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SOMALIA PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES

TRANSITION INITIATIVES FOR STABILIZATION PLUS BASELINE ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT

IDIQ AID-623-I-14-00009

TASK ORDER AID-623-TO-16-00015

September 20, 2017 Deliverable #7

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. under IDIQ AID-623-I-14-00009, Task Order AID- 623- TO-16-00015.

SOMALIA PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES (SPSS)

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DELIVERABLE #7

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**September 1, 2017
Resubmitted September 20, 2017**

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IDIQ AID-623-I-14-00009

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COVER PHOTOS: *Somalia News Net*, June 2017.

“What is necessary and sufficient for real and sustainable stabilization? And when can you say you have achieved stabilization?”

“... I think we’re all struggling to find sensible answers to those questions. The community-based reconciliation and stabilization is important, but it is one part of the picture and we also need progress on the higher-level political settlements that are crucial for sustainable stabilization. The problem is that Al-Shabaab simply controls too much territory, and territory can often revert to Al-Shabaab control, or they can easily terrorize newly liberated areas. Then if you are too closely connected to the liberators and to government, you are in a very personally insecure position. For this reason, people don’t trust that liberation will last...”

“There is also an issue of depth. You can do the frontline quick (impact) projects and that’s important, but are you just putting a ‘project pin’ in a map, without thinking of how many pins you need in the map to achieve sustainable stabilization. It is important for these programs to at least consider whether they are spread too thinly.”

Senior Stabilization Advisor (Donor Government), May 2017

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
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ACRONYMS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AS	Al-Shabaab
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a
AWD	Acute Watery Diarrhea
BLIS	Bilateral Labor-Intensive Stabilization Program
BP	Bridging Plan
BRA	Banaadir Regional Administration
CA	Contribution Analysis
CC	Community Checklist
CDD	Community Driven Development
CEWERA	Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DARS	Data and Research Solutions
DC	District Commissioner
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
ENDF	Ethiopia National Defense Forces
ERI	Early Recovery Initiative
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMD	Federal Ministry of Defense
FMS	Federal Member State
HH	Household Survey
HOPE	Harnessing Opportunities for Peaceful Engagement in Afgoye
IBTCI	International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc.
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INGOS	International Nongovernmental Organizations
IP	Implementing Partner
IS	Islamic State
ISWA	Interim South West State Administration
JSS	Jubaland State of Somalia
KAQ	Key Assessment Questions
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LJ	Lower Juba
LS	Lower Shabelle
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOIFAR	Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation
MP	Member of Parliament
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NISF	Nordic International Support Foundation
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives

PIKA	Pool of In-Kind Activities
RRA	Inter-Rahanweyn Resistance army
SIF	Somalia Infrastructure Fund
SNA	Somali National Army
SOW	Scope of Work
SPSS	Somalia Program Support Services
SSF	Somalia Stability Fund
SSI	Somalia Stabilization Initiative
SWS	South West State
TIS	Transition Initiative for Stabilization
TIS+	Transition Initiative for Stabilization Plus
TO	Task Order
ToC	Theory of Change
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNJPLG	United Nations Joint Programme on Local Governance
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/SFO	USAID/Somalia Field Office
USG	United States Government
VE	Violent Extremism

Figure 1: TIS+ Baseline/Endline Assessment Clusters



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chronic instability in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 have resulted in two decades of warfare and violence in Somalia. The decades of instability, intercommunal conflict, and humanitarian crisis that marked the second half of the 20th century in Somalia were marked by numerous attempts at peacekeeping, stabilization, and international relief. Clan conflict, violent extremism, drought, famine, out-migration, and multiple failed central state governments have typified the obstacles facing a unified, independent Somali state capable of service delivery and crisis response. Somalia was not able to establish a complete central government until 2012 when the country held its first presidential election since 1967 after 20 years without a parliament. Despite the continued threats of disorder and violence posed by Al-Shabaab (AS), the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in partnership with the international community, has taken impressive strides toward durable peace and nation building. Most recently, with extensive support from the international community, Somalia held an “indirect” election on February 8, 2017, during which popular Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo was elected president in a second round of voting, unseating incumbent Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

In November 2016, FGS launched a draft of the first National Development Plan (NDP). This plan is organized per the following objectives: poverty reduction, infrastructure repair, strengthening state capacity, and sustaining political inclusivity.¹ Gender mainstreaming and a focus on youth are both features of the NDP.

To assist Somalia in these efforts, the USAID Strategic Framework for Somalia 2016–2019 has identified three primary objectives to guide investments over the 2016–19 period that support the goal of building durable foundations for a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Somalia:

- Transition Objective 1: Systems and Processes that Enable Inclusive Governance Strengthened
- Transition Objective 2: Service Delivery Improved
- Transition Objective 3: Inclusive Economic Growth Expanded

The core assumption underpinning this strategy is that if there is an increase in political participation and trust in the political process; if effective, accountable, and representative governance institutions are strengthened; and if key communities are stabilized, then the necessary systems and processes that enable more inclusive governance in Somalia will be strengthened.

TIS+ PROJECT BACKGROUND

The Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus (TIS+) activity is a five-year, US\$66.9 million implemented by AECOM that will run from May 2015 to April 2020. The intent of the TIS+ activity is to support achievement of USAID’s goal by fostering participatory processes that promote good governance and community cohesion. Given the fragile nature of the Somali government and the existence of an insurgency in parts of South Central Somalia, USAID is maintaining a continued focus through TIS+ on quick impact stabilization activities at the district and community levels. At the same time, Somalia is aiming to move from crisis response and stabilization to medium- and longer-term development, so TIS+ is also designed to support this aim. Under Somalia’s New Deal Framework as well as the recently completed National Development Plan (NDP), the FGS and the donor community have committed to advancing inclusive political dialogue, improving security, and increasing economic growth—pillars that TIS+ will also support.

¹ Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. *National Development Plan Summary*. Accessed: February 15, 2017. <http://mopic.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/National-Development-Plan-Summary.pdf>

TIS+ seeks to implement community-centric stabilization activities that are: (1) implemented with multiple levels of government (e.g., caretaker and interim administrations, new states, and the FGS); (2) supporting inclusive participation of stakeholder groups in community decision-making; and (3) encouraging shared asset management between citizens and the government to demonstrate the government's interest in and emerging capacity to contribute positively to citizens' daily lives. TIS+ activities are designed to contribute to improvements in government service delivery, leading to strengthened governance and community cohesion.

BASELINE AND ENDLINE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

USAID/Somalia has commissioned Somalia Program Support Services (SPSS) to perform a baseline and endline assessment of the TIS+ project from September 2016 through July 2019. The primary purpose of the TIS+ baseline and endline assessment is to generate a better understanding of the extent to which TIS+ interventions have achieved their objectives and contributed to TIS+'s (and USAID's) goal of increased stability in Somalia through participatory processes that promote good governance and community cohesion. Specific clusters or geographic areas have been strategically chosen to be analyzed to assess the influence that the TIS+ program activities have had on mitigating the effects of violent extremism and insurgency in these high-risk areas of Somalia. This will also assist USAID in identifying lessons learned from conducting stabilization activities in Somalia.

The SPSS team has designed a methodology that identifies findings that explicate how increased governance and social cohesion activities factor into TIS+ and what other external factors influence these changes. The baseline will provide USAID and stakeholders with an initial analysis of the clusters prior to TIS+ interventions. Because there are few locations without any donor intervention in the identified clusters, control sites were not used. Instead the team used an approach called "contribution analysis" (CA) to assess United States Government (USG) investments and impact on measured changes. SPSS's methodology works on two levels: (1) to assess conditions at the cluster level (Phase 1 and 2); and (2) to aggregate these factors into a consolidated analysis at endline of TIS+ activities across clusters (Phase 3 and 4).

Key Assessment Questions

The TIS+ baseline/endline assessment focuses on two levels of analysis: (1) within cluster analysis (cluster-level analysis) and (2) cross-cluster analysis (comparative cluster analysis). USAID has identified five clusters for analysis: (1) Lower Juba (Afmadow-Kismayo) (2) Gedo/Bay Region (which also includes Dinsoor), (3) Bakool, (4) Lower Shabelle, and (5) Banaadir (Mogadishu). Following are the assessment questions for both the baseline and endline, some of which will be assessed only at endline. At endline all questions will be answered in their original form and compared across clusters to show comparative approaches utilized by TIS+.

Cluster-Level Analysis

- I) Did TIS+ contribute to any of the following anticipated results?
 - a. Community ownership of development projects and processes?
 - b. Effective shared asset management in the communities in which they were implemented?
 - c. Improved delivery of services targeted by TIS+? Improved satisfaction with delivery of services?
 - d. Reduced conflict over resources?
 - e. Greater citizen confidence in government?

f. Reduced support for violent extremism?

2) Were TIS+ approaches used in the cluster, e.g. the community consensus process itself, instrumental in contributing to the achievement of TIS+ results described in Question 1? [ENDLINE ONLY]

3) Did government at all appropriate levels contribute sufficiently to asset management in communities in which TIS+ was implemented? How? Did government at all appropriate levels have both the capacity and the will to contribute?

4) Were TIS+ activities inclusive of women, youth, and minority clans, as applicable to the context of the cluster being evaluated? [ENDLINE ONLY]

Aggregate and Cross-Cluster Level Analysis [ENDLINE ONLY]

5) *In the aggregate*, did TIS+ contribute to the anticipated results described above? What range of results can be observed across assessed clusters?

- 6) Which cluster-level factors contributed most significantly to achievement of results? *For example:*
- a. Did successful inclusion of women, youth and minority clans amplify the effectiveness of TIS+ activities?
 - b. Were results greatest in newly liberated clusters or in bridge clusters?
 - c. Were some kinds of interventions more effective than others in improving citizen confidence or reducing support for violent extremism?

METHODS

The baseline employed a mixed-method approach that integrates a suite of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods to answer the key assessment questions. This methodology affords USAID a greater depth of comparative analysis across the clusters as well as aggregated analysis at the endline stages. Data collection methods consist of a household survey cross-sectional household survey to a randomly selected group of 424 residents living in communities anticipated to participate in TIS+ activities within each of the five clusters for a total sample size of 2,120; desk review/literature review of internal and external documents of relevance to the TIS+ activity; more than 100 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs); 78 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs); and over 100 Community Checklists (CCs). Assessment questions are answered using a combination of these five data collection methods via the triangulation of evidence and the use of contribution analysis to estimate TIS+'s unique contribution to observed results.

Contribution Analysis (CA) is an analytical approach to *estimating* program effects in complex contexts with many factors and actors influencing intervention outcomes. CA works within a Theory of Change (ToC) model to look at contribution from several angles. It employs an applied ToC approach to look beyond high-level outcomes (goal/objectives) to more specific activities and interventions across diverse project spaces. CA is a pragmatic and methodologically rigorous approach to situations in which the activity is one of many potential contributory causes and where it is not possible to measure attribution directly, as is often the case in stabilization programming. For this assessment, CA is used to assess the contribution that TIS+ activities are making to observed outcomes based on the totality of evidence. The essential value of contribution analysis in this case is that it offers an approach designed to reduce uncertainty about the contribution TIS+ is making to the observed results through an increased

understanding of why the observed results have occurred (or not) and the roles played by TIS+ activities and other internal and external factors.²

Security and Access

Somalia is a difficult terrain in which to gather data, and the team had to consider security limitations as well as the dynamic nature of districts and areas under varying stages of control by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is a dynamic and increasingly more networked group, both at the transnational and local (cluster/district) level. The clusters and settlements that were accessible during the baseline stage include: Jubaland State/Cluster 1 Lower Juba (Afmadow and Kismayo); Gedo Region/Cluster 2 Gedo/Bay (Baardheere, Garbaharey, Dinsoor and CeelWaaq); South West State/Cluster 3 Bakool (Xudur, Ceel Barde, and Waajiid); South West State/Cluster 4 Lower Shabelle (Waleweyne, Afgooye, Merka, Qoryooley, Barawe); and Banaadir Regional Authority/Cluster 5 Mogadishu (Bondhere, Dharkenley, Hodan, Howl Wadag, Huriwa, Kaxda, Karan, Shibis, Waberi, Wadajir, Warta, Nabada, and Yagshid). The areas that were inaccessible during baseline because of security include: Jilib and Jamame (Cluster 1); Tayeglow and Rab Dhuure (Cluster 3); and Kurtunwaarey (Cluster 4).

Index Tool

An Index Tool was developed to allow the team to aggregate a series of interrelated questions from the HH survey to establish trends at the cluster level. This index assists the team in cross-cluster and aggregate analysis as well as providing an analytical anchor to look at the relationship between these factors: key assessment questions, TIS+ interventions, and impacts on stability. These measures will also be used at endline to assess changes in areas of TIS+ programming, which include good governance, community cohesion, and stability. To validate index scores, one sensitivity analysis was conducted per index.

The primary goal of TIS+ is to increase good governance and community cohesion by promoting participatory processes and enhanced engagement with government, the private sector and communities. Base on this goal and the objectives of TIS+ the following index categories were established. Each category looks at specific sub themes that support these areas and data was collected both quantitatively and in qualitative data methods. The stability index combines the measures used for *good governance* and *community cohesion* and incorporates specific measures on gender and inclusion of youth and minority groups. Community cohesion was used rather than social cohesion³ as the TIS+ assessment is looking at specific geographic areas and will be looking at similarities and distinctions from these specific clustered communities.

The table below shows the initial scores by cluster. Qualitative data collection and analysis of security and AS movements was triangulated at baseline to interpret these scores. These index scores were used to assess which factors seem to impact community perceptions of security and stability. The index will help the assessment team analyze how these aspects impact local populations and what their perceptions are in these clusters of government services and community cohesion. At baseline, these measures were

² John Mayne. 2008. "Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect," http://dmeforpeace.org/sites/default/files/0501_Contribution_Analysis_ILAC.pdf.

³ Community cohesion is the term used by AECOM and USAID for the TIS+ program. This definition applies that a specific geographic community is the defined target of analysis. The definition is like *social cohesion* but implies a more distinct and group of people sharing a common government, vision and pathway for opportunity. The diversity of these groups is a strength if the community has shared and equal access to resources, opportunity and agency. Community cohesion is usually a specific goal and objective for local government programs seeking to minimize tensions or discord in diverse communities.

triangulated with the qualitative data and at endline these scores will be used to compare across clusters TIS + intervention methods and their impact on these scores and variations.

Baseline Index Scores	Jubaland State	Gedo/ Bay Region	South West State Clusters		Banaadir
	Lower Juba	Gedo/Bay	Bakool	Lower Shabelle	Mogadishu
Good Governance	57%	52%	54%	39%	40%
Community Cohesion	59%	60%	53%	52%	55%
Stability	60%	56%	55%	46%	46%
Color Key	Critical = < 50% (Crisis)		Average = 50% – 66% (Stable)		Green = > 67% (Development)

Operational Challenges

Complex conflict contexts are challenging. The SPSS team designed the approach and management plan to mitigate anticipated effects as much as possible through means such as multiple data points for each question, confirmation of facts, customized data collection protocols that helped the team collect data in remote and insecure areas, and staggered data collection time frames. Conducting complex multidimensional data collection requires tight discipline, efficient use of time and resources, close communication with the team and the client, the ability to adapt and solve data collection problems on the spot, and the ability to be an evaluation diplomat when dealing with informants at all levels, but especially in senior positions. While considerable, these challenges were not unfamiliar or insurmountable.

BASELINE ASSESSMENT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Prior to the inception of TIS+, USAID/Somalia had invested a considerable amount of resources in specific settlement areas in the strategic clusters over the years. KIs and FGDS with youth leaders, women, elders, minority group members, and district and regional administration staff provided initial indicators of impact from more targeted stabilization assistance by the USG and partners. It is clear from findings that these clusters are strategic, critical to state- level and regional stability, and the most heavily impacted by CVE. At baseline, it is important to identify that where TIS+ staff and interventions have carried over from former activities, there are initial indications that the contribution that USAID/Somalia has made in linking citizens to more participatory and inclusive forms of programming is evident. It is also important to be mindful that there are a significant number of partners working in these clusters and that their contributions and impact are catalysts for and complements of TIS+. Stabilization is a continuum and where possible the team has sought to identify the areas of overlap relevant and these are outlined in the CA tables at the end of each cluster findings section.

TIS+ is a multi-layered project and this baseline analysis focuses on five strategic cluster areas. These are not administrative regions but clusters of districts where AS has continued influence, security is dynamic, and stability is critical for USG and national interests of Somalia. TIS+ focuses on community planning, contracting, and improving the oversight frameworks that strengthen citizen and government relationships at the district, regional, and national level. TIS+ follows on initial interventions in newly recovered areas with a consensus-based community-driven development model that prioritizes equitable participation in decision-making and management of community assets. Participatory, consensus-building approaches are used to build citizen confidence in the governing institutions and address critical local-level needs by

facilitating the construction and/or rehabilitation of vital community infrastructure (such as roads, bridges, community centers, local administration offices, health clinics, schools, water sources, and markets).

In more stable districts, TIS+ will begin to prioritize village-level participatory planning in a way that is synchronized with new local governance efforts. At baseline, there were some areas where TIS+ has already started work. Where this was evident the team worked to establish an initial narrative and picture of what the clusters looked like at the start of TIS+. Current context, conflict dynamics, and other stabilization initiatives were assessed and data collected at the settlement level to identify trends relevant to the cluster. There are variations in selection by the regions and by the regional governments. Some of these included local clan politics and proximity to areas that needed to be liberated, economic reasons, stabilization and governance priorities that don't overlap.

I. INTRODUCTION

Chronic instability in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 have resulted in two decades of warfare and violence in Somalia. The decades of instability, intercommunal conflict, and humanitarian crisis during the second half of the 20th century in Somalia were marked by numerous attempts at peacekeeping, stabilization, and international relief. Clan conflict, violent extremism, drought, famine, out-migration, and multiple failed central state governments have typified the obstacles facing a unified, independent Somali state capable of service delivery and crisis response. Somalia was not able to establish a complete central government until 2012 when the country held its first presidential election since 1967 after 20 years without a parliament. Despite the continued threats of disorder and violence posed by Al-Shabaab (AS), the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in partnership with the international community, has taken impressive strides toward durable peace and nation building. Most recently, with extensive support from the international community, Somalia held an “indirect” election on February 8, 2017, during which the popular candidate Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo was elected president in a second round of voting, unseating incumbent Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

In November 2016, FGS launched a draft of the first National Development Plan (NDP). This plan is organized per the following objectives: poverty reduction, infrastructure repair, strengthening state capacity, and sustaining political inclusivity.⁴ Gender mainstreaming and a focus on youth are both features of the NDP.

Strategic Framework for Somalia: 2016–2019

USAID’s development hypothesis for its 2016–2019 strategy is as follows:

If Somali governance systems and processes that enable inclusive governance are strengthened and the Somali people benefit from expanded, tangible dividends of the state-building project, then the foundation will be built for Somalia’s longer-term recovery.

This hypothesis recognizes that the process of Somalia’s recovery will extend far beyond the life of this strategy. However, it is in USAID’s manageable interest to focus on core strategic areas that are most important for Somalia’s transition, and to maintain sufficient flexibility to adapt both its strategic approach and its programmatic mechanisms to adjust to changing political, security, and developmental circumstances.

To assist Somalia in these efforts, the USAID Strategic Framework for Somalia 2016–2019 has identified three primary objectives to guide investments over the 2016–19 period that support the goal of building durable foundations for a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Somalia:

- Transition Objective 1: Systems and Processes that Enable Inclusive Governance Strengthened
- Transition Objective 2: Service Delivery Improved
- Transition Objective 3: Inclusive Economic Growth Expanded

The core assumption underpinning this strategy is that if there is an increase in political participation and trust in the political process; if effective, accountable, and representative governance institutions are strengthened; and if key communities are stabilized, then the necessary systems and processes that enable

⁴ Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. *National Development Plan Summary*. Accessed: February 15, 2017. <http://mopic.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/National-Development-Plan-Summary.pdf>

more inclusive governance in Somalia will be strengthened. The following sub-transition objective is focused on the area most relevant to this task order.

Sub-Transition Objective 1.1: Create Enabling Conditions through Stabilization of Key Communities

In fragile communities, such as those formerly under the control of AS, USAID/Somalia, in partnership with the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), will identify quick impact programming to provide immediate assistance and public assets to improve basic welfare in the months following a successful military operation. These efforts seek to increase the levels of confidence in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Somali National Army (SNA), and the government in each area, so that communities do not feel abandoned after military interventions. Through this initial assistance, citizens may conclude that they will not be excluded from services under the FGS and that development dividends may increase.

USAID will follow on these initial interventions with a consensus-based community-driven development model that prioritizes equitable participation in decision-making and management of community assets. USAID will work in tandem with multiple levels of government (e.g., caretaker and interim administrations, regional and state authorities, and the FGS) to help them build and strengthen relations with these communities.⁵ Participatory, consensus-building approaches will be used to build citizen confidence in the governing institutions and address critical local-level needs and to facilitate the construction and/or rehabilitation of vital community infrastructure (such as roads, bridges, community centers, local administration offices, health clinics, schools, water sources, markets, playgrounds, etc.).


Project Background

The intent of the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus (TIS+) activity is to support achievement of USAID's goal by fostering participatory processes that promote good governance and community cohesion. Given the fragile nature of the Somali government and the existence of an insurgency in parts of South Central Somalia, USAID is maintaining a continued focus through TIS+ on quick impact stabilization activities at the district and community levels. At the same time, Somalia is aiming to move from crisis response and stabilization to medium- and longer-term development, so TIS+ is also designed to support this aim. Under Somalia's New Deal Framework as well as the recently completed NDP, the FGS and the donor community have committed to advancing inclusive political dialogue, improving security, and increasing economic growth—pillars that TIS+ will also support.

TIS+ seeks to implement community-centric stabilization activities that are: (1) implemented with multiple levels of government (e.g., caretaker and interim administrations, new states, and the FGS); (2) supporting inclusive participation of stakeholder groups in community decision-making; and (3) encouraging shared asset management between citizens and the government to demonstrate the government's interest in and emerging capacity to contribute positively to citizens' daily lives. TIS+ is designed to contribute to improvements in government service delivery, leading to strengthened governance and community cohesion. The objectives of the TIS+ activity are outlined in Figure 2.

⁵ USAID Strategic Framework for Somalia: 2016–2019.

Figure 2: TIS+ Activity Objectives and Link to Analytical Foci



Stabilization and Security in Somalia

Ideological and politically driven conflicts have been on the rise for the past generation in Somalia. The impact of violent extremism in Somalia and transnationally is arguably one of the greatest threats to regional and state-level stability. Violent extremism (VE) does not act as a driver of conflict in the same way as other categorical drivers. Rather, in many instances, VE has been the end-product of marginalization and exclusion. In Somalia, economic, social, and political marginalization, along with uneven access to critical services, particularly security services, have made communities prone to VE, often undermining development gains. Defining VE has historically been complicated because in many instances, groups that were labeled terrorists by western governments became liberation movements and eventually governments. Also, the distinctions between subnational conflict actors and recognized terrorist organizations such as in Somalia are often difficult to delineate because communities view members of these groups in various ways depending on the services they provide and the role that they fill at the community level.

AS has established its own governing structures in the territories under its control in Somalia, providing social services as well as collecting taxes. As areas of Somalia become more inaccessible due to VE activity, communities living in these areas have no recourse but to accept services and security from groups that control their geographic spaces. While AS enjoyed support as a resistance group after the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, that support began to erode in 2009 when Sheikh Sharif became the country's

president and Ethiopian troops left the country. AS consequently lost some of its basis for popular support because it had depended on the goal of introducing Sharia law—which Sharif promised to do as president.


In 2009, AS officially pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda, and in 2012, Al Qaeda formally announced a merger between the two organizations. AS and Al Qaeda leaders have trained and fought together. Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, one of the top leaders of AS, published a statement in 2008 that praised Al Qaeda and explicitly shifted toward emphasizing the struggle in Somalia as part of a global jihad. AS aligned itself more closely with Al Qaeda in ideology and tactics. It began to target civilians through suicide attacks much more frequently, and the organization’s leadership began to include many Al Qaeda members. AS leveraged its relationship with Al Qaeda to attract foreign fighters and monetary donations from Al Qaeda’s supporters.

In 2015, the Islamic State (IS) released a video appealing for AS, as East Africa’s most prominent jihadi group, to pledge allegiance to IS. On April 25, 2016, IS claimed responsibility for its first terrorist attack in Somalia. In an official statement circulated on social media, the extremist group IS said its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a military vehicle belonging to African Union peacekeeping forces on the outskirts of Mogadishu, the country’s sprawling capital. It is the first time the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS or ISIL, officially declared its involvement in an operation in Somalia. The incident signals the extremist group’s desire to make inroads in a war-torn region. Increasing its base in Somalia could translate into big rewards for ISIS, including access to Africa’s longest coastline and the neighboring nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, all key U.S. allies. Currently it seems that AS and ISIS act more as competitors, but this is likely to change over time as allegiances and networks change in key areas of Somalia.

By magnifying the terror of their message, AS in Somalia has benefited from these tactics. The rapid proliferation of social media and the instantaneous, constant news cycle has played a role in guaranteeing the circulation of conflict and influence of AS. In the case of violent Islamist extremism, particularly Al-Qaeda and the IS, this technology is essential for their growth and reputation. The rapid dissemination of images of their terror has magnified the impact of these groups arguably beyond their actual reach.

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) researchers recently studied whether the use of remote violence, such as IEDs or roadside bombs, in sub-Saharan Africa enables armed groups to attack targets that they don’t have the power to attack more directly (ACLED, 2015b). Recent data on Al-Shabaab in Somalia is consistent with this trend. Since African Union troops pushed AS from Mogadishu in 2014 and the group lost territory, rates of remote violence by the terrorist organization have increased (see Figure 3). This figure also shows how these groups tend to use multiple tactics

Figure 3: ACLED 2015 Research Showing Increased IED Use by AS in Somalia



simultaneously. The increased use of IEDs both in Somalia and Kenya has been of increasing security concern.

Other militant groups are also active in Somalia and are in direct conflict with the government. Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a (ASWJ), another Somali militant organization that was established to protect the country's traditional form of Sufism, began to fight Al-Shabaab in 2008 after the group started destroying sacred Sufi sites. Besides these rival groups, Al-Shabaab also has various affiliates that have sworn allegiance to it. Those groups include a Kenyan militant organization called Al Hijra, also known as the Muslim Youth Center. Some of these groups may be absorbed into the SNA or military apparatus in Somalia.

II. BASELINE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Task Order Purpose

The primary purpose of the TIS+ baseline and endline assessment is to generate a better understanding of the extent to which TIS+ interventions have achieved their objectives and contributed to TIS+'s (and USAID's) goal of increased stability in Somalia through participatory processes that promote good governance and community cohesion. Specific clusters or geographic areas have been strategically chosen to be analyzed to assess the influence that the TIS+ activities have had on mitigating the effects of violent extremism and insurgency in these high-risk areas of Somalia. This task order is designed to assist USAID in identifying lessons learned from conducting stabilization activities in Somalia.

The Somalia Program Support Services (SPSS) team has designed a methodology that will identify findings that explicate how increased governance and social cohesion activities factor into TIS+ and what other external factors influence these changes. The baseline provides USAID and stakeholders with an initial analysis of the clusters prior to TIS+ interventions. There are few "clean" sites (i.e., locations without any donor intervention in the identified clusters) so control sites were not used. Instead the team used an approach called "contribution analysis" (CA) to assess United States Government (USG) investments and impact on measured changes. SPSS's methodology works on two levels: (1) to assess conditions at the cluster level (Phase 1 and 2); and (2) to aggregate these factors into a consolidated analysis at endline of TIS+ interventions across clusters (Phase 3 and 4).

Key Assessment Questions

The TIS+ baseline/endline assessment focuses on two levels of analysis: (1) within cluster analysis (cluster-level analysis) to be conducted during Phase 1 and Phase 2, and (2) cross-cluster analysis (comparative cluster analysis) to be conducted during Phase 3 and Phase 4. USAID has identified five clusters for analysis: (1) Lower Juba (Afmadow-Kismayo) (2) Gedo/Bay Region (which also includes Dinsoor), (3) Bakool, (4) Lower Shabelle, and (5) Banaadir (Mogadishu).

Table I below details the assessment questions and how they were adapted at baseline to assist in data analysis. At endline all questions will be answered in their original form and compared across clusters to show comparative approaches utilized by TIS+. This will be done in Phase 4 of this Task Order (TO) which is outlined in the Scope of Work (see Annex I).

Table 1: Key Assessment Questions: Baseline and Endline

No	Key Assessment Questions (KAQ)	Baseline Assessment KAQ Phase 1 and 2	Endline Assessment KAQ Phase 3 and 4
Cluster Level Analysis			
1	Did TIS+ contribute to any of the following anticipated results: ➤ Community ownership of development projects and processes? ➤ Effective shared asset management? ➤ Improved delivery/satisfaction of services? ➤ Reduced conflict over resources? ➤ Greater citizen confidence in government? ➤ Reduced support for violent extremism?	What is the status of the following at the cluster level? ➤ Community ownership of development projects ➤ Community ownership of development processes ➤ Shared asset management in the communities targeted by TIS+ ➤ Quality/Delivery of service targeted by TIS+ ➤ Conflict over resources ➤ Citizen access to information ➤ Citizen satisfaction in government ➤ Confidence in government ➤ Support for violent extremism	Endline, Phase 3, and Phase 4. Same as KAQ 1.
2	Were TIS+ approaches used in the cluster (e.g., the community consensus process) instrumental in contributing to the achievement of TIS+ results described in Question 1?	Endline only	Endline, Phase 3, and Phase 4. Same as KAQ 2.
3	Did government at all appropriate levels contribute sufficiently to asset management in communities in which TIS+ was implemented? How? Did government at all appropriate levels have both the capacity and the will to contribute?	What is the government (at all appropriate levels) contribution to asset management in communities targeted by TIS+? Level of communities' inclusion in the following: ➤ Setting priorities and identifying needs ➤ Community contracting ➤ Community contribution ➤ Community advocacy with government to provide services needed for intervention and response by government	Endline, Phase 3 and 4. Same as KAQ 3.
4	Were TIS+ activities inclusive of women, youth, and minority clans, as applicable to the context of the cluster being evaluated?	➤ Endline, Phase 3, and Phase 4. Same as KAQ 3.	Endline, Phase 3, and Phase 4. Same as KAQ 4.
Aggregate and Cross-Cluster Level Analysis (Endline: Phase 4)			
5	<i>In the aggregate</i> , did TIS+ contribute to the anticipated results described above? What range of results can be observed across assessed clusters?	Endline only	Endline, Phase 4. Same as KAQ 5.

6	Which cluster-level factors contributed most significantly to achievement of results? <i>For example:</i> ✓ Did successful inclusion of women, youth, and minority clans amplify the effectiveness of TIS+ activities? ✓ Were results greatest in newly liberated clusters or in bridge clusters? ✓ Were some kinds of interventions more effective than others in improving citizen confidence or reducing support for violent extremism?	Endline only	Endline, Phase 4. Same as KAQ 6.
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III. METHODS

The baseline employed a mixed-method approach that integrates a suite of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods implemented over two phases to answer the above key assessment questions. This methodology affords USAID a greater depth of comparative analysis across the clusters as well as aggregated analysis at the endline stages (Phase 3 and Phase 4). Data collection methods consist of a literature review, household (HH) survey, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and Community Checklists (CCs). Assessment questions are answered using a combination of these five data collection methods via the triangulation of evidence and the use of contribution analysis to estimate TIS+'s unique contribution to observed results.

CA is an analytical approach to *estimating* program effects in complex contexts with many factors and actors influencing intervention outcomes. CA is a good option for a stabilization program because it examines stabilization as a continuum and explores conflict dynamics. CA works within a Theory of Change (ToC) model to look at contribution from several angles. It employs an applied ToC approach to look beyond high-level outcomes (goal/objectives) to more specific activities and interventions across diverse project spaces.

Figure 4: Steps of Contribution Analysis

THE STEPS OF CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

1. Set out the cause-effect issue to be addressed in a detailed ToC.
2. Identify the risks to the postulated ToC, including rival explanations.
3. Gather evidence (baseline and endline).
4. Assemble and assess the contribution claim and challenges to it.
5. Seek out additional evidence.
6. Revise and strengthen the contribution story.

CA is a pragmatic and methodologically rigorous approach to situations in which the activity is one of many potential contributory causes and where it is not possible to measure attribution directly, as is often the case in stabilization programming. For this task order, CA is used to assess the contribution that TIS+ activities are making to observed outcomes based on the totality of evidence. The essential value of contribution analysis in this case is that it is designed to reduce uncertainty about the contribution TIS+ is making to the observed results through an increased understanding of why the observed results have occurred (or not) and the roles played by TIS+ interventions and other internal and external factors.⁶ This analytical approach is described in detail in Section IV of this report.

Data Collection

A quantitative HH survey was administered to residents living in communities where TIS+ activities are planned to be implemented. The qualitative data collection instruments included secondary literature review, in-depth KIIs with diverse TIS+ stakeholders, FGDs with persons living in the targeted clusters, and a community checklist tool, designed to better understand the status of community infrastructure

⁶ John Mayne. 2008. "Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect," http://dmeforpeace.org/sites/default/files/0501_Contribution_Analysis_ILAC.pdf.

planning within each cluster. This robust evidence base will be analyzed to provide comprehensive answers to KAQs 1-4 within clusters and KAQs 5-6 across clusters. A description of each data collection method is provided below as well as a description of the catchment and cluster areas accessible at baseline.

Security and Access

Somalia is a difficult terrain in which to gather data, and the team had to consider security limitations as well as the dynamic nature of districts and areas under varying stages of control by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is a dynamic and increasingly more networked group, both at the transnational and local (cluster/district) level. Al-Shabaab continues to control many rural areas in several regions, including the Lower Juba, Gedo/Bay, Lower Shabelle, and Bakool regions. Participants for the HH survey were selected by random walk and had to be full time residents of the cluster for a minimum of one year. Participants were stratified by gender (50% female/ 50% male) and the age range was 16 and above. FGD and KIs participants were selected based on similar criteria, but were not selected using a random walk method. Participants were either identified through AECOM and USAID or were selected based on pre-identified criteria such as age, time living in cluster, clan affiliation, and gender.

The following table shows the clusters and settlements that were accessible and inaccessible (due to insecurity) or excluded (due to small population size) during the baseline stage. This could change at endline.

Table 2: Clusters Surveyed at Baseline

Jubaland State	Gedo Region	South West State		Banaadir Regional Authority
Cluster 1 Lower Juba	Cluster 2 Gedo/Bay	Cluster 3 Bakool	Cluster 4 Lower Shabelle	Cluster 5 Mogadishu
Afmadow Kismayo	Baardheere Garbaharey Dinsoor* CeelWaaq *in Bay Region	Xudur Ceel Barde Waajiid	Wanleweyne Afgooye Merka Qoryooley Barawe	Bondhere Dharkenley Hodan Howl Wadag Huriwa Kaxda Karan Shibis Waberi Wadajir Warta Nabada Yaqshid
Areas Inaccessible at Baseline (due to security)				
Jilib Jamame	NA	Tayeglow Rab Dhuure	Kurtunwaarey Awdeghle	NA NA
Areas Excluded at Baseline (due to small population size)				
NA	NA	NA	NA	Abdiaziz Daynile Hamar Jajab Hamar Weyne Shangani

Literature Review

The first data collection method undertaken by the team was to conduct a comprehensive review of internal and external documents of relevance to the TIS+ activity. The SPSS team worked in coordination with USAID/SFO and the TIS+ management team to identify, collect, and review documents over the course of the evaluation that include, but are not limited to the following:

- Statements of work
- Activity designs, training curricula, event agendas, and other key documents for understanding the content of activities
- Annual work plans (initial and subsequent)
- Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (initial and revised)
- Quarterly and annual reports
- Results from TIS+ participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities
- SPSS monitoring and verification reports
- Additional documents such as stability assessments, community consensus reports, etc.
- External publications by other stabilization stakeholders, donors, academic researchers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO)

Household Survey

In partnership with Data and Research Solutions (DARS), a Somali research firm subcontracted by IBTCI, SPSS administered a cross-sectional HH survey to a randomly selected group of residents living in communities anticipated to participate in TIS+ activities within each of the five clusters for a total sample size of 2,271. Under the cluster-level approach, each cluster is treated as a separate analytical population for sampling purposes. This means that for each cluster examined, the baseline and endline survey samples must be large enough to draw statistically meaningful conclusions about the results of TIS+ activities within that cluster. Populations of each settlement were assessed to ensure that the sampling numbers reflected a realistic cross section of these small communities within the chosen clusters. The following table shows the sample size. Additional numbers reflect data quality control measures to ensure gender balance.

Table 3: Cluster Sample Size at Baseline

Cluster Samples Achieved at Baseline			
Jubaland State (JS)	Achieved Sample	Male (%)	Female (%)
Cluster 1: Lower Juba	453	221 (49%)	232 (51%)
Gedo/Bay Region **includes Dinsoor in Bay	Achieved Sample	Male (%)	Female (%)
Cluster 2: Gedo	500	249 (50%)	251 (50%)
South West State (SWS)	Achieved Sample	Male (%)	Female (%)
Cluster 3: Bakool	452	224 (50%)	228 (50%)
Cluster 4: Lower Shabelle	433	218 (50%)	215 (50%)
Banaadir	Achieved Sample	Male (%)	Female (%)
Cluster 5: Mogadishu	433	215 (50%)	218 (50%)
Total	2,271	1,127 (50%)	1,144 (50%)

The HH survey instrument was in part modeled on a past stabilization survey fielded in Somalia, which was used to generate the Transition Initiative for Stabilization (TIS) Survey Synthesis Report in 2014, and the TIS performance evaluation done by SPSS in 2016. The survey instrument for TIS+ was tailored to ensure that it accurately reflects TIS+ activities and their expected outcomes, while also ensuring that the key assessment questions could be assessed at both baseline and endline.

Index Tool

An Index Tool was developed to allow the team to aggregate a series of interrelated questions from the HH survey to establish benchmarks at the cluster level. This index assists the team in cross-cluster and aggregate analysis as well as providing an analytical anchor to look at the relationship between these factors: key assessment questions, TIS+ interventions, and impacts on stability. These measures will also

be used at endline to assess changes in areas of TIS+ programming detailed below. Additional information on the index tool can be found in Annex IV, the Quantitative Analysis Plan.

The primary goal of TIS+ is to increase good governance and community cohesion by promoting participatory processes and enhanced engagement with government, the private sector and communities. Based on this goal and the objectives of TIS+, the following index categories were established: *good governance*, *community cohesion*, and *stability*. Each category looks at specific subthemes that support these areas and the specific questions linked to each subtheme can be found in Annex IV Table 4. The stability index combines the measures used for *good governance* and *community cohesion* and incorporates specific measures on gender and inclusion of youth and minority groups. The goal for the TIS+ project is to increase stability in the clusters of implementation. And for stability to be achieved, two preconditions should be satisfied: (i) Increased good governance and (ii) increased community cohesion. The label *community cohesion* was used rather than social cohesion because the TIS+ assessment is looking at specific geographic areas and will be analyzing similarities and distinctions from these specific clustered communities.

This index looked at the following:

1. **Good governance** was assessed based on the designed activities of TIS+. This included a careful analysis and discussion with AECOM staff to determine the types of activities and interventions that would lend themselves to improved perceptions of good governance, focused on the community and district level. Eighteen HH survey questions were then constructed to reflect measurement scales that covered the following subthemes: (1) confidence in governance, (2) service delivery, (3) community–government relationships, and (4) stakeholder partnerships. Confidence in government included measures of the following: trust, perceptions of corruption, accountability to local populations/communities vs. clan interests, transparency, representation, and governance strengthening. Service delivery included measures of the following: access, satisfaction, quality, and security as a service provision responsibility of the government. Community-government relationship included measures of the following: participation and consultation in decision-making. Finally, stakeholders’ partnerships included the following measures: collaboration (among all stakeholders) and consensus building.
2. **Community cohesion** was assessed based on the design of TIS+ as well as an identification of the types of interventions that would lend themselves to improved community cohesion. These measures focused on the community level and looked at individual perceptions of community cohesion relevant to inclusion at the community level, particularly settlement and district levels. Fourteen HH survey questions were constructed to reflect measurement scales that covered the following subthemes: (1) peace building (status of conflict and conflict mitigation), (2) sociocultural activities, and, (3) national unity (perceptions of identity). Peace building included measures of the following: conflict management (over shared resources), conflict resolution, community interaction, and security improvement. Sociocultural activities included measures of the following: cultural and sport events and social integration primarily focused on inclusion in decision-making, participation in community planning and management, and perceptions of community engagement.
3. **Stability** measures are a compilation of *good governance* (18 questions) and *community cohesion* (14 questions), and include questions related to *gender inclusion*. Scores were then aggregated and compared at the cluster level and triangulated with qualitative interviews and focus group discussions.

The index was calculated based on the following:

- *Good Governance*. All 18 questions in the four subthemes are assumed to contribute equally; $(100\% \div 18) = 5.56\%$ (regardless of the subtheme).
- *Community Cohesion*. All 14 questions in the three subthemes are assumed to contribute equally; $(100\% \div 14) = 7.14\%$ (regardless of the subtheme).
- *Stability*. All 36 questions in the eight subthemes are assumed to contribute equally; $(100\% \div 36) = 2.78\%$ (regardless of the characteristic).

To validate index scores, one sensitivity analysis was conducted per index. The sensitivity analysis involves the design of two models: Model 1 is primary and Model 2 is required to validate Model 1 and check how estimated summary statistics and distributions would vary under a different scenario. A side-by-side comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 for each index score indicates that the proposed index calculation is valid and can be used for validation and triangulation with other tools of the TIS+ baseline and endline assessment. Below are presented the good governance, community cohesion and stability indices, showing the validation conducted to ensure utility.

Figure 5: Index Validation Models




Table 4 below shows the baseline scores by cluster. The index will help the assessment team analyze how these aspects impact local populations and what their perceptions are in these clusters of government services and community cohesion. At baseline, these measures were triangulated with the qualitative data

and at endline these scores will be used to compare TIS + intervention methods and their impact on these scores and variations across clusters. A detailed description of the method for construction of the indices is presented in Annex IV (Quantitative Analysis Plan) along with illustrative examples (Appendix I of Annex IV) of how calculations were done for two response scales: Binary (Yes/No) and Likert (strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree).

Table 4: Index Cluster Scores and Key (Baseline, Phase I, and Phase 2)

Baseline Index Scores	Jubaland State	Gedo/ Bay Region	South West State Clusters		Banaadir
	Lower Juba	Gedo/Bay	Bakool	Lower Shabelle	Mogadishu
Good Governance	57%	52%	54%	39%	40%
Community Cohesion	59%	60%	53%	52%	55%
Stability	60%	56%	55%	46%	46%
Color Key	Critical = < 50% (Crisis)		Average = 50% – 66% (Stable)		Green = > 67% (Development)

Key Informant Interviews

The SPSS team and DARS conducted over 100 KIIs at baseline. KIIs were essential in triangulating the results from the HH survey and elaborating on the index scores. KIIs allowed for more in-depth discussions with members of the communities and regional and district government officials familiar with stabilization efforts, USAID, and CVE programming. This includes 85 targeted KIIs and four relevant to each of the five clusters, for a total of 20 KIIs at the cluster level. The selection of the KIIs was done in collaboration with USAID/SFO and the TIS+ implementing partner, AECOM, to develop a representative list of informants well versed in the activity design, implementation, and anticipated results. The following represents the universe of KIIs that were targeted for data collection at the baseline stages:

- USAID officials in the USAID/SFO
- AECOM senior management, regional offices staff, and subcontractors staff
- Officials from the Emerging Federal States and relevant government actors at the central and district levels in Somalia
- Key staff from other stabilization programs that interact with TIS+ or support programming that shares its objectives and geography
- Representatives from private sector, nongovernmental, or governmental donor organizations collaborating with, or asked to collaborate with, TIS+ communities
- Participants purposively selected to contribute to contribution analysis relevant to analyzing the effects of TIS+ program design and activities within the targeted clusters and catchment areas

Focus Group Discussions

The SPSS team conducted a total of 78 FGDs. This included 68 targeted FGDs and two relevant to each of the five clusters, for a total of 10 additional FGDs at the cluster level. A major advantage of the FGD method, as opposed to other forms of qualitative research, is its flexibility for in-depth exploration of the knowledge and attitudes of the group toward specific cluster-level conditions relevant to TIS+ activities and processes (i.e., participation; initial levels of trust in district, regional and FGS officials; community contracting and planning approaches; and the inclusion of women, youth, minority clans, and members of other marginal groups in decision-making). Four FGDs were conducted in each selected settlement with the following groups: (1) female elder beneficiaries, (2) male elder beneficiaries, (3) male youth beneficiaries, and (4) female youth beneficiaries. This demography of FGDs was conducted in up to 50 percent of the TIS+ communities within a cluster.

Community Checklists

Qualitative researchers made direct observations about infrastructure planning and maintenance in sample communities using a detailed checklist as well as community-based dialogues at the cluster level. A total of over 100 structures were tracked and discussions were held in each cluster with community members currently active in community-driven infrastructure planning, project monitoring, and/or community maintenance of these structures. At baseline, the information provides analysis of the status of infrastructure planning within the clusters and at endline the tool will be used to compare TIS+ communities to past cluster-level experiences with community-driven and participatory practices such as consensus building, participatory planning processes, and in Bridging Plan communities. Bridging Plan communities are those where TIS+ is working in collaboration with government counterparts (local, state and regional) to strategically identify development projects (primarily infrastructure) that link districts and/or regions together. The idea is that these Bridging Plans and subsequent interventions will provide a blueprint for enhanced collaboration and transparency between government and citizens and assist in longer-term development planning.

Challenges and Mitigation Measures

Complex conflict contexts are challenging and the SPSS team noted some data collection limitations early on in fieldwork planning. The SPSS team designed an approach and management plan to mitigate anticipated effects as much as possible through means such as multiple data points for each question, confirmation of facts, customized data collection protocols that helped the team collect data in remote and insecure areas, and staggered data collection time frames. Conducting complex multidimensional data collection requires tight discipline, efficient use of time and resources, close communication with the team and the client, the ability to adapt and solve data collection problems on the spot, and the ability to be an evaluation diplomat when dealing with informants at all levels, but especially in senior positions.

The limitations and challenges identified at the baseline stage were mitigated, but will require consideration when planning for endline. Anticipating the Somali context and its inherent challenges, the team identified several important limitations that the SPSS approach addressed and will consider from baseline to endline planning.

- **Challenge:** *Identifying contribution to higher-level outcomes derived from relatively low-intensity, short-term, and issue-specific interventions.*
Mitigation measure: The SPSS team worked with both USAID and AECOM to review strategic approaches and ensure that even short term interventions would be measured in areas where significant impact or influence was noted.
- **Challenge:** *Ruling out alternative explanatory variables along the ToC based on multiple service providers in a similar geographic space. Balancing the validity of data and outcome analysis with a reasonable and well-evidenced causal analysis (i.e., applying contribution analysis) and balancing this with quantitative data evidence.*
Mitigation measure: The SPSS team worked to map potential contributions to longer term and more strategic goals at the baseline stage through contribution analysis at the cluster level.
- **Challenge:** *Ensuring that HH level data collection was applied consistently across diverse geographic spaces and diverse populations. Local dialects and terminology required careful translation and enhanced enumerator training.*
Mitigation measure: SPSS trained the field teams and had three team members working on data quality control and oversight with field supervisors in Somalia.
- **Challenge:** *Collecting sufficient data to inform the assessment questions and to plan for baseline and endline tool needs within and across clusters. Data analysis needs to be clearly articulated within cluster and across cluster groups to show variations and distinctions that will contribute efficiently to the design and implementation of future stabilization programs in Somalia.*

Mitigation measure: The assessment questions were adapted to reflect the baseline phases and will be addressed in full at endline planning stages. Tools will be adapted to reflect more in depth data collection needs post TIS+ intervention using similar data collection methods. Cross-cluster analysis will reflect changes in baseline conditions as well as intervention influences noted through data collection and CA analysis. Tool consistency is essential but adaptations to the tools will be needed at endline to capture the effects of community contracting, bridging plan development, consensus process, etc.

- **Challenge:** *Changes need to be measured in collaboration with the government at all levels (FGS, regional, district, and local administration). These findings will also need to be validated with beneficiaries at the endline stage. At baseline this was not necessary, but at endline this will be essential to ensure that TIS+ efforts are adequately captured, particularly impacts on improved governance at the local/ district and regional levels.*

Mitigation measure: Many of the planned TIS+ interventions involve support for FGS ministries and regional and district governments. At endline, interviews and FGDs will be held with government officials as well as direct beneficiaries of these efforts to measure the value and influence of these interventions within and across clusters.

- **Challenge:** *Obtaining the perspective of women and marginalized groups proved to more difficult than anticipated, requiring specific data collection methods as well as staffing.*

Mitigation measure: Female field operatives are essential as are local staff knowledgeable about the local clan dynamics and impacts on cluster conditions. Additional female enumerators were hired and trained to ensure that these perspectives were captured at all stages of data collection in Somalia.

- **Challenge:** *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) impact dynamics and are likely to impact the terrain over the life of the TO and not just with regard to conflict, climate change, drought cycles, etc.*

Mitigation measure: The SPSS team has worked to identify and understand the specific IDP issues at the FGS, state and regional level. TIS+ beneficiary populations will consist of IDPs and it is essential that this group and their needs be identified and well articulated in project planning and data collection.

- **Challenge:** *People have a lot to say, but data is hard to move around. Al-Shabaab is a serious impediment to safety at the local level so moving data is not easy.*

Mitigation measure: Data movement requires time, patience, and creative techniques. Often it is necessary to have separate staff conduct the FGDs and KIs and then have another team transport the data out of remote areas. Phones, recorders, and electronic devices are sometimes not allowed, so these potential situations need to be anticipated and planned for.

Limitations

- Due to poor security conditions (settlements controlled by AS) during the data collection, the research firm DARS was unable to collect data in five settlements: Awdeghle, Kurtunwarey, Jilib, Jamame, Tayeglow and Rabdurre. To achieve the minimum required number of completed interviews in each cluster, the sample sizes for these settlements were redistributed to other settlements proportional to the settlement population sizes.
- Five settlements targeted by TIS+ activity had a relatively small population size (10, 574 – 30, 833), less than the anticipated minimum number of households (3 – 8) to be interviewed per settlement. These settlements were Abdiaziz, Daynile, Hamar Jajab, Hamar Weyne and Shangani. To achieve the minimum required number of completed interviews in each cluster, the sample sizes for these settlements were redistributed to other settlements proportional to the settlement population sizes.
- While ensuring that the planned sample size was achieved, the redistribution method described above has the potential to introduce a Type I error by failing to collect data from the inaccessible or excluded settlements above. The likelihood of a Type I error is considered small, since most of the settlements within each cluster were considered to be homogeneous, meaning that similar data patterns would be observed if excluded from the survey.

- Community cohesion is the term used by AECOM and USAID for the TIS+ activity because this term implies that a specific geographic community is the defined target of analysis. The definition is similar to *social cohesion* but implies a more distinct group of people sharing a common government, vision and pathway for opportunity. The diversity of these groups is a strength if the community has shared and equal access to resources, opportunity and agency. Community cohesion is usually a specific goal and objective for local government programs seeking to minimize tensions or discord in diverse communities.

IV. CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS AND TIS+

The Role of Contribution Analysis

TIS+ operates within a wider system in which it is only one of several factors that potentially affect activity outcomes. One purpose of contribution analysis is to identify the effect that TIS+ programming had in an environment with other stabilization actors and influences at both the baseline and endline stages. “Stabilization actors” is specific and refers to other donors, military, government counterparts, and NGOs working specifically on stabilization-type activities. To ensure that this is consistent at baseline and endline, this term is used to identify specific counterparts that complement or work in conjunction with TIS+ efforts.

The TIS+ Assessment team integrated the following steps into the data collection and analysis process to ensure that CA is applied to the development of sound and reasonable conclusions for USAID and TIS + stakeholders at both the baseline and endline stages.

During baseline (Phase 1 and 2) CA has been applied in the following ways:

1. Set out the cause-and-effect issue to be addressed in a detailed ToC. This step maps out the cause-and-effect logic leading from project activities to expected outcomes and carefully outlines the expected outcomes, possible unexpected outcomes, and causal linkages, along with key assumptions and causal mechanisms underpinning the ToC.
2. Identify the risks to the postulated ToC, including rival explanations. This step assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the cause-and-effect logic underlying the ToC and assesses the nature and extent of TIS+’s contribution to each expected result, along with factors that imperil the hypothesized causal linkages and other possible contributory factors and rival explanations.
3. Gather evidence. This step involves the implementation of the data collection methods described above to gather evidence for the contribution analysis, particularly (1) whether the expected results did or did not occur, (2) why expected results did or did not occur, and (3) the causal process and contextual and other contributory factors explaining why expected results did or did not occur.

At endline (Phase 3 and Phase 4) CA will contribute the following to the overall analysis:

4. Assemble and assess the contribution claim and challenges to it. This step constructs the contribution story, while assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the cause-and-effect logic considering the evidence collected during the previous step, the relevance of other contributory factors, and the evidence for rival explanations.
5. Seek out additional evidence. This step determines what kind of additional evidence is needed to enhance the credibility of the contribution claim and gather the appropriate evidence, as feasible.
6. Revise and strengthen the contribution story. Having identified and addressed any challenges to our credibility, such as the strengths of certain assumptions and/or the roles of other influencing factors, this step builds a more credible contribution story. Because this process involves both bottom-up and

top-down measurement of change, it provides triangulation of evidence for change up and down the project ToC. It also provides a reasonably robust approach to measure contribution and guard against “self-importance bias,” which occurs when the relative importance of other contextual factors is underestimated and the importance of project-specific factors is overestimated.

An Applied Theory of Change for TIS+

A ToC explains “what will need to happen in order to get from ‘here’ (the prevailing undesired situation) to ‘there’ (the intended outcome or result).”⁷ A ToC is used at different levels, ranging from high-level theories about how wider social, political, and behavior changes happen to theories about how programs and projects will work within this wider context.⁸ USAID/Somalia has a ToC that summarizes at a high level how change is expected to happen in its focal areas of intervention in Somalia and the TIS+ ToC feeds into this higher-level theory.

Summary of TIS+ High-Level Theory of Change

Community-centric stabilization activities that (1) are implemented with multiple levels of government (i.e., caretaker and interim administrations, new states, and the FGS), (2) support inclusive participation of stakeholder groups in community decision-making, and (3) through these means lead to shared asset management will demonstrate the government’s interest and emerging capacity to contribute positively to citizens’ daily lives. Effective shared asset management will increase stability by improving service delivery and demonstrating good governance processes, thereby improving citizen confidence in government and reducing the appeal of violent extremism.

TIS+ has worked on articulating a “development hypothesis” at the overarching program level including a summary of the intervention logic, mechanisms, and assumptions. These overarching mechanisms and assumptions developed for the TIS+ Monitoring and Evaluation Plan⁹ were an excellent starting point for the current ToC and have been incorporated into it. However, Contribution Analysis requires a ToC that is much closer to the level of the interventions, or what the program is doing, and that describes the sequence of resultant behavior changes that are expected to lead or catalyze outcomes.¹⁰ It is necessary to ask at endline whether the program was implemented as originally planned, and to assemble the evidence for the behavior changes expected and the other factors and actors that may have influenced these changes. In response to this need, and as required in the task order, we have built on TIS+ existing work to develop a fuller ToC for these purposes. The development of this ToC was based on a one-day workshop on 14 June 2017 in Nairobi with TIS+ field and headquarters staff, as well as the USAID/Somalia lead for the TIS+ activity. We have also drawn on existing TIS+ work on ToC and other program documents.

⁷ Tembo, F. 2012. “Citizen Voice and State Accountability: towards theories of change that embrace contextual dynamics,” ODI Working Paper 343 <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7557.pdf>

⁸ Marjan van Es, Irene Guijt, and Isabel Vogel. 2015. *Theory of Change Thinking in Practice: A Stepwise Approach*. Hivos.

⁹ Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus (TIS+) Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (August 2016)

¹⁰ Davies, R. 2012. “Criteria for assessing the evaluability of a Theory of Change.” Rick on the Road Blog. <http://dmeforpeace.org/learn/criteria-assessing-evaluability-theory-change>


Figure 6: TIS+ High-Level Mechanisms of Change

- By improving the delivery of services to citizens, supporting government accountability to the people in service delivery, and empowering citizens to determine their relationship with government, public confidence in the government will increase.
- By facilitating a peaceful planning process for activities, partnerships will develop among civil society, the private sector, and government, ensuring Somalis will be empowered to create stability.
- By requiring inclusive, participatory, and transparent processes, citizens will feel a sense of ownership over those processes and the results of those processes.
- By employing strategic communication methods, Somali culture (dance, poetry, painting) and values will be reinforced and the influence of extremists will be reduced.

Hence, we have aimed to generate a ToC that captures the core interventions within TIS+ providing the basis for testable hypotheses and propositions for assessment at endline. This ToC should not, however, be regarded as something set in stone. It will naturally change over time as the program changes and adapts. TIS+ may want to iterate the ToC over time, and the endline assessment will need to update the theory to reflect any changes in program implementation in the changing Somali context. It is important to note that TIS+ is operating in the most complex and dynamic of programming environments, making it more important to use ToC as a process and a flexible approach, rather than a prescribed methodology.¹¹ This ToC is nonetheless an important guide to the original intentions of the program, and any changes to the ToC during implementation will be captured at endline, and will in themselves be interesting findings. We have presented the ToC in the form of a diagram in *Figure 7* that is focused squarely on what the interventions are doing.

¹¹ Vogel, I. 2012. "Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in International Development." Review Report and Practical Resource – Draft, UK Department of International Development.

Figure 7: Applied Theory of Change for TIS+ (Baseline Stage)



Overarching Mechanism: Community–Government Engagement

The ToC development workshop, as well as TIS+ documents, reveals that “The TIS+ model is strongly based on a community-government programming approach.”¹² The high-level mechanisms of change already developed by TIS+ in its M&E plan reflect the centrality of this community-government approach, as shown in the adjacent text box. We have reflected this by placing this community and government engagement at the center of the ToC diagram.

This model is the basis of TIS+ Objective 1 work, which accounts for the program’s largest expenditure, and the Objective 2 work, which is a modification designed for areas that have achieved a higher level of stability and have a stronger semblance of district government. TIS+ Objective 3, on supporting Somali engagement, is a cross-cutting objective that feeds into the work under Objectives 1 and 2, or allows for activities supporting social reconciliation or cohesion in communities that may be too volatile for Objective 1 activities, where Objective 1 is planning to roll out, or where it is already implementing. It follows a similar process of using community consensus groups, but also allows for some activities to be supported without conducting the full community engagement process. There are other exceptions to the core TIS+ community engagement process, whereby TIS+ may deliver quick impact projects, for example airstrips, that are crucial to establishing government legitimacy and infrastructure and allowing other actors, including humanitarian actors, to enter.

Objective 4 integrates gender across the program in a holistic manner and is represented in this way in the ToC diagram. This objective encompasses both the focus on women’s participation in the community consensus process and coordination within and between district, state, and federal levels of government on gender-sensitive planning and implementation.

We have included TIS+ work on capacity building in ministries at state and district level on the right-hand side of the ToC diagram because, although this work is not covered by a separate objective, it is only partly intended to support Objective 1 and 2 activities, and is also intended to strengthen communication across levels of government on stabilization activities.

Intervention-Level Mechanisms

This section outlines some of the crucial mechanisms highlighted in the ToC workshop, starting from the bottom of the results chain, and the bottom of the ToC diagram.

Understanding local dynamics and conflict drivers is a key mechanism for ensuring inclusivity in the intervention process and outcome, and to ensure interventions do no harm. The ToC workshop highlighted the importance of ensuring TIS+ staff know and understand these dynamics.

Inclusivity in the community consensus, planning, financing, and monitoring process is key to its proper functioning. This ensures that the interventions do not reinforce or create grievances in allowing specific clans or stakeholders to dominate. When inclusivity is ensured the intervention process itself can allow a level of cooperation between actors that was not present before. For example, where grievances between two clans are entrenched, having representatives from both cooperating in an iterative process of selection, financing, and monitoring a project is as important to building cohesion as the resulting project. Inclusivity is especially important in areas where Al-Shabaab members, sympathizers, or Al-Shabaab relatives are often part of the community, and where affiliation to Al-Shabaab or FGS may shift over time. It is important that the entire community is aware of how TIS+ works, and that it is intended to include and benefit the whole community.

¹² Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus (TIS+) Process of Engagement document (March 2016).

The community gets the chance to meet and collaborate with government in an iterative process, building trust and legitimacy. This mechanism goes to the heart of the TIS+ model. Community and government representatives are involved in the planning, selection, contracting, and monitoring of projects. If the community engagement has been inclusive (see the mechanism above) this gives an opportunity for all parts of the community (including youth and women) to meet and collaborate with government.

TIS+ Technical Coordinators support the work of Objectives 1 and 2, as well as building supply-side capacity on stabilization across different levels of government. Technical Coordinators can ensure and promote supply-side engagement with Objective One and Two interventions, and on the other hand, the ministries in which the coordinators work can pitch ideas to the TIS program. There are already signs that ministries are engaging more with TIS+ and other donor-funded interventions as a result. The coordinators' more outward facing role in supporting broader stabilization work across government contributes to sustainable supply-side capacities.

The ability to tailor interventions to the immediate needs of communities under blockade by Al-Shabaab will maximize responsiveness to immediate stabilization needs. TIS+ is working in some communities that are under full blockade by Al-Shabaab and are effectively cut off from other recovered areas. TIS+ has been considering how the needs of these communities may differ from other intervention areas. In these areas, speed and quality of delivery is critical for stabilization, and prioritizing this may be more important than engaging in the full community consensus and planning process in the first instance. In addition, communities of this type may be less able to mobilize some of their own resources to support TIS+ projects, compared with those in areas not under full Al-Shabaab blockade.

Intervention-Level Assumptions

Assumptions are that the factors within, and external to, the program must behave as we expect or hope them to for the mechanisms to work as expected. The TIS+ M&E plan lists some high-level assumptions that are especially relevant to the top levels of the results chain and the ToC. We include these in the text box below. This section aims, however, to flesh out some of the assumptions at the more granular intervention level, starting from the bottom of the ToC diagram.

Figure 8: High-Level TIS+ Assumptions

- The security situation does not deteriorate in Mogadishu to the point where the Federal Government of Somalia falls and antigovernment elements take control
- The capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia at various levels (central, state, regional, district and subdistrict) is built to deliver on its mandate, and in turn promotes good governance and increased security
- Political stability in Somaliland continues and there is increased engagement and enhanced coordination by the USG and international community
- Puntland remains relatively stable but continues to be challenged by increased presence of Al-Shabaab as they are dislodged from their traditional bases in South Central Somalia
- Coordination within the international community continues and the current operating status is maintained or improved, providing TIS+ with the ability to move forward with the implementation of the TIS+ program
- Stabilization clusters as well as pockets of opportunity continue to arise in South Central Somalia

Al-Shabaab does not understand local conflict dynamics better than we (both TIS+ and the government) do. We have mentioned above the importance of understanding local conflict dynamics as a mechanism, and the corresponding assumption is that TIS+ staff do understand these dynamics. This

will inevitably be easier in some areas than in others, and the relative lack of data on and access to newly recovered areas will undermine this assumption.

Community engagement is sufficiently inclusive. We have mentioned above the importance of inclusivity as a mechanism. The corresponding assumption is that the engagement process will be consistently inclusive, which is likely to be more challenging in some areas than in others, and will depend upon the extent TIS+ staff understand, and can control or mitigate, the propensity of certain actors to dominate.

District Commissioners (DCs) and state and federal officials do not try to skew TIS+ interventions toward certain interest groups. Related to the above assumption, we know that the involvement of DCs is crucial to the TIS+ process, but they are often used to certain practices and ways of working and distributing resources in project implementation. TIS+ staff need to manage these practices to ensure the transparency of the process while maintaining the buy-in of DCs.

Fear of Al-Shabaab retaliation against those involved in TIS+ work will not be prohibitive.

Al-Shabaab does target Somalis who are working with the Federal Government of Somalia both in recovered territories and in territories that revert to Al-Shabaab control. There have been two cases in which Somalis who were engaging in TIS+ intervention processes were targeted by Al-Shabaab, although it remains unclear whether their involvement with TIS+ was the main reason for being targeted. This assumption is crucial to all TIS+ intervention areas and the corresponding risks are monitored by the program. However, the fact that TIS+ works predominantly in areas that have been fully recovered and less in the more “grey” areas that are in the process of recovery means that this assumption is deemed to be relatively stable in TIS+ locations.

The right stakeholders are always available and willing to engage with TIS+ processes and projects. Objective 2 activities aim at including a broader range of actors and leveraging resources from the private sector and other stakeholders. In some areas, TIS+ has strong stakeholders available and interested in working with the program, such as strong Chambers of Commerce. In other areas, such actors may not be so well organized or willing to engage.

Drought does not negatively affect the TIS+ intervention level. The ToC workshop discussed at length the effects of the ongoing drought on TIS+ interventions. Although the drought is having mixed effects on higher-level issues of government legitimacy, the outcomes of which are uncertain, at the intervention level drought has already been seen to affect the ability of communities to focus their own resources on TIS+ interventions. For example, where TIS+ works with the Chamber of Commerce or other private sector actors, these may naturally prioritize drought-related support during times of drought.

V. ENDLINE PLANNING

The clusters chosen for TIS+ are critical for stability in Somalia and are strategic in the fight against AS. As shown in interviews with USAID, AECOM staff, and FGS stakeholders, these five clusters have some of the most active and complex stabilization dynamics. Although most districts remain relatively stable, there are active areas of instability and various levels of AS influence five to ten miles outside these areas. The following is also true for analysis at the cluster level:

- These areas are also problematic for the FGS, and by choosing these clusters the USG can engage at a more strategic level with the FGS and state-level government as it evolves.
- Cluster-level and cross-cluster analysis allows USAID more detailed information on *effect vs efforts*.

- Synergies can more effectively be leveraged to maximize USG impact and share “risk” across stabilization stakeholders.
- TIS+ is less “reactive” and more “responsive” focusing on the demand *and* the supply side of stabilization needs.
- Bridging plans and targeted partnership activities can be tracked for specific impact on stabilization with host country counterparts as well as beneficiaries.

At baseline, it is evident that there are a several factors that will influence changes in these environments, and although TIS+ is the largest program in these clusters, it is not the only program working on improving governance, community cohesion, and stabilization. SPSS has mapped carefully the partners, programs, and factors that are most likely to impact and influence the work of TIS+. At endline further information will be solicited from specific programs likely to influence TIS+ such as the stipend program for police and the SNA that is being funded by the State Department and United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID).

At baseline, TIS+ was not yet working in all the clusters, so it was important to understand clearly the current conditions in these clusters prior to interventions. Where TIS+ had worked, SPSS was careful to choose and plan data collection tools to mitigate this potential influence. At endline these tools will be refined to look at specific project activities and processes in these clusters and compare TIS+ planning to methods used by other donors. Interviews will be much more targeted to direct beneficiary groups. SPSS will also look more deeply at cross-cluster differences, and identify where these differences have impacted governance, community cohesion, and/or stabilization and in what ways TIS+ approaches contributed to this. SPSS will look at all objective areas of TIS+ and look at more technical interventions, such as capacity development approaches used within the FGS and at the state level embedding staff-specific ministries.

The interviews conducted at baseline and the analysis of baseline data reinforce that CA methods are an excellent match for USAID and TIS+. CA is particularly appropriate in situations in which “multiple initiatives are working towards the same end” and complex environments mean that linear attribution of results to any one intervention is “neither meaningful nor accurate.”¹³ Stabilization programs fit these criteria and are good candidates for the use of CA methods. The suitability of CA for programing in conflict affected contexts has been recognized in several sources,¹⁴ but a literature search has revealed that few CA evaluations/assessments of such programs are available. Therefore, the application of CA methods is an innovation for USAID/Somalia and TIS+ that can add to improving methods of assessing programming in the future. Whenever possible we have adapted this to also fit a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program approach. We have done this by assessing various strategies to minimize the influence of AS at the programmatic and donor strategy level and comparing these approaches to TIS+ implementation and program planning.

By now the six steps in CA are fairly familiar. We have updated the steps to reflect what has been done in the baseline phase, the sequence of the analytical process, and the supplementary data collection needed at endline. This will allow USAID/Somalia staff and stakeholders to assess where we are at present and where we aspire to be by the end of the TO.

¹³ Quinn Patton, Michael. 2008. *Utilization-Focused Evaluation: The New Century*. 4th edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

¹⁴ Goldwyn, Rachel and Diana Chigas. 2013. “Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Sensitivity: Methodological Challenges and Practical Solutions” DFID, CARE and CDE Collaborative Learning Projects Paper; Rogers, Mark. 2012. “Selecting Evaluation Approaches: Options in Peacebuilding Evaluation” Care International Paper.


Table 5: CA Steps and the Baseline/Endline Assessment

Contribution Analysis Steps	TIS+ Evaluation Phase	Where We Are in the Process
Step 1: Set out the cause-effect issue to be addressed in a detailed ToC. This step maps out the cause-and-effect logic leading from project activities to expected outcomes and carefully outlines the expected outcomes, possible unexpected outcomes, and causal linkages, along with key assumptions and causal mechanisms underpinning the ToC.	Baseline, Phase 1, and Phase 2 Endline, Phase 3	During the baseline phase a ToC workshop was conducted with TIS+ staff and a representative from USAID. Based on this workshop, as well as a review of existing TIS+ work on ToC, a draft ToC was developed for the baseline. This ToC is a more detailed articulation of the mechanisms at work in the causal linkages between activities and expected results, as well as assumptions on which these are based. This ToC will need to be revisited and refined at the beginning of the endline but will demonstrate the intended program theory at the baseline stage.
Step 2: Identify the risks to the postulated ToC, including rival/alternative explanations. This step assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the cause-and-effect logic underlying the ToC and assesses the nature and extent of TIS+'s contribution to each expected result, along with factors that imperil the hypothesized causal linkages and other possible contributory factors and rival/alternative explanations.	Baseline, Phase 2 Endline, Phase 3	This step will mostly be fulfilled during the endline phase, when the ToC is revisited and tweaked to reflect actual implementation. However, at baseline, we have begun to map out the other actors and factors influencing the mechanisms and expected outcomes, and we have presented these for each cluster. They include both expected factors that will positively influence hypothesized linkages and negative factors that will imperil them. The endline will need to assess whether the expected factors did have an effect as well as identify factors that were not evident at baseline. We elaborate in the text how these factors will be used either to confirm the hypothesized mechanisms or to develop alternative explanations.
Step 3: Gather evidence. This step involves the implementation and use of Endline TIS+ data collection methods to gather evidence for the contribution analysis, particularly (1) whether the expected results did or did not occur, (2) why expected results did or did not occur, and (3) the causal process and contextual and other contributory factors explaining why expected results did or did not occur.	Endline, Phase 3	This step involves using the data collected with the main endline tools, including the HH survey, KIIs, and FGDs. These tools are designed to gather evidence on whether the expected results occurred as well as generate evidence on why they occurred, at the cluster level . The endline tools will also include questions on external factors influencing outcome areas. Existing datasets and documents will also be used, including TIS+ monitoring and other studies and databases mapping stabilization, humanitarian, and development actors in Somalia.
Step 4: Assemble and assess the contribution claim and challenges to it. This step constructs the contribution story while assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the cause-and-effect logic considering the evidence collected during the previous step, the relevance of other contributory factors, and the evidence for rival explanations.	Endline, Phase 3	Using the analysis and supplementary data collection in step 3 above, the CA process will now generate contribution stories at the cluster level for each of the major results evident at this level. This will involve mapping out in detail what the TIS+ contribution claim is linking its activities to the observed results and then considering and laying out the other explanations for the results.

Step 5: Seek out additional evidence. This step determines what kind of additional evidence is needed to enhance the credibility of the contribution claim and gather the appropriate evidence, as feasible.	Endline, Phase 3	The CA process will conduct supplementary KIs and FGDs to ask specifically what factors were decisive in explaining the results observed.
Step 6: Revise and strengthen the contribution story. Having identified and addressed any challenges to the credibility of the contribution stories, such as the strengths of certain assumptions and/or the roles of other influencing factors, this step builds a more credible contribution story.	Endline, Phase 4: Synthetic Comparative Analysis	Individual cluster-level contribution stories will be finalized, including scorings and assessments. Then the CA process will look across contribution stories and produce a synthesis that analyzes findings within and between clusters, and makes an assessment about the overall contribution of TIS+ to its higher-level objectives.

The above steps will need to be properly sequenced with the design of the final endline data collection tools so that CA requirements can influence the design of the tools. This will ensure that data is collected and available in time to inform specific steps in the analysis of data.

Figure 9: Sequencing of Data Collection Tools and CA at Endline



Influencing Factors and Alternative Explanations

It is important to outline the difference between influencing factors and alternative explanations in CA. Influencing factors are used to either support contribution stories or to support alternative explanations for results observed. We show in Table 6 below definitions of influencing factors and alternative explanations developed by a practitioner of contribution analysis.¹⁵

¹⁵ Lemire, Sebastien et al. 2012. "Making Contribution Analysis Work: A Practical Framework for Handling Influencing Factors and Alternative Explanations." Evaluation Journal, Association of Evaluators, 2012 pp. 294-309.

Table 6: CA Definitions and Terms

Influencing factor	<p><i>Influencing factors are contextual conditions that might enable or impede mechanisms ... they can be considered at different levels:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The individual capacities of key actors and stakeholders such as interests, capacities, and credibility</i> • <i>The interpersonal relationships required to support the intervention such as management</i> • <i>The institutional setting, such as culture, leadership</i> • <i>The wider (infra)-structural and welfare system, such as political support, the availability of funding and resources</i>
Alternative explanation	<p><i>Alternative explanation is best viewed as a competing explanation to the claimed mechanism that represents a plausible rival explanation for the observed outcome(s). In the context of CA, alternative explanations may potentially modify, or even undermine, the intended primary explanatory mechanism, and hence affect the explanatory capacity of the contribution story.</i></p> <p><i>CA may develop different types of explanations:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Direct rival explanation: a mechanism different from the program's claimed mechanism. This is a rival explanation for observed results that if accepted would reduce the estimate of the program's contribution.</i> • <i>Commingle explanation: other mechanisms that, along with the intervention, contribute to observed outcomes together. This is especially important in the case of TIS+, which is explicitly designed to work with other interventions, and to leverage other resources from development partners and communities.</i>

Influencing factors for stabilization include both contextual factors and other interventions. Contextual factors will be strongly linked to conflict analyses at the intervention level produced by TIS+, other development partners, and academics. Other interventions include donor and partner contributions where relevant in the targeted areas. Other donor programs working on similar activities and overlapping geographically are also potential data sources. TIS+ maps and actively collaborates with stabilization actors in TIS+ areas, and this will be analyzed for contribution, impact, and relevance. In addition, there are other initiatives to map stabilization such as host country, development, and humanitarian actors in Somalia, with which the baseline has begun to engage, and others that will require more research and targeted KIs and FGDs with direct beneficiary groups at endline.

Developing a Stabilization Narrative: Contribution Stories

Because CA is an analytical tool and not a method of data collection, it relies on the types of data that are being generated to feed the analytical process. TIS+ itself, and the baseline and endline assessments, will operate and collect data at the cluster level. Therefore, observed results and contribution stories will also be generated at this level. Major results observed in each cluster will be turned into contribution stories so that the cross-cluster analysis can reach an assessment of the overall contribution to outcomes of TIS+. To reach robust conclusions, CA contribution stories must meet certain criteria for establishing a plausible link between the intervention and the observed results.¹⁶ The narrative sections of the contribution stories at endline will be structured per these criteria, with the addition of a final section explaining the overall assessment:

1. *Plausibility: Is the theory of change plausible?*
2. *Implementation per plan: Has the program been implemented with high fidelity?*
3. *Evidentiary confirmation of key elements: To what extent are the key elements of the theory of change confirmed by new or existing evidence?*

¹⁶ Mayne, J. 2011. "Addressing cause and effect in simple and complex settings through contribution analysis." In: Schwartz R., K. Forss and M. Marra, eds. *Evaluating the Complex: Attribution, Contribution and Beyond*. New York: Transaction Publishers.

4. Identification and examination of other influencing factors: *To what extent have other influencing factors been identified and accounted for?*
5. Disproof of alternative explanations: *To what extent have the most relevant alternative explanations been disproved?*
6. Overall assessment of contribution (including performance table).

CA has sometimes been criticized for lacking a consistent operational approach for assessing the strength of evidence for plausible associations. Several CA practitioners have responded by developing “performance sheets” that cover the key elements of the assessment as well as scoring the strength of the evidence for each element and of the influencing factors. These rankings are sometimes complicated, and due to the complexity of the TIS+ intervention and its context, we recommend simplifying the scorings to three scores (strong, medium, and weak) as shown in the below illustrative example. The endline will develop detailed definitions for each score.

Table 7: Contribution Story Scoring Sheet

Contribution Story Scoring Sheet						
Mechanism	Are we seeing evidence of the effects we would expect? (weak, moderate, strong)	Was the intervention implemented fully? (Fidelity)	Influencing factors - positive influence (weak, moderate, strong)	Strength of evidence (weak, moderate, strong)	Influencing factors - negative influence (weak, moderate, strong)	Strength of evidence (weak, moderate, strong)
The community meets and collaborates with government in an iterative process, building trust and legitimacy.	Moderate evidence of increased trust in government.	Yes, the intervention was implemented as planned, with X number of meetings involving community and government representatives.	Two other programs had also supported community councils.	Strong evidence that other programs had a positive effect.	District Councilors were favoring groups.	Moderate evidence from the HH survey and FGDs.
					Clan conflict over land-grabbing undermined inclusion in community consultation.	Moderate evidence from TIS+ monitoring and FGDs.

VI. BASELINE ASSESSMENT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Prior to the inception of TIS+, USAID/Somalia had invested a considerable amount of resources in specific settlement areas in the strategic clusters over the years. Where there has been overlap with TIS, and where TIS+ was active prior to baseline data collection, there is evidence that the impacts of these efforts have shifted the rubric of participation in some of these settlement areas. KIs and FGD interviews with youth leaders, women, elders, minority group members, and district and regional administration staff provided initial indicators of impact from more targeted stabilization assistance by the USG and partners. It is clear from findings that these clusters are strategic, critical to state-level and regional stability, and the most heavily impacted by CVE. At baseline, it is important to identify that where TIS+ staff and interventions have carried over from former TIS activities, there are initial indications that the contribution that USAID/Somalia has made in linking citizens to more participatory and inclusive forms of programming is evident. It is also important to be mindful that there are a significant number of partners working in these clusters and that their contributions and impact are catalysts for and complements of TIS+ (see Figure 10). Stabilization is a continuum and where possible the team has sought to identify the areas of relevant overlap and these are outlined in the CA tables at the end of each cluster findings section.

Figure 10: USG Stabilization Activities




Analytical Planning: Baseline (Phase 1 and Phase 2)

TIS+ is a multi-layered project and this baseline analysis focuses on five strategic cluster areas. These are not administrative regions but clusters of districts where AS has continued influence, security is dynamic, and stability is critical for USG and national interests of Somalia. TIS+ focuses on community planning, contracting, and improving the oversight frameworks that strengthen citizen and government relationships at the district, regional, and national level. TIS+ is not OTI. OTI identifies programming to provide immediate assistance in the months following a successful military operation. Activities are structured to foster constructive interaction between citizens and newly established governing authorities, such as basic training of authorities and community leaders, supporting visible small-scale infrastructure, and creating forums for regular dialogue such as town halls and cultural events. TIS+ follows on initial interventions in newly recovered areas by OTI with a consensus-based community-driven development model that prioritizes equitable participation in decision-making and management of community assets. Participatory, consensus-building approaches are used to build citizen confidence in the governing institutions and address critical local-level needs by facilitating the construction and/or rehabilitation of vital community

infrastructure (such as roads, bridges, community centers, local administration offices, health clinics, schools, water sources, and markets).

In more stable districts, TIS+ will begin to prioritize village-level participatory planning in a way that is synchronized with new local governance efforts. At baseline, there were some areas where TIS+ has already started work and some where there was evident overlap with TIS and with OTI's ongoing Somalia Stabilization Initiative (SSI) program (see *Figure 11*). Where this was evident, the team worked to establish an initial narrative and picture of what the clusters looked like at the start of TIS+. Current context, conflict dynamics, and other stabilization initiatives were assessed and data was collected at the settlement level to identify trends relevant to the cluster. There are variations in selection by the regions and by the regional governments. Some of these included local clan politics and proximity to areas that needed to be liberated, economic reasons, stabilization and governance priorities that don't overlap.

Figure 11: Overlap of TIS+ and TIS Consensus Processes Area and SSI and TIS+ Overlap



The following table shows the clusters and objective and analytical subthemes that were used at baseline to ensure the coverage necessary to establish initial conditions prior to TIS+ interventions. The table below also denotes clusters where bridging plans are planned and ongoing. These activities are distinct and at endline these clusters will be assessed and compared to non-bridging plan clusters.

Table 8: Cluster-Level Analytical Plan

Cluster	Objective(s)	Analytical Subthemes	Cluster Context
JUBALAND STATE			
Lower Juba (Afmadow-Kismayo) *Bridging Plan Cluster	Objective 1	1.1 Service delivery 1.2 Community–government relationship 1.3 Stakeholder partnerships 1.4 Confidence in government	All objective activities planned. Contribution analysis will be used to identify specific Bridging Plan activities for analysis at endline.
	Objective 2	2.1 Community–government relationship 2.2 Stakeholder partnerships	
	Objective 3	3.1 Peace building 3.2 Sociocultural activities 3.3. Unity and nationalism (identity)	
	Objective 4	4.1 Gender inclusion	
GEDO/Bay Region (*includes Dinsoor in Bay)			
Gedo/Bay	Objective 1	1.1 Service delivery 1.2 Community–government relationship 1.3 Stakeholder partnerships 1.4 Confidence in government	No Bridging Plan activities.
	Objective 3	3.1 Peace building 3.2 Sociocultural activities 3.3. Unity and nationalism (identity)	
	Objective 4	4.1 Gender inclusion	
SOUTH WEST STATE			
Bakool *Bridging Plan Cluster	1-4	Same as Lower Juba	All objective activities planned. Contribution analysis will be used to identify specific BP activities for analysis at endline.
Lower Shabelle	1, 3, and 4	Same as Gedo	No Bridging Plan activities.
BANAADIR			
Banaadir (Mogadishu) *Bridging Plan Cluster	Objective 2	2.1 Community–government relationship 2.2 Stakeholder partnerships	Only Bridging Plan. Contribution analysis will be used to identify specific BP activities for analysis at endline. Endline qualitative data will compare difference in Banaadir to the other two clusters (Lower Juba and Bakool) with all four objective areas implemented.
	Objective 3	3.1 Peace building 3.2 Sociocultural activities 3.3. Unity and nationalism (identity)	
	Objective 4	4.1 Gender inclusion	

Jubaland State: Current Priorities and Conditions

Jubaland State of Somalia (JSS) was formalized in April 2015 with the inauguration of its parliament. The state consists of the Lower Juba and Middle Juba provinces and its capital, Kismayo, is the largest city of the state. The city has one of the most important seaports in the country and an airfield, which was refurbished and reopened in the beginning of 2014. It has a population of approximately 1.3 million, representing 11 percent of the total population of the country per 2014 estimates. It is also estimated that about 70 percent of the population are 15 years old or younger.

JSS's current and most pressing challenge is security and access to rural populations and areas under control of AS. In areas where AS is not in control, there are still ongoing military operations and the impact of this on development planning, economic growth, and community cohesion is critical. At the policy level, there is an absence of clear guidance regarding the distribution of power and resources between the Federal Government and the Federal Member State (FMS), and among the JSS government, parliamentarians, regional administrations, and district administrations. Addressing this challenge is essential to JSS legitimacy and functionality. Without these political settlements being reached, accountability is unclear as well as lines of authority for decision-making.

JSS faces many challenges and although there is high potential, the region has been beset by civil war, mass displacement, humanitarian assistance dependency, chronic insecurity, rampant natural resource exploitation, and an undereducated populace that knows little of stable government. Increasing drought cycles as well as looted and destroyed water infrastructure have greatly undermined productivity in this region. Before the civil war, about 15 percent of the estimated cultivated land of 1.1 million hectares was under irrigation. It is now estimated that as much as 85 percent to 90 percent of the originally irrigated land is now used for rain-fed agricultural production, mostly due to the looting of irrigation assets; lack of maintenance of the physical infrastructure for water storage, distribution, and flood control; inadequate agriculture services; and the displacement of plantation owners and experienced farmers.

JSS Development Planning

JSS's overall vision is to contribute to the establishment of a progressive and accountable local government system capable of supporting the overall economic development and stability of the Federal Republic of Somalia. JSS's values and principles are outlined in its provisional constitution. JSS is of critical importance to the FGS. Trade through the port and airport of Kismayo is a lifeline for the country, and several offshore oil and gas deposits have been detected in the waters along the Kenya-Somali border. It is a region rich in natural resources, with good seasonal rainfall, year-round rivers, forests used for charcoal production, and farm land that provides the potential of irrigated large-scale agriculture ranging from cash crops such as bananas, sugar cane, and cotton to critical food stores such as rice, sorghum, and millet. Lower Juba is the richest agriculturally in the Somali region, with its combination of fertile soil, grazing land, and marine resources. The major economic activities in Jubaland are livestock production from the northern districts, agriculture from Lower Juba, and the fishing industry from the Lower Juba and Middle Juba coastline. The fishing industry has yet to be fully exploited because of the poor road infrastructure from the coastal areas and the lack of cold chain storage facilities to preserve fish. Currently, it is estimated that 68 percent of the total marine resources of Somalia are found in waters in Jubaland.

Planning for Participation

To improve governance and social cohesion in JSS and in the strategic clusters it is essential that TIS+ move beyond normal Community-Driven Development (CDD) driven projects. TIS+ planning needs to move into the space where the process of community consensus building and bridge planning impacts and influences stability, access, and collaboration between citizens and the state. Political settlements and power sharing arrangements must be negotiated to move development forward in this region. Specific

priorities of JSS relevant to TIS+ planning are detailed in Annex II and organized by priority areas. These priorities are helpful for TIS+ project planning and have been included for all clusters.

Cluster I – Lower Juba (Afmadow–Kismayo)

Lower Juba: Geography and Demography

The Lower Juba (LJ) region is part of the Jubaland state of Somalia. Per the demarcation of 1991, LJ consists of four districts: Afmadow, Baardheere, Kismayo, and Xagar. The capital of LJ is Kismayo, which is situated on the coast near the mouth of the Juba River. Kismayo is believed to have the largest IDP population in the region, mostly located in the areas of Farjano and Fanole. Kismayo is also the capital of Jubaland state. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Population Estimation Survey of Somalia estimated that LJ has a total population of 489,307, of which 172,861 live in urban areas, 161,512 live in rural areas, 124,334 are classified as nomads, and 30,600 are classified as IDPs (UNFPA 2014).

Agriculture and livestock are the main economic drivers of the region. Climate change, drought, and resource stress has had a tremendous toll on this cluster and region. The Juba River runs through the region and exploitation of this important water resource mainly for irrigation has been hampered by the overall destruction of infrastructure due to conflict. Most irrigation schemes collapsed as a direct result of the civil war in the 1990s. Longstanding conflicts forced farmers to abandon well-maintained farmlands. Today mainly traditional farming methods are practiced and large-scale farming has been abandoned. People in this cluster face an acute shortage of basic social and economic infrastructure, such as health and educational facilities, veterinary services, and access to safe drinking water.

Current Context

Lower Juba (specifically Kismayo) has been the center of armed fighting between alliances of armed militias from such major clans as the Darod, Hawiye, and Dir. For instance, Kismayo has been captured and has fallen under different militias more than ten times from 1991 to 2013, when the current Jubaland administration was formed. These factions were also allied to neighboring countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) and received both political and military support from them.

Lower Juba is home to several major social groups/clans including Darod subclans, Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) subclans, Hawiye subclans, Dir subclans, the Jareerweyne communities, and others. Since the 1990s Kismayo has been the epicenter of power struggles within the larger Darod subclan, notably between the Ogaden and Marehan. Sheikh Ahmed Madobe was elected in May 2013 as the regional president. The region is marked by extensive power sharing struggles between and among clans. The Jubaland Initiative was created to bring about local stability, in the model of the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland regions in the northern part of the country. Conflict in the Lower Juba cluster is exacerbated by the complex clan composition of the area.

The former president of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and his government declared the formation of Jubaland illegal, claiming that stakeholder clans were not consulted and the process was foreign-driven. To mitigate some of these extensive power struggles the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brokered regional mediation meetings and supported the formation of an agreement between the federal government and the new Jubaland administration. In 2015, the Jubaland administration led by current President Ahmed Madobe (Ogaden) hosted reconciliation dialogues with the Marehan clan. Attempts to accommodate other minority clan interests in these discussions were not widely successful and several clans (e.g. Harti and Hawiye clans) still feel marginalized from this reconciliation process. Political stability has improved since these reconciliation discussions with Marehan in late 2015.

Kismayo is the second-largest metropolitan city in southern Somalia after Mogadishu with approximately 40 subclans, making it one of the most diverse cities in Somalia. The main feature of the city is the seaport. Most of the population relies on livestock, agriculture, fishing, and trade. Since the collapse of the Somali state, Kismayo has been a hotly contested area due to its strategic location and access to deep-water ports and shipping. It has constantly changed hands since the collapse of the Somali state but has always been under the control of clan-based warlords or Islamists. Between 2006 and 2012 Kismayo was under the control of AS. In 2012, an anti-Shabaab alliance led by the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) removed the group from the city. AS, however, is still active in key areas of this cluster and the strategic significance of this area for AS trade and criminal activities is paramount to the group.

Afmadow has an estimated population of 65,108 and is dominated by the Mohamed Zubeir subclan of the Ogaden. Although the territory is prone to AS attacks, Afmadow is currently under the control of AMISOM troops. The district is occupied by a largely pastoralist community who keep goats, camels, and sheep. It is one of the major sources of livestock for sale in the region with most livestock sold at the Garissa livestock market. Afmadow is also a commercial hub that connects rural villages to Kismayo because it is strategically located on the Dhobley–Kismayo highway. The district is one of the most drought-affected areas, and the loss of livestock is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands.

Dominated by the Mohamed Zubeir subclan of the Ogaden, Afmadow District is critically important in Lower Juba politics. Afmadow and Dhobley towns are under the control of AMISOM troops. Approximately 40 percent of the district is held by anti-Shabaab forces though this territory remains prone to attacks by the group. There are primary and secondary schools, and a functioning health center funded by the Somali diaspora. The district also has a small airstrip. Dhobley town has a health center. Water points in Afmadow District are owned by private individuals. Water points in areas under AS control are overseen by the group.

Stabilization Actors

The current major political actors in both Middle Juba and Lower Juba are the Jubaland government, AMISOM, and AS, the latter controlling pockets of Lower Juba (rural areas between districts) and most parts of Middle Juba (Sakow, Jamame, Buale, and Jilib). AS remains a key political actor in Middle Juba, a region that is believed to be a host for senior AS operatives. The region is currently under the control of AMISOM and SNA operating under the Jubaland administration. AS remains present, particularly in Jamame District. Although government and AMISOM forces control all three districts of Lower Juba, most rural territory remains under the control of AS mobile units. These dynamics pose a security challenge to peace and stability in both Lower Juba and Middle Juba. Although AS is a serious proximate conflict driver, its presence also serves to suppress some of the clan and subclan conflicts described below and serves as an external enemy uniting actors that would otherwise be in conflict among themselves.

The Somali Federal Government and the Jubaland regional state have limited presence on the ground in Middle Juba but control Lower Juba save for pockets of rural villages in Badhadhe, Afmadow, and Kismayo districts. KDF and Ethiopia National Defense Forces (ENDF) that are part of AMISOM are also key stakeholders in Jubaland. The KDF are based in AMISOM Sector Two along the western side of Lower Juba, with key bases in Kismayo's airport and seaport as well as along the road running from west to east between Dhobley and Afmadow towns.

Index Tool

Based on the HH survey and the Index Tool developed, Lower Juba was more stable than Banaadir or Lower Shabelle. These conditions seem to be relatively fluid as AS is pushed into more rural areas and security improved, particularly in newly formed states. At endline these scores will be used to analyze cross-cluster differences and compare these with TIS+ interventions. CA will also be used to look at the

other factors that may have contributed to improved scores in these three areas. At baseline these scores were used to triangulate with qualitative data and to see whether the scores also were reflected in community-level responses (FGDs) and KIs with community members and local, regional, and FGS staff and officials.

Figure 12: Baseline Index Scores – Jubaland State Clusters, Lower Juba

Baseline Index Scores	Jubaland State Clusters
	Lower Juba
Good Governance	57%
Community Cohesion	59%
Stability	60%

Color Key	Critical = < 50% (Crisis)	Average = 50% - 66% (Stable)	Green = > 67% (Development)
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Inclusion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- Gender equality, minority inclusion, and participation of youth
- Relevance to KAQ Question 4

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

Clan vendettas, compounded by historical grievances among clans, a scarcity of resources, discrimination and marginalization against specific groups, political struggles that have never created power sharing arrangements, and mistrust of political leadership are the key causes of conflict in this cluster. One of the major impediments to increasing inclusion in decision-making, governance, and stability at the settlement and district level in LJ is the complex nature of clan dynamics, power sharing and access to land and resources. This is currently magnified also by IDP issues and an increased need to identify potential land and resource conflicts looming on the horizon. The current famine and drought have taken a severe toll on this cluster as well. The humanitarian emergency has in some ways been beneficial because it has provided the local, district, and regional governments an opportunity to show that they can coordinate and be as organized as International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) and donor initiatives, but it is difficult when the capacity of the government is exceptionally low. In KIs with stabilization partners this was cited as impacting inclusion planning because the capacity of regional and district officials to respond to emerging local conflicts was often very low. Per sources interviewed, local community expectations are sometimes “raised and then crushed” by external stakeholders “overreaching” in their abilities to create local cooperation with overworked and under-trained government partners.

Gender inequity was evident in interviews, although the HH survey showed some similarities to Lower Shabelle and other clusters. As a system of community governance, inclusion, and security the clan is a male-dominated entity. Remote communities rely on these structures for community security, access to resources, and conflict mitigation. Where AS is present there is evidence that the clan system and relationships are sometimes manipulated to encourage stability and compliance among clan groups. As it relates to gender, the presence of AS creates an impediment to the participation of women because areas considered insecure are not accessible, which limits participation in a variety of formal and informal forums designed to increase the participation of women and youth.

Inclusivity in the community consensus, planning, financing, and monitoring process is key in LJ. It is possible that TIS+ interventions will create or reinforce grievances by allowing specific clans or stakeholders to dominate. Even when minority groups are targeted, this does not always mitigate this issue. Low levels of participation and representation in development planning forums can aggravate complex clan dynamics and power sharing grievances that have long festered in some of these areas. When inclusivity is ensured, the intervention process itself can allow a level of cooperation between actors that was not present before. For example, where grievances between two clans are entrenched, having representatives from both cooperating in an iterative process of selection, financing, and monitoring a project is as important to building cohesion as is the resulting project. Inclusivity is especially important in areas where AS members, sympathizers, or AS relatives are often part of the community, and where affiliation to AS or FGS may shift over time. It is important that the entire community is aware of how TIS+ works, and that it is intended to include and benefit the whole community.

- It is evident in some areas in this cluster that AS is embedded within the community and this makes representation, participation, and identification of a beneficiary group complex because community members have divided loyalties.
- Although the HH survey did not support this, there is evidence in interviews and FGDs that youth recruitment is a concern for some members and that increases in food insecurity, employment, and access to resources may push youth into working within the AS structure. This was largely a concern of women interviewed.
- Although women and men in this cluster had relatively similar views of gender equality, there was clear evidence that clan rules, elder domination, and male dominance of leadership roles in community planning and consultation events limit the agency of women.
- The clan system is the major impediment to the involvement of women and youth in decision-making, and this structure is essential for community life. In interviews, it was suggested that the clan system itself be used as an intervention to encourage more inclusion in community life by sharing responsibilities with other groups such as women and youth.
- While these settlements acknowledge that women play a key role in peace, security, and fostering social cohesion, their role in key leadership positions in these regions is obscured. From FGDs and KIs it was apparent that they are only involved in peripheral roles and that management roles for women or youth are not common, even on local committees.
- Regarding access to opportunities, both male and FGD participants in Afmadow and Kismayo hold the consensus that men have more access to opportunities than women. Participants stated that there were religious and cultural aspects that limit women's opportunities and access. Youth states that although this may change, elders and clan leadership still enforce these limitations.
- There are impediments to increasing the participation of women in public life because security and access makes traveling for women complicated in Somalia.

Inclusion Recommendations

- There may be specific opportunities for women and youth that are more attainable. Donor interventions are limited in scope and scale, and working on youth and gender policies may be a significant and lasting place for TIS+ to intervene at the district and state level.
- Focus on projects that engage youth directly in planning and project development. Developing specific infrastructure projects run and managed by youth may provide a significant opportunity for youth to be more engaged in planning where the clan system may limit their participation and engagement.

Good Governance

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- Confidence in government
- Service delivery
- Community government relationships
- Stakeholder partnerships
- Relevance to KAQ Question 1, 2, and 3

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Governance Section charts detail specific information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster and specific subthemes analyzed to establish the baseline findings.

Social services and infrastructure are limited in this cluster, with schools and medical facilities dysfunctional in most districts, except for a few facilities such as the Kismayo Regional Hospital and Jilib Hospital. Basic social and economic infrastructure—such as health and educational facilities, veterinary services, access to safe drinking water, and justice facilities (police stations, courts, and correction facilities)—is either lacking or limited. LJ is likely to receive the third-highest number of IDPs, which will impact resource conflicts. Anticipated increases in resource competition across varied groups is a concern for minorities, youth, and community leaders interviewed. The regional government has assured stakeholders that reintegration and integration has been planned for, but there was noted hesitancy and trust in this at the local level. It has yet to be determined how this will impact TIS+, but it is likely that this will be systemic and a long-term development planning issue for local officials and communities in Somalia.

- Systemic but sporadic AS violence impacts Lower Juba, but this has been lower than reported in previous periods (from July 2015).
- KDF and ENDF have retreated from several bases and this is anticipated to give more space for AS to recapture or reoccupy liberated towns in Lower Juba.
- JSS has tackled clan violence and insecurity by forming an all-inclusive cabinet and there have been reported inroads and political reconciliation between the JSS government and specific clans.
- The target of ensuring more appropriate levels of representation by women continues to be a challenge in this cluster; this is consistently evident in both qualitative and quantitative data collection.
- JSS hosted the National Consultative Forum prior to the elections and both state- and federal-level officials participated. These types of efforts have helped to stabilize this cluster, but more work is needed.
- The USG has invested in this cluster both with TIS and with TIS+, primarily around infrastructure planning. Cooperation exists with other stabilization actors such as NISF, SSF, and JPLG.
- IDP influx in this cluster is the third highest in Somalia, and with increased drought and food insecurity this is likely to increase resource conflicts during the performance period of TIS+.
- Bridging plan concepts are very new in this cluster and although there has been participation and collaboration between donors and the Jubaland Administration, the efforts have been largely led, funded, and organized by donors.
- There was evidence of a higher level of awareness and exposure to participatory planning approaches, and a more established relationship with the government on some specific efforts and projects.
- On larger or more linked development projects that serve multiple communities or deal with shared assets, there was greater evidence of community involvement and awareness of the roles and responsibilities of district and regional government stakeholders.
- The participation of government in these efforts, however, is mixed depending on the project type and size, and the commitment of the regional ministries.

- There exists a range of shared assets in both Kismayo and Afmadow including schools, universities, hospitals, seaports, and airports. Management of public assets involved both the local authorities at the settlement level as well as communities themselves.
- In interviews and FGDs it was evident that on these types of projects the community and local administration (Jubaland in Kismayo and District Council in Afmadow) are involved in the management of public assets.
- Community education is considered an important factor in ensuring effective management of public assets. For enhanced oversight, public assets should be managed and maintained under relevant ministries including trade, education, and health. When this was planned, it seemed the projects were more favorably viewed in interviews.
- In interviews, there was an expressed concern about the quality and safety of public assets. Sources expressed a need to ensure competence among those charged with safeguarding public assets as well as ensuring collaboration between state and non-state actors.
- There was evidence of much greater awareness of development planning and consensus in this cluster, as evidenced perhaps by other USG and donor efforts. It is important that these distinctions be mapped to better assess the distinctions with TIS+ efforts at baseline.
- Most respondents had confidence in member state government and local administration to work on local development, and perceptions of corruption was lower in this cluster but still systemic.
- A higher percentage of people interviewed felt that government officials (local and FGS) were influenced by clan interests.
- This cluster also had lower scores in terms of communication and information efforts led by local administration (M 35 percent and F 33 percent) as well as government officials encouraging local-level participation in development planning efforts (M 34 percent and F 32 percent).
- Service provision satisfaction was higher in this cluster, except for water for other purposes and financial services.
- Satisfaction with security in this cluster was much higher (M 95 percent and F 100 percent) than in other clusters and may be a result of the work done by the KDF and ENDF in 2015 and in 2016.
- The participation of FGS, state, and local administration officials (district level) in this cluster was higher than the average.
- Awareness of local oversight or planning committees was over 50 percent in this cluster, higher than most. There was a high opinion of the performance and effectiveness of community planning meetings in identifying local priority projects (M 78 percent and F 72 percent), an early indicator of efforts by INGOs and stabilization actors in this cluster.

Governance Recommendations

- There is a need to strengthen the capacity of government officials to improve transparent budget planning, oversight, and public planning at the district level in this cluster.
- It will be critical for TIS+ staff to weigh the advantage of larger infrastructure needs and projects with the intention of TIS+ to interface citizens, the private sector, and the government. It may be that smaller, more community-driven approaches stimulate more participation, and that the larger infrastructure projects act as a platform for improving governance behaviors such as improved planning and public accountability.

Community Cohesion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis.

- Peace building (status of conflict and conflict mitigation)
- Sociocultural activities
- National unity (perceptions of identity)

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

- Respondents from this cluster had very high levels of intolerance for AS and other elements of VE. This may also be a “holdover” effect from stabilization actor efforts in this cluster. However, there was a distinction between the HH survey tool responses and qualitative interview responses, and in KIs it was clear that there is a complex relationship between the community and some elements of AS as there was evidence that there are often lucrative livelihood options for community and business members that make this relationship complex.
- National pride and the perception that things were improving were very high in this cluster, but both males and females feared that Somalia would never be a peaceful country; in fact this was one of the lowest of the clusters (M 20 percent, F 25 percent).
- In interviews and data analysis sports and cultural events were considered helpful in improving peaceful coexistence and inter-clan dynamics in this cluster. These events allowed interaction between groups on a different level and were considered essential by many respondents for increasing social cohesion.

Community Cohesion Recommendations

- There is a need to support infrastructure and development planning for youth development centers or vocational training facilities in this cluster to mitigate the concerns of the susceptibility of youth to criminal employment and activity with AS.
- Livelihoods are not the only focus of these interventions, but also increased awareness and exposure for youth who are isolated and who feel less relevant in their cultural and community settings often dominated by the clan system and elders.
- Youth need greater access to forums for participation that allow them access to planning and community engagement.
- There was an interest in this cluster in being more engaged on youth policy and planning, and opportunities for these types of interventions should be incorporated into current TIS+ planning.

Community Checklist

At baseline the Community Checklist (CC) Tool was used to assess initial infrastructure planning processes and challenges at the cluster level. Questions looked at specific categories of infrastructure and looked at the funding mechanisms, maintenance, and interviewed project oversight members and local government officials. Please see Annex III for specific findings relevant to this cluster as well as interventions highlighted for endline analysis in Phase 3 and 4.

Contribution Analysis

Stabilization and security is slowly improving in LJ but there is still a long way to go as Al-Shabaab controls significant areas of this region. There are myriad stabilization actors that are initially mapped for their influence in this cluster in the attached CA table for this cluster. The influencing factors most likely to impact TIS+ activities evident at baseline are delineated in this table.

Table 9: Contribution Analysis – Lower Juba

KEY: INFLUENCING FACTORS BY TYPE				
Security	Political/ Governance	Social	Economic	Geographic or climatic
Cluster 2, Lower Juba				
Settlements/Districts: Afmadow and Kismayo				
Major Clans: All Somali major clans (Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn) are found in this region. There are over 40 subclans in the region making it one of the most diverse regions in Somalia. They include Darod subclans, Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) subclans, Hawiye subclans, and Dir subclans.				
Minority Clans: Some of the minority clans are Jareerweyne, Bajun, and Boni/Reebi.				
Influencing Factors: Other Stabilization Partners *Note – there are many actors, especially in Kismayo.		Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis		
The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) has worked and is working in Afmadow, where they focused mostly on employment-intensive works clearing an airstrip and building two youth centers, and in Kismayo, where they supported the Jubaland Public Financial Management system and the Civil Service Commission and built the Ministry of Finance building as well as a youth center. SSF is not involved in TIS+ type community consensus and planning work.		<p><u>Expected weak to moderate positive influence</u> SSF and TIS+ collaborate closely to avoid duplication, which means we would expect to see stronger results due to their combined efforts. However, SSF is mostly working in different spheres than TIS+ and is not focusing on a community engagement process.</p> <p>The endline will need to use available data to assess the strength of the evidence for the influence of SSF interventions on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Interviews with SSF, TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017).</p>		
The UN Joint Program on Local Governance (JPLG) JPLG works in Kismayo on District Council formation. Since Kismayo has been targeted by TIS+ for a Bridging Plan, more overlap/contact between TIS+ and JPLG could be expected.		<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> JPLG and TIS+ work in different parts of a stabilization continuum, with JPLG generally coming in at a later point than TIS+. Kismayo is targeted by TIS+ for a Bridging Plan, which is designed for areas that have progressed further from early stabilization, and where JPLG may be supporting the formation of the District Council; therefore the two programs may work together more concurrently in the governance sector of Kismayo and Jubaland in general.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Interview with JPLG; TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017).</p>		
African Development Bank (AfDB) Multi-Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF) The SIF has worked on technical assistance to infrastructure ministries in Jubaland as well as support to infrastructure improvement of Kismayo port, airport, key roads, and the Kismayo electric power grid and water supply system.		<p><u>Expected moderate to strong positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> SIF documents</p>		

IOM/UNHABITAT IOM/UNHABITAT are thought to be working in Kismayo on returnees and capacity building for local administrations.	<u>Expected weak positive influence/no influence</u> This work is in a very different area than TIS+. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
Local Governance Consortium (EU funded) Led by Finn Church Aid (FCA) This intervention is supporting District Council formation in Afmadow. It has governance components (e.g., community consultation, gender, civic education, peace building and capacity building).	<u>Expected moderate to strong positive influence</u> FCA district formation work will include Afmadow community consultations. This process will include activities similar to TIS+, such as community consultations, strengthening/capacity building of district administration with gender, conflict resolution, quick impact projects, and civic education components. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
UN Rule of Law Program This program has refurbished a courthouse.	<u>No influence expected</u> This work appears quite bounded and is in a very different area from TIS+. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
American Refugee Committee <i>The committee has worked on a fish market, a meat market, a vegetable market, and a workshop for port maintenance (handing over to JCCI). Additional projects will include a youth/sports center, training for football teams, a returnee support center, and a short-story writing competition.</i>	<u>Expected weak to moderate positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GIZ has completed a women's center and plans a milk market in Kismayo.	<u>Expected weak positive influence</u> None noted <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
The UK Early Recovery Initiative (ERI) ERI has worked in Kismayo.	<u>Expected weak to moderate positive influence</u> ERI and TIS+ work in different parts of a stabilization continuum, with ERI generally coming in at an earlier point than TIS+ as one of the first responders, along with military actors. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
Influencing Factors: Other Interventions (USG Partners)	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
The US Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) OTI is working in Kismayo and Afmadow. In Kismayo, work includes dialogue between returnees and host communities, radio drama and PSAs, 16 Days of Activism, youth engagement through soccer, and female youth and sports. In Afmadow, work includes empowering youth through sports.	<u>Expected strong positive influence</u> TIS+ and OTI are designed to work together, which means we would certainly expect to see stronger results due to their combined efforts. They often work on different points of the stabilization continuum/process. The endline will need to use available data to assess the strength of the evidence for the influence of SSF interventions on TIS+ results.

	<u>Sources</u> Interviews with OTI, TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017).
Somalis Harmonizing Inter- and Intra-Communal Relationships (SHIIR) SHIIR works in Dhobley town in Lower Juba.	<u>Expected weak positive influence</u> <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping.
Influencing Factors: Positive	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
Established existence and awareness of peace and safety committees and other local capacities There are peace committees, women's groups, youth groups, and business groups in government-held areas, and traditional leaders play important roles in peace building. The baseline HH survey found high levels of awareness and perceptions of the effectiveness of local oversight or planning committees in this cluster, perhaps reflecting the efforts of INGOs and stabilization actors.	<u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> The preexistence of such committees will positively influence the TIS+ community consensus, planning, financing, and monitoring process. The endline will assess the relative contribution of these to TIS+ results. <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Baseline HH survey.
Established Chamber of Commerce that is willing to collaborate Of the established capacities and nongovernmental organizations mentioned above, a particularly valuable partner for TIS+ is the Jubaland Chamber of Commerce, which has also demonstrated a willingness and capacity to collaborate including leveraging its own resources to contribute to projects.	<u>Expected moderate to strong positive influence</u> The TIS+ is explicitly designed to leverage support and resources from actors such as chambers of commerce. The endline will need to assess the contribution of this preexisting organization both as an influencing factor and as a TIS+ result. <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
District security institutions in place There are functioning police stations, correctional facilities, and district courts in Kismayo and Afmadow.	<u>If this is borne out by evidence, expected moderate positive influence</u> The existence of these institutions, if built upon, <i>should</i> help Jubaland better rule of law and contribute to greater trust in government. <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
Nascent district and regional authorities Functioning district and regional authorities exist in the region, but these have been appointed and not elected.	<u>If this is borne out by evidence, expected moderate positive influence</u> The existence of these institutions, if built upon, <i>should</i> help contribute to greater trust in government as the authorities provide democratic accountability and service delivery. <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Saferworld (2016) Forging Jubaland: Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance and Reconciliation
Influencing Factors: Negative	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis

<p>Al-Shabaab Although the Jubaland Army, SNA, and AMISOM control the Kismayo, Afmadow, and Badhadhe districts, Al-Shabaab controls some rural areas with mobile units and remains in control of the Jamame and Hagar districts, restricting the movement of people and trade in the Lower Juba region. This in turn affects the purchasing power of people in the region. Movement of government officials and aid workers remains difficult.</p> <p>Although Al-Shabaab is a serious proximate conflict driver, its presence also serves to suppress some of the clan and subclan conflicts described below and serves as an external enemy uniting actors that would otherwise be in conflict among themselves.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u> Their targeting of opponents has the capacity to undermine several key TIS+ mechanisms of change.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis. • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p>Historical grievances and persistent inter- and intra-clan conflicts Lower Juba has been the focus of protracted conflict between different clans, subclan, and political actors since the collapse of the Somali state. Struggles over ownership and control of resources as well as political ideologies and control have caused significant grievances. The main players are Ogaden, Harti and Marehan (Darod), Rahanweyn, and the Hawiye. Different Darod subclans and Hawiye all make historical claims to the control of Kismayo. As noted above, the presence of Al-Shabaab may serve to mask or suppress these conflicts.</p> <p>These are structural and proximate conflict drivers.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u> Removal of AS from Middle Juba and parts of Lower Juba by the long-awaited “Jubaland Offensive” may create a vacuum.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ baseline context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Baseline HH survey
<p>Continued contestation over Jubaland state formation Because of the protracted conflicts mentioned above, there has been political contestation over the formation of Jubaland state, with new President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declaring the process had not consulted stakeholder clans. Since the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brokered an agreement between the FGS and the new Jubaland administration, the latter has made progress in accommodating and reconciling with political opponents. However, many key actors still feel marginalized.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ baseline context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Saferworld (2016) Forging Jubaland: Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance and Reconciliation
<p>Threats and limits to political rights There have been reports of arrests and detention of some voicing political opposition to the Jubaland administration.</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate to strong negative influence</u> If these reports continue, they risk undermining the credibility of the new administration and further progress of democratization and good governance.</p>

	<p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saferworld (2016) Forging Jubaland: Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance and Reconciliation
<p>Drought and high WASH vulnerability Lower Juba is deemed to have extremely high Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation (WASH) vulnerability (except for Badhadhe, which has very high vulnerability) based on AWD/cholera risk, flood risk, drought risk, number of IDP, water, and sanitation coverage.</p>	<p><u>Depending how the situation develops, potential for a strong-moderate negative influence</u> Although drought allows FGS to be the provider/ coordinator of humanitarian assistance, drought and resultant displacement can be a significant conflict driver.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASH cluster, WASH Vulnerability Analysis (May 2017) • OCHA Somalia Drought Situation Report (as of 13 June 2017). • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
Influencing Factors: Unknown	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>Highly strategic location The strategic location of Kismayo is a key advantage for economic growth and development but also accounts for the protracted conflict over the city and the fact that it has changed hands so much during the conflict. Kismayo, a deep-water port, is the commercial hub of the Jubaland region and southern parts of the country located halfway between Mogadishu and the Kenyan border. It acts as a commercial center for products from the pastoral, fishery, and agriculturally rich hinterland.</p>	<p><u>Unknown</u> The strategic location of Kismayo is a key advantage economically but conflict over control of this resource has also acted as a structural conflict driver.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)
<p>Regional powers – The Ethiopia National Defense Forces (ENDF), Kenya Defense Forces (KDF). The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) and Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) are part of AMISOM that was part of the movement that liberated Kismayo and are also key stakeholders in Jubaland. The KDF are based in AMISOM Sector Two along the western side of Lower Juba, with key bases in Kismayo's airport and seaport as well as along the road running from west to east between Dhobley and Afmadow towns.</p> <p>Many Somalis have long accused neighboring countries of having a destabilizing effect on Somalia. Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement in the Jubaland process is seen by some as a self-interested attempt to establish proxies.</p> <p>KDF and ENDF soldiers have retreated from several bases, and this is anticipated to give</p>	<p><u>Unknown</u> The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)

<p>more space for AS to recapture or reoccupy liberated towns in Lower Juba.</p> <p>The planned AMISOM withdrawal from Somalia, if it materializes, will much depend on how much land is recovered from AS and how the local communities, (especially the clans not feeling accommodated by the current Jubaland administration) are incorporated into the new political setup. However, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops are likely to stay longer, especially in this part of the country, to prevent further influx of extremism and illegal commerce to their borders.</p>	
<p>Regional powers – The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) IGAD comprises several states in the region and has supported the Jubaland Initiative since mid-2012. Common interests between Kenya and Ethiopia formed the basis for the 2012 IGAD Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia.</p> <p>Kenya and Ethiopia are both believed to have been keen to establish a buffer zone to protect their respective borders with Somalia.</p>	<p><u>Unknown</u> The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ baseline context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)
<p>AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) The SNA in Lower Juba is made up of the Kenya-backed and Isiolo-trained troops who officially fall under the authority of the Jubaland administration. There have been criticisms that there was no SNA in Kismayo and merely clan militias. The implementation of the new FGS Security Architecture endorsed by Federal Members States and later approved by the FGS parliament may incorporate Jubaland forces to the SNA.</p>	<p><u>Unknown</u> The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis. <p>CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)</p>
<p>Ras Kamboni Brigade (RKB) This anti–Al-Shabaab militia was part of the offensive with Kenya that secured Kismayo and the controversial appointment of Ahmed Madobe as president thereafter. This militia has evolved and has become the Jubaland force that is hugely engaged in stabilization of Kismayo and Afmadow.</p>	<p><u>Unknown</u> The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis. • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)

Cluster 2 – Gedo/Bay Region *(includes Dinsoor in Bay Region)*¹⁷

Geography and Demography

Gedo Region is the second largest in Somalia and lies on the Somalia borders with Ethiopia and Kenya; it shares borders with Bay, Bakool, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba regions. The primary settlements identified in this cluster are in the Gedo Region, save one that is in Bay. Per the UNFPA Somalia Population Estimates of 2014, the region hosts nearly 510,000¹⁸ with a rural/urban divide (63 percent and 37 percent respectively). The region is home to many IDPs especially in Luuq and Dollow. Gedo has six administrative districts: Garbaharey, Baardheere, and El Wak in the south, and Belet Hawo, Dolow, and Luuq in the north. Two major rivers run through the region, the Dawa and the Juba. The Marehan clan dominates Gedo. Other communities including Rahanweyn, Ogaden, and Harti clans and some Bantu also live in the region.

Current Context

Gedo is part of the Mandera Triangle and is a vibrant cross-border area critical to economic growth and development for not only Somalia, but also Kenya and Ethiopia. More than any other Somali border area, the Mandera Triangle constitutes an integrated cross-border economy. This area contains critical corridors for commerce and livestock sales for the entire region. Local populations move across the borders for access to social services and markets. Communities on both sides of the border not only engage in cross-border trade, but also make use of one another's services, including livestock markets, schools, health posts, and airstrips. Over the past decade some aid programs (including USAID) have sought to encourage the sharing of cross-border facilities as part of an effort to strengthen local commitments to peace in border zones. This approach has been welcomed locally and several informal cross-border arrangements, especially on border security and disease surveillance, have been supported through these programs.

Clan conflict over territory and resource control has been a major feature in this cluster since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. Conflicts in this region are greatly impacted by minority clan dynamics and exacerbated by AS deliberately and mindfully. Targets of this marginalization and manipulation include non-Marehan subclans as well as the Hawarsame and Fiqi Yaqub (both are Marehan subclans but considered to be lower-caste groups). The agro-pastoralist Rahanweyn communities, which include both the Digil and Mirifle, have long felt marginalized by Somali speakers and have a better relationship with Hawiye subclans. There are frequent conflicts between Gabaweyn (Digil/Rahanweyn) farming communities and the pastoralist Marehan. The Gabaweyn claim that Marehan communities are occupying their farms and displacing them from the district. Climate change and forced migration due to drought cycles and access to resources have increased tensions as well as drastically impacted pastoralist communities and those reliant on livestock trade.

¹⁷ This strategic cluster also includes Dinsoor, and information from this district was included in the findings section.

¹⁸ UNFPA 2014 Somalia Population survey.

Stabilization Actors

The major stabilization actors in this cluster include the Ethiopia National Defense Forces (ENDF), Somali National Army (SNA), Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), Al-Shabaab and Ahlusunna Waljama'a (ASWJ). Both KDF and ENDF are part of AMISOM peacekeeping forces. Gedo region falls administratively under the Jubaland regional state, which has appointed a governor and several district commissioners across the region. While major efforts by security actors such as AMISOM and SNA have successfully liberated many districts (most recently Baardheere in 2014), AS still controls rural parts of El Wak, Luuq, Garbaharey, and Baardheere. The Gedo region historically has experienced widespread inter-clan as well as sectarian conflict with both AS and ASWJ fighting for political control over the region. AS seeks political and economic control of the region. The ASWJ's southern branch operates now as part of the SNA after the former signed an agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in April 2013. The ASWJ who fight alongside the SNA consist largely of moderate Sufi Muslims who are fighting against the strict religious agenda espoused by AS.

Index Tool

Based on index scores compiled from analyzing the HH survey questions, Gedo had significantly higher scores in governance, community cohesion, and stability factors than Banaadir and Lower Shabelle. At endline these scores will be used to analyze cross-cluster differences and compare these with TIS+ interventions. CA will also be used to look at the other factors that may have contributed to improved scores in these three areas. At baseline these scores were used to triangulate with qualitative data and to see whether the scores also were reflected in community level responses (FGDs) and KIs with community members and local, regional, and FGS staff and officials.

Figure 13: Baseline Index Scores – Gedo/Bay

Baseline Index Scores	Gedo/Bay Region (**includes Dinsoor in Bay)
	Gedo
Good Governance	52%
Community Cohesion	60%
Stability	56%

Color Key	Critical = < 50% (Crisis)	Average = 50% - 66% (Stable)	Green = > 67% (Development)
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Inclusion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- Gender equality, minority inclusion, and participation of youth
- Relevance to KAQ Question 4

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

Gedo is part of the Mandera Triangle and this region is a point of convergence for many Somali clans. Clan territorial claims are more contentious and disputed than in many other parts of the eastern Horn and in other parts of Somalia. This has made the entire area more vulnerable to communal clashes over land and water, and this is likely to increase as Ethiopia plans for large-scale dam projects and water stress due to climate change becomes more acute. Gedo is an extremely strategic location for AS and is a critical transit zone for gun smuggling and human smuggling/trafficking, enterprises that AS affiliates are a part of. Cross-border trade is both informal and illegal in many areas of Gedo. Lucrative smuggling of goods across the border is a large part of AS operations and its affiliated partnerships transnationally and globally.

Women, youth, and minority groups are active in cross-border trade and movement. Traditional practices limit the participation of women in clan-affiliated decision-making, but women have been more active in this cluster in small- and medium-enterprise businesses. Youth recruitment in AS and youth involvement in criminal activity is also a concern that emerged in interviews, research, and data collection. Livestock marketing, mainly across the border of Somalia and into the Gulf States, is a hugely profitable and poorly regulated area of informal commerce that involves local communities as well as government officials. There is research and evidence that shows AS also benefits from this trade, and some partners have surmised that youth are utilized to assist in this cross-border trade and movement. AS recruitment targets youth for this enterprise and it is an important funding flow for VE in Somalia as well as transnationally.

Traditional clan rules and male dominance limit the role of women, but vibrant trade and commerce in some areas has also provided economic empowerment options for women. Complex clan conflicts and alliances exist in this cluster based on competing access to resources, trade, and livestock corridors. Most clans in this region have participated in a long history of cross-border engagement and competition over political and power sharing arrangements AS provides financial resources and opportunities for power and access to resources that far exceed the current livelihood options for these groups.

Status of Gender Gaps

- Although women and men in this cluster had relatively similar views of gender equality, there was clear evidence that clan rules limit the participation and engagement of women in community planning and consultation events.
- As in other clusters the clan system is the major impediment to the involvement of women, and in some cases youth, in decision-making.
- While the general opinion is that men and women are included in leadership and benefit equally from services, the feeling that men still dominate decision-making processes is evident. For example, across the FGDs, there was no clarity on what positions of leadership women hold apart from leadership in women groups.
- It was also clear in data collection that traditional views on religion also impact the role that women can play in community level decision-making. For example, here is a quote from an FGD: “We are a Muslim community and Muslims have Sharia law, which directs the women to make decisions in their homes, [and] stay in their homes, and that is what is required of them so we can prevent sin from ourselves.” This is a significant reality that needs to be confronted and planned for in some remote settlement areas in Gedo and in other clusters.

Status of Participation (Youth, Women, and Minorities)

- Youth expressed frustration in feeling that their involvement was marginalized and limited in community planning and development.
- There is evidence of some tension between youth and elders. Elder committees often choose representatives from the community and this has caused some tension by youth who want to have greater voice and agency in community decision-making.
- Some of the factors impacting this perception among youth were: (1) lack of focus on employment and job creation for youth, (2) dominance by elders in decision-making and planning, and (3) weak understanding of local conditions by INGOs and stakeholders working in Gedo on youth programming.
- Where the criteria for selection to local planning committees has bypassed the clan system, there is conflict and local-level tension, particularly on larger infrastructure and water access projects. So even though the clan system limits inclusion on some levels, it is the dominant community structure for development planning and support, particularly on smaller infrastructure efforts.

- Clan dynamics and an embedded history of cross-border trade and migration as well as competition over resources (e.g., land and water access) impacts political settlements, trust, and civic engagement among clan groups in this region.
- By most accounts there is improved interface with the government and youth and women. Most projects in the settlements surveyed were dominated by NGO efforts and projects had varied criteria for minority and youth inclusion in project management, maintenance, and selection.
- As in other clusters there is also evidence of increased expectation for development projects to be managed by NGOs and not by the government. Evidence also suggested that NGO projects were preferred to government-led or government-managed efforts.

Status of Women, Youth, and Minority Groups Rights

- There was evidence in several interviews that women and youth are susceptible to recruitment in Gedo by AS. There is some evidence that this takes the form of informal economic partnerships in support of cross-border smuggling.
- Some minority groups feel that the presence of AS has helped address some perceived injustices and past dominance by certain clan groups and has also provided them with justice for past grievances.
- This is particularly evident around the acquisition of land and access to resources critical for livelihoods of minority groups, particularly pastoralist groups who in the past suffered from limited access to water or restricted movement.
- For clans and subclans, tactical affiliation with AS has been a useful means of countering a dominant rival clan. AS has successfully exploited local clan and other grievances to this end.
- Three aspects of this form of identity politics are worth highlighting, particularly as it relates to minority clans: (1) affiliation or alliance with AS is generally very tactical and reversible across Gedo; (2) accusations that a clan is “pro-AS” — whether true or not — is an easy way to harness external (Ethiopian, Kenya, AMISOM, USG) support against a local rival; and (3) at least some clashes that appear to be AS vs. SNA in this cluster are actually clan clashes and not affiliated with AS.
- This dynamic has increased local levels of violence, particularly among small subclans, and has been the main cause of instability in Gedo in recent years, causing significant displacement.

Inclusion Recommendations

- TIS+ interventions with women’s empowerment should be sensitive to religious realities of Somali culture. It was suggested in interviews in Gedo that women could play an important role in peace building at the local level as they are less of a security threat when engaged in inter-clan dialogue. Women often intermarry into other clans and their views and perspectives are valued, particularly as it relates to community-level security issues and inter-clan cooperation.
- Youth job creation and/or access to productive roles in the community and in their family structure seems to be an important intersection for youth engagement. Youth engagement programs in Gedo seem to have been considered more successful when they focused on these aspects.
- Minority clan manipulation needs to be well understood in Gedo because there are complex relationships with Al-Shabaab that relate to identity. Interventions targeting clan cooperation may be helpful, particularly ones that encourage the engagement of youth.

Governance Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- Confidence in government
- Service delivery
- Community government relationships
- Stakeholder partnerships
- Relevance to KAQ Question 1, 2, and 3

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Governance Section charts detail specific information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster and specific subthemes analyzed to establish the baseline findings.

The region is currently under the control of various security actors including AMISOM and SNA operating under the Jubaland administration. AS remains present, particularly in the rural locations of El Wak, Luuq, Burdhubo, Bardera, and Garbaharey districts. Security in this region is a high concern for both Ethiopia and Kenya due its location. AMISOM troops, especially KDF, have suffered staggering attacks, including an attack in El Adde town in January 2016 when AS infiltrated the KDF base and killed close to 180 soldiers. Factional fighting among different groups and subclans of the Marehan continues to be a feature of the security situation in the region and these dynamics are used to AS's advantage. Overall, the security and access situation in North Gedo, to Luuq, has improved for INGOs. The area is controlled by SNA forces backed by Ethiopian forces (AMISOM). However, South Gedo is relatively more insecure due to continued clashes and greater access and influence of AS in the rural areas of Garbaharey, Buur Dhuubo, and Baardheere.

There is a significant level of mistrust in this cluster and limited interface with regional representatives of the Gedo regional government and its authorities. Local communities primarily interface with local administration, and even this is limited. The clan system and ad hoc committees formed by INGOs or NGOs are the primary vehicles for development planning, although data shows that communities are aware that those making these efforts must collaborate and get permission from local authorities. There is limited cooperation between citizens and government on planning primarily due to the low capacity of local officials to plan and manage development efforts directly.

- Although there is currently relative stability in some limited areas of the region, there are incidences of insecurity and clashes where inter- and intra-clan conflicts have reemerged following the removal of AS in key districts.
- The principal economic activities in the region are livestock, farming, and cross-border trade with Kenya and Ethiopia. The strategic location of Gedo, bordering Kenya and Ethiopia, makes this cluster important for cross-border trade and security.
- Social services in Gedo are minimal, and although there has been increased effort in recent years to improve roads and access, the region is very remote and lacks even the most basic infrastructure except in some border towns.
- The proliferation of these border towns has put stress on the need for services and access to health care, education, and livelihoods.
- The drivers of conflict are largely over land and access to resources, political marginalization and exclusion, and ideology.
- The districts of Luuq, Belet Hawa, and Bardera are regional flash points and are particularly susceptible to the influence and manipulation of AS.
- The Marehan in Gedo include *guri* (original inhabitant) and *galti* (new settler) communities that have

been divided into competing political groups.

- Regional government actors have sought to improve relations with the Marehan clan in the Gedo region, an important clan dynamic for stability as well as legitimacy in this region.
- The FGS and regional government stakeholders have prioritized Gedo and the regional capital, Garbaharey, for the formation of a district council for which the UNJPLG will take the lead in assistance.
- As in other clusters there are exceptionally high levels of perceptions of corruption. This included such measures as local government accountability to communities vs. clan interest, use of public funds for development planning, and knowledge of local priorities for development. This is a serious concern in an area with porous borders, extensive cross-border trade, and extensive criminal activity.
- Service provision was low in all primary community development areas. The drought has put severe stress on some communities (food production and water for livestock and animals). This has increased tensions between groups and is likely to increase insecurity according to some sources interviewed.
- Satisfaction with security and police and administration were very low and AS provides a certain measure of security that the regional governments cannot compete with.
- In data analysis, it was clear that AS serves as a substitute in this cluster for security and on some levels, local justice provision. It was also evident that there are severe levels of mistrust between the SNA and some clan groups.
- Evidence suggests that in the Gedo Region there are significant gaps in coordination and planning, but there is a will to improve this. Larger projects are easier for the regional government to be engaged in. DCs often lack vehicles and rarely travel outside of the urban areas, and most government officials have some fear of retaliation if involved in USG projects.
- There is little community interface with government officials around community prioritization of development planning, and where this does take place it was primarily initiated by one of the stability actors working in the region.
- There is a need to weigh the advantage of larger infrastructure needs and projects with the intention of TIS+ to interface citizens, the private sector, and the government. In some cases, the lowest level of government may be the most accessible so more moderate projects may yield higher levels of participation and interface.
- Awareness of local oversight or planning committees was higher in this cluster. In KIIs and in FGDs, it was clear past USG and INGO programming had increased awareness and in some cases, direct participation in planning and oversight on specific projects or efforts.
- Most respondents had confidence in member state governments and local administrations to work on local development, but there were very high perceptions of corruption and weak accountability for local groups at both the FGS and local level. There was also evidence of mistrust in the FGS as well as the SNA.
- The participation of FGS, state, and local administration officials (district level) in this cluster was higher than in other clusters, and there was a greater reliance on the role of local administration in delivering services.

Governance Recommendations

- Information sharing between communities and local administration is not adequate in this cluster. There is a need for better and more targeted information campaigns. Despite improvements in communication on larger projects, knowledge of development planning is limited and done primarily at the project level. This can create perceptions of issues with transparency.
- The participation of FGS, state, and local administration officials (district level) in this cluster was very low in development planning. This is largely a result of capacity and lack of experience in public

accountability and development planning. This is a critical skill set and should be considered for capacity development efforts by TIS+.

Community Cohesion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis.

- Peace building (status of conflict and conflict mitigation)
- Sociocultural activities
- National unity (perceptions of identity)

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

- Long-standing clan conflicts still cause political issues and severe mistrust. AS is seen by some respondents as a “manipulator” of these sentiments. Minority clans also use this to their advantage and seek to align themselves strategically to gain influence over a rival clan or to gain resource access.
- When asked about identity, most respondents said they would chose Somali national identity over clan affiliation (M 64 percent, F 55 percent), however in FGDs and KIs it was evident that deep-rooted clan conflicts impact service delivery and political settlements.
- National pride and the perception that things were improving was very high in this cluster, but both males and females feared that Somalia would never be a peaceful country (M 35 percent, F 33 percent).
- In interviews and data analysis, sports and cultural events were considered helpful in improving peaceful coexistence and inter-clan dynamics in this cluster. These events allowed interaction among groups on a different level and were considered essential by many respondents for increasing social cohesion.
- Most respondents, both male and female, described the security situation among settlements in this cluster as unstable. Respondents in this cluster ranked security services very low.
- Quantitative data suggest that youth in this cluster are not prone to forced recruitment in VE groups, but this was a concern by some respondents in FGDs and KIs.
- Strengthening and consolidating state power and allowing space for reconciliation and dialogue is an important aspect of stability in this cluster.

Community Cohesion Recommendations

- Vocational and livelihood training across clan groups is considered an important aspect in building community cohesion. There is a need for more interface between groups where cooperation and not competition is the objective. There was a suggestion for more cross-border cooperatives between groups to minimize conflict.
- Cultural events and sports should be considered to improve community cohesion and inter-clan cooperation. These events are also widely attended and considered to be a neutral way to engage with other clans and communities.

Community-Driven Infrastructure Planning

At baseline the CC Tool was used to assess initial infrastructure planning processes and challenges at the cluster level. Questions looked at specific categories of infrastructure and the funding mechanisms and maintenance, and interviewed project oversight members and local government officials. Please see Annex III for specific findings relevant to this cluster as well as interventions highlighted for endline analysis in Phase 3 and Phase 4.

Contribution Analysis and Gedo

Stabilization and security are slowly improving in Gedo, but there is still a long way to go as Al-Shabaab controls significant areas of this region. Myriad stabilization actors are initially mapped for their influence in the attached CA table for this cluster. The influencing factors most likely to impact TIS+ activities evident at baseline are delineated in this table. If a midterm evaluation is conducted, these programs and factors should be considered when identifying impact and lessons learned. This will ensure that the USG can identify more specific contributions of TIS+ programming in stabilization environments impacted by VE actors and influence.

Table 10: Contribution Analysis – Gedo/Bay (including Dinsoor)

Key: Influencing factors by type				
Security	Political/ Governance	Social	Economic	Geographic or climatic

Gedo/Bay Region Settlements/ Districts: Baardheere, Garbaharey, Dinsoor,* and CeelWaaq *Dinsoor is in Bay	
Major Clans: Major clans present in Gedo are subclans of Darod (Marehan and Ogaden), Rahanweyn, Hawiye, and Dir.	
Minority Clans: The main minority clans are Jareerweyne, who are spread throughout the region.	
Influencing Factors: Other Stabilization Partners	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) has a moderate presence in Gedo, mainly due to its continued work in Baardheere. SSF has previously worked in El Wak through PACT, but no longer operates there. In Baardheere, SSF is working on infrastructure including a district office, solar streetlights, a sports stadium, a community center, and a market. SSF has coordinated closely with TIS+ to avoid duplication. The endline will require a full description of the influence on TIS+ results.	<p><u>Expected moderate to positive influence</u> SSF and TIS+ collaborate closely to avoid duplication, which means we would expect to see stronger results due to their combined efforts. SSF is mostly working in Baardheere, however, and is not focusing on a community engagement process.</p> <p>The endline will need to use available data to assess the strength of the evidence for the influence of SSF interventions on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Interviews with SSF, TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017).</p>
The UN Joint Programme on Local Governance (UNJPLG) is present in Garbaharey, working on District Council Formation.	<p><u>Expected moderate to positive influence</u> JPLG and TIS+ work in different parts of a stabilization continuum, with JPLG generally coming in at a later point than TIS+. They are overlapping only in Garbaharey, which has been prioritized for the formation of a district council for which JPLG will take the lead in assistance.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Interview with JPLG; TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017).</p>
The UK Early Recovery Initiative (ERI) has conducted projects in Baardheere.	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u></p>

	<p>ERI and TIS+ work in different parts of a stabilization continuum, with ERI generally coming in at an earlier point than TIS+ as one of the first responders, along with military actors.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping</p>
<p>Local Governance Consortium (EU funded) Led by Finn Church Aid (FCA) This intervention is supporting District Council formation in Dolo. It has governance components (e.g., community consultation, gender, civic education, peace building and capacity building).</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate to strong positive influence</u> FCA district formation work will include TIS+ interventions such as community consultations, strengthening/capacity building of district administration, particularly in areas such as gender sensitivity and conflict resolution.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping</p>
Influencing Factors: Other Interventions (USG Partners)	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>The US Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is present in Garbaharey working on support to schools, capacity support to District Administration, empowering women's groups, and engaging local youth as peace ambassadors. In El Wak, OTI is working on engaging youth through soccer.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong positive influence</u> TIS+ and OTI are designed to work together, which means we would certainly expect to see stronger results due to their combined efforts.</p> <p>The endline will need to use available data to assess the strength of the evidence for the influence of SSF interventions on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Interviews with OTI, TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017).</p>
<p>Somalis Harmonizing Inter- and Intra-Communal Relationships (SHIIR) has been operating cross-border community work in El Wak, implemented by PACT.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak positive influence</u> This intervention is working on only one TIS+ area, and on a different type of intervention than TIS+, although there are elements of this program that are complements and impact TIS+ interventions. Reconciliation work done by PACT will need to be carefully analyzed at endline to assist in CA.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping.</p>
<p>USAID and UNICEF Pastoralist Education Program <i>Targets Gedo and Bay regions.</i></p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> Needs analysis at endline to determine the relevant impacts and interventions of this USAID-funded program.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> USAID Reference Program (Baseline Comments).</p>
Influencing Factors: Positive	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>Trade and economic growth Although there have been conflicts over control of trading opportunities, Gedo's geographical position means it benefits from trade with Kenya and Ethiopia, contributing to a thriving economy and a fairly stable economic environment in border towns. There</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> The relative strength of the economy makes it more likely that TIS+ interventions can leverage support.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis. • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)
<p>Established peace and safety committees Outside the more recently liberated Baardheere, there are established peace and safety committees</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> The preexistence of such committees will positively influence the TIS+ community consensus, planning, financing, and</p>

<p>in Gedo that comprise local elders, religious leaders, clan leaders, and district administrations. They play roles of conflict and dispute resolution. There are also established women and youth organizations.</p> <p>Awareness of local oversight or planning committees was higher in this cluster than in others in the baseline HH survey.</p>	<p>monitoring process. The endline will assess the relative contribution of these to TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Baseline HH survey.
<p>Established district security institutions</p> <p>There are district and regional security institutions, including police units, intelligence, custodian authority, and district courts</p>	<p><u>If this is borne out by evidence, expected moderate positive influence</u></p> <p>The existence of these institutions <i>should</i> help the FGS provide better rule of law. However, in the baseline HH survey, respondents in this cluster ranked security services very badly.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Baseline HH survey
Influencing Factors: Negative	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>Al-Shabaab</p> <p>While AMISOM and SNA have successfully liberated many districts (most recently Baardheere in 2014), Al-Shabaab still controls rural parts of El Wak (and they conducted a raid on El Wak town in 2016), Luuq, Garbaharey, and Baardheere. Al-Shabaab restricts trade and movement of people in the areas under their control and there have been targeted killings of people perceived to oppose them.</p> <p>This is a proximate conflict driver.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p>Although Al-Shabaab is deemed to have lost support and popularity in Gedo, their targeting of opponents has the capacity to undermine several key TIS+ mechanisms of change.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis. • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p>Persistent inter- and intra-clan conflicts These include protracted conflict between the Marehan and Garre clans over political control of El Wak, unresolved by various peace processes; political tensions among Marehan subclans over the sharing of parliamentary seats; and resource-based conflicts between Garre and Ali Dhere (Marehan) also in El Wak. In Garbaharey there are intra-Marehan rivalries over territorial, trade, and administrative control. In Baardheere there has been frequent conflict over control of district administration and trade routes among Maheeran subclans.</p> <p>The baseline HH survey found that long-standing clan conflicts cause severe mistrust and Al-Shabaab is seen by some respondents as a “manipulator” of these sentiments.</p> <p>These are structural and sometimes proximate conflict drivers.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Baseline HH survey
Lack of infrastructure	<u>Expected moderate negative influence</u>

<p>Some of the region is very remote and lacks basic infrastructure except in border towns.</p> <p>Most locations in Gedo can be accessed by land and air, but some remote villages are inaccessible and many roads between districts and neighboring regions are in bad condition.</p>	<p>Lack of infrastructure makes it harder to have an impact in delivering services and demonstrating the value of government as a service provider.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p><i>Lack of fully functioning district and regional administrations</i></p> <p>The region and its six districts have not elected functioning district and regional administrations.</p>	<p><u>If this continues, expected moderate negative influence</u></p> <p>TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <p>TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)</p>
<p><i>Drought and high WASH vulnerability</i></p> <p>Gedo is deemed to have extremely high (clean) Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation (WASH) vulnerability (except for El Wak, which has very high vulnerability) based on AWD/cholera risk, flood risk, drought risk, number of IDPs, water, and sanitation coverage. Drought has prompted migration into urban centers in Gedo since November 2016.</p>	<p><u>Depending how the situation develops, potential for a strong to moderate negative influence</u></p> <p>Although drought allows FGS to be the provider/ coordinator of humanitarian assistance, drought and resultant displacement can be a significant conflict driver. It has already caused depletion of livestock and agriculture-based livelihoods and increased clan conflicts over recent years.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASH cluster, WASH Vulnerability Analysis (May 2017) • OCHA Somalia Drought Situation Report (as of 13 June 2017) • TIS+ Jubaland State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p>Influencing Factors: Unknown</p>	<p>Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis</p>
<p><i>Regional powers and the Ethiopia National Defense Forces (ENDF), Kenya Defense Forces (KDF)</i></p> <p>The ENDF and KDF are present because of the borders that the region shares with Ethiopia and Kenya. Kenya and Ethiopia are not seen as impartial and Al-Shabaab has in the past manipulated the perception that these forces favored certain clans/subclans over others.</p> <p>The planned AMISOM withdrawal from Somalia, if it materializes, will much depend on how much land is recovered from AS and how the local communities are incorporated to the new political setup. However, Kenya and Ethiopian troops are likely to stay longer, especially in this part of the country, to prevent further influx of extremism and illegal commerce to their borders.</p> <p>Ethiopia has treated the Gedo region as its sphere of influence since the mid-90s when it quelled the extremist Al Ittihad (Jihadist organization linked to ONLF, also on the US Terrorist List) that formed</p>	<p><u>Unknown</u></p> <p>The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)

military training in border towns of Gedo (Luuq and Beled Hawo).	
AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) The implementation of the new FGS Security Architecture endorsed by Federal Members States and later approved by the FGS parliament may incorporate Jubaland forces to the SNA.	<p><u>Unknown</u> The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis. • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)
Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a (ASWJ) ASWJ has been part of the sectarian conflict in Gedo. The ASWJ's southern branch is now operating as part of the SNA after the agreement with the FGS in April 2013 to fully integrate its forces into the SNA and for the FGS to start paying salaries to troops based in the four districts under their control including Dolow, Belet Hawa, Luuq, and Garbaharey.	<p><u>Unknown</u> The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)

South West State

South West State (SWS) is the regional administration that Lower Shabelle and Bakool clusters fall under. Each cluster has been treated as a strategic area and analysis has been conducted in key settlement areas in which TIS+ is currently working and plans to work. A major impediment to development in these clusters is not only security, but also lack of access to remote areas and systemic unresolved inter-clan conflict that has been manipulated for decades by warlords, militias, and now AS. Gaining control of these areas, winning over diverse and marginalized populations, and linking these efforts to development will not be easy for donors, the SWS administration, or the FGS. However, SWS has worked hard to build core government institutions despite these challenges, and there is an active state parliament with a significant gendered representation (31 out of a total of 149 MPs are women, the largest proportion in any parliament in Somalia). This region has specific "hot spots" and AS does control a significant portion of rural territory, but significant strides by the regional governments should not go overlooked. The institutional progress in SWS reflects a significant degree of intra-state social reconciliation and sustained efforts to improve cohesion among varied clans with long-standing political grievances.

Current Challenges

Ongoing armed insurgency by AS continues to have a significant negative impact on security, limiting access to key parts of the state including arable land needed for economic recovery and food security. The SWS government has developed and improved state capacity, but the administration is severely hampered by weak administration and is operating in a context of a severely limited budget. There are significant gaps in technical capacity and project implementation and management at all levels of government and this is a major impediment to stability in this state. Despite pockets of stability, the SWS still needs significant efforts to improve inter-clan reconciliation and improve social cohesion. There is a pressing need for political settlements to be negotiated to ensure more equitable power sharing, access to resources, and voice for minority groups and clans.

SWS Development Planning

The regions that now form SWS are critical potential drivers of economic growth. In the agriculture sector alone, the state has the potential to return some 11 million hectares of arable land (particularly in the Lower Shabelle region) to production. It also has over 150 miles of coastline to develop. The private

sector is active and growing, and taking the initiative to make early, concerted investments in public services and infrastructure. The private sector in the state has taken significant strides to promote public–private partnerships with government, pending improved public finances for such initiatives. The key strategic priorities for SWS are outlined in the State’s Strategic Plan 2017-19, a three-year comprehensive, results-based strategic framework for recovery and development. A summary of the state’s framework is provided below and is useful in considering ways for TIS+ to integrate these into cluster interventions in Lower Juba, Bakool, and Banaadir. This plan was reviewed and interviews conducted at the settlement and with government officials to confirm some initial areas relevant for TIS+ programming, consensus planning, and bridge plan development.

Planning for Participation

To improve governance and social cohesion in SWS and in the strategic clusters, it is essential that TIS+ move beyond normal CDD approaches to a space that is also focused on enhancing trust and accountability between citizens and the state. TIS+ planning needs to move into the space where the process of community consensus building and bridge planning impacts and influences stability, access, and collaboration between citizens and the state, and strengthens community mechanisms and structures critical for community security.

One of the most important objectives of the SWS administration is to promote peace, justice, and equality for all people across SWS, under an increasingly representative and inclusive system of government. Well-coordinated community-based inter-clan reconciliation must be established to promote political stability, security, and social cohesion. Annex II outlines specific priorities of SWS.

Cluster 3 – Bakool

Geography and Demography

Bakool region covers an area of approximately 26,000 km² and consists of five districts, namely Hudur (the headquarters of the region), Wajid, Tieglow, El Barde, and Rabdhure. The region is primarily agro-pastoralists, who make up 70 percent to 80 percent of the population and are predominantly located in Hudur, Wajid and Tieglow districts with a small proportion found in Rabdhure district; and mainstream pastoralists, who make up 20 percent to 30 percent of the population and are mainly located in Rabdhure and El Barde districts.¹⁹ The area is semi-arid with a warm climate and average daily temperatures range from 25° C to 34° C. The region is flat land with loam soil that is ideal for farming and pastoralism. There are no rivers in the area and people depend mainly on earth pans, bore holes, and shallow wells. The region hosts about 370,000²⁰ people who live across the four districts.

Bakool is largely seen as a cosmopolitan region that hosts subclans within the Rahanweyne as well as other Somali clans who live in the region and have equal representation in the administration. The other clans include the Ogden’s Aulihan and Reer Afgab subclans and Buurashadley in Yed, the Aulihan and Jejele clan in El Barde and Hudur, and the Gadsan (Dir) in Rabdhure district.

Stabilization Actors

The region has a functioning regional and district administration that was appointed by the interim SWS regional government. All major subclans of Rahanweyne clan live in the region except El Barde, which is dominated by Ogaden. The major political actors in the region are the AMISOM (Ethiopian Defense Forces), and the Interim South West State Administration (ISWA) who control Hudur, El Barde, and Wajid. Al-Shabaab still controls Rabdhure and parts of Tieglow. The region is currently under the control

¹⁹ FSNAU 2015 Bakool Region Food Security Analysis.

²⁰ UNFPA 2014 Population Survey.

of various actors including the AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) under the Interim South West State. Al-Shabaab remains present in Bakool, particularly in Rabdhure district and the rural areas of all the other three districts. Although government and AMISOM forces control most towns in the region, most rural territory remains under the control of AS's mobile units. These dynamics pose a security challenge to peace and stability in Bakool.

Recent Political History

In Bakool, clan conflict is primarily based on competition over resources. Most conflicts happen between the Rahanweyne and Ogaden due to territorial land disputes (particularly in the El Barde area), livestock theft, grazing rights, water, charcoal, humanitarian aid, and deforestation-related disputes. There are significant latent conflicts and unresolved clan conflicts that still exist between the Rahanweyn community and Ogaden.

Historically, Bakool region has witnessed a series of inter- and intra-clan conflicts. The most notable conflicts are the “Salbalaad” conflict (invasion by Mohamed Farah Aided), the Marehan war, the Inter-Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) conflict, and the Ogaden war by Mohamed Omar Jess. A political conflict exists between Rahanweyn and the Ogaden clans, who fight for control of power. This has gotten much worse since the formation of SWS in 2015. Ogaden who mainly live in El Barde have rejected results of the SWS formation conference, arguing that they have not gotten “rightful” representation in the FMS level parliament and as cabinet members. As a result, Ogaden politicians (who got notable support from Jubaland) have declared “Upper Bakool Administration,” claiming an autonomous political entity independent from SWS. However, this conflict has been somewhat mitigated after Jubaland and SWS leaders met to discuss and compromise on issues related to Rahanweyn representation and political participation in Jubaland.

Index Tool

Based on index scores compiled from analyzing the HH survey questions, Bakool had significantly higher scores in governance, community cohesion, and stability factors than Lower Shabelle. At endline these scores will be used to analyze cross-cluster differences and compare these with TIS+ interventions. CA will also be used to look at the other factors that may have contributed to improved scores in these three areas. At baseline these scores were used to triangulate with qualitative data and to see whether the scores also were reflected in community level responses (FGDs) and KIs with community members and local, regional, and FGS staff and officials.

Figure 14: Baseline Index Scores – Bakool Cluster

Baseline Index Scores	South West State		
	Bakool Cluster		
Good Governance	54%		
Community Cohesion	53%		
Stability	55%		

Color Key	Critical = < 50% (Crisis)	Average = 50% - 66% (Stable)	Green = > 67% (Development)
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Inclusion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- Gender equality, minority inclusion, and participation of youth
- Relevance to KAQ Question 4

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

- AS appeals to disgruntled Somali clans by charging that foreigners are manipulating internal affairs, and implicitly, the defender of Somalia's sovereignty. This is particularly compelling as leverage for some clan-based power dynamics at the local level in Bakool. There was evidence in several interviews across settlements that the perception of AS is mixed. Although their influence has diminished, they still control some large rural areas in this cluster.
- AS manipulates minority sentiments, and larger clans can also affiliate with AS to resolve specific conflicts around land or water access in specific areas. This is particularly evident around the acquisition of land and access to water resources critical for livelihoods of minority groups. The drought has only amplified this effect according to some sources.
- Some of AS's leadership is also from this region, so the reach and structure of AS in this region may be more sophisticated according to officials interviewed.
- Traditional clan rules still limit the participation of women in some aspects of life, and this is more evident in rural areas.
- Gender gaps were prominent in the HH survey, however per interviews, there are interventions and champions who actively promote gender inclusion in Bakool. Women's associations and organizations at district and federal levels, such as the Ministry of Human Rights and Women's Affairs in South West state, district government officials, and women's organization in the state, play a significant role in this. There are also international partners and diasporic women who support and promote women's interests.
- Youth expressed a feeling that their involvement was being more recognized. Security had improved and this had promoted more opportunities for youth to engage in public planning and project development.
- There was evidence in Bakool that many of the projects initiated recently had focused on community consensus planning and community cooperation. However, all the projects given as examples were donor-led with minimal local government participation.
- By most accounts there was greatly improved interface with the government and youth and women. Most projects in the settlements surveyed had criteria for minority and youth inclusion in project management, maintenance, and selection.
- Although women and men in this cluster had relatively similar views of gender equality, there was clear evidence that clan rules limit the participation and engagement of women in community planning and consultation events, although this was said to be improving.
- Clan dynamics and an embedded history of migration and competition over resources (e.g., land and water access) impacts political settlements, trust, and civic engagement among clan groups in this region. There is significant competition over land and water, and this can impact whole communities.
- Development planning at the national and state level is gradually changing, and as more established district and local systems are developed, it is likely that expectations of participation and inclusion will increase. Much of this is due to the dominance of INGO and NGO development-led planning.

Inclusion Recommendations

- Bakool has several active women's associations and organizations at district and federal levels that seek to play a significant role in increasing the voice and agency of women in the newly formed FMS.

It was recommended that women have the opportunity to lead infrastructure projects or development efforts to show the impact the women can have and their competency in planning and coordination.

- There is a need for more explicit inclusion of minority member clans and leadership in larger-scale development planning with the express purpose of increasing transparency and opportunities for these groups.

Governance Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- *Confidence in government*
- *Service delivery*
- *Community government relationships*
- *Stakeholder partnerships*
- *Relevance to KAQ Question 1, 2, and 3*

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Governance Section charts detail specific information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster and specific sub themes analyzed to establish the baseline findings.

- Bakool is one of the administrative regions of SWS. The region borders the Bay, Gedo, and Hiran regions as well the Ethiopian border on the northwestern side. Currently political and security control of the region is mainly under the SWS while the districts are under government control.
- Before the formation of the federal state SWS only Hudur and El Barde were under government control, but in 2014 the military operations against AS in Bay and Bakool regions by joint forces of AMISOM, SNA, and SWS forces allowed the government to regain control of all the districts in Bakool region.
- There is a newly liberated area with some clan conflicts that have become more pronounced after the formation of the state (Rahanweyn and Ogaden).
- All main district centers of the Bakool region are now under government control. SWS state forces, with the help of SNA and AMISOM, are patrolling the roads between districts of the region. The security situation in the region is improved, but the withdrawal of support by Ethiopia has caused some increased insecurity. AS continues to control some critical corridors, making movement in this area still a cause of concern.
- Although movement to Bakool by air is not restricted, there is a sporadic siege on most of the districts by AS and there is poor access to some towns and settlements. Because of this siege and restrictions there is weak market by roads to and from these towns.
- This restriction on movement takes its toll on local populations, sometimes limiting the flow of essential commodities and driving up the price of goods.
- Bakool has been severely affected by drought, and this has had a significant impact on increased resource conflicts. These resource conflicts (particularly over land and water) have been getting worse.
- Security continues to be an ongoing cause of concern for both the government as well as local communities. AS continues to provide security in some rural areas.
- Local conflicts (e.g., family conflicts, small-scale land conflicts) seem to be resolved as they arise by local and religious leaders, but there is increasing stress over access to water and grazing rights.
- A conflict between the Rahanweyn and Ogaden clans is a particularly destabilizing dynamic. There are essential political and power sharing arrangements that need to be made based on some of the state formation boundaries defined in 2015.
- Many respondents, both male and female, described the security situation between settlements in this cluster as improved. As a newly liberated cluster the change in security was significant.

- Respondents in this cluster ranked security services higher than the norm and this is likely due to drastic changes in access over the past two years.
- Quantitative data suggest that youth in this cluster are not prone to forced recruitment in VE groups, and there was a recognized intolerance for VE both quantitatively and in FGDs. However, in more in-depth KIs it was evident that youth employment by AS is still a significant concern.
- There were higher levels of confidence in member state government and local administration to work on local development, but clan interests were considered a factor in decision-making and access to planning and development.
- Measures relating to corruption and community accountability were not as high in this cluster but they were still concerning. Because most projects seem to be managed by NGOs or INGOs, this statistic seems high. Some of this comes from the prevalence of illegal checkpoints and taxing that is conducted not only by AS, but also AMISOM actors and in some cases the SNA.
- Service provision was relatively low in all primary community development areas, save the provision of drinking water and security, and more moderate levels in access to health services.
- This is an extremely drought-affected area; service delivery has been prioritized as drought relief in some areas, and is largely dominated by humanitarian assistance interventions.
- Local administration was largely seen as responsible for the administration of services, particularly security services. NGOs and businesses are often described as service delivery mechanisms. It was noted in some local areas that the diaspora plays a significant role in contributing to key services.
- Security has greatly improved from the previous year and satisfaction with security was statistically higher in this cluster.
- Awareness of local oversight or planning committees was higher in this cluster, and this is likely due to current projects detailed in the CA table.
- Interface with government officials around development planning has recently improved, and where this took did occur, it was primarily initiated by one of the stability actors working in the region on stabilization programming.
- Local governance is improving, but still weak. As district councils form and become more established, it will be important to integrate this structure into planning larger infrastructure projects.

Governance Recommendations

- Support for district council formation in this cluster and in other clusters (pending secure access to those districts impacted by AS insurgency) is needed. This was noted in several interviews and recent work on participatory approaches have raised expectations in this cluster for improved community level engagement.
- There is also a need for enhanced support for local reconciliation and dialogue efforts, including specific provisions to promote the participation of women in these interventions and efforts.

Community Cohesion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis.

- Peace building (status of conflict and conflict mitigation)
- Sociocultural activities
- National unity (perceptions of identity)

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

- Most people interviewed in this cluster felt conflict over resources had decreased in the past year; there were also higher levels of trust in local mechanisms for conflict mitigation (e.g., clan elders) compared with other clusters.
- When asked about identity, most respondents said they would chose Somali national identity over clan affiliation (M 64 percent, F 55 percent); however in FGDs and KIs it was evident that deep-rooted clan conflicts impact service delivery and political settlements.
- National pride and the perception that things were improving were very high in this cluster, but a significant percentage of respondents, both males and females, feared that Somalia would never be a peaceful country (M 58 percent, F 42 percent).
- Sports and cultural events were very helpful in improving peaceful coexistence and social integration, but a lower percentage than other clusters felt that they contributed to increased levels of tolerance.
- Specific clan conflicts still cause political issues and severe mistrust. AS is a masterful “manipulator” of these sentiments, particularly around land conflicts.

Community Cohesion Recommendations

- There is also a need to support youth engagement in development efforts in this cluster. There was an expressed concern of youth vulnerability to recruitment with militia groups and to engage in conflict.
- In this cluster there is a need to look at ways to elevate the role of youth and to engage them more actively in community life and development planning.

Community-Driven Infrastructure Planning

At baseline the CC Tool was used to assess initial infrastructure planning processes and challenges at the cluster level. Questions looked at specific categories of infrastructure and looked at the funding mechanisms, maintenance, and interviewed project oversight members and local government officials. Please see Annex III for specific findings relevant to this cluster as well as interventions highlighted for endline analysis in Phase 3 and Phase 4.

Contribution Analysis and Bakool

Myriad stabilization actors are initially mapped for their influence in the attached CA table for this cluster. The influencing factors most likely to impact TIS+ activities evident at baseline are delineated in this table. If a final evaluation is conducted, these programs and factors should be considered when identifying impact and lessons learned. This will ensure that the USG can identify more specific contributions of TIS+ programming in stabilization environments impacted by VE actors and influence.

Table 11: Contribution Analysis Table – Bakool

Key: Influencing factors by type				
Security	Political/ Governance	Social	Economic	Geographic or climatic
Cluster 5: Bakool				
Settlements/Districts: Xudur, Ceel Barde, and Waajid				
Major Clans: The Somali major clans Rahanweyn, Darod, Dir, and Hawiye live in Bakool region; Rahanweyn subclans are dominant in most districts.				
Minority Clans: There are not many notable minority clans in Bakool region except in Buurashadley (mainly Harti/Darod old police officers left by Italians)				
Influencing Factors: Other Stabilization Partners		Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis		

<p>The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) SSF has operated in Xudur, where it implemented an intensive community consultation process through the Danish Demining Group (DDG). SSF is no longer working in Xudur but Finn Church Aid is continuing its work in the district.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak positive influence</u> In Xudur, SSF work included a community consensus process on which TIS+ work may build, but SSF involvement has finished, so the Finn Church Aid continuation of this work is likely to exert a stronger influence by endline. They also worked in Wajid during Phase I.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with SSF • TIS+ mapping
<p>Local Governance Consortium (EU funding) of Finn Church Aid (FCA) FCA is working to support District Council formation in Xudur. The intervention has governance components (e.g., community consultation, gender, civic education, peace building, and capacity building).</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> In Xudur, SSF work included a community consensus process, on which TIS+ work may build, but SSF involvement has finished, so the FCA continuation of this work is likely to exert a stronger influence by endline.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with SSF • TIS+ mapping
<p>UNDP support to FGS Stabilization Plan This program supports a Local Governance Advisor/Community Liaison Officer in Xudur and Wajid.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak influence/no influence</u> This work appears quite bounded and is in a very different area than TIS+.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping</p>
<p>Nordic International Support Foundation (NISF) has worked in Xudur, delivering 75 solar streetlights, refurbishing a market, and rehabilitating a District Community Center. It has also rehabilitated a meat market in Wajid.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak to moderate positive influence</u></p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping</p>
<p>Influencing Factors: Other Interventions (USG Partners)</p>	<p>Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis</p>
<p>TBD</p>	<p>TBD</p>
<p>Influencing Factors: Positive</p>	<p>Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis</p>
<p>Established existence and awareness of peace and safety committees and other local capacities There are peace committees, women's groups, youth groups, business groups, traditional leaders, and a functioning Chamber of Commerce in Bakool. Many community groups were strengthened by work during the first phase of TIS. Further, traditional leaders play important roles in peace building and conflict resolution, as confirmed in the baseline HH survey. The survey found that awareness of local oversight or planning committees (in the assessed areas, especially Hudur and El Barde) was higher in this cluster and there was awareness of community planning events. The previous TIS work at the community level may have contributed to this.</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> The preexistence of such committees, supported in the first phase of TIS, will positively influence the TIS+ community consensus, planning, financing, and monitoring process. The endline will assess the relative contribution of these to TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Baseline HH survey
<p>District security institutions in place</p>	<p><u>If this is borne out by evidence, expected moderate positive influence</u></p>

Security infrastructure exists, although it is nascent and underdeveloped. There are police stations in all districts of the region, although they are ill equipped.	<p>The existence of these institutions, if built upon, <i>should</i> help the FGS provide better rule of law and contribute to greater trust in government.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p>Nascent district and regional authorities</p> <p>Functioning district and regional authorities exist in the region. Districts such as Hudur, Rabdhure (Yeed), and Wajid have caretaker district administrations that are dominated by the DCs. These are strong authorities, but they need to build up their accountability.</p>	<p><u>If this is borne out by evidence, expected moderate positive influence</u></p> <p>The existence of these institutions, if built upon, <i>should</i> help contribute to greater trust in government as the authorities provide democratic accountability and service delivery.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) Saferworld (2016) Forging Jubaland: Community Perspectives on Federalism, Governance and Reconciliation
Influencing Factors: Negative	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>Al-Shabaab</p> <p>Although all district centers in Bakool are now under government control, Al-Shabaab remains present, particularly in Rabdhure district and the rural areas of all the other four districts. Al-Shabaab conducts sporadic sieges in most of the districts and there is poor access to some towns and settlements. Movement is restricted on important roads and market corridors, although SWS state forces with the help of SNA and AMISOM are patrolling the roads between some districts of the region.</p> <p>This is a proximate conflict driver.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p>In their targeting of opponents and restriction of movement on important roads and market corridors, Al-Shabaab has the capacity to undermine several key TIS+ mechanisms of change.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ evaluation context analysis CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p>Protracted inter- and intra-clan conflict</p> <p>Bakool is one of the regions in Somalia most affected by protracted clan conflict since the collapse of the Somali state, and Xudur has been among the most contested cities in Somalia, changing hands seven times since 1991.</p> <p>Clan conflict is primarily based on competition over resources, notably between the Rahanweyne and Ogaden over land grabbing in El Barde area, livestock theft, grazing rights, water, farmlands revenge killings, charcoal, and humanitarian aid resources, and disputes over deforestation.</p> <p>The baseline HH survey found that most people interviewed in this cluster felt conflict over resources had decreased in the past year, but FGDs and KIs also revealed that deep-rooted</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ baseline context analysis TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) Baseline HH survey Baseline KIs and FGDs

clan conflicts impact service delivery and political settlements. These are structural and proximate conflict drivers.	
Continued contestation over South West State formation The political and clan conflicts in Bakool have included a conflict over the formation of South West State dating to 2015. The Ogaden who mainly live in El Barde have rejected results of the SWS formation conference, arguing that they were not adequately represented in the Federal Member State-level parliament and cabinet. As a result, Ogaden politicians, with support from Jubaland, have declared an Upper Bakool Administration as an autonomous political entity independent from SWS. The tension has recently reduced after negotiations between (Ogaden-dominated) Jubaland and (Rahanweyn-dominated) SWS leaders on Rahanweyn representation and political participation in Jubaland.	<p><u>Depending on the course of events, expected weak to moderate negative influence</u> This expectation depends on the hoped-for resolution of this conflict.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline context analysis
Drought and high WASH vulnerability Bakool deemed to have extremely high Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation (WASH) vulnerability (except for Rabdhure, which has very high vulnerability) based on AWD/cholera risk, flood risk, drought risk, number of IDP, water, and sanitation coverage. Reliance on livelihoods from pastoralism, nomadism, and rain-fed farming make Bakool particularly vulnerable to drought and humanitarian access, and effective provision of assistance to rural villages in Bakool remains a challenge due to insecurity.	<p><u>Depending how the situation develops, potential for a strong-moderate negative influence</u> Although drought allows FGS to be seen as the provider/coordinator of humanitarian assistance, drought and resultant displacement can be a significant conflict driver.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WASH cluster, WASH Vulnerability Analysis (May 2017) OCHA Somalia Drought Situation Report (as of 20 June 2017) TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
Influencing Factors: Unknown	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) AMISOM is dominated by Ethiopian forces in Bakool.	<p><u>Unknown</u> The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ evaluation context analysis

Cluster 4 – Lower Shabelle

Geography and Demography

The Lower Shabelle (LS) region is one of the most populated regions of Somalia and is the third largest in terms of population after Banaadir and Waqoyi Galbed. It has a population of 1,202,219 per UNFPA's recent (2014) survey, almost 10 percent of the total Somali population. There is a significant youth

population in this region with over 75 percent of the population estimated to be younger than 30 years old. The urban population is 215,752 and the rural is 723,682, the largest compared with all other regions. Roughly 159,815 are classified as nomadic and there are an estimated 102,970 IDPs, which is the third-largest population after Banaadir and Galgadud. The region consists of seven administrative districts: (1) Marka, the capital; (2) Afgoye, the most populated and only 30 km from Mogadishu; (3) Barawe, the capital of South West State; (4) Kurtinwaarey; (5) Qoryooley; (6) Sablaale; and (7) Wanlaweyn. Lower Shabelle has been described as the breadbasket of Somalia due to its rich agricultural potential and access to coastal resources. Afgoye, Qoryooley, Kurtinwaarey, and Sablaale fall along the main Shabelle River while Marka and Barawe lay at the Indian Ocean. Marka and Barawe have been the primary port areas in Somalia for centuries. Both riverine and coastal towns have attracted migration for centuries, and the region has the most clan diversity in the country. This region has over 1,433 settlements or villages per a recent UNFPA rural framework assessment.

Recent Political History

This region has a long history of large-scale farming and agricultural projects, most controlled by the Somali government until the collapse of Somalia in 1991. After the collapse, militias and warlords backed by bigger clans migrated into this region, particularly into resource-rich farming areas and coastal towns, and displaced many local communities, most of them minority groups who were at the time unarmed and unorganized. This is where the term “*Fara*” (new settlers) began to be used as these newer populations pushed the “*Asal*” (original settlers), mostly smaller clans and groups, away from resource-rich areas. After 1991, warlords backed by large clan-based militias began to dominate this area and there is a history of increasing tensions between groups seen to be *Fara* and those believed to be *Asal*. This situation continued for more than a decade until 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) captured most of Southern Somalia for a brief time and then later evolved into Al-Shabaab. There are reports that AS has confiscated many previously government-owned farms and redistributed them to AS leaders in some areas and to minority groups in others.

During UIC and later AS rule, most of the looted and occupied farms, lands, and properties were returned to their original owners. For the minority groups and clans, UIC and AS liberated them and restored their dignity and access to land and resource rights. For the first time in many years, these smaller groups were provided with “justice and protection” from the warlords and militias. This context background explains much of what is happening today in areas of Somalia with similar histories of resource control and conflict. This background also sheds some light on how local communities perceive SNA that integrated at various stages former clan militias and warlords into its ranks. Some of these former militia members have moved into high-level positions within the SNA.²¹ Many smaller clans and minority groups in LS have severe mistrust of government due to some of these historical dynamics as well as deeply rooted mistrust of the SNA.

Stabilization Actors

The main stabilization actor in LS is the South West State (SWS) regional governor appointed in late 2015. FGS has political influence in the region as SNA falls under the Federal Ministry of Defense (FMD). AMISOM together with SNA controls five districts: Afgoye, Wanlaweyn, Qoryooley, Marka, and Barawe. There are caretaker district administrations in the main district capitals under AMISOM/SNA control that have been appointed by FGS and govern the towns and areas that have been liberated. AS controls all other parts of the region.

²¹ One example is “Indha’adde” who ruled LS for years before UIC replaced him in September 2006 and is now a “lieutenant general” in SNA.

Lower Shabelle falls under Sector I of AMISOM along with Middle Shabelle and Banaadir region. In this region, only Kurtunwaarey and Sablaale are under AS control. However, AMISOM and SNA are present only in urban towns or district capitals and their suburbs, and AS rules the rest of the region including roads between those urban towns under AMISOM and SNA control. AS carries out sporadic attacks and ambushes against AMISOM and SNA bases as well as an increased use of IEDs. Unlike in other districts such as Hudur, El Bur, Buloburte, and Kismayo where AS is surrounded and strictly sanctions any movements of civilians' in and out, movement to and from districts in LS that are under AMISOM/SNA control are not as restrictive. This dynamic is believed to be necessitated by the importance of trade movement that allows AS to tax and generate revenue as goods move in and out of these areas.

AS does not get as much resistance from local communities as in other parts of the country because it has leveraged land and resources conflicts to its benefit and seeks to intervene on these issues when it gains them popular support in areas critical to security and movement. AS also has a more efficient system of taxation in this area and is sometimes preferred to the sporadic and poorly regulated AMISOM/SNA checkpoints. For example, AMISOM/SNA-ruled areas are believed to be less secure and unstable compared with areas under AS control. There have been numerous reports of mismanagement, insecurity, and human rights violations committed by SNA against local communities. For example, SNA, which for local communities means the "FGS," has many illegal checkpoints that each levy tax from trucks, passenger buses, and even private cars while areas under AS have fewer checkpoints and levy tax only after issuing an "official receipt." This dynamic makes liberation and control a confusing and irrelevant concept for local populations long under the effect of oppression and manipulation by more dominant political and security actors.

Index Tool

Based on index scores compiled from analyzing the HH survey questions, Banaadir and Lower Shabelle rated the lowest in terms of governance and stability. At endline these scores will be used to analyze cross-cluster differences and compare these with TIS+ interventions. CA will also be used to look at the other factors that may have contributed to improved scores in these three areas. At baseline these scores were used to triangulate with qualitative data and to see whether the scores also were reflected in community level responses (FGDs) and KIs with community members and local, regional, and FGS staff and officials.

Figure 15: Baseline Index Scores – Lower Shabelle

Baseline Index Scores	Lower Shabelle
Good Governance	39%
Community Cohesion	52%
Stability	46%

Color Key	Critical = < 50% (Crisis)	Average = 50% - 66% (Stable)	Green = > 67% (Development)
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Inclusion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- Gender equality, minority inclusion, and participation of youth
- Relevance to KAQ Question 4

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

In Lower Shabelle, complex clan conflicts and migration have allowed for a diverse and broad array of gender and clan dynamics. One of the major impediments to increasing inclusion in decision-making, governance, and stability at the settlement and district level in LS is the complex nature of clan dynamics and migration in this area. One of the impacts of migration due to food scarcity and climate stress has been the systemic increase of resource competition across varied groups. Instability, mistrust of government, and weak regulatory frameworks have made land and access to resources a valuable commodity that has been wielded as a weapon and a tool for minority manipulation, both by former dominant clans and warlords, and now by AS. Weak government presence and poor SNA recruitment practices and relationships with minority clans in the region have also created fissures of mistrust between the FGS and minority groups living in LS.

Traditional clan rules limit and make irrelevant the role of women in this structure. Within the clan system the role of women does not exist, but outside of this structure the gender dynamics are much more multidimensional and varied. The clan system plays prominently in community dynamics, security, and decision-making. In HH survey data and in FGDs held at the settlement level, it was evident that equality issues are more complex in Somalia than anticipated. Statistically the ratio of response to whether men and women were considered equal was predictable and follows a similar trend in the other clusters. It was evident upon data analysis that it is often the clan system itself that is the impediment to the inclusion of women in community life, and not the culture or perceived ability of women to take on leadership roles in conflict mitigation. What is unique about Somalia is that the potential participation of women in areas such as politics, conflict mitigation, community security, and peace building is generally acceptable across genders but these initiatives are largely funded and initiated by external sources and are not indigenous to these settlement areas. A consistently high percentage of respondents both in the HH survey and in qualitative data noted attributes of women and their potential in leadership and peace building as an important community attribute as well as a cultural perspective.

- There was evidence in several interviews across settlements that the perception of AS is mixed. Some minority groups feel that the presence of AS has helped address some perceived injustices and past dominance by certain clan groups. This is particularly evident around the acquisition of land and access to resources critical for livelihoods of minority groups.
- Across data sets youth consistently expressed frustration in feeling that their involvement was marginalized and limited. Some of the factors impacting this perception among youth were: (1) access to skills necessary to set and identify community priorities, (2) dominance by elders in decision-making and planning, and (3) poor selection of local partners by larger INGOs and NGOs unfamiliar with local dynamics.
- Although women and men in this cluster had relatively similar views of gender equality, there was clear evidence that clan rules limit the participation and engagement of women in community planning and consultation events.
- The clan system is the major impediment to the involvement of women and youth in decision-making, particularly in communities where the clan system is dominant in community politics, security, and decision-making. The male-dominated clan system and the dominance of these structures in community life impact access to decision-making for women.
- Where the clan system is not dominant or where community leadership is requested and selection managed through other means, the participation of women and youth is more equitable.
- Clan dynamics and an embedded history of migration and competition over resources (e.g., land and water access) impacts political settlements, trust, and civic engagement among clan groups in this region. This will impact a more sustained level of participation in development planning in LS.
- By most accounts there is little if any interface with the government and youth and women. Most projects in the settlements surveyed are dominated by NGO efforts and projects have varied criteria for minority and youth inclusion in project management, maintenance, and selection.

- There is an interest among youth and women as well as minority groups to be engaged in decision-making, but weak interface and understanding of district government roles and responsibilities.
- There is evidence of increased expectation for development projects to be managed by NGOs and not by the government. This was consistent across qualitative and quantitative data.
- Inclusion and participation seems to be largely a product of INGO and individual project efforts and not primarily initiated by the regional or district government as their resources are severely limited in engaging in this way with local communities.

Inclusion Recommendations

- TIS+ needs to ensure that the role of government is clear in project planning, particularly with marginalized groups, women, and youth. This will prove difficult in smaller community-level interventions in which district level government staff try to prioritize development planning and transparency with these groups.
- Staff within LS and in newly formed FMSs need to gain skills in community participation and planning techniques such as public consultations with minority or underrepresented groups. This will be a critical piece in improving the relationship between citizens and state representatives. This may also help create a space for identifying minority concerns and interests in access to development planning resources at the grassroots level.
- TIS+ should also prioritize holding separate consultative processes with women and encourage women politicians and district representatives to attend events. Holding separate events may increase the voice and agency of women.

Governance Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- *Confidence in government*
- *Service delivery*
- *Community government relationships*
- *Stakeholder partnerships*
- *Relevance to KAQ Question 1, 2, and 3*

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Governance Section charts detail specific information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster and specific subthemes analyzed to establish the baseline findings.

The main political actor in LS is the regional governor who was appointed in late 2015. AMISOM together with SNA controls five districts: Afgoye, Wanlaweyn, Qoryoley, Marka, and Barawe. There are caretaker district administrations in the main district capitals under AMISOM/SNA control that have been appointed by FGS and govern the towns and areas that have been liberated. AS controls all other parts of the region and are embedded in many settlement areas and districts through clan ties as well as a level of acceptance from local minority groups and affiliated communities that see AS as being more effective at local level security and justice provision.

The TIS+ approach is distinct from the TIS approach in that community planning is done in partnership with the government and local authorities. There is an intended emphasis on skills transfer and coordination with government officials and district level officials so that they can improve their own roles in development approaches that are effective for stabilization environments. The interventions are locally owned but with direct connection to the local government authorities. The objective is to increase the interface that government has with local communities and help them develop systems that encourage greater inclusion in community planning and security. The problem with this cluster and others is that the community is generally very unaware of the role of government and what they have done or can do. The

following statement from a woman in Marko sums this up: *“I do not know of any service offered by the government but all the other service providers serve the community well.”*

Previously there has not been sufficient connection between the local government and the federal government so TIS+ seeks to do this by seeking ways to improve the interface between citizens and their local, regional, and in some cases, national representatives. These interventions include funding technical coordinators within the Ministry of the Interior to transfer skills and knowledge. In some cases, TIS+ works in areas where the leaders are not legitimately elected or selected. However, where there are discussions and planning for district councils, for example in Mogadishu and Kismayo, a state-centric approach is more effective and it is possible to cede more leadership to the government. There is a regional government in LS, but the local and district officials are representatives of the FGS and have not been duly elected through a popular or democratic process.

- Lower Shabelle is a high priority of the SWS government as well as the FGS due to its potential for economic growth.
- As in all clusters LS is severely drought-affected; this has had a significant impact on increased resource conflicts. These resource conflicts (particularly land conflicts) are used by AS to increase tension between key clans and to win support from minority groups.
- SWS plans to relocate its capital to Barawe once security improves. AMISOM and SNA are present, but their areas of control are limited.
- Security continues to be an ongoing concern both for the government as well as local communities. AS continues to provide security in areas that are not urbanized in this cluster.
- Local conflicts (e.g., family conflicts, small-scale land conflicts) seem to be resolved as they arise by local and religious leaders. However, a long-standing clan conflict between the Biyomaal (locally dominant clan) and Habar Gidir (seen as “new” settlers) is a particularly destabilizing clan dynamic.
- There are numerous inter-clan conflicts and this dynamic has a long history of political manipulation by dominant clan groups, warlords, and now AS.
- In some areas, SNA’s reputation has been damaged and they are seen locally as contributing to inter-clan tensions. According to some sources, these factors may influence SNA and AMISOM’s ability to hold Merka against AS.
- The “government” (mainly referred to as FGS) is unpopular in this cluster and area of Somalia. AS has manipulated and used this feeling to stir Biyomaal and marginalized clans against the government.
- Information sharing between communities and local administration was adequate but there were exceptionally high perceptions of corruption per the HH survey tool (above 40 percent). This is exceptionally high by any standard or measure.
- Service provision was low in all primary community development areas, save the provision of drinking water. The drought has put severe stress on some communities for water for other purposes such as basic livelihood needs (food production and water for livestock and animals).
- Satisfaction with security and police and administration were very low. In several interviews and in data analysis it was clear that AS plays a substitution role in this cluster for security, and on some levels, local justice provision.
- Evidence suggests that in LS there are significant gaps in coordination and planning. Larger projects seem to get more attention from the regional and district government but have less direct participation at the community level.
- There is very little community interface with government officials around development planning and where this did occur, it was primarily initiated by one of the stability actors working in the region on stabilization programming.
- Where this is evident in interviews at baseline the impression left on local community members and government officials is significant. But the sustainability issue, post-donor intervention, is also evident.

- At the community level this emerges as a perception that INGOs and NGOs “fund” the efforts and community members come just for an initial meeting and the ribbon ceremony.
- At the government level this is evident from concerns about budgeting for transparency mechanisms, coordination, and field-based travel to visit communities that are insecure and are believed to be held by AS.
- Awareness of local oversight or planning committees was also extremely low in this cluster. However, in KIIs and in FGD discussions, it was clear in areas of past USG or INGO programming that there was increased awareness, and in some cases, direct participation in planning and oversight on specific projects or efforts.
- There was minimal awareness of community planning events specific to development (↑75 percent), and often these events seemed to be premeditated and not inclusive or participatory. A more structured approach to public planning events is needed.

Governance Recommendations

- There is a significant need to strengthen the capacity of government officials to improve transparent budget planning, oversight, and prioritization processes at the district level in this cluster.
- There is a need to weigh the advantage of larger infrastructure needs and projects with the intention of TIS+ to interface citizens, the private sector, and the government.
- Large infrastructure projects require transparent and efficient communication and planning efforts with local communities impacted, and TIS+ will need to carefully manage expectations and appropriate levels of community engagement.
- Evidence suggests that there may be a typology of project that is better suited for clusters such as LS, where the influence and movements of AS are significant outside urban centers and main roads. It may be that in areas where AS is embedded in local communities, community development projects are better suited for intervention than large infrastructure projects in which citizens are less likely to be able to directly experience engagement with local and regional officials.

Community Cohesion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis.

- Peace building (status of conflict and conflict mitigation)
- Sociocultural activities
- National unity (perceptions of identity)

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

- Most people interviewed in this cluster felt that conflict over resources had increased in the past year, but there were resources to resolve these conflicts at the settlement level. There are, however, significant land and resource conflicts that need resolution and mitigation at the district level as increased food insecurity is increasing the level and depth of these conflicts and grievances.
- Long-standing clan conflicts still cause political issues and severe mistrust. AS is a masterful “manipulator” of these sentiments, particularly around long-standing land conflicts.
- Community-based inter-clan reconciliation is an evident need and priority in this cluster (particularly in the Merka area).
- Plans for an inclusive Reconciliation Committee are underway as a part of the Somalia NDP and districts in this cluster are critical partners of any efforts to identify and resolve long-standing grievances through a national healing process.

- When asked about identity, most respondents said they would chose Somali national identity over clan affiliation (M 64 percent, F 55 percent); however, in FGDs and KIs it was evident that deep-rooted clan conflicts impact this sentiment in practice.
- National pride and the perception that things were improving was very high in this cluster (influenced by the presidential election), but despite this positive outcome, both males and females feared that Somalia would never be a peaceful country (↑30 percent).
- In interviews and data analysis, sports and cultural events were considered helpful in improving peaceful coexistence and inter-clan dynamics in this cluster. These events allowed interaction among groups on a different level and were considered essential by many respondents for increasing social cohesion.

Community Cohesion Recommendations

- There is a need to assist with more formalized approaches to conflict mitigation at the district level as increased food insecurity escalates the level and depth of these conflicts and grievances. TIS+ may want to consider this as an intervention area, particularly in LS.
- The clan system is the primary tool for conflict mitigation, but there is going to be an enhanced need for this skill to be developed with local government officials and representatives. Conflict mitigation training may be a necessary and critical skill for enhanced citizen and government engagement over the life of TIS+ and beyond.

Community-Driven Infrastructure Planning

At baseline the CC Tool was used to assess initial infrastructure planning processes and challenges at the cluster level. Questions looked at specific categories of infrastructure and looked at the funding mechanisms, maintenance, and interviewed project oversight members and local government officials. Please see Annex III for specific findings relevant to this cluster as well as interventions highlighted for endline analysis in Phase 3 and Phase 4.

Contribution Analysis and Lower Shabelle

LS and the SWS regionally is one of the most critical stabilization areas in Somalia. Myriad stabilization actors are initially mapped for their influence in this cluster in the attached CA table for this cluster. The influencing factors most likely to impact TIS+ activities, as evident at baseline, are delineated in this table. If a final evaluation is conducted, these programs and factors should be considered when identifying impact and lessons learned. This will ensure that the USG can identify more specific contributions of TIS+ programming in stabilization environments impacted by VE actors and influence.

Table 12: Contribution Analysis Table: Lower Shabelle

Key: Influencing factors by type				
Security	Political/ Governance	Social	Economic	Geographic or climatic
Lower Shabelle Settlements/ Districts: Wanleweyne, Afgoye, Merka, Qoryooley, and Barawe				
Clans: As one of the most populated regions, Lower Shabelle hosts the biggest number of clans. The clans are spread throughout the seven districts of the region and there is no one clan that dominates all districts or even most districts. Three out of the four Somali major clans (based on the 4.5 power-sharing formula, major clans are Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn), namely Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn, are spread throughout the region. However, there are a significant number of minority clans, some of them dominating districts, for example Barawe.				

Influencing Factors: Other Stabilization Partners *Note – there are many actors, especially in Lower Shabelle*	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) SSF is present only in Barawe, where they are planning to build an airstrip and have provided some technical assistance to government. They have not conducted any community engagement work here.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak positive influence</u> SSF is not currently sufficiently active in Lower Shabelle to exert a significant influence on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with SSF, TIS+ mapping • Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017)
<p>The UN Joint Programme on Local Governance (UNJPLG) JPLG works in Afgoye and Wanleweyne to support District Council formation.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak to moderate positive influence</u> JPLG and TIS+ work in different parts of a stabilization continuum, with JPLG generally coming in at a later point than TIS+.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Interview with JPLG; TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017)</p>
<p>AfDB Multi-Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF) The SIF has worked on technical assistance to South West infrastructure ministries as well as supported repairs to local roads in Barawe and Merka and repairs to Barawe port.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak to moderate positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline. TIS+ and USAID are currently in discussions about partnering on 30 km of the Mogadishu-Afgoye road project. Efforts such as this will need to be analyzed at endline.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> SIF documents</p>
<p>UNDP support to FGS Stabilization Plan UNDP has been supporting District Peace and Stability Committees in Barawe.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline. The overlap with TIS+ does not appear to be sufficient at present to exert a strong influence on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping</p>
<p>Nordic International Support Foundation (UK and Norwegian funding) NISF has worked in Wanleweyne, where it has supported 75 solar streetlights, market refurbishment, and rehabilitation of the District Community Center. It is not clear in the TIS+ mapping whether this is the same as the ERI work in Wanleweyne noted below.</p> <p>NISF also runs the Bilateral Labor-Intensive Stabilization (BLIS) program with Norwegian support in Afgoye, where it has worked/will work on solar streetlights, canal excavation, and road rehabilitation.</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline as there may be some coordination on the Afgoye Road project and construction (see AfDB note above).</p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping</p>
<p>The UK Early Recovery Initiative (ERI) ERI has worked in Wanleweyne, Barawe, Merka, Afgoye, and Qoreooley.</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> ERI and TIS+ work in different parts of a stabilization continuum, with ERI generally coming in at an earlier point than TIS+ as one of the first responders, along with military</p>

	<p>actors. The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017)</p>
Influencing Factors: Other Interventions (USG Partners)	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p><i>The US Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)</i> OTI is present in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Wanleweyne, where it has worked on women's dialogue, soccer and dialogue, capacity support to District Administration, and conflict prevention dialogue ➤ Merka ➤ Qoreooley, where it has worked on conflict prevention dialogue ➤ Afgoye, where it has worked on community engagement through participatory theatre, conflict prevention dialogue, and a cultural festival ➤ Barawe, where it has worked on conflict prevention dialogue 	<p><u>Expected strong positive influence</u> TIS+ and OTI are designed to work together, which means we would certainly expect to see stronger results due to their combined efforts. They often work on different points of the stabilization continuum/process.</p> <p>The endline will need to use available data to assess the strength of the evidence for the influence of SSF interventions on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> Interviews with OTI, TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017)</p>
<p><i>USAID-funded Harnessing Opportunities for Peaceful Engagement in Afgoye (HOPE) project (IRC)</i> HOPE works on increasing community resilience to violence in South Central Somalia by strengthening community relations and decision-making at the local level. The project works on both community engagement and strengthening local government institutions.</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate positive influence in Afgoye</u> At endline this project will be reviewed to see whether community relations impacted decision-making on any linked or relevant efforts, with a specific focus on any work IRC is doing with government partners shared by TIS+ interventions.</p> <p><u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping</p>
Influencing Factors: Positive	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p><i>Nascent but limited peace and safety committees and other local capacities</i> There are peace committees, women's groups, youth groups, and business groups in government-held areas, and traditional leaders play important roles in peace building. They are limited in their capacities to fulfill their mandate as they are newly formed.</p> <p>The baseline HH survey found that awareness of local oversight or planning committees was also extremely low in this cluster.</p>	<p><u>Expected weak positive influence</u> The preexistence of such committees will positively influence the TIS+ community consensus, planning, financing and monitoring process. The endline will assess the relative contribution of these to TIS+ results. The weakness of these nascent capacities will weaken the extent of their influence on TIS+ results, and the more TIS+ must build them up, the more TIS+ will have contributed to community engagement results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) • Baseline HH survey
<p><i>Nascent but limited district and regional authorities</i> There is a Regional Governor for Lower Shabelle Region, and in the liberated districts there are local administrations headed by</p>	<p><u>Depending how quickly they can be built up, weak to moderate positive influence</u> The existence of these institutions, if built upon, <i>should</i> help contribute to greater trust in government as the authorities</p>

<p>District Commissioners (DCs) and their deputies. However, in the three districts that are still under control of AS, local administration structures are lacking. There are no structures below the Regional Governor such as the DCs and the community-level social groups.</p>	<p>provide democratic accountability and service delivery. These institutions are starting from a low base in this case.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p>Influencing Factors: Negative</p>	<p>Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab</p> <p>In this region, Al-Shabaab has complete control over only Kurtunwaarey and Sablaale. However, AMISOM and SNA are present in only urban towns or district capitals and their suburbs (Afgoye, Qoryoley, Wanlaweyn, Marka, and Barawe) and Al-Shabaab rules the rest of the region including roads between those urban towns under AMISOM and SNA. AS carries out hit-and-run guerrilla attacks and ambushes against AMISOM and SNA bases. However, Al-Shabaab does not restrict the movement of civilians to and from districts under its control to the same extent as in other regions, perhaps because of the need to maintain the flow of agricultural goods from which Al-Shabaab extracts significant revenues.</p> <p>There is less local resistance to Al-Shabaab relative to other parts of Somalia.</p> <p>This is a proximate conflict driver.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p>Al-Shabaab targeting of opponents has the capacity to undermine several key TIS+ mechanisms of change. In addition, if it appears to provide better governance and rule of law than FGS, this will seriously undermine FGS trust and legitimacy.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
<p>Perception that AMISOM/SNA areas are less secure</p> <p>Reports of mismanagement insecurity and human rights violations committed by the SNA, who are from outside the region, compounded by the history of abuses by warlords and militias, also from outside the region, against locals have contributed to the perception that Al-Shabaab-controlled areas are more secure. Areas under the SNA are thought to have a lot of illegal checkpoints that each levy tax from trucks, passenger buses, and even private cars, while areas under Al-Shabaab have fewer checkpoints and levy tax only after issuing an “official receipt.”</p> <p>The baseline HH survey confirms that the “government” (mainly referred to as FGS) is unpopular in this cluster and area of Somalia.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p>If Al-Shabaab appears to provide better governance and rule of law than FGS, it will seriously undermine FGS trust and legitimacy.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) • Baseline HH survey
<p>AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA)</p> <p>Reports of human rights abuses by AMISOM and the SNA (who are also perceived as outsiders) have a negative impact on stabilization aims and FGS trust and legitimacy.</p>	<p><u>Potential serious negative influence</u></p> <p>The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)

<p>The baseline HH survey confirms that SNA's reputation has been damaged as they are seen locally as contributing to inter-clan tensions.</p> <p>Inter- and intra-clan conflicts, and conflicts between "new settler" and "original inhabitant" communities</p> <p>There is a plethora of conflicts over competition for agricultural resources in the districts and villages along the long and fertile Shabelle river and over market and commerce in the coastal districts. Many grievances surround the tension between "new settler" communities, who migrated south from central regions and gained control of valuable resources such as farmland from older original communities, and "original inhabitant" communities. These dynamics are mostly unresolved, continue to represent major political fault lines, and have been manipulated by Al-Shabaab.</p> <p>There are also conflicts over political control, notably between Biyomal and Habar Gidir in Marka, but also many others between clans and subclans at the district levels that are latent and/or suppressed by Al-Shabaab. These conflicts are expected to emerge when Al-Shabaab is removed.</p> <p>These are structural and proximate conflict drivers.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline HH survey
	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ baseline context analysis CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014) TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) Baseline HH survey
<p>Lack of infrastructure and services</p> <p>Social services and infrastructure are poor. Schools and hospitals exist but lack infrastructure, equipment, and qualified staff. In some districts, Marka for instance, facilities such as water are privately owned and are only accessible at a fee.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) Baseline HH survey
<p>Drought and high WASH vulnerability</p> <p>Lower Juba is deemed to have extremely high Water, Hygiene and Sanitation (WASH) vulnerability (except for Sablaale, which has very high vulnerability) based on AWD/cholera risk, flood risk, drought risk, number of IDP, water, and sanitation coverage.</p>	<p><u>Depending how the situation develops, potential for a strong-moderate negative influence</u></p> <p>Although drought allows FGS to be the provider/ coordinator of humanitarian assistance, drought and resultant displacement can be a significant conflict driver.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WASH cluster, WASH Vulnerability Analysis (May 2017) OCHA Somalia Drought Situation Report (as of 13 June 2017) TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015)
Influencing Factors: Unknown	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>Large agricultural and farming resources</p> <p>Large farming projects, legacies of Italian investments from the early 1900s as well as</p>	<p><u>Unknown</u></p> <p>Conflicts over these resources have the potential to exert a strong negative influence on stabilization aims. However,</p>

<p>Somali Government projects after 1960, are an obvious asset from the perspective of longer-term economic growth and development. But these resources have become a curse during the conflict, as evidenced by protracted conflicts over who controls them. Warlords seized these resources as well as access to coastal towns, displacing local communities. Subsequently the Union of Islamic Courts and later Al-Shabaab returned some of these areas to their original owners, gaining increased legitimacy as a result.</p>	<p>their transparent and legitimate management has the potential to exert a strong positive influence on economic development.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ evaluation context analysis • CEWERU Conflict Analysis (Conflict Dynamics, 2014)
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Banaadir Administrative Region (Mogadishu)

Context

Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, is also referred to as the Banaadir region. This administrative region covers the same area as the city of Mogadishu. Although it is the smallest administrative region in Somalia, it has the largest population. The city, governed by a mayor, is divided into 17 districts, each headed by a district commissioner. UNFPA 2014 estimated the city's population at 1.7 million. The city is home to the largest number of IDPs in the country, most of whom arrived from the southern and central regions (Lower and Middle Shabelle, Lower and Middle Juba, Bay, and Bakool) due to conflict and during the drought emergency of 2011.

Banaadir Regional Administration (BRA) bears the dual responsibility of managing the affairs of the region as well as the municipality of Mogadishu. Thus, its head is dually the governor of the Banaadir region as well as mayor of the city. In the current administrative structure the president appoints the mayor of Banaadir. Three deputy governors/mayors assist the mayor, each assigned one of the following specific functions: finance and administration, security, and political and social affairs. The new Farmajo government has appointed a new BRA governor/mayor. Together with the president, the new mayor also replaced all former district commissioners and appointed young DCs, five of them female (the most significant number of female leaders in Somali history).

In Banaadir region, security is the biggest challenge not only for the government, but also for its citizens. As recently as June 6, a car filled with heavy explosives crashed into a restaurant in the middle of Mogadishu. Four AS fighters then stormed into the restaurant and killed more than 45 people (10 soldiers and 35 civilians) with many more wounded. Since 2008, this has become a part of life in Banaadir. With the rise of AS and the increased use of IEDs the death toll has risen, even though it is unclear whether the ranks of AS have kept pace. The toll that this takes on a population and its government representatives cannot be underestimated. A rough equilibrium exists in the city, expressed in terms of informal understandings about which clans have political preeminence in each district. Clan hegemony over the capital city promises to be a major impediment to consolidation of peace in the country, but in the short term is treated as a given. Even so, a host of factors ranging from terrorist violence to high unemployment have earned Mogadishu the distinction of the world's most dangerous city.²²

Security has greatly impacted this region at all levels and the impact on women and youth is multi-layered. It impacts movement, access to education, critical basic services, and perceptions of safety and security. In Mogadishu, the stress caused by migration due to conflict and food insecurity has reached critical stages. The drought and migration into Mogadishu has put incredible stress on the city's infrastructure. Chronic conflict, the drought, and prospects of famine have created a staggering influx of IDPs, the bulk of them

²² Somali Conflict Analysis, Regional for East Africa 2016. Nordic Trust.

living in makeshift camps in Mogadishu. Overcrowding and poor sanitation incubates infectious diseases like cholera and measles. In some of the camps, “gatekeepers” masquerading as “camp elders” obstruct aid deliveries and extort bribes, making it even more difficult for NGOs to deliver essential services. These conditions have created predictable levels of stress on the population of Banaadir and on the FGS to respond.

Another challenge to long-term stabilization in Mogadishu is the issue of land disputes, which have turned chronic, pervasive, and deadly. High demand for real estate, including by Somalia’s large diaspora, increases values still further. Twenty-five years of displacement, squatting, undocumented sales, expropriation, and inheritances have rendered much of the city’s real estate prone to contested claims.²³ The BRA has no effective land titling system that it can apply and enforce. Land conflict in this region is likely to increase and its impact on local development and access to services is yet to be determined. Annex II outlines specific priorities of the BRA as outlined in the Somalia National Development Plan.

Cluster 5 – Banaadir (Mogadishu)

Index Tool

Based on index scores compiled from analyzing the HH survey questions, Banaadir rated the lowest (40 percent) in terms of governance and stability. This region along with Lower Shabelle ranked very low in scores relating to good governance, perceptions of corruption, accountability, and transparency. This ranking proved to be consistent with findings.

Figure 16: Baseline Index Scores – Banaadir Administrative Region

Baseline Index Scores	Banaadir Administrative Region
	Mogadishu
Good Governance	40%
Community Cohesion	55%
Stability	46%

Color Key	Critical = < 50% (Crisis)	Average = 50% - 66% (Stable)	Green = > 67% (Development)
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Inclusion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- Gender equality, minority inclusion, and participation of youth
- Relevance to KAQ Question 4

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

Girls and women in displacement camps and in urbanized areas of Mogadishu are particularly at risk. As a result, the government has deployed additional police and special gender protection personnel to the camps, but this continues to be a significant concern for citizens as well. An increase in the representation of women in parliament and government in Somalia offers an unprecedented opportunity to work on these issues, but ministries and mechanisms for gender protection are still being established. One of the

²³ Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement Ownership, and Displacement in a Contested City, (Nairobi and Mogadishu: Rift Valley Institute and Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, February 2017).

most critical areas for intervention in Mogadishu and this region are to empower more gender-sensitive frameworks for the protection of women and youth, particularly considering the impact that conflict has had on women and girls. This needs to be prioritized and women politicians and newly formed ministries, commissions, and FGS staff seen as critical partners in strengthening protection policies and practices. Interviews, data collection, and research reveal that gender protection is an intervention area that TIS+ needs to explore with more rigor.

- In interviews with government staff and women leaders in Banaadir, gender protection in this region is said to be critical. Safety and security issues plague movement in and out of IDP camps and there is evidence that there is weak understanding of a comprehensive response system by local officials interviewed. Informal camps and insecurity in urban area for women and youth is also an expressed concern.
- Despite an increase in the role of women in parliament and in political office in Somalia, issues of protection for women and youth are not well defined in the strategic planning processes either with BRA or the FGS.
- Increasing the safety of women and girls is an expressed development objective of the NDP and a strategic goal of USAID and TIS+.
- There is little evidence in the TIS+ reporting documents that a clear plan and strategy is in place to work on gender protection issues in a systemic way in infrastructure planning and in initial consensus discussions in Banaadir.
- In interviews and in the HH survey, although security has improved, there is still a concern about the safety of women in Banaadir.
- Youth in this region were particularly motivated to take part in policy and legal formation. In several interviews and in FGDs there was a desire and interest in the development of a youth policy and a more substantive role for a younger generation of leaders.
- Although women and men in this cluster had relatively similar views of gender equality, there was clear evidence that traditional rules limit the participation and engagement of women in community planning and consultation events as well as security concerns.
- Security in this region greatly limits the interface with the government and youth and women. The security situation although improved is a significant impediment to interface between citizens and the government.
- Although widely cited in government documents and policies as a priority, gender equality is a challenge. In interviews, it was clear that despite increases in gender representation, there is a systemic belief that women will not be given equal voice in these roles.
- In interviews with men, traditional elders, and male youth, there was an expressed hope and evidence that the increased participation of women in public events, sports, and in government and politics is impacting this view. In FGDs and KIs specific examples were given showing how the role of women was slowly changing in Somali society
- It was also evident from data that there are areas where the role of women is more accepted. Women taking part in development planning, particularly on shared services such as healthcare and education, was cited as an example where women can play a more substantive role, both at the local level and in setting policy.
- Lack of education was cited as a particular impediment to advancing the role of women, particularly when education is a problem throughout Somalia for boys and girls.
- Increasing alternative forms of training for women in leadership and in development planning were suggested as a way to overcome some of the traditional barriers that have prevented the inclusion of women in more substantive development planning. Training in project planning and oversight was also suggested.

- In FGDs with youth in this region, there was interest in more opportunities for developing skills in consensus building, facilitation, and in public speaking, even for women and girls who had some exposure to higher education.

Inclusion Recommendations

- Youth in this region had an interest in more opportunities for developing skills in consensus building, facilitation, and in public speaking. This was evident across gender groups.
- Youth were particularly interested in conflict mitigation skills as well as opportunities to facilitate community events and efforts around planning and participation.
- Support for improved gender protection and technical skills for government officials in planning for gender safety and gender sensitivity in infrastructure and development planning is an important intervention area in this cluster.
- Including women leaders and actively recruiting allies within the Ministry of Gender will be an important way to strengthen this deficiency, particularly because Banaadir is a Bridging Plan Cluster and is likely to include some larger infrastructure projects.
- Solar lighting and electrification projects have made a huge improvement to safety and security for women and girls, and this was mentioned in several interviews. This area could serve as a platform to increase inclusion and agency for women in development planning at all levels and allow security issues to be addressed for women and girls.
- Ensure that TIS+ staff embedded in the Ministry of Women looks at this issue in a more substantive way, not only in this region and with the FGS, but also with other FMS as coordination improves.

Governance Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis:

- *Confidence in government*
- *Service delivery*
- *Community government relationships*
- *Stakeholder partnerships*
- *Relevance to KAQ Question 1, 2, and 3*

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Governance Section charts detail specific information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster and is organized based on the above factors.

Mogadishu, where both public and private officials have their own armed escorts and some of them private security providers, is the most armed city in the country. The regional administration also has its regional and district-based police and other security systems that are under its jurisdiction. Other community services are mostly provided by international partners through local NGOs. Due to its expansion and unclear demarcated regional boundaries, relationships with neighboring federal member states such as South West State (SWS) and Hirshabelle have been deteriorating. People who are the original settlers of the Banaadir region want some mechanism for independent rule, although the status of Mogadishu as the Somali capital and an independent local municipality must be agreed on through a constitutional process.

Security has also impacted interface between citizens and government officials, and this added layer of “protection” often impacts public event planning. Development planning in collaboration with citizens is new and there are no systems currently in place to encourage this within the FGS framework or within the BRA. Coordination is a significant hurdle as communication between the FGS and the BRA is not well established, and there is often overlap and confusion regarding roles and responsibilities related to some development projects within the BRA area. TIS+ interventions aim to improve these dynamics by seeking ways to improve the interface between citizens and their local, regional, and in some cases, national

representatives. These interventions include funding technical coordinators within the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Gender and Social Protection to transfer skills and knowledge.

- The prevalence of extremist-related violence in the capital of Mogadishu continues to impact work with FGS and partners for most stabilization actors.
- The focus of the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MOIFAR) has been to support the finalization of the National Reconciliation with FMSs and the Wadajir Framework, a pathway to local governance that is supported by several donors as well as USAID and TIS+.
- MOIFAR is also focused on the role of community planning, and has been focused on improving guidance on consensus planning and community contracting processes, which MOIFAR wants all stabilization and local governance programs to follow across Somalia.
- Coordination is a concern with FGS officials and TIS+, and others are supporting improved coordination efforts. Coordination between FGS and FMS is tenuous and BRA is also likely to meet some of these interface challenges as the governor plays a dual role as mayor of Mogadishu.
- Information sharing between communities and local administration was inadequate and there were high levels of perceptions of corruption per the HH survey tool (above 30 percent).
- Service provision was higher than in other clusters, but still fell in the critical range in almost all primary community development areas, save the provision of health care and drinking water.
- Security impacts the ability of women to take part in public planning events and this was cited as an impediment in this cluster in several interviews and FGDs.
- Satisfaction with security, the police, and the administration was low. Security at the national and local level was considered by most to be poor.
- This cluster had some of the lowest score in terms of interface with government officials. There seemed to be greater awareness of the roles and responsibilities of government, but also higher expectations.
- Some respondents expressed optimism that this would improve with the new president and there were examples cited of this.
- Women, youth, and minority clans are still seen as having little access to voice and agency in development planning. This was largely cited as being a product of traditional values (e.g., elder domination of development planning priorities at the local level). In some interviews this was cited as something that is slowly changing with time.
- Participation of the community and cooperation with government officials around development planning seemed to be mainly initiated by one of the stability actors working in the region.
- At the government level this is evident from concerns about budgeting for public planning events and community meetings.
- There was minimal awareness of any formal oversight committees and there was very limited understanding of how the maintenance and management of development projects worked.
- A much larger percentage of respondents felt that government and local administration were responsible for the maintenance of key structures and services. This was a departure from other clusters surveyed where expectations of this were more moderate. It may be that in Banaadir there is a higher percentage of educated and diverse citizens who are beginning to demand more from their government representatives than was evident in other clusters. This will need to be looked at when conducting the cross-cluster analysis at endline.
- Most respondents felt that the participation of women and young people (both male and female) were limited in community-based development efforts.
- Awareness of local oversight or planning committees was extremely low in this cluster and there was minimal awareness of community planning events. However, of respondents surveyed who had been exposed to such efforts, the majority felt that these forums were effective in addressing community priorities and needs.

Governance Recommendations

- Per project documentation, the main TIS+ counterparts at the FGS level is MOIFAR and the BRA/Mayor of Mogadishu office. The decision to embed TIS+ coordinators within these entities is already showing some signs of impact and is an important area to consider at endline.
- These efforts need to be captured in this cluster and in clusters in the other FMS. It is essential that this capacity development approach be assessed to see how it has improved or impacted stabilization planning at the national and FMS level.

Community Cohesion Findings

The following factors and areas were used to assess quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis.

- Peace building (status of conflict and conflict mitigation)
- Sociocultural activities
- National unity (perceptions of identity)

Note: Consolidated charts have been developed for this section and can be found in the separate Attachment II. The Inclusion Section charts detail specific gender information from the HH survey relevant to this cluster.

- Most people interviewed in this cluster felt conflict over resources had decreased in the past year, but respondents were mixed as to who was responsible for the resolution of these conflicts when they arose.
- When asked about identity, most respondents said they would choose Somali national identity over clan affiliation (M 85 percent, F 87 percent).
- National pride and the perception that things were improving were very high in this cluster, but both males and females feared that Somalia would never be a peaceful country (M 21 percent, F 20 percent).
- Sports and cultural events were very helpful in improving peaceful coexistence and inter-clan dynamics in this cluster, but this cluster had the lowest rate of these types of events. In FGDs and in interviews, security was cited as a major concern.
- Quantitative data suggest that youth in this cluster are not prone to forced recruitment in VE groups; however, this cluster had the most significant variation when asked about the extent to which VE is accepted.
- In several interviews, it was not recruitment that was the largest concern, but AS acting as an employer for youth for criminal activities particularly within specific urban centers within Mogadishu.

Community Cohesion Recommendations

- TIS+ should focus in this cluster on sports and cultural events and infrastructure that increases opportunities for family and community engagement such as stadiums and football fields. These interventions were noted to be particularly helpful in bringing together different groups, ages, and genders.
- There is also a need to support infrastructure and development planning for youth development centers or vocational training facilities to mitigate the concerns in this cluster regarding the susceptibility of youth to criminal employment and activity with AS. In this cluster and in others (Lower Shabelle and Gedo), employment and engagement concerns were noted. Youth need greater access to livelihoods but also exposure to other types of skills and activities that will allow them to spend time more constructively.

Community-Driven Infrastructure Planning

At baseline the Community Checklist (CC) Tool was used to assess initial infrastructure planning processes and challenges at the cluster level. Questions looked at specific categories of infrastructure and

at the funding mechanisms, maintenance, and project oversight members and local government officials were interviewed. Please see Annex III for specific findings relevant to this cluster as well as interventions highlighted for endline analysis in Phase 3 and Phase 4.

Contribution Analysis and Banaadir

The BRA region is one of the most critical stabilization areas in Somalia and still faces significant challenges. Myriad stabilization actors are initially mapped for their influence in the attached CA table for this cluster. We have delineated the influencing factors most likely to impact TIS+ activities as evident at baseline in this table. If a midterm or final evaluation is conducted, these programs and factors should be considered when identifying impact and lessons learned. This will ensure that the USG can identify more specific contributions of TIS+ programming in stabilization environments impacted by VE actors and influences.

Table 13: Contribution Analysis Table for Banaadir

Key: Influencing factors by type				
Security	Political/ Governance	Social	Economic	Geographic or climatic
Banaadir Settlements/Districts: Bondhere, Dharkenley, Hodan, Howl Wadag, Huriwa, Kaxda, Karan, Shibis, Waberi, Wadajir, Warta Nabada, and Yaqshid				
Major Clans: The Hawiye clan dominates the city and its surroundings but because Mogadishu is the capital of the country, all major clans are present.				
Minority Clans: Banaadiri is the major minority clan attributed as some of the first settlers of Mogadishu, however there are people from every Somali minority clan. There are also hundreds of thousands of IDPs.				
Influencing Factors: Other Stabilization Partners		Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis		
The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) SSF is not currently working in any district in Mogadishu, but has worked on some infrastructure in Shibis and Yaqshid in the past.		<u>Expected weak positive influence/ no influence</u> SSF has not worked sufficiently in Banaadir to exert a significant influence on TIS+ results and is no longer working there. <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with SSF, TIS+ mapping Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017) 		
The UN Joint Programme on Local Governance (UNJPLG) TIS+ and JPLG overlap in Mogadishu in their work supporting the Wadajir Task Force at MOIFAR, where JPLG is now supporting the Deputy Director of the Task Force.		<u>Expected moderate to positive influence</u> JPLG's work on the Wadajir Task Force is expected to exert a significant influence on this bounded area of shared work. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ MOIFAR February 2017 Report		
World Bank Somali Urban Investment Planning Project This project focuses on building the capacity of the Banaadir Regional Authority to conduct road investment projects.		<u>Expected weak positive influence</u> This project is quite bounded but may overlap with TIS+. The extent of any overlap should be assessed fully at endline. <u>Sources</u> Interview with JPLG; TIS+ mapping; Itad/Altai Consulting Mapping of 2016-2017 Stabilization Projects in Somalia (May 2017)		

AfDB Multi-Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF) The SIF has 27 pipeline projects in Banaadir in its current phase (2017-21). These include: repairs to Mogadishu airport, the Mogadishu household energy project, urban road renewal, the repair of Afgoye well-fields, and the water pipeline to Mogadishu/Afgoye.	<u>Expected moderate to strong positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline. The number of expected projects may indicate a moderate to strong expected positive influence. <u>Sources</u> SIF documents
UNHABITAT UNDP has been supporting youth programming and support to the Banaadir Regional Authority Planning Department.	<u>Expected weak positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
Turkish Government The Turkish government is working on road construction with the Banaadir Regional Authority.	<u>Expected moderate positive influence/no influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
UNHCR and other humanitarian actors A number of humanitarian actors are working in Mogadishu, working both on government coordination of the Somalia-wide drought response and with drought-displaced and other IDPs in Mogadishu.	<u>Expected weak to moderate positive influence/no influence</u> <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping
Nordic International Support Foundation (Norway Funded – RNE) NISF runs the Bilateral Labor-Intensive Stabilization (BLIS) program with Norwegian support in Daynile and Yaqshid districts of Mogadishu, where it has worked/will work on solar streetlights, the electrification of Daynile hospital, and a vocational training school.	<u>Expected moderate positive influence</u> The scale of this work and the areas of overlap will need deeper investigation at endline. <u>Sources</u> TIS+ mapping TIS+ baseline context analysis
Influencing Factors: Positive	Type of Influence, Evidence ,and Source of Analysis
Political will and women’s representation in government The new president appointed a new Banaadir region governor/mayor. Together with the president, the new mayor also replaced all former district commissioners and appointed young District Commissioners, five of them women, making this Somalia’s largest proportion of female DCs. In addition, for the first time since the collapse of the state, someone from Darod (Majerteen, mainly from Puntland) was appointed as a DC. This bold appointment is seen as fostering political inclusivity of the capital and cementing Mogadishu’s status as all-Somali owned capital. There has not been noticeable resistance from the “locals.”	<u>Expected moderate to strong positive influence</u> It remains to be seen what influence the new Mayor and his District Commissioners will have, but there is potential for a significant positive influence. <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baseline context analysis
Relatively stronger government structures and political stability	<u>Expected weak positive influence</u> The efforts to enhance inclusion will positively influence the TIS+ community consensus, planning, financing, and

Over the past five years, Banaadir region has been relatively stable politically, despite suffering from high levels of political violence and rapid turnover of administrators. A rough equilibrium exists in the city, expressed in terms of Mogadishu's status as the capital and informal understandings about which clans have political preeminence in each district.	<p>monitoring process. The endline will assess the relative contribution of these efforts and their relationship to TIS+ results. The weakness of these nascent capacities (particularly with newly elected commissioners) will weaken the extent of their influence on TIS+ results, but TIS+ is specifically seeking to work with these representatives. There is the assumption that the more TIS+ has done to build them up, the more TIS+ will have contributed to community engagement results that are more inclusive.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ South West State of Somalia District and Regional Stability Assessment Report (December 2015) Baseline HH survey
<p>Relatively better, and improving, infrastructure and service delivery</p> <p>Rehabilitation of Mogadishu's devastated infrastructure has progressed including public-private partnership projects for roads, hospitals, seaports, and airport rehabilitation. The baseline HH survey found that a much larger percentage of respondents felt that the federal government and local administration were responsible for the maintenance of key structures and services. This was a departure from other clusters surveyed, where expectations of this were more moderate.</p>	<p><u>Strong expected positive influence</u></p> <p>Better service delivery</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline context analysis Baseline HH survey
Influencing Factors: Negative	Type of Influence, Evidence, and Source of Analysis
<p>Al-Shabaab</p> <p>Al-Shabaab has left most of its positions in Banaadir, but Al-Shabaab attacks targeting government officials, civilians, and security forces in public locations are persistent. Al-Shabaab continues to represent the greatest threat to both federal and regional government and to ordinary citizens in Mogadishu.</p> <p>This is a significant proximate conflict driver.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p>Al-Shabaab attacks are a significant obstacle to stabilization in Mogadishu.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ baseline context analysis
<p>Non-Al-Shabaab criminal violence</p> <p>Mogadishu also suffers from non-Al-Shabaab violence with regular targeted killings, bombings, kidnappings, and pervasive criminal violence. Some districts are particularly affected. Heliwa and Dayniile, for example, have high levels of assassinations that are attributed to both AS and other criminals.</p>	<p><u>Expected strong negative influence</u></p> <p>Non-Al-Shabaab violence contributes to the insecurity that is the main threat to stabilization in Mogadishu.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> TIS+ baseline context analysis Heritage Institute (2014), <i>Perceptions of Security and Justice in Mogadishu</i>
<p>Poor coordination among security actors</p> <p>The poor coordination among Mogadishu's security agencies — the police force, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM — has been cited as a cause of insecurity in Mogadishu. There have been historical reports of AMISOM and the SNA conducting operations</p>	<p><u>Expected moderate negative influence</u></p> <p>The endline will need to consider what influence these factors have had on TIS+ results.</p> <p><u>Sources</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Heritage Institute (2014), <i>Perceptions of Security and Justice in Mogadishu</i>

without informing district authorities or the police.	
Land disputes Very high real estate values in parts of the city raise the stakes over ownership to levels worth fighting for. High demand for real estate, including by Somalia's large diaspora, increases values still further. Twenty-five years of displacement, squatting, undocumented sales, expropriation, and inheritances have rendered much of the city's real estate very prone to contested claims. The Banaadir administration has no effective land titling system that it can apply and enforce.	<u>Expected strong negative influence</u> <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ baseline context analysis • Rift Valley Institute and Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (2017) <i>Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement Ownership, and Displacement in a Contested City</i>
High unemployment In spite of improvement in economic growth, Somali cities have high rates of unemployment and underemployment. The link between youth unemployment and violent extremism is nonlinear and complicated, but youth unemployment is widely cited as both a cause and result of insecurity.	<u>Expected moderate to strong negative influence</u> <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TIS+ baseline context analysis • IOM/Altai (2016) Youth, employment and migration in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa • Heritage Institute (2014), <i>Perceptions of Security and Justice in Mogadishu</i>
Drought and high WASH vulnerability and drought-driven displacement All of Mogadishu is deemed to have extremely high Water, Hygiene and Sanitation (WASH) vulnerability based on AWD/cholera risk, flood risk, drought risk, number of IDP, water, and sanitation coverage. More than 739,000 people have been displaced by drought, and most of them have settled in urban areas, including an estimated 155,000 new drought-related IDPs in Mogadishu.	<u>Depending how the situation develops, potential for a strong-moderate negative influence</u> Although drought allows FGS to be seen as the provider/coordinator of humanitarian assistance, drought and resultant displacement can be a significant conflict driver. <u>Sources</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASH cluster, WASH Vulnerability Analysis (May 2017) • OCHA Somalia Drought Situation Report (as of 20 June 2017)

Annex I: Scope of Work, Task Order

1. PURPOSE OF THE TIS+ EVALUATION

The primary purpose of the TIS+ evaluation is to generate a better understanding of the extent to which TIS+ interventions have achieved their objectives and contributed to TIS+'s (and USAID's) goal of increased stability in Somalia, both within and across activity clusters, through participatory processes that promote good governance and community cohesion. Another purpose of this evaluation is to learn lessons about conducting stabilization activities in Somalia to improve future programming in this area. The evaluation must provide comprehensive answers to six key evaluation questions (see Section C.3) in the process of assessing the extent to which the activity goal and objectives were achieved and identifying lessons learned.

2. AUDIENCE AND INTENDED USE

The audience for the TIS+ evaluation is USAID Somalia, the FGS (including the Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs, a key TIS+ partner), Emerging Federal Members States (e.g. Jubbaland State of Somalia, Southwest State of Somalia), AECOM, and other USAID offices, donors or development organizations supporting Somalia. The TIS+ evaluation will help guide USAID in improving the design of its future stabilization interventions in Somalia. TIS+ evaluation reports will be uploaded to the Development Experience Clearinghouse and shared with the above stakeholders.

3. KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The TIS+ evaluation focuses at two levels of analysis, each with its own set of evaluation questions: within cluster analysis (cluster-level analysis) and cross-cluster analysis (comparative cluster analysis). Within each of the five clusters, the evaluation must answer the following four cluster-level evaluation questions:

- 1) Did TIS+ contribute to any of the following anticipated results:
 - a. Community ownership of development projects and processes?
 - b. Effective shared asset management in the communities in which they were implemented?
 - c. Improved delivery of services targeted by TIS+? Improved satisfaction with delivery of services?
 - d. Reduced conflict over resources?
 - e. Greater citizen confidence in government?
 - f. Reduced support for violent extremism?
- 2) Were TIS+ approaches used in the cluster, e.g. the community consensus process itself, instrumental in contributing to the achievement of TIS+ results described in Question 1?
- 3) Did government at all appropriate levels contribute sufficiently to asset management in communities in which TIS+ was implemented? How? Did government at all appropriate levels have both the capacity and the will to contribute?
- 4) Were TIS+ activities inclusive of women, youth, and minority clans, as applicable to the context of the cluster being evaluated?

Besides the above cluster-level evaluation questions, the evaluation must answer two additional cross-cluster evaluation questions as part of the comparative analysis scheduled for the first half of 2019:

- 5) *In the aggregate*, did TIS+ contribute to the anticipated results described above? What range of results can be observed across assessed clusters?
- 6) Which cluster-level factors contributed most significantly to achievement of results? *For example*:
 - a. Did successful inclusion of women, youth and minority clans amplify the effectiveness of TIS+ activities?
 - b. Were results greatest in newly liberated clusters or in bridge clusters?
 - c. Were some kinds of interventions more effective than others in improving citizen confidence or reducing support for violent extremism?

Note that the two cross-cluster evaluation questions are, in essence, restatements of the cluster-level evaluation questions applied at the aggregate cluster level. However, for the purpose of making a clear distinction between the cluster-level and cross-cluster components of the TIS+ evaluation, we have elected the simplifying expedient of referring to them as distinct evaluation questions.

The results of this baseline/endline evaluation will contribute to any final evaluation of TIS+ if USAID/Somalia chooses to conduct one. Although the Scope of Work/SOW for the TIS+ baseline/endline evaluation does not include the final evaluation, the evaluation methods described in this technical proposal have been designed, as well, to provide sufficient comparative potential for the final evaluation to answer the following two final evaluation questions:

- 1) Were results to which TIS+ activities contributed sustainable over time? In clusters implemented early in TIS+ (2016/2017), are the results that were observed at the conclusion of activities in those clusters still observed at TIS+ activity end?
- 2) Did the cluster-based approach itself contribute to the effectiveness of TIS+ interventions?

Gender considerations must be taken into account in answering each of the above key evaluation questions.

4. METHODOLOGY

The TIS+ evaluation must use a mixed-methods approach that integrates a suite of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods implemented over four implementation phases to answer the above key evaluation questions. As described in Section C.4.3, data collection methods will consist of a household survey, secondary research; key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and community checklists. Evaluation questions must be answered using a combination of these five data collection methods via the triangulation of evidence and the use of contribution analysis to estimate TIS+'s unique contribution to observed results.

Contribution analysis is a pragmatic and methodologically rigorous approach to situations in which the activity is one of many potential contributory causes and where it is not possible to measure attribution directly via creation of a scientifically-valid counterfactual (as is the case here). Instead, contribution analysis assesses attribution in terms of the contribution that TIS+ activities are making to observed outcomes based on the totality of evidence. The essential value of contribution analysis in this case is that it offers an approach designed to reduce uncertainty about the contribution TIS+ is making to the observed results through an increased understanding of why the observed results have

occurred (or not) and the roles played by TIS+ activities and other internal and external factors.²⁴ (For more on contribution analysis, see Section C.4.5.)

4.1 DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION APPROACH

As noted above in Section I, the purpose of the TIS+ evaluation is to generate a better understanding of the extent to which TIS+ activities have achieved their objectives and contributed to TIS+’s goal of increased stability in Somalia, both within and across the five TIS+ clusters. The unit of analysis for the evaluation is the specific communities within these five clusters where TIS+ activities will be implemented.

Table I shows the current understanding of the clusters and communities in which TIS+ activities will be implemented. As seen in Table I, the evaluation must cover 38 communities in which implementation will be undertaken in the early stages of the process.²⁵ Within the different clusters and communities, TIS+ is expected to pursue a variety of objectives and implement an even wider variety of activities falling under those objectives. Thus it is imperative that the evaluation achieves a sufficiently representative coverage of clusters and communities so as to capture this expected variety.

One option to do this is to conduct data collection activities in a representative sample of communities, along with objectives and activities. Sampling is appropriate in such cases where the number of communities is too large to allow full coverage of communities within existing resource constraints. Another option is to conduct data collection activities in a census of communities, which will provide a fully comprehensive coverage of communities, objectives and activities. A census approach is appropriate where the number of communities is not so large that comprehensive coverage is possible within existing resource constraints. The latter appears to be the case here; 38 communities is not so large that it falls outside the scope of available resources. Thus, we propose to conduct both quantitative and qualitative data collection activities in all 38 TIS+ communities during both baseline and endline evaluation rounds, as this will allow us to develop a fully comprehensive picture of TIS+ results, which, we believe, will ultimately prove more useful in informing USAID programming decisions ongoing. The evaluation will not cover all activities during the timeline, and it is not anticipated that additional clusters will be added to the evaluation TO.

Table I. Number of TIS+ Communities/Districts per Cluster

Cluster	Region	District	Settlement	Estimated No. of Households	Estimated Population
1	Lower Shabelle	Wanleweyne	Wanleweyne	5,308	36,625
	Lower Shabelle	Afgooye	Afgooye	12,037	83,055
	Lower Shabelle	Qoryooley	Qoreoly	10,692	73,775
	Lower Shabelle	Barawe	Barawe	3,007	20,748
	Lower Shabelle	Marka	Marka	7,960	54,924
	Lower Shabelle	Kurtunwaarey	Kurtunwarey*	1,890	13,041
	Lower Shabelle	Afgooye	Awdeghle *	N/A	N/A
2	Lower Juba	Afmadow	Afmadow	6,880	39,216

²⁴ John Mayne, (2008), “Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect,” http://dmeforpeace.org/sites/default/files/0501_Contribution_Analysis_ILAC.pdf.

²⁵ TIS+ activities will be implemented in other clusters beyond the five specified while this evaluation is still

	Lower Juba	Kismayo	Kismayo	21,824	124,397
	Lower Juba	Jamame	Jamame*	1,832	10,442
	Middle Juba	Jilib	Jilib*	N/A	N/A
3	Gedo	Baardheere	Baardhere	4,610	29,965
	Gedo	Garbahaarey	Garbaharey	3,852	25,038
	Bay	Dinsoor	Dinsoor	N/A	N/A
	Gedo	Ceel Waaq	El Wak*	2,102	13,663
	Gedo	Baardheere	Geriley*	N/A	N/A
4	Banadir	Abdiaziz	Abdiaziz	1,775	12,070
	Banadir	Bondhere	Bondhere	4,447	30,240
	Banadir	Daynile	Daynile	10,033	68,224
	Banadir	Dharkenley	Dharkenley	13,744	93,459
	Banadir	Hamar Jajab	Hamar Jajab	8,682	59,038
	Banadir	Hamar Weyne	Hamar Weyne	2,331	15,851
	Banadir	Hodan	Hodan	13,027	88,584
	Banadir	Howl Wadag	Howl Wadag	7,327	49,824
	Banadir	Huriwa	Huriwa	5,239	35,625
	Banadir	Kaxda	Kaxda	N/A	N/A
	Banadir	Karan	Karan	12,073	82,096
	Banadir	Shangani	Shangani	1,134	7,711
	Banadir	Shibis	Shibis	4,034	27,431
	Banadir	Waberi	Waberi	8,568	58,262
	Banadir	Wadajir	Wadajir	18,929	128,717
	Banadir	Warta Nabada	Warta Nabada	11,166	75,929
	Banadir	Yaqshid	Yaqshid	14,083	95,764
5	Bakol	Xudur	Xudur*	3,075	20,295
	Bakol	Tayeeglow	Tayeglow*	7,271	47,989
	Bakol	Ceel Barde	El Barde*	1,780	11,748
	Bakol	Rab Dhuure	Rabdurre*	N/A	N/A
	Bakol	Waajid	Wajiid*	9,958	65,723
Total	5	36	38	240,670	1,599,469

Key: * - To be determined

Region	Multipliers (Average Household Sizes)
Lower Shabelle	6.9

Lower Juba	5.7
Gedo	6.5
Banadir	6.8
Bakol	6.6
Bay	4.8
Middle Juba	4.0

Note: Numbers of Districts (36) and Settlements (38) are preliminary. Catchment area of Bakol has to be determined.

Note that in Somalia the last population census was conducted in 1987 due to the collapse of the Federal Government of Somalia in 1989 and the subsequent conflicts that followed. The population data shown in Table I represents the United Nations Population Fund's (UNFPA)²⁶ best estimates. The population figures for communities shown in Table I will be used to guide sample size distribution.

4.2 EVALUATION PHASES

This section of the SOW describes each of the four evaluation phases.

Phase 1

Evaluation Phase I must involve a thorough desk review of activity data and documents generated by TIS+, in addition to in-depth interviews with USAID officials and key members of the TIS+ and implementing partner (IP) management teams. A critical objective of Phase I activities must be to reach an agreement with TIS+ on the final list of communities in the five clusters selected by USAID for implementation of baseline and endline assessments. Then with the knowledge gained from the desk review and interviews, the Contractor must create an in-depth and fully specified activity ToC (necessary for the contribution analysis, see Section C.4.5) and finalize all details related to the evaluation design including the creation of a set of cluster-level toolkits, which include the quantitative and qualitative data collection instruments and data analysis plan, and a final work plan, which includes a projected timeline, logistical arrangements, sampling plan and data collection methods.

Phase 2

During evaluation Phase 2, the Contractor must implement the baseline evaluation within each of the five clusters and 38 communities following the design and using the data collection methods and instruments developed during Phase I. The Phase 2 baseline data collection must involve a single data collection wave to be launched soon after the final work plan is approved. At the conclusion of the baseline data collection, the Contractor must will analyze the baseline data, with a focus on describing and explaining the baseline conditions in the cluster, using the methods described in Section C.4.3, and prepare the baseline evaluation report. The analytic focus in the baseline evaluation must be on describing the initial conditions in each of the clusters with regards to the key outcome variables related to EQs 1-4. Within clusters, all data must be analyzed in the aggregate and disaggregated by gender, age, and membership in minority clans. Once all baseline data collection has been completed, the Contractor must prepare a baseline evaluation report incorporating the findings from all five clusters.

Phase 3

Phase 3 of the evaluation involves the endline data collection in the same five TIS+ clusters and 38 communities using the same data collection methods as in the Phase 2 baseline evaluation. Unlike the

²⁶ <http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/somalia/drive/Population-Estimation-Survey-of-Somalia-PESS-2013-2014.pdf>

baseline evaluation, the endline evaluation must occur on a rolling basis as TIS+ phases out its activities within each of the clusters over time. For the purpose of cost containment, SPSS anticipates two waves of data collection. One wave will cover three clusters, and two clusters in the other wave.

At the conclusion of each endline data collection wave, the Contractor must analyze the data and prepare an endline evaluation report for each cluster covered by that wave, resulting in five separate cluster-level endline evaluation reports. The analytic focus in the endline evaluation will be on (1) measuring changes in key outcome variables, (2) assessing TIS+'s contribution, and that of other factors, to the changes in the key outcome variables and (3) based on the findings/conclusions to 1 and 2, answering EQs 1-4.

Phase 4

In Phase 4, the Contractor moves from the within cluster evaluation to the cross-cluster evaluation to produce a synthetic comparative analysis of results aggregated across the five clusters. Phase 4 of the evaluation must occur in close succession after the completion of Phase 3 and will begin with creating an updated data analysis plan, after which the Contractor must aggregate all of the data collected during Phases 2 and 3, analyze it, and prepare a final, comparative evaluation report, along with a set of actionable recommendations to improve the design of future stabilization interventions in Somalia. The analytic focus during Phase 4 will be similar to that in Phase 3, except that the focus must now be on measuring changes in key outcome variables and assessing TIS+'s contribution to them across all five clusters so as to answer evaluation questions 5-6. Cross-cluster data must be analyzed in the aggregate and disaggregated by gender, age, membership in minority clans, and cluster.

4.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

Under our proposed mixed-methods design, the Contractor must implement a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods to answer the above key evaluation questions. The sole quantitative method is the household survey, which must be administered to residents living in communities where TIS+ activities are implemented. The qualitative data collection instruments include secondary research, in-depth KIs with diverse TIS+ stakeholders, FGDs with persons participating in and benefiting from the TIS+ activities, and community checklists. This combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods will allow the Contractor to construct a robust evidence base that will be analyzed to provide comprehensive answers to EQs 1-4 within clusters and EQs 5-6 across clusters.

4.3.1 Household Survey

The Contractor must administer a repeated cross-sectional household survey in the baseline and endline to a randomly selected group of 424 residents living in communities participating in TIS+ activities within each of the five clusters covered by the TIS+ evaluation for a total sample size of 2,200.²⁷ Under the cluster-level evaluation approach, each cluster is to be treated as a separate analytical population for sampling purposes. This means that for each cluster examined, the baseline and endline survey samples must be large enough to draw statistically meaningful conclusions about the results of TIS+ activities within that cluster. This will further allow full disaggregation by cluster when the survey data from each cluster are consolidated for the comparative analysis in Phase 4.

²⁷ A repeated cross-sectional survey interviews a different random sample of respondents in each evaluation round. In contrast, a longitudinal, or panel survey, survey interviews the same cohort of randomly selected respondents in each evaluation round. The relative strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches are discussed in Section 4.8.

To calculate the required sample size in each cluster, the Contractor must use the sample size calculation formula for determining the appropriate sample size for detecting a difference between two proportions. The first step in calculating the sample size using this approach is to determine the key outcome variables and the minimum detectable effect (MDE) to be measured.²⁸ A number of outcome variables of interest (e.g. improved satisfaction with delivery of services, greater citizen confidence in government, reduced support for violent extremism) can be used for this purpose. The question then becomes: What amount of change (effect size) does USAID expect to observe over time in the relevant outcome variable as a result of TIS+ activities? The 2016 TIS evaluation findings have been used to estimate expected effect size for any of the key outcome variables. The assumptions include the following:

- Effect Size: 10 percentage points (Note that the assumed effect size is the smallest effect size that we consider to be relevant for informing USAID programming decisions and which is feasible within reasonable budget parameters.)
- Confidence Level: 95%
- Statistical Power: 80%

The above assumptions produce a required sample size of 385 households per cluster, which multiplied by the five clusters covered by the TIS+ evaluation yields a total baseline and endline sample size of 2,200. To this total the Contractor next adds a 10% oversampling factor, which is done to ensure a sufficient number of responses for each survey question given an expected 10% non-response rate that is typical for household surveys in Somalia. Adding this 10% oversampling factor pushes the sample size to 424 per cluster and 2,120 across the five clusters.

The survey instrument will be modeled in part on a past stabilization survey fielded in Somalia, which was used to generate the TIS Stabilization Report in 2013/2014, and the TIS performance evaluation done by SPSS in 2016. In addition to these two surveys, the survey instrument must draw on other surveys done to evaluate USAID local governance projects in other countries, many of which use methodologies similar to TIS+ to develop the capacity of local government institutions to deliver local services and to strengthen civil society structures within those countries. The survey instrument for TIS+ will be tailored to ensure that it accurately reflects TIS+ activities and their expected outcomes, while also answering the evaluation questions, within the constraints of the method.

4.3.2 Secondary Research

The first data collection method undertaken by the team will be to conduct a comprehensive review of internal and external documents of relevance to the TIS+ activity. The Contractor must work in coordination with the TIS+ management team to identify, collect and review documents over the course of the evaluation that include, but are not limited to the following:

- a) Statements of work
- b) Activity designs, training curricula, event agendas, and other key documents for understanding the content of activities
- c) Annual Work plans (initial and subsequent)
- d) Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (initial and revised)
- e) Quarterly and annual reports
- f) Results from TIS+ participatory M&E activities

²⁸ MDE is the smallest true effect, or change, for a given outcome variable, which is detectable for a given level of power and statistical significance.

- g) SPSS monitoring and verification reports
- h) Additional documents provided with the evaluation SOO
- i) External publications by donors, academic researchers, and NGOs, etc.

The results from TIS+'s participatory M&E activities will further comprise a primary source of performance data for the cluster-level evaluations. TIS+ M&E data must be integrated with the data generated from the other data collection methods and must be used as a source for triangulation to answer the key evaluation questions.

The evaluation team will incorporate information from the secondary research in the enumerator training so as to ensure that enumerators understand the background and context of TIS+ and are attentive to the need for data to answer the primary evaluation questions.

4.3.3 Key Informant Interviews (N=85, plus 20 [four in each cluster] for validation including the contribution analysis = 105)

KIIs are in-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted with individual activity stakeholders. The evaluation team must use the knowledge gained from the desk review and in-depth interviews conducted during evaluation Phase I to inform the design of the KII discussion guides and selection of key informant interviewees. Interviews must be conducted in both the baseline and endline with key informants from the following stakeholder groups, with other stakeholder groups and key informants added in during both evaluation rounds if certain key information can be gained from others not listed below.

- a) USAID officials in the USAID Somalia Office. N = 4.
- b) AECOM senior management, regional offices staff and sub-contractors staff. N = 10.
- c) Officials from Interim Regional Government Authorities and relevant government actors at the central and district levels in Somalia. N = 51 interviews (5 Ministry of Interior representatives, 10 FGS officials and 1 district senior representative per sampled community, in total 36).
- d) Key staff from other stabilization programs that interact with TIS+ or support programming that shares its objectives and geography (for example the Office of Transition Initiatives' Somalia Stabilization Initiative, World Bank, DfID). N = 10.
- e) Representatives from private sector, non-governmental or governmental donor organizations collaborating with, or asked to collaborate with, TIS+ communities. (N=10)
- f) Participants will be selected purposively for the additional four KIIs for each cluster, which will take place after initial data has been collected, analyzed and preliminary findings produced and presented. The purpose of this second round of KIIs is to validate the preliminary findings, and gather additional data required to complete the contribution analysis for the cluster.

The key informants from each of the groups listed above, and their locations and their numbers will be finalized in coordination with USAID and TIS+ during evaluation Phase I and again during Evaluation Phase 3 at the beginning of the endline data collection. It should be noted that the list of stakeholder groups, and number of KIIs per group, found above are estimates based on information available at this time and are subject to revision based on discussions with USAID and TIS+.

The KII interview guides must follow an open-ended format that will give the interviewees the space to describe their experiences in their own words and allow the interviewer to probe for information that will uncover new insights into key aspects of TIS+'s performance. The interview guides will be modular such that certain question modules will be asked of all respondents, while other question modules will be tailored to specific groups of respondents.

4.3.4 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) (N = 68 + 10 [two in each cluster] for validation including the contribution analysis = 78)

FGDs are in-depth moderated discussions with small groups of TIS+ community representatives. FGDs are a key method for measuring program performance as perceived by beneficiaries because in-depth information can be collected on the effects of participation in activity interventions. Four FGDs must be conducted in each selected community with the following groups:

- a) Female beneficiaries
- b) Male beneficiaries
- c) Male youth beneficiaries
- d) Female youth beneficiaries

The Contractor must conduct four FGDs in up to 50% of the TIS+ communities within a particular cluster. This produces the total number of FGDs in each cluster shown in Table 2. The communities participating in the FGDs must be selected purposively guided by criteria to be established by the evaluation team in conjunction with TIS+ management and field staff. FGD participants within communities will be selected based on the criteria that they are permanent community residents and have participated in one or more of the activities implemented by TIS+ in their community. FGD participants will be drawn, for example, from participants in TIS+ consensus groups, monitoring committees, and local tendering committees, as well as other well-informed community members. To the extent feasible, the FGDs will consist of homogenous groups. So as to get a fully representative picture of activity and implementation, the composition of FGD participants will be determined on a rolling basis in each successive community depending on the nature of activities implemented within those communities, previous issues identified within those communities (e.g., via TIS+ monitoring activities) and the coverage of TIS+ participants in prior FGDs.

Participants must be selected purposively for the additional two FGDs for each cluster, which will take place after initial data has been collected, analyzed and preliminary findings produced and presented. The purpose of this second round of FGDs is to validate the preliminary findings, and gather additional data required to complete the contribution analysis for the cluster.

Table 2. Estimated Number of FGDs per Cluster

Cluster	Estimated Number of TIS+ Communities	Estimated Number of Communities for FGDs	Estimated Total Number of FGDs
1	7	3	12
2	4	2	8
3	5	2	8
4	17	8	32
5	5	2	8
Total	38	17	68

The FGD guide will give the discussion moderator a set of key questions and topics for guiding the discussions to uncover key information for answering the evaluation questions and determining whether TIS+ met its objectives, how TIS+ activities unfolded within the community and the contribution of TIS+ activities to observed changes within the community. To keep respondents focused throughout the session, FGDs will be organized at the venues where participants will be

comfortable to be recorded using digital audio recorders. The FGDs will include from 6-10 participants for a two-hour discussion.

As with the KII interview guides, the FGD discussion guides will follow an open-ended format that will give the participants the space to describe their experiences in their own words and allow the interviewer to probe for information that will uncover new insights into key aspects of TIS+'s performance. The discussion guides will be modular such that certain question modules will be asked of all respondents, while other question modules will be tailored to specific groups of respondents, clusters and objectives.

4.3.4 Community Checklists (N=380)

Qualitative researchers must make direct observations about sample communities using a detailed checklist, which will be used to evaluate the extent to which physical structures that were rehabilitated.

4.4 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS

The following presents a summary of the Contractor's quantitative and qualitative data analysis methods. The Contractor must disaggregate all data analysis by gender, age, membership in minority clans, or other population characteristics, as appropriate.

4.4.1 Quantitative Data Analysis Methods

The primary quantitative results of interest are the changes in key outcome variables related primarily to EQI, which will be measured as the change in two proportions; for example, a change in the proportion of survey respondents who express confidence in government in the baseline compared to the proportion who express confidence in government in the end-line. To analyze changes in key outcome variables, and so as to understand the relationships between other variables in the survey dataset, we will employ a range of statistical tests depending on the nature of the data. These tests include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Tests of independent means for numerical and binary data.
- Non-parametric tests for ordinal data: A number of the household survey questions will be Likert scales, which produced ordinal data.
- Tests of categorical data, such as the Pearson's chi square test.

4.4.2 Qualitative Data Analysis Methods

Data from the KIIs and FGDs must be analyzed using an inductive thematic approach, which reduces text to codes and identifies patterns among the codes. Analysis will be performed using the NVivo qualitative analysis software program. Using a standardized iterative process, a codebook will be developed and codes will be systematically applied to the data. A matrix will be designed to identify themes to better understand: (1) the ways in which TIS+ activities have affected outcomes related to the evaluation questions; and (2) other factors, both internal and external to TIS+, that may have affected these outcomes. At the same time, codes will be developed to facilitate the integration of findings across the qualitative and quantitative data.

The Contractor must design the data analysis strategy for both quantitative and qualitative data before the baseline data collection begins. Data analysis will employ a parallel, mixed-data approach in which quantitative data are independently analyzed from qualitative data, but both using coding related to the evaluation questions.

The Contractor must then seek to expand on the findings that emerge from the quantitative data by identifying qualitative trends to provide explanations and depth for those results. At the same time, the Contractor must take the themes and trends emerging from the qualitative data and (1) look for existing quantitative results or (2) undertake additional quantitative analysis so as to determine whether there is evidence to generalize the qualitative findings to the target populations.

Finally, the Contractor must utilize different types of triangulation to validate findings, analyses, and conclusions including: (1) data triangulation, using a *variety* of data sources and (2) investigator triangulation involving the use of *different evaluators* who bring diverse perspectives and cultural and analytical skills.

4.5 CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

TIS+ operates within a wider system in which it is only one of a number of factors that potentially affect activity outcomes. TIS+'s interventions will, therefore, be at best a contributory cause to any observed outcomes. In other words, TIS+ activities are a necessary part of a "package" of causal factors that are together sufficient to produce the observed outcomes. It is important, therefore, to place project activities within the wider range of other potential causal factors and to understand that these other factors have a potentially important influence on the occurrence, scale and nature of change. According to Jonathan Mayne, contribution analysis infers causality from the following evidence:

- The project is based on a well-reasoned ToC, while the assumptions underlying the ToC are plausible, sound, informed by evidence and agreed-on by key stakeholders.
- The project implements activities as outlined in the ToC.
- The evidence verifies both the occurrence of expected outcomes in the ToC and its underlying assumptions.
- External factors, including context and rival explanations, are assessed and are shown not to have made a significant contribution to observed results, or, if they did, their relative contribution is recognized.

One purpose of contribution analysis is to work through a set of contribution stories that assist in answering the relevant evaluation questions. In working through the contribution stories, the analysis must be guided by the following three considerations related to the nature of causality/contribution.

First, project interventions do not operate in isolation but are part of a causal package that includes other interventions, events or conditions external to the project. Thus the purpose of contribution analysis is less whether and how TIS+ has contributed to a particular outcome but instead whether and how the causal package, which includes TIS+ interventions, has contributed to the outcome.

Second, any particular causal package is comprised of the intervention outputs plus the assumptions, which together are sufficient to bring about the intended impacts. The TOC will identify the support factors (assumptions) and confounding factors (risks). It also explains how and why intended impacts are expected to occur. The causal questions will get at: 1) has the intervention made a difference; in what way was it a contributory cause? And 2) why has the impact occurred? How did the causal factors bring about the result? What was the context and the mechanisms? What role did the

intervention play (i.e. as a trigger) compared to contributions played by other influencing factors? Therefore, this approach should shed light on the questions about what was the relative contribution of TIS+ approaches to anticipated results, which is the first EQ, which leads to the second EQ, the extent to which TIS+ approaches were instrumental in achieving results.

Third, assessing contribution must take into account the probabilistic nature of causality and the lack of certainty that often attends our attempts to measure it. This requires that the Contractor talk more in terms of likelihoods instead of certainties with regards to conclusions about contribution. Thus, the standard of evidence to determine contribution that the Contractor will apply through the contribution analysis is that the causal package is a *likely sufficient* cause of the observed change, while TIS+ activities are in turn a “likely necessary” part of the causal package.

Thus in lieu of creating a statistically valid counterfactual, contribution analysis reduces uncertainty about the contribution TIS+ is making to observed changes through an increased understanding of why the observed changes have occurred (or not occurred) and the role TIS+ played in contributing to these changes relative to other internal and external factors. As specified by Mayne, and as to be implemented in the TIS+ evaluation, contribution analysis involves the following six-step approach to arrive at evidence-based conclusions about the factors likely contributing to observed changes.

CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS PROCESS	TIS+ EVALUATION PHASE	PRODUCTS
<i>Step 1: Set out the cause-effect issue to be addressed in a detailed ToC. This step maps out the cause-and-effect logic leading from project activities to expected outcomes and carefully tracing out the expected outcomes, and possible unexpected outcomes, and causal linkages, along with key assumptions and causal mechanisms underpinning the ToC.</i>	PH 1: PREPARATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Attribution problem statement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ What needs to be addressed ○ Articulate the cause- effect question ○ Explore contribution expected ○ Identify other influencing factors ○ Identify plausibility of the contribution ● Articulate causal questions related to the EQs
<i>Step 2: Identify the risks to the postulated ToC, including rival explanations. This step assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the cause-and- effect logic underlying the ToC and assesses the nature and extent of TIS+'s contribution to each expected result, along with factors that imperil the hypothesized causal linkages and other possible contributory factors and rival explanations.</i>	PH 2: BASELINE PHASE	Draft of the TOC with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -assumptions and risks -roles played by other factors -how contested in the TOC? -review results Questions for inclusion in tools & analysis plan

<p><i>Step 3: Gather evidence.</i> This step involves the implementation of the data collection methods described above to gather evidence for the contribution analysis, particularly (1) whether the expected results did or did not occur, (2) why expected results did or did not occur, and (3) the causal process and contextual and other contributory factors explaining why expected results did or did not occur.</p>	PH 3: ENDLINE	<p>Comparative Analysis section for each cluster report following analysis plan</p> <p>Preliminary Findings and guides for follow up KIIs and FGDs</p>
<p><i>Step 4: Assemble and assess the contribution claim, and challenges to it.</i> This step constructs the contribution story, while assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the cause- and-effect logic in light of the evidence collected during the previous step, the relevance of other contributory factors and the evidence for rival explanations. This step involves three analytical tasks:</p>		
<p><i>Bottom-up measurement:</i> This task assesses how TIS+ activities have facilitated changes at the outcome level by analyzing the effects of interventions and their interaction with the context, including other actors, the local political economy and other external factors.</p> <p>○ <i>Top-down measurement:</i> This task assesses the key changes in outcomes and then investigates how activities and other factors have driven these changes.</p> <p>○ <i>Compare and triangulate findings:</i> This task investigates the causal relationships between activities and observed outcomes by assessing the extent to which observed outcomes and contributory causal factors are consistent across data collection methods and contexts.</p>		
<p><i>Step 5: Seek out additional evidence.</i> This step determines what kind of additional evidence is needed to enhance the credibility of the contribution claim and gather the appropriate evidence, as feasible.</p>	PH 3: ENDLINE	Final sections with data second round of FGDs and KIIs
<p><i>Step 6: Revise and strengthen the contribution story.</i> Having identified and addressed any challenges to our credibility, such as the strengths of certain assumptions and/or the roles of other influencing factors, this step builds a more credible contribution story. Because this process involves both bottom-up and top-down measurement of change; it provides triangulation of evidence for change up and down the project ToC. It also provides a reasonably robust approach to measure contribution and guard against “self- importance bias,” which occurs when the relative importance of other contextual factors is under-estimated and the importance of project-specific factors is overestimated.</p>	PH 4: SYNTHETIC COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS	Result of analysis with added data

4.6 QUALITY ASSURANCE

To reduce sources of bias and obtain valid and accurate responses from participants, we will implement a series of rigorous quality assurance (QA) methods for both quantitative and qualitative data. These methods are described below.

Interviewer Training. Central to overall quality assurance must be providing training for local research partners and its interviewers. Each member of the quantitative and qualitative field teams must participate in a 2-3 day training workshop before entering the field during which time they will receive a question-by-question instruction in research instruments, their purpose and their implementation along with instruction and practice in the research protocols related to, for example, skip patterns, coding and use of handheld devices (quantitative training) and sound interview/moderation, probing and participatory research techniques (qualitative training).

Cognitive consistency. Instrument calibration must also be critical to ensure accurate results. Instruments must be tested on location with key informants and/or representatives of the target population. The purpose of this step is to fine-tune the translation and check the cognitive consistency and precision of the questions asked. This might result in re-phrasing of some questions, adjustment of vocabulary, or response options to better fit the local context.

Use of technology. The evaluation must use both Mobile Data Collection (MDC) and traditional paper-and-pencil data interview (PAPI) methods. MDC will be used with quantitative data collection instruments in communities that are considered very accessible. It must also be used to create digital audio recordings of KIs and FGDs proceedings. PAPI must be used with quantitative data collection instruments in communities that are considered moderately accessible and where the use of MDC would draw attention – thus risking the lives of interviewers. It will also be used for KIs and FGDs as a backup record of KI and FGD proceedings. The Contractor must be familiar with the challenges posed by both MDC and PAPI tools and as such must develop a set of rigorous data management and quality assurance protocols for each (complementing the QA methods described above) and must train all field researchers in their use.

Pilot testing. The Contractor must conduct a pilot test of all quantitative instruments with the intended informants and target population and in circumstances similar to that of the study itself. The purpose of the pilot is three-fold. First, it tests the data collection protocol. Second, it further trains the survey team by giving its members the opportunity to get better acquainted with the content and the target population. Third, it permits further adjustments of the language in the instruments for better flow and to ensure internal consistency of the responses. Based on the findings of the pilot, changes will be made to the survey instrument and protocols.

Household survey data checks. For the household survey, the Contractor conduct routine quality and completion checks in the field during the household survey implementation so as to ensure enumerators follow protocols and ensure data accuracy. Conducting regular spot checks will allow problems to be identified and resolved while the data collection team is on location. Each enumeration team must include one Field Supervisor to manage check that each record is completed before assigning other sample cases to the enumerator. A Data Collection Coordinator must oversee all enumeration teams and will check the data of each Field Supervisor at the end of each day. Based on this information, they will assign callbacks to Field Supervisors or re- conduct surveys themselves. Callbacks make sure data are collected correctly but also point to problems that are more systemic and may require refinements to the data collection protocols.

Qualitative controls. Qualitative quality control methods must include, among other things, standardizing introductory comments, so as to create a common set of expectations for respondents, holding discussions in venues where participants feel comfortable and secure, excluding activity staff or local authority figures from FGDs, and monitoring a random sample of KIs and FGDs to ensure that team members are following the moderation protocols.

After completion of each FGD session, each evaluation team member must review the transcripts from the transcribers individually. Next, they will meet to discuss and review the transcriptions. If unanticipated information is uncovered, team members will design appropriate probing questions for the ensuing KIs. Finally, prior to processing the data, the qualitative evaluation team must review collected data to ensure all findings are properly recorded and documented.

Data cleaning. At the end of each day, survey data must be uploaded to a local server as well as a server hosted by researchers. Back-office staff, both locally and remotely, must run analytic programs that perform data cleaning, check coding, and produce descriptive statistics. These analytic checks must be performed daily or at an adequate frequency so problems may be addressed immediately.

Debriefings. During the fieldwork, both quantitative and qualitative data collection teams must hold a debriefing at the conclusion of each field day to share notes, check data quality, ensure that instruments have been completed correctly and troubleshoot problems. Using the real-time, back end verification capabilities embedded into the MDC platform, the Field Supervisors and Data Collection Coordinator must verify the data collected and uploaded for that day.

Check-ins. The Contractor must institute a regular check-in process consisting of weekly teleconferences between the Data Collection Coordinator and the Evaluation Manager and weekly status reports from the Field Supervisors. Challenges arising in the field will be resolved where appropriate on the spot by the Field Supervisors. Where this is not possible, the Field Supervisor will refer the problem to the Data Collection Coordinator for resolution. As a last resort, and for the most serious issues, the Data Collection Coordinator will refer the problem to the Evaluation Manager for resolution.

4.7 DATA FORMAT AND SHARING

The evaluation data and information must be converted to the appropriate formats and shared with USAID per ADS 579, “USAID Development Data”, or “USAID Open Data” requirements and guidelines. To ensure transparency and replicability, quantitative data must be submitted as annotated datasets clearly defined with codebooks and annotated analysis files. Unstructured qualitative data, such as interview transcripts, must be stored in text-based data entry templates, while structured quantitative data will be stored in Excel and SPSS files. To ensure respondent anonymity, survey data must be entered into two separate databases, one with identifying information and one without identifying information. Metadata must be generated in the form of codebooks and data summaries. The final dataset must be compiled and submitted to USAID in accordance with relevant Agency guidelines. The evaluation team must also work with USAID Somalia’s Open Data Point of Contact to ensure that it submits the correct files and data in the appropriate format.

4.8 DISSEMINATION OF RESULTS

To ensure that key findings and recommendations are harmonized into a realistic and meaningful body of analytical work, the evaluation team must vet findings with key stakeholders to get input and validate recommendations. At the conclusion of the evaluation, the Contractor must host a workshop for key

project stakeholders where the Contractor must present its findings and receive feedback. The workshops and presentations will be an important tool in achieving stakeholder buy-in and ensuring that results are acceptable.

The Contractor must conduct a second round of FGDs for each cluster, to take place after the two waves of data collection. They will happen after analysis, preparation of preliminary findings, including each cluster “contribution story” and presentation to USAID and stakeholders in Nairobi. Out of those presentations may come additional questions; they will also review the topics that will be covered in the second round of FGDs and KIs, for their inputs then, the second round of FGDs and KIs will take place, where the preliminary findings must be presented, and final contribution analysis information collected. These data must be used for the final reports for each cluster.

A workshop is planned in Mogadishu, in the final synthetic comparative analysis phase, to present the evaluation report preliminary findings, before finalizing the report. This will be similar to the preliminary findings workshop for this phase with stakeholders in Nairobi, but will allow more GoS and civil society representatives to attend. Final planning on these second round FGDs, KIs and the final workshop, will be refined during the phase one preparation stage.

4.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

All data collection must be conducted according to the professional standards of the American Evaluation Association. Signed informed consent must be obtained prior to the start of any data collection activity, while interviewees will be given the option not to respond to any questions or to decline any interview. To protect the interviewee’s anonymity, the Contractor must implement a number of safeguards. To begin with, all evaluation team members will be required to sign a certificate of confidentiality. Any information that could be directly linked to an individual will not be used, including quotes provided in evaluation reports. Further, only general information (e.g., location, sex, age, etc.) will be utilized for analysis or reporting, while only members of the evaluation team will have access to the transcripts and raw data. Finally, datasets provided to USAID or other stakeholders must be cleaned with identifying information removed.

4.10 METHODOLOGY STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

USAID’s Evaluation Policy states that any methodological strengths and limitations are to be communicated explicitly in SOWs. Some of the methodological strengths and limitations of the TIS+ evaluation include are described below.

4.10.1 Methodological Strengths

- The sampling design provides 95 percent confidence level and 80% statistical power, both of which adhere to established best practice in evaluation research, thus providing reliable data for decision-making purposes.
- Contribution analysis provides a credible alternative approach for dealing with the issue of attribution in the absence of a counterfactual. While contribution constitutes a lower standard of causality than attribution, contribution analysis is a second-best alternative, which can still provide rigorous evidence of an activity’s specific contribution to observed outcomes.
- The Contractor must be mindful of the political polarization in Somalia, and must discuss and coordinate with USAID Somalia Office and TIS+ about selection of respondents and other issues that may arise. While bias can never be entirely eliminated from an assessment, there are a number of checks the evaluation team will engage in to mitigate and minimize bias. The KII will be

implemented using question guides rather than a detailed interview guide that might “force” respondents to provide answers to questions about aspects of the activity for which they may have inadequate knowledge.

- Conveying independence of the evaluation team from TIS+ implementation and decision-making and the fact that the evaluation will have no direct influence on future project activities will strengthen the independence of the TIS+ evaluation.
- Evaluator conflicts of interests are another potential source of bias. The Contractor must certify that no individual included in its evaluation team, including contractor staff employed to collect data, will possess a material or perceived conflict of interest that might influence the evaluation process, the quality of the data collected, or the findings of the evaluation.
- Data collection using mobile devices will allow for quality control and analysis in near real time, enabling fast decision making by the evaluation team for quality control and quick course corrections on fieldwork plans and data collection instruments based on clearly identified need and response to exigencies that may arise during fieldwork.
- Emotional attachment and professional reputation may enter as a different source of bias in the data that will be collected from IP management and staff. Reputational considerations and strong attachments to the Stabilization Project and the areas where it worked may create a tendency to answer questions in ways that cast a positive light on some of the more challenging aspects of TIS+. Triangulation of data from different sources is the key analytical technique for identifying and controlling this bias. That is, bias will be controlled by cross-referencing information from interviews with USAID officials, with information from IPs, with data collected from beneficiaries in the TIS+ communities, plus data from secondary sources including independent MV&R. The triangulation of data from these different sources will ensure that the answers to the evaluation questions reflect a distillation of the full range of dynamics surrounding TIS+ programming and the various interests of its stakeholders.
- Insecurity is a persistent limitation that affects all types of work in Somalia, including evaluations. Insecurity may affect the mobility of evaluators and access to research subjects and activity sites. Insecurity may create bias in evaluation findings if it results in the systematic exclusion of certain types of activity sites and/or groups of respondents. If during the course of fieldwork insecurity compromises the evaluation team’s ability to fulfill the evaluation plan, then SPSS will immediately identify the best means of revising the evaluation plan such that inaccessible locations and/or respondents are replaced with comparable ones that are accessible. Thereby the evaluation team will control the potential source of sampling bias that might arise from insecurity.

4.10.2 Methodological Weaknesses

- Data collection will be limited to TIS+ clusters and communities. This requirement forecloses the possibility of creating a counterfactual, which would allow us to attribute findings with regards to EQI to TIS+ activities. In lieu of a counterfactual, we have proposed to use contribution analysis (see above).
- Notwithstanding best efforts to avoid or mitigate potential biases (see above), they remain a risk, particularly with regards to qualitative methods, which rely heavily on respondent perceptions and interviewer interpretation. The desire to attract follow-on programming among certain types of respondents is one such source of bias. This source of bias is often a feature of the community context where project beneficiaries and stakeholders attempt to provide the information that they think will prompt the delivery of additional benefits from a new project.

More generally, KII and FGD respondents have their own biases that must be recognized and considered when analyzing their responses. Biases can also emerge during FGDs if not

moderated correctly that can taint their usefulness. Finally, qualitative data collection methods are also subject to some important interviewer effects in that the quality of the research is heavily dependent on the skill of the researcher and can be easily influenced by their personal idiosyncrasies and biases. Interviewers' bias will be mitigated by convening daily team debriefs, rolling data analysis and presentation of transcripts with 24 hours of each qualitative data collection.

- Key informants from important stakeholder groups (e.g., government agencies) are likely to rotate in and out over time meaning that (1) valued key informants during the baseline evaluation may not be available during the endline evaluation and, thus, (2) key informants during the endline round may lack the institutional/historical knowledge or context to answer questions. In addition, the selection of key informants for KIs may be challenging and findings can be biased if the informants are not carefully selected. When only a few people are involved in a particular activity, it may be difficult demonstrate the validity of the findings.
- Within the clusters and communities covered by the evaluation, TIS+ will be implementing a range of activities tailored to the needs in each community falling under Objectives 1-4. At the time of the baseline data collection, the specific needs and priorities of communities and therefore the specific content of the TIS+ interventions – may not yet be known, although they will be by the endline. Moreover, while the qualitative methods allow significant flexibility to adjust the discussions to issues of more specific relevance to individual communities, the household survey does not mean that questions in the household survey must be written at a higher level of generality that may not allow a fine granularity of analysis.
- The repeated cross-sectional survey design is a cost-effective means for tracking changes in general population characteristics over time; however, it does less well than a longitudinal (panel) survey in terms of measuring the variations in the patterns of change at the household (or unit of observation) level or in explaining why the change is occurring. On the upside, a repeated cross-sectional survey does not suffer a loss in explanatory (statistical) power that is characteristic of longitudinal designs due to panel attrition (respondents who drop out of the panel from the baseline to the endline).

4.1.1 IMPLEMENTATION RISKS

The use of consultants for assignments that are intermittent with possible schedule changes for reasons outside of anyone's control (political changes in Somalia, IP implementation delays, security concerns), can lead to changes due to availability issues with consultants. SPSS mitigates this by staying in regular contact with the Evaluation Team, by using some team members who are known quantities, and by exercising strong technical oversight at the field and Home Office levels to ensure continuity.

Annex II: State-Level Development Priorities²⁹

Cluster 1: Jubaland State: Lower Juba (Afmadow-Kismayo)

Specific priorities included in the National Strategic Plan and in JSS State planning and confirmed in data collection and analysis relevant to TIS+ planning are detailed below and organized by priority areas.

JSS National Development Priorities	
Relevant to TIS+ Objective 1 and 2	Infrastructure Priorities
	<p>Specific priorities here could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rebuild essential social services infrastructure in collaboration with the FGS (including roads, ports, airports, information communication technology (ICT), water, waste management, and energy). • Road construction priorities include building the Liboi-Kismayo road and rehabilitating the Kismayo-Mogadishu road. • Rebuild and expand the Kismayo airport. • Expand the Kismayo port. • Rehabilitate the Yontoy project for water supply to Kismayo city at the Liboi, El Wak, and Beled Xawo border crossing points. • Develop renewable energy sources to boost the reestablishment and development of agricultural produce processing as well support the fisheries sector.
	Economic Growth Priorities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve access to financial services and markets, and stimulate investment opportunities for private sector investment in farming and agriculture with the potential for job creation and food security. • Develop a dedicated program to restart fishery cooperatives across the regions. • Identify remunerative incomes for artisanal fishermen, establish simple infrastructure such as jetties to support fishing enterprises in coastal communities, and construct ice-making and fish processing facilities in villages and towns to develop markets. • Support the development of policies in the livestock subsector that increase income generation for nomadic pastoral and seminomadic agro-pastoral communities through improved production services and advisory services on range management, animal health services, and more effective livestock marketing systems. • Support reconstruction and rehabilitation of economic facilities, including the Mareray sugar factory, the Fanole hydroelectric power plant, the Kismayo meat factory, the Kismayo fish processing factory, the Kismayo leather factory, the Maganbo rice processing facilities, and the maize processing and packaging factory.

²⁹ Somalia National Development Plan, November 2016, and confirmed in interviews and data analysis with FGS staff, donors, and stakeholders working on development planning, infrastructure development, and national planning processes in Somalia.

	Social Development and Resilience ** For Minority Clans, Women and Youth <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political settlement, peace and reconciliation, and conflict mitigation services are all things that are specified in the JSS planning process. • JSS is the one region that has specified in their planning and constitutional review process the need for a functioning social protection system for women, minorities, and vulnerable groups. This should be supported with FMS officials and at the provincial level as it emerges. • Increase youth employment in livestock production, through improved access to vocational training and employment schemes. • Increase access to vocational training in key professions to contribute directly to economic recovery priorities and youth employment in productive sectors. • Empower youth to participate in social, political, and economic development by providing quality education, training, and life skills, with an emphasis on young women and vulnerable youth. • Assist JSS officials with the development of a new youth employment policy by the end of 2017, including provisions addressing need to decrease youth out-migration. • Support increased access for youth to formal and informal vocational skills training in areas immediately marketable and relevant to economic recovery priorities in the state. • Promote youth participation in leadership, decision-making, and related life skills development, including through existing youth associations. • Develop a rehabilitation program for defected youth from AS, including women. • Expand the fisheries sector, particularly in Lower Juba, to contribute to national food security and sustainable livelihoods in coastal communities. Specific priorities here could include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Vocational and skills training for youth to promote increased employment in the sector; and ○ Construction of physical infrastructure for harvest facilities, fish marketing, and distribution support to reduce post-harvest losses.
	Support for Government Capacity <p>Specific priorities relevant to TIS+ in this area include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen JSS public administration by expanding its reach and competency, and reviewing and reforming local government laws, policies, rules, and regulations. • Improve services and economic opportunities for the citizens of Jubaland that conform to the federal, political and executive frameworks. • Support the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Public Services Commission as stipulated in the JSS 2015 Constitution.
	Support for Inclusive Politics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop an inclusive political system by adopting the JSS 2015 Constitution, and appoint a JSS governmental commission to review the constitution in close collaboration with the FGS. • Establish a Peace Building and Reconciliation Commission, as stipulated in the JSS 2015 Constitution.

Relevant to
TIS+
Objective 3
and 4

	Justice and Security
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support CVE efforts particularly in Lower Juba and assist in reconciliation efforts between clans in conflict. • Support the establishment of independent, accountable, and efficient justice institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the people of Jubaland in line with JSS 2015 Constitution, federal constitution, and international principles. • Support the establishment of the Human Rights Commission and the Land Use and Dispute Resolution Commission as stipulated in the JSS 2015 Constitution.

Cluster 2: Gedo/Bay Region (includes Dinsoor in Bay)

Specific priorities included in the National Strategic Plan and confirmed in data collection and analysis relevant to TIS+ planning are detailed below and organized by priority areas. Gedo was included in the JSS section because this cluster was previously considered a district of this state.

From the National Development Priorities for JSS	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is relevant because representatives from Gedo previously contributed to this plan. 	
Relevant to TIS+ Objective 1 and 2	Infrastructure Priorities
	<p>Specific priorities here could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rebuild essential social services infrastructure in collaboration with the FGS (including road, ports, airports, ICT, water, waste management, and energy). • Rebuild and expand Garbaharey and Baardheere airports. • Rehabilitate the Yontoy project for water supply to Kismayo city at the Liboi, El Wak, and Beled Xawo border-crossing points. • Renovate and rehabilitate pre-civil war projects that combined the use of renewable energy resources such the hydroelectric 185MW Baardheere dam project that would also have allowed the expansion of irrigated farming land by 700,000 acres. • Develop renewable energy sources to boost the reestablishment and development of agricultural produce processing as well support the fisheries sector.
	Economic Growth Priorities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve access to financial serves and markets, and stimulate investment opportunities for private sector investment in farming and agriculture with the potential for job creation and food security. • Support the development of policies in the livestock subsector that increase income generation for nomadic pastoral and seminomadic agro-pastoral communities through improved production services and advisory services on range management, animal health services, and more effective livestock marketing systems.
	Social Development and Resilience
	<p>** For Minority Clans, Women, and Youth</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political settlement, peace and reconciliation, and conflict mitigation services are all things that are specified in the JSS planning process. • This is the one region that has specified in their planning and constitutional review process the need for a functioning social protection system for women, minorities, and vulnerable groups. This should be supported with FMS officials and at the provincial level as it emerges. • Increase youth employment in livestock production through improved access to vocational training and employment schemes. • Increase access to vocational training in key professions to contribute directly to economic recovery priorities and youth employment in productive sectors. • Empower youth to participate in social, political, and economic development by providing quality education, training, and life skills, with an emphasis on young women and vulnerable youth. • Assist state and regional officials with the development of a new youth employment policy

	<p>by the end of 2017, including provisions addressing need to decrease youth out-migration.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support increased access for youth to formal and informal vocational skills training in areas immediately marketable and relevant to economic recovery priorities in the state; promote youth participation in leadership and decision-making, and related life skills development, including through existing youth associations. • Develop a rehabilitation program for defected youth from AS, including women.
	Support for Government Capacity
	<p>Specific priorities relevant to TIS+ in this area include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening public administration, by expanding its reach and competency, reviewing and reforming local government laws, policies, rule and regulation.
Relevant to TIS+ Objective 3 and 4	Support for Inclusive Politics
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for and inclusive political system, national dialogue and reconciliation.
	Justice and Security
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support CVE efforts particularly in Lower Juba and Gedo and assist in reconciliation efforts between clans in conflict. • Support the establishment of independent, accountable, and efficient institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the people of this region in line with the federal constitution and international principles. • Support the establishment of the Human Rights Commission and the Land Use and Dispute Resolution Commission.

Cluster 3 and Cluster 4: South West State (Bakool and Lower Shabelle)

Specific priorities included in the SWS Strategic Plan and confirmed in data collection and analysis relevant to TIS+ planning are detailed below and organized by priority areas.

South West State Development Planning Priorities (2017–2019)	
Relevant to TIS+ Objective 1 and 2	Infrastructure Priorities
	<p>Specific priorities here could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitate and rebuild regional (particularly Bakool) and district courthouses. • Rehabilitate and equip the four public referral hospitals. • Rehabilitate and repair agricultural irrigation infrastructure (e.g., dams, canals, reservoirs). • Improve facilities and service delivery for veterinary care. • Build fodder reserve and livestock holding facilities for the pastoral migration routes. • Maintain arterial roads between regional centers and between urban and rural areas that are reliably usable, particularly targeting those roads connecting productive land to markets and ports, and for improved access to key districts for extension of state authority. • Repair roads within the three main regional towns (Xudur, Merka, and Barawe) as well as in the interim capital of Baidoa. • Rehabilitate and improve the seaport in Lower Shabelle. • Prioritize repair and maintenance of access roads to the port to promote greater potential for agricultural exports from SWS in line with national economic recovery priorities. • Renovate airport facilities at KM50, Baidoa, and Xudur airports to ensure reliable functionality. • Complete a new airstrip at Barawe.
	Economic Development and Resilience
	<p>** For Minority Clans, Women, and Youth</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase youth employment in livestock production, through improved access to vocational training and employment schemes.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to vocational training in key professions to contribute directly to economic recovery priorities and youth employment in productive sectors. • Empower youth to participate in social, political, and economic development by providing quality education, training and life skills, with an emphasis on young women and vulnerable youth. • Assist SWS officials with the development of a new youth employment policy by the end of 2017, including provisions addressing need to decrease youth out-migration. • Support increased access for youth to formal and informal vocational skills training in areas immediately marketable and relevant to economic recovery priorities in the state. • Promote youth participation in leadership and decision-making, and related life skills development, including through existing youth associations. • Develop a rehabilitation program for defected youth from AS, including women. • Expand the fisheries sector, particularly in Lower Shabelle, to contribute to national food security and sustainable livelihoods in coastal communities. <p>Specific priorities here could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improve facilities for landing for artisanal fisheries. ○ Provide vocational and skills training for youth to promote increased employment in the sector. ○ Construct physical infrastructure for harvest facilities, fish marketing, and distribution support to reduce post-harvest losses.
	<p>Support for Government Capacity</p> <p>Specific priorities relevant to TIS+ in this area include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the devolution of authority to local government regarding policies and regulations for decentralization in line with Wadajir Framework. • Support district council formation (pending secure access to those districts impacted by AS insurgency), based on local reconciliation and dialogue and including provisions to promote participation of women in local decision-making. • Increase capacity development for district council members and staff (e.g., local governance functions, decentralized service delivery, financial/public expenditure and project management, revenue collection, planning and budgeting). • Increase community outreach and civic education to promote the role of local government in dispute resolution, effective service delivery, and public engagement in governance. • Increase the efficiency of central SWS government ministries and effectiveness of state civil servants. • Provide expert technical support to ensure participation in the comprehensive review and revision of the SWS constitution. • Train MPs on basic parliamentary procedures and functions, with special support to women MPs. • Create a public information and communications infrastructure with improved access to facilitate reliable information-sharing and outreach to SWS citizenry. • Assist the SWS government in the development of communications and free media policies and regulations. • Improve public outreach and awareness-building through information-sharing on government recovery and development priorities. • Encourage public-private collaboration on telecommunications initiatives to regulate media and information-sharing. • Improve policy, regulatory, and technical capacities of SWS government to plan, operate, and maintain essential infrastructure. • Assist with the assessment of technical and financial feasibility of key infrastructure priorities, in coordination with federal authorities. • Develop capacity for key infrastructure sectors to plan, implement, monitor, and repair projects.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop public works organizational and technical capacities for maintenance in key areas (e.g., road and bridge repairs, garbage collection).
Relevant to TIS+ Objective 3 and 4	Support for Inclusive Politics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish an inclusive Reconciliation Committee to guide and coordinate grassroots initiatives (particularly in Lower Shabelle/Merka area). Raise public awareness on reconciliation and traditional dispute resolution over land and other conflict factors (relevant to shared assets and CDD planning in these clusters).

	Security <p>Implement a state security framework under the State Security Policy and overseen by the State Security Committee and relevant ministries;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, particularly vulnerable youth and women. <p>Specific activities relevant are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support ex-combatant women. Enhanced outreach to districts to promote DDR opportunities and increased AS defections. Support the expansion of DDR across SWS to reach newly liberated districts in Bakool and Lower Shabelle. Expand vocational training to include demobilized surplus militia members.
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Cluster 5: Banaadir

Specific priorities included in the National Strategic Plan relevant to Cluster 5, Banaadir, and confirmed in data collection and analysis relevant to TIS+ planning are detailed below and organized by priority areas.

Banaadir Development Priorities	
	Infrastructure Priorities <p>Specific priorities here could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritize the rehabilitation of the following roads — General Daud Road, Dabka Road, Warshadaha Road, Wadnaha Road, and Sodonka Road. Construct a 150 MW solar power electricity plant and install high-mast solar lighting in the city. This is critical for electrification needs as well as to promote security. Rehabilitate the Ceelasha biya water system because it is the critical supply for Mogadishu. Rebuild and reestablish the Somali National University campus. Construct three vocational training centers. Construct three libraries. Rehabilitate all primary and secondary schools. Establish and support a teacher training college. Mogadishu has seen a large influx of migrants to the city and the population is rising fast. To meet the demand for decent housing, a dedicated scheme to build low-cost housing estates will be developed.
Relevant to TIS+ Objective 1 and 2	Economic Development and Resilience <p>** For Minority Clans, Women, and Youth</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To promote opportunities for women, the BRA plans to construct women's development centers in all districts. Empower youth to participate in social, political, and economic development by providing quality education, training and life skills, with an emphasis on young women and vulnerable youth. Assist BRA officials with the development of a new youth employment policy by the end of 2017.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support increased access for youth to formal and informal vocational skills training in areas immediately marketable and relevant to economic recovery priorities in the state; promote youth participation in leadership and decision-making, and related life skills development, including through existing youth associations. • Develop a rehabilitation program for defected youth from AS, including women.
	Support for Government Capacity
	<p>Specific priorities relevant to TIS+ in this area include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support coordination and planning improvements within the BRA. • Develop capacity for district council members and staff (e.g., local governance functions, service delivery, financial/public expenditure and project management, revenue collection, planning, and budgeting). • Provide community outreach and civic education to promote the role of BRA in dispute resolution, effective service delivery, and public engagement in governance. • Increase the efficiency of BRA civil servants. • Create public information and communications infrastructure with improved access to facilitate reliable information-sharing and outreach to citizenry of the Banaadir region. • Assist the BRA in the development of communications and free media policies and regulations. • Increase public outreach and awareness-building through information-sharing on BRA roles and responsibilities as well as recovery and development priorities.
Relevant to TIS+ Objective 3 and 4	Support for Inclusive Politics
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure appropriate representation of the different groups in society. • In collaboration with the federal government and other state governments, contribute to the development of an effective public accountability structure for governance and development planning.

Annex III: Community Development Checklist Planning (Cluster Level)³⁰

Cluster 1: Jubaland State: Lower Juba (Afmadow-Kismayo)

In LJ, the following information was gathered in selected settlements, showing the significance of donor-initiated infrastructure projects.

Community Checklist Information – Lower Juba

Category	Subcategory	Total (n)	Funder (%)		Maintainer (%)		Purpose utilization		Maintenance quality (%)	
			Donor	(local) government	Donor	(local) government	<= 5	> 5	<= 5	> 5
Roads and Bridges	Roads	7	86%	14%	29%	71%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Water and Sanitation	Water point	4	100%	0%	25%	75%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Small water reservoirs	1	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Shallow wells, pump houses	4	100%	0%	75%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Education	Newly constructed/renovated (education)	6	67%	33%	67%	33%	0%	100%	33%	67%
Health	Newly constructed/renovated (health)	5	100%	0%	80%	20%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Sociocultural Facilities	Resource centers	4	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Playgrounds	4	100%	0%	20%	80%	20%	80%	20%	80%
	Community centers	1	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Energy	Solar home systems	5	100%	0%	25%	50%	0%	100%	100%	0%
Economic	Microenterprise	4	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Markets	1	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Airstrip	1	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	—	—
Others	Administrative buildings	4	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%

By analyzing the TIS+ database some examples of ongoing projects were also assessed for the LJ cluster (see below). These projects provide an example of Pool of In-Kind Activities (PIKA) projects that will be looked at in more detail at endline.

³⁰ Less than 5 and greater than 5 refers to the number of projects surveyed that were stated to be used for the intended purpose or maintained adequately per community standards.

PIKA Projects	Description
Cluster I: Lower Juba	
Construction of Afmadow District HQ and Community Hall	This PIKA is expected to increase stability by improving service delivery and demonstrating good governance while improving the local district administration's capacity to serve its citizens.
Construction of Afmadow Women's Market	This PIKA seeks to increase stability in Afmadow District by increasing trade and commerce opportunities through the construction of a new women's market. The facility will promote economic empowerment for the Afmadow community, particularly the women.
Kismayo Town – Airport Road (section I) Design Work	This PIKA will support technical design and social survey work for the section I (TIS/DAI supported) road that requires additional work, after TIS agreed with USAID and the Jubaland Government to cancel the contracted work in April/May 2016.
Kismayo Market Roads Design Work	This PIKA will support technical design and social survey work for the road network that passes through the main market and business sections of Kismayo town.
Kismayo Solar Street Lighting Maintenance Unit	This PIKA will support the establishment and equipping and training of a competent Solar Street Lighting Maintenance unit in Kismayo, to enhance the sustainability of the existing and any new solar lights set up in Kismayo.
Kismayo Freedom Square Rehabilitation	This PIKA will support a wide range of Kismayo citizens who directly benefit from a tangible stabilization project derived from their local consensus planning processes that will garner contributions from local stakeholders.

At endline, the database will be used to assess which projects should be focused on for endline planning and the CC tool will be used to interview and assess community and stakeholder engagement in these efforts. Potential projects for endline may include the following for Cluster I, Lower Juba:

Cluster I: Lower Juba
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JSS002: Institutional Support to the Ministry of Interior Stabilization Department (JSS planning efforts) • JSS010: Kismayo Freedom Square Rehabilitation • JSS015: Afmadow Town Local Administration and Community Hall Construction • JSS016: Afmadow Town Women's Market Construction • JSS017: Afmadow Iftar Event • JSS019: Afmadow Hydrological Assessment • JSS022: Jubaland Chamber of Commerce Capacity Building • JSS024: Ministry of Gender – Capacity Building • JSS026: Ministry of Youth and Sports – Capacity Building

Cluster 2: Gedo/Bay Region (includes Dinsoor in Bay)

In Gedo, the following information was gathered in selected settlements, showing the significance of donor-initiated infrastructure projects.

Community Checklist Information – Gedo

Category	Subcategory	Funder (%)		Maintainer (%)		Purpose utilization		Maintenance quality (%)	
		Donor	(local) government	Donor	(local) government	<= 5	> 5	<= 5	> 5
Roads and Bridges	Road	100%	0%	50%	50%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Bridge	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Water and Sanitation	Embankments, protection walls	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Shallow wells, pump houses	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Education	Newly constructed/renovated (education)	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Health	Newly constructed/renovated (health)	71%	29%	71%	29%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Sociocultural Facilities	National cultural monuments	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Childcare facilities	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Playgrounds	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Religious centers	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Graveyards	—	—	—	—	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Community centers	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Multipurpose halls	100%	0%	67%	33%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Economic	Markets	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Others	Administrative buildings	100%	0%	13%	87%	0%	100%	0%	100%

By analyzing the TIS+ database some examples of ongoing projects were also assessed for the Gedo cluster (see below). These projects provide an example of PIKA projects that will be looked at in more detail at endline.

PIKA Projects Cluster 2: Gedo/Bay	Description
Roads, bridge, and airstrip design and assessment study in Baardheere	This PIKA will support the development of the priority infrastructure projects identified through the community consensus planning session in April 2016, by supporting the technical design and social survey work for Baardheere infrastructure to include the airstrip design,
Construction of Community Center in Baardheere	This PIKA is expected to support local peace processes and youth and women livelihood opportunities through the construction of a multipurpose community orientation center in Baardheere. The proposed PIKA will construct two offices for women and youth
Construction of Baardheere-Sakow Road	This activity seeks to improve the quality of services provided by the Jubaland Regional Administration and Baardheere local administration by providing an efficient road infrastructure.
Construction of Baardheere Airport Road	This activity seeks to improve the quality of services provided by the Jubaland Regional Administration and Baardheere local administration by providing an efficient roads infrastructure.
Rehabilitation and Upgrading of Baardheere Airstrip	This activity seeks to improve the quality of services provided by the Jubaland Regional Administration and Baardheere local administration by constructing/rehabilitating airstrip infrastructure.
Rehabilitation of Dinsoor Airstrip	This activity seeks to improve the quality of services provided by the South West State (SWS) regional administration and Dinsoor local administration by providing efficient airstrip infrastructure.
Construction of a Women's Center in Dinsoor	This PIKA will support the construction of a women's center in Dinsoor to strengthen the important roles women play as leaders among their communities.
Construction of a Football Stadium – Dinsoor	This PIKA intends to support the construction/upgrading of a local football field in Dinsoor into a fully functional football stadium with the construction of a perimeter wall and Two changing rooms for the teams, bleachers, and an administrative and operations area.
Rehabilitation of Dinsoor Main Road	This activity will cover the cost of constructing 6 km gravel on the main road connecting the town and the local airstrip, which is the main lifeline for the people of Dinsoor. Currently, the road is dilapidated and has many trenches.

At endline the database will be used to assess which projects should be focused on for endline planning, and the CC tool will be used to interview and assess community and stakeholder engagement in these efforts.

Cluster 3: Bakool

In Bakool, the following information was gathered in selected settlements, showing the significance of donor initiated infrastructure projects.

Community Checklist Information - Bakool

Category	Subcategory	Total (n)	Funder (%)		Maintainer (%)		Purpose utilization		Maintenance quality (%)	
			Donor	(local) government	Donor	(local) government	<= 5	> 5	<= 5	> 5
Roads and Bridges	Roads	4	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Water and Sanitation	Water point	4	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Small water reservoirs	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Shallow well	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Education	Newly constructed/renovated (education)	5	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Sociocultural Facilities	Childcare facilities	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Community centers	4	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Energy	Street lights	4	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Economic	Markets	5	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Others	Administrative buildings	1	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%

TIS+ is not yet active in Bakool so now there were no planned or pending PIKA projects to consider. At endline the database will be used to assess which projects should be focused on for endline planning, and the CC Tool will be used to interview and assess community and stakeholder engagement in these efforts.

Bakool
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SOM002: Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs – Technical Coordinator SOM003: Ministry of Gender – Technical Coordinator SOM006: Capacity Building on Community Consensus Planning and Guide SOM008: Ministry of Information – Technical Coordinator SOM012: Sustainable Solar Streetlight Maintenance Workshop

Cluster 4: Lower Shabelle

In LS, the following information was gathered in selected settlements, showing the significance of donor initiated infrastructure projects.

Community Checklist Information – Lower Shabelle

Category	Subcategory	Total (n)	Funder (%)		Maintenance (%)		Purpose utilization		Maintenance quality (%)	
			Donor	(local) government	Donor	(local) government	<= 5	> 5	<= 5	> 5
Roads and Bridges	Bridges	4	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Water and Sanitation	Shallow wells, pump houses	4	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Education	Newly constructed/renovated (education)	2	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Health	Newly constructed/renovated (health)	7	100%	0%	86%	14%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Sociocultural Facilities	Community centers	2	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Multipurpose halls	2	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Economic	Microenterprise	4	100%	0%	50%	50%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Others	Administrative buildings	8	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%

By analyzing the TIS+ database some examples of ongoing projects were also assessed for the LS cluster (see below). These projects provide an example of some of the types of PIKA projects that will be looked at in more detail at endline, although the process of planning and inclusion will be the point of emphasis.

Pike Projects Cluster 4: Lower Shabelle	Description
Construction of a Football Stadium – Barawe	Following a planning session conducted by TIS+ in Barawe, communities and their administration listed the construction of a secure football field as one of their priority projects for support by TIS+ program.
Barawe Urban Roads assessment study	This PIKA will support a competent, comprehensive, technical design study and socioeconomic survey work of seven (7) prioritized roads of approximately 3 km each within Barawe town. The study will also include the assessment of the existing main roads.

At endline the database will be used to assess which projects should be focused on for endline planning and the CC tool will be used to interview and assess community and stakeholder engagement in these efforts.

Lower Shabelle
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SWS002: Promoting Peace and Stability through Arts and Culture• SWS005: Strengthening Institutional Capacity of Stability Department• SWS004: Barawe: Community Consensus Planning• SWS009: Barawe: Youth Capacity Building• SWS010: Wanleweyne: Community Consensus Planning• SWS018: Wanleweyne: Technical Support to the Council of Elders

Cluster 5: Banaadir (Mogadishu)

In Banaadir, the following information was gathered in selected settlements, showing the significance of donor-initiated infrastructure projects.

Community Checklist Information – Banaadir

Category	Subcategory	Total (n)	Funder (%)		Maintainer (%)		Purpose utilization		Maintenance quality (%)	
			Donor	(local) govt	Donor	(local) govt	<= 5	> 5	<= 5	> 5
Roads and Bridges	Road	1	100%	0%	50%	50%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Bridge	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Water and Sanitation	Embankments and protection walls	4	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Shallow wells, pump houses	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Education	Newly constructed/renovated	3	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Health	Newly constructed/renovated	7	71%	29%	71%	29%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Sociocultural Facilities	National cultural monuments	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Childcare facilities	1	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Playgrounds	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Religious centers	1	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Graveyards	1	–	–	–	–	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Community centers	1	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	100%
	Multipurpose halls	1	100%	0%	67%	33%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Economic	Markets	3	100%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Others	Administrative buildings	8	100%	0%	13%	87%	0%	100%	0%	100%

By analyzing the TIS+ database some examples of ongoing projects were also assessed for the LS cluster (see below). These projects provide an example of PIKA projects that will be looked at in more detail at endline.

PIKA Projects Cluster 5: Banaadir	Description
Stability Perception Assessment in Somalia	This activity will support the Banaadir Regional Administration to better design, implement, and evaluate the stabilization activities in its administration by assessing the perceptions in communities targeted by the TIS+ programming.
Rehabilitation Warta Nabada District Basketball Court	This PIKA involves minor rehabilitation of the district basketball court, which was an identified priority of the district during the consensus group meeting facilitated by the BRA Task Force in 2016.
Rehabilitation Abdiaziz District Basketball Court	The purpose of this PIKA is to rehabilitate/renovate the Abdiaziz basketball court apart from developing and implementing a new approach of enhanced community ownership for the sustainability of the sport facility.
Rehabilitation Hawlwadag District Basketball Court	The purpose of this PIKA is to rehabilitate/renovate the Hawlwadag District basketball court apart from developing and implementing a new approach of enhanced community ownership for the sustainability of the sport facility.
Gap Filling and Upgrading of Sayidka Road – Hawlwadag District Mogadishu	This PIKA, as part of the overall Bridging Plan with the Banaadir Regional Authority, focuses on the enhancement and upgrading of 2.2 km road of Sayidka in Hawlwadag District, through road safety measures such as gap filling, speed bumps, and signs for school.
Technical assessment and feasibility Study for Roads – BRA Bridging Plans	This PIKA will support the feasibility assessment of roads and technical design as well as a conduct a socioeconomic survey focusing on the impacts of the proposed roads under the bridging plan priorities for BRA.
Construction of Qoob-Dooro Playground in Karaan District	This PIKA intends to support the construction of a football playground, including construction of a perimeter wall and changing rooms for the teams, spectator bleachers, administrative and operations offices, and an office for the youth.
Upgrading of Dan-Wadagaha Road, Wadajir District, Mogadishu	This PIKA, arising from the overall Bridging Plan developed by the Banaadir Regional Authority, will focus on the enhancement and upgrading of about 2 km of road of Dan-Wadagaha in Wadajir District. The enhancements will include speed bumps and zebra crossings.

At endline the database will be used to assess which projects should be focused on for endline planning, and the CC tool will be used to interview and assess community and stakeholder engagement in these efforts. Potential projects for endline analysis may include the following for Banaadir:

Mogadishu (Banaadir)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BRA003: Bridging Plan Task Force for Roads • BRA004: Bridging Plan Task Force for Sports Facilities • BRA005: Task Force Capacity Building • BRA006: Technical Assessment of Roads • BRA007: Department for Urban Planning and Engineering Capacity Development

Annex IV: Quantitative Analysis Plan

AECOM's log-frame adjusted by the TIS+ evaluation team (and reviewed by AECOM) guided the development of themes to be used in the analysis process for the HH Survey tool (see the revised log-frame and themes). The survey questions and associated themes were formulated such that they would assess the following four TIS+ objectives by comparing responses in sample areas selected.

- Objective 1: Increase confidence in governance based on equitable participation in decision-making and management of community assets. TIS+ will engage in stabilization support activities as well as peace building activities as determined by consensus between civil society/community members, government representatives, and the private sector in selected communities.
- Objective 2: Empower community and government representatives to engage with private sector and development actors in a collaborative process for community growth. The TIS+ team will support selected districts and localities in designing Bridging Plans to support districts and localities to move from quick impact stabilization activities to one or more aspects of medium-to-longer term development.
- Objective 3: Increase Somali engagement in creating a more stable future. Objective 3 activities will contribute towards a more enabling environment for stabilization and will foster increased, broad-based community participation in the interventions outlined in Objectives 1 and 2.
- Objective 4: Support inclusive, sustainable development by reducing gender gaps in stabilization and development. TIS+ will support men and women to be change agents and leaders in development processes through gender-sensitive facilitation training and support of local governance and community planning that are inclusive of men, women, and youth. Objective 4 activities include: (1) incorporating a gender analysis component into TIS+ activities and assessments and (2) increasing women's leadership in peace building and social reconciliation.

In each cluster, TIS+ (will) implements interventions targeting either objective 1 or 2 or both (objectives 3 and 4 are common to all clusters). Therefore, primary analysis within each cluster will be guided by the objective(s) (1 or 2 or both) to be achieved by TIS+. Analysis on other objectives may be deemed secondary – for instance in Table 2, sub-themes for objective 1 cross-cut with those of objective 2. This implies that objective 1 clusters will primarily be evaluated for objective 1 then analysis on objective 2 will be conducted but results interpreted as secondary.

Table 1: TIS+ objectives by cluster

Cluster	Objective (s)
1	1
2	1 & 2
3	1
4	2
5	1 & 2

Table 2: Summary of analysis subthemes per TIS+ objective

Objective	Subthemes
1	1.1 Service delivery
	1.2 Community government relationship
	1.3 Stakeholder's partnerships
	1.4 Confidence in government
2	2.1 Community government relationship
	2.2 Stakeholder's partnerships
3	3.1 Peace building
	3.2 Socio-cultural activities
	3.3 Unity and nationalism
4	4.1 Gender inclusion

The goal for TIS+ project is to increase stability in the clusters of implementation. And for stability to be achieved, two preconditions should be satisfied: (i) Increased good governance and (ii) increased community cohesion. This subsection, therefore, explains the development of index scores³¹ to measure good governance, community cohesion and stability.

For baseline assessment, the team examined responses for all survey questions related to objectives 1 – 4 above (for all clusters). See **Attachment 2, Annex A** for *Cluster and Objective Charts (Baseline Phases I and II)* charts detailing data per the TIS+ objectives.

Models Used

To calculate index scores for good governance, community cohesion and stability, two models have been formulated under each. Model 1 is primary and is validated through sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis process involves the formulation of model 2 to check how estimated summary statistics and distributions would vary under a different scenario. The survey question numbers used are indicated in the **Table 7**, HH Survey Themes Linked to Survey Questions.

Good Governance Index

Model 1:

- ✓ Household survey questions have been grouped into the four subthemes explaining good governance (confidence in government, service delivery, community-government relationship, and stakeholders' partnerships).
- ✓ Each of the four subthemes is assumed to contribute equally to the overall good governance index score (each contributes 25.00%).

Model 2:

- ✓ All the survey questions in the four subthemes are assumed to contribute equally to the overall good governance index score. There are 18 survey questions across the four subthemes and each contributes $(100\% \div 18) = 5.56\%$ (regardless of the subtheme).

Community Cohesion Index

Model 1:

- ✓ Household survey questions have been grouped into the three subthemes explaining community cohesion (peace building, socio-cultural activities, and national unity).
- ✓ Each of the three subthemes is assumed to contribute equally to the overall good governance index score (each contributes 33.33%).

Model 2:

- ✓ All the survey questions in the three subthemes are assumed to contribute equally to the overall community cohesion index score. There are 14 survey questions across the three subthemes and each contributes $(100\% \div 14) = 7.14\%$ (regardless of the subtheme).

Stability Index Score

In the TIS+ assessment, stability is measured using all the subthemes in good governance and community cohesion. Gender inclusion survey questions have been included in calculation of the stability index score. See **appendix 3** for specific development and contribution of each survey question to the overall index scores. Models 1 and 2 for the stability index are based on the eight defined characteristics below that define stability:

- I. Confidence in government

³¹ Index score is a single measure derived from a set of variables

2. Access to basic services (including security)
3. Community-government partnership in management of shared assets and participation in consensus processes
4. Stakeholders partnerships
5. Peace building
6. Frequency of socio-cultural activities
7. National unity
8. Gender inclusion

Model 1:

- ✓ Household survey questions have been grouped into the eight characteristics explaining stability.
- ✓ Each of the eight characteristics is assumed to contribute equally to the overall stability index score (each contributes 12.50%).


Model 2:

- ✓ All the survey questions in the eight characteristics are assumed to contribute equally to the overall stability index score. There are 36 survey questions across the eight characteristics and each contributes $(100\% \div 36) = 2.78\%$ (regardless of the characteristic).

Sensitivity analysis

This involves comparing the distribution of derived scores under models 1 and 2³². All the primary models (model 1) for good governance, community cohesion and stability seem plausible as the distribution and mean of index scores are relatively stable under model 2 (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: Index Validation Models



³² This sensitivity analysis process used a subset of the household survey dataset

Application and interpretation of index scores

Using model I, the calculated index scores for good governance, community and stability are 44%, 57% and 51% respectively (**Table 3**). This implies that the level of good governance is below average and community cohesion is slightly above average. These two result in a borderline stability – which may need further strengthening.

Table 3: Computed Scores







Index	Score	Key		
Good governance	 44%		> 67%	Acceptable
Community cohesion	 57%		50 - 67 %	Average
Stability	 51%		<50%	Below Average

Illustration of Index Calculations (Using Good Governance Index)

The table in Appendix I has the following columns: theme weight, sub – theme weight, question weight, sub question weight, unweighted response value, response, question, weighted score for (sub) question, weighted theme score. Each of these is explained below using examples:

- Theme weight: Here we give an example of good governance which had four themes and these were – service delivery, community government relationship, stakeholder partnerships and confidence in government. As a result, under model I, each of these was assumed to contribute equal weight of $100\%/4 = 25\%$.
- Sub – theme weight: Each theme was further sub – divided into subthemes. For example – community government relationship as a theme under good governance was further sub-divided into participation at decision making level and consultation in decision making level. Each of these two was assumed to contribute a weight of $25\%/2 = 12.5\%$ each.
- Question weight: Main survey questions were then grouped by the subthemes. Therefore, the contribution of each survey question was determined by dividing the sub– theme weight by the number of questions under each. For example, the sub–theme participation at decision making level had three survey questions. Each of the three questions was then assumed to contribute $12.5\%/3 = 4.17\%$.
- Sub question weight: As some of the survey questions had nested/sub questions, then weights assigned to each survey question was further subdivided by the number of sub–questions. For example, the question '(I) Which of the following facilities and services, if any, do you have within 2 km of your house?' had 12 sub–questions and therefore each sub-question was to contribute $6.25\%/12 = 0.52\%$.
- Unweighted response value: these were the specific weights assigned to responses. For instance, there were “Yes/No” responses to the service/facility availability question in (iv) above. If an answer was ‘Yes’ to any of the sub–questions then was assigned a weight of 100%, otherwise if “No” or “DNK” then was assigned a weight of 0%. Otherwise for a Likert scale, weights were assigned based on the strength of the response. Here we give two examples using Likert scales of different ranges.

Example I: To a question like: ‘4. To what extent are you satisfied with the following services provided in your settlement? Please rate on a scale from 1 – 10, with 1 being “least satisfied” and 10 being “most satisfied”.’ the responses were assigned weights as below:

Response	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Weight	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	100%

Example 2: To a question like ‘6. How effectively were these services maintained during the past year? (School)’ the responses were assigned weights as below:

Response	Weight
Very effectively	100%
Somewhat effectively	67%
Somewhat ineffectively	33%
Very ineffectively	0%

- vi) Response: Denoted the specific position of the response selected (as was programmed in excel formulas). In the table we have used 1 to denote the selected response.
- vii) Question: Denoted the specific questions used in index calculations.
- viii) Weighted score for (sub) question: this was derived by multiplying the following: question weight (or sub question weight depending on if a survey question had sub – questions), unweighted response value and response.
- ix) Weighted theme score – is the summation of all the weighted scores for (sub) questions under each theme.

Table 4: Household Survey Themes and Questions Linked to Index Calculations

<i>HH Survey (Baseline and End line)</i>		
Themes	Sub Themes	Survey Questions
1: Good Governance		
1.1: Service Delivery	1.1.1: Assets and Infrastructure	1
	1.1.2: Access (Equality and equity)	
	1.1.3: Satisfaction	4
	1.1.4: Quality	6
	1.1.5: General Security (Access)	7, 8
1.2: Community-Government relationship	1.2.1: Participation at decision-making level	2, 3, 9
	1.2.2: Consultation in decision making	10
	1.2.3: Communication Mechanisms	
	1.2.4: Management and Ownership (shared assets)	
1.3: Stakeholders' partnerships	1.3.1: Collaboration amongst community, government, private sector and development partners	16, 18
	1.3.2: Consensus Building (Designing the social development interventions)	19, 20
	1.3.3: Oversight Committees	
1.4: Confidence in government	1.4.1: Public Trust (in government)	21
	1.4.2: Transparency	22
	1.4.3: Accountability	23
	1.4.4: Legitimacy (representation)	24
	1.4.5: Confidence in Somali officials (President, Mayor, MPs, etc.)	
	1.4.6: Governance Strengthening	26
2: Community Cohesion		
2.1: Peace building	2.1.1: Conflict Management	27
	2.1.2: Conflict Resolution	28

	2.1.3: Community Interaction	34
	2.1.4: Security Improvement (reduced violent extremism)	35, 36
2.2: Socio-cultural activities	2.2.1: Cultural Events (drama, poems, arts, crafts)	37
	2.2.2: Sports Events	38
	2.2.3: Social Integration	39, 40
2.3: Unity and Nationalism	2.3.1: Identity (clan, federal, member state levels)	41
	2.3.2: Community Involvement	42, 43
	2.3.3: Attitudes and Behaviors (towards other citizens)	44
	2.3.4: Clan vs. National Identity	45
3: Inclusion		
3.1: Women's Participation	3.1: Status of Women's Participation	46, 47, 50, 51
	3.2: Women's Participation (Governance and Peacebuilding)	

Appendix I: Good Governance Index³³

I.1 Service Delivery

Theme weight	Subtheme weight	question weight	Sub-question weight	Unweighted response value	Response	Question	Weighted score for (sub) question	Weighted theme score
								25%
25.00%	Access to services							
	6.25%					(I) Which of the following facilities and services, if any, do you have within 2 km of your house?		
		0.52%				Health clinic	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Police post	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Primary school	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Secondary school	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Government or local administration office	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Local court	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Market	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Access to drinking water	0.52%	

³³ The calculations here do not include all the questions used for the good governance index. However, these have been used to illustrate the calculation.

Theme weight	Subtheme weight	question weight	Sub-question weight	Unweighted response value	Response	Question	Weighted score for (sub) question	Weighted theme score
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Access to water point	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Settlement center	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Sports Hall	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
		0.52%				Bank/financial institution	0.52%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
	Satisfaction							
	6.25%					4. To what extent are you satisfied with the following services provided in your settlement? Please rate on a scale from 1 – 10, with 1 being “least satisfied” and 10 being “most satisfied”.		
		0.63%				Health services	0.63%	
				0%		1		
				10%		2		
				20%		3		
				30%		4		
				40%		5		
				50%		6		
				60%		7		
				70%		8		
				80%		9		

Theme weight	Subtheme weight	question weight	Sub-question weight	Unweighted response value	Response	Question	Weighted score for (sub) question	Weighted theme score
				100%	1	10		
	Quality of services							
	6.25%					6. How effectively were these services maintained during the past year?		
		1.04%				School	1.04%	
				100%	1	Very effectively		
				67%		Somewhat effectively		
				33%		Somewhat ineffectively		
				0%		Very ineffectively		

I.2 Community – Government Relationship

Theme weight	Subtheme weight	question weight	Sub-question weight	Unweighted response value	Response	Question	Weighted score for (sub) question	Weighted theme score
25%	Participation at decision-making level							25%
	12.50%	4.17%				2. Who has access to community planning events?		
			0.38%			Myself	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			Women	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			Men	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			Young people – male	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			Young people - female	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			Clan elders	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			Religious leaders	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			District officials	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			State officials	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		

Theme weight	Subtheme weight	question weight	Sub-question weight	Unweighted response value	Response	Question	Weighted score for (sub) question	Weighted theme score
			0.38%			<i>Federal government officials</i>	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		
			0.38%			<i>NGOs/CBOs</i>	0.38%	
				100%	I	Yes		
				0%		No		

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Annex VI: Conflict of Interest Disclosures

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Sarah Cohen Wood
Title	Team Leader
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	TIS Plus
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	Sarah Cohen Wood
Date	November 23, 2016

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	ANNA PATERSON
Title	DC
Organization	INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	CONTRIBUTION ANALYST TIS+
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	TIS+ (SOMALIA PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES)
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</p> <p><i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	11/4/17

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	OTIENO MICHAEL OLOO
Title	Qualitative Specialist
Organization	International Business and Technical Consultants Inc (IBTCI)
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	AID-623-TO-16-00015
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Somalia Program Support Services; USAID Transition Initiatives for Stabilization Plus (TIS+)
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</p> <p><i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	9/11/2016

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Lucas Malla
Title	Quantitative specialist
Organization	IBTCL
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	TIS+ baseline
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	TIS+ baseline
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</p> <p><i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	21/08/2017

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Jama Abdillahi Egal
Title	Subject Matter Specialist
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	#16-201
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	SPSS programTIS+ Baseline/Endland Evaluation
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or previous employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular project and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	<p>I have been involved in TALO INITIATIVES bid proposal writing related to an activity by AECOM (Gedo Region Peace Mapping, at Dolow district) which was part of TIS+ project, in Nov 2016. The project was 3 days long facilitation of Peace Mapping exercise for around 30 participants. TALO is a firm that I have been associated as a member of its board at the time of the application. However, the proposal was not processed by TIS+ due to the severe drought that had befallen on the region and no final decision has been made until now by AECOM. I have informed IBTCI about the potential COI and IBTCI had contacted USAID and a firewall has been created. Until now, we are not sure whether TALO will win the project.</p> <p>Furthermore, I have already detached myself from that activity and I will not be involved to avoid COI since I am involved in the baseline/endline evaluation of TIS+ activities in Somalia, including Gedo region.</p>

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	11.08.2017

Annex VII: Evaluation Team Member CVs

SARAH COHEN WOOD

Nationality: USA

Affiliation: IBTCI

Position Title: Evaluation Team Leader – Transition Initiative for Stabilization Plus

Education:

M.A., International Comparative Development, University of Oregon 2003

B.A., Applied Social Anthropology, Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina 1992

Relevant Experience:

Ms. Wood is an evaluator and international development manager with over 15 years of experience in monitoring and evaluation, governance systems, conflict prevention and mitigation, participatory public planning processes, anticorruption, institutional strengthening, alternative dispute resolution, and gender and social inclusion analysis. She has more than 15 years of direct overseas experience in conflict-affected countries and has provided technical and institutional support for host country governments, civil society organizations (CSOs) and donors, and multilaterals.

She is experienced in conflict-sensitive project design and planning; emphasizing the use of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) principles in the planning and design process, as well as during program implementation and impact evaluation. Ms. Wood has over a decade of experience as a conflict-sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) trainer and she designed the first conflict-sensitive M&E course for United States Agency for International Development (USAID) field staff and partners, held in West Africa. She is a Master Trainer, qualified in Do No Harm (DNH) Training as well as Reflecting on Practices (RPP) for Peace.

Ms. Wood has worked for USAID in the Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) Bureau as well as for the Office for Private and Voluntary Cooperation (DCHA/PVC) as a Capacity Building Specialist for a global NGO Sector Strengthening Program. This grants program was active in 17 post-conflict countries in Latin America, Africa and South Asia working at the national and sub national level to strengthen civil society laws, frameworks and policies in post conflict and transition environments. Ms. Wood served as the USAID liaison for the State Department's Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (State/CRS). She worked on the Fragile States Strategy and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ISAF), with the Director of the Office of Conflict and Mitigation (CMM) and with the Deputy Administrator for DCHA to provide technical guidance on the Interagency Management System (IMS) for USAID and the State Department. Ms. Wood served as a Conflict Specialist for USAID's Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management (USAID/CMM) as well as a Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Specialist and Strategic Learning Coordinator for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA). She has worked in Africa including DRC, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. She has experience in fragile states such as Timor-Leste, Yemen, and Nepal.

Professional Experience:

April 2016 – June 2016, Conflict Specialist and Lead Researcher; Changing Nature of Conflict Study: Conflict Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (1995-2016); USAID/ Africa Bureau, Office of Sustainable Development) - Conducted research and analysis for USAID/AFR/SD on conflict trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1995-2016. Literature review and global conflict data set analysis. Presentation and paper presented in Washington, DC. July 2016.

March 2016 – August 2016, Team Leader, Mid Term Evaluation of Decentralization and Access to Justice Project (Ba Distrito), Timor-Leste, U.S. Agency for International Development – In September 2013, USAID awarded a four-year project called Ba Distrito (*"To the Districts"* in Tetun) Program to Counterpart International. The goal of the activity is to increase institutional and human capacity at local

levels to deliver basic services effectively and in a manner that is responsive to citizen needs and expectations. The activity is being implemented in 100 sucos in four municipalities. Below are five components of the activity: (1) Local Governance Strengthening, (2) Decentralization and Input of Local Institutions, (3) Legal Aid Organization Sustainability, (4) District Court Functionality, and (5) Local Elections Support. Tasks as Team Leader included evaluation and tool design and management of a household mid-line survey for three remote districts and a baseline survey for two districts added to the project in 2016. The survey results will be incorporated into the mid-term evaluation and a baseline survey constructed for the two districts added to the project.

December 2015 – April 2016, Team Leader Evaluation of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Small Grants Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) U.S. State Department – Designed and managed a regional evaluation of WPS small grants programs implemented in SSA between 2011 and 2015 implemented by these two office in the U.S. State Department. Designed all tools and methods and managed field based data collection in locations in West, East Africa and Central Africa. Provided recommendations for future WPS program efforts as well as detailed analysis of gaps in UNSCR NAP implementation in this region relevant to this program and the U.S. State Department and U.S. NAP.

October 2014 - December 2015, Senior Social Cohesion and Protection Advisor, Ministry of Social Solidarity, Government of Timor-Leste and UNDP/ Timor-Leste– Senior Social Cohesion and Protection Advisor responsible for technical advisement and strategic planning support to the Minister of Social Solidarity and the National Directorate for Assistance and Social Cohesion. Provided policy and technical support for mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in national level social assistance and protection programs. Provided technical support for social protection policy development, human security and risk analysis, state budget planning, and annual and periodic operations planning for the Ministry. Technical advisement to UNDP on social cohesion and protection programming in compliance with New Deal planning and government policy.

October 2015 to present, Technical Team Leader, Women, Peace and Security Small Grants Evaluation, Africa Region, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs and Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues– Team Leader for performance evaluation for the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) and the Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/GWI) small grants projects awarded under Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) initiatives. The evaluation seeks to advance learning and accountability around implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS and associated efforts in the Africa Region. The evaluation's evidence-based findings, conclusions, and recommendations will be used for two main purposes: (1) to assist AF, S/GWI, and their implementing partners to assess impact, identify programming gaps, and formalize lessons learned from the WPS grants in the Africa Region; and (2) inform the Department's future funding of small grants for WPS initiatives. Contracted by Dexis Consulting Group on behalf of the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.

June 2015 to October 2015, Team Leader, Security Sector Reform Evaluation, Sustaining Police, Supporting Peace (SPSP) 1207 Project, USAID and the U.S. Embassy, Timor-Leste Team Leader for a performance evaluation of a USG Security Sector Reform (SSR) Program in Timor-Leste. The "Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace" program, started in 2011-2015 and is a "whole of government" (1207 funded) suite of nine projects totaling \$11.32 million designed to support the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) and to help guard against potential violence and instability as the United Nations policing monitoring presence declined in 2012. This evaluation will be used by the USG to inform the direction of continuing projects under the program, as well as the design of any future support in the conflict prevention, policing and civil society sectors in Timor-Leste. More broadly, the evaluation will be shared with other donors and other USAID and State Department offices to provide valuable research to inform the development of ongoing and future conflict and violence prevention efforts by both USAID and the Department of State in other countries. Contracted by Social Impact, Inc. on behalf of the USAID, Timor-Leste.

November 2014 – April 2015, Team Leader, Burma Evaluation for the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (State/CSO), International Consultant, Social Impact – Team Leader for an Evaluation of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (State/ CSO) engagement in Burma from 2012-2014. Specific technical focus on strategy planning, policy formulation and USG work on peace process issues, victim assistance, reconciliation, inter-communal violence and humanitarian mine action initiatives in Kayah and Rakhine State. Contracted with Social Impact, Arlington, VA on behalf of the U.S. Department of State.

April 2014 – October 2014, Senior Gender Equality Policy Advisor, Cabinet for the Secretary of State, Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality, Government of Timor-Leste– Office of the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality (SEPI), Timor-Leste is the Government's main body responsible for the design, execution, coordination and assessment of policies as defined by the Council of Ministers, for the promotion of gender equality. Reporting to the Secretary of State, the Advisor provides advice and technical support to ensure engendered policies, strategies, legislation, plans, programs and budgets in line with the principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. Assist with monitoring and advisement on the National Action Plan on Gender Based Violence. Provide technical and policy support for Timor-Leste candidate for Judge for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

May 2013 – January 2014, UNDP, Crisis Prevention and Response Unit Senior Conflict Prevention Advisor for Ministry of Social Solidarity, Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion (MSS/DPBSC) Dili, Timor-Lest - Senior Conflict Prevention Advisor responsible for technical advisement and strategic planning support to the Directorate and Chief of the Department of Peace-Building and Social Cohesion in the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS/DPBSC) for the Government of Timor-Leste. Conducted a Peace and Development Analysis (PDA) for Timor-Leste working on social protection planning issues in Timor-Leste. Interviewed high level government officials, international donors, and multilateral organization leadership and provided briefings and reporting to high level national and international officials as well as host country civil society partners. Supported, mentored and managed national and international staff. Provided training and summaries for civil society and for host country government officials.

February 2013 –May 2013. Pact Worldwide, USAID/Nepal Sajhedari Bikaas Project, Community Driven Development (CDD) Specialist and Master Trainer, Kathmandu and Nepalgunj, Nepal – Supported start up and implementation planning for the USAID/Nepal funded Sajhedari Bikaas project (\$27M), with the goal that targeted communities are empowered to direct their own development. This community driven development (CDD) project promotes three key principles, 1) inclusion in local governance and planning for marginalized groups; 2) gender and social inclusion; and, 3) public accountability. This consultancy consisted of two major deliverables: 1) a master training of trainers (MTToT) course and materials on public planning and participation in Nepal for staff and local NGOs, and 2) a MTToT course and materials on community contracting (CC) and management in post conflict settings. Both deliverables incorporated an analysis and integration of current Government of Nepal (GON) policies, strategies and development frameworks relating to gender equality and social inclusion (GESI), decentralization and public planning.

March 2008 – February 2013, Civil Society, Conflict and Governance Specialist; Democracy and Governance (DG) Sector; Technical Practice Lead Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Management (CPMM) Initiative, Tetra Tech ARD; Burlington, Vermont. – Provide strategic planning and technical assistance on civil society, governance and conflict mitigation for a wide array of Tetra Tech ARD's technical contracts in countries around the world and on direct technical assignments with USAID operating units and within the US government (USG). Served as team lead for Tetra Tech ARD's Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Management Special Initiative (CPMM). Specialized in institutional

strengthening and capacity building interventions in conflict-affected states, conflict mitigation program design for local governance programs, assessments and conflict sensitive monitoring and evaluation of development programming. Helped to form a HICD Community of Practice within the DG Sector at Tetra Tech ARD and is considered a specialist in HICD methods and practices.

Selected Field Assignments (USG, Academic Institutions, NGO, Private Sector and other donors):

- **Senior Technical Advisor and Manager for the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives Office (USAID/OTI) Support that Augments Rapid Transitions (START)** Indefinite Quality Contract (IQC). In partnership with Development Transformations and Caerus Associates. October 2012 – February 2013.
- **Senior Technical Advisor and Manager for the USAID/DCHA/ Office of Conflict, Mitigation and Management (USAID/CMM) Alerts List 2013; a Global Ranking of Fragility and Instability.** In partnership with the University of Maryland's Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). Provided technical support and guidance on technical briefs relating to conflict trends and analysis and provided support for CIDCM researchers and staff. August 2012 – February 2013.
- **Senior Technical Advisor and Manager for the USAID/DCHA/CMM Instability, Crisis, Recovery Program (ICRP) IQC.** Provided technical guidance on conflict prevention and mitigation programs for the USG. Also provided technical leadership in conflict analysis and assessment in governance and civil society programs, with an emphasis on gender and social inclusion. March 2011 – February 2013
- **Chief of Party of a USAID funded Project in Nepal, Nepal Government Citizen Partnership Project (NGCPP), Kathmandu, Nepal and Biratnagar, Terai Region.** Project was in collaboration with the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), USAID, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the State Department. Managed the closeout of a \$4.9 million conflict mitigation program, managed 16 program staff, three international partners, nine local NGO partners and provided technical guidance and support to CSOs and Government of Nepal (GON) officials. Specific tasks included support for project monitoring and evaluation, technical guidance on alternative dispute resolution and gender and social inclusion analysis and programming. Responsible for reports and presentations for USAID and GON officials, liaison and technical training for GON staff, as well as conflict analysis training and local-level assessments.

September 2003 – March 2008, USAID Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance. Washington, D.C.

Served as Conflict Sensitive M&E Trainer for local and international NGOs, Government Officials, USAID and the UN staff working in conflict-affected and fragile states. Designed curriculum and training programs, including manuals, training modules and Master Training of Trainers (MToT) programs. June 2008, October 2010, December 2010 - January 2011; location Sri Lanka, Indonesia (Papua, Central Sulawesi and Banda Aceh) and Nepal.

USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/ OFDA). Provided technical assistance for disaster risk reduction programs and planning. Worked with OFDA to support the development of Transition Planning in disaster response interventions and provided analytical services for strategic planning in complex humanitarian emergencies. March 2007 – March 2008. (Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Specialist and Strategic Planning and Learning Coordinator)

State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Provided technical assistance for civilian and military coordination for development programs. Worked directly with the Deputy Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA/DA) as the USAID representative for inter-agency planning. March 2006 – March 2007.

USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID/CMM). Provided technical assistance for the design of conflict programs for USAID missions. Designed and implemented conflict-sensitive monitoring, evaluation, and analysis. December 2005–March 2006. (Senior Conflict Analyst)

USAID Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation—Program, Design, and Management Division (DCHA/PVC-ASHA). Program manager for \$20 million dollar portfolio of development projects focusing on organizational development and institutional strengthening of local NGO, CSOs, and associations in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Responsible for fiscal management, technical guidance, evaluation, and management and impact analysis. Designed and implemented the first Conflict Sensitive M&E Training for USAID and local partners in Africa. Areas of specialization included development management, organizational assessment, including strategic planning, project design, resource development, process facilitation, training, and performance monitoring and evaluation. September 2003–December 2005

USAID/ Yemen Mission. Operational Plan Support and Conflict and Security Analysis, USAID/Yemen Mission and Embassy, Yemen. August - December 2006 (Conflict Strategy Specialist)

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Field Officer. USAID/ Sudan. Field Officer for USAID/OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team in El Fasher, and Nyala, Sudan. Primary interface with UN agencies, international agencies, African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the African Union, local government officials, Sudan technical ministries, and international and national NGOs. Responsible for program management, monitoring, and assessment for relief and humanitarian assistance projects, and return and relocation issues. January – March 2005, April–July 2005, September 2005 – December 2005

Global Development Alliance Secretariat (USAID/GDA). Analyzed due diligence for corporate compliance. February–May 2004. Liaison between USAID/DCHA-PVC and the Global Development Alliance Secretariat. May 2004 – December 2005. (Public Private Alliance Analyst)

NAME: Anna Patterson

Nationality: British

Affiliation: IBTCI

Position Title: TIS+ Contribution Analyst

Education:

Ph.D., Political Science, University College, London

2010

M.A, Political Science, University College, London

2000

Relevant Experience:

Dr. Anna Patterson is an experienced evaluator and methodologist with over ten years of experience in monitoring and evaluation, program design, data collection and research. She has experience applying a wide range of evaluation methods, including contribution analysis, case study methodology, randomized control trials, and process evaluations. Currently, she is one of the evaluators for the five year, multi- phase evaluation of the DFID Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme (HIEP), which uses a case study approach and draws heavily on contribution analysis. She led the research and development of the Research for Health in Humanitarian Crises Programme case study. From 2013 – 2014, Dr. Patterson served as Deputy Team Leader on the Norad Training for Peace (TfP) Programme evaluation, which included fieldwork in Somalia. She developed the methods, design and analysis for the impact evaluation component using contribution analysis to address causality when experimental methods proved not feasible. Dr. Patterson has a strong background in designing and reviewing M&E systems for flexible and adaptive programming, and she has significant experience reviewing and evaluating theories of change, logframes, indicators, and M&E systems. She recently served as the M&E Advisor on a learning and evidence programme in Nigeria that is part of the Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL) on public service reform, where her work included developing indicators, data sources and a baseline for the impact level of the PERL Results Framework. She served as the M&E expert designing programs for DFID South Africa and DFID Nigeria, and she served as the Evaluation Advisor for DFID Nigeria, designing and monitoring their new evaluation strategy, advising on evaluation tools, and providing a quality assurance role across all DFID Nigeria evaluations. Dr. Patterson has a strong background in social research methods and field-based data collection in conflict-affected states, including Somalia. She served as the Qualitative Research Lead on a feasibility study for a potential RCT impact evaluation of a community peacebuilding programme in Somalia and assisted with designing alternative options for evaluating impact when an RCT proved unfeasible for security reasons. Dr. Patterson has a Ph.D. in political science.

Professional Experience:

April 2016 to date, M&E Advisor, DFID Nigeria, Learning Evidence and Adaptation Programme (LEAP) – M&E adviser providing support to LEAP, part of the Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL) for public service reform in Nigeria. This programme aims to generate evidence and learning to support the adaptive, flexible and politically smart approach of the PERL programmes. Current work includes developing indicators and tools for impact level monitoring.

2013 - 2018, Research into Use Evaluator, DFID - Three phase evaluation of the DFID Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme (HIEP) to build evidence and data for humanitarian interventions. Led on the case study of the R2HC Research for Health in Humanitarian Crises Programme (Save the Children).

October – November 2016; May – June 2016, Consultant, DFID Rwanda - Annual Review of the Rwanda Investment Climate Support Programme Phase 3 (RICPR3). Annual Review of the Rwanda Genocide Research and Reconciliation Programme DFID Rwanda

January – June 2016, Value for Money Specialist, DFID Somalia - Lead on Value for Money in the Mid Term evaluation of the DFID support to the Somalia Stability Programme (SSF)

September – December 2016, M&E/ Value for Money Specialist, UN, Somalia - M&E and Value for Money lead in the Mid Term Review for the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG) in Somalia. Reviewed M&E system including Theory of Change and logframe and advised on required improvements.

June – August 2015, Consultant, Danida - Assignment for Danida to develop a full Theory of Change, revise the logframe and strengthen the M&E system for the Uganda Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), a large multi-donor facility working on democracy, accountability and Human Rights.

May 2015 – February 2016, M&E Expert, DFID South Africa - M&E expert on the design team researching the political economy context for, and designing the business case for a potential new Southern Africa Regional Trade Integration Programme.

September 2014 – April 2015, External Reviewer, International Development Research Centre (IDRC) - External Reviewer in a review of the IDRC Governance, Security and Justice Research Programme, a broad programme for development research working mainly with Southern partners in the Middle East and North Africa, East, West and Southern Africa, Asia and Latin America.

December 2014 – March 2015, Team Leader, Danida, Uganda - Annual Review of the Uganda Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), a large multi-donor facility working on democracy, accountability and Human Rights. Review included an assessment of the appropriateness of the facility's M&E system.

November 2014 – January 2015 Learning and Results Specialist, DFID Nigeria, Public Sector Reform and Accountability Programme Design - Lead on M&E in designing the next generation of DFID Nigeria's public sector reform programming.

June – September 2014, Nigerian Federal Public Administration Reform Programme (FEPAR), DFID Nigeria - Worked for the Nigerian Bureau of Public Service Reform (BPSR) on two RBM and results-based planning assignments. Led on the process of the Nigerian National Strategy for Public Service Reform (NSPSR) into an implementation plan; and led on the initial M&E Action Plan for the NSPSR.

March – April 2014, Team Leader, DFID Nigeria, Nigerian Federal Public Administration Reform Programme (FEPAR) - Team lead on a review of the evidence base supporting Public Sector Reform interventions, to support evidence based planning for the Nigerian Federal Public Administration Reform Programme (FEPAR).

April 2013 – June 2014, Deputy Team Leader, Norad – Deputy Team Leader and lead methodologist for the evaluation of the Training for Peace (TfP) Programme to build capacity for improved and self-sustaining African civilian and police capacity for peace support operations. Chr. Michelsen Institute. Field work in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Somalia. This evaluation drew on a large number of structured interviews with trained and untrained police and used Contribution Analysis.

December 2013–April 2014, Lead Researcher, International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
- Lead Researcher on the Tajikistan side of a research project on conflict, trust and trade along the Afghan Tajik border.

November 2013 – February 2014, Qualitative Research Lead, DFID Somalia, Somalia Impact Evaluation Feasibility Study - Feasibility study and designing options for a potential Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) Impact Evaluation of a community peacebuilding programme in Somalia. I was the qualitative research lead alongside internationally renowned Principal Investigator, Philip Verwimp. The RCT proved unfeasible for security reasons.

July 2013 – October 2013, Governance and SECR evaluator, Itad - Evaluation of Ten Years of Human Rights and International Justice (HRIJ) Grantmaking in Nigeria for MacArthur Foundation. Developed retrospective theories of change for HRIJ projects and collected data using key informant interviews, focus groups and other qualitative methods.

January 2013- July 2013, Principle Consultant, Fragile and Conflict Affected States, ITAD - Position advising on, and building up, Itad's portfolio of work in Fragile and Conflict-affected states, and on principles for M&E in FCAS. Lectured on M&E in conflict-affected states to MA students at the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) in York University.

November 2011- December 2012 Evaluation Adviser, DFID Nigeria - Led in drafting and monitoring DFID Nigeria's Evaluation Strategy to implement and manage DFID's new approach to evaluation and advised on appropriate use of evaluation tools across the DFID Nigeria portfolio. Led on drafting terms of reference for new evaluations and participated in their commissioning processes and management. Quality assurance role across all DFIDN evaluations. Collaborated with DFID RED to commission a jointly-funded research programme on urbanisation in Nigeria.

November 2009 – October 2011 Research Evidence Broker, Research and Evidence Division, DFID - Key new role promoting evidence-based policy-making and programming in DFID and better processes for using findings from research and evaluation in policy and programme planning, design and management. Key outputs included: Advice on research uptake in DFID research programmes; Lead author of the DFID synthesis publication 'The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States'; Part of the team of authors of the DFID Evidence Review *Improving Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health: Burden, Determinants and Health Systems*; Member of the group working on DFID's 'Empowerment and Accountability' policy in 2010, and lead author of the evidence mapping for the policy. Produced the evidence review for the 2010 Governance 'Refresh' presented to the DPC. Support to country offices, including an Afghanistan country visit to produce a mapping of research capacity and data availability.

2009, Consultant, Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) - Consultancy to design human security indicators and data collection strategies for a pilot human security monitoring project in Afghanistan commissioned by the FCO.

2009, Consultant, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces - Afghanistan Working Group, researched and authored 'The Regional Dimensions of Afghan Security Sector Reform' in *Afghanistan's Security Sector Governance Challenges*.

2008, Researcher, DFID – 'Understanding Afghanistan' analytical exercise commissioned by DFID to support its Country Assistance Plan. Desk and field research and significant inputs into three of the papers produced by the exercise: the literature review, the political economy analysis, and the non- technical economic growth diagnostic report.

2007 – 2009, Contributor, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) - Designated contributor producing quarterly Country Reports on Afghanistan for the EIU with 14 reports completed. Reports deal with investment climate and political, security and economic risk for foreign direct investors.

2007, Consultant, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) - Consultancy designing, researching and drafting a study on formal microfinance and informal local credit institutions for AREU in Kabul and Herat, Afghanistan, as part of a multi-country World Bank study on mobilizing rural institutions for sustainable development.

2006, Researcher, Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS NET) - Design, research and production of a special report for FEWS NET, Labor Markets, Livelihood Strategies and Food Security in Afghanistan, including design of labour market indicators to be incorporated into early warning monitoring. The report is available at

2005-2006, Research Lead – Political Economy and Markets, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) - Field researcher on political economy of economic development and reform based in Afghanistan for two years. I designed, led the field investigations for, and produced research outputs funded by the World Bank, DFID and the EU. Working with, and mentoring, teams of Afghan staff, I conducted extensive, long-term field work in several provinces, including Herat, Balkh, Baghlan, Kunduz, Bamiyan, Nangarhar and Nimruz. Outputs include:

- Three political economy studies of different market sectors in Afghanistan and the synthesis paper ***Going to Market: Trade and Traders in Six Afghan Sectors***, described as ‘an enjoyable must-read for those interested in the Afghan economy’ on the World Bank Private Sector Development (PSD) blog;
- ***Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Privatisation and Economic Reform in Afghanistan***; and the jointly researched and authored ***Enabling or Disabling? The Operating Environment for Small and Medium Enterprises in Rural Afghanistan***.

2002-2004, Research Analyst, Foreign and Commonwealth Office - Fixed term contract as a specialist on Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, producing political research to inform policy desks and other Whitehall departments. One year as the research analyst on Ukraine, including a familiarisation visit and production of analytical pieces including on Ukrainian oligarchs and their role in the political economy of reform.

2000 – 2002, Research Analyst, World Markets Research Centre (Now IHS Globalinsight) - Research Analyst on Russia and the former Soviet Union at this business intelligence company, producing bespoke analysis of political, economic and security risk to foreign investors in the region.

Languages

English (5S; 5R), Welsh (5S; 5R), German (4S; 4R)

JAMA ABDILLAHI EGAL

Nationality: Somali

Affiliation: IBTCI

Position Title: Subject Matter Specialist

Education:

M.A., Peacebuilding & Reconciliation, Winchester University, UK (online)	Ongoing
Post-Graduate Diploma, Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Hargeisa, Somaliland	2012
M.Sc., Political Science, University of Helsinki, Finland	2005

Relevant Experience:

Jama Egal has over nine years of management and leadership experience in program design, strategic planning, monitoring, and research in the fields of peacebuilding and governance. He has wide-ranging experience working in fragile contexts and in-depth knowledge of the Somali social structure and the diverse regional contexts within Somalia. Currently, Mr. Egal is concluding his work as the Subject Matter Specialist for Somali Program Support Services (SPSS) supporting the Somali Perception Survey. He provided input into the design of the nationwide survey instrument to ensure it fit the context of each region, assisted with analysis of both the qualitative and quantitative data, and contributed to the final report. Mr. Egal also has monitoring and evaluation experience. He served as the Subject Matter Specialist for SPSS for the SSG baseline and the TIS final program evaluation. He is very familiar with the model of community-based grants used by TIS+ from his work as the Subject Matter Specialist for the TIS final program evaluation. As the Program Manager for Finn Church Aid (FCA), his responsibilities included conducting conflict analyses, facilitating reconciliation between traditional leaders, supporting the start-up of European Union (EU)-funded District Formation Projects, contributing to a study on “Radicalization and Al Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia,” and producing an inclusivity analysis of the Interim Galmudug Administration analyzing demographic, socio-economic and political dynamics. He oversaw community-based projects and conducted community consultations on their priorities for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. As a Project Advisor for the Danish Refugee Council, he carried out a mid-term evaluation of the Somali Religious and Traditional Leaders Peace Initiative. As the Program Manager for the Peace Initiative Project, he monitored and verified activities carried out by implementing partners and produced two comprehensive conflict assessments covering all regions of Somaliland and Puntland. He has worked closely with all levels of government in the different regions of Somalia on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, including contributing the peacebuilding component to the Somaliland National Development (NDP) plan with the Minister of National Planning. He is a native Somali speaker.

Professional Experience:

May 2016 – January 2017, Subject Matter Specialist, SPSS, IBTCI – Subject Matter Specialist for the Strengthening Somali Governance (SSG) baseline assessment. Contributed to design of Somali Perception Survey by drafting questions and contextualizing the survey instrument to fit different regions of Somalia. Participated in the analysis and interpretation of the quantitative survey data collected and presented preliminary findings to USAID. Contributed to sections of the draft final report, providing greater background and context for recommendations.

February 2016 – April 2016, Subject Matter Specialist, SPSS, IBTCI – Subject Matter Specialist for the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) final program evaluation. Conducted KIIs with Somali government officials and TIS staff. Participated in the analysis and interpretation of the quantitative and qualitative data collected through the household survey, FGDs and KIIs. Drafted sections of the performance evaluation report. Participated in the presentation of findings to USAID.

January 2016 - Present, Senior Consultant and Team Leader, Managing SSF's support to Hiran and M. Shabelle Administration Formation Process – Key tasks: Managing Somalia Stability Fund support to Hiran and Middle Shabelle administration formation conference in Jowhar. Produced

“Risk Analysis on Supporting Hiran and Middle Shabelle State Formation Process” report for SSF prior to its engagement in the process. Managing procurement process of food, accommodation and internal transport service providers. Monitoring and overseeing contractors’ services provided to the conference. Supporting conference technical committee on the ground.

2013 - 2016, Program Manager (Part-Time), Finn Church Aid – Key tasks: Overall leadership and technical implementation of three peacebuilding projects covering Sool, Sanaag, Mudug, Galgaduud, Hiran, ISWA and JSS. Provide technical support to project manager and partners in implementation, coordination and links to local communities. Extend back-stopping support for the project manager and country manager on context analysis and links to regional and national authorities. Monitor and contribute to the implementation of key activities with large impact. Contributed to “Radicalization and Al Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia” study by FCA and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Contributed to Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers global strategy during its formation. Contributed to presentations about Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Somalia at the Dubai Conference on Global CVE Expo 2014. Participated in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG) meetings and other governance-related coordination meetings.

Sool, Sanag and Mudug: Carried out “Youth for Peace” football tournament in Sool, Sanag and Mudug.

Galmudug: 80% involved in implementation of Galmudug Administration Formation from early 2014 up to Oct 2015 (when the 5 million Somalia Stability Fund funded project ended). Developed induction training and trained Technical Committee that managed the administration formation conference. Facilitated reconciliation meetings inside Mogadishu for central regions’ clans. Supported Dhusamareb reconciliation conference. Managed (both financially and technically) logistics, constitution development, trainings and overall support of the Galmudug Administration Formation Conference in Adado. Contributed and supported Ministry of Interior and Federalism’s development of Stabilization Plan and reconciliation frameworks. Produced, Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA) “Inclusivity Analysis: A detailed study on new Galmudug demography, infrastructure, socio-economic and political dynamics.”

Contributed to newly starting EU funded District Formation project.

Bay and Bakool (later Interim Southwest Administration [ISWA]): Conflict analysis about the 3-region vs. 6-region political conflict prior to ISWA formation. Contributed to the ISWA administration formation by facilitating reconciliation between traditional leaders.

Baydhabo: Contributed to the design and proposal of newly starting DDR project with UN.

Benadir and ISWA: Contributed to newly starting EU funded Non-State Actors (NSA) project in Benadir and ISWA.

2011 - 2013, Program Manager, Peace Initiative Project (PIP), Finn Church Aid, Somaliland and Puntland – Key tasks: Overall project management (implementation, financial management and reporting). Developed project ideas and conducted proposal writing (for the following projects, see above 2013-current). Held community consultations on their priorities in peacebuilding in general and conflict resolution. Carried out stakeholder meetings and consultations on newly proposed projects. Identified and selected local partners for peace building projects. Monitored and verified activities implemented by partners. Coordinated with Somaliland and Puntland Ministries of Interior and National Planning. Liaised and closely collaborated with NGOs and UN agencies working in the Peacebuilding sector (in Somaliland and Puntland). Produced two comprehensive Conflict Assessments covering all regions of Somaliland and Puntland (identifying structural root causes and conflict resolution resources and capacities at the local levels as well as areas of intervention and methodologies). Carried out separate Central Regions Conflict

Analysis as a baseline for Central Regions Project Proposal. Completed program review with external consultant. Developed two peacebuilding project proposals for Bay and Bakool and Central Regions which were approved and funded by DFID and EU (see years 2013-current, above). Contributed and closely worked with FCA's advocacy work that supported State-Formation Technical Committee for Parliament and Presidential Elections in August 2012. Facilitated (and sometimes mediated) the successful resolution of eight community conflicts, some of them unique and historical. Facilitated the production of Sool and Sanag Regional Peacebuilding Plans (two booklets identifying more than 40 root causes of conflicts in these regions and their solutions, developed by more than 200 key community leaders). Financially supported, reviewed and contributed to Somaliland National Peace Building and Safety Policy. Personally contributed peacebuilding component to the Somaliland National Development (NDP) plan with the Minister of National Planning. Developed Peacebuilding Training of Trainers (TOT) Manual. Trained 30 Trainer of Trainers in peacebuilding and conflict resolution (mediation, negotiation and conflict analysis) who later trained 270 people (consisting of women, youth, elders, imams and local authorities).

2011, Head of Country Office, Finn Church Aid, Somaliland and Puntland – Key tasks: Registering and establishing Finn Church Aid in Somaliland and Puntland. Opened offices and recruited support staff in Somaliland and Puntland. Contributed to the strategic and annual country plans for years 2011-2015. Coordinating and liaised with top-level officials in Somaliland and Puntland. Carried out mapping and identification of potential partners for FCA projects. Developed several peacebuilding project ideas and proposals.

2008 - 2010, Project Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, Somali Religious and Traditional Leaders Peace Initiative - Key tasks: Project implementation support (assessments, conflict analysis, trainings and facilitation of conflict resolution conference). Reviewed baseline and proposal before submission. Liaised with relevant government authorities from Interior Ministries of SL and PL to regional governor and district commissioners in all regions of SL and PL. Identifying and engaging 1st tier prominent traditional and religious leaders in Somaliland and Puntland. Designed and carried out preliminary conflict assessments in Somaliland and Puntland. Carried out Conflict Assessment in Galgaduud region. Facilitation of successful resolution of twelve major conflicts in Sool, Sanaag, Togdheer, Sanag and Mudug regions between major clans (agreements signed). Trained over 500 people including Imams, traditional leaders, youth and women. Provided capacity building for partner organizations' staff in peacebuilding. Monitored and verified activities implemented by partners. Carried out Mid-Term Evaluation assessment with external consultant. Organized Consultative and Reconciliation Conference for 100 peace advocates from Somaliland, Puntland and South Central. Contributed to and facilitated part of FCA's state-building advocacy work with Somali traditional leaders (with UN and Finnish Government). For example, the Asmara Group and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) negotiations that resulted in the Djibouti Process in 2009. Scope: 5 regions of Somaliland, 3 regions of Puntland and Galgaduud region.

2007 - 2008, Project Manager, Somali Youth Peace Contest - An annual peace contest funded by the government of Finland, implemented by Horn Organization for Peace and Democracy (Somaliland). Key tasks: Project idea development, project design, implementation and reporting including financial management. Formulated the concept and designed the proposal based on consultations with prominent poets and youth groups in Somaliland. Liaison and coordination with regional and national authorities (governors and ministry of youth and sports). Written and publicized announcement of the competition. Formed steering committee consisting of most prominent poets. Organized six visits and preliminary regional peace poem contests in regional capitals. Trained event organizers. Prepared winners' prizes. Organized final national contest. Gender sensitization and mainstreaming during the process. Compiled quarterly and final reports. Produced a booklet that compiled best poems (regional and national poems)

1999 - 2007, Teacher, Somali Language and Culture for Finnish Civil Servants, Työvaenopisto, Helsinki - Assessed the functionality monitoring mechanism, data compilation procedures within project framework and reporting requirements, and revamped proposed revamping program unit restructuring to enable effective M&E function.

2006 – 2007, Research Assistant, Somali Traditional Healing Practices, University of Helsinki - As a research assistant and also translator (Somali-Finnish/English-Somali), participated in the research design (from cultural perspective). Translated questionnaires to Somali and responses to English. Facilitated meetings and appointments for key informant interviews as well as FGDs. Recorded tapes, translated to a written form to the questionnaire forms. Organized trips to Burao, Berbera, Borama, Gabiley and to rural villages near Ethiopian border. Reviewed findings

Languages:

Somali – Native. English and Finnish – Very good. Arabic – Good.

Name: Lucas Malla

Nationality: Kenyan

Affiliation: IBTCI

Position Title: Quantitative Specialist

Education:

Doctor of Philosophy in Medical Statistics, Oxford University, UK	2017
Master of Science in Applied and Bio Statistics, Universiteit Hasselt, Belgium	2012
Bachelor of Science in Mathematics and Computer Science, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, Kenya	2009

Relevant Experience:

Mr. Lucas Malla has more than 5 years of data analysis and management for donor funded programs with a special emphasize on public health. Having worked as a consultant for several evaluations and assessments under Somalia Program Support Services (SPSS), Mr. Malla has vast experience with developing data collection tools, sampling design, data quality assurance methods, and statistical packages including SPSS, R, STATA and R. In 2016, he served as the Quantitative Researcher on the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) project, the predecessor to TIS+, so he is very familiar with the program and the data collection tools and methodologies used by SPSS. He is also proficient in several programming languages, including C, C++, Java, Perl, Microsoft SQL server and MySQL. As an experienced statistician, Mr. Malla is currently responsible for compiling, analyzing and presenting data for reporting of program progress and impact, and quality assurance, conducting data collection and baseline surveys and developing testing data collection instruments at University of Nairobi. Mr. Malla is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Medical Statistics at Oxford University, and he received his Master's degree in Applied and Bio Statistics from Universiteit Hasselt in Belgium. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics and Computer Science from Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology. Mr. Malla has excellent written and verbal communication skills in both English and Kiswahili.

Professional Experience:

May 2013 - Present, Statistician, University of Nairobi, Kenya– Planning sound data collection i.e. generating the evidence needed for decision making. Baseline surveys, both simple and complex quantitative modelling frameworks. Experienced in using a range of data management tools and statistical packages some of which include: SAS, SPSS, R, Winbugs, CAMAN, IstBayes and STATA. Statistical modelling and management of huge datasets. Programming Languages: C, C++, HTML, PHP, Java, Perl, Microsoft SQL server and MySQL. Office Tools: Microsoft office suite (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Access, Outlook, Microsoft Project). Qualitative software: MAXQDA, NVIVO and Atlas STI

December 2015 – January 2017, Statistician, IBTCI, Somalia Program Support Services (SPSS), Kenya – Statistician for the Somali Perception Survey implemented by SPSS, a nationwide perception survey of Somalia. Assisted with designing the survey tool, designing the sample frame, providing data quality control for survey results, and analyzing the data and presenting it in an effective visual format in the final report.

October 2015 – April 2016, Quantitative Researcher, IBTCI, SPSS, Kenya – Quantitative specialist for final performance evaluation of USAID-funded Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) project. Responsibilities included developing a system for categorization and coding of TIS grants, participating in the design of the survey instrument and developing a pilot test plan, designing the sample frame for both quantitative and qualitative data collection activities, overseeing data collection by subcontractor and providing quality assurance, and cleaning and analyzing the data using statistical packages, such as R, and qualitative software. Contributed to drafting sections of final evaluation report.

July 2014 – September 2014, Consultant, Movement Against Substance Abuse in Africa (MASAA), Addiction and Drug Abuse among underage in Kajiado and Murang's counties project, Kenya - Research Design: sampling design, sample size determination, and definition of primary and secondary outcomes. Contribution to data collection tool design. Data quality assurance: discrepancy and consistency checks, ensuring data are within proper ranges. Data analyses: Descriptive analyses, Quality of Health and Depressive symptoms analyses.

August 2014, Consultant, Movement Against Substance Abuse in Africa (MASAA), Alcohol and drug abuse and wellness/Kenya Airports Authority, Kenya - Study Design: sampling design, sample size determination, and definition of primary and secondary outcomes. Data management: Cleaning, validation. Statistical Analyses: Descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. Contributed to report writing.

April 2013 – September 2014, Research Officer/Statistics, KEMRI-WELLCOME TRUST, Nairobi, Kenya– Reviewing cleaning and analytical STATA do files and developing similar files in R. REDCap Maintenance, updating, version control. Redcap and R technical support for users. Hospital reporting / dashboard development support. Site specific data cleaning, security, archiving & labelling. Data quality assurance and monitoring protocols centrally. Developed statistical strategies for analyzing missing data in quality of care longitudinal studies in hospitals.

October 2014, Consultant, CADCKE/NACADA, Kenya - Investigating Root causes /Risk factors for ADA. Investigating Types of Alcohols and drug abused in Starehe Sub-county. Data management: Entry, Cleaning, validation. Standard Descriptive Analyses.

November 2014, Consultant, Movement Against Substance Abuse in Africa (MASAA), Alcohol and drug abuse and wellness/Kenya bureau of Standards, Kenya - established the prevalence of alcohol and drug abuse among Kenya Bureau of Standards employees in the eight provinces of Kenya in order to recommend an intervention strategy to the board as prelude to mitigating on DSA at the work- front. Study Design: sampling design, sample size determination, and definition of primary and secondary outcomes. Data management: Cleaning, validation. Statistical Analyses: Descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. Contributed to report writing.

February 2012 – August 2012, Statistician, University of Antwerp/Center for Health Economics Research and Modeling Infectious Disease, Belgium– Designed of questionnaires for Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL) and Body Mass Index (BMI) surveys for individuals in Flanders-Belgium. Performed Data Quality Assurance for the research center. Analyzed all the datasets for Health Related Quality of Life and BMI surveys

October 2009 – December 2009, Monitoring Officer, House of Training, Kenya– Data collection, validation, cleaning and analysis of Kenyan 2009 census monitoring data. Monitoring the coverage by census clerks hired by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Report writing and compilation.

January 2010 – August 2010, Research Assistant, Improve Life International, Kenya - Data entry, basic data manipulation. Graphical data exploratory. Verification of expected assumptions in the data before actual quantitative data modeling. Ensuring data quality from the field surveys.

Languages:

English and Kiswahili – Fluent, French – Basic

NAME: Otieno Michael Oloo

Nationality: Kenyan

Affiliation: IBTCI

Position Title: TIS+ Qualitative Specialist

Education:

M.A., Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi

2006

B.A, Political Science, University of Nairobi

2000

Relevant Experience:

Mr. Michael Oloo is an M&E specialist with over 10 years of experience in international development, focused on democracy, good governance and accountability. He has served as a team leader or team member on over five baseline and mid-term evaluations and assessments, where he has been responsible for conducting literature reviews, developing data collection tools, conducting focus group discussions and interviews, analyzing data, and report writing. He is also an experienced trainer, who has developed and led trainings for implementing partners on a wide variety of topics. Mr. Oloo is particularly experienced conducting and analyzing qualitative data and he's trained to use the NVivo qualitative analysis software. He earned his M.A. in political science and public administration from the University of Nairobi.

Professional Experience:

April 2015 to date, East Africa Governance Adviser, IMC Worldwide, Making All Voices Count – East Africa Project – Providing Evaluation and Governance leadership and final report writing of DFID funded projects implemented by Caritas, Transparency International and International Rescue Committee in Kenya.

July 2015, Trainer, MS TCDC/ Action Aid Denmark – Trainer on Social Audit and Social Accountability for Action Aid Mozambique in Maputo Mozambique. The tasks included, Development of curriculum, Training Manual, training materials and delivery of training.

April & November 2014, Trainer, MS TCDC/ Action Aid Denmark – Arusha, Tanzania training on Taxation and Economic Justice, for Action Aid Burundi. The tasks included development of curriculum, training manual, training materials and delivery of training.

April 2013, Trainer, MS TCDC/ Action Aid Denmark – Arusha, Tanzania training on Taxation and Economic Justice, for Action Aid Burundi. The tasks included development of curriculum, training manual, training materials and delivery of training.

June 2012, M&E Consultant, Transparency International, Kenya - Development of Citizen Monitoring Tool for monitoring procurement and supply of pharmaceuticals in public health facilities in Kenya.

July 2011, Evaluation Team Member, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Probation and After Care Service – Evaluation of Community Service Orders Programme. Main tasks included Programme Evaluation - Review of secondary data, develop tools of data collection, identification of respondents, data collection, and report writing.

January – February 2011, Lead Consultant, National Taxpayers Association, Baseline Survey of Government of Kenya's Economic Stimulus Programme (ESP) - Main tasks included review of secondary data, develop tools of data collection, identification of respondents, data collection, report writing.

December 2011 – Present, Governance Advisor, National Taxpayers Association, Kenya - Provide technical support on governance and project implementation on citizen demand for accountability from public service providers and managers of public resources at devolved level.

December 2011 – Present, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi - Teaching, assessing and supervising students in Political Economy, Public Administration, Comparative Politics

September 2008, Lead Consultant, World Vision, Pala Area Development Program, Kenya - Lead Consultant for Baseline Survey of World Vision's Pala Area Development Program in Kenya, an integrated child focused development program with projects in Health, Education, Sanitation, Water, HIV/AIDS, OVC, Capacity Building, and Christian Commitment.

January 2008, Consultant, World Vision, Riruta Area Development Program - Mid-term Evaluation of the World Vision Riruta Area Development Program, Kenya, an integrated child focused development program with projects in Health, Education, Sanitation, Water, Micro-Enterprise, HIV/AIDS, OVC, Capacity Building, and Christian impact.

June 2007 – November 2011, Programme Officer and & National Coordinator, National Taxpayers Association (NTA) - Coordinated research and development of Citizens Report Cards; engaged with Policy Makers for advocacy. Managed 13 members of staff at the national and Regional Offices

January 2007, Consultant, Government of Kenya – Feasibility study of the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Plan (NELSAP) for the Government of Kenya. Main tasks included literature Review, comment/review of standard data collection tools, community engagement and report writing.

August 2006, Consultant, Evaluation of Performance of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) - Main tasks included Preparatory meetings, development of data collection tools, identify key informants, hold interviews and FGDs, report writing, presentation of report to the staff and stakeholders in Nairobi.

Languages

English (5S; 5R), Kiswahili (5S; 5R)