

VILLAGE USE OF COMMUNAL RICE LAND
IN
QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN, QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES,
VIETNAM

by
Edward T. Fitzgerald
and
Henry C. Bush

Control Data Corporation
December 1970

With the Assistance of the
Research Cadre of the
Pacification Research Program,
Office of the ACofS, CORDS

Sponsored by ADLR, USAID, Vietnam
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This report is also available in Vietnamese from ADLR, USAID, Vietnam.

CONTROL DATA

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ABSTRACT

The Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture and Fisheries Development, is concerned about the application of the Land to the Tiller law to village communal lands, particularly in coastal Central Vietnam. This research was done to learn: (1) how much rice land is communal land in villages in MR 1, (2) who gets to use village communal rice land, how, for how long, and why, (3) whether villagers regard the present system of allocating village communal rice land as equitable, and (4) whether they want to continue using communal land as they now do or distribute it to individual tillers.

The research: 943 persons were interviewed: 267 village officials and 676 villagers. Of the villagers half are now using village communal land and half are not. From village officials interviewers endeavored to learn how much of the rice land in the village is communal rice land, who gets to use it, for how long, and why. From villagers who are not officials they endeavored to learn what benefits if any they derive from village communal land, whether they regard the system as just or unjust, and whether or not they favor giving title to communal rice land to individual tillers. The sample was stratified, quasi-random, using a variable sampling technique. One can be 95% confident that errors of measurement are less than $\pm 5\%$.

Findings: In Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam most rice land is communal rice land (62% in Quang Tri, 64% in Thua Thien, and 50% in Quang Nam). Some hamlets also control communal land. In the lower two provinces of MR 1 where Annamese culture and tradition are less strong, so is the index of habit and social cohesion: village communal land. In Quang Tin communal rice land is only 10% of all rice land, and in Quang Ngai only 28%.

About 20% of all village communal rice land is reserved to be put up for bid at the market price for rent to raise money for village schools, worship ceremonies, routine village budget expenses, special projects of interest to the village, and to support the PF and PSDF. The other 80% is a small subsidy to all. It is allocated among all eligible families in the village at a token price. Of this 80% about 50% is allocated by lottery, each eligible family having an equal chance to win a plot; about 20% is allocated by shares, one share to each eligible family where enough communal land exists; and about 10% is leased to village families having certain priority because of hardship. In Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam this 80% is distributed largely equally or with equal chance to receive it among all village families. It seems to provide or promise some general security to all against landlessness. In Quang Ngai it is used largely as welfare for those suffering special hardships.

In Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Quang Nam village officials decide who needs it. In Quang Tin and Quang Ngai the welfare priorities largely determine who needs it. In all provinces of MR I villages give families of deceased or disabled war veterans a high priority for village communal land. In Quang Tri the landless and members of the PF and PSDF have lesser priorities. In Thua Thien members of the PF and PSDF have lower priorities and the landless still lower. In Quang Nam the landless and aged have priority. In Quang Tin the landless have priority, and members of the PF and PSDF have a lower priority. In Quang Ngai the landless have a high priority and members of the PF, PSDF, and village cadre a low priority.

Villages in Quang Tri and Thua Thien grant communal rice land to natives, wherever they now live. Villages in Quang Nam require that one have been born there and that one live there. In Quang Tin villages grant communal land preponderantly to those who live there, wherever they were born. In Quang Ngai all villages require that one have been born there, and most also require that one live there.

In Quang Tri and Thua Thien almost all who receive communal land may sublease it. In Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai those who receive it must farm it. In Thua Thien many villages also permit heirs to inherit the unused lease rights.

The average plot of village communal rice land in MR I is 2.38 sao (0.119 hectares). Tenure is usually for three years in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin. In Quang Ngai it is usually for five years.

Most villagers (53%) say communal land pays for village budget expenses, and for worship ceremonies, and for village projects which they could not otherwise pay for. 19% say they receive no benefits from village income from communal rice land. Almost all regard their village's existing use of village communal land as equitable. Most do not want village communal land to be distributed to individual tillers. Only in Quang Nam do a majority of villagers favor giving tillers of communal land owner title to it. See Figure 2.

Conclusions: If communal land is distributed in MR I a social hiatus will be created, as well as gaps in village budgets. To distribute it will run counter to tradition, and tradition is strong in the villages in MR I, particularly in the northernmost provinces. Communal land seems to provide minimum security against landlessness and destitution and to promise a minimum initial stake to future generations. It seems to have

a quasi-religious function in maintaining or seeming to maintain ties between the villager and his native place, in reaffirming Central Vietnamese values, and in reaffirming the fact or fiction that the village is where, when you've got no place else to go, they've got to take you in.

REASONS FOR THE INQUIRY

The Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture, and Fisheries Development (MLRAF), responsible for the administration of the Land to the Tiller law, is concerned about the application of the law to village communal lands, particularly in the crowded coastal plain of Central Vietnam where a large percentage of all rice land is communal land.

This research endeavors to learn:

1. how much rice land is communal land, in villages in MR 1,
2. who gets to use communal rice land in villages in MR 1, how, for how long, and why,
3. whether villagers in MR 1 want to continue using village communal rice land as they now do, or distribute communal rice plots to individual tillers, and why

VILLAGE COMMUNAL LAND,
LOCAL DEFENSE, REVENUES, AND HISTORY

Most communal land in Vietnam is village communal land. Most of it is in the coastal plain of Central Vietnam (Annam). In Central Vietnam it is a large proportion of all rice land. In the Delta it is not.¹

In the course of Vietnamese expansion south into what is now Central Vietnam, in the struggle against the Kingdom of Champa (roughly from the year 982 to 1697) mandarins were ordered to establish military colonies. They were given large land grants. They recruited Vietnamese families, frequently from their native villages, to settle in the areas. Organization was feudal. The family was the primary social unit then as now. Settler families were given individual holdings to be tilled, but the mandarin

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1. In coastal Central Vietnam, before Communist efforts to distribute it and massive relocations of rural persons because of insecurity, it was about 26% of all cultivated land. In the rest of Vietnam it was about 2%. In the vast rice-rich delta it is less than 3%. Reports estimate all communal land in SVN to be between 185,000 and 274,000 hectares, about 180,000 of which are cultivated rice land. Of this from 91,000 to 125,000 hectares are in coastal Central Vietnam. ("Communal Land and Ricefields," Report No. 5, December 1960, by the Secretariat of State for Land Property and Agrarian Reform, summarized in Table 6, summary volume, Land Reform in Vietnam, report to the Republic of Vietnam and USAID by the Stanford Research Institute, 4 vols., 1968; and estimate by the Directorate of Land Affairs, late 1965, summarized by J. P. Gittinger in "Communal Land Concepts in Recent Vietnamese Policy," pamphlet, May 1966.)

retained large parts of the village or settlement area and collected taxes from it. When the founding mandarin died he was often deified as the village guardian spirit. His land became communal land, administered by the village. The village financed itself from the communal land, because privately owned land was not taxed until 1707.²

Often groups of settler families moved out to clear and farm in adjacent lands. Thus hamlets grew, loosely attached to the parent village. The land between these hamlets was often declared to be communal land. Hamlets imitated their parent village, and hamlet founders after death were sometimes deified and their lands declared to be hamlet communal lands.

In 1428 the Emperor Le Loi declared all communal lands to belong to the crown, but granted unlimited usufruct rights to villages. In 1803 the Emperor Gia Long established a limit of three years' use on communal land per lease, and the use of communal land for welfare for all villagers began to be emphasized more than the use of the land to raise money for the village. During the period of French rule taxes were collected on private lands but not on communal land. The use of communal land for the welfare of the village's needy was emphasized. After the French were driven out

2. Gittinger, cited in note 1; and Nghiem Dang, Vietnam: Politics and Public Administration (East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1966), p. 24 ff.

both the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong attempted to distribute communal land to individual tiller families. They did not attempt to collectivize communal land holdings; where they distributed them they did so to individuals and then levied "taxes" on the tillers. Thus where enemy control reached and endured long enough there was a regression from the welfare functions of communal land back to the use of it to raise revenue. Where enemy control did not reach there was a shift to less use of communal land to raise revenue and more use of it for welfare.

In Annam . . . the overwhelming waves of refugees entering the towns from the autumn of 1964 onwards demanded land to till in the vicinity; in many places this could only be found by allotting them a share of the communal lands . . . hitherto put up to auction and frequently sublet to the wealthy bidders at rack rents. . . .³

In legal theory communal land belongs to the nation but in practice the village owns it. Its traditional welfare functions are reflected in the vocabulary of coastal Annam. There is "food portion" land (khẩu phần) parcels allocated to villagers for bare subsistence farming. There is "open land" (bút điền) used to buy supplies and services for the Village Council. There is "rice land for supplying food" (phần điền) used to pay honoraria to Village Council

3. Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Oxford, 1968), p. 361. The Government of Vietnam prohibited auctioning of communal land by competitive bidding, subleasing, and ordered that rents not exceed 25% (Circular No. 9275 BCN/HCTC.3 dated August 23, 1965, and No. 5619 BCN/HCTC.3 dated May 27, 1966, Ministry of Agriculture) but all three practices continue.

members. There is "school land" (học điền) used to support village schools. There is "salary land" (lương điền) traditionally used to pay local men impressed into military service and to aid exsoldiers, and now used to help support the village PF and PSDF. There are "riceland for the worship of village guardian spirits" and "riceland for the worship of Buddha" (ruộng thần tự and ruộng phật tự) used for religious ceremonies and to maintain pagodas, temples, and shrines. There is "orphan and widow rice land" (cô-nhi quả-phụ điền) for widows. And there are no doubt other welfare uses of village communal land embedded in Annamese vocabulary which this investigation did not discover.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Locus: The study was not done in all of coastal Central Vietnam; it was limited to ethnic Vietnamese villages of the provinces of MR 1. Certain insecure, sparsely populated hinterland districts were excluded. The DMZ strip (Trung Luong) was excluded because most native villages once there have long been relocated on the coast. The urban environs of the cities of Hue and Danang were excluded. Figure 1 shows the concentration on the rural Vietnamese coastal areas. The districts and villages sampled are given in Appendix B.

Method: Village officials, villagers now tilling or leasing communal land, and villagers not now having the use of communal land were interviewed. From village officials interviewers endeavored to learn how much rice land in the village is village communal land, who gets to use it, for how long, and why. From villagers (tillers of communal rice land, and those not tilling or otherwise using communal rice land) they endeavored to learn what benefits, if any, they derive from communal rice land, whether they regard the system as just or unjust, and whether or not they favor distributing it to individual tillers. Interview format was structured to minimize interviewer omissions or improvisations. The study was pre-tested in Quang Nam. The main field work was done in September and

October, 1970. The questions put to village officials and villagers are given in Appendix A.

The Sample: All provinces of MR 1 were sampled. Refugee camps, Montagnard hamlets, urban areas, non-coastal hinterland districts, and villages in exile were excluded. Thus the sample was stratified, to focus research on relatively stable, enduring, rural Vietnamese rice-growing villages. Within each province of MR 1 the interviewers were given a list of districts in which to work (those shown in Figure 1) and within each district a quota of villages in which to conduct interviews. They were told how many interviews of each type (of village officials, of villagers now tilling communal land and of those not now using communal land) they must obtain. The choice of villages within the district quota was left to the interviewers; it had to be because of security conditions. Thus true random sampling was not possible; the sample was quasi-random. Population sizes of districts and villages thus specified to the interviewers had been ascertained from the current HES. The variability of the data had been estimated by examining the data gathered during pretest in Quang Nam. Rough estimates of what percentage of all rice land is communal land in each province were available from region-wide and CVN-wide estimates such as those cited in note 1. The sample was so designed that the number of villagers now tilling communal land and the number of villagers not now using communal land were proportional to the estimated percentage of all cultivated land which is communal land in each province. In all, 943 persons were

interviewed in 27 districts, in 160 villages and in 287 hamlets. Of the 676 villagers who are not officials, 343 are now using communal land and 333 are not. Of those now tilling communal land, all are farmers. Of those not now using communal land, about 2/3's are farmers and the others work at things typical in rural areas. The average respondent not now using communal land is a farmer tilling about half a hectare, and two of three of them own the land they farm. With samples of such size, given the range of variability found by pretest, one can be 95% confident that, of the village officials, data obtained is within $\pm 4\%$ of the true population of village officials in rural, coastal MR 1 Vietnamese rice-growing villages, and one can be 95% confident that, of villagers living in such villages who are not officials, data obtained is within $\pm 5\%$ of the data which would be obtained from the whole such population.

The Analysis and this Report: Both authors worked together on the research design. E. T. Fitzgerald supervised the field work and did the analysis. H. C. Bush wrote this report. This is less than ideal procedure, but Dr. Fitzgerald had to return to the U.S. A. suddenly and it was unavoidable. Dr. Fitzgerald's draft report "Communal Riceland in MR 1: A Study of Allocation Systems and Traditions and an Investigation of Villagers' Attitudes towards Communal Riceland Distribution," November 1970, and the primary data are available for examination at the Control Data research group, ADLR, USAID.

RESULTS

How much of all rice land in villages is village communal rice land?

According to village officials:

in Quang Tri	62% is
in Thua Thien	64%
in Quang Nam	50%
in Quang Tin	10%
in Quang Ngai	28%

Land for Revenue: About 20% of all village communal land is reserved for allocation by competitive bidding at whatever price the market will pay. The money thus raised is used by the village to support village projects and activities such as the village schools, honoraria for Village Council members, worship ceremonies, pagodas, temples and shrines, and ceremonies honoring the village guardian spirits.

Land for Subsistence and Welfare: The other 80% is leased to eligible families in the village. About 50% is allocated by lottery, each eligible family having an equal chance to win the privilege to lease a plot. About 20% is allocated by shares, one share to each eligible family where enough village rice land exists. About 10% is leased to persons possessing certain priority because of hardship. Most of this 80% is leased at a token rental much lower than the market price paid on land leased by

competitive bidding. Aside from systems of priority for specific cases or categories of need, 80% of all village communal rice land is a subsidy to whoever tills it or is eligible to have a chance to till it.

Table 1 shows how it is allocated by Province.

In Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam, where village communal rice land is 50% or more of all rice land, it seems to be used to provide general security against landlessness for all villagers. In Quang Tin, where it is only 10% of all rice land, so little communal rice land cannot provide or seem to provide much general security against landlessness to all, but nevertheless it is distributed equally or by chance to all. In Quang Ngai, however, it seems to be in part a welfare system for those suffering special hardships. This suggests that the northernmost provinces of MR I are more bound by Annamese traditions and customs than Quang Ngai. This is also indicated by those interviewed who are now tilling village communal land. See Table 2.

Who or What Determines Who Gets Communal Rice Land? In the three northernmost provinces, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam, the village officials for the most part decide who will get communal land. In the two southernmost provinces, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, the welfare priorities for the most part decide it. In Quang Tri 69% of village officials say they decide who needs and gets communal land; 31% say the welfare priorities determine it. In Thua Thien 43% of village officials say they decide it. In Quang Nam 52%. In Quang Tin only 19%. In Quang Ngai

Table 1

How Villages Allocate Communal Rice Land
According to Village Officials

<u>Province</u>	<u>Competitive Bidding</u>	<u>Lottery</u>	<u>Equal Share</u>	<u>Hardship Priority</u>
Quang Tri	14%	60%	20%	6%
Thua Thien	35%	38%	18%	9%
Quang Nam	21%	58%	14%	7%
Quang Tin	16%	56%	22%	6%
Quang Ngai	8%	46%	20%	26%
All MR 1 Provinces	19%	52%	19%	10%

Table 2

Tillers of Communal Rice Land: How They Received the Right To Till It

<u>Province</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Competitive Bidding</u>	<u>Lottery</u>	<u>Equal Share</u>	<u>Hardship Priority</u>	<u>Other</u>
Quang Tri	252	9%	47%	27%	10%	7%
Thua Thien	149	38%	42%	6%	1%	13%
Quang Nam	74	12%	52%	15%	9%	12%
Quang Tin	17	23%	41%	28%	0	8%
Quang Ngai	39	<u>0</u>	18%	<u>0</u>	<u>74%</u>	8%

only 1%. This too suggests that the northernmost provinces of MR I are more bound by Annamese traditions and customs than are the southernmost: Quang Tin and Quang Ngai.

Welfare Priorities: Responses of village officials and of villagers now tilling village communal rice land indicate the following:

1. In Quang Tri families of deceased or disabled war veterans and those obviously victims of the war have a high priority. The landless and aged citizens have lower priorities. Members of the PF and PSDF have still lower priority.⁴
2. In Thua Thien families of deceased or disabled war veterans have a high priority. Members of the PF and PSDF have lower priorities. The landless have still lower.⁵

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4. In Quang Tri 88% of all villagers interviewed who are now tilling village communal rice land are from families of deceased or disabled war veterans or victims of the war. Twelve percent were otherwise landless farmers. Ten percent of village officials interviewed said that in their villages the aged have priority for communal land (which they do not farm but generally sublease). In 2% of the villages in which officials were interviewed families of the PF and PSDF have priority.
 5. In Thua Thien 41% of all village officials interviewed said that in their villages families of deceased or disabled war veterans have priority. Twelve percent said families of the PF and PSDF have; only 2% said the landless have any priority.

3. In Quang Nam families of deceased or disabled war veterans and the landless have a high priority. Aged citizens have a lower priority. The landless have an undefined priority in some Quang Nam villages.⁶
4. In Quang Tin families of deceased or disabled war veterans and the landless have a high priority in many villages. Members of the PF and PSDF have a lower priority.⁷
5. In Quang Ngai families of deceased or disabled war veterans and those obviously victims of the war have a high priority. The landless have also a high priority. Members of the PF, PSDF, and village cadre have lower priority.⁸

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6. In Quang Nam 12% of all village officials interviewed said that in their villages families of deceased or disabled war veterans have priority; 11% said in their villages the landless have; 2% said older citizens have. A small number of villagers interviewed who are actually now tilling communal land were all otherwise landless.
 7. In Quang Tin 26% of all village officials interviewed said that in their villages families of deceased or disabled war veterans have priority; 21% said that the landless do; 10% said that the PF and PSDF do.
 8. In Quang Ngai 62% of all village officials interviewed said that families of deceased or disabled war veterans or other villagers obviously victims of the war have priority, and 66% of all villagers interviewed who are now tilling communal land are members of such families. Twenty percent of all village officials interviewed said the landless have priority in their villages, and 24% of all villagers interviewed and now tilling communal land are otherwise landless. Nine percent of all village officials interviewed said the PF and PSDF have priority in their villages and 10% of those interviewed and now tilling communal land are members of the PF or PSDF. Eight percent of all village officials interviewed said that in their villages village cadre have priority.

In insecure villages the priority system may be in abeyance because many villagers have fled, relocated, or do not venture far off the main road;

e. g. :

Every one is free to till as much as he wants to. Approval by the village authority is given immediately upon request because this is an insecure area and the majority of people here are afraid of VC terrorism and therefore dare not farm.

(Village Official in Thua Thien Province)

Must One Live There or Have Been Born There or Both? Villages in Quang Tri and Thua Thien grant communal land to natives, wherever they now live. In Quang Nam villages require that one have been born there and that one live there. In Quang Tin they grant communal land preponderantly to those who live there, wherever they were born. In Quang Ngai all villages require that one have been born in the village, and most also require that one live there. See Table 3.

Table 3

Residence and Nativity Requirements To Receive Communal Land

<u>Province</u>	<u>% of Villages in Which One Must Live There</u>	<u>% of Villages in Which One Must Have Been Born There</u>
Quang Tri	9%	97%
Thua Thien	11	70
Quang Nam	100	94
Quang Tin	91	19
Quang Ngai	68	100

May One Sublease Communal Land, or Inherit the Lease? Table 4

shows that in Quang Tri and Thua Thien almost all who receive communal land may sublease it. In Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai those who receive it may not; they must farm it. Only in Thua Thien do many villages permit heirs to retain lease rights.

Table 4

Permission To Sublease Communal Land and To Inherit Lease Rights

<u>Province</u>	<u>% of Villages in Which One May Sublease</u>	<u>% of Villages in Which One May Inherit Lease</u>
Quang Tri	97%	7%
Thua Thien	59	77
Quang Nam	6	0
Quang Tin	0	7
Quang Ngai	0	5

If one grants communal land to natives who no longer live in the village, as almost all villages in Quang Tri and Thua Thien do, then one must allow native but nonresident beneficiaries to sublease it. Nevertheless this, like Table 3, suggests that the northernmost provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien are closer to the Annamese tradition of tying the native to his village and of identifying the native by his

birthplace.⁹ Villages in Quang Tri and Thua Thien use (and conceive of) communal land as a tie between a village native and his community.

Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, on the other hand, use communal land to resolve or decrease present welfare problems. They are more modern.¹⁰ Some in fact are so modern they know about their rights; e. g. :

Since the promulgation of the Land to the Tiller law the Village Authority has been unable to collect any rent at all. No one wants to pay it because it has been admitted that the government did stop collecting rent, thus causing serious difficulties to the village budget. . . .

(Village Deputy Chief for Administration, in Quang Ngai)

Some villages in Quang Ngai have what are in effect punitive rules to enforce the intended use of communal rice land; e. g. :

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9. ". . . the traditional personality of the Vietnamese was a personality committed in advance, a personality which became aware of itself in that commitment. It was absolutely and fundamentally bent on social order. Mr. So-and-so, son of So-and-so, born in such-and-such a village, in such-and-such a district, in such-and-such a province: that's how life was determined." John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and their Revolution (New York, Harper & Row, 1970), p. 99.
10. What was traditionally Vietnamese and perhaps traditionally Confucianist was once traditionally European, too. Historians of medieval Europe and of the development of man as an individual point out that in the 12th century if you asked a man who he was he would reply something like "I am Anselm of Saarbrucken" but in the 18th, 19th or 20th century if you asked a man who he was or is he would reply something like "I am Henry C. Bush." E. g. G. C. Coulton, Medieval Panorama (New York, Macmillan, 1947) and Erich Kahler, Man the Measure (New York, Pantheon, 1943).

Those who lease rice land allocated to deceased veterans' families have to pay VN\$3,000 per sao per year (i. e. VN\$60,000 per hectare!) (Village Deputy Chief for Administration, in Quang Ngai)

Size: The average plot of communal rice land in MR I is 2.38 sao (0.119 hectares). Table 5 shows the average plot size by province.

Table 5

Average Size of Communal Rice Land Plots

<u>Villages in</u>	<u>Average Size</u>
Quang Tri	2.73 sao (0.136 ha.)
Thua Thien	3.81 sao (0.190 ha.)
Quang Nam	2.25 sao (0.112 ha.)
Quang Tin	1.94 sao (0.097 ha.)
Quang Ngai	1.93 sao (0.096 ha.)

Tenure: In villages in Thua Thien communal rice land plots put up for bid for what the market will pay are usually rented for one year. The 80% of communal rice land not used to raise money but allocated either to needy families or by chance or equally to all natives or residents is leased for three years. In villages in Quang Tri, Quang Nam and Quang Tin communal land is leased for three years. In villages in Quang Ngai it is leased for five years.

Rent: The 20% of communal land leased by competitive bidding commands the market price. The 80% not used to raise money is rented at a token price, in most cases the same price for each plot. See Table 6.

Table 6

Do All Tillers Pay the Same Rent for Village Communal Rice Land?
(According to Village Officials)

<u>Villages in</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Quang Tri	100%	0
Thua Thien	69	31%
Quang Nam	100	0
Quang Tin	90	10
Quang Ngai	68	32

In almost all cases in which families are leased plots of communal land at different prices, it is the quality of the land that determines the difference in rent charged by the village. In Quang Ngai, however, lower prices are set for the needy, especially families of disabled or deceased war veterans. Some hamlets in Thua Thien set lower prices on rent of hamlet communal land for members of the PF and PSDF.

At times land normally not used to raise money will be rented by competitive bidding at the market price, for a special project; e. g. :

. . . It was mutually agreed that the allocated portions (already allocated to hamlet residents) be put up for auction to make a public fund for the hamlet. An amount of VN\$1,650,000 was received from the auction, and the payers were allowed to till for six years.

(Village Official, in Quang Tin)

Villagers' Attitudes Re Communal Land: Benefits: Most villagers (53%) say communal land pays for village budget expenses and village worship costs. Nineteen percent say there are no benefits from income from communal land. Ten percent don't know. Table 7 shows this by provinces.

The following are representative of villagers' responses:

from Quang Tri:

Thanks to this villagers are exempted from cash contribution to village self-development projects. . . .

The 25% of communal rice land auctioned by bidding is for the village budget to pay construction costs such as schools and administrative expenses, saving villagers from having to contribute cash for them. . . .

No benefit as yet because communal rice land hectarage has been left unused for so long now. . . .

Rehabilitating village roads, constructing a school, and covering administrative expenses as well as organizing village meetings. . . .

This is used to pay for the common good purposes such as maintaining the village meeting place, the temple, and so on. . . .

To drill wells in the hamlet and dredge the canal for irrigation, without having to request heavy contributions from all villagers. . . .

Table 7

What Villagers Say Income from Communal Rice Land Is Used For

Benefit	All of MR 1 (N=680)	Quang Tri (N=249)	Thua Thien (N=219)	Quang Nam (N=106)	Quang Tin (N=52)	Quang Ngai (N=54)
It pays village budget expenses	36%	28%	31%	41%	71%	58%
It pays for worship expenses	17%	4%	40%	9%	15%	0
There is no village income; the land is allocated to villagers without charge	10%	6%	10%	16%	4%	19%
Don't know	10%	21%	2%	1%	4%	15%
Profits are shared among villagers	3%	0	6%	0	6%	0
There have been no benefits as yet because of abnormal security costs and/or because people are just now returning after having left because of insecurity	3%	9%	2%	0	0	0
It pays PSDF expenses	1%	1%	0	0	0	6%
Other	1%	2%	1%	1%	0	0
No benefits	19%	29%	8%	32%	0	2%
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

from Thua Thien:

Previously when the village was still perfectly secure each voter received VN\$100 each year extracted from the income from the communal lands reserved specifically for the village authority to lease for profit. Then at the end of the year if there was some balance in the fund we divided it again. However, some years we received nothing because much money had to be spent for our yearly worship ceremonies. . . .

Each one may receive VN\$500 per year in cash. The rest is used to perform worship ceremonies in the village. . . .

To maintain and repair the shrines. . . .

About VN\$600 in cash every year. . . .

The benefit we may enjoy is that we don't have to pay anything for tilling the communal rice land allocated to us. . . .

Ninety hectares of communal land has been reserved specifically for the village authority to cover its yearly budget. . . .

from Quang Nam:

I've been told that all the income received from communal land is used to pay for village officials' salaries. . . .

All income from village communal land is only enough to cover office supplies and pay village officials' wages each year. . . .

No benefit at all because communal land in this village was distributed by the Viet Cong back in 1954. Now the GVN has taken it back to reallocate to all villagers. Each is required to pay only VN\$100 per year to the village budget for the use of communal rice land and may enjoy in full the crops he produces. . . .

from Quang Tin:

Communal rice land here is rented out by means of auction (competitive bidding) to raise money to build a village temple and secondary school. . . .

- . . . the income resulting from auctioned village rice land is used to cover village administrative expenditures.

All the income resulting from communal rice land is divided equally among all villagers. . . .

. . . to cover the village budget. . . .

from Quang Ngai:

To cover village administrative expenditures and help the PSDF members whenever they suffer accidents.

To sustain the village PSDF members. . . .

About one in five said they receive no benefits. The following responses are typical:

We haven't received anything beneficial as yet.

Nothing worth mentioning.

There is but a little communal rice land here; therefore no concrete benefits have been observed.

Some public works have been observed but nothing really very helpful.

No benefit has been observed as yet.

It is perhaps useful to remind the reader of the obvious, that: (1) if the answer is nothing it is difficult and useless to say anything much about nothing. (2) Plots of communal land in villages of MR 1 are very tiny and 75% of them are leased at token rents, some at no rent at all. Village income from them probably does not amount to much and personal benefits from partial indirect effects of the use of income which does not amount to much would amount to less than not much. (3) Although villages in coastal MR 1 are

safer now than they were in 1969 or 1964, many villages still suffer or imagine enough enemy threat to operate at more than once-normal security expenses and at less than once-normal faith in all villagers. Consider the following responses:

Although this village has been considered pacified for so long now, Communist action has often been observed. So, how could we have benefits under such hard conditions?

Viet Cong activity is still to be seen . . . the village authorities cannot have enough income to provide benefits for villagers when village rice land here has just been recultivated for a few harvests, as of now. . .

(4) Government per se, whether local or national government, is a web within which we live and thrive, but its effects are largely remote, indirect, and preventive rather than direct and positive. Aside from efforts by an enemy, of government anywhere and everywhere it is the absence of local anarchy, the diminution of theft and crime, the prevention of epidemic diseases, etc. that are the effects of government on the citizen. Would not a citizen in a small town in the U.S.A. be hard put to name benefits he receives from, say, the town retail sales tax or the state income tax because he receives them indirectly and is not aware of them?

One cannot assume that because 19% said they receive no benefits from income from communal land that 19% are dissatisfied with the system. No truly critical response was made by any villager.

Do Those Who Need It Receive It? Table 8 shows, by province, that most villagers in all provinces regard the allocation of communal rice land as equitable.

Why Some Who Need It Do Not Receive It: Those who said they know of families

who need communal rice land but do not receive it gave the following reasons:

- 37% said there is not enough communal rice land for all the needy
- 28% said some of the needy are not legal residents of the village
- 17% said some of the needy were not born in the village
- 8% said allocation is difficult or impossible because of insecurity
- 4% said some of the needy can neither afford to bid for land auctioned nor afford to farm

Among provinces: In Quang Tri traditional requirements of nativity exclude some who are in need. In Thua Thien there is not enough communal rice land for all who need it. In Quang Nam insecurity is the largest problem but shortage of communal rice land is also a major one. In Quang Tin the requirement of residency excludes most of those who need it and do not obtain it, and the shortage of communal rice land excludes some others. In Quang Ngai the problem is overwhelmingly that there is not enough communal rice land for all who need it.

Why Some Who Do Not Need It Receive It: Those who said they know of families

who do not need communal rice land but do receive it gave the following reasons:

- 55% said those not needing it have a legal right to communal rice land by tradition
- 21% said persons not needing it receive it because they are natives (which is one form of tradition)
- 8% said persons not needing it receive it because they rent it from others (but the others received the right to sublease it, and those who sublease presumably pay the market price)
- 6% say that, in their villages, anyone, needy or not, may till communal rice land because insecurity has reduced the population and reduced the demand for farm land

In sum, if from Table 8, we add up the responses under "few and "none" under each of the two questions province by province, we must conclude that

Table 8

Equity of Communal Rice Land Distribution, as Expressed by Villagers

<u>Questions and Responses</u>	<u>All of MR 1 (N=676)</u>	<u>Quang Tri (N=244)</u>	<u>Thua Thien (N=219)</u>	<u>Quang Nam (N=107)</u>	<u>Quang Tin (N=51)</u>	<u>Quang Ngai (N=55)</u>
Q: Are there any who need communal rice land but do not receive it?						
many	10%	2%	15%	9%	11%	33%
few	35%	48%	25%	14%	50%	41%
none	43%	31%	48%	75%	39%	15%
don't know	<u>12%</u>	<u>19%</u>	<u>12%</u>	<u>2%</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Q: Are there those who receive communal rice land but do not need it?						
many	1%	0	3%	1%	0	0
few	27%	32%	39%	2%	12%	13%
none	55%	44%	39%	95%	76%	74%
don't know	<u>17%</u>	<u>24%</u>	<u>19%</u>	<u>2%</u>	<u>12%</u>	<u>13%</u>
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

the distribution of communal land is as equitable as are most welfare systems in the U.S. or other countries. And when we consider why some who do not need communal rice land receive it, we see that tradition is the main barrier to more equitable distribution.

Have They Heard of the Land to the Tiller Law? Almost everybody has.

In Quang Tri 86% have, in Thua Thien 91%, in Quang Nam 96%, in Quang Tin 100%, and in Quang Ngai 98% have.

Do They Want Communal Rice Land To Be Distributed to Individuals? Most (53%) do not; 24% do. The rest are as yet undecided. The only province in which as many as 50% desire ownership of communal land by individual tillers is Quang Nam. See Table 9 and Figure 2.

More who are now tilling communal rice land (31%) than villagers not now tilling communal rice land (17%) agree that tillers should own the communal rice land they till. More of those not now tilling communal rice land (30%) than of those now tilling it (16%) are undecided.

Villagers' Reasons: Table 10 gives the main reasons why villagers agree or disagree that communal land should be distributed to individual tillers.

A major theme concerns the difficulties of distributing ownership of communal land to tillers in a fair and equitable manner.

Respondents who favor distribution of ownership qualify their statements with ". . . but those who are capable of making a better living ought


Table 9

Villagers Who Agree and Disagree that
 "Farmers Who Till Communal Rice Land Should Own That Land"
 (TCL Means Tiller of Communal Land. OV Means Other Villager)

<u>Responses</u>	<u>All of MR 1</u> (N=676)			<u>Quang Tri</u> (N=244)			<u>Thua Thien</u> (N=219)			<u>Quang Nam</u> (N=107)			<u>Quang Tin</u> (N=51)			<u>Quang Ngai</u> (N=55)		
	TCL	OV	All	TCL	OV	All	TCL	OV	All	TCL	OV	All	TCL	OV	All	TCL	OV	All
Agree	31%	17%	24%	9%	16%	12%	38%	7%	25%	69%	34%	50%	57%	22%	31%	18%	18%	18%
Disagree	53%	53%	53%	77%	37%	60%	37%	63%	49%	29%	52%	41%	43%	78%	69%	64%	43%	47%
Undecided	16%	30%	23%	14%	47%	28%	25%	28%	26%	2%	14%	9%	0	0	0	18%	39%	35%
<u>Totals</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Figure 2

Percentage of Villagers Who Agree and Disagree that "Farmers Who Till Communal Riceland Should Own that Land"



* Data for those who were undecided are omitted.

Table 10

Reasons Why Villagers Agree or Disagree that

Farmers Who Till Communal Riceland (CRL) Should Own that Land *

Reason	Quang Tri % (N=44)	Thu Thien % (N=41)	Quang Nam % (N=21)	Quang Tin % (N=26)	Quang Ngai % (N=28)	All Provinces % (N=160)
<u>Agree</u>						
Yes, provided that distribution is fair	14	17	05	00	18	12
Yes, if it is the will of the government	07	02	05	04	04	04
Other	05	05	14	00	00	04
<u>Disagree</u>						
Unfairness would result; ** Not enough CRL to go around	30	34	43	08	25	28
Violation of tradition; communal land cannot be owned by individuals	32	12	05	73****	30	29
CRL revenue needed for village budget & worship expenses	11	22	00	12	22	14
Other	01	07	28****	03	00	09

* Neutral responses and unclear responses were omitted.

** Unfairness to future generations is a frequent response.

*** Since most of these responses were not recorded verbatim by the interviewers, this percentage is open to question.

**** "Not practical due to insecurity" accounts for this high proportion of 'other' responses.

not to receive communal riceland," or ". . . but in reality there is not enough land for distribution in this village."

Examples:

Yes, I agree, but it is my judgment that expropriating privately-owned land is already a problem and that expropriating public land is still far more difficult. . . . This is quite a big problem which might result in vital conflict. . . .

If I may own the communal land I am now working on I would fertilize it much better to get more income. . . it is my observation that very few people will take good care of communal land in their third (last) year of their lease and that they will not fertilize it to increase production.

Yes, I agree because the tradition to allocate communal land only to the residents is practically unjust. It is my judgment that the Land to the Tiller law aimed at making needy people property owners is very reasonable and logical.

Yes I agree. However, application of the Land to the Tiller law in Central Vietnam is not appropriate because communal land here is not enough to allocate to each one hectare.

Yes I do, because in the last lottery I gained a portion of communal land of good quality.

Respondents who favor the status quo point out that there is not enough communal land to go around, and they express deep concern that future generations would not be served, that inequity of distribution would be bound to occur, and that social discord might result.

Two other important reasons mentioned frequently by those who do not favor distribution of CRL ownership are that it would violate tradition; and that village and hamlet expenditures and religious observations could not be financed without the revenue from communal land.

Examples:

Traditionally, it should be noted that communal riceland is the legacy of the village ancestors who had spent their hard labor to clear it to hand down to all villagers rotatively. Now, if it is taken away to distribute definitely to individuals it is contrary to what the ancestors had wanted.

It should be noted that village riceland is traditionally believed to have a god who protects it. Now, if it is taken away to give to a certain number of farmers, how may we villagers here have funds to make offerings to our god and implement the construction projects in the village every year?

No, I disagree. . . If communal rice land is to be expropriated to distribute to the tillers who are tilling it, from what possible source of income may we villagers here have to cover our yearly worship ceremonies and construction projects? As a result, I prefer to retain the present status of communal land unchanged. This is not only my own opinion but also that of the whole populace in this village, I think.

No, I disagree because as of now communal rice land has always been the common property of all villagers. Now if it is taken away to distribute to a certain number of people as their own, it will surely be unacceptable. From what other possible source of income may we have to perform the worship ceremonies and to cover the administrative expenditures of the Village Authority?

Why should we touch communal land to make things more complicated?

No, I disagree because this is the common interest of all villagers and must be tilled on a rotation basis. No one may own it individually.

Communal rice land is the legacy of the village ancestors left to all villagers to share and every one here would like the present system to remain unchanged.

I disagree because if ownership is transferred definitively to those who are tilling it future generations will have lost their interest.

. . . everyone here desires to retain the existing amount of communal rice land to cover worship ceremonies in commemoration of the village ancestors.

I disagree because I myself am allocated poor land but I may expect to receive a better plot in the future. It is a great loss to me if the portion of communal rice land which I am tilling is to be transferred to me definitively. It is of very poor quality.

. . . if communal land is made the property of present tillers, how and where can we get more for future generations? It is conclusive that inequity, confusion, and objections would be the consequence. For those civil servants and military men now serving outside their village, whose dependents still remain in the village, and for those who have had to leave their village because of war and who have not returned as yet, where can we get more communal land to distribute to them when they return home in the future? It should be noted too that communal land is land cleared by ancestors of families in the villages and that no one else may take it as his own. If so it is considered that ancestors are forgotten, and this would cause serious divisions in the village.

No, I disagree. I do not think communal rice land could possibly be divided proportionately. . . .

Those who are not eligible for communal land will show strong objections and discrimination against recipients of communal rice land in every community activity, thus causing feuds between one family and another. Those who are eligible for communal land dare not receive it because they will feel themselves unreasonably greedy.

No, I disagree because villagers living now in other places as refugees will have to suffer losses--their share of communal rice land will be taken away.

. . . from what other source of land may servicemen and civil servants have land when they return to the village in the future? There will be unfairness.

Communal land is the common property of all villagers. If it is taken away to distribute definitively to a certain number of tillers under the Land to the Tiller law I am afraid there will be a lot of questions and criticisms among us.

If communal rice land is taken away. . . how can we find other sources of income to take care of periodic worship ceremonies in the future?

I disagree. . . what can each tiller do with just a few square meters of land?

Communal land here is limited and people are so crowded it is really impossible to make every one a property owner. Even if it were possible we do not want it that way because if communal land is no longer available what other possible source of income may we have to take care of our yearly worship ceremonies in the village and to pay for construction while we are incapable of contributing to the village budget?

This is a big problem and I am quite sure that no one of us will agree because we are afraid that in so doing we will be losing all the bequest of our village ancestors who were the initial clearers of our present communal rice land.

. . . it is contrary to what the ancestors wanted. . . .

. . . those who are capable of making a better living ought not to receive communal land.

Conclusions: It is impossible to avoid the conclusions that if communal rice land is distributed in MR 1 a social hiatus will be created, as well as gaps in village budgets. The existence of village communal rice land seems to provide security against landlessness and destitution.

For many thousands of rural families it has recently provided security against destitution.¹¹ It also seems to promise a minimum initial stake to future generations. To distribute it to individual owners would run

11. See page 4 on the use of communal land to help destitute refugee families in the middle and late 1960's.

counter to tradition; to many villagers it is inconceivable that individuals could own communal land: the village is the owner and heir.

In sum, we found no pressing demand in villages in MR 1 for distribution of communal land. Only in Quang Nam, and there only by a slim majority, do more favor distribution than favor continuation of the present system.

We found most villagers satisfied that the systems of allocation and use of village communal rice land, they now have are equitable. We could not fail but be impressed by the quasi-religious feelings of villagers associated with the traditions of village communal land. Perhaps none of the above seeming barriers to distribution of communal land are unsurmountable, provided that there are sound reasons for the national government to distribute communal rice land to individual tillers and provided these can be communicated to the rural people and their village leaders in MR 1.

APPENDIX A

Form A: for use in interviewing villagers

Form B: for use in interviewing village officials

FORM A #CLI _____
_____ Village Official _____ Province
_____ Village Resident, but not _____ District
_____ Village Official _____ Village
_____ Tiller of Communal Rice Land _____ Hamlet

1. Are you a farmer?

_____ Yes (If 'yes,' go to questions 2 and 3. Don't ask question 1a.)

_____ No (If 'no,' go to question 1a.)

1a. What is your occupation?

_____ (Go to question 7. Don't ask questions 2 through 6.)

2. How much land do you till?

_____ (Indicate sao/hectares, etc.)

3. Do you own all of the land you till?

_____ Yes (If 'yes,' go to question 7. Don't ask questions 3a through 6.)

_____ No (If 'no,' go to question 3a.)

3a. Is any of the land you till owned by your village (hamlet)?

_____ Yes (If 'yes,' go to question 3b.)

_____ No (If 'no,' go to question 7. Don't ask questions 3b through 6.)

3b. How much of the land you till is owned by your village?

_____ (Indicate sao/hectares, etc.)

4. How did you receive the right to lease and till this land?
(More than one can be checked.)

_____ Bid, auction

_____ Lottery

_____ Allocation of shares to villagers

Special Eligibility

_____ War veteran

_____ Disabled war veteran

_____ Family of disabled veteran

_____ Family of deceased veteran

_____ Family of war veteran

_____ PF or PSDF

_____ Family of person in military service

_____ Landless

_____ Other Please Specify: _____

5. For how long were you given the right to till this land?

_____ Years

6. How much of your crop do you give to the village for allowing you to till this land?

_____ % of rice crop

7. What benefits do the people of your village receive from payment for the use of village rice land? (Write in response.)

8. Are there some families in your village who need land but do not receive the use of village land?

_____ Yes _____ Many? _____ Few? (Then go to 8a.)

_____ No (Go to question 9. Don't ask question 8a.)

_____ Don't know Go to question 9. Don't ask question 8a.)

8a. Why don't these families receive use of village land?

9. Are there any families in your village who have received village land but don't really need this land?

_____ Yes _____ Many? _____ Few? (Then go to 9a.)

_____ No (Go to question 10. Don't ask question 9a.)

_____ Don't know (Go to question 10. Don't ask question 9a.)

9a. Why do these families receive use of this land?

10. The Land-to-the-Tiller Law will give title to each farmer who is tilling the rice land.

(a) Have you heard of the Land-to-the-Tiller Law?

_____ Yes

_____ No

(b) Do you agree or disagree that farmers who are tilling village communal rice land should own that land?

_____ Agree

_____ Disagree

_____ Undecided/don't know

_____ Other Specify: _____

_____ Village Official

_____ Province

_____ Hamlet Official

_____ District

_____ Village

_____ Hamlet

1. How much communal rice land does your village (hamlet) own?

1a. What percentage is this of the village's (hamlet's) total rice land?

_____ %

2. Do any of the hamlets of your village own communal rice land which they administer themselves?

_____ Yes (If 'yes,' go to question 2a.)

_____ No

2a. Which hamlets have communal rice land of their own?

(Interviewer: Note instructions at end of page 4 after you complete this interview.)

3. Do any persons have special priority to till village (hamlet) communal rice land? (More than one can be checked, if necessary.)

_____ Allocation by village authority

_____ War veteran

3. (cont'd.)

_____ Disabled war veteran

_____ Family of disabled veteran

_____ Family of deceased veteran

_____ Family of war victim

_____ PF or PSDF

_____ Family of person in military service

_____ Landless

_____ Other Please specify: _____

4. By what means is the right to till village (hamlet) communal rice land given?

_____ Bid, auction

_____ Lottery

_____ Share

_____ Other Please explain: _____

5. How much communal rice land may one family lease?

6. Must those who are given the right to till village (hamlet) communal rice land be residents of the village (hamlet)?

_____ Yes

_____ No

6a. Must those who are given the right to till village (hamlet) communal rice land be natives of the village (hamlet)? (Note: "Native" means "born in that village.")

_____ Yes

_____ No

7. May village (hamlet) communal rice land be sublet to others?

_____ Yes

_____ No

8. For how long is the right to lease and till a plot of village (hamlet) communal rice land granted to a family?

9. May the use of village (hamlet) communal rice land be inherited?

_____ Yes

_____ No

10. Does everyone who leases village (hamlet) communal rice land pay the same price?

_____ Yes (If 'yes,' go to question 11. Don't ask questions 10a, 10b, and 10c.)

_____ No (If 'no,' go to question 10a, and end the interview.)

10a. What kinds of people pay less than others for leasing village (hamlet) communal rice land? (More than one can be checked, of course.)

_____ Allocation by village authority

_____ War veteran

APPENDIX B

Geographical Scope of the Sample:
 Districts, Villages, and Hamlets Sampled in
 Each of the Five Provinces of MR 1

Quang Tri Province

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Gio Linh	Gio Le	Ha Thuong
		Ha Thanh
	Gio Ha	Mai Xa Chanh
		Vinh Quang Thuong
Hai Lang	Hai Son	Ha Loc
		Luong Dien
	Hai Lam	Nhu Son
		Mai Dan
		Dien Sanh
	Hai Tho	Thuan Duc
		Tho Ong
	Hai Vinh	Cu Hoan
		Cau Nhi
	Hai Thien	Ha Lo
		Kim Long
	Hai Nhi	Hoi Yen
		Phuong Lang
	Hai Que	Co Luy
		Ba Du
	Hai Ba	Lam Thuy
		Phu Kinh
Hai Kinh	An Tho	
	Giap My	
Hai Truong	Giap Hau	
	Giap Trung	

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Quang Tri Province (cont'd.)

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Cam Lo	Cam Thai	Thuong Nguyen
	Cam Hung	Ba Thung
		Phan Xa
	Cam Hien	Lam La
Trieu Phong	Trieu Di	Ai Tu
	Trieu Tai	Ta Huu
		An Hung
		Tai Luong
	Trieu Do	An Gia
	Trieu Thanh	Nai Cuu
		Bich Dong
		An Tiem
		Bich La Dong
	Trieu Long	Tan Dinh
		Bich Khe
	Trieu Thuan	Phuc Loc
		Vo Thuan
		Duong Le Dong
	Trieu Dai	Dai Hoa
		Quang Luong
	Trieu Son	Linh Chieu
		An Phu
		Phuong Son
	Trieu Hoa	Ha My
	Trieu Giang	Phuoc My
	Trieu Trung	Ngo Xa Dong
		Xuan Duong
Trieu Trach	Le Xuyen	
	An Trach	
	Bo Ban	
	Long Quang	
Trieu Van	Tuong Van	
Trieu Phuoc	Vinh Lai	
Hai Quy	Quy Thien	
Trieu Thuong	Nhan Bien	
Hai Thuong	Thuong Xa	
Dong Hoa	An Binh	
Dong Luong	Trung Chi	
	Dai Ang	
	Vinh Phuoc	

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Thua Thien Province

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Phu Vang	Phu Duong	Duong No
		Trach Can
		Phu Khe
	Phu Mau	Khanh Xuan
		Pho An
		Khanh Xuan
		Tay Thuong
		Vong The Giang
		Mau Tai
	Phu An	Lai Triem
		Trieu Thuy
	Phu Tan	Trieu Nam
		An Truyen
Dien Truong		
Phu My	Tan My	
	An Luu	
	Duong Mong	
	My Cam	
	Vinh Ve	
	Tan My	
Phu Thuong	Trung Dong	
	Tay Tri Nhon	
	Trung Nam	
	La Y	
Phong Dien	Phong An	Thuong An
		Bo Dien
		Thuong An
	Phong Binh	Hien Si
		Van Trinh
		Hoa Vien
	Phong Loc	Vinh An
		Dai Phu
		Tuong Mai
	Phong Hoa	My Phu
		Uu Diem
		Trach Pho
		My Xuyen Cang

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Thua Thien Province (cont'd.)

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Phu Thu	Vinh Ha	Ha Trung I
		Ha Trung II
		Ha Trung III
		Ha Trung IV
		Ha Trung V
	Phu Da	Luong Vien
		Duc Thai
		Hoa Da Tay
		Lam Trung
		Hoa Da Dong
	Phu Ho	Su Lo Thuong
		Dong Nhi
Tay Ho		
Su Lo Dong		
Nam Hoa	Thuong Hoa	Kim Ngoc
		Dinh Mon
	Thuong Bang	Cu Chanh
		Bang Lang
Phu Loc	Loc Bon	An Nong Cu
		An Nong I
		An Nong II
	Loc Dien	Luong Dien Thuong
		Te Xuan
		Bach Thach
		Su Lo Dong
		Luong Dien Dong
		Vinh Vy
	Loc Son	Ban Mon
		Nam Pho Ha
	Loc An	Phu Mon
		Ha Vinh
	Loc Tri	Cao Doi Xa
		Trung An
Vong Tri		
Tuan Luong		
Dong Luu		

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Thua Thien Province (cont'd.)

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Huong Tra	Huong Chu	An Luu
		Co Buu
		Bon Pho
	Huong Long	An Ninh Ha
		An Ninh Thuong
		Truc Lam
		Van Xuan
	Huong So	My Lai
		Tri Le
		Doc So
	Huong Vinh	An Van Ha
		Trieu Son Nam
Trieu Son Dong		
Bao Vinh		
Huong Can	The Lai Thuong	
	Huong Can	
	Lieu Coc Ha	
Quang Dien	Quang Vinh	Co Lao
		Lai Trung
		Pho Lai
	Quang Phuoc	Lai Xa
		Thanh Can
		Khuong Pho
		Tranh Luc
	Quang Phu	Thach Binh
		Ha Lang
		Xuan Tuy
		Bao La
	Quang Loc	Phu Le
		Tay Thanh
		Phu Ngan
		An Thanh
		Dong Xuyen

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Quang Nam Province

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>	
Que Son	Phu Hiep	Phu Luong Xuan Thieu	
	Phu Thanh	Thanh My	
	Phu Huong	Huong Que	
	Phu Dien		Phu Trach II Phu Trach III
		Phu Phong	Phu Trang
	Hoa Khanh	Da Son	
	Hoa Tho	Cam Bai	
	Hoa Chau	Phong Nam	
	Hoa Phat	Ngai An	
	Hoa Thanh	Cam Hoa	
	Hoa Lan	Thi An	
	Hoa Vinh	Van Duong	
	Hoa Lac	Quang Nam	
	Hoa Long	Khui Bac	
	Hieu Nhon	Cam Kim	Ngoc Thanh
		Cam Chau	Son Pho
	Dai Loc	Loc An	Nghia Dong
Hieu Duc	Hoa Hung	Thuy Loan	
	Hoa Luong	Goc Kha	
Duy Xuyen	Xuyen My	Ba Long Xuyen	
	Xuyen T	Trung Dong	
	Xuyen Kieu	Tra Kieu Thuong	
	Xuyen Chau	Xuyen Tay	
	Xuyen Quang	Cau Lau	
	Xuyen Hiep		Kieu Son Kieu Son II
Duc Duc	Xuyen Phu	My Son	

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Quang Nam Province (cont'd.)

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Dien Ban	Vinh Hoa	Ngoc Tam
		Bang An
	Thanh Phong	Phong Nhi
	Thanh Truong	Phong Ngu
	Thanh Minh	Phong Ho
	Vinh Tho	Triem Trung
		Triem Tay
		Thanh Chiem
	Vinh Xuong	Vinh Dien
		Uat Ly Dong
		La Qua
	Vinh Phuoc	Khui Luy
	Vinh Ha	
Hoa Vang	Hoa Khanh	Da Son
	Hoa Tho	Cam Bac
	Hoa Chau	Phong Nam
	Hoa Hiep	Xuan Thieu
	Hoa Phat	Nghi An
	Hoa Thinh	Cam Hoa
	Hoa Lan	Thi An
	Hoa Vinh	Van Duong
	Hoa Lac	Quang Nam
	Hoa Long	Khue Bac

Quang Tin Province

Thang Binh	Binh Nam	Thai Dong
	Binh Trung	Dong Xuan
	Binh Nguyen	Ha Lam
		Lieu Tri
	Binh Sa	Binh Truc

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Quang Tin Province (cont'd.)

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Thang Binh (cont'd.)	Binh Giang	
	Binh Dao	
	Binh Phuc	Binh Hoa
		Ngoc Son
		Tai Vien
		Binh Hiep
	Binh Tu	Tu Phuong
		Tu Cam
		Tu My
		Tu Ngoc
	Binh An	An Duong
		An Thanh
		An Thai
Ly Tin	Ky Chanh	Duc Bo
	Ky Sanh	Da Phu
	Ky Luong	
	Ky Ha	Xuan Trung
Tam Ky	Ky Ly	Chien Dan
	Ky Bich	Bich Tan
	Ky Anh	Quy Thuong
		Kin Doi
	Ky Hung	Phu Trung
	Ky Huong	Ba Ban
	Ky Phu	Ha Thanh
		Phu Thanh
	Ky My	
	Ky Trung	Ban Long
	Ky Nghia	Trung Dan
		Khanh Think
	Ky Binh	Tu Hoi Tay
	An Thanh	
	Tu Hoi Dong	

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Quang Ngai Province

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Duc Pho	Pho Long	Vinh Hien Nam Vinh Hien Bac
	Pho Binh	An Truong Binh Lac
	Pho Hung	Tap An Bac
	Pho Trung	Dien Truong
	Pho Thach	
	Pho Trang	
Binh Son	Binh Giang	
	Binh Sa	Binh An
	Binh Thanh	Phu Loc
	Binh Van	Giao Thuy
	Binh Phuong	My Yen
		Binh Xuan
	Binh Nghia	My An
	Binh Thang	Nam Binh
		Chau Tu
		An Diem II
	Phuoc Hoa	
Son Tinh	Son Huong	The Cong
	Son Trung	Tho Loc
	Son Long	Phu Hoa
		An Buong
		Phu Nhon
	Son Thanh	Phu Loc
	Son Hoi	An Loc
	Son Hoa	Phu Binh
		Phu Thanh
	Son Kim	
Mo Duc	Duc My	Thach Tru
	Duc Quang	Bo De
	Duc Vinh	Dong Cat

APPENDIX B (cont'd.)

Quang Ngai Province (cont'd.)

<u>District</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>Hamlet</u>
Nghia Hanh	Nghia Chanh	Long Ban
	Nghia Khuong	Dai An
	Nghia Hung	Hiep Pho Nam
Tu Nghia	Tu Luong	An Nang II
	Tu Nguyen	Xuan Quang Nam
	Tu Thanh	Phuoc Long
	Tu Duy	An Ha
	Tu Binh	Chau Thanh
	Tu An	La Ha
	Tu Chanh	Go Phu
	Tu Hoa	Nhu Nang
	Tu Quang	Thu Pho Dong
	Tu Thuan	Phu An I

APPENDIX C

Hamlet Communal Rice Land in MR I

According in GVN law a village is a legal entity; a hamlet is merely a cluster of farmers or subcommunity within the village. But in coastal Central Vietnam hamlets evolved by communities moving out from parent villages to clear and settle new lands nearby. In tradition reaching farther back in time than present GVN laws governing villages, to Annamese the hamlet is a community--a little village.

Hamlets often own hamlet communal land, including hamlet communal rice land. To ascertain whether the uses of hamlet communal land differ much from those of village communal rice land, the interviewers sought out hamlets reported by village officials to possess hamlet communal land, and asked hamlet officials the same questions, about allocation systems and communal land use, that they had put to village officials. 112 hamlet officials were interviewed.

How Much of Hamlet Rice Land Is Hamlet Communal Land: According to hamlet officials:

in Quang Tri	50% is
in Thua Thien	55% is
in Quang Nam	61% is
in Quang Tin	34% is
in Quang Ngai	none is

Other data, from Province Land Affairs Services records, indicates, how-

ever, that at least a few hamlets in Quang Ngai own some communal land, or once did.¹

Land for Revenue: Most all hamlets that possess communal land, like villages, reserve a portion, from 20-25%, for auction by competitive bidding at the highest price possible.

Land for Subsistence for All: Most all hamlets possessing communal land, like villages, use most of it, 75-80%, as a small subsidy to all living in the hamlet.

How Hamlets Allocate Communal Rice Land: Hamlet methods of choosing beneficiaries are the time-worn ones used by villages: by bid if for revenue, by lottery equally among all, and if there is enough for one plot for each family, by shares. See the table below. _____

How Hamlets Allocate Communal Rice Land

<u>Province</u>	<u>Competitive Bidding</u>	<u>Lottery</u>	<u>Share</u>	<u>Other</u>
Quang Tri	9%	61%	21%	9%
Thua Thien	46%	31%	16%	7%
Quang Nam	33%	38%	21%	7%
Quang Tin	13%	38%	21%	7%

1. See M. J. Korin, "Report on I CTZ Field Trip April 13-27, 1970," (ADLR, USAID files)

Who or What Determines Who Gets It: In Quang Tri 79% of the hamlet officials say the hamlet chief decides who gets hamlet communal land. In Thua Thien 68% say the hamlet chief decides. In Quang Nam 50% say the hamlet chief decides. In Quang Tin no hamlet officials say the hamlet chief decides; all say the welfare priorities of the system decide. Hamlet systems of allocating their communal land, like village systems, suggest that the northernmost provinces of MR 1 are more traditional and less modern than the southernmost.

Welfare Priorities: Hamlets possessing hamlet communal land in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Tin grant a high priority to families of deceased or disabled veterans. In Thua Thien they also grant a high priority to families of war veterans generally and to members of the PF and PSDF. In Quang Tin they grant a high priority to the landless.

Residency or Nativity Requirements: In Quang Tri 96% of the hamlet officials say that to receive hamlet communal land one must have been born there. In Thua Thien 64% say one must have been born there and 26% say one must live there. In Quang Nam all say their hamlets require both. In Quang Tin 93% say their hamlets require that one live there and 45% also require that one have been born there.

Whether One May Sublease or Inherit a Lease: In Quang Tri, in all hamlets possessing hamlet communal land all officials say one may sublet;

none say one may inherit unused lease rights. In Thua Thien 57% say one may sublet; 74% say one may inherit a lease. In Quang Nam 33% say in their hamlets one may sublease but in none may one inherit lease rights. In Quang Tin 43% say one may sublease but in none may one inherit lease rights.

Size of Hamlet Communal Rice Land Plots: In Quang Tri the average size is 2.87 sao (.143 hectares). In Thua Thien it is 3.38 sao (.165 hectares). In Quang Tin it is 2.67 sao (.133 hectares).

Tenure: In all four provinces of MR 1 in which hamlets possess communal land tenure, the 75-80% allocated equally to all or with equal chance to all or to special welfare cases is leased for three years. In Thua Thien almost all hamlets possessing hamlet communal land lease the 20-25% that they put up for bidding (to raise money) for one year.

Rent: Like village use of village communal land, hamlets possessing communal land rent most of their land (75-80%) at a token price. Most rent most of their land at the same price per plot and most exceptions to this are explained by the differences in the quality of the plots. Some hamlets in Thua Thien rent hamlet communal land at a price even lower than the token rent charged all hamlet dwellers, to members of the PF and PSDF.