

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Analysis of the Insurgency in Thailand and U.S./RTG

Counterinsurgency Strategy and Programs

A Report Prepared By

Roger Darling

For the Director

United States Operations Mission to Thailand

Agency for International Development

Bangkok, Thailand

May - June, 1973

~~SECRET~~

Classified by Rey M. Hill; Subject to General  
Declassification Schedule of E. O. 11652 Auto-  
matically Downgraded at Two Year Intervals  
and Declassified on December 31, 1981.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ANALYSIS OF THE INSURGENCY IN THAILAND AND U.S. /RTG

COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS

INDEX

<u>INTRODUCTION</u> (U)	1
<u>CHAPTER ONE The Insurgency</u> (U)	5
Part I - A New Conceptual Scheme for Analyzing Insurgency (U)	5
- General Commentary	5
- Method of Analysis	6
- Basic Insurgency Ingredients and Evaluation Process	8
- Definition of Insurgency	9
- Causal Process - Source/Political/Participation	10
- Intimidation Process	13
- Resource Process	15
- Guerrilla Action Process	16
- Collective Psychological Strategy Process	19
- Primary Determinants of Insurgency Quality	20
- The Special Cases	22
Part II - The Thai Insurgency (S)	25
- Causal Process - Social/Political/Participation - General	25

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Causal Process - Social/Political/Participation - North	31
- Causal Process - Social/Political/Participation - Northeast	33
- Causal Process - Central, Mid-South, Far-South	34
- Intimidation Process	36
- Resource Process - Internal	37
- Resource Process - External	39
- Guerrilla Action Process	41
- Collective Psychological Strategy Process - The Nature of the Insurgency, the Nature of the Threat	44
- Communist Nature of the Insurgency	49
- Urban Insurgency	51

CHAPTER TWO Counterinsurgency (U) 55

Part I - A New Conceptual Scheme for Analyzing Counterinsurgency (CI) (U)	55
- General Commentary	55
- Strategic Considerations	57
- Strategic Possibilities	60
- The Special Problem of Development - Modernization versus Counterinsurgency	64
- Insurgent Versus Counterinsurgent - Functional Postures	67
- Strategic Spheres - The Conceptual Scheme	68

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Modernization	68
- Modernization as a CI Strategy	69
- Stabilization	71
- Stabilization as a CI Strategy	72
- Concepts of Security	73
- Indigenous Structural Change	77
Part II - U.S. /RTG Counterinsurgency Strategy and Programs (S)	79
- An Analysis of U.S. /RTG Counterinsurgency	79
- Stabilization	86
- Modernization	92
- Indigenous Structural Change	100
- U.S. /RTG Strategy Differences	102
<u>CHAPTER THREE - Considerations for a Revised CI Strategy (S)</u>	109
- Insurgent Strategy Vulnerabilities	109
- General Commentary	113
- Strategic Consideration #1 - (Name and Basic Thrust)	120
- Strategic Consideration #2 - (Determinants of CI Effectiveness)	121
- Strategic Consideration #3 - (Endless War)	121
- Strategic Consideration #4 - (Resource Balance)	122

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Strategic Consideration #5 - (National Effort)	124
- Strategic Consideration #6 - (Intense Paramilitary Effort)	127
- Strategic Consideration #7 - (Intense Intelligence Effort)	129
- Strategic Consideration #8 - (Identify National Assets in the NDA)	130
- Strategic Consideration #9 - (Reversed Development)	131
- Strategic Consideration #10 - (Altered Police Activities)	132
- Strategic Consideration #11 - (Psychological Support)	133
- Strategic Consideration #12 - (Hilltribe Citizenship)	134

CHAPTER FOUR U. S. Project Selection Criteria (S) 137

- Stabilization	137
- Development	137
- Basic Criteria	144
- Functional Criteria	145
- Police Criteria	148

UNCLASSIFIED

INTRODUCTION

Several basic and quite unique processes taking place in a qualitative Insurgency, if well understood and properly observed, reveal the Insurgency problem to be quite different from the traditional view. To miss the import of these processes is to fail to grasp the true nature of the Insurgency and the true nature of the threat. This invariably leads to the fostering of contorted Counterinsurgency approaches as well as Security Assistance support configurations. In turn this unnecessarily weakens the Counterinsurgent's posture. On the other hand, to detect and respond qualitatively to them can assist the Counterinsurgents in compensating somewhat for some of the natural disadvantages he inherits in a qualitative Insurgency situation. The collective dynamic of these processes is not generally analyzed.

In order that these processes and their collective dynamic be recognized and given proper emphasis and attention this Report required a unique format -- one that would simultaneously provide the requested analysis but also redefine and demonstrate the more exact natures of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Two conceptual schemes are thus developed: one for Insurgency, another for Counterinsurgency. These disaggregate the important ingredients and processes for each and provide the systems for analysis. Since the analytical systems are new and different, the interpretations arising therefrom provide a new explanation of the Thai situation. It is one that appears to be more logical and holistical than previous rationalizations.

This Report is therefore not a synthesis of past research or official documentation and reporting. It is rather an attempt to


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ask the right questions about the Thai situation in conjunction with a new framework for analysis, and to derive answers from the data that have relevance for official use in CI strategy and program design. The Report does not rehash data already reported, it holistically interprets the data on hand. It blends research, review, experience, analysis and interpretation with original conceptual schemes.

The information available to this mission is good. Gaps exist but were not too serious and did not preclude the general pattern of basic Insurgency processes from emerging. In the causal process more and better information would have been helpful in describing the specifics of the Insurgent social structure, and its dynamics. Data on the resource process was particularly weak related to external resource configurations -- particularly training content and method.

The Report develops sequentially starting with the new conceptual scheme for analyzing Insurgency. This is immediately followed by an analysis of the Thai Insurgency using the new conceptual framework. This comprises Chapter I. Chapter II repeats the process by establishing the new conceptual scheme for analyzing Counterinsurgency and then applies that framework to the U.S. /RTG Counterinsurgency effort. Chapter III analyzes the Insurgent strategic vulnerabilities and provides considerations for a new CI strategy. Chapter IV provides criteria for U.S. Security Assistance programs and project inputs in support of RTG Counterinsurgency.



It is necessary that the Report be read sequentially. This is because Chapters II, III and IV stem from the new analysis and interpretation of the Thai Insurgency provided in Chapter I. The Report is long and this may take time, but there is no shortcut. It is the only way to fully understand the analytical reasoning involved. The Report uses simple and easily understood language -- it does not resort to any complex research techniques or terminology.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Because the Report is a direct attempt to overcome the fragmentary approach to analyzing Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, the Reader is urged to withhold forming judgments until the entire Report is read. For this reason also no summary is provided because attempts to summarize a situation as complex as this Thai Insurgency are not productive. CI already suffers from too much brevity and over-simplification. The Report itself is a summary, providing sufficient space to do no more than render a good basic understanding of the Thai situation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER ONE

The Insurgency

PART I A New Conceptual Scheme for Analyzing Insurgency\* (U)

General Commentary

In its severest form, an Insurgency reveals the alarming danger a society incurs when there is widespread non-compliance with the law. Order and stability in a normal society are taken for granted and when they decline the real nature of Insurgency is surprisingly revealed. When the Insurgents mine roads, all roads become suspect and need clearing prior to use. If a major building is bombed, buildings must be guarded. It soon emerges that the physical security task is an impossibility. All that is vulnerable cannot be protected -- including key personnel.

Such examples demonstrate how highly dependent any society is on the voluntary compliance of its citizens with law. A society simply does not have the resources to force everyone to comply, or to guarantee safety to everything. But citizens are not generally aware that they voluntarily comply with the law. They assume a sense of "enforcement". This attitude is a fragile one and susceptible to rapid change which can arise over declines in government capacity to perform effectively. If government predictions and attempts to deal with broad unlawful activity are shown to be inaccurate, this voluntary compliance with the law diminishes rapidly. This eventually leaves the government

---

\* The material in this sub-section (Chapter I, Part I) is an abridged Chapter from a manuscript to be published by the Author. It is loaned to this Report. It will be subject to Copyright and therefore should not be published or quoted.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

operative only where exceptionally stern or repressive measures are taken. Therefore, when voluntary compliance with the law is seriously reduced the society-government fabric is in jeopardy. Nothing less is the potential of an Insurgency.

An Insurgency is revolutionary radical conduct -- an exceptional activity. Any circumstance wherein numerous people move about armed and embodying an intention to inflict even selective extra-legal harm on the social and political community precludes standard life-processes from taking place. Because it is so exceptional, conventional reasoning in examining Insurgency is therefore largely unproductive. This is because it cannot penetrate below the surface and detect the deeper meaning to visible Insurgency phenomena. Much of the Insurgency threat is the subtle and corrosive inhibition to normal life-processes and thinking, a slow constriction of confidence. Analysis must show how this takes place.

Relative to Insurgency causes, a primary disadvantage accrues to a government confronted with a qualitative Insurgency. It is that the ground or environment for a conventional "addressing the causes" counter-response has largely been preempted. The very presence of an Insurgency is a realization that the cumulative results of perhaps centuries of deeply rooted life patterns of social injustice and governmental abuse have crossed a line of tolerance, never to return. Radically new circumstances exist, counter actions cannot be considered on the basis of what is desired, what might have been or what existed before. It must consider what exists. The Insurgent will be sure to guarantee no reversion to past conditions, skillfully using his tools to do so.

The basic thrust of a qualitative Insurgency is psychological. It pervades and subtly dominates the entire activity. The significance of all other components is found in the manner in which they relate to each other and create a dynamic that leads to desired psychological ends. Thus, while an Insurgency embodies such elements as guerrilla forces (it is incorrect to refer to a guerrilla "army"), social/political organization, causes, leadership and resources, their individual importance is subordinate to their

UNCLASSIFIED

~~- 7 -~~

6

UNCLASSIFIED

collective contribution to planned psychological effect.

Method of Analysis

To properly analyze an Insurgency as this conceptual scheme suggests, it needs to be disaggregated as to its basic components and processes with all of the interrelationships demonstrated. The parts must then be viewed holistically. This disaggregation can then help determine the existence or absence of certain strengths in the Insurgency, and where it might be vulnerable. Analysis has an important bearing on Counterinsurgency since the entire Counterinsurgency process depends on the capacity of analysis to give an accurate picture of what is actually taking place in front of the government concerned. In understanding an Insurgency it is the processes taking place that matter, not the numbers, locations, names, etc. It is the dynamics of the total structure that reveals the nature and threat of a qualitative Insurgency.

The absence of qualitative analytical criteria has plagued Insurgency analysis in the past and has largely caused officials to rely on the force and momentum of a wide range of assumptions and predelictions about conflict, conflict tools and foreign assistance resources related to the process. Most of these assumptions arise out of military/police and intelligence experience in situations quite alien to LDC Insurgency.

Analysis of an Insurgency, using this scheme and system, however, is more than merely describing each of the basic components and processes. Since complete data is rarely available on all of the Insurgency processes the analysis problem is basically to find patterns of conduct in what the Insurgent is doing and interpret it relative to those factors that constitute a qualitative Insurgency. This method will be used.

Other techniques for providing refinement of understanding will be used as well. Such techniques are to artificially create various conditions within the Insurgency which will isolate processes and reveal their strength or weakness. For example, it can be supposed that external resources are totally cut off.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

Under such circumstances will the internal resources be capable of maintaining the collective psychological strategy thrust? If not, why not? Suppose that the government decides to give the Insurgent all he wants, literally taking the extreme step of surrender to his total demands. Would the Insurgent then stop fighting? This might reveal if the Insurgency is a special case? Suppose the government ceased attacking guerrilla actions. Would they expand? Would their effect be minimized and thus negate the Insurgent strategy objectives?

It can thus be shown that the disaggregated elements and processes of an Insurgency provide a means of imperfect, but nevertheless more precise analysis than has heretofore existed. Within the space limits of the Report the scheme and its description should allow for a very good picture or "fingerprint" of the Insurgency to unfold.

### Basic Insurgency Ingredients and Evolutionary Process

The following is a list of the basic ingredients of an Insurgency which will be referred to in the Report.

#### Ingredients:

- Body of social/political/economic/cultural desires
- Field of oppression
- Frustrations
- Collapse of political community
- Defined political objectives
- Leadership
- Organization
- Resources -- internal, external
- Planning
- Level of Tolerance
- Actions - effects

The following is a simplified description of the evolution of an Insurgency.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Evolution Process: Closely held desires are rebuffed in a field of oppression generated by some organized entity, usually a government. This interaction generates frustration which endures over a period of time, and which is controlled through whatever mechanisms of political and social community exist. In due course these mechanisms are unable to deal with the volume or intensity of the frustration, and they collapse. The system of political community is therefore no longer able to mediate effectively between social forces. The group enduring the frustration then progressively moves along a somewhat predictable course that may or may not lead to Insurgency depending on the degree to which it acquires other ingredients: a leader, organization, resources, belief in a remedy, planning and a definable political objective.

Assuming that the frustrated people comprising this group do acquire a leader, organization, etc., an Insurgency may still not be generated unless attitudes and sentiments exceed a degree of tolerance that is unique to that particular group and it is motivated to take physical action. Passing over this line of tolerance reveals the degree of such motivation, and is usually accompanied by a degree of planning for the contemplated actions. The actions taken are of two types: those of despair, and those which are carefully planned and disciplined. The long-term capacities of the disciplined actions are what gives an Insurgency its success potential.

Definition of Insurgency

The following definition of Insurgency, although imperfect in that there is no one simple statement of such a complex activity, nevertheless captures its fundamental meaning.

- Actions by one or many disaffected indigenous groups rising in forcible opposition to the lawful authority of an LDC government for definable political objectives. The political objectives may or may not include the overthrow of the government.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Causal Process - Social/Political/Participation

Insurgency is conflict over social organization and social cohesion. It is conflict over what a man's place in society should be and what values should link him to other men. It is directly related to the traditional ethos as well as access to power, wealth, and opportunity. It is a process taking place within an even larger process of bringing traditional rural cultures into modern economic systems - i. e., bringing peasants into modern society. The quality of an Insurgency is in part determined by the capacity of its leadership to recognize that its social/political efforts constitute an integrated and comprehensive totality inextricably connected to this end. Since few revolutionary leaders have such insight there are few highly qualitative Insurgencies. Where one exists its impact is enormous -- and basically psychological.

The causal process originates with closely held social, political, economic or cultural desires which are rebuffed in a field of oppression generated by a government. This interaction generates frustration which endures over a period and is controlled through whatever mechanisms of political and social community exist. In due course these mechanisms are unable to deal with the volume or intensity of the frustration and they collapse. The system of political community is therefore no longer able to mediate effectively between social forces.

At this point the conflict becomes an intellectual competition between the government and the Insurgent, with social organization as the core issue. The Insurgent attempts to conceptualize his social/political thrust so as to embrace the traditional values and behavioral system and stimulate peasant motivation on his behalf. This involves the structuring of a political objective and a social/political organization that is absolutely more relevant to the sensibilities of the peasant population than the existing government system. The challenge to the Insurgent is to transform the largely static local grievances and frustrations into a posture of attitudes which will be amenable to

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

accepting the Insurgent design, and suffering for it. While the Insurgent may exploit long existing social injustices and governmental abuses the causal process has one basic aim -- to capture popular motivation and hold it. In this process true causes as well as contrived causes can be used.

An Insurgency's strength and expansionary capacities arise from this process of positive motivation. The peasant finds a new social structure before him. It is one to which he can easily relate, offering him for the first time refreshing participatory opportunity. It is opportunity to achieve status, mobility and rewards which have been denied him by the existing social system. It is opportunity to demonstrate capacities. Not only does this process usually tap largely heretofore hidden talent, but high risk motivation. Further, it accomplishes a primary modernization as well as a revolutionary goal -- the expansion of political participation.

Revolution is often described as the extreme case of the explosion of political participation. The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and scope of the expansion of political participation. In developing this participation and in designing the causal process the Insurgent is sincerely addressing deeply felt (if not 'spiritual') sentiments within the peasant psyche. He is not posturing as a false savior. In this regard, the popular view of Insurgency - i. e., disgruntled groups responding primarily to negative incentives or coercion, is not valid. The confined, stunted and stagnant regions of bandit control achieved by the Mafia in Corsica attest to the limitations of purely negative approaches.

The causal process of a qualitative Insurgency creates a strong linkage between the social/political structure offered by the Insurgent and the interests, goals and values of the peasant population. The resulting motivation is the root strength of an Insurgency. An indication of the skill of Insurgent leadership in designing the social/political structure is that even though Communists (e. g., Castro, Viet Cong, etc.) design and administer it they nearly always do so with a minimum, or even absence, of ideological content. This keeps the goals for political awareness

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

consistent with the low levels of peasant education. But the process still captures peasant motivation. In this way, skillful leadership is able to harness an important social group without that group necessarily becoming Communists, pseudo-Communists, or even recognizing their participation as part of a Communist system. Insurgency is thus rarely, if ever, implanted (such as Che Guevara's attempt in Bolivia). Rather, it is an indigenous rooting, slow and measured. It is aided and stimulated by external elements, but it is indigenous. It is indigenous by design.

Not all causes elicit high risk motivation. Causes like those in the Crusades, Irish Republican Army and the World War II undergrounds stimulated risk levels higher than groups in history who wanted lower taxes, economic reform or increased welfare. Thus risk levels vary with Insurgency causes. Lower risk levels weaken a causal process. The "national character" is also a factor. If the people embody strong will, tenacity of conviction, faith, determination and a sense of self-sacrifice to fundamental life or national principles, such characteristics are likely to reinforce a strong causal process. Soft people and tempered character will weaken it. These factors affect the quality of an Insurgency. The Cause-Risk relationship might be categorized as:

Cause-Risk Relationship

Cause

Risk Capacity

Welfare Causes

Closely aligned to the immediate personal welfare, traditional values and goals of the Insurgency adherent.

Elicits strong but not always high-risk motivation.

Transcending Causes

Transcends the immediate personal welfare (national, religious, racial, etc.) but is closely tied to the traditional values and goals of the Insurgency adherent.

Elicits the highest degrees of high-risk motivation; extremely self-sacrificing, even fanatical.

UNCLASSIFIED

.. UNCLASSIFIED

Perhaps the most important aspect of the causal process has to do with recognizing it as a process. The matter can be considered this way: A cause is static. While it is perhaps deeply rooted historically or culturally it is an inert feeling of frustration. It derives no importance relative to Insurgency until it is turned into a dynamic. (For example, the Untouchables of India are confronted with numerous static causes. They remain static causes because they are not generated into a dynamic - i. e., affect the motivation of the Untouchables.)

A cause turns into the dynamic or causal process through the manner in which the cause is manipulated by the Insurgent -- exaggerated, supplemented, explained or related to other factors. The Insurgent leadership is a catalyst in precipitating the causal process. It is the manner in which this is done that gives cause a special meaning to the Insurgency adherent. That is to say that through the causal process the cause is transformed. In this new state it is seen by the adherent in a way that directly relates to and stimulates his motivation. The cause problem at that point therefore is no longer the original static cause, it is the total process. It is for this reason that Counterinsurgents' attempts to "deal with the causes" take on special significance. It is really very late to simply try and alter the old static cause condition. What is needed is to recognize the transformation that has taken place and address the manner in which the Insurgency adherent now sees the cause. This is a much more complex matter. It means that the government has a primary disadvantage in confronting a qualitative Insurgency because the ground or environment for his "counter-action" has largely been preempted. By design, the Insurgent then compounds this complexity even further by introducing the intimidation process into the causal process.

Intimidation Process

The Insurgent is not unaware that some adherents will not be fully attracted by his social/political structure and the opportunities therein, or, if they are they may waver. He knows also that hostile elements may join and yet live among motivated adherents. The Insurgent's skill in developing a qualitative

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

causal process, and in protecting against these dangers, is enhanced by the manner in which he subtly weaves into it a web of real or implied intimidation. The Insurgent cannot function in an unpredictable climate, he requires assured conduct. Insurgency thus becomes a form of warfare for predictable behavior. It is really warfare against the civilian supporters of the government wherein such supporters, in an area of interest to the Insurgent, are induced to cooperate positively through the causal process, and negatively through the subtle introduction of intimidation in to that process.

A villager knows he can never be protected against Insurgent retribution. If the Insurgency leadership wants to punish him it can eventually do so, and at small cost. Intimidation that is subtly managed is often not recognized as such by the peasant. He may see it in terms of self-interest - i. e., the Insurgent can protect him from the government. The natural extension of his reasoning in such circumstances is his recognition that to not work reliably for the Insurgent can remove such protection. However managed, the implication is present that cooperative conduct with the government can (and will) be punished. The causal process and intimidation process thus become mutually reinforcing in a combined single dynamic.

A vignette from the Cuban Insurgency may illustrate this process and also aid in furthering the meaning of Insurgency as "warfare against the civilian supporters of the government". An American ex-GI fighting with Raul Castro became frustrated and bored with Raul's approach to Insurgency. The American complained that Raul didn't know a thing about Insurgency because he rarely mounted an ambush, a raid or other militant actions. He said: "All Raul does is go around killing Chivatos (informers)." Raul, indeed, understood qualitative Insurgency; he was interested in raids, etc., only if they produced a planned psychological benefit worth the risks and cost. He saw Insurgency as developing vast terrain wherein his guerrilla forces could operate predictably because the population knew that to provide information or cooperation to the government meant death. Actually this vignette is in part unrepresentative since most of the rural population in Eastern Cuba cooperated willingly with Castro owing to the

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

positive social/political/participation structure offered by the Insurgents. The structure addressed their interests, goals, and values, thus inducing their motivated cooperation.

### Resource Process

The Insurgent knows he is in a disproportionate resource contest with the government. It is a contest which enables him to compete only by executing his general activity in an unconventional manner. The unconventional conduct reinforces the causal process and helps generate both internal and external resources in the following manner: The motivation created in the causal process inspires acts of participation. These, in turn, attract and mobilize physical support assets -- more adherents, food, shelter, finances, arms, materials, etc. These comprise the internal resource base. A dynamic is thus created between the causal process and resources. The dynamic is circular in nature. It links together the cause, resources (generated from the motivation), the political objective (which is served by the acts of participation), back to causes (which are manipulated by the political structure and political objective). This circular dynamic can be described as the Cause-Resource Principle. Without using the precise definition, which requires extensive background development, this principle can be simply defined as a mutually reinforcing relationship between the Insurgency causal process and resources wherein the interaction between them produces a social "force" effect that reinforces the political objective of the Insurgency. Force in this context is the Communist concept of force - i. e., acting so as to determine the actions of others. It has a social/political connotation, not military.

This internal resource process can be considered a self-generating foundation of strength. It is a foundation on which other important processes depend. Because the internal resource process is foundational, qualitative Insurgency will require self-reliance and frugal resource practices so as to keep the Insurgency from becoming dependent on external resources more than is absolutely necessary. In pursuing such a policy it also reinforces the political objective in affording widespread opportunity for additional participation from a wide array of local adherents.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

Important as internal resources are, it is the external resources that largely determine the potential of the Insurgency. The Cause-Resource Principle also operates on the Insurgent's behalf in generating external resources. It does so by adding the more esoteric dimension of ideology, or a higher level of political interest, to the local peasant causal process. That is to say that if the causal process and political objective of the insurgent addresses other nations' ideological and other interests, a supportive resource asset may be generated. To achieve this is a primary Insurgent aim because it broadens his base of strength. It takes only a cursory review of those Insurgencies which have not enjoyed external resource support (Philippines, Malaya, etc.) to recognize the importance of this Insurgency process. The real value of external resources, however, is achieved only if the influx of resources (primarily material, weapons, finances, propaganda and training) can be made constant, or assured, over a long period of time, thus supplementing indigenous absorptive capacities.

The resource process represents one of the two basic strengths of an Insurgency (the other is the causal process). Resources will be explained more fully in the section on Collective Psychological Strategy.

### Guerrilla Action Process

The popular or traditional view of the nature and the threat of an Insurgency focuses on the guerrilla actions. But by its very design a qualitative Insurgency is not a military threat. This seeming anomaly is difficult to perceive because the violent guerrilla actions are so prominent and destructive. Such actions, however, are misleading, making it necessary to look more deeply into the violence arena to derive their real significance.

There are two basic strategic facts about an Insurgency:

1. The guerrilla forces component by its very design is not geared to win a military victory. This is in part because such forces will always be inferior to those of the government, and their potency arises from their unconventional nature. For the Insurgent to

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

compete on conventional military terms is to lose these advantages. (Followers of Mao's phases of revolutionary war who will have problems with this fact overlook Mao's own preaching of flexibility. This makes it unwise to expect all Insurgency to follow the China pattern exactly. Actually, none have.)

2. The guerrilla forces component of an Insurgency is basically designed to: (a) wage warfare against the civilian supporters of the government - i. e., a subtle reign of intimidation in which the civil population is induced to cooperate more significantly and predictably with the Insurgents than with the government; and (b) perform highly selective militant actions to achieve psychological and political ends. In achieving those ends the guerrilla forces become an expensive irritant to the government. (How expensive is an important factor in their strategic planning, as will be shown.)

The violent acts are thus not ends in themselves. They serve other and more important purposes. To view them as ends is to focus on the symptoms or effects of an Insurgency rather than the reasons for the actions. This is to be drawn into an expensive and fruitless pursuit of trying to stop or contain them.

It is this aspect of Insurgency that is thought to be well understood by devotees, but which in fact is universally misunderstood. The danger of such misconception is to advance the view that these violent symptoms or effects constitute the threat - i. e., that a guerrilla "army" will grow to where it is widespread, eventually weakening the government and possibly even culminating in a "march on the capital". This is not the case. The real threat of a qualitative Insurgency is quite different and will be demonstrated later. (It might be noted here that even the French, Dutch and other Undergrounds in World War II were more valuable for their psychological threat to the Germans than for a military one.)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

In this regard, however, Insurgent propaganda, particularly through its front and external propaganda support mechanisms, will intentionally perpetuate the impression that the guerrilla actions are "armed struggle", "war", or "revolution". This is done to deceive the government into viewing the threat in military terms, and for other reasons that will shortly be apparent. Another vignette from the Cuban Insurgency may help put the role of guerrilla forces into better perspective.

Fidel Castro's highly qualitative Insurgency did not envisage widespread guerrilla armies or an eventual "march on Havana". Instead, Castro (a most skillful Insurgency leader) was taken by surprise when his still small guerrilla forces, which were harassing Batista's Army at many points, found that the Army was collapsing from internal factors. This unexpectedly opened the way to Havana. The popular view of those events was that Castro's guerrilla forces had won conventional land battles. This was not the case. Further, Castro was actually planning (and using refined psychological strategy) for these guerrilla actions on a broad scale to create a popular climate conducive to a general strike. It was through the general strike (largely urban) throughout Cuba that he planned to bring down Batista. It may be recalled that he was days in getting to Havana after the collapse. This was due to his having been surprised to win so easily, largely due to the cumulative effects of the psychological thrust of his strategy. He never expected to win with guerrilla forces. Batista's self-crippling responses to them were induced by Castro's strategy.

A glimpse of Castro's psychological strategy may be gained from this final Cuban tale. While Castro had his genius as an Insurgency leader in understanding the psychological aspects of Insurgency, his compatriot, Che Guevara, never understood or appreciated that aspect of conflict, with fatal results. On one occasion Che wanted to ambush and capture a truck which he felt would be useful to move supplies and men; Castro would have none of it. Instead, Castro, conserving his meager manpower, planned a small raid on a police station which he carefully timed to coincide with Batista's lifting of press censorship. The raid, which otherwise might have gone unnoticed in that only a few policemen were killed, brought national (and international) press coverage

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

giving evidence that the guerrillas were not crushed (as Batista had earlier claimed), and were skillfully executing operations. Popular response to the news in typical Latin fashion exaggerated the numbers of guerrilla involved -- as Castro knew it would. The collective psychological impact on Castro's own forces, on the local peasant population, on the government and its supporters, and internationally was enormous. Guevara's failure to understand these refinements of strategy led him to view his Bolivia venture with the perspective of an infantryman rather than that of a psychological strategist. He died as a result.

### Collective Psychological Strategy Process


All of the processes already described take their full significance and potency from their combined dynamic. This is the pinnacle of Insurgent strategic planning and is largely governed by the dynamics of the Cause-Resource Principle. While we observed earlier that this Principle functions in the causal process to generate internal and external resources - i. e., the resources of the Insurgent -- it can now be shown how the application of the Principle to the government's resources (i. e., the Counterinsurgent's resources) gives it a meaning of exceptionally great strategic importance. It does this again by the Insurgent applying to the strategic design the Communist concept of force - i. e., acting so as to determine the actions of others, but he now targets the enemy rather than the local population and friendly nations. It is a peculiar but exact application of the principle of Judo - i. e., getting your opponent's actions to reinforce your actions against him.

Insurgent strategy infused with these dimensions is able to orchestrate a series of Insurgency processes which function as a total system. The system is designed to psychologically induce the government to self-initiate responses to the selective actions of the Insurgent which over the long term will be incrementally cumulative and constitute an escalatory process of self-destruction. The strategy is primarily targeted on creating and exploiting resource and credibility distortions (contradictions) in the government camp. This process is preferably illustrated in a live Insurgency case. Such is provided in Part II. However, the following graphic may aid in understanding the conceptual basis of this collective strategic process:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The Manner in Which Basic Insurgency Processes  
Interrelate and Form a Collective Dynamic



The interrelationship and collective relationship between processes can now be seen. Through the collective processes a qualitative Insurgency becomes an activity lending itself to systematic and reliable analysis. Its potential can be determined. It should be reemphasized that not all Insurgencies embody these characteristics-- hence few are qualitative Insurgencies.

It is only necessary to look to the cases of Chiang Kai-shek in China (1945 - 1949), Batista in Cuba (late 1950s), France in Indochina (1947 - 1954), and the United States and South Vietnam (1963 - 1973) to obtain glimpses of the ramifications of such strategy. Japan, during the period 1937 - 1945 in China, demonstrated perceptive strategic caution not to rise to the Insurgent bait and instead held coastal enclaves. These did not give it all it wanted in China, but nevertheless averted it from losing to China through internal resource declines arising out of unwise responses to Chinese strategy.

Primary Determinants of Insurgency Quality

Frequent reference has been made to a "qualitative" or "highly qualitative" Insurgency. This requires clarification. Many Insurgencies are isolated, poorly led and self-defeating endeavors

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

because they either lack some of the ingredients or processes shown, or are designed and managed poorly. They lose in the intellectual competition. Insurgency achieves its degree of quality from the individual and holistical refinement of these processes. For example, an Insurgency resting on a causal process that is significantly addressing the social/political/cultural interests and values of a peasant population (deriving therefrom high risk motivation), and operating in conjunction with an external resource configuration that assures a continual flow of modest but essential resources of indigenous capacities, would embody exceptional strengths. These strengths make it a likely candidate for being defined as a qualitative or highly qualitative Insurgency. But factors other than the causal process and resources process must be considered. In a simple listing the primary determinants of Insurgency quality can be considered to be:

### Primary Determinants of Insurgency Quality

1. Leadership having the skill and capacity to holistically view social/political change in a peasant society and design social/political organization and participation that addresses fundamental peasant interests, goals and values.
2. The capacity of the causal process (the total social/political participation dynamic, in conjunction with the intimidation process) to stimulate and maintain high risk motivation and geographic areas of favorable predictable adherent behavior.
3. Leadership capacity and skill in developing a psychological strategy process that functions holistically and induces self-destructive government responses.
4. Leadership capacity and skill in attracting external resources on a continuing and assured basis, and in achieving a largely self-sufficient internal resource process.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

### The Special Cases

Not all Insurgency calls for overthrow of the government. In fact, most LDC Insurgency stems from groups at odds with the government but pursuing objectives far short of governmental overthrow. They are oriented toward achieving changes within the existing social/political system. Where such a limited objective exists there is room for a government to consider compromise - i. e., a balance of interests between the Insurgent and the government. This would be accommodating to the Insurgent demands for some changes. It would be a compromise in which the needs of the Insurgent can be met by reforms and reallocations of wealth, power and opportunity that do not destroy the existing social organization, but rather modify it favorably for the society as a whole.

It should be clearly recognized, however, that such a balance may not be attainable. There are numerous reasons for this, but when it is apparent that there is no room for social change to take effect and address and ameliorate the causal process so that the Insurgent will cease his hostility, it is apparent a special case exists.

Special cases arise where overthrow is an integral part of the Insurgent's political objective. It usually arises within situations involving civil war, coup, revolution, invasion, secession and captured revolution. In all such cases the government and Insurgent are basically engaged in a resource contest. A resource contest is not an equitable undertaking. The Insurgent costs are insignificant compared to the government. The contest, while relating basically to resources, implies the totality of resources, particularly the psychological. It is in this area where the Insurgent's strategic skill exceeds that of the government. The result is a contest between the Insurgent's meager resources, which he applies so as to generate a highly weighted psychological impact, and the government's resources which enjoy virtually no psychological weighting.

A resource contest takes its full meaning relative to the Insurgent's collective psychological strategy and gives a more

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

complete meaning to the term protracted warfare - i. e., its resource-attrition aspects. This meaning primarily comes from recognizing that the Insurgent's strategy is not resource attrition arising from what the Insurgent erodes through his guerrilla actions, but rather the internal corrosive and destructive effects arising from self-induced government actions. This is the basic threat of a qualitative Insurgency.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PART II The Thai Insurgency

Causal Process -- Social/Political/Participation - General

The high degree of Insurgent leadership skill used in transforming the causal base in Thailand from static historical grievances into strong high risk motivation can be appreciated by noting that many Insurgency adherents see themselves as nationalists and patriots, fighting for King and country! To stimulate latent peasant economic grumblings to such esoteric levels is a significant feat.

The causal base is not properly characterized as a matter of the RTG "neglecting" certain regions of the country and thereby arousing peasant resentment. To be sure, the RTG has not done much in remote parts of Thailand, but the dimension of RTG "neglect" of any of the Insurgency adherent groups should be seen as having been added by earlier leftist parliamentarians and contemporary Insurgency leadership. The Insurgent has manipulated the causal base.

The Insurgency regions have for centuries naturally constituted resource poor and unproductive economic areas. Both the natural resource and human faculty endowments relative to achieving material progress were then and are now poor. Engaged in a modernizing process which really only began at the end of World War II, it is not surprising that the deficiencies of the dissident areas simply did not attract RTG attention any more than a poor feasibility study would attract an investor. The Insurgency regions have therefore evolved in history from naturally stagnant development climates to areas commanding increased modernization attention. This has occurred not because of any change in their natural endowments, but primarily because of political events largely associated with neighboring countries that were viewed by the RTG as possible dangers to Thai security. The causal base is therefore not a matter of an outraged constituency rising to voice concern over non-development and "neglect", but rather that of a generally unproductive rural citizenry being awakened to a new view of their deficient condition.

~~SECRET~~

There is not widespread social discontent in Thailand. There is much intellectual political grumbling in Bangkok, but such as exists in the rural areas is modest. This discontent is embodied in rural people who have generally lacked a capacity to self-generate their low living standard causal base into a reform crusade. Over a period of decades the legislators in the Northeast never moved their hostility to the government much past outspoken considerations of separation or regionalism. Motivation was never stimulated. The fibre of the people in these remote regions of the countryside normally lacks those characteristics favorable to generating social change, just as they lack the faculties to generate more economic productivity from the area. Their material progress never depended primarily on the RTG, but rather on their own attitudes, aptitudes, motivations and social/political organization. They have not sought nor expected much progress, and such grievances as they held were attributed more to fate than an unresponsive government. It was not until the 1950s, when General Sarit pushed economic development, that the rural people came to have a more paternalistic government. This was a new concept of government. Previously the rural peasantry was steeped in self-sufficiency -- looking to government primarily for help only when sought, or to protect them from intruders.

Despite this latency and impotency of the causal base, Insurgency leadership has been most skillful in dealing with it and successfully manipulating the causes to where adherents have come to accept the credibility of the Chinese idea of "putting a new man on earth", of the "peasant's role in society" and the injustice of contemporary governmental systems as explained in Communist terms of contradictions. Their slogans cover class problems, equality, Thai freedom and culture. "The Insurgent wants to" "... mobilize the mass and abolish old social systems ..." The manner in which the Insurgent leadership has implanted Mao's idea of the role of the forgotten peasant classes; hurdled problems of ideology and the basic vulnerabilities in Thai peasant behavior; and, harnessed peasant motivation on behalf of the Insurgency, are reasons why this Insurgency is to be taken seriously.

The Insurgent is focusing on youth. While not ignoring the elders he has been able to hurdle much of the historical Thai rural social cohesion by tapping the more flexible, volatile and receptive youth. The youth are more susceptible to the inconsistencies

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

between rural and urban life, and between government promise and performance. They have been skillfully and subtly led, largely through simple educational mechanisms, to absorb the Communist reasoning and even perform informant type reporting on their own families and village compatriots. A sense of unease over who to trust, a feeling of the necessity to report others, the acceptance of self-criticism and the role of subtle intimidation (explained below) applied to the village social fabric, have created in many peasants a sense of unavoidable belonging. It has also created a strong group dynamic -- an organizational fabric for the causal process.

But what is the basis of this belonging, this attraction? What are the causes? Thailand, like any LDC has inherent governmental, institutional and resource inadequacies which disturb rural people. Few of them could cause an Insurgency. The most relevant Thai disaffections for Insurgency stimulation might be summarized under these broad headings:

- Limited access to substantive political participation.

- Limited social mobility

- Disparity between expectations and fulfillment of RTG administrative efforts

- Economic disparity and opportunity inequity

- Corruption -- government and commercial

- Ethnic, land and citizenship anomalies.

But even under the pressure of rising population these are not sufficient to promote Insurgency. The additional ingredient that gives them Insurgency relevance is the social transformation taking place in rural Thailand.

With the proliferation of local officials spreading the concept of government interest and desire to help the peasant, he has come to not only see the government in more paternal, benefactor terms, but expects results and has grown critical when they do not materialize. Normally dependent on a single patron, the peasant has

~~SECRET~~

found the growing government presence an infringement on his basic freedoms. It is altering his single patron dependency - i. e., his initiative to undertake inter-personal relationships as he chooses. As the government's economic development thrust has reached into the rural areas it has implanted urban ideas on the village structure but has left the surrounding economic system largely untouched. While not becoming a total government economic dependent the peasant is nevertheless largely caught in a flux of value and system changes that are very revolutionary in terms of his historic life patterns. The Insurgency areas are thus regions of vast social and attitudinal transformation.

But how is the quantum jump of Communist recruitment made? How does the Insurgent take these largely static historical grievances and rural social transformations and translate them into high risk motivation? He does it through a dynamic involving a blend of many factors with peasant sentiments. It can be visualized somewhat as follows: The peasant's social relationship pattern is changing. Not an organized person, distrustful and largely bored, he now hears radio and travels. Comparisons are made. He learns of other parts of his country. Disparities between his life and others becomes apparent. In Buddhist fashion he tends to avoid involvement in a more complex village society with its new government associations. He stands back. But through a friend, a relative, a patron or other inter-personal relationship he has these disparities and contradictions of his life pattern explained. The urban areas are full of corrupt officials and merchants, the culture is endangered. The peasant is said to be an excluded class in a society run by a dishonest government. Being something of a village renegade he questions these things. He wonders. It is difficult to become dissatisfied with the simple patterns of village life and thinking. The friend offers him opportunity to take part in a political group. He listens. He is influenced to see how the peasant class will never better their condition or have a role in the present society. His perception of his ability to affect change is being altered. The new role for the Chinese peasants under Mao is explained. Thailand can achieve the same honest government. China is helping. Other socialist states are helping. The group is a party, it is international. Roles are placed before him. He has choices - a rewards system attracts his interest. A position, status, responsibility and advancement can be had. Training is promised; perhaps a gun.

~~SECRET~~

Wavering, he decides to try and takes part. The comradeship is attractive. Mutual interests and associations stimulate him further. Soon he is afraid of the government or of others learning he has taken part. Someone might inform. He wants to be protected. He worries but does not withdraw although tempted to do so. He likes the new demands, the fraternal activity. He is challenged. His friend describes him as a patriot, a nationalist, a true Thai citizen. The cell leadership exerts a friendly but firm interest in him. He counts. He takes on more tasks and is involved in an action. Simple ideology is explained by political cadre who are friendly and sincere. He accepts their logic of the peasant social order. They tell him his safety depends on others and theirs on him. He must be responsible. He has entered into a new kind of inter-personal relationship -- he is part of a group. He is committed.

This causal process combines positive and negative stimulants. It employs certain aspects of the principle of espionage-agent control, but despite this it still taps basic human values and interests. It appeals to pride, the vibrant human qualities, nationalism. It hurdles cultural patterns and behavioral habits, and exacts new conduct. It takes largely economic disaffection and transforms it into a social/political force. It stimulates risk motivation through an appeal that transcends personal interests and reaches toward eschatological pursuits. It therefore blends peasant poverty with spiritual concerns.

But an important distinction should be noted. The guerrilla is motivated in this manner but not all village supporters. The guerrilla is thus much more strongly motivated than the village supporter. That is to say the village supporter has been drawn into the activity not so much through this tenacious appeal to nationalism and a peasant role in a new order, but more through associational factors -- family, friends, etc. His motivation is more tenuous. It is this distinction that will be seen later as having great significance for CI strategy. It gives a clue to an Insurgent strategic vulnerability.

It will not do to belittle the Insurgency recruitment by pointing out that only 7,000 core adherents have joined such an appeal. That is to overlook how they were brought out of a latent historical posture, which was reinforced by poor education and general rural ignorance, and led to believe in and respond to a new social/political organization.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The significant skills that Insurgency adherents manifest, evident in literally every available intelligence report, reveal that they have embodied these little recognized and unappreciated capacities all along, only waiting for the catalyst to precipitate them.

This harnessing of peasants from economically poor regions represents a strong contrast to the virtual absence of similar social/political alternative channels for participation available within the RTG system. The courage and daring of the Insurgent social/political design is seen in the fact that much of its behavioral requirements challenge Thai cultural patterns. Good leadership, for example, is not to be influenced by one's family relationships (breaking the connections of the extended family). Instead, it will rest on the "common struggle" (merit performance). The strong discipline, group spiritedness and selfless conduct daily exhorted from adherents run counter to basic Thai characteristics of personal interest and individualism. Nevertheless, they are relentlessly pressed by Insurgency organizers. A significant role is offered to women. With the RTG expanding its official presence into the remote areas the Insurgent propaganda and political arm has strengthened its causal process by showing how petty corruption by many officials confirms their characterizations of the RTG. It provides a contrast to the more exemplary unselfish behavior they require of their leaders.

The Insurgency is not deriving its strength or impetus from external sources. It is indigenously rooted in a strong causal process. The numbers of adherents (largely reported from information which is itself a fragmentary picture of the total Insurgency activity) are modest figures at best. Even allowing for the Insurgent planting of "captured documents" and ordering defections to spread information that exaggerates his strength to mislead the government, there is ample evidence from the pattern of Insurgent organizational conduct that the adherent base is not only numerous but qualitatively strong in its motivation. Comfort should not be taken from the possible existence of only 7,000 trained adherents. The numerous village supporters, although untrained, are also effective and are additional valuable if not essential participants.

The Insurgency is a popular movement. It constitutes a social and political program that more relevantly addresses the rural problems

~~SECRET~~

of Thailand than the RTG social/political organization in the eyes of the peasant adherent. It is in such relevancy, and in the capacity of the Insurgent leadership to manipulate causes into social meaning for the peasants, that the causal process derives its strength. That defectors and prisoners have largely been low-level village supporters provides clues to high motivation arising from this social/political relevancy.

#### Causal Process -- Social/Political/Participation - North

The causal base derives primarily from the hilltribes' spiritual attachment to the land area. They see it as not only their traditional home but as their birthright. They embody a fundamental determination and desire to remain there and live in conformity with life patterns practiced over centuries. Their very means of subsistence are inextricably tied to the geography and foliage of the area. RTG legal and administrative encroachments on the conduct of their living patterns are the core of the causal process. The hilltribes do not want to be either integrated or assimilated into the Thai national body politic. They cannot be "taught" respect for the RTG and monarchy. If they do not feel it naturally from centuries of experience, it cannot be implanted. While the Insurgent has been successful only primarily with the Meo, other hilltribes are susceptible to these fundamental appeals to their basic interests.

The hilltribes see this alarming pattern of Thai conduct as a danger to their very existence. It is reinforced by the continuum of Thai antipathy toward them as persons. This deeply offends their natural sense of social justice. These entrenched causes are not behaviorial or superficial. Rather, in the eyes of the hilltribes they are spiritual. Such actions are surfacing the martial instincts of a normally peaceful people which in itself serves as a clue to the intensity of their feelings and motivation about the activities taking place. Their reaction is inspiring high risk motivation at levels quite inconsistent with their general ignorance. It is only necessary to note that it was hilltribe guerrilla forces that stopped Phu Kwang in 1971-72, to gain an appreciation for the capabilities such motivation is inspiring.

Not embodying the criteria or experience by which they can judge the promises or intentions of the Insurgent, the hilltribes respond to his more sincere behavior patterns and simple organized activity. They do so because these address their basic interests and values.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Despite increasing Insurgent aberrations of conduct, wherein hilltribes are being overly regimented to supply performance roles and thus creating a number of defections, the basic social/political structure offered by the Insurgent is quite relevant to the hilltribes. It is so because it assures: (1) they can stay on their land; and (2) they can carry out life processes in their traditional ways. The Insurgent has thus, while making many mistakes with the hilltribes, purposely avoided attempts at sophisticated ideological patterns. He exploits the RTG threat to the hilltribes existence by increasing his capacities to protect the hilltribes from the government. Even when such protection fails, the resentment aroused is directed more toward the government for taking the actions than the Insurgent for failing to stop them. Now that the RTA does not try to penetrate the hill area such a protective policy has succeeded in the eyes of the hilltribes.

The link between the social/political/participation offered these people by the Insurgent and their basic interests and values is thus very strong. It is strong because it relates to their life patterns. In this regard the social/political organization is a sincere undertaking by the Insurgent. He truly plans to allow the hilltribes to stay in the area and live as in the past, thereby emulating the simple but effective DRV approach to its Montagnard population. This convincing posture has a strong motivational effect and reveals that the Insurgent strategy is designed to merely "use" the North - i. e., use it as a base or platform for other purposes. The important factor in the mind of the hilltribes is that they get what they want. In return they perform quite predictably on behalf of the Insurgent. To consider that approximately 12,000 out of some 45,000 Meo are with the Insurgent is to gain some appreciation of the success of their causal process.

The Insurgent approach is singular; he lives with what exists now. He gives the hilltribes what they now want. Perhaps the Insurgent has other plans for the area later, but he is not mixing such considerations with his current strategic approach of "using" the area. This contrasts somewhat with the RTG approach of wanting to control hilltribe life in the area for future natural resource concerns. This is a large burden in the midst of an Insurgency. RTG hilltribe refugee resettlement programs aggravate the hilltribes, as well as lowland Thais, because they surface the sensitive problem of land ownership

~~SECRET~~

and citizenship rights. The cost of such undertakings is beyond even RTG good intentions, thus allowing non-performance to fuel Insurgent propaganda and give rise to tribal groups returning to the Insurgent in the hills. The hilltribes see such failures to deliver the promised benefits of resettlement as further RTG deviousness.

Contrived causes are thus virtually absent in the North except wherein some hilltribe personnel are given leadership training and roles and exposed to modified political indoctrination. For the most part such training still approaches causal manipulation more through simple ideological applications and placing the blame for hilltribe problems on the RTG.

Collectively considered the North enjoys what can be called a transcending causal process which has been perhaps irrevocably etched into the sensibilities of the hilltribes through the rampant RTA military actions in the late 1960s. The causal process in the North does not have an external or alien rationale. It represents skillful Insurgent exploitation of local conditions and values.

#### Causal Process -- Social/Political/Participation - Northeast

Contrived causes are the primary causal base in the Northeast. While regionalism has been a factor in the politics of the area it is regionalism within a broad context of national commonalities and loyalties -- to the King, national activities and successes. It is not separatism, although at one time it might have been. The causal base would yet be latent regional grumbling over poor natural resources and standard of living levels were it not that the region was ripe for leadership that could capitalize on these deficiencies. The leadership has since been provided and has skillfully designed a social/political as well as ideological thrust which attributes the low standard of living not to the actual paucity of natural resource and population aptitude endowments but to governmental "neglect", disinterest and administrative failings. The artificiality of this theme is even carried forward by the Insurgent into the idea of the RTG now having a moral obligation to the people for development -- thus not only naming the culprit but linking him to the near impossible task of achieving the development.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The causal process therefore cannot be considered transcending even though it is obviously stimulating and inspiring large numbers of adherents into high risk motivation. What accounts for this anomaly is that while the North is primarily a military arena with a low social/political thrust (addressing the special social conditions existing there) the Northeast is a low military arena with more sophisticated social/political organization (addressing its special conditions). That is to say that people with higher aptitudes than those in the North are being attracted. They constitute the driving force of the Insurgency there because they are more alert to the higher personal gain potentials. This elicits higher motivational and organizational content. In this regard it is a potentially more dangerous Insurgency area because the proliferation of committee and sub-committee position structure existing below the Northeast Branch Central Committee of the CPT provides for exceptionally broad peasant participation, mobility and status achievement. The basic Thai-Lao ethnic base gives it not only a stronger character fibre but more expansionary capacity than that of the hilltribe base vis-a-vis adjacent lowland Thai areas. Both military and political authority have been generally decentralized so that important decision making takes place at the local level. This is further stimulating leadership potential. It provides experience and training, increasing the efficiency of operations.

Like the hilltribes the Northeasterners are having their local values and life patterns significantly addressed through the social/political organization offered by the Insurgents. In both areas the Insurgent has taken what must be seen as a sincere interest in the area and its people. There is nothing to indicate an artificiality about his social/political thrust in the Northeast. As in the North therefore the linkage here between the Insurgent social/political/participation process and the interests and values of the people involved is very strong: The motivation, however, is more personal and individualistic than the group or tribal motivation in the North.

#### Causal Process -- Central, Mid-South, Far South

While it was necessary to draw attention to some basic difference in the causal process between the North and Northeast, such distinctions are not fully necessary for the Central, Mid-South and Far South. This is because the small differences in how

~~SECRET~~

Insurgency leadership in these areas apply intimidation, generate resources, conduct guerrilla actions and approach their tactical assignments within the collective strategy of the CPT are not that important. However, there are some distinctions relative to the Mid-South alone which will be occasionally referred to in the Report. (The Far-South is a conflict distinctly alien to the CPT Insurgency pattern. It will not be covered.) For a number of reasons which the discussion will make apparent, it is the Insurgency in the North and Northeast that is the most important.

The strong sense of regionalism in the South, stemming from the more recent "colonial" aspects of central government dominance over the area, does stimulate some behavioral characteristics in the peasantry which in conjunction with obviously weak Insurgent leadership, has created a less qualitative causal process than in the North or Northeast. Nevertheless, high risk motivation is generated even though it is difficult to easily distinguish between Insurgent, banditry, feuding or even vigilante activity. Leadership appears less skilled in linking the peasant motivation to the experience of China. Intimidation is applied less skillfully, and over the past several years it can be said that the Insurgent leadership has either been poorly equipped, or distinctly unable, to orchestrate its collective activities. It has relied on quite elaborate village installations, demonstrated poor internal security procedures, and conducted guerrilla actions without their being selective or psychologically oriented. These (and other) characteristics proved vulnerable to some original and unorthodox Counterinsurgency tactics designed by RTA General San Chitpatima.

Recent patterns of conduct however make it apparent that the Insurgent leadership has responded qualitatively to these temporary set-backs and is skillfully restructuring a growing organization in a manner that both neutralizes these strategic and material gains of General San. The Mid-South Insurgency is in a strong regenerative stage. It rests on a good causal process which is able to sustain a potential, and although quite different from the North or Northeast it is nevertheless serious because it is becoming a more integrated process and is taking place in an area manifesting greater social/political independence (and even pervasive animosity) toward the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

central government. There is more evidence of urban support in the South than in the North and Northeast.

### Intimidation Process

Because of the manner in which the Insurgent is subtly applying intimidation to the causal process he is achieving an increasingly disciplined operation and insuring predictable adherent conduct. It is intimidation that is being applied in most cases, not terror.

While certainly less sophisticated than in some other insurgencies the leadership has achieved a well-balanced and skillfully applied form of implicit intimidation. It is effective because it uses youth (explained in the previous section) and is geared more to protecting the villager from the RTG than in threatening him for non-performance. While exceptions do certainly exist, it is this general pattern of subtle intimidation that leads to the conclusion that most Insurgency adherents are not even viewing it as such. They are not only seeing their day-to-day interests but their safety tied to Insurgent capabilities. The manner in which members of the village come to inform on each other, watch and report to Insurgent leadership, creates a strong group fabric.

There are countless indications of the Insurgent camp suffering from what might be considered the standard human frailties, disputes, purges, administrative mix-ups and misunderstandings. These are often interpreted as weakenings in the Insurgency. To the contrary, their presence amid the general efficiency of Insurgent conditions should be seen as signs of strength. They do not appear to be so pervasive that the leadership cannot absorb them and still manage an effective balance between the causal process and its intimidation reinforcement. A very strong system of rewards and punishments exists. It is administered with an effective discipline which reinforces the implicit intimidation but adds a positive element to it. One somewhat humorous example of Insurgent problems helps to maintain perspective. In the Northeast situations have arisen where "... men and women comrades are sent to make close acquaintance with the enemy, but women pregnant and man influenced by money -- they lost their ideals".

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

It is incorrect to view the Insurgents as Communist Terrorists (CT). This unfortunate term has generated an almost universal official and public acceptance that the Insurgent operates and motivates through negative incentives - i. e., through terror. This obscures the qualitative and systematic manner in which he is motivating adherents. Even a cursory review of available information reveals the Insurgent to be applying implicit intimidation -- not terror. Further, this term misleads as to the Communist nature of the Insurgency and who in it are Communists. Certainly the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), the leadership of the various regional central committees, the province and Amphoe committees could be considered Communists. But except for village organizers, guerrilla force military and political leaders, or heads of village cells, it is doubtful that the bulk of the insurgent adherents -- the guerrillas and their village supporters -- are Communists. Here again the effect of the term is to obscure the political and social, as well as the non-ideological, nature of the Insurgent supporters' motivation.

#### Resource Process -- Internal

Internal resources are basically comprised of the human element. Local manufacturing, repair and training are not prevalent but do exist. Internal adherents are dispersed and their modest supply requirements and capacity to operate on a cost-effective basis has kept the Insurgency intentionally frugal in response to leadership command. Such spartan approach has developed indigenous strength.

The ability to generate on demand such items as local food, finances, shelter and manpower reflects and confirms the quality of the causal and intimidation processes. The general availability of good intelligence on a timely basis, often produced on demand from local as well as higher RTG levels, reflects exceptional communication and organizational capacity. While leadership may be in some respects generally weak, considering the vast area covered by the Insurgency, this weakness may be numeric rather than quality. Training and instructional materials would seem to be unusually qualitative because of the consistency of leadership behavior.

The educational level of the peoples both in the North and Northeast is low and limits the number of candidates for training.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The significance of this observation is in what has been accomplished by using such an educational base for leadership talent. Manpower policy is thus geared to an indigenous base. In so doing it rests on a strong foundation. The ability to perform systematic political reinforcement is present; as is the ability to recruit and train locally. A constant expansion of supporters is maintained. The rate exceeds 30% each year although this does not hold true in the North for 1972. Considering, however, that such growth is computed from fragmentary information, most of which represents the counting of guerrilla forces and does not cover support organizations, the rate may be conservative. The fact is that the growth rate is not known. But the Insurgency grows.

If we consider that with modest "seed capital" in the form of external leadership training, the CPT spent the quiet years of the early 1960s laying the foundation investment for this Insurgency, it then used self-generating internal resources as its expansionary capital and has since achieved a level of sustained growth. The Insurgency cannot be characterized as "unsuccessful". (One report noted that the "Thai simply do not make good insurgents".) Reported Insurgency activity probably represents less than 20% of what is taking place. The full scope of Insurgency organization is thus much greater than thought.

It is the scope and quality of its organization that is important, not the number of actions mounted by the guerrillas. With external resources available to assist in indigenous growth, and a disproportionate resource ratio of perhaps 500:1 (it costs the Insurgent 1/500 what it costs the government), the Insurgency simply must be seen as a viable and profitable venture. Any businessman would like to see his market expand at such a rate. Evidence exists to show that the Insurgent generates resources predictably from RTG sources. For example, he has attracted development resources to some villages under his tacit control making villages more supportive of the RTG complaint of inequitable treatment. In other instances the Insurgent has benefitted from RTG resources through accommodations, sometimes in extremely large amounts of bribe money. Such resource generation capacity reveals sophisticated leadership at senior as well as lower levels. There is unusual and special attention given to medical care both in the Insurgent camp and among his supporters. Nurses are prevalent and doctor care is sometimes free. The

~~SECRET~~

organization that exists to sustain such a special resource component -- obviously an important policy objective -- is impressive.

Higher levels of Insurgent leadership have pursued a policy of internal resource self-sufficiency. This is purposeful as we will see in discussing Counterinsurgency. Should external supplies be totally cut off it is obvious that local resource capacities both on hand and generatable would be adequate to still pursue the Insurgent's overall strategic plan although at a modified rate. The internal resource base is substantial.

#### Resource Process - External

External resources are primarily conceptualization, leadership, weapons, propaganda, material and training. Acting as a natural complementary element the external resource system is somewhat diffused between the Chinese and North Vietnamese. Nevertheless it is a reliable and assured resource base generated by the Thai Insurgency causal base interacting with the national, international and ideological interests of these two nations. The Pathet Lao support is also significant. The external resource component is therefore not just a matter of their contemporary foreign policy but is a predictable process geared to these more politically esoteric, and even spiritual concerns.

The most important external resource was the strategic planning and Insurgency design -- the intellectual component. That it came from two nations steeped in highly qualitative Insurgency performance is of special note. This helps give the Thai Insurgency a qualitative content. This component transcends the CPT leadership which functions largely in-country and within a national framework. It transcends the CPT in that top leadership in China and the DRV established the original Insurgency framework and process in the genesis period, and once having done so now help guide the CPT only in the policy and design modifications required to keep pace with current situation changes. The CPT is therefore the beneficiary of more advanced strategic conceptualizations.

Information does not provide for an adequate understanding of the manner in which China and North Vietnam (and Pathet Lao) have

~~TOP SECRET~~

divided up the Thai Insurgency support efforts, nor of the use of Northern Laos on behalf of this Insurgency support. Nevertheless it is evident that general harmony exists at the present time although some friction has been apparent in the past and may arise again. They nevertheless maintain a consistent program.

Not only long-term but highly qualitative social/political, military and leadership training is available at numerous known locations. While leadership of the Thai Insurgency can be characterized as good at local level, poor at provincial level and exceptionally good at the strategic or conceptual level, such a rating configuration reveals the CPT emphasis on local activities and high-level strategic consideration.

The external resource component may change considerably in the near future. With the Indochina Ceasefire in effect there can be no doubt that if Insurgency leadership feels that the Thai Insurgency can profitably absorb and apply additional resources to the strategic design, those resources can be made available. An extremely important element should be noted here. The Chinese and DRV inputs are modest because they are used to complement indigenous capacity to use them. As shown earlier relative to causes they are not inserted to generate indigenous capacity. This basic principle of Insurgency leadership and design is a fundamental reason for the Thai Insurgency's inherent strength and expansionary capacity. Hence, it is unwise to see the Insurgency in terms so often stated " ... only 2/100 of 1% of the population ... " or as " ... so unsuccessful, it has only 5,000 adherents in 10 years!" The numbers are not that important. It is how they are organized and what they are doing, as well as the integrated process related to total strategy, that gives them significance.

With the increased influence of the Pathet Lao in Northern Laos, and the area now assured to their future administrative control, support of the Thai Insurgency can be facilitated through improved communication, transportation and logistic facilities. Of special note in regard to Indochina is a possibly more hostile Cambodia. While the North and Northeast reflect special potency as Insurgency areas, in part due to their being adjacent to Northern and Central Laos, the addition of the Cambodian border to external resource support possibilities would not only enlarge the most potent Insurgent areas

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

but place them closer to Bangkok. The consequences for already strained RTG resources could be considerable.

### Guerrilla Action Process

There can be little doubt that the armed actions of the Insurgency are selectively executed. Their timing, the flow of information surrounding them, their nature and manner of execution all confirm this fact. The decisions as to targets and timing are made largely at local (District) level under a general framework established at Province and Regional level. The actions are primarily for offensive psychological impact on the RTG elements but some are defensive as well - i. e., arising from opportunity against RTA or police movements. There are virtually no occasions when guerrilla units are surprised as such and made to fight by the RTA or police elements.

Throughout the development of the Thailand Patriotic Front (TPF) and later the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF), propaganda has repeatedly played up the idea of the Insurgency getting ready to or actually waging a "people's war" characterized by "armed conflict". This theme has been a virtual drumbeat. It has been reinforced by the "Voice of the People of Thailand (VPT)" radio broadcasts from China, and in DRV and Pathet Lao propaganda. The following are examples of the references to militant actions in such propaganda (underscores supplied):

"... rely on the formation of the people's armed struggle to seize power."

"Only be resolutely daring to use revolutionary violence..."

"Raging fire of people's war over the past 3 years..."

"... greatly appreciate the dictum of Chairman Mao ... that 'state power grows out of the barrel of a gun' and 'the seizure of power by armed force ...'"

"... the settlement of the issue by war is the central task and highest form of revolution."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

All of these quotations came from a single paragraph of one broadcast! Although made in 1969 it is quite typical of subsequent themes.

Traditional analysts at the time felt this example was a deliberate attempt to conceal the desperate attempt of the CPT to survive in a hostile RTG climate. The analysis missed the point. While such broadcasts may well have attempted to conceal CPT problems the continuum of such references to war, violence, armed conflict and the like is to intentionally induce the RTG to see the Insurgency in terms of a military contest. The RTG did then, and does now, see the struggle largely in these terms: Why the CPT would want this will be apparent in a moment. Suffice to say at this point that these themes were preparing a psychological environment for the guerrilla actions. (In CPT literature there are continual references such as the following:

"The government lacks understanding of the real nature of the armed struggle, and its planning therefore is not appropriate to the actual situation."

By selectively timing and executing the guerrilla actions in the North and Northeast CPT propaganda themes are reinforced. These actions are well integrated and effective. So-called "liberated zones" have been achieved, with the propaganda saying they were "won". This is to reinforce internal morale and point to CPT achievements. But such zones are not intentional guerrilla action achievements, nor do the Insurgents truly administer them in a conventional manner. (These exist primarily by default, having been an inexpensive and valuable Insurgent asset acquisition.) The Insurgent is not concerned with government intrusion into these zones because the RTG has psychologically induced itself to see them as largely impenetrable.

Actually, the Insurgent appears to have no acquisitive elements in his strategy. This is confirmed in the pattern of actions over six years. The lack of territorial ambitions is consistent with this Insurgency's qualitative leadership and general strategic design. Such a policy further confirms the purely psychological and political objectives of the selective guerrilla actions. (Even in Vietnam when more conventional war was pursued, territory was not held by the V.C. This was traditionally interpreted as "we kept them out", or, "they didn't succeed in taking village X". But such territory was

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

intentionally not taken. Just before the Indochina Ceasefire, when it made good sense to do so, the PRG did take and hold territory adjacent to friendly borders!) The Insurgent gains more for his strategy by threatening than by acquiring. He derives psychological and political gains -- being seen as strong and able. Conventional interpretation of these repeated "set-backs" questions how Insurgent morale has consistently remained so high. To the Insurgent they were not defeats-- but successes in his strategic terms. Since the Insurgency processes are not seen through his eyes or strategic configurations it is easy to be blinded by Counterinsurgent analytical biases.

Guerrilla actions originated in the late 1960s. This implies without much question that about four years of prior quiet organizing, stockpiling and training had taken place and was completed when the actions surfaced. Border Patrol Police (BPP) reporting during those earlier years indicated that training and propagandizing were indeed taking place. Violent actions however were not. Reporting later showed that the martial capacities of the Insurgent were actually far greater than the guerrilla actions being mounted. This revealed that even in the early period of the Insurgency good leadership was orchestrating the guerrilla actions selectively and purposely. More ~~contemporary~~ contemporary evidence supports the contention that these actions have been deliberate and provocative -- growing out of qualitative Insurgent understanding of the habits, strategic and tactical practices of the RTA.

The example of the "liberated zones" and guerrilla actions shows the dangers in basing interpretation of Insurgency progress on observable phenomena. Such are misleading as to their real impact. Further, by focusing on the actions their absence or decline induces a false sense of accomplishment - i.e., feeling that RTG action have stopped them. Guerrilla actions come and go by Insurgent design. They are not an indicator of progress. Their existence in an integrated pattern indicates qualitative Insurgency. When reporting focuses on incidents rather than their fuller meaning it reveals an absence of understanding of the Insurgent's overall strategy. This leads to CI focusing on the incidents rather than the larger strategic considerations. With reporting giving only a fragmentary glimpse into its inner Insurgency processes, with most reporting unable to get into the internal thinking, planning and policy for Insurgent activity (concentrating on such static factors such as organization, personnel,

**SECRET**

finances, weapons, etc.), it is only possible to determine an Insurgency's progress by broad analysis of the pattern of activities and their collective psychological affect.

Collective Psychological Strategy Process (The Nature of the Insurgency  
the Nature of the Threat)

The importance of the processes described to this point is found in their combined dynamic (as described in Chapter I, Part I). Before describing and interpreting this combined dynamic some preliminary discussion may be helpful.

Up to this point the term Insurgency has been employed to describe the conflict in Thailand. It may be well however to carefully examine if the term is accurately used. Is the Thai conflict an Insurgency? If we use the definition of Insurgency already provided:

Insurgency - Actions by one or many disaffected groups rising in forcible opposition to the lawful authority of an LDC government for definable political objectives. The political objectives may or may not include the overthrow of the government.

We are immediately confronted with the problem of rationalizing the external support of the conflict and asking if it makes it something more than an Insurgency -- perhaps a modified invasion, or possibly an artificial civil war.

We gain some assistance by recognizing that the conflict in Vietnam was an Insurgency, but it was more than just an Insurgency. It was more a civil war or invasion and less an Insurgency. Such a modified definition is prompted largely by the resource configuration of the Vietnam conflict - i. e., there were large external as well as internal resource inputs but the external ones actually determined the intensity and potential of the conflict. As in the case of Thailand the Vietnam internal resource component (prior to the 1965 period) was basically human while the external component was basically: leadership, strategy, material, propaganda, financial and training.

~~SECRET~~

If we consider that Vietnam was less of an Insurgency than a civil war on invasion, Thailand would appear to be predominantly an Insurgency -- but also more than just an Insurgency. It is perhaps a mild form of "invasion" (Ideological) as well as a "civil war" (over social/political organization). This modified definition arises because of the resource configuration. It is very small internally while larger externally. Both resource areas however are growing and the basic questions would seem to be: "Is the Insurgency dependent on the external resources?" If all external resources were excluded would it continue to further the collective strategic design? For the Insurgency to pursue the design developed by the Insurgent leadership the answer would be yes. As shown earlier in the Resource Process discussion if external resources were totally cut-off, the conflict would be able to maintain the basic collective psychological strategy thrust, but at a modified rate. There would still be a serious Insurgency condition because of the existence of all the elements indigenous to a qualitative Insurgency. The question of no external aid however is academic since it is not only historic but it is assured by China and North Vietnam. The discussion nevertheless sheds some light on the unique nature of this Insurgency showing that it is appropriate to refer to it as an Insurgency.

In that it is more than an Insurgency it does constitute a special case. The Thai Insurgency is a resource-contest. It is so because the Insurgent demands overthrow of the government. A clear appreciation of this stance can be gained by asking: "Would the Insurgency stop if the RTG gave the Insurgent all the social reforms and structural realignments it complains of not having in the society"? The answer is clearly no. (In similar fashion the Vietnam War was a special case, a resource-contest. It was so because no compromise other than abdication would have stopped the conflict. The DRV and VC demand overthrow of the government.) The RTG literally cannot surrender in a social/political organization sense. The Insurgent is not interested in compromise, he wants overthrow. (The next chapter on Counterinsurgency will discuss how the special case is dealt with through CI strategy.)

To continue now with the discussion of the Collective Psychological Strategy Process it should be stated that the basic Insurgent strategy is to induce Thailand into a series of self-initiated but self-defeating

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

actions fundamentally built around its resource base and related to government credibility in coping with the Insurgency. The strategy is designed to take advantage of the basic strengths of the Insurgent - i. e., his unconventional conduct, guerrilla action initiatives and overall psychological and political thrust, all of which compensate somewhat for his material weakness. These are to be employed while simultaneously diluting and negating the basic strengths of the RTG side - i. e., its resource base, administrative and political power. This strategy is a fundamental application of the dynamic of the Cause-Resource Principle as applied to Insurgency causes but directed at Counterinsurgent resources. It is designed to take advantage of the RTG focus on the military aspects of the conflict. The strategy further is an attack on the total RTG resource base which includes the U.S. Security Assistance support. This gives the Insurgency broader than national dimensions, and in the light of past U.S. resource approaches to Insurgency it is an attack on its resources and creditability as well. The Insurgent strategy is thus exceptionally holistical -- connecting local peasant causes with international resource considerations!

In its dynamics the collective strategy is functioning as follows: The Insurgency has already developed into a disproportionate resource-context. The Insurgent at very low cost (possibly on a ratio of approximately 500:1) is able to exercise his basic strengths in a manner that capitalizes on these historic social/political distortions and grievances (contradictions) in Thai rural society and generate therefrom a strong causal process. Through the application of the dynamic of the Cause-Resource Principle it generates sufficient internal and external resources to develop guerrilla forces that can mount selective and effective actions. These forces are then employed to create actions that will skillfully play on traditional U.S. /RTG behavioral, value and strategic practices relative to methods of counteracting them - i. e., primarily applying suppression methodology and other resources (larger contradictions). Insurgent understanding of the U.S. /RTG value system and its strategic postures relative to Insurgency predicts that such response will be to:

- 1) Focus on the guerrilla actions
- 2) See these actions in terms of an eventual national threat (defined basically in terms of armed conflict)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3) Conceptualize the solution to these actions as attainable through the management of increased resource applications.

Since such a response has actually materialized in the C/P/M CI strategy, the U.S./RTG have created internal conditions that reinforce the social/political goals of the Insurgent - e.g., suppression operations, greater police presence, increased police and military TOs, expanded economic development efforts, and the proliferation of local and special security units. Viewed more closely it can be seen that all of these activities have two ingredients in common -- they are resource costly and can reflect psychologically on RTG performance creditability vis-a-vis the Insurgency if they do not reduce or solve the Insurgency.

The strategy therefore attacks the RTG where it is quite vulnerable - in producing and allocating scarce resources, and in coping with Insurgent actions. (In the RTG's eyes this is the area where it thinks it is the strongest. Hence, part of its vulnerability is its incapacity to see beyond its own conceptual framework and see the Insurgent's framework through Insurgent eyes.) By diverting scarce RTG resources away from their most productive application and into activities the Insurgent knows will not be effective against him, he thus sets in motion a self-defeating process within the RTG. Viewed more specifically, a process has been set in motion by the very first guerrilla action which has achieved the following:

- 1) A psychological lift to Insurgency adherents and the remote area peasant population.
- 2) Insurgent experience in improving operational and organizational effectiveness.
- 3) Contortion of the normal operational activities of local RTG elements (civil and military).
- 4) A detraction from the cost-effectiveness of RTG forces in the Insurgency area, and the national government in general.
- 5) It disproves RTG claims of progress against the Insurgency.
- 6) It creates a diversion of scarce resources from other national objectives.

~~SECRET~~

- [REDACTED]
- 7) It achieves national (and international) attention and hence a substantial psychological benefit to the Insurgent's prestige and that of Communism generally.

To have all of this derive from a modest investment of local guerrilla action is cost-effective indeed. The resource disproportionate ratio of 500:1 may now be seen as quite legitimate.

(Such considerations put the full impact of the seemingly latent and contained Insurgency in the North in different perspective. While not expanding at this time the potency of that part of the Insurgency is thus able to achieve commendable "force" applications -- such as through Phu Kwang and Sam Chai. The impact of these activities on the RTG has been enormous psychologically, and were achieved at moderate cost. If the North arena Insurgency can accomplish effects such as this in the face of its internal problems with the hilltribes, it can probably in time work out the qualitative jump into the lowland areas of the North. One quotation from CPT documents somewhat characterizes this strategy:

"The Thai Peoples Liberation Armed Forces resist suppression ... (and are) ... becoming stronger each year through protracted armed struggle ... in contrast government strength is diminishing through economic and political attrition caused by prolonged counterinsurgency." )

But the problem is now even more complex. Such a collective strategy is not static. It is dynamic and must be viewed holistically as well as over the long term. What has happened is that static causes at the local level, which seem petty and readily addressable by a government "presence", have their real significance not locally but in relation to how they are used relative to an overall strategy coupled with government resource considerations. The Insurgent strategist knows that resources will not solve the Insurgency problems. Even if resources became generally effective he always has the inexpensive capacity to alter his patterns of conflict so as to negate the positive impact any input might have.

The real danger of this process is to gradually attrit public confidence in the governmental capability to live up to its escalating

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

assurances. Considering the hounding of the RTG from Bangkok students, intellectuals and average citizens, it can be imagined how such groups would react as repeated RTG assurance of effectiveness against the Insurgency are proven false or unattainable. That threat the RTG has not yet seriously considered. It can even be compounded by imagining the impact of an economic slump (reduced U.S. spending, reduced foreign investment and increased Insurgent action) on the consumer and service oriented industries of Bangkok. Such an economic blow would not be felt as much in the rural areas.

The collective psychological effects of this strategic process should now be abundantly apparent. Their seriousness can be recognized. Superimposing the impact of this process onto the recent Vietnam experience with all of its resource aberrations, it is possible to gain a better impression of the nature of this Insurgency, and the nature of the threat. The threat is clearly not the cumulative effect of armed conflict leading to roving bands of guerrillas who may eventually deny government access to large areas, or possibly march on the capital. Guerrillas will expand and be a form of threat, but the real threat is more complex. It is not what the Insurgent is going to inflict on the RTG, rather it is the self-initiated self-inflicting damage the U.S. and RTG response to those Insurgent actions can achieve psychologically on themselves over the long run. The Insurgent strategy could never be so simply explained away as stemming primarily from the armed guerrillas. His grand strategy is much more sophisticated and complex -- largely lost because detailed analysis has not been performed to detect it. The Insurgent will not let the Counterinsurgent off cheap. He is already exacting a large price by using RTG actions to reinforce his strategy. The Insurgent is very effectively outgeneraling the U.S. and RTG in the intellectual competition.

#### Communist Nature of the Insurgency

It might be observed that the Insurgency in Thailand has made few attempts to conceal the fact that it is Communist inspired and led. The purpose of this intentional maneuver is to urge the RTG to view the Insurgency in Communist/Anti-Communist terms and along the militant lines of Mao People's War. This adds a dimension of seriousness it otherwise might not enjoy. But this is only part of the

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

Insurgent intention. This association with China is more for internal psychological/political purposes than outside consumption. The Insurgent gains rub-off benefits from letting adherents know they are associated with Chairman Mao in particular, and with the widely known China success story. In so doing the CPT avoids having to explain or rationalize a new or different revolutionary or political approach for Thailand. This precludes any accusations of revisionism from more sophisticated Communist supporters.

The CPT actually needs this associational reinforcement because of inherent weaknesses arising from Thai national character and its general Insurgency inexperience (only 8-10 years). The Thai Insurgency is not as qualitative as that in Vietnam. By making itself part of a larger effort the CPT thus gains more and loses less than it would if it tried to stay aloof from such an association with an external Communist power. This aspect of the conflict is often misread in terms of China engineering the Insurgency. This is not the case, although it has helped conceptualize it and certainly wants it to succeed within the Communist fraternal order. The Insurgency implementation however is left to the Thais.

The thrust of this association with Mao strategy and organization has also misled observers to view the Insurgency in terms of Mao's People's War phases, troop configurations, etc. Even a cursory comparison between what the Insurgent literature says and what is actually taking place disputes this Insurgency closely following Mao's pattern. CPT literature for example, refers to Party Soldiers. But virtually no such soldiers are known to exist, only in name. The CPT literature frequently uses the word "army". Guerrilla groups however rarely exceed 50 men. In the minds of simple Insurgency adherents these references are psychological reinforcements, not operational facts.

The Chinese aspects of the Insurgency need further comment: In its earliest form the CPT was a part of the Chinese Communist Party. As the movement evolved over the years toward open Insurgency it had what can be called a predominantly Chinese or Sino-Thai leadership, with Maoist leanings. However, as the movement progressed through the 1950s and 1960s, it appears that two structural changes took place: 1) the movement became more predominantly Thai (...)

TOP SECRET

(consistent with changes in PRC thinking as to the necessity of Wars of National Liberation being indigenously rooted rather than implanted); and 2) the Insurgency structure provided for the PRC (and possibly DRV) to perform much or most of the original strategic thinking and planning, and the continuing external (international) propaganda support. The Thai leadership devoted itself to the basically administrative role of running the Insurgency inside Thailand. Such changes accommodated the basic strength of the Thai, Chinese and DRV components and placed each organizationally where it could serve best. Despite this external component the Insurgency is nevertheless an indigenous Thai movement.

Other themes discussed earlier reinforce this reasoning. Since there has been no Thai leader of any charismatic significance to put forward to the Thai nation, the movement has remained largely faceless -- except for this Chinese association. Fundamentally, the CPT has used Mao as a surrogate charismatic leader. He exercises a strong pull on the Thai peasant. Considering the skillful management of the causal process described earlier, in which peasants are strongly motivated on the basis of Mao's new role for peasants in society, it would appear that the surrogate leader technique has been successfully applied.

Whether or not the association with the Chinese alienates more urban Thai elements is not known. It is significant that the CPT propaganda has not made attempts to use the Thai King. This is possibly to avoid any need to rationalize a king-image in the midst of Maoist peasant revolution. It may also be because there is a strong Sino-Thai element in the Thai Insurgency leadership as well as popular following which is purposely being kept quiet. The surrogate use of Mao precludes the need to surface any such Sino-Thai leader.

### Urban Insurgency

A word is necessary on the urban Insurgency aspects of the Thai situation. There is no urban Insurgency in the sense of urban guerrilla actions of South America - i. e., preying on city police, government installations and innocent kidnap victims from foreign missions. But an urban component exists. It is a supportive element similar to that used by Castro in Cuba. It provides the Insurgent

~~SECRET~~

with propaganda -- "grey" literature to culturally criticize old customs and ideas, and to pave the way for a new society, funds, liaison, communication, logistics support and intelligence services. Some legitimate businesses appear to be run by the Insurgents in the urban areas.

It may be asked why the Insurgent does not mount hostile actions in the cities to provide a "second front". Mao strategy does not call for it, and more is to be lost than gained by doing so. He would incur a large negative psychological impact from the popular elements harmed and inconvenienced by the actions. The intellectuals would be alienated. Further, since the RTG strength is basically in the cities the Insurgent could not function there as efficiently as he does in the rural area. Each guerrilla action would be a partial suicide mission. Such fanatical approaches would further hurt psychologically.

It should not be discounted that this situation will not change. The Insurgent knows that the effects of systematic actions on a metropolitan area like Bangkok could be devastating. If the time comes that he feels he can afford the psychological losses arising from such actions (or through strikes), they will affect RTG creditability to deal with the Insurgents. They would further erode and discount RTG resource strength. At this time however, the Insurgent does not have this capability.

It may be well at this point to summarize the high points results of this Part II analysis. Such a summary will serve as the foundation for Chapter II, Part III -- Considerations for a Revised Counter-insurgency Strategy:

#### Thai Insurgency Analysis Summary

The Insurgency is a special case -- overthrow of the government is the Insurgent political objective,

The Insurgency is a resource-contest. The causal process avenue for Counterinsurgency resolution is not available.

The Insurgency is qualitative -- it embodies all of the basic determinants of Insurgency quality described in Chapter I, Part I. (It is not a

~~SECRET~~

highly qualitative insurgency owing primarily to: the lack of CPT political and insurgency experience; the dependency on surrogate nationalism (relying on the China example to stimulate Thai nationalism); and, the general "softness" of some Thai behavioral patterns.)

A rating of the basic Insurgency processes is as follows:

Causal Process --- skillfully managed; very strong but embodying basic vulnerabilities relative to Thai peasant behavior.

Intimidation Process -- Skillfully managed and very effective; only infrequent lapses into terror.

Resource Processes:

Internal -- soundly based and frugal; effectively managed but embodying some basic weaknesses relative to the subsistence existence of the village support base.

External -- Skillfully managed; a continuing and assured process.

Guerrilla Action Process --- Skillfully managed; very strong; virtually no weaknesses.

Collective Psychological Strategy Process -- Skillfully designed and managed; highly effective.

The Insurgency is fundamentally indigenous and capable of a high degree of expansion and self-sufficiency. It is durable. Although not pervasive throughout the total geographic area of Thailand it is a legitimate social/political alternative to the majority of the Thai rural population and in this theoretical, ideal or philosophic posture it does pervade the total national fabric.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER TWO

Counterinsurgency

PART I A New Conceptual Scheme for Analyzing Counterinsur-  
gency (CI)\* (U)

General Commentary

Counterinsurgency is basically an intellectual competition with the Insurgent strategist wherein the Counterinsurgent is attempting to relate his capacities to the exact nature of the Insurgency in a holistical pattern that will maximize his strengths and minimize or negate those of the Insurgent. For this reason alone the importance of determining the exact nature of the Insurgency cannot be overemphasized. It is an intellectual competition in which each protagonist is attempting to structure social, political, cultural and economic factors in a way that is absolutely more relevant to peasant interests and values than his opponent.

In Chapter One it was demonstrated that the fundamental strength of an Insurgency is the motivation of the participants and that such motivation does not arise from coercive processes. People are positively induced but negatively reinforced through intimidation to perform predictably. Their actions constitute the driving force of the Insurgency furthering the political objective through a unique strategic design. Some special aspects of the causal process might be noted here since they are fundamental to Counterinsurgency.

---

\* The material in this sub-section (Chapter II, Part I) is an abridged Chapter from a manuscript to be published by the Author. It is loaned to this report. It will be subject to Copyright and therefore should not be published or quoted.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Causes, even if slowly addressed by a government tardy to recognize their seriousness, embody a seriousness by their very existence - i. e., having been allowed to develop. The government is thus at a time-disadvantage relative to them. Moreover, this disadvantage is heightened by the ability of the Insurgent to manipulate those causes and gain significant physical, as well as psychological, benefit from them. Because the Insurgent has manipulated the causes - i. e., put them into a context which favorably alters the adherent's motivation - the causes no longer exist in isolation. They are no longer the core problem. The core problem is the newly formed view of the causes held by the Insurgency adherent. For a government to deal with the old static cause (absence of government interest, low living standards, abusive official conduct, etc.) without simultaneously dealing with the adherent's new perception of those causes, will be unproductive.

The Insurgent also can be counted on to actually use the government's well-intended efforts at development in its propaganda. He will call it tardy and superficial interest arising only because the Insurgent has demonstrated the correct social/political structure, and has shown interest in the peasant groups. It will be unproductive for another reason. The infrastructure (social/political organization) of government for mounting an activity toward the peasant - i. e., competing with the Insurgent on supposed equal terms and in a parallel or similar manner - does not exist. It does not exist because the infrastructure being used by the government is basically unchanged. That is to say, it is the same one which helped create the latent dissidence in the first place. All that has changed in the government approach in most cases is the surface behavior (better treatment, more official interest and more development resources and services). The existing social organizations represent the government's actual interest in the peasant, and the new development programs represent largely its posturing for CI purposes. The basic government structure is still the same, offering little status and upward mobility to the peasant groups and possibly still even endangering what status and mobility some of them have. The newness of what the Insurgent offers stands in contrast and is a further erosion of the ground on which the government can compete.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Insurgency, by capitalizing on historically rooted and deeply engrained behavioral and structural patterns, becomes something of a spiritual concern for those taking part in it. Even if discontent is not rampant the new opportunity offered by the Insurgent social organization is a strong incentive to indigenous interests and values. In addition, it is revolutionary, radical and exceptional activity. Countermeasures to be effective have to be somewhat equally exceptional. It is therefore unwise for a government to believe, or be led to believe, that the cumulative effects of perhaps centuries of aberrative conduct (viewed in this spiritual manner by the peasant and daily reinforced by an Insurgency leadership skilled in maintaining a given level of disaffection) can be overcome by sudden manifestations of national level interest in the area, more service benefits and more courteous official conduct stimulated by "command attention." Perhaps this can all be summarized into a basic strategic question for Counterinsurgency: "How can you counter, negate and capture the motivation of Insurgency adherents which is effectively reinforced by subtle intimidation; and, how can you maintain the positive favorable motivation of the remainder of the population?" To answer that question is to begin to develop effective Counterinsurgency strategy.

Strategic Considerations

The central problem in any Insurgency is conflict over opposing ideas about social organization. It is dispute about social status and social cohesion, over what a man's place in society should be and what values should link him to other men. The problem can be stated another way--Insurgency is directly related to social values, to the traditional ethos. CI is therefore a problem of strategy. It is strategy that must take into account that the core Insurgency conflicts are over social organization, values and access to power, wealth and opportunity.

CI strategy, by default, therefore, must deal with social values and organization and blend these two components with a defined political objective that will have popular appeal. This collective total constitutes a framework with which the various groups of

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

society can identify and which will inspire motivation. Putting the contest in these terms it is easy to see why the Insurgent, offering a new social order, has an advantage over the Counterinsurgent who is defending the status quo organization. These facts make it impossible to consider CI strategy in any other terms than mandatory social change, unless, of course, the special case exists - i. e., invasion, secession, coup, revolution, civil war, etc. (In such cases social change is ruled out as a strategic alternative.) Other elements are relevant to CI strategy, but its bedrock is social change.

Strategy is not myopic; it is comprehensive. It deals with a vast array of elements and must be attuned and adjusted to their diverse natures. Strategy is integration. For example, CI strategy must accommodate LDC economic factors, the social structure, popular attitudes, native psyche, administrative capacities, national goals, the resource base, Insurgency causal processes, the nature of the Insurgency, urban political conditions, foreign policy, and even new international conditions. CI strategy must be able to recognize and accommodate to new and changing conditions in these areas. Strategy is thus a fluid process. It is not set up or conceived one time and then followed without change. In dealing with strategy, the skillful CI administrator will consider a wide range of major and minor forces, favorable and unfavorable conditions. He will carefully define the options and he will view these over the long term. He will not focus on the immediate or short term, nor dwell on fragments. The strategist goal is to bring this vast array of components into sharp conceptual focus vis-a-vis the nature and the problems of the Insurgency. The strategist must recognize that his opponent is doing the same thing and that the quality of his work may absolutely determine success or failure.

Many natural conflicts exist among peoples in the world. For example, there is a race animosity between the Cambodians and Thais; and between the Malays and the Chinese; there is a natural hostility between Japan and China, coupled with a desire of each to have a strong political and economic hegemony throughout Asia. There are tribal conflicts between African tribes and ruling groups,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

between Latin peasants and landowners. Many such conflicts that have been fermenting for centuries may break into Insurgency in the near future. The pressures behind them are inexorable. Is it possible for CI to do more than perform mere patchwork in dealing with them? Is CI only a rearguard action against these "natural" social and political forces that are destined to run their historical course and force changes? Informed development economists feel that it is not only safer, but more productive in the long run, to not tamper with the natural forces in an LDC, but rather to let them evolve and stimulate change unimpaired. To interfere is said to only delay the inevitable and incur resentments from the lesser LDC peoples who are struggling to achieve needed change. Concern with the very question of Security Assistance support of CI, therefore, is to become automatically involved in this arena of antagonistic natural forces in an atmosphere already highly charged. Strategy must cope with these forces too.

Strategy concerns itself with organizations at all levels in the LDC: national government structure, political organizations, financial and commercial institutions, administrative systems, and even simple rural market place organization and processes. A fundamental principle governing organizations, not just in the LDCs but worldwide as well, is that they are created on the basis of self-perpetuation and not on the basis of change. It is an established fact that the very forces that create an institution, despite prudent attempts to install mechanisms for orderly self-change, automatically force it to defend its *raison d'etre* and oppose anything that tends to change or challenge that existence. Organizations tend to preserve their current positions because they breed on their own life strains - i. e., they favor and reward those who conform. To challenge is to incur hostility. The older the organization the more resistant it is to change. LDC institutions and organizations are at the heart of the Insurgency problem since they are obviously the framework on which the current (unsatisfactory to the Insurgent) social values are attached. CI strategy therefore cannot avoid dealing with the natures of these organizations.

In viewing strategy this way, many questions immediately arise. Can the LDC government avoid resorting to a sheer military-resource

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

contest and honestly bring about needed social changes without weakening or destroying itself? Does the Insurgent have such a natural advantage in such factors as unconventionality of conduct and pre-emptive strategy that these characteristics virtually preclude success against him? Can an LDC government maintain a society in relatively normal status and simultaneously fight an Insurgency that constantly strains its resources? When an Insurgency is under way, has a process been set in motion that is not reversible? If social change will not solve the Insurgency that is a special case, how then can it be resolved? The very range of these questions indicate the vast expanse of CI strategic considerations.

### Strategic Possibilities

What are the CI strategic possibilities open to an LDC government? A range of possibilities could be imagined which provide for one extreme wherein the LDC government simply fulfills all the demands of the Insurgent, and another extreme of absolute retrenchment of the existing social/political order wherein it fiercely preserves it through suppression. But suppression is an archaic CI device. While it is unfortunately prevalent, it is historically proven to not be successful as a strategy. Other strategic methods and devices must be used if CI is to be successful. Further, the Insurgent can resort to a pre-emptive strategy, denying a cohesive social fabric to the LDC government, which, in turn, becomes frustrated in attempting to maintain a prosperous society in the face of so many obstacles. Since the LDC government by the very nature of its requirements for survival cannot emulate such a pre-emptive strategy, other than belatedly trying to hold the wavering populace to its values, its optimum primary goals and its challenge is to defuse the Insurgency as early as possible through enlightened social adjustments. In so doing, it can avoid a disastrously expensive military-resource contest. The critical time for addressing the Insurgency at least cost is prior to the collapse of political community or, failing success up to that point, certainly before the level of tolerance is crossed. Again, in the special cases this avenue of social adjustment is closed.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

A fundamental CI problem is that all Counterinsurgents succumb to impatience and want to fight on their terms, using the weapons convenient to them, and with a minimum of social or political inconvenience. They little realize that the Insurgency process is unique and does not lend itself to such approaches. Therefore a basic strategic determinant for CI is not what options are available to the LDC government to preserve its social/political basis, but rather what strengths are inherent in the Insurgency. It is therefore necessary to make a major shift in traditional strategic thinking so as to approach CI strategy more from the standpoint of the precise nature of the Insurgency and its strengths, rather than viewing the problem from the standpoint of what the Counterinsurgent wants. But, what does the Insurgent want, or, what are the basic strengths to be dealt with if this demand cannot be met? The basic strengths of an Insurgency have already been identified for us by the Cause-Resource Principle: its causal process and its resource processes. CI strategy must relate directly to these two elements if it is to be meaningful and successful.

We saw earlier that Insurgency causes and resources mutually reinforce each other, but that cause related more directly to the social arena, while resource related more directly to the military suppression arena. In order for CI strategy to address these two strengths, it is forced by their very natures to largely choose between one of two options. These CI options are:

1. CI can be effective against the Insurgency by addressing the causal process. It can provide the Insurgent with what he wants in the way of reforms and reallocations of wealth, power and opportunity, or it can reach compromises with the Insurgent (except in the special cases) on these requirements to end the Insurgency. By either method, Insurgent supporters thus have their frustrations accommodated, and in turn change their motivation toward the Insurgency. In so doing, they reduce or eliminate the internal resource process

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

of the Insurgency. In time, the Insurgency diminishes and dies. The cause avenue is thus the ultimate CI strategic thrust. It addresses the Insurgent causal process through social change and reform. It obviates mobilization and an expensive resource contest. Since in the special case however the cause avenue is not open, it makes it necessary to consider alternatives.

2. CI can be effective against the Insurgency by addressing the resource processes. By targeting and destroying the resources, human as well as material, the Insurgent (despite his motivation) is denied the means for carrying out his acts. An Insurgency can thus be ended in this manner if all the resources can be targeted and destroyed. It is here that the importance of internal versus external resources comes into play. If all of the resources are not targetable, resources are not an acceptable avenue or option for CI strategy. The resource avenue is a CI strategic thrust distinctly opposite the cause avenue, since it seeks resolution through force and not reform, through mobilization and a resource-contest. It is therefore usually the main avenue for addressing (not solving) the special case. But other factors must be considered.

Most CI strategies address cause and resource simultaneously, although the emphasis is on the military pursuit of resources. The basic weakness of this approach is conceptual. Unless both efforts are carefully planned to be complementary the attack on the resources tends to psychologically dilute attempts to gain the Insurgent's confidence that causes will be addressed. Force negates the causal thrust. Thus, while the LDC must of course defend its basic assets and processes, its aggressiveness toward the resources has to be related to the possibilities of achieving compromise on the causes. Otherwise its left hand will undo what its right hand is building.

It can thus be seen then that the Cause-Resource Principle has important relevance to CI strategy. By addressing causes,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

resources can also be affected; and by addressing resources, causes can be affected. The LDC government can search out Insurgent hideouts, increase the living standards of the target population, develop industry and transportation, expand the army and police, disseminate propaganda, etc., but unless it deals with the causal process and the resource process its efforts are not relevant to effectiveness against the Insurgency. This is a basic conceptual premise and principle for strategy. To disregard this fundamental principle is to disorient strategy and incur the danger of allowing the activities that flow from it to deal primarily with the "effects" of an Insurgency, or in areas not related to its causes. The CI conceptual scheme developed in this Chapter is founded on this Cause-Resource Principle.

We have seen that the LDC government cannot protect all the assets of the population absolutely and cannot in all probability get at all of the resources of the Insurgent. This by default in most cases precludes the use of a purely resource avenue, or what might be called a mobilization-retrenchment strategy. The preferable strategy, therefore, is for the LDC to reallocate-realign the sharing of power, wealth and opportunity. This can be accomplished by reforms addressing the interests, values and incentives that relate to the Insurgency causes. In this sense, the LDC government can truly be destroying the two basic strengths of the Insurgency by disarming them through reform. Such a course, however, is clearly contrary to human nature and difficult politically in that it strikes at vested interests. It is also against the inherent tendency of institutions and organizations to perpetuate themselves rather than recognize or welcome the need for change - especially the surrender of power or wealth.

The history of Insurgency is replete with primary applications of suppression and secondary attention to social change. In some historic cases social change did take place, but only after the Insurgent was crushed. Social change was then basically a reaction and precaution against further outbreak. At the same time, the history of Insurgency reveals clearly that a logical CI strategy, other than pre-empting the Insurgency from ever

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

beginning, is to reverse this sequence and commence with a plan of social change and reform. Communication is the basic need for this process. Mechanisms are needed to enable the two sides to talk and explore common ground. Suppression is not the logical initial action in CI since it prevents such communication, creates unyielding defensive postures, threatens and reinforces existing dissatisfactions. It is, however, in part the only response when it is clear that the possibilities of social change do not exist - i. e., coup, invasion, secession, civil war, revolution, or captured revolution. The Insurgent wants overthrow of the government. These are the special cases.

The Special Problem of Development - Modernization versus Counterinsurgency

A conceptual distinction can and should be made between Modernization and Counterinsurgency. Since this distinction is fundamental to the conceptual scheme developed in this Chapter, it is necessary to firmly establish it at the outset of this discussion. Modernization can be defined as the process by which institutions and attitudes are changed and systematized to enhance efficiency and productivity, and to facilitate the development of manpower, natural resources and the application of technology. (Since development is basically a more specific process taking place under the umbrella of Modernization - i. e., development of manpower, industrial development, natural resource development, etc. for the purposes of this Report Modernization and development can be used interchangeably.) Consider the matter this way: an LDC is moving forward at a modest pace in its pursuit of Modernization. It follows a national plan which is concerned primarily with four basic tasks which cut across all sectors of the national fabric. These tasks are:

1. The development of national manpower.
2. The development of natural resources.
3. The accumulation of capital and its reinvestment for productivity and growth, as well as the stimulation of entrepreneurial talent.
4. The stimulation of institutional and technological advances and social attitudinal changes.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Modernization is comprehensive and interdependent in nature, concerned with the productive capacity of the country, its commerce, education, health, legal and administrative structures, social cohesion, economic viability. Modernization is long range and constructive, it is institutional building in nature. It is a thrust toward an integrated national fabric wherein each sector of the society becomes interdependent upon the others. Its tools are economic -- material, funds, organization, ideas, planning, etc. The expertise needed, both within the LDC itself and from outside aid sources, is professional-technical. It involves pragmatic rational developmental processes and values/motivation that are modern--closely aligned to the institutional framework being established. It addresses the attitudes, aptitudes, faculties and motivations of people for material progress.

Let us further consider now that the LDC is moving along in its Modernization program, but is suddenly confronted with an Insurgency. The term suddenly is appropriate since an LDC government in most cases is traditionally slow, or lagging, in recognizing the extent of social discontentment and the real nature of an Insurgency. The immediate task confronting the LDC is to mount a countereffort. But, as we examine the precise nature of Insurgency, we note that it affects the LDC in several basic ways. These effects are: First, it is an immediate strain on the scarce resources of the LDC. Second, it is a threat to the Modernization process in that it diverts resources and manpower and threatens social cohesion. Third, it threatens the physical assets of the country through resource denial achieved by the Insurgent actions--bombing, strikes, pre-empting population, kidnappings, terror, intimidation, etc. To counter such basic Insurgent effects, therefore, is to engage in an activity completely different from Modernization. Unlike Modernization, such counteractions involve a short time frame; pursuing the defense of national assets and processes and attacking the Insurgent's resources; requiring military and security-oriented foreign assistance; requiring educated but security-oriented personnel; involving ad hoc processes that are not developmental in nature and encompass values/motivation that are protective, defensive and almost totally security oriented--not productivity oriented. Its tools are: police, intelligence, military, information/propaganda.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

In mounting CI therefore the LDC government is challenged to carry it out in such a way that:

1. CI not interrupt the Modernization process any more than is necessary.
2. It ensures that Modernization activities contribute wherever possible in helping to resolve the Insurgency.
3. Modernization is coordinated with CI activities so that they consider the total national interests and complement each other.
4. It ensures that normal social and commercial intercourse can take place.

There is no doubt that there is a social rehabilitating effect from Modernization and economic development. The existence of an economic structure on which human inventiveness, industry, productivity and prosperity can be attached does provide a basis for much social contentment which should preclude disaffection and other ills that cause an Insurgency. But, other than material considerations are involved and the sequence of these events is highly important. If an Insurgency is already under way in the LDC, it is evident that at least some sizable group within the social order is not satisfied. It is, therefore, an important strategy question whether or not new or more economic or modernization improvements at such a late date will address material and more spiritual (motivational) interests and resolve the Insurgency. Such economic program improvements have been historically shown not to solve the Insurgency for the very reasons given above - i. e., the Insurgency causes are largely spiritual (because they have been manipulated into motivation-generating processes) and quite beyond the reach of what slow-moving Modernization programs provide in living improvements or economic benefits. The sequence in reverse - i. e., with Modernization creating a favorable atmosphere in the LDC before an Insurgency breaks out - can ideally pre-empt an Insurgency. If it can accomplish this then Modernization must be considered the ultimate CI strategy.

This conceptualization may sound academic when one considers the totality of the Modernization and CI requirements facing an LDC,

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

but it is the very absence of such careful conceptualization that tends to blur the different natures of these two activities, obscures the strengths and weaknesses of their different tools and leads to disoriented organization, planning and strategy to address them. The totality of the LDC problems is considered by many as "one ball of wax". But within that one ball there are many diverse components or elements which have unique characteristics. Modernization and Counterinsurgency are two such components. These involve special tools and methods that are not uniformly applicable to both processes.

It should be clear to the reader at this point that conventional development tools which support an LDC Modernization effort can continue indefinitely and still not in any way be relevant to the causes of an Insurgency existing in the same LDC - even if it is a special case. The tools of Modernization are thus not necessarily the tools of CI, and vice-versa. Modernization and CI take place side by side, one addressing a productivity-developmental-growth undertaking, the other addressing a military-defense-psychological undertaking. This illustrates why CI and Modernization must be seen as separate but related processes.

### Insurgent Versus Counterinsurgent - Functional Postures

If we examine the relative situations of the Insurgent and Counterinsurgent side by side wherein we compare their conduct, social, psychological, political and economic functions and postures, what emerges from such an examination is: (1) the obvious tasks that each must perform, (2) the series of contests that are involved, and (3) the fundamental social/political nature of the conflict. These elements then lend themselves to a natural stratification into areas of strategic concern. First, the series of contests will be examined.

The Insurgent works for social change (new) while the government works to primarily stabilize the existing order (old). The Insurgent holds the initiative and is on the offensive while the government is fundamentally in a defensive posture. The

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

Insurgent actions are destructive, while those of the government are constructive. The Insurgent does not have to administer conventional government, while the government's main concern is more effective government administration. The Insurgent's conduct is unconventional, while that of the government is conventional. It is clear that there are advantages on both sides although the Insurgent perhaps enjoys greater initial advantages. Much depends on the skill of leadership in managing the resource process, unconventional conduct, causal process, etc. This has already been covered.

The obvious tasks that must be performed by the government are also apparent. First, the LDC as a marginal productivity unit relative to its development or Modernization process is required to defend that productivity base-i.e., to keep the Modernization process functioning effectively. Second, it must perform a Stabilization function within the society relative to the hostile actions of the Insurgent. These two functions, while important, may only help preserve the society--they do not resolve the Insurgency. The third function is therefore geared to that end - e.g., to address the causal process (motivation) of the Insurgency. The following discussion will place these three elements into strategic spheres:

### Strategic Spheres - The Conceptual Scheme

#### Sphere 1 - Modernization

The continuation of the Modernization process is a basic LDC task. If the Insurgency slows this productive capacity, essential resources will not be available for stability. The ultimate reason Modernization cannot be allowed to slacken is that it represents the proclaimed national values and objectives which the LDC government has chosen to pursue. Society accepts Modernization on faith since it does not fully understand the process. Its judgment comes relative to the practical results which it does more fully understand. Since an Insurgency is in large part a competition for broad popular attitudinal support,

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

failure in the capacity of Modernization to maintain even its rather traditional slow pace of accomplishment can produce throughout the society a number of mini-economic shocks which affect the individual's immediate well-being--jobs, taxes, rising prices. This, in turn, can alter motivation or confidence.

Modernization is therefore a standard measure of government capacity or credibility in the eyes of the populace-- a task that the LDC government simply cannot handle poorly. Since the LDC peoples are already impatient with the progress of economic improvements, and often force government changes when progress is poor, any additional slowdown can have a strong influence on the success of Counterinsurgency. We should recognize also that some LDC social groups may not even be aware of the existence of a Modernization process. The whole undertaking may have been poorly conveyed or advertised to the people. Their resistance to Modernization then can be a simple case of ignorance. This makes no difference since the net effect is the same--to express dissatisfaction with government performance.

### Modernization as a CI Strategy

But what about Modernization as a Counterinsurgency strategy? Is Modernization a form of Counterinsurgency? Modernization can be pre-emptive in nature if it creates a climate that provides for greater social contentment and economic prosperity. It can even be considered the ultimate form of Counterinsurgency. But it does not often succeed. Why? Social pressures have been seen to be growing faster than the ability of the LDC governments to understand and react to them. It does not automatically preclude the LDC government from following policies that serve illogical political purposes or pursuing elusive status and prestige goals. Pragmatic realism is not always the basic premise of Modernization. Also, Modernization forces can help start an Insurgency, but its processes are ill suited for stopping it. Modernization, therefore, is not reliable as a pre-emptive strategy. Not having succeeded in precluding the Insurgency, can it be considered as a strategic alternative for application after the Insurgency begins?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Modernization as a strategy after the Insurgency begins is also open to serious question. While it has the advantage of dealing with broad social change throughout all sectors of the nation, it approaches social change in a gradual, evolutionary-developmental manner. That is to say that Modernization gives the promise of eventual prosperity and individual benefit over time. It is a large interdependent mechanism, somewhat impersonal in nature and alien, aloof and enigmatic to the lesser LDC peoples. In its broadest contexts it is understandable only to very educated people, and its immediate benefits accrue to those classes that have aptitudes and motivation for material progress, elite levels, not the lower classes. The time lag between Modernization inputs and individual benefits is critical.

Modernization suffers other deficiencies as a strategy. It is often applied as a CI tool on the assumption that the development of social strengths, motivation and managerial-administrative capacities can be given abrupt command attention and be telescoped or condensed into short periods of time. Such an approach disregards historic development evidence showing that LDC managerial and institutional strengths evolve very slowly - usually closely correlated with educational progress. This is primarily because they start from a very small productivity, education and capital base. There is little foundation on which to build the geometric or cumulative effect of training and experience--both of which take time. They cannot be created by sudden leadership desires for productivity. Programmed economic development can often artificially stimulate projects which are made possible only by external resource agents and inputs, but which are not firmly rooted in indigenous interests and political strengths. In addition, Modernization must utilize LDC administrative personnel (cadre or external change agents) who embody values, education and attitudes that make it inherently difficult for them to empathize with the lesser LDC peoples who are the primary target of the Modernization process.

Further, Modernization depends on educated manpower, not only at the senior or national levels of administration, but on resident trained manpower at the lower LDC administrative levels. It takes considerable time for the LDC to expand its

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Modernization program away from a traditional urban orientation and into the more remote rural areas. It takes time to develop rationale and to train personnel to perform even selected Modernization work in these areas, and to demonstrate a true interest in peasant well-being. The disinterest, lack of empathy and inefficiency of lower level administrative personnel are equally big handicaps. It is interesting to note that while this deficiency vis-a-vis using poorly educated rural peasants exists on the Counterinsurgent side, and stems from a typical and inherent contempt for peasant capacities, the Insurgent is usually quite skilled at utilizing poorly educated lower class LDC peoples in his structures and strategy. This is partly because he is not carrying out material development. It reveals quite clearly that values are at the heart of lesser LDC popular motivation-- and that Modernization is not finely attuned to those values.

Sphere 2 - Stabilization

Like Modernization, Stabilization is an unavoidable task for the LDC government. We have seen that the Insurgency is an immediate threat to Modernization and to the resource base of the country. It is an equal or even greater threat to the ability of peoples and groups to engage in their normal daily activities. The Insurgent, through the use of intimidation, terror, assassination, kidnapping, destruction and ambush, can bring about a quasi-paralysis of these normal processes. This is where the unconventionality of the Insurgent serves him most profitably in relation to the resource-contest nature of the Insurgency. By resorting to unpredictable and violent acts, the Insurgent can create an aura of omnipresence for the Insurgency - i. e. , the Insurgent is thought to be everywhere at all times. Roads are not used because there may be an ambush; structures are not built because they may be destroyed; actions are not taken because they may offend the Insurgent. In response to such an atmosphere, society tends to stagnate and normal processes are reduced in efficiency, or cease to take place.

There are four basic tools that can be considered boilerplate for Stabilization. They are:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1. Police - Maintaining law and order; investigating and developing information on subversion; detention; protection of social processes and preserving social stability.
2. Intelligence/Counterespionage - Ascertaining the Insurgent's capabilities and assets; conducting operations against the Insurgent's resources; and disruption of enemy processes.
3. Military - Defending national assets and processes; maintaining external security; mounting operations against the Insurgent's resources; and dealing with Insurgent effects.
4. Information - Disseminating information and propagandizing for purposes of social cohesiveness (target is the friendly audience); propagandizing against the motivation and support of the Insurgent (target is the unfriendly audience).

It is not necessary to go into greater depths as to the individual contributions each of these tools can make. Their basic roles are apparent, defensive. They also perform a secondary role which is devoted to offensive objectives. It is this secondary role that primarily concerns us relevant to Stabilization as a CI strategy.

Stablization as a CI Strategy

Can Stabilization be a viable Counterinsurgency strategy? If it has strategic relevance it exists within the use of the four tools outlined above. The natures of these tools are in most cases quite clearly related to the use of force, and thus what applicability they have to resolving an Insurgency is clearly not through the cause avenue but via the resource avenue. If the resources of the Insurgent are generally targetable, the police and military, working on the basis of information made available through intelligence sources, can possibly destroy them. However, if the resources are both internal and external, some of them not

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

then being targetable, there is little likelihood of the military or police destroying sufficiently critical amounts of resources to end the Insurgency. In like manner, Insurgents themselves are also considered resources. They can be killed in large but perhaps not critical numbers as they are discovered or attempt to perform their physical acts against the government. The Stabilization forces basically deal with the effects of the Insurgency and not its causes.

The application of information or propaganda against the Insurgent comes the closest to addressing Insurgency causes. Even this effort must be seen as limited, a "one-way conversation" with propaganda messages believed or refuted, depending on the makeup of the target audience and the ability of the Insurgent to perform his highly important political motivation and persuasion work. It is quite clear then that Stabilization performs a more qualitative role in its primary task of defense--temporary preservation. Its secondary or offensive task, while relevant and useful as a partial addressing of Insurgency strength, deals with Insurgency effects and is not adequately equipped with cause-relevant tools to be considered a strong CI strategy alternative, except for the special cases.

Concepts of Security

It is necessary in discussing Stabilization to comment briefly on concepts of security. Security is traditionally considered the one essential ingredient to a CI effort--the first priority, the core around which all other CI activities revolve. This is the premise which causes developed and LDC governments to resort to suppression and military methods for resolving Insurgency, to focus on the guerrilla actions because of their nature, and to succumb to Insurgent propaganda to see the conflict in military terms. If there is a central core or nucleus in CI, it is social organization, not security. This is true even in the special cases. This can be readily seen when it is recognized that the individual citizen is not the target of the Insurgent's hostility. What makes this difficult to appreciate is that some citizens are assassinated, kidnapped or intimidated. But these

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

actions are against selected portions of the population--they are punitive or demonstrative--not representative of a wholesale destructive assault on the populace. The population is certainly the target of the Insurgent, but the target in a sense relates to political, attitudinal and psychological factors, not military factors. The Insurgent goal is not to kill off all of the population; it is to exploit it, to use popular motivation to its own advantage. One must ask then if security is to be provided, it is security against what?

The inappropriateness of the traditional concept of security grows out of viewing security in a tactical or military sense. In a tactical sense assets can be secured with some concentration of military force. Military units can protect their base of supply, their command posts, their lines of communication. But can such a concept of security be appropriately applied to a whole population unit? No. The LDC government is confronted with bands of Insurgents moving freely about, exploiting and influencing the populace and pre-empting it from government use. The desire of the LDC government is quite naturally to physically prevent the Insurgent from such free movement--to target and destroy him, to remove his resource base. By not viewing the Insurgency in its true psychological-social-political nature, however, the LDC government can and does make the gross mistake of attempting to deny the Insurgent access to the populace, of "protecting" the populace from the Insurgent--or providing it "security". To do this it resorts to guardhouses, roving troops and stationed police. It fails to see that the conceptualization is not only unsound, but it is a physical impossibility to protect everything to enforce compliance with the law. Even though it establishes guard towers and stations troops, it is not truly protecting the population. The damage from this approach is psychological--the cumulative effects of non-effectiveness against the Insurgent.

The dichotomy is even clearer when it is considered that the individual LDC citizen does not agitate for

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

security. His basic need is normalcy and survival--a concern not to be caught in the hostility that emerges between the Insurgent and the government. He recognizes that he is not the Insurgent's target, although he fully understands that he can incur the Insurgent's hostility. He also is wise enough to know the Insurgent's access to him cannot be readily denied, that there is no escape from intimidation. The impetus for such defensive security therefore comes not from the local citizen or local interests, it comes from the national government. Security is clearly a device arising from the LDC government's conceptualization of the conflict which is based on the premise that corralling population will lead to "control", "support" or "loyalty". It is a concept which is the outgrowth of fear over the effects of the Insurgent's actions combined with a fear of the loss of popular support. It is a conceptualization completely out of context with the exact nature of Insurgency and which assumes that military force can engage the Insurgent and deny him access to the population. This basic fact is highly relevant to the entire conceptual base on which Stabilization tools are designed and employed in CI.

The real damage in such an approach to "security" is not only the perpetuation of a false premise that "control" and "loyalty" derive from it, but that the corralling of population within such nebulous and improbable "secure" boundaries as can be provided by guard towers, stationed police and roving troops, constitutes a weakening of the enemy! It is counterproductive to consider that such actions attrit Insurgent strength, or that the accumulation of such "controlled" population will end the conflict. The troops and police can guard lines of communication temporarily, or guard buildings or guard bases, but they are not weakening the enemy by so doing. The assumption that such gains arise from the performance of these tasks is so conceptually disoriented that it encourages the LDC government to resort to more and more resource mobilization in the hope of gaining eventual victory through such "security" strategy. It equates doing more with performing better and as such has a self-defeating cumulative effect. Nothing

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

illustrates more completely the arithmetic nature of a strategy arising out of false conceptualization, and the need to distinguish between harassing the Insurgent and reducing his strength (processes).

There is a further and very important negative result of employing the traditional concept of security in CI. An Insurgency is a social-political process. The population is interwoven into the process by the Insurgent. To employ the Stabilization tools associated with the traditional concept of security means that those tools, which cannot distinguish loyal from disloyal population, will result in the indiscriminate destruction of portions of the population. This will thus reinforce the feelings of hostility that groups in it hold toward the government, or create hostility where it did not heretofore exist.

It is for these very reasons that the military and police tools are poorly adapted to a CI role. This is not to belittle their roles. It is merely to recognize the true nature and limits of their tools, and to call attention to a long overdue reconceptualization of their role in CI. It is precisely the void of such reconceptualization that has led to the general acceptance of "force" as an efficient tool in dealing with the social-political nature of Insurgency over the centuries. It is accepted as relevant because "force" is dramatic, colorful and gives the impression that because of its motion it is accomplishing something. This assumption is so universally ingrained in the average consciousness that it is now an automatic one. The application of "force" is thought to be "certain" to bring results. The premise, however, is grossly mistaken. It is actually counterproductive. Consider the feeling aroused when a citizen sees tank columns and marching men going out into the field. He is moved and impressed. He thinks: "How can the Insurgent withstand these weapons"? The Insurgent sees their relevancy in clearer terms and conducts himself so as to negate such conventional military might.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

The logical concept of security relative to an LDC government responding to an Insurgency is quite simply the provision of defense of national assets and social processes. It is defense against the effects of the Insurgent so that the Insurgent cannot cripple the government's resource capacity. In the special case it certainly includes offensive activities directed at vulnerable points in the Insurgency resource process - leaving much room for flexibility, but still depending on the configuration of the Insurgent resource processes.

### Sphere 3 - Indigenous Structural Change

It becomes clear now that this strategic sphere constitutes a very confined and narrow activity which can be defined as Indigenous Structural Change. This sphere is distinctly different from Modernization and Stabilization. This sphere is a very select realm in which the social elements related to the Insurgency causes are to be addressed so as to affect Insurgent motivation. This narrows down the focus on potential government actions that will be relevant to the Insurgency causes. Causes are addressed primarily by reforms and reallocations or realignments of power, wealth and opportunity. But terms like power, wealth and opportunity are very broad. What specific reallocations are needed, in what sectors of the society, and can they be made in terms of the totality of national interests? Indigenous structural change in its strict sense may or may not take place at all. If it does, it must be undertaken without creating greater problems or weakening the national fabric elsewhere. It requires a careful balance of national interests, thus giving us clues as to why it is a purely indigenous process and a qualitative one - one a government does not set in motion without being certain of the ramifications and results.

When an Insurgency is a special case - i.e., overthrow of the government is the political objective of the Insurgency - this sphere's significance in CI strategy is reduced to where it cannot be the avenue for resolving the Insurgency, but rather only one of many avenues by which some erosion of the Insurgent

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

causal process may take place, or, by which the government's strength can be preserved. That is to say that although the government cannot overcome the revolutionists' urge to overthrow the government by offering significant social reorganization, it can to some extent cut into his peasant support base by presenting a meaningful social/political alternative to the peasant. If this does not gain the peasant's interest at least it somewhat weakens the hold of the Insurgent. The role of this strategic sphere in the special case will be clearer in subsequent sections.

This particular strategic sphere deserves special consideration because it has not been generally included in definitions of Modernization. That is to say that most literature has tended to define "modernization" and/or "development" too much in purely economic productivity terms, thereby precluding the social/political concerns from receiving appropriate attention. More attention to the requirements for social/political structural change should make Modernization more efficient and effective. To the degree that this does occur Modernization will tend to be a more relevant pre-emptive CI tool. The analysis has demonstrated that it is precisely because of this inattention to social/political development and structural change that the Insurgent has been able to manipulate causes virtually unchallenged.

UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

## PART II U.S. /RTG Counterinsurgency Strategy and Programs

### An Analysis of U.S. /RTG Counterinsurgency

At the end of Chapter I, Part II, it was shown that the Insurgent strategy was predictably negating basic RTG strengths while reinforcing those of the Insurgent. The challenge to the U.S. /RTG over the years has been to devise a CI strategy that capitalizes on their strengths while negating those of the Insurgent. The dilemma has been that the Insurgent understands U.S. /RTG behavior and strategic thinking better than his is understood. The analysis of U.S. /RTG Counterinsurgency which follows deals with these fundamental considerations.

The basic U.S. /RTG CI approach is the Civil/Police/Military (CPM) strategic configuration. It is described in various ways but the following examples provide a collective summary of the essential framework and elements:

" ... the Communist Terrorist problem is a complex one. A thorough understanding of the problem is necessary if we are to find a solution. We now have a golden opportunity to seize the initiative while the Communists are still weak. The best way to fight them is to form a united organization of civilian, police and military as our force and make the people our target. We must rally the people to our cause, and, at the same time, cut off access to the Communist forces. We must obtain the support of those peoples in the most remote areas as the first priority. Once we have gained their loyalty we will have gained access to vital intelligence ... "

(Lt. Gen. Saiyud Kerdpol, The Struggle for Thailand)



" ... U.S. assistance to Thailand in support of counterinsurgency programs has been based on the consideration that U.S. objectives in Thailand require a relatively stable nation, politically and economically, and this would, in turn, require elimination or control of the insurgency. This was to be achieved by the RTG, through:

- 1) Organizing and adapting its own armed forces, police and paramilitary organizations for the priority task of countering armed insurgency and subversive activities.
- 2) By initiatives designed to counter the insurgency through economic, administrative, informational and social development efforts directed at the threatened areas and through an effective and meaningful government presence in those areas:

(U.S. Mission paper: General Concept for U.S. Support of Thai Counterinsurgency.)

"In the CPM plan, the military will directly confront the armed guerrillas, the police will protect the villagers, prevent contacts between the guerrillas and the villagers and obtain intelligence for capture of communist leaders and agents; and the civil servants will administer the areas, establish close relations with the people and form a bridge between them and the Government."

(Theh Chongkhadikij, "The Bangkok Post" May 28, 1972)

" ... the 'Maoist strategy' is to develop an Insurgency by moving cadre quietly into the rural areas ... where the regular government presence is limited or non-existent ... seizing on whatever local grievances exist, establish a foothold upon which they can develop a controlled population base ... The CI doctrine which has been developed to repel this strategy

~~SECRET~~

fundamentally requires the government to do two things:

- 1) Suppress the armed forces of the insurgency and defend the population while at the same time;
- 2) .developing the means to fill the vacuum in the hinterland with a constructive government presence.

The Thai adaptation of this approach is theoretically sound."

(NSSM-159)

The CPM approach to Counterinsurgency was jointly formulated years ago and has been modified to a minor extent since then. It is basically a variation of the CI strategy used in Vietnam but which commendably embodies greater recognition of the importance of indigenous manpower and initiatives, lower U.S. profile and resource inputs, and attention to the social/political aspects of the conflict. The CPM approach of countering the Thai Insurgency has been described in contracted research as:

"... soundly based in concept and policy but inadequate as yet in allocation of resources, in management, and in quality of performance. Thai politics and U.S. bureaucratic inertia have constrained and obstructed the implementation process, reducing effectiveness below the level required to eliminate what remains a relatively minor threat to Thailand."

The CPM approach is based on the following fundamental propositions as expressed in the above U.S. and Thai references:

- 1) That a thorough understanding of the Insurgency problem has been achieved.
- 2) That the Communist Terrorists (CT) are still weak.
- 3) That there are no legitimate reasons for their dissidence.

~~SECRET~~

- 
- 4) That the preferable way to fight the CT is through suppression methodology.
  - 5) That the Insurgency is an external threat.
  - 6) That the people should be the CI target.
  - 7) That suppression tactics weakens the Insurgent.
  - 8) That the people can be made to rally to the RTG cause.
  - 9) That CT access to the village people can be cut off.
  - 10) That the loyalty and support of the rural people can be obtained.
  - 11) That a meaningful RTG presence in a threatened area helps eliminate or control the Insurgency.
  - 12) That the Insurgency can be eliminated or controlled.
  - 13) That villagers can be protected.
  - 14) That the armed forces, police and paramilitary have the priority task of countering armed Insurgency.
  - 15) That adequate levels of resources, management and quality of performance can eliminate the Insurgency.
  - 16) That Thai politics and U.S. bureaucratic inertia constrain the effective implementation of CI resources.

While certainly there are necessary civil, military and police activities related to Counterinsurgency, there are distinct problems with considering them strategically or tactically complementary. Doing so tends to blend their diverse natures and the tasks and functions they can effectively perform into a single composite whole. This obscures important characteristics and capacities. Fundamentally, CPM does not respond to the exact nature of the Insurgency or to the exact nature of the threat. It views the Insurgency and the Counterinsurgency process largely in terms of: countering Insurgent actions,

~~SECRET~~

improving popular allegiance to the RTG, erradicating rural economic deprivation and improving poor RTG administration/management/implementation. It is largely subjective. CPM does not rest on a careful analysis of the Insurgency, but rather on a fragmented strategic outlook, dealing with components rather than seeing them in terms of a totality -- an integrated resource-contest wherein a cumulative psychological erosion of the RTG productivity and CI performance capability and creditability are being subtly attacked. Thus, while CPM strategy takes into account the apparent Insurgent demand for overthrow of the RTG, it suffers from various conceptual disorientations that work to largely negate its desired impact on the Insurgency. For these reasons the foregoing CPM propositions are largely unfounded-- i. e., the tools CPM can bring to bear cannot achieve the objectives outlined in the propositions. The following discussion will attempt to explain some of these disorientations.

CPM views the Insurgency fundamentally in terms of a guerrilla-military threat. Because it is seen largely in military suppression terms CPM is conceptualized on an offensive rationale. Many of the PM tools employed are directed against targets that basically do not exist. Insurgent leaders or supplies are not readily targetable by conventional military or police forces operating in patrols or large sweeps. Guerrilla units evade actions except where they are desired -- i. e., they are not brought to bay. Villagers do not exist in a configuration conducive to protection - they are always accessible to the Insurgent. Assassinations are not prevented. The presence of security units does not attrit Insurgent strength. While the military and police components of CPM are thus strategically oriented toward offensive roles, tasks and functions, the exact nature of the Insurgent organization and conduct works to transform the capacity of these tool applications into a defensive posture. That is to say that the tools are thought to be offensive but in practice are defensive. This means that the primary roles, tasks and functions that the military and police can actually perform shift from a goal of attriting Insurgent strength to a secondary one of merely preserving the fundamental infrastructure of the RTG social/political system. While these tool alterations have taken place in practical application within CPM institutions and politics they are still seen as having strong offensive capability. (The specifics of tool capacities will be covered in the section on Stabilization below.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


Another basic disorientation deals with the Civilian component of CPM. Because the conflict is a resource-contest the causal process is closed as an avenue for Insurgency resolution. Since the C Component is basically a development thrust - largely static and involving evolutionary processes quite the opposite of the more dynamic military and police processes, it does not lend itself to an offensive or Insurgent strength attriting capacity. It does not lend itself to a time-phased complementary role with the P and M elements. That is to say that if the M and P conduct an operation in a given district area, the C component cannot generate a substantive development fabric simultaneously with the M and P operational time-table. Medical teams may go along, land titles may be handed out by local officials in the course of the operation, but this is not substantive C infrastructure creation. The specifics of these and other limitations on the C component are covered in the section on Modernization below. It might be noted here that its strategic relevance is not offensive, it is basically defensive - i. e., helping to preserve the RTG social/political fabric, to slow down further Insurgent erosion.

In addition CPM is based on a totally subjective RTG view of the Insurgent threat. It is not focusing its CI strategy so as to compete socially and politically with the Insurgent - with the peasant's new perception of his rural life problems. Rather, CPM focuses on what the RTG wants to preserve, and how it wants to preserve it. The RTG does not accept any legitimacy to the reasons for dissidence. It has therefore built into CPM an absolute retrenchment of the existing social/political order. In so doing it allows the Insurgent to totally preempt the ground or environment in the rural area on which it might base, if not a strong social/political offensive to win back the lost citizens, at least establish a relevant alternative that might loosen the Insurgent's hold on them (or slow down further erosion).

Lastly, CPM is accepted as a legitimate strategic configuration. It is not questioned and therefore devotes the institutional structure and CPM management time primarily to dealing with the amounts of resources available for tactical application, and to the management and implementation of those resources in the system. The strategy is therefore largely arithmetic and has over the years subtly established a management premise that more resources will equate to more effectiveness against the Insurgency - i. e., giving or

~~SECRET~~

applying more will mean doing better. Despite the factual poor cost-effectiveness of large prior resource inputs CPM has not determined why such prior inputs have been ineffective against the Insurgent, so that if additional inputs are to be made their improved performance can be assured. CPM has come to accept as given that the only impediments to success against the Insurgency are the availability of adequate resources and improved RTG understanding, attention, management and implementation. This theme has dominated official U.S. reporting for years. As a result, the U.S. Security Assistance institutional support mechanism has developed fundamentally into a resource management activity. The conceptual basis and the capabilities of CPM tools against the Insurgent are accepted unquestioned. The following simple graphic may illustrate this disorientation:



~~SECRET~~

Relative to U.S. concerns the CPM CI strategy that is being employed is fundamentally tied to the basic foreign policy question related to any Security Assistance resource input: "What does the U.S. want the resource to accomplish; and, does it have the capacity to achieve what is expected?" While jointly formulated, the CPM CI strategy is administered only by the RTG. Thus, U.S. interests are closely tied to the success or failure of this CI strategy. Since serious disorientations do exist it is important to recognize their limiting effect on the expectations that have been established for U.S. inputs and CPM CI operations. The following discussion of the CPM approach in each of the strategic spheres of the CI conceptual scheme will hopefully help clarify some of these limitations.

### Stabilization

Stabilization has been conceptualized on the basis of military tactical security - i. e., that the population can be secured, protected and controlled. This inappropriate security concept has been extended to include: 1) the expectation that military and police security forces can deny the Insurgent access to the population and that a military police presence weakens the Insurgent; and 2) the expectation that military police field units can engage the Insurgent "main force" and guerrilla units.

This is an application of security to a rural population unit that does not take into account the offensive as well as defensive limitations of the military/police tools being applied to achieve it. The basic question to provide perspective on the offensive capability is: "What specific roles, tasks and functions can the military and police perform that will attrit Insurgent strength?" Relative to that question, the following is a summary of the primary military/police roles, tasks and functions that can be performed by their personnel and organizational tools.

### Military (Conventional and Auxillary)

- Patrolling -- long range, short range; road and bush.
- Sweeps -- large (area and small village).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- Reconnaissance by air.
- Installation defense -- including village self-defense.
- Paramilitary reconnaissance -- kill or capture; harassment; supply destruction.
- Quick-reaction.
- Air strikes, artillery.

Police (Regular and Special)

- Patrolling -- long range, short range; road, bush, village.
- Investigation, information, law/order.
- Arrest, detention.
- Quick-reaction.
- Counter-espionage, intelligence.
- Building rapport with population, civic action.

It is evident that the majority of these are defensive even in their original design. Sweeps, and quick-reaction have offensive capability only when the Insurgent is surprised. He evades being engaged. RTA forces guard installations, village defense personnel are stationed, police scouts are trained, and the BPP investigators make arrests and detainments but these activities do not inflict much loss on the Insurgent. There can be no doubt that Insurgent village support mechanisms and processes are disrupted when sweeps take place or by some patrolling includes arrests. Some Insurgents may even be caught in the open, or killed (or innocent villagers thought to be Insurgents are killed). But the most that can be said of these major Stabilization tools is that they harass Insurgent activities not directly through specific targeting in most cases, but indirectly through the capacities of the RTA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

random association (unless of course precise intelligence prescribed the movement). The offensive capacities of these tools are thus transformed to that of defensive owing primarily to Insurgent organization and conduct, and the Insurgent is not weakened by them.

Other tools are more effective offensively. The Insurgent does suffer loss through any qualitative paramilitary reconnaissance (kill or capture), supply destruction or through specific counter-espionage arrest of known leaders. But it has been shown that the RTG does not mount many qualitative paramilitary harassment-type activities, even though LRRP and other special units do exist; and, while the arrest of Insurgent leaders has taken place few are detained and prosecuted. Most are released in a short time. Therefore the quick recovery of the Insurgent from these more efficient and more severe actions by Stabilization tools represents a very minor loss or disruption relative to the extreme cost accruing to the RTG to mount them. Air strikes and artillery are least effective since vital targets are purposely not made available by the Insurgent. The quick reaction capacity is effective not as an offensive weapon, but as a defensive reaction to Insurgent initiative -- and is at the same time vulnerable to planned ambushes. In total therefore, the offensive and defensive tools do not attrit substantive Insurgent strength or provide defensive security for the population. In its primary offensive role Stabilization therefore is a heavy-handed high-cost defensive process.

Real tool cost-effectiveness cannot be calculated because the RTG benefits are virtually impossible to detect, let alone measure. The RTG cost is measurable. (Those as resource advocates who have claimed on behalf of CPM that the Vietnam configuration of local to national level Stabilization tools (PSDF to ARVN, totalling 1.1 million men) led to the establishment of rural security and a containment of the Insurgent (both unsustainable), have little or no conception of the cost of that "achievement".) The Thai CPM CI effort cannot afford not to be adequately cost conscious. The conditions for resource acquisition are not the same as Vietnam although the CPM strategic approach is based on a resource availability concept that assumes it is. In reply to the question: "Can the RTG afford this activity?", CPM officers almost invariably reply: "They can't afford not to." This is an approach totally inconsistent with the CI strategic resource capacities of the RTG.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The problem goes deeper. The accomplishments from these P and M activities are primarily assumed -- to be seen as a natural result of the mounted activity. This means that accomplishments arise not so much from field results but from program expectation. They are reported in this manner. If the RTA mounts a sweep or the police provide a new presence in a given area the reporting assumes a consequential disruption or loss to the Insurgent -- largely because Insurgent activity lessens. Since no result is actually measurable, and intelligence capacity is unable to procure time-related operational information to confirm or deny it, there is no assurance that such reporting is valid. It is not valid. The inadequacy of such reporting is proven later when dated information from CPT documents reveals the meager affect the RTG activity had on the Insurgent's basic processes and organization. As a result CPM strategy has come to enjoy a sense of success that close examination of the tool capacities and performance does not sustain. Such reporting is cumulative and misleading strategically -- it tends to further the idea that more resources sustaining more activity of this type will bring more "results".

The larger Stabilization operations which have attacked Insurgent base areas have arisen largely out of U.S. urging that such base areas contained targetable assets worth the operational risks and costs. It was felt that the operation would: 1) engage the main forces in combat; 2) disrupt the lines of supply; 3) drive the Insurgent out of the area; and 4) lay the ground for programs to "control" the population. These accomplishments were seen as a potential blow to the Insurgent that would be severe or critical. Since base areas contain at best static supply assets and highly fluid leadership and organizational infrastructure (and forces) which do not always defend the area, the cost-effectiveness of such undertakings has to be seriously questioned. This is particularly evident when considering the purposeful psychological nature of the Insurgent's strategy and how the lack of success of such undertakings affects public confidence in RTG CI creditability. The RTG psychological loss from base area attack failures has been great -- admitted by senior Thai officials.

It is this illusory "offensive" capability of P and M, which linked to the proposition that the Insurgency can be eliminated through sufficient suppression activities, has created the basis for a

~~SECRET~~

quantitative resource rationale. This has led to the proliferation of security elements and organized rural citizenry militia. The pursuit of these expanding objectives has not only aggravated the delicate Thai military-police political balance but has created a wide array of small institutional fiefdoms which are in turn escalating demands for additional resources. Little attention is being given to the role relevancy of these new elements against Insurgent strength, or to the ultimate cost spiral of these moves. Village defense units are shown to have a difficult time relating to villagers thus becoming isolated and inert.

There are numerous dangers in the process of expanding the local defense units and arming militia. First, it demonstrates strategic motivation more by the importance of resource input than task or function effectiveness against the Insurgent. Second, by providing even obsolete U.S. arms to local militia a process is set in motion that has an escalatory resource-demand effect. This is to say that arming some village units will result in:

- Setting the pattern for more and better arms to be requested so as to compete with the well armed Insurgent.
- Reinforcing the idea that defense can prevent an Insurgent attack (or that the Insurgent attack's villages -- he rarely does).
- Setting the pattern for arming other villages.
- Setting the stage for a psychological decline when the militia are not successful against the Insurgent.
- Establishing a complex organizational and communication arrangement whereby the regular military/police units have to provide reaction back-up to an ever expanding security-field. (They cannot cover all villages although all villages will expect them to do so.)

One additional observation applies -- the increased presence of police and other local defense units among the rural people is a mixed blessing. Their presence offends many peasants who have not joined the Insurgent, and the proliferation affords expanded opportunity for

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

petty official corruption from non-motivated security personnel. Perhaps the most serious negative impact of these Stabilization moves is that both the population in the rural area and in Bangkok as well, are being led to believe that the RTG can through its military/police configuration of CI forces control and protect the people, retain or regain their loyalty -- and, in so doing the Insurgent is being weakened. This creates a false sense of values which can and is having serious ramifications relative to the Insurgent strategy against the RTG. The merits of an expanding RTG presence in the rural areas is open to serious question. The section on Modernization will expand on it.

The proposed increase of BPP from 12,000 to 17,000, for example is based on the assumption that such an increase will bring more effectiveness. This rests on the well-earned BPP reputation for building good relations with the people -- not on their offensive capacity against Insurgent strength. The BPP have performed commendable work, but a close look at BPP tool capability shows it to be primarily: 1) building rapport with the local people; and, 2) procuring intelligence. While it is present in an area, and does kill Insurgents in the process of patrolling or quick reaction, it does not defend the people or interdict enemy supplies as the basic CPM proposition holds. It does these things intermittently, or indirectly -- not in quantity. Because of good BPP rapport with the people it has now become the framework for a variety of mini-development civic action-type programs. This move tends to alter its very operational rationale.

Some miscellaneous repercussions arise from Stabilization activity. Reports indicate frequent accommodation between military forces and the Insurgent. Accommodation represents a net gain for the Insurgent since it insures the uninterrupted functioning of his structure while it diverts RTG resource applications into unprofitable pursuits. The opportunity for accommodation can be reduced through alternative and more productive applications of P and M tools. For example, police patrols often arrest village supporters. But villagers so arrested under the Communist Suppression Act can be detained only for a short time unless evidence can be collected to convict. He is invariably released. Depending on how he has been treated the arrested villager can return either angry over the harassment, or impressed by the fair treatment given him by the police.

~~SECRET~~

While police work has this positive offensive potential to simultaneously disrupt the village support mechanism and also create a good RTG image, the technique has not been so used.

Perhaps the Stabilization sphere can best be summarized by saying that it is not conceptualized consistent with the nature of the Insurgency or the nature of the threat, and that the objectives set are beyond the capacity of the tools it commands. It is not seriously damaging or even harassing Insurgent strength. In attempting to carry out an illusory offensive strategy of controlling the guerrillas and protecting the people from them so as to build strength for the RTG, it is actually laying a foundation for greater RTG resource weakness. It is perpetuating false expectations and promoting unattainable objectives at great cost.

#### Modernization

A government is instinctively inclined to consider development as a basic Counterinsurgency strategic thrust because it employs one of its basic strengths and at the same time assumes an economic incentive in the peasant population. It cannot be doubted that there is a social rehabilitating effect from development. The existence of a social structure on which human inventiveness, industry, productivity, and prosperity can be attached does provide a basis for much social contentment which should preclude disaffection. But the matter is very complex. Development as a CI strategy component is dependent on various additional factors which the following discussion will hopefully make apparent.

In approaching the Modernization strategic sphere it is not possible to divorce what might be called the conventional development activities of the RTG from those supposedly designed to serve only CI ends. The ARD road, village water facilities and local public works and other activities have an impact on the rural area not much if any different from such conventional development activities as: rural electrification, protein food development, rural health, rural education, local government in-service training, civil service improvement, etc. For this reason this discussion will embrace all of the development effort that relates in any way to the rural area.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The development component of the CPM strategy has been conceptualized on the proposition that the RTG can compete on equal terms with the Insurgent in the social/political contest, and that development has an offensive strategic capability. Further, development is seen as being time-phased with the military/police ad hoc efforts - i.e., it is complementary to those processes. Since the conflict is a resource-contest the causal avenue for resolution is largely cut off as a strategic approach. The Insurgent adherent's view of causes has moved from the economic into the social/political arena -- it is not now addressable through economic thrusts. This virtually eliminates any offensive capacity development might have had, thus leaving its best capability to help preserve the RTG social/political system and hold already favorable RTG peasant sentiment. It is therefore a purely defensive preservative effort.

But this is not how the Civil component of CPM is approached. It is approached on the basis of an equitable competition -- that the peasant is being given valid social/political alternatives to choose from within an economic framework. This view does not take into account that the ground or environment for such an equitable competition has largely been preempted by the Insurgent's manipulation of the original static causes and that his use of intimidation has solidified the causal process. This leaves the government with the basic task of administering the very infrastructure which helped cause the original disaffection in the rural areas. And since the government cannot use intimidation it cannot similarly enforce its motivational pull from development. This leaves the peasant quite free to see and accept development entirely on its economic or personal-benefit merits. Development is thus not linked to a social/political thrust or to any transcending RTG cause. It is an isolated ad hoc activity which in the peasant's eyes is more revolutionary than the social/political organization the Insurgent is offering -- and its appeal to him is directly related to whatever faculties he has for material advance. Since a minority have such faculties it is not a strong or broadly based rural strategic thrust even defensively.

Since this government alternative is still a system that embodies all of its historic inequities and aberrations it offers no true release from the status, mobility or opportunity bondage the rural peasant has experienced for many years. The Insurgent's offering tugs in this

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

social/political direction -- the RTG development activity tugs in an economic -- personal material advance direction. In the peasant's eyes the Insurgent is addressing the rural problems that led to the dissidence. The Civil component of CPM CI strategy therefore is not a simple matter of the Insurgent's program versus that of the RTG. The structural configurations and differences behind their programs are what is significant, as well as the peasant's perception of what is taking place.

The development process is taking place in a manner that is shaking the peasant's stable world of the past. Villages are rapidly moving from a subsistence to a cash economy. Some peasants having more faculties for material advance than others are rising to the opportunities offered -- the village social structure is being fractured. Old traditions and behavioral patterns are being supplanted. Mobility is increased -- family cohesion is reduced. Because of the growing RTG presence a certain dependency is being established. Development rests primarily on an RTG thrust of providing accelerated attention to resource poor areas, it is made up of energized administration, crash infrastructure and institutional building, services and paternal interest in a rural social environment that has not necessarily sought these devices. How it is beneficial to suddenly confront this awakening peasantry with an economic revolution has not been determined, but its relevancy to the Insurgency is assumed. As village development activities proliferate -- creation of development councils, water facilities, roads, health and educational services, expanded police, cadre and administrative officials, the village people are being subtly oriented toward a welfare or recipient posture -- a dependency on external resources and direction. In the CPM configuration, development thus faces the danger of undermining traditional peasant self-sufficiency, generating unattainable material progress levels and resource demands the RTG cannot satisfy within its own resource base in the future. The impact of this revolutionary development on peasant society can be seen in this quotation from a study on Thai rural development.

" ... it is those provinces which have experienced the greatest development in the two decades between 1947 and 1966 which have also experienced the most serious (Insurgency) challenges to central Thai control."

[REDACTED]

Further, most of the CI development activities are being rendered not on the basis of sound economic investment considerations or feasibility grounds, but rather on the basis of addressing causal grievances which, as shown earlier, are based on the natural resource poverty of the areas. This is therefore not really development in the sense of expanding employment, income, the tax base, or productivity. It is basically the creation of service-oriented infrastructure which it is hoped will enable the individual peasant to benefit through link-ups later on.

Development is to a large extent a free undertaking that draws from the RTG tax base -- it does not add to it. It does not constitute for the majority in the rural area an indigenous institutional rooting but rather an artificial stimulant. In this way the CI development efforts contribute to RTG resource distortions. It is diverting scarce resources from elsewhere in the society where they could be more productive. The danger in this is that future peasant link-ups to the infrastructure may not be within the reach of his economic capacity (or that of the village tax base) and thus may represent an additional future service obligation to the government.

The C component of CPM is a sincere effort to build strength but is a process that is creating weakness by inducing peasants to look to devices beyond their own capacities and resources for their material advancement. It is actually an objective that the majority of the peasants have not sought and whose faculties and motivations do not sustain. As an extension of the capitalist urban economy to the rural area it does link-up those with the faculties and motivations for material advance -- and that is commendable -- but in analyzing it relative to CI, Modernization must be seen as not addressing the majority who do not have those faculties or motivations. The net effect is a widening gap between the rich and the poor, those within the RTG structure and those outside it. The cost must be considered. For example, Ceylon is faced with near bankruptcy over attempting to provide social services from a weak national economic base.

The Insurgent is purposely not offering a counter-development effort. He is offering a social/political structure which he feels is more closely attuned to the real interests and values of the peasants. The Insurgent attempts to appeal to the peasant's inner or spiritual development more than to his external or material development.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Since the peasant has not been accustomed to much material advance this approach is quite relevant. By attempting to bring the Thai rural peasantry into modern society on a crash basis the RTG is engaging in activities that are not consistent with contemporary peasant levels of absorption.

The AIR research activity has uncovered something their original study design perhaps did not anticipate. While they have been attempting to measure the impact of development on the rural population through identifying a system of "investments" - i.e., link-ups by the peasant to government development infrastructure -- sending children to school, using a road, etc., they have found something for this Report's purpose that is more important than measuring this individual decision. They have shown that such investment is probably being made by less than a majority of the peasants, and that the quantum jump in making this link-up to development infrastructure reflects basically on those who embody the attitudes, aptitudes and motivations toward material progress. But by drawing the more advanced attitudes development fractures rural society. As the minority do make this jump the remainder are left behind. The net result of this vast melange of conflicting forces set loose by development has been therefore to split rural society into three new strata -- strata that have particular relevance to CI:

- 1) Those peasants or middle-peasants embodying the faculties, attitudes, aptitudes and motivations for material progress. They have attached themselves to the tentacles of a modern economic system reaching down to them. It is unlikely they will be easily swayed by Insurgent appeals to sacrifice this vested interest. They can however be intimidated into a posture of ambivalence, or non-cooperation with the RTG on political and security matters. They are thus not a total asset to the government.
  
- 2) Those peasants who are without the basic faculties and motivation to make the quantum jump to the economic system but who are inclined toward its appeals -- primarily from a rather typically Thai personal-benefit standpoint. Perhaps they are constructively envious of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of those who are benefitting and becoming more mobile and wealthy. Their incentive might be to learn how to make the jump and do so themselves. As such they show rising aptitude but are susceptible to Insurgent appeal.

- 3) Those peasants who are perhaps the older or more conservative element, who are not interested in the modern economic system, its benefits and appeals -- and who reject any or most link-ups. These are probably not a majority, and are not necessarily easy prey for the Insurgent. They probably constitute a group that have simply opted out of any changes. They are however more susceptible to the Insurgent than the RTG.

This stratification reveals that groups 2 and 3 when combined are a majority of the rural population. They are certainly vulnerable to the Insurgent appeal. Not having the personal capacities to make an easy link-up with the RTG development appeal (and the RTG development effort not at this point creating numerous points in its infrastructure building so that peasants can make an easy link-up) -- it will be difficult to insure their maintaining a favorable posture toward the RTG. Certainly it should be clearer now why economic incentives are not an adequate strategy to defensively hold them and why a strong RTG social/political realignment would be helpful. For those who have economic incentives it would be easier to hold them if the C component of CPM provided for quicker and easier link-ups. Much of the favorable impact of C is lost through its highly impersonal nature. Modernization is fundamentally complex to begin with but under the pressures of an Insurgency environment it suffers these additional complications and short comings even as a defensive strategy. Development thus, as a defensive strategy appeals directly to a select rural minority.

The RTG in its urgency to develop the rural area is learning that it does not understand its own peasantry very well -- certainly not as well as the Insurgent. This is evident in the high C dependency on "cadre" or external change agents - i. e., Thai elites. The limits of these elites in peasant regions is being demonstrated by their difficulty in relating to the peasantry (urban Thai are found not to be very effective with rural Thai, who do not confide in them readily and are unsure about their explanation on political matters. The C approach

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

is not accommodating this important fact. Also, CPM has come to see peasant participation too much in economic terms rather than in social and political terms. The assumption is growing that participation in development is an end in itself -- that peasant involvement addresses a peasant need. With the design and impetus for expanded development coming from the central government the participation that is generated is not fully indigenous or well rooted -- as reports of peasant submissive compliance to official requests indicate.

The C approach assumes that development resource inputs will quickly accrue to the benefit of peasants. This premise can be questioned on the very ground that the President of the World Bank recently called for more donor aid to address the lower 40% of the LDC peoples. His statement was an admission that over 25 years of donor support of LDC development programs had not significantly benefitted that lower social strata. The Thailand rural area is that situation in miniature. Accelerated CI development assistance (in an Insurgency environment) is slow (if ever) to reach the marginal peasant. It must be recognized that aid funds, commodities and materials, to be effective in development, have to go into infrastructure that knows how to make productive use of them - i. e., the more advanced levels of the rural area, not the marginal peasants. The capacity for productive use evolves slowly through experience and education. The basic impatience of the RTG in its CI work forces it to attempt short cuts to the agonizing gradualism of development processes. In so doing it is perhaps as disruptive as it is constructive. Actually, both the Insurgent and RTG are disrupting the rural area -- but the key question is which system has more relevance to the individual marginal peasant.

RTG development is to some extent building a source of strength for the Insurgent. The Insurgent has been able to exploit the influx of resources to his own advantage. Villages thought to be succumbing to Insurgent control are rendered more assistance than those friendly to the RTG. This has generated intra-village dissension. The Insurgent has helped create such diversion. Accommodation with CI road construction contractors has enriched the Insurgent. Evidence supports cases where Insurgents, aware of the impending visits of RTG development officials, reduce or eliminate normally hostile actions in the area to increase the likelihood that development will be considered

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to have paid off. Later, after the visit the Insurgent mounts actions that shatter the impression and create psychological loss for the officials and their development efforts. This reveals the capacity of the Insurgent to undermine development with shifts in his operational tactics.

If the RTG could stimulate productive enterprises in the dissident areas and thus help expand the tax base on which further development might rest, it would root development more indigenously and gain more benefits. This would also strengthen the RTG against the Insurgent through: expanded employment, a partial detraction from the Insurgent social/political thrust, and an expanded tax base. The RTG is finding it difficult to do so because the human faculties and natural resources are not present to stimulate natural investment -- and government development cannot make up for the absence of these determinants.

In many respects the RTG development activity under CPM is a grant aid program within a grant aid program. That is to say that the U.S. in providing grant aid to the RTG for CI purposes is banking on its faculties and institutional strengths to turn those resources into productive returns. The RTG, in similar fashion, is providing grant aid to the rural areas and is banking on the faculties and strengths of the rural framework and peasant to turn those resources into productive return. But in both instances the basic faculties are largely lacking -- i. e., the RTG has little expertise toward rural development generally and is following a CI development strategy which disorients the impact of many of those resources. The peasant lacks the aptitudes, attitudes, motivations and rural institutional structure to receive and transform the resources into an integrated and beneficial return. (To some degree it might be said that the C or development component of CPM is more Marxist than the approach of the Insurgent -- in that it places a heavy emphasis on the economic determinism of the peasant society.)

As development expands under the impact of grant aid many vested interests are being attached to the process -- civil servants, village committees, cadre, contractors, etc. They are becoming dependent on it. As development expands it will be increasingly more difficult politically for the RTG to cut back the activities. Should it voluntarily do so, or be forced to do so under an economic slump or

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

declining U.S. aid, it will suffer psychologically. This will reinforce the Insurgent's strategy - i.e., it will be a contradiction in RTG society from which the Insurgent derives psychological gains. The call for more development resources must be considered in this light and in terms of evaluating why the earlier C resources have not been effective against stated objectives. Rather than basing additional resource requests on such an examination, which will largely reveal that the determinants of development are not present and the results will not attrit Insurgent strength, the call for more inputs is based primarily on faith that they will be more relevant than those in the past.

The Modernization strategic thrust -- the C element of the CPM-- can perhaps be summarized by noting that it is not adequately consistent with either the exact nature of the Insurgency, or with the majority of the peasant's interests and capacities. It is not a relevant vehicle for dealing with the Insurgent causal process. In attempting to hurdle the time-limits of development it is contributing to the resource dis-orientation of the RTG, and hence to the Insurgent's strategy. But it does provide a defensive attraction to that part of rural society which is inclined to material advance, and in projecting urban capitalism into the rural area it offers something of a last resort alternative to the wavering Insurgent adherent.

All of this is not to say that development is not good. It is, and should be pursued on sound economic grounds. This discussion does not analyze development in isolation but to development in an Insurgency situation. Its merits must therefore relate to CI. The good that it can accomplish has to be seen from the standpoint of what exists, what is wanted in CI, and what the development tools can achieve.

#### Indigenous Structural Change

Earlier sections have indicated that the RTG is unwilling to make even minimal realignments of power, wealth and opportunity -- changes in the Thai social/political organizational structure which might help alter the ground on which peasant motivation is created. Fundamentally this shows that the RTG is not willing to publically accept that the Insurgent has struck a responsive chord in the peasant psyche. Perhaps it suspects this has happened and is somewhat bewildered by the prospect that the national character, religion,

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

loyalty to the King and country are not as invulnerable as had been expected. But the problem is more complex than a simple matter of the RTG deciding to release more power and opportunity.

Power and its supportive political foundation are not given -- they evolve, are earned and grow indigenously. That this is not taking place in Thai rural society is indicative of the absence of the aptitude, motivations and organization on which politics -- hence power, can rest. Aware of this the RTG even if it wanted to release more opportunity for access to power would be slow in doing so because it has no way of knowing just where to start, or of the ramifications and cumulative results of even an incremental alteration to the political fabric. It should therefore not be seen so much as a group of venal men clutching power but rather more as men, whatever their characteristics, uncertain that if they release more opportunity for access to power -- even administrative power -- they will set in motion a process they cannot arrest, and which can shatter the cohesiveness of governmental authority. It is unrealistic to criticize the RTG for not arbitrarily surrendering to demands for rapid expanded political participation.

In such a state the government has opted for the course of doing nothing in the way of fundamental social or political realignments. This is a core weakness in the entire Thai social/political milieu vis-a-vis the Insurgent, and has vast ramifications for Counterinsurgency strategy. Perhaps the greatest concern over development is its political linkages. For the RTG to stimulate regions economically and then restrain them politically in the national system is to invite structural tensions and more social conflict. But there are facts and CI must contend with them. The ramifications are basically that the primary social/political atmosphere in which the CPM approach must attempt to counter the Insurgency is the very atmosphere that helped create the dissidence in the first place. All that has changed is the intensity and pace of government interest in maintaining the old social/political order. CI must therefore proceed on the basis that this primary condition will not change -- and that development is building social tension at a rapid rate without a corresponding release of political participation. Social mobility exists; but only for those who do not challenge the existing order. It is an unhealthy situation.



## U.S. /RTG Strategy Differences

While the U.S. and the RTG have jointly conceived the CPM CI strategy, divergences in outlook have arisen over the implementation of CI in the field and are relevant to considerations for future CI. The differences have arisen primarily in the military and police spheres. It is apparent that over the past several years the Thai perception of CI has been undergoing a revision which it did not choose to fully explain to the U.S. Mission. Close observation of Thai actions however revealed that such a change was certainly taking place. The divergences were reflected in actions that can perhaps be summarized into three categories:

- 1) Thai unwillingness to explain Thai CI operational or political rationale to U.S. officials.
- 2) Thai avoidance of mounting large military/police operations, and doing so primarily at the urging of U.S. officials.
- 3) Thai incapacity to implement CI effectively and to reflect an adequate appreciation of the nature of the Insurgency problem and its threat.

The cumulative result of these observations and experience led to U.S. Mission sentiments of which the following is rather typical:

"The basic reason for past disappointing (CI) performance is the fact that the Thai ruling group and its indigenous supporters' have not perceived the Insurgency threat as serious enough to require them to alter traditional national priorities or to give up their usual method of conducting business ... (the) ... decisive factor, therefore, in bringing about effective Thai performance against the Insurgency is the attitude of the leadership... The resources and organization are at hand; the critical element has been and will continue to be the ability of the Thai leadership to give the attention, emphasis and action to the process of countering the Insurgency."

████████████████████

What was happening was that the U.S. officials were fully satisfied with the CPM CI strategic approach, and saw it as relevant and potentially effective if only the Thai would implement it properly. Thai incapacity was the missing "critical element". The RTG, on the other hand, had clearly come to question -- not the management or implementation problems of CPM -- but the very conceptualization on which it rested. It is perhaps a positive reflection on the good faith of the Thai as partners that despite these shifting sentiments they were still willing to carry out operations such as Phu Kwang, Sam Chai and others. What is important however is that a basic attitudinal change was taking place and that it was possibly coming about as a result of three processes:

- 1) The RTG had qualitatively analyzed the Insurgency and learned that its nature and threat were inconsistent with the CPM CI strategy being employed. (This is doubtful.)
- 2) Through bitter field experience (Phu Kwang, etc.) it determined that its CI tool capacities were not relevant to the nature and threat of the Insurgency. (This is likely.)
- 3) The RTG is considering other alternatives (possibly accommodation) for future options against the Chinese or DRV, is uncertain as to the precise manner in which these will develop and does not want to preclude their realization should the opportunity present itself. It does not choose to share such considerations with the U.S. at this time. (This is likely.)

It is more than probable that the basic change in RTG strategic thinking came about as a result of portions of 2) and 3) above. The net result has been for the RTG to diplomatically disagree with the CPM strategic approach -- which is basically the Vietnam CI suppression configuration applied to Thailand. The RTG rejected it not only from a functional standpoint but within psychological, resource and institutional considerations as well. The RTG decided it did not have the institutional or emotional capacity to conduct that type of CI.

~~SECRET~~

The disappointment on the U.S. side over these years of transition has largely been created by a reluctance to accept the fact that the Thai were simply not buying the U.S. brand of CI. Rather than see the problem in these terms, U.S. officials have tended to resort to strong criticism of Thai understanding, management, leadership and implementational capacity. This theme has pervaded official correspondence, and even NSSM-159. It resulted in efforts to increase Thai resource and leadership commitments to CI - i.e., to induce their compliance with the strategy. The following quotations reflect this thrust and perhaps reveal a not too subtle arrogance and sense of American superiority about CI:

"The Thai are spending more on CI than they have in the past and, thanks to the influence of the U.S., in a more rational way. (The RTG is) a government that is reluctant to pay the price to defend itself against a threat ..."

"... Thai know pitifully little about Insurgency ... worse yet, they had little idea about how to find out. Again, thanks to U.S. advisors, there has been considerable progress in the area ..."

A certain self-delusion was implicit in these attitudes and approaches which in their totality tended to assume:

- 1) That the U.S. understanding of the nature and threat of the Insurgency, and its proposed CI strategy, were correct.
- 2) That the RTG understanding and approaches to CI were wrong.
- 3) That Thai management, implementation and adequate resource commitments were all that was standing in the way of eliminating the Insurgency.
- 4) That time was essential - i.e., CPM CI should be pushed now while the Insurgency was small and manageable rather than later when it would cost more to resolve.

~~SECRET~~

It was basically inappropriate to criticize the RTG for not making the CPM CI strategy a success because it fundamentally meant that they were being chastized for not succeeding in a strategic configuration at low resource cost that the U.S. had been unsuccessful in pursuing at enormous resource cost. Such criticism reflected therefore not a rational U.S. analysis of the Thai Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, but to a great extent self-justification over supposed CI success in Vietnam (with the cost factors being ignored). The RTG was detecting these refinements more perceptibly than the U.S. Mission, thus causing it to veer from the CPM strategy and manifest an unwillingness to follow a resource commitment route it could not sustain. In this regard the RTG holistical appreciation of the CPM strategy relative to its total national fabric was perhaps more enlightened than that of the U.S. Mission.

But the problem was even more complex. There is distortion within distortion. It was not merely a matter of the U.S. attempting to have the Thai institutional structure absorb and digest an alien strategic configuration that had been proven ineffective elsewhere -- the basic strategic structure is inconsistent with the actual nature of Insurgency and its ultimate threat. The Thai could not achieve something that their tools simply were not able to do. The objectives set for the strategy were unattainable in the configuration presented. There is much justification for frustration and impatience over Thai management practices, but relative to the goals to be achieved by such CPM CI management, no one could have attained them.

One additional danger that this U.S. /RTG divergence of viewpoint created was the tendency for the RTG to play upon the urgent U.S. view of the threat so as to lever more U.S. resource and materials inputs than were actually needed. The impatience and the false confidence in the correctness of its view has thus caused the U.S. to unduly add to the disorientations of the CPM strategic approach.

While still not sharing its complete new CI strategic thinking with the U.S., the February 27, 1973 Memcon of Mr. Edward E. Masters' meeting with General Surakij Mayalarp, Army Chief of Staff, provides the best picture of the present state of RTG CI thinking. The appropriate portions are quoted as follows:



" ... there are three levels of threat: :

- 1) The immediate threat is Communist Insurgency:
- 2) In the intermediate term, Thailand sees serious difficulties as a result of instability in Laos and Cambodia ...
- 3) In the long term, they (U.S.) must guard against the possibility of conflict in the area by the "larger powers".

(The Thai approach to Counterinsurgency ... (is) ... now following a new concept which has four elements:

- 1) Normally Thai units are trained to operate at the battalion or at the lowest level, at the company level. It is now obvious that this concept must be changed and the Thai Army must be trained to function effectively in the field at the platoon and squad levels. It must be broken down into smaller units which can operate independently in the type of tough terrain occupied by the CT ...
- 2) Police will be used under the CPM concept to control population movements and interdict access routes into areas of heavy CT infestation.
- 3) Civilians will work in the surrounding areas to expand educational, health, sanitation and other facilities in order to "win the hearts and minds of the villagers".
- 4) Small ranger units will be organized to penetrate into the CT controlled areas in order to gather intelligence, harass the CTs, disrupt their food supplies, and interrupt their contact with the villagers. In other words, to turn the communists' own tactics back against them."

~~SECRET~~

Although fundamentally similar to the CPM in its general operational content - i. e., military, police and civil elements will be coordinated offensively against the Insurgent, there is a basic functional shift -- a fundamental desire to reduce the size and configuration of those military elements which will take offensive action against the Insurgent. No longer will large units perform this role, but smaller -- platoon and squad-size units. Therefore while the operational content is similar the functional content is changed -- at least in word. Such a shift (if made operational) can have considerable significance for future CI. This will be discussed in the following Chapter. It should be noted here, however, that while General Surakij's comments tend to imply the Army will break down into smaller units for this new operational thrust at the Insurgent, most officials interpret this to mean that the Army will only help train "volunteers" from outside the Army to engage in this effort. The significance of this (if true) is basic to effective CI in the future.

~~SECRET~~

  
CHAPTER THREE

Considerations for a Revised Counterinsurgency Strategy (S)

Insurgent Strategy Vulnerabilities

Before discussing considerations for strategy revision it may be helpful to pick up the discussion at the end of Chapter I, Part II - Thai Insurgency Analysis Summary, and amplify on some aspects of the Insurgent strategy--particularly with reference to vulnerabilities.

Expanding on the general ratings provided in that summary each of the processes can now be rated as susceptible to CI as follows:

Causal Process --

It does not lend itself to easy alteration through either conventional or accelerated development efforts for a variety of reasons already described. It is the root strength of the Insurgency owing to the skill of its management. But the differences between the motivational levels of the guerrillas and the village supporters relative to factors in the resource processes, provide some CI strategy possibilities -- but not through the causal avenue.

Intimidation  
Process --

It does not lend itself to direct alteration by any RTG program input. It offers no CI strategy possibilities.

~~SECRET~~

Resource  
Processes --

There is a CI strategic possibility through the Insurgent's policy of internal resource self-reliance. This relates to the causal process and will be covered more fully later. While the external resource process is largely beyond the reach of any RTG program input it provides an avenue for reinforcing a CI approach relative to internal resources.

Guerrilla  
Process --

It lends itself to direct RTG CI program inputs only when the Insurgent chooses to make contact, or is caught off-guard by RTG forces (infrequent). It offers very minor CI strategy possibilities.

Collective Psychological Strategy  
Process --

It offers some indirect CI strategic possibilities, as will be shown.

Considering these relative CI strategy possibilities it can be seen that the internal resource process is the weakest link in the Insurgent strategic configuration. It is weak primarily because of: the manner in which it relates to the causal process, its resting on a somewhat delicate foundation of "soft" Thai behavior patterns, the differences between guerrilla and village supporter motivations, and the presence of revolutionary new experiences coupled with a peasant subsistence existence. That is to say that while the internal resource process has offered the peasant opportunity for participation in the movement, there is an abrasive element involved in the guerrilla intercourse with the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

village support mechanisms. This is abundantly apparent in the intelligence on the Insurgent internal processes. It shows that while the guerrilla elements are quite strong in their discipline and operations, the support elements react quite erratically to impositions on their subsistence conditions. They support the guerrillas and the movement with their resources, food, money, shelter, but have a low tolerance level for this activity. One intelligence report in particular typifies the potential of this vulnerability:

"Although the Jungle Insurgents were for the most part unscathed by (the large RTG military operation)... they encountered demoralizing harassment and supply shortages as villagers became more unwilling to provide them with regular support... The lack of support... (was)... offset to some extent by an increase in Party allocated funds... (but the Insurgents were)... forced to cling to the lowest common denominator of influence and rely on sympathizers or their relatives who provided support for humane rather than ideological reasons."

Other intelligence reports reveal an extreme sensitivity among Insurgent leaders for: storing food carefully in the jungle, fearing that RTG elements will find it and use routes he has not booby trapped.

This lower tolerance level of the village supporter is not just a factor of their resources being tapped, but as referred to earlier, it is a factor of their weaker motivation for understanding why they are being tapped. The linkage between the subsistence existence and the weaker motivation (even reinforced with intimidation) lends itself to CI exploitation. Such CI exploitation however is not to make up for the village supporter's supply losses through say a "development approach" to replace those losses -- but to increase his losses by placing increasing demands on him. This can be done as follows.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Insurgent, by pursuing a policy of internal resource self-sufficiency and frugality, has imposed a natural strain upon the village support base. While he has built an inner strength against any dependency on external resources (over and above the weapons, training and larger materials he needs) he has thus simultaneously built a vulnerability into his strongest process--the causal process. The vulnerability arises in two ways: 1) attacks on the external resources that might disrupt their predictability or quantity can throw a severe strain on the internal resource process - i.e., require heavier burdens on the village supporters; and 2) attacks on the internal resources that do not inflict psychological damage to the RTG from village supporters can also throw a severe strain on the cause-resource relationship between village supporters and the guerrilla/leadership elements. It is thus not the simple destructive attacks on internal or external resource quantities that is important (since insufficient quantities could be attacked and destroyed to alter the Insurgency). Rather it is the internal repercussions such resource disruptions can have on all of the relationships linking to those two resource components - most notably the serious impact it can have on the village support mechanism on which his whole strategy rests. It is his weakest link in an otherwise very strong chain.

CI strategy, therefore, while having small possibilities open to it in the only other areas of vulnerability: the causal process area (application of some selective development, etc.) in the guerrilla forces process area (selective police and paramilitary activities); has a very large opportunity in the resource process. Its importance arises from being able to disrupt the collective psychological strategic thrust of the entire Insurgency. That is to say that a qualitative attack on the internal and external resources can negate some of the Insurgent's collective strategic impact on the RTG. Further, it can even be done in such a way as to reduce the self-destructive resource spiral already self-launched by the RTG. It can achieve the latter by coupling CI strategy operational revisions with a basic shift in the quantitative resource thrust

~~SECRET~~

of the CI strategy as a whole. By simultaneously altering the basic weakness of the CPM CI strategy thrust with a qualitative attack on key Insurgent strategy vulnerabilities, the collective impact can not only negate or slow the Insurgent momentum it can stop the self-destruction of the RTG. Two mandatory CI strategic objectives would therefore be:

- (1) To attack the internal resource process of the Insurgent so as to strain his village support base and thus eventually disrupt his collective psychological strategy thrust,
- (2) To immediately begin to establish an RTG resource input balance between productivity and Counterinsurgency - and thus further negate the collective psychological strategy thrust of the Insurgent by reversing the self-inflicted resource-decline spiral the RTG is already suffering.

The first is to do what can be done (through the only vulnerability available) to the Insurgent to attrit his strength; and the second is to do internally what will basically restore RTG perspective and resource balance for endless war. These objectives fulfilled would largely isolate the Insurgency and reduce its potency -- as well as its expansionary capacity. These objectives, however, must be supplemented with other considerations which the next section covers.

#### General Commentary

In the previous section it was shown that the RTG had largely gravitated away from, if not the total operational content of the CPM strategy, at least the functional content. It had come to consider a major part of the military-operational activities as conceptually improper for the Thai Insurgency. Subsequent modifications of their CPM approach (as shown in Mr. Masters' Memcon), while not greatly different, offered some basic moves in the direction of a

~~SECRET~~

CI strategy that would fit more consistently with the nature and threat of the Insurgency. RTG approaches under the new strategy deserve closer scrutiny for they are moves in the right direction - even if only in word. This section will attempt to take CI strategy from this beginning transformation (arising out of new Thai perceptions and insights) into a more logical configuration - building on the two basic objectives already developed.

Perhaps the major dilemma in conceptualizing a strategic approach at all is to recognize that the capitalistic system of government and society largely provides the impetus for the approach being used. That is to say the U.S. /RTG approach to bringing peasants into modern society is to structure an extension of the basic capitalist system into the rural areas -- offering a framework on which the aptitudes, faculties and motivations of the denizen can find fulfillment for material advance. These are largely materialistic and pragmatic considerations, which have been shown to be already fracturing their rural society into strata embodying varying capacities to link-up with the system. The cultural and spiritual, if not cosmic, aspects of the rural denizen's life are not readily involved in the process. Each peasant is left to adjust to or accept the Modernization as he individually determines. There is nothing wrong with such a development approach or philosophy. It has been used elsewhere and with success. However, such an approach must be viewed in comparison with the philosophy and system competing against it in an Insurgency situation.

The Insurgent has conceptualized a reverse strategic approach. He emphasizes the cultural, spiritual and cosmic factors and plays down material advancement. He bases his social thrust primarily on a rather new (but really old) eschatological concept of a final correction of all social ills - of a place for the forgotten and down-trodden in society. Rather than appealing to the individual aptitudes and faculties of each denizen relative to material advance, he appeals more

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to the spirit or inner soul of the peasant, offering him opportunity for service (but not giving him anything materially). He is offering socially and politically what has been denied for centuries and is now beginning to appear as attainable (China, etc.) The idea of sharing a worthy objective, of self-sacrifice for the common national good of achieving human equity, are appeals to universal eschatological instincts. In these terms the Insurgent's underlying approach is literally a peasant spiritual crusade.

While these explanations are overly brief and simplified they do offer foundational considerations which have a bearing on CI strategy. This bearing is seen better by recognizing the RTG as a capitalist state quite different in its governmental and social infrastructure than many Western capitalist democracies. The Thai infrastructure is weaker and less directly connected to the rural areas. Further, the RTG approaches capitalism through adherence to the basic principles of investment and productivity but with broad adulteration of the day-to-day business process. In the eyes of those not readily having access to it, the system is one that enriches those in positions of leverage without their having to render a service to justify such rewards. The discipline of the entire system is weak or "soft", and does not allow for the derivation of predictable rewards or benefits. The further down in society one is the less predictable are the benefits. This returns us to the peasant population who are being made aware of these elements.

The peasant population is fundamentally not at serious odds with the government in its natural latent state of economic suffering, but it is made to feel so by Communist manipulation. This has been adequately demonstrated. Evidence reveals that the peasant subsistence existence is probably even in decline, owing not just to a poverty of resources but more fundamentally to a poverty of the faculties and motivations, as well as opportunities, by which he can exploit the natural resources for material advance. The peasant is not demonstrating that he wants much material advance. With most having few tools by

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

which to link-up with a system stretching out from the central government, they are unable to make many of the necessary and radical adjustments in life-processes necessary to keep up with the pace of Thai progress.

Both the speed and nature of the system work against his past traditional capacities. His habits are too ingrained to provide for a rapid transition into a mini-capitalist. Since the transformation erodes his already simple but weak village structure of values and institutions it must be seen from his eyes as a very revolutionary and not totally satisfactory upheaval. The problem is compounded as the RTG attempts to make the entire process more appealing by providing a wide array of services and cost free benefits which the peasant has not only never had before, but has not fully believed he was entitled to receive. He is thus undergoing a radical shift from a history of self-sufficiency and spartan existence to a violent rush into a social welfare revolution.

Were the problem a simple case of development -- bringing a backward rural people into a modern social/political/economic system, it would be difficult enough, but compounding the process is the problem of the Insurgency with its pull toward a completely different basis for bringing the peasant forward into the modern world. It is necessary therefore to look well beyond the ethereal concerns of a government presence, peasant services, the furtherance of a capitalistic system to the rural areas and building democratic institutions, to recognize the Insurgency competition for what it is. It is basically a spiritual competition with an opponent who not only disagrees with the total institutional and value system being offered but who is prepared to employ skillful processes to achieve his aims and back them up with armed influence on the peasant. The process taking place around the peasant therefore is radical and revolutionary; it not only interrupts his normal reactions to stimuli such as the RTG would offer, but it precludes rational response. His reactions have been manipulated and reinforced toward a different set of social/political values -- and they will be maintained in that.

~~SECRET~~

direction. The basic problem of CI strategy therefore is to find what will work against the Insurgent process, not deal with what the peasant might want or what the government might give to him. What is able to counter and negate the strengths of the Insurgent? -- that is the major CI question.

Whether it likes it or not the RTG is forced to approach CI totally dependent on the collective results of its history. It must live with the current state of the national character, the institutions, the values and manner in which the entire dynamic takes place. It cannot escape the manifold weaknesses resident in the system, nor can it overcome them rapidly without incurring other fractures in the society (which is what is occurring in development). People and institutions simply do not change as fast as Counterinsurgents want them to do -- they are naturally impatient. Hence CI strategy has to work with what exists.

But what collectively exists within society and the government in Thailand is a fabric not strong enough to significantly counter or negate what the Insurgent is doing. The possibility therefore simply has to be faced that the Insurgent has set in motion a process which is absolutely more relevant to the interests and values of the rural population than the RTG can offer - and, which the government cannot significantly alter through CI. The major limitations of the RTG CI role are thus numerous and endemic. They should be examined briefly in sequence - and can be summarized in terms of strategic options:

#### Major Limitations of the RTG CI Role

- 1) First Strategic Option - The ideal and ultimate CI strategy of governing over time so as to preclude or pre-empt an Insurgency from ever beginning was not achieved. It was lost through the historical process of allowing the Thai Insurgent conditions to evolve. The Insurgency exists. For whatever human or natural reasons, the ultimate pre-emptive strategy failed.
- 2) Second CI Strategic Option ~~It has been shown earlier~~ It has been shown earlier that for valid reasons the RTG cannot carry out what

~~SECRET~~

might be considered the second best CI strategy complement - i.e., undertaking indigenous social/political structural changes that would (even if not in itself be a total CI strategy structure) at least create a social/political climate in which other CI activities might operate more effectively vis-a-vis peasant attitudes. This strategic option is precluded by the peasant RTG leadership but if it were replaced it is possible this important area could be opened up by more liberal leaders.

- 3) Third CI Strategic Option - The third best strategy is the current CPM approach. But it has shown in the analysis of this Report to be inconsistent with the nature and threat of the Insurgency, and is actually a strategy that is largely reinforcing the Insurgent strategic thrust against the RTG. It rests on deeply engrained patterns of conduct and training which will not change readily. This strategic option should be precluded - i.e., it should be radically altered, but will probably not be.
  
- 4) Fourth CI Strategic Option - The fourth best strategy is one that carefully considers the actual nature and threat of the Insurgency but which rests on RTG managerial and political capacities to put it into meaningful motion. It is regrettable to say, but too many substantive facts support the contention, that the RTG is not politically, institutionally or emotionally equipped to conduct effective Counterinsurgency in a special case Insurgency configuration. This statement is not made lightly -- it is based on observation of the impact that certain Thai behavioral, social, political and administrative habits have on the total effectiveness of the CI operational fabric. That is to say that endemic patterns of conduct within the total Thai system work to negate the very strengths needed to cope with the Insurgent situation -- both offensively and defensively -- even under an improved strategic configuration. In

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

fact, the current weaknesses are even greater under an improved CI strategic configuration because it will call for more qualitative rather than quantitative performance. The fact has to be taken into consideration that the RTG cannot conduct meaningful Counterinsurgency - will go through the motions of trying to do so, but the substance will be lacking.

This is not a willing or intentionally unproductive process - it is endemic, natural and predictable. While some vital ingredient or process may be established in a new CI strategy, the RTG will not be able to politically make it effective, thus negating the total strategic thrust. That is to say that even though desiring to implement it the RTG will be unable to find the balance between the ingredient function and the political resource that will give it life. Thus in trying to balance what will work against the Insurgent with the political resources to do it, the RTG can simultaneously threaten its own internal political strength. The fundamental political decisions necessary to launch any new more relevant CI strategy will probably not be made.

In this Insurgency situation both time and the nature of the Insurgency threat do not accommodate this avoidance of qualitative conduct. While by no means a war in the conventional sense, it can be said that this CI "war" cannot be fought without getting hurt, nor can it be fought in the time frame and under the conditions prescribed by the Counterinsurgent. It must be fought on the terms that exist -- and they will probably not be faced. (It should be emphasized here that these comments are not a judgment on Thai character or behavior -- they are a judgment on Thai behavior as it relates to Counterinsurgency strategy and operations in a special case configuration. In this sense it should not be seen as pejorative, but as a realistic and constructive acceptance of fact) - having a direct bearing on the fulfillment of US objectives.

[REDACTED]

Thus while this strategic option is not precluded - i. e., it is possible to devise an improved CI strategy, it is very doubtful it would be implemented effectively. Nevertheless, the following section outlines some basic considerations for a new CI strategy. These considerations are based on the analysis of this Report -- are not idealized or unattainable. They are realistic, achievable functions that are relevant to the vulnerabilities of the Insurgent and which can contribute to an integrated effective CI strategy. They are based for the most part on a combined effort of applying relevant CI tools to where they will collectively result, along with other factors, in a weakening of the strategic process and internal infrastructure of the Insurgent - and collectively embrace the two strategic objectives outlined in the first section of this chapter.

Strategic Consideration #1 - (Name and Basic Thrust)

In order to avoid any psychological disorientations stemming from a special name which attempts to include the various operational components -- such as CPM, Pacification or Communist Defense and Development -- any new CI strategy that might be devised should be called just that -- the New CI Strategy. Effort should be made not to explain it fully to the public and to purposely give the impression that it is not only a revision of past strategic configurations, but that much of the revisions are secret -- it is best to keep them from the Insurgent. This will preclude the government from having to explain every step it takes. Such a new name, reinforced with certain actions which will be explained in the considerations that follow, should create a somewhat greater public confidence in the RTG's ability to express humility and adjust its CI efforts when needed, and to conduct a discreet but meaningful CI effort.

Such a strategy would not be a frontal assault on the Insurgent organization or actions but rather a highly selective program of operational undertakings -- a distinctly qualitative rather than quantitative thrust -- wherein each action would be designed to have a calculated impact on known Insurgent vulnerability.

[REDACTED]

Strategic Consideration #2 - (Determinants of CI Effectiveness)

It is legitimate to ask at the outset of this Fourth Strategic Option -- "What are the determinants of CI success in a special case configuration?" All of them have been covered in the previous sections but it will be well to assemble them here so as to give perspective to the strategic outline and considerations that follow:

Determinants of CI Effectiveness for the Special Case

- 1) Insurgency analysis to determine Insurgent strategy strengths and vulnerabilities.
- 2) Conceptualization of a CI strategy consistent with the Insurgency analysis and enjoying some indigenous structural social/political changes by the Counter-insurgent government.
- 3) CI task and function effectiveness and capacity to achieve:
  - a) the attrition of Insurgent strength through his strategy vulnerabilities.
  - b) the preservation of the Counterinsurgent government and its social/political structure.
- 4) The avoidance of a resource-contest = i. e., maintain resource balance.
- 5) Maintenance of the Counterinsurgent productivity base without serious interruption.

Strategic Consideration #3 - (Endless War)

The possibility of solving or ending this Insurgency does not exist. It cannot be ended because not only is there a sufficient peasant recruiting base for maintaining indigenous rooting

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

indefinitely but there is adequate Insurgent and external Communist interest to insure that it does not end. This Insurgency is too integral a part of international communism to be allowed to end. Even were its indigenous base to weaken so that it would linger in a merely harassing posture to the RTG, it would be maintained. This is because gain would derive from even a reduced effort, and psychological loss would be incurred by international communism if it did end.

No matter what CI the RTG implements, no matter how efficiently it is performed, the very best its tools and capacities can accomplish is a reduction of the rate of Insurgent expansion or a possible containment -- a levelling off of Insurgent activity and organizational growth. The efficiency of the RTG's CI effort in the future will absolutely determine its capacity to accomplish even these limited objectives. No CI program is going to end this Insurgency. (The conflict will be endless - or until the RTG succumbs.) Expectations should therefore be consistent with Insurgency facts and strategic possibilities.

Strategic Consideration #4: (Resource Balance)

The RTG is already engaged in a crucial race for time. It is a race for time to restore resource balance in its CI strategic thrust. This balance is related to preserving the national structure and government. The balance needed is between its indigenous productivity base and the resources needed to carry out effective CI. Every time that balance is lost - i. e., the RTG is drawn into a commitment or an ineffective effort, it contributes to the Insurgent goals. This balance is already seriously lost, with the Insurgent now more capable of disrupting it at his discretion.

In certain respects the RTG has a hopeless resource imbalance to overcome - i. e., it is not just competing with the CPT, but rather with the combined selective resources that China, the DRV and even what other communist nations could

[REDACTED]

provide should it become necessary to do so to keep up with incremental increases the RTG makes. The disparity is not only in material resources. It relates to conceptual and intellectual resources as well. Consider for example the disparity between what China provides the CPT -- conceptualization, training, leadership, weapons; and what the U.S. provides the RTG -- economic/military aid, funds, but little in the way of proven conceptual or strategic input. The Insurgent system is geared to match every move the RTG makes - thus drawing the RTG into deeper resource commitments as time goes on.

The RTG cannot and should not feel it must respond to every hostile Insurgent initiative. While its position is a true dilemma in that it is damned if it responds and damned if it doesn't attack the Insurgent or respond to him, the RTG must become selective in its application of resources and only undertake those activities that will:

- 1) Attrit the Insurgent processes through relevant tasks and functions.
- 2) Maintain its own resource productivity base.
- 3) Avoid being vulnerable to psychological loss (either from resource or credibility loss) in its efforts to be effective against the Insurgent.
- 4) Maximize its own basic strengths while minimizing those of the Insurgents.

The collective result of adhering to a balance of productivity and CI resources is to immediately achieve the two basic objectives shown earlier:

- 1) The negation and/or dilution of much of the Insurgent's collective psychological strategy.
- 2) The reversal of the resource decline-spiral the RTG is already suffering.

~~SECRET~~

known why they have not been effective because of conceptual and functional disorientation. These can be corrected but they require important political decisions to do so on with ID card use. Its purpose is to help finance the national CI effort, but the growth levels for CI should be frozen and followed by an intensive effort to evaluate across the board CI and M small functional performance capacities relative to insurgent vulnerability. Revisions should then be made in sector or national with a concentration on only those efforts which do have capacity to disrupt the insurgent strategy at reasonable cost. Then, rather than expanding force or unit levels, an intensive retraining effort should be undertaken to instill a sense of qualitative performance self-coupling, both for individuals as well as the organizations; to an incentive, rewards system and a system of punishments for poor performance. Rather than a life rating guaranteed careers in expanding organizations, careerism should be made to rest on performance effectiveness against the insurgents. The only hiring should be for replacements on to the nation.

The RTG should establish a national-level mechanism to manage and maintain this national resource balance. It annually, and the military segment receiving priority funding at the Strategic Consideration #5 - (National Effort) urgent actions (at the expense of the development sectors), the RTG Counterinsurgency should be made a national effort. The dissident countryside has to be linked to the other world of Bangkok and the other urban areas. This linkage is to commit all of the Thai people to the common insurgency problem, not just the rural administrators. This can be done by the RTG, declaring the North and Northeast National Danger Areas (NDA) and provide for extra-legal processes to be enforced in these areas. The RTG may already do as it wishes, but the purpose of this move would be to reinforce the national consciousness to an awareness of the insurgency problem and lay the ground for more radical or revolutionary CIA approaches in those specific areas. Such radical measures might include special provisions for tentative land rights, inducements for accelerated private investment, special arrest procedures, migration inducements, productivity incentives, tax benefits and extra-legal counter-espionage methods.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-224-  
125

[REDACTED]

While such balance will not eliminate the Insurgent it will thus negate many of the advantages he has heretofore inexpensively gained and isolate the Insurgency's effectiveness. The new CI strategy must be highly cost conscious and selective as to program capacity, and sensitive as to psychological impact.

In the early days of Pineapple cultivation in Hawaii where the soil is rich in iron, extensive research was undertaken to determine why the crops would not grow as well as in other countries. Since iron was a basic requirement for pineapple cultivation it came as a shock when the researcher advised that iron fertilizer was needed! This was found to be necessary because the iron in the soil was of the wrong chemical type. The proper chemical configuration could only be added through a fertilizer! When it was added, the production exceeded all expectations. A similar case exists in the Thai Insurgency relative to reducing resources. It may sound absurd, but the first order of business for a new CI strategy is to reduce resource inputs and simultaneously shift to selective qualitative performance. More resource inputs are not the solution to this Insurgency -- they are to a large degree the basic problem. They are the problem because: 1) the resources are primarily military and police tools which cannot perform the tasks and functions demanded of them; 2) they are not directed at the vulnerabilities of the Insurgent strategy; and 3) they contribute to the Insurgent's strategy against the RTG.

The matter of reducing resources is imperative for various reasons. We already have experienced from other Insurgencies showing that additional resources are not relevant to the basic Insurgency problems. This is true in the Thai situation as well. Additional resources given over the past four years of the Thai Insurgency have not arrested the Insurgency in any way. It has actually grown faster where the resources were applied. It has grown approximately 30% per year. It would seem mandatory therefore before considering more resources, arms, financial support, etc., to first examine carefully why the resources already given have not been effective. Actually, it is already

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Reinforcing this national psychological move would be a small head-tax on every Thai citizen. It should be enforced through a simple receipt process in conjunction with ID card use. Its purpose is to help finance the national CI-effort, but more importantly to create a greater sense of national urgency -- the necessity of each citizen to play even a small role in countering the Insurgency. In declaring the North and Northeast National Danger Areas the RTG would be admitting to the seriousness of the Insurgency problem, and use this opening for reduced government services throughout the nation. This will aid in not only reducing RTG commitments to development and other expected achievements and instill a greater sense of self-sufficiency in the population, but make the absence of RTG performance or development benefits appear to be the result of the Insurgency. This will help reduce future RTG creditability losses. This move would particularly begin to restore a greater sense of self-sufficiency in the rural areas coupled with an increased sense of obligation to the nation.

With the current RTG budget running a 25% deficit annually, and the military segment receiving priority funding attention for any fluctuations in the intensity of Insurgent actions (at the expense of the development sectors), the RTG is actually most vulnerable to Insurgent actions at this very core of its governmental resource fabric. That is to say that where the RTG thinks it is the strongest - i. e., in its resource base, it is at that point the most vulnerable because it does not appreciate how the Insurgent can easily exploit it, or see the internal Modernization or psychological damage caused by such disruption. Every infrastructure built must be maintained (the ARD road maintenance system is already beyond the Highway Department's capacity); the proliferation of officials in the rural area draws on the national tax base; expanded militia require new weapons; etc. It should be seen that this vast expansion not only rests on an insufficiently strong productivity base to keep pace with the rate of such expansion, but such expansion is not dealing with the Insurgent

~~SECRET~~

problem. Further, it is unwise to continue to create an increasingly untenable posture which the Insurgent can easily exploit. As it now stands the Insurgent is able to predictably disrupt Modernization and the productivity base through actions that will create violent strains on the budget structure.

Strategic Consideration #6 - (Intense Paramilitary Effort)

It was shown earlier that the Insurgent's most vulnerable point is his internal resource process -- particularly where the village supporter is concerned. A qualitative CI effort in this area; exploiting the lower tolerance level and lesser motivation of the village supporter, would have important repercussions on the strongest part of the Insurgency -- the causal process. This provides the only major offensive CI strategic possibility. In conjunction with Strategic Consideration #4 -- reevaluating the performance effectiveness of all CI operational components -- it is necessary that the RTG undertake an immediate priority program of organizing and training small paramilitary units. These would operate independently within the Insurgent area, and specifically target the Insurgent resource configuration -- leadership and installations -- but, most importantly the cached food supplies. It would include an attack on the movement of external resources. This move would be consistent with the new strategic direction already taken by General Surakij. The potency of such teams would be seen not only in destroying resources (although not critical amounts), but in starting a chain reaction within the Insurgent structure which will constrict his causal process. Recruitment could thus be slowed.

While it is true that paramilitary units already exit and do enter Insurgent territory, there is no information to indicate that such efforts are being performed on a broad scale or under an overall strategic plan. The Army should be responsible for this task, leaving to the police penetration and patrolling units the basic task of maintaining a police presence and procuring intelligence. This would reduce friction between the Army and police were they to have shared responsibility for such new penetration operations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

It is of course known that these operations are not always successful and that there are complex problems in retrieving the teams if they run into trouble. All of those obstacles will be a major deterrent to the success of this effort -- but, this activity affords the only strategic offensive thrust available to the RTG - it therefore has little choice but to fight this battle. The problem of whether the RTA would use its own men, or volunteers, etc., is an internal political decision which will have to be faced. It can only be emphasized that if the Insurgent structure is to be weakened significantly this is the way to do it, and a price must be paid to do so.

The effort would require an intensive undertaking (coupled with the intelligence component -- Strategic Consideration #7) which will tax the leadership and capacities of the RTA. The net effect of a steady program of penetrating the Insurgent area, killing or capturing leaders, destroying supplies and procuring new intelligence, will be to significantly harass the Insurgent support structure to where its performance will be less predictable. Should it be found that such teams cannot operate in this manner, there then can be no doubt that the ability of the RTG to level off the Insurgent's growth will have been lost.

Owing to Insurgent strategic flexibility and adaptability, it should also be anticipated that if the RTA gets more aggressive in this selective and qualitative paramilitary manner the Insurgent will respond accordingly -- perhaps escalating attacks on fixed installations. But if this happens it means the Insurgent will lose some of his initiative and unconventional conduct advantage. Designing this new activity affords the military element broad opportunity to put into practice a wide variety of penetration tactics and skills which are known to exist.

The one primary skill such paramilitary units must demonstrate when in Insurgent territory is to treat the population with great care and deference -- paying for food or things damaged, etc. An opportunity for intensive psychological impact on the

~~SECRET~~

11-128

**SECRET**

Insurgent's support base accompanies this military thrust. The teams, if successful against internal resources, and depending on the quality of the intelligence effort launched to sustain this priority effort, could possibly be expanded to include selected attacks on external resources as they enter Thailand. If external resources can thus be harassed as well and even in conjunction with the internal resources, a significant strain can be placed on the village support population, with predictable results. In time such attrition would bring detectable negative results on recruitment and other Insurgent processes within peasant villages.

Strategic Consideration #7 - (Intense Intelligence Effort)

In conjunction with Strategic Consideration #6, a priority intelligence effort should be undertaken for the sole purpose of acquiring and refining internal and external resource data for the support of the paramilitary teams. Since such teams will operate more effectively and safely with precise intelligence as to leaders, supply movements, caches and Insurgent installations, a special effort should be made to provide it. Since precise intelligence appears to already be quite readily available from a variety of sources, the problem is primarily to intensify the collection and coordinate it operationally with the paramilitary program. (There is no attempt here to presume SRF or other covert penetration activities of this type are not already being undertaken. However, the absence of results tends to confirm that such as are taking place are not sufficient in number or in quality to have the desired effect on the Insurgent structure.)

Relative to external resources, such intelligence, while not necessarily permitting air strikes or penetrations into Laos, could provide assistance in tracking the movement of trainees and supplies to the Thai border. Knowing the crossing points and the trails used for such movements would provide the paramilitary teams with more precise target opportunities for quick strikes and withdrawal.

**SECRET**

This activity would test the quality of the intelligence being procured, and point to ways in which it can be improved. At the present time it is apparent considerable operational information is not being utilized for a variety of reasons. Under a new strategy, both the intelligence and paramilitary capacity can be refined to a more qualitative joint undertaking, the resulting effort could have a large beneficial impact on CI efforts.

Strategic Consideration #8 - (Identify National Assets in the NDA)

In conjunction with Strategic Consideration #5, the RTG should establish in the National Danger Areas a first and second priority list of all national assets worth defending. Such a list would then be used to guide RTA and other security elements in operational roles. Basically, the security units would maintain a low defensive posture in the NDA areas, being highly selective as to movements and reaction undertakings. It is recognized that the Insurgent will create difficult situations - i. e., attack an installation which is weak or vulnerable, thus causing RTG security elements to decide whether to come to its support. Such support should be provided only if a national asset is in jeopardy, or if the security elements have a known advantage in the fighting. Patrolling and other movements such as road security should be undertaken only when the risks and costs warrant the benefits arising from the road movements.

While the above is brief it nevertheless provides the general basis for a new military operational rationale in the Insurgent area. The purpose of such a new rationale is to reduce military vulnerability, to reduce military costs, to increase the cost effectiveness of attriting Insurgent strength, and to deny the Insurgent as much freedom of initiative and advantage from unconventionality as possible. It is a defensive rationale designed to protect basic national assets at lower cost than heretofore, and to hold those assets while the new paramilitary teams work to disrupt the Insurgent structure. It is thus a logical complementary role to the paramilitary teams.

~~SECRET~~

Strategic Consideration #9 - (Revised Development)

It must be recognized that in the rural area, and relative to development, few of the peasants embody the faculties or motivation for much material advance, and the majority who do not are found to rarely feel that the Insurgent is taking anything from them worth dying for. There is not a deep vested interest in material advance, nor a linkage between it and the motivation to resist the Insurgent. The peasant is not going to resist the Insurgent very strongly, and such a will to resist cannot be implanted -- certainly not through the development undertakings of the RTG. It was shown earlier that development is not associated with any transcending RTG cause and does not have an offensive strategic thrust - i.e., to win back lost adherents to the Insurgency. It can achieve at best some hold on that portion of the peasant population which does have some motivation toward more material advance.

These considerations have a strong bearing on the development role in CI, and while the next Chapter deals at length with the criteria for the selection of development projects, it should be noted here that whether designed to build productivity, create infrastructure or provide services, development should be rendered on the basis of economic and pragmatic feasibility and not on any considerations of altering the Insurgency. It should be a patient, economic undertaking.

Productivity and infrastructure should be rendered on the basis of sound economic return from the region in question and rest on the aptitudes and motivations of the people therein. Service development -- schools, health operations, water source efforts, etc., should be rendered on the basis of normal development patterns - i.e., creating the asset where it can link with individual or group productivity motivations, rest on RTG resource continuity, and eventually root locally and continue under local resource inputs. All development should be rendered in conjunction with the most stern criteria for the application of scarce resources. A program of austerity should

~~SECRET~~

underlie the development effort. Development should slowly stop being a service oriented or government grant effort and begin to gently turn to where it is based on sound economic ground. Stand local indigenous strengths and should simultaneously turn from a C.I. oriented activity to one based on an economic development rationale.

- The Insurgency is attempting to disrupt modernization

The basic thrust of a new development approach would be to recognize the distortions being created by accelerated external inputs. E.G. all artificial institutional structures, efforts external dependency, economic advance without political power, national resource strain and lack of development continuity, etc. and turn development to where it will build strength in the rural system on a more solid foundation. In doing this development may not bring back those peasants lost to the Insurgent, but it will create a more reliable economic fabric which will simultaneously strengthen the national productivity and help somewhat to hold the peasants from going to the Insurgent.

- The RTG cannot and will not be able to render free services Strategic Consideration #10 (Alternative Police Activities) on local strength. They must pay their own way with the

It was shown earlier that many of the BPP operational tools do not have the offensive capacities often attributed to them. This means that their actual capacity to attrit Insurgent strength is very limited. It is in keeping with Strategic Consideration #4 - freezing force levels and undertaking a reevaluation of their offensive tool capacities -- that leads to the conclusion that the offensive role of the BPP should be seriously re-examined as to its true relevance against the Insurgent strengths. There can be no doubt that the BPP has great capacity in building good rapport with the rural population (in most areas) and that it is capable of acquiring good intelligence. But these are not withstanding, operational purpose is to provide security and protection in critical areas - the attrit Insurgent strengths. Therefore, to continue to expand BPP force levels on the assumption that they are reducing Insurgent strengths is unproductive. Both the positive and negative factors of an expanded police presence in the rural areas deserve more careful study for the hill tribes. It can use ~~its own~~ extra-legal authority to do

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The newly acquired development role of the BPP should be dropped. While the BPP presence in a village has usually resulted in the creation of good rapport with the people, the resulting good relationship will have value if not in eroding Insurgent strength, at least in preserving the hold on the population at hand. Development efforts are not needed to reinforce that hold. BPP coordination with the Province Police and Amphoe Police should be developed to where a reliable investigative infrastructure is maintained to reinforce their capacity to detect, detain and convict Insurgent adherents. The proliferation of development activities through police structures does not appear productive.

The TNPD should start a carefully administered program of planned Insurgent village supporter harassment. It would be an effort to identify and arrest supporter suspects, but to let the program orientation be primarily psychological rather than regulatory. Suspects would be treated exceptionally well and purposely released after a brief detention. The impact of their having received good police treatment and returning to their villages with such news, coupled with the temporary disruption to the Insurgent village organizational processes, could constitute a net psychological gain for the RTG. Such an effort is directed at a delicate part of the Insurgent organization. This activity could actually help reinforce the role of the paramilitary penetration teams in attempting to disrupt internal resources.

Strategic Consideration #11 - (Psychological Support)

Consistent with the Program of a new national awareness on the Insurgency (Strategic Consideration #5) the RTG should start a qualitative and contractually assisted program of psychological support. It should be an integrated program where the national propaganda themes should be reinforced by all lesser RTG psychological support elements. Some major themes should be:

~~SECRET~~

- The Insurgency is a national danger, it has grown and is a problem that all must contribute to solving.
- The Insurgent is using Thai territory and people for foreign ideological purposes.
- The Insurgency is attempting to disrupt modernization efforts on behalf of the people.
- The RTG will not be foolishly drawn into frantic efforts of attempting to respond to every violent act of the Insurgent.
- The RTG will continue to build a strong economic base throughout the country and expand popular participation within the democratic process.
- The RTG is in a time race with the Insurgent which it expects to win by everyone making some sacrifices.
- The RTG cannot and will not be able to render free services as in the past. Programs will be undertaken to build on local strength. They must pay their own way with the government helping as it can.
- There is a role for all in Thai society from the peasant to the high officials. Changes are needed and changes will be made.

This propaganda program should commend the very best talent available to the RTG. Through it a national consciousness of the Insurgency can be created that is not just informational but behavioral -- it will develop a national attitude toward how the RTG is building on strength and not idealism or wishful thinking. It should be a forthright effort to let the Insurgency facts be known to the public, and to link the cities to the rural dissident areas.

Strategic Consideration #12 - (Hilltribe Citizenship)

In the North the RTG should provide a form of citizenship for the hilltribes. It can use the NDA extra-legal authority to do

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

so. Further, it should remove all doubt as to their access to the land and forests -- possibly evading the difficult question of ownership for the moment, but at least removing hilltribe fears for their being denied rights to the land. Since it is already apparent that the forests available for swidden agriculture are in short supply (and many hilltribes are moving to other forms of agriculture) this move would appear to offer few risks. The legal technicalities of this may prevent dealing with citizenship and land separately. This should be studied from the Thai legal system standpoint with attention given to possibly granting the citizenship along with land rights simultaneously.

This effort may help counteract the Insurgent causal process in the North and erode the ground on which he has been able to largely win hilltribe support - i. e., assurance that they can stay on the land and live as they do. A similar RTG approach, even if belated, would divorce the future considerations and concerns of the area from present Insurgency problems and enable the RTG to compete on more equal terms with the Insurgent. The RTG should consider a plan of social organization for its hilltribes somewhat along the lines used by the DRV -- however, as long as the hilltribe regions are adjacent to hostile areas it is doubtful that real political gains can be made at this time.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## CHAPTER FOUR

### U. S. Project Selection Criteria (S)

#### Stabilization

While the discussion in this Report has described the various characteristics of the military CI tools relative to the nature of the Insurgency and its threat, and attempted in so doing to demonstrate serious problems in applying those tools in pursuit of largely unattainable objectives, it is not the charter of this Report to turn such discussions into military project selection criteria. There are, however, sufficiently valid arguments to sustain the described limitations on such military tools - particularly as to their offensive versus defensive capacities - to warrant serious consideration by both the RTG and the U. S. advisory element for a review and further study of such tool capacities. Such study might ensure that future Thai military CI applications could prove more relevant, efficient and cost-effective.

Selected criteria for the Police Program are discussed below in a special section under Development (Modernization).

The remainder of this Chapter deals with the rationale and criteria for development - not just that development which has in the past been described as CI development, but those U. S. O. M. resource inputs that are conventional support of RTG rural development. It is not possible to divorce these two development activities since they each have a similar impact on the rural area.

#### Development (Modernization)

Two basic questions must be asked relative to U. S. resource inputs on behalf of RTG rural development: 1) What does the U. S.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

want to accomplish with the inputs; and 2) Do the inputs have the capacity to achieve what is desired: Both of these questions have been referred to in previous discussion so as to develop and recognize the limitations -- and strategic distortions -- such inputs embody relative to U.S. objectives. It is best to start with the basic U.S. policy objectives for development resource inputs. They can be briefly summarized as follows:

- 1) To maintain a productive relationship with the RTG relative to protecting broad U.S. security, political and economic interests in Southeast Asia.
- 2) To maintain access to Thai bases and facilities.
- 3) To help control and defeat the communist Insurgency.
- 4) To help maintain the RTG military power capable of preserving Thai national security without the need for U.S. force assistance.

Because U.S. development resource inputs are very modest in comparison to those of the RTG, the role of such U.S. resources in maintaining access to the bases, protecting broad U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, and aiding Thai national security does not have its importance in the specific development objectives such resources can achieve, but rather in it representing a symbol of U.S. support to Thailand. It is basically bilateral politically-oriented foreign assistance, and as such serves the broader U.S. political interests as its primary purpose, and economic development secondarily. While the economic development is of only secondary concern, it is nevertheless important because it does have some direct relationship to the U.S. objective of controlling or defeating the Insurgency. U.S. development inputs therefore have a dual purpose, both of which are valid, but relative to the original U.S. resource input questions posed it can be said that these inputs do not have the capacity in themselves to achieve the policy objective desired.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Because of their small size these inputs represent special problems. Being only about 7 or 8% of the Thai budget, and often constituting a specific project configuration which the RTG has requested or insisted upon as an important ingredient to its overall development effort, both the size and such political considerations tend to disorient such resources away from their most productive developmental use. The USOM program has had no choice under these circumstances but to be selective and identify those special Thai economic needs that its programs can best address. The USOM program is basically an effort to institutionally stimulate the RTG to do things of value to its national economic fabric.

Two additional limitations work to further constrict the total impact U.S. resource inputs can have on behalf of development, and hence on the fulfillment of U.S. policy objectives. The first is the preclusion of any substantive internal Thai political impact from the programs. This limitation arises primarily because of the unwillingness of the RTG, in its present governmental configuration, to allow even peripheral popular political participation in the urban or the rural areas. People are prohibited from assembling in groups of more than five persons. Program criteria could concern itself with indirect political impact, such as has been achieved in opening avenues of improved communications between the RTG and labor groups. However, since the political pay-off from such indirect efforts is certain to be minimal in the highly centralized RTG system, it is considered counterproductive to devote much USOM management time to devising political content for its projects.

Similarly, the RTG has precluded through its unwillingness to alter the social structure in the rural areas, which could provide for more equitable access to social mobility and hence positions of administrative importance and power, any direct possibility of U.S. supported programs contributing to meaningful social change in the rural area. U.S. supported programs are thus required to help reinforce the maintenance of the existing

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

highly-controlled social system. It is considered counterproductive to devote much USOM management time to devising social content to its projects. This is not to say that such projects do not have a social impact -- it is merely to note that such impact cannot be accurately predicted or made an integral part of the project's objectives. Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to develop or utilize project criteria calling for political stability or greater social cohesion. It is because these two vital ingredients to any Counterinsurgent program are precluded that development is largely emasculated as a competitive CI strategic thrust. As indicated earlier, it is thus isolated and accepted or rejected by the rural peasant on an individual or personal benefit basis. It is not attached to any transcending RTG social or political cause.

Almost therefore by the process of elimination, or by default, the development program becomes a pure economic thrust. Since it is unlikely that RTG views as to social and political change (recently demonstrated in the 1972 closing of the Parliament and the banning of political parties) is going to be altered in the foreseeable future, it would seem legitimate to develop criteria for U.S. project inputs into RTG development that will: (1) serve selected national economic ends; and (2) simultaneously relate to those aspects of the Insurgency and CI that were shown earlier to have some susceptibility for its capacities. Because the U.S. development program has such a small direct impact on the Insurgency, the national economic development problems it can address offer a broader and more rational basis for strengthening the RTG. Accordingly, it would seem advisable that development should begin to move from a CI program rationale to one of economic development on its own merits.

Before proceeding with the development of actual criteria, it would seem imperative to recap from the earlier discussions the fundamental Insurgency and Counterinsurgency related facts that were found to exist for development (modernization) capacities. They are as follows:

~~SECRET~~

Recap of Development CI Capacities

- 1) Development has virtually no offensive CI strategic capacity - i. e., it is unable to win back peasant motivation that has already been lost to the Insurgent under his social/political program.
- 2) Development does not have a valid time-phased complementary operational role with the police or military components of CPM Counterinsurgency.
- 3) Development has a definite primary defensive CI strategic capacity relative to those rural people who already possess the faculties and motivations for material progress, but it is noted that this segment of the rural population constitutes a minority. (It is fairly certain that the Insurgent, through his social/political program, is not attracting this portion of the rural population who are largely motivated by desires for material advance; just as it is certain that the RTG development (economically-oriented) program is similarly not attracting those Insurgent adherents who are motivated for social and political reasons.)
- 4) Development has an uncertain secondary defensive CI strategic capacity relative to those rural people somewhat inclined toward material advance. It is noted that this segment of the rural population also constitutes a minority.
- 5) Development has no known defensive CI strategic capacity relative to those of the rural population who have largely opted out of any change-involvement, and may actually be causing serious social or economic tensions for this group.
- 6) Development, as it is being conducted by the RTG, has become a process pushed well beyond its normal evolutionary time-frame and the absorptive capacities

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of most of the rural population; and, is stimulating regions economically while simultaneously denying them appropriate social and political outlets for such advancement. This dichotomy is creating structural tensions and laying the ground for even greater social conflict in the future.

- 7) The defensive CI strategic capacity that development does possess (Item 3 above) relates to some extent beyond the rural population target described. It should be seen as contributing some rehabilitating effect through the improvement of total economic structure. Despite the tensions and other disorientations it creates, it is nevertheless helping provide an extended framework on which Thai inventiveness, industry, productivity, and prosperity can be attached -- and which certainly contributes to some social contentment. In this both positive and negative posture development helps expand and maintain a Thai society and economic structure which stands as a form of alternative, refuge or attraction to any wavering Insurgency adherent.
  
- 8) Development activities, whether designated CI or having a more conventional development orientation, have a similar impact on the rural area. It is not productive to continue to handle them separately.

In a special case qualitative Insurgency situation these limitations and considerations show that development should not be considered a vital CI tool, nor should expectations from its activities be seen as relating very directly to the Insurgency problem. It is regrettable to say that despite its good economic intentions and humanitarian concerns, development is not an important factor in either containing the Insurgency or in achieving U.S. policy objectives related to it. Nevertheless, development has an important defensive CI role to play, even if limited, and should play it well. The criteria are designed to derive the best possible CI usage from U.S. resource inputs.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The attainment of the U.S. policy objective vis-a-vis the Insurgency is hampered by the fact that the political and security ambitions for U.S. resource inputs are much greater than their monetary or operational potential -- and, the relationship between development and security varies with different Insurgencies. In this Insurgency situation it was shown that development is not an equitable competitor with the Insurgent's social/political program, thereby revealing that the development-security relationship is to be found indirectly in the defensive CI strategic capacity of creating some form of personal-benefit attraction or greater economic dependency for that rural minority who are motivated for material advance. The only specific CI objective to be served by development is related to this element -- i.e., development activities should rapidly deliver personally-oriented benefits. These objective concerns are built into the criteria.

In a special case Insurgency situation it might be said that the relationship between development and security has one direct and two indirect relationships, as follows:

- 1) Development clearly serves as a form of defensive dependency or attraction to that portion of the rural population inclined toward material advance, and in so doing to some extent serves to diminish Insurgent recruitment potentials. This also helps achieve U.S. objectives relative to the Insurgency. (Direct)
- 2) Development clearly serves to strengthen the national economic fabric, despite the presence of serious social and political structural distortions and weaknesses, and contributes to the broad and long-term resource productivity interests of the RTG. These in turn help achieve U.S. objectives relative to the Insurgency. (Indirect)
- 3) Development clearly serves, even as a modest quantitative foreign assistance resource input, the symbolic

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

objective of expressing U. S. interest in Thai security and long-term growth. This contributes to the furtherance of the broader U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia, and to Thai national security. (Indirect).

Development can thus be seen to serve the long-term symbolic, and broader political security objectives of U. S. more fully than it does the short-term Insurgency related goals. Nevertheless, despite these limitations and more narrow focus of its role vis-a-vis the Insurgency, it is necessary to provide selected criteria by which the impact of development can be made more effective relative to the target rural audience.

#### Basic Criteria

The criteria that follow are divided into two general sections: 1) those criteria that are basic to all projects; and 2) criteria that relate to three functional areas: productivity, infrastructure, and services-administration. That is to say that a project should meet the basic criteria before it is considered in a functional area by more selective criteria. The basic criteria arise from earlier discussions in the Report and are largely concerned with the nature of the Insurgency and its threat, and considerations for a more relevant CI strategy. The basic criteria are:

Basic Criteria #1 - The project cost must be shown to be within the present resource capability of the RTG and consistent with its future resource commitments and anticipated productivity capacities. The project must not contribute to an RTG resource imbalance that is vulnerable to Insurgent manipulation. (See Strategic Consideration #4, Chapter Three, for additional rationale.)

Basic Criteria #2 - The project should not be undertaken unless the RTG, while contributing catalyst

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

resources to aid in launching the project, can demonstrate that the activity stems from indigenous local interest capacities and initiative, and in a reasonable time-frame can become dependent primarily on local resources.

Basic Criteria #3 - The project should not be undertaken unless it helps to develop and maintain a qualitative performance capacity for the functional area.

Functional Criteria

The functional areas have been arranged in their priority order of importance. U.S. resource allocations for project activities that will directly or even indirectly contribute to productivity, for example, should be given precedence over more infrastructure building or expanded government services or administration. Functional area criteria are as follows:

Productivity -

(Productivity related projects are those directly related to increasing employment, income generation, industrial and commercial productivity, and to an expanded tax base.)

This functional area has been given first priority because its functional activities relate most directly in a short time-frame to the rural peasant's employment, income and material advance; and, because it also in a short time-frame directly strengthens the national economic fabric and resource base. Both of these are directly related to CI strategic concerns outlined in earlier discussion. It should be recognized that U.S. project inputs have no significant leverage or influence on such internal Thai processes as income distribution or equity. Nevertheless, within these limitations projects should be selected according to their capacity to:

~~SECRET~~

- 
- 1) Stimulate additional rural employment and investment.
  - 2) Stimulate low collateral rural credit.
  - 3) Provide a demonstrative catalyst that will elicit more productivity incentive from rural farmers and entrepreneurs.
  - 4) Expand exports.
  - 5) Create new marketing centers and diminish the role of the middleman.
  - 6) Stimulate the development of latent rural natural resources.
  - 7) Stimulate new foreign investment.

Infrastructure -

(Infrastructure related projects are those activities designed to establish major capital installations in the rural area which are funded by the national tax base but which can provide the basis for later individual benefits for rural peasants.)

This functional area has second priority because its functional activities relate quite closely in a short time-frame to the rural peasant's employment, income and material advance; and, because it also in a short time-frame strengthens the national economic fabric and resource base. However, since it does involve a less immediate direct link-up by the individual to the infrastructure for personal benefit, it does not have the same importance as productivity. Projects in this area should be selected according to their capacity to:

~~SECRET~~

- 1) Assist the rural peasant in making a link-up to an already existing infrastructure -- water, electricity, irrigation, etc.
- 2) Create new infrastructure that has a basis for sound economic return from the region - i. e., it is related to the natural resources and the aptitudes and motivations of the denizen.
- 3) Create new infrastructure that is required for overriding security considerations -- a new road, etc.
- 4) Create a new infrastructure related to the exploration of untapped natural resources that could give rise to expanded employment in a short time-frame.

Services-Administration -

(Services-administration related projects are those activities which do not directly relate to productivity, employment or income generation, and which use tax funds rather than contribute to them -- schools, health care, CD cadre, Administrative structures, etc.)

This functional area has the lowest priority, not because such activities as it represents are not important, but primarily because of their large and growing drain on the tax base. Also, they contribute little to the Insurgency related problems or national economic development over the short time-frame. These characteristics cause them to contribute to the national resource imbalance discussed earlier -- hence they have a direct bearing on reinforcing the Insurgent strategy to some extent. Projects in this area should be selected as follows:

- 1) The project should be sustained by at least 25% of local funding in the genesis period, and be

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

by at least 75% of local funding in a reasonable period of time. Flexibility should be maintained so as to accommodate the unique natures of the various activities - i.e., schools are more difficult to launch than a dispensary, etc.

- 2) After an initial brief period of tutelage and assistance, the project should be managed by local personnel with a minimum of external cadre assistance.
- 3) The project should be undertaken only if local conditions demonstrate the need for it.  
(See Basic Criteria #2.)
- 4) The project should be undertaken if it improves existing government rural administrative processes so that they are more relevant to the immediate individual and personal needs of the peasant.

### Police Criteria

The problems of police tool application to the Insurgency have been covered in Chapter Two, and in other discussion in the body of the Report. Since the police program comes under the U. S. O. M. it does fall within the charter of this Report and criteria are therefore provided. The criteria are arranged in a sequence that will reveal a high priority given to any CI offensive strategic capacities - i.e., Insurgent attrition capacities; and a lower priority to defensive strategic capacities. While both are important to the problem of rural law and order in Counterinsurgency, it is evident that any project that will diminish the Insurgent strength should in most cases have precedence over activities that will only help preserve social cohesion. However, this may not always be true. Therefore, discretion and flexibility should be guides in utilizing the criteria below. Police projects should be selected according to their capacity to:

- 
- 1) Create an attrition of Insurgent material strength.
  - 2) Harass Insurgent processes and indirectly attrit his material strength, organizational efficiency, and morale.
  - 3) Develop strong productive rapport and a qualitative presence with rural people.
  - 4) Develop timely and specific internal resource intelligence
  - 5) Develop investigative talent and supporting record systems
  - 6) Train qualitative police personnel.
  - 7) Develop qualitative and timely law and order services to the rural population.
  - 8) Improve existing facilities and build new stations where police are already stationed.
  - 9) Expand police presence where it can be demonstrated that qualitative police personnel are available and needed.

(Since the police role in narcotics suppression was not covered in this study, the above criteria do not attempt to accommodate its requirements.)