



MID-TERM EVALUATION (JUNE 4 – AUGUST 23, 2015)

THE AFGHANISTAN TRADE AND REVENUE PROJECT



HAIRATAN BORDER, AFGHANISTAN; Photo Courtesy: Savitri Singh

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Executive Summary	1
	1. Background	1
	2. Purpose of Evaluation	1
	3. Methodology, Limitations, and Definitions	2
	4. Summary Findings and Conclusions.....	3
	5. Summary Recommendations	4
	6. Barriers to Implementation and Satisfaction with Project	7
II.	Introduction.....	9
	1. Background	9
	2. Purpose of Evaluation	10
	3. Methodology, Limitations, and Definitions	11
	a. Methodology	11
	b. Limitations.....	11
	c. Definitions	12
III.	Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations	12
	Evaluation Question 1	12
	Finding – Legislative Reforms for WTO Accession	12
	Conclusion	13
	Recommendation.....	13
	Evaluation Question 2.....	13
	Finding – Capacity and Sustainability of ATAR’s Partners	13
	Conclusions	17
	Recommendations	18
	Evaluation Question 3.....	19
	Finding – Facilitating Access to Regional Markets	19
	Conclusions	25
	Recommendations	25
	Evaluation Question 4.....	26
	Finding – E-Pay	26
	Conclusions	28
	Recommendations	28
	Evaluation Question 5.....	28
	Finding – Increasing Women in Government.....	28
	Conclusions	30
	Recommendations	31
	Evaluation Question 6.....	31

Finding – Capacity TPAU and CSO	32
Conclusions	34
Recommendations	34
Component 1: Support to ACD on Strengthening the Customs Code	34
Finding – Customs Valuation-GATT Article VII.....	34
Conclusions	36
Recommendation.....	36
Finding – Advanced Binding Rulings.....	36
Conclusion	36
Recommendation.....	36
Finding – Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights	37
Conclusions	37
Recommendations	37
Component 3: Support to ACD on Customs Administration	38
Finding – Monitor Border Management Model.....	38
Conclusions	40
Recommendations	40
Finding – Risk Management	41
Conclusions	42
Recommendations	42
Finding – Streamlining – Implementing the Blueprint	43
Conclusions	44
Recommendations	44
Finding – Post Clearance Audit	45
Conclusions	46
Recommendations	46
Finding – Ensuring Compliance at ACD	46
Conclusion	47
Recommendation.....	47
Finding – Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA).....	47
Conclusion	48
Recommendations	48
Overall Findings Relating to ACD, MoCI Concerns	48
IV. Annexes	51
Annex I Legislative Agenda and Status- MoCI-ATAR Comparison EQ-1	51
Annex II Capacity Building EQ-2	54
Annex III Statement of Work	60
Annex IV Work Plan	75
Annex V Bibliography of Documents Reviewed	92

Annex VI Schedule of Meetings.....	94
Annex VII Detailed Description of Methodology	103
Annex VIII Evaluation Tools	106
Annex IX Response to Security Questions.....	114
Annex X Detailed Interview Notes.....	115
Annex XI Disclosure of Any Conflicts of Interest	116

ACRONYMS

ACBR	Afghanistan Commercial Business Registry
ACCI	Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ACD	Afghanistan Customs Department
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIB	Afghanistan International Bank
ANCA	Afghanistan National Customs Academy
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANSA	Afghanistan National Standards Authority
APTTA	Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement
APTTCA	Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Coordinating Authority
ARFC	Afghan Rural Fund Company
ASYCUDA	Automated System for Customs Data
ATAR	Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project
B2B	Business-to-Business
BCP	Border Crossing Point
BMM	Border Management Model
CABOC	Central Asian Business Opportunities Conference
CAR	Central Asian Republics
CAREC	Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
CATF	Central Asia Trade Forum
CBTA	Cross-Border Transport of Persons, Vehicles, and Goods
CCI	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CHAMP	Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Program
CITS	Comprehensive Integrated Tariff System
CPMM	CAREC Corridor Performance Management and Monitoring
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CO	Country Office
CSO	Central Statistics Office
DAB	Da Afghanistan Bank
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EDI	Electronic Data Interchange
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ENP	Enquiry and Notification Point
EPAA	Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan
E-Pay	Electronic Payment
EPU	Entry Processing Unit
EQ	Evaluation Question
FAIDA	Financial Access for Investing in Development of Afghanistan
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
ICD	Inland Clearance Depot
IP	Intellectual Property
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IT	Information Technology
KCCI	Kyrgyzstan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
KIA	Kabul International Airport
KIC	Kabul Inland Customs
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MoCI	Ministry of Commerce and Industries
MOIC	Ministry of Information and Culture
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NPP	National Priority Program
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PATTTA	Pakistan Afghanistan Tajikistan Transit and Trade Agreement
PCA	Post Clearance Audit
PPQD	Plant Protection and Quarantine Department
Promote	Promote Women in Government
REC	Regional Economic Cooperation project
SAARC	South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area Agreement
SATIS	SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services
TA	Technical Assistance
TAFA	Trade Accession and Facilitation for Afghanistan Project
TCCI	Tajikistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TFA	(WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TIR	Transports Internationaux Routiers
TOT	Training of Trainers
TPAU	Trade Policy Analysis Unit
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
TRIPS	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
USPTO	United States Patent and Trademark Office
WB	World Bank
WCO	World Customs Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. BACKGROUND

The Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) is a four-year, USAID-funded project that began on November 7, 2013 and will end on November 6, 2017. Implemented by Chemonics International with a budget of approximately \$77.8 million, it continues the work of two previous USAID/Afghanistan activities, Trade and Accession Facilitation (TAFA) I and II, as well as expands their outreach, particularly with respect to regional integration. ATAR supports capacity building at both individual and organizational levels, and has extended its support to both the public and private sectors across the region, especially to the Central Asian Republics (CARs).

ATAR is designed to strengthen the business climate of Afghanistan to enable private investment and enhance trade, job creation, and fiscal sustainability through Afghanistan's critical Transition Period, and continuing into the Transformation Decade. The Project has three components:

Component 1 - Provide technical assistance on trade agreements, World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, and rules compliance;

Component 2 - Provide support for the organization of regional trade fairs and private sector matchmaking events, support in implementing regional trade agreements and support the implementation of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Corridors 5 & 6 by working with the relevant regional countries.

Component 3 - Provide capacity building for the implementation of reforms in customs (e.g., Border Management Model (BMM), Risk Management (RM), customs procedures modernization and streamlining, customs procedures harmonization with customs of other countries).

ATAR works with many key Afghan Ministries/Departments, including the Ministry of Commerce and Industries (MoCI), the Afghan Customs Department (ACD), the Ministry of Information and Culture, (MoIC), the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Afghan National Standard Authority (ANSA), and the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA). In addition, the Project's work extends to key private sector entities, including the Chambers of Commerce, associations, and women's groups, and has a cross-cutting focus on gender.

2. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to provide answers to the Evaluation Questions stated in the Statement of Work (Annex 3), and listed below. The evaluation focused on assessing ATAR's performance from its inception in 2013 to the end of 2014 in achieving its

program goals, objectives, and results. We answer Evaluation Question 6 in a table at the end of our Recommendations, for ease of reporting.

1. Is the current status of the legislation for the laws required to join the WTO (particularly the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade) consistent with the latest reports by the Implementing Partner about their current status?
2. How effective have been ATAR's efforts to improve the technical abilities of the staff it has worked with at the partner agencies to organize, negotiate, draft and implement the WTO related legislation, regulation, procedures for which they are responsible?
3. To what extent has the technical assistance provided correctly targeted the necessary skills, appropriately delivered, to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan)?
4. To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?
5. Which aspects of ATAR's assistance have been most effective in expanding the participation of Afghan women, and, opening career options for these women at the counterpart ministries? As appropriate, identify those approaches that were both effective and the most accepted by ministry staff.
6. How effective has each component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

3. METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

a. Methodology

The ATAR performance evaluation was conducted over a seven-week period by a team of two international consultants and two Afghan consultants. The evaluation was principally qualitative, using a document review, interviews with key stakeholders in the public and private sectors, field visits, focus groups discussions, and telephone and Skype calls.

b. Limitations

The time allotted for the evaluation, the reach of ATAR, and security concerns posed challenges and constraints to the Evaluation Team. The evaluation began during the month of Ramadan, when the work schedule was shortened to accommodate fasting, followed by the three-day Eid holiday. Further, because ATAR spans several ministries, government field offices for customs operations, and private sector stakeholders both in Afghanistan and South

and Central Asia, it was difficult to engage with as many of the partners and beneficiaries as the evaluation team would have liked. With respect to Component 2 of the Project and regional integration, the team relied on phone and Skype interviews with ATAR's regional counterparts. Security concerns added yet another layer of constraints, making visits to the Afghan borders difficult.

c. Definitions

Re-route, when used in a risk management context, means to manually change the ASYCUDA-generated risk level designation to another risk level designation.

Second-level senior staff, when used in the context of the MoCI, means staff under the DG level, *e.g.*, Head of a Unit.

4. SUMMARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Evaluation Question 1

- ATAR's report on the status of the Legislative Action Plan is consistent with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIROA's) current reported status on these laws, procedures, and actions.

Evaluation Question 2

- ATAR's Component 1 is on track regarding WTO accession activities.
- ATAR has begun limited capacity development to implement WTO obligations, mostly by preparing ministry officials to respond to the WTO.
- Senior-level officials in the International Trade Directorate have built capacity to negotiate during these past years, starting with TAFAs. Negotiating the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), in particular, developed capacity and an understanding of the policy impact of negotiations, which is continually being developed. This is sustainable only to the extent that these officials remain in their current positions.
- The capacity to draft legislation and organize varies across ministries and within offices in any given ministry. The relevant ministry units do not have the capacity to draft laws, and have limited capacity to draft regulations and procedures. They have varying capacities to organize. ATAR developed capacity in the government when it worked directly with staff on drafting legislation, and failed to do so when it drafted legislation remotely and handed it to the government.

Evaluation Question 3

- The Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA) is a weak institution. This is due to a number of factors, including EPAA's current lack of financial sustainability. However, supporting EPAA financially or EPAA's achieving financial independence

is outside the scope of ATAR's mandate. ATAR's efforts to support EPAA under its contractual obligations and within the scope of its work plans have included support to regional trade shows/fairs and activities, which have been successful as measured within its defined goals.

ATAR has achieved some promising results so far in the Central Asian Republics. However, it has been hampered by being spread thinly – both geographically and thematically. ATAR's presence within the region appears worth maintaining, but to reach its potential, it requires a clearer focus going forward.

Evaluation Question 4

- E-Pay was correctly targeted and sequenced under the circumstances at the time. So far, the pilot program at Kabul International Airport and Kabul Inland Customs appears to be working well. Generally, the trading community has welcomed it, and it secures the government revenue.

Evaluation Question 5

- ATAR's efforts to increase gender representation at the Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD) were ineffective, including recruiting female interns. In addition, ATAR's efforts to increase the participation of businesswomen in trade have been very weak. While ATAR's Work Plan concerning the interns contained good intentions, the Project did not appear to have a plan to coordinate with either ACD or MoCI for a defined program for the interns.

5. SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

Evaluation Question 1

- ATAR should continue providing technical support and capacity building to the relevant Ministries and Departments regarding the relevant WTO laws, regulations, and procedures.

Evaluation Question 2

- Capacity building in drafting legislation, regulations, and procedures: ATAR should adopt a policy of providing technical assistance and capacity building on site, if possible, and in a working group setting. If security restrictions limit the implementation of such a policy, experts should be available to provide in-depth overviews of the model laws and regulations, followed by technical assistance when needed.
- Building negotiating capacity: Senior MoCI officials should adopt a policy of engaging middle-level staff when discussing negotiating strategies, have them

participate in meetings to the extent feasible, and placing some responsibility on senior staff to develop the negotiating skills of middle-level staff.

Evaluation Question 3

- USAID and ATAR should review the possibilities of and decide how to best narrow the scope of ATAR's work under Component 2 so that it can be more effective. Despite some real strengths and successes, its overall impact appears to be watered down by attempting to do too much with insufficient resources.
- ATAR should consider using the name of Component 2 as its official name within the regions, to clarify purpose and avoid misunderstandings with CAR governments.¹
- EPAA might consider establishing an online/web-based market place that links regional businesses and traders.
- ATAR, together with USAID, should consider how to improve communication with USAID's CAR regional office in order to share information on activities of mutual interest.
- ATAR should also consider working more closely with Afghanistan's Offices of Commercial Attaché in the CARs relating to business-to-business linkages.

Evaluation Question 4

- ATAR should implement the patch to the extent feasible. Support public awareness and rolling out E-Pay to other customs locations.

Evaluation Question 5

- ATAR should learn from other donor projects with gender components that have successfully recruited larger numbers of female interns and placed them in jobs.

Evaluation Question 6 (see table on next page)

¹ Communications problems raised by ATAR's name was a point raised by both ATAR and USAID staff.

Capacity Building with the Trade Policy Analysis Unit (MoCI), Central Statistics Office, and Afghanistan Customs Department

TA/Capacity Building Area	Conclusion	Recommendation for ATAR
MoCI - TPAU	The TPAU lacks the capacity to conduct trade analysis. However, the Unit has developed limited capacity in understanding the impact of trade data on trade policy matters. ²	Consider including TPAU staff when conducting analyses and assessing policy implications. <i>The evaluators acknowledge that USAID officials have noted that providing professional capacity building in analysis is beyond ATAR's budget.</i>
CSO	ATAR improved CSO's outputs – an important function for both the GIRoA and the private sector.	Continue its support to CSO to the extent feasible as well as inform senior officials before hand of upcoming events/activities.
ACD Customs Valuation- GATT-Article VII	ACD is not using international best practices in determining customs valuation. Instead it is using a valuation database that is generally used as a risk management tool.	Work with the ACD to implement customs valuation best practices – the GATT Article VII method of valuation.
Advanced Rulings	ATAR met its Work Plan commitments in technical support on Advanced Rulings to ACD	Continue providing training on Advanced Rulings to the responsible customs officers
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)	<p>More training and awareness are needed, as well as capacity building for ACD, ACBR, and the MoIC.</p> <p>Neither the copyright nor the trademark automatic database is functional.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Help develop Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA) capacity for training regarding IPR enforcement as well as work with the Afghanistan Commercial Business Registry (ACBR), the Copyright Unit, and ACD to build capacity for more uniform IPR enforcement. ▪ Continue its activities in IPR awareness. ▪ To the extent feasible, assist the GIRoA in implementing automated databases for trademark and copyright.

² According to USAID officials, ATAR does not have the financial resources to provide professional training to TPAU to develop the needed analytical skills.

Border Management Model (BMM)	There have been mixed results with ATAR's BMM efforts. Also, senior-level ACD officials would like to implement a new BMM. Some scanners are non-functional.	Communicate with ACD on BMM and, to the extent feasible, provide implementation support.
Risk Management	ACD's risk management model does not meet international best practices. Additional training is also needed.	Continue working with ACD to update the risk management indicators/criteria and implement them. Conduct more risk management trainings to ACD and build ANCA's capacity to do so.
Post Clearance Audit (PCA)	ACD has not implemented an international best practices PCA system and is using "PCA" as post payment, pre-cargo release tool.	Continue working with ACD to implement an international best practices PCA program aimed at larger importers.
Fighting Corruption	ATAR assistance is ongoing.	Work with ACD and find a common understanding of what ACD is seeking.
ANCA	ATAR has contributed to better outputs from ANCA. ANCA needs more capacity building and a curriculum.	Continue support to ANCA. Prepare and provide a curriculum to ANCA, including long-term courses.

6. BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION AND SATISFACTION WITH PROJECT

1. Security – Lack of security is a major barrier both to ATAR's ability to build and sustain relationships and build capacity at MoCI and ACD. ATAR's security protocols, especially relating to its national staff, have resulted in serious discontent at MoCI (and ACD).

Recommendations cannot be made regarding security concerns. However, one point that might be worth considering is that if ATAR employees cannot go to the relevant Offices, the Project might consider having government staff come to the Baron Compound.

2. Translations – there has been widespread complaints that the legal translations ATAR provides are not accurate and that ATAR does not employ translators with technical knowledge. *ATAR counters that its translators do possess the technical knowledge, and that translations are difficult to convey the actual meaning.* We recommend that ATAR annotate the legal text when providing translations.
3. Relationship between ATAR and the GIROA – While most of the line ministries are pleased to varying extent with ATAR's support, ACD, and to a lesser extent, MoCI, expressed dissatisfaction with ATAR's technical support and capacity building.

Some of this discontent stems from the inability of ATAR to devote more in-Ministry/Unit time at the institutions due to security issues. There is also dissatisfaction with the level of knowledge and experience of ATAR's national staff, and in a few cases, with ATAR's international staff. In addition, both ACD and MoCI claim that they have limited input in hiring the ATAR's staff. *A key ATAR official stated that ATAR follows strict hiring protocols that include participation by the relevant counterparts.*

4. WTO Accession – Despite its dissatisfaction with some aspects of ATAR's support, the MoCI is overall pleased and grateful for ATAR's support regarding Afghanistan's WTO accession process.

II. INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND

The Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) is a four-year, USAID-funded project that began on November 7, 2013 and will end on November 6, 2017. Implemented by Chemonics International with a budget of approximately \$77.8 million, it continues the work of two previous USAID/Afghanistan activities, Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan (TAFA). Similar to TAFA I and TAFA II, ATAR supports capacity building at both the individual and organizational levels, and has extended its support to both the public and private sectors across the region, especially to the Central Asian Republics.

ATAR's Theory of Change

The theory of change underlying ATAR “holds that with continued provision of technical assistance to GiRoA related to promoting the necessary policy reforms and capacity strengthening, the resulting better business enabling environment will lead to higher private sector investment, and increase regional trade, economic growth, job creation, and potential for higher domestic revenues.”³

ATAR's Hypothesis for its Support

ATAR's support is based on the hypothesis that adopting liberalized trade and an enabling investment environment policy will lead to sustainable growth, job creation, and the ability of GiRoA to deliver services and maintain fiscal stability in the medium term. ATAR bases these assumptions on (1) that GiRoA is committed to the reforms made under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and in its National Priority Programs, and (2) that the security situation in Afghanistan will allow the private sector to take advantage of a liberalized trade and investment regime and better service delivery by investing and creating jobs.

To accomplish this, ATAR's key inputs include technical assistance, training, study tours, as well as providing limited commodities, including IT equipment, that are necessary to sustain and implement reforms in trade policy, promotion, and customs agencies. This support is expected to result in tangible outputs that will lead to the achievement of the project purpose of an Afghan-led liberalized trade policy, including the adoption of a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compliant trade regime, strengthened regional trade and access to markets for Afghan exporters, and the resulting economic growth and jobs creation pursued by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. ATAR also has a cross-cutting goal of increasing female representation in government.

³ Evaluation SoW.

ATAR's Components to Achieve its Goals and Purposes

To accomplish its goals and purpose, ATAR's work is divided into three components.

Component 1: Support Trade Policy Liberalization

ATAR's Component 1 supports the liberalization of Afghanistan's trade regime by supporting its accession to the WTO. In doing so, ATAR seeks to assist the GIROA to formulate a strong, well-coordinated trade and tariff policy that contributes to improved trade policies, laws, and regulations.

The primary focus of ATAR's efforts are: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI), with a focus on the Directorate of International Trade and the Afghan Business Commercial Registry; the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) on WTO matters; the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL); the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH); the Ministry of Justice (MoJ); the Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC); and the Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA).

Component 2: Facilitate Access to Regional Markets

ATAR's Component 2 facilitates the development and implementation of regional trade in four ways. First, it brokers trade and transit agreements. Second, it assists GIROA in implementing regional trade agreements and reforms. Third, it supports the implementation of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Coordination Authority (APTTCA), and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Corridors 5 & 6 by working with countries in the region, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and India. Fourth, it fosters trade promotion and public-private dialogue. Component 2 also focuses on the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA), as well as regional institutions and private sector entities, including USAID offices.

Component 3: Improved Customs and Tax Administration

ATAR's Component 3 is focused on capacity building, which modernizes, streamlines, and harmonizes customs policies, codes, procedures, and practices. ATAR has been working in ACD, as well as with the Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA).

2. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to provide answers to the Evaluation Questions stated in the Statement of Work (Annex 3), and listed below. The evaluation will focus on assessing the activity's performance from its inception in 2013 to the end of 2014 in achieving its program goals, objectives, and results.

1. Is the current status of the legislation for the laws required to join the WTO (particularly the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade) consistent with the latest reports by the Implementing Partner about their current status?
2. How effective have been ATAR's efforts to improve the technical abilities of the staff it has worked with at the partner agencies to organize, negotiate, draft and implement the WTO related legislation, regulation, procedures for which they are responsible?
3. To what extent has the technical assistance provided correctly targeted the necessary skills, appropriately delivered, to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan)?
4. To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?
5. Which aspects of ATAR's assistance have been most effective in expanding the participation of Afghan women, and, opening career options for these women at the counterpart ministries? As appropriate, identify those approaches that were both effective and the most accepted by ministry staff.
6. How effective has each component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

3. METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

a. Methodology

The ATAR performance evaluation was conducted over a seven-week period by a team of two international consultants and two Afghan consultants. The evaluation was principally qualitative, using a document review, interviews with key stakeholders in the public and private sectors, field visits, focus groups discussions, and telephone and Skype calls. Interview questions were designed to obtain consistent information from stakeholders based on ATAR's Work Plan, reports, and the goals of the Project. A fully-developed methodology is provided in Annex 7.

b. Limitations

The time allotted for the evaluation, the reach of the ATAR Project, and security concerns posed challenges and constraints to the Evaluation Team. The evaluation began during the month of Ramadan, when the work schedule was shortened to accommodate fasting, followed by a three-day Eid holiday. Further, because ATAR spans several ministries, government field offices for customs operations, and private sector stakeholders both in

Afghanistan and South and Central Asia, it was difficult to engage with as many of the partners and beneficiaries as the evaluation team would have liked. With respect to Component 2 of the Project and regional integration, the team relied on phone and Skype interviews with ATAR's regional counterparts. Security concerns added yet another layer of constraints, making visits to the Afghan borders difficult.

c. Definitions

Re-route, when used in a risk management context, means to manually change the ASYCUDA-generated risk level designation to another risk level designation.

Second-level senior staff, when used in the context of the MoCI, means staff under the DG level, *e.g.*, Head of a Unit.

III. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section outlines key findings derived from the fieldwork and analysis. We present the findings in the order of the evaluation questions.

EVALUATION QUESTION 1

Is the current status of the legislation for the laws required to join the WTO, particularly the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), consistent with the latest reports by the Implementing Partner about their current status?

Finding – Legislative Reforms for WTO Accession

ATAR's Component 1 primarily supports the legislative and regulatory reforms needed for Afghanistan's commitments for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its implementation obligations. In its application, Afghanistan committed to submitting a comprehensive legislative action plan (LAP) outlining a list of current laws, as well as a proposed work program, to achieve full conformity with all WTO rules by the date of accession. The LAP includes the status or intended action of the particular law/regulation and the projected completion date, and therefore represents Afghanistan's legal framework for WTO accession. It is updated as needed and should reflect an accurate status of the WTO-related laws, regulations, and procedures.

Starting with the Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan (TAF) Project, in preparation for WTO accession, Afghanistan began to undertake a series of legal reforms by drafting legislation for new laws and amendments to existing legislation, implementing procedures, and moving these measures through the legislative or regulatory process.

Afghanistan submitted its first LAP to the WTO on October 28, 2011, and it is updated as needed. The revised LAP was last submitted to the WTO on March 3, 2014.⁴

Some key laws and the responsible Ministries/Department include:

- a. *Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)*: Copyrights and related laws (MoIC); Law on Geographical Indications, Law on Industrial Designs, Patents including The Protection of New Varieties of Plants, The Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits, and Undisclosed Information Including Trade Secrets and Test Data (MoCI);
- b. *Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)*: the Law on Food Safety (MoPH); The Law on Animal Health and Veterinary Public Health and the Law on Plant Protection and Quarantine (MAIL); and
- c. *Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)*: The Law on Standards and Technical Regulations (ANSA).

Conclusion

Our review finds that ATAR's report on the status of the LAP is consistent with GIROA's current reported status on these laws, procedures, and actions.

Recommendation

ATAR should continue providing technical support and capacity building to the relevant Ministries and Departments regarding the relevant WTO laws, regulations, and procedures.

Annex 1 contains a comparison of MoCI's and ATAR's LAP status report.

EVALUATION QUESTION 2

How effective have been ATAR's efforts to improve the technical abilities of the staff it has worked with at the partner agencies to organize, negotiate, draft, and implement the WTO-related legislation, regulation, and procedures for which they are responsible?

Finding – Capacity and Sustainability of ATAR's Partners

ATAR's Component 1 focuses primarily on supporting WTO accession and the implementing obligations. The MoCI is the lead Ministry responsible for Afghanistan's WTO accession.⁵ Other key line ministries/agencies include the MAIL, both the Plant Protection

⁴ WTO Accession Status for Afghanistan, WTO website:

[https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=\(%20@Symbol=%20wt/acc/afg/*\)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#](https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(%20@Symbol=%20wt/acc/afg/*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#)

⁵ The relevant offices are Deputy Minister of Trade, DG of International Trade, and the DG of Commercial Business Registry. The relevant Units under the Directorate of International Trade are Trade Policy Analysis Unit, which collects trade data for analysis, the Unit of Bilateral Trade Agreements, the Unit of Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Unit.

Directorate and Veterinary Health Directorate; the MoCI; the MoPH; the MoJ; and ANSA. Also, WTO obligations include activities related to ACD functions – the Customs Code, Customs Valuation, and Intellectual Property Enforcement. We address the Findings regarding ACD in Evaluation Question 6.

WTO Accession involves a broad range of public and private stakeholders. The Afghan [WTO] Inter-ministerial Committee is comprised of representatives from the relevant ministries and private sector stakeholders who meet to discuss WTO issues. In responding to this question, we examine the relevant the key public institutions: MoCI, the Line Ministries, and ANSA, to determine the level of capacity development and sustainability.

Capacity to Negotiate

Negotiating responsibilities for WTO accession as well as for regional and bilateral agreements for Afghanistan lie primarily with the Deputy Minister of Trade and the International Trade Directorate at the MoCI. Regarding the current capacity to negotiate, one official stated, “We came from the well to the surface with negotiations.” While the International Trade Directorate still seeks ATAR’s support on substantive and technical details in negotiating, it has developed significant negotiating capacity. Senior officials believe that the only assistance MoCI now requires is on technical points and position papers in order to be fully informed of the policy needs and nuances relating to Afghanistan’s interests.

In support of this, senior MoCI officials note that they negotiated independently seven WTO bilateral agreements with WTO members.⁶ In addition, with ATAR’s assistance on technical details, the Ministry is continuing its negotiations on the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan Transit Trade Agreement (PATTTA), and also successfully negotiated reducing the list of sensitive items in the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).⁷

While senior officials⁸ have the capacity to negotiate key agreements, second-level MoCI staff do not have a well-developed capacity to negotiate.⁹ Staff in the Bilateral Trade Agreements Unit and the Regional Trade Agreements Unit report having some limited capacity to negotiate, but claim their staff need significantly more capacity building before they can do so independently.

With respect to sustainability, capacity is not very deep and is only sustainable to the extent that senior officials remain in their positions (government-wide).

⁶ Bilateral with Norway, Thailand, United States, Turkey, Chinese Taipei, Korea, and the European Union.

⁷ Negotiations have not yet begun but there are nascent discussions regarding the following agreements: (1) Bilateral agreement on transport and transit between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan; (2) Bilateral agreement on transport and transit between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan; (3) Bilateral agreement on transport and transit between Afghanistan and Azerbaijan; (4) Bilateral agreement on transport and transit between Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan; (5) Bilateral agreement on transport and transit between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan.

⁸ We use the term “officials” to denote both singular and plural to protect the confidentiality of the source.

⁹ Based on interviews with senior MoCI officials.

Because we found that the capacity to draft varies depending on whether it is a law, regulation, or procedure being drafted, we have addressed each one separately.

(i) Drafting laws and amendments

Across MoCI and all relevant line ministries, we found that the capacity to draft laws is not well-developed.¹⁰ This is largely because, whether it was TAFE or ATAR, technical assistance was provided by drafting laws and amendments remotely and then providing them to the relevant Ministry. Often, there were no face-to-face meetings with the person(s) drafting the law and the responsible Ministry officials in order to explain the meaning of the provisions, the technical requirements, and reason for each provision.

While ATAR's senior WTO advisor is well-respected and praised among the Ministries, there were widespread complaints that often there was no one from ATAR who could readily explain a technical provision that the responsible Ministry did not understand. This was exacerbated by translation difficulties, including the complaint that literal translations do not always capture the meaning of terms or phrases and that the legal text was not annotated. The attempts by ATAR's local staff to explain provisions were insufficient and lacking, according to the relevant ministries.

As one government official said,

I have never met [the person who drafts the laws]. There has never been any discussion with [that person], no face-to-face meeting... We just receive draft laws and nobody really understands the full meanings of the laws. When we ask the national staff what something means, they don't know and no one can explain the technical meanings.

In at least one case involving an amendment (the Trademark Law), ATAR reportedly did not seek input from the responsible office but provided the draft amendment directly to the Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industries, who signed off on it. The amendment made its way to the MoJ, was later rejected by the Council of Ministers, and then sent to the responsible office to make necessary changes. This also caused consternation with that office.

There were some cases in exception to the above, which allowed for capacity building. For example, according to ANSA, ATAR's staff and ANSA worked together on the language of an amendment, which built capacity of participating ANSA staff.

(ii) Drafting regulations

Drafting regulations was also difficult for government staff, as they would require a clear understanding of the relevant law in order to draft the implementing regulations. The

¹⁰ The relevant line ministries are MAIL, MoPH, MoIC, MoJ, and ANSA.

responsible ministries worked with ATAR to varying extents in drafting regulations, but none of the ministries believe they can draft regulations without donor support. However, the responsible offices believe they have more capacity to draft regulations than the capacity to draft laws without donor support.

(iii) Drafting procedures

We found more capacity within ministries to draft procedures than laws, amendments, and regulations, although this also varied from ministry to ministry. Again, this variation may be attributed to the method ATAR used. ATAR usually drafted procedures in a working group setting, where relevant stakeholders discussed the reason for the particular procedure and the best process to accomplish the stated reason. With ATAR's assistance, MAIL, MoPH, and ANSA all stated that they had developed some level of capacity to draft procedures. They believe they can sustain this capacity but need more support to further develop it.

Capacity to Organize

We found that the ministries, in general, have the capacity to organize, including organizing working group meetings, related WTO activities, joining international organizations, and arranging trainings with local or international organizations. For example, in addition to regular working group meetings with stakeholders, MoCI's Afghanistan Commercial Business Registry (ACBR) has organized trainings for staff with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).¹¹ The same office researched and asked India to review the first patent application Afghanistan received because Afghanistan lacks the capacity to conduct patent prosecution/ examination.

Capacity to Implement WTO Obligations

Although the WTO Accession Package was substantially completed by TAFA, ATAR has continued working with the key counterparts to draft regulations and procedures relating to the LAP, and to work with the MoJ in shepherding the legislation through the legislative process.¹²

In its Year 1 Work Plan, ATAR undertook to support implementation of WTO laws and commitments by "building capacity of the relevant ministries and state agencies to launch the process of fulfilling WTO commitments." To this end, ATAR prepared model regulations, supported the formation of working groups headed by relevant ministries and involving relevant stakeholders; trained a working group on international standards, trade-related

¹¹ As further examples, MoPH and MAIL have organized meetings with Codex Alimentarius (CODEX) and other international bodies. With ATAR's assistance, the MoCI is preparing for membership in Berne Convention, the Paris Convention, and the Madrid Protocol, Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks.

¹² Based on document reviews and interviews with key staff from ATAR and MoCI, Afghanistan's WTO Accession Package was substantially ready by December 2013, with most of the Accession Package having been prepared by TAFA. ATAR 5th WTO Working Party Meeting was anticipated to take place in February 2014. However, election delays and a lack of approval for the Afghan WTO Delegation by the Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting was postponed. President Ashraf Ghani will soon review the WTO Accession Package to decide whether Afghanistan will proceed with WTO Accession.

aspects of intellectual property rights, and intellectual property conventions; supported the finalization of draft legislation for adoption; and assisted in shepherding the draft through the legislative process and providing support until adoption.

ATAR reported in its Year 2 Work Plan that it had supported the Consolidation of the Schedule of Concessions and Commitment on Goods (Goods Offer) and the Schedule on Specific Commitments on Services (Services Offer), which were both accepted by WTO members on February 27, 2014. Although this work was begun by TAFSA, its completion is a significant step in the WTO accession process.

ATAR has been assisting responsible ministries with tasks related to WTO accession, as specified in its Year 2 Work Plan, on an as-needed basis. However, with respect to monitoring domestic compliance with WTO, we found a lack of capacity within the government to implement WTO-related legislation and obligations. While most of these obligations have not yet come into force, there are some implementation obligations that can begin now. These include the Rules on Customs Valuation – WTO Article VII of GATT 1994, and intellectual property enforcement. These are more fully discussed in our response to Question 6.

A more in-depth reflection of the relevant ministries capacity is provided in Annex 2.

Capacity Building and Technical Assistance by ATAR's Employees

The MoCI has also expressed dissatisfaction with the level of knowledge and technical skills of ATAR's employees, as well as the absence of international consultants. The staff member of the one key Unit stated that ATAR's national staff cannot build capacity their capacity because they [the MoCI Unit] are more experienced than ATAR's staff. He further noted that ATAR's employees cannot even function effectively as a go-between because they are seldom at MoCI due to security constraints. These complaints resonated across the relevant MoCI Units and have contributed to bitterness with ATAR, particularly within some Units.

Conclusions

1. ATAR's Component 1 is on track regarding WTO accession activities and is continuing work on the LAP in preparation for WTO accession.
2. ATAR has begun limited capacity development to implement WTO obligations, mostly by preparing ministry officials to respond to the WTO. As discussed in Question 6, more capacity development is needed to implement those WTO obligations that are in various stages of implementation.
3. The MoCI reports that it had banned ATAR for a period of time. However, a senior official noted that work on WTO accession proceeded during that time but capacity building with the Ministry was stalled.
4. Starting with TAFSA, senior-level officials in the International Trade Directorate have built the capacity to negotiate. ATAR has continued developing this capacity. Staff in

the Units (Offices under the Directorate General level) have limited negotiating capacity. However, this capacity is only sustainable to the extent that senior officials remain at the MoCI in the same positions.

5. The capacity to draft legislation and organize varies across ministries and within offices in any given ministry. The relevant units do not have the capacity to draft laws, and have limited capacity to draft regulations and procedures. They have varying capacities to organize. ATAR has developed capacity in the government when it has worked directly with staff on drafting legislation, and has failed to do so when it has drafted legislation remotely and handed it to the government.
6. Translation issues appear to be a barrier, as several ministries complain that ATAR does not utilize translators with the relevant technical expertise. *However, ATAR noted that it employs translators with technical expertise, but translations, in general, are difficult. As an example, a key ATAR employee noted that a document was translated from English to Dari and back to English, and the English translation was different from the original document in English.*
7. Security is a major barrier both to ATAR's ability to build and sustain relationships and build capacity at MoCI. ATAR's security protocols, especially relating to its national staff, have resulted in serious discontent at MoCI (and ACD).

Recommendations

- Regarding capacity building in drafting legislation, regulations, and procedures, we recommend that ATAR adopt a policy to provide technical assistance and capacity building on site, if possible, and in a working group setting. If security restrictions limit the implementation of such a policy, we suggest that when model laws or regulations are provided, experts are available to provide in-depth overviews of the measures, followed by technical assistance when needed.
- On building negotiating capacity, we recommend that senior MoCI officials adopt a policy of engaging second-level senior staff when discussing negotiating strategies, having them participate in meetings to the extent feasible, and placing some responsibility on senior staff to develop negotiating skills of second-level staff. This can be done in monthly lunch sessions inviting university faculty staff, mock negotiations, etc. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MoFA's) School of Diplomacy offers courses to its staff, and it might be worthwhile for ATAR to coordinate/facilitate any negotiation trainings between MoCI and MoFA.
- With respect to ATAR's national staff, we suggest that ATAR manage expectations. The Project's national staff tend to be young and inexperienced. ATAR is building capacity with them, but the MoCI regards them as "experts," which, they are not. As a result, MoCI expects capacity building from them, which, for the most part, they cannot provide. This creates a situation of conflict and frustration. *A key ATAR employee said its employees for MoCI are to facilitate communication while building*

capacity. Thus, ATAR should manage expectations by clarifying the roles and capacities of its employees to MoCI.¹³

- Regarding translation issues, we suggest managing expectations on the technicalities and difficulties of translations and providing annotations to the text, which can facilitate understanding.
- Security is a major issue and we cannot make recommendations regarding security concerns. However, one point that might be worth considering is that if ATAR employees cannot go to the relevant Offices, the Project might consider having government staff come to the Baron Compound. Based on our desk review, ATAR appears to have done so on some occasions.

EVALUATION QUESTION 3

To what extent has the technical assistance provided correctly targeted the necessary skills, appropriately delivered, to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan)?

Finding – Facilitating Access to Regional Markets

ATAR's Component 2 – Facilitate Enhanced Access to Regional Markets – supports MoCI, the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA), and regional institutions. We respond to this question in two parts: 1) Targeting and delivering the necessary skills of Afghanistan's institutions to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors; and 2) Targeting and delivering the necessary skills within the region to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity [with Afghanistan].

1. Targeting and Appropriately Delivering Necessary Skills in Afghanistan Institutions

Support to MoCI

ATAR's Component 2 support to the MoCI is focused primarily on the International Trade Directorate, which falls under the leadership of the Deputy Minister of Trade and the Directorate of International Trade.¹⁴ ATAR also provides some support to the Trade Policy Analysis Unit (TPAU).¹⁵ ATAR has a national employee with expertise on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)/SAFTA embedded in the Regional Trade Agreements Unit.¹⁶

¹³ Failure to do so might be also unfair to ATAR's employees because of how they might be perceived by MoCI (and ACD).

¹⁴ Negotiating skills for this Directorate are discussed in Evaluation Question 2.

¹⁵ We detail ATAR's capacity building to TPAU in our response in Evaluation Question 6.

¹⁶ While the Unit Head is satisfied with the employee's level of SAARC expertise and support, he noted that this is insufficient for substantive capacity building. Moreover, more senior members of ATAR become involved during preparations for SAARC meetings, especially related to SAFTA. ATAR has also financed Afghanistan's attendance at SAFTA meetings, and is financing the SAFTA meeting that is due to take place in Kabul in August 2015.

While there is a general consensus that ATAR's technical assistant is helpful, the MoIC's staff also report that ATAR has provided very little capacity building, that its trainings have been inadequate, and that they do not seem to be part of any plan or coherent strategy. Although ATAR has conducted a capacity needs assessment of the International Trade Directorate, it does not seem to have covered all Units, and the resulting training given was superficial and insufficient. All the Units feel that they have some level of skills and capacity, but are weak areas in other areas, such analysis and negotiations, where they need capacity building.

Support to EPAA

The EPAA is seen as a key institution that is in need of support, both financially and technically. However, making EPAA financially sustainable is outside the scope of the ATAR Project. ATAR's efforts to support EPAA have included support to regional trade shows and activities, which have been successful as measured within its defined goals.

Regarding capacity building for necessary skills, we found the following:

Support for trade shows: ATAR's support to EPAA regarding trade shows has included assisting the agency to organize trade shows, providing advice to participating traders, providing printed materials, and financially supporting the attendance of one or two EPAA staff. According to EPAA, this work was insufficient to address the fundamental issues around export financing, and a more comprehensive approach is required. EPAA also has serious financial needs and sustainability issues, especially since it lost a large number of staff and became a directorate of MoCI, after losing financial support from GIZ at the end of 2013.

Support for trade promotion strategies and services: ATAR has provided some training to EPAA staff and traders, mainly in July 2014, on market research, data gathering and analysis, and global supply chain management. While EPAA staff report it was useful to traders, the materials were only available in English. ATAR also provided some studies, as well as a document outlining the process EPAA should follow to develop an export promotion strategy, with which EPAA is satisfied.

Access to finance: ATAR's assistance to EPAA has resulted in two financial institutions (Afghanistan International Bank and Afghan Rural Fund Company) signing an agreement to offer preferential rates to EPAA's registered traders. However, traders prefer their existing arrangements and have not taken loans from either institution, as they did not find the interest rates offered competitive enough.

Developing EPAA's institutional capacity: While EPAA believes that ATAR's technical assistance has been helpful, its support has been insufficient to meet EPAA's capacity

needs.¹⁷ ATAR's Year 1 Work Plan noted that EPAA's existing capacity needed further development, but there was no clear needs assessment or baseline.¹⁸

Developing the capacity of traders (including women) & B2B linkages: Through training, roundtables, and trade show support, ATAR reaches traders through EPAA. Focus groups with traders found they consider trade shows useful but expensive to attend.¹⁹

Facilitating government consultation/engagement with private sector: Based on focus group discussions (FGDs),²⁰ we found that the overall awareness and the degree of consultation within the business sector regarding trade agreements is very low.²¹

Supporting the Implementation of Transports Internationaux Routiers Convention (TIR)

In September 2013, the Afghanistan Chambers of Commerce and Industries (ACCI) was approved by the International Road Transport Union (IRU) to administer TIR within Afghanistan. ATAR's work plans have included activities to increase TIR awareness among transport operators and freight forwarders. However, ATAR's work with ACCI was limited due to USAID directives.²² ACCI reports that the TIR carnet system is working, although to-date it has only issued two carnets. The Hairatan Border Customs reported it had processed one carnet *en-route* to Pakistan that returned *via* Hairatan, and so far it has processed 337 carnets that entered Afghanistan.

2. Targeting and Appropriately Delivering Necessary Skills in the CARS

ATAR's Central Asian Republics (CAR) activities have focused primarily on building skills within Customs (in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and with the Chambers of Commerce, particularly in Tajikistan, transport associations, and customs brokers.²³ ATAR's specific activities include:

Supporting the Cross-Border Transport Agreement Transit Corridors 5 & 6

While ATAR's Year 1 Work Plan placed a large emphasis on supporting the process of Afghanistan's accession and implementation of Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) Transit Corridors 5 and 6, progress on Corridor 6 was not possible due to Uzbekistan's unwillingness to join the agreement. According to ATAR's staff and documentation, further

¹⁸ Without this, it is difficult to determine the degree to which ATAR's training has been well targeted and effective. Subjective assessments of EPAA's current capacity vary, but generally focus on its current lack of staffing and financial strength.

¹⁹ Traders state that they have difficulty differentiating between trade shows supported by ATAR and other trade shows. Generally, they have not noticed capacity changes in either EPAA or themselves. They are frustrated by continued obstacles that they face in doing business abroad and lack of government support.

²⁰ For the most part, these were larger companies active in export.

²¹ A common theme from the FGDs is that the private sector feels unsupported by government, and feels that the government is an impediment to their trade activities, largely due to high taxes, corruption and a lack of services.

²² In June 2015, ATAR conducted a TIR awareness workshop with ACCI, their first collaboration, and prior to this, ATAR had conducted 3 other trainings or awareness workshops on TIR.

²³ Most stakeholders from these groups agreed that the information and training that ATAR provided was relevant and needed, as did other donors within the region.

progress on Corridor 5 has stalled because of a political disagreement about border demarcation between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Assessing Conformity with the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement

ATAR has completed assessments of the degree of national conformity with the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, and has launched a similar assessment for Uzbekistan.²⁴ The quality of this work, particularly the assessment in Kyrgyzstan, was widely praised.²⁵ Several officials from the Kyrgyz government affirmed that ATAR's work on the TFA had played an important role in helping the government prepare for the WTO TFA.²⁶ The Ministry of Economy is creating a plan of action to address the WTO provisions, as per ATAR's report, and also to ratify the TFA in Parliament.²⁷

Supporting Tajikistan's Participation in Trade Negotiations with Afghanistan and Pakistan

ATAR has supported Tajikistan's participation in the Pakistan Afghanistan Tajikistan Transit and Trade Agreement talks.²⁸

Business-to-Business Linkages

ATAR's B2B activities have included workshops and training events with business and business associations, ongoing work with the Chambers of Commerce, and other activities to create linkages between Afghan and CAR businesses.²⁹ While these events were welcomed, a common concern was that such events, in the absence of adequate follow-through, were inadequate to address the pressing capacity and logistical needs that traders and transport companies face when attempting to do business across borders. The Kabul Chambers of Commerce and Industries (KCCI), for example, reported that although its members had participated in the B2B forum in Dushanbe, they were not able to make any new trade deals, and could not find useful trade partners among the Afghan participants.

ATAR staff reported that two transportation companies (one Kyrgyz, the other Tajik) made an agreement with each other to provide support to transporters in their respective countries should either run into difficulties.³⁰ At the same time, it seems unlikely that these events will catalyze significant improvements in trading relations outside the framework of a more comprehensive strategy.

24 Not yet completed.

25 Including people from USAID, GIZ, OSCE, and the Kyrgyz government.

26 These included a former staff member of the state Single Window Enterprise and an official from the Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy.

27 ATAR is translating the TFA into Kyrgyz language at the government's request. GIZ officials also reported using the report in their work and training.

28 ATAR has provided advice 'at the table', translation, and financed the travel of the small Tajik negotiation team to Pakistan. According to a government official, the Tajik government is anxious to move the trade agreement forward, and has found ATAR's support to be helpful.

29 Events included a multilateral B2B forum with 124 participants from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan (Jun 23-24, 2014, in Dushanbe)A workshop on Modern Transport and Logistics with 107 participants from around the region (Dec 2014, in Bishkek)

30 The evaluation team did not independently verify this claim.

ATAR's Year 1 and Year 2 work plans include the encouragement of Chambers of Commerce and Industries (CCIs) to create a joint business council. The Kyrgyz CCI reportedly did not see any benefit of signing, as it felt the bilateral agreements they had in place with neighboring CCIs was already sufficient. As a result, this has not been done.

Within Turkmenistan, ATAR's primary role is to link Afghan and Turkmen traders in any manner possible. The coordinator there appears to be proactive but his efforts are limited. He had a "near success" in introducing Afghan marble traders to Turkmen marble buyers.³¹

Customs Work

Supporting Customs reform, primarily in implementing the TFA, has been the major focus of ATAR's work in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. ATAR staff's expertise in Customs was noted and praised by numerous stakeholders, including GIZ, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), USAID country office representatives, and Kyrgyz government officials. ATAR's staff were also widely regarded as approachable and collaborative. Some key accomplishments include: successfully re-establishing a Customs Council in Kyrgyzstan,³² conducting a workshop and a roundtable on risk management for government veterinary inspection officials in Tajikistan in 2014,³³ collaborating with OSCE on training events,³⁴ and implementing the Single Window State Enterprise in the Kyrgyz Republic.³⁵

However, ATAR's Customs work has faced a number of key constraints and challenges.³⁶ While ATAR brought in short-term specialists to work on issues with the Customs Department, the timing was not conducive for accomplishing their work.³⁷ Other challenges are related to ATAR's delivery, specifically the Project's scope of work and budget.

3. The appropriateness of ATAR's technical assistance delivery

ATAR's delivery of technical assistance within CAR is mixed, with both notable strengths and weaknesses, summarized in the following table:

31 A large trade deal was discussed, but not signed, because the Afghan government put a ban on the export of raw marble.

32 This was reported by both ATAR and by officials from the Kyrgyz Custom Brokers Association, and confirmed by USAID officials. The Council had met several times with two more meetings planned.

33 Based on ATAR M&E records, reports, and interviews with ATAR staff.

34 This is not included in ATAR's events database, but was confirmed by an OSCE official. Included IPR training for Customs.

35 Includes a database of tariff and non-tariff measures developed by ATAR. In the words of a Single Window staff, plan to "use it as a tool for traders to find tariffs and special measures"

36 Both the accession to the Customs Union, and the implications of accession for customs and border management practices were mentioned as key issues by a number of respondents, including ATAR, USAID, OSCE and GIZ respondents, as well as Kyrgyz government officials.

37 Kyrgyz Customs Department refused ATAR's database for tariff and non-tariff measures, and reportedly refused most of ATAR's customs-related assistance throughout the year that they were focused on accession. The same database was found useful and adopted by GIZ and the Single Window State Enterprise, a government agency.

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ATAR has a presence in CAR ▪ Level of expertise of ATAR staff and consultants is generally seen to be very high ▪ ATAR is widely seen as open and cooperative ▪ ATAR has excellent coordination with other donors and projects – particularly with GIZ and OSCE ▪ ATAR has good relations with the USAID country offices in CAR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Limited budget ▪ No discretionary budget at regional level ▪ Slow decision-making process ▪ Limited to ‘direct benefit’ to Afghanistan ▪ The name of the project can be off-putting to governments ▪ Sometimes the priorities set out in the work plan mismatch with current circumstances and local priorities ▪ Strategy is poorly defined and lacks focus (despite being the proposed plan by each country office and approved by the USAID Office in Almaty) ▪ Poor “claimed” communication with regional USAID Office in Almaty

Fig. 1

ATAR does not have a formal strategy to work with Afghanistan’s commercial attachés within the CARs, although they report some informal connections and involvement, which varies by country. Regarding the ‘weaknesses’ listed in Fig. 1, a relevant USAID official noted that,

The ATAR project management has and continues to strengthen its communication with the Central Asia and Kyrgyz Republic Missions. [T]his mission’s efforts to place someone in CAR to monitor all trade activities was first approved then denied by USAID CAR. The Afghanistan Mission also proposed to fund an FSO and FSN to focus on regional trade. That position, which will now be funded by the Central Asia Mission, is currently on the bid list.

However, one thing that did work was that the Missions and country offices appointed ATAR activity managers in each country. The USAID project team members are about to institute regular calls to ensure more frequent and effective communication.

As for strategic focus, it must be remembered that the priorities for ATAR’s activities in the first year were entirely demand-driven and mostly demand-driven in the second year. Over the course of these past two years, everybody has learned more about what issues ATAR can

and should focus on to improve connectivity with Afghanistan and South Asia. Those lessons will be reflected in the third year's work plan.

Conclusions

1. ATAR's support to EPAA appears, on the whole, to have been relevant and of reasonable quality, but appears to have been piecemeal. USAID has noted,

ATAR's work plan never included significant work with EPAA after they [EPAA] made it clear upfront (November, 2013) that they only wanted ATAR's help with the occasional items/events. Thus, a "piecemeal" approach.³⁸

2. Despite a slow start in three of the four countries where it has set up, ATAR's presence in CAR, to-date, has achieved some promising results. However, it has been hampered by being spread thinly – both geographically and thematically. ATAR's presence within the region appears worth maintaining, but to reach its potential, it requires a clearer focus going forward.

Recommendations

- USAID and ATAR should review the possibilities and decide how best to narrow the scope of ATAR's work under Component 2 so that it can be more effective. Despite some real strengths and successes, its overall impact appears to be watered down by attempting to do too much with insufficient resources.
- ATAR should assess whether it is capable, can afford, and plans to expand its efforts within the scope of its goals to support EPAA. If yes, ATAR should conduct a capacity needs assessment of EPAA's staff, develop a corresponding work plan, and share it with EPAA's management and work towards implementation.
- ATAR might consider using the name of Component 2 as its official name within the regions, to clarify purpose and avoid misunderstandings with CAR governments.³⁹ *However, according to a USAID official, this point was not discussed with any CAR government officials and it is unclear if this is true.⁴⁰*
- EPAA might consider establishing an online/web-based market place that links regional businesses and traders. This can be done in cooperation with export agencies in the CARS, or in conjunction with ACCI and regional Chambers of Commerce.⁴¹
- ATAR, together with USAID, should consider how to improve communication with USAID's CAR regional office regarding sharing information on activities of mutual interest.
- ATAR should consider working more closely with Afghanistan's Offices of Commercial Attaché in the CARS relating to business-to-business linkages. Senior MoCI officials echoed this sentiment, with the Minister stating that he planned to use

³⁸ Comment of USAID Official.

³⁹ Communications problems raised by ATAR's name was a point raised by both ATAR and USAID staff.

⁴⁰ USAID official (comment).

⁴¹ There are models available for on-line market places.

those offices to expand Afghanistan's market access and B2B linkages. Working with Afghanistan's Offices of Commercial Attaché can be a win-win situation where ATAR can build capacity with those offices while expanding CAR market linkages.⁴²

- Finally, key informants offered the following two main suggestions:⁴³
 - ATAR should focus more on non-governmental actors, and put less effort in government capacity building. Traders and trade associations have a clear interest in improving trade efficiency and flow.⁴⁴ If they are empowered to organize, understand the system, and lobby for changes themselves, this may turn out to be a more effective way of inducing longer-term change in government processes.
 - ATAR should focus its CAR presence more exclusively on cross-border management and customs harmonization.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4

To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?

We interpreted this question as referring to E-Pay. We assess targeting and sequencing E-Pay separately.

Finding – E-Pay

ATAR's Component 3 supports the Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD) and the Central Bank, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), relating to E-Pay.⁴⁵ E-Pay is an electronic payment method that provides traders the option to pay their customs debts, using either cash or bank transfers at a commercial bank or at DAB, remotely from a customs location. It is a trade-facilitating procedure targeting traders while securing payment of the government's debt.

E-Pay Was Correctly Targeted

A pilot E-Pay system was implemented at Kabul International Airport (KIA) and Kabul Inland Customs (KIC) beginning in June 2015. According to DAB, since the system was implemented, around 60% of payments have been made through E-Pay.⁴⁶ DAB performs reconciliation at the end of every day and sends hard copies of the payment documents to

⁴² The Minister of Commerce stated that he planned to create joint Chambers of Commerce with neighboring countries and start identifying traders' problems first with the neighboring countries and work on removing those barriers. He plans to first identify five problems with neighboring countries and make an action plan. Then after solving those, identify another five problems. After that, "we move to the next layer of neighboring countries".

⁴³ These suggestions were offered by ATAR staff in Kabul and the regions, and USAID regional staff, as well as representatives from other donor agencies or projects familiar with ATAR and the context.

⁴⁴ Reasons for doing this are that working with government in some CAR countries is extremely difficult and slow, that anything potentially 'political' is a non-starter in countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and that political will for some reforms, particularly in Customs, may be lacking.

⁴⁵ E-Pay was started under TAFA but was not implemented. Without E-Pay, all Customs duties and taxes have to be paid in cash to the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) located at the specific ICD or BCP. Payments also have to be made by 2 pm.

⁴⁶ The evaluators cannot confirm this figure as the statistics are not available -the system is still very new.

ACD the next day. DAB asserts E-Pay is very secure because there is no physical movement of funds. Moreover, ACD can view the account and once a payment is made to ACD, it is irrevocable.^{47, 48}

Based on our review, we find that E-Pay correctly targets traders by affording them a convenient, easy, fast, and secure way to pay their customs debt, while also freeing them from transporting large amounts of cash for the payment of large duties and fees.⁴⁹ E-Pay also allows the secure receipt of payments due to the government, which is consistent with the government's plan to have electronic payments and reforms in the banking sector.

E-Pay Was Correctly Sequenced

E-Pay works as follows: the trader/broker takes the assessment document (entry document) to either a commercial bank or DAB and pays either in cash or by bank transfer. Once DAB receives the payment, it manually completes the Fund Transfer Form and generates a unique payment number that allows ACD to release the goods. This information is electronically transmitted to Customs.

E-Pay contains a manual step because, at the time the system was being configured, Customs was using the software ASYCUDA ++, which was not web-based and was less-suited for fully integrating and automating E-Pay. In addition, the World Bank was working on a system to fully integrate and automate the banking system in Afghanistan. There was an expectation that the system would be ready in less than a year, and it did not appear cost-effective to fully automate the system since it would be replaced in a few months. Therefore, under the circumstances at the time, E-Pay was correctly sequenced.

Fixing the Manual Step in E-Pay

DAB learned the World Bank will not be able to fully integrate and automate Afghanistan's banking system for at least another 1½ to two years. Meanwhile, ACD has begun using ASYCUDA World, a web-based system, in some locations and plans to introduce this system throughout the rest of the country. The present E-Pay system can be easily integrated into ASYCUDA World to be fully automated.

⁴⁷ DAB stated that it has provided usernames and passwords to the relevant government officials in order for them to check/verify the payments and status at any time. DAB further noted that, to date, the government has not been very interested in doing so.

⁴⁸ DAB noted that the 20th paragraph of the interbank payment regulation provides for "Irrevocability in interbank payment system." Once the transacted amount is credited in the beneficiary account, it cannot be revoked. DAB contends that it has the authority to collect customs duties and fees on behalf of ACD. Letter (undated), from Alhaj Essa Khan "TURAB" Second Vice -President Da Afghanistan Bank to Customs. Article 157 of The Customs Code provides for the transfer of funds to pay customs debt. ACD does not plan to amend the Customs Code for electronic payment as ACD officials noted that electronic payment is part of the banking laws.

⁴⁹ For these reasons, Standard 4.6 of the Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) requires customs administrations to specify the permitted payments for customs duties and fees. Further the Guidelines to Standard 4.6 encourages the use of electronic payment as an efficient method of payment.

In light of this development, DAB and ATAR would like to “patch” the manual step in E-Pay to render it a fully automated and integrated system.⁵⁰ The patch would connect the DAB (via the ACSS) and the ASYCUDA system together via central servers. The patch would also enable DAB to implement a national switch system in Afghanistan, which it hopes to do by the middle of 2016. The national switch will allow traders to pay their customs duties and fees using debit cards, Internet, and mobile banking/payment.

Conclusions

E-Pay facilitates trade, reduces the cost of doing business, and is consistent with the government’s goal of reforming the banking system to receive electronic payments. It correctly targets traders while securing the receipt of the government revenues. E-Pay was correctly targeted and sequenced under the circumstances at the time.

Recommendations

That ATAR:

- Confirm the cost of \$20,000 to fix “the patch.” In the event that the cost has risen considerably, undertake a cost/benefit analysis.
- Implement the patch to the extent that it is possible to do so. This will eliminate the manual step, which can be prone to human error. Also, DAB officials stated they plan to implement a “national switch” in 2016 that will allow more modes of payments, e.g., Internet, mobile.
- Work with ACD to ensure that it fully understands how E-Pay works, and to embrace and roll it out to all customs locations.
- Follow through on Work Plans⁵¹ to assist ACD and DAB in an outreach program to inform traders how E-Pay works.

EVALUATION QUESTION 5

Which aspects of ATAR’s assistance have been most effective in expanding the participation of Afghan women and opening career options for these women at the counterpart ministries? As appropriate, identify those approaches that were both effective and the most accepted by ministry staff.

Finding – Increasing Women in Government

ATAR’s Work Plan for both Year 1 and Year 2 included recruiting ten female interns for each period and increasing gender representation in ACD, as well as to support the Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA) to deliver gender awareness training to all

⁵⁰ ATAR has stated that it received an estimate that the patch from the vendor, Virmati, would cost \$20,000 and take about 1½ months to fully automate and integrate the system. In light of the timing for the completion of the World Bank’s bank reform project, DAB is willing to work with the patch, but has stated that it cannot fund the patch.

⁵¹ ATAR’s 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 Work Plan provides for these activities.

ACD staff, including conducting training of ACD trainers.⁵² In addition, ATAR’s Year 1 Work Plan also stated that ATAR would include businesswomen in all activities, especially activities involving decision-making, capacity building, and job creation, and reduce gender gaps in business and trade.

ATAR recruited only two female interns during Year 1 and Year 2, respectively. The two women in Year 1 were placed at ACD and the two women in Year 2 were placed at MoCI. Neither ACD intern received an employment offer. It is unknown at this time if the interns at MoCI will receive offers upon completion of their internship.




Fig. 2. FAIDA and EGGI’s total number of recruits and placements were divided by the period of their activity for a six-month period.

In comparison to other donor programs that have a gender component, ATAR has lagged far behind in both recruitment and job placement of women. For example, the USAID Project, Financial Access for Investing in Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA), recruited 300 female interns during an 18-month period.⁵³ Extrapolating this data gives an average of 100 interns during a six-month period.⁵⁴ The Economic Growth Initiative’s Women in Government (WIG), another USAID-funded project, recruited 446 female interns for government offices and placed 73% of them during a four-year period in various government offices, including at the Ministry of Finance.⁵⁵ USAID’s new Promote Women in Government Project received 200 applications for its female internship program, resulting from a ten-day announcement on Afghan job portals, university boards, and women’s organizations lists.⁵⁶ Promote shortlisted 25 interns for its first cohort. No placement data is available because Promote is just beginning.

Afghan Customs Department

ACD officials admitted that it could have done more to mentor the interns but said there was no clear plan with ATAR. One official noted that,

The interns were sitting behind their computers and were only doing something when we asked them to do so. They did not always take the initiative. ATAR had not put

⁵² This activity was to be supported by the ATAR National Training and Development Specialist. ATAR’s Year 2 WP, p. 63. This training was done and is referenced in Question 6, ANCA.

⁵³ Verified with former responsible FAIDA employee. Of the 300 recruits, 160 were placed at the banks, microfinance institutions, and private companies.

⁵⁴ Data extrapolated in Fig. 2 for FAIDA and WIG.

⁵⁵ Final Evaluation of EGGI Report, Sep-Nov, 2014.

⁵⁶ Verified with responsible Promote employee.

together a plan for them with ACD to see in which areas they should develop their capacity and learn about customs work.

The official recommended the interns go through some courses at ANCA and work practically with ACD departments.

While the interns had an ATAR supervisor, they did not have a mentor at ACD and did not have any rotations to different Customs Units. One intern stated that she had learned a lot and that ACD had been supportive. However, because of a lack of planning between ATAR and ACD, it was difficult for the interns to obtain employment.⁵⁷

Ministry of Commerce and Industries

A senior official at MoCI stated that he did not understand why the Ministry had interns. He believed that ATAR was utilizing interns instead of experts in order to save money and that it would be “okay” to keep the interns if experts were also provided. The official further stated that,

There are also challenges for female interns because they cannot run errands or go to places as easily as male interns. Also, the Ministry has minimal influence in selecting interns, as they [the Ministry] only receives a shortlist – in other words, ATAR narrows the list to those interns it wants to hire.

Outreach to Businesswomen

In Year 2, ATAR conducted a three-hour training session for 13 businesswomen on trade financing and a consultative meeting on the Central Asian Business Opportunities Conference (CABOC) in which 16 businesswomen participated. The women business owners complained that they are generally excluded from selection in trade shows.⁵⁸ They also feel that they have been ‘over-trained’ by various projects, and instead need concrete help with issues such as financing and market access.

Conclusions

1. All aspects of ATAR’s efforts in increasing gender representation at ACD were ineffective, including the number of female interns recruited. In addition, ATAR’s efforts to increase the participation of businesswomen in trade have been very weak.
2. ATAR’s Work Plan concerning the interns contained good intentions, but the Project did not appear to have a plan to coordinate with either ACD or MoCI for a defined program for the interns. ATAR was not aware that the interns needed to apply through the Civil Service Commission for employment, and it did not have any pre-arrangements, such as an agreement or commitment letter for the placement of the interns.

⁵⁷ Interview with ACD interns, July 8, 2015

⁵⁸ Based on a focus group discussion with women business owners conducted at Checchi. (EPAA and MoCI selects the traders).

Recommendations

- ATAR should learn from other donor projects with gender components that have successfully recruited larger numbers of female interns and placed them in jobs.
- ATAR should consider signing a Memorandum of Understanding with its partners and/or obtaining a commitment letter so that at the end of the internship period the Ministry/Office considers the interns(s) in their *tashkil* (permanent staff) or vacant positions.
- ATAR should formulate a plan for the interns that includes Afghan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) training. The plan should also include assigning a mentor to the intern to advise on placement and guidance on how to apply for a job.
- ATAR can widen its reach to businesswomen through well-known businesswomen’s associations.⁵⁹ This would also reduce the “overtraining” that the women feel.

EVALUATION QUESTION 6

How effective has each component of ATAR’s technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

The following table pairs ATAR’s three components with their relevant institutional entities, and clarifies where in this report the effectiveness of ATAR’s capacity building and technical assistance have already been addressed.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Examples include the Peace Through Business Network, Leading Entrepreneurs for Afghanistan’s Development (LEAD) and Goldman Sach’s 10,000 Women’s Afghan Alumni Association.

⁶⁰ In a meeting with USAID on July 16, 2015, the parties agreed that Evaluation Question 6 would pertain only to non-WTO related capacity building and technical assistance. In addition, some aspects of Evaluation Question 3 address capacity-building under ATAR’s Component 2, and so are not addressed there.

Component 1	Component 2	Component 3- Improved Customs Administration
1.Trade Policy Analysis Unit (TPAU) (Covered in this section)	EPAA (See response to EQ3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Support Regional Integration (See response to EQ3) b. Monitor the Border Management Model c. Implement Risk Management Systems d. Ensuring Compliance at ACD e. Support Streamlined Customs Procedures f. Enhance the Development of Post Clearance Audit g. ANCA
Bilateral Trade Agreements Unit (See response to EQ2)		
Regional Trade Agreements Unit (See response to EQ2)		
2. Central Statistics Office (CSO) (Covered in this section)		
3. Component 1 Customs - Strengthening the Customs Code (Covered in this section): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a.Valuation b. Advanced Binding Rulings c.IP Enforcement 		

Fig.3

Finding – Capacity TPAU and CSO

The Trade Policy Analysis Unit (MoCI- TPAU)

The TPAU collects trade data from ACD and the EPAA, which is used to compile Afghanistan’s annual *Trade Policy Review*. Accurate analysis of this data is critical for determining Afghanistan’s trade policy and assessing the impact/benefits of potential trade agreements.⁶¹

TPAU staff stated they have not received assistance from ATAR for the past six months to a year. Even when they were receiving regular assistance, it was largely in the form of visits once a week from an international ATAR staff member, which they found insufficient. The staff stated that ATAR’s international consultant was cooperative and had practical knowledge that they found helpful, but “did not know about economic theory.” TPAU’s staff consist of well-educated recent graduates with a need and interest to develop practical experience.⁶²

As one official stated “they [consultants] sit at Baron and send the analysis to us.” As a result, the staff have not developed sufficient capacity to analyze data by themselves. While TPAU staff confirmed that ATAR conducted a needs assessment, they said ATAR had not interviewed relevant staff. However, the staff confirmed benefitting from an ATAR workshop they attended on accessing the database and data analysis, hosted at the Central

⁶¹ For example, this data was used in the estimating the impact of the implementation of the SAFTA agreement on Afghanistan, which led to negotiating a reduction in the list of sensitive goods. MoCI verified that ATAR has provided technical support on this.

⁶² This point was expressed both by the staff of TPAU and a senior official within MoCI.

Statistics Office (CSO). The Unit stated that it had not received any lectures on economic theory, trade policy, or economic development.

ATAR's technical assistance has had some limited but positive impact on TPAU's outputs. One example is the use of trade data to negotiate reducing the list of sensitive goods in the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). ATAR has also helped in preparing the *Trade Policy Review*, which is a very useful and contains critical data for formulating trade policy.

A relevant USAID official stated that, in response to a request by the Directorate of International Trade to provide more in-depth analytical training, USAID priced the cost, which USAID [ATAR] could not afford.

Central Statistics Office (CSO)

ATAR has supported ACD and CSO to harmonize trade-related data between the two organizations. ATAR also supported ACD and CSO in signing an MoU in March 2014 to promote cooperation in the area of import and export statistics for Afghanistan.⁶³

ATAR provided two computers and a scanner to CSO to handle ACD data, which CSO reported as being very helpful in accomplishing its work and increasing its outputs. ATAR also trained CSO staff on ACD's data structure. According to CSO, these trainings have helped build its capacity and improved its ability to address earlier problems with data analysis.

ATAR has also conducted roundtables involving CSO and ACD officials to assist in identifying reasons for discrepancies.⁶⁴ Discrepancies in trade statistics during Year 1 were reduced from around 30% to 15%-20%. ATAR's goal in Year 2 is to reduce discrepancies from 15% to 12% overall, with a maximum data discrepancy of 20% within any product category or country.

According to CSO, the data it now receives from ACD is the exact data ACD has in its ASYCUDA system. CSO reported it has representatives in places where ASYCUDA is not implemented and it combines all data from customs and publishes it in weekly, monthly, and annual reports.

To further reduce statistical discrepancies, ATAR held six trainings at CSO in January and February 2015. These trainings focused on the application of software in statistics and analysis and the preparation of formats to help eliminate discrepancies in the reporting of external trade data by CSO, ACD, MoCI, EPAA, and MAIL.

⁶³ According to the MoU, CSO receives information on import/export statistics from ACD on a monthly basis and processes this information in accordance with the CSO reporting structure.

⁶⁴ Major sources of discrepancies include (i) country of origin versus country of departure; (ii) dutiable versus non-dutiable imports (the latter category includes, for example, imports by the International Security Assistance Force, diplomatic missions, and international organizations); and (iii) manual versus ASYCUDA data.

CSO claims that its data now has zero-percent discrepancy. It also stated that it is able to sustain its current capacity levels, although it would like more training. While CSO is pleased with ATAR's capacity building and support, the Office would like the Heads of Departments to have some input regarding upcoming trainings.

Conclusions

1. The TPAU lacks the capacity to conduct trade analysis. The Unit complains that ATAR provides analyses instead of including staff in the analytical process. However, the Unit has developed limited capacity in understanding the impact of trade data on trade policy matters.

According to USAID officials, ATAR does not have the financial resources to provide professional training to TAPU to develop the needed analytical skills.

2. CSO is responsible for data the government relies on to make policy decisions. While we do not have the evidence to confirm CSO's claim that it now has zero-percent discrepancy, we can state that ATAR's support to and capacity building of CSO has had a positive effect and has significantly improved CSO's outputs – an important function for both the GIRoA and the private sector. ATAR has met its benchmarks for reducing discrepancies in statistical reporting between ACD and CSO.

Recommendations

- ATAR should try to include TPAU staff when conducting trade analysis.
- ATAR should continue its support to CSO and seek the Office's input regarding upcoming trainings.

Component 1: Support to ACD on Strengthening the Customs Code

Finding – Customs Valuation-GATT Article VII

The WTO Law on Customs Valuation is contained in GATT Article VII and is the standard used most all over the world. It is very complex, consisting of six methods of determining valuation, and represents international best practices. It is the standard that WTO members must use in determining customs valuation.

The Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD) is in the process of amending its Customs Code to adopt GATT Article VII.⁶⁵ An ACD official insisted that while the amendment to the Customs Code is pending, it is employing GATT Article VII as the means of determining customs valuation. The official further noted that the United Nations Conference on Trade

⁶⁵ Source: ACD.

and Development (UNCTAD) helped ACD, and ACD has decided on amending the Customs Code by using a single sentence that it has adopted GATT Article VII.⁶⁶

National Valuation Database

The World Customs Organization (WCO) provides guidelines on the use of a national valuation database. It makes clear that a valuation database may be used by a Customs Administration only as a risk-assessment tool (along with other risk-assessment indicators), and must be designed specifically to assess potential risk regarding the truth or accuracy of the declared value for imported goods.⁶⁷

Field Visits

In our visits to Jalalabad/Nangarhar, Herat, Hairatan, Kabul International Airport, and Kabul Inland Customs locations, we found that every location was using the valuation database to determine customs valuation.

ACD contends that many invoices and declarations are fraudulent; therefore, it uses the database when the importer cannot establish the authenticity/accuracy of the value. However, in every location we visited, Customs officials stated they only consider the invoice documentation if the invoiced value is higher than the value in the database. If the invoice value is lower in the database, then that is the value used to determine applicable duties irrespective of authenticity of the invoice.

One private sector importer stated that when an item is not in the database, Customs contacts a sales establishment and obtains a price. Often, the items are not the same, so the pricing is not accurate.

ACD has received valuation technical assistance from ATAR,⁶⁸ and according to the Department, from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as well, but seems unwilling/unable to implement it. This might be the case because ACD customs officers do not have the capacity to apply GATT Article VII, as it is very complicated. ACD also has a handbook that contains the methods of customs valuation. However, it was not being applied in the customs field despite ACD's claims. Moreover, each location we visited had valuation issues because all commodities are not in the database. For example, for a shipment of serum, Herat Customs was unable to determine the value because the Herat valuation database did not contain a value for serum.

⁶⁶ According to the official, the methods of valuation are contained in the procedures regulations, which have been drafted and procedures and are being used by customs all over the country.

⁶⁷ The information in the database must be recent and must be regularly updated to provide accurate pricing. Further, the database values are not be used in determining the Customs value for imported goods, as a substitute value for imported goods, or as a mechanism to establish minimum values.

⁶⁸ ACD officials also stated that ATAR had not conducted any valuation training. However, we verified from ATAR's training database that ATAR has conducted at least five GATT Article VII valuation training to ACD, three of which were trainer to trainer (TOT). ATAR also stated in its Year 2 WP that it had delivered sessions on customs valuation, training to eight ACD/ANCA officials who have the capacity to train others. *ATAR Year 2 Work Plan*, p. 14

Conclusions

1. ACD is not using international best practices in determining customs valuation. We discussed this matter with ATAR staff, who are aware of this.
2. Using the valuation database to determine valuation might also be unfair to legitimate traders who cannot make the best business decisions because they do not know what value is in the database. Further, traders should be able to make deals with confidence that Customs will accept their invoice value, and if not, apply the GATT Article VII method of valuation to determine applicable duties.
3. In this case, we cannot determine the impact of ATAR's efforts on customs valuation because ACD is not employing the WTO valuation rules.

Recommendation

We recommend that ATAR find some common ground and work with the ACD to implement customs valuation best practices – that is, the GATT Article VII method of valuation.

Finding – Advanced Binding Rulings⁶⁹

In response to a written request from an importer, Customs can provide a written binding ruling related to classification, country of origin, and valuation of an import or export. Advanced Rulings provide certainty to importers, enabling them to make more informed business decisions, and is also a trade-facilitating measure. The decisions are binding on Customs.

ATAR assisted ACD in preparing the rules and procedures for Advanced Rulings. ACD has verified that ATAR has provided technical assistance on this, and ACD has accepted ATAR's proposals. However, a senior ACD official stated that the Department will not implement Advanced Rulings for about 1 ½ years.

Implementing Advanced Rulings is complicated and requires strong capacity and understanding of the customs rules and procedures related to classification, country of origin, and valuation. ACD does not appear to have the capacity to do so at this time and it will take significantly more capacity building to do so.

Conclusion

ATAR met its Work Plan commitments in technical support on Advanced Rulings to ACD.

Recommendation

ATAR should continue providing training on Advanced Rulings to the responsible customs officers.

⁶⁹ Under Standard 9.9 of the Revised Kyoto Convention, contracting parties are bound to provide Advanced Rulings.

Finding – Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights

ATAR's Year 2 Work Plan included assisting the GIROA in establishing an Intellectual Property Border Enforcement Unit at ACD in April 2015, as well as providing training to the staff on the basis of adopted procedures on border enforcement.⁷⁰ ATAR also planned to support the development of procedures and a database for this Unit, including the development of methodologies for recognizing infringing goods and providing support for trademark and copyright awareness.

ATAR has done some work on intellectual property training and awareness.⁷¹ In April 2014, ATAR conducted intellectual property legal training for judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and members of the Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC). ATAR also facilitated a tour of the US Patent and Trademark Office for Afghan officials,⁷² and provided trademark training in 2014 and two trainings to date in 2015.

ACD is enforcing intellectual property rights (IPR) at the border crossing points, but needs more capacity building on this. ATAR's IPR trainings were useful but more training/capacity building is needed for IPR enforcement.

There is currently no automated database or registry for either trademarks or copyrights, which makes enforcement uneven, *e.g.*, according to the Afghanistan Commercial Business Registry (ACBR), ACD issues different decisions regarding the same item.

Conclusions

1. Given the importance of IPR enforcement and the complexity in enforcing IP rights, more IPR training and awareness are needed, as well as capacity building, for ACD, ACBR, and the MoIC.
2. Neither the copyright nor trademark automatic database is functional.

Recommendations

- ATAR should follow through on its Work Plan and develop ANCA's capacity for training regarding IPR enforcement.
- ATAR should work with ACBR, the Copyright Unit, and ACD to build capacity for more uniform IPR enforcement.
- ATAR should continue its activities in IPR awareness.

⁷⁰ Source – ATAR employee. "ACD requested the GIROA allocates resources to establish an Intellectual Property Border Enforcement Unit at ACD. This Unit was expected to be established in April 2015 and staffed in May- June 2015, but the GIROA did not allocate the requested resource to establish the Unit. Once the GIROA allocates the resources, then ATAR will assist ACD in establishing the Unit and provide training to the staff on the basis of adopted procedures on border enforcement with a focus on implementing *ex officio* authority."

⁷¹ To date, ATAR conducted 25 IP Trainings in Trademark, Copyrights and Patents.

⁷² The Responsible official complained that this training did not target responsible staff and was therefore not helpful to the Directorate. He stated that ATAR should decide if the training is capacity building or lobbying for WTO accession and plan accordingly.. *i.e.*, which staff should participate in the activity.

- To the extent feasible, assist the GIROA in implementing automated databases for trademark and copyright.

Component 3: Support to ACD on Customs Administration

Finding – Monitor Border Management Model

In most countries, the Customs administration is tasked with: 1) facilitating trade, in which both the customs department and the private sector have compelling and competing interests; and 2) securing the borders to protect national security against threats relating to arms trafficking, commercial fraud, violation of intellectual property rights, and health, safety, and environmental laws. These competing roles of border enforcement and trade facilitation can often lead to tensions and conflicts between the private sector and the responsible government agencies.⁷³

On March 16, 2011, President Hamid Karzai signed a Border Management Model (BMM).⁷⁴ To implement the BMM, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Interior Affairs signed an MoU regarding the BMM on June 4, 2011. Under the agreement, the BMM is based on a “two-agency” approach whereby the Afghanistan Border Police (ABP) fulfills immigration and security responsibilities and ACD fulfills all other commercial and trade-related duties.⁷⁵ ATAR undertook an assessment of a number of Border Crossing Points (BCPs) for compliance with the BMM. ATAR’s assessment found that the BMMs were fully compliant.⁷⁶

The Evaluation Team visited Jalalabad, Herat, the Hairatan Inland Customs, and Hairatan Border. Due to security reasons, we were unable to visit Islam Qala (Herat) and the Torkham borders (Jalalabad/Nangarhar). However, we interviewed key officials in Nangarhar, Herat, Hairatan Inland Customs, and Hairatan Border Customs regarding the BMM.

ACD – Kabul

A senior official at ACD stated that the BMM was really important. He noted that while the TAFE project had supported ACD in drafting procedures and implementing the BMM, ATAR did not have any activity in this regard.

The official stated that ACD Kabul had sent an official letter to the customs field office to implement the BMM. The official further noted that ACD is not monitoring implementation of the BMM because it is already implemented and functioning. The official explained that

⁷³ In Afghanistan there are agencies at the border that can sometimes overlap with customs functions. These agencies include the State Owned Corporation (SOC) and State Owned Enterprises (SOE) under the Ministry of Commerce and Industries known as ASTRAS and the FLGE respectively.

⁷⁴ Presidential Decree No. 7413-25/12/1389.

⁷⁵ In 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) placed a benchmark upon the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to implement a revised operating model for agencies at Border Crossing Points (BCPs).

⁷⁶ ATAR’s *Final Report on Border Management Model Compliance*. The Report also noted that the truck scanner at Torkham was non-operational and “needed to be repaired urgently as it was a vital tool in efforts to combat smuggling” ATAR’s BMM Compliance, p.9.

ACD needs a new version of BMM because there are many offices, which is not useful and create problems in the processing of the goods. These offices include CSO, ANSA, the Municipality in Hairatan Customs, oil, petroleum, and liquid gas companies. The official stated that ACD had asked ATAR to assess the BMM implementation and ATAR's assessment was "perfect." The official expressed skepticism regarding ATAR's BMM assessment.

ACD is currently considering new BMM models, including establishing a bonded warehouse at Hairatan. Officials state that ACD would like to have ATAR's support and input.

Nangarhar Inland Customs

Nangarhar Customs officials reported challenges at the border because there are many agencies taking space and interfering with its entry clearance procedures. These include: MAIL, MoI, Passport Control, and the National Intelligence Department.

The officials also stated that ATAR's employee meets regularly with the Afghan Border Police (ABP) regarding BMM and has established good cooperation between Border Customs and the ABP, but the ABP still continues to interfere with customs functions. Officials reported the ABP takes money from people with hand-carried cargo and illegally re-routes them so that they do not pay duties on their hand-carried cargo. One official noted that he had been working at Torkham Customs for the past year and, so far, had not observed any customs clearance for hand-carried cargo. Senior officials at ACD Kabul stated that, "*the problem is not really with the BMM but with Customs' not taking responsibility.*" Officials further stated "*the money that passes goes far beyond the Border Police but to other places as well.*"

It is noted that the scanner at Torkham is non-operational and there are still no security cameras.⁷⁷

Herat Inland Customs

At the time we visited Herat Inland Customs, the Deputy General for Border Customs and the Deputy General for Inland Customs were both new; therefore, we were unable to obtain much information on the functioning of the BMM. The ATAR employee stated that he had conducted an assessment of the BMM and met with the Head of Islam Qala Customs and ABP. He noted that the current model is working without any problems.

The scanner at Islam Qala was non-operational.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Hairatan Border Customs

Senior officials at Hairatan Border Customs stated that the ATAR employee was the person mostly working with Border Customs regarding BMM. Customs reports that, currently, Hairatan ACD and the ABP cooperate well and each department works according to the BMM, with no intervention by either side.

A Senior Hairatan Border Police also confirmed that there is good cooperation between the ACD and ABP and neither side intervenes in the activities of each other. The official noted, “I am really happy with the cooperation and coordination of customs with our department and I don’t have any complaints.”⁷⁸ *However, senior ACD Kabul officials state that Hairatan Border Customs has many problems, including insecure holding places for incoming cargo/oil, leakage etc., and is one reason to reassess the current BMM.*

Conclusions

1. ATAR is assisting ACD in monitoring the implementation of the BMM. However, given the limited observations that we made, we are unable to state whether ATAR is being effective in all six borders where the BMM has been implemented.
2. We are able to state that, at least in Torkham, ATAR is trying to enforce the BMM with limited success. We can also state that the BMM appears to be working well in Hairatan, with ATAR playing an important role.
3. As a result, ATAR, to some extent, is improving the output of customs operations at the border.

Recommendations

- Scanners at the border are important tools in customs clearance procedures in combatting smuggling and illegal shipments, and they also facilitate trade. The scanners at both Torkham and Islam Qala should be repaired.
- Notwithstanding the BMM, the Minister of Commerce and Industries stated that ATAR should have worked on the borders better and provided a clearer structure. He stated that, “[N]one of the borders’ problems have been solved in the past years.”⁷⁹
- He recommended that ATAR should come up with a clear structure for all the borders and clear roles and responsibility of the MoCI as trade facilitator and customs in the borders. He further noted, “[T]his should become their priority.”

⁷⁸ The ATAR employee stated that he had implemented the BMM in Shairkhan Bandar, Hairatan, and Aqina and had reviewed all the BMM in all Afghanistan Customs. We have good BMM in Hairatan Customs.

⁷⁹ See Note ____, interview with the Minister Humayoon Rasaw, at MoCI on July 26, 2015.

Finding – Risk Management

Risk Management is a trade facilitation measure contained in the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA)⁸⁰ and requires each Member to adopt or maintain, to the extent possible, a risk management system for customs control. Risk management is based on the premise that customs officials target high-risk shipments using a range of indicators instead of 100% examination of all cargo. Risk Management is also an International Monetary Fund benchmark for Afghanistan.

Currently, ACD has a risk management system in ASYCUDA (ACD implemented under the auspices of the World Bank) that uses only one indicator – a commodity indicator/criterion (HTS) to designate the risk level for a particular shipment (green, yellow, or red).

In the every single customs locations we visited, it was the practice for the Risk Management Committee to re-route (some) green and yellow shipments for examination based on their experience as to whether a shipment has a higher risk level than the ASYCUDA designation. As a customs official stated,

ACD does not know the background of our traders and does not understand our local risk management issues. ... We know the traders and we can check to see if their documentation is correct. ACD does not know this and the risk management module does not check for traders' profiles.

This re-route practice is contrary to international best practices, and it undermines the risk management system and hinders trade facilitation.

According to the customs field offices, ATAR is collecting information related to re-routing. The customs field officials state they do not know what ATAR is doing with the information – they merely provide it. ATAR stated it is collecting the information for analysis and later use in the risk management database to include more indicators/criteria for an international best practices risk management system.

ATAR activities, as stated in its Year 2 Work Plan, include the development and implementation of additional risk criteria.⁸¹ To date, ATAR has conducted three risk management trainings in Kabul, one in Herat, and two in Tajikistan.

To date, ATAR's technical support and capacity building on risk management has been limited mostly to collecting data, which is important. ATAR should follow through on its plan to analyze and use the data to refine the risk management criteria, update ACD's risk management system, and provide training to customs officials.

⁸⁰ Article 7.4 of the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation.

⁸¹ ATAR's WP also includes developing and training Risk Management Units and Intelligence Units, and implementing risk management principles in cargo selectivity at all Automated Systems for Customs Clearance Data (ASYCUDA) clearance locations — both at ICDs and BCPs.

Risk Management Unit's Revenue Data (Re-Routing)

Period	Herat IC ⁸²	In US \$	Nangarhar IC	In US \$	Hairiatan IC ⁸³	In US \$
22 Dec 14 - 20 Jan 15	5,601,201	\$92,452	2,151,128	\$35,506	1,267,723	\$20,923
21 Jan 15 - 19 Feb 15	1,670,809	\$27,578	4,329,905	\$71,468	113,493	\$1,873
20 Feb 15 - 20 Mar 15	1,482,466	\$24,469	4,026,852	\$66,466	163,215	\$2,694
21 Mar 15 - 20 Apr 15	3,414,038	\$56,351	5,398,182	\$89,101	874,824	\$14,438
21 Apr 15 - 21 May 15	1,503,838	\$24,822	4,390,910	\$72,475	293,909	\$4,851
22 May 15 - 21 June 15	840,688	\$13,876	625,431	\$10,322	271,478	\$4,481
Total	14,513,040	\$239,548	20,922,408	\$345,338	2,984,642	\$49,260

Fig. 4. Conversion rate Afs @ 60.59 with figures rounded; IC – Inland Customs

Conclusions

1. ACD's risk management as currently implemented hinders trade facilitation and does not meet international best practices. The risk management indicators/criteria need to be refined, including additional criteria/indicators. Customs field offices also need more risk management training.
2. ATAR's limited risk management training has not resulted in significant positive outputs in ACD's risk management system.
3. Based on the revenue collected from re-routing, as illustrated in Fig. 4, there are significant differences in revenue collection with the different Inland Customs locations. Explaining this is beyond the scope of our evaluation due to time constraints and the unavailability of essential data, such as the volume of trade. However, we provide this finding for your reference.

Recommendations

- ATAR should continue working with ACD on updating and increasing the risk management indicators/criteria and implement them.
- ATAR should conduct more risk management trainings to prepare customs officials to observe international best practices.

⁸² Source: Kabul ACD for Herat and Nangarhar,

⁸³ Source: Hairatan Inland Customs



Nangarhar Customs; Photo - Courtesy: Savitri Singh

Finding – Streamlining – Implementing the Blueprint

Between June and September 2011, the TAFE Project had assisted ACD in reviewing the importation procedures at all Inland Clearance Depots (ICDs). This review identified significant differences within each regional ICD. Shortly after these reviews were completed, TAFE assisted the ACD in the development and implementation of a single national standard procedure (hereafter referred to as the ‘blueprint’). This blueprint contained a total of 13 steps.⁸⁴ ATAR’s field employee stated that TAFE had succeeded in substantially eliminating non-compliant steps. However, during the gap between TAFE and ATAR, customs locations added non-compliant steps.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ See, *Compliance Assessment of the National Streamlined Importation Procedures Blueprint*, USAID Report

⁸⁵ We were unable to obtain the data to confirm this.

Streamlining Status Current and Prior to ATAR

Location	Current Steps ⁸⁶	No. Of Non-compliant Steps	Steps before ATAR ⁸⁷	No. Of Non-compliant Steps Prior to ATAR
KIA	20	7	20	7
Kabul ICD	18	5	18	5
Herat ICD	18	5	16	3
Jalalabad ICD	22	9	19	6
Hairatan ICD	19	6	20	7

Fig. 5

We found that ATAR faces challenges insofar that the customs locations are resistant to ATAR's efforts to remove non-compliant steps. For example, a senior official in Herat complained that ATAR had removed a step that resulted in the Head of Entry Processing Unit no longer having authority to sign documents. The same official complained that ATAR wanted to remove extra organizational steps, and that Herat IC was opposed to this.

In Nangarhar, while Customs senior officials were happy with ATAR's streamlining activities, they opposed the Project's efforts to eliminate additional steps.

It is worth noting that there seems to be a communication gap between ATAR and ACD Kabul. For example, a senior official at ACD stated that ACD Kabul had sent a letter to all the field offices informing them to follow the blueprint for entry processing steps. *The official stated that ATAR has not informed ACD of its efforts and challenges on streamlining for the past 1½ years, and therefore ACD Kabul has not advised the field offices to work with ATAR on streamlining. The official stated that this is an important point and he would be pleased to work with ATAR on implementing the blueprint regarding streamlining.*

Conclusions

1. ATAR appears to face an uphill battle in eliminating additional entry-processing steps. Its activities in this area have had a very limited positive impact on outputs.
2. There appears to be a communication gap between ACD and ATAR. We are unable to decipher if this is due to an animus ACD might harbor towards ATAR, or whether it is an accurate depiction of ATAR's efforts.⁸⁸ Whatever the case, ATAR should clarify both its relationship and its scope of work with ACD. Based on our evaluation, the relationship appears to impact both productivity and the potential positive impact of the Project.

Recommendations

- ATAR should continue its streamlining efforts.

⁸⁶ ATAR Bi-Weekly Report June 1-15, 2015

⁸⁷ ATAR Quarterly Report Nov-Dec 2013

⁸⁸ We do not believe that there is a personal animus or personality issues involved.

- ATAR should consult with and urge ACD Kabul to advise/require customs field offices to work with ATAR on following the blueprint entry-processing steps.

Finding – Post Clearance Audit

Post Clearance Audit (PCA) is an effective trade facilitation measure insofar that it allows the immediate release of imported cargo through the subsequent use of audit-based regulatory controls.⁸⁹ At the time of importation, customs assess duties based on the declaration the trader submits. Once customs verifies the declaration and decides whether or not to examine the goods, the goods are released upon the payment of duties. However, there are elements of the declaration that cannot be adequately verified at the time of importation. Customs may then conduct a PCA to determine the accuracy of the information. If the audit finds that the declarations were not accurate and additional duties are required, the trader pays the additional duties.⁹⁰

However, in the field locations we visited, we found that ACD conducts the “PCA” after the payment of duties but prior to the release of the cargo. ACD has agreed that the process is not consistent with PCA best practices.

International best practices PCA works well for large companies insofar that they have repeated customs business, are easily found, and customs can more easily collect any additional duties. However, we found that many traders at the borders are small businesses that would be difficult to find during a PCA. In Herat, customs was conducting “PCA” prior to the release of the cargo because the importers demanded confirmation that the declarations were correct at the time of entry, otherwise they would refuse to pay any additional duties after the release of the cargo. Partly because of the difficulties in finding small importers and the challenges in collecting additional duties, all the customs locations we visited were conducting “PCAs” prior to the release of the goods.

ACD Kabul is aware of this and understands that this practice is inconsistent with international best practices. ATAR is also aware of this and is planning to support ACD in implementing a professional PCA function.

⁸⁹ The WCO Revised Kyoto Convention Standard 6.6 provides that “Customs control systems shall include audit-based controls.”

⁹⁰ The primary purpose of PCA is to confirm that compliance exists following an audit of a customer's processes, systems, and procedures. PCAs are often targeted at larger, international companies and undertaken at a customer's place of business.

Post Clearance Audit's Revenue Data

Period	Herat IC	In US \$	Nangarhar IC	In US \$	Hairatan IC	In US \$
22 Dec 14 - 20 Jan 15	235,435	\$3886	136,494	\$2253	41,263	\$681
21 Jan 15 - 19 Feb 15	330,674	\$5458	242,190	\$3998	71,600	\$1,182
20 Feb 15 - 20 Mar 15	101,750	\$1679	135,264	\$2233	274,400	\$4,529
21 Mar 15 - 20 Apr 15	126,592	\$2,089	68,576	\$1132	231,577	\$3,822
21 Apr 15 - 21 May 15	111,874	\$1,847	111,398	\$1839	77,000	\$1,271
22 May 15 - 21 June 15	144,229	\$2381	65,830	\$1087	54,000	\$891
Total	1,050,554	\$17,340	759,752	\$12,542	749,840	\$12,376

Fig. 6. Source: ACD; Conversion rate Afs @ 60.59 with figures rounded; IC – Inland Customs

It should also be noted that if Afghanistan used an international best practices risk management system, it is likely that these particular “PCA” steps would be eliminated. But then, as one person noted, that will “close the Customs supermarket.”

Conclusions

1. ATAR activities on PCA are ongoing, and as a result we cannot measure the impact of ATAR’s assistance to ACD regarding PCA.
2. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the revenue collected from employing “PCA” does not appear to be substantial and should be balanced against the cost to traders and the negative impact on trade facilitation. There is also insufficient information to determine the validity of these additional duties. Again, doing so is beyond the scope of our evaluation due to time constraints and the availability of essential data. However, we provide the table for your reference.

Recommendations

- ATAR should continue working with ACD to implement an international best practices PCA program, in the beginning, aimed at larger importers.
- The process currently being used by customs as “PCA” should be termed pre-release verification (post-payment verification) or something else, as it is not a PCA even within the literal meaning of the term.

Finding – Ensuring Compliance at ACD

In consultation with ACD, ATAR prepared a draft policy and procedure manual for the implementation and operation of an Internal Audit Unit (IAU) for ACD to combat corruption. According to ATAR, the policy and procedures contained in the manuals are in line with associated standards in the “Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.”⁹¹

⁹¹ ATAR Quarterly Report, March 2015, p. 49

A senior ACD official stated that the Department needed help with anti-corruption, and ATAR prepared “two big manuals and gave them to us. ... We filed them away.” The official then stated that ACD needs tangible assistance in combatting corruption. According to him, ACD has implemented an asset declaration policy whereby employees must register their assets. According to the official, ACD can track to see if an employee suddenly has more property, cars, *etc.*, that are inconsistent with his/her salary. The official further stated that, “We need little advice. We want and need action. We do not need documents.”

We discussed this matter with the responsible ATAR employee, who believes that ATAR’s assistance in providing the manuals was beneficial to ACD and the matter is still under consideration with ACD.

We would also note that customs automation and ATAR’s efforts have most likely reduced streamlining steps and have had a positive impact on reducing corruption.⁹²

Conclusion

ATAR’s assistance to ACD on combatting corruption is ongoing. Therefore, we cannot determine the impact of ATAR’ assistance on ACD’s outputs.

Recommendation

ACD has expressly stated that documents are not helpful without an action plan. ATAR should consult with the appropriate ACD official and agree on a plan of action for combating corruption.

Finding – Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA)

In its Year 1 and Year 2 Work Plan, ATAR set out to develop gender-training material for ACD and support ACD and ANCA to deliver gender awareness training to all ACD staff, including conducting training of ACD trainers.⁹³ ATAR’s Year 2 Work Plan included, among other tasks, that ATAR would build the capacity of ANCA’s trainers to train on intellectual property border enforcement, support the development of a modern customs curriculum, and train Afghan trainers in the development and delivery of customs courses.

ATAR has been involved in ANCA’s activities since the beginning of 2014. The following is a list of the main trainings that ATAR has delivered to ACD.⁹⁴

- Two training-of-trainers and three gender trainings at ANCA
- One two-day TIR awareness and training seminar⁹⁵

⁹² We cannot definitively state this as a fact as we do not have supporting data. Generally, however, such steps have a positive impact on reducing corruption.

⁹³ This activity will be supported by the ATAR National Training and Development Specialist. ATAR Year 2 Work Plan, p. 63.

⁹⁴ Source: ATAR events and trainings.

⁹⁵ At the Association of Afghanistan Freight Forwarders Companies (AAFFCO) for 30 transport operators Sept. 17 and 18, 2014.

- One two-day TIR train-the-trainers workshop at ANCA for 20 customs officers⁹⁶
- Training and promotion materials to support current and future TIR programs
- One IPR training (December 27, 2014)

According to ANCA, ATAR developed the *Afghanistan National Customs Academy Administration Instruction*, which was very helpful.⁹⁷ However, ANCA faces a challenge in not having a proper curriculum. ATAR stated that it is developing a curriculum it will provide to ANCA.

While ANCA officials stated that ATAR’s trainer is knowledgeable and helpful, they expressed dissatisfaction that he comes only about five times a month and sometimes less so due to “white city” lockdowns. However, ANCA noted that the trainer is available through the Internet and has done a great job in developing training materials, conducting trainings, and is usually responsive to ANCA’s requests. The ANCA official noted, “[H]e is like me, an Afghan, and he does not need much security. If he could come on regular basis, I mean five days a week, then he would be more efficient.”

ATAR stated ANCA has not been operating since September 2014 for budgetary reasons. For this reason as well as for security reasons, ATAR has not been supporting ANCA since then.⁹⁸ However, ANCA informed us that it has continued to conduct short-term training during this period.

Conclusion

ATAR has contributed to better outputs from ANCA, but the latter believes that it needs more capacity building.

Recommendations

- Continue support to ANCA.
- Prepare and provide a curriculum to ANCA, including long-term courses.

Overall Findings Relating to ACD, MoCI Concerns

Relationships between ATAR and ACD

We found the relationship between ACD Kabul and ATAR to be generally weak, with a few ACD officials expressing an animus toward ATAR, although this did not appear to be personal. Areas of expressed dissatisfaction include:

⁹⁶ Sept. 7 and 8, 2014

⁹⁷ Source: ANCA officials

⁹⁸ ANCA was off-limit to ATAR staff due to suicide bomber on World Customs Day.

- ACD's suspicion of ATAR's hiring practices relating to ATAR's national personnel staffer(s). ACD alleges that ATAR's personnel discriminate against certain Afghan ethnic groups.
- The relationship appears more positive in the regions. ACD's senior officials in Herat, Jalalabad, and Hairatan were largely pleased with ATAR's national staff and believe they are building capacity and facilitating better outputs at these locations.
- A senior ACD official expressed discontent that he was not involved in the development of ATAR's SoW. *The relevant USAID official noted that the particular ACD official did not hold his present position at the time and therefore could not have been a part of the SoW discussions. Both ACD and USAID officials agree that ACD was involved in ATAR's Year 2 Work Plan.*

ACD and MoCI Common Concerns

- Both ACD and MoCI seem to harbor resentment of their inability to meaningfully participate in ATAR's hiring of employees. Both parties contend they are provided only a shortlist of employees from which to make a selection, and that is insufficient because it limits their ability to select candidates who work with them. *On the other hand, a key ATAR employee stated that ATAR follows strict hiring protocols, which includes sharing the long list of qualified applicants with the relevant counterpart, with both sides formulating shortlists, which are then merged. ATAR conducts the interviews and the resulting shortlist is shared with the counterpart. ATAR conducts the reference checks.*
 - *It should also be noted that the hiring protocol was the subject of a separate study resulting in a jointly developed and approved process with MoCI in May, 2014.*
- Criticism of the capacity of ATAR's national staff to provide adequate technical assistance and capacity building. *On the other hand, regarding ACD, a key ATAR staff noted that ACD has been slow to adopt best practice and redress noted shortcomings even after the same staff received repeated trainings, under both TAFE and ATAR. We have addressed this, recommending that ATAR manage expectations.*
- ATAR's security protocols very often limit both national and international staff from going to the counterparts' offices. This not only impacts capacity development, but has also resulted in deep cynicism, especially with regard to ATAR's security protocols for national staff. A few quotes include:
 - Senior MoCI official: "lockdowns are exaggerated for locals and they laugh at us [MoCI staff], telling us that we are working and they are sleeping at home. Statistics will show that locals are not targets."
 - Senior MoCI Official: Security "has impacted capacity building about 80%. The reason TAFE was so successful was because the consultants were in the office with us."

- Senior ACD Official: “They [ATAR] have some good advisors but in most cases their advisors are not competent. They do not come here much, not even the local staff. They sit at the Baron compound and provide online advice. They say they have security issues but is their blood better than mine?”

Recommendation

As we noted in our response to Evaluation Question 2, we suggest that ATAR manage expectations in general regarding what it can and cannot do relating to specific capacity building and technical assistance. While this might initially cause consternation on the part of the Ministry, doing so has the potential to lead to more understanding and harmony on all sides.

IV. ANNEXES

ANNEX I LEGISLATIVE AGENDA AND STATUS- MoCI-ATAR COMPARISON EQ-1

COMPARISON OF THE STATUS OF GIROA's and IMPLEMENTING PARTNER's (ATAR) WTO LEGISLATIVE ACTION PLAN				
No	Legislation	Responsible Gov't Authority	Status	Stage /Consistent with ATAR's Report
1	Amendments to the Law on Trademarks of 1 September 2009	MOCI	On Feb. 10, 2015, the President endorsed the trademark law, and it was sent to MOJ for publication on March 7, 2015.	Adopted/ <i>Yes</i>
2	Procedure on Customs Control of Intellectual Property Rights (Intellectual Property Border Enforcement)	ACD	The Minister of Finance adopted this procedure on April 12, 2014.	Adopted/ <i>Yes</i>
3	Order on Optical disks	Ministry of Information and Culture	The Minister of information and Culture signed this Order in November 2013	Adopted/ Not reported
4	Law on Geographical Indications (Law on Indication of Production Place)	MOCI	On Dec. 17, 2014, the Lower House approved the law, which was sent to the Upper House. On Jan. 5, 2015, a session was held on the law at the Commission of Religious Affairs, Cultural and Higher Education of the Upper House. On Jan. 6, a session was held at the National Economic, Financial and Budgeting Commission.	Parliament/ <i>Yes</i>
5	Law on Plant Protection and Quarantine	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL)	Submitted it to Parliament in January 2015.	Parliament/ <i>Yes</i>
6	Amendments to the Law on Supporting the Rights of Inventors and Discoverers of 31 April 2009 (Patents Law)	MOCI	MOJ is further reviewing the draft per request of Council of Ministers Legislative	Council of Ministers/ Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
7	Amendments to the Law on Supporting the Right of Authors, Composers, Artists, and Researchers of 26 July 2008 (Copyrights Law)	Ministry of Information and Culture (MOIC)	The Legislative Committee of the Council of Ministers approved the draft and requested MOJ to check certain terms.	Council of Ministers/ Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>

8	Amendments to the 2005 Customs Law	ACD	MOJ submitted the draft to the Legislative Committee of the Council of Ministers in March 2014. The draft is under review.	Council of Ministers/ <i>Yes</i>
9	Law on Animal Health and Veterinary Public Health	MAIL	The draft is under the technical review by MOJ's Educational, Cultural and Health Department.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
10	Law on Food Safety	Ministry of Public Health (MOPH)	The draft is under the technical review by MOJ's Finance and Economic Department.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
11	Law on Industrial Designs	MOCI	The MOJ Executive Committee held its third working group on the law on March 4, 2015.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
12	Draft amendments to the Commercial Procedural Code	MOCI	Draft Amendments being reviewed by MOJ and Supreme Court.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
13	Law on Trade Secrets (undisclosed information)	MOCI	Technical review on going by MOJ.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
14	Law on Topography of Integrated Circuits	MOCI	Technical review on going by MOJ.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
15	Law on Consumer Protection (provisions on Unfair Competition)	MOCI	MOJ's Commercial and Private Sector Department completed its review. The draft is now under the review of MOJ's executive committee.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
16	Amendments to the Law on Publication and Enforcement of Legislation of 1998	MOJ	Being reviewed by MOJ's Executive Committee.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
17	Law on Foreign Trade in Goods	MOCI	Being reviewed by MOJ's Executive Committee.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
18	Law on Safeguards Measures for Domestic Protection	MOCI	MOJ's Finance and Economic Department initiated technical review of this draft.	Ministry of Justice/ <i>Yes</i>
19	Law on Standards and Technical Regulations	Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA)	Draft not yet finalized by ANSA. To be submitted to MOJ once finalized.	ANSA/ <i>Yes</i>
20	Procedure on Advance Ruling on Binding Decisions (covering advance origin rulings)	ACD	Draft has been finalized and is being reviewed by DG ACD before submission to the Minister of Finance for signing.	ACD/ <i>Yes</i>

21	Procedure on Customs Valuation (including interpretative notes and software and interest charge valuation)	ACD	Draft to be finalized for review by DG ACD and further signing by the Minister of Finance.	ACD/ <i>Yes</i>
22	Procedure on Import and Export Licensing	MOCI	The draft procedure is finalized and will be adopted once the law on foreign trade is adopted.	MOCI/ <i>Yes</i>
23	Amendments to the Regulation on Drafting Procedure and Processing of Legal Acts	MOJ	The draft is not yet finalized	MOJ/ <i>Yes</i>
24	Procedure on Customs Storage Fees	ACD	The draft is not yet finalized.	ACD/ <i>Yes</i>
25	Regulations of production and importation of medicines and medical equipment of 24 February 2007 (concerning fees)	MOPH	The draft is not yet finalized.	MoPH/ <i>Yes</i>
26	Income Tax Law (concerning unequal treatment of import tax)	Ministry of Finance	The draft is not yet finalized. . To be submitted to MOJ once finalized	Ministry of Finance/ <i>Yes</i>
27	Law on Plant Variety Protection	MAIL	The draft is not yet prepared. To be submitted to MOJ once prepared and finalized.	Not drafted/ <i>Yes</i>

ANNEX II CAPACITY BUILDING EQ-2

Ministry/ Office	Draft/ Sustainability	WG	Capacity to Organize	Capacity Building/ Sustainability to Implement WTO Obligations	Comments/ Issues
MoCI/ International Trade	Senior officials ⁹⁹ stated that they have the capacity to draft agreements. They point out that they have been engaged in negotiating and drafting agreements during the APTTA, the APTTCCA, PATTTA and other agreements, including bilateral agreements relating to Afghanistan's WTO Accession. Regarding drafting legislation, their capacity is limited. The official stated that MoCI can build capacity very quickly if provided with sufficient capacity building.	Yes	Yes. The Directorate has organized events, international meetings, working group discussion. According to senior officials, this capacity is sustainable and the Ministry can function on its own but might need logistical and financial resources.	The Directorate is pleased with how ATAR has helped in its WTO accession activities. They can now organize meetings and negotiate on their own and respond to WTO members queries. Officials noted that they might still have some questions on policy or technical issues when negotiating an agreement but they have the capacity as evidenced from independently and successfully negotiating their WTO bilateral agreements. The official noted that ATAR helped them reach out to Central Asia.	Barriers: Security: Has impacted capacity building about 80 %. A Senior official stated that the reason TAFE was so successful was because the consultants were "in the office with us." Lack of Knowledge/experience: ATAR's national staff do not have the capacity to help build capacity.

⁹⁹ We use the term "Officials" in both the singular and plural sense for reasons of confidentiality.

MoCI/ WTO Unit	This Unit stated that it needs capacity building, at the technical level, in negotiating and drafting legislation. It should be noted that this Unit is not responsible for drafting legislation but wants to understand proposed legislation, as the Unit is an integral part of Afghanistan's WTO accession process. The Unit noted that senior level management can negotiate but the technical staff need more capacity development. The Unit noted that ATAR discussed drafting amendments with them but brought new laws, which they discussed together with ATAR and the relevant entities, <i>e.g.</i> MAIL, stakeholders.	Yes	Yes. This Unit organizes working groups and contributes to organizing and participating in WTO meetings. In addition, an official stated that he was called upon to organize Afghanistan's participation in the Exhibition Milano and was able to do so and only needed financial resources. The Unit stated that it can continue to organize on its own except it might need financial or logistical support.	The Unit stated that it needs Post-WTO accession capacity building, especially for Afghanistan to avail itself of the full benefits of LLDCs.	<p>Barriers: Security This Unit is unhappy with the national staff because they do not come often enough due to security issues. The Unit noted that security is a big problem. "It causes a lot of delays and impacts our work up to 70-80%".</p> <p>Lack of Knowledge/experience: Officials stated that the national staff serve only as a "go-between" and its Unit is more knowledgeable than the ATAR's national staff. Therefore, ATAR's national staff cannot provide capacity building or technical assistance.</p> <p>Translations: The Unit noted that translations are a problem insofar that they are literal and do not convey the actual meaning of the English text.</p>
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MoCI/ IP Registry	The Directorate has limited capacity to draft legislation. It has drafted regulations with ATAR and there was some capacity building but that was not enough. The Unit also needs capacity building in drafting procedures, and stated that “It is not enough what ATAR is doing”. Officials further stated that they are also receiving help from WIPO on TRIPS.	Yes	Yes. The Directorate has arranged trainings with local and/or international organizations. In addition to regular working groups meetings with stakeholders (including ATAR), this Unit has organized trainings for staff with WIPO. It also researched and organized for India to review the first patent application it received because Afghanistan lacks the capacity to conduct patent prosecution/ examination. It is in regular consultations with international bodies relating to its membership in Paris Convention, Madrid Protocol, and Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks. This capacity is sustainable and might only need logistical and/or financial support.	Officials stated that the missing link is that ATAR does not help with capacity building. However, the Directorate noted that without ATAR’s help, it would have been impossible to come up with outputs – ATAR helped with some software that was essential in accomplishing outputs. The Directorate stated that it needed more help for post- accession because it does not have the capacity.	Barriers: Security. Officials stated that the national staff do not come often enough because of security issues. Officials noted that the lockdowns are exaggerated for locals and that they laugh at MoCI staff telling them that they [MoCI] “are working but we are sleeping at home. Statistics will show that locals are not targets. Security is a serious issue and has a negative impact on capacity building” Lack of Knowledge experience: Officials stated that the local staff are only a “go-between” because they do not have the knowledge or capacity. Officials further noted that even the ATAR’s experts are limited – “they know theory but have no practical experience”. He referenced the IP training earlier this year when the expert was highly educated but could not answer questions on practical applications of the trademark law.
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MoJ	ATAR's assistance to MoJ is to facilitate MoJ's understanding of the proposed legislation and to assist in shepherding the legislation through the legislative process	Yes	Yes. The Directorate organizes working groups and meetings as needed. Officials stated that they can continue to do so on its own except it might need financial or logistical support.	MoJ officials stated that ATAR had assisted in 24 laws and regulations, including TRIPS and Copyright, the Law on Food Safety, and the Law Industrial Protection. They worked together with ATAR on this - when they have questions concerning documents, ATAR is helpful and answers their question. MoJ also noted that ATAR has been effective and has helped in understanding the issues.	MoJ officials stated that the local employee was embedded when needed and that this was both efficient and effective. MoJ officials further stated that they can do many things by themselves but will need ATAR for Post-WTO implementation. Barriers: Translation: MoJ stated that the translations were not done by translators with technical knowledge and there were no annotations to understand what literal works or phrase meant. As a result, this impeded its work.
MAIL/ Animal/ Veterinary	The Directorate stated that it already had the capacity to draft regulations and procedures independently. Officials noted that they do not have the capacity to draft laws. Officials stated that they want to learn how to draft legislation, and enforce the SPS. They need more capacity building.	Yes	Yes. The Directorate organizes working groups and meetings as needed. Officials stated that they can continue to do so on their own except they might need financial or logistical support.	Officials stated that, "ATAR provided procedures and regulation and we corrected the translation which has too much problem. They never build the capacity of our staff to be able to produce new regulation and procedure [by ourselves]." However, officials stated that ATAR did assist in helping draft regulations and procedures consistent with WTO rules.	Officials stated that the ATAR employee comes one a week to "check on translations – that is all". Barriers: Translation: Officials noted that there are serious translations issues and they spend their working group time correcting translations.
MAIL/ Plant Protection	Officials stated that the Directorate cannot draft laws independently but can draft regulations and procedures with technical assistance.	Yes	Yes. The Directorate regularly organizes meetings, including meetings with international organizations, including CODEX. It also is in contact with IPPC to arrange/organize assistance.	Officials stated that ATAR's employee comes once a week for a group meeting and is very helpful in building capacity and understanding the procedures. The Directorate needs on-going capacity development because the issues are very complex.	Officials noted that the local staff are very helpful and knowledgeable in building capacity.

MoPH	Officials stated that ATAR conducted a workshop with all stakeholders and discussed the articles of law. This was helpful but the Directorate cannot draft laws or regulations independently of donor assistance.	Yes	Yes. The Directorate organizes working groups, inter-ministerial and other meetings as needed, including with international organization such as CODEX. The Directorate stated that it can continue to do so on its own except it might need financial or logistical support.	Officials stated that MOPH will need ATAR's assistance in upcoming years for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ technical advisor to install and calibrate technical equipment; ▪ A food technical advisor and more similar technical tasks; and ▪ Help in documentation for ISO and the SPS. 	The Directorate stated that it was pleased with ATAR's employee who had expertise and skills and who comes once a week for a working group meeting. The Food Safety Law is new and there were translations issues. Barriers: Translation.
MoIC	ATAR assisted in government reform and in the amendments to the copyright law. ATAR also explained the importance of the WTO and is assisting Afghanistan in membership to the Berne Convention. This Unit is new and needs on-going capacity building. They cannot draft regulations or procedures independently and needs continue donor assistance.	Yes	Yes. The Unit organizes working group meetings and can do so with minimal assistance. However, this Unit is new and need logistical and financial support.	Officials stated that ATAR's embedded employee helped to develop its copyright policy but they need more capacity building and training to be at the same level as neighboring countries. Officials noted that there are no copyright experts in Afghanistan. ATAR also helped with copyright awareness and MoIC can do this on its own but lacks the resources.	This Unit needs more awareness outreach. "We are so pleased with ATAR that we want to give them a medal. This has been delayed due to a change in administration." Barriers: Translation: USAID translators are not technical and they do not always translate the terms correctly.

ANSA	ANSA has independently prepared some guidelines for the certification but cannot draft the regulation. Officials stated that they can now draft rules and regulation without technical assistance in the future “(because drafting laws and rules is not easy)”. Officials stated that they need technical assistance in drafting regulations and procedures only in new areas.	Yes	Yes. ANSA has the capacity to organize at several levels. It organized a public/private partnership entity, as well as seeking donor assistance with the Law on Metrology, and coordinates with South Asian technical experts. Officials stated that this capacity is sustainable partly because ANSA operates on the presumption that ATAR will not always be around.	ANSA stated that in preparing regulations there was sustainable capacity building because there were long discussions with ATAR on each article and each sentence of the amendment. Officials stated that ANSA needs capacity building in lab management and other aspects of its function including conformity assessment. In terms of sustainability, ANSA will need continued capacity building but hopes to be financially sustainable due to assessing fees. It is also expecting to have its information center running in the near future. ANSA has developed a public/private partnership aimed at generating fees. ATAR successfully assisted ANSA in developing four marks: product certification, food certification, system certification, halal certification which ANSA plans to establish conformity standards. ANSA is now a Member of ISO and has adopted some ISO standards but does not have the capacity to conduct laboratory tests and conformity assessments.	Officials stated that the Unit needs technical assistance but can substantially manage on its own. Officials stated that ANSA is seeking other donors for TA in implementing the Law on Metrology. The official noted that ANSA needs a public awareness program. ANSA stated that it was happy with ATAR.
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ANNEX III STATEMENT OF WORK



**OFFICE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INFRASTRUCTURE (OEGI)
&
OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENT (OPPD)**

STATEMENT OF WORK

**MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
OF
AFGHANISTAN TRADE AND REVENUE (ATAR) PROJECT**

I. PROGRAM INFORMATION

Program/Project Name:	Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR)
Contractor:	Chemonics International Inc.
Contract #:	<u>AID-306-TO-13-00009</u>
Total Estimated Cost:	<u>\$77,755,426</u>
Life of Program/Project:	Nov 2013 – Nov 2017
Active Provinces:	Kabul, Nangarhar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar, Central Asia(Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and South Asia (India and Pakistan)
USAID/Afghanistan Mission Development Objective (DO):	DO1: Sustainable, Agricultural-led Economic Growth Expanded DO3: Performance and Legitimacy of GIRoA Improved
Linkage to Standard Program Structure (SPS):	4.2.1 Trade and Investment enabling Environment 2.2.1 Legislative Function and Processes
Required?	Required - Large project
Type:	Performance, Mid-Term

II. INTRODUCTION

USAID's Evaluation Policy encourages independent external evaluation to increase accountability to stakeholders and to inform decisions on program management, implementation, resource allocation and design. In keeping with this aim, this mid-evaluation will be conducted to review and evaluate the performance of the USAID-funded Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) implemented by Chemonics International Inc. The evaluation will

focus on assessing the activity's performance between 2013 and end of 2014 in achieving its program goal, objectives, and results.

ATAR is a four year project that began on November 7, 2013 and will end on November 6, 2017. It is designed to strengthen the business climate of Afghanistan to enable private investment, enhanced trade, job creation, and fiscal sustainability through the critical Transition Period and continuing into the Transformation Decade. ATAR provides: 1) technical assistance on trade Agreements, World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, and rules compliance; 2) organization of regional trade fairs and private sector matchmaking events and supports bilateral agreement for Afghanistan; and 3) capacity building for the implementation of reforms in customs (*e.g.*, Border Management Model (BMM), Risk Management (RM), customs procedures modernization and streamlining, customs procedures harmonization with customs of other countries).

III. BACKGROUND

ATAR is building on the success of two previous USAID/Afghanistan activities, TAFE & TAFE II. In both instances, USAID supported capacity building at both individual and organizational levels. ATAR has three components.

Component 1: Support Trade Policy Liberalization

The goal of Component One is to help Afghanistan take full advantage of WTO membership. Under this component, ATAR supports the liberalization of Afghanistan's trade regime by supporting its accession to the WTO. It is also helping improve the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIRoA) ability to formulate a strong, well-coordinated trade and tariff policy that contributes to improved trade policies, laws, and regulations. ATAR supports efforts made by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to coordinate and strengthen trade-related policy and help reduce the many technical and tariff barriers obstructing both exporters and importers. ATAR works closely with the Trade Policy Analysis Unit (TPAU), the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA), and the Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA).

Component 2: Facilitate Access to Regional Markets

ATAR facilitates the development and implementation of regional trade in four ways. First, it brokers trade and transit agreements. Second, it is assisting GIRoA implement regional trade agreements and reforms. Third, it supports the implementation of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Coordination Authority (APTTCA) and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Corridors 5 & 6 by working with countries in the region such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and India. Fourth, it fosters trade promotion and public-private dialogue.

Component 3: Improved Customs And Tax Administration

Component Three is dedicated to capacity building, which modernizes, streamlines, and harmonizes customs policies, codes, procedures, and practices. Some of these include Border Management Model (BMM), Risk Management (RM), customs codes, Electronic Data Interchange, Customs Duty Collection Systems, enforcement, and analysis. ATAR has been working in the Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD) and with the Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA) in particular. Also ATAR transferred \$ 4 Million to DFID to support VAT efforts in ACD.

ATAR's Theory of Change

The theory of change underlying ATAR “holds that with continued provision of technical assistance to GIRoA related to promoting the necessary policy reforms and capacity strengthening, the resulting better business enabling environment will lead to higher private sector investment, and increase regional trade, economic growth, job creation, and potential for higher domestic revenues”.

ATAR's Development Hypothesis

The development hypothesis of ATAR draws from the CARAVAN PAD which posits that sustainable growth and job creation in Afghanistan depend critically on a liberalized policy environment to enable diversified investment and trade and on the ability of the GIRoA to deliver services and maintain fiscal stability in the medium term. In turn, these requirements depend on two major assumptions. The most important one is continued GIRoA political will to pursue change in policy and governance, such as tackling the massive corruption problem through a combination of enforcement and reduction of the institutional space for graft. The GIRoA has made important commitments to reform under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and in its National Priority Programs. The second major assumption is that the security situation will allow the private sector to take advantage of a liberalized trade and investment regime and better service delivery by investing and creating jobs.

Key inputs for the ATAR project will include technical assistance, training, study tours, and also provide limited commodities that are necessary to sustain and implement reforms in trade policy, promotion and customs agencies. These targeted inputs, based on international best practice and standards, will result in outputs that are both tangible and results oriented. Moreover, study tours and the procurement of IT equipment for GIRoA will result in the completion of policy studies and trade-impact assessments by GIRoA officials, streamlined mechanisms for customer service provision on trade-related questions and issues from the private sector, and the institutionalization of automation in customs procedures. These outputs, among others detailed in the logical framework will lead to the achievement of the project purpose of an Afghan-led liberalized trade policy, including the adoption of a WTO-compliant trade regime, strengthened regional trade and access to markets for Afghan exporters, and the resulting economic growth and jobs creation pursued by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

ATAR Partners in GIROA

Most of ATAR's progress has been at the output level since the nature of the work requires several years and notable events to achieve the intended results: WTO accession, regional trade agreements that are enacted and enforced to increase transit, and reliable and accountable integration of the customs systems to banks and with relevant ministries. To achieve those results, ATAR has been providing consulting advice and technical expertise with its institutional partners.

- MOJ (Ministry of Justice Legislative (Taqnin) Department
- MOCI (Ministry of Commerce and Industry): International Trade Directorate and it's the Transit Department, Afghanistan Central Business Registry and Deputy Minister Office
- MOF (Ministry of Finance): Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD) and, within it, Afghanistan National Customs Academy
- MAIL (Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and livestock) : Policy and Planning Department, Animal Health and Veterinary Services Department and Plant Protection Quarantine Department
- MOPH (Ministry of Public Health) :Pharmacy Department, and Agriculture and Pharmacy Faculties,
- Quasi-governmental Agencies Afghanistan National Standard Authority and Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan.

ATAR Achievements

Component 1: Support Trade Policy Liberalization

- GIROA is prepared for its fifth, and possibly final, WTO Working Party meeting. The Working Party proceedings, which are 40% of the accession process, are largely complete other than adoption of WTO-related laws.
- GIROA drafted new or reformed existing trade laws necessary for WTO accession, the majority of which are on the legislative action plan for Afghan year 1393 and action plan will move to 139.
- The Central Statistics Organization (CSO), Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD), and Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA) are sharing data and discrepancies reduced from around 70% to around 15%-

Component 2: Facilitate Enhanced Access to Regional Markets

- Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan are now engaged in high level diplomatic negotiations to revise the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and Bilateral Trade Agreements.

- Afghanistan's Council of Ministers approved the Cross-Border Transport Agreement-Corridor 5 (CBTA-5) between Afghanistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan in April 2014. The Kyrgyz Republic must now ratify it.
- The Government of Pakistan opened a trade mission in Almaty, Kazakhstan and vowed to assist the USG in opening up trade routes between Central and South Asia.
 - More than \$8 million in business deals were concluded at the Gulfood exhibition in Dubai in February 2014 between Afghan and non-Afghan businesses. Twenty-one Afghan traders, almost half of whom were businesswomen, participated in the exhibition.


Component 3: Improved Customs Administration

- ATAR helped the ACD and the Afghan Border Police (ABP) create a formal partnership to implement the Border Management Model (BMM) and, therefore, conducted a compliance assessment at Customs locations in Islam Qalat, Aqina, Hairatan and Sher Khan Bandar in the north, Torkham in the east, and Kabul International Airport in central Afghanistan.
- ATAR reviewed ACD's risk management and import clearance systems and identified areas for improvement. ATAR provided training to ACD officials in risk management to improve their understanding and implementation of the internationally accepted approach to clearing cargo.
- ATAR created an internship program at the ACD including several women within the civil service ranks.

IV. PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of ATAR is to strengthen the business climate in Afghanistan. This will enable private investment, job creation and promote fiscal sustainability through the critical Transition Period and continuing into the Transformation Decade. As depicted in the results framework below, the expected results are: (1) Capacity of Afghan government to formulate and implement liberal policy framework for trade and investment strengthened; (2) Regional and global integration enhanced; and (3) Revenue generation for fiscal sustainability strengthened through reforms and anti- corruption measures in customs and taxation.

Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) Project Result Framework



To accomplish these results, the Implementing partner is providing technical assistance to counterparts. The activities include, but are not limited to:

- Draft relevant WTO legislation
- Prepare for WTO negotiations
- Improve technical trade analyses
- Improve the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan's ability to represent the country in Expos
- Negotiate trade agreements such as the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement among others.
- Better coordinated customs policies, procedures, data exchange, and enforcement of internationally accepted models for cross-border operations
- Modernize the ACD by upgrading and automating customs payment operations, registration and clearance modules
- Train customs professionals on valuation, enforcement, risk management, communications,

V. PURPOSE OF THIS MID-TERM EVALUATION

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to study and document the performance of the project, determine the effectiveness of ATAR work toward its stated goals and expected results, identify major lessons learned, and make recommendations for the improvement of project implementation in the coming years. The findings and recommendations of the evaluation will be used by USAID/OEGI Trade Team and the Implementing Partner to inform implementation during the remaining life of the project. In addition, shared lessons will also benefit the wider OEGI office and the Mission at large.

In particular, the evaluation should:

1. Examine the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of ATAR's intervention in each of the activity components, focusing on the following key areas:
 - a. Creation of work teams, organizations, and procedures for and accession to the WTO;
 - b. Technical assistance to the principle partners at the MOCI (ANSA, TPAU and EPAA),
 - c. Creation of a cadre of capable staff at the MOJ Legislative (Taqnin) Department, and MOF (ACD) who can implement and carry out reforms, particularly the ability to utilize software systems that automate payment systems and cargo acquittal;
 - d. Capacity building of GIRoA officials; and
 - e. Linkages between businesses and associations in the private sector throughout South and Central Asia through its Business to Business (B2B) events (forums, expos, workshops etc.).
2. Identify lessons learned on program design and implementation that can guide and enhance the second half of the program

3. Make recommendations on any corrective action deemed necessary to improve ATAR's on-going and planned activities.

VI. EVALUATION QUESTIONS:

The evaluation questions are presented in two sets. The first set pertain to purported achievements in preparation for WTO accession, the readiness of the ACD to initiate commercial customs fees payments, and changes in trade policies and practices between Afghanistan and its neighbors in Central and South Asia. The second set of questions concern the human and institutional capacity building efforts within the units that ATAR works with to the greatest extent.

- MOJ (Ministry of Justice Legislative (Taqnin) Department:
- MOCI(Ministry of Commerce and Industry): International Trade Directorate and it's Transit Department; EPAA
- MOF (Ministry of Finance): Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD)

WTO Accession, Customs & Trade:

- a. Is the current status of the legislation for the laws required to join the WTO (particularly the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade) consistent with the latest reports by the Implementing Partner about their current status?
- b. To what extent has the technical assistance provided correctly targeted the necessary skills, appropriately delivered, to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan)?
- c. To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?
- d. Which aspects of ATAR's assistance have been most effective in expanding the participation of Afghan women, and, opening career options for these women at the counterpart ministries? As appropriate, identify those approaches that were both effective and the most accepted by ministry staff.

Human & Institutional Capacity Building:

- a) How effective have been ATAR's efforts to improve the technical abilities of the staff it has worked with at the partner agencies to organize, negotiate, draft and implement the WTO related legislation, regulation, procedures for which they are responsible?
- b) How effective has each component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of

implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

- c) How has ATAR incorporated gender considerations into its project implementation level and activities, particularly women's inclusion in male dominated organizations, capacity development and trade regulations reform platforms, affected the presence and influence of women? What are the obstacles? What activities are most effective?

VII. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY:

The evaluation team will be responsible for developing an evaluation strategy and methodology that include a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis approaches. The approach should be participatory in both the design and implementation. The selected approach should also assess the different aspects of the program and use the most appropriate evaluation tools to comprehensively answer the evaluation questions. Close coordination with USAID/Afghanistan (OEGI and OPPD) will be necessary to ensure that the evaluation team selects methods that are suitable for use in the conflict areas. Data sources may include document reviews and focus groups and key informant interviews with key GIRoA officials from MOCI, ACD, MAIL, MOPH, MOJ, ANSA, EPPA and the private sector in order to collection information. Where applicable, data collected for the evaluation questions should be disaggregated by sex and by location. Analysis of lessons learned, success and failures should be compared and contrasted across geographic areas. The proposed evaluation design and methodology will be critically evaluated against the 'purpose of the evaluation', most importantly in its ability to provide actionable guidance to USAID for current and future programming. The methodology will be presented as part of the draft work plan as outlined in the deliverables (Section XII) and included in the final report.

The OEGI Point-of-Contact for the team is the ATAR COR Bryan BByrne@state.gov; Amin Ahmadzai the Alternate COR aahmadzai@state.gov and Mohammad Safi msafi@state.gov the trade staff.

The suggested methodology should include a combination of, but is not limited to:

1. Desk/document review
2. Direct observations
3. Interviews and meetings with key informants
4. Focus group discussions
5. Program and beneficiary records
6. Program data collection forms
7. Review of program performance databases
8. Consultations with other donors (e. g. The World Bank, International Financial Corporation (IFC), UK Department For International Development (DFID), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), etc.)

While USAID/ Afghanistan anticipates that the evaluators will draw from the above illustrative list, the evaluators are expected to propose appropriate quantitative and qualitative methodologies necessary to address the provided questions.

VIII. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATION

The evaluation team shall include evaluation and technical specialists with relevant experience, particularly in trade facilitation, customs, capacity building and public-private alliances in a conflict/post-conflict country. It is recommended that the team include one expatriate and three Afghan professionals with strong interpersonal, technical and writing skills. Below are minimum qualifications for the team members:

- *Trade Facilitation Specialist (Expat)*.
- *WTO Specialist (Expat)*. The specialists shall possess at least a Master's degree in law, social sciences or a field related to trade organizations, and 7 years of applied evaluation experience in WTO related activities and reforms. The successful candidate is required to have highly developed interpersonal skills. Preference will be given to those with experience in India, Pakistan and Central Asia.
- *Customs, Trade Facilitation & Promotion Specialist (Afghan)*. The Customs, Trade Facilitation and Promotion Specialist candidate shall possess a Bachelor's Degree in Economics or International Trade with at least 7 years of experience in technical assistance capacity building of relevant government officials around the region, or a Master's degree with 4 years of relevant experience.
- *Gender Analysis Specialist (Afghan)*. Candidates for this position must be female and have a Bachelor's Degree in Social or International Trade with 6 years of relevant work experience, or a Master degree with 4 years of relevant work experience.

The mix and composition of the team may vary. The team lead may possess any of the technical skills. The Team Leader (TL) shall be an evaluation expert with at least 10 years of program evaluation experience preferably with USAID - or Asia Foundation, DFID or European Union funded trade support programs with strong leadership and report writing skills. The TL shall possess at least a Master's degree, PhD preferred, in economics, law, public administration, international development, social science, or a related discipline. The TL should be able to write a high quality, standard, accurate and concise report in English.

IX. EVALUATION SCHEDULE

The estimated time period for undertaking this Evaluation is 50 days, of which at least 37 days should be spent by the two expats (Trade Facilitation Specialist & WTO Specialist) in Afghanistan. The expat team members should arrive in Kabul no later than June 15, 2015. *This schedule and LOE assumes that Option Year 3 of SUPPORT-II will be exercised by USAID and work will be authorized past July 4, 2015.*

The evaluation team is authorized to work six days a week (regular work days in Afghanistan are from Sunday through Thursday). Members of the team will be required to evaluate ATAR's activities in locations outside of Kabul, including Torkham, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat.

Illustrative Level of Effort (LOE) in days for STTA Team:

Activity	LOE for Expat Team Lead	LOE for Expat WTO Specialist	LOE for Afghan Specialist Customs, Trade Facilitation & Promotion	Total LOE in Days
Document review, begin preparation on work plan, draft questions, data analysis plan, suggested list of interviewees	1	1		2
Travel to and from Afghanistan	4	4		8
In-briefing with USAID	1	1	1	3
Draft work plan	3	3	2	7
Kabul based interviews (including interviews with ministry partners and traders)	12	12	12	36
Field Interview (in Torkham, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat)	12	12	16	40
Mid-point briefing	1	1	1	3
Data analysis, preliminary report and presentation to USAID	8	8	5	21
Final report	8	8	1	17
Totals	50	50	38	138

Position	Remote prep	Travel to/from Kabul	In-Country	Finalization of Report	Total
Expat Team Leader	1	4	37	8	50
Expat WTO Specialist	1	4	37	8	50
Afghan Customs, Trade & Promotion Specialist			36	2	38
SUPPORT-II Afghan Gender Specialist*					
Totals	2	8	110	18	138

*Note: One prep day for each expat is sufficient, not required of Afghan STTA. Field travel will require 16 days LOE per STTA and the Afghans will be required to travel to Torkham without the expats. **The SUPPORT-II Gender Specialist's LOE is not included in this activity budget as the position is LTTA.**

X. MATERIALS

Illustrative List of Documents for Pre-Field Review:

- 1) ATAR Contract
- 2) ATAR Statement of Work
- 3) ATAR Work plan(s) and M&E plan
- 4) ATAR Performance Management Plan(s)
- 5) ATAR Monthly and Quarterly Reports, and annual report "if any"
- 6) ATAR Fact Sheet
- 7) USAID 3-Year Strategy
- 8) USAID 10-Year Strategy
- 9) Other documents as requested and deemed necessary
- 10) ACD Five years Strategic Plan
- 11) ANDS, the section of Regional cooperation

XI. MANAGEMENT

Checchi will identify and hire the evaluation team, assist in facilitating the work plan, and arrange meetings with key stakeholders identified prior to the initiation of field work. The evaluation team will organize other meetings as identified during the course of the evaluation in consultation with the SUPPORT II project and USAID/Afghanistan.

Checchi/SUPPORT-II is also responsible for arranging accommodation, security, office space, computers, internet access, printing, communication, and transportation for the evaluation team to the program sites.

The Evaluation Team will officially report directly to Checchi SUPPORT II management. Checchi/SUPPORT-II is responsible for all direct coordination with USAID/Afghanistan/OPPD, through the SUPPORT II COR Daryl Martyris (dmartyris@state.gov). From a technical management perspective, the evaluation team will work closely with Bryan Byrne (bbyrne@state.gov) the COR for ATAR and Amin Ahmadzai (aahmadzai@state.gov) the Alternate COR for ATAR and Charmaine Matovu: CVMatovu@state.gov, OPPD M&E. In order to maintain objectivity, OPPD's Monitoring and Evaluation Unit will make all final decisions about the evaluation.

XII. DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1. **In-briefing** with USAID/OEGL. **Within two days of arriving in Afghanistan**, the Evaluation Team shall attend a kickoff meeting at USAID to discuss the SOW, clarify any questions and prepare the team to create a work plan. This meeting will allow for discussion

of background documents, and a suggested interview/contact list. If necessary following the meeting, the SOW can be adjusted, with USAID approval.

2. **Evaluation Work Plan:** within **five days** of the in-briefing, the team shall submit to USAID/OEGI and OPPD (M&E) a detailed Draft Work Plan for conducting this Mid-Term Performance Evaluation. The draft work plan shall detail the evaluation methodology, incorporate any proposed modifications to this statement of work, and elaborate the customized survey and evaluation tools to be used by the team. Additionally, a draft schedule of proposed visits to Ministries key officials, traders and training sites should be included. Within five business days of receipt of the draft work plan, USAID will provide comments to SUPPORT II. Within two business days of receipt of comments, the team will resubmit the revised work plan to USAID. Once USAID approves the work plan (a revised version of the draft based on USAID comments), it will be formally considered part of this Third Party Evaluation Statement of Work, and will guide the continued implementation of this evaluation.
3. **Mid-term Briefing and Interim Meetings:** The evaluation team is expected to hold a mid-term briefing with USAID on the status of the assessment including potential challenges and emerging opportunities. The team will also provide periodic briefings and feedback on the team's findings, as agreed upon during the in-briefing. These will include:
 - a) **Weekly Fieldwork Briefings** to USAID (30-60 min. each): As requested by USAID, the team will be available for a weekly briefing on progress and constraints during this evaluation effort, at a time to be determined between USAID and the Evaluation Team Leader. This may be in person or by telephone
4. **PowerPoint and Final Exit Presentation:** The evaluation team is expected to hold a final exit presentation to discuss the summary of findings and recommendations to USAID. This presentation will be scheduled as agreed upon during the in-briefing. Presentation slides should not exceed 18 slides in total.
5. **Draft Evaluation Report:** A draft report will be submitted prior to or within 48 hours of the exit briefing. The draft evaluation report should be consistent with the guidance provided in Section XIII: "Final Report Format." The report will address each of the issues and questions identified in the SOW and any other factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation. Any such factors can be included in the report only after consultation with USAID. **The submission date** for the draft evaluation report will be decided upon during the mid-term or exit briefing and submitted to OPPD's M&E unit by Checchi. Once the initial draft evaluation report is submitted, the following deadlines should be followed:
 - a. OEGI will have **10 working days** in which to review and comment on the initial draft, after which point USAID/OPPD's M&E unit will have **5 working days** to review and consolidate all USAID comments (total of **15 working days**). OPPD will submit the consolidated comments to Checchi.
 - b. The evaluation team will then have **5 working days** to make appropriate edits and revisions to the draft and re-submit the revised final draft report to USAID.
 - c. OEGI and the M&E unit will have **10 working days** after the submission of the second revised draft to again review and send any final comments.
6. **Final Evaluation Report:** The evaluation team will be asked to take no more than 3 days to respond/incorporate the final comments from OEGI and OPPD. The Evaluation Team

Leader will then submit the final report to OPPD. All project data and records will be submitted in full and should be in electronic form in easily readable format; organized and documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or evaluation; and owned by USAID.

7. **Capacity Building of Afghan Evaluation Team Members:** The evaluation team will report to Checchi on how the capacity of local evaluation team members was built during this evaluation. Checchi will then consolidate this information together with capacity building from other evaluations and submit in the quarterly and annual reports to USAID.

XIII. Final Report Format

The evaluation final report should not exceed 35 pages in length, not including annexes. It should be written in English, using Times New Roman 12 point font, 1.15 line spacing, and be consistent with USAID branding policy. The report should be structured as follows:

- Title Page
- Table of Contents (including table of figures and table of charts if needed)
- List of any acronyms,
- Acknowledgements or Preface (optional)
- Executive Summary (3-5 pages)
- Introduction
 - a. A description of the project that was evaluated including goal and expected results.
 - b. Brief statement of the purpose of the evaluation including a list of the evaluation questions.
 - c. Description of the methods used in the evaluation (such as desk/document review, interviews, site visits, surveys, etc.), the rationale and location for field visits (if any), and a description of the numbers and types of respondents
 - d. Limitations to the evaluation, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.)
- Findings
 - a) Describe findings, focusing on each of the evaluation questions and providing **gender and geographic disaggregation** where appropriate
 - b) Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay, or the compilation of people's opinions
- Conclusions – This section should include value statements, supported by evidence that will address:
 - a. Whether the program is on track to attain its stated goals and objectives.
 - b. Highlight the strengths and weaknesses of implementation.
 - c. Other conclusions as identified by the evaluation team.
- Recommendations – This section will include:
 - a. Actionable practical and specific statements to improve the overall performance of the program. They should also apply to the design and performance of future programming. Suggestions for mid-course adjustments/corrections and changes to improve performance. Actions or decisions to be taken by management.
 - b. Each recommendation should be supported by a specific set of findings

- c. Include recommended future objectives and types of activities based on **lessons learned**

XIV. Annexes:

- a) Evaluation Scope of Work
- b) Methodology description (include any pertinent details not captured in the report)
- c) Copies of all survey instruments and questionnaires
- d) List of critical and key documents reviewed
- e) Schedule of meetings and sources of information (If confidentiality is a concern, the team should discuss and agree upon an approach with USAID)
- f) Notes from key interviews, focus group discussions and other meetings
- g) Documentation of any changes to the SOW or evaluation process
- h) Meeting notes of all key interviews
- i) One page briefer of findings, recommendations and lessons learned (optional)
- j) Statement of differences (if applicable)

XV. REPORTING GUIDELINES

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate the validity of the project's hypothesis and the effectiveness of the project.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the statement of work.
- The evaluation report will be written in highly professional English, free of colloquial language, grammatical and typographical error, and with professional formatting.
- The evaluation report should include the statement of work as an annex. Any modifications to the statement of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the SUPPORT II COR.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex of the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess how results affected men and women.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and should not be solely based on anecdotes, hearsay, or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex. If confidentiality is a concern, the team should discuss and agree upon an approach with USAID.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical, and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

DRAFT WORK PLAN

**MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
OF
AFGHANISTAN TRADE AND REVENUE (ATAR) PROJECT**

Submitted on:

June 9, 2015

Evaluation Team:

Savitri Singh
Sarah Parkinson
Manizha Wafeq
Amid Ahmad

I. Introduction

ATAR is a four year project that began on November 7, 2013 and will end on November 6, 2017. It is designed to strengthen the business climate of Afghanistan to enable private investment, enhanced trade, job creation, and fiscal sustainability through the critical Transition Period and continuing into the Transformation Decade.

ATAR consists of the following three components: Component 1: Trade Policy Liberalization; Component 2: Enhanced Access to Regional Markets; and Component 3: Improved Customs Administration. The support activities and goals of each component are detailed below.

The purpose of this Mid-Term Evaluation is to study and document the performance of the project, determine the effectiveness of ATAR work toward its stated goals and expected results, identify major lessons learned, and make recommendations for the improvement of project implementation in the coming years.

a. PROJECT BACKGROUND

ATAR is building on the success of two previous USAID/Afghanistan activities, Tafa and Tafa II. Through both projects, USAID supported capacity building at both individual and organizational levels.

A. ATAR's Development Hypothesis

The development hypothesis of ATAR draws from the original PAD which posits that sustainable growth and job creation in Afghanistan depend critically on a liberalized policy environment to enable diversified investment and trade and on the ability of the GIRA to deliver services and maintain fiscal stability in the medium term. In turn, these requirements depend on two major assumptions. The most important one is continued GIRA political will to pursue change in policy and governance, such as tackling the massive corruption problem through a combination of enforcement and reduction of the institutional space for graft. The GIRA has made important commitments to reform under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and in its National Priority Programs. The second major assumption is that the security situation will allow the private sector to take advantage of a liberalized trade and investment regime and better service delivery by investing and creating jobs.

Key inputs for the ATAR project will include technical assistance, training, study tours, and also provide limited commodities that are necessary to sustain and implement reforms in trade policy, promotion and customs agencies. These targeted inputs, based on international best practice and standards, will result in outputs that are both tangible and results oriented. Moreover, study tours and the procurement of IT equipment for GIRA will result in the completion of policy studies and trade-impact assessments by GIRA officials, streamlined

mechanisms for customer service provision on trade-related questions and issues from the private sector, and the institutionalization of automation in customs procedures. These outputs, among others detailed in the logical framework will lead to the achievement of the project purpose of an Afghan-led liberalized trade policy, including the adoption of a WTO-compliant trade regime, strengthened regional trade and access to markets for Afghan exporters, and the resulting economic growth and jobs creation pursued by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

B. ATAR's Theory of Change

The theory of change underlying ATAR “holds that with continued provision of technical assistance to GIROA related to promoting the necessary policy reforms and capacity strengthening, the resulting better business enabling environment will lead to higher private sector investment, and increase regional trade, economic growth, job creation, and potential for higher domestic revenues.”

C. Implementation

Consistent with and in implementing ATAR's *Development Hypothesis* and *Theory of Change*, the technical support and goals of ATAR's three components are as follows:

Component 1: Support Trade Policy Liberalization

The goal of Component One is to help Afghanistan take full advantage of WTO membership. Under this component, ATAR supports the liberalization of Afghanistan's trade regime by supporting its accession to the WTO. It is also helping improve the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIROA) ability to formulate a strong, well-coordinated trade and tariff policy that contributes to improved trade policies, laws, and regulations. ATAR supports efforts made by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to coordinate and strengthen trade-related policy and help reduce the many technical and tariff barriers obstructing both exporters and importers. ATAR works closely with the Trade Policy Analysis Unit (TPAU), the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA), and the Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA).

Component 2: Facilitate Access to Regional Markets

ATAR facilitates the development and implementation of regional trade in four ways. First, it brokers trade and transit agreements. Second, it is assisting GIROA implement regional trade agreements and reforms. Third, it supports the implementation of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Coordination Authority (APTTCA) and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Corridors 5 & 6 by working with countries in the region such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and India. Fourth, it fosters trade promotion and public-private dialogue.

Component 3: *Improved Customs And Tax Administration*

Component Three is dedicated to capacity building, which modernizes, streamlines, and harmonizes customs policies, codes, procedures, and practices. Some of these include Border Management Model (BMM), Risk Management (RM), customs codes, Electronic Data Interchange, Customs Duty Collection Systems, enforcement, and analysis. ATAR has been working in the Afghanistan Customs Department (ACD) and with the Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA) in particular. Also ATAR transferred \$ 4 Million to DFID to support VAT efforts in ACD.

1.2 EVALUATION FOCUS

The evaluation will analyze the extent to which the USAID resources have been deployed to maximum effect in each of the component areas where ATAR is providing technical assistance. The evaluation will examine the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of ATAR's interventions in each component area and, to the extent possible, will clearly and concisely outline relevant findings with respect to:

4. Creation of work teams, organizations, and procedures for and accession to the WTO;
5. Technical assistance to the principal partners at the MOCI (ANSA, TPAU and EPAA),
6. Creation of a cadre of capable staff at the MOJ Legislative (Taqnin) Department, and MOF (ACD) who can implement and carry out reforms, particularly the ability to utilize software systems that automate payment systems and cargo acquittal;
7. Capacity building of GIRoA officials; and
8. Linkages between businesses and associations in the private sector throughout South and Central Asia through its Business to Business (B2B) events (forums, expos, workshops etc.).

The evaluation will identify any lessons learned on program design and implementation that can guide and enhance the second half of the program. The report will conclude by making recommendations on any realistic corrective action deemed necessary to improve ATAR's on-going and planned activities to achieve its stated goals.

II. Methodology

This evaluation will be anchored with a desk review of documents and literature, interviews with the relevant public sector stakeholders and beneficiaries, both direct and indirect, and observations, to the extent available. The data used will be primarily qualitative.

2.1 COLLECTION OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DATA

#	Method	Data	Sources
a.	Document Review	ATAR'S <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statement of Work; • Work plan(s); • M&E plan; • Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Reports; and • Fact Sheet; • USAID 3-Year Strategy, USAID 10-Year Strategy, • ACD Five years Strategic Plan; • ANDS, the section of Regional cooperation; • Available relevant statistics, literature; • Project collected data including pre and post training data, questionnaires, surveys, <i>etc.</i> • Legislation 	Reports to USAID USAID documents Project records (to the extent available) Government publications – whether on line or from the relevant ministries. Legislation – if available from the MoJ.
b.	In-depth interviews with key informants/stakeholders	Notes and transcripts	Key informants/stakeholders
c.	Literature and Data Review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National statistics of trade volume, volume customs clearance, and revenue collection, foreign direct investment. 	Government, donors, World Bank Reports, databases.
d.	Focus group discussions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Notes and transcripts 	Direct and indirect beneficiaries of ATAR's events and trainings, stakeholders.
e.	Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Observations and notes 	ATAR's training, expositions and other activities, if possible.

2.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Based on the in-briefing on June 4, 2015, it was agreed that SoW Question a) under Human and Institutional Capacity Building would be merged under Evaluation Question a), Heading WTO Accession, Customs and Trade. For ease and flow of the Report, the Evaluation questions have been restructured to fully merge WTO Accession, Customs and Trade with

Human and Institutional Capacity Building under the Heading **Evaluation Questions** which are numbered as follows.

1. Is the current status of the legislation for the laws required to join the WTO (particularly the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade) consistent with the latest reports by the Implementing Partner about their current status?
2. How effective have been ATAR's efforts to improve the technical abilities of the staff it has worked with at the partner agencies to organize, negotiate, draft and implement the WTO related legislation, regulation, procedures for which they are responsible?
3. To what extent has the technical assistance provided correctly targeted the necessary skills, appropriately delivered, to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan)?
4. To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?
5. Which aspects of ATAR's assistance have been most effective in expanding the participation of Afghan women, and, opening career options for these women at the counterpart ministries? As appropriate, identify those approaches that were both effective and the most accepted by ministry staff.
6. How effective has each component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

#	EVALUATION QUESTIONS	METHODS								
		DR	DO	PB R	PDF	IP	KPI	ID	KI	FG
1	Is the current status of the legislation for the laws required to join the WTO (particularly TRIPS, SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade) consistent with the latest reports by the IP about their current status?	x	x	x		x			x	
2	How effective have been ATAR's efforts to improve the technical abilities of the staff it has worked with at the partner agencies to organize, negotiate, draft and implement the WTO related legislation, regulation, procedures for which they are responsible?	x	x	x		x			x	
3	To what extent has the technical assistance provided correctly targeted the necessary skills, appropriately delivered, to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan)?	x	x	x	x			x		
4	To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
5	Which aspects of ATAR's assistance have been most effective in expanding the participation of Afghan women, and, opening career options for these women at the counterpart ministries? As appropriate, identify those approaches that were both effective and the most accepted by ministry staff.	x	x	x		x			x	
6	How effective has each component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	

2.3 METHODOLOGY KEY AND JUSTIFICATION

Key	Abbreviation	Key Function – Obtain Quantitative and Qualitative data
DO	Direct observation.	Firsthand information observing trainings, workshops, activities, <i>etc.</i>
DR	Desk/document review.	Obtain background, findings, and performance results.
FG	Focus group discussions.	Private sector actors.
ID	Consultations with other donors (e. g. The World Bank Group Corporation (WBG) UK Department For International Development (DFID), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, (CAREC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) etc., to the extent available.	Representatives and regional bodies who work with or have the opportunity to observe impact of ATAR’s technical assistance and/or training. Assess impact of ATAR’s technical assistance to the GIROA on regional integration.
IP	Implementing Partner Representatives.	
KI	Interviews and meetings with key informants	Recipients of training & technical assistance within relevant government institutions.
KPI	Interviews with private sector beneficiaries, stakeholders, business community, traders, participants in ATAR’s events and activities, and Chamber of Commerce, if available.	Private sector representatives who work with or have the opportunity to observe those who have received training and/or who might be impacted by reforms or government actions resulting from ATAR’s technical assistance.
PBR	Program and beneficiary records.	Results/impact of ATAR’s activities.
PDF	Program data collection forms, including pre- and post- training data.	Results/impact of ATAR’s activities.

Key Actors and Relevance

#	Actor	Relevance
1	Chemonics	Implementing Partner for ATAR.
2	USAID/OEGI Trade Team	Funder
3	Afghanistan National Standard Authority ((ANSA) - Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI))	Received support from ATAR.
4	Trade Policy Analysis Unit (TPAU) -(MoCI)	Received support from ATAR.
5	Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA -MoCI)	Recipient of training/capacity building, especially with respect to representing the country in expos.
6	Ministry of Justice (MoJ) Legislative (Taqnin) Department	Customs reforms, WTO accession reforms.
7	Afghan Customs Department (ACD, - Ministry of Finance (MoF))	Customs: has received a variety of support.
8	Businesses and associations in the private sector	Especially attendees of B2B events, recipients of any additional training (through ATAR/Chemonics records), also as observers of the ministries and linkage to the business/investment/trading sector.
9	Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI)	Key linkage with trader/business private sector.
10	Afghan Border Police (ABP)	Received support from ATAR to implement Border Management Model in formal partnership with ACD.
	Participants in internship program at ACD	This included 'several women'.
11	Central Statistics Organization (CSO)	Is now sharing data related to trade and exports with the EPAA and ACD, reducing data discrepancies...reportedly as a result of ATAR's interventions.
12	GiRoA members of the WTO Working Party	WTO Accession preparation.
13	MoCI: International Trade Directorate and Transit Department	Works on Regional Trade/Transit Agreements.
14	MoCI: Deputy Minister Office	Recipient of ATAR support.
15	Afghanistan Central Business Registry	Recipient of ATAR support.
16	DfID, ADB, CAREC	Donors to Afghanistan that support trade and transport programs. Also, ATAR transferred \$4 million to DGID to support VAT at ACD.
17	MAIL (Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and livestock): Policy and Planning Department, Animal Health and Veterinary Services Department and Plant Protection Quarantine Department	WTO Accession preparation.
18	Afghanistan National Customs Academy (ANCA)	Provides training for customs officers.
20	MoPH (Ministry of Public Health):Pharmacy Department, and Agriculture and Pharmacy Faculties	WTO Accession preparation.
21	Afghanistan National Standard Authority (ANSA)	WTO Accession preparation.

Limitations

This methodology relies on the availability of documents, including program and beneficiary records, data collection forms and the availability of appropriate interviewees. Given the government transition and attrition in Afghanistan, it is uncertain if the direct recipients/beneficiaries of the ATAR's efforts will be available for interviews. Also, in light of the fact that ATAR has a regional reach in Component 2, *Facilitate Enhanced Access to Regional Markets*, it is uncertain whether the evaluation team will be able to interview Afghanistan's regional counterpart beneficiaries to assess the effectiveness of ATAR's technical assistance on skills for enhancing regional trade and transit. Attempts will be made to reach both groups within the evaluation time period.

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Deliverables and Activity Schedule

Deliverables	Date Due
In-briefing / SOW Presentation	Thursday 4 June
Draft Work Plan to USAID	Tuesday 9 June
Final/USAID-approved SOW/Work plan	Thursday 11 June
Interim briefing on evaluation and sustainability analysis	Tuesday 14 July
Final Briefing	Thursday 30 July
Draft of report submitted	Sunday 8 August
Comments back from USAID	Tuesday 18 August
Final revised report	Sunday 23 August

3.1 Timeline

<i>Weeks</i>	
W1 June 1– June 4	Inbriefing with USAID
W2 Jun 21-25	TL arrival and initial team meeting. Team deploy for initial interviews with key informants and stakeholders.
W3 June 27-July 2	Continue interviews key informants and stakeholders.
W4 July 4-9	Continue interviews key informants and stakeholders; focus group discussions
W5 July 11-16	Continue interviews key informants and stakeholders; focus group discussions. Tue 14 July Interim USAID briefing.
W6 July 18-July 23	Analysis of interview and survey data. Preparation of key findings.
W7 July 25- 30	Continue preparation of key findings. Presentation of key findings and prepare draft report and internal distribution for team comments. Thur July 30, Final USAID briefing.
W8 August 1- 6	Conclude draft report. Draft Report submitted to USAID.

3.2 Annexes:

- a) Evaluation Scope of Work
- b) Methodology description (include any pertinent details not captured in the report)
- c) Copies of all survey instruments and questionnaires
- d) List of critical and key documents reviewed
- e) Schedule of meetings and sources of information (If confidentiality is a concern, the team should discuss and agree upon an approach with USAID)
- f) Notes from key interviews, focus group discussions and other meetings
- g) Documentation of any changes to the SOW or evaluation process
- h) Meeting notes of all key interviews
- i) One page briefer of findings, recommendations and lessons learned (optional)
- j) Statement of differences (if applicable)

2. REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF TENTATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (QUESTIONS TO BE FURTHER REVISED AND REFINED)

Component 1: Trade Liberalization (Target-Government staff, officials across Ministries/Department working on WTO accession)

What is the current status of the following legislation: the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade? To what extent did ATAR provide technical assistance in drafting this legislation?

Did ATAR provide technical assistance in creating work teams and working groups, organizations, and procedures to facilitate accession to the WTO? How effective have been these working groups and procedures in facilitating Afghanistan's accession to the WTO?

How effective has this component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

Are your WTO activities on target with the Legislative Action Plan? Can the relevant staff independently track and update the Legislative Action Plan? Can you provide a copy of your WTO legislative tracking chart?

How has ATAR's technical assistance helped in negotiating bilateral market access negotiations on services and goods?

How effective have been ATAR's efforts to improve the technical abilities of the staff it has worked with at the partner agencies to organize, negotiate, draft and implement the WTO related legislation, regulation, procedures for which they are responsible?

Did the capacity building ATAR provided result in a cadre of capable Ministry staff that can independently move the WTO process forward? In other words, to what extent would the staff need technical assistance in drafting legislation? Negotiating agreements? Managing the passage of legislation?

Have the technical assistance and capacity building ATAR provided to staff and GIRA sufficiently prepared staff for post-WTO accession? In other words, would staff be able to draft independently implementing regulations as well as comply with its WTO obligations?

If yes, how is this capacity building sustained? In other words, is there a system in place to ensure continued staff capability following attrition? If yes, please explain

Do you see areas of improvement where ATAR can more effectively prepare staff and GIRA officials for its upcoming 5th WTO Working Party Meeting?

Where relevant, how likely does it appear that changes made as a result of this component of ATAR's technical assistance will be sustained or built on?

Is your Department/office satisfied with the level of technical assistance ATAR provided?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how prepared are staff to draft laws, negotiate agreements with partners, and implement WTO obligations independently?

Is ATAR's technical assistance key in assisting Afghanistan move forward towards its WTO accession process?

Do you see areas of improvement for ATAR to provide more effective and or efficient technical assistance? If yes, please explain.

What issues are hindering Afghanistan's accession to the WTO? Has ATAR been effective in resolving some of these hindrances?

Are there areas where the efficiency of resource use could be improved, or conversely, priority areas, which appear under resourced?

Trade Policy Analysis Unit (TAPU)

ATAR provided lectures on economic theory, trade policy and economic development to your unit. Does the staff have a sounder understanding of these matters now to the extent that they can formulate trade policy?

Has ATAR provided technical assistance in reviewing tariff policy and sensitive list products? If so, to what extent does the staff need further capacity building or technical assistance to formulate tariff policy?

Are there areas where the efficiency of resource use could be improved, or conversely, priority areas, which appear under resourced?

Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA)

What aspect of your Certification Unit is currently functioning to certify products?

Did ATAR provide technical assistance in setting up the Unit, adopting guidelines and standards? If so, how effective was this technical assistance? Were resources efficiently used/directed?

Did ATAR provide capacity training to staff to the extent that staff can sustain the functioning of the Unit?

How many international standards has ANSA adopted and what to what extend did ATAR provide technical assistance and capacity building?

Please describe ANSA's Standards and Information Center.

How effective was ATAR's technical assistance in establishing this Center?

How will this Center be sustained? How much technical support does ANSA need to continue its work? To sustain this Center?

Are there areas where the efficiency of resource use could be improved, or conversely, priority areas, which appear under resourced?

Component 2: Facilitate Enhanced Access to Regional Markets (Target-MoCI, agencies/department, MOTCA, MoFA, CAREC, Public Sector, ACCI, EPAA and other relevant entities (chart will be made as to which office the questions will be directed)

To what extent has the technical assistance ATAR provided correctly targeted the necessary skills, appropriately delivered, to improve trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors (Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan)?

How effective has this component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

Did ATAR provide support in the re-approval of the Cross-Border Transport Agreement? If so, how effective was this support in facilitating the re-approval?

How effective or efficient has been ATAR's technical assistance in developing trade and tariff policy for SAFTA?

How effective or efficient has been ATAR's technical assistance in implementing the APTTA and providing capacity building for APTTCA participation?

Is the capacity building ATAR provided to the staff sufficient to sustain activities towards improving trade policy, transit, and trade capacity with Afghanistan's neighbors? If yes,

please explain or provide examples. If no, please identify areas where technical assistance is needed/desired.

Did ATAR's technical assistance prepare you for negotiating the trilateral transit trade agreement with Tajikistan and Pakistan? Other transit and trade agreements?

Is your Department/office satisfied with the level of technical assistance ATAR is providing? If no, please explain areas for improvement.

Have the activities - Business to Business (B2B) events (forums, expos, workshops *etc.*, and technical assistance this component provided created linkages between businesses and associations in the private sector throughout South and Central Asia? If so, were these linkages effective? Did they lead to any tangible results? If yes, please explain. If no, please describe how this can be improved.

Were you satisfied with the business and private/public sector representation at these activities?

What activities do you see as most effective or key in enhancing access to regional markets?

To what extent has ATAR provided technical to promote exports? What activities were most effective in promoting exports? Were resources efficiently used?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

Are there areas where the efficiency of resource use could be improved, or conversely, priority areas, which appear under resourced?

Donors, Regional Organizations

How much interaction have you had with ATAR and their regional activities?

What are your impressions or observations regarding the project?

Do ATAR's activities overlap with any of your activities?

Do you seek advice/collaboration from ATAR on regional issues?

Do you see ATAR as complimentary to your organization?

Have you observed any of ATAR's activities in assisting Afghanistan develop and expand regional trade? If so, what are your impressions of those efforts?

Component 3 Improved Customs Administration: (Target-ACD, ACCI, private sector)

To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?

How effective has this component of ATAR's technical assistance to institutions been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.

What is the status of the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) implementation with Pakistan? With other regional countries?

To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance and capacity training for developing and implementing a risk management system?

To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance in ASYCUDA training?

Are customs staff trained and have the capacity to sustain assessing customs valuation and risk management?

To what extent has ATAR provided assistance with refining the customs code?

Has ATAR provided capacity training to customs staff on developing policy and skills in implementing the customs code?

To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance for E-Pay of customs fees/debt? Capacity development to staff for E-Pay?

What challenges do you see in E-Pay and what steps do you think are required to overcome those challenges? In what way could ATAR provide further assistance in rolling out E-Pay?

To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance to ACD on implementing a one-stop concept for the border crossing points? For border clearance procedures? How effective was this technical assistance?

Is there a cadre of trained staff that can continue to manage independently EDI, ASYCUDA, E-Pay software and other customs software?

To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance and capacity building to the Afghan National Customs Academy (ANCA)? Has this resulted in a cadre of well-trained customs

officers? If yes, please explain. If no, please explain areas of improvement.

Is ACD issuing advance rulings? Has ATAR provided technical assistance on issuing advance rulings? If so, how effective and efficient has ATAR provided this technical assistance and capacity building? Are staff independently preparing advance rulings?

Central Statistics Office (CSO)

CSO and the Afghan Customs Department signed an MoU for ACD to provide export data on a monthly basis. Is this working as planned?

What effect has receiving this information made to CSO's statistics and improving discrepancies between CSO and ACD data?

ATAR provided equipment to handle the ACD data. Is the equipment being used and is it adequate for CSO's needs?

What impact, if any, has receiving this data on a monthly basis had on trade policy?

Are there areas where the efficiency of resource use could be improved, or conversely, priority areas, which appear under resourced?

CROSS-CUTTING GENDER: (Target-Ministries, trainings, activities and events)

How has ATAR facilitated increasing the number of women in your institution? In key roles?

Which aspects of ATAR's assistance have been most effective in expanding the participation of Afghan women and opening career options for women at your ministry and counterpart ministries?

What do you see as the biggest challenges/hindrances in expanding the participation of Afghan women and opening career options for women at the counterpart ministries?

As appropriate, please identify those approaches that were both effective and the most accepted by ministry staff.

As appropriate, please identify means that can best overcome challenges/hindrances to career options for women at your ministry and counterpart ministries.

ANNEX V BIBLIOGRAPHY OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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ANNEX VI SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

No.	Date	Organization	Name	Title	Phone	Email
1	22-Jun-15	ATAR	Abdul Safir Sahar	Deputy Chief of Party	795846213	safirsahar@gmail.com
2	22-Jun-15	ATAR	Francois-Jude Pepin	Chief of Party	794152509	fpepin@atar-af.com
3	22-Jun-15	ATAR	Rawajuddin Dakhunda	M&E Director	700065581	Rawaj1dakhunda@gmail.com
4	24-Jun-15	ATAR	Heela Barakzai	Gender Specialist	785441293	hbarakzai@atar-af.com
5	27-Jun-15	MoJ	Abdul Majeed Ghanizada	General Director of Legislation	700231087	Ghanizada.moj.gov.af@gmail.com
6	27-Jun-15	MoJ	Aqila	Member of Legislation	780583795	N/A
7	27-Jun-15	MoJ	Ayamuddin Khan Sader	Director	700226192	asader@moj.gov.af
8	28-Jun-15	ACCI	Abdul Qadir Bahman	Deputy to Chief Executive Officer	776856824	Qadir.bahman@acci.org.af
9	28-Jun-15	ACCI	Atiqullah Nusrat	Chief Executive Officer (CEO)	796652222	Atiqullah.nusrat@acci.org.af
10	28-Jun-15	ACCI	Mohammad Qasim Nasiri	International Relation Director	788889182	Ir.director@acci.org.af
11	28-Jun-15	ACD	Gul Pach (Pacha)	General Director Customs, Technical Affairs	703111888	Gul.pacha@gmail.com
12	28-Jun-15	ACD	Khaliqullah	Director	799441000	Khaliq_afg@hotmail.com
13	28-Jun-15	ACD	Roohullah Aslami	Director of Enforcement	700006464	Roohullah-aslami@yahoo.com
14	28-Jun-15	ACD	Sultan Aziz	Intelligence and Risk Management Director	799315721	
15	29-Jun-15	ACD	Najibullah Wardak	Director General of Customs	799406065	dr_najib2007@yahoo.com
16	29-Jun-15	EPAA	Yama Satarzai		93700627784	y.satarzai@epaa.org.af
17	29-Jun-15	Harakat	Naseem Akbar	CEO	93799336526	Naseem.akbar@harakat.af
18	30-Jun-15	FGD with Business Women	Saleha	President of Precious Stones Jewelry	782382821	Saleha_ahmadzai@yahoo.com
19			Khadija	President of Nejat Trading Co.	794855169	Snk_khadjia@yahoo.com
20			Nazifa Jalali	Partner of Green of Valley of Afgh.	729201838	Nojaim.jalali@gmail.com
21			Freshta	Baghlan Sufra Handicraft Co.	783279785	safaribaghlancompany@gmail.com
22			Maryam Yousofi	President of Maryam Handicraft Co.	771142729	Mariam.yousofi@hotmail.com
23			Nilofar	La'al Badakhshan Jewelry	790653141	badakhshanlal@yahoo.com
24			Fauzia Hashimi	Refah Zana Handicraft and Carpet	791913434	fawziahshemi@gmail.com

25			BibiShirin	Sisters Handicraft	700847940	Bibisheran.akbari@yahoo.com
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27			Zohra Hussaini	Zohra Hussaini Handicraft	799471843	Zohra_hussini@yahoo.com
28			Zohra Qubadi	Zohra Jena Co.	788025153	zohraqobadiy@yahoo.com
29	30-Jun-15	MoCI	Muhammad Rahim Momand	DG International Trade	795400191	Iam_rahim@yahoo.com
30	30-Jun-15	MoCI	Mozammil Shinwari	Deputy Minister	700774501	Shinwari000@yahoo.com
31	1-Jul-15	MoCI	Sayed Yahya Akhlaqi	Director of Transit and Trade Facilitation	93796300399	
32	1-Jul-15	USAID (Kazakhstan)	Amy Lovejoy	CAR Economic Development Officer		alovejoy@usaid.gov
33	1-Jul-15	USAID	Bryan Byrne	Private Enterprise Officer, Trade Team Leader, ATAR COR	93702-626-294	BByrne@state.gov
34	2-Jul-15	ATAR	Abdul Qadeer Rahmanzai	Regional Trade Facilitation Advisor	788687880	arahmanzai@atar-af.com
35	2-Jul-15	ATAR	Shams-Ul Qamar	Export Development Advisor	780735076	sqamar@atar-af.com
36	2-Jul-15	Herat Inland Customs Department	Abdul Saboor Ghoriani	Customs Specialist, ATAR embedded employee	799181342	sghoriani@atar-af.com
37	2-Jul-15	Herat Inland Customs Department	Ahmad Najeeb Baizayee	Herat Customs Director	705356666	baizayee@yahoo.com
38	2-Jul-15	Herat Inland Customs Department	Said Younas	Head of Entry Processing Unit	700403525	Said.sh52yh@yahoo.com
39	3-Jul-15	ATAR (Tajikistan)	Julie Leaf	Country Representative (Tajikistan)	988070412	jleaf@atar-af.com
40	4-Jul-15	ATAR	Nisar Ahmad Masoud	Regional Trade Advisor	0795400178	nmasoud@atar-af.com
41	4-Jul-15	ATAR	Sunirmal Ray	Regional Trade Integration Manager	0794501134	SRay@atar-af.com
42	4-Jul-15	CSO	Shir Mohammad Jamizada	President General	700281446	Shirmohammad_jamizada@yahoo.com
43	4-Jul-15	MoIC	Zakiullah Amiri	Head of Copyright	799305556	
44	4-Jul-15	MoPH	Kamela Sultani	Consultant, Food and Drug Quality Control Lab	793698094	ksultani@gmail.com
45	4-Jul-15	MoPH	Hamid Furmulu	Acting Director of Food and Drug Quality Control Lab	799332956	furmulu@hotmail.com

46	4-Jul-15	MAIL - Plant Protection and Quarantine Department at Badam Bagh	Eng. Abdul Wadood Ghorbandi	Director of Plant Protection and Quarantine	700500302	Ghorbandi411@yahoo.com
47	4-Jul-15	MAIL Plant Protection and Quarantine Department at Badam Bagh	Mohammad Iqbal Karimi	Plant Protection Change Management Specialist	780357291	Iqbl.karimi@mail.gov.af
48	5-Jul-15	CHAMP	Rod Carvajal	CoP	93799482388	Rod.Carvajal@rootsofpeace.org
49	6-Jul-15	FGD with businesses that participated in ATAR-sponsored exhibitions (hosted at EPAA)	Alisa Momand, president	Muska Company (Leather Exporter)	93700281927	
50			Mar Rajuddin, vp	Marjan Company (Gemstones)	93798500569	
51			Habdullah Faiz, VP	Negin Sang Co. (Fresh & dried fruit)	93796320063	
52			Postum Ali, VP	Shah Qadam Rug	93782485724	
53			Amad Seyah Amari	Afghan Numu Agri Business	93798515154	
54			Suma Raman Rahid	Khadmaq Mines Extraction Group	93786892007	
55			Ahmad Shuaib	Nesar Shoib Rug Co.	93777325214	
56	7-Jul-15	ATAR (Uzbekistan)	Nozim Kasimov	Regional Trade Specialist	998935477052	nkasimov@atar-af.com
57	7-Jul-15	ATAR (Kyrgyzstan)	Robert Olson	Country Representative for Kyrgyzstan	996771671733	rolson@atar-af.com
58	7-Jul-15	ATAR (Turkmenistan)	Serdar Agayev	Regional Trade Coordinator	99365689714	sagayev@atar-af.com
59	7-Jul-15	Jalalabad Inland Customs	Bashir Ahmad Pigham	Head of Entry processing Unite	777162274	bashirpigham@gmail.com
60	7-Jul-15	Jalalabad Inland Customs	Dr. Latif Hemat	Customs Specialist, ATAR embedded employee	799209853	ahemat@atar-af.com
61	7-Jul-15	Jalalabad Inland Customs	Ghulam Farooq Momand	Head of Systems	781601470	gf_momand@yahoo.com
62	8-Jul-15	FGD 1 with traders at ACCI	Sarajuddin Kamali		799304151	sarajuddinkamali@gmail.com
63			Mohd. Hussain	Kabul Carpet Manufacturer & Exporter Association	784429979	kabulcarpet@yahoo.com
64			Kazim	Qasimy Brothers Carpet Co.	787316191	Qbc1@live.com
65			Salim Kazemi	Niazi Carpet Trading Co.	788804269	Salemkazemi627@yahoo.com

66			Sharafzai	Khadmat Mining and stone trading	786892007	khadmatmine@gmail.com
67			M.Gul Rashid	President of Precious & Semi Pre. Stones Traders Association	779881400	Afghan.gemstone@yahoo.com
68	8-Jul-15	FGD 2 with traders at ACCI	Rasool Zazai	CEO, Zazai Mzamal Company	786009836	Zazai186@gmail.com
69			Naser Ahmad Nazimi	CEO, Fruit Association	799461697	Nasirahmadnazimi@gmail.com
70			Said Hakem	CEO, Haji Said Karim Company	795512830	
71			Abdul Basit	Deputy CEO, Aziz Basit Ramaki Company	744021000	Ab.ramakilt@gmail.com
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74			Milad Fedaie	Assistant, Haidar Refat	778441766	miladfedai@gmail.com
75			8-Jul-15	Torkham Inland Customs	Said Bashir Ahmad Sadat	Head of Torkham Customs
76	8-Jul-15	FGD with Female Interns and Female Staff of ACD	Weeda Maryam	Former Intern-ATAR	796316649	maryamweeda@gmail.com
77			Nasima Zafari	Former Intern-ATAR	744998609	Nasima.zafari@gmail.com
78			Malalai	ANCA Manager	700227030	Malahat_ibrahimi@yahoo.com
79			Torekai	International Affairs Manager	773308313	
80			Anjila	ACD Exemption Officer	744862958	Engila.hasib@gmail.com
81	9-Jul-15	GIZ "Support to Regional Trade in CA" Programme (Kyrgyzstan)	Khushnidjon Rasulov	Team Leader		khushnidjon.rasulov@giz.de
82	9-Jul-15	Ministry of Economy (Kyrgyzstan)	Meerim Momunzhanova	Head of Foreign Trade Sector		trade@mineconom.gov.kg
83	9-Jul-15	OSCE (Kyrgyzstan)	John Krob	Customs Project Expert		skidchopper03@yahoo.com
84	9-Jul-15	World Bank	Hasan Afzal Zaidi	Head of Transport Unit		via enasiree@worldbank.org
85	9-Jul-15	World Bank	Khaleda Atta	Strategy and Operation Officer		via enasiree@worldbank.org
86	9-Jul-15	World Bank	Nazir	Private Sector Development Specialist		via enasiree@worldbank.org

87	10-Jul-15	GIZ "Support to Regional Trade in CA" Programme (Kyrgyzstan)	Damira Osmonova	Coordinator		damira.osmonova@giz.de
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93	11-Jul-15	MAIL- Veterinary Directorate	Dr. S. Abdu IHussain Qanee	Head, Central Epidemiology	772274953	Sayedabu_10@yahoo.com
94	12-Jul-15	Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank of Afghanistan)	Mir Aziz Baraki	Payment General Director	202102203	Azizi.baraki@centralbank.gov.af
95	12-Jul-15	MoCI	Ahmad Tariq Mateen	Head of Regional Trade Agreements	789810617	ahmad.tariq07@gmail.com
96	12-Jul-15	MoCI TPAU	Sabawoon Gharany	Agriculture Expert		
97	12-Jul-15	MoCI TPAU	Safiullah Qazizada	Specialist		
98	12-Jul-15	MoCI TPAU	Mohammad Azim Yousofi	ECOTA Expert		
99	12-Jul-15	MoCI TPAU	Sadiqullah Mofakir	SAFTA Expert		
100	12-Jul-15	MoCI TPAU	Shabir Stanikzai	Trade Analysis Expert		
101	12-Jul-15	MoCI TPAU	Zedrullah Shahidi	ECO Officer		
102	12-Jul-15	MoCI	Jamal Shah Santekzai	Head of Bilateral Trade Agreements	777424346	stanekzai@gmail.com
103	13-Jul-15	ACD	Shah Jahan Ahmadzai	Head of Legislation Department	775079464	
104	13-Jul-15	ANCA	Eimal Omari	Manager	776350120	
105	13-Jul-15	ATAR	Farhat Farhat			fyfarhat@eif-inc.com
106	13-Jul-15	Embassy of Afghanistan (Kyrgyzstan)	Rahmatullah Karimi	First Secretary	996-705-542200	karimi111234@gmail.com

107	13-Jul-15	Administrative Office of the President	Habibullal Shinwari	Head, Identification and Development Policy	795400180	hzmaray@gmail.com
108	13-Jul-15	Independent Expert (CAR Region)		Prefers to be unnamed		n/a
109	13-Jul-15	MoCI	Abdul Kareem Mailkyar	Head, WTO Unit	799317803	abdulkareemaf@gmail.com
110	13-Jul-15	MoCI	Tariq Ahmad	Head, IP Registry	700634545	Tariq_af_@hotmail.com
111	14-Jul-15	Customs Cargo Service LLC (Kyrgyzstan)	Natalia Shyrshova	Director	996(555)55021 1	Natasha_001@mail.ru
112	14-Jul-15	AIATT - National Transport Association (Tajikistan)	Nargis Khamidova	HOD International Relations	907757773	n-hamidova@mail.ru
113	14-Jul-15	Customs Brokers' Association (Tajikistan)	Firuz Makhmudova	Deputy Chairperson	00992-935- 981199	m.firuz@ikdom.com
114	14-Jul-15	Independent (CAR Region)	David Brantley	Independent Trade, Development and M&E Consultant		davidebrantley@yahoo.com
115	14-Jul-15	Kabul International Airport	Akhundzada Tareen	Member of Post Clearance Audit Department	770432912	
116	14-Jul-15	Kabul International Airport	Haji Azizullah Aziz	Head - Entry Processing Unit	799444496	
117	14-Jul-15	Kabul International Airport	Mohammad Anwar Gran	Broker	778869121	
118	14-Jul-15	OSCE (Kyrgyzstan)	Saltanat Alibekova	OSCE Customs Project Manager	996775970256	Saltanat.Alibekova@osce.org
119	14-Jul-15	Single Window State Enterprise (Kyrgyzstan)	Urmat Takirov	Head of Division (former)		takirov81@gmail.com

120	14-Jul-15	Customs Brokers' Association (Tajikistan)	Firuz Makhmudova	Deputy Chairperson	992-935-981199	m.firuz@ikdom.com
121	14-Jul-15	USAID (Kyrgyzstan)	Paul Hamlin	Activity Manager for ATAR	996-555-777-856	phamlin@usaid.gov
122	15-Jul-15	Association of International Road Transport Operators of the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan)	Turkmen Bootaev	Chairman	996(770)979705	t.bootaev@airto-kr.com
123	15-Jul-15	Freight Operators Association (Kyrgyzstan)	Temirbek Shabdanaliev	Chairman		temir300@mail.ru
124	15-Jul-15	Ministry of Economy (Kyrgyzstan)	Taalaibek Bektashev	Head of Trade Policy Department	996(555)922250	t.bektashev@mineconom.gov.kg
125	15-Jul-15	Tajikistan Chamber of Commerce (Tajikistan)	Manzura Rustamova	Deputy Chairperson	992900971000	rmanzura@mail.ru
126	15-Jul-15	USAID (Kazakhstan)	Laura Gonzalez	Deputy Director, Economy	77770171241	lagonzalez@usaid.gov
127	15-Jul-15	USAID (Tajikistan)	Daler Asrorov	Activity Manager for ATAR	(99237)229-26-04	dasrorov@usaid.gov
128	15-Jul-15	USAID (Turkmenistan)	Serdar Yagmurov	Activity Manager for ATAR		syagmurov@usaid.gov
129	16-Jul-15	ATAR	Farhat Farhat	Trade Advisor	0790498218	fyfarhat@eif-inc.com
130	16-Jul-15	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan)	Nurlan Musuraliev	Deputy Chairperson	996(770)921818	mbs7722@gmail.com

131	20-Jul-15	ANSA	Dr. Mujiburrahman Khatter	Technical Deputy Director General	700215246	faqiria@yahoo.com
132	20-Jul-15	Association of Customs Brokers (Kyrgyzstan)	Ivan Geletyuk	Chairman	996(770)714297	svtsbroker@list.ru
133	21-Jul-15	ABBAT Tajik National Transport Association (Tajikistan)	Larissa Kislyakova	HOD International Relations	446000540	k_larisa64@mail.ru
134	21-Jul-15	CSO	Azizullah Faqiri	Head of Economy Statistic Department	799134472	Azizi.baraki@centralbank.gov.af
135	21-Jul-15	MoCI	Abdul Kareem Mailkyar	Head, WTO Unit	799317803	abdulkareemaf@gmail.com
136	21-Jul-15	MoCI	Rahim Momand	DG International Trade	795400191	Iam_rahim@yahoo.com
137	22-Jul-15	Hairatan	Zahir Oqab	Head, Border Police	728055757	
138	22-Jul-15	Hairatan Border Customs	M. Amin	Head, Port One Warehouse	777777010	
139	22-Jul-15	Hairatan Border Customs	Salih Khan	Head, ,Transit Department	799106993	
140	22-Jul-15	Hairatan Border Customs	Ehsanullah	Head, Data Entry Unit	799433958	tech.ddg@ansa.af
141	22-Jul-15	Hairatan Inland Customs	Haje M. Zahir Ansari	Deputy to Hairatan Inland Customs	799089019	
142	22-Jul-15	Hairatan Inland Customs	Haji Abdul Ghafoor	Entry processing Unit Manager	799269242	
143	22-Jul-15	Hairatan Inland Customs	M. Jamshid Wasiq	Customs Specialist- ATAR embedded employee	799211730	
144	24-Jul-15	Hairatan Inland Customs	Satar Sarhal	Hairatan Inland Customs Director	799312793	
145	26-Jul-15	ACD	Abdul Haleem Sadrey	Director, Customs Operations	700222110	Abdul.sadrey@graduateinstitue.ch
146	26-Jul-15	ACD	Gul Pach (Pacha)	General Director Customs, Technical Affairs	703111888	Gul.pacha@gmail.com
147	26-Jul-15	ACD	Imran Hamidi	Head, Customs Valuation	700620760	hamidiimram@yahoo.com
148	26-Jul-15	Kabul Inland Customs	Pashtonyar	Head of Entry Processing Unit	700271190	

149	26-Jul-15	Kenetic Legale	Sher Saeedi	Managing Partner	771149699	ssaeeedi@kineticlegale.com
150	26-Jul-15	MoCI	Humayoon Rasaw	Minister	790922922	Humayoon.Rasaw@moci.gov.af
151	27-Jul-15	EPAA	Mohammad Khalid Tayeb	Project Manager (and Acting Head of EPAA May-July 2015)	700050628	khalid.tayeb@epaa.org.af
152	27-Jul-15	Kabul University	Spian Jan "Lalahand"	Associate Professor	700029059	
153	27-Jul-15	Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Tajikistan)	Soliev Farukh	HOD International Trade Division	933002801	farukh.soliev@gmail.com
154	29-Jul-15	ACD	Muhammad Umer Momand	Support and Development Director	799721441	m_umar25@yahoo.com
155	29-Jul-15	USAID-Promote Women in Government	Mina Sherzoy	Acting COP	797111888	msherzoy@gmail.com
156	4-Aug-15	USAID	David Marsden	Deputy Director, Technical Services	202-712-5193 +93(0)702-636-317	dmarsden@usaid.gov
157	8-Aug-15	ACD	Najibullah Wardak	Director General of Customs	799406065	dr_najib2007@yahoo.com

ANNEX VII DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY

The focus of the evaluation will be to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of ATAR's work toward its stated goals and expected results, and to make recommendations for the improvement of project implementation in the remaining years of the Project.

There was close coordination with USAID/Afghanistan (OEGI and OPPD) to ensure that the evaluation team selected approved methods. Data sources included document reviews, focus groups and key informant interviews with key GIRoA officials from MOCI, ACD, MAIL, MOPH, MOJ, ANSA, EPAA and the private sector. The proposed evaluation design and methodology were critically evaluated against the "purpose" of the evaluation as stated in the SoW (*See, Annex a*).

The evaluation followed a qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews with key Ministries and the private sector; direct observation at project sites; focus groups; and literature review. The evaluation considered a review of project outcomes including effectiveness and sustainability. Questionnaires were designed to obtain consistent information across a variety of stakeholders to compare situations prior to and since ATAR support. In addition, key ATAR staff were interviewed.

Literature Review

Documents reviewed included those internal to the project such as annual, quarterly, progress, and terminal reports; technical reports from consultants/subcontractors; methodological documents; tools and training guidelines; as well as external documents from GIRoA and other development organizations. (*See, Annex 2: Bibliography*)

Interviews, Focus Groups Discussions And Field Visits

a. *Checklists and Questionnaires*: The evaluation team developed a core question checklist and/or questionnaires to ensure consistency in data collection. The evaluation team submitted the checklists and/or questionnaire for USAID approval in the Work Plan prior to use.

b. *Focus Group Discussions*: The evaluation included focus group discussions with the private business sector and beneficiary groups.

c. Field interviews were conducted in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad.

Individual/Key Informant Interviews: The evaluation team interviewed representatives of USAID/Afghanistan OEG staff, ATAR's partners including relevant GIRoA officials, private sector representatives, including associations, women's groups, key beneficiaries, USAID/CAR (based in Almaty in Kazakhstan), ATAR staff, private business sector, beneficiaries including beneficiaries in the CARS - Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as well as groups, local leaders, and other donors and organizations working in Afghanistan. The Table below summarizes the key informants and relevance.

Key Informants Interviewed and Relevance

#	Actor	Relevance
1	Chemonics	Implementing Partner for ATAR.
2	USAID/OEGI Trade Team	Donor
3	MoCI Deputy Minister Office	Recipient of ATAR support.
4	MoCI International Trade Directorate	ATAR's support WTO accession, Bilateral, Multilateral, Regional Trade/Transit Agreements.
5	MoCI TPAU Trade Policy Analysis Unit)	Received support from ATAR –data analysis for formulating trade policy.
6	MoCI EPAA (Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan)	Recipient of training/capacity building, especially with respect to representing the country in expos and regional integration.
7	MoCI IPR Afghanistan Central Business Registry)	Recipient of ATAR support.
8	ACD (Afghan Customs Department) (Ministry of Finance (MoF))	Received capacity building and technical assistance from ATAR
9	MoJ (Ministry of Justice) Legislative (Taqnin) Department	Received capacity building and technical assistance from ATAR
10	MAIL (Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and livestock): Policy and Planning Department, Animal Health and Veterinary Services Department and Plant Protection Quarantine Department	WTO Accession preparation.
11	MoPH (Ministry of Public Health): Pharmacy Department, and Agriculture and Pharmacy Faculties	WTO Accession preparation.
12	ANCA (Afghanistan National Customs Academy)	Provides training for customs officers.
13	ABP (Afghan Border Police)	Received support from ATAR to implement Border Management Model in formal partnership with ACD.
14	ANSA (Afghanistan National Standard Authority)	WTO Accession preparation. Received resources and TA support from ATAR
15	CSO (Central Statistics Organization)	Received equipment, resources and TA to improve trade related data acquisition from EPAA and ACD aimed at reducing data discrepancies.
16	Government of Tajikistan (Customs)	Received customs training for regional integration and harmonization.
17	Government of Kyrgyzstan	Received WTO trade facilitation training for regional integration and harmonization.
18	Businesses and associations in the private sector, including in Afghanistan,	Especially attendees of B2B events, recipients of any additional training

	Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan	(through ATAR/Chemonics records), also as observers of the ministries and linkage to the business/ investment/ trading sector.
19	ACCI (Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry)	Key linkage with trader/business private sector.
	Female participants in internship program at ACD	ATAR's internship program at ACD
20	DfID, CAREC (CAR)	Donors to Afghanistan that support trade and transport programs. Also, ATAR transferred \$4 million to DGID to support VAT at ACD.
21	USAID Projects: FAIDA, Promote	USAID Donors

ANNEX VIII EVALUATION TOOLS

1. To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance and capacity training for developing and implementing a risk management system?
 - a. Was this assistance provided to all provinces except Kandahar and Kunduz?
 - b. If not, in how many provinces/customs office was this technical assistance provided?
2. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 5 is the implementation of the Risk Management System in Khost, Andkhoy and Nimroz. To what extent is ATAR be providing technical support to Customs on this?

3. In terms of capacity building and technical support in developing and implementing a risk management system:

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest) is ACD able to sustain this capacity development based on the assistance provided?

4. To what extent, if any, has ATAR provided technical assistance in ASYCUDA training?
5. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 4 is the implementation of the new pricing module in the ASYCUDA system. To what extent, if any, is ATAR providing any technical support on this? If so, please explain/detail.
6. To what extent has ATAR provided capacity building on customs valuation? Was this technical assistance helpful to ACD?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest) is Customs able to sustain this capacity development based on the assistance provided?

7. To what extent has ATAR provided assistance with refining the customs code?

- a. Has ATAR provided capacity training to customs staff on developing policy and skills in implementing the customs code?
 - b. Did ATAR provide technical assistance and capacity building to streamline processes and minimize barriers to trade? If so, please describe the kinds of assistance.
 - c. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - d. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - e. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest) is Customs able to sustain this capacity development based on the assistance provided?
8. To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance for E-Pay of customs fees/debt?
 9. To what extent was the technical assistance correctly sequenced and/or targeted to enable ministries to accept payment of customs fees from commercial traders and process release forms at commercial banks throughout the country?
 - a. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - b. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - c. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest) is Customs able to sustain this capacity development based on the assistance provided?
 10. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 6 Starting the process of pilot electronic payments in Kabul Customs.
 - a. Please describe the level of technical support ATAR has provided to Customs regarding this.
 - b. What challenges do you see in E-Pay and what steps do you think are required to overcome those challenges?
 - c. In what way could ATAR provide further assistance in rolling out E-Pay?
 11. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs, Question 1 is to increase the efficiency of collection of government revenue at least 10% in comparison to the previous year.

- a. Has ATAR been helpful to Customs in terms assisting customs in increasing revenue collection?
 - b. If so, what was the type and level of support?
 - c. What further support, if any, would you like to see from ATAR on this?
12. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs, Question 2 is the implementation of Customs Data Exchange System with Tajikistan. To what extent has ATAR supported ACD in reaching this goal?
 13. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 7 Implementation of sending text messages to traders for providing the customs returns.
 - a. To what extent is ATAR be providing technical support to Customs on this?
 - b. If not, is this an area of technical assistance ACD where would like to have technical support from ATAR?
 14. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 8 Providing the customs human resources reform plan to the cabinet and activation of customs national academy with customs specific education programs.
 - a. Has ATAR been providing training to ANCA?
 - b. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - c. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - d. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest) is Customs able to sustain this capacity development based on the assistance provided?
 15. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 9 Preparing draft tariff for precious and semi-precious stones in agreement with Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, AISA and Chamber of Commerce. To what extent is ATAR providing technical support and capacity building on this?
 16. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 10 Preparing the draft schedule of agricultural products tariff in agreement and cooperation with Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock. To what extent is ATAR providing technical support and capacity building on this?
 17. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 11 Preparing the draft of industrial tariff system for supporting domestic industry in

- cooperation with Ministry of Commerce. To what extent is ATAR providing technical support and capacity building on this?
18. To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance to ACD on implementing a one-stop concept? How effective was this technical assistance?
 19. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 12 Opening and capacity building Window in Customs.
 - a. To what extent is ATAR providing technical support on this?
 - b. What challenges does ACD see in implementing a single window in Afghanistan?
 20. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question 13 Finalizing Customs Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran and United Arab Emirates Is ATAR assisting Customs on drafting this MoU?
 - a. If so, to what extent?
 - b. If not, would Customs like to have ATAR's assistance and to what extent?
 21. The Afghan Government's (MoF)s 100 day plan Customs Affairs Question **14** Providing a plan to address the main problems caused by importing goods in retail.
 - a. What are the key issues?
 - b. What types of solutions do you see?
 - c. Is ATAR assisting Customs in addressing these problems. If so, to what extent?
 22. To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance and capacity building to the Afghan National Customs Academy (ANCA)? Has this resulted in a cadre of well-trained customs officers? If yes, please explain. If no, please explain areas of improvement.
 23. To what extent has ATAR provided technical assistance on issuing advance rulings? If so, how effective and efficient has ATAR provided this technical assistance and capacity building? Does ACD's staff have the capacity to prepare independently advance rulings?
 - a. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - b. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?

- c. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest) is Customs able to sustain this capacity development based on the assistance provided?
24. What is the status of the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) implementation with Pakistan? What are the challenges in implementing EDI with Pakistan?
 25. Is there a cadre of trained staff that can continue to manage independently EDI, ASYCUDA, E-Pay software and other customs software?
 26. Has ATAR provided capacity building and technical support on ACD's Border Management Model?
 - a. Did ATAR together with ACD and ABP conduct an assessment of six sites to ensure that these locations were compliant with BMM?
 - b. Did ATAR develop a template for this purpose?
 27. How effective has ATAR's Component 3, Customs, technical assistance to ACD been in enhancing operational effectiveness and in improving the quality of outputs (strategy, policy, operational plans, etc.)? If applicable, identify (including the degree of impact) the primary barriers, factors that have improved or, other aspects of implementation that had a positive or detrimental effect on the technical assistance on the quality of the outputs from the beneficiary institutions.
 28. ATAR has provided embedded support to ACD. Did this support serve to increase ACD's staff capacity?
 - a. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how efficiently did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - b. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest), how effectively did ATAR provide its technical assistance?
 - c. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being the lowest) is Customs able to sustain this capacity development based on the assistance provided?
 29. Has ACD is overall satisfied with the technical support provided by ATAR?
 - a. If no, what changes would ACD like to see?
 - b. What recommendations does ACD have to facilitate a move effective, efficient and sustainable technical support from ATAR?

On Gender:

1. How many female interns were placed at ACD?
2. How was the experience with those interns?
3. Why they were not recruited when their internship was ended?
4. Is ACD a good place for women to work?
5. If so, what ATAR should do with ACD to enable more women to work here and what should be different with the internship program?

Questions for Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA)

1. Q. Is ANSA a full member of ISO? What date?
2. Q. What is the status of the Law on Standards and Technical Regulations? (Sponsoring Ministry)? The TBT Law Did ATAR assist in drafting this law?
3. Q. In assisting in drafting this law, did ATAR work with your staff in explaining the reasons for particular provisions, *etc.* In other words, did ATAR help build staff capacity/technical skills in legislative drafting?
4. Q. Have regulations and procedures pertaining to this law been drafted?
5. Q. What is the status of the procedures? In assisting in drafting procedures, did ATAR work with your staff in explaining the reasons for particular provisions, *etc.* In other words, did ATAR help build staff capacity/technical skills in drafting regulations and procedures?
6. Q. Does your office have the capacity to draft regulations and procedures independently? If not to what extend do you need assistance in preparing regulations and procedures?
7. What is the status of your Law on Legal Metrology?
8. Q. Did ATAR create work teams to enable your Office to more effectively work the technical issues for which ANSA is responsible? If so, was this useful? Was this an effective way to build understanding and capacity with your office? Was this an efficient way to build understanding and capacity?
9. Please describe what other activities, including trainings in ISO standards that ATAR has undertaken to build capacity and technical skills with your ANSA. Have these been effective? Is this an efficient way to build capacity with your office?

10. Has ATAR assisted in developing syllabus and training materials and provided existing training materials. Is this helpful? Do you have any recommendations that would improve this assistance?
11. Did ANSA participate in an April 14, 2015 working group meeting ATAR supported on the procedure for food hygiene practices for manufacturing, packing, or holding? Was this helpful in promoting your understand of food standards? Do you recall what other groups participated in this working group? (MOPH, MOCI, EPPA, the National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA), ANSA, Kabul University, and the private sector).
12. Q. Did ATAR provide technical assistance in setting up the Certification Unit, adopting guidelines and standards? If so, how effective was this technical assistance? Were resources efficiently used/directed?
13. Q. What aspect of your Certification Unit is currently functioning to certify products? Has ATAR assisted you in designing a certification mark for export products and internally manufactured products that meet standards and requirements? What is the status of the mark?
14. Q. Did ATAR provide capacity training to staff to the extent that staff can sustain the functioning of the Unit
15. Q. How many international standards has ANSA adopted and what to what extend did ATAR provide technical assistance and capacity building? (ATAR states that it supported the acquisition of 31 international standards for ANSA)
16. Q. Please describe ANSA's Standards and Information Center.
17. Q. How effective was ATAR's technical assistance in establishing this Center?
18. Q. How will this Center be sustained? How much technical support does ANSA need to continue its work? To sustain this Center?
19. Q. Are there areas where the efficiency of resource use could be improved, or conversely, priority areas, which appear under resourced?
20. Q. What are the barriers you face in preparing going forward for a fully functioning ANSA? Has ATAR assisted in overcoming these barriers? Has ATAR's support facilitated or improved your outputs regarding the ANSA's functions and responsibilities?

21. In terms of technical skills, including laboratory procedures, how independently can ANSA work without ATAR's support? In other words, to what extent does ANSA have the technical skills and capacity to sustain itself?
22. Does your office have an embedded ATAR employee? If so, this this valuable assistance to your Office? Was this an efficient way to provide support to your Office? An effective way to provide support to your Office?
23. Q. How responsive is ATAR to your request for technical assistance and capacity building?
24. Has ATAR assisted in launching development of a database of standards and technical regulations and in developing a web interface for accessing this database?
25. What recommendations do you have for continued ATAR's assistance?

ANNEX IX RESPONSE TO SECURITY QUESTIONS

1- How are security decisions made regarding the movement of national staff?

National staff receive regular security briefings and trainings from the Country Security Team (CST) in Kabul. Part of this ongoing training is how to arrange for their movement. Chemonics security platform maintains a network of Logistics Officers based in its projects areas of operation (Kabul, Western and Southern Afghanistan). This network provides up-to-date information on the security situation in each area of operation and performs routes and venue assessments prior to National Staff movements.

For movement outside of the duty station (example: Kabul-based staff visiting other provinces or districts outside of Kabul city), prior CST approval is required as part of the TAF (Travel Authorization Form). Once notified, and depending on the location and the method of transportation, as well as precedence (if staff have been to that location recently), the CST will provide a pre-departure briefing to the National Staff to go over the security risks, suggested routes, methods of transportation and necessary precautions that are specific to that trip. National Staff are required to maintain communications at all times during their travel, and their movements are tracked through the Operations Center (a 24/7 manned center managed by the security subcontractors and supervised by CST). National Staff also need to debrief after returning to provide an ongoing assessment of routes and locations. For long, complex trips, it is common for the CST to dispatch a member to travel with the National Staff (sometime before the trip), to conduct necessary coordination with ANSF in these areas to allow and facilitate for safe travel. This is especially true if travel is planned to new districts/provinces where Chemonics does not have Logistics Officers based.

For movement inside the duty station (normal travel to/from work in the same city, or travel to embed locations), the CST has to have an updated venue assessment at all times to identify risks and mitigation factors associated with each location. Part of this assessment process is working with the project team to identify required security upgrades for each location, these may include setting up safe rooms, redundant communication methods, interior and exterior security measures (T-walls, Hescos, protective film on windows, strong doors, barbed wire, etc.) to be installed at embed locations. Part of Chemonics security policy is that “office work is done in secure compounds”, this applies to National Staff if they are to work (i.e. be embedded) at a ministry, or other partners location. Security resources (i.e. armed guards and armored vehicles) are generally not deployed with National Staff in order to lower their profile and allow them to blend in with the community, but strict tracking, briefing, assessment requirements are in place to protect National Staff movements.

2- How are security decisions made regarding the movement of international staff?

Security Sensitive information.

ANNEX X DETAILED INTERVIEW NOTES

Provided separately.

ANNEX XI DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

[The Evaluation Policy requires that evaluation reports include a signed statement by each evaluation team member regarding any conflicts of interest. A suggested format is provided below.]

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

Name	Savitri Singh
Title	Consultant
Organization	Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	Contract No. AID-306-C-12-00012
USAID Project to be Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	x Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
<p>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	<p>3. As the Senior Regional Economic and Trade Advisor to UNAMA, I interacted with donor trade projects in Afghanistan, including TAFAs. I have interacted with some of the government officials/Ministries that are beneficiaries of the project. In other words, I have interacted directly or indirectly in past with the project as well as with US government and Afghan government officials relating to the project while in Kabul. My interactions were short, professional and, in my view, neither in-depth nor significant.</p> <p>4. I have applied in the past for a position with TAFAs/ATAR but I never received a response. I have not had any direct contact with the project since leaving Kabul in 2012.</p> <p>I am a professional with the highest level of integrity. I am confident that past interactions will have no bearing on my professional evaluation of the project and should not present any issues of impartiality, perception or reality based.</p>


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for

as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	May 19, 15

Name	Sarah Parkinson
Title	Consultant
Organization	Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.
Evaluation Position?	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)	Contract No. AID-306-C-12-00012
USAID Project to be Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	Afghanistan Trade & Revenue (ATRIR) Project
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	22/05/15

Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.
Afghanistan SUPPORT-II Project
Wazir Akbar Khan
Kabul, Afghanistan