



Woodrow Wilson
International
Center
for Scholars

*Project on Leadership and
Building State Capacity*





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LEADERSHIP *and* Building State Capacity

COMBINING THE SKILLS
OF DIPLOMATS AND TRAINERS





A large, stylized, light-colored leaf graphic is positioned in the background, extending from the top left towards the bottom right. The leaf has a central vein and several smaller veins branching off it. The overall background is a solid, muted olive-green color.

LEADERSHIP AND BUILDING STATE CAPACITY

Combining the Skills of Diplomats and Trainers

This workshop was conducted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in partnership with the American University Peacebuilding and Development Institute, Conflict Management Partners (CMPartners) and ESSEC's Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe (IRENE).

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Washington, DC
July 8–10, 2005

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The Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe (IRENE) is affiliated with ESSEC Business School in Paris, France. IRENE's network is composed of more than thirty experts from public and private sectors, who conduct research through case study analyses and interviews in order to develop a practical approach to negotiation and conflict management.

IRENE was established to meet the need for negotiation learning in Europe. The Institute therefore focuses on the art of negotiation, as a combination of knowledge (*savoir*), know-how (*savoir-faire*) and knowing how to be (*savoir-être*). It is simultaneously a field of interdisciplinary concepts, a set of skills and a way of being with others. These three dimensions are at the core of its mission. The first aspect focuses on academic goals and, in particular, on theoretical and applied research at the Institute. The second translates operational concepts into training for practitioners through cases and simulations. The third casts light on IRENE's final objective, which consists of extending to the greatest number of people the best conflict resolution practices and a renewed approach to negotiation.

The Peacebuilding and Development Institute

The Peacebuilding and Development Institute (PDI) is part of the School of International Service and the International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program at American University. PDI aims to provide cutting-edge training, research and capacity-building opportunities for practitioners and scholars in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, diplomacy and conflict resolution. In addition, the Institute provides practical opportunities for students to complement their academic work by connecting peace-building and development actors via research, symposia and forums.

PDI has several components: trainings and symposia; the Summer Institute; the Children and Youth Division; peace-building forums; and international programs. These components integrate policy, practice and theory to create new approaches to conflict-sensitive and transformative peace practices.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) is organized within USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). CMM envisions an agency that effectively prevents, mitigates and manages the causes and consequences of violent conflict and state fragility. CMM leads USAID's efforts to identify and analyze sources of conflict and fragility; supports early responses to address the causes and consequences of instability and violent conflict; and seeks to integrate conflict mitigation and management into USAID's analysis, strategies and programs.

CMM provides analytical and operational tools to USAID Overseas Missions, development officers and program partners to enable the Agency to better address the causes and consequences of conflict through its development assistance programming. Its mission is to "mainstream" conflict programming within USAID's traditional assistance portfolios, and allow it to utilize its resources in a more strategic, cost-effective manner. Among its many activities, CMM conducts conflict assessments, develops cutting-edge "Toolkits," supports conflict-management programs, contributes to the development of an "Early Warning" system and provides extensive outreach and training.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAI	African-American Institute
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AU	African Union
BLTP	Burundi Leadership Training Program
CBLP	Community-Based Leadership Program
CBPRI	Community-Based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative
CIMIC	Civil and Military Cooperation
CMM	Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID
CMPartners	Conflict Management Partners
CPA (Liberia)	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Liberia
CPA (Sudan)	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ELN	National Liberation Army, Colombia
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GAO	Government Accounting Office, United States
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICR	Interactive Conflict Resolution
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMTD	Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
IRENE	Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISC	Institute for Sustainable Community
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	National Democracy Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPI-Africa	Nairobi Peace Initiative—Africa
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID
PCP	Public Conversations Project
PDI	Peace and Development Institute, American University
PMF	Presidential Management Fellow
SARC	South Asian Regional Cooperation
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SIMSOC	Simulated Society
SIS	School of International Service, American University
SPLM/A	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army
SWAN	Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi
U.S.	United States
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOB	United Nations Operations in Burundi
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WHO	World Health Organization

I. Introduction

Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity

The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity (Leadership Project) of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Wilson Center) was launched in June 2005 in response to the growing demand for leadership training directed at both the prevention of violent conflict and the reconstruction of war-torn societies.

Among diplomats and policymakers alike, there is an increasing international awareness of the importance of leadership training in achieving sustainable peace. On a technical level, the art of building democratic state capacity is well understood. But the harder political tasks of helping the leaders of warring factions to achieve their objectives, to work collaboratively in avoiding war or supporting post-war reconstruction and to build democratically accountable links between the governors and the governed, are generally neglected. The challenge is to make that which is required for durable peace and sustainable democracy politically achievable. This requires a careful examination of the underappreciated “leadership factor” in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

Under the direction of Ambassador Howard Wolpe, Director of the Wilson Center’s Africa Program, the Leadership Project aims to address the missing process and leadership dimensions of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; to expand the cadre of professional trainers capable of working in regions in conflict or emerging from conflict; and to deepen the international community’s capacity to conceptualize, implement and manage these complex interventions.

ORIGINS OF THE LEADERSHIP PROJECT

The Leadership Project has its origins in a significant capacity-building initiative launched in the central African nation of Burundi in 2002. With the support of the World Bank Group’s Post Conflict Fund and the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI), and in partnership with ESSEC’s Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe (IRENE) and Conflict Management Partners (CMPartners), the Wilson Center’s Africa Program launched the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP). The BLTP is designed to build social cohesion and collaborative capacity within Burundi both nationally and in local communities.

While Burundian leaders had negotiated a formal peace agreement, nothing had been done to address their deep fears, insecurities and mutual suspicions that were the product of four decades of intense civil conflict and inter-communal massacres. The BLTP process recognized that unless Burundian leaders’ ability to work effectively across lines of ethnic and political division was strengthened, it was extremely unlikely that Burundians would be able to find their way to a durable peace and sustainable economic recovery.

The BLTP process identified four key political and social-psychological imperatives that needed to be addressed within Burundian society: **shifting the dominant political paradigm of key leaders** from the zero-sum mind-set induced by war, in which survival or “success” inevitably depends upon the defeat of the other, to a new recognition of the interdependence of former belligerents, and of the value of collaboration even with competitors; **building trust** and restoring shattered relationships among key leaders; **developing a new consensus on “the rules of the game,”** including how power should be organized and shared, and how decisions should be made; and **moving from confrontational to cooperative modes of discourse.**

Leadership Training Initiative, Democratic Republic of Congo

Building on the success of the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP), the Wilson Center was invited by the British Department for International Development (DFID) to explore with diplomats and a cross-section of Congolese leaders the applicability of a training initiative in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All stakeholders proved enthusiastic, and, in conjunction with ESSEC IRENE, the initiative was launched in January 2006. The initiative seeks to build collaborative capacity among Congolese leaders and to strengthen the cohesion and capacity of the fragile Congolese state.

The two-year strategy envisions the constitution of six “training groups” of thirty-five to forty strategically selected participants drawn from different social and institutional sectors, across the lines of ethnic, regional and political division. Each training group participates in an inaugural five to six day training retreat, and reconvenes periodically in follow-on workshops designed to reinforce the skills learned and to strengthen the personal relationships among participants.

The project began with an inaugural training retreat in Kinshasa in January 2006, which brought together thirty-six key national leaders for the Nganda I Core Workshop. In February, a second group of political leaders began their training with a six-day Nganda II Core Workshop. At the request of participants and diplomats, the third group of trainings targeted two of the country’s most volatile regions: North and South Kivu. In March, the first regional workshop was conducted in Goma with a diverse group of forty-nine North Kivuan leaders. A virtually identical South Kivuan process was launched in May at a workshop in Bukavu. Plans are underway to conduct the first workshop in Ituri and to continue working with political leaders, including presidential candidates, the newly elected government officials and the military in Kinshasa. Funding for these activities was provided by DFID, the European Community and both the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation and the Office of Transition Initiatives of USAID.

The leadership training that is central to the BLTP process focuses on the development of skills in interest-based negotiations, communication, conflict analysis, conflict transformation and the management of organizational change. Experiential simulations and interactive exercises are employed to build a climate of trust, to establish effective communication and to provide key leaders drawn from all social sectors the skills required to collaborate productively across lines of ethnic or political division, to prevent violent conflict, to reconstruct their societies and to build cohesive, effective state institutions.

The success of the BLTP training strategy exceeded all expectations. It dramatically altered the mind-sets and relationships of training participants; helped to generate important momentum in the integration and reform of the key security sector; enabled political party leaders to collaborate in the management of orderly national elections; and equipped local communities to more effectively reintegrate refugees, displaced persons and ex-combatants.

The role of the BLTP process in advancing the country's peace process and democratic transition has led to the introduction of Burundi-style leadership training programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Liberia, and to broad international interest in the extension of this work to divided societies in other regions as well. A long-term program in the DRC and a program in Liberia were both launched by the Wilson Center in 2006.

LEADERSHIP PROJECT ACTIVITIES

The Leadership Project expands upon the BLTP process to more carefully examine the role of leadership training in facilitating conflict transformation. International diplomacy generally tends to ignore the elements of personal transformation necessary for the achievement of sustainable peace. This is due in large measure to the fact that diplomats and policymakers are seldom trained in conflict mitigation and management, and are consequently unaware of the powerful tools and techniques that have been developed to transform institutional cultures and build cohesive, effective organizations. These skills are well known both to corporate managers and military leaders who understand that trust, cohesion and managerial capacity are of critical importance for organizational effectiveness.

Conversely, the trainers who are specialized in techniques of conflict mitigation and management, and of institutional transformation, generally have little access to national elites and little understanding of the political and diplomatic context of states in crisis. The central challenge, therefore, is to construct a new intervention paradigm that will link the skills and expertise of diplomatic practitioners with those of trainers.

To address this challenge, the applied dimension of the Leadership Project features an ongoing series of workshops that seek to build a new synergy between trainers and diplomatic practitioners. The workshops are designed to encourage effective collaboration in building state capacity and in post-conflict

reconstruction, to create the conditions for more holistic peace-building interventions and to expand the cadre of trainers available for deployment to states in crisis or societies engaged in post-conflict reconstruction.

Additionally, a standing Working Group on Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States meets periodically to distill leading lessons from case studies in internationally facilitated peace processes and high-level post-conflict interventions. Comprised of distinguished diplomats, policymakers, trainers and academic specialists—each with expertise in the political environment of states in crisis—the objective of the Working Group is to combine the skill-sets of diplomats and organizational specialists to yield a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the most effective ways to build cohesive states within divided societies. The Leadership Project’s public events also serve to bring the issues of leadership and the social-psychological dimensions of peace-building and conflict resolution into the United States (U.S.) policy arena.

Workshop on National Reconciliation and Collaboration Monrovia, Liberia

The United Nations and the Ambassador of the United States to Liberia invited the Wilson Center to launch a training program designed to enable an ethnically diverse network of influential Liberians to transcend the country’s ethnic and political divisions and to work collaboratively in forging a new sense of national unity and common purpose.

The Workshop on National Reconciliation and Collaboration was held from April 23–28, 2006, at St. Theresa’s Convent in downtown Monrovia. Funded by the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/CMM) and Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI), the workshop brought together thirty-five Liberian participants for training.

Participants represented a broad range of Liberia’s social and institutional diversity and included government ministers, members of the Senate and House of Representatives, youth leaders, former armed faction leaders, church leaders, women leaders and several activists from human rights, peace-building and other civil society organizations.

II. Combining the Skills of Diplomats and Trainers Workshop July 8–10, 2005

From July 8–10, 2005, the Wilson Center's Leadership Project, in partnership with the Peacebuilding and Development Institute (PDI) of American University, Conflict Management Partners (CMPartners) and ESSEC's Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe (IRENE), held its first domestic training workshop, "**Leadership and Building State Capacity: Combining the Skills of Diplomats and Trainers.**" This three-day workshop was held at American University in Washington, DC, and was funded by the United States Agency for International Development's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/CMM).

Coordinators included:

Howard Wolpe, Director, Africa Program and the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;

Steven McDonald, Consulting Program Manager, Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;

Elizabeth McClintock, Partner, Conflict Management Partners; Lead Facilitator and Program Designer, Burundi Leadership Training Program and Community-Based Leadership Project in Burundi; Lead Facilitator, Liberia Training Program;

Alain Lempereur, Director, ESSEC's Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe; Co-Facilitator, Burundi Leadership Training Program; Lead Facilitator, DRC Training Initiative;

Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Director, Peacebuilding and Development Institute; Associate Professor, Division of International Peace and Conflict Resolution, School of International Service, American University;

Ronald Fisher, Professor of International Relations, Division of International Peace and Conflict Resolution, School of International Service, American University.

(Please see page 45–55 for a complete list of coordinator and participant biographies.)

The workshop introduced professional trainers and diplomatic practitioners to the leadership training strategy that is being pursued by the Wilson Center's Leadership Project in Burundi, the DRC and Liberia. Specifically, the workshop provided a

forum to discuss the challenges involved in undertaking post-conflict interventions, as well as an opportunity for trainers and diplomatic practitioners to consider how collaboration between these two professional communities might be most effectively established. A total of thirty-eight diplomats, academics, trainers and field practitioners took part in the workshop.


The workshop was organized with three purposes in mind: 1) to provide an opportunity for trainers, who are skilled in the management of institutional change and conflict and in the building of cohesive organizations, to interact with diplomatic practitioners, who have knowledge of and experience with the structure and modalities of internationally facilitated peace processes but often have little exposure to the strategies and techniques of institutional and conflict transformation; 2) to orient already highly skilled professional trainers to a particular post-conflict reconstruction strategy that is being pursued in war-torn Central Africa; and 3) to identify trainers who would be available to participate in post-conflict reconstruction and state transformation initiatives in the future.

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

The workshop was divided into four sessions. The first session constituted a review of current approaches to conflict resolution; the second session consisted of country case study assessment and conceptualization of intervention strategies; the third session was devoted to a full-day simulation; and the fourth session centered on lessons learned and reflections on the training.

Howard Wolpe introduced participants to the leadership training approach developed through the BLTP. He laid out the conceptual foundations of what, in Burundi, has become known as “the Ngozi process,” and described the organizing principles that guided the program’s development: the strategic identification of the participating leaders; securing Burundian ownership of the process; the framing of the program as a technical capacity-building initiative that would involve the participants in their individual capacities, rather than as representatives of their respective organizations and institutions; securing regional and international diplomatic support of the venture; structuring the initiative as a long-term program, rather than as a series of independent workshops; and stressing that the training was designed to achieve concrete end-results. He then described the evolution of the BLTP process, as Burundians have sought to extend the Ngozi process training as widely and quickly as possible.

The discussion that followed Wolpe’s debriefing identified several factors that can impact the viability of Burundi-type peace-building interventions: the size of the country; the nature of the conflict; the extent of war fatigue and the receptivity of leaders to such a process; the effectiveness of donor coordination; and the availability of long-term funding.



SESSION ONE

A Framework: Issues and Challenges to Consider in Peace-building Interventions

PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES OF PEACE-BUILDING TRAINING MOHAMMED ABU-NIMER

Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Director of the Peacebuilding and Development Institute, and Associate Professor within the Division of International Peace and Conflict Resolution in the School of International Service (SIS) at American University, provided a review of the current issues and challenges to consider in peace-building interventions.



Peace-building Terminology

Standardization of peace-building terminology and usage was identified as a major challenge in the field. In an attempt to minimize the confusion that often results from using these terms interchangeably, Abu-Nimer outlined the common and divergent expectations of conflict-related terminology as demonstrated in the inset text box.

Peace-building: an umbrella term that relates to actions attempting to bring closure to a conflict. It includes both peace and conflict resolution activities regardless of whether they take place before or after the signing of a peace agreement. However, the term is also used to describe peace activities (social, economic or political) carried out in a post political agreement

Peace-making: a broad term referring to all efforts (often by a third party) that bring parties together to establish peace through integrated activities performed by both professional diplomats and non-diplomats alike

Conflict Management: a term developed in the 1960s and 1970s, to refer to activities often involving a third party, which are intended to provide a temporary resolution to a conflict so as to reduce tensions in the short-term

Conflict Resolution: a term coined in the mid-1980s to define long-term solutions that address the root causes of conflict

Conflict Transformation: a term intended to capture the deep levels of change in the structural aspects of conflict; it incorporates a preventative element and focuses on relationship building

Training as a Tool of Social Healing

Abu-Nimer identified training as one of the available and effective tools by which to achieve the individual, social and relational changes necessary for peace. While significant literature exists on training in para-professional areas such as nursing, business-management and cross-cultural training, Abu-Nimer noted that dispute-resolution training or training in peace-building is a relatively new field. Having originated as a forum in which to introduce conflict resolution concepts and skills to participants for use in their day-to-day lives, training workshops have been further developed as a form of intervention to not only provide skills, but to provide a space in which individuals affected by conflict can begin to engage in negotiation and social healing. Abu-Nimer explained that training seeks to provide participants with 1) new peace-promoting attitudes, knowledge or skills; 2) reinforcement of culturally relevant peace-promoting attitudes, knowledge and skills; and 3) the opportunity to redirect or erase negative or divisive attitudes, knowledge and skills that are deemed to inhibit growth.

While conflict resolution or peace-building training workshops, in general, constitute positive interventions that benefit a variety of individuals affected by conflict, Abu-Nimer noted that both international and local trainers are faced with several challenges when implementing training interventions. Specifically, there are a relatively large number of international trainers who lack the space or opportunity to coordinate in terms of their methodology and training content. Without specific cultural scripts, skills or experience, trainers must overcome the difficulties of working within mixed ethnocultural settings and adapt to a variety of cultural contexts. Additionally, lack of consistent funding makes it more difficult to ensure the sustainability of the intervention and to demonstrate measurable impact on both individual participants and the society at large.

Furthermore, competition and tension exists between the various practitioners engaged in peace-building activities. Specifically, Abu-Nimer noted that tension exists between human rights activists, mediators and conflict resolution practitioners. Human rights activists generally undertake non-violent resistance, advocacy and confrontation on issues of justice, whereas mediators and conflict resolution practitioners, who work at the diplomatic level, attempt to avoid the imposition of their own values in the interest of remaining impartial and neutral. Consequently, human rights activists often believe that mediators are passive participants in conflict. However, mediators are trained to interact in quite different environments than activists, and rather than focus on their different approaches, Abu-Nimer indicated that it is important to reinforce the similarity of the root values that these different actors share. Through their varied interventions, their efforts can and should be linked to avoid unproductive fragmentation of the peace-building field.

Principles and Strategies of Peace-building Training

Abu-Nimer suggested that jointly training activists, mediators and practitioners in a variety of conflict resolution and peace techniques would not only serve to enhance their understanding of training as a catalyst for conflict transformation, but would also serve to bring together disparate actors; thus bolstering the collective value-added to the peace-building process.

Specifically, Abu-Nimer emphasized the relational aspect of conflict transformation as an element of training that should be better understood by all practitioners. He explained that conflict transformation methodology recognizes the need for a deep change in the minds, concepts and structures of the parties in conflict in order to achieve peace. Consequently, the transformative process focuses on replacing old perspectives and values that fueled the conflict with concepts of equality, dignity and human rights, thereby countering the de-humanization that often accompanies violent conflict.


To further clarify the role of training as a conflict transformation methodology, Abu-Nimer referenced the “Twelve Elements of Social Peace-building” developed by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD). The IMTD was co-founded by Ambassador John McDonald and Dr. Eileen Borris in 1992 with a mission to promote a systems approach to peace-building and to facilitate the transformation of deep-rooted social conflict. Recognizing that in order for a conflict-habituated system to move to a peace-system, the IMTD believes it is necessary to remove from those systems the elements which cause and maintain the conflict, and stimulate or introduce into the system elements which transcend and transform habitual patterns. These “transcenders” address the four basic needs of identity, security, community and vitality and compose the twelve elements of social peace-building. These transcending elements include: hope, trust, nourishment, power, community, learning, healing, creativity, will, diversity, complexity and myth deconstruction.

Peace-building training interventions, Abu-Nimer explained, provide an environment in which the twelve elements of social peace-building can be introduced and integrated into situations of conflict in different forms and designs. Such training interventions promote social interactions that infuse hope and build trust between previously divided communities. Training in peace-building and negotiation presents a larger picture of the conflict that reveals the complexity of the situation; emphasizes the possibility for change by replacing old myths; and deconstructs old ways of perceiving the other community groups.

In addition, peace-building training curriculum can provide practitioners or peace workers and people in conflict zone areas with psychological sustenance through the presentation of new approaches to and mechanisms for the peaceful management of conflict. Specifically, Abu-Nimer emphasized the role of the training approach in educating participants in methods of active listening and dispute

Twelve Elements for Social Peace-building
The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1993

- | | |
|----------------|---|
| 1. Hope | <p><i>Possibility, opportunity, dreams, vision</i>
Training gives hope to a situation that seems hopeless</p> |
| 2. Trust | <p><i>Safe space, fairness, reliability, representation</i>
Training builds trust among people from different sides</p> |
| 3. Nourishment | <p><i>Caring, encouragement, appreciation, inclusion, love, respect, acceptance, recognition, gratitude</i>
Training provides psychological sustenance</p> |
| 4. Power | <p><i>Empowerment, responsibility, balance, control and creation of resources, realities and behavioral options</i>
The power of people has often been seized by corrupt leaders during a conflict; training restores power to individuals and civil society groups</p> |
| 5. Community | <p><i>Connection, communication, coalitions, networks, alliances, teams, cooperation, consensus, dialogue, interdependence, systems thinking</i>
Regimes control people by disconnecting them during conflict; training connects people with each other</p> |
| 6. Learning | <p><i>Feedback, ongoing discovery, curiosity</i>
Training provides space to humanize and learn from the other</p> |

- 
7. Healing *Forgiveness, reconciliation, trauma recovery, addiction release*
Everyone is injured during conflict; training acknowledges the need for repair, rehabilitation and facilitated healing
 8. Creativity *Creative problem solving, archetypes, myths, art, music*
Training is a catalyst for the creative management of conflicts in a situation of deadlock
 9. Will *Intention, commitment, single-pointed focus, clear purpose*
People have often given up during conflict and lost their will to continue striving; training provides techniques that increase their ability to seek possibilities for change
 10. Diversity *Acceptance, respect and appreciation of differences*
Training exposes participants to diversity of opinions
 11. Complexity *Holding various realities simultaneously*
Training removes the blinders of tunnel vision and shows a bigger picture instead of a polarized view of reality
 12. Demythologizing *Clarify distortions of perception, stereotypes, legends, roles*
In conflict, demonizing is an activity engrained in individuals so that they are not aware of their accepted myths; training challenges and replaces myth and deconstructs familiar ways of perceiving the other

resolution which humanize all individuals and enable them to learn from each other. At the community level, peace-building training empowers members of civil society who previously felt victimized by political entities and corrupt leaders. Additionally, at the elite level, peace-building training encourages leaders to be accountable to and responsible for the society as a whole. Applicable at all levels of society and for a wide-range of actors, Abu-Nimer concluded that peace-building training is able to promote the re-establishment of community by re-connecting people.



INTERACTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION (ICR) RONALD FISHER

Ronald Fisher, Professor of International Relations within the Division of International Peace and Conflict Resolution in the School of International Service (SIS) at American University, addressed the role of training within the emerging field of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR). Fisher noted that as international conflict has become increasingly characterized by internal conflicts between or among contending communal groups within divided societies, new conceptual tools and expanded methods of conflict resolution have developed. Innovative methodologies including dialogue, reconciliation and conflict resolution training have built upon the concept of problem-solving workshops to form an unofficial, informal, grassroots approach to conflict resolution.

Noting that terminology differences were arising in the field, the Harvard Center for Psychology and Social Change brought together scholar practitioners, experts in dialogue and workshop methods, who were tasked with establishing a framework of terminology and a definition of this emerging field. As one of those scholar practitioners, Fisher volunteered to define the field, choosing the term “Interactive Conflict Resolution” and producing a concept paper in 1991. Recognizing that conflict resolution is both developmental and interactive, Fisher built a typology of the different forms of possible ICR interventions.

ICR is broadly defined as facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, training, education or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis, problem-solving and reconciliation among parties engaged in protracted conflict—in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality. Fisher explained that ICR is more specifically defined as small group problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are facilitated by an impartial third party panel of social scientist practitioners. Training is one such approach to ICR.

Forms of Interactive Conflict Resolution

The problem-solving workshop was identified by Fisher as the oldest and most notable unofficial approach to conflict analysis and resolution. Problem-solving workshops, conducted with mid-level or high-level participants, are intended to facilitate informal, small-group discussions. The workshop format brings together representatives of conflicting groups to jointly analyze their conflict and develop creative options for de-escalation and resolution. These discussion outcomes can then be fed back into official channels for implementation.

Dialogue, reconciliation and conflict resolution training are among the newer approaches to conflict resolution that have developed within the ICR field. Fisher defined dialogue as a facilitated interchange and discussion between individuals of opposing ideas designed to increase mutual understanding, but not to resolve basic issues. Fisher explained that dialogue is an overused term that often serves as a proxy for politics in a different form.

However, when implemented as a method of ICR, it is intended to encourage collaborative analysis that leads to resolution and groundwork for reconciliation by addressing the perceptions, biases and prejudices of the participants.

Reconciliation is another form of facilitated interaction between members of conflicting groups; however, reconciliation seeks to encourage empathy between groups in order to re-establish harmony and cooperation. Empathy is achieved by encouraging some combination of acknowledgments of transgressions, apologies, forgiveness and assurances regarding future behavior. In essence, Fisher noted, reconciliation promotes interaction to re-knit the fabric of a society that has pulled itself apart.

Fisher noted that conflict resolution training facilitates the acquisition of skills and methods for addressing conflict more effectively than dialogue or reconciliation by introducing participants to new methods of communication, negotiation, mediation and problem-solving. When used as an ICR tool, training provides a shared learning experience for members of conflicting groups through which concepts and models for understanding their conflict can be explored.



Issues in Training as Interactive Conflict Resolution

Training in ICR improves relationships between conflicting parties through the changed actions of individuals. However, Fisher identified various issues that must be addressed if training is to be implemented effectively. First, **cultural appropriateness** in implementing ICR training activities is imperative. Fisher noted that trainers, often from dominant cultures, may transport their values, beliefs, norms and practices across cultural boundaries and impose or propose their standards for use in the host culture. However, training can only operate effectively in cross-cultural environments if sufficient cultural analysis has been conducted. Fisher added that it is critical that the trainer have sufficient self-knowledge to understand the culture that he or she introduces into the training context.

Fisher identified the **educational approach** to training as a second dimension of effective ICR practice. Trainers often *prescribe* their models for conflict analysis and their strategies and methods for conflict resolution, rather than *eliciting* local cultural knowledge and practices and *collaborating* to find the most appropriate and effective approaches. Instead, trainers should recognize that every society has its own way of defining, experiencing and managing conflict and thereby trainers should encourage and enable participants to integrate new skills into their cultural realities in the process of conflict resolution.

Third, it is important to maintain the **training focus** on process rather than content. Participants are often motivated to use the training forum to discuss and debate the conflict between them, thus focusing on content rather than process and reducing the attainment of knowledge. Fisher noted that often, too much debate is directed to the conflict itself rather than the process used to approach the issues.

Fourth, trainers must effectively manage **political intrusions**. It was noted that external events, actions or demands from the political arena of the conflict can intrude upon the training environment and create a mini-crisis that derails or detracts from the learning process. Even when the original conflict has ended, any reintroduction of crisis can derail the learning process.

Fifth, international trainers should develop a plan outlining the **succession of training interventions** by which knowledge and skills will be passed on to indigenous players. Training within the inter-group environment allows for further adaptation of concepts and methods to local cultures and conditions. The group should map out the evolution of training and discuss how to create institutions that will carry on the process.

In this vein, **transferring knowledge** of the positive effects of the training from participants to other actors in the conflict is a sixth dimension to be addressed. Changes in understanding, attitudes, behaviors and relationships that are achieved during the trainings should be communicated to decision makers, opinion leaders and the public, Fisher stated.

Finally, **evaluation** is an important component of every training program. Fisher emphasized the need to assess the effectiveness of the design, the process, the outcomes and the transfer effects of the training intervention.

PARTICIPANT DISCUSSION

In discussing the role of training as an effective conflict resolution tool, participants noted that too many expectations are often placed on what training can actually accomplish. It was acknowledged that training opens doors for multiple possibilities within different sectors of society, and as a conflict resolution tool, training can be instrumental when combined with other resources. However, participants emphasized the need for trainers to **acknowledge the limitations of training workshops**, stating that it is unrealistic to assume that the weight of history can be conquered by a few people who engage in dialogue.

Participants recognized the lack of integration that exists between conflict resolution techniques and strategies that target different groups. For instance, it was noted that track-two diplomacy often lacks real connection with track-one diplomacy, and that success at the community level is not easily transferable to the political arena. In order to realistically achieve resolution, participants emphasized the need to **implement a combination of conflict resolution approaches** among grassroots movements, political leadership and facilitators, and furthermore, to integrate the work of diplomats and trainers in both conflict and post-conflict situations.

Trainers challenged by multi-faceted situations often have difficulty deciding on which facet to focus. Consequently, participants agreed that trainers need to **contextualize each training in its relevant country history and conduct detailed conflict analysis**—not just theoretical research, but research about every facet of the history of the conflict—so as to tailor the training to the most relevant aspects of the conflict. Equally, while some trainers use a mechanical approach through which they offer a manual and teach skills, participants suggested that trainers should devote more time to working with local people to identify key challenges and approaches relevant for particular communities. Additionally, to be effective, trainers must “walk their talk” both in conflict-



settings abroad and in their own personal lives. Teaching conflict resolution skills does not necessarily mean that the trainer has integrated those skills into their own values.

Concerning the timing of a training intervention, participants noted that institutionally, it is easier to intervene in post-conflict situations. Many leaders in unstable situations are wary of international interventions before an outbreak of violence. However, **the involvement of the international community can be critical in helping to prevent an outbreak of violence, if leaders are able to recognize the benefits of training** in 1) transforming the zero sum paradigm, 2) building trust and restoring relationships, 3) developing a consensus on “rules of the game” and 4) strengthening communications capacities. efits of training in 1) transforming the zero sum paradigm, 2) building trust and restoring relationships, 3) developing a consensus on “rules of the game” and 4) strengthening communications capacities.

SESSION TWO Country Case Studies: Conceptualizing Intervention Strategies

During the second session of the workshop, participants were presented with six brief country case studies for examination. The content of these case studies was created and provided by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for the Woodrow Wilson Center. It is important to note that these case studies were produced in July 2005 and therefore reflect the status of world events at that point in time. The cases are available on pages 56–61 of this publication. The six cases were selected on the basis that they are countries affected by conflict to which some form of process intervention could be introduced with anticipated positive results. The cases included Colombia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal and Sudan. Participants were asked to select a country of interest, divide into small groups and respond to three questions:



- What is unique about this particular conflict?
- What are possible points of entry for a successful process-type intervention? How might we approach entry process design?
- What particularly outstanding challenges need to be addressed before intervention?

COLOMBIA

Unique elements of the conflict

The Colombian case was identified as unique on several fronts. Most prominently, participants noted the country's geographic proximity to the U.S. as an influential factor affecting Colombia's approach to its civil war. Plan Colombia, initiated under the Clinton Administration, provided development aid and security assistance limited to counter-narcotic training and equipment. However, participants noted that as a result of U.S. support for counter-terrorism activities, re-initiated under the Bush Administration, the Colombian guerilla groups including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have been further alienated from the peace process.

President Alvaro Uribe, who took office in 2002, adopted a hard-line stance against armed groups and narco-traffickers. This stance has had mixed results in combating terrorist activity. Participants noted that the central state bureaucracy, run by a wealthy political oligarchy, does not control a large percentage of the country. This resulted in the alienation of the majority of the population from the state. Additionally, Colombia's extensive narcotic trade and insufficient state security forces were identified as major contributing factors to the increased influence and power of paramilitary groups that have emerged to fill the security vacuum. The existence of such groups has served to further decentralize the power base and effectively erode any sense of national unity.

Possible points of entry

Recognizing the unique challenges facing Colombia, participants suggested two possible points of entry for a leadership training intervention. The first design outlined a process that would bring FARC to the negotiation table by encouraging the group to develop its originally stated ideology of helping the poor and promoting improvements in standards of living. The second design focused on the education and mobilization of popular music or sports stars, specifically soccer personalities, in peace promotion activities as a means of encouraging popular participation in the peace process.

Outstanding challenges

Participants identified several outstanding challenges that need to be addressed before a successful intervention could be implemented. These challenges include engaging the elites and the middle class in the conflict resolution process; allocating adequate resources and human capacity to solving the crisis; increasing the capacity of the rural class to articulate its interests; and facilitating official government interaction and negotiation with the rebels and paramilitaries.

HAITI

Unique elements of the conflict

Participants familiar with Haiti discussed three unique elements of the conflict. The first characteristic is the population's apathy toward international interventions. Claims of a U.S.-led *coup d'état*, which resulted in President Jean Bertrand Aristide's departure from Haiti in 2004, contributed significantly to Haitians' existing distrust of international interventions. The accusation against the U.S. furthered the fragmentation of good will between those who supported the Aristide government, and the rebels who expressed forceful opposition. Additionally, the international community's long-term yet inconsistent involvement in Haiti has undermined the population's historical pride and has contributed to a pervasive apathy and feeling of dispossession.

The second unique element of the conflict was identified as Haiti's political environment. Participants explained that Haitian electoral history has been plagued

by vigorous and violent contestation, and that politics have been dominated by the involvement of multiple parties, private armed forces and warlords who lack both the political will and the collaborative capacity to work toward reconciliation.

Third, participants highlighted the challenges posed by poverty, HIV/AIDS and natural disasters. They noted the extreme societal inequality between those who benefit from narcotic-related wealth and the majority of the population that lives in poverty. Due to the low standards of living, many Haitians immigrate to the U.S. causing a brain drain that erodes the human capital in Haiti. In addition, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and natural catastrophes, including floods and hurricanes, has served to further destabilize the society. Haiti's proximity to the U.S. was also noted as a source of brain drain that results in loss of human capacity for Haiti.

Possible points of entry

Participants discussed small-scale economic initiatives, health-related development programs, humanitarian assistance initiatives and election preparation programs as possible points of entry through which to develop a platform for a leadership training intervention.

Outstanding challenges

Participants identified four specific challenges that should be addressed before an intervention could be mounted. The first challenge would be to identify clearly the actors in the conflict—the warlords, expatriates and civil society activists—and carefully determine which groups would entail the stakeholders in a leadership intervention. Second, the current capacity for conflict analysis in the country should be strengthened through in-depth research with the donors, public constituencies, leaders and other community players. Third, a relationship map of current international and local organizations involved in conflict-mitigation and reconstruction activities should be developed to determine which organizations are present in the country, how they are intervening and who the intervention is intended to target. Finally, the information available to Haitian communities in which reconciliation efforts are implemented should be increased in an effort to manage the population's expectation of the reconciliation programs.

NEPAL

Unique elements of the conflict

Participants in the Nepalese discussion group identified four unique elements of the conflict. These included King Gyanendra's possession of supreme power over the state; the political parties' lack of legitimacy within the political system; the opposition rebels' control of over sixty-five percent of the country; and extreme poverty.

Participants recognized that the King's possession of extensive legal, traditional and divine authority in Nepalese society, and his commitment to personal, societal

and international isolation, pose unique challenges to any conflict resolution intervention that seeks to leverage his involvement and support of an integrative process.

Participants emphasized the lack of legitimacy of Nepalese political parties, stating that the political parties are characteristically corrupt, self-interested, unrepresentative and significantly stunted from thirty years of imposed dissolution by the King. The Maoist rebels, by contrast, have generated a powerful insurgency committed to directly challenging the authority of the monarchy. Participants commented on the U.S. identification of these rebels as terrorists noting that any negotiation efforts to integrate them into the peace process could face potential resistance from the U.S.

Lastly, the extreme level of poverty in Nepal, where twenty-eight million people exist on a rural subsistence economy, is a significant contributing factor to the conflict, one that participants recognized would need to be considered when launching an intervention.

Possible points of entry

The points of entry identified for the Nepalese case focused on the three political power bases: the political opposition parties, the Maoist rebels and the King. Participants suggested that access to the political opposition parties could be easily obtained, and the Maoist rebels could potentially be reached through a few existing channels. However, they agreed that it would be very difficult to access the King.

Participants proposed three approaches to leverage the power of the King. The first approach would involve a dignitary of equal royal stature and respect, such as the King of Thailand, the King of Bhutan or a group of Kings, who would approach the King of Nepal to discuss the conflict and present a proposal for intervention. Second, it was suggested that the South Asia Regional Cooperation (SARC) extend a non-political, non-forceful, non-threatening intervention to conduct conflict resolution modeling exercises in Katmandu. Lastly, participants proposed the mobilization of a broadly popular, heroic Nepalese celebrity to galvanize society in support of the peace process.



Outstanding challenges

Participants identified four outstanding challenges that would need to be addressed in advance of launching a training intervention in Nepal. Primarily, the role, purpose and goals of the key

figures in the conflict should be mapped out. Participants explained that this analysis would include clarifying the King's definition of a successful settlement and determining whether the Maoists would commit to a compromise in lieu of revolutionary change. Second, methods of ensuring rural class and middle class inclusion should be determined in advance of a training intervention. Third, strengthening the capacity of the rural class to enable citizens to articulate their own interests was identified as a long-term challenge. Lastly, the participants stipulated the importance of identifying the intervention's own criteria for success in advance of implementation and of determining how to address the legal and financial implications of working with actors classified by the U.S. as terrorists.

LEBANON

Unique elements of the conflict

Participants emphasized the lack of national sovereignty as a significant obstacle to the achievement of peace in Lebanon. Following the French occupation (1918–1943), Lebanon's sectarian divisions were managed under a power-sharing formula between the major religious communities identified in the census of 1933. The formula encourages community allegiance to religious structures rather than to the state, and limits the number of apolitical non-sectarian organizations. Serving to aggravate the tension between Christian and Muslim religious groups, and contributing to the political discontent of the Lebanese people, the power-sharing formula failed to prevent the outbreak of civil war in 1975.

The sectarian civil war (1975–1990) had its origins in the conflicts and political compromises of Lebanon's colonial period and was exacerbated by inter-religious strife and the involvement of Syria and Israel. Syrian troops, asked to intervene early in the war by one of the Lebanese militia groups, were focused on the containment of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1979. However, when the civil war officially ended in 1990, Israel maintained control of southern Lebanon until 2000 and Syria occupied the north until 2005. Participants remarked that it was the extension of the Israeli and Syrian occupations beyond the end of the civil war that most profoundly undermined Lebanese autonomy, isolated northern Lebanon from the south and created additional cleavages and fault lines within the country.

In the time period following Syria's withdrawal, youth emerged as proponents of the peace process. Participants noted the impact of the youth demonstrations in Beirut's Martyrs' Square, which lasted over two months and brought about an unlikely alliance between the Sunni Muslims, Druze and Christians. However, participants recognized that the youth efforts were marginalized by the increasing divide between the allied Sunni, Druze and Christian groups and the pro-Syrian supporters of the Shi'a parties—particularly over relations with Syria and the future role of the militant Hezbollah movement.

Possible points of entry

In designing an entry framework, the objectives outlined by participants included building bridges across sectarian lines, fostering regional stability so that protected states can radiate outward and addressing the lack of stability within the country that has provoked a need for structural change.

It was recognized that the international community, specifically the U.S., Britain, France and Russia, could potentially have a positive impact on the situation. However, the U.S. classification of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization affects the type of interventions that are available.

Similarly, updating the census data and adjusting the 1943 power-sharing formula to incorporate changes that have developed over the span of half a century in the proportion of Christians, Sunni, and Shiite populations, the impacts of emigration and the influx of intergenerational Palestinian refugees was recognized as a highly contentious issue.

Participants identified two hopeful elements of the Lebanese situation that contribute to the potential for peace. The first is the existence of the inter-sectarian army, which provides a unifying force by requiring all male citizens to contribute one year of service involving travel to all areas of the country. The second is the fact that the Lebanese have known positive times and public nostalgia makes a return to former and better times possible.

Participants identified the time period before the influential elections of 2007 as a window of opportunity for possible points of entry. Additionally, they identified ten groups of key actors who should be targeted by an intervention. These include political leaders and parties across the board; disaffected youth and young men recently released from the army; the diaspora community, which could offer monetary support and a social safety net; the inter-sectarian military; religious leaders; intellectuals; the Lebanese business community; Hezbollah; the media; and the mayors of various municipalities.

Outstanding challenges

Participants identified several outstanding challenges that require attention before an intervention could be successfully implemented. It was recognized that Lebanon's unchanging political structure and the reality of arms trafficking across Lebanon's borders are contextual factors that would have to be addressed. Participants acknowledged that instability in Lebanon poses continued risk of civil war in societies across the region. Consequently, participants emphasized the regional dimension and encouraged trainers to conceptualize a method that would increase regional stability through strengthening the individual state.

A second point of concern is the format of the intervention and the appropriateness of sequential or concurrent sets of interventions. Specifically, participants highlighted the challenge of conceptualizing sequences of activities across constituencies and inquired as to what process and neutral actors could be used to move the different elements of the peace process forward concurrently. Additionally,

the issue of which organizations and states would have the credibility to act as conveners was raised. Lastly, the group noted the significance of composing a peace-building coalition that addresses the multiplicity of sectarian divides.

LIBERIA

Unique elements of the conflict

Liberia is unique because it is the oldest republic in Africa. Additionally, unlike many of the conflicts on the continent, Liberia has a relatively short history of violent ethnic rivalry, although ethnic divisions between and among indigenous groups and Americo-Liberians have existed for 140 years. The eight-year civil war (1989–1997) initiated by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) could be characterized as a quest for power, motivated by greed and facilitated by outsiders, rather than as an inter-ethnic dispute, although Taylor was to return the Americo-Liberians to power after the overthrow and death of Samuel Doe, the first and only indigenous president of Liberia. Participants identified the widespread use of dehumanizing killing techniques directed at the uneducated indigenous civilian population as having the most devastating psychological effects. Additionally, the conflict resulted in extensive exploitation of the region's mineral resources including tropical hardwood, rubber, iron ore and diamonds, and almost complete destruction of the country's infrastructure.

The changing role of traditional leaders in Liberia contributed to the violence. Traditional leaders were often emasculated by young fighters during the war and thereby were disrespected or ignored by rural populations. The overshadowing personality of Charles Taylor gave the conflict a unique dynamic that was difficult to overcome even after his departure. Participants highlighted the importance of cross border alliances and sub-regional dynamics that not only contributed to the conflict in Liberia, but caused the overflow of violence into other countries through the movement of mercenaries, light weapons and money flows.

Participants referenced Liberia's relationship with the U.S. as another unique element of the conflict. Despite the U.S. involvement in establishing Liberia as a republic in 1847, U.S. interests in Liberia faded after the end of the Cold War, and the U.S. maintained a policy of disengagement throughout the Liberian civil war and Taylor's presidency. The U.S. preferred to influence the conflict indirectly through support to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Even though the U.S. did not rescue Liberia from civil war as many Liberians hoped, it still remains an overwhelming influence in Liberian political, economic and social affairs and would need to be a part of—or at least supportive of—any intervention.

Lastly, the lack of Liberian national unity was identified as a contributing factor to the conflict that has destabilized the peace process and undermined the authority of the transitional government. The lack of political preparation for the 2005 elections was also noted as a significant challenge to the country's transition to peace.

Possible points of entry

Participants discussed a three-pronged approach to intervention in Liberia. Warring factions, civil society groups and the newly elected government were identified as the three primary target groups. It was suggested that establishing a forum for negotiations outside Monrovia could attract the warring factions to participate in dialogue and training activities in advance of the elections. Second, establishment of a roundtable series for the civil society groups and individual opinion leaders could act as a means of promoting increased collaboration among communities. Third, training for the newly elected and outgoing government officials following the elections would facilitate the transition of power and encourage inclusion of all elements of Liberian society in the new government structure.

The United Nations and ECOWAS were identified as potential umbrella interveners through which peace-building efforts could be orchestrated and legitimized. Additionally, participants suggested that the U.S. influence in Liberia could provide a point of entry for such interventions through individuals such as the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia and the USAID Mission Director. However, any U.S. role would have to be carefully managed to overcome Liberian mistrust of U.S. motivations.

Outstanding challenges

Liberia's history of domination by outside powers (the U.S.) or Americo-Liberians provokes internal suspicion of international interventions. Participants recognized this trend as one of the most significant challenges that a leadership training intervention would have to overcome. More specifically, participants identified the culture of impunity and the lack of political will that exists within Liberia as posing a challenge to the effective transformation of the conflict and the establishment of sustainable peace. Contributing factors include the lack of coordination among the multiplicity of organizations in Monrovia and the general lack of national unity that exists outside the capital.

An inclusive process that involves representatives from the different segments of society and effectively manages the media was suggested as a means of potentially facilitating the situation. However, participants identified several issues that would have to be addressed if such an intervention was launched. Specifically, the intervention would need to involve those individuals who are being shifted from direct power centers, but who still retain significant constituencies, in such a way that they remain committed to the peace and feel part of the process. In addition, participants considered the inclusion of leaders of other African countries who could serve as positive role models, a method of handling the backlash of individuals and parties not included in the intervention, as well as whether to include Charles Taylor in the process, now a moot point with his arrest as a war criminal, but still relevant to his loyal followers. Lastly, participants addressed the role of youth in the peace process and identified the reintegration of child soldiers as a serious challenge that threatens the stability of the peace.

SUDAN

Unique elements of the conflict

The Sudan conflict has been characterized as an inter-religious war between the northern Islamic culture and the southern Christian and animist cultures. While religion has served to enflame the conflict, participants emphasized the historical role that ethnicity has played. Southern Sudan's resistance to the northern government should be considered more a struggle against imposed Arabization or pan-Arabism than simply a struggle against Islam as a religion. Additionally, tribal tensions are a major factor in the conflict. An overwhelming number of the Sudanese fighters and refugees are from the Dinka tribe. However, until tribal concern over the inequity of resource distribution in the peace agreement is addressed, the peace will not hold.

Participants noted that the sheer size of the country has hindered the state's ability to establish effective infrastructure and communication mechanisms, thereby further polarizing the north from the south, isolating indigenous cultures from the mainstream society, and necessitating international assistance to address humanitarian disasters such as famine and drought. Government exploitation of oil, water, timber and mineral resources has contributed to internal tensions.

The Sudanese conflict has a unique external component related to use of the Nile River. Participants identified the control of the water supply as an issue that causes tensions with Egypt as well as with East African states to Sudan's south. Sudan's unification would result in increased access to and use of the river Nile which would threaten surrounding nations' development. Consequently, regional interests are a factor in the approach to resolution of the conflict. Moreover, a unified, peaceful Sudan could play a positive stabilizing role in the region in such conflicts as northern Uganda.

Possible points of entry

Participants observed that a credible process-type intervention could be introduced through potential entry points at the local, regional and international levels. At the local level, participants suggested locating credible Sudanese actors to advocate for the intervention. Suggestions included Francis Deng, Research Professor of International Politics, Law, and Society and Director of the Center for Displacement Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. Deng served as the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992–2004 with the rank of Under-Secretary-General. He is a leading scholar on the politics and conflicts of identity in Sudan, and more broadly on conflict management and the challenges of building state capacity in Africa. Nureldin Satti, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi, was identified as another high-ranking Sudanese who has gained respect and legitimacy in peace-keeping efforts in Burundi through the United Nations Operations in Burundi (UNOB).

Additionally, civil society leaders such as Pauline Riak, a Sudanese refugee who founded the Sudanese Women's Association in Nairobi (SWAN), would be influential in raising awareness for the intervention among the refugee community outside Sudan. Participants recommended working with the Sudan Council of Churches in northern Sudan, the New Sudan Council of Churches in the South, the Sudan Inter-Religious Council and the New Sudan Islamic Council to organize an inclusive intervention.

At the regional level, participants suggested obtaining the backing of regionally active institutions such as the Moi Foundation, the Nile Basin Initiative and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Former Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi has remained engaged in regional peace initiatives in Somalia and Sudan through the creation of the Moi Foundation. While Moi's impartiality in previous peace processes in southern Sudan has been questioned, he retains an important role in the region. Similarly, Egypt's relationship with Sudan has improved since diplomatic relations were restored between the two states in 2000. Participants emphasized the importance of Sudanese unity to Egypt's national security and suggested that Egyptian support of an intervention could provide a further international stimulus for settling the conflict in Sudan.

Additionally, Egypt is among ten countries in the Nile Basin whose water security is directly affected by the situation in Sudan. The Nile Basin Initiative was created in 1999 to create a basin-wide framework to achieve water security, avert conflicts over water resources, fight poverty and promote economic development

in the region. Participants suggested that this initiative,

supported by the World Bank and involving

Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, could be a

strategic launching pad from which to gain regional support for a process-type inter-

vention. Similarly, participants suggested collaboration with IGAD in any such

intervention. IGAD was created in 1986 as a regional grouping of seven East

African countries. One of IGAD's aims is the promotion of peace and stability in the

sub-region and the creation of mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention,

management and resolution of inter- and intra-state

conflicts through dialogue. It has achieved regional and

international legitimacy and in fact led peace negotiations in the Sudan in 2004.

At the international level, participants suggested tapping into the influence of Libyan leader Mu'ammr Abu-Minyar al-Qadhafi, who has emerged as a popular



African leader and prominent figure in various pan-African organizations such as the African Union (AU), or other individuals who have accumulated multinational sources of oil wealth.

Outstanding challenges

Timing was identified as one of the main challenges to effective implementation of a process-type intervention in Sudan. Due to the continuation of violence in spite of the signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement, participants questioned whether Sudan has fully moved into a post-conflict stage of development, thus requiring a post-conflict response as opposed to a conflict resolution approach. An effective intervention would need to recognize and address the conflict flash points such as the control of ports and trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings, and be able to mitigate the current causes of conflict, while assisting the ongoing peace process.

In addition, participants recognized the need to shift expectations of the role of international organizations in affecting the transition to development. Participants expressed concern that the Sudanese population has abdicated responsibility of its own role in leadership building, and they emphasized the need to reinforce empowerment within communities if possible. Additionally, participants identified the need to address issues related to the distribution of wealth and contribute to efforts to manage the population's expectations of equitable resource distribution once peace is attained. In this context, participants noted that it would be important to determine the role of force in managing conflict.

PARTICIPANT DISCUSSION

Possible points of entry

Participants from the country case study groups reconvened to discuss their findings. In formulating points of entry and designs for the entry process, the participants emphasized the need to monitor the conflict environment in order to develop sensitivity to the actors and determine the optimal time for intervention. Participants encouraged eliciting input on intervention design and implementation from the parties in conflict and suggested that non-formal points of entry, such as health sector reform activities, should be considered.

Challenges to Intervention

Participants outlined eight action points to anticipate, manage and minimize challenges related to the effective implementation of process-type interventions:

1. Learn from evaluations of past interventions;
2. Make realistic goals about the populations' capacities to commit to change;
3. Conduct an assessment to identify the causes of the conflict prior to programming;

4. Create a detailed relationship map to determine possible conveners and champions for intervention;
5. Utilize existing networks effectively;
6. Consider purposes and timing of linkages between efforts;
7. Respect the importance of natural resources management; and
8. Manage the expectations of donors, constituencies and parties.

Adaptability and Readiness of the BLTP Process

Participants recognized that organizations engaged in conflict transformation activities should be more rigorous about fitting intervention designs to specific conflicts. Consequently, while the BLTP process was recognized as a tool that worked well in Burundi, participants encouraged further examination to distinguish between its replicable elements and its context-specific elements.

Participants emphasized the role of key **personnel resources** that legitimized the BLTP process in the perceptions of the population. A key aspect of replication, therefore, would be finding an external personality or institution to champion the process. In addition, it would be critical to identify one or several senior local partners to serve as conveners of the process.

Additionally, participants noted the availability of **substantial and consistent funds** throughout the BLTP process. The importance of securing adequate resources for this kind of process-type intervention was emphasized. Effective replication of the BLTP process was recognized as requiring sufficient funding from a donor willing to take high risks, as well as commitment from core personnel with adequate time to implement the program. However, participants also noted that while U.S. Government support for the BLTP process was acceptable in Burundi, the politics surrounding U.S. funded projects may pose problems when looking to replicate the process elsewhere.

The **timing** of the BLTP intervention also contributed to the program's success. The BLTP was preceded by the Arusha peace process, which provided groundwork for reconciliation, and was launched in an environment weary of war and receptive to reconciliation efforts. Participants highlighted the importance of this "readiness factor" in determining the type of reception the program received in Burundi. Consequently, they determined that replication would depend in part on the sequence of events preceding the desired intervention—that either prepare the ground, or make it untenable—and partly on the will of the participant populations, which determine when and where the program will be successful. In the same vein, participants stressed the value of the inclusive nature of the BLTP process, where the various parties to the conflict were identified as primary actors.


SESSION THREE SIMSOC: Simulated Society

The third session of the workshop was comprised of an all-day simulation. Simulated Society (SIMSOC) is a complex simulation designed by William Gamson to provide insight into the dynamics of social and political conflict. In brief, SIMSOC consists of a single society comprised of four regions—Red, Green, Blue and Yellow—with an unequal distribution of resources. Participants spend an entire day coping with the challenge of personal survival while building a viable society both within and among their assigned regions. They must do so under conditions which closely parallel those of the real world. These conditions include extreme inequality between individuals and groups, a lack of sufficient subsistence for individuals in the poor region, major communication barriers between regions, a lack of shared experience and expectations and a diversity of personal goals.

The members of SIMSOC must subsist, secure employment and decide how to allocate whatever resources they possess—whether by investing in industry, in public welfare programs or in the creation of police forces. Rioting is also an option. All of the decisions participants make, individually and collectively, determine whether the national indicators rise or fall; this in turn determines whether the income available to the society's basic institutions increases or declines. If any of the national indicators fall below zero, the society collapses. The success or failure of SIMSOC rests on the ability of its members to resolve conflicts arising from resource scarcity and the unequal distribution of both power and wealth—and to develop a broad national vision that transcends their regional boundaries and identities.

SIMSOC Regional Asset Distribution

- n **Green Region**
BASIN (Basic Industry)
HUMSERVE (Human Services)
POP (Party of the People)
- n **Yellow Region**
SOP (Society Party)
RETSIN (Retail Sales Industry)
- n **Blue Region**
MASMED (Mass Media)
EMPIN (Employee Interests)
- n **Red Region**
None



As in the real world, there is a tendency for the members of SIMSOC to think and act on the basis of their parochial regional interests and—usually without substantive foundation—to mistrust the intentions of participants from other regions. The fact that the cleavage between the society’s “haves” and “have-nots” largely corresponds to regional boundaries (the poor Red region versus the rich Green region) only compounds the mistrust and aggravates societal tensions. What matters in SIMSOC is not participants’ real-life ethnicity or regional origins, but to which region each participant has been assigned. In assigning participants to each of four regions, care is taken by the organizers to ensure that all regions are ethnically, politically and socially diverse. Within SIMSOC, as within many states in conflict, divisions and conflict are a reflection of the uneven distribution of societal resources, and are the direct consequence of poor inter-group communication and the absence of an inclusive process by which national decisions are made.

The SIMSOC produced by the workshop participants was reasonably successful. It is not unusual for SIMSOCs to collapse after two or three game sessions, and this SIMSOC survived over the course of three game sessions. As is typical, participants became emotionally invested in their society and each region developed a cohesive identity. Severe strains within the SIMSOC led to a sharp decline in the national indicators measuring social cohesion and standard of living. As is customary, the impoverished Red region, which confronted the total absence of food, money and even the ability to travel outside the region, became the most cohesive of all the regions. Having only their human resources to rely upon, the members of the Red region determined that a lack of resources did not mean an absence of intelligence; as one member declared, “at least we have our brains.”

By contrast, the better-endowed Green, Blue and Yellow regions were focused initially on the management and protection of their wealth and on the creation of more wealth through the industries located within their regions. At one point, a member of the Green region secretly bought insurance to protect the region’s wealth. While members of both Green, Blue and Yellow regions were concerned about the fate of the impoverished Red region—recognizing that high unemployment or death rates in the Red region would impact negatively on the social and economic health of the wider society—they did not fully appreciate the dire situation the Red region confronted. Consequently, members of the Red



region reacted very negatively to what they perceived to be the insensitivity and patronizing arrogance of the Greens, the Blues and the Yellows; conversely, the Green, Blue and Yellow regions saw the Red region as lacking any sense of gratitude for what was intended as generous acts of benevolent charity. This disconnect, together with other misunderstandings that arose in the course of various transactions, led to a sharp deterioration in trust and national cohesion.

The debriefing session that followed the playing of SIMSOC yielded powerful insights and important lessons learned. Participants discussed:

- the role that proximity and communication play in developing (or destroying) trust;
- the fact that messages are not always received as intended, either because of differences in perception and experience, or because of the sender's lack of clarity;
- the danger of acting on the basis of untested assumptions;
- the impact of the uneven distribution of resources on inter-group perceptions and conflict;
- the tendency of regions to "balkanize," focusing on their own internal needs and losing sight of their linkages with, and dependence upon, the broader society;
- the need to put oneself into the shoes of the other; and
- the importance of inclusive decision-making processes in building trust and resolving conflict.

As a result of their experience in SIMSOC, participants acquired firsthand understanding of the lessons generated by the process-type training approach implemented by the Wilson Center in Burundi, the DRC and Liberia. The following comments offered by participants during the verbal feedback session are illustrative:

- "SIMSOC is one of the few interest-based negotiation simulations that begins with inherent structural inequalities. The unequal resource distribution demonstrates the extent to which the organization of power in society produces conflict."
- "SIMSOC demonstrates how leaders emerge and interact with followers, and illustrates the burden of leadership and the desire for power."
- "There exists little interest in bringing all regions together on an equal footing in an open space. This is due in part to each region's reluctance to be vulnerable and take risks. Consequently, the tendency is to wait for others to take the first step."

- “We cannot underestimate the extent of human instinct to take care of one’s own needs before those of another. The Red region provided a sense of social justice and was outraged by the members of the Green region. However, if the situations had been reversed, members of the Red region would have been equally inactive, and members of the Green region would have been equally as cohesive.”
- “Everyone starts with good intentions. However, negative expectations of others lead to defensive actions that are often perceived by other groups as offensive.”

During the debriefing discussion, participants analyzed SIMSOC as a facilitation tool. The simulation was commended for engaging participants in problem-solving and societal complexities at all levels including inter-group, inter-regional and inter-societal. However, the complicated, in-depth rules and high-level comprehension skills required to follow those rules were identified as a limitation to field application. It was suggested that a PowerPoint presentation or distilled rulebook would be helpful in simplifying the explanation of the simulation.

Participants also recognized that varying contextual learning styles could affect the applicability and relevance of SIMSOC to some conflict-affected areas. To assist participants in understanding and participating fully in SIMSOC, it was suggested that the trainers organize brief feedback sessions after each round of SIMSOC. In contrast, however, it was noted that part of the value of the simulation is to create an honest, continuous reality so as to better analyze human interactions as they might occur in the real world. Periodic feedback sessions would dilute this experience.

When applying SIMSOC to different cultural contexts, participants emphasized the importance of accounting for variances in learning styles during both the simulation and the debriefing session. Recognizing that most of the workshop participants who had just completed SIMSOC shared similar ideas, insights and awareness of group dynamics, the lessons gained from simulations conducted in very diverse and conflict-affected environments could be dramatically different. The feedback sessions, therefore, were identified as very important, and it was determined that these sessions should ideally be comprised of three main components: 1) a safe space for participants to vent their frustrations; 2) a forum in which to discuss what actions could have produced a better outcome; and 3) an examination of how these lessons could be applied.

The application of SIMSOC within the context of conflict resolution training was valued as a means of facilitating unique discussions on the root causes and the human dynamics of conflict. It was seen as an innovative tool that could be effective within a broader tool kit of approaches. Specifically, SIMSOC puts into practice the psychology and sociology of negotiation through contextualizing conflict resolution training exercises and interactions. Participants emphasized SIMSOC’s utility as an effective transition between more informal track-two training exercises that focus on building personal rapport, and more formal, track-one approaches that address and negotiate specific conflict issues in each country.

SESSION FOUR

Lessons Learned: Reflections on Leadership Training

Training Approach: Challenges to Effective Implementation

Participants addressed means of managing a variety of challenges trainers face in the field including participant resistance, gender-based discrimination, factionalized armed groups and program longevity. Specifically, participants discussed the difficulties of managing more educated groups of participants who have attended previous trainings on conflict resolution. It was noted that creating an inclusive environment, letting the participants demonstrate their strengths, showing respect for fellow participants and evidencing a willingness to cooperate are effective means of managing such groups. Furthermore, establishing trust among participants and asking them initially to put their egos aside could enable the training to be conducted more smoothly.

Trainer Identity

It was noted that, due to the fact that they are considered outsiders to the conflict, trainers often face resistance from participants. Being clear in communicating funding sources and affiliations was recommended. In addition, participants encouraged approaching the training as an opportunity to learn from the trainees, reinforcing that it is not always a question of “what can we *teach* them?” but a question of “what do they *want* from us?” In this way, trainers are less likely to underestimate the contribution that parties and individuals in conflict can bring to the training process.

Participants discussed how women can address gender-based difficulties that arise during trainings. It was noted that male training team members who respect fellow female team members often set the example for participant interaction with the female trainers. In this way, the training team can capitalize on the benefits of gender differences. For example, participants acknowledged that women are able to employ a quieter leadership style that is less threatening to participants and that being an American woman, for example, is sometimes more beneficial than being a woman from the indigenous culture. Participants observed that sometimes race, nationality or a lack of background knowledge on the country or conflict can be more of an issue than gender differences. It was concluded that trainers should emphasize whatever components of their identities contribute to the success of the training process.



Integrating Spoilers

Participants discussed how best to train fragmented armed groups as opposed to cohesive and determined spoilers. It was noted that maintaining dialogue with multiple armed factions and emphasizing the open and inclusive process of the training provides an opportunity for would-be spoilers to get involved. Based on their collective experience, participants acknowledged that in Liberia, as in Burundi, trainers knew that all sides to the conflict had people who suffered directly or were personally affected by the conflict. Consequently, rather than asking the armed factions to put aside their self-interests, it was suggested that trainers should demonstrate to the armed factions how they can actually benefit from peace and how their private agendas and public goals can reinforce each other. Reinforcing the interdependence of private and public goals helps to make evident the fact that cooperation is possible.

Creating Lasting Impact

Participants observed that several factors should be in place to ensure the effective implementation and lasting impact of training activities. Specifically, it was noted that **clarifying the mission and objective** of the training program facilitates the expansion of training of trainers networks; **engaging government representatives**

helps to achieve a solid institutional grounding; working through

and **maintaining constant contact with institutions** in which the individuals are embedded rather than the individuals themselves produces the greatest impact;

and **helping participants to readjust** to reality outside of the training environments all contribute to the longevity and sustainability of the training program. Participants agreed that training programs should be responsive to the environments in which they are implemented and should address both the development and the security needs of the participants. Similarly, both diplomats and trainers should be involved in the training process so that the skills of both can be incorporated into the approach. Finally, participants agreed that long-term engagement is imperative, as real success

comes in five-to-ten-year blocks of time.



III. Recommendations

Develop A Trainers' Network

1. Immediately, **create a database of expertise** that incorporates the July 8–10, 2005, Wilson Center workshop participants.
2. Immediately, **establish the Wilson Center as the center point** of the training network.
3. In the medium term, **build a new generation of trainers** through this coaching and mentoring network.
4. Throughout the process, **keep the conversation and training network alive** through email updates and an e-newsletter that notifies network members of each other's activities.

Expand The Community of Trainers

1. Immediately, **facilitate conversations in other core U.S.-based institutions and universities.**
2. In the medium term, **engage the European community** to develop and maintain a transatlantic and global network of experts.
3. In the long term, **counter territorialism in the conflict resolution community** by increasing communication between sectors and integrating the field of intercultural communication.
4. Throughout the process, **conduct regional high-level gatherings** of policymakers, trainers and implementers using a similar format to the July 2005 workshop.

Expand Training to Other Areas

1. Immediately, **support training interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo.** (Please see page 10 for information on the Wilson Center's initiative in the DRC).
2. In the medium term, **adapt the methodology to different international contexts** including Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Togo, among others.
3. In the medium term, **introduce SIMSOC to other peace-building players**, such as women activists, local governments and illiterate groups.
4. In the medium term, **establish African sub-regional cooperation** with other organizations and institutions including ECOWAS.
5. In the medium term, **integrate areas with conflicting memories**, such as France and Algeria; Europe and the Arab world; and the African Great Lakes region.

6. In the long term, **conduct trainings of trainers in different parts of the world** focusing on specific area experts.
7. Throughout the process, **maintain the link with the implementing partners.**

Increase The Use of Training in Peace-building

1. Immediately, **create a visual one-pager** on how the BLTP fits into peace-building endeavors, for use with agencies and decision-makers.
2. Immediately, **expose more policymakers to training of trainers** workshops.
3. In the medium term, collect information and **create a guide on different kinds of group interventions** to further peace processes.
4. In the medium term, **incorporate this training methodology into other on-the-ground projects.**
5. In the medium term, **develop better evaluation methods** of each training activity.
6. In the medium term, conduct a workshop to **analyze where training fits into post-accord peace-building.**
7. In the medium term, **make the concept of training of trainers more accessible to the general population** possibly through the use of the media.
8. Throughout the process, **ensure better documentation of cases,** lessons and successes across training initiatives.

Enhance The Credibility of the Field

1. Immediately, **clarify the terminology** across the field.
2. In the medium term, **pursue conflict response funding** to address short-term needs and long-term strategic planning and programming.
3. In the medium term, **improve the understanding of key donors,** such as the U.S. Government, on the topic of leadership building through inter-agency trainings among key departments.
4. In the medium term, **explain “if” and “when” this type of intervention is most appropriate** for the benefit of decision-makers and donors.
5. Throughout the process, **ensure the ongoing credibility of facilitation teams** and implementing organizations.
6. Throughout the process, **foster a culture of evaluation** and understanding of best practices.
7. Throughout the process, **increase coherence within the field** by making links between this training approach and reconciliation work and cultural communication.

IV. Appendices

COORDINATOR BIOGRAPHIES

MOHAMMED ABU-NIMER is Director of the Peacebuilding and Development Institute and Associate Professor in the Division of International Peace and Conflict Resolution in the School of International Service (SIS) at American University. An expert on conflict resolution and dialogue for peace, Abu-Nimer has conducted research on conflict resolution and dialogue for peace among Palestinians and Jews in Israel; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; application of conflict resolution models in Muslim communities; interreligious conflict resolution training; interfaith dialogue; and evaluation of conflict resolution programs. As a practitioner, he has been intervening and conducting conflict resolution training workshops in many conflict areas around the world, including: Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Northern Ireland, Philippines (Mindanao), Sri Lanka and the U.S. He has published articles on these subjects in the *Journal of Peace Research*; *Journal of Peace and Change*, *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* and in various edited books. Abu-Nimer is the co-founder and co-editor of the new *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*.

JULIA BENNETT was Program Assistant for both the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity (formerly the Conflict Prevention Project) and the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the time of the training. In this capacity, she worked with the Program Director to coordinate Washington-based meetings, write and edit publications and manage program funding. As part of the Iraqi Women's Democracy Initiative, she has also helped organize workshops in the region on family law, conflict resolution, strategic planning and political participation. She holds a graduate Certificate in International Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. in Philosophy from Bucknell University. At Bucknell University, she completed an honors thesis on the role of imitation in Socratic education. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, she helped to facilitate the graduate admissions process at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

RONALD FISHER is Professor of International Relations in the Division of International Peace and Conflict Resolution in the School of International Service (SIS) at American University. He was the Founding Coordinator of the Applied Social Psychology Graduate Program at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada, and has taught peace studies and conflict resolution at a number of universities in Canada, the U.S. and Europe. Fisher's primary interest focuses on interactive conflict resolution, which involves informal, third-party interventions in protracted and violent ethno-political conflict. He has worked on the longstanding dispute in Cyprus and similar conflicts in other parts of the world. Fisher has thirty years of experience as a trainer and consultant in the areas of conflict analysis and manage-

ment, communication skills, small group processes and team building, providing services to a wide range of public and human service organizations. At the international level, Fisher has provided workshop design and training expertise in conflict resolution to several international institutes that organize workshops for diplomats, NGO staff, military personnel and citizen peace-building from a wide range of countries.

MIKE JOBBINS is Program Associate for the Africa Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He works with the Program Director to coordinate the Africa Program's Washington-based meetings, fellowships, publications and a series of seminars for Congressional Staff. He also supports leadership capacity-building projects in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He graduated from Harvard University in 2004 with a joint degree in Government and Romance Languages & Literature, with an emphasis on Francophone Africa. While at Harvard, he was a Research Assistant with the Harvard Center for International Development, and received a grant from the Harvard College Research Program to conduct field research and prepare a thesis on separatist violence in the Casamance region of Senegal.

ALAIN LEMPEREUR is the Director of ESSEC's Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe (IRENE). He has led consulting missions, conferences and training sessions on negotiation and mediation for government and international organization officials and diplomats, as well as for the business community. He has developed negotiation seminars for ESSEC, the Universities of Paris—Sorbonne—II & V, ENA and also in continuing education, namely for the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, World Health Organization, the World Bank, the BCG and McKinsey. He has also served as a facilitator for expert meetings in conflict prevention, as well as for resource mobilization and for other diverse private and public consultations.

ELIZABETH MCCLINTOCK is a Partner of Conflict Management Partners (CMPartners), where she designs and implements training and coaching programs for government officials, NGO staff members and business professionals throughout Asia, Africa, Europe, the U.S. and Canada. Recent clients include the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the African Virtual University and a range of grassroots and community organizations. McClintock also is the lead facilitator and program designer for the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP), sponsored initially by the World Bank and most recently by the Department for International Development (DFID). In addition, she has trained and now manages a cadre of Burundian conflict management facilitators in their work with local leaders in Burundi under the auspices of the Community-based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative sponsored by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).

STEVEN McDONALD is the Consulting Program Manager for the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. In this capacity, McDonald is responsible for the oversight and

implementation of the Wilson Center programs of leadership capacity building in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia. McDonald has worked as a consultant for the Wilson Center since 2002, taking this position after over thirty years of international work focused primarily on Africa. From 1992–98, McDonald was the Executive Vice President of the African-American Institute (AAI), where he was responsible for running the Institute's policy programs, including its Congressional Affairs Program African Leader Program and Democracy and Governance Program. AAI had offices in twenty-four African countries under McDonald's supervision. Before coming to AAI, McDonald was Associate Director for the Aspen Institute's Southern Africa Policy Forum from 1988–92. There he worked with Members of Congress to inform them about developments in Southern Africa. McDonald served as a Foreign Service Officer from 1970–79, with postings in South Africa and Uganda.

GEORGINA PETROSKY is Program Associate for the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. In this capacity, she supports the Project Director and Project Consultants in coordinating Washington-based meetings, publications and capacity-building projects in Liberia. Petrosky assumed this position after obtaining her M.A. in International Development Studies, with an emphasis on conflict resolution, from The George Washington University. Most recently she served as research consultant with the United States Agency for International Development's Displaced Children and Orphan's Fund, where she conducted research on the positive effects of program interventions on the psycho-social well-being of street youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

HOWARD WOLPE, a former seven-term Member of Congress and Presidential Special Envoy to Africa's Great Lakes Region, is currently Director of both the Africa Program and the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A specialist in African politics, Wolpe chaired the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for ten of his fourteen years in the Congress. He also chaired the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee. His other roles in the Congress included the co-chairmanship of the bipartisan Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition and the Congressional Energy and Environmental Study Conference. Prior to entering the Congress, Wolpe served in the Michigan House of Representatives and as a member of the Kalamazoo City Commission. Wolpe has taught at Western Michigan University in the Political Science Department and at the University of Michigan in the Institute of Public Policy Studies, and he has served as a Visiting Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, as a Woodrow Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar, and as a consultant to the World Bank and to the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. State Department. Wolpe received his B.A. degree from Reed College, and his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

EILEEN BABBITT is Assistant Professor of International Politics and Co-Director of the Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She is also an Associate of the Program on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Before joining the Fletcher faculty, Babbitt was Director of Education and Training at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, DC, and Deputy Director of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Her publications include two books: *Principled Peace: Conflict Resolution and Human Rights in Intra-State Conflict*, published by the University of Michigan Press; and *Negotiating Self-Determination*, co-edited with Professor Hurst Hannum and published by Lexington Books.

HOLLY BENNER is a Conflict Prevention Officer in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State (S/CRS). Prior to joining S/CRS, she worked on support to peace processes initiatives, conflict prevention/mitigation strategy development and monitoring and evaluation for the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) at USAID, the Political-Military Bureau at the Department of State and with the Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program. Benner worked with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to promote coexistence initiatives in refugee return efforts and with Seeds of Peace to develop leadership-building and dialogue programs for youth from conflict regions. She holds an M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a B.A. from Colorado College.

JOSEPH BIGIRJUMWAMI is the Deputy Director of African Strategic Impact, a Burundian NGO that is implementing the USAID/OTI-Burundi's Community-based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative (CPRI). He is specifically responsible for coordinating the Community-based Leadership Program (CBLP), which is designed to train community leaders on conflict mitigating and cooperative decision-making in Gitega and Ruyigi, two highly war-affected provinces of Burundi. From 2002–2003, he was a Program Officer for Burundi Initiative for Peace, a program funded by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and implemented in Burundi by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).

EMMANUEL BOMBANDE is Co-founder and Executive Director of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). He is a peace-building practitioner and international trainer in conflict mitigation and prevention across Africa and beyond, with a strong background in conflict analysis. He is a member of the Government of Ghana's Special Committee to promote peace in the Northern Region and a member of the Advisory Board of the United Nations Ghana Country Team on

Governance and Peace. In addition, Bombande teaches a negotiation course at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and also acts as an External Faculty of the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre in Canada.

BRONWYN BRUTON is a Program Officer at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), where she manages the East and Horn of Africa portfolio. She has worked previously as a Program Manager at the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and as an International Affairs and Trade Analyst at the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Bronwyn was born and raised in Southern Africa and has managed several programs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

MEENAKSHI CHAKRAVERTI is an Associate of the Public Conversations Project (PCP). She offers PCP's standard, open-enrollment training programs, as well as customized trainings in dialogue training, facilitation and consultation to U.S.-based and international groups that are embroiled in polarized conflict on public issues. Meenakshi's work with PCP has included designing and facilitating conversations between Israelis and Palestinians, and between Pakistanis, Indians and Kashmiris. She also teaches international negotiation at the Graduate School for International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California.

NISHAN DEGNARAIN, originally from Mauritius, grew up in the United Kingdom and graduated from Cambridge University in Economics and Geography, before going on to work for the BBC as a journalist. Among various international assignments for the BBC's World News Desk, Degnarain spent time in the BBC's East Africa Bureau, located in Nairobi. He has written on and traveled to several conflict and post-conflict regions throughout Africa and Asia, and he recently co-authored a journal article with General Romeo Dallaire, former UN Commander in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Currently, Degnarain is at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government pursuing a graduate degree in International Development, where he is focusing on Development and Conflict Resolution.

TRACY DEXTER is an independent consultant and currently is interim Director for International Alert in Burundi. Previously, she was a Program Officer for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Zambia, working with the Political Party Training project. Subsequently, through colleagues at the University of Zambia, she piloted the *Street Law* program, which trained fourth year law students to teach basic legal and human rights and conflict resolution principles to the grassroots community. Before joining NDI, Dexter was a legal clerk for two justices of the California Court of Appeals. Among her pro bono activities, she has been involved with the Victim Offender Reconciliation Program, a restorative justice project, as a volunteer mediator and trainer of trainers in Fresno, CA. She also served on the Fresno Human Relations Commission.

BRUNO DUPRÉ, a lawyer by training, has been a French civil servant for the last twenty years. He has worked for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in various positions such as legal council, economic advisor and political counselor. An expert in antitrust law, he was also appointed as a French counselor to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission to develop links between the U.S. and European antitrust authorities. In 1998, he joined NATO headquarters as a political advisor to the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support. He participated in the Partnership for Peace NATO initiative with a special focus on Russia and Ukraine. He joined the NATO Kosovo Crisis Cell during the conflict with a special focus on Civil and Military Cooperation (CIMIC). In 2001, Dupré joined the Strategic Affairs Department at the French Ministry of Defense, where he is the head of the Non Proliferation and Disarmament Bureau. Crisis resolution and scenario planning are at the heart of the Bureau expertise.

GRETCHEN ELIAS is a Program Support Manager at the Institute for Sustainable Communities (ISC) where she provides monitoring and evaluation and programmatic support to ISC's advocacy and civil society programs in Russia, Ukraine and Macedonia. Previously, Elias served as a technical advisor to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on gender issues, and as a consultant to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) on women's entrepreneurship in transition countries.

ALBERT EMBOUNOU works for the World Health Organization (WHO) External Relations Unit in Brazzaville. He is involved in negotiation, preparation and monitoring of implementation of cooperation agreements between the WHO countries and funding institutions. From 1997–2003, he was WHO Liaison Officer with the African Development Bank in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) and was responsible for negotiating cooperation and funding agreements between the Bank, WHO and African countries. Previously, he was the Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Republic of the Congo.

MARI FITZDUFF is Professor of Intercommunal Coexistence and Director of the Masters Program on Coexistence and Conflict at Brandeis University. From 1997–2003, she held a Chair of Conflict Studies at the University of Ulster, where she was Director of a United Nations University centre UNU/INCORE based in Northern Ireland. From 1990–1997, she was Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council. Fitzduff has also worked on programs addressing conflict issues in the Basque Country, Sri Lanka, Middle East, Indonesia, the Caucasus and Russia. She is utilized as an international expert by many governments and international organizations on issues of conflict and coexistence. Her publications include *'Beyond Violence' - Conflict Resolution Processes in Northern Ireland*, *Community Conflict Skills*, *NGOs at the Table* and *The Psychology of Resolving Global Conflicts: From War to Peace*.

CAROLE FRAMPTON is the Director of Training at Search for Common Ground (SFCG). She was trained as a mediator and facilitator at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa. In this capacity, she worked locally on community issues, as well as in Southern and Central Africa, where she set up and ran various training programs. She joined Search for Common Ground as the Director of the Women's Peace Centre in Burundi in 1999.

DARA FRANCIS is an Assistant Program Officer for Africa at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Formerly, she worked as a Research Associate with the Henry L. Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program. Her research experience includes work with the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa on such issues as conflict in sub-Saharan Africa and the role of civilian police in post-conflict peace-building. In 2003–04, Francis co-developed and co-taught a conflict resolution course for 6th graders at Francis C. Hammond Middle School in Alexandria, VA.

ALEXIS GENSBERG is an Associate Mediator at Susan Podziba & Associates, where she helps design, facilitate and analyze conflict interventions used to address complex public policy issues. Her current and past cases include a negotiated rulemaking for the U.S. Department of Transportation, in consultation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to develop minimum standards for driver's licenses and personal identification cards.

HEBA HAGE is an independent consultant. Her professional experience includes action research, program coordination, fieldwork, resource development and training and facilitation on a diversity of workshops. Thematically, she has been involved in child and youth empowerment, rural and environmental development, peace-building initiatives and conflict resolution projects.

CRISPIN (XAV) HAGEN served as Resident Country Director for the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Liberia until June 2006, where he headed political party capacity building and advocacy for Muslim women from rural and disadvantaged communities. Previously, Hagen took an assignment as a Crisis Corps Volunteer with the American Refugee Committee, implementing a pilot agriculture project in Guinea. In Guinea, he worked with the U.S. Embassy/Conakry as the Ambassador's Special Projects Coordinator, as well as with USAID/Guinea as a Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee Monitor.

ERIC HENRY is a Managing Partner of CMPartners (CMP) where he conducts workshops on negotiation strategy and joint problem solving and communications mastery. He also acts as an advisor to one or several parties to a negotiation or dispute. He is currently a Scholar-in-Residence at the School of International Service (SIS) at

American University. Previously, Henry worked as a practicing attorney, first serving as law clerk for U.S. District Court Judge Charles P. Sifton in New York. From 1988–1999, Henry co-founded and was president of Logotel, Inc., a licensing and merchandising company.

JEAN-LOUIS HÉRIVAUULT has taught economics and finance at the University of Prince Edward Island and at Algonquin College in Ottawa. He then became Academic Dean at Vanier College in Montréal, before being appointed by the Québec National Assembly as the first CEO of the Québec Institute for Research in Compensation. From 2000–2004, Hérivault was Québec representative in Toronto covering Ontario, Manitoba and Nunavut, while retaining his responsibilities for the Vancouver office and Western Canada.

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COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

National Endowment for Democracy

The case studies were written by the National Endowment for Democracy and provided to the Woodrow Wilson Center for this workshop. It is important to note that these case studies were produced in July 2005 and therefore reflect the status of world events at that point in time.

COLOMBIA

The forty-one year armed conflict in Colombia has made it difficult for the government to establish legal authority throughout the nation. The government continues to be faced with increased threats to the security of its citizens, and the judicial system has been unable to effectively establish justice in every part of the country, especially at the municipal level. However, a provision in the 1991 Colombian Constitution created the position of justice of the peace. The provision seeks to make access to justice more fair and efficient in an overburdened court system. The role of the justice of the peace is to resolve minor family, commercial, labor, land and personal disputes at the local level. The justice of the peace tribunal system offers a viable solution for providing communities order and the peaceful resolution of conflict through elected arbiters and fills a void where state judicial systems have been deficient. Colombia has justices of the peace in twenty-five municipalities, well below its goal of 300 municipalities.

One particular area of intense armed conflict is the department of Valle del Cauca. This department's security has deteriorated significantly as the war intensifies and the number of displaced families grows. In recent years, Valle del Cauca has elected nearly 500 justices of the peace, making this otherwise dangerous and neglected department a model in the resolution of community conflict in the country. While some gains have been made, much work remains to be done to consolidate the sustainability of the justices of the peace tribunal system in Valle del Cauca and the rest of Colombia.

HAITI

With the dates for the local and presidential elections in Haiti now set, the international community's attention is focused on the ability of the interim government and the United Nations peacekeeping forces to guide a country battered by political upheaval and violence to a peaceful, democratic election. It promises to be a difficult task. Still hobbled by the controversy over the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004, the interim government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue continues to confront a deeply divided and violent nation. Together with the United Nations peacekeeping forces, Minustah, the interim government is struggling to disarm both anti- and pro-Aristide groups, and large parts of the coun-

try are still outside the authority of the government. According to the Haitian human rights organization National Coalition for Human Rights, over 400 people have been shot dead in Port-au-Prince alone since October 2004, many of them in clashes between police and armed gangs.

Whether the new elections can serve as a step toward rebuilding Haiti's fractured society and political system will also depend on the engagement and interest of the Haitian voters. After almost a decade of elections consisting of little more than pitched battles between an array of capital-city based opposition leaders and the Aristide movement *Fanmi Lavalas* and regular charges of stolen elections, confidence among Haitians in the electoral process is low. With each election after 1995, voter participation dropped, reaching lows of less than twenty percent for parliamentary and local elections. Part of the disillusionment of Haitian voters stemmed from the paltry choices that they faced. Political campaigns were typically based on personalities or the promise of patronage rather than policies and platforms. The majority of the political parties represented little more than cliques of leaders in Port-au-Prince. For the upcoming elections, over 91 parties and 100 candidates have registered with the elections commission, indicating that if anything the partisan landscape has not changed. Several of the presidential candidates, including rebel leader Guy Philippe, have open ties to armed groups raising the specter of coercion and bloodshed around the elections.

LEBANON

Lebanon's political system and culture have been shaped by its mosaic society, which was accommodated by means of a power-sharing formula. By giving priority to the rights of Lebanon's diverse religious communities at the expense of individual rights, this system produced a fragmented society of distinct communities living side by side, but with each community showing more allegiance to its religious feudal leadership than to the state. Under this framework, efforts to maintain a sectarian balance resulted in a system that sought to democratically manage potential conflict situations. Although it is arguable whether this system could be called a democracy, the country's constitution does guarantee certain civil and political rights, the separation of powers and defines a judicial and legal system that ensures the rule of law, freedom of the press and pluralism.

However, a true civil society was not able to emerge, and Lebanon's precarious democracy inevitably collapsed in the face of the volatile regional situation. Years of civil war created additional cleavages in the society that will be as difficult to repair as the physical vestiges of war. The task of rebuilding is made even more difficult by a political system in which political power too often derives from factional militias or the backing of foreign powers, rather than from honestly earned popular support. Although there have been numerous expressions of public support for an autonomous and non-confessional civil society, little persistent effort has been made to address the lack of civic initiatives, and there are few

apolitical organizations that cross sectarian lines. As religious and political factions in Lebanon remain powerful and continue to reinforce these societal cleavages, conditions for independent civic nongovernmental organizations remain difficult. Recently, political and sectarian tensions were further strained with the extension of President Emile Lahoud's term in office, issuance of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for foreign troops to leave Lebanon and the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri.

Key political developments have had a positive impact on the revival of civil society. The largely free and fair municipal elections of 2004 raised expectations for greater citizen engagement in public issues and an expectation that change is feasible at the local level. Withdrawal of Syrian troops in April resulted in expectations of less foreign interference in Lebanese affairs, which will be tested in upcoming parliamentary elections. Lebanese NGOs play an important role in this revival by providing civic education, and serving as dialogue initiators, facilitators of networks and campaigners on social, political, economic and environmental needs in their local communities. This move toward greater revitalization of Lebanese civil society has been demanded by several actors, chief among them the Lebanese youth. Marginalized by their elders, these youth look increasingly for a voice within their communities.

LIBERIA

The August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brought an end to the vicious cycle of violence that devastated Liberia for two decades. Rebel factions, former government officials, political parties and civil society organizations agreed to a two-year political transition, creating a fractious transitional government. As the transition enters its final year, Liberia is preparing for national elections in October 2005. However, the transitional government is hamstrung by corruption and infighting, and much work remains to ensure a smooth electoral transition.

Liberia's last elections in 1997 set a poor precedent, which, lacking an inclusive peace, brought warlord Charles Taylor to power on a platform of fear, led to greater repression, economic decline and international isolation, and incited the bloodiest phase of Liberia's civil war. Although Taylor fled the country on the eve of the CPA's ratification, his legacy of instability remains through his cronies and other potential spoilers who fill the ranks of the transitional government. While UN peacekeepers maintain security and relative calm has returned to the country, the transitional leadership has made little progress in restoring order in Liberia despite half a billion dollars in international aid. Even in the capital, potable water and electricity have not been restored, and roads, schools and hospitals remain derelict.

Rural inhabitants continue to suffer considerably from the war's aftermath. Hundreds of thousands were killed, fled the country as refugees or were

displaced from their homes. One half of the country's rural population is living in camps for internally displaced persons. In rural areas, entire towns have been destroyed. Nimba County, in particular, is a volatile conflict zone wedged between Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire that was the original crucible of Liberia's civil war. Thus, successful elections rely as much upon enabling and educating rural inhabitants as upon legislating in Monrovia. A peaceful transition depends on reconciliation at the grassroots, empowerment through literacy and skills development and rural civic development. Civil society has been a vibrant force in Liberia, and it has a crucial role to play cultivating grassroots democracy and supporting a credible electoral process to form the basis of an enduring peace.

NEPAL

On February 1, 2005, Nepal's Constitutional Monarch, King Gyanendra, sacked Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, dismissed the government and declared a state of emergency, once again throwing Nepal into political crisis. King Gyanendra announced that he had dismissed the government for not holding elections, for discrediting democracy and for failing to curb a growing Maoist insurgency that now threatens the state itself. King Gyanendra, who assumed the crown in 2001 following a palace massacre that left ten members of the royal family, including his older brother King Birendra, dead, has dismissed three governments since he assumed power.

The Maoist rebellion, which began as a small, localized affair in a number of rural districts, has morphed into a countrywide problem that now threatens towns and cities. Although most informed observers believe the government will need to use force to contain the rebellion, such a response is likely to undermine the possibility for a political settlement and further stoke the flames of rebellion.

Nepal, a country of twenty-seven million people nestled between China and India, is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. Over forty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and prospects for the future remain dim as tourism, one of the key drivers of the Nepalese economy continues to suffer in the wake of the Maoist conflict and heightened security concerns following the attacks of September 11 in the United States.

Against this background of ineffective political parties, short-lived governments, rampant corruption, a Maoist insurgency, a weak economy, a palace massacre and a King with a penchant for dismissing governments, the current political crisis is only the latest in a series of political set backs that Nepal will have to overcome before it can begin to build strong, democratic institutions and practices. As the International Crisis Group recently concluded, "Only a legitimate, broad-based, democratic government will be able to strengthen the institutions of state to the point where the combined political and security strategy necessary for dealing with the ever more dangerous Maoist insurgency becomes possible."

SUDAN

Sudan's transition to democracy remains full of contradictions. An historic peace agreement, which was signed on January 9, 2005, is being implemented between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), ending more than twenty years of civil war. As many as four million refugees are beginning to return home, and the south is starting to rebuild. At the same time, a new conflict continues to rage in Darfur, two million more people have become refugees and the entire peace process is endangered. Many southern Sudanese are calling for secession, saying that the peace agreement gave up too much to the north and the conflict in Darfur is intended to sabotage the agreement. Likewise, many northerners say the peace agreement gave southerners more than they deserve, and blame the south for the conflict as an attempt to bring down the government. Large constituencies in both the north and the south were effectively excluded from the peace agreement, sowing the seeds of discord; internal dissension within both the government and the SPLM/A is growing.

Indeed, the Sudanese conflict may be largely attributed to the marginalization of the rural areas of Sudan, not only the south, but Darfur in the west, Nubia in the far north, the Nuba in the center and the Beja in the east. It is in these areas that the worst human rights violations have occurred, and where the need for news and information is the greatest. Unless all Sudanese are able to air their views freely, participating in the democratic process that is just getting underway, then the peace agreement and efforts to heal the rift between the center and the marginalized areas of Sudan will be for naught.

Even as the political space opens up, human rights violations persist. In particular, the press, which is expanding and becoming increasingly independent, is still subject to harassment and arrest. Although a presidential decree on August 12, 2003, officially lifted censorship of the press, no news is allowed on Darfur or the National Popular Congress party headed by the former fundamentalist leader of Sudan, Hassan al Turabi. On March 16, the Sudanese Minister of Justice issued an order for all prosecutors to refrain from suspending any more newspapers, but journalists have been arrested for their reporting, pre-publication censorship still occurs and publications have been confiscated due to critical articles.

On May 21, 2005, Sudanese authorities shut down *The Khartoum Monitor* for a day due to two articles it had published about clashes that took place when Sudanese police tried to relocate residents of the Soba Eradi IDP camp outside of Khartoum. Yet, the role of the press is more important than ever. Sudan's transition requires a robust, open, peaceful debate throughout the country. News, information and intensive discussion about human rights and democracy must reach a larger audience, especially the rural areas that have been marginalized.

No where else in the world has the conflict between Muslims and Christians been more stark, or caused more human suffering, than Sudan. Although the

Sudanese conflict is far more complex than simply a matter of religion, and includes important racial, ethnic, regional, political, economic, cultural and social elements, religion is undeniably a critical factor. Yet it is common in Sudan to find Muslims and Christians living together as members of the same family, working together, going to school together, socializing together and fighting on both sides of the conflict. The peace agreement signed at the end of 2004 marks a major step forward, but it is more than just an end to the fighting. It entails a national unity government that will provide a six-year testing period for the various communities to learn to live together, culminating in a referendum that would allow the Christian and traditional religions-dominated south to opt for self-determination if they remain unsatisfied with a unified arrangement. This agreement is also likely to serve as the basis for a solution to the current crisis in the Darfur region of western Sudan. In the meantime, efforts to resolve conflict among Sudan's many communities, and most especially between Muslims and Christians, remain fundamental and vital.

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WILSON CENTER AND PARTNER WEBSITES

Africa Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/africa>

Alliance for Peacebuilding
<http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org>

Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP), Burundi
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1417&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=44130

Institute for Research and Education on Negotiations in Europe (IRENE), ESSEC Business School, Paris
<http://www.irene-paris.com/us/Institut/index.html>

Peacebuilding and Development Institute, American University
<http://www.american.edu/sis/Peace-building/>

Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/leadership>

USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/

ADDITIONAL WEB RESOURCES

Beyond Intractability: A Free Knowledge Base on More Constructive Approaches to Destructive Conflict
<http://www.beyondintractability.org>

The Conflict Resolution Information Source
<http://www.crinfo.org>

Conflict Resolution Network
<http://www.crnhq.org>

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre: Conflict Prevention and Peace Studies
<http://www.kaiptc.org>


Resource Pack: Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-Building: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/resource_pack.html

Training for Peace
<http://www.trainingforpeace.org>

Cover Photo: Alain Lempereur, Director of ESSEC's Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe (IRENE), leading group discussion with workshop participants during the July 8–10 workshop in Washington, DC.

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