

DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM STRATEGY

FOR

AFGHANISTAN

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Asia Near East and Europe Bureau's (ANE) "open markets" and "open societies" objectives for self-sustained economic growth are premised on the mutually reinforcing relationships of economic development and political freedom. For Afghanistan, a country which experienced a coup d'etat and a brutal occupation by the Soviet army that led to over a decade of war, more than a million deaths and five million refugees, this goal is particularly daunting. The Afghanistan Democratic Pluralism Initiative (DPI) Strategy provides the framework to foster the development of Afghan non-government organizations and future Afghanistan governmental institutions to provide oversight for basic civil and political freedoms and re-establish the rule of law.

The United States Government has had a long-standing commitment to support economic growth and the development of democratic institutions and values in Afghanistan. When the Afghans sought to open up their political system and reform their central government, the U.S. actively supported Afghan efforts through its assistance programs, beginning as early as the 1950s. But assistance for Afghanistan, through official programs from the United States and the non-communist nations, slowed to a trickle following the April 1978 coup d'etat in which the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. Despite the lack of a legitimate government in Kabul, the United States maintained its commitment to Afghanistan and the Afghan people. The Geneva Accords gave hope of a stable and peaceful country, but as yet that condition has not developed, and no end to the conflict is in sight. This Strategy seeks to continue the United States' commitment during the present troubled circumstances and to help lay a foundation for sustaining that commitment into the period when peace and stability return to Afghanistan.

The U. S. Government recognizes that Afghanistan will face a massive task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Although the responsibility for this renewal and reconstruction will lie preeminently with the Afghans, the U. S. Government is ready to join other countries and organizations willing to aid the Afghans in this time of rebuilding.

The DPI is proposed because economic development and political freedom have been associated in modern times, each reinforcing the other throughout the world. Open societies -- through legally guaranteed freedoms of speech, press and association, as well as through free elections and a system governed by the rule of law -- enable economic development. For this reason, along with economic aid for developing nations the promotion of political and civil freedoms -- the goal of the Democratic Pluralism Initiative -- is a foremost priority of American foreign policy.

Any attempt to apply DPI to Afghanistan will require careful attention to the complex political conditions in the country. Afghanistan has in modern times been wrought by internal divisions so that the development of effective administrative institutions has been particularly difficult. The Kabul government, in order to maintain its preeminence, appealed to traditional bases of authority, and also established dependent relations with outside powers. The government had only a marginal need to remain sensitive to popular concerns. On the local level the diversity of interest groups and the fragility of loyalties in many communities kept the rural populations from developing strong ties among each other, so that even though they were often restive they were usually kept relatively under control by the Kabul rulers. But the relative strength of the rural areas kept the Kabul regime from imposing progressive reforms. The nation-state that formed in the 20th century was actually composed of merely a small enclave of educated urban elite. Nevertheless, the Kabul regimes were generally accepted as legitimate, on the basis of traditional loyalties to the Barakzai lineage and Islam.

The communist coup d'etat of 1978 placed in power a social element that was unable to win the loyalty of more than a fraction of the population. As the conflict that ensued has engulfed the nation a number of changes have taken place in the society:

- Nation-wide political organizations ("parties") acquired a preeminent importance in the society because they became conduits of foreign assistance in the conflict.
- Islamic fundamentalism became the idiom of the resistance against the Afghan communists.
- In the rural areas local commanders (sometimes in consultation the elders) became the effective rulers.
- Local rivalries have, in places, become more vicious.
- The populations have become accustomed to increased contact with each other.
- Resentment against foreign involvement in Afghanistan affairs has increased.

The current political situation is mixed. The forces of the Kabul regime and the mujahedin resistance groups are at a stand-off. Commanders continue to dominate, as control of weaponry is the basis of preeminence. The accessibility of weapons has made everyone more vulnerable, and old scores and internecine resentments have in many areas been exploding into

bloody conflict. The refugees have been losing hope, the war having continued without resolution more than a year after the Soviet troop withdrawal. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) has lost its credibility because of its evident impotence. The mujahedin "parties" have lost their credibility, as they have not resolved their differences and are obviously dependent on outside powers. In Peshawar the frustration has festered into overt acts of hostility against westerners and especially educated Afghans. Some prominent Afghans serving the refugees have temporarily left Peshawar. Because of threats and attacks, some of the women's programs have been shut down. Nevertheless, there is still strong popular support for the western community serving the refugees; and a few educated Afghans bravely persist in their work despite threats and the murder of several of their number. At the present time contrary social forces -- not only in the war between the regime and the resistance groups, but also within the two sides, owing to internecine tensions -- foster instability and a general uncertainty about the future.

It is hoped that an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union will take place soon and that the other involved powers -- Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia -- will also disengage from the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

The Strategy is broadly cast into three phases reflecting a rough scheme for the anticipated developments. The phases, separated by threshold events, are:

- Phase I - The current situation before an agreement is reached on a transition process.
- Phase II - Following an agreement or other event such as a coup, a transition period commences in which an interim body administers the country until the Afghan people legitimate a form of government and the new government takes charge.
- Phase III - The period of a legitimate successor government begins by the legitimation of instituted offices of government through an act of approval by the Afghan people.

The Afghanistan DPI Strategy is premised on the following principles linking the strategy to broader U.S. policy goals for Afghanistan:

- The DPI Strategy should be consistent with our stated policy to promote democratic pluralism.
- The most effective means of promoting democratic pluralism is through targeted, low-profile assistance.
- Pluralism should be promoted but not at the expense of political unity.

- Program elements should demonstrate a sensitivity to historical experience and socio-political factors.
- Mission-funded activities will promote the strengthening of links among all segments of the Afghan population.
- To the extent possible, activities should build on existing Afghan practices.
- Support should be given for the creation and strengthening of organizations that become self-sustaining.
- Program elements should be "portable," and not bound to the current circumstances.

In line with the above objectives and with the frequently voiced concerns of many of the people visited by the team, a priority objective of the U. S. Government should be to terminate all support for elements of the resistance that are opposed to the free and open expression of ideas and the exercise of the human rights of women and minorities. The Strategy assumes that this necessary change in policy must take place before the DPI activities suggested here can be effective.

Activities for the Afghanistan DPI strategy fall into three broad categories: voice, choice, and governance. Voice activities include activities designed to encourage the free flow of information, increased Afghan participation in international fora, adherence to international standards of human rights, the promotion of Afghan national identity, the strengthening of civic groups, and the improvement of opportunities for women and minorities. Choice activities support the conduct of public acts that legitimate the government through such activities as free and fair elections. Governance activities include efforts aimed at strengthening institutional capabilities and the development of efficient and responsible government institutions which respect and abide by the rule of law.

The Mission intends to amend and expand its recently approved PVO Support Project to specifically include democratic pluralism activities, and intends to sign a cooperative agreement with a non-profit U.S. organization, The Asia Foundation, for the bulk of the Strategy. However, some funds should be set aside for other activities that may arise as a result of changing circumstances. Care should be taken to avoid offending the target populations and to establish that the security of the participants and the facilities are assured.

## II. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

The United States Government has had a long-standing commitment to support economic growth and the development of democratic institutions and values in Afghanistan. This Strategy seeks to continue that commitment during the present troubled circumstances and to help lay a foundation for sustaining that commitment into the period when peace and stability return to Afghanistan.

### The United States' Commitment to Afghanistan

Ambitious U.S. economic assistance programs that were begun in the 1950s introduced vital improvements in Afghanistan's infrastructure, notably in its transport, communications, and agriculture sectors, and in its educational system. In the 1960s, when the Afghans sought to open up the political system and reform the central government, the U.S. actively supported Afghan efforts through its assistance programs. Thousands of Afghans received training in institutions and programs supported by the United States; in addition to acquiring technical skills, they were exposed to the values and practices associated with democratic and pluralistic societies. Some of these people are among the most valuable participants in the resistance movement.

Assistance for Afghanistan, through official programs from the United States and the non-communist nations, slowed to a trickle following the April 1978 coup d'etat in which the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. The demands and conditions imposed on aid providers by the Taraki and Amin regimes, plus the growing disorder and lawlessness around the country, barred further assistance activities. With the 1979 Soviet invasion, all U.S.G. assistance efforts for Kabul ceased.

Despite the lack of a legitimate government in Kabul, the United States has maintained its commitment to Afghanistan and the Afghan people. Assistance channelled through multilateral organizations and bilateral programs support the Afghan displaced population, which, estimated at approximately five million refugees outside plus two million displaced inside the country, constitutes the largest single refugee population in the world. The United States has also supported war-affected Afghans who remain in the country through the Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance program. The United States has also actively supported the resistance to the illegitimate Kabul regime through vigorous diplomatic efforts and through other forms of material support.

The Geneva Accords call for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces; self-determination for the Afghan people; restoration of Afghanistan's neutral, non-aligned status; and the return of the refugees with safety and honor. Only the first of these goals

has been achieved. It is now up to the Afghans, with the assistance of friendly nations, to accomplish the remaining three.

The United States believes that an Afghanistan that lives in peace with all its neighbors and does not through its own instability invite outside interference, is essential to the stability of the entire region.

As of spring 1990, over a year after Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, no end to the conflict is in sight. The Kabul regime maintains control over the crucial urban areas and retains the ability to resupply by land and air. The Afghan resistance has been unable to overcome its political and military weaknesses, but it does control much of the countryside and continues to enjoy much of the moral advantage. Discussions aimed at a political settlement continue on all fronts, but no consensus has yet emerged to back a process leading to a settlement.

The U. S. Government recognizes that Afghanistan will face a massive task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Far more than just the economy has been shattered by this conflict: the delicate tissue of society, polity and culture has been mutilated and will require patience, compassion, and sensitive nurturing as it re-creates itself. The responsibility for this renewal and reconstruction will lie preeminently with the Afghans; other countries and organizations intent upon aiding the Afghans, however, may lend support. They must, of course, contribute positively to the process, so as to strengthen new institutions without being counterproductive. This is the primary goal of the Strategy.

#### DPI and its goals

Economic development and political freedom have in modern times mutually reinforced each other throughout the world. Open societies, through legally guaranteed freedoms of speech, press and association, as well as through free elections and a system governed by the rule of law, allow the unrestricted flow of ideas and the expansion of a private sector that is a vital counterweight to state power. Open markets, in turn, promote political diversity by providing employment outside of government, allowing individuals to maintain their livelihood independent of the state.

For these reasons, the promotion of political and civil freedoms and economic development -- the goal of the Democratic Pluralism Initiative -- is one of the foremost priorities of American foreign policy.

As an economic development agency, A.I.D. in the past has focused on those activities which contribute to broad-based sustainable economic growth. Its recent adoption of the DPI agenda enhances A.I.D.'s traditional economic activities by addressing the political, legal and regulatory constraints to sustainable growth. Through the DPI, A.I.D. will strengthen institutions which promote the openness and transparency of markets, fair and efficient adjudication of disputes, and the protection of the right of individuals to associate for economic purposes, to hold property, and to retain the profits from their labor.

### III. DPI IN THE AFGHANISTAN CONTEXT

Any attempt to apply DPI to Afghanistan will require careful attention to the complex political conditions in the country. We here examine the structure of Afghanistan as it existed before the war and exists now, with a view to identifying the particular challenges entailed in providing the Afghans with assistance in developing a democratically integrated society.

#### Political structure of pre-war Afghanistan

Afghanistan has in modern times been so wrought by internal divisions that the development of effective administrative institutions has been particularly difficult. In order to maintain its preeminence the Kabul government, besides appealing to traditional bases of authority, has established dependent relations with outside powers that have weakened its need to remain sensitive to popular concerns.

#### The traditional structure.

Before the war certain social alignments were in place that had existed for generations, and despite the dislocations of millions of people and the destruction of property have persisted throughout the war. Two notable features of these alignments deserve mention because they will surely affect the course of events in the future: the diversity of interest groups and the fragility of loyalties in many communities. The central government had to deal with the broad fractiousness at the grass roots in establishing its suzerainty.

The mosaic of conflicting social alignments. Social interests in Afghanistan are generally diversified by the broken terrain that has spatially dispersed the populations, by the diversity of ethnic and sectarian types, and by endemic tensions among the residents of rural communities.

The terrain is shattered into thousands of isolated tracts of land by the Hindu Kush range, which transects the country from northeast to southwest. The tracts in the higher glens are

smaller and more isolated, those on the periphery around the range larger and more accessible to the main corridors of movement. As most agricultural communities depend essentially on irrigation, these tracts are defined by the availability of surface water. The relative isolation of many communities work to limit the interests of the occupants to local concerns. Most peasant communities have few incentives to cooperate with residents of other communities nearby, although trade in agricultural products exists between communities in different ecological zones.

Besides the peasants living in irrigated alluvial plains there were, before the war, large numbers of pastoralists -- said to be about one seventh of the population -- who in summer moved into the highlands to graze their flocks and in winter dispersed outward into the lowland plains around the periphery. Because they grazed their flocks separately and needed to cooperate on a large scale only during the spring and fall, when they migrated together, the ties of broad affiliation among the pastoralists operated only intermittently. Relations between the pastoralists and the agriculturalists were cool, because of (often) ethnic differences and the tendency of the migrating flocks to wander into cultivated fields.

The peoples of the country were also divided into different ethnolinguistic and sectarian affiliations. There were over a dozen ethnolinguistic types and three Islamic sects in the country, not to mention the small populations of Hindus, Jats and others. Before the war many people, especially in the provinces, had a stronger sense of loyalty to their community, kinship group, or sect than to the central government that claimed suzerainty over them. Such distinctions were important: the various ethnolinguistic groups, especially those in rural areas, collectively remembered their past conflicts, and still distrusted each other. The sect groups -- Sunnis (the majority), Shi'ites, and Isma'ilis (a small minority) -- maintained the sharpest social boundaries: whereas people of different ethnolinguistic types intermarried if they belonged to the same sect, rarely did people of different sects marry, except in rare cases of a Sunni man marrying a Shi'ite or Isma'ili woman; a Shi'ite or Isma'ili male did not marry a Sunni woman.

Besides the spatial separation and cultural diversity of Afghanistan's populations, within local communities, which were usually composed of relatives to various degrees, there were often factions. The factions arose from three common sources of tension. One was the shortage of land. As the boundaries between plots were sometimes marked only by piles of stones or unploughed ridges, the owners of adjacent plots, cousins of some degree, sometimes disagreed on the correct location of boundaries. Another source of tension was the disagreements over sharing and helping; people had different notions of what was

appropriate generosity so that occasionally people disputed over what was a fair return on past gifts and acts of support. The third reason for tension was the shortage of marriageable women, probably because of the high mortality rate of young mothers and the practice of polygamy. Thus, in agricultural communities the relatives who were supposed to be helping and supporting each other sometimes had occasion to quarrel, as they put it, over zamin (land), zar (gold, money), and zan (women). The nomadic populations of course had fewer quarrels over land, but they had similar problems over reciprocity of support and women.

Mechanisms of broader unity. There were, however, mechanisms by which the relatively disconnected, sometimes internally fractious communities were able to cooperate with each other on a wider scale. One of these mechanisms was the necessity to deal with the central government through the medium of local representatives, known as maliks. These representatives were appointed by the government with the consent of the communities they represented. Already influential members of their communities, these men of course gained additional influence through their office. Their clients were nevertheless not always satisfied with them and relations of friendship and dependence on a malik were not altogether warm. It was not rare that the clients of a malik sought to have him removed from office.

Beyond the local networks of kinsmen who acknowledged obligations to each other there were, in some places, larger affiliations based on putative descent through the male line from a common ancestor, that is "tribes." Afghanistan is often loosely described as a "tribal" society. Actually, however, political affiliations of this broad sort, uniting large groups of people, exist mainly among the Pushtuns (Pushtun and Pakistani observers generally describe the whole of Afghanistan as "tribal"). Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkomen have no tribes in this sense; and the tribes of the Hazaras have not functioned for generations. For these ethnolinguistic types, and many others, the largest functioning social units have been scarcely more than localized extended family alliances. Even among the Pushtuns, "tribal" ties have provided the basis for temporary or intermittent cooperation only for specific purposes; they have been invoked when needed and ignored when not. Indeed, such tribal alliances have been functional among only certain Pushtuns; perhaps no more than 60 percent of the Pushtuns have active tribal affiliations. Moreover, the sizes of the Pushtun tribal affiliations varied a great deal, largely in respect to the sizes and contiguity of their lands. The Durrani tribes of the south occupied larger tracts of land, both for cultivation and animal grazing, and were able to form relatively large coalitions; the Ghilzai tribes of the east dwelt on smaller "islands" of cultivation and pasturage and formed smaller tribal coalitions.

Broader social relations of another kind existed all over the country and among virtually all Afghan groups, although somewhat differently in the north than in the south. These were Islamic networks, ties of affiliation that focused on prominent Islamic authorities. Even though these social ties were informal and essentially religious in character, they had the potential of being mobilized for collective action on at least a short-term basis and essentially to respond to critical situations, in the name of Islam.

There were two kinds of Islamic networks, those united by ulama and those by pirs, or "saints." Ulama were specialists in formal Islamic knowledge and served in the mosques and schools. There was, however, a kind of informal hierarchy of Islamic specialists, the least of them called "mullahs" in western literature, the more eminent of them "ulama." Many people believed that the knowledge of the Islamic specialists included curative and protective devices and they sometimes turned to them for cures and charms. Certain ulama enjoyed great respect among the populace. Besides their connections to the ordinary people, the ulama maintained informal ties to each other, as they shared obvious professional interests and common causes, and in many cases had graduated from the same Islamic schools; also ulama families often intermarried. The most prominent ulama had large followings and were connected to many other ulama in broad networks of informal friendship.

The other kind of Islamic authority, pirs (often called "saints" by westerners), differed from the ulama on the basis of their putative special access to God and supernatural power. Their blessings and prayers were believed to be especially efficacious. The notion of holy men who have special access to God and extraordinary powers entered Islam as part of the early sufi movement, but since then only certain pirs headed actual sufi circles; many pirs had large followings without heading a circle of dedicated adepts in the formal sufi manner. Pirs were recognized on the basis of their "noble" descent from Muhammad (or one of his colleagues), their putative knowledge of esoteric secrets, and their direct inspirational experiences. Unlike the ulama, the less respected of whom were merely hired to lead prayers and teach, pirs were venerated and given gifts in the hope of receiving blessings; they were never paid for services. However, the great pirs were also respected ulama formally trained in Islamic subjects.

Because of their renown, the great pirs had huge followings, often from different ethnolinguistic types. The loyalties of people to their pirs were expressed in visits and gifts. But the followers of a pir varied in their closeness to him. Some people only visited their pir occasionally, bringing gifts and seeking blessing, of course. Others -- as in the very active sufi orders

of the north -- maintained close ties to their pir, studying and praying under his tutelage. The influence of a pir was normally informal and apolitical, but in times of crisis a pir sometimes stirred his followers to cooperate in common cause, which was justified in Islamic terms. In these instances a pir's following could become a powerful coalition, sometimes headed not by the pir himself but by a close associate.

As a consequence of their wide personal ties the ulama and the pirs represented large networks of personal relationship that bridged between different localities and different ethnolinguistic types. They did not, however, connect people from different sects; like the ordinary people, the learned authorities of the different Islamic sects -- Sunni, Shi'ite, Isma'ili -- had little to do with each other.

Underlying this structure of influence, in which certain Islamic authorities had influence based on informal relations, was a strong popular commitment to customs and rituals considered Islamic. For many people, Islam embodied not only virtue and sublimity but also the means of curing and well-being. The Islam of the Afghans was not, however, particularly anti-western. The Afghans were the only Muslim people who have never been under colonial control. Even though they were sometimes suspicious of Western influences, they had not, before the war, developed (as Muslims elsewhere did) a particularly defensive attitude toward western culture.

#### Government and the centralization of power

The spatial dispersion and relative isolation of many of Afghanistan's populations has limited the government's ability to control and draw them together into a national unity. Many rural communities have had little loyalty to the Kabul government, Kabul being merely the strongest and most consolidated among many scattered agricultural oases. Constituting about 85 percent of the total population, the agricultural and nomadic peoples exerted a powerful centrifugal force on Afghanistan affairs; until about 1956, when the government began to receive military assistance from the Soviet Union, the rural peoples could muster a much stronger fighting force than the government. The rural populations have, however, rarely in any numbers collectively opposed the Kabul government. When there were uprisings -- and there were many -- they were usually localized; and the government dealt with each disturbance as an individual and isolated problem, and in such cases the odds were in its favor. The clearest example of this pattern occurred during the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman of Kabul at the end of the nineteenth century. He was able to subjugate several sectors of the country that had been either fractious or relatively autonomous by confronting them one at a time. He was able to bring most of the country under his control by subjugating the

troublesome peoples in succession, for Kabul was at least the richest, most populous, and strongest of the scattered islands of population.

The Kabul government for many years held its preeminent position by forming agreements with certain Pushtun tribes that could be counted on to provide military support when needed. The government also made use of the usual means of centralizing a country: it developed a bureaucracy and an army, and it built roads in order to make its various localities more accessible. And it carefully sought to enshroud itself with an aura of legitimacy by appealing to tribal and religious loyalties. The Kabul rulers have for generations invoked their right as Barakzai Pushtuns, the lineage that has ruled the country most of the time since early in the nineteenth century. But the tactic of greatest importance in winning broad support was to maintain close ties with the country's principal Islamic authorities, whose wide personal contacts and special status gave them unusual influence among the people, and to make Islam a cachet of national identity. The Kabul rulers cultivated the support of the Islamic authorities by providing stipends for them; licensing them (in order also better to control them); and, especially after the uprising that overturned Amir Amanullah in 1929, by giving special deference to the eminent Sunni pirs; they also maintained respectful relations with the leading authorities of the minority sects. The government, therefore, while attempting to integrate its diverse populations by the usual bureaucratic, military, and technological means, also made use of Islamic symbols to undergird its claim to suzerainty over its people.

#### Afghanistan government polity in the 20th Century.

The political character of modern Afghanistan largely results from the country's position between the territory controlled by the world powers of the late 19th Century, England and Czarist Russia. Although Afghanistan was never colonized, its borders were demarcated by British-Russian boundary commissions in line with their own interests, at times even without consultation with the Afghan ruler. Afghanistan became, in effect, a buffer territory interposed between the expansionist Czarist and British empires.

The Afghan rulers, beginning with Amir Abdul Rahman (1881-1901), began to build an internally autonomous state substantially based on external colonial support. The British paid Amir Abdul Rahman a subsidy in return for British control over Afghan foreign policy. The British subsidy enabled the Amir to build an army without incurring large obligations to his subject populations. Although taxes were collected, they were never sufficient to cover the costs of government.

Relations between the government and its subject populations were distant. The local populations paid some tribute and provided conscripts for the state army in return for the provision of security for domestic commerce and a rudimentary system of justice. An important early effort by the state to promote social development occurred during the reign of Amir Amanullah (1919-1929). After Amanullah gained total independence from the British in 1919 he embarked on an ambitious, though ill-conceived, plan of national development inspired by Ataturk in Turkey.

But Amanullah, unlike Ataturk, failed to appreciate the need for a strong and loyal military, necessary to enforce his reforms. His army was unready, and indeed unwilling, to quash the uprisings that appeared as he sought to extend his writ over the countryside. Amanullah's defeat in 1929 by a series of tribal and Islamic revolts may be his most durable legacy; for it induced his successors, until the Communists came to power in 1978, to conclude that they could not effect global social transformations in Afghanistan but must introduce reforms in the country generally and gradually. As an educated, largely state-supported middle class congealed in the capital, the policy of incremental change in the society as a whole created a distance between the societal elements associated with the state and its capital city (and to some extent its larger provincial capitals) and the rest of the population of the country. The nation-oriented middle class became an enclave, insulated from the traditional society.

Although Nadir Shah, who wrested the government from the traditional elements who had removed Amanullah, and Nadir's son Zahir Shah, shared Amanullah's goal of "modernizing" Afghanistan, they concluded from his experience that the balance of forces in the country precluded a state-imposed global transformation. Instead, while compromising with the traditional forces, they forged links with the international state and commercial system that enabled them gradually to enlarge the influence of the state centered in Kabul. The mini-nation-state of Zahir Shah depended less-and-less on the peasant and tribal peoples who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population and increasingly on the resources obtained from the outside. Internal revenue diminished in importance. Foreign trade, foreign aid (especially after 1957), and the sale of natural gas to the Soviet Union (after 1968) became the vital sources of support for the government. Thus, the government became less dependent on, and hence less accountable to, its own populations as it became more dependent on -- and perhaps more responsive to -- international sources of support.

The formation of the nation-state as an enclave supported mainly by its links to the international system, deprived the state of most of the instruments through which other leaderships

have carried out social change and exerted control over their subject populations. The Afghan leadership came to regard foreign powers as the sources of stability and development. As a result, for most Afghans the state is regarded today, not as the trustee of national interest, but as another particular interest group like a tribe or clan.

That the nation-state was essentially a small enclave in Afghanistan society also undermined attempts to develop democratic institutions. King Zaher Shah signed the 1964 Constitution that introduced a constitutional monarchy and provided for a supreme court as well as a bicameral parliament. The parliament consisted of a fully elective 216-member House of the People and a partially elective/partially appointed House of Elders. But few Afghans participated in the first elections under the new constitution. Louis Dupree has written:

The bulk of the ninety-five percent non-literate Afghans . . . knew little and cared less about the new Constitution and "New Democracy." Interest rose very high, on the other hand, among the intelligentsia in the major urban centers. . . . What these dissident intellectuals (usually western-trained) wanted was instant democracy . . . without the agony of generations of development.

#### The impact of ten years of war on Afghanistan society

Afghanistan, a diverse and fragmented society on several levels, and relatively weak at the center, was shaken in the 1970s by the ascendancy of the Afghan communists, who sought to employ the institutions of government to enforce a widespread restructuring of the society. The story of their rise and their mistakes is well documented; but it is useful to note the obvious: that the Afghan communists were genuinely supported by a mere fragment of the total population and the great majority bitterly opposed them. The loss of the legitimacy of the Kabul regime under the communists was a significant change in the structure of Afghanistan society. The destruction of property, the loss of life, the unprecedented numbers of refugees inside as well as outside the country, derive from the absence of a legitimately instituted government in Afghanistan.

Besides these cataclysmic changes other important changes have taken place; and also, interestingly, certain things have not much changed. The important social developments in the recent period that could affect the shape of the new society follow.

### The rise of nationwide political organizations ("parties").

Nationwide political organizations (called "parties" in English but tanzim, "organizations" as well as hezbs, "parties" in the vernacular) arose legally in Afghanistan in the 1960s but became vital institutions in the context of international politics. "Parties" were introduced among the urban middle classes in the 1960s, encouraged by the government as part of a program of democratization. The "parties" were, however, essentially urban societies and attracted little interest among the rural peoples. During the presidency of Da'ud, who was agitating for a Pushtunistan, Z. A. Bhutto encouraged some dissident elements from Afghanistan, mostly students from Kabul University, to form resistance groups against the Da'ud regime. When they attempted to stimulate an uprising inside the country they gained little support.

It was after the communist coup d'etat in 1978 that public opposition to the government began to harden. Especially after the Soviet invasion in 1979, there was a groundswell of opposition in several parts of the country, and in that setting the resistance groups that had originally formed in Pakistan gained support. It was, however, not until they became the channels of external support for the mujahedin fighting groups that these groups, calling themselves "parties," became important to the Afghan people. The mujahedin "parties" became conduits of goods and money from the United States and the other countries providing help for the mujahedin and the refugees that fled into Pakistan. Pakistan recognized only certain "parties," eventually seven of them, including some whose nascence went back to the Da'ud period, to be conduits of aid to the Afghans who were now fighting the war inside Afghanistan. Four of the seven "parties" became known as "fundamentalist" "parties," as they espoused Islamic fundamentalist agendas; the other three "parties," even though based on established traditions in Afghan societies, were called "moderate." Pakistan's support went beyond the use of them as conduits of weaponry to the mujahedin; it required all Afghan refugees to join one of the seven in order to receive rations. Like the Soviet-supported communist parties in Kabul, the mujahedin "parties" have been conduits of foreign influence as well as weaponry to the Afghanistan peoples. The seven groups are essentially creations of Pakistan policy, sustained and strengthened by the support of the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The selection of these "parties" as the conduits of aid to the Afghans reflects a certain bias. Of the seven, all are Sunni, and six are mainly Pushtun, the seventh being the mainly Persian speaking Jamiat-i-Islami, whose strength is in the northern provinces. No Shi'ite "party" has been recognized by the Pakistan government; most of the support for the Shi'ite "parties" (of which there have been eight, now ostensibly united)

has come from Iran. Modest support for Harakat-i Islami, led by Ayatollah Mohsini from Pakistan, has also been provided.

The basic social alignments from which most of the seven Pakistan-based groups were constituted were those already in place in Afghanistan society. The basic scaffoldings of the "moderate" "parties" headed by Sayyed Ahmad Gaylani, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, and Mowlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi were the networks of client groups that venerated their leaders as eminent ulama or pirs. Although Gaylani does not personally stress his noble descent, an important source of his influence is the power imputed to him because of his descent from a line of famous pirs; his family has long been the focus of the Qadiri sufi order. Because many of the Mujaddidi family were executed by the Kabul government, Sibghatullah Mujaddidi is virtually the last living Islamic authority in a family that has produced many eminent Islamic authorities and who have long been prominent in the Naqshbandi sufi order. Mohammadi's strength has been his eminence in a network of Islamic authorities in Paktia; he appears to be, like Mujaddidi and Gaylani, regarded as a "saint" by some of his followers.

Most of the fundamentalist "parties" formed around tribal and ethnic affiliations. Of the fundamentalist leaders Professor Rabbani is the most moderate: he is a respected scholar of Islamic theology and law, was a professor in Kabul University and, like Mujaddidi, graduated from Al-Azhar University in Cairo. But much of his support is regionally and ethnically based: being from Badakhshan, he is strongly supported by Persian and Turkic speakers in the northern part of the country, who have been informally interconnected through the sufi networks there. The essential adhesive of Yunus Khalis's "party" has been composed of government-educated ulama and the ulama of the Khugiani and Jadran tribes of Nangarhar. All of these "parties" have been developed around structural relations that existed in Afghanistan before the war. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's "party" appears to be structured on a different social axis, apparently around ideological agendas; in recent months its underlying Ghilzai Pushtun tribal basis has become more evident. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf's "party" is the most blatantly pragmatic organization, as it essentially exists as a conduit of aid from Saudi Arabia.

The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as the preeminent idiom of national politics.

The fundamentalist "parties" have introduced a style of Islamic politics that was, until this war, alien to Afghanistan society. The fundamentalist "party" leaders have introduced a strident anti-western Islamic political rhetoric developed by modern Muslims in Egypt and South Asia who were struggling against the perceived hegemony of the West. These

fundamentalists argue that previous attempts to apply Islamic ideas to modern contexts have missed the crucial intent of Islam; some fundamentalists charge progressive Muslims with being inconsistent in their understanding of Islam and half-hearted in their application of it. They claim to be responding to modern political circumstances in terms of concepts and principles entailed in, they say, the original Islamic revelation.

But it has not been because of their ideology that the fundamentalists have held a prominent place in the Afghanistan war. They have been favored by the Government of Pakistan, which has controlled nearly the entire support program for the Afghan mujahedin. The Saudi Arabians have also found certain fundamentalist "parties," mainly Sayyaf's and Hikmatyar's, useful conduits in the Afghanistan war. Besides official Saudi support many Arabian volunteers have joined the Afghan jihad ("holy war"). Through their influence Wahabism, a fundamentalist sect founded in the 18th century, now the official religion of Arabia, has been introduced to the jihad. Wahabis have introduced alien notions, such as the right to take booty and concubines in war, that have offended many Afghans. Although significant resources are now underwriting Wahabi activities inside Afghanistan, the permanence of Wahabi influence in Afghanistan is questionable. Similarly, it is unclear how thoroughly Islamic fundamentalist ideas have permeated Afghanistan society. No doubt the bulk of the Afghan people are Muslim, but whether they will continue to support fundamentalist leaders in a free and open society is doubtful, for the fundamentalists' dependence on foreign support has undermined their influence.

The ascendance of local institutions of social control:  
commanders and shuras.

Inside Afghanistan, the commanders of the mujahedin bands have become the preeminent figures in their communities. The rise of the commanders reflected the general demand for a certain kind of leadership in the war. Their rise indicated the general recognition that access to weaponry and the ability to organize for conflict was necessary for the protection of local interests as well as to resist the communists. The government had little control of anything more than Kabul, the provincial capitals, and the main transport arteries, and it lacked the means to maintain control of the rural areas. Control of affairs in the more isolated areas was maintained through the influence of commanders or local councils. Many of the commanders took on political responsibilities in their neighborhoods, as they possessed the necessary weaponry and ultimately controlled the resources. Often they effectively became the patrons of their respective communities; even the former eminent men and maliks became dependent on the commanders. (In the refugee camps some of the maliks have been able to serve as the representatives of their communities.)

The elders in rural communities have sometimes played an important consultative role to the commanders. Meetings of elders, or the entire membership of a community, are called jirgas or shuras, "consultative assemblies." Shuras were common among many of the peoples in Afghanistan, but they were never administrative bodies. They were instead merely ad hoc meetings of the men who had a stake in the issues. They met when necessary, and for long periods might not meet. Moreover, the members of the shuras had different degrees of influence; the most powerful elders clearly carried the greatest weight in discussions, often remaining silent for most of the discussion. Once they took a position on a matter, most other people agreed readily. Shuras have functioned in this way, as ad hoc groups of concerned citizens discussing how to deal with current problems. However, the local commanders have had a powerful influence on the decisions of shuras, as they, in the context of the war, held the preeminent positions of power. The commanders have varied in their willingness to allow the shuras to exercise their own judgement; some have dominated local councils; others have allowed them to function somewhat autonomously. The Oversight Shura (Shura-y Nazar, formerly known as the Council of the North) instituted by Mas'ud is a council that has specified administrative responsibilities.

Local rivalries have, in places, become more vicious and bloody

Besides such new developments as the rise of "parties" and commanders there were indications that local antagonisms had affected party loyalties among the mujahedin fighting groups.

Generally, the war stimulated a degree of cooperation on a wider scale than occurs in normal circumstances; this was especially so in the initial period when there was widespread shock and outrage at the Soviet invasion. Where there were viable tribal affiliations, as in Kandahar, the tribes became coordinated fighting bodies. And where larger affiliations were less seriously impeded by local antagonisms, as in the north where the networks of sufi pirs provided broad scaffoldings for mutual cooperation, large functioning coalitions were formed.

However, in many parts of the country old patterns of local rivalry persisted and affected mujahedin activities. Local kinship-based coalitions were a common unit of resistance, and although the several factions in an area cooperated to a degree, sometimes old feuds kept them apart. In the parts where local antagonisms were especially intense, as in the Hazarajat (the central region of the country) and the Pushtu-speaking eastern provinces, the fragmentation of interests was manifested in contrastive party alignments among the mujahedin. Rival fighting groups aligned with different mujahedin "parties," forming a

checkerboard of loyalties. The competitive search for party support fostered a fluidity in allegiances; in the Hazarajat where the antagonisms were more volatile, some of the fighting bands shifted party affiliations several times in the course of the war, always to improve their capability with respect to rival bands. Such loyalty shifts were possible because the "parties" were competitively courting clients and the commanders were competitively seeking arms. The urgency of military needs over-rode ideological considerations. Many commanders who earnestly opposed the communists sometimes aligned with the government in order to ensure their positions vis-a-vis their rivals. The pressing issues were mainly local and often personal.

#### Wider contacts among the various populations and with the outside world

Despite the worsening tensions among rival groups, contrary forces have been at work, fostering a general sense of national allegiance. The war has forced diverse peoples into close contact with each other. And the common hatred of the Soviets has given the Afghan people a sense of common cause that has overridden some cultural differences. Travelling mujahedin, for example, have been allowed to pass through otherwise hostile villages and have also even been served food, even when the menfolk were elsewhere. The contacts among the diverse peoples of the country may not have always been positive, but they have opened lines of contact that can in the future become useful in developing other relations. It remains to be seen whether the old antagonisms will rise to the same intensity as before.

Also the mobility of the mujahedin and the movement of families into alien areas to escape the war has brought more Afghans into contact with a wider world. Some of the refugees in Pakistan have enjoyed facilities (e.g., electric power, running water, sanitation) they have not had before. Many have encountered a way of life little known to them before. Moreover, the radio has become increasingly important to Afghans inside and outside the country. Many people schedule their affairs to listen to BBC and VOA news; many also listen to broadcasts emanating from Iran, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan. Just how much these new experiences will affect the life of the Afghans in the future is unclear.

#### A heightened resentment against foreign intervention.

Another change that could affect developments has been the growing awareness of foreign influences in Afghanistan affairs. Afghans have ambivalent feelings about those influences. On one hand, in the last decade of conflict they have learned to depend on billions of dollars of aid from foreign donors. On the other hand, they have resented the huge involvement of non-Afghans in

their internal affairs. In the past, Afghan rulers who turned to foreign sources of support in order to sustain their positions as rulers have been strongly opposed; some have been overthrown. Afghans today compare Babrak Karmal to Shah Shuja, the king installed by the British in 1839. Neither Taraki or Amin are reviled as much as Karmal because, even though Soviet advisors were active in Afghanistan during their rules, they were not directly protected by alien forces.

Following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989, the general feeling of revulsion against President Najib (Karmal's successor) in Kabul was matched by a broad sense of disillusionment with the leaders of the mujahedin "parties" ensconced in Pakistan, whose close dependence on Pakistan, the United States and Saudi Arabia has become transparent. Afghans from many social levels, in Peshawar, Quetta, and Islamabad, often disparage the political leaders on both sides, all of whom are considered totally dependent on foreign patronage for their survival. Scarcely any sources of revenue for the political "parties" exist other than those from foreign donors. Both sides continue to depend on foreign patrons in their efforts to win control over Afghanistan, evincing the longstanding negligence of relations to the Afghan populations they lead. Their agendas are regarded as manifestly self-interested and have little commonality with the concerns of the majority of the Afghan people.

There is thus a need for a leadership to emerge in Afghanistan that is responsive to the needs of its populations. Political institutions must be established that require leaders to be more accountable to the public they serve. The people must be the primary source of revenue, support, and legitimacy.

The DPI strategy aims to structure programs that will encourage Afghan organizations to reduce their dependency on foreign sources of revenue and increase dependency on -- and hence responsiveness to -- their own society. The result will be a greater accountability to the populations they serve.

### The current political situation

#### Inside the country.

The current political situation is mixed. Generally, there is a standoff between the forces of the Kabul regime and the mujahedin resistance groups. The Kabul regime continues to report that more mujahedin have made an accommodation with it. At the same time, the battle for Khost, Paktia Province, has been intense, with the possibility that the city could fall to the mujahedin. If it does, they are likely to pay a high price to hold it. There is no sign of serious weakness in the position of

the regime, despite the recent coup attempt. Soviet support has persisted unabated.

Beyond the few areas controlled by the regimes commanders continue to dominate, as control of weaponry is the basis of preeminence. Normally commanders get what they want. There are few places where commanders don't simply possess and rule by force. The war has selected for good fighters; the more aggressive and decisive people have led the charge against the communists. Even though in many places educated men have risen to commanding roles, observers report that in some places there has been a selection against intelligent and questioning individuals, who are often resented and distrusted. The war has also selected for the Islamic specialists, the mullahs, who early were alarmed by the rise of the communists in Kabul and have employed Islamic terms to appeal for sacrificial opposition to the regime.

The accessibility of weapons has made everyone more vulnerable, and old scores and internecine resentments have in many areas exploded into bloody conflict. Some commanders have stayed in control only by personal vigilance and others are said to be fearful of their own men, to the point of (in the words of one well-informed observer) "paranoia." In places where commanders have lost control there is anarchy. In isolated localities young women are especially vulnerable. There have been violent quarrels over brides. Men with sufficient arms have simply taken young women as brides, paying nothing for them, even shooting the men who have tried to protect them. The brides in these areas have gone to the men with the power, that is, who have the weapons. There are reports of frantic races after young women by the men, so few are the marriageable girls inside the country; girls are sometimes being hidden to protect them from capture.

At the same time, there is evidence that where the society has stabilized, development activities have been possible and pre-war institutions of social control have resurfaced. In the eastern provinces, where refugees in the camps have been able to commute to their fields, agricultural activity has recommenced. Assistance from the PVOs has enabled the agricultural elite to recover their former prominence, and the commanders have fallen under their control.

#### Outside the country.

The refugees have been losing hope, the war having continued without resolution a year after the Soviet troop withdrawal. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) has lost its credibility with the Afghan people because of its evident impotence. Similarly, the "parties" have lost much of their credibility, as they have been unable to resolve their differences and develop a united front;

the dependence of the seven Sunni "parties" on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and the eight Shi'ite "parties" (now united into one) on Iran has been an embarrassment. The contradiction between popular opinion and practical necessity has been exacerbated by the overwhelming support from outside sources for the Hezb-i-Islami (Hikmatyar) "party", which is much feared by many educated Afghans and much resented by many others.

In Peshawar the frustration has festered into overt acts of hostility against westerners and especially western educated Afghans. The unsolved murders of Professor Majruh in 1988, Dr. Ludin in 1989, and Dr. Shagiwal in 1990, and recent sackings of private voluntary organizations, evince a concerted attempt to exterminate prominent educated Afghans. There have been threats against Afghan women involved in educational activities among the refugees, attacks on Shelter Now International installations in Nasr Bagh (Pakistan) and Nangarhar (Afghanistan), growing numbers of minor offenses against westerners in Peshawar -- events that reveal a widening intensity of anti-western feeling among at least some elements of the resistance. Some prominent Afghans serving the refugees have temporarily left Peshawar. Some of the programs for women have shut down.

On the other hand, there is evidence of a great deal of popular support for the progressive Afghans and the western community serving the refugees. Despite threats from unknown quarters, some of the Afghan women teachers have persisted in their educational activities, and other educated Afghans continue to serve the relief effort. Moreover, virtually every Afghan questioned about the Nasr Bagh event expressed regret; some argued that it was an isolated event; one person said that there is strong resentment among the people at Nasr Bagh against the Pakistan police, who reportedly have released the persons taken in custody.

#### The expected trajectory of change

The possibilities for change will vary as the country evolves to a period of peace and stability. At the present time contrary social forces -- not only in the war between the regime and the resistance groups, but also in the internecine tensions that tend to fracture both sides of the war -- foster social instability and a general uncertainty about the future. As social conditions become more stable and predictable people will be more willing to take up normal activities and begin rebuilding their lives and their country. For the present the contrary pressures exerted from other nations obviate any possibility of stability.

A first step in establishing a stable situation in the country, therefore, will be some kind of understanding between the outside powers involved in the Afghanistan war. It is hoped

that an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union will take place soon so that the stage will be set for the other involved powers -- Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia -- similarly to disengage from the internal affairs of Afghanistan. These changes should mark the beginning of the transition from war to peace. In the meantime the Mission should be involved in supporting those elements of the Afghanistan population that are most likely to be helpful in establishing Afghan democratic institutions.

The interim period between the initiation of moves that will lead to the resolution of the conflict and the establishment of a legitimate government will not be easy. The response of many Afghans will not immediately be positive. Neither the Afghans in the regime nor those in the resistance are likely to accept graciously any outside agreement. There will likely be a period of confusion, at least among the mujahedin still nourishing hopes of victory. There will likely be much disorder, banditry, and further abuses of human rights. This will be a difficult period, when desperate people attempt to claim vital resources and to ensconce themselves in secure positions. Unresolved offenses will be requited in kind.

At the same time, there are strong impulses to peace and the resolution of conflict. The Afghans are able, without outside involvement, to resolve their disputes. A number of councils on various levels of the society are likely to set the terms of a temporary peace on local levels. This interim period, when the trajectory of change is toward the resolution of conflict, will be critical. With care and discernment, aid by international agencies may be given to the Afghans that will help establish new programs fostering the emergence of a democratic society.

The society that emerges in the wake of the hostilities in Afghanistan will be a distinctive configuration of relations derived from that which preceded it. It will reflect similar contradictory impulses, some for a strong central government, others for the autonomy of the rural localities of the country. The pressures for local autonomy will be strong, as the rural localities have for some years been effectively autonomous, and institutions of local control will, at least in some places, be well established. Also, the people will continue to be heavily armed; they may not easily accept the intrusion of officials from the central government. There will also be pressures in the opposite direction, that is, for a strong central government, as many leading Afghans seem to presume that the new government will, as before, dominate the country. But those pressures will also come from many of the ordinary people, who have encountered a higher standard of living in the cities they have visited in Pakistan. They will bring from their experience in the neighboring countries some new perspectives about what they expect from a government and will be pressing the central

government to provide services that before the war they might have considered unnecessary and even intrusive in their affairs.

The early period of the development of a new nation will also be, therefore, a critical period in Afghanistan's history; assistance in the development of democratic institutions can be especially effective, as the institutional foundations of the new society will be laid at that time.

#### Rationale for DPI among the Afghans

The Mission can provide important assistance for the Afghans in all three periods of change leading to the establishment of a legitimate government. Because the United States has had extensive experience with democratic institutions the Mission will be able to bring useful suggestions to the Afghans in the establishment of a new democratic society. The Mission can do this through financial assistance and specialized personnel.

#### IV. STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN DPI

The Strategy is broadly cast into three phases reflecting a rough scheme for the anticipated developments. The phases, separated by threshold events, are:

- o Phase I - The current situation before an agreement is reached on a transition process.
- o Phase II - Following an agreement or other event such as a coup, a transition period commences in which an interim body administers the country until the Afghan people legitimate a form of government and the new government takes charge. Planning and preparations will likely be undertaken for elections or a national consultative assembly with representatives possibly chosen by non-electoral means. During this phase refugees are expected to return in large numbers, economic activities and commerce will increase.
- o Phase III - The period of a legitimate successor government. The threshold will be the legitimation of instituted offices of responsibility through an act approving the new political system by the Afghan people.

At present, little can be said about Afghanistan's future, either in the short- or long-term. Regardless of how events unfold, these three phases are meant to be more descriptive than prescriptive or predictive. The significance of the thresholds is not so much in the specific events themselves, but in that each marks a major shift in the character of domestic political activity.

The most unlikely outcome is that a government which has legitimacy and full support will immediately emerge from the current situation. Most likely there will be an interim period (Phase II) before which a legitimate government is established. Whether Phase II follows a sequence pre-planned by interested parties or is beset by confusion, uncertainty and disorder, the interim between the current situation and the eventual outcome will be qualitatively different from both.

#### U.S. Policy-Driven Principles Guiding Afghanistan DPI

The Afghanistan DPI Strategy is premised on principles linking the strategy to broader U.S. policy goals for Afghanistan. These principles establish the framework in which specific program elements are to be evaluated. The following principles figure in this framework.

The DPI Strategy should be consistent with our stated policy to promote democratic pluralism.

Nearly all the Afghans that the team interviewed expressed a desire for a stable, truly democratic and pluralistic Afghanistan. However, the team repeatedly faced sharp criticism from Afghans and expatriates alike who asked why, if the U.S. were sincerely committed to democratic pluralism in Afghanistan, it continued to back groups which are stridently opposed to that goal. The view that stated U.S. policy does not correspond to U.S. actions was widespread among well-intentioned and intelligent Afghans and other seasoned, respected observers of Afghanistan with whom the team met.

The most effective means of promoting democratic pluralism is through targeted, low-profile assistance.

U.S. policy has consistently emphasized self-determination for the Afghan people and eschewed a preference for a party, party philosophy, or party leader. This policy acknowledges that outsiders have been historically unsuccessful at imposing their will on Afghanistan. The Mission should be prepared to respond to requests from Afghans for assistance and avoid actively initiating programs and activities.

Pluralism should be promoted but not at the expense of political unity.

If an essential characteristic of democratic pluralism is the existence of numerous widely diffused power centers, then Afghanistan is an exemplar.

Several observers who have travelled extensively in Afghanistan in recent months described an accelerating process of social and political fragmentation weakening what unity existed

in the past. Authority had grown increasingly defused among local commanders, religious leaders, and community elders. Decentralization, a strength when fighting a guerrilla war, has aggravated the problems of forging broad-based unity.

Support to particular organizations that may deserve U.S. help must be handled carefully. Thoughtful Afghans point out that support given to a particular group might strengthen it, but could further splinter an already badly fragmented political scene.

Afghans must also concern themselves with issues of ethnic pluralism. Non-Pushtun ethnic types -- such as Hazaras and Uzbeks -- that were dominated before the war, now sense that they have earned a stake in the national balance of power. Integrating these populations into the power structure will remain difficult for the foreseeable future.

Program elements should demonstrate a sensitivity to historical experience and socio-political factors.

Given the complex character of Afghan society, it will be very easy to mistakenly support a group that is politically unacceptable and, therefore, ineffective or worse, divisive. It will be equally easy to make cultural miscalculations. Programs which are concerned with women's issues, for example, carry the potential for backlash. Trouble comes both from those who sincerely believe women's role in society should be limited and from those who manipulate the issue to achieve other objectives.

Mission-funded activities will promote the strengthening of links among all segments of the Afghan population.

Ideally, all organizations supported under the DPI strategy will have a capacity to steep their ideas, agendas, and programs in the reality of the Afghan mainstream. Similarly, the Mission's support should be structured so that organizations will have to look to their own society for longer-term support, and for an audience for their activities. The Mission will put priority on funding specific activities promoted by organizations instead of providing general organizational support or operational expenses. The aim is to foster organizations that actively seek to build themselves up, and encourage organizations to make budget and staffing decisions on a programmatic basis. Opportunities for staff from organizations to learn about the role that NGOs have in a democratic society, about strategies for fund-raising, and bookkeeping should be provided.

In line with this principle, DPI elements should address the means by which the residents of Kabul-controlled areas will be integrated into activities during the strategy's second and third phases. In efforts to promote democratic pluralism in the new

Afghanistan, the millions of Afghans who have lived under regime rule must be given freedom of expression and choice. In the first phase, organizations receiving funds should be required to demonstrate that they have developed plans for incorporating such individuals in their organizations. In the second and third phases, any organization that discriminates against Kabul residents by virtue of their having lived under regime control should be denied further USG support.

To the extent possible, activities should build on existing Afghan practices.

Afghans have honored customs which have withstood stresses of time, internal hostilities and invaders. These have proven sufficient to sustain a vigorous society which, whatever its apparent fractiousness and disorganization, has thwarted all foreign invaders, including the Soviet army. These practices are not encrusted in tradition but have shown themselves responsive to changing circumstances. These practices should neither be preserved for their historical interest nor abandoned as anachronistic. Afghans generally are aware of the options available and are capable of selecting a practice or combination they deem appropriate. Outsiders who recognize certain practices as distinctive and "traditional" should refrain from promoting them out of concern for the distortions that they stimulate.

Support should be given for the creation and strengthening of organizations that become self-sustaining.

No matter how effective they may be, many Afghan NGOs are closely identified with a particular individual. They succeed or fail depending on the person. When he or she leaves the organization or is absent, it sinks into inactivity. The Strategy should support programs that promote institution building so that a structure will be established and sustained apart from one person or a small group of like-minded persons.

Similarly, many foreign donor supported organizations themselves depend on outside support for their existence. Afghan organizations should not be supported indefinitely by foreign donors. The organizations should be encouraged to establish indigenous sources of support.

Program elements should be "portable," and not bound to the current circumstances.

Although initially funded program elements may occur in Pakistan, DPI elements that receive support should be capable of being moved into Afghanistan either in the current phase or during successive phases. As with other Mission activities, the focus for the Afghanistan DPI is in Afghanistan, not Pakistan. To the extent possible, DPI activities should be directed cross-

border. Recognizing the difficulties, the Mission will support exile groups and activities but will push them to move into Afghanistan or sponsor activities inside at the earliest moment.

#### Goals and program elements for a DPI for Afghanistan

In line with the above objectives and with the frequently voiced concerns of many of the people visited by the team, a priority objective of the U. S. Government should be to terminate all support for elements of the resistance that are opposed to the free and open expression of ideas and the exercise of the human rights of women and minorities. The Strategy assumes that this necessary change in policy must take place before the DPI activities suggested here can be effective.

Activities for the Afghanistan DPI strategy fall into three broad categories: voice, choice, and governance. Voice activities include activities designed to encourage civic participation, and association or advocacy. Choice activities support free and fair elections. Governance activities include efforts aimed at strengthening institutional capabilities and the development of efficient and responsible government institutions which respect and abide by the rule of law.

Given the uncertainties of the political situation, specific periods within which these Afghanistan DPI goals are achieved cannot be specified. Furthermore, progress towards the goals will probably be incremental and difficult. In implementing program elements of the strategy, however, specific objectives should be delineated against which the particular elements can be evaluated.

The specific goals and suggested program elements for the three categories of the strategy are the following:

#### Voice

The goals for "Voice" activities in this DPI strategy are to: 1.) widen access to the political process; 2.) strengthen participatory institutions, especially those that bridge regional, ethnic, and religious differences; 3.) increase effectiveness of participants to disseminate news and opinion in Afghanistan and abroad, and 4.) encourage sensitivity and adherence to human rights. Voice activities will be supported beginning in Phase I.

Free Flow of Information. A critical impediment to the free flow of information in Afghanistan is the low literacy rate. Another is the lack of radio programming aimed at the interests of the audience. The Mission's Education project is currently addressing the problem of low literacy and the USIS is supporting a radio-training institute in Pakistan to prepare future

professionals in that medium. Much more can yet be done to encourage the free and open flow of information. Prospects are dim that the parties which control the few resistance radio stations will use their stations for other than propaganda.

During Phase I the Mission will fund Afghan-sponsored workshops, conferences, seminars and training programs, and other specific activities proposed by and aimed at Afghan media professionals. The U.S.-funded Afghan Media Resource Center (AMRC) has trained many highly skilled audio and visual journalists in technical skills. But AMRC lacks the resources and the mandate to establish a program to develop the professional competence of journalists.

In Phase I the Mission should study the feasibility of supporting a non-partisan, Afghan-run radio program that would be capable of reaching the majority of the population. If practical, this program should commence as soon as possible. The program could be an outlet for Afghan radio professionals including those trained at the USIS-supported training institute. The program could serve as both a laboratory for the institute and as an outlet for programming dedicated to democratic and pluralistic values. The program could also be used to disseminate information related to other assistance and development activities.

Among the options the feasibility study should consider are acquisition of hardware to establish a station, or whether broadcast time could be purchased from an established radio transmitter in the region capable of transmitting the program to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has a reasonably adequate network of transmitters and repeaters spread throughout the country. This and the time needed to construct a station, considering that there is now an urgent need for such programming, indicate that the former option is more practical. Another factor in favor of the former option is the difficulty of securing a transmitter both from the regime and from elements in the Resistance who would want to gain control of it to promote their particular agendas.

Another activity appropriate for Phase I is a training course for Afghan journalists highlighting differences between editorial and objective writing. All Afghan journalism is now polemical. What passes for objective writing is ineffective, as are their highly partisan editorials. Both skills can be taught; all practitioners could be admitted from diverse ideological backgrounds; and skills could be imparted by focusing on a non-Afghan curriculum. For example, students could work on Brazilian deforestation rather than the return of Zaher Shah. There are too few Afghan journalists for classroom space to be a problem if

the courses are short and repeated until all interested parties are trained.

Increased Afghan participation in international fora. A hallmark of open societies is the participation of its citizens in international meetings and organizations. Participants from developing countries in international fora are able to return to their countries with new ideas and a sense of global political, economic, scientific, and other trends. Afghanistan's opinion leaders have been afforded little opportunity to keep pace with the mainstream of current affairs over the past decade. Re-integration into international networks will influence the direction of the country's society.

To promote linkages between Afghanistan and the rest of the world, beginning in Phase I and continuing through successive phases, the Mission will continue to support and finance Afghan participation in international fora. (Under Mission sponsorship, resistance members have attended a UNICEF-sponsored Oral Rehydration Conference and several regional narcotics conferences.). Washington's assistance will be required in this endeavor, particularly to use government leverage in soliciting invitations. Meetings of women's environmental groups, and associations of the handicapped are especially relevant examples.

Participants should be nominated by Afghan organizations based upon criteria focused on the expected benefits derived from participation. The Mission will review and approve all nominees to ensure that they are the most suitable persons.

Adherence to international standards of human rights. Human Rights constitute the most basic of democratic values. Evidence presented in the annual Department of State human rights report, by Dr. Felix Ermacora, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, show that all parties to the Afghan conflict -- even though they pay lip service to human rights principles -- fail to adhere to international standards.

Documenting human rights abuses remains a crucial activity. However, it should be done in an impartial manner, where abuses committed by all sides are given the same scrutiny and condemnation. Under the DPI, the Mission will support mechanisms that can help publicize the records of all the parties to the conflict and thus bring to bear international pressure that might halt, or at least contain, the pain and suffering caused by unchecked violations.

In FY-89, a small A.I.D. grant was awarded to the Afghan Psychiatric Center which treats victims of torture and is in contact with Amnesty International. Additional funds may be provided to the Center and to other organizations judged capable

of contributing to an improved human rights environment for all Afghans.

The Mission would also like to identify in Phase I a new or existing organization which could assist in developing the capability immediately to do the following: to encourage the observance and defense of human rights for all Afghans, with an emphasis on respect for Islamic and international norms; to monitor human rights practices of all parties to the conflict; and actively to assist the resistance in complying with human rights principles. The Policy Sciences Center, which will conduct a USIS-sponsored Law and Policy Institute for Afghans this summer, might be such an organization.

Promoting Afghan national identity. Afghanistan has a rich and diverse cultural heritage. Artistic expression plays an important role in maintaining national identity. Afghans of all social strata take pride in vernacular verse and stories. The strength of this passion led past governments to support cultural activities. However, often this was done selectively so that some ethnic and linguistic groups were slighted. Activities which forthrightly are committed to presenting a representative cross-section of Afghan cultural and artistic expression could promote a shared national identity and help affirm the country's cultural diversity.

The leaders of the 1978 coup made concerted attempts to mobilize the literary and artistic community in support of their agendas. The voices of Afghan writers who spoke out in dissent were stilled by imprisonment, torture, execution, and exile.

In exile, the artistic community encountered constraints imposed by conservative leaders of the resistance. Few opportunities have existed for publication or exhibition, or communication among artists. Re-establishment of cultural expression will help to bridge the gaps between past and present, between the refugees and those who remained in the country, and among the various ethnic groups. This can also provide a medium for overseas Afghans to preserve links to their homeland, links that could facilitate critical flows of talent, investment capital and political support.

Artists and authors in Peshawar have drafted a charter for the Cultural Association of Afghanistan. This organization plans to preserve and develop the national culture of Afghanistan, collect literature concerning the jihad, collect and preserve current collections of folklore, encourage the establishment of a library on Afghan culture, and facilitate the training of a new generation of artists and authors. It will issue a journal, arrange exhibits, arrange literary readings, and award prizes for outstanding artistic achievement.

Beginning in Phase I, the Mission should support such organizations which actively promote respect for Afghanistan's cultural diversity among Afghans in the country and among the diaspora.

Strengthen Afghan civic groups. Professional and voluntary organizations constitute the political and social pluralism which offsets the concentration of political power in a small elite. Organizations whose membership is based on professional or other interest-based affinity should be encouraged, aimed at establishing relations and interests which bridge competing ethnic, regional and familial bonds.

At present the few professional Afghan PVOs active in Pakistan that address broad-based or single issue democratic issues are few, under-funded and face security threats to their program and personnel. These groups must be supported and new groups and individuals identified to increase the variety of interests represented. During Phase I, these groups would provide an important haven for the intellectuals and professional community at large to organize in opposition to statist economics, violence, and to support their profession or other common interests.

These organizations should be supported in a way that encourages them to develop firm links to their own society. They should not simply be self-contained groups with little relevance to Afghan society at large.

Beginning in Phase I, and continuing into Phase III the Mission will support specific programs but not operating expenses of civic organizations. The organizations which receive support should demonstrate that they are seriously seeking to appeal to a domestic audience. Moreover, they will have to move towards obtaining a significant portion of their revenue from domestic sources, through contributions, dues, fees or other means.

Improved opportunities for women and minorities. Certain categories in Afghan society have not been accorded access to the same opportunities that have been available to the dominant category of individuals in the society, Pushtun men. Women and non-Sunnis have been particularly neglected; despite efforts by A.I.D to reach all the elements of the population, it has been notably unsuccessful in serving the needs of the Shi'ites and the peoples in central Afghanistan. To promote a truly pluralistic society, in which all categories have equal opportunity, could be the most difficult objective of the Mission's DPI strategy.

Beginning in Phase I, the Mission will continue to push for greater inclusion of minority populations as beneficiaries of its projects, without neglecting the Pushtun males whose participation continues to be important. In addition; it will

seek to fund additional activities for women through its support of PVOs; current programs for women should be maintained.

Choice: Conduct of acts of self-determination

The Afghanistan DPI Strategy goals for "Choice" activities which will most likely commence in Phase II are to: 1.) institutionalize elected representation; and 2.) develop capabilities for civic education and election management observation.

Although the United States supports genuine self-determination for the Afghan people, the specific form which the act of self-determination takes should rest with the Afghans themselves. It could be an election based on models of "one person one vote"; a consultative shura process where participants, either selected or elected, meet to develop a consensus; or some combination or variation of the two.

The U.S. Government will support the process for legitimizing the transition to a government chosen by the Afghans. The Mission will be responsive to requests for help with elections but will refrain from making unsolicited offers. The Afghan Interim Government is still pressing for a local-option scheme involving elections or selection to pick delegates to a Resistance-wide shura or to a grand national assembly (loya jirga). Other proposals call for elections either as a precursor to creation of an interim administration or after one has been formed in Phase II. Regardless of how the transition process occurs, the Mission stands prepared to expedite processing of Afghan requests for necessary equipment and material, training, and technical advice.

If an election plan is accepted and steps are taken to actively implement it, the Mission could, if requested by the responsible parties, support technical training for Afghan election supervisors and monitors with organizations that have been involved in recent successful, well-conducted elections, especially in Islamic countries.

Recent experience in Nicaragua dramatically demonstrated that citizens can vote incumbents out of office if they feel the process is secret. If elections develop, the Mission may receive additional and substantial funds to support this phase as was done in Eastern Europe, Nicaragua and Chile. In those instances, A.I.D. gave support for: electoral commissions; non-partisan civic education groups; local and international election monitors; and, non-communist, pro-democratic political parties. Such funding could be integrated into this DPI Strategy but it is not now a part of it.

## Governance

Although most "Governance" activities must wait until Phase III, some programs could begin in the current phase. The Governance goals are to: 1.) create and improve responsive administrative and management capacity at all governmental levels; 2.) promote broader participation in government decision-making; and 3.) develop effective systems of governance through training in public administration and fiscal management for the local and national levels.

National level -- strengthening representative government. Attempts in the 1960s at establishing a representative government foundered for many reasons. One of the most serious problems was that few people understood the responsibilities that representatives had to the country and the function of a parliamentary system. This experience suggests the scale of the problem Afghanistan faces. According to Olivier Roy:

The atmosphere in parliament . . . was anarchic: a quorum was never reached, there was a constant din, and simple-minded and fanciful speeches were the order of the day . . . . The state was viewed much as the court was in former times by the [representatives]: each came there to seek for favors.

Since then Afghans have become far more aware of national level politics. Their own experience with elections and the experiment in parliamentary democracy are recalled. Through the radio and print media they know about Pakistan, Iran and other countries' experience with such systems. Most importantly, they have witnessed the failed attempts by both the Kabul regime and the resistance to use a representative system to legitimize their leadership.

It is inconceivable that the Afghans can realize their goal of having a government of their own choosing that will provide stability and rehabilitate the country, without some form of representative government. To that end, the Mission will support activities that will lay the groundwork for a representative form of government. These include seminars, workshops, and training courses aimed at developing and strengthening the understanding of representative government among opinion leaders.

Individuals who demonstrate strong interest and commitment to this should be offered opportunities to visit and possibly intern in institutions associated with representative government.

Phase I activities should also include components aimed at disseminating this information widely through the print and electronic media.

In Phase III, the DPI should support training activities for parliamentarians, similar but more extensive than those programs designed for freshman senators and congressmen in the United States. An NGO, perhaps in conjunction with the Political Science faculty at Kabul University and a political organization from a country with a comparable parliamentary system could develop and conduct such a program.

National level - increasing government efficiency. The fluid political situation and the lack of political progress demonstrated by the Afghan Interim Government suggests caution in making an across-the-board commitment in the Strategy to increase the public administration competence of the AIG during Phase I. Instead attention should be directed at providing opportunities for those elements within the AIG or elsewhere that have shown the potential to assume administrative responsibilities in this Phase or in the future.

Many educated Afghans would be needed to provide technical expertise and skills in an independent government, either during a transition phase or afterwards now live in the West. O/AID/REP has supported the International Organization for Migration (IOM) "Return of Talent" program. IOM maintains a database of expatriate Afghans who have expressed interest in applying their talents and expertise to aid their countrymen. Approximately 600 overseas Afghans have submitted information indicating their interest in participating in the program. To date fewer than 10 Afghans have returned under this program mainly, because of the difficulties in matching candidates with appropriate positions in Pakistan-based organizations.

In Phase I of the strategy the Mission will review the IOM database to determine whether it contains candidates for programs aimed at improving organizational efficiency. Such programs could be of shorter duration than those which would allow IOM to arrange candidates' return in the "Return of Talent" program. In these cases the Mission could support participation of those persons in the program. In later phases of the strategy, the mission will seek to draw from this pool of talent to the extent possible.

In Phase III, to meet the need for administrative training, short term training programs should be designed specifically for Afghans in country. Participants would include staff from the organs of the central government and other levels of governance, if they exist.

Consideration should also be given as to whether development for a public administration curriculum at an Afghan university should be supported.

Local level - support for consultative process. Among many, but not all Afghan peoples, community issues are addressed through the consultative shura process, where the adult males in a community deliberate on a matter and may take a decision that could be followed by action.

As foreign aid donors sought out local-level Afghan counterparts which could facilitate their activities, many became quite interested in the shura process and its potential. Afghans, upon recognizing donors' interest in local level quasi-governmental organizations, readily established such bodies. However, in many instances those shuras may have no relevance to the local community and are intended merely to extract donor resources.

Although shuras dealing with all types of issues and at all scales of geographic inclusivity are reportedly active (and some may be effective), the potential and appropriateness of the shura process depends on the specific circumstances in which the shura operates. A recent report by AKBAR (a base organization of some fifty NGOs operating out of Peshawar) summarizes the differing views of shura effectiveness:

There appears to be a fairly broad belief that Afghans have experience with institutions of this kind. Such experience, of course, could help ensure the success and smooth operation . . . . Some commentators also appear to believe that because of what they see as the egalitarian nature of Afghan culture, councils can be forced to function democratically and may even be used to strengthen democratic processes. On the other end of the spectrum, there are those who believe that it will be very difficult to establish councils that reflect anything other than the power of commanders, that such councils will be very limited in the kinds of tasks they can undertake, and that they must be closely supervised because they cannot be expected to be fair, given socio-cultural pressures to benefit their own kin and lineage.

The shura process is an indigenous practice with the potential for giving certain populations a voice in the administration of justice, the distribution of resources and responsibilities, and other functions performed by government administrators. Thus while the consultative shura process can promote the democratic process, it cannot be supported in isolation from the specific context in which it occurs.

Although the AKBAR study focused on the potential for shuras with respect to humanitarian assistance, additional research on shuras may be appropriate beginning in Phase I, since the local-

level consultative process will be important in many places where other administrative institutions are lacking.

The proposed research would develop a protocol of procedures and guidelines for determining the critical contextual elements affecting the character and appropriateness of the shura process. Among elements which need to be understood for each situation where shuras are considered as objects for distribution of resources are: 1.) the extent of the community and its corporate interests, 2.) the established forms of community consultation and the range of issues about which the consultation occurs, 3.) the position of prominent local individuals, the base for their prominence and the assets they control, 4.) the current conflicts and tensions within the corporate community and between the community and others that could impede cooperation, and 5.) the reasons why a donor seeks a consultative shura and the type of resources about which the shura is expected to deliberate.

Development of such a protocol cannot provide a definitive means to determine the prospects for a consultative process. Instead, it could alert the organizations that want to establish a link to a community or region, to the type of factors which affect the shura process there.

Local and regional levels - decentralization of authority. The war has eroded the influence and authority of the central government on both sides of the conflict. Many observers predict that the central authorities in the "new" Afghanistan will be unable or unwilling to establish control over the periphery. While some see a federal arrangement with power vested at the regional level, others caution that the centrifugal tendencies in the country are so great that without a strong central authority, the country will shatter into ever smaller fragments.

Questions must be answered about the kinds of incentives and obligations that can be created so that it would be possible to establish local institutions; in the past, weak local institutions could not cope with the stronger national level institutions. Another issue is whether regional polities can and should be encouraged to establish their own bases of power and autonomous institutions of authority so that they could develop some autonomy. Any non-central institution would likely try to prevent the reconsolidation of authority at the center, and the national government would be forced to negotiate with the country's respective elements.

Afghans have divergent views on the type of relations that should be established between the center and periphery. Starting in Phase 1, the Mission will support Afghan activities that seriously address the options regarding the relations between the national government, provinces, and the local levels.

## V. AFGHANISTAN DPI IMPLEMENTATION

### The relationship with PVOs

The Mission will approach the DPI with a mix of commitment, caution, and an openness to learn from experience. Implementation of Phase I of the Afghan DPI Strategy, will present a major start-up and monitoring challenge to the Mission since most DPI funds will go to local non-registered PVOs for specific activities. In such cases, registered PVOs can perform a wide array of project management and pass-through services. The Mission intends to amend and expand its recently approved PVO Support Project to specifically include democratic pluralism activities, and to sign a cooperative agreement with a non-profit U.S. organization for the bulk of the Strategy. However, some funds should be set aside for other activities that may arise as a result of changing circumstances.

The Mission will coordinate closely with the Department of State and USIS, which are similarly interested in activities that promote democratic pluralism.

### Allocating funds to The Asia Foundation

A.I.D. procurement regulations permit grants or contract agreements in which the grantee acts for and with the Mission to sub-grant to local PVOs. Because Afghan PVOs are not registered officially, A.I.D. legal counsel has determined that it is not possible to give grants directly to Afghan PVOs.

A PVO grantee must meet the following selection criteria: be registered in the United States; have a current field operation in Pakistan/Afghanistan, with an expatriate director; have a demonstrated capacity to select, train, monitor and evaluate local PVOs dedicated to basic civil and political freedoms and the rule of law; and demonstrate an understanding of the objectives of "open societies" within the context of self-sustained economic growth.

The Mission intends to enter into an agreement with The Asia Foundation to implement the DPI.

Project proposals will be evaluated against the following criteria: relevance to the goal of encouraging an open market and open society, and sensitivity to the local conditions which presumably will evolve in view of the expected changes in the political and security situation.

In addition, care should be taken to avoid offending the target populations and to establish that the security of the participants and the facilities are assured.

With respect to sub-grantee selection criteria and unless otherwise agreed to by A.I.D. in writing, the sub-grantee shall:

- (a) Receive not more than 25 percent of its funding from A.I.D.
- (b) Request funding for specific activities rather than general operating expenses (e.g., salaries), although overhead for specific activities may be requested.
- (c) Ensure that activities focus on the political economy for civil and political freedoms, and the rule of law (e.g. voice, choice and governance).
- (d) Have or develop activities that include the poor and illiterate as target audiences or beneficiaries.
- (e) Have or develop a plan for activities inside Afghanistan.
- (f) Have or develop a plan for the programs' future geared to a steadily reduced reliance on support from foreign donors.

#### VI. MONITORING AND EVALUATING DPI ACTIVITIES

Potential for an impact, within the limits of the above guidelines

Eventual ability of the emerging Afghanistan society to sustain institutions in its own terms

#### VII. CONCLUSION

It seems fitting to conclude this Strategy by reiterating a crucial point: a priority objective of the U. S. Government should be to terminate all support for elements of the resistance that are opposed to the free and open expression of ideas and the exercise of the human rights of women and minorities. The Strategy assumes that this necessary change in policy must take place before the DPI activities suggested here can be effective.

Afghanistan has been physically devastated and its society traumatized by more than a decade of violence, socio-economic turmoil, and political uncertainty. While many Afghans may try to cling to the anchors of the past, it will be difficult to return to the old ways. Too much has changed. It is uncertain whether communal, religious, or secular law will emerge as prevalent; whether traditional or resistance authorities will be looked to for leadership; or whether a generation of Afghans who have grown up in refugee camps and cities will be able to adapt to the rural way of life. In some ways, transitional periods, such as the one with which Afghanistan is now confronted, are ideal times to promote positive change and adjustment. On the other hand, improperly handled, both the concepts being promoted

and the object of the promotion (in this case, Afghanistan) could be severely damaged. We are, thus, called upon to approach democratic pluralism initiatives with careful forethought, cautious implementation, and a conscientious commitment to Afghan self-determination.

ANNEX

INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED BY DPI TEAM

May 6 [team, Diana Swain, Phyllis Oakley]

O/AIDREP Democratic Pluralism Initiative team

Cultural Committee for the Afghanistan Resistance

Marissa Lino, American Embassy Refugee Coordinator

Walter Pflaumer, American Embassy Political Officer

May 7

William Lenderking, USIS Islamabad

Thomas Eighmy, O/AIDREP

May 8 [team, Diana Swain]

Hank B. Cushing RAO/AF

Ted Albers, and Dr. Aslami, ACBAR

May 9 [team, Diana Swain]

Lela Margiou, USIS, Peshawar

Wakil Akbarzai, Mahaz-e-Milli Islmai (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) Director of a program that provides work for widows and wives of indigent husbands.

Thor Armstrong and Jerry Debeurs, Shelter Now International Directors of PVO that had recently been attacked. [seen by Phyllis Oakley]

Jerry Feierstein, American Consul

Ahmed Shah, Minister of Communications, and Aide to Sayyaf, deputy leader of Ittihad-e-Islami- Afghanistan, a fundamentalist party

Engineer Es'Haq, political committee, Jamiat-e-Islami (Rabbani), a fundamentalist party

May 10

Todd Peterson, International Medical Corps  
An A.I.D. funded Agency that trains medics for work inside  
Afghanistan and runs a medical clinic near Nasir Bagh  
refugee camp

Nancy Dupree, ACBAR Resource and Information Center  
Experienced observer of Afghanistan affairs

Qazi Amin Waqad  
Former associate of Hikmatyar and head of a party not  
recognized by Pakistan

Dr. Taleb, Nasr party (Shi'a)  
Also representative of the newly formed Hizb-i Wahdat

Abdul Karim Muhajirzad and Faiz Kakar, Hezb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar)  
Fundamentalist party

May 12, 1990

Mowlawi Tarakhel  
Prominent Pushtun mullah, founder and director of a madrasa  
in Dey-e-Sabz, Ashraf-u-Madaras, moderate

Hamed Karzai, Jabha-e-Nijat-e-Milli  
"Moderate" or establishment party, political advisor to  
A.I.G. President Mojadeddi

Bruce Wannell  
Former director of Afghan Aid (UK) and currently an  
independent contractor. Experienced observer of  
Afghanistan. Speaks excellent Farsi.

Frederik Roussell  
Formerly with IRC. Experienced observer of Afghanistan

May 13, 1990

Fazle Akbar, Afghan Information and Documentation Center  
Independent Afghan PVO

Carla Grissman, Asia Foundation  
Many years of experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Members of the Shahid Niazi Front, Herat Province

intellectuals from Herat, graduates of madrasas in Herat, broadly educated, moderate, still actively working against the Kabul regime.

Nassim Jawad, Austrian Relief Committee  
Experienced PVO providing medical and educational assistance to refugees

Jan Goodwin, Save the Children  
Experienced observer of Afghan affairs, author of "Caught in a Crossfire"

Engineer Abdul Rahim, Director, Reconstruction Agency of Free Afghanistan

May 14

Fatana Gailani, director of an Afghan PVO  
Operates two schools and a mother-child clinic.

Hafisa Sadaat and Naheed, IRC Women's Education

Tom Yates, International Rescue Committee  
PVO with extensive experience in refugee assistance

Khalid Aziz, Sarhad Development Corporation  
Active in planning for regional economic cooperation among Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Soviet Union [Katz]

Steve Masty and Anne Hurd, Mercy Fund  
PVO with experience working with Afghans  
[Canfield and S. Lenderking]

Dr. Sayyed Gul Safi, Human Concern International  
PVO providing health services, construction assistance, support for orphans in the camps and inside Afghanistan  
[Canfield, S. Lenderking]

Engineer Mohammad Kabir, Reconstruction Committee of the Supervisory Council. [Canfield and S. Lenderking]

Siddiqullah Mujaddidi and Sayyed Ismail Fatimi, Afghan Youth  
[Canfield and S. Lenderking]

May 15 [Canfield and S. Lenderking met the following in Peshawar]

Dr. Kerry Conner, independent observer of Afghanistan

Dr. Khalid Maruf, Sher Habib, Farhad Sabit, Mr. Salimi, and several other members of the Lawyers Association for

Afghanistan [a multiparty, multi-ethnic association of "lawyers", mostly Islamic jurists, that publishes a journal in Pushtu and Persian, and a bulletin on human rights abuses by the Kabul government]

Dr. Babrakzai, AIG Supreme Court

Also member of the AIG election commission, former jurist in the Afghan government before (and for a short time after) the 1978 coup

Professors Rasul Amin and Aryubi, Writers Union of Free Afghanistan [an association of writers and scholars collecting published information on Afghanistan and publishing literary and scholarly works in Persian and Pushtu]

Professor Hakim Taniwal and Dr. Abdul Quddus Sameem, Association of Professors of Afghanistan [an association attempting to advance higher education in Afghanistan, originally formed to found an Afghan university].

May 14, 15 [Katz and Nicastro met the following in Quetta]

Baluch and Pushtun leaders from southwest Afghanistan.

Mercy Corp International [provides health services in Quetta]

Local leaders of Harakat-i-Islami [a Shi'ite party]

Abdul Wahid, Abdul Wahid, Ghulam Ali Hydari, M. Issa Gharjistani, Independent Hazara Intellectuals

Tim Lenderking, UNOCA Mine Awareness Program [well informed on conditions in Quetta, and closely in touch with Hazaras]

Mullah Malang, Ghilzai Pushtun commander active in attempts to form a commander's shura.

May 16 [in Peshawar]

Nancy Jamieson, Freedom Medicine [an experienced observer of health needs and services to the Afghans] [Canfield only]

Mohammad Ismail Siddiqi, Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami [a "moderate" party], and Chief, Tokhi tribe [Canfield and S. Lenderking]

Dr. Saiadrain, Afghan Psychiatry Centre [an Afghan PVO that provides psychiatric services to refugees, specializes in treatment of torture victims] [Canfield and S. Lenderking]

Pir Syed Ishaq Gailani, director, Afghan Relief Foundation, with his wife Fatana Gailani [Canfield and Lenderking]

Dr. Anwar, director of a rural development project inside Afghanistan on behalf of the International Rescue Committee [Canfield and S. Lenderking]

Dr. Laurence Lamonier and Dr. Paul Icks, Management Sciences for Health [physicians who have had extensive experience inside Afghanistan and in Peshawar] [Canfield]