

**FINAL DRAFT**

OBSTACLES TO THE LAND TO THE TILLER  
PROGRAM IN COASTAL CENTRAL VIETNAM

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by

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CHAPTER I  
RESEARCH DESIGN

Reasons for the Inquiry: The Land to the Tiller program, (LTTT) a splendid success in the delta and the provinces of Military Region III of Vietnam, has not transferred much land in the crowded coastal plain of central Vietnam. The Director General of Land Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Associate Director of USAID for Land Reform requested research to try to assess the obstacles to land transfers under the Land to the Tiller program in this region.

When the Research Was Done: The study was designed and approved in December 1972 and early January 1973. Field work was done from 9 January through 20 April 1973.

The Sample: Coastal central Vietnam was taken to be the plain of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan provinces. The following were included or excluded in designing the sample:

<u>Excluded</u>	<u>Reasons</u>	<u>Included</u>
Quang Tri province	insecure	all other provinces of CVN-9
4 of the 8 Districts of Binh Dinh province	insecure	the other 4 Districts of southern and central Binh Dinh
Cities and towns	population is largely urban	all rural villages
Villages in District or Province capitals	population is partly urban	all others
Villages right on the coast	population is partly fishermen	all land-bound villages
Villages in hinterland Districts in the mountains	population is largely Montagnard and sparse	all on the coastal plain
Villages <u>not</u> having LTTT distribution goals	probably no LTTT program there	all villages having LTTT goals
Villages rated D, E, or V on the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)	insecure	all villages rated A, B, or C on the HES

The sample was chosen to focus on rural, reasonably secure, villages in which a major program concerning farmers and land tenure changes should have affected the maximum number. It was also designed to have maximum geographic spread on the coastal plain of central Vietnam. Wherever possible only one village per District was sampled--in order to sample the maximum number of Districts. Wherever security permitted within a village, most hamlets were sampled--in order to avoid concentration on central village hamlets. Field work was done in 9 provinces, 38 Districts, 52 villages, and 150 hamlets. They are listed in the Appendix. The geographic coverage of the coastal plain is shown on page 2A.

We interviewed farm families (wherever possible, the heads of the households) whose members:

farm some or all of their land as tenants, sharecroppers or squatters  
 formerly farmed some or all of their land as tenants, sharecroppers,  
 or squatters and have received title to such lands under LTTT or  
 have applied for title under LTTT;  
 rent out some farm land to others  
 formerly rented out some farm land to others and have been expropriated  
 under LTTT

We did not interview those who are:

owner-operators of all of the land they farm  
 landless  
 not farming for other reasons


We interviewed 1671 farm families.

We also interviewed Province, District, and village officials. From them we sought expertise: their opinions about constraints and obstacles to land transfers under LTTT in their jurisdictions, and their ideas about how land distribution could be increased.

We also sought to plumb their attitudes and biases re LTTT. We interviewed 289--105 of whom are Province or District officials, 139 village officials, and 45 Hamlet Chiefs. See below.

#### LOCAL OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED

<u>Job Title</u>	<u>No.</u>
Province Chiefs	7
Deputy Province Chiefs	8
Province Land Affairs Chiefs	6



<u>Job Title</u> (Con't)	<u>No.</u>
Deputy Province Land Affairs Chiefs	6
Other Province officials concerned with land reform	3
District Chiefs	22
Deputy District Chiefs	30
District Chiefs of Finance and Economic Development Sections	23
Village Chiefs	41
Deputy Village Chiefs	29
Chairmen of Village Councils	18
Village Commissioners for Land Reform and Agriculture	45
Hamlet Chiefs	45
Land Reform Cadre (same as Village Land Registrars)	4
Village finance officials or Village Chief Clerks	2
	<u>289</u>

The Method: In interviewing farm families, 6 or 7 interviewers were used in each village. In each we divided the hamlets between interviewers so that outlying hamlets as well as the central one were sampled. Each interviewer sampled farm houses randomly to avoid being led on guided tours by solicitous local officials. All interviews were anonymous.

All interviews of farm families were semi-structured--that is, some questions sought specific details, some probed deep to get at the fears and obstacles which, in the minds and lives of tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters, prevent them from applying for title to their land under a national program which permits and encourages them to do so.

## CHAPTER II

## RESULTS

We will report on:

1. The extent, effects, functions and malfunctions of LTTT in CVN. Does it fit most tillers' circumstances or not? How many ignore it? How many take advantage of this opportunity to become landowners?
2. The constraints, taboos and survival options of landlords, tenants, sharecroppers and squatters whom LTTT is intended to reach which deter them from applying for title to their land, and of landlords, deter them from accepting transfer of their land.
3. The agents of the LTTT program: Province, District and village officials and LTTT.

I. The Extent, Effects, Functions, and Malfunctions of LTTT in CVN

Land Tenure: We found that 22% of all farm families are owner-operators and were before LTTT. These we did not interview. 28% are landless or not farming for other reasons. These we did not interview. The remaining 50% were or are tenants, sharecroppers or squatters, or owners of part of the land they farm and tenants, sharecroppers or squatters on part. <sup>1</sup> These we did interview.

Of this 50%, 18% were part-owner-operators and part-tenants or sharecroppers or squatters before LTTT, and 76% rent or sharecrop or squat on all of the land they farm, or did before LTTT. Most of this 76% are or were tenants on village communal land.

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1. Excluding landless from the above, our findings compare to the 1960-1961 agricultural census of Vietnam thus:

	<u>Census</u>	<u>Our findings</u>
Tenants or sharecroppers plus those who rented some	70%	69%
Owner-operators	27%	30%
<u>but:</u>		
Those who, before LTTT, rented or sharecropped all of their land	11%	56%
Those who owned some and rented some land	59%	13%

Suggesting, from 1960-1973, a great increase in tenancy on communal land as, during 13 years of war, thousands of refugees from land abandoned sought some subsistence or subsistence plots from their native villages. (Report on the Agriculture Census of Vietnam, 1960-1961, Agricultural Economics & Statistics Service, Government of Vietnam, Table 6). This explanation is consistent with historical explanation (e.g. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam; Oxford, 1968), with large increases in the refugee populations in 1964, 1968, and 1971-2, and with statements by Province and District officials cited later in the text that there is much abandoned privately owned land in insecure areas.

Extent of LTTT: Of the above (landless and owner-operators excluded) LTTT has reached and changed the land tenure of 69%. That is, 69% of those who, before LTTT, held some or all of their farm land as tenants, sharecroppers or squatters---34 1/2% of the farm family population--have become new owners under LTTT or have applied for title under LTTT to some or all of the land they till.

Most of those who have benefited from LTTT were tenants on village communal land. Of 1,161 farm families who, because of LTTT, now own or have applied for title to all or some of the land they used to farm in tenancy or as sharecroppers or squatters, 918 (79%) were farming village communal land. 20% have received title or applied for privately owned land. (One percent have received title to public domain)

19% of all who might have applied under LTTT are still tenants, sharecroppers and squatters on all of the land they farm.

Effects of LTTT: LTTT is a quantitative success in CVN despite its failure to transfer much privately-owned land to tenants and sharecroppers. Of those who are new owners or who have applied for title (69% of all who might have) half express gratitude to the GVN and enthusiastic support for the program. Only 15% criticize it, or say it had negative divisive effects, or say it has made no changes in their lives and their villages. Most (38%) say land ownership because of LTTT has lessened their hardships or improved their lives, or that they expect improvement because of land ownership in the future. Another 17% say it has made possible a slight improvement in their life. 21% say it has made no difference. A mere 1% say they have suffered losses because of LTTT. 2.

2. The principal reasons given:

by the 50% who express gratitude:

that the GVN helps them, helps the poor, helps the farmers.

by the 15% who criticize LTTT or say it has had no effects:

that LTTT is anti-village traditions; that it does nothing for the landless, for the really poor; that it cannot get the landlord off the back of the tenant or sharecropper on privately-owned land.

by those who say it has helped lessen hardships in their lives:

that, owning land, they no longer pay rent; that now they are owners they feel more free; that owning land, they will improve it


by those who say it has made no difference in their lives:

that the plots they now own are too small to help their subsistence problems

by those who say it has caused them losses:

that because they thought of applying or their landlord feared they might, they were evicted from some of their land

To sum this up in terms of absolute percentages of the supposed rural universe (the 1,671 farm families interviewed plus families found by random sampling who, because they are not affected by LTTT, were not interviewed):



Size of Holdings and Negativism re LTTT: Almost all farm holdings in CVN are very small. See Table 1.

TABLE 1  
AVERAGE FARM HOLDINGS IN CVN

Province	No. Fam Families Interviewed	Total Hectarage Farmed per family	Ha. Farmed in Tenancy, Sharecropped, Squatted on, or Applied for under LTTT per / family
Thua Thien	170	0.825 ha.	0.76 ha.
Quang Nam	247	0.4	0.249
Quang Tin	179	0.559	0.338
Quang Ngai	230	0.467	0.30
Binh Dinh	199	0.534	0.39
Phu Yen	109	0.613	0.41
Khanh Hoa	205	1,032	0.94
Ninh Thuan	160	1.336	1.066
Binh Thuan	183	1.318	1.3

It is in the provinces where communal holdings are smallest per farm family, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, that complaints by new owners and applicants that LTTT does nothing for them and that LTTT has made only a very slight difference in their lives are most frequent. In Quang Nam 54% so say. In Quang Ngai 38% so say. In all of CVN only 21% so say.

Extent of Distribution of Land in Terms of Hectares: One of the hypotheses this study sought to test was whether only negligible amounts of privately owned land have been distributed, whether almost all land distributed has been communal land.

In terms of farm families who are new owners, or who have applied for some or all of the land they farm, as remarked above, 79% have received title to or will receive title to communal land, 20% to privately owned land, and 1% to public domain land. In terms of hectares, according to village officials in the 52 villages in which we did field work, in MR1 70% of the land distributed in communal, 24% privately owned, and 6% public domain, and in MR2 57% is communal land, 25% privately owned, and 18% public domain.

In hectares, of the 52 villages sampled, this totals:

	<u>Communal</u>	<u>Private</u>	<u>Public domain</u>	<u>Total</u>
in 22 villages of 4 provinces of MR 1	923.ha(70%)	316.ha(24%)	76.65ha(6%)	1,315.65ha.
in 30 villages of 5 provinces of MR2	2,873.65(57%)	1,246.(25%)	902.(18%)	5,021.65

The LTTT distribution goals for these villages, for 1972, obtained from the DGLA, totalled 281 ha. for the 22 villages of MR1 and 502 ha. for the 30 villages of MR2.

A characteristic of central lowland villages is relevant here. Because of the historical pattern of settlement, the most fertile lands were closest in. These usually became village communal lands and about 80% of them were put up to bid to raise money-- the poorest communal land usually being used for subsistence distribution to native families. It is these communal lands, those put up to bid in the past, that in general have been distributed. Privately owned land developed as the villages and farming extended outward. It is much of these lands which the war and insecurity have caused to be abandoned. In 7 of 38 Districts and in 14 of the 52 villages in which we interviewed District and village officials, they remarked that there is much privately owned land which is now abandoned due to insecurity. No official interviewed remarked that there is any communal land that is now abandoned due to insecurity, (though a very few farm families did.)

Given that privately-owned land is usually further out and much of it is less secure, given statements by District officials in 18% of the Districts and by village officials in 27% of the villages that there is much abandoned privately owned land which cannot be distributed because it is still insecure, given the fact that in all of MR1 except Quang Tin about 50% of all cultivated land is communal land, and given village officials' data showing that 24% of the land distributed under LTTT was privately owned land, one must conclude that distribution of privately owned land is lagging but one cannot say that almost none has been distributed.

II. The Constraints, Taboos, and Survival Options of Landlords, Tenants, Sharecroppers and Squatters

Those Who Do Not Apply: 19% of the 1,671 farm families we interviewed are still tenants, sharecroppers or squatters on all of the land they farm. Another 26% are still tenants, sharecroppers or squatters on some of the land they farm. *total 45%*

We are mainly concerned with those who are tenants, sharecroppers or squatters on privately owned land. These are 30% of the 1,671 farm families, 30% of all those who might have or have been affected by LTTT. (502 in all.) Various reports by Land Reform field personnel and pacification research reports on specific villages have repeatedly estimated that about 30% of those who were tenants or sharecroppers on privately owned land before LTTT still are. These estimates are correct. *what about the other 15%?*

But, of this 30%, 11% (176 in all) cannot or will not apply for title, because:

- Their landlord is a relative (101) and kinship ties are more important than desire for land ownership
- The land is exempt. It is worship land, church land, or pagoda land (56)
- The tiller is ineligible because he is also an owner-operator or new owner of 1. ha or more (18)
- The crop is exempt (1)

Those who can and might apply but have not are 19% (326 in all). They have not for these reasons:

- They are afraid of their landlords. They are afraid of violence against them and their family, or they are afraid they will be evicted from the land (163)
- They have moral taboos against taking another's land or they sympathize with the landlord whom they know personally, whom they know for a long time, who lives close by, or who is poor as they or poorer (103)
- They haven't heard about LTTT, or have heard only vaguely; they do not know how to apply nor to whom to apply; they are waiting for the signal from their village or hamlet officials that LTTT is to begin; or they assume their village or hamlet officials will do all for them if there is anything to be done in this land distribution program (129)
- Other lesser reasons, only 32 in all, are not typical of CVN. They are that:
  - in Quang Ngai 20 and in Quang Tin 3 report they would apply but have been cheated of the opportunity by their landlords or by their village officials
  - in Quang Ngai, 4 report they fear the enemy, the Viet Cong, will persecute them if they apply
  - in Binh Thuan 4, all Chams, fear they would be possessed by spirits if they violate Cham sacred taboos against taking other's goods
  - in Binh Thuan 3 say their holdings exceed 1. ha maximum and that if they apply they would be reduced to 1. ha.

Fear is powerful deterrent. Fear of the landlord is a very real thing among tenants, sharecroppers and squatters in the coastal lowlands. Local government does not protect the little man in local matters there--unlike most delta villages, where fear of landlords is almost never mentioned.<sup>3</sup> In CVN, when asked why he does not apply for title and pressed re what he thinks would really happen if he did apply, he put it in these terms (163 of 502 do):

"I worry if I apply the landlord may throw grenade into house or secretly shoot me in night time. When it happens nobody suffers for me. I think if the Government wants to distribute land to tenants it had better send cadre to village to collect tenants' names, then send to Central Office for procedures. I do not worry about landlord's revenge because I do not apply."

(sharecropper, Quang Tin)

"For us humble squatters, we dare not confront our landlords who are rich and influential. We are afraid. If I applied---at night, what might befall me? I could not know."

(sharecropper, Quang Nam)

"I dare not apply. Prefer to remain sharecropper. If I refuse to pay rent or share crops with the landlords I would be accused as a Viet Cong and seized, or they would inform the Viet Cong that I am pro-Nationalist Government, then the Viet-Cong would kidnap and execute me. I dare not apply for anything."

(sharecropper, Binh Dinh)

"The landlord's husband is in the Communists' ranks. I am afraid of being retaliated against if I do not share the crop. Nobody here applies for privately owned land. Afraid. If I apply, the landlord's husband comes back, I don't have the rent money, I will be dead."

(Tenant, Binh Dinh)

"A landlord's son, a soldier, threatened a farmer not to apply for his father's land. He said if he did he would cut the farmer's legs off. Farmers here are still afraid of landlords."

(Hamlet Chief, Binh Dinh)

"In this hamlet nobody has applied for privately owned land. In 1970 one tried. His landlord heard, wanted the land back. Tenant refused. Landlord took grenade to tiller's house and threatened to kill his whole family. After that farmers in this hamlet discouraged and no one ever dared to try to apply for land title to privately owned land again."

(sharecropper, Binh Dinh)

"I dare not apply for it. He might beat me mercilessly."

(tenant, Khanh Hoa)

"A neighbor of mine was murdered by the Viet Cong. It was suspected that a

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3. In Control Data's study of delta provinces, not one of 985 farm families interviewed in 29 villages spoke of this. (The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta, report to the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Development and ADLR, USAID, Dec. 1972)

landlord in the area plotted the murder, as he and the victim had a quarrel over land."  
(sharecropper, Ninh Thuan)

"I knew a family living next to my house. The family head is a tenant on the land of a soldier. When the tenant applied for land title he was threatened by the landlord with a rifle. The landlord told him if he continues to apply for it some grenades will be put in the ground of his house. So this family dare not apply for land title."  
(sharecropper, Binh Thuan)

"Landlord came and told me and other tenants we did not need to request land. Let him request it and all tenants may continue to rent his land for many years--50% of crop. Landlord told us if any tenant does not pay rent to him, in the coming year when this tenant come to plough rice field both he and his buffalo will be killed in the field. For fear of it, tenants pay rent."  
(tenant, Binh Thuan)

A little fear goes a long way. Landlords in CVN can command guns and killers. Because most tenants and sharecroppers know they can enforce their will and defend their local power, if necessary by killing or maiming, they almost never have to.

Nor is this rough style rule by local gentry rare in regions of other countries. Italy, for example, south of Rome and on the island of Sicily, is run the same way. The State of Illinois south of about Carbondale is run largely the same way. The cause, in CVN and elsewhere, seems to be that local gentry or elite want it the way it was in the past. Whether Neapolitans or landlord cliques in Annam (the old central region of Vietnam) they think and act politically, not economically. They are proud of the past. They do not want to change.

Fear of eviction and of near starvation, landless, is also very real. Landlords in CVN simply ignore GVN's orders to cease collecting rents, to cease evicting tenants, and to accept expropriation. Typical responses:

"If I apply and don't get it, lose land. Landlord is rich, influential. We are poor and humble. We could never win."  
(sharecropper, Quang Nam)

"I am afraid the landlord take back the land. Even if I sold my house I could not pay the uncollected rent or shares. Village and hamlet authorities could not do anything, even the District Chief could not. In past, when I failed to pay up the agreed share even for one basket the landlord would take the land and give it to another sharecropper."  
(sharecropper, Binh Dinh)

"When Land to the Tiller was implemented, the landlady took the land back. I went to see the Hamlet Chief to complain. Hamlet Chief told me the landlady's son was former police security member, dismissed from service because of corruption and now appointed Village Land Reform and Agriculture Commissioner. I was advised to give up and spare myself being arrested and detained."

(exsharecropper, now landless because evicted, Binh Dinh)

"The landlord would take land back. I am afraid to speak of this." (tenant, Phu Yen)  
"Cautions, fearful during interview. Re applying for title, afraid even to think of it, much less do it" (interviewer's note)

"Those who have applied for title have become landless even though title was received. Those who did not apply for title are still on the land they have been sharecropping. Land to the Tiller has been twisted by local people to be 'Land Away from the Tiller.' We are afraid of landlords' powerful influence and we dare not report such cases to the District."

(tenant, Binh Thuan)

There are those whose personal moral standards or taboos prevent them from "taking another's land" as they put it, and there are those whose landlord is poor, or too old to farm, or is an old friend or acquaintance. Sympathy for him as a person prevents them from presuming to "take his land." Typical responses by this next largest group of tenants and sharecroppers who could but have not applied (103 of 502):

"The landlord owns only this tiny bit of land (.5 ha). To take it would violate contract. I cannot do it."

(mortgage-holder, having right to use the land rent-free as security for a loan, Quang Ngai)

"My husband thinks that to apply for land ownership is to do a bad act. The landowner is poor and very old."

(tenant, Ninh Thuan)

"They know their landlords long and have helped them and been helped by them many times. Here most landlords own small holdings. Only a few own as much as 3 hectares. Several times I have distributed blank application forms to these tenants but they all return the blanks to me eventually, still blank. Land to the Tiller is workable here only on communal land."

(Hamlet Chief, Binh Dinh)

"I didn't want to do that because it's pitiful. He is poorer than I am."

(Tenant, Khanh Hoa)

"I can't apply because the landlord is serving in the Army. If he is not serving in the Army he must have his land back to farm or how will he and his family eat?"

(sharecropper, Khanh Hoa)

"If the landlord is rich I apply for title but in my case he is poor same as us."

(tenant, Ninh Thuan)

"The landlord is very old. Son away in Army. If I apply he and his wife will have nothing to eat."

(sharecropper, Quang Tin)

Some sympathize with small landowners, and also are afraid. E.g.:

"All kinds of difficulties from landlords. Really they are very small landowners. They own a small plot, about .2 to .5 ha, so if their land is expropriated they will become landless so they must try to create troubles for tenants, frighten them, to get back the land, insult them, threaten troubles, and nobody could help present tillers to oppose the landlords. Some land was taken back, then tenants had no land and nothing to eat. At last the former tenants agreed to farm the same plots as laborers. Very hard, very poor here. No title to privately owned land has been distributed here."

(sharecropper, Quang Ngai)

A few have been cheated of their rights under LTTT. E.g.

"In 1971 a group of land reform cadre came here talking about land to the tiller and explained how to apply for title. Villagers, about 100, applied. But after long time waiting we applied again. Six times, but still no result. Later we were told the land we had applied for is all worship land and not subject to Land to the Tiller. We know that the land belongs to a big landlord. He has 70 hectares. All 70 hectares worship land? After hearing about our applying the landlord took the land back and let us each farm on very small plot. As we know, Land to the Tiller has not yet been implemented here!"

(sharecropper, Quang Ngai)

A large number (129 of 502) just do not know how to apply and have not had any help from their village to do so. Typical responses:

"Nobody told me. I did not hear about people might receive title. No title has been given out here."

(sharecropper, Quang Ngai)

"The village officials just talked about the law summarily and have not made any dissemination or guidance to help people understand what to do."

(sharecropper, Binh Dinh)

"I don't know. Nobody has ever explained anything. I cannot conceive of having permission to own it. How can I apply for title since it is some one else's land?"

(sharecropper, Binh Dinh)

"Farmers were asked to attend mass meetings on Land to the Tiller in this hamlet, that is all. Nobody has applied for privately owned land."

(sharecropper, Binh Dinh)

"I just farm. I don't know anything about this."

(tenant, Khanh Hoa)

The levels of literacy and formal education and access to communications from Saigon (whether official communications, newspapers, ownership of radios, or other) are much lower in the central lowlands than in Military Regions 3 and 4 of Vietnam. The dead hand of traditional Annamese culture, which emphasizes that one must keep his place vis-a-vis his superiors, is stronger. The spirit world too, it seems, is on the side of those who want things as they have always been, and against change. E.g.:

- Q: Tell us why you haven't applied for title to this land  
A: I would be possessed by the spirit of the Land God  
Q: What do you think would really happen if you applied?  
A: I would be bewitched  
Q: What do your friends, relatives and neighbors think might happen to some tenant or sharecropper who applied?  
A: He would be bewitched  
(tenant, Cham, Ninh Thuan)

It seems obvious that neither further general publicity for LTTT by the GVN nor further repetitions of existing central government orders (to stop collecting rents, to cease evicting tenants) nor further mass meetings by land reform cadre and village and hamlet officials <sup>are</sup> likely to reduce such strong fears in the near future.<sup>4</sup>

We must therefore reduce our CVN-wide total of 19% who can or might be persuaded to apply for title to their land by those who are afraid--afraid of what their landlords or the enemy or the evil spirits might do to them if they applied for title. This leaves only 9% who can or might be persuaded to apply.

This is the optimum gain. It assumes, utopianly, that agents of the GVN, somehow, will modify or eliminate those moral principles and that sympathy for small landlords that deters 6% of that 9%.

It is true that, as some reports have estimated, about 30% of all who were tenants or sharecroppers on privately owned land still are. It is also true that nothing can be done to move 21% of them. The LTTT program has distributed 91% of all the privately owned land it is possible to distribute, given present insecurity and landlords' opposition.

In absolute percentage of the supposed rural universe (the 1,671 farm families interviewed because LTTT has applied or could apply to them, plus all families found by random sampling who were not interviewed because LTTT does not affect them--the landless, and owner-operators) this 9% is only 4 1/2% of the total rural population. Efforts in addition to those now being made to push LTTT in CVN are not worth the trouble. E. g. the political gain would be about 50% of 4 1/2%, minus about 15% of 4 1/2% political loss--or a net political gain of 2-%.

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4. A number of American officials interviewed about LTTT by the writer in regional headquarters of MR1 and MR2 assert hopefully that "CVN is where the delta and MR3 were in pacification in about 1967." The implication is that CVN will, eventually arrive where MR3 and MR4 are now, re acceptance of LTTT, economic development, and strong identification with national goals for national development. The writer and various American economists who have worked in CVN or on its problems, disagree.

Those Who Have Applied Compared to Those Who Have Not: See Table 2.

TABLE 2

NEW OWNERS & APPLICANTS COMPARED TO TENANTS, SHARECROPPERS & SQUATTERS, ON PRIVATELY OWNED LAND.

<u>Landlord: tiller characteristics:</u>	Percentage of Those Who Have <sup>NOT</sup> Applied (N=269)	Percentage of Those Who Have <del>Not</del> (N=211)
He still pays rent	89%	19%
The landlord or exlandlord lives in the same hamlet, village or District	64%	11%
The landlord or exlandlord lives in the same hamlet or village	51%	8%
The landlord has only one or two tenants or sharecroppers, or owns only 1--2 ha, or is very old, or is very poor	51%	10%
The landlord is a friend, or the tiller has known him personally for more than 10 years	48%	10%
The landlord or exlandlord is remote, absentee, or has abandoned the land, or has joined the Viet Cong long ago, or the tiller is a mortgageholder and has paid no rent for many years	30%	48%
The exlandlord agreed to transfer the land to the tiller	0%	10%

It is obvious that to somehow prod and push that remaining 9% into applying for title would be harder than it was to persuade the others.

Work Other Than Farming: No Barrier to LTTT: One of the hypotheses which this research was asked to try to prove or disprove is whether farmers in CVN depend on income from sources other than farming to such a degree that they, or many of them, perhaps value land less and value clientele ties for other income and other jobs more, and whether this impedes land distribution under LTTT.

The subsistence nature of farming in CVN is apparent from the tiny sized plots families farm. See Table 1. That many, probably most farmers in CVN do not raise enough to feed, clothe and house their families on their tiny holdings and that almost all are very poor is apparent to any one who spends any time in coastal lowland villages.

It is also very apparent from respondents' comments to our interviewers. For example:

"We hope we no longer will have to mix potatoes and manioc with rice to fill our bellies"

(an applicant, for .3 ha. of communal land, in Thua Thien)

"It is less hard than before, but we still have to suffer the shortage of food by clenching our teeth!"

(new owner of .5 ha. of communal land, Khanh Hoa)

"It is very thoughtful of the Government to help farmers here escape from starving!"  
(new owner of .5 ha. of privately owned land, Thua Thien)

69% of all farm families interviewed only farm. 31% farm and work at other things to earn money. Of these:

13% are unskilled laborers, doing whatever work they can find.

11% work at skilled and semi-skilled crafts, trades and farm sidelines. The most frequent ones are: raising livestock, carpentry, masonry, small storekeeping or street vending, soldiering in the Regional or Popular Forces, cutting wood, making charcoal, ploughing with a team of oxen or (rarely) with a rototiller, making rice paper, fishing and brick making.

7% are village or hamlet officials.

This is work in addition to farming to survive. No respondent among 1,671 farm families mentioned any connection between what he and his family do in addition to farming and their farming or land tenure. No respondent mentioned that any concern about his family's other jobs or small commerce has anything to do with why he did or did not apply for title to the land he farms.

Village Opinion: No Obstacle to LTTT: Almost no respondent said that the opinions of other villagers about those who apply for title to privately owned land deterred them or encouraged them to apply. Of communal land, yes; many remark that some of the landless and some of the tradition-bound elders opposed and still oppose distribution of communal land. To some, communal land is by definition something which belongs to all and cannot be distributed to individuals. But it does not seem to have deferred or reduced applications for title to communal land by present tillers. Of privately owned land a few admit to embarrassment ("I don't want to be the first to do this,") but no one spoke of any village opinion among farmers against distribution of privately-owned land to present tillers. On the contrary:

"Villagers all very miserable. Anyone applies, sympathy from them!"  
(sharecropper, in Quang Tin)

The problem is not village farmer resistance to LTTT. The problem is the landlords.

Who Needs the Landlord? Sharecropping in cash-short subsistence and subsistence CVN is apparently an exact business. If the landlord and sharecropper agree to share 50:50 that means the landlord pays for or provides 50% of the costs of all inputs, or of specific inputs.

Can sharecroppers farm without landlord help? They think so, 51% say they would not need any help as owner operators. Another 27% say they would somehow have to be able to lay hands on, borrow, money. Agricultural credit could take care of this, and an increase in agricultural credit to farmers is a major part of the GVN's current program of agricultural development. Another 20% say they would need farm equipment or buffalo for ploughing, which they now borrow or which the landlord borrows for them.

Landlords and LTTT: Landlords' unwillingness to accept expropriation and compensation seems almost universal. "Only those landlords whose land is insecure want to be expropriated," says Land is enormously prized and overvalued. Money is not.

For example:

"Although I might receive compensation from the Government in the future for my land if it is expropriated, I am only a farmer by skill. I do not know any other business. After receiving compensation how would I use it for something? Maybe wasted."

(landlord, renting 8.4 ha to 11 sharecroppers, in Binh Thuan)

"Even if the compensation is generous I cannot take his land. He is only the owner of a small amount of land. If his land is expropriated he will not only lose real property of everlasting value but the compensation money will be spent soon or late"

(tenant, in Ninh Thuan)

People in CVN are only slightly used to and, because most of them live on subsistence or subsistence crops and incomes, only slightly involved in, a money-based economy. Rents are quoted in bushels (gia), not in piastres. A major private bank in Saigon will have some 30-35,000 accounts. A bank in a city in CVN will garner only a few hundred. In parts of Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai it is still reported that rural people, when they have any money, bury it in the ground for safekeeping.

Compensation, on average about 150,000VN\$/ha, is asserted by almost all to be less than one-tenth, sometimes less than one-twentieth, of actual land value. In interviews with Province, District and village officials, those in all 9 Provinces, in 17 of 38 Districts, and in 31 of 52 villages say this is a major reason why landlords do not transfer land. Compensation is so small a percentage of land value that to accept expropriation is to give the land away.

This is nothing new in CVN. It was assessed and reported as early in planning for LTTT as October 1969.<sup>5</sup> It is also not unique. E. g. in the U.S. A. certain growth stocks still sell at 40+times annual earnings, though "blue chip" stocks are for sale at only 10-12 times earnings. E. g. land anywhere within two hours fast travel of downtown Tokyo or Osaka in Japan can be sold for hundreds, in some cases thousands of times possible returns in a lifetime from any possible use of the land. For that matter, any land rumored to be developable anywhere on the main island of Honshu, Japan, can be sold for many times its last quoted price, even though its last price was quoted as recently as a month ago.<sup>6</sup> In CVN land is worth what people will pay for it, intrinsic value and possibilities of income therefrom aside. To landlords, for traditional reasons and because of overvaluation everywhere because of farm overpopulation, it is worth 10 or 20 times present GVN compensation.

Landlords ignore compensation. They ignore the orders of the GVN to file for it. Even when they have been expropriated they ignore summons of local governments to come in and collect it. They say it is too slow, too much trouble, too complex. Officials interviewed in 7 of 9 Province Headquarters, in 16 of 38 Districts, and in 27 of 52 villages say this is a major reason why land does not transfer.

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5. "Land Value Survey" (Control Data Corp. to ADLR, USAID, October 1969)
  6. Yoshikazu Miyazaki, "Concept and Realities of Management Control," Sekai, Tokyo. (Available in English in full translation in Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines, April, 1973, from Translation Services Branch, American Embassy, Tokyo)

11% of all tenants, sharecroppers or squatters on privately owned land also say this. Only 3 (of 502) assume that compensation is adequate and that the landlords should be satisfied.

Landlords themselves (49 were found and interviewed) clearly indicate that they do not consider compensation to be compensating. They ignore it.

"I am very old. If the Government expropriates the land I must eat dirt for a living?"

(landlord, renting to two sharecroppers, in Quang Nam)

Landlords also ignore the law re rent maximums. The law of the land for many years has limited farm rent to 25% of the crop, and of land transferable under LTTT has made collection of rent illegal. But rents are very high in CVN. Rents paid in cash in advance average 36,000VN\$/ha. Rents paid in shares are mainly 50% of crop. (61% of all sharecroppers share 50:50. 29% share 66:33. 9% share 75:25) At the most modest assumptions: (1) that the current price of paddy per standard bushel (MR3 and MR4, not CVN, gia is 1000VN\$; (2) that inputs average 20% costs of the crop (which is valid for the delta but probably high for the cheap labor of CVN); and (3) that the average yield is about 100 standard gia (probably low for CVN), net rent after costs for the 61% of all landlords who share crops at 50:50 would be 40,000VN\$/ha. and net rent after costs for the 29% who share crops at 66:33 would be 26,700VN\$. It seems clear that because of high rent income from farm land, compensation at about 150,000/ha. is inadequate.

*who gets what?*

A plausible argument can be made that one can—if one rents land out at legal prices—make as much or more money from money as one can from land. In CVN, because rents are high, this is not true. Rents average 36,000/ha. Crop shares after crop costs average 27-40,000/ha. A landlord who accepts expropriation, compensated at 150,000 plus 10% interest since the promulgation of the LTTT law March 26, 1970, would receive 20% in cash plus interest, or about 40,000VN\$. This he could invest on deposit and earn 17%--or 6,800VN\$/year. In subsequent years, for 8 more years, he would receive

10% in cash plus 10% interest since March 26, 1970, or annual increments of about 21,000 which on deposit at current bank interest rates would yield him about 3,600VN\$. Aside from landlords' strong preference for land rather than money and aside from their conviction that they can if necessary sell their land for many times (10 or 20 times) the value of compensation, the income from compensation payments does not approach their high incomes from rent.

To increase compensation rates in CVN greatly, from an average of 150,000/ha to 1,000,000/ha, might remove much of the stone wall of resistance by many landlords to expropriation, in that compensation would approach land value. But the costs would run about 26,000,000,000VN\$ --- a considerable additional burden on an already overburdened national budget.

What one can do is show local officials and landlords that those who are expropriated can receive 100% compensation for the first hectare or less, plus 10% interest from March 26, 1970. This, at an average compensation of 150,000VN\$/ha., means a sum of 195,000 cash payment. On deposit at the current bank rate of 17% this would yield 37,000VN\$ a year. This equals rent. But no landlord among the 49 we interviewed had heard of this. And no Province or District or village official mentioned this 100% compensation as something which landlords could draw equivalent income from. No Province or District or village official spoke of the possibility of pushing this argument to small landlords.

53% of the 49 landlords we interviewed rent out 1. ha or less. We were interviewing in villages. A study done 3 years ago found, of landlords in villages and District towns, that 59% of all landlords in CVN rent out 1. ha or less.<sup>7</sup>

Small landlords renting out 1. ha or less are the only fulcrum by which to pry more tenants and sharecroppers out of tenancy and into self development. Unless they can

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7. Small Landlords' Dependence on Rent Income in Vietnam (Control Data Corp. to ADLR, USAID, Oct. 1970) Graph 2.

be persuaded to abandon their preferences for their pre-monetary land-based small world, and to accept and join the money-based world of the GVN, Saigon, and the prosperous, growth-minded delta, nothing can be done to move tillers in CVN from tenancy and sharecropping to the status of free farm owner-operators.

III. The Agents of the Program: Province, District and Village Officials and LTTT

Province, District and village officials were interviewed for their expertise in their particular jurisdictions. When asked why it is so difficult to transfer privately owned land, why tenants and sharecroppers do not apply for free land, they give the same answers we received from 1,671 farm families: that tenants and sharecroppers are afraid of their landlords, that they are very cowed and feel inferior vis-a-vis landlords, that they fear they will be thrown off the land if they do; that many farm land of relatives and that one simply does not push, egotistically, one's own prosperity at cost to another member of one's family (that the land is all in the family anyhow so what is there to gain?); and that many value tenant: landlord or sharecropper: landlord ties of long standing (rather like those of servant and master), that most landlords are poor and many tillers sympathize with them and are not willing to reduce them to landlessness.

When asked what can or should be done to increase transfers of land under LTTT their pattern of answers showed attitudes toward compensation very like those of landlords themselves. They said increase compensation; speed compensation. Most described LTTT as a just law, a well-intentioned law, a program which has done wonders for the people of the southern parts of Vietnam but which does not and cannot fit CVN. Some gave interesting explanations of why LTTT cannot fit the people of CVN: e. g. in terms of traditional Annamese culture: that the people of the coastal lowlands believe above all in harmony between individuals of different status and in keeping their place; e. g. in terms of geography and environmental handicaps: that CVN is flood-prone, disaster prone, that the people are closely tied to nature and do not dare to change anything (including land tenure); e. g. in terms of the backwardness and lack of

individuality of central lowland people: for example that many are illiterate, that they have rarely had need to handle cash or commerce so they do not think in terms of individual economic opportunity to better their lives. These were interesting and unquestionably all are partial causes of the condition of CVN, but they are irrelevant to the problem of what can or should the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Development or the GVN do about it. In sum, Province, District and village officials accept the unworkability or limited workability of LTTT in CVN and offer no particular solutions other than that the GVN should vastly increase compensation.

Not that they are biased against the program. Interviewers, skilled by years of field work at probing attitudes and watching behavioral signs that what is said is or is not what is meant, assessed local officials thus:

Officials in 9 Province headquarters:

friendly, helpful, honest re LTTT	94%
worried, discreet, wary re LTTT	6%
	<hr/> 100%
<u>biases:</u>	
pro-LTTT	25%
anti-LTTT or pro-Landlord	12%
no discernible bias re LTTT	63%
	<hr/> 100%

Officials in 38 District headquarters:

friendly, helpful, honest re LTTT	90%
worried, discreet, wary re LTTT	10%
	<hr/> 100%
<u>biases:</u>	
pro-LTTT	42%
anti-LTTT or pro-landlord	8%
no discernible bias re LTTT	45%
neutral re LTTT	5%
	<hr/> 100%

Officials in 52 village headquarters:

friendly, helpful, honest re LTTT	82%
worried, discreet, wary re LTTT	12%
insincere	2%
	<hr/> 100%
<u>biases:</u>	
pro-LTTT	42%
anti-LTTT or pro-landlord	10%
divided (some pro-LTTT, some anti)	12%
anti-distribution of communal land	6%
no discernible bias re LTTT	30%
	<hr/> 100%

Note how the percentage of officials who have doubts about LTTT increases once one gets below those important arms of GVN policy and implementation: Province and District.

Village officials were asked their land tenure; province and district officials were not because few Province or District officials have time to farm. Whatever the difficulties implementing LTTT are at the village level they are not because village officials themselves are landlords. Of 139 village officials and 45 hamlet chiefs interviewed:

53% are owner operators  
 17% own no land and do not farm  
 14% are themselves new owners under LTTT  
 8% once were owner operators and own land now long abandoned because of insecurity  
 4% are tenants, either on communal land or on privately owned land  
 2% have applied for land under LTTT  
 1% are exlandlords whose land has been expropriated under LTTT  
 1% are landlords whose land is exempt from distribution  
 100%

LTTT is a major GVN program, and they, as loyal officials, largely support it. Although many describe it as a just and great program, intended to reduce inequity, to help the poor farmers for whom little else has been done, there is no indication in any of the interviews (very unlike the delta!) that any officials understand, or have even heard of, the importance of land ownership in that it makes most persons who benefit from LTTT identify with the GVN regime. The political effects which LTTT can produce, by freeing farm families from tenancy and making them land owners, is something they either do not know about or do not concern themselves with. To them it seems to be just another major program which the Government requires them to implement.

One almost missing link in the chain of agents of GVN re LTTT is the land reform cadre. We went to 52 villages. We interviewed 139 village officials and 45 hamlet chiefs. We found only 4 land reform cadre among those 184. Nobody among 1,671 farm families spoke of a village land reform cadre or a village land registrar. Almost everybody, 86%, has heard about LTTT, and 61% say they heard about it from land reform cadre. But responses to the questions when, how, usually are that about 2 years ago a group of cadre came here and explained it at a hamlet or village meeting. Nobody has seen

them lately. We found only 4, in 52 villages. 10% say they don't know anything about LTTT, or that there is no implementation of LTTT here (in their hamlet, their village), or that there is none yet.

Villagers have rather faint ideas of what LTTT is all about and many complain that their village officials are either reluctant to get on with LTTT implementation or that some of their actions in the name of LTTT are arbitrary, incorrect, and illegal. In 29% of 150 hamlets, some farmers said the village officials are unwilling, reluctant to implement LTTT, indifferent to LTTT, or do not know how to administer it. In 21% some complained they are arbitrary in distributing land. (Incidentally, more complain of unwillingness to implement LTTT and of arbitrariness in doing so in MR1 than in MR2. In general about 45% of all villages are complaint-free re LTTT in MR1. About 67% of all villages are complaint-free re LTTT in MR 2.) It would be worth the trouble and expense to reprint and distribute not only to village offices but to farm households the excellent pamphlet and propaganda material about LTTT which were used briefly more than a year ago, explaining who must do what and who may get what from whom and how, under the program.

## CHAPTER III

## CONCLUSIONS

1. About half the rural farm population of CVN were tenants, sharecroppers, or squatters before LTTT. Thirty four per cent have become new owners of or have applied for title to all or some of the land they farm. Most were tenants on village communal land, not on privately owned land.
2. About 23% of all (69% of the beneficiaries of LTTT) have become pro-GVN because of LTTT. About 5% (15% of the beneficiaries) are not moved to identify with the regime because of LTTT, or say it has had divisive effects.
3. About 13% (38% of all beneficiaries) say LTTT has made it possible to improve their farming and their lives. 7% (21% of all beneficiaries) say it has had no effect.
4. About 30% of all who were tenants, sharecroppers or squatters on privately owned land before LTTT still are.
5. Of these still in part or completely in tenancy, sharecropping or squatting on privately owned land, 11% cannot or will not apply for title because their landlord is a member of their family, because the land is exempt, or the tiller is ineligible because he already owns other land.
6. Of the remaining 19% who are, in whole or in part, still tenants, sharecroppers or squatters on privately owned land and who can or might apply but do not do so, most are afraid of their landlords. They are afraid of violence and of being pushed off the land. Evidence is abundant that their fears are real ones justified by the circumstances in their villages.
7. The next largest group of tenants, sharecroppers and squatters on privately owned land who could and might apply but do not, simply do not know about LTTT, or they are waiting for their village or hamlet officials to tell them to do something or to do something for them about it.

8. The next largest group of the above have moral taboos against taking another's land, or sympathize with and identify personally with their landlords.
9. No other barriers or obstacles to applying for title to privately owned land are of any quantitative significance nor general throughout all 9 of the 10 provinces of CVN in which we interviewed.
10. In absolute percentage of all farm families, if all remaining tenant, sharecropper and squatter families who can and might apply were persuaded to apply, the political and economic gain to the GVN would be close to nil-less than 2% of the rural farm population. *excluding those who are afraid*
11. Most tenants, sharecroppers, and squatters could farm by themselves without landlord cash or other inputs. The landlord is not a vital part of the production process for most sharecroppers.
12. Landlords are the chief barrier to distribution of privately owned land under LTTT. They ignore rent ceilings. They ignore rent remission. They ignore expropriation and the requirement to accept land transfer to tenants, sharecroppers and squatters. They ignore compensation procedures. They seem to want what was in the past. They seem to be only slightly interested in cash. They seem to prefer land-based pre-monetary living.
13. Small landlords are the fulcrum by which the GVN can possibly increase land distribution. Unless persuasion is switched from the tenant, sharecropper and squatter, to get him to apply, to the small landlord, to persuade him that he can trust banks, that he will receive compensation reasonably soon, that he will receive 100% compensation for the first hectare of his land transferred, and that he can make more money with this money than he can make exploiting farm families, no gains in land distribution are likely or possible.

14. Local officials concerned with general government and particularly with land distribution at Province, District, and village levels support LTTT loyally and, as national officials, endeavor to implement it. Almost all know that the unwillingness of small landlords to transfer land and accept compensation is the barrier to distribution. Almost all suggest vastly increasing compensation. Almost none seem aware of the points made above in conclusion 13. Support for LTTT among village officials is much less than at Province and District levels.
15. No local official seems aware of the potential political impact of LTTT; that it produces strong support for the GVN among beneficiaries.
16. One almost missing link in the LTTT chain of officialdom is the land reform cadre. Nobody has seen them lately in any of the 52 villages in which we did research. Among 184 village officials found and interviewed in 52 villages, we were able to locate only 4 land reform cadre. No villager associates land reform cadre with the village; nobody refers to them as village land registrars or as village land reform cadre.
17. Almost all villagers have heard something about LTTT from radio, slogans, newspapers, cadre, or at village or hamlet mass meetings during the past 3 years, but many, almost 1 of 2, have very faint ideas about what the program is, who must do what, and who may receive what from whom and how, under the program. Intensive written publicity (e. g. reprinting of the excellent pamphlet used more than one year ago) and distribution to villagers seems likely to increase understanding of the program and reduce complaints by villagers that their village officials are not implementing the program or are doing so arbitrarily, unjustly and illegally.

## APPENDIX

LIST OF PROVINCES, DISTRICTS, VILLAGES AND HAMLETS IN WHICH FARM  
FAMILIES AND OFFICIALS WERE INTERVIEWED

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>	
THUA THIEN	Quang Dien	Quang Phu (12)*	Phu Le Bat Vong Tay Bao la	
		Huong Tra	Huong Can Lieu Coc Ha Co Lao	
		Phu Vang	Phu Mau (5)	Mau Tai Lai Tien Tien Non
		Phu Thu	Phu Ho (6)	Dong Thanh Do An Su Lo Dong
		Huong Thuy	Thuy Thanh (3)	Van The Thanh Thuy Chanh
QUANG NAM	Duy Xuyen	Xuyen Hiep (4)	Kieu Son I Kieu Son II	
		Dai Loc	Dai Phu Sang Binh My An	
	Dien Ban	Vinh Hoa (2)	Ban An Tay Cau Nhi Dong	
		Thanh Truong (5)	Phong Ngu Vien Tay Bo Mung	
	Hieu Duc	Hoa Luong (4)	Phu Son Huong Son La Chau	
	Hoa Vang	Hoa Chau (4)	Phong Nam Quan Chau Giang Dong	
QUANG TIN	Ly Tin	Ky Sanh (8)	Tra Tay Da Phu Phu Qui	
		Ky Chanh (8)	Diem Pho Ly Tra Tien Xuan	
	Tam Ky	Ky My (5)	An My Ha An My Trung An My Thuong	
		Ky Binh (7)	Tu Hoi Tay Binh An An Thanh	
	Thang Binh	Binh Tu (7)	Tu Ngoc Tu An Tu Cam	

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>
QUANG NGAI	Duc Pho	Pho Binh (5)	Binh Lac An Truong
	Mo Duc	Duc Vinh (6)	Thi Pho Nhut Dong Cat Vinh Phu
	Nghia Hanh	Nghia Khuong (5)	Dai An Phuc Minh Phu Dinh
	Tu Nghia	Tu Duy (3)	La Dien Phu Tan An Ha
	Son Tinh	Son Trung (7)	Truong Xuan Tho Loc Ha Nhai
	Binh Son	Binh Thang (4)	Tri Binh Nam Binh Chau Tu
BINH DINH	Phu Cat	Cat Nhon (9)	Chanh Nhon Dai Loi Lien Tri
	Binh Khe	Binh Tuong (3)	Hoa Lac Hoa Son
		Binh Nghi (3)	Thu Thien Thuong Thu Thien Ha
	An Nhon	Nhon Loc (6)	Lai Nghi Cu Lam Nam Dong Lam
		Nhon Thanh (8)	An Thanh Van Thuan Chau Thanh
	Tuy Phuoc	Phuoc Thanh (6)	Phu Thanh Nam Tang Canh An
Phuoc Loc (8)		Binh An Vinh Thanh Trung Thanh Dai Tin	
PHU YEN	Tuy Hoa	Hoa Tri (4)	Phung Tuong Quy Hau
		Hoa Thang (11)	Phuoc Khanh My Thanh Dong Loc
	Hieu Xuong	Hoa Xuan (8)	Phu An Ban Nham Ban Thach
		Hoa Vinh (2)	Phuoc Luong Truong Thinh Dong My

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>	
KHANH HOA	Ninh Hoa	Ninh Quang (8)	Phu Hoa That Thanh Thanh My Phuoc Loc Xuan Hoa Nghi Phung Dien Tinh Dai Cat	
		Ninh Phung (6)		
	Van Ninh	Van Binh (5)	Trung Dong Binh Loc Binh Trung Xuan Phong Xuan Hoi Dac Loc Phu Coc Xuan Khanh	
	Vinh Xuong	Vinh Phuong (4)	Dai Dien Trung Dai Dien Dong Tan Xuong Xuan Phu Khanh Thanh	
	Dien Khanh	Dien Lam (2)	Dac Nhon Nhon Hoi	
		Dien Dien (2)	**Luong Tri **Phuoc Nhon **An Nhon My Nhon Hiep Kiet	
	Cam Lam	Suoi Cat (3)	***Suoi Gieng Khu Xom Den Long Hai Tu Tam Hoa Thuy	
	NINH THUAN	Buu Son	My Son (7)	**Phuoc Dong **Chat Thuong **Nhu Ngoc Van Lam **Hieu Thien **Vu Bon
		Du Long	Cam Tho (3)	
		Thanh Hai	An Hai (4)	
BINH THUAN	An Phuoc	Hau Phuoc (11)		
		Dai Phuoc (7)		
	Thien Giao	Hoa Vinh (2)	Hoa Thanh Hoa Dien	
	Phan Ly Cham	Phu Long (4)	Phu Cuong Phu Hoa Phu Truong Phu Thinh	
Hau Quach (3)		**Hau Quach **Minh My An Binh **Lac Tri **Thanh Vu **Cao Hau		
	Lac Tri (6)			

\*Total number of existing hamlets in the village

\*\* CHAM hamlets

\*\*\* Montagnard Hamlet

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>VILLAGE</u>	<u>HAMLET</u>
BINH THUAN (cont'd)	Hoa Da	Cho Lau (9)	Xuan An Xuan Hoi Xuan Quang
	Ham Thuan	Phu Sung (3)	Quang Nghia Go Boi Loc Tho

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. R. Wade Jones, ADLR

DATE: June 23, 1973

FROM : Henry C. Bush, CDC, ADLR *HB*

SUBJECT: Privately Owned Land and Obstacles to LTTT in CVN

REF : draft final report, "Obstacles to the LTTT Program in CVN," Bush to you June 19, and meeting, Jones, Evans, Bush June 20, 1973

This attempts to answer your and Mr. Evans' questions and criticisms of the above draft final report. It focuses entirely on privately owned land. The format used is to try to answer your questions and fill the gaps you identified, in the order in which your comments occurred in your critiques of the draft report.

Re p. 5 question: "Are squatters prevalent enough to keep emphasizing?"

Squatters on privately owned land are 4% of all those on privately owned land who have not applied for title---22 of 502. Of these:

- 15 say they do not know how to apply or do not know about LTTT or have had no word nor orders from their hamlet or village officials to apply
- 4 say they are afraid that if they apply the owners will appear and either threaten them or evict them
- 3 are ineligible for other reasons

Re p. 6 criticism: "Show somewhere how the total eligibles break out between communal land and private land alongside percentage who have applied."

	<u>on communal land</u>	<u>on private land</u>
Percentage who have become new owners or have applied for title.	79%	33%
Percentage of those who have <u>not</u> applied, who are legally eligible to do so.	6%	57%
Percentage <u>not</u> eligible.	<u>15%</u> 100%	<u>10%</u> 100%



23 June 1973

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Re p. 9 But among those eligible to apply almost 1 of 4 (23% of all of those eligible) probably will not because the landlord is a relative, and kinship ties are regarded as more important than land ownership.

Of those who can and might apply, but have not, among those eligible to do so, most give one or several seemingly compelling reasons for not doing so:

They are afraid of their landlords. They are afraid of violence against them and their family, or they are afraid they will be evicted from the land (163)  
They have moral taboos against taking another's land or they sympathize with the landlord whom they know personally, whom they know for a long time, who lives close by, or who is poor as they or poorer (103)

Other lesser reasons, only 32 in all, are not typical of CVN. They are that:

- in Quang Ngai 20 and in Quang Tin 3 report they would apply but have been cheated of the opportunity by their landlords or by their village officials
- in Quang Ngai, 4 report they fear the enemy, the Viet Cong, will persecute them if they apply
- in Binh Thuan 4, all Chams, fear they would be possessed by spirits if they violate Cham sacred taboos against taking other's goods
- in Binh Thuan 3 say their holdings exceed 1. ha maximum and that if they apply they would be reduced to 1. ha.

The compelling nature of their fears in their particular circumstances is illustrated in the text of the draft report on pages 10-14.

It seems probable that further general publicity for LTTT by the GVN, aimed at tenants and sharecroppers, and further mass meetings of them at which land reform cadre explain LTTT, will not reduce such strong fears in the near future.

Most of them are afraid of their landlords. If GVN, PLAS, District, and village persuasion could be shifted to landlords, particularly to the vast percentage who are renting out (and still collecting rents on) holdings of less than 1. hectare, to inform them that for less than one hectare they will receive 100% compensation, to inform them that they can make 17% interest with that money one way and 21%<sup>or</sup> another,<sup>1</sup> and to convince them that they can make more money with money than they are now making with land, it seems likely most of these fears would cease to frighten tenants and sharecroppers away from LTTT.

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1. According to the Agricultural Development Bank one can earn 17% on money on deposit if one also wants, as the result of the deposit, a chance at certain national lotteries. Most money is so deposited. One can earn 21% if one deposits money but foregoes such lottery chances, but few do.

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The possibilities and the economic plausibility of the above are discussed in the text of the draft report under "Landlords and LTTT," on pages 17-21.

A large number of tenants and sharecroppers (129 in all, of 436) say or also say that they do not know how to apply or have not had any help from their local officials to do so, that or that they are waiting for some signal from their village or hamlet officials that LTTT is to begin, or that they assume their village or hamlet officials will do all for them if there is anything to do in this land distribution program. Examples of such are given in the text of the draft report on page 13.

Re p.13 Criticism: "Is there any evidence that they would not also fall into 1 (fear) or 2 (moral taboos)? As stated it leaves the impression that simply informing them would cause them to apply. Would it?"

No, there is no evidence that it would cause all of them to apply, or even most. We can only say that they have not yet learned that for the past three years they have had the opportunity to do so. Whether they would have the will to do so is unknown. A few also cite other reasons--those given above.

The weak organizational link in publicity of LTTT and persuasion to apply was found to be the land reform cadre. The findings and effects of this are described in the draft final report on pages 23-24.

Re p.14 Of the statement "Efforts in addition to those now being made to push LTTT in CVN are not worth the trouble." Criticism: "By what standards...?"

In quantitative terms, those who are legally eligible to apply for private land they farm in tenancy or share crop are barred from LTTT by the following:

<u>Obstacle, constraint</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Probable action if informed and if landlord did accept transfer</u>
Fear of landlords	37%	most would apply
Ignorance of LTTT or waiting for village permission and orders	29%	most would apply
Landlord is relative	23%	almost none would apply
Moral taboos	23%	most would apply, because most are tabooed against reducing a man as poor as they are to landlessness
Other fears and special interests	7%	none would apply

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(The above totals more than 100%---it totals 119%---because a few gave more than one strong constraint.)

The probable results adumbrated above are only probable if small landlords (who are 52-59% of all landlords) can be persuaded to accept money from money instead of paddy from farm land as their major income and source of security. Only thus can landlords be removed as a major cause of tenants' and sharecroppers' unwillingness to take the initiative and risk to apply for title and become owner operators. And also, the probable results are only probable if the land reform cadre and publicity about LTTT get to tenants and sharecroppers who have not yet after 3 years got the word from their village and hamlet officials. If the above are not achieved, the findings are clearly that little more privately owned land is likely to transfer.

Re. p. 15 Criticism of Table 2: "I don't understand this table."

The headings of the columns were reversed. The correct table follows:

NEW OWNERS & APPLICANTS COMPARED TO TENANTS, SHARECROPPERS & SQUATTERS, ON PRIVATELY OWNED LAND.

<u>Landlord: tiller characteristics:</u>	<u>Percentage of Those Who Have Not Applied</u>	<u>Percentage of Those Who Have</u>
He still pays rent	89%	19%
The landlord or exlandlord lives in the same hamlet, village or District	64%	11%
The landlord or exlandlord lives in the same hamlet or village	51%	8%
The landlord has only one or two tenants or sharecroppers, or owns only .1--2. ha, or is very old, or is very poor	51%	10%
The landlord is a friend, or the tiller has known him personally for more than 10 years	48%	10%
The landlord or exlandlord is remote, absentee, or has abandoned the land, or has joined the Viet Cong long ago, or the tiller is a mortgage-holder and has paid no rent for many years	30%	48%
The exlandlord agreed to transfer the land to the tiller	0%	* 10%

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It is obvious that to somehow prod and push that remaining eligibles into applying for title will be harder than it was to persuade the others, unless landlord opposition is removed or reduced.

Re p.19 Criticism: "But these are gross rents..."

No, average rents and landlord incomes from crop sharing given in text of the draft final report, page 19, are net rent and the text so states. It also points out that the assumptions about costs are probably high for CVN so that net rents are probably higher than those stated.

cc: Evans, J.

Enclosures: Jones' copy of draft final report for reference to comments thereon.