Final Evaluation of CSO's Kenya Engagement

(February 2012-April 2013)

Public Report

Prepared by Social Impact

for

US Department of State
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)

Evaluation Services IDIQ Contract S-AQM-MA-12-D-0086
Task Order S-AQM-MA-13-F-2663

December 2013

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This report was prepared by Social Impact for the US Department of State's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations under Task Order S-AQM-MA-13-F-2663.

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Acknowledgements

This evaluation would not have been possible without the honest, candid participation of the Kenyans who were interviewed during four weeks of fieldwork. The team wishes to thank the Department of State and USAID staff in Washington and Nairobi for their participation. Special thanks go to CSO's evaluation Technical Representative (TR) Dr. Bruce Hemmer for his attention to detail, timely feedback, and careful analysis. His insights and wisdom are greatly appreciated. The team also wishes to thank Sarah Alvarez for her administrative, research, and logistical support. Erick Ngosia and Kevin Sudi, the team's Kenyan consultants, provided excellent evaluation and logistical services and worked tirelessly to make the teamwork go seamlessly.

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Acronyms

CBO	Community Based Organization
CICC	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics
CoP	Champions of Peace
CO	Contracting Officer
CRC	Civilian Response Corps
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSO	State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DoS	Department of State
DPC	District Peace Committees
EDG	Elections Donor Group
EWER	Early Warning / Early Response
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FPFK	Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya
GoK	Government of Kenya
GOR	Grants Officer Representative
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IFES	International Foundation of Electoral Systems
KECOSCE	Kenya Community Support Centre
KII	Key Informant Interviews
KPIC	Kenya Planning and Implementation Cell
MCA	Member of the County Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NSS	National Security Staff (merger of NSC and HSC)
OTI	USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives
PEV	Post-Election Violence
SI	Social Impact
SME	Subject-Matter Experts
SMS	Short Message Service
SOW	Scope of Work
TR	Technical Representative
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/DRG	Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
USG	United States Government

Glossary of Key Terms

Askari	Police Officer.
Baraza	Local meetings convened by local government officials such as Village Elders, Assistant Chiefs, Chiefs, DOs, DCs and County Commissioners. In most cases, baraza refers to meetings convened by the first three.
Boda-Boda	Local motor cycles used to ferry passengers to various destinations. They may be three-legged or two-legged motorcycles.
Bunge	National Parliament or the County Assembly.
Bunge la Mwananchi	The People's Parliament; a pro-poor social movement related to the struggle for empowerment and participatory democracy, which aims to provide people with a platform to discuss their issues.
Coastarians	Coastal people of Kenya.
Matatu	Small mini buses commonly used in Kenya to offer transport to Kenyans in different towns.
Mungiki	A Kikuyu movement that is engaged in religious activities, politics, local development, crime, and violence, that operates in Nairobi's slums and others parts of Nairobi and Central Province. It was banned by the Kenya government in 2002 but is believed to still be operational and to be responsible for post-election violence in 2007/2008.
Mwananchi/Wananchi	Citizen/citizens of Kenya.
Tiwi	An area within South Coast of Kenya.

Geographic Coverage

Figure 1: Geographic Coverage of Fieldwork



Evaluation Questions

Figure 2: Evaluation Questions

National (roughly 25% of evaluation effort)	
Effectiveness	1. How effective were the CSO embeds in Nairobi at: a. Keeping the Strategic Plan updated with current assessment and recommendations from the field? b. Coordinating the interagency at Embassy Nairobi and in the field, and coordinating with local and international partners, to implement the current Strategic Plan? c. Producing timely, accurate and effective strategic communications which helped achieve the plan's objectives? d. Tracking progress on plan implementation nationally and sub-nationally?
	2. What were the key factors aiding or impeding effectiveness in each of the national-level objectives evaluated in question 1? a. Contextual b. Other organizations (USG, GoK, local partners, implementing partners, others) c. CSO strategy, tools, structures, procedures, etc.
Likely Future Effects	3. How well did the engagement prepare and motivate Embassy Nairobi to plan and operate in a strategic and coordinated whole of government manner to prevent and mitigate conflict after CSO's departure?
Lessons Leaned	4. What lessons does this experience provide about such efforts (embedding in embassies, coordination cells for interagency planning and implementation, coordinating electoral violence prevention, etc.) for other engagements? What key factors affect the transferability of these lessons?
Subnational (roughly 75% of evaluation effort	
Effectiveness :Analysis and Planning	5. How effective was the subnational analysis at the following? a. Understanding and prioritizing regional/local political and conflict dynamics, especially: i. Mapping civic actors participating or potentially participating in EWER ii. Identifying and analyzing spoilers iii. Developments related to the election, violence prevention, and reforms b. Identifying and prioritizing gaps in information or intervention (especially regarding the election, policing and devolution)?
Effectiveness: Reporting and Coordination	6. How effectively did the subnational teams report analysis and recommendations to the CSO embeds in Nairobi on the points listed in question 5? To what degree did the Embassy or USAID Mission make use of these reports and recommendations, and are there ways in which they could have been made more useful?
	7. How effectively did the subnational teams coordinate subnational diplomatic and programmatic efforts with each other and with Kenyan efforts?

Effectiveness: Implementation	8. How effective were each of the subnational efforts in achieving each of their diplomatic and programmatic objectives, as they evolved? a. Rift Objectives i. Enhancing EWER networks, including relationships between these networks, and police/government, between these networks and communities, and between communities and police/government ii. Deterring spoilers iii. Promoting peaceful attitudes and behavior through peace messaging and outreach iv. Strengthening community resilience against political manipulation (e.g. voter/civic education) v. Preventing electoral violence b. Coast Objectives i. Enhancing EWER networks (note added emphasis on capacity building for reporting and response), including relationships between these networks, and police/government, between these networks and communities, and between communities and police/government ii. Deterring spoilers iii. Promoting peaceful attitudes and behavior through peace messaging and outreach iv. Strengthening community resilience against political manipulation (e.g. voter/civic education) v. Reducing grievances and promoting confidence in the new devolved government vi. Preventing electoral violence
Effectiveness: Cross-Cutting	9. What were the key factors aiding or impeding effectiveness in each of the subnational-level objectives evaluated in questions 5-8? a. Contextual b. Other organizations (USG, GoK, local partners, implementing partners, others) c. CSO strategy, tools, structures, procedures, etc.
	10. What unintended positive or negative effects did the programming have, and why?
Likely Future Effects	11. How well prepared, resourced, motivated and respected are the EWER networks to continue conflict prevention/mitigation activity after CSO's departure?
Lessons Learned	12. What lessons does this experience provide for a. Follow-on efforts in Kenya b. Other engagements with these characteristics (electoral and ethnic violence prevention, EWER, coalition-building, civic-police relations, anti-separatism, devolution, subnational focus, etc.)? What key factors affect the transferability of these lessons?

1. Executive Summary

1.1 Background on the Kenya Context

In early 2012, following a request from the US Embassy Nairobi and the National Security Staff (NSS), the Department of State's (DoS) Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) was tasked to support a joint DoS-United States Agency for International Development (USAID) team develop and implement a conflict prevention initiative. The resultant Kenya engagement, as it was called, took place from February 2012 to April 2013.

The engagement was implemented at both the national and subnational level. In Nairobi, CSO deployed personnel to be integrated into the Embassy's Political Section and USAID Mission. CSO also deployed a total of nine sub-national officers to the Rift Valley, the Coast, and Kisumu. These officers were tasked with (1) enhancing coordination mechanisms between subnational programmatic and diplomatic engagements with Kenyan efforts; (2) ensuring communities are better equipped to respond quickly and credibly; and (3) developing and supporting subnational messaging that amplifies and augments Embassy Nairobi's strategic communications.

Overall, the Kenya engagement mobilized $3.5 million in USG funding, including $619,000 for cooperative agreements and grants and $2.88 million for operations. The engagement is particularly significant to CSO as it represents the first time CSO sub-national officers have engaged in both diplomacy and programming simultaneously.

1.2 Evaluation Purpose and Methodology

In August 2013, Social Impact (SI) was contracted by CSO to carry out an independent final performance evaluation of its Kenya engagement. SI was asked to focus on analyzing three key aspects of Phase 3, its: (1) effectiveness; (2) likely future effects; and (3) transferability of lessons learned. The team utilized a qualitatively-focused mixed-methods evaluation approach consisting of a desk review of relevant documents; key information interviews; small group and focus group discussions; and a quantitative email survey. The evaluation took place over three months (September-December 2013) with fieldwork in Washington, D.C. and Kenya (Nairobi, Rift Valley and Western Kenya, Coast, and Kisumu). The team had four members, two expatriate and two Kenyan nationals.

1.3 Major Findings and Conclusions

Below are the findings and conclusions the evaluation team deemed most significant.

National Conclusions

CSO made significant and positive contributions in its **coordination and reporting** role.

1. CSO's coordination role in Nairobi was one of its most effective functions. CSO provided critical surge support, contributed positively to inter-agency relations, set up the Command Center for election results, and coordinated International Observer Missions.

2. CSO officers successfully augmented the Political Section and helped achieve USG reporting objectives, with sub-national officers providing timely, accurate and detailed on-the-ground information not covered prior to CSO's arrival.

Sub-National Conclusions

There is evidence that CSO's subnational **diplomatic and programmatic activities** contributed in important ways to peaceful elections in areas where CSO operated. However, its contribution was influenced by numerous and significant factors present during CSO's engagement, such that the exact level of contribution cannot be measured.

1. CSO effectively enhanced Kenya-led initiatives. CSO sub-national officers were able to catalyze civil society organizations (CSOs) to coordinate their efforts with the police and work together as networks to implement a range of activities which enhanced Early Warning Early Response (EWER) systems, deterred potential spoilers from engaging in violence, provided voter education, and distributed peace messages.
2. Recognizing the urgency of action and given its relatively short duration of programming, CSO took advantage of pre-existing networks and USAID partners already on the ground, but continually worked to expand these networks.
3. Unlike other actors with fixed locations to operate, CSO remained flexible enough to pivot at opportune times to add a new geographic area, e.g. Kisumu, in order to respond to updated analyses indicating a potential risk of post-election conflict.
4. CSO's improvement of relations between communities and police in Rift Valley was short-lived. More of its stronger effects in Coast, where it deployed a police advisor, continue.
5. Grievances were not addressed by CSO, in line with the mandate it accepted from the Embassy. Many respondents, especially the perceived spoilers, said a continued failure to address their grievances is likely to lead to violence. The prioritization of peace messages over civic education during the election may have compounded this by producing a passive citizenry ineffective at holding politicians to account nonviolently.

1.4 Prioritized Recommendations

1. Clarify Mandate

CSO may have a well-known mandate within the ranks but it clearly has been misunderstood outside of CSO, leading to unnecessary turf battles within DoS and between CSO and USAID, particularly USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Therefore, before any deployment, CSO must have a clearly defined set of objectives, activities, and actors that are well known. Any appearance of hiding information such as funding levels or programming objectives compromises the potential support and accomplishments of CSO.

2. Continue Use of Programming to Fill Gaps and Complement Other CSO Roles

The Kenya engagement has shown how important programming can be to complement and enhance CSO's coordination, reporting and other diplomatic roles. CSO correctly identified a gap in USAID and other partners' programming and targeted the police in its activities. CSO is well-positioned to work with the police, and the evaluation team recommends this

continue. While programmatic coordination with other USG agencies may prove to be difficult given CSO's short time horizon, more, timely information ahead of deployment and during program implementation would help. CSO must have greater transparency and must communicate the amount of funding both within CSO and between CSO and USAID. Subnational Scopes of Work should more clearly identify programming.

3. Minimize Credit-taking (or be more strategic about it)

CSO needs to be more careful in claiming credit for successful activities or contributions to peaceful elections. Many interviewees (in Washington and in Nairobi, Kenyans and American) complained that CSO wanted too much credit for its activities instead of attributing the role that all USG efforts were making together. Others complained that CSO claimed credit for activities that others had done or were currently doing. CSO with its limited budget and short engagement is "a small fish in a big pond" of donor funding during elections. As one CSO officer aptly put it, "CSO should let its work speak for itself."

4. Increase the Implementation Period and Connect to Longer-Term Change

In the future, CSO should ideally arrive at least six months prior to the elections and stay in-country for at least one month afterwards wrapping up and gathering feedback. CSO should more actively look for opportunities to connect its activities to longer-term conflict prevention/mitigation and development efforts and ensure no harm to those efforts.

5. Improve Continuity and Expand Types of Staffing

The key to CSO's success in other environments is its staff members and the connections they make on the ground. CSO staff members, especially the sub-national officers, need to be assigned for the entire CSO engagement rather than shifting team members in and out of the country during any active engagement. When officers are deployed for more than six months, CSO should consider providing for families to join in a safe location in-country. CSO officers need broader skills to carry out CSO's functions, including but not limited to program management training. CSO support in Washington could benefit from having access to an experienced contracting/grants officer to identify mechanisms that have the flexibility and the substantial involvement that CSO requires. Similarly, others with specific technical expertise such as police experts need to be recruited in greater number.

6. Expand Partnerships with Competition and Directly Partnering with Locals

Although reliance on existing USAID implementing partners (IPs) allowed for rapid programming, the partnerships also presented several obstacles such as discontent in the hiring of local staff, procurement complexities, and limitations in the geographic focus. Therefore, future work, if started earlier, could be based on competition rather than sole sourcing USAID partners. CSO should also consider increasing its flexibility to engage directly with local CBOs or NGOs rather than via international NGOs.

7. Measure impact

CSO needs to better conceptualize the impact it is striving to achieve, and measure/report, attuned to its limited time and resources. It should plan for contending with the blurred attribution caused by CSO activities riding on other organizations' programs.

2. Introduction and Background

2.1 Background on the Kenya Context

Since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1992, every election in Kenya has been characterized by election-related violence (1992, 1997, and 2007 elections). However, the 2007 elections were marred by ethnic violence that was unprecedented, catching many observers both inside and outside of Kenya by surprise.[1] Though estimates vary, 1,100 to 1,500[2] people were killed and approximately 660,000 were internally displaced during the 2007/2008 post-election violence (PEV).[3] Many Kenyans disputed the final results of the heated contest between President Mwai Kibaki and Opposition Leader Raila Odinga. Widespread violence occurred in the Rift Valley, in Coastal areas especially Mombasa, in Luo-dominated Kisumu, and in the Nairobi slums following the election results.[4]

In 2008, UN Former Secretary General Kofi Annan mediated a peace agreement resulting in power-sharing arrangements between President Kibaki and opposition leader-cum-Prime Minister Odinga. The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence, more commonly referred to as the Waki Commission, was established to investigate the perpetrators of the violence, but little progress was made within Kenya to hold the appropriate people accountable for the violence.[5] When the Kenyan Parliament voted against establishing a local tribunal to adjudicate those identified in the Waki report, the names were submitted instead to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

During his election campaign in 2002, then Vice President Kibaki promised constitutional reform but entrenched political interests prevented any progress until 2005. The draft constitution provided limited reforms such as the creation of the position of Prime Minister, but many viewed it as flawed as it maintained a powerful executive and did not address key issues such as land reform. After the 2007/2008 PEV, the need for a new constitutional arrangement became more apparent, and on April 1, 2010 Parliament passed a draft constitution; it was later approved in a referendum on August 4, 2010. The post-2007 election period provided the opportunity to create a new system of governance in Kenya with checks and balances and devolved power. The resultant 2010 Constitution contained provisions for a "President with curtailed power, the elimination of the position

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[1] Valentina Bau, "Five years on: identity and Kenya's post-election violence." January 2013. Open Democracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/valentina-ba%C3%BA/five-years-on-identity-and-kenyas-post-election-violence.

[2] http://kigafrica.org/downloads/Peaceforum.pdf.

[3] "CSO Kenya Engagement: Engagement Review." June 2013, pg. 6.

[4] The UN OHCHR report identifies "three distinct but sometimes concurrent patterns of violence – spontaneous, organized, and retaliatory. The first phase was spontaneous violence which began immediately after the announcement of the contested election results. Opposition supporters took to the streets in protest in places such as Kisumu and the Nairobi slums. The second wave consisted of "organized attacks in the Rift Valley which appear to have targeted non-Kalenjin communities and those perceived as opponents of the ODM party including the Kikuyu, Kissi, and Luhya communities. The third phase was retaliation by Kikuyu youth attacking non-Kikuyu groups in Naivasha, Nakuru and Mathare.

[5] Freedom House.

of Prime Minister, the creation of a Senate, a more powerful, bicameral and independent legislative branch, a reformed judiciary, and an independent electoral management body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), all with the goal of addressing the longstanding grievances and weaknesses in democratic institutions that prompted the PEV."[6]

On March 4, 2013 Kenyans went to the polls for the first election under the new Constitution to elect six different positions, including President, Governor, Senator, Member of Parliament (MP), Women County representatives and Member of the County Assembly, making it the most complex election in Kenya's history.[7] With an estimated 86 percent voter turnout, Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner, having won 50.5 percent of the votes—by a margin of approximately 9,000 votes—a second round was unnecessary.[8] Unlike in 2008, the opposition went to court instead of the streets. Odinga told his supporters to respect Kenya's new, reformed institutions. It is estimated that the 2013 elections resulted in only 22 deaths. Although the Supreme Court conceded some irregularities, it dismissed Odinga's petition and declared the results credible on March 30, 2013. Uhuru was inaugurated on April 9, 2013.

2.2 Background on CSO Engagement

Following the 2007/2008 PEV, Kenya received support from the international community, including the United States Government (USG), to undertake reforms promoting peaceful and credible elections in 2013. The US considers Kenya a vital, strategic partner representing a "stable, democratic and a reliable ally in a volatile region."[9] As one Kenya expert describes, Kenya is "the anchor state of East Africa."[10]

As the 2013 elections approached, the anticipated scale of violence was difficult to predict due to the ever-changing political dynamics and alliances. Most reports concluded that wide-scale electoral violence was unlikely, but due to "historical patterns, increased political maneuvering and delayed implementation of reforms…violence remains a distinct possibility."[11] The alliance established in December 2012 between presidential candidate Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and his running mate, William Ruto, a Kalenjin, raised the prospects for peace during the 2013 elections but a weak IEBC, local armed militias, and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) secessionist movement were indicators that the forthcoming elections could "be marred by violence and regarded as illegitimate by [some] Kenyans."[12]

Phase 1: Analysis (February-March 2012)

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[6] US Department of State. "Conflict Prevention Planning: The Road to Kenyan Reforms and 2013 Elections." Pg. 4.
[7] Barkan, Joel "Electoral Violence in Kenya: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 17." Council on Foreign Relations. January 2013.
[8] Burchard, Stephanie. "After the Dust has Settled: Kenya's 2013 Elections," Africa Watch, July 25, 2013.
[9] Eythan Sontag, "Action Memo for the Assistant Secretary," April 19, 2013.
[10] Barkan, Joel. "Electoral Violence in Kenya: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 17." Council on Foreign Relations. January 2013.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid

In early 2012, following a request from Embassy Nairobi and the NSS, CSO was tasked to "support a joint State-USAID team to develop and implement a conflict prevention initiative leading up to the March 2013 elections."[13] Between February and March 2012, the team conducted a desk study and produced a Gap Analysis which (1) defined USG objectives for the Kenya elections, (2) identified knowledge, programming and diplomatic gaps, and (3) outlined geographic areas which were likely hotspots based on the existing political environment. In sum, it outlined hypotheses on key geographic locations, key institutions, and key actors to engage for conflict mitigation before, during, and after the elections. It also concluded that devolution and the creation of new ethnic minorities, new electoral boundaries, new hotspots due to shifting alliances, youth coopted by politicians, the uncertain role of the media, stalled security sector reform, the influx of small arms, and stalled land reform could threaten peaceful and credible elections.[14]

Phase 2: Planning (April-May 2012)

Following the Gap Analysis, a joint DoS-USAID team then developed the "Proposed US Plan to Support Kenya to Hold Credible, Transparent, and Peaceful Elections; Advance Reforms; and Prevent and Mitigate Conflict," more commonly known as the USG "Strategic Plan." It outlined three strategic objectives for all USG election-related assistance to Kenya, including to: (1) hold credible, transparent, and peaceful elections; (2) advance reforms (devolution, judicial, land and police); and (3) prevent and mitigate conflict. It is around these three objectives from which the CSO Kenya engagement was formed, but priority for CSO's role was placed, at the request of the Embassy, on the peaceful aspect of the first objective and the electoral aspect of the third.

Phase 3: Implementation (June 2012-April 2013)

Implementation of the Strategic Plan began in June 2012 with the formation of the Kenya Planning and Implementation Cell (KPIC) in Nairobi, followed by the deployment of sub-national officers beginning in August. In Nairobi, focusing more on what it termed "national" level issues, CSO deployed seven personnel (three CSO staff and four subject matter experts from the USG Civil Response Corps) to be integrated into the Embassy's Political Section and USAID Mission's Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Office to assist them to "prioritize, communicate, implement, and monitor core elements of the *Strategic Plan.*"[15] From late August 2012 to April 2013, CSO deployed a total of nine sub-national officers to Rift Valley, Coast, and Kisumu, identified as key hotspot areas, to prevent and mitigate local violence. Specifically, these officers were tasked with (1) enhancing coordination mechanisms between subnational programmatic and diplomatic engagements with Kenyan efforts; (2) ensuring communities were better equipped to respond quickly and credibly to incidents of violence; and (3) supporting subnational messaging that amplified and augmented the Embassy's strategic communications.[16]

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[13] CSO Engagement Review, June 2013, pg. 2.
[14] Kenya Gap Analysis.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Evaluation SOW.

Overall, the Kenya engagement mobilized $3.5 million in USG funding of which $2.25 million was 1207 funding (reserved for conflict mitigation activities). This included $619,000 for cooperative agreements and grants $2.88 million in operational costs, involving more than 102 Kenya staff and 460 volunteers in Nairobi, Rift, and Coast; 16 interagency staff; two diplomatic security agents; two US Marshals Service Officers; and one social media expert. These efforts complimented the more than $37 million of USAID medium-term assistance towards the Kenya elections. The total international assistance for the elections is estimated to have been $60 million with $34 million going to the IEBC through United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) basket fund.[17] The engagement is particularly significant to CSO as it represents one of the first large engagements where CSO sub-national officers have actively engaged in diplomacy and substantial programming simultaneously, a combination which CSO is developing as a niche.

2.3 Theory(ies) of Change behind the Engagement

By CSO's own admission in internal documents but also supported by the evaluators' interviews,[18] the engagement was not originally designed with a clear theory of change (TOC). Initial strategy documents outlined what CSO perceived to be "Kenya's Conflict Triangle" and argued that by (1) strengthening Early Warning Early Response (EWER) through the power of civil society networks and local dispute resolution; (2) politically engaging those that incite violence; and (3) discouraging those that would carry out violence, CSO could break Kenya's historical cycles of violence. While this early understanding helped clarify some of CSO's basic programming assumptions, it was not until November 2012 that CSO clearly articulated the causal pathways between its activities, outputs, outcomes, and ultimate desired impact. Below, the evaluators present their best efforts at reconstructing these TOCs based on a review of CSO strategy documents and interviews with CSO staff. As stated during nearly every CSO interview, the engagement did not appear to have one overarching TOC but rather separate TOCs at the national and subnational levels.

The engagement's TOCs are presented below for three reasons: (1) to convey the casual logic through which CSO believed it could achieve its overarching objectives; (2) to demonstrate the assumed importance of the activities that CSO decided to implement; and (3) to provide a basis for tracing CSO's possible contribution to peaceful elections.

[17] In addition to the CSO Kenya engagement, USAID programming, the USG contributed $2.1 million to the UNDP basket fund which was used to support training of police officers and support to women's participation through UN Women.

[18] See for example CSO's internal "Kenya Engagement Review," Pg. 12.

National Level:

If CSO provides specialized, embedded surge capacity support in conflict prevention programming and reporting, and election coordination…	**Then** the USG will be better able to provide more coordinated, focused support to Kenyan election preparation and institutional reforms…	**Because** lessons from the 2007 elections and present resource constraints emphasize the need for additional support tracking, prioritizing, and implementing key USG and other donor support.

Subnational Level:

Assumption: Election violence likely to start at local levels and spread to regional and national levels. So… **If** CSO engages prioritized hotspot local communities with diplomacy and programming to support their efforts to build local networks focused on preventing, mitigating, and rapidly responding to incidence of election-related violence…	**Then** incidents of localized violence will be better contained and less likely to escalate to larger levels of violence…

Because
1) Linking "positive influencers" in local communities, governments and police allows the amplification of their efforts.
2) Constructively engaging spoilers redirects them from violence
3) Educating the public on the electoral process makes them less vulnerable to incitement to violence.
4) CSO, operating locally as an extension of the Embassy, has special status and convening power to help make these processes happen.
approach.

2.4 Broader Context behind the Engagement

US Embassy Context

At the time of the CSO engagement, Embassy Nairobi housed 13 separate USG entities (subdivided among 31 different offices). Complicating an already complex structure, the Embassy undertook a change in leadership during the early phases of the engagement. The publically-available Inspector General's report provides a detailed account of the adverse operating environment in the Embassy at the time. Some of the main inhibiting factors were the Embassy's loss of confidence in the (then) Ambassador's leadership; "damaged cohesion of the US Embassy Nairobi's country team;" and the need to both refocus "the Political Section's reporting on the forthcoming March 2013 elections" and strengthen public diplomacy efforts through "better internal communication and coordination among agencies to publicize US assistance efforts in Kenya."[19]

[19] US Department of State, Office of Inspections. "Inspection of Embassy Nairobi, Kenya." Report Number ISP-I-12-38A, August 2012.

Another critical factor was the resource burden faced by Embassy Nairobi before and during the elections. USG staff interviewed agreed that there was insufficient staffing to cover the programmatic, reporting, and coordination needs during the election period. In the words of one interviewee, "we simply couldn't have managed without [CSO] surge support." Another explained, "USAID was programming about $6 million per month except for the months leading up to elections when we jumped to $30 million per month."

Department of State Context

Formed in November 2011 as required by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, CSO is one of the newest Bureaus within DoS and faces the challenges of needing to establish a clear identity and document early successes in order to justify future budgets and protect its emergent reputation. CSO's activities are thus particularly formative in nature, with CSO striving to learn, shift, and adapt its engagements as appropriate to the contexts within which it operates.

3. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

3.1 Evaluation Purpose

In August 2013, Social Impact (SI) was contracted by CSO to carry out an independent, final performance evaluation of its Kenya engagement. SI was asked to focus on the "implementation phase" of the engagement, defined as the activities following the initial gap analysis and subsequent design, and to analyze three key aspects of the engagement: (1) effectiveness; (2) likely future effects; and (3) the transferability of lessons learned. Regarding likely future effects, the team was reminded that the engagement was not intended to be "sustainable" in the traditional development sense but rather to help mitigate potential outbreaks of violence specifically around the elections. The team was also asked to emphasize a learning (versus accountability-based) evaluation approach.

The primary audiences for this evaluation are CSO leadership and engagement teams, as well as key stakeholders throughout DoS such as US Embassy Nairobi, the Bureau of African Affairs (AF), the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), and DoS's evaluation community. USAID is also a key audience, and the report may be useful to other agencies such as the Departments of Justice and Department of Defense. The evaluators emphasize their hope that the report will be made publically available given the repeated requests received during fieldwork for a copy of the final report.

The evaluation Scope of Work (SOW) contained a detailed list of 12 primary questions and 26 sub-questions (38 questions overall). The SOW required a 25 percent focus on the national-level analysis and 75 percent focus on the subnational evaluation questions. The evaluation questions, organized along the three primary aspects of investigation, are presented at the beginning of this report and a full version of the SOW is found in **Annex A**.

3.2 Research Methodology

The evaluation team utilized a qualitatively-focused mixed-methods evaluation approach consisting of (1) a desk review of relevant primary and secondary documents; (2) key

information interviews, (3) small group and focus group discussions, and (4) a quantitatively-focused email survey (see **Annex E**).

The evaluation took place over a three-month period (September-December 2013) with fieldwork taking place in Washington, D.C. (September 9-13) and Kenya (September 16-October 13). While in Kenya, the team traveled to Nairobi (10 days), Rift Valley and Western Kenya (14 days), Coast (14 days), and Kisumu (3 days). The team was comprised of four team-members, two expatriate and two national, with the Nairobi and Kisumu fieldwork shared between all four team-members and the Rift Valley and Coast fieldwork divided between two sub-teams.

Recognizing the difficulty of establishing causal linkages between CSO activities and the national-level mitigation of election-related violence, the team applied a "process-tracing" approach to more rigorously try to analyze contribution. This involved looking at the causal process—links between CSO activities and their intended outcomes and impacts—and establishing indicators identifying a *plausible contribution* of the intervention to an observed result. The team's data collection methods are presented below.

Desk Review: CSO provided the evaluators electronic copies of a wide variety of documents, including planning documents, mid-term evaluations, matrices, and grant agreements. More than 40 documents were reviewed by the team.

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs): The team interviewed a total of 149 respondents, of which 75 percent (112) were men, and 25 percent (37) were women. Of the 149 interviewees, 114 individuals were interviewed through KIIs and 35 were interviewed through FGDs. For a detailed list of people interviewed, please see **Annex B** for the interview instruments used.

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs): The team conducted a total of six FGDs, in Bungoma, Burnt Forest, Kitale, Likoni, Mombasa, and Tana River. The FGD in Bungoma was conducted in both Swahili and English, whereas all others were conducted in English.

Short Electronic Survey: Following fieldwork, the team drew from their initial interview findings to create an electronic survey of 14 questions using an online survey platform (Survey Monkey), allowing it to examine selected findings quantitatively. A sample of 37 included CSO, USAID, and other DoS officials. Of the 37 individuals who received the survey, 20 participated which is a 54 percent response rate. All these individuals were American and based either in Washington, D.C. or Nairobi. 6 of the 20 (30%) respondents were from CSO and had been deployed to Kenya during the engagement.

Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis: The team utilized a layered approach to review the extensive data sets compiled during the evaluation. The team held regular meetings to discuss emerging trends and themes in the interview response. This "rolling analysis" was then further solidified during weekly check-in calls with the CSO evaluation technical representative and SI's senior technical advisor. Three weekly check-in calls took place throughout the four weeks of fieldwork where the full team discussed how the evaluation was progressing, possible remedies to challenges in data collection, and the evidence gathered to answer the evaluation questions. Then when the two sub-teams joined together in Kisumu, they held a team meeting to analyze the similarities and differences emerging from their fieldwork in the Rift Valley and Coast. A similar full team meeting took

place on the final day of fieldwork where the team discussed the major "take-aways" from their fieldwork. Following fieldwork, the team undertook a systematic review of their notes and created detailed data files to code, quantify, aggregate and disaggregate their data.

3.3 Limitations of the Study, Threats to Validity and Mitigation Strategies

Despite the team's best efforts to develop appropriate mitigation strategies, the threats to validity and limitations of this study are significant, and most are inherent to any social science research involving similar levels of time, scope, and resources. These limitations, and the team's mitigation strategies, are presented below.

Limitations of the Evaluation

During the March 2013 elections many different actors, both local and international, were involved in conflict prevention and mitigation activities throughout Kenya, the large number of similar election activities (those funded by USAID and those funded by other development partners) meant that **interviewees at times had trouble parsing out which activities** were related to the projects being evaluated (this was particularly true at the subnational level). Interviewers helped respondents identify CSO activities by referring to individuals or specific actions involved. However, this dynamic setting made the task of attributing causality to CSO activities nearly impossible. In response, as a mitigation strategy adopted at the outset of the evaluation at CSO's recommendation, the team looked to assess contribution (versus attribution) to more macro level changes in context, as well as the attempts mentioned above to distinguish CSO activities in respondents' minds.

Many respondents had been interviewed for other evaluations, since USAID, USAID/OTI and CSO were conducting evaluations at virtually the same time. Thus "evaluation fatigue" due to multiple interviews in a short time period may have been a factor in some interviewees' responses. A potentially significant bias was that interviewees incorrectly believed that this evaluation could lead to future funding. During the evaluation, several USAID and OTI-funded projects had recently come to an end or had received news of reduced funding. Respondents may thus have given overly positive answers if they believed additional funding might be made available, but the Team sought to dispel any such expectations through the efforts to distinguish CSO from USAID and by mentioning that CSO has no plans for further engagement.

The evaluation may have been affected by certain outside events that occurred during the period of the evaluation, including: the Westgate terrorist attack, riots in Mombasa following the killing of Sheikh Ibrahim, and the ongoing ICC trials. Although none of these events impeded our respondents' willingness to meet with the evaluation team, even immediately following these events, the extent to which they may have influenced the responses provided, consciously or unconsciously, remains unknown. There are not clear implications for how these events would have changed the content of responses, other than perhaps making people less open. The ICC trials, which began on October 14, 2013, likely

had more of a limiting effect on respondent openness, particularly in Rift Valley,[20] as respondents might have been suspicious of the evaluators' true purpose. As a mitigation strategy, the evaluators provided a clear and consistent introduction, outlined the purpose of their evaluation, and explained that the data collection was in no way tied to events happening in The Hague. Due to particular sensitivities, the evaluators did not interview any journalists in Rift Valley, since one of the journalists from Kass FM, the Kalenjin-language radio station based in Eldoret, is currently facing charges at the ICC trial.[21] Journalists were interviewed in Nairobi, Coast and Kisumu only. Due to the nature of the questions for the journalists, the evaluation team was able to collect sufficient data regarding the media without interviewing Rift Valley journalists.

Limitations of the Research Methods

One of the most significant limitations was the ***difficulty of establishing causal linkages*** between CSO activities and changes in attitudes and behaviors, particularly at the county and national level. First, the lack of a baseline study meant that the team had no reliable baseline data against which they could compare reported changes.

The ***limited time in country***, while unavoidable, is another limitation to be recognized. Although the team tried to meet with as diverse a group of stakeholders as possible, alternate viewpoints not currently presented in this report may likely have materialized with greater time in country and broader geographic reach. However, given the purpose and resources of this evaluation, the team is satisfied with the number and diversity of interviews they were able to complete.

Our ***interview selection may have been over representative towards those likely to give positive accounts of CSO activities***. Considering the majority of the interviews conducted over the four weeks of fieldwork involved respondents involved in the engagement in some capacity, the answers received may be over-representative of those likely to have a positive predisposition for these types of activities given their own involvement. In order to mitigate the impact of this bias, the team interviewed as many non-participant community members, implementers, and donors as time and resources allowed.

Our evaluation team also had a ***limited amount of implementer data*** to use to validate interview responses. The lack of consistent and reliable monitoring data made it particularly difficulty to analyze the impact and true changes in behavior and attitudes. As a mitigation strategy, the evaluators tried to find as much reliable secondary data as possible and to triangulate interviewee responses as best they could.

Another considerable threat to validity surrounded the ***Hawthorne Effect*** of qualitative data collection, i.e. the risk that the interviewee might alter what would otherwise be their

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[20] For a day-by-day summary of the events of the ICC trial during the evaluation period, please see the Open Society Justice Initiative's website. http://www.icckenya.org/

[21] In 2007-2008, Kass FM radio presenter Joshua Arap Sang reported on post-election violence in 2007. Currently, he is on trial at the ICC, accused of hate speech and organizing killings. He will be tried for crimes against humanity accused of murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population, and torture and persecution of political opponents. On the radio, he is accused of explicitly discussing expulsion of Kikuyus. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/08/kenya-hate-radio-dj-set-for-war-crimes-court/.

response in order to "please the interviewer" or give an answer they think the interviewer wants to hear. The evaluation team sought to mitigate this threat in two ways: (1) interview teams would in all cases be comprised of at least one expatriate and one national evaluation team member and (2) the teams would triangulate responses received with information from other interviews or found in primary and secondary documents.

4. Findings

4.1 Relevance and Flexibility of Design

Overall, a majority interviewees agreed the activities CSO chose to implement were relevant and responsive to the needs of the country at the time of the elections. However, two common critiques were consistently raised during discussions on design—the timing and duration of those activities. By far the most common criticism was that effective election-related programming involves a cyclical, not episodic, effort. Interviewees, particularly those implementing other election-related programs but several community members as well, questioned the ability of CSO to have a true impact given its short programming timeframe. Interviewees explained that while the elections may have proceeded with limited incidents of violence this time around, it would be imprudent to think that core grievances had been addressed and conflict truly mitigated. Instead, interviewees expressed concerns that violence had simply been deferred. While it is important to recognize that CSO purposefully focused on electoral violence prevention rather than longer-term issues at the Embassy's request, the criticism that CSO could only make superficial contributions to effective election or conflict mitigation work given its short horizon is worth noting. The tension between working to "keep a lid" on potential violence (episodic programming) versus working to address underlying conflict drivers or needed institutional reform (cyclical programming) was a common theme throughout interviews across the evaluation.

Regarding the flexibility of design, the engagement followed CSO's overall swift and agile approach. Three notable examples involved the: (1) revision of the Policing Expert's SOW from working with Usalama, a leading Kenyan civil society organization working on security reforms, to focusing on building community-police relations in Coast; (2) de-prioritization of the threat posed by the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in the Coast;[22] and (3) reassignment of a CSO sub-national officer to Kisumu following the alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto, making PEV between the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins in the Rift Valley less likely.

[22] Earlier USAID and DFID conflict assessments had flagged the MRC as a major potential spoiler, however, following reporting of CSO's Coast officers and trips by the CSO Engagement Lead and a US Embassy Political Officer, CSO determined that the MRC's disruptive potential was not as high as initially feared

4.2 Findings on Implementation Effectiveness

While some may have disagreed on elements of the engagement's design, a majority of respondents in the Coast, Kisumu, Nakuru, Trans Nzoia and Bungoma found it effective overall (see Figure 3 below).[23] This finding was echoed by a majority of USG survey respondents[24] who also judged the CSO Kenya engagement to be "effective" in terms of preventing and mitigating violence around the 2013 elections (see Figure 4 below).





4.2.1 Achieving CSO's National-Level Objectives

Coordination

In June 2012, CSO deployed personnel to Nairobi to establish the KPIC which worked with the Embassy's Elections and Reform Task Force (ERTF) to interact with international partners and coordinate, track, and implement the US Plan to Support Kenya.[25] The coordination role played by CSO was widely reported as one of the key successes of the CSO engagement in Kenya.

The most widely cited contribution was that CSO provided much-needed personnel during a critical period where staff shortage would have impeded the capacity at both the Embassy and USAID. Not only did CSO provide staff to supplement the Political Section at the Embassy, but it also provided technical specialists on elections and coordination, who worked at USAID and supported the Mission's overall objectives.

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[23] The question was asked slightly different in different locations. In Coast, respondents were asked about SCEWER, whereas, in other areas, they were asked about CoP. In some cases, the respondents were not familiar with the official name of these activities, so the interviewer used the name of local partner who implemented the activity to supplement the original question wording.
[24] See Section 3.3 for more information on the sampling and design of the Survey Monkey questionnaire.
[25] "CSO Approach on Preventing Elections-Related Violence in Kenya in 2013"

A second widely-cited contribution was CSO's coordination of the election observers. During the elections, 35 US observer teams were deployed to 33 different locations throughout Kenya, by far the largest observer mission of any development partner in Kenya.[26] CSO also helped to coordinate other development partners' observation efforts by managing over 170 applications for IEBC accreditation. On Election Day, CSO organized and managed the US Embassy Elections Observation Command Center and invited other international partner representatives to participate in the monitoring of real time reporting of events. Due to the time difference between Nairobi and Washington and the pace by which returns were coming in, the Command Center operated on a 24-hour basis to provide timely, accurate election information to the Kenya Desk Officers in Washington. One USG respondent comments that CSO came with "clout and expertise," which increased the likelihood of CSO's officers contributing to the US objectives. Originally, USAID was supposed to carry out these tasks as Chair of the Elections Donor Group (EDG), but USAID readily admitted that its staffing levels and increased programming during the elections resulted in it not being able to carry out this function. USAID retained its position as Chair but CSO worked to coordinate the election observers as part of the joint USG effort. USG staff interviewed agreed that this was an appropriate role for CSO to play and that CSO played it well.

Ambassador Godec also directed CSO to be the Embassy Point of Contact (POC) with international partners and coordination bodies outside of direct election observation efforts.[27] However, CSO quickly found that USAID was better placed to coordinate with external development partners such as UNDP. USAID was chair of the EDG prior to CSO's arrival. And according to both CSO and USAID, USAID had a longer presence in Kenya so it made sense for CSO to concentrate on the election monitoring and internal USG coordination (i.e. a supportive role) rather than the overall coordination efforts with external development partners (i.e. a leading role). Other development partners indicated that they were unaware of CSO's operations and were only familiar with USAID. This occurred despite CSO representatives attending the EDG meetings, indicating a level of confusion as to where CSO's coordination role ended and where USAID's began.

To track progress on USG objectives, CSO created a matrix at the request of the NSS shortly after their arrival as a means of informing policy discussions in Nairobi and Washington by presenting clear data on how the election preparations were going. A system of red-lights and green-lights were used and regular briefings with the Ambassador were held to update mission management in order to track progress. However, there were divergent views about the utility of the matrix. The previous Ambassador preferred the tracker approach, whereas the new Ambassador is said to have preferred a different kind of briefing tool. By the time the elections were approaching, the matrix was no longer being updated regularly, and it is unclear as to how useful the matrix remained.

From the electronic survey, the support for the coordination role is almost unanimous. 95 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that Nairobi-based CSO officers filled a gap in the coordination of election-related events and activities in the lead up to the March

[26] 33 out of 47 counties were covered according to CSO Kenya Engagement Overview.
[27] "CSO Kenya Engagement: Engagement Review," June 2013, p.7.

2013 elections. CSO's largely effective coordination can be attributed to two primary explanations. First, there was clear leadership from the Ambassador mandating that CSO to play an important coordination function which paved the way for all USG agencies to get on board. Second, CSO staff worked tirelessly as the elections approached to ensure that CSO coordinated all of its efforts with USAID and relevant sections of the Embassy. As one USG employee described, CSO was "the glue to hold us all together."

Reporting

CSO supplemented the Political Section with needed staff to help with reporting during a critical time. USG interviews, with both Embassy and USAID staff, revealed that the normal staffing levels leading up to the elections were not adequate to deal with increased demands and that CSO provided critical surge support. There is a virtually unanimous view that the reporting from CSO, especially from the sub-national field officers, was rich in substance on what was going on in key areas of the country. While a US Political Officer did travel regularly to the Coast, CSO's reporting provided useful additional contacts and insight, and other areas such as the Rift Valley were not adequately covered by the Political Section staff until the arrival of the CSO sub-national officers. Embassy interviewees from the Political Section and Public Affairs Section expressed satisfaction with the reporting received; that they found the increased localized understanding useful. In the electronic survey, 60 percent of the respondents said that the political analysis provided by CSO to the Embassy and to Washington was either helpful or very helpful. Similarly, 55 percent of respondents said that CSO officers were "very useful" or "useful" for improving the USG's understanding of local political and conflict dynamics.

There is divided opinion about whether or not the reports from CSO officers were "cable-ready" and whether or not they even should be. On the one hand, several non-CSO respondents in both Washington and in Nairobi felt that CSO officers should be sent to the Foreign Service Institute for training on cable writing prior to deployment; while other non-CSO State Department respondents, also in both Washington and Nairobi, said that the reports provided what was needed and that "a good political officer can transform a good report in less than 30 minutes." A couple of respondents noted that some of the reporting, even in internal documents and cables, was written in a style that seemed to "market" CSO's achievements more than in typical DoS reporting. A minority of USG officials asked that CSO not use the cables to focus narrowly on CSO activities but to focus on broader subnational reporting topics, while a majority of respondents expressed satisfaction with the contents of the subnational analysis.

> "We had close interaction with the [CSO] guys in Coast—we liked this, wasn't just us chasing them. They were really keen to know about people's perceptions on the ground, what should we do to overcome it."
>
> **~Local USAID Partner**

4.2.2 Achieving CSO's Subnational Objectives

1. Identifying and Enhancing Networks and Relationships

CSO effectively utilized programmatic activities to engage local actors and improve their reporting simultaneously. CSO staff used their "convening power" as US Embassy representatives to facilitate the establishment of networks and encourage buy-in from higher level Government of Kenya (GoK) and police officials in

their programmatic activities. The pairing of programmatic and diplomatic activities made it possible for CSO officers to continually engage and request information from network members.

Throughout the evaluation the team was struck by the CSO officers' active and persistent engagement of local community-based organizations (CBOs) and their ability to use existing mechanisms, such as the monthly USAID implementer meetings, to identify potential partners and expand their networks. In Coast, the vast majority of respondents, representing CBOs/NGOs within and outside the KECOSCE network, reported meeting the Coast officers at meetings where they were informed about KECOSCE's EWER activities.[28] CSO officers also used these meetings to gather information on community perceptions and attitudes, asking about individual prognoses for the upcoming elections, people's general attitudes towards violence, and what people were expecting for the future. In the Rift Valley, CSO drew upon the networks which had already been established by other partners and by local Kenyan efforts. In Nakuru and Eldoret, the United Nations had first established coordination meetings of all organizations implementing projects dealing with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) after the 2007/2008 PEV. Although the funding for these coordination meetings had ended, the organizations continued to meet to discuss peace activities in their areas. These networks served as platforms upon which Champions of Peace (CoP) was formed in Nakuru and Uasin Gishu counties.

However, a minority of interviewees, largely representing USAID and its implementers, questioned the effectiveness of CSO's shifting roles. One USAID staff explained, "Programming? Why go there? You want to create another OTI? Don't duplicate it—take advantage of where CSO has comparative advantage—don't just get into programming because 'it's sexy and you can report on it.'" Another USAID official questioned, "Where was the marginal value-added? CSO did some programs and I'm sure that some did some neat and useful things. But they should realize it is a small bit compared to broader USG funding—USAID put in $37million. CSO's value was bringing people together and making policy coherent."

In the electronic survey, the results are mixed with 40 percent agreeing or strongly agreeing that programming in addition to diplomatic work increased CSO's effectiveness, while 30 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed and 30 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. Although the survey responses were anonymous, qualitative interviews revealed a strong disagreement between CSO and USAID staff in the utility of CSO's programming role, perhaps explaining the divide in response above.

CSO also diplomatically and programmatically worked to bring networks, communities, and police together in order to improve attitudes and behavior towards one another,

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[28] Overall, project documents report that CSO helped KECOSCE develop organizational relationships with 14 civil society organizations; brought 21 organizations together for a press conference focused on maintaining election-day peace; received contact lists from 13 organizations to build an SMS database of over 10,000 telephone numbers; organized 56 trainings and events geared towards strengthening, understanding, and mitigating conflict, reaching a reported 2,218 individuals; and recruited 210 peace monitor volunteers to support KESCOCE's 93 paid peace monitors.

particularly between community members and organizations and police. According to the qualitative interviews, 72 percent (22 of 30) of GoK, police, CBO representatives, and community members in the Coast felt that attitudes towards police had improved. In the Rift Valley and Kisumu, the story is more complex with 50 percent (12 out of 24) saying there was an improvement in police-community relations. Responding to this figure, CSO staff said that they expect this figure and the others in the chart below to be higher in Kisumu; however the sample size was too small to allow the evaluation team to reliably parse the data at this level. While many respondents said that the CSO-funded activities involving the police were extremely useful in the Rift Valley, and especially in Kisumu, the activities were too few to be of significance. None of the respondents felt that the attitudes and behaviors had changed permanently due to CSO programming priorities in both the Rift Valley and Kisumu. However, it should be noted that this was mostly attributed to changes in personnel of police who are no longer at the same locations after the elections.



CSO also worked to improve relations between the networks and communities to boost their effectiveness in gaining information and facilitating response. In Coast, 71 percent (15 of 21) felt that community attitudes towards CBO and EWER networks had improved, but only 38 percent (5 out of 13) in the Rift Valley and Kisumu felt there was improvement with respondents citing skepticism since it was temporary and limited to the elections period.

The evaluation gathered similar data on community attitudes towards politicians, which potentially could improve as a result of the influence of diplomacy, peace messaging or EWER on their behavior. According to qualitative interviews, 61 percent of respondents in the Coast (14 of 23) felt that community attitudes towards politicians had improved, while only 29 percent (6 out of 21) in the Rift and Kisumu saw improvements with the politicians. In the Rift Valley and in Coast, respondents said that politicians were no longer using overt ethnic appeals but were just being “more clever” in how they campaigned.

2. Improving the Frequency and Quality of Early Warnings

In addition to information received from community members through its growing EWER networks, trained peace monitors in all the targeted areas played a central role in the functionality of these networks and were particularly instrumental in improving both the frequency and quality of EWs. One high-level police commander in the Coast remarked, "If I were to rate contribution [to peaceful elections], peace monitors would get 50 percent of the credit, police would take 20 percent, and the public would get 30 percent. They were down in the communities where situations were developing, getting information of planned attacks." A GoK official added that the peace monitors "were efficient and would come and check all sides of the story and allowed me to make an informed decision."

In Coast, there is evidence that CSO's support helped improve the assessment and quality of EWs. Once received, EWs were passed to the "project situation room staffed by a project coordinator assisted by two data analysts and a communication officer."[29] KECOSCE explained how the sub-national officers had worked with their staff to set up this situation room, which is still operational.

In Kisumu, CSO supported the establishment of a CoP call center where none existed, which became very active. CSO documents show that in March 4-30, 2012, the Kisumu call center received 1,923 calls and made 2,135 calls to validate reports and support localized responses. In one example, the call center responded to a report that police were harassing and beating residents by getting media to respond, which successfully ended the abuse. In other locations, Mercy Corps supported already established local initiatives. CSO assisted FPFK's EW system in Trans Nzoia by providing phones which greatly increased the capacity of the EW system. CSO also supported EW systems in Eldoret and Nakuru that Mercy Corps had started in 2011.

Overall, the responses from local partners, GoK officials, and community observers were positive on the utility of the local EW system. Several community and police interviewees identified specific incidents where the system helped prevent further violence. However, interviews with police provided a more mixed assessment of the utility of the SMS reporting system. Although the majority of police officers interviewed were still positive on the utility of the system, a couple of officers in Coast claimed that they had received few warnings through the EWER system and that these had turned out to be of little use. A few (less than five) also claimed that the information had been useful during the election period but that people had stopped using the numbers. In the Rift Valley, a police offer said that the SMS reporting system (not established or supported by CSO) is working quite well in the reports he gets daily from District Peace Committee members. However, he doubted whether the EWER systems established by NGOs were providing any useful information.

3. Improving Early Response

CSO's work with police filled a critical gap in programming. One USAID partner explained, "We were not active in working with police, CSO filled a gap. I think this was a good part of the program; they were doing what others were not doing." USAID officials said that USAID

[29] Pact Quarterly Report. Pg. 4.

did not have police specialists, and CSO's EWER activities allowed "USAID to step back from EWER in Coast. Our funding was expiring and CSO was able to continue with the same partners and expand into new areas."

In addition, a critical element of CSO's approach to improving ER came outside of working directly with police. CSO believed that community members—respected elders, women leaders, trained mediators, prominent business people, DPCs, and peace monitors, etc., could play a critical role in mitigating, reporting, or even responding to early incidents of violence (or activities that could potentially lead to violence). CSO worked not only to train these groups in conflict resolution techniques but also sought their help in improving community attitudes to facilitate greater cooperation.

While acknowledging that attitudes may have changed in the Coast, several interviewees questioned if police capacity to respond had truly improved, arguing that the majority of Kenyan police continue to remain ill-equipped, poorly trained, corrupt and still too slow to respond. DPC members from all five major districts in Mombasa revealed suspicions that the EWER system had even been used as a trap—that assailants had used falsely reported an "early warning" to lure police to an isolated location where they were vulnerable.

Incidents of EW Preventing Further Violence

"I am familiar with the KECOSCE system. I thought the system was excellent. It allowed police officers to respond to issues quickly. I heard that the system was used in Mwishomoroni, that police raced there were able to stop violence. Officers ended up being killed but I think it probably stopped larger scale violence." **~ Local Civil Society Advocate**

"There was an incident in Likoni around the elections. But really fast response time and no violence happened. Around the same time that people in black and red that were attacking police stations. Seemed like both reporting and response was effective." **~ Founder of local CBO**

"We had four meetings [with KECOSCE] to talk about EWER—they were very successful. We created networks, opened up channels of information. Information was really flowing, any slight threat was reported. All our officers shared the telephone numbers. We also had a meeting with all CSOs to discuss what it takes to respond. For example, there was an unfortunate incident in Molowaba where four people were killed. We received information and were able to arrest the perpetrators and that capped further violence since I'm sure they were trying to spread further violence." **~GoK Official**

4. Deterring Spoilers[30]

After CSO sub-national officers identified potential spoilers in the Coast, Rift Valley and Kisumu, programming was developed to incorporate them into Pact and Mercy Corps' activities. The team noted that working to deter potential spoilers was not listed as an explicit objective of the Safe Coast Early Warning and Early Response project in either its original concept note or in the final Pact/CSO cooperative agreement nor was it listed in the Mercy Corps cooperative agreement establishing CoP networks. It may, therefore, not constitute a fair criterion upon which to judge either IP's effectiveness.

[30] The reader should note that this section addresses short-term effects of CSO's activities on deterring spoilers while section "4.3: Findings on Longer-Term Impact" addresses CSO's effectiveness (or lack thereof) in addressing the grievances of these spoilers.

However, it was an objective in CSO's concept notes for its own subnational activities and is a factor in judging CSO's effectiveness in diplomacy as well as its continual close supervision of programming to ensure responsiveness to newly detected threats and opportunities as they arose. This ability to continually steer programming for adaptive conflict prevention/mitigation rather than leave it to autopilot under its original conception is a key advantage of CSO's subnational presence and hands-on approach.

There was evidence that the Coast team made active efforts to include members of the MRC, by far the most frequently identified potential spoiler in Coast, in its programming. One police commander who had worked closely with the project explained, "CSO would hold seminars, acting as conveners, and invite area chiefs, opinion leaders, police, village elders, and 'bad boys.' We knew who the bad boys were and that they were MRC but we never said this to the group. We just said these people are interested in hearing about what we have to say." Although the commander never said so explicitly, the example was intended to demonstrate a case in which CSO provided a forum for MRC members to articulate their grievances and participate in the political dialogue surrounding the elections. However, it should be noted that during a focus group interview with purported MRC members, [31] only one of the five had heard of the CSO project.

Interviews with both police and community members in Likoni suggested that CSO and KECOSCE's EWER system had directly averted potential MRC "attacks." Interviewees from both groups explained that a "roving gang" of "around 300 youth" dressed in black and red (seen as the colors of the MRC) gathered and began intimidating community members. This was reported through the KECOSCE system and the police's quick response encouraged the group to "move on."

In Rift, CoP identified spoilers and worked with them in different ways in different parts of the country. For example, in one of the CoP chapters, a potential spoiler was hired to work as a program officer. In other cases, "spoilers" such as boda-boda operators were effectively brought in to attend activities, increasing their involvement and perceived "stake" in peace activities. In Kisumu, most of the potential spoiler groups American Marines and the China Squad attended CSO-sponsored events but expressed skepticism about the efficacy of their participation in meetings at hotels. "It was just a lot of talking at nice hotels," one participant complained. One member said that although he had agreed to put away his guns during the 2013 elections due to his involvement in CSO activities, he was ready to take them out again next time.

5. Promoting peaceful attitudes and behavior through peace messaging and outreach

Substantial efforts were made to promote peaceful attitudes and behavior through peace messaging and outreach in the Coast, Rift Valley, and Kisumu. SMS peace messages were sent out during the registration period, seen as the most critical time in the election cycle. CSO's "facilitation" of these messages—defined as buying of mobile phones, airtime, and

[31] N.B. The evaluators suspect that only one, possibly two, members of this group was actually MRC. However, the others would certainly qualify as "sympathizers" and thereby still provide a useful perspective.

other costs associated with maintaining the hotline—was described by respondents, in all targeted areas, as critical.

That said it is difficult to (1) comment on the actual effect of these messages; and (2) disaggregate any effect attributable to CSO. Numerous interviewees explained that there was an "oversaturation" of peace messages during the period of the elections from many other sources. As one interviewee put it, "Peace has never been preached like this [in the run up to elections] before. DPCs started making a lot of [positive] noise. Peace was everywhere; very few people missed hearing about peace." Another police commander explained, "Government and religious leaders, musicians and actors, all were spreading message of peace. Everybody was touched by the words 'peace' and 'security.'" Yet another respondent may have captured the sentiment best, "during the elections, we ate, slept, and breathed peace."

Overall, although peace messaging and conflict prevention activities were found to be the modal response, CSO's degree of contribution to this versus other international and local efforts cannot be determined. Further, Interviewee responses indicated that of all its different activities, CSO's contribution to creating and disseminating peace messages produced the least marginal added value given the plethora of similar efforts already on the ground. However, one exception is in Kisumu where CoP utilized the media to spread peace messages in addition to SMS technology. CSO worked closely with the local radio stations such as Radio Victoria to contribute to their election-related programming. CSO also provided transport to leaders of local NGOs to get them to the media houses. As one NGO leader in Kisumu explained, "If we had organized the event alone, the media would not have come but the media covered the event not only locally but also in the national media because the Americans were here."

6. Strengthening community resilience against political manipulation (e.g. voter/civic education)

CSO sub-national officers worked to strengthen community resilience through capacity building of DPCs to resolve local conflicts. While originally CSO sub-national officers were supposed to meet with DPCs on a twice monthly basis, interview responses in Coast indicated that these meetings were more infrequent. Nevertheless, CSO provided critical "facilitation funds" which helped these resource constrained groups hold regular meetings. However, all DPC members interviewed in both Rift Valley and Coast spoke of a need for continued support beyond the elections in the form of further "facilitation fees," refresher conflict resolution training, and CSO's continued support in building relationships with local police.

While the support from CSO was helpful, serious concerns remain about how active these DPCs will remain going forward. Several interviewees, including respondents from the GoK, KECOSCE, and the DPCs themselves, explained that while the DPCs had been active during the elections, many of them are now in danger of becoming idle due to lack of funding, though this varies by geographic location and by the individual DPC member.

CSO also made a concerted effort to incorporate religious and business leaders into its programming, particularly to support the spread of peace messages. Through the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC)[32] and the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) in Eldoret, peace messages and hotline number were distributed during sermons and other religious activities. Coast sub-national officers and CoP-Kisumu made a concerted effort to incorporate business leaders and convince them of the economic benefit of peace (or economic cost of violence). In one example, the head of the manufacturers' association led the efforts of CoP-Kisumu and helped to fund some of the peace activities during the election period. They explained that it was in the personal interests of business owners to support these activities to prevent a repeat of destruction and financial losses they experienced following the 2007/2008 PEV.

7. **Reducing grievances and promoting confidence in the new devolved government**

CSO agreed to the Embassy's desire for CSO to prioritize its engagement on preventing electoral violence rather than devolution and reforms. However, it did include in the concept for Coast reducing grievances and promoting confidence in the newly developed government. This was due to initial perceptions that the MRC was likely to act as a spoiler during the elections. When CSO determined this was not the case, it deprioritized this objective and did little to work on it. The relatively low level of electoral violence might seem to validate this decision and the decisions not to include it all in the Rift concept or to engage in civic education as well as voter education. However, as detailed in later sections, many respondents in all subnational areas expressed concerns that CSO's narrow focus on short-term electoral violence prevention rather than also helping voters' participation in the election to be informed and effective on justice issues missed an opportunity to make violence less likely in the medium term.

4.2.3 Cross-Cutting Factors Influencing CSO's Effectiveness

Numerous cross-cutting contextual or internal factors served to either aid or hinder CSO's effectiveness as described above. This section presents the most salient of these factors and explains their significance in facilitating or impeding the engagement's overall success. Contextual factors complicate determining CSO's effects, as they may be partly or entirely responsible for observed effects. One could wonder if the many positive contextual factors were strong enough that international assistance was not needed, but we have discussed evidence that efforts such as CSO's to magnify this sentiment and build EWER and conflict prevention capacity were helpful adjuncts. Understanding the contextual factors is also relevant to evaluating how different contexts for similar future engagements might impact effectiveness, and how those engagements might need to be modified. Understanding the internal factors could inform organizational changes to improve future performance in similar engagements or more generally.

Contextual Factors

[32] CICC is a faith-based non-profit that works with religious leaders from all major faiths in Coast.

1. **Political Realignments**

The most important factor influencing CSO's effectiveness was the ever-changing political dynamics and alliances that were formed prior to the elections. According to the team's interviews in the Rift Valley, the alliance between presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu and his chosen vice presidential candidate William Ruto, a Kalenjin, was the result of negotiations not only between the political elite but also between the ethnic leadership. Ethnic enemies in 2007/2008 thus became political allies in 2013. The announcement in early December 2012[33] changed the predicted pattern of PEV and made Kikuyu-Kalenjin violence much less likely, which reduced conflict risk in the Rift Valley. By this time, CSO sub-national officers had already been deployed in the previous hotspots, and IPs working in those areas had already been identified to receive CSO funding. Despite this, CSO was sufficiently agile and moved one of its officers to Kisumu rather than increasing the staffing levels in the Rift Valley.

2. **Abhorrence of previous violence**

A majority of interviewees in all areas of investigation expressed their surprise, disbelief, and ultimate disgust with the levels of violence that ensued during 2007/2008. Kenyans themselves truly wanted these elections to be peaceful. Fears of greater loss of life and memories of those they lost in 2007/8 motivated many Kenyans to take part in conflict prevention activities. In addition, many attached significance to a sense that "the world is watching" during the 2013 elections. When asked about CSO's presence at the subnational level, the sentiment that the USG is concerned enough to be here and is watching was expressed often during the interviews. This was seen as a significant deterrence to potential violence, but it is one that is dependent on the underlying association of violence with disapproval. It is also a way of amplifying a Kenyan resiliency on which CSO filled key gaps for the USG through its unique sustained subnational presence and its role in organizing election monitors.

3. **The ICC Effect**

The influence of the ICC trials cannot be overemphasized. When asked what factors helped explain the difference in the level of violence between the 2007 and 2013 elections, all but one respondent in Coast (45 out of 46 interviews) mentioned the ICC and the belief that "if they can get the President, imagine what they can do to someone like me." A similar sentiment was expressed in virtually all interviews in the Rift Valley and Kisumu.

4. **Trust in New Institutions**

Interviewees also frequently expressed guarded optimism in the new Constitution, devolution of power, and other new institutional arrangements. "Coastarians" expressed optimism that process would finally begin to address some of their historical injustices, though respondents in other locations doubted the reforms would make any difference for long-standing injustices such as land reforms. Interviewees were most positive on reforms to increase the independence of the Judiciary and the IEBC, and explained that these

[33] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20511930 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20578837

reforms were a key reason for renewing citizens' faith in these institutions. Instead of going to the streets as in 2007 to dispute the election results, opposition leader Raila Odinga challenged the elections through the Supreme Court, and people ultimately accepted the Court's decision. According to recent Afrobarometer surveys,[34] the electoral management used to be one of the least trusted institutions but as a result of the reforms the IEBC became one of the most trusted institutions just prior to the elections. Interviews suggested that was a new belief that the national elections were no longer "winner takes all" as losing at the national level could be compensated by winning at the county or governor level.

However, follow on survey following the elections caution that "it is unclear how much respect or trust Kenyans continue to have in their political institutions."[35] Raila Odinga has announced that his party would boycott all future elections until the IEBC is reformed. In a recent national survey, confidence in Kenya's new political institutions, including the Supreme Court and the IEBC (from 62 percent in February to 32 percent in July, only five months later), has fallen dramatically.[36] While the enthusiasm for the new institutions has waned in Kisumu as throughout the country, interviewees there explained that in the newly devolved system, the Luos still won the governorship even if they did not win the presidency. Therefore, the winner-take-all nature of the previous system has been replaced with multiple levels of contestation.

5. Improved Behavior of Politicians and the Media

A majority of interviewees also cited restraint and more responsible behavior from the politicians themselves. Politicians did not overtly use ethnic messages as a way of mobilizing voters. The media coverage during the election period was significantly different than in 2007 due to strong formal rules from both the National Steering Committee on Election Monitoring, under the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), and the Media Council of Kenya[37] as well as internal, self-imposed mechanisms. Journalists trained by USAID-funded Internews specifically covered stories promoting peaceful elections. One IEBC official explained how politicians in her district were asked to sign a "Code of Conduct" with the understanding that any violation of that code could result in invalidation of one's candidacy. Similarly the media houses such as Radio Victoria had strict internal codes in place for its journalists. On several occasions, the editors would simply stop airing a politician's interview while they were speaking if they said something that was inflammatory or was perceived by the producer or editor to bring violence. The journalists did not inform the politicians of this, so the politicians would keep on talking until the producer would turn their voices back on air. Another interviewee explained the obvious concern and restraint shown by politicians during their rally, choosing less obvious and provocative words in the face of the multitudes of cellphones recording the event. Finally, journalists were keenly aware that their fellow journalist was

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[34] See www.afrobarometer.org for the full survey results. The University of Nairobi's Institute of Development Studies is the local partner for the Afrobarometer in Kenya.
[35] Burchard, Stephanie. "After the Dust has Settled: Kenya's 2013 Elections," Africa Watch, July 25, 2013.
[36] "Political Barometer Survey," Ipsos Synovate, July 10, 2013.
[37] Put name of the Media Council document here.

standing trial at The Hague, making ethnicized reporting a risky endeavor. It should be noted, however, that diplomatic activity and peace messaging to which CSO contributed may have also influenced politicians and journalists, as well as building on attitude and behavior changes that were already happening.

6. Lack of Police Resources and Institutional Memory

While outside of CSO's direct control, two critical factors limited CSO's success in working with the police. While police officers made strides in organizing more tactical police responses, these efforts were and continue to be hampered by the fact that many police officers simply do not have the equipment needed to respond and effectively ensure their safety. A second limiting factor was the frequent transfer of officers, especially senior ones. Police officers trained during the engagement were often transferred to other areas, severely limiting any lasting intuitional memory.

7. Other Development Partners' Activities

Interviewees emphasized that there was an abundance of domestic and international actors involved in peace-building activities during the elections in the Coast, Eldoret, and Nakuru. The saturation of peace messages motivated peace monitors and community watchers but also meant that there was some overlap and duplication of efforts.

In a significant number of interviews in the Rift Valley and Kisumu, interviewees continually referred to CoP as USAID funded or confused CoP activities with Mercy Corps' Local Empowerment for Peace or the Yes Youth Can activities. Even some of Mercy Corps' program officers in the Rift Valley whose salaries were paid by CSO did not know the difference between USAID's or CSO's funding support. For many local Kenyans, all aid to Kenya from the USG was from USAID. This fact made it difficult for the team to assess the degree to which respondents felt CSO's programmatic overlap with other partners' activities was helpful or redundant.

In other areas such as Kisumu, Burnt Forest, Bungoma, and Kitale, fewer NGO and CBO activities took place. Interviewees stressed that, although CSO played a helpful part, that part should not be overstated given the still high level of activity occurring before, during, and after CSO's engagement.

8. Prevalence of an Allowance Culture

CSO decided generally not to pay allowances—known as "sitting" or "participation" fees—in part due to lack of program funding at the beginning of its subnational work, although this was not consistently applied in different geographic areas. This had both positive and negative unintended consequences. On the one hand, of all the organizations that came to the initial meetings of CoP, only those truly committed to peace continued attending subsequent meetings. However, the negative side of the policy is that some participants who perhaps wanted to attend could not for legitimate reasons such as not having enough funds for transportation. Furthermore, CSO did not stick to a consistent policy throughout its areas of operation, with allowances being paid in some CoP meetings but not in others. Fortunately, the geographic separation helped to keep this inconsistency concealed.

Transport costs may be considered as a separate albeit related issue. In some areas, where poverty is higher and transport more difficult, payment (or reimbursement) of transport

costs is a necessity for the project to operate. For example, in the Mount Elgon area, it takes several different modes of transport, which can be expensive, to get from Cheptais to Bungoma. Many participants in this area can only attend if they are given transportation funds. In one case, participants were told *after they had already arrived* that they would be given their transport allowances or reimbursements by SMS payments after the event. Participants expressed outrage at this policy and the organizers were forced to give funds out of their pockets for their return expenses.

Internal Mechanisms

1. **Agility and Short-Term Nature of CSO's approach**

When asked to consider CSO's greatest contribution to the peace work in the Coast, a Pact representative responded that CSO was faster and more flexible compared to other donors, providing "surge support and adding on what was already there...quick and light money compared to USAID." A broad spectrum of other interviewees (community members, CBO leaders, police, and governmental officials) highlighted CSO's sustained presence in the Coast as a key comparative advantage helping to foster relationships and trust and also allowing Coast officers to identify those actors most interested and committed to building peace. CSO's ability to pivot to cover Kisumu is often cited as evidence of this agility.

However, a negative consequence of CSO's agility and shorter-term programming horizon is that it is less effective in addressing core structural and institutional grievances. Interviewees in all geographic areas stated that they felt the engagement activities did not do enough to address core grievances such as land, unemployment, illiteracy, security, and other historical injustices. One community-based respondent argued, "If I could do it over, I would differ a bit with [CSO's approach]. I feel that banners and meetings are not enough. This is too short-term; I would want to develop a more long-term strategy. You can't just do 'fire-fighting' to address immediate needs—you need to make sure historical injustices are addressed." Another GoK official explained, "I think donor programs need to be sustainable and continue to work with communities on land issues and capacity building—if you look at conflict issues, it comes from ignorance and people taking advantage of the situation. Education programs and capacity building programs would help a lot." While it was never CSO's intent to address these underlying grievances, these sentiments reveal the limits of short-term programming and the true conflict mitigation impact CSO can hope to achieve. Only in Kisumu was an event, using unspent money, held *after the elections* addressing devolution and the new system of government.

One potential missed opportunity for addressing longer term grievances identified by respondents was CSO's focus on *voter* over *civic* education. CSO aided voter education efforts to reduce the ability of potential spoilers to mobilize conflict based on misinformation or misunderstandings about the voting process. In Nakuru and Uasin Gishu, CoP sponsored voter education materials that told people where to vote, i.e. the newly demarcated electoral boundaries, the polling centers in the constituency, and the number of ballots on the day of voting (six different elected offices). In some cases, CoP's partners used IEBC materials as well.

While explaining how to vote is an important contribution, there was limited focus on its corollary civic education, i.e. explaining *why* one should vote. Issues such as the definition

of the roles of the newly elected positions (e.g., the difference between an MP's role and a Member of the County Assembly), political accountability, and devolution are just a few of the topics that were not properly addressed in the materials. Instead there was an overly narrow focus on peace messaging. Many different leaders of organizations raised these issues in the Coast, Rift Valley, and Kisumu. "There is a major difference between peace and more effective democracy. If you are more concerned about peace, then you don't have to worry about being informed. But if you are promoting effective democracy, you really want people to be passionate about the outcome." Several community and Nairobi based interviewees (including at least one USG interviewee) lamented that justice was sacrificed for peace during the elections.

Following a review of this initial finding, a CSO officer explained that CSO prioritized voter over civic education as the latter was considered to be a longer term concern and an area where USAID was already active.

2. Convening power

Embassy presence at the subnational level brought a different dynamic to local activities. Many respondents stated that US Embassy representatives attracted higher level officials than NGOs with additional media attention as well. CSO subnational officers' affiliation with the US Embassy granted them access that other implementers would not be able to attain, particularly with high-level GoK and police officials. Local NGO leaders in Kisumu expressed appreciation for this, saying that only because of the Americans did high level GoK, police and party officials come to CoP–Kisumu events.

However, a negative consequence of US Embassy affiliation was the perception of furthering US partisanship. On Tuesday, February 5, 2013, President Obama issued a statement on the Kenyan elections, urging Kenyans to vote peacefully and to let the courts handle any election dispute. The President also said, "The choice of who will lead Kenya is up to the Kenyan people. The United States does not endorse any candidate for office but we do support an election that is peaceful and reflects the will of the people."[38] However, this historic statement was never referenced during the evaluation, although project documents claim that KECOSCE did distribute segments of this speech through its social media platforms. Instead, the statements two days later by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, a former US Ambassador to Kenya, were repeatedly quoted. Although Carson refrained from naming then-presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta or his running mate William Ruto during a conference call with reporters, he responded to questions about Kenyatta by warning repeatedly that "choices have consequences." He explained, "People should be thoughtful about those they choose to be leaders, the impact their choices would have on their country, region, or global community." When asked specifically about Kenyatta, Carson responded, "Individuals have histories, individuals have

[38] Emmanuel Onyango, "Obama: US to Respect Free and Fair Kenya Presidential Vote." Daily Nation. Tuesday, November 5, 2013.

images, individuals have reputations. When they are selected to lead their nations, those images, histories and reputations go along with them."[39]

These comments were widely interpreted throughout Kenya to mean that the election of a candidate charged by the ICC would have consequences different from elections if another candidate is chosen. Therefore, no matter what CSO did to dispel this myth, it was widely assumed that Raila Odinga was the US's preferred candidate. In the Rift Valley, interviewees reference this statement as a cause for concern and claimed it had the potential for negative effects. In areas outside of the Rift Valley, the issue did not emerge as a problem. Therefore, CSO operated much more easily in pro-ODM areas such as Kisumu and the Coast as compared to Kenyatta's stronghold in the Rift Valley, and Carson's statement may have worked to rally support for the then Uhuru-Ruto coalition.

3. Late start of programming

In all areas in which CSO operated, interviewees stated that the time period for implementing the programs was too short. As one KECOSCE staff member in Coast explained, the program "started a bit late, five months is a very short amount of time." Another interviewee added, "It is difficult to do effective election programming so late in the game." For CoP members, the time line was even shorter. The Mercy Corps agreement only took effect from December 2012, and CoP activities began in earnest in January 2013 only two months away from the elections. While mindful of certain factors explaining the relative late start of the activities were out of CSO's control, such as the availability of funds, and also understanding CSO's more short-term catalytic nature, the overwhelming feeling conveyed by respondents was that if the duration of programming needs to be scaled back, then so do the expectations for what the program can reasonably achieve (and claim to achieve). According to the electronic survey, 50 percent of the respondents said the CSO engagement was "much too short" or "somewhat too short" with 44 percent saying it was the right amount of time. The divided views are likely affected by some respondents who included the planning period of the engagement with the programming part.

4. Information Asymmetries

Many respondents from USAID indicated that they lacked clear information about CSO programming. CSO's own documentation was equally unclear. Many felt that the programming aspect of the CSO sub-national officers was not clearly spelled out in their SOWs. Some of CSO's own officers were not aware of the amount of funding available for programming even after they were already in the field. There was a lack of transparency on funding amounts and program activities until just before the activities began.

A significant negative consequence of this informational asymmetry, particularly at the community level, was an awkwardly one-sided

> "…the team believes strongly that Champions of Peace would not have been started absent our participation, at least in the Kenyan context. That said, USG staff come with their own baggage in terms of the way the communities perceive them, countering this perception requires a delicate touch"
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> **~CSO Engagement Review**

[39] Kevin Kelly, Daily Nation, "Choices Have Consequences, US tells Kenyan voters." Daily Nation. Thursday, November 7, 2013.

relationship with local partners. Before the programming side of CSO sub-national work began in January 2013, CSO sub-national officers were working on the ground without dedicated funding. In many cases, CSO officers used their own funds to buy refreshment or other supplies for meetings. Participants at these meetings expressed sincere gratitude and noted the commitment that CSO officers had to peacebuilding in Kenya. One Kenyan exclaimed, "If they care so much about our country, then so should we." However, their presence at the meetings was always noticed and/or felt, and they were thereby unavoidably conspicuous. During the initial coordination meetings held between October and December 2012, the CSO sub-national officers were primarily gathering information (reporting function) and began to engage in other diplomatic efforts such as identifying spoilers.

Since USAID and its partners had been on the ground longer and had long-standing relationships with local officials, IPs at times expressed confusion about who this sudden new USG actor was supporting similar activities Interviews with USAID and its partners revealed a marked concern that CSO's activities could potentially harm USAID's own election related work. In Eldoret, one USAID implementer received an angry phone call from a GoK official regarding CoP work in the area. As CSO became increasingly associated with programming rather than simply information gathering, this confusion and associated concern eased somewhat.

In areas where CSO had better relations with the GoK, the confusion made less of a difference, but in areas where CSO had less contact with GoK the confusion was widespread. Of course, the causal direction could be reversed. In either case, it is impossible to know how much effect, if any, this awkwardness had on CSO achieving its objectives, but this was an often-mentioned concern.

A further factor that contributed to awkwardness was how CSO sub-national officers introduced themselves. Their business cards stated that they were Political Officers from the US Embassy. "Political" in many environments, including Kenya, denotes partisan interests. This was a cause for concern for many Kenyans, but due to the dedicated efforts of sub-national officers the skeptics still participated in CSO-funded and CSO-supported activities.

Interestingly, community members in Coast did not seem to be overly concerned. As one interviewee explained, "for us it didn't really matter…To us, what mattered is that they came here to help."

5. Staff Turnover

High turnover of staff negatively affected program implementation as well as diplomatic efforts. The longest serving CSO sub-national officers were in country for 8 months (August to April) While unforeseen circumstances cannot be avoided, the short duration of officers' assignments was by design. CSO provided officers to serve as team members for the KPIC Cell for a period of 11 months, beginning in mid-June through April 2013, noting that "staff will serve for periods of 5-6 months."

6. Available Procurement Mechanisms

Although the procurement mechanisms used by CSO were commonly referred to by respondents as grants, DoS had "substantial involvement" [40] and these were actually cooperative agreements. In fact, due to the very high level of involvement both in the agreements and on the ground, the appropriateness of these mechanisms is questionable. Contracts were not used, although at times what CSO really wanted to do was to procure goods and services, and this contributed to conflicts between CSO and the IPs.

For example, CSO faced enormous challenges in the Rift when hiring local staff due to Mercy Corps rules. While CSO documentation describes need for "clarity on hiring mechanism for Kenyan staff,"[41] this was a serious impediment to CSO's effectiveness. Some CSO sub-national officers had grants management experience while others had none. CSO in Washington gave a variety of instructions such as hiring local staff as PSC[42] or they were hired as translators.[43] In one case, a CSO sub-national officer had an agreement to hire someone only to be told that the person would be hired at one-third of the promised amount. Fortunately, this was eventually reversed. There seems to be a difference between the amount of involvement that the CSO sub-national officers wanted to have and the amount of involvement with which the IP was comfortable. This led to friction with the Mercy Corps officers on numerous occasions (over hiring of personnel to procurement issues), but the issues were diffused due to the personal involvement of the country director and her desire to work things out amicably. The reason given was that the CSO officers had no experience in programming so mistakes were expected. However, CSO officers suggest it was due to the IP's lack of experience with the added oversight inherent in cooperative agreements.

7. Use of Central Hotels for Large Events

There was a tendency to hold large events in centralized hotels, perceived by community members as overly expensive, rather than going into rural areas or using local facilities. However, according to CSO staff, in nearly every case, Kenyans themselves chose to hold meetings in these facilities, not CSO, despite CSO advising against this. Whether due to IPs' procurement rules, proximity to CSO sub-national staff members, or security considerations, most functions were held in towns. In Eldoret and in Kisumu, participants explained that events at these hotels provided them with lunches that cost more than participants' daily salary. This was viewed by local NGOs and especially CBOs as wasteful and attracting the wrong kind of participants. In one case, a CSO officer successfully worked around Mercy Corps' procurement rules to avoid having an event in a hotel which was "pre-authorized" but was not the desired location by CSO or by CoP participants. Through the officer's persistence and due to a Mercy Corps officer being on holiday, the event was held at the appropriate location. On several other occasions, hotels were used. Some key stakeholders at the local level may have been missed, and this town-based approach lends itself to attracting "workshop entrepreneurs." Fortunately, this was minimized by CSO's

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[40] Substantial involvement by the Department of State included participation on the Steering Committee and review and approval of "all existing personnel and personnel to be hired."
[41] "CSO Kenya Engagement: Engagement Review." June 2013.
[42] Ibid., p. 5
[43] Ibid., p. 25

decision, on most occasions, not to pay attendees to go to its functions. Furthermore, many CoP meetings did not happen in hotels, including weekly meetings in a Catholic church in Eldoret and free office space used in Nakuru.

4.3 Findings on Medium to Long-Term Impact

4.3.1 CSO's Contributions to USG Objectives

Of the three overarching USG objectives, respondents unanimously agreed that CSO's engagement did not nor was it ever designed to contribute to advancing reforms. Its time frame and limited resources were meant for short-term, high impact interventions rather than reform efforts which are better-suited for long and medium term interventions such as USAID programming. Interviewees agreed that CSO contributed mostly to the "peaceful" part of "credible, transparent and peaceful elections" as originally outlined in the USG strategy.[44] CSO thereby also contributed to the conflict prevention and mitigation objective, but was so focused on preventing electoral violence as to have more limited effects beyond the election than might otherwise have been. As discussed below, many respondents, including potential spoilers, suspect violence was merely deferred, and opportunities were missed to make the election a more effective mechanism for addressing grievances and thus preventing violence in the longer term.

Within this context, a wide range of explanations were given to explain the relative peace of the 2013 elections as compared to the 2007 elections. Of the 89 responses from interviews in the Rift Valley and in Kisumu,[45] greater awareness of peace from peace messages and civic education efforts was the top reason (21 percent or 19 out of 89) given for less violence in 2013. Therefore, some attribution can be given to development partners and local implementers in that they contributed to these efforts.

4.3.2 Enduring Intended Effects

CSO prioritized police-public relations through activities that brought civil society organizations and police together. This focus was unique to CSO's approach as USAID did not do this. A key successful activity involved police officers giving out their personal cell phone numbers for citizens to call them directly about election-related violence and also signaled to the community that they cared and would respond to their reports.

More police-focused activities occurred in the Coast than in the other areas of the Rift Valley and Kisumu. In the Rift Valley, most senior police officers were transferred to other locations throughout the country after the elections, so many of the current officers were

[44] CSO's election observation efforts were cited by a few interviewees as helping to verify and validate the credibility of the election process. The bracketed sentence above simply conveys the shift in the "topline messaging" of the US Embassy leading up to the elections.

[45] Due to respondents giving multiple answers, the number of *responses* is higher than the number of *respondents*.

unaware of CoP activities during the elections.[46] In Coast, the situation is different from Rift with a spectrum of respondents there more likely to believe that relations between the community and the police had improved. The presence of the Police Specialist in Coast likely helps explain part of the variation between Rift and Coast.

Respondents disagreed that relations between politicians and the public had improved as the result of CSO interventions. During the election period, CoP had great difficulties getting politicians to attend their events in the Rift Valley. Only in Kisumu, a more US-friendly atmosphere, did politicians attend peace-building events, but then still had difficulties avoiding being overtly partisan even at these USG-sponsored peace events. After the elections, there is substantial agreement that the elected politicians are distant from the electorate less only seven months after being elected.

4.3.3 Enduring Positive and Negative Unintended Consequences

1. Rewarding those who Perpetrate Violence

During interviews in Nakuru and Eldoret (in the Rift Valley), allegations abound that certain ethnic groups (either the Kikuyu or the Kalenjin) were benefitting more than the other as a result of the 2007/2008 PEV. This includes references to services given to IDPs such as land or new housing as well as participants in certain CoP activities. Some respondents contended that CoP was dominated by a particular group or that a Mercy Corps program manager was working to assist only members of his/her ethnic group. On several occasions, respondents questioned the inclusion of potential spoilers into CSO activities as participants. While the inclusion of spoilers in CoP activities was a key to preventing election violence, an unintended consequence is that underlying grievances and inequalities may be exacerbated. This could inadvertently contribute to future violence between groups if the perpetrators of previous violence receive recognition in peace programs that is not granted to the victims of violence.

A corollary to the above is the perception that international partners overlook peace and only care when Kenyans threaten violence. Several interviewees expressed frustration that CSO, like other donors, ended their programming and left immediately after the "peaceful" elections. As one religious leader put it, "the message we take away is that 'we only care about you when you will potentially be violent.'" Phrased differently, donors could be seen as "punishing peace" and creating perverse incentives towards violence. However, CSO officers countered that this may not be a fair criticism as several donors, including USAID, continue to maintain a long-term presence working on peacebuilding, devolution and other constitutional reforms.

2. Unintended Consequences of Peace Messages

Some interviewees questioned CSO's assumption that working towards peaceful and yet still credible elections are complementary goals. With the inundation of peace messaging,

[46] Both senior as well as junior officers are regularly transferred to different parts of the country since the police service is national and has not been devolved to the county level. Some senior officers who are perceived as having been politically loyal have been promoted to positions in Nairobi.

civil society leaders now express concern that this has inadvertently led to a passive electorate. "I think peace messages were so effective that opposition civil society leaders toned people down so much that we 'sacrificed justice for peace.'" Many citizens conflate peacefulness with passivity, and resentment is building towards newly elected leaders who are not fulfilling their elected mandates. One proclaimed that civil society is "dead" in Kenya. In order for voters to hold their newly elected leaders accountable, citizens need to be active and engaged. Some voters may have misunderstood the extensive peace messaging, thinking that it meant that they should not vocalize their anger on grievances. This may have made the election less effective at producing leaders who will address those grievances, and this could be compounded if civil society continues to be passive in the post-election period. Consequently, the argument goes, the peace messaging could perversely cause grievances to mount, making it more likely that spoilers will use them to mobilize violent conflict. Many spoilers interviewed threatened to do just that if grievances are not addressed.

3. Competition for Scarce Funding

An unintended consequence of CSO's networking was the in-fighting that emerged between network members. Many of the network members began to see CoP as a competitor with its members for scarce donor funding. CoP has become another organization rather than remain a movement, due to the limited funding provided by CSO and the encouragement by CSO sub-national officers to first register and then apply for additional funding. In some of the chapters of CoP, members dropped out of activities soon after the elections and vehemently opposed CoP registering as a CBO or NGO. Additionally, member organizations who were active in CoP during the elections are largely NGOs so many questioned the utility of CoP registering as a CBO. "How can our NGO be a member of a CBO? It doesn't work that way. CoP should have remained a network rather than a CBO," explained one civil society leader. In Kisumu, approximately 11 member organizations founded CoP and CoP claims that all are still members. At its height, more than 30 organizations took part in CSO-sponsored CoP activities in Kisumu. Due to the controversy over registration, it is unlikely CoP-Kisumu will be able to maintain the active involvement of the 11 founding members, let alone reach higher numbers in the future.

4. EWER systems

EWER systems may have been too effective, encouraging under-equipped officers to respond to active and violent situations. This rather paradoxical, unintended consequence was the EW systems such as the one installed by KECOSCE may have been more effective than the ER component was able to handle. The incidents of police deaths in Changamwe and Kisauni were provided as examples.

However, as a positive side effect, the EWER hotline was also utilized for the reporting of non-election related incidents in the Coast, in Rift Valley and in Kisumu. The hotline established during the KECOSCE program remains operational and receives around five messages per day, a number with which KECOSCE staff seemed satisfied. A hotline in Kisumu still exists but not in any of the areas in the Rift Valley. Non-election related incidents and crimes include child abductions, petty theft and crime, and domestic violence. Both KECOSCE and CoP-Kisumu continue to analyze and filter this information, and the

majority of incidents are sent to the DPCs where the incident took place for further criminal investigation.

In Nakuru, Eldoret and Kitale, like Coast, citizens sometimes used the EWER systems for incidents that were not election-related. Due to the belief that police would not actually come, the ER system received "false calls," where local residents just wanted to see if the police would really respond. When police arrived, they found no violence taking place. In one incident, police responded to a false report and then were not able to attend a real event of violence that happened at the same time elsewhere. However this was a rare occurrence, and the most common complaint especially in the Rift Valley, is that the police never responded at all.

4.4 Findings on Future Effects and Sustainability

Although the CSO Kenya engagement was not designed to be sustainable in the traditional development sense, several outcomes, particularly at the subnational level, have lasted beyond the end of the funding and the departure of the CSO officers. In the electronic survey, half of the respondents (50 percent) said the lasting effects are with the increased capacity of local Kenyan partners to address conflict and 43 percent say there is improvement with the police relations, with only 21 percent identifying lasting effects with the Embassy staff. Slightly over one third of respondents (35 percent) said there were no lasting effects. These findings echo findings from the qualitative field interviews.

4.4.1 Evidence at the Embassy in Nairobi

There is surprisingly little evidence of lasting effects at the Embassy Nairobi. This can be explained by several reasons. First, due to staff turnover, individuals arrived during the summer of 2013 and are new to the mission. Second, officials throughout the Embassy were aware of conflict issues prior to the arrival of the CSO team and therefore their awareness, knowledge, and capacity may not be attributed to CSO's presence. Both State and USAID officials rated themselves highly knowledgeable on conflict prevention and mitigation, and the evaluation team found this to be the case during the interviews.

However, this in no way should be taken to mean that the CSO engagement was not effective. A majority of respondents who work at the Mission (State and USAID) gave credit to CSO for adding value. CSO helped the Embassy enormously with reporting, coordination and analysis during the election period.

Further, CSO officers were not viewed as having specialized skills exclusive to CSO. One high-level USG official said that CSO officers provided excellent support during the elections, but DRL or other State Department officers could have equally done the job. However, while recognizing some functions could have been replicated by other bureaus, CSO staff felt their analytical and planning processes and establishment of field-based operations were unique contributions.

According to the findings of the electronic survey, neither CSO nor USAID were found to be uniquely qualified on a wide range of attributes.[47] Rather the vast majority of respondents said both USAID and CSO were equally qualified to carry out the work.

4.4.2 Evidence with the Partners at the Subnational level

At the subnational level, there is evidence to suggest that the engagement has resulted in lasting effects in some key areas. EWER systems have continued to function in Mombasa, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu and Kitale and are being implemented by local partners. The EWER systems are now used for non-election violence. Second, there is some evidence that the relationships which were established between stakeholders, such as between local NGOs and in fewer instances between local NGOs and the police, have continued. Most importantly, the networks which brought CSOs and other organizations together continue to provide a platform for this interaction. These networks have now shifted from peace-building to post-election issues like devolution.

The views on what has happened to CoP are mixed. Many partners complained that since the elections ended they had not heard of CoP again. In other areas, like Bungoma and Kitale, the moniker CoP was not recalled at all during the evaluation interviews, likely owing to the short amount of time CSO operated there. The views are divided as to whether CoP still exists or not. Only CoP-Kisumu is functioning, while CoP-Nakuru and CoP-Uasin Gishu claim to be still in existence, but there is no evidence to confirm this other than ambitious program managers who are in the process of fundraising. There are also conflicting reports from former members of CoP about the existence of a CoP office. CoP-Nakuru is in the process of receiving office furniture from CSO during the disposition process. CoP-Nakuru also admits it has no funding to pay for office rentals to put this furniture.

Both CoP-Nakuru and CoP-Uasin Gishu are in the process of registering as CBOs, and CoP–Kisumu registered as a CBO on April 24, 2013 with the District Gender and Social Development Officer under the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. Membership has dropped off due to the legal registration and its implications.

While CSO successfully fostered key institutional and personal relationships, the endurance of these achievements is heavily dependent on external variables such as the outcome of the ICC trials, the implementation of the new Constitution and its reforms, and other factors such as the sustained motivation and presence of actors with whom CSO worked in Coast, Rift, and Kisumu. In other words, the peace that was produced during the elections may or may not endure due to other factors.

Interestingly, interviewees in Coast were more optimistic of the likelihood of sustained future effects than expected, with 20 of 34 responding (59 percent) indicating that they either "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that EWER networks were well prepared, resourced, and motivated to continue their conflict prevention activities after CSO's departure. In the

[47] This includes implementing and scaling up quickly, being efficient and cost effective, bringing in local networks, bringing in additional financial resources, bringing technical expertise, using innovative approaches, responding to Washington, and responding to beneficiaries.

Rift Valley and in Kisumu, respondents were prepared and motivated but virtually all claimed that they were not adequately resourced to continue the EWER systems.

5. Conclusions

Analysts both within and outside of Kenya declared the 2013 elections a relative success due to the low levels of violence before, during, and after the elections.[48] However, as there were many different donors and IPs supporting a wide range of conflict prevention and mitigation activities, *attribution* to CSO specific activities is hard to establish. However, with a small budget, a short time frame, and dedicated American and Kenyan personnel, CSO and its partners still made important *contributions* to the 2013 elections. CSO's contributions and approach were unique and did not merely augment other ongoing USG efforts but provided new partnerships and new types of intervention.

5.1 National Conclusions

1. CSO provided necessary support and filled critical personnel gaps at the Embassy and USAID during the election period.
2. CSO officers usefully augmented the Political Section, with sub-national officers providing detailed, on-the-ground information to the Embassy's Political Section not typically collected by capital-based Political Officers. This produced reporting to Washington that was detailed and included subnational analysis that was not covered prior to CSO's arrival.
3. CSO's coordination role in Nairobi was one of its most effective functions during the Kenya engagement. After a tumultuous period at the Mission largely due to the leadership issues and insufficient staffing, CSO provided critical surge support, contributed positively to inter-agency relations, set up the Command Center for the election results, and coordinated the International Observer Missions.

[48] There was election-related violence but it was undisputedly at much lower levels than in 2007/2008. Violence that is related to long-standing grievances is not considered in this conclusion and this violence continues to plague parts of Kenya on a regular basis.

4. Extending the Embassy's diplomatic reach beyond Nairobi assisted to achieve the USG reporting objectives prior to and during the elections by providing timely and accurate data from the subnational level.

5.2 Sub-National Conclusions

1. CSO effectively enhanced Kenya-led initiatives. By using a demand-driven approach, CSO sub-officers were able to catalyze civil society organizations to coordinate their efforts with those of the police and work together as networks to implement a range of activities which enhanced EWER systems, deterred potential spoilers from engaging in violence, provided voter education, and distributed peace messages.
2. Recognizing the urgency of action and given its relatively short duration of programming, CSO took advantage of pre-existing networks and USAID partners already on the ground in both the Rift Valley and the Coast, but continually worked to expand these networks. CSO leveraged existing USG procurement mechanisms and previous organizational assessments to optimize the efficiency of its partner selection in the Coast and the Rift Valley.
3. Unlike other actors with fixed locations to operate, CSO remained flexible enough to pivot at opportune times to add a new geographic area, e.g., Kisumu, in order to respond to updated analyses indicating a potential risk of post-election conflict. While other areas of the country were saturated with peace programming, CSO was able to move sub-national officers, find new partners, and provide programming to an important area where others had not been able to respond. Much of the analysis during the planning stages relied on 2007/2008 hotspots, but the political dynamics were substantially different in 2013. Once the grants and cooperative agreements were signed, it was hard for CSO to change its programming, but it was possible to change the location of its sub-national officers to some degree.
4. Although using USAID IPs (Pact and Mercy Corps) assisted in CSO's ability to get on the ground quickly, this limited the reach of CSO to other hotspots and dealing with other emerging issues. Since Mercy Corps was based in Eldoret and focused mostly in Nakuru and Eldoret, other hotspot areas such as the Mount Elgon area in Bungoma and Burnt Forest in the Rift Valley were not covered despite their historical ethno-economic cleavages. The decision not to cover these areas was largely due to Mercy Corps' pre-existing programmatic focus rather than CSO's independent analysis. Furthermore, Langas, the large, densely populated slum area outside of Eldoret, was not covered despite Mercy Corps being located in near-by Eldoret. However, these areas did not experience significant electoral violence, so it is not clearly evident that Mercy Corps was wrong to prioritize other areas, or that CSO was wrong to accept that decision.
5. CSO did not itself establish subnational EWER systems but enhanced the Kenyan-led initiatives to do so. Sub-national officers provided critical and welcomed support to ensure that the EWER systems worked more effectively.
    a. These EWER systems led to improved citizens' attitudes to the police in some locations.

b. In the Coast, there is evidence that CSO directly improved local EWER systems, particularly in terms of the frequency and quality of EWs. CSO effectively supported KECOSCE's EWER system through the hiring and training of peace monitors and active education and confidence-building measures in its five targeted districts

c. In the Rift Valley, CSO effectively supported EWER systems in Nakuru, Eldoret and Kitale. In Kitale, CSO provided funding on three occasions supporting a call center which was operated by the Peace and Rights Programme of the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya (FPFK). CSO also enhanced EWER systems in Kisumu, including a call center.

6. CSO made important strides in strengthening the relationship between communities and the police, though these were stronger in the Coast area, where CSO deployed a police advisor, and short-lived in the Rift Valley.[49] However, a lack of resources and sustained police presence restrained the full potential of CSO's activities to implement the ER part of EWER. While CSO acknowledged from the outset that the police were under-resourced and that much of the ER would be carried out by the community members (such as respected elders, women leaders, prominent business people, DPCs, and trained peace monitors), a few incidents in which police officers were killed responding to EWs were identified by community members as evidence of officers being too eager to respond and not taking proper precautions or following necessary protocols. CSO focused on the political aspects of police development because there are other organizations, notably the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), focused on police development. However, CSO did not bring in coordinated assistance by such organizations to complement its efforts.

7. There was no significant change (positive or negative) in the attitudes towards politicians in either Coast or Rift, partially due to the low level of involvement of the politicians in peace-related activities. Where CSO officers used their convening power, politicians did come to a limited number of events, for example, Kisumu. The behavior of politicians was remarkably different in 2013 than in 2007 with fewer overt references to ethnicity during their campaigns.

8. CSO and its IPs successfully brought potential "spoilers" into many its activities. In some cases, potential spoilers were invited to activities such as peace caravans or peace meetings, and in other cases individuals perceived by some as spoilers were even hired by Mercy Corps to assist with project implementation.

9. Underlying issues of justice were not addressed in the CSO activities, in line with the short-term and prioritized mandate it accepted in discussion with the Embassy.

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[49] In targeted communities in the Rift Valley, the activities involving the police were greatly appreciated and lead to short-term increased confidence in the Kenya Police Service. The presence of a full time CSO Police Advisor led to greater focus on the police and greater success in programming in the Coast than the Rift, where the police were largely invited participants/co-facilitators in peace activities in the region. Central to this success in Coast was improving police relationships with the peace monitors.

According to many respondents, especially the perceived spoilers who were interviewed in the evaluation, the peaceful elections were a façade, and a continued failure to address their grievances may still lead to violence. As noted in the gap analysis and USG Strategic Plan, land, unemployment, and security issues remain important grievances.

10. Peace messages may have worked too well and produced a passive citizenry, confusing peace with being inactive. The oversaturation of peace messages without guidance for how to hold elected leaders accountable through civil electoral debate and effective nonviolent political expression has caused many citizens to think that being "peaceful" means to remain quiet, even when a leader is not doing his/her job—even though this was not the expressed message. This may inadvertently harm the ability of civil society to mobilize citizens to constructively express views on contentious political issues, making it harder to hold newly-elected leaders to account nonviolently, ultimately leading to violent explosions of pent-up discontent. More systematic observation, such as survey research, would be necessary to determine the breadth, severity and longevity of this effect.
11. There is evidence that CSO contributed in important ways to peaceful elections in areas where CSO operated. However, its contribution was influenced and affected by numerous and significant enabling factors present during CSO's engagement, such that the exact level of contribution cannot be measured.

6. Recommendations

1. Clarify Mandate

CSO, as one of the newest bureaus with DoS, may have a well-known mandate within the ranks but it clearly has been misunderstood outside of CSO, leading to unnecessary turf battles within DoS and between CSO and USAID, particularly OTI. Therefore, before any deployment CSO must have a clearly defined set of objectives, activities, and actors that are well known, and other agencies should be informed or consulted as these change. Any appearance of hiding information such as on funding levels or programming objectives compromises the potential support and accomplishments of CSO.

2. Continue Use of Programming to Fill Gaps and Complement Other CSO Roles

The Kenya engagement has shown how important programming can be to complement and enhance CSO's coordination, reporting and other diplomatic roles. Without programming, CSO sub-national officers are in awkward one-sided relationships which limit effectiveness of other functions. With program funding, CSO officers are able to provide technical assistance and support local efforts through a synergy of programming and subnational diplomacy that State Department and USAID officers rarely achieve.

CSO correctly identified a gap in USAID and other partners' programming and targeted the police in its activities. CSO is well-positioned to work with the police, and the evaluation team recommends this continue. In the future, CSO may wish to explore engaging with other branches of the host-country government in order to improve the EWER systems.

In order to make the programming more effective, better subnational coordination needs to occur with USAID, especially OTI. While programmatic coordination may prove to be difficult given CSO's very short time horizon, more timely information ahead of deployment and during program implementation would help. In order for CSO team members to do this effectively, CSO must have greater transparency and must communicate the amount of funding both within CSO and between CSO and USAID. Subnational Scopes of Work should more clearly identify programming.

3. Minimize Credit-taking (or be more strategic about it)

While CSO is a new bureau and in need of showing successes, CSO needs to be more careful in claiming credit for successful activities or contributions to peaceful elections. Many interviewees (in Washington and in Nairobi, Kenyans and American) complained that CSO wanted too much credit for its activities instead of attributing the role that all USG efforts were making together, and others complained that CSO claimed credit for activities that others had done or were currently doing. CSO with its limited budget and short engagement is "a small fish in a big pond" of donor funding during elections. As one CSO officer aptly put it, "CSO should let its work speak for itself," rather than trying so hard to prove that the Bureau is successful.

4. Increase the Implementation Period and Connect to Longer-Term Change

An overwhelming majority of respondents believed that the actual implementation part of the implementation phase of the engagement was too short and that the sub-national officers and project funding arrived too late to make a significant impact. Development partners in Kenya have been advised by local leaders not to wait until 2017 to begin thinking about Kenya's 2018 elections. In the future, CSO should ideally begin implementing activities at least six months prior to the elections and stay in country for at least one month after the election with sufficient staff to allow for adequate wrap up activities.

Even when prioritizing prevention of conflict during a high-risk window as in this engagement, CSO should more actively look for opportunities to connect its activities to longer-term conflict prevention/mitigation and development efforts by the USG and others, and ensure that it is not doing harm to those efforts. In this case, for example, CSO might have done more to 1) ensure peace messaging did not interfere with civil society using effective nonviolent advocacy to maximize the election's effectiveness in addressing grievances, 2) connect police with those providing resources/training that could allow them to respond more effectively, and 3) ensure that local partners could sustainably build on the progress made with their EWER networks in the post-election environment.

5. Have More Consistent Leadership, [50] Increase Supervision and Share Best Practices

Leadership is another critical factor determining the success of any engagement. The leadership provided by the Ambassador is critical and therefore his or her buy-in to all

[50] Since CSO has no control over mission staffing decisions, there will be no recommendations related to mission staff turnover but only on CSO turnover in the Recommendations section.

aspects of the CSO mission is necessary. When a change of leadership occurs, CSO's engagement will be affected. CSO needs to better inform Ambassadors, especially during early phases of the engagement, about how CSO is uniquely qualified to do work that DoS Bureaus or USAID officers cannot do, rather than just thinking that CSO officers are "extra hands on deck." The Ambassador must be ready and willing to take on the virtually automatic turf wars that often ensue with the arrival of new players. While CSO/Washington leadership is extremely important, it must be well-coordinated with Mission leadership.

6. Improve Continuity and Expand Types of Staffing

The key to CSO's success in other environments is its staff members and the connections they make on the ground. First, CSO staff members, especially the sub-national officers, need to be assigned for the entire CSO engagement rather than shifting team members in and out of the country during any active engagement.[51] CSO's Kenya engagement was marked by a relatively high degree of staff turnover given the small size of the team and the short nature of the engagement with only four sub-national officers having stayed for the entire subnational engagement. Since the subnational work is highly dependent on personal relationships established with local partners, the potential for negative effects is greater at the subnational than national-level CSO assignments. Therefore, substantive continuity is dependent on having continuity in personnel at the subnational level.

According to CSO sub-national officers, in order to keep officers in the field for assignments longer than six months, considerations may be needed for families to join and live in the capital city or another safe location in-country. While this has cost implications, the benefits to effectiveness and efficiency of staff will outweigh the increased costs.

Second, some, if not all, CSO officers need broader skills to carry out CSO's functions. CSO sub-national officers should be better trained in program management and should be required to take the Grants Officer Representative or Contracting Officer Representative course prior to deployment if this is relevant to their duties. CSO support in Washington could benefit from having access to an experienced contracting/grants officer who will work with CSO to develop appropriate contracting mechanisms that have the flexibility and the substantial involvement that CSO needs to do its work effectively. Similarly, others with specific technical expertise such as police experts need to be recruited in greater number.

7. Improve the Grant-Making (or Contracting) Process

Significant problems affecting project implementation were due to the incompatibility between CSO's mode of operations and the grant facilities it had available. Beyond substantial involvement which is provided for in cooperative agreements, CSO may wish to consider giving an IP a contract for the provision of specific goods and services in order to have greater control over the process. Grants may not be the appropriate mechanisms for the kind of work CSO wants to undertake. A thorough comparison between assistance and acquisition would be useful for CSO to undertake prior to signing grants and cooperative

[51] Kenya Planning and Program Experts were recruited to work from June-December 2012 "with opportunity for extension through April 2013."

agreements in the future. As mentioned above, CSO engagements should be advised by an experienced contracting/grants officer and field staff should have appropriate representative training.

8. Expand Partnerships with Competition and Directly Partnering with Locals

Although reliance on the existing USAID IPs allowed for a rapid response for programming, the partnerships also presented several obstacles such as discontent in the hiring of local staff, procurement complexities and limitations in the geographic focus. Therefore, future work, if started earlier, could be based on competitive (or limited) requests for proposals or contracts to consultants rather than sole sourcing USAID partners. In this way, cooperative agreements (or contracts) could be appropriately designed for the type of relationship CSO wants to have with its implementers.

CSO should work even more strongly to identify NGOs and CBOs beyond established partners and known peace builders, especially in more remote areas. CSO should consider increasing its flexibility to engage more closely with local CBOs or NGOs in addition to the international NGOs, rather than automatically partnering with international NGOs for implementation of its programming as an intermediary between CSO and local NGOs.

9. Identify Geographic Gaps and Expand Geographic Coverage

CSO should more actively triangulate information from Washington-based desk studies and early planning activities with other new sources once on the ground to vet the geographic areas for its operations, and make any needed changes. CSO should continue its internal planning exercise once sub-national officers get on the ground. The key to CSO's success is its flexibility and ability to respond to emerging events. This should be enhanced through on-going planning exercises and assessments. CSO should not limit its sub-national activities to where its sub-national officers are (or can be) safely accommodated. By doing so, important areas for activities may be missed. Security issues of sub-national officers should not preclude programming by local partners in an area.

10. Have a Flexible Approach on Payments

CSO made the right decision to generally not pay "facilitation allowances" for participants or "sitting fees," i.e. payments made for merely showing up for a meeting. In some cases, CSO may wish to consider having a more flexible approach to transportation reimbursement, which is substantially different from allowances for attendance. When participants are coming from far distances and are extremely poor, CSO may need to amend its policy of not paying participants, or it will risk perpetuating exclusion of some actors, an exclusion that has historically inflamed existing tension and catalyzed conflict.

11. Re-consider CSO Branding

CSO benefits in many cases from not having branding requirements similar to those USAID is mandated to follow. This allows for CSO to play a behind-the-scenes role and support Kenyans initiatives. However, it also leads to confusion as to who the CSO sub-national officers are. In order to clarify CSO's role, a different kind of branding is needed. CSO needs to carefully re-consider the way it introduces itself to local partners. For example, CSO should work with political sections to reconsider using the Political Officer title on business cards which will be distributed in the field. "Political" is confused with being partisan in

many countries. Calling them elections officers, program officers or some other title would be preferable. In order to ensure that CSO sub-national officers are understood by other USG organizations, clear SOWs and implementation plans should be distributed in advance and updates promptly circulated as plans change. This will also help to reduce the misunderstandings that sometimes occur.

12. Do better handover and more follow-up

After a successful partnership between CSO sub-national officers and local partners, the departure of the sub-national officers needs to be more consciously and responsibly executed. More broadly and proactively working with local counterparts on planning and resourcing their future conflict prevention roles (which may need to adjust) would make it more likely that they sustainably capitalize on the progress made. For instance, such planning with both civic actors and police might have better sustained and operationalized the improvements in civic-police relations for cooperation after the elections.[52]

13. Measure impact

CSO needs to better conceptualize the impact it is striving to achieve, and measure/report, attuned to its limited time and resources. It should plan for contending with complicating factors like the blurred attribution caused by CSO activities riding on other organizations' programs. This begins with more fully articulating (and updating) a detailed theory of change and using it to form a M&E plan designating intermediate and final outcome indicators designed to distinguish CSO's effects from other causal factors. It also requires providing timely and adequate resources for implementing the plan and consequently measuring baselines and more actively measuring interim and final effects. An aspect of closer handoff coordination with local partners should be to organize their monitoring of longer-term impact and communication of these results to CSO after its departure.

Final Thoughts

In general, CSO-like engagements fill a crucial gap, and given that this was one the first large CSO engagements of its kind, there are improvements to be made in terms of the planning, implementing, exiting and evaluating impact after the engagement. The potential is evident for future engagements to have clearer and more significant impact not only on a peaceful election, but to political and civic developments improving the basis for longer-term conflict prevention.

[52] While some of the loss of improved relations is due to police officer rotations, such planning might have identified this pending problem and encouraged exceptions to this system or encouraged officers to hand off civic relationships before rotating and to establish similar ones at new assignments.

Annexes

Annex A: Scope of Work

Annex B: List of People Consulted

Annex C: List of Documents Reviewed

Annex D: Interview Protocols

Annex E: Summary of Survey Responses

Annex A: Scope of Work for Evaluation of CSO Kenya Engagement

Nature and Purpose of the Evaluation

This will be a performance evaluation of the 2012-2013 Kenya engagement of the United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), conducted soon after engagement termination. The purpose is to gather lessons to inform follow-on activity in Kenya by the U.S. government or other actors, and similar efforts elsewhere by CSO and others. To achieve these goals, the evaluation has three main areas of inquiry - effectiveness, future effects, and transferability – each of which are further elaborated by the detailed evaluation questions presented in a later section below.

The primary inquiry is to examine the ***effectiveness*** of the CSO Kenya engagement in achieving its objectives, and the *key factors aiding or impeding effectiveness*. Significant unintended positive or negative effects should also be captured.

A secondary inquiry is to evaluate the likely near-term ***future effects*** of the developments created by the engagement, both positive and negative. For example, is improved interaction between civic networks and local police likely to continue without CSO's presence? Note that the engagement was not explicitly designed to produce sustainable change, being focused principally on helping Kenya pass peacefully through the recent election, and thus cannot be held accountable for that. However, it is still useful to capture whether lasting positive effects can be expected, and it is critical to identify any negative effects which should be prevented or mitigated.

The final inquiry is to evaluate what factors affect the ***transferability*** of lessons from this context to other contexts. This will aid CSO and other actors in choosing where to intervene in this manner, and anticipating specific ways in which the approach should be adapted other contexts.

The ***primary audiences*** are CSO leadership and engagement teams, and interested entities throughout the State Department such as U.S. Embassy Nairobi, the Bureau of African Affairs, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and the Department's evaluation community. USAID is the primary audience within the rest of the U.S. government, and it may be useful to other agencies such as the Departments of Justice and Defense as well. The evaluation report will also be shared publicly in the hopes that it will inform similar efforts. (If sensitive information needs to be removed to protect respondents, U.S. foreign relations, or U.S. national security, a redacted version may be created for public consumption.)

Background and Current Status of the Engagement

CSO strengthens U.S. national security by breaking cycles of violent conflict and mitigating crisis in priority countries. Guided by local dynamics, CSO acts quickly to devise sustainable solutions to address the full spectrum of conflict, from prevention to crisis response to stabilization. CSO seeks to:

- Demonstrate impact in priority countries of strategic significance.
- Build a respected leadership team & trusted partnerships.
- Work in agile, innovative ways.

CSO builds its engagements on research and analysis, strategic planning, coordinated action and catalyzing locally-led change. These values should be reflected throughout CSO's engagements. Of particular importance to this evaluation, CSO expects its objectives and activities to agilely adjust to continually updated analysis of conflict dynamics, the broader environment and the most effective paths to the desired impact.

Following a request from U.S. Embassy Nairobi and tasking from the National Security Staff (NSS) in early 2012, a joint USAID-State team began a concerted conflict prevention effort for Kenya for the period leading up to and beyond Kenya's elections in March 2013. The presidential election concluded with minimal violence and resulted in a slim victory in the first round by the candidates who had been indicted by the ICC for inciting violence in the 2007 elections. The leading opposition candidate contested the result in the courts but accepted a Supreme Court decision that declared his opponent the victor. Other elections for a newly

devolved system of government also took place and were mostly deemed to be fair and free without resort to violence. It is possible that some of these races may be contested in the courts, but the outlook for violence attendant to these appears slight. The engagement personnel will leave Kenya by April 19, 2013 and programming will end on May 31, 2013.

The engagement proceeded in three main phases: assessment, planning and implementation. This evaluation will focus on the implementation phase, informed by the previous phases. For example, it may make observations regarding how the previous phases impacted the ability of the implementation phase to achieve intended results.

Phase One - Assessment: CSO conducted a review of relevant existing analyses and produced a gap analysis that identified knowledge, programming, and diplomatic gaps.

Phase Two – Planning: Informed by the gap analysis, a joint USAID-State team (led by CSO) worked with Embassy Nairobi personnel to develop a whole-of-government U.S. strategic plan to support Kenyans to: (1) hold credible, transparent and peaceful elections; (2) advance constitutional reforms; and, (3) prevent and mitigate conflict (henceforth called the *Strategic Plan*).

Phase Three – Implementation: CSO aided implementation of the plan in three ways:

A) ***National:*** Seven personnel (three CSO staff and four long-term subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Civilian Response Corps (CRC)) deployed to Nairobi assist the U.S. Embassy and the USAID Mission to prioritize, communicate, implement, and monitor core elements of the *Strategic Plan.*[53] They deployed from late June 2012 to the end of the engagement. These "CSO embeds"[54] in Nairobi were embedded by agency into the Embassy's Political Section or the USAID Mission's Democracy and Governance Office. They were to dedicate up to 25 percent of their time to supporting the section/mission in which they were embedded, and at least 75 percent to planning and implementation connected to the *Strategic Plan*. The stated "duties and deliverables" of the embeds in the Scope of Work (dated 11/28/2012) were to:

   a. Help coordinate, track and implement the Strategic Plan
   b. Increase coordination with partners
   c. Craft timely and accurate strategic communications messaging
   d. Support Kenyan efforts to address conflict dynamics at national and local levels
   e. Monitor Kenyan implementation of tasks
   f. Assist in the planning and implementation of the Embassy's election observation mission. The cell will support the elections observation cell operations and service in the cell as appropriate.
   g. Provide reach-back support for sub-national members.

   Intended activities to achieve these objectives included: staffing the Reform Task Force; facilitating meetings within the Embassy; participating in relevant external meetings with the Government of Kenya (GoK), international partners, and civil society; updating the strategic communication plan; travelling to Coast and Rift Valley regions; providing conflict analysis; preparing briefings; cables and reports; updating the progress tracker and contingency plans; facilitating U.S. election observation planning; responding to requests for support from sub-national officers; coordinating information flow between Political section, USAID, and officers; and drafting statements of work for personnel to work at the subnational level or as subject matter experts.

   The long-term Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in Nairobi included the following. *CSO does not anticipate separately evaluating their specific roles, unless CSO deems that developments in Kenya*

[53] The number reduced to six when CRC police advisor from the Department of Justice transitioned to sub-national work on DATE.

[54] Together, they formed what engagement design documents call the Kenya Planning and Implementation Cell (KPIC), but this term was not used in-country.

have significantly raised the importance of these issues. They are described here for reference in case that determination is made.

- Police Advisor, CRC-DOJ (September 2012-April 2013): Originally intended to advise Usalama, a Nairobi-based civic group advocating police reform, the engagement team decided in October 2013 to deploy the Police Advisor as part of the Coast region team described below to work on relations between police and civic groups in that region. Thus, this advisor's work should be evaluated principally as part of that team's work.
- Elections Advisor, CRC-USAID (September 2012-April 2013): An elections expert was deployed to support the USAID Mission's Senior Elections Advisor in coordinating USAID strategy, assistance and policy in support of Objective One of the U.S. Plan to Support Kenya (hold credible, transparent and peaceful elections). This necessarily included, but was not limited to, project management, including technical expertise and oversight, for the numerous instruments that support the elections component of USAID/Kenya's Democracy and Governance (DG) portfolio. Because this advisor's work is expected to be encompassed in the Embassy's After Action Report, it is not expected to be addressed in this evaluation beyond incorporating relevant conclusions from that report.
- Program Advisor, CRC-USAID (September 2012-April 2013): A program expert was deployed to link diplomatic and international efforts with USAID programming targeting youth, women, civil society, and conflict-affected populations, provide country analysis and concept development to support existing and future programs and strategies in high priority areas, and support the design and implementation of new country program operations. The key aspect of this advisor's work for the purposes of this evaluation is linking of diplomacy and programming, which will be covered under general questions on coordination.
- Logistics and Management Support Officer, CRC-USAID (January-April 2013): A logistics officer was deployed to enhance CSO's operational capacity during the pre-election phase through the end of the engagement. Principle duties included facilitating the travel, administrative, logistical arrangements for all CSO personnel in support of the expanded diplomatic presence in Nairobi and subnational areas; liaising with Embassy Nairobi Management Section and CSO HQ to coordinate the financial, staffing, and procurement needs of the CSO Kenya engagement; assisting the Elections and Reform Taskforce; assisting the Elections Observation Cell with U.S. Elections Observation effort planning and implementation; and assisting CSO officers in Nairobi and the field with the management of grants and troubleshooting.

B) ***Subnational:*** CSO deployed a total of nine officers over the course of the engagement (beginning in late August 2012) to the Rift Valley and Coast regions (with the objective of staffing at least two per region). These regions were identified as priority hotspots likely to produce localized violence that might spread. The officers were intended to increase the Embassy's understanding of subnational political, security, and conflict dynamics, and work with Kenyans to increase likelihood of credible and peaceful elections. The Scope of Work specifies these duties and responsibilities:

a. Inform political reporting with analysis on political, security and conflict dynamics specifically related to the USG's three strategic objectives. In coordination and clearance with the political section, produce cable-ready analysis on the dynamics related to the USG's three stated objectives.

b. As needed and based on the situation on the ground, work with the Elections and Reform Task Force and other relevant Embassy and USAID personnel to identify potential activities or diplomatic interventions that support Kenyan efforts to coordinate early warning systems and strengthen response mechanisms to prevent and mitigate conflict.

c. Work with the Elections and Reform Task Force and other relevant Embassy and USAID personnel to support linkages between ongoing diplomatic and programmatic efforts, including messaging and strategic communications at the sub-national level.

Their guidance was refined by an October 2, 2012 document on the *CSO Approach on Preventing Elections-Related Violence in Kenya in 2013* to "Amplify Grassroots Networks, Reporting and Messages in Hotspots to Prevent or Mitigate Conflict" through these objectives:

a) *Enhance coordination mechanisms between sub-national programmatic and diplomatic engagements with Kenyan efforts.* Sub-national officers work with the Embassy to support Kenyan electoral security planning efforts; support linkages between critical stakeholders such as youth, women's groups, and the business community with Kenyan institutions; and map spoilers.

b) *Ensure communities are better equipped to respond quickly and credibly.* Sub-national officers amplify Kenyan-led mitigation efforts to identify and respond non-violently to security concerns, including building and strengthening early warning and early response mechanisms, enhancing mediation networks, countering messages of sub-national spoilers and encouraging inter-community dialogue.

c) *Develop and support sub-national messaging that amplifies and augments Embassy Nairobi's strategic communications.* Leveraging U.S. influence to target both instigators of violence and national institutions to decrease the frequency and impact of inflammatory rhetoric.

In pursuit of these objectives, the sub-national officers were to engage in local diplomacy with civic, GoK and international counterparts and extend strategic communications from Embassy Nairobi. Plans were tailored to conditions in each region as briefly described below. CSO also provided a grant to an implementing partner in each region to support local early warning/early response (EWER) networks, with monitoring and coordination by these subnational CSO officers. Both implementing partners were already partners with USAID and well-established in these regions.

- Rift Valley: CSO efforts here concentrated primarily on building Champions of Peace Networks in four priority hotspot counties (Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Nakuru and Kisumu), building on already-existing organizations but engaging them in a new way to focus around issues of peace. The effort developed a stronger focus on using the moral authority of the network to deliver peace messages and dissuade violence than on EWER.

  Mercy Corps received $241,503 to support Champions of Peace. The objective stated in the Mercy Corps Scope of Work is: "Counter political manipulation through early warning and response to ensure a peaceful electoral process in Kenya." It details four main tasks:

  1. Increase public knowledge of voter registration processes in targeted areas
  2. Spread coordinated peace messages to offset negative political rhetoric
  3. Reduce barriers to community-police relations
  4. Enhance existing early warning and response systems

- Coast: The Coast effort originally had different plans due to the context of a separatist movement (MRC), drug traffickers influencing political leaders, more severe distrust of police and GoK, and a less developed civil society and EWER network than the Rift Valley. Rather than simply forming a network of civil society organizations, the Coast plan was to form a "Network of Networks" with individuals who were hired or who volunteered as peace monitors working to improve information flow and relationships between communities/civil society and authorities. Initial plans called for facilitating MRC-GoK dialogue to reduce MRC interference with the election. Initial plans also placed more emphasis on reducing perceived grievances that supported separatist sentiments, by improving civic relations with police and GoK and by increasing confidence in the

newly devolved structures to relieve grievances. Early is the project design, however, a policy decision was made to minimize the MRC focus and elevate the focus on improving relations between District Peace Committees (DPCs – GoK-mandated structures with civic participation) and District Security and Intelligence Committees (DSICs). The bulk of the effort focused on peace messaging and monitoring and reporting on the sensitive environment. The sensitive environment on Coast dictated that media did not play as large of a role in the peace messaging as in Rift.

PACT received $330,190 to support this "Network of Networks." The PACT Scope of Work specifies these objectives:

1. Increased understanding and flow of information among the DSIC, DPCs and peace monitors
2. Strengthened capacity of peace monitors especially to document and disseminate conflict and peace reports and updates
3. Expanded structures and sources of early warning information
4. Ensure security of information received and widen the reach of EW messages
5. Increased response efficiency and effectiveness
6. Increased awareness on peaceful coexistence, devolution and community participation in political processes
7. Enhanced preparedness to respond to emerging conflict

- Nairobi: A small additional grant was made in Nairobi. *CSO does not intend to include this activity in the evaluation, as it was small and peripheral to the main thrust of the engagement. It is included here for reference in case CSO determines that developments in Kenya have sufficiently raised the salience of this activity to warrant inclusion.* CSO made a third grant of $23,330 to the Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA) in Nairobi to support a soccer tournament in February 2013 designed to promote peace using multiethnic teams of boys and girls. Matches were combined with peace messaging activities. The stated objectives were to:

  1. Bring political candidates and youth together in a friendly and fun event
  2. Help reduce inter-ethnic, political and other tensions in the community
  3. Raise awareness on the importance of free, fair and peaceful elections
  4. Demonstrate and promote inter-ethnic solidarity among the youth

C) ***Short-term SMEs:*** CSO deployed short-term SMEs for the following tasks. *Because of the short duration of these efforts, they will not be covered by this evaluation unless CSO deems that developments in Kenya have significantly raised the importance of these issues. They are included here for reference in case that determination is made.*

- Media and Technology Consultant (Feb. 4-12): CSO deployed a high-level expert for two weeks to assist in designing the Embassy's election observation control room, conduct a limited review of existing Kenyan early warning technology, and advise on strengthening these capacities and/or harnessing them to help better inform U.S. decision-making related to supporting free, fair and peaceful Kenyan elections.
- Judicial Security Advisors (Jan. 2-16, 2012): When the Embassy determined that improving the security of high-profile judges was a key need, CSO worked with DoJ to deploy two U.S. Marshalls for two weeks to assess judicial security and make recommendations. They were to determine whether the U.S. can provide short-term training, mentoring or other assistance to address this need. A follow-on initiative was recommended.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation is to assess the effectiveness, future effects and transferability of the Implementation Phase of the Kenya engagement. It should answer the following specific questions which tailor these inquiries to each aspect of the engagement. Roughly 25% of the evaluation effort should be spent on the national level element, with roughly 75% focused on the subnational elements.

National (roughly 25% of evaluation effort)

13. How effective were the CSO embeds in Nairobi at:
    a. Keeping the *Strategic Plan* updated with current assessment and recommendations from the field?
    b. Coordinating the interagency at Embassy Nairobi and in the field, and coordinating with local and international partners, to implement the current *Strategic Plan*?
    c. Producing timely, accurate and effective strategic communications which helped achieve the plan's objectives?
    d. Tracking progress on plan implementation nationally and sub nationally?
14. What were the key factors aiding or impeding effectiveness in each of the national-level objectives evaluated in question 1?
    a. Contextual
    b. Other organizations (USG, GoK, local partners, implementing partners, others)
    c. CSO strategy, tools, structures, procedures, etc.
15. How well did the engagement prepare and motivate Embassy Nairobi to plan and operate in a strategic and coordinated whole of government manner to prevent and mitigate conflict after CSO's departure?
16. What lessons does this experience provide about such efforts (embedding in embassies, coordination cells for interagency planning and implementation, coordinating electoral violence prevention, etc.) for other engagements? What key factors affect the transferability of these lessons?

Subnational (roughly 75% of evaluation effort)

17. How effective was the subnational analysis at the following?
    a. Understanding and prioritizing regional/local political and conflict dynamics, especially:
        i. Mapping civic actors participating or potentially participating in EWER
        ii. Identifying and analyzing spoilers
        iii. Developments related to the election, violence prevention, and reforms
    b. Identifying and prioritizing gaps in information or intervention (especially regarding the election, policing and devolution)?
18. How effectively did the subnational teams report analysis and recommendations to the CSO embeds in Nairobi on the points listed in question 5? To what degree did the Embassy or USAID Mission make use of these reports and recommendations, and are there ways in which they could have been made more useful?
19. How effectively did the subnational teams coordinate subnational diplomatic and programmatic efforts with each other and with Kenyan efforts?
20. How effective were each of the subnational efforts in achieving each of their diplomatic and programmatic objectives, as they evolved?
    a. Rift Objectives
        i. Enhancing EWER networks, including relationships between these networks, and police/government, between these networks and communities, and between communities and police/government
        ii. Deterring spoilers
        iii. Promoting peaceful attitudes and behavior through peace messaging and outreach

iv. Strengthening community resilience against political manipulation (e.g. voter/civic education)

v. Preventing electoral and ethnic violence

b. Coast Objectives

i. Enhancing EWER networks (note added emphasis on capacity building for reporting and response), including relationships between these networks, and police/government, between these networks and communities, and between communities and police/government

ii. Deterring spoilers

iii. Promoting peaceful attitudes and behavior through peace messaging and outreach

iv. Strengthening community resilience against political manipulation (e.g. voter/civic education)

v. Reducing grievances and promoting confidence in the new devolved government

vi. Preventing electoral and ethnic violence

21. What were the key factors aiding or impeding effectiveness in each of the subnational-level objectives evaluated in questions 5-8?
    a. Contextual
    b. Other organizations (USG, GoK, local partners, implementing partners, others)
    c. CSO strategy, tools, structures, procedures, etc.
22. What unintended positive or negative effects did the programming have, and why?
23. How well prepared, resourced, motivated and respected are the EWER networks to continue conflict prevention/mitigation activity after CSO's departure?
24. What lessons does this experience provide for
    a. Follow-on efforts in Kenya
    b. Other engagements with these characteristics (electoral and ethnic violence prevention, EWER, coalition-building, civic-police relations, anti-separatism, devolution, subnational focus, etc.)? What key factors affect the transferability of these lessons?

Evaluation Design and Data Collection Methods

This is a performance evaluation conducted soon after the completion of the engagement. In assessing effectiveness, it will seek to measure outcomes and impact, but generally without employing experimental or quasi-experimental design. It will use mixed methods and largely involve retrospective process tracing. Concepts should generally be measured by multiple indicators and sources to improve validity and reliability. Evidence must be presented to support any findings made. Some indicators have been measured by the engagement team, as indicated by the attached metrics tracker. These are largely quantitative and output or immediate outcome level. For most indicators, there is no baseline.

Identification and use of appropriate existing data from external sources such as surveys or police statistics is encouraged. With such data, or using analysis of media and social media, limited use of comparison groups may be included to help distinguish CSO influence on EWER networks and social attitudes, knowledge and behavior in targeted areas of Coast and Rift Valley from other locations that are similar in demographics and previous levels of violence. This should not involve major additional fieldwork or expense. The contractor would be responsible for identifying suitable comparison groups, with CSO advice.

Data collection will include review of documents in Washington and Kenya from CSO, U.S. government partners and international and local partners. CSO will provide extensive documents of this nature, but more might be obtained from partners directly. The evaluation team should also seek and review relevant documents from independent observers such as think tanks, academics or media. Media analysis and social media analysis may be helpful for judging effects on public attitudes, knowledge and behavior, including retrospective estimates of baselines.

Data collection will largely involve key informant interviews and focus groups, including the following:

In Washington:

- Six CSO and CRC staff who were deployed to Nairobi
- Seven CSO and CRC staff who were deployed to Coast and Rift Valley
- Relevant desk officer at DOS/AF/E, USAID (including OTI, DRG and CMM), and NSS.
- Select members of the nongovernmental Washington-based Kenya Working Group (CSIS, Friends Committee for National Legislation, Bridgette Moix at George Mason University).

In Nairobi:

- U.S. Embassy Nairobi (Political Section (POL) chief, two other POL staff (including a local hire), Public Affairs Section Chief, and the Ambassador)
- USAID Mission (Senior Elections Advisor, Head of Democracy , Human Rights and Governance, Head of Education, Head of Office of Transitional Initiatives and, Deputy Mission Director and Mission Director)
- Five to ten international and local partners such as UNDP, NDI, national-level police, elections and peace officials.

In Coast and Rift Valley (in about three communities in each):

- Field staff of PACT and Mercy corps
- Members of the EWER networks
- DPCs, DSICs, local police and regional/local officials
- Community residents
- Independent observers such as local journalists
- Relevant international partners

CSO will provide extensive contact information, but the team should also seek contacts independently. Most interviews will be possible in English, but Swahili may be needed for some interviews in the field, particularly with community residents.

Annex B: List of People Consulted

Key Informant Interview or Focus Group Discussion	Location	Name	Position	Organization
KII	Nakuru	Tom Mboya Ochieng' and Rhoda	Director	Gaplink International
KII	Nakuru	John Busii	Chairman	NGO Regulatory Council
KII	Nakuru	Bruno Owiti	Program Manager	Young Women Entrepreneurs Kenya
KII	Nakuru	Mercy Kinywa		Provincial Peace Forum
KII	Nakuru	Pius Kamau		Mercy Corps
KII	Nakuru	Philip Ngok	President	Yes Youth Can (YYC)
KII	Nakuru	Justus Kimeli	Peace Cop	Administration Police
KII	Eldoret – Langas	Nelson Kuria		Marithiano Youth Group
KII	Eldoret - Langas	George		Christian Sports Contact (Chrisc)
KII	Eldoret	Rev. Simeon Kipkosgei		National Council of Churches Kenya (NCCK) North Rift
KII	Eldoret	David Busienei	Director	Centre for Community Dialogue and Development (CCDD)
KII	Eldoret	Nancy Koech	COP	Yes Youth Can (YYC)
KII	Eldoret	David Mustapha		District Peace Committee
KII	Eldoret	Mercy Shahale		OTI/KTI
FGD	Burnt Forest	Pauline Ngunjiri	Member	District Peace Committee (DPC)
FGD	Burnt Forest	Francis Biu	Chair	Peace Net Kenya; Inter-Community Peace Choir
FGD	Burnt Forest	Lucy	Field Officer	Yes Youth Can (YYC)
FGD	Burnt Forest	Florence Njeri	Assistant Project Officer	CJPC
KII	Kitale	Festus Mukoya	Director	Peace and Rights
KII	Kitale	Abongo	Assistant County Commissioner	Trans Nzoia County Government
KII	Kitale	Reuben Butaki	Chair	Sabaot Supreme Council
KII	Kitale	Kibet	Head	Kenya National Commission of Human Rights
KII	Kitale	Dominic Rono	Member	Kenya National Commission of Human Rights
KII	Kitale	Kiptoo Barasa	Member	Kenya National Commission of Human Rights
FGD	Kitale	Julius Chirchir	Member	District Peace Committee (DPC) Trans Nzoia West
FGD	Kitale	Richard Lusweti	Communications Coordinator	FPFK/Peace and Rights
FGD	Kitale	Stella Nyamosi	Member	District Peace Committee (DPC) Trans Nzoia East
FGD	Kitale	Daniel Khaemba	Ward Educator –	Independent Elections and

			Gitwamba	Boundaries Commissions (IEBC)
FGD	Bungoma	Edwin Killong	Peace Monitor,	Provincial Administration
FGD	Bungoma	Ptala Naibei	Chair	District Peace Committee (DPC) Mt. Elgon
FGD	Bungoma	Rosemary Cheptai	Member	Rural Women Peace Link – Cheptais
FGD	Bungoma	Abigail Lusweti	Member and Civic Educator	Yes Youth Can (YYC)
FGD	Bungoma	Getrude Ndiema	Ex-SLDF member	Mt. Elgon Peace Platform
FGD	Bungoma	Benson Kaos	Ex-commander	SLDF
FGD	Bungoma	Maurice Ngeywo	Member	Mt. Elgon Elders Association
FGD	Bungoma	Alfinus Muga	Coordinator	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC)
FGD	Bungoma	Lazarus Papela	Peace Monitor/Data Analyst	
FGD	Bungoma	Sharon Inyo	Observer	National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)
KII	Bungoma	Mokin Arap Ptanguny	County Executive Member	Bungoma County
KII	Kisumu	Elly Opondo	Lead Consultant	Top Option Consultancy; former Field Support Staff for CSO
KII	Kisumu	Michael Odongo	Founder	Centre for Legal Rights, Advocacy and Development (CLREAD)
KII	Kisumu	Velma Ong'ang'a	Assistant Marketing Manager	Radio Lake Victoria
KII	Kisumu	Easter Achieng	Director	Kenya Female Advisory Organization (KEFEADO)
KII	Kisumu	Israel Agina	President	Kenya Association of Manufacturers
KII	Kisumu	Musa Kongoli	Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD)	Kenya Police Service
KII	Kisumu	Willis "Boy" Akoth	Leader	China Squad
KII	Kisumu	Rev.Fr. Felix Atindah	Assistant. to Archbishop Zacchaeus Okoth	Archdiocese of Kisumu, Catholic Church
KII	Kisumu	Nick	Head of News	Radio Lake Victoria
KII	Kisumu	Sospeter Okusah	Quality Control	Radio Lake Victoria
KII	Nairobi	Ezra Chiloba	Program Analyst	United Nations Development Programme
KII	Nairobi	Maurice Amollo	Dep. County Director	Mercy Corps
KII	Nairobi	Prof. Njuguna Ng'ethe	Professor	University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies (IDS)
KII	Nairobi	Jared Ombui	Journalist and	Kenya Broadcasting

			Radio Presenter	Corporation, Corporate Communications
KII	Nairobi	Emmanuel Kola	Journalist	Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, Corporate Communications
KII	Nairobi	Daudi Were	Project Director – Africa	Ushahidi
KII	Nairobi	Zephaniah Aura	Senior Election Advisor	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	Karen Freeman	Mission Director	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	Rubeidah Akinyi	Program Manager	Muslims for Human Rights
KII	Nairobi	Keziah Waweru	Program Manager	International Republican Institute
KII	Nairobi	Joyce	Chief of Party	Yes Youth Can!
KII	Nairobi	Isiah Parnell	Deputy Chief of Mission	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	Dan Spealman		
KII	Nairobi	Sam Kona	DRG Staff	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	Monica Azimi	DRG Deputy Director	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	Makena Kirima	DRG Staff	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	Lisbeth Zonneveld	Country Director	Mercy Corps
KII	Nairobi	Michael Kelleher	Deputy POL Chief	
KII	Nairobi	Jebiwot Sumbeiywo		
KII	Nairobi	Beneah Odemba	Former Program Manager, Kisumu	Champions of Peace
KII	Nairobi	Mike Yard	Chief of Party	International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
KII	Nairobi	Galeeb Kachra		USAID/Kenya/OTI/Kenya Transition Initiative
KII	Nairobi	Lisa McClean	Senior Resident Country Director	National Democratic Institute (NDI)
KII	Nairobi	Mary O'Hagan	Former Country Director	National Democratic Institute (NDI)
KII	Nairobi		Pact Country Office Director and Staff	
KII	Nairobi	Richard Maina		Transparency International
KII	Nairobi	John Smith-Sreen	DRG Director	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	Keith Bean	POL Staff	USAID/Kenya
KII	Nairobi	John Tomaszewski	Country Director, Program Manager	International Republican Institute
KII	Mombasa	Tom Ngar		Coast Women in Development
KII	Mombasa	Masha	Deputy Chief of Party	Yes Youth Can (YYC)
KII	Mombasa	Gabby Fondiller		
KII	Mombasa	Daire		USAID/Kenya /OTI/ Kenya

				Transition Initiative
KII	Mombasa	Husna		USAID/Kenya /OTI/ Kenya Transition Initiative
KII	Mombasa	Irene Randu	Chairwoman	Kisauni Peace Committee
KII	Mombasa	Dennis	Chairman's Representative	People Parliament, Kisuani
KII	Mombasa	Phyllis Muema	Chairperson	KEKOSCE
KII	Mombasa	Charles Okello		Mombasa City Residence Association
KII	Mombasa	Nelson Marwa	County Commissioner	Mombasa County
KII	Mombasa	Fr. Wilybard Lagho	Priest	Catholic Archdiocese of Mombasa
KII	Mombasa	Dama	Reverand	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics Trust
KII	Mombasa	Rev. Stephen Anyenda	Reverand	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics Trust
KII	Mombasa	Lawrence Kinyua	Deputy Chief of Police	Likoni Police Department
KII	Mombasa	F.B. Boaz	District Commandant	Administrative Police
KII	Mombasa	Nelly Llougo	Member	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commissions (IEBC), Kisauni Constituency
KII	Mombasa	Monica Mbogo	Member	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commissions (IEBC), Kisauni Constituency
KII	Mombasa	Mbwana Kh. Nguzo	Council Member	Kaya Council of Elders
KII	Mombasa	Amina Soud	Regional Elections Coordinator-South Coast	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commissions (IEBC)
KII	Mombasa	Wilson Amani	Council Leader	Singwaya Governing Council
KII	Mombasa	Allen Nyange	Member	Kituo Che Sheria, Center for Legal Empowerment
KII	Mombasa	Mohamed Sadik	Assistant Chief	Mwembe Tayari
KII	Mombasa	Rachel Kavata	Assistant Chief	Junda Ward
KII	Mombasa	Kipkemol Ror	OCPD	Mvita
KII	Mombasa	Stambuli Abdillahi Nassir	Muslim Leader	Mvita
KII	Mombasa	Florence Beryl	CEC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)
KII	Mombasa	Suleiman Nzingo	Provincial Operations Officer	Associated Press, Mombasa
KII		Cynthia		Federation of Women Lawyers
KII	Kilifi	Paul Rotich	DO	
KII	Kilifi	Harold Mwatua	Chairman	Kilifi PC
KII	Kilifi	Jacob Machekele	Constituency Elections Coordinator	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)

KII	Kwale	Mr. Achoki	County Commissioner	Kwale County
KII	Malindi	Teeri James Reeria	Assistant County Commissioner	Malindi County
KII	Mailindi	Ali M. Ali		Malindi Maaruf Community Organization
KII	Malindi	Stanley Nduku	CEC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)
FGD	Tana River	Yemuel N. Bonaya	Chairman	Pokomo Council of Elders
FGD	Tana River	Usione Hakuna Vurugu Ukafikri Kuna Amani	Member	District Peace Committee
FGD	Tana River	Rose Auma	Member	District Peace Committee
FGD	Tana River	Feisal Bahero	Chairman	District Peace Committee
FGD	Mombasa	Gabrielle Fondillo		Peace Activist
FGD	Mombasa	Duncan Otieno Guara	Member	District Peace Committee
FGD	Mombasa	Mkonga Kibinana		Peace Activist
FGD	Tana River	Sammy Chirchir Kisuan	Member	District Peace Committee
FGD	Tana River	Yuda Loth Komora	Member	Pokomo Council of Elders
FGD		Peter Kwame		Peace Activist
FGD	Tana River	David Mbogho	Member	District Peace Committee
FGD	Tana River	David Magasani Nahori	Chairman	Pokomo Council of Elders
FGD		Bibi Ngare		Peace Activist
FGD	Tana River	Cleoppar Pwawasi	Member	District Peace Committee
FGD			Member	MRC
FGD			Member	MRC
FGD			Sympathizer	MRC
FGD			Sympathizer	MRC
FGD			Sympathizer	MRC
FGD	Tana River	Asahel Daiddo Uruji	Member	District Peace Committee
FGD	Tana River	Yohah Kongwe Galugalu	Member	District Peace Committee

Interview Data Disaggregate by Gender and Location

Breakdown by Type of Interview			
	Male	**Female**	**Totals**
KII	86/85	28/29	114
FGD	26	9	35
Totals	**112/111**	**37/38**	**149**

Interviews by Location		
	Total	**Percentage**
Bungoma	10	6.7%
Eldoret and Burnt Forest	11	7.3%
Kisumu	10	6.7%
Kitale	10	6.7%
Likoni	6	4%
Mombasa and Kisauni	47	31.5%
Nairobi	23	15.4%
Nakuru	8	5.3%
Other	2	1.3%
Tana River	6	4%
Washington, DC	15	10%
Totals	**149**	

Annex C: List of Documents Reviewed

- "Political Barometer Survey," Ipsos Synovate, July 10, 2013.
- "Scope of Work: Kenya Planning and Implementation Cell," June 13, 2012.
- Barkan, Joel "Electoral Violence in Kenya: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 17." Council on Foreign Relations. January 2013.
- Barkan, Joel. "Electoral Violence in Kenya: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 17." Council on Foreign Relations. January 2013.
- Burchard, Stephanie. "After the Dust has Settled: Kenya's 2013 Elections," Africa Watch, July 25, 2013.
- *Champions of Peace Lessons Learned*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, January 2013
- *Coast Network of Networks Status Check*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, February 2013
- *Conflict Prevention Planning: Road to Kenyan Reforms and 2013 Elections*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, May 2012
- *CSO Approach on Preventing Election-Related Violence in Kenya in 2013*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, November 2012
- *CSO Fact Sheet: Preventing Elections-Related Violence in Kenya in 2013*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, February 2013
- *CSO Kenya Engagement Overview,* United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, May 2013
- *CSO Kenya Engagement Overview,* United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, May 2013
- *CSO Kenya Engagement: Engagement Review*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, June 2013
- *CSO Kenya Fast Facts, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, February 2013*
- Eythan Sontag, "Action Memo for the Assistant Secretary," April 19, 2013.
- Kelly, Kevin. "Choices Have Consequences, US tells Kenyan voters." Daily Nation. Thursday, November 7, 2013.
- *Kenya 2013: Sub-National Officer Transition Package*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, April 2013
- *Kenya Elections Progress Tracker—Priority Actions*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict Stabilization and Operations, February 2013

- *Kenya Gap Analysis*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- *Kenya Monitoring and Evaluation Report,* United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, November 2012
- *Kenya Sub-National Design Summary*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, September 2012
- *Kenya's Champions of Peace: Fast Facts,* United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, January 2012
- *Kenya's Network of Networks: Fast Facts*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, January 2012
- *M&E Guide to CSO Kenya Engagement: Reporting and Benchmarks*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, November 2012
- *Mid-Engagement Progress Report—Champions of Peace*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, February 2013
- *Proposed U.S. Plan to Support Kenya to Hold Credible, Transparent, and Peaceful Elections; Advance Reforms: and Prevent & Mitigate Conflict*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- *Revised M&E Guide CSO Kenya Engagement: Reporting and Benchmarks*, United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, February 2012 (CD)
- *Safe Coast Early Warning and Early Response Project (SCEWER): Programmatic Progress Report,* United States Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and Pact Inc., January 1-March 31, 2013
- Throup, David. "Reading the Tea Leaves on the Kenyan Elections: Patterns of Violence and Political Alliances." CSIS. November 16, 2012.
- US Department of State, Office of Inspections. "Inspection of Embassy Nairobi, Kenya." Report Number ISP-I-12-38A, August 2012.
- US Department of State. "Conflict Prevention Planning: The Road to Kenyan Reforms and 2013 Elections."
- Valentina Bau, "Five years on: identity and Kenya's post-election violence." January 2013. Open Democracy.

Annex D: Interview Protocols

DoS Kenya Engagement Evaluation
Beneficiaries in Rift and Coast
COVERSHEET

Date of Interview:	**Interviewee Name, Title:**
Project:	**Time Start: Time End:**
Interviewer(s):	**Location**
Category of Interviewee:	**Age Group:**
No. of Interviewees _____ M ____ F_____	**Ethnic Group:**

Introduction: Good morning/afternoon. Thank you for taking time to speak with us today. As mentioned during our interview request, we have been hired to conduct an independent evaluation of some of the support that the US Government provided during the 2013 election period. We are not here to ask about the current political situation or any specifics of the 2013 election but only to find out your views about the support the US gave to Kenya, if you think it was beneficial or not, and how it can be improved in the future.

Our team has had the opportunity to review documents. However, such documents can only tell us so much. We would like to speak with you today to hear about your experience, in your own words, in order to help us better understand how these projects look and function "on the ground."

Confidentiality Protocol

- We will collect information on individuals' names, organizations, and positions. A list of key informants will be listed at the end of our final evaluation report, but those names and positions will not be associated to any particular findings or statements in the report.
- We may include quotes from respondents in the evaluation report, but will not link individual names, organizations, or personally identifiable information to those quotes, unless express written consent is granted by the respondent. Should the team desire to use a particular quote, photograph, or identifiable information in the report, we will contact you and ask your permission first.
- All of the information gathered during this interview will be used for the sole purposes of this evaluation and will not be shared with anyone else or used for any other purpose.

Once again, thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Do you have any questions for us before we get started?

Inform interviewee we may be following up with a closed-ended survey

1. **Rift: Are you aware of Champions of Peace?**

   Coast: Are you aware of the Safe Coast Early Warning and Response (SCEWER) or KECOSCE?

   a. If yes, when did you first become aware?

   b. Did you participate in any of their activities?

      i. If yes, how many?

      ii. Which ones? (type of activities)

      iii. What were the key messages and themes that you remember?

      iv. Were there any outputs from these activities?

      v. Who were the key people you interacted with?

      vi. Are you aware of similar efforts that were already there before, or was this new to your community?

2. **In your opinion, did any of these activities make a difference in your community?**

   a. If so, in what ways?

   b. If not, why not? What factors prevented its success?

3. **These activities were meant to prevent or reduce violence. Do you think they targeted the right people?**

   a. The people working for peace?

   b. The people working against it ("spoilers")?

   c. Were the people who might have been causing the violence targeted in the programs or were there any that were missed

   d. Do you know if the police participated in any of the activities?

4. **In your community, was there any conflict related to the elections earlier this year?**

   a. Did it lead to violence?

   b. How would you compare the 2013 elections to the 2007 elections in your community?

      i. If different, then why was it different?

      ii. If it was not different, then why was it not different?

5. **What do you think explains the relative low levels of violence in the 2013 election (compared to 2007)?**

   a. What changes would you make?

   b. [for respondents who report high levels of 2013 election violence] How can future election violence be reduced or prevented in your community?

6. **Rift: Does Champions of Peace continue to exist today here?**

   Coast: Does Safe Coast Early Warning and Response (SCEWER) or KECOSCE continue to exist today here?

7. **Rift: What recommendations would you make to the Champions of Peace to make it more effective?**

   Coast: What recommendations would you make to the Safe Coast Early Warning and Response (SCEWER) or KECOSCE in your community?

   This marks the end of our interview. Do you have any questions?

Thank you very much for your time.

DoS Kenya Engagement Evaluation
CSO GRANTEES and SUB-GRANTEES
COVERSHEET

Date of Interview:	**Interviewee Name, Title:**
CSO Team (Nairobi, Rift, Coast):	**Time Start: Time End:**
Interviewer(s):	**Location**
Category of Interviewee: Age Group:	
No. of Interviewees _____ M ____ F_____ Kenya national?:_____	

General:

1. **Before we begin, can you tell us a bit about your organization and activities during the election period?**

Specific:

2. **How did you first hear/start working with CSO? (Probe for Major/Rick or Will/John)**
   a. What activities did they help support?
   b. Did they provide any other type of support? (Probe on diplomacy with police and spoilers, analysis, strategy, coordination)
3. **As part of our study, we are interested in seeing if there were changes in attitudes and relationships. Can you please tell us what your organization's relationship was before and after the program with the following:**
   a. Political Leaders?
   b. Police?
   c. Citizens?

Do you think these relationships will continue in the future?

4. **Have the attitudes of citizens about participating in violence changed during this election period?**
   a. What do you expect these attitudes to be like going forward?
5. **Do you think your program was effective at preventing electoral violence?**
   a. Did you see any unintended consequences from your activities?
6. **How strongly would you agree or disagree with this statement:**

   The efforts to prevent violence during this election will have lasting effects on civic groups, citizens, police and political leaders that will make large-scale violence less likely in Coast/Rift Valley Province in the future.

   Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree
7. **In retrospect, would you have changed your approach or any of your activities?**
   a. Do you think CoP/NoN targeted the right people? The right issues?
8. **What do you think explain the difference in levels of violence in 2013 compared to 2007?**
   a. Do you think that foreign donor assistance contributed? If yes, how so?
9. **Is your organization still involved in violence prevention now that the election is over?**

a. Are these efforts affected by the experience or relationships you gained with the help of Major/Rick or Will/John?

b. Are you still working together with the networks formed during the election?

   i. At the community level

   ii. At the district or province level

c. Do you expect your organization will continue to be involved in violence prevention a year from now?

Definitely not Probably not Neutral Probably yes Definitely yes

d. Does your organization have any critical unmet needs to be able to do this?

DoS Kenya Engagement Evaluation
DoS Staff Questions
COVERSHEET

Date of Interview:	**Interviewee Name, Title:**
Project:	**Time Start: Time End:**
Interviewer(s):	**Location**
Category of Interviewee: Age Group:	
No. of Interviewees _____ M ____ F_____ Ethnic Group:_____	

General:

1. **Before we begin, can you tell us when you first heard about the CSO engagement in Kenya and when you first began interacting with CSO?**
2. **Based on your understanding, was there a Theory of Change on which the CSO engagement based?**
3. **First we would like to discuss the CSO's national work based here in Nairobi.**

   a. How did CSO's engagement affect the Nairobi Embassy's preparedness to prevent and mitigate conflict during the Kenya 2013 elections?

   Follow up: And after CSO's departure? Are you aware if the systems are still in place now?

   b. How did the CSO team contribute to the Embassy's reporting requirements during the elections?

4. **Coordination is a major theme of the CSO documents we have reviewed thus far.**

   a. What are some examples of the types of coordination and information sharing that CSO provided to the various organizations?

   b. How would you describe the level and effectiveness of coordination mechanisms? Between DC and the Embassy? Between various parts of the USG? Nairobi and the field? Between the USG and other development partners?

   Follow up: Can you help us understand the relationship between the CSO staff in the field and the implementers (Mercy Corps and PACT)?

5. **Now, we would like to discuss CSO's engagement at the sub-national level, specifically in Rift and Coast. What were the major accomplishments of that CSO's engagement , if any? (If Champions of Peace/Network of Networks is not directly mentioned, then ask: What were the major accomplishments of the Champions of Peace, if any?)**
6. **How effective was the subnational CSO intervention on the following?**

   a. Enhancing EWER networks and relations between networks, police, and communities

b. Identifying and deterring spoilers

c. Promoting peaceful attitudes and behavior through peace messaging and outreach

d. Preventing electoral violence

7. **What were the key factors which aided or impeded CSO's overall effectiveness in the Rift Valley/Coast?**

8. **How did CSO decide on the mix between diplomatic and programming activities? Between USG and local personnel? And the mix between Nairobi and field-based staff? In your opinion, was it the right mix?**

9. **Were there any unintended consequences of the CSO activities?**

10. **What are the "lessons learned" from CSO's interventions in Kenya?**

11. **What contribution did CSO make to the overall USG efforts for peaceful, non-violent elections?**

DoS Kenya Engagement Evaluation

NON-CSO DONORS AND IMPLEMENTERS
COVERSHEET

Date of Interview:	**Interviewee Name, Title:**
Interviewer(s):	**Time Start: Time End:**
	Location
Category of Interviewee: Age Group:	
No. of Interviewees _____ M ____ F_____ Kenya national?:_____	

General:

1. **Before we begin, can you tell us a bit about your organization's programming during the election period?**

Specific:

2. **Did your organization participate in any election-related donor/development partner task force or coordination meetings?**

   a. If yes, which ones? When did this start?

   b. Did you find these meetings helpful? If yes, can you tell us how?

   c. Were any of these led by the US Embassy? Or USAID?

      i. Can you remember the names of anyone who led these meetings?

3. **The US Embassy implemented programs in Rift and Coast. Did you implement any conflict mitigation programming before, during, after the 2013 elections in these areas?**

   a. If yes, who did you work with?

   b. How did you identify them?

   c. In retrospect, are there any others that you wish you had or had not worked with?

4. **Overall assessment: What do you think explains the relative low-levels of violence in 2013 compared to 2007?**

   a. Do you think that foreign donor assistance contributed? If yes, how so?

   Probe: Which donors/development partners? (US Embassy?).

Annex E: Summary of Survey Responses

The charts and graphs below represent a summary of the responses received from an e-survey administered to 20 individuals involved with or aware of CSO's Kenya Engagement. Of the 20 respondents, 19 provided information on their affiliation to the Engagement. One-third of respondents worked for State and were based in Kenya during the Engagement; however a majority of respondents worked for a USG agency other than State Department. A total of three respondents worked for a non-USG organization.

Survey Question	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
The Nairobi-based CSO officers filled a critical gap in the coordination of the election-related events and activities in the lead up to the March 2013 elections	35%	60%	0%	5%	0%
Programming (i.e. funding to Mercy Corps and PACT) in addition to the diplomatic work increased the effectiveness of CSO's work in Kenya	20%	20%	30%	10%	20%
CSO duplicated work that other USG partners were doing in Kenya	20%	20%	25%	30%	5%
By working only through USAID partners, CSO missed other organizations with which to work*	0%	31%	37%	21%	11%
In Kenya, CSO identified the right "hot spots" and worked in the areas most likely to have post-election violence	30%	35%	30%	5%	0%
CSO is able to fill "intervention gaps" that other USG organizations are not able to do*	11%	36%	11%	26%	16%

Represents 19 of 20 respondents



The political analysis provided to the Embassy in Nairobi and to Washington by the CSO officers was:	Response Percent
Very helpful	20%
Helpful	40%
Somewhat helpful	35%
Not helpful	5%
Not at all helpful	0%

(Above, below) represents 20 respondents



The presence of subnational CSO officers was _____ (fill in the blank) for improving the USG's understanding of important local political and conflict dynamics during the March 2013 election period.	Response Percent
Very useful	35%
Useful	20%
Somewhat useful	25%
Not useful	20%
Not at all useful	0%



Represents 18 of 20 respondents

Which of these general attributes do you associate most strongly with State/CSO, USAID, both or neither?	State/CSO only	USAID only	Both State/CSO and USAID	No opinion
Can implement and scale up quickly	11%	17%	50%	22%
Efficient and cost effective	6%	17%	33%	44%
Brings in local networks	0%	44%	50%	6%
Brings in additional financial resources	0%	22%	67%	11%
Brings technical expertise	0%	39%	56%	6%
Professional	0%	11%	78%	11%
Innovative approaches	11%	22%	44%	22%
Responsive to Washington	11%	6%	78%	6%
Responsive to beneficiaries	0%	28%	56%	17%



Represents 18 of 20 respondents

The time period for CSO engagement in Kenya to accomplish its goals was:	Response percent
Much too Short	6%
Somewhat too short	44%
The right amount of time	44%
Too long	6%
Much too long	0%

Respondent Recommendation: "Better align and sync up short-term crisis-driven interventions of CSO with longer-term sustainable development and peacebuilding work of USAID." ~**E-*survey Respondent***

After CSO departed from Kenya, what, if any, have been the lasting effects?	Response percent
Local Kenyans partners have increased capacity to respond to conflict issues.	35%
US Embassy Nairobi staff are more aware and better trained on conflict analysis.	15%
The communities have a better relationship with the police.	30%
EWER systems which were established or improved continue to operate effectively.	10%
None of the above. There are no lasting effects from the Kenya engagement.	25%
Other	30%

Represents 20 respondents





Represents 19 of 20 respondents

Overall, How would you rate the CSO Kenya Engagement?	Response percent
Very effective	16%
Effective	53%
Neither effective nor ineffective	26%
Ineffective	5%
Very ineffective	0%



Represents 19 of 20 respondents

In your opinion, should the CSO model used during the Kenya engagement be--	Percent Response
significantly modified before using in other countries	32%
modified slightly and used in countries with potential for post-election violence	53%
remain unchanged and used in other countries with potential for post-election violence	5%
this model should not be replicated by CSO again.	10%

"There were some logistical and administrative issues that if corrected would make future engagements run more smoothly. I think the basic activities and areas of focus worked well."~ ***E-survey Respondent***



Represents 16 of 20 respondents

"The support to the early warning work in Coast and Kisumu. The improved relationships between the communities and police played a demonstrated role in addressing conflict in both areas, especially during the lead up to elections and the long period of tension during the Supreme Court case."
~E-survey Respondent

"Coordination. CSO contributed more time and effort than anyone else to ensure that the many and varied USG actors in Nairobi as well as Washington were all reading from the same playbook in pursuit of the same goals. The significance of this should not be underestimated. CSO brought special skills and experience to this endeavor. It is clearly a comparative advantage." ***~E-Survey Respondent***