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USAID/OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES CÔTE D'IVOIRE TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 (CITI2) FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

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A FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF USAID/OTI'S CÔTE D'IVOIRE TRANSITION INITIATIVE 2 (CITI2)

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ACRONYMS

ADS	Automated Directives System
ASCAD	<i>Académie des Sciences, des arts, des cultures d'Afrique et des diasporas africaines</i>
CEI	<i>Commission électorale indépendante (national level)</i>
CEL	<i>Commission électorale locale (local level)</i>
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CITII	Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative – First Phase
CITI2	Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative – Second Phase
DDGS	Direct distribution of goods and services
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
FER	Final Evaluation Report
FPI	<i>Front populaire ivoirien</i>
FY	Fiscal Year
GM	Grant Manager
ICC	International Criminal Court
ONI	<i>Office national d'identité</i>
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PDCI	<i>Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire</i>
PDO	Program Development Officer
POJED	<i>Plate-forme des organisations de jeunesse de Duékoué</i>
PSC	Personal Services Contract
RHDP	<i>Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix</i>
RDR	Rassemblement des républicains de Côte d'Ivoire
SI	Social Impact, Inc.
SMT	Senior Management Team
SOW	Statement of Work
SRS	Strategic Review Session
STTA	Short Term Technical Assistance
SWIFT	Support Which Implements Fast Transitions
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USG	US Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In May 2011, President Alassane Ouattara was sworn in as the President of Côte d'Ivoire, bringing the bloody crisis that followed the 2010 election to an uneasy close. The political transition remained fragile, however, as the violence had deepened divisions within the country. In September 2011, USAID/OTI launched phase one of the Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative (CITI1), implemented by AECOM International Development Inc., which ended in August 2014. In early 2014, OTI decided to continue support through the 2015 presidential election, and in June 2014, it awarded the CITI2 contract to Chemonics International Inc. With offices in Abidjan and the western town of Daloa, the program aimed to support an inclusive and credible electoral process and increase social cohesion. As of February 2016, CITI2 had cleared sub-grants worth just over \$5.6 million, with 70 percent focused on the election and 30 percent on social cohesion.

This evaluation seeks to determine the effectiveness of CITI2's support to the Ivorian transition. Specifically, it determines whether (i) the CITI2 strategy was relevant and adaptive to the transition, (ii) the program met its two program objectives, and (iii) CITI2 yielded lessons learned for OTI programming elsewhere. The evaluation team included two external consultants who had worked on the 2014 evaluation of CITI1 and an OTI Senior Transition Advisor. They spent three weeks in Côte d'Ivoire in January and February 2016, interviewing over 120 individuals in Abidjan and the West, as well as in Bouaké and Sakassou.

FINDINGS

A Focused and Adaptive Strategy – But the Wrong Bookend?

A Strong Strategy – CITI2 maintained relentless focus on the critical issue of Côte d'Ivoire's transition: the 2015 presidential election. CITI2 narrowed its geographic focus to the most high-risk areas during the elections – especially the West, a bastion of support for former president Laurent Gbagbo and the scene of much violence in 2011. OTI understood the strong linkage between social cohesion and a peaceful election. Without a modicum of short-term social cohesion, there can be no peaceful election; and a peaceful election is necessary to ensure social cohesion in the long term. This intertwining of the two objectives gave the CITI2 strategy its focus and was key to the program's effectiveness. CITI2 prepared the field for elections by first focusing on cohesion and then weaving cohesion-building work throughout election activities. By extension, the OTI team was a key player within the US Embassy, where OTI was seen as a team player with a strong program that contributed to Embassy reporting and helped secure positive outcomes in the country.

Is CITI2 Ending Too Soon? – Despite the strong strategy, the current situation in Côte d'Ivoire raises a question that is hard to ignore: is the 2015 presidential election the right end point for OTI in Côte d'Ivoire? Is OTI leaving too soon? Well-informed interlocutors across the country – local authorities, community leaders, traditional chiefs, businesspeople, civil society leaders, journalists, and politicized youth – repeatedly stressed the view that local elections (legislative in late 2016, regional and municipal in early 2017) are the true test of the transition. Their concerns included the return of pro-Gbagbo refugees,

the enduring inter-communal tensions over rural land tenure and nationality, more immediate irritants such as the general political situation and the trials at the ICC, and the greater volatility of local elections. Although USAID continues elections-focused programming through a Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) mechanism in country, it has limited resources and little to no community-based activities, which raises the concern that it might not provide enough support to communities vulnerable to political manipulation and conflict.

Did CITI2 Meet its Social Cohesion Objective?

Bringing Ivorians Together – Building on CITI1’s legacy, CITI2 responded to a deep yearning among Ivorians to reconnect after decades of conflict and separation. CITI2 activities brought people together in training sessions, debates, radio roundtables, participatory theater, and awareness sessions. On several occasions, perpetrators of past violence asked victims for forgiveness. There was strong symbolism in having hardline community members participate in forgiveness ceremonies – a key strength of the CITI2 strategy.

Mitigating Violence – CITI2 activities mitigated violence in numerous instances: the resolution of a local chieftaincy conflict in Mona; the calming of tensions following the death of a pro-Gbagbo youth in Guiglo in June 2015; the support of a representative local youth platform in Duékoué to positively intervene and diffuse a crisis between (Guéré) high school students and (Dioula) transporters. Authorities in Vavoua, Duékoué and Guiglo say they relied on CITI2-supported youth groups to help solve local crises.

Measuring Social Cohesion – In the absence of in-depth quantitative research, it is difficult to measure improved social cohesion. Still, we heard many anecdotal, though tangible, outcomes. People greet one another again. They exchange news, do business, eat together. Most communities have become safer and people move about more freely. In speaking to dozens of interlocutors and cross-checking, it is clear that CITI2 activities contributed to improved social cohesion in many if not all the areas where the program was active.

Did CITI2 meet its Election Objective?

National Programs – CITI2 launched a number of highly visible, mass-audience, national-level programs to raise awareness around the election, with catchy and hip messages, many of which proved popular such as: an information campaign for peaceful elections through comic strips, a woman-centered television miniseries on the elections process, the diffusion of the ‘*Election c pas gnaga*’ (elections are not a physical fight) poster and television campaign with support from famous Ivorian soccer stars, a widely disseminated elections song, and large murals in strategic locations in Abidjan. These activities were especially remarkable in how they targeted youth.

Direct Support to the Electoral Process – The program prepared for the electoral process by creating an elections-focused plan of action that listed key milestones and possible programmatic responses that enabled CITI2 to respond rapidly to last-minute changes. In the West, CITI2 worked directly with local electoral commissions to design activities around the publication of the electoral code, voter registration, the updating of electoral lists, the management of voter registration dispute processes, and the casting of ballots – all in consultation with the central Independent Electoral Commission (*Commission électorale indépendante*, CEI). Regional CEI officials were highly appreciative of OTI’s material support and training.

Awareness Raising Campaigns – CITI2 drew on CITI1 partner contacts and grassroots knowledge to build awareness around the elections and work in close collaboration with local civil society representatives

and government officials. Some efforts were the result of careful planning (rural western hotspots), but CITI2 staff also responded to emerging tensions. For instance in Vavoua, a staff-led effort brought together pro-Gbagbo activists and former rebels to conduct election awareness in and around the town.

“Reverse Manipulation”: *Mobilizing Spoilers* – In Côte d’Ivoire, people blame violence on political parties manipulating the local populations. Some of CITI2’s most distinctive work was to engage in reverse manipulation and enroll potential spoilers – e.g., politicized youth, transport sector workers, and traditional chiefs – in activities that promoted social cohesion and a peaceful election. CITI2 brought together different groups and individuals at opposite ends of the ethno-political spectrum, turning them into a tangible incarnation of that message.

Paths Not Taken

There are a number of programming avenues that CITI2 might have explored, but did not. These included follow-on activities in former CITI1 areas, such as Bouaké and Korhogo; Ebola programming; support to the Ivorian National Identity Office (*Office national d’identité*, ONI); and work on critical political issues, such as supporting the return of pro-Gbagbo refugees from Liberia, facilitating peaceful debates about the Gbagbo trial at the International Criminal Court in the The Hague, helping local authorities address the proliferation of weapons in ungoverned spaces in the West; or supporting discussions of past and future boycotts of the election by the hardline wing of the *Front populaire ivoirien* (the FPI, Gbagbo’s party). These were possible avenues of CITI2 engagement and the program was conservative in its engagement choices. But CITI2 was a short, compact, condensed program with limited resources, and OTI was right not to spend time and money it did not have to explore avenues that were not closely tied to its central objectives.

LESSONS LEARNED

Innovative Grant-Making

Effective grant-making was CITI2’s central strength. It enabled the whole of a modestly-sized program to be greater than the sum of its parts. There are several lessons for OTI. The success of CITI2 activities has much to do with the CITI2 team’s strong field presence. CITI2 listened to communities to hear what they needed. CITI2 also took a highly collaborative approach to the identification, design, and implementation of activities, which local partners greatly appreciated. Furthermore, CITI2 showed that creative and risky community engagement is key to achieving visible impact with awareness activities. CITI2 undertook reverse manipulation, turning potential spoilers into promoters of social cohesion and a peaceful election. Finally, CITI2’s approach of creating multiple linkages between individual activities, local partners, and locations served as an impact multiplier and should become an OTI best practice. These are for the most part not new lessons learned, but they confirm OTI best practices.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Activity-level M&E – It would have been useful to create activity outcomes for objective 2 (social cohesion). Many of the activity-level outcomes that tied closely with sub-objective or even objective-level results, were difficult, if not impossible, to measure after an individual activity was implemented.

Program-level M&E – The overly broad sub-objectives were unmanageable and made it hard for the program to explore lessons learned in a meaningful way. The activity clusters were large and essentially divided according to the two program objectives. Sub-objective-based cluster evaluations could have been used to test assumptions or explore how activities contributed to a peaceful election or cohesion. Absent more granular sub-objectives – the missing middle – it is difficult to link activity outcomes to objective-level outcomes.

Staffing

Experience – The CITI2 team, on both the OTI and the implementing partner sides, had both country and OTI experience and many of the Ivorian professionals were quality holdovers from CITI1 who brought experience, contacts, and understanding on how OTI could support the transition in Côte d'Ivoire.

Surge – CITI2 provided surge support through a variety of mechanisms. Of these, the most innovative were local activity coordinators whose dynamism and networks were crucial to activity implementation, particularly in the lead-up to the election, despite adding an extra layer between awardees and the program.

One Team – OTI and Chemonics embodied a strong one-team approach at the senior management level, which reverberated down to all layers of the program. Additionally, under CITI2, Grant Managers reported to Program Development Officers in an effective move to foster a team approach and reduce bottlenecks during activity implementation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This successful CITI2 experience yields a number of important conclusions for OTI.

The Importance of Political Will – The main reason CITI2 has been a focused, innovative, and impactful program is because the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire has been a strong one. The authorities have been supportive of positive change. Most ordinary Ivorians have wanted to see normalcy prevail, and they have had the political space to act. Absent this political space, the presence of empowered partners, and the overall benevolence of the authorities, CITI2 would have been a shadow of the program it has been. Without popular support, political will, and sufficient political space, it is hard to conceive of a successful political transition, regardless of the quality of the transition support program.

The Importance of a Mature Program – Another reason that CITI2 did well is because it was in fact a mature program, which evolved since it started in 2011. CITI2 benefitted from the contacts, the partners, the experience, the ground knowledge, the staff, and indeed even the mistakes of CITI1. The conclusion for OTI is that, with the exception of highly dynamic transitions, a program starting up from scratch will in most cases not achieve immediate results across the board, especially at the grassroots level.

The Challenge of Local Elections – The peaceful ballot in 2015 was a success but it is becoming clear that the local elections – legislative, regional, municipal – of late 2016 and early 2017 will pose a real threat to stability in the country. The stakes will be highly local and personal, and long-term issues like land tenure and nationality remain unresolved. The danger is that the social cohesion that CITI2 fostered – politicized youth working together and community chiefs interacting – might not hold should the political situation turn violent again. This leads to the one programmatic recommendation of this report. USG and OTI

should consider how best to continue community-based support in Côte d'Ivoire through the local elections of late 2016 and early 2017, whether through direct programming, collaboration with other USAID programming, or another solution. The success of CITI2 must not eclipse the need for a continued OTI or OTI-like, locally focused, small-grants support to the Ivorian transition, one of the few successful transitions in OTI's history in Sub-Saharan Africa.

INTRODUCTION

In May 2011, President Alassane Ouattara was sworn in as the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire. In the preceding months, the long-awaited presidential election, held in October 2010, had quickly yielded anger, grief, and despair as the electoral dispute between incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and challenger Ouattara escalated into violence. In international circles, the fighting gave rise to serious concern that Côte d'Ivoire's slow emergence from civil war might transform once again into bloody conflict. Support to the fragile transition was the key tenet of U.S. policy in Côte d'Ivoire.

To help provide that support, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives' (OTI) launched in September 2011 what was to become the first phase of the Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative (CITI1), implemented by SWIFT partner AECOM International Development Inc., which ended in August 2014.¹ A July 2014 external evaluation deemed that CITI1 had been largely effective in supporting the political and social transition underway in Côte d'Ivoire. In early 2014, OTI had already decided on a follow-on program, CITI2, to support Côte d'Ivoire in the run-up through the 2015 presidential election, widely held as a key milestone in the country's transition. OTI awarded the second contract to Chemonics International Inc., also a SWIFT partner, in June 2014. As of this writing (April 2016), OTI and Chemonics have completed the scheduled close-down of CITI2. This report is the final performance evaluation of CITI2.

OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of this performance evaluation is to provide USAID/OTI with an external review of the CITI2 program. It has been commissioned by OTI.

This evaluation is based on field research conducted in Côte d'Ivoire in January and February 2016. It draws on the 2014 CITI1 final evaluation and considers key events in Côte d'Ivoire's recent political transition to determine the extent to which CITI2's design, strategy, and implementation were relevant during this period. Specifically, the evaluation seeks to:

- Assess the appropriateness of CITI2's program strategy following the end of the CITI1;
- Document the program's impact and challenges against the stated program objectives during the life of the program;
- Compile best practices and lessons learned as well as offer recommendations to USAID/OTI, USAID/Côte d'Ivoire, the U.S. Embassy, and other relevant institutions.
- Examine USAID/OTI's progression from CITI1 to CITI2, including its geographic targeting, shifts in strategy, and programmatic and operational approaches to grant-making and activity design to document best practices and lessons learned.

¹ SWIFT (Support Which Implements Fast Transitions) is a USAID indefinite quantity contract through which OTI provides fast, short-term assistance to countries in transition. USAID issued the fourth and latest iteration of the SWIFT contract in February 2014. It is a five-year agreement with a potential of up to \$2.5 billion and focuses on political transition and stabilization needs.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation questions, as laid out in the evaluation terms of reference, are the following:

1. Was the CITI2 strategy relevant to the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire and how did it adapt to critical developments as they unfolded during the performance period?
2. To what extent did the program contribute to the achievement of its stated objectives?
 - a. To what extent did CITI2 programming – through dialogue, negotiation, and mediation – help target communities cope with violence, resolve conflict, and reduce tensions? This entails reviewing cohesion indicators such as local coexistence, trust, reconciliation, and the capacity of civil society organizations and the government to promote peace and social cohesion.
 - b. To what extent did CITI2 pre-election programming – specifically civic education, voter education, voter registration, debates, forums, and information campaigns – contribute to increased public engagement in a peaceful electoral process, the successful implementation of elections, and public perceptions of an inclusive and credible electoral process?
3. Lessons Learned: What best practices and lessons learned from the CITI2 program could be applied to other transition programming or to programming in the Côte d'Ivoire context?

USAID/OTI intends to share final products with other U.S. Government agencies and other interested groups.

METHODOLOGY

THE EVALUATION TEAM

The external evaluation team was composed of three members: a Team Leader, an Ivorian Analyst, and an Evaluation Specialist, who is a USAID/OTI Senior Transition Advisor.²

The Team Leader and the Ivorian Analyst were also members of the CITI1 final evaluation team. The Ivorian Analyst also led the 2014 hotspot mapping exercise, which CITI2 had requested to inform its geographic interventions and general program strategy. The Evaluation Specialist had not previously worked with CITI2, but was familiar with OTI programming and had West Africa experience, including Côte d'Ivoire. The team found this composition valuable in building on previous experience with OTI's engagement in Côte d'Ivoire and the local political context, while balancing this experience with a new perspective. In addition, the team's previous experience in Côte d'Ivoire allowed the team to quickly understand the context, reestablish relationships with individuals from CITI1, and cover the country in a short period of time.

FIELD RESEARCH

After initial desk research and remote and in-person interviews, the Team Leader and the Evaluation Specialist traveled to Côte d'Ivoire, where they joined the local Analyst to conduct field research over three weeks in January and February 2016. The research for the evaluation relied primarily on field interviews with project staff, awardees and counterparts, for two reasons: first, on-the-ground interviews usually yield, in the experience of the evaluators, the most relevant information, and second, good security conditions in Côte d'Ivoire make field research easy to organize and carry out.

In selecting and scheduling interviews with awardees and other partners, the evaluation team relied on recommendations from the CITI2 team and on input from the Ivorian Analyst, as well as on experience and contacts from the 2014 CITI1 evaluation. The evaluation team spoke with between 55 and 60 percent of CITI1 awardees, and there were only two repeat awardees whom the team did not interview. All in all, the evaluation team interviewed over 120 individuals, in either one-on-one or group meetings (some interviews were by phone). A list of interviews is included as an annex.

In Washington DC, the evaluation team interviewed OTI and Chemonics staff, as well as former U.S. Embassy (Abidjan) staff. In Côte d'Ivoire, the evaluation team met with OTI and Chemonics staff, U.S. Embassy personnel (USAID and State Department), CITI2 awardees, beneficiaries and other partners. Interviewees included civil society representatives (women and youth groups), professional transport

² Molly Byrne (OTI Senior Transition Advisor) was the Evaluation Specialist, Prof. Assi Kimou of the Houphouët-Boigny University in Abidjan provided local analysis and support, and Victor Tanner served as the Team Leader. Though the report reflects the joint findings of the evaluation team, Tanner is ultimately responsible for the report, including any errors it may contain.

organizations and unions, media (community radio stations), community leaders (village chiefs and religious leaders), university representatives, local elected and appointed government officials, and partners from national bodies (the CEI, ASCAD), as well as a few former CITI1 partners.³ Nearly all meetings with program counterparts and Chemonics' Ivorian staff were carried out in French, without interpretation.

The field research focused primarily on the country's western regions and the greater Abidjan area – the geographic focus of CITI2 programming. The evaluation team traveled to the West, conducting interviews in Daloa, Yavoua, Duékoué, Bangolo, Guiglo and Bloléquin. In the greater Abidjan area, the team met with national partners, as well as local partners in the large, populous *communes* of Abobo and Yopougon, and the small satellite town of Dabou. The team also visited the central towns of Bouaké and Sakassou to meet with former CITI1 partners to explore whether the CITI2 decision to leave Bouaké was valid and capture different views on the situation in the country. The only area where CITI2 was active that the evaluation team did not visit was Issia (south of Daloa) – for want of time and because only one grant was made there.

The team reviewed project documentation, including strategy documents, program performance reviews, reports (monthly, quarterly, and annual), program maps, and activity information from the program activity database (OTIAnywhere).

At the end of the field work, the team conducted debriefings for CITI2's Senior Management Team and the U.S. Ambassador, and gave a general presentation to a Chemonics all-staff meeting in Abidjan.

GAPS AND CONSTRAINTS

The evaluation team gathered a significant amount of activity-level data, primarily from CITI2 internal reporting and interviews with awardees. However, the evaluation team faced two constraints. One was a lack of program-level evaluation data, since the sub-objectives were not very different from the program objectives – a point covered in detail in the section below on monitoring and evaluation in the 'lessons learned' section. The other is a lack of data from downstream end-users and indirect beneficiaries of CITI2 activities – the evaluation team did not have sufficient time to interview many ordinary Ivorians who benefitted indirectly from the trainings and other awareness-building activities through the feedback, outreach and dissemination exercises (see footnote 3). One reason for this that the field research for this evaluation took place during a single, three-week trip to Côte d'Ivoire – as compared with the two multi-week trips sometimes used for OTI final evaluations – perhaps owing to the short duration of the CITI2 project.⁴ Also, the evaluation team felt that necessarily short conversations with indirect beneficiaries were unlikely to yield interesting results. Many of the indirect beneficiaries the team would have liked to

³ In this evaluation, an 'awardee' is an organization or person who received a grant under an activity; a 'beneficiary' is a person who participated in or benefited from an activity; an 'indirect beneficiary' is someone who was indirectly associated with the project and benefited it, for instance through feedback and outreach sessions from discussion fora or training sessions, or people who watched an election-themed TV series; a 'partner' is an individual who was associated with the activity, often because of his or her official capacity or standing in society (a community leader, a local official); and a 'key interlocutor or observer' is someone who, by virtue of position, has an informed opinion of the activity and its outcome.

⁴ Personal communication, Côte d'Ivoire team-member, OTI/Washington, 2015.

hear from to see if CITI2 awareness-raising activities reached them are those who lived in more remote locations requiring too much time to reach. And, had the team gone to one or more of these locations, there would not have been time to organize effective focus groups. Likewise, focusing on these locations would have meant not meeting with many awardees.

The evaluation team sought to overcome the lack of data from indirect beneficiaries by proposing to OTI a field-research component carried out by Ivorian students and supervised by the evaluation Advisor. The initial idea was to carry out field visits to a number of CITI2 villages. That approach then evolved to random phone interviews using a cellphone-number database put together by Chemonics. However, given OTI's questions regarding the field research proposal, it became clear to the evaluation team that time and resources were insufficient to carry out this research within the parameters of the evaluation, and the evaluation team dropped the idea.

Also, the timeframe of the evaluation and the resources allotted did not allow for other methods of data collection such as indirect beneficiary focus group discussion, crowdsourcing, polling or surveying to obtain beneficiary data. As a result, the evaluation team acknowledges the potential bias from interviewees. In response, the evaluation team sought to corroborate data through multiple interviews and points of view in single locations to confirm reporting – for instance hearing what awardees and beneficiaries had to say about the impact of activities they were not directly involved in.

ADS 203

In accordance with ADS 203, there are several reasons why the evaluation team conducted a performance evaluation, and not an impact evaluation. First, as a transition program, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to select control groups or areas that had similar characteristics to intervention zones. The areas of intervention, target beneficiaries, and selected approaches were not expected to be, and were not, consistent throughout program implementation, and the program needed flexibility to move in response to changes in the environment. As a result, intervention zones could not have remained static.

In addition, areas of intervention and target beneficiaries were selected because they had different characteristics than other areas of the country, therefore control groups with similar characteristics would have been difficult, if not impossible, to identify. Second, objectives, sub-objectives, and corresponding indicators of change were expected to be adjusted throughout the program, so a fixed baseline for comparison would have been difficult to put in place. Finally, the program was implemented for less than two years. The short nature of the program did not allow significant time and resources to put in place a baseline study with which to compare results.

CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW

COUNTRY CONTEXT

Côte d'Ivoire was, until the late 1980s, a beacon of political stability and economic prosperity in West Africa.⁵ But the Ivorian miracle, as it became known, did not last. In the mid-1990s, in the aftermath of the political vacuum left by the death of long-time president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the political situation grew increasingly tense, focusing on the intertwined issues of land tenure and nationality. Over the decades, migrants mostly from the dry North of the country (known as *allochtones*) and from poor neighboring countries like Mali and especially Burkina Faso (*allogènes*) had settled in central and southern Côte d'Ivoire, where they prospered by working the land. The mostly Christian and animist inhabitants of these southern regions – the so-called *autochtones* – see themselves as the 'original' owners of the land. The presence, and the success, of the newly arrived migrants caused resentment. The term '*ivoirité*,' originally coined to capture the common cultural identity of all Ivorians, acquired nationalist, xenophobic – and anti-*Dioula* overtones.⁶ Politicians from all sides drew on local tensions, fanning and fueling them in the process.

Beginning in the early 2000s, this tense situation degenerated further, with increasing political and communal violence and eventually a civil war that tore the country apart in 2002 between northern rebels (the *Forces Nouvelles*, generically known as *nordistes*, or northerners), the majority but not all of them *Dioula*, and the government in Abidjan. A tentative peace agreement signed in Ouagadougou in 2007 led to the 2010 presidential ballot, in which the de facto leaders of the opposing sides of the conflict faced off: former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, the political leader of the (then) opposition *Rassemblement des républicains de Côte d'Ivoire* (RDR) and the standard bearer, in the second round, of the *Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix* (RHDP) coalition, and Laurent Gbagbo, the incumbent president and leader of the *Front populaire ivoirien* (FPI), whom many southerners and westerners saw as their champion.⁷ Gbagbo led the first round, but the Independent Election Commission (CEI) declared Ouattara the victor in the second round. Gbagbo's refusal to acknowledge these results led to bitter fighting in Abidjan and the West between his supporters and those of Ouattara. In April 2011, pro-Ouattara forces, backed by French troops, captured Gbagbo, who was later taken to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. As President Ouattara took the oath of office in May 2011, much of the population, shocked

⁵ The following paragraphs draw on the context section in the 2014 evaluation of CITII.

⁶ A generic term for Malinkés, but much used in Côte d'Ivoire to refer to Muslim northerners in general.

⁷ Several parties make up the RHDP, the most important of which are Ouattara's RDR and the *Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), which carries the Houphouëtiste mantle. In the first round, each party in the coalition presented a candidate; in the second round, the various RHDP candidates rallied behind the one with the most votes – Alassane Ouattara.

by the explosion of violence and the killings of the post-electoral crisis, was uncertain about the future, and there was enduring anger and bitterness among the partisans of Laurent Gbagbo.⁸

Nearly five years hence, there is much cause for optimism. The institutions of the Ivorian state have made a successful return to areas formerly beyond the control of Abidjan. National security has been restored across most of the country. Much needed institutional reforms have taken place, and public faith in these institutions has begun to return. The national economy has experienced high economic growth since 2011, achieving dynamic gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in recent years.⁹ The Government of Côte d'Ivoire has launched large infrastructure projects, invested in social services, and raised public sector salaries. Foreign investment is on the rise. The municipal elections of 2013 came and went relatively peacefully (with some localized violence in Bangolo and Vavoua), despite the boycott of former President Gbagbo's *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI). Most importantly, the October 2015 presidential election occurred without violence, albeit with low participation rates, especially among the internally fractured opposition parties.¹⁰ The hardline wing of the FPI, led by Aboudramane Sangaré, boycotted the elections, while the moderate, self-described 'pragmatic' wing of the party, led by Affi N'Guessan, took part, receiving 9.29 percent of the vote in the second round.

Points of concern endure, to be sure. The large issues that enabled politicians to mobilize society for violence – nationality, land – remain unaddressed. National reconciliation remains elusive, as few of President Ouattara's supporters have been called to account for their alleged crimes during the post-electoral crisis. The FPI is riven between hardliners and moderates who are divided on how the party should participate in the country's political life. Uncertainty surrounding the post-Ouattara phase is already causing disquiet within the ruling coalition between his *Rassemblement des républicains de Côte d'Ivoire* (RDR) and Henri Konan Bédié's *Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), Houphouët's former single party. Tens of thousands of refugees belonging to ethnic groups supportive of Gbagbo have yet to return, and when they do, mostly in the west of the country, rural land tenure will likely be a highly combustible

⁸ As noted in the CITII evaluation, excellent treatments of Côte d'Ivoire's crisis of the last 15 years (and more) include: Christian Bouquet: *Côte d'Ivoire – Le désespoir de Kourouma*, Armand Colin (Paris 2011); Mike McGovern: *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*, University of Chicago Press (2011); and Sasha Newell: *The Modernity Bluff – Crime, Consumption and Citizenship in Côte d'Ivoire*, University of Chicago Press (2012). Must-reads for understanding the country also include the latest novels of the famed and much missed Ivorian novelist Ahmadou Kourouma – *Allah n'est pas obligé* (2002) and *Quand on refuse on dit non* (2006) – as well as the remarkable novels of Ivorian journalist Venance Konan, especially *Le rebelle et le camarade président* (2013) and the *Katapila* series, at once funny and poignant, about the travails of Burkinabè settlers in southern Côte d'Ivoire and their relations with the *autochtones*.

⁹ Côte d'Ivoire's GDP yearly growth rate has been 10.7, 9.2 and 8.5 percent for 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively, and is forecast at between 8-8.5 percent through 2018, according to World Bank data updated in late 2015 (<http://data.worldbank.org/country/cote-divoire>, retrieved 09 March 2016).

¹⁰ The low participation rates in 2015 were widely expected, among Ivorians and in the international community. It should be said that the 2010 election participation rate reached historic highs, explained in part by UN (and other international) financial, material, organizational, and technical support of the entire electoral process. In addition, the 2010 presidential election was the first one held in over a decade, and the stakes were high (Ouattara versus Bédié versus Gbagbo).

issue, as much of the land has been occupied and planted by migrants.¹¹ The state's economic development policies have yet to yield much trickle-down effect among the poorer segments of the population, especially its youth, which accounts for about 70 percent of the population. Nevertheless, the transition in Côte d'Ivoire is on a good track, especially considering the violent abyss the country stood at the edge of a mere six years ago, but much remains to be done.

THE CÔTE D'IVOIRE TRANSITION INITIATIVE PROGRAMS

The CITII Legacy

In September 2011, nearly a year after the bitterly contested November 2010 presidential elections and four months after the inauguration of President Alassane Ouattara, OTI launched the Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative (CITII) program. The three-year program ran through summer 2014 and was implemented by AECOM International Development, Inc. The objectives of CITII varied throughout the life of the program, with a focus on political stabilization by facilitating the return of state institutions to formally rebel-held areas, increasing citizen access to information and civic rights, improving governance, and mitigating community tensions. By July 2014, CITII had cleared about \$12m in grants in the north (Korhogo), the center (Bouaké and Sakassou), the West and center-west (Divo, Duékoué, Bangolo, Guiglo, Bloléquin, and Toulepleu), the east (Abengourou), greater Abidjan (Yopougon and Abobo), as well as national-level projects.

The 2014 final evaluation of CITII found that, despite initial difficulties, it had been a successful program, concluding that:

CITII gave the people of Côte d'Ivoire what they said they most needed – a chance, after over ten years of conflict - to reconnect [with one another] and re-engage with state institutions. It is a program that no other international donor or organization had the resources to implement. Almost all of the nearly 200 individuals whom the evaluation team interviewed stated their firm belief that CITII activities had contributed positively to what they call the process of transition in their country. There is abundant micro-evidence of the positive outcomes of CITII activities – small conflicts resolved, larger conflicts defused, marginalized individuals people empowered, and relations re-established between segments of society who had grown apart.

The report also made three strong recommendations for the incoming CITI2 program:

- o Move West – The geographic focus of CITI2 should shift to the conflict areas of the West, while maintaining a strong presence in the large, restive Abidjan *communes* of Yopougon and Abobo, strongholds of the Gbagbo and Ouattara, respectively.
- o Get political – CITI2 should focus on the political issues that could undermine the transition (nationality, land, local violence, and impunity) by bringing together mutually hostile segments of society. The evaluation also recommended that CITI2 identify spoilers and hotspots (through a

¹¹ Many migrants did not return back to Côte d'Ivoire due to the Ebola crisis during which the Ivorian borders with Guinea and Liberia were closed and refugee repatriation convoys were stopped by UNHCR.

mapping exercise) and push deeper into villages and *campements* (settlements where rural migrants tended to live), where tensions were greatest, as well as in urban neighborhoods.

- o Build on CITI1 – The evaluation called on the incoming project to mobilize the contacts, relationships, and experience of CITI1 in support of the 2015 presidential election.

Overview of CITI2

In June 2014, OTI awarded the CITI2 contract to another SWIFT partner, Chemonics International, Inc. In contrast with CITI1, CITI2 maintained a firm and clear strategy to support the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire with the following objectives:

- (i) to support an inclusive and credible electoral process, and
- (ii) to increase social cohesion.¹²

The sub-objectives were the following:

- Sub-Objective 1: To strengthen public engagement in a peaceful electoral process.
- Sub-Objective 2: To capacitate national and local level institutions to implement elections.
- Sub-Objective 3: To develop/strengthen community strategies to cope with and reduce violence and conflict and promote the use of non-violent methods to manage and reduce violence and conflict
- Sub-Objective 4: To increase distribution of credible information.¹³

The CITI2 theory of change (TOC) was:

- **If** issues that contribute to community instability are addressed and communities become more cohesive [links to the community cohesion objective, Objective 2], and **if** elections are inclusive and credible [links to the elections objective, Objective 1],
- **then** Cote d'Ivoire will continue to achieve and consolidate greater political, social, and economic gains [Program Goal],
- **because** insecurity and lack of community cohesion are significant obstacles to Côte d'Ivoire's political, social, and economic progress and if longstanding community conflicts are not addressed, conflict could erupt again [links to Objective 2] and **because** elections will increase Ivorians and the international community's perception of the government's legitimacy [links to Objective 1].¹⁴

The program's focus on community, or 'social,' cohesion (*cohésion sociale* in French) reflects an important concept in the Ivorian context, that of harmony between the different geographic and ethnic components

¹² USAID/OTI: "CITI2 Program Document v.2," 06 January 2015, p.2.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ USAID/OTI: "Program Document, Côte d'Ivoire," Version 3, 8 June 2015, p.4.

of society. Most Ivorians see the breakdown in harmony as both a cause and a result of the political and then military conflict that tore the country apart for nearly two decades.

In all, CITI2 spent just over \$5,615,281 on activities.¹⁵ The distribution of activities and monies spent by program objective is as follows:

Table 1: Distribution of activities and money disbursed by program objective, as of March 30, 2016

Program Objective	Activity Count	% of Total Activities	Total Amount Disbursed	% of Total Disbursed
Support an Inclusive and Credible Elections Process	68	58%	\$3,918,089.73	70%
Increase Community Cohesion	49	42%	\$1,697,191.21	30%

The CITI2 Chief of Party and his Deputy Chief of Party, as well as the Senior Program Development Officer (SPDO), an Ivorian national, were based in Abidjan. The Abidjan office also included the operations platform – the main finance, procurement, administration, reporting, information and technology, and monitoring and evaluation hubs. The Daloa office also had procurement, finance, and M&E staff. The Abidjan office covered activities in Abidjan, both local and national, as well as activities in the nearby satellite town of Dabou. In the CITI2 Request for Proposals, OTI had requested offerors to describe a regional presence in Bouaké, which is where CITI1 had its regional platform. Once awarded the contract, however, Chemonics was asked to open a regional platform in the West. Chemonics rapidly reconfigured its plans, opening an office in Daloa, a town some five hours drive West of Abidjan, in August 2014. A Regional Program Manager led the Daloa office, which covered all programming in the center-west and west. The distribution of activities and monies spent by program office location is as follows:

Table 2: Distribution of activities and money disbursed by office, as of March 30, 2016

Office	Activity Count	% of Total Activities	Total Amount Disbursed	% of Total Disbursed
Abidjan	56	48%	\$2,473,851.11	44%
Daloa	61	52%	\$3,141,429.83	56%

A seminal event in the course of the program was the Strategic Review Session (SRS) of March 2015, in which the program’s Senior Management Team, representing both OTI and the implementing partner, decided on a hard pivot from social cohesion to pro-election activities (as explained later, this was not as hard a pivot as it would appear). Spending shifted accordingly as is clear from the table and graph below.

¹⁵ According to the OTI *Field Manual*, “activities are generally made up of both material investments (e.g., equipment or technical assistance) and processes (e.g., community consultations) that together help produce meaningful effects, such as fostering or changing relationships, building knowledge, setting the groundwork for change, testing assumptions about behaviors, or targeting key drivers of instability.”

Figure 1: Activity count and funding by objective and per month cleared




Table 3: Clearance by quarter and objective (election objective highlighted in blue)

Year	Quarter	Program Objective	Activity Count	USD Cleared
2014	July-Sept.	Increase Community Cohesion	12	\$378,691.51
	Oct.-Dec.	Support an Inclusive and Credible Elections Process	2	\$123,806.99
2015	Jan.-March	Increase Community Cohesion	18	\$603,704.97
		Support an Inclusive and Credible Elections Process	13	\$672,542.50
	April-June	Increase Community Cohesion	8	\$297,618.13
		Support an Inclusive and Credible Elections Process	26	\$1,684,216.45
	July-Sep.	Increase Community Cohesion	2	\$56,730.87
	Oct.-Dec.	Support an Inclusive and Credible Elections Process	24	\$1,220,963.72
2016	January	Support an Inclusive and Credible Elections Process	3	\$220,971.87
		Increase Community Cohesion	5	\$280,399.08
		Increase Community Cohesion	4	\$85,182.51

CITI2 Met OTI Engagement Criteria

Through the evaluation process, it is instructive to determine whether a program has met OTI's four criteria for engagement. The CITI2 program did meet all criteria, both at its inception in early 2014 and throughout its 20-month duration.

- *Is the opportunity an important US foreign policy interest?* Côte d'Ivoire may not garner many headlines in the U.S. but the country is key to stability in West Africa. It has, by regional standards, a well-organized state administration, good infrastructure, and a performing economy. Growing instability in the Sahel, and the regional threat of terrorism, has heightened U.S. interest in the region.
- *Is there a window of opportunity?* Ceasing support to the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire a little more than a year before the 2015 presidential ballot would have made little sense – 2015 was a critical year in the country's process of normalization. The majority of political actors, civil society groups, and ordinary citizens in Côte d'Ivoire are determined to see the political transition succeed.
- *Does the OTI model bring a comparative advantage to support positive political momentum during the crucial period?* CITI2, like CITI1 before it, provided a form of support to Ivorian society that other national or international actors could not match. OTI's mix of national-level engagement with highly local activities remains both unique in the Côte d'Ivoire context and highly suited to it. CITI2 combined activities that raised awareness, built capacity, and fostered cohesion with material support in a manner that multiplied the effect of those activities – all this in highly targeted, local interventions. CITI2 provided a uniquely winning model in support of the Ivorian transition.
- *Does the operating environment allow for OTI's systems and processes to be optimized?* Côte d'Ivoire was a highly permissive operating environment in 2014, and it has remained so throughout the life of the CITI2 program. The CITI2 team has been able to implement quality activities, with responsive partners, under the aegis of responsible and supportive authorities, in a permissive security setting.

FINDINGS

This section reviews the first two questions asked of the evaluation team: (i) was the CITI2 strategy relevant to the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire and how did it adapt to critical developments as they unfolded during the performance period, and (ii) to what extent did the program contribute to the achievement of its stated objectives?

The evaluation team finds that the CITI2 strategy was focused, relevant, and adaptive to its stated goal – though there are signs that the end date chosen for the program – the 2015 presidential election – may not be the right one. The evaluation also finds that the program was successful in achieving both of its objectives. This section focuses on Objective 2 (social cohesion) first, as it precedes Objective 1 (peaceful elections) both logically and in terms of the chronological unfolding of activities.

This section also reviews two other important findings, highlighting CITI2's excellent relationship with the U.S. Embassy - Abidjan, and reviewing potential paths not taken by CITI2.

A FOCUSED AND ADAPTIVE STRATEGY – BUT THE WRONG BOOKEND?

From the very beginning of the program, in the summer of 2014, and in keeping with a central recommendation of the CITI1 evaluation, CITI2 focused on the critical issue of Côte d'Ivoire's political transition: the 2015 presidential election.

The Transition from CITI1 to CITI2

CITI2 benefited greatly by following CITI1, not only operationally but also conceptually. Under CITI1, the approach had proven at times to be too dispersed, in terms of both geography and programmatic focus. In response, the CITI1 final evaluation recommended that “the west must be the first priority of CITI2” and that “CITI2 [should] focus on the future: the elections of 2015.”¹⁶ The CITI2 team developed a strategy driven by the presidential election on the horizon and consistently implemented that strategy throughout the life of the program. The CITI2 team also narrowed the program's geographic focus to areas that were most at risk of violence during the election – especially the West, a bastion of support for former president Laurent Gbagbo that was the scene of much violence in 2011, and where competition over land continues to drive a painful wedge between ‘local’ and ‘settler’ communities.¹⁷

Social Cohesion and Peaceful Elections – Two Sides of the Same Coin

Nearly every interlocutor interviewed by the evaluation team stressed that social cohesion and “peaceful elections” (the shorthand used for credible and inclusive elections) are intimately linked in Côte d'Ivoire. Without a modicum of short-term social cohesion, there could be no peaceful elections. At the same time, peaceful elections are necessary to ensuring social cohesion in Côte d'Ivoire over the long term.

¹⁶ CITI1 Evaluation (2014), pp. 26 and 31.

¹⁷ Interviews, OTI/Washington, OTI/Côte d'Ivoire, Chemonics staff (January and February 2016).

This intertwining of the two objectives – credible and inclusive elections and social cohesion – is what gave the CITI2 strategy its single-mindedness and thrust, which are at the root of the program’s effectiveness.

Many awardees stated that the social cohesion activities were a necessary precursor to talking about the election. Without these activities, interviewees speculated that people would not have been willing to sit down and discuss elections – trust and cohesion had to be rebuilt first. As a woman leader in Duékoué put it, speaking of the markets of Carrefour and Kokoma which had been segregated by the post-electoral violence (Malinké and Guéré women could not safely go to the ‘other’s’ market), “the two markets had to have reconciliation before the elections.”¹⁸ The implication was that the continued separation of the two markets was an open wound that would have made it harder to have a peaceful, inclusive, and credible ballot day.

The fact that the ‘credible and inclusive elections’ objective came first is recognition of the CITI2 goal, its *raison d’être*. But logically, social cohesion was the first priority, at least chronologically. The first nine months of CITI2 focused on social cohesion – an essential preparatory step – as a necessary precursor to the election. Also, during that period, there was little clarity on the actual date of the election and the steps in the electoral process, and the *Commission électorale indépendante* (CEI, the national independent electoral commission) was very behind in its preparations. Without an electoral calendar, programmed events or real movement within the CEI before the beginning of 2015, there was little opportunity for election programming in 2014 and early 2015.

The Pivot Towards Elections

But by early 2015, the elections calendar began to emerge with greater clarity. As the date for the ballot drew nearer, the SMT decided it was time to shift the strategy to focus more purposefully on actual electoral activities. During the March 2015 Strategic Review Session (SRS), the SMT decided to increase monthly target activity clearance rates and shift programming from community cohesion (Objective 2) toward the election (Objective 1) in order to prepare for the 2015 presidential election.¹⁹ The SMT decided that 80 percent of future programming funds should focus on Objective 1 by May 2015, or six months before the scheduled election.²⁰

While the election pivot in the spring of 2015 was a key change in priorities, this does not imply that the CITI2 team neglected social cohesion activities. Many of the social cohesion activities combined elements of both cohesion and elections in order to maximize effectiveness. And while the program had formally pivoted to focus on the election, a majority of new elections activities wove together support to both cohesion and the election.

As a result, CITI2 successfully prepared the field for elections programming by first focusing on cohesion through bringing communities together and rebuilding trust, and second by weaving cohesion-building work throughout elections activities. A striking illustration was CITI2 training individuals from different

¹⁸ Interview, woman leader, Duékoué (January 2016).

¹⁹ CITI2 SRS Note to File, March 2015.

²⁰ Interview, OTI/Abidjan, Abidjan (January 2016).

and even conflicting ethnic and political backgrounds in election-related matters and having them go out, *together*, to talk to communities. (Greater detail in the ‘Reverse Manipulation – Mobilizing Spoilers’ subsection, below). The local CITI2 staff and awardees’ understanding of this strong link between cohesion and peaceful elections was crucial in the preparation for and design of successful elections programming.

In the Right Places and at the Right Time

Good Timing – First, the decision to launch CITI2 as a follow-up to CITI1 was the correct one. It was not an easy decision for OTI/Washington at a time of financial pressure and intense international competition for transition funds.²¹ But it was a necessary decision: it would have been wrong politically and even morally for OTI to leave Côte d’Ivoire a year before scheduled elections. A premature departure would have served neither the transition in Côte d’Ivoire nor U.S. foreign policy goals. Second, the pivot to elections in the spring of 2015 came at the right time. Until then, it would have been difficult to work with the CEI, as it was not far along in its own preparations, and the focus, at least in the west, was still rightly on social cohesion and recovering from the extraordinary violence of 2010-2011. Once the ballot day was only six or seven months away, it became necessary to concentrate on the election with more deliberation – and an abrupt pivot was no doubt needed to focus the efforts of the entire team on the other objective.

The Right Places – The decision to focus on the west was the right one. In the west, tensions remain higher than in other areas of Côte d’Ivoire. Opening an office in Daloa, while not immediately easy for Chemonics, which had planned an office in Bouaké, was also the right call. From there, the early hotspot mapping exercise (ABJ001) helped CITI2 make appropriate tactical programming decisions – to deepen the focus on Bangolo, Duékoué, and Guiglo, for instance, and not to focus on Mont Péko. Finally, CITI2’s decision to target rural villages surrounding key intervention towns was also the right decision: the remote rural areas, where tensions run high over land tenure issues, are where trouble often starts.

But Is CITI2 Missing the Most Important Critical Event?

CITI2’s strategy has proven focused and highly relevant to the transition in Côte d’Ivoire, and has successfully adapted to the evolution of events in the country. But, as the programs closes down, a question arises that is increasingly hard to ignore: was the CITI2 end date – the 2015 presidential election – the right one? Is OTI leaving too soon?

The 2015 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire was lauded both nationally and internationally as a successful election, owing to the lack of violence and a process that was generally deemed credible. For many, after two decades of civil war and violence, and after the bloody post-electoral crisis of 2011, Côte d’Ivoire had reached a decisive milestone in its political transition.

However, the evaluation team heard a fairly radically different perspective from respondents. Nearly every one of the interlocutors across Côte d’Ivoire voiced strong concerns around the local elections – the legislative (parliamentary) elections scheduled for late 2016, and combined municipal and regional elections

²¹ Interview, OTI/Washington (January 2016).

slated to take place afterwards, probably in early 2017.²² In interview after interview, well-informed individuals – local authorities, community leaders, traditional chiefs, business people, civil society leaders, journalists, and youth from the political parties – told us that they see a high potential for conflict and view these local elections (legislative, regional and municipal), not the presidential election, as the true test of Côte d'Ivoire's sustainable transition to post-conflict governance.

To be sure, there was widespread agreement that the presidential election had been peaceful and credible, and that this was a real achievement. But respondents explained this by the presence of a single viable candidate, meaning that the race was never truly competitive, coupled with local disinterest in national politics. By contrast, these same interlocutors voiced specific concerns over local elections, to include:

- o *The return of refugees in the West* - We heard reports of increasing numbers of returning refugees from southeastern Liberia, many of whom were hardline Gbagbo supporters. The return of these populations often leads to heightened tension over land which they consider theirs but which *allogène* (outside) communities have cultivated in their absence. Also, these refugees did not receive the same level of information (CITI2 or other) as host communities leading up to the 2015 presidential election. There is a need for raising awareness this returning community in advance of the local elections.
- o *The enduring fragility of some inter-community relations* - While social cohesion has improved remarkably across hotspots in the West and greater Abidjan, many people we spoke to believe it has solidified only on the surface and that deep-seated fractures persist, driven by long-term conflict drivers like land tenure and nationality. More immediate irritants also exist, such as ongoing trials, both abroad at the ICC and in the country, and competition among and within political parties. Reconciliation issues have not been fully addressed. Underlying tensions could be rekindled and exploited for political gain before, during, and after local elections.
- o *Local and personal stakes* - Compared to the presidential election, interviewees stressed that the stakes in local elections are more immediate and personal in nature. Legislative, municipal, and regional election campaigns are local events. Candidates are known at the community level and weave local issues with political messages. Political and ethnic powerbrokers who yield power in Abidjan (whom Ivorians refer to as *les cadres*) reach deep into the communities through the candidates to mobilize supporters along ethnic and communal lines, leading to tension.
- o *Political fractures* - Local elections entail many candidates for few positions. There will be tension between political party coalitions, within coalitions, and even within parties as incumbents and candidates vie for votes and power. Even though candidacy decisions are normally made in party headquarters and other centers of power in Abidjan, these tensions will reverberate back into towns and villages and could easily spill over into broader society. At the same time, political parties can exploit fractures and divisions across community lines. Larger political parties (the RHDP, the more moderate FPI wing of Affi N'Guessan, the hardline FPI wing of Sangaré, etc.), including those who called for the boycott of the presidential election, are planning to participate

²² In general, our interlocutors tended to speak generically about local elections, though they did often mention the fact that there would be three types of local elections – legislative, municipal, and regional. Nearly all those we spoke considered the legislative elections as local because of the highly local nature of the candidates, the campaigning, and the outcomes.

to the local elections. While a broader participation in elections is the hallmark of a successful transition, it also raises the fear of renewed tension.

People spoke with passion, fear, and sometimes anger about their concerns. One man in Guiglo likened the situation to a bowl of taro root porridge: the surface may be cool and calm, but put your finger in deep and you will get scalded.²³ Burkinabè leaders in Duékoué could barely contain their anger when speaking about cocoa farms that had been cut down by park rangers of the *Ministère des Eaux et Forêts* (the state authority in charge of policing state-owned land), while Guéré chiefs, also in Duékoué, spoke darkly of their land being appropriated by the *allogènes* and *allochtones*.²⁴ A community leader in Bloléquin, told us that “there is much blood in the forest,” and that “a month does not go by without a death [occurring],” referring mostly to Guéré-Burkinabè violence. He went on to say that “the only problem we have, it’s that forest, we will have a clash at any moment.”²⁵ A Guéré leader near Guiglo told us that, with the lead-up to local elections, “tribalism would come out again.”²⁶ A prefectural official said that the local elections are “going to be difficult” and that “every problem is politicized, even domestic disputes.”²⁷ In Abidjan, high-ranking officials and the independent electoral commission said that “the legislative elections are even harder [than the presidential election], we know from experience that there are hot zones [...] We are apprehensive [...] It is hard to have peaceful legislative elections.” “Imagine what the legislative elections will be like,” said another CEI official, “where every last vote counts.”²⁸

As a result of these concerns, if appropriate measures are not taken to inform communities, including groups outside the country (the pro-Gbagbo refugees in Liberia, for instance) around the elections, local elections have the potential to be more divisive and detrimental to continued social cohesion and peace than the presidential election. Key state and civil society actors that proved so adept at preparing local populations for the presidential ballot lack the means, primarily transportation, to reach the same communities in advance of the local elections. Also, engaging with newly returned refugees – most of them Gbagbo supporters – who were not reached before the presidential election and have not lived through the improvements in social cohesion, will be crucial to a peaceful result.

In conclusion, the CITI2 strategy was focused, relevant, and adapted well to the unfolding of the presidential electoral process. However, with the presidential election successfully conducted, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the transition in Côte d’Ivoire faces a further, grave challenge – the various local elections slated for late 2016 and early 2017.

It should be clear that this is not a criticism of the stewardship of the CITI2 program. One could only come to this conclusion once the 2015 elections had successfully taken place. Moreover, the CITI2 team lacks resources to continue programming. But the fact remains that the various upcoming local elections are more likely to generate political tensions and even violence than the 2015 ballot and that CITI-like activities will remain necessary in the run-up to the local elections. Although the USAID and U.S. Embassy

²³ Interview, community notable, Guiglo (January 2016).

²⁴ Interviews, community leaders and traditional chiefs, Duékoué (January 2016).

²⁵ Interview, Malinké community leader, Bloléquin (January 2016).

²⁶ Interview, Guéré leader, Zouhan (Guiglo-Bloléquin axis, January 2016).

²⁷ Interview, prefectural official, Duékoué (January 2016).

²⁸ Group interview, Commission Electorale Independante, Abidjan (February 2016).

have other programs underway in 2016 and beyond, some of which focus on election support, they do not offer a local, tailored approach or have the funding agility to allow for rapid response interventions in volatile areas during the potentially divisive election period. An OTI-like, community-based small grants mechanism could be a useful addition.

WAS CITI2 SUCCESSFUL IN MEETING ITS SOCIAL COHESION OBJECTIVE?

To what extent did CITI2 programming help target communities cope with violence, resolve conflict, and reduce tensions through dialogue, negotiation, and mediation?

Social cohesion (*cohésion sociale*) is a term that most if not all people in Côte d'Ivoire can relate to. It captures a yearning that is palpable among Ivorians, a desire for normalcy, a return to pre-conflict times when communities lived in greater harmony, a coming together to move beyond the crises of the past two decades, and an end to violence. CITI1 and CITI2 sought to tap into this yearning and to help develop it further through activities that brought communities together, reduced conflict, and improved ties among themselves and between communities and authorities.

Bringing People Together

CITI2 continued the CITI1 strategy of providing Ivorians with the chance to reconnect after decades of being torn apart. While the country has come a long way since the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis, there are still instances in which it is hard for Ivorians to be together, especially in the West. Perhaps one of the most striking examples of this is in Vavoua, where CITI2 supported the creation of youth and women's groups (*Plate-forme de leaders de jeunes et femmes de Vavoua*) to carry out election activities (DAL059). The platform brought together individuals from different ethnic, social, and religious backgrounds, including some who had previously been antagonistic to each other – including a local FPI official and a former leader in the *Forces Nouvelles* (the anti-Gbagbo rebels in the north). Before working together for the elections, many people had not been on speaking terms. During CITI2 training sessions, individuals not only established relations with each other, they became a team that was able, together, to participate in awareness-raising around elections in rural villages.

In Duékoué, CITI2 support to the local coalition of women leaders (*Coalition des femmes leaders de Duékoué*) aimed to bring Malinké and Guéré women together through the reintegration of the Carrefour and Kokoma markets (DAL004 and DAL024). As the women of the coalition explained, Malinké women had not been able to go to the Carrefour market and Guéré women to the Kokoma market because of mutual harassment and threats of violence. Thus heightened fear, mistrust, and anger on both sides had interfered with women's livelihoods. The coalition worked through local chiefs to bring together the two leading market women on each side. The process required many visits, and the coalition was only successful because of the support of traditional chiefs on both sides, because it is itself a mixed body (Malinké, Guéré, and others), and because of material and technical support from CITI2 (transportation, meals and refreshments, mediation, and facilitation). Once women started trading again, relying on each

other's supply chains, it not only removed an irritant between the two communities but helped the population at large become more accepting of one another.²⁹

In Duékoué, CITI2 helped customary chiefs come together for cohesion and reconciliation as well as a forgiveness ceremony (DAL020): “people needed to talk and release what they held in their heart,” a Guéré chief told the evaluation team.³⁰ In Abidjan, a CITI2 activity (ABJ005) brought together hostile youth in the rival neighborhoods of Yaoséhi and Doukouré in Yopougon. In Bangolo, north of Duékoué, CITI2 helped youth from rival political parties work together on community-improvement projects (DAL014) and grew rice together (DAL019) – previously, these youth “hardly spoke to one another.”³¹

In order to reach deeper into communities and touch more people, CITI2 also provided support to the reconciliation efforts of local radio stations, part of a broader effort to strengthen the capacity of these local stations. In Duékoué, CITI2 provided support to *La Voix du Guémon*, the local radio station, also a CITI1 partner, to conduct roundtables in and around Duékoué (DAL005) and Bangolo (DAL022) that would allow people from different communities to discuss how the 2010-2011 violence and subsequent tensions had affected them. “We were able to bring the communities closer together...,” a journalist at the radio told the evaluation team, “the youth of Duékoué have taken these activities to heart,” a statement confirmed by youth leaders in Duékoué, as well as Bangolo.³² Another former CITI1 partner was *Radio Tchrato* in Daloa, which also received support from CITI2 to promote local reconciliation and peace, notably bringing together ex-combatants to talk about what they had gone through during the fighting and say that they did not want any more violence (DAL012).³³

More generally, a number of observers (the grantees themselves, local authorities, and trainers), especially in the West, told the evaluation team how CITI2 activities brought people together through training sessions, debates, radio roundtables, joint activities, participatory theater, awareness sessions, and others. These events became an opportunity for victims and perpetrators (*‘boureaux’*) of violence to meet. On several occasions, perpetrators asked for forgiveness. Also, there was strong symbolism in having community leaders who had been involved, if not in the violence, at least in tough rhetoric against other communities, participate in forgiveness ceremonies, individually or with others (DAL020). These were moving moments for Ivorians, who could measure how far astray their politicians had led them, and what a long way back it was from the abyss.³⁴

Reducing conflict

There are numerous instances of local violence that CITI2 activities or grantees managed to mitigate. In the small village of Mona, a few kilometers west of Guiglo, support from CITI2 was instrumental in resolving a dispute over the authority of the local chief (DAL007).³⁵ In Guiglo, an incident occurred in June

²⁹ Interview, two women leaders, Duékoué (January 2016).

³⁰ Interview, Guéré chiefs, Duékoué (January 2016).

³¹ Interview, Youth Platform, Bangolo (January 2016).

³² Interview, Radio *Voix du Guémon*, Duékoué, and youth leaders in Duékoué and Bangolo (January 2016).

³³ Interview, Radio Tchrato, Daloa (January 2016).

³⁴ Interview, CITI2 awareness and training consultant, Abidjan (February 2016).

³⁵ Interviews, Mona village chief, prefectural authorities in Guiglo, other notables, Mona and Guiglo (January 2016).

2015 when a young pro-Gbagbo man was killed during a demonstration in town; relatives from his home village expressed their determination to seek vengeance from pro-government communities, but the youth platform, which CITI2 had helped create, mobilized and was able to calm the situation.³⁶ In Duékoué, a key CITI2 (and CITI1) partner, *Plate-forme des organisations de jeunesse de Duékoué* (POJED) – the local youth platform – was able to diffuse a crisis that brewed when local Guéré high school students and Dioula transporters clashed near Carrefour market.³⁷ In Vavoua, north of Daloa, the youth and women platform, which CITI2 helped create, was able to intervene after the authorities had arrested a local FPI leader, diffusing a tense situation in the run-up to the elections.³⁸

These positive developments were confirmed by the fact that the local prefectural authorities have come, by their own admission, to rely on local platforms to solve local crises – groups that CITI1 and then CITI2 helped grow and train – for instance in Vavoua, Duékoué, Guiglo, and Bangolo. Several sous-préfets told the evaluation team how they were reliant on youth and civil society groups, either created or empowered by CITI2, to help keep the peace in their jurisdiction.³⁹ The emergence of these relationships between local authorities and civil society groups is a striking achievement, one not often seen in political transitions.

Measuring Social Cohesion

In the absence of in-depth, detailed quantitative research, it is very difficult to measure improvement in social cohesion. The evaluation team systematically asked interlocutors about improvements in cohesion and most confirmed that they saw improvements and what led them to think so. Mostly, people pointed to anecdotal, though tangible, outcomes. People greet one another. They speak, do business together, and eat together. Freedom of movement has improved in most locations.⁴⁰ A woman from an *autochtone* community outside of Daloa told us that before CITI2, “we didn’t even want to see a ‘Dioula’” and that now she worked with Muslim women in a women’s platform in Daloa, a fact confirmed by several Muslim women.⁴¹ A woman in Dabou told us that the atmosphere in nearby villages had changed as a result of CITI2 programming: “There is less suspicion and more courteousness.”⁴² Whenever the overall ‘mood’ of a given place is improved, there is less fear and less violence. And the peaceful elections were the ultimate proof. The evaluation team is confident that CITI2 activities contributed to improved social cohesion in many if not all the areas where it intervened.

³⁶ ReliefWeb, CrisisWatch June 2015.

³⁷ Interviews, transporters, youth, prefectural authorities, Duékoué (January 2016).

³⁸ Interview, women and youth platform, Vavoua (January 2016). This could appear as a biased citation, as it comes from the platform itself, though it is lent more credence by the fact that the group of people we interviewed included both a local FPI cadre and a former *Forces Nouvelles* (rebel) commander and that they all agreed.

³⁹ Interviews, prefectural authorities, Vavoua, Duékoué, Guiglo (January 2016).

⁴⁰ One exception seems to be, according to a number of interlocutors, some of the protected wilderness areas (*forêts protégées*) where there has been much illegal cultivation, where there is little law and order, and where tensions between cultivators of different ethnic groups run high.

⁴¹ Interview, women’s group, Daloa (January 2016).

⁴² Interview, civil society leader, Dabou (February 2016).

WAS CITI2 SUCCESSFUL IN MEETING ITS ELECTION OBJECTIVE?

This evaluation question seeks to answer to what extent CITI2 pre-election programming – specifically civic education, voter education, voter registration, debates, forums, and information campaigns – contributed to increased public engagement in a peaceful electoral process, the successful implementation of elections, the peaceful acceptance of the elections results, and public perceptions of an inclusive and credible electoral process.

When speaking to Ivorians about the 2015 ballot, a recurring concept is that of *élections apaisées* – peaceful elections. The expression seems to have proven contagious as many Ivorian CITI2 staff adopted this short-cut definition of the objective, which served as a proxy for the arguably more ambitious ‘credible and inclusive’ elections of the official objective.

The peaceful election of 2015 in Côte d’Ivoire was a country-wide phenomenon, for many reasons, including the generally positive direction of the country’s transition, the desire of most Ivorians to eschew violence, and the general impression, even among those most opposed to him, that the reelection of President Ouattara had become a foregone conclusion. But in the midst of these macro-level factors, there was room for local situations to degenerate and spill over into neighboring areas or for entire swathes of the country to simply ignore the elections. CITI2 contributed to the overall success of the election in five, sometimes overlapping, areas:

1. National programs

CITI2 launched a number of highly visible, mass-audience, national-level programs to raise awareness around the elections, with catchy and hip messages, many of which proved popular. These included, for instance, an information campaign for peaceful elections through comic strips (ABJ032); the production of a woman-centered television miniseries which became, according to CITI2 staff, very popular (ABJ030); the diffusion of the ‘*Election c pas gnaga*’ (elections are not a physical fight) poster campaign with support from famous Ivorian soccer stars such as Didier Drogba (ABJ033); a widely disseminated elections song and video (ABJ048); and large murals in strategic locations in Abidjan (ABJ015). With an emphasis on popular culture, sports stars, music, and social media, these activities were an effort to target youth. *Election c pas gnaga* became a coined phrase, one that the evaluation team was told that everyone in Abidjan knew (the evaluation team’s queries to random Ivorian contacts were less conclusive in that regard; many did not know the slogan). According to OTI, these CITI2 activities were some of the only large audience, youth-focused social marketing to have taken place during the election period.

2. Direct Support to the Electoral Process

The program prepared for key events in the electoral process by creating an elections-focused plan of action that listed important steps in the electoral process and possible programmatic responses. As a result, when dates were officially announced for the electoral calendar, which often occurred with very little notice, CITI2 was prepared and able to respond rapidly. These responses included activities focused on:

- Electoral list – three activities: DAL043 and DAL047 (local electoral commissions) and DAL049 (civil society organizations);
- Electoral map – one activity: DAL047 (local electoral commissions);
- Distribution of voter cards – three activities, all with local elections commissions: DAL037, DAL040, and DAL041;
- Training local electoral commissions – one activity: DAL050;
- Informational campaigns – seven activities: DAL037, DAL040, DAL041 (local electoral commissions), DAL039 (women journalists), and DAL042, DAL027 and DAL053 (*préfectures* and *sous-préfectures*);
- Radio shows on the electoral code (with local electoral commissions): DAL043;
- Logistical support/materials – three activities: DAL037, DAL040 and DAL041 (all local electoral commissions);
- Electoral campaign – three activities: DAL042, DAL027, and DAL053 (all with *préfectures* and *sous-préfectures*).

The CITI2 elections plan, shown in Annex VI shows how these activities hewed to the electoral process.

In the West, CITI2 decided to work directly with local electoral commissions to help bolster their performance as well as improve their reputation with local populations. Many pro-Gbagbo supporters in the West saw the CEI, and its local branches, as the cause of the 2010 post-electoral violence and the demise of the Gbagbo administration.

Regional CEI officials for Cavally (Guiglo) and Haut-Sassandra (Daloa) were extremely appreciative of OTI's material support, training, and opportunities to network with other regional managers. (The evaluation team was not able to not meet with the Guémon commissioner). "Without CITI, it was going to be difficult. We would have had a many [more] Zouhan," said one regional manager, referring to Zouhan, a village west of Guiglo on the road to Bloléquin where the local chief had told him and his team that they were not welcome to conduct educational activities. "It really helped us interact with the population."⁴³ For another regional CEI official, CITI2 provided assistance "without which we would not have had the positive outcome we had."⁴⁴

Officials at the central CEI headquarters in Abidjan similarly acknowledged CITI2 support, but also stressed that they had felt somewhat cut off from the relationship that CITI2 staff developed directly with the regional commissioners. "It is important that we have the specifications [*cahier des charges*] for activities providing direct support [to the local commissions] but this was not, as far as I know, the case," a high-ranking official at the CEI told us.⁴⁵

⁴³ Interview, CEI official, Guiglo (January 2016).

⁴⁴ Interview, CEI official, Daloa (January 2016).

⁴⁵ Interview, CEI official, Abidjan (February 2016).

Nevertheless, CITI2 awarded a sizeable grant to the central CEI (ABJ052, \$126,875) to help build the capacity of members of the CEI secretariat and of its national technical team that supports the commissioners. The CITI2 program was also able to fill important gaps, for instance, in supporting the CEI with archiving, which was appreciated by U.S. Embassy senior staff, as well as by the CEI in Abidjan.⁴⁶ In addition, the program worked closely with other USAID partners, primarily National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

3. Raising Awareness about the Election

CITI2 drew on CITI1 contacts and local knowledge in small towns, villages and neighborhoods to build awareness around the elections, working with civil society, and local government officials. Some of these efforts had been long planned, as were, for instance, the informational campaigns in rural western hotspots around Guiglo, Bangolo, and Duékoué. CITI2 staff also responded to brewing tensions, for instance, in Vavoua, where the team rapidly assembled an effort to conduct a voter education drive among communities in and around the town and raise awareness on civic and electoral issues. CITI2 also used the newly-formed Vavoua youth and women platform, in which representatives from both ends of the political spectrum underwent training and then worked together to sensitize rural communities (DAL059). In the small town of Dabou, west of Abidjan, where anti-RDR resentment ran high (the RDR is the party of President Ouattara), and where a sizeable population of ex-combatants had resettled after the 2010-2011 crisis, CITI2 implemented an innovative ‘vote-ball’ tournament to bring youth together and build their understanding of the electoral process, seizing on the excitement generated by the *Eléphants*’ fresh victory in the African soccer cup (ABJ035), a point made by several interlocutors.⁴⁷

4. Reverse Manipulation: Mobilizing Spoilers

Some of CITI2’s most distinctive work was to enroll potential spoilers into awareness-raising activities for social cohesion and peaceful elections. This active mobilization represented successful CITI1 tactic, which CITI2 also leveraged to good effect. In Côte d’Ivoire, politicized youth and people working in the transport sector are often perceived as potential spoilers – groups that had already been manipulated by political actors and might easily have been so again. Political parties turn to the youth to create unrest through demonstrations, stoke violence and intimidation, and attack each other and their ‘enemy’ communities. Political leaders often have strong ties to transporters and exploit their extensive organization, their mobility, and large youth contingent, many of whom are found at the margins of society and are easy to manipulate (assistant drivers, spanner-boys, fare collectors, passenger ‘coaxers’, and so on).

CITI1 had already worked with both politicized youth and transporters (for instance, *taxi-moto* groups in Korhogo and Bouaké). For CITI2, continuing to work with these groups offered a threefold advantage. One, engaging these groups meant engaging key spoilers. Two, working with these groups helped mobilize the very qualities that make them potential spoilers (their energy, mobility, and organization) for the benefit of the program. And three, by bringing together different groups and individuals at opposite ends

⁴⁶ Interviews, U.S. Embassy, CEI officials, Abidjan (January and February 2016).

⁴⁷ Interviews, youth groups and CITI2 staff, Daloa (January 2016).

of the ethno-political spectrum, CITI2 turned them into live, tangible manifestations of social cohesion and of what a peaceful election process should look like.

The activities with the various youth platforms – in Duékoué, Guiglo, Daloa, Bangolo, and elsewhere – not only brought together young people from different political horizons who might otherwise be antagonistic towards one another, especially in an elections period, but they also brought these people to take a common, and public, stand against violence and political manipulation. This conveyed a powerful message to their communities. It also made it somewhat harder for them to go back to violence. The experience of the Vavoua civil society platform, which brought together FPI cadres and a former *Forces Nouvelles* sub-commander, also provided a powerful message and an example to these individuals' respective communities – something the evaluation team observed firsthand and that the Vavoua préfet strongly praised.⁴⁸ In bringing them together, CITI2 was not only encouraging a message of togetherness and cohesion, it was turning these individuals into the embodiment of that message. Another strong example of youth programming was ABJ013, implemented by the *Plate-forme des organisations de la société civile d'Abobo* (POSCA). POSCA enrolled some 20 local Malinké youth groups called *grins*, which normally play a positive social role within society (*grin* reportedly means “together” in the Malinké language), but many of which had reportedly been manipulated by the opposition during the 2010-2011 crisis. POSCA trained them in civic education, the responsible handling of information, and how to resist political manipulation (resisting political manipulation had been one of the most popular activities with youth under CITI1). CITI2 also worked with universities and art institutes (Daloa and Abidjan) and high school students (Daloa), including university unions. Students, often politicized, were potential spoilers, especially given their roles in the 2010-2011 violence.

Programming with transporters (mostly urban and short- and long-distance passenger transport companies) was also a striking example of reverse manipulation. Activities with transporters included ABJ028 (Abobo), DAL038 (Duékoué), DAL054 (Bangolo), DAL055 (Daloa), and DAL056 (Guiglo). The representative of the *Association pour les droits et devoirs de chauffeurs*, an organization representing transporters in Abobo, told the evaluation team that CITI2 had allowed them “to include” in their voter education work “the *gnamboro* [young, rough fare collectors and passenger coaxers] whom [the political parties] always mobilize for trouble.”⁴⁹ The head of a transporters' union in Daloa said of the *gnamboro*, “they are crazy, but we trained them... We'd have liked to do more, it would do good [for the local elections].”⁵⁰

CITI2 also worked with local chiefs who are also seen as potential spoilers (mostly because of their close involvement with rural land tenure issues), involving them in civic and voter education activities, providing conflict resolution and land tenure management training, and resolving local conflicts. Activities included DAL003 and DAL008 on land tenure management; DAL020 on reconciliation; DAL007 on conflict resolution in the village of Mona, near Guiglo; and DAL027 to engage Cavally chiefs in raising awareness against electoral violence.

⁴⁸ Interviews, members of the youth and civil society platform and Vavoua préfet, Vavoua (January 2016).

⁴⁹ Interview, ADDC representative, Abobo (February 2016).

⁵⁰ Interview, transporter union official, Daloa (January 2016).

5. Cohesion Building for Elections

Finally, as noted above, improvement in social cohesion was a necessary step for elections to take place. Several CITI2 partners told the evaluation team of the positive impact a number of non-election CITI2 activities had had on the electoral process. In Duékoué, for instance, a Guéré chief told us that CITI2 multi-community reconciliation activities, which included symbolic forgiveness ceremonies (DAL020), made it possible for local populations to engage with the local electoral commissions.⁵¹ Also in Duékoué, residents told the evaluation team that the reintegration of the two ‘enemy’ markets, Carrefour and Kokoma, was a necessary step in the electoral process (see the section ‘Social Cohesion and Peaceful Elections – Two Sides of the Same Coin’ above).

CITI2’S ROLE IN THE US EMBASSY

The OTI team was a key player within the U.S. Embassy. Across the board, from the Ambassador to the Regional Mission Director, to USAID and State Department staff, OTI was seen as a team player with a strong program that contributed to embassy reporting and helped secure positive outcomes in the country. Ambassador McCulley told the evaluation team that OTI had “proven the value of long-term investment at the grassroots level.” He added that “OTI has helped inform [embassy] reporting, informing our understanding” and helped to “build a picture of a place that was moving forward in a positive way.” “I had great confidence in the program and the leaders of the program,” he said, also saying that “OTI is more nimble” than other USG programs. When asked if he believed CITI2 had been a necessary ingredient in the success of the 2015 elections, he answered “I think OTI was essential, I really do.”⁵² OTI invited embassy staff to the field, contributed to cables, and provided on-the-ground reporting.

PATHS NOT TAKEN

There are a number of programming avenues that CITI2 might have explored, but did not. Some were recommendations from the CITI1 evaluation, and others were potential opportunities that emerged from the unfolding of events. They included the following:

- o *Follow-on activities in former CITI1 areas* – The CITI1 evaluation had recommended that CITI2 dedicate some resources to “select follow-up activities in Bouaké, Divo, Korhogo, Sakassou and others” to help the more outstanding CITI1 partners transmit at the grassroots level the knowledge and skills they had received.⁵³ CITI2 was not able to follow through on this recommendation, mostly for want of financial and human resources, and also to avoid the dispersion of focus that had bedeviled CITI1.⁵⁴ CITI2 deserves credit for managing nevertheless to involve a number of former CITI1 grantees from areas no longer targeted – e.g., the youth

⁵¹ Interview, Guéré chiefs, Duékoué (January 2016).

⁵² Interview, Amb. McCulley, Abidjan (January 2016).

⁵³ CITI1 Evaluation, p.33.

⁵⁴ Interview, OTI/Abidjan, Abidjan (January 2016).

platform in Bouaké, the taxi-moto leaders in Bouaké, and others – in training and networking activities (for instance DAL021).

- o *Ebola* – Côte d’Ivoire mobilized decisively against Ebola, and CITI2 Ivorian staff felt very strongly that CITI2 should contribute. Some pointed out that one could build clear political themes (national unity, cohesion, and government-society cooperation) into anti-Ebola activities.⁵⁵ OTI, in both Abidjan and Washington, were wary of Ebola taking on too much importance within CITI2, and that the program could be hijacked by Ebola funding (Chemonics implemented a small – less than \$5,000 – activity to provide Ebola educational materials through a DDGS activity that could be expanded if need be but that never was).⁵⁶ Ultimately, the Ivorian government and PEPFAR took the lead, and OTI was not asked to provide support during the critical public health Ebola awareness raising period.⁵⁷ In hindsight, the OTI SMT is in agreement that it was a wise decision to not get involved in Ebola programming.⁵⁸
- o *The Office national d’identité (ONI)* – One of the bottlenecks in the electoral process was the difficulty that citizens faced in obtaining the documents they needed to register to vote from the ONI, which was unprepared to meet the sudden and intense demand of its services during the pre-election period. Several PDOs suggested providing support to the ONI to facilitate the process, especially for more vulnerable groups (single mothers, the poor, and the elderly) who could not afford to queue for hours to get the required documents. Working with the ONI met resistance within the Embassy, where senior officials felt the ONI registration process, which included the payment of consequential fees, was akin to a polls tax – and that USG support to the process was inappropriate.⁵⁹ As a result, CITI2 did not implement any activities focused on the ONI.
- o *Involvement in political issues* – There are a number of political issues that CITI2 could have involved itself in and did not. These include, for instance, the pro-Gbagbo refugees in Liberia (perhaps assisting the official and customary authorities in their efforts to get them to return, addressing the issue of what has happened to their land while they were gone); the Gbagbo trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC), which started while the evaluation team was in Côte d’Ivoire (CITI2 could have promoted more discussion around the trial); the issue of pro-Gbagbo FPI chiefs in the West who are still not recognized by the authorities; the issue of the proliferation of weapons in the West in ungoverned spaces like the Forêt de Tai; or the boycott of the election by the hardline wing of the FPI. All of these issues were live during the program and impacted how people felt about the transition and, by extension, about the elections. CITI2 could have taken one or several of them on. The fact that it did not caused a senior member of the

⁵⁵ Interviews, Chemonics and OTI SMT members, Abidjan (January and February 2016).

⁵⁶ Interview, senior manager, Chemonics/Abidjan, Abidjan (January 2016). Direct distribution of goods and services (DDGS) are activities where there is no grantee, and that can be easily scaled up or down.

⁵⁷ Communication, OTI/Abidjan (February 2016).

⁵⁸ OTI had provided a substantial response to the cholera outbreak in Haiti in 2010 (with Chemonics and DAI as implementers).

⁵⁹ Interview, OTI and Chemonics SMT members, Embassy official (January 2016).

implementing partner team to tell us that “we never felt like a political project.”⁶⁰ It is possible that working on these issues may have been neither feasible nor wise – this is difficult for the evaluation team, on the basis of a few interviews, to determine. But the fact is that the CITI2 program, for all its courage in tackling tough issues at the very local level, remained somewhat conservative on larger political issues. This was, to a certain extent, in keeping with the tenor of the political transition in Côte d’Ivoire, where difficult issues are sometimes not addressed head on. It was certainly in keeping with both the narrow and carefully thought through scope of CITI2’s goal and, more broadly, with USG policy in the country, which is to support the Ivorian government in its political transition

In conclusion, the evaluation team does not believe that the leadership of CITI2 deserves any criticism over these paths not taken. CITI2 was a compact program with limited resources and a clearly defined goal, and it did not have much leeway in terms of money, staff or time to explore programming avenues that were not closely tied to its central objectives.

⁶⁰ Interview, CITI2 Chemonics team-member, Abidjan (January 2016).

LESSONS LEARNED

What best practices and lessons learned from the CITI2 program could be applied to other transition programming or to programming in the Côte d'Ivoire context?

INNOVATIVE GRANT-MAKING

The central strength of the CITI2 program has been its innovative grant-making, which enabled the whole of this fairly modestly-sized program to be greater than the sum of its parts. There are several lessons for OTI.

A Field-Based Approach

The success of CITI2 activities has a lot to do with the strong presence of the CITI2 team in the field. Field presence is of course a mainstay of OTI programs worldwide, and Côte d'Ivoire's permissive environment made it that much easier. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that CITI2 staff (OTI and Chemonics, and especially the PDOs and GMs) was very present in the field, particularly in the West, which can sometimes feel remote from Abidjan. Awardees understood that CITI2 staff were active, invested, and available and had a strong understanding of their communities. Grantees and partners mentioned this *travail de proximité* – hands-on, tailored management – as one of the main reasons CITI2 activities were effective and distinctive.

Listening to Communities and Following Up

Again, listening to what communities say they need and then following up is another mainstay of best OTI programming practice. The positive experience of CITI2 reinforces the importance of this practice. CITI2 staff spent a lot of time on the ground talking with community members. The PDOs and many of the Grant Managers (GMs), having worked with CITI1, understood the OTI model, and knew local issues and actors. They took the time to listen to the issues and problems expressed by communities. CITI2 also followed up: a member of the SMT explained that one of the keys to CITI2's success in Daloa – a city where CITI2 was new – was because of Chemonics' deliberate, up-front, multi-week investment in listening to people when the team first set up in the town in August and September 2014 to find out what kind of activities were really needed, and was rapidly followed by tangible activities.⁶¹ Numerous awardees and local authorities confirmed this, and not just in Daloa. Also, the evaluation team heard repeatedly that CITI2 used the right trainers; individuals who were at once proficient technically, capable of engaging a less well-educated audience, and passionate about the issues (civic education, voter education, and rural land tenure management). Awardees specifically mentioned three key trainers as being effective at conducting training with rural communities and providing support around sensitive topics.⁶²

Working with Grantees

⁶¹ Interview, SMT member, Daloa (January 2016).

⁶² The three were Professor Jean-Paul Tuho, Dr. Alain Toh (a sociologist), and Agnès Kraiy (a journalist).

Another important ingredient to CITI2's success, and something that OTI programs should always strive to achieve, was CITI2's collaborative and inclusive approach to the identification, design, and implementation of activities – something that awardees repeatedly lauded. The evaluation team found that CITI2 staff worked collaboratively with awardees to identify and design individual activities. Many awardees stated that, rather than imposing preconceived ideas and enforcing an idea that may have worked elsewhere, CITI2 listened and developed activities based on the local group's needs. "I like the OTI method. They don't come to you with rules. They take your idea and craft the project just the way you wanted it."⁶³ Whether or not the idea came from CITI2 or the awardee, CITI2 PDOs and GMs talked the idea over with awardees and keep them part of the development process. Awardees felt joint ownership with CITI2 over the activity in either situation.

New Methods of Engaging People

CITI2 was effective at engaging people. The lesson for OTI is twofold. First, being creative in engaging communities is key to achieving impact with awareness-raising activities. Two, a program need not necessarily always reinvent the wheel, and real impact can be achieved by finding ways to make time-tested program recipes more novel and effective.

Awardees consistently found CITI2 activities relevant and engaging. For instance, CITI2 used innovative, crowd-pleasing methods, such as participatory theater, to engage communities (in interviews, participatory theater came up repeatedly as an effective approach to explain cohesion and elections in rural communities). The vote-ball experience in Dabou that brought together participatory theater with election awareness-building and the Ivorian passion for soccer was especially popular (ABJ035).

CITI2 also took a new approach to the "workshop/report-back-to-community" model. This model, in which leading elements of society are trained on key issues or discuss important topics in facilitated meetings and then go back to their communities to share what they have learned or discussed, generally works well in Côte d'Ivoire, where people have been starved for connection after two decades of crisis and violence. It also allows for a multiplier effect by engaging more people at the community level. But the model had begun to show limitations, especially in areas where CITI1 and then CITI2 had been active for years. Merely bringing people together was no longer enough – the transition had moved forward, and new types of activities were needed for the program to remain relevant. In order to ensure good turnout for the feedback and outreach sessions in which civil society leaders who had received CITI2 training shared their newly acquired knowledge with the community, CITI2 provided support in the form of podium trucks, singers and bands, recorded music, soft drinks, and so on.⁶⁴ This generated excitement in small towns and villages, and people attended in high numbers, according to CITI2 staff, awardees, and more neutral observers (authorities). In general, CITI2 provided material support for reporting back to the community in combination with trainings, which was appreciated by awardees who felt that it gave them tools to continue to attract populations and spread their messages.

Also, CITI2 provided opportunities – through community meetings, debates on radio, participatory events, meetings between groups who at been at odds – for people to air their grievances and to simply talk.

⁶³ Interview, religious leader, Adjamé (Abidjan, February 2016).

⁶⁴ The French term for feedback is *restitution*.

These opportunities were an essential first step towards building social cohesion, and something that communities had not previously had the opportunity to do.

Mobilizing Spoilers

One of the most striking aspects of CITI2 programming is how the program succeeded in a form of reverse manipulation, engaging potential spoilers, mobilizing their harmful capacities for positive outreach, and turning them into prized participants in social cohesion and elections activities. For examples of how CITI2 engaged politicized youth, transporters and traditional chiefs, see the section ‘Reverse Manipulation: Mobilizing Spoilers’ in the Findings section above. This piece of programming, in which potential spoilers are turned into agents of positive change, offers a powerful example for OTI programs elsewhere.

Multi-layered grant-making

Another lesson from CITI2 that should become an OTI best practice is the program ‘swarming’ approach which enabled it to saturate areas considered critical with different yet interconnected activities to an array of different actors in Duékoué, Bangolo, Guiglo, Daloa, and to a lesser extent (because of size), the Abidjan townships of Yopougon and Abobo. CITI2 replicated the successful CITI1 approach of creating multiple linkages between individual activities, with the outcome that the whole of the program is greater than the sum of the parts. For instance, CITI2 grantees in a given area – Duékoué, Bangolo, or Daloa – worked together to achieve shared incomes. This enabled them to build on each other’s successes, as well as to forge relationships among themselves. CITI2 was also effective in bringing like-minded groups from different parts of the country together, again with the aim of helping local groups form national networks. Finally, and this is especially worthy of praise, CITI2 engaged certain former CITI1 grantees to work with current grantees in the hope of sharing experience and building networks. The outcome of these efforts is a concentration of focus that brings greater impact and helps local groups feel connected nationally.

Gender

CITI2 had a belated but strong focus on gender. In Daloa, expatriate Chemonics staff worked hard to integrate gender concerns into the program development cycle, training staff on how to develop activities that focus on women participation through targeted questions and the tweaking of the activity design template. Ivorian staff in Daloa acknowledged these efforts to better incorporate women.⁶⁵ Activities like ABJ037 focused on awareness-building among women, reportedly reaching 50,000 women in the Abidjan *communes* of Koumassi and Yopougon with this activity, according to Chemonics.⁶⁶ These efforts notwithstanding, there were no female PDOs (though the existing PDOs were excellent) and the push to focus on women came in the latter half of the program. The lesson for OTI is captured in the words of the OTI representative in Côte d’Ivoire, “Gender should not be an afterthought.”⁶⁷ Specifically, every OTI program should endeavor to have at least one female PDO.

⁶⁵ Interviews, Chemonics CITI2 team members (Washington DC and Daloa, January 2016).

⁶⁶ Personal communication, Chemonics SMT member (Abidjan, February 2016).

⁶⁷ Personal communication, OTI SMT member (Abidjan, February 2016).

STAFFING

The CITI2 program’s effective use of creative staffing solutions throughout the program to provide surge support, coverage, and technical support to the program is a valuable lesson learned for OTI.

Project Staffing

The CITI2 team, on both the OTI and the contractor sides, was strong and experienced. The OTI team was experienced and deeply committed to the transition in Côte d’Ivoire, and the quality of CITI2’s programming made it clear how much the program’s leadership cared about the country and the people. The expatriates hired by Chemonics all had either OTI or Côte d’Ivoire experience. The majority of the Ivorian staff members were quality carryovers from CITI1 and brought experience, contacts, and understanding of both the context and the OTI business model.

Surge

In the programmatic ramp-up to the elections, CITI2 provided surge support through local interns and especially activity coordinators, often energetic youth recruited in the community. The interns were seen to be useful, although sometimes stretched beyond their capacity and duties. The activity coordinators were crucial to implementing activities, particularly in the lead-up to the elections. The evaluation team met with two activity coordinators and found them both dynamic and very in tune with local dynamics. However, the coordinators did provide an additional layer of coordination and communication between the awardees and CITI2 staff. The evaluation team heard a few reports of miscommunication or lack of information flow: in Dabou, where outer villages were not part of the activity, and in the villages of Abobo Baoulé and Abobo Tè, where leaders refused to let *Radio Arc-en-ciel* conduct roundtables.

Bullpen

OTI bullpeners and DC-based staff helped with the establishment of strategy and M&E systems at the beginning of the program.⁶⁸ This was useful and beneficial to the program. In addition, bullpeners provided coverage during periods of OTI staff absences.

One Team

OTI and Chemonics embodied a strong one-team approach at the senior management level, which reverberated down to all layers of the program. Several CITI2 staff said that “teamwork” was key to getting things done. In an innovative move, the program had GMs report to PDOs as a means to foster a team approach and reduce hierarchical communication flows during activity implementation, which seemed to work effectively at improving activity ownership.

INTRA-PROGRAM HAND-OVER

⁶⁸ The Bullpen is OTI’s in-house STTA and talent retention pool, made up of personal service contract (PSC) holders.

Under the auspices of OTI, AECOM and Chemonics handled the transition from CITI1 to CITI2 with professionalism, grace, and a strong commitment to the well-being of both the overall mission and of the Ivorian staff. Both companies, in Abidjan and in the U.S., deserve high praise for this. It may seem a straightforward achievement but smooth handovers are not always the norm in OTI projects.

For OTI the lesson from the CITI1-to-CITI2 transition is twofold. First, OTI in Côte d'Ivoire prepared for the change, namely by relying on recommendations from the CITI1 evaluation and by seeking the advice of people who had worked through previous such hand-overs.⁶⁹ Second, the OTI leadership in Côte d'Ivoire fostered a positive and transparent atmosphere in which the transition took place. Ultimately, however, success boils down to the behavior of individuals – again, the leaders of Chemonics and perhaps especially A, the outgoing contractor, deserve real kudos for managing the hand-over so seamlessly and elegantly.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Activity-level M&E

At the activity level, the program provided a good level of oversight over the activity inputs and outputs. In activity level Final Evaluation Reports (FERs), the program M&E specialists, local consultants, and other CITI2 staff during site visits captured evaluation data. In general, monitoring methods were appropriate for the activity-level. The program used informal interviews, observation, and field reports to assess the achievement of activity objective 1 (activity-level outputs) and activity objective 2 (activity-level outcomes).⁷⁰ In addition, the PDOs wrote final evaluation reports (FER) for each activity, an OTI best practice to ensure maximum program learning in real time. The program did a good job of writing FERs in a timely manner, though they were not, according to OTI/Abidjan, very “substantial in providing critical analysis of what worked and what didn’t.”⁷¹

While the FERs showed generally robust results for activity-level outputs (activity objective 1), an area of improvement could have been in the crafting and evaluation of activity-level outcomes (activity objective 2). Many of the activity-level outcomes that tied closely with sub-objective or even objective-level results, were difficult, if not impossible, to measure after an individual activity was implemented. For instance, did a voter education activity contribute to peaceful elections? Did a reconciliation process contribute to social cohesion? In some cases, the link is clear and widely acknowledged. Concerning the reintegration of the Carrefour and Kokoma markets in Duékoué, for instance, the fact that the Malinké and Guéré women could go to each other’s markets was seen by many in Duékoué as a key ingredient in improved community relations (“social cohesion”) in the town and in the peaceful election process (“credible and inclusive elections”). But in a place like Dabou, where CITI2 input was less consequential, the link is much harder to establish.

⁶⁹ A member of the CITI1 final evaluation team had worked through several program transitions and was able to advise OTI/Abidjan on best practices.

⁷⁰ In an OTI activity database there are three activity objectives for each activity: objective 1 (outputs), objective 2 (outcomes), objective 3 (sub-objective/cluster). These activity objectives are different from the program objectives.

⁷¹ Communication, OTI/Abidjan (February 2016).

For the sake of illustration, it is useful to fully unpack an example. The ABJ046 activity objectives were:

- Objective 1 (output). Hold a press conference in Abidjan with 50 religious leaders and journalists, produce a recording of this conference to be broadcast on religious, local, and commercial radio stations and support a billboard campaign using images of religious leaders;
- Objective 2 (outcome). Raise awareness and disseminate messages to people of all religious backgrounds in order to promote peaceful public participation in the 2015 elections;
- Objective 3 (sub-objective/cluster): To strengthen public engagement in a peaceful electoral process.

The second objective (outcome) consists of an outcome (raising awareness), an output (disseminating messages) and language similar to one of the sub-objectives. In the M&E plan the desired outcomes for this activity, under activity objective 1 were:

- Outcome 1: Populations embrace the messages of the religious leaders (measure: interviews, direct observations)
- Outcome 2: Targeted populations express their willingness to participate peacefully in the upcoming presidential elections (measure: interviews and direct observation)

These outcomes would typically have been more appropriate for the corresponding sub-objective or objective. However, the FER results state that the activity (the posters, presence of religious leaders, forum, etc.) contributed to the peaceful and violence-free participation in the 2015 presidential elections. There is little substantiating data to show how this link was made, however. Even with more robust data, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to directly link one activity to the achievement of peaceful elections. This is not to say that the activity did not contribute to those aims. Still, it is more likely that it did not do it alone and the activity was part of a group of activities (or cluster) that together contributed to the program's sub-objectives/objectives. It may have been more useful for the program to identify outcomes that were measurable and attainable at the activity-level. For this example, focusing on whether or not the activity "raised awareness" may have been more appropriate to test and measure.

As a result, often FERs attempted to make the link between the activity and the achievement of a high-level effect, but this link was nearly impossible to accomplish as a result of one activity.

Program-Level M&E

CITI2 struggled to implement a robust monitoring and evaluation system at the program level. There are several reasons for this, including OTI staffing absences and changes that may have affected the ability of OTI to provide M&E guidance and oversight for the program and an intense, condensed implementation period in the run-up to the 2015 presidential elections. In addition, OTI began updating program-level monitoring and evaluation guidance, including updating training on clusters, in early 2015, several months into program implementation. While the lack of strong M&E at the program level did not seem to affect CITI2's ability to implement and contribute to objective-level results, the program may have missed valuable opportunities, such as explaining innovative and strategic linkages between activities and objectives (and between objectives), encouraging program learning (feedback loop) and improvement, and sharing results with external audiences.

CITI2 conducted two cluster evaluations: an evaluation of the Early Warning System cluster, conducted by an outside consultant; and a social cohesion cluster evaluation, conducted internally by the M&E team. There was no cluster evaluation conducted for the following three clusters:

- Strengthen public engagement in a peaceful electoral process (59 activities)
- Capacitate national and local level institutions to implement elections (five activities)
- Increase distribution of credible information (nine activities)

Both cluster evaluation reports had mixed reviews by the CITI2 team. For the Early Warning System cluster, some staff found that they had useful recommendations, particularly the implementation of trainings for Early Warning monitors; however, others found that the consultant did not address some of the core questions, while still others never saw the reports. For the Social Cohesion Cluster evaluation, the results were presented to the team in the summer of 2015, after the “pivot” towards the elections. Specific effort was made to frame the findings as relevant to the elections, given the program’s priority focus. For some, these recommendations were useful for elections programming; for others, it seemed irrelevant. In addition, the cluster attempted to draw general conclusions across a wide swath of activities and as a result, lacked sufficient data that explained how the conclusions on impact were reached and seemed unwieldy and unapproachable for future cluster evaluations. It is worth noting that there was no elections-focused cluster evaluation, “which might have helped tailor our programming more. Again, time was an issue, which in general was the main challenge for cluster evaluations. This was an inherent weakness of our program.”⁷²

The Problem with Unspecific Sub-Objectives

Another lesson learned is the danger of having unspecific sub-objectives. CITI2 did not lack sub-objectives: there were four of them.⁷³ What CITI2 lacked were sub-objectives that were sufficiently different than the objectives that could explain the components of the program.⁷⁴ The two main sub-objectives essentially repeated the objectives. As a result, there was no piece of the strategy that broke down the objectives into more obtainable or measurable pieces. For example, the objective of social cohesion could have been broken down into sub-objectives of ‘people talk to each other,’ or ‘people can air grievances.’ By not having small components that added up to the objectives, by missing the middle, the program lost the ability to link the activities to the objectives and missed the opportunity to explore findings and lessons learned on a more manageable level. (When designing activities, CITI2 staff used the sub-

⁷² Communication, OTI/Abidjan (February 2016).

⁷³ They were: “(i) to increase public participation in the electoral process, (ii) to capacitate national and local level institutions to implement elections, (iii) to develop/strengthen community strategies to cope with and reduce violence and conflict and promote the use of non-violent methods to manage and reduce violence and conflict, and (iv) to increase distribution of credible information” (USAID/OTI: “CITI2 Program Document v.2,” 06 January 2015, pp. 2-3).

⁷⁴ For instance, of the 68 activities implemented in the inclusive and credible elections process objective, 56 were tied to sub-objective (i) ‘increase public participation in the electoral process, and 15 activities fell outside of it; likewise, of the 49 activities implemented under the social cohesion objective, 45 fell under sub-objective (iii) ‘develop/strengthen community strategies to cope with and reduce violence and conflict and promote the use of non-violent methods to manage and reduce violence and conflict,’ and only four activities were tied to other sub-objectives.

objectives/clusters in different ways. Some used the sub-objectives to guide programming selection and design, while others focused on the objectives and picked the closest corresponding sub-objective after the activity was designed.)

Final Evaluation

A lesson learned from this evaluation is that the cases in which OTI (or the evaluation team) deems beneficiary information is needed to prove a linkage between activity outcomes and program outcomes, the methodology for final evaluations should allow for sufficient time to gather this beneficiary information. In practice, this means allowing the evaluation team the time and reasonable resources to organize focus group discussions, surveys, polling, crowd sourcing, or whatever appropriate means to understand how activities, in aggregate, affect cluster- and program-level outcomes. In the case of this evaluation, it is probable that one three-week trip was not enough, especially in a country with a security environment as permissive as Côte d'Ivoire's, where most locations, awardees and program partners are accessible, meaning paradoxically, that there are more places to go and people to meet.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID/OTI's CITI2 has been a successful program. OTI's decision to prolong the CITI1 program in 2014 to provide support to the presidential election was the right decision. The CITI2 strategy was clear, consistent, cohesive, and focused. Its dual focus on bolstering social cohesion and promoting peaceful elections, in Abidjan and the West of the country, has been highly relevant to the political transition in the country. CITI2 drew from the experience and social capital of the CITI1 program.

From a programmatic point of view, CITI2 was exemplary in its grant-making, and it implemented strong activities through strong grantees. CITI2 was especially successful in engaging potential spoilers such as politicized youth, turning them into messengers for social cohesion and a peaceful election process. Absent hard quantitative data, it is not possible to determine to what degree CITI2 activities contributed to the peaceful October 2015 election. But the evaluation team heard enough tangible, anecdotal evidence of impact to be convinced that CITI2 contributed to reducing communal tensions in critical areas of the country and helped large numbers of Ivorians approach the elections with greater knowledge of the process and confidence in it. Certain important observers, such as the U.S. Ambassador, went as far as to say that CITI2 was an “absolutely” necessary ingredient to the success of the 2015 elections.

This successful CITI2 experience yields a number of important conclusions:

- *The importance of political will* – The main reason CITI2 has been a focused, innovative, and impactful program is because the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire is a strong one. The authorities are supportive of positive change. Perhaps most importantly, a majority of ordinary Ivorians are determined to see normalcy prevail in their country, and they have the political space to exercise that determination. Absent the requisite political space, the presence of empowered partners, and the overall benevolence of the authorities, CITI2 would probably have been a shadow of the program it has been. Without popular support, political will, and sufficient political space, it is hard to conceive of a successful political transition, regardless of the quality of the transition support program. Does this mean that the elections would have been successful even without an OTI program? Perhaps, but it is hard to prove a negative. What is sure is that the electoral process would have been messier, there would have been more delays and probably lower participation rates, and there may well have been more tension in the flash-points where CITI2 was most present. In final analysis, the strong transition makes for a better transitional program, and the stronger transitional program improves the outlook of the transition.
- *The importance of a mature program* – Another reason that CITI2 did well is because it was in fact a mature program, one that started in 2011 and has evolved since. CITI2 benefitted from the contacts, the partners, the experience, the ground knowledge, the staff, and indeed even the mistakes of CITI1. CITI2 succeeded because OTI used the CITI1 evaluation, and followed its recommendations, and held true to its narrowly defined goal and objectives. In other words, CITI2 even matured programmatically. For OTI, the general conclusion is that, with the exception of

highly dynamic transitions, a program starting up will in most cases not achieve immediate results across the board, especially at the grassroots level.

- *The strength of multi-layered grant-making* – A key strength of CITI2, one that was already visible in CITI1, was the ability to attack issues through a concerted mix of mutually supportive grants and to foster links between grantees. CITI2 sought to improve social cohesion and strengthen the electoral process from a number of angles, engaging in the same geographical area youth, women, traditional leaders, local media, the authorities, religious leaders, professional groups, election officials, academics, and others. The result was a focused multiplier effect in which grants reinforced other grants, grantees worked together, beneficiaries were engaged from different angles, and the overall impact was greater than the sum of the activities. This multiplier effect is further strengthened when a program is committed to bringing together grantees from different locations and even past grantees, leading to the creation of networks of likeminded individuals and groups, and feelings of connectivity that people find empowering.

In the midst of the good news about CITI2 and the October election, the evaluation team also heard other news while in Côte d'Ivoire. In multiple conversations across the country, a great variety of interlocutors – civil society representatives, local authorities, community leaders, journalists, youth, women leaders, politicians, civil servants, and ordinary citizens – all expressed their deep concern about the upcoming local elections and the need for an OTI-like program working at the grassroots level. The presidential election was the easy one, they said, as there was only one candidate, a significant resignation among opponents of the current government, and no real local political competition. The real challenge will be the legislative, municipal, and regional elections tentatively scheduled in late 2016 and early 2017.

Local elections carry local stakes that are also highly personal. Given the presence of acute irritants like the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé trials in The Hague, the potential for politically-driven conflict is high. At the same time, the issues that fueled the country's descent into violence 20 years ago – land tenure, nationality – remain mostly unresolved. They have, in fact, grown more acute, especially with regards to land tenure, as the pressure on the land increases with population growth, migration, and the return of refugees mostly coming from Liberia. CITI2 awardees who had spoken forcefully of the achievements of the program in 2015 also warned that these achievements – increased cohesion, youth working together, community chiefs interacting – would not hold if the political situation became fraught again.

This leads to the one programmatic recommendation of this report. Contrary to the general assumption that governed CITI2, the 2015 presidential election was not the appropriate end date for OTI's Côte d'Ivoire programming. The 2016 legislative, municipal and regional elections have the potential for violence and could disrupt Côte d'Ivoire successful march to stability. USG and OTI must seriously consider how best to continue supporting the transition in Côte d'Ivoire, whether through direct programming, collaboration with other USAID programming, or some other solution. Existing and planned structures – diplomacy, USAID programming, other types of support – are necessary but lack the necessary local focus, funding agility, and ability to work with critical partners and potential spoilers. The very real successes of CITI2, and of CITI1 before it, must not eclipse the need, through the upcoming election cycle, for continued OTI or OTI-like small-grants programming in support of Côte d'Ivoire's promising but still fragile transition.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

PDQIII Task Order #10

Activity #4: Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative II (CITI 2) Final Evaluation

Scope of Work

Period of performance: August 14, 2015 – March 25, 2016

BACKGROUND

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched the Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative (CITI) program in September 2011, four months after the end of the post-election violence that claimed the lives of three thousand people and displaced hundreds of thousands of others. While some of the violence has subsided, Côte d'Ivoire continues to face serious challenges as it emerges from more than ten years of civil conflict. As the October 2015 presidential elections approach, the tensions that led to the violence in 2010 are re-emerging as flash points, and increased efforts are needed to support a non-violent and transparent electoral process so Côte d'Ivoire maintains stability.

In response to evolving needs, USAID/OTI's work in Côte d'Ivoire has been implemented in two phases. The first phase (CITI 1), implemented by AECOM from September 2011 to August 2014, supported public confidence in the post-conflict recovery process through enhanced governance processes and effective community initiatives. In line with US foreign policy objectives, USAID/OTI's goals shifted in the lead up to the upcoming presidential election period to focus more specifically on supporting greater social cohesion and political stability around the elections. This current second phase, from June 2014 to March 2016, has been coined CITI 2 and is implemented by Chemonics International Inc.

At the conclusion of CITI 1, OTI engaged Training Resources Group (TRG) and The QED Group to conduct an independent performance evaluation. The evaluation, completed in October 2014, assessed the program's effectiveness, identified strengths and weaknesses, and provided recommendations for CITI 2. The full evaluation report is available here: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00k6xd.pdf.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this activity is to conduct an independent performance evaluation of USAID/OTI's CITI 2 program, from its launch in June 2014 to the present. The findings from this final evaluation will capture the strategic direction and impact that CITI 2 had on the political transition in Côte d'Ivoire during its period of performance and provide a product that concisely explains gains and lessons learned. The final product will be shared with the Ivorian government, US Government agencies, and other interested groups. The evaluation should draw upon the findings of the CITI 1 evaluation and consider key events in Côte d'Ivoire's political transition to determine the extent to which CITI 2's design and strategy were appropriate as well as impact achieved during this period.

Specifically, the evaluation will:

- Assess the appropriateness of CITI 2's program strategy following the end of the CITI 1;
- Document the program's impact and challenges against the stated program objectives during the life of the program;
- Compile best practices and lessons learned as well as offer recommendations for USAID/OTI, the USAID office in Abidjan, and for other relevant institutions; and
- Examine USAID/OTI's progression from CITI 1 to CITI 2, including its geographic targeting, shifts in strategy, and programmatic and operational approaches to grant-making and activity design to document best practices and lessons learned.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation shall seek to answer the following questions:

4. To what extent did the CITI 2 strategy adapt and remain relevant to critical issues in Côte d'Ivoire's political transition?
5. To what extent did the program contribute to the achievement of its stated objectives?
 - a) To what extent did CITI 2 programming (specifically civic education, voter education, voter registration, debates, forums, and information campaigns) before the elections contribute to increased public engagement in a peaceful electoral process (accounting for gender dynamics and violence, filling critical gaps), successful implementation of elections, and public perceptions of an inclusive and credible electoral process?
 - b) To what extent did CITI 2 programming through dialogue, negotiation, and mediation help target communities cope with violence, resolve conflict, and reduce tensions? This may entail reviewing trust, indicators of cohesion, capacity of CSOs and the government, engagement in peace, and reconciliation.
6. Lessons Learned
 - a) What best practices and lessons learned from the CITI 2 program could be applied to other transition programming or to programming in the Côte d'Ivoire context? The scope of this question may be narrowed over the next few months in coordination with OTI's preparation and data collection for an After Exit Review for this program.

METHODOLOGY

This evaluation will be non-experimental and largely qualitative in nature, but mixed methods may be used as appropriate. In answering the evaluation questions, the contractor shall utilize data that is disaggregated and analyzed by sex, whenever such data is available. Methodological specifics will be agreed upon among the evaluators, OTI/Côte d'Ivoire, and OTI/Washington, and the evaluators are encouraged to suggest creative approaches. OTI's activity database is a rich source of information on individual projects and should be utilized by the evaluation team. The program has also conducted external cluster evaluations, an independent "hotspot mapping" analysis report from the Global Challenge Corporation, and all grants and other programmatic activities have final evaluation reports (FERs). The evaluation team should draw

on the data and findings from these efforts as well as other reliable sources in preparing its analysis of CITI 2.

The evaluation should not focus on questions that often concern more traditional development programs. For example, as a small grants program that uses experimental approaches to produce short-to medium-term effects on localized and regional conflict, long-term sustainability should not be a primary area of focus.

Possible methods for the evaluation include:

- Facilitated workshop with key program staff to reflect on program implementation, challenges and successes;
- Field visits to the implementation areas;
- Interviews with key program stakeholders, including US Embassy and USAID staff, community leaders, government officials, and beneficiaries;
- Focus group discussions and interviews with beneficiaries, grantees, and others;
- Direct observation;
- Documentation review, e.g., quarterly and annual reports, reports from Strategy Review Sessions (SRSs) and Program Performance Reviews (PPRs), perception surveys and other existing data, and Côte d'Ivoire's activity database.

TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team should be comprised per the specifications described below. The positions to be filled by Social Impact require OTI concurrence of the proposed candidates. Candidates for all positions shall possess fluent written and spoken English and French to be able to both conduct field work and prepare a written evaluation and present briefings. In addition to two evaluators engaged by Social Impact, Molly Byrne, an M&E Advisor with OTI, will participate in the evaluation as a third team member.

- A **senior lead evaluator** with experience designing, implementing, and evaluating activities with specific knowledge of OTI-type programming. The senior lead evaluator will serve as the team leader and will be responsible for the field review, interviews, the draft and final evaluation reports, debriefs in Côte d'Ivoire for the CITI 2 Senior Management Team, USAID Senior Leadership Team and, if appropriate, the US Embassy. In addition, the team will present to various audiences in Washington, DC.
- A **mid-level evaluation specialist** with research and/or evaluation experience in complex political crises. This evaluation specialist should be a host country national and have local research and/or evaluation experience. Knowledge of OTI-type programming is preferred. The mid-level evaluation specialist will support the team leader and participate in the field review, interviews, the draft and final evaluation reports, and debriefs in the field and potentially in Washington, DC.

TIMELINE and LEVEL OF EFFORT (LOE)

The field work of the evaluation will take place over approximately two weeks. The team will travel to Côte d'Ivoire on/about January 15, 2016 and depart on/about February 7, 2016. In addition, the team will have a total of two weeks of LOE in advance of departure for reading and some Washington-based interviews in November and December. In addition, this activity will include three weeks of LOE for writing and completion of deliverables. **In total, OTI envisions up to 53 days of LOE per member of the evaluation team per the timeline below:**

Dates*	Task	LOE
November 15-December 31, 2015	Reading on Côte d'Ivoire context. Key materials to be provided by OTI. Key Washington-based interviews.	12 Days
December 2015 (precise date TBD)	Kick-off meeting with OTI team to refine evaluation questions, methodology, travel and logistics; database training.	1 Day
January 15-16, 2016	Travel to Côte d'Ivoire	2 Days
*January 17-February 6, 2016	Field-based interviews and analysis, debriefs to senior management, staff and USAID mission as appropriate.	18 days
February 7-8, 2016	Travel from Côte d'Ivoire	2 Days
February 8-19, 2016	Report writing; submit first draft to OTI by COB February 26, 2016.	10 Days
February 29 – March 14, 2016	Receive comments from OTI by COB March 4, 2016. Submit final report by March 14, 2016.	5 Days
March 15-18, 2016	Debriefs with OTI, Chemonics and USG interagency as determined by OTI.	3 Days
		TOTAL: 53 days LOE

* All dates listed above are illustrative and subject to change.

A six-day work week is approved during the field work for this activity.

TASKS and DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team, under the direction of the Team Leader, is responsible for completing the following Tasks and submitting the following Deliverables:

- Proposed interviewee list (so OTI can provide contact information);
- Summary of proposed data collection methods;
- Summary of out-briefing before departing Côte d'Ivoire;
- **Draft evaluation report for comments (content and structure), due February 26, 2016;**
- Debrief summary (handout or presentation);
- Debrief(s) with OTI, Chemonics and USG interagency as determined by OTI; and
- **Final evaluation report, due March 14, 2016.**

All deliverables will require OTI concurrence prior to their finalization.

The final evaluation report will be posted on the USAID's Development Exchange Clearinghouse (DEC) website by Social Impact.

Social Impact will be responsible for the following logistical matters with respect to the two evaluation specialists engaged through this activity:

- Social Impact is responsible for all scheduling, arranging meeting locations, and confirming times/dates/locations with the team and interviewees and grantees. OTI will provide references, but Social Impact is responsible for all scheduling. While the evaluators are in country, OTI's partner Chemonics International will make available a conference room in its offices for the evaluators to use in Abidjan and Daloa. However, meetings in hotel lobbies, bars, and gardens are sometimes preferable and convenient. USAID/OTI will facilitate access to the US Embassy for meetings with other USAID and Embassy officials, and arrange conference rooms in the Embassy.
- Social Impact shall arrange and purchase all international and US travel. TOCOR concurrence is required for all international travel not included in the original activity budget;
- Social Impact shall provide per diem (lodging and M&IE) for the evaluation team in Côte d'Ivoire;
- Social Impact shall fund in-country air travel and ground transportation;
- Social Impact will obtain visas; and
- Social Impact and the evaluation team will work with OTI and implementing partners to arrange interviews in Washington, DC and in Côte d'Ivoire.

USAID/OTI will arrange international travel, provide per diem, secure lodging, fund in-country air travel, and obtain a visa for the OTI member of the evaluation team. Social Impact will, however, be responsible for including the OTI staff member when making ground transportation arrangements for the team while in Côte d'Ivoire.

REPORT STRUCTURE

The evaluation report, written in the English language, should be no more than 20 pages (excluding annexes) and adhere to USAID guidelines and be structured as follows:

- Cover Page with photo
- List of Acronyms
- Table of Contents, which identifies page numbers for the major content areas of the report.
- Executive Summary (2 to 3 pages): should be a clear and concise stand-alone document that gives readers the essential contents of the evaluation report, previewing the main points in order to enable readers to build a mental framework for organizing and understanding the detailed information within the report. Thus, the Executive Summary should include: major lessons learned; maximum of two paragraphs describing the program, summary of objectives and intended outcomes; areas of meaningful under- or over-achievement.
- Methodology: Describe the data collection methods used including strengths and weaknesses, inclusion of stakeholders and staff, rough schedule of activities, description of any statistical analysis undertaken. This section should also address constraints and limitations of the evaluation process and rigor, including what can and cannot be concluded from the evaluation. All actual or potential conflicts of interests among members of the evaluation team should be noted in this section. In accordance with ADS 203, the report should also state why a performance evaluation was conducted in lieu of an impact evaluation.
- Findings: The evaluation team should determine how best to organize this section based on the evaluation questions. In some cases, it is helpful to organize the report against project objective, but in other cases it may make more sense to organize the report against evaluation questions.
- Synthesis, Recommendations and Lessons Learned: This is space for the evaluation team to think about the data and results, and make concrete recommendations for project improvements/changes, pull out organization lessons learned, and generally comment on data and results.
- Annexes: data collection instruments in English and French; list of stakeholders interviewed with number and type of interactions; the SOW, qualitative protocols developed and used, any data sets can be provided in electronic format, any required photos, participant profiles or other special documentation needed.
- The entire report, excluding annexes, should not exceed 25 pages in length.

POINT OF CONTACT

The OTI/Côte d'Ivoire Program Manager will serve as the point of contact for overall coordination of the Washington meetings. There will be some occasions where he/she arranges the meeting and location and others where he/she may provide contact information for the consultants to arrange their own logistics. The TOCOR will remain the point of contact for all technical direction and requests requiring formal concurrence.

ANNEX II: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Key Informant Interview Guide

- 1- Pouvez-vous nous parler de l'appui dont vous avez bénéficié dans votre communauté dans le cadre de CITI2/USAID? *(Tell us about the support you received from CITI2 in your community.)*
- 2- L'intervention de CITI2/USAID était-elle nécessaire dans votre communauté? *(Was CITI2 support needed in your community?)*
- 3- En quoi l'approche de CITI2/USAID est-elle différente de celles des autres organisations qui interviennent dans votre communauté? *(How was the CITI2 approach different from that of other organizations that work in your community?)*
- 4- A votre avis que ce serait-il passé sans l'intervention de CITI2/USAID? *(What do you think would have happened without the support of CITI2?)*
- 5- Comment jugez-vous les rapports entre les différentes communautés aujourd'hui? Y a-t-il eu des changements au niveau de la cohésion sociale? *(How are current relations between different communities? Have there been changes with regards to social cohesion?)*
- 6- Comment l'intervention de CITI2/USAID a-t-elle contribué aux élections apaisées dans votre localité ? quels éléments distinctifs ont pu faire la différence? *(How did the support of CITI2 contribute to peaceful elections in your community? What specific elements made a difference?)*
- 7- Comment entrevoyez-vous les élections législatives et locales (municipales et régionales) à venir dans votre communauté? *(How do you see the upcoming legislative, municipal and regional elections in your community?)*

ANNEX III: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1	Simplice Kouassi	Chemonics	PDO	Daloa
2	Felix Youl	Chemonics	PDO	Daloa
3	Luc-Armand Bohoulet	Chemonics	M&E specialist	Daloa
4	Marie Laure	Chemonics	Grant Manager	Daloa
5	Bema Timité	Chemonics	Grant Manager	Daloa
6	Dominique Dieudonné	Chemonics	RPM	Daloa
7	Issiaka Bamba	Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires	Director	Daloa
8	Koné Daouda	Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires	Asst-Director	Daloa
9	Sery Bahi	Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires	Asst-Director	Daloa
10	Bakayoko Mehoue	Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires	Cultural Promotion Officer	Daloa
11	Sangaré Soumahila	Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires	Section Head	Daloa
12	Zano André	Commission Electorale Indépendante	Permanent Secretary	Abidjan
13	Mme Coulibaly Jeannine	Commission Electorale Indépendante	General Secretary	Abidjan
14	Mme Yoli Bi Marguerite	Commission Electorale Indépendante	Senior Commissioner	Abidjan
15	M. Koné Yaya	Commission Electorale Indépendante	Assistant to the First VP	Abidjan
16	Alla Pascal	Plate-forme des jeunes leaders	Spokesman	Daloa
17	Touré Katinan	Plate-forme des jeunes leaders	President	Daloa
18	Aman Blé Nadraud Louise	Fédération de l'Association des femmes leaders	Advisor	Daloa
19	Karidja Diarra	Fédération de l'Association des femmes leaders	President	Daloa
20	Massan Traoré	Fédération de l'Association des femmes leaders	General Secretary	Daloa
Daloa	Ouattara Salimata	Fédération de l'Association des femmes leaders	General Secretary	
22	Lozo Rose Poboua	Fédération de l'Association des femmes leaders	Member	Daloa

23	Traoré Drissa	Radio Tchrato	Director	Daloa
24	Nicole Séry	Radio Tchrato	Head of programming	Daloa
25	Pasteur Kaya Rodrigue	Plate-forme des Leaders Religieux de Daloa	President	Daloa
26	Touré Aboudramane	Haut Conseil des Entreprises de Transport du Haut-Sassandra	General Secretary	Daloa
27	Youssef Konaté Yaya	Gare Centrale de Daloa	Station Head	Daloa
28	Tapé Délaba	Coalition des Organisations de la Société Civile du Haut Sassandra	President	Daloa
29	Déhoulé N'Guessan	Préfecture de Vavoua	<i>Préfet</i>	Vavoua
30	Evelyne Koffi	Direction Départementale de la Jeunesse	Director	Vavoua
31	Irié Lou Léocadie	Plate-forme de Vavoua	President	Vavoua
32	Diarrassouba Tiémoko	Plate-forme de Vavoua	Project Manager	Vavoua
33	Kouassi Aya Thérèse	Plate-forme de Vavoua	Treasurer	Vavoua
34	Kiéhoué Roland	Plate-forme de Vavoua	Assistant Gen. Secretary	Vavoua
35	Kouamé Bouama	Plate-forme de Vavoua	Comm. Officer	Vavoua
36	Tozan Eddy Jean R.	Plate-forme de Vavoua	VP	Vavoua
37	Kouakou Kouassi Hamidou	Radio Duékoué	Director	Duékoué
38	Ouédraogo Salimata	Coalition des femmes leaders	President	Duékoué
39	Sylla Vazoumana	Plate-forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue (POJED)	President	Duékoué
40	Chef Batahi François	Conseil de Paix du Guémon	<i>Chef de canton Zagné</i>	Duékoué
41	Quinlo Serey	Conseil de Paix du Guémon	<i>Chef de Tribu</i>	Duékoué
42	El Hadj Ali Traoré	Comité de Veille et Sensibilisation	President	Duékoué
43	Djédjé Gougoua Grégoire Théophile	Sous-préfecture	<i>Sous-Préfet</i>	Duékoué
44	Touré Abdoulaye	Collectif des Taxi villes et communes	President	Duékoué
45	Dosso Ibrahim	Collectif des Taxi villes et communes	Line Manager	Duékoué
46	Koné SoumahilaKolo	Sous-Préfecture	<i>Sous-Préfet</i>	Bangolo
47	Ouonhouli Leoye Daniel	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders	President	Bangolo

48	Bah Maherou Roger	Plate-forme des Leaders de Jeunesse	Secrétaire Général	Bangolo
49	Keignan Fabien	Plate-forme des Leaders de Jeunesse	Secrétaire Général chargé des projets	Bangolo
50	BahaMonkouin Michel	ONG Source du Bonheur	President	Bangolo
51	Yahiri Didier	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo	President	Guiglo
52	Podé Lohi Narcisse	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo	Scientific Committee Coordinator	Guiglo
53	Guiryéouhou Toh Bruth	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo	Scientific Committee Member	Guiglo
54	Gnarou Klato	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo	Scientific Committee Member	Guiglo
55	Kpassé Paul Leblanc	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo	Secretary General	Guiglo
56	TopkaPohosson Raoul	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo	Member	Guiglo
57	Opoh Billy	Plate-forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo	Assistant Secretary	Guiglo
58	Maho Théodore	Village de Mona	Village chief	Guiglo
59	Gnonflé Bruno	Village de Mona	Local leader	Guiglo
60	Julien Gomba	CITI2	Local Coordinator	Guiglo
61	Koné Messemba	Préfecture	<i>Préfet de Région</i>	Guiglo
62	Okou Tohoury Paulin	Sous-Préfecture de Guiglo	<i>Sous-Préfet</i>	Guiglo
63	Coulayes Victor-Emmanuel	Conseil des Chefs Traditionnels	<i>Chef de terre</i>	Guiglo
64	Bakary Lakoun	Commission Electorale Indépendante locale	President	Guiglo
65	Chef Douai Jacques	Village de Zouan	Village Chief	Guiglo
66	Blo Etienne	Communauté Guéré	<i>Chef Central Wê</i>	Bloléquin
67	Traoré	Communauté Malinké	Malinké Chief	Bloléquin
68	Kpahé Didier	Jeunesse de Bloléquin	President	Bloléquin
69	GuidouéDeringue	Jeunesse Bloléquin	Member	Bloléquin
70	Bléhi Olivier	Jeunesse de la Sous-Préfecture	President	Bloléquin
71	Bohé Paul-Marinair	Commission Electorale Indépendante locale	President	Bloléquin
72	Stephan Delou	CITI2	Local Coordinator	Bloléquin

73	Koné François	Association pour la Défense des Droits des Chauffeurs (ADDC)	President	Abobo
74	Doumbia Abou	Association pour la Défense des Droits des Chauffeurs (ADDC)	Secretary General	Abobo
75	Marie-Roger	Radio Arc-en-Ciel	Journalist	Abobo
76	Franck Sylvanus	Radio Arc-en-Ciel	Managing Editor	Abobo
77	Brou Marius	Plate-forme des Organisations de la Société Civile (POSCA)	President	Abobo
78	SamakéAmisa	Plate-forme des Organisations de la Société Civile (POSCA)	Member	Abobo
79	Nogbabé Boris	Plate-forme des Organisations de la Société Civile (POSCA)	Member	Abobo
80	Fofana Mamadou	Réseau Ouest Africain pour l'édification de a Paix (WANEP)	Early Warning Manager	Abobo
81	Diomande Inza	Radio Yopougon	Director	Yopougon
82	Mme Sanya Kanou	ONG Sanya Kanou	President	Yopougon
83	Mme Yao	ONG FCIEX	President	Yopougon
84	Prof. Haidara Daouda	ASCAD	President	Abidjan
85	Imam Mamadou Dosso	Forum National des Confessions Religieuses de Côte d'Ivoire	Advisor to the President	Abidjan
86	Zohouri Magloire	Préfecture de Sakassou	Prefecture Secretary General	Sakassou
87	Assi Assi Diahou Archille	Sous-Préfecture de Sakassou	<i>Sous-Préfet</i>	Sakassou
88	Goh Félicité	Préfecture de Sakassou	Chief of staff	Sakassou
89	Kamenan Edia René	ONG Handi-Espoir (Groupe Moteur)	President	Sakassou
90	Koffi Affoué Rose	ONG Handi-Espoir (Groupe Moteur)	Member	Sakassou
91	Traoré Siaka	ONG Handi-Espoir (Groupe Moteur)	Member	Sakassou
92	M'Bla Aristide	ONG Handi-Espoir (Groupe Moteur)	Member	Sakassou
93	Tré Eric	Conseil Général des Jeunes de Bouaké (CGJB)	Vice- President	Bouaké
94	Bamba	Mairie de Bouaké	Deputy Mayor	Bouaké
95	Mme Konan	Association des femmes commerçantes	President	Bouaké
96	Mme Barry	Association des femmes commerçantes	Board member	Bouaké

97	Souma Boubacar	Association des Taxi-Moto	President	Bouaké
98	Fofana Ibrahim	Association des Taxi-Moto	Vice- President	Bouaké
99	SEM Terence McCulley	US Embassy	Ambassador	Abidjan
100	Mark Lawler	Chemonics	CITI2 Chief of Party	Abidjan
101	Kate Woods	Chemonics	Deputy Chief of Party	Abidjan
102	Tiohozon Coulibaly	Chemonics	Senior PDO	Abidjan
103	Daouda Dao	Chemonics	M&E specialist	Abidjan
104	Youssouf Touré	Chemonics	PDO	Abidjan
105	Mark D. Emmert	OTI/Abidjan	Country Representative	Abidjan
106	Parker Bennett	OTI/Abidjan	Deputy Country Representative	Abidjan
107	Hadja Binaté Nagolodjon	OTI/Abidjan	Project manager	Abidjan
108	Benjamin Olawodje	USAID/Abidjan	DG officer	Abidjan
109	Gilbert Gnangne	Radio Leboutou	Director	Dabou
110	Djedjemel Armand Thomas	Radio Leboutou	Journalist	Dabou
111	Olivier Koffi	Union de la Jeunesse Communale	President	Dabou
112	Mme Diarra	ONG « Unir et Servir »	President	Dabou
113	Alexandre Duprez	USAID/West Africa	Mission Director	Abidjan
114	Jeff Bryan	USAID/Côte d'Ivoire	Development Counselor	Abidjan
115	Christopher Campbell	US Embassy	Political Officer	Abidjan
116	Kristen Grauer	US Embassy	Pol/Econ Officer	Abidjan
117	Megan Mamula	OTI/Washington	Africa Team Leader	Wash DC
118	Joshua Litwin	OTI/Washington	Africa Team Program Manager	Wash DC
119	Bridget Burke	Chemonics	Director	Wash DC
120	Alyssia Amparan	Chemonics	Manager	Wash DC
121	Edward Landreth	Chemonics	Associate	Wash DC
122	Andrew Hall	OTI/Washington	ABPC Team Leader	Wash DC

123	Sarah Gardener	US Embassy (former)	Political Section	Wash DC
124	Zaiko Bohou Pauline	Coalition des femmes leaders	General Secretary	Duekoué
125	Guela Renaud	Plate-forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue (POJED)	member	Duekoué
126	Guidea Françoise	Plate-forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue (POJED)	member	Duekoué
127	Diomande Vacaba	Plate-forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue (POJED)	member	Duekoué
128	Diarrassouba Raissa	Plate-forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue (POJED)	member	Duekoué
129	Diouffo Fabrice	Plate-forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue (POJED)	member	Duekoué
130	Hien Marcel	Judiciary	Judge	Guiglo
131	Celestine Kabran	Chemonics	Grant Manager	Abidjan
132	Mariame Kamate	Chemonics	Grant Manager	Abidjan
133	Patricia Kadio	Chemonics	Grant Manager	Abidjan

ANNEX IV: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Cables

- Côte d'Ivoire: USAID OTI Final Push Before Elections (October 21, 2015)

Cluster Reports

- Evaluation of the Early Warning System in Abobo, Yopougon, Duekoue, and Bangolo (July 2015)
- Social Cohesion Cluster Evaluation (no date listed, but we know the final results were presented in August 2015)
- PowerPoint of M&E meeting (presentation of cluster evaluation results) - August 6, 2015

Database

Activity specific review and team ran reports on:

- Burn rate by month
- Awardees and Activities by Awardee
- Activities by office
- Activities by Program Objective
- Activities by Sector
- Activities by Theme
- All activities

Maps

OTI DAT team created the following maps:

- Program Objectives (Program, Abidjan and West)
- Program Beneficiaries (Program, Abidjan and West)
- Conflict Data/conflict events and OTI programming
- Activity count and funding per month cleared
- Clusters
- Dollars cleared and disbursed
- Grants cleared, completed, and closed each month
- Weeks in each activity Phase

PPMP documents

- March 2015 SRS Note to File
- CITI 2 Program Meeting/Rolling Assessment - June 10-11, 2015
- M&E meetings (January 2015, February 2015, April 2015)

- Rolling Assessment/M&E meeting - August 2015
- April 2015 SRS Report
- Regional Advisor Note to file - December 14, 2014

Reports

Annual:

- CITI2 Annual Report June 2014
- CITI2 Annual Report September 2015

Quarterly

- CITI2 Quarterly Report August 2014
- CITI2 Quarterly Report November 2014
- CITI2 Quarterly Report March 2015
- CITI2 Quarterly Report June 2015
- CITI2 Quarterly Report September 2015

Monthly

- CITI2 Monthly Report February 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report March 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report April 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report May 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report June 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report July 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report August 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report September 2015
- CITI2 Monthly Report October 2015

Bi-Weekly

- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report July 10, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report July 24, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report July 27, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report August 8 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report August 22, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report September 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report October 31, 2014

- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report November 14, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report November 28, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report December 12, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report December 29, 2014
- CITI2 Bi-weekly Report January 9, 2015

Strategy

- 2015 OTI Elections Support Infographic
- CITI2 1 pager - November 2015
- Strategic Framework (French and English) - May 20, 2015
- CITI2 Program Document - June 8, 2015
- CITI2 Program Document - March 27, 2015

Transforming Lives stories

- 2015.2.4 Success_Story_CDI_marketplace FINAL
- 2015.03.02 CDI_TL_Soccer_LPA final
- 2015.3.6 CDI_TL_Fashion_LPA final
- 2015.07.16 CDI_Radio_Stations LPA final
- 121012-CDI068_SNAPSHOT_Abobo_roundtable-FINAL-CDI-ABJ-mde
- CDI053_SNAPSHO_Bangolo_roundtable_120912-FINAL
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives April 2015
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives December 2014
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives February 2015
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives January 2015
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives July 2015
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives June 2015
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives March 2015
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives November 2015
- CITI 2 Transforming Lives October 2014
- CITI2-ABJ015_Success Story_August 2015
- Transforming Lives - June 2014.final_
- Transforming lives May 2014_CDI295.final_
- Transforming lives November 2014 CITI2_October SnapshotI_30.10.14_final

CITII Final Evaluation:

Evaluation of Côte d'Ivoire Transition Initiative Program (CITI I)

Links to CITI2 Online:

Facebook:

CITI2 Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/cotedivoiretransitioninitiative2/?fref=nf>

Mon Vote- Mon Avenir Campaign Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/Mon-Vote-Mon-Avenir-1490350301266810/>

US Embassy Abidjan Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/US-Embassy-Abidjan-183116651779953/>

Youtube:

Bangolo intervention: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-0dc27lo6E>

CITI2 youtube page: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCObTjvIKvDYI3bpdMs05nZA>

Blogs:

USAID Impact Blog: <https://blog.usaid.gov/2015/10/cote-divoire-election-to-mark-turning-point-after-years-of-healing-from-conflict/>

USAID Medium Blog: <https://medium.com/usaid-2030/voices-not-violence-e5bc42f8ed55#.g4aiczhzx>

DEVEX article on grantee: <https://www.devex.com/news/harnessing-radio-to-promote-democracy-in-ivory-coast-87331>

CITI2 on the national TV station, RTI:

CEI Internal Elections Review Workshop: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBh6Z6OdTCE>

Last Night's Top Television News on RTI: Headline 3: CEI builds capacity of agents in Western Côte d'Ivoire ahead of the election (go to 0:32-

0:52). <http://www.rti.ci/replay.php?chaine=emirti1&id=453077104&genre=rti1&annee=2015&mois=10&jour=14&titre=Le%20Flash%20de%2018%20Heures%20de%20RTI%201%20du%2014%20octobre%202015>

Mon Vote- Mon Avenir promotion starts at

22:35: <http://rti.ci/replay.php?chaine=emirti1&genre=quotidienne&id=17255&annee=&mois=&jour=&titre=les-rendez-vous-de-rti-1-du-02-octobre-2015-avec-naomi-alaf>

Women's pagne presentation starts here at

16:00: <http://rti.ci/replay.php?chaine=emirti1&genre=quotidienne&id=17253&annee=&mois=&jour=&titre=matin-bonheur-de-rti-1-du-02-octobre-2015-avec-christelle-m-l-dje-partie-2>

Coverage of the musical handover ceremony. It starts

at 26:50 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4NbRKhcI5I

ANNEX V: DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Victor Tanner
Title	Senior Evaluation Specialist
Organization	Social Impact, Inc.
Evaluation Position?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	Task Order # AID-OAA-TO-15-00012
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation Training Courses (PM&E) Evaluation of Citi 2 (USAID/ON Cite d'Ivoire)
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</p> <p>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating and managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant through indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant through indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be and is an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Perceived bias toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	<p>3.- I evaluated the predecessor project (CITI 1) to the one being evaluated.</p> <p>5.- I am a part-time employee at ON, a competitor of the implementing entity for CITI 2 (Cherance).</p> <p>I do not believe either of these points constitute any CoI, but I am disclosing them for the sake of full transparency.</p>
<p>I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.</p>	
Signature	<u>Victor Tanner</u>
Date	<u>29/12/15</u>

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ANNEX VI: CITI2 ACTIVITIES

Activity PDF Export

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Entered Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
ABJ001	Hotspot Mapping Consultancy			2014-08-01	\$88113.94
Closed	GLOBAL CHALLENGE CORPORATION-CI			2014-12-20	\$88113.94
ABJ002	Building peaceful relationships between youth of Anokoua Kouté and PK18 in Abobo			2014-09-01	\$24032.11
Closed	Plate-Forme jeunesse Anokoua et PK18			2014-12-31	\$24032.11
ABJ003	Promoting tolerance and forgiveness in Yopougon by example of resiliency			2014-10-09	\$14442.12
Closed	Comite de Coordination de la Societe Civile de Yopougon			2014-11-30	\$14442.12
ABJ004	Provision of educational materials on the Ebola virus in West Africa			2014-08-31	\$4887.87
Closed	DDGS			2015-03-27	\$4887.87
ABJ005	Supporting dialogue between Yaoséhi & Doukoure youth of Yopougon			2014-10-02	\$37430.80
Closed	Comite de Coordination de la Societe Civile de Yopougon			2015-01-02	\$37430.80
ABJ006	Restoring social cohesion in Gesco, Yopougon			2014-11-15	\$22376.71
Closed	Femme Côte d'Ivoire Expérience (FCIEX)			2015-02-27	\$22376.71

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
ABJ007	Promoting dialogue between communities of Kennedy, Abobo Baoule and Aboboté			2014-10-13	\$25098.32
Completed	ONG Environnement Sain et Durable			2014-12-31	\$25098.32
ABJ008	Promoting political tolerance in Abobo through participatory theater			2014-11-03	\$16219.05
Closed	Plate-Forme des organisations de la société civile d'Abobo (POSCA)			2015-03-06	\$16219.05
ABJ009	Engaging women to promote social cohesion in Abidjan			2014-11-24	\$33738.04
Closed	Rondement Belle			2015-01-31	\$33738.04
ABJ010	Supporting Religious Leaders to Promote Peaceful Elections Campaigns			2015-04-01	\$59974.32
Closed	Forum National des Confessions Religieuses de Côte d'Ivoire			2015-07-31	\$59974.32
ABJ011	Establishing an early warning and response system in Abobo			2015-01-11	\$50439.35
Closed	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-CI)			2015-09-30	\$50439.35
ABJ012	Combating Violence in the Urban Transport Sector in Abidjan			2015-02-13	\$59575.60
Closed	Haut conseil des Patrons des Entreprises de Transport en Cote d'Ivoire			2015-06-30	\$59575.60
ABJ013	Confronting bias and misinformation in informal discussion groups in Abobo			2014-12-15	\$23693.49

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
Closed	Plate-Forme des organisations de la société civile d'Abobo (POSCA)			2015-11-20	\$23693.49
ABJ014	Holiday celebration to promote social cohesion in Koweit, Yopougon			2014-12-22	\$25121.74
Closed	SANYA KANOU			2015-01-31	\$25121.74
ABJ015	Encouraging peaceful participation in the elections through murals in Abidjan			2015-04-20	\$52686.24
Closed	Institut National Supérieur des Arts et de l'Action Culturelle (INSAAC)			2015-11-30	\$52686.24
ABJ016	Increasing public participation in the elections with Radio Yopougon			2015-02-16	\$36995.94
Closed	Radio Yopougon			2015-11-27	\$36995.94
ABJ017	NGO Consortium for One Voice on the Elections			2015-05-04	\$49303.55
Closed	CASOCICDE-CI			2015-07-12	\$49303.55
ABJ018	Women's Half Marathon on International Women's Day 2015.			2015-02-05	\$24620.18
Closed	ONG MANINKA			2015-03-22	\$24620.18
ABJ019	Establishing an Early warning and response system in Yopougon			2015-02-09	\$30780.65
Closed	WANEP-CI			2015-09-30	\$30780.65
ABJ020	Awareness Campaign against Violence in the Urban Transport Sector in Abidjan			2015-02-23	\$48887.66
Closed	DDGS			2015-06-30	\$48887.66

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
ABJ021	Highlighting the role of women on International Women's Day in Dabou			2015-02-16	\$15864.41
Closed	Unir et Servir			2015-03-31	\$15864.41
ABJ022	Awareness Campaign by Religious Leaders in Dabou				\$30000.00
Rejected					\$0.00
ABJ023	Public Debates on Elections and Violence in Cote d'Ivoire			2015-03-02	\$40239.93
Completed	L'Académie des Sciences, des Arts, des Cultures d'Afrique et des Diasporas Africaines (ASCAD)			2015-07-31	\$40239.93
ABJ024	Building Independent Electoral Commission capacity for better communication			2015-04-13	\$105107.89
Cleared	Commissssion Electorale Independante			2016-02-29	\$76095.78
ABJ025	Increasing public participation in the elections with Abobo's Radio Arc-en-Ciel			2015-04-12	\$33074.53
Closed	Radio Arc en Ciel			2015-11-27	\$33074.53
ABJ026	Supporting a National Workshop on the Civic Education Strategy for the Elections			2015-04-20	\$21919.38
Closed	DDGS			2015-07-31	\$21919.38
ABJ027	Promoting university student participation in elections with CROU-A			2015-05-11	\$121400.17
Completed	Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires d'Abidjan (CROU-A)			2016-01-31	\$121400.17

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
ABJ028	Engaging the transport sector for peaceful presidential elections			2015-05-11	\$38732.10
Closed	Association pour les Droits et Devoirs des Chauffeurs (ADDC)			2015-08-15	\$38732.10
ABJ029	Evaluating Early Warning and Response Activities supported by CITI2			2015-06-15	\$16623.28
Closed	STTA			2015-07-31	\$16623.28
ABJ030	Involving women in the electoral process through a television drama			2015-05-25	\$148107.12
Closed	DDGS			2015-11-18	\$148107.12
ABJ031	Outreach on the Electoral Code and institutions involved in the elections			2015-06-04	\$51866.31
Closed	Regroupement des Acteurs Ivoiriens des Droits Humains (RAIDH)			2015-09-30	\$51866.31
ABJ032	Organizing information campaigns through comics strips for peaceful elections			2015-05-24	\$47069.30
Closed	DDGS			2015-11-30	\$47069.30
ABJ033	Ivoirian stars for peaceful presidential elections			2015-09-05	\$75970.95
Closed	Foot Attitude			2015-11-06	\$75970.95
ABJ034	Social networking for peaceful and inclusive elections in Côte d'Ivoire			2015-06-01	\$35863.83
Closed	Akendewa			2015-11-27	\$35863.83

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
ABJ035	"Vote-ball" Tournament in Dabou for Peaceful Elections			2015-07-06	\$41104.10
Closed	Union de la Jeunesse Communale de Dabou (UJCD)			2015-09-30	\$41104.10
ABJ036	Educating Abobo voters on Electoral Code and institutions governing elections			2015-06-22	\$44963.36
Closed	Regroupement des Acteurs Ivoiriens des Droits Humains (RAIDH)			2015-10-29	\$44963.36
ABJ037	Women getting out the vote in Abobo, Yopougon and Koumassi			2015-09-25	\$56019.49
Completed	DDGS			2016-01-31	\$52502.84
ABJ038	Promoting strategies for greater participation of women in politics			2015-06-04	\$27842.20
Closed	Femmes des Partis politiques de Côte d'Ivoire			2015-06-19	\$27842.20
ABJ039	Encouraging local radio to engage in civic education for the 2015 elections			2015-07-13	\$79663.44
Closed	Haute Autorite de la Communication Audio-visuelle			2015-08-31	\$79663.44
ABJ040	CITI 2 SMS Platform			2015-06-15	\$36713.26
Cleared	DDGS			2016-02-29	\$36713.26
ABJ041	Engaging Traditional Chiefs and Elders in Preventing Electoral Violence in Dabou			2015-08-10	\$78108.00
Rejected	Association pour les Droits et Devoirs des Chauffeurs (ADDC)			2015-10-20	\$0.00

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
ABJ042	Engaging Youth in Preventing Electoral Violence in Abobo and Anyama			2015-08-23	\$39595.53
Closed	ONG Environnement Sain et Durable			2015-11-23	\$39595.53
ABJ043	Educating Dabou voters on Electoral Code and institutions governing elections			2015-07-14	\$77365.97
Closed	Unir et Servir			2015-10-19	\$77365.97
ABJ044	Broadcasting in local languages for peaceful elections on Radio Yopougon			2015-08-03	\$13585.48
Closed	Radio Yopougon			2015-11-30	\$13585.48
ABJ045	Broadcasting in local languages for peaceful elections- Radio Arc-en-Ciel, Abobo			2015-08-03	\$22839.73
Closed	Radio Arc en Ciel			2015-11-30	\$22839.73
ABJ046	Communications Campaign with Religious Leaders			2015-09-07	\$24779.71
Closed	Forum National des Confessions Religieuses de Côte d'Ivoire			2015-11-09	\$24779.71
ABJ047	Increasing public participation in the elections with Dabou's Radio Leboutou			2015-08-01	\$20815.64
Closed	Radio Leboutou			2015-11-30	\$20815.64
ABJ048	Mass Mobilization of Youth for Peaceful Elections in 2015			2015-08-16	\$120860.08
Completed	DDGS			2015-10-31	\$120860.08
ABJ049	Sensitization of MPs on Reconciliation, Prevention and Management of Conflict			2015-08-20	\$10079.14

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
Closed	DDGS			2015-09-30	\$10079.14
ABJ050	Support for Local Electoral Commissions in Abobo, Yopougon, and Dabou			2015-10-05	\$34410.09
Closed	DDGS			2015-11-06	\$34410.09
ABJ051	Reinforcing the Early Warning Early Response System Ahead of the Elections			2015-10-05	\$36322.14
Completed	WANEP-CI			2015-11-13	\$36322.14
ABJ052	Building the Electoral Commission's capacity to manage the Presidential Election			2015-10-05	\$149915.00
Completed	Commissison Electorale Independante			2016-01-31	\$146045.37
ABJ053	Strengthening the capacity of CITI2 civil society partners in Dabou			2015-12-02	\$40986.00
Cleared	DDGS			2016-02-29	\$33043.93
ABJ054	Civil society summit for coordination and effectiveness			2016-01-13	\$40338.00
Completed	DDGS			2016-02-10	\$36277.10
ABJ055	Strengthening civil society partners in Abidjan			2016-01-04	\$42423.33
Cleared	DDGS			2016-01-28	\$40970.38
ABJ056	Strengthening the organizational capacity of CITI2 partners in Abidjan			2016-01-19	\$8029.00
Completed	DDGS			2016-01-22	\$6747.02

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
ABJ057	Support to CONARIV and CITI Partners on Social Cohesion			2016-01-11	\$30021.00
Completed	DDGS			2016-02-11	\$29349.11
ABJ058	Partner networking and coordination events in Daloa and Abidjan			2016-02-08	\$6794.51
Cleared	DDGS			2016-02-19	\$1766.32
DAL001	Engaging youth in violence prevention in Duékoué			2014-07-30	\$38251.59
Closed	Plate-Forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue			2014-10-31	\$38251.59
DAL002	Reducing community violence in Duékoué through an early warning mechanism			2014-08-18	\$5449.44
Closed	Plate-Forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue			2014-11-18	\$5449.44
DAL003	Building the capacity of Dah-Zagnan and Beoue-Zagnan to resolve land disputes			2014-09-01	\$23647.18
Completed	Sous-Prefecture de Bangolo			2014-11-29	\$23647.18
DAL004	Easing community tensions through dialogue between Malinké and Gueré women			2014-09-10	\$15131.28
Closed	La Coalition des Femmes Leaders pour la Lutte contre les Violences faites aux Femmes et Filles de Duékoué			2014-12-10	\$15131.28
DAL005	Facilitating meaningful reconciliation through radio discussions			2014-09-17	\$35823.62

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
Closed	Radio Guemon			2015-02-13	\$35823.62
DAL006	Enhancing collaborative relationships among Guiglo youth			2014-09-17	\$42718.76
Closed	Youth Leaders of Guiglo			2014-12-31	\$42718.76
DAL007	Strengthening local decision-making institutions in Mona			2014-11-10	\$28510.09
Completed	Sous-Prefecture de Guiglo			2015-02-27	\$28510.09
DAL008	Building the capacity of Lokosso communities to resolve land disputes			2014-10-20	\$38701.89
Closed	Sous-Prefecture de Doukoue			2015-02-20	\$38701.89
DAL009	Conflict resolution and management training for youth in Bangolo			2014-10-06	\$48830.40
Closed	Préfecture de Bangolo			2015-03-20	\$48830.40
DAL010	Integrating at-risk youth into the community in Duekoué			2014-10-30	\$17516.91
Closed	Chambre des métiers de Duekoué			2015-01-30	\$17516.91
DAL011	Disseminating objective information on citizenship laws in Duekoue			2014-11-03	\$63348.96
Closed	Conseil de Paix de la région du Guémon			2015-04-08	\$63348.96
DAL012	Facilitating meaningful reconciliation in Daloa			2014-11-10	\$51598.65
Closed	Radio Tchtrato			2015-05-29	\$51598.65

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
DAL013	Facing the past to prevent future electoral violence in Duékoué			2014-12-08	\$60458.03
Closed	Plate-Forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue			2015-06-07	\$60458.03
DAL014	Educating Bangolo youth on the principles of a democratic society			2014-11-03	\$47316.37
Closed	Jeunes Leaders de Bangolo			2015-05-10	\$47316.37
DAL015	Enhancing collaborative relationships between youth in Daloa			2014-12-08	\$28501.78
Closed	Plate-Forme des Jeunes Leaders de Daloa			2015-04-07	\$28501.78
DAL016	Promoting Peace Among Youth in Issia			2015-02-16	\$47416.60
Completed	AMOOGNAN			2015-07-01	\$47416.60
DAL017	Arts and Culture Festival to Promote Dialogue in Duékoué			2014-12-02	\$30682.48
Closed	Mairie de Duekoue			2015-02-27	\$30682.48
DAL018	Empowering students in Daloa for non-violent action			2015-01-15	\$48564.17
Completed	National Instrument for Democracy and Economic development (NIDE)			2015-06-15	\$48564.17
DAL019	Enhancing Bangolo youth's skills for greater economic prospects			2015-06-01	\$40107.59
Cleared	Jeunes Leaders de Bangolo			2016-02-29	\$26890.80
DAL020	Promoting reconciliation through a forgiveness ceremony in Duekoue			2014-12-08	\$36118.10

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
Closed	Comité de Veille et de Sensibilisation de Duekoué			2015-04-20	\$36118.10
DAL021	Monitoring Hate Speech ahead of the 2015 Elections			2015-04-13	\$97078.41
Completed	Plate-Forme des Organisations de Jenesses de Duekoue			2015-11-27	\$97078.41
DAL022	Facilitating Meaningful Reconciliation in Bangolo			2015-02-16	\$52555.40
Completed	Radio Guemon			2015-07-15	\$52555.40
DAL023	Fostering peace and tolerance in Daloa during the African Nations Soccer Cup			2015-01-05	\$55082.56
Closed	Plate-Forme des Jeunes Leaders de Daloa			2015-03-06	\$55082.56
DAL024	Supporting inter-ethnic dialogue between market women in Duekoue			2015-02-10	\$41243.15
Completed	Coalition des Femmes Leaders de Duekoue			2015-08-10	\$41243.15
DAL025	Operationalizing Duekoué's early warning committee			2014-01-15	\$24425.27
Completed	Plate-Forme des Organisations de Jeunesse de Duekoue			2015-06-30	\$24425.27
DAL026	Education Campaigns on Ebola in Duekoue and Bangolo				\$
Rejected	Plate-Forme des Organisations de Jenesses de Duekoue				\$0.00

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
DAL027	Engaging Traditional Chiefs in Preventing Electoral Violence in Guiglo			2015-05-12	\$62641.42
Completed	Sous-Prefecture de Guiglo			2015-11-26	\$66300.07
DAL028	Encouraging Guiglo youth participation in the democratic process			2015-03-16	\$50383.44
Completed	Plate-Forme des Jeunes Leaders de Guiglo			2015-06-12	\$50383.44
DAL029	Promoting the benefits of citizenship with the national Identity Card			2015-03-20	\$50586.52
Completed	Office National de l'Identification			2015-08-20	\$50586.52
DAL030	Preventing Electoral Violence in Bangolo with an Early Warning & Response System			2015-02-20	\$41412.54
Completed	Source du Bonheur			2015-08-10	\$41412.54
DAL031	Engaging University of Daloa students in Peaceful 2015 Elections			2015-03-26	\$75139.75
Completed	Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires de Daloa (CROU-D)			2015-08-26	\$75139.75
DAL032	Supporting Daloa Women's Association for Peaceful 2015 Elections			2015-04-20	\$40439.65
Completed	Fédération des Associations de Femmes de Daloa			2015-10-15	\$40439.65
DAL033	Engaging high school students in the Guémon region for non-violent elections			2015-04-15	\$69955.70

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
Completed	Direction Régionale de la Culture et de la Francophonie			2015-06-12	\$69955.70
DAL034	Preventing Elections Violence in Guiglo			2015-05-11	\$77556.11
Closed	Conseil des Chefs Traditionnels de Guiglo			2015-10-16	\$77556.11
DAL035	Supporting the First Instance Tribunal Inauguration in Man			2015-02-17	\$1294.66
Closed	DDGS			2015-03-17	\$1294.66
DAL036	Bangolo Youth for Peaceful Elections			2015-05-04	\$90975.76
Completed	Jeunes Leaders de Bangolo			2015-08-31	\$90975.76
DAL037	Supporting Haut-Sassandra's Local Election Commission (CEL)			2015-05-20	\$67413.39
Completed	Haut-Sassandra Local Independent Electoral Commission (CEL)			2015-11-13	\$68828.54
DAL038	Promoting peaceful elections participation with Duékoué transporters			2015-06-15	\$68003.37
Closed	Collectif des Syndicats des Taxis Ville et Commune de Duekoué			2015-10-30	\$68003.37
DAL039	Promoting Women's participation in Elections in the West			2015-07-15	\$67928.57
Closed	Réseau des Femmes journalistes et des Professionnelles des médias de Côte d'Ivoire (RFJPM-CI)			2015-11-13	\$67928.57

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
DAL040	Supporting Guemon region's Local Electoral Commission (CEL)			2015-06-04	\$85876.16
Closed	Local Electoral Commission in Guemon (CEL)			2015-11-16	\$85876.16
DAL041	Supporting Cavally's Local Electoral Commission (CEL)			2015-06-05	\$65972.68
Completed	Local Electoral Commission in Cavally (CEL)			2015-11-16	\$65972.68
DAL042	Community members and local authorities addressing elections security in Cavally			2015-09-22	\$84722.87
Closed	Prefecture de Guiglo			2015-10-30	\$84722.87
DAL043	Educating Voters in the West on Electoral Reforms			2015-07-06	\$63272.87
Completed	Commission Electorale Independante de la Region du Haut-Sassandra			2015-09-30	\$63272.87
DAL044	Supporting Mothers for Women's Participation in the Elections			2015-05-29	\$72382.26
Completed	Fédération des Associations de Femmes de Daloa			2015-07-31	\$72382.26
DAL045	Supporting Community Radio Stations in the West during Elections			2015-07-06	\$53544.21
Completed	Reseau des Radios de Proximité de la Paix a l'Ouest de la Cote d'Ivoire			2015-11-16	\$51281.47
DAL046	Supporting New Voters in the West				\$100000.00
Rejected					\$0.00

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
DAL047	Supporting CELs in the West During the Voter Registration Dispute Phase			2015-07-06	\$49851.60
Completed	Haut-Sassandra Local Independent Electoral Commission (CEL)			2015-09-14	\$49851.60
DAL048	Religious Leaders in Daloa Promoting Peaceful Elections			2015-08-23	\$79843.26
Completed	Plate-forme des Leaders Religieux de Daloa			2015-10-24	\$79843.26
DAL049	Electoral Dispute Resolution in Haut Sassandra			2015-07-27	\$70849.70
Completed	Coalition des Organisations de la Société Civile du Haut Sassandra			2015-09-30	\$70849.70
DAL050	Building the Capacity of CELs in the West in Elections Management			2015-10-05	\$49606.60
Completed	Commission Electorale Independante de la Region du Haut-Sassandra			2015-11-09	\$49606.60
DAL051	Religious Leaders in Duekoue Promoting Peaceful Elections			2015-08-23	\$47340.80
Closed	Plate-forme des Leaders Religieux de Duekoué			2015-10-24	\$47340.80
DAL052	Preventing Electoral Violence with Voter Education in Vavoua			2015-08-04	\$67017.38
Closed	Prefecture de Vavoua			2015-10-30	\$67017.38
DAL053	Engaging Traditional Bangolo Chiefs in Preventing Electoral Violence			2015-08-04	\$63126.17
Completed	Sous-Prefecture de Bangolo			2015-12-11	\$63912.98

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
DAL054	Promoting Peaceful Participation in Elections with Bangolo Transporters			2015-09-01	\$56177.34
Closed	Collectif des Syndicats des Transporteurs de Bangolo			2015-10-31	\$56177.34
DAL055	Promoting Peaceful Participation in Elections with Daloa Transporters			2015-09-15	\$56962.91
Closed	Haut Conseil des Patrons des Entreprises de Transport du Haut Sassandra			2015-11-06	\$56962.91
DAL056	Promoting Peaceful Participation in Elections with Guiglo Transporters			2015-09-07	\$51757.77
Completed	Collectif des Syndicats de Transporteurs de Guiglo			2015-10-31	\$51757.77
DAL057	Youth and Women Promoting Voter Education in Duekoue			2015-10-01	\$26348.95
Closed	Plate-Forme des Organisations de Jeunes de Duekoue			2015-11-10	\$26348.95
DAL058	Voter Education by Women in Daloa			2015-10-01	\$29124.93
Closed	Fédération des Associations de Femmes de Daloa			2015-11-10	\$29124.93
DAL059	Women and youth promoting voter education in Yavoua			2015-10-01	\$30904.23
Closed	Plate-forme de leaders de jeunes et femmes de Yavoua			2015-11-11	\$30904.23
DAL060	Building the Capacity of Youth, Women & Religious Leaders in the West			2015-11-20	\$84726.65

Activity Number Status	Activity Title Awardee	Completed Signed	Received Cleared	Start End	Estimated Activity Award Amount Disbursed
Completed	DDGS			2015-12-14	\$82499.22
DAL061	Evaluation of the 2015 elections with CELs in the West			2015-12-04	\$34517.00
Completed	DDGS			2015-12-18	\$34346.21
DAL062	Strengthening Youth, Women & Religious Leaders Organizations in the West			2015-12-01	\$94374.00
Completed	DDGS			2016-01-29	\$85522.10
DAL063	Supporting Social Cohesion through the Duékoué Arts & Culture Festival			2015-12-15	\$25542.37
Completed	DDGS			2015-12-30	\$27999.48
Total Distinct Activity Count:	121				
Total Estimated Activity Award:	\$5,820,483				
Total Amount Disbursed:	\$5,537,127				

ANNEX VII: FIELDWORK ITINERARY

Date	Locations	Meetings/activities	Travels
18/01/2016	Abidjan	CITI2/COP	Based in Abidjan
19/01/2016	Abidjan	US Embassy,	Travel to Daloa
20/01/2016	Daloa	CITI2/PDOs, GMs, RPM, Beneficiaries	Based in Daloa
21/01/2016	Vavoua	Beneficiaries, local authorities,	Travel to Man via Duekoue
22/01/2016	Bangolo and Duekoue	Beneficiaries, local authorities	Based in Man
23/01/2016	Duekoue and Guiglo	Beneficiaries, local authorities (first round)	Based in Man
24/01/2016	Man	Rest and Wrap up	Based in Man
25/01/2016	Duekoue and Guiglo	Beneficiaries, local authorities (second round)	Travel to Guiglo
26/01/2016	Guiglo and Bolequin	Beneficiaries, local authorities	Based in Guiglo
27/01/2016	Daloa	Beneficiaries	Second travel to Daloa
28/01/2016	Daloa	Beneficiaries	Travel to Bouaké
29/01/2016	Sakassou and Bouaké	CITII Beneficiaries and Mayor's office	Based in Bouaké
30/01/2016	Bouaké	CITII Beneficiaries	Based in Bouaké
31/01/2016	Bouaké	No meeting	Travel back to Abidjan
01/02/2016	Abidjan	Chemonics and OTI/USAID staffs	Based in Abidjan
02/02/2016	Abidjan /Abobo	Beneficiaries and US embassy staff	Based in Abidjan
03/02/2016	Yopougon and Dabou	Beneficiaries	Travel to Dabou/ Based in Abidjan
04/02/2016	Abidjan	Beneficiaries / prep debriefing with US Ambassador	Based in Abidjan
05/02/2016	Abidjan	Debriefing with US Ambassador/meeting with beneficiaries	Based in Abidjan
06/02/2016	Abidjan	Debriefing with SMT	Travel back home (Assi in Abidjan)


ANNEX VIII: ROADMAP FOR CÔTE D'IVOIRE'S 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Préparatifs de l'Élection du Président de la République (EPR) en 2015 Feuille de route / RoadMap _ Etapes clés (*)		
Opérations	Dates indicatives	Activités
❖ Mise en place nouvelles instances centrales et locales de la CEI (composition & installation-règlement intérieur-mise à niveau des nouveaux Commissaires en CI et à l'étranger)	août 14 – mars 15	
❖ Ajustement du cadre juridique des élections (Code électoral et différents textes subséquents)	mi-nov 14 – fin mars 15	
❖ Mise à jour_ Révision de la liste électorale (RLE) 2010 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Elaboration-adoption textes juridiques & réglementaires d'encadrement ; mode opératoire ; choix operateur technique ; cartographie des lieux enrôlement - formation des Commissaires et agents électoraux (recenseurs) - campagnes sensibilisation des populations sur la RLE - collecte in situ des données & compilation - traitement des données-production & affichage de la liste électorale provisoire- traitement du contentieux de l'inscription sur la liste – production & publication de la nouvelle liste définitive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - oct. 14 – avril 15 - janv – mars 15 - mars – juin 15 - mai – juin 15 - mai – juin 15 	<p>DALI047/049</p> <p>DAL043/047/049</p>
❖ Ajustement du Répertoire des Lieux & Bureaux de vote (finalisation de la carto électorale)	01 mai – 31 juillet 15	DAL047
❖ Confection – distribution des cartes d'électeur	sept. – 17 oct. 15	DAL037/040/041
❖ Formation des Commissaires et Agents électoraux (BV)	oct. 14 – mars 15 août – sept. 15	DAL050
❖ Réception – traitement des candidatures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ouverture réception des candidatures - date limite réception - date limite publication liste candidats retenus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 20 juillet 15 - 10 sept. 15 - 05 oct. 15 	
❖ Campagnes de sensibilisation des populations sur le scrutin présidentiel	août – déc 15	DAL037/039/040/041 DAL042/027/053
❖ Conception des documents et imprimés électoraux	15 sept. – 05 oct. 15	DAL043
❖ Logistique - confection et déploiement des kits de matériels et des documents électoraux	10-25 oct. 15	DAL037/40/41

❖ Campagne électorale (1 ^{er} tour)	10-23 octobre 15	DAL042/027/053
❖ Déroulement du vote	25 octobre 15	
❖ Proclamation résultats (1 ^{er} tour) _ provisoires (CEI) /définitifs (CC)	28 oct – 04 sept. 15	
❖ tenue 2 ^e tour (éventuel)	22 novembre 15	

() Document prepared by Chemonics, formatted by CITI2 Evaluation Team*

ANNEX IX: ACTIVITY MAPS






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