

**LAND REFORM IN VIETNAM
WORKING PAPERS
Volume IV, Part 1
Surveys and Analyses Related
to Land Tenure Issues**

Prepared for:

THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA, USA



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Volume IV, Part 1 of 2
Surveys and Analyses Related
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


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CONTENTS

1	INTRODUCTION	1
	Objectives of the Study	1
	Land Ownership in the Political Struggle	2
	Sample Surveys Conducted	4
	The Hamlet Resident Survey	5
	The Absentee Landlord Survey	6
	Size Distribution of Holdings	7
	Acknowledgments	8
2	SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF RURAL RESIDENTS OF THE SOUTHERN REGION . 11	
	Household Characteristics	11
	Salient Characteristics of the Delta Farmer	12
	Occupational Status of Households	20
	Literacy	22
	Religion	23
	Ethnic Groupings	23
	Size of Households	24
	Rural Population Mobility	25
	Rural Refugees	26
	Rural Aspirations	27
	Impact of Change on Vietnamese Culture	28
	The Farmers' Relationships with Village Officials	28
	Personal Security of Hamlet Residents	32
	Farm Production and Income	34
	Indebtedness, Interest Rates and Credit Needs	40
	The Marketing System for Farmers' Products	47
	Farm Supplies and Equipment	48
	Improved Farm Technology	50
	Status of Dwellings	52
	Farmers' Ownership of Durable Goods and Working Livestock	53
3	STATUS OF LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIPS	57
	Background	57
	The Landlord Class	58
	Rental Collection, Legality, and Problems	69
	Land Rental and Lease Contracts	74

CONTENTS

3 Continued

Disputes Over Land Tenure 76

The Landlords' Role in Assistance to Tenants 77

4 LAND REFORM AS A PACIFICATION MEASURE RELATED TO THE DESIRE
FOR LAND 81

Land Reform as a Pacification Measure 81

The Desire of Farmers for Land 82

Desire To Own Land as Affected by Security 89

Priorities in Extending Land Ownership 93

Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Ordinance 57 94

 The Impact of Ordinance 57 on Land Ownership 94

 Hamlet Resident Survey Findings Related to Ordinance 57 . . . 95

 Absentee Landlord Survey Findings Related to Ordinance 57 . . 95

Future Land Redistribution Programs 106

Land Titles 108

Sale of Communal Lands 109

5 IMPACT OF PAST AND FUTURE LAND DISTRIBUTION 113

Degree of Land Scarcity in Vietnam 113

Land Availability in Asian Countries That Have Resisted Com-
munist Insurgency 113

Land Scarcity of Indo-Chinese Peninsula Countries 116

Inequality of Ownership Size Distributions in Selected East
Asian Countries 121

Land Reform Programs in Selected East Asian Countries 122

 Japan 122

 Korea 125

 The Republic of China 126

 Vietnam 128

Land Scarcity Within the Three Regions of the Republic of
Vietnam 130

Effectiveness of Land Redistribution 134

 French Lands 134

 Ordinance 57 Lands 135

Future Redistribution 137

CONTENTS

5 Continued

Current Demand for Land Ownership	142
Communal Land	145
Supply of Undistributed Ordinance 57 and French Lands	146
Potential Farm Owners on Public Lands	146
Redistribution of Privately Owned Lands	149
Private Lands Available from Lowering of the Retention Limit	149
Land Distribution in the Central Lowlands	152
Cost Estimates for Expropriating Private Lands	154
Political Aspects of Land Redistribution	156
 GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS	 159
 ANNEX	 165
 INDEX	 175

ILLUSTRATIONS

1	Location of Areas, Hamlets, Villages, and Province Capitals Visited in the Surveys, Southern Region, Republic of Vietnam, 1967	15
2	Lorenz Curves Showing the Size Distribution of Farm Ownership Holdings by Groups of Provinces, the Southern Region, Republic of Vietnam, SRI, Hamlet Resident Survey, 1967	21
3	Southern Region of the Republic of Vietnam, 1968	66
4	Relationship of Population to Total Land Area for Selected Countries, 1965	119
5	Density of Agricultural Population to Arable Land in Selected Countries	120
6	Lorenz Curves Showing the Size Distribution of Farm Holdings in the Republic of Vietnam (1960-61), Korea (1945 and 1955), and Taiwan (1960-61)	123
7	Lorenz Curves Showing the Size Distribution of Farm Holdings in the Southern Region, Republic of Vietnam, 1967	129
8	Lands in Regions III and IV Expropriated Under Ordinance 57	140
9	Former French Lands in Regions III and IV	141

TABLES

1	Composition of Rural Household Sample in the Hamlet Resident Survey in the Southern Region, 1967	13
2	Farm Cropping Pattern in the Southern Region, 1966	18
3	Average Size of Farm or Unit Held by Type of Tenure and Cultivation, by Areas in the Southern Region, 1967	19
4	Farmer Opinion and Knowledge of Village Council Activities in the Southern Region, 1967	31
5	Viet Cong Hamlet Activities as Reported by Residents in the Southern Region, 1967	34
6	Rice Production and Sales--Comparison Between Rural Income and Expenditure Survey and Hamlet Region Survey Results in Southern Region, 1964 and 1966	36
7	Value of Rice Produced--Comparison Between Rural Income and Expenditure Survey and Hamlet Resident Survey Results in the Southern Region, 1964 and 1966	37
8	Receipts from Sales of Farm Products--Comparison Between Rural Income and Expenditures Survey and Hamlet Resident Survey Results in the Southern Region, 1964 and 1966	37
9	Value of Rice Produced by the Hamlet Resident Survey Sample in the Southern Region, 1966	38
10	Farm Operator Gross Income from Sales of Farm Products in the Southern Region, 1966	39
11	Open-Ended Views of Priorities by Rural Residents on What Is Needed To Solve Local Problems and Improve Family Living Conditions in the Southern Region, 1967-68	41
12	Indebtedness Status by Areas of the Southern Region, 1967	42
13	Annual Rate of Interest Paid on Loans in the Hamlet Resident Survey Sample in the Southern Region, 1967	43
14	Ranges of Interest Rates, Village of Khanh Haun, 1958	44
15	Usual Source of Money Borrowed by Rural Residents in the Southern Region, 1967	45

TABLES

16	Availability to and Use of Farm Supplies by Farm Operators in Southern Region, 1967	49
17	Use of Fertilizer by Farm Operators	49
18	Location of Landlords Who Rented Land to Tenants and Owner- Tenants in Villages in the Southern Region, 1967	59
19	Average Size of Parcel Rented Out and Number of Tenants per Landlord in the Southern Region, 1967	60
20	Location and Ownership of Lands Farmed by Village Residents in the Southern Region, 1967	61
21	Provinces Where Land Was Expropriated According to Land Registration Records, Ordinance 57, 1956	63
22	Land Ownership Holdings of Landlords Expropriated Under Ordinance 57, 1956, by Residence of Owner	64
23	Location of Land Ownership Holdings of Landlords Expropri- ated Under Ordinance 57, 1956, by Residence of Owner	65
24	Communist Control of Ordinance 57 Expropriated Lands, 1956 and 1968 Absentee Landlord Survey Sample	69
25	Fixed Rent Paid in Kind by Landless Tenants Compared with Total Value of Rice Production, by Areas of Southern Region, 1966	73
26	Hectares of Land Owned or Retained by Sample of Landlords Whose Lands Were Expropriated Under Ordinance 57	96
27	Value of Land Set by Landowners and Compensation Received by Landowners Whose Land Was Expropriated Under Ordinance 57	103
28	Cadastral and Agricultural Cultivated Area and Population Density for Republic of Vietnam and Selected Countries	114
29	Cadastral and Agricultural Area and Population Statistics for Countries on the Indochinese Peninsula	117
30	Estimated Density of Rural Population in Relation to Cadastral and Riceland Area by Regions	131

TABLES

31	Distribution of French Lands by Province	134
32	Impact of Redistribution of Ordinance 57 Lands	136
33	Potential Impact of Distributing Land Available Under Current Programs; Undistributed Ordinance 57 and Former French Lands, 1968	138
34	Number of Small Landowners Who Are Potential Recipients of New Land and Amount of Land Needed, 1967	143
35	Demand for Ownership of Land, Southern Region	145
36	Estimated Number of Family Farms That Could Be Created by Subdividing the Undistributed Communal Ricelands, Southern Region	147
37	Distribution of Undistributed Ordinance 57, French, and Communal Lands, Southern Region	148
38	Estimated Number of Farm Families That Could Be Resettled on Their Own Farms by Redistributing Communal, Ordinance 57, and Former French Lands	150
39	Estimated Number of Landlords Whose Land Would Be Expropriated Compared with New Owners Who Would Receive Land in the South- ern Region, 1968	157

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Objectives of Study

This volume is focused on those socioeconomic and political considerations relevant to the formulation of land reform policy appropriate to the Republic of Vietnam under present conditions of insurgency. Article I-A-(ii) of contract AID/VN-8 stated that one objective of the study is to overcome critical deficiencies in present land tenure information by "generating the data not now available but essential for execution of existing programs and formulation of new land policies." Article I-B-2 further specifies that "this element of the Research Program will consist of a series of studies, relying upon sophisticated analytical techniques, where appropriate aimed at overcoming critical gaps in AID and GVN understanding of land tenure issues." Among the studies mentioned, the following are relevant to this volume:

- "(i) Villager Survey--Careful analysis, based upon systematic field interviews to determine the nature, importance and impact of land tenure issues at the village level. Among the questions to be explored are: importance of land tenure issues compared to other problems of village life; dissatisfactions with rental levels; experience with Viet Cong (VC) land policies; reaction to village and GVN roles in administration of land tenure programs; attitudes toward land owners; and so forth. It is recognized that the difficulty of this survey will require experimentation with alternative questionnaires, undertaking pre-tests, and use of valid sample design, and careful consideration of interpretive pitfalls.

- "(iii) Size Distributions of Holdings--Determination of existing distribution by size of land ownership and residence of owners. The purpose of this study is to provide information on the amount of land that would become available in various parts of the country for redistribution if ownership-retention were reduced."

The findings of the above villager sample surveys form an important part of this volume.

The sample surveys were designed to elicit matters of fact, attitude, and opinion, particularly of the rural population concerned with the land, its ownership and cultivation, and the tenurial relationships that bind the rural society together. The object of these surveys was to understand the rural condition--social and economic--and those attitudes, opinions, and relationships that would throw light on the experience with the land reform program of 1956, the strength of the desire for land ownership, and the circumstances and conditions under which a new land reform program could substantially contribute to strengthening the political ties between the government and the people.

This volume is concerned with a description of economic conditions as these are related to farmers, the dominant residents of the countryside. Land ownership and tenurial relationships are explored. The surveys sought to obtain an understanding of the attitudes and opinions of Vietnamese farmers and nonfarmers and how they assess the present land tenure situation, the previous land reform program, and any new program of land reform that may be undertaken.

Land Ownership in the Political Struggle

A major objective in both the surveys mentioned was to obtain the attitudes of the land-owning and the landless classes so that it will be possible to design a future land reform program that will, on the one hand, meet the aspirations of the landless, and on the other hand, satisfy and not alienate the larger landowners.

Basic to an analysis of GVN policy alternatives is the question of the intensity of the peasant's desire for land ownership. The basic issue is whether a policy for extending the ownership of land to a substantial proportion of the landless and land-poor farmers will in any significant manner affect their political position and shift their allegiance and support in some useful degree from the Viet Cong to the GVN. A major shift in the political orientation of the landless and the land poor in the country to the GVN could conceivably determine the future outcome of the war.

Suitable satisfaction of the desire to own land may not necessarily produce an immediate swing of the rural population to the side of the GVN. Personal security is of the greatest and overriding importance, and the farmer's decision will be affected by the extent to which the

GVN is also able to provide security for him and his family. Thus, the military program and the pacification effort must be carried out simultaneously. There must also be credibility in the GVN program, in the sense that the farmers will believe in what the GVN proposes and actually supports in implementation.

The land reform program has had comparatively low priority in the pacification effort to date, including the completion of distribution of lands already in government hands from the previous land acquisition programs, and any new land reform initiatives that might be undertaken. Crucial to the decision to put a higher priority on land reform are (1) the strength of the farmers' desire to own land and (2) the effect of a program to extend land ownership on the political situation through attracting more support for the government. Some persons believe that permanent land tenure is an adequate substitute for land ownership and that the allegiance of the farmer can be gained most effectively by modernizing agriculture and introducing rural prosperity. A corollary argument, over which there has been much controversy among policy makers, is whether a new land reform program redistributing land from those who own large tracts to those who are landless would eventually have a political impact of some magnitude on the course of the war in favor of the GVN. The presumption so far appears to have been that such a measure at this time, when the GVN is hard-pressed, could only have the effect of alienating the landed interests who are giving it their support. It is argued by the opponents of land reform that such a measure could produce the dangerous consequence of "upsetting the political applecart," which would endanger survival of the Government.

The proponents of land reform argue that this measure is needed precisely for the purpose of winning the war, that land reform, especially a policy of land redistribution, is needed to achieve the political goal of obtaining a greater commitment on the part of the rural people, to induce them to lay aside passivity, to reduce their support to the Viet Cong, and to switch their allegiance to the forces of the Government.

In framing agrarian policy, present emphasis in achieving national production objectives and in winning over the farmer is to follow a policy designed to create rural prosperity by a rapid expansion in planting the "miracle" IR-8 rice and providing adequate fertilizer and pesticides, better breeds of pigs, and improved equipment. The other dimensions of land tenure improvement and extension of ownership have received less emphasis in recent years despite major achievements from 1955 to 1960 in the face of deteriorating security in the countryside and growing political instability.

To the landless and the land poor farmers, the neglect of this second element of a comprehensive agrarian policy--more extensive landownership--may mean the difference between getting social justice or injustice. History has shown in other countries that the full creative and physical energies of farm people are most effectively harnessed if programs to modernize farm technology and the institutions that serve rural people are combined with a land reform program that gives farmers the satisfactions derived from receiving social justice.

The issue of social justice is explored to the extent that this can be done in a sample survey--in part by determining to what degree there may be economic exploitation, and in part by determining whether the desire for land ownership is a critical issue to farmers in Vietnam. This matter is pursued extensively in a number of questions in the surveys.

In addition, the volume includes a study of the inequalities in the ownership and holdings of land by farmers and the related question of absentee ownership. This part of the study was done particularly to satisfy the terms of the contract that required a specific exploration of the size distribution of land holdings. Factual data on the size distribution of land ownership measure inequalities of holdings and can also expose the existence of other inequalities. In addition, this factual information becomes the basis for the calculation necessary for evaluating alternative land retention policies, the amount of land that might become available for redistribution from each alternative, and the numbers of people, both landlords and tenants, who would be affected by the acquisition and redistribution policy.

Sample Surveys Conducted

The contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development required a villager survey to explore attitudes and opinions and other characteristics relative to the land tenure and land reform issue. In fact, all four of the sample surveys conducted in the project provided information that was used in this volume and that was of special relevance to problems of land tenure and land reform. Most of the data in this volume are from the Hamlet Resident Survey and the Absentee Landlord Survey, but some useful and relevant information was also obtained from the Village Administrative Chief Survey described in Volume II, and the information on the size distribution of ownership based on village tax assessments was obtained from the Provincial Land Service Chief Survey. (See Volume II.)

The Hamlet Resident Survey and the Absentee Landlord Survey were undertaken with the primary purpose of seeking illumination on policy decisions that must be faced by the GVN in approaching the problem of land tenure improvement and land reform in the major rice growing area of Vietnam--the Southern Region--including the highly productive Mekong Delta. These surveys were designed to throw light on the current attitudes and opinions as well as the social and economic situations of the parties to such programs most likely to be involved. The aim of these studies was to obtain factual and attitudinal information for use by the policy maker in designing a better land tenure improvement and land reform program in the future.

The political context in which these surveys were carried out must be kept in mind. Aggressive rebellion is in progress all over the Southern Region and necessarily affected the Hamlet Resident Survey in the sense that it is probably biased toward conditions in the secure areas. Moreover, these conditions affect the attitudes and the positions recorded in the responses, and they reflect a dynamic and fluid situation in the Southern Region. It is an area where the competing interests and programs of the GVN and the Viet Cong strive daily to advance their own causes. The daily contention of the opposing forces over the entire area makes it clear that the presence of the Viet Cong must be recognized overtly because the GVN is constantly competing for the loyalty of its citizens with the designs and hostilities of the Viet Cong.

These two surveys and their methodologies and findings are discussed in detail in Part 2 of the volume (bound separately). Following is a brief description of the surveys.

The Hamlet Resident Survey

The Hamlet Resident Survey, as the title implies, was designed as a self-weighting sample survey in which all types of rural residents were to be interviewed in proportion to the probability of their appearance in the rural population. Thus, every type of social and occupation group would be represented in the sample. Because of relatively insecure conditions in many of the rural parts of the Southern Region, the survey was eventually conducted in 54 hamlets considered to be sufficiently secure for the safety of the interviewers.

In the attempt to avoid insecure hamlets, a certain amount of bias may exist in the results since it is probably true that conditions, attitudes, and opinions may be significantly different between the secure and the insecure hamlets.

The sharp deterioration of security conditions that followed the Tet offensive of January 30, 1968, led to a cancellation of plans for conducting similar surveys in the Central Lowlands. The findings discussed in this volume therefore relate almost entirely to conditions prevailing in the Southern Region.

It cannot be overemphasized that great caution should be used in extending the findings to other parts of Vietnam because they could lead to completely inaccurate and false conclusions. The same caution must also therefore apply to those criteria for an improved land tenure or land reform program that might follow from the findings based upon the Hamlet Resident Survey of the Southern Region.

The Absentee Landlord Survey

The Absentee Landlord Survey attempted to obtain information to complement the data obtained from the other surveys. The survey was undertaken as a means of exploring the attitudes and position of the large landowners of the Southern Region who had experienced land expropriation under Ordinance 57 of October 1956. The objective was to obtain better insights on how a future land acquisition and redistribution program based on the lowering of the private land retention limit should more appropriately be carried out. Among many related matters, the questionnaire was designed to probe the present economic situation of these landlords, their political attitudes toward land reform in general, and many specific issues of land reform such as the retention limit, the method of compensation, the determination of land values, and the landlords' relationship with the land and their tenants.

The Absentee Landlord Survey was conducted immediately after the Tet offensive during February and early March of 1968. It was confined to the Saigon metropolitan area and to Long Xuyen in the comparatively secure province of An Giang. Can Tho was to have been in the survey, but this city was badly damaged in the Tet offensive, and parts of it still remained insecure when the survey work was drawing to a close. The total sample includes 187 interviews consisting of 162 in Saigon and 25 in Long Xuyen. Considering the long time--10 to 12 years--since these individuals were identified by the Land Affairs Directorate General, it is surprising how many of them could still be found today. The proportion interviewed was 37 percent of the landlords whose land had been expropriated and who had been identified.

In conducting these surveys, Stanford Research Institute subcontracted with the Center for Vietnamese Studies, a privately incorporated nonprofit social science research institute which has operated in Saigon since 1954. The Center selected and hired the interviewers, conducted their training under SRI supervision, made important contributions to sample and questionnaire design, and participated in the field testing of the questionnaire and operating procedures. In addition, the Center performed all work of processing the data, including the checking of questionnaires.

Size Distribution of Holdings

As indicated earlier, a major objective of this volume, as requested under the contract, is to measure the size distribution of farm ownership and operator holdings. The main purpose is to determine how much land would be available for redistribution to the landless and the land-poor farmers if the ownership retention limit was reduced in a new land reform program. Another immediate purpose is to permit a comparison between the inequality of holdings between the Republic of Vietnam and other countries, especially countries of East Asia where land reform programs have been carried out in the post-World War II period.

With these objectives in mind, size distribution data were developed from both the Hamlet Resident Survey and the Provincial Land Office Chief Survey, the latter being based on the tax records of the villagers.

Related to measures of the inequality of holdings is also the question of the population density to available land. This is explored both internally in Vietnam and in comparison with countries of Asia and elsewhere in the world.

Also attempted is a measurement of the impact made by the Ordinance 57 land distribution program on the Southern Region and the possible impact of new redistribution programs on the ricelands of Vietnam. The new programs would extend land ownership in a number of categories, such as completion of the task of distributing government lands including undistributed, Ordinance 57 and former French lands; possible distribution of communal lands; and further extension of ownership to the landless by a reduction of private landowner retention limits.

Acknowledgments

All professional members of the 20-man multidisciplinary SRI research team engaged in field work in Vietnam participated in many aspects of these surveys including design, coordination, management, processing of material, and analysis of results.

The Hamlet Resident Survey was under the special personal supervision and participation of the project director, Dr. William Bredo. A special survey task group was formed to design, coordinate, and manage the survey. The task group in the initial months was under the leadership of Mr. Paul Slawson, development economist, and included Dr. Paul Taylor, economist and rural sociologist; Dr. Raymond Jessen, survey statistician; Mr. Jay Sumner, survey specialist; Miss Gertrude Peterson, sociologist; Mr. Randal Barrick, survey manager; Mr. Leonard C. Moffitt, land use planner; Mrs. Irene Longwell, computer programmer; and Mr. Nguyen Van Thuan, research adviser. After the departure of Mr. Slawson from the field in December, task force leadership was undertaken by Mr. Moffitt and Miss Peterson. During the field work, the Hamlet Resident Survey, as well as the other survey efforts, received strong support, guidance, and continuity from Mr. Robert Shreve, field director of the Land Tenure Project.

The survey task group was directly responsible for development and testing of the questionnaire, design of the sample, provision of operating procedures and scheduling, supervision of the interview teams, conduct of computer programming and processing of survey data, and coordination of data requirements with appropriate team members.

Special mention must be made of the role of Mr. Nguyen Van Thuan in the survey. Mr. Thuan has spent the last ten years in university level research in his country. His wealth of information concerning agriculture and rural society made him an outstanding adviser on local conditions and usages. He also made valuable contributions to the team in dealing with the subtleties and nuances of the Vietnamese language during the development of the questionnaire.

Much of the time of members of the survey task group was spent in the rural areas of the Southern Region to ensure uniform quality of the work and to become acquainted with rural conditions as the basis for proper planning of the effort.

The Absentee Landlord Survey was carried out under the leadership of Mr. Leonard C. Moffitt supported by some of the other staff members mentioned above. Credit for the original idea to undertake the Absentee

Landlord Survey belongs to Dr. John D. Montgomery, Professor of Political Science, Harvard University, who provided some of the original suggestions for the content of the survey.

The Village Administrative Chief Survey and the Provincial Land Service Chief Survey were both carried out under the leadership of Mr. Michael J. Aylward, working in close liaison with Mr. Donn E. Seeley, Task Leader for Land Administration; Mr. M. O. Edwards; Dr. John M. Hutzel; and special advisers Major Nguyen Thanh Toai and Miss Nguyen Le Chi.

SRI wishes to thank the Center for Vietnamese Studies for its fine work; the organization assisted effectively in every way in conducting the field work in the rural communities. Special mention must be made of the Director, Mr. Nguyen Khoa Phon Anh and the Associate Director, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Huong. In addition to its own staff, SRI was fortunate also in having the assistance of three U.S. professionals provided through the courtesy of CORDS and USAID who managed the operation of the three field teams. The SRI staff prepared all the questionnaires, designed the methodology, and managed the logistics of the survey teams in the field.

Survey plans, particularly the questionnaire design and content, were checked with senior staff at USAID and the GVN. Special mention must be made of the contributions of Mr. John L. Cooper, Special Assistant to the Director for Land Reform (USAID), for his great interest in this part of the project; Mr. Keith W. Sherper, Assistant Land Reform Adviser, and Mr. Nguyen Xuan Khuong and Mr. Cao Thanh Chuong, both specialists in the USAID Land Reform Adviser's office, who provided valuable assistance in connection with the survey planning effort. The questionnaire and the general plans for the survey were also submitted to the Government of Vietnam, particularly Mr. Ton That Trinh, then Minister of Land Reform and Agriculture, and Mr. Nguyen Van Trinh, formerly Director General of Land Affairs.

Volume IV was prepared by Dr. William Bredo, Project Director, with the substantial assistance of Dr. Paul S. Taylor, Miss Gertrude Peterson, Mr. William J. Tater, Mr. Alexander T. Cole, Mr. Constantine Glezakos, and Mr. Ronald Rasch. Research assistance in home offices was provided by Mrs. Nancy E. Lawry.

Mrs. Barbara A. Carey provided secretarial and administrative support throughout the project. In the field during the survey phase, secretarial support was provided by Miss Claudia G. Stockman and Miss Darlene N. Wheeler.

The overall land reform project was under the technical leadership and administrative management of Dr. William Bredo, Project Director, and Mr. Robert O. Shreve, Project Field Director.

Chapter 2

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF RURAL RESIDENTS OF THE SOUTHERN REGION

Household Characteristics

The population studied in the Hamlet Resident Survey (HRS) was designed to be representative of all households in rural hamlets in the Southern Region of Vietnam sufficiently secure to permit interviewing.*

The respondents in the survey were generally the head of household or the spouse of the head; 65 percent were household heads and 6 percent were spouses.† The remainder were qualified sons, daughters, or relatives. Since the respondents were predominantly heads of households and the information from spouses is not likely to vary much from that from the household head, no differentiation in the source of the information has been made.

Of the household heads, 79 percent were males. The respondents tended to reflect an older age bracket; more than half were over 50 years of age, and 29 percent were age 60 or over. The effect of the war in drawing off the male population may be seen in the fact that only 12 percent of the household heads were under 35 years old.‡ A special analysis of data showed that heads of households in three predominantly Hoa Hao provinces (Area II) were older than in the rest of the rural population, namely 58 percent were over age 50 and 32 percent were over 60.§ It is believed that the effect of the war in drawing away the younger men is shown in at least two ways: (1) the drafting of youth into GVN service

* The sample survey was conducted in 24 of the 27 provinces of the Southern Region. For purposes of analysis, the survey results were grouped into data on three different areas: Area I--six densely populated provinces in the Mekong Delta; Area II--three provinces where the Hoa Hao religion is predominant; and Area III--15 provinces in the more sparsely populated peripheral areas. Of the latter, the three provinces of Phuoc Long, Binh Long, and Binh Tuy were not surveyed because they were not considered to be riceland areas.

† HRS, Tables 4 and 5, Q147B, Q147C.

‡ HRS, Table 1, Q146A.

§ HRS, Table 346, Q146A.

has been heavier in the hamlets and (2) many youths migrate to cities like Saigon to obtain jobs and avoid being pressed into the Viet Cong forces. It is possible also that the age of the refugee population may be younger than that of the households that remain behind in the hamlet when conditions of security deteriorate.

Salient Characteristics of the Delta Farmer

The composition of the farm population for the several farm status groups, based on the findings of the Hamlet Resident Survey, is presented in Table 1 for the Southern Region and for the three areas (subregions) by which the sample results were analyzed. Figure 1 shows Areas I, II, and III of the Southern Region and the locations of the hamlets, villages, and province capitals surveyed. Part 2 of Volume IV gives details of methodology and location.

According to the sample survey, 64.9 percent of all rural households in the Southern Region were farm households. These are almost equally divided between those who own land and the landless. Those who own land consist predominantly of owners (40.8 percent) and owner-tenants (8.5 percent), for a total of 49.3 percent. Included in this group are landlords who reside in the hamlets--a group amounting to 7.7 percent of all farm households.* Landless households in the tenant group--33.9 percent of all farm households--are farm operators, and another group of 16.8 percent includes the landless farm laborers.

Another way of looking at farmers is in terms of their status as farm operators. The data show that farm operators are nearly equally divided into 49.1 percent owners and 50.9 percent renters. Some of the latter group (10.1 percent), however, are part owners, so that considered from the viewpoint of owning or not owning land, 59.2 percent of the farm operators own all or part of their land and 40.8 percent are landless farm operators or tenants. The 10.1 percent who are owner-tenants undoubtedly rent land to gain a better livelihood; it is surprising that this group is no larger proportionately among the farm operators since they have an important role in the tenure structure.

One would expect less reliability in the HRS sample results for any breakdown of tenure status information for parts of the Southern Region, but the data are believed to be of sufficient reliability to provide a close approximation of the existing situation. It is significant, then,

* This figure does not include the absentee landlords, who rented land to tenants in the villages surveyed but were themselves resident in "urban" areas not included in the HRS total of "rural" residents.

Table 1

COMPOSITION OF RURAL HOUSEHOLD SAMPLE IN THE
HAMLET RESIDENT SURVEY IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	<u>Area I</u>		<u>Area II</u>		<u>Area III</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Densely Populated Provinces*</u>		<u>Predominantly Hoa Hao Provinces†</u>		<u>Peripheral Provinces‡</u>		<u>All Provinces</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total sample	163	100.0%	214	100.0%	477	100.0%	854	100.0%
Farm households	94	57.7	150	70.1	310	65.0	554	64.9
Owners	40§	42.5	42**	28.0	144††	46.5	226	40.8
Owner-tenants	1	1.1	16	10.7	30	9.7	47	8.5
Tenants	48	51.1	50	33.3	90	29.0	188	33.9
Farm workers	5	5.3	42	28.0	46	14.8	93	16.8
Nonfarm households	69	42.3	64	29.9	167	35.0	300	35.1

* Provinces are: Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Phong Dinh, Vinh Long.

† Provinces are: An Giang, Chau Doc, Sa Dec.

‡ Provinces are: Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy, Tay Ninh, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Kien Giang, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Vinh Binh, Binh Tuy, Binh Long, Phuoc Long.

§ Includes 4 landlords who are nonfarm operators.

** Includes 3 landlords who are nonfarm operators.

†† Includes 14 landlords who are nonfarm operators.

Source: SRI, Hamlet Resident Survey, Tables 11, 289, 380A, 380B, 380C, 390A, 390B, and 390C.

Figure 1
 LOCATION OF AREAS, HAMLETS, VILLAGES,
 AND PROVINCE CAPITALS VISITED
 IN THE SURVEYS
 Southern Region, Republic of Vietnam
 1967



LOCATION OF AREAS, HAMLETS, VILLAGES, AND PROVINCE CAPITALS
VISITED IN THE SURVEYS*
SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1967

Provincial Land Office Survey		Village Admin. Chief Survey	Hamlet Resident Survey	Provincial Land Office Survey		Village Admin. Chief Survey	Hamlet Resident Survey
13 Provinces	Province Capital	37 Villages	54 Hamlets	13 Provinces	Province Capital	37 Villages	54 Hamlets
IV Region				P6 Kien Tuong Moc Hoa			
P1 An Giang	Long Xuyen	V1 Vinh Trach	H1 Tay Binh	P7 Phong Dinh	Can Tho	V20 Tuyen Thanh	H29 Ba Ken
		V2 Hoa Binh Thanh	H2 Hoa Thanh			V21 Thuong Thanh	H30 Thuong Thanh Cai-Rang
		V3 Long Dien	H3 Long Dinh			V22 Thoi Long	H31 Thoi My
		V4 My Hoi Dong	H4 My Thuan	P8 Sa Dec	Sa Dec	V23 Tan Vinh Hoa	H32 Vinh Thoi
		V5 Tan My	H5 Tan Hoa			V24 An Tich	H33 An Thanh 1
		V6 Tan Loc Dong	H6 Tan My			V25 Long Thang	H34 Long Dinh
(An Xuyen)	(Quan Long)	(Hoa Thanh)	H7 Tan Phong B	P9 Vinh Binh	Phu Vinh	V26 Phuoc Hao	
(Ba Xuyen)	(Thanh Huag)	(My Xuyen)	H8 Hoa My			V27 My Cam	
			H9 Can Gio	(Vinh Long)	(Vinh Long)	(Tan Luoc)	H35 Tan Hung
P2 Bac Lieu	Bac Lieu	V7 An Trach	H10 Khuc Treo			(Son Dinh)	H36 Dinh Binh
P3 Chau Doc	Chau Phu	V8 Phuoc Hung	H11 Phuoc Thanh			(Thanh My Hung)	H37 An Thanh
		V9 Da Phuoc	H12 Phuoc Quan	III Region			
		V10 Hoa Hao	H13 Trung 1	(Bien Hoa)	(Bien Hoa)	(Thien Tan)	H38 Thien Tan
		V11 Chau Phu	H14 Chau Long 2			(Tan Thanh)	H39 Tan Lai
P4 Chuong Thien	Vi Thanh	V12 Vi Thuy	H15 Vi Thanh			(Hiep Hoa)	H40 Tam Hoa
(Dinh Thong)	(My Tho)	V13 An Huu	H16 An Tri A	(Hau Nghia)	(Khien Cuong)	(Tan An Hoi)	H41 Ap Dong
		V14 Hoi Cu	H17 An Thien 2	P10 Long An	Tan An	V28 Truong Binh	H42 Hoa Thuan 1
		V15 Trung An	H18 Luong Tri	(Long Khanh)	(Xuan Loc)	(Dau-Giay)	H43 Nguyen-Hue
(Go Cong)	(Go Cong)	V17 Tan Nien Tay	H19 Giong Ong Ng			(Hieu-Kinh)	H44 Bao-Thi
P5 Kien Giang	Rach Gia	(San Tan Dinh)	H20 Cay Duong	P11 Phuoc Tuy	Phuoc Le	V29 Phuoc-Tho	H45 Phuoc-Thoi
		V18 Thanh Hoa	H21 So Tai			V30 Phuoc-Tinh	H46 Phuoc-Lam
		V19 Thanh Dong	H22 Dong Phuoc	P12 Tay Ninh	Tay Ninh	V31 Thai-Binh	H47 Binh-Phong
		(Dong Yen)	H23 Keo Ro 1			V32 Thai-Hiep-Thanh	H48 Thai-Ninh
(Kien Hoa)	(Truc Giang)	(An Hoi)	H24 Ap 2 Chau Thanh			V33 Thanh-Phuoc	H49 Phuoc Thanh
		(Binh Hoa)	H25 Binh An	Capital Special Zone			
(Kien Phong)	(Cao Lanh)	(Tan Thuan Dong)	H26 Dong Thanh	P13 Gia Dinh	Gia Dinh	V34 Thong Tay Noi	H50 Dong Tam 8
		(An Long)	H27 An Phu			V35 Hiep Binh	H51 Dong Tam 7
		(Long Khanh)	H28 Long Thanh B			V36 An Lac	H52 Binh Trieu
						V37 Dong Hung Tan	H53 An Lac 1
							H54 Cho Cau

* Provinces, Province Capitals and Villages in parentheses are provided for geographical reference purposes only. Only those numbered were actually included in the surveys. No Province, Villages or Hamlets were visited in either I or II regions as a result of the Viet Cong 1968 Tet offensive, which prevented all survey work planned for these regions.

in looking at the subregional data, that Area II--the Hoa Hao area--is the most rural (70.1 percent) and Area I--the densely populated central Delta provinces--is the least rural (57.7 percent), when considered in terms of the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture. Areas I and II have the highest proportion of landless farmers, and Area III has the highest proportion of those who own land.

Of the farm operators, approximately 9.2 percent cultivate rice exclusively or in combination with other crops, and 8.5 percent cultivate other crops exclusively, such as vegetables, other grains, fruits, and sugar cane.* Single cropping of rice is much more prevalent (61.8 percent) than multiple cropping including rice (5.1 percent). Production of broadcast rice takes up 14.2 percent of the riceland farmed in the Southern Region.† While no growth trends could be determined, the increasing importance of nonrice crops, such as vegetables, in the Delta is shown by the fact that 8.5 percent of the area in farms produces no rice at all, and another 10.3 percent grows other crops in addition to rice--nearly 20 percent of all riceland (Table 2).

The average farm operator in the Southern Region cultivated 2.85 hectares, which was somewhat larger than the average 2.21 hectares of the rice cultivator (Table 3). The Hoa Hao provinces (Area II) had 50 percent larger farming operations than the other areas, while in the six densely populated provinces, population pressure is made very evident by the small farm units in operation.

Owners and owner-tenants held 4.0 hectares on the average in the Region but much larger holdings were located in the Hoa Hao area (5.96 hectares), and they were even larger in Area I provinces (6.29 hectares). The amount of land rented out by landlords in the villages sampled tends to be small, only 2.63 hectares, but the average amount rented out outside the villages was 15.93 hectares.

An unexpected result is the large hectarage, owned by landlords resident in Area III and particularly Area I and rented out to tenants living outside the villages sampled; the figures were 11.71 and 44.67 hectares, respectively. The fact that the hectarage rented out in the villages by resident landlords tends to be low (2.63% with little regional variation) may

* HRS Tables 286 and 288.

† Broadcast rice, often called floating rice because it is grown under flooding, is grown in larger holdings. This accounts for the larger average farm size in the Hoa Hao area where broadcast rice is predominantly grown (Table 3).

Table 2

FARM CROPPING PATTERN IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1966
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	<u>Single Cropping</u>	<u>Multiple Cropping</u>	<u>Broad- cast Rice</u>	<u>Rice and Other Crops</u>	<u>Any Type of Rice Culti- vation</u>	<u>Other Crops (No Rice)</u>	<u>All Types Culti- vation</u>
Number of farmers [*]	273	22	64	73	395	121	440
Average number of hectares per farmer [†]	2.16	2.21	2.13	1.35	2.21	0.67	2.17
Percent of all land cultivated [‡]	61.80%	5.11%	14.23%	10.34%	91.48%	8.52%	100.0%

Note: "Number of farmers" row not additive in land cultivated by crop because some farmers cultivate more than one kind of crop and would appear more than once.

* HRS Tables 286 and 288; a ratio of 440 (total all farm operators) divided by 379 (farm operators with 61 filtered out of sample because of improper answers) was used to obtain an expansion factor of 1.161.

† HRS Tables 286, 287 and 288.

‡ HRS Table 287.

Table 3
 AVERAGE SIZE OF FARM OR UNIT HELD BY TYPE
 OF TENURE AND CULTIVATION, BY AREAS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
 (Hectares)

	Area I Densely Populated <u>Provinces</u>	Area II Predominantly Hoa Hao <u>Provinces</u>	Area III Peripheral <u>Provinces</u>	Total Southern <u>Region</u>
Ownership				
Average area per owner (including owner-tenants)*	6.29	5.96	2.82	4.0
Farm Operation				
Average operating farm size†	2.16	4.41	2.43	2.85
Average cultivated area per farm operator‡	1.31	3.12	2.03	2.17
Average riceland culti- vated per rice producer§	1.38	3.11	2.05	2.21
Tenancy				
Average rented in land per tenant (including owner-tenant)**	1.35	2.32	1.93	1.92
Average rented out land per landlord††	28.20	2.73	5.75	7.94
Average rented out land per landlord (inside village)††	3.50	2.88	2.36	2.63
Average rented out land per landlord (outside the village)††	44.67	1.75	11.71	15.93

* HRS Table 277.

† HRS Table 289, based on 440 farmers.

‡ HRS Tables 286, 287, based on 379 farmers.

§ HRS Table 288, based on 273 farmers.

** HRS Table 279.

†† HRS Table 278.

be explained by the many small owners who rent out land that they cannot farm themselves. Area I, the densely populated central Delta provinces, has a very unequal distribution of farm ownership and holdings (Table 3 and Figure 2).

Occupational Status of Households

According to the HRS survey, 65 percent of household heads classified themselves as farmers, including farmworkers, and 35 percent were non-farmers. The status categories were defined as mutually exclusive. The sample showed that 26 percent of family heads were owners, 22 percent were tenants and another 5 percent were owner-tenants.* Thus, the farming group consists of about 54 percent farm operators (including landlords who did not farm) and 11 percent farm workers. In the sample, about 13 percent of all households owning land classed themselves as landlords.†

When heads of households were questioned concerning their occupation, a high rate of involvement in farming was indicated by the tenants (91 percent) and even more by owner-tenants (98 percent), whereas much lower figures were shown for owners (63 percent) and landlords (44 percent).‡

Nonfarm occupations were engaged in by all categories to some degree, except owner-tenants and tenants who are practically all full-time farmers. Artisans accounted for 19 percent of nonfarm occupations; artisan was the major employment of nonfarmers (37 percent) and next to farming, was the major occupation (30 percent) of the farm workers. Many artisans came from North Vietnam in 1956 and have since retained their trade. Shopkeepers and peddlers were the occupations of 20 percent of the nonfarm group, but only 7 percent of the owners and 4 percent of the heads were in the military and civil service, and these were most important proportionately in


* HRS Table 346, Q146A.

† HRS Table 346, Q146A. The farm population is classified by status into farm operators and farm laborers. The farm operators are classified into mutually exclusive categories: owners, owner-tenants, and tenants. The owners do not rent land in or out. If an owner rents land in, he becomes an owner-tenant. A tenant is a farmer who owns no land at all. The landlord classification overlaps the owner and owner-tenant groups. By definition, a landlord rents out land. If he farms and also rents in land, he is an owner-tenant. A farm worker by this classification system is a person who does not operate a farm either by ownership or tenancy. He is a farm worker by his own definition and no minimum time of work on a farm is required; however, usually a substantial amount of farm work is performed by those in this category.

‡ HRS Table 11.

Figure 2

LORENZ CURVES SHOWING THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF
FARM OWNERSHIP HOLDINGS BY GROUPS OF PROVINCES
THE SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
SRI, HAMLET RESIDENT SURVEY
1967



- 1 Densely populated provinces
- 2 Predominately Hoa Hao provinces
- 3 Peripheral provinces
- 4 Total Southern Region

SOURCE: Annex Table A-1.

the nonfarm group (20 percent), and less important in the landlord and farm owner groups (14 percent and 10 percent, respectively.)*

Only a very small proportion (7 percent) of the hamlet population held any administrative position in the village, including just 1 percent currently holding office, 5 percent who had formerly held office, and 1 percent who both formerly and currently held office, while 93 percent said they had never held any administrative or political position in the village. It may be assumed that those who held office would be more likely to come from the upper status groups in the hamlet.†

Literacy

Students of literacy in Vietnam assume that everyone who has more than one year of schooling can read and write. Those who had had less than one year of schooling were specifically asked if the family head could read and write. Vietnamese tended to answer a question about these capabilities modestly. Thus, when the results of this question are combined with those who had more than one year of schooling, a reasonably correct literacy rate may be expected.‡

<u>Status</u>	<u>Percent Who Can Read and Write</u>	<u>Percent with Over Five Years of School</u>
Farm owner	74%	16%
Owner-tenant	69	4
Tenant	69	8
Farm worker	57	4
Nonfarmer	74	16
Average	71	12

For a developing country, Vietnam has an unusually high literacy rate. These findings appear to be in line with the expectations of professionals acquainted with rural Vietnam. The literacy rates are directly related to economic status. Farm owners, including most landlords, and

* HRS Table 11, Q112.

† HRS Table 13.

‡ Derived from HRS, Table 9, Q149, and Table 10, Q150.

nonfarmers have the highest literacy rates; these rates decline as income and social status decline, and farm workers have the lowest literacy rate. Farm owners and nonfarmers also have the highest educational attainment, since as many as 16 percent have more than five years of schooling and about 2 percent have more than 15 years. The owner-tenant group has an inexplicably low level of school attainment.

Religion

An analysis of the religions of the Southern Region of the Republic of Vietnam provides some rather startling facts about the composition of rural religions there. Although the two Buddhist sects of Mahayana (greater vehicle) and Hinayana (smaller vehicle) are generally assumed to include most of the population of Vietnam, in fact, only 45 percent* of rural respondents claimed membership in either of these two sects. However, 25 percent claimed membership in the Hoa Hao Buddhist movement. Because the sample included three of the four Hoa Hao provinces, an upward bias may exist. On the other hand, a surprising 8 percent of the respondents were members of the Cao Dai sects in spite of the absence of any major Cao Dai Province in the sample. Also, the Catholics represented 14 percent of the total rural population. The urban Catholic population is believed to be proportionately greater than the rural population.†

Ethnic Groupings

Ethnic Vietnamese are overwhelmingly predominant in the population with 94 percent of the total, varying from 90 percent in the nonfarmer group to 99 percent in the farm owner group. Of the non-Vietnamese group, the Chinese constituted 4 percent of the rural population sample, but almost all were in the nonfarm group. The Chinese play an important role in commerce; the survey shows that quite a number are active in rural areas, more so than is usually believed. The proportion of Cambodians was about 2 percent; they are represented in all farm categories but tended to be concentrated most among farm workers and tenants.‡

* This figure is identical with that reported by A. T. Rambo, J. M. Tinker, and J. D. LeNoir in The Refugee Situation in Phu-Yen Province, Viet-Nam. (abridged version) Human Sciences Research, Inc., McLean, Virginia, July 1967 (p. 29, Table 4).

† HRS Table 6.

‡ HRS Table 7.

The low percentage of Cambodians may be due to a low sampling rate in those provinces located near the Cambodian border. Because the Hamlet Resident Survey was restricted to the relatively secure rural areas of South Vietnam, there was a tendency to reduce the number of inhabitants with ethnic backgrounds that are non-Vietnamese. For example, the Cambodians are found in the Delta near the Cambodian border as well as in Saigon. Most of these Vietnamese with Cambodian ancestry were missed in the survey, so that only 2 percent were estimated by the sample. Montagnard tribal groups are not reflected in the ethnic data since they are nearly all located in the Central Highlands and outside the region surveyed.

Size of Households

Rural households tend to be rather large. The average (mean) size of family in the sample was 6.66 persons and the most frequently occurring value, or mode, was 7 persons.* The modal household size for farm workers was one less with 6 persons. Overall, the households with more than 7 persons accounted for 36 percent of the total, although this proportion varied considerably--from 23 percent for farm workers to 45 percent for owner-tenants. The survey shows that the size of the household and those receiving support from the household are practically identical.†

Some differences in the size of household occur in the different parts of the Southern Region. In Area I, the densely populated provinces, 44 percent of the households had 7 or more persons compared with 34 percent in Area II, the Hoa Hao Provinces, and 34 percent in the Area III, the more sparsely settled peripheral provinces. Thus, the densely settled provinces tend to have somewhat larger households.‡

A small proportion--only 24 percent of the households--have married sons or daughters living with them in the household. This practice varies directly with the status of the farm family--38 percent of the owner-tenants had married sons or daughters living with them, compared to 28 percent of the owners, 25 percent of the tenant families, and 20 percent of the farm workers. However, in the higher income nonfarm group, only 18 percent had married children living with them.§ On the average, they accounted statistically for only 0.23 persons of the 6.66 per household.

* HRS Table 16.

† HRS Table 14.

‡ HRS Table 347.

§ HRS Table 18.

There is an impression that instances of married children living at home are becoming increasingly rare, but that sons and daughters will tend to live with parents in an attempt to protect the parents in war time. The comparatively high proportion of married offspring living with owner-tenant households may explain the greater income of this group and its greater capability to farm more land.

Because of the multipurpose questionnaire, only limited information could be asked about family relationships. Respondents interviewed tended to be quite elderly, and their children would normally be expected to be mature and living apart from their parents. In fact, however, the family size of extended families of the respondents tended to be quite large and certainly greater than anticipated for elderly people who are approaching an age when they can no longer work and provide for their children.

Rural Population Mobility

In the survey, it was also desired to probe the degree of mobility of the rural population and especially the extent to which there is contact between rural people and urban communities. The usual stereotyped assumption is that of two separate worlds, with little communication between the world of the hamlet and the world of the city. In contrast, the survey indicated an unusual degree of mobility on the part of the rural population. Over half of all the respondents (57 percent) said that they had been to Saigon-Cholon at some time or another. In every category, more than 48 percent said they had been to Saigon-Cholon.* However, as would be expected, the number of visits was lower in 1967.† About one in three (35 percent) had visited Saigon-Cholon in 1967. Nonfarmers showed the highest frequency, 42 percent, possibly because some in this category are peddlers or merchants or perhaps because they tend to have a higher income. Among the farmers, the number of visits ranged between 27 percent and 38 percent, with the owner-tenant being the most mobile, and the tenant being the least. The survey showed that quite a few had been to Saigon more than once in 1967, including 5 percent who had been to the metropolis more than 50 times. This may be explained by proximity or the fact that the persons concerned were engaged in transport, trading, or the marketing of goods.

Passenger bus transportation has been maintained through most of the territory in the Southern Region despite the war, and this must be an

* HRS Table 25.

† HRS Table 26.

important explanation of the mobility and substantial contact with the cities that the foregoing survey data indicate. However, the answer would not be complete without mention of the extent to which the scooter, the motorcycle, and the bicycle have contributed by giving the people independent means of mobility.

Of the 200,000 Hondas imported into Vietnam in recent years, many have obviously gone to the countryside. Also, in travel between hamlets and the district capitals, the three-wheeled Lambretta has become increasingly popular as a public conveyance.

The extensive mobility introduced by this new equipment, combined with the conditions of rapid change introduced by the war, must have given a new dimension to the life of the rural resident. Thus, the image of the rural resident of Vietnam as a person isolated from city life will certainly have to be discarded. Increasing prosperity, as reflected in the ownership of durable goods, especially the bicycle, the scooter, and the motorcycle, are bringing the farm resident into touch with the more dynamic and progressive influences of the cities.

Rural Refugees

In the survey, respondents were asked if they were refugees, but no definition was offered by the interviewer. The result was that a remarkably high proportion of 38 percent declared they were "refugees." In terms of status, nearly half (47 percent) of the nonfarmers said that they were refugees. Farmer refugees were particularly high among the farm worker (43 percent) and the farm owner (40 percent) groups.* Among non-farm refugees, about 24 percent were artisans, and fairly high proportions were in the military and peddler occupations.†

Refugees from the war tend to crowd for security into the urban centers. Their movement into autonomous cities including Saigon was discouraged--at least before the Tet offensive--by simply not recognizing anyone to be a refugee who resided in such cities as Saigon, but a considerable number still flowed into the cities in search of employment and some degree of security. Because of the government policy to retard population shifts into the major cities, large numbers have crowded into smaller urban centers, and their numbers are reflected in responses to survey questions.

* HRS Table 8.

† HRS Table 274.

Rural Aspirations

On a question related to the matter of rural mobility, respondents were asked if they would prefer having a job in the city or owning riceland. The farm people categorically reject city life and express a preference for owning riceland, including 86 percent of the owners, 97 percent of the tenants, 100 percent of the owner-tenants, and 87 percent of the farm workers.* The figure for farm workers is amazingly high considering that a high proportion of these are only casual workers on the farm. Thus, the farm population is almost single-mindedly devoted to continuing its present way of life and preferably to owning riceland. Only in the case of nonfarmers was a job in the city more popular--49 percent preferred a city job while 44 percent preferred to own riceland. There is little doubt that the answer of the farm people is another expression of the Delta farmer's hunger for land, an issue discussed at length elsewhere; but it also appears indicative of the farmers' aspiration for a rural and not an urban way of life.

In the Hamlet Resident Survey, one question that was left open-ended produced a variety of answers that turned out to be very revealing about what the farmer and the rural inhabitant really wanted in the present circumstances.† The question concerned what could be done to solve local problems and improve living conditions for the respondent and his family. The question was asked with the idea of obtaining comments on local community development and how it could be advanced. The comments took a broader frame of reference with the emphasis on the respondents' personal situation.

Highest on the list of the farmers' priorities was the need for land, and better credit was almost equally high. However, for all rural residents, the need for credit ranked even higher than the demand for land, showing that the influence of nonfarm elements tended to make the dominating problem that of credit. Discussion of the desire to own land and of the credit situation later in the report will make these results more understandable.

Next in priority of those engaged in farming was the need for agricultural supplies--equipment and livestock--and other agricultural assistance--149 compared with a preference of 201 for credit and 206 for land.

Improvements in the community--in terms of more public works, including schools, roads, and bridges; better administration; and other government help--were given preference by only 117. Even "security" and "peace"

* HRS Table 203, Q137.

† HRS Table 232, Q144.

were low on the list except in Area III, where insecurity was the most severe.* The nonfarm population seemed to be more concerned proportionately than the farmers about insecurity and local development.

In conclusion, it may be said that the farmer tends to limit his horizon to those things that have real personal meaning and impact on himself and his family--land, credit, and agricultural improvement.

Impact of Change on Vietnamese Culture

Although it is not feasible to attempt to discuss the culture or the many subcultures of Vietnam in this report, it may be useful to touch on those characteristics that contribute to encourage change versus those characteristics that may deter change. The culture of Vietnam is old and can be expected to provide a pervasive continuity for the people while rather drastic wartime changes and dynamic developments are occurring. However, the history of the development of the Delta is comparatively short. The uprooting and movement of people, especially in the last two centuries, has produced some important ruptures with the past and may have encouraged a cultural tendency that makes it more likely to accept change in this region than in areas where the people have lived in stability for many centuries. The rather rapid acceptance and expansion of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religions may be evidence of this tendency. Also, the upheavals of this long war have caused this generation to be more receptive to change than the generation before World War II.

The Farmers' Relationships with Village Officials

Volume II of this study extensively described village government and its relationship to the central and provincial government administration. Historically, the Vietnamese village has always enjoyed great independence in managing its own affairs. In more recent times, under the government of Prime Minister Diem, an effort was made to place candidates of the central government's own choosing in control of village affairs. This was done partly to curb growing insurgency but partly also to obtain greater cohesion in a nation controlling its own destiny for the first time in modern history. Thus, the distant central administration, represented in the past by the mandarin official, brought close control right into the village during the period 1958 to 1963. Local control was again instituted in the decree of December 24, 1966, and most local elections were

* HRS Table 414C.

completed in June 1967. The very fact that these elections could be held on a broad scale and that in many of these elections, former appointees of the national government were replaced reveals the strength and independence of the people in the villages.

With the intent of exploring the interest of the rural hamlet resident in his own government and his attitude toward village officials and local affairs, a number of questions were asked in the Hamlet Resident Survey. For the sample as a whole, 59 percent of the respondents were able to name at least one member of the Village Council.* Among the farmers, a majority in all status groups could name at least one member. Knowledge of members of the Council varied directly with the status and educational level of the farm people--that is, between 56 percent for farm workers and 78 percent for landlords. Except for farm workers, it is surprising how many in each status group could name six or more individuals on the Council, ranging from 5 percent for farm workers to 28 percent in the case of owner-tenants. The analysis leads to the encouraging conclusion that this knowledge and presumably greater interest in local administration represents a considerable improvement over the last few years. One possible deterrent to greater knowledge of officials in the local administration is the continuing necessity to obtain a permit for a gathering of more than five people--a requirement introduced by the Diem government. Nevertheless, it appears that permits are fairly easily obtained and faithfully requested so that gatherings can be and are held. There is thus a much greater opportunity for meeting village leaders than before.*

<u>Farming Status</u>	<u>Number of Village Council Members That Could be Named by Respondents</u>			
	<u>At Least 1</u>	<u>1-3</u>	<u>4-5</u>	<u>6 or More</u>
Farm worker (N=93)	56%	44%	6%	5%
Tenant (N=188)	69	46	12	11
Owner (N=226)	66	42	12	12
Landlord [†] (N=36)	78	39	14	25
Owner-tenant (N=47)	74	34	13	28

* HRS Table 225.

† "Landlord" is not an exclusive category--it may include both owners and owner-tenants.

Recently instituted local elections give the hamlet resident a greater interest and stake in his community. Another reason why the attitude may be improving toward the village official is that this occupation under present wartime conditions is a dangerous one that requires a most courageous and dedicated man. Even in the most secure areas, many hamlet chiefs and village chiefs move from house to house or even go to the nearest district or provincial capital to sleep at night. There is little monetary return for these services. Although charges of corruption are often leveled at officials at the district and especially at the province level, such charges are rarely directed at the officials in the village or the hamlet. The lack of material reward for the position and the real risk of being killed by the Viet Cong create a certain amount of admiration for these officials, and it is amazing that somehow for each one that is killed, another is willing to stand up and take his place, a fact that suggests a large reservoir of courageous and dedicated people in the rural population.

Additional questions provide more insight into the attitudes of hamlet residents with respect to local officials and local affairs. In the Hamlet Resident Survey, a pair of questions asked respondents were: What, in their opinion, should be the principal duties of the village council? What did they believe actually to be the current activities of the council? In other words, a comparison may be made between what the people thought council members should do and what council members, in fact, do (Table 4).

Some 109 of 554 farm household heads (about 20 percent) were uncertain as to the actual activities of the council. While this figure is moderately high, only a bare 4.5 percent (25 respondents) had no suggestion as to what the council members should do. Thus, it appears that villagers generally had a well-formed opinion as to what services council members should perform even though they were somewhat less certain as to their actual activities.

In general, the four categories of farmers (owners, owner-tenants, tenants, and workers) were similar in their opinions and beliefs concerning council members' duties. Also, with respect to two activities of the council--carry out orders and issue licenses--the belief of villagers as to what the council should do and what it does correspond very well. A very important exception to this correspondence concerned the council member's duty to report to the District Chief. Here 222 (40 percent) of the farmers thought the council member should report, whereas only 67 (12 percent) believed the council actually acted in this manner. Thus, a substantial portion of villagers believed that the activity of informing the District Chief is the most important responsibility of the Village Council.

Table 4

FARMER OPINION AND KNOWLEDGE OF VILLAGE COUNCIL ACTIVITIES
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Activity of Village Council	Question Asked of Respondent	Number of Persons Answering				
		Owner	Tenant	Owner- Tenant	Farm Worker	Total
Carry out orders from higher level of government	Should do	24	25	5	13	67
	Actual duties	27	29	6	17	79
Inform chief	Should do	84	83	22	33	222
	Actual duties	19	29	13	6	67
Issue license	Should do	105	70	19	40	234
	Actual duties	130	98	22	49	299
Activity unknown	Should do	13	10	1	1	25
	Actual duties	<u>50</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>109</u>
Total		226	188	47	93	554

Source: HRS Tables 226 and 227, Q140A and Q140B.

It would appear that the hamlet residents were not reluctant to communicate with higher levels and would even prefer the Council to exercise this duty to a greater extent than what they believed to be the case.

Hamlet residents were questioned for their views concerning the landlords' power and influence on the Village Council. A high proportion--51 percent (excluding landlords)--had no view to express, but 30 percent felt that landlords had no influence, 8 percent thought that they had about the right amount, and those who thought they had too little or too much influence balanced each other at 5 percent. The farmers even more than the nonfarmers denigrated the local influence of the landlord. The

landlord group rated itself as having less influence than ascribed to it by any other group, which could be expected.*

Respondents' interest in local development was explored as a guide to future policy. When asked if they would prefer to contribute to village development by paying in cash or in labor contributions, 70 percent of the farm residents preferred contributing free labor to paying in cash; the nonfarmer group was indifferent.†

As pointed out earlier, the villager put his own interest far ahead of local development, probably because he has found that local programs have so far contributed little to him in improving conditions of life for him and his family.

Personal Security of Hamlet Residents

Personal insecurity is something that a high proportion of villagers must live with frequently in their daily lives.

About 10 percent of the sample of rural residents held land in insecure areas. About 60 percent of these landholders were denied either total or partial access to their lands because of insecurity.

While hamlet residents may be more subject to harassment than to the possibility of bodily injury or death, the proximity of fighting can endanger everyone. For example, about 20 percent of 263 respondents reported that they knew of villagers who had moved away to avoid nearby combat.‡ However, it must be recognized that Viet Cong terrorists tactics are highly selective in character and pose a greater threat to leaders or potential leaders, such as members of the Village Council, than they do to the average hamlet resident.§ In the Hamlet Resident Survey, 30 percent of all respondents answered that they knew of village officials who slept away from their homes at night** to avoid terrorists. This result may be expressed more strongly since ordinary hamlet residents would not necessarily know the sleeping habits of officials. A more appropriate view of the question would be whether anyone interviewed in a given hamlet knew of officials sleeping away from home. In 38 of 54 ostensibly secure hamlets, officials felt it necessary to conceal their whereabouts at night.

* HRS Table 707, Q141.

† HRS Table 710, Q143A and Table 712, Q143B.

‡ HRS Table 902, Q162.

§ See Volume III Working Paper, Impact of the Viet Cong.

** HRS Table 902, Q167.

Because the evidence indicates that very few hamlets are really secure, it might seem surprising that only 40 percent of the responding hamlet residents reported that they knew of the enemy (presumably Viet Cong) coming to the hamlet. Aside from some reluctance to answer such a question affirmatively, a possible explanation is that even hamlet residents do not necessarily know exactly who belongs to the Viet Cong.

Among the reasons expressed by hamlet residents as to why Viet Cong members would have visited their village, those that might be considered to be a form of harassment were obtaining or transporting supplies, recruiting, and taxation. Recruiting and obtaining supplies were relatively less numerous (7 and 13 percent, respectively) while 30 percent of hamlet residents who were aware of Viet Cong visits reported having to pay Viet Cong taxes.

When queried on a comparison of Viet Cong and GVN taxation, a small proportion thought Viet Cong exactions were the same or even slightly lower, but quite a high proportion expressed the view that they were higher. Propaganda assumed even greater significance; over half (55 percent) of the respondents reported this type of Viet Cong propaganda activity. On the other hand, only 13 of 346 respondents who knew of Viet Cong visits (1.5 percent of the total sample) had received any sort of assistance from the Viet Cong.*

Comparison of survey results with other data shows that actual fighting near the hamlets was underestimated in the survey; quite possibly, other Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military activity may also be understated.

Despite the ever-present problem of personal insecurity, it is surprising that the villager does not place a higher premium on security. In an open-ended HRS inquiry--Question 144--respondents had the opportunity to express their views on any matter they believed would improve village life. The main emphasis was on matters concerned with economic self-interest. The concern for more land and improved credit overshadowed every other desire, even security and peace. Among farmers, 46 mentioned security and fewer than that mentioned peace, compared with 165 who mentioned land and 142 who mentioned credit as the major problems to be solved for improving local conditions.†

The hamlet residents generally have an optimistic view about future security. In total, 23 percent expect that it will be unchanged, but 28 percent expect that it will improve, and only 6 percent expect a

* Table 5.

† HRS Table 715, Q144.

Table 5

VIET CONG HAMLET ACTIVITIES AS REPORTED BY RESIDENTS
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Subject of Question</u>	<u>Number of Affirmative Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Those Who Re- ported Any Viet Cong Presence</u>	<u>Percent of Total Sample (% of 854)</u>
Obtained supplies or labor from village	23	6.6%	2.7%
Recruited residents	45	13.0	5.3
Organized demonstrations	54	15.6	6.3
Taxed residents	103	29.8	12.1
Issued propaganda	191	55.2	22.3
Provided assistance	13	3.8	1.5
Visited village	346	100.0	40.5

Source: HRS Tables 910-915, Q170A-F.

deterioration. Thus, about half believe that the situation will be unchanged or will improve. However, those who have not made up their minds constitute a very large 43 percent. If they could be added to those who believe that future security will be unchanged or improved, this would make a large majority with a tendency toward optimism--despite the constant terror and killings in the countryside.

Farm Production and Income

The Hamlet Resident Survey included a series of questions designed to lead to understanding of the character of the agricultural economy in the Southern Region of Vietnam. The HRS was carried out in 24 of the 27 provinces in III and IV Corps and is concerned with the rural economy

associated with the cultivation of the ricelands of the Southern Region. Table 2 shows that rice cultivation in this region accounted for 91.5 percent of the total cultivated area of the farms surveyed. The region is predominantly riceland, except for three provinces in the area north of Saigon.

Out of 395 households in the sample classified as farmers who normally grew rice, only 317 produced rice in 1966 (see Table 6). Farm operators who produced rice had an average output of 131.1 gia,* equivalent to 2.83 metric tons per producer. This is considered a low yield; 1966 was the lowest rice production year since 1959 essentially because of Mekong River Delta flooding, which caused total or partial crop failure on many farms. This yield compares with 170.0 gia per rice producer recorded in the RIES Survey of 1964. Average production of rice in the Southern Region on all operating farms was 94.5 gia or 2.04 metric tons per producer. It appears that Area II--the Hoa Hao provinces--was particularly hit by flooding.† If an upward adjustment of 14.5 percent is made for the particularly low yields in this area to bring yields up to the average in Areas I and III, it would raise the average yield per farm operator to 108.2 gia or 2.34 metric tons.

Among the farm cultivators who produced rice, only 24.9 percent sold rice. The comparable figure from the RIES Survey was 51.4 percent. The average amount of paddy sold per farmer who sold rice was 123.5 gia (2.67 metric tons), and the total amount sold constituted 23.5 percent of total production. The comparable RIES figure was 29.4 percent of production sold, but the average sales per farm producer were lower, at 97.2 gia (2.10 metric tons) per seller. These data reveal again the low production per producer. What is particularly striking is that, at least in the year 1966, only a quarter of the farmers of riceland actually sold rice into the market economy. Between the RIES Survey of 1964 and the HRS of 1966, the average price recorded rose from VN\$72.25 per gia to VN\$200.75 per gia‡--an increase of about 275 percent, representing price inflation. Thus, because of a combination of higher sales per producer and higher prices, the total value of sales per producer was much higher in the HRS--VN\$26,320 compared with VN\$12,370 in the RIES (Table 7).

In terms of 1966 gross farm sales receipts from farm products, 36.9 percent of total value was obtained by farmers from rice, compared with 33.3 percent from other crops and 29.8 percent from animal products. The RIES study arrived at a rather similar distribution of sales in these categories of commodities (Table 8). If a price of VN\$200.75 per gia is

* One gia is approximately 21.6 kilograms.

† It is also a major broadcast rice area.

‡ VN\$9.3 per kilogram.

Table 6

RICE PRODUCTION AND SALES--COMPARISON BETWEEN RURAL INCOME AND
EXPENDITURE SURVEY AND HAMLET RESIDENT SURVEY RESULTS
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1964 AND 1966
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	<u>Hamlet Resident Survey</u>	<u>Rural Income and Expenditure Survey</u>
Farm operators in sample	440	n.a.
Rice production (gia)	41,560	n.a.
Output per farmer (gia)	94.5	n.a.
Rice growers* in sample	395	n.a.
Rice production (gia)	41,560	n.a.
Output per grower (gia)	105.5	n.a.
Growers who produced rice in 1966	317	825
Rice production (gia)	41,560	140,249
Output per producer (gia)	131.1	170.0
Number of sellers	79	424
Sellers as percent of growers	24.9%	51.4%
Sales vs production		
Growers who sold rice in 1966	79	424
Rice sold (gia)	9,750	41,226
Rice produced (gia)	41,560	140,249
Sales as percent of output	23.5%	29.5%
Rice sold per grower		
Number of growers who produced rice	317	825
Rice sold (gia)	9,750	41,226
Sales per grower (gia)	30.8	50.0
Rice sold per seller of rice		
Number of sellers	79	424
Rice sold (gia)	9,750	41,226
Sales per seller (gia)	123.5	97.2

* Farmers who normally grow rice.

Sources: Hamlet Resident Survey, Tables 291 and 294.
Rural Income Expenditure Sample Survey, Table 19, USOM,
Saigon, July 1965.

Table 7
 VALUE OF RICE PRODUCED*--COMPARISON BETWEEN RURAL INCOME AND
 EXPENDITURE SURVEY AND HAMLET RESIDENT SURVEY RESULTS
 IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1964 AND 1966
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	Hamlet Resident Survey Data for 1966	Rural Income and Expenditure Survey Data for 1964
Number of rice producers in sample	317	825
Value of production* for calendar year (VN\$)	VN\$8,336,000	VN\$10,206,000
Average value for producers (VN\$)	26,320	12,370
Average price received for rice sold (VN\$)	200.75	72.25

* Assumes average prices would hold for unsold portion of rice production.

Source: Stanford Research Institute, Hamlet Resident Survey Tables 291 and 295 (Version 2 of Hamlet Resident Survey), RIES Tables 19 and 21.

Table 8
 RECEIPTS[†] FROM SALES OF FARM PRODUCTS--COMPARISON BETWEEN RURAL INCOME AND
 EXPENDITURE SURVEY AND HAMLET RESIDENT SURVEY RESULTS
 IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1964 AND 1966
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	Hamlet Resident Survey				Rural Income Expenditure Survey			
	Number of Farmers	Receipts (VN\$1000)	Percent of Total Receipts	Average per Farmer (VN\$)	Number of Farmers	Receipts (VN\$1000)	Percent of Total Receipts	Average per Farmer (VN\$)
Rice	79	VN\$2,109	36.9%	VN\$26,700	424	VN\$2,978	29.5%	VN\$7,024
Other crops	96	1,899	33.3	19,780	†	3,653	36.2	3,205
Animal products	104	1,703	29.8	16,380	†	3,458	34.3	2,557
Total	211‡	VN\$5,711	100.0%	VN\$27,090‡	†	VN\$10,089	100.0%	VN\$4,164

* Based on current prices. Average paddy price in 1966 was VN\$200.75 per gia.

Average price of RIES sample was VN\$72.25 per gia.

† Not available due to different data classification.

‡ Column not additive because farmers may produce more than one product type.

Source: HRS Table 296 (Version 2); RIES Tables 21 and 23.

imputed to the unsold rice produced, the addition to farm income is VN\$6,380,000, which brings gross farm income for the 440 farm operators of the HRS sample to VN\$12,091,000 of which VN\$5,711,000 or 47.2 percent was derived from actual commodity sales. It must be noted that this gross income figure excludes considerable unrecorded nonrice output consumed at home and payments for certain farm labor services since farmers tend to quote a net production figure (Table 9). While rice sales are 17.5 percent of estimated gross income, the value of all rice produced is 69.5 percent of gross income.

Table 9

VALUE OF RICE PRODUCED* BY THE HAMLET RESIDENT SURVEY
SAMPLE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1966
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Size Group (gia)</u>	<u>Number of Producers</u>	<u>Percent of Producers</u>	<u>Value of Rice Produced, 1966 (VN\$1,000)</u>	<u>Percent of Rice Production</u>
1-9	15	4.8%	VN\$14	0.2%
10-19	21	6.6	56	0.7
20-29	12	3.7	54	0.7
30-49	38	12.1	282	3.4
50-99	96	30.4	1,264	15.1
100-249	95	30.0	2,748	33.0
250-499	26	8.0	1,563	18.7
Over 500	<u>14</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>2,355</u>	<u>28.2</u>
Total	317	100.0%	VN\$8,336	100.0%

* Assumes average prices would hold for unsold portion.
Value of production and number of producers have been increased by ratio of 440 to 379, to account for 61 farm operators who failed to answer properly questions on rice production.

Source: HRS, Tables 291 and 295 (HRS Version 2).

A special computation is made of the effects of valuation of the entire rice crop in view of the fact that production of rice is more than four times the amount of rice sold. The usual skewed distribution of producers and output is obtained with only 42.4 percent of the producers producing more than 100 gia per farm, but these same farmers produced a rice crop valued at 79.9 percent of total production. The HRS sample produced no net income figures per farm, and therefore only gross income figures can be obtained.

The unequal size distribution of commodity sales shows a high proportion of producers with only small amounts to sell (Table 10). These farmers are only a small step above the 75 percent of the producers who are not producing for the rice market at all. At the upper level, only 17.5 percent of the producer-sellers who had sales of more than VN\$50,000 marketed 60.8 percent of the entire value of commodities sold.

Table 10

FARM OPERATOR GROSS INCOME FROM SALES OF FARM
PRODUCTS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1966
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Gross Income Class (VN\$1,000)	Number of Sellers	Percent of Sellers	Amount of Sales (VN\$1,000)	Percent of Sales
VN\$1-4.9	51	24.2%	VN\$139	2.4%
5.0-9.9	26	12.3	171	3.0
10.0-19.9	51	24.2	693	12.1
20.0-49.9	46	21.8	1,245	21.7
50.0-99.9	22	10.4	1,209	21.3
100.0-199.0	13	6.2	1,801	31.6
200.0-299.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Over 300.0	2	.9	453	7.9
Total	211	100.0%	VN\$5,711	100.0%

Note: Receipts have been increased proportionately to account for farm operators who did not answer questions on sales.

Source: HRS Tables 291 and 296 (HRS Version 2).

Indebtedness, Interest Rates and Credit Needs

The Delta farmers express a strong need for credit, and the majority of them are in debt, as are all classes of rural society covered in the survey. As mentioned earlier, when farmers were asked what could be done to solve local problems and improve living conditions, the need for land was given highest priority and that of credit came close behind (Table 11). Being in debt appears to be a way of life for the majority of rural residents, but the proportion of the landless in debt was somewhat higher than the proportion who own land. The higher the status, the more likely the household is to be free of debt. On the basis of land tenure status, the landowner was the least likely to be in debt and the laborers were more likely to be in debt than the tenants.* While the Rural Income and Expenditure Survey† is not totally comparable, it would appear, even taking inflation into account, that the indebtedness of the rural population of the Southern Region has increased in both number and amount. Similar data are available for 1958 in Hendry's study of Khanh Hau, a small village in the Delta Province of Long An.‡

To understand the importance of credit to the farmer of the Southern Region, one must take into consideration the fact that 62.2 percent of the respondents had loans, 94 percent of which were in cash.§ The highest percentage of borrowers was among farm workers (73 percent), and the lowest percentage was among the owner-tenants (57 percent). The average loan was about VN\$22,062 (for the standard error of the mean of VN\$2,017, and the most frequently occurring loans were between VN\$5,000 and VN\$10,000.** The RIES Survey results show that 53.9 percent of the people in the Southern Region had debts of an average of VN\$5,500. (Debt is used here to mean the unpaid balance at the time of the survey.) In the three years between the two surveys, inflation of 200 percent of the rice price occurred. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assert that the degree of indebtedness of the rural population of the Southern Region has increased in number as well as in amount between 1964 and 1967. The borrowers with the biggest loans were the nonfarmers and the owners. With respect to duration of loans, 33 percent were for an indefinite time, while 62 percent were for a period of one year or less.††

* HRS Table 160.

† USOM: Rural Income and Expenditure Survey; Preliminary Report 1965, Saigon (Table 47).

‡ See James B. Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1964, pp. 205-06.

§ HRS Tables 160 and 161.

** HRS Table 315.

†† HRS Table 316.

Table 11

OPEN-ENDED VIEWS OF PRIORITIES BY RURAL RESIDENTS ON WHAT IS
NEEDED TO SOLVE LOCAL PROBLEMS AND IMPROVE FAMILY LIVING
CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967-68
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Needs Expressed</u>	<u>Response of Farmers</u>			<u>Total Farmers</u>	<u>Total Nonfarmers</u>
	<u>Area I</u>	<u>Area II</u>	<u>Area III</u>		
Land	29	77	100	206	51
Credit	33	53	115	201	146
Agricultural equipment	9	24	51	84	4
Livestock	9	14	25	48	12
Other agricultural help	3	4	10	17	0
Public works	8	12	13	33	18
Better administration	5	3	6	14	10
Government help	4	5	11	20	22
Security	8	8	41	57	24
Peace	3	1	13	17	15
End to defoliation	2	0	25	27	0
Lower cost of living	4	1	7	12	13
No needs	7	8	21	36	34
Other	2	6	9	17	29

Source: HRS Tables 232, 414A, 414B, and 414C.

Important regional differences in indebtedness are brought out in Table 12 which refers to all rural residents, including the farm population. The densely populated provinces of Area I show the smallest proportion of indebtedness (54 percent) but the average loan size of VN\$33,671 is about 50 percent above the regional average and double the average size of loan in Area II. However, Area II shows the highest percentage of the respondents' indebtedness--70 percent compared with a Southern Region figure of 62 percent. For the Region as a whole, 94 percent of the loans were in cash, and this figure deviated little within areas of the region.

Table 12

INDEBTEDNESS STATUS BY AREAS OF THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	I Densely Populated Provinces	II Predominantly Hoa Hao Provinces	III Peripheral Provinces	Total Southern Region
Percent of households in debt	54.0%	69.6%	61.6%	62.2%
Percent of loans in cash	94.3%	96.0%	93.5%	94.4%
Average amount of loan (VN\$)	VN\$33,671	VN\$16,622	VN\$21,624	VN\$22,062

Source: HRS Tables 315, 401A, 401B, 401C, 357, and 358.

An individual's desire for a loan is derived from his expectation of some future benefit or profit to be obtained from the amount borrowed. The strength of his desire to borrow is indicated by his willingness to pay a high interest rate for the loan. In this sense, the rate of interest paid by the farmers in the Southern Region is indicative of their great demand for credit on the one hand, and the prevailing conditions of shortage in the supply of money for credit on the other, as reflected by both wartime conditions and even more the inadequacy of credit institutions to supply the farmer with his requirements for money.

Interest rates paid by farmers thus tend to run extremely high in the Southern Region. More than half of those who pay interest pay in excess of 60 percent per year, and only 16 percent of those who pay interest pay at a rate of less than 20 percent per year. The most common interest rates reported in 1967 were 3, 5, and 10 percent per month (Table 13). These rates correspond rather closely with those observed by James Hendry (Table 14) in 1958.

A high percentage of the loans were for an indefinite term. Quite a few of the respondents stated also that they did not pay any interest or that they could not give an estimate of the rate they had to pay. This is probably because most of them either had borrowed from friends and relatives or had bought goods on credit and the amount they owed in interest had already been included. As a consequence, the cases of loans with interest might have been underestimated.*

Table 13

ANNUAL RATE OF INTEREST PAID ON LOANS IN
THE HAMLET RESIDENT SURVEY SAMPLE
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Rate</u> (percent)	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Cumulative</u> <u>Percent</u>
1-4%	5	1.78%	1.78%
5-9	11	3.92	5.70
10-14	27	9.61	15.31
15-19	2	.71	16.02
20-29	15	5.34	21.36
30-39	50	17.79	39.15
40-59	17	6.05	45.20
60-79	78	27.76	72.96
80-99	14	4.98	77.94
100-119	3	1.07	79.01
120-149	43	15.30	94.31
≥ 150	<u>16</u>	<u>5.69</u>	100.0
Total	281	100.0 %	

Source: HRS Table 320.

* HRS Table 320.

Table 14

RANGE OF INTEREST RATES, VILLAGE OF KHANH HAU
1958

Interest Rate (percent per month)	Reported Debts	
	Number	Percent
Interest free	19	33.3%
1	6	10.7
2	--	--
3	6	10.7
4	3	5.4
5	16	28.6
6	--	--
7	--	--
8	5	8.9
9	--	--
10	1	1.8
Total	56	100.0%

Source: James B. Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1964, p. 201.

The majority of the loans (75.2 percent) were obtained from friends and relatives (Table 15). Some 6.4 percent was borrowed from money lenders, 5.0 percent from businessmen, and 4.6 percent from huis (fraternal societies). Only 5.4 percent of the loans were obtained from government agencies, such as the Agricultural Development Bank. Loans from landlords, 1.8 percent, were negligible. It is believed that many loans or most loans from friends and relatives were interest-free; nevertheless, the high interest rates recorded must be attributed to the limited availability of credit and to the obvious fact that the government lending agencies play a minor role in meeting the credit requirements of farmers in the Southern Region.*

* HRS Table 168.

Table 15

USUAL SOURCE OF MONEY BORROWED BY RURAL RESIDENTS
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(Percent)

	Area <u>I</u>	Area <u>II</u>	Area <u>III</u>	Regional <u>Total</u>
Government sources	3.6%	4.2%	6.6%	5.4%
Landlords	3.6	1.4	1.5	1.8
Moneylenders	4.8	7.7	6.2	6.4
Businessmen	6.0	5.6	4.4	5.0
Huis	2.4	4.9	5.1	4.6
Relatives	42.2	30.1	41.6	38.4
Friends	37.4	44.1	32.8	36.8
Other sources	--	2.0	1.8	1.6
 Total	 100.0%	 100.0%	 100.0%	 100.0%

Source: HRS Table 359.

There is little direct information from the survey about the use of loans. It is believed that a high percentage of the loans were for social, religious, and medical expenses. Obviously, some loans must have been taken for the purpose of buying seeds and fertilizer and other production needs. Still another and probably common reason for borrowing is to feed the family during the production period until the harvest becomes available. Another reason for short term borrowing by tenants is apparently to pay their rents. Many tenants, it appears, prefer to pay their rents in cash even if they had agreed to pay in kind, and the number of people who pay rents in cash appears to be steadily increasing, according to information provided by the HRS interviewers. There may be several reasons for this fact. One is that in cases where the rent agreed to is paid in kind, the landlord sometimes requires the tenant to store the rice. By paying the landlord for his share of the rice in cash, the tenant avoids the danger of the rice being spoiled or eaten by rats, while the landlord saves the cost of transportation. Also, where the tenant expects to have a

shortage of rice later in the year, he may prefer to pay the cash equivalent of the rent in terms of the low price of rice prevailing at the time of harvest.

In connection with interest rates and loans, a special study was made of the additional information provided by interviewers arising out of the comments made by the respondent. The following are some of the most frequent comments written in by the interviewer:

1. There is no deadline set in my loan. I pay it back when I have the money or when I can.
2. I pay my loan back little by little, since there is no pressure to pay it back or to pay interest because I have borrowed from relatives.
3. There is no deadline agreed for the repayment of my loan. So far I pay the interest regularly every month.
4. I do not know how much interest I have to pay because the money-lender keeps saying that he does not know what percent he will ask at the end.
5. I pay the interest every month. When the moneylender asks for the principal, I have to beg him to wait.

For those who stated that they did not pay interest, the most common reason was that they had borrowed from relatives. However, other reasons were given such as the following:

1. I do not pay interest for the money I have borrowed, which I will repay gradually, because the money came from the master to whom my child is servant.
2. I do not pay interest, but I have to sell the rice to the money-lender.
3. I have borrowed from two moneylenders who sell fish in Saigon. When I have fish, I bring it to them and they subtract the money equivalent from the loan.

With respect to loans in kind, it is possible to see from the few written comments in the questionnaire that if one borrowed one gia of rice at the beginning of the production season, he would have to pay back two at the end of the harvest. There must be a very small margin of savings, and for the most part, none at all for the poverty-stricken farmer of the

Southern Region with a very small farm and low yields. As a consequence, credit is tight partly because of poor institutions and partly because in the given institutional environment, the risks entailed in lending money to the farmer are very high. These conditions impede any attempt by the farmer to improve his farm or his methods of cultivation, and make it impossible for him to break out of his poverty.

It is obvious, then, that any land redistribution program will have a small chance of becoming a real success unless it is accompanied by improved farm credit services. In the case of new owners of land, it is essential to have short term and intermediate term credit to buy fertilizer, improved seed, implements, and other farm necessities. In addition, he will require reliable long term credit to acquire land and to meet the payments required to service the loan.

The Marketing System for Farmers' Products

Very little empirical information was obtained on the marketing process, but observation along with the findings of Hendry* indicate that those in the lowest economic group are more likely to get the worst of the bargain than those higher on the economic scale. Many farmers cannot raise enough paddy to exceed their own household needs and therefore do not have any paddy to sell. The Hamlet Resident Survey found that 24.5 percent of the farmers sold rice. Still others have very little to sell and their cash needs are high, so that they must sell immediately and cannot wait until a more favorable price can be obtained.

In Khanh Hau--described by Hendry--there is no central market. The same is true of most rural hamlets, although some are close to central markets in some of the larger towns in the Delta. At least three-fourths of those who sold paddy in Khanh Hau sold it to Vietnamese rice merchants from Khanh Hau or nearby villages. This appears to be the typical pattern for the Delta. A few households sell to Chinese merchants in Cholon directly but these tend to be the largest--and richest--producers who also have greater access to up-to-date price information.

The farmer tries to find out as much as he can about prices, but his sources of information are limited, and hence, he must bargain somewhat blindly. The buyer, on the other hand, has better, more accurate, and more recent information, and thus the system favors the buyer. The system tends to work to the disadvantage of those least able to afford it economically,

* Op. cit., Chapter 6, The Marketing Process.

and perpetuates the already destitute situation of those low on the economic scale.

Farm Supplies and Equipment

One good indicator of Vietnamese adaptability to improve his farming techniques is the degree of his desire for, and the extent to which he actually uses, improved modern farm supplies and farm equipment.

Responses to the Hamlet Resident Survey provide some insight about the availability as well as the demand for and use of farm supplies and equipment in the Delta rural area (Table 16).

When asked about the availability of farm supplies, about 39 percent of the farm operators stated that supplies were not available when needed or purchase was impossible because of lack of credit. About one-third of the respondents stated that they had no problem in obtaining supplies while the balance of 28 percent answered that they never used or bought such things.* Although 28 percent claim that they never bought farm supplies, only 11 percent bought no fertilizer (Table 17), which is actually a farm supply. Thus, at least 17 percent responded incorrectly. Apparently this inconsistency of response occurred in all three areas where the rural population was sampled and there was no statistical difference in response between the three regions sampled. It is believed that this apparent contradiction in responses can be explained in several ways. First, the question probably was too general for some of the villagers, and they did not associate fertilizer or seed with the term "farm supplies." Second, the respondents probably conceived and answered the question in terms of buying from the GVN since they might have identified the interviewers with some part of the government. Consequently, responses to the question on farm supplies in general should be interpreted with qualifications. It should be pointed out, however, that the answers on the availability and use of farm supplies were not significantly different regionally.

With respect to individual farm supplies, fertilizer was the least scarce and also the most used farm input, as can be seen from Table 16. This reflected a major drive to make fertilizer available at subsidized prices in 1966-67 to encourage more intensive rice production. Only a little less than 10 percent of the respondents stated that fertilizer was not available, and about 18 percent stated that they do not use any.

* HRS, Table 104.

Table 16

AVAILABILITY TO AND USE OF FARM SUPPLIES BY FARM
OPERATORS IN SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Kind of Supply</u>	<u>Available</u>		<u>Not Available</u> (percent)	<u>Do Not Use Any</u> (percent)
	<u>Fully</u> (percent)	<u>Partly</u> (percent)		
Fertilizer	57.4%	14.5%	9.5%	17.9%
Insecticide	42.3	16.0	15.2	25.5
Sprayer	16.0	11.3	44.6	26.0
Water Pump	20.5	7.4	32.6	38.3
Tractor for rent	15.5	10.0	31.6	41.6
Improved rice seed	33.7	11.6	20.5	33.4
Good pig breed	21.6	11.6	49.5	16.6

Source: HRS, Tables 105 through 111.

Table 17

USE OF FERTILIZER BY FARM OPERATORS

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Use Fertilizer</u> (percent)	<u>Do Not Use Fertilizer</u> (percent)
Rice	89.0%	11.0%
Vegetables	23.4	76.6
Fruit trees	6.6	93.4
Other	5.8	94.2

Source: HRS, Tables 94, 96, 98 and 100.

Farmers whose land is subject to flooding and who apply floating rice cultivation techniques observe that water movement shifts their top soil as well as any fertilizer downstream. The risk of losing all of one's fertilizer benefits is sufficient to discourage them from using fertilizer.

Surprisingly, the insecticide sprayer was stated to be the scarcest piece of farm equipment, with about 45 percent of the farmers stating that this equipment was not available to them. The insecticide sprayer is an excellent symbol of modern and intensive cultivation and points out the desire of the farmers to improve their production.

In spite of the fact that about 42 percent of the farmers did not make any use of tractors, one-fourth of them stated that they could easily or with little difficulty rent a plowing tractor. This is an indication that the Vietnamese farmers have somehow become familiar with mechanical means of cultivation, and it should not be long before these means will be used on a greater scale through imitation.

The use of fertilizer is widespread in rice cultivation; 89 percent of the farmers used it in various quantities. With up to 15 percent of farmers owning buffalo or oxen, one would expect these farmers to utilize manure for crops.

Fertilizer is also used by vegetable growers. However, there is only a small number of growers and the growing areas are also small, so that the fertilizer requirements are minor relative to needs for vegetables.

Improved Farm Technology

In the opinion of agricultural extension workers experienced in other countries, the Vietnamese rice farmer of the Delta is surprisingly receptive to techniques for improving farm technology. As in other countries, however, the farmer tends to be conservative because his livelihood depends almost entirely on the size of his rice crop, and it must be demonstrated to him that a new practice will result in a larger or better crop. Any change carries substantial risk, and he is naturally reluctant to endanger his family's livelihood.

In addition to the risk factor, another deterrent to the use of more advanced technology is the philosophy that the "old way is the best way." Still another deterrent must be the fact that new techniques require more care and more work. Thus, while row planting itself is estimated to increase production by 15 percent, farmers prefer broadcasting of rice.

Another possibility is that a new strain of rice may produce a larger crop, but it may not be as popular in the market. A farmer is usually a very shrewd decision-maker and will act on new advice or will adopt new techniques and equipment if he is convinced that they are in his interest.

Thus, while the general impression one gets in discussing the matter with knowledgeable people is that the Vietnamese farmer is receptive to new ideas and techniques, it must still be recognized that the proportion of farmers who are receptive toward, and welcome the need for, improved farm technology is probably small, possibly 10 to 20 percent, based on the observation of a Vietnamese colleague who has spent many years interviewing farmers in the Delta. This tends to be supported by the HRS results.

Vietnamese farmers do not always operate with what may be considered the greatest economic effectiveness for a number of reasons. First, they do not always have the knowledge or the training to use their resources as effectively as they might. Second, they resist changing the old ways because of lack of credit, lack of knowledge, or risks entailed in a new practice that could substantially reduce their livelihood. They may lack the credit or the ready cash to make the investments that are necessary. This explains why Delta farmers have the unusually strong urge to obtain more credit. If they had more cash reserves and more access to credit, they could sometimes hold their crops longer without selling it at the peak of the harvest season when the prices are lowest. To introduce change, it is necessary to give farmers the confidence that the change will provide them with a better, more marketable, or larger crop. The problem is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new methods and to convince the farmers of the efficacy of the new methods for improving their way of life.

Sometimes cultural values will stand in the way of economic effectiveness. Large investments might be made in social or religious functions such as weddings and funerals while from an economic point of view, the money might better have been spent on equipment or supplies for the improvement of agriculture. Such attitudes or practices are not easily changed, and Vietnamese farmers are far from unique in this respect.

The field work and other evidence indicate that the horizon of the rural residents is a rather narrow one. They essentially live on a day-to-day basis and little more. Their overall outlook, especially from an economic point of view, tends to be for the immediate present only. They have few cultural amenities and no evident prospects that their lot will improve, and it therefore is not surprising that they cannot and do not think far ahead.

However, this is not to say that rural residents live without hope concerning the future. For example, despite the savagery of the war, the majority of the rural residents believe that next year will be better than this year. The Vietnamese rural residents have shown tremendous endurance and capability of bearing hardship. Basically, they feel that they cannot influence or affect the course of events, and therefore they mind their own business and continue their life in the narrow sphere over which they have some control.

Status of Dwellings

Almost all households, 93 percent of the sample, own their own house, as distinct from the land on which it stands, but ownership is greatest in the farming categories, in which more than 95 percent own their house. It is somewhat lower, 87 percent, in the nonfarmer group.* However, only a little more than one-third of rural households--39 percent--own the plot on which their house stands. But the proportion of home plot ownership varies greatly by status, being 68 percent for owners and owner-tenants, but only about 25 percent for tenants, farm workers, and nonfarmers.†

The quality of house construction materials and the method of construction are directly related to the status of the householder. While the majority of the houses--65 percent--had thatched roofs, 26 percent of the nonfarmers, a relatively well-to-do group, had tiled roofs on their houses while only 3 percent of the farm workers had tiled roofs.‡ With respect to walls, 53 percent had thatched walls, but only 16 percent of the houses of farm owners and 22 percent of those nonfarmers had masonry walls, while none of the farm workers' houses had masonry walls.§ About 68 percent of house floors were made of earth, while cement was used by 16 percent of the owners and 19 percent of the nonfarmers, but only by 2 percent of the farm workers.**

Some caution should be noted, however, in interpreting these data. First, houses with permanent features such as tiled roofs are subject to a higher tax. Second, observations indicate there may be some danger in owning an expensive house since it may become a target of the Viet Cong. Therefore, people do not build or improve their property to the extent that they might. Even so, it is clear that the differences in the quality of dwellings are directly related to the economic status of the population

* HRS, Table 22.

† HRS, Table 23.

‡ HRS, Table 19.

§ HRS, Table 20.

** HRS, Table 21.

surveyed. The data reflect that the survey was successful in the goal of including in the sample a cross section of rural people in various economic strata, with high representation of the lower income rural groups, as might be expected.

Farmers' Ownership of Durable Goods and Working Livestock

To develop further economic status information, rural residents were asked about their ownership of durable goods including radios, televisions, bicycles, motorcycles, and automobiles, as well as their possession of buffalo and oxen.

Some 44 percent of the respondents were found to own radios, a figure substantially higher than anticipated. Ownership was directly related to status, being as high as 52 percent for nonfarmers but only 19 percent for farm workers. Among farm operators, 48 percent of the farm owners, 44 percent of the tenants, and 34 percent of the owner-tenants had radios.* Apparently, the radio has moved out of the prestige or luxury class. Also, in wartime conditions it may become a necessity to keep up with events, many of which may vitally affect a family.

The high ratio of radio ownership has considerable implications for "reaching the people" in connection with information or propaganda programs. Conceivably, in most rural areas, radio messages could directly reach one in two or one in three households. Therefore, communication with the general rural population can be exceedingly rapid, especially when supplemented by the word-of-mouth network already existing in the hamlets.

Although television is a truly rare item in the hamlet, it is there, and 1 percent of the sample households owned television sets.* Many rural hamlets have community television sets, but most of the 100,000 sets in the country are in the cities. Since the TV programs are broadcast from government-controlled stations, the possible impact of TV on the rural peasant can be tremendous.

The high ownership of radios even outranked the ownership of bicycles--44 percent compared with 35 percent for bicycles--and this was consistent in every class except owner-tenants. As with the radio, bicycle ownership is directly related to status class. Bicycles are owned by 43 percent of the farm owners and owner-tenants, but as few as 10 percent of the farm workers own bicycles.

* HRS, Table 24.

While 35 percent of the rural population sample own bicycles, only 7 percent own motorcycles and scooters, and the ownership of automobiles, 1 percent of the entire sample, was as rare as ownership of television. Taking all forms of transport equipment together, of which the bicycle is a major part, 43 percent of the households interviewed owned some form of transport. Thus, the rural population has the capability of a higher degree of mobility than most observers have believed existed.

The tabulation* below shows the relative ownership pattern of (1) radios and television; (2) bicycles, motorcycles, and autos; and (3) buffalo and oxen.

Status Group	Percent of Ownership		
	Radio and TV Sets	Bicycles, Motorcycles, and Autos	Buffalo and Oxen
Farmer owner	49%	55%	13%
Owner-tenant	34	38	25
Tenant	45	47	47
Farm worker	19	10	9
Nonfarmer	53	48	1
Average	45%	43%	13%

On the average, both farmer and nonfarmer respondents favored the ownership of radios and television over cycles or working livestock, with an average of 45 percent of all respondents having some sort of a receiving set. Nonfarmers tended to have even more receivers, with 53 percent of them owning sets. The levels of ownership tended to follow the status group, which in turn reflects the income level. Among the farmer groups, some 49 percent of farm owners had a receiver compared with 44 percent for owner-tenants. Tenants, with presumably lower incomes, possess fewer receivers; 35 percent had radio or TV receivers. Only 19 percent of farm workers had receivers.

Although more farm status respondents had radios or TV than had vehicles, 55 percent of the farm owners had bicycles, motorcycles, or autos compared with 49 percent who had radios or TV. Also, 47 percent of the tenants had vehicles, contrasted with 45 percent who had receivers. Certain tenants lived in secure areas but did their farming at considerable distances away in less secure areas. Possibly this may help to explain

* HRS, Table 24.

the reason why cycles are preferred to radios by this group. Only 10 percent of farm workers had cycles, compared with 19 percent who had receivers. However, no explanation is readily available to explain the preference for radios, apart from a desire to learn about prevailing conditions in Vietnam.

In an attempt to obtain further insight into the ownership pattern for communications and transportation equipment, the respondents were categorized by the three areas. Area I and Area II appeared to favor receivers over cycles. The highest ownership of these items was in the Area I denser provinces, the next highest was in the Area III sparsely occupied provinces, and the least ownership was in the Area II Hoa Hao provinces. Ownership of working livestock was in the reverse order, as shown by the following tabulation.*

	Percent of Ownership		
	<u>Radio and TV Sets</u>	<u>Bicycles, Motorcycles, and Autos</u>	<u>Buffalo and Oxen</u>
Area I	54%	42%	7%
Area II	37	32	15
Area III	46	49	14
Average	45%	43%	13%

Buffalos or oxen for work purposes are owned by 47 percent of the responding owner-tenants, compared with 25 percent of the tenants, 13 percent of the owners, and 9 percent of the farm workers.† The high ownership of this working livestock by owner-tenants may possibly reflect a desire by these farmers to increase their income and security by owning livestock. Land owners, who are more subject to Viet Cong harassment, find that livestock ownership increases their vulnerability to attack.

As noted above, there is an increasing problem in owning working livestock on farms under wartime conditions because of the danger that the animals will be killed through war action. Accordingly, farmers may sell their animals to retrieve their investment, and may borrow or hire work animals when they are required.

* HRS, Table 348.

† HRS, Table 24.

The survey results of ownership of durable goods and livestock, and the family dwelling, as well as house construction, all indicate real socioeconomic differences among the rural farm and nonfarm status groups. The considerable prevalence of radios, cycles, and oxen or buffalo in the rural communities apparently reflects the increasing prosperity that has occurred in the Delta during 1966 and 1967 through GVN and USAID assistance policies.

Chapter 3

STATUS OF LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIPS

Background

In understanding landlord-tenant relationships in Vietnam, it is important to realize that for some time now they have been in historical transition. The time when the tenant's condition was serflike is still recent. The tenant brought gifts to the landlord at appointed times during the year and gave free labor to the landlord on important occasions or ceremonies.

World War II and the almost continuous war conditions since have set in motion political forces that have drastically changed the relationships between landlords and tenants. Land reform efforts begun by the Viet Minh in 1946 and taken up by the Viet Cong in recent years have essentially eliminated landlordship in the area that the Viet Cong controls today.

Similarly, in the GVN-controlled areas of the Southern Region, land reform carried out under Ordinance 57 has substantially reduced the economic and political power and status of landlords by expropriating all land owned in excess of 100 hectares. In the process, land ownership has been extended to many tenants and small owners. Also, the expropriation of the land of French citizens removed some of the very largest of the landlords from the rural scene in the Southern Region.

The effect of the actions of the Viet Cong, combined with the legitimate land expropriations of the GVN--the former uncompensated and the latter compensated--have eliminated landlords with large holdings from the Vietnam countryside, particularly in the Delta region. As a result, a sharp change in the old relationship between the landlord and the tenant has occurred in the Southern Region, and this old relationship will probably never be revived. The relationship in the Central Lowlands, where the metayage system of tenure tends to maintain older practices, may continue somewhat as in the past, but the landlord's power is much reduced from what it once was.

Landlords with large and medium-sized holdings are the targets of the Viet Cong and must either operate inconspicuously or move to the cities for safety. When there is any danger of Viet Cong control being instituted,

the landlord realizes the insecurity of his ownership and leaves to save his life and that of his family.

Thus, the landlord no longer assists the tenant with his farm operations, if he ever did to any extent, because of distance, the risk in lending money, and the danger of visiting or continuing to live in the village. Insecure conditions have made it difficult for the landlord to collect rents or to correct poor practices on his tenanted land.

It must also be recognized that a tenant can do little to maintain a close relationship with his landlord under insecure conditions. This may account for the fact that so few disputes are reported between landlords and tenants. Not only does the cultural situation tend to preclude such disputes, but also conditions of insecurity do not allow much time for them.

However, strong vestiges of the old bonds between landlords and tenants remain. A number of instances have been mentioned to the team concerning tenants who literally sneak from Viet Cong controlled areas carrying the usual rent to their landlords who are now living in Saigon.

The Landlord Class

Although it might seem appropriate to distinguish landlords residing in rural hamlets from absentee landlords, the distinction cannot be drawn because within broad limits, a man can buy land where he wishes. Thus, many resident landlords also rent out land they own in other places outside the village. In addition, local tenants and owner-tenants rent land from landowners who reside both inside and outside the village.

Inequalities in the size distribution of land ownership are described in Chapter 6 and will be discussed there. At this point, the aim is to focus on landlord-tenant relations and how the available owned land is distributed by the owners to available tenant farmers.

Mass landlord absenteeism is generally assumed to be the case in Vietnam. Exploration of this issue in the Hamlet Resident Survey identified 188 landowners, of whom 42 percent lived in the village. Landlords tend to be distributed inversely with distance from their property. Land was rented in the village from absentee landlords living in the district, the province, Saigon-Cholon, and other places. Many of these residential locations outside the village may be in other rural communities. In terms of land rented, the location of landlords and number of parcels rented by location are shown in Table 18.

Table 18

LOCATION OF LANDLORDS WHO RENTED LAND TO TENANTS AND OWNER-TENANTS
IN VILLAGES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	Land Rented Out			
	Hectares		Parcels	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Village	168.9	37.6%	99	42.3%
District	72.6	16.1	34	14.5
Province	72.9	16.2	26	11.1
Other	41.9	9.3	16	6.9
Unknown	56.4	12.6	41	17.5
Saigon-Cholon	36.9	8.2	18	7.7
Total	449.6	100.0%	234	100.0%

Source: HRS, Tables 277, 278, and 279.

In terms of hectarage, local landlords rented out 38 percent of the land rented by owner-tenants and tenants. If landlords located in the village and district are considered as rural, 53.7 percent of the land is rented out currently by rural-based landlords. Only 8.2 percent of the land rented in the village is from Saigon-Cholon-based landlords, but 38.1 percent of the land is rented from absentee landlords living in other places (some unknown), including residence abroad.

The size of unit owned by landlords increases beyond the village level. Inside the village, the average landlord has fewer than 1.75 tenants, compared with about 3 tenants for landlords who rent land outside the village.

The large Saigon-Cholon landlords, most of whom are probably in the category of landlords whose land was expropriated under Ordinance 57, have almost 24 tenants on the average. The landlord in the village who rents to village residents is a small farmer who rents out 2.63 hectares on the average (Table 19). However, the landlord who has land to rent outside the village area rents out about 16 hectares on the average. Not all the

landlords in Saigon could be expected to have as much land as the landlords whose lands were expropriated under Ordinance 57. The expropriated landlords who were surveyed in the Absentee Landlord Survey (ALS) owned an average of 94 hectares each (Table 19). Table 20 shows the location and ownership of lands farmed by village residents.

Table 19

AVERAGE SIZE OF PARCEL RENTED OUT AND NUMBER OF TENANTS PER LANDLORD
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Type of Parcel</u>	<u>Total No. of</u>		<u>Tenants/ Landlord</u>	<u>Area Rented Out (ha)</u>	<u>Area/ Tenant (ha)</u>	<u>Area/ Land- lord</u>
	<u>Landlords</u>	<u>Tenants</u>				
Land rented out inside village by village landlords*	24	42	1.75	63	1.50	2.63
Land rented out out- side village by vil- lage landlords*	14	44	3.14	223	5.07	15.93
Land owned and rented out by expropriated landlords†	69	1,623	23.52	6,503	4.01	94.25

* HRS, Tables 278 and 280.

† ALS, Q11 and Q15.

It is evident from the HRS and the ALS that large landowners no longer constitute an easily identifiable class. They no longer possess the economic or political power that they held before expropriation. The ALS, in which 187 landlords* living in Saigon and Long Xuyen were interviewed,

* The landlords sampled in the ALS had their lands in excess of 100 hectares expropriated under Ordinance 57.

Table 20

LOCATION AND OWNERSHIP OF LANDS FARMED BY VILLAGE RESIDENTS
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1967
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(Hectares)

	<u>Inside Village</u>	<u>Outside Village</u>	<u>Total Village</u>
Land owned by resident	485	604	1,089
Land rented in by tenants	451		451
From rural areas	242		242
Village	169		169
District*	73		73
From urban areas	209		209
Province†	73		73
Saigon-Cholon	37		37
Other location	<u>99</u>	<u> </u>	<u>99</u>
Total	936	604	1,540
Subtract:			
Land rented out by owners	63	223	286
Total lands farmed by village residents			1,254

* Not including village.

† Not including district.

Source: HRS, Tables 277, 278, and 279.

indicated that only 15 percent of the landlords received rents from their land regularly while as many as 60 percent report that they seldom or never receive rents (ALS Q87). Some 13 percent are active or retired civil servants; 14 percent are engaged in professional careers; 15 percent have investments in urban properties; 6 percent have income from industrial investments, including industrial management (ALS Q123); and 29 percent profit from commercial enterprises. Among the less fortunate are 21 percent who are dependent on their children and 17 percent who report no other income than what they can collect from tenants on their remaining 100 hectares of riceland. In these last two cases, none of the landlords are wealthy, and a few even live in poverty (ALS Q86).

Ethnically, 90 percent of the landlords in the ALS were Vietnamese, 6 percent were Chinese, 2 percent were Indian, and 1 percent were French (ALS Q127). Buddhism was the religion of 63 percent compared with 39 percent of the HRS sample of village landlords; thus, the absentee landlords were close to the national religious composition. Also, whereas 8 percent of the village landlords were Catholic, 15 percent of the absentee landlords were Catholic. Ninety-two percent of the absentee landlords were born in the Southern Region. Their children own no land other than their homesites in 85 percent of the cases, and they tend to move into medicine, education, law, engineering, government service, military service, and business affairs (Q127, Q130, and Q135).

It should be pointed out that the ALS sample of absentee landlords can be considered representative only of those landlords in the cities of Saigon and Long Xuyen. Other cities were not surveyed because of the insecure conditions following the Tet offensive. The sample included almost 10 percent of the landlords whose land was expropriated under Ordinance 57. Tables 21, 22, and 23 present the geographical distribution of landholdings and residences for all those whose land was expropriated; the data are not confined to those that were interviewed. The inland Mekong provinces (see Figure 2) had a larger proportion of landlords with smaller sized holdings than other areas but the variation in size of holdings in relation to where the owner lived was not great. The most striking feature of the distribution of large land holdings is their disproportionate concentration along the Mekong River, especially at the Delta mouth in the provinces of Ba Xuyen, Vinh Binh, and Bac Lieu. Ba Xuyen and Vinh Binh, labeled "mouth of the Mekong" in Figure 3, between them have as many expropriated cases as all the rest of Vietnam combined, except for the five provinces labeled "inland Mekong." Practically no expropriations were conducted in the Central Lowlands.

It is apparent that land reform and the war have had the effect of increasing the absenteeism of landlords from the Southern Region. About a

Table 21

PROVINCES WHERE LAND WAS EXPROPRIATED ACCORDING TO
LAND REGISTRATION RECORDS, ORDINANCE 57, 1956
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Province</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Percent of All Listings</u>	<u>All Listings</u>
An Xuyen	9	9%	285 (17%)
Bac Lieu	3		
Kien Giang	13		
Chuong Thien	0		
Ba Xuyen	32	9	575 (34%)
Vinh Binh	18		
Chau Doc	3	17	596 (36%)
An Giang	40		
Phong Dinh	28		
Vinh Long	11		
Kien Phong	18		
Kien Hoa	2	8	146 (9%)
Dinh Tuong	9		
Go Cong	0		
Kien Tuong	1		
Long An	12	24%	70 (4%)
Bien Hoa	2		
Phuoc Long	0		
Binh Duong	0		
Binh Thuan	0		
Tay Ninh	2		
Phuoc Tuy	1		
	204	(100%)	1,672*

* Not all listings gave the province of owner's residence. In all, 1,972 landlords were expropriated.

Table 22

LAND OWNERSHIP HOLDINGS OF LANDLORDS EXPROPRIATED UNDER ORDINANCE 57, 1956
BY RESIDENCE OF OWNER
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(Size Classes in Hectares)

Owner's Residence by City or Province	1-50	51-250	251-800	800-2,000	Above 2,000	Total
1. Saigon	131 23%	242 42%	151 26%	41 7%	7 1%	572
Cholon						
Gia-Dinh						
2. An Xuyen	66 22%	144 49%	68 23%	17 6%	3 1%	298
Bac Lieu						
Kien Giang						
Chuong Thien						
3. Ba Xuyen	86 30%	144 51%	49 17%	4 2%	1 --	284
Vinh Binh						
4. Chau Doc	102 39%	120 46%	29 11%	7 3%	2 1%	260
An Giang						
Phong Dinh						
Vinh Long						
Kien Phong						
4A. Can Tho	24 35%	31 43%	9 13%	3 4%	2 3%	69
4B. Long Xuyen	22 36%	30 49%	8 13%	1 2%	0 --	61
5. Kien Hoa	29 31%	44 47%	14 15%	5 5%	1 1%	93
Dinh Tuong						
Go Cong						
Kien Tuong						
6. Long An	9 30%	17 57%	3 10%	0 --	1 3%	30
Bien Hoa						
Phuoc Long						
Binh Duong						
Binh Thuan						
7. Unknown	56	78	32	3	1	170
8. France	0	3	0	0	0	3
Total No.	525	853	363	81	18	1,840
% of Total No.	29%	46%	20%	4%	1%	100%
Est. Total Hectarage	59,000+	163,500±	109,500±	73,500±	41,500±	446,500
% of Hectares	13%	37%	25%	16%	9%	100%


Table 23

LOCATION OF LAND OWNERSHIP HOLDINGS OF LANDLORDS EXPROPRIATED UNDER
ORDINANCE 57, 1956, BY RESIDENCE OF OWNER
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Owner's Residence by City or Province	(2)		(4)		(5)		(6)	Total
	An Xuyen Bac Lieu Kien Giang Chuong Thien	(3) Ba Xuyen Vinh Binh	Chau Doc An Giang Phong Dinh Vinh Long Kien Phong	Kien Hoa Dinh Tuong Go Cong Kien Tuong	Binh Thuan Long An Bien Hoa Gia Dinh Phuoc Long Binh Duong			
1. Saigon	73 26%	178 31%	199 33%	70 48%	51 73%		571	
2. An Xuyen Bac Lieu Kien Giang Chuong Thien	183 64%	101 18%	11 --	1 --	0 --		296	
3. Ba Xuyen Vinh Binh	14 5%	255 44%	13 --	1 --	6 9%		289	
4. Chau Doc An Giang Phong Dinh Vinh Long Kien Phong	8 3%	23 4%	227 38%	5 --	0 --		263	
4A. Can Tho	1	8	66	} 21%	2	0	77	
4B. Long Xuyen	3	3	57		0	0	63	
5. Kien Hoa Dinh Tuong Go Cong Kien Tuong	2 --	5 --	18 3%	63 43%	2 --		90	
6. Long An Gia Dinh Bien Hoa etc.	1 --	2 --	5 --	4 --	11 16%		23	
	285 100%	575 100%	596 100%	146 100%	70 100%		1,672	

Figure 3

SOUTHERN REGION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1968



★ SAIGON

INLAND MEKONG

- g. Chau Doc
- h. An Giang
- i. Phong Dinh
- j. Vinh Long
- k. Kien Phong
- zb. Sa Dec

NON-DELTA

- p. Long An
- q. Bien Hoa
- r. Phuoc Long
- s. Binh Duong
- t. Binh Thuan
- u. Tay Ninh
- v. Phuoc Tuy
- w. Gia Dinh
- x. Hau Nghia
- y. Long Khanh
- z. Binh Tuy
- za. Binh Long

NORTHEAST DELTA

- l. Kien Hoa
- m. Dinh Tuong
- n. Go Cong
- o. Kien Tuong

GULF OF THAILAND

- a. An Xuyen
- b. Bac Lieu
- c. Kien Giang
- d. Chuong Thien

MOUTH OF MEKONG

- e. Ba Xuyen
- f. Vinh Binh

third of all expropriated landlords lived in the Saigon metropolitan area at the time of expropriation. The largest proportion of landlords who lived near their holdings occurred in the provinces most distant from Saigon--that is, those along the Gulf of Siam. Since Saigon and the next three largest cities in the Southern Region can account for only about half of the absentee landlords by residence, the other half must have been living in the small towns and even in the villages in the late 1950s. Not one absentee landlord lived in the Central Lowlands. Unfortunately, war conditions prevented the team from gaining any idea about the residential distribution of the total of absentee landlords in 1968.

In the villages of the resident landlords, no unit rented out exceeded 10 hectares, and 96 percent of the units were less than 7.5 hectares in size.* Tenant responses corroborated those of the resident landlords; that is, 96 percent of the units rented were below 7.5 hectares and none exceeded 10 hectares.† The landlords who rented out land outside the village had a much wider distribution in the size of unit rented out; 80 percent of the units were below 7.5 hectares.

One unit rented outside the village had an area of 130 hectares. This unit represented ownership of land in excess of the amount permitted under Ordinance 57, but it cannot definitely be established that this was an illegal case.‡ Thus, one out of the 273 farms owned in the sample was in excess of the legal limit. If such units should show up in the same frequency throughout the Southern Region, it may be expected that about 0.37 percent of the farm units owned would be in excess of the legal limit established by Ordinance 57.

The location of landlords renting village lands to owner-tenants and tenants is shown in Table 18, based on the HRS results. A total of 1,254 hectares were farmed by villagers sampled in the HRS. The total land held by village farmers came to 1,540 hectares, including 604 hectares of land owned by villagers outside the village. Owners held 485 hectares in the village, compared with 451 hectares rented in from all locations (Table 20). The land rented in by tenants and owner-tenants was classified in the HRS by origin--that is, the village itself, the district, the province, Saigon-Cholon, and other areas. For purposes of calculating the size distribution

* HRS, Table 278.

† HRS, Table 279.

‡ At a maximum, a single owner would be permitted to own 100 hectares of riceland, 15 hectares of worship land, and 12 hectares of garden land. If this owner stated his area in approximate terms, he might just qualify for the legal limit.

of ownership, it has been assumed in this study that the land rented in from the village and district area is a part of the rural region sampled by the HRS and that the land rented in from elsewhere comes from urban areas.

From the total of 1,540 hectares must be subtracted the land rented out (to avoid double counting) by owners resident in the village; this rented land amounted to 286 hectares. This leaves a total of 1,254 hectares farmed by village residents, excluding the land owned by villagers but rented out to others.

From this analysis, it is evident that any future land expropriation plan will primarily affect the absentee landlords located in the urban centers. Very few landowners in the rural areas have more than 20 hectares of land. Those who have more land tend to live outside the villages and are more likely to be affected by such a program. Most affected will be the landlords whose land was expropriated under Ordinance 57, and who generally reside in the urban communities today.

Although a majority of the responding absentee landlords had only infrequent contact with the rural areas where the lands were located, their estimates of security conditions might usefully supplement the findings of other surveys. Table 24 shows lands expropriated under Ordinance 57 that are now under Viet Cong control. If one may believe these respondents, security conditions generally improved after partition of Vietnam up to a point, but they have grown worse since 1956. Reporting of lands either totally safe or totally under Viet Cong control takes the following pattern:

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1968</u> *
All safe	35%	40%	36%
Viet Minh or Viet Cong controlled	24	22	32

A cross-tabulation by reportings of respondents for security in 1956 and 1968 indicates that at most, 19 cases improved for the better, whereas nearly twice that number (35) grew worse, and 91 apparently remained relatively unchanged. In the first two years of the Republic of Vietnam, between 1954 and the eve of expropriation in October 1966, only 5 cases were reported to have grown worse, whereas 17 had improved, and 139 had remained

* ALS, Q17 and Q18.

Table 24

COMMUNIST CONTROL OF ORDINANCE 57
EXPROPRIATED LANDS, 1956 AND 1968
ABSENTEE LANDLORD SURVEY SAMPLE

Percent of Landlord's Holding Reported to Be Under Viet Minh Control in 1956	Viet Cong Control of Land- lord's Holding in 1968 (num- ber of landlord responses)			Total
	Yes	No	Don't Know	
None controlled	23	40	5	68
20% controlled	6	3	0	9
40% controlled	14	1	0	15
60% controlled	11	4	0	15
80% controlled	8	4	0	12
100% controlled	34	2	2	38
Don't know	4	0	9	13
Total	100	54	16	170

Source: ALS, Table B-1, Q17.

unchanged. Clearly, the security situation at that time was much less severe than today. Since these tabulations are drawn from statements made many years after the fact, they are only as reliable as the respondents' memories (Q9 versus Q2). A comparison is also made between the access to the lands by tenants in 1968 and that in 1956 when the Viet Minh was in control. Another indicator of the importance of security to economic conditions can be measured by the fact that 57 percent listed the changing state of security in rural areas as a principal factor affecting the economic condition of landowners.

Rental Collection, Legality, and Problems

The Hamlet Resident Survey asked whether tenants were required to pay excessive rents in violation of Ordinance 2, Article 15. This Ordinance

states that in the type A contract there should be a rent reduction of two-thirds for a one-third loss of crop, and a complete exemption from the agreed-on fixed rent in case crop failure is at least two-thirds of the harvest.*

During 1966, on which the HRS findings are based, an unusual amount of crop failure occurred because of flooding in the Mekong Delta. According to the survey, 78 percent of all the tenants reported partial or total crop failure.† No rent reduction of any sort was received by 15 percent of the tenants who lost one-third or more of their crops and were eligible for rent reduction under the law. Among those 75 tenants who lost at least one-third of their crop, only 52 percent were compensated partly or wholly for their lawful claim, and of the 62 who lost two-thirds of their crops, only 37 percent received their full claim. In total, only 43 percent of the tenants received what they were entitled to and another 20 percent received only a fraction of what they should have received. Allowing for some possible exaggeration of losses, it appears that the tenants were compensated much below their rightful claims, perhaps by as much as 50 percent.‡

Despite this finding, an overwhelming 88 percent of the landlords said they customarily reduced rents in the case of crop failure.§ One must conclude that a legal edict is inadequate as an inducement to landlords to accept a share of the risk of crop failure as the law specifies. The situation may also reflect ignorance of the law by the tenants and fear that the landlords would deprive them of the right to continue renting the land.

Eighty-nine percent of the hamlet resident tenants in the sample survey said that they paid their rent in full, 8 percent said they paid rent only in part, and 2 percent said not at all. Crop failures were blamed for nonpayment of rent in all cases.** In contrast, almost half the resident landlords (47 percent) reported their ability to collect all the rents due them, and another 42 percent said that they collected their rents in part.†† For reasons related to insecurity, only 15 percent of the absentee landlords reported in the Absentee Landlord Survey that they could collect rents regularly. Twenty-five percent said they could collect rent "sometimes or only partially," and 60 percent said they could collect "seldom or never."‡‡ The possible reason for the high rate of

* See Volume I, Appendix E-1.

† HRS, Table 143.

‡ HRS, Table 310, Q63 and Q64.

§ HRS, Table 130, Q22.

** HRS, Table 139, Q59.

†† HRS, Table 112.

‡‡ ALS, Q87.

rental payments declared by tenants, disregarding some overstatement, is that the resident tenants surveyed lived in reasonably secure areas, whereas the landlords would also have a considerable amount of land rented out in insecure areas where they would have much difficulty in collecting rents.

An unexpectedly high percentage of tenants (about 12 percent) stated that their landlords always or sometimes require payment of the rent before rather than after harvest. There is some possibility, however, that some of the respondents may have misunderstood the question. On the other hand, payment in advance could be a device for raising the level of rent contrary to the law. Even more serious is the heavy burden that this practice could place on the tenant in requiring him to pay the rent before harvest, which is the time the tenant is likely to be in the very poorest financial condition. Finally, it should be noted that almost all of the tenants paid rent exclusively for the use of land. A mere 2 percent paid rents for house use or for fruit trees in addition to the rent for the land.* This may be explained by the fact mentioned earlier that almost all the tenants own their own houses, but only a small proportion own the land on which the house stands.

About 16 percent of the responding tenants believed that the rental agreements with their landlords were not fair.† In view of what has been said, it is surprising that the proportion of those registering a complaint in the survey is so low. Here again, the results may reflect the tendency among Vietnamese farmers to be polite or the feeling that nothing can be done about the alleged unfairness anyway.

According to the tenant reports, in 77 percent of the cases, the rents were collected by the landlords in person.‡ This high proportion is easily explained by the statements of half the tenants that their landlords lived in the same village and that about 17 percent of the tenants rent local, communal, or church land.§ The difference in the figures can probably be accounted for by the landlords who live in a nearby area such as in the next village and who also personally collect rents. For example, 15 percent of the tenants said that their landlord lived in another village but in the same district.**

The survey revealed that a direct relationship generally exists between the tenant and the landlord. Only about 10 percent of the land was

* HRS, Table 141.

† HRS, Table 257.

‡ HRS, Table 145.

§ HRS, Table 71 and 252.

** HRS, Table 252.

sublet from an intermediary.* Another interesting result is that almost one-fifth of all tenants are relatives of the landowner or the intermediary from whom they rent.†

Another illegal practice, the requirement of key money, was studied in the HRS to determine if the landlord was using it as a means of raising the rent level. This practice might be expected in a situation where land to rent is scarce and tenants are in sharp competition for it. The survey reported that only 3 percent of the tenants were required to pay key money, indicating that this was not a common method used by landlords to evade the law.‡

The survey found that the average rent paid by tenants is about 20 gia of paddy per hectare.§ As noted earlier, payment in kind is the common practice. The payment for fixed rent varied greatly, from 4 to 50 gia per hectare, reflecting differences in land fertility, location, and management.** Cash rental paid by tenants varied from VN\$9 to over VN\$400 per hectare with an average of VN\$44.6.†† The range in cash payments was almost identical to that in the payments received by the landlords, but the average of about VN\$70 per hectare was considerably higher.‡‡

The rental level permitted by law is 15 to 25 percent of the principal crop or crops without allowances or deductions for production costs. To determine whether the law pertaining to rentals is currently observed in the Southern Region, the fixed rent paid in kind by landless tenants was computed as a percentage of total rice production. Data for the landless tenants were analyzed because all their produce was grown on rented land, and hence they are the only category for whom an estimate of rent as a percentage of total rice production is possible. The results are summarized in Table 25 for the Southern Region and for the three areas of the

* HRS, Table 122.

† HRS, Tables 250 and 251.

‡ HRS, Table 147.

§ Paddy is unhulled rice as harvested. A gia is a measure of 40 liters. In the case of paddy, it is equivalent to a weight of 21.6 kg. It is approximately equivalent to a bushel.

** HRS Table 305.

†† HRS Table 307.

‡‡ HRS Table 308. The figure for the average amount of rent in kind received by landlords is 20 gia per hectare. These two averages are not statistically different at a 40 to 50 percent level of significance. Because of the very small number of landlords reporting rents received in cash and the large standard error of the average rent estimated to be about 40 piasters, the reliability of the average rental received by landlords is considerably lower.

provinces. The finding is that for the Southern Region as a whole during 1966, rental payments amounted to 34.5 percent of total paddy production. More specifically, only in 39 percent of the cases was the rental payment within or below the legal limit of 25 percent. In about 61 percent of the cases, the rent constituted more than one-fourth of gross production and exceeded the legal limit.

Table 25

FIXED RENT PAID IN KIND BY LANDLESS TENANTS COMPARED
WITH TOTAL VALUE OF RICE PRODUCTION,
BY AREAS OF SOUTHERN REGION, 1966
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	<u>Area I</u>	<u>Area II</u>	<u>Area III</u>	<u>Total</u>
Rent as percent of pro- duction	35.0%	57.1%	27.3%	34.5%
Average rent in gias per hectare	21.5	19.9	16.9	20.1
Average production per rented hectare (gias)	61.5	34.8	61.8	53.9

Source: HRS, Table 309.

Because of the severe floods in the Delta in 1966, abnormally low paddy production was recorded, which may tend to exaggerate the proportion of illegal rental payments. In addition, the legal requirement is that the rental is to be paid only on the principal crop or crops and not necessarily on total crop production. This means that the finding of illegal payments in 61 percent of the cases may well be an underestimate. Since these two considerations tend to counteract each other, the finding that rental payments constituted 34.5 percent of total paddy production may be assumed to be close to representing the true situation.

Calculations were also made of the ratio of rental payments to production in each of the three areas of the Southern Region into which the

sample was divided. The interesting finding is that the average rent of 18.6 gia per hectare paid in the Southern Region differed in the three areas of the region only by 7 to 15 percent from the regional mean. In contrast, the rent paid as a proportion of production was substantially different. The major reason must have been comparatively low yields of paddy per hectare obtained in Area II--the predominantly Hoa Hao provinces--where a yield of about 35 gia per hectare compares with about 62 gia per hectare in Areas I and III. The Hoa Hao provinces were particularly hard-hit by flooding in 1966, more so than the other areas of the region. If paddy yield per hectare in Area II had been 61.5 gia as in the other two areas, rent as a proportion of production would have been 32 percent instead of 57 percent, which is close to the average for the region. On this basis, the average rent paid in the Southern Region would have been about 30 percent.

Rent as a ratio of production was closer to the legal limit in Area III (27 percent) than in Area I (35 percent). This can possibly be explained by the much greater population pressure on the land in the centrally located and densely populated provinces in Area I of the Delta.

Thus, even allowing for the adverse effects of crop failure and the prevalence of fixed crop share rents, which would have the effect of raising rental levels as a proportion of production, there is little doubt that evasion of the law by landlords with respect to the imposition of rents is a current practice. This means that the administration of the law is ineffective, and the evidence would indicate that little effort is being made to enforce it. In justification, it should be said that enforcement of rental ceilings would be difficult even in a strong administrative system and can never be expected to work well, especially in areas where there exists a great demand for rental lands relative to the supply available.

Land Rental and Lease Contracts

The most common land rental arrangement in 63 percent of the cases in the Southern Region is a verbal rather than a written contract applicable for an indefinite period of time.* In contrast, the law emphasizes the written contract: Of the tenants, 67 percent reported that they had never

* In the HRS, 63.4 percent of the tenants and 63.9 percent of the landlords said that they had verbal renting arrangements while the rest have written contracts (Tables 119 and 115).

renewed their contracts.* This probably means that the rental arrangement goes on from year to year without specification of a given period of tenancy, until one of the parties desires a change. The common use of the verbal rental agreement probably indicates that both landlords and tenants tend to be satisfied with these informal arrangements. Aside from weaknesses in the administrative system, this explains why only a small number of contracts are actually registered at the village and province level, even though the proportion of written contracts registered appears to be very high.†

Sixteen percent of the tenants operate under a crop-sharing arrangement, while a majority of 82 percent surprisingly have a fixed rental agreement.‡ The merit of the crop-share agreement for the tenant lies in that he does not bear the risk completely in the event of a poor crop or crop failure. On the other hand, the crop-share agreement has a serious disadvantage in that it reduces the tenant's incentive for investment in agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, from which the landlord will benefit by an increased crop without having contributed a share of the cost of the input. In a situation where crop yields tend to be stable, tenants may be willing to incur some of the added risks. Not enough is known about the frequency of crop failure in the Delta to evaluate the reasonableness of the tendency to favor the fixed rental agreement. On the other hand, the frequency of the practice may suggest the stronger bargaining position of the landlord and a tendency toward exploitation of the tenant.

Rents are most frequently paid in kind in the Southern Region, accounting for 74 percent of the cases.§ The high percentage of those paying rent in kind may be related to present conditions of insecurity in the rural areas. There is evidence that under normal conditions, two-thirds of the tenants would be expected to pay their rent in cash, whereas the survey showed only about one-fourth. The reason given is that under present circumstances, cash is scarce. There is much evidence that under insecure conditions, the tenant has an advantage in bargaining with the landlord, and in view of uncertain prices, he would prefer to pay in kind. The landlord, on the other hand, would probably prefer to receive cash, which is much less difficult to carry in emergencies.

* HRS Table 254.

† Of the tenants who reported that they had written rental contracts, more than four-fifths said they had registered them at the village office (HRS Table 120).

‡ HRS, Table 131.

§ HRS Tables 133 and 135. For those with crop-share rental agreements, payment in kind accounts for 82 percent (HRS, Table 312).

It was noted that nearly two-thirds of lease contracts are verbal arrangements between landlords and tenants, even though the law emphasizes the written contracts.* Eighty-one percent of the tenants with written contracts stated that the lease contracts were registered and filed with the village office.† A large number of the responding tenants (84 percent) said that the rental agreements with their landlords were fair.‡ Somewhat consistent was the view of 70 percent of the tenants that rents paid were about fair, while a fourth of them thought they were too high and three percent thought they were too low.§

Leases in the Southern Region are indefinite in term in 62 percent of the cases, and if leases of five years and over duration are included, the proportion of long term leases rises to 77 percent.** The landlords were predominantly (83 percent) satisfied with the duration of the lease period.†† A majority of tenants (63 percent) believed that they could extend their leases indefinitely.‡‡ Also indicative of stability in leasing was the information that only one-third of the tenants had ever renewed their written or verbal lease agreement.

The picture that emerges is that landlord-tenant relationships with respect to type of contract and duration of lease are considerably informal.

Tenants and owner-tenants were asked from whom they rented their land. The vast majority (83 percent) rented directly from individual landowners, but 7 percent rented from church bodies and 9 percent from village councils. In Area I--the densely populated provinces--the village council was likely to be the landlord in one of the six cases but no church lands were recorded at all. In the other two areas, church landlordship was recorded in about 10 percent of the cases.§§

Disputes over Land Tenure

According to the Hamlet Resident Survey, there were hardly any disputes between landlords and their tenants. The precise meaning of "dispute" may have been interpreted by respondents to include only disputes

* HRS, Table 119, Q50.
† HRS, Table 120, Q51.
‡ HRS, Table 257, Q81.
§ HRS, Table 258, Q82.
** HRS, Table 121, Q52.
†† HRS, Table 118, Q26.
‡‡ HRS, Table 253, Q53
§§ HRS, Tables 71 and 349.

formally presented to others for adjudication and to exclude disagreements resolved directly between the parties or through informal intermediaries. In either case, the importance of disputes is minimal. Among 232 tenants interviewed, only three reported any disputes with their landlords during the past three years.* One resident landlord out of 36 reported having one to three disputes within the last three years.† In the three disputes reported, two were settled by the Village Council. Most of the disputes are apparently settled by an appeal to local citizens before they are even taken to the Village Council.

The Landlords' Role in Assistance to Tenants

Economic theory suggests and experience demonstrates that the severing of the link between the landlord and the tenant in a land redistribution program may cause a sharp subsequent slump in production. This is most likely to happen in an agricultural economy in which the landlord provides the farmer with essential services that are subsequently cut off by the creation of owners who can no longer get the material, financial, or technical help from other sources than the landlord. The weaknesses that then appear may reflect the inadequacies of the social infrastructure, the credit system, the marketing system, or the technical extension assistance that should normally be provided by the central government. The weaknesses may also reflect the lack of technical and management capability of the new owner.

Since the landlord's present role in farm production is an important issue likely to affect consideration of the advisability of undertaking another land redistribution program in Vietnam, this matter was explored in a number of questions in the HRS.

Accordingly, it may be emphatically stated that the survey findings showed that landlords as a group, whether they reside in the village or are absentees, are without function in the sense of service to the tenant on agricultural production.

The response of resident landlords to the following questions makes the point in regard to the provision of supplies to tenants:‡

- Do you give loans for purchase of farm supplies? 94 percent No

* HRS, Table 239.

† HRS, Table 236.

‡ HRS, Tables 244-249.

- Do you give assistance for farm improvements? 94 percent No
- Do you assist with familial needs? 89 percent No
- Do you assist in other ways--e.g., powering or harrowing?
97 percent No
- Do you provide seed? 97 percent No
- Do you instruct your tenants about good seed, etc.? 81 percent No

Tenants' responses corroborated those given by landlords. Ninety-eight percent said they rented nothing from their landlords but the land.* Only four percent of the tenants said that they borrowed money from their landlord.†

The Absentee Landlord Survey reported similar results. The number interviewed (187) was a much larger group than the landlords residing in the villages interviewed in the Hamlet Resident Survey. These absentee landlords performed few functions on which agricultural production depends, notwithstanding their extensive and long established ownership of large tracts of land. They do not reside on their lands. About 91 percent till no land now, and about two percent tilled between 10 and 40 hectares each.‡ In contrast, 44 percent of the local resident landlords in the villages engaged in farming as their chief source of income. At least 94 percent of the absentee landlords reported that before 1956 they personally had tilled no land at all, and 86 percent reported that they had not personally supervised tillage in 1956.§ Of the 22 percent who reported that they had ceased tilling about one-third had ceased between 1954 and 1961, and 60 percent had stopped between 1945 and 1954. Insecurity was cited as the major reason for stopping tillage but some reported reasons of personal health, family needs, sufficient income from other sources, or a preference for city living in that order.**

Besides taking little or no part in the tillage of land or its supervision, the absentee landlords commonly contribute almost nothing financial toward meeting the costs of agricultural production. Only 3 to 5 percent reported that they contributed anything, and then vaguely mentioned

* HRS, Table 141.

† HRS, Table 168.

‡ ALS, Q13.

§ ALS, Q8 and Q8a.

** ALS, Q13, Q13a, and Q136.

various contributions, including the provision of seed, fertilizer, farm implements, irrigation and drainage costs, draft animals and credit for farm production.*

The contribution of these absentee landlords in the form of technical guidance to improve production is also extremely minor. Ninety-three of the landlords responding said that they provide no assistance to their tenants in agricultural production. Only 3 percent felt they provided such services extensively.†

Absentee landlords play a very small role as lenders of money to their tenants to meet personal need. They report themselves as participating only slightly more in helping to meet "familial" needs than in giving technical assistance to improve production. Only about 9 percent said that they loaned money to their tenants for "familial" needs,‡ a low figure, but one corroborated by the Hamlet Resident Survey.

The growing tenuousness of relations between landlords and tenants was probed in a question as follows: As compared with ten years ago (1957), have you seen a change in the behavior of farm tenants toward you, the landlord? Twenty-five percent of the landlords said they were unable to answer because they had no personal contact with the tenants. Twenty-two percent of the landlords said they noted "no change" in the attitude of tenants, 14 percent reported only a "slight change," and 39 percent noted a "considerable change."§

In considering the role of the landlord from a social viewpoint, one important question relates to how land ownership is acquired. HRS respondents were asked to indicate the source from which they had acquired their land. Some 40 out of 73 (55 percent) stated they had inherited their lands. Another five had received land gifts, providing a total of 61 percent of landowners who received land by inheritance or gift. Still another four had received government lands, three by purchase of Ordinance 57 lands and one through concession lands. Surprisingly, 32 percent of the owners had purchased private lands. Thus, landowners because of the predominance of inheritance, tend to perpetuate themselves, and reduce the opportunity for others to become landowners.

However, a more meaningful understanding could be obtained by checking into the amounts of land held. The results were cross-tabulated, and as

* ALS, Q39 and Q41.

† ALS, Q45.

‡ ALS, Q46.

§ ALS, Q99.

might be anticipated, the larger land holdings were obtained by inheritance while the private purchases tended to be smaller. In total, 65 percent of the land was obtained by inheritance, less than 3 percent by gifts, and 32 percent by private purchase.

The findings from the Absentee Landlord Survey show highly comparable results. Since multiple answers are possible, the proportion of total answers is given in terms of holdings. It shows that 54 percent of the holdings in whole or part were obtained through inheritance, almost 5 percent came from gifts or purchases from relatives, and a high proportion (36 percent) was acquired by purchase from nonrelatives. In cases where holdings were wholly acquired by one method or another, inheritance and purchase again predominated, 69 and 28 percent, respectively.*

The transfers of land through purchase cited above appear to be of greater significance than has been thought. Undoubtedly, lack of security is a factor in facilitating such private transfers.

This survey also reveals that some of the absentee landlords have either sold all their land or some of it and have transferred their wealth to other business endeavors. Commerce, particularly, and industry seem to be capturing the interest of these landowners in preference to agriculture.

As a result of the expropriation of holdings of large landowners under Ordinance 57, landlords are no longer able to accumulate great wealth. Today the merchant appears to be succeeding the landlord as the wealthy investor, and the landlords appear to be moving into commerce and industry. In this case, it means a transfer of wealth from agriculture or from the land to commerce, industry, and real estate development. This type of investment transfer into nonagricultural development is probably the direction in which events should move for the good of Vietnamese future economic development.

* ALS, Q6.

Chapter 4

LAND REFORM AS A PACIFICATION MEASURE RELATED TO THE DESIRE FOR LAND

Land Reform as a Pacification Measure

Land reform in the present context of Vietnam represents an economic measure designed to attain a political objective: to use land reform as a measure to contribute toward the war effort by converting present rural indifference and passivity and even direct assistance to the Viet Cong into a political commitment to the Government of Vietnam. It is from this viewpoint that the GVN and the USAID Mission to Vietnam may want to consider any proposal for a new land reform program. Looking ahead, especially toward the postwar period, the economic aims of land reform are of great significance and essential if increasing levels of agricultural productivity are to be attained as in comparable programs in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

The fundamental question underlying further land reform effort concerns the ways in which a program for the redistribution of land to the landless and the land poor can be an important means of achieving the vital political goal of winning the commitment of the rural people to the GVN. Basic to the issue is the peasants' attitude towards land ownership.

One view is that the farmer of Vietnam, steeped in a long heritage as a tenant, has no understanding of land ownership and what it can mean to him, and that he would therefore be satisfied with tenancy subject to full security of tenure rather than ownership. Another view is that land ownership to the farmer of Vietnam constitutes a vital issue that has great and fundamental meaning to him. According to this view, the Vietnamese farmer's whole idea of social justice is inextricably intertwined with the basic urge to own land, and to him permanent occupancy with security of tenure can never be counted as an adequate substitute for land ownership.

As a political issue, the case for land redistribution clearly hinges on the farmer's desire for land ownership. If this desire is strong, a land reform program could have far-reaching consequences in

securing the support of Vietnamese farmers for the GVN by creating a psychological impact that, if conducted extensively and if well-implemented, could affect the outcome of the war.

The Desire of Farmers for Land

If one of the most urgent arguments for additional land reform effort in Vietnam in this time of insurgency is that of creating a successful psychological impact on the farm population, then the question of whether or not the farmer has an intense desire to own land is a critical one.

A correct answer to this question is essential for realistically appraising the possible political benefits to the GVN of undertaking further land reform effort. A careful assessment of the current attitudes of farmers toward owning land must be the essential basis for an effective land reform program.

There has been much controversy as to whether extending more land ownership to farmers in the ricelands of Vietnam would assist in pacification by motivating the farmer to give less military and material help to the Viet Cong and to increase his commitments to defend those of his interests that are associated with the GVN.

It has been argued that the landless Vietnamese farmer does not really understand and appreciate land ownership, that he has had a long tradition without land, and that therefore he would be quite satisfied with security of tenure if it could be assured him.

This argument is quite the reverse of historical Communist doctrine and strategy used by the Viet Cong, which deliberately takes lands from landlords and distributes them to the landless as weapons in its drive to power (see Volume III). It is certain that in the Republic of Vietnam, the Viet Cong applied these weapons by catering to what farmers basically really want--landownership--and by eliminating the landlords' political opposition in order to secure control of the rural areas.

Accordingly, a series of questions in the Hamlet Resident Survey was introduced to probe the strength of the desire of farmers to own land.

Tenants and owner-tenants were asked if they would prefer to buy land based on a 12-year government-guaranteed credit program or to rent it with full security of tenure. The responses were 80 and 81 percent,

respectively, in favor of purchasing. These answers were based on the respondents' prior estimate of the current price of land. After allowing for those respondents who were confused about the price, the favorable response ratio was even higher--almost 8 to 1 in favor of buying land.*

In questions to tenants, owner-tenants, and farm workers about land purchase, several price levels were introduced--the market price estimated by the respondent, three-quarters of the market price, and half the market price. The results were overwhelmingly in favor of the desire to purchase land at any price, indicating that demand is price inelastic. Even sharp price reductions have little effect on the desire to buy land. Furthermore, the desire to buy and own land varies hardly at all with farmer status. At the full present market price, 78 percent of the tenants, 79 percent of the owner-tenants, and 76 percent of the farm workers said that they wanted to purchase land.† If the price of land would be dropped to half the market price, the proportions in favor of purchase rise less than 10 percent. At half the market price, the answer in favor of purchasing land was 87 percent for tenants, 85 percent for owner-tenants, and 83 percent for farm workers.‡ At the present price, 76 percent want to become owners; at a price drop of one quarter, the desire for ownership rises to 80 percent; and a price reduction to half the market price raises the farm buyers to 82 percent.§

When these results are analyzed for the three areas (see Figure 1) of the Southern Region, the effect of dropping the price of land shows that the strongest impulse for ownership is in the Hoa Hao area.** In these relatively secure areas, the GVN need not fear placing an adequate price on land made available to farmers in a redistribution program. Farmers are quite willing to pay for land ownership, and dropping the price to the farmer from the present market level will have very little effect in raising the desire for land ownership.

The responses to the survey give overwhelming empirical evidence of the desire of the landless farmers in the Southern Region to own land. The overwhelming proportion of those who say they want to own land and the consistency among them in this desire--regardless of conditions of sale--are rarely seen in sample surveys of this type.

* HRS, Table 184, Q 73.

† HRS, Tables 190 and 201.

‡ HRS, Tables 188 and 199.

§ HRS, Tables 199, 200, and 201.

** HRS, Tables 363, 364, 365, 369, 370, and 371.

The desire of farmers to own land is closely intertwined with their attachment to the soil where they live. A tenant living in a thatched hut on one-third of a hectare expressed this vividly and simply to an American member of the team. To the initial question: "Do you want to own the land you till, and to have legal title to it?" the immediate response was, "Yes." To the second question, "Why do you want to own it?" the response was equally unhesitating: "Because my ancestors lived here and because to own it will secure my future." With a few words he linked ownership to his past, present, and future.

This feeling about land has been called by a Vietnamese colleague an obsession of the farmers of the Delta. From another point of view, land ownership is a sheer economic necessity. When the farm laborer or the tenant becomes too old to work, he has no source of income since he has no land to rent out and most likely he has accumulated no life savings. He becomes economically dependent on someone else, generally a member of his family. The ownership of land takes care of the past, his ancestors; the present, his livelihood; and the future, his descendants; and provides assurance that his descendants will take care of him and that they will continue to venerate their ancestors.*

To test the strength of the desire for ownership against this strongly localized attachment to land, tenants, owner-tenants, and farm laborers were asked if they would buy land even if it were located outside their own village, again supposing the same conditions--GVN credit and repayment in 12 annual installments at the full market price. The answer was affirmative by 53 percent of the tenants and owner-tenants, and the response of the farm workers was 63 percent affirmative.†

The answers are consistent with the general reluctance of farmers to leave their ancestral homes. It is not likely that the respondents viewed the question as entailing a move to a distant place, a view that would reinforce conservative attitudes toward moving.

The response to the question varied greatly within the region. In Area I, 40 percent of laborers and 53 percent of tenants favored buying outside the village, with corresponding figures of 45 percent and 48 percent in Area III. However, in the Hoa Hao area, the proportions were much higher--68 percent for tenants and 82 percent for laborers.‡

* HRS, Tables 184, 188-190, and 191-201.

† HRS, Tables 187 and 202.

‡ HRS, Tables 362 and 372.

The preference for land ownership in one's own village is clear, but the strong urge to stay in the place of one's ancestors is clearly outweighed by the strength of the desire to own land even if it means moving elsewhere. This urge is especially strong among landless laborers in the Hoa Hao area.

The prime importance attached to land ownership revealed in the Hamlet Resident Survey is corroborated by the findings of the Rural Income and Expenditure Survey of 1964. The following quotation reveals the same result by another interesting approach in survey questioning.

Before each RIES interview was completed the respondent was asked some questions concerning (a) how he would use additional money if household income were to rise by a given amount, and (b) what he would buy or do with "a lot of money" . . . For an increase of VN\$1,000 "buy more food and clothing" is at the top of the list, but where the increase is 5,000 and then VN\$10,000 it sinks to seventh and ninth rank, respectively among the first choices. On the other hand, "buy land" ranks number 11 when the increase is VN\$1,000 but ranks number six when it is VN\$5,000 and number one when it is VN\$10,000

The shift away from "buy more food and clothing" to "buy land" is understandable: (1) an increase of only VN\$1,000 may not be a significant increase except for the very poor. (2) Not much land can be purchased for VN\$1,000 if the per hectare land value figures cited earlier in this report are meaningful. (3) Land may be looked upon as a form of security in a country characterized by so much insecurity. (4) Land ownership is a mark of prestige and taken as a sign that one can provide well for his family.

The detailed general tables show . . . that it is the poorer and middle income groups that show the greatest intensity of interest in land. The number of first choice mentions of "buy land" is not so prominent among the relatively well-to-do. This too is understandable . . . about 80 percent of RIES households were found to own no land. Even if this percentage is overstated by a considerable margin there is no doubt that most of the peasants own no land. Those who rent land predominantly rent small parcels. In any event, the RIES and data from other sources show that income is correlated with the amount of land held and a greater interest in land ownership would therefore be expected among the poor . . . at the VN\$10,000 level of income increase, if "buy land" was mentioned at all it was nearly always mentioned as a first choice. The same cannot be said of any of the other ranked choices.*

* Rural Income and Expenditure Survey, Sections XXXVIII, XXXIX, Economic and Financial Planning Division, USOM, Saigon, 1965.

The strong ties of the peasant to his land have survived through the recent decades of turmoil and uncertainty. These ties are felt not only as a principle, but also as a cherished desire within every class of the community. As a test of the pervasiveness of this feeling, hamlet residents were asked whether they preferred a city job or ownership of riceland. Only nonfarmers expressed a slightly greater preference for a city job. The preference of all farm classes was overwhelmingly in favor of land ownership--86 percent among the owners, 97 percent among the tenants, 100 percent among the owner-tenants, and 87 percent among the laborers.* Clearly, the farmers have a strong commitment to farming and to land ownership, which makes farming meaningful and fruitful to them.

The desire to own land is not the farmer's only desire. Farmers have other needs, and the desire to own land must compete with these. To test the strength of the desire to own land against desires to satisfy other needs required to improve their economic position, tenants and owner-tenants were asked to assign their priorities among three types of assistance: (1) credit to purchase farm implements, (2) technical agricultural assistance to increase production, and (3) long term credit to purchase land. Only 10 percent of the tenants and 11 percent of the owner-tenants gave first priority to technical assistance to increase production. Twenty percent of the tenants and 32 percent of the owner-tenants gave first priority to credit for purchase of farm implements. The overwhelming priority was for purchase of land. Seventy-three percent of the tenants and 64 percent of the owner-tenants gave as their first priority the desire for credit to purchase land.†

Thus, the farmer's desire to own land is overwhelming compared with the availability of technical assistance, which would cost them nothing, and the availability of credit to buy farm implements, which would cost them little. In contrast, to acquire land, farmers would commit themselves to repayment of a large block of future income over an extended time period. Understandably, the tenants' preference for land ownership exceeds that of the owner-tenants who already own some land. Even the owner-tenants desire to own more land in preference to those other forms of assistance that would improve their economic situation.

These findings support the view that a government program which provides the Delta region rice farmer with more technical assistance and more farm production supplies and equipment but fails to provide him with land ownership will fall far short of meeting his aspirations.

* HRS, Table 203.

† HRS, Tables 192, 193, and 194.

To determine to what extent voluntary sales of land between private parties could be successful in meeting the inherent desire of farmers to own land or to enlarge their ownership, tenants and owner-tenants were also asked whether landlords would sell them the land if they had enough money. Leaving out those who could not answer ("Don't know"), only one in three felt that his landlord would sell him the land.* These were rather realistic answers since they probably know the landlords' intimate situations, for only 1 out of 36 landlords would consider selling his land to tenants even if the GVN gave a long term, 12-year credit guarantee.† The explanation is to be found in the fact that in 55 percent of the cases, the landlords want to leave the land to their children, and in one-third of the instances, the landlords feel that they have an insufficient amount of land themselves.‡

It is clear from this questioning that the landlord is not going to voluntarily become a source of land for the landless farm person. Yet as will become apparent in Chapter 5, the aims of a land redistribution program that will create an impact by satisfying those landless who need it cannot be met only from GVN-owned lands but will require access to additional land held privately. Such access may be either (1) through lowering the land reform law retention limit so that the large holdings of landlords can be redistributed further, or (2) through the introduction of strong incentives that will induce the landlord to sell his land and to use his capital and entrepreneurial capabilities in nonagricultural endeavors.

This finding has some relevance regarding voluntary land purchase plans that the GVN is currently formulating. There is no doubt that such a plan would be useful and would be a great asset in a broad agricultural development program. But the likelihood of making any substantial redistribution impact does not appear promising on the basis of these survey results if reliance is placed solely on the landlords' desire to sell. To be a success, a voluntary purchase program will require a combination of carefully designed incentives and sanctions to convince large landlords that it is in the national interest to sell off land which they are not farming themselves.

Another point to consider, according to field observations, is that tenants have considerable reluctance to approach landlords for the purchase of land. Rural cultural customs still appear very much in evidence on this matter. According to a Vietnamese colleague, even now a tenant

* HRS, Table 186, Q 75.

† HRS, Table 205, Q 34.

‡ HRS, Table 206, Q 35.

would not approach his landlord directly concerning the purchase of land, because it would be a grave insult to the landlord. One reason is because an "inferior" would be approaching a "superior" with such an offer. A second reason is that the request would imply that the landlord had to sell his land because he was too poor to keep it. Conversely, a landlord cannot approach a tenant with an offer to sell land, because it would imply that he was in desperate financial stress and he would be demeaning himself to an "inferior." Therefore, in any case, an intermediary would have to be used, and the transaction would have to be handled with great delicacy. Actually, the records show that few land transactions have taken place in recent years, as shown in Volumes I and II. This may have been further aggravated by the high level of the land transfer tax, but no quantitative estimate of this effect is known to SRI. Thus, while the landlord's status and role have changed radically in recent decades, there are still strong vestiges remaining of the high cultural status of the landlord in the Delta region.

In one section of the HRS questionnaire, all respondents residing in the hamlet were asked for their views concerning development within the village, essentially with the idea of getting their views about the effectiveness of village government in improving conditions of village life. The following question was answered with most unexpected results: "What are the most serious problems in your village that have to be solved to make it a better place to live in for you and your family?" It was an open-ended question, and no suggestions were given to the respondents. The vast majority of farmers interpreted the question in terms of those things that would influence their lives directly; thus, 37 percent of those responding expressed the desire for land as essential for a better life for them in their village. Also, very high on the list (36 percent) was the indicated need for credit. In contrast, only 27 percent expressed a greater need for farm equipment, livestock, and other agricultural needs. The need for public works in the village was given an even lower priority.*

Thus, the Vietnamese farmers want, first, to own more land, then to get more credit, and finally to acquire additional farm inputs. However, present government programs have priorities that appear low on the scale of the farmer's priorities. Present government emphasis is on trying to give the farmer increased prosperity through greater use of agricultural inputs, including new seeds, and the improvement of the credit supply and credit institutions. It may be expected that these things will have

* HRS, Table 232.

increasing meaning to the farmer as he begins to appreciate them, and particularly if they represent significant economic benefits to the farmer, as improved rice seed is expected to do. On the other hand, they are not meeting his basic desire to own land.

An additional conclusion may be drawn from the low priority given by the farmer to local public works programs, including schools and hospitals, roads and bridges, and other facilities that clearly should have considerable meaning to him. Also it should be stressed that the Vietnamese farmer has a great desire for education for his children, as shown by the high literacy rate of the population. However, local public works projects have probably not yet progressed to the point where the farmer believes that these projects can make a real improvement in the conditions of his life. Such an attitude is usual in agrarian developing countries and is by no means unique to Vietnam.

Farmers were also asked to evaluate priorities of alternative government programs from the standpoint of their usefulness to them. The choices posed were: (1) assistance to buy land; (2) assistance in obtaining more farm production inputs, and (3) more technical assistance on new methods of doubling the rice crop. Seventy-one percent wanted assistance to buy land on the basis of a long-term, 12-year guaranteed credit program. Only 23 percent gave the highest priority to borrowing money for the purchase of farm supplies and only 10 percent were interested in new methods for substantially increasing the rice crop. In short, close to three times as many desired the purchase of land as desired farm supplies or technical assistance to increase farm production.*

The farm workers' desire for land was tested in another way by asking them if they would like to rent land and cultivate it for themselves. Again, the response was exceedingly high--78 percent.† The indicated interest in renting is almost as high as that of the other farm categories in expressing their desire to own land.

Desire to Own Land as Affected by Security

The war has a profound effect on the attitudes of rural people toward many things, including their attitude toward land. A pertinent question, therefore, is how and to what extent the war has affected the farmers' desire for land ownership.

The impact of the war on the people in rural Vietnam may be gauged from the answer to a member of the project team by a Viet Cong defector

* HRS, Tables 192, 193, and 194; Q79a, 79b, and 79c.

† HRS, Table 197, Q 106.

(Hoi Chan) who had joined the forces of the Viet Minh 20 years before. When asked "What is it that the farm people want most in their lives?" his answer was that first they want security of life and limb for themselves, their families and their relatives; and next, above everything else, they want land. Then he added that the main motive of the Viet Minh in driving out the French was to obtain the land of the large landlords of the Delta.

Attitudes toward land ownership would be expected to vary according to the degree to which security prevails. Research findings tending to support this hypothesis were obtained from the Rand interviews of the Hoi Chan, the PIE interview series, and the results of the Hamlet Resident Survey.

For this purpose, three separate security categories can be discussed: (1) secure areas under GVN control; (2) contested areas; and (3) Viet Cong-controlled areas.

In the relatively secure areas, village society appears to be disrupted least by Viet Cong penetration, and military operations are infrequent. The GVN can afford some protection of ownership rights, such as free access to land, the right of the tenant or owner to harvest his crops and market them freely, and freedom from intimidation. Without the presence of the Viet Cong in the more secure areas, the inequalities that exist in the traditional land tenure system continue to operate to a greater or lesser extent. Under these conditions, the desire for land ownership compared with the other needs and wants of the farmer is extraordinarily high.

The Hamlet Resident Survey covered a number of hamlets in contested areas as well as hamlets that were considered secure. The findings clearly indicate that the intensity of the desire to own land is higher in the secure hamlets than in the less secure or contested hamlets.

The contested areas are characterized by fairly intensive military operations and a general deterioration of GVN security and administration but they are not under complete Viet Cong control. The desire for land ownership appears less strong in these areas; apparently it is diminished by the intrusion of more immediate problems of security and social disruption. The fundamental conclusion to be drawn is that while the general attitude does not vary from secure to contested areas, the intensity of the desire for land ownership appears to be greater where conditions of security prevail.

As long ago as 1964 (before the intensification of the ground war), a U.S. government agency survey of land tenure problems in 11 Delta provinces indicated that security ranked equally important with land titles and high rental rates. "Viet Cong control and threat in the countryside," one summary concluded, "tend to overshadow any dissatisfaction over aspects of land."*

A further impression of a somewhat uncertain desire for land ownership comes from the Rand interviews. A common theme in these interviews was disappointment over the wartime conditions that robbed land ownership of much of its advantages and desirability, whether in the form of heavy Viet Cong taxes and enforced service, or allied bombings and crop destruction. This feeling of war weariness was summed up by one refugee farmer who insisted that "the people in the countryside want only peace. They are even longing for a time like that prior to the Front uprising."

The decreasing desirability of land ownership in the current situation is strongly demonstrated by the decision of many rural people to leave their homes when caught directly between the opposing sides of revolutionary war. As pointed out in Chapter 2, a high proportion of these refugees are owners. The overwhelming social disruption, together with the general insecurity of the rural areas, has forced many farmers to break their traditional ties with the land. Before the Tet offensive, official estimates placed the number of refugees from the rural areas to the cities at more than 1 million. Perhaps another 500,000 have crowded into the cities since the Tet offensive. The Hamlet Resident Survey shows that 38 percent of the hamlet residents classified themselves as refugees. By "refugees," respondents probably meant a person who has been uprooted from his ancestral place and has moved to a new community.

This willingness of so many peasants to leave their homes reinforces the obvious fact that in a choice between the survival of his family and residence in an ancestral place, the rural farmer choose survival. However, the desire for land ownership is clearly not diminished in a basic sense, and it can be expected to reassert itself as soon as the environment of insecurity is removed.

This highlights again the importance of providing protection to the rural inhabitants so that the benefits of land ownership may be enjoyed. Land redistribution in this setting can have meaning only if the farmer

* Land Tenure in South Vietnam, Saigon, USIS, 1964, p. 31.

can be assured that he can return to the land and reap its product. If the land he owns continues to be Viet Cong-controlled, it will be of little value to him.

A unique characteristic of the Viet Cong-controlled areas is that they have frequently been under complete and long term social and economic control. In areas of long term domination, the direction of Viet Cong land reform has usually been toward nearly equal distribution of the land among all farmers. It is said that individual allocations range from fractions of a hectare to as much as 20 hectares depending on " ... the availability land for distribution, fertility, crop yield, and other such factors."* "Rich peasants" who did not have their land expropriated directly were either driven to abandon the land because of exorbitant Viet Cong taxation or simply induced to hand it over to the Viet Cong voluntarily to avoid danger. This leveling effect is designed to achieve the maximum incentives for, and commitments from, the landless and to prepare for eventual communization in the case of a Viet Cong take-over.

Because of the adverse impact that knowledge of future Viet Cong intentions would have on the population, these final stages of Viet Cong land reform are never advertised in advance in the revolutionary struggle. The essential point is that the greatest satisfaction and commitment from thorough land redistribution have already been reaped in the Viet Cong-held areas. There may be resentment over the heavy land taxes imposed by the Viet Cong since military escalation in 1955, but this is offset by the fear of the complete loss of the land gained from the Viet Cong land reform if their control should disappear. Thus, the resident population has a vested interest in continued Viet Cong control despite the high taxes and the personal controls that prevail.

This exposition strongly suggests the suitability of a declaration by the GVN indicating that the GVN would not reverse the decisions of the Viet Cong but would confirm the farmers in their ownership, and that the landlords affected would be compensated for lands lost by Viet Cong action. An unequivocal declaration by the GVN recognizing the land reform carried out by the Viet Cong could neutralize one of the principal Viet Cong holds on farmers.

* R. Michael Pearce, Land Tenure and Political Authority: The Processes of Change in Land Relations and Land Attitudes in Vietnamese Villages of the Mekong Delta Since 1945, p. 147.

Priorities in Extending Land Ownership

The Vietnamese conception of the justice of widespread land ownership embraces all elements of the rural community, as revealed in the following question asked of all hamlet residents: "Who should be helped under a new government land redistribution program?" Fifty-eight percent said that owners of small farms should be granted more land, but a much larger number, 92 percent, said that tenants of small farms should be recipients, and an even larger number, 96 percent, said that farm laborers should be given land. Thus, it was made very clear that as far as the views of rural residents are concerned, the highest priority in distributing land should be given first to farm laborers and next to farm tenants. These landless people are favored predominantly over the owners of small farms. Despite their own strong desire for land, even the owners and owner-tenants are willing to step aside for those most in need of land.*

To check the preceding responses, respondents were specifically invited to suggest priorities as to who should receive land among the three principal status classes concerned. Laborers were accorded the first priority by 97 percent of all respondents. Tenants with little land were accorded second priority by 96 percent, and owners with small areas of land were given third priority by 97 percent. The near unanimity of all sections of the rural community is emphasized by the fact that respondents from all classes, e.g., owner-tenants, farm laborers, and non-farmers, were in substantial agreement.† More than any other, these responses demonstrate the value system of the Vietnamese rural resident, which embraces assistance to the less fortunate and extends to the priorities that should be established in distributing land for ownership.

Actions under Ordinance 57 did not distribute land according to this system of priorities. For one thing, the farm laborer was almost completely left out as a recipient. The scheme of values is also probably different from the one that most U.S. economists would use. Instead of considering need, a common argument in favor of leaving out the farm laborer in a redistribution program is likely to be based on whether he would have the financial and technical capability to conduct farm operations successfully. It is no coincidence that Viet Cong and Communist strategy is to make the two lowest landless classes‡ the chief beneficiaries of land distribution since it is on them that the revolution is

* HRS, Tables 219 and 220.

† HRS, Tables 220, 221, and 222.

‡ Farm workers and tenants, according to the Viet Cong classification into five classes (the top three classes being landlord, rich peasant, and middle peasant).

built. The success of Viet Cong logic is supported by the findings of the Hamlet Resident Survey shown below, from HRS Tables 221 and 222:

Q125 - Who should get first priority and who is next (under another program that would distribute land)?

	<u>Owner</u>	<u>Tenant</u>	<u>Owner- Tenant</u>	<u>Farm Worker</u>	<u>Non- Farmer</u>	<u>Total</u>
3rd priority, landowners with little land	98%	96%	98%	97%	96%	97%
2nd priority, tenants with little land	96	96	98	98	96	96
1st priority, laborers with no land	96	96	96	98	97	97

Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Ordinance 57

The Impact of Ordinance 57 on Land Ownership

The holdings of 72 of the absentee landlords interviewed in the ALS (38 percent) were spread over two or more provinces. Inheritance had been the source of the entire holdings of 43 percent, and a quarter had received varying proportions of their holdings in this manner. In comparison, the HRS revealed that 33 percent of the owners and owner-tenants interviewed had received their lands through inheritance. In all cases in the HRS, the inherited units were less than 20 hectares in size and 70 percent of the units were less than 5 hectares in extent.*

The land purchase and redistribution program carried out under Ordinance 57 allowed landlords to retain 100 hectares of land as a maximum, but this was relaxed in certain cases, where heads of extended families were concerned, to permit another 15 hectares for worship land. Each of the 187 absentee landlords interviewed in the Absentee Landlord Survey had experience in expropriation under Ordinance 57 of whatever land he owned in 1956 in excess of 100 hectares. A decade later in 1968, these landlords were asked to recall their attitudes toward that land reform at the time it was initiated. Impending at the time of the interviews was the possibility of further land redistribution at some future date by cutting the retention limit of 100 hectares, and it may be assumed that this prospect was in the minds of many of those that were interviewed in the sample.

* HRS, Q144.

Hamlet Resident Survey Findings Related to Ordinance 57

In the HRS, 33 individuals were identified as having received land under the redistribution provisions of Ordinance 57. This represented 6 percent of the responding farmers.* The recipients included 5 percent of all owners, 23 percent of all owner-tenants, and 4 percent of all tenants. Thus, the total impact on the farm population of the Southern Region of land redistribution under this land reform program was extremely small.†

Those who received land under the program were asked if the amount received was enough to provide for the needs of the family. The results indicated that 84 percent of those who had been granted land felt that it was insufficient to meet their requirements. The HRS revealed further that 15 of the 33 persons maintain regular payments for the land, 15 make their payments irregularly, and the remaining three do not know. Probably the payment situation is this regular because the majority (73 percent) of those who benefited felt that the program was good for them personally. The same proportion felt that it was also good for the other people in the village. Half of those who felt that the program was good were owners, and almost a third were owner-tenants.‡

Absentee Landlord Survey Findings Related to Ordinance 57

Ninety-three percent of all expropriation proceedings for the 187 landlords interviewed in the Absentee Landlord Survey were completed by the end of 1960. This corresponds with the actual figure of 91 percent of all landlords affected by expropriation in the nation by that time under Ordinance 57.

Out of 185 responses that could be computerized on the Absentee Landlord Survey, 88 percent indicated that they had retained the allotted amount of 100 to 115 hectares of riceland permitted under Ordinance 57.§ Seven respondents actually retained less than the 100 hectares, reportedly because of surveying mistakes or because the parcel remaining was too small to be retained. None of the final holdings fell below 90 hectares. (See Table 26)

* The term "farmer" is used to include tenants, owner-operators, and farm workers.

† HRS, Table 210, Q115.

‡ HRS, Table 213, Q118; Table 211, Q116; and Table 215, Q120.

§ ALS, Q52.

Table 26

HECTARES OF LAND OWNED OR RETAINED BY SAMPLE OF LANDLORDS
WHOSE LANDS WERE EXPROPRIATED UNDER ORDINANCE 57
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

<u>Pre-expropriation (1956)</u>		<u>Post-expropriation</u>		
<u>Size Class</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Size Class</u>	<u>Number of</u>	
<u>(ha.)</u>	<u>of Owners</u>	<u>(ha.)</u>	<u>Owners</u>	<u>Number of</u>
			<u>After 1956</u>	<u>Owners-1968</u>
0-115	20	None	--	12
150-199	28	1-99	7	26
200-399	48	100-115	162	134
400-699	42	116-300	9	9
700-1199	16	Over 300	7	4
1200-2000	11			
Over 2000	7			
Total				
Owners	172*		185	185

* Thirteen of the responses were incomplete regarding pre-expropriation ownings.

Source: ALS, Q1a, Q5a, and Q52.

In contrast, going up the scale, 16 of the landowners interviewed (9 percent) held on to more than 100 hectares or 115 hectares, including worship land. Of these, four stated that the land was under Communist control, and hence was not expropriated, presumably because the GVN could not exercise jurisdiction. Six more had converted their ricelands to other crops that were exempt from expropriation; two admitted that husband and wife had managed to keep their ownerships separate and thus would be able to hold at least 200 hectares. An additional four said that they managed to retain more than the prescribed 15 hectares under the category of "worship riceland." Of doubtful legality were the cases

of four more landowners who volunteered that their holdings were not registered.* Thus, less than 2 percent of the cases may have some element of irregularity.

There have been allegations that in the implementation of Ordinance 57, many large landlords were able to transfer much of their land to relatives before expropriation proceedings could acquire the land that they held in excess of the legal limit. The Absentee Landlord Survey found only eight such landlords--less than 5 percent of the respondents--who admitted that they had made transfers to relatives.† Of course, this procedure was perfectly legal if done within the time period allotted by law. Conceivably, there were more cases, but the unusual frankness of the interviewees in mentioning apparently illegal situations is evidence that this practice may not have been widespread.

The absentee landlords were asked the question: "Before Ordinance 57 was enacted in October 1956, did you approve of the principle of land distribution to the deserving landless with, of course, proper compensation to the former owners?" The affirmative response was overwhelming--6 to 1. Eighty-three percent said they had approved and only 14 percent said they had disapproved.‡

Although 83 percent of the absentee landlords said that they approved of land distribution in principle on the eve of Ordinance 57, opinion was divided whether the landowners whom they knew would have been better or worse off without expropriation and redistribution. In answers that appear not entirely consistent, as many as 30 percent said that they would be worse off without expropriation. Twenty-four percent said that their "economic fate" would be better,§ 43 percent said that they definitely would prefer to have their "former lands with their former rentals on them back."** However, the respondents could possibly have understood this question to mean under former conditions of security.

The landlords were asked what in their opinion prompted the GVN to expropriate private lands under Ordinance 57. More than one explanation was given by the 152 who answered. The responses afford convincing evidence that absentee landlords were well aware, in the main, of the

* ALS, Q52a.

† ALS, Q54.

‡ ALS, Q56.

§ ALS, Q78.

** ALS, Q77.

political pressures and justifications for land reform in 1956. While 22 percent said that they did not know, of those who did answer, 56 percent attributed the ordinance to the political purposes of the Diem government, 24 percent specified Viet Minh propaganda, 9 percent cited U.S. pressures on the GVN, and 11 percent cited the successful examples of land reform in Japan and Taiwan.* The effect of expropriation and compensation is brought into focus by the landlords' answers to the question "What factors affected the economic conditions of expropriated landowners?" In the answers, landowners gave major importance to growing insecurity. Fifty-seven said that the changing status of security in rural areas was the factor that most adversely affected landlords' interests. Twenty-nine spoke of the effects of inflation, and only three spoke of the "better opportunities for enterprising men outside of agriculture."†

On questions of attitude, the response pattern is consistent regardless of age. There are wide variations in attitudes, but they do not seem to be correlated with age differences, despite the range from 30 to 94 years of age among the respondents.‡ The slight variations that occur in attitudes between age groups do not fit the usual expectation that conservatism is related to age. To a degree, the youngest group--30 through 54 years--claim to be more in favor of land reform in principle as performed in 1956. However, concerning future land reform, it was the oldest group--65 to 94 years--that expressed the least opposition, and the middle group--55 through 64--that indicated the most opposition. The youngest group was most likely to state that they would never sell their land. The oldest group was the least resistant to selling remaining lands and was the most inclined to accept a land hectare retention limit, as might be expected as they had neared the end of their active life.

Discriminatory treatment in the expropriation process was mentioned most frequently by the youngest group and least by the oldest group of owners. The youngest group was also the most prone to believe that compensation had not been determined fairly. The youngest group most often expressed the feeling of the loss of local influence. This may also have been related to their view that land reform might possibly aid the fight against Communism, which was expressed much more frequently by this group than by the middle-aged group.

* ALS, Q55.

† ALS, Q79.

‡ Als, Table B-9, Q131.

Not surprising was the finding that the youngest age group had the most interest in returning to the country estate because presumably they have a considerable part of their life still ahead of them, in contrast to the oldest group, which expressed the least interest in a rural residence. The middle aged group appears to have the closest ties with tenants since it also contains the largest proportion who had recently been rural residents. This may explain why they are the most likely to resist land reform and are the most skeptical about the effect of land reform as a factor in winning the war.

While the youngest age group had the highest average education, containing especially a large number of high school and college graduates, the oldest age group had the largest number of well-educated men, including those with advanced college degrees.

Whether a respondent lived in Saigon or in Long Xuyen apparently had little effect on his attitude.* It should be noted, however, that only 25 interviews were obtained from Long Xuyen, and therefore the smallness of this sample raises a question about the statistical significance of differences.

An Giang Province is probably the safest of all Delta provinces from Viet Cong action. The capital city, Long Xuyen, had proportionately fewer landlords who were willing to sell their remaining lands. Possibly related to this more favorable situation, fewer respondents there believed in a positive effect from land reform in combating Communism. Because Long Xuyen landlords probably have had long-standing easy accessibility to their estates, a higher proportion of Long Xuyen landlords thought that their local influence had not decreased, despite the fact that a lower proportion of them had lived on their estates since 1946.

No Long Xuyen landlord had practiced metayage, and a smaller proportion of subleasing by tenants was reported. The Long Xuyen landlord, in comparison with his Saigon counterpart, expressed less interest in industrial investment, preferring commerce and property as investment opportunities.

On most questions, respondents who were the original registered owners of the property at the time of expropriation answered in virtually the same manner as the sons, daughters, in-laws, and relatives who have since become owners through inheritance. However, in a few questions, significant differences were indicated. Thirty-two percent of

* ALS, Table B-10.

the original owners whose land was expropriated reported that they currently rented out no land. This was in contrast to 43 percent of those who inherited the property, of whom a lower proportion said that their land was insecure due to Viet Cong activities.*

Attitudes toward the 100-hectare retention limit of Ordinance 57 varied widely. Of the 183 landlords responding, 41 percent stated objections to the 100-hectare limit,† 15 percent stated that the 100-hectare limit was too high, 26 percent felt it was too low, and the rest had no view.

Under Ordinance 57, a landlord may own 100 hectares but he is limited to the personal cultivation of 30 hectares. Only 12 percent of the 183 respondents expressed a favorable reaction to this fact,‡ while 15 percent emphasized the possible handicap that may be placed on a farm operator by this limitation, which may limit the emergence of truly modernized farming. Another 49 percent simply said that since few individuals really farm that much, it matters little.

From a political point of view, two thirds of the landlords who favor a higher than 100-hectare retention limit said that the statement "espousing capitalism" most nearly represented their views of land ownership.§ Those who believe in a lower retention limit lean toward a statement that would reflect what Vietnamese would associate with a relatively feudalistic viewpoint.

Those favoring a lower retention limit had a higher proportion of their land under Viet Cong control than those favoring the existing limit. This attitude may be partly because they can no longer get much use out of their land anyway and therefore are disposed to get rid of it. This fact should prove useful in designing a voluntary land sale and purchase program especially in contested areas.

Some of the seemingly "progressive" landlords who favored a lower retention limit, even though it would affect the amount of lands they now control and could draw rents from, may have virtually nothing to lose from further land reform because they cannot exploit the holdings they now nominally own. In fact, they may gain if the government compensates them for taking their currently inaccessible and insecure land.

* ALS, Q14 and Table B-11.

† ALS, Q58.

‡ ALS, Q60.

§ ALS, Q103.

This may explain their readiness to welcome a new land redistribution program under GVN auspices.*

A series of cross-tabulation analyses revealed few sharp divergencies in views among the various kinds of landlords interviewed. However, the results pointed up some major differences, particularly on their views regarding the retention limit as it relates to past and potential land redistribution programs. It will be recalled that 15 percent of the landlords felt that the 100-hectare retention limit of Ordinance 57 was too high. These individuals were very dogmatic in their judgment on this matter. They were also much more prone to believe that the landlords would be worse off because of changes in economic conditions if they retained their old holdings than the 26 percent who believed that the 100-hectare limitation was too small.

Those who believed that the retention limit should be lower were much less anxious to return to a rural residence than those who felt that the retention limit should be higher, probably because their land was located in insecure areas. Those who were satisfied with the 100-hectare retention limit fell in between these two views. All of those who thought that the 100-hectare limitation should be lower accepted the idea of a future land reform program, and 57 percent indicated they would even welcome it. Among the 26 percent of those who favored a retention limit above 100 hectares, few welcomed a new program; 23 percent of them indicated that they would oppose it only in principle, whereas 44 percent stated that they would oppose it strongly.

SRI's Vietnamese associates suggested that the frankness of some of these landowners may indicate that they are tired of holding land they cannot use effectively. At the same time, they are targets of Communist vilification as "exploiting" landlords. They may well be ready to dump their excess holdings for whatever they can get for them, even if it is by way of application of the land reform law.

Since the application of expropriation procedures, 42 of the landlords (22 percent) have further reduced the size of their holdings. About 7 percent had eliminated their land holdings entirely, while another 5 percent had enlarged their hectarage in some cases by marriage between landowners. In summary, two-thirds of the landowners retained the original size of their holdings after expropriation despite constant war and Communist control of some or all of their land. However, it is significant that there was some decline in ownership holdings, indicating some transfer of capital out of agriculture.†

* ALS, Table B-12

† ALS, Q1a, Q5a, and Q52.

Almost twice as many of the original owners, as compared with new owners, thought the retention limit should be higher. The tendency for new owners to lean toward a lower retention limit than the original owners shows up with regard to future land reform and to the effect of land reform on the Viet Cong insurgency. The original owners were more inclined to strongly oppose further land reform than the new owners. More of them expressed skepticism about the favorable effect of land reform on the war. These findings suggest that the new owners are more liberal in their views and more flexible in accepting further reform than the old owners. If this finding is true, one would expect a further easing of landlord opposition to land reform as ownerships are inherited from those who had the experience of expropriation under the Diem government and whose attachment to the land appears to be declining.

A significant conclusion from the Absentee Landlord Survey is that the major opposition to the Ordinance 57 land reform program among the expropriated owners stems mainly from how it was administered rather than from the principle of government acquisition of land to be redistributed to the deserving landless and land poor farmers. Landlords were frustrated and angered by the inequities in administration but favored the principle for which expropriation was done.

Considerable political alienation is apparent in the responses of the landowners interviewed who felt they were discriminated against. As many as 56 percent thought that Ordinance 57 was a political maneuver to benefit the Diem government.* In contrast, only 14 percent thought its intention was to help farmers, and only 24 percent saw its purpose as countering Communist propaganda. The responses may reflect an exaggeration of their real views. Yet, 15 absentee landlords bluntly stated in regard to this program that injustice was endemic to their cultural system.†

Dissatisfaction with the valuation placed on expropriated land exceeded landlord satisfaction by three to one.‡ Expropriated land owners received 10 percent in cash and 90 percent in bonds under Ordinance 57. The absentee landlords were asked how they would have invested the total compensation had they received it all in cash. Of the 155 who responded, 62 percent who stated that they had received "enough compensation to be important" said that they would have invested in Vietnamese commerce or industries, 18 percent said that they would have invested in property, and four percent would have preferred agricultural plantations.§

* ALS, Q55.

† ALS, Q124a.

‡ ALS, Q63.

§ ALS, Q73.

A major cause of dissatisfaction in the implementation of Ordinance 57 was over the price placed on the expropriated land (see Table 27). Only 24 percent were satisfied that land values were determined fairly; 72 percent of the respondents claimed that the value placed on their land was not established fairly.* Two important points are made in the answers. They base their view on the claims that land classifications (which determined price) did not reflect real market values and that landowners were insufficiently represented in the price determination process. Thus, it was felt that the government unilaterally set the price to its own advantage. In most of the cases, the landowners received less than VN\$10,000 per hectare. In contrast, 69 percent believed that the value of their land was worth much more than this figure, including 7 percent who felt that their land was worth more than VN\$20,000 per hectare.† Moreover, nearly half (47 percent) claimed to have experienced discriminatory treatment in the classification of land for compensation purposes. In total, two-thirds (65 percent) believed that the system operated unfairly.‡

Table 27

VALUE OF LAND SET BY LANDOWNERS AND COMPENSATION RECEIVED
BY LANDOWNERS WHOSE LAND WAS EXPROPRIATED UNDER ORDINANCE 57
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Per Hectare Size Classes (VN\$)	Value of Land Set		Compensation Received	
	Number of Cases	Percent	Number of Cases	Percent
VN\$0- 2,000	--	--%	36	23%
2,000- 3,999	3	2	37	23
4,000- 6,999	25	16	45	28
7,000- 9,999	21	13	40	25
10,000-10,999	39	25	--	--
11,000-13,999	11	7	--	--
14,000-15,999	26	16	2	1
16,000-19,999	22	14	--	--
Over 20,000	11	7	--	--
Total	158	100%	160	100%

Source: Absentee Landlord Survey, Q65 and Q67.

* ALS, Q63.

† ALS, Q65-67.

‡ ALS, Q76.

The method of compensation--90 percent in government bonds and 10 percent in cash--provided another major source of irritation. Only 18 percent of the respondents said that this mode of payment was satisfactory; 79 percent denounced it.* When asked for an explanation of their dissatisfaction, the bulk of the 79 percent felt that the payments were made piecemeal and in installments too small to be useful. The other reasons included inflation, the time lag before the bonds could be cashed, and the problem of transferring or investing with bonds.†

In the event of another land reform program, it is clear that the respondents did not want a repetition of the method of compensation used previously. In fact, almost two-thirds (63 percent) prefer outright compensation in cash. Only 5 percent favored a compensation of 50 percent bonds and 50 percent cash, and the small number of the rest preferred a variety of choices, including treasury bonds, bonds for investment in government industries, and investment in private industrial enterprises.

Also annoying to the landlords were the delays in receiving compensation; some cited as long as five years required for the process.‡ Even worse, eight of them said that they have not yet received compensation. Government officials may be able to demonstrate that much of the delay was due to the noncooperation of landowners. On the other hand, 11 percent reported being paid in six months, and almost half (48 percent) within a year. Another 40 percent were paid in the second year. Thus, only 12 percent were not paid off after two years, and only 3 percent were delayed beyond four years.‡

The question of discriminatory treatment of landlords in the administration of Ordinance 57 was explored in inquiring into the extent of their political influence in the village§ and the question of the behavior of villagers toward landlords.** Those who believed they had experienced discriminatory treatment in the application of the program during the expropriation process tended to feel, in two-thirds (69 percent) of the cases, that the villagers now pay them less respect. This, of course, is far from conclusive, but it may suggest that some landlords have a tendency toward political alienation. The selectivity of this alienation, however, is rather marked, since 66 percent of those reporting discriminatory treatment also felt that landlords had not lost political influence at the village level.

* ALS, Q69.

† ALS, Q70.

‡ ALS, Q74.

§ ALS, Q84.

** ALS, Q100.

Optimism toward the future still remains in the minds of the interviewees affected by the previous program. Despite complaints about the first land reform program, half of them (52 percent) did not foresee that political influence would impair a fair process of compensating landlords in a future program.*

The survey also obtained landlords' views on the alternative means that might be considered in compensating landlords in a future program for expropriating land. Respondents were asked what investment alternatives they thought would provide them with an economic return equivalent to what they received from rentals on agricultural land.

The most popular choice, accounting for 46 percent, was investment in commerce, while investment in industry was only half as popular.† That a total of about two-thirds leaned toward nonfarm enterprises augurs well for the future as it suggests the feasibility of transferring substantial entrepreneurship and capital from agriculture to the great tasks of industrialization ahead.

Rather remarkably, only 3 percent of those interviewed thought that urban land would be most remunerative as an investment, whereas 21 percent replied that they did not know enough about other kinds of investments to decide. The interest in land, however, was still great on the part of 64 percent who thought that they could do well in industrial agriculture--that is, in nonfood crops of the plantation type.‡ However, only 15 percent could envision themselves taking a leadership position in industry.§

While 60 percent of the landowners expressed some interest in modernized and mechanized large-scale agriculture, only 29 percent still had enough land within their control and safe from Communist domination to consider engaging in this form of enterprise.** Also, only 6 percent were really serious about engaging in large scale modern agriculture.

Future Land Redistribution Programs

Opposition to a future land redistribution program was less strong and much less uniform among the absentee landowners that might have been expected. Twenty percent of the respondents asserted that they would even welcome land reform if it were fair and equitable. Another 32 percent said

* ALS, Q124.

† ALS, Q118.

‡ ALS, Q120.

§ ALS, Q122.

** ALS, Q121.

that they would not oppose such a program, and 25 percent said simply that they would accept whatever the government decreed on this matter. Thus, contrary to what appears to be the general expectation, 77 percent of the absentee landlords indicated that they would not resist a new land reform program, subject to the condition that it would be administered equitably. Less than a quarter--22 percent--indicated that they would oppose such a program vigorously or that they would work for its modification.*

In judging the efficacy of a program, the extent to which principles of equity were satisfied was very strong in the minds of the individuals interviewed. Strong opposition to a new program would drop to only 9 percent if all government-controlled lands such as former French land and the remainder of the previously expropriated lands, Ordinance 57 land, were redistributed to the landless first. Thus, the total number who would either welcome or not oppose such a program would rise to 90 percent.

The former landlords were also queried concerning their attitude toward the application of a redistribution program to other kinds of agricultural land, rather than just riceland in a future program. The opposition to such a proposal rose only another 3 percent, up to 25 percent. Even so, 64 percent asserted they would either welcome, or at least not oppose, such a program.†

Apparently there is considerable sentiment in favor of including church lands in a land reform measure, since strong opposition to a reform program would then drop from 22 percent to only 16 percent, but a consistent 64 percent would welcome or not oppose the inclusion of such a measure.‡

Communal lands are not extensive in the Southern region compared with the hectareage in this category in the Central Lowlands. Nevertheless, they do represent another source of land for redistribution. With this in mind, respondents were asked their views about applying land redistribution to communal lands. If communal lands were included in such a program, strong opposition would drop to an insignificant 3 percent, while 69 percent would welcome or not oppose this measure.§

Thus, it may be concluded that the broadening of categories of land chosen for redistribution, including government land or church lands in addition to private holdings, markedly reduces the strong opposition group, and does not affect adversely, but in fact generally improves, the size of the majority for whom land reform is acceptable and even welcome.

* ALS, P104.

† ALS, Q106.

‡ ALS, Q107.

§ ALS, Q143.

Apparently an overwhelming 89 percent of 160 respondents thought that a future land reform program should be part of an agrarian reform program that should include other features besides the acquisition and redistribution of land. The desirability of government programs to help farmers acquire modern tools of agriculture, such as tractors, pumps, and electrification, was mentioned by 80 percent of the respondents. The need for the dissemination of technical know-how to farmers in an agricultural extension program was given a lesser priority since only 50 percent mentioned the need.*

The absentee landlords were also queried concerning their views on a measure to control the resale price of expropriated land in the distribution of income sources by the farmers of the Southern Region. Only 39 percent recognized the inherent fairness of such a measure to control incremental windfalls when the next buyer converts agricultural land to a more remunerative nonagricultural purpose.† However, about half (52 percent) of those who recognized the value of controls felt that they should be maintained for a period of 10 to 12 years. While 55 percent of those interviewed favored a land price based solely on agricultural use, 26 percent of the respondents preferred whatever the market might bring, including the resale of land for more profitable urban uses.‡

The absentee landlords were also asked for their estimation of the effect that land reform would have in the war against the Communists; 46 percent mentioned possible gains; however, 40 percent saw no positive effect.§ Unfortunately, the survey was not designed to probe why these landlords did not relate land reform to the war. Further study of this point might uncover some basic factors about why land reform has not been employed extensively in Vietnam as a positive weapon for winning the war. Battles in the streets of Saigon were still going on, since the survey was begun just before the Tet offensive. That experience should have made respondents feel the direct impact from the war, yet they apparently did not establish a close tie between a land reform program and the fact of insurgency or its use as a positive weapon against insurgency. Nevertheless, as pointed out, a majority of even the large landowners see a value in land reform for its own beneficial effect, regardless of the war and its potential impact on the political situation.

* ALS, Q108.

† ALS, Q112.

‡ ALS, Q109.

§ ALS, Q142.

Land Titles

There has been considerable discussion about the efficacy of granting permanent rather than provisional titles to farmers granted land under Ordinance 57; in 1967, almost 117,000 permanent titles were issued by the government for those who received land under Ordinance 57. To determine the extent to which a title has meaning to a farmer, the question of titles was explored in the Hamlet Resident Survey.

Of the 273 owners and owner-tenants interviewed in the sample, 114 or 42 percent indicated that they had titles to their own land. This number included 89 owners and 25 owner-tenants. With the exception of six of the owners in this group, all had their titles registered at the provincial land office. Those who wanted permanent land titles were 88 percent of the 51 who answered the question on permanent compared with provisional titles.*

There has been controversy over the question of whether farmers prefer to keep their land titles at home or elsewhere, perhaps at the provincial land office, in view of lack of security in their areas and the possible danger of incrimination resulting from the presence of such a document. Of those that had titles, 71 percent said that they kept them at home and the remainder said that they kept them elsewhere. Thus, the argument that the farmer does not want to keep his title in his house appears to be disproved by these results, and it is conceivable that a high proportion of the farmers who received Ordinance 57 land would have been pleased to receive the 117,000 titles issued by the government if they had been distributed and not kept in the warehouses at the provincial offices.†

Sale of Communal Lands

Since communal land represents a considerable resource for possible distribution in the extension of ownership to the landless and land poor, questions on the attitude of rural residents were asked in the Hamlet Resident Survey.

As might be expected, those who would be most likely to benefit from redistribution of communal lands for extension of ownerships tended to be in favor of it. Sixty-two percent of the owner-tenants and farm workers were in favor of selling communal lands to landless people, but only 37 percent of the landlord group was in favor. The owners registered 43 percent, and the nonfarmers 40 percent. However, it must be recorded

* HRS, Table 48, Q9; Table 49, Q10; and Table 51, Q12.

† HRS, Table 50, Q11.

that the number of individuals who did not have an opinion tended to be rather large in this question, amounting to about 10 percent, including about one-fifth of the nonfarmers and quite a few farm workers. Thus, from the overall view, excluding the vote of the landlord, 50 percent expressed an opinion in favor of selling communal lands, and 40 percent expressed a negative opinion. *

When these attitudes are analyzed on an area basis within the Southern Region, rather sharp differences of opinion become clear. In Area I, where the farm unit is rather small, opinions tend to be against the selling of communal lands, about 44 percent being in favor and 50 percent against the idea. Of course, these results include the opinion of the nonfarmer, which probably should not be given as much weight as that of the farmers. The tenants are in favor (58 percent) of selling off these lands, but the owners generally tend to take a more negative view on the matter.

In Area II, 61 percent of the opinions favor the sale of communal lands, and 32 percent reject the idea. In this area, the majority of tenants and owner-tenants are for the sale of communal lands, 77 and 64 percent, respectively, and the owners and nonfarmers are equally divided on the issue.

In Area III, 47 percent are in favor of the sale of communal lands, 39 percent reject the proposition, and 13 percent are indecisive. In this area, the owner-tenants and the farm workers are in favor of the sale of communal lands, and even the nonfarmer is favorably inclined.

Considering all three areas, the conclusion is definitely in favor of the sale of communal lands for extending land ownership, although the finding is not overwhelming for all groups. If only farmers and farm workers are considered, 55 percent are in favor, and 40 percent are against, of the high proportion who expressed views. When those who want more land are considered (leaving out the owners, including the landlords), the tenants, owner-tenants, and farm workers together strongly favor selling communal lands, namely 62 percent in favor and 34 percent against.[†] Apparently, with a majority of the rural farm population in favor of the distribution of communal lands, the GVN should have no difficulty in carrying through a feasible policy for redistributing these lands among those who are in greatest need.

Although the hectareage in communal lands in the Southern Region is not as large as in the Central Lowlands, the Village Administrative Chief Survey found that everyone of the 37 villages included in the sample had some communal lands, although some of them have only "garden," "residential," or "public" (schools and temples) communal lands, not riceland.

* HRS, Table 235.

† HRS, Tables 407a, 407b, and 407c.

The method of handling the distribution of occupancy rights to village communal lands seems to differ from village to village. In 66 percent of the villages, occupancy rights are determined periodically--yearly, every three years, or every five years. In another 14 percent, the occupancy rights are indefinite but continuous; in 10 percent of the other cases, they are inherited; and in the rest, the procedures are unknown.

It is clear that a number of principles are used to establish priorities in guiding the decision-makers on who will get occupancy rights to village communal lands. Surprisingly, in 50 percent of the cases, inheritance was the main deciding factor. Also important was the need of the applicant, such as a widow or an infirm, aged, or handicapped person. Military veterans received a preference in 53 percent of the villages. Apparently in 20 percent of the villages, the outlawed bidding practice was still in operation, and the highest bidder was given the land.* The factor of inheritance seems more important than it appears at first glance. Actually, when a redetermination is made every few years, inheritance is one of the most important factors. In connection with the bidding procedure, it seems that certain criteria are used, including inheritance, for selecting candidates who are eligible to bid. Thus, the highest bidder procedure is probably used in more than 25 percent of the villages surveyed.

It is instructive in this context to consider the results of the Hamlet Resident Survey concerned with the same issues. Respondents in the several status categories were asked if they considered that the village office used reasonably satisfactory methods of selecting tenants. In the case of the farm operators, the affirmative answers are three to six times as high as negative answers, but in the case of the farm workers, the affirmative answers are only slightly more than the negative answers--29 percent to 24 percent. When the respondents were asked how they thought that the village office should set the rents for communal lands with a choice among the bidding system, customary procedures, and rental at 25 percent of production, two-thirds indicated a preference for the existing system of customary procedures, one-quarter favored rental based on 25 percent of production as specified by the law, and only 13 percent of those indicating preference favored a bidding system. In general, the tenant and owner-tenant groups had a greater preference for customary proce-

* Although bidding is outlawed, the bidding may continue until the five-year contract expires.

dures. On the other hand, while farm workers favored these procedures also, they leaned more in the direction of rental based on 25 percent of production. This may reflect the fact that farm workers' chances of getting communal land to farm are rather less than those of the other groups if the other methods of selection (procedures or bidding) are used.*

* HRS, Tables 233 and 234.

Chapter 5

IMPACT OF PAST AND FUTURE LAND DISTRIBUTION

Degree of Land Scarcity in Vietnam

Among the conditions favoring a need for land reform are (1) a relative shortage of cultivable land, as evidenced by heavy population pressure on the land, and (2) restrictions on land ownership imposed by the land tenure structure. As long as land is plentiful, no problem exists for farmers who wish to obtain their own land. However, land redistribution becomes critical for an important segment of the rural population--the landless who strongly desire to own land and the small owner who wants more land, because they have no alternative to farm employment. This problem has existed in many countries, and many have taken the major step of carrying out thorough land reform.

In the Republic of Vietnam, the Viet Cong has attempted to manipulate this longing for land by identifying it with the Communist class struggle. Land reform is particularly important in pacifying the Vietnamese landless. Some idea of the intensity of comparative scarcity of land and unsatiated longing for land can be obtained by comparing the population density with those of other countries that have been faced with the Communist problem.

Land Availability in Asian Countries That Have Resisted Communist Insurgency

A comparison of population and area statistics of the Republic of Vietnam with those for Japan, The Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China should provide some insight into the need for land reform. First, it can be observed from Table 28 that Japan covers a total area of some 369,660 square kilometers and The Philippines has an area of 300,000 square kilometers or nearly double the area of the Republic of Vietnam, which has a cadastral area of 170,810 square kilometers. The Republic of Korea, with an area of 98,430 square kilometers, is about half the size of the Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) has a total island area of only 35,960 square kilometers.

Table 28

CADASTRAL AND AGRICULTURAL CULTIVATED AREA AND POPULATION DENSITY
FOR REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND SELECTED COUNTRIES
1964

	Total Area (sq km) (1)	Agricultural Cultivated Area (sq km) (2)	Total Population (thousands) (3)	Agricultural Population (thousands) (4)	National Density (5)	Agri- cultural Density (6)	National Agricultural Density (7)
Republic of China (Taiwan)	35,960	8,900	12,429	5,840	345.6	656.2	1,396.5
Republic of Korea	98,430	22,740	28,377	15,594	288.3	685.8	1,247.9
Republic of Vietnam	170,810	29,350	16,124	13,705	94.4	467.0	549.4
Philippines	300,000	112,270	32,345	18,738	107.8	167.0	288.1
Japan	369,660	69,520	97,960	23,685	265.0	340.7	1,409.1

Source: Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4: FAO Production Yearbook, Vol. 20, 1966, using 1964 statistics.

Column 5: Total population \div total area.

Column 6: Agricultural population \div agricultural area.

Column 7: Total population \div agricultural area.

Japan has a population of 97.9 million with a density of 265 per square kilometer. The Philippines has a population of 32.3 million with a density of 108 persons per square kilometer compared to Vietnam with 94 square kilometer. Vietnam has about half the population of The Philippines with 16.1 million and slightly over half the area, encompassing some 170,810 square kilometers. The Republic of Korea is about half the size of Vietnam with an area of 98,430 square kilometers and a population density of 288 persons per square kilometer. The Republic of China is only about a third the size of Korea with 35,960 square kilometers and a population of 12.4 million. The density of Taiwan is 346 persons per square kilometer.

Vietnam is the least developed of the four countries, and hence we find that The Philippines has a cultivated area of 112,270 square kilometers compared with only 29,350 square kilometers for Vietnam. Although Korea is much smaller than Vietnam, it has a cultivated area of 22,740 square kilometers. Taiwan, with 40 percent of Korea's population, has a roughly proportional amount of cultivated land--8,900 square kilometers. Japan has 69,520 square kilometers of cultivated land.

The agricultural density of The Philippines, measured in terms of agricultural population divided by the agricultural area, is 167 persons per square mile versus 467 persons per square kilometer for Vietnam. The Republics of Korea and China (Taiwan) have 686 and 656 persons per square kilometer, respectively. Surprisingly, Japan has a relatively small agricultural population with a resulting agricultural density of only 340.7 agricultural persons per square kilometer of cultivated land. This is a lower density than Vietnam because the farm population has been able to shift into industry, a necessary condition for reducing pressure for farm employment and land control or ownership. It is pertinent to note that a rigorous land reform program was carried out in Japan to thwart dissension in the farm areas and to preclude Communist insurgency aimed at a class struggle.

The capacity of each country to feed its population, measured in terms of total population divided by the cultivated area for each country, favors The Philippines with only 288 persons per square kilometer of farmland compared with 549 for Vietnam. The densities for the Republics of Korea and China are 1,248 and 1,397 persons per square kilometer, respectively, and Japan has the highest density with 1,409 persons per square kilometer. In studying these comparative statistics, it should be remembered that Japan is highly industrialized and able to offset food imports with industrial goods, and Korea and China (Taiwan) are also undergoing rapid industrial development. In spite of this increasing ability to import food, these three countries have very efficient rice farming methods.

The Republic of Vietnam depends on agriculture not only to attain self-sufficiency but also to produce agricultural surpluses to offset the imports of nonagricultural goods, since a highly productive farm economy is essential for future national economic growth.

Both Korea and China (Taiwan), have succeeded in uniting the people behind their governments. One major contribution to this success has been strong measures taken in land reform. The Philippines, with a much larger availability of farmland both in per capita and total but with a laissez-faire attitude toward land reform, has failed (as evidenced by the Huk belligerency) to achieve the unified anti-Communist front achieved by the Koreans and Chinese. Unfortunately, Vietnam has failed to implement a successful land reform program even though it does not have sufficient land or political stability to permit significant inequalities in land ownership.

Land Scarcity of Indo-Chinese Peninsula Countries

The Indo-Chinese Peninsula is generally considered to include Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and the two governments of Vietnam. Burma is the largest country, with a total area of 678,030 square kilometers followed by Thailand with 514,000 square kilometers. Third is Malaysia with 332,630 square kilometers, fourth is Laos with 236,800 square kilometers, fifth is Cambodia with 181,040 square kilometers, and sixth is the Republic of Vietnam with 170,810 square kilometers. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is the smallest, with 158,750 square kilometers.

The Republic of Vietnam is second only to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of all countries of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula in terms of population density related to the total land area (Table 29). Laos is least dense with 8 persons per square kilometer; second is Malaysia with 28, closely followed by Cambodia with 35, and Burma with 36 per square kilometer; fifth is Thailand with 59 per square kilometer. The Republic of Vietnam has 94, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has 116 persons per square kilometer. These gross density figures pertain to all the land in the countries and do not attempt to reflect the agriculture area available.

In terms of developed agricultural land, Burma has the largest agricultural area with 162,300 square kilometers, followed by Thailand with 112,670 square kilometers. Malaysia is third with 34,070, Cambodia is fourth with 29,380, the Republic of Vietnam is a close fifth with 29,350, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is sixth with 20,180 square kilometers of agricultural land. Laos is the least developed agriculturally with 16,000 square kilometers.

Table 29

CADASTRAL AND AGRICULTURAL AREA AND POPULATION STATISTICS
FOR COUNTRIES ON THE INDOCHINESE PENINSULA
1964

	Total Area (sq km) (1)	Agricultural Cultivated Area (sq km) (2)	Population (thousands) (3)	Agricultural Population (thousands) (4)	National Density (persons/ sq km) (5)	Agri- cultural Density (persons/ sq km) (6)	National Agricultural Density (persons/ sq km) (7)
Burma	678,030	162,300	24,732	15,334	36.5	94.5	152.4
Thailand	514,000	112,670	30,561	23,861	59.5	211.8	271.2
Malaysia	332,630	34,070	9,403	5,161	28.3	151.5	276.0
Laos	236,800	16,000	2,000	1,625	8.4	101.6	125.0
Cambodia	181,040	29,380	6,300	4,725	34.8	160.8	214.4
Republic of Vietnam	170,810	29,350	16,124	13,705	94.4	467.0	549.4
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	158,750	20,180	18,400	14,720	115.9	729.4	911.8

Sources: Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4: FAO Production Yearbook, Vol. 20, 1966, using 1964 statistics.
 Column 5: Total population ÷ total area.
 Column 6: Agricultural population ÷ agricultural area.
 Column 7: Total population ÷ agricultural area.

In comparing the agricultural population (Table 29), Thailand has the largest population with 23.8 million, followed by Burma with 15.3 million. Third is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with 14.7 million, followed by the Republic of Vietnam with 13.7 million, Malaysia with 5.1 million, Cambodia with 4.7 million, and finally Laos with 1.6 million.

In considering the pressure of the agricultural population on cultivated land, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is the most densely populated with a population of 729 persons per square kilometer, followed by the Republic of Vietnam with 467 persons per square kilometer. Third is Thailand with 212 persons per square kilometer, fourth is Malaysia with 152 persons per square kilometer, fifth is Laos with 102 per square kilometer, and the most sparsely populated is Burma with 94 persons per square kilometer.

Finally, to obtain some idea of the relative ability of Vietnam to feed itself compared with other Indo-Chinese countries, the total population of each country is divided by the cultivated land in square kilometers. The most densely populated country again is the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with a total of 912 persons per square kilometer, followed by the Republic of Vietnam with 549 persons. Third is Malaysia with 276 persons per square kilometer, closely followed by Thailand with 271 persons. Next is Cambodia with 214 persons, followed by Burma with 152 persons per square kilometer, and finally Laos with 125 persons per square kilometer.


Although the Republic of Vietnam is not under as much pressure as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for land or farmlands specifically, it suffers population pressure far greater than that of any other areas of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula.

To place these measures of population pressure in perspective on a larger world basis, the pressure in the Republic of Vietnam is compared with those of 24 other countries selected to represent a variety of conditions in the continents of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Figures 4 and 5 show all major high population density countries.

Figure 4 measures total population pressure on the entire land area. All countries with the highest population density are in East and South Asia. Taiwan has the highest population density in the world, with 346 persons per square kilometer, followed by South Korea and Japan. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is fifth in density and the Republic of Vietnam is eighth. The United States has a higher population density to area than major South American countries.

Figure 4


RELATIONSHIP OF POPULATION TO TOTAL
LAND AREA FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
1965



SOURCES: FAO: Production Yearbook, 1966; Tables 1, 4, 5.
UN: Statistical Yearbook, 1966; Table 17.

Figure 5

DENSITY OF AGRICULTURAL POPULATION TO ARABLE
LAND IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
1965



120

SOURCES: FAO: Production Yearbook, 1966; Tables 1,4,5.

UN: Statistical Yearbook, 1966; Table 17.

There is a vast difference in most countries between total land area and the arable area because much land is uncultivable. Also, the proportions of the agricultural population of a country declines directly with the degree of industrialization. In many developing countries, the impact of industrialization has not yet strongly changed the relationship of the agricultural to the total population, and a comparison of the agricultural population density to the arable land area has more meaning because population migration to the cities is still relatively low.

Figure 5 compares the agricultural population density related to the arable land area of these countries. In this case, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has the highest agricultural population density in the world with 729 persons per square kilometer. South Korea and Taiwan are next, and the Republic of Vietnam is fourth in the world with 460 per square kilometer. Japan in this comparison has dropped to seventh and The Philippines to ninth position. Among these top nine high density countries, land redistribution programs have been carried out in each one except Indonesia (sixth). The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has carried out a land reform program in the Communist ideological style, as described in Volume III. South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan completed successful land reform programs that removed the basis for any possible Communist class struggle activity and tremendously increased agricultural productivity by releasing the energies of the farm population. The same has happened in Kenya. Pakistan has also had successful programs, especially in West Pakistan.

Inequality of Ownership Size Distributions in Selected East Asian Countries

The FAO 1960-61 Census of agriculture data permit intercountry comparisons of size distribution information, but the data have reference only to the size of the farm operating unit or holding. While data on farm operating units are useful in viewing the economics of farming, they must be re-enforced by data on farm ownership units, in order to understand the land tenure situation of a country. For this purpose, a size distribution of farms by the size of the ownership unit is essential. In this study, considerable effort has been taken to obtain information on land ownership of farmers.

The operating farm size distribution of a country reflects many factors other than the tenurial conditions applicable to the individual parcels of an operating farm viewed as a management unit. The size of the operating units is dependent on the farmer's needs; his capability as a farmer; and the land, labor, and financial resources subject to his control. The availability of land will depend on whether it can be rented

or bought on terms he can afford. Thus, the size of the operating farm represents an adjustment between the resources that a farmer owns and those over which he can acquire control (determined by his needs and capabilities), and the infrastructure of credit and other services related to his farming activity.

Lorenz curves are a convenient device for comparing the inequality of farm holdings shown in different size distributions. They compare the proportion of land held by various proportions of farmers. Comparisons are presented as Lorenz curves in Figure 6 for the Republic of Vietnam, Taiwan, and South Korea with respect to the holdings of farm operating units. Two curves are shown for Korea, comparing the situations before and after land reform--that is, 1945 with 1955.

The effects of the South Korean land redistribution program for extending ownership to farmers produced a dramatic effect even on the original size distribution. Land reform substantially reduced the inequality of farm holdings and must necessarily have had a substantial impact on reducing the inequality of farm ownership.

The Lorenz curves reveal that South Korea now has the least unequal size distributions compared with those of Taiwan and the Republic of Vietnam, whereas before land reforms in 1954, it had the most unequal distribution of farm holdings. Comparatively, the Taiwan land reform program apparently was not as effective as that in South Korea in reducing inequality of holdings, and the least effective measured in this way was the land redistribution program of the Republic of Vietnam. According to these FAO data, the Republic of Vietnam had the most unequal size distribution of farm operating units in 1960-61 compared with the two East Asian countries that had very successful land reform programs.

Land Reform Programs in Selected East Asian Countries


Japan

Land reform programs in many Asian countries were introduced following World War II to provide greater equality of ownership among the farm community and to provide a bulwark of contented rural citizens.

After the war there was a great deal of unrest in the rural areas of Japan. The Japanese government had made some unsuccessful attempts at land reform. The occupation forces in Japan and the Japanese government had considerable fear of possible successful Communist agitation in the farm communities. One of the architects of the Japanese Land Reform

Figure 6

LORENZ CURVES SHOWING THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM HOLDINGS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (1960-61), KOREA (1945 AND 1955), AND TAIWAN (1960-61)



- 1 Korea: Farm holdings, 1945 (before land reform)
- 2 Korea: Farm holdings, 1955 (after land reform)
- 3 China (Taiwan): Farm holdings, FAO Census of Agriculture, 1960-61
- 4 Republic of Vietnam: Farm holdings, FAO Census of Agriculture, 1960-61

SOURCES: 1, 2 A Study of Land Tenure System in Korea, Korea Land Economics Research Center, Seoul, Korea, 1966. Tables 4 and 5, p. 92.

3, 4 FAO Report on The 1960 World Census of Agriculture, Rome, 1966.

Program, later an adviser in Vietnam, described the situation in this period in the following terms:

In agrarian countries the cultivator of the soil must be placed "in the center of the peace." No government can count on popular support without the peasant support; it is that or no support at all. The Communists are aware of it, and have therefore placed the land question with the slogan of "land for the landless," in the center of Asian politics. The Communists are masters at exploiting agrarian discontent for their own political ends. This was their main weapon of seizing power in Russia, and this is the manner in which the Chinese Communists defeated the Nationalist government in China. The lessons of this strategy should be all too clear to the non-Communist regimes. This is not the case, unfortunately. The tendency to maintain the status quo in the face of the Communist exploitation of the peasants' hunger for landownership is still overwhelming. In effect this means that the anti-reform land lords and governments play into the hands of the Communists, they become their unwilling allies and the creators of a revolutionary situation from which only the Communists stand to benefit.*

Land reform in Japan included improvement of land tenure conditions with rentals and land values frozen at the 1939 level. Land reform as enacted during the period of U.S. military occupation under Gen. Douglas MacArthur and promulgated by him on December 9, 1945, stated, "The Japanese Imperial Government is directed to make measures to insure that those who till the soil of Japan should have more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor." Major provisions of this land reform law were:

1. The government was to purchase all absentee-owned land.
2. This land was to be resold to the tenants.
3. Tenants could buy land with up to 30 annual installment payments.
4. Landlords were paid by annuity bonds amortized over 24 years.

* Wolf J. Ladejinsky, Land Reform in Japan: A Comment (taken from K.H. Parsons, R. J. Penn, and P. M. Raup, the University of Wisconsin Press, Proceedings of the International Conference on Land Tenure and Related Problems in World Agriculture held at Madison, Wisconsin, 1951, published 1963, pp. 228-29).

5. Owner-operators were restricted to 7.5 acres (3 hectares) on the islands of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, with 30 acres (12 hectares) on Hokkaido. Additional land could be cultivated by family labor or if the productivity of land were lowered by subdivision.
6. A resident landlord was also permitted to retain an average of 2.5 acres (1 hectare) of tenant-cultivated land.

No provision was made against further subdivision of small holdings. Thus, there was a serious problem of fragmentation of farm holdings that would become too small to farm properly or provide a reasonable level of living.

Although Japan enjoyed the advantages of being a highly industrialized nation and was adequately supported by administrative and technical personnel, the handling of huge numbers of parcels of land that had to be purchased by the government and then redistributed did cause administrative problems.

The extreme danger of Communist subversion was averted in Japan in 1945, the farm population was effectively won over by the government, and the danger has been forgotten. Land reform applied severe operating retention limit restrictions and absentee ownership was eliminated. Tenancy was reduced from 46 percent in 1945 to 12 percent at the end of 1948. At the same time that tenancy was reduced, the proportion of owner-operators increased from 54 percent to 88 percent.*

Korea[†]

Korea became a divided country after World War II. South Korea faced insurgency of Communists emanating from the North. The Koreans were anxious to gain the support of the peasants against any possible Communist insurgency. A rather straightforward system of land reform was introduced in Korea that limited farm ownership to tenants with a ceiling of 3 chongbo (almost 3 hectares) of land. The government undertook to purchase the lands and to sell them to the tenants. The government compensated the landlords and then resold the lands to the tenants.

* General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, National Resource Section, Report No. 127, Tokyo, 1950.

† "A Study of Land Tenure System in Korea," Korea Land Economics Research Center, Seoul, Korea, 1966.

Land reform in Korea entailed government acquisition of all tenanted lands and any land or any farmland that exceeded 3 chongbo. Owners of farmland were to be compensated on the basis of 1.5 times the average annual production from those farmlands. The government was to distribute the acquired lands to the tenants up to 3 chongbo in area. The tenant-purchaser was given up to five years to repay the cost of the land although earlier payment could be made. The land could not be sold, donated, or mortgaged until the full amount of the purchased price was paid.

Although claims have been made that the productivity of farms in Korea suffered because of the lack of direction and assistance of landlords, the production of rice on riceland has increased.*

In 1946, tenancy existed on 60.5 percent of all arable land compared with 39.5 percent under owner-operators. Actually, the proportion of tenants was much higher because tenants had smaller holdings. Indeed, some 65.1 percent of the households farmed less than one chongbo. As a result of reform program in Korea, nonoperating landlords were virtually eliminated. Although other problems occurred because of lack of credit and the tendency to fractionate land by subdivision,† the program succeeded in giving land to the tiller of the soil. Undoubtedly, the ability and desire of Korean citizens to unite and fight off the insurgents from the North was in no small way the result of an aggressive and quickly executed land reform that proved to the farmer that the government was sincere in attempting to cure inequities of ownership and to close the gap between the rich and poor.

The Republic of China

Like Korea, Taiwan had developed a pattern of land ownership reflecting an outmoded feudal system with objectionable inequalities. The ownership pattern could obviously not satisfy the inhabitants of Taiwan, an island country with one of the densest populations in the world. The population pressure had been aggravated with the arrival of Nationalist Chinese from the China mainland after 1948. The natural birth rate, which

* J.A.E. Hong Cho, Indiana University, Ph.D., 1964, Ann Arbor, Michigan, "Land Reforms and Their Consequences in South Korea."

† The Council on Korean Affairs, Korean Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1962, Koh Yeong-Kyong, Land Reform and Agricultural Structure in Korea, pp. 428-39.

was about 33.5 per thousand, was more than double the world's rate of 16 per thousand.

Land reform in Taiwan started with improvement of tenure conditions, including in particular the implementation of rent reduction. This was introduced in 1949 and was enforced. Indeed, the lowering of rents discouraged many landlords from retaining their farmlands so that many sold their land. Land redistribution was introduced by a land-to-the-tiller bill on January 20, 1953. Some of the provisions of land reform in Taiwan are enumerated below:

1. Limitation of tenant-cultivated land holdings by a landlord to 3 chia (2.9 hectares) of good paddy land with proportional additional allowances for poorer land. That is, the limitation was based on productivity.
2. The land purchase price was 2.5 times the value of the main crop. The purchase price was paid 70 percent in land bonds based on the value of rice (to allow for inflation) and 30 percent in stocks in government enterprises.
3. Any tenant could purchase from landlords leased land that he had cultivated continuously for eight years, or could get government financing where the owner was an absentee landlord or not an owner-cultivator. However, provision was made for continued ownership by the old and infirm, orphaned, widowed, or physically disabled persons as well as certain public welfare organizations that were dependent on the land income for support.
4. Provisions were made for overcoming land fragmentation by merging adjoining lands under one farm owner-operator.
5. The standard area of public land to be purchased by a farming family was set at 0.5 to 2 chia of paddy field or 1 to 4 chia of cultivated dry land.

Land reform in Taiwan, which was carried out by the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, has turned out to be one of the most successful programs conducted in any country. It was executed as an integrated agrarian reform program in which the social and the physical infrastructure required by the farmer was provided, in addition to social justice, through a more equitable distribution of land ownership.

Republic of Vietnam


Vietnam's land reform program was clearly neither as far-reaching nor as successful as the land-for-the-tiller programs of Japan, Korea, or Taiwan. First, the land redistribution scheme for Vietnam was limited to the redistribution of excess holdings over 100 hectares. Since ownership holdings of this size hardly existed in the ricelands of the Central Lowlands, the impact of the program in Vietnam was primarily restricted to the Southern Region. The Lorenz curves comparing the size distribution of ownership between 1955 and 1966 (Figure 7) show that an important shift toward less inequality of ownership was achieved by the Ordinance 57 program of 1956. However, comparative Lorenz curves (Figure 6) for Vietnam, Taiwan, and Korea are evidence that Vietnam continues to have a considerably more unequal size distribution of ownership.

Figure 7 shows 1955 data from the Directorate of Land Administration (Republic of Vietnam) on land ownership in the Southern Region and compares it with two sets of more recent data. The comparison is revealing because it shows that Ordinance 57 program of 1956 was substantially effective in redistributing land ownership. However, the impact came principally from the effects of expropriation of holdings of large landowners, and a much lesser effect came from redistribution to the landless or small owners.

The most recent data are shown in the two less skewed curves in Figure 7. One is based on tax records obtained from the Provincial Land Office. The other is derived from the SRI Hamlet Resident Survey. Whereas the tax record data and the HRS data agree at the lower end of the curves, the HRS data are more sharply skewed at the upper end. Thus, the results of the Hamlet Resident Survey suggest a slightly more unequal distribution of land ownership in the Southern Region of Vietnam than is indicated by the tax records, an inconsistency that may well be due to the tax records not being completely up to date.

The SRI Absentee Landlord Survey tends to corroborate the basic correctness of the Hamlet Resident Survey. It can be seen that although land redistribution carried out under Ordinance 57 increased the portion of land owned by the smaller owners, it is still true, as it was in 1955, that about 35 percent of the land is owned by 2 percent of the owners and that approximately 10 percent of the land is owned by less than half of one percent of the owners. While the Ordinance 57 land reform program did accomplish one of its basic objectives in eliminating land ownership by individuals in excess of 115 hectares, it did not, according to the HRS results, significantly reduce concentration of land ownership at the upper end of the distribution. This conclusion is important because it shows that, in addition to government and communal lands, a large pool of privately owned lands could be made available for redistribution if the present retention limit were lowered still further.

Figure 7
 LORENZ CURVES SHOWING THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION
 OF FARM HOLDINGS IN THE SOUTHERN REGION
 Republic of Vietnam



- 1 Directorate of Land Administration Data for 1955
- 2 Provincial Land Office Data for 1966
- 3 Hamlet Resident Survey and Absentee Landlord Survey, 1967

SOURCE: Plotted from data in Annex Table A-2

Referring again to Figure 7, it may at first glance appear surprising that a land redistribution program which raised the portion of land owned by small landowners would have so little effect in lowering the concentration of ownership at the upper end of the curve. While the mechanics of Lorenz curves can be rather complicated, the explanation in this case can be understood intuitively. Lands expropriated under Ordinance 57 were redistributed to new landowners, not to those who previously had very small holdings. Thus, the total number of landowners was increased and the new owners were given rather small parcels. Such a procedure has the effect on a Lorenz curve of raising the lower end of the curve while leaving the upper end nearly unchanged.

A major usefulness of the Lorenz curve in the present context lies in the use of HRS data for estimating the area of lands which would be made available for redistribution if the retention limit were further lowered. Another use is that of estimating the land area which would be required to raise the size of holding among present small landowners up to some established minimum. However, the landless farm population, the tenants and farm workers, constitute a larger and more urgent group demanding land than the land poor, and these landless do not appear in a Lorenz curve at all. The number of farmers in need of land, both land poor and landless, is discussed in the following sections.

Land Scarcity Within the Three Regions of the Republic of Vietnam

The Southern Region of the Republic of Vietnam is slightly larger in area than either the Central Lowlands and the Central Highlands. The three regions have cadastral areas of 66,184 square kilometers, 56,598, and 48,318 square kilometers, respectively.* The Southern Region has about half the population with 10.9 million, compared with 5.2 million for the Central Lowlands and only 815,800 for the Central Highlands. More than 70 percent of the riceland is located in the Southern Region, with a total of 18,187 square kilometers out of a national total of 22,947 square kilometers. The Central Lowlands has 4,204 square kilometers in riceland, and the Central Highlands, 556 square kilometers.

The population densities for the three regions are 165 persons per square kilometer in the Southern Region, 93 persons in the Central Lowland area, and 17 persons in the Central Highlands. The farm population

* Statistics include autonomous cities within geographical bounds of three regions; see Table 30.

Table 30

ESTIMATED DENSITY OF RURAL POPULATION IN RELATION TO CADASTRAL
AND RICELAND AREA BY REGIONS, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1968

	Total Population (thousands)	Agri- cultural Population (thousands)	Total Area (sq km)	Total Agricultural Area (sq km)	Persons per Sq Km		
					Total Pop. ÷ Total Area	Total Pop. ÷ Agri. Area	Agri. Pop. ÷ Agri. Area
Southern Region	8,643.7	3,970	66,052	18,187			
Vung Tau	69.3	--	.074	--			
Saigon	<u>2,204.9</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>.058</u>	<u>--</u>			
Total So. Region	10,917.9	3,970	66,184	18,187	165	600	218
Central Highland	815.8	377.6	48,318	556	17	1,467	679
Central Lowland	4,942.3	2,600.7	56,518	4,204			
Danang	286.1	--	.080	--			
Cam Ranh	<u>47.4</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	93	1,255	619
Total Central Lowland	<u>5,275.8</u>	<u>2,600.7</u>	<u>56,598</u>	<u>4,204</u>	93	1,255	619
Accumulative Total	17,009.5	6,948.3	171,100	22,947	99	741	303

Sources: Total Population from MACV: Hamlet Evaluation System Information Report, Saigon, January 1968.
Land Areas from Vietnam Agric. Econ. and Stat. Service: Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, 1966
Agricultural population estimated by Hamlet Resident Survey.

densities* for the three regions, which provide a rough indication of the ability of the farmers to support not only themselves but other nonfarming persons in the region, are of 218 persons per square kilometer of riceland for the Southern Region, compared with 619 in the Central Lowlands and 679 in the Central Highlands. The national agricultural density is 303 per square kilometer of riceland.

More meaningful statistics are the population densities in terms of riceland only, since these statistics provide a guide to the ability of each region to feed its people. The Southern Region has a total population to riceland area density of 600 persons per square kilometer, compared with 1,255 for the Central Lowlands and a surprisingly high density of 1,467 for the Central Highlands. These statistics include the populations of the autonomous cities located in these areas.

Another significant finding is that the population pressure in the Central Lowlands is in excess of the density of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam--1,255 inhabitants per square kilometer of riceland, compared with 948 persons per square kilometer.† In spite of the general belief to the contrary, the land situation in the latter is less acute than in the Central Lowlands.

Farm population density in the Central Lowlands of the Republic of Vietnam is among the highest in the world. Some idea of this population pressure has been discussed in the preceding pages. As mentioned, the area of cultivated riceland in the Central Lowlands, amounting to 4,204 square kilometers, is the basis for supporting an agricultural population of 2.6 million. The question is how many farm families are contained in this agricultural population. Assuming an average size household of about 6 persons,‡ this agricultural population represents roughly 400,000 farm families including owners, tenants, owner-tenants, and farm workers. However, the 1960-61 census reported 695,981 agricultural land holdings in

* Agriculture population divided by total agricultural area; see Table 30.

† To update the mid-1965 Democratic Republic of Vietnam statistics, a population growth of 4 percent was assumed for 18 months, which increased the density from 912 to 948 persons per square kilometer of riceland.

‡ Average farm household size in the Central Lowlands is probably between 5 and 6. In 1964, the Rural Income and Expenditure Survey sample showed 5.0 persons for the Central Lowlands and 5.7 persons for the Southern Region, whereas the SRI Hamlet Resident Survey indicated an average farm family of 6.66 persons in the Southern Region.

the Central Lowlands. These relationships suggest that more than one farm holding is operated by the average farm household. Detailed information is not available, although observations made in II Corps indicate that tenants farm more than one parcel of land. Also, the number of families operating farms is believed to have decreased during the 1960-67 period. One reason for the decrease has been the abandonment of land by refugees who feared the Viet Cong and sought refuge in urban centers and cities where they felt they were more secure. Another reason for believing that the number of farm families had decreased is because of the large number of jobs that have been created through the war effort. The natural attrition has probably not been offset with new farmers because of the drafting of young men in the armed services. With a decrease in the number of available farmers in the rural area, it would be anticipated that the average operating farmer today is handling somewhat more land than he handled in the 1960-61 period. However, this statement is not founded on quantitative information. Even if the low estimate of 400,000 farmers in the Central Lowlands is employed, it appears that there is only sufficient land to provide these farmers with about 1 hectare each. Without considering the need for resettling refugees or ex-servicemen after the war, there is a major problem in providing sufficient land for those farmers who are now farming in the Central Lowlands. If an average desirable level of 1.5 hectares per family is assumed, there is a need for 200,000 hectares of land at this time (a 1.5-hectare size was used compared with 2 hectares for the Southern Region because more lands in the Central Region are adaptable to double cropping).*

Perhaps the fundamental problem in the Central Lowlands is that the number of farm families in the region (including potential farmers not now growing crops due to insecurity or some other temporary reason) appears to be greater than the available riceland can support at a reasonable standard of living. There is urgent need to alleviate the problem of land scarcity. Unless large numbers of families are to be moved to the Southern Region, where land is less scarce although not plentiful, or unless new lands close to the Central Lowlands can be cleared, the only alternative may be a shift in the urban-rural balance--that is, a population shift from the farms to the cities, provided that suitable employment opportunities can be made available.

* Higher population pressure on the land usually results in a comparatively higher intensity of cultivation and smaller operating farm units.

Effectiveness of Land Redistribution

French Lands

Probably one of the major tragedies in Vietnam in relation to land reform was the failure to take advantage of the Vietnamese-French agreement of September 10, 1958, and distribute as much of this land as possible. Not until August 23, 1965, did the Government of Vietnam decide to sell former French lands. By that time, an estimated 175 thousand hectares, more than 75 percent of these former French lands, had been subjected to harassment by the Viet Cong.

Since August 1965, the Vietnamese government has succeeded in distributing 10,650 hectares of the former French lands with titles, and an equivalent area is being processed for distribution (Table 31). At the time of writing, the program seems to be gathering speed.

Table 31
DISTRIBUTION OF FRENCH LANDS BY PROVINCE*
(as of July 1968)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Estimated No. of Rural Households</u>	<u>Amount of Land Dis- tributed† (hectares)</u>	<u>No. of Recipients</u>	<u>Percent of Households Acquiring French Lands</u>
An Giang	53,500	2,913	222	0.4%
An Xuyen	24,600	279	119	0.5
Ba Xuyen	42,300	87	26	0.1
Bac Lieu	24,900	352	154	0.6
Bien Hoa	46,500	7	2	-0-
Binh Thuan	13,500	12	17	0.1
Chau Doc	59,400	209	86	0.1
Dinh Tuong	65,600	497	95	0.1
Ninh Thuan	14,800	1,719	1,149	7.8
Phong Dinh	31,300	2,850	618	2.0
Sa Dec	26,500	932	340	1.3
Tay Ninh	39,700	68	65	0.2
Vinh Binh	45,100	358	511	1.1
Vinh Long	<u>52,200</u>	<u>367</u>	<u>231</u>	0.4
Total	539,900	10,650	3,635	0.7%

* Volume I, Appendix F-22.

† Does not include approximately 11,210 hectares applied for and in process, mostly in Phong Dinh province.

The situation in the Southern Region is quite different, since a very large hectarage of former French land there is owned by the GVN. Of the total of 229,259 hectares purchased, 125,725 hectares are cultivated, of which 48,707 hectares remain in secure GVN-held territory. A hectarage of 77,018 cultivated land is estimated to be in Viet Cong-controlled territory, where it has undoubtedly been distributed for use to resident tenants. It is apparent that a high proportion of former French lands is held by the Viet Cong. This suggests the possibility of a Viet Cong strategy to gain control of, and to make political capital from, the redistribution of these large blocks of land to landless farmers, an advantage that the Government appears to have missed.

Ordinance 57 Lands

The distribution of Ordinance 57 lands (Table 32) started at a time when French lands were withheld for large scale rice plantations. Consequently, the total effort of the GVN in land reform was focused on the problems of expropriating and distributing Ordinance 57 lands. By 1961, 243,615 hectares had been distributed out of a total of 250,563 distributed up until July 1968.* Unfortunately, the GVN exhausted its funds for this purpose and was short of trained administrators and cadastral surveyors as well. Security deteriorated seriously from 1960 on, and U.S. funds were unavailable for land reform during the five fiscal years 1960-65. Land distribution fell off drastically.

Discussions with GVN officials and U.S. advisers, together with perusal of documents, have been interpreted to indicate that intimations of no additional funding for land reform were apparent at the end of 1960. Attempts were made by GVN officials to obtain both financial and technical assistance. When funding was not forthcoming, rapid action was taken to turn over the management of French lands to Provincial Chiefs who were granted 40 percent of rentals to be used by the province and villages. This step was a delaying action until the Vietnamese government could gain control of the Ordinance 57 distribution program.

The initial impetus was sufficient to provide some success. The distribution of Ordinance 57 lands was primarily in the Southern Region where large riceland holdings existed and were largely under the control of the GVN. Eight provinces were able to supply land for more than 30 percent of all rural households within those provinces. The province of Bac Lieu

* Volume I, Appendix E-22

Table 32

IMPACT OF REDISTRIBUTION OF ORDINANCE 57 LAND
Republic of Vietnam

Province	Corps Area	(1968)	Estimated Total Number of Rural Households† (thousands)	Area Distributed Under Ord. 57‡ (hectares)	Number of Recipient Households‡	Percent of Rural Households that Received Land
		Estimated Rural Population * (thousands)				
An Giang	IV	353.6	53.5	25,965	7,950	14.9
An Xuyen	IV	162.1	24.6	19,978	7,330	29.8
Ba Xuyen	IV	279.2	42.3	22,792	9,300	22.0
Bac Lieu	IV	164.8	24.9	30,376	10,542	42.3
Bien Hoa	III	307.0	46.5	751	460	1.0
Binh Duong	III	172.6	26.1	189	170	0.7
Binh Thuan	II	89.0	13.5	136	134	1.0
Chau Doc	IV	392.9	59.4	7,372	4,118	6.9
Chuong Thien	IV	217.9	33.0	21,989	9,332	28.3
Dinh Tuong	IV	433.5	65.6	8,534	5,697	8.7
Gia Dinh	III	794.4	120.3	1,537	1,007	0.8
Go Cong	IV	139.0	21.0	3,833	2,298	10.9
Hau Nghia	III	144.4	21.8	1,226	923	4.2
Kien Giang	IV	142.2	21.4	20,710	8,580	40.1
Kien Hoa	IV	405.2	61.4	5,282	3,635	5.9
Kien Phong	IV	263.2	40.0	15,952	5,868	14.7
Kien Tuong	IV	22.3	3.3	580	121	3.7
Long An	III	236.7	35.8	5,085	3,710	10.4
Phong Dinh	IV	207.1	31.3	18,002	9,326	30.0
Phuoc Tuy	III	56.8	8.6	104	37	0.4
Sa Dec	IV	174.6	26.5	2,168	1,576	5.9
Tay Ninh	III	262.3	39.7	1,071	645	1.6
Vinh Binh	IV	297.9	45.1	22,976	13,921	30.2
Vinh Long	IV	<u>344.8</u>	<u>52.2</u>	<u>13,945</u>	<u>10,165</u>	<u>19.5</u>
		6063.5	917.8	250,563	116,845	12.7

* Population from MACV: Hamlet Evaluation System Information Report (Unclassified), January 1968, American Embassy, Saigon.

† Computed by dividing the rural population by 6.6, the overall average number of persons per family calculated from the results of the SRI Hamlet Resident Survey.

‡ From Appendix E-16, Volume I.

received the greatest benefit from Ordinance 57 with 42 percent of all of the present rural households having received government land grants. Kien Giang also enjoyed land grants sufficient to supply 40 percent of all rural households now in that province. An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, and Phong Dinh also received Ordinance 57 lands for 30 percent of their rural households. In addition, Vinh Binh received land grants for 23 percent, and Ba Xuyen for 21 percent of their rural households. An Giang, Kien Phong, and Vinh Long received 15 percent, Go Cong received 11 percent, and Long An received 10 percent. Thus, 12 provinces received sufficient land to resettle 10 percent or more of their rural households. The provinces of Sa Dec and Chau Doc received land for 7 percent, and Kien Hoa received land for 6 percent.

Future Redistribution*

The land redistribution program under provisions of Ordinance 57 achieved 58 percent of Prime Minister Diem's goal of resettling 200,000 farm families on their own lands. The French lands were not considered as potential family farms until 1965 so that very little of this land has been distributed. With 420,047 hectares of undistributed Ordinance 57 and former French lands, or roughly two-thirds of the total amounts of these lands accumulated by the Government of Vietnam, the impact that could still be made is twice as great as any success already attained. However, it should be added that not all these lands may be readily cultivable since it is estimated that only 207,500 hectares are presently being cultivated.

Table 33 shows by province the amounts of both Ordinance 57 and former French lands that remain to be distributed throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Only undistributed lands thought to be currently cultivated are included, whether or not they are in a secure area. These lands represent an estimate of the maximum amount from these two programs which could be redistributed readily if there were adequate security. An attempt has been made to allow for relative land quality and scarcity between the provinces by assuming that new parcels would be allocated at the same average size granted during the earlier redistribution of Ordinance 57 lands. For practical purposes, the amount of these lands that could be distributed in the Central Lowlands is negligible and therefore is ignored in this discussion.

* During the remainder of this volume, extensive use will be made of Annex Table A-3, which summarizes the occupational status of the rural population by province for the Southern Region.

Table 33

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DISTRIBUTING LAND AVAILABLE UNDER CURRENT PROGRAMS;
UNDISTRIBUTED ORDINANCE 57 AND FORMER FRENCH LANDS, 1968
Republic of Vietnam

Province	Corps Area	1968 Estimated Total Rural Population ¹ (thousands)	Estimated Number of Rural Households ² (thousands)	Total Land Available Under Current Programs ³ (Ha.)	Average Parcel Size ⁴ (from Ord. 57) (Ha.)	Number of Potential Recipient Households ⁵	Percentage of Households Receiving Land ⁶ Total
1. An Giang	IV	353.6	53.5	14,561	3.3	4,412	8
2. An Xuyen	IV	162.1	24.6	9,822	2.7	3,638	15
3. Ba Xuyen	IV	279.2	42.3	44,090	2.5	17,636	42
4. Bac Lieu	IV	164.8	24.9	24,225	2.9	8,353	34
5. Bien Hoa	III	307.0	46.5	533	1.6	333	1
6. Binh Duong	III	172.5	26.1	34	1.1	31	-0-
7. Binh Thuan	II	89.0	13.5	12	1.1	11	-0-
8. Chau Doc	IV	392.9	59.4	4,210	1.8	2,339	4
9. Chuong Thien	IV	217.9	33.0	14,540	2.4	6,058	18
10. Dinh Tuong	IV	433.5	65.6	6,171	1.5	4,114	6
11. Gia Dinh	III	794.4	120.3	1,700	1.5	1,133	1
12. Go Cong	IV	139.0	21.0	381	1.7	224	1
13. Hau Nghia	III	144.4	21.8	926	1.3	712	3
14. Khanh Hoa	II	261.1	39.5	21	-	11	-0-
15. Kien Giang	IV	142.2	21.4	25,871	2.4	10,780	50
16. Kien Hoa	IV	405.2	61.4	4,478	1.5	2,985	5
17. Kien Phong	IV	263.2	40.0	8,184	2.7	3,031	8
18. Kien Tuong	IV	22.3	3.3	4,704	4.8	980	30
19. Long An	III	236.7	35.8	952	1.4	680	2
20. Long Khanh	III	119.2	18.0	-	-	-	-
21. Ninh Thuan	II	97.7	14.8	769	-	289	2
22. Phong Dinh	IV	207.1	31.3	30,186	1.9	15,887	51
23. Phu Yen	II	258.8	39.2	628	-	314	1
24. Phuoc Tuy	III	56.8	8.6	13	2.8	5	-0-
25. Sa Dec	IV	174.6	26.5	821	1.4	586	2
26. Tay Ninh	III	262.3	39.7	14	1.7	8	-0-
27. Vinh Binh	IV	297.9	45.1	6,962	1.7	4,095	9
28. Vinh Long	IV	344.8	55.2	2,890	1.4	2,064	4
		6,800.3	1,029.3	207,496	2.1	90,709	9

¹ MACV: Hamlet Evaluation System Information Report, Saigon, January 1968.

² Computed by dividing the rural population by 6.6, the overall average of number of persons per family in the SRI Hamlet Resident Survey.

³ From Appendix B-11, Volume I. Sum of cultivated undistributed lands from both programs.

⁴ Average size of parcel distributed under Ordinance 57 in province. See Table 32 data.

⁵ Calculated by dividing total land available for distribution by average parcel size.

⁶ Percent of households receiving land under Ordinance 57 to total households in province (Number of recipient households ÷ Total households in province x 100).

The distribution of the remaining undistributed Ordinance 57 and former French lands would undoubtedly favor certain provinces while providing no benefits to others simply because of the scattered distribution of these holdings. Four provinces--Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Kien Giang, and Kien Tuong--have large amounts of undistributed lands relative to the present rural populations of these provinces. In these four provinces, 30 or more percent of the rural households could be accommodated by the estimated available Ordinance 57 and former French lands.

The above analysis is overpessimistic in terms of the potential impact of further redistributing public lands, because all rural households were considered as possible recipients. In fact, it is reasonable to suppose that only landless (tenant and worker) and land poor (small landowners) should be considered as future land recipients and that other rural residents (nonfarmers and medium to large landowners) need not be considered. Table 33 shows that at an average redistributed parcel size of 2.1 hectares for the Southern Region, only 9 percent of rural households could be satisfied. However, HRS results estimated only 33 percent* of rural residents in the Southern Region to be landless farmers, of whom 27 percent could receive 2.1 hectare parcels from the government pool of undistributed, cultivatable, Ordinance 57 and former French lands. As the survey results were obtained for the Region as a whole and not for individual provinces, they were not used to estimate landless in each province of Table 33.

The physical ability of the land to support new landowners is an estimate that should be tempered by the ability or lack thereof to provide security against the Viet Cong. To avoid another failure like the Strategic Hamlet Development, land distribution must be accompanied by a realistic appraisal of present and future provisions of security. Unfortunately, much of the undistributed Ordinance 57 and former French lands has reverted to wild land with heavy growths of trees and underbrush, conditions ideal for concealing Viet Cong. Consequently, these areas are characteristically insecure. The nature of security conditions, as determined by the need to protect widely dispersed ricelands, is dramatically borne out by maps of III and IV Corps (Figures 8 and 9) showing Ordinance 57 and former French lands.

Any master plan for land redistribution should be carefully integrated with military planning. Undoubtedly, the ability of the Vietnamese to supply police and military protection will strongly influence the

* 281 tenants and laborers in a sample of 854.


Figure 8

LANDS IN REGIONS III AND IV EXPROPRIATED UNDER ORDINANCE 57
Republic of Vietnam



Figure 9

FORMER FRENCH LANDS IN REGIONS III AND IV
Republic of Vietnam



selection of land to be resettled. The objective of security will tend to concentrate areas of resettlement, and from the viewpoint of administration, this action would probably be desirable. However, this goal further aggravates the problems of localization of land reform and militates against the peasant's desire to farm near his present home.

The distribution of Ordinance 57 and former French lands is somewhat scattered but covers large parts of the Southern Region. The variation in distribution is sufficient to provide flexibility in planning land redistribution during the present period of conflict.

Current Demand for Land Ownership

The Hamlet Resident Survey established that all farmers--whether landless, landowners, or landlords--had an overwhelming, intense desire to own land. Some 80 percent of the respondents wanted their own farmland.* This proportion represents an estimated 246,000 farm households out of 308,000 landless farmers in the Southern Region who want land. Since this survey was conducted in 1968, the estimate is up to date, and may be considered a minimum figure for farmers desiring to own land.

In addition to this nearly 250,000 of potential farm owners, there are an estimated additional 108,000 land poor families[†] in the Southern Region (see Table 34) who desire farmland, subject to a reasonable degree of security by the military and police against the Viet Cong. Undoubtedly, there are many more landless farmers and operators of small marginal farms in the Central Lowlands who also have need for their own farms. However, this analysis is limited to the Southern Region.

The present farm population in the Southern Region, both landless and land poor, is an incomplete indication of potential demand for land. In the Republic of Vietnam, large population groups live under temporary conditions due to the war situation. Particular mention should be made of the military, both regular armed forces and militia, and of refugees, including many thousands not officially recognized as such because they

* HRS, Q77 and Q109.

† Land-poor families are defined as those who own less than 1.5 hectares of land. In the Southern Region the Hamlet Resident Survey estimated 135,000 of such families. The Survey showed that 80 percent of the landless and a like percent of the land poor would want to purchase land, i.e., 108,000 families.

Table 34

NUMBER OF SMALL LANDOWNERS WHO ARE POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS
OF NEW LAND AND AMOUNT OF LAND NEEDED, 1967
SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Present Ownership Class (ha)	Rural* Population (thousands)	No. of** Landowners (thousands)	Minimum Amount of Land To Be Owned							
			1.5 Hectares		2.0 Hectares		3.0 Hectares		4.0 Hectares	
			Number Affected (thousands)	Land Needed (ha)	Number Affected (thousands)	Land Needed (ha)	Number Affected (thousands)	Land Needed (ha)	Number Affected (thousands)	Land Needed (ha)
.1-.4	6,238.4	24.1	24.1	29,600	24.1	41,700	24.1	65,800	24.1	90,000
.5-.9	6,238.4	42.8	42.8	40,000	42.8	60,300	42.8	103,100	42.8	145,900
1.0-1.4	6,238.4	65.8	65.8	29,600	65.8	62,500	65.8	128,300	65.8	194,100
1.5-1.9	6,238.4	20.8	--	--	20.8	7,700	20.8	28,500	20.8	49,300
2.0-2.9	6,238.4	52.7	--	--	--	--	52.7	48,200	52.7	100,900
3.0-3.9	6,238.4	36.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	36.2	34,000
Total	6,238.4	242.4	132.7	99,200	153.5	172,200	206.2	383,900	242.4	614,200

* MACV Data, Hamlet Evaluation System Information Report, Saigon, January, 1968

** Modified HRS data, Table A-2, converted into global figures by applying expansion factor:

$$\frac{\text{Agricultural population}}{\text{Average family size } 6.66} \times \frac{1}{\text{Sample size } 854} = 1,097$$

have elected to seek safety in the large urban areas rather than established refugee camps.

The Republic of Vietnam has approximately three-quarters of a million men under arms. Many of these men undoubtedly came from the farms, though probably the portion is less than that of the nation's population as a whole since military recruitment is more intense in the urban areas. It may be estimated that no more than one-third of the military came from a farming background and probably less than half of these are landless who definitely favor returning to farming their own land. Thus, an order of magnitude approximating the long-range demand for land by returning servicemen may be 125,000 parcels. Half that amount, say 65,000, may be more realistic for the next decade since during that time period, it is unlikely that the armed forces would be reduced to less than half their present strength.

The refugee situation is even more difficult to assess. An estimate by the Refugee Division of CORDS in February 1968, listed 506,000 refugees* for the country, including those in urban areas. It is reasonable to suppose that a major share of these came from rural areas which are relatively less secure. Since the Hamlet Resident Survey estimate of the landless portion among rural residents is 33 percent,† one may suppose that about 150,000 refugees represent potential demand for land, if they return to farming. Although many of these might prefer to shift to other occupations, the refugee situation may be more acute than the official statistics indicate, and on balance the 150,000 estimate may be acceptable.

The combined estimate of demand for land by returning military veterans and refugees, 215,000 families, applies to the entire country. Although the present analysis concerns demand for land in the Southern Region, military and refugee totals for the country are relevant since readily available land for resettlement is largely limited to the Southern Region. However, it is reasonable to suppose that not all of those coming originally from the Central Lowlands of the Republic of Vietnam would accept resettlement in the Southern Region. Thus, instead of 215,000 military and refugee families wishing land within the next 10 years, a figure as low as 150,000 may be more realistic, though probably this figure is a minimum. The remaining approximately 65,000 families would aggravate land scarcity in the Central Lowlands, discussed later

* Volume I, Appendix I-5.

† 281 in a total sample of 854.

in this chapter. Table 35 summarizes this discussion of demand for land in the Southern Region.

Table 35

DEMAND FOR OWNERSHIP OF LAND
SOUTHERN REGION
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

	<u>Farm Families</u>
Short run demand for land	
Estimate of landless farmers who want land (80% of 308,000)	246,000
Estimate of land poor who want land (80% of 135,000)	<u>108,000</u>
Total	354,000
Long run demand for land	
Refugees and rehabilitation of servicemen	Approx. 150,000
Total	Approx. 500,000

Communal Land

Communal lands are public lands controlled by the villages and used for public and welfare purposes. There are two types of communal lands:

1. Cong Dan Dien Tho or nationally owned land on which the village enjoys usufruct rights. In case of expropriation, the government pays indemnities only.
2. Tu Dan Dien Tho or village-owned land.

Historically, the Cong Dan Dien Tho lands were created (1) by mandarins and other senior officials; (2) by expropriation from rebels, big landowners, and properties left in estate; (3) by royal gifts; and (4) by villages that cleared forests and drained swamps. The Tu Dan Dien Tho lands were acquired as gifts from wealthy men or were purchased by villages

using village resources. For this report, both Con Dan Dien Tho and Tu Dan Dien Tho will be considered together as communal lands.*

There are 128,374 hectares of communal lands in the Southern Region, of which 97,240 hectares are cultivated. However, only 100,759 hectares out of the 128,374 hectares are ricelands so that the 97,240 hectares may well represent the total amount of communal riceland suitable for farming. For this study, an estimate of 97,240 hectares is used for arable communal riceland.†

Currently these lands are handled in different ways by the villages in each province. For example, in An Giang Province, communal lands were leased to the highest bidder until this practice was outlawed. In Ba Xuyen, the communal lands are leased with priority given to soldiers and their families. In Binh-Duong, the land is leased to families of war victims, soldiers, and the poor.

If the government of Vietnam decided to distribute communal lands, some legal arrangement would have to be made to acquire and pay the villages for Tu Dan Dien Tho land as well as to ensure the villages of alternative sources of income. However, for the purposes of this study, the possibility that 97,240 hectares would become available for redistribution is used.

Supply of Undistributed Ordinance 57 and French Lands

As stated previously, there are approximately 420,047 hectares of undistributed Ordinance 57 and former French lands, of which approximately 207,500 hectares are currently being cultivated in both secure and insecure areas.‡ The latter figure is used throughout this analysis. It should be noted that the situation regarding French lands is continually changing as that program gathers momentum; at the time of writing, over 11,000 hectares have been provisionally allocated over the past few months to new applicants, although processing has not yet been completed.

Potential Farm Owners on Public Lands

Some 280 farm respondents were asked how much additional land they could operate. The amount indicated in these responses was added to the

* Volume I, Communal Land.

† Volume I, Appendixes H-4, H-5.

‡ Volume I, Appendix B-11.

existing size of their farms to give a specific measure of the area of land they felt they could handle.

Of these respondents, 92 farmers, or about one-third, felt that they could handle additional land. Seventy-five (or 80 percent) responded that they could manage only 5 hectares or less while 58 (or 63 percent) indicated 4 hectares or less. Larger families tended to indicate capability for handling larger areas. On the basis of these results, it was felt that an average 4-hectare farm size, possibly with some farms slightly larger and some slightly smaller, could satisfy any reasonable demands for land.*

If the communal lands were subdivided into parcels of 1.5 hectares, there should be sufficient land to settle 65,000 farm families. Possibly a more reasonable parcel of land would be 2 hectares, which would reduce the number of potential settlers to about 49,000. Some larger families might need more land so that if parcels averaged 3 hectares, the number of settlers would be reduced to 32,400, and a 4-hectare distribution would further limit settlers to 24,000. (See Table 36.)

Table 36

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FAMILY FARMS THAT COULD BE CREATED
BY SUBDIVIDING THE UNDISTRIBUTED COMMUNAL RICELANDS*
SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1968

Average Size of Planned Farms (hectares)	Available Communal Ricelands (hectares)*	Number of Farms Available†
1.5	97,240	65,000
2.0	97,240	49,000
3.0	97,240	32,000
4.0	97,240	24,000

* Statistics taken from cultivated communal lands as reported in Volume I, Land Reform in Vietnam, Appendix H-5.

† Rounded to nearest thousand.

* HRS Tables 300, 301.

If these numbers of families are compared with the numbers in Table 35, it is clear that communal lands could fill only a small portion of the potential demand for land. However, communal lands exist in most provinces, although in variable quantity, and the impact of such distribution would be widespread geographically. Because the charge has already been made that a little land reform may be worse than no land reform at all, responsible officials should be careful to ensure that sufficient land is available for redistribution to saturate the latent demand for land. To accomplish this, land additional to the communal lands would have to be located and distributed.

If the same assumptions are used as to size of farm to be distributed, comparable estimates of the number of farmers who could be settled on the 207,500 hectares of Ordinance 57 and former French lands will be obtained. Assuming subdivision of this land into minimum sized parcels of 1.5 hectares, there would be sufficient land to resettle 138,000 farm families. Using an average of 2 hectares per farm, the land would provide farms for 104,000 only. Perhaps if larger farms averaging 3 to 4 hectares were considered desirable, then these undistributed lands would support only 69,200 or 51,900 families, respectively. (See Table 37.)

Table 37
DISTRIBUTION OF UNDISTRIBUTED ORDINANCE 57,
FRENCH, AND COMMUNAL LANDS
SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1968

<u>Size of Farm (hectares)</u>	<u>Communal Lands (no. of farms)</u>	<u>Ordinance 57 and Former French Lands (no. of farms)</u>	<u>All Public Land (no. of farms)</u>
1.5	65,000	138,000	203,000
2.0	49,000	104,000	153,000
3.0	32,000	69,000	101,000
4.0	24,000	52,000	76,000

In summary, a redistribution of communal, Ordinance 57, and French lands would provide at most 203,000 parcels of land using a minimum farm size of 1.5 hectares. If a typical 2-hectare plot is used, only 153,000 farmers could be settled. For a larger farm of 3 hectares, only 101,000

could be rehabilitated while a 4-hectare farm size would permit a settlement of only 76,000 farmers.

These two categories of government land presented in Table 37 would be insufficient to resettle 250,000 landless farm families now requiring land, let alone 100,000 land poor and possibly 150,000 farm families to be rehabilitated after the war. More land would have to be found. In the short run, the only other source of land would be from further redistribution of privately owned land in large holdings.

Redistribution of Privately Owned Lands

To obtain land from private holdings, two alternatives could be used. One would be to lower the retention limit. The other would be to pursue a land-for-the-tiller program such as in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, where only farmers are permitted to retain riceland.

Private Lands Available from Lowering of the Retention Limit

At the present time, no landlord is permitted to own more than 100 hectares of land, subject to some additional allowance for ancestor worship. The possible need to further reduce this limit was suggested in the Hamlet Resident Survey when the rural respondents were asked to indicate what they felt was a desirable retention limit.

If the retention limit is reduced to 50 hectares, and parcels of 2 hectares are distributed, there is estimated to be sufficient private land to resettle 87,000 families on 174,000 hectares as shown in Table 38.

An even smaller farm size of 1.5 hectares would permit 115,000 families to be resettled. However, if much of the land proved to be of inferior quality and unsuitable for subdivision, an average farm size of 3 or 4 hectares might be necessary. For an average 3-hectare size farm, the available land for expropriation would satisfy only 58,000 families; a 4-hectare average size farm would reduce such resettlement to only 44,000 families.

If the land made available from a 50-hectare limit proved insufficient, the impact on land availability of reducing the ownership retention to 30 hectares may be considered. This particular figure is of interest because it is the maximum hectarage that one farmer is permitted to operate by himself under Ordinance 57. Also, 62 percent of the farmers in the HRS favored a retention limit of 30 hectares or less. Subdividing

Table 38

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FARM FAMILIES THAT COULD BE RESETTLED ON
THEIR OWN FARMS BY REDISTRIBUTING COMMUNAL, ORDINANCE 57, AND
FORMER FRENCH LAND PLUS LOWERING OF LAND RETENTION LIMIT, 1968
Southern Region, Republic of Vietnam

	Communal Lands* (ha)	Ordinance 57 and Former French Lands† (ha)	Total Public Lands (ha)	Estimated Land Made Available by Lower Retention Limit‡				Estimated Land Available from Communal, Ordinance 57 and Former French Lands with Lower Retention Limit			
				50 Ha	30 Ha	20 Ha	10 Ha	50 Ha	30 Ha	20 Ha	10 Ha
				Number of New Farms				Number of New Farms			
Total Land Owned in Holdings Exceeding Retention Limit (ha)				487,000	598,000	680,000	761,000				
Estimated Land Available for Redistribution (ha)	97,240	207,500	304,740	174,000	334,000	432,000	576,000	480,000	640,000	738,000	882,000
Average size of farm (hectares)	Number of New Farms			Number of New Farms				Number of New Farms			
1.5	65,000	138,000	203,000	115,000	223,000	286,000	384,000	318,000	426,000	489,000	587,000
2.0	49,000	104,000	153,000	87,000	167,000	216,000	288,000	240,000	320,000	369,000	441,000
3.0	32,000	69,000	101,000	58,000	111,000	144,000	192,000	159,000	212,000	245,000	293,000
4.0	24,000	52,000	76,000	44,000	84,000	108,000	144,000	120,000	160,000	184,000	220,000

Note: All figures rounded to nearest thousand hectares.

* Based on 97,240 hectares of communal ricolands.

† Based on 420,047 hectares of Ordinance 57 and former French lands and assuming 207,500 hectares cultivable.

‡ Based on modified HRS data, Annex Table A-2.

the land so obtained into 1.5-hectare parcels would make available a total of 223,000 individual farms. Parcels of 2 hectares would provide 334,000 hectares of land for 167,000 families. Large families might require and would be able to farm 4 hectares. If all farms were 4 hectares in size, only 84,000 families could be resettled. If the average plot were 3 hectares, only 111,000 families could be re-established on 330,000 hectares.

A reduction of the retention limit to 20 hectares (49 acres) or even less might have to be considered. Even though this is much less than the present 100-hectare limit, it would still permit relatively large farms based on present farming methods. A 20-hectare retention limit would provide 286,000 1.5-hectare farms, 216,000 2-hectare farms, 144,000 3-hectare farms, or 108,000 4-hectare farms. The impact of establishing this many new landowners could be very substantial.

An even smaller retention limit such as 10 hectares (24.5 acres) would still result in farms considerably larger than the maximum sizes permitted in Japan, Korea, or Taiwan. This reduced limit would permit a resettling of 384,000 families on 1.5-hectare plots, 288,000 families on 2-hectare plots, 192,000 families on 3-hectare plots, and 144,000 on 4-hectare plots.

These retention limits and farm sizes provide an array of possibilities to be considered in a comprehensive plan for land reform. Four sources of land are combined here to find out how adequately they could supply farmland ownership for the landless farmers and refugees. These lands for distribution include communal lands, Ordinance 57 lands, former French lands, and private lands.

If one assumes a 50-hectare retention limit and 1.5-hectare farms, the combined scheme could supply farms for 318,000 households (see Table 38). If the farms distributed were increased to 2 hectares in size, some 240,000 families could be resettled. It is assumed that these lands are, or could be made secure.

If the retention limit were reduced to 30 hectares and an average size of 2 hectares were used, these land sources would supply 320,000 farm families with 2-hectare farms, provided that security conditions permit. Such a program would appear to combine a reasonable retention limit with provision for adequately sized farms for distribution. If the retention limit is reduced to 20 hectares, one would have 369,000 family farms of 2 hectares each while a 10-hectare retention limit would provide land for 441,000 families on 2-hectare farms.

Another scheme practiced in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan was the land-to-the-tiller concept in which only farm operators were permitted to own land. Such a scheme could be associated with any level of retention limit deemed appropriate.

The advantage of such a scheme combining the retention and operating size limit is the ease of monitoring such a law because the whereabouts of operators who must farm the lands is known. Since 37.6 percent of all land is currently occupied by tenants, a land-to-the-tiller scheme based on a retention limit of 30 hectares would result in the distribution to farmers of a minimum estimated 334,000 hectares.* That is, anywhere between 84,000 and 223,000 families could be given ownership (including those landlords who might decide to operate their own land), depending on the assumed size of farms distributed, ranging from 4 hectares down to 1.5 hectares. By combining this land availability from the land-to-the-tiller scheme with distribution of communal lands (to 49,000 families) and undistributed Ordinance 57 and French lands (for another 104,000 families), a total of 320,000 families could each be given 2 hectares of land. This alternative would supply 90 percent of the estimated 354,000 of landless and land poor peasants with land. The scheme would not be dependent on the need for any ownership retention other than the 30-hectare operating limit now in effect.

Land Distribution in the Central Lowlands[†]

Actual information on land tenure in the Central Lowlands is less complete than is the case for the Southern Region of the Republic of Vietnam. In particular, the Hamlet Resident Survey did not include the Central Lowlands. As a consequence, the discussion presented here is tentative.

In treating land redistribution in the Southern Region, emphasis has been placed on providing land for landless and land poor families--that is, farm workers and tenants who own no or very little land. In the Central Lowlands, the number of tenants who own no land has been estimated to range between approximately 10 and 20 percent[‡] (compared with 43 percent in the Southern Region as shown by Hamlet Resident Survey data).

* The figure 334,000 is a minimum because it assumes that large landowners farm up to the 30-hectare limit.

† The Central Lowlands comprise the following provinces: Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, and Binh Thuan.

‡ The 1960-61 Agricultural Census estimate was 10 percent. The RIES Survey, USOM, Saigon, July 1965, estimate was 18 percent.

Including the unknown number of farm workers and sharecroppers, it is reasonable to conclude that as much as 30 percent of the Central Lowlands farm population may be entirely landless. On the other hand, the 1960-61 Census indicates that 79 percent of the agricultural holdings contain less than 1 hectare of land, an area considered too small to support a family of five or six persons adequately. Thus, it is suggested that at least half a million farm families in the Central Lowlands could benefit from having additional land to farm. Furthermore, the land needs of the landless must be evaluated with the needs of the very small owner-operator of less than half a hectare who may even be poorer than one who rents 5 hectares.

The principal ready sources of cultivable lands that might be used in a land redistribution program are government lands, communal lands, and the holdings of large landowners. The first of these sources is currently of little value since the GVN has not acquired large holdings in the Central Lowlands.* The amount of available privately owned lands is difficult to estimate quantitatively because no data are available on the size distribution of land ownership. An estimate based on operating farm units may be made,[†] but it must be recognized as only a very rough approximation. On the basis of operating farm data, if one were to think in terms of government acquisition of privately held lands in excess of, say, 3 hectares, probably the smallest retention limit that might conceivably be applied, the purchase would free only 11,000 hectares, or enough for 11,000 families if the minimum ownership unit were 1 hectare,[‡] the average size of unit held in this region today.

* According to the SRI Absentee Landlord Survey, no private property was expropriated in the Central Lowlands under Ordinance 57. Unpublished data from the Directorate of Land Reform, October 4, 1967, indicate that 4,460 hectares were acquired mostly through purchase of former French lands but that only 1,047 hectares were distributed. This area is too small to have had any significant effect on land ownership.

† Report on the Agricultural Census of Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam, Department of Rural Affairs, Agricultural Economics and Statistics Service, 1960-61.

‡ Security conditions did not permit extending the SRI Hamlet Resident Survey to the Central Lowlands; thus, these data may not be extended directly to the Central Lowlands situation. However, there is a rough correspondence between the farm management data of the 1960-61 Census and farm ownership data from the SRI survey. On this basis, the above estimate of privately held lands in excess of 3 hectares should be a correct order of magnitude.

The only source of land capable of having an immediate impact on a significant portion of the farm population is that of communal lands. The total area of communal lands in the Central Lowlands is reported to be 164,097 hectares, of which 89,051 hectares are currently cultivated.* It is highly probable that the 65,000 hectares not currently cultivated are either inaccessible due to insecurity or other reasons or difficult to cultivate since it is doubtful in an area of such land scarcity that any significant amount of usable land would lie inactive. However, if all these cultivated communal lands could be redistributed in 1-hectare parcels, and if the truly landless farm families number about 200,000 (i.e., 30 percent landless out of approximately 700,000 farm families),† about 45 percent or 90,000 out of 200,000 families could receive land of their own. On the other hand, there would remain the fact that a large majority of all farmers on the Central Lowlands would operate less than 1 hectare of land, an unsatisfactory condition no doubt, but it would be improved by ownership rather than tenancy.

It is important to re-emphasize that the factual basis for discussing land tenure in the Central Lowlands is very sketchy. Even the role of the communal lands as a social institution is incompletely documented, and it would be premature to suggest that the communal lands should be done away with in favor of ownership entirely by individuals. However, unless new areas are opened, communal property remains the only substantial source of lands for new private owners.

Cost Estimates for Expropriating Private Lands

A major obstacle in any land reform scheme is the cost of expropriating available land. To establish present land values, both landlords and tenants were asked for estimates in terms of piasters (VN\$) per hectare‡ (118 VN\$ = 1 US\$). Reported land values varied from about VN\$10,000 to over VN\$80,000 per hectare. The variations in value reflected differences in productivity. Although the values were subjective, the average value

* Volume I, Appendix H-6.

† The estimate of 700,000 households may be high since it is based on the 1960-61 Agricultural Census estimate of farm holdings, which could include fragmentation and possibly some share cropping. Furthermore, there has been some land abandonment since that time.

‡ 1 hectare - 2.47 acres; VN\$44,000 piasters per hectare is roughly the equivalent of US\$147 per acre.

of land which the landlords rented was estimated to be worth VN\$47,200 per hectare, which was only slightly higher than the average value of land leased by the tenants, namely VN\$41,145. Indeed, the differences in these two values could readily have been due to chance sampling variation--and probably some self-interested bias--and are statistically not significant. An average value of VN\$44,000 per hectare is employed as a convenient estimate for the average value of riceland in the Southern Region.

The capital value of land is a current estimate, which depends on its productivity. Therefore, as productivity increases, the land values will also increase. That is, every measure taken to improve seed, fertilizer, water control, and methods of growing rice tends to increase the cost of this land. Land value also depends on rents received, while payment of rents tends to increase with security. For this reason, one can anticipate increasing land values as the confused areas and Viet Cong-dominated areas are gradually liberated by the Vietnamese government. A third factor that influences land value is inflation. With increasing inflation in Vietnam, one may anticipate increasing prices. At official exchange rates, the prices measured in U.S. dollars will increase even more rapidly. If land reform is to take place, delays are costly not only in terms of loss of good will of the Vietnamese landless farmers, but also in terms of costs of expropriating land.

Although past land reform schemes have been funded by giving landlords bonds, this action destroys the effectiveness of the landlord class as a group that could invest in other nonagricultural enterprises, and thus chokes off a desirable source of private support for industrial and commercial development.

Employing the best available estimates of land ownership in the Southern Region of Vietnam, a reduction of the retention limit to 50 hectares is estimated to provide 174,400 hectares for distribution. If this retention limit is dropped even further, to the 30-hectare operating limit, the quantity of available land would nearly double to 334,000 hectares. A further reduction to 20 hectares would add about 100,000 hectares, bringing the total to 431,200, and a 10-hectare limit would increase total land availability to 576,400 hectares.

In terms of Vietnamese piasters, the total direct cost of expropriating estimated available land by lowering the retention limit to 50 hectares would cost the government VN\$7.67 billion or about US\$65.0 million. If the retention limit is lowered to 30 hectares, the program would cost VN\$14.7 billion or US\$124.5 million. At a 20-hectare retention limit, the scheme would cost VN\$18.9 billion or US\$160.7 million. At a 10-hectare retention limit, the cost would amount to only VN\$25.3 billion or US\$214.9 million.

On the other hand, if a land-to-the-tiller program were adopted, the cost would be VN\$14.7 billion or US\$124.5 million, assuming a 30-hectare limit. The cost would be higher if landlords elected to farm less than 30 hectares.

Political Aspects of Land Redistribution

Land redistribution under a land reform program such as Ordinance 57 must be considered from a political point of view. The political gain from extending ownership to the many landless and the land poor who are the immediate beneficiaries of the program must be weighed against the possible political disadvantages that might result from expropriation of the land of the many fewer landlords who own a high proportion of the land.

In making a decision, the GVN will carefully have to weigh the social and political costs and benefits of taking any further action in redistribution at all. If the GVN believes it advisable to proceed beyond Ordinance 57, there is the crucial question of the extent to which it should reduce the retention limit. The political impact depends directly on the level to which the retention limit is reduced and the size of the farm ownership to be distributed. As the retention limit is lowered, the number of larger landowners whose land will be expropriated will increase. If they are not properly handled, their reaction to the government decision could become a political liability. On the other hand, the political advantages to the GVN will increase directly with the number of new farm owners that can be created by a new land redistribution program. The number benefited, however, will depend on the size of unit distributed to the landless farmers. The danger is that distribution of a very small unit could only make farmers very dissatisfied because it would be inadequate for the needs of the family. This appears to have happened in carrying out Ordinance 57 distribution, according to the findings of the Hamlet Resident Survey. On the other hand, even ownership of a small farm that does not completely meet the needs of a family will create satisfaction and political benefits in that some of the requirements of social justice will be met.

A comparison of the number of households of the landless and of the larger landowners who would be affected by a lowering of the retention limit and by distribution of different-sized farm ownership units is presented in Table 39. A farm size distribution unit of 2 hectares may be assumed as a reasonable unit for this purpose.

Table 39

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF LANDLORDS WHOSE LAND WOULD BE EXPROPRIATED
 COMPARED WITH NEW OWNERS WHO WOULD RECEIVE LAND IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, 1968
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Retention Limit (hectares)	Land Made Available (thousands of hectares)	Number of Owners Affected (thousands)	Minimum Ownership Unit (thousands of landless families affected)				Land Reform Ratio*			
			1.5 ha	2.0 ha	3.0 ha	4.0 ha	1.5 ha	2.0 ha	3.0 ha	4.0 ha
50	172.5	6,250	115.0	87.2	58.1	43.6	18.4	14.0	9.3	7.0
30	334.1	8,780	222.7	167.0	111.3	83.5	25.3	19.0	12.7	9.5
20	429.6	12,400	286.4	215.6	143.8	107.9	23.1	17.4	11.6	8.7
10	576.3	18,430	384.2	288.2	192.1	144.1	20.8	15.6	10.4	7.8

* Number of landless families affected divided by number of landlords whose land would be expropriated.

Source: Computed from HRS data, Annex Table 2 (modified data) by applying expansion factor, 1,097, to land owned in sample.

The retention limit of 100 hectares applied under Ordinance 57 resulted in the expropriation of land of about 2,000 landlords, and if all the land had been distributed, it would have provided land ownership to about 200,000 farmers--that is, the ratio of those receiving direct benefits from the distribution would have been 100 to 1.

The data in Table 39 show that a distribution unit of 2 hectares would create benefits in the ratio ranging between 14 to 1 and 19 to 1, the highest ratio being at the 30-hectare retention limit. After this point, the ratio of those benefited declines somewhat. Also, it should be clear that the reduction in the retention limit would probably be increasingly unpopular as more landowners had their land expropriated. At a 30-hectare retention limit, almost 9,000 landowners will be required to sell some land, and the political benefits should be apparent by the fact that 167,000 farmers would be able to obtain 2-hectare units and as many as 223,000 would benefit from the distribution of 1.5-hectare units.

HRS results show that the large landowners would be inclined to sell off land only if the GVN considers it politically essential in the interest of the country. If the matter is put in this way, the landlords will find such land sales acceptable. However, to make the sales politically agreeable to the landlords, the GVN would need to treat the landlords equitably and give adequate and flexible compensation so that their capital can be transferred from agriculture with minimum difficulty to other sectors of the economy. If they are handled correctly, the landowners would achieve economic benefits, and a possible political liability could be turned into an asset.

G L O S S A R Y A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S

GLOSSARY

General

Land Affairs. This term covers all matters pertaining to the administration of land, including both routine land administration and land reform. The term may be used in a specific sense, as the "Director General of Land Affairs," or in a generic sense, such as "the administration of land affairs." In the latter sense, the term land tenure administration is considered synonymous.

Land Administration. As used here, the term "land administration" has a restricted meaning, embodying the routine tasks for identifying and measuring land and for recording, transferring, and storing title documents showing ownership of land.

Land Reform. As used here, the term "land reform" includes the dictionary definition, "the more equitable distribution of agricultural land, especially by governmental action," as well as the more equitable regulation of landlord-tenant relationships. Land reform is generally policy-oriented and includes policy, laws, administration of land affairs and programs concerned with improving conditions of land tenure and creating a more equitable distribution of land.

Agrarian Reform. Often used synonymously with land reform (and used somewhat interchangeably in translations from VN documents), the term "agrarian reform" is usually used here in a broader sense to embrace all of the related actions beyond mere distribution of land to assure its comprehensive, beneficial use by the farmer, i.e., including such matters as seed, fertilizer, credit, and markets, and indeed rural development in the broader sense.

Land Registration System

Dia Bo. "Dia Bo" refers to land registers kept originally under the Vietnamese kings and improved by the French administration. The system was established by the French before the turn of the century.

So Dien Tho. "So Dien Tho" refers to land registers kept under the 1925 full Torrens system.

New Dia Bo. "New Dia Bo" refers to land registers kept under the 1962 modified Torrens system.

Kien Dien. "Kien Dien" refers to the 1962 land identification system.

Torrens System. The "Torrens System" refers to a very complete system of land registration entailing an adjudication or detailed determination of title to land. The system has been used in the Southern Region since 1925, and a simplified system was introduced in 1962.

Civil Service

Cadre. "Cadre" refers to positions for recruiting and employment. Under the Vietnamese civil service system all civil servants are grouped by skills into cadres.

Doc Su. "Doc Su" refers to administrative cadres or civil service officials, Class A (office and field administrators).

Tham Su. "Tham Su" refers to administrative cadres or civil service officials, Class B (senior clerks).

Local Administration.

The legal administrative divisions are the provinces, the autonomous cities, and the villages. However, the regions, districts, cantons, and hamlets also are important and so all of the various territorial subdivisions are listed here in order of decreasing size.

Region. Prior to January 1, 1956, "Region" refers to the three regional governments, one in the North, one in the Central, and one in the South. Since that date, when these were abolished, it refers to the groupings of provinces, corresponding presently to the I, II, III, and IV Army Corps Tactical Zones. Until recently the Corps Commander was also the Government Delegate and charged with inspectorate authority for the provinces in his region.

Province. "Province" is the basic territorial and administrative subdivision of the central government (currently 44). It is a legal entity possessing an autonomous budget and public property and is governed by a province chief appointed by the president.

City. "City" (sometimes called "autonomous city") is a legal entity (currently six) having an autonomous budget and public property, each one governed by an appointed prefect or mayor and a city council.

District. "District" is an extension of the provincial administration embracing a group of cantons or villages.

Canton. "Canton" is a territorial unit (currently 177) that exists in some provinces (sometimes in name only, since the canton chief functions more as an advisor to the district chief); it is a group of villages within a district.

Village. "Village" (commune or Xa) is the lowest legal administrative entity possessing an autonomous budget and property.

Hamlet. "Hamlet" (or Ap) is an extension or subdivision of the village made up of a grouping of inhabitants united by a rapid and easy means of communication. It is the smallest territorial unit.

Laws

Ordinance (in Vietnamese, Du; in French, Ordonnance) is a law issued by the former King of Vietnam, between 1949 and 1956. Many are still in effect.

Law (in Vietnamese, Luat; in French, Loi) is a law issued by the former National Assembly of Vietnam between October 10, 1956 and November 1, 1963, and by the new National Assembly inaugurated November 1, 1967.

Decree (in Vietnamese, Sac Luat; in French, Decret-Loi) was an instrument issued by the Chairman of the National Leadership Committee (the Prime Minister) to appoint judges, to announce rewards or medals, to grant reductions of punishments, to pardon, to effect an amnesty, and for such matters requiring high authority to decide but being administratively uncomplicated. Since November 1, 1967 decrees are issued by the President.

Arrete (in Vietnamese, Nghi Dinh; in French, Arrete. The closest equivalent in English is Departmental Order, but it is not used) was an instrument issued by:

---the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee (the Prime Minister) to effect routine matters,

---Commissioners (Ministers) to implement matters within their organizations or to implement ordinances, laws, decree-laws, their provinces.

Since November 1, 1967, the arrete is issued by the President, Prime Minister and Ministers.

Violations of an arrete may be brought to prosecution by the Police before Justices of the Peace.

Source: The General Commission for Justice of Vietnam as reported in the USAID Public Administration Bulletin, No. 35, Vietnam, Feb. 1, 1967

ABBREVIATIONS

ADPA - Associate Director, Public Administration

ADDP/LR - Land Reform Adviser to the Associate Director, Domestic Production (USAID)

CORDS (MACCORDS) - Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (the overall organization for administering the pacification program under MACV)

DGLA - Director General of Land Affairs

DRV - Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)

EARI - Engineer Agency for Resources Inventory (a U.S. Army agency working on a contract in An Giang province)

GVN - Government of Vietnam

JCRR - The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (Taiwan)

JUSPAO - Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office

MACV - Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

NIA - National Institute for Administration (under the Office of the Prime Minister)

NLF - National Liberation Front of South Vietnam

NTC - National Training Center at Vung Tau

RD - Revolutionary Development

RVN - Republic of Vietnam

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

VC (Viet Cong) - Vietnamese Communist (pejorative of the term Viet Cong-San).

A N N E X T A B L E S

Annex Table A-1

SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP, 1967
 AREA GROUPINGS, SURVEY SAMPLE
 SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Size Class of Ownership Unit (Ha.)	Group I* Densely Populated Provinces						Group II† Predominantly Hoa Hoa Provinces						Group III‡ Peripheral Provinces					
	No. of Owners	Percent of Owners	Cumu- lative Percent	Area Owned (Ha.)	Percent of Area	Cumu- lative Percent	No. of Owners	Percent of Owners	Cumu- lative Percent	Area Owned (Ha.)	Percent of Area	Cumu- lative Percent	No. of Owners	Percent of Owners	Cumu- lative Percent	Area Owned (Ha.)	Percent of Area	Cumu- lative Percent
.1 - .4	5	12.20	12.20	2	0.58	0.58	2	3.51	3.51	1	0.18	0.18	15	8.62	8.62	4	0.78	0.78
.5 - .9	6	14.63	26.83	4	1.36	1.94	11	19.30	22.81	6	1.74	1.92	22	12.64	21.26	14	2.75	3.53
1.0 - 1.4	9	21.95	48.78	9	3.48	5.42	12	21.05	43.86	13	3.68	5.60	39	22.41	43.67	41	8.40	11.93
1.5 - 1.9	2	4.88	53.66	3	1.16	6.58	2	3.51	47.37	3	0.94	6.54	15	8.62	52.29	24	4.96	16.89
2.0 - 2.9	7	17.07	70.73	15	5.81	12.39	6	10.53	57.90	13	3.79	10.33	35	20.11	72.40	72	14.66	31.55
3.0 - 3.9	4	9.76	80.49	12	4.76	17.15	8	14.04	71.94	25	7.41	17.74	21	12.07	84.47	63	12.89	44.44
4.0 - 4.9	3	7.32	87.81	12	4.65	21.80	5	8.77	80.71	22	6.41	24.15	6	3.45	87.92	25	5.14	49.58
5.0 - 7.4	2	4.88	92.69	12	4.65	26.45	4	7.02	87.73	25	7.24	31.39	14	8.05	95.97	80	16.36	65.94
7.5 - 9.9	0	0		0	0		1	1.75	89.48	8	2.35	33.74	1	0.57	96.55	8	1.63	67.57
10.0 - 19.9	1	2.44	95.13	10	3.87	30.32	2	3.51	92.99	35	10.15	43.89	2	1.15	97.69	20	4.08	71.65
20.0 - 29.9	0	0		0	0		1	1.75	94.74	21	6.18	50.07	2	1.15	98.84	42	8.57	80.22
30.0 - 49.9	0	0		0	0		1	1.75	96.49	44	12.88	62.95	1	0.57	99.42	40	8.16	88.38
50.0 - 99.9	1	2.44	97.56	50	19.36	49.68	2	3.51	100.0	126	37.06	100.0	1	0.57	100.0	57	11.63	100.0
100.0 - 114.9	0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0	
115.0	1	2.44	100.0	130	50.33	100.0	0	0		0	0		0	0		0	0	
TOTALS	41	100.0		258	100.0		57	100.0		340	100.0		174	100.0		490	100.0	

Source: HRS Tables 382A, 382B, 382C.

* Group I consists of Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Phong Dinh, Vinh Long.

† Group II consists of An Giang, Chau Doc, Sa Dec.

‡ Group III consists of Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Long Khanh, Phuoc Tuy, Tay Ninh, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Kien Giang, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Vinh Ninh, Binh Tuy, Binh Long, Phuoc Long.

Annex Table A-2

IMPUTED SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND OWNED
COMPARISON OF HAMLET SURVEY CALCULATIONS AND PROVINCIAL TAX OFFICE DATA
SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 1967

Size Class of Ownership Unit (Ha.)	Hamlet Resident Survey Data*						Provincial Tax Office Data (Sample of 15 Provinces)†						Directorate of Land Administration‡						
	No. of Owners	Percent of Owners	Cumula- tive Percent	Area Owned (Ha.)	Percent of Area	Cumula- tive Percent	No. of Owners	Percent of Owners	Cumula- tive Percent	Area Owned (Ha.)	Percent of Area	Cumula- tive Percent	No. of Owners	Percent of Owners	Cumula- tive Percent	Area Owned (Ha.)	Percent of Area	Cumula- tive Percent	
.1 - .4	22.3	7.84	-	6.0	0.48	-	24,185	13.1	13.1	6,046	0.6	0.6	183,670	72.44	72.44	360,000	16.44	16.44	
.5 - .9	40.6	14.26	22.10	24.5	1.95	2.43	24,972	13.5	26.6	18,729	1.9	2.5							
1.0 - 1.4	61.8	21.68	43.78	65.8	5.25	7.68	68,001	36.7	63.3	136,003	13.9	16.4							
1.5 - 1.9	19.6	6.84	50.62	31.7	2.53	10.21													
2.0 - 2.9	50.1	17.59	68.21	107.3	8.56	18.77													
3.0 - 3.9	35.5	12.44	80.65	113.4	9.04	27.81	27,681	14.9	78.2	110,722	11.3	27.7							
4.0 - 4.9	14.7	5.15	85.80	63.6	5.07	32.88													
5.0 - 7.4	21.6	7.59	93.39	132.3	10.55	43.43	22,850	12.3	90.5	171,378	17.6	45.3							
7.5 - 9.9	2.0	0.71	94.10	16.1	1.28	44.71													
10.0 - 19.9	5.5	1.92	96.02	74.1	5.91	50.62	10,592	5.7	96.2	158,869	16.3	61.6							28,840
20.0 - 29.9	3.3	1.17	97.19	74.5	5.94	56.56	2,931	1.6	97.8	73,261	7.5	61.9							
30.0 - 49.9	2.3	0.82	98.01	100.8	8.04	64.60	2,043	1.1	98.9	81,710	8.4	77.5							
50.0 - 99.9	4.5	1.58	99.59	278.4	22.20	86.80	1,389	0.8	99.7	104,140	10.7	88.2	3,550	1.40	99.07	273,000	12.47	65.90	
100.0 - 114.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	143	0.1	99.8	15,443	1.6	89.8	2,330	0.92	100.0	747,000	34.10	100.0	
≥ 115.0	1.2	0.41	100.0	165.5	13.20	100.0	419	0.2	100.0	99,448	10.2	100.0							
TOTALS	285.0	100.0		1,254.0	100.0		185,206	100.0		975,750	100.0		253,500	100.0		2,190,000	100.0		

* Computed by Stanford Research Institute from HRS, Table 277; includes ownership of resident landowners plus estimate of land rented in by tenants from urban landlords.

† Land tax records sampled from following Provincial Tax Offices: Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Tuong, Phong Dinh, Sa Dec, Vinh Binh, Phuoc Tuy, Tay Ninh, Gia Dinh, An Giang, Chau Doc, Kien Giang, Long An.

‡ Director of the Directorate of Land Administration in the Southern Region, Republic of Vietnam, 1955 study including the following provinces: Bac-Lieu, Ben-Tre, Can-Tho, Chau-Doc, Cho-Lon, Go-Cong, Long-Xuyen, My-Tho, Rach-Gia, Sa-Dec, Soc-Trang, Tan-An, Tra-Vinh, Vinh-Long.

Annex Table A-3
 DEMOGRAPHIC AND OCCUPATIONAL SUMMARY
 27 PROVINCES OF THE SOUTHERN REGION, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 1968

<u>Province</u>	(1) <u>Total Population</u> (000)	(2) <u>Rural Population</u> (000)	(3) <u>Farm Population</u> (000)	(4) <u>Farm Households</u> (000)	(5) <u>Landowning Farm Households</u> (000) ^{a/}	(6) <u>Landless Farm Households</u> (000) ^{b/}
An Giang	497.7	353.6	229.4	34.4	17.0	17.4
An Xuyen	258.8	162.1	105.2	15.8	7.8	8.0
Ba Xuyen	381.6	279.2	181.1	27.2	13.4	13.8
Bac Lieu	257.2	164.8	106.9	16.1	7.9	8.2
Bien Hoa	375.9	307.0	199.2	29.9	14.7	15.2
Binh Duong	234.8	172.5	111.9	16.8	8.3	8.5
Binh Long*	65.7	59.1	38.3	5.8	2.9	2.9
Binh Tuy*	59.8	53.8	34.9	5.2	2.6	2.6
Chau Doc	482.0	392.9	254.9	38.3	18.9	19.4
Chuong Thien	261.4	217.9	141.4	21.2	10.4	10.8
Dinh Tuong	572.3	433.5	281.2	42.2	20.8	21.4
Gua Dinh	1064.3	794.4	515.3	77.4	38.1	39.3
Go Cong	165.9	139.0	90.2	13.5	6.6	6.9
Hau Nghia	200.3	144.4	93.7	14.1	6.9	7.2
Kien Hoa	576.7	405.2	262.8	39.5	19.5	20.0
Kien Giang	336.0	142.2	92.2	13.8	6.8	7.0
Kien Phong	315.1	263.2	170.7	25.6	12.5	13.1
Kien Tuong	43.8	22.3	14.5	2.2	1.1	1.1
Long An	307.4	236.7	153.5	23.0	11.3	11.7
Long Khanh	144.6	119.2	77.3	11.6	5.7	5.9
Phong Dinh	440.8	207.1	134.3	20.2	10.0	10.2
Phuoc Long*	35.4	31.9	20.7	3.1	1.5	1.6
Phuoc Tuy	99.9	56.8	36.8	5.5	2.7	2.8
Sa Dec	258.7	174.6	113.3	17.0	8.4	8.6
Tay Ninh	323.6	262.3	170.2	25.6	12.6	13.0
Vinh Binh	405.4	297.9	193.2	29.0	14.3	14.7
Vinh Long	478.6	344.8	223.7	33.6	16.6	17.0

Column 1: M.A.C.V. Hamlet Evaluation System Information Report, Saigon, January, 1968
 2: Residual of Column (1) after subtracting population of urban areas
 3: Obtained from Column (2) by applying H.R.S. ratio of 554 farm households out of a sample of 854 rural households
 4: Obtained from Column (3) by applying H.R.S. average--household of 6.66 persons
 5 and 6: Obtained from Column (4) by applying H.R.S. ratio of 273 landowning farm households and 281 landless out of a sample of 554 farm households

* Urban population data not available--rural population assumed to be 90% of total population

^{a/} Including owner-tenants, i.e., those who both own and rent in land

^{b/} Tenants and farm workers

INDEX

- Absentee landlords 58-59, 95ff.
Absentee landlord survey 6, 60ff., 94-97, 128
Administration, citizen participation in 29-32
Administration, local 28-29, 32
Age of household members 10, 98, 99
- Bidding for communal lands 110, 146
Buddhism 23
- Cambodians 23-24
Cao Dai 23, 28
Catholics 23, 62
Change, receptiveness to 50-52, 28
Chinese 23, 62
Church lands 71, 106
Communal lands 106, 108-111, 145-148, 153-154
Communication, rural 25-26, 53-55
Consumer goods, ownership of 53-56
Credit 27, 40, 47-48
Crop failure 70, 73
Cropping pattern 17, 18
Crop sharing 75
- Disputes over land 76-77
Dwellings, characteristics of 52
- Expropriation 59, 64-67, 94ff., 128
- Farmers 12, 17-19, 20, 34ff., 82ff.
Farm supplies 48-50
Future land reform owner opinion toward 105-107
Future land redistribution, Central Lowlands 152-154
Future land redistribution, cost estimate of 154-156
Future land redistribution, Southern Region 137-139
- Government lands availability 137, 146-149
- Hamlet residents 11ff.
Hamlet Resident Survey 5, 11ff., 57ff., 69ff., 82ff., 95, 108ff., 128-130,
149

Hoa Hao 23, 28, 74, 84
 Holdings, management versus ownership 121-122, 153
 Holding, size of desired 133, 146-147
 Holding, size distribution of 7, 17, 19, 21, 60, 67, 94, 96, 128-130, 150
 Households, demographic characteristics of surveyed 11, 24

 Illegal holdings 97
 Income, distribution of 39
 Income, farm 35ff.
 Indebtedness 40, 42-47
 Insecurity, effect on village chief 30, 32
 Insecurity, effect on survey 5-6
 Insecurity, wartime 30, 32-33, 68-69, 90-91, 100
 Insecurity, effect on ownership desire 33, 68-69, 89ff., 97, 99, 133, 139
 Interest rates 40, 43-44
 IR-8 rice 3

 Japanese land reform 122-125

 Key money 72
 Khanh Hâu 40, 44, 47
 Korean land reform 125-126

 Land, compared with other needs 86, 88-89
 Land, desire for ownership 27, 82ff., 142, 144-145
 Land-for-the-tiller 128, 149, 152, 156
 Land, ownership priorities 93-94
 Land redistribution, estimated requirements for 142, 144-145
 Land redistribution, French lands 134-135
 Land redistribution, Ordinance 57 lands 135-137
 Land reform ratio 157-158
 Land requirements for new owners 143, 149-152
 Land, source of acquisition 79-80, 99
 Land tenure structure 12, 121, 128-130
 Land values 103, 154-155
 Land, willingness to purchase 82-84
 Landless, estimate of 12, 139, 142-145, 149, 152
 Landlords, assistance to tenants 77-79
 Landlords, history 57-58
 Landlords, location of holding 62-63, 65, 57, 94
 Landlords, opinion toward expropriation 97ff.
 Landlords, profession 62, 99
 Landlords, resident 58-59, 61, 64, 67
 Landlords, social status of 79-80, 99
 Lending agencies 44

Literacy 22, 89
Livestock, working 53-55
Lorenz curve, inequality of holdings 121-123, 128-130
Metayage 99

Non-farmers 12, 20, 108
Occupational status of households 12, 13, 20
Ordinance 57, compensation 102-105
Ordinance 57, expropriation 62-67, 94-97, 128-130
Owners 12, 17, 20, 29, 58ff., 82ff., 108
Owner-tenants 12, 17, 20, 29, 58ff., 82ff., 108

Permanent land titles 108
Political effects on land reform 2-3, 81-82, 107, 116, 156-158
Population density, Central Lowlands 132-133, 154
Population density, Far East countries 113-116
Population density, Indo-Chinese Peninsula 116-118
Population density, intercountry comparison 119-121
Population density, North Vietnam 116-118, 121, 132
Population density, Regions of Republic of Vietnam 130ff.
Population density, Republic of Vietnam 130-133
Population, farm 12, 17, 114-121, 136, 138
Population, nonfarm 12, 17, 114-121
Priorities, rural 41
Provincial Land Office Survey 4, 7, 128-129
Provincial land titles 108
Public works 27, 32, 88-89

Refugees 26, 91, 142, 144-145
Religion 23, 62
Rental contracts 74-76
Rental rates and payments 69-74
Retention limit, effect of lowering 149-152
Resettlement, attitude 28, 91, 133, 139, 144
Rice cultivation methods 17
Riceland 17-18, 35, 73, 139
Rice marketing 47
Rice production 35ff.
RIES survey 5, 49, 152

Sales of farm produce 35-39
Sample surveys, operation 7, 15
Sample surveys, purpose 2, 4-6
Social justice, relevance of land to 4, 70, 81

Taiwan land reform 126-127

Technical assistance 77, 86, 89, 107

Tet offensive 6, 107

Tenants 12, 20, 58ff., 82ff., 108, 137, 142-144

Transportation, rural 25-26, 53-56

Viet Cong activities 30, 32-34, 68-69, 89-92, 100, 134-135

Viet Cong land policy 92-94, 113

Viet Minh 90

Village Council 29-31

Voluntary land sales 87-88