

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
169	84/07/06	CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL	RABIES; FY 82; MAURITANIA; DROUGHT; QUARANTINES	quarantining livestock, in addition to being unlikely to reduce rabies infection in either livestock or humans, would also have a limiting effect on food supply for the animals, particularly during a drought period.
263	85/02/22	FVA	AFRICA; FY 84; FY 85; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; TFAF	although drought was the main cause of the food emergencies in the 1983-84 african food crisis, more fundamental underlying causes were often cited. these included weak production and marketing systems, inappropriate agricultural policies, and lack of financial resources. future food crises are likely if these other causes are not addressed also.
264	85/02/01	FVA	AFRICA; FY 84; FY 85; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; MONETIZATION; TFAF	multi-year monetization programs are more appropriate than emergency programs for addressing the deeply-rooted underlying causes of food emergencies.

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
265	85/02/12	FVA	AFRICA; FY 84; FY 85; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; CONTINGENCY PLANS; GHANA; ZIMBABWE; GAMBIA; MALI; SENEGAL; TFAF	drought relief programs during the african food crisis of 1983-84 would probably have been more efficient and effective had host country emergency preparedness plans been available and implemented. instead, most governments hastily organized interministerial drought relief committees. only ghana and zimbabwe had emergency preparedness plans; gambia, mali, and senegal had food sector strategies.
266	85/02/12	FVA	AFRICA; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; FAO; TFAF; EARLY WARNING	early warning information systems to forecast food crises in africa are unreliable. drought-prone countries and donors must give high priority to strengthening the accuracy and timeliness of these systems. a good example of the type of information such systems should monitor is the fao's "global information and early warning system on food and agriculture."

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
267	87/10/15	FVA	AFRICA; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; FOOD DISTRIBUTION; FY 84; FY 85; TFAF; ASSESSMENT; TRANSPORTATION	food needs assessments should also include an evaluation of the country's logistical capabilities, including shipping and port facilities, and inland rail, water, and road transport. mission evaluations during the african food crisis of 1983-84 stressed the importance of examining the country's food distribution capabilities, especially where the transportation infrastructure was poorly developed and population sparsely settled over large areas.
268	85/02/12	FVA	AFRICA; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; FOOD DISTRIBUTION; MONETIZATION; FY 84; FY 85; TFAF	programming requirements vary depending upon individual recipient needs and the country's financial, institutional, and administrative capability to support relief operations. these can range from modest expansions of existing food delivery systems to major campaigns to feed large population groups. some additional program requirements during the african food crisis of 1983-84 were: monetization to fund transport and other relief-related costs; agricultural inputs such as seeds, pesticides, and fertilizer; medical supplies; and technical assistance.
269	85/02/12	FVA	AFRICA; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; FY 84; FY 85; GAMBIA; MONETIZATION; FOOD FOR	title ii monetization programs are well suited for financially-strained countries

RECNO DTENT SOURCE

KEYS

LESSON

PEACE| TFAF| TRANSPORTATION

where local currency is needed to support relief operations and rehabilitation activities. for example, during the african food crisis of 1983-84, one-third of gambia's title ii government-to-government assistance was monetized to defray transportation and other drought-related costs.

270 85/03/26 FVA

AFRICA| DROUGHT| FOOD
SHORTAGE| FY 84| FY 85| TFAF|
GHANA| SENEGAL| DISASTER
MANAGEMENT| HOST GOVERNMENT

drought relief operations must be managed by an organizational structure with sufficient authority and expertise to coordinate the multiple functions and ministries involved and streamline bureaucratic procedures to expedite food distribution. during the african drought of 1983-84, the most effective administration occurred when the host government appointed a special coordinating unit, such as the national mobilization unit in ghana and the commission de suivi in senegal.

271 85/03/25 FVA

AFRICA| DROUGHT| FOOD
SHORTAGE| FY 84| FY 85| TFAF|
DISTRIBUTION

disaster-prone countries should prepare food distribution plans as early as possible to ensure the needy are adequately targeted. senegal experienced problems in the 1984 drought when disputes arose over the size of rations and number of distribution systems in adjoining areas that had differing needs. if eligibility criteria can be established in advance, delays stemming from such problems can be avoided.

RECNO DTENT SOURCE
272 85/02/12 FVA

KEYS
AFRICA| DROUGHT| FOOD
SHORTAGE| FY 84| FY 85| TFAF|
FOOD AID| TANZANIA

LESSON
commodities should be processed prior to shipment to avoid processing-related delays that may arise in-country. during the 1983-84 african drought, usaid/dar es salaam reported that protracted negotiations between two got ministries, aid, and several processors over who should process crude vegetable oil and what price should be paid caused delays that could have been avoided had refined vegetable oil been provided instead.

273 85/03/26 PAUL RUSSELL

GHANA| AFRICA| FY 84| FOOD
SHORTAGE| DROUGHT| DONOR
COORDINATION| DISASTER
DECLARATION

despite possible political repercussions, the ghanaiian government decided early on to acknowledge that a disaster situation was evolving and request assistance. this action allowed donors (and the gog) to plan and coordinate their response before the food shortage reached crisis proportions. when the situation did in fact get bad, the relief response was already in motion.

RECNO DTENT SOURCE

274 85/03/25 FVA

KEYS

AFRICA| DROUGHT| FOOD
SHORTAGE| FY 84| FY 85| TFAF|
BOTSWANA| GHANA| FOOD
DISTRIBUTION

LESSON

the supply and distribution of emergency food aid must be carefully monitored to avoid possible dependency and disincentive effects upon local food production and marketing. in botswana, reliance on emergency food was compounded by the fact that some farmers had lost their draft animals and/or their desire to plow and plant after three crop failures. in ghana, the gov was concerned about the latter stages of emergency programs, i.e. how to manage residual stock distribution without interfering with the current harvest and how to continue food-supported development programs without discouraging production.

275 85/03/26 FVA

AFRICA| DROUGHT| FOOD
SHORTAGE| FY 84| FY 85| TFAF|
CONTRACTORS| MONITORING|
VOLAGS

countries and missions should anticipate the need to establish or expand food distribution monitoring systems as crises begin to develop. actions taken during the african drought of 1983-84 included usaid funding of additional support staff for pvos and contractors for field monitoring, supporting preparation of a disaster preparedness plan and a country profile, and sharing information with regional offices.

RECNO DTENT SOURCE
276 85/03/25 FVA

KEYS
AFRICA| DROUGHT| FOOD
SHORTAGE| FY 84| FY 85| TFAF|
GHANA| SENEGAL| GAMBIA| MALI|
TANZANIA| CONTRACTORS|
MONITORING

LESSON
emergency food shipments
require additional staff time
at all implementation levels.
food monitors in particular
are essential in many
countries to supplement host
government and mission
monitoring capability. food
monitors, hired under personal
services contracts, were
considered essential in ghana,
senegal, gambia, mali, and
tanzania.

277 87/10/19 ETHIOPIA DROUGHT FINAL REPORT
FOOD AID| OCEAN
TRANSPORTATION| PORTS|
MONITORING| LOGISTICS| FOOD
STORAGE| FOOD DISTRIBUTION|
DROUGHT| FOOD SHORTAGE|
ETHIOPIA| AFRICA| FY 87

a full-time port monitor is
indispensable if the ports
used do not normally handle
major food shipments.
forwarding agencies cannot be
relied upon to handle such
shipments unassisted.
ideally, ngo's should employ
their own port monitors to
ensure that their food is
being stored properly and
dispatched expeditiously. a
single monitor to oversee all
a.i.d. food may also be
practical. in any case,
frequent visits by the local
a.i.d. staff are needed to
ensure that all parties are
doing their job.

RECNO DTENT SOURCE

KEYS

LESSON

278 85/03/25 PAUL RUSSELL

GHANA| AFRICA| FY 84| FOOD
SHORTAGE| DROUGHT| HOST
GOVERNMENT

the experience in ghana highlights the importance of encouraging the host government to assign a disaster coordinator who has the full backing and authority of the government. because the chairman of the national mobilization committee (the disaster organization) had backing at the highest gov level, he could cut through ministerial lines of authority and red tape and get things done.

279 85/03/25 FVA

AFRICA| DROUGHT| FOOD
SHORTAGE| FY 84| FY 85| TFAF|
REPORTING| EVALUATION

a report entitled "1983-84 african food crisis: lessons learned" was compiled by fva/ppe in december 1984. it includes lessons learned from aid's food relief response to the drought as reported by the african missions involved. the missions answered questions about causes of the emergency, contingency planning, food needs assessment, etc., and the questionnaire sent to the missions is included in the report. ofda's lessons learned system includes most of the report's lessons, which can be retrieved using the key word tfaf (task force on african famine).

communication, and diplomacy (for use with the ngo's as well as with the host government, u.n., and other

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
283	87/10/19	ETHIOPIA DROUGHT FINAL REPORT	U.S. DISASTER PERSONNEL; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE; EMBASSY/MISSION; DROUGHT; FAMINE; ETHIOPIA; AFRICA; FY 87	a local a.i.d. office is essential for the management of a disaster relief program of major size and duration. the essential skills needed for such an office are in analysis, management, donors). technical skills in logistics, health, nutrition, etc., are not essential for permanent staff as these can be obtained on a tdy basis. more important are the abilities to analyze and reconcile the conflicting and partial data available, synthesize it into a coherent picture, and accurately communicate it to the decision-makers in aid/w.
284	87/10/15	BEN HOSKINS, USAID/BAMAKO	MALI; AFRICA; DROUGHT; U.S. DISASTER PERSONNEL; EMBASSY/MISSION; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; FY 87; FOOD FOR PEACE; LANGUAGE CAPABILITY	if there are indications of an impending drought in mali, food for peace staff, or others with previous experience in drought, should be recruited in sufficient force by september-october. washington must make funds available for that purpose and provide candidates. for a large-scale drought, a staff of at least four is recommended, with one coordinator, one bookkeeper, and two field people, all with previous food for peace or africa experience. it would also be of great assistance if at least one person spoke french as his or her mother tongue.

RECNO DTENT SOURCE

KEYS

LESSON

285 85/03/25 PAUL RUSSELL

GHANA| AFRICA| FY 84| FOOD
SHORTAGE| DROUGHT| PUBLIC
RELATIONS

the government of ghana conducted an extensive publicity campaign about the food relief operation and commercial food imports, which helped reduce hoarding and price gouging. grain speculators, seeing plenty of food moving into the countryside and prices stabilizing, decided to release grain rather than hold out for higher prices.

286 85/03/25 AMB. BOB FRITTS

GHANA| AFRICA| FY 84| FOOD
SHORTAGE| DROUGHT| HOST
GOVERNMENT| VOLAGS

the usg was able to avoid pressure from the ghanaian government to funnel food aid through official gog channels by demonstrating that the u.s. distribution channels were efficient and of high integrity and that there was continual close monitoring of the relief operation. this was possible through the use of two pvos (crs and adra) which have long standing programs and are well respected in ghana.

287 85/03/26 PAUL RUSSELL

GHANA| AFRICA| FY 84| FOOD
SHORTAGE| DROUGHT| DONOR
COORDINATION| VOLAGS

donor coordination worked well in ghana because all the donors put their support behind the gog-designated disaster organization, the national mobilization committee. several donors gave relief directly to the nmc; others, like the usg, gave through in-country pvos and wfp. in the latter cases, all program data was furnished to the nmc for coordinating purposes.

RECNO DTENT SOURCE

KEYS

LESSON

288 85/03/25 JOAN MITCHELL/CRS

GHANA| AFRICA| FY 84| FOOD
SHORTAGE| DROUGHT|
TRANSPORTATION COSTS| VOLAGS|
OFDA

because inland transport was a major constraint in the food relief operation in ghana, the provision by ofda of funds for truck tires, spare parts, batteries, and tarpaulins was a major incentive to truck operators hired by crs and adra to move the food. it also had the effect of reducing losses because the truck operators and drivers were told that if losses occurred they would not get additional spare parts.

289 85/03/25 PAUL RUSSELL

GHANA| AFRICA| FY 84| FOOD
SHORTAGE| DROUGHT| RELIEF
SUPPLIES| VOLAGS| TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE| MEDICAL SUPPLIES|
OFDA

the ofda response to the food shortage in ghana was particularly effective because it was an integrated package of relief, encompassing all relevant support components -- money, personnel, spare parts and equipment, medical supplies, and food aid. the technical assistance, equipment, and financial support enabled the responsible pvos to quickly move the food aid into areas of need.

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
303	87/10/15	ETHIOPIA DROUGHT FINAL REPORT	REHABILITATION; OFDA; GRANTS; USAID; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; VOLAGS; CONTRACTS; EMBASSY/MISSION; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; ETHIOPIA; AFRICA; FY 87	for long-term relief and rehabilitation grants (i.e., lasting more than six months), responsibility for grant management should be delegated to the a.i.d. field office. by 1986, the ethiopian situation was no longer an "emergency" even though it remained a disaster. since much of the ongoing a.i.d. grants were for rehabilitation rather than relief, these grants became the responsibility of afr/pd rather than ofda. in these circumstances, ofda (and ser/cm) should delegate to the field certain contract management responsibilities, such as no-cost budget amendments and grant extensions, for these continuing activities.
325	87/10/19	ETHIOPIA DROUGHT FINAL REPORT	AIRCRAFT; CONTRACTS; AIR TRANSPORT; TRANSPORTATION; ETHIOPIA; AFRICA; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; FY 87;	management of airlifts requires special knowledge and attention; either a transport specialist should be used to manage emergency airlifts full-time, or one contracted on a short-term basis to set up a management system. the transamerica airlift was the single most expensive non-food component of the usg relief assistance. by chance, ofda contracted with an air transport specialist to prepare an airdrop proposal in july, 1985. the consultant helped the aid/addis ababa contract manager to tighten

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
				management and bring the cost of flying a ton of food from asmara to mekele down from about \$475 to about \$350. given the cost of the airlift (some \$20,000 per day per aircraft), a full-time professional manager would be justified.
326	87/10/19	ETHIOPIA DROUGHT FINAL REPORT	LOGISTICS; FOOD DISTRIBUTION; TRANSPORTATION; FOOD AID; ASSESSMENT; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; ETHIOPIA; AFRICA; FY 87	an assessment of logistical resources and needs is as important as that of food aid requirements. unless there is the capacity to deliver the food to those in need, the actual donation of food will be of little consequence. granted, a certain amount of "leveraging" may be needed to try to get the local government to supply its share of transport resources. however, if the usg is committed to providing food aid in an emergency situation, regardless of the host government's cooperation, the same policy should be applied to providing the transport resources to deliver the food if it proves necessary to do so.

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
327	87/10/19	ETHIOPIA DROUGHT FINAL REPORT	AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; ETHIOPIA; FY 87; SEEDS; SELF HELP; REHABILITATION	in a famine relief program, attention should be given at the earliest possible juncture to agricultural recovery needs. plans must be developed early for timely provision of seeds, tools and other inputs needed by drought victims. special attention must be paid to people in feeding centers as they are likely to need the most assistance and may be reluctant to return to their homes unless they are confident that they will get the agricultural inputs needed to resume farming and the relief food needed to sustain them until the next harvest.
328	87/10/19	ETHIOPIA DROUGHT FINAL REPORT	ETHIOPIA; FY 87; DROUGHT; FOOD SHORTAGE; FOOD FOR PEACE; FOOD DISTRIBUTION; TRANSPORTATION	a major disaster relief program requires flexibility to address the variety and changing nature of relief needs. the ethiopia program was composed of a variety of complementary inputs. the food aid component would not have been successful without title ii internal transport funding to get the food to the victims, and ofda funding for trucks, program administration, feeding centers and health/nutrition personnel. likewise, ofda agricultural recovery grants and the title ii food-for-seed swap were essential to returning the drought victims to self-sufficiency.

RECNO DTENT SOURCE
352 86/01/07 LOCUST HANDBOOK

KEYS
INFESTATION| AFRICA| FY 86|
DROUGHT

LESSON
near normal rains that ended the drought in africa also created conditions for a widespread outbreak of grasshoppers and locusts in 1985 and 86. young locusts are called hoppers or nymphs, characterized by undeveloped wings and solitary behavior. as locusts develop, they become gregarious, capable of swarming and destroying huge quantities of crops and vegetation. the best time to spray is when locusts are still in the nymph/solitary phase, before they start swarming or can lay eggs.

362 87/03/25 OFDA

FY 86| DISASTER DECLARATION|
DROUGHT| INFESTATION| EARLY
WARNING| MITIGATION| RESOURCE
DEPLOYMENT

ofda should consider encouraging u.s. missions to declare a disaster in the early stages of a creeping disaster, such as drought or insect infestation. u.s. missions are justified in making a disaster determination in situations that could potentially develop into life-threatening emergencies. an early disaster declaration will facilitate using ofda funds for pre-disaster surveys, prepositioning of supplies, and mitigation measures, which may avert damage and human suffering later on.

RECNO	DTENT	SOURCE	KEYS	LESSON
364	87/11/02	A.I.D. PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 17	FY 88; AFRICA; DROUGHT; FAMINE; TFAF	in the event of another crisis approaching the magnitude of the 1984-86 african famine, the president should again publicly announce that the a.i.d. administrator will serve as his special coordinator. an interagency task force should be established in a.i.d. under the leadership of the geographic bureau. various smaller action-oriented working groups may also need to be created to handle actions and requests for assistance.
365	87/11/02	A.I.D. PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 17.	FY 88; AFRICA; DROUGHT; FAMINE; REFUGEES; USAID; TFAF	during the 1984-86 african drought, a coordination issue arose in western sudan when there was a mixture of chadian refugees and sudanese drought victims. the state department urged that unoeoa take responsibility for the entire group, while usaid insisted on a bilateral approach. because of the different philosophies of aid and state rp, guidelines should be issued for determining appropriate rations for refugees in those situations.
366	87/11/02	A.I.D. PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT NO. 17	FY 88; DROUGHT; EARLY WARNING; ASSESSMENT; TFAF; AFRICA; TRANSPORTATION	when alerted to impending drought/famine by early warning systems, donors and host countries should agree on

RECNO DTENT SOURCE

KEYS

LESSON

annual action plans, including
(a) joint multidonor/host
country assessments midway in
the rainy season to determine
likely minimum needs in order
to ensure that first relief
shipments arrive by january,
(b) joint multidonor
postharvest missions to refine
estimates and determine
residual relief requirements,
and (c) multidonor logistic
missions to assess
infrastructure and possible
limitations on timely relief
distributions.

413 89/05/22 LAUREN LANDIS

FY 88| MOZAMBIQUE| MALAWI|
FAMINE| DROUGHT| AGRICULTURAL
RECOVERY

ag-paks, packages of seeds,
fertilizer, pesticides, and
tools, need to be distributed
with food, otherwise hungry
recipients may resort to
eating the seeds or selling
inputs for food. often these
seeds have been chemically
treated, and make the person
sick if consumed. this lesson
learned was reported in
mozambique and malawi, where
ag-paks were distributed to
mozambican displaced persons.