ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Liberia

August 2016

ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

LIBERIA: FINAL REPORT

August 2016

Liberia Strategic Analysis Contract No: AID-669-C-16-00002

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

ACS	American Colonization Society
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
APD	Alliance for Peace and Democracy
ANC	Alternative National Congress
BIN	Bureau of Immunization and Naturalization
BVR	Biometric Voter Registration
CBO	Community-based Organization
CDC	Congress for Democratic Change
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Processes
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency (Liberia)
DRG	Democracy, Rights, and Governance
ECC	Elections Coordinating Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
EU	European Union
GOL	Government of Liberia
ICFES	Inter-agency Consultative Forum on Electoral Security
IEA	Ian, Evan, and Alexander Corporation
IFES	International Foundation of Electoral Systems
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IPCC	Inter-Party Consultative Committee
LASS	Liberia Administrative and Systems Strengthening
LEPT	Liberia Elections and Political Transitions
LP	Liberty Party
LNFS	Liberia National Fire Service
LNP	Liberia National Police
LSA	Liberia Strategic Analysis
MFDP	Ministry of Finance & Development Planning

MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAYMOTE	National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections
NDC	National Democratic Coalition
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDPL	National Democratic Party of Liberia
NEC	National Election Commission
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NPP	National Patriotic Party
NUDP	National Union for Democratic Progress
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PSU	Police Support Unit
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation
PUP	Peoples' Unification Party
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNPOL	UN Police
UP	Unity Party
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Electoral Security Framework, developed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), provides policy-makers and electoral and security practitioners with a toolkit to evaluate electoral conflict; design programs to prevent or contain such conflict; and monitor and measure the effectiveness of subsequent interventions. In June 2016, Liberia Strategic Analysis/Social Impact, with USAID/Liberia and the U.S. Embassy's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Office (INL), used this Framework to conduct an electoral security assessment in Liberia in anticipation of the 2017 presidential and legislative elections, slated for October 10, 2017. The following problem statement and development hypothesis arose from the assessment.

Problem statement: A highly contentious and competitive political environment surrounding the 2017 elections is shaped by opposition grievances, a history of political leaders rejecting electoral results, and political party capacity to mobilize supporters and protesters, which increase prospects for violence in the campaign and immediate post-election periods. These political factors are compounded by institutional constraints, including inadequate coordination, resources, capacity, and political will within and among state stakeholders to ensuring transparent and well-run elections that gain citizen confidence, and to providing sufficient electoral security.

Developmental hypothesis: If Liberia can foster an environment of confidence and trust in electoral and security mechanisms, reinforce civic awareness and collective commitments to peace, and better support plans and resources for electoral security, opportunities for widespread electoral violence will decrease.

The electoral security assessment examined three analytical concepts that compose the USAID Electoral Security Assessment Framework: 1) contextual analysis 2) historical analysis, and 3) stakeholder analysis. Based on this assessment, and taking into consideration triggers, election scenarios, and mitigating factors, preliminary objectives and broad programmatic recommendations are provided.

MAJOR FINDINGS:
- **The assessment found that the risk of widespread violence is relatively low.** The pre-electoral environment in Liberia tends to be relatively free of intimidation or widespread violence, although low-level incidents and clashes between rivals may occur. However, a number of vulnerabilities and potential triggers exist that could spark some level of pre- or post-election violence in particular circumstances.

- **Liberia's recent electoral history demonstrates that the immediate post-election period, in particular the time between election day and the run-off election, is highly sensitive and susceptible to conflict.** With a highly fragmented political party system, a second round in 2017 is likely. Run-off elections in the past have involved, at least to some extent, high-level negotiations to garner support from various political factions, creating noted public cynicism of the process.

- **While the security sector continues to experience capacity and resource constraints, the LNP have received significant international support in the post-conflict period and have built a basic level of operational and strategic capacity**. Higher prioritization within the GOL on planning and allocation of resources will be required to enable security actors to execute this strategy and perform effectively during the electoral period.

- **The LNP has partnered with other domestic security actors to develop a Joint Security Strategy for the 2017 elections to provide full coverage for the anticipated 2080 voting centers.** However, GOL budgetary restraints likely preclude hopes of having a requisite number of officers appropriately trained and in place by Election Day.

- **GOL has not to date developed a plan or procured resources to accommodate comprehensive electoral and security logistical needs.** While the UNMIL drawdown is not expected to have serious implications for election security, if UNMIL departs ahead of the 2017 elections, it will remove the option for an emergency logistical backup to NEC operations and security forces should unanticipated challenges emerge.

- **The assessment noted that Monrovia is an area particularly vulnerable to electoral violence, based on both past precedent, but also due to its dense population and likelihood as a focal point for any major electoral grievances.** While other vulnerable areas likely exist throughout the country, Monrovia is one of the most at-risk for isolated conflict igniting more widespread mobilization.

ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

In the aftermath of a lengthy and debilitating war, Liberia continues to struggle to overcome political, security, institutional, and social deficits. Genuinely democratic processes and institutions are a relatively recent phenomenon and have yet to be consolidated. Electoral competition ahead of 2017 is framed by a high-stakes, zero-sum system and a staggering number of political competitors, making a presidential run-off highly likely. The crowded and open field with no frontrunners is generating substantial anxiety among the public. Moreover, rhetoric from opposition parties implies that they may not accept the electoral results should they lose the presidency or valuable district races.

Anticipated political tensions may be exacerbated by security weaknesses, in particular fears surrounding the drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). While Liberian forces capably managed election security independently for the 2014 senatorial elections and have otherwise incrementally assumed policing responsibilities with formal security transition occurring June 30, 2016, there is a residual psychological dependence on UNMIL that could undermine confidence in the electoral security environment. Despite significant strides in Liberia's security sector since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003, the Liberia National Police (LNP) lack sufficient resources and manpower to provide robust state security and are often seen as ineffectual or corrupt.

At least part of the LNP's perceived inadequacy compared to that of UNMIL is a result of severe financial and logistical constraints that impact many state and non-state actors. Both the National Election Commission (NEC) and the LNP lack the logistical support and resources they need to comprehensively execute their mandates. Moreover, the Government of Liberia (GOL) has not developed a specific plan for elections gaps that UNMIL's drawdown may create or procured the necessary resources to compensate for those gaps. This is compounded by poor coordination within and among relevant government agencies at all levels that creates inefficiencies and discrepancies in electoral security planning and implementation.

Socially, a number of historic and emergent grievances could exaggerate emotions around the elections, or depress civic participation, including unresolved reconciliation and transitional justice issues, and

growing cynicism with the government and legislature regarding corruption, lack of accountability, and absent constituency services. In addition, citizens and government actors are operating in a low information environment, with minimal civic awareness – especially in rural areas – and vulnerability to rumors and hearsay. Increases in partisan radio content is also limiting the volume of independent voices shaping the political environment.

The role of youth in the upcoming elections may be as both a conflict actor and mediator, with young voters embracing more issue-based politics and a national identity before ethnic and religious identities, but remaining easily mobilized by political actors. Ritualistic killings associated with the electoral process are also difficult to isolate in terms of frequency and severity, but they have been reported, with a general perception that incidence of such acts will increase in the electoral period.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

In the last decade since the CPA and subsequent political transition, elections have played important roles in consolidating Liberia's nascent democracy and been relatively free, fair, and peaceful. International and domestic observers have typically characterized Liberia's modern history of elections as competitive, transparent, and credible. The 2011 general elections, however, revealed a weakness in the electoral security environment, as political party supporters mobilized around allegations of electoral rigging, and clashes with police resulted in at least one death and several injuries. This experience has highlighted the vulnerability of the immediate post-election period and in particular the time between the first and second round of voting. Further, it revealed that heightened competition around the process, and the perception of fraud, can incite tensions. It also demonstrated the likelihood of these tensions converging in Monrovia and raised questions regarding the efficacy and professionalism of security forces.

A number of other historical electoral security trends could resurface in the upcoming elections, in particular the late and incomplete release of funds for election day security operations, especially stipends for deployed security officers. In the past, there have also been challenges in the deployment of materials and personnel, the occurrence of simultaneous political rallies that increase tensions, trucking of voters, and vulnerabilities in the security of materials, warehouses, tabulation centers, and electoral offices.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

There are a number of state and non-state stakeholders that shape the electoral security environment in Liberia, the most relevant of which include the NEC, the LNP and the joint elections security force it leads, central and local government, political parties, civil society, and the media. These actors affect the contextual risks noted above, and can play crucial roles in both escalating and de-escalating conflict. To ensure leverage of recommended electoral conflict prevention programming, the presence and role of the international community in electoral and policing assistance is analyzed.

Following the stakeholder analysis, the assessment team identified a number of mitigating influences that could moderate electoral conflict vulnerabilities or increase prospects for mediation. Some of these include conflict fatigue, support for community-level security and peace efforts, concrete steps toward electoral security coordination, increased responsibility and management capacity within the LNP, and an evolving political culture more attuned to policy issues and the democratic process.

ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

There are opportunities to promote resiliencies, mitigate risks, and reduce the likelihood of triggers identified in the assessment. However, these openings should be deliberated in the context of current

and future political dynamics, funding mandates and constraints, and local capacity. Specifically, stakeholders should consider how the context may change over the upcoming electoral cycle, confront possible and worst-case scenarios for the elections, and consider remedies based on an informed development hypothesis and understanding of the political, donor, and local environment.

To support the development hypothesis, the assessment team identified a series of recommended programmatic objectives. Programmatic recommendations include intermediate results that support the broader identified objective.

PROGRAMMATIC OBJECTIVES

1. Promote political party and political leaders' ownership of electoral integrity and use of appropriate, peaceful remedies to resolve disputes
   a. Foster more constructive and engaged dialogue between political parties and relevant stakeholders, including the NEC, security forces, and civil society at the national and local level
   b. Improve party capabilities for well-trained and effective party poll-watching
   c. Increase party awareness of electoral procedures and election law, including the appropriate use of complaint processes

2. Enhance joint security forces ability to comprehensively manage the electoral security environment and rapidly respond to conflict should it occur
   a. Aid in clarifying roles and authorities of security actors
   b. Train security forces on election responsibilities
   c. Work to increase public confidence in the LNP
   d. Facilitate increased engagement between the NEC and security forces to reconcile operational gaps

3. Bolster the transparency, credibility, and security administration of the electoral process
   a. Help NEC confront logistical gaps that could cause problems and undermine confidence in the electoral process if left unaddressed
   b. Help NEC better prepare for electoral dispute resolution at the local, magistrate and, national level
   c. Promote long-term nonpartisan citizen election monitoring
   d. Support international election observation

4. Increase the availability of accurate and independent information on elections to citizens and engage them in peacebuilding around the electoral process and political transition
   a. Encourage widespread and earlier civic and voter education, particularly in rural areas with community-based organizations (CBOs)
   b. Incorporate messages of peace, unity, and the transition specifically into civic and voter education initiatives
   c. Bolster independent, accurate voices in the electoral environment

There are a number of initiatives and activities already in place designed to strengthen existing resiliencies and diminish vulnerabilities that could drive electoral conflict, including USAID's election programming portfolio, INL's programmatic support for the LNP, and other ongoing activities supported by international and regional donors. To the extent possible, these programs can be leveraged to target reforms or used as the basis for supplemental projects. In some instances, new funding sources and partners could assume additional complementary activities that support the ultimate objectives.

The upcoming elections are a defining crossroads for Liberia, in which the country can consolidate the peace gains of the post-conflict period and follow a promising democratic trajectory, or submit to power wars and exploited grievances. The electoral security assessment generally corroborated the analysis of the May 2016 Liberia Conflict Vulnerability Assessment that the likelihood of widespread, unmitigated violence surrounding the elections is relatively low. However, conflict risks and triggers do exist, and vulnerabilities in a new and changing electoral and security environment should not be underestimated.

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The 2017 elections in Liberia are a pivotal moment in the country's post-conflict transition. Liberia's developing democratic institutions and prospects for stability are intrinsically linked to its electoral processes. Despite the democratically recessive trend in the region of elected leaders extending or altogether removing term limits to remain in power, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf intends to step down at the end of her term, ushering in a new government after 12 years of rule. Should sustained peace prevail through a democratically elected regime change, Liberia can serve as a strong example in West Africa and reduce the country's likelihood of backsliding into violent conflict in the long-term.

However, facing an open election in the first post-war transition of power, stakes in the 2017 election are incredibly high. An abundance of presidential candidates have already emerged, and the crowded field is anticipated to be highly competitive. Moreover, the elections are occurring in the shadow of UNMIL's drawdown from the country, a prospect that has some stakeholders nervous about the security environment surrounding the exercise. Liberia's peace remains fragile, and some root causes of conflict persist that may become politicized within the electoral context.

From June 8 through 24, 2016, Liberia Strategic Analysis (LSA)/Social Impact conducted an electoral security assessment in Liberia with interagency participation from both the US State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and USAID. The assessment looked towards the upcoming 2017 presidential and legislative elections, slated for October 10, 2017, with a possible accompanying constitutional referendum (no date scheduled yet), and potential presidential run-off in November 2017. The team was composed of Julia Brothers from Social Impact, Jack Nielsen from the State Department's INL bureau (contracted through IEA), Carol Sahley from USAID's Center for Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) in Washington, and Lauren Seyfried from USAID/Liberia's Office of Democracy and Governance. Team members were supported by LSA/Social Impact's Project Manager Barward Johnson and logisticians Ne-Suah Livingstone and Albert Thompson.

During the assessment, team members met with representatives of the electoral commission; state security forces; central and local government; legislators; political parties; civil society, youth, women and traditional leaders; media organizations; and the international community. A total of 83 interviews and group discussions were conducted in ten counties and 14 cities throughout the country, including: Bomi, Bong, Gbarpolu, Grand Bassa, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Gedeh, Lofa, Margibi, Montserrado, and Nimba. A list of meetings held is shown in Annex I.

The assessment sought to identify escalating and mitigating opportunities early in the electoral cycle, and develop a problem statement and developmental hypothesis to approach these issues. The assessment also sought to assess the state of election security planning and management by the GOL. The interagency nature of the Liberian assessment, with perspectives from both INL and USAID and their local partners, helped to triangulate security concerns in the electoral context, and electoral concerns within the security context.

To determine the problem statement, development hypothesis, and subsequent program considerations, the team applied the methodology found in USAID's Electoral Security Framework guide[1] and was also informed by the recent Liberia Conflict Vulnerability Assessment.[2] The structure of this report includes following four sections:

- **Assessment**: This section examines three major areas of analysis: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis. It also includes an analysis of conflict risks vis-à-vis triggers and electoral scenarios, as well as mitigating factors that could help stabilize the electoral security environment.
- **Planning**: This section highlights evolving issues in the electoral context; programmatic objectives; donor portfolios and current interventions; and capacity, resource, and political considerations for additional projects.
- **Programming**: This section outlines specific programming recommendations and associated short- and medium-term goals.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):** This section identifies illustrative indicators for possible programming activities.

Annexes also include a list of organizations interviewed, electoral incident coding, an analysis of possible risks and triggers in the pre-election, election day, and post-election phase, and works cited within this report.

---

[1] Electoral Security Framework: Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers, June 2010, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdf

[2] CVA will be public this week so we can add a footnote here with the link

ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Liberia's violent past is intertwined with the struggle for political and economic power and rooted in a long history of social disparity and political exclusion. Liberia's modern political history began with the resettlement of former American slaves establishing the formal state in 1847. The structure of the colonization, in particular frameworks put in place by the American Colonization Society (ACS), encouraged a two-tiered system in which Americo-Liberians, who occupied most positions in government and business, prevailed over indigenous peoples. Political and economic institutions based largely on patronage reinforced divisions between the two groups and geographic and ethno-linguistic rifts separating Liberian natives from the ruling class widened.[3] Oligarchical institutions consolidated power for over 100 years before the country erupted in civil unrest in the second half of the 20th century.[4]

The initial conflict was sparked by Samuel Doe's indigenous uprising that exploited these social and economic cleavages. However the war was maintained and fomented, off-and-on, over 14 years by inter-ethnic conflict, disputes over land and exploitation of resources, a culture of impunity, entrenched systems of patronage and corruption, regional instability, lack of effective state security forces, and the overall weakness and accountability of state institutions.[5] The subsequent oppressive government under Charles Taylor was incapable of maintaining ceasefires or deterring armed insurgents, and instead catalyzed warring factions. Over 250,000 people were killed throughout the protracted conflict, and millions displaced.[6]

After a series of international and regional interventions, the Government of Liberia (GOL) and a number of insurgent groups and political parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003, initiating a prolonged peace process. The CPA deconstructed substantial parts of the GOL's institutions, including demobilizing and reforming Liberia's security forces, launching a transitional government, and establishing a timeline for elections for a new government.[7] As part of the peace agreement, UNMIL and its some 15,000 military personnel assumed an ambitious conflict mitigation, humanitarian aid, and nation-building portfolio in the country, which has lasted, in varying stages, for over a decade.[8]

Post-conflict restoration in Liberia had to face psychological, social, and economic devastation. Basic infrastructure and administrative institutions including buildings, sanitation systems, schools, medical facilities, finance services, and the electricity grid were decimated.[9] The GDP of Liberia plummeted by 90

---

[3] Final Report," Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, December 2009, http://trcofliberia.org/reports/final-report.
[4] "Early Warning and Response Design Report (EWARDS): West Africa Conflict Assessment - Liberia." USAID, September/October 2010.
[5] EWARDS 2010
[6] "Liberia Democracy Human Rights and Governance Assessment," USAID, September 2012.
[7] "Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties." Accra, August 18, 2003. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf
[8] "Resolution 1509 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4830th meeting, on 19 September 2003." UN Security Council, September 2003. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1509(2003)
[9] EWARDS 2010

percent and saw almost 75 percent of the population under the poverty line.[10] In 2006, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) attempted to constructively confront the national trauma experienced by the population and facilitate transitional justice.[11] However the reconciliation process and subsequent report is criticized for lacking capacity, consistency, diligence, and authority.[12] Many of the recommendations from the final TRC report have yet to be implemented, and some have been declared unconstitutional.[13]

The size and scope of UNMIL has shaped the post-conflict development of the country. Only recently have many Liberian institutions developed independence from UNMIL support and the ongoing mission drawdown has created added pressure on the GOL to demonstrate capacity and inspire long-term confidence. Despite advances in quality of life over the last decade since the war, Liberia still faces development challenges and some root causes of the initial conflict persist, while other issues are emerging. The most salient risks to peaceful elections in Liberia are political, security-based, institutional, and social factors that represent intersecting and complex state and non-state weaknesses.

POLITICAL FACTORS
Electoral System
Liberia's legal framework provides for a plurality electoral system, with senators and representatives elected by first-past-the-post voting and the president requiring an absolute majority of votes to avoid a subsequent run-off election between the top two candidates. The country also has a presidential government so political parties are not compelled to create coalitions as they would in parliamentary structures. These winner-take-all systems create a high-stakes, zero sum game that can heighten tensions around the competition and outcome. Moreover, Liberia has a relatively high number of relevant parties for its political framework (currently 22 are registered), and the extensive number of likely presidential nominees make a run-off almost inevitable. Run-offs in the past have involved, at least to some extent, high-level negotiations to garner support from various political factions, creating some noted public cynicism of the process.

Political Competition and Expectations
Discussions with citizens and other stakeholders revealed a high level of anxiety from the public regarding the abundance of political parties and assumed presidential candidates. With no clear front-runners and a plethora of competitors, there is a perceived leadership vacuum that can increase political confusion and prospects for a highly contentious process.

These insecurities are compounded by a predisposition of parties and candidates to reject election results. Previous elections have demonstrated many parties and independent candidates have been involved in election challenges, and some opposition parties are already promoting a narrative that appears to rule out the possibility of a legitimate electoral loss in the upcoming elections. It is likely the party could attempt to use small-scale mistakes or merely the perception of mistakes by election officials to discredit or challenge results in 2017. Moreover, the transition of presidential power remains of utmost importance to political competitors. Stakeholders at the national level indicated very little concern or investment in legislative outcomes, and a high-level of turnover in the House is anticipated for 2017. It is therefore unlikely that legislative gains could serve to placate parties losing in the

---

[10] "Liberia: Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) Report, 2010." USAID, May 28, 2010.
[11] DRG Assessment 2012
[12] DRG Assessment 2012
[13] *Williams vs the Independent National Human Rights Commission and the Government of Liberia,* Liberia Supreme Court Ruling, January 21, 2011

Presidential race.

SECURITY FACTORS

UNMIL Drawdown

UNMIL's current mandate expires on December 31, 2016. A United Nations (UN) assessment mission will travel to the country in August-September 2016 to provide recommendations regarding any mandate extension or reconfiguration to the Secretary General by November 15, 2016. The UN Security Council plans to decide the way forward by December 15, 2016. Per the UN Security Council's directive, the GOL and UNMIL have worked on a security transition plan, with UNMIL incrementally withdrawing control and personnel from multiple sectors over the last year and the UN transferring full authority of state security to the GOL on June 30, 2016.

The waning mandate of UNMIL raises questions regarding its impact on security surrounding the upcoming elections. Many Liberians have developed a strong sense of comfort in UNMIL's role in the post-conflict transition, and there is a fear that without its presence as a deterrent, violent actors may be emboldened, especially in the electoral environment. In reality these concerns may be overblown. UNMIL security forces have already left most counties across the country with little incident, and Liberian forces have been managing the bulk of the nation's security operations with increasing levels of independence, including for the 2014 senatorial elections, although the extent to which Liberian security actors operate may not be widely known or understood. In addition, some citizens do not differentiate between UNMIL and other UN departments that will likely remain active in Liberia, such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Food Programme (WFP), meaning general UN presence and visibility will not plunge as drastically as some anticipate. Regardless, the public's perception of insecurity without UNMIL, legitimate or not, can still undermine confidence in the electoral security environment and become potentially destabilizing.

Most critical for the upcoming elections, the UNMIL drawdown may remove the option for logistical support to fill NEC and security actors' logistical gaps that have serious potential to impair electoral operations and security. UNMIL has provided substantial communications, intelligence, engineering, transportation, and maintenance infrastructure for many aspects of public administration, some of which has already been reduced. There is not currently a clear picture as to what extent remaining equipment and substructures will be left in-country for government use.

Evolution of and Challenges to State Security

The progress - and lingering challenges - of security sector reform in Liberia is a critical backdrop for the 2017 elections. Liberian police and military forces were implicated as drivers of and participants in the mass atrocities that occurred during the civil war. Following the conflict, and as a part of the peace process, the security forces were disarmed. While the military was completely disbanded, demobilized and reconstituted, reformation of the LNP was resource-strapped and subsequently less dramatic, relying on new recruits, advisors, and training to promote change from within. Though the LNP underwent full-scale vetting to weed out conflict actors (with only 75 original LNP personnel remaining), the reform process nonetheless may have disadvantaged the LNP in both public perception – specifically not having the opportunity to completely clear its wartime image – and speed of progress in terms of size, leadership, and capacity.

The LNP force now includes approximately 5,100 trained civilian police officers; however, GOL budgetary constraints likely preclude hopes of having 6,000 by the 2017 elections. While regular officers remain unarmed, elite forces including the Police Support Unit (PSU) and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) are partially-armed and serve as rapid responders with strategic capabilities. Despite these efforts, the LNP remains ill-equipped and under-funded. Moreover, stakeholders repeatedly acknowledged a lack

of confidence in the LNP, partially as a result of logistical limitations, but also for being seen as corrupt or otherwise compromised.

Recognizing some of these shortcomings, the LNP, with the support of the international community, have been working with other county and local actors to build security and conflict resolution mechanisms within communities. County and district security councils are being developed around the country to increase coordination among various state and non-state stakeholders and build localized capacities to manage conflict. Community policing projects rely on networks of citizens to report and discourage crime, and may enhance the relationship between citizens and the LNP. Significant headway has been made, through other Liberian institutions and international initiatives, in implementing peace committees or traditional and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, working with traditional or local leaders, to resolve local conflicts, improve access to justice, and fill gaps in the justice system.

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Logistical and Resource Constraints
Elections, and effective security around elections, require intensive operational and financial support. However, despite advances in economic development since the war, Liberia faces substantial logistical and resource constraints. Providing government services in the low infrastructure and often isolated environment was, temporarily, made manageable by support from UNMIL. However, the GOL currently has not developed a plan or procured resources to cover the logistical gaps UNMIL's departure may create.

While both the NEC and the joint security forces generally recognize resource and logistical constraints, their approach to prioritizing needs and requesting support is not always strategic. County and local authorities appear to be rarely consulted, and some big ticket items tend to take precedence over more low cost solutions or essential needs. The NEC, in particular, continues to advocate for an inflated budget, at the expense of moving forward with operational planning. Without sufficient and timely financial and logistical plans and support, the NEC could see administrative errors and delays leading up to and on election day.

Over the last decade, the LNP has significantly increased its level of responsibility in managing internal security, assuming the full mandate on June 30, 2016; however, while their manpower and responsibility has increased, their access to logistical support has not. The LNP lacks sufficient and consistent funding, equipment, maintenance support, and communications. This includes everything from vehicles and radios to fuel and uniforms. Inadequate resources could hinder the LNP's ability to respond and to contain incidents, particularly during the electoral period when the LNP is already strained by the broad deployment of its officers to polling centers across the country and simultaneous staffing of mobile support units.

Government Coordination and Decentralization
Poor government coordination, turf wars, and bottlenecks at many levels of government are clouding responsibilities and creating inefficiencies around electoral security. While shifts in UNMIL's mandate after June 30 means that it will no longer serve as the immediate back-up force for the LNP in the case of internal unrest, there is no clear chain of command or rules of intervention for the AFL, the presumptive reinforcements. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Ministry of Justice (in charge of the LNP) and the Ministry of Defense (responsible for the AFL) has yet to be signed, the absence of which could contribute to significant confusion and likely exacerbate risks should the President deploy the AFL to contain an incident or incidents.

The NEC and security forces met for a two-day high-level conference in April 2016 to begin discussions

regarding the upcoming elections, which has since evolved into weekly electoral security meetings through the Inter-agency Consultative Forum on Electoral Security (ICFES). Despite these efforts, however, the operational plans of the NEC and joint security forces remain out-of-sync or ill-defined in certain areas. There is also a lack of consensus or strategy between the NEC and the joint security forces on how to best prioritize and advocate for mutually-beneficial resources and procurement needs for electoral security.

In addition, the GOL remains woefully centralized, creating disconnects and inconsistencies between national election and security structures and county and local-level administrators and officers. Information from Monrovia rarely seemed to make its way to county and local structures, and there was often an incorrect or underestimation in headquarter offices regarding the needs, concerns, and operations of local counterparts.

SOCIAL FACTORS

Historical and Emergent Grievances

A number of factors could intensify emotions around the elections, or discourage constructive civic participation. For instance, there are lingering and unresolved reconciliation and transitional justice issues throughout Liberia. Implementation of the TRC's recommendations has been incomplete, and the use of truth-telling and grievance-airing remains a sensitive topic. There are lasting apprehensions expressed by stakeholders regarding whether concerted efforts at post-conflict justice could threaten long-term peacebuilding prospects or otherwise disrupt the fragile transition.[14] A particularly contentious election could exploit some of these insecurities and/or increase ethnic tensions. Moreover, many high-profile figures from the war are likely to be running for office in the upcoming elections, further complicating how ordinary citizens effected by the conflict view and engage in the process.

Emerging issues also aggravate the political climate surrounding the elections. Stakeholders expressed increasing frustration in government corruption and lack of transparency. High-profile scandals, such as the recent large-scale bribery scheme within the GOL to facilitate the mining expeditions of a foreign firm, are eroding confidence in the government and furthering disillusionment with political leaders.[15] While the executive office has developed a task-force to swiftly investigate the allegations, damage to public opinion is already underway and may contribute to greater insecurity in the leadership of the ruling party and its affiliates.

This sentiment is compounded by citizens' profound disaffection with their legislative representatives, who were perceived as unresponsive and unaccountable. Most voters and community leaders the assessment team spoke with, particularly outside of Monrovia, expressed extreme displeasure with their representatives and senators, who they felt did not deliver on campaign promises, and rarely, if ever, made contact with their constituents once elected. Such frustration is evident in the frequent turnover during legislative elections of the past. This lack of accountability, both real and perceived, is fomenting strong cynicism around the upcoming elections. Many voters - even those that were highly politically engaged - indicated that they or their peers may not participate in the 2017 elections based on limited confidence in the candidates and faltering faith in the legislative system.

Information Environment

Liberians continue to suffer from a dearth of reliable information regarding civic and political life, and

---

[14] "Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia." International Center for Transitional Justice, May 2010. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Liberia-Beyond-TRC-2010-English.pdf
[15] "The Deceivers." Global Witness, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/thedeceivers/

general news more broadly, creating a space highly vulnerable to rumors, hearsay, and misinformation. Rural areas often have no access to print news and are limited to just one or two radio stations, if at all. Even in places with several media outlets, radio environments in which independent voices operate are increasingly crowded with sources owned by political elites or candidates and tinged with bias.

There is an overall lack of awareness and understanding of electoral processes, particularly in rural areas. Throughout the assessment, civic and voter education was consistently highlighted as one of the biggest spaces for improvement from previous elections, with clear recommendations for earlier, localized, and more robust outreach. There was noted concern about civic and voter education reaching far flung villages or more isolated areas, with criticism of Monrovia-based CSOs lacking the local understanding to translate, contextualize, and frame messages for certain communities and cultures. Gaps in information surrounding the electoral process can cause distrust and create environments where misinformation is used to manipulate and polarize the public. In addition, women tend to be disproportionately uneducated on civics and elections, which can amplify their marginalization from the democratic process.

Role of Youth
Liberia has an enormous youth population – the median age in the country is 18 – however, it is difficult to predict the role such a large and diverse population will play in the upcoming elections. There is a pervasive distrust of the youth from older generations, who often view young people as trouble-makers. Many young people suffer from unemployment and are sidelined from the country's modest development over the last decade, making them easily incentivized with financial assets or tangible goods. There is a precedent of political parties and candidates mobilizing youth – through some form of payment or other incentives – to serve as protesters, campaigners, and, in some instances, hired thugs.

However, there is a growing awareness among some young people, particularly active youth leaders, about being used and manipulated in the past by political actors that otherwise marginalize them from the process. Despite the role they play as supporters and in crowd visibility, youth are generally not politically-integrated into party apparatuses. Young people are politically underrepresented as voters, candidates, and party leaders. Efforts are underway by many youth leaders and civil society organizations to promote unity among the youth population and advocate for more responsiveness to youth-identified issues.

Given the substantial number of first-time voters that Liberia's youth bulge will bring in the upcoming elections, political parties, the NEC, and other stakeholders may confront new or unpredictable voting blocs, electoral expectations, and level of voter knowledge. Conversations throughout the assessment indicated that young people tend to identify less along ethnic and tribal lines, bringing a more nationalistic, forward-looking, and issue-based focus and approach to the electoral process.

Traditional Rituals
Traditional cultural rituals, based on beliefs of witchcraft and held within certain secret societies, include ritual sacrifice and the use of human body parts. Children, particularly young girls, are often a target. Stakeholders in several counties highlighted recent incidents of ritualist killings and stated that the practice increases around elections, as political actors seek good luck and power. However, these reports are anecdotal and complicated by the difficulty of differentiating ritualistic murders from other deaths and disappearances and/or directly linking them to the electoral process. The assessment team therefore could not confirm the veracity of each incident or quantify their frequency. Whether or not these fears are exaggerated, the assessment reveals a sense of insecurity around this issue that is expected to increase during the elections period.

HISTORIC CONFLICT FACTORS

Prior to the 2003 CPA, Liberia's background with the democratic process was troubled. As described in the Contextual Analysis section above, pre-conflict elections historically resulted in de facto one-party rule illustrated by the True Whig Party. During the conflict, elections themselves were used to fraudulently legitimize leaders, or flouted entirely in violent coup d'états. However, in the last decade since the agreement and subsequent transition, elections have, thus far, played important roles in consolidating Liberia's nascent democracy and been relatively peaceful. There have been two general elections since 2003 (in 2005 and 2011, respectively), both requiring presidential run-offs, even in the case of a sitting incumbent. There have also been a series of by-elections, and country-wide senatorial elections in 2014.

2005 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Following two years of transitional government, the 2005 presidential and legislative elections offered Liberians the opportunity to establish new representative institutions. Per the requirements of the CPA, an independent National Elections Commission (NEC) was established, although at the time it operated with heavy supervision from the UN and relied on logistical, financial, technical, and security support from the international community.

The pre-election period of the 2005 elections saw broad competition and was generally free from violence although isolated incidents, particularly violent clashes between supporters, did occur. Almost 1.3 million Liberians, approximately 90 percent of the eligible population, registered to vote. Reports from the first round of elections found the process to be credible, fair and peaceful, with minor administrative errors resulting from poorly trained poll workers and challenges in the low-infrastructure environment. International election observers lauded the enthusiasm and dedication of voters: turnout was estimated at approximately 75 percent in the first round of elections and saw incredibly long lines. UNMIL worked with the LNP to deploy two security agents at every single voting center and provided mobile units of UNMIL and Civil Police across the country.[16]

In the crowded field of presidential hopefuls – 22 in total – no candidate met the absolute majority threshold to claim victory and avoid a run-off. Populist candidate George Weah of the CDC received 28 percent of the vote, and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of the Unity Party (UP) received 20 percent, pushing them into a second round approximately four weeks later.[17]

The period between the first round and the run-off was viewed as particularly sensitive. Given Weah's background as an indigenous Liberian and Sirleaf's perceived link with elites, there were serious concerns that historical grievances would become politicized during the campaign. Concerted efforts were made by the UN, the NEC, and the candidates themselves to dissuade polarizing language and reduce tensions. UNMIL announced preparations for quick response needs to ensure the run-off campaign could be conducted in a climate free from violence and intimidation.[18]

---

[16] "Observing Presidential and Legislation Elections in Liberia." Final Report on the International Observation Delegations Sponsored by the National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center, October - November 2005. https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/15124/uploads

[17] NDI/TCC Final Report 2005

[18] "Liberia Run-Off: Background Information from the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute." November 5, 2005. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2241.html

While tense, the run-off period saw no particular incidents of violence, and the run-off election was met with similarly peaceful engagement as the first round, although turnout dropped slightly to 60 percent. Administrative mistakes and confusion were noted by observers, but the results demonstrating Sirleaf's win over Weah (59 percent to 41 percent respectively) were considered credible by observers. The CDC lodged complaints alleging electoral fraud, which the NEC investigated and heard over several weeks in an adjudication process deemed largely transparent by observers. While Weah ultimately accepted the results, CDC supporters participated in marches and protests in Monrovia in the immediate post-election period, heightening tensions and, according to some reports, engaging in intimidation, looting, and property damage.[19]

2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The 2011 elections would represent a new challenge for state and party institutions, including the NEC, to demonstrate capacities built over the last six years. The NEC received significant financial and technical support from the international community but ran the elections with autonomy. The elections were preluded by a referendum that occurred just two months prior to the presidential and parliamentary elections, placing extra strain on the NEC to deliver on both fronts.

Boundary delimitation ahead of the 2011 elections was contentious and ultimately flawed. The single-member districts used for the House of Representatives are determined by the NEC and, according to the constitution, based on population. Though a formal census was conducted in 2008, political wrangling in the legislature prevented both the use of the census as the basis for the demarcation – instead relying on voter registration figures – and the reduction of districts in areas that clearly did not meet requisite population thresholds. The result was constituency demarcations that are both technically unconstitutional and vary wildly in terms of over- and under-representation of voters. At the time of this report, the delimitation used for the 2011 elections had not yet been updated for future elections.

Voter registration and campaign period for the 2011 general elections were vibrant but generally peaceful, with minor incidents of property damage or inflammatory speech. Abuse of government power and the misuse of state resources for electoral advantage became a growing concern from observers.

UNMIL still played a logistical role in the administration of the 2011 elections, including the airlifting of materials to remote or otherwise difficult-to-access areas. The LNP managed most aspects of law and order for the process, including deploying static guards to polling stations; however, UNMIL did provide intelligence and limited operational support to security forces, and deployed patrolling forces to strategic areas.

According to reports, election day once again saw robust turnout and was free from conflict. Ultimately incumbent president Sirleaf received 44 percent of the vote, followed by the CDC's Winston Tubman with 33 percent, yet again necessitating a second round. Legislatively, out of 64 House members, only 24 were returned, and just two out of 15 Senators won re-election.

Though domestic and international observers noted that the election day voting and counting process was transparent and largely free of widespread irregularities, opposition parties alleged that the tally process was fraudulent. These charges were dismissed on account of insufficient concrete evidence

---

[19] NDI/TCC Final Report 2005

presented by the parties during the complaints process.[20] However, citing the allegations of fraud, the CDC, leading eight opposition parties, announced that they would boycott the run-off elections. Three days later, on November 7, a CDC rally turned violent as supporters spilled into the streets of Monrovia, some allegedly throwing stones at local police forces. The police purportedly used tear gas and live ammunition to control the crowd. Reports vary regarding exactly how the events unfolded that day, but at least one protester was killed and several more injured, and most reports confirm that the security forces used excessive force. The police detained almost 80 people in the aftermath, and the government ordered temporary closure of media outlets accused of inciting violence. According to the UN, UNMIL security forces quickly responded to manage the deteriorating situation.[21]

The CDC's boycott of the second round resulted in a landslide victory for Sirleaf but contributed to low voter turnout (39 percent) and a cloud over the process. However, despite the lack of political competition and the events on November 7, which the Carter Center noted as "tragic but isolated," the 2011 elections were seen as an administrative success and did not appear to substantially deter from Sirleaf's mandate.[22]

2014 SPECIAL SENATORIAL ELECTIONS
The December 2014 special senatorial elections, which were held for half the country's senatorial seats (15 contests in total), occurred in the midst of the Ebola crisis. The initial elections were initially scheduled for October, but were delayed on account of the epidemic. Voter turnout was low (25 percent), which was not unexpected given the low-profile nature of the elections and the environment in which they took place. The entire campaign period was reduced to only a few weeks, and restrictions on mass gatherings to mitigate the outbreak meant the entire process was subdued. However, according to reports from domestic election monitors, incidents of violence were linked to the highly contentious senate race between George Weah, CDC party, and Robert Sirleaf, of the UP and President Sirleaf's son.[23]

Despite its low turnout, the 2014 elections confirmed an anti-incumbent trend for Liberian legislative elections. Only two of the 12 incumbents running were re-elected, reflecting the extensive legislative turnover that has been seen in previous elections. A number of losing candidates challenged the results, but many allegations were dismissed in the subsequent complaint proceedings.[24]

Notably, the GOL, in particular the LNP, administered electoral security forces completely independent of UNMIL for the 2014 elections with little incident. However, the NEC made a last minute, emergency request to UNMIL for logistical support (one ship and three helicopters) to transport materials to four different counties. According to the NEC, the unique nature of the 2014 election – in particular the unclear and ultimately truncated timeline – made it almost impossible to plan and implement logistics in those areas, thus requiring the last minute support.

TRENDS AND ANALYSIS
The pre-electoral environment in Liberia tends to be relatively free of intimidation or widespread violence, although low-level incidents and clashes between rivals occur. The pre-election period,

---

[20] TCC Final Report 2011
[21] Special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 16 April 2012, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Liberia%20S2012%20230.pdf
[22] TCC Final Report 2011
[23] "Special Senatorial Election, Final Report." Elections Coordinating Committee (ECC), 2014.
[24] ECC Final Report 2014

however, is prone to the misuse of state resources and other tactics that could create an uneven playing field or incite tensions during the campaign. Election day has similarly seen low-levels of violence and largely isolated incidents of damage to materials or threats. These threats were usually directed at NEC staff or between rival supporters. Nevertheless, Liberia's recent electoral history has demonstrated that the immediate post-election period, in particular the time between the first and second presidential rounds, is highly sensitive and susceptible to conflict.

Historical Risks for Electoral Violence

Past experience has shown that heightened competition around the process, and the perception that the process is not free or credible, can incite tensions. It also demonstrated the likelihood of these tensions arising in Monrovia and the surrounding regions. That said, in addition to mobilizing support, losing contestants have also regularly used electoral complaint mechanisms in the post-election period, demonstrating a general willingness to work, to a certain extent, within the legal framework.

The security of sensitive materials as they travel, especially to more rural areas, and protection of county and national election offices has been threatened in the past, with several reports of tabulation centers mobbed and vandalized by crowds during ballot consolidation, or protests surrounding the NEC office in Monrovia. In addition, stakeholders cited simultaneous rallies of different parties at the same location as a source of local-level conflict in the past elections.

One of the most frequent complaints in previous elections is related to trucking voters over country, county, and district lines, both for the voter registration period to acquire registration cards and on election day. Trucking can distort political representation by enabling candidates to be elected with limited accountability to citizens in their districts. While trucking voters has not resulted in serious incidents of violence in the past, it has increased frustration and cynicism among voters. Trucking of voters can also undermine the integrity of the electoral results while being difficult to quantify in the face of electoral challenges.

Historical Challenges to Electoral Security Management

The November 7, 2011 incident also raised some questions regarding the efficacy and ethics of security forces in containing large, aggrieved crowds. Conversations with stakeholders highlighted other factors from previous elections that hamper electoral security planning and effective response. In particular, the release of funds for election day operations, particularly related to security personnel stipends, has typically come at the last minute, jeopardizing the timely deployment of security staff and necessary elections materials. Security officers involved in previous elections expressed frustration over late or insufficient stipends and a lack of food and water. In some cases, officers refused to execute their duties - including escorting sensitive materials - without payment, and the burden fell on NEC officials to provide basic resources and/or transportation to deployed forces. In addition, some security forces had problems deploying to far flung polling stations, and in a few reported cases, never made it to their final destination. There was also some inconsistency regarding whether officers were deployed separately from polling staff, or together, blurring the lines of responsibility for security transportation.

Historical Intensity of Electoral Violence

Generally, successive national elections marked by competitiveness, transparency, and widespread participation have provided foundations to normalize the democratic process. Recognizing the localized nature of most violence in previous elections but also the predilection for post-election protests and

weak security management, and referencing the electoral security framework's incident coding system,[25] the level of violence in previous elections can be characterized as relatively low with isolated incidents of serious violence. The full incident coding chart can be found in Annex II.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

There are a number of state and non-state stakeholders that will shape the electoral security environment for the upcoming 2017 elections. This section will describe the roles of the key players in the process and how they may impact risks or serve to help mitigate election-related violence. Below is a diagram demonstrating some of the direct and indirect relationships of state stakeholders, which will be extrapolated in more detail throughout this section.

Figure 1: Stakeholder Diagram

THE NATIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION (NEC)
The NEC is an independent body comprised of seven commissioners nominated by the president and confirmed by the senate and is responsible for all aspects of election administration. The institution is highly centralized, with the Monrovia-based board and bureaucracy developing policy, making decisions, and managing many election processes such as party registration and candidate nomination. Voter registration, polling day, and tabulation are administered at the local level through the NEC's 19 magistrate offices located in each of the 15 counties[26]. The NEC is expected to receive less technical and donor support for the 2017 elections than it has in the past, and management of an election of such size, scope, and political contention will be a testament to the commission's skill and maturity. The NEC

---

[25] The Electoral Security Assessment framework describes the first level of violence as "…violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspapers being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents" while the second level is comprised of "…violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture." Taking into account the relatively open and peaceful campaign period and voting process, Liberia's post-conflict history of elections can be considered a 1.

[26] Four of the largest counties have two magistrates to manage the population. This includes Bong, Lofa, Montserrado, and Nimba.

generally enjoys a positive reputation[27], but the impartiality of some election officials has been questioned for being too closely aligned to certain parties or political leaders.

Given the importance of the 2017 elections, insecurities surrounding UNMIL's departure, and party reluctance to immediately cede defeat, the NEC's performance for the upcoming elections will be under considerable scrutiny. Any real or perceived lack of credibility in the process could be used to dispute the outcome. Unfortunately, priorities outlined in the NEC's budget and operational plans do not altogether align with the most substantial concerns for electoral integrity and security. At the time of this report, the most recent iteration of the election budget included over $20 million for biometric voter registration (BVR), a system that, while convenient, is unnecessary, and lacks sufficient resources and time for proper implementation by the February 2017 voter registration period.

Planning documents and strategies underestimate forthcoming operational challenges and fail to focus on trouble-shooting significant gaps that may need to be addressed in light of UNMIL's departure. The current operational and strategic plans do not realistically consider needs at the magistrate level, answer major operational questions such as whether magistrates will be moved to different counties - as was done in 2014 - and does not at any point reference security forces and how they may or may not play a role in the process.

While some concerted steps are being taken now to coordinate strategies with the joint security forces' plan, specifically through weekly ICFES meetings, the NEC continues to separate themselves at higher levels from the joint security forces during electoral planning activities. The NEC did not provide any input to the security forces' elections plan, nor did it seek feedback from security actors regarding its operational or strategic plans. This has led to some discrepancies and possible misunderstandings between the two bodies, particularly related to the security forces role and deployment during the voter registration period, logistical responsibilities related to deployment and materials transfer, security trainings, and perceived risks in specific electoral activities and potential conflict areas.

The Inter-Party Consultative Committee (IPCC)
The NEC works with registered political parties through the Inter-Party Consultative Committee (IPCC), which serves as a forum to provide parties with information regarding the elections and solicit feedback regarding plans, concerns, or disputes. However, given the large number of registered political parties, the NEC's control of the agenda, and the voluntary nature of the IPCC, the forum is limited in the level of constructive dialogue it can encourage while still providing basic information on election updates. The NEC has also alluded to using the IPCC to facilitate political party trainings to promote better internal democracy and support party poll-watching, which not only could be considered out of its purview but also requires time, expertise, and resources that could be allocated elsewhere.

Civic and Voter Education
Civic and voter education remains a central pillar in ensuring informed participation in the elections, but also in reducing the likelihood of violence in the face of unknown or misunderstood electoral procedures and protocols. To address this, the NEC is spearheading an ambitious civic and voter education effort that includes not only producing messages and materials but also accrediting civil society to disseminate this information. The NEC has budgeted over $4 million for civic and voter

---

[27] USAID's 2014 Liberia Electoral Access and Participation Survey, which assessed citizen perceptions across the electoral environment in a nationally representative sample, found that 42% of respondents had a "very favorable" attitude toward the National Elections Commission (NEC), and 46% had a "somewhat favorable" attitude toward the NEC.

education, although managing such a large initiative could be challenging. While the accreditation process has yet to be detailed, such procedures could limit civic voice and in particular the need identified by local communities to use local actors for voter outreach instead of or in addition to Monrovia-based CSOs.

Moreover, linking civic and voter education can result in a delay in starting, and limit penetration for, civic education, which could be more critical in the face of a political transition, which requires an understanding well beyond electoral specifics. The NEC's timeline for either civic or voter education does not begin until December 2016, just before the voter registration period, although most citizens interviewed reported not only the necessity, but the eagerness, to begin civic and voter education as soon as possible. Many community-based organizations are well prepared, and almost restless, to start outreach but lack funding.

Procedural Vulnerabilities

Based on stakeholder interviews, vulnerabilities in the elections were identified that could become fodder for parties seeking to challenge voters, candidates, or results. For instance, the NEC's enthusiasm for BVR included public advocacy for the system, with the explicit implication that the more traditional form of registration was insufficient and vulnerable to fraud. It is now clear BVR cannot be implemented in the time allotted, but, partially as a result of the NEC's BVR campaign, there is now more distrust in the current, traditional system.

Another issue is an amendment to the legal framework requiring that voters must register - and subsequently vote - at the registration center "where he or she ordinarily resides," a change from the previous system that essentially allowed citizens to choose their registration and polling place.[28] While such a clause was designed to prevent trucking - and is otherwise a best practice in voter registration - the amendment is widely unknown to voters and even election administrators. Magistrates and commissioners provided multiple conflicting interpretations of the law, and there is currently no plan for enforcing the measure or educating the public about it. Unclear or inconsistent application of the clause during the registration period could create serious voter confusion or aggravate pre-existing grievances.

Finally, while campaign finance regulations exist, the NEC openly admitted that they have no effective mechanism for collecting, monitoring, and enforcing campaign finance rules, particularly in the pre-election period. Parties also lack a thorough understanding of how to report finance data and do not have the systems in place that distinguish operational funds from campaign funds. This could become problematic in cases where parties challenge campaign finance violations, such as issues related to foreign funding, which are likely to occur. Without consistent campaign finance enforcement, the NEC creates vulnerabilities related to the eligibility of parties or candidates that could be disputed at critical points in the process.

Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Given the level of competition and high stakes associated with the 2017 elections, electoral complaints, particularly in the immediate post-election period, are likely to be numerous. The NEC's ability to capably, impartially, and transparently process challenges could impact whether parties feel they have effective avenues for redress and how they view the credibility of the results. According to the electoral code, the dispute resolution process is administered and adjudicated by the NEC. Complaints are first managed at the polling station level. If the issue is not satisfactorily resolved, it moves to higher level

---

[28] Republic of Liberia New Elections Law, 2015

reviews, to the magistrate level, and then to the central commission in Monrovia. Any voter, candidate, or registered political party can file complaints via standardized forms provided by the NEC or submitted in writing elsewhere within seven days of the offense. Only after the NEC has administered a final decision on a complaint can it be appealed to the Supreme Court.

For the last general elections, the NEC's dispute resolution team at the national level received international support to process complaints, which still suffered from some delays. Such support may not be available for the 2017 elections and the NEC's legal division, charged with organizing, managing, and implementing the complaints process, has not yet instilled a large degree of confidence in their capabilities. For instance, the mismanagement and inconsistent interpretations of the voter registration amendment and delays in election regulation finalization falls under its purview.

With limited support and legal expertise at the local level, electoral complaint mechanisms at the polling station and magistrate level have suffered from low capacities, insufficient staff and/or poor training in the past. While the NEC is attempting to address this for 2017 by providing hearing officers that can help manage and process complaints, it is unclear who these will be and what capacity or preparation they will have.

In addition, the judges that preside over election cases in the instance that complainants exhaust the avenues available within the NEC have demonstrated a lack of knowledge or appreciation for electoral concerns. For instance, the Supreme Court was criticized for its management of a party petition ahead of the 2014 senate elections, which put a hold on all activities just two weeks prior to election day. The court's hearing of election appeals has been incredibly slow, raising concerns for speedy post-election resolutions.

NEC Magistrates
Discussions with NEC magistrates within the counties demonstrated stark divisions between the central commission in Monrovia and the local level. During the time period of the assessment, magistrates appeared almost completely unutilized and disengaged from the central office; one expressed the sentiment, "We sit, and we await instructions." NEC magistrates were almost entirely in the dark regarding the budget and operational plans for 2017, and most did not have a clear understanding of the electoral code since the 2014 changes. Some only received the election calendar when it had been finalized for public consumption. Generally, political parties and civil society organizations in Monrovia demonstrated substantially more knowledge regarding electoral developments than the NEC's own county-based staff.

Magistrate offices are also insufficiently resourced and appear to have largely been ignored since the last active electoral period. Transportation and telecommunications gaps persist, while many magistrate offices lacked basic needs such as office supplies, printers, and electricity. Magistrates also highlighted some security concerns, particularly related to the safety of their warehouses which hold sensitive election materials, as well as the magistrate offices. Several magistrates reported the offices - which serve as central ballot consolidation centers - being mobbed by crowds or attacked by supporters during and immediately following the tabulation. Magistrates were not informed about the NEC's meetings and coordination with security forces; in fact those that knew about the NEC security conference had found out via media coverage of the event. The level of engagement of election magistrates in county security councils or with local security actors varied by location.

THE LNP AND JOINT SECURITY FORCES
The LNP relies on a joint security strategy for elections because it lacks sufficient manpower to provide full coverage of the 2080 voting centers (over 5000 individual polling stations) on its own while

maintaining reserve forces and mobile units. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Liberia National Fire Service (LNFS) also provide electoral security. Typically, two officers are deployed per voting center, and the security forces also make provisions for escorting sensitive materials to and from centers, and guarding the warehouses within which the materials are stored.

The 2017 Election Security Plan

Based on current operational plans, the BIN will dedicate 1000 personnel to the effort, the LNFS 350, and the DEA 200 to the LNP's pre-existing cadre, for a total force of 7315 organized around the elections. The non-LNP personnel largely serve as "static guards" at voting centers and do not have the power to arrest or other police authority. A $6.7 million budget accompanies the operational plan and addresses previous gaps related to stipend availability and management and deployment logistics, but has yet to be approved and is not currently considered by the NEC to be part of the elections budget. Joint security forces cannot finalize or operationalize draft plans without the necessary funds.

Despite regular meetings, the operational plan and a number of other prevailing election security assumptions have not been reconciled with the NEC, however. For instance, the assessment team heard discrepancies related to election security training, including who is responsible for it and when, as well as the role and deployment of BIN officers during the voter registration period.

To the extent possible, the joint forces plan to deploy officers within their own counties to avoid any significant cross-country travel or cultural clashes. However, some PSU and ERU officers may be deployed to new areas, especially areas identified as vulnerable by the LNP, and may require additional trainings to sensitize them to the local environment.

Response Capacity and Challenges

Large-scale deployment of security actors comes with serious challenges, not the least of which is meeting the logistical requirements necessary for the operation which are currently inadequate. The capacity of the LNP will be stretched around elections and can be exceeded in certain scenarios. Given the sensitivity of the immediate post-election period, particularly in county capitals and Monrovia, officers will have to be quickly redeployed from their voting center locations to provide security in hot spots in the immediate aftermath. Should large-scale violence or multiple simultaneous violent events occur while security forces are thinly dispersed across the country, the situation would be difficult to contain. Moreover, according to electoral assistance stakeholders, approximately 30 percent of voting centers lack cellular coverage, meaning officers deployed at such locations would require long-range radios in order to report serious incidents of violence or calls for back-up on election day, which thus far have not been sufficiently budgeted for.

Because the AFL only deploys internally at the express direction of the President, the role of the AFL in electoral security is uncertain. While the relationship between the LNP and the armed forces is improving according to stakeholders, clashes at low levels between police and military officers continue to be reported, further necessitating a clear coordinating mechanism between the institutions.

CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

While the NEC is an independent government body separate from the Cabinet, a number of Ministries play roles in shaping the electoral security environment at the highest levels. The efficacy, priorities, and capacity of these institutions can either mitigate or exacerbate pre-existing threats to a peaceful process. The central government has demonstrated some coordination and knowledge gaps related to the elections and a reluctance to take responsibility to secure needed budgets and procurement.

The most relevant government institutions for election security are the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Ministry of Finance & Development Planning (MFDP), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA)/local government. All of these bodies fall under the Executive office, which maintains a strong influence over their operations and fosters real and perceived links to the UP. Any presumed politicization of government institutions involved in the elections can undermine confidence in election administration and security, particularly by opposition leaders.

Ministry of Justice
The MoJ plays several roles related to electoral security. Chiefly, the Ministry is the overarching authority for the LNP and the rest of the joint election security forces. In addition, the MoJ may be called upon to investigate and prosecute electoral violations and disputes that are appealed to the courts. In previous elections, stakeholders indicated that the ministry rarely embraced either responsibility within the electoral context. Many security officers and election administrators highlighted late and incomplete funds as the biggest hindrance to security for the elections in 2011 and indicated that the MoJ did not take as active a role as it could to advocate for the budget and timely allocation.

Ministry of Defense
While the MoD does not have any specific electoral mandate, it is responsible for the AFL. The relationship between the LNP and the AFL is reliant on communication and protocols between the MoD and the MoJ, which are currently weak. The LNP and AFL have been conducting joint exercises together to better prepare for any instance in which the two forces may have to work side by side. However, the AFL is largely untested, and the absence of an MOU between the two ministries outlining AFL rules of engagement places the security environment in a vulnerable position, particularly in the case of widespread violence that could necessitate the president to order military intervention.

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
The MFDP is the sole government financier for the elections, not only securing funds for the process, but also controlling the timeline for allocation. Given the substantial problem with timely and sufficient election security finances in the past, the MFDP's approach to the 2017 electoral budget will be critical. However, conversations with stakeholders revealed the MFDP as rather passive and vague on budget priorities and operations. The MFDP appears to be jettisoning some budget management and accountability responsibilities to other ministries and the executive. The ministry also convoluted the annual operational budget of the NEC with its election-administration-specific requests and conflated that budget with the separate election security budget. The MFDP was unable to conjecture the timeline for budget allocation or what monies would be available for the elections in the 2017/2018 fiscal year.

Ministry of Internal Affairs/Local Government
The President appoints local government administrators, including County Superintendents, and, in the absence of local elections, mayors and chiefs as well, all of which are managed through the MIA. While county government does not have a specified role in the electoral process, it is integral in coordinating local security forces and can influence the elections in many ways. Superintendents are often in charge of securing public spaces and roads for campaigning parties and candidates and chair county security councils that bring together relevant security stakeholders. Given their association with the president and the ruling party, local governments have been implicated in the past for misusing state resources for electoral advantage.

POLITICAL PARTIES
The threshold to become a recognized and registered political party in Liberia is relatively low. There are currently 22 parties registered, with more anticipated to come as politicians make decisions regarding the 2017 elections. Of the 22, ten currently have representation in the Senate, with no party

holding an absolute majority. They include the Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD), the Alternative National Congress (ANC), the CDC, the Liberty Party (LP), National Democratic Coalition (NDC), National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), the National Union for Democratic Progress (NUDP), the National Patriotic Party (NPP), People's Unification Party (PUP), and the UP. A number of new parties are also gaining momentum in the pre-election period.

Political parties in Liberia are still underdeveloped and remain largely driven by standard bearers and other individual leaders, not ideology or policy platforms. Parties are also poorly funded, often relying on the coffers of individual leaders or from diaspora support. In some areas, political party identity still falls along ethnic or regional lines. Aside from the main opposition stalwart, the CDC, the crowded field of parties are not clearly delineated as ruling or opposition factions, and they tend to have shifting allegiances depending on the election. Some of the smaller and newer parties the team spoke with seemed to recognize the inevitability of building coalitions with other parties ahead of the 2017 elections.

Limited resources and capacity inhibit parties' abilities to safeguard party interests before, on, and after election day, including collecting credible information on electoral irregularities or fraud through party poll-watchers. Most parties interviewed had fielded party agents in previous elections but admitted being unable to provide full, or close to full, coverage in every polling station. Political parties in Liberia have rarely been able to offer credible data to support lodged electoral complaints. In addition, some magistrates and civil society leaders criticized party poll-watchers for being poorly trained, unprofessional, and disruptive.

In the last decade, political parties and their leaders have been one of the primary drivers for election-related conflict in the country. Though registered parties have signed a Code of Conduct that, among other items, pledges to promote peaceful elections and abstain from inflammatory tactics, enforcement mechanisms like the IPCC are weak and voluntary.

Political parties in Liberia have the potential to both incite and mitigate conflict. They lack the ability to hold party leaders and standard bearers accountable, and with limited nationwide coverage and internal structures, many parties struggle to engage with voters and control party messages. While some political parties may have an incentive to drive conflict for electoral gain, most of them lack the size and capacity to mobilize large bases, with the exception of the UP and the CDC.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society in Liberia plays an important role in peacebuilding, citizen engagement, and promoting government accountability. Compared to other stakeholders, local civil society organizations appear the most attuned to community issues and needs, and they are often the most effective in providing trainings and support at local levels. Many CSOs and CBOs interviewed have been involved in conflict mitigation, women's empowerment, and civic education and were eager to begin voter education campaigns. Despite good faith initiatives, Liberian civil society is limited by resources and capacity.

The Election Coordinating Committee (ECC)

Nonpartisan citizen election monitors, in particular the Election Coordinating Committee (ECC), a nationwide coalition of several major civil society networks, is generally well-known and respected. The organization deployed approximately 2000 observers for both the 2011 and 2014 elections, releasing several in-depth statements. The ECC is currently planning to do extensive long-term election observation, including of the voter registration and campaign periods and post-election dispute resolution processes. The organization is also prepared to monitor the potential constitutional referendum poll, the general elections in October 2017, and the possible run-off in November 2017.

Given the pressure surrounding the upcoming elections, the ECC has the opportunity to play a critical role. However, the organization currently struggles with the resources, capacity, and focus for more comprehensive or systematic election observation.

Motorcycle Unions
Liberian motorcycle unions provide organization to some of the country's most at-risk populations, including ex-combatants and young men. The unions are highly organized and have influence in their communities across the country. However, many community stakeholders raised concerns about the unions' proclivity toward violence and how they can be easily mobilized. A common sentiment among stakeholders regarding the unions was, "You touch one, and you touch them all."

Motorcyclists often provide escorting for candidates and politicians in exchange for payment or gasoline, but this service appears available across party lines and not an expression of support. While the potential exists for them to be hired for troublemaking or otherwise exploited for their numbers, one mitigating factor is that they are not a monolithic group politically. There is no party or candidate that has predominant influence over the unions as a whole.

MEDIA
Radio remains the most widely used and available form of media in Liberia. There are over 100 radio stations across the country, providing coverage to all 15 counties. An active network of community-based radio stations often participates in voter education and anti-violence campaigns and provides forums for political debate and, in some cases, security briefings. Most of these stations have signed Codes of Conduct regarding accurate, equitable, and responsible coverage and are members of the Press Union of Liberia (PUL), an advocacy and self-regulatory body for journalists.

Such stations lack resources which can create conflicts of interest when seeking additional funds. Some community radio stations are being financially supported by candidates and other politically interested individuals in exchange for influence. Moreover, there is a growing concern of politicians purchasing and running their own private stations. Thus some radio outlets are increasingly compromised and politically biased, creating the potential for them to be used to mobilize - or agitate - supporters around elections or contribute to misinformation. Stations typically follow "pay to play" models so any buyer can purchase airtime, political or otherwise, creating obstacles to information quality and equitable coverage during an election season. Further, most radio stations rely on talk-shows and call-ins to fill airtime. These usually allow a relatively unmoderated platform for guests and unvetted phone calls from listeners that can often be more venting or confrontational than informative. Such formats can be difficult to manage in terms of accuracy and content, and can fuel rumors.

Access to the internet in Liberia, particularly via mobile phones, has more than doubled since the previous general elections, including the use of social media.[29] It is unclear what, if any, influence this may have in the upcoming 2017 elections as a conflict mitigating factor or escalator. Social media can be utilized to disseminate important voter education messages, but also serves as a venue for mobilization. Social media could play a substantial role in Monrovia, which is not only a vulnerable area for electoral violence but also has the highest internet penetration in the country.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
There remains a substantial dependence on the international community, particularly for resources but

---

[29] International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and database, and World Bank estimates.

also technical assistance and training. In addition, in the anxiety surrounding UNMIL's departure, many actors are calling for a greater international presence around the elections. Political parties, and particularly the CDC, emphasized the importance of international election observers as one of the only ways to deter electoral fraud. The US government, UN agencies, and other donors are providing support to election administration, civil society organizations, and the security sector ahead of the 2017 elections.

USAID is providing multifaceted programming to support the NEC, CSOs, and media outlets. An $11 million cooperative agreement with Internews is concentrated on Liberia Media Development (LMD); building sustainable, independent, and professional media houses and promoting freedom of the press and information. Through the Liberia Elections and Political Transitions (LEPT) program, a $15 million cooperative agreement with the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes (CEPPS), USAID is supporting the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to work directly with the NEC to develop technical capacity required to effectively manage the electoral cycle and enhance key relationships, including with the IPCC and the National Civil Society Council of Liberia. USAID partner the National Democratic Institute (NDI) is working with the Elections Coordinating Committee on election monitoring as well as with other Liberian CSOs to implement strategic community-based voter education campaigns related to both the possible constitutional referendum and the 2017 general election.

USAID is also providing assistance to support the long-term institutional development of the NEC via the Liberia Administrative and Systems Strengthening (LASS) activity, a $4 million contract with IBI International. The LASS program works with the NEC commissioners and offices on specific focus areas, including Strategic Planning, Human Resource Management, Financial Management Systems, Information and Communications Technology Systems, and Procurement, to develop critical administrative and operational systems, policies, and procedures.

UNDP, in partnership with the European Union (EU), is also providing technical and financial assistance to the NEC through the Elections Project. While UNDP and IFES work in close collaboration, the institutions have carved out certain areas within the technical development of the NEC. UNDP has provided BRIDGE training courses, spearheaded work with the NEC regarding electoral security, and taken the lead on electoral framework consolidation and dispute resolution mechanisms. That said, there is still some overlap, and occasional confusion, in coordinating technical assistance particularly in cross-cutting sectors like gender inclusion, civic and voter education, and political party engagement.

Concurrently, the US Department of State through INL, alongside UNMIL, the Embassy of Sweden, and the EU, has provided critical assistance to the LNP and other national and local security actors to consolidate domestic capacity to maintain and increase an effective, responsive, and comprehensive security force. INL works with the LNP on leadership development and trainings, operations and logistical support, leadership development and trainings, operations and logistical support, and the training and equipping of the PSU and ERU. INL also works with the Liberian DEA to increase the state's ability to manage drug and narcotics interdiction and other drug prevention and treatment capacities. In May 2016, President Sirleaf and U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas Greenfield launched the national security radio communication network under which INL will rehabilitate the national security radio communications system of the GOL through the augmentation of existing infrastructure. The contract will also include extensive technical training for a team of GOL civilian security personnel who will be given the skills and capabilities to maintain the network and mobile communications equipment. The GOL is establishing a Technical Center of Excellence, which will serve as the hub for this new network and technical team, and has committed to funding the ongoing costs of running the new network.

There is a growing ECOWAS presence, and the organization has been implementing an early warning/early response system through the Peacebuilding Office and Liberian CSO networks that should link to the U.S. Government (USG)-funded broader ECOWARN system. While this early warning system is not specifically focused on electoral violence it could provide valuable information closer to election day if implemented in a systematic and comprehensive way. ECOWAS has stated that it will not be providing any security presence for the elections, but it is likely to have electoral observers present on election day.

ASSESSMENT OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS

The Liberia Electoral Security Assessment distilled a number of risks related to both the potential for electoral violence, as well as challenges to broader electoral security planning and management to mitigate or contain violence in the pre-election, election day, and post-election period. These findings are summarized in the problem statement, but explained in more detail throughout this section and considered in risk analysis as well as scenario planning.

MAJOR FINDINGS

Overall, the likelihood of widespread violence is low, however there were many contextual and stakeholder-related risks that emerged from the assessment that could be vulnerable to triggers or create challenges for comprehensive electoral security. Of these risks, only a handful have both 1) a high likelihood or high frequency of occurrence and 2) a high degree of impact on the severity of possible electoral violence. They include factors that can directly drive electoral conflict, as well as factors that can inhibit the mitigation, management, and mediation of such violence.

Overall Findings:

- **The assessment found that the risk of widespread violence is relatively low.** The pre-electoral environment in Liberia tends to be relatively free of intimidation or widespread violence, although low-level incidents and clashes between rivals may occur. However, a number of vulnerabilities and potential triggers exist that could spark some level of pre- or post-election violence in particular circumstances as elaborated on in the following sections.

- **Liberia's recent electoral history demonstrates that the immediate post-election period, in particular the time between election day and the run-off election, is highly sensitive and susceptible to conflict.** With a highly fragmented political party system, a second round in 2017 is likely. Run-off elections in the past have involved, at least to some extent, high-level negotiations to garner support from various political factions, creating noted public cynicism of the process.

- **While the security sector continues to experience capacity and resource constraints, the LNP have received significant international support in the post-conflict period and have built a basic level of operational and strategic capacity**. Higher prioritization within the GOL on planning and allocation of resources will be required to enable security actors to execute this strategy and perform effectively during the electoral period.

- **The LNP has partnered with other domestic security actors to develop a Joint Security Strategy for the 2017 elections to provide full coverage for the anticipated 2080 voting centers.** However, GOL budgetary restraints likely preclude hopes of having a

requisite number of officers appropriately trained and in place by Election Day.

- **GOL has not to date developed a plan or procured resources to accommodate comprehensive electoral and security logistical needs.** While the UNMIL drawdown is not expected to have serious implications for election security, if UNMIL departs ahead of the 2017 elections, it will remove the option for an emergency logistical backup to NEC operations and security forces should unanticipated challenges emerge.

- **The assessment noted that Monrovia is an area particularly vulnerable to electoral violence, based on both past precedent, but also due to its dense population and likelihood as a focal point for any major electoral grievances.** While other vulnerable areas likely exist throughout the country, Monrovia is one of the most at-risk for isolated conflict igniting more widespread mobilization.

Risk Factors for Electoral Violence

- **The 2017 presidential election is expected to be highly competitive.** With President Sirleaf stepping down at the end of her second and final constitutionally-mandated term, competition is heightened and magnified as there is no incumbent or clear front runner vying for the presidency. There is intense jockeying for position within and outside government by political actors seeking to maintain or access power and control of state resources. An abundance of presidential candidates from the 22 registered political parties have already emerged, and the crowded field is anticipated to be highly competitive. The crowded field with no frontrunners is generating substantial anxiety and confusion among the public.

- **Political parties and leaders may be predisposed to reject electoral results. An apparent sense of overconfidence on behalf of key opposition actors and unresolved grievances from past elections raise concerns that unfavorable results might be rejected.** This is significant in a country in which political parties and their leaders have been one of the primary drivers for election-related conflict in past elections.

- **The NEC faces some capacity and logistical challenges that could compromise electoral integrity and reduce confidence in the results, further fueling party discontent**. Given the importance of the 2017 elections, insecurities surrounding UNMIL's departure, and potential reluctance of parties to immediately concede defeat, the NEC's performance will be under considerable scrutiny. Any real or perceived lack of credibility in the process could be used to dispute or discredit the outcome. The NEC generally enjoys a positive reputation and has increased its capacity since 2005, but the managing of an election the size, scope, and expected political contention of 2017 will be a test for the NEC's skill and maturity. The NEC is expected to receive less technical and donor support for the 2017 elections than it has in the past, and it continues to struggle with perception issues.

- **A low information environment susceptible to rumors and inflammatory speech could discourage civic engagement or incite undue tensions.** Liberians continue to suffer from a dearth of reliable information regarding civic and political life, and general news more broadly, creating a space highly vulnerable to rumors, hearsay, and misinformation. Rural areas often have no access to print news and are limited to just one or two radio stations, if at all. Even in places with several media outlets, radio environments in which independent voices operate are increasingly crowded with sources owned by political elites or candidates and tinged with bias. there is a growing concern of politicians purchasing and running their own private

stations. Access to the internet in Liberia, particularly via mobile phones, has more than doubled since the previous general elections, including the use of social media. It is unclear what, if any, influence this may have in the upcoming 2017 elections as a conflict mitigating factor or escalator, particularly in Monrovia, which has the highest internet penetration in the country.

Risks to Electoral Security Mitigation, Management, and Mediation

- **Key coordination gaps remain between and within the joint security forces, NEC, and AFL that if left unresolved may impede an effective response.** Poor government coordination is clouding responsibilities around electoral security. While the NEC and joint security forces are meeting regularly via the ICFES, the operational plans of the NEC and joint security forces remain out-of-sync or ill-defined in certain areas. In addition, shifts in the UNMIL mandate may mean that it will no longer serve as a back-up option for an in extremis event if the joint security forces' capabilities are overwhelmed, and there is no clear chain of command or rules of intervention for the AFL, the presumptive reinforcements.

- **The LNP and joint security forces may have their capabilities overstretched if multiple incidences occur or if resources are not made available by the GOL in a timely manner.** Inadequate resources could hinder the LNP's ability to respond and to contain multiple incidents, particularly during the electoral period when the LNP will already be strained by the broad deployment of its officers to polling centers across the country and simultaneous staffing of mobile support units. Should large-scale violence or multiple simultaneous violent events occur while security forces are thinly dispersed across the country, LNP may be unable to rapidly respond. Moreover, according to electoral assistance stakeholders, nearly a third of voting centers lack cellular coverage, meaning officers deployed at such locations would require long-range radios in order to call for back-up. The LNP lacks sufficient and consistent funding, equipment, maintenance support, and communications. Delays or shortfalls in budget allocations will decrease LNP's response abilities for the upcoming electoral period.

RISKS, TRIGGERS, AND SCENARIOS

The chart below attempts to conceptualize how the risks and triggers identified in the assessment could react over the 2017 electoral period. The triggers are not exhaustive but rather serve to demonstrate some of the potential flashpoints in the electoral process. The "Scope" column attempts to estimate the severity of the conflict, specifically the likelihood of violence remaining isolated or localized versus more widespread.

For the purposes of this exercise, the phases are divided by the Electoral Security Assessment framework's three major periods of the electoral process, although we assume in the Liberian context the possibility of two election days (first and second rounds) and therefore two post-election periods as well.

Phase	Risks	Trigger	Threats/Tactics	Scope
Pre-election	Traditional rituals	Political ambition/rituals	Ritualistic killings	Localized
	Low information NEC capacity and logistical challenges	Confusion over voter registration	Confrontation/skirmishes at centers	Localized
	High stakes political competition Poor regulation of parties	Simultaneous campaigns in same area	Clashes between rival groups	Localized
	Low information/bias information	Inflammatory media or	Intimidation, clashes	Localized

Phase				
	Historical and emergent grievances	political rhetoric		
	High stakes political competition	Unlevel campaign playing field	Intimidation, clashes, arrests	Localized and widespread
Election day	Low information NEC procedural vulnerabilities Logistical/resource challenges	Disagreement of eligibility or results at polling station level	Confrontation between supporters; attack on election officials/materials/ infrastructure	Localized
	High stakes political competition Parties predisposed to reject results	Tabulation center challenges	Attacks on election officials/materials/ infrastructure	Localized
Post-election	NEC procedural vulnerabilities Capacity and logistical/resource challenges of NEC and joint security Youth easily mobilized	Fraudulent election, or the perception of fraud	Protests, riots, unrest	Localized and widespread
	High stakes political competition Low information/bias information Capacity and logistical/resource challenges of NEC and joint security	Close election results	Protests, unrest	Localized and widespread
	High stakes political competition Parties predisposed to reject results NEC procedural and dispute resolution vulnerabilities Youth easily mobilized	Rejection of results	Protests, riots	Localized and widespread
	High stakes political competition Parties predisposed to reject results	Boycott of second round	Rallies, unrest	Localized
Anytime	Capacity/mistrust of joint security	Heavy-handed or inappropriate security response	Intimidation, unrest, confrontation between civilians and police, arrest	Localized

After considering the challenges to electoral security and which incidents could potentially become widespread if triggered, we can highlight what scenarios have substantial potential for violence. Many of these scenarios are possible or probable events outside of the control of any stakeholders – such as the result of the elections or the occurrence of simultaneous incidents. The scenario only provides the premise, and it is the planning, management, and reaction of stakeholders that influence the implications and potentials of violence associated with each.

These scenarios can help frame early warning signals and should be revisited over time to determine how vulnerable or inclined to any of these circumstances the political and security environment appears. To better target interventions and highlight priorities, political and security scenarios are examined by electoral phase below.

Phase	Scenario	Description	Implications	Questions to Consider
Pre-election or Election day	Logistical problems severely impact election administration	Logistical issues, such as transport, communication, and other infrastructure issues significantly disrupt electoral operations	Delayed or inadequately staffed/equipped election processes foments confusion, heightens opposition party grievances, and call into question the credibility of the results Could result in protests	What is the contingency plan in the case of administrative emergencies? What is the communications plan to control voter confusion and

			or violence at voter registration, polling centers, or NEC offices	mitigate anger from political contestants?
Post-election	Results are too close to call/uncertainty of outcome	Initial reports from counties or the NEC demonstrate that the outcome (either to exceed 50%+1, or between two candidates in the second round) is too close to call, resulting in delayed announcement of results or recounts	Citizens or parties react to uncertain or delayed results with unrest and accusations; could result in rallies or protests Places NEC tabulation under substantial scrutiny	How transparent was the process? What's the percentage of invalid ballots?
Anytime	Widespread or large scale protests	Large scale protests immediately before or after elections while security forces are still deployed	Joint security forces cannot contain large scale protests immediately after elections due to lack of manpower	Who and where is the backup?
	Multiple incidents	Several incidents of violence occur at the same time in different places, straining already thin security forces	Joint security forces cannot contain multiple simultaneous incidents of violence due to resource/coverage constraints	Who and where is the backup?
	Excessive force by security	Heavy handed response to protests or incidents by the LNP or other security actors	Security forces harm protesters, or incite a violent response from protesters	Is this an action of individuals or commands from above?

MITIGATING FACTORS

Contextual, historical, and stakeholder analysis reveal a number of preceding and developing risks. Such risks may be vulnerable to triggers that ignite mobilization or contravene mitigating factors, provoking conflict. However, there are a number of resiliencies that emerged throughout the assessment that should be taken into consideration when measuring the likelihoods and impacts of conflict threats. As acknowledged in the recent Conflict Vulnerability Assessment, other broad mitigating factors exist, but the following have been identified by the assessment team for their relevance to election security. In some cases, these mitigating factors can help reduce the severity of the contextual risks, or can be used by stakeholders to forestall or mediate security concerns.

Conflict fatigue and commitment to peace – Many interviewees, by and large, reflected both a low tolerance for violent conflict and the need to play an active role in the peace process. Even past conflict drivers repeated messages of nonviolence, indicating, at the very least, a pressure to appear peaceful.

Strong coordination among joint security forces – The LNP, BIN, DEA, and LNFS appeared to be well-coordinated at the local, county, and national levels. Officers were in frequent communication with one another, appeared unified on major issues, and in some instances shared offices and other resources.

Increased capacity of the LNP – Despite its limitations, the LNP is the largest and strongest it has been since the CPA. The force has experience in implementing electoral security, and opportunities exist to further prove itself following UNMIL's departure.

Support for community level security and mitigation efforts – Many actors appreciated and cited use of the county and district security councils, community policing projects, access to justice initiatives, and alternative dispute resolution outlets. The systems put in place at local levels were clearly being utilized in the majority of places visited and were helping to bridge gaps between law enforcement and citizens.

Active peacebuilding campaigns – Many CSOs are already engaging in campaigns for peace, unity, government accountability, and youth empowerment. Some CSOs the team spoke with, such as WANEP and NAYMOTE, were already engaging in election violence prevention dialogues with parties, especially youth wings. Community radio stations reported airing peace messages and jingles and running programs that helped build relationships between security forces and the community.

Shifts in political culture – Political and civic life has become increasingly open and inclusive, with youth populations expressing civic and political awareness. Inter-ethnic tensions appear to be reducing, and there is less focus on tribalism and regionalism in politics, particularly by young citizens.

Steps toward electoral security coordination – While some synchronization issues persist, there are structures in place to facilitate well-organized election security planning within and among the NEC and the joint security forces. If used well, the weekly inter-agency consultative forum can serve as a productive space to work out security details and build consensus on joint priorities.

Recent history of relatively peaceful elections – Liberians have demonstrated a commitment to the democratic process, including a high level of political participation both in voter registration and voter turnout. The public holds generally positive opinions of the NEC, and the majority believe in the credibility of electoral outcomes.[30] Moreover, the previous two national electoral contests have not demonstrated a propensity for systematic or widespread violence and have generally met international and regional standards for genuine democratic elections.

---

[30] "Final Survey Report: DRG Learning, Evaluation, and Research Activity – Liberia Electoral Access and Participation (LEAP) Survey." USAID, April 24, 2015.

ELECTORAL SECURITY PLANNING: CONSIDERATIONS AND OBJECTIVES

Over the next 14 months, there are opportunities to promote resiliencies, mitigate risks, and reduce the likelihood of conflict. However, these openings should be deliberated in the context of current and future political dynamics, funding mandates and constraints, and local capacity. Specifically, stakeholders should consider how the context may change over the upcoming electoral cycle and determine programmatic objectives based on an informed development hypothesis and understanding of the political, donor, and local environment. This section will also evaluate issues to consider for a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) in the Liberian context.

MONITORING THE CHANGING ELECTORAL CONTEXT

The electoral security assessment was conducted over a year prior to election day in order to provide sufficient time for necessary interventions or programmatic updates. There are still some pivotal pieces of data that could escalate or mitigate identified risks and triggers and substantially shape the electoral security environment.

Constitutional referendum – While political roadblocks in the legislature are currently decreasing the likelihood of a constitutional referendum ahead of – or on – election day, it remains a real and unpredictable possibility. A constitutional referendum could be a flashpoint given some of the contentious amendments included in the proposed changes[31] and put a strain on the planning and administration of both processes, potentially compromising the quality of one or both of the elections. The GOL has not budgeted for such a circumstance, and there are no contingency plans from NEC or security forces in the event of a referendum.

Budget – Election and security budgets have been developed, but their approval and timeline for allocation and disbursement are unknown. Assuming the MFDP prioritizes these budgets, it is unclear whether the legislature will approve requested funds and how long that process would take. If it is approved in full, the availability of funds within the GOL, especially for the following fiscal year, remains uncertain.

Presidential candidates – While many candidates have declared their intentions to run for president, nominations will not be official until the parties' conduct their conventions and primaries, many of which are slated for late 2016 or early 2017. The formal ballot qualification process through the NEC is not scheduled until July 2017. The ultimate pool of candidates could have an impact on the political environment and competitive fervor leading into election day.

---

[31] This includes proposals to establish Liberia as a "Christian nation," race-based citizenship requirements, reductions of term limits, and a number of land concession and decentralization changes.

Fragmentation, realignments and merging of political parties – Political party dynamics are likely to change throughout the year leading up to the election. Should relatively unified ruling and opposition coalitions emerge prior to the first round, or should the larger parties fragment further, some political calculations could substantially change leading into election day.

UNMIL presence – A UN assessment mission is slated for August-September 2016 to assess the current justice and security environment. Should the UN Security Council decide to keep an UNMIL presence after December – and how that presence is configured – may have an impact on confidence in and support to logistics for electoral security.

Shifts in political climate – Public opinion and political influence are changing every day, particularly as fallout from the recent concessions scandal continues to take shape. The political climate and the stakeholders within it could fluctuate as the elections approach.

Pending legislation – There are a number of pieces of pending legislation that could shape the electoral security framework if enacted. This includes the Police Act[32] and the Firearms and Ammunition Control Act,[33] both of which have been passed by the legislature but not yet signed by the President. Full implementation of the Local Government Law, which has thus far been slow, could have an impact on the decentralization of authority and coordination among county and national offices. Finally, passage of the Land Rights Act[34] by the Legislature could strengthen general citizen confidence in governance mechanisms.

These windows of uncertainty should be monitored regularly to determine how they impact programmatic objectives and the risks and scenarios identified in this report.

PRIMARY OBJECTIVES

Based on the findings of the electoral security assessment, including analysis of contextual and historical risks, stakeholders, triggers, and scenarios, the team has identified the following problem statement:

A highly contentious and competitive political environment surrounding the 2017 elections is shaped by opposition grievances, a history of political leaders rejecting electoral results, and political party capacity to mobilize supporters and protesters, which increase prospects for violence in the campaign and immediate post-election period. These political factors are compounded by institutional constraints, including inadequate coordination, resources, capacity and political will within and among state stakeholders, to ensure transparent and well-run elections that gain citizen confidence and to provide electoral security.

To address this problem, the assessment proposes the following developmental hypothesis:

If Liberia can foster an environment of confidence and trust in electoral and security mechanisms, reinforce civic awareness and collective commitments to peace, and better support plans and resources for electoral security, opportunities for widespread electoral violence will decrease.

---

[32] The Police Act helps further professionalize the LNP, providing clearer standards for leadership, better defined mandates and responsibilities and mechanisms to increase communication between the LNP and the public

[33] The Firearms and Ammunition Control Act creates opportunities for security forces to more easily acquire arms while placing the regulation and management of small arms control and trading within the Liberian government.

[34] The Land Rights Act would recognize the rights of communities to collectively own and manage their ancestral territory, shifting away from the current environment where land is transferred to foreign investors through concessions and local communities are largely excluded.

There are a number of programmatic objectives and intermediate results that can help achieve this goal.

PROGRAMMATIC OBJECTIVES

1. Promote political party and political leaders' ownership of electoral integrity and use of appropriate, peaceful remedies to resolve disputes.

2. Enhance joint security forces' ability to comprehensively manage the electoral security environment and rapidly respond to conflict should it occur.

3. Bolster the transparency, credibility, and security administration of the electoral process.

4. Increase the availability of accurate and independent information on elections to citizens, and engage them in peacebuilding around the electoral process and political transition.

PLANNING FOR ELECTIONS

Fortunately, the USG, implementing partners, and Liberian civic groups have already begun a number of projects that reflect some of these programmatic priorities, including security sector development and long-term planning; technical assistance, capacity-building, and logistical support to the NEC; long-term election monitoring; support for voter and civic education; and expanding and diversifying media and access to information. Pre-existing efforts should be leveraged and built upon to emphasize the above objectives.

Other donors, such as the European Union or the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) are still developing their electoral support strategies and could be conduits for areas where there are programmatic gaps, such as political party work. The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) is active in Liberia and has supported election-related projects in the past. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is supporting civic initiatives in Liberia, which could serve as a potential complementary activities for USAID or INL programs.

As projects develop, it is important to appreciate the relatively low level of capacity in Liberia, including the ability to absorb funding and additional projects. Local partners should be considered throughout every step of the planning and implementation process to ensure expectations are realistic and funding is not bloated.

RESULTS VERIFICATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE LIBERIAN CONTEXT

As aforementioned, one of the most likely electoral flashpoints in Liberia concerns the tabulation and announcement of electoral results. Given the precedent of party and contestants being reluctant to cede defeat, an independent assessment of the process before, during, and after the elections would help determine whether the will of Liberian voters is reflected in the official vote count and would promote confidence in the election results to the degree warranted. The use of long- and short-term observation activities to systematically capture and analyze qualitative and quantitative information can provide neutral, accurate, and evidence-based assessment of the overall electoral process.

For concerns related specifically to the election day vote count, a parallel vote tabulation (PVT), an advanced observation methodology that involves rapidly collecting information on the quality of the process and vote count data from observers deployed to a random, representative sample of polling

stations, can provide a nonpartisan verification of the official election results. To be credible, a PVT should be conducted by trained observers who observe and report on the entire process at the polling station on election day.[35] In the case of credible electoral processes, PVTs can confirm the official results of the election, playing a critical role in mitigating the potentials for electoral violence and more protracted conflict rooted in underlying grievances and tensions. When PVTs confirm election results, they can encourage losing parties to concede defeat. However, there are a number of issues to consider in assessing the appropriateness of a PVT in Liberia.

Given some of these concerns, the USG should consider deploying an expert to evaluate internal and external factors, including logistical and organizational constraints and political considerations, to determine the feasibility and viability of a PVT.

---

[35] Assessing and Verifying Election Results: A Decision-Maker's Guide to Parallel Vote Tabulation and Other Tools. USAID, April 2015.

ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAMMING

This section extrapolates some specific goals and activities to support the broad objectives identified in the previous section. These approaches take into consideration pre-existing projects and possible political constraints.

PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information collected during the electoral security assessment, a number of approaches have been identified that could improve electoral security programming. Considering resources available, the USG could consider expanding the scope of its current programs, or introduce additional complementary components. The sub-points under each broad objective are intermediate goals that support each objective. Activities highlighted under each sub-point are illustrative.

1) Promote political party and political leaders' ownership of electoral integrity and use of appropriate, peaceful remedies to resolve disputes
The purpose of this objective is to reduce the likelihood of political parties or candidates mobilizing supporters around violence, particularly in the instance of a rejected electoral outcome. Currently, no technical assistance provider in Liberia is working closely with the political parties. However, in order to promote a more peaceful and constructive role for parties in the electoral process, they need to be better integrated in and knowledgeable of the elections, have stronger relationships with electoral stakeholders, and actively and appropriately safeguard their interests before, during, and after election day. Given the influence of party leaders and standard bearers on party initiatives, approaches may consider seeking their buy-in for such efforts. Specific intermediate goals should include:

  a) **Foster more constructive and engaged dialogue between political parties and relevant stakeholders, including the NEC, security forces, and civil society at the national and local level**
  Building more open communication between the parties and the election commission can solidify party investment in the process and reduce misinformation. It could help ensure political parties are on the same page regarding the rules of the game. As political parties in Liberia continue to splinter and multiply, it is important that multiparty dialogue increases to leverage common goals. Creating more venues for communication with the LNP can build confidence in security and diffuse some tensions, especially with parties that may otherwise associate the force with the ruling government. Some activities to consider are:
  - Strengthen the IPCC's role in communications and coordination
    - Increasing the number of IPCC meetings or varying formats for such meetings; developing special IPCC sessions with less management from the NEC and more open discussion with other political parties
    - Encourage senior leadership attendance to IPCC meetings so that critical election information is received by decision-makers
    - Civil society and security forces be invited to attend, participate in, or even lead certain IPCC meetings

- IPCC meetings continually revisit the electoral code of conduct signed by parties to promote self-regulation. Encourage discussion of possible enforcement mechanisms, and encourage the IPCC to publicize the Code of Conduct content through the media
- Foster better working relationships between the LNP and political parties, at the national level, including by utilizing the IPCC and other national forums
- Amplify the roles of existing local level coordinating bodies, including promoting party representative attendance to county and district security council meetings
- Consider other local forums that can promote inter-party dialogue beyond security councils, which will not always be an appropriate avenue for local party election concerns, discussions, and questions

b) **Improve party capabilities for well-trained and effective party poll-watching**
More effective mechanisms for participating in and analyzing the electoral process would better serve party interests and hold them more accountable in the complaints process. Some activities to consider are:
- Multiparty poll-watching training-of-trainers, including how to capture and report information beyond simply the election results; include the development of a party poll-watcher handbook and standardized election day checklist
- Consultations with party leaders on the goals of party poll-watching, how to develop a cogent cascade training plan, and how to build structures to capture information required to seek redress for violations of electoral related rights and safeguard voting results
- Consultations on components of coalitions: While it will ultimately be up to each individual party to determine to what degree they are willing to work with other parties through non-alliance coordination, most parties in Liberia will not be able to achieve nationwide agent coverage of polling stations, and they could consider collaborative effort to maximize resources.

c) **Increase party awareness of electoral procedures and election law, including the appropriate use of complaint processes**
More frequent and accessible information regarding the electoral process, and particularly dispute resolution, can help reduce the likelihood of party and voter confusion and help parties feel they have clear avenues for peaceful redress. Some actions to consider include:
- NEC provides timely and complete information regarding its election dispute resolution mechanisms on the local and national levels
- Sample complaint forms made available online
- NEC or third party offer trainings to parties on filling out complaint information
- Incorporate complaint process filing into party poll-watcher trainings

2) Enhance joint security forces' abilities to comprehensively manage the electoral security environment and rapidly respond to conflict should it occur
The purpose of this objective is to ensure that any potential or real electoral violence can be effectively mitigated, managed, and mediated, even in the face of some of the most precarious scenarios identified, like widespread or simultaneous incidents of electoral violence. Support to security forces should largely focus on shoring up electoral security plans, acquiring necessary resources and materials to execute those plans, and building on pre-existing efforts to promote public confidence in the LNP. Specific goals should include:

a) **Aid in clarifying roles and authorities of security actors**
Before the electoral season is fully underway, and ideally prior to the beginning of voter registration in February 2017, a clear agreement between the LNP and AFL regarding chain of command, information-sharing, intervention coordination, and other protocols should be established. While establishing an MOU between the AFL and LNP will likely require diplomatic pressure, civic education regarding roles and responsibilities can be supported at all levels of the organizations. Joint security forces, including the LNP, BIN, DEA, and LNFS, should be informed of any election-specific mandates.

b) **Train security forces on election responsibilities**
All forces should undergo training regarding their specific pre-election, election day, and post-election responsibilities. Such training should be tailored to specific roles. For instance, election day mobile patrols trainings should follow a separate curriculum from those for static guards at polling stations.

c) **Work to increase public confidence in the LNP**
LNP should increase attempts at visibility in their communities, and consider engaging more with electoral stakeholders as elections near. At the national level, a strategic public relations campaign ahead of the elections could help alleviate voter and stakeholder fears of UNMIL's withdrawal. The LNP should consider working with community radio stations to better promote the role of the police, meeting with local leaders, and utilizing local security and peace councils. The LNP should work with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and local governments to prioritize the establishment of County and District Security Councils where they do not yet currently exist.

d) **Facilitate increased engagement between the NEC and security forces to reconcile operational gaps**
While structures for coordinating between the NEC and security forces already exist, in particular the weekly interagency meetings, these efforts may need to be better organized and more strategic. The NEC and security forces should consider mandatory attendance for key actors. The two bodies should also be encouraged to compare their operational plans and reconcile any discrepancies sooner rather than later. Other details that are not included in their plans, including clarifying who will be conducting (and funding) election security trainings and how both institutions plan to overcome logistical gaps, should also be resolved.

At the county level, NEC representatives, such as county magistrates, should regularly attend and participate in security council meetings. In addition, the LNP should consider working with the NEC to develop a list of potential "hot spots" and/or at-risk polling stations to help more strategically procure and allocate resources.

3) Bolster transparency, credibility, and security administration of the electoral process
Increasing prospects for transparent and credible elections can help inoculate the process from criticism and protests from parties and spoilers. Ensuring security and electoral concerns and priorities are harmonized will reduce the likelihood of logistical or administrative disruptions before, during, and after election day. The USG is already providing significant support to the NEC and other stakeholders relevant to the quality of the electoral process. Many of the following focuses can be incorporated into current projects. The NEC should be encouraged to more realistically consider logistical challenges and develop plans to overcome these challenges at the national and local level. Considerations should include the sheer density of electoral complaints anticipated during the 2017 elections.

a) **Assist NEC to confront logistical gaps that could cause problems and undermine confidence in the electoral process if left unaddressed**
   - Conducting a simulation ahead of election day to better understand the length of time and costs associated with deploying materials and staff.
   - Magistrate convening with the central NEC to specifically discuss logistical needs.
   - NEC consultations with magistrates to discuss logistical lessons learned following the voter registration process. NEC consultations with parties to identify important confidence building measures. For example, some stakeholders have pointed to the transport of ballots and tally sheets by the NEC to the magistrates county office as a weakness in the process enabling fraud, as these transports are not accompanied by security or other party representatives.

b) **Support NEC to better prepare for and execute electoral dispute resolution at the local, magistrate, and national levels**
   - NEC identifies and trains local level complaint hearing officers early in the process.
   - NEC reviews the complaints mechanisms following the voter registration exercise to identify any potential weaknesses.
   - Increase trainings on election dispute resolution for NEC magistrates, and increase complaint processing curriculum in polling staff trainings and training materials.
   - Incorporate the court system, including judges, in understanding how they can best facilitate electoral complaints should they be lodged at the justice level.
   - In addition to strengthening the formal dispute resolution process, train local level NEC officials in conflict mitigation techniques to better handle conflicts that may erupt in polling stations and at county NEC offices.

c) **Promote long-term nonpartisan citizen election monitoring**
   Given the political context ahead of the 2017 elections, long-term election observation, including electoral violence monitoring, will be critical in providing regular analysis of election developments that can promote citizen confidence in the process, and identify any problems that could adversely affect the integrity of process well in advance of election day. The ECC already has plans to deploy long-term observers for the pre-election and post-election period. To help better distinguish conflict trends, risks, and possible triggers as they emerge, the ECC can more thoroughly examine the misuse of state resources in the pre-election period, candidate rhetoric, incidents of violence, party adherence to the code of conduct, NEC's organization and administration, and the progress of civic and voter education. Technical assistance to the ECC could be increased to provide the most systematic long-term observation. Should the USG choose to fund a PVT through the ECC, however, this could potentially impact the size and scope of the organization's long-term observation effort.

d) **Support international election observation**
   International election observation compliments citizen election monitoring in terms of building confidence in the electoral process while deterring fraud or exposing it should it occur. In the Liberian context, international election observation could help alleviate insecurity about UNMIL's drawdown by demonstrating continued international support for the country's democratic development. Many stakeholders, especially opposition parties, highlighted international observers as a key component to safeguarding the integrity of the upcoming elections, and implied that there would be more comfort and trust in the process with the presence of international missions.

   While there is currently no program for international election observation, the Carter Center,

which has a history of observation in Liberia, has expressed interest in supplying a mission to the 2017 elections. The European Union, which has the potential to bring a substantial long and short-term election observation force, has not yet decided on such a mission. In addition, ECOWAS and the African Union will likely be present, although their missions tend to be much shorter and smaller.

4) Increase the availability of accurate and independent information on elections to citizens and engage them in peacebuilding around the electoral process and political transition
Citizens' access to independent and robust information regarding the electoral process and political transition is not only critical to ensure voters are able to make informed decisions at the polling place, but also to reduce confusion, tensions, and the likelihood of citizens being able to be mobilized around violence. The USG is already supporting civic and voter education and media organizations more broadly, but there may be room to augment these projects to better meet assessment recommendations. Specific intermediate goals should include:

a) **Encourage widespread and earlier civic and voter education, particularly in rural areas with community-based organizations (CBOs)**
Frontloading civic education will help better prepare voters for the election season and give organizations more time to disseminate key messages and penetrate low-information environments. In particular, activities could include:
   - Encouraging civic education prior to the NEC's official timeline of December 2016
   - Taking advantage of *ardei* forums, frequent social sessions for young people where they discuss current events and politics over palm wine
   - Working with NEC to ensure that CBOs at the community level can be accredited for voter education, not just nationwide or Monrovia-based organizations
   - Similarly, work with NEC to ensure that broad civic education not require accreditation

b) **Incorporate messages of peace, unity, and the transition specifically into civic and voter education initiatives**
As well as providing election information, civic and voter education should help reinforce collective commitments to peace and downplay political divisions to help reduce the likelihood of citizens being mobilized around violence. This could be particularly effective if education efforts can utilize political leaders, civic leaders, and the LNP to deliver these messages to their communities and areas of influence. Also, given Liberia's recent history, most voters have never experienced a peaceful transition, and after over a decade of a single administration, it may be disruptive or unexpected for some. Civic education platforms should consider how they can constructively shape expectations around the political transition. These efforts could also be well served within the GoL so that public servants understand what to expect should the government change party hands.

c) **Bolster independent, accurate voices in the electoral environment**
Promoting a plurality of constructive and informative voices around the elections can help mitigate misinformation, confusion, or grievances that can lead to violence. This could include working with community stations that receive political funds or in-kind donations to ensure these resources do not influence content and train journalists on nonpartisan electoral coverage. Moreover, unbiased stations in vulnerable areas or places with limited independent content could perhaps receive targeted support. In addition, support to the PUL could emphasize self-regulation and reinforce codes of conduct. Internews is already working on a large community radio project, and this program could be augmented to help strengthen the quality and independence of radio content.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR USAID AND INL PROGRAMS

The development of an M&E framework for the evaluation of electoral conflict prevention programs requires collecting and organizing baseline data and considering program targets and accompanying custom indicators.

BASELINE DATA

Collecting incident data from previous elections from the NEC, LNP, Carter Center, ECC, UNMIL and other actors can serve as a source of baseline data for incidents of electoral violence. Incident data should be standardized to a common format for the purposes of analysis. In doing so, the following entry fields can be considered:

- Date of Incident
- Time of Incident
- Location: city, county, state, and specific address of incident if available
- Election phase: including pre-election, election day – first round, interim post-election, election day – second round, post-election after second round
- Targets or Victims: such as political candidates, their family members and supporters, election official, police, journalists, voters, or others
- Number of Victims Involved by each Tactic/Gender
- Spoilers or Perpetrators: political candidates, family members or supporters, criminals, police, voters, or others;
- Type of Incidents/Tactics: such as multiple homicides, individual homicide, physical assault, sexual assaults, kidnapping, destruction of physical property, destruction of sensitive electoral materials, riots and street actions
- Verification: Note whether the incident is verified or unverified

An analysis of these indicators can provide a conflict profile and electoral violence changes over time. In addition, baseline capacity assessments of key institutional state and non-state stakeholders should be conducted so that capacity building can be measured. Based on the objectives identified, this could include the NEC, the LNP and members of the joint security forces, the ECC, the media, and major political parties. Most importantly, implementers should continually refer to the issues highlighted in the Monitoring the Changing Electoral Context section, as some of those conditions could alter the critical assumptions for an M&E plan.

PROGRAM TARGETS AND INDICATORS

The following provides a framework for a performance monitoring plan, including F indicators and customized indicators to help measure both pre-existing and new programs influencing electoral security. Specific activities remain illustrative.

Objective 1: Promote political party and political leaders' ownership of electoral integrity and use of appropriate, peaceful remedies to resolve disputes
Foster more constructive and engaged dialogue between political parties and relevant stakeholders, including the NEC, security forces, and civil society
F indicator: • Number of consensus-building forums held with USG assistance

Illustrative indicators:
- Number of political parties and candidates participating in consultative forums with stakeholders from the election commission, civil society, and security forces
- Number of local forums for local party operatives and other elections stakeholders

Improve party capabilities for well-trained and effective party poll-watching

F indicator:
- Number of individuals who receive USG-assisted political party training

Illustrative indicators:
- Number of parties and party members that receive party poll-watcher training
- Number of party consultations with party leadership regarding party poll-watching strategy
- Number of step-down party poll-watcher trainings
- Number of party agents deployed, by party, on election day

Increase party awareness of electoral procedures and election law, including the appropriate use of complaint processes

F indicators:
- Number of people reached by USG assisted voter education

Illustrative indicators:
- Number of parties and party members that receive information on election regulations
- Number of parties and party members that receive training on the use of dispute resolution mechanisms
- Number of parties that correctly use electoral dispute resolution mechanisms

Objective 2: Enhance joint security forces ability to comprehensively manage the electoral security environment and rapidly respond to conflict should it occur

Work to increase public confidence in the LNP

Illustrative indicators:
- Number of community-based meetings with LNP officers
- Number of radio programs regarding the role of the LNP
- Number of public campaign messages highlighting the progress of the LNP in managing Liberian security disseminated

Aid in clarifying roles and authorities of security actors

Illustrative indicators:
- AFL, LNP, and joint security forces receive clear information regarding their roles in the case of an AFL deployment

Train security forces on election responsibilities

F indicator:
- Number of Government Officials Undergoing USG Assisted Security Sector Governance Training

Illustrative indicators:
- AFL, LNP and joint security forces are trained on their roles in the electoral process

Facilitate increased engagement between the NEC and security forces to reconcile operational gaps

Illustrative indicators:
- NEC and security forces revise operations plans for cohesiveness
- Number of meetings between NEC and security forces at the national level
- Number of meetings between NEC magistrates and security forces at the county level

Objective 3: Bolster transparency, credibility, and security administration of the electoral process
Help NEC confront logistical gaps that could cause problems and undermine confidence in the electoral process if left unaddressed

F indicator:
   • Number of Electoral Administrative Procedures and Systems Strengthened with USG Assistance
 	
Illustrative indicators:
   • NEC develops a plan addressing targeted logistical challenges

Help NEC better prepare for electoral dispute resolution at the local, magistrate, and national level

F indicator:
   • Number of Electoral Administrative Procedures and Systems Strengthened with USG Assistance
 	
Illustrative indicators:
   • NEC trains and deploys complaint hearing officers
   • NEC increases training content on electoral dispute resolution
   • NEC publishes sample complaint form online
   • Courts and judges are trained on their role in electoral dispute resolution

Promote long-term nonpartisan citizen election monitoring

F indicator:
   • Number of Domestic Election Observers Trained with USG Assistance
 	
Illustrative indicators:
   • Number of statements based on long-term observer reports issued by Liberian monitoring organizations
   • Number of long-term observers effectively recruited, trained, and deployed
   • Number of observers monitoring election dispute resolution processes

Support international election observation

Illustrative indicators:
   • Number of long and short-term international election observers deployedNumber of international missions in Liberia
   • Number of statements on the electoral process released by international observers

Objective 4: Increase the availability of accurate and independent information on elections to citizens and engage them in peacebuilding around the electoral process and political transition
Encourage widespread and earlier civic and voter education, particularly in rural areas with community-based organizations

F indicator:
   • Number of People Reached by USG Assisted Voter Education
 	
Illustrative indicators:
   • Number of civic and voter education materials distributed and where
   • Number of CSOs participating in civic and voter education
   • Number of CBOs engaged in civic and voter education
   • Amount of civic education conducted prior to December 2016

Incorporate messages of peace, unity, and transition into civic and voter education initiatives

F indicator:
- Number of People Reached by USG Assisted Voter Education
- Number of Campaigns Supported by USG to Foster Public Awareness and Respect for Rule of Law

Illustrative indicators:
- Number of key political and civic leaders that disseminate information on peace, unity and political transition
- Number of materials and messages distributed to foster awareness of the upcoming political transitional
- Number of materials and messages distributed to promote peace and unity in the upcoming electoral process and political transition

Strengthen independent, accurate voices in the electoral environment

F indicator:
- Number of Journalists Trained with USG Assistance
- Number of non-state news outlets assisted by USG

Illustrative indicators:
- Peer pressure to abide by media code of conduct increases
- Number of radio stations with unbiased content
- Number of journalists trained on responsibly covering the elections and political transition
- Listenership of unbiased radio stations

CONCLUSION

Electoral processes in Liberia have, to date, been relatively peaceful but not absent incidents of serious electoral violence. While institutional capacities for free and fair elections continue to improve, Liberia's 2017 election offers the first post-war transition of power and are expected to be contentious. Moreover, underlying structural and social afflictions and emerging risks could exceed the capacities of the country's nascent state institutions to manage. Based on contextual, historical, and stakeholder analysis, the assessment team determined that the likelihood of widespread violence is low, but challenges and triggers for electoral violence exist and could be exacerbated.

Specifically, the team noted that political parties and leaders are predisposed to reject electoral results, which has resulted in boycotts and violent protests in the past. Simultaneously, the NEC faces some capacity and logistical challenges that could compromise electoral integrity and reduce confidence in the results, further fueling party discontent. This is compounded by security forces' current lack of resources, manpower, and public confidence to provide comprehensive and rapid response security during the electoral period. In addition, Liberia suffers from a low information environment susceptible to rumors and inflammatory speech that could discourage civic engagement and incite undue tensions. The Liberian government's ability to manage these conditions is complicated by poor coordination among and within agencies and institutions and a lack of political will at some government levels to prioritize electoral and security planning.

However, there are numerous mitigating factors at work in the country that bolster resiliencies to conflict drivers, and many spaces for practical reforms and mediations to prevent or mitigate vulnerabilities to electoral violence. The timing of the electoral security assessment, almost 16 months before the general elections, allows for substantial pre-election interventions that can help reduce political parties' likelihood of rejecting results, decrease citizens' susceptibility to be mobilized around violence, and increase the ability of the LNP and the NEC to sufficiently manage electoral security. This includes better integration of political parties into the process and holding them accountable to safeguard their interests while building the capacity of the joint security forces to manage election-related conflict. Support for transparent and credible electoral processes before, during, and after the elections will also help reduce the likelihood of violence, as can engaging citizens with comprehensive, accurate, and unifying information regarding the democratic process.

In some cases, diplomatic involvement may be necessary to inspire effective and meaningful reforms. In other instances, pre-existing projects closely complement assessment recommendations, offering opportunities to augment and maximize assistance to state and non-state stakeholders for the purposes of improved electoral operations and security and violence mitigation. Support for political parties through leadership consultations and party poll-watching remain the largest gaps in the current electoral assistance environment in Liberia.

The upcoming elections are a defining crossroads for Liberia, in which the country can consolidate the peace gains of the post-conflict period and follow a promising democratic trajectory, or submit to power wars and exploited grievances. Present and evolving vulnerabilities in a new and changing electoral and security environment are not insurmountable, but they should not be underestimated.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: SITE VISIT MAP

ANNEX II: INTERVIEWS AND GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Date	Stakeholder Affiliation	Interviewee Affiliation	City, County
June 8, 2016	Legislature	Senate Committee on Defense, Security, Intelligence and Veteran's Affairs	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 8, 2016	Legislature	House Committee on Peace, Religious, and Reconciliation	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 8, 2016	Central government	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 8, 2016	International community	IFES	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 8, 2016	International community	National Democratic Institute	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 8, 2016	International community	UNMIL	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 8, 2016	International community	US Embassy, Defense Attache Office	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 9, 2016	International community	Carter Center (Access to Information)	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 9, 2016	International community	IBI International, LASS	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 9, 2016	International community	Internews	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 9, 2016	International community	UNMIL Chief of Political Affairs	Monrovia
June 9, 2016	International community	US Embassy	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 10, 2016	Political parties	Liberty Party	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 10, 2016	Election commission	NEC	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 10, 2016	Central government	Peace Building Office, MIA	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 12, 2016	Media	Radio Kintoma	Voinjama, Lofa County
June 13, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Voinjama, Lofa County
June 13, 2016	Political parties	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)	Voinjama, Lofa
June 13, 2016	Security Forces	DEA	Voinjama, Lofa
June 13, 2016	Security Forces	LNP	Voinjama, Lofa
June 13, 2016	Security Forces	BIN	Voinjama, Lofa County
June 13, 2016	Local government	County Superintendent	Voinjama, Lofa County
June 13, 2016	Political parties	ANC	Zwedru, Grand Gedeh
June 13, 2016	Local government	County Superintendent Office	Zwedru, Grand Gedeh
June 13, 2016	Security Forces	LNP	Zwedru, Grand Gedeh
June 13, 2016	Security Forces	LNP	Zwedru, Grand Gedeh
June 13, 2016	Civil Society	Motorcycle Union	Zwedru, Grand Gedeh
June 13, 2016	Civil Society	National Civil Society Council	Zwedru, Grand Gedeh
June 13, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Zwedru, Grant Gedeh
June 14, 2016	Media	Alternative Youth Radio	Zorzor, Lofa
June 14, 2016	Security Forces	BIN	Zorzor, Lofa
June 14, 2016	Local government	District Council	Zorzor, Lofa
June 14, 2016	Security Forces	LNP	Zorzor, Lofa
June 14, 2016	Media	Radio Life	Zorzor, Lofa
June 14, 2016	Civil Society	Women's discussion group	Zorzor, Lofa
June 14, 2016	Political parties	CDC	Zwedru Grand Gedeh
June 14, 2016	Civil Society	Community meeting	Zia Town, Grand Gedeh
June 15, 2016	Security Forces	BIN	Ganta, Nimba
June 15, 2016	Security Forces	LNP	Ganta, Nimba

June 15, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Tappita, Nimba
June 15, 2016	Political parties	ALP - Bong County	Gbarnga, Bong County
June 15, 2016	Security Forces	Gbarnga Regional Hub	Gbarnga, Bong County
June 15, 2016	Political parties	MOVEE	Gbarnga, Bong
June 15, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Gbarnga, Bong County
June 15, 2016	Media	Radio Gbarnga	Gbarnga, Bong
June 15, 2016	Civil Society	WIPNET (Women in Peacebuilding Network)	Gbarnga, Bong
June 16, 2016	Local government	County Superintendent	Kakata, Margibi County
June 16, 2016	Security Forces	LNP - Upper Margibi	Kakata, Margibi
June 16, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Kakata, Margibi
June 16, 2016	Political parties	CDC	Ganta Nimba
June 16, 2016	Civil Society	Concerned Women of Nimba County	Ganta, Nimba
June 16, 2016	Civil Society	Liberia Motorcycle Transport Union(LMTU)	Ganta, Nimba
June 17, 2016	Security Forces	Bureau of Immigration & Naturalization	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 17, 2016	Political parties	Congress for Democratic Change (CDC)	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 17, 2016	Security Forces	LNP	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 20, 2016	Political parties	All Liberia Party (ALP)	Buchanan, Grand Bassa
June 20, 2016	Civil Society	Bassa Youth Caucus (BYC)	Buchanan, Grand Bassa
June 20, 2016	Civil Society	BOWADA	Buchanan, Grand Bassa
June 20, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Buchanan, Grand Bassa
June 20, 2016	Security Forces	BIN	Bopolu, Gbarpolu
June 20, 2016	Civil Society	CSO County Secretariat	Bopolu City, Gbarpolu
June 20, 2016	Civil Society	Gbarpolu Rural Women's Association	Bopolu City, Gbarpolu
June 20, 2016	Local government	Gbarpolu County Superintendent Office	Bopolu, Gbarpolu
June 20, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Bopolu City, Gbarpolu
June 20, 2016	Media	Radio K PO	Bopolu, Gbarpolu
June 21, 2016	Security Forces	DEA	Bo Waterside, Grand Cape Mount
June 21, 2016	Media	Radio Cape Mount	Sinje, Grand Cape Mount
June 21, 2016	Local government	County Superintendent	Tubmanburg, Bomi
June 21, 2016	Local government	County Superintendent Office	Tubmanburg, Bomi
June 21, 2016	Election commission	NEC Magistrate	Tubmanburg, Bomi
June 21, 2016	Media	Radio Bomi	Tubmanburg, Bomi
June 21, 2016	Civil Society	WIPNET Bomi County	Tubmanburg, Bomi
June 22, 2016	Central government	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 22, 2016	Election commission	NEC	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 22, 2016	Election commission	NEC/Joint Security	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 22, 2016	Civil Society	WANEP/WipNET	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 22, 2016	International community	ECOWAS	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 23, 2016	Civil Society	Elections Coordinating Committee	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 23, 2016	Civil Society	Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY)	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 23, 2016	Civil Society	NAYMOTE	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 23, 2016	International community	NDI	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 23, 2016	Media	Press Union of Liberia	Monrovia, Montserrado
June 24, 2016	International community	UNDP	Monrovia, Montserrado

ANNEX III: ELECTORAL INCIDENT CODING

Code Level	Description
0	No reported electoral violence before or after a vote.
1	The first level of violence is violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspapers being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents.
2	The second level of violence is violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture.
3	The third level is a highly violent campaign, in which there are repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths

Based on these codes provided by USAID's Electoral Security Framework guide, Liberia's modern history of elections (from the CPA forward) can be coded as a 1, the first level of violence.

ANNEX IV: REFERENCES

"Annual Work plan 2016." United Nations Development Program: Project of the Government of Liberia Support to the 2015-2018 Liberian Electoral Cycle.

"Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia." International Center for Transitional Justice, May 2010. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Liberia-Beyond-TRC-2010-English.pdf

"Cooperative Agreement" Liberia Elections and Political Transitions (LEPT), July 31, 2014.

"Cooperative Agreement." Liberia Media Development, September 18, 2015.

"Cooperative Agreement." Access to Justice, December 2015.

"Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties." Accra, August 18, 2003. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf

"The Deceivers." Global Witness, 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/thedeceivers/

"Early Warning and Response Design Report (EWARDS): West Africa Conflict Assessment - Liberia." USAID, September/October 2010.

Electoral Security Framework: Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers, June 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdf

"Final Report," Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, December 2009. http://trcofliberia.org/reports/final-report.

"Final Survey Report: DRG Learning, Evaluation, and Research Activity – Liberia Electoral Access and Participation (LEAP) Survey." USAID, April 24, 2015.

"Liberia Conflict Vulnerability Assessment Report." USAID, April 2016.

"Liberia Democracy Human Rights and Governance Assessment," USAID, September 2012.

"Liberia: Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) Report, 2010." USAID, May 28, 2010.

"Liberia ICAF Update Report." Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, US Department of State. March 2012.

"Liberia Run-Off: Background Information from the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute." November 5, 2005. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2241.html

"National Elections in Liberia: Final Report." The Carter Center, Fall 2011. https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/liberia2011-finalrpt.pdf

"Observing Presidential and Legislation Elections in Liberia." Final Report on the International Observation Delegations Sponsored by the National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center, October - November 2005. https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/15124/uploads

"Proposed Amendments to the 1986 Constitution." Republic of Liberia Constitution Review Committee, March 29-April 12, 2015.

Republic of Liberia New Elections Law, 2015.

"Resolution 1509 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4830th meeting, on 19 September 2003." UN Security Council, September 2003. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1509(2003)

Special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 16 April 2012. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Liberia%20S2012%20230.pdf

"Special Senatorial Election, Final Report." Elections Coordinating Committee (ECC), 2014.

"Statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia." UN Peacebuilding Commission, Tenth Session. April 19, 2016.

"Support to the 2015-2018 Liberian Electoral Cycle." Election Project Annual Report, 2015.

"USAID/LASS Institutional Assessment and Capacity Building Implementation Plan." USAID/LASS, September 2015.

U.S. Agency for International Development - Liberia
502 Benson Street
Monrovia, Liberia