



Conflict-Sensitive Development Programming in Transitional Situations: Lessons from Water-Related Projects

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ACRONYMS

CBIWDM	Community-Based Initiatives for Water Demand Management
CBIWDM II	Community-Based Initiatives for Water Demand Management II
CLP	Community Livelihoods Project
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DNH	Do No Harm
LCD	Leadership and Community Development Project
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NWRA	Yemen National Water Resource Authority
TOR	terms of reference
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WRM	water resource management
WSSP	Water Supply and Sanitation Project

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the USAID/DCHA/CMM FY2012 Annual Program Statement (APS) for Technical Leadership, a Group W Inc research team conducted a study of water-related development operations in countries affected by the Arab Spring. The objective of the study was to generate lessons to improve conflict sensitivity of projects being implemented in locations affected by political transition. In northern Jordan in refugee host communities the study team examined: Community-Based Initiatives for Water Demand Management II Project (USAID) and the Leadership and Community Development in Jordan Project (UK Department for International Development), both of which are being implemented by Mercy Corps. In Yemen, the study team examined the Community Livelihoods Project (USAID), implemented by Creative Associates, and the Yemen Water Sector Support Program (World Bank).

Challenges in Transitional Contexts

Political transitions generate a myriad of challenges to water user access and governance. As water insecurity can easily escalate tensions under tenuous circumstances, development programming that addresses water governance and access issues can be a critical entry point for conflict mitigation. The research tapped practitioners' tacit knowledge to identify practical challenges and recommendations for improving the conflict sensitivity of projects in transitional environments.

Practitioners cited these ***ten challenges to promoting good water governance*** in transitional environments: (i) strained citizen-government relations; (ii) political and social power struggles; (iii) weak water regulation; (iv) poor operations and maintenance; (v) cost inflation; (vi) unsustainable user behavior; (vii) looting and vandalism; (viii) displacement and migration; (ix) aid economy; and (x) stalled investments.

Practitioners also identified ***six issues with donor practices***: (a) "Do No Harm" remains more a philosophy than a practice; (b) short-term stabilization objectives take priority over future development; (c) pilot efforts lack a long-term view; (d) host community needs are overlooked; (e) donor branding overshadows host government image building; (f) women's initiatives are marginalized by other strategic priorities.

Lessons and Recommendations to Improve Conflict-Sensitivity

Implementers need "Do No Harm" (DNH) training and resources. USAID needs to instantiate standards for implementers by outlining these in agreements, requiring appropriate training, and recommending resources and electronically available guidance.

Donor branding should not obscure credit due to the host government. Projects in transitional contexts often have two objectives: (1) improve local perceptions of the donor government through branding and (2) promoting stability by building host government legitimacy. However, efforts for the former can preempt outcomes of the latter.

Measurements of conflict and violence should be incorporated into project plans as early as possible. By incorporating conflict analysis and measurements of peacebuilding into templates for baseline assessments, local project proposals and micro-finance applications, implementing partners build a road map to implement conflict-sensitive development projects. This up-front work also lays the groundwork for monitoring and evaluating conflict impacts of project activities.

Monitoring and evaluation should be used strategically to improve project conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding. Adding conflict-related questions to performance baselines and evaluation questionnaires is a low-cost investment that yields valuable information about how projects interact with conflict dynamics. Donors and implementers can then apply findings to investments and implementation approaches. So it is not overlooked, implementers emphasized this M&E approach *must be specified in the terms of reference*.

Perceptions of exclusion should be managed when conducting pilot projects. When conducting pilot projects, implementers need to consider how competition can develop if non-beneficiaries perceive exclusion. Stakeholder communications should inform the whole public of the rationale for a pilot location, and consequently those *not included* should understand how they can benefit from the model and future development opportunities.

Governments should use data on local water conflicts to improve water management and services. Local systems for reporting and documenting violence over water (e.g., through police) can be used by regulatory authorities and service providers to inform their activities, which can be purposefully designed to mitigate conflict and promote stability.

Conflict training can improve community-driven implementation. Conflict training should not be pigeonholed simply as “mediation and facilitation” or “conflict analysis”. Trainees can augment their abilities to assess and discuss needs of their own and their fellow stakeholders. This improves local investment and builds stronger community bonds.

Aid strategies in situations involving displaced persons should address host community needs. Displaced persons receive more aid than their hosts, however host communities also experience economic and social hardships that are further compounded by new arrivals. Aid to host communities reduces their frustration with lopsided aid and mitigates violence.

Short-term employment should segue to less water-intensive livelihoods. To promote future stability, short-term employment opportunities (e.g., cash-for-work) should be integrated into long-term livelihoods strategies. And where water scarcity fuels conflict, job creation strategies need to incentivize growth of less water intensive livelihoods over time.

Competition over local financing should be monitored. During water crisis, competition for local water infrastructure and services financing can increase. If financing programs are locally administered implementers need to monitor for conflict escalation or violence.

Aid should capitalize on local willingness to try new technologies. In critical times of need, stakeholders can be open to new methods for resolving water insecurities. Models of new technology can lay the groundwork for early adoption of it.

Awareness campaigns should prevent the looting and vandalizing of aid supplies. Strategic communications about aid supplies and distribution procedures can be critical to reducing the risk of violence between beneficiaries and damage to aid supplies.

Environmental education should promote risk awareness and improved water user behavior. Citizens may resist efficiency improvements if they are not aware of the environmental and conflict risks. Coupling public environmental education with water investments is a low-cost solution to build citizen support for better resource management.

Customs and border control policy issues can be incorporated into water development strategies. When equipment imports, such as drills and pumps, drive water insecurity, donor strategies can expand to support customs reform and border enforcement activities.

INTRODUCTION

During political transitions, which can be highly insecure and dynamic environments, development programs can strategically contribute to stabilization and peacebuilding. Political transition can bring a sense of insecurity, and in the midst of this, uncertain access to water can increase the propensity for conflict and violence. However, effectively designed and implemented development initiatives can mitigate conflict risks. This study provides practitioners with key lessons and actionable recommendations to improve the conflict-sensitivity of water-related projects in transitional environments. This analysis examines development projects in Yemen and Jordan, two countries that have been affected by the Arab Spring in different ways, and synthesizes real-world guidance from practitioners operating in these complex situations.

Conceptual Framework

The study team derived lessons and recommendations by examining project documents and conducting interviews and workshops with donor staff, project implementers and project beneficiaries. The study team used the Conflict-Sensitive Project Conceptual Framework (Figure 1) as a guide to identify (i) **challenges** that risk causing or exacerbating conflict in transitional environments, (ii) **conflict mitigating activities** of projects, and (iii) **conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding outcomes**. What are the challenges when operating in transitional environments and how do they risk causing conflict escalation? How can those challenges be managed within a project? How can peacebuilding outcomes from these project initiatives be assessed? This candid exploration documents practitioners' lessons and recommendations to improve future water-related projects. And while the project case studies all relate to water, *many of these challenges are not unique to water sector programming*. These real-world examples yield transferable lessons for initiatives in a variety of sectors in fragile and conflict-affected countries around the world, and they reveal opportunities for programs in transitional environments to be as conflict sensitive as possible.

Paper Contents

Challenges in Transitional Contexts

This section summarizes challenges that practitioners and beneficiaries found common, frequent or significant when projects were implemented in these transitional contexts. "What are you glad you knew or what do you wish you knew before you did this project?" is the overarching question interviewees considered when reviewing challenges in managing conflict risks in these operating conditions.

Lessons and Recommendations for Mitigating Conflict

This section reviews recommendations and lessons for designing and implementing water-related projects in transitional situations. Practitioners who participated in the research considered: "What would you advise future projects to do to improve their conflict sensitivity?" These adaptable and transferable suggestions from interviews and project reports are extrapolated from practitioners' tacit knowledge and field experience.




FIGURE 1: Conceptual Framework for Building Conflict-Sensitive Projects

Case Studies

Water-related conflict is not a stand-alone issue in transitional environments, but rather it is part of a system of uncertainty and tension that manifests practical challenges for development projects. The study examined four ongoing projects in Yemen and Jordan; though very different, many of the lessons and recommendations span across these two transitional contexts. In Yemen water is a major social, economic and political issue of contention. One interviewee alleged: “killing over water is bigger than killing due to terrorism.”¹ Several interviewees claimed that each year Yemen witnesses 4,000 deaths due to armed conflict over water.² Poor water governance and weak rule-of-law, particularly in rural areas, which comprise more than 70% of the Yemeni landscape, increase the magnitude of this problem. The collapse of the Saleh regime during the 2011 revolution and the political transition that followed have compounded water governance challenges.

Jordan presents different but equally concerning dilemmas. The northern border region is struggling with the consequences of Syria’s bloody struggle for a political transition. Refugee inflows are pressuring the Jordanian economy, resources and host communities, and forcing governance systems to transition and respond to uncertainty and insecurity. Overstretched systems and unaffordable water supply are legitimate household concerns.

¹ Interview with Yemeni national government official, Sana’a, 5 May 2013.

² Interview with Yemeni national government officials, Sana’a, 5 and 8 May 2013.

Consequently, water is becoming a locus for violent confrontation between aggrieved refugees and their hosts.³

Yemen Projects

World Bank Water Sector Support Program (WSSP): Launched in 2009, this project supports the Government's implementation of the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP) to strengthen institutions for sustainable water resources management, increase access to water supply and sanitation services, improve water use in agriculture, and stabilize and reduce groundwater abstraction.

USAID Community Livelihoods Project (CLP): Launched in 2010, this multi-sectoral initiative – including agriculture and health activities – is intended to mitigate the drivers of instability in some of Yemen's most difficult areas by facilitating quality basic services, job creation and economic opportunities, responsive local governance and civic participation.

Jordan Projects

USAID Community Based Initiatives for Water Demand Management II (CBIWDM II): Launched in 2013, this project focuses on refugee host communities in northern Jordan to improve water use efficiency, demand management and conservation through improved infrastructure and citizen participation. CBIWDM II is a second-phase extension of CBIWDM, a successful 7-year project that was conducted nationwide.

U.K. Department for International Development Leadership and Community Development Project (LCD): Launched in 2013, this multi-sectoral project provides technical and financial support – including conflict management training, community dialogue and small infrastructure grants – to community initiatives that minimize or alleviate tensions between Jordanians and Syrian refugees. *In communities where both CBIWDM II and LCD are under implementation, they combine efforts to provide conflict training and community dialogue.*

USAID/DCHA/CMM FY2012 Annual Program Statement for Technical Leadership

The study was funded through the USAID/DCHA/CMM FY2012 Annual Program Statement (APS) for Technical Leadership. The USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) leads USAID's efforts to identify, analyze, and address the causes and consequences of conflict and instability, and to ensure development programs are sensitive to these dynamics. A core component of DCHA/CMM's programming is devoted to advancing applied research in topics pertinent to conflict, security, and development in order to improve the quality of development programming and policy-making. These research and learning efforts are referred to as the *Technical Leadership* agenda.

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³ Mercy Corps 2013: Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan, 3.

USAID headquarters and country missions, World Bank, Mercy Corps – Jordan and Creative Associates. Comments, questions, and requests for additional information should be directed to Sandra Ruckstuhl, Group W Inc (sruckstuhl@groupw.com).

CHALLENGES IN TRANSITIONAL CONTEXTS

As experienced practitioners know, development operations are very complex in a situation where the host country is undergoing political transition. In the case of the Arab Spring revolutions, countries across the Middle East and North Africa saw their populaces take to the streets and demand change in their governments – seeking more democratic systems that would bring more effective citizen engagement. In this process, reform brought aggrieved voices to the forefront, broadcasting and escalating sentiments that governance regimes were inefficient, inequitable and unfair in delivering benefits to citizens. As the longstanding governments of these countries were challenged by protests and violence, these institutions and their policies were forced to change.

And yet change did not stop within the borders of any one country. Spillover is a common theme we often associate with Arab Spring events. Early Arab Spring protests in Tunisia and Egypt inspired change across the region. And in some cases, where violence has led to massive destruction and refugees, spillover has fostered grievances and newer challenges in neighboring countries – as the Syrian War demonstrates. As lawlessness breeds physical insecurity and governance systems break down, civil society is continuing to find ways to cope. These circumstances affect a variety of sectors, including water management and service delivery. Development interventions can be part of a strategy to foster stabilization and peacebuilding.

In the transitional contexts of Arab Spring Yemen and Jordan, water governance has faced a myriad of challenges. Research of project experiences, as outlined below, reveals several issues that have contributed to interruptions in water access. During the course of our study, donors, project implementers and beneficiaries highlighted those they felt deserve considerations when designing and implementing future water projects in transitional situations. These project challenges described below are not mutually exclusive; they are overlapping and reinforcing. And many of these challenges are not unique to water sector programming. Water is an input into a range of social and economic activities that development agencies support through other sectors, such as health, agriculture and education. Practitioners from the four case study projects considered: “What are you glad you knew or what do you wish you knew before you did this project?” Their observations are summarized below.

Challenges to Good Water Governance

Strained citizen-government relations are an inherent element of transition. A primary cause of political transition, as has been witnessed during the Arab Spring, and consequent challenge to new governance regimes, is the perception of institutional illegitimacy. In Yemen, where national authorities have historically been challenged, local traditional leadership has historically exercised authority over water resources in many locations, and intervention by national authorities is perceived negatively, and even invasive or hostile. Events of the Arab Spring have reinforced these entrenched civil systems of resistance to

central authority. As one interviewee in Yemen aptly stated: “With the revolution there is no government. So who will bring us our rights? We will. We cannot trust them [the government] to do anything for us. We have to take care of ourselves.”⁴

In Jordan, prior to the Syrian crisis many northern communities perceived an ineffective and corrupt national government, as impoverished households experienced poor access to public services such as water. And the arrival of Syrian refugees worsened water supply issues. For example, between 2011 and 2013 the population of the city of Mafraq doubled, which meant that per capita water supply declined even further, as an already strained system was suddenly pushed to provide for a larger population. In turn, satisfaction with government services further deteriorated.⁵

As governance systems experience pressure and uncertainty, rivalries and power struggles can increase. In Yemen, one project beneficiary explained: “Sheikhs [tribal leaders] make demands of donors without considering upstream/downstream water rights. Sometimes sheiks strategically purchase land upstream, and they build walls to stop flow so that the people downstream in the valley will not get water flows. Then they can get all the economic benefit – like from growing and selling qat or bananas.”⁶ Further complicating these dynamics in Yemen, tribal boundaries span across administrative boundaries in basins such as Sana’a and Amran. In other cases, especially in the context of weak governance during transition, a tribal leader might drill his own well directly next to a public well, and directly compete with that well’s supply for his own benefit. Ultimately, access to scarce resources like water can become currency for power play in the midst of uncertainty, creating a myriad of challenges for implementing partners.⁷

Operations and maintenance (O&M) of water infrastructure can deteriorate, especially in locations of less strategic priority. Protests and violence across the Middle East and North Africa have damaged public and private infrastructure, including water infrastructure. As seen both in Yemen and in Jordan, when crisis hits and many communities request assistance, locations of lesser political or economic importance may be a lower priority for government and O&M service providers. As project managers described in Yemen, security issues limit movement of personnel, equipment and supplies. Infrastructure rehabilitation is often a local and international priority for stabilization and reconstruction, but the longer-term challenge is capacity building to support infrastructure operations and maintenance so that users can be more confident in water services and communities will be resilient to future emergencies.

As governments falter so can water regulation. As governments come under extreme pressure from their constituents, regulatory policies and institutions can fall by the wayside. This can enable the development of unregulated, unsustainable infrastructure, and consequently, over-extraction of water resources. Staff of the Yemen National Water Resource Agency explained that increased drilling and groundwater depletion: “will certainly lead to increased conflict.”⁸ Though officials reported there was progress regulating illegal drilling and water transfers prior to the 2011 revolution, these illegal

⁴ Interview with local Yemeni government official, Sana’a, 7 May 2013.

⁵ Mercy Corps 2013: Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan, 4.

⁶ Interview with former Yemeni national government official, Sana’a, 8 May 2013.

⁷ Lichtenthaler, Gerhard 2010: “Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen.” Middle East Report (MER), 3.

⁸ Interview with Yemen National Water Resource Agency staff, Sana’a, 7 May 2013.

activities took off again when the government collapsed.⁹ For two years prior to the 2011 crisis there had been a nationwide campaign to stop illegal drilling, and so when the government was ousted people saw an opportunity; “massive drilling” took place, as people deepened existing wells or drilled and concealed new wells in case the new government would reinstate regulations. And though there is a 200,000 Yemeni riyal penalty for drilling illegal wells, “if that was collected – and it has not been since the revolution – the well owner wouldn’t care. They are willing to pay up to 1 million riyals to keep that well because water is livelihood. Water is power.”¹⁰

In a different type of situation, host communities in Jordan complained of unsafe or inadequate access to water and electricity from public and private providers, as supply has been inadequate and distribution across the growing population has not been regulated. Jordanians argued that the Syrian refugee camps were receiving more water supply because of humanitarian appeals, and that “the power of humanitarian aid organizations’ dollars are more important [to governments] than fair regulation and distribution to everyone.”¹¹ Consequently, Jordanians claimed, water managers and service providers prioritize their short-term financial benefit by supplying water to refugees over long-term sustainable water management.

Prices for water, equipment and services can spike. Crisis conditions during transition drive up costs for a number of reasons, such as security regulations, long transportation routes and fuel shortages. Interviewees in Jordan explained, for example, that landlords do not need to guarantee a household connection for water supply in the rented unit, and that unconnected properties are often rented at a more competitive price.¹² In dire need of lower-cost housing, poor Jordanians and Syrian refugees move into these structures and rely on tankered water. Yet high demand for tankered water in camps and host communities has pushed water prices up, consequently breeding animosity between Syrians and Jordanians inside Jordan.

Rising input costs challenge service providers as well, as customers may be unable to pay – or worse – they may resist paying due to dissatisfaction. This was a common complaint in Yemen, where during the revolution services and infrastructure deteriorated and services became less and less functional. One interviewee reflected: “Pay for what? And even if someone did pay, how did you know your payment is going to the right place in that chaos?”¹³

Crisis can disrupt good water user behaviors. Practitioners and stakeholders emphasized that inefficiency is a root cause of water conflict. Inefficient practices, such as flood irrigation in Yemen, or damaged or clogged water conveyance systems in Jordan, are a focal issue for donors looking to create tangible peace dividends. However, water user behavior is equally as critical to improving efficiency. Yemen National Water Resource Agency staff reported: “People are complacent. Many have not yet felt the extreme environmental impacts of poor management. They think water will come from God. And during a crisis we do not have the capacity to educate them otherwise.”¹⁴

⁹ Interview with former Yemeni national government official, Sana’a, 8 May 2013.

¹⁰ Interview with local Yemeni government official, Sana’a, 8 May 2013.

¹¹ Interview with Jordanian officials, Ramtha, 6 October 2013.

¹² Workshop with community leaders, Mafraq, 9 October 2013.

¹³ Interview with former Yemeni national government official, Sana’a, 5 May 2013.

¹⁴ Interview with Yemen National Water Resource Agency, Sana’a, 7 May 2013.

Aid agencies breed aid economies. Humanitarian aid is provided during transition because of a genuine need to help stabilize those locations. However Jordan, in particular, reflects some of the negative and potentially *destabilizing* manifestations of an aid economy. For example, in Zaatari refugee camp aid organizations have been willing to pay tanker trucks double the regular price for a cubic meter of water, and in turn those private suppliers have imposed the higher price on customers outside the camp. However, those customers do not have the buying power. This is a fragile situation in host communities that were already struggling with poverty and deficient public services, which is now compounded by the economic strain of a refugee influx. The need for cash fuels black market profiteering from humanitarian supplies (e.g., resale of water vouchers and storage equipment). Consequently, interviewees described, higher prices and financial gain from aid supplies have bred negative perceptions and animosity among Jordanians and Syrian refugees.¹⁵

Communities come under stress when experiencing in-migration. Even under good circumstances, public systems and host communities can struggle to find the capacity to meet the needs of new residents, like refugees. However, demographic change can overtax municipalities, utilities and water systems, and contribute to competition and conflict among water users in host communities. In Jordan, for example, perceptions of “excessive” Syrian water use and a “Syrian” burden on water supply has led Jordanians to blame refugees for reductions in household water supplies. One project beneficiary explains, however: “Syrians became scapegoats for a problem that already existed in this area. Yes, the doubling of the population worsened our water problems, but we had problems to begin with.”¹⁶

Another challenge to planning development initiatives is the indefinite timeline for hosting mobile populations such as refugees. In the case of Jordan, host communities expressed concern about constructing water infrastructure (e.g., wells, networks) for Syrian refugees. One interviewee said: “making the living conditions positive for the refugees might mean they will never want to go home, like the Palestinians or Iraqis. They will stay here forever. And Jordan does not have the resources for that.”¹⁷ While short-term humanitarian aid such as vouchers causes problems, for this reason they are preferred over infrastructure investments.

Stopped investments can foster grievance and frustration. In different kinds of ways, crisis and political transition can interrupt development efforts that are underway. For example, a lack of disburseable funds, due to private investors’ or donors’ policies can also interrupt work. Some WSSP infrastructure development activities were either halted or were conducted on speculation.¹⁸ In a Yemen project one remote utility company stopped work with the contractor due to their political affiliation, and a new contractor had to be located, signed and equipped for the work.¹⁹ Regardless of the reason, when stakeholder

¹⁵ Interview with Jordanian community members, Ramtha area, 6 October 2013 and Mercy Corps 2013: Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan, 11.

¹⁶ Interview with Jordanian national government official, Amman, 3 October 2013.

¹⁷ Interview with Jordanian local government official, Amman, 6 October 2013

¹⁸ This challenge overlaps with the section “Donor Practices” and is a common business policy issue that requires discussion beyond the purview of this study.

¹⁹ Interview with local Yemeni government official, Sana’a, 9 May 2013.

expectations for a new investment are not met because construction or service is interrupted by transition-related events, this can foster frustration and damage perceptions of authorities that are involved in the efforts at a time when building legitimacy can be critical.

Insecurity and lawlessness can enable aid supply looting and vandalism. In unstable conditions, including transitional contexts, there is genuine concern about looting and vandalism. In some cases, local implementers may be concerned that such activities will be instigated by aggrieved civilians who feel excluded from aid initiatives or groups that disagree with the sponsor. For example, a water cistern financed by USAID and displaying the USAID logo might be deliberately damaged by an anti-American group. One local implementer in Yemen explained that conflicts that erupt locally over projects and aid supplies often go to local councils, who mediate and resolve those conflicts and then report back to the donor with requests for any changes to the project. For example, when a group of farmers disputes the location and operation of an irrigation canal the local council can negotiate a solution and present a revised design to the donor or implementing partner. The implementer explained: “Forty percent of the time these kinds of cases are quickly resolved because the solution is accepted by donors. But sixty percent of the time the solution is not accepted, and this can put the donor at risk. I can tell you about more than 20 cases that resulted in stolen project cars or kidnappings in relation to these types of disputes.”²⁰

Challenges to Donor Practices

“Do No Harm” may be more knowledge than practice. “Do No Harm” principles (see Box 1) for conducting development projects are highly relevant when working in unpredictable, volatile transitional contexts. However, many in-country interviewees, including implementing partners and especially community-level implementers, candidly admitted to having limited knowledge of these principles, and even fewer had plans and procedures for putting them into practice. In one case in Yemen, a local implementer changed the selection criteria for distributing silver water filters; according to his activity plan the poorest families of a particular community were to be the targeted beneficiaries. The local implementer, however, changed the implementation plan and distributed to students with the highest scores in school. While this may have been conceived as an incentive for student performance, in reality it turned out that high performing students came from “better off” households. This fostered grievance and frustration among poorer households whose children were not high performers in school; these households felt the filter distribution method was unfair. “Donors need to develop practitioners’ awareness of their choices about distributing benefits. They need to help us understand how to connect development to peacebuilding.”²¹

Though some recognized the concepts of “Do No Harm” (DNH) once they were described, and they saw the value in them through the course of conversation, none could cite training activities or educational materials that had been provided to inform them of such policies or practices. Community-driven implementation methods may seem prudent for stakeholder inclusion and contextual tailoring, however indirect implementation challenges supervision

²⁰ Interview with local stakeholder, Sana’a, 6 May 2013.

²¹ Interview with implementing partners, Sana’a, 4 May 2013.

of “do no harm” approaches. For example, community-driven development projects like CBIWDM and CLP work with municipal authorities and community-based organizations. Stakeholders from these projects asserted that building “do no harm” knowledge and capacity is necessary to ensure implementation by local partners is truly conflict-sensitive.

BOX 1: Conflict Sensitivity and “Do No Harm”

Together, “conflict sensitivity” and the “Do No Harm” approach require a practitioner to:

- Understand the context in which s/he is operating. In particular, to understand intergroup tensions and the “divisive” issues with a potential for conflict, as well as the “connecting” issues with the potential to mitigate conflict and strengthen social cohesion;
- Understand the interaction between the intervention and the context; and
- Act upon that understanding, in order to avoid unintentionally feeding into further division and to maximize the potential contribution to strengthen social cohesion and peace.

Why is conflict-sensitivity important?

Conflict sensitivity is fundamentally about making foreign assistance more sustainable, effective, and ethical. Organizations operating in a country context become part of that context. They interact with the conflict dynamics whether they intend to or not, creating new risks and opportunities for USAID, its partners, and the communities where they work. The idea behind conflict sensitive practice is to make practitioners more aware of the context, more self-aware and deliberate in their actions, and more strategic and responsible in the risks taken.

STEP 1: Understand the conflict context.

A systematic conflict assessment and rolling conflict analysis should help donors, implementers, and stakeholders understand the conflict dynamics: patterns of grievance and resilience, how key actors mobilize groups for peace or conflict, and which likely events could trigger violence or create openings to build peace. At a minimum, conflict analysis for conflict sensitivity requires basic knowledge about the dividing and connecting issues in a society as well as important actors pursuing conflict or peace. Where possible, analysis should be done in conjunction with local partners and updated during project implementation.

STEP 2: Understand interactions between the project and the conflict context.

What is the interaction between the identified key elements of conflict and fragility and key elements of the intervention itself? The three fields of observation include: (1) the project, (2) the partners and stakeholders, and (3) the organizational setup. Identify relevant factors in each of these categories which are either creating tensions or positively affecting the conflict context. This should include consideration of sequencing and how the intervention fits with other assistance activities (e.g., connecting humanitarian assistance and development interventions thoughtfully).

STEP 3: Adapt and make strategic choices.

There are always options and opportunities to be more conflict sensitive. Project, program,

and management decisions should be taken on the basis of conflict analysis. Be prepared to admit mistakes and make changes — donors and beneficiaries will be appreciative. Remember that conflict sensitivity is as much about HOW you work as WHAT you do; it is possible to modify a project while keeping the goals the same. Making reflective, strategic adaptations in operations and implementation should become part of the program management cycle.

Adapted from Swiss Peace: KOFF conflict sensitivity factsheet and CDA Collaborative “Do No Harm” Program Resources and Fact Sheet.

Quick-turn results and short-term stabilization strategies are only one part of the story.

In times of crisis and transition, emergency-oriented projects seek quick-turn results that build stability and boost stakeholder confidence in government. While activities like “cash for work” can generate short-term benefits, they do not guarantee long-term changes in public perceptions that support peacebuilding. As one donor affiliate explained, water resource management can be too long-term an investment, which can be perceived as incompatible with the donor’s near-term strategy.²² However, implementing partners in Yemen reinforced the linkages between WRM and long-term stability; they expressed serious concern that neglecting WRM altogether is counterproductive and will have enduring negative consequences, as “water scarcity is causing destabilization.”²³

Pilot efforts can be helpful for the near term, but not always for the long. In a quick-changing situation, such as a transitional context, pilot initiatives can be sensible, as they are small scale, testable, adaptable and less expensive to implement under tenuous circumstances. CLP piloted green house technology and CBIWDM piloted solar water heaters, for example, and in turn their popularity grew. However, communities engaged in pilot projects have also faced challenges: due to limited suppliers new technology can be expensive and spare parts and technical support specialists can be harder to get in an insecure environment. However, according to practitioners, the most concerning issue for conflict sensitivity is when neighboring communities who are not involved in the pilot feel excluded and aggrieved for not being selected to participate.²⁴

Refugee and IDP aid benefits only part of the population in a host community. As the world’s attention turns to a refugee or IDP crisis, so too do donor programs. In Jordan, for example, at the time of the research in 2013, international aid heavily targeted Syrian refugees over poor Jordanians in host communities. Sudden demographic changes such as refugee flows have strained services, affecting all residents of these communities. Refugee-focused aid has fostered grievance among Jordanians and has led to bullying of Syrian children in Jordanian schools, price gauging of refugees presumed to be receiving vouchers and subsidies, physical confrontation between Syrian and Jordanian families, and more.²⁵

Donor branding can overshadow host government image building. Both CBIWDM and CLP had the objective of improving civil-government relations by helping authorities demonstrate to the public what critical services, such as water, they can provide. At the

²² Interview with implementing partner, Sana’a, 11 May 2013.

²³ Workshop with implementing partners, Sana’a, 5 May 2013.

²⁴ Interview with implementing partner, Amman, 2 October 2013.

²⁵ A broad analysis of these dynamics is provided in: Mercy Corps 2013: Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan. Interviews with community leaders, beneficiaries and implementing staff reiterated these challenges.

same time, donors often have an additional objective to improve beneficiary's perceptions of the donor country. In both of these projects, for example, beneficiary community perceptions of USAID seemed to be generally positive, especially in communities where few donors were visibly active. The downside of donor branding, however, is that when less credit for success is attributed to government authorities a critical opportunity to build citizen-government relations is missed.²⁶

Women's involvement can be rendered to a box-check when other priorities prevail.

Transitional contexts can present the opportunity for reform, including with regard to gender policies and women's participation. Women's participation in the 2011 Yemen uprising and the plight of female-headed households in northern Jordan are reasons why donors have given attention to women's engagement in these locations. However, due to shortage of time and resources in emergency circumstances "gender" can be rendered a box-check exercise more than a strategic issue that involves analysis of gender-roles and impact assessment of gender-focused activities. In some projects this has fueled frustration among women who feel donors and implementing partners overpromise benefits to women, and they feel neglected when female-targeted activities are not thoroughly evaluated by donors.²⁷ In short, women's involvement in political transition can be a revolution in itself, and beneficiary women express that they need influential leaders, such as donor staff, to persist in championing their change (see Box 2 for more details).²⁸

BOX 2: Meeting Common Challenges Faced by Women and Girls

Project implementers and beneficiaries cited a range of challenges faced by women and girls in the Yemeni and Jordanian transitional contexts:

- Quantitative indicators are frequently used to measure women's inclusion in a project. Donors agree that training is a primary and feasible approach to improving women's and girls' awareness of water management issues. How many women and girls were trained in efficient irrigation? How many women and girls were trained in water safety, like boiling and chlorinating water? How many women and girls were provided chlorine tablets? The answers to these questions are helpful for monitoring output objectives, however the more significant indicator of success is impact.²⁹ Did the women retain the new knowledge and change their behavior when using water?
- In development projects that seek to contribute to stability, such as CLP and CBIWDM, "quick wins" are a priority. However, because women are often not seen as posing an immediate threat to stability, women may not be a priority target for the donor, and gender considerations may not be a primary objective. In these circumstances "field staff are encouraged to keep women as a priority", however reporting and supervision may not require any gender-focused indicators.³⁰ Beneficiaries agreed: women are critical to maintaining stability in communities. As housewives, for example, they are responsible for caring for and disciplining their youth – hence "keeping them off the streets, in school and out of trouble." So, any

²⁶ Interview with implementing partners, Sana'a, 4 May 2013 and Amman, 2 October 2013.

²⁷ Interview with implementing partners, Sana'a, 3 May 2013.

²⁸ Interview with beneficiaries, Ramtha area, 7 October 2013.

²⁹ Interview with implementing partner, Sana'a, 2 May 2013.

³⁰ Interview with implementing partner, Amman, 1 October 2013.

stability-focused project should consider how the benefits of the project could free up women's time to contribute to these types of stability-building activities.³¹

- In Yemen, donors have supported a large-scale effort to improve women's representation – from setting up women's offices in all ministries to allocating seats for women in water users associations. However, women and men alike admit these new "head counts" have had little or no impact on water governance. One female interviewee asserted: "We participated in the protests during the revolution, but women's rights were not a big issue for most of the men. We were fighting the old regime and not female discrimination." In sum, measuring a quota of female representation is not an indicator for success. The interviewee continued: "It is positive that the donors helped create these new positions. But now if they want to know they were successful then we need to measure changes in men's attitudes and behaviors toward these women's offices. Because until now we are insignificant to the male-dominated offices and we are still easily ignored."³²
- Northern Jordan hosts a growing number of female-headed households. Some refugee women and their children flee the violence in Syria, as the men stay behind to fight. Women can play an influential role educating household members on efficient water use. Syrian refugee women who head households are often held in high regard in their communities, and can be instrumental community educators about these issues.³³
- In parts of Yemen, women are important sources of agricultural labor, for example doing irrigation work for crop production. Even if they are unpaid, women are income generators – if not for their own household, then for someone else's benefit and income. If their water use efficiency is improved through training, saving farmers money to pump well water for irrigation, then that farmer could have spare cash to compensate the female workers.³⁴

LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATING CONFLICT

Implementers need "Do No Harm" (DNH) training and resources. Transitional situations may not be violent – but the uncertainty and insecurity that comes with transition risks triggering or escalating latent conflict. "There is no conflict now" and "conflict is not a part of this project" were common responses from some interviewees. Local implementers may be expected to uphold donors' "Do No Harm" principles (DNH), but they are rarely informed or educated on these principles and how to put them into practice. In sum, this means that if "it's not in the TORs", the project agreement or the M&E plan, then donors and implementers may miss critical project opportunities to prevent conflict from escalating.

To uphold DNH principles, USAID needs to initiate standards for implementers by outlining these in agreements, requiring USAID-supported training, and providing a public portal for guidance and practical resources. Some interviewees expressed the value of DNH, but

³¹ Interview with implementing partner, Amman, 1 October 2013.

³² Interview with Yemeni national government official, Sana'a, 6 May 2013.

³³ Workshop with community leaders, Mafraq, 9 October 2013.

³⁴ Interview with Yemeni local government official, Sana'a, 8 May 2013.

admitted to having limited knowledge about how to apply the concepts to their projects. Suggestions for building DNH capacity included:

- Require simple DNH training for all implementers. Primary contractors should be trained by USAID, and these organizations should then be required to provide training and resource materials to secondary contractors including local community implementers. Recommended training formats emphasized time-efficiency and worldwide feasibility: (1) low-tech and low time, like reading followed by a one-hour workshop, or (2) a donor-monitored online training course for the global student body and for those operating in insecure locations with restricted movement.
- Distribute the series of USAID conflict toolkits, such as the USAID Water and Conflict Toolkit, so that implementers can use those as conflict-sensitivity primers and technical guidance (<http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications>).
- Provide a template for field staff to do “on the fly” conflict sensitivity assessments. A one-page checklist of questions that the implementer can consider when doing site visits, for example, will facilitate proactive problem solving to prevent or resolve conflicts in the project location.

Donor branding should not eclipse efforts to build approval of the host government.

There is a delicate balance when implementing projects in transitional situations, as there can be a dual purpose for these initiatives: (1) donor branding to improve local perceptions of the donor government, and (2) promoting stability through peaceful government transition and improved legitimacy of government systems. For example, CLP and CBIWDM II sought to decrease local perceptions of insecurity and increase consumer confidence in public services. These were also heavily branded by USAID, and consequently beneficiary communities reported positive views of USAID and US donations. Though local government officials were involved in public events affiliated with these projects, the field research revealed that donor branding tended to turn beneficiaries’ attention to US intervention and credit for project outcomes – such as improved water supply or higher crop yields – was attributed to the US rather than the host government. Several officials commented on donor branding: “Because of this we are missing the opportunity to build citizen-government relations.”³⁵ Donors and implementers need to be careful to conduct strategic communications that address *all* objectives to improve citizen perceptions.

Measurements of conflict and violence should be incorporated into project plans as early as possible. Baseline assessments for water projects generally focus their measurements on basic measures of infrastructure capacity, service delivery, coverage and consumption patterns. Incorporating conflict analysis and measurements of peacebuilding, as CBIWDM II did, lays the groundwork for formative and summative evaluations. It also informs implementing partners of conflict considerations to keep in mind during implementation. Annex A provides a typology of peacebuilding outcomes that can be adapted for this purpose.

CBIWDM II also included questions about conflict management, resolution and prevention in loan and grant applications. Community financing applicants were required to complete

³⁵ Interview with implementing partners, Sana’a, 4 May 2013 and Amman, 2 October 2013.

a problem tree as part of the justification for their submission. The benefit of including questions, such as those bulleted below, on applications is that they require applicants and implementers to think proactively about preventing latent conflict escalation and resolving active conflict. The application can also provide baseline material for monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity of loans and grants over time. Applications questions could include:

- Has the community experienced conflict over water before? If so, please describe.
- Has the community experienced conflict over any development project before? If so, please describe.
- How does the project you propose *prevent* or *resolve* the types of conflicts described above?
- How do you plan to monitor conflict prevention during the implementation of your project? And after your project is implemented? What indicators will you use?

Monitoring and evaluation should be used strategically to improve project conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding. Donors and implementing partner staff commonly asserted the value and importance of evaluating conflict impacts. However, when asked about their own work on evaluating conflict impacts, they commonly said: “It is not in the terms of reference.” Independent evaluators of the Community Livelihoods Project were among those who explained that conflict was not included in their TORs. But, if conflict issues came up as they monitored and evaluated any of the project activities the evaluators noted these in the “Issues for Consideration” section of the report template. One CLP evaluator explained: “It would take no extra time to ask a question like ‘Has there been any conflict as a consequence of the project?’ That would be a marginal and a smart investment to include in the evaluation. It should be standard procedure to include, especially in a situation like this, and it should be included in the terms of reference.”³⁶ In summary: donors must require project implementers and external evaluators to include conflict and peacebuilding in their analysis. In an ideal situation, conflict and peacebuilding indicators would be tracked from project design to completion and beyond. This could include accounting of (1) latent or active conflicts that the project has identified, (2) conflict escalation as a consequence of the project – either between local stakeholders or between beneficiaries and implementers, (3) conflicts that the project resolved and (4) peacebuilding impacts of the project. Also, beneficiary satisfaction should be assessed and non-beneficiaries would be interviewed for their counter perspective.

Perceptions of exclusion need to be managed when conducting pilot projects. Where efficient irrigation technology and greenhouses, solar water heaters or wastewater reuse systems are modeled for on community, another community can feel neglected. One Yemeni official described road blockades in his province, where “excluded” communities demanded aid. CLP prevented conflict by promoting the idea to replicate models. One local official recommended that implementers should actively and sensitively communicate to communities the reasons why they are included (or not) and the ways that the “un-included” can capitalize on future development opportunities.³⁷

³⁶ Interview with evaluator, Sana’a, 8 May 2013.

³⁷ Interview with Jordanian local government official, Yemen, 8 October 2013.

Governments should use data on local water conflicts to improve water management and services. Strategically managing water conflict for the longer-term – or any social conflict for that matter – requires foremost that authorities be aware of these dynamics. For example, interviewees from the National Water Resource Authority in Yemen are transparent in their concern for growing conflict over water, especially in rural areas. One official emphasized: “There needs to be a process for reporting conflict over water so public authorities like us can address them systematically. Then we can strategically improve our response to conflict through regulation, public investment and so on.”³⁸ NWRA officials recommended that a system be established where citizens are encouraged to report violence over water – in urban areas to the police and in rural areas to the local sheikh – and in turn these authorities should transfer the reports up to NWRA. “Currently, grievances over water management often jump from the local level straight up to the ministerial level, and NWRA, the water regulator, is bypassed. We miss the opportunity to be aware and to respond to citizens’ problems. Only conflicts that span across governorate boundaries should be reported to the ministerial level. And still, we should be notified of these too so that we can fulfill our role managing water – and water conflict - better.”³⁹

Conflict training can improve community-driven implementation. Conflict training is not about ending violence – it is about improving problem solving. One Yemeni official said: “People do not talk about conflict because they do not want to open Pandora’s Box. And it is too hard to resolve issues of weak government.”⁴⁰ However, as CBIWDM II and LCD demonstrate, conflict training has broad purpose and should not be pigeonholed. A primary benefit of conflict training in these projects, as community members explained, was their improved ability to discuss community-members’ needs. Consequently, after building a common understanding of these needs, communities could more effectively build consensus on community grant investments for local infrastructure.

Aid strategies in situations involving displaced persons should also address host community needs. In the early stages of the Syrian refugee crisis in northern Jordan, host communities received limited support. Now, three years into the war, more attention is being paid to challenges faced by host countries and rising tensions between hosts and refugees. As seen in Jordan, assistance to overburdened host communities is a critical lesson for maintaining stability. Jordanians and Syrians both perceive that donor assistance to host communities, for example by improving water supply through CBIWDM II, helps to reduce anger, frustration and occasional violence toward refugees in host communities.⁴¹ In turn, it improves Jordanian-Syrian social and economic relations.

Short-term employment needs to segue to less water-intensive livelihoods. To improve stability during political transition some donors prioritize funding income-generating activities to jumpstart economic revitalization and support reconstruction. CLP coordinated urban waste removal cash-for-work programs after the revolution, and this helped to provide money to households in need while also benefiting storm drainage and groundwater recharge systems. However, for sustainable outcomes, beneficiaries asserted that short-term employment opportunities should be integrated into long-term livelihoods strategies. And in locations where water scarcity fuels grievance and conflict, job creation

³⁸ Interview with Yemen National Water Resource Agency staff, Sana’a, 7 May 2013.

³⁹ Interview with Yemen National Water Resource Agency staff, Sana’a, 7 May 2013.

⁴⁰ Interview with former Yemeni national government official, Sana’a, 6 May 2013.

⁴¹ USAID 2013: CBIWDM II Project Proposal, 1.

strategies should incentivize less water intensive livelihoods. For example, CLP is conducting activities to reduce qat production and build Yemen's coffee supply chain.

Competition over local financing should be monitored. Community-managed micro-financing mechanisms, like the community grants and revolving loans programs administered under LCD and CBIWDM II, are strategic methods for ensuring local needs and causes of instability are addressed. In the case of the community grants program under LCD, social cohesion grew as communities came together to determine priorities for investing grant money in local infrastructure.⁴² These micro-financing mechanisms can also help avert crisis. When a water crisis hit a village in northern Jordan, for example, the CBIWDM-sponsored revolving loan mechanism experienced a sudden increase in demand. Due to problems with the main line from Mafrq, the village was disconnected from the water supply network for two weeks. To manage this problem, village members depended on the CBIWDM-financed rainwater cistern of one community member. Due to the two-week crisis there was a spike in applications for loans to build cisterns, and now there is a queue of more than a dozen applicants-in-waiting. The loans are issued on a revolving basis: As one loan recipient pays off a loan another person waiting for a loan will receive it. Community culture and peer pressure encourages loan payback for the benefit of the next borrower, and the system seems to be working to the communities' relative satisfaction. However, if another water crisis were to hit, for example in a community experiencing extreme stress due to refugee hosting, then frustration could escalate into conflict. Beneficiaries reiterated the need for donors and implementing partners to manage escalation, and plan to use micro-financing tools strategically to mitigate such escalation.⁴³

Aid should capitalize on local willingness to try new technologies. Instability that is associated with transition can also bring a moment of ripeness when needy local communities are willing to try new technology to address their water problems. By modeling rainwater catchment systems and solar panels through CBIWDM II, for example, community members have witnessed the direct pay-off of these investments, and consequently more beneficiaries opt in. However, interviewees explained, beneficiaries need to be cautious about introducing new technologies that require technical support and special equipment that can be difficult to maintain or obtain in insecure situations (e.g., glass for solar panels). Hence, consider low-tech solutions where appropriate, such as simple household gray water reuse schemes.

Awareness campaigns can prevent looting and vandalization of aid supplies. Strategic communications can be critical to reducing the risk of violence and damage to aid supplies during instability. In Yemen, an implementing partner distributed silver water filters through schools in one district, which triggered armed confrontation between tribes. As beneficiaries arrived to collect their filters some demanded taking more than their allotment. To counter future risks of armed confrontation the implementer coordinated a pre-distribution public information campaign with local leadership to explain: what would be distributed, when and where, and how much to whom. Subsequently, local sheikhs convened community meetings to explain the distribution program, and to assert prohibition of (i) weapons use and (ii) looting during distribution. The sheikhs explained: "This will only deter the donors from working in our community and delivering aid again."

⁴² Workshop with community leaders, Ramtha area, 7 October 201 and United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) 2012: Conflict Pool Project Form, 3.

⁴³ Interview with community leaders, Zaatari area, 8 October 2013.

Because of the communities' needs and aid requirements during the crisis the beneficiaries determined to comply, and so the communications strategy was successful.⁴⁴ However, this also highlights implementers can prevent conflict escalation by maintaining DNH principles as they conduct outreach activities.

Environmental education should promote risk awareness and improved water user behavior. Conservation may not be a priority for water users when they are faced with insecurity and an uncertain future. In Yemen, water authorities argue that lack of local knowledge of scarcity is fueling the likelihood of increasingly violent water conflicts. And citizens often resist changes in usage and technology when they do not buy into the reason for such change. Wastewater treatment facilities are frequently objected to, as local stakeholders are concerned about health and safety issues. One Yemeni stakeholder advised improving water conservation through a two-part public education strategy: (1) *local situation* - build awareness and understanding of current conditions and causes of water resources scarcity, (2) *citizen action* - inform users of methods and benefits of managing scarce water.⁴⁵ Interviewees recommend coupling environmental awareness building with things like pilot initiatives that demonstrate new technology or novel methods for water management.

Customs and border control policy issues can be incorporated into water sector development strategies. In unstable transitional situations regulation can weaken, and consequently import/export markets can respond to opportunity. During the political transition in Yemen, illegal well drilling surged and became an even more extreme problem. This was agitated in part by the fact that the import of drilling equipment was unregulated, and some interviewees allege it grew in abundance during this period.⁴⁶ One government employee and NGO leader has spoken out on television and lobbied parliament to blockade the import of drilling equipment. He exclaimed: "There are no rules, no laws to stop people from doing what they are doing. And during the revolution and the transition there is no political will to make a change like this."⁴⁷ The official advised that customs and border control are supported by some donors, and he recommends that to tackle Yemen's impending water crisis the import of drills and pump equipment should be included as a consideration in those programs.

⁴⁴ Workshop with Yemeni local government officials, Sana'a, 8 May 2013.

⁴⁵ Interview with Yemeni national government official, Sana'a, 6 May 2013.

⁴⁶ Lichtenthaler, Gerhard 2010: "Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen." Middle East Report (MER), 3.

⁴⁷ Interview with former Yemeni national government official, Sana'a, 8 May 2013.

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ANNEX A: TYPES OF PEACEBUILDING ENABLERS IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

During transition, uncertainty and insecurity can sway parties to compete for influence and authority. Stability begins by growing relationships that can sustain collaboration for common benefit. Water, as an essential resource, can be a conduit for building social cohesion and facilitating highly visible changes in governance.

Interviewed donors and implementing partners complained that they do not have good monitoring and evaluation tools to assess conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding. They agreed that commonly used quantitative output indicators (e.g., number of people trained, number of meetings held) do not adequately survey the quality of stakeholder interaction. *Furthermore, they confirmed that engaging or convening stakeholders who may be in conflict is not peacebuilding. Rather, peacebuilding is what happens after that initial engagement.*

The typology below outlines nineteen different conditions, identified by interviewees and in project documents, which can enable peacebuilding. This list can be used to inform project peacebuilding objectives and to develop peacebuilding indicators for M&E plans. *In a follow-on activity, the study team is developing an M&E tool out of the peacebuilding outcomes typology. Contact Sandra Ruckstuhl for more information (sruckstuhl@groupw.com).*

The peacebuilding enablers listed below are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are overlapping and reinforcing. And though this typology was developed from a study of water-related projects, its utility is transferable to other development sectors.

Type of Peacebuilding Enabler	Sample Primary Questions (“Yes” can indicate the <i>occurrence</i> or the <i>opportunity</i> to enable peacebuilding through a project)
<p>Increased Awareness</p> <p>Stakeholders need to be aware of environmental management issues that can contribute to grievance and conflict. With this they begin to understand the need to collaborate for common benefit.</p>	<p><i>Attitude:</i> Do stakeholders understand the problem or the risk to water security? Do they perceive potential water insecurity? Do they understand the interdependent roles of water users with regard to maintaining water security?</p> <p><i>Behavior:</i> Are stakeholders building their awareness of water management and water use? Do they understand their individual roles in that system?</p>

Trust and Confidence

Once initial engagement occurs the parties can begin to build confidence in the project process, perceiving that it will meet expectations and will “do no harm” to their interests. Confidence also implies that members of a stakeholder group are somewhat satisfied with their role in the project. Confidence is associated with accountability and a sense of physical safety. Trust – in people, processes and data – is a deeper manifestation of *confidence*, which fosters a sense of security.

Attitude: Do stakeholders have confidence in the process of engaging with other stakeholders and potential adversaries? Do they have confidence that they can command respect during the process? Are they confident that the information they are receiving is accurate? On a deeper level, do they trust these things?

Behavior: Do stakeholders display their trust and confidence by engaging each other with respect? Do they communicate their confidence and trust? Do they promote trust and confidence in others?

Knowledge Sharing and Transparency

Policies and mechanisms for improved information sharing reinforce awareness building, confidence and trust, and essentially all other peacebuilding enablers. In the beginning, third parties (such as donors and implementing partners) are important information conduits, as they disseminate through websites and meetings. To ensure long-term peacebuilding, projects can instantiate good beneficiary habits for data sharing, information management and audience targeting.

Attitude: Do stakeholders value sharing data? Do they trust data that is shared?

Behavior: Do stakeholders voluntarily share information? Do they share it in ways that are accessible to target audiences? Do they seek information? Do they know where to find it? Have they recently improved the way they share information? Have they maintained good information sharing habits?

Reframed Relationships

As engagement challenges norms that determine social acceptability in connecting with adversaries, relationships can be reframed as more “normal” or “positive”.

Attitude: Do stakeholders perceive adversaries in a more positive way?

Behavior: Do stakeholders describe adversaries in more positive terms? Are stakeholders willing to collaborate with adversaries?

Opinion Expansion

As contact between previously adversarial stakeholder groups continues over the course of a project and circles of knowledge widen, the benefits of engagement and support of sustainable development principles should be perceived positively by a growing number of stakeholders.

Attitude: Has public opinion supporting sustainable water management expanded?

Behavior: Are stakeholders demonstrating their support through personal or public communications? Is growth up public opinion communicated by the media?

Environmental Stewardship Imperative

Several processes, such as knowledge development, learning and discussion around project plans, can build the sense that environmental sustainability is imperative to human security and conflict prevention.

Attitude: Do stakeholders value stewardship of the environment? Do they associate environmental stewardship with human security? Does the community perceive the need to “do better” at managing resources and improving environmental sustainability of their practices?

Behavior: Do stakeholders maintain habits to conserve and protect natural resources?

Priority for Cooperation

As the perception of individual benefit from environmental stewardship expands and the mutual benefits of cooperation are perceived, opportunities for sustained engagement and capacity to act in the collective interest are strengthened.

Attitude: Do stakeholders perceive mutual benefit in working together to manage water? Do they value cooperation? Do they think it is a priority, even if some might disagree?

Behavior: Are stakeholders motivated to cooperate with one another? Are they collaborating with each other? Do stakeholders choose cooperation over “self-benefiting” actions? Do they try to convince others of the importance of cooperation?

Initiated Superordinate Goal

Identifying a shared superordinate goal helps to build stakeholder relationships. And as those stakeholders operationalize that goal they shift from a process of visioning to a process of implementation.

Attitude: Do stakeholders representing different interests share a superordinate goal? Are they aware that they share it?

Behavior: Are stakeholders, representing different interest groups, working to achieve the superordinate goal?

Cross-Border, Representative Consultative Bodies

Projects establish consultative bodies to include a range of representative stakeholders. Most importantly for long-term impact, these groups need to maintain their engagement in the project and sustain their participatory and representative activities beyond the project’s conclusion.

Attitude: Do stakeholders value the consultative bodies? Do they value their own participation? Do they perceive the consultative bodies as fair and representative?

Behavior: Are stakeholders setting up consultative bodies (e.g., to improve sustainable water management across water user groups and associations)? Are they participating in them? Are they maintaining them? Are they maintaining a fair balance of power as these consultative bodies work?

Open Dialogue

Transparency and confidence support open, internally driven dialogue. In turn, the discussion of risks and opportunities can be established as normal and constructive. Furthermore, norms of openness can counter negative, virulent rumors about formerly adversarial groups and promote constructive debate.

Attitude: Do stakeholders see the value in engaging in open dialogue? Do they perceive it as constructive for building relationships, increasing environmental security and boosting sustainable development?

Behavior: Do stakeholders willfully engage in dialogue openly? Do they conduct themselves respectfully? Do they listen to contradictory opinions? Do they build on each other's ideas to develop alternatives?

Volunteerism

Motivated from within, rather than by third party requirements, volunteerism means individuals self-select and opt into cooperative processes, and they value and encourage representation.

Attitude: Are stakeholders self-motivated to participate in collaborative activities? Do they value representation?

Behavior: Do stakeholders seek out opportunities to collaborate? Do they encourage others to opt in? Do they sustain their engagement?

Champions

Stakeholders that perceive benefit from sustained engagement can rise as champions for the project process and the peacebuilding enablers that it employs. These champions can thereby take on a leadership role to uphold project standards and objectives – even in the face of controversy.

Attitude: Does someone feel the need to be a champion? Do they feel empowered to be a champion? Do stakeholders respect the champion? Do they perceive the champion as a legitimate example or a leader?

Behavior: Are stakeholders positively influenced by the champion? Do they act in support of the champion? Are they inspired to do things differently because of the champion?

Coalitions for Change

Champions can further their influence by building constituencies that support the project and its principles. These coalitions for change and cooperation can mark expanded multi-stakeholder support, including voluntary civil society engagement. Political will can indicate significant opportunity and affect policy change to institutionalize sustained engagement. Building political will can be constrained during the transitional period, but it is integral to long-term success.

Attitude: Is a champion willing or interested in building a coalition? Are stakeholders willing to support such a coalition? Do they perceive the coalition as being effective or having the potential to be effective?

Behavior: Are stakeholders building a coalition for positive change? Are they incorporating influential personalities? Are they incorporating government authorities?

More Equitable Distribution of Power

As consultative bodies are established and governance activities begin, a more equitable distribution of power should be established. However, equitability may not come naturally in unstable or transitional circumstances; third parties must play a role in addressing power imbalances when governance institutions are established or reformed in affiliation with a project.

Attitude: Do less powerful stakeholders perceive that they are empowered? Do they perceive that the opportunities and benefits afforded to them are equitable?

Behavior: Do powerful stakeholders empower the less powerful stakeholders to participate? Do they show respect for the needs of the less powerful? Do they act based on the recommendations of the less powerful? Do the less powerful stakeholders actively and constructively engage with the more powerful?

Written Agreements

Projects are generally established on some legal parameters and can result in written agreements - from local parties to international treaties - that formalize relationships between stakeholders.

Attitude: Is the agreement viewed as valid by the authorities and the public?

Behavior: Do stakeholders obey the agreement? Is rule of law exercised?

Experimentation

In uncertain transitional circumstances, small-scale experimental initiatives or “trial balloons” can test feasibility or public reaction to a project approach. When executed in a controlled fashion experiments can be used to manage conflict risks and to identify opportunities to expand peacebuilding efforts – thus improving conflict sensitivity.

Attitude: Do stakeholders view experimental activities as a way for finding potential solutions?

Behavior: Are stakeholders engaging in the experiment constructively? Are they working together to envision how the experiment can be improved or expanded?

Redemption

Redemption is when negative stakeholder perceptions changes to the positive, and consequently the social fabric that connects adversarial groups is rewoven. Redemption does not necessarily mean that history has been forgotten by the parties, but it does indicate that adversaries have redeemed themselves in the eyes of the other.

Attitude: Do stakeholders perceive they have made mistakes in the past? Do they feel the need for redemption?

Behavior: Are stakeholders making efforts to redeem their past mistakes?

Equitable Livelihood and Standard of Living Improvements

The peacebuilding enablers discussed above can directly and indirectly facilitate livelihood development, however to support long-term peacebuilding livelihoods opportunities must be equitable, preventing grievances between “haves” and “have nots”.

Attitude: Do stakeholders perceive that they have fair and equitable access to opportunities to improve their livelihoods and standard of living?

Behavior: Do stakeholders make efforts to improve equitability?