten

years of continued factional fighting, the absence of effective governance institutions, lawlessness, and anarchy, Islamic groups emerged as a major social and political force with regard to maintaining security and providing vital social services and reviving spiritual renewal. The role of Islamic groups has been more prominent in those regions where political groups failed to set up institutions for governance such as Mogadishu, central, and southern regions. In the midst of the inter-clan violence that characterized life during the last ten years, Somalis naturally sought comfort in their faith to make sense of their national disaster. The traditional response of the practicing Muslims to social trauma is to be explained in terms of a perceived sin that has caused society to stray from the 'straight path of truth' and consequently to receive Allah's punishment. The way to regain Allah's favor is to repent collectively and rededicate society in accordance with Allah's divine precepts.

The *Wadadis* have been more actively engaged in public orientation than any other civil group. Because they have access to many social institutions, they have been able to play an influential role in the road to peace. They did not focus on attending conferences, and national peace conventions sponsored by the external actors but continued to mobilize communities at neighborhoods, community and village levels in mosques and *Qur'aanic* schools, through Islamic preaching and spiritual guidance.

Today, as a result of widespread unemployment, coupled with the dismay of continued public chaos and instability, more people are practicing Islam. The *Qur'aanic* schools' enrollments are rising in number, mosques are full at prayer times, and more mosques are being constructed in remote villages. The following institutions that are run by the Islamists and pro-Islamists contribute directly or indirectly to peace building and efforts to maintain peace at a grassroots level.

> ***Mosques***: There are learning sessions of *Qur'aan* interpretation, *Hadith,* and Islamic jurisprudence almost every day in mosques before and after prayers. There are lectures of diversified topics in which acts of mischief are discouraged. The Friday prayers are usually occasioned for public orientation and delivering of peace messages. In some places, the mosques are not merely a place for worshipping but also handle security issues and keep law and order. In Dinsor town, through the microphone of the mosque, it was announced – I have been present – that any one who shoots fire in the sky will be fined 10,000 Somali Shillings.

From mosques, street *Da'wa* propagation is also organized where teams with microphones wander through the streets, preaching messages of peace to the public.

Qur'aanic Schools: The *Qur'aanic* schools have survived from the civil wars, partly because of the community's sense of owning these institutions and partly because the looters respected them as places of God. Besides children and women who attend in the morning shifts, the *Qur'aanic* schools have special sessions for young people decommissioned from the militia life in the afternoon and night shifts. They undergo moral rehabilitation and take courses of religious guidance. The *Qur'aanic* schools put efforts to prevent incidence of fighting and stop clashes. In Bule-barde, where two clans have clashed, the *Qur'aanic* schools have been instrumental in stopping the violence by suspending their sessions. Students and the *Qur'aanic* teachers went into the streets in protest of the inter-clan fighting that was affected the lives of the inhabitants.

Formal Schools: Today most of the schools in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country are run by Islamists with financial support from the Islamic world, business community, and local people. Some of the schools have recently introduced peace education in their syllabus. They have also established special programs for those who are joining schools at late ages including ex-militias and former fighters. Schools are not merely for learning but venues for social interaction as students from different clans are brought together to live and mate with each other, regardless of their clan identity. Most of the schools have parent associations that not only deal with education and school affairs, but also manage the conflicts in the school zones so that their children can safely go to school. The parties held at the end of the school year bring together parents including politicians from factions opposing each other and the event is graced by exchange of jokes which sometimes lead to opening of dialogue between those factions. The school administrations want this to happen and encourage social interaction as part of their educational service to the people. The schools in Mogadishu, which mostly have Islamic background,

participate and play remarkable roles through their management board known as AFPEN (Formal Private School Network) in all social events such as peace rallies and mass congregations that discourage violence.

Business Entities: Similarly most businesses are operated by Islamists or pro-Islamist individuals. These companies have a tendency to recruit militias of their close relatives as security personnel to, in part, decommission them from the criminal environment and integrate them back into society. The militias are to stop chewing *Qat* and smoking (the main cause of the criminal activities) as a precondition to have employment with these companies. The Islamists see this act as part of their religious propagation responsibility, and they have really succeeded to re-integrate large number of militias into society. The business companies operated by the Islamic individuals also finance the local mediations and reconciliation conferences. They also fund local initiatives by the villages and neighborhoods to address security problems by creating local police units. The Islamic entrepreneurs also contributed to Hawiye reconciliation in Mogadishu in both political and traditional phases. This reconciliation which lasted over a year had considerably reduced tensions among the Hawiya clans and led to convening of the Arta peace conference in Djibouti.

Media: Some of the Islamic groups have their own newspapers. Among the social agendas they portray in their editorial columns is peace. They have set up the media services not for making profit but to use for public orientation and for spreading Islamic principles. There are columns in local papers reserved for religion; the Islamists use these columns to reach the people and spread their word. Islamic preaching constitutes 10% of Moadishu radio and television programs air time. There is daily interpretation of the *Qur'aan* in the public media. Debates are also held among the religious scholars in the local televisions and radios to discuss issues of concern *i.e.* security. They contribute to the overall public awareness of peace. Some of the dedicated Islamists have also set up FM-radio stations attached to their studio shops with small coverage areas in the markets

and other populated areas. These localized radios daily air preaching by the most famous scholars in Somalia. The preaching focuses on themes of brotherhood, forgiveness, reconciliation, peace, and other issues that are part of the Islamist campaigns to participate in peace building and conflict resolutions.

Relief Organizations: Most relief agencies in Somalia that have continued to support Somalis, after the security situation caused most international organizations to depart, are Islamic. Because they mostly employ local staff, these organisations have been able to deliver services. They offer support in times of disaster such as floods, drought, and cholera. Along with their aid distribution, they continue to call for public order, fear of Allah, and denouncing fighting. These organizations have also been providing financial assistance to reconciliation efforts in some parts of Somalia.

Civic Groups: Local Islamic organizations are part of strong civil society machinery in Mogadishu. Advocacy and peace building form the core of their activities. They bring together traditional elders, militias, and women's groups for peace awareness building. These Islamic groups often provide venues for such meeting and offer incentives for participants.

Mediating Conflicts

Apart from building public awareness towards peace through the above institutions, the *Ulema* (Muslim clergies) also engage in direct mediation. During the first week of the intense fighting in Mogadishu between the USC forces and those of Siyad Barre, a group of *Ulema* had tried to work out a temporary cease-fire to allow for the burial of the dead. In 1992, when the fighting between the Ali Mahdi and Aideed factions in Mogadishu scaled up, a group of *Ulema,* led by the late Sheikh Mohamed Moalim, engaged in an intense mediation between Ali Mahdi and General Aideed for two months. They had proposed a four point agreement, which included cease-fire, demarcating a temporary green line between their forces, ceasing propaganda through radios, and opening dialogue. These points had been the basis of the agreement that the Multi-

international Task Force (UNITAF) worked out between the two factions soon after they landed offshore, in December 1992. In Buroa, the *Ulema* of Habar je'le and Habaryonis played a key role in settling the disputes between the two clans. The agreement mediated between the two clans by the *Ulema* in the village of Durqsi in 1997 paved the way for the return of the two clans to Buroa to live with each other in harmony.

In Mogadishu, *Ulema* and Islamic groups had mediated between several groups including Abgal and Murasade, Abgal and Habargidir, Hawadle and Habargidir, Fiqi Mohumud and Qubays of Dir clan. In Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions, mediation included between Hawadle and Badi-adde, and Galje'el and Badi-adde. In Juba region, groups inclluded Galje'el and Ogaden, Shikhal and Galje'el, Ujuran and Ogaden, and among the Ogadeni themselves. In Lower Shabelle, mediation brought together the Habargidir and Biyamal. In some of the disputes, the Diya(blood price) was paid by the *Ulema* to achieve lasting settlements between the warring parties. The *Ulema* did not succeed in all their peace endeavors, but they have undertaken bold attempts to stop bloodshed, and for that they deserve credit.

Some of the Islamic groups have recently organized themselves as civil society groupings and pioneered the foundation of civil society networks in Mogadishu. Prominent civic groups established by the Islamists include the Somali Reconciliation Council and the Pressure Committee, the latter, although its members belong to diversified civic groups including women, are led by well-known *Ulema* figures in Mogadishu. The aim of the committee is to pressurize the political factions and other traditional institutions to commit themselves to peace. Similarly the Somali Reconciliation Council was launched in Mogadishu by one of the Islamic groups in Somalia known as ISLAH, with the objective of mediating both political and traditional disputes in many parts of southern Somalia. They have adopted a strategy of localizing reconciliation efforts, calling on roles for the traditional chiefs rather than politicians who tend to inflame the clan wars. They mainly play a facilitating role and provide financial support for local reconciliation initiatives that bring together in a neutral venue the traditional chiefs of the warring clans. They accommodate the traditional chiefs in this venue with all lodging and food facilities. This gesture helps all membedrs of the group to address problems of mistrust and to make room for confidence building. Meanwhile a team from the council gives technical support to the traditional chiefs, jotting down agendas, summarizing

discussions, and providing clerical services. To enforce agreements reached, the council arranges a peace caravan composed of traditional chiefs of the two warring clans and the technical team of *Ulema* and scholars from the council. They go to the conflict zones to arrange agreements to establish a cease-fire. After the cease-fire takes hold, all disputes would be settled through *Shariah* law. In their peace efforts, the council has employed the following strategies:

> ***Confidence:*** The question of confidence must be addressed at first. To do this there should be a neutral place where people meet to discuss their differences.
>
> ***Financing***: The warring parties would not fund their meeting. There must be a third party to finance them.
>
> ***Technicality***: Somalis are talkative and often spend a great deal of time talking about irrelevant issues. They frequently need some technical people to support them in the management of the meeting and timing.
>
> ***Manipulation:*** Few mischievous people manipulate the affairs of the clans. The peace lovers who make the majority of the people need to be mobilized and given leading roles by giving them the required facilities to have a voice.

The council, with the support of well-intentioned politicians free from political factions, had been pursuing Hawiye reconciliation from May 1999 to April 2000. The council has built its reconciliation initiatives within Hawiye clans on the experience of Somaliland and Puntland where the traditional chiefs have played leading roles in ending most of the conflicts. Thus they have focused on reactivating the role of traditional groups to marginalize the influence of the political groups who have been manipulating the traditional institutions. The one-year reconciliation process of Hawiye clans has paved the way for the convention of the Arta conference in Djibouti. At the Arta peace convention, the council and the other Islamic figures had been instrumental in making the event success. Through their individual clans and as independent observers, they have narrowed the differences and bridged understanding among the participating clans.

Other Religious Actors in Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution

There are other initiatives under way through these organizations. For example, there are the *Shariah* courts. The establishment of community-based Islamic courts came in response to growing insecurities, mainly in the southern Somalia. They followed the failure of the political factions to establish a system of governance and to pacify the areas they claim to control. Setting up of these *Shariah* courts had become a *modus operandi* – a localized special way of addressing security problems in the troubled areas. Traditional and Islamic leaders had pioneered the founding of these *Shariah* courts. The most effective one was set up in North Mogadishu and functioned between 1994 and 1996. It operated independently from factional politics to a certain degree. The Islamic courts improved the situation and curbed banditry and the killing of innocent people. There was popular support for their operations by the business community as well as common people who had been relieved for some time from the violence perpetuated by the freelance gangs. The success of the *Shariah* courts was mainly attributed to their grassroots nature as the elders, women, youth, business community, and to some degree the intellectuals of the founder clans were involved. The spirit of founding these courts was purely local and no external forces had contributed to their establishment. Nonetheless, the Islamic courts were not without problems. The localizing of Islamic penal codes, such as amputation and executions, have been a bone of contention among the religious scholars themselves. There is not yet one agreed-upon *Imam* able to generalize the implementation of *Shariah* law over all people and regions. The political groups had challenged the Islamic courts, seeing them as a force diminishing their power base and curtailing their influence. The politicians labeled the courts as fundamentalist groups to get the support and sympathy of the international community. In one incident, the conflict between the political factions and *Shariah* courts led to the collapse of the North Mogadishu Islamic court. In some regions in the Northwest and Northeast, there are rudimentary *Shariah* courts where people go voluntarily to settle their disputes because they have more confidence in these courts than in those of the authorities.

The Islamic courts in south Mogadishu have crushed the most notorious bandits who were responsible for kidnapping aid workers and minority people in Mogadishu from 1997-1999. The kidnapping had

become a profitable business for the bandits as they exchanged the release of the captives with heavy ransom money. Some of the captives had been released by force by the *Shariah* courts. Probably the most important achievement of the *Shariah* courts was to silence the armed factions and to open opportuities for strong civic groups which have mobilized the community through clusters of peace meetings. No one could dare hold such meetings without the consent of the warlords before the *Shariah* courts had addressed security problems in Mogadishu and elsewhere. Other notable accomplishments of the *Shariah* courts with regard to peace building and conflict resolution are:

- banditry attacks against the people and their property have been greatly reduced
- about 50 checkpoints and roadblocks have been removed, especially between Mogadishu and Merca
- as the Islamic courts put up strong challenge to political factions, civic groups were encouraged to break their silence and openly to criticize the human rights. The efforts of civic groups set the stage for convening the Arta Reconciliation conference
- rudimentary reconciliation committees have been set up by individual courts to resolve disputes before they pass to legal proceedings
- bloody confrontations between rival clans have been stopped (i.e. between Tunni and Biyamal in Merca and Brava area, between two Shikhal subcalns in Mogadishu, and between two other sub-clans of Dir)
- in the areas they operated, the *Shariah* courts have set up semi-structured civil administrations in the form of consultation councils (*Shura*) composed of all sectors of society.

The *Shariah* courts have established rehabilitation centers for militias and juvenile delinquents. They provide food and teachings

of Islam. The parents arrest their delinquent children in these Islamic courts, paying a daily charge of 5,000 - 10,000 Somali Shillings for each detainee for education, food, and accommodation. Those militias that improve their behavior during the rehabilitation period are recruited by the Islamic courts as security personnel, clerks, and secretaries. In one of the *Shariah* courts in Mogadishu known as Hararyale, over 500 criminals, mostly arrested by their parents, are currently being rehabilitated. Several other batches of militias had also taken a period of forced rehabilitation under this Islamic court.

Tablikh: The Preachers Without Borders

This is a 100 year old worldwide group that had some limited presence in Somalia before the fall of the late government. The *Tablikh* has mobilized itself as a large spiritual movement for the last ten years. Because of their modest and unpoliticized way of preaching, the group has impressed a lot of people in all parts of the country and gained a lot of followers. They embark on missions of religious propagation and delivery of peace messages known as *Khuruj* to all parts of Somalia and to the outside countries as well. Organizing themselves into smaller groups known as *Jama'a* of 6-10 members, they make journeys on foot from town to town in order to make peace. Because of their strong faith that none can render profit or harm other than Allah, they have been missioning as peace caravans regardless of the clan composition of the *Jama'a* members to hostile areas preaching Islamic brotherhood and unity of Muslims. This spiritual movement has become fashionable, even for militias and some of the war profiteers, for repentance of their wrongdoing. In every place they visit, they call the people to join their *Khuruj* mission to travel with them and in the process, the new followers learn about religion. *Tablikh* is also offers moral rehabilitation for the militias. The parents send their children who have strayed to join the *Tablikh* movement and to follolw morally corrective courses. This helps them to stay away from criminal colleagues and wayward environments for a period of time.

As most Somalis have no doubt of the *Tablikh*'s sincerity as they travel about the country, they often recieve half-priced fares. They receive special prices because they are known as *Alle u Raran* (Laden for God's sake). *Tablikh* play important roles in confidence building among the society. A number of times, they have been able to take militia on

their mission to visit their opponents. This helps to build confidence and trust among previously warring fractions. Through these *Khuruj* missions, some towns or villages that had been at war have broken the walls of separations and reduced ternsions. The *Tablikh* even tend to lie to reconcile communities (Islam permits lying for this purpose). They would falsely narrate stories of goodwill from one community to another to narrow their differences and finally they would build a shady tree in the cut line of the two communities where the dialogue starts and face-to-face communication takes place.

The influence of *Tablikh* is increasing as the group continues to impress a lot of the elite classes such as doctors, military officers, and politicians as well as individuals from the business community who, in turn, influence the sectors of the society towards practicing Islam and building peace.

Conclusion

The call for fair representation of all sectors of Somalia, including women's groups, in any peace initiative is high. We must be as inclusive as possible and not entertain the outdated idea that the *Wadadis* are only fit for blessing our souls and animals and leading prayers. We cannot negotiate politics, mediate conflicts, and contribute to mending Somalia's mess without their inclusion. The Islamists, unlike politicians, would pose no threat to any peace dealing they are not part of. However, they can help tackle many of the contentious issues and obstacles to peace through spiritual guidance as has been manifested at Arta. There, despite their marginal representation, they played an important role in narrowing the gap between the different Somali clans through honest mediation.

CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR

Islamization and Democratization of Somaliland Politics: Incompatible or Mutually Reinforcing?

Jama Gabush

Introduction

Somaliland political life is in a transition from traditional to constitutional democratic procedures. To be more fitting, there is a grave need for mindful and conscious contextualization of democratic concepts. The democratization process, to be more accurate, must be mindfully incorporated with other local and inherent processes in place in Somaliland society. The process of Islamization has also been going on for a long time in Somaliland societal spheres. Therefore, if the democratization process is to be accelerated, the careful integration of Islamization and democratization is indispensable in Somaliland politics. This paper considers whether the two processes underway in Somaliland politics can be incorporated to form a single set of governance principles.

While both processes, democratization and Islamization, are

underway in Somaliland politics and while each has its proponents and advocates, this paper emphasizes the great need for mindful and conscious study of both systems. The future Somaliland political stability lies in the integration and contextualization of both Islam and democracy. Islamization and democratization share more similarities and fewer differences if one carries out a well thought-out analysis, devoid of playing with words.

Background

In the last two centuries, ever since the arrival of the colonial powers, there have been rapidly developing socio-political changes in the Somali political culture. Somalis, though 100% Muslims, rarely have had good command of Islamic teachings in their daily lives. This gap is due to the pastoralist nature and nomadic lifestyle of Somali society as well as the lack of urban centers. Even though the Somali legal system (*heer*) was incorporated with *Shariah* law, basic Islamic social principles never intruded and shaped Somali pre-Islamic social beliefs (*e.g.* the traditional and non-Islamic Somali marriage systems that oppress women and that the culture never questioned).

The political sphere, especially the war, was even more non-Islamic (*e.g.* violent rangeland wars and camel expropriation, in which the confiscator never felt guilt [as in Muslim belief systems] but instead would become swollen with pride). The modern political theories of state also came with the western colonial powers in the 19th century and were applied in the middle of the 20th century. The first graduates of formal religious education also arrived at this time with *Shariah* teachings.

The colonial powers imposed their modern ways of thinking about politics, economics, legal systems, and other social arrangements without significant incorporation of the local systems. Students of formal primary, elementary, and possibly higher education provided by the colonial powers became the rulers after liberation. Few of these students were acquainted with the detailed workings of democracy, let alone understood it. Nor were they able to incorporate democratic theories into the local culture. Later Marxist revolutionaries stifled the growth of democratic governance. During the resistance against the Siyad Barre regime also, few declared or claimed to believe that democratic principles would prevail in the post-Siyad Barre era. In the last ten years and beyond, many Somaliland leaders and intellectuals have realized the need

for genuine application of democratic political principles. Even though Somaliland experienced the beginnings of limited democratic constitutional arrangements, they realize that there is a long way to go for them to attain further democratization.

Religious education in pastoral Somalia was rare. A few boys traveling with religious teachers and gathering charity from nomad herdsmen were the only available religious men. Religiosity of the people was low. As one popular Somali story goes, there was a wealthy man who died in his fifties. His wife invited a religious cleric so that he distributed the inheritance of the dead man for his children. The cleric asked the widow, as the story goes, whether the dead man used to pray. Amazingly, she replied, *wallaahi, dee danina uma geynin oo waxaas oo xoolo ahba isagaa lahaa! Da'ina uma geyninoo, lixdankiiba fooda lamuu gelin)!* The Islamic *Fiqhi, Tafsiir* or *Hadith* literature were very limited and rarely available in Somali territories. Even literature by famous scholars of the *Shafi'i* School, which is widely followed by Somali people, were rarely found nor studied by even the most eminent teachers.

It was only during the 1950-60s, when the first academic graduates came back from prestigious Islamic universities like *Al-azhar,* that more formal Islamic teachings became available in Somalia. This coincided with the universal Islamic resurgence and revivalist Islamic awakening that were underway in all Muslim societies of the world. These academic religious scholars had little influence in the socio-political spheres at the beginning. However, they gradually won over and educated many students (male and female) who later confronted the atheistic Marxist ideologies of the seventies and eighties. From the sixties, a process of mass Islamization has been underway. The struggle against the Siyad regime also took on religious dimensions as, for example, death on the battlefield took on new religious meaning. The SNM has included in its agenda the creation of an Islamic state after Barre's fall. The Islamization process that began from the fifties and sixties onwards, is still going on. A great number of Somaliland leaders and intellectuals realize the need for further Islamization of Somaliland politics.

While both belief systems, democratization and Islamization, are underway in Somaliland politics and each has its advocates, this paper emphasizes the great need for mindful and conscious study of both systems. It is the author's conviction that the future of Somaliland political stability lies in the infusion and the contextualization of both Islam and democracy. They share more similarities than differences.

What Do We Mean By Political Islamization?

Islam, unlike other religions, is a way of life. Its teachings cannot be directed only to the spiritual world. "The division of the world into sacred and profane, religious and secular, or priesthood and laity does not exist in Islam. The separation of politics and ethics, politics and economics, church and state....do not come naturally to it."[1] This was a grave mistake made by many modern Muslim intellectuals at the beginning of the last century. There seem to be few debates on this issue in Somaliland today. However, a great number of proponents of Islamization and those of democratization misjudge Islamic principles of governance.

Some proponents of this process play on words. They rarely meet the center of the question. They set clear-cut *Fiqhi* rules as if the field (or social sciences as a whole) is concisely elaborated by the *Qur'aan* and *Sunnah* like *fiqhul Ibaadaat.* For the field of political science, Islam establishes basic principles such as justice, equality, freedom, well-being, and welfare of humanity. There is no specific political system in Islam. Nevertheless, the Islamic political systems are based on the principles of *Shariah.* The great Islamic philosopher, al-Ghazali, summarizes the principles of *Shariah*, "to promote the welfare of the people, which lies in safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, their posterity and their wealth." He further writes that, "Whatever ensures the safeguarding of these five serves public interest and is desirable."[2]

Islamic political principles are based on *shura* (mutual consultation), justice, freedom, and equality. There are clear texts in the *Qur'aan* and *Sunnah* verifying the conduct of *shura* in political affairs. The fundamental political principles of Islam include:

- both the *Qur'aan* and *Sunnah* clearly define the values and guidelines for the Muslim community

- no unique procedure for choosing rulers was identified by the two sources of Islam. The method was left for each Muslim community and that is why selection methods for the four Caliphs differed. Many contemporary Muslim political thinkers recognize the best procedure is the election of the head of the state and other representative bodies through direct free elections by all citizens

- political freedom is an indispensable value, guaranteed to be fundamental in Islam. Islam guaranteed the greatest of freedoms, the freedom to believe 1400 years ago, while this freedom was unknown to any philosophy or religion

- *Shura* is a legal process whereby the executive authority is obliged to accept the decisions of the legislative body.[3] *Shura* is defined as the process through which decisions concerning the state's public affairs are made and it constitutes the backbone of the Islamic political system

- equality before the law and equity in the treatment of citizens and in the assessment of their rights and liberties are essential Islamic values. Such values should under no circumstances be abandoned

- political activism for virtue by any individual is required in the form of enjoining what is right and what is wrong **Al-Qur'aan*, 3:104)

- rulers are accountable to the community and responsible for looking after its affairs. The Prophet himself endorsed this responsibility in action. No ruler ever claimed to enjoy immunity in any form

- justice, which Islam has accorded to a place of eminence in its legislation, is accorded higher value as a system of law than in any other belief system. No stronger proof for this could be given than the many verses in the *Qur'aan* that urge and enjoin justice in a general, universal order, encompassing all human affairs

- further political Islamization of Somaliland politics, for Somalilanders, means more than future political stability. It means more faithfulness and internalization of Islamic values and less infidelity. It implies consonance of our world view with our socio-economic life that has remained inconsistent for so long.

What Do We Mean By Democratization?

Although there are some democratic elements of decision making in Somali traditional political systems, the modern democratic form has not been well practiced. In fact, there was a promising democratization right after the colonial powers left, but incongruent tribalism defaced it and the following 22 years of harsh dictatorship together with stern application of Marxism further held back any political democratization. During the last ten years, Somaliland has performed a rapid political democratization. Almost all institutions of a democratic state are on place. However, there are many important elements of democracy that are absent and seriously needed. Accountability and transparency are not known in the political arenas of governmental offices.

In contrast to all forms of authoritarian government, democracy comprises procedures for arriving at collective decisions through public controversies and compromises based on the fullest possible participation of citizens. At a minimum, democratic procedures include equal and universal adult suffrage within guarantees of minority rights, which ensure that collective decisions are approved by a substantial number of those expected to make them. Democratic procedures also include protection from arbitrary arrest and respect for law among citizens and their representatives. In addition, democratic principles assure the constitutional guarantees of freedom of assembly and expression and other civil and political liberties, which help guarantee that those expected to decide or to elect those who decide, are included. In this system, people can choose from among real alternatives and pursue various social policies (in fields such as health, education, child care, and basic income provision) which prevent market exchanges from becoming dominant and thereby ensure that citizens can live as free individuals by enjoying basic political and civil entitlements.

Expressed differently, democracy requires the institutional division between a certain form of state and civil society. It is a system of open-ended institutions in which the exercise of power is flexibly controlled. It is a multi-layered political and social mosaic in which political decision-makers at the local, regional, national, and supranational levels are assigned the job of serving the *res publica*, while, for their part, citizens living within the nooks and crannies of civil society are obliged to exercise vigilance in preventing each other and their rulers from abusing their powers and violating the spirit of the commonwealth.

John Keane,[4] in *Democratic and Civil Society* has argued at length that the minimum definition of democratic procedures is not wedded to any particular form of life. He views it as a basic precondition of the peaceful cohabitation of different forms of life, views, and opinions. So understood, democracy is not a power-hungry and moralizing ideology that claims to be universal, but rather a condition from and for ideology. Democracy is, in other words, the means by which a plurality of groups with different and often conflicting views, policies, and even beliefs can live with their differences and get along without murdering or dominating each other. Thus, democracy institutionalizes the right to be different.

Though democracy in the Somaliland context is less rooted than Islam, there are a number of intellectuals who deem it inevitable in political spheres. There is no doubt that the current political situation is in great need for more democratization. However, learning from the past, democratization needs more mindful contextualization and incorporation with Islam and local traditions.

Differences and Similarities

It is misleading to assume that democracy and Islam have no differences. Democracy is both a concept and a procedure that deals with the allocation of power. As a procedure, democracy has no substantial discrepancy with Islam. As a concept, democracy holds that sovereignty belongs to the people while Islam adheres to the sovereignty of Allah. Muslims are not apologetic about this point. Islam does not accept that judgments of imperfect human beings be substituted with the Will of the Creator they believe in. The idea of majority correctness is not valid in Islam. All Prophets, including Mohammed and Jesus (Peace Be Upon Him), began their revelations as individuals and as a minority, while we testify and witness to their righteousness. It is surprising and absurd to consider Islam as incompatible with democracy. Allah, rather than the people, is sovereign in Islam while just *one human being constitutionally remains sovereign in one of the outstanding democracies*, namely Great Britain, where the Queen rather than people is sovereign. Apart from the point of sovereignty and its related concepts and procedures, there are few differences.

One might argue that Islam, defined in an ideological way, contradicts democracy. Democracy resists absolutism or adherence to any pure and grand ideology. If liberalism, an ideology, and Christianity,

a religion, live with and shape democracy (*e.g.* liberal democracy, Christian Democrats) why not Muslim Democrats, as in the American Council of Islam and Democracy (ACID) pioneered by American Muslim intellectuals. Indeed, as observed in secularism in France (*e.g.* Scarve Case in Paris) and Kemalism in Turkey, the rejection of religion is itself a pseudo-ideology and yet compatible with democracy! In fact the transformation of European Christianity into the contemporary world of secular states was the final triumph of irreligious forces over the transcendentally anchored man. Further, instead of the Biblical passage, 'render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto God that which is God's,' Islam holds "*inil hukmu illaa lillaah, amara allaa ta'buduu illaa iyyaah,* the judgment (rule) is for none but Allah. He has commanded that you worship none but Him" (*Al-Qur'aan*, 12:40)

On one hand, we have secularism as a model promoted by democracy. This has been put into effect most consistently in France but in almost all other Western democratic states such as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Scandinavian states, religion and state remain linked in some form (in religious education, school prayers, church taxes, holidays, the observation of Sunday as day of rest, religious oaths, etc). Islam also denies the separation of state from religion. This is due to the fact that 'state' in Islam is not an end in itself, but is the stage preparatory to the Hereafter, which is the final and lasting life.

Islam and democracy, though different in some respects, share many governing values. Islam and democracy, briefly mentioned, share the election of the governing leaders, checks and balances of governmental organs, establishment of political parties and interest groups, the rule of law, political participation, and the guarantee of minority rights. Further, Islam and democracy both require transparent and accountable systems of governance. Islam and democracy live together smoothly in many parts of the Muslim world where the secularists respect democracy. This is now evident in countries such as Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Yemen. Islamists have their political parties in these countries and party politics guided by democratic and Islamic principles are respected. Islamists have been incorporated in the democratic processes and the democratization process has accelerated in these countries. The experience shows that Islamists respect and adhere to the rules of democracy much better than the secularists who claim to be democrats. Secularists never respected democracy in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Turkey, and therefore the democratization was aborted and prevented from taking place.

Conclusion

Few democratic processes have been allowed to succeed in the Muslim world and few regimes have agreed to hold fair elections. Democracy is well stated in the Somaliland constitution in which it declares adherence to Islam and its values. Many Muslim political thinkers view democracy's wisdom as a cluster of concepts that Muslim societies must incorporate into their ideology. Democracy must come to terms with the world view of Somaliland society as it works with the world view of those European and North American societies. Somaliland's future political stability lies in the harmonization of the people's world-view. The Islamic (ideology and faith) and democratic socio-political belief systems were torn apart, or at least kept apart by the extraneous systems of governance soon after independence.

The aspiration of the people of Somaliland during the struggle for independence for an Islamic constitution and Islamic state is an historical fact. The people of Somaliland overwhelmingly rejected the 1962 referendum for the mainly Italian secular constitution. They were demanding, instead, a more Islamic constitution. When religious scholars sent from Hargeisa to refute the secular constitution and instead demand an Islamic one were 'influenced' and came back with compliance, the Somaliland people sang with *waayahay wadaad wadankii dhammaa waxyar siisatee*. To the dismay of our people, the 1962 referendum was rigged, its results fraudulent. It is against this backdrop that many Somalilanders demand the re-combination of the Somaliland people's world-view, which are the Islamic heritage and the desired system of governance, namely, democracy.

The preceeding analysis shows that Islam and democracy are mutually reinforcing. Although religious elements are involved, Islamic political ideas do not involve complete rule by the religious hierarchy such as in *Shi'ite* Muslim states like Iran. In *Sunni* teachings, there is no *Velayati Faqih* who has the ultimate say on the interpretation of Islam. The Islamic political system involves a great deal of political participation and shares with democracy many features of the democratic process. The Islamic political system is based on *Shariah*, which constitutes the basis for the state's constitution and makes it morally binding. It is also democratic because the people enjoy the right of popular involvement in the managing of the state's affairs. Thus, mindful incorporation of Islamic and democratic political principles is essential for a stable Somaliland.

Endnotes

1. John Keane, *Democratic and Civil Society,* p. 29.

2. M. Umer Chapra, *Islam and the Economic Challenge*, 1990 (Recipient of the 1990 Islamic Development Bank and King Faisal International Awards in Islamic Studies)

3. Hassan al-Alkim, *Power-sharing Islam, 1993* p. 81.

4. A professor at the University of Westminister and Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy.

SECTION SIX

Reconciliation and Development

Introduction to Section Six

What are the long-term solutions to postwar clan conflict, landmine proliferation, rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure, and refugee re-entry? Five articles offer examples of different strategies, programs, and opportunities.

Which comes first, development or integration? Should one place energy first on creating a climate in which people can live together and then work on development? Or is it more feasible to launch development programs independent of the levels of integration, and hope for the best?

One paper suggests that both can be carried out at the same time. Using participatory tools to mobilize communities that may have intense internal conflicts, a small team of specialists helps villagers to resolve conflicts, build community consensus, and adopt action plans that the entire community will support.

Even so, with investment of considerable funds and with carefully planned interventions, a livelihood gap continues. In a well- documented presentation, Chaper Twenty Seven describes several reasons why. Their paper notes that in spite of major efforts in poverty alleviation, problems for much of Somalia remain overwhelming. The key is to reconcile differences among the warlords, creating plans in which local groups are free to define their own needs and write their own action plans.

The fourth paper identifies the contradiction between clan-based governance and the needs of development. Where, the author asks, are women and women's groups in clan governance models? Where do the young people fit? And where is the link between popular participation and the hierarchal model of clan governance. Perhaps the transition can be found in Chapter Six (page 91), which recounts how Somalilanders conducted a referendum with virtually all adult citizens – male and female – saying "yes.'.

The final article reminds us all that clan tensions are not the only source of friction in Somalia. The Bantu-speaking Somalis, living mostly in the region between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, are old and established members of the Somali society but have not been accorded their full share of representation in access to livelihoods and resources in Somalia.

Development is no easy task.

CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE

Reconciling Integration With Development

Abdulkadir Osman Farah

Introduction

Denmark shelters approximately 15,000 Somalis, mostly dispersed in major cities such as Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense, and Aalborg.[1] The largest number came as refugees. The rest migrated voluntarily because of student scholarships and family reunion procedures. They constitute the largest black African people in this small Scandinavian nation, with an obvious and strong Islamic-Somali identity. Somalis in Denmark have frequently been the subject of media debates (often biased) and practical challenges related to their integration into Danish society. At the same time, Somalis contribute to the efforts of reconstruction and development of their own country. This paper, based on observations and interviews with Somalis and their organizations, discusses how Somalis cope with integration and development, both in ways that are complementary as well as in areas of contradiction.[2] Further, the paper briefly assesses the role of the Danish authorities and NGOs in aiding integration and development of Somalis and Somalia.

Background

In understanding the level of integration in reconstruction and developmental conducted by the Somalis, the social, economic, and educational backgrounds constitute critical variables. Somalis arrived in Denmark in significant numbers during the early 1980s. These included young students who were members of various opposition groups operating at the time in and outside of Somalia. They were fiercely engaged in resisting the dictatorial regime of Siyad Barre. Many of them had finished secondary school before leaving Somalia and therefore had urban or semi–urban social backgrounds. They confronted minimum challenges and attracted no attention in pursuing education and employment opportunities. The positive tolerant climate towards outsiders and immigrants at the time might partially provide explanation. The early and mid-nineties witnessed a second influx of Somali refugees. Most of these recent newcomers belonged to the civil war refugees, escaping from a repressive regime. This second wave of Somalis was more diverse, representing different social, economic, age, class, political, and regional origins. With these latest arrivals, Danish politicians and ordinary citizens became apprehensive. Tensions heightened. Furthermore, with the UN/US involvement, the period was also characterized by international attention into the humanitarian and civil war crises of Somalia.

The third group belongs to the so-called post civil war victims consisting of Somalis who directly or indirectly experienced warlordism, banditry, total civil unrest, and hunger. Among many other disadvantages, this last group brought not only traumatic mental disorders that made adaptation to the Danish system difficult, but many of them had limited schooling and rural origins.

Nonetheless, there were elements among this group identifiable as elites of the ousted regime and the commercial sector. Due to the expanded quantity of recent arrivals supplemented by natural differences of culture and behavior between the Danish and Somalis, serious misunderstandings and conflicts, mainly initiated and sponsored by the media and the political elite, erupted. During this time, 2/3 of the Somali residents of this country experienced verbal accusation with racist slurs and undertones. Almost 1/5 of the Somalis said that they encountered some sort of physical abuse.[3] In addition extreme right wing politicians suggested that Somalis should be parachuted back into their war devastated country. These serious escalations, emanating from the Danish side, led Somali organizations and their activists to demand resettlement

of their community to less hostile countries.[4] Apparently disturbed by the deteriorating conditions of her fellow countrymen in Denmark and elsewhere, Maryan Mursal (a legendary Somali singer and artist, one of the prominent Somali figures who sought refuge here) reflecting the sober mood, toured and sang throughout Denmark, urging the Somalis not to blame anyone else but instead endeavor to seek peace through the alteration of their grave situation both back home and in exile:

Dunidu way i nala yaabtay
Dadyow, Dadyow
Ku dadaala nabad nabad
Soomaali u diida ceeb
Naftiina u diida cay.[5]

The whole world is startled bewildered
[By our bad behavior and condition]
Oh, people, people [The Somalis]
Promote peace, peace
Safeguard Somalia from dishonor
Safeguard yourselves from insult

The Definition of Concepts

The definition of integration is controversial. The word originates from the Latin and signifies "making it whole" by connecting and bringing variety and multiplicity together.[6] It refers to the process in which people, groups, and components with different cultures integrate, creating common understanding and sharing basic fundamental values. Moreover, it is a multidimensional notion as it concerns and involves cultural, historical, economic, technology and many other aspects. Through these interconnections power relations and inequality, related to the access of resources, emerge. Often the host nation or group imposes dominance, resulting in less equal opportunities and platform. Some analysts also differentiate structural and cultural integration. The first refers to the possibility of integrating the host country or nation through employment, obtaining political position, and acquiring appreciated socio-economic status. The second recounts the physical appearance, cultural practice, or performance, and the ordinary pursuit of distinct lifestyles and language expressions. Others distinguish internal and external integration, differentiating integration within the immigrant community and their

overall attempt of becoming part of the society.[7] The assumption is that in order to secure proper integration at the macro level, one must first ensure micro integration within ones nation or local group. Similar to this is the distinction between the so-called personal or cultural system on one hand, and the behavioral social system on the other. The later includes economic and social status and weighs more heavily than the former.[8]

The question of development is similarly intricate. In conventional terms, the concept relates to the level of economic and political development. Apart from the well-known debate on modernization that raged during the colonial and post colonial periods, the term development is specifically related to the division of the world into more industrialized and less developed parts. While much of the richer sections are said to belong to the advanced world, Africa, Asia, and Latin America are categorized as less fortunate and poorer parts of the world. Thus, the general understanding of the concept induces the efforts of poorer countries and peoples modernizing their political and economic structures, thereby following or imitating the more advanced parts of the world. As far as Africa is concerned, the nationalist movements that replaced the colonial powers and the subsequent military rulers represented the internal version of development strategies and mechanisms.[9] Another significant dimension of the concept of development relates to the input provided by exile or diaspora groups and individuals for the benefit of their country of origin. Immigrant groups and refugees, because of the pressure from civil wars, oppression, and economic difficulties, seek opportunities for protection and to leave the country. Though it may take longer than expected, when these deficiencies subside, the chances of these people contributing to development and reconstruction efforts in their home countries increase. Similarly, the connection, direct or indirect, between the immigrant or the refugee and his/her country of origin persists in generations.

Another significant point worth mentioning is that most immigrants and refugees constitute the most capable of their societies, economically, educationally, and politically. Their contribution is indispensable. For instance, both the Irish and Jewish diaspora communities in the United States have done enormously well in assisting the development of their countries of origin, with the help of enjoying the favorite environment of the host country in accommodating their desire. Concerning the Somalis, it is widely known that during the 70s, Somali immigrant employees in Arabian Gulf countries contributed to the welfare of the Somali economy and people. In the course of this analysis, development simplistically

refers to the actions and initiatives taken by the refugees or the diaspora in providing assistance to the well being of their home country.

The Somalis and Integration

The integration of Somalis in Denmark is a relevant question to investigate. Eventual reflections and responses to the issue largely depend on which aspect to emphasize and for whom to propose straightforward inquiry. A lot has happened since Somalis arrived in Denmark. Unlike earlier stages, the presence of colorful Somalis around major towns no longer instigates controversial debates among the Danish. For similar reasons, no major parties are selectively preoccupied in demanding the expulsion of the Somalis, at least not in public. Nonetheless, the survey findings, recently conducted by a respected regional newspaper among randomly selected Danes, indicates their dissatisfaction of having a Muslim, particularly a Somali, as a neighbor.[10] Alternatively, one could examine the degree of integration by assessing the satisfaction or the willingness of the Somalis to stay in Denmark. Different and rather contradicting responses emerge.

The first group, obviously frustrated by the absence of progress, asserts that Denmark, in conjunction with many other European countries, appears increasingly hostile. Consequently, serious struggle in terms of values and religion progresses. This conflict seems difficult or impossible to correct in the short run. Thus successful integration into these societies remains an illusion. The proponents of these ideas urge fellow compatriots to maintain contact with the motherland and promote reconstruction there. Furthermore, they raise concerns on Somali children adapting to the host country's cultures and values, representing serious disadvantages and setbacks in the long run.

The second, and relatively moderate point of view, suggests that Europe and particularly Denmark positively responded to our rescue when we were in desperate deprivation, as persecuted refugees, particularly in a situation where our own country and people neglected and suppressed us. Thus, remaining in Denmark, according to this proposal, is much more reasonable and beneficial than returning and reconstructing a society that is deadlocked into an indefinite and endless cycle of conflict.

The third and the final opinion propounds that the West, including Denmark, represent the core of the world. From this region, the rest of world's directions are literally steered. In other words, what happens here affects the rest of humanity that increasingly remains marginal and

subordinate. Somalis should feel satisfied to have sought refuge to the core, where the future of the world politically and economically is largely determined. By not pursuing aggressive integration in Denmark, Somalis not only hurt themselves in the short term, but such tendencies directly undermine their people having representatives that could talk on their behalf in the core, concludes this position.[11]

Examining how Somalis are doing in regard to the so-called external integration, it is easily observable that Somalis are increasingly entering the employment market in major Danish cities. For instance, in Aalborg and the greater part of western Jutland, due to native Danish migration to southwards and urban centers, immigrants, including Somali residents, occupy vacant underprivileged employment such as cleaning and slaughterhouse jobs. In addition, as the result of relatively higher birth rate, Somali children participate in almost every major public school in large cities. Consequently, more football and cultural clubs recruit Somali youth to compete in local and regional tournaments. Political and organizational efforts are underway to increase the number of Somalis who join integration councils and even run for municipality seats.[12]

As far as internal integration among the Somalis is concerned, one senses relative improvement. A difficult task still lies ahead. In the early '90s, during the peak of atrocities and the devastation of the civil war, Somalis understandably divided themselves into vicious regional and clan groups. To the bewilderment of many, some even collected huge amounts of money for the warring parties in the country. It is significant to note as the contempt of warlordism and civil conflict gained ground and momentum in Somalia proper, so did the unwillingness to finance warfare from Scandinavia. Subsequently, Somalis began to organize themselves through religious, professional, interest, or friendship ranks.

Despite all these differences, most Somalis have been living in Denmark for over 15 years. In terms of adjusting to this country, for instance learning the language, looking for jobs, and observing the rules, Somalis are considered integrated. But unfortunately, many, even after extended residence in Denmark, continue to be dependent on the state for help. Answering why the situation is like this, they complain on structural and institutional problems propelling them into indefinite passivity. Their organizations agree, blaming the widespread discrimination both in the private and the public sector as the main obstacle. Nonetheless, Somalis are relatively good in the Danish language, while their numbers in schools and the employment sectors are moderately increasing.

Providing multiple explanations suggests that in terms of

immigration, Denmark is a beginner in this area. Evidence, nonetheless, shows that this country enjoyed the status of being an empire for centuries, bringing numerous countries and nations under its rule. Others attribute the reluctance to the geographical constraint and the lack of natural resources. This is far from convincing either as countries that are similar or smaller than Denmark (for instance, The Netherlands and Luxembourg) deal with the situation much more effectively. The situation even worsened in recent months as right wing parties overwhelmingly won November national elections, subsequently proposing serious indiscriminate restrictive policies making access to this country extremely limited.[13] In order for ordinary Somalis to integrate and became part of this society in the long run, models have to be found. For instance, those who could make headway in various socio-economic and cultural aspects could provide role models for younger generations. The political and structural environment of this country must similarly change, ensuring a multiethnic platform.

The Somalis and Development

While most claimed to have some ideas about integration because of the intense debate concerning this controversial topic, the number of Somalis understanding development is relatively small. For most it signifies helping and assisting relatives back home, making money, developing one's ancestral region, or simply imitating groups of Somalis who have conducted such programs. Few of them mention state or national development. Instead most think about individual, economic, or family welfare gain. Somalis in Denmark annually transfer an amount of 70 million DK (approximately $9,000,000) in remittances. This is a significant economic transaction, not always professionally organized, but normally channeled to cover the daily living needs of relatives back home. Similarly, few Somali groups or associations are involved in the efforts of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts of their country. Most do it individually by building a house or establishing a small factory for their immediate family. It is also limited what the Somalis in Denmark do in regard to reconciliation efforts back home. Earlier, Somalis differed on numerous ideologically and political issues. But Somalis in Denmark seem these days to understand each other as they discover their common heritage and destiny, whether in Denmark or any where else.

Discussing the impact on integration here in Denmark by developmental activities, Somalis undertake to help their people back

home. Several scenarios are worth underlining. First is the decision to work for a better future in Denmark. For instance, that includes pursuing further education, getting jobs, and investing for the long term. Interview results attest that this strategy mainly appeals to those who stayed in Denmark for the longest period. Some of them have jobs, bought houses, and invested their futures in Denmark. In addition, many have the privilege of bringing their close relatives out of the civil war ravaged Somalia. In contrast, the second group prefers focusing extensively on the development, the connection, and the rehabilitation of Somalia. The members of this group are characterized by their willingness to maintain almost daily contact with relatives and families back home, and for that reason supply routine economic assistance. Most of them are recent arrivals with extended civil war experience. They admit that they would have a guilty conscience if they paid less attention to their country and family back home. The fact is that these groups confront serious problems concerning integration. To name one familiar example, activities exist after formal school hours that contribute to the health, education, and personality of the child. These activities require additional funds. Should Somalis send money back home to help family members there? Or should they invest it in Denmark for after school programs that will increase the cultural integration of their children into Danish lifestyles?

The strategy of conducting integration and development at the same time is the most productive arrangement. In order for this to produce positive results, Somalis must ensure internal integration supplemented with capable and reliable organizations in Denmark. Second, through these organizations, the community needs to establish better relationships with the Danish public and relevant NGOs, combined with better coordination and support to the civil societies back home. Though it might sound like an exaggeration, during the most devastating years of Somalia's civil war, a broad range of civil society groups such as women's, religious, humanitarian, and environmental associations emerged. Most of the Somalis in the diaspora left home without knowing the existence of these organizations. Therefore, to a certain extent, one senses that for nostalgic reasons, diaspora Somalis maintain practices and cleavages that are passé in Somalia.

Danish NGOs and Integration

There are numerous Danish organizations involved in humanitarian and development activities. Among the leading of those are the Danish

Association for International Cooperation (popularly known MS) and the Danish Refugee Council. The two organizations have helped and shown particular interest in the Somali community's attempt to integrate and pursue development and recovery back home. Historically, both organizations are the product of World War II, initially created to tackle European problems. Following the disaster of the world wars, Europe confronted refugee problems and devastation, leading to the formulation and introduction of the refugee regimes and conventions the world knows today. The idea was to protect Europeans from Europeans. In those old days, these organizations were idealistic and organizationally independent, as they aimed at providing help and support for needed people. Consequently, they enjoyed support and appreciation from ordinary people and voluntary groups and associations. The focus rested on peace and prosperity in Europe.

In the contemporary and much more complex world, these organizations differ in terms of structure, ideology, and approach. The stress lies upon the organization itself, its performance, and capacity. Strong lobby-oriented organizations come into being not only for the purpose of an idealistic goal but also for the sake of enhancing the organization's ability, capacity, and conduct, demanding competent management. Accordingly, a greater share of the organization's budget goes to capacity building and internal organizational activities.

In recent years, programs from these organizations designed to assist immigrants and refugees have increased. As people from distant regions made their way to Denmark, these institutions provided expertise and space for not only the new inhabitants but also for the state and government. Especially, the Danish Refugee Council attained the responsibility of integrating the new comers into the society. Unfortunately, after criticism, particularly from right wing parties, the municipalities and the state assumed responsibility. Clearly disappointed with such measures, the Danish Refugee Council together with MS began instead undertaking certain mediating and promoting activities aimed at bringing the Danish majority and the different minorities together.

As far as cooperation with the Somalis is concerned, MS (Danish Association for International Cooperation) enjoys a good relationship with Somalis and their organizations. The association launches joint efforts enhancing the integration of the Somalis. The Somali organizations and MS held debates and social gatherings dealing with current affairs and cultural events. More recently, MS began recruiting Somali members and activists for its local and national board.[14] MS

further helps providing the resource and the financial backing to host major conferences and seminars with guests from abroad.[15] In all these aspects, community sharing of information, understanding, and idea exchange attract considerable attention.

The Danish Refugee Council is also a leading non-governmental organization with good working relationships with the Somali community. For instance, in the last two years, a project has been helping Somalis to create a network of media and an additional one of involving, maintaining, and promoting contact among the resource groups started. Despite criticism from certain participants, the process is proceeding and have so far created some sort of network among the Somalis who are interested in integration.

The Danish NGOs and Development

In terms of development and reconstruction efforts, both MS and DRC are international organizations with capacity and offices extending beyond Denmark and European borders. Though originating in Denmark, these organizations conduct global humanitarian obligations. The DRC is currently involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Somalia.[16] They help repatriation of Somalis from Ethiopia and neighboring countries for eventual resettlement and re-schooling programs.[17] The humanitarian work in Somalia is the least controversial, but disagreements arise when discussing DRC' s work on integrating in Denmark, more precisely its attempt to help some Somalis to go back home. Henceforth, Somalis, particularly their associations, demand and call for complete explanations of what the government does and what the NGO undertakes. The recent anti-foreign climate manifested itself through the legislature and the general mood among the Danish. Thus, Somalis suspect that Danish non-governmental organizations might be dragged into an attempt to deport unwanted or unwelcome Somalis.

On its part, MS, though not directly involved in reconstruction efforts of Somalia, has facilitated basic humanitarian assistance to other organizations, transporting materials to Somalia. MS operates in over a dozen program countries. Negotiations and preliminary considerations are under process in establishing contacts with partners in Somalia, if the security situation allows it.

In Denmark, governmental and NGO policies are less dramatic and fractious than in other countries. Basic ideas converge and appear less confrontational. Denmark is also a member of the European Union and

therefore complies with EU regulations and directives in dealing with third world poorer countries like Somalia. Thus, formulating fully independent development strategies seem restrained. It is however worth noting that demographically, the number and organizational capacity of the Somalis residing in Denmark is increasing. They are in the process of organizing themselves better with the intention of exploiting the democratic opportunities available.[18] Through this, they could be effective members of the Danish NGOs and could influence governmental decisions directed to their country. The Somalis could further investigate the taxation possibilities where it is possible to transfer money for humanitarian and developmental purposes. Finally, they could initiate macro- and micro projects or simply extend support to those already under process in Somalia.

Undoubtedly, Danish companies and NGOs could make major differences in economic and developmental concerns in Somalia. For instance, Danish expertise could also be a major benefit for the locals in Somalia. Although these organizations undertake numerous valuable tasks, they suffer from limitations. Their overwhelming state dependence compromises their independent role as dynamic and inventive organizations. For instance, in crisis periods, they may stay away from controversial issues that may negatively influence their relationship with the authorities. Accordingly, they could easily approve efforts by the state to repatriate and enforce particular politics that necessarily not confirm the principles of these organizations or the wishes and well-being of refugees.

The declining membership consent and public support also limits the organizational enthusiasm. More significantly, with the expanding bureaucratic structures, these organizations obtain their own life, where a great deal of strength and intensity diverts to lobbying and so on.

Conclusion

Most problems confronting Somalis in Denmark and their home country could be solved through institutionalization and dialogue. First, there is an urgent need to combat racism and intolerance in Denmark. Without this fundamental initiative, nothing will be accomplished. In short, Somalis should feel welcome in order to construct loyalty toward this society and its centuries old institutions. Moreover, evidence from various countries shows that prejudice and intolerance could be partially eliminated through structural and institutional innovation. In extension,

Denmark would sooner or latter discover the benefits of legislating and regulating the employment and social sector to help immigrants – herewith the Somalis – to establish roots in these areas.

Second, there is a need to distinguish governmental (state) performance from NGO conduct. Naturally, in order to preserve state-society convergence, civil society components should demonstrate loyalty towards the legislative and executive institutions. Nonetheless, most expect that the role of the NGO constituents is safeguarding and promoting the interest of less fortunate components of the society.

Third, instead of mediation and information processing tasks, activities that Somali associations are capable of undertaking, the Danish NGOs should initiate long term progressive efforts to help Somalis combine better conditions here in Denmark and back home. That is achievable by coordinating the efforts of Danish NGOs and the Somalis to engage in small projects such as education, poverty eradication, and institutional capacity building in Somalia.

On their part, Somalis and their organizations need to be creative in their attempt to be part of the Danish society. For instance, they need to modernize their organizational methods to empower less qualified and influential members of their community to acquire further qualifications and knowledge. In order to gain proper and successful external integration with other nationals, hereunder the Danish, Somalis must maintain tolerant inter-community dialogue and cohesion. Inevitably, everything depends on the fate of the more than decade-long Somali conflict. Without its total conclusion, Somalis will have no other option but to continue following the difficult path in search of an optimal combination of successful integration and promising development.

Endnotes

1. The statistics office of Denmark reports that in 1999 there were 13,500 Somalis in Denmark.

2. Dozens of Somalis contributed information about their situation in Denmark and their contact and relationship with relatives and family members back home.
3. Studies conducted by Lise Togeby, quoted in "Somalis and Their Everyday Life in Denmark," thesis presented at Danish School of Journalism, June 2000.

4. "Somalis and their Everyday Life in Denmark," thesis presented at the Danish School of journalism.

5. Quoted from a cassette recorded by Maryan Mursal. together with Danish artists in 1995.

6. *Gyldendals Foreign Concepts Dictionary*, 1993.

7. Dialog og debat om de Somaliske flygtninges integration i Danmark, 3-4 Juni 1996, Dansk Flygtningehjælp (p. 7-8).

8. Talcott Parsons quoted in Klassisk og moderne samfundsteori (Red) Heine Andersen og Lars Bo.Kaspersen, 1996, p. 243-244.

9. Hague, Harrop, Breslin, *Comparative Government and Politics,* 1993, p.168-169.

10. Århus Stiftstidende measuring tolerance among the Danish in late 90s.

11. Group of Somalis responding to the question of integrating and becoming part of the Danish Society.

12. Somalis, representing various political parties, joined as candidates in Nov. 2001 municipality elections.

13. The major Liberal Party joined the Conservative Peoples Party and the extreme right anti-immigrant Danish Populist Party to build a right wing coalition, sidelining centrist parties for the first time in generations.

14. MS Regional Newsletter, Aarhus 2001.

15. MS Newsletter 2001, Aarhus.

16. International Projects, leaflet from Danish Refugee Council, September 2000.

17. Dansk Flygtningehjælp, En kort præsentation af organizationens arbejde i Danmark og Verden.

18. Hetz Mod Somaliere, Article at Jyllandsposten 29-05-2001 by Abdulkadir Osman Farah

CHAPTER TWENTY SIX

Participatory Tools for Peace Building: New Models for African Governance

Richard Ford and Adan Abokor

Introduction

Twenty-first century Africa faces many challenges, not the least of which is to consider new models to maintain peace and provide effective governance. During the final decade of the 20th century, at least a dozen Africa nations have fallen prey to wanton and whimsical exploitation that has led to the disintegration of many states and societies. While many of these states continue in conflict and turmoil, Somaliland offers a different model of governance. They are combining traditional and modern practices in ways that carve out new modes of management, power sharing, decentralization, and decision-making. An example drawn from the village of Dararweyne, 35 kms northeast of Hargeisa, offers lessons about a community finding ways to solve its own problems, setting precedents for the *de facto* decentralization that will almost certainly be part of Africa's 21st century governance. This case study notes how the

community has been using analytical tools, drawn largely from Participatory Rural Appraisal, to hammer out new styles of decision-making, leadership, peace building and conflict mediation.[1]

The Setting

Dararweyne is an agro-pastoralist village of 120 irrigated farms, located along a seasonal riverbed (*tog*). Roughly 100 households make it their primary residence. During the rainy season, water is abundant and the farms productive. When the rains stop, the river dries up and water is available only to those who have the means to pump it from shallow wells dug in or near the sandy tog. About twenty-five of the farmers own pumps. A few additional families have access to the pumps through clan and family connections. Many others irrigate by hand.

Those with pumps produce good harvests twice, and sometimes three times a year, including mango, papaya, banana, citrus fruits, tomatoes, lettuce and maize, much of which is sold in the nearby Hargeisa market. These crops made Dararweyne a prosperous community before 1985. Yet even a small and isolated village could not avoid the trauma and destruction of the civil war fought against the Siyad Barre regime in the late 1980s.

Dararweyne's people are mostly members of three Isaaq sub clans who had lived in peace and harmony for many years, even through some of the worst times of the civil war. While many fled the community and sought sanctuary in refugee camps in Ethiopia during some of those years (1988-1991), some stayed on, especially women, and continued to produce crops for sale in the markets of Hargeisa and environs.

The secret of their peaceful existence can be easily identified. Settlement began in 1956. In spite of a severe drought that year, farmers produced a modest harvest and the settlement slowly grew. In particular, the new settlers relied on the ago-old Somali tradition of *guus*, a village practice in which the community would help a farmer or family in time of need. From house building, to offering assistance in time of flood, to relining a collapsed well, to weeding a farm, to raising funds for burial of a family loved one, *guus* enabled the people of Dararweyne to carve out close working relationships and strong community ties, in spite of the presence of three sub clans. In those early years, the elders drew up an agreement of "peaceful coexistence" in which all families agreed to put the interests of the community ahead of those of their clan. They relied

on their internal leadership to settle conflicts within the community and to avoid involvement in external clashes. For example, in 1958 there was a short but sharp clash between two sub clans – Arab and Eidagelle – that Dararweyne elders avoided. While the village participated in protests for independence in the late 1950s through the Somali National League (SNL), they did not become embroiled in the local politics or small land access conflicts.

Peace lasted until the mid-1980s when the anti-Siyad war became intense. Even then, the people of Dararweyne still pursued a strategy for peace. For example, one woman elder in the village, whose husband had been killed in the fighting, decided she was going to do something about insuring "her" people's safety. In the thick of the Somali National Movement (SNM)-Siyad fighting, in 1990, she organized a meeting in her Dararweyne home between the local military leaders of both sides. By her account, the meeting went on for several days with the commanders coming regularly, drinking tea together, and talking about the war. At the conclusion of the meeting, she had secured an agreement that neither side would bother the village farms, most of which were managed by women in those days because the men had either joined the fighting or fled the region. The farms continued to produce in 1989-1991 and the women were able to sell vegetables in the Hargeisa market on a regular basis. So effective was the agreement that the Dararweyne women accumulated considerable profit from their sales and established a loan fund that they shared with the men when they returned in 1992-1994. The loans enabled the farms to return to production.

Regrettably, the cooperative and peaceful traditions were not to continue. The elders who had founded the settlement in the 1950s were getting old, had been killed in the war, or had died. They were no longer able to maintain the harmony and collaborative spirit of Dararweyne's earlier decades. Authority passed to a younger generation of villagers who did not know the skills of peace making. Instead, they had been socialized through the experiences of civil war. Peace making was not high on their agenda. Further, whereas the sub clans had lived in peace before the war, differences in political orientation during the conflicts had raised tensions among the people and created suspicion and distrust between and among members of the community. In addition to the leadership vacuum, the youth of the village were developing new ideas about their future. They sought the adventure of the urban life style in nearby Hargeisa rather than the security of farming in the village. They

had learned new values during the war and priority for family solidarity was not one of them. Because of the scarcity of young people in the village, families began to hire cheap agricultural laborers from Ethiopia.

Matters came to a boil when two of the remaining founding elders died in 1998-1999. The central government appointed a 'new elder' from a pastoral community in the area even though his group had not been an integral part of Dararweyne's agricultural tradition. The new elder was unable to settle local conflicts such as friction between young people who sought permission to use new land or tap new water sources. Nor could he bring harmony among brothers who had inherited a farm from their father and could not decide how to divide the land or cooperate in farming it. Nor could he settle disputes within families about who would be responsible for taking care of aging mothers who could no longer work or pay health fees.

The division in the community not only caused disharmony among the villagers, it exerted negative impacts on village morale. A storm in 1998 blew off the roof of the village clinic. In earlier days, the elders would have called a public workday and mobilized communal labor to buy materials and repair the roof. In 1998, no such days were organized and the roof remained unrepaired. Clinic services stopped. The latrines in the school were no longer useable and the walls of the school itself crumbling, but no one volunteered to fix them. Some of the shallow wells were deteriorating and water for irrigation less available, but no village work team cleaned or relined the wells. Land mines planted during the war were blocking some of the access roads to farms and obstructing external markets for the community, but no villagers volunteered to work with the de-mining team to clear the explosives. The peace and harmony of Dararweyne's early years were eluding the village of the 21st century. Perhaps the ultimate problem was that the community could not agree on forming a new council of elders that all would support. Given the nature of clan tension and rivalry that had emerged, elders on the council tended to put their clan interests ahead of the community. The conflicts were so great that even productivity on individual farms was declining because of the village-wide malaise.

The Challenge

Without peace there can be no development.
Without development there can be no peace.

Dararweyne had a problem that was greater than the people could solve by themselves. Elders had learned of an NGO in Hargeisa that might help. They made contact and agreed that the NGO would come to Dararweyne and see what might be done.

The plan evolved through the following steps. Good peace building at any level – global, national, regional or local – may take place if the adversaries can establish common ground, values, or goals that all groups in the community endorse. To get to the stage of common goals requires a systematic method.

Most conflicts are rooted in one or a combination of three types of causes. One set are *spatial* in nature and involve conflict over access to resources such as land or water or over mineral resources with economic value. Second, causes of conflict may be *historical* in nature, evolving over many years (or centuries), changing over time and erupting in different forms at different times. The historical tensions are usually based in the belief that a wrong has been committed and that a grievance against one or more parties has not been settled. The third source of tension are social-institutional rifts that may involve ethnic, religious, class, caste, gender, family, or national disputes based on real or perceived differences.

Conflict mediation therefore requires digging deeply into the spatial, historical, and socio-institutional experience of a community and developing a profile(s) of the problem and its causes. It is also helpful to analyze this information to learn what efforts have been attempted in the past to resolve these problems and whether some approaches have worked – and why, as well as other approaches that have not worked – and why not. Once problems have been analyzed, the next step is to determine which of these needs is of most concern or highest priority to the community. Further, it is useful to see what ideas the community may have about solving these tensions. The priority needs and possible solutions can be identified with tools for ranking, involving all members of the community. The ranking usually results in consensus within the community about common needs. It also enables most residents to assume ownership for these priorities. This process concludes with an action plan that the community devises to resolve or at least ease its tensions. The sequential plan appears as Figure 1.

Figure 1


PARTICIPATORY TOOLS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PEACE BUILDING IN SOMALILAND
SPATIAL DATA COLLECTION
TEMPORAL DATA COLLECTION
SOC/INST DATA COLLECTION
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
RANKING PROBLEMS
RANKING SOLUTIONS
ESTABLISHING COMMON NEEDS: FOR EXAMPLE, LEADERSHIP, WATER, LAND, HOUSING, HEALTH, EDUCATION, INCOME
COMMUNITY'S VERSION OF ACTION PLAN
SEARCH FOR ACTION PARTNERS
JOINT ACTION PLAN
Routine Participatory Tools
Tools Adapted to Conflict Mediation

The Nature of Participatory Tools

Over the last 15 years, a revolution has occurred in data collection, analysis, and action for rural development. Bundled together under the general rubric of participatory methods, these tools offer a new approach for field research and action. While used extensively to plan and implement community development projects such as micro credit, water development, soil erosion control, health and family planning, or rehabilitation of access road, the tools have been slow to catch on for local peace building. The Dararweyne experiment was designed, in part, to determine if these tools could be used effectively for community-based conflict mediation. The tools share the characteristic of bringing groups of people in a community together to create charts, diagrams, maps, or other visual representations of their community. Bringing groups together for such exercises offers a number of virtues.

First, by meeting in groups, information flows between and among villagers and back and forth between the field team and the community. Unlike the one-way flow of information from questionnaires, the iterative quality of participatory tools enables residents to correct one another, modify their responses, think in detail about the questions and tasks at hand, and interact with the field team as they construct a chart and diagrams about their community.

Second, the visual character of the exercises enables all members of the community to participate. While questionnaires favor the literate and articulate who are accustomed to verbal discourse, the visual representations enable non-literate villagers to make their voices heard on equal terms with the community's local elite. The visual nature of the documentation therefore enables marginalized or minority members of a community to express their opinions and priorities in ways that questionnaires do not encourage.

Third, creating diagrams neutralizes and depersonalizes data collection. Questions are not asked about how many cattle or goats one owns. Rather, residents prepare sketch maps or institutional diagrams that indicate how or where different problems or accomplishments can be found in the community or which institutions in a village are more effective than others. No political or personality factors need enter the data collection.

Fourth, participatory tools ensure more accurate responses because data are collected in a public forum. Public responses are offered in the

presence of one's peers and colleagues in which the openness of the data collection provides quality control through the presence of the rest of the community. Accuracy is more likely than with private interviews and questionnaires.

Participatory tools therefore yield qualitative information about community perceptions rather than the statistical information of questionable accuracy compiled from questionnaires. Because participatory tools are designed to help a community see itself in a new light, to bring the community into consensus about which needs are most important and to help the community act in a unified way, these tools help villagers assume greater control of their own planning and development.

Given these new perspectives and tools through which communities can manage their own information to build partnerships with outside groups, the role of participatory tools in peace building assumes new and intriguing dimensions.

Participatory Data Collection and Analysis in Dararweyne

Spatial Data

If local conflicts are caused, in part, by factors related to spatial distribution, it is important to gather data about the community's spatial layout. Dararweyne villagers prepared four types of spatial data: a Sketch Map (Figure 2); Livelihood Maps — to show amounts of livelihood earned inside and outside the village; Farm Sketches — to illustrate different types of farming systems and land use practices; and a Transect — to show differences from one part of the community to another. Drawing and presenting the Sketch Map enabled the community to begin discussions about their needs. Topics and needs discussed during the mapping included: clinic not functioning, school inadequate to house the community's children, insects and other pests infesting farmers' fields, difficulties in marketing agricultural produce in Hargeisa, poor capacity for food storage in the community, weak agricultural extension services from the government, and deficiencies in the village's leadership.

The field team made no attempt to rank these problems or to evaluate which ones could be the key to the community's tensions. Instead, they recorded the comments as villagers presented their map to the assembled community. In a later evaluation of the exercise, field team members stated that the sketch map was a good way to get to know the village. It

Figure 2
Sketch Map of Dararweyne



also engaged the community immediately with a task that they knew well and which they were comfortable to present. Making the map also opened a dialogue between the community and the field team in ways in which the villagers were the "experts," not the outsiders. In a return visit to Dararweyne six months after the planning exercise, villagers responded in a group meeting with comments such as:

> ... the map helped us a lot as it provided a picture of the various places where we work,
> ... the map helped us to organize village clean up campaigns,
> ... the sketch map indicates clearly the location of the school, water sources, roads and the river bed. It made it much easier for us to locate and discuss our problem areas.

Information from some of the other spatial exercises helped identify previous successes as well as provide additional detail about some of the community's continuing needs.

Temporal Data

The second category of causes of local-level conflict arises from persistent grievances. To gather information about time-related themes, the field team helped the villagers to assemble a timeline, several trends lines, a seasonal calendar, and two gender calendars, one from the men's perspective and the second from a woman's point of view (Figure 3). The timeline established a list of important events in the life of the community since its founding in 1956. The trend lines (not shown) enabled the community to show changes over the last 20 to 30 years. Topics the community chose to represent as important trends included: vegetation cover, education, health, family income, livestock, population, and agriculture. Recording the trend lines reinforced information on some of the problems and successes gathered with the spatial exercises and introduced some new problems such as health and livestock.

The gender calendar stimulated an especially dramatic discussion. The women wanted the entire community to know that men were not providing the same support that they had before the war. In very clear terms they portrayed the day of an "average man" as one of chewing *qat*, quarreling with his wife, and not working very hard on the farm. While many men took issue with this "calendar," the men did say that the

Figure 3
Gender Calendar: Women's Views About Daily Work in April for Women and Men

Time	Household Woman	Farm Woman	Serious Man	Average Man	
				Pastoralist	Farmer
5.00 am	-wakes up and prays -lights the fire and puts on the kettle	-wakes up and prays -lights the fire	-wakes up and prays -breakfasts		-refuses to wake up
6.30 am	-starts cleaning the house while the water boils -prepares the breakfast	-the same -the same	-takes his tools and walks to the farm	-wakes up -drinks tea	-wakes up for breakfast
8.00 am	-feeds the family and prepares and sends the children to school -milks the goats -takes the goats to herders	-takes breakfast to farm workers -supervises the farm workers	-digs, levels the ground -divides into squares	-goes to village after ordering the family to look after the livestock	-back to bed
9.00 am	-walks to the farm and collects fruits, vegetables and works on the farm. -returns home and collects firewood on her way back	-the same -helps out pick the harvest -puts the vegetables and fruits in boxes and sacks	-waters the ground -plants seeds		
11.00 am	-cooks lunch and feeds the family before praying. -fetches water, cleans dishes	-loads vegetables and fruits on the pick up to town -work on the farm -returns home & prays	-continues work on the farm -prays, back home to have his lunch and take a nap.	-starts chewing -walks back home arrives and beats up the family for losing a camel or a goat	-wakes up and eats lunch -goes to farm -picks up fruits and vegetables and takes them to village in exchange for qat
3.00 pm	-kneads dough for dinner -washes clothes -prepares the pancakes	-the same -the same -waits for the return of the pick up to find information on the sales prices.	-back to the farm -picks fruits, vegetables -prays -prepares sacks and boxes		
6.30 pm	-milks the goats and prays -feeds the family before the last prayer	-back home and prays -feeds the family and helps children with homework	-loads fruits, vegetables -back home -chewing and chatting		-children ask for food and he sends them back empty handed or borrows the money
8.30 pm	-ensures children do homework and puts them to bed.	-starts to weave			-goes home and starts a fight with his wife

women carried a disproportionately large share of the household and farm duties in the village.

The temporal data served many useful purposes. First, it complemented and in several cases reinforced the problem identification task of the spatial data collection. It provided a new platform for women to express themselves, especially through the gender calendar. Finally, it created an opportunity to have serious and soul-searching discussions about who does the work in the village and how much of it falls on the backs of the women.

Field team members noted that the gender calendars were helpful but may have presented a biased view of the community. Others said that the tool provided a unique opportunity to see inside the community and to understand a great deal about relationships, including tensions, between men and women. A third commented that the tool clearly showed the important role that women play in the village.

Dararweyne residents discussing the process six months after the appraisal noted that the gender calendars had helped some of the men to wake up to the fact that women were working harder than men. One man said that he was now listening much more closely to his wife and getting up earlier. Another man observed that men had previously held a distorted view about the village women. After the calendar exercise, he noted, men realized that women were the 'backbone of the community.' A third man related that the women's groups were much more active in the community since the appraisal and that there seemed to be more members going to the meetings. A woman confirmed this was true, stating that they were meeting regularly on Thursdays and that membership in women's groups during the previous six months had increased from 18 to 52.

Social and Institutional Data

The third general cause of conflicts are social and institutional factors. Residents analyzed the importance of different institutions in the village as well as the extent to which each village institution cooperates with others. This exercise included a detailed profile for each of the major institutions in the community, noting especially what individual institutions had accomplished in recent years as well as what aspirations the groups had for the future. The resulting diagram (not shown)

indicates that the Council of Elders is the preeminent institution in the community, with minor roles played by women's and peace organizations, local and central government, and the mosque/*Qur'aanic* schools. With the elders in control of water, farms, health, education, transport, and the youth, there is little left for others. This diagram not only reinforces earlier findings about the role of elders, it also pinpoints the central position that the elders play in Dararweyne.

Both field team members and villagers said the institutional analysis was an important exercise to help understand the nature of their problems as well as in working out solutions. Field team people noted how the diagram gave a quick 'photograph' of the community's main institutions as well as their working relationship with one another. A second member commented on how quickly one could see that most of the important business of the village came under the direct jurisdiction of the elders. Another mentioned how it helped to understand linkages in the community while still another observed that the central role of the elders council stressed even more the critical importance of leadership for Dararweyne.

Villagers made similar comments. One man noted that the exercise helped to see how much of the village affairs revolved around the elders. Another said the chart helped him to see ways in which village organizations were important and why it was of high priority to make these institutions work effectively. One woman agreed that this chart was most helpful in increasing awareness among many people in the community.

Analysis of the Data

Once the data were collected — for Dararweyne it took a total of six hours of village meeting time — the next step was analysis. Figure 4 presents a portion of the problem analysis carried out with the village. Field team members listed as many problems as they could find in various exercises over the previous three days. Villagers reworked the list to frame the problems with their own definitions as well as reshaped the list into manageable proportions. The community's final list of problems included: (in no particular order) health, leadership, access roads, agriculture, education, lack of investment and credit facilities, *qat* chewing, unemployment, land degradation, and floods.

Figure 4
Problem Analysis Chart for Dararweyne, January 2001

Problem	Causes	Previous Attempts to Solve	Proposed New Suggestions to Solve (Opportunities)
Health	Lack of facilities Lack of trained staff Poor Sanitation Lack of Emergency facilities	Training of health assistants and TBAs Establishment of MCH Garbage collection and burning Immunization Cooperation with military De-mining	Prayers of community Rehabilitation of MCH and giving trained staff incentives to stay Awareness campaign to build local ownership of MCH facility Private pharmacy with trained staff
Leadership	Clan conflict Outside interference Competition for resources Founder's ideals slipping away	Previous Mayor's attempts failed Minister of the Interior attempted Present Mayor trying Local community's attempts have failed	Select a different community member Select a minority community member Rotate leadership
Access Roads (De-Mining)	Floods Conflict during attempt at mine removal Lack of maintenance	Place leaves and branches in the tog (wadi) to enable vehicles to cross Place fences around the mines	Food for work to maintain roads Military to mobilize army for mine removal Irish bridge to cross tog (wadi)
Agriculture	Floods Lack of extension services Water table low Lack of crop variety (seeds) Lack of transport to market	Gabion dam Increased extension services Pumps and wells Credit scheme Goos	Diversification Sub-surface dam Restriction of important to help increase prices for local crops
Education	No upper grade school facility Increase in number of children No trained teachers	School build Koranic schools created Teachers paid	Four more classrooms needed for upper grades Equipment to be obtained

With the list of problems established, the community filled in the rest of the chart, including the causes of each of the problems, previous attempts to solve the problem, effectiveness of the approach, and for the final column, what solutions the community recommended as practical and possible for each of their major dilemmas. This conversation accomplished two goals. First, it enabled all of the villagers to see that they could solve some of their own problems. Comments on possible solutions and what things they could contribute toward these solutions helped them to realize that they need not wait for outside experts. Rather, they could help themselves to meet some of their needs.

Second, constructing the chart enabled all members of the community to express their opinions about what could and should be done. This stage was critical in increasing community ownership of the process as well as of the eventual action plan that would follow. Note that the proposed solutions are not grandiose and costly items. Generally they are actions within the villagers' grasp such as broadening the membership of the elders council, rehabilitating the existing clinic, fixing the present school, or diversifying agriculture. While the recommendation to construct a sub-surface dam in the *tog* is a large project, it is not beyond the capability of the community if modest external help could be secured to provide some of the costly materials (cement and reinforcing rods) as well as to get an engineering study completed.

The exercise also normally helps the community to narrow its list of the most pressing problems so that when it is time to rank problems from highest to lowest priority, the list can be further reduced. However, in the case of Dararweyne, the community members chose to keep all of the problems on their list for ranking. Figure 5 offers details of the ranking.

Ranking Problems, Ranking Solutions

The two ranking exercises for Dararweyne proved to be the most useful and effective participatory tools in their peace building process. Ranking of problems is designed to create consensus among the community so all residents will work together to implement solutions. The ranking process (Figure 5) is a simple tool.

Each of the previously identified problems is listed in a matrix on both the horizontal and vertical axes. Note that each pair of problems (for example health and leadership) meets twice in the matrix. Block

Figure 5
Ranking of Most Severe Problems in Dararweyne

	Health	Leadership	Roads	Agriculture	Credit	Education	Kat	Employment	Floods	Land Deg-radation	Count	Rank Order
Health		L	H	H	H	H	H	EM	H	H	7	2
Leadership			L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	9	1
Access Roads/ De-mining				A	C	ED	R	R	R	R	4	5
Agriculture					A	A	A	A	A	A	7	2
Investment/Credit						ED	C	C	C	C	5	4
Education							ED	ED	ED	ED	6	3
Kat								EM	F	D	O	7
Employment									F	EM	3	6
Floods										F	3	6
Land Degradation											O	7

Final Ranked Order of Ten Most Severe Problems in Dararweyne

1. Leadership
2. Health
2. Agriculture
3. Education
4. C credit
5. Roads
6. Employment
6. Floods
7. Kat
8. Land Degradation

out all duplicate intersection points so you have only one comparison point per pair. Note this has been done in Figure 5. Then work through the matrix, asking the villagers to indicate which of the two paired issues is the greater problem. Note that when the Dararweyne residents compared health and leadership, they determined that leadership was a higher priority — hence the "L" in the matrix box. The people continued with the ranking, indicating in each box the higher priority of each pair. Sometimes, the discussion took only a few minutes. Other times, the villagers spent 30 minutes deciding, for example, whether need for employment or improved agriculture was more important.

In carrying out the ranking, people were never asked to vote on which of the two problems was of greater concern. Instead they talked, considered, listened, and talked again until consensus had been reached. Voting is discouraged when using this tool because casting ballots inevitably creates winners and losers. If the goal of ranking is to build consensus and ownership among the community about their highest priority, then the use of voting will weaken that goal and possibly create more dissension than unity. Even though the exercise took more than two hours, by the end of the discussions, Dararweyne had come to complete consensus that leadership was their number one need and their highest priority problem.

There were two side benefits to the ranking. First, during the discussions, many points were made about the previous data collected and the problem analysis. People pointed out that roads, although important, had no value unless steps were taken first to increase agricultural production. So when roads and agriculture were compared, villagers decided that agriculture was the higher priority. But when agriculture and leadership were compared, a long discussion enabled men and women to exchange views noting that good leadership would be necessary if agricultural benefits such as improved irrigation or expanded food storage would serve the entire community and not just a privileged few. During this two hour discussion residents learned much about their community's needs as they analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of each pair of choices.

There was a second benefit during the ranking. As people spoke, they began to talk about some of the possible solutions to the higher priority problems. Gradually the conversation about leadership turned to solutions. As the discussion continued, an alternative mode of leader selection emerged. For the previous ten years, each elder was elected by

his/her particular sub clan and therefore usually placed clan interests ahead of the community. How, several residents asked, could we alter the election process so that elders would place the village ahead of the sub clan? Several options were considered. While this question was not a formal part of the ranking process, it was certainly part of the informal agenda. Why not, one villager asked, make the election a two part process? Let each sub clan nominate a few candidates but let the village as a whole — men and women — elect the actual council. This way, the elders would be responsible to the entire community that had elected them rather than the sub clan from which they had come. It would also serve as an incentive for the sub clan to nominate candidates acceptable to the entire community rather than one who would rally support only for his or her sub clan.

This conversation was a by-product of the main ranking agenda. The point is that it emerged because the people had collected data and analyzed their problems and were now thinking about the nature of their needs and how to solve them. The discussion during the ranking, while not focused primarily on finding solutions, stimulated even more thoughts about solutions. A tentative solution emerged from the ranking discussion. A schematic diagram, presenting the final solution, appears as Figure 6. It resulted from the initial idea launched during the ranking and then perfected the following day. The number of nominees grew from two to five from each sub clan so voters would have many candidates from which to choose. An additional candidate would come from a slate nominated by minorities who were not members of any of the three dominant sub clans. This latter group included women in the village as it is a common Somali practice for a man to marry outside his clan. While the children become members of the man's sub clan, the women do not always affiliate. Hence without the minority provision in the elder council selection, many women might have lost the representation that they had held in previous years.

Note that the ranking process clearly identified leadership as the community's highest need. The letter "L" appeared more often in the boxes (nine times) than any other problem. In second place were two problems that each received seven choices. Agriculture and health were therefore noted as tied for second. Others followed, as noted in Figure 5.

Figure 6
Peace Building Tool from Dararweyne



Once the priority problems were identified, it was time to look for solutions. Opportunities were taken from the final column in the Problem Analysis chart (Figure 4) and placed on a matrix similar to the problem ranking form. Then a discussion began about other opportunities that might help solve the leadership problem. Options from the earlier discussion were considered again, the shared nominations/election added and the options ranked (not shown). This time, things went very quickly. People had become familiar with the ranking process. They had talked through several options and clarified their thinking. The range of choices was far shorter than when problems were ranked. The community's preferred solution to their leadership problem was to find ways for leaders to be trained in skills of decision-making, conflict mediation, setting priorities, and financial management. The second preference, shared nominations, received three choices, confirming that villagers wanted training before holding the elections. While shared nominations continued to be an important option, training became a higher priority.

At this stage, the conflict mediation was working well. While there had been a number of long discussions and one heated conversation that erupted into a shouting match — the session was adjourned for a thirty minute recess — the overall process had been smooth, deliberative, and rational. Further, the residents had accepted the process as one that would enable them to solve their conflicts and tensions themselves rather than having an external government or legal agency enter into the dispute. The only remaining step in the peace building process, as set out in Figure 1, was creation of the action plan.

Creating the Community Action Plan

From this point, the Dararweyne process took on a more technical form. The priority problems and ranked solutions were presented to the community in a village seminar. In the case of Dararweyne, opportunities were ranked for the second and third community priorities, agriculture, health, and education. This process enabled all residents to plan two or three different sets of activities and then pursue parallel conversations with external agencies while getting started on their own initiatives. These activities were incorporated into the Community Action Plan (CAP), as noted in Figure 1. Although Dararweyne's CAP was three

Figure 7
Dararweyne Community Action Plan

Problem	Suggested Activity	First Step	Analysis; Specifications; Estimates	Needed Labor; Material; Money	Who Will Act; Who Will Follow-up	When	Indicators
Leadership	Training Seminars	Identify Topics	Inquire of NGOs about topics such as finance, management, leadership			March (after leadership in place)	Lack of conflict; Number going to seminars;
	Process to Select Council Members and Chair	Hold Meeting to start selection process			Elders	Soon	When selected; How smoothly council works;
Agriculture	Construct Sub-Surface Dam	Permits Engineering assessment			VDC to start; Guus to cooperate to implement	Sept. (after leadership in place)	When engineer comes; When plan gets started
	Install Cement Rings to Rehab Shallow Wells	Technical survey to determine needs and costs			Guus or VDC and association of farmers	After leadership in place.	How many rehab; How strong wells; How productive;
	Food Storage	Train farmers in traditional methods of crop storage	No cost	Several short workshops and training run by older farmers	Guus or VDC and association of farmers	Sept. (after leadership in place)	Number trained Reduced crop loss Amount food for sale and eating
	Marketing	Marketing study to see which crops best suited—mango, papaya, guava, others?	Perhaps work with other villages; explore ways to get new and improved seeds		Guus or VDC and association of farmers	Sept. (after leadership in place)	More profit; More sales; Amount of crops sent to Hargeisa

pages long, only one page is produced here as an example (Figure 7). Note that it includes several columns. The suggested activity to solve the problem is followed by the first step. After that come needed materials, who will follow up, when it will be done, and what indicators will be used to determine how well things were being accomplished. For leadership improvement, several of the needs required negotiation with outside agencies. For other things such as school rehabilitation, work could begin rather soon.

The next steps for the community were to begin making contact with outside agencies about some of their needs and then to meet regularly to monitor whether implementation of the plan that integrated community development and peace building was working.

Return Visit

The initial visit and community-based peace building assessment were conducted in January, 2001. The action plan (Figure 7) was completed at that time. A few members of the field team returned to Dararweyne in July 2001 to meet with the villagers and learn of their progress in implementing the plan. The conversation was most interesting.

About 20 residents joined with half a dozen of the field team. It became clear that some work had started but that things were moving slowly. One of the women stated that as a direct result of the action plan, the women's group was now meeting on a regular basis — every Thursday — and that membership had tripled — from 18 to 52 members — during the six month period. She also described two sets of activities that the women's group was sponsoring. First, they were conducting periodic village cleanup campaigns to remove garbage and trash from the pathways throughout the village. There was no question that the village was a far cleaner place in July than in the previous January. Second, the women had met, drawn up some proposals, and then hired a petition writer from Hargeisa to write two different proposals. They had then taken their proposals to several NGOs and UN agencies in Hargeisa to engage potential development partners. They described the frustration they had experienced in trying to make an appointment or even talk with someone from the agency. They had only recently completed the proposals so had not been working very long on courting partners.

They were also exploring ways in which they could enlist the help of elected members of parliament who represented them, but a national constitutional referendum had just been carried out and all of the politicians had been preoccupied for two months getting the referendum organized. So there had not been much progress there either.

The men said they had held many conversations and two formal meetings about seeking leadership training. Two men were scheduled for one session to begin the following week. Others were under discussion. They had taken no formal steps toward an election, in part because of the distraction of the referendum and in part because they wanted to have a few training courses before announcing the elders election.

Men and women said that the tensions in the community were greatly reduced now that they were working together to implement solutions. There was more discussion about agricultural improvements than previously. Several had decided that perhaps the school was a higher priority than the clinic because two walls had crumbled in the existing school building the previous month. Other discussions were focused on related topics.

A quote from a villager at the follow up session sums up the community response:

> ... The atmosphere is now good. Our tensions are greatly reduced. We have not solved all of our problems yet, but we are once again working as a single community rather than quarreling with each other. We may decide to start a Community-Based Organization (CBO) to help us solve some of these problems. When we get our new leadership selected, we will find out how to organize one. It is our hope that we will implement our action plan through our new leadership and new community institutions and spirit.

Lessons Learned about Decentralization

To work effectively, decentralization should function at two levels: local and national. To serve local requirements, there is need for trained staff and clear procedures to enable villages and pastoral communities to apply tools such as those used in Dararweyne. Working in conjunction with district planners, local communities can play active, constructive, and sustainable roles that will help local planners to implement action for

peace and development. Tools exist to help farmers, nomads, small merchants, and artisans to assume leadership in local planning. Dararweyne's experience offers an example of how these tools work.

National action is equally important. Indigenous and external NGOs, bilateral donors, international agencies, and government offices need to foster policies and programs that support local planning, offer small grants, create training opportunities for nomadic and agricultural settlements, make available facilitation staff, and support infrastructure that assists local level planning and action. It may be that Africa's new discussions about decentralization and civil society can create tools for participatory peace building and local planning. Such policies and programs would be a major step forward for donors seeking to develop and expand new techniques of governance and leadership at local levels. Such steps are especially important for post-conflict situations such as Somalia/Somaliland and could become vital parts of any rehabilitation and reconciliation activities.

A second need is attention to the details of local-level training. At present, donors and NGOs think of training as something offered by professionals with university degrees and formal certificates. While such approaches are important and should be continued, there are alternatives. One new option is to think of the villagers as trainers. Two leaders from Dararweyne recently attended a leadership training course. Plans are underway to offer opportunities to Dararweyne's leaders in conflict mediation. The villagers in Dararweyne had little difficulty carrying out the tasks of the initial assessment—data collection, analysis, ranking, and planning. There is no reason why they cannot help to pass these skills on to other community leaders. There is certainly enthusiasm among Dararweyne's people at the present time This enthusiasm can become a catalyst to disseminate participatory tools to other communities near Dararweyne.

Another way to accomplish training at local levels is to activate the Somali Diaspora youth. There are thousands of Somali young people with European and North American university degrees in a variety of technical, economic, political, and information management disciplines. Much to the disappointment of both these young people and their parents, they do not speak Somali very well nor do they know the customs of their ancestors that have made the Somali people unique. For modest funding, there could be a Somali Diaspora Peace Corps that would bring these young and talented recent university graduates to their homelands where

they could work for one or two years. On one hand, they would be contributing technical skills of local development and peace building planning and management to rural Somalis. On the other hand, they would be deriving enormous cultural and linguistic skills that would help shape their adult values, whether they eventually settle in Europe/USA or in Somalia/Somaliland.

A third need is national government policy and procedures to link the local plans into district plans and to have funding options through NGOs, international agencies, and perhaps government development funds as well as to offer incentives for local communities to play a much larger role in looking after their own needs.

Finally, there is need for large international donors to adopt procedures such as Dararweyne's into programs such as the World Bank's social investment funds or UNDP's poverty alleviation programs. With initiatives coming from the communities and funds available at national and district levels to respond to these needs, sustainability will increase for local project initiatives. It is likely that local incomes will increase as well. The key to all of these actions is energizing the local communities and providing skills in planning, implementation, and monitoring within and among local communities.

Lessons Learned about Peace Building and Development

Four clear lessons follow from the Dararweyne experiment. **First, peace building needs to start and be maintained at very local levels.** Small boys throwing stones or two pastoralists contesting rangeland or water sources can set off a chain reaction that can engulf a region in chaos. Strong and well-respected local institutions previously existed in greater Somalia. Local management can be restored and applied to many of these disputes, calling on skills of local leadership.

Second, tools for carrying out such local peace building and development are known and can easily be assembled in training programs and policy initiatives. Lessons from Dararweyne's experience suggest that villagers can manage these tools and use them to devise community action plans comparable with Dararweyne's.

Third, local peace building and action planning can be most effectively used in a decentralized environment in which people have a sense of ownership of the process and the product. Six months after creating their action plan, the people of Dararweyne are still deeply

committed to their plan. They have already taken steps toward its implementation and have high energy and motivation to continue with follow through. While it will take persistence from within the community and some facilitating from groups external to the community, it is a manageable task.

Fourth, no matter how good the leaders and how strong the plans, development will not go forward unless there are strong community institutions and methods in place to maintain peace, dialogue, trust, cooperation, and mutual assistance. Community institutions will be empowered only if they learn not only the tools of conflict reduction but also how to use them to help in development planning and action. These skills are within reach of local community groups. They need only to know how to systematize their information, mobilize their resources, and reach out to external agencies to form partnerships.

Epilogue

Dararweyne is a long way from completing its journey to lasting peace and development. After six months, the people have yet to form a durable partnership with any NGO or government agency and they have yet to complete a project in which they are the primary planner and actor. While they have a Community Action Plan (CAP), they do not yet have a Joint Community Action Plan (J-CAP). Yet they have taken the essential first step. They have restored trust and confidence within the community and reduced the quarreling that had immobilized the village for the last few years. They have a vision about how they can elect and train leaders to serve the needs of the entire community. They have started to draft proposals to carry out their action plan. Dararweyne is no longer at the beginning of its journey. But they are still far from the end. The difference between now and six months earlier is that they are now aware that there are tools of participation to help guide them on their trek

Endnotes

1. For additional information on Participatory Rural Appraisal, see Clark, 1989, *PRA Handbook*. For more detail on the approach used for peace-building in Dararweyne, see Ford, Abokor, and Abdillahi, 2002, *Nabad iyo Caano*.

CHAPTER TWENTY SEVEN

The Livelihoods Gap: Responding to the Economic Dynamics of Vulnerability in Somalia

Andre Le Sage and Nisar Majid[1]

Introduction

In Somalia, long-standing political, economic, and social systems that sustain lives and livelihoods have been disrupted and transformed by more than a decade of conflict and recurrent episodes of drought and flooding.[2] In the early 1990s, at the height of the civil war, these factors combined to create a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions - famine, epidemic outbreaks, and direct violence claimed the lives of an estimated 400,000 persons. (Bradbury, 1994: 16) While the plight of Somalis did not remain so visible over the latter half of that decade, the country's history of civil strife and economic stratification has limited the ability of many Somalis to cope with further stress or even to meet their basic human needs. As a result, Somalia faces some of the world's highest rates of mortality, morbidity and malnutrition. All of these indicators of on-going crisis are reflected in the UNDP Human Development Index that

ranks Somalia as one of the world's poorest countries. (UNDP, 1998, 2002)

Humanitarian conditions in Somalia vary considerably year to year. Despite the continued prevalence of diseases such as measles, malaria, tuberculosis, cholera, and Kala Azar (SACB 1999), emergency conditions across Somalia abate significantly when good rainfall leads to increased crop yields, better water availability, and improved livestock conditions. Such was the case between mid-2000 and mid-2001. While UN agencies estimated the immediate vulnerable and food insecure population to be as high as 1.5 million people in mid-1999 (UNCU, 1999), that number had fallen dramatically to an estimated 400,000 by the time of the main cereal harvest in September 2000. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 8th International Congress of Somali Studies in Hargeisa on 5 July 2001. This revised version benefited from the comments of a number of readers, particularly Mark Bradbury and the editors of *Disasters*. (UNCU, 2000) During such times of plenty, many poor Somalis are able to regain enough assets to survive without recourse to relief aid.

The alleviation of the harshest humanitarian conditions has been facilitated by improved security conditions since the height of civil war in the early 1990s. Many parts of Somalia have now achieved remarkable political stability following the establishment of regional administrations in the northwest (Somaliland in 1991) and northeast (Puntland in 1998). Somali populations in the southern and central regions have benefited from stabilization of front lines between main militia-factions since 1999, when the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) consolidated control in Bay and Bakol regions. Although Mogadishu remains a divided and violent city, the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) has raised hopes for further reconciliation. While aid agency access is extremely limited in many parts of southern Somalia, conflicts between militia-factions and their immediate humanitarian impact have generally remained short-lived and localized. Even in the absence of state institutions that deliver essential social services, increased political stability is a public good that enables ordinary Somali households to return to agricultural production, expand opportunities for transhumant grazing, and undertake labor migration, without exposure to predatory militia.

However, even when such positive environmental and security conditions coincide, very few Somalis have the potential to stabilize their

household economies, rebuild asset bases and invest in longer-term recovery. Although agricultural and livestock production temporarily improve, the breadth and sustainability of such recovery remains limited by underlying economic factors. Good rainfall and harvest production do not enable the poorest and most destitute populations to improve their situation given their almost total lack of ownership of productive assets (*e.g.* land, animals, labor and cash). Gains made by those vulnerable populations that are slightly better off are consumed by the repayment of debt or the inevitable recurrence of drought and flood conditions. Such new stresses re-exhaust asset bases that Somalis are able to accumulate during good times, and the seasonal cycle of 'boom and bust' continues.

In addressing these economic dynamics of vulnerability, a 'livelihoods gap' has become evident in the international community's engagement with Somalia. To prevent poor households' regular return to sub-subsistence income levels after a brief period of plenty, aid agencies need to reorient and expand existing interventions to assist poor households capitalize on temporary improvements in environmental and security conditions. Based on data and interviews collected during UN Inter-Agency Assessments for Bay and Bakol Regions (1999) and Gedo Region (2000), as well as monthly vulnerability monitoring conducted by FSAU and UNCU,[3] this paper argues it is necessary to devise country-wide interventions that will protect and rebuild household asset bases in the short-run by reducing expenditure on essential services and ensuring that markets benefit poor producers. Such livelihoods support is a necessary corollary to both emergency relief preparedness/response and efforts to stimulate long-term economic growth.

The Livelihoods Gap

Orthodox explanations of the Somali civil war overstate the influence of clan conflict and environmental stress, and understate the economic stratification of society and the role of self-interested elites.[4] From a political economy perspective, violent competition between the militia factions that overthrew Siyad Barre in 1991 has perpetuated long-term patterns of alienation and exploitation. Existing socio-economic inequalities were accelerated by Barre's nationalization of arable land, and industrial and urban infrastructure. (Samatar, 1989) The distribution of these resources to regime supporters reinforced a wealthy politico-business elite and left landless Somalis as an underclass of wage laborers and urban destitute. (Besteman, 1999) In this context, Somali's long

history of exploitation by 'outsiders' in distant state institutions was easily played upon by self-interested local leaders, turning communal fears into animosities and justifying militia-factions as 'guardians' of clan interests. (Samatar, 1992)

Warlords used their militias to assert personal political and economic dominance. In the southern countryside, these elites used military strength to appropriate land for agricultural export production and livestock shipment, and to control trade flows towards external markets. Similar forms of economic 'development,' wherein Somalia's productive resource base is monopolized by politicians and well-connected businessmen also occur in the northern regional administrations of Somaliland and Puntland. (Marchal, 1996) Power struggles between these elites encourage competition for resources which in turn guarantees a minimum level of support for the militias. (Menkhaus, 1998) In this struggle, no groups or individuals can claim outright victory. In fact, many appear content with the functional status quo of competition. Yet, large numbers of outright losers are produced. People's livelihoods collapse and their vulnerability rises as a result of increasing powerlessness in the face of political and criminal violence, lack of access to productive resources, and biased and unstable markets.

In this context, aid agencies are facing a gap in strategies to address the economic dynamics of vulnerability resulting from Somalia's long history of predatory development and asset stripping. Following the inglorious departure of the UNOSOM peacekeeping operation in August 1995, the future of humanitarian assistance in Somalia became uncertain. Fearing the return of rampant insecurity, many agencies withdrew from the country pre-emptively. Efforts to overcome both the implication of classical relief programming in financing the war efforts of Somalia's militia-faction leaders and the security constraints to maintaining expatriate presence in the field led to a dramatic change in the international community's humanitarian strategy. Institutionally, this shift was symbolized by the establishment of the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB) in 1995. This is a voluntary body, including NGO, UN and donor bodies as members, designed to facilitate information sharing, co-ordinate policy formulation and avoid the mistakes of large-scale, top-down aid programs providing unsustainable social services until a crisis ends.

The mandate of the SACB was to apply a new conceptual apparatus of aid - the notion of a continuum between relief and development

practices - which professed the use of foreign assistance in a manner which would simultaneously save lives in the short-term and promote peaceful development in the long-term. (Bradbury and Coultan, 1998) To operationalize the continuum rubric in Somalia, SACB partners utilized a new conceptual framework to represent the country as a 'collapsed state.' As detailed in the UN Consolidated Appeal for 1996/97, most of southern and central Somalia was defined as a zone of crisis appropriate only for relief assistance, parts of central Somalia and the entirety of Puntland were labeled zones of transition where 'rehabilitation' activities should be supported, and Somaliland was termed a zone of recovery where the 'development' process was to be supported. (UNDHA, 1996) This served to move beyond criticisms that classical relief operations neglected the political context in which they operated. Both the UN and the EU, representing the SACB's largest implementing agencies and donor respectively, supported this scheme wherein the 'political maturity' of different regions forms the basis for differentiating the engagement strategies of SACB members across different territorial divisions of Somalia. (UNOCHA, 1999: Section 2.3) The autonomous administrations in Somaliland and Puntland were considered to be the 'building blocks' of a future, federal Somalia, while southern regions are still characterized by lack of central authority and chronic instability. (UNOCHA, 1999)

This framework was presented as a conceptual advance as it acknowledged the decentralization of power that reflects the 'political order' of Somalia as 'a stateless society.' (Menkhaus, 1998) However, the zonal framework was taken by humanitarian critics to be far from a step forward. Conceptually, it is criticized for making the teleological assumption that zones of less 'political maturity' will slowly move in the direction of recovery as Somalia conducts a staged return to 'normality.' As argued by Macrae (1997: 225), 'conflicts, and the humanitarian crises they generate, are not temporary interruptions in a linear process. Rather, they arise from a failure of existing models of development to provide the conditions for political and economic stability.'

Practically, the zonal framework anticipated that the return to formal governance that will enforce law and order and regulate economic growth would be accompanied by a shift from relief needs to development opportunities, and hence a reduction in the direct provision of aid goods and services to beneficiaries. However, it is well documented that humanitarian crises recur across the country despite the consolidation of

public administrations in Somaliland, Puntland, and Bay and Bakol regions. Critics therefore charge that the international agencies ignore Somalia's durability as an 'emerging political complex' in favor of creating an instrumental rationality (Duffield, 1999) of Somalia. As Duffield has asserted, 'the types of information that aid agencies produce are geared more to satisfying organizational needs rather than understanding the new political formations that are emerging in the global periphery.' (Duffield, 1996: 174)

Admittedly, since 2000, the zonal framework has been increasingly replaced in policy papers in favor of a more parsimonious distinction between the stable northern regions and the conflict-prone south. (*e.g.* UNOCHA, 2000 and 2001) Still, the international aid response in Somalia has not developed the appropriate tools and strategies to address the economic dynamics that perpetuate widespread vulnerability. This is evidenced by a review of the SACB Project Matrix and the SACB Operational Framework, which respectively list all international aid projects in Somalia and detail the sectoral strategies for aid delivery.[5] A review of the SACB Project Matrix reveals that three distinct modes of responding to vulnerability - relief, rehabilitation and development aid - persist in different parts of the country. Relief aid is used to meet the immediate shortfall in minimum subsistence requirements required for survival. This form of aid prevailed in Somalia's southern regions where insecurity, displacement, drought and flooding were common. Rehabilitation assistance attempts to increase agricultural output, and remains concentrated along the banks of the Shabelle River valley. Development aid focuses on building state-like administrative structures and encouraging economic diversification in areas of established stability. Such programs are substantially concentrated in Somaliland and Puntland.[6]

In the SACB Operational Framework, only once does there appear a reference to supporting economic recovery. In the sectoral strategy for Food Security and Rural Development, SACB partners state their efforts to 'enhance food security, nutritional status and economic self-reliance by improving agricultural and pastoralist production and providing immediate food assistance.' Further, it states that the intended outcome of expanded local production is to 'reduce dependency on future food aid by enhancing sustainable rural productivity.' (SACB, 2001) Nowhere does the possibility emerge for understanding the political economy of marginalization and exploitation, or how aid agency plans to pursue

'relief or development' programs overlay upon these local dynamics. Mark Bradbury summarizes the implications of this trend succinctly: 'In redefining [complex emergencies] as opportunities for development, what we are seeing is a process of "normalization." This normalization is characterized by a creeping acceptance of higher levels of vulnerability, malnutrition and morbidity.' (Bradbury 1998: 330)

In sum, the zonal framework and the north-south distinction in programming correspond to: 1) the archetypal division of donor budget lines along the continuum from relief to rehabilitation to development, and 2) liberal visions for political reconstruction of the Somali state. It is necessary, even amidst chronic political instability and fluctuating environmental conditions, to deliver aid in a manner that supports the economic strategies of poor households to stabilize their livelihoods by rebuilding their asset bases. If extant development strategies are not an option in Somalia due to the lack of functional institutions, then standard relief responses are also no longer adequate. Aid strategy in Somalia lacks attention to the local economic dynamics perpetuating vulnerability across all levels of political maturity. As Sue Lautze states, it is a livelihood gap:

> a focus solely on saving lives in the very short term is insufficient because disaster-affected populations pursue their own strategies to maximize the trade-off between both lives and livelihoods in order to save the most lives over several time periods, not just the present. (Lautze, 1997:5)

It is necessary to design aid programs that respond to the dynamics perpetuating vulnerability and the strategies that vulnerable populations pursue to survive and even prosper amidst crises. This means abandoning conceptually driven debates about the meaning and linkages between relief and development, and instead focusing on local realities throughout the country. Operationally, this requires flexible, knowledge-based operations that are able to compliment, support and protect how the losers of war economies eke out a living.

Disaggregating Vulnerability in Somalia

To better understand the dynamics that underlie and reproduce the need for humanitarian aid in Somalia, it is necessary to disaggregate the multiple causes of vulnerability. Vulnerability is a phenomenon that

varies over time and space, depending largely on the changing processes through which individuals, households and larger social groups fulfil their immediate subsistence needs and invest in medium- and long-term reproduction of their social system. Analyzing vulnerability in this manner requires identifying specific physical, economic and social resources that are accessed and how they are utilized to ensure the adequate provision of food, shelter, safe water, health, education and social care. This provides a structural analysis of how groups live at any one time and creates a baseline against which the impact of changes in resource endowments, economic performance, and socio-political conditions can be assessed. Between mid-2000 and mid-2001, Somalia experienced simultaneously stable security and positive climatic conditions. During this time, in aggregate terms, the immediate emergency conditions generated by conflict and displacement gradually ameliorated as front lines stabilized, displaced communities integrated into their surroundings and domestic food production increased. While vulnerability remained high, political violence, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks were replaced by depleted household assets bases, lack of social services and poor terms of trade (for certain groups), as the determining factors in understanding household well-being. In effect, vulnerability was, at least temporarily, reduced to a function of poverty and destitution, rather than natural disaster and conflict. The poorer populations are generally able to survive and cope but the extent of their well being often seems to extend little beyond access to their most basic food needs.

Nonetheless, it must be recognized that in any one country, different populations survive, prosper, and suffer in different ways, adapting to the physical and social environments in which they live. Livelihoods and vulnerability must be disaggregated to account for this variance. Towards this end over twenty different food economy groups[7] have been identified in Somalia. Given that agrarian production systems underpin both rural and urban subsistence across Somalia, understanding these different food economies provides a useful starting point to assess the different factors that sustain and undermine the way people live. For the sake of simplicity, these groups can be divided into four basic categories:

- **Pastoralists:** throughout all rural areas of Somalia, but predominant in the arid lands of northern and central

Somalia, as well as along the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders.

- **Agro-pastoralists:** mainly in inter-riverine regions of Bay, Bakol, western Hiran, and eastern Gedo in southern Somalia, but also found in certain areas of the northern regions.
- **Riverine Farmers:** defined as households whose domestic production is derived exclusively from farming and who do not maintain livestock holdings. They live along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle rivers.
- **Urban Residents and IDPs:** the majority are concentrated in the cities of Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Kismayo, Bosaso, and Baidoa. IDPs are a particularly vulnerable sub-stratum of urban populations.

Admittedly, none of these groups should be treated in isolation. Interaction between these groups takes place constantly, whether through trade links, social networks, or sharing and competing for resources. (Narbeth, 2001) Further, no group is homogeneous. Vast disparities exist within each group depending on individual households' asset levels (including money, land, livestock, and tradable goods), productive abilities, security, and political strength, and their levels of access to formal and informal economic and social networks. Further marginalization and, in some cases, outright exploitation is also commonplace along lines of gender roles, minority status and racial identity.

Nonetheless, for the sake of the analysis at hand, these five categories provide a useful means of distinguishing the core production, entitlement and coping systems across Somalia. This breakdown enables an initial analysis of the significance of various factors that underpin the success and viability of household economy strategies. In this regard, what follows is a breakdown of certain aspects of the ways different Somali communities now live and the different factors currently affecting the sustainability and rehabilitation of their livelihoods.

Pastoralists

Several different pastoral groups have been identified in Somalia. Environmental and market factors are the major influences determining

herd composition and different patterns of access to income. For example, the dominant pastoralists of the Lower and Middle Juba and Bay regions maintain herds predominantly composed of cattle and goats. Households in these areas utilize Kenya as the major market for live animal exports. Food and income are obtained through the consumption and sale of live animals, milk, and milk products. In general livestock move between the Juba River and inland areas closer to Kenya according to the season.

By contrast, in the Haud area of the Northeast and Northwest, herds are primarily composed of camels and goats (some sheep and cattle are also kept). For the Haud pastoralists, Saudi Arabia is the major export market, with the annual Hajj pilgrimage generating a huge seasonal demand for sheep and goats. No natural water points are found in the Haud. As a result, poorer pastoralists - who do not own water catchments, called berkads - often have to pay for water in the dry season. Rainfall patterns often drive camels far into Region 5 of Ethiopia. For those who live close to large urban centers, camel milk sales are another important source of income.

The long, dry *jilaal* season is usually the most difficult time for pastoralists and their animals. During this time, energy needs are high (during the search of water and pasture), while milk production is low, market prices for livestock sales decrease, and household expenditure costs increase according to the scarcity of food and water. Further, there has been a gradual shift in herd composition amongst many pastoralists (from camels to cattle) in response to a combination of asset loss, insecurity and m arket incentives. This shift has resulted in increased vulnerability to drought as cattle are unable to survive prolonged dry conditions as camels do.

In all areas, the major criteria for determining vulnerability to drought and economic shock amongst pastoralist communities is the difference between wealth groups. Wealth is defined according to the number and type of animals owned, with wealthier groups having larger herds of more varied stock.

However, households also depend on remittances, kinship ties and credit (both commercial and social) as important sources of income that cushion the effects difficult times. This is a coping strategy of limited reliability for Somalia's poorest and most vulnerable, given their weak inclusion in these social and economic networks.

Factors Undermining Pastoral Livelihoods[8]

- restricted grazing mobility due to insecurity
- conflict induced asset depletion
- increasing commercial and communal debt
- poor terms of trade in some areas due to distance from markets
- border closures and trade disruptions - livestock import/export bans
- unregulated trading system, provides limited returns to producers
- high rates of expenditure on social services and production inputs (*e.g.* livestock drugs and treatment)
- poor livestock health care systems with an unregulated drug market
- population expansion and sedentarization.

In general pastoralists have been considered least vulnerable to food insecurity over recent years due to a combination of political and natural circumstances, including the politico-military strength of the pastoralist clans and the mobility of their livestock-based assets. In recent years, drought conditions and two livestock bans have disrupted these generally positive trends. As a result, during 1999 and 2000, a significant reduction in herd sizes took place in some areas that seriously threatened the economic sustainability of these groups.

The impact of drought conditions from 1999 to early 2000 has resulted in reduced access to food, or increased costs of obtaining food, as fewer animals are available for sale and less milk is available for consumption and sale. Reduced reproduction rates also have serious longer-term implications for restocking, and therefore household economic recovery. Livestock recovery will depend on good rains for several consecutive seasons, allowing good re-production, re-stocking, and intra-community re-distribution of livestock.

In September 2000, following an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, states on the Arabian Peninsula imposed a ban on the importation of livestock from Somalia. Since then, market demand for livestock in northern Somalia has fallen sharply. Loss of the Arabian livestock market throughout its usual seasonal peak (related to the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca) has severely limited the income of many urban and pastoral households who are dependent on trade-

related employment and livestock sales. Earnings from livestock trade also represent a major source of public revenue, employment and access to foreign exchange.

Early warning systems highlighted which population groups would face difficulties and when. The analyses stressed three social groups in northern Somalia were of primary concern: internally displaced persons (IDPs), the urban poor, and poor pastoralists. For pastoralists, the impact comes from the lack of trade- and employment-related earnings to access food in the markets when milk production is most limited and livestock value very low. Reduced participation in livestock health programs has been noted as pastoralists are less able to afford drugs for their animals. A prolonged dry season has indeed taken place, leading to the slaughter of young animals to protect the mothers, costly water trucking at a time of reduced purchasing power, and increased commercial and communal debt.

Emergency conditions are still not apparent in pastoralist areas. Yet, the assets of poor households are being stretched to their limits, consumption patterns have changed (*e.g.* the number of daily meals has decreased), and nutrition problems are probably going to rise. In a best case scenario, the livestock ban will further delay needed economic recovery for communities and perpetuate vulnerability. In a worst case scenario, sudden deterioration is possible in case of any additional shock, including conflict, drought, or further devaluation of the Somali shilling.

Despite ongoing efforts to convince Arab states to lift the livestock ban and long-term proposals to diversify and expand the Somali economy, no interventions have been designed to protect poor households' remaining assets and improve their access to markets. Although 'public works' projects have been proposed by donors and aid agencies to stimulate incomes, there has been lack of action to develop and fund such projects. As a result, the following coping strategies are used to sustain pastoral livelihoods during times of stress:

Strategies Sustaining Pastoral Livelihoods[9]

- increased sales of animals even during times of poor terms of trade
- mobile assets in times of conflict and seasonal migration during dry seasons and droughts
- decreased household size in poor households by sending children to live with wealthier relatives

- increasing commercial and communal borrowing;
- rural-to-urban migration to seek employment opportunities
- increasing commercial and communal borrowing;
- increasing reliance of poorer households on the generosity of their kin
- increased exploitation of natural resources - collection/production of firewood, charcoal, aromatic gums.

Agro-Pastoralists

The majority of Somalia's agro-pastoral groups live along or between the Juba and Shabelle River valleys. They are also found in areas of western Somaliland and scattered pockets of the northeastern regions. Cattle are the dominant livestock species reared and sorghum is the primary crop cultivated. Within this general group, there is diversity in how cropping and livestock systems are combined. Proximity to markets is also important given the significant deterioration of road and transport conditions. The major criteria determining the wealth status and coping potential of agro-pastoralists is the area of land cultivated and the number of animals owned by a particular household.

In general, agro-pastoral households are considered the most food insecure populations during drought years. Their vulnerability derives from a combination of natural and human-induced factors. The agro-pastoral populations in southern Somalia come primarily from politically and militarily marginal clans, and have been amongst the greatest victims of violence since the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. (Besteman and Cassanelli, 1996) Combined with poor rains and harvests, the resulting asset losses (of both food stocks and livestock) and displacement have resulted in large-scale food deficits.

Strategies Sustaining Agro-Pastoral Livelihoods

- sales of household food stocks and livestock assets
- seasonal migration to urban areas for employment
- intra-community social support
- increasing commercial and communal borrowing
- selling part of a herd in order to buy fodder to keep the remainder alive
- slaughtering new born calves to protect the mother

- reduction of food consumption to below minimal nutritional levels for short periods of time.

Following the *gu* harvest in August 2000, household economies were expected to have strengthened across most of southern Somalia. Good cereal production in Bay, Bakol, and the Shabelle valley led to improved food availability in the region. As the food supply expanded, market prices decreased, resulting in better access to essential commodities for poor households. Following the 2000 *gu* and *deyr* rains, water and pasture conditions were considered to be good across the region. Terms of trade were far more favorable than the same time in recent years.

Yet, the improvement in livelihood conditions has proved limited and short-lived. Prior to last year's very good *gu* season harvest, nutritional surveys and routine surveillance reported high malnutrition rates among poor wealth groups across southern Somalia (17-30 global, with some 3-6 severe). Following the impact of the good rains, good harvests, and low cereal prices however, malnutrition rates in all surveys have remained above 12 - much higher than expected. NGOs and UN agencies operating supplementary feeding programs in southern Somalia report providing assistance to a significant patient population (*circa* 1 0 of the overall caseload) whose nutritional status does not improve even after more than three months of care. Areas of particular concern include Gedo, Bay, and Bakol regions - the scene of some of Somalia's worst internecine fighting and displacement over the past ten years.

No abnormal population movements or reductions in household food consumption were noted in the twelve months following the *gu* 2000 in agro-pastoralist regions of southern Somalia. Further, no extraordinary health factor has appeared that could sustained malnutrition, although the persistence of tuberculosis and *Kala Azar* are obviously contributory factors. Rather, concerns rest on the long-term impact of conflict and displacement on reducing household assets. This has limited the ability of poor Somalis to care for vulnerable children as whole families are likely to be sharing the SFC dry rations provided to child patients.

Additional factors include sub-standard water supply and sanitation, and the poor quality of the dietary intake even when food availability is adequate. Further, recovery for some households is extremely slow and many have been rendered destitute. Continuing political and economic marginalization may deny market access to some social groups, including minorities and small sub-clans. It should also be noted that many poor

agro-pastoralists are only able to meet minimal income and consumption requirements during the agricultural season by working, leaving little time to manage their own fields and invest in their future food security. In sum, the long-term dynamics of impoverishment were not significantly alleviated by this year's successful *gu* harvest.

Factors Undermining Agro-Pastoral Livelihoods

- poor rains and consecutive seasons of crop failure
- conflict-induced asset depletion of fixed and immobile assets (*e.g.* land)
- trade disruptions due to conflict and potential border closures
- physical isolation from port and services in Somalia's main urban centers
- lack of security from violence and economic exploitation, especially for weaker social groups
- increasing commercial and communal debt
- crop pests, disease and bird attacks
- decreasing assistance from international aid agencies.

Riverine Farmers

The largest riverine populations are found towards the coastal end of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers. This group tends to have very small herds or no livestock at all. Riverine households generate the majority of their food and income from the cultivation and sale of cereal and non-cereal crops. Flood-recession and pump-irrigation farming are their two primary methods of providing water for crop production. Riverine households can be more resilient than others given the variety of crops produced and the availability of fruit trees and wild foods. Further, they may in fact derive some benefits from drought conditions that increase crop prices.

Riverine groups depend, to a large extent, on rains in the Ethiopian highlands, which determine river water levels in southern Somalia. The destruction of river embankments during the El Nino floods in 1997 and the decrepit irrigation infrastructure resulting from lack of public maintenance means that riverine households are seasonally vulnerable to flooding. Repairing such infrastructure - which requires the financial means to rent bulldozers and pay for their fuel - is a financial burden that communities at large have proven unwilling to bear.

Strategies Sustaining Riverine Livelihoods

- community labor to rehabilitate and maintain irrigation infrastructure
- petty trade
- casual employment - particularly agricultural labor
- temporary migration to urban areas to seek employment
- fish and wild-food consumption and sales.

Further, riverine farmers - particularly poorer households who do not own the most valuable land close to irrigation canals - are often saddled with high costs for fuel and generators to ensure adequate water provision. In many areas, riverine groups are politically marginalized, vulnerable to discrimination by well-mobilized and well-armed pastoralist militia who regard agriculturalists as belonging to a lower caste. In some areas, riverine groups have been forced off their former land holdings when mutually beneficial alliances have not been created with their neighbors. As a result, flood vulnerability has increased for many riverine farmers that now live in the *dheshek* depressions immediately adjacent to the river embankments.

Factors Undermining Riverine Livelihoods

- lack of available land or secure tenure
- lack of capital for land preparation, labor and fuel for water pumps
- high production costs and low market prices for produce;
- lack of access to and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure
- lack of protection from seasonal flooding;
- high market costs for fuel
- lack of security from violence and economic exploitation.

Urban Residents and IDPs

Urban groups are directly dependent on the state of the Somali economy. Their households are characterized by lack of involvement in direct agricultural production, livestock rearing or cultivation. Household income derives from trade (petty and large scale activities), employment

(casual, or more formal), remittances, gifts and begging, and other income generating activities such as the rental of urban infrastructure.

Overall, the dynamics and vulnerabilities of urban livelihoods are under-researched. It is known, however, that the livelihoods of Somalia's urban residents are more stratified than those of other groups. Poor and very poor households are more dependent on casual- and self-employment activities. Vulnerability is closely linked between commodity prices and income opportunities and their rates, as well as the number of people in a family working and their access to remittance income.

Factors Undermining Urban and IDP Livelihoods

- rising market prices due to limited domestic production
- lack of market access and asset loss due to devaluation of the Somali shilling
- few employment opportunities and limited social services
- lack of security from violence and economic exploitation
- lack of aid programs, especially ones generating 'pro-poor' economic conditions
- increasing commercial and communal debt
- lack of local government policy or action
- lack of socio-economic protection from kin for IDPs in particular.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are a particularly vulnerable sub-stratum of the urban community. IDPs originate from all of the different livelihood groups discussed above - pastoral, urban, agro-pastoral and riverine. Defining the meaning of displacement in the Somali context is difficult. Other than the general description of communities that have fled their home territories due to civil conflict and natural disasters, there are complications in providing a more specific definition due to the problem of multiple and recurring displacements, and the crucial importance of clan and sub-clan affiliations underpinning the causes and routes of population movements.

Overall, displaced households have already lost the vast majority of assets and have been forced to 'drop out' of their usual system of accessing entitlements. The potential for IDPs to return to their previous livelihoods varies enormously, depending on changes in the political context resulting in their flight, as well as their potential to re-generate household incomes while being displaced. Wherever they move IDPs

remain as minorities. While virtually everywhere in Somalia lacks basic services and low incomes, IDPs are an unheard voice, usually living in extremely difficult conditions. For many, without significant assistance, their near complete lack of assets gives them a bleak future. The major threats to the basic survival of IDPs in Somalia include the following:

Strategies Sustaining Urban and IDP Survival

- trading
- casual employment
- prostitution
- gifts from kin
- petty trade
- crime
- remittances
- scavenging
- begging

The Economics of Vulnerability

Vulnerability in Somalia is too commonly attributed to the country's natural resource base, the limitations of 'traditional' methods of agricultural and livestock production, and the impact of non-liberal political and economic practices. As Samatar has noted, "the causes assigned to poverty are either climatic aridity, poor resource endowment, and/or a corrupt public sector." (Samatar, 1991: 3) Admittedly, the sustainability of household economies is severely affected by erratic rainfall and cyclical drought. As noted by the SACB, 'Rainfall levels are lower or more irregular than in any other area of sub-Saharan Africa outside the Kalahari' (SACB, 2001) This uncertainty is well illustrated by the conditions of the last three years, where 1997 El Nino rains brought massive flooding and led to disease outbreaks and extensive infrastructural damage. Since then, the prevailing drought conditions have been caused by poor to very poor rains in most areas.

Environmental conditions are undoubtedly important as contextualizing and contributory factors. Yet, assigning causality to these alone has resulted in a misrepresentation of the dynamics that perpetuate the exposure of at least one quarter of the Somali population to threats of displacement, disease, and lack of food and water. From the foregoing analyses of factors affecting the viability of the various household economies in Somalia, it is possible to identify a number of key economic factors affecting livelihoods across the country. These are man-made factors that exist within the natural context of aridity and environmental uncertainty. Disaggregating the web of social and economic entitlements and interactions which structure and sustain livelihoods is a difficult but

necessary means of understanding how people live and survive during periods of political stress.

Asset Depletion and Destitution: Political intimidation and asset stripping have crippled household economies and forced hundreds of thousands of Somalis to flee from their homes. This factor has more greatly affected urban residents and agricultural producers as their assets are less mobile than those of pastoralists. Another important variable in assessing vulnerability to asset stripping is the political and military strength of specific social groups - usually clans - to protect their members. However, few communities have been spared entirely. Until equitable and secure land tenure relations are established, access and incentives for increased food production will remain limited.

Lack of Labor Opportunities: The collapse of the state led to the demise of Somalia's industrial base and state sector. This has severely reduced domestic production and what can be considered 'formal sector' employment. Although the new 'free market' has led to booming regional trade, not all Somalis have been able to benefit from continuing economic activity. Displaced persons, in particular, tend to live off subsistence wages for unskilled day labor. Specialized laborers, involved in occupations from construction to bureaucratic administration, have found few opportunities for employment and remain unskilled in subsistence production.

Limited Benefits from Economic Expansion: Unequal relations of production and high urban unemployment rates have maintained very low returns to labor, even when the demand for that labor has risen substantially. Unequal terms of trade between capital (in limited supply) and labor (in large supply, particularly given Somalia's high rates of displacement and destitution) mean that private-sector employment for the poor has not yielded anything more than subsistence wages. This does not allow for patterns of savings or investment by the poor substantial enough for them to gain access to new means of production.

Lack of Infrastructure and Social Services: With the exception of international aid projects, there has been little or no investment in

infrastructure and social services in Somalia over the last 10 years. Following the gradual decline in state investment in social services throughout the 1980s, much of the material, equipment, and expertise required to provide and sustain public goods was destroyed during the civil war. In addition, trade and transportation suffers due to the poor road system as well as insecure conditions along many of the major routes. Despite the best efforts of UN agencies, NGOs and donors, public access to aid services is limited by the concentration of projects in urban areas, dwindling agency presence in southern regions and a continually dwindling funding base. This means that access to any basic health care, education, clean water and sanitation are very limited.

Lack of Macroeconomic Management: The arrival of large sums of newly printed Somali shillings in Mogadishu since the beginning of 2001, has generated rampant inflation. These consignments are ordered by businessmen, primarily in Mogadishu, who quickly introduce the shillings to urban markets in vast quantities. Whereas the shilling has generally remained stable for years, exchanging between SSh8,000 - SSh10,000 per US dollar, the increased money supply has devalued the currency to over SSh20,000 per dollar in 2001. Poor and middle-income households who predominantly hold shillings are now unable to purchase imported food items, while the value of any existing savings in shillings has decreased by half. Further, many merchants are no longer willing to risk accepting shillings, thus further limiting access to the market.

Market Dependency and Volatility: Very few, if any, Somali households survive on subsistence production alone. Rather, domestic livestock and agricultural produce are traded for imported food stuffs and other durable items. Due to the combination of variable supply of local produce, insecure access to urban market areas and volatile demand from some regional markets (as evidenced by the occasional bans on the export of livestock), Somali producers are vulnerable to extreme fluctuations in their ability to utilize markets to their advantage.

Social Support and Remittances: Intra-clan, intra-community and intra-family assistance and resource re-distribution have been vital

in mitigating the worst effects of re-current stress and crises. (Medani 2000). In particular, the Somali diaspora has played a key role by returning a portion of foreign-earned wages to relatives in Somalia. As the scale of the remittance economy is estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars, this organic social safety net eclipses the amount of humanitarian and development assistance brought into Somalia. However, the benefits of the remittance economy accrue primarily to urban, middle-class groups which - due to educational and employment opportunities during the pre-war era - are more likely to have kin living abroad.

Conclusions

As evidenced by declining rates of severe malnutrition and limited food aid needs, the magnitude and immanence of emergency conditions across Somalia reduced between mid-2000 and mid-2001. Acute humanitarian needs did not disappear, but the effects of clan-based conflict and climate failures were largely localized. The general improvement in the humanitarian situation was due to good rainfall, impressive harvest yields, normal pasture conditions and surface/ground water availability. Even in the absence of essential social services delivered by public institutions, these factors enabled a proportion of poor households to produce and exchange enough resources to ensure their immediate survival and generate savings (in terms of seed stores, larger herds and cash reserves) to avoid destitution in case of future stress.

However, very few Somalis are rebuilding their household economies in a sustainable manner. Due to the fluctuating rainfall, it is estimated that one in every five harvests will be a partial failure and one in ten will be a complete write-off. (SACB, 2001) Livestock, the major source of savings, income, and consumption for a majority of the Somali population, is similarly affected by drought and market fluctuations. This makes it essential for Somali households to capitalize on such temporary improvements to avoid future cycles of vulnerability.

Furthermore, one of the long-term socio-economic effects of the war in Somalia has been to entrench differential access to the country's productive resource base. The expansion of the private-sector has benefited from these available resources, without providing concomitant returns to groups that have become dispossessed. Current economic development programs operate on the assumption that increased private sector activity, including high returns to national and international

investors, will lead to poverty reduction, rather than simply increasing aggregate GDP. This assumption appears misplaced. Wealth accumulation by merchant classes does not necessarily 'trickle down' to benefit the poor in any substantial manner.

By this count, Somalia appears not so different from other African countries - the depth and breadth of structural poverty in Somalia produces opportunities of economic advancement only for landowners, capital holders and external investors. Until aid agencies face up to these facts and design aid programs accordingly, little will be done to assist poor Somalis capitalize on improving environmental and security conditions in order to end the regular cycle of post-emergency recovery and relapse. The cyclical - indeed seasonal - return of higher rates of vulnerability is sustained by widespread poverty resulting from decades of economic stratification, devastated household asset bases, lack of basic social services, and the alienation of producers from the country's productive resource base. Until these underlying factors are addressed, longer-term development efforts will also be compromised.

From this analysis, at least one significant conclusion regarding the need to support grassroots economic recovery can be drawn: only by accumulating ownership of and access to enough assets over time will a sufficient cushion exist for Somalis to face future droughts and other natural stresses without recurrently succumbing to the need for relief assistance. Unfortunately, there are no blueprints for translating this strategy into action. However, based on the economic dynamics of vulnerability discussed above, it is possible to formulate an initial breakdown of potential and reinforcing program objectives:

- protect household asset bases by extending access to essential social services in order to reduce household expenditures (*e.g.* promote the presence of more aid projects for health, water, education, etc., and increase their coverage in rural areas)

- rebuild asset bases by supporting the household economy strategies of poor groups, including strengthening the benefits received from labor migration, the informal economy, social networks and coping strategies (*e.g.* consider the potential for projects to contribute to in-cash and in-kind savings by poor households)

- focus and time aid interventions to minimize seasonal stress (*e.g.* during the dry season and or planting season) to enable households to 'capitalize' on seasonal gains (*e.g.* good harvests and restocking)

- stimulate household income through 'public works' projects targeting improved market and social service infrastructure

- intervene in markets to ensure adequate access and terms of trade for poor households (*e.g.* consider modalities of improving market incentives for geographical redistribution of food from surplus-producing areas, or purchasing excess livestock and grain supplies when cash earnings are required)

- reconsider 'cost-recovery' initiatives that increase the costs of social services for poor households.[10]

Admittedly, such efforts will do little to reduce future vulnerability in the face of renewed, large-scale political violence and the destruction, displacement and looting that would accompanies it. Further, such support cannot guarantee the automatic succession of any renewed or vigorous trend towards 'development.' Rather, in the absence of further conflict, the rebuilding of household assets among poor wealth groups will allow Somalis to recover a minimum level of subsistence and undertake uncertain investment in their own future. It is well possible that to expect more than these limited gains is simply Utopian following two decades of strife and pauperization. In any event, the only existing alternative is clear. In the absence of household economic recovery, continuous food aid, supplementary feeding, water trucking, and emergency responses to epidemics will remain the blunt, problematic tools of last resort for the humanitarian agencies to prevent further catastrophes in Somalia.

Endnotes

1. Nisar Majid worked for SC-UK and FAO at the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) from November 1998 - August 2001.

2. The analysis and recommendations of this paper are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the views or policies of the UN. The authors are indebted to a number of colleagues in the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) that made this paper possible, particularly Bernard Harborne, Mark Bradbury, Simon Narbeth, Noreen Prendiville, Buzz Sharp and members of the SACB Humanitarian Analysis Group.

3. The UN Inter-Agency Assessment Reports for Bay, Bakol and Gedo are available from UNCU and FSAU, as well as from the UN Somalia website (www.unsomalia.org).

4. This review of the Somali war economy is drawn from the author's contribution to *Le Billon*, 2000.

5. Both the SACB Project Matrix and SACB Operational Framework are available on the SACB website accessible through www.unsomalia.org.

6. It is important to note that since the RRA's establishment of central control over Bay and Bakol regions in mid-2000, little substantive development support has been provided there, as evidenced by the absence of UNDP and EC operations.

7. The term and methodology originate with Save the Children - UK, but are now often referred to as Household Economy Analysis. Simply put, food economy groups comprise individuals and communities who (a) share similar methods and patterns of accessing food, income, and (b) are at risk to similar events that may undermine this access.

8. The following lists of factors and strategies affecting livelihoods are derived from fieldwork and workshops across Somalia conducted by the UN Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) between 1997 and 2000.

9. There is sometimes a fine line between short-term coping strategies and longer-term changes in household economies sustainable recovery. For example, increased wood-cutting may be necessary and sustainable in stressful times, but may have negative environmental consequences when income from cutting becomes a mainstay of livelihoods.

10. For further discussion of the dangers of shifting the economic burden of relief to vulnerable communities in the name of sustainability, see Bradbury (1996:336-337).

CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHT

Can Clan Representation Contribute to Rebuilding 21st Century Somalia?

Fowsia Abdulkadir

Introduction

This paper will focus on the appropriateness of clan representation in the context of Somalia in general and particularly in the aftermath of the decade-long civil war. The paper will pose some thought provoking questions to Somalis: What is the role of the clan in the 21st century? Does the clan belong in the political arena? Can it provide a political ideology? Are Somalis mistakenly using clan as a political ideology? Are there contradictions between Somali clan representation and civil society, especially with respect to gender representation?

In an attempt to answer the above questions, the paper reflects on the manner in which clan representation functioned prior to European colonization and after independence. Also, it highlights how clan was exploited in Somali politics as well as the atrocities that were committed against Somali women and children during the deadly civil war. Finally the paper will aim at challenging Somali intellectuals to shift their debate and analysis into critically rethinking Somali politics in an effort to educate and bring out the truth of these issues.

Clan Representation from a Woman's Perspective

The purpose of this analysis is to examine the appropriateness of clan representation in Somalia in the aftermath of the Somali civil war. Initially I would like to reflect on ways in which clan functioned or didn't function as well as how it was exploited in recent Somali history, both prior to and following colonization. Also, this paper will highlight some of the atrocities that were committed against Somali women and children in the name of clan, not to mention how difficult if not impossible it would be for Somalis to reconcile the concept of gender representation with clan/male representation.

Clan Roles in Governance Prior to the European Colonization

This paper explores ways that clan function in Somali society. Clan provided and still provides an identity to its members, both an individual family identity through the paternal blood lineage and social identity. The clan tradition also provided a social support network within a clan or among particular clans that share geographical territory. This support works like social welfare. For example, when there are conflicts in which someone is killed, then settling such conflicts might include paying blood money *(Diyo am Mag)* to the victim's family. Another way that the social support works is when a particular family has financial difficulties or emergencies, the people in that settlement will collect money to raise funds for the family in need. This is called *Qaraan*. Hence clan worked like a social welfare system for neighboring clans or sub-clans that shared these supports as a community for their survival.

Clan also worked as a social contract that functioned on a continuing basis, based on the needs and situation that require the collective action of the community. According to Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (Gandhi) and others who wrote extensively on Somali traditions, there is *Xeer*, Somali customary law that existed in combination with Islamic *Shariah* law.

Clan relations and kinship derived mainly from two major sources: *vertical relations*, which are based on the father's bloodline (*Xigto or Xigaal*) which is how clan solidarity is formed; and *horizontal relations*, which are based on marital relations (*Xidid*) which is how clan alliances were formed. If one sees a tree as the symbol to represent these two kinds of relations, I find it not only absurd but cruel that we Somalis want to keep the trunk, branches, and the leaves of the tree, and sever and separate them from its roots, *i.e.*, asking a daughter or a son to choose

paternal uncles over their maternal uncles because they are "their father's children" and must declare loyalty to the father's clan.

Clan Roles in Governance in Post Independence Somalia

Somalis were never organized under one central government prior to European colonization. Every clan or group of family of clans had its mutually agreed upon social contracts with its neighbors and maintained a sense of order based on Islamic law and Somali traditional *xeer*. This could have evolved into some kind of governance with central authority, cofederation, or some separate mini Somali-speaking state or province. However, colonization occurred and the rest is history.

Ali Jimale Ahmed opens his article "Daybreak Is Near, Won't You Become Sour" in the book he edited, *The Invention of Somalia*, with three quotes, one of which is by Raymond Williams, The Year 2000,

> Nation as a term is radically connected with 'native.' We are born into relationships, which are typically settled in a place. The form of primary and 'placeable' bonding is of quite fundamental human and natural importance. Yet the jump from that to anything like the modern nation-state is entirely artificial.

Given that in normal circumstances "the jump to a nation state is artificial" was not the case for post colonial Africa, especially in the Somali context. As we know, Somali governance didn't evolve within 'normal' conditions. Instead we have had a marriage between European colonial notions of government and the local social structure, in this case the Somali clan system. Colonization totally disregarded the local modes of governance, and introduced a notion of governance with a colonial agenda. This was not based on democratic forms of government in which the people elect their own government bodies. Rather it was imperialist colonial governance, which had a specific agenda to exploit the lands that they were colonizing.

The Europeans never fully introduced capitalism, or any other form of ideology in Africa, not even after independence. According to Ali Mazrui, what the European colonial administrators have introduced was only one side of capitalism which created consumers out of the population of the so called Third World. This turned the Third World into an ever lasting market for the goods that were being and are still manufactured in the First World, including weapons.

After independence, Somali clans, which were used to serving specific clan interests, came together to serve a collective national interest and form a nation. Somalis, with somewhat egalitarian social clan structures, dealt with each other on the basis of their mutually developed *xeer*, although some clans were larger in number and have used violence against others. They have learned from their European colonizers hierarchical forms of central government that concentrated authority in one city. The Somali clan system is more individualistic in its approach than collective. Compounded with the notion of colonial governance, the result was concentration of unlimited power in the hands of the few. Those who ended up running the country have sought the mandate of the people in the name of their particular clan kinship, but had no intention of serving the collective interest.

What ensued for nine years after independence was rampant corruption, confusion, and a clash between what the masses expected to get from their new found freedom, *(aan maalo hasheena Maandeeq)*, which was peace and prosperity from independence on ever after. Instead, Somali politicians have demonstrated what they learned from their colonial masters which was how to exploit and rob the country. A Somali proverb is appropriate here: (*Nin aan kuu furi doonin yaanuu kuu rarin*), which means (he who will not help you unpack should not help pack and move). In this context the colonial administrators have moved Somalia and many other countries in the colonized world into a central form of governance designed to safeguard the colonial interest, even after they have given the flag independence to these countries. Needless to say, these administrators were not there to help unpack and settle these new found freedoms and nation states.

Somali political parties in the sixties were nationalistic in intent but were formed along clan lines. The nine-year period ended a window of opportunity that Somalis might have used to get on the right track to democratic forms of governance. This brings us to the 1969 military coup in Somalia.

Clan Exploitation During Siyad's 20-year Dictatorship

Mohamed Aden Sheikh in his article "The Need for a Responsible Answer," in *Mending Rips in The Sky*, discusses how naïve Somalis were to have believed that we would be the exception to the rule of military dictatorship in Africa. Somehow, Somalis believed that we would end up with democratic rule after the coup in 1969.

Coming back to Siyad's use of clan, he exploited and manipulated the concept to divide and rule. He succeeded. The social fabric of Somali society was politicized to serve the interest of a few greedy politicians. In my opinion, those who wanted to gain political power had sought the people's mandate to satisfy personal greed. They mobilized and organized the masses politically along clan lines, only to abandon their responsibility of serving the collective interest. In other words, they moved people with clan sentiments to gain personal political power.

Clan power sharing in the history of Somali Democratic Republic has proven to be disastrous, time and again. I believe that clan representation cannot replace or function as an ideology because it moves people's emotions rather than their rational powers of analysis. Somali clan power sharing has been exploited first by the non-military governments in the sixties and then notoriously by the dictator. The dictator managed to use and misuse the clan system. He succeeded in using one clan to destroy another, and slowly, over 20 years, killed the trust we had in our local social structure.

Clan Misuse and Abuse During the Somali Civil War

Charles Geshekter's "The Death of Somalia in Historical Perspective" in *Mending Rip in the Sky*, writes "The disintegration of Somalia raised policy questions about the culture of power in the modern state, the definitions of good governance, the principle of national sovereignty, and the concept of 'humanitarian intervention.'"

Many other scholars have also noted that what happened in Somalia defied all logic, and the human race can attest to how painful it has been. Many scholars, Somali as well as non-Somali, have written and are still writing about the Somali civil war. For the purpose of this paper I would like briefly to mention some of the atrocities inflicted on Somali women and children, in the name of clan. These few words do not do justice to the enormity of the horrors of human rights violations committed against Somali women and children. But my point is to highlight and think about these horrendous things that were done in the name of clan. When we Somalis want to share power along clan lines we exclude Somali women from that power sharing structure. As a result, women become victims of the very clan structure that was intended to protect them.

As is the case in any civil war, the casualties of the Somali civil war were disproportionately women and children. Whether it is how their own brothers told them that their children belonged to the wrong clan, or how

they were raped by 'others' taking revenge on 'their clans,' the result is the same. It is the women who suffer. Somali women were subjected to abuses that were never before carried out in the name of clan.

Somali women were raped because they belonged to the wrong clan and when they got pregnant 'their own' clans abandoned them and cast them out. Children were hurt by their maternal uncles, if not physically, certainly emotionally, because they were from the wrong clan. The identity crisis of these hateful actions will haunt our children and all the rest of us for years to come. The fragmentation that the clan based civil war has caused is one major factor that is hindering a healthy integration of Somali youth and adults, even in diaspora settings.

Conclusion

I conclude by putting forth more questions than answers, but first let me provide some answers to the question I posed at the beginning of this paper. Can clan representation contribute to rebuilding Somalia in the 21st century? The answer is yes and no, yes in the short term as clan representation may work stop the killing. But for the longer term, the answer is no. It will not provide a lasting solution, especially with our record of clan misuse and abuse. Does clan belong in the political arena? In my opinion no, it does not. I don't want to give my political mandate to a politician because he is my cousin. The difficulty I see is how can Somalis change clan representation to an objective political process? Can they identify and use objective criteria to deal with incompetent politicians?

Last but certainly not least is the question of gender representation and gender equitability in power sharing. That will not become a reality within the context of the Somali male dominated clan system as long as our political system is rooted in clan concepts.

CHAPTER TWENTY NINE

Background Information on the Bantu Community in Somalia

Hussein M. Muse (Hussein Bantu)

Introduction

Warm greetings to all. After my best wishes, my name is Hussein M. Muse, known as Hussein Bantu. I am pleased to have the opportunity and the pleasure to present to you some background information about the Bantu people in Somalia.

During this presentation I will focus on three aspects of the Somali Bantu community:

- the different regions where the Bantu community have settled
- the subdivisions of the Bantu in Somalia
- the culture and tradition of the Wazigwa group.

The Bantu community is settled in Somalia and lives in nine regions, around the riverine areas of Juba and Shabelle such as Hiiran, Middle Shabelle, Banadir, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, and

Lower Juba regions. The Bantu Somalis have been estimated to be about 35% of the Somali population and they produce about 65% of the national food requirement. They are farmers, fishers, and technicians as well as domestic and urban service providers.

Settlements of the Bantu in Different Regions

Hiiran Region - The Bantu groups who live in this region are the four-Makane groups, the Shabelle, and the three-Omar groups

Middle Shabelle Region - Those living in the middle Shabelle are the six Shiidle groups, the Kabole, and the Bah-Salaama (the Jareer Laborers who were owned by Mudulood)

Banadir Region - Those living in the Banadir region are the Hamari people who were known as the Zing

Bay Region- Those living in the Bay region are the Gure Shash, also known as Gacan ku Dhiigle Shash, who are descendants of the Eyio tribe

Bakool region - Those living in this region are the Gaabow Shash who are also descendants of Eyio tribe

Gedo Region - Those living in this region are the Gurane-Shash who are known as Gawaaweyn from the Eyio tribe

Lower Shabelle - Those living in this region are divided into two main groups which are Digil and Afar-waab-dhoobey and the Dhanaane, known as Biyomaal Bantu. The Digil group is concentrated in Afgooye, Walowayn, Awodheegle, Qoryoolay, Kurtunwaaray, Sablaale, and Brava districts. The Biyomaal Bantu live in the Merca district

Lower and Middle Juba - The Bantu who live in these regions originally migrated from East and Central Africa. They were mainly descendants of the Wazigua who came from Tanzania. They are now known as the Mushunguli in Somalia. They are the only group in Gosha who preserved their language and cultural traditions.

The Subdivisions of the Somali Bantu

The Bantu in Somalia are two main groups. Those who are native to Somalia and those who migrated from East and Central Africa.

First Indigenous Somali Bantu

These groups of people are settled in the central and southern regions of Somalia. Their movements from one side to another are according to the wildlife movements that they hunt. Some aspects of their culture and tradition are similar to the San (Bushmen) of Southern Africa. They are known as the Eyio people. Their historical background has been traced to the stone age, because all the artifacts and tools found on Mount Eyio and Mount Hebe of the Bay region show historically the same characteristics as those used by stone age people.

The Eyio kingdom is famous and was the first kingdom ever established in Somalia. The territory of the Eyio kingdom extended from the Bay area to the Lower Shabelle area. Some of the well known names are Gedi-Ababow, Debka Balow, and Fayle Arrow.

The Invasion of the Galla (Oromo) in Somalia

The Galla form Ethiopia invaded Somali territory and destroyed the Bantu kingdom, forcing them to withdraw from several areas and gather in the higher rainfall areas of the riverine zone of the Juba and Shabelle. As the war continued, the Somalis who lived in the northwest of the Houd came to attack the territory as well, which resulted in the escape of the Galla and Ajuran people towards the Kenyan border. Although the Bantu kingdom was destroyed, the people remained.

Afterwards, the Shangawaya kingdom was formed near Brava. This kingdom belonged to the Wanika tribes who consist of Wa-Mujikenda tribes, such as Wa-pokomo, Wa- taita, Wakalaje and others. Some of the people had linkages with people now living in Kenya, though at that time there were no borders and people moved freely. The rest of the Shangawaya kingdom are the Bajuni group.

The Bajuni are a mixture of African and Malaysans. They speak a Bantu language (Kibajuni). They live in the area which extends from Kismayo to Mombasa. Some of their villages are Kismayo, Fuma, Istambul, Koyama, Kudha, the islands of Chula and Chuwaya, and Raskyamboni in Somalia. In Kenya, the settlements are Shakani, Kiyonga, Lamu, Malindi, and Mombasa.

Second Immigrant Somali Bantu

The immigrant Bantu of Somalia originally came from eastern and central Africa. The came to the Juba area sometime in the 16th or 17th centuries. They are known as the Wagosha people. The most important tribe in Wagosha are the Waziguwa who originally came from Tanga in Tanzania. Historical research has determined that in the middle of the 16th century, during the great seven-year famine in eastern and central Africa, many people fled into several locations such as: Somalia, the Comoros, Zanzibar, and other parts of Africa.

The Waziguwa who are in Somalia today came in the 17th century to live in the Juba valley. The first village they established was Chamama which, in the language of Kiziguwa, means a special kind of grass that grows in lakes. The Waziguwa people, led by Madam Wana-Nkucha, were the first to settle in the southern region of the Juba valley. After some time the Waziguwa spread to the whole area of the Juba. As they expanded, they established a new ruling administration as part of their kingdom. Villages they established included Buje, Migwa, Mchala, Mofi, Songolo-dimwe, Chigola, Mauya, Machaku, Mswagiro, Makomani, Fikiro, Mkalongo, Kow-zuma, Shongolo-mavula, Subutuni, Mgambo, Takaungo, Zunguni, Kwa-Mwenzundu, Kobongo, Harara, Man-mofi, Jiwe, Yonte, Mbolini, Mpangeni, Kismayo, Gowme (Goobwayne), Chiruwa-mombasa, Dikono, Kwamdroka, Jilibu, Kam-Mtande, Homboy, Mabungo, Funga-moyo, Chambike, and Kwa-dosa. Residents of these villages speak the Kiziguwa language. These settlements document that the areas belong to the Waziguwa and Wagosha.

After 1843, the first Somalis reached the Juba Valley from Ethiopia. They came through Lower Shabelle and fought with Ajuran and then the Digil. They were defeated and sent back to Bo'ale (Middle

Juba) and Afmadow (Lower Juba). The people from the Ogaden region in Ethiopia were looking for grazing land, so they fought with the Wardey and the Ajuran who were defeated and sent towards the Kenyan border.

The second group of Somalis came to Kismayo in 1868 under the leadership of Sultan Said Barkash who had a commercial relationship with Sultan of Hobyo Ali Yusuf. Waziguwa and Wagosha had an active commercial relationship. The Wagosha had first a relationship with Sa'd Sa'd Sultan of Zanzibar and later with Barkash. The ruling Kingdom of Sa'd Sa'd and Barkash extended form Zanzibar to Sofala, Mozambique to Somalia. The towns in Somalia that they ruled included Kismayo, Brava, Merca, Mogadishu, Adale, Aluula, and Ras Hafun. The center of commerce and trade of the Waziguwa and the Arabs was Goweni, currently known as Goobwayn. The Arab merchants were selling arms, clothes, salt, and dates to the Waziguwa. The Waziguwas were selling ivory, cotton, leopard skins, sesame, and maize to the Arabs

In 1891, the British colonials from Kenya came and met with the Waziguwa elders, Mze Mkomwa Maligo, Mze Nasibundo, Mze Mavula, and Mze Farhani Mbaluku. They discussed political, economic, and social issues of the Juba and agreed, with the exception of Nasiib-Bundo, to allow a visit from a British inspector. The British inspector reached Afmadow where he met with the Ogaden elders. After a long discussion the British announced that they had reached an agreement with the Waziguwa to allow a British inspector to visit the Gosha region. The Ogaden elders refused to recognize the agreement between the British and the Waziguwa. That turned out to be the beginning of the controversial conflict between the Waziguwa and Ogaden. The biggest conflict occurred in 1893 in the Migwa village, which was the headquarters of the Waziguwa at that time. The Ogaden were eventually defeated very badly and their leader, Shiekh Mohamed Ambulo, died in that battle. That is when the Ogaden surrendered and shouted *Mushunguli Abuur Reeba* which means, don't eliminate, let our seed remain." That was the time that Saint Shiekh started to reconcile and they reached everlasting peace in Gosha. The Waziguwa got their own borderline in the south at Mlimaboga, which is now known as Goobwayn, and in the west, Waamo.

The Waziguwa still speak their own language, Kiziguwa, and they have maintained their culture and traditional dances, songs, poems, and music as well as other traditions such as male circumcision, wedding ceremonies, traditional ways of preventing infectious diseases, the birth of a child, and coming of age sessions for male and female adolescents. The non-Somali speaking Bantu in Somalia are Waziguwa who speak Kiziguwa, the Bajuni speak Kibajuni, and the Brava speak Chinini.

Ladies and Gentlemen, what I have presented is a small part of the historical background of the Bantus in Somalia, especially the Waziguwa history that I belong to. The Bantus in Somalia are suffering because of discrimination and political, economic, social, and academic oppression. They have been subjected to horrifying massacres, raping and the appropriation of their land which caused them to flee to the neighboring countries. However, those who remained are still suffering.

SECTION SEVEN

Women's Roles

Introduction to Section Seven

Can reconciliation and development succeed without attention to gender? Can a culture that has been governed by male elders for 1,000 years engage women in planning, decision-making, management, and evaluation? Can Somali women who have accomplished remarkable things in peace building, entrepreneurship, health, nutrition, and community governance play a more active role in shaping the course of the Somali people to increase reconciliation and rehabilitation?

Yes, say four contributors who focus on women's roles in building the new Somali presence. Economic accomplishments in small-scale and micro-enterprise efforts form the basis for the first article. Changes resulting from the decade of war, especially the rising importance of the informal sector, have created new and challenging careers for women.

The next two articles, noting that children and women constitute far more than half of Somali society, lament that they do not yet have access to livelihood resources in the same way as men. To what extent is national productivity limited because of traditional views about the role of women? Are gender stereotypes carried over from previous generations inhibiting opportunities for expanded peace building? Is the incorporation of women as "elders' in rural communities and urban neighborhoods a threat to the stability of traditional Somali values?

The final chapter deplores the present practice of chewing *qat*. Why do men allow *qat* to take precedence over family, work, child-rearing, and community development? How can the hours now spent chewing *qat* be converted into time and resources to rebuild families, communities, and infrastructure? And from the male's perspective, how can the sense of community, belonging, and camaraderie now derived from *qat* chewing be replaced by other networks and social constructs that are more focused on community building?

CHAPTER THIRTY

Women's Roles in The Economy: Informal Sector Activities in Hargeisa

Hawa I. Koshen

"Human Development, if not engendered, is endangered."
UNDP Human Development Report, 1995

Introduction

The phenomenal growth of the informal sector in recent times has led to a great deal of discussion and research. Its dual role as a contributor to economic growth and a means of poverty alleviation by employment creation is widely recognized. (Mayoux, 1995) In this study, the 'informal sector' will mean, briefly, small scale units producing and distributing goods and services, managed by independent, self-

employed workers; with little or no access to organized markets or to credit institutions. These units are not recognized, supported, or regulated by the government. Their profit margins are relatively low.

As knowledge of the informal sector has increased, it has become apparent that women play a major role, not just as employees and part-time workers, but also as entrepreneurs. (Mayoux, 1995) Experts on women in development have extensively demonstrated the value of women for sustaining their families and their society. Besides their traditional roles in reproduction (child bearing, family health care, and child-rearing responsibilities), they contribute substantially to production, either in subsistence or as income-earners, and fulfil a community managing role, based on the provision of items of collective consumption and mutual exchange of services. (Moser, 1989)

The UNDP *Human Development Report, 1995* (UNDP, 1995), states that "Poverty has a woman's face," citing that women comprise 70% of the 1.3 billion poor people in the world. The report attributes women's dominance in the informal sector to this fact, quoting the Congo and Zambia, where women account for two thirds of the informal production; Botswana, where half of employed women compared to 10% of employed men are involved in informal sector activities; and Peru, where more than 80% of the economically active women work in the informal sector. The main attractions for women are low barriers to entry and the flexible nature of the work, thereby allowing them to combine gainful employment with domestic responsibilities are. However, the same factors make it difficult for women to expand their enterprises and earn a decent living. Among many other reasons, the main reasons for turning to the informal sector include unemployment, economic and social crises, and gender-based occupational segregation.

Characteristics of the Informal Sector and Women's Roles

In order to understand better the characteristics of the informal sector, it may be easier to examine the formal/informal sector relationship. The main characteristic of the formal sector is its relationship to the government. Economic activities that are officially recognized and supported by the government enjoy considerable advantages: they obtain the direct benefits of access to credit, foreign exchange concessions, work permits, and other important benefits that reduce the cost of capital in relation to that of labor. Indirectly, the establishments in the formal sector benefit from the restriction of

competition through tariffs, quotas, trade licensing, and product and construction standards drawn from richer countries or based on their criteria. Because of its privileged access to resources, the formal sector is characterized by large enterprise, sophisticated technology, high wage rates, high average profits, and foreign ownerships.

On the other hand, ILO (UNDP, 1995) has defined the informal sector as that set of economic activities characterized by relative ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership, small scale operations, labor intensive inputs, reliance on skills acquired outside the formal educational system, and unregulated and competitive markets. Therefore, enterprises and individuals within the informal sector operate largely outside the system of government benefits and regulation, and thus have no access to the formal credit institutions and the main sources of transfer of foreign technology. Many of the economic agents in this sector operate illegally, though often pursuing similar economic activities to those in the formal sector – for example, producing and marketing foodstuffs, carrying out the repair and maintenance of machinery and consumer durables, and running transport. Illegality here is generally due not to the nature of the economic activity, but instead, to an o fficial limitation of access to legitimate activity.

Peattie (Peattie, 1987) asserts that the dichotomy between a formal and an informal sector is one of dualistic conceptualizations that have stressed the contrast between two sets of economic activities: one relatively profitable and privileged, the other relatively disadvantaged. Hence, one of the characteristics of the informal sector, agricultural and non-agricultural, is the low income for those who work in it. A natural consequence of these low incomes is that monetary exchanges within the informal sector are different in quality from those in the formal sector. A most important consequence of a low income is the high level of risk and insecurity. As a consequence, entrepreneurs in the informal sector must act continually to protect themselves against risk. Accordingly, they establish semi-permanent relations with suppliers and buyers, frequently at the expense of their profits. For the same reason, they may be hesitant to innovate, particularly in agriculture, for they cannot take the chance of failure. Morgan, in a study carried out for UNESCO (Morgan, 1989) identified several complex factors that lead to success in microenterprise: an adequate market for the produce or service, availability of finance, suitable premises, good equipment, a reliable supply of working materials, absence of unnecessary bureaucratic constraints, and non-penal rates and thresholds of taxation

All of the above characteristics have relevance in varying degrees to the circumstances in Somaliland. Although municipalities levy taxes on hawkers/operators (where such entities exist), this formality will not disqualify these enterprises from being classified as informal sector activities for the purpose of this report.

Women's Role in the Informal Sector

In the mid 1970s and early 1980s, there was generally a growing interest in the newly identified 'informal sector' as a contributor to economic growth and a means of targeted poverty alleviation through employment creation. (Mayoux, 1995) Ways of increasing women's access to income were highlighted by the extent of discrimination which women faced in the labor market and the household. An ESCWA report cited studies by Moghadam (ESCWA, 1994) stated there was increasing global evidence, as well as irrefutable signs in many parts of the Third World, that poverty has a gendered impact, asserting that discriminatory tradition is one of the reasons women bear the brunt of the poverty burden. It is this reality that has led to the coining of the phrase 'the feminization of poverty.' Aid agencies recognized that as well as the fact that women's economic contributions in times of crisis are crucial to the survival and welfare of their families and communities. This recognition led to many income generating projects for women as one of the most effective ways of responding to women's needs and alleviating poverty.

Women's roles in the informal sector vary considerably with educational background, the status of the worker, and the type of activity involved, as well as its location. There are also social and economic values that contribute to job discrimination by sex, for example, the belief that women are secondary earners in the family, that they are not committed to permanent employment and therefore not worth an investment in skills training. Furthermore, gender division of labor is strikingly similar to that of the formal sector, as women are engaged in a range of less skilled and less capital intensive activities. For example women were mainly involved in tuckshops and food catering, knitting, vegetable growing and selling, firewood collection and selling, hairdressing, clothes selling, and tailoring. In contrast, men were involved in building, metalworking, electrical repair, shoe repair, upholstery and tin smithing activities. (World Bank, 1991)

Women who turn to the informal sector fall generally into five categories:

- women who head households and are the sole income earner as a result of male migration, family disintegration, male mortality, or single parenthood

- housewives whose spouses' earnings are not sufficient and they have to find other sources of supplementary income

- former employees who could no longer subsist on their meager salaries and are therefore forced to quit their formal jobs to engage full-time in the informal sector

- employees who for various reasons can't afford to quit their jobs but at the same time can't subsist on their wages and are thus forced to work part-time at their small enterprises, usually after working hours and during weekends

- displaced women who, due to economic, civil, or natural crises, are deprived of traditional means of livelihood and are forced to relocate and seek other means to survive.

Reasons for women seeking income from the informal sector vary:

- they are the head of the household and are solely responsible for providing the financial needs for the survival of their wards

- as a short term solution to alleviate social, natural, or economic crisis, such as an hiatus in their regular source of income

- lack of job access near home and restricted mobility to obtain better opportunities leaving them with the only option of turning to activities within their home domain

- lack of education and skills to undertake any other occupation. Generally women have more limited education and technical skills than men and this prevents them from participating in activities other than those which are domestic related

- flexibility of the informal sector allows for domestic and child rearing responsibilities. Studies show that a majority of small business women operate at home or near home with very limited equipment and space, this helps them to combine domestic duties with business activities

- need for an independent source of income over which they have direct control and can dispose at their own discretion, separate from the income provided by the head of the family which should be used for the household.

Constraints

Women entrepreneurs face many constraints that apply to a lesser extent or not at all to their male counterparts. Legislation often prevents them from taking out loans without the consent and signature of a husband or male relative. In addition, most women do not own title deeds to land and are unable to use land as collateral for loans, Banks and other support agencies tend to be dominated by men who are biased against women in business. Domestic responsibilities (especially in rural areas) often conflict with business responsibilities and married women with children have far less time to devote to running a business than do single or married men. Since most women are in the same position, they dominate the same lowly paid activities. Some female entrepreneurs who operate with very small capital have a minimal profit margin which influence the amount of raw material she is able to purchase.

Police harassment is another problem, often due to the fact that the entrepreneurs operate illegally, or in areas where such activities are prohibited. Other difficulties include the lack of child care facilities and lack of help in their domestic chores.

Benefits

Positive effects are significant. Apart from the primary objective of meeting their family's basic needs, women's entrepreneurial activities have given new importance to their economic role, challenging societal attitudes, especially those that perpetuate gender inequality. It has sometimes led to a new marital relationship, with husbands helping and supporting their wives in the domestic duties and even in their businesses.

Small enterprise activities have empowered women and given them a confidence to make decisions with the knowledge that they are shaping their own destinies. As will be noted in this paper, a majority of the respondents consider that they are making a useful contribution to their country.

Recent History

In 1960, British and Italian Somalilanders gained independence and united to form the Republic of Somalia – run by a democratically elected government. During the 1969 electoral process, there was disarray, which motivated a bloodless *coup d'etat*, leading to the 22 year rule of the despotic Mohamed Siyad Barre who manipulated clan differences and set the fratricidal war in motion.

The 1980s brought disenchantment with Barre's authoritarian style. The resulting corruption and nepotism caused internal conflicts. There was also a change in the political ideology – from socialist to capitalist. This was further exacerbated by the austere economic measures caused by the Structural Adjustment Program. The confusion and insecurity resulted in civil disobedience and defiance which were dealt with heavy-handedly. A civil war resulted with dire consequences for the civilian population. Killing campaigns, looting of property, and rape ensued. There were mass movements of population and refugee camps were established near the borders.

Barre was finally ousted in early 1991, bringing down the last vestiges of a national government. The Barre regime deliberately neglected Somaliland and its resources were exploited to the point of extinction. The people of Somaliland were made to feel alien in their own land by being persecuted and marginalized. The rebirth of the Somaliland Republic took place in May 1991. To date, Somaliland is a haven of stability and peace, a viable and credible government has been established. People feel confident of the future and the country is gradually regaining its dignity through hard work and sacrifice.

Socio-economic Background

In 1988, the size of the population of Somalia was 6 million and per capita GDP was $170. (World Bank, 1990) By 1993, the population was estimated to be 9 million. (United Nations, 1995) According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 75% of the population

in 1993 were pastoralists. Nomadism stands central to the cultural and economic life of the country, deriving livelihoods chiefly from livestock resources.

According to the UNDP *Human Development Report 1995*, Somalia was among the ten least developed countries in the world, with a Human Development Index of 0.246 (average world human development index is 0.759) and the lowest daily calorie supply per capita of 1,505 (average for developing countries is 2,546). (UNDP, 1995)

The economy of Somaliland is based on export of livestock and agricultural produce – namely camels, sheep, goats, fish, and myrrh. It is remarkable that in the absence of strong institutional infrastructure, basic services are provided mainly by the private sector ranging from utilities, health care, education, communications, media, and transport. Social and economic statistics on Somaliland were not available, hence the absence of this vital information.

Status of Women in Somaliland

Somali society is built on the clan structure. Individual identity is mainly based on clan membership. The majority of Somali people are pastoralists or agro-pastoralists and this traditional philosophy permeates even the modern day thinking of women's status. This pastoral tradition is reinforced by Islamic conservatism. Accordingly, a woman retains her legal rights with her agnatic group throughout her life. This forms the most important institution which protects her basic rights and safeguards her interests and welfare. For example, if she commits any crime, only her agnatic kinsmen are liable for customary compensation. Alternatively, if any crime is committed against her, her agnatic kinsmen claim compensation. Similarly, women in distress, most commonly divorced women raising children without the support of husbands, are given moral and material assistance by their kinsmen.

Upon marriage, only her reproductive and productive roles are transferred to the husband's family. She is not granted actual 'ownership' rights in the a nimal wealth of her husband or any clear control over family stocks. However, she is entitled to keep her own stock either bought by her or bequeathed to her. This stock is normally attached to her own kinsmen's stock. Proceeds from the sale of animals as well as pastoral products of meat, milk, purified ghee, and hides form the largest part of a nomad's income. These appeared to be controlled by men

although women may be given part of the proceeds to acquire household goods or for personal needs.

In 1988 the nation experienced a massive movement of people to border areas to escape the ravages of war. It is known that women's labor in both productive and reproductive spheres increases disproportionately to men's in times of forced migration, which is almost always accompanied by a loss of property and support services. This was typical in Somaliland where women had to find shelter, food, and survive without even the basic amenities. The demand to generate income for the survival of the family increased as did the burden of household chores as she cared for more and more people. The number of mouths to feed and to cook for grew as displaced, wounded, disabled, impoverished, and orphaned relatives sought refuge in their households. UNICEF, in its report on Women and Children in Somalia, (UNICEF, 1991) reported that women often develop a sense of assertiveness over time as a pre-condition for survival since becoming refugees. It states that in developing characteristics to cope with the increased demands of camp life, some of the women have been forced to assume these more assertive patterns of behavior and this can often have dramatic implications for the marital relationship. Cultural constraints broke down in the face of critical changes in life circumstances and some women assumed both a greater role for themselves within the family and exercised more power within the marriage. This occurred to the extent that the traditional role of men as providers became severely altered, and some women began to question their status.

Women's Income-earning Activities

In a report entitled *Assessment of Small Scale Industries and Business Ventures in Hargeisa and Borama,* (Haybe, A. *et al,* 1996), the authors mentioned that following the civil war, the contribution of the informal sector to the "economic, social and political life of the country has been tremendous," elaborating that:

- it has been the largest employment/income generator in the country
- it has contributed immensely to the retention and creation of skills

- it has contributed to positive human interaction, particularly among settlements within the country and with neighboring countries, thereby reducing psychological, political, and social barriers

- it has taken over or complemented public sector functions *e.g.* information, communications and education services.

Women's involvement in activities to generate income began in the traditional agro-pastoralist society where they were responsible for proceeds from milk and poultry products. Traditionally, the women decided on what was required for household consumption and earnings from the rest would be disposed accordingly to their needs. Urbanization offered more opportunities and women traveled between villages and cities to trade on a very small scale. During the civil war (in refugee camps) it was the norm for those women, who had no other source of income, to indulge in some sort of income-earning activity.

In contemporary times, the entrepreneurial spirit of Somali women has introduced them to international trade, taking them to places like Pakistan, Syria, UAE, Turkey, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia, where they identify and trade in items that are marketable in Somaliland. Items as varied as medicines, furnishings, foodstuffs, clothing, and cosmetics are imported in exchange for hides, myrrh, fishery products, and other raw materials. Many of them also have agents in countries with large Somali communities (Canada, USA, Europe, Australia) to whom they send ethnic products (clothing, cosmetics, jewelry) for sale. A large number of women started their operations with funding from *hagbad* (syndicate that collects cash and allocates proportionately to its members on a rotational basis), loans, savings or gifts from family.

Somalia's *Report to the Fourth Women's Conference* (Core Group, 1995) states that the "informalization of the Somali economic structure since the collapse of the central government has placed women in a better position to participate in the economy, since it is traditionally in this sector that women most actively participate." The same report states that the biases that resulted in the gender division of labor in the informal sector during the pre-war period are giving way to the need to survive for many households, and women are currently involved in every type of income-generating activity. However, this is contradicted by Haybe (Haybe, A. 1996) who found that there is still a marked division of

women's and men's activities in the informal sector, with women dominating petty trading activities, whereas small scale industries and business ventures are "overwhelmingly owned, managed, and run by men."

The Core Group Report (Core Group, 1995) refers to a 1982 Labor Force Survey stating that 30% of the female labor force is active in the informal urban sector as compared to 18% males. This can be attributed to the rural-urban migration and the monetization of the economy. The same report also revealed that about 71% of women living in villages and towns are the heads of their households. Lack of statistics following the civil war can only leave one to reflect that the number of women-headed households must have increased dramatically due to the conscription, death, and maiming of male relatives. The high prevalence of female-headed households, coupled with the hardship of civil conflict, thus substantiates the 'feminization of poverty' theory in Somaliland.

Hargeisa Survey

A questionnaire, which was distributed to 24 women involved in informal sector activities in Hargeisa in 1996, yielded the following results.

Activities: The main activities in which women invest time include food processing, tailoring, vending, poultry and agriculture, handicrafts, selling of *qat* (a mildly-narcotic leafy plant), teaching, vegetable vending, cosmetics (making *oonsi* in the Somali language or *bakhoor* in Arabic, which is a form of incense used by ladies), petty trading in goods such as clothing. On the question 'reason for choice,' among several reasons, the highest rated were family financial needs (59%), illiteracy (44%), time complementarity (24%), lack of knowledge or skills (20%), profitable (16%). Other reasons rated less than 16%.

Age and Family Status: Although it was difficult for women to furnish their age accurately, due to lack of records and certificates, the survey revealed that the average age of women entrepreneurs was 32.5 years. This response confirmed that the women were in their prime years. Of the total, 52% were married, followed by 18% widowed, 11% divorced, and 7% single. The majority were heading the household (52%) due to absence of husband, being divorced, widowed, or single. The average household comprised 10 persons (including herself, spouse, children, siblings, parents, and other relatives).

Education: Illiterate women dominate the informal sector in Hargeisa (52%), followed by those who have reached the intermediate level of schooling (28%), and elementary (8%). Those with no schooling keep records of transactions mentally or with the help of a literate family member.

Experience: Evidence from the survey suggests that most women commenced their activities following the civil war, with an average of 7.2 years in the business (the civil war started in 1988). Of those who responded to the question of occupations immediately preceding their present activity, 30% were involved in different types of commerce, 25% were housewives, 20% were employed in the formal sector, 15% were students and others comprised 10%. Most of the respondents reported that their income earning skills were self acquired (44%), 26% learned skills from family members, followed by 17% from friends, 13% reported that their skills were learnt in a formal manner (schools/training).

Working Conditions, Premises: Most women entrepreneurs were operating in the market place (70%), 16% were operating from their homes. Other locations amounted to 8%. Those who operated from the market paid an average rent of US$4 for space, kiosks, or stalls and were charged an average rate of US$2 for municipal taxes.

Employees: Respondents mostly sold their own products (88%), others were assisted by family members as unpaid laborers. Only 20% of the respondents reported employing one or more female workers in their enterprises.

Funding: Since formal credit facilities were lacking, 32% reported receiving loans from friends, 24% began their operations from savings, 24% received loans from family members, 8% received gifts from family members. The average amount of start up capital was calculated at US $240.

Markets: A major portion of products were purchased by local consumers (48%), followed by retailers (32%), and others (16%). From the list of problems experienced by entrepreneurs, lack of markets rated second (24%). Other impediments were lack of time and lack of materials. A contributing factor to lack of demand is the high inflation rate that is presently being experienced. Consumers are forced to cut down on their spending leading to loss of purchasing power.

Incomes, Business, and Personal Expenditures: An average monthly income of $81 is earned by the entrepreneur, out of which 54% is spent on food/clothing, 12% on house rent, 9% on schooling, 9% on fuel/utilities, 8% on work-related expenses including rent, 3% goes to savings, 2% on loan repayment, 2% on municipal taxes, with 1% on other expenses. Compared to UNICEF (UNICEF 1991) that reported that in a 1987 survey, 79% of the women entrepreneurs used their income for basic family needs and household expenses. The current survey reports in response to the question 'Are activities the major source of income,' 93% respondents replied positively. The average amount reported as other income from spouse or family members was $9 monthly.

Performance: No specific activity stood out as being particularly profitable. This may suggest that the level of returns depend on the size of the business. Most of the respondents expressed a wish to change their activity (64%), citing various reasons such as limited income. Most respondents report that they have difficulty in carrying out all their commitments (domestic and income-earning). They spend an average of 2.6 hours in domestic activities and six hours in their income-earning activities. Due to the lack of or the high cost of electricity (where available), work is mostly carried out during daylight hours. Their performance was severely restricted by the lack of facilities available. Notably, most women believed that they were contributing to the economy in general.

Problems: Out of the list of difficulties encountered, the highest single problem was constraint on time (28%), followed by lack of markets (24%), and lack of materials (16%). The remaining respondents reported multitple impediments including family objections, lack of training, and competitive markets. They all considered that government assistance was essential with social services such as education and health topping the list (84%), loans and financing second (80%), utilities (piped water and electricity) third (52%), and training fourth (40%). Inflation and personal security, although not m entioned in the questionnaire, were also concerns of the respondents.

Profile

The Somali woman entrepreneur is in the prime of her productive years. She is self-employed and works alone. Her activities began following the mass evacuation of the population to a refugee camp in Ethiopia. As with the other countries studied, she is carrying out traditional activities – food production, tailoring, etc. She is illiterate and has had no previous experience, her skills have been acquired from other operators/family members. Her start-up capital came from informal loans as well as financial assistance from family members. She operates from a stall in the market for which she pays rent and tax. Her main concern is time constraint. Lack of markets caused by the high rate of inflation/loss of purchasing power leaves her with few customers. Most of her income is spent on living expenses – food, rent, schooling for the children. Very little is saved. As a consequence of the civil war, the government provides no services such as sanitation, health, utilities, education. Searching for these and accessing them is an additional burden. She finds conditions extremely hostile but has no alternative. She is the head of the household (numbering ten persons), but depends on the extended family network to help in her domestic duties.

Mariam's story: I was widowed several years ago when my husband was working in the UAE. My children are now grown up. I ,used my husband's pension to begin buying foodstuffs and consumer items from the UAE and shipping them to Somalia for resale. There are many businesswomen such as me. Our overheads are very high. From the time of purchase in Dubai, we have to pay

for transport to the port, onloading, and arranging shipment. Our goods are not insured and often we face total loss due to negligence of the shippers. At Berbera port we again pay for offloading, customs, security guards, and transportation to other distribution centers. Sometimes when there are roadblocks we have to pay the militia. When we finally receive our fees in local currency, we have to bear the cost of devaluation. I usually transfer my money to the UAE in hard currency. Some people buy goods such as myhrr, tanned hides, shark fins, and livestock. They export these goods bacvk to Dubai, but I find this too cumbersome and risky. I wish the men would play a bigger role in helping women to cope, but all they do is talk and criticize. In the old days our men were different but their values are changing. I think its because of the frustration and helplessness. Maybe if there were opportunities for employment they could regain their confidence and control.

Fadumo's story: My husband was killed in the civil war, leaving me to support six children and other relatives. I started selling *qat* when we were evacuated from Hargeisa to a camp on the Ethiopian border. Since our return to Hargeisa two years ago, I have continued. The *qat* is brought in from Ethiopia daily. By the time the trucks come into Hargeisa, around mid-day, I have finished my domestic chores and go to the market to begin selling *qat*. I have certain customers who I can count on for their daily purchase. By early evening I have sold my supply and can count up and go home. I prefer *qat*-selling because it does not involve much time or work. The only problem is that we are not respected, men speak to us rudely, and sometimes they don't pay. I consider *qat*-chewing a bad habit and a waste of time and money, but the majority of men chew it to take their minds off the difficult times. If only they could use the money for their families and children. The resources of the country are being drained by the import of *qat*. For me, it is my way of earning a living and supporting my family.

Conclusion

Through adversity, Somali women had to devise strategies to cope. This led to the significant contribution they are making economically and socially. The resilience of women in difficult circumstance has been recognized in the ESCWA (ESCWA, 1994) report which quotes Ben

Hamida and Cheikh's findings in urban Tunisia, pointing to the resourcefulness of women living in dire poverty, with the revelation that poor women tend to manage better than men living under the same circumstances. The researchers attribute this finding to the type of strategies that poor women are ready to resort to in order to overcome their poverty, thus reflecting the flexibility of female gender roles in response to changing conditions. In Hargeisa, the high level of women's participation in the informal sector supplements this theory. Thus it may be seen as a desperate attempt by women with few alternatives, rather than a premeditated choice.

Among women operating in the informal sector mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the Hargeisa survey shows that three categories are dominant: female headed households, households with insufficient earnings from spouses/relatives, and displaced women resorting to informal sector activities. This is true for Hargeisa, where the population experienced relocation twice - in 1988 and again in 1994. Upon their return at present, many families are not living in their former habitats.

Quoted impediments are lack of funding, lack of infrastructure, lack of education and skills, and lack of multiple sources of income in the household. The plus side is the fact that the extended family plays a major role in alleviating pressures of household and childcare duties. Support and recognition from spouses/relatives were commonly reported. Other gains that were inevitable include the empowerment of women entrepreneurs and women overwhelmingly reporting that they have full control of how their earnings are spent.

It is apparent that the informal sector will continue to grow, fueled by unemployment, increasing cost of living, political uncertainty and other factors. As long as 'Poverty has a woman's face' it is unquestionable that women will continue to play a leading role in this sector. Fighting poverty requires creating surroundings in which women can exercise greater direct control over resources. The key requirement for realizing the potential of women entrepreneurs is to create a hospitable environment. Here, governments have the major responsibility. With sustained commitment on the part of governments and more sharply focused targeting, entrepreneurial capacity, especially that of women, can be released for the national benefit. The responsibility of government to improve the environment through the provision of utilities, infrastructure, sanitation facilities, education, health facilities, would go a long way to relieving the burden on women.

Recognizing this, donors (OECD, 1995) are also focusing concerted

efforts on providing resources and services to help eradicate legal and administrative constraints on women's entrepreneurial activity. They are promoting women's participation in project implementation, evaluation activities, and in decision making bodies. They are also helping women to acquire technologies for decreasing domestic workloads so as to free up time for entrepreneurial activities. Finally, donors have added programs to provide training and extension services. on-site. and at convenient hours.

UNDP (UNDP, Gender, 1996) reiterates that "households may be better protected against poverty when women earn an income." At the same time, they acknowledge that "female earnings are generally lower, but allocations to household budget proportionately higher." Empirically, this report substantiates these findings.

We can therefore conclude that as a strategy of household economy management, an increasing number of women in Somaliland have turned to the informal sector. However, they enter this sector without choice, unaided, unsupported, and thus almost empty-handed. The small capital they operate with leads them to small enterprises that are sometimes even 'uneconomic.' The task and activities they engage in have only added to their responsibilities. Because they are over stretched, they are unable to perform all their roles efficiently.

These are the women whom we see in the markets of Hargeisa – their mission is survival. Their heroic role is to sustain their families. Their means are minimal. They are unrecognized and are not seeking recognition. Let us recognize them. Let us say thanks to the mothers, sisters, daughters, and widows. Let us say thanks for their selfless dedication.

CHAPTER THIRTY ONE

Rights for Women and Children

Fatima Saeed/Ibrahim

Introduction

What do we mean when we talk about human rights? Then again, what are human rights? Everyone has his or her version and thoughts about human rights. Here are a few key points:

- government officials state that human rights are about monitoring violations, abuses, and atrocities
- civil society organizations assert that human rights are to be defended, no matter what the cost
- religious leaders say that human rights are a westernized system made to lead women astray.

So what are human rights? The best way to describe human rights is that all human beings are born free and equal, in dignity, and with rights. They are based on assumptions that people are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards each other in a sprit of brotherhood. All human beings have the right to access education, health, security,

economy, and equality. Human rights are:

- the right to education
- the right to health
- the right to protection and stability
- the right to work
- the right to equality
- the right to life

Human rights are the overcoat of equitable human development.

Since men always state that human rights are only about women and child rights, let us look at the basic human rights instruments:

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
- Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
- Convention on the Rights of the Child
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

Please let us keep in mind that these are not westernized thoughts, because the prophet's first wife, Khadija, was a well respected business women whom the prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Upon Him) worked for and respected. Khadija was the one who instigated the marriage between herself and the prophet. (Khadija asked for the prophet's hand in marriage).

It is clear that Somali women strongly believe in justice and peace. Their contribution towards peace and reconciliation and rising above clanism has made them the backbone of the Somali community. We must acknowledge the vital and important role Somali women play as well as give thanks to the contribution and sacrifices they have made in rebuilding their country. Yet they are not accepted or recognized and have

not been given their right place in the political and social economic sectors.

Despite the complexity and struggle that the Somali community faces, Somaliland has the opportunity to heal the wounds of the past and develop peoples participation in the building of a nation. An opportunity has emerged for the authorities to realize that without protecting and promoting women's and children's rights, no such goal can be attained. The responsibility for the protection and assistance to access their rights lies with the government of Somaliland.

The fundamental rights and freedoms that are universally recognized and have been developed over the decades are the same as the teaching of Islam. As a Muslim community, we therefore should support:

- the right to life
- freedom from slavery
- freedom from torture
- the right not to face discrimination because of racial, ethnic origin, gender, or religion
- the right not to be arrested and imprisoned arbitrarily
- the right to a fair trial
- freedom of expression
- freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

Many countries ratified these rights in 1948 when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

These rights were stated in the *Qur'aan* and *Sunna*. Although men are very well versed in how women should behave and act, our Somali men have neglected their duties as husband and fathers, leaving the women to brave the harsh weather of the sun, wind, and rain every day in order to place food on the table for their children.

The rights of a human being are not given by man, but from Allah (SWT). In Islam, when a man engages in the wedding ceremony, he pledges to Allah and the witness that he will provide and protect and give his wife and children, if any, the rights that Allah (SWT) has ordained them.

Yet as the Somali proverb states:

Dumarka beenna waa lagu soo hoyiyaa,
Runna waa lagu dhaqaa

Which means,

> You entice women into marriage with lies,
> But live with them in harsh reality

Islam states that boy and girl children should receive the same love, affection, education, and nutrition. Yet this is not practiced. Islam states that those caring for orphans will earn a place in heaven, yet people call the orphanage a place of illegitimate children, the home of bastards.

Women work in the market places and in small stalls having to leave their children with the eldest daughter, which means while she plays the role of mother, the girl misses out on school. There are too many street children in Somaliland without homes or a decent meal, with shabby clothes that will not protect them from the cold or the sun. Their faces are black from the dirt and the sun since they have no protection or shade, yet people won't help these children because they believe they are internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees from Baidoa or Ethiopia.

Allah did not specify in the *Qur'aan* that we should be kind only to our children. It states all children. The *Qur'aan* calls for compassion, understanding, and patience to women and children, yet again that does not apply when we face domestic violence, FGM, forced marriages, and children leaving home to start on drugs and cigarettes, alcohol, and *Qat*.

The prophet Mohammed (Peace Be Unto Him) started the *Batul Mal*, the house of finance for the poor and the disadvantaged. Yet there are mentally handicapped and ill women on the street and men take advantage of them. There are also abandoned children who are left by the wayside.

Children are being arrested for misdemeanors and placed in adult prisons where they suffer unspeakable violations and abuses. Children go missing everyday and are announced on radio Hargeisa. Where do they end up? Who knows? For this country to grow and prosper it has to educate its women and young girls as well as the boys. Women must be able to take their rightful place in society and the government. As you can see, Edna [Adan] is a prime example of what a Somali woman can do when given the chance.

We understand that for the sake of peace and stability the government policy is to give representation to the different clans in the House of Elders, Parliament, and Council of Ministers in order for the clans to give their voice and opinions. But the country is now moving forwards with a new constitution and a multi party system.

In this case the question is, "Who represents the women, children, and youth of this society? Who speaks on their behalf about their needs and priorities? Where is the voice of the silent majority?" We all understand that Allah created man and woman because one needs the other. One cannot function without the other but together we are a mighty force to reckon with.

We are up against a dilemma because this silent majority (the women and youth) took the referendum by storm and provided a victory without a shadow of doubt. Without them, the referendum would have been a failure. What the Somaliland community wants and what they are prepared to sacrifice for are far apart. For example:

- Somaliland wants recognition without recognizing the important role of women and children.
- Somaliland wants the votes of the silent majority without listening to the voices of the women and children
- Somaliland wants the understanding of the world, without understand the plight of their women and children.

Somaliland wants equality without recognizing the equal needs and priorities of their women and children. How can one ask Allah for his compassion and assistance, without affording this compassion and assistance to each other?

Allah has stated in the *Qur'aan* to give to your brother/sister what you would like for yourself. Yet this is not practiced, since the girl child is still disadvantaged in every way. Therefore I ask myself what are we working for? I answer, the future. I ask, who is the future for? I answer our children and their children's children.

Then I beg please make the future brighter, healthier, and richer for our children. Let's teach them love, respect, equality, understanding, and patience. Then I beg again because for this to happen we have to practice what we preach and treat our men and women equally and our girl and boy child equally, by giving them their God given rights as human beings. Only then will there be a land of milk and honey.

CHAPTER THIRTY TWO

Women's Rights in Somaliland and Their Role in Reconciliation and Peace Making

Nagaad

Introduction

What is Nagaad?

Nagaad is a non-governmental, non-political, and humanitarian women's umbrella organization, established in 1997 with 32 member organizations.

Background

In the aftermath of the prolonged civil wars in Somaliland, which led to the total destruction and devastation of the country and the unraveling of its society, women's organizations emerged to meet the basic needs of their families and communities.

Their main goal was to assist in rebuilding society and restoring

shattered economies. However, this important role of women NGOs needed a united effort to effectively address the socio-economic issues and problems and to overcome several constraints they had faced, since the concept and hence the experience with NGOs was relatively new to them.

The birth of women's umbrella organization was a felt need and inevitable to address the multitude of problems facing the country. Nagaad works to empower women to realize sustainable development. It strives to address two key goals that are of concern to its members.

- advancing the economic, social, and political status of women in Somaliland
- strengthening the capacity of its members to implement effective projects that facilitate the realization of the first goal.

Women's rights are human rights and since all human rights are universal, indivisible, inter-dependant and inter-related, their full and equal enjoyment by women and girls is a priority and is essential for the advancement of women.

Somaliland women obviously shared many problems with their male fellow citizens, especially in this post-war era, but they also differ on a number of issues. Women's specific concerns are shaped by their social roles as daughters, wives, and mothers. Economic positions and obligations as well as by prevailing cultural conceptualization of gender roles also influence the family and the community. The issue of women's rights in Somaliland is deeply rooted in the realms of culture and religion. Gender discrimination is part and parcel of culture. Cultural beliefs in male superiority and greater ability to lead socializes attitudes of the men. The women, traditionally, accepted subordinate positions.

From early ages, boy children are socialized into roles, which prepare them to exercise power in the family over women, younger children, and productive resources. Girls, on the other hand, are socialized into roles, which do not prepare them for power and decision-making over other people or resources in either the public or private spheres.

Women's rights are one of the areas of concern of Nagaad that has been in fact difficult to implement because of these cultural barriers. Nevertheless, Nagaad has since its establishment been campaigning to create an awareness of women's rights on issues such as their participation in the decision-making process of the country.

The participation of women in decision-making at all levels of public and private life is important as an issue of human rights as well as the strengthening of the democratic process of this post-war period.

Women's desire to be included in decision-making is more than a simple demand for numerical representation, proportional to their presence in the society. It is a demand based on the fact that institutions governed by men are unlikely to reflect the specific interest and views of the female population, instead, they would reinforce the marginalized position of women in society.

In this post war situation, women comprise more than two-third of the population. As heads of households, primary caregivers of children and the elderly, and the backbone of the formal and informal economies, women's empowerment is critical to the success of the country and its experiment with democracy. Women have initiated scores of non-governmental organizations and activities that have contributed to the development of Somaliland. Thus the fact that women have been completely excluded from positions of leadership presents a serious obstacle to the democratization of Somaliland. There are no women in senior positions in national politics, local politics, or the private sector.

Men wield all the power at all levels of society, from their traditional positions as the legal heads of households and decisions over family resources, to their control over public institutions such as parliaments house of elders (*Guurti*), cabinet, and local government. At the present time, the clan-based system of governance is the major obstacle to women's participation in public leadership positions. Traditionally men hold exclusive rights to clan positions and thus women are not allowed to represent their clans. Also, the majority of the female populations are not aware of their legal rights and religious rights due to lack of education. Misinterpretation of religious concepts by traditional religious leaders augments the problem and hinders women from acquiring political positions.

For women, constitution making is a process of the highest importance. If their concerns and rights are not included in the new constitution, this will have long-term impacts on recovery and options for development. The constitutional referendum of May 2001 and the legalization of political parties furnish an important opportunity for women to make progress in gaining greater representation and influence in politics, since Somaliland male politicians will for the first time be forced to recognize women as an important constituency, both numerically and as opinion leaders. Meanwhile women have been

preparing themselves for this event. Nagaad has been implementing a three-year program on the empowerment of women in the decision-making process of the country.

In a survey conducted by SOWRAG (Somaliland Women's Research and Action Group) in collaboration with the ICD, on potential women leaders, a large majority of the interviewed women (65 women) showed a high degree of readiness in participating in leadership positions in the government.

Nagaad, with the help of its partners namely the ICD, NOVIB and the National Endowment For Democracy, are working on a national political agenda for women consisting of:

- capacity building initiatives for political empowerment of women (negotiation, lobbying and management of electoral campaigns techniques)
- meeting with political parties for the investiture of women as heads of the electoral lists and to promote their access to the decision-making positions within the political parties
- strategic alliance with associations involved in the promotion of the status of women (business community and pressure groups).

The Role of Women in Peace Making

Somaliland women in conflict situations are not passive sufferers but are some cornerstone forces that anchor the society. Though they are rarely included in the decision-making process related to reconciliation, conflict prevention, resolution, and management, women can be agents of peace.

Given the collapse of the communities and the values that they supported, the role of women is very crucial. They continue to pass on culture, tradition, and values to the next generation. Women preserve human dignity and social order in the midst of chaos and civil strife and are the agents of change for building of a new society from the ashes of the old.

Though women are never allowed to sit at the negotiation table with men to discuss reconciliation and peace making, they are involved in resolving conflicts in various ways. In the home and the community, women have their own traditional strategies for resolving conflicts. As mothers, they sense developing conflicts at early stages, both in the

family sphere and in the immediate community. At this stage, women play a dynamic role to resolve conflicts within the neighborhood.

Since they do not have a direct role in resolving clan and inter-clan conflicts, women always have their own alternative strategies that usually contribute effectively to reconciliation and conflict resolution. Somaliland women compose poems that emphasize the power of solving problems peacefully. Also their indirect role in resolving inter-clan conflict is demonstrated in the bonds and relationships that result from inter-community and inter-clan marriages that serve as concrete bridges for peaceful living between the different warring clans.

Since women and children are the most vulnerable groups during wartime, their first priority is to initiate peace and seek all means to resolve conflicts. Women lose their most beloved in the wars, their husbands, brothers, and sons. They become widows and are left behind to fend for their families and take care of their children, a heavy burden that has fallen over the shoulders of mothers in more than half of the households in this post-war period.

In post-war Somaliland, women have played a significant role in supporting peace and reconciliation. This includes exerting pressure on the elders to mediate. In the Berbera conflict, women organized demonstrations in Hargeisa in support of peace and petitioned the former president's administration to sue for peace.

Women's groups, in their effort to consolidate peace and security, petitioned for the formation of national police force. When the police force was formed a particular women organization, which is a member of Nagaad, provided the uniforms for the first police units formed. When again in 1994 fighting broke out in Hargeisa and spread to Burao a year later, women got fed up and could no longer bear the eruption of new hostilities. They took to the streets again and organized a very big demonstration in Hargeisa, chanting slogans such as "in a war a son is lost but not born," "we want peace, not war," "at time of peace, milk is sweet," etc.

Women's groups have also organized a mass prayer rally in one of the public gardens in Hargeisa, praying to God, to help them with their peace-making efforts. Moreover, a group of 22 women submitted a petition to the government to stop the new out break of violence and to the negotiating table once again.

In the grand peace conference held in Borama town in 1993, women got a greater chance to participate in the conference. They recited poems, provided financial support, and mediated between the warring groups.

However, they were never considered as delegates to the peace conference, only observers.

CHAPTER THIRTY THREE

The Negative Impact of *Qat* on Somali Society

Qania Ismail Aden

Introduction

Qat "Qaad" (*Catha edulis*) has been consumed in Somali society for a long time but its use has dramatically increased in recent decades among all segments of the society. Its use has both defenders and critics. Defenders claim that it is not much stronger than coffee, is non-addictive, has an important cultural use as part of conflict resolution, and is enjoyed by thousands of users (primarily men) in a responsible way. Critics say that it is addictive, has significant negative health affects, destroys family economies, and undermines development efforts.

Like many debatable issues, and particularly those dealing with personal behavior, there is no right or wrong position, but many shades of gray. Can *Qat* be used responsibly? Yes, of course it can. Can its use be severely abused? Yes, this is evident to even casual observers. So the

question becomes one of scale of abuse and the impact this has on Somali society.

I am not advocating that we make *Qat* illegal. This was tried before and did little but make some people extremely rich while making many others technically criminal users. What I am advocating is that we consider how the present use of *Qat*, both within Somaliland and throughout the Diaspora, affects the development of Somaliland as well as the status of Somali communities elsewhere.

My hypothesis is that the cost of present *Qat* use is too high, given the pressing needs we have to develop Somaliland – needs for schools, hospitals, jobs, and our future. Every surplus dollar spent on *Qat* is one less dollar available for investment in our national development. It is too high in terms of national income, too high in terms of health effects, and too high in terms of impact on family life.

Economic Impact

An excessive amount of money is spent on *Qat*. According to Green (1999) *Qat* production in northeast Africa is between $1.5 and $2 billion dollars, wholesale. This is apportioned between Ethiopia ($500 million), Kenya ($300 million), and Somaliland ($50 million). While producers in Somaliland can now legally grow *Qat* (during a portion of the years of Siyad Barre's regime *Qat* production was illegal), the output is not sufficient to meet daily demand. Production is about 25% of total consumption and the quality is considered by some to be inferior to that grown in Ethiopia, perhaps due to the soils, elevation, and rainfall patterns of Somaliland. Green (*ibid.*) states that Ethiopia consumes half of its production with the balance being exported to Somaliland, Djibouti, London, Yemen, and Somalia. Data from the United States Department of Commerce (2000) states that *Qat* production in Ethiopia increased dramatically after 1997 and is now the second largest export crop after coffee.

Hargeisa Consumption: A study by Nair (1998), which was published by the United Nations Office of Somalia (UNDOS), looked at the *Qat* trade in Somaliland and Somalia. Based on data collected in 1997, the average amount of *Qat* arriving daily in Hargeisa from Ethiopia at that time was 9,000 *mardouf*. A *mardouf*, equivalent to approximately one kilogram, is comprised of four *majin* (bundles) with the *majin* being the basic unit of *Qat* consumption. *Qat* chewers typically consume one, two, or even more *majins* in a single sitting. The price per *majin* in July

2001 was approximately 5,000 Somaliland Shillings, which is equivalent to $1.00 using July 2001 exchange rates. Thus daily *Qat* expenditures in 1997, using today's dollars, can be estimated to be on the order of $36,000 per day.

Many people are convinced that daily total consumption of *Qat* is much higher in 2001 than in 1997, when Nair's study was undertaken. This is based on general observations on the ubiquitousness of *Qat* evident to even a casual observer in Hargeisa. Many people have special rooms for chewing *Qat* in their homes, and people can be routinely seen chewing *Qat* in front of places where *Qat* is sold. It is also based on unsubstantiated data derived from discussions with *Qat* users in Hargeisa in mid-2001.

In addition, the economy of Somaliland has improved since 1997 and there have been increased numbers of northern Somalis who have returned from abroad to Somaliland. There is also an increased involvement by external Somalilanders in assisting needy relatives, investing in small businesses, buying land for the future, and constructing houses for themselves and for relatives. Thus there are probably higher levels of foreign currency available within the economy which can at least partially fuel higher rates of *Qat* consumption.

The current population in Hargeisa is estimated to be 350,000 people. (Massey 2000) It is my belief that as many as 100,000 of this total chews *Qat* on a regular basis. Among men, about four out of every five men I talked to stated that they chew *Qat*. It is also evident that young teenage boys increasingly are consuming *Qat*. There is much concern from the Somaliland Youth Society (SYS) about what the future will bring to the youth of our society, because there many boys who have started chewing *Qat* by the age of 12 or 13 years. Another disturbing trend an apparent increase in the number of women who chew *Qat*.

Based on these rough estimates, daily consumption in Hargeisa could easily exceed 200,000 *majins*, which represents an approximate value of $200,000. On an annual basis, this represents an expenditure of $73,000,000. Assuming a 25% domestic production which is purchased using local currency, total imported value is nearly $55,000,000 transferred out of the country to pay for *Qat* produced in Ethiopia and Kenya. Imagine what this huge sum of money could do each year if it was invested in education, health care, agriculture, and job generation? This by far exceeds any kind of development assistance Somaliland can expect to receive from donor countries at this time. And this is our own pocket change spent *mardouf* by *mardouf*.

There is an estimation that the money spent in *Qat* monthly could build one hospital like the Edna Maternity Hospital every month. Imagine, building a school or a hospital every month with a bit of our *Qat* money? This would be fabulous and would help to develop our country more quickly.

Qat Consumption in the Diaspora: Many Somalis living abroad devote considerable resources to purchasing *Qat*. One Somali male living in the United States said to me " I make $400 a week and spend $35 (cost of a single *majin*) on *Qat* every day, seven days a week." That totals $245 per a week, or $12,740 per year, representing 61% of total income. Since he cannot afford to rent his own place he told me that he shares an apartment with four others, who also chew *Qat*. It's even worse when families are involved in this kind of life, since a wife and children create more responsibilities.

Qat consumption outside Somaliland is moderated most probably because people have many more alternatives to chewing *Qat* as well as responsibilities related to education, work, and family. However, it is clear that leisure use of *Qat* by the Somali diaspora does represent a significant financial resource that could be redirected towards more productive uses.

Remittances: Remittances comprise a significant source of income for people living in Somaliland and Somalia. They are sent to sustain relatives and families, with amounts depending upon the income level of the remitter. According to an ILO study (1998) there are an estimated 322,000 Somalis living abroad, with the top three countries or regions where Somalis live being the Gulf States (120,000 people), Canada (70,000), and the United States (50,000). This study lists three categories of migrants providing remittances back to Somalia and Somaliland.

The first category are emigrant workers, including unskilled (laborers, maids, guards, etc.) and semi-skilled (carpenters, electricians, cooks, etc.) workers. These are people who left Somalia as early as the 1960's, primarily to the Gulf States. The second category are refugees and refugee seekers who left during and after the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime. Many are still refugees while others have become permanent residents or citizens of host countries, often acquiring advanced education and skills (and increased earning power). Finally, a third category are business people living abroad, representing traders and businessman who transferred businesses and assets outside of Somalia prior to the dissolution of the Barre government.

According to household surveys conducted under the ILO study,

remittances from the three categories listed above are used primarily for household food, children's education, important family events (weddings, births, funerals), and small businesses. While purchasing *Qat* does not show up as an official use in the household surveys (perhaps people would be embarrassed to tell surveyors that any money is being used for this purpose) it is evident that if income is increased through remittances that this would increase people's ability to finance *Qat* purchases.

Estimates of the total amount of remittances vary greatly (ILO 1998), with most in the range of $100 to 300 million per year, which is obviously a very significant sum. Most Somalis I know give at least $100 or $200 each month to relatives back home. Given that as much as $55 million per year is sent out of the country for *Qat* just from Hargeisa, it is extremely likely that remittances are an important component of households budgets which facilitate Somalis' ability to finance *Qat* purchases.

Health Impact

Another cost of *Qat* use is its impact on the users health. A number of studies have described the effects of using *Qat* on the body. (Pantelis *et. al.* 1989, Al-Khamel 1994) As in so many vices, moderation is often the key. The body seems to be able to tolerate a moderate use of *Qat* without obvious harm. Overdose symptoms include grandiose delusions, insomnia, loss of appetite, increased blood pressure, stomach irritation, and other various effects.

Overall *Qat* negatively affects health by the "hangover" effect – a tired and mildly depressed state of mind, which makes it difficult for the user to work effectively. Like so many other commodities, whether it is coffee, tobacco, or even sugar, overuse may negatively affect health.

There appears to be a high rate of mental disturbance in most of the cities in Somalia. Given the difficult history in our country over the past 15 years, this is perhaps not surprising. Civil war, economic hardship, death, lack of medical services, and lack of hope are all factors that can be seen as contributing factors towards psychological difficulties. I would argue, however, that abuse of *Qat* can be an important factor in increasing mental difficulties. Many cases are affecting young males between the ages of 18 to 30.

I was told by a number of parents in Hargeisa during recent trips that *Qat* consumption is making their boys abnormal. I personally met a young father of five who appeared to be normal. However, he was on his

way to Hargeisa's mental hospital because he could not sleep and because he came home and beat his wife and children after chewing *Qat*. His family said that they observed that he would become normal if he went two days without chewing *Qat*. So now mental hospitals are having to treat those who are having mental problems after chewing *Qat*. Kennedy (1987 in Pantelis *et al.*) has described transient psychotic phenomena following *Qat* sessions. Confusion, disorientation, grandiose fantasies, and a mildly depressed mood may occur. In discussions that I had with two aged people chewing *Qat*, both admitted that there are more negative than positive impacts on personal health and they would love to stop chewing.

Family Life Impact

Qat also negatively affects family life in several ways. First and foremost is the expenditure of scarce dollars on *Qat* that takes money away from households, money that is no doubt better used for food, clothing, education, and general family expenditures. Thus children may suffer at the expense of *Qat*. A recent article in the *Journal of Addiction and Mental Health* (Nasrulla, 2000) documents a Somali mother in Toronto who was severely beaten by her husband when she refused to hand over grocery money he wanted to purchase *Qat*.

My own personal interactions with Somali women are consistent with a view that *Qat* use by men can seriously disrupt family life. I talked to a young and newly married Somali girl about her concern with her husband's use of *Qat*. She said, "I love my husband and I want to be with him but we cannot save money to pay back our wedding expenses, since he is chewing *Qat* every day and spending $35 a week." She is not the only concerned Somali wife.

There are many others around the globe who are concerned about *Qat* addiction by their husbands, the impact of *Qat* purchases on their own family economy, and their overall family stability. A number of authors have discussed the links between *Qat* consumption by men and neglect of their families. (Kalix, 1987 in Pantelis *et al.*) *Qat* has furthermore been implicated as a casual factor for family instability. (Elmi, 1983 in Pantelis *et al.)* Some feel that *Qat* can contribute to the dissolution of families through increasing divorce, can encourage of prostitution and even criminal behavior. (*ibid.*)

True Stories

There was a recent story in Hargeisa where a husband came to his home after some time away chewing *Qat*. While knocking on the door and waiting for someone to unlock it from the inside, his neighbors came over from next door and said to the man that no one is home. "Where is everybody?" he asked, and the neighbor answered "your wife had a baby about five hours ago and your three kids are with the neighbors!" This man was so shocked and ashamed of himself for not knowing what had happened to his family that he stopped chewing *Qat* on that day and is now active in anti-*Qat* campaigns.

In another story a man responsible for his family's business had many financial problem with his brothers. He used to chew *Qat* every day and could not save money nor make any profit from his business. Finally he stopped chewing and started putting the money previously spent on *Qat* into a savings account. After one year he counted the collected money and it was enough for him to buy a truck. His business and his family are now prospering.

Wastes Time

Qat chewing takes valuable time from work, from spending time with one's family and children, and from useful social activities. It is a tremendous investment in time. As we all know, one doesn't just take a *Qat* break in 15 minutes. Typically, many hours are devoted to chewing – hours that could be devoted to caring for our children, working for income, educating ourselves, or volunteering our time in rebuilding our country. We all need recreational breaks from work. However far too many *Qat* users invest excessive time and money in the drug. The habit creates a huge drain on our human resource capital.

The well know poet Mohammed Ibrahim "Hadrawi,' said that *Qat* takes 24 hours of your time every day. He said you spend " six hours looking the for money plus six hours looking where to chew, six hours to sit and chew and six hours of lost sleep and appetite." In other words, it can be all consuming of one's disposable time. According to the poet there is no time left for *Qat* chewers to spare for the rest of their life. Time spent on *Qat* could be better spent planning for the future, meeting and spending time with family, contributing to the economy and getting enough sleep and eating normally to be health and productive.

In a discussion that I had with one of the occasional *Qat* chewers, he said "I know when I go to the *Qat* sellers that it is a nightmare that I am buying for tonight." I asked him how bad it was for him and he replied "I can hardly sleep at night and on top of that I can hardly eat or function properly the next day." He meant that his life has been impacted by not sleeping well and not getting up to work early. He said " I am wondering how they can live chewing this thing every hour of their time." Generally, addicts feel the same way. When you ask why are they wasting their time on chewing, their answer is "I need to get something to do, something other then chewing."

One of the NGO drivers said "I cannot operate in the morning until I have my bundle of *ijabane* ('eye opener'). Time spent chewing *Qat* used to be no more than 2-3 hours per day before the civil war. Primarily males would chew *Qat* in special sitting rooms (*mafris*) after working hours and after the main meal. Now things have changed. *Qat* arrives in Somalia as early as seven in the morning and immediately is available in the market, where there are small huts ready for customers to chew. You see many young Somali men seated there to spend their time chewing, often until midnight. These are the people who are supposed to be working rather than spending more than 12 hours each day chewing *Qat*. On average, people chew from 1 p.m. to 8 p.m.. How much development could have been done in 8 hours everyday? I am sure one minute of your time that you contributed to your life by reading, writing, exercising, teaching, counseling, or cleaning would have been much more productive than hours of chewing *Qat*.

Discussion and Recommendations

Attempts to change human behavior related to consumption of recreational products such as *Qat*, tobacco, alcohol, and illegal drugs are extremely difficult. After nearly 40 years of social marketing on the health impacts of cigarettes in the United States, about 25% of the adult population still smokes. While significant, it is a large reduction from the 1960's when rates were much higher. This was achieved through extensive campaigns of public education, greatly increased taxation on tobacco products, and limitations on where they can be consumed. Somalis should consider adopting a similar strategy.

While it is unlikely that middle-aged *Qat* users will quit, we can provide those who wish assistance with ways to give up the habit, just like the West has health programs to help people give up cigarettes or

illegal drugs. At the same time, we could develop educational programs for schools that can educate our children on the various negative aspects of *Qat* consumption. As many countries have made alcohol consumption illegal for those under 18 or 21, we could consider similar legislation here.

Probably the biggest thing that could be done to reduce *Qat* use is to create employment opportunities for the many unemployed and for the many employed in the *Qat* trade. The Honorable Mohammed M. Awale, The Minister of Pastoral Development and Environment said "This is the main income generating activity here in Somaliland. About 50,000 women (primarily) alone are getting their daily bread from selling *Qat*!" He added, "if employment could be created, there will be a little time for *Qat* consumption." (personal communication 2001)

Unemployment itself may be one of the major reasons that people chew *Qat* to excess. If Somaliland's economy expanded and if the unemployed could find jobs, then expenditures of money for *Qat* would at least be less negative on family income and users would have less time for chewing. The experience of Somalis in western countries is that *Qat* use is more manageable because it can only be undertaken within a society where most people have jobs and most children are in school. Even there it can still be problematical in some cases.

One positive development is at the Edna Aden Maternity Hospital. To obtain employment at the hospital you cannot use *Qat* during working hours. She also does not look favorably upon job applications from people who chew *Qat*.

An additional positive step has been taken by the Somaliland Youth Society (SYS) which has formed a rehabilitation center for those who are willing to stop chewing *Qat*. They promote activities such as sports, reading groups, writing, and theatre. Somalis need more groups doing work comparable with the SYS and more people like Edna Aden to give youngsters options to wasting their time, jeopardizing their health and losing money by consuming *Qat*.

Most of the NGO's are aware of the harmfulness of *Qat*, but it seems as if there are few fiinancial resources nor interest in the NGO community to fight this debilitating drug. NGOs could help to develop afternoon activities which give people alternatives to chewing *Qat*. We also need income generating projects for those who sell *Qat*, especially for women. Government, UN Agencies, and NGO's should support organizations like SYS.

Conclusions

There should be an open debate on the use, abuse, and impact of *Qat* on Somali society. Public information campaigns should be launched which inform the population on the negative effects of *Qat* consumption on national income, health, and the future of our children. If you talk to *Qat* users, you find that many could be more productive if they were to quit, but somehow lack the will to do it. One part of this is that *Qat* use is almost institutionalized right now, even though many realize the cost to the society is large. Like campaigns in other countries which have reduced cigarette smoking, drunk driving, littering, and other social evils (including spitting in public), change doesn't happen immediately, but over time behaviors can be modified and changed in more positive directions.

For those who finance their *Qat* use from money sent by relatives in the US, Canada, or Europe, please realize that brother Abdi and sister Xalimo worked hard driving taxis, or working at Wal-Mart, so that you can chew your *Qat*. Similarly, for those of us using *Qat* abroad, every dollar spent is one less dollar we can send back to our country to help our families and assist with national development.

SECTION EIGHT

Environment

Introduction to Section Eight

Critical to the rehabilitation of any society is the productivity of its resource base. The Somaliland Minister of Pastoral Development and Environment is charged with the management of natural resources. In spite of limited budgets, small numbers of staff, and virtually no equipment, the emerging ministry is taking hold. Local enforcement of bans on tree cutting is viewed as more effective than top down and centralized methods. Use of local NGOs and community institutions is seen as a more sustainable approach than one coming from the center. The minister's paper describes the workings of this bold experiment in decentralizing sustainability.

Three sector-specific assessments follow: water, livestock, and agriculture – all linked to increasing productivity and maintaining sustainability in the context of getting Somaliland's environmental management going again.

The water analysis ponders the irony that so many Muslim countries have survived in the face of severe water deficits. Institutional and governance models for water management in such climates are reviewed. The livestock offering contemplates the role of regional politics and the global economy in managing meat exports to the Gulf, including the adverse impact on the rangeland because the animals are not being exported. The article on agricultural sustainability suggests that field trials demonstrate beyond question the role of participation in developing local ownership for innovative approaches. Common to all four presentations is a spirit of hope for the rangelands, farms, and water sources in the Somali environment and the livelihood systems that it supports. In spite of catastrophic losses – human and physical – across the land during the civil war, examples of successful practices are emerging and lessons are becoming available that can be harvested from the field and processed for adaptation to other settings.

CHAPTER THIRTY FOUR

The State of the Somaliland Environment

Mohamed Muse Awaleh

Introduction

Today, the survival of the people of Somaliland is essentially based on access to, and use of, renewable natural resources. However, evidence suggests that the renewable resource base is degrading in a frightening manner, undermining any social and economic development effort.

Environmental degradation in Somaliland is already a serious threat to the economic viability of the production system through unsustainable exploitation and management practices. Historically it has been demonstrated that the traditional pastoral livestock production system was the most efficient use of the arid terrestrial resource per hectare, and no one has yet proved otherwise. However this production system has been affected by changing land use, social behavior, and reduction of the mobility of the pastoral society. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the intensification of agricultural land exploitation has led to the reduction of natural grazing rangeland, resulting in huge land and resource competition, which already is having serious impact on security, and also accelerating desertification. The government has to solve this problem and with urgency.

The huge demand for charcoal production is another threat to any conservation and protection because wood fuel is the only type in use. This is further exacerbated by the illegal export from all the corners of the country (Elayo, and Bosaso in Puntland, although we are glad to hear that Puntland has recently stopped charcoal exploitation). The charcoal also undermines non-timber forest products such gum, resin, and honey, and is having an effect on biodiversity.

All in all, ladies and gentlemen, this country is facing a serious ecological imbalance triggered mainly by the fast expansion of its population size which has led to and made the country very susceptible to serious erosion affecting the hydrological cycle and is affecting the volume of the river flow.

In order to address the above, the Ministry of Pastoral Development and Environment is following these guidelines:

- sustainable management and conservation of natural resources
- addressing resource degradation causes rather than symptoms
- following the cross-sectoral approach that involves community participation at all decision-making levels
- strengthening institutional and human capacity
- minimizing conflict associated with access to natural resource.

Taking note of what I have mentioned above, the Government of Somaliland has put together several basic documents. Most important of these is our working policy on environmental management.

Environment Policy of Somaliland.

As explicitly stated in article 18 of the Constitution of Somaliland, the mandate of the government environment policy is to ensure the survival of its people, and the conservation and protection of the environment. This policy provides:

1. that everyone has a right to an environment that is not harmful to his health or well-being
2. an environment that is protected for the benefit of present and future generations through legislation
3. measures that:

- prevent pollution and ecological degradation
- promote conservation and also secure ecologically sustainable development.

Thus the policy and mission of this ministry in developing and implementing this policy is to ensure implementation and development of a national environment plan of action and strategies that are designed to combat desertification. As a public trust and as custodian of a government organ, the Ministry of Environment and Pastoral Development accepted the leading role in taking this responsibility and setting up the appropriate and necessary measure to:

- ensure that the environmental rights of the people are enforced
- ensure that the government fulfils it's obligation to act as custodian of the environment
- promote, coordinate and enhance sustainable development with all organs at the local, regional and national level
- develop and coordinate the implementation of all programs in an integrated and holistic environment management system.

In addition, this policy specifies the roles of international organizations, research institutions, local communities, and NGOs.

The Role of the Community/Government and Donors

The commitment of various levels of government authorities (central, regional, district) should have in place the basic institutional functions and facilities such as public works and the provision of public services such as extension, training, education, and health. First because many of the projects planned at the village level include aspects such as land use rights and its policy implications, and this must be settled at the government level as a precondition for any land management activities. Second, no technical, long term program can succeed without institutional and financial back up. Production systems of marginal areas have low savings capability to be able to reinvest in environmental protection. It is also well known that rehabilitation of fragile ecosystems must obtain the government's sustained commitment. Therefore the government should ensure continuity and sustainability of specific activities now and beyond any project lifespan.

The Role of the International Agencies

Desertification control and food security at present are managed on short-term action, oriented in ways that the national economy alone cannot support. The donor community will have to bear the major share of the related financial burden. There is also a crucial need to coordinate among agencies, and between agencies and government, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and increase the operational effectiveness of projects. However, the complexity and the magnitude of the problem is such that the donor and specialized technical agencies should play an active role and assist government and local organizations in all phases of the program cycle.

The Role of Individuals, the Community, and Local NGOs

The frequent announcement of support for popular participation expressed by donors and government have seldom materialized, but the main pattern of development planning in desertification has been a government-driven, top-down approach. Government and donor agencies now recognize that past efforts to combat desertification have often failed because they did not include adequate consideration for traditional production systems and for the local communities to be involved. Local participation is necessary because small local NGO organizational units seem to be far more cost effective. However, eventually to achieve efficient management of natural resources, the community must be actively involved right from the preliminary stages of the process.

Somaliland is aware that popular participation should be well planned to avoid falling into demagogy or risk when appealing to people offering that you have solutions for their problems. However, involving people to take part should be an indispensable precondition when undertaking rural development activities. It is also important to have the institutional framework supported by the political will of the Government.

The other point I wish to stress is the need for better integration and partnerships. This integration strengthens local level collaboration with local communities so that they will be accountable and become more responsible for management of natural resources within their jurisdiction.

We also recognize that this ministry is partly responsible to improve the involvement of land users in the conservation of the environment and create mechanisms of dialogue, and establish functional representative structures with the aim of conserving the environment and improving benefit flows to those living off of, or affected by the environment.

May I also mention that public information about environmental issues is crucial in order to stop the progressive depletion of the natural resources, thus a change in public attitude is urgently needed in order to stop long term lethal consequences such as desertification that may not be self evident in the short term. Enforcement measures would also have little effect if not well financed. Only effectively educated public awareness and opinion can have a lasting impact.

To conclude, ladies and gentlemen, this country since its creation in 1991, has had many workshops and meetings. Although all have been offered with good intentions, and many have produced environmentally sound recommendations, most outputs from the workshops have ended up in files. What we need now my friends is action, not rhetoric. I hope this meeting is not another contribution that does no more that create more paper work. I hope it will be a meeting that leads to a better and more fruitful future for Somaliland.

CHAPTER THIRTY FIVE

How Safe Are Somali Water Sources?

Noah Arre

Introduction

Water is one of nature's most precious resources. It is the source and origin of all life and, thanks to God, Mother Earth is awash with it because the hydrosphere is as much as 71% water. But fresh water that is sanitary and wholesome is dwindling at a fast rate in many parts of the world. Many concerned international organizations, including the UN, say that a shortage of fresh water may erupt any day! Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East are short of water and also are the regions where the world's human population is growing rapidly. Concrete and positive steps are needed to combat population and the water resources imbalance to forestall this imminent crisis.

The geometrical growth of world population further complicates the situation because it greatly increases water demand, reduces supplies, depletes groundwater reservoirs, pollutes available surface supplies, increases negative impacts on the environment, and increases wastewater in need of safe disposal.

As a result, many waterborne diseases (chemical and bacteriological)

are rife, endemic, and epidemic, especially in freshwater deficient areas in the developing world. These shortages increase vulnerability to many diseases, raising the morbidity/mortality of the nations' manpower resources and causing many premature deaths. Worldwide, as many as 17 million people die each year in water-related problems. And these losses, of course, negatively affect the GDP of the nations concerned!

Unfortunately, Somalia's annual renewable water resource is estimated at 15.7km^3/year, meaning that Somalia/Somaliland are in water deficient environments. They also experience conditions of poor water quality. Conductivity, salinity, hardness, and dissolved solids are too high. For example,conductivity is as high as 11,000 μS/cm in some areas and the few bacteriological tests done for pathogen screening (total coliforms) in some areas are >200/100ml (the world standard is zero), indicating present drinking water conditions from many 'barkeds' (in-ground water tanks) and springs may be unsanitary and unfit for human consumption.

Water, What Is It?

Water is a unique blend of colorless and odorless liquids. It is unique because it is not a living organism, but there can be no life without it. It is made up of two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, in the volume ratios of 2:1. Water is also unique in both its physical and chemical properties as it is one of the few substances that expands on cooling to zero degrees centigrade, a condition that facilitates ice to float so that life in oceans and seas is preserved. This is because large bodies of water covered with masses of ice and snow still provide enough heat (warmth) for undersea *flora* and *fauna* and at the same time maintain enough dissolved oxygen that is so essential to the survival of those living organisms.

Were it not this uniqueness, oceans, seas, and all bodies of water would freeze from the bottom up, killing and maiming all the creatures living in it. Blocks of ice and snow would stay unmelted even during hot summers, creating drastic climatic changes as there would be less water evaporation resulting in less precipitation.

Water is also unique as it can absorb a lot of heat without itself becoming warmer. This alone can justify why bodies of water remain cool when adjacent beaches may fry your bare feet. And on the other hand, during evaporation, water absorbs heat and the moisture escapes into the atmosphere. But when it comes down as rain, the same heat is

dissipated back to the atmosphere. Water acts as an energy custodian and as a liquid that is in the oceans, seas, and the air. It acts as a thermostat that regulates heat. Water is also a universal solvent and all living things (plants and animals) depend on it for food assimilation that is so important for sustenance and growth.

Water Is Life

Water is the source and origin of all life! All living things (*flora* and *fauna*) depend on water for survival and existence. On average, the human body is 75-85% water. Unlike hunger that our body can survive for several weeks as the body possesses sufficient reserves, a lack of water will lead to certain death within days as our body cannot retain any water reserves. Thus every person needs a minimum of three liters of water per day, just for drinking to stay healthy.

In addition, we need water for keeping clean and most importantly, for growing food. Water insures that all living things assimilate food nutrients without which life on this Earth would be impossible. Biochemical/biological reactions that take place during metabolism and growth of living cells (both plant and animal) take place only in aqueous media. With the help of water through osmosis, chlorophyll, and sun light, plants absorb nutrients/minerals to build simple sugars. Water helps our body discharge its wastes. Water lubricates our systems, keeps them free from waste, and maintains a normal body. Water is also a critical component of most global systems, such as climate, vegetation, and erosion. Human disturbances of one part of the water cycle inevitably impacts others.

The Holy Qur'aan emphasizes the importance of water. For instance, Surah 16, the Bee, verse 64 says "God sendeth down water from the sky and therewith reviveth the Earth after her death." And in Surah 32, The Prostration, verse 27 says "Have they not seen how We lead the water to the barren land and therewith bring forth crops whereof their cattle eat and they themselves?" And in Surah 21, The Prophets, verse 30 says "Have not those who disbelieve known that the heavens and the Earth were one piece, then We parted them and We made every living thing from water?" And in Surah 24, The Light, verse 45 says " Allah hath created every animal of water." And in Surah 25, The Criterion, verse 54 says "And He is It Who has created man from water." And Surah 22, The pilgrimage, verse 5 says "and thou seest the Earth barren but when We

send down water thereon, it does thrill and swell and put forth every lovely kind of growth." And verse 22 says "seest thou not how Allah sendeth down water from the sky and then the Earth becomes green upon the morrow."

Global Freshwater Distribution Hugely Uneven

Fortunately, in nature, water is abundant as it covers about 71% of the Earth's surface. Estimates say in total, there is about 1.4×10^{21} liters. But only a very small percentage (0.008%) is freshwater and most of it is unreachable in deep underground sources or at the two poles, in the form of ice and snow.

Water exists in three forms: solid, liquid, and gas. It is in oceans, lakes, rivers, and underground. Estimating worldwide freshwater availability is a hard task because it is dynamic. Only 0.26% of the total amount of freshwater on the Earth is found in lakes, reservoirs, and rivers.

At present, about two-thirds of global freshwater use comes from surface sources. Considering the quantity of global groundwater in relation to surface water, (groundwater is at least 95 times more prevalent) it is safe to say that we have not even come close to running out of freshwater. However, water resources distribution over the Earth is uneven. It is this poor distribution of freshwater resources in nature that causes the water scarcity crisis, worldwide.

Solar heat evaporates water into the air from the Earth's surface. This vapor spreads over the surface of our planet, falling back to Earth as precipitation. Precipitation is the main source of land waters (rivers, lakes, groundwater, and glaciers). Some of that water evaporates back into the atmosphere and some penetrates into the soil and recharges groundwater sources. In one estimate (1991 – 1996) every year, the water turnover on Earth involves 577,000 km^3 of water. It is water that evaporates from the ocean surface (502,800 km^3) and from land (74,200 km^3). The same water amount falls as atmospheric precipitation (458,000 km^3 on oceans and on land 119,000 km^3).

The difference between precipitation and evaporation from land surface (119,000 - 74,200 = 44,800 km^3/year) represents the total runoff of the Earth's rivers (mostly) and is the principal source of fresh water to supply life necessities.

The greatest water availability of 170,000 to 180,000 m^3 per capita (1995) is in Canada, Alaska, and Oceania. In densely populated Asia,

Central and South Europe, and Africa, water availability is within 1,200 to 5,000 m^3 per capita (less than 1 thousand m^3 per capita is catastrophically low). In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), water availability is only 200 to 300 m^3 per capita.

In 1950, over the greater part of the Earth's surface, specific water availability was average or above average (average is 5,000 to 10,000 m^3 per person) and only in North Africa and the Middle East was it very low. In Central and South Europe, North China, and South Asia it was low. Catastrophically low availability of water was observed in no regions of the world. But by 1995, the situation drastically changed as supply sharply decreased. It became catastrophically low in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, very low in north China and South and Western Asia.

Uneven Distribution and Geometrical Population Growth Cause Of Scarcity

Freshwater is a finite resource. The average available water was 43,000 m^3 per person per year in 1850. This dropped to only 9,000 m^3 per person per year 1990 because of population growth. Worldwide, water use has increased fivefold this past century, and today's per capita availability is predicted to decline by a third over the next generation.

Forecasts say that by 2025, water shortages will deepen and the greater part of the Earth's population will live under the conditions of low and catastrophically low water supply (in 1955 world population was 2.8 billion people; in 1990, it was 5.3 billion and in the year 2025, it is projected to reach between 7.9 billion to 9.1 billion people by low and high UN variants).

The geometrical world population growth and the higher living standards have increased the world's thirst for water. As world population grows at an unbelievable rate, demand for water will double every 21 years. New studies further agree that by 2025, 52 countries will suffer from chronic water shortages and the number of people living in water stressed countries is projected to climb from 470 million to three billion persons.

Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia will be the most seriously affected as they are areas where water is being pumped out to exhaustion (population growth rate is high). Today in Asia, one in three people lack access to safe drinking water and more than half of Europe's cities are over-exploiting their groundwater resources. The Aral sea region, the

Ganges, the Jordan river, the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates where population is to increase up to 75% are already hot spots.

According to the World Water Council, water scarcity threatens all fundamental aspects of human security: food production, the health of the aquatic environment, and social and political stability. According to *Indian Express,* over-pumping makes water tables drop steadily in several regions because ground water is pumped faster than nature can replenish, affecting several major food-producing areas.

In addition, as world population passes the six billion mark (April 2000 estimate 6.14 billion) with three billion entering reproductive age (a figure that is equal to the entire population of the world in 1960), freshwater demand escalates even more. Last year alone, population grew by 78 million, most of it from poor countries. Deforestation is also taking its toll, as over 600,000 square miles were cut over the last 10 years alone and human beings are inadvertently changing climate worldwide through the heat-trapping greenhouse gases their activities increasingly release intothe air. This activity is likely to further change rainfall and storm patterns. In fact, some climatologists predict that global warming will intensify the extremes of the water cycle, exacerbating droughts. Hence, regional fresh water supplies will be dangerously low. Rivers are already drying up and many lakes at their lowest levels in history with eighty-two nations that depend on subsistence farming unable to feed their population.

Global Freshwater Withdrawal Rate

Global total water withdrawal comprises about 4,500km^3/per year. In future, total water withdrawal will be growing at 10-12%. By 2025, it will reach approximately 5240km^3 per year (a 1.38-fold increase). But during the next decades, the most intensive growth of water withdrawal is expected to occur in Africa and South America and the smallest in Europe and North America. In Africa, the greatest water withdrawal takes place in North Africa (50% of water withdrawal on the continent falls on this region).

Present water withdrawal in the world as a whole is not great in total, amounting to 8.4% of global water resources and by 2025 this figure is expected to increase to 12.2%. However, water resources in the world are distributed very unevenly. Even at the present time in Europe and Asia, water withdrawal comprises 15 to 17% of water resources and will reach

21 to 23% by 2025. But in the northern part of Africa, even at the present time, renewable water resources are almost totally withdrawn (95%) while in Central Asia withdrawal is 42 to 44%.

Unfortunately, man's use and misuse of water resources coupled with uneven distribution are causing catastrophes worldwide. Overuses of groundwater are visible in many parts of the world. In China, water tables have been dropping as much as one meter per year (PAI) and in Bangkok, over-exploitation of groundwater causes the city to sink 2 to 4 inches per year, leading to cracked pavements, broken sewers and pipes, and seawater intrusion. For instance, in India, lakes are poisoned by raw sewage; in Africa rivers run in a filthy trickle; and around Asia's Aral Sea, millions are stranded as their water sources shrink and dry up.

Spreading water shortages are also threatening to reduce global food by more than 10% (*Worldwatch Institute*). If unaddressed, this drop in food supply could lead to hunger, civil unrest, and even wars over water. The Middle East countries are home to 5% of the world's people, but contain less than 1% of the world's annual renewable freshwater, with population more than doubling in every thirty years.

Currently 20% of the world's population faces water shortages. If present trends continue, this figure will rise to 30% by 2025, affecting 52 countries; (a country with less than 1000 m^3 per person per year is water scarce).

There are two reasons for the escalating worldwide water demand. First, the geometrical growth of human population tremendously increases water demand, diminishes supplies of fresh water, depletes groundwater reservoirs, contaminates other supplies, increases impacts on the environment, and increases wastewater supplies. Second, as the living standard improves, the demand for water goes up.

Freshwater Availability/Scarcity In Muslim Countries

The Muslim world population stands at 1.1 billion people. This amounts to nearly one sixth of the world's population and its area extends from Morocco to Indonesia. With increases in living standards and expanding national economies, more and more water is needed and the gap between water supply and demand is increasing rapidly.

With the exception of some West African and Southeast Asian countries, the Muslim world is generally water scarce. For instance, in 1955, Djibouti, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan were water scarce nations.

In 1990, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, and Somalia were added. Several oil-rich states including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates make up five of the nine countries with the least water per capita. With continuing high family size in these countries, renewable water will become increasingly scarce. The five newly independent Central Asian countries are already at odds with one another over the drying up of Aral Sea water resources.

Furthermore, thirteen Arab nations are already water scarce and 15 of the world's first 24 water-poor countries are Arabs. By 2025, all 22 Arab countries will be water scarce. Surprisingly, according to World Watch Institute and the Pacific Institute, in Libya, Qatar, UAE, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, water use exceeds 140% of their renewable water supplies with Libya using nearly 400% of its water resources. The MENA region is the driest region in the world.

CHAPTER THIRTY SIX

The Environmental Impact of the Somali Livestock Ban

Mowlid Mohamoud Ibrahim

Introduction

Somalis traditionally use three main livestock production systems: nomadic pastoral, agro pastoral, and specialized urban ownership-management. Nomadic pastoralism is the predominant livestock system, which is an extensive and mobile system of grazing upon natural vegetation. There are four main seasons in this country: the *Gu* lasts from April to July, *xagaa* extends from July to September, *Dayr* lasts from October to December, and *Jiilaal* extends from January to March. The rainfall occurs mostly in *Gu* and *Dayr*. The *Gu* rains are more reliable, while *Dayr* rains often fail. The majority of Somaliland water resources are surface water that has traditionally been obtained from a variety of surface collection points. These include dugouts (*Ballis, Har, War*), wells, and cemented water reservoirs called *Berkado*. The ground water potential is limited because of limited recharge.

Over the last two decades, Saudi Arabia has imposed several bans on Somaliland livestock. The bans purportedly are to contain diseases. The first ban was twenty years ago after the discovery of rinderpest elsewhere in East Africa. A second ban came in November 1983 on sheep and goats. The third came in February 1989 and lasted 18 months. The most recent ban was imposed in September 2000 by all Gulf states, in response to reported Rift Valley Fever in southern Somalia and Kenya.

Objectives

The major objective of this paper is to identify and understand how the livestock ban affects the environment. Detailed objectives include:

- to study livestock range resource degradation
- to highlight the firewood and charcoal production crisis
- to identify how animal density affects the environment.

The Economic Importance of Livestock

The livestock sector is the backbone of Somaliland economy because it is the major contributor to employment, exports, and gross domestic production (GDP). The total population engaged in livestock production is estimated at about 60%. Those who are deriving their livelihood from livestock-related activities are estimated about 20% of the adult population of Somaliland. Generally, livestock exports have a positive impact on trade activities.. Food purchases are financed and other economic activities are enhanced by livestock sales revenues.

Figure 1: Livestock Export From Berbera, Somaliland (1995-1999)

Type of Animal	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Sheep/Goat	294,470	2,376,646	2,510,126	834,358	2,048,136
Cattle	77,638	65,127	62,205	80366	37,430
Camels	2,1007	42,828	47,205	11,450	89,967
Totals	393,115	2,484,601	2,621,039	926,174	217,553

Source: Ministry of Commerce, Hargeisa, Somaliland

Figure 2: The Livestock Export Destination in 1999 (Head)

Animals	Percentage	Destination
Sheep	12%	Oman and UAE
	22%	Yemen
	77%	Saudi Arabia
Cattle	11%	UAE
	81%	Yemen
	8%	Saudi Arabia
Camels	2%	UAE
	7%	Yemen
	91%	Saudi Arabia

Source: Chamber of Commerce, Hargeisa, Somaliland

The Livestock Ban and Its Major Environmental Impact

The ban has three main environmental impacts:

- livestock range resources degradation
- firewood and charcoal, production crisis
- problems of increasing livestock numbers.

The Livestock Range Resources Degradation

It has been estimated that Somali rangelands are overstocked by 200 to 300 percent. The livestock grazing in Somali/Somaliland regions is an extensive and mobile system of grazing on natural vegetation. The principal determinants of livestock density are livestock numbers and rangeland area. In 1975 the livestock density was estimated at one animal unit per 4.5 ha. of rangeland. In 1995 the density had declined to 2.7 ha or roughly twice as many animals on the range in Somalia. It is assumed that the land available per stock unit has decreased even more today.

As a result of the livestock export ban, the number of livestock units has increased the pressure on range resources. For instance in the Tog-wajale grazing area, 2,400 cattle rejected by the Gulf states are now back on the range, putting greater pressure on pasture and water resources.

Firewood and Charcoal Production Crisis

The traditional Somali source for energy is firewood and its derivative, charcoal. The intensive use of firewood and charcoal has increased since the livestock export ban and has contributed to serious environmental degradation in the form of deforestation and soil erosion. Livestock prices have declined significantly in Somaliland markets, cereal prices are rising and the Somaliland Shilling is being devalued. Income generating possibilities for the great majority of the people has gone down, hence purchasing power of pastoral and urban households has been greatly reduced.

The price of charcoal is either the same or less than before the ban because a number of pastoralists have turned to charcoal production, increasing the firewood and charcoal supply. Increased charcoal production substantially raises demand for the trees of the nation, thereby increasing environmental degradation.

The Livestock Numbers Increase Problem

Generally the level of livestock off-take is low in Somaliland and all Somali regions because pastoralists traditionally do not sell all marketable animals. Instead they sell their animals only when they need cash to buy food and clothes. Moreover, the climatic uncertainly plays a major role in the low livestock off-take.

The continual movements of animals, which reach the highest in the dry season, destroys pasture and increases soil erosion. By the time rainfall occurs, a large number of live animals collects in those areas where most rain has fallen and the pasture is richest. For example, in Somaliland many livestock have recently gathered between Qoolcadey and Gumburaha where good rains have fallen and the pasture is good.

Recommendations

- diversification of livestock markets
- improvement of livestock production systems, transforming intensive sedentary system
- improvement of range resources.

CHAPTER THIRTY SEVEN

Conserving Agricultural Biodiversity: An Integrated Approach to Food Security in Somaliland

M. Manzelli, Ali Ismail, S. Benedettelli, V. Vecchio, L. Cavestro

Introduction

This research is conducted within a project implemented by an Italian NGO, CINS (Cooperazione Italiana Nord Sud), and funded by the European Commission, "Seed Security Improvement and Conservation of Indigenous Genetic Materials in The Northwest Agricultural Areas of Somalia (Somaliland)." The research aims to contribute to increase the knowledge of the Agricultural Biodiversity existing in this region, referred to the issue of food security.[1]

Food Security and Seed Security

Today, nearly 800 million people in the world are undernourished and 1.5 billion live in abject poverty. There is a general opinion about the linkage between food availability and production and biophysical, social,

cultural, political, and economic factors. In particular the problems caused by major disasters[2] (floods, war, drought, and earthquakes) are of considerable weight and complexity.

The majority of the people affected by these events are living today in conditions of chronic starvation and food shortage. As a result of the spread of the conflict and increased occurrence of disasters, there has also been a marked increase in the burden of providing assistance and each year the sums spent on humanitarian aid[3] in such disaster areas are multiplying. However it is necessary today to ensure that the availability of food is not only dependent on food aid. In fact there is an urgent need to implement other technical, political, and economic strategies to encourage the resumption of agricultural activity in the countries affected by different types of natural and man-made disasters. (Benedettelli *et al.*, 1997)

The objective of food independence may only be achieved if the people involved have adequate agricultural resources. Regarding this, the seed security program4 is an important agricultural resource to achieve long-term food security. The seeds represent a precious biological tool, which can bestow considerable socio-economic benefits, as maintaining and increasing the level of productivity, maintaining the equilibrium in the environment, sustaining the local markets, etc.

The Role of Biological Diversity in Feeding the World

Crises such as natural disasters, civil wars, or political collapse are threatening biological diversity throughout the world. Today it is known that the genetic resources are a priceless patrimony in need of protection, Fortunately in the last years some of the scientific community's activities have focused on the conservation and valorization of biodiversity. In this way governments and international organizations have started to take into account this topic. The actual approach is developing correct strategies to preserve, at all levels, this important resource, partly already lost.

Agricultural biodiversity or agro-biodiversity is a broad term that includes all components of biological diversity of relevance to food and agriculture. As reported by FAO (1999) agricultural biodiversity refers to the variety and variability of animals, plants, and micro-organisms on earth that are important to food and agriculture that result from interaction between the environment, genetic resources, and the management systems and practices used by people. This variability is essential to sustain key

functions of the agro-system, its structure, and processes for, and in support of, food production and food security.

As recognized by the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1995, the distinctive features of agro-biodiversity include:

- it is essential to satisfy basic human needs for food and livelihood security
- it contributes to production, environmental sustainability and rural development
- farmers actively manage its many components as biodiversity would not survive without human intervention. Indigenous knowledge and culture are integral parts of the management of agricultural biodiversity
- because of the degree of human management of agricultural biodiversity, its conservation in production systems is synonymous with sustainable use
- the greatest part of agricultural biodiversity is present in developing countries
- nevertheless in the intensive-industrial farming system, the level of agro-biodiversity is decreasing. Much biological diversity is actually held *ex situ*, rather than *in situ*. The selection of improved varieties is possible only if there is availability of genetic diversity.

Figure 1. The Interactions Between Food Security, Seed Security. and Agro-biodiversity



From this point of view, a correct way to preserve and enhance genetic resources may be to implement appropriate strategies aimed to guarantee food security through diversity. Differention in cropping

systems and seed material are essential to meet food supply and demand and to exploit potential resources.

Target Area

The Horn of Africa, including Somalia, was affected by the recent civil strife and recurrent droughts. As a result, many people are at risk to access for the food as the crop production had sharply decreased in both rainfed and irrigated areas. The farmers lost many of their most important inputs including local selected seeds, namely landraces.[6] The traditional landraces of the food crops including indigenous genetic materials, which were adaptive to the local environmental conditions, are in danger of disappearing in this region. The risk of the genetic erosion of the local landraces is very high due to the natural disaster (floods and droughts) and civil war as well. Also, the seed sector situation for the resource-poor farmers was aggravated with provision of the emergency seeds supplied by the international agencies. This intervention, even if necessary in some cases, can lead to the collapse of local markets and create an economic dependence in the long term and threaten the biodiversity of locally cultivated species. In this regard, the farmer's incapacity and the impossibility to preserve the seeds for the next season depend on the lack of resource. This leads to a dependence on a "chronic insecure seed, often coming from abroad." (Cromwell *et al.*, 1993)

Rainfed sorghum and maize are main staple food crops grown as a mono-crop in Somaliland (Figure 2). The sorghum, [*Sorghum bicolor* (L.) Moench], originated in the region, especially along the Ethiopian border with Somaliland. (Dogget, 1988) This crop plays an important role as food and fodder production for both human and livestock consumption.

Importance of Sorghum in the Somali Economy

Although 60% of the income in the north of Somalia comes from the animal sector, the sorghum has a relevant importance as a food and fodder crop, especially in this type of environment. For example, during the dry season (*Jiilal*), the stems of sorghum are the only fodder source for the herds and constitute an important family income. The grains are used to obtain flour from which, after fermentation, bread is made (*Anjera*).

Figure 2: Somaliland Staple Grain Crops Production

Crop	*Gu* 1997		*Gu* 1998		*Gu* 1999	
	HA	Tons	HA	Tons	HA	Tons
Sorghum	17,610	15,741	14,200	9,640	19,105	14,845
Maize	11,398	7,979	6,300	5,040	8,720	6,976

Source: FSAU-8, 1999

Having seen the importance of sorghum as food and fodder, it is of interest to improve this crop, one that is typically sold in the local market and auto-produced. In fact this crop represents an important local resource, known well and accepted by farmers, and to which the farmers have access. Even if these data are not representative of Somaliland, Figure 3 provides general information about the decrease in cultivation and production of sorghum in the last decade in Somalia.

Figure 3. Cultivated Areas and Average Yields of Sorghum in Somalia and in the World

Years	Cultivated areas (ha)		Yields (kg/ha)	
	Somalia	World	Somalia	World
'89-'91	450,000	43,113,000	525	1,324
'96	450,000*	47,424,000	322	1,512
'97	500,000*	44,136,000	306	419
'98	400,000*	44,442,000	270	1,428

* FAO estimate

Project Strategy

For reasons mentioned above, the NGO CINS (Cooperazione Italiana Nord Sud) has implemented in 1999 the project "Seed Security Improvement and Conservation of Indigenous Genetic Materials in The Northwest Agricultural Areas of Somalia (Somaliland)."

The overall objective of this project is to guarantee and increase the food security in Somaliland's agricultural areas, focusing on resource-poor smallholder farmers. This objective is pursued through the creation of an efficient seed sector, including the evaluation and the exploitation of local biodiversity. As reported above, seed security is one of the most important steps to preserve and enhance the availability of food. The expected results are:

- increased genetic seed quality
- increased physiological seed quality
- increase production and distribution of quality seeds
- promoted appropriate organizations in seed quality standards (capacity building).

The presence of an important research component has been undoubtedly innovative, especially within the international cooperation programs. In fact, as reported by World Vision International (WVI),[9] this component is one of the most critical factors that may contribute to the success of seed programs. (De Vries *et al.*, 1997)

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) is one of the most important aspects of the project. The involvement of local people during the activities is a powerful means to get in touch with different cultures, to increase knowledge, and to guarantee long term development. In particular this collaboration has provided social and environmental information (society structure, agricultural background, local needs, etc.) and focuses attention on the beneficiaries of this activity, without loosing the main objective of the project, the food security.

Implemented Activities

Up to now the implemented activities are:

- collecting local germplasm of Sorghum (*ex situ* conservation)
- phenotypic and genetic characterization of local landraces

- establishment of experimental fields
- selection of participating farmers
- training on seed production and storage techniques
- foundation seed production at farmer's level (*in situ* conservation)
- support and organisation of farmer's associations
- training of local technicians
- rehabilitation of seed centre (storage and laboratory).

The farmers and local institutions have been involved in all of these activities, directly or indirectly. For example the following topics have been examined in collaboration with the local communities:

- local society hierarchy, in term of subdivision of responsibilities within the groups
- land distribution, especially in the areas around the villages
- available agricultural inputs
- seed storage methods
- collection and selection of local landraces
- main activities in different target areas
- local needs.

To obtain sustainable results, all activities have been focused on the creation and amelioration of an appropriate capacity building at different levels, *e.g.* the enhancement of knowledge on agricultural biodiversity, the utilisation of sustainable methods for agro-biodiversity conservation, the planning of political and social strategies to reach the seed security.

Conclusions

The reserach finds that an integrated approach is the most effective way to obtain durable effects; using different actors may be the key step to maintain biological diversity, agricultural sustainability, and food security at local, regional, and global levels. The approach permits people to:

- share information and competence
- increase knowledge at farmer and scientific level
- focus on local needs
- obtain a complete framework essential to guarantee the food security in the long term

- evaluate the socio-economic impact of the biodiversity enhancement on local communities.

Acknowledgements

The authors are indebted to their contributions from the farmer's associations of Boodlay, Togwajaale, Kalabayd, and Galooley in Gabiley District; the Ministry of Agriculture of Somaliland; and the Research Institute ICRISAT (International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics).

Endnotes

1. FAO defines food security asl people at all times having physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. In this definition three issues are implicit: food availability, food production stability, access to food.

2. This phenomenon arose between 1979 and 1995 in Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

3.Three types of humanitarian intervention may be identified: food aid programmes, food aid projects and emergency food aid.

4.Louwaaars (1995) defines seed security as the farmer's sustainable capacity to have the quantity and the quality of seed in the right time. The variety choice, presence of structure certifying the quality, a logistic support and an efficient marketing sector are the key to implement correct policies of intervention.

5.*In situ* conservation refers to maintenance of local agro-biodiversity in the environment of its domestication; *ex situ* conservation is the agro-biodiversity collected is conserved in gene-banks or in other different environments.

6.The term landrace refers to local biotype.

7.*Gù* is the main rainy season in Somaliland from April to June.

8. FSAU (Food Security Assessment Unit) is managed by WFP/Somalia, funded by EC/Somalia, the Italian C-operation and WFP/Somalia, and supported by USAID/Somalia and FAO.

9. World Vision International, PO Box 1490, Kaneshie, Accra, Ghana.

SECTION NINE

Health and Well-Being

Introduction to Section Nine

Health is central to the productivity and peacefulness of any society. While Somalia/Somaliland health systems are in a fragile state, there is reflelction, analysis, and action underway. HIV/AIDS, the scourage of many African nations, has not yet struck in full force among Somalis. Health leaders in Somalia have observed the catastropic lessons in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa and are taking heed. As a direct result of the SSIA Congress, one Somaliland NGO is now devising a new AIDS education and treatment program. Another health issue – female genital mutilation (FGM) – is also receiving new attention. The newly appointed Minister of Family and Culture in Somaliland offers her views on FGM, including vivid and emotionally-troubling detail about the practice itself. Why, the Minister asks, cannot Somalis follow the leadership of other Mslim nations and abolish the practice?

Finally, the members of the class of student nurses at the Edn Adan Maternity hospital present their own reserach findings on the applicationis of *Saar*, a traditional cure for depression and exhaustion that afflicts many Somali women, especially those in mid-life. Why, they ask, are there not ways to combine the wisdom of traditional cures with the health care sciences of the West?

The final article on well-being focuses on the satus of Somalis and their effort to rehabilitate their war torn society. It presents a summary of UNDP's *Human Development Report* (HDR) for Somalia. A decade ago, UNDP challenged the definition of development as simply increases in per capita income. A report on the human well-being of the world as well as individual nations is now produced by UNDP. As a complementary concept, the HDR draws attention to the human side of development, suggesting that enhancing livelihoods is a factor of economics AND social variables, including health, life expectancy, and education, as well as income. The report notes, unfortunately, that the civil war has set Somalis back by a least a generation and that humam development for Somalis is lagging far behind other nations.

CHAPTER THIRTY EIGHT

HIV and TB Co-infection in Borama TB Hospital, Somaliland

Ahmed Omar Askar, MD and Abdisalaam Jama Ibrahim, MD

Introduction

Co-infection of HIV and mycobacterium tuberculosis is an increasing global problem. (Harries *et al,* 1998; Festenstein and Grange, 1991) One billion seven hundred million of the world's population are infected with mycobacterium tuberculosis (Kochi, 1991). Worldwide, the number of HIV infected persons is estimated at 17 million (WHO TB/HIV, 1996), one third of whom are also infected with TB. Almost three quarters of the infected are from sub-Sahara Africa. The influence of HIV on the trend of tuberculosis depends on the prevalence of HIV infection, especially among age groups of 15-49 and the break down rate of tuberculosis infection to overt disease. (Styblo, 1990) In sub-Sahara Africa there is high prevalence of both tuberculosis and HIV among the age group of 15-49 years.

The HIV infection rate in Somaliland is among the lowest in the region, but there has been a refugee migration in the last decade to Ethiopia and Djibouti. The flight has increased the risk of transmission. This report is based on data on HIV/TB co-infection rates in the Borama TB Hospital, gathered at the peak of an increasing HIV infection. TB patients were interviewed before smear examinations and HIV/AIDS symptoms were used to make HIV tests (Rapid Method CAPILUS TM HIV 1/HIV 2). The number of patients tested for HIV was 274. Of these, 55 were infected with HIV and out of these 46 were HIV/TB co-infected. Among the HIV positives, 98.7% were between the ages of 15-54 and one was below 15. Of these cases, 28.5% were female. The percentage of the HIV/TB co-infection was 5.8% of the total TB cases for the year 2000. There were 15 HIV/TB deaths. The NTP have to cope with the new situation of HIV/TB which will raise the number of smear negative TB and will also increase the burden on the hospital beds which are occupied by HIV/AIDS patients in severe conditions. There is no policy or guideline for the prevention and care of HIV/AIDS in Somaliland. The examinations are done without counseling and the patients and their family members are not informed about the results. We recommend that testing be done after counseling and that patients be informed about the results. It is time to provide HIV/AIDS patients with proper and adequate health and social services.

In the United States, a 1988 report, found that 4% of AIDS cases had tuberculosis, and in a report a year later, 2.6% of AIDS cases had extra-pulmonary tuberculosis. HIV infection is highly prevalent among newly diagnosed tuberculosis patients in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in East and central African countries. Recent studies in Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia have revealed HIV sero-prevalence rates above 70% in newly diagnosed tuberculosis cases. (Harries *et al*, 1996)

In the Dominican Republic, it was observed in the newly diagnosed TB cases that 9.1% of those with TB were HIV sero-positive. (Macosa Espinal *et al*, 2000) In Kampala, Uganda, the tuberculosis notification rate was increasing from 1980 after it had experienced some decline earlier. This was associated with an annual increase of AIDS of 10-20%. (Festenstein and Grange, 1991) Among the patients with tuberculosis in Kinshasa, Congo, HIV sero-prevalence was reported as 40% in 1985 and 36% in 1987. In another report in Kampala it was found that two-thirds of the TB patients were sero-positive and other findings show that 66% of tuberculosis cases were sero-positive. (Erik *et al*, 1991).

In Somaliland, HIV/TB co-infection is estimated at 6-10%. The HIV infection among thte population is estimated to 0.9%. Those testing positive with HIV among blood donors are estimated at 2.3%. (National Health Policy 1999) In Somaliland, though the HIV infection is among the lowest in the region, still it is a growing problem. During the last decade there was a great population movement in the area to and from neighboring Ethiopia and Djibouti. There are open routes of commerce and *Qat* trafficking from and to both countries. All conditions that favor transmission are possible in cross-border contacts o f t he neighboring populations. In Somaliland, there is neither policy nor strategy to control the HIV infection. At the peak of this growing HIV problem, we are reporting the HIV and TB co-infections in Borama TB Hospital.

Methods

At the Borama TB Hospital, all TB suspect cases were interviewed before ordering a smear check up. In this first interview, all cases with symptoms of HIV took the HIV test, using the CAPILLUS TM HIV 1/HIV 2-rapped method. The method has low sensitivity but is good in specificity. Tests using ELISA (Enzyme Linked Immunsorbent Assy) and (Simple/Rapped Immuno-binding Assy) are required to confirm the positive tests with Western Bolt. Repeat tests are needed in ELISA and Simple/Rapped tests. However, according to WHO recommendations, it is permitted in low income countries to consider one positive test to equal an HIV positive determination. (WHO HIV/TB co-infection 1996) TB diagnosis was made with smear microscopy and with clinical and x-ray examinations for the smear negative cases and for extra-pulmonary.

All the HIV infected cases and HIV/TB co-infected cases were found in the TB register and laboratory records of the year 2000. Data collected were analyzed to calculate the number of HIV cases, the number and percentage of HIV/TB co-infections, the percentage of HIV infection to the number examined, and the monthly registered HIV seropositive. The HIV infected sex and age distributions were also calculated.

Materials

We examined 790 TB cases that were registered in the Borama TB Hospital in the year 2000. We also used 274 patients who were tested for HIV, 55 HIV infected patients, and 46 HIV and TB co-infection.

Results

In 2000, the TB cases registered in Borama were 790. Patients tested for HIV totaled 274, total HIV positive were 55, and total HIV/TB co-infected were 46. The monthly HIV tested patients and the monthly HIV positive cases are in Figure.1. The mean positive case per month is 4.5 and percent of HIV positives among the tested patients is 20.1%.

Figure 1: Monthly HIV Tested and Monthly HIV Positive

Month	Total Paients Tested HIV	Total HIV Positive	Percent
January	47	5	10.6
February	13	4	30.8
March	22	2	9.1
April	14	1	7.1
May	14	4	28.6
June	22	8	36.4
July	19	4	21.1
August	22	9	40.9
September	22	4	18.2
October	31	4	12.9
November	23	3	13
December	25	7	28
Total	274	55	11

Figure 2 notes 29 HIV positive cases identified at the first interview. Figure 3 shows age and sex distributions of the HIV positives. Of these cases, 97.8% are between the ages of 25 and 54; women made up 28.3% of the total cases.

The HIV/TB co-infected case definitions are shown in Figure 4. The percentage of HIV/TB co-infections of total TB cases in 2000 is 5.8%. The total TB cases in 2000 is 790. Among the 46 HIV/TB co-infections there were 15 deaths during the year 2000 of which 2 cases were female and 13 were male. The cause of death was progression to AIDS.

Figure 2: HIV Cases Categorized According to Symptoms

Symptoms Presented at Eirst Interview	Number of Cases
Weight Loss	29
Diarrhea	27
Fever	31
Tuberculosis	23
Esophagitis, glositis, oral lesion	27
Generalized lymphadenopathy	5
Generalized skin rashes and itching	11

Figure 3. Age and Sex Distributions of HIV Positive Cases

Age	3748	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	Total
Female	1	1	4	5	1	0	13
Male	0	1	15	13	5	0	34
Total	1	2	19	18	6	0	46

Figure 4: HIV/TB Co-infected Classification According to TB Case Definition

Sex	Smear Positive	Smear Negative	Extrapulmonar	Total
Female	3	7	3	13
Male	15	10	8	33
Total	18	17	11	46

Discussion

HIV/AIDS is a new health challenge in Somaliland and is a growing problem. The HIV/TB rate of co-infection is estimated at 6-10%. The HIV/TB in Borama hospital in 2000 is 5.8%, which is close to the earlier estimation. The age groups that are HIV infected are between 15 and 54. HIV is killing the most productive age groups of the community. There were 15 deaths among the HIV/TB of whom the cause of death was progression to AIDS. For control of co-infection of HIV/TB, the TB control program will have to cope with another form of TB, which will be complicated with HIV patients who are already weak. The NTP will have to channel part of its limited resources to care for HIV/TB cases. Most of the TB centers have experience with HIV/TB cases and every TB center is keeping a number of these patients.

The HIV and AIDS stigma is very strong among the community and the health workers cannot speak about it nor can they inform the patient about the problem. The health workers are afraid of the risk of being harmed by the relatives of the patients and fear reaction of the patient if informed about his/her disease. Health workers protect the patients as the families will abandon the patients and some have tried to kill the sick relative. There are neither guidelines nor a policy for warning the partner of HIV positive cases and the community about the risk of transmission.

At the present time, there is no defined national plan or strategy to control the transmission of HIV. Both government and the people are aware of the existence of HIV infection. Yet many face the situation in silence. Many countries that were high in HIV prevalence some years ago are now low prevalence countries. It is time to act. In the absence of action, many healthy and beautiful young people of today will not be alive tomorrow.

CHAPTER THIRTY NINE

Gynecological and Obstetrical Complications of Female Genital Mutilation in Somaliland

Edna Adan Ismail (Nurse/Midwife)

Introduction

Female genital mutilation describes all procedures that entail removal of part or all of the external genitalia of girls and women for traditional or cultural purposes. It does not include medically prescribed surgery nor any procedures performed for sex change reasons. (World Health Organization).

Prevalence

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is an ancient tradition that is said to have existed for thousands of years. For a long time, it was confined to some African and Asian countries and at one time was reported to have existed in Europe before it was abolished there. With increased travel and

migration of peoples, it is now prevalent throughout the world as witnessed by the constant attention it receives from international health and human rights organizations as well as from the world media.

In Africa, FGM is reported in as many as 27 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zaire. In some of these countries FGM is performed on all or most of the female population while in other countries it may be performed only on some women belonging to certain ethnic groups. In Asia, FGM is found occasionally in Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and among certain Moslem communities in Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan. In other pasts of the world, FGM is found among immigrant populations in almost every country of the world even though the practice may have been unknown until immigrants introduced it.

Types of Female Genital Mutilation

The different types of FGM encompass a wide range of traditional procedures and practices that are performed with some variations by the different tribes or ethnic groups. There are two broad categories: FGM and Female Circumcision. Within FGM, there are three basic varieties:

- excision of the prepuce of the clitoris or partial amputation of the body of the clitoris. This type is known as the *sunna*

- excision of the clitoris and of the labia minora. This is what is commonly known as 'excision' and may be the most prevalent type which is performed on girls and women who undergo genital mutilation

- excision of the clitoris, excision of the labia minora, excision of the inner walls of the labia majora and the suturing together of the inner walls of the labia majora. This is what is known as 'infibulation' or 'pharaonic.'

The second category of FMG is know as 'female circumcision.' This is the most mutilating form and is the type that is likely to cause complications as soon after it is performed and throughout the

reproductive life of the victim. It should also be noted that there are additional varieties such as 'introcision,' 'cauterization of the clitoris,' 'angurya,' and 'gishiri cuts' but the writer has no experience with these practices so they are only mentioned and not described.

Who Performs Female Genital Mutilation and at What Age?

Female genital mutilation is usually performed by traditional birth attendants (TBAs) and by male or female traditional healers. Although it is considered illegal, immoral, and unethical for professional health worker such as doctors, midwives, or nurses to perform such mutilation, there are, nevertheless, individuals who still perform these procedures clandestinely for personal financial gain.

The age at which female genital mutilation is performed varies from country to country and according to the type of mutilation being done. In any case, the usual aim is that whatever type is intended, it be performed before the onset of the menarche.

The *sunna* is generally the type that is performed at a very young age and may be carried out soon after birth, during the first week of life, or at any time before the menarche. In the case of excision and infibulation, in which more tissues are removed that entail more manipulations, the child is allowed to grow older so that the tissues intended for excision are given a chance to grow some more. This will also enable the operator at the time of the operation to pinch and hold on to the child's clitoris with one hand while the other hand yields the knife that cuts and removes the external genitalia of the child. The usual age when excision and infibulation are performed is between seven and nine.

Use of Local or General Anesthesia

Anesthesia is rarely used except when the operation is being carried out by a medically trained person (doctor, nurse, midwife, medical assistant) who has access to anesthetics and who also has knowledge in their use. This inevitably leaves the majority of girls to be mutilated by traditional healers and birth attendants without any form of anesthesia being administered while this very sensitive part of the female body is being brutally cut and manipulated! In other instances, traditional practitioners sometimes acquire local anesthesia, needles, and syringes, which they often use with complete ignorance about the safe and correct administration of the products being used.

How is Female Genital Mutilation Performed?

In order to understand fully the extent of the resulting damage, it is necessary to describe in more detail the general procedures that are utilized when girls are being mutilated.

Sunna is performed with any sharp instrument that is often the operator's favorite tool for carrying out a wide range of operations that include uvulectomies, tonsilectomies, male circumcisions, dental extractions, facial scarifications, and deliveries. The instrument is often just washed or wiped after each use and is rarely sterilized. In rare cases, the parents may demand the use of a new razor blade although there will still be no guarantee that the operator's hands and nails will be clean and free from contamination since gloves are never worn.

An anesthetic is rarely used for the *sunna*, which is considered to be very 'minor' by the operator who usually carries it out in a single slash to slice off part or the entire clitoris in one go. After the operation, the stump is not sutured but is pinched between the forefinger and thumb for a while to stop the bleeding after which the wound is sprinkled with herbs that are supposed to enhance healing.

No particular after-care is observed for the *sunna* unless the bleeding becomes uncontrollable or an infection sets in a few days later. In this case, the operator would be summoned again rather than a medical person for fear of a denouncement that could lead to legal complications. Also, it is considered 'unlucky' for the wound to be seen by many persons, thus ensuring minimal interference from others apart from the ministrations of the traditional healer who originally performed it and the immediate female relatives who provide the child with after care.

To perform excision, the same instruments are used as for the *sunna*, although excision may require sutures. Alternatively, herbs such as gum arabica and myhrr may be sprinkled on the wound to stop the bleeding and to assist healing. If the operator or the family is able to acquire it, local anesthesia may be administered during this type of mutilation. Naturally, since the excised tissues are greater than those removed during *sunna*, the pain, bleeding, and shock that ensue are more intense and the risk of infection as well as delayed healing are more likely.

Infibulation is the most drastic form of FGM and is often results in more severe obstetrical complications. As in excision, a local anesthetic may or may not be used for the reasons previously mentioned. A wide range of instruments and procedures are used for performing infibulation:

Instruments

- any sharp cutting instrument such as a knife, broken glass, or a razor blade will do. The operator may have acquired medical instruments like a scalpel forceps or scissors
- the instruments may be new or may have already been used for other purposes and/or on other persons
- operators seldom know sterilization nor is it performed.

Sutures

- regular surgical catgut, silk, or cotton thread
- domestic sewing thread
- vegetable or nylon fibre pre-selected by the operator.

Needles

- regular surgical suturing needles (round bodied or sharp and any size)
- domestic sewing needle
- long Acacia thorns
- hat pins or dressmaker's pins.

Condition of Hands

- no gloves are worn during the operation
- the nails of the operator are allowed to grow as they are used as pincers during operations. Rings, amulets, and other hand ornaments are rarely removed, as these items are not recognized as likely sources of contamination
- hands may or may not be washed. They become wet and it is not unlikely for the operator to wipe his/her hands on the thighs of the child or on the sand in order to dry them to improve dexterity!

Cloths and Bedding

- since bleeding will occur and since there will be some secretions for some days, the family usually finds an old mat or floor covering that can later be discarded.

Instead of cloths, sand is sometimes placed on the mat under the buttocks of the child in order to absorb blood and other secretions. In the case of more affluent or educated families, they may be more likely to be aware about the risks of infection and usually such families would have clean sheets and also perineal pads to absorb any blood or secretions from the wound.

The Operation Itself

The child is made to squat on a stool or mat facing the operator at a convenient height that offers the operator a good view of the parts to be handled. This is important as the operator is often an elderly person whose sight may be impaired.

Understandably, it is vital for the child to be held as still as possible in order to avoid inflicting cuts other than those intentionally being carried out for the purpose of infibulation. For this, adult helpers grab and pull apart the legs of the little girl. Usually, two persons grab one leg each and also hold down her hips. A third person holds back the head and torso. To prevent kicks, the child's legs are held back by tying a rope to each of her ankles which is then tied to her thighs, thus keeping each leg in a tightly flexed position in what can roughly be described as a modified and forced Trendenlenberg. If available, this is the stage at which a local anesthetic would be used.

The elements of speed and surprise are vital and the operator immediately grabs the clitoris by pinching it between her nails aiming to amputate it with a slash. The organ is then shown to the senior female relatives of the child who will decide whether the amount that has been removed is satisfactory or whether more is to be cut. After the clitoris has been 'satisfactorily' amputated, and also after the female relatives have ululated to let those outside know that the business at hand is progressing well, the operator can then proceed with the total removal of the labia minora and the paring of the inner walls of the labia majora. Since the entire skin on the inner walls of the labia majora has to be removed all the way down to the perineum, this becomes a very messy business as the child who is by now screaming and struggling is also bleeding profusely, making it difficult for the operator to hold with bare fingers and nails the skin and the parts that are to be cut.

It needs to be stressed here that it is important for the wound to heal by first intention, not only to protect the child from a repeat operation, but

also mainly to preserve the popularity of the operator who would otherwise acquire a bad reputation and lose future potential clients and income.

Having made sure that sufficient tissue has been removed to permit the desired fusion of the skin, the operator pulls together the opposite sides of the labia majora, ensuring that the raw edges where the skin had been removed are well positioned. The wound is now ready to be stitched or for thorns to be applied. If a needle and thread are being used, close and tight sutures will be placed to ensure that a flap of skin that covers the vulva and extends from the perineum to the base of the mons veneris and which, after the wound heals, will form a bridge of scar tissue that will totally occlude the vaginal entroitus. A small hole having the diameter of a matchstick will be left unstitched in order to permit the passage of urine and vaginal secretions.

If thorns were being used, an equal number would have been inserted into each side of the labia majora, and a string would then be used to pull the thorns together and this way bring the raw edges of the labia majora together. The string would be wound in the same way that sports shoes with hooks are laced. After the stitching, an egg is broken over the wound, which is then sprinkled with whatever herbs, sugar, or concoctions were prepared according to the dictates of local custom.

No dressing is used and the legs are kept together for a week after which the leg bindings are slightly loosened and the child allowed to take small steps. The leg bindings will be removed altogether after a further week. To ascertain that the urethra has not been accidentally closed, the child is encouraged to urinate a few hours after the operation.

Whether sutures or thorns were inserted, these will be removed on the seventh day but only after the operator is satisfied that the two sides of the labia majora have fused together and that the remaining hole for micturition is not wider than three to five millimetres in diameter.

Complications

Considering the clumsy and unsanitary conditions under which FGM is usually performed, complications are frequent and numerous and can be classified in the order in which they are likely to occur.

Immediate: Shock From Fear, Pain, and Hemorrhage

In addition to the intentional cuts on the clitoris, labia minora, and labia majora, there may be accidental lacerations inflicted on the child as a result of her struggles. These accidental cuts may involve the vagina, urethra, anus, and thighs. As result, quite a few children are taken to hospitals for the control of hemorrhage, or for the repair of severe lacerations that were inflicted intentionally or accidentally.

Within the First Ten Days

Infection of the wound and septicemia are often encountered and tetanus is not uncommon.

Retention of urine due to:

- post-traumatic edema of the vulva resulting from the damages inflicted on the clitoris and labiae impedes or obstructs/ prevents the passage of urine through the swollen urethra
- obstruction of the urethra by a blood clot or by the thorns that were inserted to hold the sides of the labia majora together
- accidental suturing of the urethra itself
- over-tight application of the binds that were used to keep the thighs and legs together
- psychosomatic urine retention out of sheer fear and pain.

Failure of the infibulation

- when the two sides of the labia majora fail to fuse, it is necessary that the child undergo a second operation.

At the Onset of Menstruation

At times, the small opening that had previously permitted the passage of urine becomes insufficient to permit the drainage of the more viscous consistency of menstrual bleeding. This necessitates an enlarging of the infibulation hole subjecting the girl to all the associated risks for a second time.

Dysmenorrhoea

When the infibulation hole is too small, there is a constant stagnation of menstrual blood and other vaginal secretions causing bacteria to spread into the uterine cavity and beyond. This is likely to increase the risk of chronic pelvic inflammation that might cause the severe abdominal cramps experiensed by infibulated females during menstruation.

Recurrent Urinary Tract Infection

Because a flap of skin obstructs the urethra after infibulation, urine does not jet out during micturition. Instead, it hits the flap of skin obstructing the vulva and is then sprayed back into the vagina. This obstruction prevents proper vaginal hygiene and causes urinary stasis which may cause recurrent urinary infections.

Complications at the Time of Marriage

The infibulation opening that had until then permitted the passage of urine and vaginal secretions does not allow intercourse. This will require that the husband make a forcible penetration to burst the skin obstructing the entrance to the vagina, or the opening will have to be cut open with scissors or a knife to allow the consummation of marriage, *Dyspareunia*. The scar tissues that surround the vaginal orifice may be rigid and inelastic and can then cause pain during sexual intercourse.

Infertility

Because of the constant stagnation of menstrual blood and other vagina secretions that have accumulated in the vaginal cavity, the resulting pelvic inflammations may block the fallopian tubes and obstruct the normal travel of the ovum along the tubes preventing it from becoming fertilized by the male spermatozoa.

Vulval Keloids and Dermal Cysts

Apart from their unesthetic appearance, these may interfere with consummation of marriage or with childbirth during delivery.

During Pregnancy

It is not uncommon for a previously infibulated and pregnant woman to attend the ante-natal clinic for follow-up of the pregnancy or for a pregnancy-related complaint and find that the opening of the infibulation will not admit the introduction of even one finger into the vagina for diagnostic and exploratory purposes. Such women will require an opening of the infibulation during the pregnancy if complications are to be avoided at delivery.

During Labor

Some women arrive at the maternity hospital in labor with a very tight and small infibulation opening. To prevent severe vaginal lacerations and possible third degree tears, it is likely that an elective Caesarean Section will be decided if the vagina is seen to be too rigid and scarred, particularly if keloids have formed.

Prolonged Second Stage of Labor

Infibulation is likely to cause the most complications during childbirth as the tissues of the vagina, perineum, and the labia have all undergone mutilation that have left extensive scar formation. This makes the vaginal canal inelastic and the pelvic floor muscles rigid, thus preventing the normal and gradual

dilatation of the vagina as well as the descent of the presenting part of the child during the second stage of labor.

a) Foetal Complications:

- large caput formation
- excessive molding of the head
- intra-cranial hemorrhage
- hypoxia
- foetal distress
- intra-uterine death.

b) Maternal Complications:

- uterine inertia
- obstructed labor
- extensive vaginal and perineal lacerations
- third degree tears
- uterine rupture
- impacted foetus
- maternal distress
- maternal death.

Postnatal Complications

- infection of the lacerations
- delayed healing of the repaired perineum and vaginal tissues
- anaemia
- sloughing of the vaginal wall resulting in vesico-vaginal fistula and/or recto-vaginal fistula
- puerperal infection.

Cystocele and Rectocele

Because of the prolonged labor during each delivery, there is added stretching of the vaginal wall muscles. This causes a prolapse of either the bladder or rectum to bulge into the vagina.

HIV/AIDS

In recent years and since the HIV/AIDs pandemic, the likelihood of transmission of the AIDS virus has become added to the long list of complications associated with female genital mutilations. This risk is made real because of the fact that traditional healers do not know the dangers of using unsterilized cutting instruments that have previously been used on different individuals who might have been carriers of the AIDs virus.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to provide a general listing of dangers associated with FGM and of the multiple physical complications that can result from such traditional practices. Although many of these physical injuries can be treated and can heal, the psychological trauma will always remain with the victim throughout her life. Because the practice is so brutal, unnecessary, and illegal and is also a practice that is condemned by all the known religions of the world, a major concerted effort needs to be mobilized for its abolition.

The battle is definitely too difficult to be left to individual crusaders and little old women. It has to be fought by all, and particularly by professionals such as obstretricians, gynecologists, pediatricians, and midwives who are the ones who have to deal with the mess caused by female genital mutilations.

CHAPTER FORTY

Practicing *SAAR*

Student Nurses of the
Edna Adan Maternity Hospital
Hargeisa, Somaliland

Introduction

In any traditional Somali village, it is not uncommon for people to become psychologically depressed and fatigued. Given the demands placed on villagers, especially women, to provide food, water, fuel, housing, and education, along with the normal household demands of child rearing, caring for the elderly, and keeping the family healthy, it is not surprising that people would sometimes run out of energy. Over many generations, a body of beliefs and practices has evolved, known as *SAAR*, in which special members of the community assume time-honored roles and practice a ritual for 'curing' these states of depression. The student nurses enrolled in the training program at the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital have conducted extensive research into the practice of *SAAR* and compiled the following presentation.

Who is Affected

While anyone can become afflicted, the condition is particularly found among women 30 years of age and older. The individual becomes psychologically depressed, tires easily, and loses appetite. She ceases to

become an effective and productive member of the household. Filled with anxiety, worry, and guilt about one's condition, the patient would often grow worse, just because of nervousness about possible death from the symptoms. When the condition becomes acute, the woman would seek traditional healers and spend money for a cure, money that would normally be spent on food, medical care, and housing for the family.

There are different types of *SAAR*. It might have originated in East Africa as it is known in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Somaliland, and other nations in the Horn. One legend suggests that *SAAR* originated in Egypt and then went to Xiis and Maydh, ports on the Red Sea, from where it spread on to Somaliland. *SAAR* seems to be most prevalent among middle-aged women. Young people generally are not bothered and the very old have reduced responsibilities and therefore have little tension in their daily lives.

Victims are prepared to spend a great deal of money, even if they are themselves very poor. There have been reports that women have paid as much as $400 for the treatment which is a fortune for nomads. For the most part, the victims are uneducated and illiterate village women. This makes the payment all the more difficult. Yet it is often carried out if it requires that the woman sell some of her jewels or precious sheep and goats from the herd.

The Ritual

SAAR is carried out by an *Alaka, a* special and mystical person. She will usually stay between four and seven days to perform the necessary ritual for the treatment. The *Alaka* is given money with which she buys food and animals for the ritual. What she does not spend on food, she keeps for herself as her fee. It is important that the *Alaka* slaughter the animals herself. Sometimes a variety of animals are slaughtered including goats, sheep, roosters, rams, and chickens. The *Alaka* prepares a strong traditional perfume with herbs and fumigates or bathes the patient with the lotion. While she anoints the patient, the *Alaka* chants a phrase, "we have seen your illness, now show us your health."

She starts the ritual, beginning with the slaughtered sheep, stepping over the sheep's blood three times. She then puts some blood on the forehead, palms, and soles of the patient's feet. After that, she dilutes the blood with water, adds salt, and has the patient drink some of the blood. As she is preparing the potion, she chants, "we have given you your rights, leave her." While the *Alaka* carries out this ritual, the meat of the slaughtered animals is cooking, usually with a special blend of herbs.

When the food is served, the patient tastes it. In the afternoon, they will make a circle with the patient in the middle, and then begin dancing and beating drums while singing special songs. When they finish dancing and eating, everyone goes home, except for the *Alaka* and the patient.

The ceremony is repeated the second day, essentially the same as the first with feasting and dancing at the end of the day. On the third day, the *Alaka* slaughters the chickens. As in other parts of the ritual, she will circle the patient's head three times with the chickens, the cooking pots, and sometimes with special herbs and potions. On this third day they also prepare the *Sabaya* which is a bread, much like a the Indian 'chapati.' The feasting and dancing continue as in the first two days.

At midnight the *Alaka* brings a cooking pot with butter and coffee beans. They cook them together and prepare a soft coffee butter. When the butter is ready, they circle the pot three times around the head of the patient and then anoint her entire body with the butter. On the fourth day, the patient washes her body in the morning and then eats for breakfast the coffee beans and butter that remain. Often the breakfast consists of *Lahooh*, a traditional Somali pancake served without sugar. After the washing and eating of breakfast, the ceremony is over and the patient is considered 'cured.' She goes home to much rejoicing and singing.

Often a drummer will accompany the *Alaka*, especially during the fumigation of the patient and the anointing ceremony. The patient often wears a red dress and sometimes, when the *Alaka* is fumigating the patient with perfume, holds the perfume in a container with a red or a white lid. If the patient is fortunate to own any gold, she will wear it during this part of the ceremony. During the fumigation and the anointing, the patient is covered with a sheet so that she will be able to inhale the aromas of the perfume or that of the cooked food.

During some *SAAR* ceremonies, the patient must wear special clothing. There are several rules that must be observed about the clothing. First, the dress must belong to the patient – it cannot be borrowed. Second, it cannot be worn for any occasion other than the fumigation, the feasting, the drumming, and other parts of the *SAAR* ritual. Finally, it must be a new dress, purchased especially for the *SAAR*. The dress is an important part of the ritual and observing these rules is important for the successful healing of the patient. There are some special *SAARs* that require more than one dress. In this situation, the patient wears a green dress on the first day and a red dress on the second. In this version, she puts a chicken on each shoulder and rides a ram with a white head – an albino, a rare variety since the Somali breed of sheep have a black head.

CHAPTER FORTY ONE

Human Development in Somalia 2001: An Overview[1]

Mark Bradbury and Ken Menkhaus

Introduction

Somalia is a country in transition. After years of civil strife the nature of the Somali state has changed and Somalis have an extraordinary opportunity to reconstruct their political, social, and economic systems afresh. In 2001 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Somalia published the second Human Development Report (HDR) for Somalia. The report compiles the latest available data on Somalia and provides a timely analysis of a society in transition. This paper is extracted from the overview to the report, published in December 2001.

Somalia in Transition

In 1991, the world was shocked when civil war engulfed Somalia, the government collapsed, and a humanitarian tragedy of unprecedented scale unfolded. The impact of 'state collapse' on human development has been profound, involving staggering loss of life, massive internal migrations and flight abroad, the collapse of political institutions, the destruction of Somalia's social and economic infrastructure, and

environmental damage. Somalis experience the indignities of statelessness in restrictions on international travel, their marginalization in economic transactions, and a lack of national and international protection and security. Civil war has led to a questioning of a single Somali sovereignty and has revealed the heterogeneity of Somali society and culture. At the same time, many Somalis in the diaspora are investing substantially in their country through overseas remittances.

At the start of the new millennium, Somalia is in a period of complex political, economic, and social transition. Although Somalia was without a single central government throughout the 1990s, politics, economics, and development did not stand still. The early 1990s were a time of state *fragmentation* and a *localization* of political authority in which varied structures of governance and authority emerged at community, district, and regional levels to fill the vacuum of central government. Since 1998, the process of state fragmentation and factional politics that characterized the early 1990s has given way to a process of *consolidation* and an evolution of broader political alliances based on more institutionalized and less violent forms of authority. Polities have been established since 1991 in the northwest 'Republic of Somaliland' and since 1998 in the northeast 'Puntland State of Somalia,' with public administrations that fulfil some basic functions of government.[19] Since 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) has begun to establish an administration in the two southern regions of Bay and Bakol that have been chronically insecure for most of the past decade. The most significant political development since 2000 has been the establishment of a 'Transitional National Government' (TNG), based in Mogadishu. The product of a lengthy national peace process, the TNG holds the potential for resolving the protracted conflict that has plagued southern Somalia for over a decade. The TNG's acceptance in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the former Organization of African unity has given Somalia formal representation in these international bodies for the first time in a decade.The political and economic decentralization that has taken place in Somalia over the last decade is unlikely to be totally reversed and the political entities are still fragile and evolving. Nevertheless, there are economic and social forces in Somalia that appear to demand greater regulation and order. The development of governmental forms of political authority in regional administrations and the growth of urban centers such as Hargeisa, Garowe, Bosaso, and Baidoa, point to a process of consolidation. Coupled with a decrease in humanitarian needs since 1999, due to improved security conditions and a respite from climatic stress, these trends herald the potential for a period of positive change in

Somalia.

In the decade that Somalia has been without an effective central government, the international environment has also undergone significant changes. These include the ending of the Cold War, the deregulation of world trade, the consolidation of economic wealth and political power in the West, and the emergence of liberal democracy as the template for 'good governance.' The model of state-led development has been superseded by one of market-led development. Human rights have risen up the international agenda. Regional institutions have gained a greater political and economic role in state affairs. There have been rapid advances in communication technology. Official development aid has declined and as governments are no longer considered the sole arbiters of development, the systems for the delivery and management of aid have changed, with a growth in the number, wealth, and influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These changes have an impact on human development in Somalia and the transformations taking place are, in part, an adaptation to these external influences. These internal and external transitions present unique challenges to the promotion of human development.

Human Development

Since the early 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its partners have been promoting the concept of *human development.* As defined by its principal architect, the late Mahhub ul Haq, human development aims at 'enabling people to have wider choices.' For many years, gross national product (GNP) per capita was used as a crude measure of development. This has proven to be an unreliable indicator, largely because many countries enjoying high real GNP per capita are unable to translate this into development gains for their citizens. Moreover, for many people improved income or material gain is of secondary value to cultural or religious freedoms or a sense of community. Placing people at the center of the development process, human development expands the concept of development beyond a sole concern for economic growth and provides a more qualitative measure of development.

Since 1990, global, regional, national, and sub-national HDRs have become one of UNDP's principal vehicles for promoting and measuring advances in human development. The long-running collapse of the Somali state means that there is no single, unified Somali voice for formulating development policies. Indeed, the disputed legitimacy of sub-national

polities in the country reflects both the diverse developmental needs and varied aspirations of the Somali people. The 2001 HDR describes some of the main trends in human development in Somalia.

Aims of the 2001 Human Development Report

War can involve not just the breakdown of society, but also its re-ordering. (Keen, 1997) Strategies to promote human development in Somalia should therefore be cognizant of the changes that have taken place in Somalia over the past decade.

The first HDR for Somalia in1998 provided an historical background to the long running political and humanitarian crisis in Somalia. (UNDP HDR, 1998) The 2001 Somalia HDR assesses the main socio-economic trends since 1998. By compiling the latest available data on Somalia's human development, the report aims to aid Somali community leaders, international policy makers, donors, and development agencies in formulating human development and humanitarian strategies in Somalia.

The 2001 HDR seeks to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of transition in Somalia by examining three forces that impact on human development, creating both challenges and opportunities: *globalization*; *the private sector, and human rights*. By this, the report aims both to describe and promote discussion on the changing nature of the Somali state and the international context, and how these forces can be harnessed to advance rather than hinder human development.

Themes of 2001 Human Development Report

Trends in Human Development: Continuity or Change?

After ten years of civil conflict and state collapse, human development in Somalia is unacceptably poor. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis live in destitution, vulnerable to the vicissitudes of political violence, global markets, and climate. At the same time, some people have benefited economically over the past decade and there have been significant developments in communications technology and economic infrastructure. Cultural changes are also apparent in the enhanced role of traditional institutions in governance, the new economic role of women, and the influence of Islamicists in social, economic, and political life.

Drawing on existing documentation and data, the HDR considers

several questions:

- What are the significant trends in human development?
- Is the state of human development in Somalia better or worse than 10-15 years ago?
- Are the trends similar across regions and social groups?

Table 1: The Human Development Index, Somalia 2001[3]

Indicator	1989-90 (base)	1995-97 (median)	2001
Life expectancy at birth (yrs)	46	42	47
Adult Literacy Rate	24	15.5	17.1
Primary Sch. Enrolment Ratio (6-12 yrs.)	18	11.5	13.6
Secondary Sch. Enrol. Ratio (13-16 yrs)	10	0.4	1.1
Tertiary Enrolment Ratio	3	---	0.1
Combined Gross EnrolmentRatio	12.9	6.6	7.5
Real GDP Per Capita (PPP US$)	836	650	795
Life Expectancy Index	0.35	0.283	0.376
Adult Literacy Index	0.24	0.155	0.171
Gross Enrolment Index	0.129	0.066	0.074
Educational Attainment Index	0.203	0.125	0.139
Real GDP Per Capita Income Index	0.354	0.312	0.284
Human Development Index	0.303	0.24	0.284

The current data indicate that the trends in human development are mixed. In the three years since the first HDR for Somalia was published, the country has undergone a number of significant economic, political, and social changes. During this period, some areas of the country have experienced progressive changes in certain human development indicators, such as primary school enrollment and per capita income. Somalia's Human Development Index (HDI) in 2001 has been calculated to be 0.284, indicating an overall improvement since 1998. These

improvements are primarily due to reduced levels of armed conflict and population displacement in comparison to the early and mid 1990s. Nevertheless, most human development indicators in Somalia remain extremely low and disparities between regions and socio-economic groups have grown. Furthermore, the HDI places Somalia 161 out of 163 states, in terms of the level of human development, above Niger and Sierra Leone,[3] among seven neighboring countries in Eastern Africa and the Horn, Somalia is lowest in all indicators, with the exception of life expectancy and GDP per capita (See Table 2).

Table 2: Comparative Human Development Indicators 2001[4]

Country	Life Exp't	Infant Mort.	Under 5 Mort.	Mat'rl Mort.	Pri-mary Sch'l (GER)	Ad't Lit-ercy	GDP\ p/c (PPP US$)
Djibouti	41	104	149	---	32	63.4	---
Eritrea	51.5	66	105	1000	30	37.4	881
Ethiopia	44.5	118	176	---	35	37.4	628
Kenya	52.2	76	118	590	65	81.5	1022
Somalia	**47**	**132**	**224**	**1600**	**13.6**	**17.1**	**795**
Tanzania	51.1	90	141	530	48	74.7	501
Uganda	41.9	83	131	510	73	66.1	1167

Trends in Human Development

Demographic Trends

- Some demographic trends are favorable. The numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons have declined over the past three years, indicating an improved security environment. However, migration to strong economic centers, such as Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Bosaso, Burao, Galkaiyo, and Baidoa is creating new human development challenges in the provision of services and employment

that are typical of rapid urbanization.

- The most vulnerable people are the internally displaced, returning refugees, the urban poor, destitute pastoralists, and southern riverine farming communities.

Human Security Trends

- The stabilization of violent conflict throughout much of Somalia since the mid 1990s has meant that deaths related to war, life-threatening emergencies, refugee movements, and internal displacement have diminished. However, the security situation cannot be generalized. While security in the northern regions continues to be relatively secure, volatile and unpredictable security in much of the South restricts humanitarian access. Security and humanitarian access have dramatically improved in Bay and Bakol regions since 1999, when the RRA established control. The resource-rich agro-pastoral lands of this region were intensely fought during the civil war and a settlement of the conflict in these regions could signal one of the most important changes in the war for a decade. The potential impact on Somalia of the attacks on the US in September 2001 is a cause of concern.

- Long-term trends in food security have shown little improvement. After the disastrous el-Niño floods of 1997/98 and drought in 1998/99, cereal production in southern Somalia in 2000 was the best in seven years. Overall agricultural production, however, remains far below pre-war levels and 2000 may prove to be a short reprieve. It is anticipated that crop yields for 2001 will be low in parts of the south, due to the failure of the spring *gu* rains. Importantly, a long-term decline in terms of trade for livestock continues to affect the pastoral economy and bans on livestock imports by Gulf States in 1998 and 2000 have dramatically reduced the purchasing power of most Somali households and jeopardize the food security of poorer families.

Social Services Trends

- Aggregate human development indicators for Somalia disguise significant economic disparities. Levels of human development are generally higher in Somaliland and Puntland than in much of southern and central Somalia, with better food security, an absence of armed conflict and higher household income. Urban populations generally fare better than rural ones, due to the higher concentration of social services in urban centers. Families with access to overseas remittances enjoy privileged access to social services and have better food security than households without.

- There have been modest gains in education, with enrollment in primary schools reaching levels of pre-war times, and numbers of secondary schools increasing since 1998. However, with overall adult literacy of only 17.1% and a gross primary school enrollment of 13.6%, educational attainment are among the lowest in the world.

- Health indicators suggest there has been no improvement in the health of the population over the past three years. Indeed, indicators show a slight increase in levels of infant and under-five mortality while pockets of chronic malnutrition persist in parts of southern Somalia. Health facilities are concentrated in urban centers so that rural populations have limited access to health services. There are very few newly qualified medical personnel taking up work. Drug importation is unregulated with the consequence that the privatized health services are supplied with expired and poor quality medical drugs.

Economic Trends

- Remittances have long been a critical part of Somalia's economy. With current levels of agricultural production and manufacturing very low, remittances from the large Somali diaspora enable the country to manage a balance of trade deficit and to enjoy higher levels of food security

and access to private social services than would otherwise be the case. Future trends in remittances will be a key factor in sustaining human development.

- Privatization is shaping human development in Somalia. The protracted collapse of the central government and low levels of international rehabilitation and development assistance means that Somali households must procure their social welfare needs from the private sector. In some places, the private sector has responded reasonably well. Elsewhere, market failures have left welfare needs unmet and the introduction of user fees for health or educational services invariably excludes the poorest.

- The economy has been in recession since the outbreak of the civil war, with large amounts of capital, labor and agricultural land unutilized. In some sectors, however, there have been modest levels of growth. A demand in the Arabian peninsula for dried limes and sesame, for example, are generating new opportunities for smallholder export crops in southern Somalia, partially offsetting the collapse of banana exports. In Hargeisa, Mogadishu, and Bosaso, investments in light manufacturing have expanded, indicating local investor confidence in the economy and local security.

- The service sector is the most dynamic part of the economy. Money transfer companies and telecommunication companies have expanded throughout Somalia and have increased the range of financial services, facilitating the flow of remittances from the diaspora and commercial transactions. These companies, which did not exist a decade ago, are amongst the most powerful businesses in Somalia today. Likewise, the transportation sector continues to expand, with several Somali-owned airlines operating international services. Private education and health care services, hotels and restaurants, and utility companies such as electricity and water, are also providing new income generating and employment opportunities. Progress in the service sector

is hindered, however, by the lack of regulation and the incompatibility of some utilities such as telecommunications.

- Commerce has expanded in recent years. Despite the embargo on imports of Somali livestock by Gulf States since September 2000, domestic demand, funded largely by remittances, provides a modest market for foodstuffs, fuel, clothing, and other basic commodities. The main growth in commercial activity has been in the transit trade, with Somalia acting as an entrepot for goods travelling to markets in the Horn and East Africa. The 'Berbera Corridor' handles increasing amounts of container cargo destined for Ethiopia, while in the south a robust transit trade moves consumer goods from Mogadishu's beach ports into Kenya. The absence of credible banking services that can provide a letter of credit remains a severe constraint to trade.

- The lack of an accountable and responsible authority to execute monetary policy is a threat to economic development and livelihoods. In 2000 and 2001, the import of counterfeit Somali shillings by Somali businessmen triggered hyperinflation. This has severely reduced the purchasing power of the poor, while wealthier Somalis, who operate mainly in a dollarized economy, have been less affected.

- There is a stark contrast between northern and southern parts of Somalia in the state of the infrastructure. In Puntland and Somaliland, investment in road and port rehabilitation has been possible, facilitating the flow of commerce. In contrast, the road, seaport, and airport infrastructure of the South is in a state of rapid deterioration, adding to the costs of transport and merchandise.

Environmental Trends

- Somalia faces some serious environmental challenges. Uncontrolled cutting of acacia and juniper forests for charcoal exports and timber is causing lasting damage to the rangelands, Somalia's most precious resource. Similarly, Somalia's marine resources are being depleted through unsustainable fishing practices, mostly by foreign trawlers.

Foreign Aid Trends

- Foreign aid to Somalia has fallen significantly since before the war and since the early 1990s. Since 1998, humanitarian assistance has declined while rehabilitation assistance has increased as a proportion of overall aid, reflecting an improved security environment and change in donor aid policy. Compared to the value of trade and annual remittances, however, international aid represents a small contribution to the Somali economy.

Globalization and Localization

UNDP's 1999 global HDR concluded that globalization "offers enormous potential to eradicate poverty in the 21st century," but its impact on poorer nations is, at best, mixed, often marginalizing the poorest of the globe's impoverished people while creating new opportunities for others. (UNDP, HDR, 1999) To ensure that globalization is better harnessed to promote human development, the 1999 global HDR called for the better management of globalization through more effective governance at the local, national, regional, and international levels.

Globalization is linked to the weakening of state sovereignty and competence and is complemented by a trend towards 'localization.' The 2001 HDR examines the interplay between globalization and localization in Somalia. The prolonged absence of a central Somali government means that Somali society is more directly exposed to both the beneficial and harmful effects of globalization. The impact on human development is complex and diverse, but is apparent in a number of areas:

- the global nature of refugee and migrant labor movements has facilitated a substantial growth of the Somali diaspora around the world
- new telecommunication technologies have facilitated the development of a sophisticated financial system for the remittance of money from the Somali diaspora to Somalia
- lack of trade regulation in Somalia has facilitated the expansion of international trade networks through Somalia, linked to Dubai and Kenya. However, it also facilitates the flow of weapons from the globalized arms market and the importation of poor quality drugs and expired foodstuffs
- global crime syndicates have exploited the collapse of the Somali state
- the global network of UN agencies, donors, and NGOs plays a significant role in meeting welfare and social protection needs in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, in the country's economy
- international Islamic movements carry out their own relations with Islamic groups within Somalia.

New policies are needed at local, national, and international levels to maximize the positive aspects of globalization in Somalia and to minimize its more harmful impacts on human development.

The Private Sector and its Impact on Human Development

One of the major changes in Somalia over the past decade has been the growth of the private sector. Economic deregulation and privatization have accompanied the radical localization of governance. The growth of the private sector is closely linked to processes of globalization. In the context of weak and often ineffectual public administrations, the private sector is playing an instrumental role in providing social services and shaping development. As a market economy has replaced a centrally planned economy, development has become market-driven rather than government-led. The 2001 HDR examines in some detail the evolution of the private sector and its impact on human development. It argues that:

- The civil war achieved what the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s did not, that is, economic deregulation that has enabled the expansion of the private

sector. However, with the exception of a few sectors such as telecommunications, there has been little fundamental change in the economy. In most sectors, economic activity was better before the war, due largely to external aid. While a few people are likely to benefit from this situation, high levels of unemployment mean that a large number of people are unable to participate in the economy.

- The changes in the economy and the current business class in Somalia have their roots in economic and political processes dating back to the 1980s. In the different regions of Somalia, business people have adapted to state collapse in different ways, variously influenced by security, kinship, and Islam.

- There is a growing recognition among Somalis that the private sector has a role to play in governance. Some business people are supportive of a more regulated, legal environment for the private sector which, among other benefits, would facilitate cooperation with foreign companies.

- The administrations in Somalia lack sufficient resources to support social services. However, the private sector's increased role in social service provision and the management of public goods is unlikely to improve equity, wealth distribution, and welfare. In some instances, the private sector has proved to be a relatively effective provider of key social services, such as water or transport. In other cases, such as health, it has not. By definition, private services are provided for a fee, and hence tend to be accessible only to those who can afford them.

Human Rights and Governance

For some 30 years there has been a human rights crisis in Somalia. The 21-year regime of Siyad Barre had one of the worst human rights records in Africa. During the civil war in the late 1980s, Somalia's entire legal, judicial, and law enforcement system collapsed, human rights abuses escalated, and international and locally accepted norms and rules were systematically violated.

In the decade during which Somalia has been without a national

government, human rights have risen in international and domestic relations as a measure of 'good governance.' The international human rights regime has been strengthened by the establishment of the Office for the High Commission of Human Rights (OHCHR) and an agreement to create an international criminal court. There has been an evolution in mechanisms for the redress of human rights violations, such as the south African truth commission and the international tribunals on former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. As recognition of the instrumental as well as intrinsic value of human rights has grown, relief and development agencies have increasingly adopted a rights-based approach to their work.

The elevation of human rights, however, is not without controversy. Tensions exist between the universality of rights and their cultural specificity, between individual and collective rights, between the indivisibility and prioritization of rights, between international law and national law, between national sovereignty and international intervention, and between ratification and enforcement. International expressions of concern for human rights violations are criticized for being selective. Furthermore, while states are accountable to human rights conventions, influential non-state actors such as multinationals, international financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations are not.

The 2001 HDR examines relationships between governance, human rights, and human development. In the context of fragmented authority, a deregulated economy, and a dynamic civil society, it considers what social arrangements exist to protect human rights, and the challenges to Somali administrations and the international community in protecting the rights of all Somalis and securing justice. The chapter finds the following:

- Progress in human rights is closely linked to the troubled history of the state. Lasting results in human development will depend on protecting and advancing human rights for all.

- The end of military rule brought some freedoms for some, but respect for human rights also reached its nadir during the civil war and famine in the early 1990s. A decade later, human rights in Somalia defy simple generalizations. In political and economic recovery, the human rights situation is greatly improved. Where political unrest and chronic humanitarian needs persist, the human rights situation remains dire.

- Across Somalia there are currently no uniform constitutional and legal rules governing social or economic behaviour. Where public administrations have been established, advances have been made in restoring formal judicial systems. Elsewhere, and in most rural communities, traditional Somali law *(xeer)* and Islamic *Shariah* continue to be practised.

- A significant legal development in Somalia over the last decade is creation of *Shariah* courts and the extension of Islamic jurisprudence *(fiqh)* beyond family to penal issues and revenue collection. This has created tensions over the promotion of human rights. Some Somalis view the international human rights agenda as antithetical to Islam and certain cultural norms, while others perceive human rights and Islamic law as compatible.

- The re-establishment of accountable and effective legal institutions and law and order will be critical for the protection of human rights and for social and economic recovery in Somalia. A common pre-requisite for this has been a peace process and political dialogue resulting in a 'social compact' and constitutional framework for the re-establishment of law and order. The transitional charters for governance of the Somaliland, Puntland, and TNG administrations, which articulate the rights and responsibilities of citizens, have provided such frameworks as precursors to constitutions.

- The re-establishment of law and order cannot, by itself, be equated with the advancement of human rights and justice, nor does a secure operating environment for international agencies necessarily translate into a secure environment for Somalis. The process of re-establishing the judiciary across the regions and the record of the administrations in applying the rule of law has been uneven.

- While there has been progress in re-establishing legal institutions and law enforcement agencies, the issue of post-war justice has received little attention. Unanswered allegations of human rights abuse and crimes against humanity pose an obstacle to dialogue and reconciliation and perpetuate

a culture of impunity. Issues of contested farmland and range ownership remain unresolved. There is no consensus in Somalia over how these issues should be addressed, or even whether they should be. Western and Somali concepts of justice sit uneasily together. However, while human rights and structural causes of violence go unaddressed, there is a danger in creating an environment of 'negative peace' in which justice is not seen to have been done.

- Internationally, the state is considered the legal 'duty-bearer' for protecting and upholding the rights of its citizens. In a 'collapsed state,' questions arise over where responsibility for the protection and upholding of human rights lies. In the current situation, the family, clan, civil society organizations, administrations, businesses, and international actors all have responsibilities for protecting and advancing human rights.

Human Development Indicators

Somalia's protracted political crisis has hampered systematic collection and verification of human development data, especially in central and southern Somalia. Large-scale population movements during the civil war, the population's nomadic life-style, fluid borders, and the informal economy make the collection and analysis of the most basic data in Somalia problematic. Whereas before the war there were central institutions for data collection and analysis, there are now many aid agencies with different data needs and different ways of collecting information. Consequently, there is no agreed list of 'facts' on Somalia.

In an effort to redress this, the 2001 HDR has compiled a list of basic human development indicators on which there is a broad consensus among aid agencies operating in Somalia. The human development indicator tables in the report provide an accessible resource for Somalis, aid agencies and policy makers.

It is debatable, however, whether conventional variables, such as income, education, or life expectancy (even if they can be accurate) are able to capture the complexities of human development in the context of Somalia. Describing the complexities of data collection in Somalia, the 2001 HDR initiates a debate on whether in a country like Somalia, alternative, more culturally appropriate variables that go beyond 'facts and figures' are needed.

Endnotes

1. The Human Development Report was co-authored by Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhaus, and Roland Marchal. A summary of the draft report was presented at the Somali Studies International Association Congress in Hargeisa. July 2001. This paper is extracted from the overview to the report, published in December 2001. The published report is available on request from UNDP Somalia.

2. Throughout this report, Somaliland and Puntland are used to refer to these two northern polities. This does not confer recognition by the United Nations and the report takes no position on the juridical status of these administrations or their borders.

3. The HDI for 2001 uses data collected through a socio-economic household survey managed by UNDP, primary school data from UNICEF, and demographic data from UNFPA. The index for the base and 1995-1997 are computed using UNDP's current methodology and are therefore adjusted from previous values.

4. Non-Somalia data are taken from UNDP (2001) *Human Development Report 2001*. New York/London: OUP, except the primary school GER for Uganda and Kenya taken from UNDP *Human Development Report 1998 and 2000*. New York: OUP.

NOTES

#1. Comments on the Work of Horn of Africa Relief and Development Organization

Fatima Jibrell

Editor's Note: Three short presentations of particular relevance to the themes of the Congress are included as "Notes." While not formal research studies or policy papers, they do contain important information for those wishing to pursue peace, governance, and reconstruction for all Somali peoples.

Mission

Horn of Africa Relief and Development Organization is working towards sustainable peace in Somalia through capacity building of local communities, empowerment of women, and environmental protection. Horn Relief focuses on awareness raising and education of women and youth in areas of human rights, leadership, human and animal health, and skills to manage natural resources. Horn Relief assumes that access to resources, political decision-making, and education should be open to all individuals, regardless of gender.

Horn of Africa's Accomplishments

Education

- A youth and education sports center in the Buran Rural Institute
- Initial capital to build the Dur Duri elementary school

Animal Health

- Training young pastoralists in animal health
- Cooperating with the Resource Management Somalia Network

Capacity Building for Women

- Creating the Women's Training Center in Buran
- Construction of 20 stone and brick houses for homeless women
- Rehabilitation of the Buran Rural Institute
- Women's Peace and Advocacy Initiatives
- Supporter and member of women's networks
- Assisting Somali women to attend international training and workshops

Natural Resource Management

- Natural Resource Management Network
- Solar power project
- Construction of rock dams
- Dur Duri fish project
- Charcoal awareness campaign

Water

- Borehole rehabilitation in Buran and El-buh
- Loans for hand-dug wells
- Water system for Buran, managed by women

Administration

Horn of African maintains offices in Nairobi, Bosaso, and Buran (Puntland).

#2. Comments on the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy (IPA)

John Hirsch

Regional Approach

The end of the Cold War has not led to the end of conflicts in Africa but has entailed reduced external commitment and involvement, as exemplified by the international community's abandonment of Somalia and failure to respond to the genocide in Rwanda. These events have placed a greater responsibility on African leaders to devise new regional approaches to conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

The Program

IPA's three year program has started with a major seminar on "Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects" held in Gaborone in December 2000. The program will continue with seminars in Abuja with ECOWAS this September and in Djibouti with IGAD in late 2002. These seminars are designed to facilitate maximum interaction among African diplomats, military officers, representatives of regional and subregional organizations, and members of civil society in candidly assessing political and economic constraints in their subregions and formulating realistic recommendations for moving forward.

These discussions have already highlighted the need for redefining the traditional understanding of security in Africa, meaning in large part the security of sovereign states and their borders. Security viewed

through the lens of threat perception has often led to high defense expenditures and confrontation rather than negotiations; it has tended to be state-centric rather than people-centric. The primary goal of any new security architecture for African subregions, including IGAD, must be to address the changing security needs of populations facing continued intrastate as well as interstate conflicts. Good governance and sound economic policies are key. In much of Africa, the HIV-AIDS pandemic presents a particularly serious threat as highlighted by the Security Council in January 2000 and the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in June 2002.

Reflections

In closing, an observation drawn from my 17 years of diplomatic service in Somalia, South Africa and Sierra Leona may be helpful. Somalia and Sierra Leone are cases of failed states where prevention strategies were either negligible or non-existent. In contrast, the South African three year period of negotiation that led up to the transition in 1994 from the white-controlled apartheid regime to the non-racial multiparty democracy spared the populace from a major bloodbath. This contrast highlights the key role of personal leadership and the willingness to compromise, as opposed to the "winner-take-all" approach to political conflict practiced elsewhere on the continent. These experiences are relevant to the ongoing efforts to end fighting in various parts of Somalia as well as to the ongoing war in Sudan and the stabilization of the Ethiopian-Eritrean situation following the recent war.

#3. Miracles of Adult Literacy

Hassan Ahmed

In the last World Education Conference held in Dakar in April 2000, there was a declaration that no country should be constrained by lack of financial resources if that country commits a fair share of its domestic resources for educating its people. Somalia/Somaliland were not represented in the conference. Education is a humanitarian social service. It should be free from politics. These days we very often hear the slogan that every person or child has a right to education. In light of such new educational developments, I would appreciate very much if those present in this conference will assure that Somaliland/Somalia are not left behind in the international campaign for Education for All (EFA).

The Somali language script, which came into being in 1972, gave a way to a massive urban and rural illiteracy eradication campaign conducted by the Somali regime of Siad Barre between the years 1973 and 1975. There is no official record as to the number of people who benefitted from those illiteracy reduction initiatives but there is no doubt that many people have taken advantage of those Somali literacy interventions. In the seventies, it became a government policy not to recruit someone who was not a Somali literate. Subsequently it was obvious to see in the Somali government civil service sector many people of this background. I think there are some good lessons learned from that experience.

The Somali-Ethiopian war in the late 1970s and the Somali Civil Wars in 1980s reversed this trend. As we are aware, Somali civil wars disrupted the entire educational system. Literacy and adult education were worst affected.

Thanks to the peace and security prevailing in Somaliland and Puntland, literacy seems to be progressing in those two areas. With close collaboration of the ministries of Education in Somaliland and Puntland and respective local communities, the Africa Educational Trust, an international NGO based in UK, has enabled more than 6,000 girls and young men over the last three years to graduate from eight month Somali functional literacy and numeracy courses. Africa Educational Trust intends to work in the field in the near future. In Puntland a Scandinavian NGO called Diakonia enrolled about five thousand girls and young men in 2000 for basic working Somali literacy.

In addition to AET and Diakonia, a handful of other International INGOs are working in Somali literacy programs. To mention some of them, CARE International is working with Ministry of Education in Somaliland in the Family Life Center where literacy is one of the major subjects taught by such centers. Another INGO, known as SwissGroup, among other things, is currently funding 300 Somali literacy students run by local NGOs in Hargeisa. The USA-based NGO, called International Rescue Committee, is also engaged in a Somali literacy project by enrolling the first 200 literacy students in Hargeisa this month. Save the Children-USA is about to launch women's literacy interventions in Somaliland.

Besides INGO operations in Somali literacy, there are many local groups, particularly women's NGOs, providing afternoon or evening literacy sessions in major towns in Somaliland and Puntland.

There are also numerous private schools ranging from one classroom schools to a large size. They are well managed schools, mushrooming in Somalia/Somaliland, providing Arabic and English literacy but sometimes Somali literacy as well.

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Index

Addis Ababa 145, 184, 533
Ali Mahdi, Mohamed 132, 216, 308
Arta 90, 101-104, 112, 114, 117, 118, 123, 127, 128, 130-132, 136-138, 144, 145, 307, 310, 312, 314, 529, 533
Baidoa 112, 375, 426, 498, 502
Bantu Somalis 326, 397-400, 402
Barre, Mohammed Siyad 28, 101, 107, 117, 128, 130, 131, 135, 146, 170, 173, 184-186, 195, 196, 199, 201, 204, 205, 216, 218, 282, 308, 316, 328, 342, 369, 379, 411, 438, 509, 519
Berbera 94, 119, 123, 124, 173-176, 185, 198, 419, 433, 462
Biodiversity 448, 465-468, 470-472, 532
Borama 2, 104, 112, 119, 122, 130, 145, 176, 185, 413, 433, 475-478, 480, 535
Bosaso 120, 122, 158, 375, 448, 498, 502, 505, 516
Burao.... 119, 124, 125, 174, 176, 185, 190, 195-198, 283, 433, 502
Canada 208, 209, 263, 414, 438, 444, 456, 540, 546
Clans/Clanship 92, 103, 118, 119, 124-127, 129-133, 148, 149, 151-157, 159-161, 165, 168, 176, 214, 217, 219, 221, 230, 267, 274, 304, 306, 307, 309-312, 314, 342, 343, 358, 377, 379, 380, 385, 392-394, 396, 426, 431, 433, 529
Darood 2, 103, 119, 129, 131, 141, 158
Decentralization 341, 363, 364, 371, 498
Democracy.... 90, 94, 99, 105, 111, 113, 114, 121-123, 125, 153-155, 180, 188, 189, 204, 280, 302, 316, 317, 320-324, 431, 432, 499, 518, 538
Diaspora 2, 13, 66, 111, 229-238, 251, 259, 269-273, 276-278, 294, 330, 331, 334, 364, 387, 396, 436, 438, 498, 504, 505, 508, 528-530, 533, 535, 543, 546
Dir 119, 131, 141, 309, 312
Diya 148, 149, 154-156, 160, 168, 170, 171, 227, 309
Djibouti 36, 37, 101, 123, 124, 127, 131, 132, 197, 203-207, 210, 259, 307, 310, 414, 436, 459, 472, 476, 477, 482, 494, 502, 517

Dubai 418, 419, 508
Education 13, 62, 67-69, 225, 232, 244, 248, 253, 267, 278, 279-283, 285-293, 298, 306, 313, 316, 317, 320, 322, 328, 334, 338, 350, 353, 360, 374, 386, 388, 409, 412, 414, 416, 418, 420, 423, 424, 426, 431, 437-440, 442, 449, 474, 493, 504, 505, 512, 515, 516, 519, 520, 531, 540, 543, 544
Egal, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim 123, 125, 176, 181, 188, 282
Egypt 131, 132, 171, 203, 230, 251-256, 258, 259, 261-268, 322, 482, 494, 527, 530, 531, 535, 537, 538, 541, 542
Environment 120, 121, 129, 139, 153, 155, 158, 159, 165, 170, 185, 186, 206, 207, 219, 230, 239, 241-248, 269, 270, 274, 275, 322, 482, 494, 527, 530, 531, 535, 537, 538, 541, 542
Eritrea 184, 186, 203- 210, 235, 252, 259, 472, 482, 502, 537
Ethiopia 36, 37, 118, 131-134, 138, 140, 142, 144, 145, 148, 149, 153, 174, 175, 183, 184, 195, 196, 203-207, 210, 218, 238, 241, 248, 259, 268, 336, 342, 344, 376, 399-401, 414, 418, 419,426, 436, 437, 472, 476, 477, 494, 502, 506, 533, 539, 546
Famine 129, 215-217, 219, 241, 367, 400, 510, 538
Firewood/Fuelwood 230, 242-244, 246, 379, 408, 462-464
France 73, 148, 204, 208, 209
Garowe 112, 119, 122, 150, 498
Gender 37, 154, 155, 159, 263, 274, 287, 292, 304, 345, 350, 352, 375, 391, 392, 396, 404, 406, 408, 410, 414, 420, 421, 425, 430, 515, 528, 536, 537, 539-542, 545
Germany 208, 209, 322, 533
Gulf States 131, 184, 438, 462, 463, 503, 506
Guurti 119, 124, 431
Habar Gidir 100, 131, 132, 141
Hargeisa 7, 28, 104, 112, 122-124, 145, 171, 173, 174, 184, 186, 187, 195-197, 200, 201, 206, 238, 281-283, 288, 290, 294, 295, 323, 341-343, 345, 348, 362, 368, 375, 405, 413, 415, 416, 419-421, 426, 433, 436, 437, 439, 441, 462, 463, 493, 498, 502, 505, 513, 520, 530, 535, 537, 543
Hawiye 307, 310
Health 174, 206, 223, 224, 236, 248, 252-256, 258
Heer 154, 170, 316
HIV/AIDS 474-480, 492, 518, 532, 534, 535, 538, 542-544, 546
Human Rights/Minority Rights 107, 112, 153-155, 159, 168, 174, 175, 177, 195, 200, 201, 206, 312, 320, 322, 395, 423-425, 430, 431, 482, 499, 500, 509-512, 515, 532, 535,
International Committee of the Red Cross/ICRC 215-218, 220, 224, 227
IGAD 101, 109, 128, 203, 517, 518
Informal Sector 404-410, 413-416, 420, 421, 542
Isaaq 2, 119, 123, 129-131, 133, 158, 183, 195-200, 342
Islam 2, 26, 102, 158, 168, 170, 230, 252, 257, 269, 270, 273, 274, 276-278, 279, 280, 301-305, 313, 314, 316-319, 321-324, 425, 426, 509, 511, 531, 536, 537, 546
Juba 100, 103, 106, 158, 168, 309, 326, 375, 376, 379, 381, 397-401

Kenya 36, 131, 132, 178, 183, 197, 203-207, 210, 230, 239, 241, 242, 244-250, 261, 263, 267, 268, 376, 399-401, 414, 436, 437, 462, 474, 482, 502, 506, 508, 513, 529, 533, 534, 536
Kinship 213, 234, 262, 376, 392, 509, 540
Kismayo 106, 107, 127, 168, 221, 375, 400, 401
Kuwait 322, 459, 460
Landmines 194, 203-210
Language 1, 2, 35, 36, 38, 41, 48, 54, 59, 66, 69, 75, 79, 85, 87,183, 213, 270, 280, 291, 329, 332, 398, 400, 402, 415, 519
Livestock 9, 100, 125, 154-157, 165-167, 243, 252, 304, 350, 368-370, 375-379, 381, 382, 384, 386, 387, 389, 412, 419, 446, 447, 461-464, 468, 503, 506
Mass Graves 107, 187, 191, 194, 198, 200, 201
Merca 312, 398, 401
Mogadishu 90, 100, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 118, 126-129, 131-136, 139-142, 144, 151, 184, 188, 199, 219, 220, 222, 223, 226, 264, 281, 295, 303, 305-309, 311-313, 368, 375, 386, 401, 498, 502, 505
NGOs 291, 336, 338, 345, 366, 370, 442, 443, 450, 465, 470, 474, 520
National Restoration Council/NRC 140, 141
Ogaden 183, 199, 309, 401
Participation 103, 115, 119, 151, 152, 159, 168, 276, 278, 320, 322, 323, 326, 366, 378, 420, 421, 425, 430, 431, 446, 448, 450, 542
Proverbs 2, 36, 59-70, 83, 277
Puntland 36, 37, 95, 100, 101, 108-112, 114, 118-122, 125, 127-130, 133, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 149-152, 154, 160, 161, 165, 167, 168, 204, 206, 218, 310, 368, 370-372, 448, 504, 506, 511, 513, 516, 520
Qat 307, 350, 353, 404, 415, 419, 426, 435-444, 477, 527, 541, 542
Qur'aan/Qur'aanic 274, 275, 278, 281, 287-289, 290, 291, 318, 319, 322, 353, 425-427, 455
Referendum 90-97, 105, 112, 121-125, 150, 172, 177-179, 190, 246, 323, 326, 363, 427, 431
Refugees 174, 196, 197, 199, 207, 229, 230, 232, 239-244, 246-248, 252, 255, 256, 261-268, 270, 272, 327, 328, 330, 331, 335, 337, 413, 426, 438,502, 503, 528, 530, 532, 535-539, 541
Rehabilitation 152, 170, 207, 280, 283, 306, 312, 313, 326, 333, 334, 336, 347, 362, 364, 372, 373, 375, 404, 443, 446, 449, 471, 505-507, 516, 527, 538, 543
Remittances 129, 234, 236, 333, 376, 383, 384, 386, 438, 439, 498, 504-507, 536
Rahanweyne Resistance Army/RRA 100, 110, 126, 127, 130, 133, 140, 141, 143, 145, 368, 498, 503
Saudi Arabia 128, 198, 263, 376, 377, 414, 460, 462, 463, 482, 536,540
Shabelle 309, 326, 372, 375, 379-381, 397-400
Shir-beeleed 120-122, 125, 130, 145
Somali National Alliance/SNA 126, 218

Somali National Front/SNF 140, 143, 145
Somali National Movement/SNM 119, 120, 123, 125, 130, 140, 170, 173-176, 186, 195-200, 206, 317, 343
Somali Salvation Democratic Front/SSDF 119, 120, 129, 149
Somali Patriotic Movement/SPM 140, 143, 145
Tanzania 398, 400, 472, 482, 502, 538
Transitional National Government/ TNG 90, 101-103, 109, 111, 114, 117, 118, 123, 127, 128, 131-146, 187, 188, 303, 368, 498, 511
United Nations/UN 101, 107, 109-114, 128-130, 134, 152, 169, 172, 176, 180, 187-189, 192, 199-201, 204, 206, 208, 211, 216, 217, 219-221, 223, 224, 227, 245, 291, 295, 328, 362, 368-371, 380, 386, 390, 411, 425, 436, 443, 453, 457, 497-499, 508, 513, 518, 531, 540, 541, 545
United Nations High Commission for Refugees/UNHCR 240, 243-246, 248-250, 255, 256, 258, 262, 265, 267, 268, 536
United Nations Children'sFund/ UNICEF 216, 220, 287, 288, 413, 417, 513, 529, 534, 540, 544, 545
United Nations Task Force/ UNITAF 152, 217, 219-221, 309
United Arab Emirates/UAE 132, 414, 418, 419, 460, 463, 482
United Nations Organization Somalia UNOSOM 211, 216, 217, 219-221, 223, 224, 226, 263, 370
United Somali Congress/USC 126, 135, 141, 143, 308
Xeer 109, 147, 148, 150, 152, 154, 158-161, 163-168, 213, 227, 392-394, 511
Yemen 131, 132, 208, 209, 322, 377, 436, 460, 463, 482
Yusuf, Abdullahi 117, 121, 122, 281, 401, 527

POLITICS, CURRENT AFFAIRS/AFRICA

War Destroys, Peace Nurtures presents selected papers form the 8th Somali Studies International Association congress held in Hargeisa in July 2001. This volume focuses on finding tools, solutions, and policies that speak to the need for building peace, establishing equitable and stable governance, and achieving reconciliation. The papers are of value not only to Somalis throughout the Horn of Africa but also to other African states that have suffered horrific disasters over the last few decades including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Zaire/DRC, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and others.

Contributors describe the role of women's groups in reconciliation, peace-building, and economic development; potential linkages between traditional and modern governance models; alternative modes of decentralization; the role of language, poetry, and proverbs in cultural reconciliation; techniques of community participation for building peace at the community level; overcoming health concerns, especially HIV/AIDS and FGM; the role of local institutions in sustaining environmental resources; and ways in which Islam is compatible with democracy and can be an effective tool for building peace. The book opens with a section on the poetry of peace and reconciliation, written in Somali.

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ISBN 1-56902-187-2 $34.95

9 781569 021873 53495

The Red Sea Press, Inc.
Publishers & Distributors of Third World Books

P.O. Box 1892
Trenton, NJ 08607

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Asmara, ERITREA