

Implementation Plan

Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi (Grant Ref. AID-OAA-G-12-00006)

J-PAL SA at IFMR

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1. Introduction

This document outlines the implementation plan for J-PAL South Asia's randomized-controlled trial to investigate how elected officials and voters respond to different information campaigns in New Delhi, funded in part by USAID under the grant "Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi."

The project is a set of interventions to see how information impacts voter behaviour and councilor performance in local elections. The design and implementation of the interventions is undertaken in collaboration with a partner non-government organisation Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS) that has extensive experience in this domain, especially in use of India's Right to Information Act to obtain information on government behavior.

Previous research has pointed to information gaps as one of the major reasons why public service delivery is insufficient in slums and other poor areas. By providing detailed report cards in local newspapers on spending and committee attendance for a group of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Councilors, we hope to improve the information citizens have on the performance of their elected representatives may face. Direct distribution of these report cards to some households will also be undertaken to see if there is an added effect. We will also explore whether politicians who are made aware of these information campaigns change their behavior. In a further intervention, by providing report cards on public service delivery in garbage and sanitation facilities to elected councilors and Members of Legislative Assembly, we hope to bridge information gaps faced by politicians about their constituencies. These report cards also seek to understand quantitatively the scope of garbage and sanitation problems in Delhi slums. The report cards will evaluate if there is any improvement in the provision of these facilities over time in response to increased information to politicians. As a consequence of conducting these interventions as randomized-controlled trials, the project will accurately measure the effects of different ways of increasing the information available to citizens, relative to a control group of wards not provided with this information.

The sections below discuss the project design and the implementation plan for the components of the treatment and the endline surveys. Section 2 presents the research design and describes the nature of the treatments. Section 3 describes the methodology for project evaluation. Section 4 discusses the design of the endline surveys. Section 5 summarizes by describing the timeline of these project activities. Section 6 provides a deliverables schedule.

2. Research Design

The project is a randomized-controlled trial design. It seeks to measure the effects of information provision to low-income voters and elected officials. Information provision takes place through pre-election voter awareness campaigns (PEVACs) and public service delivery audit report cards

delivered to Members of Legislative Assembly and Municipal Corporation of Delhi councilors (elected officials) respectively. Our baseline surveys enabled us to obtain measures of stated preferences amongst slum-dwellers and other citizens that helped shape the design of the interventions, and in particular supported the focus on public toilets and garbage disposal.. After the conclusion of these interventions, we will measure the impact of the treatments on politician and voter behaviour and public service delivery

Baseline Surveys

A list of nine common criteria closely correlated to the census definition of slums was drawn up.¹ We used a two-stage process: First, we compiled a list of potential areas from inspection of the visual appearance from aerial photographs of Delhi using satellite imagery, based on housing density and appearance, complemented by Delhi government listings. This was then verified by field visits; locations that prominently featured at least five of these nine characteristics were marked as slums.

Two core surveys were collected in all the areas defined as slums in a 226 ward sample. The first baseline survey covered local area development issues, access to rations and other certificates, access to healthcare facilities, access to educational services, voting record, civic knowledge, political actions, sanitation, access to water, local transport, access to electricity, crime, and demographics. The second survey baseline survey covered migration, health, aspirations for children, social networks, security, property rights, housing finance and migration, and anthropometrics. These provide useful and extremely detailed data on Delhi slums.

Audits Baseline

Based on the data collected in the baseline surveys, it emerged that slum dwellers considered garbage and sanitation among the most important topics of concern. As a result, JPAL South Asia conducted service delivery audits on garbage and sanitation facilities. Our audits provide objective data on service delivery. The relevance of measuring these outcomes is highlighted by our current work. Sanitation spending is given in the report card, and the audits examine drains, waste disposal, and public toilets, with some measures of which key portions of infrastructure are present (e.g. “Are drains open?”, “Is there a toilet seat present?”, etc.).

The interventions are:

- I. *Newspaper Publication of Councilor Report Cards* (Based on Government Spending Data)

¹They included high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles and frequent cohabitation with animals.



Fig.1.1: Sample Report Card

Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS) constructed report cards on incumbent councilor performance during the preceding year. The report cards utilize data received from the government from Right to Information (RTI) filings. They detail how councilors spent the public funds that they are statutorily allocated to spend at their discretion, the councilors' committee attendance records, and their performance in public meetings and committees. These report cards provide information to increase transparency and accountability in the electoral process.

Having received this information, voters can pressure representatives for improvements. Our experimental design aims to capture the mechanisms behind politician reaction so as to better understand their decision-making. In this case, there are three possible mechanisms that could cause changes: the *pure incentive* effect, wherein politicians improve their performance to reduce risk of punishment by voters; the *selection* effect, where voters or parties get rid of poorly performing candidates (assuming performance is a personal trait); and the *activism* effect, where informed voters demand results from politicians and thus make poor performance more costly.

Our newspaper intervention is conducted in two rounds. In 2010, we distributed information on councilor performance to treatment group T2 wards (midline of the councilor's elected period). In the second round (March 2012) we will be distributing to both treatment groups T1 and T2 wards, about two weeks before elections.

The purpose of this intervention is to see if there is any impact of information provision on voting. Between the two treatment groups, there is an opportunity for voters in group T2, through activism, to lobby their officials for public service delivery between the midpoint report card and the endpoint.

Within each of the treatment groups, we differentiate between “publication” and “distribution.” Publication refers to the simple appearance of a report card in a ward. Distribution refers to physical distribution by SNS of copies of the newspaper to slums in a ward. In doing this, we are additionally testing to see if there is an impact of physical distribution, or if slum dwellers are already consumers of newspaper information.

The groups were defined and treated as follows.

Treatment ID	0 (Control)	1	2
n	72	58	105
Wards Surveyed	40	20	41
Newspaper Report Cards 2010	N	N	Y
Newspaper Report Cards 2012	N	Y	Y
2010 Newspaper Distribution	N	N	41 (surveyed wards only)
2012 Newspaper Distribution	N	20 (surveyed wards only)	41(surveyed wards only)

II. *Public Service Delivery Audits Intervention (Three Rounds)*

The audits are conducted in three stages: baseline, midline, and endline, to measure differences in conditions across time thanks to political initiatives of elected leaders. These audits are conducted by JPAL, and do not depend on government and RTI data. They provide a fuller picture of conditions in slums beyond just councillor spending. We will measure if the provision of audit report cards to councilors and MLAs leads to objectively better quality of sanitation and waste disposal facilities between our baseline, midline, and endline audit report cards.

Audit report cards were mailed for each round to selected MLAs and councilors with the information coming from audit survey data. The cross randomization was done as follows from a sample of 100 wards.

	Treatment MLA (27 ACs)	Control MLA (28 ACs)
Treatment Councilor (51 wards)	31 wards	32 wards
Control Councilor (49 wards)	30 wards	32 wards

Since the parts of some wards will have a treatment MLA, and parts of others will have a control MLA, this does not sum to the number of wards (some will be double counted). Each of the treatment groups will receive two rounds (baseline and endline) of audit report cards. The difference between service delivery quality from baseline to endline will be the outcome variable and effects will be measured for councilor treatment, MLA treatment, and both MLA and councilor treatment (to measure interaction).

3. Outcomes

Accurate impact assessment must look to a variety of metrics. For our assessment, we focus on voting outcomes, representative actions, and services provision.

The first metric of interest is how our intervention changes the political decisions of voters. We will evaluate this through electoral data. Electoral outcomes at the ward and polling station levels, such as turnout and candidate vote share, will measure how voter preferences shift. This is also an area of our project where we will measure if there are differential results based on gender. One reason we suspect that there may be a differential effect by gender is previous research by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) which demonstrated that women in India are more likely than men to cite drinking water and welfare programs when placing formal requests with local governments. Similarly, areas in which the percentage of female voters is larger or where there is a female elected representative may display different spending patterns. This metric captures both the *selection effect* and the *activism effect*.

Changes in politician behavior are the desired outcome of information campaigns, but few studies have attempted to measure this outcome. We will examine councilor's attendance and participation in meetings to represent constituent interests, such as the ration shop committees that monitor the functioning of those shops. We will also look at spending totals and distributions. Most councilors did not utilize the entire available discretionary fund, and what was spent seems inconsistent when compared to constituent demands from baseline: councilors tended to spend on roads, one of constituents' least desired areas for spending. Our campaign should both increase spending totals and shift spending categories to better match voters' wishes. One of the benefits we will include in our cost-benefit analysis is the increase in spending in treatment wards, which could easily dwarf the cost of the intervention. We will be using GPS tools and QGIS software to look at the spatial allocation of public service delivery during the intervention period (expanded upon in the next section). This metric captures the *incentive effect*.

While a reaction from the councilor is important, it is possible that shifts in spending will not lead to real improvements in services for the urban poor. Councilors may simply skim any additional spending, leading to no improvement in service provision. Or they may choose to spend only in more affluent areas of their ward, such that the urban poor derive little benefit. Our audits of public sanitary facilities in each of the wards objectively measure changes in service provision.

To develop an on-the-ground measure to see if spending shifts actually culminate in better public service delivery, we deploy our other method of measuring changes in politician behaviour, namely our audit report card intervention. Our audits examine drains, waste disposal, and public toilets, recording which key portions of infrastructure are present. We take GPS coordinates at all audit sites to get a sense of the geographic distribution of problems across a ward. Because we have the GPS locations of the surveyed households, we can match audit- and household-level data to better understand how the provision of services determines political opinions and voting behavior. This measure captures improvement in service delivery.

In the event that no significant differences in real outcomes exist among treatment and control groups, our data will enable us to determine why this occurred. It is possible that the campaign will not change voter behavior, or that councilors will not react to potential disciplining. However, even if both parties act, the behavioral changes may not prove sufficient to bring about objective change. In that case, data will help determine other binding factors inhibiting service

provision (e.g. corruption among street-level bureaucrats), even if PEVACs work. Combined, our outcomes will give a more complete picture of the information campaign and allow for detailed cost-benefit calculations.

4. Endline Survey

The objective of the endline survey is to capture the impact of reduction in the asymmetry of information between low-income urban voters and their respective councilors on electoral results, delivery of public services and accountability of elected officials. We are interested in effects both amongst slum-dwellers and outside slums (the bulk of Delhi's population and of the income-poor, actually live outside slums now). We already have very rich information on the characteristics and views of slum-dwellers from the two baseline surveys already undertaken. Our endline will have the following components:

- 1) *Endline of Public Service Delivery Audits in Slums:* In continuation with the baseline and midline audits of garbage and toilet facilities in slums, we propose to conduct a third round of endline audits to measure improvements in the actual quality of public service delivery. The three rounds of audits (baseline, midline and endline) would be instrumental in assessing whether the provision of audit results to councilors and legislators had an impact on the delivery of public services in those areas. In addition, the endline audits will include additional indicators on the consequences of (especially of the quality of toilets) for water quality, which is instrumental to the transmission to health status. The endline audits will also include questions to nearby households on access, availability, quality, and conditions.
- 2) *Measurement of electoral outcomes:* The second endline will evaluate the impact of dissemination of information to voters through publication and distribution of newspaper report cards and dissemination of information to councilors through the provision of audit results. In this endline, we plan to measure electoral outcomes at the polling station level by mapping polling stations and analyzing councilor electoral results for each ward. In addition to the actual impact of the information on voting behavior, the baseline surveys (of slum-dwellers and of Resident Welfare Association officials) would be utilized to help interpret how this behavior relates to household perceptions and preferences, and the views of RWAs.
- 3) *Measurement of changes and spatial allocation of public service delivery:* As a part of this endline, we plan to map every expenditure item under a councilor's discretionary fund over the last three years (2009-2011). We propose to obtain an item-wise breakup of the fund under the Right To Information Act. A comparison of the spending concentration across the three years can help in assessing the impact of the RWA intervention and the slum audits results on the accountability of the councilors and the change in delivery of public services in both slums and RWAs.

We feel that these activities would be able to aptly capture the aim of the study, which is to assess the impact of dissemination of information to voters and councilors on electoral outcomes, public service delivery and accountability of elected officials.

5. Timing of Project Activities

TIMELINE		MILESTONE
Estimated Start Date	Estimated Completion Date	
February 10, 2012	February 28, 2012	1 Project Implementation Plan
March 1, 2012	March 31, 2012	2 Publication and distribution of newspaper report cards (for March/April elections).
April 1, 2012	May 31, 2012	3 Final Round of Audit Report Cards and Measurement of Electoral Outcomes We will provide the following data points: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total number of report cards distributed • Summary statistics on report cards • Preliminary Data on Polling Stations in our Sample
June 1 2012	September 30, 2012	4 Mapping of Public Service Delivery Items We will provide the following data points: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • map of spending items and change over time
October 1, 2012	Jan 15, 2013	5 Final Report with Preliminary Data
TBD	TBD	TBD Final Impact Evaluation Assessment

6. Deliverables Schedule

DATE	Milestone
28 Feb 2012	Project Implementation Plan
1 March 2012	Delivery of Baseline Surveys
1 May 2012	Report on Publication and distribution of newspaper report cards (for March/April elections). Provide the following data points: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total number of report cards distributed • Number and news outlets report cards distributed to • Preliminary data on polling stations in our sample
1 July 2012	Submission of endline survey materials. Service Delivery Audits: We will provide the following data points: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total number of report cards distributed • Summary statistics on report cards
1 Sept 2012	Progress Report, to include preliminary data on spending mapping
15 Jan 2013	Final Report with preliminary data

Section 13: Pregnancy Record (गर्भधारण रिकार्ड)

ध्यान दें—कोई एक ऐसी माता को चुनें जिसका बच्चा 6 महीने से 5 साल की उमर का है। अगर ऐसी एक से ज्यादा माताएं हैं तो जिसका बच्चा सबसे छोटा है उनको चुनें। अगर ऐसी कोई भी माता नहीं है तो और माताओं को चुनें। यदि उन में भी एक से ज्यादा माताएं हैं तो जिसका बच्चा सबसे छोटा है उनको ही चुनें।

Please select a mother whose children are between 6 months and 5 years in age. If there is more than one such mother, pick the one with the youngest child. If there are no such mothers, pick any mother, using the same youngest child rule for picking among multiple mothers.

ध्यान दें—आप किससे प्रश्न पूछ रहे हैं? Who are you interviewing?		Mother Name माता का नाम		
		Mother's Age माता का उम्र		
No Such Mother (NC) ऐसी कोई भी माता नहीं है <input type="checkbox"/>		Youngest Child's name सबसे छोटे बच्चे का नाम		
		Child's age बच्चे की उम्र		
13.01	आप अपने जीवन में कितनी बार गर्भवती हुई हैं? उनको मिलाकर बताएं जब आप जीवित बच्चों को जन्म नहीं दे सके। How many times in your life have you ever been pregnant, including times that didn't lead to live births and not including current pregnancies?	कितनी बार TIMES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
13.02	जब आप पहली बार गर्भवती हुई थी तो आपकी क्या उम्र थी? उनको मिलाकर बताएं जब आप जीवित बच्चों को जन्म नहीं दे सके। ध्यान दें—उमर ना बता पाएं तो कितने महीने या साल पहले गर्भवती हुयी थी वह पूछें। How old were you when you first became pregnant, including times that didn't lead to live births and not including current pregnancies? How many months or years ago was it? Use months or years ago if she does not know age of pregnancy.		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Age when first pregnant उम्र	1	
		Number of Years Since First Pregnant कितने साल पहले	2	
		Number of Months Since First Pregnant कितने महीने पहले	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
13.03	उस वक्त आप कहां रह रही थी ? Where were you living at that time?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	
		Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	2	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	3	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	4	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	5	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		जवाब नहीं Won't Answer	-998	
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	
13.04	क्या गर्भावस्था के दौरान आप किसी डॉक्टर या अस्पताल में जांच पड़ताल अथवा इलाज के लिए गयी थी? Did you go to any doctor or hospital for a check-up or treatment during that pregnancy?	No नहीं	0	→13.06
		Yes हाँ	1	→13.05
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→13.06
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→13.06
13.05	आपने कितनी बार जांच पड़ताल कराई? How many times did you get check-	कितनी बार TIMES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	

	ups?	Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
13.06	क्या आपने गभावास्था के दौरान कोई इंजेक्सन लगवाया था? Did you receive any injections during that pregnancy?	नहीं No	0	
		हाँ Yes	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
13.07	क्या उस गर्भ से जीवित बच्चा पैदा हुआ था ? Did that pregnancy result in a live birth?	नहीं No	0	→13.11
		हाँ Yes	1	→13.08
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→13.11
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→13.11
13.08	आपने बच्चे को कहाँ जन्म दिया ? Where did you give birth?	At home, unassisted or assisted by relatives only घर पर, बिना सहायता के या रिश्तेदारों की सहायता से	1	
		At home, assisted by a traditional midwife (dai) घर पर, पारंपरिक दाई की सहायता से	2	
		At home, assisted by a midwife, nurse or doctor घर पर, दाई, नर्स या डॉक्टर की सहायता से	3	
		In a clinic क्लीनिक में	4	
		In a hospital हॉस्पिटल में	5	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
13.09	यह बच्चा कहाँ है? Where is that child?	Dead जीवित नहीं	0	→13.10
		Alive जीवित	1	→13.11
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→13.11
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→13.11
13.10	वो बच्चा/बच्ची कितने साल का था/थी जब उसका देहांत हो गया ? How old was he/she when he/she died?	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>		
		दिन Days	1	
		हफ्ते Weeks	2	
		महीने Months	3	
		साल Years	4	
		मिनट Minutes	5	
		घंटे Hours	6	
		नहीं बताना Won't Answer पता नहीं Don't Know	-998 -999	
13.11	आपने कितने बार जीवित बच्चे को जन्म दिया है ? How many times have you given birth to live children?	कितनी बार TIMES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		नहीं बताना Won't Answer पता नहीं Don't Know	-998 -999	
13.12	आपके कितने बच्चे अभी जिंदा हैं ? How many of your children are still alive?	CHILDREN बच्चे	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
Interviewer checkpoint 13.ii				
	क्या वह एक से ज्यादा बार गर्भवती हुई है? Has this woman been pregnant more than one time?	No नहीं	0	→Section 14
		Yes हाँ	1	→13.13
13.13	जब आप पछली बार गर्भवती हुई थी तो आपकी क्या उम्र थी? ध्यान दें—उमर ना बता पाएं तो कितने महीने या साल पहले गर्भवती हुयी थी वह पूछें। How old were you when you last became pregnant, including times	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>		
		Age when last pregnant उम्र	1	
		Number of years since last pregnant कितने साल पहले	2	
		Number of months since last pregnant कितने महीने पहले	3	

	that didn't lead to live births <i>and not including current pregnancies</i> ? How many months or years ago was it? Use months or years ago if she does not know age of pregnancy.	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	-998 -999	
13.14	उस वक्त आप कहां रह रही थी ? Where were you living at that time?	दिल्ली Delhi Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं) Other अन्य जवाब नहीं Won't Answer पता नहीं Don't Know	1 2 3 4 5 -997 -998 -999	
13.15	क्या उस गर्भावस्था के दौरान आप किसी डॉक्टर या अस्पताल में जांच-पड़ताल अथवा इलाज के लिए गयी थी ? Did you go to any doctor or hospital for a check-up or treatment during that pregnancy?	नहीं No हाँ Yes नहीं बताना Won't Answer पता नहीं Don't Know	0 1 -998 -999	→13.17 →13.16 →13.17 →13.17
13.16	उस दौरान आपने कितनी बार जांच पड़ताल कराई ? How many times did you get check-ups?	कितनी बार TIMES नहीं बताना Won't Answer पता नहीं Don't Know	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> -998 -999	
13.17	क्या आपने गर्भावस्था के दौरान कोई इंजेक्सन लगवाया था? Did you receive any injections during that pregnancy?	नहीं No हाँ Yes नहीं बताना Won't Answer पता नहीं Don't Know	0 1 -998 -999	
13.18	क्या उस गर्भ से जीवित बच्चा पैदा हुआ था? Did that pregnancy result in a live birth?	नहीं No हाँ Yes नहीं बताना Won't Answer पता नहीं Don't Know	0 1 -998 -999	→section 14 →13.19 →section 14 →section 14
13.19	आपने बच्चे को कहां जन्म दिया ? Where did you give birth?	At home, unassisted or assisted by relatives only घर पर, बिना सहायता के या रिश्तेदारों की सहायता से At home, assisted by a traditional midwife (dai) घर पर, पारंपरिक दाई की सहायता से At home, assisted by a midwife, nurse or doctor घर पर, दाई, नर्स या डॉक्टर की सहायता से In a clinic क्लीनिक में In a hospital हॉस्पिटल में Other अन्य Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	1 2 3 4 5 -997 -998 -999	
13.20	यह बच्चा कहां है। Where is that child?	Dead जीवित नहीं Alive जीवित Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	0 1 -998 -999	→13.21 →section 14 →section 14 →section 14
13.21	वो बच्चा/बच्ची कितने साल का थी/थी जब उसका देहांत हो गया ? How old was he/she when he/she died?	संख्या NUMBER दिन Days हफ्ते Weeks महीने Months	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 1 2 3	

		साल Years	4	
		मिनट Minutes	5	
		घंटे Hours	6	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

ID: -Date: --**Section 14: Anthropometric Measures****WEIGHTS OF CHILDREN**

सबसे पहले 6 महीने से 5 साल के बच्चे का नाम पूछें और पिछले रोस्टर से मिलायें, बच्चों के नाम क्रम से लिखें, बाद में नाप-तोल के लिए बात करें, नाप-तोल के समय जूते चप्पल उतारवा लें।

14.00. Serial No. of Child क्रमांक संख्या	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>				
14.01. Name of Child बच्चे का नाम					
14.02. Age of Child बच्चे का उम्र					
14.03. Child is Present? बच्चा मौजूद है?	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> -998: _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> -998: _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> -998: _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> -998: _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> -998: _____
	01 → 14.04, else → next child				

Child Presence Code List	Permanently elsewhere in Delhi स्थायी रूप से दिल्ली में कहीं और.....4
Present मौजूद.....1	Parent Refused Permission माँ बाप ने मना किया.....-997
Died मृत2	Other कौड़ और.....-998
Permanently outside of Delhi स्थायी रूप से दिल्ली के बाहर.....3	Don't Know पता नहीं.....-999

14.04. Weight of Child Alone, if possible (kilograms) केवल बच्चे का स्केल माप	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> → 14.09	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> → 14.09	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> → 14.09	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> → 14.09	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> → 14.09
	Held -222 → 14.05				
14.05. Weight of Child Held by Another Person (kg) किसी दूसरे व्यक्ति द्वारा पकड़ कर बच्चे का स्केल माप	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>
14.06. Weight of Other Person Alone (kg) दूसरे व्यक्ति का अकेला स्केल माप	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/>
14.07. Relationship Code of Other Person दूसरे व्यक्ति की क्रमांक संख्या	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>				

ID: -Date: --**Section 14: Anthropometric Measures (एंथ्रोपोमेट्रिक माप)**

बच्चों की लंबाई/ऊंचाई

दो साल से कम उम्र के बच्चों के लिए उनके कद के जगह लंबाई नापें। For children below the age of 2, measure their length rather than their height.

14.08. Serial No. of Child क्रमांक संख्या	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>				
14.09. Name of Child बच्चे का नाम					
14.10. Measurement from Shoulder to Elbow (centimeters) कंधे से कोहनी तक का माप सेंटी मीटर	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm
14.11. Measurement from Shoulder to Elbow Divided by Two (centimeters) कंधे से कोहनी तक का भाग दिया हुआ सेंटी मीटर	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm
14.12. Mid Upper Arm Circumference (centimeters) मध्य उपरी हाथ की परिधि सेंटीमीटर	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm
14.13. Height (centimeters) लंबाई सेंटीमीटर	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> . <input type="text"/> cm
14.14. Measured Lying Down or Standing Up? खड़े हो के या लिटा कर मापा गया	Lying लिटा कर 1 Standing खड़ा कर के 2				

ID: □□□□-□□

नान-बायो मेडिकल रिसर्च मे भाग लेने हेतु अनुमति-पत्र
शहरी भारत सर्वेक्षण में सार्वजनिक वस्तु वितरण एवं नागरिक सक्रियता

मेरा नाम _____ है और मैं एक सर्वेक्षणकर्ता हूँ। यह रिसर्च J-PAL (जमील पोवर्टी एक्शन लेब साउथ एशिया) और दो अमेरिकी विश्वविद्यालयों, एम आई टी और हार्वर्ड के प्रोफेसरों के सहयोग से संचालित किया जा रहा है।

इस रिसर्च के एक भाग के रूप में, हम आपका एक साक्षात्कार करना चाहते हैं। इस साक्षात्कार में आपका चुनाव एक लोटेरी के द्वारा किया गया है। यह साक्षात्कार आपके लिए अनिवार्य नहीं है और यदि आप इस साक्षात्कार के लिए सहमत हैं, तो पूछे गए कोई भी प्रश्न या सभी प्रश्नों का उत्तर देने से मना कर सकते हैं। आप के सभी उत्तरों का उपयोग केवल रिसर्च के उद्देश्य के लिए होगा और उनको पूर्णतः गुप्त रखा जायेगा। आपका नाम और आपके उत्तर किसी और को नहीं बताए जायेंगे।

आपका साक्षात्कार लगभग एक घंटे का होगा। आपका यह कीमती समय लेने और यदि इससे आपके कार्य में कोई व्यधान पड़ता है तो, उसके लिए हमें खेद है। जहाँ तक हमें जानकारी है, इस रिसर्च में भाग लेने से आपको किसी तरह का कोई नुकसान नहीं होगा। आप जो हमें बतायेंगे उन चीजों को हम सरकार/ कर विभाग या किसी भी व्यक्ति/संस्था को नहीं बतायेंगे जो आपको नुकसान पहुँचा सके। यह जानकारी हम केवल रिसर्च के लिए प्रयोग करेंगे। साक्षात्कार के अंत में हम आपको एक छोटा सा मोबाइल रिचार्ज देंगे। इस शोध के परिणामों से भारत भर में अन्य लोगों के जीवन में सुधार लाने में मदद किया जायेगा।

क्या आप इस विवरण को समझ रहे हैं? अगर हाँ, तो हम इस साक्षात्कार को जारी रख सकते हैं?

अगर आपको लगता है कि आपके साथ अन्याय किया जा रहा है, अथवा आपको कोई प्रश्न या चिंता है तो आप संपर्क कर सकते हैं: यशस वैद्य, जमील पोवर्टी एक्शन लेब साउथ एशिया। उनकी संपर्क सूचना है, यशस वैद्य, लोवर ग्राउन्ड फ्लोर, आदि बिल्डींग, 2 बलबीर सक्सेना मार्ग, होज़ खास, न्यू दिल्ली-110016. Ph: +91-44-3247-5059, 9953803826.

रिसर्च विषय या वैध प्रतिनिधि हेतु मौखिक अनुमति

मैं उपर वर्णित प्रक्रिया को समझ रहा/रही हूँ। मैं मेरे सवालों को दिया जवाब के साथ संतुष्ट हूँ, और मैं इस अध्ययन भाग लेने के लिए सहमत हूँ, और मेरे घर के बच्चों कि ऊँचाई, वजन और मध्य ऊपरी बांह की परिधि को मापने और दर्ज करने कि अनुमति देती/देता हूँ।

_____ मौखिक अनुमति हाँ / ना (जो सही हो उस पर गोला लगायें)

नाम

जाँचकर्ता के हस्ताक्षर

मेरी समस्त जानकारी में साक्षात्कार देने वाला व्यक्ति अपनी इच्छा एवं जानकारी से अपनी और अपने बच्चों के माप के लिए अनुमति दे रहे हैं और इस रिसर्च अध्ययन में भाग लेने हेतु अपनी अनुमति देने का, उसके पास वैधानिक अधिकार है।

_____ जाँचकर्ता के हस्ताक्षर

_____ दिनांक

ID: -//**Section 1: Residents at First Survey (पहले सर्वेक्षण के सदस्य)**

M-ID	सदस्य क्र.सं. Member ID	From BL-I Roster	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
1.01	नाम Name									
1.02	लिंग Sex	महिला Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		पुरुष Male	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1.03	अभी शादी शुदा है Currently Married	No नहीं	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Yes हॉ	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1.04	उम्र Age		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
1.05	उत्तरदाता से रिश्ता क्या है? Relationship	PEOPLE CODES देखें
ध्यान दें —केवल नीचे दिए गए रिश्तेदार 'डाइरेक्ट' रिश्तेदार हैं। <i>Direct Relatives of the household head are given below. All others are not direct relatives.</i>										
उत्तरदाता Respondent	00	बेटी Daughter	08					
पिता Father	01	ससुर Father-in-law	24					
माता Mother	02	सास Mother-in-law	25					
पति Husband	03	दामाद Son-in-law	26					
पत्नी Wife	04	बहू Daughter-in-law	28					
भाई Brother	05	भाभी / देवरानी / साली / जिठानी Sister-in-Law	29					
बहन Sister	06	पोता / नवासा Grandson	30					
बेटा Son	07	पोती / नवासी Granddaughter	31					
1.06	ध्यान दें—रिश्तों को वर्गीकरण करें। Classify Relative	डाइरेक्ट नहीं Not direct relative	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		डाइरेक्ट है Direct relative	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1.07	अभी भी यहाँ हैं Still Here?	नहीं No	0 → 1.08	0 → 1.08	0 → 1.08	0 → 1.08	0 → 1.08	0 → 1.08	0 → 1.08	0 → 1.08
		हाँ Yes	1 → 1.10	1 → 1.10	1 → 1.10	1 → 1.10	1 → 1.10	1 → 1.10	1 → 1.10	1 → 1.10

ID: -//

1.08	जाने का कारण Reason for leaving	कोड 01 है तो बाँकी रोसटर ना भरें Skip rest for 01 नीचे के कोड देखें ↓									
मर गये Died.....		1	रिश्तेदारों से मिलने के लिए Visit Relatives		8	स्थायी काम की खोज में Seek Permanent Work.....		2	स्थायी निवास की खोज में Seeking Permanent Accommodation		9
अस्थायी/मौसमी काम की खोज में Seek Temporary/Seasonal Work.....		3	पिछले घर में विवाद हुआ/ असुखद थे Disagreement at Previous Residence		10	प्राथमिक अथवा माध्यमिक शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Primary or Secondary Education		4	शादी हो गयी Married		11
माध्यमिक शिक्षा के उपरांत शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Post-Secondary Education		5	अन्य Other		-997	चिकित्सा उपचार के लिए Medical Treatment		6	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer		-998
बच्चे को जन्म देने लिए Deliver Baby		7	पता नहीं Don't Know		-999	1.09		अब कहाँ हैं Where are they now?	नीचे के कोड देखें ↓		
जिस गाँव से आए थे Native Place (Rural)		2	दिल्ली में- पैसे देकर लिया गया अन्य आवास In Delhi – Other Paid Accommodation		7	जिस शहर से आए थे Native Place (Urban)		3	दिल्ली में-खुद का स्थायी आवास In Delhi – Own Permanent Accommodation		8
अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका Other Rural Area		4	दिल्ली में-बिना आवास के In Delhi – No Accommodation		9	अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं) Other Urban Area (not Delhi)		5	अन्य Other		-997
दिल्ली में-किसी रिश्तेदार/दोस्त के साथ आवास In Delhi – Other Relative/Friend Accommodation		6	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer		-998	दिल्ली में-किसी रिश्तेदार/दोस्त के साथ आवास In Delhi – Other Relative/Friend Accommodation		6	पता नहीं Don't Know		-999
1.10	दिल्ली में कितने समय से रह रहे हैं Length of Stay in Delhi		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
	दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
	साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
	पूरा जीवन Whole Life	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	
	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	
	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	

ID: -//

1.11	इस घर में कितने समय से रह रहे हैं Length of Stay in this house		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>								
		दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
		साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
		पूरा जीवन Whole Life	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
1.12	मुख्य काम—धंधा (पेशा) Primary Occupation	OCCUPATION CODES Skip rest for 00-01,32 & -995 कोड 00, 01, 32 और -995 है तो बाँकी रोसटर ना भरें	
1.13	यह पेशा कब से कर रहे हैं Length of Time in that Occupation		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>								
		दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
		साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
		बचपन से From childhood	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
1.14	काम पर जाने का वाहन क्या है Transport to Work Write all that apply ध्यान दें—जो भी लागू हो लिरवें	Skip rest for 00 कोड 00 है तो बाँकी रोसटर ना भरें नीचे के कोड देखें ↓	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	

ID: -//

घर में काम करते हैं Work at home	0	बॉटा वैन Shared Van	9
पैदल चलकर Walking	1	बस Bus.....	10
साईकिल Bicycle.....	2	मेट्रो Metro	11
साईकिल रिक्शा Bicycle Rickshaw.....	3	लोकल ट्रेन Local Train	12
बॉटा ऑटोरिक्शा Shared Autorickshaw.....	4	खुद की अन्य कोई वाहन Any other vehicle that belongs to them	13
ऑटोरिक्शा Single Autorickshaw	5	रोज बदलते हैं Changes daily	14
खुद का दो पहिया वाहन Personal Two-Wheeler.....	6	अन्य Other	-997
किसी और का दो पहिया वाहन Two-Wheeler of Someone else	7	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998
खुद का गाड़ी Personal Car	8	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999

1.15	काम तक पहुंचने के लिए कितना समय लगता है Time to work	मिनट में MINUTES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>							
		अलग अलग जगहों पर जाना होता है Work in different places, changes a lot	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
1.16	जाने आने में प्रतिदिन का खर्चा Average Cost for Transport per day	रुपए में In Rupees	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>							
		अलग अलग जगहों पर जाना होता है Work in different places, changes a lot	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999

ID: □□□-□□

□□/□□/□□□□

Section 2: Residents New Since First Survey (पिछले सर्वे से नया सदस्य)

पहले रोसटर को छोड़कर क्या पिछले तीन दिनों से लगातार कोई इस घर में रहे रहा है? Is there anyone who stayed in this household consecutively for the last three nights who was not mentioned in the previous section?	नहीं No	0	→ Section 3
	हाँ Yes	1	→ 2.01

M-ID	सदस्य क्र.सं. Member ID		101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108
2.01	नाम Name									
2.02	उम्र Age		□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□
2.03	लिंग Sex	महिला Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		पुरुष Male	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2.04	अभी शादी शुदा है Married	नहीं No	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		हाँ Yes	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		पता नहीं Don't know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
2.05	उत्तरदाता से रिश्ता क्या है? Relationship	PEOPLE CODES देखें								
<p>ध्यान दें—केवल नीचे दिए गए रिश्तेदार 'डाइरेक्ट' रिश्तेदार हैं। <i>Direct Relatives to the respondent are given below. All others are not direct relatives.</i></p> <p>उत्तरदाता Respondent 00 बेटी Daughter 08</p> <p>पिता Father 01 ससुर Father-in-law 24</p> <p>माता Mother 02 सास Mother-in-law 25</p> <p>पति Husband 03 दामाद Son-in-law 26</p> <p>पत्नी Wife 04 बहू Daughter-in-law 28</p> <p>भाई Brother 05 भाभी / देवरानी / साली / जिठानी Sister-in-Law 29</p> <p>बहन Sister 06 पोता / नवासा Grandson 30</p> <p>बेटा Son 07 पोती / नवासी Granddaughter 31</p>										
2.06	रिश्तों का वर्गीकरण करें Interviewer: Classify type	डाइरेक्ट नहीं Not direct relative	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		डाइरेक्ट है Direct relative	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2.07	उच्चतम शिक्षा Highest Education		□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□

ID: -//

		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
2.08	यहाँ से पहले कहाँ रहते थे Residence Before Here	कोड 01 है तो 2.10 में जाएं Skip to 2.10 if 01 नीचे के कोड देखें ↓								
कहीं नहीं (अभी तक यहीं रहे हैं) Left off previous survey, but lived here before 1					दिल्ली में- पैसे देकर लिया गया अन्य आवास In Delhi – Other Paid Accommodation7					
जिस गाँव से आए थे Native Place (Rural)2					दिल्ली में-खुद का स्थायी आवास In Delhi – Own Permanent Accommodation8					
जिस शहर से आए थे Native Place (Urban)3					दिल्ली में-बिना आवास के In Delhi – No Accommodation9					
अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका Other Rural Area4					नवजात शिशु Newborn10					
अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं) Other Urban Area (not Delhi)5					अन्य Other-997					
दिल्ली में-किसी रिश्तेदार/ दोस्त के साथ आवास In Delhi – Other Relative/Friend Accommodation6					जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer-998					
					पता नहीं Don't Know-999					
2.09	आने की वजह Reason For Coming	Skip rest for 01 कोड 01 है तो बाँकी रोस्टर ना भरें नीचे के कोड देखें ↓								
नवजात शिशु Newborn1					रिश्तेदारों से मिलने के लिए Visit Relatives8					
स्थायी काम की खोज में Seek Permanent Work.....2					स्थायी निवास की खोज में Seeking Permanent Accommodation9					
अस्थायी/मौसमी काम की खोज में Seek Temporary/Seasonal Work.....3					पिछले घर में विवाद हुआ / असुखद थे Disagreement at Previous Residence.....10					
प्राथमिक अथवा माध्यमिक शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Primary or Secondary Education4					शादी हो गयी Married11					
माध्यमिक शिक्षा के उपरांत शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Post-Secondary Education5					अन्य Other.....-997					
चिकित्सा उपचार के लिए Medical Treatment6					जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer-998					
बच्चे को जन्म देने के लिए Deliver Baby7					पता नहीं Don't Know-999					
2.10	दिल्ली में कब से रह रहे हैं Length of Stay in Delhi		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
	दिन Days		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	महीने Months		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	साल Years		4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	पूरा जीवन Whole Life		-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994
	जवाब नहीं दिया		-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998

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		Won't Answer								
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
2.11	इस घर में कितने समय से रह रहे हैं Length of Stay in this house	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
	दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
2.12	कब तक रहेंगे Expected Total Length of Stay	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
	दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	अनिश्चित Indefinite	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994
	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
2.13	दिल्ली में हाल में किया काम Most Recent Job in Delhi	OCCUPATION CODES कोड 00-01, 32 और -995 है तो 2.19 में Skip to 2.19 for 00-01 & 32, -995								
2.14	यह काम कब से कर रहे हैं Length of Time in this Job	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
	दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	बार-बार काम	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996

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		बदलता है Frequent Job Changes									
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	
2.15	व्यक्ति की वर्तमान औसत आय Current Average Income for the Person		
		दैनिक Daily	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
		साप्ताहिक Weekly	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
		मासिक Monthly	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
			-997	-997	-997	-997	-997	-997	-997	-997	
		अन्य Other	
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	
2.16	काम पर जाने का वाहन क्या है Transport to Work Write all that apply जो भी लागू हो लिरवें	कोड 00 है तो Q2.19 में जाएं Skip to 2.19 for Code 00 नीचे के कोड देखें ↓	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	___ ___	
घर में काम करते हैं Work in House			0			बॉटा वैन Shared Van			8		
पैदल चलकर Walking			1			कार्पोरेशन बस Corporation Bus			9		
साईकिल Bicycle.....			2			मेट्रो Metro			10		
साईकिल रिक्शा Bicycle Rickshaw.....			3			लोकल ट्रेन Local Train			11		
बॉटा ऑटोरिक्शा Shared Autorickshaw.....			4			रोज बदलते हैं Changes daily.....			12		
खुद का ऑटोरिक्शा Single Autorickshaw.....			5			कोई और Other			-997		
खुद का दो पहिया वाहन Personal Two-Wheeler.....			6			जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer			-998		
किसी और का दो पहिया वाहन Two-Wheeler of Someone else			7			पता नहीं Don't Know			-999		
2.17	काम तक पहुंचने के लिए कितना	मिनट में MINUTES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>								
		अलग अलग जगों पर	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	-996	

ID: -//

	समय लगता है Time to work	जाना होता है Work in different places, changes a lot									
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	
2.18	जाने आने में प्रतिदिन का खर्चा Average Cost for Transport per day	रुपए में In Rupees	
2.19	मुख्य काम-धंधा (पेशा) Primary Occupation	OCCUPATION CODES कोड 00,01,32 और -995 है तो बाकी रोजसटर ना भरें Skip to Section 3 for Codes 00-01,32,-995	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>								
2.20	यह काम (पेशा) कब से कर रहे हैं Length of Time in that Occupation		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>								
		दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
		महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
		साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
		बचपन से From childhood	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993	-993
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	
2.21	पिछले साल में कितने महीने काम किया Number of Months Worked in Last Year	महीने Months	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>								
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999

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2.22	पिछले 3 महीनों में लगभग हर हफ्ते कितने दिन काम किया है Average Days per week worked in last three months	दिन DAYS	<input type="text"/>								
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999

Section 3: People who have resided in the household for 15 days or more in the last two years (पिछले 2 वर्षों में पंद्रह दिन या उससे ज़्यादा के लिए रहा व्यक्ति)

पहले दो रोलर को छोड़कर क्या पिछले दो सालों में 15 दिन या उससे ज़्यादा दिन के लिए कोई इस घर में रहा है? Is there anyone who has stayed in this house for more than 15 days at a time in the past two years who was not mentioned on the first two rosters (Section 1 and Section 2)?	No	0	→ Section 4
	Yes	1	→ 3.01

M-ID	सदस्य क्र.सं. Member ID		201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208
3.01	नाम Name									
3.02	उम्र Age		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>							
3.03	लिंग Sex	महिला Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		पुरुष Male	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3.04	अभी शादी शुदा है Currently Married	नहीं No	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		हाँ Yes	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
3.05	उत्तरदाता से रिश्ता क्या है? Relationship	PEOPLE CODES देखें								

ध्यान दें—केवल नीचे दिए गए रिश्तेदार 'डाइरेक्ट' रिश्तेदार हैं। *Direct Relatives to the respondent are given below. All others are not direct relatives.*

उत्तरदाता Respondent	00	बेटी Daughter	08
पिता Father	01	ससुर Father-in-law	24
माता Mother	02	सास Mother-in-law	25

ID: □□□-□□

□□/□□/□□□□

पति Husband	03	दामाद Son-in-law	26
पत्नी Wife	04	बहू Daughter-in-law	28
भाई Brother	05	भाभी / देवरानी / साली / जिठानी Sister-in-Law	29
बहन Sister	06	पोता / नवासा Grandson	30
बेटा Son	07	पोती / नवासी Granddaughter	31

3.06	रिश्तों को वर्गीकरण करें Interviewer: Classify Relative	डाइरेक्ट नहीं Not direct relative	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		डाइरेक्ट है Direct relative	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3.07	उच्चतम शिक्षा Highest Education	EDUCATION CODES							
3.08	दिल्ली में हाल में किया काम Most Recent Job in Delhi	OCCUPATION CODES देखें Skip to 3.10 for 00-01, 32 & -995 कोड 00-01,32 और -995 है तो 3.10 में जाएं							
3.09	व्यक्ति की वर्तमान औसत आय Current Average Income for the Person	दैनिक Daily	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		साप्ताहिक Weekly	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
		मासिक Monthly	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
		अन्य Other	-997	-997	-997	-997	-997	-997	-997
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	
3.10	यहाँ से पहले कहाँ रहते थे Residence Before Here	SEE CODES BELOW नीचे कोड देखे ↓							

कोई नहीं None.....	0	दिल्ली में- पैसे देकर लिया गया अन्य आवास In Delhi – Other Paid Accommodation	7
कहीं नहीं (अभी तक यहीं रहे है)	1	दिल्ली में-खुद का स्थायी आवास In Delhi – Own Permanent Accommodation	8
जिस गाँव से आए थे Native Place (Rural)	2	दिल्ली में-बिना आवास के In Delhi – No Accommodation	9
जिस शहर से आए थे Native Place (Urban)	3	नवजात शिशु Newborn	10

ID: -//

अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका Other Rural Area4		अन्य Other-997							
अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं) Other Urban Area (not Delhi)5		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer-998							
दिल्ली में-किसी रिश्तेदार/दोस्त के साथ आवास In Delhi – Other Relative/Friend Accommodation6		पता नहीं Don't Know-999							
3.11	Reason for Coming आने की वजह								
नवजात शिशु Newborn1					रिश्तेदारों से मिलने के लिए Visit Relatives8				
स्थायी काम की खोज में Seek Permanent Work.....2					स्थायी निवास की खोज में Seeking Permanent Accommodation9				
अस्थायी/मौसमी काम की खोज में Seek Temporary/Seasonal Work.....3					पिछले घर में विवाद हुआ/असुखद थे Disagreement at Previous Residence.....10				
प्राथमिक अथवा माध्यमिक शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Primary or Secondary Education4					शादी हो गयी Married11				
माध्यमिक शिक्षा के उपरांत शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Post-Secondary Education5					अन्य Other.....-997				
चिकित्सा उपचार के लिए Medical Treatment6					जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer-998				
बच्चे को जन्म देने के लिए Deliver Baby7					पता नहीं Don't Know-999				
3.12	दिल्ली में कितने समय तक रहें Length of Stay in Delhi	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
3.13	इस घर में कितने समय तक रहें Length of Stay in this house	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	पूरा जीवन Whole Life	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994	-994
	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
3.14	कितने समय पहले यहाँ से गये Left this	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
	दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

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	Household How Long Ago	महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
		साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
3.15	जाने की वजह Reason for Leaving	कोड 01 है तो बाँकी रोसटर ना भरें Skip rest for 01 नीचे के कोड देखें ↓									
मर गये Died.....1			छुट्टी खत्म हो गई Vacation/Holiday/Break Over8								
स्थायी काम की खोज में Seek Permanent Work.....2			स्थायी निवास की खोज में Seeking Permanent Accommodation9								
अस्थायी/मौसमी काम की खोज में Seek Temporary/Seasonal Work.....3			घर में विवाद हुआ / असुखद थे Disagreement at Previous Residence.....10								
प्राथमिक अथवा माध्यमिक शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Primary or Secondary Education4			शादी हो गयी Married11								
माध्यमिक शिक्षा के उपरांत शिक्षा के लिए Pursue Post-Secondary Education5			अन्य Other.....-997								
चिकित्सा उपचार खत्म हुआ Medical Treatment Over6			जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer-998								
बच्चे के जन्म के बाद चले गए Deliver Baby7			पता नहीं Don't Know-999								
3.16	अब वह कहाँ हैं Where now										
जिस गाँव से आए थे Native Place (Rural)2			दिल्ली में- पैसे देकर लिया गया अन्य आवास In Delhi – Other Paid Accommodation7								
जिस शहर से आए थे Native Place (Urban)3			दिल्ली में-खुद का स्थायी आवास In Delhi – Own Permanent Accommodation8								
अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका Other Rural Area4			दिल्ली में-बिना आवास के In Delhi – No Accommodation9								
अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं) Other Urban Area (not Delhi)5			अन्य Other-997								
दिल्ली में-किसी रिश्तेदार/दोस्त के साथ आवास In Delhi – Other Relative/Friend Accommodation6			जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer-998								
			पता नहीं Don't Know-999								
3.17	क्या उनके आने की उम्मीद है Expected to Return	नहीं No	0 →Section 4	0 →Section 4	0 →Section 4	0 →Section 4	0 →Section 4	0 →Section 4	0 →Section 4	0 →Section 4	
		हाँ Yes	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
		पक्का नहीं, लेकिन आ सकते हैं Unsure, but likely	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
		पक्का नहीं, नहीं भी आ सकते हैं Unsure, but unlikely	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998

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		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
3.18	आएंगे कब Return When		□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□	□□
		दिन Days	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		महीने Months	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
		साल Years	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999
3.19	प्रवासन को वर्गीकरण करें Characterize Migration	निश्चित समय में Cyclical	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		एक बार One-time	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
		अनियमित Irregular	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999	-999

Section 4. Health स्वास्थ्य			
4.01	क्या आप अपने आप को दिल्ली का निवासी मानते हैं? Do you consider yourself to be a resident of Delhi?	No नहीं	0
		Yes हाँ	1
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999
4.02	आप किस राज्य के मूल निवासी हैं? In which state is your place of origin?	Delhi दिल्ली	1 →4.04
		Uttar Pradesh उत्तर प्रदेश	2 →4.03
		Haryana हरियाणा	3 →4.03
		Madhya Pradesh मध्य प्रदेश	4 →4.03
		Bihar बिहार	5 →4.03
		Rajasthan राजस्थान	6 →4.03
		West Bengal पश्चिम बंगाल	7 →4.03
		Punjab पंजाब	8 →4.03
		Other अन्य	-997 →4.03
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998 →4.04
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999 →4.04		
4.03	आप किस जिले के मूल निवासी हैं? In which district is your place of origin?	DISTRICT जिला	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999
4.04	आपका जन्म वहीं हुआ था? Were you born there?	No नहीं	0
		Yes हाँ	1 →4.07
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999
4.05	आपका जन्म किस राज्य में हुआ था? In which state were you born?	Delhi दिल्ली	1 →4.07
		Uttar Pradesh उत्तर प्रदेश	2 →4.06
		Haryana हरियाणा	3 →4.06
		Madhya Pradesh मध्य प्रदेश	4 →4.06
		Bihar बिहार	5 →4.06
		Rajasthan राजस्थान	6 →4.06
		West Bengal पश्चिम बंगाल	7 →4.06
		Punjab पंजाब	8 →4.06
		Other अन्य	-997 →4.06
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998 →4.07
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999 →4.07		
4.06	आपका जन्म किस जिले में हुआ था? In which district were you born?	DISTRICT जिला	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999
4.07	क्या आप कभी गाँव में गये या रहे हैं? शायद कभी किसी भी परिवार और रिश्तेदार से मिलने? Have you ever lived in or visited a rural village, perhaps to see family or relatives?	No नहीं	0 →4.09
		Yes हाँ	1 →4.08
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998 →4.08
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999 →4.08
4.08	Where is the village that you have spent the most time? कहाँ है वह गाँव जहाँपर आपने सबसे ज्यादा समय बिताया है।	STATE राज्य	
		DISTRICT जिले	
		Place of Origin मूल निवास	-993
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998

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अब बोलिए—अगले कुछ प्रश्नों में हम आपसे दिल्ली और गाँव की स्वास्थ्य स्थिति के बारे में कुछ तुलनात्मक प्रश्न करेंगे। हर किसी स्वास्थ्य घटना और स्थिति जो हम बतायेंगे आपको बताना है कि वह होने की संभावना कहाँ पर ज्यादा है—दिल्ली में या गाँव में। इन प्रश्नों का कोई गलत या सही उत्तर नहीं है। हम बस आपके विचार जानना चाहते हैं। कृप्या करके दिल्ली और उस गाँव की तुलना करें जहाँ पर आपने ज्यादा समय बिताया है। अगर आपने किसी गाँव में कोई समय नहीं बिताया है तो जो भी आपने गाँव के बारे में सुना है उसी आधार पर जबाब दें। दिल्ली में जुड़े हुए जगहों जैसे गुडगांव, नोएडा, फरीदाबाद, और गाजियाबाद को भी शामिल कर सकते हैं।

The next set of questions asks you to compare health conditions in Delhi and village areas. For each of the following health events and conditions, where would they be more likely to occur—in Delhi or in the village? There are no right or wrong answers, we are just interested in your perceptions. Please compare Delhi to the village where you have spent the most time; if you haven't spent any time in a village, then answer based on what you have heard about villages. When you think of Delhi, please feel free to include adjoining areas of Gurgaon, Noida, Faridabad and Ghaziabad.

		Delhi दिल्ली	Village गाँव	About the same लगभग एकसमान	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	Don't Know पता नहीं
4.09	Hypertension (B. P.) उच्चरक्तचाप (बीपी)	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.10	Dengue डेंगू	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.11	Tuberculosis (T.B) क्षयरोग (टीबी)	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.12	Malaria मलेरिया	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.13	Respiratory infection (Cold/Pneumonia) सांस का संक्रमण (ठंड और निमोनिया)	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.14	Polio पोलियो	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.15	HIV/AIDS एच आइ वी/एड्स	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.16	Diarrhea/Vomiting दस्त/उल्टी	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.17	Diabetes (Sugar) मधुमेह (सुगर)	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.18	Eye Problems (Cataract, blindness) आँख की बिमारियाँ (मोतियाबिन्द, अंधापन)	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.19	Maternal/child mortality during childbirth प्रसव के दौरान माता या शिशु की मौत	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.20	Malnutrition कुपोषण	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.21	Cancer कैंसर	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.22	Heart Attack हृदय आक्रमण (हार्ट अटैक)	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.23	Disability/Paralysis विकलांगता/लकवा	1	2	3	-998	-999
4.24	आपके विचार में चिकित्सा उपचार प्राप्त करने में कम समय कहाँ लगेगा? Where do you think it would take less time to receive necessary medical care?	Delhi दिल्ली		1		
		Village गाँव		2		
		About the same लगभग एकसमान		3		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया		-998		
		Don't Know पता नहीं		-999		
4.25	आपके विचार में अच्छी चिकित्सा सुविधाएँ कहाँ मिलेंगी—दिल्ली में या गाँव में? Where do you think you would receive better medical care?	Delhi दिल्ली		1		
		Village गाँव		2		
		About the same लगभग एकसमान		3		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया		-998		
		Don't Know पता नहीं		-999		
4.26	आपके विचार में चिकित्सा सुविधाओं के लिए कम पैसे कहाँ लगेंगे—दिल्ली में या गाँव में? Where do you think you would pay less for medical care?	Delhi दिल्ली		1		
		Village गाँव		2		
		About the same लगभग एकसमान		3		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया		-998		
		Don't Know पता नहीं		-999		
4.27	आपके विचार में आपके बिमार पड़ने की आशंका ज्यादा कहाँ है—दिल्ली में या गाँव में?	Delhi दिल्ली		1		
		Village गाँव		2		
		About the same लगभग एकसमान		3		

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	Where do you think you are more likely to fall ill?	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.28	आपकी जानकारी में मच्छर के काटने से कौन-कौन सी बिमारियाँ होती हैं? ध्यान दें- पढ़कर न बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। ध्यान रखें कि उत्तरदाता जबाब न पढ़ें। <i>Make sure the respondent is not reading over your shoulder.</i> Do you know of any diseases that are caused by mosquito bites, and if so, which ones? <i>Do not prompt. Circle all that apply</i>	None कोई नहीं	0	→4.30
		Malaria मलेरिया	1	→4.29
		Dengue डेंगू	2	→4.29
		Chikungunya चिकुनगुण्या	3	→4.29
		Japanese Encephalitis दिमागी बुखार	4	→4.29
		Other अन्य	-997	→4.29
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→4.30
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→4.30
4.29	इनमें से कौन सी बिमारी आपको या आपके परिवार में किसी को हो चुकी है? ध्यान दें-विकल्पों को पढ़कर बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। Which of those diseases have you or someone in your family personally experienced? <i>Read out all options. Circle all that apply</i>	None कोई नहीं	0	
		Malaria मलेरिया	1	
		Dengue डेंगू	2	
		Chikungunya चिकुनगुण्या	3	
		Japanese Encephalitis दिमागी बुखार	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.30	क्या आप मच्छर के काटने से रोकने के लिए कुछ करते हैं, अगर हाँ तो क्या करते हैं? ध्यान दें-लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। Do you do anything to prevent mosquito bites in your home, and if so, what? <i>Circle all that apply. Do not prompt</i>	Nothing कुछ नहीं	0	
		Cream/Spray Applied to Skin शरीर पर क्रीम/स्प्रे लगाना	1	
		Spray for rooms घर में स्प्रे	3	
		Phenyl फिनाइल	4	
		Smoke from Burning Dung उपला/कड़ा को जलाने से निकला घुआँ	4	
		Smoke from Burning Mosquito Coils मच्छर मारने की कोइल को जलाने से निकला घुआँ	5	
		Electric Dispenser (Good Knight) मच्छर मारने की टिकिया या विद्युत डिस्पेंसर (गुड नाइट)	6	
		Removal of Standing Water जमें हुए पानी को हटाना	7	
		Oil in Cooler कूलर में तेल	8	
		Regular (at least once per week) Cleaning of Cooler नियमित तौर पर कूलर की सफाई (हफ्ते में कम से कम एक बार)	9	
		Screens घर में जाली	10	
		Bed Nets मच्छरदानी	11	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.31	आपको पिछले एक वर्ष में कितनी बार बुखार आया था? How many times in the past year have you experienced a fever?	TIMES कितनी बार	<input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

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4.32	पिछली बार कब आपको बुखार आया था? When was the last time you experienced a fever?	Never Experienced a Fever कभी बुखार नहीं आया	0	→4.44
		NUMBER संख्या	<input type="text"/>	
		Days Ago दिन पहले	1	
		Weeks Ago हफ्ते पहले	2	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	3	
		Years Ago साल पहले	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.33	वह बुखार कुल कितने समय के लिए रहा था? How long did that fever last in total?	NUMBER संख्या	<input type="text"/>	
		Hours घण्टे	0	
		Days दिन	1	
		Months महीने	3	
		Years साल	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
		4.34	बुखार के साथ साथ आपको कौन सी बिमारियाँ हुई थीं? ध्यान दें—लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। What other health problems/symptoms did you have along with the fever? Circle all that apply.	Nothing कुछ नहीं
Cough खाँसी	1			
Cold/Congestion ठंड/कसाव	2			
Breathing Problems साँस की दिक्कतें	3			
Rash दाने	4			
Headache सिरदर्द	5			
Body Pains बदन दर्द	6			
Swelling सूजन	7			
Chills सिहरन	8			
Loss of Appetite भूख कम	9			
Weakness/Exhaustion कमजोरी/थकावट	10			
Diarrhea दस्त	11			
Vomiting उल्टी	12			
Dizziness/Giddiness चक्कर	13			
Boils फोड़े	14			
Other अन्य	-997			
Won't Answer नहीं बताना	-998			
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			
4.35	क्या उस बुखार की वजह से काम पर जाने में या कोई सामान्य कार्य करने में बाधा आयी थी? Did that fever prevent you from working or otherwise going about your normal activities?	No नहीं	0	→4.37
		Yes हाँ	1	→4.36
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→4.37
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→4.37
4.36	इससे कितने समय तक आप अपना काम अथवा कोई सामान्य कार्य नहीं कर पाये? How long did it prevent you from working or going about your normal activities?	NUMBER संख्या	<input type="text"/>	
		Days दिन	1	
		Months महीने	3	
		Years साल	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

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4.37	क्या आपने इस का कोई इलाज कराया? Did you seek any medical treatment for this?	No नहीं	0	→4.41
		Yes, and received treatment हाँ	1	→4.38
		हाँ, मगर इलाज नहीं हो पाया Yes, but was not treated	2	→4.41
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→4.41
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→4.41
4.38	किस प्रकार का इलाज कराया? ध्यान दें — लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। What kind of treatment did you seek? <i>Circle all that apply</i>	Went to pharmacist for medicine दवाई के लिए फारमासिस्ट के पास गया	1	
		Went to private doctor निजी डॉक्टर के पास गया	2	
		Went to government doctor सरकारी डॉक्टर के पास गया	3	
		Admitted to private hospital निजी अस्पताल में भर्ती हुआ	4	
		Admitted to government hospital सरकारी अस्पताल में भर्ती हुआ	5	
		Received medicine from hospital, but not admitted अस्पताल से दवाई ली, लेकिन भर्ती नहीं हुये।	6	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.39	क्या इससे आपके स्थिति में सुधार आया? Did this improve your condition?	Got Worse और खराब हो गया	0	
		Improved सुधार आया	1	
		No Effect कोई फर्क नहीं पडा	2	
		Won't Answer नहीं बताना	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.40	जिस व्यक्ति ने आपका इलाज किया उसने बुखार/अस्वस्थता का कारण क्या बताया था? Did the person helping you tell you what caused your fever/illness?	USE DISEASE CODES ध्यान दें — लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। <i>List all that apply.</i> जो भी लागू हो लिखें	___	___
			___	___
4.41	आपके अनुसार इस बुखार/अस्वस्थता की वजह क्या थी? What do you think was the cause of the fever/illness?	USE DISEASE CODES ध्यान दें — लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। <i>List all that apply</i> जो भी लागू हो लिखें	___	___
			___	___
4.42	क्या आपने अपनी स्थिति में सुधार के लिए कुछ और भी किया? ध्यान दें — लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। Did you do anything else to improve your condition? <i>Read out options. Circle all that apply.</i>	Nothing Else कुछ नहीं	0	→4.44
		Ate Healthy Food पौष्टिक खाना खाया	1	→4.43
		Took Rest आराम किया	2	→4.43
		Exercise व्यायाम	3	→4.43
		Puja/Prayers पूजा/प्रार्थना	4	→4.43
		Went to traditional healer पारम्परिक चिकित्सक के पास गया	5	→4.43
		Other अन्य	-997	→4.43
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→4.44
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→4.44
4.43	क्या इससे आपके स्थिति में सुधार आया? Did this improve your condition?	Got Worse और खराब हो गई	0	
		Improved सुधार हुआ	1	
		No Effect कोई फर्क नहीं पडा	2	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

Randomization of Children

उत्तरदाता के सारे बच्चों (पोते/पोतियों भी) के नाम लिखें जो भी 15 साल से कम उम्र के हैं।

Interviewer: List all children and/or grandchildren of the respondent who are under the age of 15.

4.44. यदि उत्तरदाता के 15 साल से कम उम्र को कोई भी बच्चे नहीं हैं तो दिए गए बक्स में ✓ चिन्ह लगाएं और Section 5 में जाएं।

If the respondent has no children under the age of 15, then check the box and proceed to the section 5.

बच्चे की संख्या Child number	M-ID	उम्र Age	Selection (✓)
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			

उपर दिए गए बच्चों के रेन्डमाइजेशन सूची को देखिए, और फिर बुखार के खण्ड के लिए चुने गए बच्चे का नाम निचे लिखिए।

Consult the table on Child Randomization above, and write down the name of the child selected for the fever section.

Check point 4.a	M-ID
आप कौन से बच्चे के बारे में पूछेंगे?	Name नाम
Which child will you be asking about?	Age उम्र

अब बोलिए— कृपया मुझे {बच्चे का नाम} के बारे में बताएं जो {उम्र} साल का है।**Now say:** Now I would like to speak to you about your child, [NAME], who is [Age] years old.

4.45	पिछले साल में इस बच्चे को कितनी बार बुखार हुआ था? How many times in the past year has this child experienced a fever that lasted more than 24 hours?	TIMES कितनी बार	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.46	आखिरी बार कब उसको बुखार आया था? When was the last time he/she experienced a fever?	कभी बुखार नहीं हुआ Never Experienced a Fever	0	→Section 5
		NUMBER संख्या	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Days Ago दिन पहले	1	
		Weeks Ago हफ्ते पहले	2	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	3	

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		Years Ago साल पहले	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.47	वह बुखार कुल कितने दिन रहा था? How long did that fever last in total?	NUMBER संख्या	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Hours घण्टे	0	
		Days दिन	1	
		Months महीने	3	
		Years साल	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.48	बुखार के अलावा उसे और कौन सी बिमारियाँ थीं? What other health problems did he/she have along with the fever? <i>Circle all that apply</i> जो लागू हो उसे गोला करें।	Nothing कुछ नहीं	0	
		Cough खाँसी	1	
		Cold/Congestion ठंड/कसाव	2	
		Breathing Problems सांस की दिक्कतें	3	
		Rash दाने	4	
		Headache सिरदर्द	5	
		Body Pains बदन दर्द	6	
		Swelling सूजन	7	
		Chills सिहरन	8	
		Loss of Appetite भूख कम	9	
		Weakness/Exhaustion कमजोरी/थकावट	10	
		Diarrhea दस्त	11	
		Vomiting उल्टी	12	
		Dizziness/Giddiness चक्कर	13	
		Boils फोड़े	14	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer नहीं बताना	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.49	क्या इस बुखार के कारण वह खाने, खेलने, पढ़ने या अन्य सामान्य कार्य करने में असमर्थ रहा? Did that fever prevent him/her from eating, playing, studying, working or otherwise doing his/her normal activities?	No नहीं	0	→4.51
		Yes हाँ	1	→4.50
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→4.51
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→4.51
4.50	कितने समय तक बुखार के कारण वह खाने, खेलने, पढ़ने या अन्य सामान्य कार्य करने में असमर्थ रहा? How long did it prevent him/her from eating, playing, studying, working or otherwise doing his/her normal activities?	NUMBER संख्या	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Days दिन	1	
		Weeks हफ्ते	2	
		Months महीने	3	
		Years साल	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.51	आपने क्या इस का कोई इलाज कराया? Did you seek any medical treatment	No नहीं	0	→4.55
		Yes हाँ	1	→4.52
		हाँ, मगर इलाज नहीं हो पाया Yes, but was not treated	2	→4.55

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

	for this?	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→4.55
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→4.55
4.52	किस प्रकार का इलाज कराया? ध्यान दें- लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। What kind of treatment did you seek? Circle all that apply जो लागू गोला करें।	Went to pharmacist for medicine दवाई के लिए फारमासिस्ट के पास गया	1	
		Went to private doctor निजी डॉक्टर के पास गया	2	
		Went to government doctor सरकारी डॉक्टर के पास गया	3	
		Admitted to private hospital निजी अस्पताल में भर्ती हुआ	4	
		Admitted to government hospital सरकारी अस्पताल में भर्ती हुआ	5	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.53	क्या इससे उसकी स्थिति में सुधार आया? Did this improve his/her condition?	Got Worse और खराब हो गया	1	
		No Effect कोई फर्क नहीं पड़ा	2	
		Improved बेहतर हुआ	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
4.54	जिस व्यक्ति ने बच्चे का इलाज किया उसने बुखार/अस्वस्थता का कारण क्या बताया था? Did the person helping you tell you what caused your fever/illness?	USE DISEASE CODES ध्यान दें- लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लिखें। Write all that apply	____ _ ____ _	
4.55	आपके अनुसार इस बुखार/अस्वस्थता की वजह क्या थी? What do you think was the cause of the fever/illness?	USE DISEASE CODES ध्यान दें- लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लिखें। Write all that apply	____ _ ____ _	
4.56	क्या आपने उसकी स्थिति में सुधार के लिए कुछ और भी किया? ध्यान दें- लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। Did you do anything else to improve his/her condition? Circle all that apply जो लागू गोला करें।	Nothing Else कुछ नहीं	0	→Section 5.
		Ate Healthy Food पौष्टिक खाना खाया	1	→4.57
		Took Rest आराम किया	2	→4.57
		Exercise व्यायाम	3	→4.57
		Puja/Prayers पूजा/प्रार्थना	4	→4.57
		Went to traditional healer पारम्परिक चिकीत्सक के पास गया	5	→4.57
		Other अन्य	-997	→4.57
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→ Section 5.
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→ Section 5.
4.57	क्या इससे उसकी स्थिति में सुधार आया? Did this improve his/her condition?	Got Worse और खराब हो गई	0	
		Improved सुधार हुआ	1	
		No Effect कोई फर्क नहीं पड़ा	2	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

Section 5. Education (शिक्षा)

अगले कुछ प्रश्नों में हम आपसे गाँव और शहर की शिक्षा से जुड़े तुलनात्मक प्रश्न करेंगे। इन प्रश्नों का कोई गलत या सही उत्तर नहीं है। हम बस आपके विचार जानना चाहते हैं।

For the next set of questions, we'll ask you to compare the village area from before to Delhi in terms of education. There are no right or wrong answers, we are just interested in your perceptions.

5.01	आपके विचार में स्कूल में ज्यादा आसानी से दाखिला कहाँ मिलता है? Where do you think that it is easier to get a child admitted in school?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	
		Village गाँव	2	
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
5.02	आपके विचार में स्कूलों के सुविधाएँ, शिक्षक की उपस्थिति, इत्यादि कहाँ ज्यादा अच्छी हैं? Where do you think quality of schools is better?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	
		Village गाँव	2	
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
5.03	आपके विचार में स्कूल कहाँ ज्यादा सस्ते होंगे—दिल्ली में है या गाँव में? Where do you think the cost of school is lower?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	
		Village गाँव	2	
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
5.04	आपके विचार में बेहतर शिक्षा कहाँ मिल सकती है—दिल्ली में या गाँव में? Overall, where do you believe you or a child is more likely to be able to get a better education?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	
		Village गाँव	2	
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

Section 6. Aspirations for Children (बच्चों के लिए आकांक्षाएं)

Randomization of Children for Aspirations

उत्तरदाता के सारे बच्चों (पोते/पोतियों भी) के नाम लिखें जो भी 10 साल से ज्यादा और 15 साल से कम उम्र के हैं।

Interviewer: List all children and/or grandchildren of the respondent who are under the age of 15 and above the age of 10.

6.00. यदि उत्तरदाता के 10 साल से ज्यादा और 15 से कम उम्र को कोई भी बच्चे नहीं हैं तो दिए गए बक्स में ✓ चिन्ह लगाएं और Q 6.06 में जाएं।

If the respondent has no children under the age of 15, then check the box and proceed to the Q. 6.06.

			Selection (✓)
बच्चे की संख्या Child number	M-ID	उम्र Age	Aspirations आकांक्षाएँ
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			

उपर दिए गए बच्चों के रेन्डमाइजेशन सूची को देखिए, और फिर आकांक्षाएँ खण्ड के लिए चुने गए बच्चे का नाम नीचे लिखिए।

Consult the table on Child Randomization above, and write down the name of the child selected for the fever section.

आप कौन से बच्चे के बारे में पूछेंगे?
Which child will you be asking about?

S. No. सं.क्र

Name नाम

Age उम्र

अब बोलिए— कृपया मुझे {बच्चे का नाम} के बारे में बताएं जो {उम्र} साल का है।

Now say: Now I would like to speak to you about your child, [NAME], who is [Age] years old.

6.01	अगर किसी प्रकार की सीमा नहीं होती, तो उसको किस पेशे में देखना चाहेंगे?	USE OCCUPATION CODES	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	→6.02
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→6.03

ID: -Date: //

	If there were no limitations, what occupation would you want him/her to be doing when he/she is 35 years old? ध्यान दें—जरूरी हो तभी जोर दें और बोलें कि यह तब है जब कोई भी बाधा या रूकावट न हो। पता नहीं जवाब तभी स्वीकार करें जब उत्तरदाता बार-बार मना करे। <i>Probe as necessary, saying this is if there were no barriers. Only accept Don't Know if they consistently refuse.</i>	Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→6.03
6.02	आपके अनुसार असलियत में उसके इस पेशे में जाने की क्या संभावनाएँ हैं? How likely do you think that he/she will actually end up in that occupation?	Likely संभव	1	
		Neither likely nor unlikely (about 50/50)ना संभव ना असंभव	2	
		Unlikely असंभव	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
6.03	आप उसे कौन से सबसे उच्चतम शैक्षिक स्तर तक पढते हुए देखना चाहेंगे? What is the highest education level you would like him/her to complete?	USE EDUCATION CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
6.04	आपके अनुसार आपके बच्चे की पढाई में कितनी रूची है? How interested do you think your child is in education?	A lot बहुत ज्यादा	1	
		About Average ना ज्यादा ना कम	2	
		Not at all बहुत कम	3	
		Not Applicable/Not in School	-996	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
6.05	अगर इस बच्चे की रूची के ऊपर होता, तो वो किस शैक्षणिक स्तर तक पढाई करेगा? If it were up to this child, what education level do you think he/she would pursue?	USE EDUCATION CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

ध्यान दें— अब सभी बच्चों के बारे में पूछिए।

Caution: Now ask about children in general and **NOT** the specific child.

6.06	क्या आप अपने बेटे को प्रेम विवाह करने की अनुमति देंगे? Would you permit your son to have a love-marriage? (hypothetical if no son) (अनुमान के आधार पर अगर पुत्र नहीं है।)	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हों	1	
		Maybe (conditional) शायद	2	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
6.07	क्या आप अपने बेटे को जाति से बाहर शादी करने की अनुमति देंगे? Would you permit your son to marry outside your community? (अनुमान के आधार पर अगर पुत्र नहीं है।)	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हों	1	
		Maybe (conditional) शायद	2	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

6.08	क्या आप अपनी बेटी को प्रेम विवाह करने की अनुमती देंगे? Would you permit your daughter to have a love-marriage? (hypothetical if no daughter) अनुमान के आधार पर अगर पुत्री नहीं है।	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हों	1	
		Maybe (conditional) शायद	2	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
6.09	क्या आप अपनी बेटी को जाति से बाहर शादी करने की अनुमती देंगे? Would you permit your daughter to marry outside your community? (hypothetical if no daughter) (अनुमान के आधार पर अगर पुत्र नहीं है।)	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हों	1	
		Maybe (conditional) शायद	2	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

Section 7. Social Networks (सामाजिक नेटवर्क)						
मैं संस्थाओं और संगठनों की सूची पढ़ूंगा/पढ़ूंगी और आपसे पूछना चाहूंगा/चाहूंगी अगर आपने कभी इन संस्थाओं में भाग लिया है। अगर आपने इन में कभी भाग नहीं लिया है तो मैं आपसे पूछूंगा/पूछूंगी कि आप इस तरह के संगठन के बारे में जानते हैं जिनमें आप शामिल हो पायें। I am now going to read a list of organizations in which people sometimes participate. For each, I will ask if you currently or have ever participated in the organization. If you have not, I will ask if you know of any that you could join if you wanted.						
7.0x.a. भाग लिया है? Participate in			7.0x.b. ऐसा कोई समूह है जिनमें आप शामिल हो पायेंगे? Do you know of any that you could join if you wanted to?			
7.01	स्वावलंबी समूह Self-Help Groups	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1 करते थे, पर अब नहीं Used to..2	→7.01.b → 7.02.a →7.01.b	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1		
7.02	पंचायत/सामुदायिक नेतृत्व Panchayat/ Community Leadership	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1 करते थे, पर अब नहीं Used to..2	→7.02.b → 7.03.a → 7.02.b	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1		
7.03	आवासिय हितकारी संगठन या आर डब्लू ऐ Resident Welfare Association (RWA) or similar	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1 करते थे, पर अब नहीं Used to..2	→7.03.b → 7.04.a →7.03.b	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1		
7.04	मजदूर संघ/यूनियन Worker's Organizations/Unions	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1 करते थे, पर अब नहीं Used to..2	→7.04.b → 7.05.a →7.04.b	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1		
7.05	धार्मिक समूह/वर्ग Religious Group/Order	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1 करते थे, पर अब नहीं Used to..2	→7.05.b → 7.06.a →7.05.b	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1		
7.06	स्वयंसेवी संस्था या एनजीओ Educational/civil society NGO	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1 करते थे, पर अब नहीं Used to..2	→7.06.b → 7.07.a →7.06.b	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1		
अब मैं आपसे कई सामुदायिक नेताओं के बारे में सवाल पूछना चाहूंगा अगर आप उन्हें जानते हैं और कभी मिले हैं तो कितनी बार मिले हैं, और वह कितने मददगार हैं। I will now ask you some questions about some leaders in your community. For each of these I will ask if you know the person, and if so, whether you have interacted with them. If you have interacted with them, how many times have you done so in the last year, and how helpful have they been for solving problems you have?						
		जानते हैं? 7.0x.a. Know the Person?	बात करते हैं? 7.0x.b. Interact with the person?	पिछले छः महिनें में कितनी बार? 7.0x.c. How many times have you interacted in the last six month?		
7.07	समुदायिक नेता/प्रधान Community leader / Pradhan	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1	→ 7.08.a →7.07.b	No नहीं 0 Yes हाँ 1	→ 7.08.a →7.07.c	_____
7.08	निगम पार्षद Municipal councilor	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1	→ 7.09.a →7.08.b	No नहीं 0 Yes हाँ 1	→ 7.09.a →7.08.c	_____
7.09	विधायक (एम एल ए) MLA	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1	→ 7.10.a →7.09.b	No नहीं 0 Yes हाँ 1	→ 7.10.a →7.09.c	_____
7.10	सांसद (एम पी) MP	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1	→ 7.11.a →7.10.b	No नहीं 0 Yes हाँ 1	→ 7.11.a →7.10.c	_____
7.11	स्वयंसेवी संस्था (एनजीओ) कर्मचारी NGO Staff	नहीं No 0 हाँ Yes 1	→ 7.12 →7.11.b	No नहीं 0 Yes हाँ 1	→ 7.12 →7.11.c	_____

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7.12	आपातकाल की स्थिति में अगर आपको पांच हजार रुपये की जरूरत पड़े तो पहले किसके पास जायेंगे? Who would you first go to if you needed Rs. 5000 in an emergency?	USE PEOPLE CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	38 →7.14
		No one किसी के पास भी नहीं	-995	→7.16
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→7.16
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→7.16
7.13	वो आदमी कहां रहता है? Where does that person live?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area कोई अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Delhi – In this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में	5	
		Delhi – Not in this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में नहीं	6	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
7.14	यदि वह व्यक्ति आपको उस समय पैसे देने में असमर्थ हों तो आप और कितने व्यक्तियों से मांग सकते हैं? If they were unable to give you the money at that time, how many other people could you ask?	NUMBER OF PEOPLE लोगों की संख्या	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		No one किसी से भी नहीं	-995	→7.16
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→7.16
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→7.16
7.15	वह कौन हैं? Who are they? Circle all that apply जो लागू हो गोला करें।	Relatives रिश्तेदार	1	
		Neighbor पड़ोसी	2	
		Friend दोस्त	3	
		Relative of a Friend दोस्त के रिश्तेदार	4	
		Friend of a Relative रिश्तेदार के दोस्त	5	
		Employer or Person from Work मालिक या साथ में काम करने वाले	6	
		Member of community समुदाय के सदस्य	7	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
7.16	आपको नौकरी पाने में या किसी को नौकरी दिलवाने के लिए मदद लेनी हो तो आप पहले किसके पास जाएँगे? Who would you first go to if you needed help getting a job for yourself or someone else?	USE PEOPLE CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	38 →7.18
		No one किसी के पास नहीं	-995	→7.18
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→7.18
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→7.18
7.17	यह व्यक्ति कहाँ रहता/रहती है?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	

ID: -Date: //

	Where does that person live?	Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area कोई अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Delhi – In this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में	5	
		Delhi – Not in this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में नहीं	6	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
7.18	अगर आपको अपने बच्चों या बीमार रिश्तेदारों को एक दिन के लिए छोड़ कर जाना हो तो आप पहले किसके पास जाएंगे? Who would you first go to if you needed to leave your children or a sick relative for 1 day? <i>Hypothetical if no kids</i> यदि बच्चे ना हों तो अनुमान लगायें।	USE PEOPLE CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	38 →7.20
		No one किसी के पास नहीं	-995	→7.20
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→7.20
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→7.20
7.19	यह व्यक्ति कहाँ रहता/रहती है? Where does that person live?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area कोई अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Delhi – In this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में	5	
		Delhi – Not in this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में नहीं	6	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
7.20	इस बस्ती में आपके गाँव/शहर से लगभग कितने घर/परिवार हैं? Approximately how many other households in this basti are from your place of origin?	HOUSEHOLDS	_____	
		Not Applicable दिल्ली के ही हैं	-996	→7.22
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
7.21	इस बस्ती को छोड़कर आप पूरी दिल्ली में लगभग कितने ऐसे परिवारों को नीजी तौर पर जानते हैं जो कि आपके मूल निवास स्थान से हैं? Outside of this basti, approximately how many other households do you personally know in Delhi who are from your place of origin?	HOUSEHOLDS	_____	
		जानते हैं लेकिन सही संख्या नहीं पता Yes we know, but not exact number	-993	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

अब हम आपसे कुछ सामाजिक गतिविधियों के बारे में पूछेंगे। मैं आपको कुछ सामाजिक गतिविधियों के नाम बताऊँगा/बताऊँगी जिसमें ज्यादातर लोग हिस्सा लेते हैं और यदि आपने भी हिस्सा लिया है या नहीं यदि लिया है तो कितनी बार लिया है और किसके साथ।

We will now ask about some social activities. I will list some social activities that people that people like to do, and ask if you have

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

participated in them in the last month, and if so how many times, and who with.

		7.2x.a. क्या पिछले महीने भाग लिया था? Participated in the last month?		7.2x.b. पिछले महीने में कितनी बार भाग लिया था? How Many Times in the last month? -998: जवाब नहीं दिया -999: पता नहीं	7.2x.c. किसके साथ? With Whom? <i>USE PEOPLE CODES</i> <i>List all that apply</i> जो लागू हो सब लिखें।
7.22	कोई आपके घर मिलने के लिए आए जैसे चाय के लिए Were visited in your house for social reasons (e.g. served tea/chai)	No नहीं... 0 Yes हॉ..... 1	→ 7.23 → 7.22.b	_____
7.23	आप किसी के घर मिलने के लिए गए Visited someone else's house for social reasons	No नहीं... 0 Yes हॉ..... 1	→ 7.24 → 7.23.b	_____
7.24	धार्मिक समारोह में भाग लिया Attended a Religious activity or ceremony	No नहीं... 0 Yes हॉ..... 1	→ 7.25 → 7.24.b	_____
7.25	घर के मामलों के बारे में बाहर के आदमी से सलाह ली है Got the opinion of someone not living in the household on a family matter	No नहीं... 0 Yes हॉ..... 1	→ 7.26 → 7.25.b	_____
7.26	घर से बाहर के लोगों के साथ कभी बाजार गये हैं या कोई खरीददारी की है Gone to the market or shopped with someone not living in the household	No नहीं... 0 Yes हॉ..... 1	→ 7.27 → 7.26.b	_____
7.27	घर से बाहर के लोगों की शादी में गये हैं Gone to a marriage of someone outside the household	No नहीं... 0 Yes हॉ..... 1	→ Section 8 → 7.27.b	_____

Section 8. Crime and Security (अपराध और सुरक्षा)						
8.01	क्या आपके इलाके की पुलिस आपको अधिक सुरक्षित महसूस कराती है? Do you think the police in your area generally make you safer?	No नहीं	0			
		Yes हाँ	1			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998			
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			
8.02	क्या आपको यह चिन्ता रहती है कि आपके इलाके की पुलिस आपके या आपके घरवालों को नुकसान पहुंचाएगी? Do you worry that the police in your area might cause harm to you or people living in your household?	No नहीं	0			
		Yes हाँ	1			
		Sometimes	2			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998			
8.03	क्या बस्ती के और लोगों को चिन्ता रहती है कि आपके इलाके की पुलिस उनको या उनके घरवालों को नुकसान पहुंचाएगी? Do other people in your area worry that the police in your area might cause them or people in their household harm?	No नहीं	0			
		Yes हाँ	1			
		Sometimes	2			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998			
दिये गये हर एक घटना के लिए बताइये कि यह होने की अधिक सम्भावना दिल्ली में है या गाँव में। Where do you think you are more likely to be affected by the following security concerns, Delhi or the village we used earlier?						
		Delhi दिल्ली	Village गाँव	Equal in both दोनों में बराबर	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	Don't Know नहीं पता
8.04	Theft चोरी	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.05	Gambling जुआ	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.06	Drunkenness दारुबाजी	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.07	Drug Use नशीले पदार्थों का सेवन	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.08	Kidnapping अपहरण	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.09	Assault/Fighting लड़ाई/झगड़ा	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.10	Political Violence राजनितिक हिंसा	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.11	Communal Violence सांप्रदायिक हिंसा	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.12	Domestic Violence घरेलू हिंसा	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.13	Eve-Teasing छेड़ खानी	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.14	Sexual Assault यौन अत्याचार (बलात्कार)	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.15	Murder हत्या	1	2	3	-998	-999
8.16	आपके विचार में पुलिस बल की परिणाम लाने की, यानि के केस को निपटाने की क्षमता कहाँ ज्यादा है? Where do you think that the ability of the police force to bring results, i.e. solve cases?	Delhi दिल्ली	1			
		Village गाँव	2			
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998			
8.17	सब मिलाकर आप अपने आप को कहां पर अधिक सुरक्षित महसूस करते हैं? Overall, where do you think you are safer?	Delhi दिल्ली	1			
		Village गाँव	2			
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998			
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

Section 9. Housing and Property Rights

मैं आपसे आपके घर के बारे में कुछ प्रश्न करूंगा/करूंगी। यह प्रश्न केवल शोध के लिए हैं जो कि किसी सरकारी या किसी और व्यक्ति को नहीं बताये जायेंगे। इन प्रश्नों के जवाब देने से आपके रहन-सहन पर कोई असर नहीं होगा। हम सिर्फ लोगों की जरूरत जानना चाहते हैं जिससे कि हम सुविधाओं में कुछ सुधार कर सकें।

I will now ask you some questions about your house. This questions are strictly for research purposes, and not be released to the government or any other persons. Answering the questions will in no way have any effect on your residential status: we simply want to understand the needs of people like you so that we can improve the services provided.

9.01	क्या यह घर आपका है या आप किराये पर रहते हैं? Do you own or rent this house?	Own अपना	1	→ 9.09
		Rent किराये का	2	→ 9.02
9.02	क्या आपने इस घर के लिए किराया पत्र या ऐसे कोई कागजात पर हस्ताक्षर किया? Did you sign a rent agreement or a lease for this house?	No नहीं	0	→9.05
		Yes हाँ	1	→9.03
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.05
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.05
9.03	आपने हाल में किराया पत्र या ऐसा कागजात पर कब हस्ताक्षर किया (फिर से नया किया)? When did you most recently sign a lease (renew a lease) for this house?	NUMBER	□ □	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	3	
		Years Ago सालों पहले	4	
		Never/Haven't Renewed कभी नहीं / नवीनीकरण नहीं हुआ	-995	→9.05
		Wont Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.05
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.05
9.04	यह कितने महीने के लिए है? For how many months is your lease?	MONTHS	□ □	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.05	आपको इस घर को दिलाने में किसने मदद की? Who helped you find this house?	USE PEOPLE CODES	□ □	
		No one किसी को भी नहीं	-995	→9.07
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.07
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.07
9.06	आपने उसको कितने पैसे दिये? How much did you pay that person?	RUPEES रुपए		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.07	इस घर में बने रहने के लिए आप मालिक के अलावा किसको लगातार पैसे देते हैं ? उन तीन लोगों को लिखें जिन्हें ज्यादा पैसे दिये। Other than the owner, who else do you pay regularly to be allowed continued occupancy of this house? List the three to whom the most is paid	USE PEOPLE CODES	1. □ □ 2. □ □ 3. □ □	
		No one किसी को भी नहीं	-995	→9.18
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.18
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.18
9.08	आप इस/इन व्यक्ति/व्यक्तियों को प्रति महीने कितने पैसे देते हैं? How much do you pay to this/these person/people per month?	RUPEES रुपए		→9.18
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.18
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.18
9.09	क्या आपने इस घर के लिए पैसे दिये?	No नहीं	0	→9.12

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	Did you pay money for this house?	Yes हाँ	1	→9.10
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.10
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.12
9.10	आपने इस घर के लिए कितने पैसे दिये? How much did you pay for this house?	RUPEES रुपए		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.11	यह पैसे किसको दिये? Whom did you pay?	Owner मालिक	1	→9.13
		Dalal/Pradhan दलाल/प्रधान	2	→9.13
		Government सरकार	3	→9.13
		Other अन्य	-997	→9.13
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.13
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.13
9.12	अगर आपने पैसे नहीं दिये तो आपको यह घर कैसे मिला? If you did not pay, how did you acquire this house?	Original settler बनवाया/बनाया	1	
		Inherited माता पिता या रश्तेदारों से मिला	2	
		Resettled by government सरकार ने स्थानांतरण किया	3	
		Provided by employer मालिक द्वारा दिया गया	4	
		Occupied the land घेरा लगाया	5	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.13	जब आपको यह घर मिला क्या उस समय प्रमाण पत्र दिया गया? When you got the house were you given any certificate?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.14	यह घर दिलाने में आपकी किसने मदद की? Who helped you find this house?	USE PEOPLE CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		No one किसी ने भी नहीं	-995	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.15	इस घर में बने रहने के लिए आप किसी को हरदम/लगातार पैसे देते हैं? अगर हाँ, तो कौन? Do you pay anyone regularly to allow you to continue to occupy this house? If so, whom?	USE PEOPLE CODES	1. <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 2. <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 3. <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		No one किसी को भी नहीं	-995	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.16	यदि चाहें तो क्या आप यह घर बेच सकते हैं? Can you sell this house?	No नहीं	0	→9.18
		Yes हाँ	1	→9.17
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→9.18
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	→9.18
9.17	किसको बेच सकते हैं? To whom could you sell this house?	Anyone किसी को भी	1	
		Dalal/Pradhan दलाल/प्रधान	2	
		Relative or friend रिश्तेदार या दोस्त	3	
		Government सरकार	4	

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		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.18	कभी बिजली वालों या किसी अधिकारी को दिखाना हो की आप यहाँ पर रहते हैं, तो आप किस प्रकार के कागजात दिखाएँगे? In order to show residency to service providers like electricity suppliers, what documents do you show? ध्यान दें — लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें।	Birth Certificate जन्म प्रमाण पत्र	1	
		Voter ID Card चुनाव पहचान पत्र	2	
		Ration / Authorization card राशन या प्रधिकार पत्र	3	
		Bank Pass Book बैंक पास बुक	4	
		Property Documents मकान के कागजात	5	
		Token टोकन	6	
		Electricity bill बिजली का बिल	7	
		None of these कोई नहीं	-995	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.19	इस इलाके में एक घर की कीमत क्या होगी? How much would a house cost in this area?	RUPEES रुपए		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.20	इस इलाके में एक घर का किराया कितना होगा? How much would rent cost per month in this area?	RUPEES रुपए		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.21	इस इलाके में पगडी/सुरक्षा रकम/एडवान्स कितना होगा? How much would a security deposit/advance be in this area?	RUPEES रुपए		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.22	क्या आप या आपकी पत्नी किसी जायजाद/ जमीन के मालिक हैं? Do you or your spouse own any other property/real estate/land?	No नहीं	0	→Section 10
		Yes हाँ	1	→9.23
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→ Section 10
		Doesn't Know पता नहीं	-999	→ Section 10
9.23	यह जायजाद कहाँ पर है? Where is this property located? <i>Circle all that apply</i> जो लागू गोला करें।	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Delhi – In this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में	5	
		Delhi – Not in this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में नहीं	6	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
9.24	यह किस प्रकार की जायजाद है? What type of property is this?	Farming/Agricultural Land खेतिहर भूमि	1	
		Residential – House आवासीय-घर	2	

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Circle all that apply जो लागू गोला करें।	Residential – Apartment or Tenement आवासिय-कमरा या कोठरी,चाल की	3	
	Industrial आद्योगिक	4	
	Empty Plot of Land खाली पड़ी जमीन	5	
	Other अन्य	-997	
	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
	Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

Section 10. Household Finances (घर की आर्थिक स्थिति)

अब बोलें— अब मैं आपसे आपके घर की आर्थिक स्थिति के बारे में कुछ प्रश्न करूंगा/करूंगी। यह प्रश्न केवल शोध के लिए हैं जो कि किसी सरकारी या अन्य व्यक्ति को नहीं बताये जायेंगे। इन प्रश्नों के उत्तर देने से आपके करों या अन्य आर्थिक मुद्दों पर कुछ असर नहीं पड़ेगा। हम यह जानकारी सिर्फ़ ये जानने के लिए इस्तेमाल करेंगे कि आप लोगों को क्या सुविधायें मिलती हैं और उन्हें कैसे सुधारा जा सकता है।

Now say-I will now ask you some questions about the finances of your household. This questions are strictly for research purposes, and not be released to the government or any other person. Answering the questions will in no way have any effect on your taxes or other financial matters. We will simply use the information you give to help us understand the services provided to people like you and how to improve them.

10.01	औसतन हर महीने, आपके घर में कितने लोग काम करते और कमाते हैं? In an average month, how many people in this household work and earn an income?	लोग PEOPLE <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		No one कोई भी नहीं	-995 →10.03
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999
10.02	लगभग हर महीने, इन लोगों द्वारा कमाई गई कुल आय कितनी है? In an average month, what is the total income earned by people in the household who work and earn an income?	RUPEES रुपए	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999
10.03	लगभग हर महीने कितने पैसे खर्च होते हैं? In an average month, how much is spent?	RUPEES रुपए	
		Entire amount earned पूरी कमाई रकम	-994
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999

10.04	आपके घर में ऐसा कोई है जो किसी को पैसे देता/भेजता है? Do you or anyone in your household send/give money to anyone else on a regular basis?	No नहीं	0	→10.12	
		Yes हाँ	1	→10.05	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→10.12	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→10.12	
10.05	किसको पैसे दिये/भेजे? Who do you send/give money to?	USE PEOPLE CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
10.06	पिछले साल आपने कितनी बार पैसे भेजे? How many times in the last year did you send money?		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.07	कितने समय से आप ये पैसा भेज रहे हैं?		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

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	For how long have you been sending this money?	Months महीने	3	3	3
		Years साल	4	4	4
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.08	यह व्यक्ति कहाँ रहता है? Where does this person reside?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	1	1
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	2	2
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	3	3
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area कोई अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	4	4
		Delhi दिल्ली	5	5	5
		Other अन्य	-997	-997	-997
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.09	आप यह पैसे कैसे भेजते हैं? How do you send this money? Circle all that apply जो लागू हो गोला लगायें।	Take it Myself खुद ले के जाता हूँ	1	1	1
		Relative रिश्तेदार	2	2	2
		Friend दोस्त	3	3	3
		Hundi/Hawalla हुंडी/हवाला	4	4	4
		Postal service/Money Order डाक सेवा/मनी आडर	5	5	5
		Business धंधा	6	6	6
		Bank Transfer बैंक द्वारा स्थानांतरण	7	7	7
		Other अन्य	-997	-997	-997
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.10	सामान्तः हर साल आप कितने पैसे देते/भेजते हैं? On average how much do you send/give each year?	RUPEES रुपए			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.11	इसे भेजने में कितने पैसे लगते हैं? How much does it cost to send this amount of money? ध्यान दें—अलग अलग तरीके से पैसे भेजते हैं तो पिछले एक साल के लिए पूछें।	RUPEES रुपए			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999

10.12	क्या इस घर में किसी ऐसे व्यक्ति से पैसे प्राप्त होते हैं जो लगातार यहाँ नहीं रहता?	No नहीं	0	→10.18
		Yes हाँ	1	→10.13
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→10.18

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	Does this household receive money from anyone not living in this household on a regular basis?	Don't Know पता नहीं	-999		→10.18
10.13	वह कौन है जिससे यह पैसे मिलते हैं? Who do you receive money from?	USE PEOPLE CODES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
10.14	यह व्यक्ति कहाँ रहता है? Where does this person reside?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	1	1
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	2	2
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	3	3
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area कोई अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	4	4
		Delhi दिल्ली	5	5	5
		Other अन्य	-997	-997	-997
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.15	कितने समय से आपको ये पैसा मिल रहा है? How long have you been receiving this money for?		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
		Months महीने	3	3	3
		Years साल	4	4	4
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.16	सामान्यतः हर साल आपको कितने पैसे प्राप्त होते हैं? On average how much do you receive each year?	RUPEES रुपए			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999
10.17	आपको यह पैसे कैसे प्राप्त होते हैं? How do you receive this money?	Given in Person वह खुद देता है	1	1	1
		Relative रिश्तेदार	2	2	2
		Friend दोस्त	3	3	3
		Hundi/Hawalla हुंडी/हवाला	4	4	4
		Mail Service/Courier डाक सेवा/कुरियर	5	5	5
		Business धंधा	6	6	6
		Bank Transfer बैंक द्वारा स्थानांतरण	7	7	7
		Other अन्य	-997	-997	-997
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	-998	-998
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	-999	-999		
10.18	दिये गए विकल्पों से या किसी भी	Type प्रकार	Code कोड	Skip	
		Committee/Society/ROSCA	-	1	→10.19

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	<p>तरह से कोई बचत होती है? ध्यान दें— सभी विकल्पों को पढ़कर बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। Does this household save money in any of the following ways? <i>Read out all options. Circle all that apply</i></p>	<p>कमेटी/समाज/रोसका Savings Account at Bank बैंक में जमा खाता</p>	2	→10.19
		<p>Life Insurance Account जीवन बीमा खाता</p>	3	→10.19
		<p>Microcredit/Self Help Group (SHG) स्वावलंबी समूह/बचत घट</p>	4	→10.19
		<p>Provident Fund भविष्यनिधि</p>	5	→10.19
		<p>None कोई नहीं</p>	-995	→10.20
		<p>Other अन्य</p>	-997	→10.19
		<p>Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया</p>	-998	→10.20
		<p>Don't Know पता नहीं</p>	-999	→10.20
10.19	<p>आपने इस पैसे को कैसे उपयोग करने का सोचा है? ध्यान दें— सभी विकल्पों को पढ़कर बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। What do you plan to use this money for? <i>Read out all options. Circle all that apply</i></p>	<p>Unexpected expenses अचानक कोई खर्च</p>	1	
		<p>Use when income decreases आय घटने पर इस्तेमाल करना</p>	2	
		<p>Education शिक्षा</p>	3	
		<p>Housing आश्रय</p>	4	
		<p>Vehicle गाड़ी</p>	5	
		<p>Other durable goods दूसरे टिकाऊ सामान</p>	6	
		<p>Consumable goods उपभोज्य सामान</p>	7	
		<p>Marriage विवाह</p>	8	
		<p>Remittance to Family Elsewhere कहीं और रह रहे परिवार को भेजना</p>	9	
		<p>Other अन्य</p>	-997	
		<p>Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया</p>	-998	
		<p>Don't Know पता नहीं</p>	-999	
10.20	<p>क्या इस घर के किसी सदस्य ने कभी ऋण या कोई उधार लिया है जो कि 500 से ज्यादा हो? Has this household ever taken borrowed money from someone or taken a loan of more than 500 Rs?</p>	<p>No नहीं</p>	0	→10.39
		<p>Yes हाँ</p>	1	→10.21
		<p>Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया</p>	-998	
		<p>Don't Know पता नहीं</p>	-999	
10.21	<p>पिछले तीन सालों में लगभग कितनी बार आपने पैसा उधार या कोई ऋण लिया है जो कि 500 रुपये से ज्यादा का था? In the last three years, approximately how many times have you borrowed money or take a loan for more than Rs.500?</p>	<p>NUMBER संख्या</p>	<input type="text"/>	00→10.25 01→10.25
		<p>Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया</p>	-998	
		<p>Don't Know पता नहीं</p>	-999	
10.22	<p>पिछले तीन सालों में आपने किससे पैसे उधार या ऋण लिया है जो कि 500 रुपये से ज्यादा था? इनमें दोस्तों</p>	<p>Money lender बनिया</p>	1	→10.24
		<p>Bank बैंक</p>	2	→10.24
		<p>Microcredit/Self Help Group (SHG)</p>	3	→10.24

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	या रिश्तेदारों से कम समय के लिए पैसे उधार लेना भी शामिल है। In the last three years, from whom have you borrowed money or taken a loan(s) for more than 500 Rs.? This includes borrowing money from a friend or relative just a short while. जो लागू हो गोला लगायें <i>Circle all that apply.</i>	Personal loan अन्य व्यक्ति से	4	→10.23
		Committee/Society/ROSCA कमेटी/समाज/रोसका	5	→10.24
		Have not borrowed during that time उस समय उधार नहीं लिया था	-995	→10.24
		Other अन्य	-997	→10.24
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→10.24
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→10.24
10.23	आपने यह उधार किससे से लिया? Which people have you taken personal loans from? जो लागू हो गोला लगायें <i>Circle all that apply.</i>	दिल्ली में परिवार Family in Delhi	1	
		दिल्ली से बाहर परिवार Family Outside of Delhi	2	
		पड़ोसी Neighbor	3	
		दिल्ली में दोस्त Friend from Delhi	4	
		दिल्ली से बाहर के दोस्त Friend from outside of Delhi	5	
		दोस्त के रिश्तेदार Relative of Friend	6	
		मालिक या काम की जगह के लोग Employer or Person from Work	7	
		अन्य Other	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
10.24	आपने इस ऋण का इस्तेमाल कैसे किया? What have you used these loans for? <i>Circle all that apply.</i> जो लागू हो गोला लगायें।	Paying Bills बिल का भुगतान करना	1	
		Business Investment व्यापार में लगाना	2	
		House घर में	3	
		Repay Other Loans किसी दूसरे ऋण को चुकाना	4	
		Child's Expenses/Education बच्चों के खर्च/शिक्षा	5	
		Food भोजन	6	
		Durable Goods काम की वस्तुएँ	7	
		Vehicle वाहन	8	
		Marriage शादी	9	
		Medicine/Doctor Bills दवाईयां/डाक्टर के बिल का भुगतान	10	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
10.25	आखिरी बार कितने समय पहले इस घर ने ऋण या पैसे उधार लिये थे? When did this household most recently take a loan or borrow	NUMBER संख्या	<input type="text"/>	
		Days ago दिन पहले	1	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	2	

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	money?	Years Ago साल पहले	3	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
10.26	यह ऋण कहां से लिया था? What type of loan/borrowing money was this?	Money lender बनिया	1	→10.28
		Bank बैंक	2	→10.28
		Microcredit/SHG स्वयं सहायता समूह	3	→10.28
		Personal loan अन्य व्यक्ति से	4	→10.27
		Committee/Society/ROSCA कमेटी/समाज/रोसका	5	→10.28
		Other अन्य	-997	→10.27
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→10.28
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→10.28
10.27	यह ऋण या उधार किस से लिया था? From whom did you take a loan or borrow money?	USE PEOPLE CODES	<input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
10.28	इस ऋण की राशी कितनी थी? How much was this loan amount?	RUPEES रुपए		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
10.29	इस ऋण की राशी का इस्तेमाल कैसे किया? What have you used these loans for? <i>Circle all that apply.</i> जो लागू हो गोला लगायें।	Paying Bills बिल का भुगतान करना	1	
		Business Investment व्यापार में लगाना	2	
		House घर में	3	
		Repay Other Loans किसी दूसरे ऋण को चुकाना	4	
		Child's Expenses/Education बच्चों के खर्च/शिक्षा	5	
		Food भोजन	6	
		Durable Goods काम की वस्तुएं	7	
		Vehicle वाहन	8	
		Marriage शादी	9	
		Medicine/Doctor Bills दवाईयां / डाक्टर के बिल का भुगतान	10	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
10.30	क्या आपको इस ऋण पर नियमित अंतराल पर पैसे देने पड़े? Do or did you have to make regular payments on this loan?	No नहीं	0	→10.33
		Yes हाँ	1	→10.31
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→10.33
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→10.33
10.31	कितने अंतराल पर आपको पैसे देने पड़ते थे? How frequently do or did you have to make payments?	Weekly साप्ताहिक	1	
		Bi-Weekly सप्ताह में दो बार	2	
		Monthly मसिक	3	
		Bi-Monthly महीने में दो बार	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
10.32	लगभग हर बार आपको कितने पैसे	RUPEES रुपए		

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	देने पड़ते हैं या पड़े? How much is/was each payment on average?	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	-998 -999	
10.33	क्या आप अभी इस ऋण को चुका रहे हैं? Are you currently repaying this loan?	No नहीं Yes हाँ Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	0 1 -998 -999	→10.34 →10.36 →10.39 →10.39
10.34	इस ऋण को चुकाने में कुल कितना समय लगा? In total, how long did it take to repay this loan?	NUMBER संख्या Days दिन Weeks हफ्ते Months महीने Years साल Didn't have to repay चुकाने की जरूरत नहीं थी Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 1 2 3 4 -996 -998 -999	 →10.39
10.35	आपने ऋण चुकाने के लिए कुल कितने पैसे दिये, मूल और कर मिलाके? How much did you pay in total to repay the loan (principal + interest)?	RUPEES रुपए Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	 -998 -999	→10.39 →10.39 →10.39
10.36	आपने जब यह ऋण लिया था तब आपको इस ऋण को चुकाने के लिए कितना समय दिया गया? समय जब से ऋण लिया था तब से लागू होगा। How long from the initial borrowing were you given to repay this loan? <i>Time is from initial borrowing</i>	NUMBER संख्या Days दिन Weeks हफ्ते Months महीने Years साल No Time Limit Given कोई समय सीमा नहीं Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> 1 2 3 4 -995 -998 -999	
10.37	आपको ऋण चुकाने के लिए कुल कितने पैसे देने पड़ेंगे?(मूल + कर) How much will you have to pay (principal + interest)?	RUPEES रुपए Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	 -998 -999	
10.38	वर्तमान में, हर प्रकार का ऋण मिलाकर, हर महीने आप ऋण चुकाने के लिए कितने पैसे दे रहे हैं? Currently, how much do you pay per month in loan repayments, including any other loans?	RUPEES रुपए Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	 -998 -999	

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

दिये गये सभी वित्तीय सेवाओं के लिए यह बताइये कि वह प्राप्त करने में आसानी कहाँ है—दिल्ली में है या गाँव में? Where do you think it would be easier for you to receive the following financial services, in Delhi or in the village we discussed earlier? There are no right or wrong answers, we are just interested in your perceptions. कुछ गलत और सही जवाब नहीं होंगे हम सिर्फ आपकी विचारों को जानने के इच्छुक हैं।		Delhi	Village	About the Same	Won't Answer	Don't Know
10.39	बैंक शाखा में बचत खाता चलाना या ऋण लेना Accessing savings and loan services at a bank	1	2	3	-998	-999
10.40	बनिया से ऋण लेना Getting a loan from a moneylender	1	2	3	-998	-999
10.41	रिश्तेदारों और दोस्तों से ऋण या उधार लेना। Getting a loan from a relative or friend	1	2	3	-998	-999
10.42	दूर की जगह में पैसे भेजना या प्राप्त करना Send/receive money from relatively distant places	1	2	3	-998	-999
10.43	यदि आपके पास महीने के अन्त में कुछ पैसे बचते हैं तो उसको अगले 6 महीने तक बचाकर रखना कहाँ आसान होता है? If you had some money left over at the end of the month, where would it be easier to save that amount for the next 6 months?	Delhi दिल्ली	1			
		Village गाँव	2			
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3			
		Won't Answer नहीं बताना	-998			
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			
10.44	सामान्य तौर पर आपके विचार में भविष्य के लिए कुछ बचाना कहाँ ज्यादा आसान है? In general, where do you think it easier for you to make an investment for the future, in cash or kind?	Delhi दिल्ली	1			
		Village गाँव	2			
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3			
		Won't Answer नहीं बताना	-998			
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			
10.45	सामान्य तौर पर आपके विचार में कम ब्याज दर में कहाँ ऋण ले सकते हैं? In general, where do you think you could you get a loan at a lower rate?	Delhi दिल्ली	1			
		Village गाँव	2			
		About the same लगभग एकसमान	3			
		Won't Answer नहीं बताना	-998			
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			

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Section 11. Migration (पलायन)

ध्यान दें— 4.02 में यदि उत्तरदाता का मूल निवास स्थान दिल्ली है तो सीधा 11.i पर जायें, नहीं तो आगे पूछें।

Not Applicable
लागू नहीं
-996 →11.i

If the respondent's place of origin is Delhi in 4.02, then skip to question 11.i. Otherwise, continue.

11.01	क्या आने वाले समय में वापस अपने मूल निवास स्थान जाकर रहना चाहेंगे? Would you want to move back to your place of origin in the future?	No नहीं	0	→11.03
		Yes हाँ	1	→11.02
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→11.03
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→11.03
11.02	आप कब अपने मूल निवास स्थान वापस जाना चाहेंगे ? When would you move back to your place of origin?	Never कभी नहीं	0	
		In less than 5 years 5 साल से कम	1	
		Between 5 and 10 years 5 से 10 साल के बीच में	2	
		10-20 years 10-20 साल	3	
		Over 20 years 20 साल से उपर	4	
		No specific plans, but when possible निश्चित नहीं, पर जब संभव हो	5	
		No specific plans, but when necessary निश्चित नहीं, पर जब जाना पड़े	6	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.03	वह कौन सी तीन चीजें हैं जो आपको मूल निवास स्थान में ज्यादा अच्छी लगती है दिल्ली के मुकाबले में? अहमियत के अनुसार क्रम में रखें। ध्यान दें — नीचे के Comparison कोड देखें। विकल्पों को पढ़कर ना बतायें। In order of importance, what are the three main things that you like about Delhi compared to your place of origin? Caution: Do not prompt	Rank	Code	If Other, specify
		1		_____
		2		_____
		3		_____
11.04	वह कौन सी तीन चीजें हैं जो आपको दिल्ली में अच्छी लगती हैं अपने मूल निवास स्थान के मुकाबले में? अहमियत के अनुसार क्रम में रखें। ध्यान दें — नीचे के कोड Comparison देखें। विकल्पों को पढ़कर ना बतायें। In order of importance, what are the three main things that you like about your place of origin compared to Delhi? Caution: Do not prompt	Rank	Code	
		1		_____
		2		_____
		3		_____
Comparison Codes				
स्कूल/ कॉलेज Schools/Colleges1	वातावरण Environment 9	बिजली सुविधाएं Electricity provision 15		
स्वास्थ्य सुविधाएं Healthcare 2	सही लोगों के बीच रहना Mixing with the "right" people 10	पानी सुविधाएं Water provision 16		
रोजगार Employment 3	खाना Food 11	Having more space और जगह की चाह...17		
परिवहन सेवा Transportation 4	घर आवास Housing 12	ज्यादा आराम More leisure 18		
रिश्तेदारों की मौजूदगी Presence of relatives..... 5	मनोरंजन Entertainment 13	मन मुताबिक काम Preferred work 19		
बच्चों की परवाह Childcare 6	विस्तृत परिवार से दूर अपने मूल परिवार के साथ रहना Living away from extended family, with smaller family 14	कुछ नहीं Nothing -995		
सुरक्षा Security 7		अन्य Other -997		
स्वच्छता/साफा Cleanliness/ Sanitation 8		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer -998		
		पता नहीं Doesn't Know -999		

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

11.i. SEASONAL MIGRATION (मौसमी पलायन)

पिछले 5 साले में क्या आप हर साल कुछ समय खेती या अन्य काम या छुट्टी के लिए अपने मूल निवास स्थान या दिल्ली से बाहर कहीं जाके वहाँ रहते हैं? In the last five years, did you travel to your place of origin or any other location outside Delhi every year and stay for a significant period of time, such as for farming or work?	No नहीं	0	→11.ii
	Yes हाँ	1	→Continue

अब बोलिए—कृपया मुझे बताएं की आप दिल्ली से बाहर किन किन जगहों पर साल में एक महीने के लिए रहते हैं।

Now say: Please tell me about the different places outside Delhi where you live for at least a month every year.

11.i.1. क्र.सं. S.No.	11.i.2. राज्य State	11.i.3. जिला District	11.i.4. जगह के प्रकार Type of place नीचे के कोड देखें ↓	11.i.5. हर साल कौन कौन से महीने वहाँ रहते हैं? हर महीने पे गोला लगाएं। Months in a year Circle each individual month						11.i.6. जाने की वजह Reason for Moving Codes प्रयोग करें, एक से ज्यादा उत्तर आ सकते हैं। Why did they move? Multiple Answers Allowed	11.i.7. वहाँ क्या करते हैं एक से ज्यादा उत्तर आ सकते हैं। Occupation at that place Multiple Answers Allowed
				भारतीय	01	ग्रेगोरियन	02				
1				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12		
2				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12		
3				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12		
4				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12		
5				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12		
6				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12		
7				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12		

TYPE OF PLACE CODES			
Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे.....	1	Delhi – In this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में	5
Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे.....	2	Delhi – Not in this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में नहीं	6
Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका.....	3	अन्य Other	-997
Other (not Delhi) Urban Area कोई अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं).....	4	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998
		पता नहीं Don't Know	-999

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

11.ii. MIGRATION HISTORY

अब बोलिए—कृपया मुझे बताएं की अब तक आप किन किन जगहों पर रह चुके हैं?

ध्यान दें— केवल वही स्थान लिखें जहां वह एक महीने या ज्यादा के लिए रहे हैं या रह रहे हैं। जवाबदेह व्यक्ति को कथात्मक रूप में जवाब देने दें। उसे तभी रोकें यदि कोई जानकारी छूट जाये। हर अलग रहने की स्थिति या हालात के लिए अलग जानकारी लिखें, उदाहरण:— जवाबदेह व्यक्ति गाँव से दिल्ली आता है या उसी शहर में घर बदलता है या बेघर हो जाता है। अगर उन्होंने कभी घर नहीं छोड़ा या अभी वहीं रह रहे हैं तो "जगह क्यों छोड़ी" के स्थान पर '0' लिखें और सीधा प्रश्न 11.06 पूछें।

Now say: Please tell me about the different places you have lived up until now.

Only give locations where lived for a month or more. Try to allow the respondent to reply in narrative form as much as possible, only stopping to ask about specific details that might be missed. A separate entry should be filled for each change in living situation. E.g., if the respondent moved from a village to Delhi, or changed houses in the same city, or became homeless. If they have never moved houses, then mark 0 in the "Why Next Location" column and skip to question 11.06.

11.ii.1. क्रम संख्या SNo	11.ii.2. राज्य State	11.ii.3. जिला / स्थान (दिल्ली में) District/ Place (in Delhi)	11.ii.4. गाँव -1 शहरी-2 Rural/ Urban	11.ii.5. कितने समय रहें 1-दिन 3-महीने 4- साल Time Resident 1- Days 3- Months 4- Years			11.ii.6. उस समय क्या कर रहे थे? What did they do there? Occupation कोड प्रयोग करें।	11.ii.7. किसके साथ रहते थे? People कोड प्रयोग करें। Companions	11.ii.8. घर कैसा था Housing कोड प्रयोग करें। Type of housing	11.ii.9. घर ढूढने / खरीदने / बनाने में किसने मदद की Help Finding/ Purchasing/Building People कोड प्रयोग करें।	11.ii.10. यह जगह क्यों छोड़ी? Reason for Moving कोड प्रयोग करें। Reason for leaving
					1	3	4				
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

HOUSING CODES निवास स्थान के प्रकार	
कोई नहीं (बेघर) None (homeless)	1 फ्लैट Apartment/flat 5
मिश्रित / अस्थायी Mixed/transient	2 बंगला Bungalow 6
टेंट / अस्थायी कैम्प Tent/temporary camp	3 अन्य Other -997
कच्चा घर Kaccha house	4 जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer -998
पक्का घर Pakka house	5 पता नहीं Don't Know -999

11.iii	क्या आप अपने जीवन में किसी भी समय पर सूची में दिए गए जगहों के अलावा किसी जगह पर निवास किया है/कर रहे हैं? Have you at any point in your life lived anywhere else besides the places listed in the roster above?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

उपर दिये गये सूची को पढ़कर सुनायें, और जगहों को फिर उसी सूची में लिखना है।

Read out the places on the roster. Use this question to add periods to the roster above, if necessary.

11.iv	क्या आपने अपने जीवन में कभी भी किसी सार्वजनिक स्थान फुटपाथ, ओवरपास, रेलवे स्टेशन आदि पर लगातार दो दिनों से ज्यादा सोया, खाना पकाया अथवा नहाया है? Have you at any point in your life slept, cooked and bathed in a public space (footpath, overpass, train station, etc.) for two or more consecutive days?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

इस प्रश्न की मदद लेकर बेघर होने की समयअंतराल सूची में भरें, यदि जरूरी हो तो।

Use this question to add periods when the person was homeless to the roster above, if necessary.

उत्तरदाता द्वारा बताये गये जगहों के क्रम को ध्यान देते हुए अब क्रमांक के लिए संख्या डालें।

Now put numbers for SNo, giving the order of places in which the respondent lived.

11.05	सामान्त: एक वर्ष में आप कितने महीने दिल्ली में बिताते/रहते हैं? In an average year, how many months do you live in Delhi?	MONTHS महीने	□ □	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.06	पिछली बार कब आप दिल्ली के बाहर एक हफ्ते से ज्यादा के लिए गए थे? When was the last trip you left Delhi for a week or longer?	NUMBER संख्या	□ □	
		Days Ago दिन पहले	1	
		Weeks Ago हफ्ते पहले	2	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	3	
		Years Ago साल पहले	4	
		Never कभी नहीं	-995	→11.13
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			
11.07	आप कुल कितने समय के लिए गए थे? ध्यान दें—यह सात दिन या ज्यादा के लिए होना चाहिए। How long were you gone in total? Note: This must be more than 7 days. ध्यान दें—7 दिन से ज्यादा	NUMBER संख्या	□ □	
		Days दिन	1	
		Weeks हफ्ते	2	
		Months महीने	3	
		Years साल	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	

ID: -Date: //

		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.08	आप कहाँ गये थे? What was the destination of this trip?	DESTINATION गंतव्य स्थान State		
		District		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.09	बताई गयी जगह को ठीक प्रकार से चिन्हित करें। What type of destination was this? Classify the given location.	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.10	किस कारण आप वहाँ गये थे? ध्यान दें—पढ़कर न बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। What was the purpose of this trip? Circle all that apply.	Seek permanent work स्थायी काम की खोज में	1	
		Seek temporary work अस्थायी काम की खोज में	2	
		Pursue primary or secondary education प्राथमिक या माध्यमिक शिक्षा के लिए	3	
		Pursue post-secondary education माध्यमिक शिक्षा के बाद की पढाई के लिए	4	
		Medical treatment चिकित्सा उपचार	5	
		Delivery बच्चा पैदा करने के लिए	6	
		Visit relatives रिश्तेदारों से मिलने	7	
		Look after business/financial interests धंधा/वित्तीय लाभ को देखने के लिए	8	
		Disagreement with people in Delhi/household दिल्ली/घर में लोगों से टकराव	9	
		To go to a wedding शादी में जाने के लिए	10	
		To get married शादी करने के लिए	11	
		Holiday छुट्टी मनाने के लिए	12	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
ध्यान दें— प्रश्न 11.06 देखें यदि आखिरी बार दिल्ली से बाहर वह एक साल पहले या उससे आगे गये थे तो 11.11 में 00 डालिए और सीधा 11.13 को पूछें। Caution: Check question 11.06 to see if the last trip the person took was a year or more ago. If so, write 00 for 11.11 and skip to question 11.13.				
11.11	पिछले वर्ष आप लगभग कितनी बार दिल्ली के बाहर एक हफ्ते या उससे ज्यादा के लिए गए थे?	TIMES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	00 →11.13
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	

ID: -Date: //

	In the last year, how many times approximately did you leave Delhi for a week or longer at a time?	Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.12	किस महीने आप दिल्ली के बाहर एक हफ्ते या ज्यादा के लिए रहे? ध्यान दें — पढ़कर न बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। Which months did you spend a week or more outside of Delhi? <i>Circle all that apply and all that they remember.</i>	January जनवरी	1	
		February फरवरी	2	
		March मार्च	3	
		April अप्रैल	4	
		May मई	5	
		June जून	6	
		July जुलाई	7	
		August अगस्त	8	
		September सितम्बर	9	
		October अक्टूबर	10	
		November नवम्बर	11	
		December दिसम्बर	12	
		Don't remember all सभी याद नहीं	13	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			

11.13	दिल्ली में रहते हुए दिल्ली (एन.सी.टी.) के बाहर काम किया है? Since living in Delhi (NCT), have you worked outside of Delhi, including adjoining areas? ध्यान दें — गुडगांव, नोएडा, फरीदाबाद, गाजियाबाद जैसे जुड़े हुए जगहों में काम किया है तो भी हाँ में गोला लगायें। <i>Limit Delhi to NCT and leave out adjoining areas for now.</i>	No नहीं	0	→11.18
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→11.18
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→11.18
11.14	दिल्ली में रहते हुए दिल्ली (एन.सी.टी.) से बाहर आपने किस जगह में काम किया है? Where have you worked outside Delhi, including adjoining areas like Gurgaon and Noida? ध्यान दें —यदि काम छोड़ दिया है, तो कब छोड़ा वह बताएं। <i>Circle all that apply.</i>	Gurgaon गुडगांव	1	
		Noida नोएडा	2	
		Faridabad फरीदाबाद	3	
		Ghaziabad गाजियाबाद	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
11.15	दिल्ली से बाहर आपने पिछली बार कितने समय पहले काम किया था? When was the last time you worked outside Delhi? ध्यान दें —यदि काम छोड़ दिया है, तो कब शुरू किया था वह बताएं। <i>If they have left that job, then indicate when did they left that particular job</i>		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	एक साल से ज्यादा है तो →11.18
		Days Ago दिन पहले	1	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	3	
		Years Ago सालों पहले	4	
		Never कभी नहीं	-995	→11.18
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999					
11.16	पिछले साल आपने दिल्ली के अलावा कितने अलग-अलग जगहों पर काम किया था ? In the last year, how many different places have you worked besides Delhi?	PLACES जगह	□□	00 →11.18				
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998		→11.18			
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999		→11.18			
11.17	पिछले 12 महीनों के किन महीनों में आपने दिल्ली में काम किया और किनमें आपने कहीं और काम किया? In the last 12 months, which months did you work in Delhi, and which months did you work elsewhere?	Delhi (NCT) दिल्ली (एन.सी.टी.)	Else-where दिल्ली से बाहर	Both दोनों	Didn't Work काम नहीं किया	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	Don't Know पता नहीं	
		जनवरी January	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		फरवरी February	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		मार्च March	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		अप्रैल April	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		मई May	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		जून June	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		जुलाई July	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		अगस्त August	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		सितम्बर September	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		अक्टूबर October	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		नवम्बर November	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		दिसम्बर December	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
11.18	क्या आप शादी शुदा हैं? ध्यान दें—पीछे भरे गए रोस्टर को देखकर पता लगायें कि वह शादी शुदा हैं या नहीं। और अगर नहीं है तो ये पूछें कि कभी उनकी शादी हुयी थी। वह शादीशुदा थे और अब नहीं हैं तो उसका कारण पूछें। Are you married or have you ever been married? Look back at roster to determine if they are currently married. If not, ask if they have ever been married. If they were and are not now, ask the reason they are no longer married.	Never married कभी शादी नहीं हुई	0					→ Section 12
		Married (formal/informal) शादी शुदा (औपचारिक / अनऔपचारिक)	1					→ 11.19
		Widow/ widower विधवा / विदुर	2					→ 11.22
		Divorced/ Separated तलाक शुदा / अलग	3					→ 11.22
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998					→ 11.22
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999					→ 11.22
11.19	क्या आपकी पत्नी / पति आपके साथ दिल्ली में रहते / रहती हैं? Does your spouse live with you in Delhi?	No नहीं	0					→ 11.20
		Yes हाँ	1					→ 11.22
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998					→ 11.22
11.20	वह अधिकतर कहाँ रहती / रहते है?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1					

Baseline-II Relative Migration History

ID: □□□□-□□□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

	Where do they live mostly?	Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Elsewhere in Delhi दिल्ली में कहीं और	5	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.21	कितने अंतराल पर आपकी पत्नी/पति आपसे मिलने दिल्ली आता/आती हैं। ध्यान दें— पढ़कर बतायें। How frequently does your spouse visit you in Delhi? Read out the options.	Once a week हफ्ते में एक बार	1	
		Once a month महीने में एक बार	2	
		Once a year साल में एक बार	3	
		Less than once a year साल में एक बार से कम	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

11.22	आपके कितने बच्चे हैं? How many living children do you have?	CHILDREN बच्चे	□ □	00 → Section 12
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.23	आपके कितने बच्चे आपके साथ रहते हैं? How many of your children live with you in Delhi?	CHILDREN बच्चे	□ □	
		All of them सभी	-995	If all → Section 12
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.24	आपके कितने बच्चे दिल्ली में रहते हैं, पर आपके साथ नियमित तौर पर नहीं रहते? How many of your children live in Delhi, but do not regularly reside with you?	CHILDREN बच्चे	□ □	
		All of them सभी	-995	If all → 11.26
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
11.25	जो दिल्ली में नहीं रहते हैं वह कहाँ कहाँ हैं? Of those who do not live in Delhi, how many live in each of the following places?		संख्या	
		Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	□ □	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	□ □	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	□ □	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	□ □	
		Other अन्य	□ □	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	□ □	
Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998			
11.26	आने वाले साल के अंदर आपके कितने और बच्चे आपके पास आकर रह सकते हैं? How many of your children do you expect to join you here within the next year?	CHILDREN बच्चे	□ □	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

Randomization Roster of Non-direct Relatives

ध्यान दें—घर के उन सभी लोगों के नाम लिखें जो कि उत्तरादाता के सीधे रिश्तेदार नहीं है और 18 साल से ज्यादा उम्र के हैं और जो अभी घर में रह रहे हैं। यह हम कह सकते हैं कि 18 साल से उपर के सब लोगों के लिए है जिनके लिए 1.06 या 2.06 में जबाव "नहीं" मिला हो रोस्टर 1 और 2 में।

List members of the household who are not direct relatives of the head of the household/respondent AND who are still living in the household AND who are above age 18, in other words, for members for whom 1.06 or 2.06 are answered "No" on the HH rosters.

आगे दिये गये डिब्बे को चिन्हित करें यदि कोई भी नॉन डाइरेक्ट रिलेटिव (सीधा रिश्तेदार नहीं हो) घर में ना रहा हो। Check here if respondent has no non-direct relatives who have stayed in the house.	<input type="checkbox"/>
नाम Name of Person Selected:	_____

क्र.सं. S.No.	M-ID	Selection (✓) 'इनडाइरेक्ट' रिश्तेदार Relative Migration
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		-
9		
10		
11		
12		

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

Section 12: Migration (पलायन)

नॉन-डायरेक्ट रिलेटिव (जो की सीधे रिश्तेदार नहीं हैं) वाला रेन्डोमाइजेशन रोस्टर देखें जो कि आपने भरा है। यदि उत्तरदाता का कोई नॉन-डायरेक्ट रिलेटिव नहीं है जो कि उसके घर में रहा हो और 18 साल से ज्यादा उम्र का हो तो फिर ये सेक्सन ना पूछें। यदि ऐसा कोई है तो रोस्टर में देखें कि किस-किस के नाम के सामने चिन्हित किया गया है। और यदि चिन्हित किया गया आदमी घर में मौजूद है तो सेक्सन 12 पूछें जब आप पूरा सर्वेक्षण कर लें और यदि वो मौजूद नहीं है तो पूछें वह कब वापस आयेंगे और मिलने का समय लें।

Consult the randomization roster of non-direct relatives that you completed. If the respondent has no non-direct relatives who live in the household and are above the age of 18, then skip section 12. If they do, look to see which indirect relative has a check in the selection column and their name as selected. If the person is present in the household, carry out section 12 after you have completed the rest of the survey. If they are not present, then ask when they will return, and set up an appointment to meet with them.

12.01	क्या आप अपने आप को दिल्ली का निवासी मानते हैं? Do you consider yourself to be a resident of Delhi?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.02	आप किस राज्य के मूल निवासी हैं? In which state is your place of origin?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	→12.04
		Uttar Pradesh उत्तर प्रदेश	2	→12.03
		Haryana हरियाणा	3	→12.03
		Madhya Pradesh मध्य प्रदेश	4	→12.03
		Bihar बिहार	5	→12.03
		Rajasthan राजस्थान	6	→12.03
		West Bengal पश्चिम बंगाल	7	→12.03
		Punjab पंजाब	8	→12.03
		Other अन्य	-997	→12.03
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→12.04
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→12.04		
12.03	आप किस जिले के मूल निवासी हैं? In which district is your place of origin?	DISTRICT जिला	_____	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.04	आपका जन्म वहीं हुआ था? Were you born there?	No	0	
		Yes	1	→12.07
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.05	आपका जन्म किस राज्य में हुआ था? In which state were you born?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	→12.07
		Uttar Pradesh उत्तर प्रदेश	2	→12.06
		Haryana हरियाणा	3	→12.06
		Madhya Pradesh मध्य प्रदेश	4	→12.06
		Bihar बिहार	5	→12.06
		Rajasthan राजस्थान	6	→12.06
		West Bengal पश्चिम बंगाल	7	→12.06
		Punjab पंजाब	8	→12.06
		Other अन्य	-997	→12.06
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→12.07
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→12.07		
12.06	आपका जन्म किस जिले में हुआ था? In which district were you born?	DISTRICT जिला	_____	
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999
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ध्यान दें— 12.02 में यदि उत्तरदाता का मूल निवास स्थान दिल्ली है तो सीधा 12.11 पर जायें, नहीं तो आगे पूछें।
Interviewer Checkpoint: *If the respondent's place of origin is Delhi, then skip to question 12.11. Otherwise, continue.*

12.07	क्या आने वाले समय में वापस अपने मूल निवास स्थान जाकर रहना चाहेंगे? Would you want to move back to your place of origin in the future?	No नहीं Yes हाँ Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	0 1 -998 -999	→12.09 →12.08 →12.09 →12.09
12.08	आप कब अपने मूल निवास स्थान वापस जाना चाहेंगे ? When would you move back to your place of origin?	Never कभी नहीं In less than 5 years 5 साल से कम Between 5 and 10 years 5 से 10 साल के बीच में 10-20 years 10-20 साल Over 20 years 20 साल से उपर No specific plans, but when possible निश्चित नहीं, पर जब संभव हो No specific plans, but when necessary निश्चित नहीं, पर जब जाना पड़े Other अन्य Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया Don't Know पता नहीं	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 -997 -998 -999	
12.09	वह कौन सी तीन चीजें हैं जो आपको मूल निवास स्थान में ज्यादा अच्छी लगती है दिल्ली के मुकाबले में? अहमियत के अनुसार क्रम में रखें। ध्यान दें— नीचे के Comparison कोड देखें। विकल्पों को पढ़कर ना बतायें। In order of importance, what are the three main things that you like about Delhi compared to your place of origin? Caution: Do not prompt	Rank 1 2 3	Code	If Other, specify
12.10	वह कौन सी तीन चीजें हैं जो आपको दिल्ली में अच्छी लगती हैं अपने मूल निवास स्थान के मुकाबले में? अहमियत के अनुसार क्रम में रखें। ध्यान दें— नीचे के कोड Comparison देखें। विकल्पों को पढ़कर ना बतायें। In order of importance, what are the three main things that you like about your place of origin compared to Delhi? Caution: Do not prompt	Rank 1 2 3	Code	
Comparison Codes				
स्कूल / कलेज Schools/Colleges.....1	वातावरण Environment9	Water पानी.....16		
स्वास्थ्य सुविधाएं Healthcare2	Surrounding/mixing with the "right" people अगल बदल के लोग/सही लोगों के बीच रहना.....10	Having more space और जगह की चाह.....17		
रोजगार Employment3	Food खाना.....11	More leisure ज्यादा आराम.....18		
परिवहन सेवा Transportation4	Housing आवास.....12	Preferred work मन मुताबिक काम19		
रिश्तेदारों की मौजूदगी Presence of relatives 5	Entertainment मनोरंजन.....13	Nothing कुछ नहीं -995		
बच्चों की परवाह Childcare6	Living away from extended family, with smaller familyविस्तृत परिवार से दूर,अपने मूल परिवार के साथ रहना.....14	Other अन्य.....-997		
सुरक्षा Security7	Electricity बिजली.....15	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया.....-998		
Cleanliness/ Sanitation सफा / स्वच्छता 8		Doesn't Know पता नहीं.....-999		

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

12.11	अगर जिस परिवार के साथ आप रहते हैं वह दिल्ली के बाहर किसी ग्रामीण इलाके में चले जायें तो आप भी वहां रहने जायेंगे? Would you move to stay with this household if they moved outside Delhi to a rural location?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.12	अगर जिस परिवार के साथ आप रहते हैं वह दिल्ली के बाहर किसी शहरी इलाके में चले जायें तो आप भी वहां रहने जायेंगे? Would you move to stay with this household if they moved outside Delhi to a urban location?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

12.i. SEASONAL MIGRATION (मौसमी पलायन)

पिछले 5 साले में क्या आप हर साल कुछ समय खेती या अन्य काम या छुट्टी के लिए अपने मूल निवास स्थान या दिल्ली से बाहर कहीं जाके वहाँ रहते है? In the last five years, did you travel to your place of origin or any other location outside Delhi every year and stay for a significant period of time, such as for farming or work?	No नहीं	0	→12.ii
	Yes हाँ	1	→Continue

अब बोलिए—कृपया मुझे बताएं की आप दिल्ली से बाहर किन किन जगहों पर साल में एक महीने के लिए रहते हैं।

Now say: Please tell me about the different places outside Delhi where you live for at least a month every year.

12.i.1. क्र.सं. S.No.	12.i.2. राज्य State	12.i.3. जिला District	12.i.4. जगह के प्रकार Type of place नीचे के कोड देखें ↓	12.i.5. हर साल कौन कौन से महीने वहाँ रहते हैं? हर महीने पे गोला लगाएं। Months in a year Circle each individual month						12.i.6. जाने की वजह Reason for Moving Codes प्रयोग करें, एक से ज्यादा उत्तर आ सकते हैं। Why did they move? Multiple Answers Allowed	12.i.7. वहाँ क्या करते हैं एक से ज्यादा उत्तर आ सकते हैं। Occupation at that place Multiple Answers Allowed
				भारतीय	01	ग्रेगोरियन	02				
1				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12	_____	_____
2				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12	_____	_____
3				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12	_____	_____
4				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12	_____	_____
5				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12	_____	_____
6				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12	_____	_____
7				01	02	03	04	05	06		
				07	08	09	10	11	12	_____	_____

TYPE OF PLACE CODES		
Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे.....	1	Delhi – In this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में 5
Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे.....	2	Delhi – Not in this basti दिल्ली, इस बस्ती में नहीं 6
Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका.....	3	अन्य Other -997
Other (not Delhi) Urban Area कोइ अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं).....	4	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer -998
		पता नहीं Don't Know -999

ID: □□□-□□

Date: □□/□□/□□□□

12.ii. MIGRATION HISTORY

अब बोलिए—कृपया मुझे बताएं की अब तक आप किन किन जगहों पर रह चुके हैं?
ध्यान दें— केवल वही स्थान लिखें जहां वह एक महीने या ज्यादा के लिए रहे हैं या रह रहे हैं। जवाबदेह व्यक्ति को कथात्मक रूप में जवाब देने दें। उसे तभी रोकें यदि कोई जानकारी छूट जाये। हर अलग रहने की स्थिति या हालात के लिए अलग जानकारी लिखें, उदाहरण:- जबाबदेह व्यक्ति गाँव से दिल्ली आता है या उसी शहर में घर बदलता है या बेघर हो जाता है। अगर उन्होंने कभी घर नहीं छोड़ा या अभी वहीं रह रहे हैं तो "जगह क्यों छोड़ी" के स्थान पर '0' लिखें और सीधा प्रश्न 12.06 पूछें।
Now say: Please tell me about the different places you have lived up until now.
Only give locations where lived for a month or more. Try to allow the respondent to reply in narrative form as much as possible, only stopping to ask about specific details that might be missed. A separate entry should be filled for each change in living situation. E.g., if the respondent moved from a village to Delhi, or changed houses in the same city, or became homeless. If they have never moved houses, then mark 0 in the "Why Next Location" column and skip to question 11.06.

12.ii.1. क्रम संख्या SNo	12.ii.2. राज्य State	12.ii.3. जिला / स्थान (दिल्ली में) District/ Place (in Delhi)	12.ii.4. गाँव -1 शहरी-2 Rural/ Urban	12.ii.5. कितने समय रहें 1- दिन 3- महीने 4- साल Time Resident 1- Days 3- Months 4- Years			12.ii.6. उस समय क्या कर रहे थे? What did they do there? Occupation कोड प्रयोग करें।	12.ii.7. किसके साथ रहते थे? People कोड प्रयोग करें। Companions	12.ii.8. घर कैसा था Housing कोड प्रयोग करें। Type of housing	12.ii.9. घर ढूढने / खरीदने / बनाने में किसने मदद की Help Finding/ Purchasing/Building People कोड प्रयोग करें।	12.ii.10. यह जगह क्यों छोड़ी? Reason for Moving कोड प्रयोग करें। Reason for leaving
					1	3	4				
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		
					1	3	4		□□□ □□□		

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

HOUSING CODES निवास स्थान के प्रकार			
कोई नहीं (बेघर) None (homeless)	1	फ्लैट Apartment/flat	5
मिश्रित / अस्थायी Mixed/transient	2	बंगला Bungalow	6
टेंट / अस्थायी कैंप Tent/temporary camp	3	अन्य Other	-997
कच्चा घर Kaccha house	4	जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998
पक्का घर Pakka house	5	पता नहीं Don't Know	-999

12.iii	क्या आप अपने जीवन में किसी भी समय पर सूची में दिए गए जगहों के अलावा किसी जगह पर निवास किया है/कर रहे हैं? Have you at any point in your life lived anywhere else besides the places listed in the roster above?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

उपर दिये गये सूची को पढ़कर सुनायें, और जगहों को फिर उसी सूची में लिखना है।

Read out the places on the roster. Use this question to add periods to the roster above, if necessary.

12.iv	क्या आपने अपने जीवन में कभी भी किसी सार्वजनिक स्थान फुटपाथ, ओवरपास, रेलवे स्टेशन आदि पर लगातार दो दिनों से ज्यादा सोया, खाना पकाया अथवा नहाया है? Have you at any point in your life slept, cooked and bathed in a public space (footpath, overpass, train station, etc.) for two or more consecutive days?	No नहीं	0	
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

इस प्रश्न की मदद लेकर बेघर होने की समयअंतराल सूची में भरें, यदि जरूरी हो तो।

Use this question to add periods when the person was homeless to the roster above, if necessary.

उत्तरदाता द्वारा बताये गये जगहों के क्रम को ध्यान देते हुए अब क्रमांक के लिए संख्या डालें।

Now put numbers for SNo, giving the order of places in which the respondent lived.

12.13	सामान्तः एक वर्ष में आप कितने महीने दिल्ली में बिताते/रहते हैं? In an average year, how many months do you live in Delhi?	MONTHS महीने	□ □	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.14	पिछली बार कब आप दिल्ली के बाहर एक हफ्ते से ज्यादा के लिए गए थे? When was the last trip you took outside of Delhi for a week or longer?	NUMBER संख्या	□ □	
		Days Ago दिन पहले	1	
		Weeks Ago हफ्ते पहले	2	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	3	
		Years Ago साल पहले	4	
		Never कभी नहीं	-995	→12.21
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			
12.15	आप कुल कितने समय के लिए गए थे? ध्यान दें—यह सात दिन या ज्यादा के लिए होना चाहिए। How long were you gone in total? Note: This must be more than 7 days ध्यान दें—7दिन से ज्यादा	NUMBER संख्या	□ □	
		Days दिन	1	
		Weeks हफ्ते	2	
		Months महीने	3	
		Years साल	4	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	

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		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.16	आप कहां गये थे? What was the destination of this trip?	DESTINATION गंतव्य स्थान State		
		District		
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.17	निर्देश – बताई गयी जगह को ठीक प्रकार से चिन्हित करें। What type of destination was this?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	1	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	2	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.18	किस कारण आप वहां गये थे? ध्यान दें —पढ़कर न बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। What was the purpose of this trip? <i>Circle all that apply.</i>	Seek permanent work स्थायी काम की खोज में	1	
		Seek temporary work अस्थायी काम की खोज में	2	
		Pursue primary or secondary education प्राथमिक या माध्यमिक शिक्षा के लिए	3	
		Pursue post-secondary education माध्यमिक शिक्षा के बाद की पढाई के लिए	4	
		Medical treatment चिकित्सा उपचार	5	
		Delivery बच्चा पैदा करने के लिए	6	
		Visit relatives रिश्तेदारों से मिलने	7	
		Look after business/financial interests धंधा/वित्तीय लाभ को देखने के लिए	8	
		Disagreement with people in Delhi/household दिल्ली/घर में लोगों से टकराव	9	
		To go to a wedding शादी में जाने के लिए	10	
		To get married शादी करने	11	
		Holiday छुट्टी मनाने	12	
		Other अन्य	-997	
Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998			
Don't Know पता नहीं	-999			
ध्यान दें — प्रश्न 12.14 देखें यदि आखिरी बार दिल्ली से बाहर वह एक साल पहले या उससे आगे गये थे तो 12.19 में 00 डालिए और सीधा 12.21 को पूछें।				
Caution: Check question 12.14 to see if the last trip the person took was a year or more ago. If so, write 00 for 12.19 and skip to question 12.21.				
12.19	पिछले वर्ष आप लगभग कितनी बार दिल्ली के बाहर एक हफ्ते या उससे	TIMES	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	00 → 12.21

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	ज्यादा के लिए गए थे? In the last year, how many times approximately did you leave Delhi for a week or longer at a time?	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.20	किस महीने आप दिल्ली के बाहर एक हफ्ते या ज्यादा के लिए रहे? ध्यान दें— पढकर न बतायें। लागू सभी विकल्पों में गोला लगायें। Which months did you spend a week or more outside of Delhi? Circle all that apply	January जनवरी	1	
		February फरवरी	2	
		March मार्च	3	
		April अप्रैल	4	
		May मई	5	
		June जून	6	
		July जुलाई	7	
		August अगस्त	8	
		September सितम्बर	9	
		October अक्टूबर	10	
		November नवम्बर	11	
		December दिसम्बर	12	
		Don't remember all सभी याद नहीं	13	
		जवाब नहीं दिया Won't Answer	-998	
		पता नहीं Don't Remember	-999	

12.21	दिल्ली में रहते हुए दिल्ली (एन.सी.टी.) बाहर काम किया ह? Since living in Delhi (NCT), have you worked outside of Delhi, including adjoining areas? ध्यान दें— गुडगांव, नोएडा, फरीदाबाद, गाजियाबाद जैसे जुड़े हुए जगहों में काम किया है तो भी हाँ में गोला लगायें। Limit Delhi to NCT and leave out adjoining areas for now.	No नहीं	0	→12.26
		Yes हाँ	1	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	→12.26
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	→12.26
12.22	दिल्ली में रहते हुए दिल्ली (एन.सी.टी.) से बाहर आपने किस जगह में काम किया है? Where have you worked outside Delhi, including adjoining areas like Gurgaon and Noida? ध्यान दें—यदि काम छोड़ दिया है, तो कब छोड़ा वह बताएं। Circle all that apply.	Gurgaon गुडगांव	1	
		Noida नोएडा	2	
		Faridabad फरीदाबाद	3	
		Ghaziabad गाजियाबाद	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	

		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.23	दिल्ली से बाहर आपने पिछली बार कितने समय पहले काम किया था? When was the last time you worked outside Delhi? ध्यान दें—यदि काम छोड़ दिया है, तो कब शुरू किया था वह बताएं। If they have left that job, then indicate when did they left that particular job		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	एक साल से ज्यादा है तो →12.26
		Days Ago दिन पहले	1	
		Months Ago महीने पहले	3	
		Years Ago सालों पहले	4	
		Never कभी नहीं	-995	→12.26
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	

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Date: □□/□□/□□□□

		Don't Know पता नहीं		-999				
12.24	पिछले साल आपने दिल्ली के अलावा कितने अलग-अलग जगहों पर काम किया था ? In the last year, how many different places have you worked besides Delhi?	PLACES जगह		□□	00 →12.26			
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया		-998	→12.26			
		Don't Know पता नहीं		-999	→12.26			
12.25	पिछले 12 महीनों के किन महीनों में आपने दिल्ली में काम किया और किनमें आपने कहीं और काम किया? In the last 12 months, which months did you work in Delhi, and which months did you work elsewhere?	Month	Delhi दिल्ली	Else-where दिल्ली से बाहर	Both दोनों	Didn't Work काम नहीं किया	Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	Don't Know पता नहीं
		जनवरी January	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		फरवरी February	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		मार्च March	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		अप्रैल April	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		मई May	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		जून June	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		जुलाई July	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		अगस्त August	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		सितम्बर September	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		अक्टूबर October	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		नवम्बर November	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
		दिसम्बर December	1	2	3	4	-998	-999
12.26	क्या आप शादी शुदा हैं? ध्यान दें—पीछे भरे गए रोस्टर को देखकर पता लगायें कि वह शादी शुदा हैं या नहीं। और अगर नहीं है तो ये पूछें कि कभी उनकी शादी हुयी थी। वह शादीशुदा थे और अब नहीं हैं तो उसका कारण पूछें। Are you married or have you ever been married? Look back at roster to determine if they are currently married. If not, ask if they have ever been married. If they were and are not now, ask the reason they are no longer married.	Never married कभी शादी नहीं हुई		0			→ end	
		Married (formal/informal) शादी शुदा (औपचारिक/अनऔपचारिक)		1			→ 12.27	
		Widow/ widower विधवा/विदुर		2			→ 12.30	
		Divorced/ Separated तलाक शुदा/अलग		3			→ 12.30	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया		-998			→ 12.30	
		Don't Know पता नहीं		-999			→ 12.30	
12.27	क्या आपकी पत्नी/पति आपके साथ दिल्ली में रहते/रहती हैं? Does your spouse live with you in Delhi?	No नहीं		0			→ 12.28	
		Yes हाँ		1			→ 12.30	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया		-998			→ 12.30	
12.28	वो अधिकतर कहाँ रहती/रहते है? Where do they live mostly?	Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे		1				
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से		2				

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		आए थे		
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	3	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	4	
		Elsewhere in Delhi दिल्ली में कहीं और	5	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.29	कितने अंतराल पर आपकी पत्नी/पति आपसे मिलने दिल्ली आता/आती हैं। ध्यान दें— पढ़कर बतायें। How frequently does your spouse visit you in Delhi? Read out the options.	Once a week हफ्ते में एक बार	1	
		Once a month महीने में एक बार	2	
		Once a year साल में एक बार	3	
		Less than once a year साल में एक बार से कम	4	
		Other अन्य	-997	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.30	आपके कितने बच्चे हैं? How many living children do you have?	CHILDREN बच्चे	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	00 → end
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.31	आपके कितने बच्चे दिल्ली में रहते हैं, पर आपके साथ नियमित तौर पर नहीं रहते? How many of your children live in Delhi, but do not regularly reside with you?	CHILDREN बच्चे	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		All of them सभी	-995	If all →12.33
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	
12.32	जो दिल्ली में नहीं रहते हैं वह कहाँ कहाँ हैं? Of those who do not live in Delhi, how many live in each of the following places?	संख्या		
		Place of origin (Rural) जिस गाँव से आए थे	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Place of origin (Urban) जिस शहर से आए थे	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Other Rural Area अन्य ग्रामीण इलाका	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Other (not Delhi) Urban Area अन्य शहरी इलाका (दिल्ली नहीं)	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Other अन्य	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
12.33	आने वाले साल के अंदर आपके कितने और बच्चे आपके पास आकर रह सकते हैं? How many of your children do you expect to join you here within the next year?	CHILDREN बच्चे	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
		Won't Answer जवाब नहीं दिया	-998	
		Don't Know पता नहीं	-999	

इस सेक्शन में हम आपसे जुड़ी कुछ सामान्य बातें पूछेंगे।

Section 1: Respondent's Personal Information

1.01	What is your name? आपका नाम क्या है?	
1.02	How old are you? आप कितने साल के हैं?	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> वर्ष
1.03	Relationship to Head of Household (He/She is my...) घर के मुखिया से संबंध (वह मेरा/मेरी....है)	<input type="text"/>
1.04	Are you married? क्या आप शादी-शुदा हैं?	हाँ 1.
		नहीं 2.
1.05	Highest Education Completed उच्चतम शिक्षा प्राप्त	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
केवल एक	** Education Code का प्रयोग करें।** ** पूछें: क्या कक्षा पास की है**	अन्य <input type="text"/>

Relationship Codes

00 – Self	00 – स्वयं	11 — Mother's Father	11 — नाना	21 – Cousin	21 – चचेरे/ममेरे भाई-बहन
01 – Father	01 – पिता	12 – Mother's Mother	12 – नानी	22 – Nephew	22 – भतीजा
02 – Mother	02 – माता	13 – Father's Brother	13 – चाचा/ताऊ	23 – Niece	23 – भतीजी
03 – Husband	03 – पति	14 – Father's Sister	14 – बुआ/फूफी	24 – Father-in-Law	24 – ससुर
04 – Wife	04 – पत्नि	15 – Father's Sister's Husband	15 – फूफा	25 – Mother-in-Law	25 – सास
05 – Brother	05 – भाई	16 – Father's Brother's Wife	16 – चाची/ताई	26 – Son-in-Law	26 – दामाद
06 – Sister	06 – बहन	17 – Mother's Brother	17 – मामा	27- Brother-in-Law	27 – साला
07 – Son	07 – बेटा	18 – Mother's Sister	18 – मौसी/खाला	28- Daughter-in-Law	28 – बहू
08 – Daughter	08 – बेटी	19 – Mother's Sister's Husband	19 – मौसा/खालू	29- Sister-in-Law	29 – साली
09 – Father's Father	09 – दादा	20 – Mother's Brother's Wife	20 – मामी	.a. Other	.a. अन्य
10 – Father's Mother	10 – दादी			.b. Won't Answer	.b. जवाब नहीं दिया
				.c. Doesn't Know	.c. पता नहीं

Education Codes

00 - Never been to school	00 – कभी स्कूल नहीं गया	09 – Standard IX	09 – कक्षा IX	97 – Completed Bachelor's	97 – स्नातक
01 – Standard I	01 – कक्षा I	10 – Standard X	10 – कक्षा X	98 – Post-Graduate continue/incomplete	98 – उच्च स्नातक पूरा नहीं हुआ है
02 – Standard II	02 – कक्षा II	11 – Standard XI	11 – कक्षा XI	99 – Completed Post-Graduate	99 – उच्च शिक्षा पूरी हो गई
03 – Standard III	03 – कक्षा III	12 – Standard XII	12 – कक्षा XII	.a. Other	.a. अन्य
04 – Standard IV	04 – कक्षा IV	91 – Diploma	91 – डिप्लोमा	.b. Won't Answer	.b. जवाब नहीं दिया
05 – Standard V	05 – कक्षा V	92 – Balwadi	92 – बालवाड़ी	.c. Doesn't Know	.c. पता नहीं
06 – Standard VI	06 – कक्षा VI	93 – Anganwadi	93 – आँगनवाड़ी		
07 – Standard VII	07 – कक्षा VII	94 – LKG/Nursery	94 – LKG/Nursery		
08 – Standard VIII	08 – कक्षा VIII	95 – UKG/Prep	95 – UKG/Prep		
		96 – Bachelor's continue/incomplete	96 – स्नातक पूरा नहीं हुआ है		

Section 1: Respondent's Personal Information

1.06	If employed, what is your primary occupation? यदि आप काम करते हैं तो मुख्य व्यवसाय क्या है? ** Occupation Code का प्रयोग करें।**	0 → Section 2 1 → Section 2	
केवल एक			OccupationCode: <input style="width: 30px; height: 20px;" type="text"/> <input style="width: 30px; height: 20px;" type="text"/>
1.07	How many months did you work in the last year आपने पिछले साल में कितने महीने काम किया?		
1.08	How many days do you work in a month usually (when working) महीने में , आपको कितने दिन काम मिलता है (जब काम कर रहे हों)?		
1.09	How much money do you make? आप कितने पैसे कमा लेते हैं?		<input style="width: 60px; height: 25px;" type="text"/> रुपये <input type="checkbox"/> दैनिक <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य विवरण

Occupation Codes

00 - Unemployed 01 - Housewife/homemaker <u>Unskilled laborers</u> 02 - Guard 03 - Cleaner/Maid 04 - Cook 05 - Other Domestic Worker 06 - Shop Worker (Employee) 07 - Petty Trader, Vendor or Hawker (in a market or with a cart) 08 - Daily Manual Labor (Construction, Coolie, etc.) 09 - Farmer/Agricultural Laborer 10 - Stitching 11 - Factory Worker 12 - Rickshaw Puller 13 - Waiter (In a dhaba) 14 - Beggar 15 - Rag picker/Trash picker <u>Skilled Laborer</u> 16 - Driver 17 - Mechanic 18 - Carpenter 19 - Tailor 20 - Electrician 21 - Cobbler 22 - Plumber 23 - Printer 24 - Painter	25 - Skilled Construction Worker/Contractor 26 - Musician/Artist 27 - Waiter (In a hotel) <u>Office Workers</u> 27 - Anganwadi Teacher 28 - Government Schoolteacher 29 - Private Schoolteacher 30 - NGO Schoolteacher 31 - Government Nurse 32 - Other Government Healthworker 33 - Private Nurse 34 - Other Private Healthworker 35 - NGO Nurse 36 - Other NGO Healthworker 37 - Government Clerk (i.e. sitting at a desk) 38 - Other Government Office Worker (i.e. peon) 39 - Other NGO Worker 40 - Shopkeeper 41 - Army 42 - Police (Constable, SHO, etc.) 43 - Agent 44 - Salesman .a. Other .b. Won't Answer .c. Doesn't Know	HELP CODES 0. Nobody 1. Relatives 2. Friends 3. Caste group 4. Neighbor 5. Pradhan 6. Agent 7. Employer 8. NGO 9. Private Company 10. Elected official a. Councilor (MCD) b. MLA c. MP 11. Police 12. Government Employees (not elected) 13. Lawyer/solicitor/legal aid .a. Other .b. Won't Answer .c. Doesn't Know
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इस खंड में हम आपसे कुछ सामान्य प्रश्न पूछेंगे। आपके क्षेत्र से जुड़ी परेशानियों के बारे में पहले हम उन परेशानी के बारे में पूछेंगे जिनका आपने या आपके घर के सदस्य ने सामाना किया हो, फिर हम उन परेशानियों के बारे में पूछेंगे जो आपके क्षेत्र से जुड़ी हैं।

Section 2: Local Area Development Issues

खंड 2: स्थानीय विकास की समस्याएँ

Now I would like to ask you some general questions about problems you've noticed in your community. First I'll start by asking about questions you or members of your household have personally faced, then I will ask about problems which exist in your community.

2.01	In which areas have you personally faced problems in the last year? पिछले साल आपको किन-किन मुद्दों में समस्याओं का सामना करना पड़ा? अनेक Circle all that apply. Do not prompt. जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।	Water पानी	1.	
		Electricity बिजली	2.	
		Sewage मल निकासी	3.	
		Garbage Removal कचड़े को हटाना	4.	
		Education शिक्षा	5.	
		Health स्वास्थ्य	6.	
		Rations राशन	7.	
		Pension पेंशन	8.	
		Law and Order/Crime कानून व्यवस्था/अपराध	9.	
		.a. अन्य _____	a.	
.b. जवाब नहीं दिया	b.			
.c. पता नहीं	c.			
2.02	Which of the following areas are problematic for this community (not just your household)? कौनसी समस्याएँ आपके समुदाय के लिये समस्याजनक हैं? (केवल आपके परिवार के लिए नहीं) अनेक Circle all that apply. Do not prompt. जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।	Water पानी	1.	
		Electricity बिजली	2.	
		Sewage मल निकासी	3.	
		Garbage Removal कचड़े को हटाना	4.	
		Education शिक्षा	5.	
		Health स्वास्थ्य	6.	
		Rations राशन	7.	
		Pension पेंशन	8.	
		Law and Order/Crime कानून व्यवस्था/अपराध	9.	
		.a. अन्य _____	a.	
.b. जवाब नहीं दिया	b.			
.c. पता नहीं	c.			
2.03	Which of the following do you think is MOST PROBLEMATIC in this area? आपके हिसाब से इस इलाके में कौन सी सबसे बड़ी समस्या है? केवल एक	Water पानी	1.	
		Electricity बिजली	2.	
		Sewage मल निकासी	3.	
		Garbage Removal कचड़े को हटाना	4.	
		Education शिक्षा	5.	
		Health स्वास्थ्य	6.	
		Rations राशन	7.	
		Pension पेंशन	8.	
		Law and Order/Crime कानून व्यवस्था/अपराध	9.	
		.a. अन्य _____	a.	
.b. जवाब नहीं दिया	b.			
.c. पता नहीं	c.			

इस खंड में हम राशन कार्ड और राशन के बारे में आपसे कुछ प्रश्न करेंगे।

Section 3: Access to rations and other certificates

खंड 3: राशन-कार्ड की सुलभता

3.01	How many ration cards are owned by members of your household (including yourself)? आपके घर में कितने राशन कार्ड हैं?	<input type="text"/> Ration Cards	0			→ 3.14
3.02	Which members of your household are listed as the primary owner of ration cards? किनके नाम से राशन कार्ड बना है?	WRITE RELATIONSHIP CODES मुखिया से संबंध लिखें।	Ration Card1	Ration Card2	Ration Card3	
3.03	What color are these ration cards? ये राशन कार्ड किस रंग के हैं?	White सफ़ेद	1.	1.	1.	
		White-Stamped सफ़ेद-मुहर लगा हुआ	2.	2.	2.	
		Yellow पीला	3.	3.	3.	
		Red लाल	4.	4.	4.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	b.	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	c.	c.	

क्या जानकारी या उनकी पति-पत्नी के पास राशन कार्ड हैं?

YES → 3.04

NO → 3.11

3.04	When did you make your ration card? आपका अपना राशन कार्ड कब बना?	<input type="text"/>	1. महीने पहले 2. साल पहले	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
3.05	How did you obtain your ration card? आपको कार्ड कैसे मिला? (आपने क्या किया) Circle all that apply. Do not prompt जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।	Passed on from parents माता-पिता से मिला	1.	→ 3.10
		Exchanged old card पुराना कार्ड जमा किया	2.	→ 3.10
		Spouse's card पति/पत्नी का कार्ड	3.	→ 3.10
		Direct application at ration office राशन-कार्ड कार्यालय में सीधे आवेदन किया	4.	→ 3.06
		Paid agent/Someone to help अपने राशन-कार्ड के आवेदन के लिए किसी को/एजेंट को पैसे दिये	5.	→ 3.06
		Got help, but did not pay for help किसी ने मेरे लिये आवेदन किया (लेकिन मैंने उसको इसके लिये पैसे नहीं दिये)	6.	→ 3.06
		Govt Campaign to give card सरकारी अभियान	7.	→ 3.06
		.a. अन्य _____	a.	→ 3.06
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 3.10
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	→ 3.10

3.06	<p>What documents did you submit as your address proof?</p> <p>आपने अपने पते के सत्यापन (प्रूफ) के लिए कौन सा कागजात जमा किया?</p> <p>Circle all that apply. Do not prompt</p> <p>जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	Birth Certificate जन्म प्रमाण-पत्र	1.	
		Voter Card वोटर-कार्ड	2.	
		Cast Certificate जाति प्रमाण-पत्र	3.	
		Driver's license ड्राइविंग लाइसेंस	4.	
		Affidavit हलफनामा (एफिडेविट)	5.	
		Plot Certificate प्लॉट वितरण/पुनर्नियमन प्रमाण-पत्र	6.	
		Electricity bill बिजली का बिल	7.	
		.a. अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
3.07	<p>Who helped you obtain your ration card?</p> <p>यह राशन कार्ड दिलवाने में किसने आपकी सहायता की?</p>	HELP CODE का प्रयोग करें		
	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>			
3.08	<p>How much did you pay in fees to obtain your ration card?</p> <p>यह राशन कार्ड पाने के लिये आपने कितनी फीस दी?</p>	<input type="text"/> रुपये	1.	
		for applicationForm		
		<input type="text"/> रुपये	2.	
		for Stamp Paper		
		<input type="text"/> रुपये	3.	
		for Typing		
<input type="text"/> Total sum (if can't tell breakup)	4.			
.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.			
.c. नहीं पता	c.			
3.09	<p>How much did you pay over and above this to obtain your ration card?</p> <p>अपना राशन कार्ड पाने के लिये उसके अलावा आपने कितना खर्चा किया?</p>	<input type="text"/> रुपये	1.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
3.10	<p>When did you last update, amend or renew your ration card?</p> <p>आखिरी बार आपने अपने राशन-कार्ड का कब आधुनिकीकरण करवाया था?</p>	0. कभी नहीं <input type="text"/>	1. महीने पहले 2. साल पहले	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	

हम आपसे आपके राशन के बारे में लेंगे जो कि आपने पिछली बार लिया था।

Section 3a: Received Rations

खंड 3a: प्राप्त राशन

3a.00

When did you last purchase goods from your ration shop? _____

आपने आखरी बार राशन कब लिया था? _____

1. दिन पहले
2. सप्ताह पहले
3. महीने पहले
4. साल पहले
- .b. उत्तर नहीं दिया
- .c. पता नहीं
- .d. कभी नहीं

	3a.1	3a.2	3a.4	3a.5	3a.5
	Goods सामान	मिला/नहीं	Total Cost कुल मूल्य	Quantity संख्या	Quality क्वालिटी
A	Rice चावल	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		kg/किग्रा	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
B	Flour आटा	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		kg/किग्रा	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
D	Dal दाल	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		kg /किग्रा	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
E	Salt नमक	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		kg/किग्रा	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
F	Sugar चीनी/सक्कर	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		kg/किग्रा	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
G	Edible Oil तेल	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		litres/लीटर	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
I	Wheat गेहूँ	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		kg/किग्रा	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
J	Kerosene Oil केरोसीन तेल	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes हाँ <input type="checkbox"/> No नहीं		litres/लीटर	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
K				<input type="checkbox"/> kg/किग्रा <input type="checkbox"/> litres/लीटर	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
L				<input type="checkbox"/> kg/किग्रा <input type="checkbox"/> litres/लीटर	खराब1 ठीकठाक.....2 अच्छा.....3
	CUMULATIVE COST				

3.14 केवल एक	<p>What government committees exist to help you with the ration system? राशन-सिस्टम के संबंध में सहायता के लिये कौन सी सरकारी कमेटी है? जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	कोई नहीं None	0.	
		एम.एल.ए. (विधायक) राशन कमेटी MLA Ration Committee	1.	
		a. अन्य अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
3.15 केवल एक	<p>Have you or anyone in your household ever approached an elected official for help with your ration card or the ration system? क्या आप या कोई आपके घर में कभी अपने राशन-कार्ड या राशन-सिस्टम के संबंध में सहायता के लिये किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (चुने गये नेता) से मिले हैं?</p>	नहीं No	0.	→ Section 4
		हाँ Yes	1.	→ 3.16
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ Section 4
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	→ Section 4
		प्रधान के बारे में न लिखें		
3.16 केवल एक	<p>What was his/her position at the time? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?</p>	निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.) Councilor	1.	
		विधायक (एम.एल.ए.) MLA	2.	
		सांसद (एम.पी.) MP	3.	
		a. अन्य अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
3.17 केवल एक	<p>Did you go alone or as part of a group? अकेले गये थे या समूह में</p>	अकेले Alone	1.	
		समूह में In a group	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	

3.18	<p>What was the purpose of your meeting?</p> <p>आपकी मीटिंग का उद्देश्य क्या था?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो जागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	<p>राशन कार्ड पाने में सहायता लेना</p> <p>Get help obtaining a ration card</p>	1.	
		<p>राशन कार्ड के नवीनीकरण में सहायता लेना</p> <p>Get help updating/renewing ration Card</p>	2.	
		<p>बी.पी.एल. पाने के लिये सिफारिश करवाना</p> <p>To get BPL endorsement</p>	3.	
		<p>राशन की दुकान के बारे में शिकायत करना</p> <p>To Complain about ration shop</p>	4.	
		<p>a. अन्य _____</p> <p>अन्य</p>	a.	
		<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	
		<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>	c.	
3.19	<p>What was the outcome of your meeting?</p> <p>आपकी उस मीटिंग का क्या परिणाम हुआ?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो जागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	<p>वह दफ्तर में नहीं थे/थी</p> <p>He/She was not in his/her office</p>	1.	
		<p>उन्होंने मुझसे मिलने से मना कर दिया</p> <p>He/She refused to speak with me</p>	2.	
		<p>उन्होंने कहा कि वे सहायता नहीं कर सकते</p> <p>He/She said he/she could not help</p>	3.	
		<p>उन्होंने कहा कि वे सहायता करेंगे/करेंगी, लेकिन सहायता कभी नहीं मिली</p> <p>They said they would help, but nothing happened</p>	4.	
		<p>उन्होंने किसी से सहायता करने के लिए कहा, लेकिन सहायता कभी नहीं मिली</p> <p>They tole someone to help, but nothing heppened</p>	5.	
		<p>समस्या हल हो गई</p> <p>The problem was resolved</p>	6.	
		<p>a. अन्य _____</p> <p>अन्य</p>	a.	
<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.			
<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>	c.			

इस खंड में हम आपसे पेन्शन के बारे में कुछ प्रश्न करेंगे।

Section 4: Pensions

खंड 4: पेन्शन

4.01 अनेक	Is there anyone in your household who is a widow/old/disable & has income less than Rs. 48,400 per year? क्या आपके परिवार में कोई ऐसा व्यक्ति जो विधवा/बुजुर्ग/विकलांग हो और जिनकी वार्षिक आय रुपये 48,400 से कम हो?	None कोई नहीं	0.	→Section 5
		Old age वृद्धावस्था	1.	→4.02
		Widow विधवा	2.	→4.02
		Disabled. विकलांग	3.	→4.02
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→Section 5
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	→Section 5
4.02 अनेक	Do you or anyone in your household actually receive any of the following government pensions? क्या आपको या आपके घर के किसी व्यक्ति को इनमें से कोई भी सरकारी पेन्शन सच में मिलता है?	None कोई नहीं	0.	→Section 5
		Old age. वृद्धावस्था	1.	→4.03
		Widow विधवा	2.	→4.03
		Disabled विकलांग	3.	→4.03
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→Section 5
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	→Section 5
4.03 केवल एक	Where did you get the forms to receive this pension? इस पेन्शन को पाने के लिये आपको फार्म कहाँ से मिला?	State government office राज्य सरकार के कार्यालय से	1.	
		MLA's Office विधायक के कार्यालय से	2.	
		MCD Councilor's Office. पार्षद के कार्यालय से	3.	
		.a. अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
4.04 अनेक	Who helped you apply for a pension? पेन्शन के लिये आवेदन करने में किसने आपकी सहायता की?	HELP CODE का प्रयोग करें <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>		
4.05 केवल एक	Where do you receive your pension? आपको आपका पेन्शन कहाँ मिलता है?	Directly into my bank account सीधे मेरे बैंक एकाउंट में आ जाता है	1.	
		From MCD Councilor's Office पार्षद के कार्यालय से चेक के रूप में	2.	
		.a. अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
4.06	When did you last receive your pension? आपको आखिरी बार पेन्शन कब लिया?	<input type="text"/> महीने पहले		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	

इस खंड में हम आपसे स्वास्थ्य सुविधाओं के बारे में कुछ प्रश्न पूछेंगे जो कि आपके आस-पास उपलब्ध हैं और आपका उनके साथ कैसा तज़रबा रहा।

Section 5: Access to healthcare facilities

खंड 5: स्वास्थ्य सुविधाओं की सुलभता

5.01	<p>What was the last minor health problem of someone in your household for which you sought medical attention?</p> <p>आपके परिवार में आखिरी बार डॉक्टर के पास कब गये थे, जैसे छोटी-मोटी बीमारी-खाँसी, नजला, जुकाम आदि के लिए।</p> <p>बीमारी का नाम पूछें।</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	Cold जुकाम/सर्दी	1	
		Diarrhea दस्त/जुलाब	2	
		Loss of appetite भूख की कमी	3	
		Fever बुखार	4	
		Cough खाँसी	5	
		Vomiting उल्टी	6	
		Blood pressure बी० पी०	7	
		Diabetes डायबीटिज़	8	
		Headache सरदर्द	9	
		Minor Injury मामूली चोट	10	
		a. अन्य	.a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	.b.	
.c. नहीं पता	.c.			
5.02	<p>How long ago was this visit?</p> <p>आप कितने समय पहले गये थे?</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	1. दिन पहले	
			2. महीने पहले	
			3. साल पहले	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	.b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	.c.	
5.03	<p>Did you go to a government or private hospital or clinic for that problem?</p> <p>क्या आप इस समस्या की वजह से किसी सरकारी अस्पताल या किसी प्राइवेट अस्पताल या किसी क्लिनिक में गये?</p>	Government सरकारी	1.	
		Private प्राइवेट	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
5.04	<p>How much did you spend on that visit, including medicines prescribed at that visit?</p> <p>आपने उस समय कितना खर्च किया, जिसमें डॉक्टर कि लिखी गई दवाई एवं डॉक्टर की फीस शामिल है?</p>	Free	0.	
		[] रुपये		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
	.c. नहीं पता	c.		

अनेक	<p>5.05 For which of the following reasons did you go to that location (rather than another)?</p> <p>किन-किन कारणों से आप उस जगह गये (किसी और जगह नहीं)?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो जागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें पढ़कर न बताएँ।</p>	<p>Convenient location/nearby. सुविधाजनक लोकेशन/नज़दीकी</p>	1.	
		<p>Cheap/Free कम फ़ीस (सस्ता इलाज़) मुफ्त इलाज़</p>	2.	
		<p>Good doctor अच्छे डॉक्टर</p>	3.	
		<p>All diagnostic tests in one location जाँच के लिये किये जाने वाले टेस्ट उसी जगह उपलब्ध हैं</p>	4.	
		<p>Free medicines दवाईयाँ मुफ्त मिलती हैं</p>	5.	
		<p>Convenient timing खुलने का समय सुविधाजनक है</p>	6.	
		<p>All medical service available in the same place सभी चिकित्सा के लिये सुविधाएँ एक ही जगह उपलब्ध हैं</p>	7.	
		<p>हमेशा उसी के पास जाते हैं</p>	8.	
		<p>a. अन्य _____ अन्य</p>	a. b.	
		<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	c.	
		<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>		

5.06	<p>What problems have you noticed at the nearest government health centre? Circle all that apply</p> <p>नज़दीकी सरकारी स्वास्थ्य केंद्र पर आपने कौन सी समस्याएँ देखीं?</p> <p>जो जागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।</p> <p>DO NOT PROMPT</p>	No problems कोई समस्या नहीं	0.
		Closed when it should be open जब खुलना चाहिये तब बंद रहता है/कभी खुलता है कभी नहीं	1.
		Nurses absent नर्सें गायब रहती हैं	2.
		Doctors absent डॉक्टर गायब रहते हैं	3.
		No light/electricity बिजली नहीं है	4.
		No water पानी नहीं है	5.
		No supplies सप्लाई नहीं है (जैसे—ग्लब्स,प्लास्टर)	6.
		No medicines दवा नहीं है	7.
		Dirty/unhygienic गंदा रहता है	8.
		Workers demand bribes कर्मचारी रिश्वत माँगते हैं	9.
		Worker's won't work कर्मचारी काम नहीं करते हैं	10.
		Workers rude with/yell at patients कर्मचारी अक्सर मरीज़/घर वालों पर चिल्लाते हैं	11.
		Takes a lot of time बहुत समय लगता है	12.
		Very busy. डॉक्टर बहुत व्यस्त रहते हैं	13.
		Always refer to private/expensive doctors. हमेशा प्राइवेट डॉक्टरों के पास भेजते हैं	14.
		.a.अन्य अन्य 1 _____ अन्य 2 _____ अन्य 3 _____	a.
.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.		
.c. नहीं पता	c.		

<p>5.07</p> <p>अनेक</p>	<p>What was the last major health problem of someone in your household for which you sought medical attention?</p> <p>आपके परिवार में किसी को हाल में हुई स्वास्थ्य संबंधी बड़ी/गंभीर बीमारी कौन सी थी जिसके लिये आपको डॉक्टर की मदद लेनी पड़ी थी?</p> <p>SURVEYOR INSTRUCTIONS : बड़ी स्वास्थ्य संबंधी परेशानी को निम्नलिखित में से किसी एक या ज़्यादा लक्षणों के आधार पर परिभाषित करें :</p> <p>1000 रुपये से ज़्यादा, अस्पताल में कम से कम एक रात, या तीन दिन से ज़्यादा स्कूल या काम से अनुपस्थिति। इसमें प्रसव पीड़ा और प्रसव भी शामिल है **</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	<p>Infectious disease (like dengue, malaria, TB, etc.) संक्रमण की बीमारी (जैसे डेंगू, मलैरिया, टी.बी., टाइफ़ॉइड, आदि)</p> <p>1.</p>		
	<p>Cancer. कैंसर</p> <p>2.</p>			
	<p>Cardiovascular disease हृदय एवं धमनियों संबंधी बीमारियाँ (हॉर्ट अटैक, स्ट्रोक, हाई ब्लड प्रेशर)</p> <p>3.</p>			
	<p>Accident/injury दुर्घटना/चोट</p> <p>4.</p>			
	<p>Operation. ऑपरेशन</p> <p>5.</p>			
	<p>Labor/delivery. प्रसव-पीड़ा/प्रसव</p> <p>6.</p>			
	<p>.a. अन्य अन्य _____</p> <p>a.</p>			
	<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p> <p>b.</p>		→ 5.13	
	<p>.c. नहीं पता</p> <p>c.</p>		→ 5.13	
<p>.d. बड़ी परेशानी कभी नहीं हुई</p> <p>d.</p>		→ 5.13		
<p>5.08</p> <p>केवल एक</p>	<p>How long ago was this visit?</p> <p>यह कितने समय पहले हुआ?</p>	<p><input type="text"/></p> <p>1. दिन पहले 2. महीने पहले 3. साल पहले</p> <p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया b.</p> <p>.c. नहीं पता c.</p>		
<p>5.09</p> <p>केवल एक</p>	<p>Did you go to a government or private hospital or clinic for that problem?</p> <p>क्या आप इस समस्या की वजह से किसी सरकारी अस्पताल या किसी प्राइवेट अस्पताल या किसी क्लिनिक में गये?</p>	<p>Government सरकारी</p> <p>1.</p> <p>Private प्राइवेट</p> <p>2.</p> <p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया b.</p> <p>.c. नहीं पता c.</p>		
<p>5.10</p> <p>केवल एक</p>	<p>How much did you spend in total on that visit?</p> <p>आपने उस समय कुल कितना खर्च किया?</p>	<p><input type="text"/> रुपये</p> <p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया b.</p> <p>.c. नहीं पता c.</p>		

<p>5.11</p> <p>For what reason did you decide to go to that hospital or dispensary (as opposed to another one)?</p> <p>किन कारणों से आपने उसी अस्पताल या डिस्पेन्सरी में जाने का फैसला किया (दूसरों की तुलना में)?</p> <p>Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	<p>Convenient location/close सुविधाजनक लोकेशन/नजदीकी</p>	1.	
	<p>Good prices/inexpensive कम फीस/सस्ता इलाज</p>	2.	
	<p>Good doctor. अच्छे डॉक्टर</p>	3.	
	<p>All diagnostic tests in one place. जाँच के लिये किये जाने वाले टेस्ट उसी जगह उपलब्ध हैं</p>	4.	
	<p>Medicines available free दवाएँ मुफ्त में मिलती हैं</p>	5.	
	<p>Convenient timings. खुलने का समय सुविधाजनक है</p>	6.	
	<p>All medical services available in one place. सभी चिकित्सा के लिये सुविधाएँ एक ही जगह उपलब्ध हैं</p>	7.	
	<p>.a. अन्य अन्य _____</p>	a.	
	<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	
	<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>	c.	

अनेक

5.12

What problems have you noticed at that government hospital?

आप ने सरकारी अस्पताल में किस तरह की समस्याओं को देखा है?

Circle all that apply जो जागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें

No problems कोई समस्या नहीं	0.
Closed when it should be open/ never open जब खुलना चाहिये तब बंद रहता है/कभी खुलता है कभी नहीं	1.
Nurses absent नर्सें गायब रहती हैं	2.
Doctors absent डॉक्टर गायब रहते हैं	3.
No light/electricity बिजली नहीं है	4.
No water. पानी नहीं है	5.
No supplies. सप्लाई नहीं है (जैसे—ग्लब्स, प्लास्टर)	6.
No medicines दवा नहीं है	7.
Dirty/unhygienic गंदा	8.
Workers demand bribes कर्मचारी रिश्वत माँगते हैं	9.
Worker's won't work कर्मचारी काम नहीं करते हैं	10.
Workers rude with patients कर्मचारी अक्सर मरीज़/घर वालों पर चिल्लाते हैं	11.
Takes a lot of time बहुत समय लगता है	12.
Very busy डॉक्टर बहुत व्यस्त रहते हैं	13.
Not enough beds. पर्याप्त बेड नहीं हैं	14.
Always refer to private/expensive doctors. हमेशा प्राइवेट डॉक्टरों के पास भेजते हैं	15.
.a.अन्य अन्य 1 _____ अन्य 2 _____ अन्य 3 _____	a.
.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
.c. नहीं पता	c.

5.13	<p>Are you aware that in Delhi some hospitals bought land from the government for a low price, and therefore poor people can access their services for free</p> <p>क्या आप जानते हैं कि दिल्ली में कुछ प्राइवेट अस्पतालों को सरकार से कम दाम पर ज़मीन मिली थी और इसलिये इन अस्पतालों में गरीब लोगों का मुफ्त में इलाज़ होता है?</p>	No नहीं	0.	→ 5.16	
		Yes हाँ	1.		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.		→ 5.16
		.c. नहीं पता	c.		→ 5.16
5.14	<p>Have you ever been admitted to the hospital under such a scheme?</p> <p>क्या आप या आपका परिवार कभी ऐसा योजना के तहत अस्पताल में भर्ती हुए हैं?</p>	No नहीं	0.	→ 5.16	
		Yes हाँ	1.		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.		→ 5.16
		.c. नहीं पता	c.		
5.15	<p>Who helped you access the scheme?</p> <p>आपको योजना का लाभ उठाने में किसने सहायता की?</p>	No one किसी ने नहीं	0.		
		Councilor. निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)	1.		
		MLA. विधायक (एम.एल.ए.)	2.		
		MP सांसद (एम.पी.)	3.		
		.a. अन्य अन्य _____	a.		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.		
		.c. नहीं पता	c.		
5.16	<p>Have you or someone in your household ever approached an elected representative to discuss the issue of government medical facilities?</p> <p>क्या आप या कोई आपके घर में कभी सरकारी स्वास्थ्य सुविधाओं के बारे में बात करने के लिये किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (चुने गये नेता) से मिले हैं?</p>	No नहीं	0.	→ Section 6a	
		Yes हाँ	1.		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.		
		.c. नहीं पता	c.		

5.17	What was his or her position at the time? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?	Councilor निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)	1.	
		MLA विधायक (एम.एल.ए.)	2.	
		MP. सांसद (एम.पी.)	3.	
		.a. अन्य अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
5.18	Did you go alone or as a member of a group? अकेले गये थे या समूह में	Alone अकेले	1.	
		In a group समूह में	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
5.19	What was the subject of your meeting? आपकी मीटिंग का विषय क्या था? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	Help in gaining admission to a hospital अस्पतालों में भर्ती के लिये सहायता	1.	
		Reduction in fees for treatment इलाज फीस में कमी	2.	
		Money for treatment इलाज के लिये पैसा	3.	
		To complain about quality of local clinic स्थानीय सरकारी क्लिनिक में सुविधाओं की क्वालिटी के बारे में शिकायत	4.	
		To complain about quality of local hospital. सरकारी अस्पताल में सुविधाओं की क्वालिटी के बारे में शिकायत	5.	
		To ask them to build a new clinic नई क्लिनिक के लिये समर्थन	6.	
		To ask them to build a new hospital. नये अस्पताल के लिये समर्थन	7.	
		.a. अन्य अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	

<div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 15px; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">अनेक</div>	<p>5.20 What was the outcome of your meeting?</p> <p>आपकी उस मीटिंग का क्या परिणाम हुआ?</p> <p>Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	<p>He/She was not in the office वह दफ़्तर में नहीं थे/थीं</p>	1.	→ Section 6a
		<p>He/She refused to speak with me उन्होंने मुझसे मिलने से मना कर दिया</p>	2.	→ Section 6a
		<p>He/She refused to help सहायता देने से मना कर दिया</p>	3.	→ Section 6a
		<p>Said they would help, but help did not materialize उन्होंने कहा कि वे सहायता करेंगे/करेंगी, लेकिन सहायता कभी नहीं मिली</p>	4.	→ Section 6a
		<p>Told someone else to help, but they didn't help उन्होंने किसी से कहा लेकिन समस्या हल नहीं हुई</p>	5.	→ Section 6a
		<p>The problem improved/was resolved उन्होंने किसी से कहा और समस्या हल हो गयी</p>	6.	→ Section 6a
		<p>They gave the money I asked for जितने पैसे मैंने माँगे, उन्होंने दिये</p>	7.	→ 5.21
		<p>.a. अन्य अन्य _____</p>	a.	→ Section 6a
		<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	→ Section 6a
		<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>	c.	→ Section 6a
<p>5.21 How much money was given?</p> <p>आप को कितना पैसा दिया गया?</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 60px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></div> रुपये			
	<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.		
	<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>	c.		

Section 6a: Education Roster
खंड 6a: शिक्षा तालिका

Do you have anyone currently going to school in your family? क्या आपके परिवार में वर्तमान में कोई स्कूल जाता है?
1. Yes → 6a.01 2. No → 6.01

SEE CODES ON NEXT PAGE FOR ALL QUESTIONS	A	B	C	D	E
6a.01 ID/पहचान बच्चे का नाम					
6a.02 School Name/विद्यालय का नाम					
6a.03 Location/स्थान					
6a.04 बा/प्रा/मा Balwadi/Primary/Secondary					
6a.05 सर/नि Government/Private सर → 6a.06, नि. → 6a.11					
6a.06 एम.सी.डी.सर MCD/Delhi Government					
FACILITES PROVIDED BY THE SCHOOL: विद्यालय द्वारा उपलब्ध करवाया गया					
6a.07 निशुल्क विद्यालय द्वारा उपलब्ध करवाया गया: पाठ्य-पुस्तकें (0= नहीं,1= हाँ)Free textbooks provided by the school					
6a.08 निशुल्क विद्यालय द्वारा उपलब्ध करवाया गया: लिखने के सामान (0= नहीं,1= हाँ)Free stationery provided by the school					
6a.09 निशुल्क विद्यालय द्वारा उपलब्ध करवाया गया: ड्रेस (0= नहीं,1= हाँ) Uniform provided by the school					
6a.10 छात्रवृत्ति की राशि (रुपये में) Free stipend amount provided by the school (in Rupees)					
QUALITY MEASURE:					
6a.11 शैक्षणिक गुणवत्ता (0= कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं, 1= खराब, 2= ठीक-ठाक, 3= अच्छा)Teaching quality					
6a.12 अध्यापकों की उपस्थिति (0=कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं,1= खराब, 2= ठीक-ठाक, 3= अच्छा)Teacher atendance					
6a.13 स्कूल की इमारत कैसी है? (0=कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं,1= खराब,2= ठीक-ठाक,3= अच्छा)Conditon of the school building					
6a.14 सफाई (0= कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं, 1= खराब, 2= ठीक-ठाक, 3= अच्छा)					
6a.15 बिजली (0= कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं, 1= खराब, 2= ठीक-ठाक, 3= अच्छा)					
6a.16 पानी (0= कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं, 1= खराब, 2= ठीक-ठाक, 3= अच्छा)					
6a.17 लड़कों का शौचालय (0= कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं, 1= खराब, 2= ठीक-ठाक, 3= अच्छा)Boys' bathroom/toilet					
6a.18 लड़कियों का शौचालय (0= कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं, 1= खराब, 2= ठीक-ठाक, 3= अच्छा) Girls' bathroom/toilet					
6a.19 डेस्क, कुर्सियाँ, बोर्ड आदि (0=कोई नहीं/मौजूद नहीं,1= खराब,2= ठीक-ठाक,3= अच्छा)Conditon of desk, chairs, board, etc.					

6a.04 B/P/S CODES

- 1 – Balwadi
- 2 – Primary
- 3 – Secondary

6a.04 बा/प्रा/मा/कोड

- 1 - बालवाड़ी
- 2 - प्राथमिक
- 3 - माध्यमिक

6a.05 GOV/PRI CODES

- 1 – Government → 6a.06
- 2 – Private → 6a.11

6a.05 सर/नि कोड

- 1 - सरकारी → 6a.06
- 2 - निजी → 6a.07
- .b – उत्तर नहीं दिया
- .c – पता नहीं

6.06 MCD/DELHI GOVT CODES

- 1 – MCD School
- 2 – Delhi Government School
- 3 – Other

6.06 एम.सी.डी./दि.सर कोड

- 1 - दिल्ली नगर निगम (एम.सी.डी.)
- 2 - दिल्ली सरकारी विद्यालय
- .a – अन्य
- .b – उत्तर नहीं दिया
- .c – पता नहीं

इस खंड में हम आपसे शिक्षा सेवाओं के बारे में कुछ जानकारी लेंगे। शिक्षा से जुड़ी सरकारी योजनाओं के बारे में भी आपसे प्रश्न करेंगे।

Section 6: Access to education services

खंड 6: शिक्षा-सेवाओं की सुलभता

6.01	Do you know that many private schools in Delhi which have received land from the government on reduced prices are supposed to provide free education to the poor?	No नहीं	0.	→ 6.04 → 6.02 → 6.04 → 6.04
		Yes हाँ	1.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
केवल एक	क्या आप जानते हैं कि दिल्ली में बहुत से प्राइवेट स्कूलों को सरकार से कम दाम पर ज़मीन मिली थी और इसलिये इन स्कूलों में गरीब परिवार के बच्चे मुफ्त (बिना फ़िस दिये) पढ़ सकते हैं?			
6.02	Has a child in your household ever been admitted to a school under the EWS scheme?	No नहीं	0.	→ 6.04 → 6.03 → 6.04 → 6.04
		Yes हाँ	1.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
केवल एक	क्या आपके घर के किसी बच्चे ने ऐसे योजना के तहत किसी विद्यालय में भरती लिया है?			
6.03	Who helped this child gain admission under EWS?	No one किसी ने नहीं	0.	
		Councilor निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)	1.	
		MLA.. विधायक (एम.एल.ए.)	2.	
		MP. सांसद (एम.पी.)	3.	
		.a. अन्य अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
केवल एक	इस बच्चे को इस योजना के तहत प्रवेश दिलाने में किसने सहायता की?			
6.04	Have you ever approached an elected official for help in accessing education?	No नहीं	0.	→ Section 7 → 6.05 → Section 7 → Section 7
		Yes. हाँ	1.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
केवल एक	क्या आप या कोई आपके घर में कभी शिक्षा को सुलभ बनाने में सहायता के लिये किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (चुने गये नेता से मिले हैं)?			

6.05	What was his/her position at the time? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?	MCD Councilor निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)	1.	
		MLA विधायक (एम.एल.ए.)	2.	
		MP सांसद (एम.पी.)	3.	
		.a. अन्य अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	
6.06	Did you go alone or as part of a group? अकेले गये थे या समूह में	Alone अकेले	1.	
		In a group समूह में	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	

6.07	What was the subject of your meeting? आपके मीटिंग का विषय क्या था?	Help in gaining admission to a government school सरकारी स्कूल में प्रवेश के लिये सहायता	1.	
		Help in gaining admission to a private school निजी स्कूल में प्रवेश के लिये सहायता	2.	
		Help in reducing school fees स्कूल फीस को कम कराने में	3.	
		Asking for money for fees भरती फीस के लिये पैसे	4.	
		Asking for money for supplies (like pensils, textbooks, notebooks, etc.) पेन्सिल, पाठ्य-पुस्तक, आदि सप्लाई के लिये पैसे	5.	
		Asking for money for tutoring ट्यूशन के लिये पैसे	6.	
		To complain about the quality of the government school. सरकारी स्कूलों की स्थिति के बारे में शिकायत	7.	
		To ask for a new primary school नये प्रारम्भिक विद्यालय के लिये प्रस्ताव रखना	8.	
		To ask for a new secondary school. नये माध्यमिक विद्यालय का प्रस्ताव रखना	9.	
		To ask for a new higher secondary school.. नये माध्यमिक/उच्च विद्यालय के लिये प्रस्ताव रखना	10.	
		.a.अन्य अन्य _____	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. नहीं पता	c.	

अनेक	<p>6.08 What was the outcome of your meeting?</p> <p>आपकी उस मीटिंग का क्या परिणाम हुआ?</p> <p>Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	<p>He/She was not in the office वह दफ़्तर में नहीं थे/थीं</p>	1.	→ Section 7
		<p>He/She refused to speak with me उन्होंने मुझसे मिलने से मना कर दिया</p>	2.	→ Section 7
		<p>He/She refused to help सहायता देने से मना कर दिया</p>	3.	→ Section 7
		<p>Said they would help, but help did not materialize उन्होंने कहा कि वे सहायता करेंगे/करेंगी, लेकिन सहायता कभी नहीं मिली</p>	4.	→ Section 7
		<p>Told someone else to help, but they didn't help उन्होंने किसी से कहा लेकिन समस्या हल नहीं हुई</p>	5.	→ Section 7
		<p>The problem improved/was resolved उन्होंने किसी से कहा और समस्या हल हो गयी</p>	6.	→ Section 7
		<p>They gave the money I asked for जितने पैसे मैंने माँगे, उन्होंने दिये</p>	7.	→ 6.09
		<p>.a. अन्य अन्य _____</p>	a.	→ Section 7
		<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	→ Section 7
		<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>	c.	→ Section 7
6.09	<p>How much money was given?</p> <p>आप को कितना पैसा दिया गया?</p>	<input type="text"/> रुपये		
		<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	
		<p>.c. नहीं पता</p>	c.	

इस खंड में हम आपसे वोटर पंजीकरण और वोट देने के बारे में कुछ प्रश्न पूछेंगे।

Section 7: Voting record

खंड 7: बोटिंग रिकार्ड

7.01	Are you registered to vote?	No नहीं	1	→ Section 8
	क्या आपका वोट लिस्ट में नाम है?	Yes हाँ	2	→ 7.02
	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b	→ Section 8
	c. नहीं पता		c	→ Section 8
7.02	Where are you registered to vote?	Delhi दिल्ली	1	
	आप वोट देने के लिए कहाँ पंजीकृत (रजिस्टर्ड) हैं?	Uttar Pradesh उत्तर प्रदेश	2	
		Haryana हरियाणा	3	
		Madhya Pradesh मध्य प्रदेश	4	
		Bihar बिहार	5	
		Rajasthan राजस्थान	6	
		West Bengal पश्चिम बंगाल	7	
		a. अन्य _____		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		a
		c. नहीं पता		b
7.03	How did you obtain your voter registration?	Direct application to government office (इलेक्टॉरल रजिस्ट्रेशन ऑफिसर, ई.आर.ओ) के पास सीधा आवेदन	1	
	आपको वोटर रजिस्ट्रेशन कि प्रक्रिया में कैसे जानकारी मिली?	Government campaign सरकारी अभियान	2	
		NGO campaign एन.जी.ओ. अभियान	3	
		Political (party) campaign राजनीतिक (दल) अभियान	4	
		a.अन्य _____		a
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b
		c. नहीं पता		c

केवल एक

अनेक

7.04	What certificate did you use to prove residency for the purposes of voter registration? वोटर पंजीकरण हेतु आपने निवास-स्थान के सत्यापन (प्रूफ) के लिये किस प्रमाणपत्र का प्रयोग किया था?	None	कोई नहीं	0.	
		Birth certificate	जन्म प्रमाण-पत्र	1.	
		Cast certificate	जाति प्रमाण-पत्र	2.	
		Drivers license	ड्राइविंग लाइसेंस	3.	
		Affidavit	हलफनामा (एफिडेविट)	4.	
		Ration Card	राशन कार्ड	5.	
		Electricity bill	बिजली का बिल	6.	
		Plot certificate	पलॉट की पर्ची	7.	
		a. अन्य	_____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.	
c. नहीं पता		c.			
7.05	Did you receive help from any political candidate or elected official? क्या आपने किसी राजनीतिक प्रत्याशी या चुनाव अधिकारी की सहायता ली थी?	No	नहीं	0.	→ 7.07
		Yes	हाँ	1.	→ 7.06
		.b.	उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 7.07
		.c.	नहीं पता	c.	→ 7.07
7.06	What was his or her office (or which office was he/she a candidate for)? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?	MCD Councilor	निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)	1.	
		MLA	विधायक (एम.एल.ए.)	2.	
		MP	सांसद (एम.पी.)	3.	
		a. अन्य	_____	a.	
		b.	उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c.	नहीं पता	c.	
7.07	Did you vote in the last municipal (ward councilor or Municipal Corporation) election (in March 2007)? क्या आपने पिछले नगरपालिका (वार्ड काउंसलर या नगरपालिका परिषद) चुनाव (मार्च 2007) में वोट किया था?	No	नहीं	0.	
		Yes.	हाँ	1.	
		.b.	उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c.	नहीं पता	c.	

इस खंड में हम ये जानने की कोशिश करेंगे की आपको कितनी जानकारी है अपने क्षेत्र के नेताओं और उनकी जिम्मेदारियों के बारे में।

Section 8: Civic knowledge

खंड 8: नागरिक ज्ञान

8.01	<p>Who is the Member of Parliament (MP) for this area?</p> <p>इस क्षेत्र का सांसद (एम.पी.) कौन है?</p>	<p>CHECK ANSWER ON LIST OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</p> <p>सांसद-सूची से उत्तर की जाँच करें</p>		<input type="text"/>
8.02	<p>Who is the Member of the State Legislative Assembly (MLA) representing this area?</p> <p>इस क्षेत्र का विधायक कौन है?</p>	<p>CHECK ANSWER ON LIST OF MEMBERS OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY</p> <p>विधायक-सूची से उत्तर की जाँच करें</p>		<input type="text"/>
8.03	<p>Who is the councilor (for the corporation) (Nigam Parshad) of this area?</p> <p>इस क्षेत्र का पार्षद (एम.सी.डी. काउंसलर) कौन है?</p>	<p>CHECK ANSWER ON MCD WARD LIST</p> <p>निगम परिषद वार्ड सूची से उत्तर की जाँच करें</p>		<input type="text"/>
8.04	<p>Name some duties of the councilor</p> <p>पार्षद के कुछ कर्तव्यों (जिम्मेदारियों) के बारे में बताइये।</p>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>		

Section 9 : Political Actions

खंड 9 : राजनैतिक सक्रियता

9.01	<p>How often is politics/ political parties' activities discussed in your household?</p> <p>आपके घर में राजनीति/राजनैतिक दलों (पार्टियों) की गतिविधियों पर कितनी चर्चा होती है?</p>	Never कभी नहीं	0.
		Rarely बहुत कम	1.
		Frequently around elections, but rarely otherwise चुनाव के समय अक्सर लेकिन वैसे कभी-कभी	2.
		Sometimes कभी-कभी	3.
		Often अक्सर	4.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		c. पता नहीं	c.
9.02	<p>Which party is your family associated with?</p> <p>आपका परिवार किस पार्टी से जुड़ा हुआ है?</p>	None कोई नहीं	0.
		Congress कांग्रेस	1.
		BJP भाजपा	2.
		BSP बसपा	3.
		.a. अन्य _____	a.
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		.c. पता नहीं	c.
9.03	<p>Has a candidate or party worker ever asked you to participate in any of the following actions?</p> <p>क्या पार्टी या पार्टी कार्यकर्ता ने आपको कभी ऐसे कामों में भाग लेने के लिए कहा है? पढ़कर सुनाएँ :-</p> <p>Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन गोला लगायें</p>	None कोई नहीं	1.
		March रोड शो, रैली	2.
		Attended a speech/rally भाषण सुनने के लिये	3.
		Enforced a bandh बंद करवाना	4.
		Distributed political materials (flyers, etc.) पर्चे बाँटना या अन्य राजनैतिक निशान बनाना	5.
		Painted or made signs पेंट या अन्य तरह के (पार्टी के निशान बनाना)	6.
		Distributed useful goods(milk, clothing, alcohol etc.) for a party पार्टी के लिये सामान बाँटना	7.
		Encourage others to vote for a party or candidate पार्टी या प्रत्याशी को वोट देने के लिये दूसरों को उत्साहित करना	8.
		.a.अन्य _____	a.
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		.c. पता नहीं	c.

9.04	<p>Have you ever actually participated in any of the following actions for a party or candidate?</p> <p>क्या आपने कभी निम्नलिखित कार्यों में पार्टी या उम्मीदवार के लिए भाग लिया है?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो लागू हों पर गोला लगायें</p>	None कोई नहीं	0.	→ 9.06
		March रोडशो, रैली	1.	→ 9.05
		Attended a speech/rally भाषण सुनने के लिये	2.	→ 9.05
		Enforced a bandh बंद करवाना	3.	→ 9.05
		Distributed political materials (flyers, etc.) पर्चे बाँटना या अन्य राजनैतिक निशान बनाना	4.	→ 9.05
		Painted or made signs पेंट या अन्य तरह के (पार्टी के निशान बनाना)	5.	→ 9.05
		Distributed useful goods (milk, clothing, alcohol, etc.) for a party पार्टी या पार्टी के लिये सामान बाँटना (जैसे दूध, कपड़ा, शराब आदि)	6.	→ 9.05
		Encourage others to vote for a party or candidate पार्टी या प्रत्याशी को वोट देने के लिये दूसरों को उत्साहित करना	7.	→ 9.05
		a. अन्य _____	a.	→ 9.05
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 9.06
		c. पता नहीं	c.	→ 9.06
9.05	<p>Did you receive anything in exchange for participation?</p> <p>क्या भाग लेने के बदले में आपको कुछ मिला?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो लागू हों पर गोला लगायें</p>	कुछ नहीं	0.	
		[_____] Rupees रुपये	1.	
		Alcohol शराब	2.	
		Clothing कपड़े	3.	
		Milk दूध	4.	
		Food भोजन	5.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. पता नहीं	c.	

9.06 अनेक	In the last municipal election, were you offered any of the following by a candidate or party? पिछले म्यूनिसिपल चुनाव में क्या आपको पार्टी या उम्मीदवार ने कुछ दिया था? (जैसे कपड़ा, खाना आदि) Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन गोला लगायें	कुछ नहीं	0.	
		Clothing कपड़े	1.	
		Milk दूध	2.	
		Rations राशन	3.	
		Food भोजन	4.	
		[] Rupees रुपये	5.	
		शराब	6.	
.a. अन्य	a.			
.....				
.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.			
.c. पता नहीं	c.			
9.07 केवल एक	If the election for the Municipal Corporation (MCD) were tomorrow, which party would you likely vote for? अगर दिल्ली नगर निगम (एम.सी.डी) का चुनाव कल हो तो आप किस दल को वोट देना पसंद करेंगे?	Congress कांग्रेस	1.	
		BJP भाजपा	2.	
		BSP बसपा	3.	
		.a. अन्य	a.	
			
.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.			
.c. पता नहीं	c.			
9.08 केवल एक	When casting your vote in the municipal elections, do you think the candidate's character or the issues are the most important? वोट देने के समय आपको क्या सबसे महत्वपूर्ण लगता है, उम्मीदवार या सामाजिक समस्याएँ?	Neither कोई नहीं	0.	
		Candidate उम्मीदवार	1.	
		Issues सामाजिक समस्याएँ	2.	
		Both दोनों	3.	
		.a. अन्य	a.	
			
.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.			
.c. पता नहीं	c.			
9.09 अनेक	When casting your vote in the municipal elections, how important are each of the following issues? नगर निगम चुनाव में वोट देने के समय कौन से मुद्दे आपके हिसाब से महत्वपूर्ण हैं?	Local Development.1 <input type="checkbox"/> महत्वपूर्ण <input type="checkbox"/> नहीं	1.	
		Crime/Law and Order.2 <input type="checkbox"/> महत्वपूर्ण <input type="checkbox"/> नहीं	2.	
		Price Rise.3 <input type="checkbox"/> महत्वपूर्ण <input type="checkbox"/> नहीं	3.	
		Government Corruption.4 <input type="checkbox"/> महत्वपूर्ण <input type="checkbox"/> नहीं	4.	
		Regularization/Sealing.5 <input type="checkbox"/> महत्वपूर्ण <input type="checkbox"/> नहीं	5.	

9.10	<p>What do you think about when evaluating individual candidates?</p> <p>(circle all that apply. Give the respondent time to think through their response)</p> <p>जब आप किसी प्रत्याशी को परखते हैं तो किस बारे में सोचते हैं?</p> <p>जो लागू हों उन गोला लगायें</p>	Party पार्टी	1.	
		Caste जाति	2.	
		Religion धर्म	3.	
		Gender लिंग	4.	
		Past government work पिछली सरकार में काम	5.	
		Past non-government work पिछली सरकार ने जो काम नहीं किये	6.	
		Personal contacts व्यक्तिगत संपर्क	7.	
		Education शिक्षा	8.	
		Criminal record आपराधिक रिकार्ड	9.	
		.a. अन्य	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	
9.11	<p>Is your councilor given any money to spend in this ward?</p> <p>आपके वार्ड के विकास के लिये क्या आपके पार्षद को कुछ पैसा मिलता है?</p>	No नहीं	0.	→ 9.19
		Yes हाँ	1.	→ 9.12
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 9.19
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	→ 9.19
9.12	<p>How much do you think your councilor is given to spend in this ward in one year?</p> <p>आपके हिसाब से आपके पार्षद (काउंसलर) को इस क्षेत्र में एक साल में खर्च करने के लिये कितना पैसा मिलता है?</p>	[]Rupees रुपये		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	
9.13	<p>How much do you think your councilor actually spends each year?</p> <p>आपके हिसाब से आपका पार्षद हर साल सचमुच कितना खर्च करता है?</p>	[]Rupees रुपये		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	

9.14	<p>What type of project do you think your councilor spends MOST on?</p> <p>आपके हिसाब से आपका पार्षद किस योजना पर सबसे अधिक खर्च करता है?</p> <p>पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	Roads	सड़क	1.
		Water	पानी	2.
		Sanitation	सफाई	3.
		Health	स्वास्थ्य	4.
		Education	शिक्षा	5.
		Parks	पार्क	6.
		Community centre	सामुदायिक केन्द्र (कम्यूनिटी सेंटर)	7.
		.a. अन्य	_____	a.
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		.c. पता नहीं		c.
9.15	<p>What type of project do you think your councilor spends LEAST on?</p> <p>आपके हिसाब से आपका पार्षद किस योजना पर सबसे कम खर्च करता है?</p> <p>पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	Roads	सड़क	1.
		Water	पानी	2.
		Sanitation	सफाई	3.
		Health	स्वास्थ्य	4.
		Education	शिक्षा	5.
		Parks	पार्क	6.
		Community centre	सामुदायिक केन्द्र (कम्यूनिटी सेंटर)	7.
		.a. अन्य	_____	a.
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		.c. पता नहीं		c.
9.16	<p>What type of project would you like your councilor to spend more on?</p> <p>आप अपने पार्षद से किस योजना पर और अधिक खर्च करवाना पसंद करेंगे?</p> <p>पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	Roads	सड़क	1.
		Water	पानी	2.
		Sanitation	सफाई	3.
		Health	स्वास्थ्य	4.
		Education	शिक्षा	5.
		Parks	पार्क	6.
		Community centre	सामुदायिक केन्द्र (कम्यूनिटी सेंटर)	7.
		.a. अन्य	_____	a.
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		.c. पता नहीं		c.

9.17 केवल एक	What type of project do you think your councilor spends too much money on? आपके हिसाब से आपका पार्षद किस योजना पर फिजूल खर्चा करते है?	Roads	सड़क	1.	
		Water	पानी	2.	
		Sanitation	सफाई	3.	
		Health	स्वास्थ्य	4.	
		Education	शिक्षा	5.	
		Parks	पार्क	6.	
		Community centre	सामुदायिक केन्द्र (कम्यूनिटी सेंटर)	7.	
		.a. अन्य _____		a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.	
.c. पता नहीं		c.			
9.18 केवल एक	Do you think your councilor spends more or less money than councilors in other areas? आपके हिसाब से आपका पार्षद अन्य क्षेत्रों के पार्षदों की तुलना में अधिक या कम खर्च करता है?	Less	कम	1.	
		About the Same	लगभग उनके जितना ही	2.	
		More	ज़्यादा	3.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.	
		.c. पता नहीं		c.	
9.19	Have you ever asked an elected official for help in preventing eviction or clearing of your area? क्या आपने कभी किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि से बेदखली से बचाने या आपके इलाके को खाली कराने से रोकने में सहायता के लिये कहा?	No	नहीं	1.	→ Section 10 → 9.20
		Yes	हाँ	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.	→ Section 10 → Section 10
		.c. पता नहीं		c.	
		9.20 केवल एक	What was his/her position at the time? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?	MCD Councilor	निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)
MLA	विधायक (एम.एल.ए)			2.	
MP	सांसद (एम.पी.)			3.	
.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया				b.	
.c. पता नहीं				c.	
9.21	Did you go alone or as a member of a group? अकेले गये थे या समूह में?	Alone	अकेले	1.	
		As a group	समूह में	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.	
		.c. पता नहीं		c.	

9.22	What was the subject of the meeting? मीटिंग का विषय क्या था?	To Stop the clearing of the Area इलाके को खाली कराने से बचाना	1.
		To complain about restitutions for clearing of the Area इलाके को खाली कराना फिर से शुरू होने के बारे में शिकायत	2.
		अन्य _____	a.
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		.c. पता नहीं	c.
9.23	What was the outcome? मीटिंग का परिणाम क्या निकला	He was not in the office वह दफ्तर में नहीं थे/थीं	1.
		They refused to speak with me उन्होंने मुझसे बात करने से मना कर दिया	2.
		They didn't help हमारी मुलाकात हुई लेकिन उन्होंने कुछ नहीं किया	3.
		The slum was not cleared झुग्गी को नहीं हटाया गया	4.
		Gave us more restitution for clearing of slums इलाके को खाली कराने के बदले हमको कुछ मुआवज़ा मिला	5.
		a. अन्य _____	a.
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		.c. पता नहीं	c.

इस खंड में हम आपसे शौचालय से जुड़ी कुछ जानकारी लेंगे।

Section 10a :Sanitation Worksheet

खंड 10a : सफाई कार्य-सूची

		10a.01	10a.02	10a.03	10a.04	10a.05	10a.06	10a.07	10a.08	10a.09
	Type प्रकार	Available मिलता ?	Use इस्तिमाल करता ?	Distance (minutes) दूरी (मिनट)	Type प्रकार	Water supply पानी की सप्लाई	Cleanliness सफाई	Physical facilities (Floor/wall/etc) शारीरिक सुविधाएँ (दिवार/फर्श/वगैरहा)	Sink हाथ धोने की व्यवस्था (हौज़)	Price per use (Rs.) दाम प्रति प्रयोग (रुपये)
A	Private inhome toilet घर के अंदर शौचालय (निजी)	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	
B	Private out-door toilet बाहरी शौचालय (निजी)	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	
C	Shared private toilet सांझा शौचालय (निजी)	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	
D	Public Toilet सार्वजनिक शौचालय	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> कोई नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> ख़राब <input type="checkbox"/> ठीक-ठाक <input type="checkbox"/> अच्छा	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="text"/>
E	Open land, gutter, side of the road खुला मैदान/नाला, सड़क किनारे	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ	<input type="text"/>						

10a.4 TYPE CODES

- 1 - Flush to piped sewer
- 2 - Flush to open sewer/drain
- 3 - Disposal to improved pit – No flush
- 4 - Disposal to unimproved pit – No flush

10a.4 किस्म कोड

- 1 - नाली के पाइप में पानी डालना
- 2 - खुले नाली में पानी डालना
- 3 - सुधारे गये गढ़दे में निपटान- फ़्लश नहीं है
- 4 - बिना सुधारे हुये गढ़दे में निपटान -फ़्लश नहीं है

Section 10: Access to Sanitation

खंड 10: स्वच्छता सुलभता

10.01	<p>How is wastewater drained from your house? Includes water for washing, cooking, etc. Excludes toilet. आपके घर का बेकार पानी कैसे बाहर निकलता है ? सफाई, खाना पकाने आदि में इस्तेमाल किये गये पानी को शामिल करें, शौचालय के पानी को शामिल मत किजिये</p>	Across the floor/no specific outlet फर्श के साथ/कोई खास व्यवस्था नहीं है.	1	
		There is a gutter in the floor फर्श/शौचालय में एक नाली है।	2	
		Drain in the floor. घर में कई नालियाँ हैं	3	
		There is a basin/sink. घर में बेसिन/हौज़ (सिंक) हैं	4	
10.02	<p>Is there an open drain (nali) in front of your house or nearby? क्या आपके घर के सामने या आस-पास कोई खुली नाली (खुला नाला) है ?</p>	No. नहीं	1	→ 10.05
		Yes. हाँ	2	→ 10.03
10.03	<p>Has your drain ever over-flowed or become smelly, causing you extreme discomfort? क्या आपकी नाली कभी ओवरफ्लो हुई है या उसमें से दुर्गंध आई है जिससे आप परेशान हुए हों ?</p>	No. नहीं	1	
		Yes. हाँ	2	
10.04	<p>How many times in one month is the drain cleaned? एक महीने में कितनी बार नाली की सफाई होती है ?</p>	<input type="text"/> Times बार		
		.b नहीं उत्तर नहीं दिया	.b	
		.c नहीं पता	.c	
10.05	<p>How do you dispose of solid waste (trash) from your house? आप अपने घर के ठोस कूड़े को कैसे हटाते हैं ? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	I or someone in my household take it to the dumpster कूड़ेदान में डालते हैं (मैं या कोई मेरे घर में)	1	
		Put it in the gutter/drain नालियों में फेंकते हैं	2	
		Put it in open land खाली मैदानों में फेंकते हैं	3	
		MCD worker removes it एम.सी.डी. कर्मचारी द्वारा हटाया जाता है।	4	
		Private worker removes it निजी कर्मचारी द्वारा हटाया जाता है	5	
		अन्य अन्य.....	a	
		उत्तर नहीं दिया	.b	
		नहीं पता	.c	

10.06	How often is the nearest dumpster emptied? सबसे करीबी कूड़ेदान कितनी बारी खाली किया जाता है ?	No dumpster कूड़ेदान नहीं है	0
		Daily रोज़	1
		At least once a week कम से कम हफ़्ते में एक बार	2
		At least once a month कम से कम महीने में एक बार	3
		Less than once a month महीने में एक बार से कम	4
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b
		.c. नहीं पता	c
10.07	Have you ever taken part in any of the following actions? क्या आपने कभी इनमें से किसी कार्य में भाग लिया है ? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	Never/No कभी नहीं/कुछ नहीं किया	0
		Sit-in at office or house of elected official निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (नेता) के घर पर, कार्यालय पर या सड़क पर धरना	1
		Sit-in at government office नागरिक निकाय कार्यालय पर धरना	2
		Hired a contractor to construct drains/gutters मल-निकासी के लिए और अधिक नालियों के निर्माण के लिए ठेकेदार की नियुक्ति	3
		Hired a contractor to construct/delimit dumpster/rubbish bin कूड़ेदान के निर्माण/सीमांकन के लिए ठेकेदार की नियुक्ति	4
		Hired a contractor to construct public toilets शौचलय के निर्माण के लिए ठेकेदार की नियुक्ति	5
		अन्य .a. अन्य _____	a
		उत्तर नहीं दिया .b.	b
		नहीं पता .c.	c
10.08	What government committees affect sanitation in your area? सफ़ाई के लिए कौन सी सरकारी कमेटी आपके इलाके में प्रभावी है ? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	State sanitation committee (MLA) विधायक स्वच्छता कमेटी	1
		MCD Wards committee एम. सी. डी. वार्डस कमेटी	2
		MCD Sanitation committee एम. सी. डी. स्वच्छता कमेटी	3
		अन्य .a. अन्य _____	a
		उत्तर नहीं दिया .b.	b
		नहीं पता .c.	c

10.09	Have you ever spoken to an elected official regarding sanitation? क्या आपने कभी सफ़ाई के बारे में किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (चुने गये नेता) से बात की है ?	No. नहीं	0	→Section 11
		Yes हाँ	1	→10.10
		b उत्तर नहीं दिया		→Section 11
		c नहीं पता .		→Section 11
10.10	What was his/her position at the time? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं	MCD Councilor निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी)	1	
		MLA विधायक (एम.एल.ए)	2	
		MP सांसद (एम.पी)	3	
		.a. अन्य अन्य _____	a	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		.c. नहीं पता	c	
10.11	Did you go alone or as group? अकेले गये थे या समूह में?	Alone अकेले .	1	
		Group समूह में .	2	
		b उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		c नहीं पता .	c	
10.12	What was the subject of your conversation? आपकी बातचीत का विषय क्या था? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	Poor state of public toilets सार्वजनिक शौचालयों की खराब स्थिति	1	
		Need more public toilets और अधिक सार्वजनिक शौचालयों की आवश्यकता	2	
		Need cleaning of drains नालियों की सफ़ाई की आवश्यकता	3	
		Need construction of more drains और अधिक नालियों की सफ़ाई की आवश्यकता	4	
		Need emptying of rubbish bins/ dumpsters कूड़ेदानों को खाली करने की आवश्यकता	5	
		.a. अन्य _____	a	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		.c. नहीं पता	c	

10.13	What was the outcome of your conversation? आपकी बातचीत का क्या परिणाम हुआ?	They weren't in their office. वह दफ्तर में नहीं थे/थीं।	1
		They wouldn't meet/speak with me. उन्होंने मुझसे मिलने/बात करने से मना कर दिया।	2
		They wouldn't/couldn't help सहायता देने से मना कर दिया/सहायता देने में असमर्थ थे/थीं।	3
		They said they would help, but did not उन्होंने कहा कि वे सहायता करेंगे/करेंगी, लेकिन कोई सहायता नहीं मिली	4
		They told someone to fix it, but they did not उन्होंने किसी से सहायता करने के लिए कहा लेकिन कोई सहायता नहीं मिली	5
		The problem was resolved समस्या हल हो गयी	6
		a. अन्य अन्य _____	a
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b
.c. नहीं पता	c		

11a.03 CODES WHY NOT USE

1. Dirty
2. Dry (no water)
3. Far
4. Dry in summer
5. Doesn't come at certain times
6. No electricity for pump
- .a. Other
- .b. Won't Anser
- .c. Doesn't Know

गंदा
सूखा (पानी नहीं है)
बहुत दूर है
गरमियों में सूख जाता है
दिन में कभी-कभी नहीं आता
पम्प चलाने के लिये बिजली नहीं है
अन्य
उत्तर नहीं दिया
पता नहीं

11a.11 CODES WHO PROVIDED ACCESS

1. Individual/household
2. Group of households/neighbors
3. Full community
4. Jal Board
5. Pradhan/other local leader
- .a. Other
- .b. Won't Answer
- .c. Doesn't Know

व्यक्तिगत/जो लोग इस घर में रहते
पड़ोसी
पुरा समुदाय
जल बोर्ड
प्रधान/नेता
अन्य
उत्तर नहीं दिया
पता नहीं

इस खंड में हम आपसे जल सुलभता के बारे में कुछ प्रश्न पूछेंगे।

Section 11: Access to Water

खंड 11: जल सुलभता

CHECKPOINT

Does the respondent have access to any municipal water supply (have you checked “yes” for any categories A, B, C or D)?

क्या उनका म्यूनिसिपल सप्लाई पानी आता है (पिछले पेज पर अपने प्रकार A,B,C या D पर “हाँ” टिक किया?)

11.01	Have you ever been threatened that your connection will be terminated? क्या कभी आपको आपका कनेक्शन खत्म कर देने की धमकी मिली (म्यूनिसिपल सप्लाई का पानी)?	No नहीं	1.	→ 11.04
		Yes हाँ	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 11.04
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	→ 11.04
11.02	What was the reason given? क्या कारण बताया गया? अनेक	No reason given कोई कारण नहीं बताया गया	0.	
		Illegal connection गैरकानूनी कनेक्शन	1.	
		Failure to pay fees फीस नहीं दे पाना	2.	
		Water rationing/shortages पानी का सीमित वितरण/कमी	3.	
		.a. अन्य	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	
11.03	Who told you this/threatened you? <i>Circle all that apply</i> किसने आपसे यह कहा/धमकी दी? जो भी लागू हों, उन पर गोला लगायें।	Delhi Jal Board दिल्ली जलबोर्ड	1.	
		MCD/Corporation कॉर्पोरेशन	2.	
		Police पुलिस	3.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	
11.04	Have you ever faced non-availability of water from your water supply (as in the drying of a well, or multiple days without municipal water)? क्या आपको आपके पानी के स्रोत से कभी पानी नहीं मिलने की समस्या (जैसे, कुएँ का सूख जाना या नगरपालिका से न आना) का सामना करना पड़ा?	No नहीं	1.	→ 11.13
		Yes हाँ	2.	→ 11.05
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 11.13
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	→ 11.13

11.05	<p>Why did the problem arise</p> <p>यह समस्या क्यों आई</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो भी लागू हों, उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	<p>अनेक</p>	<p>Connection was terminated कनेक्शन काट दिया गया</p>	1.	→ 11.06
			<p>Well became dry भूमिगत पानी में कमी से</p>	2.	→ 11.07
			<p>Burst pipe पाइप के फट जाने से</p>	3.	→ 11.07
			<p>No electricity to pump water बिजली चले जानो से (पंप नहीं)</p>	4.	→ 11.07
			<p>.a. अन्य</p>	a.	→ 11.07
			<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	→ 11.07
			<p>.c. पता नहीं</p>	c.	→ 11.07
11.06	<p>What was the reason given for the termination of your connection?</p> <p>आपका कनेक्शन खत्म करने के लिये क्या कारण बताया गया?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो भी लागू हों, उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	<p>अनेक</p>	<p>No reason given कोई कारण नहीं बताया गया</p>	0.	
			<p>Illegal connection गैरकानूनी कनेक्शन</p>	1.	
			<p>Failure to pay bill/fees बिल नहीं दे पाना</p>	2.	
			<p>Water rationing/shortages पानी का सीमित वितरण/कमी</p>	3.	
			<p>.a. अन्य</p>	a.	
			<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	
			<p>.c. पता नहीं</p>	c.	
11.07	<p>What did you do to restore water supply?</p> <p>आपने पानी की सप्लाई को फिर से चालू करने के लिये क्या किया?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो भी लागू हों, उन पर गोला लगायें। पढ़कर न बतायें।</p>	<p>केवल एक</p>	<p>Nothing कुछ नहीं</p>	0.	
			<p>Took a new connection from the Jal board जल बोर्ड से नया कनेक्शन लिया</p>	1.	
			<p>Renewed older connection from Jal Board जल-बोर्ड से कनेक्शन का नवीनीकरण करवाया</p>	2.	
			<p>Made a new illegal connection नया गैरकानूनी कनेक्शन लिया</p>	3.	
			<p>Hired someone to deepen well कुआँ गहरा करने के लिए किसी को बोला</p>	4.	
			<p>Talked to Jal Board to fix pipe etc. पाइप आदि जल बोर्ड के द्वारा मरम्मत</p>	5.	
			<p>a. अन्य _____</p>	a.	
			<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	
			<p>.c. पता नहीं</p>	c.	
11.08	<p>How long did it take your water supply to be restored?</p> <p>आपके पानी की सप्लाई को फिर से चालू होने में कितना समय लगा</p>		<p><input type="text"/></p>	1. दिन	
			<p>.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया</p>	b.	
			<p>.c. पता नहीं</p>	c.	

11.09	Who did you ask for help? आपने किससे सहायता माँगी?	Help Codes का प्रयोग करें <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>		
11.10	How much did you pay in official fees or fines to restore your connection? पानी कनेक्शन को फिर चालू करने के लिए आपने कितनी बाकी फीस या जुर्माना दिया?	[<input type="text"/>] रूपये .b. उत्तर नहीं दिया .c. पता नहीं	b. c.	
11.11	How much did you pay over and above official fees and fines? पानी कनेक्शन को फिर चालू करने के लिए आपने कितना ज्यादा सरकारी फीस या जुर्माना दिया?	[<input type="text"/>] रूपये .b. उत्तर नहीं दिया .c. पता नहीं	b. c.	If "0" → 11.13 → 11.13 → 11.13
11.12	To whom did you pay this extra amount? यह अतिरिक्त पैसा आपने किसको दिया?	Delhi Jal Board official दिल्ली जल बोर्ड अधिकारी को MCD official कॉर्पोरेशन के अधिकारी को Local leader/boss निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (नेता) को Police पुलिस .a. अन्यb. उत्तर नहीं दिया .c. पता नहीं	1. 2. 3. 4. a. b. c.	
11.13	Have you ever approached an elected official regarding problems with water? क्या आप कभी पानी की समस्याओं को लेकर किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (चुने गये नेता) से मिले हैं?	No नहीं Yes हाँ .b. उत्तर नहीं दिया .c. पता नहीं	1. 2. b. c.	→ Section 12 → 11.14 → Section 12 → section 12
11.14	What was his/her position at the time? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?	MCD Councilor निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.) MLA विधायक (एम.एल.ए.) MP सांसद (एम.पी.) .a. अन्यb. उत्तर नहीं दिया .c. पता नहीं	1. 2. 3. a. b. c.	

11.15	Did you go alone or as a member of a group? अकेले गये थे या समूह में	Alone अकेले	1.	
		As a group समूह में	2.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	
11.16	What was the subject of the meeting? आपकी मीटिंग का विषय क्या था?	Non-availability of private water supply (tap/handpump) निजी पानी सप्लाई की अनुपलब्धता (घर के निजी नल/हैंडपंप)	1.	
		Non-availability of public water supply (well/ handpumps) सार्वजनिक पानी सप्लाई की अनुपलब्धता (सार्वजनिक नल, हैंडपंप या कुएँ)	2.	
		Disconnection of private water supply निजी पानी सप्लाई का बंद होना	3.	
		Disconnection of public water supply सार्वजनिक पानी सप्लाई का बंद होना	4.	
		. a. अन्य	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		.c. पता नहीं	c.	
11.17	What was the outcome? मीटिंग का परिणाम क्या निकला	They were not in the office वह दफ्तर में नहीं थे/थीं/उपलब्ध/नहीं थे/थीं	1.	
		They would not meet with me. मुझसे बात करने से मना कर दिया	2.	
		They would not help बात की लेकिन उन्होंने सहायता देने से मना कर दिया	3.	
		They said they would help, but did not उन्होंने सहायता देने का वादा किया लेकिन कुछ नहीं हुआ	4.	
		The problem was resolved/improved समस्या हल हो गई/स्थिति में सुधार हुआ	5.	
		.a. अन्य	a.	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
.c. पता नहीं	c.			

इस खंड में हम आपसे स्थानीय सड़क एवं परिवहन के बारे में एक प्रश्न पूछेंगे।

Section 12: Local Road & Transport

खंड 12: स्थानीय सड़कें एवं परिवहन

12.01 केवल एक	What is the largest vehicle that can drive on the roads outside your house?	Footpath/pedestrian only केवल पैदल यात्री	1.	
	आपके घर से बाहर की सड़क/गली पर सबसे बड़ी कौनसी गाड़ी चल सकती है?	Bicycle साईकिल	2.	
		Motorcycle मोटर साईकिल	3.	
		Auto rickshaw ऑटो रिक्शा	4.	
		Small car छोटी कार	5.	
		Large car बड़ी कार	6.	
		Lorry/Truck/Bus लॉरी/ट्रक/बस	7.	

4.

इस खंड में हम आपसे बिजली सुलभता के बारे में पूछेंगे।

Section 13: Access to electricity

खंड 13: बिजली की सुलभता

13.01	Do you have a bulb, fan, power outlet or tube light in your home? क्या आपके घर में कोई बल्ब, पंखा, प्लग पोइन्ट या ट्यूबलाईट है?	No नहीं	0.	→ 13.26
		Yes हाँ	1.	
13.02	Do you have an electricity connection in your home? आपके घर में बिजली का कनेक्शन है?	No नहीं	0.	→ 13.26
		Yes हाँ	1.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.03	Do you have an electric meter? क्या आपके घर में बिजली का मिटर लगा है?	No नहीं	0.	
		Yes हाँ	1.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.04	Do you pay for your electricity? क्या आप अपने बिजली के लिये भुगतान करते हैं?	No नहीं	0.	→ 13.09
		Yes हाँ	1.	→ 13.05
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 13.09
		c. नहीं पता	c.	→ 13.09
13.05	Whom do you pay for your electricity? आप बिजली के लिये किसको भुगतान करते हैं? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	Direct to the Power Company सीधा बिजली कंपनी को	1.	→ 13.06
		Landlord मकान मालिक	2.	→ 13.07
		Neighbor पड़ोसी	3.	→ 13.07
		Locan leader/boss स्थानीय बॉस/नेता	4.	→ 13.07
		a. अन्य _____	a.	→ 13.07
		b उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 13.07
		c नहीं पता	c.	→ 13.07

अनेक

13.06	From which company do you receive your electricity? आप किस कम्पनी से बिजली लेते हैं?	North Delhi Power Compnay (NDPL) नार्थ डेलही पावर लिमिटेड (एन.डी.पी.एल.)	1	
		BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. बी.एस.ई. एस. यमुना पावर लिमिटेड	2	
		BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. बी.एस.ई.एस. राजधानी पावर लिमिटेड	3	
		NDMC Electricity Department एन.डी.एम.सी. इलेक्ट्रिसिटी डिपार्टमेंट	4	
		a. अन्य _____	a	
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		.c नहीं पता	c	
13.07	How much was your most recent electricity bill? आपका पिछला बिजली का बिल कितना था?	रुपये <input type="text"/>		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		.c. नहीं पता	c	
13.08	How frequently do you pay for your electricity? आप प्रायः कितने बार बिजली का बिल भरते हैं?	Daily रोज	1	
		Weekly सप्ताहिक	2	
		Monthly मासिक	3	
		Bi-Monthly द्विमासिक	4	
		a. अन्य	a	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		c. नहीं पता	c	
13.09	For how many hours per day on average do you have power cuts at this time of year? साल के इस समय, रोज़ लगभग कितने घंटे बिजली की कटौती होती हैं?	घंटे <input type="text"/>		
		.b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		.c. नहीं पता	c	
13.10	Last June, for how many hours per day on average did you have power cuts? पिछले साल गरमियों में, रोज़ लगभग कितने घंटे बिजली की कटौती होती थी?	घंटे <input type="text"/>		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		c. नहीं पता	c	

13.11	How did you obtain this electricity connection? आपको यह बिजली-कनेक्शन कैसे मिला? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	अनेक	Came with the house घर के साथ मिला	1	→ 13.16
			Direct application to power compnay पावर कंपनी को सीधे आवेदन द्वारा	2	→ 13.12
			Agent बिचौलिया के द्वारा	3	→ 13.12
			Municipal drive/campaign म्यूनिसिपल का विद्युतीकरण अभियान	4	→ 13.12
			Personally attached illegal connection खुद ही गैरकानूनी तरीके से लगा लिया	5	→ 13.12
			Paid someone to attach illegal connection किसी को पैसे देकर गैरकानूनी तरीके से लगवाया	6	→ 13.12
			a. अन्य	a	→ 13.12
			b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	→ 13.16
			c. नहीं पता	c	→ 13.16
13.12	How much did you pay for the connection itself? कनेक्शन के लिये आपने कितने पैसे दिये?		<input type="text"/> (Form) रुपये फर्म के लिये	1	
			<input type="text"/> (Affidavit/Typing) रुपये अफिडेविट/टाईपिंग	2	
			<input type="text"/> (Connection charge) रुपये कनेक्शन चार्ज	3	
			<input type="text"/> (Meter) मीटर	4	
			<input type="text"/> (Total) कुल	5	
			b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
c. नहीं पता	c				
13.13	Who did you pay for the connection itself? कनेक्शन के लिये आपने किसको पैसे दिये? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	अनेक	Official fee to power compnay बिजली कंपनी को सरकारी फीस	1	
			Official fee to agent एजेंट को फीस	2	
			Bribe to compnay employees कंपनी के कर्मचारी को रिश्वत	3	
			Bribe to elected official निर्वाचित प्रत्याशी (नेता) को रिश्वत	4	
			Payment to owner of connection कनेक्शन के मालिक को भुगतान	5	
			Bribe to local leader/boss स्थानीय नेता/बॉस	6	
			a. अन्य .	a	
			b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
			c. नहीं पता	c	
13.14	Did you have to pay anything extra over and above the official fees? उपर दी गई खर्चा/फीस के अलावा भी क्या आपको कुछ पैसे देने पड़े?		No नहीं	0.	→ 13.16
			Yes हाँ	1.	→ 13.15
			b. उत्तर नहीं दिया.	b.	→ 13.16
			c. नहीं पता	c.	→ 13.16

13.15	How much did you pay over and above the official fees? उपर दी गई खर्चा/फ़ीस के अलावा आपने कितना पैसा खर्च किया?	रुपये <input type="text"/>		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.16	Have you ever been threatened that your connection will be terminated? क्या कभी आपको आपका कनेक्शन काट देने की धमकी मिली?	No नहीं	0.	→ 13.18
		Yes हाँ	1.	→ 13.17
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 13.18
		c. नहीं पता	c.	→ 13.18
13.17	What was the reason given? क्या कारण बताये गये? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	No reason given कोई कारण नहीं बताया गया	1.	
		Illegal Connection गैरक़ानूनी कनेक्शन	2.	
		Failure to pay/late bill बिल नहीं दे पाना/बिल देने में देरी	3.	
		a. अन्य <input type="text"/>	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.18	How many times was your power disconnected (excluding regular power cuts) during the last year? पिछले साल (आम बिजली कटौती को छोड़ कर) आपकी बिजली कितनी बार काटी गयी?	<input type="text"/> बार		If "0.No", → 13.25
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.19	What was the reason given for your power being cut? आपकी बिजली काटने के लिये क्या कारण बताये गये Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	No reason given कोई कारण नहीं बताया गया	0	
		Illegal Connection गैरक़ानूनी कनेक्शन	1	
		Failure to pay/late bill बिल नहीं दे पाना/बिल देने में देरी	2	
		Illegal settlement गैरक़ानूनी आवास	3	
		a. अन्य	a	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		c. नहीं पता	c	
13.20	How long did it take for your power to be restored? आपको अपनी बिजली को फिर से लगवाने में कितना समय लगा?	<input type="text"/>	1. दिन 2. सप्ताह 3. महीना	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		c. नहीं पता	c	

13.21	Through what means was your power restored? आपने अपनी बिजली वापस कैसे कराई? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	1. Took new official connection (directly from power company) नया अधिकारिक कनेक्शन लिया (सीधे बिजली कंपनी से)	1.	
		2. Restored previous connection from power company पिछले अधिकारिक कनेक्शन के बिल को चुका कर (सीधे बिजली कंपनी को)	2.	
		3. Took new illegal connection नया गैरकानूनी कनेक्शन लिया	3.	
		4. Paid agent for new legal connection नये अधिकारिक कनेक्शन के लिये बिचौलिये को पैसे दिये	4.	
		5. Paid agent to restore previous legal connection पिछले अधिकारिक कनेक्शन को फिर से शुरू करने के लिये बिचौलिये को पैसे दिये	5.	
		6. Used contacts to restore previous legal connection अधिकारिक कनेक्शन को फिर से शुरू करने के लिए राजनीतिक या अन्य संपर्कों का प्रयोग किया	6.	
		7. Used contacts to restore previous illegal connection गैरकानूनी कनेक्शन को फिर से शुरू करने के लिये राजनीतिक या अन्य संपर्कों का प्रयोग किया	7.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.22	How much did you pay in official fees or fines to restore your connection? अपना कनेक्शन फिर से लगवाने के लिये आपने सरकारी फीस या जुर्माने के रूप में कितने पैसे दिये?	रुपये <input type="text"/>		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.23	How much did you pay over and above official fees and fines to restore your connection? अपना कनेक्शन फिर से लगवाने के लिये आपने सरकारी फीस और जुर्माने के अलावा कितने पैसे दिये?	रुपये <input type="text"/>		If "0" → 13.25 → 13.25 → 13.25
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया ..	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.24	To whom did you pay this money? आपने यह पैसा किसको दिया? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	1. Power company official बिजली कंपनी के अधिकारी को	1.	
		2. Corporation official कार्पोरेशन के अधिकारी को	2.	
		3. Local leader/boss स्थानीय प्रतिनिधि (नेता) को	3.	
		a. अन्य	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
c. नहीं पता	c.			

13.25	<p>What problems have you noticed with your current electricity connection?</p> <p>अभी आपके कनेक्शन के साथ क्या समस्याएँ हैं?</p>	No problems कोई समस्या नहीं है	0.	
		Very high bill बिल बहुत ज़्यादा आता है	1.	
		Frequent power cuts लगातार बिजली का कटना	2.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		उत्तर नहीं दिया b.	b.	
		नहीं पता c.	c.	
13.26	<p>Have you ever contacted an elected official with complaints about your electricity connection?</p> <p>क्या आप कभी अपने बिजली कनेक्शन के बारे में शिकायत करने के लिये किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (चुने गये नेता) से मिले हैं?</p>	No नहीं	1.	<p>→ Section 14</p> <p>→ 13.27</p> <p>→ Section 14</p> <p>→ Section 14</p>
		Yes हाँ	2.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b	
		c. नहीं पता	c	
13.27	<p>What was his/her office at the time?</p> <p>उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?</p>	Councilor निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)	1.	
		MLA विधायक (एम.एल.ए.)	2.	
		MP सांसद (एम.पी.)	3.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.28	<p>Did you go alone or as a member of a group?</p> <p>अकेले गये थे या समूह में</p>	Alone अकेले	1.	
		In a group समूह में	2.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
13.29	<p>What did you speak to him/her about?</p> <p>आपने उनसे किस बारे में बात की?</p>	Electricity bill higher than it should be बिजली का बिल जितना होना चाहिये उससे ज़्यादा होने के बारे में	1.	
		Electricity bills higher than I could pay जितने पैसे मैं दे सकता हूँ, बिजली का बिल उससे ज़्यादा होने के बारे में	2.	
		Electricity not coming बिजली न आने के बारे में	3.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	

13.30	What was the outcome? परिणाम क्या रहा?	Was not in the office वह दफ़्तर में नहीं थे/थीं, मिलने के लिये उपलब्ध नहीं थे/थीं	1.
		Would not/could not help सहायता देने से मना कर दिया	2.
		Said they would help, but did not उन्होंने कहा कि वे सहायता करेंगे/करेंगी, लेकिन सहायता कभी नहीं मिली	3.
		Told someone to help, but they did not उन्होंने किसी से कहा लेकिन समस्या हल नहीं हुई	4.
		The problem was improved/resolved उन्होंने किसी से कहा और समस्या हल हो गयी	5.
		a. अन्य	a.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		c. नहीं पता	c.

इस खंड में आपके इलाके की कानूनी व्यवस्था के बारे में कुछ प्रश्न पूछेंगे

Section 14: Crime

खंड 14: अपराध

14.01	Are there any problems of law and order in your area?	No नहीं	0.	→ 14.03
	क्या आपके इलाके में कानून और व्यवस्था की समस्याएँ हैं? b. उत्तर नहीं दिया c. नहीं पता	Yes हाँ	1.	→ 14.02
			b.	→ 14.03
			c.	→ 14.03
14.02	What types of problems are there in your area?	Theft चोरी	1.	
	आपके इलाके में किस तरह की समस्याएँ हैं? Circle all that apply जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें	Gambling जुआ	2.	
		Alcoholism/drunkenness शराब-सम्बंधित	3.	
		Assault/violent crime हमला/अपराध/झपटमारी	4.	
		Domestic violence/abuse घरेलू मारपीट/गाली-गलौज	5.	
		Vandalism/destruction of property तोड़-फोड़/सम्पत्ति को नुकसान पहुँचाना	6.	
		Illegal drugs नशीली दवाएँ	7.	
		Extortion हफ्ता वसूली	8.	
		Blackmail ब्लैकमेलिंग	9.	
		a. अन्य	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
		14.03	Have you ever gone to the police for any law and order problem?	No नहीं
क्या आप कभी किसी कानून-व्यवस्था की समस्या को लेकर पुलिस के पास गये हैं?	Yes हाँ		1.	→ 14.04
	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.	→ 14.08
	c. नहीं पता		c.	→ 14.08

अनेक

14.04	<p>For what type of problem did you speak to the police?</p> <p>किस तरह की समस्या के बारे में आपने पुलिस से बात की?</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगायें</p>	Theft चोरी	1.	
		Gambling जुआ	2.	
		Alcoholism/drunkenness शराब-सम्बंधित	3.	
		Assault/violent crime हमला/अपराध/झपटमारी	4.	
		Domestic violence/abuse घरेलू मारपीट/गाली-गलौज	5.	
		Vandalism/destruction of property तोड़-फोड़/सम्पत्ति को नुकसान पहुँचाना .	6.	
		Illegal drugs नशीली दवाएँ	7.	
		Extortion हफ्ता वसूली	8.	
		Blackmail ब्लैकमेलिंग	9.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
14.05	<p>How did the police treat you?</p> <p>पुलिस ने आप से कैसा व्यवहार किया?</p>	They refused to speak with me at all उन्होंने मुझसे किसी भी तरह की बातचीत करने से मना कर दिया	1.	
		I was threatened/beaten मुझे धमकी दी गई/पीटा गया	2.	
		They took my report, but appeared uninterested उन्होंने मेरी रिपोर्ट ले ली लेकिन कोई रुचि नहीं दिखाई	3.	
		They were respectful and helpful वे आदर के साथ पेश आए और मददगार थे	4.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		उत्तर नहीं दिया b.	b.	
		नहीं पता .c.	c.	

14.06	How did the police respond to your complaint? अनेक पुलिस ने आपके रिपोर्ट पर क्या कारवाही की? (क्या एक्शन लिया?)	They refused to take a report उन्होंने रिपोर्ट दर्ज करने से मना कर दिया	1.	
		They accepted the report but did not investigate उन्होंने रिपोर्ट दर्ज कर ली लेकिन जाँच नहीं की	2.	
		They accepted the report but did little investigation उन्होंने रिपोर्ट दर्ज कर ली पर थोड़ी बहुत ही जाँच की	3.	
		They accepted the report and actively investigated उन्होंने रिपोर्ट दर्ज कर ली और पूरी जाँच की	4.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया c. नहीं पता	b. c.	
14.07	How did the situation change after you went to the police? केवल एक आपके पुलिस के पास जाने के बाद स्थिति किस तरह बदली?	It got worse और ख़राब हो गई	1.	
		No change कोई बदलाव नहीं हुआ	2.	
		It got better ठीक हो गई	3.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया.	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
14.08	Have you approached an elected official for help in a problem with the police or law and order? पुलिस या क़ानून-व्यवस्था के साथ किसी तरह की समस्या होने पर क्या आप किसी निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधि (नेता) से सहायता के लिये मिले?	No नहीं	0.	→ Section 15
		Yes हाँ	1.	→ 14.09
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ Section 15
		c. नहीं पता	c.	→ Section 15
14.09	What was his/her position at the time? उस समय वे किस पद पर थे/थीं?	Councilor (MCD) निगम पार्षद (एम.सी.डी.)	1.	
		MLA विधायक (एम.एल.ए.)	2.	
		MP सांसद (एम.पी.)	3.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया c. नहीं पता	b. b.	

14.10	Did you go alone or as a member of a group? अकेले गये थे या समूह में?	Alone अकेले	1.
		In a group समूह में	2.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		c. नहीं पता	c.
14.11	What was the nature of the problem? यह किस तरह की समस्या थी?	Ongoing police hearassment पुलिस द्वारा जारी उत्पीड़न	1.
		Arrest of a family member परिवार के किसी सदस्य/दोस्त की गिरफ्तारी	2.
		Law and order problems the police did nothing about/General Law and order problems क़ानून-व्यवस्था की समस्या जिसके बारे में पुलिस ने कुछ नहीं किया/सामान्य क़ानून व्यवस्था की समस्या	3.
		Police asking for bribes पुलिस बकशीश मांग रहे हैं	4.
		a. अन्य _____	a.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		c. नहीं पता	c.
14.12	What happened? क्या हुआ था?	They were not there/available to meet वह दफ़्तर में नहीं थे/थीं, मिलने के लिये उपलब्ध नहीं थे	1.
		They would not speak with me उन्होंने मुझसे बात करने से मना कर दिया	2.
		They did nothing हमने बात की लेकिन कोई सुधार नहीं हुआ	3.
		The situation improved/was resolved हमने बात की और समस्या हल हो गई/स्थिति सुधर गयी	4.
		a. अन्य _____	a.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.
		c. नहीं पता	c.

अब हम आपसे आपके घर में रह रहे सदस्यों और उनकी उम्र और वो विद्यालय गए या नहीं ऐसी कुछ प्रश्न पूछेंगे।

Section 15a: Respondent 's Personal Information

खंड 15a: गृह तालिका

Say : Now I would like to ask you a bit more about the other people who live in this house, including their ages and whether or not they have attended school

	15a.02	15a.06	15a.07	15a.08	15a.09	15a.10	15a.11	15a.12	15a.13
	ID पहचान	घर के मुखिया से सम्बंध (घर के मुखिया से इसका (पुरुष/महिला) सम्बंध का है)	Married	Highest Education Completed सर्वोच्च शिक्षा (जो प्राप्त किया गया) USE EDUCA-	नौकरी (Use OCCUPA-	Months worked in the last year पिछले साल में कितने महीने	Days worked per week (when working) महीने में, आपको कितने दिन काम मिलता है (जब काम कर रहे हों)?	Income आप कितने पैसे कमा लेते हैं?	Period
A			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____
B			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____
C			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____
D			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____
E			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____
F			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____
G			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____
H			<input type="checkbox"/> नहीं <input type="checkbox"/> हाँ						<input type="checkbox"/> रोजाना <input type="checkbox"/> साप्ताहिक <input type="checkbox"/> मासिक <input type="checkbox"/> अन्य _____

Occupation Codes

00 - Unemployed
01 - Housewife/homemaker

Unskilled laborers

02 - Guard
03 - Cleaner/Maid
04 - Cook
05 - Other Domestic Worker
06 - Shop Worker (Employee)
07 - Petty Trader, Vendor or Hawker (in a market or with a cart)
08 - Daily Manual Labor (Construction, Coolie, etc.)
09 - Farmer/Agricultural Laborer
10 - Stitching
11 - Factory Worker
12 - Rickshaw Puller
13 - Waiter (In a dhaba)
14 - Beggar
15 - Rag picker/Trash picker

Skilled Laborer

16 - Driver
17 - Mechanic
18 - Carpenter
19 - Tailor
20 - Electrician
21 - Cobbler
22 - Plumber
23 - Printer
24 - Painter

25 - Skilled Construction Worker/Contractor
26 - Musician/Artist
27 - Waiter (In a hotel)

Office Workers

27 - Anganwadi Teacher
28 - Government Schoolteacher
29 - Private Schoolteacher
30 - NGO Schoolteacher
31 - Government Nurse
32 - Other Government Healthworker
33 - Private Nurse
34 - Other Private Healthworker
35 - NGO Nurse
36 - Other NGO Healthworker
37 - Government Clerk (i.e. sitting at a desk)
38 - Other Government Office Worker (i.e. peon)
39 - Other NGO Worker
40 - Shopkeeper
41 - Army
42 - Police (Constable, SHO, etc.)
43 - Agent
44 - Salesman
.a. Other .a. अन्य
.b. Won't Answer .b. जवाब नहीं दिया
.c. Doesn't Know .c. पता नहीं

HELP CODES

0. Nobody
1. Relatives
2. Friends
3. Caste group
4. Neighbor
5. Pradhan
6. Agent
7. Employer
8. NGO
9. Private Company
10. Elected official
a. Councilor (MCD)
b. MLA
c. MP
11. Police
12. Government Employees (not elected)
13. Lawyer/solicitor/legal aid
.a. Other
.b. Won't Answer
.c. Doesn't Know

Education Codes

00 - Never been to school	00 - कभी स्कूल नहीं गया
01 - Standard I	01 - कक्षा I
02 - Standard II	02 - कक्षा II
03 - Standard III	03 - कक्षा III
04 - Standard IV	04 - कक्षा IV
05 - Standard V	05 - कक्षा V
06 - Standard VI	06 - कक्षा VI
07 - Standard VII	07 - कक्षा VII
08 - Standard VIII	08 - कक्षा VIII
09 - Standard IX	09 - कक्षा IX
10 - Standard X	10 - कक्षा X
11 - Standard XI	11 - कक्षा XI
12 - Standard XII	12 - कक्षा XII
91 - Diploma	91 - डिप्लोमा
92 - Balwadi	92 - बालवाड़ी
93 - Anganwadi	93 - आंगनवाड़ी
94 - LKG/Nursery	94 - LKG/Nursery
95 - UKG/Prep	95 - UKG/Prep
96 - Bachelor's continue/incomplete	96 - स्नातक पूरा नहीं हुआ है
97 - Completed Bachelor's	97 - स्नातक
98 - Post-Graduate continue/incomplete	98 - उच्च स्नातक पूरा नहीं हुआ है
99 - Completed Post-Graduate	99 - उच्च शिक्षा पूरी हो गई
a. Other	.a. अन्य
b. Won't Answer	.b. जवाब नहीं दिया
c. Doesn't Know	.c. पता नहीं

Relationship Codes

00 - Self	00 - स्वयं	11 - Mother's Father	11 - नाना	21 - Cousin	21 - चचेरे/ममेरे भाई-बहन
01 - Father	01 - पिता	12 - Mother's Mother	12 - नानी	22 - Nephew	22 - भतीजा
02 - Mother	02 - माता	13 - Father's Brother	13 - चाचा/ताऊ	23 - Niece	23 - भतीजी
03 - Husband	03 - पति	14 - Father's Sister	14 - बुआ/फूफी	24 - Father-in-Law	24 - ससुर
04 - Wife	04 - पत्नी	15 - Father's Sister's Husband	15 - फूफा	25 - Mother-in-Law	25 - सास
05 - Brother	05 - भाई	16 - Father's Brother's Wife	16 - चाची/ताई	26 - Husband's Mother	26 - सास
06 - Sister	06 - बहन	17 - Mother's Brother	17 - मामा	.a. Other	.a. अन्य
07 - Son	07 - बेटा	18 - Mother's Sister	18 - मौसी/खाला	.b. Won't Answer	.b. जवाब नहीं दिया
08 - Daughter	08 - बेटि	19 - Mother's Sister's Husband	19 - मौसा/खालू	.c. Doesn't Know	.c. पता नहीं
09 - Father's Father	09 - दादा	20 - Mother's Brother's Wife	20 - मामी		
10 - Father's Mother	10 - दादी				

इस खंड में हम आपसे आपके मकान से जुड़ी कुछ जानकारी लेंगे।

Section 15: General Demographic Questions

खंड 15: सामान्य जनसांख्यिकीय प्रश्न

15.01	What do you call this area?	<input type="text"/>		
	इस इलाके का नाम क्या है?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया c. नहीं पता	b. c.	
15.02	Is this are a legal settle- ment?	No नहीं	0.	
	क्या यह इलाका स्थाई है?	Yes हाँ	1.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
15.03	How are the walls of this dwelling constructed? Primarily observe, but ask if clarification is necessary Circle all that apply इस घर की दीवारें किस चीज़ से बनी है? (SURVEYOR INSTRUC- TION : पहले स्वयं जाँच कीजिये परंतु यदि स्पष्टीकरण की आवश्यकता हो तो पूछिये) जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगाएँ	Concrete/Slab ईंट/कंकरीट की पट्टी	1.	
		Wood and/or corrugated metal लकड़ी और/या धातु की चादर	2.	
		Collected Materials मिलि जुली की गयी सामग्री	3.	
		Tent/tarp/palm leaves टेंट/तिरपाल/ताड़ की पत्ती	4.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
15.04	How is the roof of this dwelling constructed? Primarily observe, but ask if clarification is necessary. Circle all that apply इस घर की छत किस चीज़ से बनी है? (SURVEYOR INSTRUC- TION : पहले स्वयं जाँच कीजिये परंतु यदि स्पष्टीकरण की आवश्यकता हो तो पूछिये) जो लागू हों उन पर गोला लगाएँ	Concrete/Slab ईंट/कंकरीट की पट्टी	1.	
		Wood and/or corrugated metal लकड़ी और/या धातु की चादर	2.	
		Collected Materials मिलि जुली की गयी सामग्री	3.	
		Tent/tarp/palm leaves टेंट/तिरपाल/ताड़ की पत्ती	4.	
		a. अन्य _____	a.	
15.05	Do you rent or own this house?	Rent किराये पर .	1.	→ 15.06
	आप किराये पर रहते हैं या यह आपका अपना घर है?	Own अपना घर है	2.	→ 15.08
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 15.10
		c. नहीं पता	c.	→ 15.10

15.06	How much do you pay per month as rent? आप हर महीने कितना किराया देते हैं?	<input type="text"/> रुपये		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता..	c.	
15.07	How much did you give as a security deposit? जमानत (सिक्योरिटी डिपॉजिट) के तौर पर आपने कितने पैसे दिये?	<input type="text"/> रुपये		→ 15.10
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	→ 15.10
		c. नहीं पता	c.	→ 15.10
15.08 केवल एक	Did you purchase this house, or did you build it? आपने यह घर खरीदा था या बनवाया था?	Purchased खरीदा था	1.	
		Built बनवाया था	2.	
		Inherited from parents माता-पिता ने या रिश्तेदारों ने दिया या दहेज में मिला	3.	
		Given by government/resettlement सरकार ने दिया/रिसेट्टलमिन्ट	4.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
15.09	How much did this house cost to purchase/build आपने यह घर कितने में खरीदा था/बनवाया था?	<input type="text"/> रुपये		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता	c.	
15.10	Since when are you living in this house? आप इस घर में कितने साल से रहते हैं?	<input type="text"/> साल		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
		c. नहीं पता .	c.	
15.11 अनेक	What language do you speak in your home? आप अपने घर में कौन सी भाषा बोलते हैं?	Hindi हिन्दी	1.	
		Urdu उर्दू	2.	
		Punjabi पंजाबी	3.	
		Magadhi मगधी	4.	
		Bengali बंगाली	5.	
		Marwari मारवाड़ी	6.	
		Bhojpuri भोजपुरी	7.	
		Maithili मैथिली	8.	
		English अंग्रेजी	9.	
		a. अन्य	a.	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया	b.	
c. नहीं पता	c.			

15.12	What is your religion? आपका धर्म क्या है?	Hindu	हिन्दू	1.
		Muslim	मुस्लिम	2.
		Sikh	सिक्ख	3.
		Jain	जैन	4.
		Buddhist	बौद्ध	5.
		Christian	ईसाइ	6.
		a. अन्य	_____	a.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
c. नहीं पता		c.		
15.13	Are you a member of a scheduled caste (SC), a scheduled tribe (ST) or an other backwards caste (OBC)? क्या आप अनुसूचित जाति या अनुसूचित जनजाति या अन्य पिछड़ी जाति में से किसी में आते हैं?	None-General	नही-सामान्य	1.
		Scheduled caste (SC)	अनुसूचित जाति .	2.
		Scheduled tribe (ST)	अनुसूचित जनजाति	3.
		Other Backwards caste (OBC)	अन्य पिछड़ी जाति .	4.
		a.अन्य	_____	a.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया .		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.
15.14	Which state are you from? आप कौन से राज्य से आये?	Delhi	दिल्ली	1.
		Uttar Pradesh	उत्तर प्रदेश	2.
		Haryana	हरियाणा	3.
		Madhya Pradesh	मध्य प्रदेश	4.
		Bihar	बिहार .	5.
		Rajasthan	राजस्थान	6.
		West Bengal	पश्चिम बंगाल	7.
		a. अन्य		a.
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
c. नहीं पता		c.		
15.15	What is the name of your village? आपके गाँव/जिला का नाम क्या है?	_____		
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.
15.16	How many televisions are owned by your household? आपके घर में कुल कितने टेलिविज़न हैं?	_____	टेलिविज़न	
		b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.

15.17	How many radios are owned by your household?	<input type="text"/>	रेडियो	
	आपके घर में कुल कितने रेडियो/गाान बजाने की वस्तुएँ हैं?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.
15.18	How Many bicycles are owned by your household?	<input type="text"/>	साइकिल	
	आपके घर में कुल कितनी साइकिलें हैं?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता .		c.
15.19	How Many two-wheelers are owned by your household?	<input type="text"/>	दोपहिया वाहन	
	आपके घर में कुल कितने दोपहिया हैं?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.
15.20	How Many other vehicles are owned by your household?	<input type="text"/>	अन्य गाड़ियाँ	
	आपके घर में और कितनी गाड़ियाँ हैं?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.
15.21	How Many mobile phones are owned by your household?	<input type="text"/>	मोबाइल फोन	
	आपके घर में कुल कितने मोबाइल फोन हैं?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.
15.22	How Many fixed landline phones are owned by your household?	<input type="text"/>	फोन	
	आपके घर में कुल कितने लैण्डलाइन फोन हैं?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.
15.23	How Many Refrigerators are owned by your household?	<input type="text"/>	फ्रिज	
	आपके घर में कुल कितने फ्रिज (रेफ्रिजेरेटर) हैं?	b. उत्तर नहीं दिया		b.
		c. नहीं पता		c.

“Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi”

Milestone 3

An update, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of USAID Development
Innovation Ventures Grant No. AID-OAA-G-12-00006

May 1, 2012
JPAL South Asia at IFMR


Summary of Activity

In the months of March and April 2012, we conducted the second and final round of our newspaper report card campaign. The material for these report cards came from Right to Information Data procured from the government on councilor spending, meeting attendance, and committee membership by our NGO partner Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS, which translates to Society for Citizen's Vigilance Initiative). SNS then submitted the data in report card form to *Hindustan*, the leading Hindi language daily. Finally, *Hindustan* published report cards for 124 of Delhi's 272 wards (our treatment group).

In a subset of 47 wards, we distributed newspaper report cards across 66 slums in order to see if physical distribution would have added impact on voter behavior. We distributed a total of 75,554 newspapers in the two weeks leading up to the April 15 election. Every family in the slum received one report card.

Below is a sample report card:

Figure One: Sample Report Card



Since every report card was distributed within a twelve day span on a day after the report card was published, the following sticker was placed on the front page of the newspaper, to direct attention toward the report card.

Figure Two: Sticker



The text translates to “Within this newspaper, your councillor’s report card is available on page ____.” The page was entered in pen manually, depending on which page of that newspaper the report card appeared in, since this sometimes varied.


Data Points

In total, we distributed 71,293 report cards across 47 wards, which included 68 slums.


Maps

Two maps are provided on the next page. The first is a map of Delhi and has yellow markers in slums that were distributed to. The second is one example of the maps provided to surveyors, which depict the slum area in a particular ward where they were required distribute (area highlighted in red). These areas and boundaries were confirmed by GPS when the surveyors arrived.

Map 1: Slums Distributed to in Delhi



Map 2: Sample Map Given to Distributors



“Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi”

Milestone 4

A progress report, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of USAID Development Innovation Ventures Grant No. AID-OAA-G-12-00006

August 1, 2012
JPAL South Asia at IFMR

Summary of activities since the last report

Since the last milestone, the following activities have taken place:

Endline of public service delivery audits

We have completed the endline of public service delivery audits in the 110 wards in our sample.

		Total Number Audited	Description
Wards		110	
Slums		313	
Toilets		819	This includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Open and closed toilets• Public toilet complexes, Mobile toilets, Cabin toilets, Bio-toilets and Urinals
Garbage Points	Formal Points	250	Dhalaos and Bins
	Informal Points	4945	Piles created by the residents, for example: next to the street, drain, railway tracks, open areas/grounds

In terms of indicators, we have decided not to undertake actual water testing: after assessing both the practical issues of testing and the literature, it became clear that to do this properly, and in way that could be useful for assessing impacts, would be a major exercise. It could be useful to do this in the context of a future research project but it is way beyond the capabilities and scope of this project. Instead, we concentrated the survey effort on ensuring that the assessment of toilet conditions was done thoroughly and carefully.

Currently, we are in the process of cleaning the dataset and preparing a final panel of toilets and garbage points audited across the baseline-midline-endline rounds, which can be further used for analysis. Attached at the end of this report is a detailed ward-wise list of the total number of toilets and garbage points (formal and informal) audited during the endline.

Electoral outcomes endline

We are currently in the process of recovering polling station level data on electoral outcomes from the Delhi State Electoral Commission, which will enable us to analyze the treatment effects of the intervention.

Proposed Revision: Measurement of changes in spatial allocation of public service delivery:

The February 15, 2012 Project Implementation Plan had listed the following as a description of the third component of the endline:

As a part of this endline, we plan to map every expenditure item under a councilor's discretionary fund over the last three years (2009-2011). We propose to obtain an item-wise breakup of the

fund under the Right To Information Act. A comparison of the spending concentration across the three years can help in assessing the impact of the RWA intervention and the slum audits results on the accountability of the councillors and the change in delivery of public services in both slums and RWAs.

In this period, we have explored two alternative methods of undertaking this analysis: field-based surveys of the location of spending items using GPS machines; and geo-coding this data with Google maps. We have decided to go with the second approach. Pilots of the field survey-based approach revealed that it would be much more expensive than estimated in the budget and would lead to a substantial overrun. On the other hand, geo-coding can be done within the budget and we believe it is of sufficient accuracy to analyze if there is any spatial shift in councilor spending in response to the information-based interventions in the experiment.

Note: In the contract signed February 2, 2012, the proposed Milestone Schedule says that Milestones 4 and 5 should “include indicators in Milestone 3.” However, the indicators, namely the “total number of report cards distributed, number and type of news outlets report cards are distributed to and geographic distribution of report cards/media outlets,” will not be updated since the newspaper report card distribution has already taken place and the data provided as of the time of submitting Milestone 3 (May 1, 2012) is final.

A Ward-wise Summary for the Endline Audits:

Ward No.	Slums Audited (Total)	Toilets Audited (Total)	Garbage Points Audited (Total)	
			Informal	Formal
5	3	0	41	0
8	2	0	96	0
9	3	15	22	3
11	6	10	42	3
12	2	5	2	2
13	1	0	1	0
14	2	0	11	0
15	2	9	12	2
16	6	25	92	10
19	4	10	68	2
20	4	21	41	5
21	2	0	15	1
22	2	0	139	0
23	2	0	135	1
26	5	23	361	4
30	5	4	69	2
31	3	25	46	7
32	1	0	5	0

Ward No.	Slums Audited (Total)	Toilets Audited (Total)	Garbage Points Audited (Total)	
			Informal	Formal
33	1	0	90	0
36	3	0	37	0
37	1	8	9	2
41	3	9	25	3
42	4	19	22	6
43	2	11	15	4
45	1	0	10	0
47	2	14	7	4
48	2	1	50	4
53	1	8	7	2
54	2	6	21	3
55	4	12	41	3
56	3	3	8	1
57	4	14	31	1
58	2	7	28	2
59	1	0	25	1
62	4	7	23	2
66	2	6	17	1
71	7	31	86	7
72	3	7	11	2
74	2	8	35	0
81	6	23	7	6
93	1	1	4	1
94	4	19	88	4
95	1	0	1	1
100	5	28	103	5
102	3	12	30	2
103	4	9	23	3
121	1	2	0	0
123	1	10	19	3
124	2	23	48	3
128	1	3	5	0
129	1	1	3	0
131	3	0	9	1
133	4	0	43	0
141	4	2	114	0
144	5	5	88	0
146	1	3	1	1

Ward No.	Slums Audited (Total)	Toilets Audited (Total)	Garbage Points Audited (Total)	
			Informal	Formal
151	4	7	31	4
152	1	2	6	1
153	2	5	4	2
154	4	10	28	6
155	6	9	29	6
156	2	6	2	2
159	1	3	9	1
166	3	6	3	5
167	2	5	19	1
168	1	9	14	4
173	1	0	14	3
178	1	6	30	3
179	2	4	13	1
180	1	4	2	2
181	2	8	2	4
193	6	15	37	4
197	2	2	40	1
198	5	7	80	8
200	13	30	44	6
203	2	31	102	4
205	5	6	154	2
206	3	0	8	2
207	4	42	84	11
212	2	3	79	1
213	6	23	44	7
214	3	3	29	1
216	3	1	81	0
226	1	12	31	4
227	3	6	8	3
230	2	5	13	2
233	1	0	43	1
236	3	4	26	1
237	5	4	13	2
242	4	19	136	5
244	3	20	18	5
246	3	1	6	1
247	4	11	14	4
248	1	3	6	0

Ward No.	Slums Audited (Total)	Toilets Audited (Total)	Garbage Points Audited (Total)	
			Informal	Formal
250	1	7	59	2
251	4	0	43	3
253	2	0	32	0
254	4	2	15	1
255	2	0	27	0
257	4	0	40	1
258	1	0	3	0
260	2	0	18	0
262	4	11	35	2
263	3	0	87	0
264	3	0	132	0
265	2	0	326	0
268	3	0	26	0
269	1	8	148	0
270	2	0	29	1
271	2	0	241	0

“Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi”

Milestone 5

A progress report, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of USAID Development Innovation Ventures Grant No. AID-OAA-G-12-00006

September 1, 2012
JPAL South Asia at IFMR

Summary of activities since the last report

Since the last milestone (Milestone 4, dated August 1, 2012), the following activities have taken place:

Endline of Public Service Delivery Audits

As reported in the last milestone, we have already completed the endline of public service delivery audits of public toilets and garbage collection across the 110 wards in our sample. Milestone 4 also had a detailed ward-wise breakup of the number of toilets and garbage points audited. Currently, we are in the process of cleaning the data, before it can be used for further analysis.

Electoral Outcomes Endline

We are currently in the process of matching our sample areas with their respective polling stations. This matching is key to the impact evaluation: it will enable us to analyze the effect of our newspaper report card campaign on the polling station-wise electoral outcomes (a list of which we have already obtained from the Delhi State Electoral Commission website).

Measurement of changes in spatial allocation of public services delivery

Our NGO partner, Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS, which translates to Society for Citizen's Vigilance Initiative) is in the process of filing Right To Information requests with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to access information on councilor spending in our sample wards across the electoral term, 2007-12. Since the Municipal Corporation was split into three in the last election, there is a bit more uncertainty than usual about how long it will take for the government to provide the information. Once obtained, geo-coding this data will enable us to measure the shifts in spatial allocation of public services delivery, and it evaluate if the provision of information on RWA and slum-dweller preferences to a treatment group of politicians affected their choices.

Note: In the contract signed February 2, 2012, the proposed Milestone Schedule says that Milestones 4 and 5 should "include indicators in Milestone 3." Data on the indicators, namely the "total number of report cards distributed, number and type of news outlets report cards are distributed to and geographic distribution of report cards/media outlets," was provided at the time of submitting Milestone 3 (May 1, 2012) is final; no further updating is required as the newspaper report card distribution was already completed and that data was final.

- **Sharing the results publicly:** We are eager to post the project results on our website as soon as practicable. The report notes that the reported results are preliminary and not ready for publication. At this stage, may we share the bottom line (that information lead to some improvements in service delivery)? Regardless, please provide us with the results as soon as they are final. We'd also be happy to link to the policy brief they plan to write.

Analysis is on-going at the moment along with cleaning of datasets and the process will continue during the course of the year. We will update you on any progress we make with the analysis and share results with you as soon as they are available. We appreciate your kind co-operation in this regard. However, a statement along the lines: *“preliminary results of the experiment suggest that provision of information to politicians on the quality of services—specifically community toilets-- can lead to short term improvement in quality of service delivery in the slums of Delhi”* can be shared.

A policy brief will be written, by the J-PAL policy team, after obtaining final results; this policy brief will be shared with USAID and can be shared publicly as soon as it ready.

- **Cost-effectiveness:** The report does not discuss the solutions' potential cost-effectiveness or whether the costs of the intervention will outweigh the benefits. If IMFR is planning on conducting a CBA, as suggested in the proposal, we'd love to hear about the results once they do this. If you do not planning on conducting a CBA, we would appreciate it if you could comment on the interventions' potential to be more cost-effective than alternatives (even if a formal cost-effectiveness analysis is not feasible). *Note that the proposal states that a cost-benefit analysis will be conducted.*

There must have been some confusion on the potential for conducting a full cost-benefit analysis, for which we apologize: this is especially difficult with respect to quantification of economic benefits, given the complex causal chain from service quality, to usage, to health status, and economic gains. Even a formal cost-effectiveness analysis will be hard to undertake given both the information demands on this causal chain, and the lack of information on alternative treatments. However, we do plan to discuss the more focused question of the cost and feasibility of replicating the approach to providing information on service quality, and to consider alternatives. A preliminary assessment follows for the audits of community toilets and dhalaos:

Audits of public services

In each round, we audited a total of 317 slums (in 108 wards), covering (on an average) a total of 819 toilets and urinals, 196 dhalaos, 5250 informal points per round. With a team of 27 auditors we were able to complete one round in three months, costing us approximately \$15,500 per round. However, the digital data collection techniques (using cellphones, GPS machines etc) along with the spread of slums across Delhi made it an intensive activity in terms of training, implementing and monitoring. Our intuition therefore, is that the insight of this experiment can be better replicated by other, more cost-effective mechanisms and should definitely be discussed while engaging with NGOs and government departments.

Publication of report cards on Councillor performance

We published a total of 109 report cards in 2010 and 124 report cards in 2012. The primary costs were incurred in filing Right to Information (RTI) requests and hiring data entry operators to clean the data and prepare the report cards. Filing an RTI costs Rs. 10 per application and hiring a data entry operator (in Delhi) costs \$140/month, making it a fairly low cost affair. Moreover, during the previous election (in April 2012), we observed that apart from Hindustan (our media partner), other

media houses (Hindustan Times, Times of India etc.) also published report cards on Councillor performance in March 2012, suggesting the cost effectiveness of the experiment along with its easy replication. However, since we are still in the process of conducting the analysis, the impact of this evaluation cannot be determined at the moment.

- **Survey results.** The report notes that almost no respondents reported that caste or religion drives their voting decisions. Could IMFR comment on the extent to which courtesy bias might have driven these responses?

Courtesy bias could well be present for this question, even though we took efforts to design the survey to include this question in the context of a range of other voting-related questions that could provide a cross-check on internal consistency. However, it is noteworthy that only 2% of the candidates have reported evaluating candidates based on their religion/caste. At a minimum, this is interesting information on the narratives that slum-dwellers present on the salience of caste. We will explore this further in analysis, though at this point it is unclear whether we can get a direct measure of the bias.

- **Intervention results:** We'd appreciate IMFR's interpretation of why the intervention resulted in certain statistically significant impacts on some outcomes of interest, but not all.

The results indicate that the provision of information on the quality of local public goods to politicians can have positive effects on the quality of service provision, especially for certain features of community toilets. This is dependent on the service category and particular aspects of implementation.

These effects occurred in the context of a system in which any influence would have been indirect. Politicians do not have executive authority over implementation, but they can intermediate in implementation. Most of the service provision—both dhalaos and toilets, but especially for toilets—was under management contracts to NGOs or private-sector operators (with the difference between these grey in practice). So any influence a politician has would be through putting pressure on contractors to change their behaviour: this probably explains why there is influence in some domains of public toilets—the number of facilities and prices—but not others. There are some indications that this was in areas linked to contractual obligations (e.g. on pricing).

The absence of any treatment effect on drains indicates that there were neither positive spillover effects—if politicians' awareness of dismal conditions were activated—nor negative ones—so increased effort in one area where information was provided (toilets) did not lead to reduced effort elsewhere.

It is noteworthy that while the election in the period of the intervention only directly affected councillors, we see similar treatment effects on the quality of public toilets for MLAs, as well as councillors. This is consistent with the unclear division of responsibility between levels of government, and with both categories of politician having some capacity to intermediate. What is more, it indicates that the incentive effects are not confined to the election period.

- It doesn't appear that these two previously requested pieces have been addressed:
 1. Discuss the degree to which the survey results are likely to be reflective of slums /people in poverty in other contexts.
 2. Discuss the external validity of the impact evaluation. In what other contexts are these results likely to apply? Are there broader implications regarding voter awareness/ accountability programs?

There is widespread evidence that even though slum-dwellers are a politically active group and elected officials are keen to garner the votes of slum-dwellers at election times, the current quality of provision and the functioning of governance mechanisms are poor. While every city is different, Delhi's slums at one level offer a broadly typical mix of long-term residents, migratory labour, unskilled/low-skilled labour and those employed in the informal sector. Specifically with respect to India, the UNDP and Government of India's *Urban Poverty Report – 2009* states that urban slums in India are uniformly characterized by high population density, lack of civic amenities like clean drinking water and access to sanitation and health services. Relative to other cities Delhi is unusual in that it has a State Government that is only responsible to the city itself. It is not unusual in having both municipal Ward Councillors, and State MLAs with (often overlapping) responsibilities for service provision. This suggests that the results are likely to be reflective of the slums in other contexts as well, though in drawing lessons elsewhere attention would have to be paid to the legal and policy basis for specific categories of service delivery. Moreover, during the course of the study, as noted in the report, various organisations from across India (research, non-government, civil society) have approached us to understand our design, methodology and results. This indicates the similarity of contexts and problems across different urban slums, and given the uniform administrative setup across India, we believe that it makes a case for our results to have some external validity.

Our findings contribute to the broader literature on the role of information in the political process in low-income settings, where institutions for supporting effective political engagement, such as the media and public auditing systems, are often relatively underdeveloped. Much of that literature, however, focuses on informing voters/citizens about the performance of their legislators as well as about their entitlements. Several of these studies find that informing voters about the performance of their legislators has substantial effects on their voting behaviour. We find that politicians respond to provision of information on service quality in their constituencies in a context of competitive elections. We are so far agnostic as to whether this is driven by the awareness that they are being monitored, or through revealing information to them that they didn't have. However, this result is likely to be applicable to other areas of competitive local elections where issues of local public goods are salient. It will be important to undertake further research in other contexts to explore this.

Scaling: The report still contains insufficient information about scaling and policy dissemination plans. The report should describe the possible pathways to scale (outlined on p. 29) in greater detail, outlining the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. We recognize that IMFR is in the early stages of the policy dissemination work, but we'd appreciate a candid assessment of how likely the project is to scale through each of these pathways, and why. Also, we'd appreciate more details about the kinds of stakeholders who might be targeted, and what role the research is likely to play in their decision making. For example, p. 29 mentions presenting ideas to government officials, but does not outline what entity/officials.

This has been added to the report.

- This project generated massive amounts of mapping data of the slum areas in Delhi. How will this data be used going forward? Will this data be shared with third parties and/or publicly?

The following GIS maps were generated during the course of the project:

- i) Administrative boundaries
This data was on the ward and assembly constituency boundaries and was prepared in 2010 during the initial phases of the project since at that point the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) did not have any ward (and AC) maps that we could have used. Since then, the MCD has created an online GIS portal for the citizens (<http://alpha.mapmyindia.com/mcdApp/>), which has all the administrative maps, is publicly available and therefore should be a better source. We are also in the process of updating our maps based on the updated MCD maps.
- ii) Slum areas
As noted in the report, the slum areas were mapped based on field confirmation and satellite images. These were created in 2010 as well. The purpose of this dataset was to make it easier for the field team to identify the slum area to implement the surveys. Since they have not been updated, any changes since 2010 would not be recorded.
- iii) Audits: Toilet and garbage locations
During the course of the toilets and garbage audits, we collected GPS locations of all audited facilities. Since the survey was done digitally, information was collected on cellphones. The primary motivation behind the collection was again to monitor the progress of field team, make it easier for the team to identify previously audited facilities. Therefore, though the location is recorded, we expect an error in the accuracy due to its collection on cellphones. So though they give a good representative picture within a ward/AC, they are not fit to be used for rigorous spatial analysis.
- iv) Spending mapping
Finally, we mapped all the spending items for all the Councillors in our sample wards for their entire term (2007-12). This mapping is based on a combination of our existing maps, Google Earth and the Delhi Eicher Maps and we expect to use them for further spatial analysis.

We want to understand the properties of this data before releasing it, including through analysis. Once we are confident that the different parts of the data collected is of value (and that there are no issues of human subjects) we will be happy to share it publicly.

- Finally, after the award closes, we'd appreciate any updates IMFR can share about policy dissemination and scaling. This will help us learn what strategies are most effective, and broadcast any successes.

This has been added to the report.

“Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi”

Final Report with preliminary data

A final report with preliminary data, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of USAID Development Innovation Ventures Grant No. AID-OAA-G-12-00006

April 1, 2013
JPAL South Asia at IFMR

Executive summary

This study used randomized evaluations to test whether providing information to government officials and slum dwellers leads to increased accountability and improved public service delivery. The evaluation consisted of two main types of intervention: one targeting voters and the other local politicians (both Ward Councillors, for the Municipality, and Members of Legislative Assembly, or MLAs, from the Delhi state government). Prior to these interventions, we conducted extensive household surveys, which enabled us to obtain measures of stated preferences amongst slum-dwellers and other citizens, and ultimately helped shape the design of the interventions. The first intervention was designed to measure the effect of voter information campaigns on voter turnout and electoral outcomes. We published report cards of municipal councillors (MCs) in 2010, mid-way through the MC's term, and again in 2012, immediately prior to the April election. In order to assess whether direct provision of information amplifies the impact, newspapers were also distributed door-to-door in a random subset of slums within each treatment ward. The second intervention was designed to examine the effect of information provision on councillor spending and quality of public services. Audits were conducted of garbage and toilet services in slums in a sample of 100 wards. The results of these audits were then compiled into report cards, which were mailed to randomly select Members of Legislative Assembly and MCs. Two rounds of audit report cards were sent: the first in August 2011 (a non-election sensitive period) and a second in January 2012 (in the lead up to the April elections).

Results from our baseline surveys indicate significant evidence of low-quality public good provision and relatively similar (and coherent) preferences at both the slum and ward level. Slum-dwellers report significant discontent about some aspects of slum life, most notably access to water and sanitation but, interestingly, not about others, including education and healthcare. The audits also reveal low quality of public amenities across Delhi: roughly 30 percent of toilet complexes in our sample were closed, only 30 percent of toilets had soap provided, despite statutory requirements, 65 percent of our sample areas did not have any formal garbage point (dhalao) and overflowing garbage dumps were a consistent problem (in 69 percent of dhalaos). Preliminary findings show that providing information to politicians on the state of public toilets and garbage disposal in their constituencies led to significant improvements in implementation. While levels of infrastructure (as measured by number of toilets, garbage points and bins) were unaffected, compliance with contractual requirements on pricing and facilities (for toilets) improved and garbage disposal points were less likely to be overflowing and, in high usage treatment areas, they were also more likely to be cleaned daily. The reduction in average price charged and improvement in facilities available within toilets is associated with an increase in toilet usage in treatment neighborhoods where baseline surveys revealed relatively high public toilet usage and/or high levels of public defecation. Analysis of the newspaper report card intervention is currently ongoing.

This report is organized in the following manner: Section I discusses the key study question, Section II examines the study design, Section III provides an overview of the datasets, Section IV discusses preliminary results; Section V discusses policy implications, and Section VI

summarises the policy dissemination activities undertaken already as well as outlines an elaborate policy dissemination plan.

I. Study Questions

My father (former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi) used to say that only 15 Paise out of a Rupee (spent by the government) reaches people. After seeing the situation here I feel that not even five paise is reaching the people.

Rahul Gandhi, Party Secretary, Indian National Congress (ruling party in India) at a rally in 2008 (Gandhi, 2008)

India is the world's largest democracy and home to roughly one-third of the world's poor, yet as the quote suggests, this voting bloc has been largely unable to translate their political weight into effective service delivery and other economic gains. Why are poor citizens unable to use their vote to elect politicians who are less corrupt, more competent at delivering services, or both?

The goal of this research is to understand the role of information in improving the governance of low-income democracies. A growing body of evidence suggests that improving the information available to voters influences electoral outcomes (see, Pande 2011). However, we know less about: (a) the types of information that influence voter behavior, (b) whether politician behavior is influenced by the fact that voters are more informed, and (c) whether and how increases in electoral accountability influence service delivery.

To this end, this study examines the following questions: 1) whether better electoral outcomes can be achieved by directly providing voters with information on politicians' performance and qualifications, 2) whether anticipation of public disclosure on performance can cause incumbents to improve their service delivery and performance, and 3) whether governance can be strengthened by directly providing elected officials with information about the quality of service and does this, in turn, affect usage of these amenities.

II. Study Design: Surveys and Interventions

Household Surveys

As mentioned in our proposal, an initial household survey was conducted of over 5,000 households in May 2010 based on spatial maps of Delhi, satellite images, Delhi government listings, site visits and interactions with local NGOs. Based on the UN-Habitat and Indian census classification¹, we categorised the surveyed areas into high-slum index and low-slum index areas.

¹ According to this classification, an area is determined to be a slum if it meets at least five out of nine criteria closely related to the census definition of slums. These criteria include high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road

Ultimately, around 3,000 households were determined to be high slum index households (in areas with five or more “slum” characteristics) and around 2,000 were determined to be low slum index households (in areas with less than five “slum” characteristics). The survey covered local area development issues, access to rations and other certificates, access to healthcare facilities, access to educational services, voting record, civic knowledge, political actions, sanitation, access to water, local transport, access to electricity, crime, and demographics.

This was followed by a second household survey, which covered migration, health, aspirations, social networks, security, property rights, housing finance and migration, and anthropometrics. We also sought to obtain information from both women and men in this survey. We experienced considerable difficulty in tracking down and finding respondents from the first household survey, particularly those working outside the home. To overcome this challenge, we undertook a series of innovative approaches—using evening and weekend teams, phone appointments and splitting the survey into different parts (for alternative household respondents). This extended the period of survey, but we ended with a complete respondent rate of over 80% (and higher for the parts of the survey that could be answered by women at home.)

A third survey of 250 heads or members Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) was also added, which asked about the problems they faced and how they dealt with them.

Report Cards on Councillor Performance

Context

The first intervention was designed to measure the effect of voter information campaigns on voter turnout and electoral outcomes. This intervention consisted of publishing report cards on local Councillors in *Hindustan*, a leading Hindi language daily. The material for these report cards came from Right to Information Data procured from the government on Councillor spending, meeting attendance, and committee membership by our NGO partner Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS, which translates to Society for Citizen’s Vigilance Initiative).

Experimental Design

A. Randomization and Power Calculations

In our original proposal, we had proposed a focus on Ward Councillors, with a random assignment of 257 wards into one of four categories: a comparison group and three treatment groups. The first treatment group (T1) was to be informed in May 2010 that report cards on their performance would be disseminated only in the run-up to the election in 2012. The second and third treatment group (T2 and T3) were to have report cards published on their performance in both 2010, at the mid-term of their time in office, and again in the run-up to the elections in 2012, with T2 wards receiving additional slum-level efforts on voter mobilisation. Treatment categories were assigned, stratifying for incumbent party and zone (there are twelve geographically

infrastructure, low access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles, and frequent cohabitation with animals.

contiguous zones in Delhi, each comprising an average of 15 wards). This structure would allow us to assess whether the knowledge that information on performance would have incentive effects on political behavior, and further, whether voter information and mobilization at the mid-term would lead citizens to increase pressures on local politicians. However, after some initial discussions with SNS, other NGOs and slum dwellers, and after conducting some piloting, we realized that it would be extremely difficult to conduct voter mobilization campaigns, especially in slum areas. Being important political vote banks, the atmosphere is politically charged close to the elections and, therefore, conducting mobilization campaigns close to the election could have threatened the security and safety of our surveyors. After careful assessment, we decided to drop voter mobilization and instead combine the second and third treatment groups.

Upon comparison after allocation to treatments, there was no significant correlation ($p < .10$) between treatment status and population, scheduled caste/scheduled tribe population, turnout or margin of victory in the previous election. Given 257 wards allocated to treatment as above, it was calculated that there must be a standardized effect of at least .19 across treatment categories (measuring effect as increase in turnout, decrease in criminal candidate vote share, increase in development spending by candidates, etc.), which is well within estimates from previous studies in Delhi (Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su 2009) and Uttar Pradesh (Banerjee, Green, Green and Pande 2009). Ultimately, we decided to drop zones 9 and 10, which contained 17 wards, because they contained rural areas or areas where few slums were anticipated. Thus, our intended treatment sample was ultimately composed of 240 wards: 72 control wards, 58 T1 wards (where report cards were to be published only prior to the election in 2012), and 110 T2 wards (where report cards were to be published both at the midterm in 2010 and again before the election in 2012).

Furthermore, within a subset of the treatment wards, another randomisation was done at the slum level within every ward. In half of the randomly selected slums in a ward, each household received a newspaper delivered at their doorstep; whereas, the other half served as a comparison group. This will allow us to explore the additional effect of newspaper distribution as compared to publication alone. In all, 66 slums in 47 treatment wards were randomly selected for distribution: 22 slums in 17 T1 wards and 44 slums in 30 T2 wards.²

B. Implementation and analysis

² In the original randomization, 61 wards were selected as distribution wards. However, the final slum-level randomization was done on those wards that *received* treatment. Thus, improperly surveyed wards, wards with Councillor suspensions/deaths, and wards dropped due to constraints by *Hindustan* were excluded. Further exclusions included a replacement ward that actually had no slums and wards with boundary issues. In 2010, we distributed a total of 62,220 newspapers and in 2012, we distributed a total of 78,212 newspapers. Every household in the slum received one report card.

In 2010, 109 report cards were published. Two wards were removed from T3: in ward 12, the Councillor died and in ward 78, the election of the Councillor was held null in void (this ward was replaced with ward 6 from T1, thereby only reducing the total number of published report cards in 2010 by 1).

In 2012, 124 report cards were published: six wards were dropped because the Councillor was suspended or died (including the two mentioned above); seven were dropped because they were never sampled (in two of these cases another ward was sampled instead); one was dropped because there were no slums in the ward; and the last 30 were dropped because *Hindustan* was only able to publish 124. To compensate for these changes, we will use an intention-to-treat framework in our analysis so they will not affect the internal validity of the study.

To be able to analyse the effect of the campaign on electoral behaviour and electoral outcomes, it was necessary to obtain a polling-station level dataset and match our sample areas to their respective polling stations. The data uploaded by the Delhi State Election Commission (DSEC) was either illegible, incomplete or missing. After repeated requests and meetings with the DSEC, we were able to obtain a raw dataset of the polling-station level electoral results, which we are currently in the process of cleaning and organising. Furthermore, to be able to match our distribution areas to their respective polling stations, we conducted a digital survey in July 2012, to collect voter id information of the slum-dwellers. However, piloting the digital survey was difficult, since respondents were not comfortable sharing sensitive voter id information on cell phones. As an alternative, we switched to conducting paper surveys, which yielded clear positive returns in terms of data collection (although it added to our monetary and time costs).

We are currently beginning the analysis to determine treatment effects for the intervention. We will examine treatment effects on electoral outcomes such as voter turnout and incumbent vote share.

Public Service Delivery Audits

Context

The second intervention was designed to examine the effect of information provision on the quality of public services, to both Councillors and MLAs. We focused on toilets, garbage and drains because the household survey found that sewage disposal (which households could have interpreted to include both toilets and drains) was ranked the “most problematic issue” by almost a third of slum households, while garbage disposal was the most problematic issue for around 12 percent of the households. Our initial proposal was to audit garbage and education facilities. However, educational facilities were dropped due to constraints on being able to audit schools without prior permission, and because slum-dwellers ranked sewage disposal as a greater problem. Moreover, our original proposal was for one round of report cards. But, considering that Councillor elections were due in April 2012, we decided to send two rounds of report cards in order to capture the difference in activism during election sensitive and non-sensitive periods.

Experimental Design

A. *Randomization and Power Calculations*

Our field experiment asked whether providing report cards on the state of toilets and garbage dumps in low-income neighbourhoods spurred activism by elected officials. Two sets of elected officials –ward councillors of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) of the State Government of Delhi– could potentially take action. The report cards were based on audits of public toilets and garbage dumps (dhalaos³) conducted in 317 low-income neighbourhoods, predominantly slum areas, drawn from a random sample of 100 of the 272 electoral districts (wards) of the MCD. These wards, in turn, were situated within 55 legislative jurisdictions of the State Assembly (termed assembly constituencies, from now on ACs). All ACs were randomized into treatment and control, followed by a balanced randomization of the wards within an AC. In the event that a ward was split across two ACs, it was put in the AC with an unbalanced number of wards. Therefore, of the 100 wards, 51 were randomly assigned to have the MCD Councillor receive a report card and, out of the 55 ACs, 27 were randomly assigned to have the MLA receive a report card on toilet and dhalao conditions in their assembly constituency (AC).⁴ Because Wards and ACs are not perfectly aligned, this made for a total of 118 Ward-AC combinations: 30 control, 30 where only the MLA received a report card, 32 where only the MCD Councillor received a report card, and 26 where both the MLA and MCD Councillor received report cards.

In total, three rounds of audits were conducted, with report cards based on the first two mailed to a group of 51 randomly selected ward councillors (out of 100) and 27 randomly selected MLAs (out of 55). Report cards were sent in August 2011 and February 2012 respectively. The first summarized the baseline audits (Round 1), conducted between April and June 2011, and the second compiled Audits (Round 2) conducted between November 2011 and January 2012. The cover letter in both rounds indicated that audit information might be later made public. The final audits (Round 3) were conducted straight after the election, between April and June 2012.

Below we describe the information provided in the report cards.

B. *Audits and Report Cards*

In each ward an average of three low-income neighbourhoods were audited thrice: between April-June 2011, November-January 2011/2012, and April-June 2012.

³ The Master Plan for Delhi defines a dhalao as “a premise used for collection of garbage for its onward transportation to sanitary landfills” (Chintan Environment Research and Action Group 2004). The *City Development Plan* (2007) defines dhalaos as “large masonry dustbins.”

²² Within each AC, we performed a balanced randomization of MCD wards into treatment and control.

All audits covered toilets and dhalaos and the second and third audit also covered drains. For each facility audited, the auditor was required to survey the entire slum and identify all facilities. To ensure audits were complete, auditors asked slum-dwellers where they disposed of their trash and which public toilet they used. The garbage disposal point or public toilet was audited when a confirmation was received from at least three residents.

During a facility audit the surveyors observed and noted the quality of the public amenities and interviewed two respondents per garbage/toilet/drainage point to obtain information on frequency of cleaning and prices. Finally, to obtain data on usage, the surveyor counted the number of people who used the toilet in a randomly chosen observation time of 15 minutes between 3-5pm.

Audit findings were compiled into report cards, which were designed to give both an immediate overall status report, color-coded to give a sharp impression of problems, and detailed information on the condition of each toilet and dhalao surveyed in their constituency—so that a politician would have the information to act if he or she chose to do so. Figure 1 shows one summary report card.

The toilet summary included the total number of toilets audited separately by gender, number of seats, percent broken, and percent dirty. The detailed toilet report included information on location, status, when last repaired, when last cleaned, average price, frequency of cleaning, and facilities present (taps, light, soap, bucket, and shower) for each audited toilet. The garbage summary included the total number of dhalaos, bins and informal piles, the number of these overflowing with garbage, and the physical structure. The detailed report for dhalaos included the location, total number of bins, frequency of pickup, whether it was overflowing and whether there was a proper structure for each dhalao. The detailed report for informal piles included the location, state of severity, last time cleaned, and date audited. Results were color-coded in terms of severity: green for “no problem,” yellow for “moderate problem,” and red for “severe problem.” A map was attached to the report cards for reference, showing the different toilet and garbage points.

Drains were also audited in the second and third rounds to observe any potential spillover effects from the intervention (since there was no information on the drains provided to the elected officials). The drain survey included questions on the size of the drain, the presence of trash in the drain, the last time the drain was overflowing, the last time the drain was cleared of garbage, the frequency of cleaning and some additional questions regarding the smaller drains outside people’s houses.

Additional Activities

Measurement of changes in spatial allocation of public services delivery

We also added a component to the study that looks at changes in the spatial allocation of public service delivery across the entire term of the Councillor (2007-12). This will potentially enable us to examine any shifts in the spatial distribution of spending of the Councillor as a result of our

interventions. In particular, since the randomisation of RWAs was within Wards, we can assess whether providing information to RWA officials led to any shift in spending to areas in these treated RWA areas related to control RWAs.

SNS has filed Right To Information requests with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, to access information on Councillor spending in our sample wards across the electoral term, 2007-12. Due to the trifurcation of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi into three autonomous city councils (North, East and South Municipal Corporations) after the elections in April 2012, it is taking longer for the government to provide the information and we are still waiting for the 2012 data on Councillor spending. Nonetheless, we have recently finished geo-coding this data using QGIS, GoogleMaps and Eicher maps. This will enable us to measure the shifts in spatial allocation of public services delivery, and evaluate the impact of the audits.

III. Datasets

From the interventions and household surveys described above, we are in the process of constructing the following six datasets:

- Data from extensive household surveys studying the lives of the urban poor
- Preferences of Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs)
- Polling station level electoral outcomes for the city council elections in April 2012
- A detailed list of a Councillor's spending and his/her participation in City Council activities
- A spatial dataset of Councillor spending
- Data from three comprehensive rounds of audits of public services

This rich set of data, ranging from the lives of the urban poor and their voting preferences to the accountability and activism of politicians provides us with the unique opportunity to study the individual behaviour of voters and politicians, as well as interactions between them. It enables us to address research and policy questions relating to the lives of the urban poor, the alignment of political activity with voter preferences, the impact of voter information campaigns, the responsiveness of politicians to relevant information provided to them and, in general, the various channels of interaction between politicians and voters. Below we detail some preliminary findings from the first household survey and the audits intervention.

IV. Results

All data analysis is preliminary and incomplete. The following are some preliminary findings, not ready for publication:

First Household Survey and RWA Survey

Access and Quality

A. Basic Infrastructure

In Table 2 we examine slum-dweller access to basic infrastructure and reported quality. We start with water and sanitation (Panel A). Water falls under the purview of the Jal board – a corporatized state entity. Legally recognized houses should be connected to piped water. In our sample, only 14% of households have a tap in their home, which is consistent with the fact that most slums in Delhi remain illegal settlements. The rest make do either with a public tap connected to the municipal supply or with a well. 4% report that they have access to neither a municipal water supply nor a well. Even among those houses with access to a water supply, quality is low. Almost half the households (42%) state that they faced non-availability of water.

At the time of the first baseline survey, the municipal corporation department held responsibility for sanitation in slums. We see that 14% of the households report having a toilet inside their homes, ranging from 6% in the poorest quintile to 30% in the wealthiest quintile. More than half the households (60%) declare that they have no specific outlet for drainage from their homes, and that figure is 72% for the poorest households.

About an equal number of households (around 45%) report taking the garbage to a dumpster as they do dumping it on an open field, though the poor are more likely to dump on open ground and the rich in a dumpster. When asked about their assessment of service quality of sanitation facilities, 30% say the cleanliness of the toilet they use is bad, and a whopping 90% of those with a drain say that it is smelly or overflowing. On the other hand, virtually no one claims that the nearest dumpster is emptied less than once a month.

Electricity provision has been privatized in Delhi, and essentially everyone claims to have access to it (Table 2, Panel C). though 62% mention that there were power cuts of 3 hours or more per day (not a lot by Indian standards) in June. The one serious complaint that we do encounter is overbilling: 20% say that they received a very high bill. Additionally, 6% of households report illegal electrical connections, based on what we can infer from their reported means of payment. This number decreases from 15% to 1% from the poorest to the wealthiest quintiles, respectively.

Most slums have narrow and, typically, non-tarmac roads. As a result motor access is another area of complaint: 80% say that there is no access to their house by vehicle bigger than a motorcycle.

B. Human Capital

Education is provided by the city and state governments (both run schools), but there are also private alternatives. About one in ten children goes to private school: however, the percentage rises, perhaps unsurprisingly, from 5% among the poorest to 19% among the richest (Panel D).

Six percent of households whose children go to government school complain about the quality of teaching, whereas only 1% of households who send their children to private schools complain of low quality teaching.

Health, like education, is provided both through government clinics and hospitals as well as private alternatives. Here the pattern of use is very different from education (Panel E): everyone, rich or poor, primarily uses private facilities. In 70% of cases of minor ailments, respondents went to private doctors. For major ailments, the rate falls to 57%. Use of government facilities decreases with wealth for minor ailments, but there is no clear pattern of use for major ailments among slum-dwellers. This is consistent with the fact that people have a somewhat negative view of the government health facilities (Das and Sanchez 2003). For both minor and major healthcare, roughly 60% of the respondents report problems at their nearest government healthcare facility.

C. Law and Order

Three quarters of slum-dwellers report some kind of law and order problem in their area (Panel F). Of those, 92% cite theft. The next most frequent problems are gambling and alcoholism, which are each cited in about 70% of cases. While wealthy households report slightly lower incidence of theft and gambling, mentions of alcoholism, violent crimes (43%), domestic abuse (53%), and vandalism (8%) all increase with wealth. It is unclear if this increase is due to underreporting of the problems among poorer quintiles.

Ten percent of slum-dwellers report having sought help from the police. Of those, 34% say that the police actually took a report and actively investigated, and 37% reported that the problem improved after going to the police.

D. Transfers

Table 3a – 3f provide information about the three major transfer programs relevant for slum-dwellers: the public distribution (or “ration”) system; pensions for the elderly, widows, and disabled; and cash and non-cash transfers for children in school.

There are different categories of ration cards and associated entitlements depending on a household’s material conditions. Yellow and red cards are for the poorest households categorized as “Below Poverty Line (BPL)” (see appendix for more details). White cards are for those “Above Poverty Line (APL).”

Table 3a shows that about 40% of the households have a BPL ration card (red or yellow) and are eligible for subsidized rations. This is substantially lower than the 57% of household reporting incomes below the poverty line, but there may be some inaccuracy in our income data. Strikingly, however, the probability of having access to a BPL card is *increasing* in wealth over most of the range. A regression of whether or not you have a BPL card on the asset index with slum fixed

effects shows that a one standard deviation increase in asset index increases the likelihood of having a BPL card by a very significant 5.9 percentage points (columns 13 and 14 of Table 4). In other words, richer people (as measured by private assets) within the same slum are more likely to have a BPL card, suggesting substantial mis-targeting.

As shown in Panel C of Table 3b, over 95% of cardholders report receiving some rations. However, the majority (63%) get less than their stipulated allotment at the stipulated price, at least based on the slum-dwellers' reports. On average they report receiving 1.9 kilos less rice and 4.8 kilos less wheat than they were supposed to on their most recent visit to the ration shop, but the shortfall is somewhat less for those entitled to the most (those with red or yellow cards). On the other hand, these same people pay a higher markup on the (lower) price that they are officially guaranteed. The average markups are 26% for rice and 15% for wheat, respectively, though the median markups are much smaller, implying that more than half of those with ration cards get their rations at close to the official price.

Qualification for pensions relies on multiple criteria: an individual must have the actual condition (of being over 60 years, widowed, or disabled), have an income less than Rs. 48,400 per year, and have lived in Delhi for five years or more. An estimate of "potential eligibility" is based on the answer to the question of whether any household member satisfies the first two conditions, and the period of living in the current residence of the respondent. This is a proxy for the true criteria, because in addition to meeting these criteria, people need to go through a certification process to verify their eligibility. Equally important is that there are a restricted number of pensions allocated to each area to be distributed by state legislators and ward councilors. Pensions are therefore potentially rationed, and the politician has a lot of discretion over them.

In Table 3c we see that roughly a quarter of the households in our sample have someone who is eligible for a pension but Table 3d suggests that only 35% of these households with an eligible member actually receive a pension. Looking at receipt as percentage of eligibility by pension type, we see that almost half of all eligible widows receive a pension, but that far fewer eligible elderly and disabled people do (only 31% and 15%, respectively).

Finally, we turn to scholarships for children. Both the state and city government offer various schemes to subsidize education for girls, physically handicapped and SC/ST/OBC/minorities students from underprivileged families. Eligibility criteria for these schemes typically require the child to be studying in a government or government-aided school and for family income to be below 100,000 Rs. per year.

Table 3e shows that more than half of the children attending government schools between the ages of 6 to 14 receive scholarships. However, the proportion that receives non-cash transfers such as free textbooks, uniforms and stationary is much higher: 93% of government school children in this age group receive non-cash transfers, mostly in the form of free textbooks (90%) and uniforms (79%). The proportion of government school beneficiaries does not vary much across asset quintiles for both cash and non-cash transfers. For example, the proportion of

scholarship recipients in government schools only moves from 53% in the lowest quintile to 55% in the uppermost quintile.

Only 6% of private school children receive scholarships, though the proportion diminishes with wealth from 12% at the bottom asset quintile to 3% of the uppermost quintile. Similarly, while only 13% of private school children receive any non-cash transfer, a higher proportion of children in the bottom quintile (26%) benefit in comparison to children in the uppermost quintile (8%). The proportion of beneficiaries for cash and non-cash transfers reduces sharply with wealth for private school children in comparison to their government school counterparts, implying that private schools may more actively target cash and non-cash transfers to students.

Heterogeneity in Provision and Problem Ranking

To what extent do differences in access and quality of public good provision vary within and across slums in the same ward? Significant heterogeneity along these dimensions would provide one explanation for the persistence of poor quality of service provision.

To examine this, we turn to regression-based analysis. The results are reported in Table 4. We estimate a series of regressions where the outcomes are different measures of either service quality or access to transfers. For each of the seven outcome variables, we use two specifications – one with just area fixed effects as explanatory variables and the second with area fixed effects and the household's asset index. In Panel A, we use slum fixed effects, in Panel B we use ward fixed effects and in Panel C we report regressions with slum and ward fixed effects (where we drop one slum fixed effect per ward). We also report the F-test for the joint significance of the fixed effects. In Panel C, the F-test can be interpreted as being informative of whether, conditional on ward fixed effects, the slum fixed effects jointly have any explanatory power.

It is striking that the asset index, while generally statistically significant, never explains more than 3% of the variation in access to any of the 7 services we look at. In Panel B, we see that ward fixed effects explain a substantial part of the variation (generally between 15 and 55 percent), and Panel C shows that slum fixed effects have significant additional explanatory power for all services. The proportion of variance explained by ward- and slum-level fixed effects is particularly high for water, sanitation and garbage removal, all of which have strong local network aspects: for example about 50% of the variation in access to municipal water and garbage removal is explained by these fixed effects. Only 15% of the variation in access to electricity can be explained by local area fixed effects, but there is little variation in electrical connections to work with given the near-universal supply. Inter-slum differences also explain 25% of the variation in whether potentially eligible pensioners actually receive a pension, and roughly 20% of the variation in receipt of a ration card or voter registration card. This is striking, since these transfer entitlements do not have local public good features.

Tables 5a and 5b look at the question of public service quality from a different angle—what slum-dwellers say are their most important problems, as well as reports from the RWA leadership. There is again a broad correspondence in the overall ranking of problems. Each

survey respondent—whether representing a household or an RWA—was asked to identify the most problematic issue in his or her area. Slum-dwellers identify water as the most problematic issue, followed by sewage, drainage, and toilets and then garbage removal. Private transfer issues (rations, in particular) follow next. Interestingly, there is very little difference in problem ranking across asset quintiles—slum-dwellers within each quintile rank each issue within 2% of its full-sample ranking. RWAs also overwhelmingly report water and sewage issues as the top two problems. Neither group considers education or healthcare as key concerns. This may reflect the fact that most slum-dwellers have opted out of the public health service delivery system (Das and Sanchez 2003). Nor is crime perceived to be a major problem by slum-dwellers or RWAs, although issues of law and order appear to concern RWAs more than slum-dwellers.

These analyses show that a lot of the problems faced by slum-dwellers are common to everyone who lives in the same slum and are not necessarily escaped with increased wealth. This stands in stark contrast to the results noted above on patterns of variation in private wealth and incomes, where the majority of the variation was within, rather than between, slums.

We have also examined the geographical alignment of preferences, in terms of the top-ranked problems. At the slum level, on average 58% of households have the same top problem, and 95% share at least one issue in their top three problems. When we aggregate over all slums in a ward, the concordance over the top problem falls to 53% (illustrating the between-slum variation again). Finally, in 31% of wards for which we have both slum-dweller and RWA data, there is concordance between the most frequently cited problem among slum-dwellers and that of the RWAs in the ward.

Why is the Quality of Provision Low?

Slum-dwellers face extensive problems with provision of basic infrastructure and receipt of private transfers, and have clear opinions over these. To a significant extent slum-dwellers' problems are aligned with broader local preferences in their community. So why does the political process not deliver on their problems?

In this section, we explore three possible reasons for this. First, does the elected representative face constraints in resources or influence in delivering better services?

Second, to the extent that representatives can do better, do they lack political incentives to do so? This could be for two reasons. It may be that improving public services and transfers is an unattractive political strategy relative to a clientelistic or vote-buying alternative. Alternatively, slum-dwellers may be disengaged from the political system, either in terms of voting or through direct interactions with political representatives?

Finally, is lack of information about their rights a significant problem for slum-dwellers?

The evidence from the survey has little that can be directly applied to the first question, precisely because it is drawn from the views of slum-dwellers, supplemented by those of RWAs. As

discussed in Section II.1 on governance, there are diverse agencies responsible for delivery of services and transfers. For example, water is a primary responsibility of Delhi's Jal Board, a public agency answerable to the state political process; electricity is provided by three privatized companies, subject to regulatory guidelines (including on access) set by a state-level regulator; garbage removal and local sanitation are the responsibility of the municipal corporation; schools are provided by state and municipality; and so on. Yet all of these are subject to control by the overall political system, at least in principle, either via the electoral and legislative process itself or the intermediation functions that state and municipal legislators have over delivery to their own constituencies.

The direct evidence from the surveys questions the responsiveness of the overall political system. In some areas there may be specific resource constraints—pensions seem to be currently rationed, for example. However, there is evidence to suggest that resource constraints are not the only issue, at least in some areas. Rations are, in principle, fully funded, and yet we observe substantial under-delivery relative to entitlements. At the council level of government, ward councilors receive a pot of money for their discretionary use: they spent over 90% of this in the 2007/08 and 2008/09, but, as discussed below, there seems to be very little alignment between their spending (largely on roads) and the most important problems faced by slum-dwellers or RWAs. As seen in Table 5, while slum-dwellers report the most problematic issues in their areas to be water (44%), sewage (30%) and garbage (11%), a breakdown of councilor spending shows that a greater part of their discretionary fund (57%) is spent on roads. While the next biggest expense category comprises of the provision of drains and roads, this constitutes a far lower proportion of their funds – 17% only. The next two expense categories do not meet slum-dwellers' interests either – provision and repair of lights (8%) and the improvement of parks and provision of gates (7%). At least in some areas, politicians could do more to respond to the problems if they chose to.

So what about the second question: is effort on providing public services and transfers to slum-dwellers a good political strategy for politicians? This takes us to the extensive literature on the drivers of political behavior in India (and other developing countries), and in particular the central theme that political interactions are primarily embedded in clientelistic relations between politician and citizen.

The essence of clientelism is the provision of private or local public goods in return for political loyalty, typically within an unequal power relationship. By one definition, political clientelism “represents the distribution of resources (or promise of) by political office holders or political candidates in exchange for political support, primarily – although not exclusively – in the form of the vote” (Gay 1990). It is argued that this can be a superior political strategy than provision of general public goods, especially when a politician can more credibly commit to delivery of such private (or local public goods) and especially where political competition is weak and information is limited (Keefer and Khemani 2005). The role of poverty is also emphasized by Wilkinson (2006) who argues that low levels of economic development facilitates clientelism because the small rewards patrons can offer have greater value, as well as the fact that a relatively poor electorate, such as slum-dwellers, rarely see the benefits of highly participatory voting.

Many authors argue that India is, in general, deeply clientelistic, or, as Chandra (2004) puts it, India is a “patronage democracy.” Three particular aspects of the Indian literature are particularly relevant to this study.

First, there is work arguing that clientelistic relations are intermediated by local political brokers. Baken (2003) finds that the most important group of lower-level political brokers connecting the mass electorate to local (city) leaders is comprised of non-elected popular leaders who generally operate on a neighborhood level: slum leaders. He argues that they operate between slum-dwellers and the political apparatus, mediating in nearly all governmental matters such as getting a license or ration card, obtaining welfare or housing benefits, and dealing with the police in cases of arrest or fines. Slums and slum-dwellers are usually refused full recognition of legitimacy by the state and inhabit uncertain legal and physical spaces (Ramanathan 2006). Jha, Rao and Woolcock (2007) report survey results from Delhi that indicate an extensive intermediation function of local leaders.

Second, it is often argued that people vote on caste or other identity-based lines, to increase the probability of getting benefits for their own group — though this depends on calculations on the size of their voting block (Chandra 2004). However, there is also evidence that such caste-based voting is a consequence of lack of information over the true qualities of candidates (Banerjee et al. 2010; Banerjee and Pande 2009).

Third, there is a rather different, and influential, argument of Chatterjee (2004, 2008) that in India the poor work through formal political channels, whereas the middle class work through civil society structure to directly access and influence the governmental apparatus.

The data from the surveys provide valuable information on the political behavior of slum-dwellers – whether they say they vote, what factors shape their voting decision, and whether they approach politicians directly to solve daily problems.

Table 6 summarizes the results. The Indian voter-registration campaigns show significant success with 85% registration among slum-dwellers. In contrast to the view that registration in slums is driven by politicians organizing a local vote bank, the bulk (78%, unreported in tables) of registration was via a “government campaign” (presumably by the Election Commission) — an example of part of the Indian state that is effective. Reported turnout in the last councilor election is also high at 72%. While most studies tend to suggest that self-reported turnout exceeds actual turnout, it is still interesting that reported turnout rates increase with wealth. To the extent that the poorest slum-dwellers are often considered the most likely targets of vote-buying and clientelistic policies, one may have anticipated the opposite. This is, however, consistent with the fact that the poor are also registered less (though, once again, one might wonder why the politicians are not out registering these voters).

We explore this further in Panel B where we examine participation in pre-election events. Most slum-dwellers (66%) state that they did not participate in any pre-election event. The most common forms of participation are participating in a march (25%) and attending a speech rally

(27%). Roughly 22% of those who so participate report receiving non-cash transfers. The incidence of cash transfers as a reward for participation is much lower and does not exceed 5% on average. Very few slum-dwellers (2%, not reported in tables) participate more actively in pre-election events, such as by distributing goods or materials or actively campaigning for votes.

Next, we examine what respondents stated were important deciding factors for voting. A number of authors have documented the widespread targeting of slum-dwellers by political parties on the eve of the election. Yet, the candidate's party is among the least-common reasons cited by slum-dwellers for favoring a particular candidate. What's more, the likelihood of reporting party as an important factor in deciding to vote is increasing, *not* decreasing, across the asset quintiles. Furthermore, only 1% of slum-dwellers report identity as a reason for voting. While recognizing the limitations of self-reports, these figures contradict many of the standard theories about the poor Indian voter.

Overall, slum-dwellers express a strong preference for using their electoral clout to ensure higher quality service delivery. Moreover, we observe relatively limited participation by the poor in political party activities prior to elections and very limited reports of direct transfers from parties in return for political participation.

A second form of engagement of slum-dwellers with politicians involves direct contacts to solve problems. We have seen that slum-dwellers face a whole array of problems affecting their daily lives. Do they use politicians to help solve these problems, and is this a successful strategy? And do they use others — intermediaries such as pradhans or fixers — to connect with the state, as has been documented in ethnographic and other work in some Indian cities? Tables 7a and 7b provide a summary of responses for a variety of services.

Only a minority of slum-dwellers seek help from politicians to resolve problems. For individual areas, the proportion ranges from 1% for access to health schemes, education schemes and issues of crime, to 5% for electricity, 9% for issues of eviction, more than 10% for problems with ration cards and sanitation, and 17% for water. This may seem a small number for each area, but 35% of households had approached a politician over some issue. This is quite a substantial number, especially given the likelihood that many households may tacitly support or free-ride on action by others.

For most issues, between two-thirds to three-quarters of meetings were with the MLA, probably reflecting either knowledge that the issue fell under the domain of the Delhi state government or a perception that the MLA held more influence than did the ward councilor. Most other meetings were with the ward councilor, and very few with a member of parliament (representing central government). The exception is sanitation, where slightly over half approached the ward councilor, in line with the fact that local sanitation fell under the responsibility of the MCD — though it is interesting that 48% still approached the MLA. Most slum-dwellers had never contacted any politician: only 23% had ever approached an MLA, fewer a ward councilor (11%), and merely 2% an MP.

There is a clear preference to approaching politicians in groups: for all cases for which we have information — including ration cards, an essentially individual entitlement — most slum-dwellers chose not to meet politicians alone. 100% of meetings regarding threats of eviction were conducted with groups, and for sanitation and water, the rate was more than 90%. These are mainly local public goods (or local public bads in the case of eviction). The fact that slum-dwellers mainly saw politicians in groups on issues of crime (89%) suggests that these visits related to general, rather than individual, crime cases. In fact, 73% of the meetings were regarding issues of “law and order” rather than harassment, arrest of family, or complaints about bribes. (A somewhat larger proportion of households go to the police directly, as seen above.)

Did the meetings bring about positive results? This varies by area. If we put aside the health and education schemes and crime, which were the subject of very few meetings, three things are worth noting. First, in the vast majority of cases, the politician was accessible. It is rare for a politician to refuse to see an individual or group from a slum; the highest proportion of refusals is 4% for appeals over law and order. After hearing an appeal, the most common response from politicians is to say they will help — or ask someone else to help — and then nothing happens. However, in a substantial minority of cases the situation is reported as improving — from a low of 17% for problems with ration cards, to 33% for sanitation, 48% for water, and 89% for (avoiding) eviction. We cannot tell from this kind of data whether the politician was actually instrumental in effecting change, but nevertheless, these are not bad percentages.

An important element of the account of clientelistic urban structures concerns the role of intermediaries, including pradhans, fixers, slumlords and others, who form an integral part of the societal mechanisms linking slum-dwellers to the state, whether to politicians, agencies, or bureaucrats. The survey only has information on this for two areas, but it is striking how rarely such intermediaries are named in response to the question, “Who helped you to resolve this problem?” The most common answer — in around 90% of cases involving ration cards and water, for example — is no one. Pradhans are the next most common answer, but only in about 5% of cases. NGOs are virtually absent (too small a proportion to report on the table).

Accounts of patronage-based networks flow especially from ethnographic studies in other cities — particularly Mumbai. It is quite possible that Delhi operates differently, especially because of the very different land situation. It is also possible that the survey’s respondents were reluctant to provide answers over such local sociopolitical connections. But if we take the responses of households at face value, a picture emerges very different from the clientelistic account. Politicians are generally approachable, and a substantial minority of households approaches them. Like politicians everywhere they often promise and don’t deliver, but they also sometimes do deliver, or at least seem to. There is little evidence that households in slums are dependent on intermediaries to solve the frequent problems they face in their daily lives.

Finally, it is notable that where there was action taken — by elected officials, government agents, or others — there is very little reporting of bribery. Across all the areas of service delivery and transfers, only 8% of households reported paying a bribe — in response to the question, “Did you pay anything above the official price?” This would, however, exclude payments for provision of

service (such as water) from an illegal source since households almost certainly (and correctly) would not see them as bribes.

So what creates the disjunction between a desire to use election to enforce accountability and slum-dwellers' ability to do so? This brings us to the possibility that lack of information could be part of the reason. We return to Panel D1 in Table 6 where we examine the levels of political knowledge among slum-dwellers. More than half the slum-dwellers report that they rarely or never discuss politics. Only 28% state that they discuss politics frequently before elections. Moreover, the incidence of political discussion increases with wealth.

Next, in Panel D2 we turn to political knowledge. Starting with the simplest question, knowledge of the name of elected representatives, we find that only a third of slum-dwellers know their representative (MLA or councilor). Only 32% know the councilor has money to spend on local projects, and only 3% are aware of the rough size of the funds he/she has. Table 3f shows that only a handful are aware of available assistance such as the private hospital scheme (6%) and the Economically Weaker Section education scheme (3%), programs which entitle the poor to free treatment and education at certain private hospitals and schools. It is clear that one immediate constraint on electoral accountability is the very low level of political knowledge.

Audits Intervention

The audits reveal low quality of public amenities across Delhi. Roughly 36 percent of toilet complexes in our sample were closed in the baseline. Despite statutory requirements, only 30 percent of the toilets had soap provided, with provision significantly worse in female toilets (50 percent of male toilets, but only 9 percent of female toilets had soap). In general, the quality of facilities provided was worse in female toilets. With regard to prices charged, the statutory contract states that the price should not exceed Rs. 1 per visit in slum areas and Rs. 2 in non-slum areas. However, user surveys showed that at baseline 39 percent of male toilets and 18 percent of female toilets charged in excess of one rupee. Despite this, usage of public toilets was high (42 percent of all households surveyed, and 62 percent for households living in areas with a high slum index—see below). Turning to garbage disposal, slums are supposed to have official garbage disposal points and bins; however in the baseline, over 66 percent of the surveyed dhalaos did not have any bins and 65 percent of neighbourhoods did not have any dhalaos. About 70 percent of dhalaos were not cleared daily (as required), according to user surveys, and overflowing garbage dumps were a consistent problem (in 69 percent of dhalaos).

While the low quality of public amenities probably comes as no surprise to anyone who has visited Delhi slums, we find that report cards spurred some change. The nature of change we document suggests that elected officials responded by asking contract-holders to better meet the terms of their contract—while levels of infrastructure (as measured by number of toilets, garbage points and bins) were unaffected, compliance with contractual requirements on pricing and facilities (for toilets) improved and garbage disposal points were less likely to be overflowing and, in high usage treatment areas, they were also more likely to be cleaned daily.

The reduction in average price charged and improvement in facilities available within toilets is associated with an increase in toilet usage in treatment neighbourhoods where initial household surveys revealed relatively high public toilet usage and/or high levels of public defecation. Similarly, for garbage disposal the increase in regular cleaning is concentrated in slums where initial household surveys demonstrated relatively high usage of dumpsters. The reduction in overflowing dhalaos is, however, uniformly distributed across high and low garbage dumpster usage neighbourhoods.

A. Toilets

Average Impacts

Table 2 examines the impact of treatment (either MLA or ward report card) on public toilet access, quality and usage. Panel A considers all toilets and Panels B and C disaggregate by male and female complexes. Column (1) considers total toilet complexes as the outcome variable. At baseline, the average control slum had 2.76 toilet complexes – or just over one male and one female complex. We observe an overtime increase in toilet complexes. However, this increase is absent in treatment areas. In column (2) we see that the overall increase in toilets is not matched by an increase in seats and the number of seats is similar in treatment and control areas.

To investigate this further, in column (3) we consider the number of open toilets as the dependent variable and find this is unchanged over time in treatment and control areas. Consistent with this, in column (4) we see that the number of closed toilets increased over time, but that this increase was absent in treatment areas. Columns (5) and (6) reproduce these patterns using the fraction of open and closed toilets as the dependent variables. These results suggest the possibility that the treatment led to a diversion of effort away from constructing new toilets towards improving the quality of the existing toilets, with the result that actual access was actually unaltered across treatment and control (but potentially achieved at lower cost in treatment areas). This pattern is similar for male and female toilets.

In column (8) we consider the total number of facilities available in the toilet. As mentioned earlier, the facilities being measured are taps, light, soap and buckets. The average toilet in a control slum had 1.98 facilities available in the baseline and the post dummy indicates a reduction of 0.2 (or 10 percent) of these facilities over time. This erosion is only significant in male toilets, which started with a significantly greater number of facilities than female toilets. By contrast, there is a significant and quite substantial positive treatment effect on the number of facilities, which mitigates the negative downward time-trend. Turning to survey reports on cleaning, we do not observe any change in the fraction of toilets that are regularly cleaned (column 9).

With respect to pricing, we observe an overtime increase in toilet prices, but this effect is absent in treatment areas (column 10). This is also reflected in a lower proportion of toilets charging over R. 1 (column 11) in treatment relative to control areas, thereby bringing these areas more in line with the general contractual price, as compared to the control. This applies to both male and

female toilets (though the reduction in the average price has the same magnitude for male and female toilets, it is noisily estimated for male toilets) and is in the context of an actual increase in prices in the control. These findings are suggestive of a treatment effect that fosters greater compliance with contracts by operators.

Finally, turning to usage: on average, 14 individuals used the public toilets over a 15 minute period in the middle of the day, but there are neither significant treatment effects nor underlying time trends for the *overall sample*, despite the observed changes in quality and pricing (column 12).

Heterogenous Impacts

Next, we explore heterogeneity in these patterns, using information from our baseline household survey on reported practices.

We consider heterogeneity along two dimensions as measured in the household survey: whether the slum was characterized by high levels of reported (1) open defecation and (2) public toilet use. In each case, we separate slums in which reported intensities were above the median (that is greater than 17 percent of households for open defecation and 29 percent of households for public toilet usage). These two characteristics are negatively correlated (0.3).

As before, we use the panel of slums to estimate difference-in-difference regressions where we now include interactions between treatment and slum characteristics. Results are reported in Table 3.

In terms of fraction of open toilets, we see no evidence of treatment-control differences in any subgroup (columns 1 and 2). In terms of fraction of usable seats, we see an overall increase in the treatment areas which reported high toilet usage in the survey. This increase is concentrated in female toilet complexes.

Turning to facilities, we again find evidence of improvements being concentrated in areas of high public toilet usage and, in this case, the effects are pronounced for male toilets. There is, however, no differential impact for the regularity of cleaning of toilets for either group.

Finally, in the case of prices, we see different impacts by type of heterogeneity. High open defecation treatment areas see a significant decline in price relative to control areas, while this pattern is reversed in the case of high public toilet usage. We find significant differences in pricing behaviour for high public toilet usage slums (column 10). The underlying trend (in control) is for increased average prices. This is offset by negative average treatment effects, but amplified by positive effects in the high public usage slums. This pattern holds for both male and female toilets, but the magnitude is substantially larger for female toilets. This is in the context of initial average pricing being substantially lower for female toilets—consistent with the view that contractors had greater scope to defend higher prices for female toilets in high public usage areas without going above contractual levels. Similarly, we find significant differences in pricing

behaviour for male toilets in high open defecation areas (column 9). However, in this case, there is no underlying trend (in control) or significant average treatment effect, but a significant trend of increasing prices in high open defecation areas, which is offset by negative treatment effects in these slums. Again, this is in the context of initial average pricing being substantially higher for male toilets.

Finally, we now see effects on usage in both groups. There is a significant relative increase in observed usage of female toilets in slums with initially high public toilet usage that receive the treatment—this is in the context of some underlying rise in usage in control slums, but a decline in treatment slums with low public toilet usage (column 12). This is aligned with the improvements in quality just noted. Similarly, there is a significant and quite large relative increase in observed usage of toilets in slums with initially high levels of open defecation that receive the treatment—this is in the context of a positive trend (in control), which is substantially reverted by a negative treatment effect and a trend of declining usage in slums with low open defecation (column 11). The increase seems to be driven entirely by increases in relative usage for male toilets. These findings are aligned with the improvements in pricing just noted.

B. Dhalaos

Average Impacts

In Table 4 (Panel A) we consider garbage disposal (dhalaos). As with toilets, we observe an overall expansion in the number of dhalaos and in the number of dhalaos with at least one bin (columns 1 and 3) across the three rounds, but no variation by treatment status. In contrast to toilets, we find some improvement in the quality of facilities over time in the control, with a rise in the proportions of dhalaos that have proper structures and full details (columns 4 and 7). We find mixed outcomes regarding maintenance over time, with an increase in the fraction of observed overflowing dhalaos (columns 5), an increase in the fraction of dhalaos with proper disposing (column 8), and no change in the fraction of dhalaos with regular cleaning (column 6). While there is no treatment effect on facilities, there is a significant positive impact on the proportion of overflowing dhalaos, which is lower in treatment than in control slums (column 5).

Heterogenous Impacts

For garbage disposal, we also explore whether there are differential effects for slums in which households have relatively high usage of dhalaos (again through separating the group with above median reported usage, which is 29 percent). There is now a significant relative effect on whether dhalaos are “regularly cleaned” in high public usage slums (Table 4, Panel B, column 6).

Does it matter who is informed?

Next, we examine whether the impact of receiving a report cards differed across ward councillors and state legislatures. To do so, we estimate regressions of the form given in equation (3) where we decompose the overall treatment indicator into three indicators: whether the MLA received a report card, whether the ward councillor received a report card and whether both the MLA and

ward councillor received the report card. In the case where both MLA and ward councillor received the report card then all three treatment dummies take a value of one.

Appendix Table 2 reports the results for toilets. The most striking findings are the similarity of effects across the councillor and MLA and that there is no evidence of an additive impact. That is, the coefficient on the treatment indicator for both the councillor and MLA receiving a report card is typically opposite signed to the coefficient on the separate legislator and ward councillor dummies. Thus, it appears that despite the apparent confusion on paper about division of responsibilities between these two levels of governance, on the ground the MLA and councillor seem to have a clear understanding on who is responsible for the activity. The only outcome where we observe some evidence of differential activity is in the case of toilet cleaning – to the extent that only councillor report card yield improvements in quality of provision this activity seems to be under the control of the ward councillor.

Appendix Table 3 considers garbage disposal. Here, we do see a difference in activism by politician level. The reduction in the proportion of overflowing dhalaos is concentrated in MLA report card areas (Appendix Table 3, column 5), which is surprising given the division of responsibilities. This is something we plan to explore in further work.

Are there spillover effects to drains?

Finally, Table 5 reports results for drains—for which no information was provided to politicians. There were no significant treatment effects, indicating that there were neither positive nor negative spillovers for this service category.

V. Policy Implications

Baseline Surveys

The substantial concordance of problems within a slum tends to apply to all slums within a ward, and notably, between the main problems reported by slums and Resident Welfare Associations within the same ward. This raises an important question: if there is such concordance, why is the political system not responding and leading to more effective state action?

The survey provides extensive information on the political behavior of slum-dwellers that sheds light on this question. There is extensive involvement in formal voting, and respondents report that they vote according to the issues and the quality of politicians, with almost none reporting voting on identity (caste or religious lines). There is little interaction with politicians to solve daily problems, but still over 30 percent of households have had some contact with a politician to deal with issues covered in the survey—most commonly the state-level Member of the Legislative Assembly, followed by the municipal Ward Councilor. Politicians are accessible and promise change, but usually nothing happens. Nevertheless, in a significant minority of cases an improvement is reported. Contradicting some accounts of slum-dwellers being dependent on

local fixers and leaders, the majority of households report that they seek to solve daily problems themselves. NGOs are also strikingly absent from the picture.

One potentially promising policy intervention would be an information campaign on the schemes and funds available to voters, for which we find little current awareness. Under the current rules in Delhi, both private schools and private hospitals are obliged to serve a certain number of poor people for free. However, only about 6 percent of slum-dwellers are aware of these schemes. Over 95% of ration cardholders report receiving some rations; however, the majority (63%) get less than their stipulated allotment at the stipulated price, at least based on the slum-dwellers' reports. Similarly, roughly a quarter of the households in our sample have someone who is eligible for a pension but only 35% of these households with an eligible member actually receive a pension. What is more, only a third of the slum-dwellers know that municipal councilors are allocated money to spend on the ward, and only a handful (3 percent) are aware of the approximate size of the discretionary fund. The urban poor's lack of awareness of schemes and funds may explain why they are not putting pressure on politicians to deliver them. By reducing this gap through information campaigns, voters can be empowered to demand what they are entitled to and punish those politicians who do not deliver at the polls.

What is more, the similar (and coherent) preferences at both the slum and ward level reveal the potential for collective action. If residents within a slum (or political jurisdiction) have very different priorities, then collective action is going to be more difficult to organize (Alesina et al. 1999); however, given that this is not the case, policy interventions that provide constituents with the tools needed for mobilization have the potential to be very effective in improving public service delivery. In light of this, we added the intervention with Residential Welfare Associations (RWAs) that was described above. RWAs were introduced under the Bhagidari scheme by the state government of Delhi as a formal mechanism for neighborhood associations to be formed and to interact with state agencies (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi 2011). RWAs were predominantly formed outside slum areas; however, our analysis found that in over half the wards there is a match between the most frequently cited problem among slum-dwellers and that of RWAs. Treatment RWAs received a mobilization program informing them about MCD spending in their area and how to engage leaders to provide services. RWAs also received letters about disaggregated spending in their areas, to get a better idea of where the funds allocated by the MCD go. Results from this intervention are forthcoming.

In short, there are clearly major areas of weak knowledge concerning personal entitlements, the names of elected representatives, and the very existence of some schemes. Substantial opportunities exist for improving public awareness and creating incentives for politicians and other state actors to improve living conditions in the slums.

Audits Intervention

Our audit results suggest there is a role for increased provision of information on the quality of local public goods to politicians in improving the quality of service provision (via collective action or other means). This study found that providing information to politicians on the state of

public toilets and garbage disposal in their constituencies led to significant improvements in implementation, especially in the case of toilets. The nature of the change we document suggests that elected officials responded by asking contract-holders to better meet the terms of their contract –while levels of infrastructure (as measured by number of toilets, garbage points and bins) were unaffected, compliance with contractual requirements on pricing and facilities (for toilets) improved and garbage disposal points were less likely to be overflowing and, in high usage treatment areas, they were also more likely to be cleaned daily.

It is notable that the effects in the Delhi experiment occurred in the context of services that were largely managed by private (or NGO) contractors. While the experiment was not designed to examine the influence of forms of delivery, two features of the results are worth noting. First, private contracting alone clearly does not solve the underlying problems of delivery—the descriptive data from the baseline survey reveals typically low levels of service. Second, politicians are able to exert influence over the behaviour of private contractors, at least on some activities.

Overall, the findings suggest there is a greater role for information provision in reducing information asymmetries between politicians and their constituents.

Other Contexts

These results are highly relevant both to the issues of improving public services in urban slums, and to the broader question of the role of information in providing incentives for politicians to improve the implementation of public programs.

India is the world's largest democracy and home to roughly one-third of the world's poor, yet this voting bloc has been largely unable to translate their political weight into effective service delivery and other economic gains. This phenomenon is not unique to India: the quality of social service delivery remains poor in most low-income democracies (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2008). Furthermore, and possibly for related reasons, the incidence of corrupt and criminal politicians remains high in these settings (UNDP, 2002; Banerjee and Pande, 2009; Golden and Tiwari, 2009). Thus, how to ensure that governments meet the local infrastructure needs of their constituents is a central challenge across the globe, and of particular urgency for the fast growing urban slums in emerging economies. A key aspect of meeting the challenge of infrastructure delivery in slums is implementation of governance mechanisms that enable high-quality construction and maintenance of public amenities and infrastructure while acknowledging the limited property rights of most slum dwellers.⁵

⁵ There is a special problem of property rights with slums that have to do with their ambiguous legal status, since most slums are on encroached land. This limits slum dwellers' ability to demand infrastructure in the capacity of property owners.

Our newspaper intervention project design is such that it can be implemented in rural and urban areas, as information delivery via newspaper is relatively inexpensive. Furthermore, scaling up should prove relatively simple, as local NGOs need not rely on central administration.

VI. Policy-dissemination

The following outlines some of the specific initiatives that have been taken by our research team to ensure timely and effective dissemination of relevant information:

Interactions with Policy Makers:

- To collect inputs on the design of the study, meetings were conducted with Mr. Harsh Mander (member of the National Advisory Council), Mr. Anil Kumar Sharma (Deputy Mayor of Delhi), Mr. Ashwani Kumar (CEO, Delhi Urban Slum Improvement Board), Ms. Vimla Devi (Councilor) and other Councillors and slum leaders in Delhi. These meetings were extremely helpful in being able to identify the urban poor, understand the political structure and activism in slum areas and therefore instrumental in selecting our sample areas.
- Mr. Martin Hirsch, Former High Commissioner for Active Inclusion Against Poverty and High Commissioner for Youth in the French government visited our project in 2011. He was interested in understanding our research questions, study design, implementation processes as well as the results. Apart from a brief overview, we organized a short field visit for him. During his last visit to Delhi in October 2012, Mr. Hirsch expressed his interest to revisit the project. Ms. Diva Dhar, Policy and Training Manager, along with Mr. Gaurav Chiplunkar, Research Associate at J-PAL South Asia, met him to brief him on the progress made in the various evaluations since his previous visit. Now that we also have some preliminary results to share, we propose to engage him in a meaningful policy discussion on the findings of the study and its application in other locations of his interest.
- Ms. Diva Dhar has also discussed the project design and methodology with Dr. S. Y. Quraishi, former Chief Election Commissioner of India and Dr. Harsha De Silva, Member of Parliament in Sri Lanka during the Governance at the Policy and Impact conference in Bangkok organized by J-PAL, IPA, Citi Foundation and the Asian Development Bank (August 2012). Dr. De Silva was especially interested in the details of the project's intervention and evaluation design, as he was considering launching an information-based campaign to involve and update voters in his constituency in Sri Lanka. We will be sharing our findings with him and possibly work with him in designing the study.

- A team from 3ie and Global Development Network (GDN) visited the project in 2011 as well as in June 2012. Detailed discussions were held with regard to the project design, evaluation strategy and policy influence plan. During their recent visit in July 2012, they were accompanied by delegates from the Gates Foundation and DFID. Apart from a detailed discussion on the evaluations and their challenges, we also arranged for a field visit. Delegates had the opportunity to observe the conditions of the urban poor, as well as participate in a demonstration of our endline audits survey.

Interactions with NGOs, Civil Society Organisations, Resident Welfare Associations and Research Partners:

- NGOs such as Hazards Centre, Water Aid, Jagori, Indo-Global Social Service Society were consulted for their inputs and feedback on the evaluation design and process. We now propose to engage them in a dialogue over both our methodology and results and consider the possibility of training them on organising information campaigns and increase awareness regarding public accountability.
- Two research-oriented NGOs, the ASER Centre (that is concerned with education) and the Population and Health Foundation of India (PHFI) were interested in the evaluations, and specifically sought details on the use and benefits of GIS technology in audits of public services. They participated in a round table conference organised by J-PAL where Gaurav Chiplunkar made a presentation on the value and application of GIS and digital data collection along with a short demonstration on using GPS machines and cellphones to collect data.
- As part of the intervention, we have also worked in close collaboration with our partner, Satark Nagrik Sangathan, and other NGOs who have been involved in slum mobilization to build their capacity and understanding of randomized evaluations. We have also met with the editors and executives at *Hindustan* to update them on the progress of the project.
- The team met with the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Transparent Chennai and Janaagraha (a leading, Bangalore-based, urban NGO) to discuss our study design, capacity building, implementation plan and challenges, as well as policy impacts since they were interested in undertaking similar voter information campaigns. We plan to share our preliminary results with them and assist them in designing and implementing their projects.
- To facilitate comprehensive dissemination of the findings, the team is currently working on compiling a report on the findings from our end line round of audits, which will be disseminated by J-PAL and SNS to other NGOs, civil society groups, government agencies and policy makers.

- Policy-oriented students at the Kennedy School of Government, have undertaken policy analyses on social pensions and sanitation in Delhi, with some of the motivation, design and data analysis linked to our work. The social pension work is continuing (with one of the alumni) at the World Bank.

Presentations and interviews:

- The sanitation-related part of the project was showcased at a J-PAL/Gates Foundation workshop for South Asian water and sanitation practitioners in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Ms. Agnes Faivre, a reporter with France-Inter (a leading French radio channel) covered some of our evaluations as a part of her report on ‘Randomized Controlled Trials.’ This report can be accessed here: <http://www.franceinter.fr/emission-la-tete-au-carre-grand-reportage-l-evaluation-aleatoire>.
- J-PAL affiliated professors and staff also presented their work on governance, including this project, at one-day workshops in program evaluation conducted as part of mid-career training programs for IAS officers in Phase III (officers with 7-9 years of experience, most of whom were district collectors), and Phase IV (officers with 14-16 years of experience, many of whom were secretaries at the state or federal level and others in rural development departments). In all, these workshops reached nearly 250 bureaucrats in key positions to influence policy.
- The design and baseline findings of the on-going Delhi project were presented to the International Growth Centre, 3ie board and at a Harvard/MIT development seminar in 2011.
- Prof. Rohini Pande presented some preliminary results from the household surveys and audits at the International Growth Centre conference in Delhi (December 2011).
- Prof. Pande and Ms. Anjali Bhardwaj (head of SNS) also presented the evaluation objectives, design and preliminary results at the J-PAL/Gates Foundation Urban Services Initiatives conference in Sri Lanka (July 2012) for researchers and practitioners from across South Asia.
- Dr. Bibhu Prasad Mohapatra, Director of India Development Foundation, made a presentation on the study at the 3ie Policy Influence Clinic in Sri Lanka (July 2012).
- Ms. Diva Dhar, discussed the project at a break-out session on Governance at the Policy and Impact conference in Bangkok organized by J-PAL, IPA, Citi Foundation and the Asian Development Bank (August 2012). Participants included researchers, government and non-government practitioners from the region.

- The project has made extensive use of innovative mapping techniques and use of mapping software. Gaurav Chiplunkar, a Research Associate on the project, made a presentation on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and its applications in the project during a round table discussion on Innovative Techniques and Technologies in Monitoring and Evaluation organized by IDRC and the Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) South Asia. The round table was attended by various NGOs, civil society groups, donors and research organizations.
- Aditya Balasubramanian, another research associate, presented the study to Mr. C.V. Krishnan, President, Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR).

Plans Moving Forward

Moving forward, we plan to disseminate information through the following three key channels, namely: civil society organisations and NGOs, development practitioners, government officials and researchers and media outlets, which play an important role in disseminating information, raising awareness and promoting the idea of voter information campaigns and accountability of government agents.

NGOs and Civil Society Organisations

During the course of the study, many NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)⁶ have expressed their keen interest in the study design, methodology and results and we have fostered our ties with them through frequent meetings, interactions and discussions. They hold the crucial advantage of having extensive and far-reaching networks and presence in the urban slums and we feel that it is extremely important to undertake extensive capacity building activities with them. This is vital in ensuring a sustainable scale up of the intervention (especially the audits of public services). As a part of the intervention, we have worked closely with Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS), as well as other NGOs who work in the Delhi slums. During the course of the study, members from these organisations have been trained so as to be able to carry out effective voter information campaigns in slums. Moreover, we propose to continue to share our experience, methodology and findings with these organisations so as to enable them to carry out effective campaigns in mobilising slum-dwellers. Specifically, we have proposed that Ms. Anjali Bhardwaj (Founder, SNS) conduct a training for other Civil Society organisations, NGOs and other research organisations to increase their awareness on voter mobilisation campaigns, present our results and share our methodology on filing RTIs, preparing and disseminating performance report cards as well as auditing public services.

A first policy dialogue that we hope to initiate over the summer is identifying what forms of proactive disclosures should be encouraged and what are the appropriate mechanisms for it. Should

⁶ Some NGOs and CSOs include: Public Health Foundation of India, Hazards Centre, Water Aid, Know Your Vote India, Jaagori, Jaanagraha, The ASER Centre, Association of Democratic Reforms, Transparent Chennai, India Global Social Service Society.

media play an ongoing role, should NGOs be deputed to spread the message or should government agencies be directly required to make this information publicly available? In March 2013, we had a first meeting on this with our Delhi NGO partner SNS and we intend to continue these dialogues in the summer. We have also reached out to Yamini Aiyar from the Center for Policy Research's (CPR) Accountability Initiative, which "works to promote accountability for service delivery by developing innovative models for tracking government programs, disseminating this information to policy makers as well as citizens, and undertaking research on how to strengthen accountability for improved service delivery in India" and people at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard who work on similar initiatives, whom we hope to engage in this dialogue.

Media outlets

Media houses tend to publish performance report cards on incumbent government officials prior to elections. However, little critical evaluation has been done to assess the impact of these campaigns on electoral outcomes and therefore we hope that the dissemination of our results to media houses would potentially encourage them to undertake more campaigns.

Media houses in fact play a dual role in aiding us in our dissemination strategy. On the one hand, by providing them with the results, we would hopefully encourage them to carry out more information campaigns, but on the other hand, the media is a useful source to disseminate information to the masses. We propose to harness this potential as well and encourage the media to disseminate our findings to the masses. *Hindustan*, our media partner in the intervention, has also been a key stakeholder among other media outlets. It is one of the most widely read newspaper dailies in the country with a readership of close to 12 million. *Hindustan Times*, its sister publication in English, has a readership of over 3.7 million. *Hindustan* has, in principle, agreed to publish our results. As reported earlier, journalists (like Ms. Favre, a reporter in the French media for example) and documentary film makers (like DocuVista from Germany) have already covered the study during its implementation stage and we propose to liaise with them as well to disseminate our findings in regional and international media.

Government departments, policy makers and development practitioners

As noted in the preliminary report on the audits, our findings propose to contribute to a growing literature on the role of information in the political process in low-income settings, where the institutions for supporting effective political engagement are under developed. Much of that literature however, focusses on informing citizens/voters on the performance of their politicians. Little is known about the effects of providing information to politicians on the problems in their constituencies. We therefore anticipate that the results (especially from the audits of public services) will be of great interest not only to the Delhi urban context, but also more broadly—both in the urban development community and in researchers and actors concerned more broadly with service delivery, and the role of politicians and public information on this. Though one need not elaborate on the importance and advantages of dissemination of information through this channel, a significant challenge we anticipate is the natural resistance and delays in working with the public system and government officials.

As reported above, during the course of the study, various government departments (eg: Ministry of Rural Development) and international policy makers (eg: Mr. Martin Hirsch, Former High Commissioner for Active Inclusion Against Poverty and High Commissioner for Youth in the French government) have shown interest in our field experience as well as our survey instruments and findings. Our research team has always shared our experiences, challenges, and implementation methodology during the course of the project, and we plan to systematically share our findings with them once these are ready.

Moreover, J-PAL also works with policy makers to scale up and/or replicate effective evaluations. Every regional J-PAL office also hosts a policy and training team, which specialises in disseminating information and findings of projects to relevant members of the J-PAL network. The policy team works with state and central governments to identify suitable locations and contexts where proven programs could be replicated or scaled up, and actively works with them through the replication.

In India, J-PAL South Asia has implemented (or is currently implementing) various research studies in collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Development, Central Pollution Control Board at the central government level along with the various health and education departments in the state governments of Bihar, Maharashtra, TamilNadu, Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan and West Bengal. Similarly, other J-PAL regional offices partner extensively with their respective national and regional governments. This provides us with an extensive network to disseminate information. Given the preliminary positive impact of auditing public services on service delivery, we propose to engage with these departments to share our methodology and findings and to encourage information campaigns in other fields as well. As mentioned previously, we anticipate that this channel of dissemination is bound to be the most challenging, given the general Indian administrative setup.

Though we do not have any final results yet, the research team has already initiated a dialogue with the policy team to identify potential contexts for scale up and replications. However, this process can only gather speed once we have more results. We propose to eventually work with the policy team in order to explore our options to replicate awareness campaigns in other states as well as stress the importance of government accountability.

J-PAL staff and affiliates have an extensive network of professional and personal contacts, in state and central governments, policy institutions, research and academic organisations and NGOs. Academic and non-academic platforms are important in being able to project our ideas and results to policy makers and practitioners. As noted in the previous section, our research team has already made numerous presentations at various academic as well as non-academic

conferences, seminars, workshops, trainings and round table discussions and we plan to continue doing the same. Along with that, our research team has been working closely with the policy and training team to ensure the timely and effective dissemination of information through any future roundtables, conferences, trainings and meetings with high-level policymakers, development practitioners and academics.

Appendix A: Household Survey Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics						
	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Panel A: Identity Group						
General	16%	14%	13%	17%	17%	20%
Hindu Scheduled Caste	42%	36%	41%	44%	45%	47%
Hindu Scheduled Tribe	8%	10%	8%	8%	8%	5%
Other Hindu Backwards Caste	14%	14%	16%	15%	12%	12%
Muslim	20%	27%	21%	16%	18%	16%
Panel B: Migration into Slum						
Years lived in current residence	17	13	16	18	19	19
Percent who arrived in the slum in the last year	5%	12%	5%	3%	2%	1%
Panel C: Education Status						
6-10 year olds in school	78%	59%	77%	86%	87%	89%
11-14 year olds in school	77%	56%	71%	80%	85%	91%
Adults with no schooling	48%	62%	52%	49%	41%	37%
Panel D: Asset Ownership						
House	85%	61%	81%	93%	96%	98%
TV	76%	29%	70%	97%	97%	98%
Mobile Phone	69%	27%	62%	86%	86%	98%
Refrigerator	25%	1%	5%	3%	53%	76%
Radio	16%	4%	8%	11%	17%	48%
Panel E: Employment*						
Days worked in a month	24	24	24	24	24	25
Distribution of heads-of-household in the top occupations:						
Unemployed	9%	8%	9%	10%	8%	10%
Homemaker	5%	4%	5%	6%	4%	6%
Unskilled Labor						
Daily Manual Labor	62%	69%	64%	61%	61%	47%
Petty Trader/Vendor/Hawker	19%	19%	22%	20%	18%	14%
Domestic Worker*	14%	18%	13%	14%	14%	10%
Domestic Worker*	10%	10%	10%	7%	13%	10%
Rickshaw Puller	5%	7%	5%	5%	3%	2%
Skilled Labor						
Skilled Craftsman**	23%	18%	20%	22%	26%	35%
Shopkeeper/Salesman	7%	6%	6%	6%	7%	8%
Shopkeeper/Salesman	5%	3%	3%	4%	6%	9%
Driver	5%	3%	4%	5%	6%	8%
Construction/Contractor	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Panel F: Fraction with Identification						
Any card	89%	73%	87%	94%	95%	97%
Ration card	62%	37%	58%	70%	74%	75%
Voter registration	85%	70%	84%	90%	91%	94%
Panel G: Health Status						
Visted a clinic for a minor health problem in the last six months	93%	92%	93%	93%	94%	93%
Visted a hospital for a major health problem in the last six months	18%	16%	19%	17%	18%	21%

* Employment statistics are calculated for those who reported themselves heads-of-household

Table 2: Access to Public Facilities

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Panel A: Water and Sanitation						
Uses indoor household tap	13%	8%	11%	14%	17%	18%
Uses outdoor well	31%	36%	32%	31%	28%	26%
Uses outdoor tap from municipal supply	61%	63%	64%	60%	62%	56%
No access to municipal supply or well	4%	7%	4%	3%	3%	4%
Faced non-availability of water	42%	38%	44%	44%	43%	44%
Uses in-house latrine	14%	6%	10%	12%	18%	30%
Uses public toilet	62%	51%	67%	68%	64%	57%
Uses open land, gutter, or side of road for toilet	40%	56%	40%	38%	35%	27%
Reports cleanliness of toilet is "bad"	30%	36%	32%	30%	30%	24%
Wastewater drain in the floor	13%	7%	10%	15%	14%	19%
No specific outlet for wastewater	60%	72%	61%	61%	54%	47%
Drain has been smelly or overflowing (if they have one)	90%	91%	91%	90%	88%	88%
MCD or private worker removes garbage	8%	4%	5%	9%	12%	11%
Disposes of garbage at a collection point (dumpster)	45%	37%	43%	47%	46%	53%
Dumps garbage in open land	43%	54%	48%	41%	38%	30%
Nearest dumpster emptied less than once a month	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Panel B: Roads						
Nothing larger than a motorcycle can pass on the road outside	80%	80%	81%	82%	80%	78%
Panel C: Electricity						
Has electricity	98%	96%	98%	98%	100%	100%
Reporting an average of at least 3 hours of power cuts per day last June	62%	60%	64%	60%	63%	59%
Reporting "very high bill" as a problem	20%	12%	22%	20%	21%	24%
Has illegal electrical connection (determined from mode of payment)	6%	15%	6%	4%	4%	1%
Panel D: Education						
HHs with a child in government school	57%	44%	54%	63%	63%	63%
HHs with a child in private school	11%	5%	10%	10%	12%	19%
HHs with a child in government school who say teaching quality is poor	6%	8%	5%	6%	7%	4%
HHs with child a in private school who say teaching quality is poor	1%	0%	2%	3%	2%	0%
Panel E: Health						
Last minor health problem for which HH sought medical attention:						
Visited government facilities	30%	31%	31%	30%	29%	25%
Visited private facilities	70%	69%	69%	70%	71%	75%
Last major health problem for which HH sought medical attention:						
Visited government facilities	43%	42%	44%	38%	46%	46%
Visited private facilities	57%	58%	56%	62%	54%	54%
Had a problem at the nearest government health center	59%	57%	61%	61%	56%	64%
Had a problem at a government hospital (conditional on having received care there for the last major health problem)	58%	58%	56%	53%	59%	62%
Panel F: Security						
Reporting a problem of law and order	76%	74%	77%	77%	77%	74%
<i>Of those reporting problems of law and order, specific issues reported:</i>						
Theft	92%	92%	94%	92%	90%	90%
Gambling	70%	74%	68%	71%	66%	70%
Alcoholism/drunkenness	68%	65%	69%	68%	68%	72%
Assault/violent crime	43%	39%	44%	41%	43%	50%
Domestic violence/abuse	53%	48%	50%	55%	53%	65%
Vandalism/destruction of property	8%	4%	6%	9%	8%	14%
Illegal drugs	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%	5%
Extortion	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%
Blackmail	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Went to police for law and order problem	10%	6%	10%	9%	12%	15%
<i>Of those who went to the police, outcomes reported:</i>						
The police took a report and actively investigated	34%	35%	28%	28%	40%	41%
The problem improved after going to the police	38%	35%	31%	28%	45%	48%

Table 3a: Ration Card Access

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Card Holders						
Any Card	62%	37%	58%	70%	74%	75%
Below Poverty Line Card						
Red Card	18%	13%	17%	22%	19%	19%
Yellow card	22%	13%	22%	27%	27%	24%
Red or Yellow	40%	26%	38%	48%	46%	43%
Above Poverty Line Card						
White-stamped	13%	6%	12%	13%	18%	21%
White	8%	5%	7%	9%	10%	11%

Table 3b: Fulfillment of Ration Card Benefits

	By Ration Card type			
	Any	Red	Yellow	White stamped
Panel A: Rice				
Percentage of official amount received*	82%	87%	84%	68%
Ratio of price paid to official price*	1.26	1.36	1.25	1.08
Panel B: Wheat				
Percentage of official amount received*	82%	87%	84%	73%
Ratio of price paid to official price*	1.15	1.28	1.10	1.02
Panel C: Rice and Wheat Rations				
Percentage of card holders who received any ration**	95%	97%	95%	92%
Percentage of card holders who get less than the official amount of rice or wheat*	63%	56%	62%	76%

*Conditional on receiving some benefit within the last month.

**Ration not limited to rice or wheat but includes any good (i.e. rice, flour, dal, salt, sugar, edible oil, wheat and kerosene oil) from the ration store.

1) The Red Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) cards are intended to target the poorest of the poor. They cover destitute households with widows, single and destitute women, disabled, infirmed or aged persons with no assured means of subsistence.

(2) The Yellow BPL ration cards cover households with annual family income below Rs 24,200.

(3) White-Stamped Cards (Above Poverty Line) are given to families with annual family income above Rs 24,200 and below Rs. 1,00,000.

(4) White Unstamped Cards (Above Poverty Line) are given to families with annual family income above Rs. 1,00,000. These cardholders are not entitled to rations.

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Eligible for any pension	23%	21%	25%	23%	23%	24%
Eligible for old age pension	13%	11%	15%	14%	14%	14%
Eligible for widow pension	8%	7%	8%	8%	8%	9%
Eligible for disabled pension	4%	25%	27%	27%	26%	28%

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Any pension	35%	31%	33%	40%	40%	34%
Old age pension	31%	33%	28%	33%	33%	25%
Widow pension	47%	32%	46%	51%	52%	55%
Disabled pension	15%	13%	13%	13%	23%	12%

(1) To be eligible for the old age, widow, or disabled pension, an individual must have an income of less than Rs.48,400 per year and must have lived in Delhi for five years or more. We used years in current residence as a proxy for the Delhi residency requirement. To qualify for the old age pension, the individual must be over 60 years of age. To qualify for the widow or disabled pension, the individual must be a widow or disabled, respectively.

	All Children	By Private Asset Quintile of Household				
		1	2	3	4	5
Percentage of Children (6-14) in Government Schools:						
Receiving a Scholarship	55%	53%	63%	49%	55%	55%
Receiving Textbooks	90%	94%	92%	91%	87%	86%
Receiving Stationary	27%	37%	26%	23%	26%	27%
Receiving a Free Uniform	79%	78%	80%	84%	76%	80%
Receiving any Non-Cash School Transfer	93%	95%	94%	94%	90%	92%
Percentage of Children (6-14) in Private Schools:						
Receiving a Scholarship	6%	12%	4%	8%	5%	3%
Receiving Textbooks	11%	21%	15%	15%	7%	7%
Receiving Stationary	3%	9%	9%	5%	0%	1%
Receiving a Free Uniform	10%	21%	13%	14%	6%	7%
Receiving any Non-Cash School Transfer	13%	26%	17%	19%	7%	8%

	Full Sample	By Asset Private Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Awareness of EWS education scheme	3.1%	1.1%	2.9%	2.6%	3.8%	5.9%
Awareness of hospital scheme	5.8%	2.9%	5.2%	5.7%	6.8%	9.8%
Use of EWS education scheme	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%	0.8%
Use of hospital scheme	1.4%	1.1%	1.7%	0.9%	2.1%	1.4%

Table 4: Explanatory Power of Slum-Level versus Ward-Level Fixed Effects

	Use a municipal water supply	Have access to a flush toilet to a piped sewer	Have an electrical connection	Dispose of trash in a dumpster	Receive a pension, if eligible	Has either voter registration or a ration card	Has Red or Yellow ration card							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Slum Fixed Effects														
Slum Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Private Asset index		0.0217*** (3.94)		0.0361*** (7.08)		0.00862** (3.27)		0.00677 (0.90)		0.0241 (1.14)		0.0604*** (10.30)		0.0590*** (6.41)
N	3330	3304	3349	3322	3271	3244	3371	3344	772	769	3367	3340	3374	3347
R-squared	0.591	0.595	0.313	0.325	0.157	0.158	0.478	0.479	0.249	0.252	0.209	0.236	0.194	0.205
F-test (on Slum FEs only)	30.47	30.51	9.642	10.02	3.868	3.846	19.51	19.31	1.591	1.590	5.628	6.472	5.128	5.427
P-value	0	0	7.89e-168	2.87e-166	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Panel B: Ward Fixed Effects														
Ward Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Private Asset index		0.0231*** (4.20)		0.0328*** (6.62)		0.0157*** (6.05)		0.0176* (2.25)		0.0148 (0.76)		0.0658*** (11.75)		0.0612*** (6.91)
N	3330	3304	3349	3322	3271	3244	3371	3344	772	769	3367	3340	3374	3347
R-squared	0.545	0.549	0.259	0.269	0.053	0.062	0.364	0.366	0.147	0.148	0.167	0.202	0.146	0.159
F-test (on Ward FEs only)	54.86	54.65	16.13	16.65	2.526	2.890	26.65	26.26	1.755	1.735	9.293	11.51	7.972	8.623
P-value	0	0	2.29e-162	3.52e-159	0	0	1.16e-268	3.37e-259	0	0.001	0	0	0	0
Panel C: Slum and Ward FE (with one Slum dropped per ward)														
Ward Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Slum Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Private Asset index		0.0217*** (3.94)		0.0361*** (7.08)		0.00862** (3.27)		0.00677 (0.90)		0.0241 (1.14)		0.0604*** (10.30)		0.0590*** (6.41)
N	3330	3304	3349	3322	3271	3244	3371	3344	772	769	3367	3340	3374	3347
R-squared	0.591	0.595	0.313	0.325	0.157	0.158	0.478	0.479	0.249	0.252	0.209	0.236	0.194	0.205
F-test (on remaining slum FEs only)	30.47	30.51	9.642	10.02	3.868	3.846	19.51	19.31	1.591	1.590	5.628	6.472	5.128	5.427
P-value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.035	0	0	0	0

Table 5: Most Problematic Issues in Areas

	According to RWA Survey	According to HH Survey
Water	31%	44%
Sewage/drainage/toilets	24%	30%
Crime/thefts/security	8%	1%
Electricity	4%	2%
Garbage removal	3%	11%
Education	3%	0%
Health	1%	1%
Ration	1%	7%
Pension	0%	1%
Roads	5%	0%
Parks and greenery	6%	0%
Traffic congestion	5%	0%
Stray dogs	2%	0%
Encroachment	2%	0%
Street lights	0%	0%

Table 6: Political life of Delhi slum dwellers

	Full Sample	By Asset Private Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Panel A: Political Activism by Slum Dwellers						
Registered households	85%	70%	84%	90%	91%	94%
Voted in the last municipal election	72%	51%	72%	76%	81%	83%
Panel B: Participation in a Political Party or Candidate's Activities						
Attended no event	66%	71%	66%	61%	68%	65%
Attended march or speech rally	33%	28%	34%	39%	31%	35%
Received no incentive*	72%	71%	67%	74%	74%	72%
Received cash incentive*	5%	5%	3%	4%	4%	8%
Received non-cash incentive*	22%	23%	27%	21%	20%	18%
Panel C1: Important Factors when Voting**						
Candidate's character only	12%	8%	11%	12%	13%	16%
Issues only	64%	69%	66%	62%	62%	58%
Both candidate's character and issues	21%	18%	20%	23%	21%	24%
Panel C2: Factors in Evaluating Candidates***						
Candidate's past government work	49%	46%	54%	50%	50%	46%
Candidate's past non-government work	16%	15%	17%	16%	17%	13%
Candidate's party	40%	36%	34%	40%	45%	46%
Caste or Religion	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Panel D1: Discussion of Politics						
Discuss politics/political parties' activities rarely or never	61%	69%	64%	60%	57%	49%
Discuss politics frequently around elections	28%	22%	24%	30%	30%	37%
Discuss politics sometimes or often	11%	9%	12%	10%	12%	13%
Panel D2: Political Awareness						
Knows name of councillor	28%	18%	25%	30%	33%	36%
Knows name of MLA	35%	24%	39%	39%	37%	40%
Aware that councillor is given funds to spend in the ward	32%	26%	34%	30%	33%	37%
Aware of funds and approximate amounts allocated to councillors	3%	1%	2%	2%	3%	7%

*Conditional on attending march, speech, or rally

**Respondents were prompted to answer whether issues or character were most important when they cast their vote.

***Respondents were prompted to say what they thought about when evaluating candidates.

Table 7a: Approaching Public Officials

	Ration Cards	Health Scheme	Education Scheme	Eviction/Slum Clearance	Sanitation	Water	Electricity	Crime
Approached public official	14%	1%	1%	9%	11%	17%	5%	1%
<i>Contingent upon approaching a public official...</i>								
Role of Official Approached								
Councillor	21%	21%	24%	15%	49%	26%	21%	24%
MLA	76%	59%	67%	75%	48%	69%	77%	71%
MP	3%	11%	9%	10%	2%	4%	2%	5%
Meeting Composition								
Alone	33%	47%	46%	0%	5%	2%	17%	11%
Group	67%	53%	54%	100%	95%	98%	82%	89%
Outcome of Meeting								
Not in Office	4%	3%	3%	1%	0%	1%	1%	2%
Refused to Speak	2%	0%	3%	1%	2%	0%	0%	4%
Could not/Refused/Did not Help	5%	9%	3%	7%	2%	5%	10%	59%
Said would help but nothing happened	41%	15%	21%	--	31%	42%	29%	--
Told someone to help but nothing happened	32%	30%	28%	--	28%	--	31%	--
Problem resolved	17%	30%	36%	81%	31%	48%	26%	35%
Other/Don't Know	0%	12%	8%	10%	7%	3%	5%	0%

*For eviction/slum clearance, 79% of problem resolution consisted of the slum not being cleared, and 2% in restitution for slum clearing

Table 7b: Help from Public Officials or Others

	Ration Cards*	Hospital Scheme	EWS Education Scheme	Water**
<i>Person who helped obtain services</i>				
No one	87%	97%	88%	89%
Elected Official	2%	3%	13%	2%
Pradhan	7%	-	-	4%
Agent	1%	-	-	0%
Relative/Neighbor/Friend	3%	-	-	2%

* Who helped obtain a ration card

**Who helped restore water after it was turned off

Appendix B: Audits Intervention Tables

TABLE 1—TOP LOCAL AREA DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: ACCESS, USAGE, AND QUALITY

	Full Sample High Slum Index Low Slum Index		
	Percent	Percent	Percent
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A. Household Concerns with Sewage and Garbage</i>			
<u>Sewage</u>			
Most problematic issue in this area	26%	30% ***	19%
Area in which the household has faced problems (last year)	70%	73% ***	65%
Area in which the community has faced problems (last year)	70%	73% ***	63%
<u>Garbage</u>			
Most problematic issue in this area	14%	12% ***	17%
Area in which the household has faced problems (last year)	53%	50% ***	58%
Area in which the community has faced problems (last year)	51%	48% ***	55%
<i>Panel B. Access, Usage and Quality</i>			
<u>Sewage</u>			
<u>Toilets</u>			
Uses in-house latrine	36%	14% ***	71%
Uses public toilet	42%	62% ***	10%
Uses open land, gutter, or side of road for toilet	29%	40% ***	12%
Reputs cleanliness of public toilet is "bad"	36%	38% ***	22%
<u>Drains</u>			
Open drain near house	75%	78% ***	71%
Wastewater drain in the floor	19%	13% ***	28%
No specific outlet for wastewater	47%	60% ***	27%
Drain has been smelly or overflowing (if they have one)	90%	90%	89%
<u>Garbage</u>			
MCD or private worker removes garbage	16%	8% ***	28%
Disposes of garbage at a collection point (dumpster)	38%	45% ***	27%
Dumps garbage in open land	42%	43% *	40%
Nearest dumpster emptied less than once a month	1%	2% ***	1%

Notes: This table reports findings from a household survey of over 5,000 low income households living in and near slums in a random sample of 107 wards. Slums areas were identified using a methodology based on the UN-HABITAT and Indian census definitions of slums. First, using aerial photographs of Delhi from satellite imagery, we compiled a list of potential slum areas based on housing density and appearance, complemented by Delhi government listings. This was followed by field visits, in which an area was defined as having a high slum index if it met at least five out of nine criteria closely related to the census definition of slums. These criteria included high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles and frequent cohabitation with animals. High index slums are those that meet at least five of these criteria. Low index slums are those that meet less than five of these criteria. Asterics denote significance for a t-test of the difference in means between slum and non-slum areas. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 2—DID REPORT CARDS INFLUENCE THE QUALITY OF TOILET PROVISION?

	Potential Access		Actual Access				Quality		Price	Usage		
	Total toilets	Total seats	Total open toilets	Total closed toilets	Fract. of open toilets	Fract. of closed toilets	Fract. of useable seats	Facilities	Fract. of toilets regularly cleaned	Price of toilet	Fract. of toilets charging above Re. 1	No. of people
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A. Toilets: All</i>												
Treatment * Post	-0.317** (0.157)	1.161 (1.639)	0.0897 (0.0751)	-0.604*** (0.200)	0.0120 (0.0198)	-0.181*** (0.0536)	0.0197 (0.0343)	0.334*** (0.106)	0.165 (0.109)	-0.177* (0.0943)	-0.170** (0.0770)	0.183 (1.850)
Post dummy	0.451*** (0.142)	1.542 (1.438)	0.0282 (0.0590)	0.612*** (0.175)	-0.0118 (0.0139)	0.181*** (0.0499)	-0.00976 (0.0308)	-0.214** (0.0798)	-0.0748 (0.0840)	0.203** (0.0829)	0.213*** (0.0657)	0.0141 (1.669)
Control mean in the baseline	2.761	22.99	1.775	1.429	0.489	0.291	0.469	1.978	0.744	1.014	0.284	14.38
Observations	951	951	951	538	951	515	951	951	538	427	437	427
<i>Panel B. Toilets: Male</i>												
Treatment * Post	-0.150** (0.0712)	0.790 (0.785)	0.0603 (0.0473)	-0.312*** (0.102)	0.00343 (0.0120)	-0.0942*** (0.0278)	0.0172 (0.0200)	0.444*** (0.143)	0.136 (0.113)	-0.181 (0.116)	-0.187* (0.101)	0.106 (1.164)
Post dummy	0.148** (0.0632)	0.338 (0.694)	-0.0704* (0.0384)	0.316*** (0.0899)	-0.0210*** (0.00748)	0.0945*** (0.0261)	-0.0261 (0.0171)	-0.253** (0.108)	-0.0924 (0.0870)	0.256*** (0.0889)	0.246*** (0.0870)	-0.683 (1.050)
Control mean in the baseline	1.451	12.38	0.958	0.714	0.256	0.145	0.270	2.139	0.740	1.323	0.433	8.394
Observations	951	951	951	538	951	515	951	951	529	427	427	427
<i>Panel C. Toilets: Female</i>												
Treatment * Post	-0.191* (0.0991)	0.306 (0.971)	0.00507 (0.0557)	-0.292*** (0.0992)	0.00253 (0.00810)	-0.0872*** (0.0260)	0.0193 (0.0116)	0.193 (0.130)	0.123 (0.106)	-0.218* (0.119)	-0.179** (0.0725)	0.0772 (0.938)
Post dummy	0.303*** (0.0924)	1.204 (0.825)	0.0986* (0.0517)	0.296*** (0.0854)	0.00216 (0.00612)	0.0869*** (0.0240)	-0.00454 (0.0107)	-0.201 (0.124)	-0.0478 (0.0852)	0.186* (0.109)	0.185*** (0.0596)	0.697 (0.868)
Control mean in the baseline	1.310	10.61	0.817	0.714	0.233	0.145	0.199	1.806	0.771	0.721	0.136	5.986
Observations	951	951	951	538	951	515	951	951	527	402	422	402

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 3—DID THE EFFECT OF REPORT CARDS ON THE QUALITY OF TOILET PROVISION DIFFER BY SLUM CHARACTERISTICS?

	Fract. of open toilets		Fract. of usable seats		Facilities		Fract. regularly cleaned		Price of toilet		No. of people	
	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A. Toilets: All</i>												
Treatment * Post * High use	-0.0440 (0.0472)	0.0539 (0.0385)	-0.0596 (0.0798)	0.112* (0.0640)	0.0780 (0.344)	0.682** (0.327)	-0.125 (0.227)	0.0885 (0.159)	-0.153 (0.190)	0.789*** (0.266)	8.500* (4.374)	6.144 (4.173)
Treatment * Post	0.0424 (0.0385)	-0.00389 (0.0223)	0.0736 (0.0539)	-0.0131 (0.0385)	0.294** (0.137)	-0.194 (0.261)	0.213 (0.145)	0.0795 (0.151)	-0.147 (0.1000)	-0.900*** (0.296)	-3.380** (1.375)	-2.734** (1.055)
Post * High use	-0.0172 (0.0351)	-0.00114 (0.0236)	0.0245 (0.0633)	-0.0572 (0.0492)	-0.209 (0.287)	-0.289 (0.247)	-0.0144 (0.154)	0.0309 (0.140)	0.112 (0.162)	-0.199 (0.175)	-7.716* (4.121)	-4.950 (3.616)
Post dummy	-0.0117 (0.0292)	-0.0192 (0.0134)	-0.0370 (0.0425)	0.00743 (0.0317)	-0.152 (0.108)	-0.0288 (0.179)	-0.0921 (0.0906)	-0.125 (0.120)	0.167** (0.0806)	0.385** (0.172)	3.078*** (1.145)	2.250** (0.996)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.557	0.830	0.543	0.760	2.248	2.480	0.788	0.780	1.121	1.031	17.79	25.80
Observations	705	705	705	705	429	429	349	349	355	355	705	705
<i>Panel B. Toilets: Male</i>												
Treatment * Post * High use	-0.0381 (0.0247)	-0.0154 (0.0346)	-0.0548 (0.0406)	0.0352 (0.0313)	-0.0632 (0.428)	0.813*** (0.298)	-0.133 (0.210)	0.0242 (0.162)	-0.395* (0.198)	0.711** (0.300)	6.565*** (2.430)	1.618 (2.530)
Treatment * Post	0.0273 (0.0177)	0.0184 (0.0258)	0.0588* (0.0329)	0.0147 (0.0235)	0.503** (0.223)	-0.152 (0.251)	0.182 (0.137)	0.100 (0.156)	-0.0331 (0.111)	-0.843** (0.343)	-2.893*** (0.847)	-0.801 (0.521)
Post * High use	0.00836 (0.0184)	0.0192 (0.0306)	0.0410 (0.0285)	-0.0152 (0.0167)	-0.185 (0.337)	-0.319 (0.198)	-0.0252 (0.153)	0.0417 (0.137)	0.416*** (0.130)	-0.149 (0.177)	-5.384** (2.300)	-2.565 (2.174)
Post dummy	-0.0305** (0.0143)	-0.0375* (0.0220)	-0.0548** (0.0263)	-0.0266 (0.0178)	-0.214 (0.190)	-0.0558 (0.169)	-0.0987 (0.0909)	-0.146 (0.119)	0.0908 (0.0612)	0.412** (0.202)	1.453** (0.610)	0.365 (0.392)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.286	0.422	0.310	0.420	2.448	2.703	0.785	0.778	1.258	1.330	10.83	14.49
Observations	705	705	705	705	426	426	349	349	350	350	705	705
<i>Panel C. Toilets: Female</i>												
Treatment * Post * High use	-0.0145 (0.0211)	0.0286 (0.0182)	0.00934 (0.0308)	0.0623** (0.0276)	0.168 (0.385)	0.350 (0.347)	-0.139 (0.231)	0.0741 (0.175)	0.165 (0.238)	1.237*** (0.280)	1.935 (2.466)	4.526** (2.142)
Treatment * Post	0.0151 (0.0145)	-0.00522 (0.00818)	0.0278 (0.0189)	-0.000827 (0.0119)	0.113 (0.253)	-0.0776 (0.242)	0.178 (0.145)	0.0500 (0.172)	-0.321** (0.132)	-1.316*** (0.301)	-0.488 (1.094)	-1.933** (0.778)
Post * High use	-0.00991 (0.0165)	-0.00109 (0.0151)	-0.0218 (0.0233)	-0.0375 (0.0254)	-0.149 (0.348)	-0.0902 (0.267)	0.0102 (0.161)	0.0253 (0.175)	-0.265 (0.214)	-0.511** (0.198)	-2.332 (2.283)	-2.385 (1.956)
Post dummy	0.00313 (0.0114)	-0.000962 (0.00628)	-0.00409 (0.0144)	0.00709 (0.0103)	-0.159 (0.226)	-0.161 (0.148)	-0.0833 (0.0950)	-0.1000 (0.157)	0.315** (0.123)	0.625*** (0.157)	1.625* (0.931)	1.885** (0.789)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.271	0.409	0.233	0.340	2.032	2.248	0.794	0.784	0.984	0.731	6.966	11.31
Observations	705	705	705	705	424	424	333	333	347	347	705	705

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. High use is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if usage is above the median. The median usage of open defecation is 16.67% and the median usage of public toilets is 28.57%. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 4—DID REPORT CARDS INFLUENCE THE QUALITY OF GARBAGE SERVICES?

	Total		Fraction of dhalaos					
	Dhalaos	Bins	Dhalaos with at least one bin	With a proper structure	Overflowing	Regularly cleaned	With complete details	With proper disposing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A. Basic Treatment Effects</i>								
Treatment * Post	-0.0903 (0.0634)	-0.0443 (0.173)	-0.0753 (0.0521)	-0.251 (0.210)	-0.269** (0.106)	-0.00203 (0.112)	-0.123 (0.108)	-0.0910 (0.176)
Post dummy	0.218*** (0.0550)	-0.155 (0.161)	0.0915* (0.0523)	0.847*** (0.185)	0.401*** (0.0942)	-0.0612 (0.111)	0.180* (0.0967)	0.337* (0.178)
Control mean in the baseline	0.437	0.704	0.155	0.747	0.687	0.407	0.820	0.220
Observations	951	951	951	322	322	322	322	322
<i>Panel B. Heterogeneity Analysis</i>								
Treatment * Post * High	0.0317 (0.157)	-0.174 (0.443)	-0.0483 (0.106)	-0.398 (0.388)	0.0819 (0.404)	0.977*** (0.232)	-0.222 (0.164)	0.215 (0.780)
Treatment * Post	-0.0665 (0.0744)	-0.0381 (0.0926)	-0.0368 (0.0299)	-0.0192 (0.284)	-0.308 (0.371)	-0.894*** (0.185)	0.0769 (0.106)	-0.346 (0.734)
Post * High Use	0.172 (0.129)	-0.134 (0.324)	0.114 (0.0934)	-0.173 (0.229)	-0.0822 (0.394)	-0.772*** (0.136)	0.209 (0.128)	-0.0733 (0.770)
Post dummy	0.125* (0.0699)	-0.0417 (0.0648)	0.0208 (0.0209)	1.000*** (0.000000103)	0.500 (0.361)	0.625*** (0.0903)	1.60e-15 (3.16e-08)	0.500 (0.722)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.649	1.027	0.216	0.614	0.640	0.430	0.789	0.158
Observations	705	705	705	242	242	242	242	242

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. In Panel B, we examine variation by usage of dhalao as reported in the household survey. High use is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if dhalao usage is above the median (29.17%). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 5—DID REPORT CARDS HAVE SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON THE QUALITY OF DRAIN PROVISION?

	Fract. of drains clogged	Fract. of drains with proper disposing	Frequency of cleaning
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A. Basic Treatment Effects</i>			
Treatment	-0.0750 (0.130)	0.146 (0.154)	-8.467 (7.205)
Post dummy	0.0750 (0.0924)	-0.200 (0.146)	1.667 (4.796)
Control mean in the baseline	0.375	0.250	51.67
Observations	132	132	95
<i>Panel B. Heterogeneity Analysis</i>			
Treatment * Post * High access	-0.102 (0.249)	-0.259 (0.303)	-13.71 (12.61)
Treatment * Post	0.0417 (0.155)	0.250 (0.282)	-3.750 (8.544)
Post * High access	0.352* (0.183)	0.159 (0.288)	15.89* (8.444)
Post dummy	-0.125 (0.110)	-0.250 (0.272)	-7.000 (5.837)
Control mean in high access areas in the baseline	0.409	0.0909	48.79
Observations	104	104	77

Notes: This table reports the results for a slum-level OLS panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by assembly constituencies (ACs). There were only two rounds of drain audits: Audits Round 2, therefore, serves as the drain baseline and Audits Round 3 serves as the drain endline. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the endline (Round 3) and is 0 in the baseline (Round 2). In Panel B, we examine variation by the access to a drain, as reported in the household survey. High access is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in slums where the average number of people reporting that there is a drain nearby is above the median (86.67%). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 1—RANDOMIZATION CHECK

	Treatment	Mean of Control Group	N	P-value of joint significance test	Councillor Report Card	MLA Report Card	Councillor and MLA Report Card	Mean of Control Group	N	P-value of joint significance test
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A. Toilets</i>										
Total toilets	-0.431 (0.477)	2.761 (0.467)	317	0.370	-0.572 (0.594)	-0.341 (0.688)	0.144 (0.832)	2.871 (0.570)	308	0.671
Total seats	-2.112 (4.582)	22.99 (4.252)	317	0.647	1.834 (7.050)	-1.229 (7.279)	-11.41 (9.691)	23.92 (5.084)	308	0.207
Total open toilets	-0.303 (0.310)	1.775 (0.297)	317	0.333	-0.261 (0.398)	-0.106 (0.476)	-0.352 (0.584)	1.806 (0.350)	308	0.332
Total closed toilets	0.259 (0.486)	1.429 (0.429)	174	0.596	-0.00857 (0.518)	-0.0527 (0.523)	0.714 (0.825)	1.535 (0.436)	169	0.742
Fract. of open toilets	-0.139 (0.0889)	0.489 (0.0888)	317	0.124	-0.123 (0.0690)	-0.0934 (0.0988)	0.0624 (0.0996)	0.474 (0.0816)	308	0.278
Fract. of closed toilets	0.0195 (0.0924)	0.291 (0.0895)	174	0.833	-0.0272 (0.0971)	0.00371 (0.100)	0.0177 (0.129)	0.316 (0.0906)	169	0.964
Fract. of useable seats	-0.136 (0.0709)	0.469 (0.0720)	317	0.0613	-0.0960 (0.0523)	-0.121 (0.0831)	0.100 (0.0957)	0.449 (0.0680)	308	0.308
Facilities	-0.303 (0.252)	1.978 (0.237)	174	0.236	0.0956 (0.334)	-0.389 (0.321)	-0.225 (0.485)	1.954 (0.261)	169	0.143
Fract. of toilets cleaned regularly	-0.109 (0.0887)	0.744 (0.0722)	144	0.227	-0.267 (0.111)	-0.115 (0.0848)	0.170 (0.154)	0.819 (0.0582)	139	0.0829
Price of toilet	0.0366 (0.106)	1.014 (0.0861)	141	0.732	0.217 (0.118)	-0.0845 (0.119)	-0.222 (0.270)	1.040 (0.0704)	136	0.140
Fract. of toilets charging above Re. 1	0.0311 (0.0648)	0.284 (0.0406)	144	0.634	0.0868 (0.0971)	-0.0289 (0.0815)	-0.0173 (0.159)	0.290 (0.0421)	139	0.732
No. of people	-2.897 (2.780)	14.38 (2.740)	317	0.302	-2.056 (3.448)	-0.445 (4.095)	-4.303 (4.746)	14.35 (3.105)	308	0.127

Notes: Each row is the regression results of the characteristics in the title column. Columns (1)-(4) report results for "Any Treatment," which is defined where either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card and columns (5)-(10) report results for councillor-specific and MLA-specific report cards. Columns (4) and (10) report the p-values of the joint significance of the treatment variables.

APPENDIX TABLE 1 *CONT'D*—RANDOMIZATION CHECK

	Treatment	Mean of Control Group	N	P-value of joint significance test	Councillor Report Card	MLA Report Card	Councillor and MLA Report Card	Mean of Control Group	N	P-value of joint significance test
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel B. Garbage</i>										
Total dhalaos	0.0349 (0.0708)	0.437 (0.0550)	317	0.624	0.113 (0.106)	0.0106 (0.106)	-0.0793 (0.155)	0.419 (0.0685)	308	0.746
Total bins	-0.111 (0.243)	0.704 (0.217)	317	0.651	0.105 (0.314)	-0.00677 (0.303)	-0.216 (0.448)	0.597 (0.214)	308	0.951
Total dhalaos with at least one bin	0.00361 (0.0518)	0.155 (0.0443)	317	0.945	0.0788 (0.0803)	0.0310 (0.0759)	-0.137 (0.108)	0.129 (0.0445)	308	0.634
Fract. of dhalaos with a proper structure	0.0479 (0.172)	0.747 (0.156)	108	0.782	0.139 (0.192)	0.0425 (0.180)	-0.355 (0.253)	0.783 (0.148)	103	0.231
Fract. of overflowing dhalaos	0.0422 (0.125)	0.687 (0.0957)	108	0.738	0.00546 (0.133)	0.0744 (0.161)	0.0618 (0.154)	0.658 (0.106)	103	0.643
Fract. of dhalaos cleaned regularly	-0.127 (0.111)	0.407 (0.102)	108	0.260	-0.0635 (0.133)	-0.150 (0.143)	0.0349 (0.169)	0.408 (0.118)	103	0.598
Fract. of dhalaos with complete details	-0.118 (0.104)	0.820 (0.0778)	108	0.260	-0.154 (0.140)	-0.00776 (0.149)	0.107 (0.192)	0.775 (0.0980)	103	0.638
Fract. of dhalaos with proper disposing	0.141 (0.0890)	0.220 (0.0796)	108	0.120	0.247 (0.0929)	0.161 (0.0955)	-0.264 (0.126)	0.175 (0.0695)	103	0.0679
<i>Panel C. Drains</i>										
Fract. of drains clogged	0.125 (0.151)	0.375 (0.119)	66	0.414	0.360 (0.171)	0.291 (0.165)	-0.608 (0.257)	0.265 (0.0978)	64	0.113
Fract. of drains with proper disposing	-0.152 (0.138)	0.250 (0.132)	66	0.278	-0.232 (0.149)	-0.155 (0.173)	0.170 (0.185)	0.294 (0.145)	64	0.445
Frequency of cleaning	4.675 (2.976)	51.67 (2.879)	60	0.126	6.896 (3.301)	5.833 (4.981)	-6.470 (5.669)	50.10 (3.730)	58	0.246
<i>Panel D. Slum characteristics in household survey</i>										
Open defecation (High use dummy)	0.00160 (0.0989)	0.475 (0.0897)	235	0.987	0.0261 (0.112)	-0.0727 (0.118)	0.0666 (0.175)	0.491 (0.0894)	227	0.814
Usage of public toilets (High use dummy)	-0.108 (0.0866)	0.574 (0.0804)	235	0.217	-0.152 (0.0906)	-0.0476 (0.116)	0.0398 (0.147)	0.585 (0.0830)	227	0.297
Usage of dhalao (High use dummy)	0.125 (0.0886)	0.410 (0.0823)	235	0.165	0.0827 (0.0936)	0.133 (0.103)	-0.118 (0.146)	0.434 (0.0794)	227	0.631
Access to drain (High access dummy)	-0.147 (0.0699)	0.607 (0.0572)	235	0.0406	-0.156 (0.0685)	-0.100 (0.105)	-0.00471 (0.132)	0.623 (0.0615)	227	0.0519

Notes: Each row is the regression results of the characteristics in the title column. Columns (1)-(4) report results for "Any Treatment," which is defined where either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card and columns (5)-(10) report results for councillor-specific and MLA-specific report cards. Columns (4) and (10) report the p-values of the joint significance of the treatment variables.

APPENDIX TABLE 2—DID THE EFFECT OF REPORT CARDS ON THE QUALITY OF TOILET PROVISION DIFFER BY LEVEL OF POLITICIAN?

	Potential Access			Actual Access			Quality		Price	Usage		
	Total toilets	Total seats	Total open toilets	Total closed toilets	Fract. of open toilets	Fract. of closed toilets	Fract. of useable seats	Fract. of toilets regularly cleaned	Price of toilet	Fract. of toilets charging above Re. 1	No. of people	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A. Toilets: All</i>												
Councillor Report Card * Post	-0.166 (0.218)	0.664 (2.523)	0.0844 (0.0881)	-0.440 (0.312)	0.0171 (0.0229)	-0.176** (0.0714)	0.0569 (0.0522)	0.282** (0.137)	0.304* (0.161)	-0.105 (0.105)	-0.0997 (0.0848)	0.147 (2.281)
MLA Report Card * Post	-0.242 (0.169)	2.343 (2.326)	0.150 (0.110)	-0.531** (0.217)	0.0332 (0.0238)	-0.167** (0.0636)	0.0328 (0.0365)	0.487*** (0.134)	0.111 (0.104)	-0.101 (0.118)	-0.141 (0.0890)	0.400 (2.033)
Councillor * MLA * Post	0.0141 (0.257)	-3.405 (2.958)	-0.155 (0.161)	0.244 (0.387)	-0.0399 (0.0411)	0.151* (0.0813)	-0.0998 (0.0664)	-0.370 (0.231)	-0.117 (0.237)	-0.176 (0.238)	-0.0308 (0.167)	-0.0401 (2.661)
Post dummy	0.387** (0.149)	1.492 (1.559)	-2.60e-16 (0.0599)	0.558*** (0.207)	-0.0216 (0.0132)	0.176*** (0.0617)	-0.0187 (0.0302)	-0.282*** (0.0974)	-0.126 (0.0888)	0.196* (0.0972)	0.203*** (0.0716)	-0.290 (1.785)
Control mean in the baseline	2.871	23.92	1.806	1.535	0.474	0.316	0.449	1.954	0.819	1.040	0.290	14.35
Observations	924	924	924	521	924	500	924	521	412	420	412	924
<i>Panel B. Toilets: Male</i>												
Councillor Report Card * Post	-0.0560 (0.101)	0.766 (1.355)	0.0806 (0.0639)	-0.238 (0.156)	0.0105 (0.0151)	-0.0933** (0.0369)	0.0392 (0.0310)	0.495** (0.202)	0.315* (0.162)	-0.0385 (0.127)	-0.0768 (0.114)	0.0778 (1.417)
MLA Report Card * Post	-0.111 (0.0766)	1.506 (1.006)	0.0906 (0.0620)	-0.273** (0.112)	0.00173 (0.0161)	-0.0864** (0.0334)	0.0159 (0.0220)	0.539*** (0.160)	0.0497 (0.103)	-0.108 (0.137)	-0.147 (0.121)	0.121 (1.211)
Councillor * MLA * Post	-0.0627 (0.118)	-2.412 (1.491)	-0.156* (0.0841)	0.136 (0.194)	-0.0177 (0.0254)	0.0795* (0.0418)	-0.0602 (0.0387)	-0.380 (0.286)	-0.0786 (0.215)	-0.250 (0.266)	-0.0541 (0.216)	0.0599 (1.650)
Post dummy	0.121* (0.0669)	0.234 (0.776)	-0.0806* (0.0463)	0.291*** (0.107)	-0.0200** (0.00890)	0.0922*** (0.0326)	-0.0266 (0.0179)	-0.355*** (0.107)	-0.147 (0.0912)	0.228** (0.0922)	0.215** (0.0928)	-0.766 (1.125)
Control mean in the baseline	1.500	12.92	0.968	0.767	0.242	0.158	0.255	2.163	0.814	1.357	0.436	8.306
Observations	924	924	924	521	924	500	924	512	412	410	412	924

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The effect of a politician-specific treatment is examined and the Councillor/MLA treatment dummy take the value 1 when the Councillor/MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 2 *CONT'D*—DID THE EFFECT OF REPORT CARDS ON THE QUALITY OF TOILET PROVISION DIFFER BY POLITICIAN?

	<u>Potential Access</u>			<u>Actual Access</u>			<u>Quality</u>		<u>Price</u>	<u>Usage</u>		
	Total toilets	Total seats	Total open toilets	Total closed toilets	Fract. of open toilets	Fract. of closed toilets	Fract. of useable seats	Facilities	Fract. of toilets regularly cleaned	Price of toilet	Fract. of toilets charging above Re. 1	No. of people
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel C. Toilets: Female</i>												
Councillor Report Card * Post	-0.110 (0.131)	-0.102 (1.309)	0.00377 (0.0569)	-0.202 (0.156)	0.00658 (0.00899)	-0.0829** (0.0347)	0.0304 (0.0214)	0.0349 (0.131)	0.262 (0.162)	-0.203 (0.132)	-0.128 (0.0837)	0.0696 (1.079)
MLA Report Card * Post	-0.131 (0.115)	0.837 (1.471)	0.0594 (0.0844)	-0.258** (0.106)	0.00650 (0.00957)	-0.0802** (0.0306)	0.0296* (0.0156)	0.316** (0.142)	0.0607 (0.0980)	-0.155 (0.136)	-0.182** (0.0690)	0.279 (1.220)
Councillor * MLA * Post	-0.0102 (0.145)	-1.225 (1.708)	-0.0858 (0.0883)	0.109 (0.194)	-0.00754 (0.0149)	0.0717* (0.0399)	-0.0670** (0.0278)	-0.209 (0.269)	-0.0852 (0.225)	-0.0382 (0.233)	0.0492 (0.138)	-0.100 (1.378)
Post dummy	0.266** (0.0999)	1.258 (0.901)	0.0806 (0.0545)	0.267** (0.100)	-0.00156 (0.00577)	0.0835*** (0.0294)	-0.00476 (0.0118)	-0.200 (0.124)	-0.0929 (0.0900)	0.199 (0.127)	0.190*** (0.0604)	0.476 (0.961)
Control mean in the baseline	1.371	11	0.839	0.767	0.232	0.158	0.195	1.736	0.827	0.720	0.141	6.048
Observations	924	924	924	521	924	500	924	511	390	406	390	924

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The effect of a politician-specific treatment is examined and the Councillor/MLA treatment dummy take the value 1 when the Councillor/MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 3—DID THE EFFECT OF REPORT CARDS ON THE QUALITY OF GARBAGE SERVICES DIFFER BY LEVEL OF POLITICIAN?

	Total		Fraction of dhalaos					
	Dhalaos	Bins	Dhalaos with at least one bin	With a proper structure	Overflowing	Regularly cleaned	With complete details	With proper disposing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Councillor Report Card * Post	-0.0720 (0.0667)	-0.133 (0.204)	-0.0809* (0.0478)	-0.162 (0.281)	-0.0487 (0.104)	-0.0272 (0.123)	0.0140 (0.132)	-0.187 (0.151)
MLA Report Card * Post	-0.0194 (0.0869)	0.147 (0.209)	-0.0134 (0.0518)	-0.115 (0.252)	-0.302** (0.132)	0.158 (0.133)	-0.0808 (0.119)	0.0551 (0.192)
Councillor * MLA * Post	0.0379 (0.0960)	0.247 (0.285)	0.104 (0.0627)	0.237 (0.348)	0.0354 (0.136)	0.0179 (0.175)	-0.0771 (0.160)	0.122 (0.192)
Post dummy	0.169*** (0.0556)	-0.282** (0.136)	0.0484 (0.0426)	0.705*** (0.223)	0.350*** (0.104)	-0.154 (0.118)	0.124 (0.103)	0.295* (0.168)
Control mean in the baseline	0.419	0.597	0.129	0.783	0.658	0.408	0.775	0.175
Observations	924	924	924	307	307	307	307	307

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The effect of a politician-specific treatment is examined and the Councillor/MLA treatment dummy takes the value of 1 when the Councillor/MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 4— HOW WERE REPORTED PROBLEMS AFFECTED BY USAGE?

<i>Panel A. Toilets</i>			
<i>Fraction of HH that report sewage as:</i>	<u>An area in which</u>		
	The most problematic issue in the area	the HH has faced problems over the last year	the community has faced problems over the last year
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Above median open defecation	0.032 (0.033)	0.017 (0.034)	0.018 (0.035)
Constant	0.249*** (0.019)	0.680*** (0.025)	0.670*** (0.026)
Above median usage of public toilets	0.110*** (0.031)	0.066* (0.034)	0.072** (0.036)
Constant	0.209*** (0.028)	0.655*** (0.030)	0.643*** (0.032)
Observations	235	235	235
<i>Panel B. Garbage</i>			
<i>Fraction of HH that report garbage as:</i>	<u>An area in which</u>		
	The most problematic issue in the area	the HH has faced problems over the last year	the community has faced problems over the last year
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Above median usage of dhalaos	-0.033 (0.023)	-0.071* (0.038)	-0.068* (0.035)
Constant	0.146*** (0.021)	0.585*** (0.029)	0.555*** (0.028)
Observations	235	235	235
<i>Panel C. Drains</i>			
<i>Fraction of HH that report sewage as:</i>	<u>An area in which</u>		
	The most problematic issue in the area	the HH has faced problems over the last year	the community has faced problems over the last year
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Above median access to drains	0.036 (0.034)	0.075** (0.033)	0.071** (0.032)
Constant	0.246*** (0.025)	0.651*** (0.027)	0.644*** (0.028)
Observations	235	235	235

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level cross section. Standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The above median variables are dummies that take the value of 1 if the access/usage in those slums is above the median. The median usage of open defecation is 16.67%, the median usage of public toilets is 28.57%, the median usage of dhalaos is 29.17%, and the median drain access (people reporting that there is a drain nearby) is 86.67%. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 4—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR TOILETS

	Fract. of open toilets		Fract. of usable seats		Facilities		Fract. regularly cleaned		Price of toilet		No. of people	
	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A. Toilets: All</i>												
Treatment * Post * High use	-0.0630 (0.0555)	0.0601 (0.0511)	-0.118 (0.0843)	0.0734 (0.0875)	-0.0239 (0.360)	0.588 (0.374)	-0.133 (0.229)	0.109 (0.211)	-0.229 (0.199)	0.764* (0.413)	8.794* (5.081)	6.955 (6.349)
Treatment * Post * Slum characteristics	0.00831 (0.00867)	-0.00287 (0.0107)	0.0362*** (0.0127)	0.0174 (0.0180)	0.130** (0.0618)	0.0700 (0.0674)	0.00741 (0.0445)	-0.00780 (0.0604)	0.0959*** (0.0317)	-0.00713 (0.0642)	-0.316 (1.027)	-0.444 (1.392)
Treatment * Post	0.00915 (0.0402)	0.00860 (0.0466)	-0.0966 (0.0880)	-0.0878 (0.0952)	-0.452 (0.360)	-0.554 (0.360)	0.169 (0.229)	0.110 (0.231)	-0.713*** (0.164)	-0.834*** (0.228)	-1.653 (5.131)	-0.721 (5.884)
High use * Post	-0.0235 (0.0348)	-0.00822 (0.0328)	0.0622 (0.0604)	-0.0198 (0.0607)	-0.126 (0.304)	-0.0824 (0.235)	-0.0207 (0.157)	0.0120 (0.190)	0.117 (0.162)	-0.321 (0.268)	-8.652* (4.802)	-6.569 (5.698)
Slum characteristics * Post	0.00429 (0.00404)	0.00321 (0.00738)	-0.0256** (0.0106)	-0.0169 (0.0155)	-0.113** (0.0552)	-0.111** (0.0479)	0.0104 (0.0388)	0.00722 (0.0513)	-0.00901 (0.0303)	0.0470 (0.0563)	0.637 (0.976)	0.734 (1.321)
Post dummy	-0.0326 (0.0341)	-0.0330 (0.0394)	0.0880 (0.0864)	0.0804 (0.0919)	0.500 (0.305)	0.493 (0.310)	-0.154 (0.201)	-0.154 (0.210)	0.220 (0.146)	0.197 (0.128)	-0.0269 (4.969)	-0.911 (5.688)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.557	0.830	0.543	0.760	2.248	2.480	0.788	0.780	1.121	1.031	17.79	25.80
Observations	705	705	705	705	429	429	349	349	355	355	705	705

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value of 1 when either a Ward Councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. High use is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if usage is above the median. The median usage of open defecation is 16.67% and the median usage of public toilets is 28.57%. The slum characteristics are the number of slum criteria observed by the auditor in the slum (out of nine). These nine criteria are closely related to the census definition of slums and include high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles and frequent cohabitation with animals. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

APPENDIX TABLE 4 *CONT'D*—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR TOILETS

	Fract. of open toilets		Fract. of usable seats		Facilities		Fract. regularly cleaned		Price of toilet		No. of people	
	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet	Open def.	Pub. toilet
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel B. Toilets: Male</i>												
Treatment * Post * High use	-0.0272 (0.0298)	0.0107 (0.0282)	-0.0723 (0.0455)	0.0362 (0.0418)	-0.203 (0.427)	0.676* (0.373)	-0.127 (0.210)	0.0996 (0.207)	-0.495** (0.217)	0.540 (0.480)	7.989*** (2.865)	3.016 (3.727)
Treatment * Post * Slum characteristics	-0.00841 (0.0101)	-0.0117 (0.00831)	0.0103 (0.00775)	-0.000695 (0.00957)	0.169*** (0.0479)	0.0888 (0.0677)	-0.0120 (0.0450)	-0.0265 (0.0605)	0.134*** (0.0448)	0.0505 (0.0831)	-0.961* (0.541)	-0.698 (0.744)
Treatment * Post	0.0699 (0.0557)	0.0687 (0.0538)	0.0113 (0.0506)	0.0180 (0.0539)	-0.463 (0.347)	-0.593* (0.337)	0.253 (0.236)	0.202 (0.241)	-0.825*** (0.260)	-1.009*** (0.336)	1.778 (2.543)	2.295 (2.982)
High use * Post	-0.00819 (0.0189)	-0.00570 (0.0201)	0.0495* (0.0264)	-0.0187 (0.0247)	-0.0905 (0.339)	-0.0944 (0.228)	-0.0362 (0.157)	0.000327 (0.186)	0.445*** (0.136)	-0.117 (0.339)	-6.764** (2.703)	-4.655 (3.344)
Slum characteristics * Post	0.0113 (0.00922)	0.0113 (0.00740)	-0.00573 (0.00552)	0.00159 (0.00823)	-0.127*** (0.0364)	-0.121*** (0.0420)	0.0182 (0.0389)	0.0158 (0.0513)	-0.0553 (0.0407)	-0.0125 (0.0765)	0.938* (0.488)	0.947 (0.697)
Post dummy	-0.0853 (0.0541)	-0.0861 (0.0516)	-0.0268 (0.0478)	-0.0334 (0.0508)	0.520** (0.243)	0.512** (0.245)	-0.206 (0.207)	-0.209 (0.215)	0.419* (0.243)	0.462* (0.250)	-3.122 (2.388)	-3.714 (2.812)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.286	0.422	0.310	0.420	2.448	2.703	0.785	0.778	1.258	1.330	10.83	14.49
Observations	705	705	705	705	426	426	349	349	350	350	705	705
<i>Panel C. Toilets: Female</i>												
Treatment * Post * High use	-0.0230 (0.0234)	0.0311 (0.0264)	-0.0124 (0.0323)	0.0480 (0.0368)	0.168 (0.416)	0.434 (0.403)	-0.150 (0.234)	0.0886 (0.214)	0.0580 (0.248)	1.237*** (0.384)	0.805 (2.763)	3.940 (2.954)
Treatment * Post * Slum characteristics	0.00423 (0.00322)	-0.000678 (0.00487)	0.0131** (0.00595)	0.00639 (0.00694)	0.0211 (0.0862)	-0.0103 (0.0807)	0.0116 (0.0544)	-0.00286 (0.0686)	0.117*** (0.0402)	-0.0283 (0.0563)	0.645 (0.630)	0.255 (0.750)
Treatment * Post	-0.00294 (0.0152)	-0.00287 (0.0181)	-0.0336 (0.0231)	-0.0283 (0.0241)	-0.0225 (0.380)	-0.0892 (0.387)	0.110 (0.299)	0.0552 (0.297)	-1.003*** (0.206)	-1.133*** (0.247)	-3.431 (3.229)	-3.015 (3.497)
High use * Post	-0.0101 (0.0174)	0.00102 (0.0192)	-0.00913 (0.0245)	-0.0241 (0.0241)	-0.125 (0.379)	-0.0123 (0.257)	0.0107 (0.163)	0.0394 (0.201)	-0.261 (0.213)	-0.668*** (0.190)	-1.889 (2.490)	-1.914 (2.687)
Slum characteristics * Post	0.000150 (0.00230)	-0.000958 (0.00323)	-0.00860 (0.00573)	-0.00610 (0.00410)	-0.0423 (0.0799)	-0.0500 (0.0617)	-0.00138 (0.0503)	-0.00637 (0.0587)	-0.0101 (0.0407)	0.0717 (0.0470)	-0.302 (0.600)	-0.213 (0.722)
Post dummy	0.00239 (0.0136)	0.00316 (0.0160)	0.0378* (0.0220)	0.0334 (0.0201)	0.0921 (0.336)	0.0887 (0.360)	-0.0749 (0.285)	-0.0720 (0.291)	0.377* (0.196)	0.309* (0.173)	3.095 (3.185)	2.802 (3.435)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.271	0.409	0.233	0.340	2.032	2.248	0.794	0.784	0.984	0.731	6.966	11.31
Observations	705	705	705	705	424	424	333	333	347	347	705	705

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value of 1 when either a Ward Councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. High use is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if usage is above the median. The median usage of open defecation is 16.67% and the median usage of public toilets is 28.57%. The slum characteristics are the number of slum criteria observed by the auditor in the slum (out of nine). These nine criteria are closely related to the census definition of slums and include high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles and frequent cohabitation with animals. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 5—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR GARBAGE

	Total				Fraction of dhalaos			
	Dhalaos	Bins	Dhalaos with at least one bin	With a proper structure	Overflowing	Regularly cleaned	With complete details	With proper disposing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment * Post * High use	0.0464 (0.153)	-0.136 (0.469)	-0.0260 (0.0985)	-0.331 (0.438)	0.188 (0.422)	0.717*** (0.263)	-0.262 (0.195)	0.0775 (0.808)
Treatment * Post * Slum characteristics	-0.0118 (0.0274)	-0.0488 (0.109)	-0.0246 (0.0200)	0.0496 (0.102)	0.0448 (0.0539)	-0.153*** (0.0423)	-0.0236 (0.0425)	-0.111 (0.0911)
Treatment * Post	-0.00739 (0.148)	0.201 (0.530)	0.0848 (0.113)	-0.377 (0.832)	-0.684 (0.556)	0.276 (0.416)	0.257 (0.325)	0.441 (1.022)
High use * Post	0.150 (0.125)	-0.138 (0.347)	0.0997 (0.0841)	-0.234 (0.301)	-0.191 (0.415)	-0.520*** (0.162)	0.247 (0.180)	0.0482 (0.800)
Slum characteristics * Post	0.0224 (0.0246)	0.00356 (0.102)	0.0143 (0.0203)	-0.0300 (0.0863)	-0.0540 (0.0484)	0.125*** (0.0363)	0.0190 (0.0377)	0.0604 (0.0766)
Post dummy	0.0140 (0.136)	-0.0593 (0.495)	-0.0503 (0.112)	1.240* (0.690)	0.932* (0.531)	-0.374 (0.304)	-0.152 (0.301)	0.0171 (0.950)
Control mean in high usage areas in the baseline	0.649	1.027	0.216	0.614	0.640	0.430	0.789	0.158
Observations	705	705	705	242	242	242	242	242

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include slum fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value of 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. High use is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if dhalao usage is above the median (29.17%). The slum characteristics variable is the number of slum criteria observed by the auditor in the slum (out of nine). These nine criteria are closely related to the Census definition of slums and include high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles and frequent cohabitation with animals. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

“Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi”

Final Report with preliminary data

A final report with preliminary data, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of USAID
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Executive summary

Does poor information explain the low quality of public service provision in low-income democracies? Are poor citizens constrained by a lack of information from using their vote to elect politicians who are less corrupt, more competent at delivering services, or both? And are elected politicians constrained from exercising their oversight, and often executive, powers to improve the quality of public amenities due to a similar lack of information? This report examines field experiments Delhi, India that attempt to answer these questions.

In this report, we report on a multi-year report card intervention in Delhi which sought to improve public service delivery in slums and help slum-dwellers to be better at holding politicians electorally accountable. Our experiment was designed to examine the impact of different types of interventions aimed at municipal ward councillors. Midterm and pre-election newspaper report cards provided voters with information on councillor spending decisions and committee attendance. Councillors knew up to two years in advance that report cards would be released. We find that councillors react by directing more spending towards slum relevant categories – toilets, drains and removal of debris. These increases appear to have come at the expense of spending on roads, “materials” and trucking. Parties, in turn, reacted favourably -- councillors that received report cards were more likely to get party tickets to re-stand for election. This, in turn, translates into a higher winning margin for these councillors.

Our second set of report cards provided information on toilet and garbage conditions in slums. These were only given to the ward councillor and not to slum dwellers. The extent of councillor activism is more muted, which we argue reflects the fact that service delivery has been largely privatized and the councillors have only indirect control over the providers. The report cards increased churning – more toilets were closed and opened such that the total number of available toilets remained largely unchanged. There are no significant impacts on toilet infrastructure and prices charged.

Taken together, these results suggest that there is a greater role for information provision in reducing information asymmetries between politicians and their constituents and improving public service delivery.

This report is organized in the following manner: Section I discusses the key study question, Section II gives an overview of the context in which this study took place, Section III examines the study design, Section IV discusses project implementation, Section V provides an overview of the datasets, Section VI discusses preliminary results; Section VII discusses policy implications, and Section VIII summarises the policy dissemination activities undertaken already as well as outlines an elaborate policy dissemination plan.

I. Study Questions

My father (former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi) used to say that only 15 Paisa out of a Rupee (spent by the government) reaches people. After seeing the situation here I feel that not even five paisa is reaching the people.

Rahul Gandhi, Party Secretary, Indian National Congress (ruling party in India)
at a rally in 2008 (Gandhi, 2008)

India is the world's largest democracy and home to roughly one-third of the world's poor, yet as the quote suggests, this voting bloc has been largely unable to translate their political weight into effective service delivery and other economic gains. This phenomenon is not unique to India: the quality of social service delivery remains poor in most low-income democracies (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2008). Furthermore, and possibly for related reasons, the incidence of corrupt and criminal politicians remains high in these settings (UNDP, 2002; Banerjee and Pande, 2009; Golden and Tiwari, 2009). Thus, how to ensure that governments meet the local infrastructure needs of their constituents is a central challenge across the globe. Why are poor citizens unable to use their vote to elect politicians who are less corrupt, more competent at delivering services, or both?

The goal of this research is to understand the role of information in improving the governance of low-income democracies. A growing body of evidence suggests that improving the information available to voters influences electoral outcomes (see Pande 2011). However, we know less about: (a) the types of information that influence voter behavior, (b) whether politician behavior is influenced by the fact that voters are more informed, and (c) whether and how increases in electoral accountability influence service delivery.

To this end, this study examines the following questions: 1) whether better electoral outcomes can be achieved by directly providing voters with information, either on politician responsibilities or on actual politician performance and qualifications, 2) whether anticipation of and actual public disclosures on responsibilities and/or performance can cause incumbents to improve their service delivery and performance and change decisions on whether to stand for re-election, and 3) whether governance can be strengthened by directly providing elected officials with information about the quality of service and does this, in turn, affect usage of these amenities.

To address the first two questions, we provided report cards on councillor or village leader performance which were collated using objective information on politician performance obtained under the Right to Information (RTI) Act (2005). The aim was two-fold. First, by informing Councillors in advance that they would receive newspaper report cards, we aim to incentivize Councillors to improve their performance. Second, by increasing awareness among voters living in slums about local development issues through midterm and pre-election report cards, we aim to give voters the opportunity to press for improvements and then judge candidates on any changes

at the end of the term. To address the last question of whether governance can be strengthened by directly providing elected officials with information, we conducted a second intervention. Based upon our findings from household surveys that sanitation and garbage services rank amongst slum-dwellers' top local development area issues, we conducted audits of toilet and garbage dumps in low-income neighbourhoods, predominantly slum areas, drawn from a random sample of 108 of the 272 electoral districts (wards) of the MCD. The results of these audits were then compiled into a report card and, following a randomized control framework, sent to randomly selected ward councillors of the MCD and Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) of the State Government of Delhi.

II. Context

The political-institutional structure of Delhi

Due to its unique position as a city, state and capital of the country, Delhi is characterized by multiple layers of formal governance, blurring the division of legislative and executive responsibilities, including those related to sanitation. Our study is focused on two key players: the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and the Delhi state government.¹

The MCD is the municipal body that covers the majority of Delhi's population. Councillors are elected from 272 electoral wards, having an average 2007 population of 50,000 per ward, and the councillors elect a mayor for a one-year term. MCD elections are held every five years, most recently in April 2012. These elections were the focus of the newspaper intervention.² In recent years the state government has acquired greater control over the MCD. This includes the right to select the MCD Commissioner, who was previously appointed by the central government, and a voice in the allocation of funds (Women in Cities International 2011).

The Delhi state government, or Government of the National Capital Territory, covers a coterminous area with the city of Delhi. It is headed by a Chief Minister and comprises 70 members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) who are elected every five years. The most recent election was in 2008.³

Local elections are vigorously contested and slum dwellers claim that politician performance is the main criterion for their vote (as opposed to, say, caste identity) and many go to local politicians to solve their daily problems (Banerjee, Pande, and Walton 2012).

¹ The MCD is one of three municipal forms of government within Delhi. The other two are the New Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi (NDMC) and the Delhi Cantonment, responsible for specific geographic areas within Delhi.

¹⁰ The elections returned the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This marks the third consecutive MCD election in which the BJP has won.

¹¹ This election was won by the incumbent India National Congress (INC) Party. Thus, the two levels of government relevant to both slum- and other city-dwellers are run by competing parties.

Slums

Our study focuses on whether and how politicians are held accountable by citizens in low-income neighbourhoods of Delhi, predominantly in slum areas. The housing of Delhi's 18 million residents falls into multiple settlement types (Government of India 2011). Of these, "Jhuggi-Jhopri" colonies (from now on, JJ colonies) and slum-designated areas are home to the majority of the "slum" population (Women in Cities International 2011). Slum-designated areas were designated as slums under the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act of 1956; while JJ colonies (where JJ refers to the temporary nature of housing materials) are unauthorized settlements of encroachers and illegal squatters.⁴ Differences in which neighbourhood and land ownership characteristics are used to define a slum have implied significant variation in slum population estimates, which range from 16 percent to 52 percent of the total population (Banerji 2009).

Policy Levers Available for Improvement of Public Services in Slums

There are two main instruments available to Councillors and MLAs to affect public good provision in the slums: the first being through direct control over the services themselves, and the second through discretionary spending.

1. Public Good Provision

Provision and maintenance of public toilets, garbage removal and cleaning of drains are local government activities in India. In the case of Delhi, much of this is undertaken in the form of management or concession contracts with private or non-government organizations. The typical public toilet contract sets the maximum user price, states which facilities should be available, and requires regular cleaning of the toilets. Contracts are awarded separately for each toilet facility for a period of 20-30 years with a clause that should "unsatisfactory" conditions fail to be improved within 15 days after notice is given, the contract may be rescinded. Garbage contracts stipulate that operators provide two bins, one for non-biodegradable and one for recyclable/bio-degradable waste, segregate the waste, and collect it daily (IL & FS Ecosmart Limited 2007). The typical garbage contract is awarded at the zonal level for a period of 9 years and includes a performance evaluation mechanism.

The lines of responsibility between the state government and MCD for sanitation issues in slums have blurred in recent years. Prior to 2010, the MCD was responsible for public toilets, drains connected to roads, and garbage removal, while the state government was responsible for piped water supply and piped sewage disposal in the city, through the state-level public corporation, the Delhi Jal Board. However, responsibilities related to public toilets and drains became unclear in "slum" areas with the July 2010 formation of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB). The Slum & JJ Department of the MCD was transferred to DUSIB, which is

⁶ The majority of slum-designated areas lie within the walled areas of the Old City. In addition to slum-designated areas and JJ clusters, the full list of settlement types also includes: unauthorized colonies, resettlement colonies, rural villages, regularized-unauthorized colonies, urban villages, and planned colonies. Resettlement colonies consist of relocated JJ cluster households. Other settlements with slum areas include unauthorized colonies and regularized-unauthorized colonies and urban villages (Banerji 2009).

“responsible for notifying certain areas as slums,” “looking after the Jhuggi Jhopri squatter settlements,” and “providing civic amenities for the Environmental Improvement and their Resettlement” (DUSIB 2013).⁵ Interviews with two MCD Councillors and the CEO of DUSIB confirm that garbage services indisputably remain within the jurisdiction of the MCD. However, the responsibility for drains and toilet services remain contentious.⁶

2. Spending

Both state and city legislators receive a significant annual discretionary fund to be used to repair infrastructure problems in their jurisdiction. In our study, we focus on the Councillors’ discretionary spending fund, which we include in our newspaper report cards. Rs. 71 lakhs in 2007-08, Rs. 2 crore in 2008-09, Rs. 50 lakhs in 2009-10 and Rs. 50 lakhs in 2010-11 was provided to each Councillor to carry out development works in the ward.⁷ Councillors spent over 90% of this in the 2007/08 and 2008/09, our baseline years, but, there seems to be very little alignment between their spending (largely on roads) and the most important problems faced by slum-dwellers. As discussed in greater detail below, while slum-dwellers report the most problematic issues in their areas to be water, sewage and garbage, a breakdown of Councillor spending shows that the greater part of their discretionary fund (57%) is spent on roads. While the next biggest expense category comprises the provision of drains and toilets, this constitutes a far lower proportion of their funds – only 17%. The next two expense categories do not obviously meet slum-dwellers’ interests either – provision and repair of lights (8%) and the improvement of parks and provision of gates (7%). At least in some areas, politicians could do more to respond to the problems if they chose to. The following quotation from the Delhi Human Development Report illustrates:

“The role of councilors in policymaking is minimal and entails ‘getting things done’ through their interface with citizens on the one hand, and the executive wing of the MCD, on the other. The councilors enjoy a greater status, as they control the constituency funds and this enables them to decide which works will be undertaken and where. The councilors also exercise some power over officials: directing them, causing transfers to be effected, and reporting accounts of corrupt practices or of insensitivity towards citizen demands.” (DHDR 2006, Singh 2010)

¹⁶ DUSIB has taken over the acquisition of land for resettlement, which was previously the responsibility of the Delhi Development Authority, as well as the relocation and site services, which previously fell under the Slum Wing of the MCD (Women in Cities International 2011). Responsibilities also include the provision of basic services to resettlement colonies.

¹⁷ In our interviews, the CEO of DUSIB indicated that DUSIB is responsible for *providing* basic services to JJ colonies, including drains, but that they are not responsible for, nor do they have the available manpower for the *maintenance* of drains, and that issues over the delineation of responsibilities between the MCD and DUSIB in this area are a source of frustration. One councillor indicated that the MCD’s responsibilities extend to the cleaning of drains as well.

⁷ Laks and crores are Indian units of account: 1 lakh = 100,000; 1 crore = 100 lakhs.

Baseline Survey Findings on Delhi Slums

Survey Instruments

1. Household survey

An initial household survey was conducted of over 5,000 households in May 2010 based on spatial maps of Delhi, satellite images, Delhi government listings, site visits and interactions with local NGOs. Based on the UN-Habitat and Indian census classification⁸, we categorised the surveyed areas into high-slum index and low-slum index areas. Ultimately, around 3,000 households were determined to be high slum index households (in areas with five or more “slum” characteristics) and around 2,000 were determined to be low slum index households (in areas with less than five “slum” characteristics). The survey was typically carried out with the household head (in 51% of the cases) or, in the case where the household head was unavailable or away on two consecutive visits made to the household, with his or her spouse (49% of the cases) or other household member. If a household proved unwilling or unavailable after multiple visits, another was selected using the same method.

The survey collected extensive data on slum-dwellers’ access, usage and difficulties with respect to social services (such as health facilities, sanitation, schools, water, electricity and law and order) and transfers (such as subsidized food rations and pensions) as well as their knowledge of the local government system, interactions with public officials and politicians, and political preferences and participation. This was followed by a second household survey, which covered migration, health, aspirations, social networks, security, property rights, housing finance and migration, and anthropometrics. We also sought to obtain information from both women and men in this survey.

A third survey of 250 heads or members Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) was also added, which asked about the problems they faced and how they dealt with them.

2. Audits Survey

Our audit report card intervention was based on audits of public toilets and garbage dumps (dhalaos⁹) conducted in 312 low-income neighbourhoods, predominantly slum areas, drawn from a random sample of 108 of the 272 electoral districts (wards) of the MCD. These wards, in turn, were situated within 56 legislative jurisdictions of the State Assembly (termed assembly constituencies, from now on ACs). In each ward an average of three low-income neighbourhoods

⁸ According to this classification, an area is determined to be a slum if it meets at least five out of nine criteria closely related to the census definition of slums. These criteria include high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, low access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles, and frequent cohabitation with animals.

⁹ The Master Plan for Delhi defines a dhalao as “a premise used for collection of garbage for its onward transportation to sanitary landfills” (Chintan Environment Research and Action Group 2004). The *City Development Plan* (2007) defines dhalaos as “large masonry dustbins.”

were audited thrice: between April-June 2011, November-January 2011/2012, and April-June 2012.

All audits covered toilets and dhalaos and the second and third audit also covered drains. For each facility audited, the auditor was required to survey the entire slum and identify all facilities. To ensure audits were complete, auditors asked slum-dwellers where they disposed of their trash and which public toilet they used. The garbage disposal point or public toilet was audited when a confirmation was received from at least three residents.


During a facility audit the surveyors observed and noted the quality of the public amenities and interviewed two respondents per garbage/toilet/drainage point to obtain information on the frequency of cleaning and prices. Finally, to obtain data on usage, the surveyor counted the number of people who used the toilet in a randomly chosen observation time of 15 minutes between 3-5pm.

Drains were also audited in the second and third rounds to observe any potential spillover effects from the intervention (since there was no information on the drains provided to the elected officials). The drain survey included questions on the size of the drain, the presence of trash in the drain, the last time the drain was overflowing, the last time the drain was cleared of garbage, the frequency of cleaning and some additional questions regarding the smaller drains outside people's houses.

Conditions in Delhi's slums: Baseline Findings

1. Household Surveys

Our baseline survey reveals that almost three-quarters of high slum index households reported problems with sewage disposal in the preceding year, both for themselves and for their local community, and about half reported problems with garbage (Table 2). Sewage disposal (that may include toilets or drains) was ranked the "most problematic issue" by roughly a third of high slum index households, while garbage was given the top-rank by 12 percent (Table 2). Only water had a higher frequency of ranking. Households from the low slum index sample (those with fewer than five slum characteristics) reported problems with sewage disposal at only a moderately lower frequency than high slum index households, but had higher reports of garbage issues (Table 2). Appendix B provides a more detailed discussion of our Household and RWA survey results.



2. Baseline Audits

The baseline audits of public toilets and garbage dumps further reveal the low quality of public amenities across Delhi. Roughly 36 percent of toilet complexes in our sample were closed. Despite statutory requirements, only 30 percent of the toilets had soap provided with provision significantly worse in female toilets (50 percent of male toilets, but only 9 percent of female toilets had soap). In general, the quality of facilities provided was worse in female toilets. With regard to prices charged, the statutory contract states that the price should not exceed Rs. 1 per visit in slum areas and Rs. 2 in non-slum areas. However, user surveys showed that at baseline 39 percent of male toilets and 18 percent of female toilets charged in excess of one rupee. Despite this, usage of public toilets was high (42 percent of all households surveyed, and 62 percent for households living in areas with a high slum index—Table 2). Turning to garbage disposal, slums are supposed to have official garbage disposal points and bins; however in the baseline, over 66 percent of the surveyed dhalaos did not have any bins and 65 percent of neighbourhoods did not have any dhalaos. About 70 percent of dhalaos were not cleared daily (as required), according to user surveys, and overflowing garbage dumps were a consistent problem (in 69 percent of dhalaos).

In short, while sewage and garbage are clearly priority areas for slum-dwellers, politicians are failing to deliver on these services, despite having multiple levers through which to effect change. Our interventions aimed to generate activism in these areas and in these areas.

III. Study Design: Surveys and Interventions

Two potentially distinct pathways for changes in public goods provision exist: pure incentives for politicians to change performance due to expected reward or punishment in electoral contests, and direct citizen and civil society pressure for specific projects (that could again potentially be enforced via their ability to not re-elect the incumbent if s/he doesn't deliver desired outcomes). Both pathways to changes in provision require that voters and civil society groups possess timely,

accurate and interpretable information on politician responsibilities and past performance; that these groups are willing and able to act on this information; and that politicians believe that these groups are willing and able to act on this information. In addition, politicians also need information on both voter preferences and the quality of current public good provision so that they can respond to issues that matter to voters.

This study examines whether changing information available to citizens and politicians influences outcomes by improving delivery of public services that are of high priority to slum dwellers, namely sewage management and garbage removal, by tapping into these pathways for change. As discussed above, in our study, politicians had multiple instruments for improving services: 1) local area development funds and 2) direct control over the services themselves, or indirect influence over the contractors providing the services. The evaluation attempts to move both of these levers, following the principles of a randomized control trial.

Newspaper Intervention

This intervention was designed to utilize both pathways for change—to measure both the incentive effect of monitoring on Councillors’ performance and the effect of voter information campaigns on voter turnout and electoral outcomes. This intervention consisted of publishing report cards on local Councillors in *Hindustan*, a leading Hindi language daily. The material for these report cards came from use of the Right to Information Act to obtain data from the MCD on Councillor spending, meeting attendance, and committee membership by our NGO partner Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS, which translates to Society for Citizen’s Vigilance Initiative).

To distinguish between the incentive and selection effects we created multiple treatment arms. We randomly assigned 240 wards into one of three categories: a control group and two treatment groups. Councillors in the first treatment group (T1) were informed in May 2010 that report cards on their performance would be disseminated only in the run-up to the election in April 2012. Councillors in the second treatment group (T2) had report cards published on their performance in both 2010, at the mid-term of their time in office, and again in the run-up to the elections in 2012. Treatment categories were assigned, stratifying for incumbent party and zone (there are twelve geographically contiguous zones in Delhi, each comprising an average of 15 wards). No report cards were distributed in control wards. This structure allows us to assess whether the knowledge that information on performance is being made available to voters has incentive effects on politician behavior, and further, whether voter information at the mid-term leads citizens to increase pressures on local politicians. Our treatment sample was ultimately composed of 72 control wards, 58 T1 wards, and 110 T2 wards.

Figure 1 is an example of a report card on 3 politicians, as published in the *Hindustan*. It includes the politicians’ photo, patterns of spending from their discretionary funds, which committees they were on, and committee attendance.

Furthermore, within a subset of the treatment wards, another randomisation was done at the slum level within every ward. In half of the randomly selected slums in a ward, each household received a newspaper delivered at their doorstep; whereas, the other half served as a comparison group with no newspaper distribution. This allows us to explore the additional effect of

newspaper distribution as compared to publication alone. In all, 66 slums in 47 treatment wards were randomly selected for distribution: 22 slums in 17 T1 wards and 44 slums in 30 T2 wards.¹⁰

¹⁰ In the original randomization, 61 wards were selected as distribution wards. However, the final slum-level randomization was done on those wards that *received* treatment. Thus, improperly surveyed wards, wards with Councillor suspensions/deaths, and wards dropped due to constraints by *Hindustan* were excluded. Further exclusions included a replacement ward that actually had no slums and wards with boundary issues. In 2010, we distributed a total of 62,220 newspapers and in 2012, we distributed a total of 78,212 newspapers. Every household in the slum received one report card.

विधान स्वरूप (कांग्रेस)


वार्ड नंबर 187 संगम विहार
संसदीय क्षेत्र
आयोजना नंबर 187

अनधिकृत कर्मियों में पैसा नहीं लगा सकते, इस कारण विकास कार्य करने में दिक्कत होती है। फिर भी काफ़ी काम किए हैं



नगर निगम में प्रदर्शन (अप्रैल 2007-मार्च 2009)
निगम की बैठकों में उपस्थिति 50/56

उपचार्य फंड का व्यय (अप्रैल 07-मार्च 09)
कुल उपचार्य राशि 2.71 करोड़ रु.
अवशेष राशि 0.79 करोड़ रु.



* प्रत्येक वार्ड को 2007-08 में 71 लाख तथा 2008-09 में 2 करोड़ वार्ड में विकास कार्य के लिए मिले

सर्विसियों में प्रदर्शन (अप्रैल 2007 से मार्च 2009)

सर्विसी	वर्ष	अवधि	उपस्थिति
वार्ड समिति (मध्य क्षेत्र)	सदस्य	2007-09	36/39
उपचार्यकार नगरिकर	सदस्य	2007-09	1/4
टिशव कार्य	सदस्य	2008-09	9/11
लाइवलिह व तकसुधारी	सदस्य	2007-09	15/33
ग्रांट इन एड	सदस्य	2007-08	दस्ता नहीं

वार्ड जैसा तीन साल पहले था, आज भी वैसा ही है। सफ़ाई तो होती ही नहीं, नाली बनी नहीं और पार्क तो है ही नहीं।



रैनु शर्मा (भाजपा)

वार्ड नंबर 120 (सीतापुरी)
संसदीय क्षेत्र
आयोजना नंबर 120

हर गुरुवार को क्षेत्र का निरीक्षण करती हूँ, जहाँ भी समस्याएँ नजर आती हैं, उनको दूर करने के लिए पूरा प्रयास किया जाता है



नगर निगम में प्रदर्शन (अप्रैल 2007-मार्च 2009)
निगम की बैठकों में उपस्थिति 51/56

उपचार्य फंड का व्यय (अप्रैल 07-मार्च 09)
कुल उपचार्य राशि 2.71 करोड़ रु.
अवशेष राशि 2.89 करोड़ रु.

तीन साल से नहीं हुआ सड़कों पर काम

वार्ड नंबर 120 (सीतापुरी) पार्थव जी का रिपोर्ट कार्ड हिन्दुस्तान सतर्क नागरिक संगठन

वार्ड नंबर 120, सीतापुरी, पश्चिम जैतन में पड़ता है। इस क्षेत्र में जनसुविधाओं को सुचारु रूप से नहीं दे पाए। जल-नलिका व्यवस्था का पार्थव जी ने नगरिकों को परेशान होना पड़ता है। इसके अलावा भी विन पार्थव और अधिकारियों में भी तर्क है, लेकिन इन नहीं निकलता। सफ़ाई भी

जल्दबाई इस वार्ड में कमजोर है। यहाँ इनके खराब है कि लोगों का राह चलन मुश्किल है। तीन साल पहले जो सड़क बननी थी, उनमें ही काम चल रहा है।
वार्ड में सड़क निर्माण को लेकर बहुत अपेक्षा की जा रही है। पंचायत की समस्या भी क्षेत्र में खनी हुई है। क्षेत्र में अनधिकृत कर्मियों भी हैं, जिनमें मूलभूत सुविधाओं का अभाव है। यहाँ पर रहने वाले लोग पार्थव के दिवाले पर धीरे धीरे दे रहे हैं, लेकिन विकास के कार्य उनके क्षेत्र में उभर नहीं रहे हैं, जिस वजह से अन्य कर्मियों में भी है।
वार्ड में पार्थव क्षेत्र में पैसा नहीं दे पाए और खर्च भी नहीं दे पाए, लेकिन इन निकलने के ज़रूरत है। इनके क्षेत्र में पैसा नहीं दे पाए और खर्च भी नहीं दे पाए, लेकिन इन निकलने के ज़रूरत है।



उपचार्य फंड का व्यय (अप्रैल 07-मार्च 09)



* प्रत्येक वार्ड को 2007-08 में 71 लाख तथा 2008-09 में 2 करोड़ वार्ड में विकास कार्य के लिए मिले

पार्क और खेलों से जुड़े कामों पर रखा गया है ध्यान

वार्ड नंबर 97 (कीर्ति नगर) क्षेत्र में सड़कों की मरम्मत और निर्माण पर ध्यान दिया गया है। काम भी हुआ है इसके अलावा पार्क-खेलों के निर्माण पर ध्यान दिया गया है। पिछले दो-तीन सालों में क्षेत्र की सड़कों की मरम्मत अच्छी करने के लिए लगभग दो करोड़ रुपए आवंटित किए गए हैं। इसके अलावा पार्क-खेलों के निर्माण पर ध्यान दिया गया है।

वैश्विभूत कोर्ट बनाने के साथ पार्क में डिजाइन गेट भी लगाए गए हैं। रोजाना नगर और कीर्ति नगर में स्थित पार्क काफ़ी अच्छी हालत में है। पार्क में खेल-कूद के भी अच्छे कार्य किए गए हैं। यहाँ नहीं क्षेत्र में निगम (व्यावसायिक) की व्यवस्था भी की गई है। इन सभी कार्यों में जहाँ जहाँ को राहत मिली है, वहाँ कुछ पार्कों की मरम्मत भी की गई है। इन सभी कार्यों में जहाँ जहाँ को राहत मिली है, वहाँ कुछ पार्कों की मरम्मत भी की गई है। इन सभी कार्यों में जहाँ जहाँ को राहत मिली है, वहाँ कुछ पार्कों की मरम्मत भी की गई है।

पूरे वार्ड में विकास के नाम पर कुछ नहीं दिखता है

वार्ड नंबर 187 (संगम विहार) यह एक ऐसा क्षेत्र है, जिसमें जगह पर हर जगह समस्या ही समस्या नजर आती है। इस वार्ड में सफ़ाई का अभाव देखकर खराब ही नहीं कि यहाँ नगर निगम को और से कुछ काम भी किया जाना है। गुरुवार रातों और इधर-उधर जहाँ जहाँ दिखता है। कुछ जगहों पर तो नलिका मरम्मत भी है। क्षेत्र में अनधिकृत कर्मियों बहुत ज्यादा हैं, जिनको हटाने का काम भी बंद हो चुका है। ऐसा लगता है कि विकास के कार्य बंद हो चुके हैं। सड़कों के निर्माण का निर्माण भी नहीं किया जा सका है। इस वजह से जल-नलिका व्यवस्था खराब हो रही है। क्षेत्र की मरम्मत करनी है कि व्यवस्था होने पर भी हानि होती है, उसमें लोगों का जीवन मुश्किल हो जाता है। इस वजह से वार्ड में काम तो जैसे हुआ ही नहीं है, इस कारण नलिका और भी फैलती है। वार्ड में पार्क तो बन ही नहीं आते।

सर्विसियों में प्रदर्शन (अप्रैल 2007 से मार्च 2009)

सर्विसी	वर्ष	अवधि	उपस्थिति
वार्ड समिति (मध्यक्षेत्र)	सदस्य	2007-2009	35/43
पार्थव हेतु आवार सफ़ाई	सदस्य	2007-2009	5/7
कटर, इस्त्रान एवं सुनी-डोपिंगी का सुचारु एवं विकास	सदस्य	2007-2009	15/18
सर्विसी व्यवस्था बाल विकास	सदस्य	2007-2009	6/7


* प्रत्येक वार्ड को 2007-08 में 71 लाख तथा 2008-09 में 2 करोड़ वार्ड में विकास कार्य के लिए मिले

उषा मेहता (भाजपा)

वार्ड नंबर 97 (कीर्ति नगर)
संसदीय क्षेत्र
आयोजना नंबर 97

नगर निगम में प्रदर्शन (अप्रैल 2007-मार्च 2009)
निगम की बैठकों में उपस्थिति 43/56

उपचार्य फंड का व्यय (अप्रैल 07-मार्च 09)
कुल उपचार्य राशि 2.71 करोड़ रु.
अवशेष राशि 2.71 करोड़ रु.



* प्रत्येक वार्ड को 2007-08 में 71 लाख तथा 2008-09 में 2 करोड़ वार्ड में विकास कार्य के लिए मिले

सर्विसियों में प्रदर्शन (अप्रैल 2007 से मार्च 2009)

सर्विसी	वर्ष	अवधि	उपस्थिति
वार्ड समिति (पश्चिमी)	सदस्य	2007-09	28/37
सफ़ाई सफ़ाई	सदस्य	2007-09	76/100
जन स्वास्थ्य	सदस्य	2007-09	15/21
सामाजिक परिष्कार	सदस्य	2007-09	6/12

ऐसा नहीं है कि वार्ड समस्याओं से मुक्त हो गया है, लेकिन काम हो रही है। निगम पार्थव को सफ़ाई-व्यवस्था और पार्कों की देखरेख पर ध्यान देना चाहिए।



नगर निगम में प्रदर्शन (अप्रैल 2007-मार्च 2009)
निगम की बैठकों में उपस्थिति 43/56

Figure 1: Sample report card on Councillor performance published by Hindustan

Audits Intervention

The second intervention was designed to examine the effect of information provision on the quality of public services, to both Councillors and MLAs. This intervention follows the incentive pathway for change, albeit from a different angle than the newspaper report card intervention. Where the newspaper report card intervention directly introduced a monitoring mechanism, the audits intervention tests whether the expected reward or punishment at the polls serves as a strong enough mechanism, and it is instead the case that politicians are facing an information gap resulting in sub-standard services.

We focused on toilets, garbage and drains because the household survey found that sewage disposal (which households could have interpreted to include both toilets and drains) was ranked the “most problematic issue” by almost a third of slum households, while garbage disposal was the most problematic issue for around 12 percent of the households. Our initial proposal was to audit garbage and education facilities. However, educational facilities were dropped due to constraints on being able to audit schools without prior permission, and because slum-dwellers ranked sewage disposal as a greater problem.

For this intervention, report cards were mailed to politicians (both Councillors and Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)) based on audits of public toilets and garbage dumps (dhalaos¹¹) conducted in 312 low-income neighbourhoods, predominantly slum areas, drawn from a random sample of 108 of the 272 electoral districts (wards) of the MCD. These wards, in turn, were situated within 56 legislative jurisdictions of the State Assembly (termed assembly constituencies, from now on ACs). All ACs were randomized into treatment and control, followed by a balanced randomization of the wards within an AC. In the event that a ward was split across two ACs, it was put in the AC with an unbalanced number of wards. Therefore, of the 108 wards, 51 were randomly assigned to have the MCD Councillor receive a report card and, out of the 56 ACs, 27 were randomly assigned to have the MLA receive a report card on toilet and dhalaos conditions in their assembly constituency (AC).¹² Because Wards and ACs are not perfectly aligned, this made for a total of 134 Ward-AC combinations: 33 control, 36 where only the MLA received a report card, 33 where only the MCD Councillor received a report card, and 32 where both the MLA and MCD Councillor received report cards. In total, three rounds of audits were conducted, with report cards based on the first two mailed to a group of 51 randomly selected ward councillors (out of 108) and 27 randomly selected MLAs (out of 56).

In each ward an average of three low-income neighbourhoods were audited thrice: between April-June 2011, November-January 2011/2012, and April-June 2012.

All audits covered toilets and dhalaos and the second and third audit also covered drains. For each facility audited, the auditor was required to survey the entire slum and identify all facilities. To ensure audits were complete, auditors asked slum-dwellers where they disposed of their trash and

11 The Master Plan for Delhi defines a dhalaos as “a premise used for collection of garbage for its onward transportation to sanitary landfills” (Chintan Environment Research and Action Group 2004). The *City Development Plan* (2007) defines dhalaos as “large masonry dustbins.”

12 Within each AC, we performed a balanced randomization of MCD wards into treatment and control.

which public toilet they used. The garbage disposal point or public toilet was audited when a confirmation was received from at least three residents.

During a facility audit the surveyors observed and noted the quality of the public amenities and interviewed two respondents per garbage/toilet/drainage point to obtain information on frequency of cleaning and prices. Finally, to obtain data on usage, the surveyor counted the number of people who used the toilet in a randomly chosen observation time of 15 minutes between 3-5pm.

Audit findings were compiled into report cards, which were designed to give both an immediate overall status report, color-coded to give a sharp impression of problems, and detailed information on the condition of each toilet and dhalao surveyed in their constituency—so that a politician would have the information to act if he or she chose to do so. Figure 2 shows one summary report card.

The toilet summary included the total number of toilets audited separately by gender, number of seats, percent broken, and percent dirty. The detailed toilet report included information on location, status, when last repaired, when last cleaned, average price, frequency of cleaning, and facilities present (taps, light, soap, bucket, and shower) for each audited toilet. The garbage summary included the total number of dhalaos, bins and informal piles, the number of these overflowing with garbage, and the physical structure. The detailed report for dhalaos included the location, total number of bins, frequency of pickup, whether it was overflowing and whether there was a proper structure for each dhalao. The detailed report for informal piles included the location, state of severity, last time cleaned, and date audited. Results were color-coded in terms of severity: green for “no problem,” yellow for “moderate problem,” and red for “severe problem.” A map was attached to the report cards for reference, showing the different toilet and garbage points.

Drains were also audited in the second and third rounds to observe any potential spillover effects from the intervention (since there was no information on the drains provided to the elected officials). The drain survey included questions on the size of the drain, the presence of trash in the drain, the last time the drain was overflowing, the last time the drain was cleared of garbage, the frequency of cleaning and some additional questions regarding the smaller drains outside people’s houses.

DETAILED REPORT ON ALL TOILETS

(सभी शौचालयों की विस्तृत जानकारी)

Code on the Map (जहाँ पर कोड)	Toilet Facilities Audited (जहाँ पर शौचालय)	Type (प्रकार)	Last Repaired (पिछली बार मरम्मत का समय)	Last Checked (पिछली बार जांच का समय)
T1	Back side of open toilet	बंद सार्वजनिक शौचालय		
T2	Cn-205 ke samne nadial ki juggi	बंद सार्वजनिक शौचालय		
T3	Indra vikash colony near of cn no 218	सहीना कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	1 सप्ताह पहले	आज
T4	Scg 1/4 near poll no 413-10 27/7 Indra vikas colony	पुण्य कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	1 सप्ताह पहले	आज
T5	Munshi ram colony front of s.c.g no 3/47	सहीना कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	7 सप्ताहों में पहले	आज
T6	S c g 3/47 k samne	पुण्य कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	7 सप्ताहों में पहले	आज
T7	Munshi ram colony front of house no 210	सहीना कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	2 सप्ताह पहले	आज
T8	Near h. No. 210	पुण्य कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	2 सप्ताह पहले	आज
T9	Dhakka village front of house no n-130/182 gali no 1	सहीना कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	1 सप्ताहों में पहले	1 दिन पहले
T10	Near h.no. 130/182 dhaka colony	पुण्य कुमर सार्वजनिक शौचालय	1 सप्ताहों में पहले	1 दिन पहले

DETAILED REPORT ON OPEN TOILETS

(सुने शौचालयों की विस्तृत जानकारी)

Code on the Map (जहाँ पर कोड)	Type (प्रकार)	Toilet Facilities Audited (जहाँ पर शौचालय)	Price (in Rs.) (मूल्य)	Freq. of cleaning (बारों में बार)	Facilities (अनुसूचित सुविधाएँ)				
					Tap (जल)	Light (दीपक)	Soap (साबुन)	Bucket (बाल्टी)	Shower (शower)
T3	सहीना	Indra vikash colony near of cn no 218	2	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗
T4	पुण्य	Scg 1/4 near poll no 413-10 27/7 Indra vikas colony	2	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
T5	सहीना	Munshi ram colony front of s.c.g no 3/47	2	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗
T6	पुण्य	S c g 3/47 k samne	1	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
T7	सहीना	Munshi ram colony front of house no 210	2	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
T8	पुण्य	Near h. No. 210	2	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
T9	सहीना	Dhakka village front of house no n-130/182 gali no 1	1.5	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
T10	पुण्य	Near h.no. 130/182 dhaka colony	1.5	दिन में 1 बार	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓

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2: Sample report card on the audits of public services

Bringing both categories of intervention together, the chart below breaks down our wards by treatment.

Treatment	Number of Wards
Pure Control	42
Only Audits Treatment	31
Only Newspaper Treatment	83
Newspaper & Distribution Treatment	35
Audits & Newspaper Treatment (Includes Distribution Wards)	50

Additional Activities

Measurement of changes in spatial allocation of public services delivery and RWA endline

We also added a component to the study that looks at changes in the spatial allocation of public service delivery across the entire term of the Councillor (2007-12). This will potentially enable us to examine any shifts in the spatial distribution of spending of the Councillor as a result of our interventions.

We also completed a small RWA intervention. RWAs were introduced under the Bhagidari scheme by the state government of Delhi as a formal mechanism for neighborhood associations to be formed and to interact with state agencies (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi 2011). RWAs were predominantly formed outside slum areas; however, our analysis found that in over half the wards there is a match between the most frequently cited problem among slum-dwellers and that of RWAs (see Appendix B). Therefore, one further promising pathway for change may be mobilizing RWAs. To this aim, we created an RWA intervention. Treatment RWAs received a mobilization program informing them about MCD spending in their area and how to engage leaders to provide services. RWAs also received letters about disaggregated spending in their areas, to get a better idea of where the funds allocated by the MCD go. We have also recently completed an RWA endline, which included questions on access to local officials and MCD spending, which will allow us to analyze the treatment impacts of the RWA intervention. What is more, using the spatial data, since the randomisation of RWAs was within wards, we can assess whether providing information to RWA officials led to any shift in spending to areas in these treated RWA areas related to control RWAs. Results are forthcoming.

IV. Program Implementation

The interventions were carried out between 2010 and 2012. The first baseline survey was conducted in May 2010, which was then followed by a second baseline survey. We experienced considerable difficulty in tracking down and finding respondents from the first household survey, particularly those working outside the home. To overcome this challenge, we undertook a series of innovative approaches—using evening and weekend teams, phone appointments and splitting the survey into different parts (for

alternative household respondents). This extended the period of survey, but we ended with a complete respondent rate of over 80% (and higher for the parts of the survey that could be answered by women at home.)

For the newspaper intervention, we had originally planned to randomly assign 257 wards into one of four categories: a comparison group, the two treatment groups previously mentioned, and a third treatment group, which was to have report cards published Councillor performance in both 2010 and 2012 and to include additional slum-level efforts on voter mobilisation. However, after discussions with SNS, other NGOs and slum dwellers, and after conducting some piloting, we realized that it would be extremely difficult to conduct voter mobilization campaigns, especially in slum areas. Being important political vote banks, the atmosphere is politically charged close to the elections and conducting mobilization campaigns in this period could have threatened the security and safety of our surveyors. This would also have made replicability problematic. After careful assessment, we decided to drop voter mobilization and instead combine the second and third treatment groups. For quite different reasons, we also decided to drop zones 9 and 10, which contained 17 wards, because they contained rural areas or areas with few slums. Thus, our intended treatment sample was ultimately composed of 240 wards.

In 2010, 109 report cards were published. Two wards were removed from T2: in ward 12, the Councillor died and in ward 78, the election of the Councillor was held to be null and void (this ward was replaced with ward 6 from T1, thereby only reducing the total number of published report cards in 2010 by 1). In 2012, 124 report cards were published: six wards were dropped because the Councillor was suspended or died (including the two mentioned above); seven were dropped because they were never sampled (in two of these cases another ward was sampled instead); one was dropped because there were no slums in the ward; and the last 30 were dropped because *Hindustan* was only able to publish 124 report cards. To compensate for these changes, we use an intention-to-treat framework in our analysis so as not to affect the internal validity of the study.

For the audits intervention, our original plan was to send one round of report cards. But, considering that Councillor elections were due in April 2012, we decided to send two rounds of report cards in order to capture the difference in activism during election sensitive and non-sensitive periods. Report cards were sent in August 2011 and February 2012 respectively. The first summarized the baseline audits (Round 1), conducted between April and June 2011, and the second compiled audits conducted between November 2011 and January 2012 (Round 2). The cover letter in both rounds indicated that audit information might be later made public. The final audits (Round 3) were conducted straight after the election, between April and June 2012.

To be able to analyse the effect of the campaign on electoral behaviour and electoral outcomes, it was necessary to obtain a polling-station level dataset and match our sample areas to their respective polling stations. The data uploaded by the Delhi State Election Commission (DSEC) was either illegible, incomplete or missing. After repeated requests and meetings with the DSEC, we were able to obtain a raw dataset of the polling-station level electoral results, which we are currently in the process of cleaning and organising. Furthermore, to be able to match our distribution areas to their respective polling stations, we conducted a digital survey in July 2012, to collect voter id information of the slum-dwellers. However, piloting the digital survey was difficult, since respondents were not comfortable sharing sensitive voter id information on cell phones. As an alternative, we switched to conducting paper surveys, which yielded clear positive returns in terms of data collection (although it added to our monetary and time costs).

Undertaking a cost-benefit analysis is especially difficult with respect to quantification of economic benefits, given the complex causal chain from service quality, to usage, to health status, and economic gains. Even a formal cost-effectiveness analysis will be hard to undertake given both the information demands on this causal chain, and the lack of information on alternative treatments. However, we do assess the more focused question of the cost and feasibility of replicating the approach to providing information on service quality, and to consider alternatives. A preliminary assessment follows for both the interventions: For the first intervention, we published a total of 109 report cards in 2010 and 124 report cards in 2012. The primary costs were incurred in filing Right to Information (RTI) requests and hiring data entry operators to clean the data and prepare the report cards. Filing an RTI costs Rs. 10 per application and hiring a data entry operator (in Delhi) costs \$140/month, making it a fairly low cost affair. Moreover, during the previous election (in April 2012), we observed that apart from Hindustan (our media partner), other media houses (Hindustan Times, Times of India etc.) also published report cards on Councillor performance in March 2012, suggesting cost is not a barrier to this approach, and there is potentially easy replication once the information is obtained and compiled. (The impact of the evaluation is of course a separate issue.)

For the audits of public services, in each round, we audited a total of 312 slums (in 108 wards), covering (on an average) a total of 819 toilets and urinals, 196 dhalaos, 5250 informal points per round. With a team of 27 auditors we were able to complete one round in three months, costing us approximately \$15,500 per round. However, the digital data collection techniques (using cellphones, GPS machines etc) along with the spread of slums across Delhi made it an intensive activity in terms of training, implementing and monitoring. Our intuition therefore, is that the insight of this experiment can be better replicated by other, more cost-effective mechanisms, which we will further explore while engaging with NGOs and government departments in the follow up policy discussion.

V. Datasets

From the interventions and household surveys described above, we have nearly completed the following six datasets:

- Data from extensive household surveys studying the lives of the urban poor
- Preferences of Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs)
- Polling station level electoral outcomes for the city council elections in April 2012
- A detailed list of a Councillor's spending and his/her participation in City Council activities
- A spatial dataset of Councillor spending
- Data from three comprehensive rounds of audits of public services

This rich set of data, ranging from the lives of the urban poor and their voting preferences to the accountability and activism of politicians provides us with the unique opportunity to study the individual behaviour of voters and politicians, as well as interactions between them. It enables us to address research and policy questions relating to the lives of the urban poor, the alignment of political activity with voter preferences, the impact of voter information campaigns, the responsiveness of politicians to relevant

information provided to them and, in general, the various channels of interaction between politicians and voters. Below we detail some preliminary findings from the first household survey and the audits intervention.

VI. Results

As the above description outlines, we implemented a large intervention with multiple moving parts. We report here our initial results, though analysis remains ongoing. We report results in the following categories:

- A. Incentive Effects: Both our newspaper and audit card interventions could have had incentive effects.
 - a. Newspaper: In 2010, a set of councillors received letters that their performance would be reported on prior to the 2012 election. By examining changes in the 2010 and 2012 report card data we can examine whether the intervention caused politicians to change spending decisions and/or committee attendance.
 - b. Audits: The first set of audit report cards were delivered in 2011. By examining outcomes between baseline and endline we can ask whether politicians were incentivized by better information. Note that a key difference between audit information and newspapers is that only in the latter was it made clear that voters would receive information on performance.
- B. Selection Effects
 - a. Party: Party decisions on which candidates to field were made close to elections – on average, less than one month before the election. This, in part, reflects the late announcement of which wards would be reserved for women. Reservation had a particularly big impact on this election as the number of wards reserved increased from 33 to 50 percent. We examine whether parties favored candidates who were reported on and whether this led to changes in the electoral fortunes of incumbents
 - b. Voters: A second channel is voters reacting to changed performance of incumbents (incentive effect) and better information on candidates. To provide evidence on the pure information channel we examine impact of a within ward intervention where a random sample of slums received report cards. This analysis is still ongoing.

Below we therefore report results on the incentive effects and the selection effects as mediated by the parties. We anticipate updating our findings with results on the within-ward distribution in the next 2 weeks.

Incentive Effects

Newspaper Intervention

To examine the incentive effect of report cards on Councillor performance we look at the treatment effect of informing the Councillor that he/she would receive a report card in the *Hindustan* on both spending and non-spending decisions (Table 3). Councillors were mailed a letter informing them that they would have a report card published in the *Hindustan* in May 2010. We can therefore examine changes in spending decisions between the first newspaper report card, which contained data from 2007-2009, prior to the politicians gaining any knowledge of publication and the second, which contained data from 2009-2011, a period in which Councillors could have adjusted their behavior. Councillors were mailed a letter informing them that they would have a report card published in the *Hindustan* in May 2010. We divide

spending categories into those more or less relevant for slum dwellers. In Panel A we consider outcomes that are more slum relevant as identified by slum dweller preferences. The largest spending category here is drains and toilets and we see increased spending in this category. Spending on drains and toilets, an area slum dwellers had identified as a priority, increases by almost 50 percent (over a control mean of 28 percent). While drain spending may occur outside slums as well, toilet spending is largely concentrated in slums. This is a key aspect that slum dwellers care about.

Waste from construction, or malba, materials are often concentrated near slums. This was particularly true in the run up to the Commonwealth games in 2010 and we see evidence of increased malba removal in treatment wards. The main reduction in spending comes from roads (noisily estimated but large) and supply of materials and trucking.

In Panel C we consider the main form of non-spending activism, which is committee attendance and observe no change.

In Table 4 we ask whether the spending impacts translated into observable differences as seen in the audit data. The decline in informal garbage piles is consistent with greater spending on removal of waste (malba). On toilets and drains we, however, do not see any discernable change.

Audits Intervention

In Table 5 we examine the impact of the audit intervention.

The basic treatment effect we find is a significant and large increase in the number of closed toilets—an increase of 24 percent over a baseline control average of 0.951 closed toilets (Table 5). It appears that the report cards spurred both closures and openings such that the total number of open toilets (Column 3), however, remains largely unaffected. We observe an (insignificant) increase in overall toilets (Column 1) in treatment areas. In other words, politicians appear to be simultaneously building and closing toilets, leaving both access and usage (Column 6) essentially unchanged. We do not observe any change in quality or price or (Columns 4 and 5); nor do we see evidence of a differential treatment effect based on baseline slum characteristics such as high open defecation or public toilet usage (Appendix Table 3). We observe no average treatment impacts on the quality of garbage services (Table 5), nor do we see spillovers into drain provision, a service for which no information was provided on the report card.

In ongoing work we are investigating whether the impacts differed by politician status. The basic treatment effects appear to be driven entirely by the MLAs. Appendix Table 1 shows that slums where MLAs receive an audits report card see a 27% increase in to number of closed toilets. Again, the number of open toilets remains largely unaffected (Column 3). Councillors receiving audits report cards actually have a negative impact on the *overall* sample of formal sites. However, when we consider report card quality (Appendix Tables 2), we find some evidence that while the MLAs affect toilet access (through building and closing toilets), Councillors affect toilet quality, as measured by our within toilet infrastructure index. In Appendix Table 2 we divide the slums into those that lie in “bad” or “good” wards. A “bad” ward is one with at least 1 severe AC summary statistic reported in the baseline report card. Summary statistics include the fraction of open toilets, fraction of dirty seats (male & female), fraction of broken seats (male & female), and number of facilities. Fraction of open toilets was color-coded as red (severe) in the baseline report card if it was below 0.5, the fractions of broken and dirty seats were coded red if they were above 0.4, and the number of facilities was coded red if the total number of facilities per toilet was between 0-1. The sample for Appendix Table 2 is restricted to slums that lie in

ACs or wards, respectively, that have toilets in the baseline. We find that the total number of closed toilets is increasing in slums that actually lie in “good” wards. The effect is driven by MLA report cards, consistent with our findings in Appendix Table 1. Interestingly, we now find evidence of toilet *quality* improvement in “bad” ACs/wards. This effect is driven entirely by the Councillors. On average, the MCD audit report card treatment increases the average within toilet infrastructure index for those slums that lie in “bad” wards by 0.59 points (over a control mean of -0.02).

In other words, MLAs appear to be acting on *access*, where Councillors appear to be acting on *quality* in response to the information provided by the audit report cards.

Selection Effects: Party Decision-making

In Table 6 we examine how the newspaper intervention impacted the incumbents’ decision to re-run. Roughly 30% of the incumbents in control wards re-ran for election. This relatively low effect is largely explained by reservation – some 46% of the incumbents in our sample are made ineligible by reservation. Column (5) shows that treatment increased likelihood that the incumbent was given a ticket by the party and that this effect is entirely driven by an increase of 18 percentage points (on a base of 1.4 percent) in the likelihood that an incumbent re-runs in a different ward if they are ineligible to re-run in their own ward due to reservation status. These results may suggest that any publicity is good publicity—simply having a report card published on you makes it easier for you to get on the ticket. In ongoing work we explore whether this effect was more pronounced for better performing incumbents.

Table 7 shows that the newspaper intervention increased the winner margin by over 30 percent where the incumbent is eligible to re-run (off a base of 11 percentage points) (Table 7).

Selection Effects: Voter Behavior

In ongoing work we examine whether and how slum dwellers reacted to this information when making their voting decisions.

Can these interventions be replicated?

There is widespread evidence that even though slum-dwellers are a politically active group and elected officials are keen to garner the votes of slum-dwellers at election times, the current quality of provision and the functioning of governance mechanisms are poor. While every city is different, Delhi’s slums broadly include a typical mix of long-term residents, migratory labour, unskilled/low-skilled labour and those employed in the informal sector. Specifically with respect to India, the UNDP and Government of India’s *Urban Poverty Report – 2009* states that urban slums in India are uniformly characterized by high population density, lack of civic amenities like clean drinking water and access to sanitation and health services. Relative to other cities Delhi is unusual in that it has a State Government that is only responsible to the city itself. It is not unusual in having both municipal Ward Councillors, and State legislators with (often overlapping) responsibilities for service provision. This suggests that the results are likely to be reflective of the slums in other contexts as well, though in drawing lessons elsewhere attention would have to be paid to the legal and policy basis for specific categories of service delivery. During the course of the study, various organisations from across India (research, non-government, civil society) have approached us to understand our design, methodology and results. This indicates the similarity of contexts

and problems across different urban slums, and given the similar administrative setup across India, we believe our results are likely to apply in other Indian cities.

Our findings contribute to the broader literature on the role of information in the political process in low-income settings, where institutions for supporting effective political engagement, such as the media and public auditing systems, are often relatively underdeveloped. Much of that literature, however, focuses on informing voters/citizens about the performance of their legislators as well as about their entitlements. Several of these studies find that informing voters about the performance of their legislators has substantial effects on their voting behaviour. We find that politicians respond to provision of information on service quality in their constituencies in a context of competitive elections; and that this is driven, perhaps, more by reducing information asymmetries than by incentivizing through monitoring. This result is applicable to other areas of competitive local elections where issues of local public goods are salient. It will be important to undertake further research in other contexts to explore this.

VII. Policy Implications

Overall, this study points to the fact that an incumbent's decision to re-run and his or her performance are sensitive to information provision. India has already implemented a strong Right to Information Act; however, there has been less emphasis on pro-active disclosures. A first policy dialogue that we hope to initiate is identifying what forms of pro-active disclosures should be encouraged and what are the appropriate mechanisms for it. Should media play an ongoing role, should NGOs be deputed to take the message to villages or should government agencies be directly required to make this information publicly available? In March 2013 we had a first meeting on this with our Delhi NGO partner SNS and we intend to continue these dialogues.

Our results show that publishing report cards in the newspaper has positive incentive effects for the politicians, so the key is to move towards potentially publishing mid-term report cards. We are currently talking with our partner, Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS) on how our findings will affect the next round of report cards that they intend to publish prior to the upcoming Delhi elections. We are also talking with the *Hindustan*, who had previously expressed interest in publishing our results and hope to make a presentation to them soon.

Our audit results show that providing information on public facilities has had limited impact. Our audit results suggest there is a role for increased provision of information on the quality of local public goods to politicians in improving the quality of service provision (via collective action or other means). It is notable that the effects we did see, in terms of number of closed toilets and improvements to the within toilet infrastructure index, occurred in the context of services that were largely managed by private (or NGO) contractors. While the experiment was not designed to examine the influence of forms of delivery, two features of the results are worth noting. First, private contracting alone clearly does not solve the underlying problems of delivery—the descriptive data from the baseline survey reveals typically low levels of service. Second, politicians appear to have only limited influence over the behaviour of private contractors, at least on some activities. Again, how should public service audits be designed and who should implement them need further discussion.

Overall, the findings suggest there is a greater role for information provision in reducing information asymmetries between politicians and their constituents. In terms of policy outreach we see the next steps

as relating to a series of policy dialogues with both beneficiaries and groups involved in information collection and dissemination to identify the right model for delivery.

VIII. Policy Dissemination Strategy

Lastly, we have identified three key channels to ensure the effective and timely dissemination of our evaluation results, namely: a) civil society organisations and NGOs, b) media outlets and c) development practitioners, government officials and researchers, which play an important role in disseminating information, raising awareness and promoting the idea of voter information campaigns and accountability of government agents.

NGOs and Civil Society Organisations

During the course of the study, many NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)¹³ have expressed their keen interest in the study design, methodology and results and we have fostered our ties with them through frequent meetings, interactions and discussions. They hold the crucial advantage of having extensive and far-reaching networks and presence in the urban slums and we feel that it is extremely important to undertake extensive capacity building activities with them. This is vital in ensuring a sustainable scale up of the intervention (especially the audits of public services). As a part of the intervention, we have worked closely with Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS), as well as other NGOs who work in the Delhi slums. During the course of the study, members from these organisations have been trained so as to be able to carry out effective voter information campaigns in slums. Moreover, we propose to continue to share our experience, methodology and findings with these organisations so as to enable them to carry out effective campaigns in mobilising slum-dwellers. Specifically, we have proposed that Ms. Anjali Bhardwaj (Founder, SNS) conduct a training for other Civil Society organisations, NGOs and other research organisations to increase their awareness on voter mobilisation campaigns, present our results and share our methodology on filing RTIs, preparing and disseminating performance report cards as well as auditing public services.

A first policy dialogue that we hope to initiate is identifying what forms of pro-active disclosures should be encouraged and what are the appropriate mechanisms for it. Should media play an ongoing role, should NGOs be deputed to spread the message or should government agencies be directly required to make this information publicly available? In March 2013, we had a first meeting on this with our Delhi NGO partner SNS and we intend to continue these dialogues in the summer. We have also reached out to Yamini Aiyar from the Center for Policy Research's (CPR) Accountability Initiative, which "works to promote accountability for service delivery by developing innovative models for tracking government programs, disseminating this information to policy makers as well as citizens, and undertaking research on how to strengthen accountability for improved service delivery in India" and people at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard who work on similar initiatives, whom we hope to engage in this dialogue.

¹³ Some NGOs and CSOs include: Public Health Foundation of India, Hazards Centre, Water Aid, Know Your Vote India, Jaagori, Jaanagraha, The ASER Centre, Association of Democratic Reforms, Transparent Chennai, India Global Social Service Society.

As mentioned above, we are currently talking with our partner, Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS) on how our findings will affect the next round of report cards that they intend to publish prior to the upcoming Delhi elections. We are also in discussion with the Accountability Initiative of the Centre for Policy Research, that is concerned with research and outreach on the accountability of the state to claims by citizens and civil society.

Media outlets

Media houses tend to publish performance report cards on incumbent government officials prior to elections. However, little critical evaluation has been done to assess the impact of these campaigns on electoral outcomes and therefore we hope that the dissemination of our results to media houses would potentially encourage them to undertake more campaigns.

Media houses in fact play a dual role in aiding us in our dissemination strategy. On the one hand, by providing them with the results, we would hopefully encourage them to carry out more information campaigns, but on the other hand, the media is a useful source to disseminate information to the masses. We propose to harness this potential as well and encourage the media to disseminate our findings to the masses. *Hindustan*, our media partner in the intervention, has also been a key stakeholder among other media outlets. It is one of the most widely read newspaper dailies in the country with a readership of close to 12 million. *Hindustan Times*, its sister publication in English, has a readership of over 3.7 million. *Hindustan* has, in principle, agreed to publish our results. As reported earlier, journalists (like Ms. Favre, a reporter in the French media, for example) and documentary film makers (like DocuVista from Germany) have already covered the study during its implementation stage, and we propose to liaise with them as well to disseminate our findings in regional and international media.

We are also talking with the *Hindustan*, who had previously expressed interest in publishing our results and hope to make a presentation to them soon.

Government departments, policy makers and development practitioners

As noted in the preliminary report on the audits, our findings propose to contribute to a growing literature on the role of information in the political process in low-income settings, where the institutions for supporting effective political engagement are under developed. Much of that literature however, focusses on informing citizens/voters on the performance of their politicians. Little is known about the effects of providing information to politicians on the problems in their constituencies. We therefore anticipate that the results (especially from the audits of public services) will be of great interest not only to the Delhi urban context, but also more broadly—both in the urban development community and in researchers and actors concerned more broadly with service delivery, and the role of politicians and public information on this. Though one need not elaborate on the importance and advantages of dissemination of information through this channel, a significant challenge we anticipate is the natural resistance and delays in working with the public system and government officials.

As reported below, during the course of the study, various government departments (eg: Ministry of Rural Development) and international policy makers (eg: Mr. Martin Hirsch, Former High Commissioner for

Active Inclusion Against Poverty and High Commissioner for Youth in the French government) have shown interest in our field experience as well as our survey instruments and findings. Our research team has always shared our experiences, challenges, and implementation methodology during the course of the project, and we plan to systematically share our findings with them once these are ready.

Moreover, J-PAL also works with policy makers to scale up and/or replicate effective evaluations. Every regional J-PAL office also hosts a policy and training team, which specialises in disseminating information and findings of projects to relevant members of the J-PAL network. The policy team works with state and central governments to identify suitable locations and contexts where proven programs could be replicated or scaled up, and actively works with them through the replication.

In India, J-PAL South Asia has implemented (or is currently implementing) various research studies in collaboration with the Ministry of Rural Development, Central Pollution Control Board at the central government level along with the various health and education departments in the state governments of Bihar, Maharashtra, TamilNadu, Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan and West Bengal. Similarly, other J-PAL regional offices partner extensively with their respective national and regional governments. This provides us with an extensive network to disseminate information. Given the preliminary positive impact of auditing public services on service delivery, we propose to engage with these departments to share our methodology and findings and to encourage information campaigns in other fields as well. We anticipate that this channel of dissemination is bound to be the most challenging, given the general Indian administrative setup.

Though we are just finalizing results, the research team has already initiated a dialogue with the policy team to identify potential contexts for scale up and replications. However, this process can only gather speed once our results are completely finalized. We propose to eventually work with the policy team in order to explore our options to replicate awareness campaigns in other states as well as stress the importance of government accountability.

J-PAL staff and affiliates have an extensive network of professional and personal contacts, in state and central governments, policy institutions, research and academic organisations and NGOs. Academic and non-academic platforms are important in being able to project our ideas and results to policy makers and practitioners. As noted in the previous section, our research team has already made numerous presentations at various academic as well as non-academic conferences, seminars, workshops, trainings and round table discussions and we plan to continue doing the same. Along with that, our research team has been working closely with the policy and training team to ensure the timely and effective dissemination of information through any future roundtables, conferences, trainings and meetings with high-level policymakers, development practitioners and academics.

Past Initiatives and Interactions

Finally, we would like to mention some specific interactions and steps taken by the research team to ensure the timely and effective dissemination of relevant information via policy dialogues, presentations, seminars, knowledge workshops etc.

Interactions with Policy Makers

- To collect inputs on the design of the study, meetings were conducted with Mr. Harsh Mander (member of the National Advisory Council), Mr. Anil Kumar Sharma (Deputy Mayor of Delhi), Mr. Ashwani Kumar (CEO, Delhi Urban Slum Improvement Board), Ms. Vimla Devi (Councilor) and other Councillors and slum leaders in Delhi. These meetings were extremely helpful in being able to identify the urban poor, understand the political structure and activism in slum areas and therefore instrumental in selecting our sample areas.
- Mr. Martin Hirsch, Former High Commissioner for Active Inclusion Against Poverty and High Commissioner for Youth in the French government visited our project in 2011. He was interested in understanding our research questions, study design, implementation processes as well as the results. Apart from a brief overview, we organized a short field visit for him. During his last visit to Delhi in October 2012, Mr. Hirsch expressed his interest to revisit the project. Ms. Diva Dhar, Policy and Training Manager, along with Mr. Gaurav Chiplunkar, Research Associate at J-PAL South Asia, met him to brief him on the progress made in the various evaluations since his previous visit. Now that we also have some preliminary results to share, we propose to engage him in a meaningful policy discussion on the findings of the study and its application in other locations of his interest.
- Ms. Diva Dhar has also discussed the project design and methodology with Dr. S. Y. Quraishi, former Chief Election Commissioner of India and Dr. Harsha De Silva, Member of Parliament in Sri Lanka during the Governance at the Policy and Impact conference in Bangkok organized by J-PAL, IPA, Citi Foundation and the Asian Development Bank (August 2012). Dr. De Silva was especially interested in the details of the project's intervention and evaluation design, as he was considering launching an information-based campaign to involve and update voters in his constituency in Sri Lanka. We will be sharing our findings with him and possibly work with him in designing the study.
- A team from 3ie and Global Development Network (GDN) visited the project in 2011 as well as in June 2012. Detailed discussions were held with regard to the project design, evaluation strategy and policy influence plan. During their recent visit in July 2012, they were accompanied by delegates from the Gates Foundation and DFID. Apart from a detailed discussion on the evaluations and their challenges, we also arranged for a field visit. Delegates had the opportunity to observe the conditions of the urban poor, as well as participate in a demonstration of our endline audits survey.

Interactions with NGOs, Civil Society Organisations, Resident Welfare Associations and Research Partners

- NGOs such as Hazards Centre, Water Aid, Jagori, Indo-Global Social Service Society were consulted for their inputs and feedback on the evaluation design and process. We now propose to engage them in a dialogue over both our methodology and results and consider the possibility of training them on organising information campaigns and increase awareness regarding public accountability.

- Two research-oriented NGOs, the ASER Centre (that is concerned with education) and the Population and Health Foundation of India (PHFI) were interested in the evaluations, and specifically sought details on the use and benefits of GIS technology in audits of public services. They participated in a round table conference organised by J-PAL where Gaurav Chiplunkar made a presentation on the value and application of GIS and digital data collection along with a short demonstration on using GPS machines and cellphones to collect data.
- As part of the intervention, we have also worked in close collaboration with our partner, Satark Nagrik Sangathan, and other NGOs who have been involved in slum mobilization to build their capacity and understanding of randomized evaluations. We have also met with the editors and executives at *Hindustan* to update them on the progress of the project.
- The team met with the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Transparent Chennai and Janaagraha (a leading, Bangalore-based, urban NGO) to discuss our study design, capacity building, implementation plan and challenges, as well as policy impacts since they were interested in undertaking similar voter information campaigns. We plan to share our preliminary results with them and assist them in designing and implementing their projects.
- To facilitate comprehensive dissemination of the findings, the team is currently working on compiling a report on the findings from our end line round of audits, which will be disseminated by J-PAL and SNS to other NGOs, civil society groups, government agencies and policy makers.
- Policy-oriented students at the Kennedy School of Government, have undertaken policy analyses on social pensions and sanitation in Delhi, with some of the motivation, design and data analysis linked to our work. The social pension work is continuing (with one of the alumni) at the World Bank.

Presentations and interviews

- The sanitation-related part of the project was showcased at a J-PAL/Gates Foundation workshop for South Asian water and sanitation practitioners in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
- Ms. Agnes Faivre, a reporter with France-Inter (a leading French radio channel) covered some of our evaluations as a part of her report on ‘Randomized Controlled Trials.’ This report can be accessed here: <http://www.franceinter.fr/emission-la-tete-au-carre-grand-reportage-l-evaluation-aleatoire>.
- J-PAL affiliated professors and staff also presented their work on governance, including this project, at one-day workshops in program evaluation conducted as part of mid-career training programs for IAS officers in Phase III (officers with 7-9 years of experience, most of whom were district collectors), and Phase IV (officers with 14-16 years of experience, many of whom were secretaries at the state or federal level and others in rural development departments). In all, these workshops reached nearly 250 bureaucrats in key positions to influence policy.
- The design and baseline findings of the on-going Delhi project were presented to the International Growth Centre, 3ie board and at a Harvard/MIT development seminar in 2011.

- Prof. Rohini Pande presented some preliminary results from the household surveys and audits at the International Growth Centre conference in Delhi (December 2011).
- Prof. Pande and Ms. Anjali Bhardwaj (head of SNS) also presented the evaluation objectives, design and preliminary results at the J-PAL/Gates Foundation Urban Services Initiatives conference in Sri Lanka (July 2012) for researchers and practitioners from across South Asia.
- Dr. Bibhu Prasad Mohapatra, Director of India Development Foundation, made a presentation on the study at the 3ie Policy Influence Clinic in Sri Lanka (July 2012).
- Ms. Diva Dhar, discussed the project at a break-out session on Governance at the Policy and Impact conference in Bangkok organized by J-PAL, IPA, Citi Foundation and the Asian Development Bank (August 2012). Participants included researchers, government and non-government practitioners from the region.
- The project has made extensive use of innovative mapping techniques and use of mapping software. Gaurav Chiplunkar, a Research Associate on the project, made a presentation on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and its applications in the project during a round table discussion on Innovative Techniques and Technologies in Monitoring and Evaluation organized by IDRC and the Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) South Asia. The round table was attended by various NGOs, civil society groups, donors and research organizations.
- Aditya Balasubramanian, another research associate, presented the study to Mr. C.V. Krishnan, President, Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR).
- Prof. Pande presented the preliminary audits results at the Barcelona Summer Forum during a keynote address on development the governance process in June 2013.
- Prof. Pande will also be teaching a session on Perception and Performance related to these studies during an international workshop on government performance management in New Delhi in July 2013, which is coordinated by the Performance Management Division of the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.
- In June 2013, Prof. Pande discussed the preliminary results during a keynote address on development and the governance process at the Barcelona Summer Forum.

Appendix A: Tables

TABLE 1— TRANSFERS, POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL AWARENESS AMONG DELHI'S SLUM-DWELLERS

	Full Sample	Lowest Asset Quintile	Highest Asset Quintile
<i>Panel A: Property Rights</i>			
Own house	85%	71%	98%
Able to sell house	54%	39%	54%
Access to indoor piped water (key indicator of legal settlement)	25%	8%	19%
<i>Panel B: Agency Measures</i>			
Knows name of councillor	28%	18%	36%
Knows name of MLA	35%	24%	40%
Aware that councilor is given funds to spend in the ward	32%	26%	37%
Aware of funds and approximate amounts allocated to councilors	3%	1%	7%
<i>Panel C: Clientelism, Transfers and Participation</i>			
Ration Card Holder	62%	37%	75%
Receiving Pension (% of eligible)	35%	31%	34%
Child Receiving a Scholarship			
in Government Schools	55%	53%	55%
in Private Schools	6%	12%	3%
Fraction Attended a March/Rally	33%	28%	65%
Fraction Received Incentive			
Cash	5%	5%	8%
Non-cash	22%	23%	18%

Notes: This table reports findings from a household survey of over 5,000 low income households living in and near slums in a random sample of 107 wards. Asterisks denote significance for a t-test of the difference in means between low and high asset quintile areas. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 2—TOP LOCAL AREA DEVELOPMENT ISSUES & HEALTH INDICATORS

	Full Sample Percent (1)	High Slum Index Percent (2)	Low Slum Index Percent (3)
<i>Panel A. Household Concerns with Sewage and Garbage</i>			
<u>Sewage</u>			
Most problematic issue in this area	26%	30%***	19%
Area in which the household has faced problems (last year)	70%	73%***	65%
Area in which the community has faced problems (last year)	70%	73%***	63%
<u>Garbage</u>			
Most problematic issue in this area	14%	12%***	17%
Area in which the household has faced problems (last year)	53%	50%***	58%
Area in which the community has faced problems (last year)	51%	48%***	55%
<i>Panel B. Access, Usage and Quality</i>			
<u>Sewage</u>			
<i>Toilets</i>			
Uses in-house latrine	36%	14%***	71%
Uses public toilet	42%	62%***	10%
Uses open land, gutter, or side of road for toilet	29%	40%***	12%
Reports cleanliness of public toilet is "bad"	36%	38%***	22%
<i>Drains</i>			
Open drain near house	75%	78%***	71%
Wastewater drain in the floor	19%	13%***	28%
No specific outlet for wastewater	47%	60%***	27%
Drain has been smelly or overflowing (if they have one)	90%	90%	89%
<u>Garbage</u>			
MCD or private worker removes garbage	16%	8%***	28%
Disposes of garbage at a collection point (dumpster)	38%	45%***	27%
Dumps garbage in open land	42%	43%*	40%
Nearest dumpster emptied at least once per week	44%	47%***	39%
<i>Panel C. Health Indicators</i>			
<u>Mosquito-borne illness experienced in family</u>			
Malaria	12%	13%***	10%
Dengue	16%	16%	17%
<i>Respondent experienced a fever in the last year</i>	72%	75%***	68%

Notes: This table reports findings from a household survey of over 5,000 low income households living in and near slums in a random sample of 107 wards. Slums areas were identified using a methodology based on the UN-HABITAT and Indian census definitions of slums. First, using aerial photographs of Delhi from satellite imagery, we compiled a list of potential slum areas based on housing density and appearance, complemented by Delhi government listings. This was followed by field visits, in which an area was defined as having a high slum index if it met at least five out of nine criteria closely related to the census definition of slums. These criteria included high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, high incidence of trash piles and frequent cohabitation with animals. High index slums are those that meet at least five of these criteria. Low index slums are those that meet less than five of these criteria. Asterisks denote significance for a t-test of the difference in means between slum and non-slum areas. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 3—THE INCENTIVE EFFECT OF NEWSPAPER REPORT CARDS

TABLE 4—THE INCENTIVE EFFECT OF NEWSPAPER REPORT CARDS ON PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION														
F	Any Newspaper	Total Toilets	Total Open Toilets	Total Closed Toilets	Within Toilet Infrastructure Index	Toilet Price	Index of formal garbage sites	Index of dhalao infrastructure	Informal Piles	Fraction of dhalao		Fraction of drains		chools
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Basic Newspaper Treatment Effects.</i>														
	Any Newspaper Treatment	-0.807 (0.568)	-0.361 (0.373)	-0.446 (0.293)	0.134 (0.0975)	0.0262 (0.104)	0.0688 (0.0801)	0.0569 (0.0814)	-0.251* (0.142)	0.165** (0.0782)	0.0603 (0.0583)	-0.0640 (0.122)	-0.00117 (0.0730)	-0.00923 (0.0215)
	Mean	3.180	1.854	1.326	-0.0494	1.203	-0.0653	-0.204	0.199	0.750	0.375	0.550	0.275	0.0183 (0.0225)
	Observations	932	932	932	414	430	932	378	795	328	328	132	132	-0.0264 (0.0194)
<i>Panel B: Including an interaction for ineligibility.</i>														
	Any Newspaper Treatment	0.0556 (0.606)	0.212 (0.363)	-0.157 (0.379)	0.137 (0.0886)	-0.0964 (0.129)	0.162* (0.0847)	0.0285 (0.115)	-0.166 (0.140)	0.229** (0.108)	0.0583 (0.0791)	-0.0830 (0.155)	-0.0299 (0.0752)	0.0416 (0.0263)
	Newspaper * Ineligible	-2.832 (1.784)	-1.924 (1.200)	-0.908 (0.780)	-0.197 (0.263)	0.269 (0.210)	-0.318 (0.228)	0.0766 (0.159)	-0.349 (0.351)	-0.146 (0.149)	0.0745 (0.118)	-0.0131 (0.245)	0.152 (0.169)	0.0183 (0.0225)
	Ineligible	1.843 (1.572)	1.332 (1.034)	0.511 (0.700)	-0.103 (0.148)	-0.312** (0.131)	0.162 (0.187)	-0.0516 (0.130)	0.0411 (0.284)	0.151 (0.110)	0.0731 (0.110)	-0.211 (0.157)	0.0353 (0.0763)	0.0183 (0.0225)
	Mean	2.727	1.527	1.200	-0.00285	1.313	-0.0505	-0.215	0.257	0.789	0.368	0.500	0.250	0.0183 (0.0225)
	Observations	929	929	929	414	430	929	376	792	328	328	132	132	-0.0269 (0.0420)

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level combined cross section. Regressions include ward fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by ward. Any Newspaper Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor of that ward had a reportcard published on them in the Hindustan and is 0 otherwise. Ineligible is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor was not eligible to re-run in their ward due to changes in the reservation status. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Panel C: The Incentive Effects of Newspapers on Councillors Attendance

F	Any Newspaper	Total Committee Attendance									
		Assembly Attendance		No. Committees		Total Committee Attendance (Frac.)		Avg. Committee Attendance		Slums Committee	
	Any Newspaper Treatment * Post	-0.00290 (0.0183)	-0.0000653 (0.0206)	-0.0152 (0.148)	0.0149 (0.189)	0.00162 (0.0250)	0.0335 (0.0267)	0.109 (0.253)	0.00731 (0.314)	0.0106 (0.0489)	-0.00432 (0.0578)
	Newspaper Treatment * Ineligible * Post		-0.00946 (0.0421)		-0.0908 (0.306)		-0.0909 (0.0569)		0.333 (0.539)		0.0423 (0.106)
	Ineligible * Post		-0.00338 (0.0322)		0.0223 (0.256)		0.0582 (0.0469)		0.0906 (0.309)		-0.0329 (0.0914)
	Post	-0.0434*** (0.0151)	-0.0422** (0.0184)	-0.380*** (0.128)	-0.388** (0.168)	-0.0703*** (0.0210)	-0.0919*** (0.0222)	0.165 (0.159)	0.132 (0.215)	-0.171*** (0.0422)	-0.159*** (0.0498)
	Mean	0.813	0.808	2.324	2.377	0.692	0.702	1.207	1.291	0.171	0.159
	Observations	1196	1196	1200	1200	1191	1191	1198	1198	1200	1200

Notes: Panels A and B of this table report results for a ward level panel with two periods. The first period is from April 2007- March 2009 (the period covered in the first newspaper report card prior to Councilor being informed that they would receive 2012 newspaper report cards) and second covers April 2009-March 2011 (this is the "post" period, or period after Councilors had been informed). Panel C is similarly a ward level panel, however for the non-spending data we have yearly data available. Thus, the "pre" period here contains observations from 2007-2009, while the "post" period includes observations for 2009-2011. Regressions include ward fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by ward. Any Newspaper Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor of that ward had a reportcard published on them in the Hindustan and is 0 otherwise. Ineligible is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor was not eligible to re-run in their ward due to changes in the reservation status. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 5—DID AUDIT REPORT CARDS INFLUENCE THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES?

	Total toilets	Total Closed	Total open	Quality Within Toilet Infrastructure Index	Price Price of toilet	Index of total formal sites	Index of dhalao infrastructure	Fraction of dhalaos		Index of Informal Piles	Fraction of drains clogged	Fraction of drains with proper disposing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Any Audits Treatment</i>												
Any Audits Treatment * Post	0.138	0.225**	-0.0868	-0.0409	-0.0408	-0.0573	0.0105	0.00120	0.0454	0.0929	0.129	0.182
	(0.138)	(0.104)	(0.132)	(0.159)	(0.123)	(0.0499)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.0883)	(0.144)	(0.183)
Post dummy	0.108	-0.0554	0.164	-0.0480	0.123	0.0746	0.327***	0.194*	-0.0919	-0.277**	-0.0750	-0.225
	(0.126)	(0.0848)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.0886)	(0.0466)	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.130)	(0.156)
Control mean in the baseline	2.622	0.951	1.671	-0.0361	0.820	-0.0653	-0.204	0.750	0.375	0.199	0.550	0.275
Observations	932	932	932	399	412	932	328	328	328	795	132	132
<i>Panel B: Slums in Red Wards (at least 1 severe ward-level summary statistic)</i>												
Any Audits Treatment * Post	0.292	0.163	0.129	0.278	0.0359							
	(0.233)	(0.187)	(0.191)	(0.286)	(0.268)							
Post dummy	0.00932	-0.0681	0.0774	-0.241	0.0794							
	(0.169)	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.245)	(0.238)							
Control mean in the baseline	2.556	1.556	1	-0.0185	0.823							
Observations	281	281	281	111	115							
<i>Panel C: Slums in Non-Red Wards (no severe ward-level summary statistics)</i>												
Any Audits Treatment * Post	0.222	0.392*	-0.170	-0.202	-0.0755							
	(0.275)	(0.213)	(0.219)	(0.164)	(0.129)							
Post dummy	0.0813	-0.0965	0.178	0.0640	0.146							
	(0.244)	(0.183)	(0.212)	(0.135)	(0.0890)							
Control mean in the baseline	4.562	1.125	3.438	-0.0439	0.818							
Observations	435	435	435	288	297							

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include ward fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. The Within Toilet Infrastructure Index is the slum-level average of an index created at the toilet-level, which averages the z-scores for the number of usable seats, the number of facilities available and a dummy for whether the toilet is regularly cleaned. The sample for the within toilet infrastructure index and price is restricted to slums with an open toilet in the baseline. Regressions in Columns (1)-(3) control for the number of toilets in the baseline. The index of total formal sites is an index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of dhalaos with no bins, the number of dhalaos with bins, and the total number of bins. The index of dhalao infrastructure is the average of a dhalao level index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of details, a dummy for having a proper structure, and a dummy for proper disposal. The index of informal piles is an index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of informal piles, the number of piles that are severely overflowing, and the number of piles that were last cleaned over a week ago. The sample for (7)-(9) is restricted to those slums with at least 1 dhalao in the baseline. Panels B and C are restricted to slums that lie in wards with at least 1 toilet in the baseline. Panel A is restricted to "red" wards--wards with at least 1 severe ward-level summary statistic reported in the baseline report card. Summary statistics include the fraction of open toilets, fraction of dirty seats (male & female), fraction of broken seats (male & female), and number of facilities. Fraction of open toilets was color-coded as red (severe) in the baseline report card if it was below 0.5, the fractions of broken and dirty seats were coded red if they were above 0.4, and the number of facilities was coded red if the total number of facilities per toilet was between 0-1. Panel B is restricted to "non-red" wards--those with no severe ward-level summary statistics in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 6—THE EFFECT OF NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION & DISTRIBUTION ON CANDIDATE STANDING

	Incumbent Re-Runs		Incumbent Re-runs in the Same Ward		Incumbent Runs in a Different Ward		Incumbent's Relative Runs		An Outside Incumbent Runs in the Ward		Number of Candidates Running	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any Newspaper RC Treatment	0.07	0.082	0.087	0.095	-0.017	-0.014	0.006	0.005	0.039	0.036	-0.772	-0.625
	[0.086]	[0.085]	[0.085]	[0.084]	[0.027]	[0.024]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.747]	[0.766]
Newspaper RC * Ineligible	0.085	0.077	-0.09	-0.097	0.176***	0.174***	-0.094	-0.101	-0.004	0	1.151	1.004
	[0.109]	[0.108]	[0.097]	[0.096]	[0.059]	[0.059]	[0.110]	[0.109]	[0.051]	[0.051]	[1.174]	[1.213]
Councillor Audits RC Treatment		0.106		0.079		0.027		-0.009		-0.029		1.332
		[0.102]		[0.103]		[0.037]		[0.021]		[0.040]		[0.947]
Councillor Audits RC *Ineligible		-0.038		-0.038		0		-0.106		0.029		-1.13
		[0.131]		[0.114]		[0.077]		[0.114]		[0.056]		[1.629]
Ineligible	0.467***	-0.457***	-0.444***	-0.433***	-0.024	-0.024	0.263***	0.294***	-0.034	-0.042	-2.286***	-1.972*
	[0.080]	[0.085]	[0.080]	[0.082]	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.089]	[0.093]	[0.029]	[0.033]	[0.872]	[1.019]
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240
Mean of Control	0.478	0.441	0.457	0.441	0.0217	0	0	0	0.0217	0.0294	10.41	9.882

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a ward-level cross section. Estimates include strata FE (zone-party) and use robust standard errors. Any Newspaper RC Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor of that ward had a reportcard published on them in the Hindustan and is 0 otherwise. Councillor Audits RC Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councillor received a report card on the status of toilet and garbage services in their ward. Ineligible is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor was not eligible to re-run in their ward due to changes in the reservation status. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

TABLE 7— THE EFFECT OF NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION & DISTRIBUTION ON ELECTORAL RESULTS

	Any Previous Incumbent Wins		Incumbent Party Wins		Winner Margin		Incumbent Vote Share		Voter Turnout (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Newspaper RC Treatment	0.027 [0.080]	0.035 [0.080]	-0.01 [0.088]	0 [0.088]	0.036** [0.017]	0.039** [0.017]	0.038 [0.034]	0.042 [0.034]	-0.008 [0.009]	-0.009 [0.009]
Newspaper RC * Ineligilble	0.031 [0.098]	0.024 [0.098]	-0.03 [0.149]	-0.041 [0.150]	-0.061* [0.036]	-0.064* [0.035]	-0.03 [0.041]	-0.034 [0.041]	-0.001 [0.015]	0.001 [0.015]
Councillor Audits RC Treatment		0.077 [0.100]		0.106 [0.106]		0.026 [0.021]		0.042 [0.045]		-0.007 [0.010]
Councillor Audits RC *Ineligilble		-0.037 [0.111]		-0.037 [0.165]		-0.026 [0.040]		-0.027 [0.049]		0.022 [0.016]
Ineligible	0.290*** [0.076]	-0.280*** [0.080]	0.088 [0.118]	0.097 [0.129]	0.024 [0.030]	0.031 [0.027]	-0.164*** [0.033]	0.157** [0.033]	-0.013 [0.012]	-0.019 [0.013]
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240
Mean of Control	0.283	0.265	0.5	0.441	0.107	0.0918	0.16	0.155	0.554	0.551

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a ward-level cross section. Estimates include strata FE (zone-party) and use robust standard errors. Any Newspaper RC Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor of that ward had a reportcard published on them in the Hindustan and is 0 otherwise. Councillor Audits RC Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councillor received a report card on the status of toilet and garbage services in their ward. Ineligible is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor was not eligible to re-run in their ward due to changes in the reservation status. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 1—DID THE EFFECT OF REPORT CARDS ON THE QUALITY OF TOILET PROVISION DIFFER BY LEVEL OF POLITICIAN?

	<u>Access</u>			<u>Quality</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>Fraction of dhalaos</u>					<u>Fraction of drains</u>	
	Total toilets	Closed toilets	Total open	Within toilet infrastructure index	Price of toilet	Index of total formal sites	Index of dhalao infrastructure	Overflowing	Regularly cleaned	Index of Informal Piles	clogged	with proper disposing
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Specific Audits Treatment</i>												
Councilor Audits Report Card * Post	0.0543 (0.165)	0.101 (0.138)	-0.0469 (0.124)	-0.0201 (0.175)	-0.0621 (0.159)	-0.112* (0.0602)	0.119 (0.129)	-0.0333 (0.139)	0.0854 (0.149)	0.0498 (0.0968)	0.175 (0.169)	0.125 (0.209)
MLA Audits Report Card * Post	0.298 (0.199)	0.255* (0.140)	0.0435 (0.174)	-0.0491 (0.183)	-0.0800 (0.139)	0.00227 (0.0591)	-0.0488 (0.201)	-0.0499 (0.146)	0.0696 (0.144)	0.0764 (0.106)	0.108 (0.162)	0.292 (0.218)
Councilor * MLA * Post	-0.360 (0.268)	-0.0362 (0.238)	-0.324 (0.214)	0.0227 (0.237)	0.161 (0.257)	0.0257 (0.0851)	-0.0958 (0.229)	0.166 (0.181)	-0.169 (0.175)	0.0396 (0.123)	-0.208 (0.318)	-0.283 (0.250)
Post dummy	0.127 (0.126)	-0.0519 (0.0860)	0.179 (0.119)	-0.0484 (0.130)	0.123 (0.0895)	0.0815* (0.0456)	0.324*** (0.114)	0.192* (0.111)	-0.0909 (0.116)	-0.279*** (0.103)	-0.0750 (0.132)	-0.225 (0.158)
<i>Panel B: Specific Audits Treatment Interacted with Newspaper Report Card Treatment</i>												
Councilor Audits Report Card * Post	0.423 (0.325)	0.399 (0.272)	0.0237 (0.169)	-0.126 (0.138)	-0.0490 (0.118)	-0.0311 (0.0987)	-0.0648 (0.183)	0.117 (0.155)	0.141 (0.196)	-0.119 (0.130)	0.158 (0.190)	0.225 (0.160)
MLA Audits Report Card * Post	0.298 (0.199)	0.255* (0.140)	0.0435 (0.175)	-0.0491 (0.183)	-0.0800 (0.139)	0.00227 (0.0591)	-0.0488 (0.202)	-0.0499 (0.147)	0.0696 (0.144)	0.0764 (0.107)	0.108 (0.164)	0.292 (0.220)
Councilor * MLA * Post	-0.728* (0.372)	-0.512* (0.291)	-0.216 (0.244)	0.162 (0.238)	0.284 (0.215)	-0.121 (0.111)	0.00623 (0.295)	0.0749 (0.226)	-0.307 (0.265)	0.353* (0.205)	0.0940 (0.314)	-0.435* (0.213)
Councilor * Newspaper RC* Post	-0.508* (0.292)	-0.406 (0.250)	-0.102 (0.128)	0.182 (0.158)	-0.0267 (0.177)	-0.110 (0.109)	0.284 (0.233)	-0.231 (0.153)	-0.0804 (0.225)	0.240 (0.175)	0.0238 (0.214)	-0.143 (0.169)
Councilor * MLA * Newspaper RC * Post	0.503 (0.350)	0.687** (0.302)	-0.183 (0.212)	-0.234 (0.266)	-0.199 (0.311)	0.213 (0.135)	-0.147 (0.313)	0.133 (0.247)	0.208 (0.280)	-0.468** (0.228)	-0.810* (0.419)	0.286 (0.222)
Post dummy	0.127 (0.126)	-0.0519 (0.0861)	0.179 (0.119)	-0.0484 (0.130)	0.123 (0.0897)	0.0815* (0.0457)	0.324*** (0.114)	0.192* (0.112)	-0.0909 (0.117)	-0.279*** (0.103)	-0.0750 (0.133)	-0.225 (0.160)

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include ward fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The effect of a politician-specific treatment is examined and the Councilor/MLA treatment dummy take the value 1 when the Councilor/MLA receives an audits report card. The newspaper report card dummy takes the value of 1 if a report card was published on the Councilor in the Hindustan. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. The Within Toilet Infrastructure Index is the slum-level average of an index created at the toilet-level, which averages the z-scores for the number of usable seats, the number of facilities available and a dummy for whether the toilet is regularly cleaned. The sample for the within toilet infrastructure index and price is restricted to slums with an open toilet in the baseline. Regressions in Columns (1)-(3) control for the number of toilets in the baseline. The index of total formal sites is an index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of dhalaos with no bins, the number of dhalaos with bins, and the total number of bins. The index of dhalao infrastructure is the average of a dhalao level index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of details, a dummy for having a proper structure, and a dummy for proper disposal. The index of informal piles is an index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of informal piles, the number of piles that are severely overflowing, and the number of piles that were last cleaned over a week ago. The sample for (7)-(9) is restricted to those slums with at least 1 dhalao in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 2—DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS BY POLITICIAN LEVEL AND SEVERITY

	Total toilets (1)	Total Closed (2)	Total open (3)	Quality Within Toilet (4)	Price Price of toilet (5)
<i>Panel A: Slums in Red Wards (at least 1 severe ward-level summary statistic)</i>					
Councilor Audits Report Card * Post	0.271	0.268	0.00331	0.586*	0.0478
	-0.367	-0.302	-0.161	-0.288	-0.321
MLA Audits Report Card * Post	0.387	0.0448	0.342	0.188	-0.0598
	-0.289	-0.191	-0.252	-0.348	-0.296
Councilor * MLA * Post	-0.557	-0.0593	-0.498	-0.47	0.27
	-0.587	-0.47	-0.424	-0.392	-0.39
Post dummy	0.0177	-0.0786	0.0963	-0.253	0.0727
	-0.165	-0.132	-0.13	-0.255	-0.244
Control mean in the baseline	2.556	1.556	1	-0.0185	0.823
Observations	281	281	281	111	115
<i>Panel B: Slums in Non-Red Wards (no severe ward-level summary statistics)</i>					
Councilor Audits Report Card * Post	0.112	0.153	-0.0406	-0.233	-0.0921
	-0.278	-0.2	-0.239	-0.184	-0.163
MLA Audits Report Card * Post	0.495	0.591*	-0.0957	-0.194	-0.0834
	-0.419	-0.296	-0.269	-0.188	-0.15
Councilor * MLA * Post	-0.561	-0.357	-0.203	0.242	0.119
	-0.468	-0.355	-0.294	-0.246	-0.288
Post dummy	0.102	-0.0816	0.183	0.064	0.146
	-0.25	-0.184	-0.214	-0.136	-0.0894
Control mean in the baseline	4.562	1.125	3.438	-0.0439	0.818
Observations	435	435	435	288	297

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include ward fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. The Within Toilet Infrastructure Index is the slum-level average of an index created at the toilet-level, which averages the z-scores for the number of usable seats, the number of facilities available and a dummy for whether the toilet is regularly cleaned. The sample for the within toilet infrastructure index and price is restricted to slums with an open toilet in the baseline. Regressions in Columns (1)-(3) control for the number of toilets in the baseline. The sample is restricted to slums that lie in wards with at least 1 toilet in the baseline. Panel A is restricted to "red" wards-- wards with at least 1 severe ward-level summary statistic reported in the baseline report card. Summary statistics include the fraction of open toilets, fraction of dirty seats (male & female), fraction of broken seats (male & female), and number of facilities. Fraction of open toilets was color-coded as red (severe) in the baseline report card if it was below 0.5, the fractions of broken and dirty seats were coded red if they were above 0.4, and the number of facilities was coded red if the total number of facilities per toilet was between 0-1. Panel B is restricted to "non-red" wards--those with no severe ward-level summary statistics in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 3—DID THE EFFECT OF REPORT CARDS ON THE QUALITY OF TOILET PROVISION DIFFER BY SLUM CHARACTERISTICS?

	OPEN DEFECACTION					PUBLIC TOILET USAGE				
	Total Toilets	Total Open	Total Closed	Within Toilet Infra. Index	Price	Total Toilets	Total Open	Total Closed	Within Toilet Infra. Index	Price
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<i>Panel A. Toilets: All</i>										
Any Audits Treatment * Post *										
High use	0.381 (0.668)	0.344 (0.690)	0.0372 (0.407)	0.0953 (0.176)	0.0547 (0.252)	0.359 (0.711)	-0.0758 (0.564)	0.435 (0.431)	-0.355 (0.406)	0.160 (0.385)
Any Audits Treatment * Post	-0.0392 (0.422)	-0.260 (0.378)	0.220 (0.234)	-0.0423 (0.129)	-0.0443 (0.161)	-0.229 (0.316)	-0.299 (0.254)	0.0694 (0.210)	0.283 (0.406)	-0.183 (0.421)
<i>Panel B. Toilets: Male</i>										
Any Audits Treatment * Post *										
High use	0.236 (0.342)	0.211 (0.339)	0.0246 (0.222)	0.101 (0.147)	-0.143 (0.318)	0.204 (0.368)	-0.00814 (0.303)	0.213 (0.217)	-0.0694 (0.246)	0.110 (0.276)
Any Audits Treatment * Post	-0.00731 (0.217)	-0.119 (0.189)	0.112 (0.123)	-0.124 (0.144)	0.0249 (0.265)	-0.0952 (0.177)	-0.132 (0.147)	0.0365 (0.106)	-0.0112 (0.199)	-0.154 (0.326)
<i>Panel C. Toilets: Female</i>										
Any Audits Treatment * Post *										
High use	0.215 (0.361)	0.205 (0.372)	0.0107 (0.186)	-0.238* (0.120)	-0.0783 (0.208)	0.127 (0.354)	-0.0954 (0.270)	0.223 (0.215)	-0.0820 (0.238)	0.281 (0.673)
Any Audits Treatment * Post	-0.0507 (0.229)	-0.159 (0.208)	0.109 (0.112)	-0.0137 (0.123)	-0.0880 (0.105)	-0.109 (0.163)	-0.142 (0.123)	0.0329 (0.105)	-0.0528 (0.211)	-0.375 (0.681)

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include ward fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. The Within Toilet Infrastructure Index is the slum-level average of an index created at the toilet-level, which averages the z-scores for the number of usable seats, the number of facilities available and a dummy for whether the toilet is regularly cleaned. High use is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if usage is above the median. The median usage of open defecation is 16.67% and the median usage of public toilets is 29.17%. Columns (1)-(3) and (6)-(8) include a control for the number toilets in the baseline. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 4— DID THE EFFECT OF REPORT CARDS ON THE QUALITY OF GARBAGE AND DRAIN PROVISION DIFFER BY SLUM CHARACTERISTICS?

	Index of total formal sites (1)	Index of dhalao infrastructure (2)	Fraction of dhalaos		Index of Informal Piles (5)	Fraction of drains	
			Overflowing (3)	Regularly cleaned (4)		clogged (6)	with proper disposing (7)
Any Audits Treatment * Post * High use	0.102 (0.135)	-0.00906 (0.300)	0.126 (0.197)	-0.286 (0.236)	-0.0628 (0.150)	0.157 (0.239)	-0.208 (0.319)
Any Audits Treatment * Post	-0.143** (0.0646)	-0.120 (0.250)	-0.112 (0.169)	0.167 (0.267)	0.177 (0.166)	0.0631 (0.184)	0.286 (0.357)
Post * High Use	0.212** (0.0927)	0.0283 (0.244)	-0.0526 (0.169)	0.173 (0.199)	0.113 (0.178)	0.150 (0.201)	0.106 (0.298)
Post dummy	-0.00102 (0.0397)	0.408** (0.178)	0.286* (0.160)	-0.163 (0.227)	-0.381* (0.209)	-0.118 (0.142)	-0.268 (0.329)

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a slum-level panel. All regressions include ward fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the assembly constituency (AC) level. The treatment variable takes the value 1 when either a ward councillor or a MLA receives a report card. The post dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation is in the midline or endline and is 0 in the baseline. The high use variable is a dummy for being above the median dhalao usage of 66.67% for dhalaos and a dummy for being access to drains (a dummy that takes the value of 1 in slums where the average number of people reporting that there is a drain nearby is above the median of 86.67%). The index of total formal sites is an index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of dhalaos with no bins, the number of dhalaos with bins, and the total number of bins. The index of dhalao infrastructure is the average of a dhalao level index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of details, a dummy for having a proper structure, and a dummy for proper disposal. The index of informal piles is an index comprised of the average z-scores for the number of informal piles, the number of piles that are severely overflowing, and the number of piles that were last cleaned over a week ago. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

APPENDIX TABLE 5— THE EFFECT OF NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION ON THE VOTE SHARE OF MINOR PARTIES

	Independent Vote Share		Vote Share of non-Congress/BJP/BSP candidates		Vote Share of non-Congress/BJP candidates	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Newspaper RC Treatment	0	0	-0.004	-0.006	0.005	0.001
	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Newspaper RC * Ineligilble	0.007	0.008	0.013	0.016	-0.015	-0.011
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Councillor Audits RC Treatment		-0.007		-0.016		-0.031
		[0.010]		[0.014]		[0.022]
Councillor Audits RC *Ineligilble		0.004		0.021		0.029
		[0.015]		[0.021]		[0.037]
Ineligible	-0.005	-0.006	-0.011	-0.017	0.02	0.012
	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.028]	[0.030]
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240
Mean of Control	0.0353	0.038	0.0774	0.087	0.175	0.185

Notes: This table reports OLS estimates for a ward-level cross section. Estimates include strata FE (zone-party) and use robust standard errors. Any Newspaper RC Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor of that ward had a reportcard published on them in the Hindustan and is 0 otherwise. Councillor Audits RC Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councillor received a report card on the status of toilet and garbage services in their ward. Ineligilble is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Councilor was not eligible to re-run in their ward due to changes in the reservation status. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Appendix B: Detailed Household Survey Results

Access and Quality

A. Basic Infrastructure

In Table 2 we examine slum-dweller access to basic infrastructure and reported quality. We start with water and sanitation (Panel A). Water falls under the purview of the Jal board – a corporatized state entity. Legally recognized houses should be connected to piped water. In our sample, only 14% of households have a tap in their home, which is consistent with the fact that most slums in Delhi remain illegal settlements. The rest make do either with a public tap connected to the municipal supply or with a well. 4% report that they have access to neither a municipal water supply nor a well. Even among those houses with access to a water supply, quality is low. Almost half the households (42%) state that they faced non-availability of water.

At the time of the first baseline survey, the municipal corporation department held responsibility for sanitation in slums. We see that 14% of the households report having a toilet inside their homes, ranging from 6% in the poorest quintile to 30% in the wealthiest quintile. More than half the households (60%) declare that they have no specific outlet for drainage from their homes, and that figure is 72% for the poorest households.

About an equal number of households (around 45%) report taking the garbage to a dumpster as they do dumping it on an open field, though the poor are more likely to dump on open ground and the rich in a dumpster. When asked about their assessment of service quality of sanitation facilities, 30% say the cleanliness of the toilet they use is bad, and a whopping 90% of those with a drain say that it is smelly or overflowing. On the other hand, virtually no one claims that the nearest dumpster is emptied less than once a month.

Electricity provision has been privatized in Delhi, and essentially everyone claims to have access to it (Table 2, Panel C).though 62% mention that there were power cuts of 3 hours or more per day (not a lot by Indian standards) in June. The one serious complaint that we do encounter is overbilling: 20% say that they received a very high bill. Additionally, 6% of households report illegal electrical connections, based on what we can infer from their reported means of payment. This number decreases from 15% to 1% from the poorest to the wealthiest quintiles, respectively.

Most slums have narrow and, typically, non-tarmac roads. As a result motor access is another area of complaint: 80% say that there is no access to their house by vehicle bigger than a motorcycle.

B. Human Capital

Education is provided by the city and state governments (both run schools), but there are also private alternatives. About one in ten children goes to private school: however, the percentage rises, perhaps unsurprisingly, from 5% among the poorest to 19% among the richest (Panel D). Six percent of households whose children go to government school complain about the quality of teaching, whereas only 1% of households who send their children to private schools complain of low quality teaching.

Health, like education, is provided both through government clinics and hospitals as well as private alternatives. Here the pattern of use is very different from education (Panel E): everyone, rich or poor, primarily uses private facilities. In 70% of cases of minor ailments, respondents went to private doctors. For major ailments, the rate falls to 57%. Use of government facilities decreases with wealth for minor ailments, but there is no clear pattern of use for major ailments among slum-dwellers. This is consistent with the fact that people have a somewhat negative view of the government health facilities (Das and Sanchez 2003). For both minor and major healthcare, roughly 60% of the respondents report problems at their nearest government healthcare facility.

C. Law and Order

Three quarters of slum-dwellers report some kind of law and order problem in their area (Panel F). Of those, 92% cite theft. The next most frequent problems are gambling and alcoholism, which are each cited in about 70% of cases. While wealthy households report slightly lower incidence of theft and gambling, mentions of alcoholism, violent crimes (43%), domestic abuse (53%), and vandalism (8%) all increase with wealth. It is unclear if this increase is due to underreporting of the problems among poorer quintiles.

Ten percent of slum-dwellers report having sought help from the police. Of those, 34% say that the police actually took a report and actively investigated, and 37% reported that the problem improved after going to the police.

D. Transfers

Table 3a – 3f provide information about the three major transfer programs relevant for slum-dwellers: the public distribution (or “ration”) system; pensions for the elderly, widows, and disabled; and cash and non-cash transfers for children in school.

There are different categories of ration cards and associated entitlements depending on a household’s material conditions. Yellow and red cards are for the poorest households categorized as “Below Poverty Line (BPL)” (see appendix for more details). White cards are for those “Above Poverty Line (APL).”

Table 3a shows that about 40% of the households have a BPL ration card (red or yellow) and are eligible for subsidized rations. This is substantially lower than the 57% of household reporting

incomes below the poverty line, but there may be some inaccuracy in our income data. Strikingly, however, the probability of having access to a BPL card is *increasing* in wealth over most of the range. A regression of whether or not you have a BPL card on the asset index with slum fixed effects shows that a one standard deviation increase in asset index increases the likelihood of having a BPL card by a very significant 5.9 percentage points (columns 13 and 14 of Table 4). In other words, richer people (as measured by private assets) within the same slum are more likely to have a BPL card, suggesting substantial mis-targeting.

As shown in Panel C of Table 3b, over 95% of cardholders report receiving some rations. However, the majority (63%) get less than their stipulated allotment at the stipulated price, at least based on the slum-dwellers' reports. On average they report receiving 1.9 kilos less rice and 4.8 kilos less wheat than they were supposed to on their most recent visit to the ration shop, but the shortfall is somewhat less for those entitled to the most (those with red or yellow cards). On the other hand, these same people pay a higher markup on the (lower) price that they are officially guaranteed. The average markups are 26% for rice and 15% for wheat, respectively, though the median markups are much smaller, implying that more than half of those with ration cards get their rations at close to the official price.

Qualification for pensions relies on multiple criteria: an individual must have the actual condition (of being over 60 years, widowed, or disabled), have an income less than Rs. 48,400 per year, and have lived in Delhi for five years or more. An estimate of "potential eligibility" is based on the answer to the question of whether any household member satisfies the first two conditions, and the period of living in the current residence of the respondent. This is a proxy for the true criteria, because in addition to meeting these criteria, people need to go through a certification process to verify their eligibility. Equally important is that there are a restricted number of pensions allocated to each area to be distributed by state legislators and ward councilors. Pensions are therefore potentially rationed, and the politician has a lot of discretion over them.

In Table 3c we see that roughly a quarter of the households in our sample have someone who is eligible for a pension but Table 3d suggests that only 35% of these households with an eligible member actually receive a pension. Looking at receipt as percentage of eligibility by pension type, we see that almost half of all eligible widows receive a pension, but that far fewer eligible elderly and disabled people do (only 31% and 15%, respectively).

Finally, we turn to scholarships for children. Both the state and city government offer various schemes to subsidize education for girls, physically handicapped and SC/ST/OBC/minorities students from underprivileged families. Eligibility criteria for these schemes typically require the child to be studying in a government or government-aided school and for family income to be below 100,000 Rs. per year.

Table 3e shows that more than half of the children attending government schools between the ages of 6 to 14 receive scholarships. However, the proportion that receives non-cash transfers such as free textbooks, uniforms and stationary is much higher: 93% of government school children in this age group receive non-cash transfers, mostly in the form of free textbooks (90%)

and uniforms (79%). The proportion of government school beneficiaries does not vary much across asset quintiles for both cash and non-cash transfers. For example, the proportion of scholarship recipients in government schools only moves from 53% in the lowest quintile to 55% in the uppermost quintile.

Only 6% of private school children receive scholarships, though the proportion diminishes with wealth from 12% at the bottom asset quintile to 3% of the uppermost quintile. Similarly, while only 13% of private school children receive any non-cash transfer, a higher proportion of children in the bottom quintile (26%) benefit in comparison to children in the uppermost quintile (8%). The proportion of beneficiaries for cash and non-cash transfers reduces sharply with wealth for private school children in comparison to their government school counterparts, implying that private schools may more actively target cash and non-cash transfers to students.

Heterogeneity in Provision and Problem Ranking

To what extent do differences in access and quality of public good provision vary within and across slums in the same ward? Significant heterogeneity along these dimensions would provide one explanation for the persistence of poor quality of service provision.

To examine this, we turn to regression-based analysis. The results are reported in Table 4. We estimate a series of regressions where the outcomes are different measures of either service quality or access to transfers. For each of the seven outcome variables, we use two specifications – one with just area fixed effects as explanatory variables and the second with area fixed effects and the household's asset index. In Panel A, we use slum fixed effects, in Panel B we use ward fixed effects and in Panel C we report regressions with slum and ward fixed effects (where we drop one slum fixed effect per ward). We also report the F-test for the joint significance of the fixed effects. In Panel C, the F-test can be interpreted as being informative of whether, conditional on ward fixed effects, the slum fixed effects jointly have any explanatory power.

It is striking that the asset index, while generally statistically significant, never explains more than 3% of the variation in access to any of the 7 services we look at. In Panel B, we see that ward fixed effects explain a substantial part of the variation (generally between 15 and 55 percent), and Panel C shows that slum fixed effects have significant additional explanatory power for all services. The proportion of variance explained by ward- and slum-level fixed effects is particularly high for water, sanitation and garbage removal, all of which have strong local network aspects: for example about 50% of the variation in access to municipal water and garbage removal is explained by these fixed effects. Only 15% of the variation in access to electricity can be explained by local area fixed effects, but there is little variation in electrical connections to work with given the near-universal supply. Inter-slum differences also explain 25% of the variation in whether potentially eligible pensioners actually receive a pension, and roughly 20% of the variation in receipt of a ration card or voter registration card. This is striking, since these transfer entitlements do not have local public good features.

Tables 5a and 5b look at the question of public service quality from a different angle—what slum-dwellers say are their most important problems, as well as reports from the RWA leadership. There is again a broad correspondence in the overall ranking of problems. Each survey respondent—whether representing a household or an RWA—was asked to identify the most problematic issue in his or her area. Slum-dwellers identify water as the most problematic issue, followed by sewage, drainage, and toilets and then garbage removal. Private transfer issues (rations, in particular) follow next. Interestingly, there is very little difference in problem ranking across asset quintiles—slum-dwellers within each quintile rank each issue within 2% of its full-sample ranking. RWAs also overwhelmingly report water and sewage issues as the top two problems. Neither group considers education or healthcare as key concerns. This may reflect the fact that most slum-dwellers have opted out of the public health service delivery system (Das and Sanchez 2003). Nor is crime perceived to be a major problem by slum-dwellers or RWAs, although issues of law and order appear to concern RWAs more than slum-dwellers.

These analyses show that a lot of the problems faced by slum-dwellers are common to everyone who lives in the same slum and are not necessarily escaped with increased wealth. This stands in stark contrast to the results noted above on patterns of variation in private wealth and incomes, where the majority of the variation was within, rather than between, slums.

We have also examined the geographical alignment of preferences, in terms of the top-ranked problems. At the slum level, on average 58% of households have the same top problem, and 95% share at least one issue in their top three problems. When we aggregate over all slums in a ward, the concordance over the top problem falls to 53% (illustrating the between-slum variation again). Finally, in 31% of wards for which we have both slum-dweller and RWA data, there is concordance between the most frequently cited problem among slum-dwellers and that of the RWAs in the ward.

Why is the Quality of Provision Low?

Slum-dwellers face extensive problems with provision of basic infrastructure and receipt of private transfers, and have clear opinions over these. To a significant extent slum-dwellers' problems are aligned with broader local preferences in their community. So why does the political process not deliver on their problems?

In this section, we explore three possible reasons for this. First, does the elected representative face constraints in resources or influence in delivering better services?

Second, to the extent that representatives can do better, do they lack political incentives to do so? This could be for two reasons. It may be that improving public services and transfers is an unattractive political strategy relative to a clientelistic or vote-buying alternative. Alternatively, slum-dwellers may be disengaged from the political system, either in terms of voting or through direct interactions with political representatives?

Finally, is lack of information about their rights a significant problem for slum-dwellers?

The evidence from the survey has little that can be directly applied to the first question, precisely because it is drawn from the views of slum-dwellers, supplemented by those of RWAs. As discussed in Section II.1 on governance, there are diverse agencies responsible for delivery of services and transfers. For example, water is a primary responsibility of Delhi's Jal Board, a public agency answerable to the state political process; electricity is provided by three privatized companies, subject to regulatory guidelines (including on access) set by a state-level regulator; garbage removal and local sanitation are the responsibility of the municipal corporation; schools are provided by state and municipality; and so on. Yet all of these are subject to control by the overall political system, at least in principle, either via the electoral and legislative process itself or the intermediation functions that state and municipal legislators have over delivery to their own constituencies.

The direct evidence from the surveys questions the responsiveness of the overall political system. In some areas there may be specific resource constraints—pensions seem to be currently rationed, for example. However, there is evidence to suggest that resource constraints are not the only issue, at least in some areas. Rations are, in principle, fully funded, and yet we observe substantial under-delivery relative to entitlements. At the council level of government, ward councilors receive a pot of money for their discretionary use: they spent over 90% of this in the 2007/08 and 2008/09, but, as discussed below, there seems to be very little alignment between their spending (largely on roads) and the most important problems faced by slum-dwellers or RWAs. As seen in Table 5, while slum-dwellers report the most problematic issues in their areas to be water (44%), sewage (30%) and garbage (11%), a breakdown of councilor spending shows that a greater part of their discretionary fund (57%) is spent on roads. While the next biggest expense category comprises of the provision of drains and roads, this constitutes a far lower proportion of their funds – 17% only. The next two expense categories do not meet slum-dwellers' interests either – provision and repair of lights (8%) and the improvement of parks and provision of gates (7%). At least in some areas, politicians could do more to respond to the problems if they chose to.

So what about the second question: is effort on providing public services and transfers to slum-dwellers a good political strategy for politicians? This takes us to the extensive literature on the drivers of political behavior in India (and other developing countries), and in particular the central theme that political interactions are primarily embedded in clientelistic relations between politician and citizen.

The essence of clientelism is the provision of private or local public goods in return for political loyalty, typically within an unequal power relationship. By one definition, political clientelism “represents the distribution of resources (or promise of) by political office holders or political candidates in exchange for political support, primarily – although not exclusively – in the form of the vote” (Gay 1990). It is argued that this can be a superior political strategy than provision of general public goods, especially when a politician can more credibly commit to delivery of such private (or local public goods) and especially where political competition is weak and information is limited (Keefer and Khemani 2005). The role of poverty is also emphasized by Wilkinson (2006) who argues that low levels of economic development facilitates clientelism

because the small rewards patrons can offer have greater value, as well as the fact that a relatively poor electorate, such as slum-dwellers, rarely see the benefits of highly participatory voting.

Many authors argue that India is, in general, deeply clientelistic, or, as Chandra (2004) puts it, India is a “patronage democracy.” Three particular aspects of the Indian literature are particularly relevant to this study.

First, there is work arguing that clientelistic relations are intermediated by local political brokers. Baken (2003) finds that the most important group of lower-level political brokers connecting the mass electorate to local (city) leaders is comprised of non-elected popular leaders who generally operate on a neighborhood level: slum leaders. He argues that they operate between slum-dwellers and the political apparatus, mediating in nearly all governmental matters such as getting a license or ration card, obtaining welfare or housing benefits, and dealing with the police in cases of arrest or fines. Slums and slum-dwellers are usually refused full recognition of legitimacy by the state and inhabit uncertain legal and physical spaces (Ramanathan 2006). Jha, Rao and Woolcock (2007) report survey results from Delhi that indicate an extensive intermediation function of local leaders.

Second, it is often argued that people vote on caste or other identity-based lines, to increase the probability of getting benefits for their own group — though this depends on calculations on the size of their voting block (Chandra 2004). However, there is also evidence that such caste-based voting is a consequence of lack of information over the true qualities of candidates (Banerjee et al. 2010; Banerjee and Pande 2009).

Third, there is a rather different, and influential, argument of Chatterjee (2004, 2008) that in India the poor work through formal political channels, whereas the middle class work through civil society structure to directly access and influence the governmental apparatus.

The data from the surveys provide valuable information on the political behavior of slum-dwellers – whether they say they vote, what factors shape their voting decision, and whether they approach politicians directly to solve daily problems.

Table 6 summarizes the results. The Indian voter-registration campaigns show significant success with 85% registration among slum-dwellers. In contrast to the view that registration in slums is driven by politicians organizing a local vote bank, the bulk (78%, unreported in tables) of registration was via a “government campaign” (presumably by the Election Commission) — an example of part of the Indian state that is effective. Reported turnout in the last councilor election is also high at 72%. While most studies tend to suggest that self-reported turnout exceeds actual turnout, it is still interesting that reported turnout rates increase with wealth. To the extent that the poorest slum-dwellers are often considered the most likely targets of vote-buying and clientelistic policies, one may have anticipated the opposite. This is, however, consistent with the fact that the poor are also registered less (though, once again, one might wonder why the politicians are not out registering these voters).

We explore this further in Panel B where we examine participation in pre-election events. Most slum-dwellers (66%) state that they did not participate in any pre-election event. The most common forms of participation are participating in a march (25%) and attending a speech rally (27%). Roughly 22% of those who so participate report receiving non-cash transfers. The incidence of cash transfers as a reward for participation is much lower and does not exceed 5% on average. Very few slum-dwellers (2%, not reported in tables) participate more actively in pre-election events, such as by distributing goods or materials or actively campaigning for votes.

Next, we examine what respondents stated were important deciding factors for voting. A number of authors have documented the widespread targeting of slum-dwellers by political parties on the eve of the election. Yet, the candidate's party is among the least-common reasons cited by slum-dwellers for favoring a particular candidate. What's more, the likelihood of reporting party as an important factor in deciding to vote is increasing, *not* decreasing, across the asset quintiles. Furthermore, only 1% of slum-dwellers report identity as a reason for voting. While recognizing the limitations of self-reports, these figures contradict many of the standard theories about the poor Indian voter.

Overall, slum-dwellers express a strong preference for using their electoral clout to ensure higher quality service delivery. Moreover, we observe relatively limited participation by the poor in political party activities prior to elections and very limited reports of direct transfers from parties in return for political participation.

A second form of engagement of slum-dwellers with politicians involves direct contacts to solve problems. We have seen that slum-dwellers face a whole array of problems affecting their daily lives. Do they use politicians to help solve these problems, and is this a successful strategy? And do they use others — intermediaries such as pradhans or fixers — to connect with the state, as has been documented in ethnographic and other work in some Indian cities? Tables 7a and 7b provide a summary of responses for a variety of services.

Only a minority of slum-dwellers seek help from politicians to resolve problems. For individual areas, the proportion ranges from 1% for access to health schemes, education schemes and issues of crime, to 5% for electricity, 9% for issues of eviction, more than 10% for problems with ration cards and sanitation, and 17% for water. This may seem a small number for each area, but 35% of households had approached a politician over some issue. This is quite a substantial number, especially given the likelihood that many households may tacitly support or free-ride on action by others.

For most issues, between two-thirds to three-quarters of meetings were with the MLA, probably reflecting either knowledge that the issue fell under the domain of the Delhi state government or a perception that the MLA held more influence than did the ward councilor. Most other meetings were with the ward councilor, and very few with a member of parliament (representing central government). The exception is sanitation, where slightly over half approached the ward councilor, in line with the fact that local sanitation fell under the responsibility of the MCD — though it is interesting that 48% still approached the MLA. Most slum-dwellers had never contacted any

politician: only 23% had ever approached an MLA, fewer a ward councilor (11%), and merely 2% an MP.

There is a clear preference to approaching politicians in groups: for all cases for which we have information — including ration cards, an essentially individual entitlement — most slum-dwellers chose not to meet politicians alone. 100% of meetings regarding threats of eviction were conducted with groups, and for sanitation and water, the rate was more than 90%. These are mainly local public goods (or local public bads in the case of eviction). The fact that slum-dwellers mainly saw politicians in groups on issues of crime (89%) suggests that these visits related to general, rather than individual, crime cases. In fact, 73% of the meetings were regarding issues of “law and order” rather than harassment, arrest of family, or complaints about bribes. (A somewhat larger proportion of households go to the police directly, as seen above.)

Did the meetings bring about positive results? This varies by area. If we put aside the health and education schemes and crime, which were the subject of very few meetings, three things are worth noting. First, in the vast majority of cases, the politician was accessible. It is rare for a politician to refuse to see an individual or group from a slum; the highest proportion of refusals is 4% for appeals over law and order. After hearing an appeal, the most common response from politicians is to say they will help — or ask someone else to help — and then nothing happens. However, in a substantial minority of cases the situation is reported as improving — from a low of 17% for problems with ration cards, to 33% for sanitation, 48% for water, and 89% for (avoiding) eviction. We cannot tell from this kind of data whether the politician was actually instrumental in effecting change, but nevertheless, these are not bad percentages.

An important element of the account of clientelistic urban structures concerns the role of intermediaries, including pradhans, fixers, slumlords and others, who form an integral part of the societal mechanisms linking slum-dwellers to the state, whether to politicians, agencies, or bureaucrats. The survey only has information on this for two areas, but it is striking how rarely such intermediaries are named in response to the question, “Who helped you to resolve this problem?” The most common answer — in around 90% of cases involving ration cards and water, for example — is no one. Pradhans are the next most common answer, but only in about 5% of cases. NGOs are virtually absent (too small a proportion to report on the table).

Accounts of patronage-based networks flow especially from ethnographic studies in other cities — particularly Mumbai. It is quite possible that Delhi operates differently, especially because of the very different land situation. It is also possible that the survey’s respondents were reluctant to provide answers over such local sociopolitical connections. But if we take the responses of households at face value, a picture emerges very different from the clientelistic account. Politicians are generally approachable, and a substantial minority of households approaches them. Like politicians everywhere they often promise and don’t deliver, but they also sometimes do deliver, or at least seem to. There is little evidence that households in slums are dependent on intermediaries to solve the frequent problems they face in their daily lives.

Finally, it is notable that where there was action taken — by elected officials, government agents, or others — there is very little reporting of bribery. Across all the areas of service delivery and transfers, only 8% of households reported paying a bribe — in response to the question, “Did you pay anything above the official price?” This would, however, exclude payments for provision of service (such as water) from an illegal source since households almost certainly (and correctly) would not see them as bribes.

So what creates the disjunction between a desire to use election to enforce accountability and slum-dwellers’ ability to do so? This brings us to the possibility that lack of information could be part of the reason. We return to Panel D1 in Table 6 where we examine the levels of political knowledge among slum-dwellers. More than half the slum-dwellers report that they rarely or never discuss politics. Only 28% state that they discuss politics frequently before elections. Moreover, the incidence of political discussion increases with wealth.

Next, in Panel D2 we turn to political knowledge. Starting with the simplest question, knowledge of the name of elected representatives, we find that only a third of slum-dwellers know their representative (MLA or councilor). Only 32% know the councilor has money to spend on local projects, and only 3% are aware of the rough size of the funds he/she has. Table 3f shows that only a handful are aware of available assistance such as the private hospital scheme (6%) and the Economically Weaker Section education scheme (3%), programs which entitle the poor to free treatment and education at certain private hospitals and schools. It is clear that one immediate constraint on electoral accountability is the very low level of political knowledge.

Policy Implications

The substantial concordance of problems within a slum tends to apply to all slums within a ward, and notably, between the main problems reported by slums and Resident Welfare Associations within the same ward. This raises an important question: if there is such concordance, why is the political system not responding and leading to more effective state action?

The survey provides extensive information on the political behavior of slum-dwellers that sheds light on this question. There is extensive involvement in formal voting, and respondents report that they vote according to the issues and the quality of politicians, with almost none reporting voting on identity (caste or religious lines). There is little interaction with politicians to solve daily problems, but still over 30 percent of households have had some contact with a politician to deal with issues covered in the survey—most commonly the state-level Member of the Legislative Assembly, followed by the municipal Ward Councilor. Politicians are accessible and promise change, but usually nothing happens. Nevertheless, in a significant minority of cases an improvement is reported. Contradicting some accounts of slum-dwellers being dependent on local fixers and leaders, the majority of households report that they seek to solve daily problems themselves. NGOs are also strikingly absent from the picture.

One potentially promising policy intervention would be an information campaign on the schemes and funds available to voters, for which we find little current awareness. Under the current rules

in Delhi, both private schools and private hospitals are obliged to serve a certain number of poor people for free. However, only about 6 percent of slum-dwellers are aware of these schemes. Over 95% of ration cardholders report receiving some rations; however, the majority (63%) get less than their stipulated allotment at the stipulated price, at least based on the slum-dwellers' reports. Similarly, roughly a quarter of the households in our sample have someone who is eligible for a pension but only 35% of these households with an eligible member actually receive a pension. What is more, only a third of the slum-dwellers know that municipal councilors are allocated money to spend on the ward, and only a handful (3 percent) are aware of the approximate size of the discretionary fund. The urban poor's lack of awareness of schemes and funds may explain why they are not putting pressure on politicians to deliver them. By reducing this gap through information campaigns, voters can be empowered to demand what they are entitled to and punish those politicians who do not deliver at the polls.

What is more, the similar (and coherent) preferences at both the slum and ward level reveal the potential for collective action. If residents within a slum (or political jurisdiction) have very different priorities, then collective action is going to be more difficult to organize (Alesina et al. 1999); however, given that this is not the case, policy interventions that provide constituents with the tools needed for mobilization have the potential to be very effective in improving public service delivery. This was the motivation behind our RWA intervention, the results of which are forthcoming.

In short, there are clearly major areas of weak knowledge concerning personal entitlements, the names of elected representatives, and the very existence of some schemes. Substantial opportunities exist for improving public awareness and creating incentives for politicians and other state actors to improve living conditions in the slums.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Panel A: Identity Group						
General	16%	14%	13%	17%	17%	20%
Hindu Scheduled Caste	42%	36%	41%	44%	45%	47%
Hindu Scheduled Tribe	8%	10%	8%	8%	8%	5%
Other Hindu Backwards Caste	14%	14%	16%	15%	12%	12%
Muslim	20%	27%	21%	16%	18%	16%
Panel B: Migration into Slum						
Years lived in current residence	17	13	16	18	19	19
Percent who arrived in the slum in the last year	5%	12%	5%	3%	2%	1%
Panel C: Education Status						
6-10 year olds in school	78%	59%	77%	86%	87%	89%
11-14 year olds in school	77%	56%	71%	80%	85%	91%
Adults with no schooling	48%	62%	52%	49%	41%	37%
Panel D: Asset Ownership						
House	85%	61%	81%	93%	96%	98%
TV	76%	29%	70%	97%	97%	98%
Mobile Phone	69%	27%	62%	86%	86%	98%
Refrigerator	25%	1%	5%	3%	53%	76%
Radio	16%	4%	8%	11%	17%	48%
Panel E: Employment*						
Days worked in a month	24	24	24	24	24	25
Distribution of heads-of-household in the top occupations:						
Unemployed	9%	8%	9%	10%	8%	10%
Homemaker	5%	4%	5%	6%	4%	6%
Unskilled Labor	62%	69%	64%	61%	61%	47%
Daily Manual Labor	19%	19%	22%	20%	18%	14%
Petty Trader/Vendor/Hawker	14%	18%	13%	14%	14%	10%
Domestic Worker*	10%	10%	10%	7%	13%	10%
Rickshaw Puller	5%	7%	5%	5%	3%	2%
Skilled Labor	23%	18%	20%	22%	26%	35%
Skilled Craftsman**	7%	6%	6%	6%	7%	8%
Shopkeeper/Salesman	5%	3%	3%	4%	6%	9%
Driver	5%	3%	4%	5%	6%	8%
Construction/Contractor	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Panel F: Fraction with Identification						
Any card	89%	73%	87%	94%	95%	97%
Ration card	62%	37%	58%	70%	74%	75%
Voter registration	85%	70%	84%	90%	91%	94%
Panel G: Health Status						
Visted a clinic for a minor health problem in the last six months	93%	92%	93%	93%	94%	93%
Visted a hospital for a major health problem in the last six months	18%	16%	19%	17%	18%	21%

* Employment statistics are calculated for those who reported themselves heads-of-household

Table 2: Access to Public Facilities

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Panel A: Water and Sanitation						
Uses indoor household tap	13%	8%	11%	14%	17%	18%
Uses outdoor well	31%	36%	32%	31%	28%	26%
Uses outdoor tap from municipal supply	61%	63%	64%	60%	62%	56%
No access to municipal supply or well	4%	7%	4%	3%	3%	4%
Faced non-availability of water	42%	38%	44%	44%	43%	44%
Uses in-house latrine	14%	6%	10%	12%	18%	30%
Uses public toilet	62%	51%	67%	68%	64%	57%
Uses open land, gutter, or side of road for toilet	40%	56%	40%	38%	35%	27%
Reports cleanliness of toilet is "bad"	30%	36%	32%	30%	30%	24%
Wastewater drain in the floor	13%	7%	10%	15%	14%	19%
No specific outlet for wastewater	60%	72%	61%	61%	54%	47%
Drain has been smelly or overflowing (if they have one)	90%	91%	91%	90%	88%	88%
MCD or private worker removes garbage	8%	4%	5%	9%	12%	11%
Disposes of garbage at a collection point (dumpster)	45%	37%	43%	47%	46%	53%
Dumps garbage in open land	43%	54%	48%	41%	38%	30%
Nearest dumpster emptied less than once a month	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Panel B: Roads						
Nothing larger than a motorcycle can pass on the road outside	80%	80%	81%	82%	80%	78%
Panel C: Electricity						
Has electricity	98%	96%	98%	98%	100%	100%
Reporting an average of at least 3 hours of power cuts per day last June	62%	60%	64%	60%	63%	59%
Reporting "very high bill" as a problem	20%	12%	22%	20%	21%	24%
Has illegal electrical connection (determined from mode of payment)	6%	15%	6%	4%	4%	1%
Panel D: Education						
HHs with a child in government school	57%	44%	54%	63%	63%	63%
HHs with a child in private school	11%	5%	10%	10%	12%	19%
HHs with a child in government school who say teaching quality is poor	6%	8%	5%	6%	7%	4%
HHs with child in private school who say teaching quality is poor	1%	0%	2%	3%	2%	0%
Panel E: Health						
Last minor health problem for which HH sought medical attention:						
Visited government facilities	30%	31%	31%	30%	29%	25%
Visited private facilities	70%	69%	69%	70%	71%	75%
Last major health problem for which HH sought medical attention:						
Visited government facilities	43%	42%	44%	38%	46%	46%
Visited private facilities	57%	58%	56%	62%	54%	54%
Had a problem at the nearest government health center	59%	57%	61%	61%	56%	64%
Had a problem at a government hospital (conditional on having received care there for the last major health problem)	58%	58%	56%	53%	59%	62%
Panel F: Security						
Reporting a problem of law and order	76%	74%	77%	77%	77%	74%
<i>Of those reporting problems of law and order, specific issues reported:</i>						
Theft	92%	92%	94%	92%	90%	90%
Gambling	70%	74%	68%	71%	66%	70%
Alcoholism/drunkenness	68%	65%	69%	68%	68%	72%
Assault/violent crime	43%	39%	44%	41%	43%	50%
Domestic violence/abuse	53%	48%	50%	55%	53%	65%
Vandalism/destruction of property	8%	4%	6%	9%	8%	14%
Illegal drugs	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%	5%
Extortion	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%
Blackmail	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Went to police for law and order problem	10%	6%	10%	9%	12%	15%
<i>Of those who went to the police, outcomes reported:</i>						
The police took a report and actively investigated	34%	35%	28%	28%	40%	41%
The problem improved after going to the police	38%	35%	31%	28%	45%	48%

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Card Holders						
Any Card	62%	37%	58%	70%	74%	75%
Below Poverty Line Card						
Red Card	18%	13%	17%	22%	19%	19%
Yellow card	22%	13%	22%	27%	27%	24%
Red or Yellow	40%	26%	38%	48%	46%	43%
Above Poverty Line Card						
White-stamped	13%	6%	12%	13%	18%	21%
White	8%	5%	7%	9%	10%	11%

	By Ration Card type			
	Any	Red	Yellow	White stamped
Panel A: Rice				
Percentage of official amount received*	82%	87%	84%	68%
Ratio of price paid to official price*	1.26	1.36	1.25	1.08
Panel B: Wheat				
Percentage of official amount received*	82%	87%	84%	73%
Ratio of price paid to official price*	1.15	1.28	1.10	1.02
Panel C: Rice and Wheat Rations				
Percentage of card holders who received any ration**	95%	97%	95%	92%
Percentage of card holders who get less than the official amount of rice or wheat*	63%	56%	62%	76%

*Conditional on receiving some benefit within the last month.

**Ration not limited to rice or wheat but includes any good (i.e. rice, flour, dal, salt, sugar, edible oil, wheat and kerosene oil) from the ration store.

1)The Red Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) cards are intended to target the poorest of the poor. They cover destitute households with widows, single and destitute women, disabled, infirmed or aged persons with no assured means of subsistence.

(2) The Yellow BPL ration cards cover households with annual family income below Rs 24,200.

(3) White-Stamped Cards (Above Poverty Line) are given to families with annual family income above Rs 24,200 and below Rs. 1,00,000.

(4) White Unstamped Cards (Above Poverty Line) are given to families with annual family income above Rs. 1,00,000. These cardholders are not entitled to rations.

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Eligible for any pension	23%	21%	25%	23%	23%	24%
Eligible for old age pension	13%	11%	15%	14%	14%	14%
Eligible for widow pension	8%	7%	8%	8%	8%	9%
Eligible for disabled pension	4%	25%	27%	27%	26%	28%

	Full Sample	By Private Asset Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Any pension	35%	31%	33%	40%	40%	34%
Old age pension	31%	33%	28%	33%	33%	25%
Widow pension	47%	32%	46%	51%	52%	55%
Disabled pension	15%	13%	13%	13%	23%	12%

(1) To be eligible for the old age, widow, or disabled pension, an individual must have an income of less than Rs.48,400 per year and must have lived in Delhi for five years or more. We used years in current residence as a proxy for the Delhi residency requirement. To qualify for the old age pension, the individual must be over 60 years of age. To qualify for the widow or disabled pension, the individual must be a widow or disabled, respectively.

	All Children	By Private Asset Quintile of Household				
		1	2	3	4	5
Percentage of Children (6-14) in Government Schools:						
Receiving a Scholarship	55%	53%	63%	49%	55%	55%
Receiving Textbooks	90%	94%	92%	91%	87%	86%
Receiving Stationary	27%	37%	26%	23%	26%	27%
Receiving a Free Uniform	79%	78%	80%	84%	76%	80%
Receiving any Non-Cash School Transfer	93%	95%	94%	94%	90%	92%
Percentage of Children (6-14) in Private Schools:						
Receiving a Scholarship	6%	12%	4%	8%	5%	3%
Receiving Textbooks	11%	21%	15%	15%	7%	7%
Receiving Stationary	3%	9%	9%	5%	0%	1%
Receiving a Free Uniform	10%	21%	13%	14%	6%	7%
Receiving any Non-Cash School Transfer	13%	26%	17%	19%	7%	8%

	Full Sample	By Asset Private Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Awareness of EWS education scheme	3.1%	1.1%	2.9%	2.6%	3.8%	5.9%
Awareness of hospital scheme	5.8%	2.9%	5.2%	5.7%	6.8%	9.8%
Use of EWS education scheme	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%	0.8%
Use of hospital scheme	1.4%	1.1%	1.7%	0.9%	2.1%	1.4%

Table 4: Explanatory Power of Slum-Level versus Ward-Level Fixed Effects

	Use a municipal water supply	Have access to a flush toilet to a piped sewer	Have an electrical connection	Dispose of trash in a dumpster	Receive a pension, if eligible	Has either voter registration or a ration card	Has Red or Yellow ration card							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Panel A: Slum Fixed Effects														
Slum Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Private Asset index		0.0217*** (3.94)		0.0361*** (7.08)		0.00862** (3.27)		0.00677 (0.90)		0.0241 (1.14)		0.0604*** (10.30)		0.0590*** (6.41)
N	3330	3304	3349	3322	3271	3244	3371	3344	772	769	3367	3340	3374	3347
R-squared	0.591	0.595	0.313	0.325	0.157	0.158	0.478	0.479	0.249	0.252	0.209	0.236	0.194	0.205
F-test (on Slum FEs only)	30.47	30.51	9.642	10.02	3.868	3.846	19.51	19.31	1.591	1.590	5.628	6.472	5.128	5.427
P-value	0	0	7.89e-168	2.87e-166	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Panel B: Ward Fixed Effects														
Ward Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Private Asset index		0.0231*** (4.20)		0.0328*** (6.62)		0.0157*** (6.05)		0.0176* (2.25)		0.0148 (0.76)		0.0658*** (11.75)		0.0612*** (6.91)
N	3330	3304	3349	3322	3271	3244	3371	3344	772	769	3367	3340	3374	3347
R-squared	0.545	0.549	0.259	0.269	0.053	0.062	0.364	0.366	0.147	0.148	0.167	0.202	0.146	0.159
F-test (on Ward FEs only)	54.86	54.65	16.13	16.65	2.526	2.890	26.65	26.26	1.755	1.735	9.293	11.51	7.972	8.623
P-value	0	0	2.29e-162	3.52e-159	0	0	1.16e-268	3.37e-259	0	0.001	0	0	0	0
Panel C: Slum and Ward FE (with one Slum dropped per ward)														
Ward Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Slum Fixed Effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Private Asset index		0.0217*** (3.94)		0.0361*** (7.08)		0.00862** (3.27)		0.00677 (0.90)		0.0241 (1.14)		0.0604*** (10.30)		0.0590*** (6.41)
N	3330	3304	3349	3322	3271	3244	3371	3344	772	769	3367	3340	3374	3347
R-squared	0.591	0.595	0.313	0.325	0.157	0.158	0.478	0.479	0.249	0.252	0.209	0.236	0.194	0.205
F-test (on remaining slum FEs only)	30.47	30.51	9.642	10.02	3.868	3.846	19.51	19.31	1.591	1.590	5.628	6.472	5.128	5.427
P-value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.035	0	0	0	0

Table 5: Most Problematic Issues in Areas

	According to RWA Survey	According to HH Survey
Water	31%	44%
Sewage/drainage/toilets	24%	30%
Crime/thefts/security	8%	1%
Electricity	4%	2%
Garbage removal	3%	11%
Education	3%	0%
Health	1%	1%
Ration	1%	7%
Pension	0%	1%
Roads	5%	0%
Parks and greenery	6%	0%
Traffic congestion	5%	0%
Stray dogs	2%	0%
Encroachment	2%	0%
Street lights	0%	0%

Table 6: Political life of Delhi slum dwellers

	Full Sample	By Asset Private Quintile				
		1	2	3	4	5
Panel A: Political Activism by Slum Dwellers						
Registered households	85%	70%	84%	90%	91%	94%
Voted in the last municipal election	72%	51%	72%	76%	81%	83%
Panel B: Participation in a Political Party or Candidate's Activities						
Attended no event	66%	71%	66%	61%	68%	65%
Attended march or speech rally	33%	28%	34%	39%	31%	35%
Received no incentive*	72%	71%	67%	74%	74%	72%
Received cash incentive*	5%	5%	3%	4%	4%	8%
Received non-cash incentive*	22%	23%	27%	21%	20%	18%
Panel C1: Important Factors when Voting**						
Candidate's character only	12%	8%	11%	12%	13%	16%
Issues only	64%	69%	66%	62%	62%	58%
Both candidate's character and issues	21%	18%	20%	23%	21%	24%
Panel C2: Factors in Evaluating Candidates***						
Candidate's past government work	49%	46%	54%	50%	50%	46%
Candidate's past non-government work	16%	15%	17%	16%	17%	13%
Candidate's party	40%	36%	34%	40%	45%	46%
Caste or Religion	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Panel D1: Discussion of Politics						
Discuss politics/political parties' activities rarely or never	61%	69%	64%	60%	57%	49%
Discuss politics frequently around elections	28%	22%	24%	30%	30%	37%
Discuss politics sometimes or often	11%	9%	12%	10%	12%	13%
Panel D2: Political Awareness						
Knows name of councillor	28%	18%	25%	30%	33%	36%
Knows name of MLA	35%	24%	39%	39%	37%	40%
Aware that councillor is given funds to spend in the ward	32%	26%	34%	30%	33%	37%
Aware of funds and approximate amounts allocated to councillors	3%	1%	2%	2%	3%	7%

*Conditional on attending march, speech, or rally

**Respondents were prompted to answer whether issues or character were most important when they cast their vote.

***Respondents were prompted to say what they thought about when evaluating candidates.

Table 7a: Approaching Public Officials

	Ration Cards	Health Scheme	Education Scheme	Eviction/Slum Clearance	Sanitation	Water	Electricity	Crime
Approached public official	14%	1%	1%	9%	11%	17%	5%	1%
<i>Contingent upon approaching a public official...</i>								
Role of Official Approached								
Councillor	21%	21%	24%	15%	49%	26%	21%	24%
MLA	76%	59%	67%	75%	48%	69%	77%	71%
MP	3%	11%	9%	10%	2%	4%	2%	5%
Meeting Composition								
Alone	33%	47%	46%	0%	5%	2%	17%	11%
Group	67%	53%	54%	100%	95%	98%	82%	89%
Outcome of Meeting								
Not in Office	4%	3%	3%	1%	0%	1%	1%	2%
Refused to Speak	2%	0%	3%	1%	2%	0%	0%	4%
Could not/Refused/Did not Help	5%	9%	3%	7%	2%	5%	10%	59%
Said would help but nothing happened	41%	15%	21%	--	31%	42%	29%	--
Told someone to help but nothing happened	32%	30%	28%	--	28%	--	31%	--
Problem resolved	17%	30%	36%	81%	31%	48%	26%	35%
Other/Don't Know	0%	12%	8%	10%	7%	3%	5%	0%

*For eviction/slum clearance, 79% of problem resolution consisted of the slum not being cleared, and 2% in restitution for slum clearing

Table 7b: Help from Public Officials or Others

	Ration Cards*	Hospital Scheme	EWS Education Scheme	Water**
<i>Person who helped obtain services</i>				
No one	87%	97%	88%	89%
Elected Official	2%	3%	13%	2%
Pradhan	7%	-	-	4%
Agent	1%	-	-	0%
Relative/Neighbor/Friend	3%	-	-	2%

* Who helped obtain a ration card

**Who helped restore water after it was turned off

“Improving Governance and Public Service Delivery with Voter Information Campaigns in Delhi”

Milestone 7

A progress report, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of USAID Development Innovation Ventures Grant No. AID-OAA-G-12-00006

September 30, 2013
JPAL South Asia at IFMR



Summary of activities since the last report

Since the last milestone (Milestone 6, dated March 15, 2013), the following activities have taken place:

Data Cleaning and Analysis

Over the past several months we have done extensive data cleaning, which has led to some significant revisions in our results. We have focused our efforts on integrating the audit and newspaper treatment results in order to examine what we see as two pathways for change in public goods provision: pure incentives for politicians to change performance due to expected reward or punishment in electoral contests, and direct citizen and civil society pressure for specific projects. We have attached the Milestone 7 deliverable (the updated Milestone 6 Deliverable--Final Report with preliminary data) with these new results.

The extent of Councillor activism is more muted than what we had been finding previously. The report cards increased churning – more toilets were closed and opened such that the total number of available toilets remained largely unchanged. There are no significant impacts on toilet infrastructure and prices charged. *Given the revised results and the weak impacts of public service audits, we decided it made little sense to conduct final revisits; instead we used budgetary resources for additional cleaning of the data and other aspects of wrapping up the field work.*

RWA Endline

In accordance with Milestone 7, we have successfully completed an RWA endline survey of the 751 RWAs in our sample with a 95% completion rate. The main reasons that the remaining 36 RWAs could not be contacted were: 1) no contact could be established/the RWA could not be located; 2) two IDs were assigned to the same RWA; 3) the RWA was not active/not a true RWA; and 4) refused. Data entry of this survey has been completed and the data has been cleaned.

While our recent efforts on analysis have focused on the audits and newspaper intervention we intend to analyze the RWA data shortly and this will be included in the Final Impact Evaluation Assessment.

Final Report with preliminary data

Please find attached the updated Final Report with preliminary data.