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ANALYTICAL SERVICES (EAS) PROJECT FOR THE  
REGIONAL PEACE AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS  
**BASELINE STUDY OF THE PEACE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT  
PHASE II (PDEV II) PROJECT**

FINAL REPORT

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AARC	Auto-Appreciation de la Résilience Communautaire (Self-evaluation of community resilience)
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BF	Burkina Faso
CAC	Community Action Committee
CAG	Content Advisory Group
CBO	Community Based Organization
CD	Country Director
CDD/Ghana	Center for Democratic Development in Ghana
CGD	Centre de Gouvernance Démocratique
CGG	Campaign for Good Governance – in Sierra Leone
CMAP	Community Monitoring and Assessment Process
COAT	Capacity Organizational Assistance Tool
COP	Chief of Party
CR	Community Reporter
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Counter-Violent Extremism
CYM	Community Youth Mapping
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DONG	Direction des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales
DREMS	Direction Régionale d’Enseignement Moyen et Supérieur
DQA	Data Quality Assessment
EA	Equal Access
EAS	Evaluation and Analytical Services Project

ETC	Entrepreneurial Training Course
FDC	Fondation de Développement Communautaire
FY	Fiscal Year
IP	Implementing Partner
IR	Intermediate Results
IRD	International Relief and Development
IREEP	Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy in Benin
LGCI	Local Government Capacity Index
LOE	Levels of Effort
LOP	Life of Project
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PDC	Plan de Développement Communautaire
PDEV	Peace through Development
PDev II	Peace through Development II
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
RF	Results Framework
RMT	Regional Management Team
RPGO	Regional Peace and Governance Office
SI	Salam Institute for Peace and Justice
SO	Strategic Objective
SOW	Scope of work
TMG	The Mitchell Group, Inc
UPitt	University of Pittsburgh
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/WA	Regional Mission of the United States Agency for International Development for West Africa in Accra, Ghana

VE	Violent Extremism
VTC	Vocational Training Center
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding – Regional Secretariat in Accra, Ghana
WARC	West Africa Research Center – in Senegal

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document is a baseline report of Peace through Development II (P-DEV II), a program funded by the United States Agency for International Development/West Africa (USAID/WA) whose main objective is to counter violent extremism in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The P-DEV II program has four strategic objectives with the main overarching goal of countering violent extremism: a) empower youth; b) increase moderate voices; c) increase the capacity of civil society; and d) strengthen local government. To advance these strategic objectives, P-DEV II concentrates its efforts on three more specific goals: 1) improve social cohesion; 2) increase resilience to violent extremism; and 3) improve youth outlook. The expectation of P-DEV II is that reaching these goals will build stronger communities and serve as a deterrent against violent extremism, extremist ideologies, and terrorist groups.

This report represents a baseline assessment of the P-DEV II program in relation to its strategic objectives and stated goals. More specifically, this report presents an initial comparison of “core” target zones (receiving all P-DEV II activities) and “non-core” target zones (receiving only P-DEV II radio programming) at the onset of the P-DEV II program in the three countries. In the long run, comparisons between core and non-core zones will allow identification of community-level differences that can be achieved through implementation of the full range of P-DEV II activities compared to communities that only receive the radio component of the program.

This document describes the study methodology, in particular questionnaire development, interviewer training, data collection procedures, and P-DEV II activity that took place in targeted communes prior to fieldwork. The survey instruments developed by IRD-InterMedia and the EAS team and the data collection on the field by the survey company TNS serve as the foundation for this baseline assessment. The EAS team designed a survey instrument that built on the instrument previously designed by IRD-InterMedia in order to improve and extend the work that had already been done. The EAS survey instrument also takes advantage of new tools available to researchers for capturing the attitudes of respondents faced with sensitive questions, such as those regarding support for the use of violence and sympathy for violent and extremist groups.

IRD-InterMedia and EAS conducted baseline surveys in “core” and “non-core” zones in the three countries between March and November of 2013. The IRD-InterMedia survey was conducted in 15 target zones in Chad, 20 target zones in Niger, and 13 target zones in Burkina Faso. The EAS survey was conducted in 15 target zones in Chad, 10 target zones in Niger, and 10 target zones in Burkina Faso. The two surveys covered 30 target zones in each of Chad and Niger and 23 target zones in Burkina Faso. Overall, 2,855 survey interviews were conducted in Chad, 2,710 in Niger, and 2,155 Burkina Faso.

The report describes data on demographics and baseline data on variables related to social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and improved youth outlook within core and non-core zones of Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Descriptions of the demographic composition of the countries in the analysis are made and, more specifically, of demographic differences between core and non-core communes in each country. Differences in social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and youth outlook between countries and between core and non-core communes within each country are also presented.

The report compares the findings from the baseline survey with those from a qualitative study consisting of 24 focus groups with key segments of the population and 31 interviews with religious leaders, local government officials, security personnel, and administrative officials. The qualitative data reveal insights into the priorities and perceptions of citizens in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and they also suggest ways to develop subsequent evaluation of P-DEV II activities.

The main results are as follows:

- Respondents in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso display some of theorized roots of violent extremism. In terms of social cohesion, the three countries fare relatively well. Similarly, the civic and economic outlook within the three countries is mostly positive. Nevertheless, each country maintains a base of support for violence as a way to solve problems and for the use of violence in the name of religion.
- For all countries and zone-types (with the exception of the non-core zones in Niger), at least a quarter of the sample professes to believe that violence is an effective way to

solve problems. Large majorities of respondents in Chad and Niger support implementation of Sharia Law, and in the case of Niger there is very wide support for very strict observance of the Law. Also, experimental evidence suggests that respondents in Chad and Niger were prone to follow the cues of an extremist group in making decisions about policy.

- Focus groups and interviews shed light on the concerns of citizens in each of the three countries. Such concerns include low political efficacy, little connection between the government and the people, high drug use among youths, and youth-related violence. The focus groups also highlighted a number of avenues for further research in subsequent evaluations, including additional attention paid to follow-up activities, more emphasis on violence as a means of solving practical problems or local conflicts unrelated to extremist ideologies, and the inclusion of traditional institutions along with governmental institutions.
- There is little evidence of consistent differences between core and non-core zones in all three countries. Results vary a great deal among indicators, and the direction of the effect is often inconsistent between countries.
- One important limitation of these analyses is that some P-DEV II programming had already taken place in many core zones prior to data collection. Some core communes had experienced up to 14 activities whereas other core communes had not yet begun their planned programming. The results reported here may therefore include whatever “early program” effects the P-DEV II interventions had on their target populations. It was not possible to fully disentangle these effects from true baseline differences between core and non-core zones, but exploratory analyses conducted in Chad and Niger indicate that early P-Dev II activities had limited impacts on program goals. More comprehensive longitudinal impact analyses of PDEV-II interventions will be conducted after mid-term and endline survey data are collected.



## I. INTRODUCTION

This report represents a baseline assessment of the Peace through Development (P-DEV II) program in relation to its strategic objectives and stated goals regarding individual and community resilience against violent extremism and extremist ideologies in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In 2013, two surveys in each country were conducted, one by IRD, the implementing P-DEV II organization, in conjunction with InterMedia, and the other by the Evaluation and Analytic Support (EAS) evaluation team.<sup>1</sup> The surveys were conducted in both “core” and “non-core” zones in the three countries. “Core” zones are those P-DEV II areas that have been designated by IRD and USAID for exposure to the full array of P-DEV II activities, while “non-core zones” are those P-DEV II areas that are receiving or expected to receive only the program’s media treatments, primarily radio programming related to good governance and countering extremism among youth. The distinction between core and non-core zones was made at the outset of P-DEV II through an extensive process of community self-assessment and assessments by IRD and USAID personnel, and was based in large part on the degree to which the zones were assessed as being susceptible to extremist violence.

The eventual goal of the University of Pittsburgh EAS Impact Evaluation of the P-DEV II program will be to assess program impact by comparing changes in indicators related to the program’s strategic objectives and goal-level indicators in the core and non-core zones --taking into account differences in the social, economic and demographic make-up of the zones – once mid- and end line data are collected in subsequent years. The baseline surveys results described in this report thus provide important information about differences that may exist between core and non-core zones in the relatively early stages of the program’s roll-out. The results here also provide important information about the overall social and political context within which P-DEV II activities are taking place in each country, and about the extent to which individuals and communities in zones where P-DEV II is active in general are vulnerable to extremist violence,

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<sup>1</sup> The EAS evaluation team is comprised of The Mitchell Group and The University of Pittsburgh.

support extremist ideologies and/or display potentially worrisome levels of social cohesion and negative outlook among youth.

The report is structured as follows. In the remainder of this section, we describe the P-DEV II program along with its stated goals and provide a brief overview of the literature on violent extremism. Next, in Section II, we discuss the methodology of this study including questionnaire development, sampling strategy, and data collection procedures. Section III presents the results of baseline analysis and outlines the next steps to be taken for assessing the overall impact of the P-DEV II program. Section IV concludes and discusses the implications of the baseline analysis.

#### A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PEACE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT (P-DEV II) PROGRAM

The Peace through Development II (P-DEV II) program is a multi-year development program whose main objective is to counter extremist violence and adherence to extremist ideologies in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. P-DEV II is the largest United States Agency for International Development/West Africa (USAID/WA)-funded program specifically designed for this purpose. P-DEV II activities are organized and structured to maximize the impact of the program in achieving its purpose. Under the overarching framework of countering violent extremism (CVE) through social and political development, P-DEV II has four multi-faceted, strategic objectives (SO):

**SO 1: Youth More Empowered** through expanded livelihoods, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic education, capacity building for youth associations, and leadership training to increase participation in local decision making by young men and women;

**SO 2: Moderate Voices Increased** through integrated radio, social media, civic education, and conflict resolution activities, enhanced quality and credible information, and positive dialogue;

**SO 3: Civil Society Capacity Increased** through formal and informal training, strengthened advocacy skills, citizen-led accountability initiatives and issue-based campaigns integrated with radio and social media and enhanced through civil society organizations (CSO) coalitions and networks;

**SO 4: Local Government Strengthened** through organized and enhanced community entities and CSO capacity, greater citizen participation, and training in public administration, transparency, advocacy, and government outreach, and integrated with radio and social media.

P-Dev II seeks to advance these four SO by concentrating its efforts on three more specific and measurable goals:

**Goal 1: Improvements in social cohesion** through generation of the norms and networks that enable collective action as measured through groups and networks, increased trust within networks and among strangers, increased social inclusion, and improved ability of communities to communicate among each other and with other communities.

**Goal 2: Resilience to violent extremism** through reduction of risk to vulnerable individuals who could become radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence by strengthening factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism. This includes attitudes toward violence and extremist ideologies, community leadership, social and political engagement.

**Goal 3: Improvements in youth outlook** through the individual and collective vision youth have of their futures, in outlooks on: economic outcomes, participation in civil society and local decision making, attitudes toward existing and potential conflict in their societies, and expectations regarding the education and learning environment.

The expectation is that furthering these goals would provide the foundation for communities that are more united by tolerance rather than extreme ideology, that are less likely to experience

extremist violence, and that provide a more promising future for its members. Taken together, the attainment of these goals would build stronger and more “resilient” communities, which would constitute a powerful deterrent against violent extremism, extremist ideologies, and support for terrorist groups.

## B. DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Research exploring the political, economic, and social sources of radicalism and extremist violence suggests that terrorism is not simply a direct consequence of religious affiliation or poverty. Rather, sympathy for radical ideologies, support for violent extremism, and vulnerability to mobilization by extremist groups is a function of complex relationships between individuals and their communities (Denoeux and Carter 2009; Piazza 2006).

The main drivers of violent extremism have socioeconomic, cultural, and political roots (Denoeux and Carter 2009). Although these drivers lead to violent extremism through distinct channels, the different mechanisms have some relationship to each other. Namely, extremist groups attract individuals who feel deprived of social, economic, cultural, and political opportunities by promoting themselves as a solution to inadequacies in the community. While not exhaustive, these sources of extremism have been addressed explicitly in the impact evaluation and academic literature and are among the most important targets of P-DEV II program interventions:

### SOCIAL DRIVERS

Socioeconomic deprivation is commonly identified as a key predictor of violent extremism (Denoeux and Carter 2009). In contrast with the vast majority of studies on terrorism and violence, the socioeconomic drivers of violent extremism, as they are described by USAID, are not directly related to poverty and resources. Instead, they refer to the complex social and economic relationship between individuals and their communities. Social drivers of violent extremism include: perceptions of social exclusion and marginality, social networks and group

dynamics, and societal discrimination. The argument is that perceived isolation or exclusion from the community can be a first step to extremist vulnerability.

Social isolation and alienation can indirectly trigger extremism through multiple channels. First, it increases the appeal of the extremist ideologies because they tend to reject mainstream society as corrupt or immoral. Second, social exclusion may prompt a desperate search for identity and purpose, increasing the likelihood that such individuals will find comfort in radical groups. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, isolation or social marginality leads like-minded, excluded individuals to form cliques that are hostile to the community that estranged them. In fact, statistical evidence suggests that terrorism is most likely in countries where majorities marginalize and exclude minorities (Satana et al. 2013).

#### ECONOMIC DRIVERS

Economic deprivation can directly and indirectly increase vulnerability to violent extremism. According to USAID (Denoeux and Carter 2009), the specific mechanisms through which economic drivers lead to extremism are: frustrated expectations and relative deprivation, unmet social and economic needs, and the proliferation of illegal economic activities. The implication is that individuals who feel that they cannot achieve the economic status they aspire to are more likely to seek help from radical groups to achieve such status. For instance, Bhavnani and Becker (2007) find that individuals with low socioeconomic opportunities—especially young and uneducated—are more susceptible to violent extremism.

For young and uneducated individuals, involvement in extremist groups can present itself as an opportunity for easy notoriety or respect and it may represent an attractive option for an unemployed, ambitious person. Alternatively, unoccupied young people may become engrossed in limited networks that in turn isolate them from new opportunities, positive experiences with diverse people, and fruitful alternatives that they might pursue. Therefore, it is critical to provide people with ample opportunities to succeed and leave little reason for them to believe they are obligated to follow a violent trajectory (Peters 2012).

## CULTURAL DRIVERS

The cultural roots of violent extremism are closely related to tolerance of difference and perceived threat. USAID defines the specific cultural drivers as: the perception of Islam as being under siege, broader cultural threats, and proactive religious agendas (Denoeux and Carter 2009). When individuals perceive their identities and beliefs to be under attack, they become radical in their own beliefs and less tolerant of moderate voices. Radicalized ideologies are by definition intolerant of other views and they manifest themselves in many ways such as the proactive searching and accessing of jihadi and extremist political views, demonstrated preparedness to use or advocate the use of violence, justification of killings, dehumanization of potential victims, religiously motivated participation in overseas conflicts, and credible expressions of desires to kill and for martyrdom (Kebbell and Porter 2012).

Research shows that individuals who associate certain superordinate beliefs with their personal identity are prone to radicalism. Kebbell and Porter (2012) argue that these beliefs may include: 1) a non-Western identity; 2) the perception that Western international policies are belligerent; 3) the belief that domestic counterterrorism policies are dangerous to them personally as well as a threat to their communities; and 4) lack of positive experiences with or isolation from members of out-groups. Individuals with high levels of social integration and memberships in heterogeneous organizations—including religious organizations—are more likely to reject the belief that political violence is justified and less likely to report participating in political violence in the past (Bhavnani and Becker 2007). By contrast, people who associate with narrow factions and isolated splinter-groups are more susceptible to extremism.

## POLITICAL DRIVERS

Finally, political roots, or perceptions of government illegitimacy, can fuel violent extremism and ideologies. Although many individuals in West Africa understand and support democratic government and democratic norms in principle, the incapacity of national and local officials to govern effectively may enable extremism, even if it does not cause extremist violence directly. On the one hand, this is due to ineffective or corrupted governmental institutions that are unable to detect, monitor, and target extremist groups. On the other hand, it is also possible

that weakly governed areas also foster passive support for extremists because residents have low expectations of the local government to provide services (Denoeux and Carter 2009). For instance, Kirwin and Cho (2009) show that individuals who are least satisfied with public service provisions and who are displeased with local governance are more likely to be attracted to violent extremism.

## II. METHODOLOGY

### A. STUDY DESIGN

This document reports on comparisons between core zones (encompassing *all* P-DEV II activities) and non-core zones (receiving *only* P-DEV II radio programming) in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Because all communities are evaluated using similar survey instruments in the early stages of the program, these comparisons help detect differences between core and non-core zones at the onset of P-DEV II activities. In the long run, comparisons between core and non-core zones will allow identification of community-level differences that can be achieved through implementation of the full range of the P-DEV II program activities compared to communities that only receive the radio component of the program. The report also provides a baseline assessment for some targeted demographics relative to others, such as youth vs. non-youth and male vs. female.

### B. QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT

Two survey instruments, one developed by IRD-InterMedia and the other by the EAS team serve as the foundation for this baseline assessment. The original survey was developed by IRD-InterMedia in consultation with USAID personnel, and served as the instrument for the first wave of interviews conducted in 24 core and 24 non-core zones in Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso in March-April 2013 (Chad and Niger) and September 2013 (Burkina Faso) (See IRD-InterMedia baseline report). The EAS evaluation team designed a second survey instrument that built on the one previously designed by IRD-InterMedia in order to improve and extend the work that had

already been done. Sixty-five percent of the items in the original IRD-InterMedia survey instrument were kept in order to combine information from both samples into a single data set that enhances the quality of the baseline assessment. In addition, the EAS survey includes several modified indicators based on innovative recent practices in social and political behavior research. For the most part, these new items originate from a variety of well-established surveys, including program evaluations in South Africa (Finkel and Stumbras 2000) and Rwanda (Paluck and Green 2009), and Afrobarometer, the largest public opinion project in Africa that spans up to 35 countries (Kirwin and Cho 2009).

The EAS team constructed a survey instrument that improved upon the original IRD-InterMedia survey in terms of comparability, reliability, and social desirability biases. This new survey combined the most powerful items from the original instrument with items that have been used in other comparable surveys in the region. The EAS survey instrument also takes advantage of new tools available to researchers for capturing the true feelings and attitudes of respondents faced with sensitive questions. These measures do not rely solely on respondent self-reports of attitudes and beliefs, and hence overcome much of the “social desirability” biases that can confound measures of sensitive items in the survey context, such as those regarding sympathy for violent and extremist groups and ideas, trust in local leaders, and antipathy towards women. The EAS survey instrument overcomes this problem through the addition of unobtrusive measures of support for violent extremism. Specifically, we included a “list experiment” to attempt to capture aggregate levels of support for terrorist actions which may involve the deaths of civilians, as well as an “endorsement experiment” to measure sympathy for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an extremist group operating in the Sahel region. The EAS survey was then implemented in the field in 16 core and 19 non-core zones in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso (See Table 1 below). Taken together, the questionnaires provide a large set of common questions used in both IRD-InterMedia and EAS data collections in the three countries, as well as a more restricted set of additional questions used only in the EAS data collection.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Copies of the English language EAS survey instrument can be found in Appendix VII.

## C. DATA COLLECTION

The section below describes the interviewer training, data collection timeline, and P-DEV II activity in each intervention zone prior to data collection. Both teams used the survey firm TNS, RMS to collect data during the baseline activity, which eliminated any biases that may have occurred through the use of different survey companies in the two sets of data collection. Data collection by IRD-InterMedia took place 6-8 months prior to data collection by the EAS team.<sup>3</sup>

### INTERVIEWER TRAINING

Interviewer training for EAS data collection was conducted in N'Djamena Chad from September 8-17, in Niamey, Niger from September 17-20, and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso from September 20-25, 2013. EAS Team Survey and Regional Specialist Social Scientist Dr. John McCauley conducted a three-day seminar in each country for all TNS field supervisors in order to familiarize them with the survey objectives, the experimental methodology and survey versions, and conduct practice sessions for administering the interviews. At this time, an oral review of the local language translations of the survey occurred in order to ensure accuracy. After the field supervisors were trained, regional training seminars were held for interview teams in each country. These took place in N'Djamena, Batha, Lac, Kanem and Barh El Gazal in Chad; Niamey and Maradi in Niger; and Ouagadougou, Ouahigouya, and Oursi in Burkina Faso. Due to a delay caused by problems with survey permission in Niger, Quality Control Specialist Adamou Hamadou oversaw a second set of training activities November 6-16 in Niger.

Piloting of questionnaires occurred following each seminar with all enumerators and field supervisors participating in the pilot in order to ensure the feasibility of administering the survey experiments and confirm questionnaire length. In N'Djamena and Ouagadougou Dr. McCauley oversaw the pilot, while Mr. Hamadou directed the activity in Niamey. This activity occurred September 12-13, 2013 in N'Djamena, and occurred on the 3<sup>rd</sup> day of each regional training

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<sup>3</sup> Data collection procedures for the IRD-InterMedia survey can be found in their baseline report p. 8-10.

seminar as they were conducted in the country. Piloting occurred September 26 in Ouagadougou, and November 9 in Niger, and took place on the 4<sup>th</sup> day of each regional training seminar. For the IRD data, training of field teams occurred in February for Chad and Niger and August for Burkina Faso. Intermedia Field Managers Abdinasir Abdi, David Kiarie, and Eman Eltigani, oversaw the four-day training seminars and piloting activities.

#### DATA COLLECTION TIMELINE

IRD-InterMedia went to the field for data collection in March 2013 for Chad and Niger, and in September 2013 for Burkina Faso. Emily Leroux-Routledge and Tim Cooper directed the data collection activities, and field managers included Mr. Abdi, Mr. Kiarie, and Mr. Eltigani (IRD-InterMedia P-DEV II baseline report).

The first interviews for the EAS team were conducted in Chad on September 16 and the field period lasted until November 16. In Burkina Faso the data collection began on September 30 and the field period lasted until October 12. Due to the delay in Niger, the first official interviews occurred on November 10 and the field period lasted until November 30. Dr. McCauley, Mr. Hamadou (Chad, Niger) and Mr. Kiarie (Burkina) conducted quality control activities during data collection. This included accompaniment of interviewers, visual inspection of questionnaires, ensuring that the survey versions were randomly distributed, interviewee debriefing, and discussions with field managers about problems that arose during data collection. Table 1 summarizes the data collection timeline, the number of sampled zones, and number of interviews conducted by country and zone.

**Table 1. IRD-InterMedia and EAS Data Collection**

Survey/Country		Date	Zones		# of Interviews	
			Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
IRD-InterMedia	Chad	March 2013	8	7	640	560
	Niger	March 2013	10	10	819	790
	Burkina Faso	September 2013	6	7	481	560
Total			24	24	1,940	1,910
EAS	Chad	Sept.-Oct. 2013	7	8	774	881
	Niger	November 2013	5	5	551	550
	Burkina Faso	Sept.-Oct. 2013	4	6	445	669

	Total	16	19	1,770	2,100
	<b>Total Interviews</b>			3,710	4,010

The IRD-InterMedia survey was conducted in 15 target zones (8 core, 7 non-core) in Chad, 20 target zones (10 core, 10 non-core) in Niger, and 13 target zones (7 core, 6 non-core) in Burkina Faso. The EAS survey was conducted in 15 target zones (7 core, 8 non-core) in Chad, 10 target zones (5 core, 5 non-core) in Niger, and 10 target zones (3 core, 7 non-core) in Burkina Faso. Overall, 30 target zones in Chad and Niger and 23 target zones in Burkina Faso were covered between the two surveys. The specific core (shaded) and non-core zones in each country included in the IRD-InterMedia and EAS data collections can be seen in Table 2 below.

**PRE-DATA COLLECTION P-DEV II ACTIVITY**

Table 2 identifies activities initiated by P-DEV II in each intervention zone, utilizing data from the activity trackers contained in IRD quarterly reports. The number of activities conducted is presented for the period *prior to data collection*. Though radio programming is ongoing in Niger and Chad and governance radio had begun in Burkina Faso by September 2013, the trackers do not account for this kind of programming.

**Table 2. Surveyed Communes and P-DEV II Activities**

Chad				Niger				Burkina Faso			
		Number of Interviews	P-DEV II Activities Prior to Data Collection			Number of Interviews	P-DEV II Activities Prior to Data Collection			Number of Interviews	P-DEV II Activities Prior to Data Collection
IRD	N'Djamena Commune 08	80	12	IRD	Agadez CU	82	11	IRD	Dori	80	9
	Mao	80	6		Niamey Arr. 5	80	10		Djibo	80	9
	Bol	80	4		Diffa	84	8		Gorom Gorom	80	9
	Moussoro	80	4		Tahoua Arr. II	80	6		Gourcy	80	9
	Ati	80	3		Maradi Arr. II	78	5		Arbinda	80	8
	N'Djamena Commune 10	80	3		Mainé Soroa	77	3		Ouagadougou Arr. 9	81	0
	Faya Largeau	80	1		Zinder Arr. II	80	3		Markoye	112	14
	Michemire	80	0		Arlit	84	1		Seytenga	110	13
EAS	N'Djamena Commune 07	114	7	EAS	Tchintabaraden	95	0	EAS	Ouahigouya	112	13
	Oum-Hadjer	110	2		Tillabéri	79	0		Ouagadougou Arr. 4	111	1
	Nokou	110	0		Niamey Arr. 4	110	10		Baraboulé	80	0
	Chadra	110	0		Zinder Arr. I	111	10		Deou	80	0
	Baga-Sola	110	0		Ballayara	110	7		Falagountou	80	0
	Ngouri	110	0		Bosso	110	7		Thiou	80	0
	Doum-Doum	110	0		Tessaoua	110	4		Tin-Akoff	80	0
IRD	N'Djamena Commune 03	80	0	IRD	Adarbissanat	79	1	EAS	Nassoumbou	80	0
	Djedda	80	0		Gamou	78	1		Bani	80	0
	Kangalam	80	0		Ingall	71	1		Boussou	111	0
	Kouloudia	80	0		Dan Barto	78	0		Oursi	112	0
	Koundjourou	80	0		Tamaské	80	0		Séguénéga	110	0
	Mandjoura	80	0		Doguéraroua	81	0		Gorgadji	112	0

	Mondo	80	0		Torodi	79	0		Tongomayel	112	0
EAS	Am Djamena	110	0	EAS	Bermo	80	0		Tougo	112	0
	Am Doback	110	0		Goudoumaria	84	0				
	Amsileb	110	0		Magaria	80	0				
	Melea	110	0		Mayahi	110	1				
	N'Djamena Commune 01	111	0		Tébaram	110	0				
	Ntiona	110	0		G. Roundji	110	0				
	Wadjigui	110	0		Matamaye	110	0				
	Yao	110	0		N'guigmi	110	0				

National-level activities, such as youth leadership training, community events held in all core zones, and the dissemination of Quranic school workshop manuals have increased in Niger and have decreased in Chad and Burkina since program rollout. In Niger, regional-level training activities for: radio operation, participatory theater, civil society organizations (CSOs), Community Action Councils, and local government officials have been held at the state level.

Commune-level activities are concentrated in the core zones, particularly Niamey Arrondissement 5, Agadez, Diffa, Maradi Arrondissement 3, and Tahoua Arrondissement 2 in Niger; N'Djamena Commune 8, Mao, and Bol, in Chad; and in Burkina, Gorom Gorom, Markoye, Dori, Djibo, and Gourcy. These included the provision of school support (supplies, textbooks), vocational training, peace and violence awareness campaigns, youth sporting events, CSO training events, and local radio training and programming. Several core zones had not yet held program activities, including Maradi Arrondissement III in Niger; and Nokou, Chadra, Baga-Sola, Ngouri, Doum-Doum in Chad.

Non-core zones have also received expected interventions such as: radio training (Adarbisannat, Mayahi, Tébaram), and local radio content production (Gamou, Mayahi, Tamaské, Torodi), and the rehabilitation of a local radio tower (Ingall). However, a few non-core zones have seen activities such as: youth leadership training (Adarbisannat), Community Action Council orientation (Mayahi), and a peace event (Filingué). By the time that the IRD or EAS surveys had

been conducted, no other commune-level activities had been initiated in the non-core zones of Chad and Burkina Faso.

These levels of pre-data collection program activity are important to keep in mind as the results of the surveys are presented in subsequent sections. The goal of the “baseline survey” to elicit information *before* any program activities take place was not possible, neither for the EAS survey which went into the field approximately a year after the program officially began, nor for the IRD-InterMedia survey that was fielded approximately six months earlier. These results may be contaminated to the extent that the early activities of the program indeed had important effects on their target populations and communities. Given the limitations of the data, we are unable to disentangle “baseline differences” from “early activity” effects with sufficient certainty, and this should be kept in mind as we present the results on these analyses. Appendix V provides an exploratory analysis that attempts to isolate early program impact in Chad and Niger, with the overall results suggesting some differences between communes that experienced PDEV-II activities and communes that did not. These effects, however, were not large and not in a particularly systematic positive or negative direction. Impact analyses will therefore be undertaken more comprehensively as follow-up waves of data are gathered at the project’s mid- and endlines, currently scheduled for 2015 and 2017.

#### **D. Qualitative Study**

To complement the quantitative study, we will analyze the results from a qualitative study that sought to examine the assumptions of the program evaluation through open-ended discussion with stakeholders. The qualitative study consists of focus groups and interviews in each country, and they cover a variety of themes related to the P-DEV II strategic objectives. The focus groups were conducted with specific populations in mind, such as youth or women, who were of particular interest to the P-DEV II program. A total of nine focus groups were conducted in Niger, nine in Burkina Faso, and six in Chad. In addition, interviews were conducted with select religious leaders, local government officials, security personnel, and administrative officials, with eight total interviews conducted in Niger and Burkina Faso respectively, and fifteen in Chad.

Training and supervision of focus group and interview research was led by Lead Qualitative Research and Analysis Specialist Sheldon Gellar in Burkina and Niger and Qualitative Research and Analysis Specialist Ezzeddine Moudoud in Chad. Training was conducted in November 2014 and data collection followed thereafter. In Burkina, training took place between November 18-23 and focus group and interviews were conducted between November 23 and December 14. Training in Niger took place between November 25-30 and focus groups and interviews were conducted between November 30 and December 29. Training in Chad took place between November 24 and November 30 and focus groups and interviews were conducted between November 29 and December 23. Each specialist conducted an intermediate qualitative report analyzing the focus group and interview data on their assigned countries. These reports can be found in Appendix VI.

### III. BASELINE DATA ANALYSIS

This section presents baseline data on demographics and variables related to social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and improved youth outlook within the targeted zones of Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. First, we describe the demographic composition of the countries in the analysis and, more specifically, the demographic differences between core and non-core communes in each country. We then present and evaluate baseline differences in social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and youth outlook between core and non-core communes. The majority of the analysis will pool the surveys conducted by IRD and the EAS team. For all items in common with both surveys, this allows for an increased sample size and improved generalizability.

#### A. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES OF P-DEV II ZONES IN CHAD, NIGER, AND BURKINA FASO

First, we present a basic demographic profile of the three countries under study (Table 3). Chad and Niger have a similar male/female respondent ratio, which slightly favors women. On the

other hand, two thirds of survey respondents in Burkina Faso are male. The proportion of youth (respondents between the ages of 15-30) is similar across the three countries. Overall, respondents in the three countries have low educational levels, with Burkina Faso being the least educated. Over half of all respondents are either illiterate or without any formal education. A small minority completed secondary education or beyond. All three countries are roughly similar in terms of religiosity. More than half of all respondents in each country report attending religious services six or seven days a week. Very small minorities only attend once or twice a week. Finally, all three countries are similarly poor.<sup>4</sup> More than 75% of all respondents in Chad and Burkina do not have any more than 3 items in the index, while Niger respondents tend to have somewhat more in terms of household items.

**Table 3. Demographics by country**

	<b>Chad</b>	<b>Niger</b>	<b>Burkina Faso</b>
Male (%)	45.3	45.8	66.3
Age	32.0	33.4	35.8
Youth (% ages 15-30)	57.2	48.8	43.0
Illiteracy (%)	34.6	29.9	43.9
Primary + (%)	28.9	35.4	20.2
Religious attendance (days per week)	5.1	5.2	5.1
Household items	2.9	3.7	2.4

In sum, respondents in the three countries are, on the basis of demographics, fairly comparable to one another. Particularly, the Chad and Niger samples are very similar on most demographic indicators with the exception of the number of household items. Respondents in Burkina Faso respondents are slightly different from those in Chad and Niger in at least three respects: the sample has a much larger male ratio, is far less educated, and is less wealthy according to the household item index.

## **B. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE BY CORE/NON-CORE ZONE**


In this section, we compare respondents in core zones to those from non-core zones within each country on these basic demographic indicators. Figure 1 shows that core and non-core zones in

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
<sup>4</sup> This was measured with information on the kinds of household items in the respondent's home. This survey instrument uses an index based on the items such as a fridge, TV, radio, and WC.

Chad have an even split between men and women, though the non-core zones have slightly larger proportion of females. Burkina Faso has a larger proportion of male respondents and Niger a larger proportion of female respondents, but differences between core and non-core zones within each country are negligible. Similarly, the core and non-core zones are nearly indistinguishable in terms of youth populations with the exception of Niger where core zones have a slightly larger proportion of youth (Figure 2).


**Figure 1. Percent female/male**



**Figure 2. Percent youth/non-youth**




**Figure 3. Educational attainment**



In terms of education, there are systematic differences between core and non-core zones in the three countries (Figure 3). Respondents in non-core zones are, on average, less educated than respondents in core zones. Non-core zones have a somewhat larger proportion of respondents with informal schooling, and core zones have slightly more respondents who have completed secondary school. In Burkina Faso, 74% of non-core zones respondents are either illiterate or have only informal schooling. In Chad and Niger, the proportions of respondents in non-core zones that are illiterate or with informal schooling are, respectively, 61% and 55%.


**Figure 4. Religiosity**



For religiosity, measured as attendance to religious services, there are almost no differences between core zones and non-core zones (Figure 4). In Chad, however, core zones tend to be slightly more religious: 63% report attending religious services 6-7 days per week compared to 52% in non-core zones.

Finally, non-core zones are consistently poorer than core zones in the three countries as measured by the household item index (Figure 5). In Chad, 85% of respondents in non-core zones report owning 0-3 household items compared to 67% in core zones. In Burkina Faso, almost 90% of non-core respondents own 0-3 household items compared to 75% in core zones.

**Figure 5. Household item index**



In sum, although there is some variation by country, core zones and non-core zones exhibit systematic differences in important demographic indicators. Core zones are, on average, more educated and slightly better off economically than non-core zones. These differences are important to take into account when analyzing baseline differences in goal-level indicators to the extent that these demographic factors are related to drivers of violent extremism. It is also the case that, at least in terms of levels of education and possession of household goods, it is *non-core zones* which appear at baseline to be more vulnerable to violent extremism than the core zones targeted by the P-DEV II program.

## C. BASELINE CORE/NON-CORE DIFFERENCES ON P-DEV II GOAL-LEVEL INDICES

This section presents an analysis of program goals (i.e., social cohesion, resilience against violent extremism, and youth outlook) as they stand in the early stages of the P-DEV II program. The goals are operationalized according to numerous indicators that, taken together, identify the main components of the program's strategic objectives.

Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we report each indicator in a descriptive way to best understand the distribution of respondents in core and non-core zones within each country. Next, we present statistical models to determine whether or not there are significant differences between respondents in core and non-core zones. This procedure involves regressing goal-level indicators on a dichotomous core/non-core zone indicator and the demographic variables discussed in the previous section. The tables below present an "unadjusted" model using only the core/non-core zone indicator as a regressor and then an "adjusted" model that controls for age, gender, education, religious attendance, and the household item index.

In the second table below, we report the marginal effects of being in a core zone (relative to a non-core zone) and the level of statistical significance in terms of  $p$ -values. Examining the marginal effect of being in a core zone allows us to show the differences between the core and non-core zones on the outcome indicators. We report both the "unadjusted" effect of being in a core zone on the outcome and the "adjusted" effect that accounts for the controls mentioned above.

The  $P$ -values shown in the tables below report a level of statistical significance for our estimates. The  $P$ -values of 10%, 5%, 1%, and .1% are thresholds that show how many times our estimates could have come about by chance, or through random sampling error. These are an indication of a confidence level that these differences are systematic and not due to random chance.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For example, a  $p$ -value of less than .05, the conventional level of statistical significance, indicates that the net differences found between core and non-core zones could have been come about by chance, or through random sampling error, only 5% of the time if there were no *true* or systematic differences between these types of zones.

## 1.Social Cohesion

Tables 4 through 9A present the baseline results for the series of questions related to Goal 1: Social Cohesion. Social cohesion is a broad concept that is captured through three separate indicators: 1) membership and diversity of groups and networks; 2) interpersonal and institutional trust; and 3) social inclusiveness in the community.

### Group Membership and Diversity

Key measureable characteristics of formal groups include the breadth and intensity of group or association membership, the degree of diversity within these groups or associations, and the nature and extent of connections across other groups and individuals. The availability of groups and social networks is considered to be a valuable defense against individual isolation. Vulnerable individuals who otherwise would turn to extremist groups might integrate socially with moderate groups of peers. Furthermore, the composition of these groups is an important indicator demonstrating the extent to which group members are exposed to a variety of voices, thereby reducing the probability of hostility against outsiders.

Table 4 presents basic summary statistics of group membership and diversity within each country. The group membership rows shows the percentage of individuals within core and non-core zones who report belonging to one or more groups (*Group Membership*) and two or more groups (*Two or more groups*). The first thing to note is that there is a clear drop-off rate between the two indicators. That is, while approximately half of each sample belongs to at least one group, only about one third report belonging to more than one group.

One interesting finding is that men are significantly more likely to be members of groups across all countries and in all zone types. The effect is particularly pronounced in non-core zones in Chad, where men are nearly 20% more likely to be members of groups compared to women.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, while men do not vary significantly between core and non-core zones, women in core zones tend to be more involved in groups than in non-core zones.

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<sup>6</sup> Tables for male/female differences can be found in Appendix III.

The statistical models in Table 4A show that there is significantly more group involvement in core than non-core zones in both Chad and Niger, but this pattern is reversed in Burkina Faso where core respondents are 12-14% less likely to report group membership(s). The differences between core and non-core zones hold even after controlling for demographic factors.

**Table 4. Group membership and diversity**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Group membership	58.6	50.7	61.7	53.4	56.6	68.6
Two or more groups	35.6	35.5	39.1	36.9	21.5	34.6
<i>Group diversity</i>						
Sex (men/ women?)	75.9	73.8	50.7	53.2	75.7	77.0
Religion	53.9	53.7	51.6	52.5	51.3	47.3
Ethnic	82.3	78.2	83.6	81.4	72.3	75.3
Political	71.5	63.2	81.9	81.6	79.9	78.8
Age	88.4	84.9	88.3	88.8	93.7	93.9

**Table 4A. Group membership and diversity (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Group membership	7.9***	4.4*	8.3***	8.6***	-12.0***	-13.5***
Two or more groups	0.0	-2.8	2.1	2.9	-13.1***	-13.9***
<i>Group diversity</i>						
Sex	2.1	1.1	-2.5	-4.3	-1.3	-1.4
Religion	0.2	-3.7	-0.1	0.0	4.1	1.2


Ethnic	4.1*	4.2*	2.2	0.1	-3.0	-3.9
Political	8.3***	5.8*	0.0	1.2	1.0	0.8
Age	3.6*	3.4+	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	-0.3

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Group diversity is only measured among individuals who reported to be members of at least one group. Respondents were prompted to report whether the group or groups they belonged to had members of various groups, indicating whether or not these groups fostered an environment of diversity. Table 2 suggests that, for the most part, these groups are fairly heterogeneous. Nearly all groups in the three countries include men and women, people from different ages, and members from a variety of political and ethnic groups. Also relevant is that in all three countries, approximately half of all respondents report religiously diverse groups. Only core communes in Chad are statistically distinguishable from non-core communes in terms of ethnic, political, and age diversity of groups (Table 4A).

Figure 10 takes a more careful look at group membership for each country. For all subsamples except the core zones in Burkina Faso, 20% or more of the respondents belong to more than three groups. This is a positive result, given that the findings from the previous table suggest that each respondent is exposed to a variety of voices in each group. Again, with the exception of the core zones in Burkina, an additional 20% belong to groups. The most group-oriented country is Niger, where there are approximately as many individuals who belong to three or more groups as those who belong to zero groups.

**Figure 10.**



Interpersonal and Institutional Trust

Trust is conceptualized in two different ways. The first is based on interpersonal trust, or the amount of trust that individuals feel towards their neighbors and their community. The second is institutional trust, or the trust that individuals place in specific social and political institutions. Table 5 shows the percentage of respondents who “agree” that they trust individuals and different social and political institutions.

**Table 5. Interpersonal and institutional trust**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
<i>Interpersonal trust</i>						
People willing to help	60.4	57.8	55.6	54.3	66.6	78.3
Naïve to trust people	47.7	42.7	33.9	34.5	34.7	36.7
<i>Institutional trust</i>						
Local authorities	56.4	65.8	63.4	67.5	66.4	85.1

Central government	54.9	63.4	61.1	66.6	62.4	80.4
Religious authorities	73.5	82.6	87.2	88.6	81.7	91.1
NGOs	63.9	71.8	68.9	74.9	71.7	80.0
Police	44.9	53.9	55.1	68.3	66.9	79.1

Interpersonal trust is measured via two indicators: respondents are asked if they believe that people are generally willing to help, and whether or not it is naïve to trust others. For all three countries, respondents reported significantly higher levels of trust for the first indicator than the second. That is, more respondents agree with the statement that it is okay to trust others to help than those who disagree with the statement that it is naïve to trust people. Core and non-core zones in Chad and Niger are almost indistinguishable in terms of interpersonal trust, whereas respondents in core zones in Burkina Faso are significantly less likely to believe others are willing to help (Table 5A).

Institutional trust is measured through five separate trust items. Each respondent was asked whether or not they trust local authorities, the central government, religious authorities, NGOs, and the police. Taken together, these items are intended to approximate the general level of trust that respondents have towards social and political institutions. Table 5 shows that, overall, religious authorities enjoy greater trust than governmental institutions in all three countries. Meanwhile, the police are the least trusted institution. The levels of trust for the central government are almost identical to the level of trust for local government authorities. Finally, the results from Table 5A show very consistent differences between core and non-core zones in all countries. That is, for nearly all indicators, respondents in core zones are significantly less trusting of institutions than respondents in non-core zones and these results are robust to the introduction of demographic controls. A notable exception to this pattern is Niger, where there religious institutions enjoy similarly high levels of trust in core and non-core zones.


**Table 5A. Interpersonal and institutional trust (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
<i>Interpersonal trust</i>						
People willing to help	2.6	2.9	1.3	1.1	-11.6***	-11.4***
Naïve to trust people	5.0 <sup>+</sup>	3.6	-0.1	0.0	-2.0	-4.0
<i>Institutional trust</i>						
Local authorities	-9.4***	-7.7***	-4.1*	-3.2 <sup>+</sup>	-18.7***	-15.6***
Central government	-8.5***	-6.7***	-5.5*	-5.0*	-18.0***	-14.8***
Religious authorities	-9.1***	-7.5***	-1.4	0.0	-9.4***	-8.8***
NGOs	-8.0***	-4.8**	-6.0***	-5.5**	-8.3***	-7.5***
Police	-9.0***	-6.5**	-13.2***	-13.9***	-12.2***	-12.6***

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Figure 11 graphs the results of an additive index of the institutional trust items. Burkina Faso, particularly the non-core zones, has the most respondents reporting trust in institutions. Meanwhile, Chad (particularly the core zones) is the least trusting. Nearly 20% of the sample does not trust any of the institutions listed. An important insight is that, regardless of country or zone-type, over half of respondents report trusting three or more of the social and political institutions provided.

**Figure 11**



### Social Inclusiveness

Social inclusiveness is the final component of social cohesion. Questions on this dimension are intended to reveal who in the community feels included in collective action, decision-making, and access to services. First, respondents were asked about who they believe makes decisions in their communities: ordinary people, women, youth, those from the respondent’s ethnic group, and people from outside the respondent’s ethnic group.

Table 6 suggests that there is no particular group that is clearly more or less represented in community decision-making for all countries. Indeed, there is much more variation across countries than across groups. Core zones in Niger, for example, are starkly less inclusive in terms of community decision-making than the rest of the sample, with only approximately half the respondents claiming that youth or ethnicities are well represented in community decisions. Meanwhile, Burkina Faso’s non-core zones are by far the most inclusive in the sample.

**Table 6. Who makes decisions in the community?**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Ordinary people	67.5	64.4	73.0	78.3	76.8	92.7
Women	60.3	59.9	69.5	73.0	80.8	86.3
Youth	68.5	64.4	53.8	70.6	78.9	95.2
Own tribe/ethnic group	70.4	66.9	53.2	64.8	79.8	97.1
Other tribes/ethnic groups	68.6	53.8	53.0	60.8	74.6	89.6

Table 6A shows that core zones in Niger and Burkina Faso are consistently less inclusive in community decision-making than non-core zones. This differences hold even after adjusting for demographic factors. By contrast, there are negligible differences between core and non-core zones in Chad except for involvement of other tribes and ethnic groups in community decision making.

**Table 6A. Who makes decisions in the community? (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Ordinary people	3.0 <sup>+</sup>	2.4	-5.2 <sup>**</sup>	-5.2 <sup>**</sup>	-15.9 <sup>***</sup>	-15.0 <sup>***</sup>
Women	0.3	-0.3	-3.5 <sup>+</sup>	-4.4 <sup>*</sup>	-5.5 <sup>***</sup>	-5.1 <sup>**</sup>
Youth	4.1 <sup>+</sup>	3.2	-16.8 <sup>***</sup>	-16.2 <sup>***</sup>	-16.3 <sup>***</sup>	-16.5 <sup>***</sup>
Own tribe/ethnic group	3.5	1.7	-11.6 <sup>***</sup>	-13.0 <sup>***</sup>	-17.3 <sup>***</sup>	-16.8 <sup>***</sup>

Other tribes/ethnic groups	14.8***	14.7***	-7.8*	-8.8**	-15.0***	-15.4***
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+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Tables 7 and 7A present the findings from a related but more normative item. Rather than asking which of the following groups *do* participate in community decision-making, this item asks whether or not the following groups *should* participate in community decision-making. Table 7 shows that all three countries score relatively high in terms of “normative” inclusiveness in community decision-making, with Burkina Faso being the most inclusive. That said, between 50-76% of all respondents in Chad and Niger think that “ordinary people”, women, youth, and ethnic tribes should be able to participate in making decision in their communities.

**Table 7. Who should make decisions in the community?**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Ordinary people	71.2	64.8	81.9	78.4	85.5	97.2
Women	70.7	67.0	78.3	74.9	90.7	97.1
Youth	76.1	68.5	76.9	81.1	92.2	97.7
Own tribe/ethnic grp.	75.5	67.9	76.0	69.9	92.5	97.6
Other tribe/ethnic grp.	72.5	57.5	74.6	66.7	89.4	95.8

**Table 7A. Who should make decisions in the community? (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Ordinary people	6.4**	4.5+	3.4	1.5	-11.8***	-13.1***
Women	3.7	2.3	3.3	2.2	-6.4***	-7.2***
Youth	7.5***	4.5+	-4.2	-4.8+	-5.5***	-6.3***


Own tribe/ethnic grp.	7.7***	4.2 <sup>+</sup>	6.1*	3.2	-5.1***	-6.2***
Other tribe/ethnic grp.	15.0***	12.1***	8.0**	5.0 <sup>+</sup>	-6.5***	-7.7***

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Regarding the differences between core and non-core zones, Table 7A indicates that core zones in Burkina Faso are significantly less inclusive in than non-core zones and these differences are robust to demographic controls. In fact, respondents in core zones are 13% less likely than respondents in non-core zones to put community decisions in the hands of ordinary citizens. Conversely, core zones in Chad and Niger tend to be more inclusive than non-core zones although some of these differences fail to hold after adjusting for demographics.


These results are presented graphically in Figure 1. Perceived inclusiveness of decision-making is on the left and the normative inclusiveness on the right. Rather than reporting on each group individually, this figure analyzes the number of groups that each respondent sees, or would prefer to see, involved in community decision-making. Approximately 80% of respondents in Burkina Faso believe that all 5 groups *should* be represented. It is noteworthy that normative preference for inclusiveness in community decision-making is always higher than perceived inclusiveness. Core zones in Niger are the least inclusive: nearly 40% of respondents in the sample report that no groups are represented in community decision-making.

**Figure 12**



The next social inclusiveness item is political participation. Figure 13 reports the average rate of voting per country by core and non-core zones. To measure this item, the IRD-InterMedia and TMG-Pitt (EAS) surveys used slightly different questions. The blue bars, representing the sample from the IRD-InterMedia survey, report the proportion of respondents who have *ever* voted. The figure depicts fairly high numbers on this measure. More than 80% of respondents for all countries, in both core and non-core zones, report to have voted at some point in their lives. The EAS survey, on the other hand, used a slightly different measure with a more restricted time frame. We asked each respondent if they had voted in the past twelve months, rather than if they had ever voted. The results are clearly different. In Niger, for example, only 46% of the sample in the core zones and 57% in the non-core zones have voted in the past year. By contrast, at least 80% of respondents in Burkina Faso report voting in the past year, perhaps due to more recent parliamentary elections in 2012.

**Figure 13**



However, voting is not the only way to participate in politics. There are other means of participation that tend to take more time and effort, and are therefore “higher-cost” forms of political participation. Table 8 reports the percentages of respondents who participate in different political activities. As opposed to electoral participation, the rate of participation in various non-voting political activities is relatively low, with respondents in Burkina Faso reporting the most political activity. In Chad and Niger, for instance, only between 15-25% reported contacting a local official or notified others about a problem in their communities.

**Table 8. Political participation**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Commune meeting	33.8	34.4	41.3	39.4	60.0	67.5
Contacted official	16.6	14.2	24.3	24.0	30.6	30.2
Notified local problem	19.1	20.3	23.5	26.1	30.0	42.2
Protest	18.6	14.8	19.2	21.3	26.0	30.5

/demonstration						
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**Table 8A. Political participation (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Commune meeting	-0.6	-3.6 <sup>+</sup>	1.9	3.4 <sup>+</sup>	-7.5 <sup>***</sup>	-4.6 <sup>*</sup>
Contacted official	2.4 <sup>+</sup>	-0.6	0.0	1.5	0.4	1.9
Notified local problem	-1.2	-3.6 <sup>*</sup>	-2.5	-1.5	-12.2 <sup>***</sup>	-9.8 <sup>***</sup>
Protest or demonstration	3.8 <sup>*</sup>	3.0	-2.0	-1.9	-4.5	-4.9 <sup>+</sup>


+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Regarding differences in participation between core and non-core zones, Table 8A suggests that there are slight differences with inconsistent patterns across forms of political participation. Core zones in Burkina Faso, for instance, are significantly less participatory than non-core zones, but we fail to observe a similar pattern in Chad and Niger.

Figure 14 presents these results graphically. This figure depicts the average rate of participation per activity per country. As was reported in Table 8, Burkina Faso is more participatory than Chad and Niger for all indicators, especially the non-core zones. Chad is the least participatory, and the results are nearly indistinguishable between core and non-core zones. It is important to note that a consistent trend across countries is that men are significantly more likely to participate than women.<sup>7</sup> This pattern is consistent across countries and forms of political participation, and it holds after adjusting for demographics.

<sup>7</sup> Tables for male/female difference can be found in Appendix III.

**Figure 14**



Finally, Tables 9 and 9A report the results for ethnic and religious biases. These items ask respondents whether they: 1) approve of voting for a candidate that is not of the same ethnic background; and 2) approve of their children to marry outside of their ethnic background. The first trend we see is that respondents in all countries are more tolerant of interethnic marriage than of interethnic voting.

**Table 9. Ethnic and Religious Bias**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core

Interethnic voting	34.8	42.0	78.0	62.0	54.5	60.3
Interethnic marriage	54.1	61.1	81.7	77.1	69.9	69.7

Approval of interethnic voting is significantly lower in core zones in Chad and Burkina, but significantly higher in Niger core zones (Table 9A). In Niger and Burkina Faso, differences between core and non-core zones are less pronounced for approval of interethnic marriage. However, core zone respondents in Chad are consistently less approving than non-core zone respondents.

**Table 9A. Ethnic and religious bias (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Interethnic voting	-7.2**	-9.3***	16.1***	14.8***	-5.8+	-10.3**
Interethnic marriage	-7.0**	-8.6***	4.6+	4.6+	0.2	-1.6

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### A Qualitative Analysis of Social Cohesion

Focus group respondents in all three countries expressed low trust in government and little interest in political participation. The most recurrent grievances related to corruption and inaccessibility of local and central government. To begin, a great deal of mistrust is rooted in the widespread belief that the government is corrupt. This concern was particularly pronounced in Niger, where seven out of nine focus groups concluded that the political elite were entirely closed off and self-interested. Respondents maintain that elected officials do not govern on

behalf of the country, but in favor of their own families and friends. This corruption takes place in a context in which most of the country does not have functional schools, health centers, or roads. A customary chief in Burkina Faso commented that, "it is we the chiefs [rather than the government] who show concern for widows, orphans, and the poor" (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Niger and Burkina Faso*, 9).

Another common complaint was the lack of communication between the government and the people. Respondents repeatedly claimed that no one in the government was listening to them. They feel as if all decisions are taken from the top-down from elites who "live in their pyramids and see nothing below" (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Niger and Burkina Faso*, 6). There are few institutional or grassroots channels for them to voice their opinions.

In each of the three countries, there has been a recent effort to strengthen the connection between citizens and the local government through decentralization, but focus group respondents criticize the decentralization as a massive failure. Respondents in Niger claim that the transfer of resources is inefficient and that there has been insufficient effort to inform or consult the public of the recent changes. In Burkina Faso, citizens are unaware of what the new institutions are supposed to do, and many institutional changes have not yet been fully implemented. However, there does seem to be more opportunity for community outreach at the communal level relative to the national level, although the danger is that the benefits can be captured by local elites.

In some cases, an undercurrent of violence is associated with the lack of political efficacy and trust in government. The youth in Burkina Faso have expressed the need to organize violent protests because "the only time the government listens to us is when we break public property and use violence" (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Niger and Burkina Faso*, 6).

These findings are notably more pessimistic than those of the quantitative survey. The quantitative study indicated that well over half of all respondents in each country trusted

government institutions, both at the local and central levels, and they expressed relatively high levels of external efficacy on two of the three items. Perhaps the most revealing survey item, however, asked respondents if they believe that *people like me have a say in what the government does*. For this item, the very low results in the quantitative survey (e.g., only 22% in Niger agree with the item, and only 14% in Chad) clearly reflect the low confidence in government found in the focus groups. Another finding that is supported in both the quantitative and qualitative studies was the propensity for protest participation in Burkina Faso. Burkina was prominently featured in the focus groups as being particularly susceptible to protest as a manifestation of low political efficacy, and it also stood out as being having somewhat higher levels of protest participation in the quantitative portion of the survey relative to the other countries.

The qualitative study indicates that political efficacy and empowerment are particularly low among women. Focus groups made up exclusively of women discussed their perceptions of politics and social belonging, and such groups repeatedly highlighted the inhibited nature of participation of women in society. In Chad, a context where citizenship is considered a particularly new concept in general, female empowerment is extremely low. To counteract the subordinate status of women, officials say that programs must focus on practical matters of financial independence before they can begin to worry about political attitudes. "Our program does promote citizens and women participation in local affairs," claims one program director, "but our main focus for now is 'poverty reduction', especially that of women in rural Chad" (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Chad*, 3). Similarly in Niger, it is the non-elite women who are the "main losers in Nigerien society" (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Niger and Burkina Faso*, 5). For all three countries, women's primary concern in the focus groups is their inability to earn a living, but they also expressed some frustration with their subordinate status in government and the grassroots level. At the same time, wealthy women from all three countries were more open about their demands for social equality and political parity.

Such pessimistic findings were not restricted exclusively to women’s focus groups. Elite interviews indicated structural mechanisms that keep women subordinate to men. An imam in Chad argued that women will never be able to improve their situation as long as they are forbidden to speak openly in public. Two other imams highlighted the persistent lack of attention to female education. “To empower them, we must train them,” remarked the imam of the Ati Grand Mosque (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Chad*, 10).

These results differ from those found in the quantitative survey, which indicated that more than half of respondents in each country believe that women actively contribute to the decision-making process in their communes. The survey also found that vast majorities of respondents believe that women *should* play an active part in political decisions. The fact that this general concern for the inclusion of women is not apparently reflected in the views of women themselves in the focus groups or in elite interviews opens an important avenue for further analysis.

## GOAL 2: RESILIENCE TO VIOLENCE EXTREMISM

Tables 10 through 14A present the baseline results for the series of questions related to Goal Level Index 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism. This concept is intended to assess whether vulnerable individuals are at risk of becoming radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence. We distinguish between: a) *resilience indicators* related to expectations of employment, access to vocational training, and political efficacy as factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism; and b) *vulnerability indicators* related to perceptions of and attitudes toward violence and extremism as factors that make individuals susceptible to violent extremism.

### Resilience indicators

Table 10 shows the percentage of individuals in core and non-core target zones who believe that finding a job is not difficult and that they can access vocational training. A consistent finding across the three countries is that there are little substantive differences in perceptions of access to jobs between core and non-core zones. Regarding accessibility to vocational training,

however, there are discernable differences between core and non-core zones.

**Table 10. Access to jobs and vocational school**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
NOT difficult to get a job in the country today	20.4	22.3	10.8	12.9	10.5	9.7
NOT difficult for a young person to find a job after leaving school	18.0	16.0	12.5	14.2	8.7	10.5
Accessible vocational training	37.1	30.2	53.0	40.1	39.7	52.2

Table 10A shows that in Chad and Niger, individuals in core zones are more likely to think that vocational training is accessible to people like them compared to individuals in non-core zones. The opposite is true in Burkina Faso, where core zone respondents are roughly 14% less likely than non-core zone respondents to think they can access vocational training. It is important to note that the percentages shown in this table reflect generally low expectations regarding access to jobs and vocational training which, in turn, may negatively affect individuals' resilience to extremism.

**Table 10A. Access to jobs and vocational school (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
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	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
NOT difficult to get a job in the country today	-1.9	0.8	-2.1	-0.1	0.8	2.7
NOT difficult for a young person to find a job after leaving school	2.0	3.1*	-0.2	0.0	-1.8	-1.4
Accessible vocational training	7.0***	4.78	12.8***	11.1***	-12.5***	-14.1***

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Despite low expectations, core and non-core zones individuals seem to have moderately high levels of “political efficacy,” which indicates people’s confidence in their ability to influence politics and public policy. Table 11 shows that in all three countries over two-thirds of respondents think that leaders and local governments respect their opinions and over 40% feel well prepared to participate in political life.

**Table 11. Political efficacy**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
My opinions respected by local leaders	62.1	61.2	64.1	66.3	76.2	90.9
Local gov’t considers opinions of citizens	66.8	63.2	69.7	73.7	75.1	90.0
People like me have a say in what gov’t does	16.7	12.1	20.0	23.4	17.9	36.6
Feel well-prepared for politics	42.5	40.5	44.0	59.1	46.5	63.6

**Table 11A. Political efficacy (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
My opinions respected by local leaders	0.9	-1.2	-2.3	-2.2	-14.7***	-12.4***
Local gov't considers opinions of citizens	3.6 <sup>+</sup>	1.2	-3.9*	-4.8**	-14.9***	-12.2***
People like me have a say in what gov't does	4.7*	5.5**	-3.4	-3.5	-18.7***	-16.9***
Feel well-prepared for engaging in political life	2.1	-0.3	-15.2***	-14.9***	-17.0***	-14.3***


+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

While these indicators suggest small differences between core and non-core zones in Niger, individuals from core communes in Niger and Burkina Faso believe they have significantly less political efficacy than individuals in non-core communes (Table 11A). These differences are consistent and particularly strong in Burkina Faso where core zone respondents are between 12-19% less likely to think they can influence politics and public policy.

Figure 15 compares how respondents in each country report total levels of external efficacy, or the perception that he/she can make a difference in politics, as indicated by the sum of the first three measures of political efficacy. No efficacy, in this case, refers to affirmative answers to zero of the efficacy measures, and high efficacy refers to affirmative answers to all three efficacy measures. Respondents in core and non-core zones in Chad and Niger report similar levels of

efficacy, whereas non-core zones in Burkina Faso have the largest proportion of high efficacy respondents.

**Figure 15**



Finally, men and women do not differ significantly in terms of political efficacy in Niger and Burkina Faso and Niger, but men in Chad report higher perceptions of efficacy than women for every indicator. This difference is particularly pronounced in core zones, where men report the highest levels of external efficacy.<sup>8</sup>

Vulnerability indicators

Moving to perceptions of vulnerability, Tables 12 and 12A show that core and non-core communes are roughly similar, with the largest differences arising in Burkina Faso. There, individuals in core zones are significantly more likely to perceive that ethnic and religious differences divide people in their villages “somewhat” and “a lot” and that their community is “sometimes” or “often” affected by violence than individuals in non-core zones. Although the

<sup>8</sup> Tables for male/female differences can be found in Appendix III.

item distinguishes between ethnic and religious differences as sources of conflict, respondents do not report consist differences between the two.

**Table 12. Perceptions of vulnerability**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Ethnic differences divide people	38.2	40.8	32.9	32.7	32.6	25.3
Ethnic divisions lead to violence	19.6	16.5	5.3	7.1	13.0	12.3
Religious differences divide people	35.3	36.0	38.1	36.4	32.9	24.3
Religious divisions lead to violence	13.3	11.9	4.5	4.1	10.1	7.5
Commune affected by violence	39.1	43.8	24.9	22.2	32.8	24.3

Beyond core and non-core zone differences, a relevant baseline indicator is that roughly 40% of respondents in Chad believe their communes to be frequently affected by violence. This percentage is high compared to the other countries, though as many as a quarter of respondents in Niger (the lowest of the three cases) report perceiving violence in their communities. However, it is not clear what the sources of that violence may be. Fewer respondents in each country report either ethnic or religious sources of violence in the communes, although there is a higher Boko Harem presence in both countries.


**Table 12A. Perceptions of vulnerability**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Ethnic differences divide people	-2.6	-6.1**	0.0	0.1	7.3***	5.4*
Ethnic divisions lead to violence	3.1	0.5	-1.8	-2.0	0.7	1.8
Religious differences divide people	-0.7	-3.4 <sup>+</sup>	0.2	3.5 <sup>+</sup>	8.7***	7.4***
Religious divisions lead to violence	1.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	2.6	2.7
Commune affected by violence	-4.7*	-7.3***	2.7	3.2 <sup>+</sup>	8.5***	8.3***

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

We illustrate the perceptions and consequences of ethnic and religious differences within communes in Figure 16. Communes in Chad and Niger are perceived as similarly divided. Between 30%-40% of the sample believes that some type of division characterizes their communes. In Chad, residents are more concerned about ethnic differences, and in Niger they perceive greater religious differences. The differences are nearly equal, and relatively low, in Burkina Faso. In the non-core zones in Burkina Faso, only a quarter of the sample reports observing divisions in their communities. Regarding the consequences of those divisions, it would appear as if ethnic divisions were a strong predictor of community violence, much more so than religion. This is especially true in Chad and Burkina Faso.

**Figure 16**



Next, this report will address the most direct measures of violent extremism: attitudes towards violence and religious extremism. Table 13 suggests that a substantial minority of respondents in all countries and zone types “agree” that violence is effective to solve problems and that religious violence is justified (roughly between 20-35% of respondents). This is an important indicator of the propensity for violence in P-DEV II targeted communities. While in all countries at least one of five respondents believe in the use of violence in the name of Islam, a small percentage believe that Islamic Law permit Al Qaeda’s violent actions. Therefore, although there is some measure of support for the use of violence, support for extremist groups appears to be not as pervasive.

Table 13A shows that, even after adjusting for demographic factors, core and non-core zones exhibit significant differences in attitudes toward violence. In Chad, individuals in core zones are 7.5% less likely to believe in the effectiveness of violence to solve problems and 5.7% less likely

to justify religious violence than individuals in non-core zones. We observe the opposite trend in Burkina Faso, where core zones individuals are about 10% more likely to see violence as effective to solve problems and as being justified in defense of religion. In both cases, the difference between core and non-core zones is highly significant. Justification of violence in the name of Islam is more or less equally distributed between core and non-core communes in Chad and Niger. In Burkina Faso, people in core zones are 5.5% less likely than individuals in non-core zones to “agree” that violence in the name of Islam is justified.

**Table 13. Attitudes toward violence**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Violence effective to solve problems	27.5	35.0	26.9	21.7	36.6	26.7
Violence against civilians in defense of religion is justified	26.6	32.3	21.9	19.1	23.6	13.5
Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	18.7	20.4	23.2	22.5	18.6	24.1
Al Qaeda’s violent actions are permitted under Islamic law	9.0	9.3	6.0	4.6	9.0	10.8

**Table 13A. Attitudes toward violence (core vs. non-core differences)**


	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Violence effective to	-7.5***	-6.3***	5.2**	7.0***	9.9***	10.9***

solve problems						
Violence against civilians in defense of religion is justified	-5.7**	-4.8**	2.8+	4.9**	10.1***	10.6***
Violence in the name of Islam is justified	-1.6	1.5	0.1	0.1	-5.5**	-4.8*
Al Qaeda's violent actions are permitted under Islamic law	-0.3	-0.9	1.4	1.4	-1.9	-1.5

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Figure 17 reports the percentage of respondents who support two critical items on attitudes towards violence. The percentages indicate the number of people per country and zone-type who believe that violence is effective and justified in the name of religion. A direct comparison of means suggests that violence is more often perceived as more effective than it is justified. This result holds true for every country and zone-type, though it is particularly evident in Burkina Faso. On average, respondents in Niger tend to hold violence in less esteem than their counterparts in Chad and Burkina. In Niger's non-core zones, for example, slightly less than 22% of respondents believe that violence is an effective means of problem-solving and only 19% of respondents believe that violence in defense of one's religion is justified. These are low numbers relative to the other countries in the sample, but they are still fairly high.

**Figure 17**



Finally, Table 14 shows the percentage of individuals in core and non-core target zones with anti-West and extremist attitudes. The table suggests that anti-extremist attitudes vary a great deal between countries and zone types. Niger is the most country with the highest percentage of support for extremist attitudes relative to the other two countries. Respondents in Niger are far more likely to believe that the U.S. is at war with Islam and far more likely to be supportive of the implementation of Sharia Law than respondents in Chad and Burkina Faso. More than 80% of all respondents in Niger support a strict adherence to Sharia Law, although the Qur'an does not prescribe Sharia Law, compared to 30-42% in Burkina Faso.

**Table 14. Anti-West Attitudes and Religious Extremism**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
U.S. is at war against Islam, not terrorism	15.0	11.4	58.4	46.4	21.9	24.2
Gov't should NOT work with western countries to fight terrorism	43.5	40.6	44.7	43.4	36.8	26.4
Should be governed by Sharia Law	38.4	56.2	75.8	67.9	33.7	36.0
Strict observance of Sharia Law as written in the Qur'an.	54.8	69.7	80.7	84.7	30.2	41.7

Table 14A suggests few patterns between core and non-core zones. In Chad and Burkina Faso, core zones tend to be less extreme than non-core zones, though the effects are only statistically significant for the items related to Sharia Law. Meanwhile, the results are reversed in Niger. This is consistent with the findings shown in Table 13A which suggest that Niger core zones are particularly prone to extremist violence. Also, the only significant effects related to the war on terror occur in Niger, for which core zones are more extreme than non-core zones.

**Table 14A. Anti-West Attitudes and Religious Extremism (core vs. non-core differences)**


	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
U.S. is at war against Islam, not terrorism	3.6*	2.1	12.1***	12.6***	-2.4	-3.4
Gov't should NOT work with western countries to fight terrorism	2.9	3.6	1.3	0.5	10.4**	13.3***
Should be governed by Sharia Law	-17.7***	-12.2***	7.9**	9.5***	-2.2	-0.2

Strict observance of Sharia Law as written in the Qur'an.	-14.9***	-9.2***	-4.0	-3.1	-11.6***	-8.6**
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+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Figure 18 illustrates the breakdown of the item on adherence to Sharia Law. Respondents were asked to choose what degree of implementation to Sharia they found most appropriate, ranging from no implementation to strict implementation. The figure suggests that many respondents in each country, as many as 20%, do not know where their preferences lie. For those who do have preferences that they are willing to share, the distributions vary a great deal by country if not by zone-type. The distribution is fairly even in Burkina Faso, but the majority of respondents in Niger (about 65%) prefer strict observance of Sharia Law. There are more than twice as many respondents as in Burkina Faso.

**Figure 18**



### A Qualitative Analysis of Resilience to Violent Extremism

One of the most striking findings from the qualitative study was the *lack* of concern for extremist attitudes and behaviors. For the most part, focus group respondents commented that extremist voices are weak in the three countries. Focus groups and interviews repeatedly claimed that citizens were very tolerant and that there was little trace of fundamentalist

extremism. Indeed, reports in Niger and Burkina Faso maintain that “tolerance is widespread and a major barrier to religious extremism.” Similarly, the overwhelming majorities of respondents in Chadian focus groups maintained that extremism is a “foreign phenomenon.”

That is not to say that respondents feel safe from local violence. On the contrary, security was reported to be a major concern within most focus group discussions. However, this violence is generally rooted in poverty and local conflicts rather than ideological extremism. According to urban respondents, high youth unemployment has resulted in a surge of crime and gang violence. Meanwhile in rural communes, local conflicts over access to land and grazing areas often turn violent. Respondents in Chad noted one particular dispute over access to water that ended in six fatalities. When prompted to consider local violence, most focus groups and interviews discussed conflicts over practical issues such as land disputes rather than extremist ideologies.

Nevertheless, some details did emerge to suggest that extremism may not be as insignificant as initially described, though its sources and manifestations differ among countries. In Burkina Faso, for example, some respondents noted that tensions have arisen over the prospect of interreligious (i.e., Muslim-Christian) marriages. Conflicts are also increasingly likely in rural areas of Burkina Faso, where many fear that Wahhabi/Sunni Muslims are intolerant and seek to impose their religious views on the government. Some cities in the north have already witnessed the growing political power of this group.

Similarly in Niger, the respondents claimed to be overwhelmingly tolerant and moderate. However, focus group participants who represent a religious minority in their communities claimed to experience discrimination. Christian children were said to have been bullied in schools by their Muslim peers, and Fulanis do not feel that they are treated fairly. Indeed, one security official in Tillaberi, Niger warned that “Fulani frustration and complaints about discrimination is a powder keg ready to explode.” Finally, the presence of Boko Haram is particularly strong in Niger’s northeastern border with Nigeria, and respondents reported feeling very afraid.

Chadians described their country as being exceptionally tolerant, but they expressed worry about the intrusion of foreign extremism. Boko Haram, which now has a strong presence in the country, was mentioned multiple times in nearly all focus groups as a possible threat to tolerance and stability. The women's focus groups also warned of religious extremism from Libyan returnees.

Both sources of violence – for practical or ideological reasons – were examined in the quantitative survey. Table 13 and Figure 17 are useful in comparing both types of violence through the items, “violence is effective to solve problems,” and “violence in the name of Islam is justified.” Clearly, violence for the sake of problem-solving is consistently more salient than violence in defense of religion, especially in Burkina Faso. However, support for both types of violence is quite high in absolute terms. Indeed, it is in the relatively high support for extremism and religious violence where the qualitative reports differ most noticeably from the findings from the quantitative survey. In reference to religious extremism, for example, a majority of respondents in each country indicated support for *strict observance* of Sharia Law. . That support is particularly high in Niger, where 80% of respondents support strict observance of Sharia Law. Furthermore, results of the endorsement experiment found that between 13 and 22 percent of respondents followed the cues of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb when making decisions about policy. Finally, it does not appear that ethnic tolerance, while high, is as high as reported in the qualitative study. Although tolerance for interethnic marriage and political participation is quite high, the quantitative analysis concluded that many respondents (*most* respondents in the case of Chad) would not be willing to vote for a candidate of another ethnic group.

### GOAL 3: YOUTH OUTLOOK

Tables 15 to 18A show the results for questions related to Goal Level Index 3: Youth Outlook, defined as the individual and collective vision young people have of their futures. This concept is operationalized using four indices: a) *economic outlook* which evaluates attitudes toward and practical vision of future careers and economic potential; b) *educational outlook* which evaluates expectations regarding education and the learning environment; c) *civic outlook* which

comprises participation in civil society and local decision making; and d) *conflict outlook* which includes attitudes toward existing and potential conflict in their societies. The tables in this section present the results for the full sample in each country, that is, individuals of all ages.

Table 15 shows the proportion of respondents scoring 6 or higher in the “ladder of life” scale (1-10) which measures satisfaction with one’s life. Overall, respondents are far more optimistic about the future than they are about the past and present, and they are least satisfied with their life conditions in the present.

**Table 15. Satisfaction with life and economic outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Life satisfaction 2 years ago	30.8	28.5	31.2	21.9	25.2	20.0
Life satisfaction now	26.6	23.0	24.7	12.9	22.2	23.7
Life satisfaction 2 years from now	76.7	71.6	72.4	60.1	74.2	67.0
The country's economy is better than a year ago	34.6	35.4	44.0	35.7	28.0	56.6

In Chad, core zones are only significantly different from non-core zones for two of the four items, and the differences are small (Table 15A). Core zone respondents in Niger are roughly 10% more likely to score high on retrospective, current, and prospective life satisfaction compared to non-core zone respondents. Figure 19 shows this graphically. In Niger, there are differences in terms of satisfaction with life between individuals in core and non-core zones, while in Burkina Faso there are small but significant differences.


**Table 15A. Satisfaction with life and economic outlook (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Life satisfaction 2 years ago	2.3	-0.5	9.4***	9.2***	5.3**	4.2*

Life satisfaction now	3.6*	0.1	11.8***	9.6***	-1.5	-4.1*
Life satisfaction 2 years from now	5.0**	2.6	12.2***	8.7***	7.2**	6.1**
The country's economy is better than a year ago	-0.8	0.6	8.2*	8.5*	-28.6***	-27.4***

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Figure 19**



Regarding educational outlook, Table 16 shows that perceptions of school quality and education tend to be fairly positive. Approximately 70% of all respondents believe that they received a good education, and more than 60% of respondents in all countries believe that their schools felt safe. The highest perception of school safety can be found in the non-core zones in Burkina Faso, which reports nearly 80% feeling safe in school. Perceptions of supply adequacy are notably lower, with only approximately 35% of respondents in Niger claiming that their schools had sufficient supplies. Finally, wide majorities of respondents in all three countries report believing that a middle school education is important for girls as well as boys.

There are substantial differences in educational outlook between core and non-core zones in Burkina Faso, with smaller differences arising in Chad and Niger (Table 16A). Burkina Faso zones are significantly different for all indicators, with more positive perceptions of education in non-

core zones. For example, core zone respondents in Burkina Faso are roughly 10% less likely than their non-core zone counterparts to perceive schools as safe places and to believe that they received a good education.

**Table 16. Educational outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
My school is/was a safe place	61.9	60.1	65.7	64.4	68.0	78.8
I received a good education	68.5	69.2	76.0	66.6	74.5	84.1
My school has/had enough supplies	52.4	51.1	34.5	37.3	57.9	65.9
Middle school is for both boys and girls	74.0	79.8	77.5	76.7	83.8	79.7

**Table 16A. Educational outlook (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
My school is/was a safe place	1.7	3.1	1.3	2.3	-10.8***	-9.5**
I received a good education	-0.7	-1.5	9.4***	8.9***	-9.6***	-11.0***
My school has/had enough supplies	1.3	2.9	-2.8	-4.6*	-8.0**	-9.6**
Middle school is for both boys and girls	-5.8***	-6.4***	0.1	-0.1	4.1*	3.2+

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Civic outlook refers to political knowledge, interest, and evaluations. Political knowledge was measured through two items that test the respondent's understanding of political institutions in their respective countries. The first question asks about the number of years in the president's term, and the second question asks about the number of seats in the assembly. Table 17 displays the proportion of respondents who answered one or both questions correctly.

According to this measure, respondents in Niger are the most knowledgeable about their political institutions, and respondents in Chad are the least knowledgeable. According to this measure of political knowledge, men are consistently more politically knowledgeable than women, even after controlling for demographics. This effect is consistent across all three countries in the analysis. Also, women in core zones tend to be more knowledgeable than women in non-core zones.<sup>9</sup>

Respondents in Burkina Faso report higher levels of interest in national and local politics relative to their counterparts in the other two countries. Finally, Chadians are most optimistic of the direction of the country. Core and non-core zones are most consistently statistically different in Burkina Faso, where non-core zones are found to be more interested and optimistic about politics than core zones.

**Table 17. Civic outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Political knowledge	47.4	37.8	63.9	67.6	59.5	56.0
Interested in community affairs	46.0	46.3	43.0	50.2	61.2	72.0
Interested in national politics and affairs	39.4	43.8	42.8	47.5	56.6	65.5
Country is headed in the right direction	72.4	77.2	63.4	57.3	67.1	78.0

**Table 17A. Civic outlook (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Political knowledge	9.6***	4.5+	-3.8	-4.8+	3.5	1.6
Interested in	-0.3	-1.4	-7.2*	-8.6**	-10.8***	-13.5***

<sup>9</sup> Tables for male/female difference can be found in Appendix III.

community affairs						
Interested in national politics and affairs	-4.4 <sup>+</sup>	-5.2 <sup>+</sup>	-4.7	-6.0 <sup>+</sup>	-8.9 <sup>**</sup>	-10.4 <sup>**</sup>
Country is headed in the right direction	-4.8 <sup>**</sup>	-4.3 <sup>*</sup>	6.2 <sup>**</sup>	6.3 <sup>**</sup>	-10.9 <sup>***</sup>	-8.3 <sup>***</sup>

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

The final indicator for Youth Outlook measures the perceived level of violence among the country's young people. The EAS and IRD survey instruments measured this item slightly differently. While the IRD survey asks how often (often, sometimes, or never) youths in the country partake in violence on behalf of their religions, the EAS survey asks the respondent if they agree, disagree, or neither agree or not disagree the statement that young people use violence. Thus, the difference is in measurement, not content. However small the difference in measurement, the results are quite distinct from one another.

Table 18 shows that a more respondents in each country report youth violence in the IRD survey than the EAS survey. However, the proportions per country are fairly consistent. For each survey, Niger reports the most youth violence, and Burkina Faso reports the least violence. Table 18A suggests that differences between core and non-core zones are most significant in Niger, where core zones report more youth violence than non-core zones. The effect is less consistent between indicators in Chad and Burkina Faso, which only achieve statistical significance in one of the two indicators.

**Table 18. Conflict outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Youth involved in the use of violence (IRD)	18.0	12.2	34.3	20.5	18.0	14.8
Youth involved in the use of violence (EAS)	11.8	12.5	14.1	8.0	8.8	16.9

**Table 18A. Conflict outlook (core vs. non-core differences)**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Youth involved in the use of violence (IRD)	5.8**	5.1*	13.8***	14.4***	3.2	1.7
Youth involved in the use of violence (EAS)	-0.7	-0.1	6.1**	6.4**	-8.1***	-9.9***

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### A Qualitative Analysis of Improvements to Youth Outlook

Focus group respondents in all three countries lamented the degenerating state of young people in their communities. The increase in drug-use among youth was a recurring theme. The issue appears to be most problematic in Burkina Faso, and especially so in the capital, where it was also associated with diminishing parental authority.

Youth drug use has been accompanied by a slew of societal ills that were highlighted in the focus groups. Petty crime is often used as a means of income for young people who want to pay for drugs with easy money. In some villages in Burkina Faso, youth banditry has become so rampant that citizens have organized vigilante groups to patrol at night. Similarly, respondents in Niger associated youth drug use with intergenerational conflicts, gang violence, and street crime. In Chad, the youth drug use and banditry were considered to be far greater threats to security than extremist groups like Boko Haram.

For all cases, the prevalence of drugs and crime was attributed to low educational opportunities and high youth unemployment. Many parents pull their children out of school early – if they send their children to school at all – as a result of overcrowding and low standards. Vocational schools are often too expensive to be reasonable options, and even those that are modestly priced often do not teach the skills, such as agriculture, that are most relevant to local needs. A common alternative is to send children to Qur’anic schools where they receive a religious education but do not generally learn skills to compete in the job market. Consequently, youth unemployment is very high and opportunities remain limited for unskilled workers. Many

respondents argue that crime and drug use have become so persistent as a direct result of these restricted opportunities.

This disappointment with educational and vocational services is largely reflected in the quantitative study. While the quantitative survey found that approximately half of the respondents in each country were quite satisfied with the quality of education, other indicators of educational outlook were very low. For example, wide majorities believe that schools are not well supplied, that access to vocational training is limited, and that the probability of obtaining a job is very low – especially for young people. Interestingly, the pervasive threat of youth violence that was emphasized heavily in the focus groups did not manifest itself in the quantitative analysis, in which less than 20% of respondents for all countries except Niger reported that youth are involved in the use of violence.

#### D. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON EXTREMIST ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORAL ORIENTATIONS

The indicators discussed in the “Resilience to Violent Extremism” section share the common feature that they all request direct answers or “self-reports” concerning personal perceptions of violence that may occur in their communities, the extremist violence that may occur beyond their communes, and various justifications for using violence to solve problems or in the name of religion. However, researchers cannot often be confident that these types of questions yield honest or externally valid responses from respondents.

The first concern about self-reported responses relates to the honesty of the response. In fact, it is well-known in public opinion and social psychology research that survey respondents tend to answer questions in a way that they believe will please enumerators or, more relevant to this report, provide desirable responses to sensitive items because they conform to a particular set of societal norms. The second concern is the external validity of the response. Are these findings generalizable to political problems in the real world? Because the self-reported items are framed in abstract terms, it is not clear they capture genuine intentions to use violence. That is, such

items identify approval of violent behaviors for vaguely-defined circumstances, but they do not measure willingness to support specific violent reactions to clearly-defined policies.

For these reasons, the EAS team devised innovative evaluation instruments that measure attitudes toward violent extremism unobtrusively, that is, minimizing the potential for untruthful answers. These techniques attempt to mitigate social desirability bias and improve internal validity of measures of vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism. They also improve external validity of measures by providing specific and realistic stimuli and relevant violent reactions. By doing so, these items capture the willingness to use violence in concrete, policy-based terms.

#### LIST EXPERIMENT

We employ a “list experiment” to capture aggregate levels of support for a terrorist attack that may result in civilian casualties, as well as two “endorsement” experiments to measure sympathy for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an extremist group operating in the Sahel region. Both approaches are unobtrusive in the sense that they provide measures of support for sensitive topics that are less susceptible to social desirability pressures than direct questions (See Blair and Imai 2012; Glynn 2013).

The *list experiment* procedure is straightforward. Respondents are presented with a hypothetical scenario and a series of instructions, read to them by the survey enumerator:

“Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I’m going to read you a list of possible responses now. *Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support.*”

The sentence in italics represents the core of the list experiment because respondents are instructed to reveal only the *number of responses* they would support but not *which responses* they would support. Half of respondents in a given target zone were randomly assigned to a “control group” to whom the survey enumerator lists only three potential responses:

- 1) A peaceful protest at the Western country's embassy;
- 2) Your government demands an apology from the Western country;
- 3) Your government declaring war against the Western country.

Responses 1-2 are likely unobjectionable. The third item is designed to be more radical so that that most respondents do not necessarily respond affirmatively to all three control items. This is referred in the literature as a *ceiling item* or a *low-prevalence item* that minimizes design effects when comparing control and treatment groups. The other half of respondents in a target zone were randomly assigned to a "treatment group," to which the survey enumerator lists the three potential responses listed above as well as a fourth, *sensitive* item:

- 4) *An attack on the Western country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties.*

Again, respondents only reveal the *total number* of potential responses to the hypothetical scenario that they would support and they do not reveal to the survey enumerator which ones. Assuming that the randomization process for assigning treatment and control groups was effective, the difference between the average number of items that respondents in the treatment group report and the average number of items that respondents in the control group report therefore yields a measure of the percentage of the sample that agrees that "An attack on the Western country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties" is an appropriate response to the publication of an offensive image of the Prophet Mohammed.

In the initial analysis, we model the respondent's answer as a linear function of his/her treatment assignment and the control covariates. These OLS regressions predict the count of violent acts provided by respondents with a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not the respondent received the sensitive item (attacking the embassy). Under the conditions of randomization, the treatment groups and control groups are equally likely to support all three non-sensitive items. Given that the groups are identical on every measure except for the addition of a fourth item on the list, any differences between the groups may be attributed to the addition of the sensitive item. Specifically, differences between the groups may be

interpreted as the proportion of respondent who support for an attack on an embassy that results in military or civilian casualties. This difference between the treatment and control groups is referred to as the “average treatment effect.”


**Table 19. List Experiment**

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Supports violent retribution	10.9*	6.1	5.3
Supports violent retribution (with controls)	11.6**	5.2	7.1

As is shown in Table 19, the average treatment effect was positive for all countries but it only achieves statistical significance in Chad. Here, 11% of the sample would support a violent response. These findings make for methodologically and substantively compelling comparisons between self-reported responses and experimentally-induced responses. Indeed, Chad’s high support of violence in the list experiment is consistent with the high support for violent actions seen in self-reported measure (See Figure 17). As with the list experiment, self-reports also indicated that respondents in Chad were the most supportive of violence among respondents in the three countries. However, the findings from the self-reported data are *twice as high* as those from the list-experiment. This suggests that, while many respondents in Chad might support violence in the abstract, the option of supporting a real act of terrorism is relatively less appealing. Nevertheless while more than 20% of respondents in Chad *might* be supportive of violence vulnerable to violent extremism, the more alarming interpretation is that nearly one in 9 would *actively support* violence in this situation, even if civilians were to be killed. This figure may be seen as particularly troubling since satires of the image of the Prophet Mohammed appear not infrequently, especially in recent Western media outlets.

Next, Figure 20 illustrates the percentage of individuals who selected each number of items in the list experiment. The design of the question conceals the overt preferences of the respondents, but a few items are in fact very revealing.

**Figure 20**



For example, consider the number of respondents who responded affirmatively to all four items in the treatment group. These individuals must necessarily have voiced approval for two very violent actions: the low-prevalence item (declaration of war) and the sensitive item (a violent attack on an embassy). Overall, very few respondents would be willing to support all four actions in response to a religious insult. Of all countries, however, respondents in Chad are more likely to support such actions than respondents in Niger and Burkina Faso. Similarly, by supporting three of the four actions, respondents in the treatment group and control groups are inadvertently voicing support for one violent act (either a declaration of war or a violent attack

against an embassy in the treatment group and certainly a declaration of war in the control group). Again, respondents in Chad are far more likely to select this option than respondents in the other countries. In total, approximately 15% of respondents in both the treatment and control groups in Chad would support at least one violent act. At the same time, nearly no respondents in Chad selected the “0 item count” option. In other words, nearly all respondents believe that some type of retribution is necessary for mocking an image of the Prophet Mohammed.

Tables 20 and 20A report the percentage item counts for each country and zone type.<sup>10</sup> For the most part, differences between core and non-core zones are inconclusive. The most consistent country is Niger, for which respondents in the non-core zones prefer lower item counts (i.e., less violent acts) than respondents in core zones. The control group in Burkina Faso is also fairly consistent such that individuals in the non-core zones prefer higher item-counts (i.e., more violent acts) than individuals in the core zones. The same relationship does not exist in the treatment group, nor does any such relationship exist in Chad.

**Table 20. Percent of Items Endorsed by Treatment Condition: Control Group**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
0 items	0.9	1.6	4.0	6.5	9.1	7.2
1 items	52.4	46.1	48.6	50.4	44.9	41.5
2 items	30.5	38.7	41.8	40.7	43.3	46.8
3 items	16.2	13.6	5.6	2.4	2.7	4.5
Total Respondents	334	310	249	248	187	265

**Table 20A. Percent of Items Endorsed by Treatment Condition: Treatment Group**


	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
0 items	0.3	2.0	3.7	4.1	7.7	8.4
1 items	45.7	37.7	45.0	53.7	43.1	42.1

<sup>10</sup> The statistical difference between core and non-core zones is provided in Figure 20.

2 items	38.5	45.3	41.7	38.2	41.4	42.5
3 items	11.7	13.4	8.3	4.1	7.2	4.6
4 items	3.8	1.6	1.2	0.0	0.6	2.5
Total Respondents	317	305	242	246	181	285

In addition to the average treatment effect, Figure 21 plots conditional treatment effects, that is, the interaction between treatment assignment and various relevant individual characteristics. The interactions in these regressions test the degree to which these individual-level characteristics predict the magnitude of the treatment effect. Or rather, they identify whether or not the propensity to support an attack against the embassy is larger for certain types of respondents. The individual characteristics selected for analysis include zone-type (core vs. non-core), gender, youth, religious extremism (as measured by support for Sharia Law), and approval of violence (as measured by approval of violence in defense of religion). The selection of these indicators was based on the types of individuals who might be more likely to support violent actions and, more precisely, the types of individuals who would require a covert item to express that support.

**Figure 21**



In Chad and Burkina Faso, individuals who believe that violence in defense of religion is justified are, respectively, 32% and 22% more likely to approve of an attack in a Western embassy, and the effect is statistically robust. In Niger and Burkina Faso, men are significantly more likely to support the attack. Finally, with regards to zone type, respondents in Niger core zones are significantly more likely to support the attack.

#### ENDORSEMENT EXPERIMENTS

Next, we implement two “endorsement experiments” that measure support for the extremist group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The endorsement experiment follows a similar structural logic as the list experiment, though its aim is to measure sympathy with active radical and extremist groups in the region, as opposed to approving of extremist violence (Bullock et al. 2011).

For the first endorsement experiment, respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of two prompts. In the control condition, the survey enumerator reads:

“The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccinations across {*Burkina Faso/Chad/Niger*}. How much do you approve of such a plan – not at all, somewhat, or quite?”

Treatment subjects, by contrast, encounter one additional detail:

“The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccinations across {*Burkina Faso/Chad/Niger*}. **It is likely that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group, will oppose this program.** How much do you approve of such a plan – not at all, somewhat, or quite?”

The baseline expectation is that individuals in the treatment group who sympathize to some extent with AQIM will be more likely than individuals in the control group to oppose the WHO program.

The models in Table 21 show that these differences are statistically significant. Pooling respondents by country, respondents are roughly 13% (Chad), 22% (Niger), and 21% (Burkina

Faso) more likely to oppose the program if it is also opposed by AQIM than if it is not. On the other hand, the treatment group contains individuals who are told that the Muslim extremist group will oppose the vaccination program. Given this heuristic, *nearly a quarter more individuals* oppose the program relative to the control group in Niger and Burkina Faso. Following the logic of the experiment, these individuals make decisions based on their positive evaluations of the extremist group.

**Table 21. Endorsement of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Disapprove of WHO Plan**

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Follows Extremist Cues	13.9***	22.6***	22.0***
Follows Extremist Cues (with controls)	13.4***	22.4***	21.2***

Table 22 displays the percentage of people who report to disapprove of the nation-wide vaccination program. The control group contains the individuals who evaluate the vaccination program on its own, with no group endorsement heuristic. Of these individuals, support for the program ranges from 13% in non-core zones in Chad to 32% in non-core zones in Niger.


	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Control Group	22.8	13.1	19.8	31.8	22.7	19.0
Treatment Group	39.3	24.7	43.5	53.3	44.6	41.0

**Table 22. Endorsement of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Disapprove of WHO Plan**

These findings are displayed graphically as average treatment effects in Figure 22 and we display the treatment effects conditional on zone type, gender, youth, and religious extremism. In Chad, respondents in core zones are 13% more likely than those in non-core zones to follow


the endorsements of the extremist group, while respondents in Niger’s core zones are 8% less likely than non-core zones to heed this endorsement. The endorsement effect is also significant among men in Niger and religious extremists in Burkina Faso.

**Figure 22**



The experiment contains more information than Average Treatment Effects. One might also be interested in the raw levels of approval for the policy, with and without the treatment condition. How many people would support the WHO policy to begin with? What kinds of people are they? Even if there are no significant differences between groups, this descriptive information is also useful. Figure 23 presents the marginal effects of each individual characteristic for both treatment and control groups. It is interesting to see that very few groups have prior opinions on the policy. Indeed, *there is only one control group* (the core communes in Chad) that shares opinions on the WHO policy without the endorsement heuristic.

**Figure 23**



In the second variant of this endorsement experiment, we tap into respondents' anti-western attitudes. The control group was asked whether they approve or disapprove of the following: "A recent proposal calls for cutting ties between Islamic countries and the West. These reforms may result in economic and political difficulties, but some believe that they will be worthwhile in the long-run. How do you feel about this proposal?" The treatment group learns that "A recent proposal **by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group**, calls for cutting ties between Islamic countries and the West. These reforms may result in economic and political difficulties, but some believe that they will be worthwhile in the long-run. How do you feel about this proposal?"

Although anti-western identity is prompted in control and treatment conditions, the endorsement procedure was designed to distinguish true sympathizers with the radical and violent AQIM from those who oppose Western interests in principle but who are unsympathetic to a violent extremist organization.

**Table 23. Endorsement of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Cutting Ties with West**

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Follows Extremist Cues	-2.8	-0.9	-3.1
Follows Extremist Cues (with controls)	-2.2	-1.0	-3.6

The endorsement does not identify a difference between vague anti-Westerners and *extremist* anti-Westerners. Table 23 indicates that people are less likely to support an anti-West position when it is endorsed by AQIM than when it is not endorsed. However, these differences are not statistically significant within countries (Table 23A).

Despite the findings from Tables 23 and 23A that including an endorsement by AQIM does not significantly increase or decrease the likelihood of overall levels of support in any country, there do appear nevertheless to be effects among some sub-groups of the target population in each country.

**Table 23A. Endorsement of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Cutting Ties with West**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
Control Group	38.1	26.7	37.4	22.0	24.9	24.3
Treatment Group	33.8	24.8	35.7	21.5	23.6	20.0

As Figure 24 shows, Core zones in Chad and Niger are more likely than non-core zones to approve cutting ties with the west given the endorsement by AQIM. Similar findings hold for religiously extreme individuals in Burkina Faso and violent respondents in Chad. Interestingly, young people in Chad are 8% less likely than adults to follow the extremist group's cues.

**Figure 24**





Figure 25 displays the average marginal effects per group and treatment assignment. These data provide some explanation for the mostly null findings in the second endorsement experiment. Upon closer analysis, the reason that the endorsement experiment did not generate differences between treatment and control groups may have resulted from the already-stable opinions of the groups. Within the control groups, core communes in Chad and Niger *already* support anti-West attitudes by large numbers, and an endorsement by the extremist group does not change that support. This finding, although technically a null finding, is important because it suggests that these groups are fairly extreme in their anti-West attitudes. On the other hand, we find that while religious extremists in Niger and Burkina Faso and those who approve of violence in Chad

and Burkina Faso support anti-West attitudes in the abstract, the endorsement experiment failed to elicit similar responses among this group.

**Figure 25**



In sum, when we compare the results of both endorsement experiments, we find that the heuristic of an extremist group is somewhat more effective in shaping ambiguous opinions than in changing opinions that may have already been formed. On the one hand, the endorsement from an extremist group can drive the policy-preferences among individuals who do not have

particularly strong prior preferences. On the other hand, the endorsement has a negative effect among individuals with strong prior beliefs.

#### IV. ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE QUALITATIVE EVALUATION

The qualitative study was designed to complement and provide an explanatory narrative to the findings of the quantitative evaluation. That is, respondents were encouraged to discuss their experiences freely rather than to respond to pre-defined survey questions. While many findings were constructive in fleshing out the quantitative analysis, some discussions clashed markedly from the survey results. In particular, many of the findings from the focus groups and interviews indicated higher general dissatisfaction and pessimism than the findings from the quantitative study. For example, citizens in each of the three countries reported far lower levels of political efficacy, less participation by women, and more youth violence than in the quantitative survey. As a prominent exception to this tendency, many of the discussions related to extremism indicated very high levels of moderation and tolerance that were not reflected in the quantitative survey.

The discrepancies between the quantitative and qualitative data would be best used to guide modifications to subsequent waves of data collection. In particular, the qualitative study suggested three key changes for the evaluation of the P-DEV II program: 1) an increased focus on individuals' experiences with program activities, 2) greater emphasis on violence as a means of solving problems, 3) an analysis of traditional political and social structures in addition to government institutions, and 4) a more thorough analysis of gender status and roles relationship to violence.

First, because the focus groups in Chad took place further along into the P-DEV II programming, the respondents were able to speak directly about their perceptions of the program and its success. A major complaint related to program follow-up. That is, while job-training or instructional programs were reported to have been executed effectively, participants felt as if they were left on their own too abruptly with little assistance. They argued that this rendered the programs useless in a context of high unemployment and little government assistance.

Therefore, later waves of data collection should do more than focus on exposure to P-DEV II programming and should also examine the *duration* of program exposure, what, if anything, the program does in terms of follow-up with participants, and what is its long-term impact.

Second, respondents in all three countries cited the presence of violence and conflict which was unrelated to religion or extremism. Focus group discussions and interviews argued that the vast majority of violence in these countries is generated by conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists fights over access to resources.

Resource conflicts included land ownership disputes, access to pasturage and common areas, and access to water wells. Land ownership disputes occur as different parties claim land or when individuals farm land that they do not own and original owners want to take it back. Access to pasturage has become scarcer as the amount of common lands and grazing areas has been reduced over time. This increases pressures from competition for land available to herders and farmers and can lead to conflict over the available resources.

Interview and focus group data suggests that these problems stem from poor local governance and that disagreements over scarce resources serve as potential alternative drivers of disagreements. Some respondents noted a local governance failure as city mayors sell property, often without notice. A woman in focus groups noted that: “we are not usually informed when there are public information meetings,” regarding the sale of land in Niger. (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Niger and Burkina Faso*, 3).

The severity of conflict varied in the qualitative data in the three countries. Conflicts arising from competition over communal lands in Niger were noted to be intense, particularly due to circulation of light and heavy weapons. In Burkina Faso, the conflicts were noted to be resolved through peaceful negotiations. In Chad, interview data suggests resource access serves as an alternative driver of conflict that rather than intolerance or extremism. The Imam of the mosque of Ati notes: “There are no disagreements or conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the city of Ati. We live in brother-hood between ethnic communities. There are land issues and problems around wells between individuals and also conflicts between herders and farmers.

Such conflicts are sometimes fratricide." (*PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Chad*, 5).

In the context of the PDEV II evaluation, most of the violence-related items in the quantitative survey related specifically to religious or ideologically-based violence and therefore did not identify resource conflict as a relevant driver of support for violence. Later waves of the survey questionnaire should incorporate questions about governance relating to the theme of resource conflict in order to examine the dynamics of additional types of violence (i.e., non-extremist violence) and how these may relate specifically to PDEV-II strategic objectives and interventions. Specifically, it will be important to evaluate whether the pressures from competition of resources and poor governance serve as drivers of violence and whether the program assumptions about interventions are appropriate given evidence of violence experienced by participants in their everyday lives.

Finally, the lack of attention to traditional institutions could misrepresent these societies. While it is true that citizens have little faith in government, the focus groups suggest that traditional institutions exert real political and social power which needs further consideration in the P-DEV II impact assessment. These traditional governing bodies mediate conflict and provide channels for citizen participation. In the current state of the program and evaluation, it is not clear how citizens compare traditional and governmental institutions or what P-DEV II hopes to achieve in terms of perceptions and functioning of traditional institutions.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

This report has described the data collection and preliminary results for the evaluation of USAID's Peace through Development II (P-DEV II) Program in West Africa. P-DEV II is a five year program that began in October 2012 and is operating in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso in a diverse range of sectors, including media, dialogue, community development, and youth engagement, all with the main objective of countering violent extremism. This report represents a baseline assessment of the P-DEV II program in relation to its strategic objectives and stated goals. In 2013, IRD-InterMedia and the University of Pittsburgh EAS evaluation team conducted

baseline surveys in “core” zones (receiving access to *all* P-DEV II activities) and “non-core” zones (only receiving access to P-DEV II radio programming) in the three countries.

To evaluate the baseline status of these core and non-core zones, the EAS team created a survey instrument based on the original IRD-InterMedia instrument but which also incorporated an array of new, innovative items to capture the dynamics of violent extremism in each country. Because all communities are evaluated using similar survey instruments in the early stages of the program, these comparisons help detect differences between core and non-core zones at the onset of P-DEV II activities. In the long run, comparisons between core and non-core zones will allow identification of community-level differences that can be achieved through implementation of the full range of the P-DEV II program activities compared to communities that only receive the radio component of the program. The report also provides a baseline assessment for some targeted demographics relative to others such as youth vs. non-youth and male vs. female. Finally, qualitative evidence from focus groups and interviews highlighted some of the most prominent issues for citizens in the region and suggested new topics for subsequent evaluation.

The most critical finding of the study is that the targeted P-DEV II zones in each country do show vulnerability to violent extremism on many, though not all, of the indicators corresponding to the strategic objectives and goals of the program. In terms of social cohesion, the three countries fare relatively well. Greater than half of the sample in each country belongs to some groups, trusts his neighbors and political institutions, and has participated in politics (at least through voting). Similarly, the civic and economic outlook within the three countries is mostly positive. For example, wide majorities of respondents in all countries are optimistic about the future and believe that the country is headed in the right direction. Nevertheless, in each country there is a substantial amount of support for extremist violence and extremist ideologies. For all countries and zone-types (with the exception of the non-core zones in Niger), at least a quarter of the sample believes that violence is an effective way to solve problems. Considerable majorities of respondents in Chad and Niger support implementation of Sharia Law, and in the case of Niger there is very wide support for very strict observance of the Law. Also, an

embedded experiment found between 13 and 22% of respondents possibly following the cues of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in making decisions about policy.

We also found important discrepancies between the quantitative and qualitative data that could potentially inform modifications to program implementation and guide subsequent waves of data collection for the evaluation. Insights from the qualitative study call for an increased focus on individuals' experiences with program activities including follow-up, increased attention to the existence of non-extremist support for violence, greater emphasis on violence as a means of solving problems and local conflicts, increased attention to traditional political and social structures in addition to government institutions, and gender roles and relationships to violence.

A second goal of this report was to compare baseline data between core and non-core zones in each country. With subsequent waves of data collection, this comparison will allow for an evaluation of the full range of P-DEV II activities relative to the radio programming. Table 24 below organizes the substantive differences between core and non-core zones in thematic order. The expectation was that core zones would be significantly worse off than the non-core zones, thus meriting more comprehensive P-DEV II intervention. Burkina Faso displays this pattern fairly consistently. In this country, positive indicators related to social cohesion, resilience, and outlook have significantly higher values in non-core zones, and negative indicators related to vulnerability to extremism have significantly lower values in non-core zones. Niger and Chad, on the other hand, are far less consistent. Each has a long list of indicators for which there are no significant differences between core and non-core zones, and in some instances the results are the opposite of what was expected. For example, in both Chad and Niger, group membership and diversity is higher in core zones than non-core zones. Also, in Chad, many vulnerability indicators are higher in non-core zones than core zones. Meanwhile, in Niger, outlook indicators tend to be higher in core zones.

Therefore, with the exception of Burkina Faso, we find little evidence of consistent and anticipated differences between core and non-core zones. As noted above, some of these differences may also reflect effects of P-DEV II program activities that had already taken place by the time of the data collection. Efforts made to disentangle these processes were not conclusive,

but from the analyses we were able to conduct it does not appear that early P-DEV II activities had substantive effects in a consistent direction on the outcomes of interest to the study.

**Table 24. Summary of Findings for Differences Between Core and Non-Core Zones**

		<b>Chad</b>	<b>Niger</b>	<b>Burkina Faso</b>
<b>Social Cohesion</b>	Core Zones Higher	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Group membership</li> <li>▪ Group diversity</li> <li>▪ Normative social inclusiveness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Group membership</li> <li>▪ Ethnic and religious bias</li> </ul>	
	Core Zones Lower	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Institutional trust</li> <li>▪ Ethnic and religious bias</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Institutional trust</li> <li>▪ Perceived social inclusiveness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Group membership</li> <li>▪ Interpersonal trust</li> <li>▪ Institutional trust</li> <li>▪ Perceived social inclusiveness</li> <li>▪ Normative social inclusiveness</li> <li>▪ Political participation</li> <li>▪ Ethnic and religious bias</li> </ul>
	Inconclusive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Interpersonal trust</li> <li>▪ Perceived social inclusiveness</li> <li>▪ Political participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Group diversity</li> <li>▪ Interpersonal trust</li> <li>▪ Normative social inclusiveness</li> <li>▪ Political participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Group diversity</li> </ul>
<b>Resilience to Violent Extremism</b>	Core Zone Higher	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Vocational school</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Vocational school</li> <li>▪ Attitudes toward violence</li> <li>▪ Anti-West attitudes</li> <li>▪ Religious extremism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Perceptions of vulnerability</li> <li>▪ Attitudes toward violence</li> <li>▪ Anti-West attitudes</li> </ul>
	Core Zones Lower	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Perceptions of vulnerability</li> <li>▪ Attitudes toward violence</li> <li>▪ Religious extremism</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Vocational school</li> <li>▪ Political efficacy</li> <li>▪ Religious extremism</li> </ul>
	Inconclusive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Access to jobs</li> <li>▪ Political efficacy</li> <li>▪ Anti-West attitudes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Access to jobs</li> <li>▪ Political efficacy</li> <li>▪ Perceptions of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Access to jobs</li> </ul>

			vulnerability	
<b>Youth Outlook</b>	Core Zones Higher		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Life satisfaction</li> <li>▪ Economic outlook</li> <li>▪ Conflict outlook</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Life satisfaction</li> </ul>
	Core Zones Lower			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic outlook</li> <li>▪ Education outlook</li> <li>▪ Civic outlook</li> </ul>
	Inconclusive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Life satisfaction</li> <li>▪ Economic outlook</li> <li>▪ Education outlook</li> <li>▪ Civic outlook</li> <li>▪ Conflict outlook</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Education outlook</li> <li>▪ Civic outlook</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conflict outlook</li> </ul>

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APPENDICES FOR BASELINE REPORT FOR IMPACT EVALUATION OF  
THE PEACE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM II (P-DEV II)  
IN CHAD, NIGER, AND BURKINA FASO

APPENDIX I: DEMOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTIONS OF COUNTRIES

Figure I-1







Figure I-2




**Figure I-3**



**Figure I-4**



**Figure I-5**



**Table I-1. Demographics by country and core/non-core**

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
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
	<b>Core</b>	<b>Non-core</b>	<b>Core</b>	<b>Non-core</b>	<b>Core</b>	<b>Non-core</b>
Male (%)	49.5	41.2	42.9	48.7	61.7	69.7
Age	32.0	31.9	32.4	34.4	35.1	36.3
Youth (% ages 15-30)	56.2	58.2	53.2	44.2	44.5	41.8
Illiteracy (%)	33.0	36.2	29.1	30.7	44.1	43.7
Primary + (%)	33.6	24.3	40.9	29.8	26.2	15.7
Religious attendance	5.4	4.8	5.0	5.4	5.1	5.1
Household items	3.3	2.4	4.1	3.3	2.9	2.1

## APPENDIX II: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE BY SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The results in this section detail the differences between the IRD-InterMedia and EAS iterations of the baseline surveys. As indicated in Section II-C, there are three fundamental differences between the two surveys: 1) items on the questionnaires; 2) the selection of core and non-core zones; and 3) the timing of data collection. The first of these differences has been addressed previously in this report. The second distinction is critical to understanding the divergent outcomes between the core and non-core zones. That is, demographic and substantive differences at the baseline may result from the process by which core and non-core zones were initially selected by IRD-InterMedia. Because surveyed communes were not selected at random, the timing of data collection was off by a few months, and since the EAS survey introduced new items, it is important to assess demographic differences between the core and non-core zones in both surveys.

Figure II-1 depicts the differences in gender between the two surveys. The IRD surveys in Niger and Chad maintained a nearly equal balance between male and female respondents, while the Niger and Chad EAS samples are more disproportionately female. Both surveys have a significant male majority in Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, both surveys are nearly equivalent in terms of the percentage of youth (respondents between the ages of 15 and 30) compared to non-youth in each country (Figure II-2).

**Figure II-1. Percent female/male, by survey**



**Figure II-2. Percentage youth/non-youth, by survey**






Figure II-3 shows that EAS-surveyed zones (both core and non-core) are less educated than the zones surveyed by IRD-InterMedia. For example, over 60% of EAS respondents in Chad report being illiterate or having informal education only compared to less than half of IRD-InterMedia respondents. Similar differences between surveys can be seen in Niger and Burkina Faso.

In terms of religious attendance (Figure II-4), the zones surveyed by IRD-InterMedia are somewhat more religious than the EAS zones. These differences are especially notable in Burkina Faso, where 60-70% of the IRD-InterMedia sample attends religious services at least six days a week, but only 50-60% of the EAS sample attends so frequently. However, the most religious zones (core and non-core) are those from the EAS Niger sample, where 60-70% of the sample reports to attending services all seven days of the week.

**Figure II-3. Educational attainment, by survey**




**Figure II-4. Religiosity, by survey**



Next, the household item suggests that EAS sampled zones, particularly the core zones, are substantially poorer than the IRD-InterMedia sampled zones (Figure II-5). The largest differences are in Chad, where 80% of the core zones sampled by EAS report owning 0-3 household items, while 50% of the core zones in the IRD-InterMedia survey report having the same number of household items. The surveys are most similar in Burkina Faso, where there are no noticeable differences between surveys.

**Figure II-5. Household item index, by survey**



To summarize, the data suggest that there are multiple differences in demographic indicators between the IRD-InterMedia and the EAS samples, though those differences do not appear to be systematic. In terms of education and poverty (as measured by the household item index), EAS zones are marginally worse off than IRD-InterMedia zones, though the differences also vary substantially across countries. In addition, the IRD-InterMedia zones tend to be more religious than the EAS zones. It will be important to consider the differences between surveys as the report progresses to the substantive analysis of goal-level indicators.

**Table II-2. Demographic profile by country and survey**

	Chad				Niger				Burkina Faso				
	Core		Non-Core		Core		Non-Core		Core		Non-Core		
	IRD	EAS	IRD	EAS	IRD	EAS	IRD	EAS	IRD	EAS	IRD	EAS	

Male (%)	54.7	45.2	50.7	35.1	45.8	38.7	52.2	43.6	62.6	60.7	65.9	72.9
Age	32.5	31.6	32.0	31.9	32.9	31.7	34.9	33.7	35.9	34.2	35.0	37.4
Youth (%)	54.1	58.0	57.1	58.9	50.5	57.4	40.5	49.5	41.4	47.9	45.9	38.4
Illiteracy (%)	21.7	42.2	30.5	39.7	31.5	25.6	38.9	19.1	37.0	51.7	29.8	55.3
Primary + (%)	42.7	26.1	33.9	18.2	43.5	37.0	26.5	34.5	28.1	24.3	17.7	14.1
Religious attend.	5.5	5.3	5.4	4.5	4.8	5.3	5.1	5.8	5.5	4.7	5.0	5.1
Household items	4.1	2.6	3.1	1.9	4.3	3.8	3.1	3.6	3.0	2.7	2.1	2.0

## APPENDIX III: GOAL-LEVEL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN

**Table III-1. Group membership and diversity**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Group membership	9.7***	18.1***	12.7***	14.3***	12.7***	6.4*
Two or more groups	10.2***	17.2***	13.1***	14.4***	8.8***	7.2*
<b>Group diversity</b>						
Sex	3.1	0.2	-1.8	-3.1	6.5	5.6
Religion	3.4	-4.8	6.6 <sup>+</sup>	-5.2	3.3	3.1
Ethnic	5.8*	-1.2	0.7	1.3	-5.2	6.1 <sup>+</sup>
Political	-1.6	3.0	-1.5	1.8	5.9	2.8
Age	1.0	-0.6	1.4	4.0	-4.0 <sup>+</sup>	0.4

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-2. Trust indicators**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
<b>Interpersonal trust</b>						
People willing to help	4.9 <sup>+</sup>	2.3	2.3	-5.1 <sup>+</sup>	-2.6	-3.5
Naïve to trust people	-4.8	-2.2	6.6	3.6	-1.6	-5.1
<b>Institutional trust</b>						
Local authorities	3.6	-5.8*	0.6	-2.9	-2.6	-1.9
Central government	5.7*	-3.9	-0.7	-4.0	-7.2*	-5.6*

Religious authorities	-1.9	-2.5	0.1	1.1	-8.0**	-3.1 <sup>+</sup>
NGOs	-3.2	2.4	2.0	1.0	-3.5	-5.7*
Police	-0.4	3.2	-2.9	-1.6	-4.2	-4.7 <sup>+</sup>

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-3. Community decision-making: who makes the decisions?**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Ordinary people	6.4*	2.7	2.7	1.1	2.9	-0.2
Women	-0.5	-8.0**	-3.6	1.8	1.3	1.4
Youth	6.7 <sup>+</sup>	7.0*	0.2	11.7**	-3.3	2.4
Own tribe/ethnic group	6.5 <sup>+</sup>	0.9	-5.6	10.6*	2.5	1.1
Other tribes/ethnic grps.	8.5*	3.8	-3.6	4.8	-0.8	1.1

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-4. Community decision-making: who SHOULD make the decisions?**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Ordinary people	10.3**	-0.1	-4.2	2.8	6.9 <sup>+</sup>	2.7 <sup>+</sup>
Women	-10.8**	-10.0**	-3.1	2.4	0.1	-2.2 <sup>+</sup>
Youth	4.0	2.1	1.8	7.5*	3.8	-1.6
Own tribe/ethnic group	2.5	0.1	-2.1	6.0	1.9	0.6

Other tribes/ethnic grps.	6.1 <sup>+</sup>	2.8	-2.9	4.1	1.2	0.9
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+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-5. Political participation**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Commune meeting	9.4***	15.1***	9.7***	5.0 <sup>+</sup>	14.9***	14.3***
Contacted official	3.8 <sup>+</sup>	8.4***	1.5	2.4	21.3***	9.2**
Notified local problem	3.9 <sup>+</sup>	12.4***	4.7 <sup>+</sup>	4.0 <sup>+</sup>	18.7***	16.5***
Protest or demonstration	3.6	2.3	9.1*	1.8	12.9**	-1.5

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-6. Ethnic bias**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Interethnic voting	-4.1	4.3	-7.9*	5.2	-8.5 <sup>+</sup>	5.9
Interethnic marriage	-9.4*	3.0	-3.0	5.5	-5.7	-0.6

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-7. Access to jobs and vocational school**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
NOT difficult to get a job in the country today	-1.9	-3.2	0.5	-0.2	3.9	0.5

NOT difficult for a young person to find a job after leaving school	-0.5	-3.4	2.5	2.0	-2.0	2.8
Accessible vocational training	4.8	4.1	3.5	4.2	1.7	1.2

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-8. Political efficacy**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
My opinions respected by local leaders	4.5	9.2**	1.3	1.7	5.0	-4.3*
Local gov't considers opinions of citizens	7.9**	8.6**	0.6	1.0	1.3	-1.0
People like me have a say in what gov't does	8.1**	5.5*	-3.3	1.5	-0.1	2.6
Feel well-prepared for engaging in political life	8.6*	11.7**	1.3	6.2	5.2	7.1

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-9. Perceptions of vulnerability**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Ethnic differences tend to divide people in your village	-0.7	1.9	-2.0	2.6	2.3	-0.6
Ethnic divisions lead to	3.9	4.3	0.9	-0.8	6.4 <sup>+</sup>	-0.5

violence						
Religious differences tend to divide people in your village	-3.3	-2.0	-2.4	0.3	3.6	4.7 <sup>+</sup>
Religious divisions lead to violence	-1.2	2.5	1.8	2.3	0.3	-1.5
Commune/neighborhood affected by violence	0.4	-0.3	0.7	2.7	8.7 <sup>**</sup>	2.7

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-10. Attitudes toward violence**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Violence effective to solve problems	-0.3	0.9	7.4 <sup>**</sup>	0.8	5.0	6.2 <sup>*</sup>
Violence against civilians in defense of religion is justified	1.9	3.8	4.0	-0.9	7.3 <sup>*</sup>	-0.6
Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	1.7	5.3 <sup>*</sup>	1.5	2.9	0.2	7.2 <sup>**</sup>
Al Qaeda's violent actions are permitted under Islamic law	-1.9	-1.2	1.3	-2.4	-5.3	-0.8

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-11. Anti-west and extremist attitudes**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
U.S. is at war against Islam, not terrorism	2.8	2.7	2.4	1.5	3.0	9.0*
Gov't should NOT work with western countries to fight terrorism	3.2	2.8	-4.3	-5.3	5.2	1.9
We should be governed by Sharia Law	3.2	3.0	3.6	8.1 <sup>+</sup>	-3.8	1.8
Strict observance of Sharia Law precisely as written in the Qur'an.	4.3	1.5	0.3	5.4	-5.4	11.6*

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-12. Satisfaction with life and economic outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Life satisfaction 2 years ago	-0.3	1.8	-3.6	2.5	1.1	-0.6
Life satisfaction now	0.5	0.1	-7.0*	0.3	-0.3	-4.7
Life satisfaction 2 years from now	1.6	2.3	-6.8*	0.9	2.6	-2.9
The country's economy is better than a year ago	2.7	9.5**	-9.3 <sup>+</sup>	4.8	10.6*	5.2

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-13. Educational outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
My school is/was a safe place	-2.5	1.1	-0.1	-2.2	-2.6	-0.7
I received a good education	-1.2	-2.7	-3.2	0.6	-3.6	-3.6
My school has/had enough supplies	-3.4	3.3	-0.8	-4.7	-7.8 <sup>+</sup>	-9.2*
Middle school is for both boys and girls	-1.6	-2.2	-4.0	0.9	-4.0	0.3

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-14. Civic outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Political knowledge	13.7***	18.5***	19.2***	12.9***	12.3*	25.7***
Interested in community affairs	3.9	5.6	4.3	11.2*	5.1	-3.2
Interested in national politics and affairs	2.6	4.8	-6.1	13.9**	12.0*	1.8

Country is headed in the right direction	1.6	-2.6	-6.2*	1.2	-0.4	-1.5
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+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table III-15. Conflict outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Youth involved in the use of violence (IRD)	1.2	-7.0*	-4.5	3.6	6.8*	-0.3
Youth involved in the use of violence (EAS)	2.4	2.7	7.9	-0.4	-2.9	-2.1

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## APPENDIX IV: GOAL-LEVEL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YOUTH AND ADULTS

**Table IV-1. Group membership and diversity**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Group membership	-1.7	-4.2	2.2	-5.1	6.5	-2.1
Two or more groups	-4.3	-3.8	-2.5	-7.3*	5.4	-1.1
<b>Group diversity</b>						
Sex	5.6	2.6	3.4	-1.0	-6.9	-7.2
Religion	7.9	5.8	1.2	0.7	-6.9	-9.0 <sup>+</sup>
Ethnic	-0.2	4.7	7.7*	-5.7	-6.8	-5.3
Political	1.9	-3.2	7.2 <sup>+</sup>	-8.6*	2.7	-3.8
Age	3.5	5.5	7.8*	-2.9	3.9	-1.5

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-2. Trust indicators**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
<b>Interpersonal trust</b>						
People willing to help	-2.8	-1.1	4.7	-2.5	0.7	1.5
Naïve to trust people	-5.2	-2.2	11.6 <sup>+</sup>	5.9	8.1	-8.4
<b>Institutional trust</b>						
Local authorities	-1.9	-0.5	-1.5	-1.0	0.9	4.9 <sup>+</sup>
Central government	-0.9	-2.5	0.3	-1.6	0.9	2.0

Religious authorities	-5.7 <sup>+</sup>	-4.2	0.1	0.4	-0.8	1.1
NGOs	1.3	-5.7	2.5	-0.1	-1.6	0.9
Police	-1.3	0.9	1.3	-0.6	4.0	1.4

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-3. Community decision-making: who makes the decisions?**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Ordinary people	-2.9	0.1	-5.1	-10.3**	2.0	3.8 <sup>+</sup>
Women	-0.7	1.1	-5.1	-5.2	2.2	0.1
Youth	-1.6	2.3	-8.4	-9.2	-1.3	0.6
Own tribe/ethnic group	2.0	-1.5	-7.9	-0.6	0.4	-0.9
Other tribes/ethnic grps.	0.7	0.8	-8.5	5.4	9.5	1.1

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-4. Community decision-making: who SHOULD make the decisions?**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Ordinary people	-0.4	-3.6	-3.6	-1.5	6.1	0.5
Women	-3.2	1.2	-3.6	-3.1	1.3	0.7
Youth	-2.6	0.6	0.0	-2.5	6.5	1.8
Own tribe/ethnic group	-3.5	-1.0	-5.4	7.7	2.1	-0.3
Other tribes/ethnic grps.	-2.6	0.6	0.0	-2.5	6.5	1.8

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-5. Political participation**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Commune meeting	-3.3	-4.8	-0.1	-3.1	-10.8*	-6.0
Contacted official	-4.0	-3.4	-0.1	-2.7	-6.9 <sup>+</sup>	2.1
Notified local problem	-2.2	-3.3	-1.6	-9.8*	-9.0*	-2.6
Protest or demonstration	-2.5	-1.5	2.3	3.0	-0.3	14.1*

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-6. Ethnic bias**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Interethnic voting	1.6	-4.5	1.8	1.4	11.2 <sup>+</sup>	-8.7
Interethnic marriage	2.4	-1.1	3.4	3.0	6.0	1.1

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-7. Access to jobs and vocational school**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
NOT difficult to get a job in the country today	1.2	0.0	0.9	0.8	2.9	0.9
NOT difficult for a young person to find a job after leaving school	3.2	2.2	-1.6	2.8	-0.3	1.5
Accessible vocational training	-1.4	-7.3 <sup>+</sup>	4.7	-5.2	-3.0	-3.8

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-8. Political efficacy**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
My opinions	0.9	-1.1	-4.7	-5.3	5.4	5.5*

respected by local leaders						
Local gov't considers opinions of citizens	-2.4	-1.9	-8.6*	-9.7**	2.0	5.6*
People like me have a say in what gov't does	-4.8	3.3	-2.3	-1.2	6.1	4.1
Feel well-prepared for engaging in political life	-1.9	5.9	-8.8	-9.1	3.6	4.5

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-9. Perceptions of vulnerability**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Ethnic differences tend to divide people in your village	-9.8**	-9.1*	-1.0	-8.9*	1.4	4.0
Ethnic divisions lead to violence	0.7	1.6	3.4	-1.1	3.1	5.0
Religious differences tend to divide people in your village	-8.7*	-0.4	2.6	-4.5	11.4**	6.2
Religious divisions lead to violence	-5.5	-3.6	-0.7	-1.4	3.3	-3.9
Commune/neighborhood affected by violence	-3.5	-5.7	-0.4	-0.8	0.5	2.5

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-10. Attitudes toward violence**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Violence effective to solve problems	-0.6	-6.1	-1.6	0.6	4.1	-3.0
Violence against civilians in defense of religion is justified	-0.5	-4.1	1.6	-0.8	2.4	2.2
Violence in the name of Islam can be	-1.4	-2.1	0.2	1.5	8.6*	6.6 <sup>+</sup>

justified						
Al Qaeda's violent actions are permitted under Islamic law	-5.0	-4.3	0.7	-1.2	11.8*	3.4

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-11. Anti-west and extremist attitudes**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
U.S. is at war against Islam, not terrorism	5.7	6.7 <sup>+</sup>	6.0	1.9	5.3	3.6
Gov't should NOT work with western countries to fight terrorism	-0.7	-1.8	6.1	0.5	-8.1	-3.3
We should be governed by Sharia Law	-2.4	3.7	3.9	7.1	5.4	6.4
Strict observance of Sharia Law precisely as written in the Qur'an.	2.4	4.7	10.5 <sup>+</sup>	4.1	14.2*	8.2

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-12. Satisfaction with life and economic outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Life satisfaction 2 years ago	-4.9	-7.1 <sup>+</sup>	-2.8	-3.5	3.2	-1.8
Life satisfaction now	-1.7	-1.8	-1.3	-3.2	4.2	6.9 <sup>+</sup>
Life satisfaction 2 years from now	-4.1	-5.4	4.7	-1.8	-2.6	-2.1
The country's economy is better than a year ago	10.3*	6.9	-11.5 <sup>+</sup>	-4.8	-2.3	-0.4

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-13. Educational outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
My school is/was a safe place	-3.2	-9.0 <sup>+</sup>	2.2	2.1	2.4	5.6
I received a good education	-5.4	-7.0	3.3	6.5 <sup>+</sup>	-3.0	-1.3
My school has/had enough supplies	0.9	0.0	-3.6	2.5	5.7	4.9
Middle school is for both boys and girls	0.3	-4.3	7.9 <sup>*</sup>	3.1	2.1	-8.0 <sup>*</sup>

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-14. Civic outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Political knowledge	10.6 <sup>*</sup>	3.8	-8.1	-8.6	-6.7	-11.4 <sup>*</sup>
Interested in community affairs	-7.1	-4.7	2.1	4.9	8.6	-0.7
Interested in national politics and affairs	-2.1	-0.3	-2.7	3.4	-2.9	-2.0
Country is headed in the right direction	-1.6	4.4	4.8	-6.4	0.8	0.9

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table IV-15. Conflict outlook**

	Chad		Niger		Burkina Faso	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Youth involved in the use of violence (IRD)	1.6	2.2	1.8	3.0	1.8	-0.9
Youth involved in the	-3.7	-3.2	0.5	1.5	-0.3	7.2

use of violence (EAS)						
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+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## APPENDIX V. EXPLORATORY ANALYSES OF THE IMPACT OF EARLY P-DEV II ACTIVITIES

As reported in Section II.C, a number of P-DEV II program activities had already taken place in all three countries prior to data collection (See Table 2). The quarterly reports submitted by IRD to USAID indicate that some core communes had actually seen more than ten activities take place by the time the survey interviews were undertaken, whereas a few others had not yet begun their planned programming. Records suggest that the number of individuals in each commune who had direct experience with early PDEV-II program activities ranged from 150 to 30,000. Therefore, there is a chance that differences between core and non-core zones reported in the previous section may reflect some “early” effects of the program. This section presents an exploratory analysis on whether pre-data collection P-DEV II activities had an impact, if any, on program goals.

We strongly caution that these results are not definitive, given the relatively small number of PDEV-II activities that were reported in the pre-data collection phase, and the lack of perfect information about the number of activities that took place, the type of activities they were, and the number of people that attended the events. It is also the case that in Burkina Faso, all but one of the core-zones had PDEV-II activities before the data collection, so the results of the “core/non-core” analyses are nearly identical to the “activity/no-activity” analyses. This means that the analysis in this section will be limited to Chad and Niger only. Finally, given the non-randomized nature of the selection of communes to be PDEV II core/non-core areas, and the non-randomized nature of the selection of core zones into “early activities/non-early activities” areas, using single-shot “cross-sectional” data to estimate program impact presents a host of potential statistical difficulties even in the best of circumstances. These analyses, then, represent our best efforts to estimate whether some of the core/non-core distinction reported earlier in

this document in fact are not “baseline differences” but rather reflect some impact of the program activities that took place before the data collection period began. A much more comprehensive and detailed analysis of P-DEV II impact will be undertaken with longitudinal data after follow-up interviews are conducted with respondents at program mid- and endlines, currently scheduled for 2015 and 2017.

Selection of core communes for early P-DEV II activities

As shown earlier in section III.A, core and non-core communes in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso differ on basic aggregate demographic characteristics. Some communes have a larger male population than others, some are more educated or better off economically, and some differ in their degree of religiosity. We showed, for example, that core zones are more educated, better off economically, and slightly more religious than non-core zones. In this section, we assess whether these differences systematically determine the probability of receiving early P-DEV II intervention and compare it to the probability of having core/non-core zone designation regardless of early program activities. We do this by regressing aggregate commune-level demographic indicators (age, % male, education, household items, and religiosity) on a dichotomous indicator of whether the commune had any early P-DEV II activities or no P-DEV II activities. Table V-1 shows the results.

**Table V-1. Targeted communes for early P-DEV II activities**

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
Age	0.026***	-0.041***	-0.009**
Male (%)	0.011***	-0.025***	0.006***
Education	0.171***	0.150***	-0.348***
Household items	0.005	-0.054***	0.438***
Religiosity	-0.048***	0.100***	0.032**

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

In Chad, early P-DEV II activities targeted core communes that were less religious, with higher levels of education, and roughly equal in terms of economic status as measured by the household item index. In Niger, P-DEV II activities targeted communes with higher levels of religiosity, more education, and slightly poorer. This is in contrast with the simple core/non-core distinction where core communes are less educated and better off economically. In Burkina Faso, the results show that differences between communes with and without P-DEV II activities match up almost identically with differences between core/non-core communes.

These results suggest the presence of commune-level “selection effects” in Chad and Niger. In other words, the program systematically targeted core communes with a certain demographic profile for early P-DEV II intervention. We do not find evidence of a similar selection effect in Burkina Faso, which is expected, given that only one core zone had not yet begun its scheduled programming. This means that the results of the core/non-core analyses will be virtually identical to the activity/no-activity analyses. Therefore, our estimates in this section will be restricted to Chad and Niger only. The selection effects in Chad and Niger mean that some of the differences on outcomes relevant to the study we may see between communes that experienced PDEV-II activities and those that did not may be due to the demographic differences between the communes. These differences will need to be taken into account when assessing early program impact, just as they were in the previous sections when we analyzed the differences between core and non-core zones.

#### Exploratory assessment of “early” program effects

To assess whether early P-DEV II had effects on program goals<sup>11</sup>, we use a dichotomous indicator of whether any activities had taken place in each commune prior to data collection. We use a simple “activity/non-activity” variable, given the relative uncertainty we have about how

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<sup>11</sup> This section reports only on the variables that were measured by both the EAS and IRD surveys.

extensive the activities were in each zone, that is, whether a zone that experienced two activities may have had the same number of individuals reached through the program as another zone with five or more activities. The tables below present three regression models: 1) an “adjusted” core/non-core zone model that replicates the baseline results from the previous section; 2) a naïve or “unadjusted” P-DEV II model using only the activity indicator as a regressor; and 3) an “inverse probability weighted regression adjustment model” (IPWRA) that accounts for commune-level selection effects and also adjusts for age, gender, education, religious attendance, and the household item index at the individual level.

IPWRA is a matching method for observational data that uses a probability-weighted regression estimator following a three-step approach. First, we estimate a “selection” model like the one in the previous section to predict the likelihood that a commune had early activities based on demographic characteristics. Next, we compute propensity scores using inverse-probability so that all respondents are weighted to represent individuals in communes with P-DEV II activities. Finally, using the estimated inverse-probability weights, we fit weighted regression models of program outcomes for activity/no-activity communes and obtain predicted outcomes for each respondent. Therefore, the IPWRA model estimates the average difference in program outcomes between core communes with early P-DEV II activities (“treatment” communes) and a weighted average of comparable communes (in terms of aggregate demographics characteristics) without P-DEV II activities (“control” communes).<sup>12</sup> It also adjusts for possible differences in the individual-level effects of the demographic characteristics in the activity and non-activity zones. Hence this final model represents an analysis that accounts for both commune-level and individual-level differences in demographic factors that may explain differences in program outcomes, *independent* of the possible effects of the PDEV-II activities that took place in those areas.

## **CHAD**

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<sup>12</sup> No-activity or “control” communes include all non-core zones and six (6) core zones in Chad and two (2) in Niger that had not yet begun their planned programming at the time of data collection.

*Goal 1: Social Cohesion*

Table V-2 shows that early program activities have no effect on group involvement and group diversity in Chad. These results stand in contrast with significant differences between core/non-core zones and between “treatment” and “control” communes without accounting for selection effects. Once we adjust for these factors, differences in group membership and diversity are eliminated completely.

**Table V-2. Group membership and diversity**

	Chad		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
Group membership	0.044*	0.040	0.023
Two or more groups	-0.028	0.008	0.036
<i>Group diversity</i>			
Sex	0.011	0.033	0.044
Religion	-0.037	0.115***	-0.036
Ethnic	0.042*	0.076**	0.012
Political	0.057*	0.110***	-0.040
Age	0.034	0.086***	0.018

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Regarding interpersonal trust, communes with early P-DEV II activities show some differences from communes without activities in Chad. Table V-3 indicates that respondents in communes

with activities are 16.8% more likely to think that people are willing to help than respondents in comparable communes without activities. In addition, the negative pattern of systematic distrust in institutions found between core/non-core zones vanishes almost entirely in communes with early P-DEV II activities.

**Table V-3. Interpersonal and institutional trust**

	Chad		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
<i>Interpersonal trust</i>			
People willing to help	0.029	0.014	0.168***
<i>Institutional trust</i>			
Local authorities	-0.076***	-0.088***	0.014
Central government	-0.066***	-0.108***	0.042
Religious authorities	-0.075***	-0.061***	0.050
NGOs	-0.048**	-0.100***	-0.060
Police	-0.064**	-0.059**	0.100**

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

In terms of social inclusiveness, Table V-4 shows no discernable differences between communes with early PDEV-II activities and those with no activities in Chad. The small significant differences in political participation between core/non-core zones become indistinguishable once accounting for selection into the treatment.

**Table V-4. Social inclusiveness**

	Chad		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
<i>Who makes decisions in the community?</i>			
Ordinary people	0.024	0.001	0.012
Women	-0.003	-0.016	0.000
<i>Political participation</i>			
Commune meeting	-0.036	0.002	0.042
Contacted official	-0.006	0.028	-0.004
Notified local problem	-0.036*	-0.017	-0.023

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

*Goal 2: Resilience to Violence Extremism*

Table V-5 indicates that early P-DEV II programming had no impact on people’s beliefs about the ease or difficulty of getting a job or access vocational training in Chad. Respondents in communes with early P-DEV II activities are indistinguishable from those in communes without early activities.

Early program activities in Chad had no impact on political efficacy. The results in Table V-6 show that respondents in communes with P-DEV II activities are 7.6% more likely than respondents in communes with no activities to think that local leaders respect people’s opinions, though this difference is not statistically significant at the .05 level. In addition, there are no discernable program effects on the belief that people can influence politics or public policy.

**Table V-5. Access to jobs and vocational school**

	Chad		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
NOT difficult to get a job in the country today	0.008	-0.094***	-0.002
NOT difficult for a young person to find a job after leaving school	0.031*	-0.072***	-0.016
Accessible vocational training	0.046*	0.094***	0.074

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table V-6. Political efficacy**

	Chad		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II	P-DEV II

		Unadjusted	IPWRA
My opinions respected by local leaders	-0.012	-0.003	0.076
Local gov't considers opinions of citizens	0.012	0.051*	-0.005

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

The results from Table V-7 suggest that early P-DEV II activities had little impact on perceptions of vulnerability in Chad. Again, these results are in contrast with the differences found between core/non-core zones and between activity/no-activity communes without taking into account selection effects. There is, however, a small positive effect of the program on perceptions of violence. Respondents in communes with early program activities are 7.8% less likely to think their commune is affected by violence.

**Table V-7. Perceptions of vulnerability**

	Chad		
	Core	P-DEV II	P-DEV II
	Adjusted	Unadjusted	IPWRA
Ethnic differences divide people	-0.061**	0.121***	0.049
Religious differences divide people	-0.034+	0.064**	-0.002
Commune affected by violence	-0.073***	0.079***	-0.078

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Finally, Table V-8 shows that early P-DEV II activities in Chad appeared to have had an overall

effect on attitudes towards violence in the opposite direction than intended, though the effects are relatively small in substantive magnitude. These results stand in stark contrast with the more positive findings regarding differences between core/non-core communes. Respondents in communes with early program activities are roughly 6 to 7% more likely to think violence is effective, to justify violence against civilians and in the name of Islam than those in comparable communes with no activities.

**Table V-8. Attitudes toward violence**

	Chad		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
Violence effective to solve problems	-0.063***	-0.075***	0.061*
Violence against civilians in defense of religion is justified	-0.048**	-0.077***	0.069**
Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	0.015	-0.068***	0.062***

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

*Goal 3: Youth Outlook*

Early program activities in Chad had no effect on life satisfaction, educational outlook, or civic outlook. The results from Table V-9 show that respondents in communes with early P-DEV II are slightly more satisfied with life than respondents in comparable communes that had no early activities and also more likely to believe that school should be diverse in terms of gender, although these differences fail to reach statistical significance. There is no evidence of program effects on the expected life satisfaction 2 years from now or on the belief that the country is headed in the right direction.

**Table V-9. Satisfaction with life, civic outlook, and educational outlook**

	Chad		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
Life satisfaction now	0.001	0.063***	0.060
Life satisfaction 2 years from now	0.026	0.012	0.001
Country is headed in the right direction	-0.043*	-0.067***	0.028
Middle school is for both boys and girls	-0.064***	0.012	0.070

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

To summarize, respondents in communes with early P-DEV II activities in Chad show marginal increases in interpersonal trust in line with program expectations along with marginal increases in approval and justifiability of violence that were not in line with the program’s goals. On balance, however, there appear to be no substantively important differences between communes with or without early PDEV-II activities.

## **NIGER**

### *Goal 1: Social Cohesion*

The results from Table V-10 suggest that respondents in communes with P-DEV II activities were

more likely to report membership in groups than respondents in communes without activities. These increased group involvement, however, has not translated in increased group diversity. In fact, it may have had a slight negative effect on gender diversity in communes with early activities, as 14.7% report that the groups they belong to do not include both men and women.

**Table V-10. Group membership and diversity**

	<b>Niger</b>		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
Group membership	0.086***	0.045*	0.052*
Two or more groups	0.029	0.035	0.071**
<i>Group diversity</i>			
Sex	-0.043	-0.108***	-0.147***
Religion	0.003	0.021	0.013
Ethnic	0.008	-0.013	-0.018
Political	0.012	-0.010	-0.041
Age	-0.006	-0.022	-0.025

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

For interpersonal and institutional trust in Niger, Table V-11 shows that the differences between communes with and without P-DEV II activities replicate those found between core and non-core communes. There are no early program effects on interpersonal trust and negative effects on trust in local authorities, the central government, NGOs, and the police. No differences are found for trust in religious authorities. It is possible, then, that early P-DEV II program activities may have heightened skepticism about certain institutions.

**Table V-11. Interpersonal and institutional trust**

	<b>Niger</b>		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
<i>Interpersonal trust</i>			
People willing to help	0.011	0.020	0.026
<i>Institutional trust</i>			
Local authorities	-0.032	-0.072***	-0.073**
Central government	-0.049*	-0.101***	-0.105***
Religious authorities	-0.005	-0.007	-0.021
NGOs	-0.055**	-0.069***	-0.080***
Police	-0.137***	-0.175***	-0.210***

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Regarding social inclusiveness, Table V-12 shows no evidence of early program effects in Niger. The small differences between core/non-core zones in community decision-making and attending commune meetings disappear once we account for selection effects.

**Table V-12. Social inclusiveness**

	<b>Niger</b>		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
<i>Who makes decisions in the community</i>			
Ordinary people	-0.052**	-0.100***	-0.005
Women	-0.044*	-0.138***	-0.038
<i>Political participation</i>			
Commune meeting	0.034	-0.029	-0.030

Contacted official	0.015	0.052**	0.000
Notified local problem	-0.015	0.047**	0.007

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

*Goal 2: Resilience to Violence Extremism*

The results in Table V-13 show that early program activities had a small negative impact on people’s beliefs about the ease of getting a job in Niger. Respondents in communes with early P-DEV II activities were, respectively, 6.7% and 4.4% less likely to think that it is not difficult to get a job in the country and that it is easy for youth to get a job after leaving school. However, early P-DEV II activities strongly increased the likelihood (14.6%) of thinking that vocational training is accessible.

**Table V-13. Access to jobs and vocational school**

	Niger		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
NOT difficult to get a job in the country today	-0.008	0.014	-0.067**
NOT difficult for a young person to find a job after leaving school	-0.004	0.001	-0.044*
Accessible vocational training	0.110***	0.124***	0.146***

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Regarding political efficacy, early program activities in Niger had no discernable impact. Note how the strong and negative effects on political efficacy shown by the “unadjusted” P-DEV II model in Table V-14 disappear once selection effects are accounted for in the IPWRA model.

**Table V-14. Political efficacy**

	Niger		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
My opinions respected by local leaders	-0.022	-0.093***	-0.027
Local gov't considers opinions of citizens	-0.048*	-0.117***	-0.015

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Moving to perceptions of vulnerability, Table V-15 suggests that early P-DEV II programming in Niger had an overall impact against the intent of the program. Respondents in communes with early program activities are significantly more likely than those in communes with no activities to perceive that ethnic and religious differences divide people “somewhat” and “a lot” and to think that their community is “sometimes” or “often” affected by violence. It appears that early P-DEV II activities may have slightly magnified the small baseline differences found between core and non-core communes.

**Table v-15. Perceptions of vulnerability**

	Niger		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
Ethnic differences divide people	0.009	0.079***	0.075**
Religious differences divide people	0.035	0.105***	0.095***
Commune affected by violence	0.032	0.023	0.136***

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Finally, the results in Table V-16 indicate that communes with early P-DEV II activities may have

seen a similar kind of effect on attitudes toward violence in Niger, i.e., in the opposite direction as intended by the program. Respondents in communes with early program activities were 9.2% more likely to think violence is effective and 12.3% more likely to justify violence against civilians in the name of religion than respondents in comparable communes that had no early interventions. These counter-intuitive effects are only seen in the full model that adjusts for commune-level and individual selection effects. There are, moreover no discernable early program effects on one of the indicators, that of justifying violence in the name of Islam.

**Table V-16. Attitudes toward violence**

	Niger		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
Violence effective to solve problems	0.070***	-0.002	0.092***
Violence against civilians in defense of religion is justified	0.049**	0.020	0.123***
Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	0.009	-0.042*	0.012

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Early program activities in Niger had a positive effect on life satisfaction but a strong negative impact on civic and educational outlook. Table V-17 suggests that early P-DEV II activities improved current life satisfaction but had a negative effect on the belief that Niger is headed in the right direction and on the belief that school should be inclusive of boys and girls.

**Table V-17. Satisfaction with life, civic outlook, and educational outlook**

	Niger		
	Core Adjusted	P-DEV II Unadjusted	P-DEV II IPWRA
Life satisfaction now	0.097***	0.098***	0.056**
Life satisfaction 2 years from now	0.086***	0.072***	0.003
Country is headed in the right direction	0.063**	-0.036	-0.088***
Middle school is for both boys and girls	-0.011	-0.084***	-0.100***

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

To summarize, respondents in communes with early P-DEV II activities in Niger show marginal increases in group membership and life satisfaction that are in line with the goals of the program, along with marginal increases in distrust of institutions, perceptions of vulnerability, justifiability of violence, and negative civic and educational outlooks that were not the intent of the program. There are, however, no substantively important differences between communes with or without early PDEV-II activities in Niger.

## CONCLUSION

This section presents an exploratory analysis of whether early P-DEV II activities that took place prior to data collection had any impact on program goals in Chad and Niger. The overall results suggest some differences between communes that experienced PDEV-II activities and

communes that did not, with some showing possible effects that were in the opposite direction as the program intended. However, the results are mixed, not substantively large, and not in a particularly systematic positive or negative direction. As a result, we are unable to reliably disentangle “baseline differences” presented in the body of the report from “early P-DEV II activity” effects due to data limitations. We await follow-up data collection and more extensive information about actual PDEV II activities so that program effects can be estimated with more certainty with longitudinal data as the project goes forward. Impact analyses will be undertaken more comprehensively as follow-up waves of data are gathered at the project’s mid- and endlines which are scheduled for 2015 and 2017.

## APPENDIX VI. QUALITATIVE REPORTS

### **PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Niger and Burkina Faso**

**Sheldon Gellar, May 20, 2014**

#### **Survey Background**

Niger is a predominantly Muslim country with at least 95% of the population Muslim. Niger has a long tradition of relatively peaceful multiparty politics although it has seen periodic rebellions by the Tuaregs and two military coups in the past two decades. Niger has greater security problems to deal with because of its porous borders with Mali and Nigeria and the proximity of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mouvement pour L'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), and Boko Haram.

Burkina Faso has what is basically a one-party system and has been ruled by the same president since the late 1980s. Political decision making is top down and dominated by the president. Youth in Burkina Faso is more willing to demonstrate and to use violence in protests while the Burkina regime is more likely to use violence to repress demonstrations and other signs of political opposition than in Niger. Although Muslims comprise the single largest religious group in the country, Christians and adherents of traditional African religions comprise important shares of the population and comprise at least 50% of the population.

Both countries have massive youth unemployment, dysfunctional educational systems, and low status of women.

*Organization and Objectives of the Qualitative Survey (QS)*

The PDev II Baseline Impact Study qualitative survey was designed to complement the extensive quantitative survey undertaken by the Evaluation and Analytical Services (EAS) Project in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, the three PDev II project countries.

Unlike the quantitative study which had a long questionnaire geared towards finding more information about the populations' knowledge of- and response to- PDev II activities and themes, the qualitative survey was more open, and designed to capture how the populations saw and described their situation, their problems, concerns, and recommendations concerning what could be done to improve their situation.<sup>13</sup>

The focus groups and interviews incorporated the main themes concerning PDev II. However, the evaluation team also used terms like "security", "insecurity," "violence," and "conflict" and avoided terms like "extremism". We used the more general term "governance" rather than "local governance" to solicit responses to how people felt about the government at all levels rather than focus uniquely on local government. We also used "tolerance" as a main theme and the situation of youth and women. Although we did not formally ask questions about the utility and impact of vocational education and the running of Koranic schools, respondents did talk about these issues during the focus groups and interviews.

We noted some discrepancy in the responses of participants in the focus groups and those interviewed. Officials--e.g., prefects, mayors, and security officials tended to provide a more positive image of people's satisfaction with governance and the state of security. This should not be surprising since local populations when interviewed in the Sahel often overstate their grievances while officials overstate how well things are going.

Interviews and focus groups in Niger were conducted by CASPA (*Centre d'Analyses et d'Actions Pour la Sécurité et la Paix*); a Niamey-based firm specializing in peace and security issues.

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<sup>13</sup> Another major objective of the quantitative survey was to identify and provide training to three research organizations/*cabinets* in the three countries to conduct the interviews and surveys. TMG identified CASPA in Niger, CERFODES in Burkina Faso, and Development Services in Chad and signed contracts with these organizations. Sheldon Gellar under the auspices of the University of Pittsburgh provided a week's training each in Niger and Burkina Faso while Ezzedine Moudoud provided similar training in Chad.

Interviews and focus groups in Burkina Faso were conducted by CERFODES (*Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et de Formation pour le Développement Economique et Social*); a Ouagadougou-based firm specializing in gender, decentralization, and development issues. CASPA and CERFODES staff each received a week's training in methodology by the evaluation team before refining themes; finalizing choice of sites to be visited and conducting a test focus group.

In Niger, CASPA concentrated on focus groups outside of Niamey, which had one focus group comprised of young people—e.g. students, representatives of youth associations, etc. Focus groups also took place in Agadez, Tabelot, Alhassas and Azel, Tessoua, Tillaberi, Ballayara, Maradi, and Zinder for a total of 9 focus groups. Eight interviews were conducted, three in Niamey and five in the interior with religious leaders, elected local government, security, and administrative officials. One of the important components of the focus groups outside the capital was a section on food and environmental security which highlighted the extremely precarious daily situation of ordinary Nigeriens. Because of time, distance, and resource constraints, CASPA was not able to conduct focus groups in Diffa.

In Burkina Faso, CERFODES organized three focus groups in Ouagadougou (CAC, Women, and Youth). Six other focus groups were held in the interior: (1) Ouahigouya (CAC) ; (2) Markoye (Women); (3) Seguenéga (Women); (4) Ours (Youth) (5) Gorgadji (Men); and (6) Seytenga: (Youth)

Eight in-depth interviews were held that included Protestant and Muslim religious figures, a mayor, a regional youth representative, two leaders of a new citizen movement and traditional chiefs.

Differences in responses in Burkina Faso and Niger can be attributed to two factors: (1) PDev II activities in Burkina Faso were launched for the first time in 2013 in contrast with Niger where PDev II activities were started much earlier; and (2) the different political, religious and security situations in the two countries.

## **NIGER: KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS**

### **A. Governance and Citizen Participation**

*Corruption.* There is a widespread mistrust of Nigerien politicians who are regarded as corrupt and working primarily for their own interests. This theme was highlighted in 8 of the 9 focus groups. In Niamey, a Protestant minister argued that political corruption reflected “a decline in traditional morality.” In Zinder, a communal government official put some of the blame on the people who “encourage corruption by giving money to government officials.

*Discrimination and Lack of Concern for the Poor.* This theme came out in 7 of the 9 focus groups. Focus group participants complained that the political elite discriminated against certain regions-e.g. Agadez-- and favored their own families, friends, and political allies when allocating land and jobs. Growing inequality was attributed to lack of concern for the poor.

*Decentralization Not Working.* This theme was expressed in several ways: non-transfer of resources to communes, poor understanding of decentralization texts and roles of officials and citizens, lack of consultation and consideration of population’s priorities; and rapid selling-off of public lands by city mayors that reduce herder and farmer access to a shrinking natural resource base. Women in focus groups complained that “we are not usually informed when there are public information meetings.”

*Low level and poor quality of public services.* Many of the focus groups expressed dissatisfaction with poor quality schools, health centers, and roads.

*Lack of communication between the government and the people.* There is a disconnect between the government and the people.

### **Religious and Ethnic Tolerance**

*General Harmony among Muslims.* Niger has long and strong traditions of religious tolerance and acceptance of all Muslims.

*Tensions between Izala and other Muslims due to Izala attitudes of superiority.* Izala/Wahhabi forms<sup>14</sup> of Islam clash with Sufi and other more traditional forms of Islamic practices in Niger. In some of the focus groups, participants complained that the government was not doing enough to control Izala/Wahhabi preachers' criticizing of Sufi and other moderate Islamic groups.

*Good Relations between Muslims and Christians.* Christians agree but cite bullying and teasing of Christian school children in public schools in Niamey.

*Harmony among Ethnic Groups.* However, Fulanis are feeling discriminated against. In Tillaberi, a security official warned that "Fulani frustration and complaints about discrimination were a powder keg ready to explode."

### Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts

*Food insecurity and concerns over having access to a shrinking natural resource base.* The population has risen from 3 million in 1960 to over 17 million in 2013. Population pressures make it increasingly difficult for Nigerien families to earn a living from farming and livestock activities. Food shortages are a frequent phenomenon in Niger.

*Security from terrorists improved in Agadez region and in towns near Malian border.* Niger's alliance with the West's anti-terrorist coalition has enabled the country to beef up its security forces on Niger's Malian border and provided more protection to Nigerien in border areas. On the other hand, a canton chief interviewed in Niamey from the Diffa region which borders with northeastern Nigeria where Boko Haram is strong and has easy access to Diffa exclaimed: "We are afraid! We are afraid!"

*Insecurity growing in rural and border areas, which lack police presence.* On the other hand, the Government of Niger (GON) has concentrated its security forces in urban areas. It lacks the resources to adequately police rural areas.

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<sup>14</sup> Izala Muslims are Wahhabi in doctrine which emphasizes rigid observance of Sharia religious laws and is critical of Sufi forms of Islam which venerate Muslim spiritual guides as intermediaries between Allah and the people. Izala is a Wahhabi movement originating in Northern Nigeria and spreading to Niger in the 1980s. Wahhabi and Sufi forms of Islam often clash throughout the Islamic world.

*Violent crimes by youth increasing in most areas.* The rise in crime is attributed to high youth unemployment and loss of hope which in turn leads to greater drug use and to various forms of violence—rape, gang wars, attacks on individuals and property.

*Conflicts between herders and agriculturalists increasing and becoming more violent.* This phenomenon is occurring as a result of growing competition for access to land and grazing areas which are becoming increasingly scarce. Conflicts are becoming more violent and deadly because of increased circulation of both light and heavy weapons and increased drug use.

*Political conflicts generally manageable.* The Nigerien political class is used to sharing power and to opposition coming to power. The political class constitutes a relatively homogeneous and aging elite used to negotiating with each other. Unlike Burkina Faso, Nigerien students seem less willing to violently confront the government. Conversely, the government in Niger is more reluctant to use violence against young students to repress political demonstrations than the government in Burkina Faso.

### Youth and Women

*Youth unemployment is high and is the cause of many societal ills.* These include breakdown of parental authority, generational conflicts, drug use, youth delinquency, violent street gangs, participation in crime networks, disengagement from politics, rural exodus, and migration.

*Poor quality of public schools leading to expansion of number of children going to Koranic schools.* The overcrowding, low standards, and lack of employment opportunities are leading parents to take their children out of school early; not send them there at all; or to recruit their children into Koranic schools where they are at least getting a moral education. This is contributing to a growing pool of unskilled youth with no hope for the future.

*Lack of vocational schools.* Focus groups expressed concern that training was not accompanied by access to tools and entrepreneurial training and deplored the lack of training in agricultural skills. Some complained, “We don’t have a single agricultural agent in our district.”

*High rates of school dropout among young girls.* This phenomenon is accompanied by early marriages and young unwed mothers. Prostitution is also on the rise.

*Limited access of women to commercial training, credit, and land needed to generate income.*

The focus groups reveal that non-elite women are the main losers in Nigerien society. They are not heard. Their subordinate status has been rarely addressed at the grassroots level. When participating in women's focus groups, the female participants' main concern was support for earning a living. On the other hand, women speaking as part of the urban elite were more confident and demanding a greater role in decision-making and representation in political bodies. A woman lawyer and activist in human rights organizations in Niamey said, "We need to push for parity in the National Assembly."

Focus groups held in Agadez and other Tuareg areas indicated that the people there were not entirely happy with the implementation of the peace agreement ending the *Mouvement Nigérien pour la Justice* (MNJ) Tuareg insurgency because of the failure to provide more employment in the region and opportunities for ex-combatants to become integrated into Niger's security forces. One young man complaining about the lack of employment opportunities in his district said, "Take a look, here we have only guitar players and consumers of drugs."

#### General Recommendations of Focus Groups

Concrete recommendations put forward in the Niger focus groups often resembled traditional "*doléances/ checklist of needs*," They called for lower fuel costs, roads, improved health and educational services, reduced school fees and more scholarships, vocational and professional education programs that provide training for commerce, mining and extraction professions, and agriculture/livestock in addition to mechanics, tailors, welders, etc.. Access to water and land were major requests in order to permit irrigated agriculture and diminish conflicts over access to urban plots, farm land, grazing areas, and water sources.

## **BURKINA FASO: KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS**

The entries for the key themes and findings for Burkina Faso had much in common with those found in Niger with a few notable exceptions which will be discussed later.

### Governance and Citizen Participation

*Autocratic Rule and Top-Down Decision-making.* People interviewed and in focus groups feel that the leaders ruling the country do not listen to them. Decisions are imposed from above without consultation and discussion. In the capital, critics speak out against the president's efforts to create a Senate and to run for still another term after being in power since 1986. A popular reggae singer has written a song entitled "No to the Senate". A woman says, "The government is deaf ... and does nothing." The government uses violent means to put down peaceful political protests and harasses journalists criticizing the president. In the past, journalists have been murdered.

A major disconnect exists between the state and the people. Decisions are top down with little consultation with the people. There are few functional intermediary institutions between the grassroots level and national political echelons. Internal democracy within Burkina Faso's political parties is not very developed. Opposition political parties do not offer much hope for change. Some efforts are being made to channel youth discontent and violence through the creation of citizen movements like CIBAL (The Broom Sweeps), led by a journalist and a popular reggae singer, and an independent press to promote political reforms.

*Lack of Communication between the Government and the People at All Levels.* The president rarely addresses the public. His major policy speeches are often delivered outside the country. There are few mechanisms to connect people at the grassroots with regional and national authorities

who “live in their pyramids and see nothing below.” “The government treats young people like little children.” The government no longer listens to the customary chiefs who incarnate the past. For their part, the people do not look to the state-run media to get their information. They listen to private and international sources.

*Corruption and Lack of Concern for the Poor.* As in Niger, there is a widespread belief that corruption is rampant and that the president and those in power are reaping the fruits of new foreign private investment and increased levels of foreign aid. Income gaps are growing between the political elite and the rest of the population. The government shows little concern for the poor. As one customary chief in the capital remarked, “it is we the chiefs who show concern for widows, orphans and the poor.” There is a strong sense that government favors the rich over the poor.

*Violent Protest Demonstrations as Advocacy.* Young members of focus groups argue that the only way to get the attention of the government is to organize violent protests. “The only time the government listens to us is when we break public property and use violence to be heard.” Violent protests at the communal level have forced mayors to meet the demands of the demonstrators.

*Decentralization New and Not Yet Working.* Decentralization is relatively new in Burkina Faso. Participants in the focus groups admit that they do not know how the communal institutions are supposed to function and their role. “Having lived in autocratic societies where commoners don’t question their rulers, people are still reluctant to say what they really think,” says one mayor. Consultative institutions at the communal level are just starting to be put in place. In some instances, mayors who represent the party in power act autocratically and use their authority to advance their interests. In other communes, the mayors are more open to listening to the people. People seem to have more of a chance to be heard at the communal level than at the regional and national levels.

The focus groups in the interior indicated that communal institutions are very weak, often captured totally by the politicians who make little effort to consult their constituents. People complain about the lack of transparency and sharing of information, especially information concerning budgets. They also seem to lack any sense of accountability. At the same time, there seems to be little popular understanding as to how local government is supposed to function and the extent to which citizens have the right to hold elected officials accountable and to publicly express opposition.

### Religious and Ethnic Tolerance

*General Harmony among Religious Groups.* Focus groups affirmed religious and ethnic tolerance as part of the country's cultural traditions. Many Muslims, Christians, and adherents of traditional African religions still attend and celebrate each other's holidays. Sometimes, problems arise over intermarriage between Muslims and Christians when families of the couple do not accept intermarriage.

*Resentment against Sunni/Wahhabi Muslims.* In Burkina Faso, participants called Muslims labelled Wahabbi in Niger "Sunni."<sup>15</sup> Focus groups and interviewees expressed more negative views of Wahhabi/Sunni Muslims in Burkina Faso than focus groups and interviewees in Niger. Critics complain that the Wahhabis say that God doesn't hear the prayers of others and that Wahhabis see themselves as superior to others and pay people money to attend their conferences. However, Wahhabi/Sunni attitudes of superiority are creating tensions and could evolve into a major source of conflict, especially in rural areas in the North where people think that these groups are trying to take over the country and to impose their religious views with the complicity of the

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<sup>15</sup> Note that Sufis like Wahhabis are both Sunni Muslims. Sufis focus more on spiritual guidance by religious authorities while Wahhabis focus more on Sharia law.

government. Wahhabi Islam seems to be making major gains in the north as evidenced in the construction of many new mosques in cities like Ouahigouya.

*Fear of Violent Islamist Extremists Coming from Mali.* In the areas near the Malian border, participants in focus groups expressed the fear that Malians seeking refuge in Burkina Faso might be terrorists and bring violence to the country.

*Staying Power of Customary Chiefs as Guardians of Public Morality.* Many of the customary chiefs retain some of their former influence with the people and see themselves as guardians of public morality. The Moro Naba, the customary ruler of the Mossi people, the largest single ethnic group in the country, still carries a lot of clout and uses lower level chiefs to inform him of the situation on the ground. The Compaoré regime is trying to co-opt chiefs by offering them high political offices and salaries.

As in Niger, religious and ethnic tolerance is widespread and a major barrier to religious extremism in Burkina Faso.

### Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts

*Crime and Insecurity in Urban Areas.* Street crime is rising. Women members of a CAC in Ouagadougou complained that people seen as more affluent have become targets of aggression of angry young people who snatch their purses, break into their homes, and make their neighborhoods unsafe at night. They assume “that anyone that has a nice apartment or car is a corrupt government official.” New urban neighborhoods often have no public lighting and police stations. Urban focus groups also noted a rise in vigilante justice in response to growing street crime.

*Insecurity in Rural and Border Areas.* People in areas close to the Mali border are nervous about the presence of Malian refugees and foreign influences. Towns seem more secure than the border villages. On the other hand, the government seems to have bolstered its police and

security forces in these areas which have made Burkinabé residents feel more secure. Vigilante justice is also increasing as villages organize groups to keep watch at night. In rural areas, youth banditry is on the rise because young people no longer listen to their parents, are taking drugs and looking for easy money.

*Herder-Agriculturalist Conflicts.* Lack of access to pasturage and damage to crops are the main source of herder-agricultural conflicts. Though frequent, herder-agriculturalist conflicts are still manageable and often resolved through peaceful negotiations in contrast to the situation in many parts of Niger where conflicts are more intense. In focus groups, farmers often complained that herders did not do enough to prevent their animals from grazing on their land. The stakes are much lower for herders and agriculturalists in Burkina Faso which result in less intense herder-agriculturalist conflicts.

*Conflicts over Land.* Disputes over land ownership in rural areas occur when different parties make claim to the same land or when individuals farm land that they do not own and refuse to leave when the original owners want the land back. Customary chiefs, rural land owners and communal authorities often claim the right to sell and allocate the same piece of land. In urban areas, sub-contractors sell the same small lots to different people. Customary chiefs are losing out to state and communal authorities in this area and winding up losing major sources of income. Conflicts also incur when government authorities take land which traditional chiefs consider to be a holy site. Focus groups cite inequitable distribution of land by communal authorities as a major source of conflict.

*Conflicts with the Mining Companies.* Gold mining enterprises in the North have generated conflict. The mining companies do not hire locals and take over scarce water sources at the expense of local communities. Collaboration between elected officials and the mining companies are regarded by youth and local communities as grounded in corrupt practices. They see elected officials collecting bribes in return for making concessions to the mining companies.

*Political Conflicts.* Several focus groups pointed out that politics was divisive and a major catalyst of conflict, not just between the government and the people, but also between and

within political parties. Politics also has divided families and pitted brothers and sisters against each other. During election campaigns, politicians often recruit young people to disrupt and attack their rivals. When young people disagree with an official, they often use force to get their way. For example, in Oursi, youth burned down the city hall because the mayor built it near his home without consulting the people.

### Youth and Women

*Youth Unemployment.* High rates of unemployment and large numbers of school leavers give youth too much leisure time with little to do to occupy them. There are simply not enough employment opportunities to hire all the people seeking work. In the capital, youth experience discrimination. The children of the political and economic elite have no problem finding employment. In the interior, the gold mining companies discriminate against local youth. The government does too little in providing vocational programs for youth and for following training with tools and credit after they finish training. Poor youth cannot afford to go to vocational training schools. Many who join these programs are unmotivated and see these programs as something to do and a source of income rather than an opportunity to gain the skills needed for a livelihood.

*Poor quality of educational system.* Focus groups in rural areas complained about the quality of the educational system. Schools are overcrowded. Teachers are not well trained and do not care about their students. Many parents in rural areas do not encourage their children to stay in school. As one farmer noted "parents would rather have their children attend to their animals and sell cakes." Higher educational opportunities are concentrated in the capital. The University is overcrowded. University degrees no longer guarantee jobs. The wealthy prefer to send their children to private schools while many Muslim parents opt to send their children to Koranic school. Koranic schools do not provide the skills needed to earn a livelihood in a modern economy. However, attending a *madrassa* may provide employment opportunities for a tiny percentage of graduates as Koranic school teachers and Imams.

*Drug use and lack of motivation.* Drug use is increasing, especially in the capital. Focus groups indicate that parental authority is declining and complain that young people are “looking for easy money” and not eager to work at regular jobs. Difficulty finding work has led many youth to lose their motivation to work. Petty crime has become a way of getting money to pay for drugs and leisure activities and drugs use a means of escaping boredom.

*Subordinate role of women.* Men in rural areas are afraid of losing control over their wives if their wives become more educated and earn more money. They also see little reason to send their girls to school. Girls are pushed to get married at early ages and have little choice. Women are encouraged to stay at home and not participate in public affairs. In the capital, well educated women participate in politics and local government and mingle more readily with men. Huge gaps exist between attitudes towards women in the capital and in rural areas. Wahhabi/Sunni practices continue to maintain women in a subordinate role. As one observer in a predominantly Muslim region said, “this is a Muslim area, thus it’s the man who decides,”

*Aspirations for Autonomy and Participation.* Women’s focus groups reflected aspirations for women to become more independent and free to earn income. Female members of Community Action Committees (CACs) complained that they were not being consulted by communal authorities and not being notified of meetings of communal institutions. Women also asserted that they too needed vocational and professional training and access to credit, “If I had some financing, I could fatten some animals and use the profits to provide for my family and keep the children in school. I could become a model for other women.”

## **SUMMARY OF SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NIGER AND BURKINA FASO FINDINGS**

### Similarities between Niger and Burkina Faso

- Low level of citizen Confidence and Trust
- Low levels of citizen Participation
- Disconnect between political leaders and the People
- Non-functional decentralization institutions

- Citizen dissatisfaction with public services
- High levels of religious and ethnic tolerance
- Tensions between Izala/Wahabbi Muslims and Sufis
- Violent Islamist Extremism not a major danger
- Crime as a major source of insecurity
- Herder-Agricultural conflicts as a persistent phenomenon in rural areas
- Access to and allocation of land, grazing areas, and water a major source of conflict
- High potential for political protest because of citizen discontent
- High levels of unemployed youth
- Rising crime rates and drug use among youth
- Inadequacy of educational system and vocational training programs
- Low social status of women
- Limited opportunities for women to earn income
- Great social gap between urban women elite and poor urban and rural women

#### Major Differences between Niger and Burkina Faso

- Political violence (especially by youth) directed at government authorities and political figures is higher in Burkina Faso than in Niger.
- Nigerien politicians more responsive to public opinion than those in Burkina Faso.
- Niger is more exposed to the risk of terrorist activities originating in neighboring countries than Burkina Faso.
- Unlike Burkina Faso, Niger has a history of post-colonial ethnic and regional insurgencies.
- Niger's population is predominantly Muslim while Burkina Faso is more pluralistic.
- Family Codes and other legislation promoting women's rights are more controversial in Niger than in Burkina Faso.
- Customary authority and traditional African religious practices are stronger in Burkina Faso than in Niger.
- Food insecurity is much higher in Niger than in Burkina Faso.
- Herder-agricultural conflicts are much more violent in Niger than in Burkina Faso.

- Organized crime networks are more developed in Niger than in Burkina Faso
- Access to land, grazing areas, and water is more critical to survival in Niger than in Burkina Faso.

## **QUALITATIVE SURVEY FINDINGS AND PDEV II PROGRAMS**

The qualitative survey sought to identify the needs and priorities of populations in zones covered by the PDev II project. The QS survey focus groups and interviews evoked key themes and objectives found in PDev II programs and recorded how people responded to the following broad themes:

- Governance and Citizen Participation
- Religious and Ethnic Tolerance
- Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts
- Youth and Women

The QS did not seek to measure the impact of PDev II programs or evaluate their effectiveness. It was more concerned in finding out to what extent PDev II programs were based on accurate assumptions concerning the context in which it operated and the extent to which its goals, Strategic Objectives (SOs), and Intermediate Results (IRs) reflected the concerns and priorities of Nigeriens. The paragraphs that follow look at the pertinence of our findings to a sampling of PDev II programs.

One of the major PDev II objectives is to strengthen citizen participation, especially youth and women in local government institutions. PDev II efforts to reinforce local governance are now just beginning. The creation of CACs has not yet proved to be effective because these bodies are not necessarily representative and have no real decision-making powers. Communal institutions have few resources and the powers that they have exist largely on paper. PDev II did a good job of explaining how local governance is supposed to work. But it is not that evident that people have internalized and applied what they learned in actually dealing with locally elected authorities and institutions. Moreover, learning about the decentralization code does

not help people to identify and solve pressing local problems. PDev II also does not look at the implications for their programming of the disconnect between how local officials describe their role and how the local populations in general and youth in particular regard their officials—e.g. corrupt, unresponsive, divisive, etc.

PDev II has developed programs to promote religious tolerance. The QS indicates that Niger and Burkina Faso both had high levels of religious tolerance long before PDev II entered the scene. This suggests that it might be more useful for PDev II to work on getting religious authorities to work together to address and solve issues like rising crime rates, drug use, and political corruption and exposing the evils of violent Islamist extremism.

PDev II is correct in identifying vocational education as a major demand and need of unemployed youth. However, the QS indicates that (1) facilities are inadequate and very costly to users; (2) vocational and professional training in agriculture, herding, mining, and trade have been neglected; (3) there has been little or no follow up in providing materials, credit, and in entrepreneurial skills after programs have been completed; and (4) vocational programs do not guarantee employment for its graduates.

PDev II leadership training focused on training youth to participate in local governance, promote tolerance and peace, and become part of local civil society. It tended to recruit from the children of the elite who are resented by the population at large. Youth civic education programs while addressing the need for peace, non-bullying in school, and civic education and safeguarding public property did not address tough issues like corruption, land grabs, lack of consultation with poor, and the growing gap between rich and poor.

The QS indicated that non-elite women have low status in society and no voice in decision-making. Elite women do not have this problem. Gender becomes a serious problem in PDev II programming. PDev II tends to work primarily with elite women and their daughters. Efforts to keep girls in school in rural areas, increase marriage age, and promote birth control are blocked

by Muslim religious authorities. PDev II may also find it difficult to get support for programs to upgrade status and skills of women in conservative rural areas.

### **NIGER REGIONAL VARIATIONS**

Niamey: Governance:

Little positive said about government which was characterized by:

1. Lack of concern for needs of people
2. State abdicating its responsibility to provide basic public services
3. Widespread corruption at the summit
4. Political complicity in drug trade
5. Elected officials imposed on people
6. People not involved in decisionmaking
7. Lack of civic responsibility (*incivisme*) and patriotism in general
8. Religious leaders interviewed cite general decline in traditional values and morality as major cause of widespread corruption

*Tolerance Issues:*

1. Islam open and tolerant; differences between Muslims but manageable
2. No major problems at university; all sects pray together
3. Good relationships between Christians and Muslims, despite isolated incidents
4. State supports religious neutrality
5. Generalized misery might lead to fundamentalism which might lead to extremism and violence.

### *Youth and Education*

1. Secondary and University infrastructure woefully inadequate
2. Little hope for employment with diplomas
3. Children of elites favored in employment
4. Primary schools overcrowded and underequipped.
5. Lack of vocational training programs
6. Little hope for future
7. Little was said about genre; only 1 woman there)

### Agadez Region

#### *Food and Environmental Insecurity*

1. Food insecurity
2. Lack of rainfall and access to water
3. Environmental degradation-grazing areas
4. Seeds delayed
5. High cost of food, fuel, and basic commodities

#### *Governance Issues*

1. Government discrimination against people in region and lack of concern for poor
2. Government not respecting its commitments concerning peace agreement with Tuareg rebels (MNJ) ; A potential threat to peace
3. Youth revolting because of dissatisfaction with governance
4. State not doing its job in providing public services and fighting drug trade.
5. Corruption in all sectors—schools, employment,

6. Agadez gets few benefits from mining activities in north
7. Relatively little transfer of resources to communal and regional government

### Security/Insecurity/ Conflicts

1. Massive flow of arms used by youth in drug trade and banditry
2. Defense forces provide a certain degree of security on borders. Beefed up security in region
3. Sense of inadequate integration of ex-combatants into Niger defense forces
4. Sultan says Agadez secure, appreciates PDEV II and donor efforts; focus groups don't agree, lots of violence; attacks by armed unemployed youth.
5. Conflict:
  1. Herder/agriculturalists- access to water, grazing lands, damage to crops
  2. Allocation of land unfair
  3. Religion becoming politicized through tolerance projects
  4. Some tensions with Wahhabi preachers, but no violence
  5. Political tensions during elections, but no major violence

### *Tolerance.*

1. Strong traditions of religious and ethnic tolerance and harmony
2. No major conflicts despite divisions within Islam
3. Muslims appreciate contributions of Christian population

### *Youth and Women*

1. Unemployment rampant, and leads to massive exodus and drug consumption
2. Discrimination against northerners in employment opportunities with mining companies and oil companies in north
3. Discrimination against poor in schools

4. Not enough vocational and professional training centers and no follow-up after training. No training for herders, agriculturalists, and occupations in mining and other extractive industries.
5. Drugs and drug-related crime a major plague in region. And cause of violence
6. Youth revolting against authority of elders
7. Youth not interested in agriculture and herding activities, want money fast
8. Girls drop out of school early; not encouraged to stay in school
9. Girls have little access to vocational training and training for commerce
10. Women have little access to credit to engage in trade
11. Women not doing well in selling artisanal products.

### Tessaoua

#### *Food and Environmental Issues*

1. Lack of wells and min-forages
2. High costs of ag inputs to improve productivity
3. Lack of ag projects
4. Danger to crops from locusts and crickets
5. High price of fuel
6. Degradation of roads

#### *Governance*

1. Rural landholders being disposed, land taken for urban construction
2. Political party competition peaceful
3. People ignorant of decentralization texts and don't know where and why tax money is spent; lack of communication
4. Perception of widespread corruption, security forces, schools

5. Rulers and political leaders discriminate and don't treat poor fairly

#### *Security/Insecurity/ Conflicts*

1. Reinforced security forces. Area deemed secure
2. Conflicts increasing :Herder-agriculturalists- lack of space for herders; access to water
3. Conflicts caused by high levels of ignorance

#### *Religious and Ethnic Tolerance*

1. Hausa preachers cause problems sometime with fundamentalist themes
2. System of control to insure that external preachers are invited by local religious leaders and that their sermons are reviewed in advance. Non Nationals not allowed to preach.
3. In general, religious tolerance and harmony

#### *Youth and Women*

1. High degree of youth unemployment, leads to high crime rates
2. High girl school dropouts
3. Lack of vocational schools

#### Tillaberi

#### *Food and Environmental Issues*

1. Lack of rainfall and animal fertilizer
2. Food insecurity
3. Little done to help agriculturalists and herders

#### *Governance*

1. Youth want to be integrated into Nigerien army and security forces
2. Unequal treatment of citizens
3. High cost of fuel

#### 4. Demands of youth

##### *Security/Insecurity/Conflicts*

1. Lack of security in the North; massive influx and use of small arms from Tuareg rebellion
2. Attacks in north from non-nationals coming from neighboring countries---e.g., Burkino Faso Mali, Ivory Coast, etc.
3. These attacks lead to reprisals from nationals who don't make distinction between nationals and non-nationals.
4. Growing conflicts and between herders and agriculturalists
5. Young
6. Fulani inciting violence to support their cause and sense of being discriminated against.
7. Creation of village-self-defense units not integrated with state security services
8. Presence of Jihadists but not organized enough to launch attacks.
9. High crime rates due to youth unemployment and drugs

##### *Religious and Ethnic Tolerance*

1. Absence of religious conflicts
2. Fulani sense of discrimination

##### *Youth and Women*

1. High drug use by children favors inactivity and unemployment
2. Lack of opportunities for youth leads to heavy drug use and crime
3. Rural exodus
4. No vocational training infrastructure for youth and no material and financial support after training.
5. Girl dropouts and prostitution

##### Ballayara (Rural Area)

### *Food and Environmental Issues*

1. Low food production; no fallow land left
2. No training for agriculture and raising livestock
3. Youth abandoning agriculture
4. Lack of state support for agriculture and herding

### *Governance*

1. Corruption in 3 N program
2. Land tenure allocation not fair
3. Authorities listen to populations

### *Insecurity/Security/ Conflicts*

1. Zone calm
2. Herder- agriculturalist conflicts—lack of grazing lands and passage ways for herds

### *Tolerance*

1. Religious harmony and tolerance- family dispute between Tijani imam and son who is Wahhabi. conflict there but controlled
2. Respect of others
3. Respect for merchants coming from out of country to cattle market

### *Youth and Women*

1. People sending kids to Koranic schools en masse
2. Drug use on the rise and rural exodus
3. No vocational training facilities
4. Lack of herder and farmer associations
5. Too many school dropouts and loss of knowledge learned
6. Girl dropouts and growing prostitution

### Maradi-Zinder

### *Food and Environmental Issues*

1. Lack of water
2. No mechanized agriculture
3. No mini-forages
4. No state support to agriculture and commerce
5. Difficult access to agricultural land (M)

### *Governance*

1. Widespread corruption in all sectors
2. Youth recruited by politicians
3. Lack of civic responsibility (*incivisme*)
4. Ignorance and lack of information and communication between government and citizens
5. Land allocated at record pace, no control
6. Discrimination against poor in general and access to hospital in Zinder in particular)
7. Rulers unjust and not interested in needs of people

### *Tolerance*

1. Zinder, a cosmopolitan city with good relations among different communities
2. Maradi, good relations between Muslims and Christians
3. Islam tolerant: 24 associations get along well and work together for peace
4. Divisions among different Muslim groups, but not major source of conflict

### *Security/Insecurity/Conflicts*

1. Porous borders, difficult to control who comes in
2. Herder-agriculturalists conflicts in rural outskirts of town
3. High drug consumption
4. Out-of control youth gangs engaged in robbery, rape, and violence

## *Youth and Women*

1. High Youth delinquency
2. Decline in morality and respect of elders
3. Emergence of violent *Palais* youth—assaults, rape, crime, pitched battles with other youth gangs
4. High unemployment and drug use
5. Vocational education facilities not adequate and no follow up.
6. People with diplomas can't find work
7. Massive migration to Nigeria and other countries
8. Few opportunities for women for training and access to credit to engage in commerce
9. Early school dropouts lead to precocious marriage, engagement in petty commerce, and prostitution
10. Girls victims of youth gangs
11. No legacy (*heritage*) to provide capital for girls.

## **BURKINA FASO REGIONAL VARIATIONS**

### Ouagadougou

#### *Governance*

1. CACs have a role and in place, consulted but no real decisionmaking authority
2. Government doesn't listen to youth or women
3. More participation at local level, but very little at national level
4. Decisions tend to be imposed from top down with little consultation with people
5. Strong opposition to creation of a new Senate
6. Need for CACs to be closer to people
7. Traditional land chiefs not consulted in local land issues.
8. Chiefs being politicized.

9. Public resources diverted to political elites ; widespread corruption
10. Growing gap between rich and poor and discrimination against poor in access to education and jobs.
11. State not taking care of poor
12. Political leaders don't keep promises
13. Lack of civic education and responsibility.
14. State information not accurate, prefer to listen to private independent media

### *Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts*

1. Growing anarchy and insecurity; crime and aggression by unemployed youth
2. Targets often people with means seen as gained through diverting state resources their way.
3. Urban neighborhoods lack health, sanitation, water, and educational services, public lighting and police presence
4. Vigilante justice growing
5. Land allocation of urban plots a major source of conflict.
6. Politics a major source of conflict; factions within ruling party; use of hired youth to intimidate political opponents.
7. Conflicts over intermarriage between Christians and Muslim sometimes lead to violence.

### *Tolerance and Intolerance*

1. Strong traditions of ethnic and religious tolerance
2. Good relationships between Muslims and Christians
3. Wahhabi influence creating tensions. Seen as outsiders with lots of money seeking to impose their views on others.

### *Youth and Women*

1. High rates of unemployment
2. Youth looking for easy money, don't want to work
3. Drugs and crime a growing problem
4. Educational system overcrowded and poor quality
5. Insufficient number of vocational and professional training programs
6. Training too long and expensive. Poor can't afford to pay.
7. Youth engaging in violent protests against conditions although they realize that violence isn't a solution. However, it is the only way the government seems to pay attention to their demands.
8. Women not listened to by men and not sufficiently informed about public affairs.
9. Women also need vocational and professional training.
10. High levels of female unemployment
11. Lack of autonomy and independence from husbands who don't want to let women work
12. Lack of credit to women for remunerative activities.

#### *Recommendations*

1. Civic education campaigns
2. Improve security and infrastructure in urban neighborhoods
3. Improve school systems, lower school costs, and provide more scholarships to students and access to more advanced programs
4. Equitable distribution of lots and parcels.
5. End discrimination against poor.
6. Create more vocational and professional training centers
7. Authorities need to listen to youth more through discussion fora
8. Support youth self-employment activities
9. Promote equal opportunities to obtain jobs to all without favouring wealthy.
10. Give more independence to women and opportunities to earn incomes.

### *Governance*

1. Newly created CACs adapt main objectives of PDEV II
2. Transparency in new communal institutions
3. Mayor listens to CACs
4. Views of CACs and communes not considered by prefects and High Commission.
5. Elected communal officials don't know their role
6. Lack of respect for public goods
7. Defiance of public authority.

### *Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts*

1. Conflicts caused by selling same piece of land to different people
2. Suspicion of corruption of those officials who "*mange/eat* " public resources
3. Politics a major source of conflict; youth from different parties often insult and fight with each other.
4. Agriculturalist-herder conflicts—lack of access to pasturage, damaging of crops, etc.
5. Area relatively secure, petty crime, but little armed robbery and banditry.
6. In villages, local youth groups keep a watch at night.
7. Poisoning of animals through too much fertilizer on soils. Animals die from eating grass.
8. Presence of foreign Muslim Malian refugees—who engage in violence

### *Religious Tolerance*

1. Traditions of tolerance among Christians and Muslims, attend each other's holidays.
2. Highly critical of Sunni (Wahhabi) newcomers supported by "desperate civil servants and needy youth." A powder keg. Fear of jihadists very strong.
3. Local populations believe that Sunnis have a plan to take over Burkina Faso and the Northern region. Send preachers from Ouagadougou. Hegemonic stance.
4. Authorities seem to be powerless in dealing with them and afraid of getting involved. A time bomb.

### *Youth and Women*

1. High degree of youth unemployment
2. No access to credit or economic activities and opportunities in gold mining limited  
Training inadequate; no follow up after training completed and long time to process requests for training. Also have to pay to be trained.
3. Use of drugs and alcohol
4. Women ready to engage in all kinds of activities but not engaged in public affairs.
5. Women not aware of what they can do.
6. Highly conservative social environment where men don't respect their wives and let them become more independent by working in economic activities.
7. Quotas for women not respected. Only 22 women out of 113 women on communal council.
8. Women work more than men.
9. Low levels of schooling and high dropout rates
10. Problem of unwed young mothers

### *Recommendations*

1. Improve access to employment
2. Training for jobs in gold mining sector
3. Public awareness campaigns against religious intolerance and making security forces more aware of Wahhabi hegemonic activities.
4. Campaigns against youth use of drugs and alcohol
5. Educate populations in urban hygiene and sanitation
6. Civic education campaigns
7. Train women and provide them with support structures to enable them to earn income
8. Need more involvement of public authorities in monitoring potential "Jihadists."

## Markoye (Women)

### *Governance*

1. Positive response concerning local authorities hearing local people. Youth and women participate in local communal affairs.
2. However, regional and national level authorities don't respect opinions and consult with local populations.
3. Women underrepresented in public ceremonies
4. Chiefs consulted but advice not always followed by administrative authorities.

### *Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts\*

1. Herder-agriculturalist conflicts- access to fodder, destruction of crops,
2. Antagonism of agriculturalists to herders who "always have their machetes."
3. Security ok. Women say they can sleep peacefully at night.
4. Source of insecurity, high youth unemployment which leads them to steal
5. Men worry about violence from Mali coming to Margoye which is near Mali border.
6. Government has beefed up security forces on Malian border. Fewer armed attacks

### *Religious and Ethnic Tolerance*

1. Religious and ethnic tolerance widespread
2. Muslims and Christians get along.
3. Problem with Sunni/Wahhabis who say other religions not on the good path.

### *Youth and Women*

1. Lack of youth employment, little choice of profession
2. High rural exodus
3. Discrimination against local youth in favour of external workers

4. Youth marched to protest lack of work; violent protest led to hiring of more local youth in mines.
5. Diplomas don't guarantee jobs.
6. Girls drop out or don't go to school
7. Early marriages
8. Women engaged in economic activities but lack financing.
9. Profits earned by women to be used to send and keep children in school.

### *Recommendations*

1. Ask government to insure greater access to work and more training programs for youth and women
2. Improve road infrastructure to facilitate trade and access to commune
3. Need more water facilities for drinking and farming.
4. Improve health centers
5. More economic independence for women. Need to make men more aware of this need.

### Seguenéga

#### *Governance (Women)*

1. Women participate in communal affairs, but participation limited because information goes only to a small group of women.
2. Opinion of women counts for little.
3. Decentralization new. People not used to question authority. Have to be taught their rights.
4. Mayor representative of local interests, but accused by local citizens of taking money from mining companies in granting them access to water supplies.
5. People don't say what they really think in public because of deference to authority.
6. Mayor asserts that texts call for *cadre de concertation communale* (which elsewhere has become CACs. Need for people understanding their roles.

7. Suspicion between mayor and local populations concerning his relationships with mining companies.

#### *Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts*

1. Insecurity because of banditry of youth who no longer listen to their parents, engage in robberies and aggression, taking drugs and looking for easy money. Women fearful for their lives.
2. Major source of conflict competition for use of water between commune and mining company.
3. Distribution of communal land another source of conflict. Strong belief that political leaders are favouring their own people and people from Ouagadougou and discriminating against the poor.
4. Unequal distribution of resources between rich and poor another major source of conflict.

#### *Religious and Ethnic Tolerance*

1. Religious tolerance among the different religions. No interreligious conflicts. Each group know their limits.
2. Problem of intolerance within families. Men don't respect women. Many misunderstandings between husbands and wives.

#### *Youth and Women*

1. Lack of employment in mining areas
2. Leads to high levels of violence and criminality where people killing each other
3. Women, especially older women have no access to work like street sweeping.
4. Lack of support to enable women to engage in income-generating activities so that they can help their families.

#### *Recommendations*

1. Help from National Water Service to resolve water issues.
2. Fairer distribution of land
3. Develop other employment sectors for youth.
4. Provide micro-credit to women
5. Greater participation and voice in communal affairs

### Gorgadji

#### *Governance*

1. Youth not listened to. Have to demonstrate and protest to be heard.
2. Mayor gave gold mining company permission to draw water from swamp.
3. Youth protested and forced mayor to back down.
4. Youth not implicated in communal activities, not informed about communal budgets
5. Lack of transparency. People not invited to attend deliberations.
6. People don't realize they have the right to demand answers and to participate.
7. Lack of participation in regional independence ceremonies.
8. Lack of understanding how the new decentralization/communalization works.\
9. Changing role of administrative authorities not understood. Local populations seemed to have more confidence in old system.

#### *Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts*

1. Lack of communication between local civil society and Mayor and conflicts who should manage new fishing center—mayor or the fishermen committee.
2. Mayor wanted to construct town hall near his house against wishes of population who noted that a location had already been chosen. Went to prefect to resolve problem.
3. Agriculturalist-herder conflicts-common
4. Security situation quiet but incertitude about future. Worried about events in Mali and whether they might spill over into Burkina Faso. Concerned about Tuareg refugees in their area.
5. Some road banditry.

### *Religious and ethnic tolerance*

1. Tolerance among the different religions
2. Ethnic harmony thanks to use of joking relationships to cool conflicts.

### *Youth and Women*

1. Inexistence of vocational and professional training centers. Youth have to go to Dori
2. Small number of people trained in recent years
3. High dropout rate, lack of support from parents
4. Parents would rather "see their children sell cakes or attend to animals."
5. Women not independent
6. Lack of motivation for women to attend literacy centers
7. Women don't participate in decisionmaking

### *Recommendations*

1. Construct dam to obtain water.
2. Need health centers
3. Construct more schools and convince parents of importance of education.
4. Convince husbands to let women be trained and engaged in revenue generating activities.

### Seytenga

#### *Governance*

1. Youth opinions respected and youth heard at local level. Youth requested and got football
2. Politics is divisive with people competing for power and same offices. Partisan politicians don't listen to the other side.
3. Youth participates in communal public discussions.
4. Mayor informs population.

5. Not respected by regional and national authorities. Annoyed at lack of participation in regional; Independence Day ceremonies.

### *Security, Insecurity, and Conflicts*

1. Agriculturalists-Herder Conflicts—now declining.
2. Conflicts due to political divisions
3. Insecurity resulting from youth having nothing to occupy them, leads to aggression, robberies, and rape.
4. Other side is that young people caught in acts of crime and aggression have been lynched.
5. Youth don't want to learn new skills, hungry for quick money.
6. Seytenga town security ok, thanks to presence of *gendarmerie*.
7. Surrounding villages more insecure and exposed to cattle stealing and other crimes.

### *Religious and Ethnic Tolerance*

1. Tolerance between Muslims and Christians
2. Complaints about Wahhabi religious behaviour and intolerance
3. Ethnic harmony
4. Generational divisions, children don't respect parents.

### *Youth and Women*

1. No vocational training centers , youth need to travel to Dori
2. Lots of children enrolled in primary schools, but they soon drop out
3. Girls drop out to get married
4. Lots of Koranic schools in Seytenga
5. Some of the graduates become Koranic school teachers and marabouts
6. Women not independent, have to obey their husbands and can't participate in decision making without agreement of their husbands.

7. Men afraid of losing authority and that women won't take care of their husbands if they allow them to engage in commerce and other revenue generating activities and they will no longer be "*père de famille*."
8. Girls believe that it is possible to maintain household duties and engage in commerce at the same time.

### *Recommendations*

1. Provide vocational and professional education to youth to make them employable.
2. Provide civic education campaigns to see that politicians don't sacrifice the commune's interests and well-being in pursuing partisan and personal interests.
3. Promote religious dialogue so that all religious tendencies are accepted.

### Oursi

#### *Governance*

1. Youth voices not heard.
2. Youth demonstrates to push their views and get mayor to back off giving access to local water supply to gold mining company
3. Youth not solicited to participate in communal activities
4. Lack of transparency in communicating and discussing budget
5. Local associations and groups not invited to participate in regional level Independence Day ceremonies.
6. Lack of understanding of decentralization/ communalization systems and declining authority of prefects.

#### *Insecurity, Security, and Conflicts*

1. Politics main cause of conflicts:

- a. Disputes between mayor and fishermen committee over control of fishing center and activities.
  - b. Location of new Town Hall. Mayor wanted it near his home while citizens insisted that it be built where originally designated.
  - c. Politics divisive and the cause of civic irresponsibility (*incivisme*)
  - d. Minorities not taken into consideration. Need to be violent to be heard.
  - e. e.. Lack of coordinating activities between authorities and citizens.
  - f. City of Oursi is secure; gendarmerie there in 2013. Border areas less secure.
2. agriculturalist-herder conflicts also widespread; but generally resolved
  3. Agriculturalists claim that herders are protected by authorities who don't enforce rules compelling herders to pay for damages to crops caused by their herds.
  4. Land disputes caused by people farming other people's land.
  5. Lack of knowledge as to who has rights to land. Parents don't tell children that land doesn't belong to them.

### *Religious and Ethnic Tolerance*

1. Islam predominant, but tolerance between Muslims and Christians
2. Some tensions with intermarriage. If there is enough love, girls will convert to Islam.
3. No problems among different ethnic groups.
4. Good relationships between youth and elders, mutual respect.

### *Youth and Women*

1. Youth can be violent. Burned down town hall.
2. Vice mayor provoked students by preventing them to pass by his house even though his house was on school grounds.
3. No vocational and professional training centers. Youth have to go to Dori
4. Rural exodus

5. High rate of school dropouts; parents can't afford school costs
6. Girls drop out to get married.
7. Low success rate and low level of learning
8. Lots of Koranic schools
9. Radio source of information, outside of Burkina Faso.
10. Women don't participate in decisionmaking
11. Social and cultural traditions hinder participation of women.
12. Muslim environment in which the man is the head of the household who decides.

### *Recommendations*

1. Need to improve communications between mayor, youth and association leaders.
2. Need to fight against corruption and corrupt authorities
3. Civic education campaigns to overcome lack of civic responsibility.
4. To reduce conflict, the authorities need to inform herders and agriculturalists as to when animals should not enter fields and access to fields after harvesting.

## **PDEV II Qualitative Survey: Synthesis of Interviews and Focus Groups in Chad**

**Third Revised Version - May 2014**

**Ezzeddine Moudoud**

### **Survey Objective and Background**

This paper is a synthesis of the qualitative survey report provided to the consultant by Development Service (DS), a Chadian consulting firm recruited by The Mitchell Group (TMG), to conduct the survey. Its objective of this paper is to summarize the key themes and findings that emerged from the survey analysis of the Chadian component of USAID's Peace through Development II project (PDEV II).<sup>16</sup>

The DS team was provided technical assistance and training by Mr. Moudoud, recruited by the University of Pittsburgh, a sub-contractor to TMG under the EAS project contract.

The main objective of the survey was to capture Chadian citizens' perceptions and concerns (and recommendations if any) of the impact of the various project interventions as they relate to the United State Government's (USG) overall goal of *Increased Community Resilience against Violent Extremism* in sub-Saharan Africa.

### **1. Methodology and themes covered by the Survey**

To achieve the above objective, the DS team covered the following themes:<sup>17</sup>

- Local Governance and Citizen Participation;

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<sup>16</sup> This synthesis relies on the survey report in French provided by the DS team to the author in late January 2014: "Rapport de Mission de Collecte des Données", Réalisé par Le Bureau Development Service, Janvier 2014.

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed description of the prompt themes, see please the French translation provided by the University of Pittsburg and used by DS team in annex 2. It must be noted here, however, that the term "extremism" was avoided by DS team in the conduct of the survey after consultations with PDEV II staff and the Director of DONG of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

- Conflicts and Conflicts Resolution;
- Youth Empowerment and Vocational Training;
- Women Empowerment;
- Resilience to Extremism; and
- Promotion of Moderate Voices and Religious Tolerance.

DS team used two main tools to conduct the survey:

- **Focus Groups:** Between November 29 and December 23, 2013 the DS team conducted six focus groups in three regions selected with consultation from: (1) the PDEV II Chadian Country Director and his senior management staff; and (2) the national key counterpart of the project, the Director of the Direction des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales (DONG) of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The regions were Bahr-El Gazal-Chadra, Batha/Oum-Hadjer, and N'Djamena. Focus groups varied in size, from 6 to 9 participants.
- **Interviews:** In addition, the DS team conducted fifteen individual interviews in the three regions between November 27, 2013 and January 9, 2014. In all, 49 participants contributed to the data collection through focus groups and individual interviews.

The DS team made sure to cover both the core and non-core zones as state in the PDEV II intervention classifications<sup>18</sup> in all three regions. Moreover, interviews included both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the project. This included: local NGO representatives working in the arena of local governance and poverty reduction;<sup>19</sup> scholars working on, and

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<sup>18</sup> This classification is based on the degree of vulnerability to extremism faced by a zone. **Core** zones are highly vulnerable and receive all of the PDEV II interventions under the four Strategic Objectives (SO) of the project. Non-core zones are less vulnerable and receive only radio broadcasting interventions promoting religious tolerance, an activity implemented by Equal Access.

<sup>19</sup> Local NGOs include Oxfam-Chad; L'Association des Témoins, des Urgences, et des Actions de Développement (ATURAD; and L'Action Tchadienne pour la Promotion des Initiatives Rurales (ATPIR).

familiar with, the “threat” of extremism in Chad;<sup>20</sup> and women and youth associations in Chaddra and Oum-Hadjer.

**Table 1 - Total Number of Focus Groups and Interviews by Region**

<b>Locations</b>	<b>Interviews</b>	<b>Focus groups</b>
<b>N'Djamena</b>	04	02
<b>Batha</b>	06	02
<b>Bahr El Gazal</b>	05	02
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>06</b>

Source: *Rapport de Mission de Collecte des Données*, Bureau Development Service, Janvier 2014;

## **2. Limits and Constraints of the Survey Methodology**

The DS team noted the following methodological limits while conducting the survey:

- Upon implementation, it was determined that obtaining the recommended 8 to 10 participants for a focus group was not possible. With certain members of the Community Action Committees (CACs) unable to attend, the focus groups were held in sizes of 6 to 9 participants.

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<sup>20</sup> Scholars include Dr. B. Walar, Professor at the University of N’Djamena and Member of the High Council of Islamic Affairs of Chad.

- The duration of the focus groups ranged from 90 minutes to 2 hours. The duration was affected by the number of participants that could be mobilized by the team.

Similarly, the team noted socio-cultural limits distinct to the Chadian environment played a role:

- The reluctance of Muslim women to participate resulted in a reduced representation during the focus groups.
- The reluctance of interviewees to express themselves clearly on issues considered as sensitive limited the identification and analysis of real security threats in the localities covered by the survey. Sensitive topics apply in particular to themes such as community conflicts, religious extremism, women empowerment and participation in local affairs, the exact content of education in Koranic schools, and the impact of radio programs broadcasts promoting religious tolerance.
- Finally, an unexpected contractual problem between the DS team and TMG with regards to advances delayed field work by almost three weeks.<sup>21</sup>

### **3. Key Themes and Findings<sup>22</sup>**

#### ***On Local Governance and Citizen Participation***

First, and foremost, local governance is a recent concept in Chad;<sup>23</sup> even the concept of decentralization (as a public policy) is relatively new.

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<sup>21</sup> An important point to mention for the EAS project and future US “capacity building” projects for our African partners institutions.

<sup>22</sup> A summary table of Key Themes and Findings can be found in Annex 1 (translation is approximate).

<sup>23</sup> Following discussions with the DS team regarding the questionnaire guidelines, PDEV II objectives under SO 4 focuses on the local level, thus the term “local governance” is used here. The more general term “governance” was considered too abstract as it refers to the national level, and was thus avoided.

*"These are very new concepts in Chad. Our program does promote citizens and women participation in local affairs, but our main focus for now is "poverty reduction", especially that of women in rural Chad".*

*Chad Oxfam Local Governance Program Director*

After decades of civil war, the first decentralization law was promulgated in 2004 and is still not yet fully implemented due to the lack of "*textes d'application*" and the proper fiscal transfers required to local governments.

Moreover, the first free local elections in the post-independence era from France just recently took place in 2012 and were limited to urban communes only. Rural communes, conversely, are still administered by central government representatives or what is called in the French administrative system, "*l'administration territoriale*" (préfet, sous-préfets, and chefs de districts).

This explains why most responses from both the focus groups and interviews<sup>24</sup> to "notions of *citizenship, citizen participation*, especially that of women, in local affairs and decision-making is still very timid to say the least."<sup>25</sup>

This is explained by the following reasons identified in almost all focus groups and interviews:

- Lack of transparency and information about local governments spending;
- Lack of formal mechanisms in place for citizen participation in decision-making over resource allocation and local budgets;
- Poor basic services delivery systems, leading sometimes, especially during the rainy season, to local conflicts;
- Overall weak local government capacity and lack of knowledge of decentralization texts and policy.

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<sup>24</sup> See Annex 1 for a more detailed analysis.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Chad Oxfam Local Governance Program Director, on November 29;

With regards to the weakness of the CACs in particular, a key partner for PDEV II success, another respondent made the following statement:

*"Members do not participate in all meetings as it should be. They expected initially to be paid, but after they realized that this was a voluntary work they were unmotivated."*

*Assistant Mayor of Moussoro*

Other remarks with regards to the weaknesses and the limited role of the CACs included:

- Most local conflicts are mediated through traditional channels, not local governments and their CACs, as it should be or as envisioned by PDEV II's Strategic Objective (SO) 4;
- Perception of corruption and lack of transparency by local authorities was also mentioned by some focus groups participants (such as in the CAC of Ati ), but no concrete evidence was provided.

However, this overall finding must be nuanced: thanks to PDEV II activities to strengthen local governance through training of local officials,<sup>26</sup> local authorities are beginning to involve civil society and community leaders, including women representatives, in major local planning and budgeting decision-making meetings.

### ***Conclusions on Local Governance and CSO Participation as It Relates to PDEV II***

- With a few exceptions (such as in CAC 10 in N'Djamena) most CACs working with the project are relatively new. The three CACs of N'Djamena were created at the request of the project in December 2012 and January 2013, unlike local authorities that were formally created after the first municipal elections in 1992. Therefore, CACs will need a more sustained financial and technical support to be able to implement some of the PDEV II concepts that are new to them. Moreover, they need more coaching and on-the-

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<sup>26</sup> In N'djamena, training of local officials was done through working with the N'Djamena District 10 CAC

job training to help them navigate through the complex eligibility criteria and procedures for accessing the project grant mechanism.

- Focus groups and interviews also revealed that local governments and their CACs working with PDEV II have different needs and expectations that do not match with the project funding priorities. With the exception of the grant in-kind for schools, PDEV II did little, for example, for small infrastructure projects that were identified as the priority of the CACs and their local communities. Moreover, when funding requests by CACs for small projects are deemed eligible, it takes months for PDEV II to process the necessary paper work.
- Another key finding is that citizen participation, and especially that of women, in local affairs is weak or nonexistent due to the lack of formal mechanisms, even if more women are members in some CACs and municipal councils. This is an area that needs to be further explored and an area where more project resources could be allocated.
- PDEV II interventions that are more appreciated tend to be soft cultural and sport activities (soccer games) funded by the project. They are seen by most participants as a way for local authorities and their CACs to enhance good collaboration with and among local communities groups under their jurisdictions. This is an area where the project can devoted more attention and resources.
- Finally, the clear contrast between urban CACs and the more rural ones should be noted. For example, in the regions of Barh El Gazal (Moussoro and Chadra), and that of Batha (Ati and Oum-Hadjer), conflicts have nothing to do with extremism. Most of them, sometimes very violent, are attributed to armed fights over access to land and water between herders and farmers (Ati and Oum-Hadjer).

### ***On Conflicts and Conflict Resolution***

Conflicts seem to be recurrent in the project areas covered by the survey seem. As mentioned above, occasionally these escalate to armed conflicts (and occasionally death).<sup>27</sup> These extreme cases, as identified by survey respondents, are due primarily to conflicts between farmers and herders over access to land and control over water points.

The lack of formal conflict resolution mechanisms and the weak capacity of local governments and the justice system in Ati and Chadra led the central government to use military intervention. With the exception of the extreme cases isolated cases, conflicts are usually mediated through local traditional channels of using traditional authorities (district chiefs, village chiefs and notables).

Other minor of conflicts have been mentioned by participants, though not related to extremism or conflicts between different religious communities. A respondent in Ati for example, declared that:

*"There are no disagreements or conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the city of Ati. We live in brother-hood between ethnic communities. By contrast, there are land issues and problems around wells between individuals and also conflicts between herders and farmers. Such conflicts are sometimes fratricide."*

*Imam of the Mosque of Ati*

Another respondent put in these words:

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<sup>27</sup> Examples of armed conflict can be seen in the Department of Fitri's Ati and Chadra CACs (as seen in Annex 1).

*"No major conflict can be reported here. However, we deplore high consumption of drugs by young people in the country."*

*Assistant Mayor of Moussoro*

### **Conclusions on Conflicts and Conflict Resolution as it relates to PDEV II**

Traditions and other socio-economic factors, especially in rural areas such as Ati and Chadra, seem to be a dominant factor explaining the lack of formal conflict resolution mechanisms publicized by local governments working with PDEV II.

As the notions of citizenship and citizen participation seem to slowly be integrated into the communities, thanks to PDEV II broadcasting programs promoting moderate voices and religious tolerance, as well as the training of Imams, it seems to have initiated the use of conflicts resolution mechanisms.

An interesting case to note is that of N'Djamena's CAC 10. The new mayor, elected in 2012, of the very populated and very poor Arrondissement appointed a woman as an assistant mayor for local conflicts resolution. Furthermore, at the initiative of the CAC, the Youth Association for the Management of Religious Conflicts Resolution was created in 2013.

There is a noticeable change under this theme initiated and promoted from the local level with the support of the PDEV II project. This positive change, although still mild, is strongly related to the previous one, and would not have been possible in such a short period of time<sup>28</sup> without PDEV II interventions in the related areas of promotion of religious tolerance and peaceful conflicts resolution.

A key and a very active partner of PDEV II, the representative of the Chadian High Council for Islamic Affairs, declares that:

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<sup>28</sup> As mentioned earlier, the first free local elections in the post-independence era of Chad from France were in held in 2012.

*"Between the months of May and June we held in N'Djamena training on awareness, prevention and resolution of conflicts and also how to find the causes of conflict..."*

*"Over a period of three years, more than 100 imams in N'djamena Moussoro, Bol and Faya received training on religious tolerance and peace."*

*Dr. Walar, member of the Chadian High Council for Islamic Affairs.*

### **On Youth Empowerment and Vocational Training**

The current socio-economic situation faced by the youth in the areas covered by the survey seems to be extremely precarious due to the lack of economic opportunity for youth, including university graduates.

From the perspective of focus groups participants and interviewees, here some of the key challenges and opportunities faced by the youth:

- Lack of vocational and professional training and new economic opportunities;
- Lack of follow up after vocational training;
- Overwhelming frustration in this area with PDEV II interventions;
- Youth training in leadership (SFCG) seems to have positive impact;
- Radio programs broadcast (Equal Access) targeting youth appreciated;
- High unemployment rate leading to drug consumption.

The project did provide some vocational training for both young men and women in various professional areas, but it was not followed up by what some participants called "mesures d'accompagnement" (follow-up measures). This is perhaps one theme area where the most negative perceptions of PDEV II were expressed:

*"I would say it is a failure. The youth here in Moussoro were trained and provided with equipment but have not put into practice their knowledge. And the granted equipment were sold by some of the recipients."*

***Conclusions on Youth Empowerment and Vocational Training as they Relate to PDEV II***

Two brief but key conclusions can be made on the youth empowerment theme:

No single project can fully meet the overwhelming needs of unemployed youth and the lack of economic and vocational training opportunities. This is a very challenging area for PDEV II.

- However, the little vocational training that was provided for both young men and women, in various professional areas, was not coupled by small project grants leading to revenue generating small activities. This is the main complaint expressed in all focus groups and interviewees (see for more details Annex 1).

There were similar issues with the vocational training under another important area- the empowerment of women.

***On Women Empowerment***

The main constraints faced by women in the project areas were characterized by most surveyed participants as follows:

- High illiteracy rates among women;
- No formal mechanism with few exceptions for their participation in local decision-making and conflicts resolution;
- Very few economic opportunities and vocational training programs for women;
- Very little interventions targeted women.

According to the participants, this is due to deeply rooted socio-cultural factors in the project areas that prevent women political and economic empowerment. To quote a few respondents:

*"What prevents a greater participation of women in the management of local affairs is the custom since it is not permissible for a woman to speak in public and be next to dignitaries when decisions are made. Women have no role in mediating conflicts and in promoting religious tolerance. Men decide everything."*

*Chaddra Imam*

*"Chadian women in general and those of the city of Ati in particular suffer. This is due to the lack of formal education. To empower them, we must train them".*

*Ati Grand Mosque Imam*

*"We must first provide a good education for women, educate them on their rights and provide them with the means for agricultural activities...". "...since our arrival we made a great effort and we did appoint some women in leadership positions".*

*Assistant Mayor of Moussoro*

### **Conclusion on Women's Empowerment as It Relates to PDEV II**

According to the focus groups, women's current predicament in the specific social, cultural and religious conservatism of Chad is a situation that can be characterized by a sense of despair, neglect and exclusion in local affairs. This spans from local decision-making, access to education and vocational training, and most importantly to economic opportunities.

### **On Resistance to Extremism**

One of the most surprising findings under this theme, according to participants, is that the key drivers of extremism, especially its influence on youth, is not religion but poverty.

According to most responses on the subject, most factors favoring religious extremism are:<sup>29</sup>

- Poverty promoting the attraction of young people to fundamentalist currents;
- Youth unemployment and drug use;
- Social injustice, illiteracy and misinterpretation of the Koran;<sup>30</sup>
- Influence of returnees from Libya seen as a fundamentalist threat;
- The existence of different Islamic sects operating without any State monitoring mechanism;
- The influence of Boko-Haram and that of the Jihadists in Mali have on the youth.

The above perceived key drivers of extremism are further expressed in the most explicit terms by some respondents. To quote a few:

*"What can lead people to accept extremist ideologies and to join extremist groups who advocate violence to achieve their end is ignorance and poverty ..."*

*Chaddra Imam*

*"At the moment I do not see an extremist danger or threat here. There is no religious problem within the Muslim community or between Muslims and Christians .... In Chad, the Islamists have no chance to win the confidence of youth. But this does not exclude awareness....we must educate them, provide them with employment opportunities".*

*A School Director in Moussoro*

## **Conclusions on Resistance to Extremism as it Relates to PDEV II**

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<sup>29</sup> See Annex 1;

<sup>30</sup> The social injustice, illiteracy and misinterpretation of the Koran were important observations repeatedly made by most participants.

The key point that emerged under this theme is that an overwhelming majority of participants consider religious extremism, with regards to Boko Haram and returnees from Libya, to be a foreign phenomenon to Chad culture and traditions. As one interviewee pointedly underlined:

“We have Koranic schools in the South. But we do not have a problem of fundamentalism. That is why we focus on poverty”.<sup>31</sup>

It is important to stress here that thanks to its activities under the radio broadcasting programs and the training of Imams (see below) PDEV II is making a very positive impact in the promotion of religious tolerance.

Finally, key qualitative information for not only PDEV II activities, but for the design of future USG counter-violence extremism programs, showed the need for more emphasis on three strategic areas: (1) youth empowerment and vocational training with the proper follow-up in the form of small grants; (2) the strengthening of local governments and partners CACs roles as *catalyst* of local demands (even if they are not always representative); finally (3) the training of Imams due to their important role in the promotion of moderate voices and religious tolerance through their teaching and preaches in the Mosques (see below).

### ***On Promotion of Moderate Voices and Religious Tolerance***

Promotion of moderate voices and religious tolerance is the only activity where an obvious consensus emerged in all the areas covered by the survey.<sup>32</sup>

Based on participants’ responses, the positive impact of PDEV II’s contribution under this activity can be summarized as follows:

Religious tolerance is widely perceived as a guarantee of peaceful coexistence and social cohesion and reflects Chadian traditions;

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<sup>31</sup> Oxfam, *op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> See Table 1 and the Key findings summary table in Annex 1.

- Training of Imams by Salam Institute seem to have a positive contribution and impact on perceptions and behaviors towards extremism;
- Radio broadcast programs by Equal Access also seem to be positively contribution to this process.

Moreover, information gathered from individual interviews conducted by the DS team further corroborates the above key findings. For example:

*"I find these broadcasting programs very important, because they bring a change in behavior of the population. These programs have impacts in the region. However, they are not regular. The population likes the presentations made on the radio. During these programs, many people participate by phone to give their views and opinions..."*

*"...we are in constant contact with the authorities to solve some problems. For example in our sermons, we disclose the contents to the authorities and they give us their opinions. We also talk about corruption and bad governance. Our sermons are helping change the attitudes of some authorities who are educated".*

*Ati Grand Mosque Imam*

With regards to the positive impact on youth specifically, the perception is that PDEV II broadcasting programs do play an important role in youth awareness. As expressed by a member of a women organization in Oum-Hadjer:

*"People think that these programs are effective to the extent that this happens to encourage the youth to go to school and have to fend for funding".*

*A Women's organization member in Oum-Hadjer*

### ***Conclusion on Promotion of Moderate Voices and Religious Tolerance as they relate to PDEV II***

Overall, with regards to promotion of moderate voices and religious tolerance, the combination of the various activities under SO 1, especially the broadcasting programs, seem to have positively impacted behavioral changes and attitudes, the promotion of religious tolerance, peaceful conflict resolutions, and good relations between communities of different faiths.

### **General Comments Specific to Chad and PDEV II Activities**

In spite of some methodological limitations and unexpected delays, the DS team was able to gather extremely useful qualitative information on participants' perceptions, concerns and especially their recommendations as they relate to PDEV II interventions in their respective areas. Needless to say, the project cannot address all aspects with regards to poverty, especially evident in the three CACs of N'Djamena that are faced with abject poverty. This research indicated that some adjustments can easily be made to increase the effectiveness of the project and there are many areas in which the project is already making changes. The areas in need of adjustment are summarized below:

- Bolster partner CACs abilities through a sustained effort of capacity building and increased training on project procedures, especially regarding the access grant mechanisms.
- Adjust the eligibility criteria of the grant funding to match the needs and priorities of the CACs and their communities.

- Increase the roles of the CACs and use them as the platform for ALL interventions in a given area. In terms of sustainability, this will increase the CACs legitimacy and representativeness, making them a permanent fixture in the community long after the project is phased out.
- Another urgent area that needs to be addressed is that of youth empowerment. It is important to make sure that no vocational training is provided without a proper individualized follow-up plan and follow through for each participant with small business grants and further on-the-job training by local training centers. This intervention has been the greatest sources of frustration and disappointment in the areas covered by the survey and there seem to be similar concerns with the Government of Chad (DONG, Ministry of Planning, the official counterpart of PDEV II).
- The aforementioned applies for all the interventions under women empowerment. Specific interventions (vocational training and small grants) need to target women with small grants and quick disbursements to rapidly achieve the needed demonstrative effects, even if it is on a small scale. This is an area that PDEV II procedures can possibly by-pass the CACs and work directly with women associations in a few core zones at least.
- Because of the apparent positive impact of the radio program, PDEV II needs to build and further consolidate the good achievements under this SO. But it needs now to prepare for the "take-over" of this activity by the Chadian themselves: local governments and their CACs, local NGOs, or and at the national level, the *Chadian High Council for Islamic Affairs and its local branches*. Any lasting positive impact of the project under this area, will not be achieved if the Chadian themselves will not appropriate the "ownership" of this activity.
- The radio programs have high audience rates, especially in remote and rural areas; these combined with the training of Imams appear to have a strong impact. If, however, these

programs continue to depend solely on PDEV II funding, local authorities will have a difficult time taking over, thereby making the program unsustainable.

**Annex 1 - PDEV II Chad Impact Key Finding Summary from the Focus Groups**

Focus Groups/ Themes	N'Djamena CAC 7 <sup>th</sup> Arrondissement	N'Djamena CAC 10 <sup>th</sup> Arrondissement	CAC of ATI <sup>33</sup>	Focus Group with Youth - Chadra	Focus Group with Women - Chadra	Focus Group with Women-Oum- Hadjer
	<p>Local conflicts of various nature emerged 7 times in this FG.</p> <p>LGs efforts focused on violent conflicts and insecurity.</p> <p>Formal mechanisms for citizenship</p>	<p>Local conflicts emerged 12 times.</p> <p>Traditional authorities (<i>chefs traditionnels and délégués de quartiers</i>) play an important mediation role.</p> <p>Conflicts increase</p>	<p>Violent conflicts over land and access to water (mentioned 10 times).</p> <p>Conflicts (between farmers and herders) over use of water are predominant, and even lead to death (6 in one armed conflict in the</p>	<p>Similar situation as in Ati: conflicts (mentioned 6 times) are over access to water and land.</p> <p>They are mediated through traditional, local, authorities.</p>	<p>No significant conflicts (mentioned only 3 times).</p> <p>Negative perception of PDEV II: the only activity this group is aware of is a soccer game for peace.</p>	<p>Conflicts among youth (mentioned 2 times).</p> <p>No formal conflicts resolution in place.</p> <p>Local authorities have never organized any training in this area.</p>

<sup>33</sup> Spelling of places used here is that of PDEV II Map of core and non-core zones for Chad.

<p><b>Local Governance, Citizen Participation &amp; Conflicts Resolution</b></p>	<p>participation are non-existent.</p>	<p>during the rainy season.</p> <p>Local authorities are and there is no formal conflict resolution mechanism.</p> <p>Some efforts (through PDEV II funding) for citizen participation and information campaign on local budget.</p>	<p>department of Fitri).</p> <p>Perceived reasons for conflicts: absence of citizen participation in local affairs and lack of transparency by local authorities and their "egoism".</p> <p>CACs creation in Ati and Oum-Hadjer (two women and two youth are members in Ati) is well perceived.</p>	<p>Chadra is not yet a "commune".</p> <p>Youth participate in conflicts resolution.</p> <p>Citizen participation, except for cultural and sport events, is absent.</p>	<p>The creation of the CAC of Moussoro is the only positive intervention.</p> <p>Participation in local affairs very limited and is even opposed by men, contrary to the south of Chad.</p>	<p>Local authorities do not involve civil society in any key decisions.</p> <p>Citizen participation in local affairs is limited, but improving with the creation of the CAC in Oum-Hadjer.</p> <p>Three elected women on the municipal council.</p>
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<p><b>Radio Moderate Voices Messaging Programs</b></p>	<p>Much appreciated by the attendees, as they promote religious tolerance.</p> <p>This is one of the areas of PDEV II evident success.</p>	<p>Appreciated and listen to (mentioned 2 times).</p> <p>The President of the CAC himself participated in training on Religious Tolerance and Peaceful Conflicts Resolution”.</p>	<p>Much appreciated, with the training of the Imams (mentioned 4 times).</p>	<p>Appreciated and widely listen to (mentioned 3 times).</p> <p>Imams rely these programs messages in their “preaching”.</p>	<p>Appreciated and listen to for their positive role on social cohesion (mentioned 2 times).</p> <p>Training of the Imams is also appreciated.</p>	<p>Some programs are listened to and have positive impact on people perceptions.</p> <p>They are relayed by the Imams preaching in the Mosques.</p>
	<p>Lack of VT for the youth (mentioned 8 times).</p>	<p>Vocational training is much appreciated.</p>	<p>High unemployment (mentioned 5 times).</p> <p>Prevailing poverty in the locality</p>	<p>Similar concerns: high unemployment; little income</p>	<p>No training for women.</p>	<p>Illiteracy and lack of technical skills are key factors for youth unemployment.</p>

<p><b>Youth &amp; Vocational Training</b></p>	<p>Issues of poverty and illiteracy, and youth unemployment.</p> <p>The CAC youth did not receive one single intervention.</p>	<p>25 youth trained by ATURAD, <sup>34</sup> a new PDEV II local partner.</p> <p>But no follow up with small grants ("<i>measures d'accompagnement</i>").</p>	<p>(mentioned 8 times). Lack of training opportunities (mentioned 3 times).</p> <p>10 youth trained. Bu, here too, no follow up.</p>	<p>generation nor many vocational training opportunities.</p> <p>10 youth trained in Moussoro, but no follow up (grants).</p>		<p>Lack of economic and training opportunities, and alcoholism and use of drugs, are also mentioned.</p>
<p><b>Empowerment</b></p>	<p>Women participation in local affairs is non-existent (high rate of illiteracy and socio-</p>	<p>Women have an important role in local conflict resolution and the promotion of religious</p>	<p>Similar socio-cultural constraints facing women in local affairs and conflict resolution.</p>	<p>Women participation in local affairs is non-existent.</p>	<p>Access to income generating activities in agriculture and training are</p>	<p>Key factors in women exclusion: fear, traditions, man "egoism", and illiteracy (mentioned</p>

<sup>34</sup> Association des Témoins, des Urgences et des Actions de Développement;

<p><b>of Women</b></p>	<p>cultural factors).  It is worth noting here, however, that the Mayor of this Arrondissement appointed a <b>woman</b> as a Mayor Assistant for local conflicts resolution.</p>	<p>tolerance.  But they are excluded in the meditation of such conflicts.  Socio-cultural factors and lack of training identified as main cause.</p>	<p>However, and thanks to PDEV II interventions and the creation of the CAC. A woman is now an "Assistant Mayor".  Another woman is a "<i>chef de carré</i>" and even a woman as a "<i>sous-préfet</i>".  Moreover, there is also a "Women Association for Rural</p>	<p>Traditions (mentioned 7 times), illiteracy, lack of micro-credits and economic opportunities, are among the cited factors.  Training and access to economic opportunities for women are lacking.</p>	<p>needed to empower women.  Women have access to land and are involved in agricultural activities though producers associations.</p>	<p>3 times).  Some women are respected and listen to, some are "marginalized" and even "mistreated."  More vocational training for women is needed.  Only activity implemented in favor of women: training by ATURAD.</p>
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			Development". <sup>35</sup>			But, here again, no follow up with grants for the creation of income generation activities.
<b>Resilience to Extremism</b>	Community and individual security is a real concern (mentioned 8 times and Boko Haram, specifically 5 times).  At the initiative of the CAC a "Youth Association for the Management of	Attraction to extremist ideologies (Boko-Haram is mentioned 9 times and violent extremists, 6 times) is associated with poverty (mentioned 8 times) and the weakness of local civil society.	Extremism ideologies are not perceived as a real threat to the community security.  Boko Haram is a concern (mentioned 5 times), but it is poverty and youth unemployment,	Poverty (mentioned 13 times) is the key driver for adherence to extremism.  Political instability is second.  Insecurity (mentioned 8	Main issues of concerns:  Poverty (mentioned 3 times).  Drugs consumption;  Insecurity	Here again, perceived threats to the security of the community (women in particular) is not extremism, but: poverty (mentioned 6 times), hunger (mentioned 2 times), and illness.  Religious extremism and violence are

<sup>35</sup>. Association des Femmes pour le Développement Rural du Batha (AFDRB);

	<p>Religious Conflicts” was created.</p>		<p>insecurity created by military authorities, use of drugs and “banditries”, are perceived as a greater threat to safety and overall security.</p> <p>More economic opportunities, and better governance through the strengthening of the CACs, are seen as the solution to extremism.</p>	<p>times) linked to both.</p> <p>Important role for civil society associations (such as AJDEC)<sup>36</sup> in conflict mediation, and promotion of tolerance.</p>	<p>(mentioned 1 time with Boko-Haram) due to lack of opportunities for the youth.</p>	<p>also perceived as a source of insecurity (Boko-Haram and Libyan returnees are mentioned 4 times), but they are associated with the weakness of civil society.</p>
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<sup>36</sup> Association des Jeunes pour le Développement de Chadra;



## **PDEV Incitations au débat de la recherche qualitative du PDEV II**

### **Page 1-2- Incitations Générales; Page 3- Incitations spécifiques aux sous-programmes**

#### **Incitations au débat pour la Gouvernance Locale et les Organisations de la Société Civile.**

- Pourriez- vous faire mention d'un désaccord ou conflit récent qui a divisé ou divise les membres de la communauté ? (Veuillez le décrire brièvement)
- Quelles ont été les causes du conflit ? Qui était impliqué?
  - Est-ce le conflit a jamais tourné à la violence ? Pensez-vous qu'il ya une possibilité que le conflit puisse donner lieu à la violence?
  - Y a- t-il eu / y a t- il un effort pour résoudre le conflit ?
  - Quel genre de mesures ont été prises / sont prises pour résoudre le conflit ?
  - Quels mécanismes locaux utilisez-vous pour résoudre les conflits ? (Par exemple: Traditionnels, Administratifs, territoriaux, recours aux représentants des collectivités locales, aux fonctionnaires du gouvernement national)
  - Comment les gens se sentent –ils par rapport à la façon dont les jeunes et les personnes âgées résolvent les différends dans la communauté?
  - Comment les gens se sentent –ils par rapport à la façon dont les hommes et femmes résolvent les différends dans la communauté?
  - Est-ce que les hommes ou les femmes se joignent-ils à des organisations afin de changer la façon dont les autres réagissent face aux désaccords ou conflits?
  - Est-ce qu'ils changent les opinions des autres qui sont en désaccord avec eux ou avec les dirigeants qui étaient auparavant insensibles? Comment?
- Est-ce que les gouvernements locaux donnent la possibilité aux gens de participer à des programmes de formation et des programmes pour lutter contre la violence afin de résoudre les conflits ? Comment? Quel genre de programme?
  - Les gens ont-ils l'occasion d'utiliser les compétences en médiation de conflits qu'ils ont acquis au cours des formation pour participer à des événements afin d'aider à prévenir les conflits à tourner à la violence?

- A votre avis, ces activités sont-elles efficaces ?
- Est-ce que les gens sentent-ils que leurs opinions sont respectées par les dirigeants locaux?
- Est-ce que les gens sentent-ils que le gouvernement local prend en compte leurs opinions lors de la prise de décisions?
  - Comment se sentent-ils à ce sujet?
  - Qu'est-ce qui favorise / Qu'est-ce qui empêche les citoyens ordinaires et les dirigeants locaux d'avoir une plus grande implication et influence auprès du gouvernement local?
  - Est-ce que le gouvernement local prend en compte les opinions des femmes de la même façon?
  - Est-ce que le gouvernement local prend en compte les opinions des jeunes de la même façon?
  - Quels sont les exemples?
  - Est-ce que le gouvernement local implique d'autres dirigeants locaux non-gouvernementaux dans leurs délibérations et la prise de décision? Comment?
  - Y a-t-il des mécanismes permettant aux citoyens de participer au gouvernement local?

Par exemple: Les comités d'action communautaires, des réunions municipales, la participation à des discussions portant sur le budget.

- Est-ce que le gouvernement local a la capacité de fournir des services locaux nécessaires?
- Quelles sont les contributions faites par les populations locales?
- Quelles sont les questions principales et les activités qui attirent les gens à assister et à participer activement:

- Aux réunions communautaires? Pourquoi / Pourquoi pas?
- Aux événements pour aider à déterminer la façon dont l'argent est dépensé dans la communauté? Pourquoi / Pourquoi pas?
- Aux événements portant sur les questions du genre(sexe)? Pourquoi / Pourquoi pas?
- Aux manifestations pour la jeunesse (comme le théâtre participatif, des manifestations contre la violence)? Pourquoi / Pourquoi pas?
- Quels types d'événements attirent la plupart des gens, et pourquoi?
- Quelle est la perception de la communauté à propos de ces manifestations?
- Qu'est-ce qui incite les gens à vouloir y assister / Qu'est-ce qui incite les gens à ne pas vouloir y participer?
- Que pensez- vous de ces activités? Nommez une activité avec laquelle vous avez le plus d'expérience.
  
- Pensez-vous qu'elle était bien organisée?
- Pensez-vous que les organisateurs sont bien informés et utiles?
- Comment vous sentez-vous après l'activité?
- Pensez-vous que la communauté serait d'accord avec ces évaluations?
  
- Est-ce que les gens ont-ils l'impression que leur participation à des organisations de la société civile / du gouvernement local a / peut être utilisée pour influencer les processus décisionnels et les politiques du gouvernement local qui affectent leurs communautés?
  - De quelles organisations sont-ils membres (religieuse- mosquée, syndicat d'agriculteurs; association professionnelle; groupe de femmes, groupes de jeunes, organisation communautaire, sports)?
  - Ont-ils l'impression que l'un de ces groupes contribue à changer les opinions des politiciens et celles d'autres dirigeants? Comment? Qu'est ce qui limite leur capacité à le faire?

- Qui peut participer à ces groupes?
- Les autres se sentent-ils à l'écart de ces groupes? Pourquoi?
- Les femmes participent-elles à ces groupes?

### **Incitations au débat pour la Radio et la Messagerie**

- Êtes-vous familier avec certains programmes de radio qui sont diffusés dans votre commune qui traitent de dialogues religieux , des problèmes des femmes et des jeunes, des questions de gouvernance? Pouvez-vous nous dire votre opinion sur un de ces programmes que vous avez déjà écoutés?

**Tchad:** Chabab al Haye (programme jeunesse); Dabalaye ( programme de gouvernance )

**Niger:** Gwadaben Matassa (programme jeunesse; Sada Zum, unci (programme de gouvernance)

**Burkina:** Malegr Sooré (programme jeunesse Moore); Pinal Sukabè (programme jeunesse fulfulde)

- Les gens ont-ils écouté ces programmes? Si non, connaissent-ils d'autres personnes qui les ont écouté? Qui écoute ces programmes?
- Qu'est-ce que les gens pensent de ces programmes?
- Que pensent les gens des questions dont ils traitent?
- Est-ce que les gens pensent-ils qu'ils sont efficaces? Pourquoi / Pourquoi pas?
- Est-ce que votre Imam a-t-il jamais parlé de voyager pour rencontrer d'autres imams afin de parler de l'islam ou de promouvoir la tolérance religieuse?
  - Ont-ils déjà critiqué d'autres groupes islamiques, d'autres religions ou de groupes religieux ou sociaux différents du vôtre ?

- Ou ont-ils parlé de tolérance envers les autres religions islamiques, ou groupes sociaux différents du vôtre?
- Êtes-vous d'accord avec eux ?

### **Résistance à l'extrémisme**

- Quelles sont les questions qui vous préoccupent le plus, et que vous percevez comme une menace pour vous, votre famille et votre communauté?
    - Vous inquiétez-vous des menaces pour votre sécurité?
    - Vous sentez-vous, vous et votre famille à l'abri des menaces de violence?
  - Que pensez-vous amène les gens à embrasser des idéologies extrémistes et à se joindre à des groupes extrémistes prônant la violence pour parvenir à leurs fins?
  - Y a-t-il une tendance pour que les jeunes adhèrent aux idéologies extrémistes ou se joignent à ces groupes? Si oui, pour quelles raisons?
  - Est-ce que les gens pensent que de meilleures opportunités pourraient dissuader les jeunes à se joindre à des groupes extrémistes?
  - Est-ce que les associations de la société civile parviennent –elles à gérer des conflits jugés modérés et les menaces de violence au niveau local?
  - Est-ce que les gens pensent que les menaces de violence extrémiste sont ou seront associées à la faiblesse des associations de la société civile?
- 

### **Discussion Invites de Formations Professionnelles**

- Est-ce que les gens ont du mal à trouver des occasions de gagner de l'argent dans votre communauté?
  - Pourquoi/ Pourquoi pas?
  - Et en ce qui concerne les jeunes? Est-il plus facile ou plus difficile pour eux de trouver du travail?

- Pourquoi/ Pourquoi pas?
- Est-ce que les gens participent à des activités de formation professionnelle en matière de compétences pour l'emploi? Combien de personnes participent dans votre communauté?
  - Comment participent-ils?
  - Quels sont les obstacles à la participation?
  - Est-ce que les femmes participent?
  - Est-ce que les jeunes participent?
- Est-ce que les gens participent à des activités de formation sur la manière dont il faut gérer une entreprise ou écrire une subvention pour recevoir des fonds nécessaires pour diriger une entreprise?
  - Comment participent-ils?
  - Quels sont les obstacles à la participation?
  - Est-ce que les femmes participent?
  - Est-ce que les jeunes participent?
- Quels sont les autres manières dont les gens peuvent améliorer leur moyens de subsistance (leurs conditions de vie)?
  - Est-ce que les gens participent à des cours d'alphabétisation (en capacité de lecture et d'écriture)?
  - Participent-ils à l'école non formelle?
  - Comment participent-ils?
  - Quels sont les obstacles à la participation?

### **Discussion Invites de l'École Coranique**

- Comment participent les gens à l'Ecole Coranique?

- Quels changements ont été survenus dans le programme, dans le numéro des individus, des filles, et dans le contenu de la prédication?
  - Est-ce que les jeunes devront fréquenter des écoles publiques ou est l'éducation Islamique fondée suffisante?
  - Adhèrent les élèves aux messages de tolérance religieuse ou l'intolérance religieuse?
    - Quels sont les aspects qu'ils n'acceptent pas?
    - Pourquoi/ Pourquoi pas?
    - À quel point fournissent les écoles Coraniques des messages de tolérance religieuse?
  - Acceptent les élèves et les professeurs de l'introduction de course de compétence tels que les mathématiques, l'alphabétisation en Français, science, et d'autre chose de ce genre dans le programme?
    - De quelles façons trouvent-ils qu'il est inacceptable? Si c'est le cas, pourquoi?
    - Sont-ils acceptés pour les garçons et les filles?
    - Est-ce que les écoles Coraniques ou écoles publiques offrent aux étudiants une meilleure préparation à la vie ou les moyens de subsistance?
  - Est-ce que les filles ont les mêmes chances de participer que les garçons?
    - Pourquoi/ Pourquoi pas?
  - Est-ce que les femmes enseignantes reçoivent les mêmes chances de participer que les hommes?
    - Pourquoi/ Pourquoi pas?
- 

### **Questions Spécifiques aux Jeunes**

- Quelles sont les principales causes de conflits parmi les jeunes?
- Ont les jeunes leurs propres mécanismes pour résoudre les conflits?

- Quels sont les principaux empêchements à accorder aux jeunes un plus grand rôle dans de postes de direction?
- Quels genres d'activités et de formation sont les plus efficaces dans l'autonomisation des jeunes et leur participation aux affaires publiques?

### **Questions Spécifiques aux Femmes**

- Quels mécanismes / programmes / activités sont les plus efficaces dans l'autonomisation des femmes?
- Que retient une plus grande participation des femmes?
- Quel rôle, le cas échéant, jouent les femmes dans la médiation des conflits et la promotion de la tolérance religieuse?
- Quels sont les points de vue des femmes sur les rôles actuels dans la famille et l'emploi?

APPENDIX VII: EAS SURVEY INSTRUMENT PEACE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT II (PDEVII)

Question numbers in **BLUE** correspond directly to items in the original PDEV II baseline study.

<b>Section Unique Identification</b>															
<b>ID0. Questionnaire type:</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	<b>ID1. Questionnaire ID</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>														
<b>ID2. Country</b> Chad .....1 Niger .....2 Burkina Faso .....3	<b>ID 3. Wave of Interview</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 30px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>														
<b>ID3. Province Code</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> (See location codes on page 2.)	<b>ID4. Target Zone Code</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 20px; height: 20px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> (See location codes on page 2.)														
<b>ID5. Neighborhood Name</b> _____ (write in)	<b>D7. Day of interview:</b> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th style="text-align: center;">Single code</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Monday</td> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tuesday</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Wednesday</td> <td style="text-align: center;">3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Thursday</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Friday</td> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Saturday</td> <td style="text-align: center;">6</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Single code	Monday	1	Tuesday	2	Wednesday	3	Thursday	4	Friday	5	Saturday	6
	Single code														
Monday	1														
Tuesday	2														
Wednesday	3														
Thursday	4														
Friday	5														
Saturday	6														

		Sunday	7
<b>ECode</b>	<b>Name of Enumerator</b>	<b>Signature</b>	<b>ID7. Date of Interview (dd/mm)</b>
<b>SCode</b>	<b>Name of Supervisor</b>	<b>Signature</b>	<b>ID8. Date Completed Check (dd/mm)</b>

<b>Section F. RESPONDENT IDENTIFICATION</b>								
F1	<b>Respondent Assignment:</b> MALE – .....1 FEMALE – .....2							
F2.	Respondent name : Mr/Mrs/Miss :							
F3	<b>Record interview start time using 24 hour clock</b> ____:____ (hour:minute)							
F4	<b>Estimated direction from start point:</b> <table border="1" style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle;"> <tr> <td>NEE</td> <td>N</td> <td>SE</td> <td>S</td> <td>SO</td> <td>O</td> <td>NO</td> </tr> </table>	NEE	N	SE	S	SO	O	NO
NEE	N	SE	S	SO	O	NO		
F5	<b>Estimated distance from start point (in M):</b> <table border="1" style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle;"> <tr> <td style="width: 30px; height: 20px;"></td> </tr> </table>							

LOCATION CODES CHAD	
<b>Province</b>	
Barh El Gazal.....01	Kanem.....04

Batha..... 02	Lac Tchad .....05
Borkou..... 03	N'Djamena .....06
<b>Target Zones</b>	
Am Djamena Bilala ..... 01	Ngouri.....07
Assinet..... 02	Nokou .....08
Baga-Sola..... 03	Ntiona .....09
Chadra..... 04	Oum-Hadjer.....10
Doum-Doum ..... 05	Wadjigui.....11
Melea..... 06	Yao .....12
Commune 1N'Djamena..... 13	Am Sileb .....15
Am Doback ..... 14	Commune 7 N'Dajamena.....16
<b>LOCATION CODES NIGER</b>	
<b>Province</b>	
Agadez..... 01	Tahoua.....05
Diffa..... 02	Tillaberi .....06
Maradi..... 03	Zinder.....07
Niamey ..... 04	
<b>Target Zones</b>	
Ballayara ..... 01	Niamey 4.....07
Dan Issa ..... 02	Tabelot.....08
G. Roundji..... 03	Tébaram .....09
Iférouane ..... 04	Tessaoua .....10
Mayahi ..... 05	Zinder I .....11

N'guigmi ..... 06	
<b>LOCATION CODES BURKINA FASO</b>	
<b>Province</b>	
Kadiogo ..... 01	Soum .....04
Oudalan..... 02	Yatenga .....05
Seno ..... 03	Zonoma .....06
<b>Target Zones</b>	
Boussou ..... 01	Oursi .....07
Gorgadji..... 02	Séguénéga .....08
Markoye ..... 03	Seytenga .....09
Ouagadougou Arrondissement 4 ..... 04	Tongomayel.....10
Ouahigouya ..... 05	Tougo.....11

**Instructions for selecting the sample.**

**Interviewer:** Recruit respondents by using the Kish grid.

Please give me the names and ages of all men and women aged between 15 and 65 years, beginning by the oldest.

**INTERVIEWER: ENTER THE NAMES OF ALL ADULTS (MEN AND WOMEN) AGED 15 TO 65 YEARS. WRITE NAMES FROM THE OLDEST TO THE YOUNGEST AND SELECT THE RESPONDENT ACCORDING TO THE KISH GRID BELOW.**

		<b>Age</b>	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
	Name and Surname <b>MEN AND WOMEN</b>	<b>From the oldest to the younges t</b>															
1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2			2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
3			1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
4			1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3
5			4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
6			4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
7			3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3
8			3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1

9			2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5
11			10	11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9	10	11	1	2	3
12			9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
13			8	9	10	11	12	13	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
14			14	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15			10	11	12	13	14	15	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

## Opening Text

Good day. My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am from TNS Global, an independent research organization. I do not represent the government of Chad/ Niger/Burkina Faso or any political party. We are studying the views of citizens in Chad/Niger/Burkina Faso, like you, to find out what your life is like and what you think the future will bring. We would like to discuss these issues with you.

Your answers will be confidential. They will be put together with the responses of over 1000 other people we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take about forty minutes.

If you are happy to proceed, then let's begin.

**NOTE: DO NOT BEGIN THE INTERVIEW UNLESS THE RESPONDENTS GIVES HIS/HER CONSENT. IF THE RESPONDENT REFUSES, LEAVE THE HOUSE AND RECORD THE REFUSAL.**

**If consent is granted:**

Thank-you. As we go through the questions, please keep in mind that you may say 'I don't know' to any question when you do not know the answer, and you may say 'pass' to any question when you do not feel comfortable answering. You may also terminate the interview at any time. Do you understand?

**[Proceed with interview only if answer is positive].**

Let's begin.

## Section A. Demographics

Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic

A1	Sex of Respondent Do not ask. Observe. Single Code	1.....Male 2.....Female	
A2	<p>How old are you?</p> <p>WAIT FOR RESPONSE</p> <p>WRITE IN NUMBER.</p> <p>(If age not known, ask respondents to estimate in years, ask them whether they were born before or after an important and widely recognized event, such as a drought. After the interview, or before, if you know you are in an area where respondents are unlikely to know their age, establish with local informants the names of prominent droughts and the approximate years they took place.</p>	_____ years old	<p>Below 15 or more than 65 years old STOP THE INTERVI EW</p>

	Estimate the respondent's age.)		
A3	What is the highest level of school that you have completed?	1...illiterate/none 2...no formal schooling 3...primary incomplete 4...primary complete 5...secondary incomplete 6...secondary complete 7...University/Poly incomplete OND 8...University/Poly complete HND 9...Post University incomplete 10...Post University complete	
A4	Are you currently employed or unemployed?	1...Employed 2...Unemployed 88...Don't know 99...Refused	If code 2 go to →A5; Else go to →A6
A5	If you're not working, what is your status?  WAIT FOR RESPONSE	1...Student 2...Non-working pensioner or invalid 3...Housewife/maternity leave 4...Looking for work 5...Not looking for work 6...Waiting for work to start 7...Other non-working, specify 88...Don't know	

		99...Refused	
A6	<p>I'm going to read a list of items and amenities that you may have inside or around your house. Please tell me whether you have or do not have each item.</p> <p>READ OUT ITEMS.</p> <p>CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Fridge/freezer</li> <li>b. Computer or iPad</li> <li>c. Video or DVD player</li> <li>d. Satellite dish</li> <li>e. TV</li> <li>f. Radio</li> <li>g. Telephone (land)</li> <li>h. Telephone (mobile)</li> <li>i. Air conditioning</li> <li>j. Washing machine</li> <li>k. Car</li> <li>l. Gas or electric cooker</li> <li>m. Inside or outside WC</li> <li>n. Inside or outside pipe borne tap</li> </ul>	
A7	<p>Speaking now about religion, which religion are you?</p> <p>AWAIT REPLY.</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE religious group</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Muslim.....1</li> <li>Shia .....2</li> <li>Ismaili.....3</li> <li>Izala/Wahabit.....4</li> <li>Sunni Muslim .....5</li> <li>Maliki.....6</li> <li>Hanafi.....7</li> <li>Shafi'I .....8</li> </ul>	

		Kadria.....9 Hanbali ..... 10 Tidjaniya..... 11 Christian..... 12 Catholic ..... 13 Protestant ..... 14 Orthodox ..... 15 Other Christian ..... 16 Jewish..... 17 Buddhist ..... 18 Hindu ..... 19 Traditional beliefs ..... 20 Baha'i..... 21 I don't belong to a religion ..... 22 Other.... .....23a If other, specify:.....23b Don't know ..... 88 Refused ..... 99	
A8	How important is religion in your personal life? Is it very important, somewhat important, or not very	1...not very important 2...somewhat important 3...very important 88...Don't know 99...Refused	

	important?  <b>SHOW CARD 01</b>		
A9	How often do you attend religious services?  READ OUT REPONSES.  SINGLE CODE.	1... Several times a day 2... Every day 3... Several times per week 4...Once a week 5... Once a month 6... Only for religious holidays or special occasions 7... Rarely or never 88...Don't know 99...Refused	
A10	How often do you pray?  WAIT FOR RESPONSE  SINGLE CODE	1... Several times a day 2... Every day 3... Several times per week 4...Once a week 5... Once a month 6... Only for religious holidays or special occasions 7... Rarely or never 88...Don't know 99...Refused	

A11	And what is your ethnic background?			
	WAIT FOR RESPONSE			
	MULTIPLE CODES			
	<b>CHAD</b>	<b>NIGER</b>	<b>BURKINA FASO</b>	
	Arab .....	Arab .....	Mossi .....	
	Kanembou.....	Toubou.....	Fulani (Peul) .....	
	Gourane .....	Hausa .....	Bobo/Dioula .....	
	Peuls .....	Fulbe.....	Senoufo .....	
	Moussei.....	Zarma/Songhai .....	Goumantche.....	
	Sara.....	Gourmantche.....	Lobi.....	
	Zaghawa .....	Tuareg.....	Gurunsi.....	
	Kanuri.....	Kanuri.....	Dagaaba .....	
	Boudouma .....	Beriberi .....	Tuareg .....	
	Moundang .....	Boudouma .....	Other, Specify .....	
	Massa.....	Manga.....	Don't know .....	
	Other, Specify .....	Other, Specify .....	Refused .....	
	Don't know .....	Don't know .....		
	Refused .....	Refused .....		
A12	Which language do you speak most at home?			
	WAIT FOR RESPONSE			

SINGLE CODE			
	<b>CHAD</b>	<b>NIGER</b>	<b>BURKINA FASO</b>
	French .....	French .....	French.....
	Arabic.....	Arabic.....	Mooré.....
	Kanembou.....	Hausa .....	Fulfuldé.....
	Fulfulde .....	Fulfulde .....	Dioula/Bambara/ Malinké .....
	Gourane .....	Gourmanchema .....	Gourmanchema.....
	Kanuri.....	Kanuri.....	Lobiri.....
	Sara.....	Zarma/Songhai .....	Gurunsi.....
	Zaghawa .....	Tamashek .....	Dagaare .....
	Boudouma .....	Toubou .....	Hausa.....
	Moundang .....	Tagdalt.....	Tagdalt.....
	Massa.....	Other, specify .....	Tuareg/Berber.....
	Other, specify .....	Don't know .....	Other, specify .....
	Don't know .....	Refused .....	Don't know .....
	Refused .....		Refused .....
A13	How many other languages do you understand well enough to listen to a radio broadcast in that language?	0...None 1...One other language 2...Two to four other languages 3...Five to seven other languages 4...More than seven other languages	

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Section B. Participation, Community Decision Making, Groups, and Trust						
Q#	Question	Response Code				Skip Logic
B1	<p>Now I would like to ask you some questions about how decisions are made in your community. When important decisions are made in this commune/neighborhood/village/camp, how much <b>DO</b> the following people participate: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>Read out Responses</p> <p>Use Show Card 02</p> <p>Single Code in Each Row</p>					
		Not at all	Somewhat	A lot	DK	Refuse
	a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3	88	99
	b) Youth	1	2	3	88	99
	c) Women	1	2	3	88	99
	d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group	1	2	3	88	99
	e) People from other tribes or ethnic groups	1	2	3	88	99
B2	And how much do you think the following people <b>SHOULD</b> participate when					

important decisions are made in this commune/neighborhood/village/camp?					
Read out Responses					
Use Show Card 02					
Single Code in Each Row					
	Not at all	Somewhat	A lot	DK	Refuse
a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3	88	99
b) Youth	1	2	3	88	99
c) Women	1	2	3	88	99
d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group	1	2	3	88	99
e) People from other tribes or ethnic groups	1	2	3	88	99
<b>B3</b>	Are you satisfied, neutral, or dissatisfied with the way decisions are made in your community? READ OUT RESPONSES. USE SHOWCARD 02a SINGLE CODE	1...Dissatisfied 2...Neutral 3...Satisfied 88...DK 99...Refused			

B4	Now I'd like your opinion on some governance issues. I'm going to read a list of statements, and I'd like you to please tell me whether you agree with the following statements: not at all, somewhat, or quite.					
	SHOW CARD 02a					
		Not at all	Somewhat	Quite	DK	Refuse
	a) My opinions are respected by local leaders	1	2	3	88	99
	b) Local government takes into account the opinions of citizens in decision-making processes	1	2	3	88	99
	c) I feel well-prepared for participating in political life	1	2	3	88	99
d) People like me have no say in what the government does	1	2	3	88	99	
B5	I'm going to list a number of activities. Please tell me whether you have or have not done each activity in the past 12 months.					
	Single Code in Each Row					
		Yes	No	DK	Refuse	
	a) Attended a commune/neighborhood councilor other public meeting	1	2	88	99	
	b) Met with an elected official, called him/her, or sent a letter	1	2	88	99	
c) Notified the village chief about a local problem	1	2	88	99		

	d) Voted	1	2	88	99	
	e) Participated in community development activities (such as cleaning up your neighborhood, repairing gutters, roads and public buildings, collecting or contributing money for the poor, and other activities that help improve and support your community.)	1	2	88	99	
	f) Joined a protest or demonstration	1	2	88	99	
B6	<p>Speaking about your role in the community, I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, inactive member, or not a member?</p> <p>SHOW CARD 03</p>					
		Not a member	Inactive member	Active member	DK	Refuse
	a) A religious group (e.g. a mosque, church)	1	2	3	88	99
	b) A trade union or farmers association	1	2	3	88	99
	c) A professional or business association	1	2	3	88	99
	d) A community or self-help association	1	2	3	88	99
	e) A youth group	1	2	3	88	99
	f) Some other voluntary association or community	1	2	3	88	99

	group.  <b>SPECIFY</b> _____						
<b>B7</b>	<b>ASK B7 IF CODE 2 OR 3 HAS BEEN CHOSEN AT AT LEAST ONE ATTRIBUTE OF THE QUESTION B6, IF NOT GO TO B8.</b> Thinking about the members of the groups to which you belong, do any of the groups...						
		Yes	No	DK	Refuse		
	a) include both men and women?	1	2	88	99		
	b) include people of different religions?	1	2	88	99		
	c) include people of different ethnic groups?	1	2	88	99		
	d) include people with different political affiliations?	1	2	88	99		
	e) include people of different age groups?	1	2	88	99		
<b>B8</b>	I will now read you two statements about your neighborhood. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements.  SHOW CARD 04						
		Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	DK	Refuse	
	a) Most people are willing to help if you ask for help	1	2	3	88	99	

	b) It is naïve to trust people	1	2	3	88	99	
<b>B9</b>	<p>Now I would like to ask you about the trust you have in different groups of people. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements.</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES.</p> <p>USE SHOWCARD 04.</p>						
		Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	DK	Refuse	
	a) I trust local authorities	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) I trust central government	1	2	3	88	99	
	c) I trust religious leaders	1	2	3	88	99	
	d) I trust non-governmental organizations	1	2	3	88	99	
	e) I trust the police	1	2	3	88	99	
<b>B10</b>	On how many days out of the last 7 did you...						
		Number of days		DK	Refuse		
	a) talk to someone who lives in a different community			88	99		
	b) talk to someone from a different religious group			88	99		
	c) talk to someone from a different ethnic group			88	99		

B11	<p>In elections, Nigeriens/Chadians/ Burkinabe often vote for candidates from their own ethnic group. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 05</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>			
	<p>1. It is normal to want to elect someone from your ethnic community</p> <p>2. Voters should place much less emphasis on ethnic considerations.</p>	<p>1...Selects statement 1</p> <p>2...Selects statement 2</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refused</p>		
B12	<p>Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:</p> <p>I tell my children (or I will tell my future children) they should only marry people from the same ethnic group as theirs.</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 04</p>	<p>1...Disagree</p> <p>2...Neither agree nor disagree</p> <p>3...Agree</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refused</p>		

Section C. Life Satisfaction, Political Interest, Media Use, Economic and Services Evaluation			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
C1	<p>Here is a ladder representing the "ladder of life." Let's suppose the top of the ladder is the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you personally stand at the present</p>		

	<p>time?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 06.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Worst Life ..... Best Life</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</b></p> <p>Don't know...88</p> <p>Refused... 99</p>	
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C2	<p>And on which step would you say you stood two years ago ?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 06.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Worst Life ..... Best Life</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</b></p> <p>Don't know...88</p> <p>Refused... 99</p>	
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C3	<p>And on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say two years from now?</p>	
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	<p><b>USE SHOWCARD 06.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Worst Life ..... Best Life</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</b></p> <p>Don't know...88</p> <p>Refused... 99</p>		
C4	<p>Thinking first of your community, would you say you have a great deal of interest, some interest, or very little interest in local community affairs?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 07</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...very little interest</p> <p>2...some interest</p> <p>3...a great deal of interest</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...refused</p>	
C5	<p>And what about national politics? Would you say you have a great deal of interest, some interest, or very little interest in national politics and national affairs?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 07</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...very little interest</p> <p>2...some interest</p> <p>3...a great deal of interest</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...refused</p>	
C6	<p>In general, would you say that the economy of [COUNTRY] is better, worse, or about the same than it was a year ago?</p>	<p>1...worse</p> <p>2...the same</p> <p>3...better</p>	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 08</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>88...DK</p> <p>99...refuse</p>			
C7	<p>In general, would you say that the country is headed in the right direction or the wrong direction?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 09</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...right direction</p> <p>2...wrong direction</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...refused</p>			
C8	<p>Now I would like to ask you about services that are available in your community. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your access to...</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 10</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE IN EACH ROW</p>				
		Satisfied	Dissatisfied	DK	Refuse
	a) Education/Schools	1	2	88	99
	b) Health services/clinics	1	2	88	99
	c) Traditional/religious justice mechanisms	1	2	88	99
	d) Government legal services (courts)	1	2	88	99
C9	Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements?				

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 04</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE IN EACH ROW</p>						
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	N/A	DK	Ref.
	a) My school is/was a safe place	1	2	3	77	88	99
	b) I received a good education	1	2	3	77	88	99
	c) My school has/had enough supplies, such as tables, chairs, books, pencils and paper.	1	2	3	77	88	99
C10	<p>Now I would like to ask you some questions specifically about middle school and vocational school</p> <p>Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements...</p> <p><b>READ OUT RESPONSES.</b></p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 04.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE IN EACH ROW.</b></p>						
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref.	
	a) Middle school is only for boys, not girls.	1	2	3	88	99	

	b) Vocational training is accessible for people like me	1	2	3	88	99	
C11	How difficult is it to get a job in [COUNTRY] today: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?  READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	1...Not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Refused					
C12	In your opinion, how difficult is it for a young person to find a job after leaving school: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?  READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	1...Not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Refused					
C13	Now I would like to ask you a couple of questions about how politics works in [YOUR COUNTRY]. Do you know how long the term of office is for the President of [Country]? That is, after he is elected, how many years does he stay in office before the next election? [All countries = 5 years]	1...correct answer given 2...incorrect answer given 88...DK 99...Ref					

C14	<p>Do you happen to know how many seats there are in the National Assembly?</p> <p>[Burkina Faso = 127]</p> <p>[Chad = 188]</p> <p>[Niger = 113]</p>	<p>1...correct answer given</p> <p>2...incorrect answer given</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	


SECTION D: Violence and Extremism			
D1A	<p>Now I would like to ask you about differences in your neighborhood. Differences often exist between people living in the same village/neighborhood. To what extent do you feel that ethnic differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p>	<p>1...Not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>	
D1B	<p>Do ethnic divisions in your village/neighborhood ever lead to violence?</p>	<p>1...yes</p> <p>2...no</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>	
D2 A	<p>To what extent do you feel that religious differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood?</p>	<p>1...Not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p>	

	READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02	88...DK 99...Refuse	
D2 B	Do religious divisions in your village/neighborhood ever lead to violence?	1...yes 2...no 88...DK 99...Refuse	
D3	When do you think that violence is an effective method to solve problems: often, sometimes, or never? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11	1...Often 2...Sometimes 3...Never 88...DK 99...REF	
D4	Some people think that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of their religion is justified. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of your religion can be often justified, sometimes justified, or never justified? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11	1...Often 2...Sometimes 3...Never 88...DK 99...Ref	

D5	In your opinion, how often is this commune/neighborhood affected by violence: often, sometimes, or never READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11	1...often 2...sometimes 3...never 88...DK 99...Refused				
D6	Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 04 Circle ONLY ONE CODE					
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref
	a) Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	1	2	3	88	99
	b) The United States is at war against Islam, not terrorism	1	2	3	88	99
	c) Youth (ages 15 to 30) are involved in the use of violence in the name of religion in this country	1	2	3	88	99
	d) The government should work with western countries to fight terrorism	1	2	3	88	99
	e) Al Qaeda's violent actions are permitted under Islamic law	1	2	3	88	99
D7	Which of these three statements comes closest to your own opinion?					

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 12</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>						
	<p>a) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government</p> <p>b) In certain situations, a nondemocratic form of government can be preferable</p> <p>c) To people like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have</p>	<p>1...Selects A</p> <p>2...Selects B</p> <p>3...Selects C</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...REF</p>					
D8	<p>Some people say we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options? Do you agree or disagree that...</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 04</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE IN EACH ROW</p>						
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref	
	a) we should get rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) we should be governed by Sharia Law	1	2	3	88	99	
	c) we should let	1	2	3	88	99	

	the military rule the country						
	d) we should only have one political party	1	2	3	88	99	
D9	<p>Now, I would like to ask you about Sharia (Islamic Law). A number of countries have implemented Sharia law to varying degrees. If Sharia law were implemented in [your country], how would you prefer to see it imposed?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 13 Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1... Strict observance of the law precisely as it is written in the Qur'an.</p> <p>2... Moderate observance of the law, such that there is room for modern advancement.</p> <p>3... I do not support the implementation of Sharia law in my country</p> <p>88... DK</p> <p>99... Refuse</p>					
	<p><b>Respondents will be split for question D10. Half of the respondents will respond to D10: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D10: Treatment Group.</b></p>						
D10: Control	<p><b>CONTROL GROUP ONLY</b></p> <p><b>If respondent answers to D10 Control, skip directly to D11.</b></p>						
	Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive	a. A peaceful protest taking place at the					



	<p>images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support.</p> <p>Please, do not tell me <i>which</i> options are necessary, only <i>how many</i>.</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 14</p> <p>WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS</p>	<p>Western country's embassy</p> <p>b. Your government demanding a formal apology from the Western country</p> <p>c. Your government declaring war against the Western country</p> <p>DK.....88</p> <p>Refuse 99</p>	
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D10: Treatment	<p><b>TREATMENT GROUP ONLY</b></p> <p><b>Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item</b></p>	
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	<p>Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support.</p> <p>Please, do not tell me <i>which</i> options are necessary, only <i>how many</i>.</p>	<p>a. A peaceful protest taking place at the Western country's embassy</p> <p>b. Your government demanding a formal apology from the Western country</p> <p>c. Your government declaring war against the Western country</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 50px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>
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	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 15</p> <p>WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS</p>	<p>d. An attack on the country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties</p> <p>DK.....88</p> <p>Refuse 99</p>	
<p><b>Respondents will be split for question D11. Half of the respondents will respond to D11: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D11: Treatment Group.</b></p>			
D11: Control	<p><b>CONTROL GROUP ONLY</b></p> <p><b>If respondent answers D11 Control, skip directly to D12.</b></p>		
	<p>The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccination across {Country}. How much do you approve of such a plan?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02a</p> <p>CIRCLE ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...somewhat</p> <p>3...quite</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>	
D11: Treatment	<p><b>TREATMENT GROUP ONLY</b></p> <p><b>Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item</b></p>		
	<p>The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...somewhat</p>	

	<p>Polio vaccination across {Country}. It is likely that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group, will oppose this program. How much do you approve of such a plan?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02a</p> <p>CIRCLE ONE CODE</p>	<p>3...quite</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>	
<p><b>Respondents will be split for question D12. Half of the respondents will respond to D12: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D12: Treatment Group.</b></p>			
D12: Control	<p><b>CONTROL GROUP ONLY</b></p> <p><b>If respondent answers D12 Control, skip directly to D13.</b></p>		
	<p>A recent proposal calls for cutting ties between Islamic countries and the West. These reforms may result in economic and political difficulties, but some believe that they will be worthwhile in the long run. How do you feel about this proposal?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 16</p> <p>CIRCLE ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...approve</p> <p>2...neither      approve      nor</p> <p>disapprove</p> <p>3...disapprove</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>	

D12: Treatment	<b>TREATMENT GROUP ONLY</b>		
	<b>Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item</b>		
	<p>A recent proposal by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group, calls for breaking ties between Islamic countries and the West. These reforms may result in economic and political difficulties, but the group believes that they will be worthwhile in the long run. How do you feel about this proposal?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 16</p> <p>CIRCLE ONE CODE</p>	<p>1... approve</p> <p>2...neither approve nor disapprove</p> <p>3...disapprove</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>	

<b>Section E: Peace and Tolerance Radio Module</b>			
<b><i>NB: Radio Module to be expanded to oversample of youth in selected communes in each country</i></b>			
E1	<p>Generally speaking, how often have you heard messages or conversations about peace and tolerance?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p>	<p>1...often</p> <p>2...sometimes</p> <p>3...never</p> <p>88...DK</p>	

	SHOW CARD 11 CIRCLE ONE CODE	99...Ref						
E2	How often within the last month have you...  READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 17 CIRCLE ONE CODE IN EACH ROW							
		Rare ly	Onc e a mon th	Sev eral time s a wee k	Ever y day	DK	Ref	
	a) watched television	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	b) read a newspaper	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	c) used the internet	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	d) made or received voice calls on a mobile phone	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	e) sent or received an SMS (text message) on a mobile phone	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	f) <b>listened to the radio</b>	1	2	3	4	88	99	
E3	What do you usually listen to on the radio?	a) Music b) News c) Drama						

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES. CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>d) Religious Program</li> <li>e) Youth Programs</li> <li>f) Governance Programs</li> <li>g) Peace and Tolerance programs</li> <li>h) Other (specify)</li> <li>i) DK</li> <li>j) Ref</li> </ul>	

CHAD			
E4a	<p>Have you ever listened to the radio program <u>Dabalaye</u> (the meeting place)</p> <p><b>IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS THEY DON'T LISTEN, READ OUT:</b> It's a governance program with presenters Mahamouth and Allamine</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p><b>If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E4b</b></p>
E5a	<p><b>IF YES AT E4a:</b> How many times a month would you say you listen to the program?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 18.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p>	<p>1... Several times a week</p> <p>2... Once a week</p> <p>3... Once a month</p> <p>4... Every three months</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E6a	<p>How much do you like [Dabalaye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E7a	<p>How much do you trust the information you hear on [Dabalaye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p>	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E8a	<p>About how many people that you know have spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Dabalaye] in the last year?: no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...no one</p> <p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E9a	<p>I am going to read a list of themes of the radio shows of [Dabalaye]. Can you tell me which ones you remember hearing?</p>	<p>1...Consequences of manipulation by religious extremists.</p> <p>2...Community involvement in local government decision making.</p> <p><b>3...Recommendations on how to get a better yield of crops from your land.</b></p> <p><b>4...United Nations involvement in peacekeeping in West Africa.</b></p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E10a	<p>Generally, when you listen to [Dabalaye]], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening</p>	<p>1... alone</p> <p>2... with some friends</p> <p>3... with family</p>	

	club?	4... in a formal listening club 88... DK 99... Ref	
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Now I would like to talk about the radio program Chabab Al Haye

E4b	<p>Have you ever listened to the radio program <u>Chabab Al Haye</u> (Youth Alive)?</p> <p><b>IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS THEY DON'T LISTEN, READ OUT:</b> It's a youth program with presenters Djamila and Abdelfatha</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p><b>If code 2, 88 or 99 go to section F</b></p>
E5b	<p><b>IF YES AT E4b:</b> How many times a month would you say you listen to the program?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 18.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p>	<p>1... Several times a week</p> <p>2... Once a week</p> <p>3... Once a month</p> <p>4... Every three months</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E6b	<p>How much do you like [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E7b	<p>How much do you trust the information you hear on [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p>	<p>1...not at all</p>	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E8b	<p>About how many people that you know have spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Chabab Al Haye] in the last year?: no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...no one</p> <p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E9b	<p>I am going to read a list of themes of the radio shows of [Chabab Al Haye]. Can you tell me which ones you remember hearing?</p>	<p><b>1...How young people learn about tolerance in school in Europe.</b></p> <p>2...Recommendations on how to turn an idea or skill into a business.</p> <p><b>3...How to maintain a healthy lifestyle as a new mother.</b></p> <p>4... The consequences of ignoring the law to when resolving</p>	

		<p>conflicts.</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E10b	<p>Generally, when you listen to [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?</p>	<p>1... alone</p> <p>2... with some friends</p> <p>3... with family</p> <p>4... in a formal listening club</p> <p>88... DK</p> <p>99... Ref</p>	

NIGER			
E4a	<p>Have you ever listened to the radio program <u>Sada Zumunci</u> (Solidarity) ?</p> <p><b>IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS THEY DON'T LISTEN, READ OUT:</b> It's a governance and religious affairs program with presenters Mairo and Abdou</p>	<p>1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	<p><b>If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E4b</b></p>
E5a	<p><b>IF YES AT E4a:</b> How many times a month would you say you listen to the program?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 18.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p>	<p>1... Several times a week 2... Once a week 3... Once a month 4... Every three months  88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E6a	<p>How much do you like [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E7a	<p>How much do you trust the information you hear on [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E8a	<p>About how many people that you know have spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>] in the last year?: no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people?</p>	<p>1...no one 2...one or two people 3...three or four people 4...more than four people</p>	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E9a	<p>I am going to read a list of themes of the radio shows of [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>]. Can you tell me which ones you remember hearing?</p>	<p>1...Consequences of manipulation by religious extremists.</p> <p>2...Community involvement in local government decision making.</p> <p><b>3...Recommendations on how to get a better yield of crops from your land.</b></p> <p><b>4...United Nations involvement in peacekeeping in West Africa.</b></p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E10a	<p>Generally, when you listen to [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?</p>	<p>1... alone</p> <p>2... with some friends</p> <p>3... with family</p> <p>4... in a formal listening club</p> <p>88... DK</p> <p>99... Ref</p>	

Now I would like to talk about the radio program Gwadaben Matassa (Youth Boulevard)

E4b	<p>Have you ever listened to the radio program <u>Gwadaben Matassa</u> (Youth Boulevard)?</p> <p><b>IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS THEY DON'T LISTEN, READ OUT:</b> It's a youth program with presenters Djamila and Abdelfatha</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p><b>If code 2, 88 or 99 go to section F</b></p>
E5b	<p><b>IF YES AT E4b:</b> How many times a month would you say you listen to the program?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 18.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p>	<p>1... Several times a week</p> <p>2... Once a week</p> <p>3... Once a month</p> <p>4... Every three months</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E6b	<p>How much do you like [<u>Gwadaben Matassa</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E7b	<p>How much do you trust the information you hear on [<u>Gwadaben Matassa</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p>	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E8b	<p>About how many people that you know have spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show <u>[Gwadaben Matassa]</u> in the last year?: no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...no one</p> <p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E9b	<p>I am going to read a list of themes of the radio shows of <u>[Gwadaben Matassa]</u>. Can you tell me which ones you remember hearing?</p>	<p><b>1...How young people learn about tolerance in school in Europe.</b></p> <p>2...Recommendations on how to turn an idea or skill into a business.</p> <p><b>3...How to maintain a healthy lifestyle as a new mother.</b></p> <p>4... The consequences of ignoring the law to when resolving conflicts.</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E10b	<p>Generally, when you listen to <u>[Gwadaben Matassa]</u>, can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?</p>	<p>1... alone</p> <p>2... with some friends</p> <p>3... with family</p>	

		4... in a formal listening club 88... DK 99... Ref	
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BURKINA FASO			
E4a	<p>Have you ever listened to the radio program <i>Malegr Sooré</i> (Voices of Change) ?</p> <p><b>IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS THEY DON'T LISTEN, READ OUT:</b> It's a youth program in Mooré with presenters Angèle and Eric.</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p><b>If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E4b</b></p>
E5a	<p><b>IF YES AT E4a:</b> How many times a month would you say you listen to the program?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 18.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p>	<p>1... Several times a week</p> <p>2... Once a week</p> <p>3... Once a month</p> <p>4... Every three months</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E6a	<p>How much do you like [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E7a	<p>How much do you trust the information you hear on [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E8a	<p>About how many people that you know have</p>	<p>1...no one</p>	

	<p>spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>] in the last year?: no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E9a	<p>I am going to read a list of themes of the radio shows of [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>]. Can you tell me which ones you remember hearing?</p>	<p>1... <b>The importance of education for young</b></p> <p>2...Community involvement in local government decision making.</p> <p><b>3...Recommendations on how to get a better yield of crops from your land.</b></p> <p><b>4...United Nations involvement in peacekeeping in West Africa.</b></p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E10a	<p>Generally, when you listen to [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?</p>	<p>1... alone</p> <p>2... with some friends</p> <p>3... with family</p> <p>4... in a formal listening club</p> <p>88... DK</p> <p>99... Ref</p>	

Now I would like to talk about the radio program Pinal Sukabè (Youth Awakening)

E4b	<p>Have you ever listened to the radio program Pinal Sukabè (Youth Awakening)?</p> <p><b>IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS THEY DON'T LISTEN, READ OUT:</b> It's a youth program in Mooré with presenters Issouf and Kady.</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p><b>If code 2, 88 or 99 go to section F</b></p>
E5b	<p><b>IF YES AT E4b:</b> How many times a month would you say you listen to the program?</p> <p><b>USE SHOWCARD 18.</b></p> <p><b>SINGLE CODE.</b></p>	<p>1... Several times a week</p> <p>2... Once a week</p> <p>3... Once a month</p> <p>4... Every three months</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E6b	<p>How much do you like [Pinal Sukabè]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E7b	<p>How much do you trust the information you hear on [Pinal Sukabè]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p>	<p>1...not at all</p>	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E8b	<p>About how many people that you know have spoken to you about things they heard on the radio show [Pinal Sukabè] in the last year?: no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...no one</p> <p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E9b	<p>I am going to read a list of themes of the radio shows of [Pinal Sukabè]. Can you tell me which ones you remember hearing?</p>	<p><b>1... The importance of education for young.</b></p> <p>2...Recommendations on how to turn an idea or skill into a business.</p> <p><b>3...How to maintain a healthy lifestyle as a new mother.</b></p> <p>4... The consequences of ignoring the law to when resolving conflicts.</p>	

		88...DK 99...Ref	
E10b	Generally, when you listen to [Pinal Sukabè], can you tell me who you are with when you listen? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1... alone 2... with some friends 3... with family 4... in a formal listening club  88... DK 99... Ref	

Section F. Experience with P-DEV II Programming							
F3	Please tell me how many times over the past year you have attended any of the following kinds of events or activities:						
	Read out Responses						
	Use Show Card 20						
	Single Code in Each Row						
		Never	One or two times	Three or four times	More than four times	DK	Refuse
	a) A workshop or forum in	1	2	3	4	88	99

	your community where issues about peace or democracy were discussed							
	b) A poetry reading or a drama about peace or democracy issues	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	c) Training to develop ways to solve community problems	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	d) A workshop or format at a place other than a mosque where imams or religious leaders discussed peace or democracy with people in the community	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	e) Trainings to help you find work or find a better job	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	f) Trainings to help you learn how to run a business or write an application for a business development grant	1	2	3	4	88	99	
	g) A meeting to help determine how community grant funding will be spent	1	2	3	4	88	99	

<b>Section O: Panel Follow-up Instructions and Respondent Location</b>	
	Thank you for taking the time to answer our survey.

	<p>We will return in 2 years to ask you some more questions. I hope that I will be the person who will return, but it may be another person in my place. Because I may not be the same person, may I ask you a few more questions just to make sure we find you again.</p>	
G2	<p>Would you be willing to speak with us again in the next few years to we can see how you're doing?</p>	<p>Yes.....1 No.....2</p>
G4	<p>Could you give us the contact information for someone who you expect will be able to help us find you in the next few years?</p>	<p><b>[WRITE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF CONTACT]</b></p>
O1	<p>Can we find you the same time of day during the week?</p>	<p>Yes.....1 No.....2</p>
O2	<p>Which is the best time to reach you?</p>	
O3	<p>Can we find you again in the next two years here?</p>	<p>Yes.....1 No.....2</p>
O4	<p>If No, where can we find you and what is the best way to get there? Interviewer: note the precise location and instructions for finding the house for the next wave:</p>	

O5	Respondent's Nick name as known in his/her neighbourhood		
O6	Respondent's occupation/profession		
O7	Sector/ Quarter		
O8	Respondent/household complet address :	_____	
		_____	
		_____	
		_____	
O9	Respondent mobile number :		
O10	Respondent position in the household		
O11	Name of head of household if different from respondent		

**Section G: Interviewer Data Entry**

G5	Record interview end time using 24 hour clock	____:____ (hour:minute)	
	<b>FOR INTERVIEWER COMPLETION ONLY --DO NOT ASK RESPONDENT!</b>		
	<b>PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER YOU HAVE LEFT</b>		

<b>THE RESPONDENT'S HOME.</b>		
G6	Length of interview	_____ Minutes
G7	Sex of interviewer	Male.....1 Female.....2
G8	In what language was the interview conducted?	French.....1 Arabic .....2 French and Arabic.....3 Kanembu .....4 Hausa .....5 Zarma .....6 Tamashek .....7 Gourane .....8 Other, specify .....9
G9 [Afr Bar]	Were there any other people immediately present who were listening during the interview?	No one.....1 Spouse only.....2 Children only.....3 A few others.....4 Small crowd.....5

G10 [AfrBar ]	What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview?				
	A. Was he or she	Friendly 1	In between 2	Hostile 3	
	B. What he or she	Interested 1	In between 2	Bored 3	
	C. Was he or she	Cooperative 1	In between 2	Uncooperative 3	
	D. Was he or she	Patient 1	In between 2	Impatient 3	
	E. Was he or she	At ease 1	In between 2	Suspicious 3	
	F. Was he or she	Honest 1	In between 2	Misleading 3	
G11 [Afr Bar]	What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?	All .....1 Most .....2 Some .....3 Few .....4 None .....5			
G12	On which attempt was the interview completed?	First attempt.....1 Second attempt.....2 Third attempt.....3			

G13	Please note any questions that caused particular difficulties for the respondent: <b>[CONTRACTOR: Do not code this list for the data set. Only provide summary of problem questions in the Technical Report].</b>		
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**U.S. Agency for International Development**

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20523

Tel: (202) 712-0000

Fax: (202) 216-3524

**[www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov)**