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# CHANGING CORRUPT BEHAVIORS ASSESSMENT: ADDRESSING EVERYDAY CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE

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**DISCLAIMER**

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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## **ACRONYMS**

CIPE	Center for International Private Enterprises
CPC	Slovenia's Commission for the Prevention of Corruption
EU	European Union
GOU	Government of Ukraine
GRECO	The Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption
ICAC	Hong Kong's Independent Commission against Corruption
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRF	International Renaissance Foundation
KPK	Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau
NAPC	National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
TICPI	Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USETI	Ukrainian Standardized External Testing Initiative
USG	United States Government



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2014 Revolution of Dignity presented a critical opportunity for Ukraine to implement sweeping reforms, which would bring the country's development up to the standards of the European Union. The European Association Agreement, which Ukraine signed following the Revolution, further committed the country to undertake such reforms both in the structure of governance and the workings of the economy. While the new government of Ukraine appears committed to undertaking these reforms, systemic corruption throughout the country's public sector stands as a primary impediment to their implementation.

Corruption is undermining Ukraine's commitment to democratic governance and rule of law, ability to implement economic reform, and efforts to restore peace throughout its internationally recognized borders. The 2014 Revolution of Dignity removed a deeply corrupt government, but Ukraine's post-revolutionary state, despite its many improvements, has not succeeded in weeding out either high-level corruption or petty graft. At the same time, the population has continued to use bribes as a way of obtaining services from a weak and inefficient state, whose procedures often seem designed to extract informal payments from citizens. In many ways, tackling corruption is the most critical step needed to transform Ukraine and bring it in compliance with its Association Agreement with the European Union.

In this context, donors are examining a variety of ways it can assist Ukraine to address its widespread corruption. In general, a whole of government approach to assisting Ukraine's anti-corruption efforts would include a variety of interventions in concert with other donors, that will both assist the government's top-down efforts to weed out corruption and support bottom-up efforts to change the attitudes and behaviors of citizens with regards to corruption. As part of this effort, USAID/Ukraine requested that a team of researchers examine the potential for tackling Ukraine's systemic corruption through a bottom-up behavioral change approach. To explore this issue, the research team, Sean R. Roberts and Robert Orttung both of The George Washington University, conducted 14 focus group discussions with average citizens and over 70 interviews with experts, activists, journalists, and public officials in five cities and one rural town throughout Ukraine during April and May of 2015. This report represents the findings of this research and provides recommendations for donors going forward.

The product of this research should not be misunderstood as a comprehensive anti-corruption assessment as it does not directly examine the structural reforms needed to make Ukraine's public administration less corrupt. While the researchers recognize that Ukraine's corruption problems cannot be resolved without extensive top-down reform, the systematic and sustained arrest and conviction of corrupt officials, and the substantial overhaul of the country's public administration system, this paper's research does not explore these issues in depth or provide concrete recommendations regarding how the international community can assist the Ukrainian government in undertaking such

actions. These issues have been or are being examined in other assessments and research conducted by parties within the U.S. government, other international development actors, and local think-tanks. The present research should be viewed as a complement to this other research. It focuses on the importance of changing the attitudes and behaviors of Ukrainian citizens at the same time that the government undertakes serious structural reforms.

The research team found that while the Ukrainian government has taken actions to address its corruption problem, including holding new presidential and parliamentary elections, establishing the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, raising natural gas prices for residential users, setting up new road police forces in three pilot cities, overhauling the military, and launching a process of lustration, there is still an overwhelming popular sense that corruption is pervasive and not being sufficiently addressed. While citizens' impatience with the reform process is understandable, it is noteworthy that most citizens do not recognize their own role in both cultivating and perpetuating the corruption they want the government to eradicate. Citizens readily admit to initiating petty bribes and talk about the process as an act that makes their lives easier. They often justify their participation in such petty corruption by noting that high level officials and oligarchs are involved in graft on a much grander scale. While this justification is understandable, it does not recognize that petty corruption is as equally corrosive to the operation of governance as grand corruption. Furthermore, the extent to which citizens and lower level bureaucrats are invested in a widespread system of petty corruption makes it difficult to believe that the eradication of high-level corruption alone would result in a sustained and systematic reduction of corruption in the country.

Research found that Ukraine is trapped in a vicious circle in which insufficient state budgets lead to poor service delivery by civil servants earning salaries that are not sufficient to support their families. The bureaucrats demand bribes from citizens, leading to a lack of trust in the state and tax avoidance, which further shrinks state budgets. Accordingly, corruption pervades many areas where citizens interact with their state, including policing, education, healthcare, and public administration. In these conditions, bribes serve a number of purposes, such as compensating for insufficient public sector salaries, allowing citizens to avoid responsibility for breaking the law, overcoming bureaucratic roadblocks, and permitting some to gain socio-economic advantage, including access to public sector employment. Taken together, these bribes erode rule of law, meritocracy, and trust in governance throughout society.

A review of international experience in other post-Soviet and developing countries shows that most successful efforts to reduce corruption rely on a combination of state-led top-down and society-led bottom-up efforts. Successful anti-corruption behavioral change programs have largely been implemented through civic education and building citizen participation. They have relied on community monitoring activities spearheaded by innovative NGOs, effective business associations, and social marketing campaigns that focus on specific types of corruption and targeted audiences while also making corruption unacceptable to large parts of the population.

Given the deep-seated historical roots of Ukraine's systemic corruption and its perpetuation through habit and the structural limitations of the country's public sector, the research found that it is a difficult issue to tackle, and no single intervention is guaranteed to eradicate corrupt behaviors from the country. However, if the new government is serious about adopting difficult structural reforms and the citizenry supports these reforms by both bolstering vertical accountability and resisting their own corrupt behaviors, the potential for societal transformation certainly exists. Furthermore, such transformation is critical to Ukraine's further development and its ability to break with the legacy of Soviet governance. However, it is noteworthy that citizens with whom the research team spoke stressed that they were unlikely to change their behaviors if they did not see that the government was making serious efforts to reform its own structures and to go after corrupt officials at all levels.

## **I. BACKGROUND ON ASSESSMENT**

### **Purpose of Assessment**

Over the last year, Ukraine has been struggling to capitalize on a new president, government, and parliament in order to radically reform its political and economic systems and start the process of bringing them into compliance with a demanding European Association Agreement. This process necessitates massive structural reforms to the country's governance, including a decentralized distribution of the state's roles, responsibilities, and resources, a reform of the judicial system, public administration restructuring, and the harmonization of its electoral legislation. One of the most challenging aspects of implementing these reforms is the systemic corruption that plagues Ukraine. The country has a history of corruption bankrupting the budget, slowing the pace of reform, and rendering government ineffective. Additionally, this corruption has eroded the citizenry's trust in governance, which threatens the general public support of, and participation in, structural reforms. Ideally, structural reforms of the government will provide an opportunity to root out this corruption and reinforce a system founded in rule of law where corruption is not tolerated. However, changing the structure of the state alone should not be assumed to eradicate corruption given the country's long history of graft and reliance on a system that thrives on bribery and nepotism. While corruption in Ukraine is facilitated and incentivized by a bloated bureaucracy, ineffective institutions, and a weak rule of law, it is also motivated by habit amongst the population as a whole.

Presently, both the Ukrainian government and international donors are working to find specific ways to address corruption as a key part of the structural reforms of the state that can bring the country into compliance with its association agreement with the EU. Already, the government is in the process of establishing both a National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), which will investigate corruption at the highest level of government and bring cases before the Prosecutor, and a National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), which will facilitate public access to state officials' financial disclosures and educate the public on ways to become involved in the fight with corruption. Additionally, the government is pushing forward numerous pieces of legislation to target corruption in both the public sector and in business. Finally, within each ministry to different degrees, there are efforts underway to streamline their work and reduce graft.

Amidst these developments, the USAID Mission in Ukraine is examining how it can become more involved in the efforts to combat corruption in the country. The Mission already has a fairly broad portfolio of activities that address corruption in various ways, but these activities are primarily parts of other projects and do not focus on corruption exclusively. Given the efforts that USAID is already undertaking to assist structural reforms and legislation and the relatively crowded field of donors in the country focusing on corruption or at least planning to do so, the Mission requested that a team of researchers examine the potential for a behavior change program focused on addressing

public participation in corruption as a way to bolster state-led reforms. While various donors have provided grants to promote public service announcements and other information campaigns against corruption in the past, there is currently nobody addressing this issue in a focused and cohesive manner.

Sean R. Roberts, Director of the International Development Studies program at The George Washington University, led the assessment team tackling this task, and Robert Orttung, a Researcher with substantial experience examining corruption in the former Soviet Union, participated as both a regional and technical expert. Additionally, Viktoriia Gnatenko supported the logistics for the assessment and assisted with recommendations for civil society and expert organizations with whom to meet.

It is critical to understand that this research was not intended to produce a comprehensive anti-corruption assessment that would provide a full picture of the reforms needed to eradicate corruption in Ukraine. In fact, the research was not intended to focus at all on the structural reforms, legislative changes, and institutional development needed within the Ukrainian state to weed out public sector corruption. Rather, USAID/Ukraine requested that the research team examine how to address the supply side of bribery and graft – the compliance and facilitation of public sector corruption by private citizens. The research was carried out with an understanding that any such bottom-up effort to address corruption can only yield results if it is coupled with substantial structural, legislative, and administrative reform within the state as well as with political will within the government to weed out corruption in the public sector. Furthermore, the assessment was carried out with the understanding that it would only inform one part of a larger whole of government approach to combatting corruption to be undertaken by donors and other USG actors in Ukraine.

The team outlined three central questions to be answered in the assessment: 1) What behaviors among people (different segments and age groups) are contributing most to corruption in Ukraine?; 2) how can existing behaviors contributing to corruption best be changed so as to reduce societal-wide corruption?; and 3) how would such efforts best be integrated into and coordinated with existing efforts, within the GOU, and among other donors to combat corruption? In addition to answering these questions, the assessment team was tasked with providing recommendations to the mission regarding future programming priorities related to changing corrupt behaviors and addressing everyday corruption in Ukraine.

## **II. METHODOLOGY**

This assessment employed a mixed-methodology that included desk research, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, and focus groups with citizens who are not directly involved in anti-corruption activities or reforms more generally. The field research was conducted between April 17 and May 9, 2015. The assessment team traveled to a total of five cities to conduct its research: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Lviv. In addition, the team traveled to the town of Korostyshev near Kyiv to conduct a focus group of more rural residents.

## Semi-Structured Interviews

The assessment team conducted semi-structured interviews with government officials, journalists, local experts, and civil society actors . With most interviews, excluding some with government officials and international donors, the assessment team asked a set group of questions designed to answer the three major research questions posed. The team then entered the answers to these questions into a database in order to generate quantitative data that could be disaggregated by stakeholder type, location, gender, and other criteria. Additionally, the interviews would follow-up with more in-depth questions appropriate to the stakeholder with whom they were conducted, leading to a substantial amount of qualitative information regarding the three primary research questions.

In total the team conducted over seventy interviews with stakeholders, and quantitative data was collected for a total of 54. The largest sample of interviewees was in Kyiv, which is predictable given that it is the center of the government and has the most activists of any region in the country (See Figure 1). The gender distribution of interviewees was decidedly skewed towards men, with about 67% of interviewees being male (see Figure 2). This gender imbalance did not reflect a bias of the assessment team; rather, it was indicative of the degree to which primary stakeholders in combatting corruption (especially government officials and experts) were mostly male. Civil society actors were more evenly distributed by gender, but even in that sector, the assessment team found that most NGO activists working on issues of corruption were male. Thus, the gender distribution of interviews is suggestive of a larger problem regarding gendered participation in anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine. The distribution of stakeholder type had a large number of civil society actors, but it also included significant numbers of local experts and journalists (see Figure 3). The focus on civil society was deliberate given the nature of the questions asked and the fact that the assessment was more focused on interventions with the population writ large than within the government. Donor interviews were not included in the quantitative data collection.

Figure 1: Location of Interviewees for Quantitative Data




Figure 2: Gender Distribution of Interviewees for Quantitative Data




Figure 3: Stakeholder Distribution of Interviewees for Quantitative Data



### Citizen Focus Groups

The assessment team felt that it was critical to include citizen focus groups in the research given the assessment’s focus on understanding everyday corruption and the behaviors of ordinary citizens that contribute to this corruption. As a result, the team hired a commercial marketing firm, InMind Inc., with whom the team leader had previously worked, to organize and transcribe fourteen focus groups in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Korostyshev. Focus groups brought together local inhabitants who do not work in NGOs, the government, or journalism and are not political party activists. In this sense, they represent a constituency that is usually not consulted by international donors on a regular basis, but nevertheless is the primary focus for any behavior change project seeking to address everyday corruption. Furthermore, each focus group was equally distributed by gender and reflected the general economic spread of the population in question. Focus groups were also conducted by age cohort, with four focus groups conducted in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Lviv with 18-20, 21-29, 30-45, and 46-65 year-olds respectively. In Korostyshev, we conducted two focus groups with 25-45 and 46-65 year-olds respectively. The focus groups provided particularly important insight into how corruption actually transpires in everyday life, the attitudes of local citizens to corruption, the types of corruption which anger people most, and the types of messages that might impact people most in deterring their participation in bribery. The assessment team’s analysis of the focus groups is provided in the findings section of the report.

### **III. FINDINGS**

Since independence, Ukraine has consistently been characterized as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Transparency International's most recent corruption perception index ranks Ukraine 142<sup>nd</sup> out of 175 countries, putting it solidly in the bottom fourth. That said, Ukraine has made recent strides towards addressing corruption, particularly with regard to regulations governing the operation of small and medium enterprises. The World Bank's "doing business" index, for example, documents a major change in Ukraine's ranking over the last two years, going from 137<sup>th</sup> in 2013 to 96<sup>th</sup> in 2015 (World Bank, 2014). Despite these gains, both experts and business people in Ukraine alike complain that the country suffers from "systemic corruption." But, what does this actually mean? What does "systemic corruption" look like for the average Ukrainian, and how did it evolve? Only by asking these questions, can one identify the behaviors that perpetuate corruption in the country.

#### **The Historical Roots of Systemic Everyday Corruption in Ukraine**

##### **Soviet Legacy**

Throughout the assessment, interviewees connected the Soviet experience to post-Soviet Ukraine's corruption problems. It is not coincidental that all of the former Soviet states with the exception of the Baltic countries have struggled with corruption since independence. While each of these states has their own unique corruption schemes, they also share much in common. These commonalities grow out of similar development paths both under socialism and after, but they arguably owe much to the Soviet legacy, which continues to influence state-society relations throughout the region. In short, each of these states has inherited aspects of a Soviet system of corruption, which has in turn evolved in the post-Soviet period.


The Soviet Union inspired a peculiar combination of political loyalty to the state as a symbol of power and lack of compliance with the declared economic rules of society. The authoritarian regime of the U.S.S.R. squashed political opposition, restrained freedom of speech, and strongly discouraged creative civic engagement with governance, and most people complied with these limitations out of fear or a sense of futility in the face of a strong and merciless security apparatus. However, in daily life, most people circumvented the Soviet planned economic structures because the system was so inefficient and often did not work. Furthermore, state officials appeared to both tolerate and participate in such practices themselves, especially during the Brezhnev period and after. As sociologist Alena Ledeneva (2006, p. 1) notes, "the Soviet system was not a planned economy... it was meant to be, but those living within its borders found that they had to counteract its over-centralization and its ideological limitations through intricate schemes of informal exchange, regional and industrial lobbying, and a variety of practices for cheating." These various means of circumventing the Soviet economic system, in turn, resulted in the perpetuation of a secondary informal economy that was not officially acknowledged, but was accepted by virtually everybody. In short, it was the informal "grey" economy that allowed the U.S.S.R. to survive and mitigated widespread discontent and dissent among its citizens.

## After the Fall of the U.S.S.R.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, this system continued to operate, but it was infused with a new mode of exchange. The Soviet “grey” economy had operated on the exchange of favors and cheating the system by taking goods from work since goods were far scarcer than money in the U.S.S.R. With the advent of market reforms in the 1990s, the scarcity of goods was no longer a problem as long as one had money. Hence, cash replaced favors and goods as the primary form of informal exchange in the post-Soviet “grey” economy. Furthermore, as the former structures of power fell, there was an intense competition for the top echelons of new power hierarchies throughout the former Soviet Union, and there appeared to be no rules for this power struggle. The corrupt processes that surrounded the mass privatization of state enterprises and assets in the early 1990s throughout the former Soviet space epitomized this competition and solidified a new elite, setting a precedent for what one needed to do in order to advance in the evolving system. Furthermore, the states’ tolerance for the corruption involved in the processes of privatization and new elite formation reaffirmed the legitimacy of systematic graft.

If the privatization process reflected the legitimization of high-level graft, lower level state officials followed suit and continued using their positions to require the exchange of gifts and favors for the delivery of services and favors. Consequently, there was a continuation of the practice from the Soviet period of citizens gaining access to a variety of services and favors through exchange, but now these exchanges usually involved money instead of goods. Furthermore, citizens did not necessarily view these exchanges as hindering their advancement, but instead willfully participated in them as a means to get what they needed and wanted. More than two-thirds of the activists, experts, journalists, and public figures we interviewed claimed that corruption actually makes life easier for average Ukrainians, reflecting this attitude towards corruption as a “solution” rather than as a “problem” (Figure 4).


**Figure 4. Does Corruption Make Life Easier or Harder for the Average Ukrainian?**



The widespread nature of these practices created the basis for today’s “systemic corruption,” and the continued participation of most people in Ukraine in such exchanges serves to paralyze reforms seeking to change the status quo. People willfully have replaced their former gifts and favors with monetary bribes in order to accomplish everyday tasks and gain access to specific services of the state, but in the process they also view the state as predatory and corrupt, regard the rule of law as arbitrary, and have

lost faith in any ideal of meritocracy. In short, people, both elites and in the general populace, assume that the only way to get ahead in society is by paying the right people. As a result, most citizens consistently distrust the state and practice tax avoidance because they do not view the state as capable of using public funds for the benefit of society. This situation has led to bankrupt state budgets, which cannot adequately pay state officials, who in turn continue to live off of bribes. In response, citizens continue to pay bribes in order to get things done and are reassured that they should seek to avoid taxes. In short, the evolution of the Soviet “grey” economy in the post-Soviet period has facilitated the establishment of a system that is self-perpetuating and creates a vicious cycle of petty corruption and government distrust that becomes very difficult to break (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: The Self-Perpetuating Cycle of Everyday Corruption



As a result of this self-perpetuating cycle, even governments that legitimately seek to address widespread systemic corruption are faced with cynicism from the general population, which does not trust that state proclamations of combating corruption are sincere. Due to this cynicism, most post-Soviet citizens have little patience for reform programs more generally, and they adopt a fatalistic perspective regarding the potential for positive change, only reinforcing the status quo. Furthermore, a government that seriously seeks to address these issues has few post-Soviet models from which to draw. The Baltic states and the former Communist states of Eastern Europe have largely broken this system, but they also benefited substantially from the pull factors of potential and eventual European Union membership. They motivated them to undertake massive administrative reforms and the complete restructuring of their governmental systems. The Republic of Georgia has made some substantial progress in breaking this cycle of everyday corruption in the last decade with substantial financial assistance from international donors, but it is unclear if it will continue to do so. Thus, outside the Baltic countries and arguably Georgia, the entire post-Soviet space is stuck in the same cycle of chronic and systemic corruption.

If this cycle of systemic corruption is widespread throughout the former Soviet space, it is particularly acute in Ukraine, which is the second most populous country, after Russia, to emerge from the break-up of the U.S.S.R. As a result, it has a particularly bloated

public sector that according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), included over 3.8 million employees, representing over 8% of the population in 2013. This portion of the population relies on the revenues of bribes to make ends meet, and the other 92% of the population acquiesces in order to get the things done with government that it must in order to survive.

## Conclusions

The deep historical roots and systemic entanglement of the cycle of everyday corruption in Ukraine makes it especially difficult to address. Virtually everybody in the country is involved in the cycle in some way, and most individuals do not believe that changing their behavior will change the system. Rather, the majority of citizens await structural change from the state or some other *deus ex machina*. Citizens in focus groups and experts interviewed for this assessment frequently expressed skepticism that changing the behavior of the population could break the cycle of corruption in the country. At the same time, structural changes within the state will take time and intense effort if they are to be successful, and carrying out this task will require patience and participation from citizens as well as from public employees at every level of the state.


In general, breaking the cycle of everyday corruption in Ukraine requires both political will within the government for the implementation of radical and widespread structural reform and broad public participation in these reforms. It is difficult to evaluate the political will and capacity of the present government in Ukraine to carry out structural reforms, but at the very least, the fight against corruption has taken a prominent place in the policy proclamations of the Poroshenko-Yatsenuk ruling tandem, and the GOU has incentives to implement sweeping anti-corruption reforms since they are critical to the fulfillment of its association agreement with the European Union. In this context, it will be critical that donors be ready to assist the GOU with structural reforms, which should include substantial restructurings within virtually all ministries of the state. Many existing USAID projects in various sectors can assist with these reforms, but it will also be important that donors be ready to design new projects as the GOU unveils new reform plans. Providing detailed recommendations to these ends, however, is beyond the scope of this assessment. Rather, this assessment focuses on work with the general population of Ukraine that should take place simultaneously with such structural reforms.

While the Ukrainian population is impatient regarding reforms, the conflict with Russia appears to be motivating Ukrainian citizens to at least tentatively support state efforts to fight corruption, push for quicker change in some areas, and not give way to its usual cynicism. The questions that remain are how swiftly and effectively the state can implement structural reforms and how ready and willing the population is to not only support, but to participate in such reforms. For mass participation in such reforms, Ukrainians must both help the state identify corrupt public officials and resist the temptation to perpetuate these officials' corruption through bribe-giving. In order to analyze how this can be accomplished, it is useful to examine what types of bribes help fuel the cycle of everyday corruption in the country.

## What Does Everyday Corruption Look Like in Ukraine?

Our research shows that corruption is rampant throughout the public sector in Ukraine, and it takes many forms. It includes various forms of nepotism and favoritism as well as widespread bribery and graft. In general, this corruption can be divided into “high-level” and “low-level” categories. “High-level” corruption includes the use of financial backing from oligarchs to influence governmental decisions, the payment of “kick-backs” for state contracts and construction rights, payments for positions on party-lists or for high-level state positions, and the use of public funds for personal enrichment among high-level officials. This type of corruption erodes the functioning of the democratic system and siphons the most money from the state budget, but it is arguably the “low-level” corruption that is the most corrosive for the functioning of everyday governance and has the most immediate impact on people’s daily lives. Furthermore, “high-level” corruption cannot be addressed from the bottom-up; it requires state efforts to root out corrupt behaviors and punish them accordingly among their own most elite ranks. “Low-level” corruption is much more dispersed and includes payments for low and middle-level state positions and a host of bribes that riddle state services. Bribes affect education, healthcare, policing, permitting, real estates deals and many other areas where citizens come into contact with their state (Figure 6).

**Figure 6. In What Contexts Does Corruption Appear Most in Ukraine?**



Here, we will focus on low-level bribes since this is the corruption that mass behavior change can impact most. For the purposes of this study, we have developed a typology of the types of bribes that are most common in Ukraine by highlighting their systemic functions: 1) market compensation bribes; 2) exhortation/responsibility avoidance bribes; 3) bureaucratic roadblock bribes; and 4) bribes to gain socio-economic advantage. None of these categories are mutually exclusive, and all of these factors are at work in most bribing schemes, which more generally reinforce each other, but this typology provides insight into how and why bribes persist in the Ukrainian public sector as well as into the ways they might be curtailed.

## Market Compensation Bribes

One of the reasons that bribes are widespread in Ukraine and many other developing countries is that public budgets do not support sufficient salaries for public officials, especially in the context of bloated bureaucracies with redundancies. As already noted above, insufficient public budgets have become a chronic problem throughout the former Soviet Union that is also perpetuated by poor tax compliance and the Soviet legacy of a massive public sector. Insufficient public budgets lead to poor and unrealistic public salaries, which stimulate an alternative economy of bribes to pay for the actual value of services and to provide public servants with a living wage. This type of corruption is most pronounced in Ukraine in the health system and in primary and secondary education.

In the health care system, bribery appears to be quite widespread and is directly related to supplementing salaries. For this reason, many interviewees with whom we spoke were not overly concerned about these bribes and viewed them as almost a part of their civic duty to support underpaid doctors. Those focus group participants with enough money to also support underpaid doctors provided similar justifications. As a middle-aged woman at one of our focus groups in Kyiv noted about the dilemma of doctors, “a person studies their entire life because it is so difficult to be a surgeon... the person saves lives, and he simply gets miserable pay; so, I understand them; what else can they do?; they need to feed their children” (Kyiv, 31-45).

However, many focus group participants were less understanding, presumably because they do not have the disposable income to pay doctors bribes. Some focus group participants even suggested that the corruption in the healthcare system was creating a clear hierarchy regarding what parts of the population had access to sufficient medical care. A male focus group participant from Lviv told a story of a friend of his who was sick in the hospital and was in a room with an alcoholic and an elderly impoverished woman. He noted that his friend had paid a substantial bribe to the doctor for superior care. According to him, the doctor told him, “the old lady will die, we will send the alcoholic away, and we will treat you” (Lviv, 46-65). Other participants complained about the heavy-handed nature of the bribe-taking at hospitals. One young woman from Kharkiv recounted how her sister came to the hospital with serious cuts from an ice-skating accident. According to her, “the doctor would not see her (my sister) for two hours, until my parents gave them money” (Kharkiv, 18-20). While some private hospitals have been established in Ukraine and offer a transparent and stable version of this “pay for care” system, the majority of Ukrainian citizens cannot afford these private institutions, whose fees tend to be higher than the cost of bribes at public institutions.

Even those people who were outraged by the corruption in the medical system understood the dilemma facing doctors, and almost everybody agreed that they would be willing to pay what they could to help doctors in exchange for decent healthcare. Furthermore, some people noted that they had received decent care without paying bribes, and these people felt obliged to offer the doctor a gift after the fact in the style of exchanges from the Soviet period. As an elderly man from Lviv noted, “I did not pay a cent, and the doctor did everything for me; I thanked him after... I merely brought him a bottle of cognac” (Lviv, 45-61).

Overall, bribes in the medical system appear to be almost completely informal, and their character, amounts, and mechanisms are dependent upon the hospital and/or doctors involved. Focus group participants suggested that this caused anxiety since they were never sure if and what they were expected to pay, yet their health or that of their loved ones often hung in the balance. While participants understood the reasons for bribery in the health system, they felt it was negatively impacting medical care and had substantial negative impacts on society writ large. Furthermore, focus group participants noted that not all bribes in the healthcare system were entirely benign. Some hospitals are assumed to operate through a pyramid of bribery that largely enriches the hospital directors. Additionally, high-level corruption related to healthcare regarding the procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment provides incentives among some elites to keep the system operating at the status quo.

Interviewees and focus group participants noted a similar situation with primary and secondary education, but in the case of schools, these monetary exchanges appear to be more formalized and to also pay for supplies as well as supplementing salaries. In this sense, monetary exchanges at schools had almost become more like donations than bribes, and they do not appear to be having substantial negative impacts on society.

Schools remain under-funded in Ukraine, and parents frequently provide monetary gifts to help the school and teachers. These monetary gifts are frequently solicited by either teachers or the school and are explained as going towards renovations or supplies. Given the interest of parents in their children's educational success, they usually are willing to give what they can for the school. However, a group of businessmen in Kharkiv noted that they are also wary of the purposes to which this money is applied. They explained, for example, that there are "class funds," which usually contribute to the class and classroom of one's children, but there are also "school funds," which are solicited for general purposes by the school. These men suggested that they always give to "class funds" but frequently resist giving to "school funds," fearing that this money is being pocketed by the school director.

Corruption in primary and secondary schools, therefore, is generally less corrosive than in the medical system, but still negatively impacts the public perception of the educational system. Parents of school children are often distrustful of school directors, who are often perceived as more interested in their positions in a wider corrupt bureaucracy of public officials than they are in pedagogy. Some schools legitimately request additional funds from parents and use these funds towards the education of children. Others undoubtedly use such requests for funds as a rent-seeking opportunity. In both cases, the requests for funds tend to be more formalized than in the medical sector. At the same time, most interviewees and focus group participants did complain that there is little transparency regarding how funds are used.

In general, the use of bribes for market compensation is akin to a regressive tax that is applied to all citizens regardless of their means. For those who are relatively well off, it is viewed as no more than a simple fee for services, but for the poorer segments of the population, it is a burden that often places them at a disadvantage regarding access to quality services. Although these are perhaps the most benign bribes in Ukraine's public sector, they do undermine both public medical care and education and negatively impact

the quality of these services, especially for the less advantaged segments of the population.

The only way to rid Ukraine of such market compensation bribes is to entirely reform the medical and primary and secondary education systems. This process will require the country to decide how it can reasonably finance these services in order to ensure their quality while at the same time making sure that all citizens can afford to have access to them. It will require increasing the official salaries of medical and educational professionals, whether this is done through increased state investment, a neo-liberal privatization approach, or a hybrid of these two models. However, given the income gaps in the country, complete privatization of these sectors would only further increase economic inequality and create more political tensions.

Until such reforms are implemented, there are less formal ways to mitigate the negative consequences of this corruption. Schools can formalize their “donation funds” even more, and they can establish transparent practices of notifying parents of how their donations are utilized. Parent-Teacher Committees or similar institutions may even be able to manage such processes and offer a stop-gap measure that would allow parents to confidently supplement the budgets of their children’s schools to the benefit of education. Of course, such measures may also have the unintended effect of widening the gap of equal access to quality education as schools with wealthier parents will inevitably have more resources and provide students a better education. In the health sector, where monetary exchanges are already more informal and random than in primary and secondary education, there is a need to establish policies for voluntary donations, which can help to supplement doctors’ salaries and hospital operation costs. Specific services might have suggested donation levels to help people understand what is appropriate, but it is critical that donations do not govern whether care is provided or not. As with schools, the health sector also needs to transparently disclose these donations and their uses to the public and especially to those who donate. These are only temporary solutions to the problems of market compensation bribes, but they may also publicize the problem more and bring it out of the shadows. Furthermore, they would help to reinforce societal recognition that bribes should not be tolerated and that the reasons behind their existence must be addressed.

### **Exhortation/Responsibility Avoidance Bribes**

There is considerable ambiguity between exhortation and responsibility avoidance bribes, which is why we categorize them together. In general, these are bribes paid to avoid some sort of punishment or fee and are mostly solicited/accepted by those working in law enforcement understood broadly. Some of these bribes are purely motivated by exhortation when the party paying the bribe has done nothing wrong, but in the majority of cases those giving bribes have committed some sort of infraction, regardless of how small. In general, these bribes are the most corrosive of the “rule of law” in society because their widespread nature suggests that there are no legitimate rules in society that cannot be broken for a monetary price. Furthermore, average citizens are motivated to


give such bribes in part because they have generally lost faith in the legal system and courts to make decisions according to the law alone.

Generally exhortative/responsibility avoidance bribes are leveraged from citizens by public officials, primarily in security organs but also in other sectors through threats of some form of punishment. These include such mundane bribes as those accepted by traffic police under threats of fines for traffic violations as well as those paid to avoid fines for other minor illegal acts, such as selling goods in public without a license, zoning violations, inspection failures, or petty tax fraud. They also include bribes paid to avoid punishment for much more serious crimes such as “protection” money paid to allow organized crime to operate, bribes to facilitate large scale graft and tax fraud, and alleged payments to judges to avoid convictions for serious crimes.

Focus group participants provided several examples where police had sought to exhort money from them for minor infractions, but few of these instances were very serious. In fact, people suggested that they are usually able to resist such exhortation if they have the time to wait out the policeman. One young woman from Kyiv (Kyiv, 18-20), for example, told a story about traveling to Odesa with her boyfriend. He was smoking in the train station, and a policeman stopped him and told him that they would need to write up the infraction. As they walked to the police office in the station, the officer suggested that the boyfriend buy him a coffee and some food, and he would subsequently let him go. When the boyfriend insisted that they go ahead and write up the violation instead of getting coffee, the officer merely said, “ok, never mind, get out of here.” The assessment team experienced a similar encounter with the police in Kyiv at night. Two policemen stopped us on the street and demanded that we show our passports. As one of us did not have it on person, the policemen insisted that they write up the infraction. As we walked to the station, we said we could just go to our apartment and get the other passport, but the policemen continued saying they would need to write up our infraction. After it became apparent that we were not offering money to make this problem go away, they said, “ok, get out of here.”

These types of encounters do not appear to be a heavy burden on the populace, but they also do not inspire confidence in the police, and they are very corrosive of the rule of law. The assessment team did not hear of any encounters of this type where the bribing party was not guilty of some sort of illegal infraction (including our case since foreigners are required to carry passports at all times by law), regardless of how small, but in all of the cases recounted to us the police appeared to have little patience for actually following up on the infraction through proper channels. Instead, they used the occasion as a means to solicit a bribe. If one is to assume that similar processes take place over more serious infractions, this type of bribe could be completely undermining any sense of rule of law in society and allowing both minor and major criminals to escape all consequences for their actions. As one focus group participant characterized the situation, “we do not live by laws, but by an understanding, an understanding that if you get caught, you must pay, and if you don’t pay, you will be forced to pay twice as much” (Kharkiv, 30-45). Our interviews with experts, activists, journalists, and public officials showed that these kinds of bribes made ordinary citizens the most angry even though they were frequently avoiding the full consequences of their actions when paying them (Figure 7).

Figure 7. What Aspects of Everyday Corruption Make People the Most Angry?



If these exhortation bribes are as endemic as they appear to be in Ukraine’s law enforcement system, it is critical that people begin countering this trend by accepting official punishments for minor infractions instead of paying bribes. That said, it is very difficult to convince people to do so since official punishments are usually more severe than the bribes. As one focus group participant from Kharkiv simply put it, “if you are written up for a fine on the street, let’s say the traffic police writes you up for a 500 Grivna fine, then you will gladly pay him 250 Grivna so as not to pay 500” (Kharkiv, 45-61). Another participant from Kharkiv noted that the same applied to tax inspection for small businesses – “when an inspection happens, you give the person an envelope so he closes his eyes and does not take notice of your problems” (Kharkiv, 21-29). As another participant noted, “we use our material means in order to hide our full income, obviously in order to pay a lower percentage to the state budget” (Kharkiv, 18-20). These attitudes are not surprising - given the option, people will usually choose to pay less if they can. While many people are unlikely to stop giving bribes that are convenient for them, some may be convinced to do so if they begin to understand how corrosive these actions are for any sense of a rule of law in the country.

However, the only way to truly eradicate these types of bribes is to cut off the demand from policemen, tax inspectors, etc., and this requires that those law enforcement officials who take bribes must be prosecuted and replaced with officials who will not partake in corrupt behaviors. In the case of the traffic police, the Ukrainian government is beginning to take measures to do exactly that, at least in Kyiv, Odesa, and Lviv, where they are implementing pilot projects with newly hired and higher-paid officers. Effectively ending petty corruption among the traffic police was one of the most popular measures adopted in Georgia. However, this process is gradual, and it is difficult to know when it will be adopted throughout the country, not to mention expanded to other law enforcement agencies. For citizens to follow suit by not giving bribes to avoid responsibilities, it is critical that such efforts by the government continue to expand and demonstrate real changes in the interactions between citizens and law enforcement while also punishing law enforcement officials who are proven to have taken bribes. In addition, civil society organizations can play an important part in this process by

exposing corrupt officials and continuing to pressure the government to follow through on its newly declared anti-corruption efforts.

### **Bureaucratic Roadblock Bribes**

Bureaucratic roadblock bribes have developed in Ukraine as one means to compensate for insufficient state investment in public sector salaries and appear to act as subsidies for employees of certain sectors of the government at all levels. These bribes are facilitated by bureaucratic processes, which are almost impossible to fulfill without giving a bribe. Examples include bribes to pass an overly onerous driving license exam, bribes paid to register land, and bribes to obtain a variety of permits. Frequently, these types of bribes also blend into exhortation/responsibility avoidance payments as in the example of intense scrutiny during inspections, which essentially are only passed by making a payment. They are also part and parcel of what has become an almost accepted market compensation system within the public sector as citizens frequently pay these bribes automatically and view them as an informal fee for services.

Obtaining a drivers' license in Ukraine epitomizes this type of bribery. During our assessment, virtually everybody we met admitted to giving a bribe to pass the drivers' exam. In fact, people believe that the exam, which is computer-based, is created in such a way that it is impossible to pass (an assertion we were unable to confirm first-hand). According to one story recounted to the assessment team, one woman who refused to give a bribe was forced to take the exam multiple times until the administrators of the exam allowed her to pass on principal. While the drivers' license example is often discussed with humor by Ukrainians, it is indicative of a larger problem related to a variety of permits, registrations, etc. Apparently the bribe for a driver's license is not very exorbitant, but the more valued the permit or registration is, the higher the price of the bribe to obtain it. According to both experts and focus group participants, the most expensive registrations to obtain are those related to land. Several focus group participants described the process of registering land as a corruption labyrinth. After giving bribes to one official to get one inspection or permit, a person is directed to another part of the bureaucracy, which again solicits a bribe. This can continue for a long period of time, and some people complained that they were never able to register their land despite paying multiple bribes.

With more simple registrations, permits, and licenses, most citizens generally find it more efficient to pay bribes than to navigate a bureaucracy, which frequently appears intentionally complex. As one focus group participant noted, "it is simply about time...now, everybody works all day, and if you need some sort of bureaucratic piece of paper, it is easier to pay than to stand in line all day" (Kharkiv, 30-45). Thus, most citizens view bureaucratic roadblock bribes as a means for making life easier. Given the stress experienced by people everywhere in obtaining registrations, licenses, and permits, the tendency of Ukrainians to take advantage of the ability to pay bribes as a means of expediting the process is not surprising. In this context, it is difficult to convince citizens to not give bribes to accomplish tasks when bureaucrats solicit and/or accept them. However, as with other bribes discussed here, citizens may be more likely to resist bribe-giving if they believe that the government is seriously trying to stop bureaucrats from

taking them and if they understand that such bribes are ultimately destructive to the future development of their country.

Some steps have been taken even before the present government took over power to deal with bureaucratic roadblock bribes, especially on the local level. Many municipalities now have one-stop shops where one can obtain a number of different permits, licenses, and registrations. However, these one-stop shops vary by quality and are not everywhere available in the country. Numerous focus group participants and civil society interviewees suggested making these various processes all computer-based in order to cut down on citizen interaction with bureaucrats. Both Georgia and the Baltic states have demonstrated positive results by increasing the administrative processes that can be accomplished via the internet. This is one area of corruption in the public sector that could be addressed quite quickly by the new government, and this would demonstrate to the population that it is serious about tackling corruption problems, helping to motivate citizens to refute their own participation in bribes.

### **Bribes to Gain Socio-Economic Advantage**

The last category of bribes in our typology encompasses those aimed at gaining socio-economic advantage. These bribes make up a large portion of higher-level graft through payments or kick-backs to receive lucrative government contracts, payments to gain high-level positions in the government or on party-lists during elections, and payments to politicians to influence state decisions. However, they are also a substantial part of everyday corruption in Ukraine where they are paid to gain academic degrees, obtain local procurement contracts, obtain entry-level public sector jobs, and gain admission into educational institutions or state-sponsored programs.

Numerous focus group participants mentioned the process of paying bribes to obtain public sector employment. This phenomenon also helps to perpetuate bribe-taking among lower-level bureaucrats once they have a position. For the casual observer, it makes no sense that somebody would need to pay a bribe for a position that pays a poor wage, but in doing so, lower-level bureaucrats are essentially obliged to begin taking bribes in order to both make back the money they paid for the job and to ensure that the job pays a living wage going forward. As one woman in Kharkiv noted, “as long as you have not paid, you will not find a job until you have ‘connections’...you need to put a ‘little money’ into the uncle’s pocket” (Kharkiv, 21-29). Although this phenomenon is not well documented, Ukrainians will say that it permeates the entire bureaucracy and creates a pyramid system of graft, which will be discussed more below. Obviously, not all Ukrainians are willing to comply with this system, and many merely chose not to become public servants. Unfortunately, as a result, those entering public service are often those who are willing to become entangled in bribes. As one focus group participant noted about her friend who applied for a government job, “he was asked to pay 3000 (Grivna), and he said ‘stop’: I want to work to make money, not to give it away” (Lviv, 46-65). The implications for the overall honesty of Ukraine’s state bureaucracy are devastating.

Additionally, universities are rife with corruption, especially in institutions providing professional degrees. Unlike in the case of primary and secondary education where

bribes at least allegedly supplement budgets, at universities these bribes tend to serve as a means of obtaining admittance, grades, or even degrees. The Ukrainian government, with assistance from USAID, has established a universal entrance exam for universities, which appears to help ensure that high performing students receive state-funded scholarships to appropriate institutions of higher learning. The assessment team met with activists from *Opora*, which monitors this process, and they suggested that, while students continue to try to cheat (increasingly through mobile technology), this system continues to work fairly well. However, once students are enrolled in universities, there is little accountability to prevent further corruption in the system.

Many focus group participants suggested that the process of obtaining grades was quite simple, and they did not view it as undermining the institution of education, let alone the meritocracy of society. As one woman noted, “my son was studying, (and) he needed some sort of grade which he did not receive... (paying) just makes things simpler, less problems” (Lviv, 46-65).

Generally, experts and civil society activists interviewed suggested that these phenomena are not universal in all higher education institutions. For example, in the humanitarian arts and social sciences, few professors ask for bribes since most of these students are studying a subject for knowledge, not merely for career advancement. However, even in such institutions, students frequently pay bribes in place of attending uninteresting, and perhaps useless, required classes such as physical education and workplace safety. As one focus group participant noted, “for classes in universities that do not make any difference, that are absolutely unimportant, they might ask for 50 Grivna (bribe), it’s no problem” (Kyiv, 21-29). In professional education programs, including medical, law, and business schools, the problem appears to be more widespread and allegedly extends to virtually all courses. As one focus group participant who had been awarded a state scholarship noted, “despite studying on scholarship, I still needed to put (money) into people’s pockets in order to get my justly deserved grades” (Kharkiv, 30-45). Furthermore, despite the hope that the *Maidan* movement would change this situation, evidence suggests that bribes at universities have continued with impunity. As one university student from our youngest focus group in Lviv noted, “I thought after the *Maidan*, it would be good to study... they wouldn’t take money and would grade on one’s knowledge... this is not the case... they take (bribes) and give out grades like before” (Lviv, 18-20).


The bribes in universities have an obvious negative impact on the development of the country. They undermine meritocracy and innovation, degrade the quality of education overall, help to cultivate unqualified professionals, and teach young adults that bribing is a legitimate and expected means to survive in society. This is a particularly critical area for development assistance for this reason. The Ministry of Education must begin enforcing a zero tolerance policy for bribes in universities, and students should become organized to resist giving bribes. Working with students on this issue is particularly important if the next generation of young professionals in Ukraine is to break the cycle of systemic corruption.

## The Bribery Pyramid: The Ties That Bind

Finally, it should be noted that these various types of everyday corruption in Ukraine are not only perpetrated by lower level public servants for their own gain. Numerous experts with whom we spoke suggested that these forms of everyday corruption are passed up a bureaucratic ladder within the government. It is difficult if not impossible to substantiate how far up the bureaucracy this operates, but citizens and experts alike suggest that lower level bureaucrats usually must pay their supervisors a portion of the bribes they accumulate. This transfer may happen directly as a percentage of bribes assumed to have been received, or it may occur through a one-time payment given to a supervisor in exchange for one's job in the public sector. If these public perceptions are correct, it suggests that much of Ukraine's bureaucracy operates as a corrupt pyramid scheme, with money ultimately accumulated from bribes paying a portion of the salary for many of those in the public bureaucracy.

According to interviewees and focus group participants, this system could go as far up as to ministers, and beyond if it is true that people give bribes to obtain the position of minister. Presumably, if a minister pays for his/her position, he/she would then require that each of his/her department heads provide certain monthly payments, which the department heads would request from the heads of institutions, who would request it from their employees (see Figure 8). While this system may not go all the way to the level of ministers, and it likely varies by sector, its existence creates an inter-dependent system of graft that goes far beyond the bribes of citizens, but which is ultimately fueled by these low-level bribes.

Figure 8: Alleged Pyramid of Bribery in Ukrainian Government



Regardless of how high up this pyramid reaches, it creates a system that is both difficult to break and inter-dependent. This immobility would be a problem even if it was only housed in isolated institutions within the state. On the other hand, if this system actually does exist as envisioned by experts and in the popular imagination, it suggests that it is a system that is very much dependent upon the supply side of bribery. As a result, one way to begin breaking the chain of systemic corruption in Ukraine is to cut off the bribery supply by promoting a popular movement of resisting bribe-giving. If such a “no-bribes” campaign is coupled with reforms to the Ukrainian public sector that streamline the bureaucracy and ensure the prosecution of corrupt officials, it could have substantial impact on corruption within the state writ large.

It is noteworthy that in many of our focus groups, some citizens came to a similar conclusion about the potential power of not giving bribes. While most participants spoke about how bribes often “simplify” tasks in their lives, others pointed out that giving bribes eventually facilitates the entire system that burdens their daily lives. As one participant in Lviv noted, “it all comes from below; that is my opinion; people give petty bribes, and it all gets divided up going up” (Lviv, 45-60). Such comments often generated substantial debate in the focus groups. Most participants were unwilling to acknowledge that their behavior was part of the problem, and they suggested that all of the fault should be laid on the state officials who accept and solicit bribes, rather than on those who give them. Many civil society activists and experts offered similar perspectives in interviews. These attitudes are understandable. Systemic corruption will continue in Ukraine without a restructuring of the incentives in the public sector that fuel the demand for bribes. Even if substantial numbers of people can resist giving bribes, there will always be others who will continue to give them and will benefit from doing so. On the other hand, if the government has the political will to restructure the bureaucracy and the international community is able to assist them in doing so, it is likely that reform efforts will not succeed in eradicating corruption unless the population as a whole also agrees to stop participating in the exchange of bribes. In short, breaking the cycle of Ukraine’s systemic corruption requires concerted effort from both the state and the citizenry – both the demand and supply side of bribery.

## **Conclusion**

Overall, the above analysis of everyday corruption suggests that there are substantial structural reasons for the observed widespread bribe-taking in the country’s public sector. A bloated bureaucracy that cannot be supported by Ukraine’s budget has led to insufficient salaries for public employees. The implication of mid-level bureaucrats and most of the law enforcement sector in bribery schemes has resulted in very little horizontal accountability within the state to punish those who partake in corruption. The lack of sufficient funds for the health care and educational system in its present form suggests that these systems must be completely reformed so that Ukraine’s budget can sufficiently support them. Furthermore, the lack of trust in government fostered by bribes and graft has led to poor tax compliance, making the state budget even leaner.

In general, the widespread presence of bribery in the present system suggests that people are already investing the money needed to make the system work, but these funds largely flow through the informal sector of corruption. The task that faces the government, if it truly wants to eradicate corruption, is to force this money to go through the formal mechanism of an official and efficient state budget. Of course, this is a much more daunting task than it appears at first glance. It requires reducing the number of state employees, paying those who remain higher wages, bolstering anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms, demanding widespread tax compliance, and completely reforming the law enforcement system, the education sector, and health care. Furthermore, such radical changes are likely to create a period of social instability as people lose jobs, prominent figures are punished for corrupt behavior, and citizens learn a completely new way of interacting with the state.

In general, the successful implementation of such radical reforms depends upon both the political will of Ukraine's leadership and the willingness of Ukrainian citizens to support the reforms. At this critical point in Ukraine's development, the international community should support both of these processes if the country is to break its cycle of systemic corruption. It is beyond the scope of this assessment to provide detailed recommendations for how the international community can support the structural changes needed to reform the Ukrainian state. Instead, here the authors will focus on the simultaneous needs for changing citizen behavior regarding corruption and ensuring that Ukrainian citizens become a positive part of the reform process rather than a force that holds reform back. Although it is naïve to assume that corruption in Ukraine can be eradicated through bottom-up behavior change alone, it may be equally flawed to assume that top-down structural reforms can eradicate corruption in the country without a cultural transformation in society given the systemic nature and long history of Ukraine's corruption.

Public support of the reforms needs to take two forms. First, civil society actors and journalists need to work to monitor all aspects of corruption in the public sector, expose it both publicly and to the appropriate government bodies, including the Anti-Corruption Bureau, and hold the state accountable for continually and universally implementing difficult reforms to the public sector. These actions can also be bolstered by diplomatic pressure from the international community on the Government of Ukraine to undertake difficult structural reforms and to prosecute officials who are exposed as corrupt. Secondly, citizens need to alter their own behaviors and expectations of engaging with state structures. People must stop initiating bribes and should resist giving bribes when initiated by government officials. This will require substantial changes in the behaviors of Ukrainians. Before discussing how to promote such changes, it is worthwhile to review international experience in combatting petty corruption, particularly in the former Communist world, and especially as it relates to behavior change.

### **Relevant International Experience**

If the systemic corruption of Ukraine largely evolved out the Soviet system, the country's competitive political system provides opportunities to address this systemic corruption that might not be present in more authoritarian post-Soviet states systems (Kupatadze, 2015). The experience of Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and Georgia shows that it is possible to break with the Soviet legacy of using bribes and favoritism to make a system work even if it must evolve out of a bloated and ineffective state. In each of these cases, the evolution of competitive political systems helped to open up opportunities to reform.

Furthermore, Ukraine can also take advantage of the current reform window by building on the accumulated knowledge derived from practitioners and scholars who have been seeking to reduce corruption for decades both inside and outside the former Soviet space. International experience overwhelmingly makes clear that successful anti-corruption efforts have to be designed for the specific time, place and culture of the target country to be successful. Additionally, they must be holistic and comprehensive in nature (McCusker, 2006), and combine a range of techniques that involve both the state and civil society (top-down, bottom-up, demand and supply) (Menocal & Taxell, 2015, p. 56;

Winbourne & Spector, 2014, p. 9). Of course tactics that have worked elsewhere may not fit into Ukraine's specific situation and all programs should be tailored to local conditions (The Engine Room, 2012).

The following section will briefly examine selected foreign experience with corruption-reduction programs and assess their relevance to Ukraine. It is not meant to provide a comprehensive review of experience from around the world; rather it provides a brief sketch of illustrative best practices, which may be particularly pertinent to the Ukrainian case. While the focus here is on behavior change programs, we also provide some insight into how structural change has been managed elsewhere in the post-Soviet environment as well as how anti-corruption agencies, which are central to the GOU's present anti-corruption strategy, have operated both inside and outside the post-Soviet region.

### **The Post-Soviet Experience with Structural Changes**

Among the newly independent states that emerged from the fall of the Soviet Union, only a few have succeeded in establishing state systems with relatively low levels of public sector corruption. If one includes the formerly communist states of Eastern Europe in this pool as countries emerging from a similar legacy of the Soviet system, the number of countries that has made substantial strides towards curbing corruption increases, but is still in the minority. The Baltic states have been the most successful, and today Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia all rank among the top fifty least corrupt governments in the world according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (TICPI). Most of the Eastern European states are only slightly behind the Baltic states, with the worst performers, Bulgaria and Romania, ranking 69<sup>th</sup> on the TICPI, but the best performer in Eastern Europe, Poland, ranks 35<sup>th</sup>, only out-shone in the former Soviet space by 26<sup>th</sup>-ranked Estonia.

In most of these countries, corruption was addressed early on in the transition from socialism. The states completely reformed their governmental structures and weeded out former communist officials from their bureaucracies. They also underwent severe austerity measures in order to dismantle their bloated public sectors and streamline their systems of government. Although these measures did not completely eradicate the Soviet legacy of corrupt behaviors, the immediate top-down governmental reforms established a system under which societal behaviors were more easily addressed and where the rule of law could be cultivated and reinforced. Furthermore, given that these reforms were undertaken immediately after these states shed their communist systems, there was a general interest and willingness in the population to adapt to new behaviors under the promise of a new and improved political, economic, and social system. In Eastern Europe, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania were somewhat slower to reform, and to a certain extent, they continue to struggle to combat corruption to this day. For all of the countries in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, the prospect of joining the European Union was instrumental in helping them reform, both in terms of motivations and funding. Unfortunately, these pull factors are less present in Ukraine today given that the Europe has been cautious in its promises to the country regarding eventual membership in the EU.

The post-Communist country with positive experiences that shares the most historically with Ukraine is the Republic of Georgia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia continued to operate within many of the principles of the Soviet “grey” economy, and corruption was rampant. Only since the 2004 Rose Revolution did the country begin in earnest to address these issues and muster political reform to fight corruption head on. Furthermore, while Georgia has undertaken reforms with the hopes of eventually joining the European Union, there have been no strong signals from the EU that this will be possible anytime in the near future. Despite these difficulties, the results of reforms in Georgia have been quite positive, particularly in the realm of petty corruption. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has sought to capitalize on this experience by making former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili chairman of the International Advisory Council on Reforms and governor of Odesa. Additionally, numerous former Georgian politicians are working in Ukrainian ministries and leading reform efforts.

The typical lesson drawn from Georgia’s success is “the critical importance of top-level political will, which enabled the prompt implementation of a strategy characterized by mutually reinforcing reforms for corruption prevention, detection, and enforcement in a wide range of public services” (World Bank, 2012). According to the World Bank, Georgia achieved notable success in eight areas of reform: “creating the patrol police, strengthening tax collections, cleaning up customs, ensuring reliable power supply, deregulating businesses, making public and civil registries work, rooting out corruption in university entrance examinations, and decentralizing municipal services” (World Bank, 2012). Additionally, the Government of Georgia set a precedent of enforcement by investigating and prosecuting corrupt officials, including many high-level officials. From 2003-2010, the Justice Ministry brought charges against approximately 1,000 public officials, including 6 MPs, 15 deputy ministers, and 31 deputy chairs of city councils (Kupatadze, 2011).

Perhaps the most popular anti-corruption reform in Georgia involved a large-scale reform of the police, one of the most visible corrupt elements of the state. The GOG slashed the Interior Ministry from 40,000 to approximately 17,000 employees, firing 15,000 policemen, over half the nation’s police force (Slade, 2011). The reforms disbanded the infamous traffic police, numbering 2,700 men, firing all of them, and then purging many of the new hires who turned out to be inappropriate for Georgia’s more service-oriented police force. Georgia’s restructured police force benefited from higher salaries (\$600/month instead of \$25) and better equipment, a process which was generously supported by the international community. Fears that the fired police would turn to a life of crime generally did not materialize. Police in Georgia now almost never solicit bribes and have the confidence of the Georgian public, which means that people are more likely to call on the police when they need help. Additionally, Georgia’s police reform was crucial for securing independence from Russia since many of Georgia’s corrupt police officers were working with organized crime groups and the Russian secret police (Light, 2014).

Using similar decisive action, Georgia’s President Saakashvili reduced corruption opportunities for bribery in the state administration by cutting the number of taxes from 22 to 5 and the number of permits required to run a business from 909 to 127 (World

Bank, 2012, p. 8). He simplified property registration, trade practices, and customs procedures by reducing the “human factor” and placing many of these functions on-line. Likewise, Georgia slashed the number of public sector employees by almost 50 percent while increasing civil servant salaries 15 times. “As a consequence, corruption has been substantially reduced in the sectors where citizens interact with the state most frequently, including registering property, licensing businesses, and tax administration (Kupatadze, 2011).”

Georgia’s reforms were not an unalloyed success. The president’s policies were not always well communicated to the public, leading to protests. Additionally, while the reforms eliminated low-level corruption in Georgia, they did little to address corruption at higher levels or in the political system. The reforms also did not lead to economic growth, which is constrained by the small size of the Georgian market, high geopolitical risks from Russia, poorly secured property rights and concerns about the true extent of democracy in the political system (Livny, 2015). Georgia’s reforms are now associated with the previous regime about which the current government is extremely critical. Accordingly, Georgia’s current government is undoing some of former President Saakashvili’s accomplishments, and there are questions of whether the country’s reforms will continue, stagnate, or eventually be seriously rolled back.

In many ways, the Georgian example demonstrates both the power of top-down political will in fighting corruption and the pitfalls of relying exclusively on top-down reforms. On one hand, a strong and resolute president in Georgia was able to quickly and decisively facilitate widespread state reforms that visibly reduced corruption and inspired confidence in the population. On the other hand, a subsequent leadership change and the vilification of the previous president now threaten to halt further reform and perhaps reverse many of those changes that had the most positive impact. Thus, a true assessment of Georgia’s success in weeding out systemic corruption will require waiting to see which reforms hold over the longer term.

While Ukraine is working to implement some elements of Georgia’s reform package, including reform of the traffic police, purchasing of medicine, and some elements of e-government, it has not followed up on some of the key ingredients of Georgia’s approach, such as building early credibility in fighting corruption to create a virtuous circle of reform, working to change mindsets with strong leadership from the top, attacking corruption across multiple fronts rather than in a piecemeal (and likely ineffective) manner, and using strategic communications for fighting corruption (World Bank, 2012, p. 103). The example of Georgia raises two questions with regards to Ukraine: 1) to what extent can Ukraine replicate Georgia’s reform experience in a country ten times larger where there is less obvious support for reform from strong leadership at the top of the political system?; and 2) can Ukraine possibly establish a more sustainable anti-corruption reform process than that which has begun to falter after a change of leadership in Georgia?

On the one hand, the size of Ukraine makes it a far more challenging country in which to implement radical top-down reform than in Georgia. Georgia’s reform of its law enforcement personnel benefitted from unprecedented international financial support. In

Ukraine, even similar international financial support, which is not yet forthcoming, would be insufficient to support a law enforcement apparatus that is likely ten times larger than that in Georgia. Furthermore, Ukraine has numerous large urban regions, all of which have their own power bases, thus making it difficult for any single leader to wield the type of power that Saakashvili did in Georgia when he ushered in anti-corruption legislation and reforms. If Ukraine's size makes it a far more challenging place than Georgia to implement radical anti-corruption reforms, it benefits from a stronger and more sophisticated civil society than was present in Georgia under Saakashvili. By relying more extensively on a mobilized civil society rather than top-down leadership to propel and sustain reforms, Ukraine may be able to build a more sustainable base for good governance that is purged of corruption (Frye, 2010).

### ***Anti-Corruption Agencies***

Numerous countries with high levels of systemic corruption, which also pervades the judiciary and prosecutors' offices, have set up anti-corruption agencies in order to create a new and independent player within the state that has considerable power to fight corruption. Such an agency, which Ukraine has recently established in the form of the NABU, can have the ability to investigate wrongdoing, prosecute individuals, and convict them of crimes through special anti-corruption courts, as well as engaging in a range of training and educational activities to prevent corruption, though the exact powers of the agency differ from country to country. Unfortunately, presently it appears that Ukraine's NABU will only have investigative powers and will rely on the prosecutors' office for prosecutions and convictions. Nonetheless, Ukraine can learn from other countries, which have set up similar agencies in order to ensure the NABU's maximum effectiveness.

A DFID study found mixed results for the effectiveness of these organizations (Menocal & Taxell, 2015). It concluded that anti-corruption agencies like Hong Kong's Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) and Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau were able to successfully reduce corruption, but that the conditions that led to their success could not be replicated in other countries. In the developing world, "political influence, institutional weakness and uneven financial support were identified as factors hindering their effectiveness (Menocal & Taxell, 2015)." However, the data measuring the overall impact of anti-corruption agencies is not conclusive. A study by Kuris found that anti-corruption agencies can be effective when they are able to hire a strong staff that is disciplined enough not to abuse its power and build alliances with powerful politicians and non-governmental organizations that can support their activities when they run into opposition from the bureaucracy or courts (Kuris, 2014).

Though Ukraine lacks many of the essential ingredients that benefited Hong Kong and Singapore, it can still learn from the experience of other countries. Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), established in 2002, is a good example of a successful anti-corruption agency in the developing world. Its founders gave it the ability to investigate, prosecute, and convict wrongdoers in its own anticorruption courts independent of the attorney general's office (Beyerle, 2014), a feature that Ukraine could adopt to circumvent its corrupt judicial system. It successfully prosecuted about 100

cabinet ministers, governors, judicial figures, electoral commission members, ambassadors, and business executives between 2003 and 2010 (Bolongaita, 2010) and gained the trust of the people. But the KPK quickly became a target for various police officers, members of parliament, and the Constitutional Court, who sought to curb its activities. In 2009, when the police arrested two KPK deputy commissioners on trumped up charges, civic leaders organized a popular campaign to pressure the president, whose commitment to the anti-corruption cause seemed to be wavering, to maintain the commission. The campaign was ultimately successful in securing the release of the deputy commissioners from jail and preserving the power of the anti-corruption commission. While KPK invests in prevention and education functions, it is the jailing of previously elusive “big fish” that “has captivated the imagination of Indonesians and foreign observers alike” (Bolongaita, 2010, p. 6). Beyond public support, the KPK owes its survival to its robust institutional design that has given it a combination of institutional independence, fiscal autonomy, and various preventive and law enforcement powers and capacities (Bolongaita, 2010, p. 23).

Another relative success story is Slovenia’s Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC), which is “toothless but forceful” (Kuris, 2013). The CPC was established at the urging of GRECO in 2004 to speed Slovenia’s EU accession and faced stiff opposition from the country’s politicians, who ultimately had to acquiesce under outside pressure. Unlike Indonesia’s powerful anti-corruption agency, Slovenia’s lacked enforcement powers. Instead, as presently appears to be the case with Ukraine’s new NABU, it was limited to referring cases to law enforcement bodies, bringing civil suits, subpoenaing documents, questioning witnesses in cases, and had no power to impose penalties. However, under the leadership of Drago Kos and Goran Klemenčič, the CPC was able to expose high-level corruption and garner public support, according to Kuris. One of the CPC’s key innovations was *Supervisor*, an online database of government spending that allowed citizens, journalists, activists, and law enforcement officers to monitor state procurement. As the CPC proved its effectiveness, a growing number of members of the public began to provide information to it. In 2013, its investigations led to the removal of a prime minister who had violated campaign finance rules. Overall, civic engagement was critical to bolster state-led efforts and to prevent backsliding by continuing to pressure state leaders to not give up their efforts to address corruption.

### **Behavior Change**

Most examples of interventions to address systemic corruption focus on state structures and enhancing horizontal accountability within the state to enforce anti-corruption laws. In many ways, such efforts are logical given that the public sector is the focal point of corruption and the source of demand for bribes. However, when one examines systemic corruption, particularly in the context of the former Soviet Union, it becomes apparent that it is not only structural, but also behavioral. While rooting out the demand side of bribes and nepotism is likely the most important aspect of combatting systemic corruption, these efforts also require a strong state that can implement sweeping reforms and enforce its laws forcefully and rapidly. Furthermore, the larger the population and territory of a state, the more difficult it is to accomplish such a task from the top-down alone, especially in centralized state systems. In larger and particularly weaker states,

therefore, anti-corruption measures must address demand and supply sides of bribes and other forms of corruption simultaneously. Addressing the supply side of corruption requires changing public behaviors and establishing a social contract that does not tolerate graft or participation in it.

There is no consensus in the recent anti-corruption literature on how to change individual behavior in order to reduce bribe-giving. Most efforts seek to raise awareness of the damage corruption does and engage the population to fight it actively (McCusker, 2006). Experience also shows that, at least initially, such efforts to raise awareness of corruption's negative effects are not effective if they are perceived as merely emanating from a corrupt state sector. For this reason, civil society has generally been the primary vehicle to address mass behavior change as it relates to corruption. This section examines the role of advocacy NGOs, media, and business associations in changing behavior. The next section lists activities these actors can pursue based on international experience.

### *Advocacy NGOs and Media*

Considerable evidence suggests that social accountability mechanisms, such as NGOs and the mass media, can reduce corruption in certain conditions. As Menocal and Taxell note, efforts by civil society groups are more effective at reducing corruption when they focus on issues that are of high salience to the targeted population, build synergies and coalitions among different actors, combine broad-based community mobilization with NGOs that are able to channel pressure onto state institutions and politicians, benefit from information provided by a free media that is focused on different levels of government, impose credible sanctions against corrupt officials, and coordinate civil society actions with functional and responsive state institutions, such as transparency enhancing legislation, parliamentary commissions, and prosecutors (Menocal & Taxell, 2015).

One key problem in past efforts to work with NGOs and media is that the donors do not take into account the overall systemic nature of the problem of corruption in neo-patrimonial societies. Under such systems, the ruler naturally seeks to remain in power and the best way to do so is through direct, personal transfers of wealth to potential opponents and lower level civil servants who could potentially unseat him (Disch, Vigeland, & Sundet, 2009). In such societies, giving NGOs access to information and allowing journalists to report on corruption is not sufficient. NGO activists and journalists can often face serious repercussions for anti-corruption activity in such regimes, even when such activity is presumably promoted by the state. In such contexts, activists and journalists need both training in creative ways of accomplishing their tasks under duress and protections against repression.

### *Business Associations*

Recent academic studies of corruption in the former Soviet Union go beyond a focus on political will at the top to provide a more nuanced picture of the problem and develop insights for more innovative and effective solutions. In particular, one recent study of

Russia and Ukraine identifies the middle level of bureaucrats as the most predatory part of the state and argues that, given the relatively low level of the problem in the hierarchy, a coalition of non-oligarchic business associations, local communities, labor, and foreign actors can be effective in addressing it (Markus, 2015).

Similarly, business associations are effective at lobbying to reduce regulatory costs associated with running a business (Duvanova, 2013, p. 170). The associations are effective because they raise the cost to bureaucrats of preying on business. By pressuring bureaucrats, the associations are able to clarify regulations and strengthen predictability.

Business associations are particularly useful for a behavior change campaign because their members have very real material incentives to push back on public sector corruption, and they have leverage within their communities as drivers of local economic activity. Thus, they are particularly well placed to coordinate mass resistance to giving bribes, which effectively leaves bureaucrats powerless. By organizing groups of small businesses together, business associations can create powerful pushback against the demand for bribes and start forcing the state to provide more law-based regulation of their sector. CIPE has provided support for such groups, which allow entrepreneurs to meet and coordinate their activities (see discussion below). Such associations could also provide impetus to consumer unions and labor unions to encourage these groups to join in a broader effort to hold the bureaucracy accountable. One concrete action they can take is sending complaints to the new Business Ombudsmen Council of Ukraine, set up in November 2014 with the support of the EBRD and other foreign partners (<https://boi.org.ua/en/>). The associations could then work with the ombudsman and his staff to follow up on specific complaints with Ukrainian state agencies in order to improve the climate for business.

### ***Activities for Changing Behavior***

#### **Social Marketing Campaigns**

Studies of social marketing to change corruption behavior offer a host of best practices. Many of the recommendations in these studies, reproduced in the bullet points below, can be applied in Ukraine. Among them are: (Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1998; Mann & Hodess, 2011)

- Tailor the campaign to a specific audience and type of corruption, such as police, schools, and universities and specific actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens.
- Leverage existing attitudes by connecting the content of the message to what people already believe. A 2012 effort in Morocco managed to reach 60% of survey respondents, but the campaign failed to make a measurable impact because the message was overly simplistic and the general public did not trust the government (Hamelin, 2014).

- Make corruption unacceptable to large parts of the population by demonstrating the cost of bribing on specific groups in society. This technique has worked in anti-speeding and anti-smoking campaigns.
- Increase people's sense of control and reduce feelings of powerlessness by identifying concrete action that individuals can take to reduce corruption, such as by reporting corrupt activities and specific individuals.
- Avoid fear-based messages. In health and drunk-driving campaigns, such messages can cause people to dismiss an issue.
- Frame the issue in moral terms and demonstrate an impact on human life.
- Coordinate anti-corruption program implementation with an effort to communicate program successes to the public; doing so helps to ensure strong public support (McCusker, 2006, p. 26).

### Community Monitoring

Community monitoring of government expenditures and budgeting is a popular way to involve the public in anti-corruption activities. Evidence based research suggests that it is not as effective as political party control over local politicians or audits conducted by the central government. However, most likely, it is social mobilization that makes these other mechanisms work. Local politicians were particularly concerned by reports that they had engaged in corruption, not because they faced state sanctions, but because they were likely to lose future elections. Therefore, the most effective anti-corruption activities come through synergies of state and society efforts (Menocal & Taxell, 2015)

### Campaigns to Avoid Bribes

Perhaps the best examples of grassroots efforts to weed out petty corruption through behavior change are from India. Fifth Pillar (<http://www.5thpillar.org/>) produces a zero-rupee note, which looks like a 50 rupee note, but has no denomination, but includes the slogan "eliminate corruption at all levels." (Beyerle, 2014, p. 143) The note, when offered to officials soliciting bribes, serves as a non-violent weapon and demonstrates non-cooperation with corruption. It provides information about Fifth Pillar and shows that individual citizens are part of a larger movement. In India's experience, bureaucrats typically accept the zero-rupee notes without a fight and deliver the requested services. Beyerle notes that corrupt bureaucrats rely on people's fear. When that fear is gone, they themselves become scared because bribery is a crime. Some officials even place the zero rupee note in their office to show that they do not extort (Beyerle, 2014, p. 157). The Nihabarnystvu group (<http://nihabarnyctvu.org.ua/>) in Ukraine has borrowed from Fifth Pillar's experience and printed zero grivna notes that it distributes to interested citizens (pictured).



### School Programs

In addition to mobilizing ordinary citizens, Fifth Pillar seeks to educate young people so that they will not accept a corrupt system once they complete their studies. In discussions with youth, Fifth Pillar trainers develop three themes (as Beyerle reports):

1. Freedom: India won its freedom from the British; now it needs to liberate itself from corruption
2. Patriotism: Help India live up to its potential
3. Be the change you want to see in the world, drawing on Gandhi's exhortations.

### Internet and Social Media

Also, in India, the NGO Janaagghraha has established an effective website system for reporting both officials who take bribes and honest officials who do not. The website, [ipaidabribe.com](http://ipaidabribe.com), has generated over 27,000 reports of bribery instances in India, and its analytics allow visitors to break these down by region. In addition to allowing people to “name and shame” corrupt officials, the website offers a large section on the proper procedures for accomplishing a number of tasks that often solicit bribes, such as getting a passport, dealing with police, paying taxes, etc. Although Janaagghraha sponsors sister websites in other countries, including in Ukraine, the Ukrainian site is very rudimentary, and the assessment team was unable to track down the organization that allegedly runs it.

Evidence suggests that social media, including Facebook groups, is more likely to generate optimism about promoting effective social change than simply sending out a newsletter (Marinov & Schimmelfennig, 2015). This is a particularly important point for Ukraine, which has substantial internet connectivity and where many people use Facebook as a means of obtaining reliable news rather than merely as a source of social interaction. The number of focus group participants who noted using Facebook for this purpose was particularly striking. Although the youngest focus groups frequently discussed using [vkontakte.ru](http://vkontakte.ru) as a preferred social media, middle-aged and even elderly focus group participants mentioned that even young people tend to transition from [vkontakte.ru](http://vkontakte.ru) to Facebook once they have left school. Intellectuals and average citizens alike in Ukraine use Facebook as a news-feed of sorts in order to sift through a confusing news terrain and identify reliable sources of information. We have compiled a list of existing Facebook groups and other websites from Ukraine that focus on corruption-related issues.

## Conclusions

International experience with combatting corruption is diverse, and its success is often very context dependent. That said, one can learn many lessons from past experiences utilized elsewhere in designing an intervention for addressing petty corruption through behavior change in Ukraine. A recent evaluation of USAID's global anti-corruption efforts offered several such lessons learned, but two are particularly germane to Ukraine: 1) secure commitment of key counterparts and tie initiatives to 'champions'; and 2) use both supply and demand approaches (Winbourne and Spector 2014:58-59). It is the opinion of the assessment team that both of these points are critical to ensuring success in tackling the systemic corruption present in Ukraine. Since the extent of political will for addressing corruption is unclear while state rhetoric clearly supports it, efforts to engage key counterparts both in government and in civil society who can use state rhetoric to leverage real results will be critical. Similarly, addressing the systemic corruption of Ukraine will require a concerted effort to influence both supply and demand from the bottom-up as well as from the top-down. This includes their interconnection by strengthening the judicial system, including investigation and prosecution capabilities. In short, it necessitates a whole of government approach that is multi-faceted and works with multiple stakeholders.

While the focus here is on the supply-side bottom-up approaches, it is obvious from our review of international experience that supply-side approaches to combatting corruption cannot exist in isolation. Where they have been relatively successful, they have taken place in countries where a strong state is also dedicated to fighting corruption, usually where democratic processes are strong, and where an active citizenry is ready to push back. We are optimistic that these features are mostly present in Ukraine today (perhaps with the exception of a strong state), but their presence remains tenuous and mostly untested. The government appears to be dedicated to reform focused on eradicating corruption, but the tasks ahead of it are daunting. While it is able to benefit from Georgia's past experience, Ukraine is also a larger country and is embroiled in an intense violent conflict. The country's democratic system appears to be well entrenched, but it also has experience with past backsliding. Finally, the population is presently motivated to be active more than any time since the country became independent, but it is difficult to know how long this motivation will last.

In general, the review of international practices above suggests that a behavior change approach to combatting corruption in Ukraine should include: 1) media and civil society's engagement with the state in monitoring corrupt practices and in holding the state accountable; 2) the state's successful attempt to identify, investigate, and prosecute perpetrators of corruption while also dis-incentivizing corruption in the public sector; and 3) a coherent but diverse communications plan that involves both messaging and activities to engage citizens on pushing back on bribes and other forms of petty corruption.

## **Towards Tackling Ukraine's Systemic Corruption: A Behavior and Accountability Approach**

As noted above, dismantling Ukraine's cycle of systemic corruption is a complex endeavor, which requires both the concerted effort of the state and the support and actions of the population. Given the country's shared history with the Republic of Georgia, it is not surprising that the government is looking towards former Georgian officials for guidance. However, Ukraine is also far larger than Georgia, and it will be much more difficult to push through rapid and wide-reaching reforms throughout Ukraine's diverse regions and population. Furthermore, the Ukrainian state is also burdened by the costs of its conflict with Russia, which draws attention and resources away from the reform process. While the government is already instituting a pilot project to reform the traffic police in three large municipalities, has established an Anti-Corruption Bureau, and is establishing a Corruption Prevention Agency, many citizens worry that these efforts are not swift enough to have lasting impacts.

In this context, it is critical in Ukraine that civil society and citizens more broadly hold the government accountable for its promised reforms and prevent it from backsliding. Ukraine should take notice of how important constant civil society activism has been in pushing the Indonesian state to stay the course in its fight with corruption. The process of reform is likely to take time, will have failures, and will be painful for some. Along the way, the pressure of civil society groups and their collaboration with interested bodies within the government will be critical to keeping reforms on track and in ensuring that instances of further corruption in the public sector are appropriately punished. At the same time, there is a need to cultivate a more widespread public movement to resist giving bribes. Such pressure from below would give those at the highest level of government the public mandate required to push their reforms more rapidly and with greater force.

### **Accountability**

The effort to establish a strong and independent Anti-Corruption Bureau should provide a source for horizontal accountability inside the Ukrainian government, but one can anticipate that this organization will have difficulty doing its job. If the NABU is to clean corruption out of the highest levels of the public sector, it will need the assistance of civil society. Civil society monitoring groups can help feed his organization information about reported corruption, and they can help testify in support of convictions for corruption. However, civil society's most critical role will be to rally political support and apply vertical accountability on the government in order to maintain the Bureau's power in face of government officials who may seek to halt its progress. Furthermore, since the Bureau presently is beholden to the prosecutors' office for prosecution of all the cases it investigates, this civil society pressure will also be critical in ensuring that the prosecutor faithfully carries out justice in accordance with the Bureau's investigations.

In this context, one must assume that any approach to addressing everyday corruption in Ukraine will require substantial support for civil society as an agent of accountability, which can continually push the government to fulfill its promises of seriously combatting corruption. However, it is also important that civil society organizations do not engage in

their advocacy in a vacuum that is only accessible by state officials. These efforts need to engage the population through public communication and inclusive activities, which can make citizens feel they are also contributing to the fight against corruption.

### **Behavior Change**

Facilitating mass behavior change among Ukrainian citizens is a more daunting task than promoting accountability, but it is as critical, if not more so, to fostering change in the country. Focus group participants viewed corrupt behaviors as a deeply engrained part of their lives. One person noted succinctly, “we have grown up with it since childhood... we cannot imagine any other way” (Kharkiv, 31-45). Another suggested that “it is just a bad habit that has over many years formed our consciousness... if one needs to do something, you can merely go and give money to have it done” (Lviv, 21-30). While participants appeared to understand that such behavior was inappropriate, they also were fatalistic about changing it, assuming that it had merely become an irreversible part of their lives.

In this context, it is critical to cultivate a new public consciousness that views corruption as corrosive to society, immoral, and unacceptable. While it is naïve to believe that such an attitude shift can happen quickly or comprehensively around the country, there is reason to believe that the public consciousness can be altered with time as more and more people begin to adopt a different perspective. In short, a concerted effort is needed that can gradually build momentum until a tipping point changes the general attitudes, and consequently behaviors, of the population.

In discussions about how to accomplish such a task, experts, journalists, and civil society activists consistently pointed out that mere information campaigns were unlikely to change anything. Passive social marketing has been attempted on a variety of issues in Ukraine, but few have had any lasting impact. The population is already too skeptical of external proscriptions to seriously react to such efforts. However, if a social marketing campaign using a unified brand can combine multiple media, leverage a sense of change in society, involve people actively, and employ messaging that has meaning for the population, it is more likely to succeed. Furthermore, the time is right for such a concerted effort given that the conflict in the east of Ukraine has consolidated people around a sense of common cause and a desire to prove to others that Ukraine can succeed.

To ensure that the behavior change campaign focuses on the areas where Ukrainians most frequently experience corruption, the campaign should be tied to national polling that measures popular corruption perceptions. Targeting the most corrupt areas of the public sector will ensure that the campaign has the greatest impact and resonates the most with the citizenry. It is important to note that such polling may show that the most egregious corruption varies by region, suggesting that any behavior change campaign should have both national and local dimensions.

One objection to a behavior change campaign aimed at the public is that it potentially shifts the responsibility of civil servants, who are criminally culpable for soliciting bribes, onto the citizens, who are really the victims of this crime. However, our focus group research made clear that it is often citizens who initiate the bribe process since they can

use such payments as a way to avoid even reasonable regulations. In this context, it is clear that tackling corruption in Ukraine requires both measures to prevent civil servants from taking bribes and efforts to convince citizens not to initiate such bribes. Reducing the supply of bribes by citizens is a necessary component of a comprehensive anti-corruption policy.

### Messaging for Behavior Change

In terms of messaging that will appeal to the Ukrainian population, our focus groups provide much food for thought. The most effective campaign in

recent memory cited by focus groups and interviewees plastered the slogan “United Country” in Ukrainian and Russian on billboards, buildings, in the Kyiv metro, and on websites (pictured here). Although the campaign could not return Crimea or the Donbass, it “went



viral” and had a powerful effect on society. All the participants of the Lviv session of 21 to 29 years olds agreed that it was effective. When the separatists declared that they were not part of Ukraine, this campaign helped people to feel that they belonged to a larger whole. It is noteworthy that this campaign benefited from a common external threat from Russia. The conflict with Russia has already instilled a sense of common purpose in the population and a pride in the country to which this campaign appealed. In the case of everyday corruption, the threat which needs to be addressed comes from inside the country itself and includes the citizens whom any campaign must influence. Thus, it is a very different project than merely supporting an already existent patriotism; it must actually make people question their own actions.

In order to create messaging that can prevent people from giving bribes and passively supporting systemic corruption, it is critical that the messages one disseminates appeal to people’s sense of morality, the things they hold dear, and their livelihoods. In our focus groups, we gave participants several rudimentary messages intended to align with different values. The principles referred to people’s attachment to the nation, to their families, to the European Union, and to financial concerns, and we expressed these values in both negative and positive forms (e.g. “stop paying bribes to secure your children’s future” vs. “by giving bribes, you destroy your children’s future”).

Overall, the most popular message that we tested across region, age, and gender was “Stop paying bribes to secure your children’s future,” as Table 1 shows. This message was clear in the action required of people and focused on a positive result. It also suggested the importance of appealing to people’s allegiances to their families. However, in a few cases, individuals saw that providing bribes was a way to advance the interests of their children, for example, by securing their place in schools and advancing them

through the university (Olga, Lviv, 21-29). Thus, messages connecting the end of bribery to a better future for children must be explained to the population.

The second most popular message was “Corruption makes medicine more expensive than it is in fact.” This message connected to concrete financial consequences affecting people’s day-to-day lives. The popularity of this message may speak to the motivations of people in giving bribes. Many people in Ukraine struggle to stay afloat economically, and they often offer bribes under the assumption that it costs them less. If one can demonstrate how bribes increase the costs for people over the long-term, it will undoubtedly make them think twice before offering a bribe. However, the population’s understanding of the costs of corruption should not be assumed; it must be demonstrated in clear terms.

The third most popular message was “Stop Corruption to Support the Future of Ukraine.” This message draws on patriotic goals, which are popular now as the country faces a threat to its territorial integrity from Russian and separatist aggression. Many people also connect the future of Ukraine to the future of their children, giving this slogan extra significance. However, when this message was discussed in focus groups, it was clear that it had only partial appeal given that citizens are not confident that the government is battling with corruption enough, and they assume that the future of the country is first and foremost a matter of governmental concern.

Messages that were less effective indicated negative rather than positive outcomes. Stressing that bribery hurt the future of Ukraine or the country’s children was less appealing because doing so did not point towards a positive outcome for Ukrainian citizens. It was easier for Ukrainians to relate to messages that connected their action with positive results.

Other less popular messages focused on tired clichés, such as “Corruption Kills” and “No to Bribes; Yes to Freedom.” Other messages were confusing, such as “Giving a bribe is Soviet; Fighting bribery is European; Which path will Ukraine take?” Since many did not remember life in the Soviet Union and had not been to Europe, they could not relate to the message in a concrete way. “Zero Tolerance for Corruption” did not make sense to Ukrainian audiences who have less experience with tolerance than Western audiences.

**Table 1. Overall Result of Message Analysis**

Message	Mean	Total	Comments
Stop paying bribes to secure your children’s future	5.7	631	This message was clear and unambiguous for most people, children's future is the most important issue (especially for Kharkov)

Corruption makes medicine more expensive than it is in fact	5.5	621	People support this message because it is proved by their own experience; corruption in medicine affects everyone
Stop corruption to support the future of Ukraine	5.5	616	Clear and unambiguous, children's future is the same as the future of Ukraine for most respondents
By giving bribes, you destroy the future of your children	5.1	571	Strong because it mention children, but controversial since it suggests that someone is harming children
In giving a bribe, you destroy Ukraine's potential	5.0	554	Strong, but the logical connection between the actions is not obvious
Corruption Kills	4.8	540	Too strong and worn out
No to Bribes, Yes to Freedom	4.7	531	Worn out cliché, there is no logical connection between its parts
Giving a bribe is Soviet; Fighting bribery is European. Which path with Ukraine take?	4.3	471	Mostly well perceived by young people, but viewed negatively by those older than 30, who have a good opinion about order in the USSR
Zero tolerance for corruption	3.9	434	Unclear for most people, bad combination of words - "tolerance"

			and “corruption” – which shouldn't be used together
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The focus group data as displayed in Table 2 demonstrated clear differences according to region and age. In both Lviv and Kyiv, younger people preferred messages that focused on the national goals of reducing bribery to support Ukraine’s future. In Kharkiv, concern for the country’s children was the top priority.

Personal financial concerns drew attention across all age groups, and high costs seemed to affect younger people as well as their older counterparts. All are concerned about the economic situation and feel insecure in their economic status. Messaging focused on the high cost that Ukraine pays for allowing corruption to continue, whether in medicine or other goods, may thus be successful in mobilizing young people as well as older generations. The key point here would be that that fighting corruption can help save money and lower prices.

**Table 2. Most Effective Behavior Change Messages, by Region and Age**

Age\City	Lviv	Kyiv	Korotyshev	Kharkiv
<b>18-20</b>	Ukraine Financial Soviet/Europe	Ukraine (+) Children (+) Medicine	No to Bribes: Yes to Freedom Children (+) Ukraine (+)	Children (+) Ukraine (+) Financial
<b>21-29</b>	Ukraine (-) Ukraine (+) Financial	Soviet/Europe Ukraine (-) Financial		Financial Children (+) No to Bribes; Yes to Freedom
<b>30-45</b>	Children (+) Children (-) Financial	Corruption Kills Financial Ukraine (+)		Children (+) Financial Ukraine (+)
<b>46-65</b>	Children (+) Children(-) Ukraine (+)/ Financial/ Corruption Kills	Corruption Kills Children (+) Ukraine/Financia l	Financial Children (+) Ukraine/Children (-)	Children (+) Ukraine (+) Corruption Kills

\*In this table (+) denotes the message in the positive form - Stop paying bribes to secure your children’s future – while (-) denotes the message in its negative form - By giving bribes, you destroy the future of your children.

Although we did not systematically collect data on the gendered attitudes towards these messages, it is possible to draw anecdotal conclusions. For example, it seems that females were more willing to give bribes to support their children than were males who focused on the larger principle of the issue. In the 21-29 Lviv focus group, for example, one women felt that giving bribes would help her child through school, while two males


strongly believed that such bribes ultimately hurt future prospects for Ukraine’s children in general. Both genders were concerned about the financial implications of corruption. Young women noted their status as future mothers and the costs of healthcare (Kharkiv, 21-29) while at least one young man in the same group concurred that he had a “maternal instinct” in placing family health and expenses associated with it as the top concern.

It is noteworthy to add that virtually all focus groups suggested that any messaging would be unlikely to impact behavior unless the population perceived that the government was also making strides towards punishing officials for corrupt actions. These discussions made it clear that citizens were only willing to change their attitudes and behaviors regarding corruption if they saw that government officials were doing the same.

In general, most participants and interviewees preferred to be offered messages with factual information that is persuasive and evidence based rather than merely with didactic slogans. Focus group discussions, for example, suggested that factual and analytical information about the costs of corruption, what to do concretely, and specific results would be effective. Infographics with numbers and data would focus viewer attention on the problem and explain its actual impact on society. They also suggested that it would be effective to describe the corruption problem and show specific results, particularly in explaining how the authorities dealt with the problem (Lviv, 21-29). Such information would help dispel the widespread notion that the authorities are doing nothing to fight corruption and that little has changed (see especially the discussion in the rural area of Korostyshiv outside of Kyiv, 46-65).

Our interviews with experts, activists, journalists, and public officials, confirmed the focus group findings. In particular, our interlocutors stressed positive over negative reinforcement, addressing concrete local concerns where possible, and appealing to issues of immediate personal financial concern, family, and nation (Figure 9).

**Figure 9. What Sort of Messaging Works Best with Ukrainians?**




### Messaging Media

In addition to the content of messages intended to change behaviors, our research suggested that the media utilized to convey these messages was equally critical. In

general, both interviews and focus groups indicated that multiple media should be employed and that different media would likely have more impact on different age groups. The elderly population, for example, was most influenced by television, although people of all ages engage television media. However, among the younger population, there was a clear preference for getting information via the internet and particularly through social media like Facebook (see Figure 10). This finding suggested that the internet is a fertile ground for influencing Ukrainian opinion and behaviors. Additionally, people reacted positively to the idea of fictional narratives, particularly on television, which could show the real-life decisions that people must make around corruption and highlight the consequences of corrupt behaviors.

**Figure 10. What Sources of Information Do Ukrainians Trust Most?**



It was clear from our research that traditional social marketing methodologies including public service announcements on television and radio as well as billboards were unlikely to have widespread impact. Rather, a multi-pronged and innovative media strategy is required, which can reach people in different corners of Ukraine’s diverse media terrain. Furthermore, different media should be targeted towards different generations and segments of the population.

A variety of indicators would indicate the success of a behavior change campaign in the short and long terms:

**Short Term Affects**

- On social media, like Facebook, there should be an increase in the number of pages discussing corruption and the number of participants as well as increases in the number of Ukrainians belonging to anti-corruption Facebook groups.
- In surveys of the population, there should be a growing number of people who
  - think that corruption in any form is not tolerable
  - report refusing to give bribes
  - are aware of anti-corruption NGOs and their activities
  - know about on-line state budget information
  - are aware of civil servants’ property declarations
- Additionally, there should be measurable increases in the number of:

- requests for information from government agencies on public procurements and general budgets and expenditures
- requests for civil servants' asset declarations
- groups, media, citizens monitoring public procurement
- people reporting corruption schemes to law enforcement agencies and investigative journalists

#### Long Term Impact

- A growing number of corruption opportunities eliminated from government as measured by estimates of how much was saved in bribes, eg “Reform of the traffic police in Kyiv reduced bribes by an estimated 100 million hryvna.”
- Public opinion polling shows an increase in citizens who think that the corruption situation is improving.
- Ukraine’s position on a number of internationally recognized indices of corruption improve, including Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s Doing Business Index.

### Existing Donor Involvement in Anti-corruption

A large number of international donors sponsor anti-corruption projects in Ukraine. Such foreign donors are crucial since they combine financial and technical assistance with the ability to apply diplomatic pressure on Ukrainian politicians to fight graft and bribery in conditions when they otherwise might be reluctant to do so. Local observers universally concur that without this outside pressure, Ukrainian institutions would be unlikely to take action.

The foreign-funded projects span a wide range of activities, which includes support for specific state and societal institutions, support in specific policy areas, and changing attitudes.

#### Support for State and Societal Institutions

- **Helping to Set Up the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU).** Several institutional donors are working to support NABU, hoping to transfer to Ukraine successful experiences in Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, and Slovenia. The World Bank is helping to set up the staffing. Canada’s EDGE is providing strategic advice. Here the main idea is to start with a small number of important cases that attract popular support for the Bureau. Needed areas of change include rooting out corruption among Ukraine’s prosecutors and developing mechanisms so that the Bureau can act on information about corruption gathered by journalists.
- **Support for National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC).** The UNDP and World Bank are working with other funders to help launch the new

NAPC, which will monitor the declarations of income submitted by public officials. The International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) is helping spread awareness of the new Agency in the regions.

- **Promoting Investigative Journalism.** Investigative journalists are crucial for uncovering corruption schemes and informing the public about them. Internews and the National Endowment for Democracy provide funding for a website (<http://corruptua.org/>) that supports journalistic investigations of corruption in Ukrainian regions. The site also includes an interactive map of corruption stories so that users can read about corruption in specific locations. The journalists pass on information to the authorities in the hopes of encouraging prosecution. IRF is also working in this area by supporting Nashi Groshi, a collective of journalists and lawyers that researches corruption.
- **Supporting change agents in Ukrainian society,** such as volunteers, NGOs, and experts studying corruption. A variety of funders, including, but not limited to, Uniter (USAID), Matra (Netherlands), and the International Renaissance Foundation provide support for such groups.
- **Support Business Associations and the Business Ombudsman.** The Center for International Private Enterprises (CIPE), with support from USAID, works with business associations in Kyiv and throughout the regions. These groups do a lot of watchdog work, overseeing regulatory agencies for businesses. They also provide support for businesses under pressure from intrusive inspections by operating a hotline businesses can call for help when inspectors are present and distributing stickers showing that individual businesses are protected by the associations (pictured). In May 2014, the EBRD signed an Anti-Corruption Initiative with the government of Ukraine to establish an independent business ombudsman to help address the problem of unfair treatment of businesses. (<https://boi.org.ua/en/>)
- **Slowly Establishing a Public Television Channel.** The government is slowly establishing a public television channel that can broadcast objective information about corruption investigations rather than relying on access to the public through the existing oligarch-controlled networks. Member of Parliament and investigative journalist Serhiy Leshchenko strongly supported public television as a positive step. USAID is supporting this effort through its grantee Internews.



#### Targeted Policy Support

- **Addressing High-Level Corruption.** The **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** focuses on high-level corruption and tries to kick start reform, with the

assumption that addressing the problem will take years and that there is no magic solution. The IMF pushed hard for creating the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, adopting anti-money laundering legislation, stimulating greater disclosure, and invigorating judicial reform. It focuses on specific areas, such as the energy sector and tariff policy, and seeks an improvement in the business environment and deregulation. Given the limitations of its charter as an international institution, the IMF monitors Ukraine's adoption of new laws and the establishment of new institutions while paying less attention to the implementation of policy.

- **Tax Reform.** The IMF is also working to reform Ukraine's tax administration to make it more effective. It seeks to increase state revenue by reducing transfer pricing, limiting offshore firms, adjusting tax rates to an optimum level, and fighting tax evasion. Currently 80 percent of government revenue comes from big business, with the rest derived from medium and small business. Individual citizens see little connection between the taxes paid on their behalf and the services they receive. Increased transparency in the tax system is crucial to fighting corruption. Ukrainian households need to believe that government bureaucrats are spending "our money" inappropriately as a prerequisite for taking action against corruption. Traditionally, Ukrainians have felt less of a connection to their state and less need to pay taxes than Russians or Poles (Berenson, 2010). By sponsoring a simple and easy-to-use website (<http://costua.com/>), the Pact project lets people know how much money their employer is paying in taxes on their behalf. This site also breaks down the budget. With the fighting in the east, taxes are becoming more of a pressing issue. A member of the Kharkiv 45-60 focus group noted that now Ukrainians have to pay a 1.5 percent military fee but that he does not know how the money is spent. Currently the Ukrainian government does not pay to equip its own soldiers. A woman in the group pointed out that her family had to buy body armor, a helmet, and shoes for a nephew currently serving in the war zone.
- **Improving Transparency and Accountability through E-governance.** There are a variety of efforts to improve the transparency of the Ukrainian government through on-line tools. The Presidential Administration has set up a site to provide an overview of the reforms currently underway (<http://reforms.in.ua/>). The UNDP is supporting a municipal budget data visualization project.<sup>1</sup> The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade as single site providing access to eservices (<http://poslugy.gov.ua/>). Other systems are being developed from prototypes, such as a new national open data site (<http://data.gov.ua/>) and the ProZorro electronic procurement system (<http://prozorro.org/>), currently being piloted in numerous ministries and the Kyiv city administration. Such digital services empower more

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/04/30/citizens-able-to-take-city-budget-under-control-grasp-its-components-undp-budget-viz-tool-at-work/>

citizens to take advantage of the services their government offers and in monitoring the government. USAID is working in this area by supporting the Bibliomist library network, which helps develop basic digital skills as well as "e-Government" training for average citizens in local libraries across Ukraine. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation also contributes to this project.

- **Cleaning up the traffic police as a demonstration project.** The U.S. government and the IMF are helping to fund the overhaul of the traffic police in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa. Success in this project could create momentum for other anti-corruption efforts by demonstrating tangible results in a highly visible area where citizens interact with their state.
- **Decentralization and improving governance and service provision at the local level.** Local governments are starting to increase revenue. The question is how they will spend this money after local elections in October 2015 and whether the money will be used effectively. The Swiss embassy in Ukraine is working with local governments to improve their ability to deliver efficient citizen services.
- **Health care.** The Swiss embassy program is also working to shift Ukraine's health care system away from its current focus on hospitals to promote greater use of family doctors and primary care. This transition should reduce the level of corruption. Such a reform will take many years to implement. In the meantime, it makes sense to improve transparency in existing medical institutions. Irina Pidluska of IRF described a system in Poltava that allows people to track the money that they pay to hospitals. The group found that once patients and their families are able to track the funds, they start counting what they are spending and receiving. Health Minister Aleksander Kvitashvili has made reducing corruption in medicine procurement a priority issue and is working with the UN system to cut costs for Ukrainian consumers.
- **Asset recovery.** Switzerland has blocked assets registered to members of the old regime and is holding them until they can be claimed by the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian authorities have to demonstrate that the assets should be returned according to Swiss procedures. The Swiss government works with the NGO International Center for Asset Recovery, which is helping the Ukrainian authorities comply with Swiss law.
- **Reducing Corruption in the Universities.** The U.S. government, OPORA, IRF and other groups helped set up a national exam to reduce corruption in the university admittance process. The system came under pressure during the Yanukovich era, but is now recovering. The establishment of the exam successfully changed behavior in regard to university admissions, though now additional efforts are needed to eliminate corruption from other aspects of the education process.

## Changing Attitudes

- **Changing Cultural/Social Attitudes.** Transparency International is trying to improve the image of “whistleblowers” in Ukrainian society. Such watchdogs have a bad reputation from Soviet times, when society frowned on turning in neighbors and colleagues, but can perform a useful role in fighting corruption. Similarly, projects associated with the Millennium Challenge Corporation were among the first to introduce the concept of “conflict of interest” in Ukraine and it has now gone into wider usage.
- **Support for efforts to increase tolerance.** Dutch funders provide support to Andrew Tarnovskiy’s Center for Civic Education to conduct a program in Ukraine to increase the level of tolerance among people of different ethnic groups. The organization employs a train-the-trainer model and focuses on a variety of target groups, including historians, school teachers, librarians, and schools of journalism. Tarnovskiy points out that there are no civic education teachers in Ukraine, so they typically work with historians and social studies teachers. The Center for Civic Education also provides lessons on how to include civic education in math and science classrooms. The group has earned the permission of the Ministry of Education to work directly in the schools.
- **Encouraging volunteerism.** The Center for Civic Education also provided small grants to people to carry out a concrete project, such as cleaning a street or installing a street light. They provided the money for supplies and materials, but the people requesting the aid must provide their labor for free. Such activities typically are covered in local newspapers. They are effective in helping people gain greater ownership over their surroundings. Such feelings are becoming more widespread – as participants in the Lviv 46-65 focus noted “Nobody will do anything for us” and “No one is investing so far.”

## Conclusions

There is substantial international donor support for anti-corruption efforts across sectors. The above-mentioned efforts do not cover all areas of activity, but they present a mostly comprehensive picture. However, there is little bringing all of these diverse activities together to represent a united front against corruption. As donors consider future programming, they need to consider how to leverage many of the existing donor efforts and highlight their impact as part of a larger societal movement for change. Doing so will require much donor coordination and buy-in, but the potential impact is significant.

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