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EVALUATION

Mid-term Evaluation of Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) Programming in Libya and Results from a National and Urban DRG Survey

January 2016

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MID-TERM EVALUATION OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE (DRG) PROGRAMMING IN LIBYA AND RESULTS OF A NATIONAL AND URBAN DRG SURVEY

**A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF DRG PROGRAMMING IN
LIBYA 2012-2015 AND RESULTS FROM A PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY
WITH NATIONAL AND URBAN REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES**

January 2016

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DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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ACRONYMS

ABA ROLI	American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative
BAA	Broad Agency Announcement
BRCC	Benghazi Regional Control Center
CDA	Constitution Drafting Assembly
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DoS	United States Department of State
DRG	Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
EDR	Election Dispute Resolution
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GNC	General National Congress
HJI	High Judicial Institute
HNEC	High National Election Commission
HoR	House of Representatives
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IP	Implementing Partner
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Studies
JCP	Justice and Construction Party
LCB	Libya Supporting Consensus Building for the National Dialogue, Constitution Drafting and Governing
LEGS	Libya Elections and Governance Support
LG	Local Governance
LYM	Libyan Youth Movement
MC	Municipal Council
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
MLG	Multi-Level Governance
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NFA	National Forces Alliance
NOC	National Oil Corporation
NTC	National Transition Council
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PAC	Political Action Committee
PFM	Public Financial Management
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
SOW	Scope of Work
RoL	Rule of Law
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION PURPOSE

This is a mid-term performance evaluation of the USAID-funded democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) programming in Libya, which has been implemented under the Libya Elections and Governance Support (LEGS) and Libya Supporting Consensus Building for the National Dialogue, Constitution Drafting and Governing Process (LCB) projects. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the success of the activities since 2012, and provide guidance for the next project cycle; and to identify where USAID should put future resources to aid the transition process and build democratic governance in Libya. In order to fulfill the evaluation purpose, the evaluation is divided into two parts: 1) Performance evaluation of the USAID-funded DRG programming in Libya. 2) Public opinion survey of the attitudes of Libyans on DRG issues.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

The LEGS and LCB projects are implemented by five implementing partners (IPs). LEGS is implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), led by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). The LCB is implemented by Freedom House and the American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI).

From the start of the LEGS in August 2012, and of LCB in 2014, until the initiation of this mid-term evaluation (April 2015) significant changes have occurred in the Libyan political and security landscapes, and the assessed projects have had to adjust to an evolving and difficult work environment.

PART I: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Methodology

The performance evaluation seeks to assess the success of the implementation of LEGS and LCB in a difficult political and security environment. The assessment is guided by an analytical framework of six key questions, which each address a number of specific questions. Together, the research and analysis of the key questions provide for the basis for the performance evaluation.

For data collection, the evaluation utilizes two main sources: document review and key informant interviews (KIIs). The document review consists of mapping and evaluating the projects' planned and implemented activities based on work plans, quarterly reports, and interviews with IPs. A total of 61 KIIs were conducted with various programme stakeholders and experts (see Annex 3: sources of information).

Conclusions

The fluid Libyan operating environment affects programming activities, particularly for the start of new activities.

Question 1: What was the timeline of project implementation concurrent with political events?

The evaluation finds that program activities were significantly affected by the unstable political environment in Libya, particularly during the intensified in-fighting that began in July 2014. During this time, there was a significant decrease in activities. There was a decrease in both ongoing and new activities, which was more pronounced for the new activities. In late 2014 and the beginning of 2015, program activities began to increase again. This corresponded with a somewhat more stable security situation in Libya and a shift towards remotely managed activities, including events held outside of Libya and web based activities. The findings indicate that the IPs were able to find ways to implement already existing activities in spite of the turmoil. This highlights the importance of ensuring that IPs have the flexibility in implementation planning to achieve

project goals (as also highlighted in question 2).

Flexibility in implementation plan throughout the programming is more important for successful activity implementation than extensive preparatory activities.

Question 2: How did the implementers determine their original workplans, and how much of that original workplan occurred?

The assessment of the preparatory activities suggests that the IPs undertook adequate preparation in the development of their work plans. While IPs did not conduct formal needs assessments, activities were designed based on scoping trips, pre-existing activities and consultations with relevant actors. As suggested above, the evaluation finds that large shares of the original workplans were not implemented. Instead, the IPs revised their workplans due to the challenges presented by the political and security climate. The activities that were particularly limited in implementation include LEGS Objective 2.4 "Legislation informed by citizens concern," and LCB Objective 1.3. "Create consensus processes for National Dialogue and Constitution drafting." Also, the assessment reveals a difference in level of implementation depending on target group (e.g. nationally elected bodies, locally elected bodies, non-elected institutions and civil society). In LEGS, programming targeting civil society has been implemented to the greatest extent, while programming targeting locally elected bodies saw the lowest level of implementation. The evaluation of the IPs' experience suggest that to meet the evolving demand of constant shifts in the political/security situation and to meet new opportunities, flexibility and the ability to alter the implementation plan to meet project goals contributes more positively to successful implementation than extensive planning.

The challenging security situation is the main driver behind the revision of workplans, which were revised through the addition – rather than alteration – of activities.

Question 3: How did the IPs change and adjust their workplans?

Considerable changes were made to the workplans, primarily because of 1) the deteriorating security situation, 2) the low levels of collaboration by some beneficiaries (mainly, the GNC) and 3) increased funding. Overall, the IPs report that the process of the revisions functioned well under the flexible programming design and that USAID was supportive of the needed revisions. Importantly, however, the analysis finds that the majority of activities planned in the original workplan were not modified or eliminated in the revisions, but instead a number of new activities were introduced. The result was revised workplans that were actually more ambitious than the original, despite the challenging environment.

While there was clearly a need to revise the workplans, the security environment continued to inhibit implementation. For the LEGS project, the findings show that the implementation of activities revised in the 1st workplan (October 2013) were implemented at the same level as activities planned in original workplan. Activities modified in the 2nd revision (October 2014) and further revisions did not positively contribute to implementation efficiency, although the period of observation was limited. From this, it is seen that the workplan revisions did not lead to expected increase in effectiveness in implementation. Regarding LCB (implemented since Aug. 2014, revised in Apr. 2015), the implementation timeline of the revised workplan was too short for accurate assessment. As such, flexibility in delivery and the development of more open-ended implementation plans may be more beneficial than IPs revising implementation multiple times. In addition, utilizing alternative communication channels, employing a flexible approach to activity scheduling, and maximizing the number of activities conducted during peaceful periods appear to be essential to implementation success and IP safety.

IPs have been sensitive to several on-the-ground priorities outside the workplan, particularly to 'political inclusion' as a result of USAID's focus on this area.

Question 4: How much do the overall workplans of the implementers incorporate or ignore other on-the-ground priorities?

In the evaluation SOW, USAID recognizes nine “other” issues as important to the Libyan development context. While the IPs have not been tasked to address all nine of these, the evaluation finds that LEGS and LCB were sensitive to these on-the-ground priorities. There is strong evidence for the inclusion of five of the nine priorities: political inclusion, human rights, local governance, national/local security, and anti-corruption. The majority of national IP staff and program beneficiaries interviewed ranked political inclusion as the highest priority for their programs and for the international community, respectively, since 2012. This is likely a reflection of USAID’s steady focus on this issue during the period (e.g. increasing awareness among marginalized and underrepresented groups, advocacy training for citizen engagement, including historically marginalized groups) and national staff and beneficiary sensitization to this issue. At the same time, the public perception survey outcomes underscore the need to continue to focus on these issues as results show issues with feelings of political inclusion, strong support for human rights, support for local governance and security as a key issue for citizens. While IP respondents viewed many of the remaining priorities as relevant in the context, they did not aim to address them through project activities.

Seven DRG programming areas are identified for the future; the development of local conditions will affect what is feasible and appropriate to prioritize

Question 5: Which DRG sectors should be programming priorities moving forward?

The overarching priorities for Libya moving forward are peace and stability. For DRG programming, the evaluation finds that there is broad agreement among interviewees on three future priorities: local governance, constitutional reform and national dialogue. All three priorities go hand in hand with the public perception survey findings which prove popular support for improved local governance and the constitution drafting process. Libyans thus support a political system with a middle ground between centralization and decentralization, supporting shared responsibility between the government and municipal councils in a number of public service provision areas. With forty-nine percent evaluating the performance of municipal councils’ so far as good or very good, there is still room for improvement. In relations to constitutional reform there is strong support in the Libyan population for the work of the CDA and for having a constitution that protects basic rights and freedoms.

In addition, the evaluation finds that there is moderate support also for activities focused on electoral reform, national institution building, civic education, and public financial management. As the public perception survey shows, Libyans support civic education in particular with regards to the constitution drafting for example. Moreover, there is space for electoral reform as most Libyans evaluate the freedom and fairness of the most recent elections increasingly negative.

Conditions in Libya will affect which of the seven identified priorities it will be feasible and appropriate to prioritize going forward. (See Figures 10 and 11 for programming options under diverse scenarios.) If Libya is able to achieve stabilization under a unified government, all seven areas could be feasible and appropriate priorities for USAID. In the event that the status quo of two rival governments persists, a limited scope of assistance with current DRG implementers is preferred and USAID and IPs will need to consider the sustainability and effectiveness of maintaining a base of operations outside of Libya under this scenario. However, if the situation deteriorates into civil war, all funding and programming will likely be suspended.

All actors have at least some will and legitimacy to carry out DRG work, but many lack the skills, knowledge, structure and incentives to be self-sustaining. HNEC, local elected officials and CSOs are the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future.

Question 6: What is the ability of the Libyans themselves to undertake work in different DRG sectors in the future, with an eye toward sustainability?

The evaluation identified six main actors for DRG programming: national elected officials, local councils, civil society organizations (CSOs), HNEC, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), and rule of law institutions. The analysis found that all actors have at least some will and legitimacy to carry out DRG work,

but many lack the skills, knowledge, structure and incentives to be self-sustaining. Moreover, as the public perception survey shows, the Libyan population does not trust many actors to improve Libya's future to the same extent. An examination of the findings reveal that *HNEC* is the most able and likely to undertake DRG work in the future, even without international support. Local elected officials offer a desirable future partner as they are believed to have willingness and legitimacy as well as comparatively higher outcomes for citizen trust but lack the technical support that USAID could provide. CSOs also offer an attractive partner although there is a risk of politicization; nonetheless civil society is perceived as particularly trustworthy by almost seventy percent of Libyans and thus enjoys popular support. The remaining actors face greater hurdles to future DRG work. *National elected institutions* are in political turmoil and the future is unclear, with citizen trust being particularly low; the *CDA* lacks technical capacity; and *Rule of law institutions*, including the judiciary, are largely unknown to national informants. As *HNEC* is regarded to have both the technical capacity and the political will, as well as the needed legitimacy, it is the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future. Finally, a majority of citizens have trust in the institution and thus have legitimacy for its work.

PART 2: PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

Methodology

The survey of 2,507 respondents was carried out by Altai Consulting using a Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) system through a call center in Tripoli. The calls were carried out using a database of 2.1 million unique numbers across the Libyana and Al Madar mobile phone networks. Covering all of Libya's 22 districts, the survey followed a quota based proportional-to-population (P2P) sampling methodology with quotas based on sex, location and age. In addition, the cities of Tripoli (n=602), Benghazi (n=608) and Misrata (n=602) were oversampled in relation to the other cities to allow for in-depth analysis of potential variation between these three major cities. The interviews were implemented in the period from August 10 to October 8, 2015. Figures presented below have been weighted to ensure a nationally representative sample. Implementation of the survey confronted challenge of poor network coverage and difficulty filling the oversample quotas, and there is some evidence of an education bias in the sample.

Conclusions

A majority of Libyans feel that they do not or cannot contribute to the political process, however, they remain optimistic and are willing to participate in future elections.

Political inclusion remains a priority programming need. Libyans generally, although there are significant differences between cities, believe it is difficult to understand and influence politics, which has led citizens to become disengaged. This is clearly reflected in the lower turnout rates for elections, as well as perceptions that elections later in the transition were not free and fair. Libyans are not, however, abandoning democracy, and a fairly high number intent to participate in future elections, especially the Constitutional Referendum and presidential elections. Residents of Misrata are generally more politically engaged (measured by participation in demonstrations) which is, if loosely, tied to the perception of fairness in the 2012 GNC Election, which residents of Misrata found fair to a larger extent than others. An important factor of future voting participation is Libyans' experience with previous elections: past voters as well as Libyans who perceived the GNC and HoR elections to be free and fair are more likely to vote in future elections.

Strong support for human rights in the population.

As key informant interviews had also suggested, most Libyans are optimistic about the constitution drafting process and they want essential democratic rights to be included in the new legislation, such as the right to a fair trial and freedom from torture. Moreover, a majority of Libyans agree that men and women should have the same basic rights, and two-thirds of Libyans assert that it makes no difference to them whether a man or a woman represents their interests in national politics. Finally, gender-based violence has rightly been identified as future programming need. In particular verbal harassment and domestic violence are perceived

by a majority of Libyans (both men and women) as commonly occurring and a major problem in their communities.

Governance is challenged by limited trust in national political institutions and the prevalence of armed groups.

Libyans have limited trust in political institutions, linked to poor perceptions of service delivery. Almost 60 percent of Libyans assert complete mistrust of the HoR, likewise, over 50 percent of Libyans completely mistrust the Tripoli-based GNC. Trust is higher on the local level, as 58 percent of Libyans have a certain degree of trust in the municipal council. At the same time, the quality of crucial services is evaluated as poor or very poor by a majority of Libyans, especially health facilities, roads and electricity services. Over one-third of Libyans believe that the responsibility for quality provision of these services should be shared between the national government and the municipal councils, underscoring trust in the municipal councils. The quality of public services is an important factor for citizens in their evaluations of municipal councils' performance and thus important in ensuring support for local governance.

In addition to low trust, the prevalence of armed groups is challenging governance in Libya. Armed groups have thus far not been part of the LEGS and LCB programming, however, a strong majority of Libyans perceive the disarmament of armed groups as the most important task that the country is facing. At the same time, 70 percent of Libyans support at least one armed group that exists in Libya today with the Libyan National Army receiving the most support. Overall, armed groups are strongly perceived to create insecurity rather than providing security. In turn, over half of Libyans believe that the local police should mainly be responsible for providing security.

Preferences and perceptions differ among youths and women

A key finding in the data is that youths and women tend to differ in their perceptions compared to older Libyans and men respectively. Younger Libyans are more likely to support armed groups, feel more affected by the conflict in their daily lives and are less optimistic with regards to citizen engagement than older Libyans. With regards to women, they feel essentially less safe than men and have lower feelings of political efficacy than men. These youths and women are thus more impacted by the current crisis and feel more politically disenfranchised.

There are clear differences across municipalities

In areas ranging from sense of security, to trust in political institutions and support for armed groups, there are notable differences between the three major cities covered by the opinion poll, Misrata, Tripoli and Benghazi. Residents of Misrata have a higher perception of the quality of public service delivery, and they also support the notion that municipal councils should be responsible for services such as infrastructure and drinking water. Residents of Misrata also feel significantly safer than those in Tripoli and Benghazi.

Recommendations

The recommendations draw on the findings and conclusions for the six evaluation questions and the public opinion survey. It is hoped that this report will serve as a point of departure for future DRG program planning in Libya. The recommendations are designed to be actionable.

Finding 1: The fluid Libyan operating environment affects programming activities, particularly for the start of new activities.

Recommendation: Given the need to adapt to a quickly changing political situation, **USAID and its IPs should engage in regular/ongoing discussions about DRG programming in Libya.** This is necessary not only to mitigate the negative effects of the fluid operating environment on the feasibility of programme activities, but also as a response to the perception of the Libyan population, as manifested in the public opinion survey, that they are strongly affected by the kind of on-the-ground contextual issues, such as the security

situation and the presence of armed groups, that may change rapidly. These discussions should combine USAID policy goals and guidance with IP's ground-based recommendations. The dialogue could be broadly framed in terms of what is needed, feasible and appropriate in the short and medium term (i.e. the IP's period of performance) with an eye to the longer term.

Finding 2: Flexibility in the implementation plan throughout the programming is more important for successful activity implementation than extensive preparatory activities.

Recommendation: While there need to be flexibility in how objectives are achieved, there should be clear consensus on what those objectives are. Towards that end, **USAID should take steps to develop a country strategy for Libya** which should be sensitive to the inter-geographical differences in the country, as are reflected in the public opinion survey. This could support the IPs in designing more open-ended implementation plans, while staying within the goals and aims of USAID's Libya strategy. The development of the country strategy can be aided by using the 2015 BAA, which seeks innovations to help USAID reach its development goal of "enabling Libya to responsibly utilize its own human, financial and natural resources for the benefit of all citizens." As manifested in the public opinion survey, the perception of Libyans on a wide range of issues varies depending on inter alia age, gender and municipality. Hence, the definition of a Libyan-led solution must be sensitive to these on-the-ground variances. In lieu of a country strategy, USAID should more clearly articulate to IPs its policy goals. As suggested above, this can be done in coordination and through dialogue with the IPs.

Finding 3: The challenging security situation is the main driver to the revision of workplans, which were revised through the addition – rather than alteration – of activities.

Recommendations: **USAID should work to improve risk management practices.** In line with USAID's 2014 report *Local Systems, A Framework for Supporting Sustained Development*, which contains several insights and recommendations relevant for future Libya DRG programming, USAID should work to ensure that USAID is making the investments that are most likely to produce sustained development. This should be done in order to mitigate the challenges posed by the security environment. Per the *Local Systems* report, this requires "develop[ing] a risk management approach that assesses risks in conjunction with strategic objectives, considers both risk and rewards rigorously and comprehensively, and is integrated seamlessly into the Program Cycle." For Libya, this requires looking at the risks and rewards of different types of programming under the different scenarios described in the report (Unity government; Status quo of two governments; Civil war).

Finding 4: IPs have been sensitive to several on-the-ground priorities outside the workplan, particularly to 'political inclusion' as a result of USAID's focus on this area. Furthermore a majority of Libyans feel that they do not or cannot contribute to the political process, however, they remain optimistic and are willing to participate in future elections.

Recommendation: **USAID should consider initiating an external development evaluation approach.** The public opinion survey shows that it has been an accurate decision to include political inclusion, human rights and local governance as on-the-ground priorities for the DRG programming in Libya following the evaluation SOW as these areas are prioritized by the population at the same time. Thus, while IPs require flexibility to defining their approach to achieving policy goals, their decisions should be well supported by the facts on the ground. A developmental evaluation approach would help provide the real time evidence to inform decision making. The involvement of an external evaluator would also help provide USAID with the assurance of objectivity and increase the monitoring needed to make a flexible implementation approach work.

Finding 5: Seven DRG programming areas are identified for the future; the development of local conditions will affect what is feasible and appropriate to prioritize.

Recommendation: **USAID and IPs should consider alternative operating models for DRG programs going forward, depending of the development of local Libyan conditions.** The evaluation team's recommendations for future programming under diverse scenarios are provided in Figures 10 and 11 in part

I and resonate with the findings from the public opinion survey. In particular, the need for national dialogue and a focus on transitional justice is supported by the strong perception amongst Libyans that the disarmament of armed groups is a top priority, while they also tend to support at least one armed group. Especially the developments on the local level will be central to observe as, depending on the actual scenario, local governance is most accessible for programming: citizen trust is higher on the local level than on the national level (please see further public opinion survey conclusions). At the same time, the survey shows that Libyans want a middle ground between central and local political powers to be established including shared responsibility for the provision of most services. Thus, so far, supporting the local government would not run the risk of reinforcing city states as these are not perceived as ideal solution by Libyans for the future Libyan political system. Under the current status quo, where implementation is managed remotely, it is recommendable to focus on strengthening existing programming rather than starting up new activities

Finding 6: Among the main local beneficiaries, HNEC is the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future, while others lag behind in technical capacity, legitimacy and/or will. Furthermore governance is challenged by limited trust in national political institutions and the prevalence of armed groups. *Recommendation:* While HNEC is the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future and election work with the HNEC should continue, elections are one of many priorities. The evaluation finds that local elected officials and CSOs are viewed to both have a high degree of political will, popular legitimacy and the citizens' trust (the opinion survey shows that while there are large geographical discrepancies, there is a general distrust of national politics). While lacking in technical capacity, **local elected officials and CSOs are the best candidates for USAID to focus on in future programming.** However, learning from the previous difficulties in collaboration with some Libyans political actors (most pronounced in the work with Libya's legislative bodies), it will be crucial to pay careful attention to the design and nature future partner collaboration. Trust, planned collaboration and local presence all correlated increase the opportunity for success.

PART I: EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATION PURPOSE

This is a mid-term performance evaluation of the USAID-funded Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) programming in Libya, which has been implemented under the Libya Elections and Governance Support (LEGS) and Libya Supporting Consensus Building for the National Dialogue, Constitution Drafting and Governing Process (LCB) projects. The purpose is to assess the success of the activities since 2012, and provide guidance for the next project cycle.

The specific evaluation objectives are to:

- Develop an understanding of the planning and implementation of the USAID-funded DRG programming in Libya since 2012, to understand what elements have had success, what element have not worked as well, and why.
- Provide recommendations on where USAID should put future resources to aid the transition process and build democratic governance in Libya, based on the experience under the evaluated programming.

In order to fulfil the evaluation purpose, the evaluation is divided into two parts:

- 1) Performance evaluation of the USAID-funded DRG programming in Libya
- 2) Public opinion survey of the attitudes of Libyans on DRG issues.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Part 1: Performance Evaluation

The performance evaluation of the USAID DRG programming in Libya seeks to assess the performance through the following questions:

- 1) What was the timeline of project implementation concurrent with political events?
- 2) How did the implementers determine their original workplan, and how much of that original workplan occurred?
- 3) How did the implementers change their workplans, and how effectively did they adjust to changes in the political environment to make the most out of unexpected opportunities?
- 4) How much do the overall workplans of the implementers incorporate or ignore other on-the-ground priorities?
- 5) Which DRG sectors should be programming priorities moving forward?
- 6) What is the ability of the Libyans themselves to undertake work in different DRG sectors in the future, with an eye toward sustainability?

Part 2: Public Opinion Survey

To further inform the findings of Part 1, Part 2 of the evaluation explores the opinions of Libyans on DRG issues, to ensure that their voices are heard in future USAID programming. This is achieved through a public opinion survey, implemented via a phone-based public opinion poll of 3,000 respondents. The public opinion survey seeks to answer the following question:

- 7) What are the perspectives and opinions of average Libyan citizens on democracy, human rights and governance in Libya?

PROJECT BACKGROUND


The USAID supported LEGS project is implemented by CEPPS, composed of NDI, IRI, and IFES. NDI's work has focused on the legislature, IRI on local governance, and IFES on elections. The LCB project is implemented by Freedom House and the ABA-ROLI and focuses on building consensus in Libyan society and facilitating the development of a constitution. This organizational structure and the objectives of the two projects are presented in Figure 1. From the start of the LEGS projects in August 2012 until the start of this mid-term evaluation (April 2015) the political and security environment has been in a state of flux, which has had a profound impact on project implementation.(See the detailed description of the operating environment below)

The LEGS project has been guided by three overall objectives of 1) Increasing public and actor confidence in integrity of elections as a vehicle for peaceful and democratic leader selection; 2) Establishing good precedents for effective governance, including stakeholder engagement, by representative bodies at the national and sub-national level and 3) Increase women's and marginalized groups' genuine inclusion and participation. To support the objectives, 11 sub-objectives have been developed with one implementing partner responsible for a sub-objective.

For the LCB project there was one overall objective to “contribute to reconstructing Libya’s social contract by providing all Libyans with the opportunity to participate in creating conditions necessary for well-being” that is supported by three sub-objectives.

Figure 1 presents an overview of the evaluated programming, including the projects, IPs and objectives.

Figure 1: USAID funded DRG programming in Libya – Implementing Partners and Objectives



METHODOLOGY

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As presented above, the performance evaluation seeks to answer six key questions. The approach to answering these questions is presented in Figures 2 and 3 outlining specific questions, research, analysis and end-products. For example, Question 1 is divided into two more specific sub-questions; an analysis approach is explained for each of the sub-questions; and an end product, a timeline of implemented activities and political events, is presented.

Questions 1 through 4 are retrospective questions that consider current USAID DRG programming, while Questions 5 and 6 are future oriented, and seek to provide insight to – and recommendations for - future programming priorities.

Figure 2: Analytical Framework Question 1, 2 and 3

Key question	Specific questions	Analysis	End product
1 What was the timeline of project implementation concurrent with political events? How did the implementers determine their original work plan, and how much of that original work plan occurred? How did IPs change their workplans; how effectively did they adjust to changes in the political environment to make most of unexpected opportunities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What key political, judicial and security events took place in Libya July 2012 – April 2015? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desk research on key political, judicial and security events Q3 2012 – Q1 2015, per quarter 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Description of timeline of implemented activities and political events
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> When were the activities of the original and revised workplans implemented? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mapping of timeline of implemented activities per sub-objective, based on quarterly program reports 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What activities did the IPs plan for in the original workplan? Were the activities in org. plan implemented, and if so, when? What preparatory activities did the IPs undertake when developing the workplan? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mapping of activities (per sub-objective) planned in original plan Mapping if/when activities in org. plan were implemented (per sub-obj.) based on quarterly program reports Desk research on key aspects of workplan preparation Analysis of IPs activities when developing workplans, based on interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of the extent planned activities have been implemented
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What revisions were made to the original LEGS and LCB workplans? What key factors drove revisions to the workplans? To what extent was the revised workplans implemented? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mapping of extensions, expansions, cancellation and additions of activities. Identification of key factors, based on interview material. Per activity, mapping of extent revised activities were implemented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysis of effectiveness of revised plans 	

Retrospective/evaluative questions

Figure 3: Analytical Framework Question 4, 5 and 6

	Key question	Specific questions	Analysis	End product
Retrospective/evaluative	4 How much do the overall workplans of the implementers incorporate or ignore other on-the-ground priorities?	• Which are the specific ‘other’ DRG priorities ?	• Mapping of <i>priorities</i> from approved workplans and the <i>other priorities</i> from the evaluation ‘scope of work’	• Assessment of inclusion of other DRG priorities
		• To what extent are other priorities included in approved workplans over time ?	• Content analysis of approved workplans of inclusion of <i>other priorities</i> over time • Analysis of efforts to include <i>other priorities</i> in workplans/project design, based on interviews with IPs	
Future oriented/recommendations	5 Which DRG sectors should be programming priorities moving forward?	• Which DRG gaps is feasible to prioritize, given the operating environment?	• Assessment of feasibility of programming in three potential future Libyan scenarios, drawing on desk research and interviews	• Identification of needed, feasible and appropriate USAID programming priorities
		• Which DRG gaps are appropriate for USAID to prioritize, given USAID’s capacities?	• Assessment of USAID’s capacity, drawing on interview IPs, USAID, other donors	
	6 What is the ability of Libyans themselves to undertake work in DRG sectors in the future, with an eye to sustainability?	• Who are the “Libyans”/ relevant actors to undertake DRG programming? • What is their extent of ability: capacity, willingness/political will, and legitimacy ?	• Define and map relevant actors, from interview material • For each mapped actor, assess ability over key dimensions (capacity, willingness, legitimacy) , drawing on interview material	• Assessment of Libyan actors’ ability within DRG work

DATA COLLECTION

The performance evaluation used document review and key informant interviews (KIIs) to inform the evaluation.

Document Review/Implementation Assessment

Methodology: The document review consisted of mapping and evaluating the projects’ planned and implemented activities based on workplans, quarterly reports, and interviews with IPs resulting in an implementation assessment for each of the planned activities in LEGS and LCB (attached in Annex IV). The IPs all commented on and validated the assessment. The evaluation team undertook the document review and implementation assessment in a five-step process:

1. Mapping of planned activities, based on LEGS and LCB workplans:¹
 - a. LEGS: Original workplan (October 2012-October 2013); 1st Revised workplan (October 2013-May 2014); 2nd Revised workplan (November 2014-April 2015)²
 - b. LCB: Year 1 workplans, dated December 2014 and April 2015
2. Mapping of implemented activities, based on LEGS and LCB quarterly reports:

¹ Throughout the report, the timeline is periodized per calendar year, where Quarter 1 = Jan-Mar, Quarter 2 = Apr-Jun, Quarter 3 = Jul-Sep, Quarter 4 = Oct-Dec. Therefore, all periodization by USAID fiscal year (Q1=Oct-Dec, Q2=Jan-Mar, Q3=Apr-Jun, Q4=Jul-Sep) as used in the IP’s quarterly reports, have been converted to calendar years. As such, e.g. Oct-Dec 2014 is referred to as Q4 2014 (not Q1 2015).

² No workplan guided the work from May 2014-October 2014, as the IPs were evacuated from Libya, along with the international community.

- a. LEGS: Ten quarterly reports for October 2012- March 2015
 - b. LCB: Two quarterly report from October 2014- March 2015
3. Assessment of the extent the IPs implemented the planned activities:
 - a. By comparing the actual implementation of an activity to what was planned, the evaluation team assessed the extent each activity the IPs had planned for was implemented, on a 0-4 scale.³
 4. Cross-comparison of implementation-assessment to the Mission's Performance Management Plans:
 - a. To validate the findings of the evaluators mapping and assessment (step 1-3), the assessment was cross-compared to the IPs own tracking of the activity implementation, in LEGS and LCB Performance Management Plans. The implementation assessment scores (0-4), were adjusted accordingly.
 5. Validation of assessment by IPs:
 - a. In the final step of the implementation assessment, the evaluators shared the assessment scores with all four IPs, for validation. All IPs were given the opportunity to comment on the scores, and provide their input. The final scores have been adjusted accordingly

The result of the five-step implementation assessment is displayed in Annex IV, which forms the basis for answering Questions 1-3.

In addition to programme documents, the evaluation team also collected and reviewed external literature on Libya's political, judicial and security situation to provide background knowledge and to inform the analysis of Question 1.

Key Informant Interviews

Methodology: To complement the document review, and to collect the needed information for Q4-Q6, 61 KIIs were conducted with various program stakeholders and knowledgeable experts, including IP international staff, IP national staff, USAID staff, Libyan program beneficiaries, non-USAID donor staff, and Libya experts. Interview guides were developed based on the document review, and tailored to each interviewee type. Sample interview guides are provided in Annex II.

The evaluation authors conducted interviews with key informants in Tunis, Washington D.C., and remotely (via ICT) in May 2015. Local researchers engaged for this evaluation conducted interviews in Libya. The evaluation team conducted the following interviews (see Annex III for a detailed list of Sources of Information):

- 21 interviews with US and Tunisia based implementing partners
- 11 interviews with USAID, other donors and Libya experts
- 21 interviews with Libya-based LEGS and LCB beneficiaries
- 8 interviews with Libya-based implementing partners' field staff

Limitations

While the evaluation team took great care to accurately represent the findings of the document review and the IPs' input, it should be noted that there is some degree of subjectivity in the final assessment score, as the evaluators made judgement calls in order to assess activity implementation on the 0-4 scale. In some

³0 = No implementation of activity, and no preparatory work; 1 = No implementation of activity, but the IPs undertook some preparations for the activity; 2 = some aspects of the activity were prepared for and implemented; 3 = Most aspects of the planned activity were prepared for and implemented; 4 = All aspects of the planned activity prepared and implemented.

cases, we aggregate assessment scores across the IPs to measure total implementation. This aggregation is based on summations that weight each activity equally. It is also worth noting that the scoring does not always reflect the work done in preparation for an activity.

A further limitation to the evaluation was that the team due to security was unable to travel to Libya to conduct interviews with Libyan beneficiaries of the program. Instead, a team of two Libyan researchers was recruited and trained in Tunis, who conducted the interview during the months of June and early July, 2015.

I: WHAT WAS THE TIMELINE OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CONCURRENT WITH POLITICAL EVENTS?

SUMMARY

The purpose of the first evaluation question is to illustrate the timeline of program implementation, in light of the significant political, judicial, and security events that took place in Libya during the programming implementation. To this end, the evaluation addresses the following question and sub-questions:

- What was the timeline of project implementation concurrent with political, judicial, and security events?
 - What key political, judicial and security events took place in Libya July 2012 – March 2015?
 - When were the activities of the original and revised workplans implemented?

The evaluation finds that the program activities were significantly affected by the unstable political environment in Libya, particularly during the intensified fighting in 2014. During 2014, there was a significant decrease in the launch of new activities. In late 2014 and the beginning of 2015, there was an increase in the program activities again, correlating with a somewhat more stable security situation in Libya and a shift to remote and online based implementation.

This section first presents a timeline of major political, judicial, and security events during program implementation. This is followed by an analysis of the relationship between these events and implementation and an elaborated account of the development of the operating environment from late 2012 through early 2015.

THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Political context and operating environment

Following the fall of the Ghaddafi regime in 2011, there was an immediate opening for actors to engage in Libya's transition process. The National Transition Council (NTC) developed a road map for Libya's transition that included the election for a General National Congress (GNC) in the summer of 2012, followed by the establishment of a constitutional committee tasked with drafting Libya's new constitution. The GNC was given an 18 month mandate to accomplish the task of setting up the committee and adopting a new constitution, after which a new legislative election would be held. Political parties and civil society organizations started mushrooming in the country and more than 140 party lists competed in the first democratic election, which included a progressive gender quota.

The first half of 2012 was thus characterized by strong political will and compromises, best exemplified by the negotiations that led to the adoption of the election law prior to the 2012 elections. Following the handover of power from the NTC to the GNC and the establishment of a government led by Ali Zeidan, political disagreements and in-fighting increasingly dominated the political environment and outlined the downwards trajectory of Libya's democratic transition.

Over time, political disagreements between the two blocks in the GNC, the National Forces Alliance (NFA) and the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), largely paralyzed the political system and the Libyan population grew increasingly dissatisfied with the parties and the GNC. One of the few key laws that were passed, the

controversial Political Isolation Law, was only so after immense pressure from armed groups.⁴ Little progress was made in establishing viable political and security institutions, local governance structures, or reforming the old institutions and systems of the former regime. Municipal elections were held in some parts of the country and local councils were established, which gave some hope that local governance structures could fill the gap left by the malfunctioning national government. The growing dissatisfaction with the political parties became evident when the election law for the Constitution Drafting Assembly was passed, which shifted to an individual rather than party-based candidate system.⁵

With little political progress being made, the GNC opted to extend its mandate, which was due to expire in February 2014, until the end of the year. This decision was met with fierce criticism; the NFA announced their withdrawal from the GNC; and several attempts were made to remove Prime Minister Ali Zeidan from office, which succeeded in March, when he was replaced with Abdullah al Thani. The political deadlock continued throughout the first half of 2014, with Al-Thani being replaced with Ahmed Meetig after just one month in office, only to be reinstated in June following a ruling of the Libyan Supreme Court, the basis of that ruling would also be used later to invalidate the elections of the House of Representatives.^{6,7}

During this same time, elections of municipal councils began to occur throughout Libya. The elections increased the legitimacy of municipal councils by allowing constituents to freely choose their municipal leadership. Further, the elections initiated the decentralization of power in Libya and the implementation of Law 59 (the law of municipal government). USAID, IRI and IRI's Libyan partners collaboratively decided to forgo engagement with municipal council's until they had been freely elected. In addition, the Ministry of Local Government's (MLG) insistence that a memorandum of understanding between IRI and the MLG be executed before programming with municipal councils could begin, also delayed program implementation (the MOU was signed in July 2014).

The inability to bridge the divide between the opposing political blocks was cemented with the election of the House of Representatives in 2014, which was dominated by NFA and affiliated candidates, while only a few JCP candidates won seats in the new legislature. In a reaction to the loss at the polls, the JCP and affiliated groups refused to give up their political power base and resurrected the GNC in Tripoli, creating a situation with two-competing legislative bodies.⁸ Since then, while efforts have been made to reconcile the competing political blocks into a single unity government, they have to date been unsuccessful.⁹

The rival governments and ministries, in addition to international recognition of the HoR, have also put implementers in an awkward position of minimizing engagement with Libyan government ministries, impacting program implementation for some LEGGS implementers.

Security context of operating environment

The downward trend in the political environment in Libya has been mirrored and closely linked to the downward spiraling security environment in the country. The removal of the Ghaddafi regime left a security vacuum in the country, which was quickly filled with a myriad of armed groups across the countries. While

⁴ International Crisis Group. (2013). *Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya* (p. 47). Brussels.

⁵ JMW Consulting, & National Democratic Institute. (2013). *Seeking Security: Public Opinion Survey in Libya*. Washington D.C.

⁶ JMW Consulting, & National Democratic Institute. (2014). *Committed to Democracy and Unity*.

⁷ Al Jazeera. (2013). Libyan prime minister seized by armed men.

⁸ Lucht, H., & Boserup, R. A. (2015). Europe Is Playing With Fire by Considering Military Intervention in Libya. *The World Post*.

⁹ Lucht, H., & Boserup, R. A. (2015)

there was relative stability in the first half of 2012, these groups grew increasingly assertive and put a distinct mark on Libya's transition period.

The first major security incident in the country happened on September 11, 2012 when the U.S. compound in Benghazi was attacked and the U.S. ambassador killed.¹⁰ This had a significant effect on the U.S. presence in Libya, leading to the reduction of USAID staff from five to one. In 2013, a car bomb exploded at the French Embassy while several car bombings took place in Benghazi.¹¹ The situation in the eastern part of the country, especially in Benghazi and Derna, grew increasingly insecure. The Islamist militia group Ansar al Sharia and other militias were the primary contributors to the instability and violence. Security in the capital also increasingly deteriorated as militias started to attack political party offices and government buildings. In addition, there were several assassinations attempts on activists, politicians and leaders.

Throughout 2013, these security incidents continued on a regular basis, while crime rates also started to rise throughout country. In the South, tribal clashes erupted. The major security shift came in May 2014 when General Haftar launched "Operation Dignity" in Benghazi with the aim of driving out the Islamist militias from the eastern part of the country.¹² This was countered by the launch of "Operation Dawn," a coalition of various militias from Misrata and Tripoli and surrounding areas. This threw Libya into civil war, and most international actors ceased operations and evacuated staff in the summer of 2014.

Since then, fighting has been on-going with neither of the two sides being able to gain the upper hand. The fighting has led to the internal displacement of more than 430,000 people. Exploiting the turmoil, the Islamic State (IS) started to gain a foothold in the country. In October 2014 the Emir in Derna declared the city the first town in Libya to join the Islamic State.¹³ While attempts had been made by international actors to re-enter the country in the beginning of 2015, the presence of IS deterred these efforts. This was underscored by the IS attack on the Corinthia Hotel, their killing of 21 Coptic Christians from Egypt, and their control of Sirte.^{14,15} Without a political agreement the security trajectory in Libya is not likely to improve and it remains to be seen what impact a political brokered agreement will have on the willingness of the armed groups to stop the fighting. As of this writing some of the factions in Libya have agreed to a framework for a peace deal brokered by the UN, but importantly without the Tripoli government signing it.

TIMELINE OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CONCURRENT WITH POLITICAL, JUDICIAL AND SECURITY EVENTS

Figure 4 depicts the timeline of project implementation concurrent with significant Libyan events from October 2012 (the launch of DRG programming) to March 2015 (immediately prior to the performance evaluation). The top half of the figure provides a brief overview of the primary political, judicial, and security events, as well as a rough quantification (summing up the number of events that took place, per quarter). The lower part of the figure illustrates the total number of outputs (workshops, trainings, completion of written products, meetings and others) of the LEGS program achieved by the implementing partners, per quarter. Quarters are based on the calendar year (Quarter I corresponds with January-March, etc.). While these simple summations do not account for the importance or relative weight of an event or output, higher numbers do correspond with periods of greater instability and output, respectively.

¹⁰Crisiswatch. (2015). Crisiswatch Libya.

¹¹ CEEPS. (2013b). Quarterly Report Q3.


¹² Al Jazeera. (2014b). Timeline: Three years after Libya's uprising.

¹³ Stephens, C. (2014). US expresses fears as Isis takes control of northern Libyan town.

¹⁴ Karadshah, J., & Alkhshali, H. (2015). Gunmen attack Corinthia Hotel in Libya; at least 10 die.

¹⁵ CNN. (2015). ISIS executes more Christians in Libya, video shows.

Figure 4: Timeline of program activities concurrent with political events



1: Counting of activities and events are subject to a certain degree of uncertainty, but inclusion evaluation is consistent across quarters and entities.
 2: Excl. preparatory meetings. Meetings held under the same activity, in the same quarter, are counted as 1 unless specified as different activities
 3: Major events incl. study trips and launch of website, working groups etc. 4: Minor events incl. reviews, smaller assessments, notable agreements and decisions


As illustrated in Figure 4, there were relatively fewer political, judicial, and security events during the first phase of programming (Q4 2012 – Q4 2013) compared to the subsequent periods. During this period there was a high and increasing level of program activity, especially in Q2 2013 and Q4 2013. In the following year, Q1-Q3 2014, we see an increase in political and security incidents and a significant reduction in program activity.

Towards the end of 2014 (Q4) and early 2015 there was a slight reduction in political and security related events and a concurrent rise of program related activities. Also, by Q4 2014, IPs had established their operations in Tunis and Malta and had begun to adjust to the political situation and operate remotely. Figure 5 explores the relationship between political events and implementation using an alternative indicator for the quantification of outputs in Figure 4. Figure 5 instead displays the extent to which the IPs were able to implement the activities successfully - based on the implementation assessment in Annex IV (i.e. the percentage of activities implemented as a percent of the total planned), and this also includes LCB activities.

As seen in Figure 5, the level of implementation in relation to the planned outcomes was affected by the political/judicial and security events in the operating environment. The figure shows the same trend as the above timeline (Figure 4) in which the programmatic activity decreased significantly during the political and security turmoil and then began increasing again.¹⁶

¹⁶ The relatively high assessment for Q3 2014 in Figure 5 compared to Figure 4 relates to the relatively low activity level this quarter.


**Figure 5: Implementation Trend of Activities
(assessment of implemented activities)**



Implementation of new versus ongoing activities

Figure 6 compares ongoing and new activities for each quarter, including both LEGS and LCB. Looking at the period of highest level of political, judiciary and security events (Q1 to Q3 of 2014), the evaluation finds that while the implementation assessment scores decrease for both new activities (activities launched in the quarter) and ongoing activities (activities launched earlier), the scores decrease more for the new activities.

**Figure 6 Comparison Ongoing Activities to New Activities
(assessment of implemented activities)**



2: HOW DID THE IMPLEMENTERS DETERMINE THEIR ORIGINAL WORKPLANS, AND HOW MUCH OF THAT ORIGINAL WORKPLAN OCCURRED?

SUMMARY

The purpose of this section is to understand the process of the development of the IPs workplans, and assess the extent to which those workplans actually were implemented. In order to do this, the evaluation addresses the following question and sub-questions:

- How did the implementers determine their original workplan, and how much of that original workplan occurred?
 - What preparatory activities did the IPs undertake when developing the original workplan?
 - What activities did the IPs plan for in the original workplan / were the activities in the original plan implemented?

The assessment of the preparatory activities suggests that the IPs undertook adequate preparation in the development of their workplans. While formal needs assessments were not conducted, activities were designed based on scoping trips and pre-existing activities. In addition, the IPs consulted with relevant actors and built in adequate flexibility.

Due to the challenges presented by the political and security climate, however, a large percentage of the proposed workplans were not possible to implement and IPs were forced to revise their workplans. For the LEGS program activities targeting civil society saw the highest level of implementation, while programming targeting non-elected institutions and nationally elected bodies saw a slightly lower implementation rate, and activities for locally elected bodies saw the lowest level of implementation.

PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES

The analysis in this section is based on the information gathered in the review of the workplans and interviews with key IP and USAID staff. To assess workplan preparation, the evaluation team explored whether the IPs undertook the following preparatory activities:¹⁷

- Involved relevant actors (national staff, beneficiaries, content/context experts and HQ staff) in workplan preparations.
- Conducted a needs assessment.
- Built in flexibility in design of the workplan.
- Included M&E Plans

Table I summarizes the findings of the interviews. A checkmark ✓ indicates that the IPs undertook the activity to a high extent, a checkmark in parenthesis (✓) indicates that the IPs undertook some elements of the preparatory activity, and a “✗” would indicate that the IP did not undertake any element of this preparatory activity. Greater detail of the preparatory activities implemented by the IPs follows in narrative

¹⁷ The analysis in the section concerns the development of the original workplan. The activities undertaken to revise the workplans are discussed under Q3.

form below. As seen in Table 1, the overall finding from the assessment is that all four IPs were relatively well-prepared for the programming, and undertook all four preparatory activities to a certain extent.

Table 1: Assessment of which activities IPs undertook when preparing workplans

Preparation Activity	Implementing Partners			
	IFES	NDI	IRI	ABA-ROLI
Involved relevant actors in workplan preparations	✓	✓	✓	✓
Conducted a needs assessment	(✓)	(✓)	(✓)	(✓)
Built in flexibility in design of the workplan	✓	✓	✓	✓
Included M&E Plans	✓	✓	✓	(✓)

Note: ✓ indicates that the IPs undertook the activity to a high extent; (✓) indicates that the IPs undertook some elements.

LEGS

- **IFES** had several staff members involved in project design, with two scoping missions to Libya in 2011 and 2012. IFES showed flexibility in responding to the challenges from changes in the election calendar by working with capacity building in the HNEC. Also, IFES included local partners in the development of the original workplan, which helped determine needs in southern Libya.
- **NDI**: Interviews suggest that NDI was able to act in a flexible manner on the basis of a workplan with broad priorities allowing for on-the-ground changes. The preparation of the workplan did not include a formal needs assessment, as this was not perceived to be necessary, but it did include scoping missions in Libya and liaison with communities around Libya.
- **IRI**: While IRI did not conduct a formal needs assessment for the original workplan, they did conduct two preparatory missions and further preparatory assessment for the revised workplans. Flexibility was built in to the workplan by actively increasing the focus on capacity of local councils.

LCB

- **ABA-ROLI**: The LCB workplan built on ABA-ROLI's work under the RIGHTS consortium, by building on a previous project as a basis for current project. Instead of a formal needs assessment, ABA had coordinated with Libyan Diaspora in 2011, following the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The continuation of previous projects allows the project to benefit from existing structures and momentum.

In the interviews with the IPs, the evaluation team sought to explore how the IPs prepared the workplans in relation to the original work proposed by USAID. In comparing the USAID's initial proposal with the prepared workplan, the scope of work differ in terms of target beneficiaries (local vs. national elected officials), and programming area (local governance vs. national governance). The IPs report that this was a gradual process of workplan development, taking a start in USAID's initially suggested work, adjusting it to the IP's experience and perceived local need. The specific drive to move from a focus on national issues to local issues, implemented by IRI under LEGS, stems from that it became increasingly difficult to operate at the national level and as the number of local council elections increased. This focus was expanded in 2nd revised workplan (from October 2014), with the addition of program Objective 2.6 (capacity building of Ministry of Local Government. Going forward, it may be useful for IPs to be guided by e.g. a Libya country strategy, or the BAA released in May 2015 (which seeks to help USAID reach its development goal of enabling Libya to utilize human, financial and natural resources for the benefit of citizens), to ensure that the development of workplans stays within USAID's planned goals and aims.

ASSESSMENT OF PLANNED VERSUS IMPLEMENTED ACTIVITIES, ORIGINAL WORKPLAN

Based on the implementation assessment of each activity for all planned activities – Annex IV – the evaluation team has assessed the extent to which activities planned in the *original* workplan were implemented. Figures 7 and 8 are based on the detailed review of each planned activity (scored 0-4, as seen in Annex IV) and summarized for each activity planned in the original workplan. The report does not assess the reason behind the various levels of implementation, and hence low levels of implementation should not, per se, be construed as a failure on behalf of the IP. As noted above, the security environment created a series of constraints for the IPs.

The original workplan for the LEGS project covers the period October 2012 – October 2013, and the original workplan for ABA-ROLI covers August 2014-April 2015. The revised workplans (October 2013 and November 2014 for LEGS; April 2015 for LCB) are discussed under Question 3.

LEGS

As seen in Figure 7, LEGS was most successful in implementation under Objective 1 on elections [*LEGS 1. Increasing public and stakeholder confidence in the integrity of elections as a vehicle for peacefully and democratically selecting leaders*] with an average implementation score of 3.5 out of 4.0. (see Annex VI). Implementation partners performed especially well with regards to the LEGS sub-objective 1.2 [*LEGS 1.2 Increased civic engagement*], in which all of the three planned activities were fully implemented.

Figure 7: Assessment of progress of activities planned for in the original workplan - LEGS

○ No progress
● Completed

Project	Objective	Sub-objectives	IP	Activities (Original Work plan)	Score	
LEGS	1. Increasing public & actor confidence in integrity of elections as vehicle for peaceful & democratic leader selection	1.1 Transparency in government	IFES	Technical support to HNEC	●	
				Technical support to Judiciary	●	
				Capacity build gov. political finance bodies	○	
		1.2 Increased civic engagement	IFES	Creation of Democracy Resource Centers	●	
				Access for Persons with Disabilities (PWDs)	●	
				Information CSOs on Elections/Political Process	●	
	2. Establishing good precedents for effective governance, including stakeholder engagement, by representative bodies at the national and subnational level	2.1 Enhanced representation and legislation in GNC	NDI	Engagement of GNC Leadership	○	
				Institutional Assessment	○	
				Seminars on Basic Legislative Practices	●	
				Orientation Series for GNC Members and Staff	●	
				Promote Understanding of Roles as Legislators	○	
				Institutional Development Committee	○	
		2.2 Strengthened policy discussions	NDI	Building Constituent Outreach Capacity	●	
				Political Caucus Development and Outreach	○	
				Public Relations Assistance	○	
		2.3 GNC increased transparency	NDI	Assist GNC in handling the media	●	
				Sub-grant to IWPR	●	
		2.4 Legislation informed by citizen concerns	IRI	Advocacy Trainings for Citizen Engagement	○	
Local Constituency Outreach Workshops	○					
Support Representative presence Constituencies	○					
2.5 Support local councilors	IRI	Town Hall Meetings	○			
		Coordination Workshops: loc. and nat. officials	○			
		Objective 2.5 introduced in Workplan Oct 2013	○			
2.6 Strengthened MoLG structure	IRI	Objective 2.6 introduced in Workplan Nov 2014	○			
		Objective 3 introduced in Workplan Nov 2014	○			
		Objective 3 introduced in Workplan Nov 2014	○			
3. Increase women's and marginalized groups' genuine inclusion and participation	3.1 Incl. of women and marginalized	IFES	Objective 3 introduced in Workplan Nov 2014	○		
			3.2 Women contribute to nat. policy	NDI	Objective 3 introduced in Workplan Nov 2014	○
					3.3 Youth engage with local leaders	IRI

The IPs showed some progress under LEGS Objective 2 on governance [*LEGS 2. Establishing good precedents for effective governance, including stakeholder engagement, by representative bodies at the national and sub-national level*] but much of the intended workplan was not or could not be implemented, resulting in an average implementation score of 1.8 of 4.0 at the level of originally planned activities. The IPs performed well with regards to LEGS sub-objective 2.3 on transparency [*LEGS 2.3 Increased GNC Transparency*]. The overall implementation score was affected by a lack of implementation under LEGS sub-objective 2.4 on citizen engagement in legislation [*LEGS 2.4 Legislation informed by citizens concern*]. The activities under this objective included the coordination of several in-person meetings between CSOs/citizen representatives and elected

officials. Unfortunately, many of the planned activities were cancelled due to security concerns. In addition, several of the activities (e.g. the adoption of a curriculum by the Ministry of Local Government) depended on government support and buy-in. Where this was not forthcoming, potentially as a direct result of the broader political instability, the projects were unable to achieve their implementation goals.

LCB

Of the LCB objectives the implementing partners saw the lowest level of implementation of planned activities under Objective 1.3 [LCB 1.3 Create consensus processes for National Dialogue and Constitution drafting]. Overall, the activities in LCB's original plan saw a lower level of implementation than those of LEGS. It is important to note, however, that LCB was only seven months into its one year workplan at the time of the evaluation. Additional challenges include:

- 1) The shorter time-span of the original workplan, as LCB's original workplan spans August 2014 – August 2015 (LEGS started in October 2013)
- 2) The challenge of organizing program activities outside of Libya, since implementers were evacuated from Libya in July 2014, just ahead of the start of the LCB program.

Figure 8: Assessment of progress of activities planned for in the original workplan - LCB

○ No progress
● Completed

Project	Objective	Sub-objectives	IP	Activities (Original Work plan)	Score
LCB	1. Contribute to reconstructing Libya's social contract by providing all Libyans the opportunity to participate in creating conditions necessary for well-being	1. Citizens able to develop consensus on key constitution issues and effectively inform the constitution drafting body.	ABA ROLI	Establish Dialogue Framework	●
				Strengthen knowledge about const. process	○
				Dialogue on the Constitution community Level	●
				Build Consensus on Constitutional Provisions	●
				Support local councils and CS for CDA	●
		2. Citizens with majority and minority views from across Libya, are able to build a consensus of state, economy and society and the relationship between them	ABA ROLI	Inform communities of the constitution process	○
				Enable Partner Communities for CDA	○
				Support capacity of the NDPC	●
				Connect local council and CS in ND	○
				Support local councils and CS recommendations	●
		3. Create consensus processes that will incorporate outputs from national dialogue and constitution drafting to inform Libya's governing processes beyond the passing of the constitution referendum in order to strengthen the political transition	ABA ROLI	Inform communities on priorities NDProcess	○
				Ensure legislature is responsive to of civil society	○
				Ensure capacity of local councils	●
				Rule of Law Institutions are engaged	●

Assessment of implementation of activities for different beneficiary groups

To further explore the implementation of activities, the report compares the implementation of activities geared towards different beneficiary groups. This was done through categorizing the beneficiaries into four groups:¹⁸

- Nationally elected bodies, i.e. the GNC and HoR

¹⁸ In the event that an activity included more than one type of beneficiary group (i.e. local elected politics and civil society), the analysis has identified the main beneficiary group (i.e. local elected politics OR civic society), and used this as basis for the analysis.

- Locally elected bodies, i.e. municipal councils
- Non-elected institutions, i.e. the High National Elections Commission, the National Dialogue Preparatory Commission, and the Judiciary
- Civil society, e.g. civil society organizations and constituencies.

For the LEGS project, IP activities targeting civil society beneficiaries achieved the highest level of implementation, with an average score of 2.6 out of 4.0 (Table 2). This is followed by support for non-elected institutions. Activities that target nationally elected bodies saw a slightly lower implementation, especially with regards to formal interactions with the GNC. The activities that targeted locally elected bodies saw the lowest level of implementation for the LEGS project, as this group was the hardest to access in the deteriorating security situation. For the LCB project it is not possible to provide a firm conclusion of which target beneficiary group the IP has been most successful with, due to the low level of implementation.

Table 2: Assessment of implementation based on types target beneficiary group, average scores across activities (0=none; 4=full)

	Nationally elected bodies	Locally elected bodies	Non-elected institutions	Civil society
LEGS	1.9	1.2	2.3	2.6
LCB*	N/A	1.3	1.8	0.6

3: HOW DID THE IMPLEMENTERS CHANGE AND ADJUST THEIR WORKPLANS?

SUMMARY

The purpose of this evaluation question is to analyze how effective the revisions to the program workplan (October 2013 and November 2014 for LEGS; April 2015 for LCB) were in adjusting to the fluid political environment in Libya. To guide the evaluation, one overall question and three sub-questions were addressed:

- How did the IPs change their workplans and how effectively did they adjust to changes in the political environment to make the most out of unexpected opportunities?
 - What revisions were made to the original LEGS and LCB workplans?
 - What key factors drove revisions to the workplans?
 - To what extent was the revised workplans implemented?

The analysis finds that the majority of activities planned in the original workplan were not modified in the revisions, but instead new activities were introduced while others were eliminated. Overall, the IPs report that the process of the revisions functioned well under the flexible programming design and that USAID was supportive of the needed revisions. The analysis identifies two factors for revising the workplans: 1) the deteriorating security situation, and 2) the need to change target beneficiaries due to low level of collaboration of the intended beneficiaries (mainly, the GNC), where the security challenges had the single biggest impact on implementation success.

For the LEGS project, the findings show that the implementation of activities revised in the 1st workplan (October 2013) was as successful as activities planned in the original workplan, indicating that an expected increase in effectiveness in implementation did not materialize. In addition, very few activities were cancelled in the revision, but a number of activities were added, increasing the planned activities in a very challenging environment instead of adjusting to the conditions. Activities modified in the 2nd revision (October 2014) and further revisions did not positively contribute to implementation. Regarding LCB (implemented since August 2014, revised in April 2015), it is not possible to assess the progress of revised activities added to limited implementation time relative to the evaluation period.

This section first maps the workplan revision, then explores the driving factors to the revisions and lastly discusses effectiveness of the workplans based on the extent to which the revised plans were implemented.

MAPPING OF WORKPLAN REVISIONS

Table 3 maps the revisions of the workplans per IP, displaying how many activities were added, extended in time, expanded in scope, cancelled, or not revised. (For a detailed table, see Annex VI and for a qualitative description see Annex V.) As indicated in Table 3, for LEGS and LCB combined, a total of 46 activities were added, seven extended, six expanded and 14 activities cancelled. In addition, two objectives changed target group (NDI shifted its focus from the GNC to national legislative body and IRI changed focus from national bodies to local elected bodies). IFES was the most active in introducing new activities in the revisions (17), followed by NDI (16) IRI (10), and ABA-ROLI (3).

The table illustrates the steps IPs took to adjust the workplans throughout the implementation periods of performance. In the interview material, the IPs report that the revisions of the workplan were conducted successfully, without major obstacles, and that USAID was accommodating to these changes. The IPs were the driving force behind the changes.

Table 3: Assessment of the process to revise the workplans

IP	Activities added in 1 st revision	Activities added in 2 nd revision (only LEGS)	Extended timeline of activities	Expanded scope of activities	Activities reassessed/cancelled	Activities not revised
IFES	7	10	1	2	4	16
NDI	4	12	6	-	-	7
IRI	6	4	-	1	10	-
ABA-ROLI	3	-	-	3	-	33

KEY FACTORS DRIVING THE WORKPLAN REVISIONS

Based on the IPs' quarterly reports of programming and interviews with IPs, the evaluation identifies three main factors that drove the above revisions to the workplans: 1) the deteriorating security situation in Libya, 2) difficulties in collaborating with target beneficiaries (i.e. the GNC), and 3) increased USAID funding.

Several activities were cancelled due to security concerns, such as planned workshops in Benghazi (LEGS Sub-objective 2.1), trainings in Zawiya due to roadblocks by militias fighting (LEGS Sub-objective 2.4), and a number of the activities under LEGS Sub-objective 2.5 (support local councils). The security situation also heavily impacted LCB's planning and conditions in the start-up phase, as national staff could not be involved in the drafting process, and liaison efforts in 20 communities could not be carried out due to security. The most far-reaching effect of the security situation was the evacuation of international staff in the summer of 2014. This change put the LEGS project on hold for the period from May 2014 – November 2014. The LCB project was not yet launched at that time.

A number of activities were cancelled or redirected as a result of challenges in cooperation with the respective bodies. IRI, which had originally planned to facilitate constituent outreach within the GNC, sensed early on that the GNC seemed to have very little interest in constituency outreach. Instead, IRI changed its focus to constituent outreach for appointed local councils and later elected municipal councils.

In addition to the two main factors, IPs also report that some cancellations and revisions were due to the fluid political environment, as different windows of opportunities opened or closed.

ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REVISED WORKPLANS

In order to assess how effectively the IPs adjusted the workplans to the fluid Libyan environment, the evaluation team explored the extent to which the IPs were able to implement the revised workplans. As described under question 2 above, this is not an assessment the reason behind the various levels of implementation, and hence low levels of implementation should not, per se, be construed as a failure on behalf of the IP.

LEGS

The original workplan for the LEGS project was approved in October 2012, followed by a first revision in October 2013, and a second revision in November 2014. In order to assess how effectively the IPs adjusted to the changing context, Figure 9 displays the implementation assessment score (on scale 0-4, drawing on Annex IV), of activities as planned in the revised workplan.

Figure 9: Assessment of progress of activities planned for in the revised work-plans - LEGS

○ No progress
● Completed

Project	Objective	Sub-objectives	IP	Revision	Activities (Revised work-plans)	Score
LEGS	1. Increasing public & actor confidence in integrity of elections as vehicle for peaceful & democratic leader selection	1.1 Transparency in government	IFES	1 st & 2 nd	Technical support to HNEC	●
				1 st & 2 nd	Technical support to Judiciary	●
				2 nd	Strategic Election Security Plan	○
		1.2 Increased civic engagement	IFES	1 st	Access for Persons with Disabilities (PWDs)	●
				2 nd	Capacity for CSO watchdog on Political Finance	○
	2. Establishing good precedents for effective governance, including stakeholder engagement, by representative bodies at the national and subnational level	2.1 Enhanced representation and legislation in GNC (<i>Original 2.1</i>)	NDI	1 st	Engagement of GNC Leadership	●
				1 st	Seminars on Basic Legislative Practices	●
				2 nd	Build representative capacity	○
		2.1 Enhanced representation and legislation in legislative body (<i>Revised 2.1</i>)	NDI	2 nd	Conditional activities	○
				2 nd	Conditional activities	○
		2.3 GNC increased transparency	NDI	1 st	Public Relations Assistance	●
		2.5 Support local councilors	IRI	1 st	MoLG adopt training materials for councilors (1 st rev.)	●
				1 st	Establish Municipal Government Associations (1 st rev.)	●
		2.6 Strengthened MoLG structure	IRI	2 nd	Regional network for MoLG (2 nd rev.)	○
	2 nd			Capacity building of MoLG (2 nd rev.)	○	
2 nd	Support capacity building of councilors (2 nd rev.)			○		
3. Increase women's and marginalized groups' genuine inclusion and participation	3.1 Incl. of women and marginalized	IFES	2 nd	Supports women's participation in political process (2 nd rev.)	●	
			2 nd	Increase access of PWD to elections (2 nd rev.)	●	
	3.2 Women contribute to nat. policy	NDI	2 nd	Outreach and partner identification (2 nd rev.)	●	
			2 nd	Strategic planning consultations & workshops (2 nd rev.)	○	
	3.3 Youth engage with local leaders	IRI	2 nd	Support initiatives implementation (2 nd rev.)	○	
			2 nd	Capacity building for youth councils (2 nd rev.)	●	

In the below analysis, we compare Figure 9 (implementation assessment score 0-4, of activities as planned in the revised a workplans) to Figure 7 on p. 15 (implementation assessment score 0-4, of activities as planned in the original workplan). The implementation assessment of the 1st revised workplan suggests a similar level of implementation to the original plan. On the one hand, this suggests that the revisions and additions made in the 1st revision did not materialize in better implementation even though it can be assumed that the purpose of the revisions was to adopt the project to the realities on the ground. On the other hand, it is important to note that rather than cancel activities in the workplan and add new ones, few activities were actually cancelled, while a number of activities were added, thereby increasing the number of planned activities in a very challenging environment.

A more in-depth analysis suggests that implementation of activities that were added or revised in either of the two rounds of workplan modifications performed better than activities that were not revised (Annex VI, Table 13). This suggests that revisions made were effective and implemented at least as successfully as activities from the original workplan. To supplement this analysis – giving an indication of the extent to which the revision were implemented – the interview material suggest that the IPs perceive that the content of the revised activities have been relevant for programming, and in line with what was planned in the original workplans. The IPs report that the activity revisions mostly focused on altering programming delivery, rather than altering the activity aim.

Looking across the IPs, implementation performance on activities added in the 1st and the 2nd revision varies significantly. IFES implements revised activities to a large degree, and NDI and IRI implements revisions somewhat (Annex VI, Table 11).

The activities planned in the 2nd revision have not been as successfully completed; however, there had only been a short implementation period (November 2014 – April 2015) and this period overlapped with departure of the IPs (together with the whole international community) from the country.

LCB

LCB's original workplan by ABA-ROLI spanned from August 2014 to April 2015, and was revised once, in April 2015. As a result of the late revision to the workplan and limited implementation time, it was not possible to conduct an assessment of the progress of activities added in the revised workplan.

4: HOW MUCH DO THE OVERALL WORKPLANS OF THE IMPLEMENTERS INCORPORATE OR IGNORE OTHER ON-THE-GROUND PRIORITIES?

SUMMARY

The purpose of this question is to understand how other on-the-ground priorities have been incorporated into the program workplans in the fluid Libyan context. This was explored through the following questions:

- How much do the overall workplans of the implementers incorporate or ignore other on-the-ground priorities?
 - Which are the specific “other” priorities?
 - To what extent are other priorities included in approved workplans over time?

USAID recognizes nine “other” issues as important to the Libyan development context in the evaluation SOW, but the evaluation team did not find an explicit articulation of these priorities in the project documentation reviewed. Indeed, the LEGS and LCB implementers have not been tasked to address all nine of these priorities, but the evaluation finds that LEGS and LCB were both sensitive to other, on-the-ground priorities. There is strong evidence for the inclusion of five of nine “other” priorities in the approved workplans: political inclusion (mitigation of political isolation), human rights, local governance, national/local security, and anti-corruption. All except local governance were part of the original project designs. For LEGS, there is increased focus on the five other priorities from October 2014 (2nd revised workplan) in particular. For LCB, three of the five (human rights, political inclusion and local governance/ decentralization) stand out. *Political inclusion* and *human rights* are reflected in the activity descriptions and anticipated results for all years; *local governance* became a central focus starting in October 2013 (1st revised workplan) when it became increasingly difficult to operate at the national level and as local councils were elected; *security* is broadly reflected in all workplans and became an activity focus over time- particularly from October 2014 (2nd revised workplan); and *anti-corruption* is reflected in the LEGS campaign finance activities for all years. IPs did not express efforts to incorporate the other priorities that were not reflected in the approved workplans. They viewed many of them as relevant context, but did not aim to address them through project activities.

To answer Question 4, the team mapped the priorities from the approved workplans and the “other” priorities identified in the evaluation scope of work; conducted a content analysis of approved workplans to determine evidence for the inclusion of other priorities – either explicitly or conceptually – over time, using an expanded list of key words; and conducted interviews with IPs and USAID to understand efforts to include these other priorities in the workplans and project design. The team also asked program beneficiaries their views of how high of a priority the international community has made these issues since 2012, and which, if any, of the issues have become more important over time.

ASSESSMENT OF INCORPORATION OF OTHER ON-THE-GROUND PRIORITIES

The evaluation SOW identified nine “other” priorities: national/ local security; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); transitional justice; human rights, mitigation of gender-based violence; political inclusion; anti- corruption; impunity of militias; and local governance. Other than this document, the evaluation team did not find a formal articulation of “other” priorities, such as in commissioned DRG

assessments, a DRG result framework or a US country strategy for Libya.¹⁹ USAID recognizes the nine issues as important to the Libyan development context, but the LEGS and LCB implementers have not been tasked to address all nine; five of the issues are clearly reflected in the program workplans and four are not.

Table 4 gives an overview of the inclusion/ non-inclusion of the nine other priorities in the workplans. A checkmark - ✓ - indicates that the other priority was included in the workplan as part of project goals, objectives, activities, indicators and/ or key assumptions; - ✖ - indicates that it was not included in the workplan. As a measure of intensity of inclusion, the narrative section below discusses how/ where the priority appears in the workplan.

Table 4: Summary of inclusion of other priorities in IP workplans

Other priorities	Key words	LEGS			LC B
		Original	1 st rev.	2 nd rev.	1 st rev.
1 National/local security	security, insecurity, stability, instability, tension, legitimate, legitimacy, safe, fluid	✓	✓	✓	✓
2 DDR	disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, integration	✖	✖	✓	✖
3 Transitional justice	transitional, justice, law, rule of law	✖	✖	✖	✖
4 Human rights	human rights, rights, universal	✓	✓	✓	✓
5 Mitigation of gender-based violence (GBV)	gender-based violence, gender, violence, ease, reduce, mitigate	✖	✖	✖	✖
6 Political inclusion (mitigation of political isolation)	isolation, access, marginalized, minority, underrepresented, disenfranchise, inclusion, women	✓	✓	✓	✓
7 Anti-corruption	corruption, anti-corruption, enforcement, influence, regulate, regulations, money	✓	✓	✓	✖
8 Impunity of militias	militia(s)	✖	✖	✖	✖
9 Local governance (LG)	governance, local municipal, councils, LG, decentralization, services, ministry, multi-level governance (MLG)	✖	✓	✓	✓

Note: ✓ indicates that the other priority was included in the workplan as part of project goals, objectives, activities, indicators and/ or key assumptions; ✖ indicates that it was not included in the workplan.

Incorporated

The five “other” priorities strongly identified in the approved workplans are: political inclusion, human rights, local governance, security and anti-corruption. IPs noted that priorities were driven by political and security realities.

Political inclusion (mitigating political isolation)

For LEGS, political inclusion is reflected in program sub-objectives (e.g. Sub-objective 1.2 regarding electoral awareness) and throughout the activity descriptions (e.g. advice to HNEC on legal and regulatory frameworks, public relations assistance to GNC, electoral access for PWDs, advocacy trainings for citizen engagement, constituency outreach for legislative bodies) for all years. From October 2014 (2nd revised workplan) there is an enhanced focus on this priority through greater support to HNEC regarding Persons with Disabilities (PWDs) and participation of women, expanded Democracy Resource Center focus beyond elections to include women’s empowerment, youth engagement and PWDs; and new Objective 3 regarding

¹⁹ The evaluation team understands there is both a USG inter-agency country strategy and USAID country strategy for Libya in draft form at the time of this writing.

women and other marginalized groups. All three implementers (IFES, NDI and IRI) aimed to address this issue.

For LCB, political inclusion is reflected in the overall project goal and project objectives, and throughout the anticipated results and activity descriptions. This priority is closely linked to human rights, which is central to LCB.

The majority of national IP staff and program beneficiaries interviewed ranked political inclusion as the highest priority for their programs and for the international community, respectively, since 2012. This may not be surprising, given USAID's steady focus on this issue during this period (e.g. increasing awareness among marginalized and underrepresented groups, advocacy training for citizen engagement, including historically marginalized groups) and national staff and beneficiary sensitization to this issue.

Human rights

For LEGS, human rights is reflected in activity descriptions related to persons with disabilities (PWDs) and technical assistance to HNEC for all years. From October 2014 (2nd revised workplan), there is an expanded focus on PWDs and on HNEC awareness of human rights issues (IFES), and protection of ethnic minority rights (NDI).

For LCB, human rights are central to the project. It is woven into the anticipated results and activity descriptions, e.g. Result 3.1: "*Legislature elected under Libya's new constitution is responsive to the demands of civil society and local governments in implementing provisions related to decentralized governance, equitable resource allocation and protection of civil and human rights.*"²⁰ There is also a specific gender approach for Objectives 1 and 2.

National IP staff and program beneficiaries agreed that human rights has been a significant priority in the past few years.

Local governance

For LEGS, local governance became a central focus in October 2013 (1st revised workplan), with the addition of program Sub-objective 2.5 (support to Libyan local councilors) as it became increasingly difficult to operate at the national level and as the number of local council elections increased. This focus was expanded from October 2014 (2nd revised workplan) with the addition of program Objective 2.6 (capacity building of Ministry of Local Government). LCB has had a steady focus on local governance and - in particular - decentralization as key topics for constitutional reform. This focus predates the LCB program.

National/ local security

For LEGS, security is reflected in the program introduction and assumptions of workplan documents for all years. From October 2014 (2nd revised workplan), there is a clear, substantive focus on national security with the addition of new program objectives and activities to address the security situation. This includes plans for: the development of a strategic election security plan with the HNEC and relevant ministries to cover security as widely as possible on Election Day (IFES), and plans for broad technical assistance to the national legislature, should their legitimacy be resolved during the workplan period (NDI). The IRI workplan for this period introduces inter-related set of activities to strength municipal governments to become a counterweight to instability at the national level.

For LCB, national security is reflected in the overall project goal and in project assumptions/ risks, in language such as "*Contribute to the reconstruction of the social contract in Libya by providing all Libyans, including women,*

²⁰ LCB Year I Workplan (August 2014-July 2015), April 2015, p. 12

youth and other marginalized groups, with the opportunity to participate in the creation of a revised constitutional framework, effective national institutions, and the social, economic and security conditions necessary for Libyans' well-being."²¹

IP national staff and program beneficiaries were internally divided on whether any issues have become more of a priority since 2012. Those who said "yes" in both groups cited cross-cutting security issues (e.g. "Before they were focusing on the national issues only, now it is more important they need to take care of the local conflicts", "The security issue has become more important and dangerous in Libya and has to be solved by the national dialogue from all conflicting parts in Libya"). A small number of national staff felt that government institution building and constitution building had also become more important.

IPs also noted that the security situation has impacted both *which* stakeholders they target and their *approach* to work over time. Several interviewees said there was an increasing emphasis on youth as a target group since youth are involved in conflicts and vulnerable to manipulation. Some also noted that they have explored social media and online training as a way to reach partners and beneficiaries since face-to-face outreach is difficult in the current security environment.

Anti-corruption

Interviewees had limited and diverging views on anti-corruption. Campaign finance reform (through LEGS/IFES) was the only anti-corruption activity cited. Some interviewees felt that US efforts to address anti-corruption came too late. A small number felt that anti-corruption is an immediate priority that requires a technical fix; others said it was premature to focus on this until a new government is in place. IP national staff and program beneficiaries ranked anti-corruption as important, but still one of the lowest priorities of the past few years.

DDR

There is limited evidence for the inclusion of DDR in the workplans. As noted under the discussion on security above, IFES's 2nd revised workplan includes the development of a strategic election security plan with the HNEC and relevant ministries. DDR is closely linked with security and militias; the activity description notes the slow and challenging process of integrating revolutionary fighters into the police and army, and the deep distrust amongst those involved. In the absence of government ministries and a full HNEC staff, the security plan has not yet been developed.

²¹ LCB Year I Workplan (August 2014-July 2015), April 2015, p1.

5: WHICH DRG SECTORS SHOULD BE PROGRAMMING PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD?

SUMMARY

This question explores:

- Which DRG sectors should be programming priorities moving forward?
 - Which DRG gaps are *feasible* to prioritize, given the operating environment?²²
 - Which DRG gaps are *appropriate* for USAID to prioritize, given USAID's capacities?²³

For DRG programming, the evaluation identified broad agreement across respondent groups on three priorities moving forward: local governance, constitutional reform and national dialogue. It found moderate/mixed opinions on four more areas: electoral reform, national institution building, civic education, and public financial management. Local conditions affect what is feasible and appropriate to prioritize going forward. Sustained engagement is key to maintaining trust with Libyan partners and decision makers, and for scaling up programming when conditions allow. If Libya is able to achieve stabilization under a unified government, all seven areas could be feasible and appropriate priorities for USAID. In the event that the status quo of two rival governments persists, a limited scope of assistance with current DRG implementers is preferred, and USAID and IPs will need to consider the sustainability and effectiveness of maintaining a base of operations outside of Libya under this scenario. If the situation deteriorates into civil war, all funding and programming will likely be suspended.

The analysis for Question 5 contains three parts: 1) identification of possible future governance/ security scenarios in Libya based on a literature review and verified through key informant interviews, 2) identification of programming needs and feasibility based on interviews with numerous international and national stakeholders²⁴ and 3) identification of future DRG priorities for USAID, drawing on steps 1 and 2 and stakeholder perceptions of USAID capacities. This is not intended to be a comprehensive political or security assessment, rather an attempt to contextualize future programmatic decisions.

GOING FORWARD: SCENARIOS AND PROGRAMMING PRIORITIES

The evaluation considered three future scenarios for Libya: 1) stabilization under a unified government, 2) continuance of current status quo, or 3) decent into civil war. Future programming will be directly affected by the development of these scenarios. The section below describes each scenario, conditions that make it likely, and potential timing for the scenario. It is understood that the scenarios are unlikely to evolve exactly as stated

Scenario 1: Unity Government (The Libyan Leap)

In scenario 1, the UN successfully facilitates talks between the two rival governments- the self-declared Islamist government in Tripoli and the internationally recognized government in Tobruk; agreement is

²² Feasibility refers to the extent to which it is possible to implement programming given the security and political environment.

²³ Appropriate refers to perceptions of USAID technical and political capital to implement certain programming.

²⁴ Includes: USAID, other USG officials, USAID and non-USAID implementers, LEGS and LCB partners and beneficiaries, and other knowledgeable experts from international think tanks and institutes.

reached on the establishment of a presidential council and a division of legislative power between the two governments; and a state council is set up to play an advisory role.²⁵ Reaching a power-sharing agreement and unifying the two parties into one government may contribute to the stabilization of important Libyan state institutions, enable the new government to deal with a growing IS²⁶ presence and disarm local militias.

Conditions making this scenario likely:

- UN mediated talks reach a successful agreement on the balance of power between the two opposing governments in a new unity government
- International pressure and continued threat of IS drives the two opposing parties closer
- Representatives of the two governments meet face-to-face in formal discussions
- The two governments effectively control their alliances and supporters in order to stop on-the-ground fighting and to distance themselves from the most extreme groups. International pressure ensures both sides are held accountable
- Municipal councils support dialogue
- Municipal councils exercise their influence over local armed groups
- A stabilization of oil prices and oil production leads to more reliable and higher oil revenue which increases incentives for an agreement on a unity government and a single National Oil Corporation (NOC)
- Peace talks successfully confront disagreements relating to powerful figures within Libya, such as General Haftar, Grand Mufti Sadeq al-Gherian, leaders of the former Libyan Islamic Group and leaders in Misrata

As this evaluation report was being finalized in July 2015, some key informants expressed renewed hope for the possibility of scenario 1. They are optimistic that the numerous reconciliation agreements signed recently is a signal that factions have made a strategic choice for peace, and that resolution on a unity government in the coming months is possible. Indeed, the Libyan Political Agreement signed on July 11 is by some viewed as a step towards peace. On the whole, however, most experts interviewed did not expect resolution on a unity government in the near term. Moreover, reaching an agreement would only be a first step, after which a unity government would face overwhelming challenges in restoring security, fighting terrorism, building institutions and restoring delivery of services. Most key informants believe that a unity government would likely operate in exile.

Scenario 2: Status Quo (The Libyan Simmer)

In scenario 2, there continues to be two rival governments incapable and unwilling to unite; Libya's financials decline further; the unfolding humanitarian crisis expands; UN support and attempts at reconciliation continue but are weakened by increasing international pressure to escalate sanctions such as asset freeze and oil embargo;²⁷ and higher level of terror threat and IS activity drive regional players to consider unilateral military interventions.

Conditions making this scenario likely:

- Demands from the two competing governments to the unity framework complicates the process and prevents agreement
- Distrust arises from both sides regarding UN's ability to create a balance of power in the unity government.

²⁵ Eljarh, M. (2015a). In Libya, the Tantalizing Promise of a Unity Government. Foreign Policy.

²⁶ Also known as ISIS or ISIL

²⁷ Emmott, R. (2015). Oil embargo should be considered if Libya talks fail, Spain says. Reuters.

- The two governments are not successful in controlling their support bases' more extreme dialogue skeptics, resulting in public demonstrations against the unity government and intensified on-the-ground fighting
- UN arms embargo is sustained, contributing to a status quo in the military power of the two sides²⁸

While respondents felt that USAID programming should continue under this scenario, there was a general feeling amongst interviewees that the status quo is not sustainable. A continuously divided government would result in a sustained deterioration of the security, financial and humanitarian situation in the country. Some international experts added that the international community is not prepared to accept “two Libyas” and will prioritize preserving the wealth of Libya.

Scenario 3: Escalating Conflict (The Libyan Implosion)

In scenario 3, UN efforts prove incapable of facilitating unity between the two rival governments; and the conflict between the two escalates, resulting in civil war. Both parties purposefully destroy assets to prevent the enemy's use of those;²⁹ access to arms and oil revenues are scattered across armed supporters and militant groups, leading to an upsurge in violence; and international interventions to support one side to stop the civil war may become the only solution.

Conditions making this scenario likely:

- Talks on establishing a unity government collapses as both sides escalate demands to tip power balance in their favor
- UN arms embargo is broken, and weapons are channeled to the two governments from different foreign allies
- Extremists on both sides manage to hold on to strategic assets and establish military conflict as only viable option
- Access to oil revenues continuously shifts, funding and arming different militias and groups
- Financial and humanitarian crises deepen, leading to increased defragmentation and desperation

Key informants described an operating environment that is increasingly difficult to navigate, with widespread political dysfunction and militias gaining strength. Most felt that the status quo of two governments is unsustainable, that neither side is able to deliver, and that a slide towards civil war is possible, if not likely. Although UN and foreign governments continue to push for a peaceful solution, it is possible that scenario 2 could decline into scenario 3 in the not too far of future.

Priorities going forward for DRG programming in Libya

The evaluation identified broad consensus across key informant groups on three priorities appropriate for future USAID programming: local governance, constitutional reform and national dialogue. It found mixed opinions on four more areas: electoral reform, national institution building, civic education, and public financial management. Libyan key informants underscored the need for international support for security, public order and political stability. The sections below discuss priorities both within and outside of existing programming areas.

Local governance

There is broad consensus amongst key informants that local governance is the most accessible operating space at the moment. Direct beneficiaries identified support to municipal councils as a top priority for 2015 as well as the next three years. USAID, the US Department of State (DoS) and European donors are all

²⁸ Eljarh, 2015b

²⁹ Global terrorism & insurgency attacks rapidly increase in five years. (2014). IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.

actively engaged in this area. Key informants stressed the importance of relations between municipal councils and communities; besides overseeing service delivery, municipal councils are viewed as a potential counterbalance to militias.

They suggested expanding USAID local governance work to focus more on institutional structure, staffing, capacity building for staff, revenue generation, revenue collection and local service delivery. Several interviewees recommended coordinating with the Ministry of Planning and the World Bank to improve the flow of funds to municipalities, and a small number raised the need for assistance with municipal legislation. There is consensus amongst nearly all international experts³⁰ that local governance is the most accessible operating space in Libya at the moment given the uncertainties at the national level.

Despite overall strong support for work in this area, the interviews raised some cautions. First, there was a strong perception among some USG respondents that local councils are losing leverage with militias.

There was also a concern that local governance work could reinforce city states, which is contrary to pluralization and modernization. Finally, many informants felt that coordination challenges will be exacerbated as more and more donors launch local governance initiatives. Interviewees from diverse entities underscored the poor coordination between the USAID and DoS/Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) local governance programs; the two programs overlap in approximately half of the handful of municipalities where they are active and are not integrated. Some informants expressed hope that the MLG will resume the lead for coordination of a unity government is formed.

It is unknown how a future national government and a future constitution will view local governance. The question of what degree of governmental authority will be decentralized is a significant issue for Libya's constitution-making process.³¹

Constitutional reform

There was broad agreement on the need for international support for constitutional reform efforts. The discussions centered on the need for communications support to the Constitutional Drafting Authority (CDA) and how to operationalize support. The *process* of citizen outreach and engagement during the drafting stage is seen as critical to the legitimacy of the constitution. Program beneficiaries ranked the finalization of the constitution as one of the highest DRG priorities for 2015, while IP national staff considered it a moderate priority for this year.

Key informants were split on whether support to the CDA outside of Libya can work. Some suggested that the CDA could develop drafts outside the country so long as committee activities and progress are actively communicated (e.g. televised meetings) and citizens have an opportunity to comment. Others advised against offsite work, saying it would breed suspicion and negative reactions from citizens, especially because the drafts developed out of country have not been well received to date.

There were also differing views on the sequencing of the peace process and the constitution. Some felt that the peace process must come first, while others advocated for pushing the constitution forward if there is not a unity government soon. Some interviewees advocated engaging other Arab nations and regional countries to maintain momentum for the constitution. There is a feeling amongst some IPs, in particular ABA-ROLI, that Libyans are hopeful about the constitution but that it is not a priority for them.

National institution building

Moving forward, the formation of a unity government could open the opportunity to resume and expand

³⁰ National staff and beneficiaries were not explicitly asked about local governance as part of Question 4.

³¹ Differing interpretations of Law 59, which regulates the relationship between the local councils and the national Ministry of Local Governance, and current challenges with the flow of funds to the local councils, suggest a challenging road ahead on this issue, whether or not a unity government is formed.

support to national level institutions, e.g. by embedding advisors for direct technical assistance on critical government functions. At the same time, some key informants are concerned that USAID does not have the longer term view required for genuine capacity building. Some felt that USAID should put more emphasis on the *practice* of good governance moving forward. This might include working with political agents to reach out to communities.

Electoral reform

Interviewees talked about a range of election-related needs to be addressed through support to the HNEC, judiciary and for the legal framework for elections. One of the next major tasks for the HNEC will be support for the constitutional referendum.

Nonetheless, some implementers, in particular representing IRI and USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), expressed dissent and caution regarding support to the HNEC and elections. They felt that elections are not a priority for international support in the next few years and that Libya does not need much help in this area. Overall, program beneficiaries and IP national staff did not prioritize electoral improvements or international assistance in this area. One informant stated, "*We have trained Libyans that elections are the best way to solve any issue. Consistently fewer and fewer people turn out for elections. Elections have lost their legitimacy.*" One also cautioned that the HNEC, like other institutions, is becoming more politically influenced (see also Question 6).

National dialogue

Most key informants support national dialogue and transitional justice programming.³²

Supporters view dialogue as a part of the peace process. They advocate dialogue at all levels- within government, between local communities and militias, and across society. They consider it an element of trust building and believe that USAID programming can bring people together and provide experts where needed, while Libyans lead the process. They see dialogue as a particular opportunity to engage militia members who are ready to move to the middle ground and moderate Islamists. These are people who can convey hope to others.

A small number of critics believe it is more important to have a free standing conversation on the importance of legitimate governing structures than to focus on national dialogue. This group points out that legitimate systems of dispute resolution are not working (see militias) and believes that the majority of Libyans would probably welcome Gaddafi back.

New Areas

Civic education

There is some support for civic education/ information to engage citizens on basic democratic principles and fight political disenfranchisement. As one respondent summarized it, "*If we don't do it, nothing else will matter.*" Most key informants recommended civic education as an expansion of existing programming rather than as a stand-alone initiative. They mentioned the need for information on the political negotiations and constitutional process to combat suspicion at the grassroots. They also believed that civic education can be a critical component of reintegration efforts, saying, "*If [we] can't get Libyans convinced that legitimate governing structures are the right way to go then everything else is for not.*" They felt that that Libyan civil society can be helpful in pushing out this type of information.

Public financial management

There is some support for USAID to expand work into the area of public financial management (PFM).

³² Program beneficiaries and IP national staff were not specifically asked about this for question 5.

Support for PFM centers on coordination with the World Bank for the flow of funds to municipal councils and successful implementation of Law 59 (see footnote above). This is meant to help municipal councils to operate efficiently and to stem the tide of illegal sources of money which militias can use to pay for influence. PFM also deals with banking sector reform, which is considered by the respondents to be beyond USAID’s purview.

Target beneficiary groups

Several implementers and national experts also noted the importance of the inclusion of politically marginalized groups, including women, ethnic minorities and especially youth going forward. Youth are seen as a source of instability given their involvement in militias; they need other employment opportunities as enticement to leave the militias. Local councilors and mayors can play a key role in this effort, making it an important consideration for DRG programming going forward. (See section above on local governance).

Linking potential programming priorities to the Libyan context

Future priorities depend on how the three future scenarios develop. Figures 10 and 11 summarize which programming priorities may be viable under each scenario, drawing on the above analysis. For each scenario, a checkmark – “✓” - indicates that the programming area is a priority and “✗” indicates that is not a priority.

If Libya is able to achieve stabilization under a unified government (scenario 1), all seven areas could be feasible and appropriate priorities for USAID; in the event that the status quo of two rival governments persists (scenario 2), a limited scope of assistance with current DRG implementers is preferred and USAID and IPs will need to consider the sustainability and effectiveness of maintaining a base of operations outside of Libya under this scenario. If the situation deteriorates into civil war (scenario 3), all funding and programming will likely be suspended.

Figure 10: Programming priorities under 3 potential future scenarios (1/2)

Priority sector	Analysis	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3
Local governance	Priority	✓	✓	✗
	Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible expansion of activities National government view of local governance (LG) Coordination with MoP and WB Coordination with other IPs Changing relationship between municipal councils and militias Perception that LG work could reinforce city states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness Coordination with other implementers Changing relationship between municipal councils and militias Perception that LG work could reinforce city states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No programming/ funds de-obligated
	Operating model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National staff in Libya Int. staff & experts outside Libya Major activities outside of Libya Heavier reliance on social media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A
Constitutional reform	Priority	✓	✓	✗
	Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communications support to CDA Coordination with TA providers Role of other Arab nations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communications support to CDA Coordination with TA providers Role of other Arab nations Sequencing of peace process and constitutional reform Sustainability Effectiveness (pros/ cons of supporting CDA outside of Libya) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No programming/ funds de-obligated
	Operating model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National staff in Libya Int. staff and experts outside of Libya Major activities outside of Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysis of effectiveness of revised plans
National level institution building	Priority	✓	✗	✗
	Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible TA for critical gov. functions Effectiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No programming/ funds de-obligated
	Operating model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A

Note: “✓” - indicates that the programming area is a priority; “✗” indicates that is not a priority.

Figure 11: Programming priorities under 3 potential future scenarios (2/2)

Priority sector	Analysis	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3
Elections	Priority	✓	✓	✗
	Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible support to HNEC, judiciary, elections framework (after constitu.) Mixed perceptions about support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited support to HNEC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No programming/ funds de-obligated
	Operating model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National staff in Libya Int. staff & experts outside Libya Major activities outside of Libya Heavier reliance on social media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A
National Dialogue	Priority	✓	✓	✗
	Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opportunity to engage more moderate militia members Linkages to transitional justice, peace process and legitimate governing structures Timing (vis-à-vis peace process, constitutional reform) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opportunity to engage more moderate militia members Links to trans. justice, peace process and legitimate governing structures Timing Feasibility (esp at national level) Sustainability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No programming/ funds de-obligated
	Operating model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National staff in Libya Int. staff and experts outside of Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysis of effectiveness of revised plans
Civic education (new)	Priority	✓	✓	✗
	Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Informational needs related to existing programming (peace, consti. reform, democratic principles An aspect of reintegration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Informational needs related to existing programming- focused on peace negotiations, constitutional reform process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No programming/ funds de-obligated
	Operating model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National staff in Libya Int. staff and experts outside of Libya Coordination with Libyan CS Heavier reliance on social media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A
Public financial management (new)	Priority	✓	✓	✗
	Considerations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Funding municipal councils & Law 59 Coordination with World Bank National government view of LG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasis on funding for municipal councils and of Law 59 Coordination with World Bank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No programming/ funds de-obligated
	Operating model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inside Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National staff in Libya Int. staff and experts outside of Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A

Note: “✓” - indicates that the programming area is a priority; “✗” indicates that is not a priority.

The interview material indicated a general consensus that USAID should remain engaged in Libya and continue a limited scope of assistance with current DRG implementers until some type of political solution is achieved. Sustained engagement is seen as key to maintaining trust with Libyan partners and decision makers, and for scaling up programming when conditions allow. In addition, the evidence above suggest that efforts should be made to promote the continuous implementation of ongoing activities – rather than start new activities - as IPs to date have had more success with ongoing activities over new (as discussed in Question 1).

Key informants felt that Libya remains open to USG support and that USAID has the institutional capacity to deliver on DRG programming. Program beneficiaries generally did not have an opinion of USAID, but those who did were positive. Several respondents noted the challenges presented by USAID’s dispersed management structure, lack of in-country presence, differences in USAID and DoS priorities for Libya and overall limitations on the amount of USG funding for Libya to date.

6: WHAT IS THE ABILITY OF THE LIBYANS THEMSELVES TO UNDERTAKE WORK IN DIFFERENT DRG SECTORS IN THE FUTURE, WITH AN EYE TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY?

SUMMARY

This question looks at the ability of Libyan actors to undertake DRG work going forward. It considers:

- Who are the “Libyans”/actors relevant to undertake DRG programming?
- What is their technical capacity, willingness and legitimacy to undertake DRG work?

The evaluation identified six main actors for DRG programming: national elected officials, local councils, civil society organizations (CSOs), HNEC, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), and rule of law institutions. The analysis found that all actors have at least some will and legitimacy to carry out DRG work, but to a varying degree, they lack the skills, knowledge, structure and incentives to be self-sustaining.

HNEC has the highest perceived technical capacity, will, and legitimacy of the six actors and is the most likely to continue its work in the future, even without international support. While *national elected institutions* are seen as important, they are in political turmoil and the future is unclear. *Local elected officials* are considered more legitimate than most other DRG actors, but have a strained relationship with national leaders, which could compromise their ability to operate effectively; *CSOs* are considered engaged and willing actors and are a key vehicle for civic education but they are at risk of politicization. The *CDA* is seen as having modest popular support and willingness to contribute to Libyan democracy, but deeply lacking technical capacity; the *CDA* is also relatively unknown to national stakeholders. *Rule of law institutions*, including the judiciary, were the least known DRG actor to national informants. This may color public perceptions about their overall abilities and could threaten the legitimacy of important national exercises, such as constitution-making.

The section presents analysis of evaluation interview material that includes the perceptions of IPs, USAID, other donors, program beneficiaries and other knowledgeable experts. Please note that the section does not include institutional capacity assessments, which would have required substantial in-country analysis and was beyond the scope of this evaluation.

ANALYSIS OF LIBYAN ACTORS

Figure 12 summarizes perceptions about the abilities of the different actors. These are relative assessments; none of the six actors is seen as fully able to carry out DRG work on its own without international assistance at this time. The assessment is based on the result of the 29 Libya-based interviews with beneficiaries and national staff, where the interviewees were asked to assess (yes/no - with the opportunity for elaboration) if each of the listed actors were able (technical capacity), willing (political will), and if they should (legitimacy) work to make a positive difference in Libyan democracy currently. The table summarizes the combined results of the interviewees' responses, where a full score indicates a high/ positive perception; a half circle indicates a moderate/ mixed perception; and an empty circle indicates a low/ negative perception about the actor's capacity, will and legitimacy, respectively.

Figure 12: Perception of Ability of Libyan Actors to Undertake DRG Work

○ Low/Negative perception
 ◐ Moderate/Mixed perception
 ● High/Positive perception

Actor	Technical Capacity	Will	Legitimacy
National elected institutions (GNC/ HoR)	○	◐	◐
Local elected institutions (municipal councils)	◐	●	●
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)	◐	●	◐
High National Elections Commission (HNEC)	●	●	●
Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA)	○	◐	◐
Rule of law institutions (judiciary/courts)	◐	◐	◐

HNEC

Overall, there are very low opinions of national- level institutions; within the DRG sector, *HNEC* was the only institution identified as having the technical capacity, willingness and legitimacy to continue aspects of its work without international support.³³

HNEC was described as more “competent”, “neutral”, and “viable” than many other institutions. This could be because they were established relatively recently, so are not burdened by the legacy of the past, in contrast to most national institutions. As reported under Question 5, there is some concern that the *HNEC* is becoming politicized and losing legitimacy. This concern appears to be limited to the international community; Libyan national staff and beneficiaries did not raise this concern.

National elected institutions

National elected institutions are in political turmoil; it is not clear who the future officials will be in the case of a unity government or formal government split. They are considered important, but severely lacking capacity, and less willing and likely to operate without international assistance. Respondents generally expressed more confidence in the ability of the GNC (which received considerable international assistance under the LEGS program) than in the HoR.

Local elected institutions (local councils)

Local elected officials are viewed as very engaged and willing actors, but lacking the technical capacity to continue their activities, making them a suitable candidate for international support. International experts noted that local governance is taking shape and that local councils have an important role, regardless of

³³ Outside of the DRG sphere, informants pointed to the central bank and oil sector as the strongest national institutions.

whether a unity government is formed (see discussion under Question 5 above). They cautioned that national leaders do not respect local leaders, however, which could threaten the ability of local councils to operate effectively. Program beneficiaries were generally more optimistic about the ability of local councils than national IP staff. This is not necessarily surprising, since few IPs work with local councils.

CSOs

As whole, civil society actors are viewed as engaged and willing actors, but lacking the technical ability to conduct activities without international support. International experts identified civil society as a main vehicle for civic education and information. However, they believe that CSOs risk becoming more politicized; they cited increasing intimidation and threats of violence against CSOs and cautioned that CSOs have become part of the conflict. A small number of program beneficiaries reported that CSOs do not understand their role in society.

CDA

The CDA is seen as having some popular support and willingness to contribute to Libyan democracy, but lacking technical capacity; the CDA is also relatively unknown to national stakeholders. Experts believe that the CDA could easily come apart if it does not achieve sufficient numbers of members from the different parts of the country; there is confusion about who is in charge and what progress is being made. As noted under Question 5, there is a debate about where the CDA should and can effectively carry out its work. Several program beneficiaries did “not know” whether the CDA would be willing or able to conduct its work without outside assistance.

RoL institutions

Rule of law institutions, including the judiciary, was the least known DRG actor to national informants. While they believe that RoL institutions are relevant and have some willingness to act, program beneficiaries frequently replied “don’t know” to questions about these institutions and their capacity to conduct their work, with or without international assistance. A limited number of international experts indicated that the High Judicial Institute (HJI) will continue its work without outside help.

Other

While DRG institutions are not yet mature, there was consensus across the different categories of interviewees that Libya has many knowledgeable subject area experts, such as former foreign ministers and university professors. The few national staff and beneficiaries who are optimistic that DRG work will continue without international assistance reported that it depends on having skilled and experienced staff to provide vision, leadership, and continuity. They cited the Libyan Youth Movement (LYM) as one such successful example, while also noting that internal conflicts caused LYM’s to “succeed on an individual level, not the whole group”³⁴. Finally, a number of national and international experts highlighted youth as a viable and important segment of the population, as elaborated on under Question 5.

³⁴ LYM, is a Libyan Facebook group started in January 2011 to spread awareness on 17 February planned protests across the country. The LYM provided news, images and videos in real time and was a voice for the Libyan people.

PART 2: PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

This part details findings from a nationwide survey conducted in August and September 2015 as part of the mid-term evaluation of the USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) Programming in Libya. The survey was conducted through phone interviews with 2,507 Libyan respondents over the age of 18. Respondents were randomly selected in a proportional-to-population sampling, covering all of Libya's 22 districts with oversampling of urban areas in Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. The goal of the survey was to provide a snapshot of Libyan attitudes to inform the assessment and to pose questions that can be replicated in future surveys to monitor progress on key indicators of interest to USAID.

Survey findings include Libyans' opinions on a range of DRG topics including elections, the constitution drafting process, women's rights, local governance performance and security providers.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The survey was conducted by Altai Consulting using a Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) system through a call center in Tripoli. The calls were carried out using a database of 2.1 million unique numbers across the Libyana and Al Madar networks, based on a pre-defined sample frame. Covering all of Libya's 22 districts, the survey followed a quota based proportional-to-population (P2P) sampling methodology with quotas based on sex, location and age. In addition, the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata were oversampled in relation to the other cities to allow for in-depth analysis of potential variation between these three major cities. The quota proportions were based on the 2006 Libya Census as well as the United States Census Bureau's estimated breakdown of Libya's population by single-year age groups for mid-year 2015. The sample frame was based on districts and dialing was thus completed across the districts in which target cities are located.³⁵ The interviews were implemented in the period from August 10 to October 8, 2015. Table 5 provides a breakdown of the sample across gender and location.

Table 5: Male, female, and total respondents per representative area

District (Shabiya)	Male Respondents	Female Respondents	Sample size (no. of respondents)
Tripoli	52 % (315)	48 % (287)	602
Benghazi	53 % (319)	47 % (289)	608
Misrata	52 % (315)	48 % (287)	602
All others*	56 % (387)	44 % (308)	695
Total	53% (1,336)	47% (1,171)	2,507

*Other parts of Libya include Darnah, Al Marj, Al Butnan, Sirte, Al Wahat, Al Jufrah, Wadi Ash Shati, Sabha, Murzuq, Al Kufrah, Wadi Al Hayaa, Nalut, Al Margab, Al Jifarah, Az Zawiyah, An Niquat Al Khums, Ghat, Al Jabal Al Gharbi, Al Jabal Al Akhdar)

³⁵ For "city" districts such as the Tripoli district, 75% of responses usually come from the district's urban area as opposed to smaller, surrounding settlements.

CHALLENGES IN DATA COLLECTION

A number of challenges and limitations related to the data collection were experienced:

- **Poor network coverage:** Due to the conflict the phone network was often down and the call-center also faced power cuts which limited operations.³⁶ This delayed the implementation and completion of the survey. As the poor network coverage had a greater impact on the Al Madar network, Altai relied more heavily on the Libyana network.
- **Difficulty filling oversampling quota:** The call center faced difficulties reaching the oversampling quota set for Misrata and Benghazi. Oversampling was also planned for Bayda, but had to be dropped due to inability to reach the targeted number of interviews.³⁷
- **Limited randomness in respondent selection due to phone methodology:** The database of phone numbers used by Altai Consulting has not been consolidated to remove duplicates, i.e. ensure that individual only figure once in the database even if they have multiple sim cards / phone numbers. Having multiple phone number is a commonality in Libya; according to World Bank statistics there are 161 cell-phone subscriptions per 100 citizens in Libya. In the obtained sample 44% of respondents indicated they had 2 or more sim cards. This limits the randomness of the sample, as not everyone will have the same likelihood of being selected as a respondent.
- **Underrepresentation of lower educated segments:** Compared to the 2006 census data, as well as estimations from UN sources on the education levels in Libya, the obtained sample was severely skewed towards higher educated population segments. According to the census 57% of Libyans have either preparatory or less education, while the obtained sample only contained 16% in this education category, i.e. marking a difference of 41 percentage points. In contrast the sample contained 53.3% with a bachelor's degree or higher, while only 9 % of the population in 2006 according to the Libya census had completed this level of education. On the one hand, this would appear to indicate a clear sampling bias. In fact, higher educated population segments tend to have multiple sim-cards / cell phones and therefore also have a higher likelihood of being selected. Thirty-six percent of lower educated Libyans reported having more than one sim-card, compared to 51% of higher educated respondents. Face-to-face interviews done in Libya has 26.5% of the population with bachelor degrees and above.³⁸ On the other hand, education levels have likely improved since the census was completed in 2006, however not to the extent that it can account for these large differences. UNESCO estimates an 8% illiteracy rate for Libya in 2015 which is only a 5 percentage point increase from the 2006 census figure of 13%.

POST-DATA COLLECTION WEIGHTING AND MARGIN OF ERROR

In order to make the survey sample nationally representative, the data has been weighted according to the population size in the 13 electoral districts and the age distribution across men and women. The skewedness of the sample in relation to education meant that it was not possible to weight the data to be representative of the education level distribution in Libya. When analyzing the oversampled cities the data has only been weighted according to the age distribution across men and women.

³⁶ During the past year, Libya has frequently seen power outages, for example due to damaged power plants; additionally there have been communication outages affecting phone and internet services, phone card shortages and vandalism towards isolated cell phone base stations (Libya Herald 2014a, 2014b, 2015).

³⁷ Altai attempted to use synthetic, or random, digit dialing with both landlines and cellphones in Al Bayda. By knowing the landlines and pre-fixes of recently released sim-cards, it is possible to target specific areas by random generating potential telephone numbers. In the end this approach was not effective and only produced a small number of surveys.

³⁸ Diwan Market Research, August 2013.

The margin of error for the urban sub-samples is +4.0%, and it is +3.1% for the national sample.³⁹ The margin of error only takes into account random error and is not a measure of systematic error. Given the sampling concerns raised above and the under-representation of low education respondents, it is possible that the true population parameter for national adult opinion lies outside of this margin of error.

In the findings section that follows, we explore select survey results on (1) democracy, (2) human rights and gender, and (3) governance in greater detail. We provide frequency tables for each of the questions with disaggregations by gender and by urban area in Annex IX.

³⁹ The margin of error is calculated using the equation: $Margin\ of\ error = 1.96 \left(\sqrt{pq/n} \right)$. “p” represents a given proportion of respondents answering a question a particular way, and “q” = (1-p). “p” and “q” are assumed to be equal to 0.5. This would occur if 50% of the respondents agreed with a statement and 50% disagreed. This is a conservative estimate, as less equal variation would result in smaller standard errors. The letter “n” refers to the sample size. The resultant standard error is multiplied by 1.96, yielding a 95% confidence interval. The sample sizes for the sub-samples are around 600. While the total sample size is 2,507, many of these observations are oversamples in specific urban areas. For example, while Misrata is 24.3% of the sample, it is only 9.4% of the national population. Once observations in the oversample are adjusted, the effective sample size for purposes of calculating the margin of error is 1,030.

DEMOCRACY


This section focuses on Libyans perception of democracy by analyzing their political engagement and electoral participation.

CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

When assessing the state of democracy in any given country, it is important to look at political efficacy in order to be able to classify voting behavior and citizen perceptions of government politics. Political efficacy refers to the extent to which citizens feel that their individual political actions affect or can affect the overall political process. Political efficacy can be assessed internally and externally: while internal political efficacy relates to the perception that the individual citizen is able to understand politics, external political efficacy pertains to the perceived degree of responsiveness of public officials and political institutions to citizen demands.⁴⁰ As shown in Figure 13, over two-thirds of Libyans (68%) feel that political efficacy is low or very low in Libya. As such, almost 60 percent of Libyans (57%) strongly agree that Libyan politics are too complicated to understand (internal efficacy), while almost half of Libyans (49%) agree that local public hearings are conducted as a formality and thus not responsive to citizen demands (external efficacy).

Figure 13: Libyans' have a low sense of political efficacy

To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Q40)




While generally low, the feeling of political efficacy is slightly lower among women, with almost three-fourths of Libyan women (71%) having low or very low feelings of political efficacy compared to 65 percent of men. (See Figure 14.) Further, lower education levels correspond with lower feelings of political efficacy. In fact,

⁴⁰ Miller (1980). *American national election studies data sourcebook*. Acocck et al. 1985 also includes an analysis of the relevant indicators.


27 percent of Libyans with preparatory or lower education feel very low political efficacy, compared to 12 percent with a secondary or professional diploma. Moreover, while the feeling of political efficacy is similarly low across the three major cities Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata, it is slightly lower among Tripoli residents. Almost three-fourths of Tripoli residents have low or very low feelings of political efficacy (73%) compared to 65 percent of Benghazi residents and 64 percent of residents in Misrata.

Figure 14: Feelings about political efficacy vary based on gender, education, age and cities



As a related aspect of political efficacy, we next turn to political participation and citizen engagement. Despite the opening up of political space that occurred after Qaddafi's removal from power, as shown in Figure 15 almost no Libyans (98%) are members of a political party or a religious organization. Over 90 percent (93%) of Libyans are not members in a labor union and/or any other professional association. Only 10 percent claim membership in a CSO or local NGO. Beyond membership, other forms of participation are higher, with one-third of Libyans stating that they have participated in a demonstration in the past three years, while twenty-six percent say that they have attended a community meeting. Membership does not vary across the three major cities Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata; however, other forms of participation do. While almost half of Misrata residents have participated in a demonstration since February 2011 (48%), only 34 percent of Tripoli residents claim the same. Further, 32 percent of residents from Misrata have attended community meetings in the past three years compared to 20 percent of Tripoli residents and 24 percent of residents from Benghazi.

Figure 15: Most Libyans are not a member of any kind of organization



ELECTIONS

Taking into account the low outcomes for political efficacy, it is not surprising that voter turnout in recent elections in Libya has been decreasing. Since the revolution, Libya has seen two rounds of national parliamentary elections (2012, 2014), national elections for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), and local municipal elections. In the 2012 GNC elections, 1.7 million votes were cast, accounting for 49 percent of the voting age population. (See Table 1.) The voting age population was 3.6 million at that time, with 2.9 million registered voters. Two years later, voter turnout had declined substantially. The 2014 CDA elections faced severe security concerns and community resistance, leading to 115 polling stations not opening on Election Day. While no official turnout figures were released, turnout was estimated at 497,633 casted votes, fewer than 50 percent of registered voters. Voter registration had also declined to only 1.1 million Libyans – accounting for less than half of the estimated voting age population.⁴¹ In the summer of 2014, only 16 percent of the voting age population (over 4 million) and 42% of registered voters (1.5 million), voted in the HoR elections casting 630,000 votes.⁴²

⁴¹ Carter Center (2014). *The 2014 Constitutional Drafting Assembly Elections in Libya*.

⁴² IDEA (n.d.). *Voter turnout data for Libya*.

Table 6: Voter Turnout for Past Elections in Libya*


	2012 GNC Elections	2014 CDA Elections	2014 HoR Elections
Voting age population (VAP)	3.6 million	+4 million (est.)	+4 million (est.)
Registered voters (RV)	2.9 million	1.1 million	1.5 million
Absolute voter turnout	1.7 million	est. 497,633	630,000
Turnout as a percent of VAP	49%	est. 12%	16%
Turnout as a percent of RV	62%	est. 45%	42%

Source: IDEA (n.d.). *Voter turnout data for Libya*

*No official turnout figures were obtained for the municipal council elections

Respondents to this survey reported voting in a higher percentage than these rates (56% for GNC election, 32% for CDA election, and 30% respectively of VAP); however, surveys typically overestimate turnout because of a social desirability bias. For those that did report not voting, the survey asked respondents why. Security concerns have often been assumed to be a primary reason for decreasing turnout. However, only a few respondents listed security concerns as a reason for not voting. Instead 36 percent of Libyans who did not vote in one of the past elections can be classified as “politically disengaged non-voters,” or non-voters who say they didn’t have time to vote (13%), did not feel like the elections mattered (12%) or did not think that their vote would make a difference (6%). Further, 22 percent of Libyans assert that they did not have an interest in any of the candidates, falling under the 35 percent of Libyans, which we classify as “politically-disillusioned non-voters.” Finally, 28 percent of Libyans who did not vote in the past elections were either ineligible to vote or in some way limited in their participation in the elections.

Figure 16: The majority of non-voters in Libya are politically disengaged or politically disillusioned




The decreasing voter turnout is temporally correlated with a drop in the perceived freedom and fairness of elections. While 40 percent of Libyans believe that the 2012 GNC elections were free and fair, 34 percent

believe the same for the 2014 HoR elections. Yet, outcomes vary across the three major cities Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata. While 45 percent of residents from Misrata and 47 percent of residents from Tripoli perceive the 2012 GNC elections to have been free and fair, only 37 percent of respondents from Benghazi agreed. By contrast, while 39 percent of respondents from Benghazi assess the 2014 HoR elections to have been free and fair, only 33% of those in Tripoli and 30% of those in Misrata agreed.⁴³

Despite low voter outcome in the past elections, a majority of Libyans say that they would vote in elections if they were held tomorrow. While intending to vote and actually voting are very different, three-fourths of Libyans (76%) report that they would participate in a Constitutional Referendum, 75 percent would take part in presidential elections, and a lower 68 percent would vote in municipal elections.⁴⁴ (See Figure 17)

Figure 17: A majority of Libyans would vote in elections if they were held tomorrow



Sixty-three percent of the weighted national sample would vote in parliamentary elections were they to be held tomorrow. To test why some individuals are more likely to vote than others, we conducted a logistic regression analysis of the intention to vote in future parliamentary election. (See Annex VII for full results.) While intention to vote was observed to be somewhat higher in Tripoli and Misrata than Benghazi, when controlling for other variables, the place of origin is not a significant factor in determining the likelihood of voting in future parliamentary elections. By contrast, an important factor in explaining intention to vote is Libyans' experience with previous elections; past-voters as well as Libyans that perceived the GNC and HoR elections to be free and fair are more likely to vote in future elections. In addition, and somewhat surprising compared to other MENA countries, women are also more likely to express an intention to vote in future elections. Furthermore intention of voting is not influenced by either income or education, which is a positive

⁴³ See annex VIII for a more detailed breakdown across cities.

⁴⁴ Respondents are more likely to report an intention to vote in a Constitutional Referendum if they think they believed that the drafting committee would develop a Constitution that they would approve of.


sign that future electoral participation will not be skewed towards wealthier population segments, leaving other groups out of the process.

MEDIA USAGE AND SOURCE CREDIBILITY


Finally, the media as source of information plays a crucial role in democracies, and in particular in conflict-affected countries. We asked respondents where they get information about the situation in Libya and what source is most trustworthy. (See Figure 18.) 74 percent of Libyans say that they use TV as a source for information on the situation in Libya and 42 percent rely on social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter). Unfortunately, 35 percent of Libyans do not see any of the named sources as trustworthy in providing information on the situation in the country. TV is considered the most trusted source for 36 percent of the sample and only 13 percent perceive social media as the most trustworthy source of information. Trust is even lower for newspapers or the radio (2%).

Figure 18: Libyans’ opinions differ on which news source is the most trustworthy

Which of the following sources do you use to get information on the situation in Libya?



Which source is most trustworthy on providing information on the situation in Libya?




HUMAN RIGHTS

This section presents Libyans perception of political rights and freedoms and the constitution, the role of the judiciary in securing these rights and women’s rights.

CONSTITUTION


With a new Libyan constitution in the making, most Libyans want essential democratic rights to be included in the new constitution. 89 percent of Libyans believe the right to a fair trial and 88 percent think that the right to work should be protected in the constitution, while 85 percent emphasize the freedom from torture. Further, three-fourths of Libyans want equal rights for women as well as freedom of speech to be protected by the constitution (78% and 76% respectively). The most mixed results were obtained for freedom of assembly and the right to access government information, yet, still over 80 percent of Libyans seek these rights to be fully or somewhat protected in the new constitution (88% and 84% respectively).

Figure 19: Strong support for protection of basic rights and freedoms in the constitution



As has already been established in the evaluation interviews, most Libyans are optimistic with regards to the overall constitution drafting process. The CDA enjoys popular support and is perceived as willing to contribute to Libyan democracy. In this way, 63 percent of Libyans are confident that the CDA will develop a constitution that they would approve of. The number is equally high for Libyans who believe that the constitution will be put to a referendum in 2016 (65%). Further, in correspondence with the measures that have been taken to engage the public in the constitution drafting process, almost 70 percent of Libyans believe that the CDA will be able to educate the public on the constitution (68%). Thus, there is proven space for civic engagement as new priority area. There are no significant differences between the major cities.

Figure 20: Libyans are confident that the CDA will develop a constitution that they would approve of




As the constitution will outline the future Libyan political system, respondents were asked if they felt that the central government or the local government should have a majority of political power. Most Libyans would prefer for the constitution to establish a middle ground between the extent of central government and local government powers, with a light tendency towards central government power. Notably, respondents from Benghazi, Sabha and Awbari stand out as they tend towards a political system where local governments have the most power.

These outcomes, showing that Libyans generally favor a middle ground solution, mitigate the USG respondents' concerns stated during the evaluation interviews that increased local governance could reinforce the notion of city states and work against a united Libya. In fact, municipal councils can play a strategic role in Libya as key informants of the evaluation perceive local governance as the most accessible space for intervention at the moment, and direct beneficiaries have identified the support to municipal councils as top priority for Libya.

Figure 21: Libyans favor middle ground between central and local government powers

On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is preferring that the constitution outlines a political system where the central government has most of the power, and 5 is preferring that the constitution outlines a political system where the local governments have most of the power




THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY


The right to a fair trial is of great importance to Libyans (cf. Figure 8), at the same time, 58 percent of Libyans agree or strongly agree that courts in Libya are providing fair trials to citizens. In terms of overall responsibilities of the judiciary, 69 percent of Libyans believe that it should be largely responsible for imposing sentences and other legal punishment. The outcomes vary only slightly for the resolution of legal disputes as well as the implementation of transitional justice and the protection of individual constitutional rights. Finally, 64 percent of Libyans think that the judiciary should be largely responsible for checking the power of the government. Overall, it needs to be kept in mind that the evaluation interviews have shown that the Rule of Law institutions and their actual capacities are least known among Libyans.

Figure 22: 58% of Libyans think that courts in Libya are providing fair trials to citizens

To what extent do you agree with the statement "Courts in Libya are providing fair trials to citizens"?




In your view, should the judiciary be largely responsible, somewhat responsible, or not at all responsible for ...



WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND PARTICIPATION

A majority of Libyans agree that men and women should have the same basic rights such as the right to primary and university education (97% respectively), the right to freely choose their spouse (93%), an equal say in how to raise their children (89%) and the same pay for the same work (88%). There is somewhat greater disagreement on whether or not women should have an equal say in household finances, freely choose their own clothing, and demand divorce. Perhaps most strikingly, only 36 percent of Libyans believe that men and women should have the same right to travel alone. The latter can presumably be treated as a question of culture in a country where women rarely travel alone, as well as related to the current insecure environment.

Figure 23: Most Libyans believe in equal basic rights for men and women




Using these variables a “support for women’s rights” dummy variable was created to conduct binary regression analysis to explain why some Libyans are more supportive of women’s rights than others. The dummy was developed by combing responses to all the different types of rights and divide into whether respondents support all the rights or not. Women are not surprisingly more supportive of women’s rights than men. Furthermore the less educated Libyans are, the more likely they are to support women’s rights. Interestingly support for women’s rights is not impacted by religiosity, nor how engaged Libyans are in elections or civil society organizations.

Two-thirds of Libyans assert that it makes no difference to them whether a man or a woman represents their interests in national politics. The numbers are thereby almost equal for men and women with 64 percent of women and 67 percent of men stating that gender does not make a difference in representation. Still, one-fourth of Libyans state that they have more confidence in a man representing their interests in national politics, compared to only 9 percent who have this confidence in a woman. This notion is equally reflected among female respondents – 27 percent of women would be more confident in a man representing their interests compared to 9 percent asserting the same for a female representative.

Likewise, two-thirds of Libyans do not see a difference between men and women performing their tasks as elected officials. Still, 24 percent assert that men perform the tasks better while 10 percent account the same for women. When comparing the answers between men and women, men tend to see less of a difference between genders than women: 67 percent of men don’t perceive a difference in the performance of male or female elected officials compared to 65 percent of women.


Figure 24: Two-thirds of Libyans have equal confidence in male and female officials representing their interests




As discussed above, gender-based violence has rightly been identified by interview respondents as a strong programming need for the future. Gender-based violence is perceived by many Libyans as commonly occurring and a major problem in their communities. In this way, two-thirds of Libyans (67%) believe that verbal harassment of women is common or very common in their communities. Violence outside the home is not so much perceived as commonly occurring however, as 73 percent of Libyans think that it is very uncommon or uncommon. Correspondingly, from a normative point of view, 78 percent of Libyans perceive violence against women outside the home as a major problem. Equal outcomes can be seen for domestic violence (77%). Interestingly, verbal harassment is less perceived as major problem compared to the other types of crime (74%) – yet, it is named as most commonly occurring at the same time.

Figure 25: Gender-based violence is perceived as commonly occurring and a major problem in the communities

How common do you think that these types of crimes towards women are in your community?




To what extent do you think that these types of crimes towards women are a problem in your community?



Men and women have similar perceptions of how common certain types of gender-based violence are in Libya. Yet, outcomes vary when a geographical distribution is taken into account. Verbal harassment is perceived less common in Misrata, with 65 percent of respondents in Misrata believing verbal harassment to be common or very common compared to 77 percent of respondents in Tripoli. Likewise, while 52 percent of respondents from Tripoli perceive domestic violence to be common or very common, 32 percent of respondents from Misrata believe the same. While, overall, violence outside the home is perceived as the least common of all types of gender-based violence(cf. figure 16), 34 percent of Tripoli respondents believe that violence outside the home is common or very common compared to 24 percent of respondents in Benghazi and 16 percent of respondents in Misrata.

Figure 26: Women and men in Libya have equal perceptions of gender-based violence




GOVERNANCE

This section analyses the Libyans' perceptions of service provision, the prevalence of corruption and the role and performance of local government. Further, the section looks into armed groups and disarmament, the perceived community and personal security situation as well as security providers.

SERVICE PROVISION

Health facilities, roads and electricity services are evaluated as very poor by a majority of Libyans. As shown in Figure 27, over half of Libyans evaluate electricity as being very poor (51%), with an additional 16 percent classifying electricity service provision as poor. Other goods are evaluated better by respondents. A majority of Libyans perceive the issuance of official documents (70%), the quality of drinking water (68%), primary and secondary education provision (64%) as well as garbage collection (58%) as good or very good. The quality of policing services is likewise perceived as good or very good by over half of Libyans (54%).

Figure 27: Health facilities, roads and electricity are evaluated as very poor by a majority of Libyans




When comparing regional assessments of service quality, strong disparities become apparent between Misrata, Tripoli and Benghazi. Figure 28 illustrates that respondents from Misrata tend to evaluate the quality of services better than respondents from Tripoli and Benghazi, in particular for the issuance of official documents, roads and electricity. Moreover, quality of education services are perceived poorest in Benghazi with 42 percent asserting very good or good quality of education compared to 80 percent of respondents in Misrata. Another element that stands out is garbage collection, with 88 percent of Misratans asserting very good or good quality compared to 43 percent from Benghazi.

For urban and rural comparisons there are only slight differences in the assessment of services. While overall evaluated highly, drinking water quality is perceived better in urban settings with a difference of six percentage

points. Policing is also evaluated better in urban settings, with 56 percent of respondents in an urban setting asserting good or very good quality of policing compared to 48 percent of respondents in a rural setting.


Figure 28: Service quality is perceived higher in Misrata than in Tripoli and Benghazi



Given the current tendency towards decentralization, the survey asked respondents whether public goods and services should be provided by the national or municipal governments or shared between the two. As shown in Figure 29, a plurality of Libyans believe that electricity and policing should fall under the responsibility of the national government (40% and 44% respectively). For primary and secondary education, hospitals and health facilities, and roads Libyans favor shared responsibility (47%, 42% and 38% respectively). Finally, a plurality of forty percent of Libyans thinks that responsibility for garbage collection should lie with the municipal councils.

Figure 29: The national government and municipal councils should share the responsibility for most services


In the current situation should the municipal councils, the national government, both of them, or someone else be primarily responsible for assuring the quality of each of the following



Across the spectrum of public services, residents from Misrata tend to show comparatively higher support for municipal council responsibility for service provision than residents from Tripoli or Benghazi. (See Figure 30.) These disparities are most evident for policing, issuance of documents, drinking water, and garbage collection. Almost 20 percent of Misrata residents believe that municipal councils should be responsible for policing, compared to 13 percent of Tripoli residents and 11 percent of Benghazi residents. While 34 percent of Misrata residents see drinking water in the responsibility of municipal councils, only 26 percent of Tripoli residents and 25 percent of residents from Benghazi would agree. Finally, 44 percent of residents from Misrata believe garbage collection should be the responsibility of the municipal council, compared to 36 percent of Tripoli residents and 37 percent of residents from Misrata.

Figure 30: Misratans have higher support for placing responsibility with municipal council


In the current situation should the municipal councils, the national government, both of them, or someone else be primarily responsible for assuring the quality of each of the following (% support for municipal council responsibility)



TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

Trust in the existing institutions is mixed among Libyans. While trust in the police and the military is relatively high (53% and 44% trust or highly trust respectively), there is general distrust of national politics. As shown in Figure 31, a majority of Libyans distrust the Tripoli-based GNC and the Tobruk-based HoR. Even though both are generally distrusted, there is some evidence to suggest that the GNC is slightly more trusted than the HoR, which corresponds with results from qualitative interviews with program beneficiaries and national IP staff. Further, three-fourths of Libyans state complete distrust in political parties, while only 7 percent have trust or high trust in political parties. Armed groups are the least trusted, with 87 percent of Libyans distrusting.


Figure 31: Libyans' trust in political institutions is overall low




Not surprisingly there is considerable variation in evaluations of the GNC and HoR by region. As shown in Figure 32, three-fourths of Benghazi residents completely mistrust the GNC. By contrast in Misrata 27 percent of Misrata residents trust or highly trust the GNC. In turn, almost three-fourths of residents from Misrata (72%) completely mistrust the HoR compared to 49 percent in Benghazi. In Tripoli, trust in the GNC is slightly higher than trust in the HoR with 39 percent of Tripoli residents asserting to have trust, moderate trust or high trust in the GNC compared to 25 percent who assert the same for the HoR.

Figure 32: Trust in political institutions differs strongly in Benghazi and Misrata

To what extent do you trust **GNC** to improve Libya's future?
Comparing major cities



To what extent do you trust **HoR** to improve Libya's future?
Comparing major cities



We conducted a regression analysis to explain why respondents were more or less trusting of both the GNC and HoR. (See Annex VII for full results.) As suggested above, trust in the GNC and HoR varies by regions; Libyans living in the East are more likely to trust the HoR, while respondents living in the West are more likely to trust the GNC. Aside from these regional drivers of trust, a number of other factors influence Libyans perception of these two institutions. Trust in GNC is also influenced by the perception of corruption in government institutions; the higher Libyans believe the corruption to be, the more likely they are to trust the GNC. Support for the GNC is furthermore driven by favorable perception of the delivery of water and health services. Lower levels of education also correspond with greater trust in the GNC.


Libyans living in rural areas, in the Benghazi, and in the South are more likely to have trust in the HoR. Support for the HoR is also positively influenced by higher family income and by favorable perception of the delivery of water, policing and electricity. Lastly lower levels of political efficacy as well as perception that government corruption is low correspond with support for the HoR.

While corruption is seen to impact on Libyans perception of the GNC and HoR, corrupt practices are not perceived to be widespread. Relatively few, 29% of Libyans, say that they have had to use *wasta* over the past year. Correspondingly, 70 percent of Libyans strongly disagree that parents have to pay bribes for their children to receive the best education, or that officials receive kickbacks for providing assistance (69% strongly disagreeing). In the same way, about two-thirds of Libyans strongly disagree that they would have to pay bribes for medical treatment or for receiving a government job in their area (69% and 65% respectively). Outcomes are similar across the three major cities Benghazi, Tripoli and Misrata.⁴⁵


⁴⁵ See annex VIII for inter-city variation.

Figure 33: A majority of Libyans disagrees that bribes are common practice in Libya

In the past year, how frequently have you had to use wasta?



Extent of agreement with the following statements...




Municipal councils were established in Libya in 2012. Less than half of Libyans evaluate their performance so far as very good or good (46%). The evaluation of municipal council performance is crucial as the councils could be used as strategic links to the communities. In this way, as the key informant interviews have shown, the municipal councils cannot only oversee local service delivery (cf. figure 18) but they also act as a counterbalance to militias.


The performance assessment varies considerably across the three major cities of Misrata, Tripoli and Benghazi. For Misrata, the performance of municipal councils is evaluated as good or very good by 67 percent of respondents. For Tripoli, responses were more mixed with 46 percent of respondents asserting good or very good performance. The performance of the municipal councils was perceived worst in Benghazi, with only 35 percent classifying the performance so far as good or very good. (See Figure 34.)

Figure 34: Considerable variation in perception of municipal council performance

Municipal Councils have been established in Libya since 2012. How do you evaluate their performance so far?



Municipal council performance – Major city comparison



Regression analysis shows that Libyans' evaluation of municipal council's performance is influenced by a number of factors. The perceived quality of public services is an important aspect in shaping people's opinion about municipal councils' performance, especially the quality of health facilities, roads, policing, garbage collection and issuance of permits. Furthermore, younger Libyans tend to be more positive in their evaluations of municipal councils' performance. Lastly, Libyans with higher feelings of political efficacy are also more likely to have positive perceptions of the municipal councils' performance. This is likely related to external efficacy, whereby respondents feel that the political institutions are responsive to citizens.


In addition to the combined analysis, we ran separate analyses for each of the cities. For Tripoli's municipal council, perceptions of the quality of roads, electricity and policing influences citizens' perceptions of the council's performance. In Misrata the only service provisions that impact perceptions is the quality of roads and electricity, while health services and issuance of permits are important for citizens in Benghazi evaluation of their council's performance. Furthermore, in Misrata citizens that prefer a centralized political system are more likely to view municipal council performance positively, while women in Benghazi are more likely to have a favorable view of the municipal council.

ARMED GROUPS AND DISARMAMENT


Armed groups have thus far not been part of the LEGS and LCB programming, however, at a time where Libya has seen continuous conflict for over a year, a strong majority of Libyans perceive the disarmament of armed groups as most important task that the country is facing. Fifty percent define the disarmament of armed groups as the most important task facing Libya and an additional 11 percent emphasize the need to assure political stability. The finalization of the constitution (8%) along with the fight against violent crime as well as unemployment (8% and 7% respectively) is the next most reported priorities. Building a democracy is seen as the top priority for only 3 percent of Libyans. (See Figure 35.)

Figure 35: Disarmament of militias is the most important task that Libya is facing today according to 50% of Libyans


Which of the following priorities would you say is the most important task that Libya is facing today?



Gender comparison of priorities



Age comparison of priorities




Priorities remain similar when comparing male and female respondents. Over half of all women (52%) see the disarmament of armed groups as greatest priority compared to 49 percent of men. Priorities are likewise similar across age groups with only slight differences.


Respondents were asked whether they had a positive or a negative view of 18 different armed groups. While on the whole the armed groups are poorly regarded and disarmament is perceived as top priority for Libya, 68 percent of Libyans stated that they had a positive view of at least one armed group that exists in Libya today. (See Figure 36.) This applies to both men (69%) and women (66%). Younger respondents are more likely to view an armed group positively, with 70 percent of respondents between 18 and 39 expressing support for at least one armed group, compared to 65 percent of respondents between 40 and 59 and 61 percent of respondents who are 60 and older. Finally, support for at least one armed group is highest in the East with 80 percent of respondents asserting their support.

Figure 36: 68% of Libyans support at least one armed group in Libya today

Positive or negative feelings towards armed groups in Libya




Socio-demographic comparison of support to armed groups



Regression results exploring factors why some individuals have a positive view of at least one armed group and why others do not finds that socio-demographic factors and occurrence of crimes influences Libyans' support for armed groups. (See Annex VII). Libyans that feel unsafe travelling to other cities, and Libyans feeling safe travelling to school/work are more likely to support armed groups. Interestingly, political engagement also influences perception of armed groups, as Libyans with higher feelings of political efficacy, those who vote in municipal council elections and those that have negative perception of municipal council performance, tend to be more likely to support an armed group.

When looking at outcomes for specific armed groups, it becomes apparent that the Libyan National Army (LNA), General Haftar's force, has the most support with 41 percent of Libyans claiming positive feelings towards the LNA. Almost one-third of Libyans uphold positive feelings towards the Saiqa Brigade, compared to 27 percent of Libyans claiming negative feelings towards this group. Support for other armed groups such as the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room is outrun by a high percentage of Libyans uttering negative feelings towards these groups. Finally, only 1 percent of Libyans claim positive feelings towards the Islamic State (IS), in contrast to 79 percent asserting negative feelings. The numbers also show that IS the best known of the armed groups with more than 80 percent having an opinion of the group, while e.g. only 62 percent know or have an opinion of the LNA.

Figure 37: The Libyan National Army has the most support among armed groups




The presence of armed groups varies locally, and so does the Libyans' support for them. While the LNA has the most support in Benghazi (65%), it is the Libya Shield Brigade in Misrata that has the most support in Misrata (53%). The support of Tripoli residents for armed groups is more spread, with collective support however for the Quat al Rida Brigade (40%) as well as the Al Nawasi Brigade (32%), both Islamist armed groups with a strong presence in Tripoli.⁴⁶ Overall, support for armed groups across the spectrum is strongest among Misrata residents. In Benghazi, support for armed groups other than the LNA and the Saiqa Brigade (58%) is low.

⁴⁶ Pack et al. (2014). *Faustian Bargains*.


Figure 38: Support for armed groups is strongest in Misrata

Feelings towards specific armed groups in Libya – major city comparison:



In light of the overwhelming presence of different armed groups, it is no surprise that disarmament is highly aspired by a majority of Libyans. Respondents were asked their opinion about different measures that could be taken to incentivize armed groups to stop fighting in the event of a peace deal. As shown in Figure 39, over 85 percent of Libyans believe that education and job opportunities will be a useful tool to stop members of armed groups from fighting (90% and 87% respectively). Likewise, over 70 percent of Libyans believe the integration of armed groups into the national police force or the military a useful method to stop the fighting. More local control is not perceived as a desirable solution, however, with 75 percent of Libyans disapproving of this approach.

Figure 39: Education and job opportunities are perceived as best method to get armed groups to stop fighting




Finally, regarding personal armament, 26 percent of Libyans state that they keep a weapon in their home. (See Figure 40.) This number almost corresponds with weapon ownership in the United States, ranking highest in the world.⁴⁷ Men were more likely to report weapon ownership in their home than with, with 36 percent of men asserting that a weapon is kept in their home compared to 17 percent of women. Given that most households include both men and women this suggests that women often don't know that a weapon is kept in their house or that they are less likely to admit to having a weapon in the home. Further, weapons are more widespread among Libyans between 18 and 39 with 31 percent claiming weapon ownership compared to 19 percent of Libyans between 40 and 69 and 20 percent of Libyans who are 60 and older.


⁴⁷ Ziv (2015). *U.S. Gun Ownership Declines*.

Figure 40: 26% of Libyans state that they keep a weapon in their home


Do you, or anyone in your family, keep a weapon in your home?



Gender comparison of weapons ownership



Age comparison of weapons ownership




COMMUNITY AND PERSONAL SECURITY SITUATION

Respondents were asked to what extent and how the current conflict had affected their lives. Figure 41 shows that overall, 76 percent of Libyans assert that their lives have been affected to some or to a large extent by the current conflict. Over half of male respondents assert a strong impact on their daily lives (53%) while 39 percent of women state the same. Outcomes are similar across different levels of education; however, Libyans with preparatory or lower education tend to see themselves slightly less affected by the conflict (40%) compared to 45 percent of Libyans with secondary education or a professional diploma and 48 percent of Libyans with university education assert the same. In terms of age groups, Libyans between 18 and 59 report similar impact, with 46 percent of those between 18-39 and 49 percent of those between 40-59 claiming that the conflict has had a strong impact on their daily lives. Libyans who are 60 and older tend to feel slightly less affected with 39 percent asserting to have been affected by the conflict to a large extent compared. Finally, residents in the East feel most strongly affected by the conflict as 56 percent of Libyans from the East claim that the conflict has had a strong impact on their daily lives, compared to 45 percent of residents in the South and 41 percent of residents in the West.

Most Libyans have experienced economic problems and restricted their travel as a result of the conflict. Specifically, 80 percent of Libyans assert that they have experienced economic problems as a result of the conflict while 77 percent state that they don't travel at night. 63 percent of Libyans report that they do not go out at night anymore, and over half of Libyans (56%) have experienced a shortage of food and/or water. Twenty-six percent report that they have been displaced from their homes.


Figure 41: Most Libyans have experienced economic problems due to the conflict



At a time where a majority of Libyans state that their daily lives have been affected by the current conflict, perceptions of personal security are correspondingly low. As shown in Figure 42, insecurity appears to be the greatest when it comes to travel and transport. Over 40 percent of Libyans feel unsafe or very unsafe when travelling by taxi or bus in their own village or town, and 66 percent of women and 61 percent of men feel unsafe or very unsafe when travelling by taxi or bus to another village or town. Furthermore, about one-third of Libyans feels unsafe or very unsafe when they are driving in their car. At the same time, one in four women feel unsafe or very unsafe when going to and from school or work, or the market for buying groceries.

Figure 42: No significant differences between the safety felt by women and men


How safe do you feel for your personal safety and security in these contexts?
(respondents feeling either unsafe or very unsafe)



When comparing regional perceptions of safety, it becomes apparent that residents in Misrata feel significantly safer than Benghazi and Tripoli residents. (See Figure 43.) While over one third of Benghazi residents claim to feel unsafe or very unsafe in their home, only six percent of Misrata residents assert the same. In the same way, while 42 percent of Tripoli residents feel unsafe or very unsafe while driving in their car, 14 percent of respondents from Misrata feel the same, marking a difference of almost thirty percentage points.

Figure 43: Misrata residents feel significantly safer than residents from Tripoli and Benghazi


How safe do you feel for your personal safety and security in these contexts?
(respondents feeling either unsafe or very unsafe)



The rise in conflict in Libya has also corresponded with an increase in crime, adding to the feeling of insecurity of many Libyans. As seen in Figure 44, 80 percent of Libyans have heard of murder occurring in their municipality. Likewise, an almost equal number of Libyans assert to have heard of robbery occurring in the past year (79%). 78 percent of Libyans have heard of drug use taking place in their municipality, at the same time, a nearly equal number of Libyans have heard of car theft and carjacking (77%).


Generally speaking, Misratans report lower instances of crime than respondents in Benghazi or Tripoli. Robbery, car theft and kidnapping have been heard of more in Tripoli and Benghazi than Misrata, with over 80 percent of Tripoli and Benghazi residents having heard of car theft and robbery occurring in the past year. Further, while 69 percent of Benghazi residents have heard of kidnapping occurring, 56 percent of Misrata residents claim the same, marking a difference of 13 percentage points. Surprisingly, this general tendency does not apply in the case of murder, where respondents in Misrata were equally or more likely to report knowing of murders in their municipality.

Figure 44: Most Libyans have heard of murder, drug use and robbery occurring in their municipality in the past year




Respondents were also asked if they had been a victim of crime or threats over the last year and, if so, who they turned to for help. As seen in Figure 45, 10 percent of Libyans stated that they were a victim of threats and theft over the past year. (See Figure 45.) Five percent have been subject to violent assault, and one percent of Libyans reported exposure to sexual harassment or honor violation. Of concern, however, is that 46 percent of those who have experienced these violations of their personal security have not sought help from anyone. Eighteen percent report to have turned to family or friends for help, followed by 16 percent who went to the police.

Figure 45: 10% of Libyans have been a victim of threats and theft over the past year



With Libyans' daily lives being significantly impacted, insecurity high and crime widespread, it is not surprising that 28 percent of Libyans are thinking of emigrating to another country. (See Figure 46.) This tendency is more pronounced among the higher educated population segments and youths. This is particularly problematic, as such emigration can lead to “brain-drain” and undermine efforts to rebuild the country.

Figure 46: 28% of Libyans have thought about emigrating from Libya due to the current conflict




SECURITY PROVIDERS

The Qaddafi regime left behind a security vacuum, which, as indicated by the high levels of insecurity, has not been filled. No actor can claim a monopoly of force in the country. Figure 47 illustrates how the local police, tribes and the military are to a large extent perceived as security providers rather than actors who create insecurity. 65 percent of Libyans assert that the municipal council and religious councils can be seen as security providers. By contrast, armed groups are typically viewed as a cause of insecurity; 77 percent of Libyans state that armed groups create insecurity.


Taking into account regional differences, it is interesting to see that the number of residents who perceive both the municipal council and armed groups as security providers is overall higher in Misrata than in Tripoli and Benghazi. For the municipal council, 78 percent of Misrata residents feel that the council is providing security, compared to 61 percent of Tripoli residents and 57 percent of residents of Benghazi who feel the same. Likewise, almost 40 percent of Misrata residents perceive armed groups to also provide security, compared to only 10 percent of residents of Benghazi and 26 percent of Tripoli residents. Overall, this positive evaluation of security provision in Misrata could also further explain the earlier outcomes that Misrata residents feel significantly safer than Libyans from Tripoli or Benghazi.

Figure 47: Armed groups are a root cause of insecurity in communities


To what extent are the following actors providing security in your community?



Municipal council as security provider – comparing major cities




Armed groups as security provider – comparing major cities




In correspondence with the perception on current security provision, over half of Libyans (53%) believe that the local police force should provide security in their area. Further, 30 percent see this task as the responsibility of the military. Finally, while 65 percent of Libyans think that the municipal council is providing security, only 10 percent believe that it should be primarily responsible for providing security. There are, however, considerable regional disparities. While a majority of respondents in Misrata and Tripoli think the police should have primary responsibility for security, in Benghazi a plurality of respondents would prefer the military to have this responsibility. In line with the earlier finding that 78 percent of Misrata residents perceive the municipal council as providing security, almost 20 percent of residents of Misrata would see the council with primary responsibility for security provision – compared to only 7 percent of Benghazi residents who assert the same. Armed groups are not supported as security providers in any of the three cities with 2 percent of Tripoli residents, 1 percent of Benghazi residents and 2 percent of Misrata residents asserting that security provision should be the responsibility of armed groups.

Figure 48: 53% of Libyans believe the local police should be responsible for providing security in their area

In your opinion, which of these groups should be the most responsible for providing security in your area?



Municipal council as security provider – comparing major cities



CONCLUSIONS

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS

The fluid Libyan operating environment affects programming activities, particularly for the start of new activities.

Question 1: What was the timeline of project implementation concurrent with political events?

The evaluation finds that program activities were significantly affected by the unstable political environment in Libya, particularly during the intensified in-fighting that began in July 2014. During this time, there was a significant decrease in activities. There was a decrease in both ongoing and new activities, which was more pronounced for the new activities. In late 2014 and the beginning of 2015, program activities began to increase again. This corresponded with a somewhat more stable security situation in Libya and a shift towards remotely managed activities, including events held outside of Libya and web based activities. The findings indicate that the IPs were able to find ways to implement already existing activities in spite of the turmoil. This highlights the importance of ensuring that IPs have the flexibility in implementation planning to achieve project goals (as also highlighted in question 2).

Flexibility in implementation plan throughout the programming is more important for successful activity implementation than extensive preparatory activities.

Question 2: How did the implementers determine their original workplans, and how much of that original workplan occurred?

The assessment of the preparatory activities suggests that the IPs undertook adequate preparation in the development of their work plans. While IPs did not conduct formal needs assessments, activities were designed based on scoping trips, pre-existing activities and consultations with relevant actors. As suggested above, the evaluation finds that large shares of the original workplans were not implemented. Instead, the IPs revised their workplans due to the challenges presented by the political and security climate. The activities that were particularly limited in implementation include LEGS Objective 2.4 "Legislation informed by citizens concern," and LCB Objective 1.3. "Create consensus processes for National Dialogue and Constitution drafting." Also, the assessment reveals a difference in level of implementation depending on target group (e.g. nationally elected bodies, locally elected bodies, non-elected institutions and civil society). In LEGS, programming targeting civil society has been implemented to the greatest extent, while programming targeting locally elected bodies saw the lowest level of implementation. The evaluation of the IPs' experience suggests that to meet the evolving demand of constant shifts in the political/security situation and to meet new opportunities, flexibility and the ability to alter the implementation plan to meet project goals contributes more positively to successful implementation than extensive planning.

The challenging security situation is the main driver behind the revision of workplans, which were revised through the addition – rather than alteration – of activities.

Question 3: How did the IPs change and adjust their workplans?

Considerable changes were made to the workplans, primarily because of 1) the deteriorating security situation, 2) the low levels of collaboration by some beneficiaries (mainly, the GNC) and 3) increased funding. Overall, the IPs report that the process of the revisions functioned well under the flexible programming design and that USAID was supportive of the needed revisions. Importantly, however, the analysis finds that the majority of activities planned in the original workplan were not modified or eliminated in the revisions, but instead a number of new activities were introduced. The result was revised workplans that were actually more ambitious than the original, despite the challenging environment.

While there was clearly a need to revise the workplans, the security environment continued to inhibit implementation. For the LEGS project, the findings show that the implementation of activities revised in the 1st workplan (October 2013) were implemented at the same level as activities planned in original workplan. Activities modified in the 2nd revision (October 2014) and further revisions did not positively contribute to implementation efficiency, although the period of observation was limited. From this, it is seen that the workplan revisions did not lead to expected increase in effectiveness in implementation. Regarding LCB (implemented since Aug. 2014, revised in Apr. 2015), the implementation timeline of the revised workplan was too short for accurate assessment. As such, flexibility in delivery and the development of more open-ended implementation plans may be more beneficial than IPs revising implementation multiple times. In addition, utilizing alternative communication channels, employing a flexible approach to activity scheduling, and maximizing the number of activities conducted during peaceful periods appear to be essential to implementation success and IP safety.

IPs have been sensitive to several on-the-ground priorities outside the workplan, particularly to 'political inclusion' as a result of USAID's focus on this area.

Question 4: How much do the overall workplans of the implementers incorporate or ignore other on-the-ground priorities?

In the evaluation SOW, USAID recognizes nine “other” issues as important to the Libyan development context. While the IPs have not been tasked to address all nine of these, the evaluation finds that LEGS and LCB were sensitive to these on-the-ground priorities. There is strong evidence for the inclusion of five of the nine priorities: political inclusion, human rights, local governance, national/local security, and anti-corruption. The majority of national IP staff and program beneficiaries interviewed ranked political inclusion as the highest priority for their programs and for the international community, respectively, since 2012. This is likely a reflection of USAID’s steady focus on this issue during the period (e.g. increasing awareness among marginalized and underrepresented groups, advocacy training for citizen engagement, including historically marginalized groups) and national staff and beneficiary sensitization to this issue. At the same time, the public perception survey outcomes underscore the need to continue to focus on these issues as results show issues with feelings of political inclusion, strong support for human rights, support for local governance and security as a key issue for citizens. While IP respondents viewed many of the remaining priorities as relevant in the context, they did not aim to address them through project activities.

Seven DRG programming areas are identified for the future; the development of local conditions will affect what is feasible and appropriate to prioritize

Question 5: Which DRG sectors should be programming priorities moving forward?

The overarching priorities for Libya moving forward are peace and stability. For DRG programming, the evaluation finds that there is broad agreement among interviewees on three future priorities: local governance, constitutional reform and national dialogue. All three priorities go hand in hand with the public perception survey findings which prove popular support for improved local governance and the constitution drafting process. Libyans thus support a political system with a middle ground between centralization and decentralization, supporting shared responsibility between the government and municipal councils in a number of public service provision areas. With forty-nine percent evaluating the performance of municipal councils’ so far as good or very good, there is still room for improvement. In relations to constitutional reform there is strong support in the Libyan population for the work of the CDA and for having a constitution that protects basic rights and freedoms.

In addition, the evaluation finds that there is moderate support also for activities focused on electoral reform, national institution building, civic education, and public financial management. As the public perception survey shows, Libyans support civic education in particular with regards to the constitution drafting for example. Moreover, there is space for electoral reform as most Libyans evaluate the freedom and fairness of the most recent elections increasingly negative.

Conditions in Libya will affect which of the seven identified priorities it will be feasible and appropriate to prioritize going forward. (See Figures 10 and 11 for programming options under diverse scenarios.) If Libya is able to achieve stabilization under a unified government, all seven areas could be feasible and appropriate priorities for USAID. In the event that the status quo of two rival governments persists, a limited scope of assistance with current DRG implementers is preferred and USAID and IPs will need to consider the sustainability and effectiveness of maintaining a base of operations outside of Libya under this scenario. However, if the situation deteriorates into civil war, all funding and programming will likely be suspended.

All actors have at least some will and legitimacy to carry out DRG work, but many lack the skills, knowledge, structure and incentives to be self-sustaining. HNEC, local elected officials and CSOs are the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future.

Question 6: What is the ability of the Libyans themselves to undertake work in different DRG sectors in the future, with an eye toward sustainability?

The evaluation identified six main actors for DRG programming: national elected officials, local councils, civil society organizations (CSOs), HNEC, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), and rule of law institutions. The analysis found that all actors have at least some will and legitimacy to carry out DRG work, but many lack the skills, knowledge, structure and incentives to be self-sustaining. Moreover, as the public perception survey shows, the Libyan population does not trust many actors to improve Libya's future to the same extent. An examination of the findings reveal that *HNEC* is the most able and likely to undertake DRG work in the future, even without international support. Local elected officials offer a desirable future partner as they are believed to have willingness and legitimacy as well as comparatively higher outcomes for citizen trust but lack the technical support that USAID could provide. CSOs also offer an attractive partner although there is a risk of politicization; nonetheless civil society is perceived as particularly trustworthy by almost seventy percent of Libyans and thus enjoys popular support. The remaining actors face greater hurdles to future DRG work. *National elected institutions* are in political turmoil and the future is unclear, with citizen trust being particularly low; the *CDA* lacks technical capacity; and *Rule of law institutions*, including the judiciary, are largely unknown to national informants. As *HNEC* is regarded to have both the technical capacity and the political will, as well as the needed legitimacy, it is the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future. Finally, a majority of citizens have trust in the institution and thus have legitimacy for its work.

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY CONCLUSIONS

A majority of Libyans feel that they do not or cannot contribute to the political process, however, they remain optimistic and are willing to participate in future elections.

Political inclusion remains a priority programming need. Libyans generally, although there are significant differences between cities, believe it is difficult to understand and influence politics, which has led citizens to become disengaged. This is clearly reflected in the lower turnout rates for elections, as well as perceptions that elections later in the transition were not free and fair. Libyans are not, however, abandoning democracy, and a fairly high number intent to participate in future elections, especially the Constitutional Referendum and presidential elections. Residents of Misrata are generally more politically engaged (measured by participation in demonstrations) which is, if loosely, tied to the perception of fairness in the 2012 GNC Election, which residents of Misrata found fair to a larger extent than others. An important factor of future voting participation is Libyans' experience with previous elections: past voters as well as Libyans who perceived the GNC and HoR elections to be free and fair are more likely to vote in future elections.

Strong support for human rights in the population.

As key informant interviews had also suggested, most Libyans are optimistic about the constitution drafting process and they want essential democratic rights to be included in the new legislation, such as the right to a fair trial and freedom from torture. Moreover, a majority of Libyans agree that men and women should

have the same basic rights, and two-thirds of Libyans assert that it makes no difference to them whether a man or a woman represents their interests in national politics. Finally, gender-based violence has rightly been identified as future programming need. In particular verbal harassment and domestic violence are perceived by a majority of Libyans (both men and women) as commonly occurring and a major problem in their communities.

Governance is challenged by limited trust in national political institutions and the prevalence of armed groups.

Libyans have limited trust in political institutions, linked to poor perceptions of service delivery. Almost 60 percent of Libyans assert complete mistrust of the HoR, likewise, over 50 percent of Libyans completely mistrust the Tripoli-based GNC. Trust is higher on the local level, as 58 percent of Libyans have a certain degree of trust in the municipal council. At the same time, the quality of crucial services is evaluated as poor or very poor by a majority of Libyans, especially health facilities, roads and electricity services. Over one-third of Libyans believe that the responsibility for quality provision of these services should be shared between the national government and the municipal councils, underscoring trust in the municipal councils. The quality of public services is an important factor for citizens in their evaluations of municipal councils' performance and thus important in ensuring support for local governance.

In addition to low trust, the prevalence of armed groups is challenging governance in Libya. Armed groups have thus far not been part of the LEGS and LCB programming, however, a strong majority of Libyans perceive the disarmament of armed groups as the most important task that the country is facing. At the same time, 70 percent of Libyans support at least one armed group that exists in Libya today with the Libyan National Army receiving the most support. Overall, armed groups are strongly perceived to create insecurity rather than providing security. In turn, over half of Libyans believe that the local police should mainly be responsible for providing security.

Preferences and perceptions differ among youths and women

A key finding in the data is that youths and women tend to differ in their perceptions compared to older Libyans and men respectively. Younger Libyans are more likely to support armed groups, feel more affected by the conflict in their daily lives and are less optimistic with regards to citizen engagement than older Libyans. With regards to women, they feel essentially less safe than men and have lower feelings of political efficacy than men. These youths and women are thus more impacted by the current crisis and feel more politically disenfranchised.

There are clear differences across municipalities

In areas ranging from sense of security, to trust in political institutions and support for armed groups, there are notable differences between the three major cities covered by the opinion poll, Misrata, Tripoli and Benghazi. Residents of Misrata have a higher perception of the quality of public service delivery, and they also support the notion that municipal councils should be responsible for services such as infrastructure and drinking water. Residents of Misrata also feel significantly safer than those in Tripoli and Benghazi.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations draw on the findings and conclusions for the six evaluation questions and the public opinion survey. It is hoped that this report will serve as a point of departure for future DRG program planning in Libya. The recommendations are designed to be actionable.

Finding 1: The fluid Libyan operating environment affects programming activities, particularly for the start of new activities.

Recommendation: Given the need to adapt to a quickly changing political situation, **USAID and its IPs should engage in regular/ongoing discussions about DRG programming in Libya.** This is necessary not only to mitigate the negative effects of the fluid operating environment on the feasibility of programme activities, but also as a response to the perception of the Libyan population, as manifested in the public opinion survey, that they are strongly affected by the kind of on-the-ground contextual issues, such as the security situation and the presence of armed groups, that may change rapidly. These discussions should combine USAID policy goals and guidance with IP's ground-based recommendations. The dialogue could be broadly framed in terms of what is needed, feasible and appropriate in the short and medium term (i.e. the IP's period of performance) with an eye to the longer term.

Finding 2: Flexibility in the implementation plan throughout the programming is more important for successful activity implementation than extensive preparatory activities.

Recommendation: While there need to be flexibility in how objectives are achieved, there should be clear consensus on what those objectives are. Towards that end, **USAID should take steps to develop a country strategy for Libya** which should be sensitive to the inter-geographical differences in the country, as are reflected in the public opinion survey. This could support the IPs in designing more open-ended implementation plans, while staying within the goals and aims of USAID's Libya strategy. The development of the country strategy can be aided by using the 2015 BAA, which seeks innovations to help USAID reach its development goal of "enabling Libya to responsibly utilize its own human, financial and natural resources for the benefit of all citizens." As manifested in the public opinion survey, the perception of Libyans on a wide range of issues varies depending on inter alia age, gender and municipality. Hence, the definition of a Libyan-led solution must be sensitive to these on-the-ground variances. In lieu of a country strategy, USAID should more clearly articulate to IPs its policy goals. As suggested above, this can be done in coordination and through dialogue with the IPs.

Finding 3: The challenging security situation is the main driver to the revision of workplans, which were revised through the addition – rather than alteration – of activities.

Recommendations: **USAID should work to improve risk management practices.** In line with USAID's 2014 report *Local Systems, A Framework for Supporting Sustained Development*, which contains several insights and recommendations relevant for future Libya DRG programming, USAID should work to ensure that USAID is making the investments that are most likely to produce sustained development. This should be done in order to mitigate the challenges posed by the security environment. Per the *Local Systems* report, this requires "develop[ing] a risk management approach that assesses risks in conjunction with strategic objectives, considers both risk and rewards rigorously and comprehensively, and is integrated seamlessly into the Program Cycle." For Libya, this requires looking at the risks and rewards of different types of programming under the different scenarios described in the report (Unity government; Status quo of two governments; Civil war).

Finding 4: IPs have been sensitive to several on-the-ground priorities outside the workplan, particularly to 'political inclusion' as a result of USAID's focus on this area. Furthermore a majority of Libyans feel that they do not or cannot contribute to the political process, however, they remain optimistic and are willing to participate in future elections.

Recommendation: **USAID should consider initiating an external development evaluation approach.** The public opinion survey shows that it has been an accurate decision to include political inclusion, human

rights and local governance as on-the-ground priorities for the DRG programming in Libya following the evaluation SOW as these areas are prioritized by the population at the same time. Thus, while IPs require flexibility to defining their approach to achieving policy goals, their decisions should be well supported by the facts on the ground. A developmental evaluation approach would help provide the real time evidence to inform decision making. The involvement of an external evaluator would also help provide USAID with the assurance of objectivity and increase the monitoring needed to make a flexible implementation approach work.

Finding 5: Seven DRG programming areas are identified for the future; the development of local conditions will affect what is feasible and appropriate to prioritize.

Recommendation: **USAID and IPs should consider alternative operating models for DRG programs going forward, depending of the development of local Libyan conditions.** The evaluation team's recommendations for future programming under diverse scenarios are provided in Figures 10 and 11 in part I and resonate with the findings from the public opinion survey. In particular, the need for national dialogue and a focus on transitional justice is supported by the strong perception amongst Libyans that the disarmament of armed groups is a top priority, while they also tend to support at least one armed group. Especially the developments on the local level will be central to observe as, depending on the actual scenario, local governance is most accessible for programming: citizen trust is higher on the local level than on the national level (please see further public opinion survey conclusions). At the same time, the survey shows that Libyans want a middle ground between central and local political powers to be established including shared responsibility for the provision of most services. Thus, so far, supporting the local government would not run the risk of reinforcing city states as these are not perceived as ideal solution by Libyans for the future Libyan political system. Under the current status quo, where implementation is managed remotely, it is recommendable to focus on strengthening existing programming rather than starting up new activities

Finding 6: Among the main local beneficiaries, HNEC is the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future, while others lag behind in technical capacity, legitimacy and/or will. Furthermore governance is challenged by limited trust in national political institutions and the prevalence of armed groups.

Recommendation: While HNEC is the most able and likely organization to undertake DRG work in the future and election work with the HNEC should continue, elections are one of many priorities. The evaluation finds that local elected officials and CSOs are viewed to both have a high degree of political will, popular legitimacy and the citizens' trust (the opinion survey shows that while there are large geographical discrepancies, there is a general distrust of national politics). While lacking in technical capacity, **local elected officials and CSOs are the best candidates for USAID to focus on in future programming.** However, learning from the previous difficulties in collaboration with some Libyans political actors (most pronounced in the work with Libya's legislative bodies), it will be crucial to pay careful attention to the design and nature future partner collaboration. Trust, planned collaboration and local presence all correlated increase the opportunity for success.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

LEGS Performance Evaluation SOW

The DRG Center and USAID/Libya are requesting services to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of the Libya Election and Governance Support (LEGS) and Libya Consensus Building activities. The primary purpose is to assess the success of the activities during their first two years, and to provide guidance for the current program for the next cycle of operation. In spite of the political chaos and periodic fighting, all programs have adapted their activities, but continue to work on key aspects of their work plans and project objectives. Most importantly, except for the chaos surrounding the national legislature(s), the Libyan counterparts for the implementing partners continue their engagement and welcome this type of technical assistance.

From the start of the LEGS and Consensus Building programs to the present, many changes have occurred in the Libyan political landscape and the programs have had to adjust to an evolving and difficult work environment. USAID seeks to understand how these programs have evolved and to get a better understanding of what has had success, what hasn't worked and why, and most importantly, where USAID should put future resources to aid the transition process and build democratic governance in Libya. Given the dynamic nature of the work environment, we are specifically interested in documenting what work has actually occurred in order to provide strong, grounded recommendations for future work. To address these questions, some combination of key informant interviews with implementing partners, GOL counterparts, and local CSO representatives will be needed.

Specific questions and issues that should guide the evaluation include:

- 1) What was the timeline of project implementation concurrent with political events?
- 2) How did the implementers determine their original work plan, and how much of that original work plan occurred?
- 3) How did the implementers change their work plans, and how effectively did they adjust to changes in the political environment to make the most out of unexpected opportunities?
- 4) How much do the overall work plans of the implementers (roughly legislative strengthening) incorporate or ignore other on-the-ground priorities (e.g. human rights, anti-corruption)?
- 5) Which DRG sectors should be programming priorities moving forward?
- 6) What is the ability of the Libyans themselves to undertake work in different DRG sectors in the future, with an eye towards sustainability?

In addition to the evaluation and assessment work described above, there is a need to make sure the voices of average Libyans are accounted for as the next redesign of the program occurs. To accomplish this goal, we request a broad phone-based public opinion survey on DRG issues. Areas of particular interest include priorities for programming and opinions surrounding the upcoming new constitution. Additionally, there is interest in how gender has been addressed in new political processes and how to improve its integration in future programming. This survey should also take into account the 2012 phone-based survey done by the DRG Center during survey instrument development in order to see changes over time on key indicators; and some recent surveys conducted by Altai International (as part of OTI's program).

ANNEX II: QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

The annex presents the interview guide as it was used to conduct interviews with beneficiaries.

INTRODUCTION

This interview is part of an evaluation of the USAID funded Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) programming in Libya. The purpose of today’s interview is to get an understanding of the planning and implementation of DRG programming October 2012 – April 2015. The results of the evaluation will be used to guide future USAID-funded DRG activities.

The USAID-funded DRG programming in Libya since October 2012 is divided into two projects, implemented by four Implementing Partners (IPs):

- 1) Libya Elections and Governance Support (LEGS) project, implemented by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) made up of:
 - a. National Democratic Institute (NDI)
 - b. International Republican Institute (IRI)
 - c. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
- 2) Libya Supporting Consensus Building for the National Dialogue, Constitution Drafting and Governing Process (LCB), implemented by:
 - a. Freedom House and American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI).

GENERAL QUESTIONS

To introduce the interview, I have a few questions about your participation of the USAID-funded DRG programming, and your general impression of the program.

Question	Answer
1. What is your title and organization?	
2. Which of the four implementing partners' - IRI, IFES, NDI or ABA-ROLI – DRG projects have you participated in, since October 2012?	
3. Have you participated in other projects with IRI, IFES, NDI or ABA-ROLI? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. [if yes] Which organization and project? b. [if yes] When? c. [if yes] How do you compare this program to your previous experience with IRI/IFES/NDI/ABA-ROLI? 	
4. What is your general impression of the IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI activities you have participated in during this project (October 2012 to today)?	
5. What benefits have you gained from participating in these activities?	
6. Do you have any general feedback or comments you would like to give to IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI or to USAID about these projects?	

IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANNED ACTIVITIES (Q2)

In this section I will ask you which specific DRG programming activities you have participated in, and also about your opinions about these activities.

Question	Answer
7. Which of the activities in Table 1 have you participated in [at interview – only ask for the IP the respondent have participated in activities in, as seen in Question 2]?	<i>[Record answer in Table 1]</i>

Table I: DRG Activities

IP	Activity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Main activity</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>Examples of specific activities(e.g. workshops, meetings, received printed material)</i> 	Did you participate? Yes/No	What specific activities did you participate in?
IFES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical support and Advice to HNEC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Received procedures manual of legal election framework ○ Election Dispute Resolution trainings and/or received manual ○ Workshop to streamline communication ○ Received CSO manual and database to support voter education ○ Trainings on campaign finance ○ Support on how to include People With Disabilities (PWD) in elections 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of Strategic Election of Security Plan with HNEC and relevant ministries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Assistance in adopting an election security plan ○ Workshop on security with HNEC, relevant ministries and security staff 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical Support and Advice to the Judiciary <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshop for Libyan Bar Associations ○ Access to the online forum and database "judgenet.ly" ○ Trainings on "judgenet.ly" ○ Election Dispute Resolution trainings for judges ○ Roundtable discuss on Election Dispute Resolution trainings between judges and HNEC 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity Building for Government Bodies on Political Finance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshops on campaign finance ○ Political Finance Stakeholder Conference ○ Creation of a political finance working group 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of Democracy Resource Centers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshops for CSOs on Democracy Resource Centers ○ Democracy Resource Centers roundtables 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political inclusion of Persons with Disabilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Meetings to establish an Electoral Access Working Group 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen CSOs to be watchdogs in political finance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshops 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support women to participate in politics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trainings ○ Roundtable in Tunis 		
	NDI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage leadership of legislative body (GNC/HoR) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Sign Letter of Intent between GNC and NDI ○ Training session for staff in GNC/HoR legislative committees ○ Distribution of White paper on GNC 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seminars of Basic Legislative Practices (for GNC/HoR members) 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Orientation Series for GNC Members and Staff <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Sessions ○ Consultations book 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promoting Understanding of Roles as Legislators <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Received user manual 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing and implementing plan for the GNC's/HoR's intuitional development 			

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Consultations with GNC members ○ Training to CDA (Constitutional Drafting Assembly) members 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Building the Representative Capacity of GNC/HoR Members <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Coaching sessions 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Support to Political Caucus <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Meetings 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Media Support to GNC/HoR <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshops ○ Radio programs 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Support Organizations Supporting Women's and marginalized groups' representation in national policy making <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Planning sessions ○ Workshop 		
IRI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advocacy Trainings for Citizen Engagement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trainings for CSOs in e.g. Sabratha, Zawiya, Yefrens 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Trainings for Local Council of how to reach out to citizens <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trainings for local councils in e.g. Sabratha, Zawiya, Yefrens 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Technical assistance for Representative Presence in Constituency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Consultations to GNC members ○ Distribution of handbooks to GNC members 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Town Hall Meetings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trainings for local councils on how to conduct town hall meetings 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Coordination Workshops for Local and National Elected Officials <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshops 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Train Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) on how to train local councillors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Trainings for MoLG trainers 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Establish majlis baladia association (MGA) for women local councilors & mayors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Meetings ○ Opening conference 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regional network for MoLG) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshops ○ Trips to e.g. Rabat or Tunis 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Capacity build of MoLG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Capacity building trainings 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Capacity building for youth councils <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Support to youth councils to host National Youth Network 		
ABA-ROLI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Establish Dialogue Framework in partner communities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Train CSOs & local actors in holding local forums ○ Training of facilitators 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Strengthen community stakeholders' knowledge of constitutional process <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study tour to Tunis on Tunisia & Yemen experience ○ National level workshops with Community liaisons ○ Awareness raising on women in local governance 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dialogue on Constitution at community level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshops 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Build Consensus among Partner Communities on Constitutional Provisions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Workshop with CDA and partner communities 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National meeting for women's groups 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support local council and CSOs to advocate to CDA 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enable Partner Communities to have an informed understanding of Draft Constitution <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Participate in survey ○ Received information 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparative Analysis of Draft Constitutional Provisions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Participated in comparative analysis 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity build National Dialogue (ND) Preparatory Commission in inclusive and transparent dialogue process <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study tour ○ Roundtables ○ Capacity workshops 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen connection local communities/CSOs with National Dialogue delegates 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rule of Law institutions analyze and monitor constitutional information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Symposium for Judges ○ Human rights analyses of constitutional provisions 		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building of Libya Bar Association National Economic Development Board and Libyan Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights 		

Question	Answer
8. Based on your contact with DRG programming, do you feel that the activities you have participated in have been implemented in a timely manner?	
9. Were any of the activities you participated in delayed? a. [If yes] Could anything have been done differently to avoid delays?	
10. Were any of the activities you participated in cancelled? a. [If yes] Could anything have been done differently to avoid cancellations?	

TIMELINE OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES CONCURRENT WITH POLITICAL EVENTS (Q1)

This section looks at how the activities you participated in by IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI were affected by the political situation in Libya.

Question	Answer
11. Was any of the activities you participated in delayed due to the following reasons: a. Security events (a nearby clash, the road to the venue blocked by militias, etc.)? b. Political events (a change in government officials rendering the activity unnecessary or unfeasible, an election making the situation unstable etc.)? c. Judicial events (a certain ruling deterring motivations to participate in the activity, a ruling forbidding certain activities etc.)?	
12. Was any of the activities you participated in cancelled due to the following reasons:	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Security events? b. Political events? c. Judicial events? 	
<p>13. Did you purposefully chose not to attend any program activity due to the following reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Security events? b. Political events? c. Judicial events? 	
<p>14. In your view, did the IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLItake adequate measures to mitigate the effects of the following events on programming activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Security events? b. Political events? c. Judicial events? 	

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNED ACTIVITIES (Q3)

This section asks questions about the IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI's plans for activities in Libya, and your assessment of these plans.

Question	Answer
15. What do you think the main needs for DRG programming in Libya are [what issues/ topics]?	
16. Do you think that this project and the activities you have participated in have contributed to addressing these needs? In what ways?	
<p>17. During any point of your participation in the program, did the aim of the activities change?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [If yes] How did the activities change? Can you give a concrete example? b. When was this change? c. Do you think that the change(s) were relevant? 	
<p>18. Did you participate in more than 1 activity?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [If yes] Did you think that any of the activities was more useful for your work / role in strengthening DRG in Libya, than the other(s)? In what way? b. To what extent (or not) did these activities complement one another? c. Can you give concrete examples? 	
19. Based on the activities you participated in, do you think that they have contributed to the overall goal of the programming: to strengthen the democracy, human rights and governance in Libya?	

CURRENT DRG PRIORITIES (Q4)

This section asks questions about **your perception of the international community's** priorities in the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance sector over the past three years- since 2012.

Question	Answer
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<p>20. I am going to read to you a list of different priorities that could be important to improve Libya's future. For each of the following, can you tell me how high a priority the international community has made each of these issues in Libya since 2012 to present: a high priority, a moderate priority or not a priority, or if you don't know enough to have an opinion.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Fighting violent crime and personal security nationally b. Fighting violent crime and personal security locally c. Support national disarmament of militias d. Support local disarmament of militias e. Ensuring transitional justice (to correct for legacies of human rights abuses) f. Protecting human rights g. Protecting women from violence h. Ensure political inclusion of marginalized groups (such as women, youth, ethnic minorities etc.) i. Fighting corruption j. Fight the lawlessness and impunity of militias 	<p>a.</p> <p>b.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>d.</p> <p>e.</p> <p>f.</p> <p>g.</p> <p>h.</p> <p>i.</p> <p>j.</p>
<p>21. Many DRG programs started in 2012. In your view, has any of the above listed priorities become more important over time?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. If yes, which one? b. In what way has its importance increased? 	

FUTURE DRG PRIORITIES (Q5)

This section asks questions about what **you think** should be the main priorities for DRG programming in Libya going forward.

Question	Answer
<p>22. Have you been involved in any other programming aimed to strengthen democracy, human rights and/or governance in Libya?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. [If yes] What organization was providing the activity? 	
<p>23. Which of the following would you say is the most important priority for democratic strengthening Libya in 2015?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Improve the electoral system/how elections are conducted b. Finalize the constitution c. Strengthen the ability of political parties to govern Libya d. Strengthen the ability of municipal council to govern their local constituencies e. Protect human rights f. Ensure political inclusion of marginalized groups (such as women, youth, ethnic minorities etc.) g. Assure political stability h. Build peace i. Strengthen civil society j. Fight violent crime and ensure public order k. Other? l. [Don't know] 	

<p>24. Which of the following would you say is the most important priority for democratic strengthening Libya in the next three years?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Improve the electoral system/how elections are conducted b. Finalize the constitution c. Strengthen the ability of political parties to govern Libya d. Strengthen the ability of municipal council to govern their local constituencies e. Protect human rights f. Ensure political inclusion of marginalized groups (such as women, youth, ethnic minorities etc.) g. Assure political stability Build peace h. Strengthen civil society i. Fight violent crime and ensure public order j. Other? k. [Don't know] 	
<p>25. Over the next three years, do you think that the following reforms are needed in Libya:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Security sector reform (reform of the military, police and/or the judiciary) b. Constitutional reform (reforming Libya's constitution) c. Decentralization reform (reforming the relationship between national and local governments) d. Why/why not? 	
<p>26. Based on your experience with IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI do you think that the IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI would be qualified to carry out work in these sectors?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Improve the electoral system/how elections are conducted b. Finalize the constitution c. Strengthen the ability of political parties to govern Libya d. Strengthen the ability of municipal council to govern their local constituencies e. Protect human rights f. Ensure political inclusion of marginalized groups (such as women, youth, ethnic minorities etc.) g. Assure political stability h. Build peace i. Strengthen the civil society j. Fight violent crime and ensure public order k. Other? l. [Don't know] m. Why/why not? 	
<p>27. How do you compare working with IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI as opposed to working with other international organizations or NGOs?</p>	
<p>28. Which international donors – as far as you are aware – are currently providing support to Libya (e.g. UNSMIL, UNDP, DfID, USAID etc)?</p>	

<p>29. Overall, how would you evaluate USAID as a donor?</p> <p>a. Do you think it is preferable, or not preferable to other donors, or do you not know USAID enough to have an opinion?</p> <p>b. Why /why not?</p>	
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LIBYAN ABILITIES (Q6)

In the last section on the interview, I would like to ask you about what you think of the ability of internal Libyan actors to carry out work to promote democracy, human rights and governance in Libya.

Question	Answer
<p>30. In your view, do the following Libyan actors <i>have the technical capacity</i> to make a positive difference in Libyan democracy currently?</p> <p>a. Nationally elected officials, in the GNC or HoC</p> <p>b. Locally elected official, in the municipal councils</p> <p>c. Civil society organizations</p> <p>d. The Constitutional Drafting Committee (the committee of 60 members tasked to develop the constitution draft)</p> <p>e. The High National Electoral Committee (the committee that oversees the organization of national elections)</p> <p>f. The judiciary and the courts (e.g the Supreme Court/<i>al-mahkamat al-a'ala</i> or The Public Courts/<i>al-mahkamem al-shabyea</i>)</p> <p>g. Any other actors (which?)</p> <p>h. [Don't know]</p>	<p>a.</p> <p>b.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>d.</p> <p>e.</p> <p>f.</p> <p>g.</p> <p>h.</p>
<p>31. In your view, are the Libyan actors listed above <i>willing</i> to make a positive difference in Libyan democracy currently?</p> <p>a. Nationally elected officials, in the GNC or HoC</p> <p>b. Locally elected official, in the municipal councils</p> <p>c. Civil society organizations</p> <p>d. The Constitutional Drafting Committee (the committee of 60 members tasked to develop the constitution draft)</p> <p>e. The High National Electoral Committee (the committee that oversees the organization of national elections)</p> <p>f. The judiciary and the courts (e.g the Supreme Court/<i>al-mahkamat al-a'ala</i> or The Public Courts/<i>al-mahkamem al-shabyea</i>)</p> <p>g. Any other actors (which?)</p> <p>h. [Don't know]</p>	<p>a.</p> <p>b.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>d.</p> <p>e.</p> <p>f.</p> <p>g.</p> <p>h.</p>
<p>32. In your view, <i>should</i> the Libyan actors listed above work to make a positive difference in Libyan democracy currently?</p> <p>a. Nationally elected officials, in the GNC or HoC</p> <p>b. Locally elected official, in the municipal councils</p> <p>c. Civil society organizations</p> <p>d. The Constitutional Drafting Committee (the committee of 60 members tasked to develop the constitution draft)</p>	<p>a.</p> <p>b.</p> <p>c.</p> <p>d.</p> <p>e.</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> e. The High National Electoral Committee (the committee that oversees the organization of national elections) f. The judiciary and the courts (e.g the Supreme Court/<i>al-mahkamat al-a'ala</i> or The Public Courts/<i>al-mahkamem al-shabyea</i>) g. Any other actors (which?) h. [Don't know] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> f. g. h.
<p>33. Based on your experience of the IRI/IFES/NDI and/or ABA-ROLI DRG work – do you think that it is likely that this type of work could continue on its own in Libya, without international support?</p>	
<p>34. In your view, do the following actors <i>have the technical capacity</i> to continue DRG work (similar to the type of work that you have participated in), without international support?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Nationally elected officials, in the GNC or HoC b. Locally elected official, in the municipal councils c. Civil society organizations d. The Constitutional Drafting Committee (the committee of 60 members tasked to develop the constitution draft) e. The High National Electoral Committee (the committee that oversees the organization of national elections) f. The judiciary and the courts (e.g the Supreme Court/<i>al-mahkamat al-a'ala</i> or The Public Courts/<i>al-mahkamem al-shabyea</i>) g. Any other actors (which?) h. [Don't know] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.
<p>35. In your view, are the following actors <i>willing</i> to continue DRG work (similar to the type of work that you have participated in), without international support?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Nationally elected officials, in the GNC or HoC b. Locally elected official, in the municipal councils c. Civil society organizations d. The Constitutional Drafting Committee (the committee of 60 members tasked to develop the constitution draft) e. The High National Electoral Committee (the committee that oversees the organization of national elections) f. The judiciary and the courts (e.g the Supreme Court/<i>al-mahkamat al-a'ala</i> or The Public Courts/<i>al-mahkamem al-shabyea</i>) g. [Don't know] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

ANNEX III: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Key Informants

Table 5: Key Informants - Implementing Partners

Name	Title	Organization	Location
Samia Mahgoub	Chief of Party	IFES	Tunisia
Demetrio Lazagna	Election Ops Advisor	IFES	Tunisia
Harry Neufeld	Chief of Party	IFES	Tunisia
Liz Reiter	Operations Manager	IFES	Tunisia
Samer Elchahabi	Program Manager	IFES	DC
Manar Hassan	Program Officer	IFES	DC
Kevin George	Country Director	ABA ROLI	Tunisia
Bob Steele	LCB Project Director	ABA ROLI	Tunisia
Mahmoud Bader	Deputy Project Director	ABA ROLI	Tunisia
Angela Conway	ABA MENA Director	ABA ROLI	DC
Kate Seifert	Senior Program Manager	ABA ROLI	DC
Abdraouf Ali Twati	Senior Program Officer	IRI	Libya
David Denehy	Libya Resident Representative	IRI	Malta
Scott Mastic	MENA Director	IRI	DC
Jennifer Crall	Deputy Director for M&E	IRI	DC
Sondra Govatski	CEPPS Director	IRI	DC
David Sands	Program Manager	IRI	DC
Brett Sidelinger	Assistant Program Manager	IRI	DC
Carlo Binda	Former Libya Country Director	NDI	Tunisia
Mary O'Donohue	Governance Director	NDI	DC
David Rolfes	Senior MENA DC Manager	NDI	DC
Ben Malick	Senior Program Assistant	NDI	DC
Megan Doherty	Former National Staff	NDI	DC

Table 6: Key Informants – Libya Experts

Name	Title	Organization	Location
Seth Meixner	IWPR Country Director	IWPR	Tunisia
Peter Salloum	Chief of Party LOCAL Program	Creative Associates	Tunisia
Panto Letic	Head of Election Unit	UNSMIL	Tunisia
Nick Marinaci	Former Libya Field Manager	OTI	Tunisia
Erica Kaster	Transition Advisor	OTI	DC
Megan Young	former Program Manager	OTI	DC
Robert McKenny	Former DRG Officer	USAID	DC
Jeffery Vanness	Democracy and Governance Field Advisor	USAID	DC
Bob Glover	Governance & Democracy Officer	USAID	DC
Adam Kaplan	Senior Media Manager	USAID	DC
Audra Dykman	Head of Chemonics	Chemonics	DC

Table 7: Key Informants – National Staff

Name	Title	Organization	Location
Hana Al-Montasser	Program Officer	ABA ROLI	Libya
Mahmoud Bader	Deputy Program Director	ABA ROLI	Libya

Wafa Twatti	Program Development Officer	Chemonics	Libya
Najwan El-Houni	Project Coordinator	IFES	Libya
Halima Belhaj	Program Officer	IFES	Libya
Amna Al-Sallak	Program Officer at Benghazi Branch	NDI	Libya
Anis al-Wellani	Senior Project manager	NDI	Libya
Mohammed Kawash	Regional coordinator in Subratha	IRI	Libya

Table 8: Key Informants – IP Beneficiaries

Name	Title	Organization	Location
Abu Alouzom	National Caucus Fazzan\ Deputy of chairman	IFES	Libya
Ahmed Ajjaj	Zaykoum Zayna Organization, Vise chairman of organization	IFES	Libya
Aisha Al-Bakoush	Chairman of Al-Berr wa El-Takwa organization	IFES	Libya
Faraj Mahmoudi	Manager at The High Judicial Institute	IFES	Libya
Mehdi Almadani	National Caucus Fazzan, Head of CSO public affair Office	IFES	Libya
Mohammed Mahmoudi	Chairman of H2O Organization	IFES	Libya
Nuri Abbar	Former Head of HNEC	IFES	Libya
Elham Zreg	Worked with IFES and IRI	IFES and IRI	Libya
AdbelSalam Shlebek	Disabled people organization " Zakum Zayna "	IFES and NDI	Libya
Huda Dhan	Chair of Zwara Based NGO " La Tayasoo - Don't lose Hope " that represents the disabeled.	IFES and NDI	Libya
Aisha El harhouni	Administrative Assistant, MLG	IRI	Libya
Hassan Musrati	Head of international cooperation department at MLG	IRI	Libya
Sabria Zgani		IRI	Libya
Saida'a Barween	Head of planning and strategy office at MLG	IRI	Libya
Samira Saeed	Member of Hay Alandalos MC	IRI	Libya
Najia El-Sadeg	Member of Shati Brak Local Municipal	IRI	Libya
Naierna Alsaffah	Member of MC of Swani	IRI	Libya
Abdraouf Shneb	co-founder of Zikom Zyna organization	NDI	Libya
Asmahan Balown	boycotting member of HOR	NDI	Libya
Sokri Gmar	Member of the Amazigh Supreme Council	NDI	Libya
Khaled Jazwi	Planning Office manager, National Economic Developing Board	ABA-ROLI	Libya

ANNEX IV: EVALUATION FACTBASE

The fact base of the evaluation draws on an extensive assessment of the IP's planned and implemented activities. Based on this assessment, each activity was assigned a score from 0-4, indicating the extent the activity was implemented as planned.

The evaluation team has presented and discussed the fact base with each of the IPs, which have reviewed, provided input and validated the assessment.

International Foundation For Electoral Systems

Implementation of IFES' DRG programming: Sub-objective 1.1 (1/4)

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
1.1 Professional ism and transpa- rency of government institutions with election- related responsi- bilities are increased through technical advice and support	Provision of Tech. Support and Advice to the HNEC	Ass. HNEC w. strategic and operational planning	- No revisions	Assisted HNEC strategy development, for e.g. procurement, public outreach and voter outreach. Modification of reporting system, produced a manual and database for CSO coordination, etc.	Continuous support to HNEC; overarching strategic plan pending
		Supporting the HNEC in preparation for the Constitutional Referendum	- No revisions	Output contingent on completion of constitution drafting process; IFES currently conducting a legal analysis of referendum laws to share with HNEC	Some implementation; remaining implementation pending.
		Providing support to the HNEC on voter registration	- No revisions	Supported HNEC and UN in voter registration (a UN-led area), incl. EDR aspects	Provided some support
		Assisting the HNEC in drafting proposals for new electoral legislation	- No revisions	Regular meetings with HNEC on Electoral regulation, 1 paper on topics to consider in electoral legislation, 1 report on lessons learned and facilitation of 1 five-day training	Activities progressed well with tangible outcomes
		Supporting the development of regulations and procedures to implement new electoral legislation	- No revisions	Supported implementation of EDR regulation and training, campaign finance processes. Formulated org. development plan based on org. assessment	Supported well in the implementation process
		Facilitating electoral management study exchange opportunities	- No revisions	HNEC chairman visit US election, 2012 and 2014 as well as HNEC participation in seminar on election in Italy, 2014	Activities fulfilled through facilitation of study trips
		Supporting the HNEC on strategic communications	- No revisions	Opening of Election Media Center. Continuous assessment of strategic communication. Support leading up to CA election	Support implemented from Q3, 2013 and forward
Participating in post- election assessments and lessons learned events.	- 1 st : New timeline: Jan 2014 - 2 nd : New timeline: Apr 2015	Compiled 1 lessons learned report based on a number of workshops	Activities under org. workplan implemented, later revisions not impl.		

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014.

1

International Foundation For Electoral Systems

Implementation of IFES' DRG programming: Sub-objective 1.1 (2/4)

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
1.1 Continued Professionalism and transparency of government institutions with election-related responsibilities are increased through technical advice and support	Provision of Tech. Support and Advice to the HNEC	<i>Not in original plan: added in 1st revision</i>	1st rev: Advising the HNEC on legal and regulatory frameworks for elections	1 procedures manual, facilitation of 5 rounds of 2-day trainings, 1-day training on EDR, met with involved parties in EDR process. Supported on campaign finance reports	Extensive support on EDR and campaign finance. ●
			1st rev: Supporting the HNEC on capacity building and electoral operations	Day-to-day technical advise by Election Operations Advisor; training on drafting procedures; capacity building of internal HNEC structures .	Support provided to HNEC; activity is ongoing ●
			1st rev: Supporting the HNEC on voter education/information efforts	1 concept for streamlining of communication, 2 5-day workshops, CSO manual, CSO database	Activities progressed well in Q1, 2015 ●
			1st rev: Capacity-building on political finance	Planned trainings. Concept paper and presentation for conference on campaign expenditure. Plan for HNEC PAC study tours on campaign finance removed due to status of PAC	Some support on pol. finance provided: reporting mechanisms not established ○
			2nd rev: Extended w. support to establishment of permanent monitoring and reporting mechanisms	1 PWD focal person hired, meetings with working group, 1 BRIDGE training in Tunisia	Extensive support and implementation of planned training ●
			2nd rev: Support HNEC on internal reporting and communication strategies	No output reported: plan to hold internal reporting activity in September 2015.	No implementation ○
			2nd rev: Support the HNEC in the adjudication of electoral disputes	Coordination began on EDR manual: continued progress contingent on approval of new referendum law to govern EDR regulations	Planning of activity started ●
			2nd rev: Assist HNEC to promote participation of women in electoral process	Recommendations based on BRIDGE training from objective 3.1 provided, 1 training held in Q4 2014	Implemented most activities of addition in 2nd rev. ●

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014.

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International Foundation For Electoral Systems

Implementation of IFES' DRG programming: Sub-objective 1.1 (3/4)

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
1.1 Continued Professionalism and transparency of government institutions with election-related responsibilities are increased through technical advice and support	Develop a Strategic Election Security Plan with the HNEC and Relevant Ministries	<i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	2nd rev: Assisting the HNEC in adopting an election security plan	No output reported: progressed stalled due to the contested political situation.	No implementation ○
			2nd rev: Holding security workshops between HNEC, relevant ministries, and security staff	No output reported: progressed stalled due to the contested political situation	No implementation ○
			2nd rev: Capturing lessons learned on election security	No output reported: progressed stalled due to the contested political situation	No implementation ○
			- No revisions	3 trainings of 70 lawyers	All planned outputs implemented ●
			- No revisions	Judge.ly launched	Planned output implemented ●
			- No revisions	2 trainings of clerks in Judge.ly (38 in total)	All planned outputs implemented ●
			1st rev: Support setting up of an EDR mechanism for the CA elections	Facilitation of meetings bt. HNEC and dep. of electoral inspection of judiciary. 2 EDR experts deployed (evacuated shortly after).	Several outputs achieved, but judge training pending ●
			2nd rev: Conduct 1 workshop of judges	Initial collection of lessons learned on EDR from past elections in Libya to inform EDR Manual, and roundtable discussion in late April 2015	Implementation initiated ●

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014.

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International Foundation For Electoral Systems

Implementation of IFES' DRG programming: Sub-objective 1.1 (4/4), 1.2 (1/2)

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
1.1 Continued	Capacity-Building for Governmental Bodies on Political Finance	2 training workshops with PPAC and stakeholders and develop a reference tool for policymakers	1 st rev: Reassessed and removed following dismissal of PAC chairman	1 workshop on campaign finance	1 of 2 workshops implemented, then cancelled ●
		Political Finance Stakeholder Conference	1 st rev: Reassessed and removed	Proposed idea of conference to the Minister of Justice	No implementation ○
		Creation of a political finance working group	1 st rev: Reassessed and removed	Agreement to form working group and 1 informal meeting	Output not fully implemented ●
		Build PPAC's knowledge and capacity on political finance	1 st rev: Reassessed and removed	1 needs assessment, 1 org. chart, review of 1 regulation's draft	Support implemented until Q2 2013 ●
1.2 Civic engagement is increased, particularly among marginalized and underrepresented groups.	Creation of Democracy Resource Centers	Build capacity of CSOs to host 3 Democracy Resource Centers	- No revisions	3 DRCs launched	Output implemented ●
		DRC host at least one roundtable event each month.	- No revisions	Activities were held in all quarters when security allowed.	Activities progress as well as expected ●
	Access for Persons with Disabilities	Conduct a country assessment	- No revisions	Finalized country assessment on electoral access for PWDs	Output implemented ●
		1 workshop for DPOs	- No revisions	Roundtable to present findings of assessment	Output implemented ●
		Establish an Electoral Access Working Group	- No revisions	1 working group established	Output implemented ●
		Not in original plan: added in 1 st revision	1 st rev: Facilitate meetings for Electoral Access Working Group	The Electoral Access Working Group has been meeting regularly to run the Zaykom Zayna campaign	Output implemented ●

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014.

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International Foundation For Electoral Systems

Implementation of IFES' DRG programming: Sub-objective 1.2 (2/2), 3.1

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4	
1.2 Continued	Civic engagement is increased, particularly among marginalized and underrepresented groups.	Info and Resources for CSOs and other Stakeholder	Build capacity of CSOs to host 3 Democracy Resource Centers	- No revisions	Meeting with CSOs and civil society activist. Workshop in March, 2015 also enhanced CSO knowledge on tech. issues; 4 sub awards granted across Libya.	Output implemented ●
		Building Capacity for Watchdog CSOs in Political Finance	Not in original plan: added in 2 nd revision	2 nd rev: Identification of civil society org. to support as campaign finance watchdog and workshops on campaign financing	No output reported: activity pending constitutional referendum.	No implementation: activity in its inception phase ○
3.1	Increase women's and marginalized groups' genuine inclusion and participation into Libyan electoral processes	Support Increased Knowledge and skills of Women to Participate in the Political Process	Not in original plan: added in 2 nd revision	2 nd rev: Implementation of BRIDGE training in Tunisia	1 BRIDGE training implemented. Two2-day roundtable for CSOs in Tunis.	Output implemented ●
		Increase awareness and access for PWDs to elections	Not in original plan: added in 2 nd revision	2 nd rev: Regular meetings and increase coordination with HNEC	1 BRIDGE training implemented, study trip to Indonesia for 3 PWD activists	Output partly implemented as no meetings were recorded ●

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014.

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National Democratic Institute Implementation of NDI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 2.1

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4	
2.1 The GNC's understanding and implementation of best practices in representation and legislative functioning is enhanced	Engagement of GNC Leadership	Signing of LOI between GNC, UND and NDI	~ No revisions	LOI was send but appears not have been signed	If no signing, no implementation	○
		<i>Not in original plan: added in 1st revision</i>	1 st : New: Tech assis. to GNC Diwan in formalizing job descriptions for legislative committee staff	1 job description drafted.	Implemented	●
			1 st New: Training sess. for staff in GNC legislative committees	3 workshops, 2 trainings and held 3 meetings to assess need for further assistance. 1 White Paper report written and distributed.	Broad assistance provided to committees. Continuously implemented	●
	Institutional Assessment	Develop and conduct the assessment	1 st New: Series of management and leadership skills workshops for senior administrators in Diwan.	0 workshops mentioned in report	No implementation	○
			~ No revisions	Assessment not implemented due to security concerns	No implementation	○
	Seminars on Basic Legislative Practices	Information sessions for GNC members	1 st : Strengthening Legislative Committees	Numerous trainings and workshops conducted while actions were taken to prepare for the new HoR	Continuously implemented	●
			<i>Not in original plan: added in 1st revision</i>	1 st New: Individual consultations for GNC members	3 meetings held in only one quarter (Q1 2014)	Limited implementation
	Orientation Series for GNC Members and Staff	Design and hand out of orientation sessions to GNC members and staff as well as follow-up sessions	~ No revisions	Quickly design of curriculum as basis for training session	Fully implemented	●
			Weekly series of on-going consultations book to 200 GNC members	2 information sessions, 3 workshops and 2 individual including regular meetings with GNC members and staff	Several consultations but not weekly as planned	○
	Promoting Understanding of Roles as Legislators	Preparing, distribution and updating of user-manual of GNC rules of procedure	~ No revisions	Preparatory activities but no final update implemented	Some preparations, but limited implementation	○
1 st : Finishing of user manual						

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014.

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National Democratic Institute Implementation of NDI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 2.1

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4	
2.1 Continued	Institutional Development Committee	Assist in developing and implementing plan for the GNC's inst. development	~ No revisions	No activities reported	No implementation	○
		Tech assis. to the forming and support of a Inst. Development Committee	~ No revisions	No activities reported	No implementation	○
	Building Constituent Outreach Capacity	Consultations with GNC members and advice to individual members	1 st : Continued individual consultations for GNC members	~ consultations for GNC members	14 one-on-one consultations, 17 roundtables and regular meetings. No implementation after 2 nd workplan	Continuously implemented
Tech ass. to CAs. Multi-day sessions.			1 st : Continued training sessions for CAs	1 introductory training session and 2 multi-day workshops	Some implementation but no follow-up after revised workplan	○
Revised ² 2.1: The newly-elected legislative body's understanding and implementation of best practices in representation and legislative functioning is enhanced.	Building the Representative Capacity of Members and Staff	<i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	2 nd : Coaching and training to elected members and staff	Outreach conducted but no trainings conducted	Only preparatory activities	○
			2 nd : Public opinion research	No activities reported	Not implemented	○
			2 nd : Online engagement	Only preparatory activities conducted. No concrete outreach to remote parts of Libya	Limited implementation	○
	Conditional activities: Conditional on the national legislature's legitimacy being resolved during the workplan period,	<i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	Orientation for members of the legislature	No activities reported	No implementation	○
			Building legislative capacity of members and staff	No activities reported	No implementation	○
			Building leg. capacity of members and staff:	No activities reported	No implementation	○
			Building the leg. capacity of members and staff:	No activities reported	No implementation	○
			Clarifying Parliamentary Rules of Procedure:	No activities reported	No implementation	○
			Building Effective Legislative Committees:	No activities reported	No implementation	○
			Engagement with the Diwan:	No activities reported	No implementation	○

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014. 2. Sub-objective 2.1 changed focus in 2nd rev workplan (from GNC to "legislative body")

10

National Democratic Institute

Implementation of NDI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 2.2, 2.3, 3.2

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
2.2 Political caucuses form & engage in informed policy discussions	Political Caucus - Development and Outreach	Meet with leading GNC members. Continuous assistance to interested leaders. Assist caucus in reviewing legislative initiatives.	- 1 st : Continued advise to caucus	3 meetings with political caucuses	Continuously implemented. Likely that GNC members would have benefited from more meetings ●
2.3 GNC increases transparency and improves external communication.	Public Relations Ass., Access to Info Media	Regular consultations with GNC political & admin leaders. Assist GNC's external communication.	- 1 st : Conduct workshops	2 meetings on designated media points and one workshop on public hearing	Only two meetings, not regular consultations ○
	Relations (assist GNC in handling the media)	Providing consultations for GNC leadership to handle media	- 1 st : Assist GNC staff to develop skills to share information	2 trainings with total 7 GNC members and 1 staff	Total 7 GNC members reached, in two trainings ●
	Subgrant to IWPR	IWPR to create opportunities for GNC members to participate in awareness-raising	- No revisions	6 radio programs in 6 cities including training of radio interviewers	Numerous activities implemented ●
3.2 Assist Organizations Representing Women and Other Marginalized Groups to Contribute to National Policy-Making.	Outreach and Partner Identification	<i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	Introducing NDI to CSOs and exploring CSO's interest in participating in the NDI program	Introduced NDI to 6 CSOs and 2 independent activists, in 4 meetings. Meeting with leaders of CSOs	Continuously implemented with some reach ●
	Strategic Planning Consultations and Workshops	<i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	Conduct strategic planning consultations with CSOs to design workshops	1 strategic planning workshop for an Amazigh group	Limited implementation ○
	Support for Initiative Implementation	<i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	Nature of support depends on partner's initiatives	No activities reported	No implementation ○

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014.

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International Republican Institute

Implementation of IRI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 2.4

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
2.4 National level legislative decision-making processes are informed by, and are more inclusive of, grassroots citizen concerns	Advocacy Trainings for Citizen Engagement	Conduct trainings with citizen groups (CG)	- 1 st : Extension: introduce democratic governance 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	4 advocacy trainings for CGs (2 Sabratha, Zawiya, Yefrens); 2 joint workshops for Local Council (LC) and CGs (Zawiya); 1 consultation w. Youth Council (Sabratha); 1 iftar meal for CG members (Tripoli), communications workshop for 15 women in Tripoli 8 prep/coordination meetings; 1 LC feedback meeting (re. advocacy training above, Sabratha); 2 constituency outreach workshops (Sabratha)	Good progress: total 7 workshops with CGs / joint CG-LC (target # unspecified in plan) Activities progressed well under org. plan: then postponed and later abandoned ●
	Constituency Outreach Workshops for Officials	Conduct trainings in local constituency outreach with elected officials	- 1 st : Postponed 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled		○
		Consultations and group discussions with members of GNC	- 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	0 consultations with GNC members	No implementation ○
	Tech. assist. for Representative Presence in Constituency	Distribute handbook to 200 GNC members	- 1 st : Extension: create online version 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	Developed and completed the distribution of 1 handbook to 300 GNC members and provided the GNC with a PDF version	Output complete ●
		Conduct trainings with citizen groups on holding town hall meetings	- 1 st : Postponed 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	1 CG training on town hall meeting with members from civil society and elected officials	Limited implementation but no outcome ●
	Town Hall Meetings	Conduct town hall meetings	- 1 st : Postponed 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	0 town hall meetings. Preparations: 2 planned but cancelled meetings (S., Z.); 1 councilor trained (S.)	Some preparations, but limited implementation ○
		Develop workshop curriculum	- 1 st : Postponed 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	0 curriculum developed. Preparations: monitored development of Local Administration Law (LAL)	Some preparations, but limited implementation ○
	Coordination Workshops for Local and National Elected Officials	Conduct workshops national & local elected officials	- 1 st : Postponed 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	0 workshops. Prep: identifying participants. Difficult to work due to local elections and poor LAL	Some preparations, but limited implementation ○
		Follow-on Strategy sessions	- 1 st : Postponed 2 nd : Obj. 2.4 cancelled	0 follow on strategy session, as no workshops to follow up on conducted.	No implementation ○
		Establish IRI ² in Libya ²	Establish IRI's in country presence in Libya	Not specified in workplans	In Q4 2012 and Q1 IRI spent time and resources to establish their own presence in Libya

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014. 2. Not explicitly stated in workplans, but addressed in quarterly reports.

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1. National Youth Network established. 1 training conducted.

International Republican Institute

Implementation of IRI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 2.5, 2.6, 3.3

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan	Revision to plan 1st rev / 2nd rev ¹	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
2.5 Local councilors are provided support in fulfilling their roles & responsibilities and to engage in representative policy making	MoLG adopt curriculum and training materials for local councilors on roles.	- <i>Not in original plan: added in 1st revision</i>	1st: Added: Provide training for local councilors via ToT ² 2nd: Extended: include municipal officials and staff	0 trainings for local councilors. Preparations: developed strategy; 1 meeting with councilors from 7 cities; 2 iftar meals planned but cancelled; 1 assessment trip to Rabat for pot. Exchanges.	Some preparations, but no trainings implemented
	Establish m-ajlis baladia association (MGA) ³ for women local councilors & mayors	- <i>Not in original plan: added in 1st revision</i>	1st: Added: Provide handbook for local councilors	Training material drafted and discussed with MoLG. Training material not finalized.	Good progress on draft but lack finalization
	Regional network for MoLG	- <i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	1st: Added: Identify stakeholders to assist MGA setup 1st: Added: Encourage development of 2 MGAs	1 program expansion assessment (Yefren, Gharyan), 1 CG meeting (Yefren); 1 LC meeting, 2 MBA trainings	Continuous progress
	Capacity building of MoLG	- <i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	1st: Added: Hold MGA founding conference	0 association conferences held. Unable as Libyan local elections & establishment of mayors delayed	No implementation
	Support MLG cap. building of councilors	- <i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	1st: Added: Start setup of online portals for two MGAs	0 portals established. Preparations: Consultations with staff managing IRI Academy portal (in D.C.)	Some preparations, but no portals set up
2.6 MoLG establishes structures for intra governmental admin	Capacity building of MoLG	- <i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	2nd: Added: Host capacity building trainings	Started development of curriculum	Preliminary preparations
3.3 Youth engage local leaders to advocate for community interest	Capacity building of youth councils	- <i>Not in original plan: added in 2nd revision</i>	2nd: Added: Develop individual training plans for youth councils to host National Youth Network	1 National Youth Network established. 1 training conducted.	Continuously implemented

1. 1st Revised workplan: October 2013 / 2nd revised workplan: November 2014. 2. Training of Trainer, for MoLG trainers 3. Trans. Municipal Government Association

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American Bar Association & Freedom House

Implementation of ABA-ROLI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 1 (1/2)

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan ¹	Revision to plan Revised workplan ²	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
1. Informed citizens are able to develop consensus on key constitution issues and effectively inform the constitution drafting body.	Dialogue Framework	Select Partner communities	- <i>No revision</i>	Ongoing discussion with community leaders in selected project communities	Project communities selected
		Planning meetings with participating communities	- <i>No revision</i>	0 meetings reported	No implementation
		Select 4 liaison/community	- <i>No revision</i>	Gathered nominations and held meetings with deans	Only preparatory activities
		Train community liaisons	- <i>No revision</i>	0 trainings reported	No implementation
		Train CSOs & local actors in holding local forums	- <i>No revision</i>	0 trainings reported	No implementation
		Train 3 project facilitators	- <i>No revision</i>	A four-day workshop was held in Istanbul, but not clear if facilitators were successfully trained	Workshop conducted,
		1 study tour to Tunis on Tunisia & Yemen experience	- <i>No revision</i>	0 study tours reported	No implementation
		National level workshops with Community liaisons	- <i>No revision</i>	0 workshops reported	No implementation
		Awareness raising on women in local gov.	- <i>No revision</i>	0 activities reported	No implementation
		Community workshops and platform to poll citizens	- <i>No revision</i>	Two one-day workshops held. Support provided to Libyan NGO 'Al Ewa' on priority issues for Libyan women	Continuously implemented
		Award 5 small grants to support discussion among marginalized groups	- <i>No revision</i>	No grants awarded. 1 workshop and meetings with Libyan NGOs held to assess interest	Only preparatory activities
		1 4-day national workshop w. CDA and communities	- <i>No revision</i>	3 day national workshop held in Tripoli for youth from 3 cities with attendees from 3 CDA members.	Output completed
		1 national meeting for women's groups	- <i>No revision</i>	0 meetings reported	No implementation
		Convene Libyan experts to conduct 1 gender analysis of draft constitution	- <i>No revision</i>	Workshop held in Istanbul for legal professionals and women's rights activists. Recommendations sent to CDA.	Output completed
Under RIGHTS consortium workplan		1 two-day Regional workshop in Tripoli; 2 one-day Regional workshop in Sabha and Benghazi	Activities appear to progress well in 2013		

1. August 2014 – August 2015- 2. Revised April 2015.

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Implementation of ABA-ROLI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 1 (2/2)

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan ¹	Revision to plan Revised workplan ²	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4	
1. Informed citizens are able to develop consensus on key constitution issues and effectively inform the constitution drafting body.	Support local council and CSOs to advocate to CDA	Support Local Community Outreach	- No revision	No activity reported (No mobile tech.; no feedback facilitation CDA-communities; no small grant)	No implementation	○
		Support development of 1 publication on decentralization & local government	- No revision	1 publication produced; distributed to CDA offices, Local Government members, research centers, University of Benghazi and via IRI.	Output complete	●
	Inform communities of the constitution process	Support timely information dissemination to public on constitution draft process	- No revision	No activity reported	No implementation	○
		Conduct town hall meetings about the draft constitution	- No revision	0 meetings reported	No implementation	○
	Enable Partner Communities with informed understanding of Draft Constitution	Conduct citizen surveys on constitution expectations	- No revision	0 surveys reported	No implementation	○
		Create audio libraries with info on the draft constitution	- No revision	0 audio libraries reported	No implementation	○
	Support Comp. Analysis of Draft Const. Provisions	Broadcast messages encouraging citizens to register and vote in the referendum	- No revision	0 broadcasts reported	No implementation	○
		Capacity build LBA., Ec Dev Board and LCCLHR ³	Facilitate a comparative analysis related to Judicial system	- No revision	Judicial analysis workshop held Tunisia	Continuously implemented
	Select municipal leaders and legal professionals to analyze Libya's constitution		- No revision	11 local government representatives analyzed constitution & developed recommendations	Fully implemented	●
		Under RIGHTS consortium workplan	- No revision	3 roundtables in Tripoli, Gharyan and Zuwarah with total 72 participants; 6 printed material/guides	Activities appear to progress well in 2013	●

1. August 2014 – August 2015- 2. Revised April 2015.

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Implementation of ABA-ROLI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 2

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan ¹	Revision to plan Revised workplan ²	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4	
2. Through national dialogue, citizens who fairly represent majority and minority views of groups (incl women, ethnic groups, and youth) from across Libya, are able to build a consensus of state, economy and society and the relationship between them	Capacity build	Study tour for ND actors on Tunisia/Yemen experience	- No revision	0 study tours; 1 strategy meeting for NDPC w 8 NDPC members in Instabul	Some preparatory activities	○
		Provide Management Advisor to NDPC	- No revision	Consultant seconded to NDPC	Continuously implemented	●
	National Dialogue (ND)	Roundtables: ND & women	- No revision	0 roundtables reported	No implementation	○
		Dispute resolution training for ND actors from CSOs	- No revision	2 NDPC representatives trained in facilitation in Istanbul. 8 NDPC representatives trained	Continuously implemented	●
	Preparatory Commission in inclusive and transparent dialogue process	5 capacity workshops for ND delegates	- No revision	0 workshops reported	No implementation	○
		1 moderate middle meeting	- No revision	1 meeting in Istanbul with 23 participants	Output complete	●
	Strengthen connection local communities CSOs w ND delegates	3 workshops: Peace/Social Media; Moderate Youth/Peace; Trust Political actors	- No revision	MM workshop held in Istanbul	Continuously implemented	●
		ND media campaign	- No revision	NDPC launched dialogue report in Tunisia	Some implementation	●
	Support local council reps/CSOs to advocate to ND delegates	Support CSO dialogue workshop	- No revision	0 workshops reported	No implementation	○
		Small grants for roundtables marginalized	- No revision	0 grants reported	No implementation	○
	Inform communities how ND integrate their priorities	1 public survey - ND issues	- No revision	0 surveys reported	No implementation	○
		1 2-day cross-regional meeting for community reps.	- No revision	0 meetings reported	No implementation	○
	Support local council reps/CSOs to advocate to ND delegates	Community-level fora w. ND del, local council, CSOs	- No revision	Considering subgrant to Benghazi Research Cons. Center (w. MoU w. CDA) to fund public outreach	Some preparatory activities	○
		Use mobile tech to share info among communities, liaisons, CDA & ND del.	- No revision	Discussions on support information sharing between the public and the CDA using mobile technology	Some preparatory activities	○
		Roundtable discussions ND delegates & communities	- No revision	0 roundtables reported	No implementation	○
	Provide info on ND outcomes via mobile tech	- No revision	No activities reported	No implementation	○	

1. August 2014 – August 2015- 2. Revised April 2015.

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Implementation of ABA-ROLI's DRG programming: Sub-objective 3 & "others"

○ No progress
● Completed

Sub-objective	Activity	Planned output Original workplan ¹	Revision to plan Revised workplan ²	Implemented output	Assessment Score 0-4
3. Create consensus processes incorporating outputs from ND & constitution drafting to inform Libya's governing processes beyond the passing of constitution referendum in order to strengthen the political transition	Elected legislature is responsive to local gov/CS demands	1 analysis of constitution, w Nat Ec & Social Dev Board	- No revision	0 analyses reported	No implementation ○
	Local council able to build on constitution re. decen. and service	Trainings for local councils and CSO representatives	- No revision	Decentralization workshop for mayors held in Istanbul	Continuously implemented ●
		Sessions on constitutional analysis, roundtables with women local councilors	- No revision	0 sessions/roundtables reported	No implementation ○
	RoL insituti. analyze and monitor constitutional information	1 symposium for Judges	- No revision	0 symposiums reported	No implementation ○
		2 human rights analysis: of draft constitutional provisions; of adopted constitution. Publish results	- No revision	1 workshop (w. National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights) in Tunis, to facilitate input from human rights experts to Constitution drafting	Output completed ●
Experts memorialize consensus for political dialogue	- Not in original plan: added in revision	Select Expert Committee to support delegates and meet in tandem w dialogue	Expert Committee selected; published response to UN draft; supported technical strengthening of a draft peace agreement.; joint statement issued.	Output completed ●	

1. August 2014 – August 2015- 2. Revised April 2015.

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ANNEX V: DETAILS ON WORK-PLAN REVISIONS

LEGS

As part of the original workplan, **IFES** introduced a number of activities focusing on provision of technical support to HNEC and the judiciary, capacity building of governmental bodies on political finance and increased civic engagement of marginalized groups. In both the 1st and 2nd revision, additional activity outputs were included to extend the scope of the technical support to HNEC in order to fulfill sub-objective 1.1. For sub-objective 1.2, IFES extended the establishment of an electoral working group with facilitation of meetings in 1st revision and in 2nd revision added a new activity covering capacity-building of CSO-watchdogs on political finance. Capacity building on public finance was extended with support to establishment of permanent monitoring and reporting mechanisms and support to setting up of an Election Dispute Resolution (EDR) mechanism was supplemented with a workshop. Four activities on political finance were included in the original workplan, but reassessed/cancelled in the 1st revision following dismissal of the Political Action Committee (PAC) chairman. In the 2nd revision, one activity was added concerning introduction of an electoral security plan and one concerning inclusion of woman and marginalized groups in the electoral process.

NDI activities in the original workplan relating to objective 2.1 focus on the GNC's understanding and implementation of best practices in representation and legislation. In the 1st revision, a number of activities were added on engaging GNC leadership and two activities concerning constituent outreach were extended. A major change in NDI programming was a shift in focus of sub-objective 2.1 from the GNC to the newly elected legislative body. In the 2nd revision, the activity outputs from the original workplan and the 1st revision were replaced with new activities and activity outputs aimed at capacity-building of staff and members of the legislative body. A number of these new activities were conditional on the national legislature's legitimacy being resolved. Activities relating to objectives 2.2 and 2.3 were introduced in original workplan, two activities were extended and one was expanded in scope to include workshops. In the 2nd revision, objective 3.2 on providing assistance to organizations representing woman and other marginalized groups was added, including three related activities.

In the 1st revised workplan, **IRI** changed the target beneficiaries, cancelling programming aimed towards national legislative bodies to instead focus on local legislative bodies. In relation to this change, a number of activities were included under sub-objective 2.4, aimed at improving grassroots/local participation and ensure their voice in national legislative decision-making. Activities aimed to support to local councilors was added in 1st revision and extended to include municipal officials and a Morocco exchange program in 2nd revision. Also in the 2nd revision, activities were included for new objective on capacity-building and support of MoLG and new objective on capacity-building of youth councils.

LCB

ABA-ROLI made few revisions in the April 2015 revised workplan. A total of 33 activities across the 3 objectives saw no revisions made in the revised workplan. Activities in objective 1 concerning public awareness outreach were expanded in scope to include the BRCC. Furthermore, 2 activities were added to sub-objective 1.8 on analysis of draft constitutional provision by different stakeholders. Objective 2 was expanded through inclusion of a communications consultant to provide advice to NDPC and workshops on peace-building for the "moderate middle". One new activity was added to objective 3 concerning the support to a committee of experts attending UNSMIL dialogues.

ANNEX VI: SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSES

The annex displays the backup calculations and analyses for the performance evaluation, per evaluation questions.

Question 2

Table 9: Implementing Partners - Average performance score on activity output from original workplans, 0-4

IFES	3.0
NDI	1.9
IRI	1.4
ABA-ROLI	1.3

Question 3

Table 10: Assessment of the process to revise the workplans

IP	Sub-objective	Added in 1 st revision	Added in 2 nd revision (only for LEGS)	Extended timeline	Expanded scope	Reassessed/Cancelled	Not revised
IFES	Sub obj. 1.1 Transparency in Government	6	7	1	2	4	10
	Sub obj. 1.2 Increased civic engagement	1	1	-	-	-	6
	Sub obj. 3.1 Inclusion of women and marginalized groups	-	2	-	-	-	-
NDI	Sub obj. 2.1 Enhanced GNC representation & legislation <i>Original 2.1 "GNC"</i>	4	-	3	-	-	6
	Sub obj. 2.1 Enhanced GNC representation & legislation <i>Changed 2.1 "legislative body" (changed in 2nd revision)</i>	-	2 + 7 conditional activities	-	-	-	-
	Sub obj. 2.2 Strengthened policy discussions	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Sub obj. 2.3 GNC increased transparency	-	-	2	-	-	1
	Sub obj. 3.2 Women & marginalized groups contribute to national policy	-	3	-	-	-	-
IRI	Sub obj. 2.4 National legislation informed by citizen concerns	-	-	-	-	10 (all activities in 2.4)	-
	Sub obj. 2.5 Support local councilors	6	1	-	1	-	-
	Sub obj. 2.6 Strengthened MoLG structures	-	2	-	-	-	-
	Sub obj. 3.3	-	1	-	-	-	-

	Youth engage with local leaders						
ABA - ROL I	Objective 1 Citizens able to develop consensus on constitution issues & inform CDA	2	-	-	1	-	15
	Objective 2 All citizens able to build consensus of state, economy and society	-	-	-	2	-	12
	Objective 3 Create consensus process to incorporate outputs from national dialogue beyond constitution drafting	1	-	-	-	-	6

Table 11: Implementing Partners - Average performance score on activity output from revised workplans, 0-4

IFES	1.9
NDI	1.4
IRI	1.5

Table 12: Average performance score across activities and for all IPs (LEGS)*, 0-4

Activities included in original workplan	1.8
Activities added in 1 st revision	2.4
Activities added in 2 nd revision	1.5

* Activities where activity outputs are added in both 1st and 2nd revision have been divided up for this calculation. This is only relevant for 2 activities, both under IFES sub-objective 1.1

Table 13: Implementation activities with and without later revisions, average score for all IPs (LEGS), 0-4

Activities without later revisions	1.9
Activities with later revisions/additions*	3

* For activities with additions, an average is made of all activity outputs within each activity.

ANNEX VII: PUBLIC PERCEPTION SURVEY – SAMPLING AND WEIGHTING

For this survey a proportional-to-population (P2P) sampling methodology based on sex, location and age was used. In addition, over-sampling was carried out in the districts of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata in relation to the other districts. The sample frame was developed on the basis of two sources:

- The 2006 Libyan Census: Although this population data is some nine years out of date, the key metric required to construct a P2P sample frame is the size of each district in Libya relative to the others. While each district's absolute population will have grown, it is assumed that each district has during the past nine years been subject to broadly comparable demographic (fertility rate, mortality rate, etc.), social (migration, urbanization, etc.) and conflict dynamics, and hence that their populations will have grown at an approximately equivalent rate. As such, 2006 Libyan census data can be taken as a reliable basis for constructing a P2P sample frame.
- The United States Census Bureau's estimated breakdown of Libya's population by single-year age groups for mid-year 2015 (last updated in December 2013). (See <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>)

The survey was implemented by phone from a call-center in Tripoli. The contact success rate was 4.0 %.

Category	Total calls
Phone number not connected	24,242
No answer	17,055
Refusals	9,587
Not Eligible (e.g., nationality)	6,222
Call back later	1,522
Partial Interviews	770
Completed Interviews	2,507
Total	61,907

With a response rate of only 4.0 % non-bias could potentially lead to significant skewedness in the sample. As mentioned a key challenge in the sampling was to obtain respondents with lower education levels. A log was made to test whether there was a non-response bias in the data by asking people that refused to participate whether they would answer one question about the education level. 233 refusals agreed to this and 42 % indicated they had a higher education certificate indicating that non-response bias was not an issue in relation to the skewedness of the education levels in the sample. The skewedness is therefore most likely explained by the database of numbers which gives a higher probability of being randomly selected if you have multiple numbers which is more prevalent among the higher educated segments of the population.

In order to correct for skewedness in the sample, the data was weighted according to the age distribution across men and women and the 13 electoral districts. As such the data presented is representative of the national population on these two key demographic variables. The weighting was done in an iterative fashion with 10 iterations. As weighting on the second variable would naturally impact on the distribution of the first variable, this process ensures that the distribution across the different weighting variables as closely resemble the defined values on all the weighting variables.

ANNEX VIII: PERCEPTION SURVEY REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Figure 1: Multi-variate logistic regression explaining intention to vote

Previous Election Experience and Perception of Fairness of Elections Determines Intention of Future Participation

Variable type	Regression Model 1	Regression Model 2	Regression Model 3	Dependent variable
Socio-demographic	Age**	Age**	Age*	Intention of voting in future parliamentary elections
	Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	Gender* (1 = male, 2 = female)	
	Family income	Family income	Family income	
	Education	Education	Education	
	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	
	Cities Tripoli* Benghazi Misrata	Cities Tripoli* Benghazi Misrata	Cities Tripoli Benghazi Misrata	
Personal values	Political efficacy	Political efficacy		
Perceptions and Behaviour		Voted in GNC election 2012		
		Voted in HoR election 2014**		
		Perceive GNC election to be free and fair***		
		Perceive HoR election to be free and fair**		

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Figure 2: Age, gender and religiousness impact on Libyans' support for Women's Rights

Gender and Education impact on Libyans support for Women's Rights

Variable type	Regression Model 1	Regression Model 2	Regression Model 3	Dependent variable
Socio-demographic	Age	Age	Age	Full support for Women's Rights
	Gender*** (1 = male, 2 = female)	Gender*** (1 = male, 2 = female)	Gender*** (1 = male, 2 = female)	
	Family income	Family income	Family income	
	Education**	Education**	Education**	
	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	
Personal values		Trust in Grand Mufti (1=very low, 4= very high)	Trust in Grand Mufti (1=very low, 4= very high)	
		Importance of religion** (1=very low, 4= very high)	Importance of religion** (1=very low, 4= very high)	
Perceptions and Behaviour			Voting intention parliamentary election	
			Attended community meeting in past 3 years	
			Collecetively raised an issue in past 3 years	

■ Positive relationship ■ Negative relationship

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Figure 3: Drivers of Trust in the GNC

Education, regions, government corruption and service provision drivers of trust in the GNC

Variable type	Regression Model 1	Regression Model 2	Regression Model 3	Dependent variable
Socio-demographic	Age	Age	Age	Trust in the GNC
	Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	
	Family income	Family income	Family income	
	Education***	Education***	Education***	
	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	Urban/Rural (1= urban, 2=rural)	
	Regions West East*** South*	Regions West East*** South*	Regions West East*** South*	
Personal values		Political efficacy	Political efficacy	
		Importance of religion	Importance of religion	
Perceptions			Government corruption* (1=low, 4=high)	
			Service pro- visions Education Health** Roads Electricity Policing Garbage col. Permits Water***	

■ Positive relationship ■ Negative relationship

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Figure 4: Drivers of Trust in the HoR

Income, rural living, regions, political efficacy, government corruption and service provisions drivers of HoR trust




Figure 5: Drivers of Municipal Councils Performance Evaluation

Age, political efficacy and service provisions are drivers of Municipal Councils Performance perceptions




Figure 6: Drivers of Municipal Councils Performance Evaluation for Tripoli
Quality of roads, electricity and politicing drives Tripoli Municipal Councils Performance perceptions




Figure 7: Drivers of Municipal Councils Performance Evaluation for Benghazi
Gender and quality of health and permits issuance drivers of Benghazi Municipal Councils Performance perception




Figure 8: Drivers of Municipal Councils Performance Evaluation for Misrata

Age, governance preference and quality of roads and electricity drivers of Misrata Municipal Councils Performance





Figure 9: Drivers of Support for Armed Groups

Age, education, regions, political engagement, crimes and security drivers of support for armed groups



ANNEX IX: CROSS-TABULATIONS FOR GENDER AND THREE MAJOR CITIES

Table I: Elections

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Reasons for not voting					
Was not allowed/eligible (underage)	5%	5%	8%	6%	5%
Did not know where voting was	1%	3%	2%	1%	3%
Did not care for any of the candidates	27%	18%	20%	26%	21%
My vote would not make a difference	6%	6%	9%	8%	6%
Was not registered to vote	4%	5%	3%	3%	4%
Not interested in politics	4%	6%	5%	3%	5%
Elections did not matter	14%	10%	10%	11%	12%
Did not have the time	14%	13%	14%	10%	19%
Not able to get to the polling place (too old, sick, or work)	9%	19%	16%	14%	14%
I was worried about potential violence at the polling station	3%	3%	2%	0%	1%
I boycotted the election	12%	12%	12%	18%	11%
Other reasons (specify)	12%	9%	9%	7%	10%
2012 GNC election					
Not free and fair	32%	37%	27%	39%	23%
Somewhat free and fair	22%	28%	25%	24%	33%
Free and fair	46%	34%	47%	37%	45%
2014 Constitution Drafting Assembly election					
Not free and fair	37%	44%	37%	39%	36%
Somewhat free and fair	22%	31%	27%	28%	33%
Free and fair	41%	25%	36%	33%	31%
2014 HoR election					
Not free and fair	39%	46%	43%	36%	46%
Somewhat free and fair	22%	26%	24%	25%	24%
Free and fair	39%	28%	33%	39%	30%
Local municipal elections					
Not free and fair	32%	36%	36%	36%	23%
Somewhat free and fair	23%	27%	27%	25%	28%
Free and fair	46%	37%	37%	39%	49%
Voting in future parliamentary elections					
Yes	64%	63%	67%	60%	67%
No	36%	37%	33%	40%	33%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Voting in future presidential elections					
Yes	75%	75%	79%	75%	79%
No	25%	25%	21%	25%	21%
Voting in future local municipal council elections					
Yes	68%	68%	70%	64%	78%
No	32%	32%	30%	36%	22%
Voting in future regional parliament elections					
Yes	47%	42%	46%	41%	42%
No	53%	58%	54%	59%	58%
Voting in future constitutional referendum					
Yes	77%	76%	79%	75%	80%
No	23%	24%	21%	25%	20%
Voters and non-voters in past elections					
Did not vote in all elections	79%	90%	87%	86%	73%
Voted in all elections	21%	10%	13%	14%	27%

Table 2: Citizen Engagement

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
People like me don't have any say about what the government does					
Strongly agree	37%	38%	42%	32%	34%
Agree	20%	21%	21%	17%	20%
Disagree	18%	18%	17%	21%	19%
Strongly disagree	26%	23%	19%	31%	27%
I know more about politics than most people my age					
Strongly agree	18%	16%	19%	16%	16%
Agree	33%	29%	32%	35%	31%
Disagree	26%	28%	25%	31%	28%
Strongly disagree	24%	26%	23%	18%	25%
Sometimes, politics and government in Libya seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on					
Strongly agree	56%	59%	59%	55%	54%
Agree	24%	26%	28%	27%	27%
Disagree	11%	9%	8%	10%	9%
Strongly disagree	9%	6%	5%	8%	10%
Local public hearings are conducted only as a formality and have little influence on municipal decisions					
Strongly agree	48%	50%	50%	48%	41%
Agree	27%	29%	30%	30%	30%
Disagree	13%	14%	12%	12%	15%
Strongly disagree	12%	7%	8%	9%	14%
Worked on a political campaign					
Yes	8%	5%	5%	9%	7%
No	92%	95%	95%	91%	93%
Participated in a demonstration since February 2011					
Yes	42%	23%	34%	46%	48%
No	58%	77%	66%	54%	52%
Used force or violence for a political cause					
Yes	6%	2%	2%	5%	6%
No	94%	98%	98%	95%	94%
Attended a community meeting					

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Yes	36%	15%	20%	24%	32%
No	64%	85%	80%	76%	68%
Got together with others to raise an issue					
Yes	45%	27%	33%	40%	36%
No	55%	73%	67%	60%	64%
Member of a Political party					
Yes	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%
No	98%	99%	98%	98%	97%
Member of a Religious organization					
Yes	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%
No	98%	99%	98%	99%	98%
Member of a Labor union and/or professional association					
Yes	9%	6%	5%	10%	11%
No	91%	94%	95%	90%	89%
Member of a Civil society organization / Local Non-Governmental Organization					
Yes	13%	7%	8%	12%	11%
No	87%	93%	92%	88%	90%
Political efficacy index					
Very low efficacy	14%	18%	16%	10%	10%
Low efficacy	51%	53%	57%	55%	54%
High efficacy	33%	27%	27%	32%	33%
Very high efficacy	1%	2%	1%	3%	3%

Table 3: Media

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Use of media					
TV	69%	78%	67%	64%	76%
Radio	8%	10%	10%	10%	21%
Newspapers	4%	2%	4%	3%	3%
Social media (Twitter/Facebook)	42%	42%	46%	54%	41%
Local imam	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Tribal leader	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Head of family	2%	10%	7%	6%	7%
National politicians	2%	1%	2%	4%	3%
Local politicians	3%	2%	3%	5%	3%
Foreign media (TV, radio or newspapers)	7%	4%	6%	9%	5%
Other (Specify)	12%	5%	10%	10%	8%
Most trustworthy news source					
TV	35%	38%	32%	39%	35%
Radio	1%	3%	2%	7%	3%
Newspapers	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Social media (Twitter/Facebook)	14%	13%	15%	7%	9%
Local imam	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Tribal leader	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%
Head of family	2%	6%	4%	6%	4%
National politicians	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%
Local politicians	2%	1%	2%	1%	3%
Foreign media (TV, radio or newspapers)	3%	1%	3%	1%	3%
Other (Specify)	6%	3%	4%	5%	6%
None of them	35%	35%	36%	32%	37%

Table 4: Constitution

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Racial and ethnic equality					
Not protected	8%	7%	6%	6%	9%
Somewhat protected	10%	9%	12%	11%	11%
Fully protected	82%	84%	82%	83%	80%
Freedom of speech					
Not protected	7%	6%	6%	6%	7%
Somewhat protected	18%	16%	21%	25%	20%
Fully protected	75%	78%	73%	69%	73%
Freedom of assembly					
Not protected	13%	11%	13%	10%	13%
Somewhat protected	26%	25%	26%	29%	27%
Fully protected	62%	64%	61%	61%	60%
Freedom of religion					
Not protected	18%	14%	17%	14%	17%
Somewhat protected	12%	11%	12%	12%	9%
Fully protected	70%	75%	71%	75%	74%
Equal rights for women					
Not protected	9%	4%	6%	6%	10%
Somewhat protected	18%	13%	20%	17%	19%
Fully protected	73%	83%	74%	77%	71%
Right to a fair trial					
Not protected	6%	5%	5%	4%	7%
Somewhat protected	6%	5%	6%	5%	5%
Fully protected	88%	90%	88%	91%	88%
Right to education					
Not protected	4%	3%	5%	3%	4%
Somewhat protected	5%	6%	4%	5%	7%
Fully protected	91%	90%	90%	92%	89%
Right to work					
Not protected	4%	4%	6%	3%	5%
Somewhat protected	9%	7%	7%	8%	8%
Fully protected	87%	89%	88%	90%	87%
Freedom from torture					
Not protected	7%	7%	8%	5%	8%
Somewhat protected	8%	7%	7%	7%	11%
Fully protected	84%	86%	85%	88%	81%
Right to access government information					
Not protected	17%	14%	18%	15%	19%
Somewhat protected	22%	24%	24%	24%	25%
Fully protected	61%	62%	58%	61%	56%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Develop a constitution that I would approve of					
Not at all	40%	35%	34%	41%	37%
To some extent	34%	42%	39%	37%	40%
To a large extent	27%	23%	26%	23%	23%
Put a constitution to a referendum in 2016					
Not at all	38%	33%	33%	37%	35%
To some extent	35%	44%	40%	42%	41%
To a large extent	27%	23%	27%	21%	24%
Educate the public on the constitution					
Not at all	36%	28%	31%	36%	32%
To some extent	32%	45%	34%	36%	36%
To a large extent	32%	27%	35%	28%	32%
On a scale of 1 to 5, where one is preferring that the constitution outlines a political system where the central government has most of the power, and five is preferring that the constitution outlines a political system where the local governments have most of the power					
1	33%	38%	36%	25%	37%
2	6%	6%	7%	3%	5%
3	11%	15%	15%	13%	16%
4	4%	4%	5%	3%	3%
5	43%	32%	33%	53%	33%
In your opinion should the draft constitution be approved by a popular referendum?					
Yes	89%	89%	88%	89%	86%
No	11%	11%	12%	11%	14%

Table 5: Judiciary

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
To what extent do you agree with the statement, "Courts in Libya are providing fair trials to citizens"?					
Strongly agree	35%	32%	31%	27%	34%
Agree	23%	26%	28%	29%	35%
Disagree	15%	16%	14%	17%	11%
Strongly disagree	27%	25%	27%	28%	19%
In your view, should the judiciary be largely responsible, somewhat responsible, or not at all responsible for:					
Resolving legal disputes					
Largely responsible	71%	71%	71%	71%	66%
Somewhat responsible	17%	21%	19%	22%	27%
Not at all responsible	12%	8%	10%	7%	8%
Impose sentences and other legal punishment					
Largely responsible	70%	68%	74%	72%	69%
Somewhat responsible	19%	24%	18%	20%	24%
Not at all responsible	11%	8%	8%	8%	7%
Protecting individual constitutional rights					
Largely responsible	72%	67%	72%	69%	67%
Somewhat responsible	19%	25%	19%	23%	24%
Not at all responsible	10%	8%	9%	8%	9%
Checking the power of the government					
Largely responsible	65%	63%	65%	63%	63%
Somewhat responsible	19%	26%	21%	25%	24%
Not at all responsible	16%	11%	14%	12%	13%
Implement transitional justice					
Largely responsible	71%	70%	71%	70%	67%
Somewhat responsible	19%	18%	17%	22%	24%
Not at all responsible	10%	11%	11%	9%	9%

Table 6: Gender

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
More confidence in a man or a woman to represent your interests in national politics (GNC or HoR) or would you say there is no difference					
Man	24%	27%	27%	21%	37%
Woman	9%	9%	6%	11%	7%
No Difference	67%	64%	67%	68%	56%
More confidence in a man or a woman to represent your interests in local politics (in the municipal council) or would you say there is no difference?					
Man	28%	33%	31%	27%	43%
Woman	9%	10%	8%	12%	7%
No Difference	63%	56%	62%	62%	50%
Male or female elected officials (GNC or HoR) perform their tasks as elected officials better, or would you say there is no difference?					
Man	21%	27%	25%	22%	35%
Woman	12%	9%	9%	12%	7%
No Difference	67%	65%	66%	65%	58%
Do you believe that men and women should have the same pay for the same type of work?					
Yes	88%	88%	90%	90%	86%
No	12%	12%	10%	10%	14%
Same right to a primary education					
Yes	97%	97%	98%	97%	98%
No	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%
Same right to an university education					
Yes	96%	97%	97%	98%	97%
No	4%	3%	3%	2%	3%
Same right to be elected for parliament					
Yes	87%	89%	89%	93%	84%
No	13%	11%	11%	7%	16%
Same right to travel alone					

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Yes	32%	41%	36%	47%	30%
No	68%	59%	64%	53%	70%
Equal say in how to raise their children					
Yes	88%	90%	89%	87%	88%
No	12%	10%	11%	13%	12%
Equal say in household finances					
Yes	78%	83%	78%	79%	76%
No	22%	17%	22%	21%	24%
Same right to demand divorce					
Yes	73%	82%	77%	81%	74%
No	27%	18%	23%	19%	26%
Same right to freely choose their spouse					
Yes	90%	95%	95%	94%	90%
No	10%	5%	5%	6%	10%
Same right to freely choose their own clothing					
Yes	70%	84%	76%	78%	78%
No	30%	16%	24%	22%	22%
Verbal harassment: For example name calling, cat calls, or acting to create an unpleasant or hostile situation					
Very common	37%	31%	41%	29%	23%
Common	31%	34%	36%	37%	32%
Uncommon	13%	13%	11%	11%	18%
Very uncommon	20%	23%	12%	23%	27%
Violence in the home: For example beating his wife or sister, or someone in his household					
Very common	15%	14%	18%	10%	9%
Common	30%	29%	34%	32%	23%
Uncommon	19%	21%	20%	20%	26%
Very uncommon	35%	37%	28%	37%	42%
Violence outside the home: For example being pushed or hit, on the street or at a market					
Very common	13%	10%	13%	9%	7%
Common	16%	14%	21%	15%	9%
Uncommon	24%	26%	27%	23%	28%
Very uncommon	47%	50%	39%	53%	56%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Verbal harassment					
Not a problem	8%	9%	6%	12%	13%
Minor problem	20%	16%	17%	20%	20%
Major problem	72%	75%	76%	68%	68%
Violence in the home					
Not a problem	8%	7%	6%	10%	12%
Minor problem	18%	14%	15%	13%	19%
Major problem	74%	79%	79%	78%	69%
Violence outside the home					
Not a problem	8%	8%	7%	11%	14%
Minor problem	16%	13%	13%	11%	15%
Major problem	77%	79%	80%	78%	72%

Table 7: Services

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Primary and secondary education					
Very good	19%	31%	19%	14%	35%
Good	41%	37%	40%	28%	45%
Poor	15%	14%	18%	19%	12%
Very poor	25%	18%	23%	39%	9%
Hospitals and health facilities					
Very good	8%	12%	8%	7%	19%
Good	22%	28%	23%	26%	34%
Poor	24%	19%	26%	23%	18%
Very poor	46%	41%	43%	44%	29%
Roads					
Very good	6%	11%	5%	5%	17%
Good	20%	26%	19%	17%	36%
Poor	23%	25%	27%	22%	22%
Very poor	51%	38%	49%	56%	25%
Electricity					
Very good	9%	13%	2%	8%	15%
Good	22%	23%	14%	16%	35%
Poor	17%	16%	16%	16%	22%
Very poor	52%	49%	68%	61%	28%
Policing					
Very good	14%	18%	12%	22%	23%
Good	32%	43%	39%	42%	48%
Poor	18%	15%	23%	13%	17%
Very poor	36%	24%	26%	22%	13%
Garbage collection					
Very good	26%	24%	16%	13%	61%
Good	35%	32%	37%	30%	27%
Poor	15%	17%	18%	19%	5%
Very poor	24%	27%	29%	38%	7%
Issuance of licenses, permits and official documents, such as driver's license, birth certificate, marriage certificate					
Very good	28%	29%	22%	20%	48%
Good	42%	42%	45%	41%	37%
Poor	12%	12%	14%	15%	9%
Very poor	18%	17%	19%	24%	6%
Drinking water					
Very good	27%	32%	24%	30%	46%
Good	41%	38%	45%	46%	34%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Poor	14%	16%	17%	11%	9%
Very poor	18%	15%	15%	13%	11%
Primary and secondary education					
Municipal councils	18%	16%	16%	14%	16%
National government	33%	26%	29%	26%	25%
Shared responsibility	42%	53%	49%	51%	52%
Someone else	8%	5%	7%	9%	7%
Hospitals and health facilities					
Municipal councils	20%	14%	16%	16%	19%
National government	36%	33%	38%	33%	29%
Shared responsibility	38%	47%	41%	43%	45%
Someone else	7%	6%	5%	8%	7%
Roads					
Municipal councils	24%	21%	24%	22%	26%
National government	35%	31%	34%	30%	29%
Shared responsibility	34%	42%	38%	40%	39%
Someone else	7%	6%	5%	7%	7%
Electricity					
Municipal councils	17%	14%	15%	16%	16%
National government	42%	39%	42%	37%	35%
Shared responsibility	34%	40%	37%	39%	40%
Someone else	7%	6%	6%	8%	8%
Policing					
Municipal councils	16%	14%	13%	11%	19%
National government	48%	41%	46%	45%	39%
Shared responsibility	30%	41%	36%	36%	37%
Someone else	6%	5%	5%	8%	5%
Garbage collection					
Municipal councils	41%	34%	36%	37%	44%
National government	24%	22%	23%	23%	20%
Shared responsibility	29%	38%	36%	33%	32%
Someone else	6%	6%	5%	6%	4%
Issuance of licenses, permits and official documents, such as driver's license, birth certificate, marriage certificate					
Municipal councils	32%	30%	29%	29%	35%
National government	33%	31%	31%	34%	28%
Shared responsibility	29%	35%	36%	32%	32%
Someone else	5%	4%	4%	5%	4%
Drinking water					
Municipal councils	32%	28%	26%	25%	34%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
National government	32%	29%	33%	34%	25%
Shared responsibility	30%	37%	36%	35%	35%
Someone else	6%	5%	5%	6%	6%

Table 8: Institutions

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
To what extent do you trust the following institutions to improve Libya's future?					
General National Congress					
Distrust	58%	50%	50%	74%	34%
Low trust	8%	14%	11%	9%	11%
Moderately trust	18%	19%	21%	10%	28%
Trust	5%	6%	6%	3%	11%
Highly trust	11%	10%	12%	4%	16%
House of Representatives					
Distrust	56%	52%	61%	49%	72%
Low trust	14%	17%	14%	16%	10%
Moderately trust	16%	20%	17%	22%	12%
Trust	6%	6%	4%	5%	2%
Highly trust	8%	5%	4%	8%	3%
Judiciary					
Distrust	26%	24%	24%	22%	17%
Low trust	11%	14%	12%	11%	10%
Moderately trust	21%	26%	25%	26%	28%
Trust	13%	15%	15%	15%	17%
Highly trust	28%	21%	24%	26%	28%
Military					
Distrust	30%	25%	35%	18%	30%
Low trust	9%	10%	12%	5%	11%
Moderately trust	18%	19%	17%	19%	23%
Trust	10%	16%	13%	15%	13%
Highly trust	33%	30%	23%	42%	23%
Police					
Distrust	19%	16%	18%	11%	17%
Low trust	8%	9%	11%	5%	10%
Moderately trust	20%	21%	22%	20%	23%
Trust	15%	18%	18%	16%	18%
Highly trust	39%	36%	30%	48%	32%
Municipal council (local government)					
Distrust	31%	28%	30%	34%	19%
Low trust	11%	14%	14%	12%	12%
Moderately trust	22%	26%	25%	24%	26%
Trust	13%	13%	14%	12%	18%
Highly trust	23%	19%	17%	18%	25%
The Grand Mufti Institution					
Distrust	45%	34%	33%	41%	26%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Low trust	9%	11%	10%	10%	8%
Moderately trust	16%	21%	21%	20%	20%
Trust	10%	14%	14%	10%	15%
Highly trust	21%	20%	23%	18%	32%
Political parties					
Distrust	78%	72%	72%	78%	70%
Low trust	8%	9%	10%	9%	11%
Moderately trust	8%	12%	12%	8%	14%
Trust	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%
Highly trust	5%	4%	4%	3%	3%
Armed groups					
Distrust	87%	87%	87%	92%	78%
Low trust	4%	5%	4%	3%	9%
Moderately trust	5%	4%	5%	2%	7%
Trust	1%	2%	2%	2%	3%
Highly trust	3%	2%	2%	1%	3%
High National Elections Commission					
Distrust	30%	28%	26%	34%	24%
Low trust	8%	12%	11%	14%	13%
Moderately trust	27%	30%	29%	26%	29%
Trust	13%	15%	17%	13%	16%
Highly trust	22%	15%	17%	14%	18%
Constitution Drafting Assembly					
Distrust	37%	28%	33%	35%	32%
Low trust	11%	14%	11%	16%	14%
Moderately trust	27%	32%	29%	28%	30%
Trust	9%	14%	11%	11%	12%
Highly trust	15%	12%	16%	10%	12%
The National Dialogue Preparatory Commission					
Distrust	30%	28%	26%	34%	24%
Low trust	8%	12%	11%	14%	13%
Moderately trust	27%	30%	29%	26%	29%
Trust	13%	15%	17%	13%	16%
Highly trust	22%	15%	17%	14%	18%
Civil society					
Distrust	22%	17%	18%	24%	17%
Low trust	10%	13%	12%	13%	11%
Moderately trust	24%	29%	27%	22%	32%
Trust	15%	19%	16%	16%	16%
Highly trust	28%	22%	28%	25%	23%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Municipal Councils have been established in Libya since 2012. How do you evaluate their performance so far?					
Very good	8%	10%	8%	6%	20%
Good	37%	38%	38%	30%	47%
Poor	19%	21%	23%	23%	17%
Very poor	35%	32%	31%	40%	16%
In the past year, how frequently have you had to use wasta?					
Often	13%	7%	10%	11%	8%
Sometimes	24%	15%	26%	22%	18%
Never	64%	78%	64%	67%	74%
People like me have to pay bribes for medical treatment in the local hospitals					
Strongly agree	9%	7%	8%	4%	4%
Agree	8%	7%	10%	5%	5%
Disagree	16%	15%	13%	13%	15%
Strongly disagree	67%	70%	69%	78%	75%
Parents have to pay bribes for their children to be enrolled in the best public primary or secondary schools					
Strongly agree	6%	5%	7%	4%	3%
Agree	7%	7%	8%	5%	5%
Disagree	18%	16%	16%	15%	14%
Strongly disagree	69%	72%	69%	76%	78%
In my municipality, officials receive kickbacks for providing assistance					
Strongly agree	7%	7%	8%	5%	4%
Agree	9%	7%	7%	5%	5%
Disagree	17%	16%	16%	13%	13%
Strongly disagree	67%	70%	69%	77%	78%
In order to get a job in the government in this area, people have to pay a bribe					
Strongly agree	10%	9%	10%	7%	6%
Agree	10%	8%	10%	6%	8%
Disagree	16%	17%	15%	14%	13%
Strongly disagree	64%	66%	65%	74%	73%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Making sure that, once elected, Members of Parliament do their jobs?					
Government	19%	30%	21%	23%	28%
Parliament	11%	9%	6%	9%	7%
Ordinary citizens	12%	12%	13%	12%	12%
Civil society	16%	9%	15%	14%	13%
A dedicated committee	43%	40%	45%	43%	41%
Making sure that, once elected, municipal councilors do their jobs?					
Government	29%	38%	34%	34%	39%
Parliament	7%	5%	3%	8%	4%
Ordinary citizens	15%	15%	15%	13%	14%
Civil society	11%	8%	11%	9%	9%
A dedicated committee	38%	35%	38%	36%	35%

Table 9: Security

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Most important task facing Libya today					
Fight unemployment	6%	8%	9%	5%	7%
Restore economic growth	3%	3%	5%	4%	5%
Build democracy	3%	2%	2%	3%	3%
Finalize the constitution	9%	7%	9%	11%	10%
Assure political stability	10%	11%	11%	9%	15%
Disarm militias	49%	52%	49%	51%	41%
Fight violent crime	8%	7%	6%	6%	7%
Delivering public services	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%
Other (Specify)	10%	6%	7%	10%	10%
Ansar al Shariah Brigade					
Positive	5%	5%	5%	6%	12%
Negative	70%	63%	58%	80%	56%
Don't know	21%	29%	31%	12%	28%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	6%	2%	3%
Libya Shield Brigade in Benghazi					
Positive	15%	14%	12%	8%	27%
Negative	50%	34%	31%	71%	30%
Don't know	31%	49%	51%	18%	40%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	6%	3%	3%
Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room					
Positive	24%	26%	28%	12%	42%
Negative	47%	31%	29%	64%	23%
Don't know	25%	38%	37%	21%	31%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Martyrs of 17 February Brigade					
Positive	21%	23%	23%	12%	35%
Negative	44%	30%	25%	65%	20%
Don't know	31%	43%	46%	20%	41%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Martyrs of Abu Sleem Brigade					
Positive	20%	20%	21%	11%	28%
Negative	45%	29%	28%	60%	22%
Don't know	32%	47%	46%	25%	46%
Refuse to answer	4%	5%	6%	3%	4%
Martyr Rafallah Shahati Battalions					
Positive	11%	7%	9%	9%	14%
Negative	44%	28%	26%	64%	21%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Don't know	41%	60%	58%	24%	61%
Refuse to answer	5%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Al-Suwayli Brigade					
Positive	15%	12%	13%	5%	24%
Negative	44%	29%	29%	57%	31%
Don't know	36%	54%	52%	35%	42%
Refuse to answer	5%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Al-Sawaiq Brigade					
Positive	13%	12%	8%	15%	7%
Negative	49%	34%	41%	46%	50%
Don't know	33%	49%	44%	36%	38%
Refuse to answer	5%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Al-Qaqa Brigade					
Positive	12%	12%	6%	15%	5%
Negative	54%	42%	49%	48%	63%
Don't know	29%	42%	39%	34%	27%
Refuse to answer	5%	5%	6%	3%	5%
Libya Shield Brigade in Misrata					
Positive	21%	21%	22%	7%	53%
Negative	45%	34%	29%	60%	20%
Don't know	29%	41%	43%	31%	23%
Refuse to answer	5%	4%	7%	2%	4%
Al Nawasi Brigade					
Positive	21%	11%	32%	4%	19%
Negative	39%	28%	27%	46%	23%
Don't know	35%	57%	35%	48%	54%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	6%	2%	4%
Quat al Rida Brigade					
Positive	30%	24%	40%	10%	45%
Negative	37%	25%	22%	45%	15%
Don't know	28%	47%	33%	42%	35%
Refuse to answer	5%	4%	6%	2%	4%
Nosoor Battalion					
Positive	8%	6%	5%	3%	19%
Negative	36%	22%	23%	40%	17%
Don't know	52%	67%	65%	53%	59%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	6%	3%	4%
Khalil al Ruwaiti Brigade					
Positive	5%	3%	2%	1%	9%
Negative	33%	21%	20%	37%	17%
Don't know	58%	72%	72%	59%	70%
Refuse to answer	5%	4%	6%	2%	4%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Al Madani Brigade					
Positive	10%	9%	8%	6%	12%
Negative	40%	26%	29%	38%	28%
Don't know	44%	62%	57%	53%	56%
Refuse to answer	5%	4%	6%	2%	4%
Saiqa brigade					
Positive	33%	28%	15%	64%	13%
Negative	33%	20%	28%	17%	37%
Don't know	30%	47%	52%	17%	45%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	6%	2%	4%
Libyan National Army					
Positive	43%	38%	28%	65%	32%
Negative	25%	17%	23%	15%	23%
Don't know	29%	40%	42%	17%	39%
Refuse to answer	4%	4%	7%	2%	5%
Islamic State					
Positive	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Negative	79%	79%	77%	87%	83%
Don't know	15%	17%	17%	9%	12%
Refuse to answer	4%	3%	5%	2%	4%
Integrate armed groups into national police force or military					
Yes	71%	76%	79%	62%	77%
No	29%	24%	21%	38%	23%
Provide other job opportunities to members of armed groups					
Yes	85%	88%	90%	82%	89%
No	15%	12%	10%	18%	11%
Provide education opportunities to members of armed groups					
Yes	88%	92%	93%	85%	91%
No	12%	8%	7%	15%	9%
Support armed groups in transforming into political parties					
Yes	24%	25%	22%	16%	25%
No	76%	75%	78%	84%	75%
Ensure economic support to communities where members of armed groups are from					
Yes	46%	50%	53%	35%	49%
No	54%	50%	47%	65%	51%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
Ensure more local control					
Yes	23%	27%	27%	12%	25%
No	77%	73%	73%	88%	75%
Do you, or anyone in your family, keep a weapon in your home?					
Yes	36%	17%	19%	29%	39%
No	64%	83%	81%	71%	61%
Support for at least one armed group index					
No support for any militia	31%	34%	39%	18%	23%
Support at least one militia	69%	66%	61%	82%	77%

Table 10: Personal Security

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
To what extent is your daily life affected by the current conflict (between HoR and GNC and their respective allied armed groups)?					
To a large extent	53%	39%	39%	62%	33%
To some extent	27%	30%	33%	26%	31%
Not at all	20%	31%	29%	12%	37%
Do not go out at night					
Yes	56%	71%	67%	68%	43%
No	44%	29%	33%	32%	57%
Do not travel at night					
Yes	74%	81%	81%	78%	73%
No	26%	19%	19%	22%	27%
Do not travel outside my home neither during the day or night					
Yes	21%	24%	23%	22%	16%
No	79%	76%	77%	78%	84%
Have taken precautions to secure my home					
Yes	50%	39%	48%	45%	40%
No	50%	61%	52%	55%	60%
Experienced economic problems					
Yes	78%	82%	79%	80%	78%
No	22%	18%	21%	20%	22%
Experienced shortage of food and water					
Yes	53%	61%	46%	53%	38%
No	47%	39%	54%	47%	62%
Been displaced from your home					
Yes	22%	30%	20%	40%	22%
No	78%	70%	80%	60%	78%
In the past year, have you heard of the following problems occurring in your municipality?					
Murder					
Yes	80%	79%	78%	84%	85%
No	20%	21%	22%	16%	15%
Robbery					
Yes	80%	77%	81%	81%	72%
No	20%	23%	19%	19%	28%
Kidnapping					
Yes	63%	60%	67%	69%	56%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
No	37%	40%	33%	31%	44%
Car theft and car jacking					
Yes	78%	77%	86%	82%	66%
No	22%	23%	14%	18%	34%
Physical assaults					
Yes	62%	51%	58%	61%	53%
No	38%	49%	42%	39%	47%
Drug use					
Yes	83%	72%	82%	83%	78%
No	17%	28%	18%	17%	22%
Online harassment or threats					
Yes	46%	33%	34%	53%	33%
No	54%	67%	66%	47%	67%
Do you think about emigrating from Libya to another country due to the current conflict?					
Yes	31%	25%	32%	30%	21%
No	69%	75%	68%	70%	80%
Do you think about moving to another place in Libya due to the current conflict?					
Yes	17%	16%	11%	22%	6%
No	79%	77%	86%	67%	90%
I have already moved	5%	6%	3%	11%	4%
In the past 12 months, have you personally been a victim of any of the following?					
Threats					
Yes	14%	6%	9%	15%	6%
No	86%	94%	91%	85%	94%
Violent assault					
Yes	7%	3%	4%	5%	3%
No	93%	97%	96%	95%	97%
Theft					
Yes	12%	9%	12%	11%	7%
No	88%	91%	88%	89%	93%
Honor violation					
Yes	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%
No	100%	99%	100%	99%	100%
Sexual harassment					
Yes	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%
No	100%	99%	99%	99%	99%

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
When this happened to you, who did you go to first to get help?					
No one	43%	55%	46%	41%	49%
Family or friends	20%	14%	23%	17%	15%
Local political leader or municipal council member	2%	0%	1%	1%	2%
Local religious leader or imam	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Local tribe leaders	4%	1%	1%	1%	3%
Local armed group	4%	4%	6%	2%	5%
Police	15%	12%	14%	16%	15%
Military	5%	5%	1%	15%	2%
Other (specify)	6%	9%	8%	8%	10%

Table 11: Security Providers

	Male	Female	Tripoli	Benghazi	Misrata
To what extent are the following actors providing security in your community?					
Local police					
Providing security	31%	42%	28%	41%	39%
Providing some security	37%	39%	42%	39%	45%
Creating some insecurity	7%	4%	9%	6%	5%
Creating insecurity	25%	16%	21%	14%	11%
Municipal council					
Providing security	24%	33%	22%	22%	33%
Providing some security	34%	40%	39%	35%	45%
Creating some insecurity	9%	8%	12%	9%	7%
Creating insecurity	33%	20%	27%	34%	15%
Military					
Providing security	34%	43%	28%	51%	39%
Providing some security	29%	30%	34%	31%	39%
Creating some insecurity	8%	6%	11%	4%	6%
Creating insecurity	30%	20%	28%	14%	16%
Tribes / tribal leaders					
Providing security	39%	46%	24%	39%	35%
Providing some security	32%	31%	30%	34%	35%
Creating some insecurity	8%	4%	11%	4%	9%
Creating insecurity	21%	19%	34%	22%	21%
Religious councils					
Providing security	29%	42%	24%	26%	43%
Providing some security	31%	29%	32%	30%	35%
Creating some insecurity	8%	5%	12%	7%	8%
Creating insecurity	31%	24%	32%	37%	14%
Armed groups					
Providing security	7%	11%	9%	4%	17%
Providing some security	13%	15%	17%	6%	22%
Creating some insecurity	12%	7%	12%	6%	11%
Creating insecurity	68%	67%	62%	83%	50%
In your opinion, which of these groups should be the most responsible for providing security in your area?					
Local police	54%	51%	60%	45%	57%
Municipal council	9%	12%	13%	7%	18%
Military	30%	30%	22%	43%	20%
Tribes / tribal leaders	5%	5%	2%	3%	4%

Religious leaders	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%
Armed groups	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%

ANNEX X: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Demographics

1. What is your gender?

1. Male
2. Female

2. How old are you?

3. Where do you live?

Do you live in a city or close to a city, or do you live in a small settlement in the countryside?

Do you live in the center of the city or on the outskirts?

Priorities

4. Which of the following priorities would you say is the most important task that Libya is facing today?

[Randomize]

1. Fight unemployment
2. Restore economic growth
3. Build democracy
4. Finalize the constitution
5. Assure political stability
6. Disarm militias
7. Fight violent crime
8. Delivering public services
9. Other (which) _____
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

Elections

5. Since 2011 a number of elections have been held in Libya. Did you vote in any of the following elections? [after, skip to 303 if "yes" to all four elections]

	1 Yes	2 No	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. General National Congress election July 2012	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Constitution Drafting Assembly election in February 2014	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. House of Representatives election in June 2014	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Local municipal elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. What was the reasons you did not vote [Skip is yes to all in q5] [INTERVIEWER: Do not mention the options and circle the choice of the respondent]

- a. Was not allowed/eligible (underage)
- b. Did not know where voting was
- c. Did not care for any of the candidates
- d. My vote would not make a difference
- e. Was not registered to vote
- f. Not interested in politics
- g. Elections did not matter
- h. Did not have the time
- i. Not able to get to the polling place (too old, sick, or work/live too far from polling place)
- j. I was worried about potential violence at the polling station
- k. I boycotted the election
- l. Other reasons (which) _____

7. In your view, to what extent do you believe that each of these elections were free and fair?

1 Not free	2 Somewh at free and fair	3 Free and fair	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]

	and fair					
1. General National Congress election July 2012	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Constitution Drafting Assembly election in February 2014	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. House of Representatives election in June 2014	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Local municipal elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. If any of these elections were held tomorrow, would you go and vote?						
	1 Yes	2 No	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]		
1. Parliamentary elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Presidential elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Local municipal elections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Elections for regional parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Constitutional referendum (referendum to approve a new constitution)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Constitution

9. To what extent do you believe that the following rights should be protected in the new constitution for Libya? [Randomize]					
	1 Not protected	2 Somewhat protected	3 Fully protected	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Racial and ethnic equality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Freedom of speech	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Freedom of assembly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Freedom of religion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Equal rights for women	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Right to a fair trial	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Right to education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Right to work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Freedom from torture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Right to access government information	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10. On a scale of 1 to 5, where one is preferring that the constitution outlines a political system where the central government has most of the power, and five is preferring that the constitution outlines a political system where the local governments have most of the power:							
	1 Central	2	3	4	5 Local	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Where do you place your preference?	<input type="checkbox"/>						

11. To what extent do you have confidence that the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (the committee of 60, tasked with developing a new constitution for Libya) will be able to...					
	1 Not at all	2 To some extent	3 To a large extent	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Develop a constitution that I would approve of	<input type="checkbox"/>				
2. Put a constitution to a referendum in 2016	<input type="checkbox"/>				
3. Educate the public on the Constitution	<input type="checkbox"/>				

12. In your opinion should the draft constitution be approved by a popular referendum?

1. Yes
2. No
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

Local government

13. To what extent do you trust the following institutions to improve Libya's future?							
	1 Dis trus t	2 Low trust	3 Modera tely trust	4 Tru st	5 Highly trust	[96Do n't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. General National Congress	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. House of Representatives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Judiciary	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Military	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Police	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Municipal council (local government)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. The Grand Mufti Institution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Political Parties	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Armed groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. High National Elections Commission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Constitution Drafting Assembly	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. The National Dialogue Preparatory Commission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Civil society	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

14. Municipal Councils have been established in Libya since 2012. How do you evaluate their performance so far?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Poor
4. Very poorly
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

15. How do you evaluate the quality of the following goods and services in your area?						
	1 Very good	2 Good	3 Poor	4 Very poor	96 [Don't know]	97 [Refuse to answer]
1. Primary and secondary education	<input type="checkbox"/>					
2. Hospitals and health facilities	<input type="checkbox"/>					
3. Roads	<input type="checkbox"/>					
4. Electricity	<input type="checkbox"/>					
5. Policing	<input type="checkbox"/>					
6. Garbage collection	<input type="checkbox"/>					
7. Issuance of licenses, permits & official documents, such as driver's license, birth certificate, marriage certificate	<input type="checkbox"/>					
10. Drinking water	<input type="checkbox"/>					

16. In the current situation should the municipal councils, the national government, both of them, or someone else be primarily responsible for assuring the quality of each of the following

	1. Municipal councils	2. National government	3. Shared responsibility	4. Someone else	[96. Don't know]	[97. Refuse to answer]
1. Primary and secondary education	<input type="checkbox"/>					
2. Hospitals and health facilities	<input type="checkbox"/>					
3. Roads	<input type="checkbox"/>					
4. Electricity	<input type="checkbox"/>					
5. Policing	<input type="checkbox"/>					
6. Garbage collection	<input type="checkbox"/>					
7. Issuance of licenses, permits & official documents, such as driver's license, birth certificate, marriage certificate	<input type="checkbox"/>					
10. Drinking water	<input type="checkbox"/>					

Local issues

17. Now I would like to hear what your feelings are towards specific armed groups in Libya. For each of the following, please tell me if you feel positively or negatively about them [Randomize]				
	1. Positive	2. Negative	[96. Don't know]	[97. Refuse to answer]
1. Ansar al Shariah Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Libya Shield Brigade in Benghazi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Martyrs of 17 February Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Martyrs of Abu Sleem Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Martyr Rafallah Shahati Battalions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Al-Suwayli Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Al-Sawaiq Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Al-Qaqa Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Libya Shield Brigade in Misrata	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Al Nawasi Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Quat al Rida Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Nosoor Battalion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Khalil al Ruwaiti Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Al Madani Brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. Saiqa brigade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. Libyan National Army	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Islamic State /ISIS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18. As you know there is a conflict between the HoR and the GNC and their respective allied armed groups. If a peace deal is reached, do you think the following methods should be used to get the armed groups to stop fighting?				
	1. Yes	2. No	[96. Don't know]	[97. Refuse to answer]
1. Integrate armed groups into national police force or military	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Provide other job opportunities to members of armed groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Provide education opportunities to members of armed groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Support armed groups in transforming into political parties	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Ensure economic support to communities where members of armed groups are from	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. Ensure more local control of armed groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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19. Do you, or anyone in your family, keep a weapon in your home?

1. Yes

2. No

96. Don't know

97. Refuse to answer

20. To what extent are the following actors providing security in your community? Are they providing security, providing some security, creating some insecurity or creating insecurity?						
	1. Providing security	2. Providing some security	3. Creating some insecurity	4. Creating insecurity	[97 Refuse to answer]	[96 Don't know]
1. Local police	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Municipal council	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Military	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Tribes / tribal leaders	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Religious councils	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Armed groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

21. How safe do you feel for your personal safety and security in these contexts? Please respond to the following conditions by telling me if you would feel very unsafe, somewhat unsafe, somewhat safe, or very safe?

	1 Very unsafe	2 Somewhat unsafe	3 Somewhat safe	4 Very safe	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. In your home	<input type="checkbox"/>					
2. In your neighborhood	<input type="checkbox"/>					
3. In your car while driving	<input type="checkbox"/>					
4. While travelling by taxi or bus in your village, town or city	<input type="checkbox"/>					
5. While travelling by taxi or bus to another village, town or city	<input type="checkbox"/>					
6. Going to and from school/ work	<input type="checkbox"/>					
7. Going to and from the shop or market to buy groceries	<input type="checkbox"/>					
8. Going to and from the mosque to attend religious service	<input type="checkbox"/>					

22. To what extent is your daily life affected by the current conflict (between HoR and GNC and their respective allied armed groups)?

1. To a large extent

2. To some extent

3. Not at all [Skip to 608]

96. Don't know

97. Refuse to answer

23. In what ways have your daily life been affected by the current conflict?				
	1 Yes	2 No	[96DK]	[97 RA]
1. Do not go out at night	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Do not travel at night	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Do not travel outside my home neither during the day or night	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Have taken precautions to secure my home	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Experienced economic problems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Experienced shortage of food and water	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Having to pass by an army checkpoint	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Having to pass by a police checkpoint	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Having to pass by a thwar checkpoint	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Been displaced from your home	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

24. In your opinion, which of these groups should be the most responsible for providing security in your area?

1. Local police
2. Municipal council
3. Military
4. Tribes / tribal leaders
5. Religious leaders
6. Armed groups
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

25. In the past year, have you heard of the following problems occurring in your municipality?				
	1 Yes	2 No	[97 Refuse to answer]	[96 Don't know]
1. Murder	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Robbery	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Kidnapping	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Car theft and car jacking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Physical Assaults	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Drug use	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Online harassment or threats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

26. Do you think about emigrating from Libya to another country due to the current conflict?

1. Yes
2. No
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

27. Do you think about moving to another place in Libya due to the current conflict?

1. Yes
2. No
3. I have already moved to another place in Libya due to the current conflict.
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

28. In the past 12 months, have you personally been a victim of any of the following? [after, skip to 60I if "no" to all five options] [male respondents skip option 5]				
	1 Yes	2 No	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Threats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Violent assault	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Theft	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Honor violation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Sexual harassment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

29. When this happened to you , who did you go to first to get help? [Interviewer: Do not read out]

1. No one
2. Family or friends [skip to 33]
3. Local political leader or municipal council member [skip to 33]
4. Local religious leader or imam [skip to 33]
5. Local tribe leaders [skip to 33]
6. Local armed group [skip to 33]
7. Police[skip to 33]
8. Military[skip to 33]
9. Other (specify)_____ [skip to 33]
96. Don't know [skip to 33]
97. Refuse to answer [skip to 33]

30. Why did you not seek help? [after skip to 33]

1. Did not think anyone could help me
2. Too embarrassed about what happened
3. I did not think it was important
4. Other (specify)_____
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

31. Was the person able to offer you the help you needed?

1. Yes
2. No
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

32. Who else did you turn to for help?

1. No one
2. Family or friends
3. Local political leader or municipal council member
4. Local religious leader or imam
5. Local tribe leaders
6. Local armed group
7. Police
8. Military
9. Other (specify)_____
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

Media

33. Which of the following sources do you use to get information on the situation in Libya?

- 1 TV
- 2 Radio
- 3 Newspapers
- 4 Social media (Twitter/Facebook)
- 5 Local imam
- 6 Tribal leader
- 7 Head of family
- 8 National politicians
- 9 Local politicians
- 10 Foreign media (TV, radio or newspapers)
- 11 Other (specify)_____
96. Don't know

97. Refuse to answer

34. Which source is most trustworthy on providing information on the situation in Libya?

1. TV
 2. Radio
 3. Newspapers
 4. Social media (Twitter/Facebook)
 5. Local imam
 6. Tribal leader
 7. Head of family
 8. National politicians
 9. Local politicians
 10. Foreign media (TV, radio or newspapers)
 11. Other (specify) _____
 12. None
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

Corruption

35. Now I would like to ask you who should be responsible for making sure that elected officials do their job. Should the government, parliament, citizens, or civil society be responsible for:								
	1. Government	2. Parliament	3. Ordinary citizens	4. Civil society	5. A dedicated committee	6. No one	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Making sure that, once elected, Members of Parliament do their jobs?	<input type="checkbox"/>							
2. Making sure that, once elected, municipal councilors do their jobs?	<input type="checkbox"/>							

36. I am going to read four statements about events that occur sometimes. When I read them, please think about your own experience and tell me how much you agree with each statement.						
	1. Strongly agree	2. Agree	3. Disagree	4. Strongly disagree	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. People like me have to pay bribes for medical treatment in the local hospitals.	<input type="checkbox"/>					
2. Parents have to pay bribes for their children to be enrolled in the best public primary or secondary schools	<input type="checkbox"/>					
3. In my municipality, officials receive kickbacks for providing assistance.	<input type="checkbox"/>					
4. In order to get a job in the government in this area, people have to pay a bribe.	<input type="checkbox"/>					

37. In the past year, how frequently have you had to use wasta

1. Often

- 2. Sometimes
- 3. Never
- 96. Don't know
- 97. Refuse to answer

Judiciary

38. To what extent do you agree with the statement "Courts in Libya are providing fair trials to citizens"?

- 1. Strongly disagree
- 2. Disagree
- 3. Agree
- 4. Strongly agree
- 96. Don't know
- 97. Refuse to answer

39. In your view, should the judiciary be largely responsible, somewhat responsible, or not at all responsible for ... [Note to interviewer, please read each of the following items]

	1 Largely responsible	2 Somewhat responsibl e	3 Not at all responsibl e	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Resolving legal disputes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Impose sentences and other legal punishment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Protecting individual constitutional rights	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Checking the power of the government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Implement transitional justice	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Citizen engagement

40. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?						
	1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Agree	4. Strongly agree	[97 Refuse to answer]	[96 Don't know]
1. People like me don't have any say about what the government does	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. I know more about politics than most people my age	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Sometimes, politics and government in Libya seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Local public hearings are conducted only as a formality and have little influence on municipal decisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

41. In the past three years, have you ever...?		1. Yes	2. No	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1.	Worked on a political campaign	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

2.	Participated in a demonstration since February 2011	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	Used force or violence for a political cause	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.	Attended a community meeting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5.	Got together with others to raise an issue	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

42. Are you currently a member of any of the following organizations?				
	1. Yes	2. No	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Political party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Religious organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Labor union and/or professional association	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Civil society organization / Local Non-Governmental Organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Gender

43. Now I would like to hear about your perception of differences between men and women in doing certain activities.					
	2 Man	1 Wom an	0 No Differenc e	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. In general, would you have more confidence in a man or a woman to represent your interests in the national politics (GNC or HoR) or would you say there is no difference?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. In general, would you have more confidence in a man or a woman to represent your interests in the local politics (in the municipal council) or would you say there is no difference?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. In general, would you say that male or female elected officials (GNC or HoR) perform their tasks as elected officials better, or would you say there is no difference?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

44. Do you believe that men and women should have the...				
	1 Yes	2 No	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Same pay for the same type of work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Same right to a primary education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Same right to an university education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Same right to be elected for parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Same right to travel alone	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Equal say in how to raise their children	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Equal say in household finances	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Same right to demand divorce	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Same right to freely choose their spouse	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Same right to freely choose their own clothing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

45. How common do you think that these types of crimes towards women (Gender Based Violence) are in your community?

	1. Very common	2. Common	3. Uncommon	4. Very uncommon	[96 Don't know]	[97 Refuse to answer]
1. Verbal harassment: For example name calling, cat calls, or acting to create an unpleasant or hostile situation	<input type="checkbox"/>					
2. Violence in the home: For example beating his wife or sister, or someone in his household	<input type="checkbox"/>					
3. Violence outside the home: For example being pushed or hit, on the street or at a market	<input type="checkbox"/>					

46. To what extent do you think that these types of crimes towards women (Gender Based Violence) are a problem in your community?					
	3. Major problem	2. Minor problem	1. Not a problem	[97 Don't know]	[96 Refuse to answer]
1. Verbal harassment	<input type="checkbox"/>				
2. Violence in the home	<input type="checkbox"/>				
3. Violence outside the home	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Demographic questions

47. Which of the following describes you best? B. Then, which describes you second best? (For Interviewer: Read the choices and write 1 next to first choice and 2 next to the 2nd choice)

First choice

Second choice

1. Libyan
2. Arab / Amazigh /Tabu
3. Muslim
4. Regional (Cyrenaica, Fezzan and Tripolitania)
5. Local (eg. Misurata, Zintani, Benghazi, Tripoli etc.)
6. Man/woman
7. [Other]:

[96. Don't know]

[97. Refuse to answer]

48. Marital status:

1. Single
2. In a relationship
3. Engaged
4. Married
5. Divorced
6. Widow
7. Separated

49. Number of children if you have:

50. Educational level:

1. Illiterate
2. Primary
3. Preparatory
4. Secondary
5. Professional diploma
6. BA/BS
7. High education diploma
8. MA/MS
9. PhD or other doctorate

51. Do you work [if no: Go to 1311]

- a. Yes
- b. No

52. How many people live with you (besides yourself)?

53. How important is religion in your life?

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Neutral
4. Not important
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

54. What is your family's average monthly income in Libyan dinar (only one answer is allowed; income should include all family member's salaries, wages, rental, etc...)?

1. Less than 500
2. 500 – 999
3. 1000 – 1999
4. 2000 – 2999
5. 3000 – 3999
6. 4000 – 4999
7. 5000 – 5999
8. 6000 – 6999
9. 7000 or more
96. Don't know
97. Refuse to answer

55. Can you please tell me if you have each of the following in your home?					
		1 Yes	2 No	96 Don't know	97 Refuse to answer
1.	A satellite dish	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.	A computer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	internet connection	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.	A cell phone	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5.	A car	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

56. Can you please tell me if you do each of the following?					
		1 Yes	2 No	96 Don't know	97 Refuse to answer
1.	Use the internet?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	Have a Facebook account	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	Follow blogs or Twitter	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

57. How many sim cards do you have?

58. Do you have sim cards for both Al madar and Libyana?

Thank you!

59. In your opinion, was the respondent being candid?

1. Yes
2. No

60. What is the network?

1. Madar
2. Libyana

61. What is the phone number?

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