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Factors Affecting Homicide Rates in Guatemala 2000-2013:

**A Study of the Municipalities of
Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva**

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Factors Affecting Homicide Rates in Guatemala 2000-2013:

A Study of the Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva

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Abbreviations

ACORGUATE	Asociación de Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Guatemala / Association of Organization Coordinators of Guatemala
AFPC	Acuerdo sobre Fortalecimiento del Poder Civil y Papel del Ejército en una Sociedad Democrática / Agreement on the Strengthening of the Civil Authority and Role of the Army in a Democratic Society
ANAM	Asociación Nacional de Municipalidades / National Association of Municipalities
ASIES	Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales / Association for Research and Social Studies
CECOIN	Centro de Coordinación Interinstitucional del Ministerio de Gobernación / Center for Inter-institutional Coordination, Ministry of the Interior
CICIG	Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala International / Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala
COCODE	Consejos Comunitarios de Desarrollo / Community Development Councils
COCEDE	Consejos Departamentales de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural / Department Councils for Urban and Rural Development
COMUDE	Consejos Municipales de Desarrollo / Municipal Council for Development
CONADUR	Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural / National Council for Urban and Rural Development
CONAPREVI	Nacional para la Prevención de la Violencia Intrafamiliar / National Coordination for the Prevention of Intrafamiliar
CONRED	Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres / Disaster Relief Coordinating Office
CUB	Comités Únicos de Barrio / Unique Neighborhood Committees
DECAM	Departamento de Control de Armas y Municiones / Department for the Control of Arms and Ammunition
DIGECAM	Dirección General de Control de Armas y Municiones / Administration for the Control of Arms and Ammunition
ENEI	Encuesta Nacional de Empleos y Ingresos National / Survey on Employment and Income
FMM	Fundación Myrna Mack / Myrna Mack Foundation
ICCPG	Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala / Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal Science of Guatemala

IDem	Incidencia Democrática / Democratic Incidence
IEPADES	Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible / Institute for the Teaching of Sustainable Development
IGSS	Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social / Guatemalan Institute of Social Security
INACIF	Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses / National Institute of Forensic Sciences
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas / National Institute of Statistics
IUSI	Impuesto Único sobre Inmuebles / Real Estate Tax
JEPEDI	Jefatura de Planificación Estratégica y Desarrollo Institucional de la PNC / Directorate of Strategic Planning and Institutional Development of the National Civilian Police
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MINGOB	Ministerio de Gobernación de Guatemala / Ministry of the Interior of Guatemala
MINUGUA	Misión de Naciones Unidas de Guatemala / United Nations Mission in Guatemala
MP	Ministerio Público Public Ministry / Prosecutor's Office
ODHAG	Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala / Office of Human Rights for the Archbishop of Guatemala
PAC	Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil / Civil Self-Defense Patrols
PDH	Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos / Human Rights Ombudsman
PNC	Policía Nacional Civil / National Civilian Police
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo / United Nations Program for Development
SECCATID	Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Comisión Contra las Adicciones y el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas / Executive Secretary of the Commission against Addictions and Drug Trafficking
SERJUS	Servicios Jurídicos y Sociales / Court and Social Services
SIAF	Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera / Integrated Financial Administration System
SIAF-MUNI	Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera / Municipal Municipal Integrated Financial Administration System

SICOMP	Sistema Informático de Casos del Ministerio Público / Information System for the Public Ministry (Prosecutor)
SNIP	Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública / National Public Investment System
TSE	Tribunal Supremo Electoral / Electoral Supreme Court
UPCV	Unidad para la Prevención Comunitaria de la Violencia / Unit for Community Violence Prevention

Executive Summary

Introduction

Since 2009, national homicide rates in the country of Guatemala have declined annually and there is considerable interest in sustaining these improvements and replicating them throughout the country and the region. This study represents a systematic approach to explaining this declining trend by focusing on three of the largest municipalities in the country: Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva.

This comprehensive study considered macro, micro, and criminal justice system domains. Using this framework, the current study addresses a many topics that reflect the leading theories of the causes of violence and homicide.

From June to September 2013, a team of researchers led by RTI International and including three prominent Guatemalan research agencies (*Incidencia Democrática – iDem*, the *Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales – ASIES*, and the *Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala – ICCPG*) conducted key stakeholder interviews and analyzed secondary data to answer these questions.

In the highest crime areas in the municipality of Guatemala, known as the “red zones,” citizens live in a situation of perpetual threat from extortion, intimidation, and violence. Afraid to go outside after certain hours, residents of communities like, El Amparo, El Limón, Paraíso, and La Limonada, are captives in their own homes. In Villa Nueva, in communities like El Mezquital and El Búcaro, the crime situation has already passed a critical threshold because of pervasive extortion and homicides at the hands of hired killers and the military detachments are now permanently assigned in efforts to curb the violence. In Mixco, La Carolingia and El Milagro stand out as some of the most high risk areas.

The municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva experienced their highest levels of homicidal violence in 2009. The number of homicides in the municipality of Guatemala has dropped most noticeably in the actual number of cases but the percentage of decrease has been highest in Mixco. Homicides in Mixco have declined 42.9% since 2009; in Guatemala, there were 36.6% fewer cases than in 2009; and Villa Nueva dropped 24.2% during the same period. In Guatemala and Mixco, the declines were incremental and steady whereas in Villa Nueva, the number decreased in 2010, increased in 2011, and then decreased again. Villa Nueva is the most challenging to explain.

Major Findings

Macro Domain

The macro domain represents the broader context within which homicide and violence occur. This includes environmental and social forces that are typically beyond any individual’s control, but may stem from individuals’ behavior in the aggregate.

Economic Conditions. All three municipalities are part of the Greater Guatemala City Metropolitan Area and economic conditions are intricately intertwined. There are however differences between the three. The municipality of Guatemala has shown steady increases in the amount of funds allocated for public expenditures, although in the last two years, operational expenses have overshadowed these investments. Villa Nueva too, spends a large portion of their budget on public expenditures, even more than Guatemala, as a percentage of their overall budget. Mixco, on the other hand, has consistently demonstrated lower public investments. In Guatemala and Mixco, the two municipalities with the most consistently declining homicide rates, a larger significant larger proportion of expenditures are going towards operational expenditures than in Villa Nueva. Villa Nueva also has substantially more irregular settlements and public works activities have been more challenging to establish.

Demographic Patterns. As the proportion of female-headed households and the percentage of young adults between ages 18 and 35 increases, so does the homicide rate (Cuevas and Demombynes, 2009). As a nation, Guatemala has the largest and fastest growing population in Central America and fully three-quarters of the population are under the age of 35. Additionally, the number of female-headed households has also been slowly increasing and is currently estimated to be around 25% (World Bank, 2011). As these crime-prone demographic sectors increase, violent crime rates will also likely increase. Unfortunately, there has not been an updated census in Guatemala since 2002 and municipal-level demographic data are not available to make any more concrete predictions.

Community Organizations. Even though 48 Community Development Councils (COCODES) exist in the municipality of Guatemala, the local government has been somewhat resistant to recognize them (El Periódico, 2013). However, Unique Neighborhood Committees (CUBs) have been somewhat effective in carrying community concerns to the mayor and the municipality. In Mixco and Villa Nueva, the municipality governments are receptive to input and active participation of the various community groups and there have been several coordinated activities to address issues of crime and violence. Each municipal government should continue to work to strengthen community organizations such as the COCODES and CUBs to further promote and encourage civil participation and community decision-making and promote civic education.

Local Governance. Democratic governance depends on the active participation of the citizens, the legitimacy of the political system, and the institutional framework on which it is based. Thus, several measures of local governance were considered in this study including: civil participation, democratic institutions, human rights, electoral participations and perceptions of impunity, corruption, and transparency. The data demonstrate that recent improvements in these areas of local governance in all three municipalities have likely contributed to the declining homicide rate observed since 2009.

Improvements in System Responses Outside of the Criminal Justice System. Several improvements outside of the criminal justice system have likely contributed to recent reductions in the homicide rate in the municipalities studied. These include:

- Emergency responders: Interviews revealed several activities that may have improved survival rates of those with serious, potentially fatal injuries.
- Hospitals and improved trauma care: Emergency room doctors and support staff have received additional specific training to improve their capacity to treat gunshot victims.
- Domestic violence shelters: Advocacy organizations like *Fundación Sobrevivientes* have contributed directly to the investigation and successful prosecution of violent criminals. Since the agency began, they claim to have supported at least 1,000 successful prosecutions of violent offenders who prey on women.
- Urban Public Transportation: As of June 2013, the *Transmetro* has completed approximately 415 million routes and currently transports between 200,000 and 250,000 passengers every week day. Since 2007, there have not been any robberies, assaults, or homicides against bus drivers or passengers. By contrast, there have been more than 900 urban bus drivers murdered, not including drivers' assistants or passengers, in the Guatemala City Metropolitan Area between 2007 and 2013.
- Mediation/Community Resolution: Only a few concrete cases of mediation activities in the municipalities were identified. The mediation efforts described were typically orchestrated by a local pastor, priest, or other religious leader and not through an NGO or government agency. Unfortunately, the mediation efforts are not balanced and frequently the communities are forced to accept whatever terms the criminals offer.

Micro Domain

The micro domain is concerned with homicide in its situational context, and includes individual behavior and other factors that relate directly to homicide. This domain is best characterized as relating to “guns, gangs, and drugs.”

Availability and Lethality of Guns. There are likely between 2 and 3 million illegal weapons in Guatemala, with an approximate 5% annual growth. Based on information from DIGECAM, the Ministry of Defense, the National Civilian Police, and other data presented here, we know the following:

- The Department of Guatemala had 12,011 registered weapons as of the end of 2012—337 in Villa Nueva (2.8%), 674 in Mixco (5.6%), and 9,669 in the capital city (80.5%).
- There are likely more than 100,000 unregistered firearms in the Department of Guatemala,

- A total of 15 shipments containing 20,654, 960 rounds of ammunition were imported into Guatemala in 2012.
- The amount of legally imported ammunition is about half of all that actually enters the country.
- 8 out of 10 firearms seized in Guatemala are illegal.
- 9 out of 10 crimes are committed with illegal firearms.
- The most common handgun used to commit crimes is the 9mm.
- Among those firearms that are legally prohibited from being owned by civilians, the AK-47 is the most frequently used to commit criminal acts.
- 82.0% of homicides committed in 2012 were carried out with a firearm.
- A time series analysis of the 2009 Firearms and Ammunition Law has not had a statistically significant effect on the homicide rate in the municipalities of Guatemala or Vila Nueva, but it does account for a small percentage of the decline in Mixco.

There is no shortage of firearms in Guatemala and it is highly unlikely that firearm or ammunition availability has had any measurable impact on decreasing homicide rates. There has been an increase in the amount of more lethal caliber ammunition in Guatemala since 2005; however, it seems unlikely that the increased lethality of weapons has significantly contributed to homicide rates.

Street Gangs. Street gang membership and influence continues to increase and they have a significant impact on the security of Guatemalan society. Efforts to increase the visible presence of law enforcement and consolidate prevention efforts have generally not had a significant impact on criminal activities in concentrated gang areas, particularly in irregular settlement areas.

Organized Crime. Organized criminal activities in this study are considered distinct from the activities of street gangs, although there is some collusion between the two. In some areas, drug dealers and cartel leaders are slowly replacing the legitimate state government and are establishing parallel and competing structures. There is evidence that some institutional structures set up by municipal governments, such as community committees, are co-opted by the drug interests and used for their own goals to communicate directly to the residents. Messages from the cartel leaders are also passed along to municipal authorities. A number of homicides have been attributed to the local vigilante groups over the past decade, and their existence poses a unique challenge for law enforcement officials.

Drug Markets/Drug Use. Drug trafficking is an especially important factor affecting homicide rates. Drug-trafficking hotspots, areas with high drug seizure rates, have homicide rates more than double those in areas of low trafficking intensity, controlling for other factors. Drug seizure rates are not, however, the best way to measure drug trafficking activity because seizure rates also are a reflection of the efficiency and

effectiveness of law enforcement. Unfortunately, no agency systematically collects drug prevalence and use rates in Guatemala, and no other market variables are available either.

Response Domain

The response domain covered the criminal justice system, including law enforcement, prosecution, courts, and corrections. This domain was developed to explore the impact that criminal justice policies and practices might have on homicide trends.

Police Presence in the Community. While there continue to be organizational challenges, the PNC is steadily improving, especially in the Guatemala City Metropolitan Area. The gains made by the PNC have been further strengthened by the creation of Municipal Police and, the Guatemalan military has provided support to PNC security efforts in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva. In Mixco, two military detachments have been permanently assigned as part of the municipal *Mixco Seguro* initiative. According to respondents interviewed for this report, these efforts to increase the visible presence of law enforcement and consolidate prevention efforts have not had a significant impact on criminal activities. More research is needed to determine whether the perceptions of residents are borne out in actual arrest and victimization data. It is important to note that technological advancements, especially since 2009 and the launching of the Center for Inter-institutional Coordination (CECOIN), have changed the way the PNC allocates resources and assigns personnel. Furthermore, since 2012, many top administrators of the National Civilian Police have taken courses from the *Universidad del Occidente* as part of the newly inaugurated Police School for Higher Learning (*Escuela de Estudios Superiores de la Policía*).

Interagency Collaboration. CECOIN, part of the Ministry of the Interior, has been in charge of bringing together all of the national institutions related to security since the passing of the National Security System Act in 2008. As part of this responsibility, CECOIN has worked to prevent violence and crime through the Secure Neighborhoods Program and the Open Schools Program as well as the Crime Prevention Unit of the Vice Ministry for Community Support. This shift in emphasis coincides with the declining homicides rates observed since 2009 although several recent situations may have limited the continued success of the law.

New Legislation and Criminal Justice System Reforms. Besides corruption and allegations of corruption, the modern Guatemalan criminal justice system has experienced a number of other challenges stemming from the lack of resources, inconsistent political will, inadequate laws and procedures, and general instability. Interviews with prosecutors and law enforcement command staff demonstrate a consistent belief that their agencies are improving and that the “old guard” is passing. Confidence in the integrity of individual actors, like Claudia Paz y Paz, is undergirding these changes.

Time series analysis based on monthly homicide rates in each of the municipalities to determine whether an association existed between five specific events that have occurred

during the last five years: the 2008 Femicide Law, the 2008 National Security System Law, the 2009 Firearm Law, the 2010 Municipal Police Law, and the appointment of Claudia Paz y Paz in December 2010 to the position of Attorney General. None of these events had an effect in Villa Nueva where the homicide rate has fluctuated considerably. However, the appointment of Claudia Paz y Paz and the Municipal Police Law did have a measurable significant effect on lowering homicide rates in Guatemala and Mixco. The Firearms Law was similarly significant in Mixco, the municipality with the greatest percentage of decrease in homicide rates.

In 2006, USAID proposed the implementation of the first 24-hour court, a new model that broke away from the traditional court structure. Prior to 2006, over three-fourths (77.3%) of criminal cases were dismissed for lack of merit in Guatemala City. In 2012, only 11.9% of criminal cases were dismissed for a lack of merit. Furthermore, as a result of the 24-hour court, the number of arbitrary arrests by police was reduced and there was an overall improvement in coordination and communication among all parties involved in the criminal process. High Impact Courts were implemented in 2009 to try cases that could not be held locally due to security risks. Between 2009 and 2012, the High Impact Courts were assigned 174 cases, including transitional justice cases such as the Dos Erres massacre case and the Rios Montt trial. Activities such as these have reduced impunity and reinforced the quality of rule of law in Guatemala.

There are several other encouraging developments as well:

- The criminal investigational capacity of both the prosecutors and the National Civilian Police was improved through training and technical assistance, and a new model for investigations was implemented, including the creation of a new subdivision within the National Civilian Police to investigate homicides.
- A new emphasis on system efficiency has led to a number of shifts in procedures among prosecutors and cases are being processed more quickly.

Emerging Police Technology. The National Civilian Police (PNC) of Guatemala is embracing the use of technology, and there are several examples. There are concerted efforts by top administrators within the PNC to improve the level of professionalism and technical capacity of the command staff. Since 2012, most of the top police commanders have been taking part in a 10-month training curriculum on police management and administration, strategic planning, national security and regional security community policing, managing human resources, strategies for coordination with other agencies, and crime prevention.

The use of advanced technology in criminalistics and forensics has improved progressively over the last several years in Guatemala. Since 2008, the National Institute of Forensic Sciences (*Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses – INACIF*) had experienced a substantial increase in the demand for certain types of forensic investigations as both the PNC and the Public Ministry are steadily improving the quality of their investigative processes.

Punishment Severity and Incapacitation. According to the Public Ministry, the number of cases successfully prosecuted have increased progressively and more criminals than ever are being convicted and sentenced to prison. The number of expedited prosecution cases has surpassed the number being tried normally. Prosecutors can now resolve their caseloads more quickly and the court system is operating more efficiently.

The number of people incarcerated in Guatemala has been steadily increasing over the last two decades while the overall incarceration rate remains low compared to the rest of Central America and most of the world. In fact, Guatemala has the lowest incarceration rate (87 per 100,000 in the population) in Central America. The incarceration data between 2010 and 2013 clearly shows a sharp increase in the number of people imprisoned.

Recommendations to Sustain Reductions in Homicides

Continue to promote local government responsibility, transparency, and accountability to the public and target specific areas of corruption concern (i.e., extortion by police/prosecutors/judges, building/construction permits, and utility connections). This will improve the perceptions of the public towards the legitimacy of the local government.

Address the budgetary crisis at INACIF and ensure that the agency has the funding to cover additional salaries, equipment, supplies, and storage and work space in order to continue to respond to requests for forensic analysis related to criminal investigations.

Reinforce interagency collaboration – especially between the National Civilian Police, the Public Ministry, INACIF, the Guatemalan military. CECOIN is a tremendous resource for promoting this ongoing collaboration. Reconcile the differences between the number of homicides reported by the National Civilian Police and INACIF. Train all law enforcement agencies in proper evidence collection and the uses of forensics investigations to support successful prosecutions.

Convene a criminal justice data summit to address opportunities for improving data quality, analytical techniques, and data sharing across agencies. Make data driven policy decisions. In order to do this, the local data infrastructure needs to be improved and reliable data collection strategies and analysis techniques must be established.

Ensure strict regulation of businesses which may contribute to crime and insecurity including: night clubs, bars, liquor stores, etc. These regulations should consider changing the hours of services and other strategies to reduce the drug and alcohol consumption. Raise awareness of other issues of social blight which may affect violence rates such as prostitution, trafficking (people, guns, and drugs), and substance abuse.

Evaluate strategic planning and budgets in each of the municipalities. Each municipality faces unique development and security challenges. According to the National System of Public Investment (SNIP) infrastructural investment should be the highest priority.

While, Guatemala and Mixco have been able to rely on a larger share of their revenues being self-generated and a larger percentage of their available budgets have gone towards operational expenses. Rapid population growth in Villa Nueva has seriously challenged the ability of the municipality to keep up with the demand for public services. Guatemala and Villa Nueva urgently need to address the security challenges within their unplanned settlements. While less prevalent in Mixco, there are over 250 of these settlements in the municipality of Guatemala and Villa Nueva has nearly 60. Public works and municipal services are inadequate in many of these areas.

Continue to restore and maintain public spaces, parks, streets, markets, central squares, etc., and reinforce community confidence by improving lighting and providing consistent security. Promote clean and green municipalities by improving the disposal of solid waste, reforestation, establishing pedestrian pathways, and reducing visual and auditory pollution.

Collect data related to drug availability, substance use patterns and addictions, drug trafficking, and treatment. There are no recent or reliable statistics on drugs and alcohol in the entire country. The Executive Secretary of the Commission against Addictions and Drug Trafficking (SECCATID) currently has a drug observatory which could potentially manage such a project if adequately funded. Drug seizure data from the PNC and the Guatemalan military should also be analyzed systematically.

Evaluate and reinforce the successful activities that are already in place. Appendix 8 includes a list of many of the violence prevention and intervention activities that have been launched in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva over the last two decades. Most of these were not evaluated. There are several current violence prevention programs that need to be evaluated as well as several municipal initiatives (i.e., *Transmetro*, *Transurbana*, *Mixco Seguro*, the Monitoring and Control Center in Mixco, the motorcycle paramedics, use of cameras and public pathways in Villa Nueva, etc.). Similarly, private activities like those being done by *Fundación Sobrevivientes* and specialized training by physicians in emergency rooms to better treat gunshot injuries should be evaluated. This research has established that many of these activities are likely associated with the declines in homicide rates but there is not sufficient data to substantiate causal links.

Promote crime and violence prevention activities that target youth to improve awareness among young people about reducing violence and formulate plans and local policies for the prevention of youth violence. Consider demographic patterns within each community (i.e., percentage of female-headed households, teenage pregnancy, truancy/dropout rates) and develop mitigation strategies to address risk factors.

Revisit the 2008 National Security System Act and follow through with the full implementation of the National Security Council including the establishment of the Crime Prevention Unit under the Vice-Ministry for Community Support.

Review the mandate and authority of the Administration for the Control of Arms and Ammunition (DIGECAM). While gun owners are required by law to register their weapons and obtain a permit, most do not. Furthermore, it is estimated that nearly all gun owners with registered firearms also have unregistered weapons. While the data currently collected by DIGECAM is commendable given the lack of gun owner compliance with the law, there are many opportunities to improve.

Prepare for increasing levels of prison crowding. Shifts in one segment of the criminal justice system inevitably affect other components of the system. As law enforcement become more proficient at arresting suspects and the court systems improves prosecutorial efficiency and case processing, the corrections system will experience an increase in the number of bookings into prison. The data presented in this report show that the time from arrest to prosecution has decreased substantially and more offenders are being sentenced to prison. Since 2010, the number of prisoners incarcerated in the country of Guatemala has increased by 46.6%. Prison crowding is already a concern and the situation is likely to worsen. Officials should begin strategizing to develop alternatives to incarceration.

Provide training to the local safety committees and councils including the Community Development Councils (COCODES), Municipal Councils for Development (COMUDES), Unique Neighborhood Committees (CUBs), and other groups. Develop, implement, and monitor strategies, programs, and plans to address public safety and violence prevention.

Introduction

The United States and other international governments have made tremendous investments to promote democracy and government stability in Guatemala. Between 1999 and 2009, the national homicide rate increased steadily, and worries about unbridled violence in Guatemala specifically—and the entire Central American region more generally—dominated most discussions about the future of democracy and the overall stability of the region (Blake & Morris, 2009). Since 2009, however, national homicide rates have declined annually in Guatemala and there is considerable interest in sustaining these improvements and replicating them throughout the country and the region (Van Dijk, Tseloni, & Farrell, 2012).

Explaining the declines in the homicide rates in Guatemala, however, has proven to be especially challenging even though there is no shortage of individuals, government agencies, and media outlets that have offered explanations, often conflicting, for the reduction. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has funded several activities designed to reduce violence in Guatemala, most notably, the USAID Violence Prevention Project implemented by RTI International. The inconclusive explanations for the decline in homicides over the past 4 years prompted USAID to fund a more systematic research project to consider homicide patterns over the last decade.

In mid-2013, USAID authorized funding to conduct a study of homicide in three of the most populous municipalities in the entire country: Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva. Guatemala has demonstrated consistent declines in homicide since 2009, whereas the trends in Mixco and Villa Nueva are less clear. A team of criminologists from RTI International developed a research design that reflected the available resources and the short timeline designated for the activity. The team based the research design on a classic study of homicide that was conducted in the United States (Lattimore, Trudeau, Riley, Leiter, & Edwards, 1997). This comprehensive study considered macro, micro, and criminal justice system domains. Using this framework, the current study includes 16 hypotheses that reflect the leading theories of the causes of violence and homicide. From June to September 2013, a team of researchers from RTI International and three prominent Guatemalan research agencies (*Incidencia Democrática – iDem*, the *Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales – ASIES*, and the *Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala – ICCPG*) conducted key stakeholder interviews and analyzed secondary data in an attempt to address the 16 hypotheses. This report provides the results of these activities.

Historical Context

Guatemala has experienced violence since its inception as a political entity during the Spanish Conquest. The Spanish colonists imposed extractive political and economic institutions upon the population. Different forms of forced labor—*repartimiento*,

econmienda—were used during colonial times to dominate the original inhabitants and it lasted longer in Guatemala than in the other Spanish colonies (Wolf, 1959).

The political independence achieved in the early 19th century did not produce social inclusion, and violence continued as a way to maintain the conditions for the economic exploitation of the country's resources—mainly agricultural exports. The liberal revolution of 1871 changed the conformation of the country's ruling elite, establishing the modern capitalistic coffee producers at the pinnacle, but keeping the masses excluded from political and economic empowerment (Pendergrast, 1999).

New forms of forced labor, including debt peonage, remained in existence. Peasants continued to be barred from owning land, and no social services were provided for the majorities. The relationship between the governing elites and the general population continued to be one of domination–subjugation. The army entrenched itself as the main state institution for governance and control. Whenever it was deemed necessary, the government did not hesitate to use force against its adversaries or to maintain its understanding of “public order” and territorial control (Grandin, 2000; Pendergrast, 1999).

A union of civic leaders and middle-rank army officers achieved the ousting of Jorge Ubico's dictatorship in 1944. The “October Revolution” and its 10 years of democratic government achieved social minimums such as the creation of the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security (IGSS) and the establishment of a labor code (Grieb, 1979). The regional context was one of inward-looking economic policies in the rest of Latin America.

Jacobo Arbenz's government in the 1950s proposed to carry out an agrarian reform to provide landless peasants with productive resources in order to expand national markets. However, this deepening of reforms was opposed by a coalition of conservative national forces and the United States in a context of Cold War confrontation that portrayed Arbenz as a communist sympathizer. His government was toppled violently in 1954 (Grandin, 2000, Manz, 1988).

The subsequent decades of military rule under a veil of fraudulent elections were characterized by the intensification in the use of violence against those opposed to the government, especially trade unions, peasants' organizations, students' organizations, and opposition political parties. Channels for democratic political expression were blocked through electoral intervention and direct repression.

During the 1960s and 1970s growing numbers of political opponents were targeted for exile, imprisonment, torture, and physical elimination. Insurgent armed groups became active and were confronted by growing repression that impinged on the civilian population, which suffered actions of genocide committed by state forces during the 1980s (Grandin, 2000; 2011).

New mechanisms of territorial and population control established by the Army forced local men and boys to form self-defense patrols (*Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil*, PACs).

The army's deployment based on military zones located inside the national territory illustrates the army's purpose as the controller of the population instead of the country's defense against external aggression. Violence branded most social relations during these decades (Grandin, 2000; 2011).

After a protracted negotiation process set forth by changing international conditions, including the decline of the Soviet Bloc and the waves of democratization sweeping Southern Europe and South America, Peace Accords were signed in Guatemala in 1996. The Guatemalan accords are recognized among the most complete in the world because of their central consideration of the socioeconomic grievances that originated the conflict, including issues of political exclusion and cultural discrimination (Grandin, 2011).

The decades of armed confrontation and of violence-mediated relations between government and the population created violence-based institutions and many specialists in the use of force. The political-conflict motivations for the use of violence now absent, the specialists—and their organizations—began to morph into criminal gangs and syndicates. This development was enhanced by the proximate international context of growing narcotics trafficking and other forms of illicit trade in humans and weapons (Demombynes, 2011). Additionally, there were internal deficiencies such as corrupt and inefficient national institutions in charge of justice and security. The social considerations of the Peace Accords remain unfulfilled. Demographic growth, migration to the urban centers, unplanned development, and a lack of education and health and recreation services, especially for the young, have all contributed to the mutation of the political violence of the past into the social and the economic forms of criminal violence of the present. Guatemala's road toward democracy is still unfulfilled, and historically high levels of violence threaten this process.

This situation notwithstanding, the country has made important achievements, mainly in the creation of an institutional structure in matters of security and justice that is respectful of democratic principles, at least in form.

- Guatemala is one of the first Latin American countries where the accusatory penal system has been fully implemented. The new penal code was approved in 1994 (Davis & Turku, 2011).
- The Peace Accord on the “Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society” called for the creation of new civilian security institutions.
- The National Civilian Police was established in 1997. The Army was reduced from 47,000 to 31,000 soldiers in 1996 and further to 15,000 in 2004 (Ruhl, 2005, Seligson, 2005).
- The self-defense patrols were dismantled by the turn of the century (Schirmer, 1998).
- A civilian Secretariat for Administrative and Security Issues (*Secretaría de Asuntos Administrativos y de Seguridad, SAAS*) was created to replace the

infamous Presidential Chiefs of Staff (*Estado Mayor Presidencial*) that served as a mechanism for the army's hierarchy to exert undue influence over the President's office (Seligson, 2005).

- The Secretariat for Strategic Analysis (*Secretaría de Asuntos Estratégicos*, SAE) was established in 1995 to create civilian competencies in matters of intelligence. The Secretariat for State Intelligence (*Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado*, SIE) replaced it in 2008 (*Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad*, 2012).
- The Civilian Directorate of Intelligence (*Dirección de Inteligencia Civil*, DIGICI) was established in 2005 as a part of the Ministry of the Interior (*Ministerio de Gobernación*) focused on operational intelligence against organized crime (*Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad*, 2012).
- The National Institute of Forensic Sciences (*Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses*, INACIF), established in 2007, has been central in the strengthening of capacities to make use of scientific evidence in criminal cases (Decree 32-2006).
- A Framework Law for the National Security System (*Ley Marco del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad*) passed in 2008 created new institutions and established mechanisms for inter-institutional coordination (Decree 18-2008).

Likewise important is the fact that civil society organizations have become increasingly active in regard to analyzing policies, drafting and presenting proposals of actions, and carrying out processes of social accountability of governmental institutions. Guatemala, with all its shortcomings, has increased freedom of speech during the past two decades. These processes are difficult to quantify, but they undoubtedly are having positive effects in matters of democratic governance and the strengthening of the security and justice mechanisms.

Research Areas

Macro Domain

The macro domain represents the broader context within which homicide and violence occur. This includes environmental and social forces that are typically beyond any individual's control, but may stem from individuals' behavior in the aggregate. Macro-level factors included demographic trends, employment rates, and educational attainment of citizens. Programs, services, and policies that are not the responsibility of criminal justice system agencies, such as public transport system (*Transmetro*), emergency medical responses, community groups and their responses to violence, and domestic violence programs, are also included in the macro domain.

Micro Domain

The micro domain is concerned with homicide in its situational context, and includes individual behavior and other factors that relate directly to homicide. This domain is best characterized as related to “guns, gangs, and drugs.”

Response Domain

The response domain covers the criminal justice system, including law enforcement, prosecution, courts, and corrections. This domain was developed to explore the impact that criminal justice policies and practices might have on homicide trends.

Project Design

The research design for this study is based on an earlier study on homicide done in the United States (Lattimore, Trudeau, Riley, Leiter, & Edwards, 1997). This original study outlined an in-depth analysis of homicide in eight U.S. cities that considered hypotheses grouped into three major categories or domains—two contextual and one response. The contextual domains were (1) environmental or macro and (2) situational or micro. The response domain included only the criminal justice system (law enforcement, prosecution, courts, and corrections). Service providers were included in the macro domain. Using this framework, the current study includes 16 hypotheses that reflect the leading theories of the causes of violence and homicide. The study used several criteria for establishing the research hypotheses. Generally, priority was given to issues where a strong, *direct* link between the factor and the homicide rate could be anticipated. To accommodate the period under study, the project also sought to investigate issues on which the target communities were likely to have acted over the past decade.

Site Selection

USAID selected three municipalities for inclusion in this project (Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva) because they are involved in several overlapping intervention efforts focused on citizen security. By concentrating the research in these three municipalities, USAID hoped to be able to clearly identify the specific differences as well as opportunities to adjust programming to maximize effectiveness of their programs. USAID seeks to continue working in these three municipalities in the future, and will apply the results of this study to inform future efforts. Additionally, recent downward trends in homicide rates in Guatemala City have not been adequately addressed, and thus, USAID intends to get a clearer sense of what factors have affected this emerging trend.

An Explanation of Municipal Governments in Guatemala

Guatemala is divided into 22 departments or states, and each department is further subdivided into municipalities. There are 337 independent municipalities in Guatemala. An important role of municipal governments is the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the development and growth of its territory. Their primary mission is to improve the quality of life of the residents.

The department of Guatemala includes 17 municipalities. Municipalities obtain the necessary resources to provide services and carry out work mainly from the payment of local excise taxes, fees for special events and holidays, real estate taxes, and other special use fees that are sometimes charged. Since 1986, the autonomy of municipalities has been ensured by the National Constitution. Municipalities operate independently of state control. This was one of the first achievements of the National Association of Municipalities (ANAM), which was formally established in 1960. Municipalities in

Guatemala are governed by a mayor and independent municipal councils whose officials are popularly elected for 2-year terms.

An important function of municipal governments in Guatemala is the planning, control and evaluation of the development and growth of the municipality. Special attention is also paid to social aspects, and local governments seek to contribute to improving the quality of life of residents. Municipalities obtain the resources necessary to provide the services and perform work mainly through the payment of local taxes. Since 1986, because of the efforts of ANAM, the federal government has been required to redistribute federal tax income to all municipalities of the country. This redistribution reinforces the political and economic autonomy of local governments.

Table 1 shows the principal sources of government financing for municipalities in Guatemala: constitutional distributions of the value added taxes, the Peace Tax, vehicle tax, fuel taxes, and the IUSI tax. The IUSI tax is a source of income that corresponds to each community, using their own appraisals of individual cadasters.¹ Guatemalan municipalities receive almost one-fifth of their resources from these federal sources. Many local government services such as water, solid waste, parks, and markets are often subsidized by private corporations. Other minor sources of revenue come from fees and taxes that are used to support municipal beautification projects.

Table 1: Public Funds Allocated to Specific Municipalities, May 2013

Municipality	Total (1000's of Quetzales) ²	Constitutional ³	IVA Paz ⁴	Vehicles ⁵	Fuel Tax
Guatemala	72,881	28,157	29,010	4,098	11,617
Mixco	28,947	13,147	13,546	1,913	340
Villa Nueva	27,835	12,643	13,026	1,840	327

Source: Guatemalan Ministry of Public Finance

The estimates provided in Table 2 are based on the total proposed budget for 2013 for each municipality. The most recent National Census of Guatemala was completed in 2002. The data shown here reflect population projections done by the National Institute for Statistics (INE), the agency responsible for conducting national censuses. These data show wide disparities between the per capita budgeted amounts in the three

1 A cadaster is a register of property used in many countries of the world to show the extent, value, and ownership of land for taxation.

2 At the time of this report, \$1USD=\$7.75 Quetzales.

3 The Federal Government is constitutionally required to distribute a percentage of sales tax income to each municipality.

4 "Peace" Value Added Tax (IVA-PAZ) which resulted from the peace processes in the early 1990s. IVA Paz is a constitutional earmark from the federal government that all municipalities receive.

5 Vehicle tax.

municipalities. Each of the three municipalities is briefly described in the following section.

Table 2: Population and Per Capita Budgeting


Municipality	Population ⁶	Total Budget (in thousands)	Per Capita Budget
Guatemala	993,552	1,401,304	1,410
Mixco	487,830	417,274	856
Villa Nueva	539,909	254,503	471

Source: INE (2008) and *El Periodico*, 06/19/2013

Municipality of Guatemala

The municipality of Guatemala has an estimated population of 993,552 inhabitants as of 2013. Guatemala City is the national capital and the capital city of the local municipality of Guatemala. It is also the largest city in the country as well as the largest city in Central America. Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen is the current mayor of the municipality of Guatemala. Arzú served as president of Guatemala from 1996 to 2000, and since then, he has been elected to four consecutive terms as the mayor.

It is easy to confuse Guatemala City and the municipality of Guatemala. The greater Guatemala City metropolitan area includes the entire municipality of Guatemala and extends into the neighboring municipalities of Villa Nueva, San Miguel Petapa, Mixco, San Juan Sacatepéquez, San José Pinula, Santa Catarina Pinula, Fraijanes, San Pedro Ayampuc, Amatitlán, Villa Canales, Palencia, and Chinautla. Guatemala City is divided into 22 zones that are numbered 1–25 (Zones 22, 23, and 24 are outside of the municipality of Guatemala). See the municipal website at <http://mu.muniguate.com/>.



⁶ Population projections were produced by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas* (INE) in the report entitled “*Guatemala: Estimaciones de la Población total por Municipio. Período 2008-2020.*” There has been no updated census of the population since 2002.

Municipality of Mixco

According to the National Institute of Statistics, the municipality of Mixco has an estimated population of 487,830 as of 2013. Located due west of the municipality of Guatemala on the western edge of the department of Guatemala, Mixco is home to Ciudad San Cristóbal, the third largest city in the country. The current mayor is Otto Perez Leal, who began serving his first 4-year term in 2012.

Mixco is divided into 11 zones that include 20 colonies and 10 smaller communities. Similar to most municipalities in Guatemala, Mixco has a Municipal Council that includes 10 popularly elected council members who are responsible for making decisions about municipal affairs. The Municipal Government is headed by the mayor and is independent from the Municipal Council. The mayor is responsible for implementing and monitoring policies, plans, programs, and projects authorized by the Municipal Council. See <http://www.munimixco.com/> for additional details.

Municipality of Villa Nueva

The municipality of Villa Nueva, located west of the municipality of Guatemala and south of Mixco on the western edge of the department, has an estimated population of 539,909 as of 2013. The current mayor is Edwin Felipe Escobar Hill.

Villa Nueva is divided into 12 zones that include the following larger communities: the Central Zone, Bárcena, Rancho Santa Clara, El Frutal, San Antonio, Villalobos, Santa Catalina (El Zarzal y Guillén), El Paraíso, El Zarzal, San Francisco, Rancho Azul, La Selva, Concepción, Santa Isabel, Roldán, and Las Lomas y El Rosario. According to the municipal website, there are more than 300 communities. Villa Nueva has some densely populated areas; El Zarzal and the colony of Peronia, in particular, have the highest saturation of inhabitants anywhere in Central America. See the municipal website for additional details at <http://www.villanueva.gob.gt/>.

Research Task Assignments

Three Guatemalan research organizations were hired and assigned specific research tasks associated with this project. These include *Incidencia Democratica* (iDem), the *Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales*, (ASIES), and the *Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala* (ICCPG).

IDem. *Incidencia Democratica* is a research organization in Guatemala committed to continuing democratization, promoting opportunities for peace, ensuring that public policy is developed with meaningful citizen participation and encouraging independent citizen-led control of the media by working with government agencies and private organizations and providing high-quality research. IDem contributed research for this report related to civil participation. Go to the IDem website for additional details at <http://www.i-dem.org/>.

ASIES. ASIES (or AsíEs) is a research think tank in Guatemala. Since their inception in 1979, ASIES has provided high-quality research in a variety of areas and has produced thousands of research-related documents. Their primary areas of work are related legal analysis, public opinion, education, economics, sociopolitical topics, labor, monitoring and evaluation, and a variety of areas related to human rights. ASIES did research related to economic development and gangs and organized crime. More details are available on their website at <http://www.asies.org.gt/> .

ICCPG. The ICCPG is a nongovernmental, academic organization that carries out research, training, advocacy, and advice in the areas of criminal justice, security, and human rights to achieve the transformation of the criminal policy in Guatemala, with a focus on the protection of individuals and respect for human rights. ICCPG contributed to two areas of research for this report: the availability of guns and violence prevention programs. See the ICCPG website for additional details at <http://www.iccpg.org.gt/>.

Research Methods

RTI began research work for this project on June 1, 2013. IDem, ASIES, and ICCPG were subsequently given their research assignments. RTI staff worked with each of the research teams to refine their research strategies and emphasis areas. In late June and July, researchers from RTI participated in several meetings and agency leaders and conducted semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. Through the interviews, we sought to obtain a general overview of the role of the respondent(s) and we asked questions to address several common themes including: changes in laws, policies, or practices affecting violent crime; data sources; social, economic, and political factors related to violent crime; gangs, guns, and drugs; distinctions about the municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva; interagency collaboration; outlook on homicide trends; and, recommendation for reducing violence and homicide. Table 3 describes the research areas and the associated data sources utilized for this project.

Table 3: Summary of Data Sources for Main Areas of Research

Research Area	Main Area of Investigation	Data Type		Data Sources
		Interviews	Secondary Data Literature/Reports	
Economic conditions				Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva – multiple sources
				INE (National Institute of Statistics)
				IAF (Integrated Financial Administration System)
				LAPOP – Latin American Public Opinion Project
				Public Investment System
				ENEI (National Survey on Employment and Income)
				ASIES Business Survey
				ASIES (Association for Research and Social Studies)
				SEGEPLAN – Constitutional Situation (<i>Situado Constitucional</i>)
	Demographics			
				Cuevas and Demombynes (2009)
Community organizations				COCODES, COMUDES, CUBs, and other community committees – multiple sources
Macro Domain				Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva – multiple sources
				ODHAG (Office of Human Rights for the Archbishop of Guatemala)
				iDem (<i>Incidencia Democrática</i>)

Table 3: Summary of Data Sources for Main Areas of Research (continued)

Research Area	Main Area of Investigation	Data Type		Data Sources
		Interviews	Secondary Data Literature/Reports	
Governance				Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva – multiple sources
				COCODES, COMUDES, CUBs, and other community committees – multiple sources
				Judicial Organism (<i>Organismo Judicial</i>)
				LAPOP – Latin American Public Opinion Project
				ASIES Study on Political Culture and Democracy in Guatemala
				iDem (<i>Incidencia Democrática</i>)
Non-criminal justice responses				ODHAG (Office of Human Rights for the Archbishop of Guatemala)
				Ministry of Health
				Observatory of Urban Health
				CECOIN (Center for Inter-institutional Coordination), Ministry of the Interior
				Domestic Violence Shelters (unnamed for confidentiality/privacy)
				Municipality of Guatemala – multiple sources
Macro Domain				CONAPREVI (National Coordination for the Prevention of Intra-familial Violence)
				ICCPG (Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal Science of Guatemala)

Table 3: Summary of Data Sources for Main Areas of Research (continued)

Research Area	Main Area of Investigation	Data Type		Data Sources
		Interviews	Secondary Data Literature/Reports	
Guns				MP (Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office)
				INACIF (National Institute of Forensic Sciences)
				PNC (National Civilian Police)
				DIGECAM – Administration for the Control of Arms and Ammunition
				ICCPG (Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal Science of Guatemala)
				IEPADES (Institute for the Teaching of Sustainable Development)
				Ministry of Defense
Street gangs				Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva – multiple sources
				CECOIN (Center for Inter-institutional Coordination), Ministry of the Interior
				ASIES (Association for Research and Social Studies)
Organized crime				Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva – multiple sources
				MP (Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office)
				ASIES (Association for Research and Social Studies)
Micro Domain	Drug markets			SECCATID (Executive Secretary of the Commission against Addiction and Drug Trafficking)
	Drug use			SECCATID (Executive Secretary of the Commission against Addiction and Drug Trafficking)

Table 3: Summary of Data Sources for Main Areas of Research (continued)

Research Area	Main Area of Investigation	Data Type		Data Sources
		Interviews	Secondary Data Literature/Reports	
Policing				PNC (National Civilian Police)
				CECOIN (Center for Inter-institutional Coordination), Ministry of the Interior
				FMM (Myrna Mack Foundation)
Criminal justice interagency coordination				MP (Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office)
				CECOIN (Center for Inter-institutional Coordination), Ministry of the Interior
				PNC (National Civilian Police)
				Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva – multiple sources
				INACIF (National Institute of Forensic Sciences)
New legislation and criminal justice system reforms				PNC (National Civilian Police)
				MP (Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office)
				CECOIN (Center for Inter-institutional Coordination), Ministry of the Interior
				ICCPG (Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal Science of Guatemala)
Technology/forensics				Municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva – multiple sources
				PNC (National Civilian Police)
				INACIF (National Institute of Forensic Sciences)
Prosecution efficiency				MP (Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office)

Table 3: Summary of Data Sources for Main Areas of Research (continued)

Research Area	Main Area of Investigation	Data Type			Data Sources
		Interviews	Secondary Data	Literature/Reports	
Response Domain	Judicial sentencing				Judicial Organism (<i>Organismo Judicial</i>); MP (Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office)
					MP (Public Ministry – Prosecutor’s Office)
					ICCPG (Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal Science of Guatemala)

Homicide Trends 2000–2013


Homicide in Guatemala

Guatemala is one of the most violent countries in the world. Following the 1996 Peace Accords, which included a provision to establish the National Civilian Police, homicide rates dropped to a 20-year low in 1999. Between 1999 and 2006, however, there was a sustained increase in homicide rates of more than 10% per year, and the overall trend of increases continued until 2009. A number of reasons have been offered for these sustained increases in violence, including disorganization within the Ministry of the Interior, which is the agency in charge of the National Civilian Police, and the growing number of criminal organizations and gang activities that have used their power and financial influence to corrupt the Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Courts of Justice.

National Homicide Trends

The data in Figure 1 below reflect homicide statistics reported by the National Civilian Police beginning in 1995. Although these are official statistics, the data before 2000 are considered less reliable than the more recent data because the data collection and analysis capacity and infrastructure had not been fully implemented following the end of the Guatemalan Civil War which occurred between 1960 and 1996 (PAHO, 2006).

Figure 1: Number of Homicides in Guatemala, 1995–2012




Despite a small reduction in 2007 of less than 2%, the annual number of homicides continued to grow, reaching its peak in 2009, when 6,498 Guatemalans were murdered. This brought the national homicide rate to an all-time high of 46.4 per 100,000 inhabitants. Since 2009 a sustained decrease has been observed.

This notwithstanding, Guatemala continues to exhibit levels of homicidal violence twice as high as the Latin American average, and over three times as high as the world average. In the next several figures, different views of the homicide situation in Guatemala will be presented.

Figure 2 shows the national homicide rates from 2000 to 2012. Even though the first quarter of 2013 seemed to be heading in the wrong direction, homicide trends for 2013 will likely show another overall drop in the homicide rate.


Figure 2: Guatemalan Homicide Rate per 100,000, 2000–2012



Source: National Civilian Police and National Institute of Statistics

In Figure 3 the total number of deaths is compared against the total number of homicides. Between 2002 and 2009 the percentage of homicides in the total death toll increased from 5.5% to 9.1%. After 2009 the percentage started to decline in accordance to the general decrease in homicidal violence that has taken place in this period. Note that homicidal violence is not a strong determinant of the total death toll in Guatemala given that in different years both variables have moved in opposing directions.

Figure 3: Percentage of All Deaths Attributed to Homicide, 2002-2011



Homicide Trends by Sex

As is usually the case in the rest of the world, homicidal violence affects mainly the male population. On average during the past 5 years, 11% of homicides⁷ have affected women. This must be understood from the perspective that Guatemala is one of the most violent countries in the world. The 11% that affects women, although not much different from other countries, is 11% of an excessively high base. Indeed, Guatemala has the highest rate of murder of women in the region. According to the *Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos* (PDH, Human Rights Ombudsman), 4,159 women were murdered in 2000–2008, and an estimated 2,900 in 2008–2011. According to the *Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses de Guatemala* (INACIF), nearly 600 women were murdered in 2012.


About 10 years ago, many researchers and national observers began to look at Guatemala as an example of a nation that had allowed femicide to occur. Some debate the definition of femicide, but in its most general sense, it refers to situations where women are killed by men because they are women. A prevailing culture of machismo and misogyny results in corruption and impunity in the enforcement and investigation of crimes against women being the norm. Organized crime, gangs, and drug and human trafficking have further exacerbated the risks that women face.

In 2009, the Law against Femicide was passed and femicide became a punishable offense, an important first step in the fight to put an end to the targeted killing of women. Figure 4 shows a steady increase in the percentage of female victims of homicide over

⁷ Homicide against women is not automatically referred to in this report as “femicide” given that this categorization requires knowledge about characteristics of the crime regarding its perpetrator/s and the gender-based motivation.

the past decade. Although the data over the past three years shows a slight decline, a wider view going back to 2008 shows that female homicides have remained fairly constant at just over 12.0%.

Figure 4: Female Homicides as a Percentage of All Homicides, 2001–2012



It is also informative to look at the percentage of female victims of assault (see Figure 5). The trends here are far more difficult to discern.

Figure 5: Female Assaults as a Percentage of All Assaults, 2008-2011




Figure 6 shows line charts for the number of both male and female homicides. Notice that the scale for male homicides is on the left and female homicides is on the right to make the trend lines more readily comparable. The data show that the patterns of violence match very closely, but the slope of the increase for females was steeper than for males

beginning in 2008. Although a decline began in 2010, females continue to have a larger percentage of overall homicides than previously.

Figure 6: Number of Homicides by Sex, 2001–2012





Figure 7 shows the absolute homicide rates by gender. Again, the view includes males on the left and females on the right and the scales are not identical, which somewhat distorts the graphic. Still, one can see that the overall rates, while closely mirroring one another, do show a steeper increase in the homicide rate of women beginning in 2003. More recently, the trend lines are getting closer together as the rate of female homicides and the percentage of female victims of homicides is declining.


Figure 7: Homicide Rates by Sex, 2001–2012



Homicides against women during the past 12 years have grown greater at times than they have against men. As can be observed in the graphs above, the decrease in overall homicidal violence since 2009 has benefited both men and women.

The use of firearms in homicidal violence has grown in the past years. From 74.9% of total homicides carried out with firearms in 2001, the proportion grew to 85.0% in 2010. Homicides against women are carried out mainly with firearms, as is also the case with men, but in a slightly lesser proportion (85.0% for men and 76.7% in the case of women). See Figure 8.


Figure 8: Homicides Committed by a Firearm by Sex, 2001–2011



Municipal Homicide Trends

Figure 9 shows the number of homicides in the three municipalities studied. The municipality of Guatemala presents the highest levels of homicidal violence in the country as measured by total deaths. The three municipalities this report focuses on experienced their highest levels of homicidal violence in 2009. Guatemala and Mixco have entered a phase of decrease in their levels of homicide since 2009. While the graph shows the greatest absolute decline in Guatemala, the percentage decrease in Mixco between 2009 and 2012 is the greatest at 42.9%. Homicides in Guatemala have declined by 36.6% during the same period.


Figure 9: Homicides by Municipality, 2008–2012



The trend in Villa Nueva is less clear. There was a decrease in 2010 of 17.3% followed by an increase in 2011 of 13.7% and then another decrease by 19.3%. The net decline between 2009 and 2012 in Villa Nueva is 24.2%. So far in 2013, homicide numbers are continuing to trend downward. Villa Nueva has experienced recent increases in population growth rates and, although no official census has been completed in over a decade, population projections for Villa Nueva made by the National Institute of Statistics will affect homicide rate calculations.


The graph (Figure 10) below shows an accelerating decrease in the levels of homicidal violence in the municipality of Guatemala during the past 3 years. It shows strong decreases in Mixco and a volatile situation in Villa Nueva during the same period.

Figure 10: Shifts in Homicide Trends, 2009-2012



When comparing the participation of the three focus municipalities in the total homicidal violence for the department of Guatemala, one can observe an important decrease in the participation of the municipality of Guatemala in the past 3 years, from 53.2% of the total in 2010 to 38.5% during the first quarter of 2013. Figure 11, shows the stacked cumulative percentages within the Department of Guatemala for each of the municipalities in this study.

Figure 11: Percentage of Homicides by Municipality, 2008-2013




*Data for 2013 is only reflected through the Month of March.

Mixco has returned to levels above 15 percent of the total as it had in 2008 although it did descend to 12.4% in 2011. Villa Nueva has increased its contribution to the total homicidal violence level of the department going from 8.5% of the total in 2010 to 13.4% in the first quarter of 2013. These developments are closely related to the decrease that Guatemala municipality experienced in this time period, which by itself swells the participation of the others.


Similarly, as in the analysis carried out for the department, one can observe that the contribution of the three focus municipalities and the department as a whole to the total homicidal violence of the country has decreased greatly since 2010. Guatemala municipality has gone from contributing 53.2% of total homicides in 2010 to 38.5% in the first quarter of 2013. These data call special attention to the dynamics occurring in the municipality of Guatemala, which are positively affecting the national levels of violence and that continue to show progress during 2013, despite a possible reversal in homicidal violence trends at the national level. See Figure 12.

Figure 12: Percentage of Homicides in National Perspective, 2008–2012



The quarterly measurement of homicide data is preferred as the variability of monthly data can be great and can be the result of very short-term situations. A 3-month period allows for a clearer understanding of trends. Figure 13 shows the quarterly homicide trends and reflects the sporadic nature of homicide. In the municipality of Guatemala, the first quarter of each year seems to reflect an annual spike in homicides but these are not shown in either Mixco or Villa Nueva. It would be worthwhile to study these trends more thoroughly to determine if specific annual events such as holidays or festivals may be contributing to these seasonal differences.

Figure 13: Quarterly Homicides in the Municipalities Being Studied, 2008–2013




During the period of study the greatest decreases in the absolute levels of violence observed in each municipality are as follows:

- Guatemala: 47.35% (absolute difference of 170 homicides). From 359 in the 1st quarter of 2009 to 189 in the 4th quarter of 2012.
- Mixco: 71.07% (absolute difference of 86 homicides). From 121 in the 4th quarter of 2008 to 35 in the 2nd quarter of 2012.
- Villa Nueva: 47.69% (absolute difference of 31 homicides). From 65 in the 4th quarter of 2009 to 34 in the 3rd quarter of 2012.

Figure 14 shows the number of homicides in each municipality which is not standardized to account for the number of people in the population. Figure 14 below shows homicide rates per 100,000 in the population and thus provides a greater contrast between the two municipalities. Homicide rates in Mixco are substantially higher than in Villa Nueva. Both Mixco and Villa Nueva are below the rate seen in the municipality of Guatemala although the most consistent and steeper downward trend since 2009 is in Guatemala. See Figure 14 for quarterly homicide rates⁸.

⁸ Appendix 2 includes line graphs showing monthly fluctuations in the number of homicides in each municipality (Appendix Figure 2-1) and the standardized view showing homicide rates in Appendix Figure 2-2. Considerations of homicide data at such short increments of time is not usually recommended because of the wide fluctuations. It is interesting to note in the figure showing monthly homicide rates however that the rates in the three municipalities are beginning to converge during recent months.

Figure 14: Quarterly Homicide Rate in the Municipalities Studied, 2008–2013



The Macro Domain: Environmental Context and Homicides

Economic Factors

This section summarizes the economic situation in the three municipalities and assesses financial resources, public investments, and specific actions that the municipal governments have used to enhance their social and physical contexts and potentially prevent crime. A brief exploration is made of inhabitants’ perceptions of the levels of trust that exist in their communities.

Descriptive statistics are presented on three topics: 1) local governments and public investment, including local public investments; 2) private investment and job creation in the metropolitan area of Guatemala City; and 3) the evolution of household incomes and residents’ perceptions regarding their communities.

Two types of data were used:

- Secondary sources: Official sources include the Integrated Financial Administration System (*Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera*), the central government financial transfers to municipal administrations (*situado constitucional*), National Public Investment System (*Sistema Nacional de Inversión Pública – SNIP*), and national surveys on jobs and income. Information was also obtained from ASIES opinion polls, including its survey of corporations

(*Encuesta Empresarial*) and its study on the political culture of Guatemalan democracy.

- Primary sources: Specific interviews were carried out with key informants in the three localities, including experts from the Public Works Division of the Municipality of Guatemala, and former officials from Mixco and Villa Nueva.

Table 4 describes the financial indicators examined and their level of aggregation. Urban metropolitan area is the lowest disaggregation level possible with the available data. This category includes the urban areas within the department of Guatemala.

Table 4: Summary of Data Sources

	Data	Aggregation Level ⁹
Public investment	Municipality incomes	Municipal
	Municipal expenditures and local public investment projects	Municipal
Private investment and job creation	Inter-year opinion results about investment and jobs indicators included in survey the ASIES survey	Metropolitan area
Socioeconomic situation of households	Average household incomes	Urban metropolitan area
Perceptions and attitudes related to the buying capacity of the households	Percentage of households expressing concerns about a lack of food and percentage of households that actually suffered food shortages	Urban metropolitan area
	Household perceptions on the levels of trust in their communities	Urban metropolitan area

Local Governments and Public Investment

Guatemalan legislation (the constitution, the decentralization law, the law on urban and rural development councils, and the municipal code) establishes local governments' functions in direct relation to national economic development. These functions include the provision of drinking water, street lights, municipal policing services, management of preschool and elementary education, paving and maintaining of streets, public transport regulation, and trash collection, among others.

The central government financial transfers to municipal administrations compose 10% of the national budget. After the 2010 reforms to the municipal code, the transfer is calculated based on the following: 30% is allocated in proportion to the total population

⁹ The metropolitan urban area refers to urban areas associated with Guatemala City in the Department of Guatemala whereas data at the metropolitan area includes a broader geographical space in that some non-urban, less densely populated areas are also included. Data at the metropolitan urban area level are preferred as more representative of the situation in the three municipalities of interest.

of the municipality, 35% is allocated in equal shares to all municipalities, 25% is distributed based on the resources per capita each municipality has been able to raise on its own, and 10% is distributed based on the number of villages and hamlets. In 2003, the municipalities that received the highest allocations were Guatemala, Villa Nueva, Puerto Barrios, Mixco, and Quetzaltenango. In 2013, the highest allocations were received by Guatemala, Mixco, Villa Nueva, Quetzaltenango, and Antigua Guatemala. Table 5 summarizes the federal distribution of funds to the three municipalities participating in the study.

Table 5: Federal Distribution of Funds to the Municipalities (in Quetzales), 2006 and 2013

Municipality	2006			2013		
	Central Government Transfers	Population	Per Capita	Central Government Transfers	Population	Per Capita
Guatemala	Q80.7 million	955,506	Q83	Q165.0 million	993,552	Q166
Villa Nueva	Q62.2 million	397,705	Q139	Q74.7 million	539,909	Q153
Mixco	Q79.2 million	423,444	Q178	Q79.2 million	487,830	Q147

Source: Municipal Integrated Financial Administration System (SIAF-Muni 2006) and the Local Governments Portal (2013).

Apart from the constitutional transfer, municipalities receive other financial resources from the central government that come from a part of the value added tax for the fulfillment of the peace accords (IVA-Paz), the tax on vehicles, and the tax on oil and its products. Moreover, municipalities receive resources from social funds and funding for the urban and rural development councils. Municipalities set their own levies and taxes that allow them a certain degree of financial independence. In the three municipalities under study, self-generated income has a significant weight (see Table 6). This independence should strengthen autonomy.

Table 6: Comparison of Self-Generated Municipal Income, 2006 and 2013

Municipality	2006		2013	
	Millions of Quetzales	Budget Share	Millions of Quetzales	Budget Share
Guatemala	Q532.2	85.4%	Q1,110.9	79.2%
Villa Nueva	Q105.5	22.4%*	Q82.0	63.3%
Mixco	Q249.6	71.9%	Q307.4	73.7%

*The proportion of self-generated income within total income was atypically low in 2006 due to the fact that Villa Nueva received a loan from the Central American Economic Integration Bank for Q260 million that year.

Source: SIAF-Muni 2006 and the Local Governments Portal (2013).

Municipalities also receive resources from internal and external debt sources as well as from the sale of financial assets.


Financial Situation of the Municipalities

Municipal Income

The financial stability of local government is directly connected to municipal income. The ability to generate income to support public works, including crime prevention strategies, is especially important to consider. Of the three municipalities, Guatemala has shown the strongest budget growth. On average, its budget has grown 11% annually during 2006–2013. In 2013 the municipality expects to raise Q1,401.3 million, which doubles the 2006 budget of Q671.0 million. This growth in income has been propelled by the increase in the municipal charges on street lights carried out in 2009, the growth in income from charges for sanitation and order, income from building permits, and the redefinition of building values that has allowed for higher revenues from real estate taxes. These factors do not occur in the other municipalities under study.

The main sources of income for the municipality of Guatemala in 2013 are expected to be as follows: rates and licenses, especially street lights and public transportation (39.5% of the budget); real estate tax (21.2% of the budget); and central government transfers of IVA-paz (5.4% of the budget). Villa Nueva and Mixco have not shown sustained growth in their budgets, but both, nevertheless, have grown at a rate of 14% in 2004 and in 2006–2010 (see Figure 15). Villa Nueva’s main sources of income in 2013 are expected to be real estate tax (29.5% of the budget); rates and licenses, especially street lights and public transportation (18.3% of the budget); and central government’s constitutional transfer (11.6%). Mixco’s main sources of income in 2013 are expected to be real estate tax (24.2% of the budget); other non-tributary income (22.9% of the budget); and central government’s constitutional transfer (17.6%).

Figure 15: Income Budgets 2004, 2006–2013




Source: SIAF-Muni (May, 2013).

Expenditures

The relationship between expenditure and public investments are especially important to crime prevention activities such as improved lighting, more police officers, improved technology, and innovation in urban planning, etc. The municipalities carry out expenditures in their operations, investments, and servicing their public debt. The proportion of resources oriented toward public investment has increased steadily in Guatemala but operational expenses have outpaced public investment dollars in 2012 and in the 2013 budget (Figure 16). In Villa Nueva, public debt has remained steady over the last few years while public investments are much higher than operational expenses. See Figure 17. Mixco has shown a clear trend towards reducing public investments while operational expenses have risen steadily. Perhaps the most important detail here is the overall amount spent on operational expenses. The municipality of Guatemala budgeted just under Q800 million in 2012 and Mixco planned for about half that much at Q381 million. Villa Nueva allocated under Q100 million. See Figure 18.

Figure 16: Municipal Homicide Rates, 2008-2012 and Expenditures in the Municipality of Guatemala, 2006–2013



Source: SIAF-Muni (July 2013).

Figure 17: Municipal Homicide Rates, 2008-2012 and Expenditures in the Municipality of Mixco, 2006–2013





Figure 18: Municipal Homicide Rates, 2008-2012 and Expenditures in the Municipality of Villa Nueva, 2006–2013




Source: SIAF-Muni (July 2013).

Investment expenditures should be analyzed separately due to their capacity to produce important benefits for the population such as improved economic opportunities, community safety, and improvements in overall quality of life (Figure 19). On average, the Municipality of Guatemala has spent 43% of its budget on investments during the 2006–2013 period. Villa Nueva’s investment budget has grown since 2008. Mixco has

spent 17% of its annual budget on investment, which is the lowest rate of the three municipalities. Guatemala has carried out the highest levels of investment in the past years.

Upon analysis of the per capita levels of investment, Guatemala, once again, comes out as the strongest municipality of the three (Figure 5). Villa Nueva has invested an average of Q200 a year in the past years, while Mixco has invested only Q110. However, the fact that Guatemala provides services to many inhabitants of other municipalities who work there must be considered. It is estimated that Guatemala’s population doubles to 2 million during workdays.

Figure 19: Comparative Public Investment Spending per Capita, 2006–2013



* 2013 is based on the current budget.

Source: SIAF-Muni (May 2013).

According to the National Public Investment System (SNIP), the municipality of Guatemala has developed the highest number of projects related to urban development, followed by energy projects and culture and sports projects. Mixco has focused its efforts in urban development, followed by public transportation and water and sanitation projects. In Villa Nueva urban development projects also prevail, followed by water and sanitation and education. Public investment in various projects is summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Public Investment Projects by Municipality, 2004–2013

	Guatemala		Villa Nueva		Mixco	
	# of Projects	% of all Projects	# of Projects	% of all Projects	# of Projects	% of all Projects
Rural and Urban Development	300	45.1	84	34.0	26	30.6
Water and Sanitation	24	3.6	80	32.4	13	15.3
Public Transport	25	3.8	15	6.1	19	22.4
Education	28	4.2	20	8.1	5	5.9
Housing	2	0.3	-	-	-	-
Culture and Sports	73	11.0	11	4.5	10	11.8
Health and Social Assistance	26	3.9	8	3.2	1	1.2
Energy	116	17.4	3	1.2	-	-
Farming/Livestock	6	0.9	6	2.4	-	-
Climate/Environment	3	0.5	-	-	-	-
Other Economic Service Activities	3	0.5	-	-	-	-
General Services	19	2.9	12	4.9	6	7.1
Other Social Service Activities	2	0.3	1	0.4	-	-
Other Administrative Activities	1	0.2	2	0.8	-	-
Labor and Social Welfare	-	0.0	1	0.4	-	-
Internal Security	8	1.2	2	0.8	4	4.7
Industry and Commerce	23	3.5	-	-	-	-
Judicial	3	0.5	2	0.8	1	1.2
Foreign Affairs	2	0.3	-	-	-	-
Science and Technology	1	0.2	-	-	-	-
Total Activities	665	100.0	247	100.0	84	100.0

Source: National System of Public Investment, SEGEPLAN. Available at: <http://snip.segeplan.gob.gt/>

Urbanization and Community Services for Urban Development

By 1950, Guatemala already showed high levels of urbanization, around 96% (Martínez López, 2011). Urban human settlements established themselves in four different time periods.

1. The 1917 earthquake produced a migration to the south area of the city, bringing about new neighborhoods in the periphery such as El Gallito, Abril, and Recolectión (Gellert, 1990).
2. During the 1950s, the concentration of lands for agricultural exports and the consequent expulsion of the rural population resulted in a flux of migrants into Guatemala City. Valladares (2003) mentions that the migrants established themselves in Ciudad Nueva and the present Zone 5. La Limonada neighborhood was formed at this time.
3. During the 1970s and 1980s, because of an earthquake in 1976 and the internal armed conflict the country became engaged in, population moved into terrains held by the Banco de la Vivienda (BANVI) originally destined to be used as public spaces. Nevertheless, state authorities were not able to deal with the housing crisis, and new settlements were established in zones 6 and 7. The Bethania, Nima Juyú, Venezuela and Bello Horizonte neighborhoods came out of these settlements.
4. In 1994, according to key informants in the Municipality of Guatemala, new settlements were created and others extended well into the neighboring municipalities of Chinautla, San Miguel Petapa, Villa Nueva, and more recently, San Pedro Ayampuc.

The Disaster Relief Coordinating Office (CONRED) (2010) identified 232 irregular settlements in the municipality of Guatemala. According to interviews carried out for this study, it is estimated that 250 irregular settlements housing 40,000 families exist in 2013. Most of the habitable spaces have already been occupied, with no more growth expected. Guatemala's municipality has striven to provide public services. In 2004, the "Plan 67" was launched and has since improved access to water and drainage in zones 6 and 7. Official municipal data indicate that most of the beneficiaries are inhabitants of the settlements.

Later, in 2005 and 2006, the "4Z" and "*Cobertura Total*" programs were executed to improve the connection of services between zones 3, 5, 18, and 21. Villa Nueva and Mixco have also implemented important water and sanitation programs. Although these efforts have increased the number and proportion of households connected to water and drainage systems during the past decade, the constant availability of water remains a challenge. Water and sewer access is summarized in Table 8.

Table 8: Access to Water/Sewer in the Guatemala City Metropolitan Area, 2000 and 2011

	2000		2011	
	# of Homes with Access	% of Homes with Access	# of Homes with Access	% of Homes with Access
Public Sewage Access	431,643	89.8%	610,908	92.8%
Public Water Access	380,133	79.1%	582,658	88.6%

Source: ASIES, Quality of Life Survey, 2000 and 2011.

Irregular settlements are a special concern in Villa Nueva. Alvarez (2011) identified 56 settlements, including the largest, El Zarzal, which includes several settlements such as Mario Alioto López Sánchez, Mártires del Pueblo, 9 de Julio, Altos de Primavera, Colinas de Villa Nueva, Las Victorias, La Paz y Valle de Nazareth. Public services are not provided as widely in the Villa Nueva settlements as in Guatemala. Only 82.5% of households had access to drinking water in 2002 according to SEGEPLAN. An important increase in water wells has taken place, from 18 in 2000 to 43 in 2013 with an average production of 170 gallons per minute (*Gran Mancomunidad del Sur*, no date). Charges for water services continue to be low (Q25 per month) and have not changed since 2002. The municipality is thus forced to subsidize water consumption by approximately Q25 million.

Mixco has only three irregular settlements: Carolingia, Las Guacamayas, and Hellen Lossi (Álvarez, 2011). Nevertheless poor neighborhoods prevail in zones 6, 7, 10, and 11 such as El Milagro, Lo de Bran, Miralvalle, San Ignacio, La Brigada, Belén, Lo de Fuentes, and San José La Comunidad. In 2002 only 85.2% of households had access to drinking water. Improvement in the provision of public services is made difficult due to steep slopes or other high-risk characteristics of the terrain where the settlements are, and because of their situation of illegality. However, the housing law establishes that by December 31, 2013, all houses built on state-owned land, and occupied by families living in poverty, will be adjudicated to them. This will improve the provision of public services. The housing deficit, nevertheless, will remain. According to Covarino, Mansilla, & Zurita (2010), using 2002 census data, the department of Guatemala has a 9.5% qualitative and a 47% quantitative housing deficit. A housing lot in the poorest areas usually has an area of 25 m² and is usually occupied by five to six people.

Sports, Recreational, Cultural and Religious Activities

The municipality of Guatemala has recovered public spaces in the central corridor Aurora-Cañas (zones 1, 2, 4, 9, and 13). This has entailed removing informal street vendors and other actions in accordance with the territorial ordering plan that considers the creation of spaces for recreation. The recovery plans began in 2004, but the most relevant actions were taken in 2010 with the modernization and pedestrianization of 6th Avenue in Zone 1. The municipality and the National Civilian Police expelled informal

sales stalls around the National Theater, where stolen goods were been sold. The rehabilitation of 18th Street in Zone 1 is under consideration. Arts schools and community programs such as “Culture in your neighborhood” have also been implemented by the municipality. Villa Nueva has begun to design its territorial ordering plan in 2012. The use of the territory has thus not been redefined yet, nor has space been rehabilitated for recreational uses (Hernández, 2012). Mixco has not yet begun the design of its territorial ordering plan. Yet, spaces for training and recreation have been created for children and young people, including closing streets identified as foci of violence.

Education

The Municipal Code establishes that the municipalities are in charge of managing preschool and elementary schooling, as well as alphabetization and bilingual education programs. In certain cases, this means that the municipalities are in charge of maintaining the infrastructure and paying teachers. According to the Municipal Index of Educational Progress (2008), the municipality of Guatemala was the second best performer in the country after Antigua Guatemala. Villa Nueva occupied place 73 in the Index in 2002, but fell to place 112 in 2006. Mixco occupied position 27 in 2002, but fell to position 54 in 2006. In the municipality of Guatemala, 81,655 students were registered at the high school level, 80% of them in private institutions. State schools provide only a minority share of educational services at this level. From 1999 to 2005, a 37% increase in the number of preschool students occurred in the municipality of Guatemala and a 25% increase in Mixco.


Great disparities remain among the quality of education in public and private institutions. In Villa Nueva the public sector provides one teacher for every 41 students compared to one teacher for every 21 students in the private sector. The situation is bleaker in Mixco where each teacher is in charge of 211 students in the public sector, but only 27 in the private sector. Marquardt, Menkos, and Delgado (2009) have calculated that only 0.1% to 3.3% of the municipal budget is oriented toward education in Mixco, which sets it below the departmental average of 3.3%. In Guatemala the public sector actually does better than the private sector with 22 students per teacher in the public sector and 34 in the private sector (Funcede, 2006).

Private Investment and Job Creation in the Metropolitan Area

Investments are concentrated in the metropolitan area, especially in the municipality of Guatemala. ASIES carries out a quarterly opinion survey among corporations, partially because there is a lack of official information in this regard. Opinions are collected on how investments have varied and the numbers of jobs that have been created or eliminated. Most (86%) of the firms surveyed are located in the municipalities of interest. Figure 20 shows the high variance in investment during the past 13 years. The high volatility between 2000 and 2004 coincides with the crisis faced by the coffee-producing sector as well as tensions with the private sector and Alfonso Portillo’s government. Economic growth during this period reached only 2.8%. There is a positive turn

afterwards that lasts until July 2007 when the effects of the international financial crisis began to be felt. The lowest level of investment was recorded in July 2009. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century investment levels had improved, led by the firms located in the metropolitan area. Nevertheless, during 2013 a weakening of public finances and a crisis in the agricultural sector is expected.

Figure 20: Changes Over Time in Likelihood of Future Business Investments, 2000–2012



Source: ASIES, Business Surveys, 2000–2012.

Investments in the Municipality of Guatemala

Industrial capacity has reached its limits in Guatemala as all industrial zones are already occupied. The territorial ordering plan sets apart three areas where further industrial investment may be feasible in zones 12, 17, 18, and 25. The concentration of industrial activities in certain zones in the city has produced traffic problems, and regulations that limit heavy vehicles from using the streets act as inhibitors to economic activity. The municipality tends to favor the establishment of residential areas that demand fewer resources and produce lower environmental impacts while at the same time increasing municipal real estate tax revenue. It has also favored the establishment of service firms, such as call centers and business process outsourcing organizations. Perez (2005) has identified the age of call center operators to be between 18 and 35, with an average of 21. Most of these jobs are concentrated in the capital city and include 24/, Atento, NCO, and Transactel. According to Agexport (2013), the expected total local and foreign investment should go beyond US\$65 million in the coming years.

Investments in the Municipality of Villa Nueva

Sical (2013) describes an important economic growth process taking place in Villa Nueva during the past 13 years that has included an expansion of commercial activities. In 2000,

only one shopping mall existed in the municipality whereas twenty exist now. The banking sector has also proliferated greatly during this period. In addition, real estate has developed in Villa Nueva, increasing from 35 private neighborhoods in 2000 to 50 in 2010. These neighborhoods contribute significantly to municipal income; up to 80% of real estate tax revenue comes from these areas. Data from the Sustainable Management of the Amatitlán Lake Basin Authority shows that 91 industrial outfits existed in Villa Nueva in 1999, including 22 food processing plants, 6 plastic factories, 1 plaster factory, 5 textile mills, 38 metallurgical factories, 11 chemical plants, and 8 paper and wood plants. According to the Civic Training and Studies Institute (2002), gravel and sand are collected in the Villalobos River for handicrafts production. By 2002, the municipality also contained thread and ceramics industries. Agricultural production included corn, beans, coffee, vegetables, tobacco, and cattle. Current economic activity has evolved significantly. The Municipality of Villa Nueva (2012) notes that 282 industries are based in the municipality, including pharmaceutical, textile, construction materials, and plastic industries.


Investments in the Municipality of Mixco

Data on economic indicators from the Institute of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment (2010) show that urbanization rates are very high in Mixco (95.5%). Only 2.3% of the workforce belongs to the agricultural sector in contrast with the departmental average of 22.2% and a national average of 58.4%. Rivera (2013) points out that most of Mixco's population work in the municipality of Guatemala. These data follow on the *Instituto de Estudios y Capacitación Cívica* (2002) observation that the capital city's growth was producing the development of housing projects in Mixco. The municipality lacks additional space for construction, and marketplaces are operating beyond their ideal capacity.

Jobs Market

The ASIES Business Survey data indicate that jobs were lost during the 2000–2004 period, a time when there was considerable pressure on the private sector to increase minimum wages. After 2004, job creation picked up. Unfortunately, official statistics do not allow for a longitudinal time series analysis. However, the extant information shows that the metropolitan area has shown higher levels of unemployment than national totals (Figure 21). Although employment levels vary more in the urban metropolitan area, incomes and work conditions tend to be better there than in the rest of the country. Nevertheless, the concentration of unemployment in a defined territory can bring about important challenges.

Figure 21: Unemployment Rate per 100, 2002–2012



*The data for 2004 includes all of the Department of Guatemala and is not limited to the Guatemala City metropolitan area.

Source: National Survey on Employment and Income (ENEI).

Relevant Economic Activities in the Metropolitan Area

The National Survey on Employment and Income (ENEI, 2012) shows that the main sources of employment in the urban metropolitan area are commercial activities as well as food and hospitality services. These areas show high levels of informal activity that affects the quality of jobs created in these sectors. In recent years clothing and textile manufacturing has experienced a loss in its competitive standing. In 2004, the sector generated 113,300 jobs, whereas in 2009, the number was only 49,700 (Vestex, 2009). This sector of the economy, very dynamic in the recent past, faces important challenges in regard to the International Trade Organization's requirement that Guatemala eliminate tax exemptions and the possibility of Guatemala becoming a member of the Trans-Pacific Alliance. In 2013, 75% of textile firms were located in the municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, or Villa Nueva, making this a very relevant economic sector for the current study (calculations based on Vestex directory for 2013 deposited in Agexport).


Apart from industry, evidence exists that the service sector has experienced important growth in the past years. Call centers have become an important source of well-paid employment for a certain segment of the population (bilingual young men and women) in contrast with the clothing and textile sector that employs people with scarce resources. According to Invest in Guatemala (2012), call centers have generated 18,880 jobs, of which 9,400 are taken by bilingual people.

Household Incomes

Using the national survey on employment and income (ENEI, 2012), total monthly income per person was calculated (see Figure 22). In nominal terms, incomes in the metropolitan urban area have grown and have always been considerably higher than

average incomes in other urban areas and in rural area. These incentives to migrate into the city have been documented in the past by anthropological studies such as Bastos (1999).

Figure 22: Simple Mean of Monthly Income per Capita, 2002–2012



Source: ENEI

Household Perceptions and Attitudes with Regards to Their Economic Conditions

The survey on the political culture of democracy in Guatemala provides evidence about household members’ feelings and anxieties with regards to a lack of financial or other sorts of resources. Tables 9 and 10 show 2012 results at the national level, in the municipality of Guatemala, and in the metropolitan area. In the last quarter of 2012, 43% of those interviewed were worried about running out of food in their households. Data from the municipality of Guatemala and the metropolitan area do not vary significantly from the national results, although the absolute levels of income are significantly different (lower at the national level). This is related to the differences in cost of living among the different areas. This notwithstanding, the percentage of interviewees that actually reported having experienced a shortage of food in the past 3 months does vary among the areas under analysis. The percentage in the municipality of Guatemala is significantly lower than at the other levels.

Table 9: In the last three months, have you ever worried that you would run out of food because of a lack of money or other resources?

	National	Municipality of Guatemala	Metropolitan Area
Yes	43.0	44.2	47.5
No	57.0	55.8	52.5

Source: LAPOP (2012); ASIES (2012).

Table 10: In the last three months, have you ever run out of food because of a lack of money or other resources?

	National	Municipality of Guatemala	Metropolitan Area
Yes	22.1	7.8	17.9
No	77.9	92.2	82.1

Source: LAPOP (2012); ASIES (2012).

However, levels of inter-community trust were considerably lower in the municipality of Guatemala and in the urban metropolitan area than in the national averages. This suggests lower levels of social cohesion in the urban metropolitan communities. The survey also allows the comparison of results from 2004 and 2012. When comparing the results, it is interesting that for both the municipality of Guatemala and the metropolitan urban area there is a sharp drop in the percentage of people who stated that people in their community are very trustworthy. However, this trend was not observed in the result at the national level. The lack of trust between neighbors in the municipality of Guatemala and the larger metropolitan area of Guatemala City is likely reflected in lower levels of social cohesion overall.

Table 11: Would you say the people in your community are ...? Results from 2004

	National	Municipality of Guatemala	Metropolitan Area
Very Trustworthy	25.5	22.1	20.4
Somewhat Trustworthy	30.3	29.0	31.8
Not very Trustworthy	34.4	36.6	37.0
Completely Untrustworthy	9.8	12.3	10.9

Source: LAPOP (2004)

Table 12: Would you say the people in your community are ...? Results from 2012

	National	Municipality of Guatemala	Metropolitan Area
Very Trustworthy	26.3	6.0	7.7
Somewhat Trustworthy	41.1	39.8	39.4
Not Very Trustworthy	26.3	41.0	40.0
Completely Untrustworthy	6.4	13.3	12.9

Source: LAPOP (2012)

Summary and Conclusions

This section has summarized the economic situation in the municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva by assessing financial resources, public investments, and specific actions that the municipal governments have used to enhance their social and physical contexts and potentially prevent crime. Municipalities, by definition, have a direct responsibility to promote economic development in their communities. While federal funds are automatically distributed to each, the municipalities also have the ability to generate substantial amounts of local funds, as seen through the metropolitan area. Opportunities for generating local revenue create more flexibility and discretion for the municipalities to determine which projects will receive funding. It is important to note that economic investments and public expenditures are especially complex matters and there are many factors, other than public safety, which figure into how municipal governments decide to operate. There are however, some interesting observations made possible by the data presented here and there are some important associational factors (not necessarily causal) to note.

Urbanization in the country of Guatemala is continuing but population pressures are being felt differently by the three municipalities. In the municipality of Guatemala, the estimated population change between 2006 and 2013 is relatively modest at only a 4.0% increase. In Mixco, the estimated population grew by 15.2% in the same period. Villa Nueva however, grew by an estimated 35.8%. This rapid period of growth has created a number of challenges for the municipality and the types of municipal projects being done reflect these differences. For example, nearly one-third (32.4%) of all projects undertaken in Villa Nueva between 2004 and 2013 were related to expanding water and sewer services for their growing population.

Related to these issues is the number of unplanned settlements in Villa Nueva. Although the municipality of Guatemala has five times more irregular settlements than Villa Nueva, the 56 settlements in Villa Nueva have less access to public services. The irregular settlements also pose more acute security concerns than in either Guatemala or Mixco. Rapid social change as a result of population growth and disorganization

stemming from the lack of public services and unplanned land use in Villa Nueva is likely an important factor affecting the irregular homicide patterns observed in Villa Nueva compared to the other two municipalities.


Additionally, Guatemala and Mixco have been able to rely on a larger share of their revenues being self-generated and a larger percentage of their available budgets have gone towards operational expenses. Whereas Villa Nueva has been undertaken most of their projects in the areas of development and expansion of sewer and water services, Mixco and Guatemala have had more discretionary use of their available budgets and have been able to pursue other types of projects. For example, nearly one-quarter of Mixco's municipal projects have been focused on improving transportation and Guatemala has undertaken far more projects directed at improving the energy grid. It is notable too that Villa Nueva has participated in far fewer projects dedicated to cultural events and sporting activities and some residents feel that these investments have had a negative impact in reducing local crime.

The data reported here emphasizes that, from 2006 to 2013, Guatemala and Villa Nueva redirected a high percentage of its available funds into public investment projects. Mixco, on the other hand, has demonstrated far fewer public investments and appears to be investing less and less each year. Thus, in the face of growing challenges affecting the provision of public services in the community, Mixco spends its available funds on operating expenses and overhead and has been less prone to investing in infrastructure. According to the National System of Public Investment (SNIP) infrastructural investment should be the highest priority. However, the areas that need these types of investments the most are also the most challenging areas to work. This is especially the case, for example, in Villa Nueva where universal drinking water and sewer services are not available.

Demographics

Guatemala is the most populous country of Central America with an estimated population in 2012 of just over 14 million people. It is also the highest population growth rate in the region at 2.4%. The mean age in Guatemala is slightly less than 20 years old and 77.5% of males and 74.7% of females are under the age of 35 (DGPEA, 2010). The number of female-headed households in Guatemala has not been adequately assessed but estimates range between 20-25%. Counter-intuitively, there seems to be a higher prevalence of female-headed households among more affluent social classes (Chant, 2007).

Figure 23: Guatemala Population Pyramid, 2010



A 2009 econometric analysis of the relationship between violent crime and demographic factors in Central America found a significant positive relationship. As the proportion of female-headed households and percentage of young adults between ages 18 and 35 increases, so does the homicide rate (Cuevas and Demombynes, 2009). Unfortunately, an updated census has not been taken in Guatemala since 2002 and therefore the current report does not include an updated analysis of demographic patterns in the three municipalities.

Community Organizations

Community Organizations in the Municipality of Guatemala

During the period of research for this report, the municipality of Guatemala was facing considerable public criticism about the system of Community Development Councils. With the exception of the municipality of Guatemala, which favors CUBs, most citizen participation occurs through two distinct civil organizations: COMUDES, at the municipal level and COCODES, at the community level. All of these mechanisms represent intentional efforts to form lines of communication between local governments and the citizens they serve. The following excerpt came from an editorial in *El Periodico*, one of the leading national newspapers, on June 13, 2013:

“The municipal authorities of [Guatemala], always predisposed to centralize and concentrate their power, have not yet determined whether they will accept the existence of the Community Development Councils (COCODES) in accordance with the Law ... the municipal authorities favor the formation of the Unique Neighborhood Committees (CUBs) exclusively, which are a pseudo-legal structure that serves to further consolidate the power of the municipality.”

Even though 48 COCODES exist in the municipality of Guatemala, the local government has been resistant to recognize them. Following the editorial above and other directed criticisms, municipal authorities did meet with representatives of the 48 COCODES; they agreed that the COCODES were valid community organizations and offered to continue a dialogue. Based on the historical precedence of the last several years, however, the COCODES may continue to be marginalized.

Despite the municipality’s apparent opposition to the COCODES, CUBs have been somewhat effective in carrying community concerns to the mayor and the municipality. In the highly residential areas, those with the greatest economic influence, the government has encouraged the developments of CUBs to help connect with local residents and make improvements. Critics argue that these CUBs are made up of supporters of the mayor’s political party and that these structures are a reflection of cronyism.

Apart from the COCODES/CUBs controversy, there have been some notable accomplishments of the mayor’s office, especially regarding municipality support of the arts. The Municipal School of Dance was begun 8 years ago in one of the historical buildings in Zone 12. The program has been remarkably successful and the organization is currently operating above capacity. The municipal government has also promoted a music program, which includes a youth orchestra that performs concerts in various parts of the city. The municipality also organized music recitals, singing, and classical and folk dances, and works with the National Ministry of Culture to promote performances of the National Chorus, National Ballet, National Symphonic Orchestra, and other artistic organizations.

Community Organizations in the Municipality of Villa Nueva

In Villa Nueva, the situation concerning COCODES is completely different than in Guatemala. Here, the Development Councils are the only recognized association between community organizations and the municipal government. The work of the COCODES in Villa Nueva is divided into “12 development poles,” and according to one municipal staff member, the COCODES are the “eyes and ears of the mayor.”

One of the leaders of a local evangelical church in Villa Nueva offered this observation:

“The local Community Council is very good because the mayor and the municipal staff make us feel that we can count on their support ... although the municipality does not always have the financial resources to address the problems that exist in the community, we do have an open line of communication.”

There are numerous examples of civil participation and collective action to address some of the common problems residents face in Villa Nueva. Programs funded by USAID have supported the creation of a number of youth activities such as dance classes and guitar lessons, but they have also directly affected issues of community security. Youth programs have reinforced positive messages regarding personal responsibility and staying out of trouble. These programs emphasize crime prevention and reducing drug addiction and alcoholism. Women, who are involved prominently in the COCODES, are encouraged to continue their participation, and they are empowered by programs offered as a result of USAID.

Gang intervention activities, resulting from efforts supported by the COCODES, are having an effect in reducing gang activity. Approximately 2,000 of the estimated 19,000 gang members in Guatemala live in Villa Nueva. Yet, in Ciudad Peronia, authorities have now declared this to be a “gang-free” community. Organizations like “*Unidos por la Paz*,” supported by the municipal government, are working to create job opportunities for former gang members. Unfortunately, the success in reducing the influences of street gangs has not been translated into consistent reductions in violence and homicide.

Community Organizations in the Municipality of Mixco

The COCODES in Mixco are similarly very active, and their work is reinforced through funding provided by USAID. Many activities are organized through the COCODES to improve local conditions and support positive choices by youth to avoid crime. Women are empowered through a variety of courses such as cooking workshops and handicraft activities, and youth take part in computer classes, organized games, and sports. Other crime prevention programs support reporting of crimes, and there are neighborhood watch groups. There is a variety of health-related interventions, also. COCODES are involved in a broad range of activities in Mixco.

Besides the COMUDES and COCODES, other community groups have organized in Mixco. For example, in the Colonia 1° de Julio an unaffiliated community organization has formed without any formal structure. These groups reflect the diversity of the communities themselves, and the municipality has accepted inputs from other neighborhood organizations as well.

According to interviews conducted for this report, local community groups in Mixco are involved in a broad range of community improvement activities that include crime prevention programs and community patrols; drug and alcohol awareness and campaigns to reduce use and address addiction problems; pollution, erosion, and other environmental concerns; and, health concerns like dengue fever and other illnesses stemming from the proliferation of mosquitos. Many avenues for civil participation are available in Mixco, and the municipal government seems amenable to receiving inputs from the citizenry. There are also some local efforts to obtain more local business sponsors to support special projects.

Summary and Conclusions

Community organizations in these three municipalities, whether they are COCODEs, COMUDEs, CUBs, neighborhood groups, or others, are a resource for municipal governments but the municipal relationships with these groups are complicated. Membership, and particularly leadership positions, within these groups are constantly changing. From a municipal administrative perspective, sorting out competing and sometimes conflicting interests between community groups is a daunting task, one that requires an ongoing commitment to understanding the relationships between these groups and the communities they claim to represent. Community trust is a perpetual challenge, one that is complicated by cooperation between neighbors and known criminal elements. Similarly community members are wary of political authorities and their motives.

It is unclear whether the efforts of community organizations in the municipalities being studied have contributed to the recent shifts in violence rates. Certainly there are numerous examples of activities that community organizers are doing to make residents aware of security risks. The right to organize is a powerful force and the existence of community organizations in Guatemala are sources of information and collaboration that should be undergirded and strengthened.

Strength of Local Governance

The Guatemalan Constitution of 1985 mandates the economic decentralization of the federal government to achieve "adequate regional development of the country" (Article 119B). Guatemala is divided administratively into 22 departments and 337 municipalities, which are autonomous. The 1996 Peace Accords emphasized the decentralization of federal power as a process to provide the citizens more opportunities to influence public policy with the goal of reducing economic gaps and encouraging participation by all sectors of society.

These reforms were expressed through three specific laws: the Urban and Rural Development Councils Act (DL 11-2002), the Municipal Code (DL 12-2002), and the General Law on Decentralization (DL 14-2002). These laws were designed to strengthen local political power, improve local public services, and increase political representation. However, these laws do not significantly address the participation of local governments to address violent crime. In fact, public safety is legislatively the responsibility of the federal government and is carried out through the Ministry of the Interior (National Civilian Police) and the Guatemalan Army.

Guatemalan municipalities with populations over 10,000 residents can establish their own municipal transit police forces as allowed by the Municipal Code (Article 79) to regulate public spaces.¹⁰ Guatemala was the first municipality to establish a Municipal Transit

¹⁰ Some municipalities in the Department of Guatemala also have Municipal Security Police. One example is Santa Catarina Pinula, which is financially more stable than most municipalities and has a force of 40 municipal police officers assigned to security details.

Police, but many others soon followed. Traffic fines for violations are an important source of income for many municipalities. Municipal police, which are under the administrative authority of local mayors, do not have the authority to make arrests, and most are limited to security assignments near bus stops and major traffic intersections. Article 259 of the Constitution allows municipalities to create Municipal Courts, but again, there is no specific mention of authority to address matters of crime and community insecurity.

Similarly, Municipal Councils, permitted as a result of Article 36, can implement municipal ordinances that are not specific to security. There is, however, a department-level Security Commission that comprises local mayors and community representatives including indigenous leaders.¹¹ Although the Development Councils are sometimes criticized for promoting unfair patronage, they are the established channel for enhancing civic participation and a number of successful accomplishments are attributed to them (DIGI-USAC, 2008). Frequent conflicts between the Municipal Councils for Development¹² (COMUDES) and the department-level Development Councils have resulted from competing political interests. COMUDES members are elected, whereas members of the Development Council are appointed.

Social relationships are an important element in every society, and the strengths or weaknesses of these bonds are reflected in the virtues or shortcomings of the democratic system and of citizen participation. Democratic governance depends on the active participation of the citizens, the legitimacy of the political system, and the institutional framework on which it is based.

A fundamental part of this study is to understand the dynamics and specific social and political factors that have influenced the three municipalities included in this research. Thus, in this section, we seek to identify changes that may have occurred with respect to social organizations, local political structures, and the balance of social capital. These are all elements that could be associated with recent shifts in homicide patterns.

Laws and policies established at the national level play a huge role in determining how civil society functions. One of the primary interests of this research is to better understand the political and social dynamics that influence local communities and determine what effect, if any, these have on homicide rates. Of course, the complexity of these tasks, coupled with the especially short period of research and investigation, make this undertaking especially challenging.

Crowding in the metropolitan area, and the associated factors of overpopulation, sorely affect municipal governments and their capacity to respond to the needs of the citizens. This has increased the demand for public services related to basic security, health care,

¹¹ The Development Councils Act (Article 1) stipulates, "The system of Development Councils is the primary strategy to promote the inclusion of the Maya, Xinca, and the non-indigenous populations into the governance process to ensure democratic planning."

¹² COMUDES members are elected, just like mayors, and are represented in proportionate distribution to the number of votes cast.

recreational outlets, etc. The challenges are so daunting and the level of cooperation required to address the demands is so great that some favor the idea of consolidating the metropolitan area into a single large district in an effort to centralize and integrate resources and the obligations to provide public services.

Villa Nueva and Mixco have unique challenges as “intermediate cities” because the continuing urban sprawl has exponentially affected the ability of these local municipalities to respond to infrastructural demands of rapid urban growth (Morán, 2010). They are no longer suburban communities of workers who travel into the city to work. These communities are becoming an integrated part of the central district economy and thus, as Morán (2010) argues, these require more direct investment from the federal government.

This research considers the notion of civil participation as defined in the Framework of Decentralization Law:

“Citizen participation is the process by which an organized community [...] participates in the planning, execution and control of the efforts of the national, departmental and municipal governments, to facilitate the decentralization process.” (Article 17)

To understand the civil participation in the communities studied, we conducted interviews with representatives involved in local Councils for Community Development known as COCODES, the Municipal Councils for Development (COMUDES), and the Unique Neighborhood Committees (CUBs).

It is important to note that there has never been a comparative study of homicide in these three municipalities. These municipalities are especially interesting to consider because of the relatively well-organized government institutions in these areas. This is not to suggest that there are not vast differences in each municipality’s capacity to collect community-level data in a reliable and systematic way, especially in Villa Nueva and Mixco. Approaches to crime in all three communities have tended to be *a priori*, that is, society expected that prevention solutions would somehow come from above. Although complaints about crime largely originate with the population, most approaches to issues of crime and insecurity were “top down” solutions instead of “bottom up” strategies resulting from civic participation.

Two specific historical events have sought to address and improve civil participation in Guatemala. Individual rights related to civil participation were clearly expressed in the National Constitution of Guatemala in 1985, and the reforms laid out in the 1996 Peace Accords boosted political pluralism and promoted more widespread representation from all members of Guatemalan society. Unfortunately, the political culture and deep-rooted social exclusion in Guatemala continues to impact citizens’ levels of participation.

This social exclusion occurs on three different levels: (1) economic deprivation including restricted access to markets and public services to meet basic needs, (2) political isolation in terms of a lack of civil rights and access to electoral participation, and (3) sociocultural

impacts whereas certain classes or groups of people, especially indigenous populations, are excluded from the political process. Reducing social exclusion within a human-rights-focused paradigm requires a concerted effort to educate and raise awareness of these issues and to encourage a culture of social accountability and promote civil participation, which are key elements of democracy. Efforts to address public security and violence prevention, including homicide, should be established upon a basic foundation that insists upon these tenets.

Civil Participation

Civil participation in this context refers to individual and collective actions designed to identify and address issues of public concern. It includes the right of the people to define the public good, determine the policies by which they will seek the good, and reform or replace institutions that do not serve that good. Table 13 describes and analyzes the conditions of governance and rights of the three municipalities.

The centralized nature of many aspects of the federal government of Guatemala is not conducive to the strengthening of the municipal governments. While the Constitution has promoted the idea of decentralization, especially regarding the transfer of financial resources and the implementation of mechanisms for planning, there are serious shortcomings with respect to the strengthening of the municipal governments in administrative and technical capacity building. In general, the local government investments are not the result of sound land use and development planning. These issues are particularly important in the rapidly expanding, densely populated areas found in Guatemala, Villa Nueva, and Mixco. The public investments made in these municipalities are often unsystematic partial measures with few or no mechanisms to ensure the transparency of the investment or the quality of the works performed.

A study done by the Guatemalan Center for National Economic Research (CIEN) in 2005, identified some of the most common weaknesses found in municipal governments in Guatemala, including the following:

- Weak and untrained leadership and management
- Scarcity of qualified human resources
- Limited access to technology
- A lack of transparency in financial dealings
- Weak planning capacity
- Widespread disorganization
- Weak accountability to citizens, and poor customer service.

Table 13: Comparisons Between Guatemala, Villa Nueva, and Mixco*

	Guatemala	Villa Nueva	Mixco
Social Structure	Centralized – strong municipal government	Centralized – municipal government relatively weak	Centralized – strong municipal government
Civil Society	High, but widely dispersed	Moderate and fragmented	Moderate and fragmented
Exercise of Citizen Rights	High	High	Moderate
Linkages between the Government and Civil Society	CUBs and the Auxiliary Mayors	COMUDES/COCODES and the program “Breakfast with the Mayor”	COMUDES/COCODES
Development Plan Focus Areas	<i>Transmetro</i> and <i>Transurbano</i> , emergency management and disaster preparedness	Land use planning and development, in addition to planned activities with neighboring municipalities as part of the “Gran Ciudad del Sur” program	Land use planning and development
Security Plan Focus Areas	Improved public lighting, recuperation of public spaces	6th Squadron for Citizen Security (Army and Police coordination), new Real-Time Crime Monitoring Center, new citizen crime reporting program, “Call Waldemar”	Plans are in place to create Model Police Stations, community safety promoted through “ <i>Mixco Seguro</i> ” program. Two military attachments are assigned to Mixco.
Management Plan Focus Areas	Water, transport, sewer, targeted security efforts (use of cameras) in coordination with the Ministry of the Interior and the National Civilian Police	Water, transport, sewer, and social programming for youth and women	Water, transport, sewer Municipal Police Force and a Municipal Court, social programming in the community
Institutional Density ¹³	Very High	Moderate	High
Web Address	http://sociales.muniguate.com	http://www.villanueva.gob.gt/	http://www.munimixco.com/

* Information presented in this table is based on analysis conducted by the organization, *Incidencia Democrática*, in 2013 resulting from key stakeholder interviews and secondary data analysis.

The cumulative effect of these shortcomings is that public services are not delivered effectively or efficiently (CIEN, 2005). The human impacts of weak local governments are considerable and include such social problems as poor community health,

¹³ “Institutional density” refers to the degree to which the rules of specific institutions overlap with one another, having reference to the same behavior (Abbott, Green, & Keohane, 2012).


malnutrition, low levels of education, and increased crime and insecurity. Additionally, citizens do not have confidence in the ability of local governments to respond to community needs. This community marginalization affects attitudes toward engagement with the political system and lower levels of civil participation (ASIES-LAPOP, 2012). Community perceptions related to political corruption are a powerful indicator of civil participation. In fact, ASIES (2012) found that the perception of corruption was the only variable statistically significant when considering support for the political system.

Democratic Institutions

A diversity of democratic institutions result in a meaningful discourse between viable political units. In ideal democratic societies, all eligible citizens have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. The Guatemalan Constitution (DL 1-85) gives all Guatemalans 18 and older the right to vote. Political parties can be formed liberally and can be officially recognized with as few as 2,000 members, half of whom are required to be able to read and write. Political parties in Guatemala are generally numerous and unstable. There are 16 different political parties represented among the 158 seats in Guatemalan Congress. Nine parties have fewer than 5 seats, while the Patriot Party (*Partido Patriota – PP*) has the most with 59 followed by Renewed Democratic Freedom (*Libertad Democrática Renovada – LIDER*) with 38. No party has won the presidency more than once and in every election period, the majority of the parties are small and newly formed. Even the longer-lived parties, such as the Christian Democrats (*Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca – DCG*) or the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca – URNG*), tend to last less than a decade as significant forces in Guatemalan politics.

Figure 24 shows the fluctuation in homicide rates since 1996 and overlays the presidential terms of the last five national presidents. From 1996 to 2000, the country was still reeling from the violence of the civil war and reacting to the newly signed Peace Accords. President Árzu's term did see declines in homicide rates, and in 1999, the lowest annual homicide rate in recent history was recorded. Alfonso Portillo served from 2000 to 2003, and his presidency was marked by a steady increase in the rate as was the first 3 years for President Oscar Berger. During the term of Álvaro Colom, the homicide rate made a clear downward trend beginning in 2010. The executive branch of government has the capacity to set the political tone for the entire country, and political campaigns are often used to vet future policies and priorities of the government.

Figure 24: Guatemalan Homicide Rate by Presidential Term, 1996–2012



Source: National Civilian Police

Some of the respondents interviewed for this study wondered if presidential candidates themselves may have contributed to a national panic related to violence in order to get elected. Others attributed presidential candidates with far more direct involvement in shifts in the homicide rate by suggesting that their supporters may have intentionally taken steps to either allow homicide rates to increase unchecked or taken extraordinary steps to suppress the reported homicides. While speculation on various conspiracies exists, there is no compelling evidence to support these claims.

Álvaro Arzú, a slightly right-of-center member of the Unionist Party, has been mayor of the municipality of Guatemala since 2004. Mixco and Villa Nueva have each had three or more different parties elected to mayor since 2000. The Patriot Party has held the mayor’s office in Mixco since 2008, and Villa Nueva has a new CREO candidate following 8 years with the Unionist Party. It is notable that the mayors of Villa Nueva and Mixco are both serving their first terms in office.

These three municipalities have shown considerable diversity of their political candidates and parties represented in office over the last four elections. This diversity suggests that democratic processes are allowing the popular vote to determine local political representation. Based on the 2012 LAPOP survey, over 90% of the randomly selected respondents in Guatemala, Villa Nueva, and Mixco say they do not have any particular political affiliation. However, over 80% said they voted in the primary election and 71.6% reported that they voted in the general election. There appears to be broad-based voter participation in the three municipalities and no apparent de facto party with an

automatic bid to political office. Viable candidates have participated in each municipal election, and meaningful discourse has taken place.

Table 14: Municipal Mayors and Party Affiliation, 2000–2016

Municipality	Electoral Cycle			
	2000–2004	2004–2008	2008–2012	2012–2016
Guatemala	PAN ¹⁴ Fritz García-Gallont	PU ¹⁵ Álvaro Arzú	PU Álvaro Arzú	PU Álvaro Arzú
Mixco	FRG ¹⁶ Elmer Morales (2000-2001) Víctor Portillo (2001) Waldemar García (2001) Abraham Rivera (2002-2004)	PAN Amílcar Rivera	PP ¹⁷ Amílcar Rivera	PP Otto Pérez Leal
Villa Nueva	PAN Salvador Gándara	PU Salvador Gándara	PU Salvador Gándara José Domingo Sical (alcalde en funciones)	CREO ¹⁸ Edwin Escobar

Human Rights

Human rights refer to the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled, including the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression, and equality before the law.

Human Rights at the Local Level

Guatemala is characterized by high levels of institutional weakness. The majority of state agencies and services are concentrated in Guatemala City and the Judiciary (*Organismo Judicial*) in Guatemala is no exception. National courts, operated by the Judiciary, have jurisdiction over cases of civil law (contractual relations), family matters (disputes over alimony, marriages, and divorces), labor disputes, and offenses against persons and property. The scope of the municipal courts is reduced to environment, urban planning, transit, and local markets. Despite the limitations mentioned above, Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva are served by the courts and tribunals located at the Judiciary headquarters in Guatemala City, and cases heard here probably receive more oversight and consistency than those in other parts of the country.

The weaknesses within the Guatemalan Judiciary have a longstanding history, and there have been repeated efforts to improve the situation. International resources have been

¹⁴ National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional –PAN)

¹⁵ Unionist Party (Partido Unionista –PU)

¹⁶ Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco – FRG)

¹⁷ Patriot Party (Partido Patriota – PP)

¹⁸ Compromise, Renewal and Order (*Compromiso Renovación y Orden* – CREO)

channeled for years toward the improving the Judiciary with limited results. During the negotiations for the 1996 Peace Accords, the need to strengthen the Judiciary was given a high priority. As a result of this intensive focus, the Commission to Strengthen Justice (*Comisión de Fortalecimiento de la Justicia*) was formed and in 1998 the Commission made a number of recommendations related to judicial administration and court infrastructure to remedy serious weaknesses that were identified related to rule of law.

In subsequent reports, the Commission pointed to the inconsistencies of the Judiciary to provide fair and prompt services, especially to those in areas outside of the metropolitan area. Similarly, it was determined that the Institute for the Public Defense (*Instituto de la Defensa Pública*), which provides legal counsel for those unable to afford a private attorney, was overwhelmed with requests for services. As a result of these weaknesses, the Guatemalan Government made a request to the United Nations and invited them to set up an International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (*Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala – CICIG*).

Established in 2006 and ratified by the Guatemalan Congress in 2007, CICIG's mandate has been extended two times in 2009 and again in 2011. CICIG has identified many problems within the Judiciary, including examples of collusion and co-optation between the military, organized crime, and court officials; unqualified judges and support staff; financial interests influencing judicial outcomes and other types of corruption; extreme inaccessibility of the justice system for common people; and many other types of abuses. The important work of CICIG has helped to improve the quality of justice in Guatemala.

CICIG has three primary objectives:

- Investigate the existence of illegal security forces and clandestine security apparatuses that commit crimes affecting the basic human rights of the citizens of Guatemala, and identify the structures of these illegal groups (including their links with officials of the State), activities, modalities of operation, and funding sources.
- Cooperate with the Guatemalan government in the disbanding of these clandestine groups and illegal security forces and promote the investigation, criminal prosecution, and punishment of crimes committed by these groups.
- Make public policy recommendations to the Guatemala government aimed at eradicating these criminal elements and preventing their recurrence, including recommending changes in legislation and other institutional reforms.

CICIG's activities have had a noticeable impact in the Judiciary, with a number of improvements over the last 5 years. In the metropolitan area, courts now have extended hours and some operate 24 hours a day. Mobile court hearings occur in the communities. In Mixco, the mobile court conducts community hearings 6–8 days per month. Villa Nueva has hearings two to three days per month, and there are several mobile hearing dates in the municipality of Guatemala. Some new specialized courts have also emerged

in response to the Law Against Femicide, and some courts have been set aside to hear cases involving female victims of violence.

Human rights concerns in the municipalities of Guatemala, Villa Nueva, and Mixco are underscored by citizens' low perceptions of the police. While the systems of justice may be slowly improving, serious problems remain, and many citizens continue to believe that high levels of impunity exist in Guatemala. Researchers from *Incidencia Democrática* have raised questions about how citizens perceive the justice system. For most citizens, the police are the only "face of justice" they ever see, and many fear the police.

According to one municipal administrator, many incidents of sexual assault in some of the *colonias* go unreported because the women are afraid to report to police, and thus, the cycle of violence is perpetuated.

In interviews completed by our research team, one COCODE official mentioned that the perception of corruption by the government is pervasive and that many people experience high levels of anomie as a result. This anomie, which is characterized by a feeling of being disconnected from the social and ethical standards of society, may have increased people's willingness to avoid government authorities and to seek their own solutions to criminal victimization. Another COCODE official in Guatemala said that police rarely investigate robberies, thefts, and even serious violent crimes, and thus, impunity is common. Several respondents mentioned the lack of action by authorities to curb extortion. Assassinations, carried out by commissioned hit men, are almost always attributed to gangs, but few arrests occur. Citizens are being forced to cope with crime and to seek their own solutions because they have little faith in the government's ability to respond. Homicides have become so prevalent in some areas that residents lose track of them.

Still another COCODE official added that drug trafficking and the sale of illegal alcohol happens with the knowledge of police, usually near police patrols so the police can get their sales commissions. Nobody in the neighborhood believes that the police investigations are fair. Not all respondents pointed toward corruption as the only issue. One COCODE representative suggested that weak investigations and the poor quality of the evidence collected by authorities often impedes the courts' ability to make strong cases for prosecution.

Electoral Participation

Electoral participation refers to the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election. In Guatemala, political parties exist primarily as electoral mechanisms and are not necessarily defined by strong partisan positions on any particular issue. According to information obtained from the Electoral Supreme Court (*Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE*) in July 2013, out of over 7 million registered voters nationwide only 728,010 individuals (9.9%) are registered with a particular party. This low level of interest and involvement with specific political parties is also reflected in general attitudes of the public. Public approval ratings of political parties in Guatemala in general were 12.9% in

2012 and more recently these had dropped to only 12.0% (ASIES, 2012; 2013). An independent poll by a local newspaper found similarly low rates at 11.0% (*Prensa Libre*, 2012).

About half of the total population in Mixco and Villa Nueva are registered to vote and nearly 80% of Guatemala residents are registered. Based on the 2011 general election results, 62.1% of registered voters in the municipality of Guatemala cast a ballot; 72.7% of registered voters in Villa Nueva voted; and over three-fourths (77.5%) of registered voters in Mixco exercised their right to vote. In general, voter registration rates have increased in recent years throughout the country, with just over 7.5 million people registered just prior to the 2011 presidential elections. Nationally, voter participation varies from election to election, but typically ranges about 40% on average. See Figure for details on voter participation in the most recent presidential election cycle.

Table 15: Voter Participation in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva, 2011

	Guatemala	Mixco	Villa Nueva
Registered Voters	829,502	230,519	187,159
Votes Cast	515,517	178,748	136,116
Number of Polling Stations	1,872	557	458
Votes Cast for Winning Mayoral Candidate*	180,198 (36.72%)	55,825 (33.86%)	39,298 (31.48%)

Source: TSE, 2011

*Guatemala=*Partido Unionista*, Álvaro Arzú; Mixco=*Partido Patriota*, Otto Pérez Leal; Villa Nueva=*Partido Creo*, Edwin Escobar

Perceptions of Impunity, Corruption, and Transparency

Improvements in perceptions of justice, impunity, corruption, and transparency will hypothetically result in decreases in violence and homicide. The idea of impunity refers to the perception and existence of certain criminal elements that are or appear to be exempt from punishment, penalty, or harm. Corruption includes wrongdoing on the part of an authority or powerful entity through means that are illegitimate, immoral, or incompatible with ethical standards. Corruption often results from patronage and is associated with bribery.

In the Municipality of Guatemala

According to interviews done by ASIES and *Incidencia Democrática* and data collected in the 2012 LAPOP survey, impunity continues to be a major concern in Guatemala and many respondents' areas of greatest concern relate to economic crimes such as embezzlement, the misuse of public funds, and especially extortion. Violence against women is another perceived area for concern. Respondents also raised the issue of crimes

against children, including all forms of abuse. Special concerns were expressed regarding the differential access to justice on the basis of ethnicity, gender, education, social class, and the ability to speak Spanish.

These same data sources suggest that citizens perceive that authorities do not take sexual assaults, particularly in the poorest communities, seriously. Moreover, victims are often reluctant to make allegations against gang members for fear of reprisals. So despite the recent reductions in homicides, many people believe that the violence continues unabated and many residents have no faith in the criminal justice system. This impunity is reinforced by the macho culture that has persisted in Guatemala since the colonial era. Oftentimes, the public perceives that authorities routinely blame crimes such as extortion and homicide on gang members, but citizens are often skeptical that this is the case. In some communities where killings are a daily occurrence, some residents suggest that the government's inability to even accurately count the number of homicide victims is another example of how impunity occurs. Many perceive that the government intentionally misreports incidents of homicide and extortion, the two crimes residents are most concerned about. To protect themselves from criminal victimization, some communities are being forced to seek local solutions, including restricting movements in previously open and public areas.

The perceived ineffectiveness of the courts is a pervasive finding among many Guatemalans, and perceptions of corruption are a serious obstacle. One respondent offered an example from Zone 14, a mixed community with both luxury homes and those that are more modest. The respondent recounted a tale of criminals caught in the act of burglarizing a home. Despite finding the thieves inside the house, the police did not make an arrest. This type of complaint is common, and many report that the police often ignore calls for service or that their responses do not lack a sense of urgency. This complacency and lack of action on behalf of law enforcement is a source of frustration and distrust for many residents. One respondent added, "If we are all working in harmony, things can change. One person can't do it alone; it must be the responsibility of everyone to make the changes happen."

Those residents who openly oppose impunity or who speak out against authorities, claim some respondents, are subjected to persecution, threats, and even violence. Community opposition leaders face especially difficult circumstances, with some labeled and treated as terrorists. Some residents in the municipality are concerned that there is another side of impunity, one where the effectiveness of the courts is measured by the ability to achieve convictions. Unfortunately, some courts are influenced by television and other media outlets, and convictions occur unjustly. These respondents fear that innocent people are being imprisoned, often with irreversible harm done to their reputation.

Other issues of human rights are also a concern. One respondent shared that when demonstrations occur in areas that are predominantly indigenous, the police and other authorities restrict individuals' freedom of movement. Other examples of human rights abuses abound, and in general, many people are distrustful of government authorities.

Some respondents, for example, refused to answer any questions related to justice and the role of government. Others suggest while the police are responsible for promoting community security, police response to calls for service sometimes results in an overuse of force. Citizens are often afraid to make a report to police because of the unpredictable responses of police. One respondent gave an example of an isolated fight between two teenagers at a school. When the police arrived, they took complete control of the facility in an overwhelming show of force. These types of displays make residents especially distrustful of the police. At times, the police seem conciliatory and even complicit with criminals and their behavior, while on other occasions, their heavy-handed tactics intimidate local residents.

In the Municipality of Mixco


The research team also conducted interviews in the municipality of Mixco and found similar concerns related to the criminal justice system. There were also similar reservations about responding to the survey. One municipal employee in Mixco, for example, refused to answer any questions related to the justice system for fear of reprisal.

Impunity, especially at the hands of the National Civilian Police, is one of the chief concerns among residents in Mixco. One respondent pointed out that the lack of local Security Commissions to provide oversight is a serious problem.

There is no consensus on these points, however. Some respondents believe that authorities in Mixco are going a good job of addressing the concerns of the citizens, and offered several examples of this. One respondent mentioned that the municipal leaders are doing a good job of celebrating some of the positive accomplishments of the community and that the municipal authorities were very supportive of the community. The municipality allows the community to utilize open spaces freely and often diverts traffic to support community events. They also provide extra security as needed for special church events. Generally, neighbors in Mixco report that a strong relationship between the municipality authorities and the community.

Others suggest that abuses of power are less common at the municipal level and more prevalent at the community and neighborhood levels. Some mention that the COCODES (local community development councils) are problematic in this regard. Numerous

Figure 25: Components of *Mixco Seguro*



unresolved complaints made to the COCODES were provided as an example of the inefficiency of these groups.

Despite these relatively minor issues, those interviewed suggest that the municipality authorities are doing a good job of managing the affairs of the community and that they seek to resolve issues fairly. *Mixco Seguro*, an initiative implemented by the mayor in early 2012, has been successful in improving security and reducing reports of abuse by the police. The mayor has also remodeled and reopened a security Monitoring and Control Center in an effort to improve citizens' willingness to report crimes. The Center also monitors security cameras that have been placed in several crime hot spots. These efforts have improved the municipality's ability to communicate concerns with state authorities regarding security. Although incidents of crime and community insecurity continue, most respondents believe that the situation in Mixco is improving.

In the Municipality of Villa Nueva

Crimes against women and issues of domestic violence are an important priority in Villa Nueva. According to some respondents, abusers are not held accountable for their actions, and cases of domestic violence, for the most part, are not actively pursued. One female respondent shared, "I suffered violence and I reported it. He hurt me, and I made a report. After two years of enduring all this, the authorities have done absolutely nothing. I am hoping to one day receive justice."

Several people raised concerns about exploitation and other crimes against children. Gang members often recruit children to serve as "*Banderas*," or lookouts who are responsible for watching out for the authorities. Children are used to carry out extortion plots, and some are recruited as assassins. In addition, the respondents mentioned concerns about intra-family violence and said there had been some cases of extreme abuses involving children.

Police corruption is a consistent theme, and many respondents perceive that the police routinely accept bribes from criminals. Attitudes toward the court system are similarly tainted. One respondent said, "There are a lot of people who make reports about extortion and about men who batter women but the cases are never prosecuted. We need for the courts to follow up on these cases and to punish these offenders." Another said, "The courts are not effective in dealing with criminals. They detain murderers and in only a short amount of time, they are back on the street. Criminals are not concerned about getting caught because there are no punishments for their crimes. The same police that make the arrests are the ones who accept bribes from the criminals. Those who report crimes are the ones who are found dead a few days later" Another respondent conceded that incidents of impunity have decreased recently just as the homicide rate has also been decreasing.

Opinions about human rights issues in general were more varied. Many said that human rights abuses are especially rare, and some indicated that they were free to organize and to bring complaints to government authorities, saying that dialogue was the way to solve

problems. Nevertheless, others claimed that the “police detain decent people as a reprisal for community action. They come in to search their homes without reason and without a court order.” Another reported that sometimes “the churches try to have evangelical campaigns but the police restrict them from doing so.” Other human right abuses are attributed to complicity between criminals and legal authorities. Some respondents say the military detachments assigned to Villa Nueva exhibit abuses of power and direct intimidation toward law-abiding citizens. There have also been clashes between citizens and “*Juntas Locales*,” who reportedly patrol neighborhoods wearing hooded jackets in Villa Nueva.

Summary and Conclusions

Perceptions of impunity, corruption, and transparency in the municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva are high. However, perceptions are not facts, and in this case they may be an unhelpfully distorted reflection of the truth. Corruption and these other issues are by definition hidden and therefore, they are especially difficult to measure reliably. Consider the results of the Enterprise Surveys done by the World Bank where 590 firms in Guatemala were interviewed from July 2010 through May 2011. Nearly two-thirds (66.2%) of businesses in the Guatemala City Metropolitan area, which includes all or part of the municipalities being studied here, identify corruption as a major constraint to doing business in Guatemala. Businesses in other parts of the country were less likely (54.4%) to say the same thing. However, when these same businesses were asked to disclose their *actual experiences* of corruption, the percentages were far less. See Table 16.

The data in Table 16 show that overall perception of corruption in the Guatemala does not match the actual experiences of corruption. This is not imply that corruption is not a very real and significant problem. What we are suggesting is that the Guatemala City Metropolitan Area and the nation as a whole suffers from a widespread distrust of government and that citizens and business owners have perceptions that do not represent their experiences. The challenge for government is to build relations with the citizenry to create an improved sense of wellbeing. Of course efforts to combat actual corruption are essential but significant attention should also be paid to addressing the perceptions of corruption. There are opportunities to make targeted gains in these areas based on the data shown in Table 16. For example, nearly one out of every five businesses surveyed in the Guatemala City area said they were expected to give gifts to get a construction permit, compared to only 2.3% in the rest of the country. Similarly, 6.2% of firms said they were expected to give gifts to get an operating license. No similar incidents were identified in other parts of the country. The challenge for municipal governments is to inform the citizenry of *actual* corruption and to reinforce messages about how corruption is or is not affecting the community.

Table 16: Results of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys

Corruption Measure	Guatemala City Metropolitan Area (n=436)	Rest of the Country (n=154)	Latin America & Caribbean	All Countries
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things done"	6.0%	6.8%	10.9%	24.5%
Percent of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials	2.2%	7.4%	6.1%	14.1%
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get an operating license	6.2%	0.0%	8.4%	15.7%
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get a construction permit	19.1%	2.3%	12.9%	22.3%
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get an electrical connection	0.7%	6.7%	4.0%	15.6%
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get a water connection	11.6%	44.8%	9.7%	15.8%
Bribery depth ¹⁹	4.5%	9.7%	6.5%	14.5%
Bribery incidence ²⁰	10.1%	13.8%	9.6%	19.0%
Percent of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint	66.2%	54.4%	25.0%	18.1%

Source: Enterprise Surveys (<http://www.enterprisesurveys.org>), The World Bank.

Each municipal government is addressing issues of impunity, corruption, and transparency. Mixco and Villa Nueva are participating in the *Mancomunidad Gran Ciudad del Sur* program to promote private investment and improve infrastructure. Both of these municipal areas recognize the critical importance of reducing insecurity. The *Mixco Seguro* program has been very aggressive in this regard. In Villa Nueva, the activities of the mayor have similarly emphasized improvements in education, infrastructure, and security. Each of these municipalities has a mayor serving their first terms and each has made intentional efforts to include neighborhood committees. These efforts should help improve perceptions of government transparency.

While the municipality of Guatemala benefits from the federal infrastructure and the identity as the capital city, it is also affected by national trends and news. The size and the density of the metropolitan population coupled with the number of reported incidents of violence that occur in the media are a persistent reminder of the insecurity of the capital. Anytime an allegation of corruption or impunity is made, the attention of the

¹⁹ Bribery depth is the percent of public transactions where a gift or informal payment was requested.

²⁰ Bribery incidence is the percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request.

nation is focused on the leadership in the Guatemala City. The municipality of the Guatemala has made significant gains through projects like the *Transmetro*. The fact that there have been no violent incidents on the *Transmetro* since the project began should be shared with the community. Similarly, the fact that violent crime rates are decreasing needs to be shared more strategically with the community to help address the widespread perceptions of impunity and corruption. All three municipalities need to do a better job of measuring outcomes of their array of programs and activities and disseminating the results.

System Responses or Resources

Improvements in Systems Responses

As we began this study, we made a concerted effort to ask about activities outside of the criminal justice system that could have an effect on violence and homicide rates in Guatemala. We hypothesized that improvements in system responses (e.g., emergency medical services, trauma service providers, domestic violence shelters) should result in decreases in homicides. In the following sections, we discuss several system responses that are likely affecting the recent reduction in homicide rates.

Emergency Responders

A number of special programs have been implemented within the last few years that may have had an impact on reducing homicide rates particularly in the Municipality of Guatemala. There may be similar activities currently in place or planned in Mixco and Villa Nueva but none were identified in these municipalities. Certainly additional research is required.

As the hypotheses for this project were being developed, the research team considered if there were any recent efforts or special programs to improve emergency responder results. Are there any activities which may have reduced lethality of certain injuries as a result of improved emergency responses? Interviews with the Urban Health Observatory and the Office of the Archbishop for Human Rights revealed several activities that may have improved survival rates of those with serious, potentially fatal injuries.

According to an interview with an emergency response researcher, the past decade has seen an important improvement in the quality of pre-hospital attention. The fire departments are the main providers of these services. Ambulance personnel are no longer limited to simply transporting the victim of an accident or violence to the hospital. They have now been trained and are better equipped to provide emergency attention on-site to stabilize the patient and at times avoid the need to go to hospital altogether.

Traffic in Guatemala City is a daunting challenge for emergency responders and although no data were identified to explain what effects delayed responses might have had on patient outcomes, it is clear that the municipality and local hospitals are aware of the problem. As a result, some local hospitals have equipped emergency responders with

motorcycles and are dispatching them in advance of ambulances. These first responders have the ability to arrive more quickly and to administer basic life saving techniques including intravenous fluids and other first aid to help stabilize victims before transport. Although multiple respondents mentioned the existence of this program, it is unclear how many first responders there are or whether any evaluations of this program have been done.

Hospital and Emergency Room Services

A forthcoming pilot study conducted by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) investigates the details of the economic costs of violent crime victimization in Guatemala. The study shows the difficulty of carrying out this kind of research as determining prices of supplies and services used to provide emergency attention is in many occasions impossible due to the lack of records kept by hospitals and other health service institutions.

The initial results indicate that the economic costs of emergency attention are lower than expected. Great differences have been verified between the costs of emergency attention in public hospitals and in private ones. Twenty minutes of human services in emergency room attention cost around Q20 in public hospitals (U.S.\$2.51), whereas in private ones it fluctuates between Q300 and Q1,000 (U.S.\$38-\$126).

Most of the victims of violent attacks and of traffic and other kinds of accidents are attended to in public hospitals where improvements have also taken place. Trauma specialists are always available and other specialized personnel are well-trained to provide efficient attention following unwritten, but usually, well-established protocols. Other respondents mentioned that some emergency room doctors and support staff have received additional specific training to improve their capacity to treat gunshot victims. It is unknown how widespread this training might be or what results these programs may have had on patient outcomes. Even so, these activities, outside of the criminal justice system, may have reduced the number of assault victims who died as a result of their injuries. The PAHO/WHO study will also provide an assessment of critical care procedures in hospitals. The report is expected to be published during the last quarter of 2013.

Domestic Violence Shelters

Supporting victims of violence and advocating for their access to the protections afforded by the criminal justice system may be another activity, outside of the criminal justice system, that has reduced homicide rates. *Fundación Sobrevivientes* provides shelter for women and their children who have been victims of violence. This domestic violence shelter has been instrumental in enhancing the public's confidence in the national institutions encouraging the victims to file complaints against their abusers and empowering victims. *Fundación Sobrevivientes* follows up on cases by making use of a legal maneuver known as *querellante adhesivo* (adjunct plaintiff). This allows the shelter

to become a co-plaintiff and to advocate more directly for the victim. *Fundación Sobrevivientes* has also made use of the local media outlets and social media tools to improve communication strategies to inform the public about successful prosecutions and their overall support of victims of violence.

Fundación Sobrevivientes, which is an advocacy agency outside of the criminal justice system, empowers women by becoming an inter-institutional liaison between victims and the police, the attorney general's office, and INACIF to achieve positive results in cases. The shelter has contributed to the setting up of a network to providers available to deliver psychological, medical, social, and legal support to victims. According to the agency, the *Fundación* contributed directly to the investigation and successful prosecution of 257 rapists and murderers in 2012. This accounts for more than one-quarter of all reported homicides and rapes of women in the Guatemala City area. Since the agency began, they claim to have supported at least 1,000 successful prosecutions of violent offenders who prey on women. *Fundación Sobrevivientes* operates a domestic violence shelter that provides housing and protection to over 200 people annually and they work to identify independent living opportunities for women.

There may be other shelters and advocacy organizations at work in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva. *Fundación Sobrevivientes* is one of the most well-established. High quality impact evaluations of these programs are not common and it is therefore difficult to substantiate the results of such programs. Even so, it seems highly probable that these programs are reducing the number of potential assault and homicide victims.

Private Security

According to an AFP report (*La Nación*, 2013), the Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras have the largest concentration of private security firms in the region. The news agency cites figures recently released by the Pan-American Private Security Federation (FEPASEP), which put the number of private security personnel in Central America at more than 200,000. The investigation found that security guards outnumber police in Guatemala by a factor of four to one. In Honduras, the most violent nation in the world in terms of its homicide rate, there are more than twice as many private security personnel as police officers (29,000). Authorities have demonstrated increasing interest in regulating the industry in Guatemala, where military personnel have been accused of coordinating with private security firms in so-called Illegal Clandestine Security Apparatuses (CIACS) in the past, often in the interests of powerful drug trafficking networks. In 2010 the Guatemalan government passed a law which required security firms to register with the state and explicitly prohibited active duty military personnel from working with private companies in any form. However, as of February only two of the registered security firms in the country had even begun the registration process (*La Nación*, 2013).

Fueled by fears about high crime, perceptions of impunity and public corruption, the number of private security companies and private security officers in Guatemala has been

steadily increasing over the last decade. In fact, expenditures on private security are roughly double the amount that the government spends on public security. One estimate suggests that private security companies brought in US\$574 million in 2010, while the State only spent US\$251 million in public safety that same year (Argueta, 2012; Sandoval, 2010).

According to the Ministry of the Interior, as of October 2012, there were 141 authorized private security companies in Guatemala with approximately 45,000 private security guards. There are however approximately twice that many security companies doing business in Guatemala and the estimated number of guards is likely well over 100,000 or about five times higher than the total number of police officers (Argueta, 2012; UNDP, 2010). In 2010, the number of guards was 40,481 and in 2011, there were 40,800 private security guards authorized to work in Guatemala.

According to surveys collected by ASIES, businesses in the metropolitan area spend between 8 and 13 percent of their total expenditures on security to protect against crime. In 1996 only 28 private security firms were registered in its federation employing 9,500 agents. By 2001 the number of firms had grown to 81 and the number of officers had increased to around 25,000. In 2006, the number of private security companies had increased to 127 (OAS, 2006). Besides the legal firms the Organization of American States estimated that there were as many as 90,000 unregistered private security agents. Escobar (2011) calculates that the private security sector produced Q2.3 billion in 2008, and employs 120,000 agents – far more than the officially recognized number reported by the Ministry of the Interior.

While there are substantially more private security officers than police, the private security industry in Guatemala has received many criticisms. First, the requirements to become a police officer are considerably more rigorous than those in private security. More importantly, the amount of training provided to private security officers is far less. A private security guard is supposed to receive at least 15 days of training but according to one researcher, the amount of actual training could be as low as two days. Police officers must attend the Police Academy for several months before they can be assigned to patrols. The majority of recruits for private security officers are former military. On the one hand, these officers do have more security training, on the other, background checks into the quality of their military service is often lacking. Additionally, research shows that many illegal weapons sold in Guatemala come from former military officers who are currently serving as private security guards (Argueta, 2012).

Perhaps the greatest concern about private security companies in Guatemala is the lack of oversight and administrative control. While the Ministry of the Interior regulates private security officer licenses, information about the activities of private security companies and who the owners of the companies are is not available. For example, regulations are not clear on how taxes are collected from the companies, how many weapons these companies have, who their clients are, etc. Most of the data available on private security companies in Guatemala is likely unreliable.

Besides registered private security companies, many neighborhood associations and communities have taken steps to secure their own property. Many of these hire security guards that are unregistered. Some have private guards 24 hours a day 7 days a week. Additionally, some neighborhoods have restricted access to their residences by putting up gates and high fences, obtaining security dogs, cameras, and other measures to secure their properties. There are not data available to estimate what impact, if any, these private security measures may have on incidents of violent crime in Guatemala.

Urban Public Transportation

The *Transmetro* is a bus rapid transit system which includes approximately 250 articulated buses in the municipality of Guatemala. The buses, which can carry approximately 100 passengers, run down the middle of the street in dedicated lanes. Spaced about a kilometer apart, there are 32 bus stations which mostly correspond to areas of heavy pedestrian activity. Service began in February 2007 with a route between the downtown area and the market at the Southern Transfer Station. The second route started operations in August 2010 and serves the central corridor between 6th and 7th Avenue of Zones 1, 4, and 9. As of June 2013, the *Transmetro* has completed approximately 415 million routes and currently transports between 200,000 and 250,000 passengers on weekdays.

Both stations and the buses are guarded by municipal police and sometimes police personnel also ride on the *Transmetro*. Officers in fluorescent yellow vests are situated at most stations on the route. These officers have made 1,015 arrests for incidents either on the buses or at the stations. Since 2007, there have not been any robberies, assaults, or homicides against bus drivers. By contrast, there have been more than 900 urban bus drivers murdered, not including drivers' assistants or passengers, in the Guatemala City Metropolitan Area between 2007 and 2013, making driving a bus in the Guatemalan capital one of the most dangerous jobs in the world (Dudley, 2011; Elbein, 2013). Furthermore, no assaults, rapes, robberies, or homicides have occurred against passengers since 2007 (*Observatorio de Salud Urbana*, 2013).

Figure 26: Transmetro Station



Source: Pešula, 2007

Summary and Conclusions

There are many activities outside of the criminal justice system that have likely affected recent declines in homicide rates. The data presented in this section are somewhat anecdotal and more research is clearly needed. The effects of some of these activities on homicide rates, such as the *Transmetro*, might not be readily apparent. However, when considering the history of bus driver deaths and other violence associated with public transportation in the municipality of Guatemala, the fact that there have been no assaults, rapes, robberies, or homicides against passengers since 2007 is a huge accomplishment given that nearly a quarter-million passengers are transported per day during the work week.

The growth and expansion of private security companies and the number of guards they employ underscore the anxiety and insecurity that many people feel and highlights their lack of reliance on government authority structures like the police. Unfortunately, the growth of the industry has outpaced the ability of the government to regulate and provide oversight and nearly half of operational security firms are not registered. While private security guards have likely had an impact on reducing homicide rates, there are substantial differences in the qualifications and training provided to private security guards. Additionally, there are other concerns about these organizations, how they are managed, and their possible involvement in firearms trading and other black market activities. Although decentralized, this alternative, paramilitary security force offers plenty for government authorities and citizens to be concerned about.

There have been substantial improvements in emergency responses by fire fighters, paramedics, and other first responders, especially in the municipality of Guatemala. Emergency room personnel have similarly received specialized training on dealing with gunshot victims. These advances since 2009 have most assuredly reduced the number of casualties and impacted homicide rates. Unfortunately, the data systems that could help measure these impacts are not well-developed and it is especially difficult to measure “homicide-deaths-avoided”. More research is needed to better understand whether the gain made in the municipality of Guatemala can be replicated in other areas.

Although the research team expected to find some evidence of mediation activities in the municipalities being studied, there were few concrete cases identified. There was one example offered by respondents in Villa Nueva about a community-led effort to negotiate or mediate with a local crime boss. There were a few other less specific cases mentioned, but there were no details available for further inquiry. In most cases, the mediation efforts described were orchestrated by a local pastor, priest, or other religious leader and not through an NGO or government agency. Unfortunately, the mediation efforts are not balanced and frequently the communities are forced to accept whatever terms the criminals offer.

The Micro Domain: Behavior and Homicide

Availability and Lethality of Guns

The 1996 Peace Accords provided a new concept of security in Guatemala through the Agreement on the Strengthening of the Civil Authority and Role of the Army in a Democratic Society [*Acuerdo sobre Fortalecimiento del Poder Civil y Papel del Ejército en una Sociedad Democrática* (AFPC)]. Under the AFPC, security is a broad concept that is not limited to protection against armed external threats, normally the responsibility of the Guatemalan Army, or protection against threats to public order and internal security, the domain of the National Civilian Police. The AFPC also established several legal and regulatory reforms to control the proliferation of weapons in the country, as well as regulate the operation of private security companies. This was an important emphasis of the Agreement since the use of arms to provide security is ordinarily the responsibility of the national security forces.

Oversight of gun ownership through the Ministry of the Interior and enforcement by the National Civilian Police ensures that those security officers, and others approved to carry weapons, are appropriately screened and trained so they do not become a threat to the population. The AFPC does not only include language regarding the possession and carrying of arms, it also addresses issues of purchasing and using weapons in an attempt to ensure more regulation over these activities. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior, with an emphasis on civil authority, was granted control of the records and the national monitoring of the use and possession of arms and ammunition.

In 1997, the Inter-American Convention against the manufacturing of and illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials was approved, and in 2003, the law was ratified in Guatemala. Among other details, this law established a complete definition of a firearm as "any weapon that consists of at least one barrel by which a bullet or projectile can be fired as the result of an explosion that has been designed for that purpose or that can be converted easily to do so except antique firearms manufactured before the twentieth century or its replicas; any other weapon or destructive device such as explosive, incendiary bomb or gas, grenade, rocket, rocket launcher, missile, system of missiles, or landmines."

According to the above definition, a firearm consists of a tube or barrel that can fire a bullet and the appliance has been designed for that purpose. A firearm could thus be manufactured and mass produced but could also be homemade, and could conceivably take many forms ranging from a weaponized ink pen to a cannon.

Some countries make distinctions between small arms and light weapons and other types of firearms primarily on the grounds of their portability. A group of experts from the United Nations has settled on a definition of small arms, which reads as follows: small arms are those that can be carried by one person and are intended for personal use. Light

weapons are defined as those firearms that can be transported by several people or a light vehicle and are intended for collective use. Globally, 42% of homicides are committed by firearms. This percentage increases in South America up to 60%, while in Central America, the percentage increases to 70% (UNODC, 2011).


Legal Firearms in Guatemala

Maintaining a registry is a fundamental requirement for any government wishing to maintain minimum controls on the sale, circulation, and use of firearms. In countries such as Guatemala—post-conflict societies with high rates of killings and insecurity—the need to have a reliable record of firearms and ammunition is especially vital. However, as this report shows, Guatemala’s efforts to monitor firearms distribution and sales have been largely unsuccessful, and fewer than half of guns circulating in the nation are registered. The Department for the Control of Arms and Ammunition [*Departamento de Control de Armas y Municiones* (DECAM)] was established in 1989 under the Ministry of Defense and assigned the task of monitoring firearms in the country. Later, with the approval of the new Weapons and Ammunition Act (Decree 15-2009), DECAM was replaced by the Administration for the Control of Arms and Ammunition [*Dirección General de Control de Armas y Municiones* (DIGECAM)]. In this role, DIGECAM is responsible for authorizing, registering and controlling the import, manufacture, storage, sale, transport, possession, and carrying of firearms and ammunition that enter, circulate, and/or leave the national territory. Much of the data presented in this report related to firearms originated with DIGECAM.

The Availability of Firearms in Guatemala

According to information provided by DIGECAM, the agency had a total of 451,515 registered firearms in their automated system as of December 2012. The majority of these weapons are handguns with ammunition clips (46.9%) followed by shotguns (22.1%), revolvers (16.3%), rifles (11.4%), and others (3.3%) that include submachine guns, assault rifles, and specialty guns. See Figure 27 for the number and type of registered weapons in Guatemala in 2012 as reported by DIGECAM (FUNDESA, 2012).


Figure 27: Number and Type of Registered Weapons in Guatemala



Source: (DIGECAM, 2012)

Handguns are undoubtedly the most frequently owned type of firearm in Guatemala, and among these, the 9mm is the most common. Although a number of manufacturers produce firearms, the popular German manufacturer, Luger, makes over half of all handguns (52.8%). These are sometimes referred to as Luger “Parabellum,” which is German “for war.” Indeed, the 9mm Luger Parabellum has been the most common military sidearm in the world for the last century. The 9mm X 19mm, a 9mm with a longer barrel, makes up 21.5% of the total number while the remaining quarter are represented by a variety of different calibers. See Figure 28 for an explanation of the number of registered handguns by caliber according to DIGECAM in 2012.

Figure 28: Registered Handguns by Caliber in Guatemala




Source: DIGECAM, 2012.

Knowing the types and quantities of ammunition purchased in the country offers some insight into the kinds and overall number of firearms that are owned. There are 157 gun dealers in Guatemala, and each one is required to report sales broken down by caliber and brand. Thus, DIGECAM has a vast amount of information on this subject. Because the percentage of the most commonly used caliber of weapons is known, it is possible to obtain a representative sample from the total number of gun dealers. A simple random sample was drawn based on a list containing sales by caliber for each of the gun dealers. We selected a sample 54 gun dealers, all with the same likelihood of being sampled, and analyzed their ammunition sales. Next, we analyzed the data by caliber type and grouped them into three categories, .22 caliber, 9mm, and others. This strategy allowed us to establish a good estimate of the percentage of the main calibers of ammunition sold in Guatemala based on a random sample of total sales.

The results show that 46.8% of the ammunition sold during 2012 was .22 caliber, which is generally the least expensive ammunition available for any handgun or rifle. Approximately, one-third (31.8%) of the ammunition sold was for 9mm weapons, while the remaining caliber shells represent only 21.4% of all sales in the country. These findings vary from those reported by the Institute for the Teaching of Sustainable Development (*Instituto para la Enseñanza Para el Desarrollo Sostenible - IEPADES*) in 2005. In the IEPADES study, 56% of the ammunition was .22 caliber, and 24% was 9mm. While a .22 caliber weapon can easily be lethal, the 9mm fires a larger round, has more gunpowder, and, thus, has far greater “knockdown power” and is more lethal than the .22 caliber. So, while the data show an increase in the amount of more lethal caliber ammunition in Guatemala compared to 2005, homicide rates have been decreasing since 2009. It seems unlikely that the increased lethality of weapons has significantly contributed to homicide rates. Sales of ammunition by caliber are shown in Figure 29.

Figure 29: Sales of Ammunition by Caliber, 2012



Source: DIGECAM, 2012.

A total of 15 shipments containing 20,654,960 rounds of ammunition were imported into Guatemala in 2012. Table 17 shows the date of entry, number of rounds, and some of the calibers of the ammunition imported. Unfortunately, the data reported by DIGECAM do not allow for a closer analysis by type of caliber because several shipments describe the types of ammunition imported as “various.”


Table 17: Ammunition Imports, 2012

No.	Date	Company	Location of Customs Clearance	Storage Location	Amount of Ammunition	Caliber	Brand
1	March 8	NAS	COMBEX-IM	Presidential hangar	30,000	7.62X51	Winchester
2	May 22	BISONTE	Saint Thomas	Company warehouse	1,425,600	9mm	Barnaul
3	May 3	MAINLEY	Saint Thomas	ALCORSA	534,000	12,20,410 y 28	Rio
4	May 10	DEFENSA	Tecún Umán	ALCORSA	1,695,000	9mm various	Aguila
5	May 24	CEMSA	Saint Thomas	Company warehouse	1,100,000	9mm/.40S &w	PMC
6	July 12	MUNICAR	Saint Thomas	Company warehouse	5,000,000	.22LR	Concorde
7	July 23	MUNICAR	Saint Thomas	Company warehouse	533,160	Various	Eibarres
8	August 8	MUNICIONES	Saint Thomas	Company warehouse	1,283,400	Various	Prvi Partizan
9	September 11	ARMAS DEFENSIVAS	Tecún Umán	Company warehouse	1,265,000	Various	Golden Eagle
10	October 4	CEMSA	Puerto Quetzal	Company warehouse	3,000,000	.22 LR	CCI
11	October 17	MILENNIUM	Moyuta Jutiapa	Company warehouse	200,000	Various	Vector
12	October 24	MUNICIONES Z.9	Puerto Quetzal	Company warehouse	1,300,000	Various	Remington
13	October 25	CAMUFLAJE	COMBEX-IM	Company warehouse	84,800	Various	Hornady
14	November 14	MUNICAR	Saint Thomas	Company warehouse	1,464,000	Various	Tulammo
15	December 12	DEFENSA	Tecún Umán	ALCORSA	1,740,000	Various	Aguila
Total					20,654,960		

Source: DIGECAM, 2012

In regard to the historical trend, the amount of ammunition imported each year has been increasing steadily since 1992. However, it is noteworthy that since 2007 this pattern has been markedly different with sharp declines in recent years. Although these figures reflect official imports rather than all ammunition that enters the country, recent reductions in the amount of ammunition imported legally could conceivably impact levels of violence but it is doubtful that there is any meaningful shortage for criminals seeking to obtain ammunition. The import of firearms is also important to consider. See Figure 30.

Figure 30: Net Import of Firearms for Civilian Use, 1992–2010



Source: DIGECAM, Interactive map of arms trafficking

The net import of firearms is important to consider but also the rate of change over time. While inconclusive, there is a notable drop in the number of imports in 2008. However, firearms rarely become completely dysfunctional and once a weapon is in circulation, it often can remain functional for decades. Ammunition does become less reliable over time but similarly, it can last for years. Despite the decrease in imports, the cumulative number of firearms available continues to increase steadily and it is highly unlikely that recent declines in homicides are tied to a shortage of firearms.

Lethality and Prices

Ammunition lethality depends on the velocity and size of the bullet. As already shown, the most widely owned handgun in Guatemala is the 9mm. Although some 9mm weapons fire at a higher velocity, most 9mm weapons fire a bullet that is subsonic, a velocity less than the speed of sound (350 meters/second compared to the speed of sound, which is 340 meters/second at sea level). In recent years, the use of 9mm ammunition has become

more prevalent while the .22 caliber has decreased. Moreover, the 9mm is more lethal overall than the .22 caliber.

Additionally, data from DIGECAM show far lower sales of ammunition for such weapons as the AK-47, and the National Civilian Police reported seizure of only 74 assault rifles in all of 2012. Even so, these rifles, because of the number of shots per second that can be fired, increase the possibility of lethal effects during any time they are fired. Additionally, these weapons are especially durable (between 20 and 40 years) and versatile (can even be used effectively in mud, water, etc.), which means a single assault rifle can be used or stored for many years.

In terms of price, 9mm ammunition in Guatemala is comparatively cheaper than many other types of ammunition such as the 7.65 and the .45, and is more potent and deadlier than the .22 caliber. This combination of price and lethality probably contributes to making it the most common firearm in Guatemala. The .22 caliber ammunition is the least expensive by far, and thus, this is the most common ammo used for target shooting. Table 18 provides some approximate values for new weapons purchased from a reputable dealer. Purchasing guns in Guatemala is expensive, but it is not difficult to find less expensive, legal and illegal, alternatives. According to interviews with reputable Guatemalan gun dealers, an illegal firearm is typically less than half the expense of a legal weapon. Reportedly, a willing buyer could obtain an illegal 9mm pistol for around US\$500 and an AK-47 for as little as US\$1,000.

Table 18: Approximate Price of Ammunition and Selected New Handguns in Guatemala (in U.S. Dollars)

Type	Price	Brand
.22 ammunition (box of 50)	\$5–10	
9mm ammunition (box of 50)	\$25	
.32 ammunition (box of 50)	\$30	
.45 ammunition (box of 50)	\$45	
.22 pistol	\$680	Walther
.22 rifle	\$425	Marlin
9mm pistol	\$1,000–\$1,200	Jericho/Magnum/Walther

Requirements for Licensure and Firearm Registration in Guatemala

Article 72 of the Law on Firearms and Ammunition establishes the requirements that a person must meet to obtain a license to carry a firearm in Guatemala. This includes an application to DIGECAM, which includes the applicant’s full name, age, marital status, nationality, occupation and employment information, residence, national identification

number, and a current address. Also, the applicant must provide the model and caliber of their weapon as well as the length of the barrel(s), and the serial number. Additionally, a sworn affidavit establishing that the applicant does not have any mental health issues is required. Individuals who abandoned their posts as officers with the National Civilian Police or the deserters from the Guatemalan Army are not eligible to carry a handgun. Several pieces of supporting documentation is also required, including a notarized copy of the applicant's personal identification card, a clear criminal background check, and proof of completion of several requirements of Article 72 (i.e., handgun safety training, knowledge of firearm laws, psychological assessment). Finally, a fee is required.

Once DIGECAM has received all of the preceding materials, the application will be processed. DIGECAM will also collect ballistics from all of the applicant's registered firearms. Once all of this is complete, the applicant will receive the firearm license.

Despite this apparently rigorous process, the system has some clear weaknesses. First and most important, brokering, transporting, or selling unregistered weapons or ammunition is not a recognized crime in Guatemala. Furthermore, there are no established criminal charges defined by the law for those who violate the general provisions of the Act. Because of this, it is practically impossible to enforce the law in cases where unregistered owners or other firearm buyers and sellers do not abide by the regulations. Essentially, Guatemalans can be unlicensed and carry unregistered weapons without any major legal concerns besides having their weapon seized by the police.

Similarly, there are no established penalties for the illegal manufacture, trafficking, or removing the serial numbers from firearms, and no financial penalties, (i.e. fines for illegally trading in firearms). Essentially, illegal arms dealers operate with de facto impunity in Guatemala.

Government agencies, like the National Civilian Police, are required to register all of their firearms with DIGECAM. However, the law is also very clear in exempting weapons used by the Guatemalan military from being registered in the system. The military uses its own system to register firearms, but recent examples of armory thefts and other examples of military weapons in civilian circulation call the integrity of this system into question as well.

The Availability of Illegal Firearms

There is no method to determine the precise number of illegal firearms in Guatemala. However, it is possible to make a reliable estimation based on a few basic assumptions. First, it is important to define all the various ways that a firearm can be considered illegal: (1) by law, certain arms cannot legally be carried by civilians as established Articles 4–10 of the Firearm and Ammunitions Law; (2) by not being registered with DIGECAM as required by Articles 63 and 72 of the same law; (3) because they are stolen—any weapon reported as stolen to DIGECAM, or reported missing by the military, cannot be subsequently legally registered; or (4) because they are modified in some way or otherwise defaced (Articles 38 & 82). With these details, it is possible to

identify data sources for creating an estimate for the number of illegal firearms in Guatemala (see Table 19).

Table 19: Methods and Variables to Measure the Number of Illegal Firearms in Guatemala

Method	Variables	Assumptions
Counting illegal firearms seized by or detected by law enforcement and/or reported missing by the military	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of military firearms that are now in circulation among civilians • Number of unique positive “hits” on firearms used in illegal activities as identified in the IBIS system • Number of illegal firearms recovered or seized by law enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not all firearms previously issued to military personnel were returned to the military • Military weapons are stolen • The effectiveness of law enforcement can be measured in terms of the number of firearms seized
Official data sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of illegal firearms seized by law enforcement • DIGECAM records • Number of reported stolen firearms • Comparisons of the amount of ammunition being imported by caliber • Number of homicides and other crimes committed with illegal weapons • Community perception and victimization surveys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official statistics are a reliable data source • A known percentage of people who have a registered legal firearm also have illegal (unregistered) firearms
Estimates of illegal firearms based on intelligence from criminal investigations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of active gang members • Number of people who are actively involved in drug trafficking • Number of assassins and other criminals who have no gang affiliation or known ties to trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most of the illegal firearms in circulation come from gangs, drug traffickers, and hired criminal mercenaries • It is possible to estimate the number of members of each group

It is worth reiterating that the Firearms and Ammunition Law went into effect in 2009, about the time the decline in homicide rates began. Table 20 provides a more complete picture of what methods are used to carry out homicides in Guatemala. In 2010, 84.1% of

all homicides in the country were committed with a firearm. In 2011, this percentage dropped to 82.2%, a significant decline ($z=2.60$; $p<.004$). The percentage of firearms used to commit homicide dropped again in 2012 to 82.0%, but this was not a significant shift. Although the evidence is not especially compelling yet, the Firearms and Ammunition Law may have had some effect on the homicide rate nationally. Later, these issues will be reconsidered using data from the municipalities studied in this report.

Table 20: Homicide Methods in Guatemala, 2008–2012

Methods of Homicide	2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Firearm	5,221	83.0	5,404	83.2	5,009	84.1	4,672	82.2	4,224	82.0
Knife/sharp object	619	9.8	593	9.1	556	9.3	563	9.9	565	11.0
Blunt object	217	3.4	220	3.4	173	2.9	204	3.6	203	3.9
Explosive device	1	0.0	10	0.2	11	0.2	15	0.3	2	0.0
Strangulation	200	3.2	222	3.4	178	3.0	180	3.2	147	2.9
Lynching	34	0.5	49	0.8	33	0.6	47	0.8	14	0.3
Total Homicides	6,292	100.0	6,498	100.0	5,960	100.0	5,681	100.0	5,155	100.0

An analysis of assaults with injuries also reveals interesting results when comparing the percentages of those cases involving a firearm. Since 2008, the relative percentages of assaults with firearms have declined nationally from 74.8% to 65.0% in 2012, a significant shift over 5 years ($z=12.61$; $p<.001$) (see Table 21). Even so, firearm use in assaults was declining before the Firearms and Ammunition Law, although it was surely being discussed and debated in 2008. The national emphasis on better firearm control does appear to have an effect on reducing firearm use in serious violent crimes like homicide and assault.

Table 21: Assault Methods in Guatemala 2008–2012


Methods of Assaults w/Injuries	2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Firearm	5,160	74.8	5,575	73.3	5,247	70.3	4,350	69.8	3,954	65.0
Knife/sharp object	1,331	19.3	1,614	21.2	1,728	23.2	1,463	23.5	1,690	27.8

Methods of Assaults w/Injuries	2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
	<i>f</i>	%								
Blunt object	380	5.5	299	3.9	357	4.8	357	5.8	399	6.6
Explosive device	5	0.1	64	0.8	93	1.3	45	0.7	7	0.1
Lynching	22	.03	56	0.7	36	0.5	21	0.3	31	0.5
Total Assaults	6,898	100.0	7,608	100.0	7,461	100.0	6,236	100.0	6,081	100.0

The number of firearms reported stolen to police is also interesting (see Figure 31). Data already presented demonstrate that the number of firearms imported for civilian use has steadily increased from 1992 to 2008, while more recently, imports have slowed. Over the past 5 years, an average of 1,800 guns per year have been reported stolen to police. Since 2010, the number of reported losses has begun to increase after substantial declines from 2008 and 2009. Typically, but not always, victims of firearm theft only report their loss if their weapon is registered. Thus, the number of firearms stolen each year is very likely grossly underreported. Since the Firearms and Ammunitions Law went into effect in 2009, gun owners of unregistered weapons were possibly less likely to report their losses to the police, which would account for the declines in reports before 2010. There are substantial opportunities to improve gun theft reports to the police, and these statistics should continue to be monitored closely.

A closer look at the municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva reveal some interesting variations compared to the national situation and to each other. The national percentage of homicides committed with a firearm has ranged between 82.0% and 84.1% over the past 3 years. Homicides in these three municipalities during the same period occurred with a firearm 87.7% to 91.2% of the time, a significantly greater percentage of homicides occurring as a result of being shot. Similarly, these areas report a higher percentage of assaults with injuries resulting from firearms than in the national figures.

Figure 31: Firearms Reported Stolen to the Police, 2008–2012



Perhaps the most impactful finding, however, is in comparing the differences between the municipalities (see Table 22). Guatemala has shown a steady reduction in the percentage of homicides attributed to firearms, dropping from 91.2% in 2010 to 87.7% in 2012. In Mixco and Villa Nueva, the percentage dropped from 2010 to 2011, but then leveled in 2012. Additionally, we see from the assault data that firearms are more frequently used in Mixco compared to Guatemala, and that Villa Nueva has the highest incidence of firearms in assault compared to both. Prevention strategies in all three areas, but especially Mixco and Villa Nueva, should emphasize strategies to reduce gun violence.

Table 22: Percentage of Homicides and Assaults Committed with a Firearm in the Municipalities Studied, 2010–2012

	Guatemala		Mixco		Villa Nueva	
	Homicides	Assaults	Homicides	Assaults	Homicides	Assaults
2010	91.2%	75.5%	90.1%	81.4%	91.0%	85.1%
2011	90.7%	74.7%	87.7%	84.4%	88.8%	86.0%
2012	87.7%	68.9%	87.7%	75.3%	88.9%	74.2%

Source: Center for Inter-institutional Coordination, Ministry of the Interior (CECOIN)

Firearm Seizures


Firearm seizures relate primarily to the level of effectiveness of the institutions responsible for identifying and seizing illegal weapons, including the National Civilian Police, the public prosecutor, and the judiciary. Therefore, a rise in seizures should not necessarily be interpreted as an increase in the circulation of illegal weapons. Any

analysis of these trends must be understood in light of the implementation of new criminal investigation strategies such as the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) and the integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), which allows law enforcement and forensic experts to perform automated fingerprint and ballistic checks.

IBIS is a tool that makes it possible to analyze digital images of the microscopic marks and striations on bullets and shell casings found at a crime scene. This system, which includes microscopes, high-resolution monitors, and special software, costs approximately US\$8 million to implement in Guatemala. The system includes a ballistics database to which samples can be compared in hopes of obtaining a positive match. With this information, law enforcement officials can identify the weapon that fired the bullet. AFIS allows fingerprint evidence to be compared to a national database of known fingerprints to aid in the identification of suspects.

The number of rifles and semi and fully automated long guns is relatively small compared to pistols and revolvers. However, the increased lethality of these firearms makes this number important to consider. The graph shown below includes only seizures reported by the National Civilian Police in 2012. The Uzi, AK-47, AR-15, M-16, Galil, and FAL weapons are especially concerning because of the ability to inflict mass casualties and because of the illicit activities in which many owners of these types of weapons are involved.


Figure 32: Types of Firearms Seized by PNC in 2012



Source: National Civilian Police, 2012.


Handgun seizures are the most common and the 9mm weapon accounts for more than three-fourths (78.4%) of all those seized (see Figure 33).

Figure 33: Handguns Seized by Caliber, 2012



It is also insightful to look at the brands of weapons seized and to better understand which manufacturers produce firearms seized in Guatemala (see Figure 34). This information demonstrates both the variety and primary sources of firearms in the country.

Figure 34: Handguns Seized by Brand Name, 2012




The closest firearm manufacturer to Guatemala is located just across the border in Chiapas, Mexico. Even so, the worldwide diversity of handgun origins found among

seized weapons is somewhat surprising, and no one single manufacturing brand stands out. Perhaps most notable is the fewer number of U.S. brands that were identified.

Firearm seizure data from the National Civilian Police in 2012 demonstrate some of the weaknesses in the how firearm data is tracked. Over half of all cases are not identified as to why the firearm was seized. Some of the seizures involve registered weapons (10.4%) and some involved licensed firearm owners (3.5%). The categories are not mutually exclusive. A licensed user could have an unregistered weapon, for example. See Figure 9.

Figure 35: Firearms Seized by Legal Status, 2012



Source: National Civilian Police, 2012.

Summary and Conclusions

The available data on firearms and ammunition in the country of Guatemala is deficient because of the large number of unregistered weapons. Documentation of legal imports of guns and ammo are more complete. Firearms seized by the police offer an additional piece of information but it is also incomplete and may reflect the efficiency of certain police operations rather than the actual number of legal and illegal weapons in the country. Disaggregating the data to the municipal level is also especially difficult. Even if the data did allow for summaries of sales and seizures by municipality, the movement of guns and gun owners across municipal, departmental, and international borders would further complicate any analysis. Despite these challenges, we do know a lot about guns in Guatemala. Based on information from DIGECAM and some of the data presented here, we know the following:

- 8 out of 10 firearms seized in Guatemala are illegal;
- 9 out of 10 crimes are committed with illegal firearms.
- The most prevalent handgun used to commit crimes is the 9mm.
- The amount of legally imported ammunition is about half of all that actually enters the country.

- The number of illegal weapons far exceeds the number of legal firearms.
- Among those firearms that are legally prohibited from being owned by civilians, the AK-47 is the most frequently used to commit criminal acts.

The range of estimates from other agencies for the number of illegal weapons in Guatemala demonstrates how difficult the number is to pin down. According to DIGECAM, based on import data, only about 15% of firearms circulating in the country are registered, which implies that approximately 2.5 million illegal arms were in the country at the end of 2012. Using firearm seizure data supplied by the National Civilian Police, IEPADES estimates that the ratio of illegal to legal firearms is 3 to 1 which would suggest some 1.5 million illegal weapons in the country. The World Bank used estimates based on the amount of ammunition being imported into the country in 2007 and determined a number of approximately 2 million illegal firearms in Guatemala. These estimates ranging from 1.5 to 2.5 million illegal firearms offer a useful baseline for further studying the issue.

Another issue that stands out, however, is that none of the previously discussed estimates address what other factors might affect increases or decreases in the number of illegal firearms in the country during a certain time period. This is important because the arms market is not static; therefore, the amount of weapons varies depending on certain factors. These could include successful community-based violence prevention programs, the efficiency in arrests by the National Civilian Police, the number of convictions brought by the Prosecutor's Office and the subsequent punishments applied, the successful internal control of weapons and ammunition as a result of DIGECAM and other efforts, shifts in behavior among the organized crime elements active in the country (i.e., "wars" between gangs, conflicts between rival drug cartels, drug market instability), the number of weapons that become obsolete or dysfunctional, and, potentially, other factors.

Additionally, according to the Ministry of the Interior, as of October 2012, 141 private registered security companies were in Guatemala with approximately 45,000 private security guards, and nearly all carry firearms. Recall that there could be as many a twice that many unregistered companies and overall estimates of the number of private security guards could be well over 100,000 (Argueta, 2012). As part of this research, we conducted interviews with several independent gun dealers and they report that private security officers, as well as police officers, members of the armed services, and other legal gun dealers, are the most common sources for buying illegal firearms. Interviews with gun dealers revealed that many legal gun owners also have illegal firearms. According to one respondent, many people who have a legal firearm usually have at least one, and often many, illegal weapons. By legalizing one firearm, gun owners can reduce the suspicions of the police if they are ever investigated. The use of technology, particularly IBIS, has shown that a firearm often is used several times before the authorities seize it.

Based on the data analyzed in this report, it is clear that assault rifles, although more lethal, are likely less important a factor in determining how homicides occur in Guatemala. Small arms, mostly handguns, account for the overwhelming majority of all firearm-related homicides and assaults, which is consistent with findings globally. According to Small Arms Survey, 90% of all gun-related deaths in the world, including wars, homicides, and suicides, occur by handguns (see <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/>).

Given that the number of weapons confiscated by the authorities is minimal in comparison with the number of legal weapons and with the main estimates that have been made, it is reasonable to suppose that the number of arms increases each year by about 5–10%, based on the number of legal firearms sold in recent years.

Taking into account that the IEPADES estimate is based on the relationship between legal and illegal weapons seized by police, it can be assumed the estimate is likely conservative. The estimate provided by DIGECAM is probably more reliable since it takes into account information collected directly by the gun dealers and the shifts in imports of ammunition. Based on the confluence of all of these factors, it seems reasonable to suggest that there are likely between 2 and 3 million illegal weapons in Guatemala, with an approximate 5% annual growth.

According to the Ministry of Defense, the Department of Guatemala had 12,011 registered weapons as of the end of 2012—337 in Villa Nueva (2.8%), 674 in Mixco (5.6%), and 9,669 in the capital city (80.5%). The municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva therefore accounted for 88.9% of registered firearms in the entire department. Accepting the estimates from DIGECAM as reliable would indicate likely more than 100,000 illegal firearms in the Department of Guatemala.

There is no shortage of firearms in Guatemala and it is highly unlikely that firearm or ammunition availability has had any measurable impact on decreasing homicide rates. Similarly, the lethality of firearms available in Guatemala has not likely impacted homicide rates.

Gangs

In general, respondents responded affirmatively to the question about the existence of barrios (sectors or blocks) controlled by gangs. This situation occurs in all three municipalities included in this study. According to a descriptive study done by Castellanos (2013), gang membership and influence continue to increase, with a significant impact on the security of Guatemalan society. Some areas of the capital city of Guatemala or the areas surrounding it are completely under the control of gangs. Situations occur in which private citizens have their property expropriated by gang members, forcing the owners to give up their homes or to allow gang members to reside in their homes free of charge and without any regulation (Castellanos, 2013).

The present study has corroborated these statements, as shown in the following paragraphs that describe what the interviewees identified as the types of control existing in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva. The information reported here is the result of interviews conducted by *Incidencia Democrática* with more than 20 respondents including leaders of COCODEs, COMUDEs, municipal leaders and staff, representatives from the faith community, and other community members. ASIES also conducted interviews with 12 key informants in some of the same roles but also including reporters, advocates working to reduce gang violence, firefighters and first responders, and others. The purpose of the interviews was to learn more about the existence of: (1) alternatively governed spaces - barrios, neighborhoods, sectors or blocks, which are controlled by gangs; (2) mediated resolutions - specific cases in which communities and gangs have agreements or resolutions; and (3) co-optation of civilians – situations in which civilians receive some kind of benefit from local gangs.

Zones Dominated by Street Gangs

According to a report of the organization, Insight Crime, “Gangs [in Guatemala] have survived mainly through local drug trafficking, extortion and robbery,” (Insight Crime, 2013). Indeed, gangs in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva have established a standard *modus operandi*, which is largely based on extortion and includes many homes and businesses that exist in these areas. The extortion model consists of the collection of a so-called “tax” to small businesses, especially in the case of storeowners. These “taxes” are also collected from all the homes in the neighborhood. According to the responses of several of those interviewed, the gangs use young women, predominantly teenagers, to deliver their threats and collect their money. Those who refuse to pay face a penalty of death if they fail to comply with this payment. This practice has a suffocating effect on local economies. Entrepreneurs are wary of starting new businesses, and homeowners worry that making physical improvements to their homes might lead to an increase in their “tax.” Based on interviews collected as part of this study, the amounts collected from residents depends on the characteristics of the building—block and two-story homes pay higher amounts than less expensive homes. According to one expert interviewed, extortion in these communities causes serious psychosocial pressure on victims who live in constant fear under the permanent threat of losing their own lives or that of a loved one.

As mentioned above, we interviewed several key informants who hold, or previously held government positions and they agreed to participate only on conditions of anonymity. In the municipality of Guatemala, these officials have experience in the planning and implementation of municipal policies, including the expansion of public services such as water and sewer, and they are aware of the relationships with local community councils. According to these city officials, Zone 18, located in the capital city area, has at least three communities—Limón, Asunción, and Colonia Maya—that are considered to be under almost total control of gang members. Most are associated with the gang “Calle

18.” Other communities such as the Roosevelt and Carabanchel in Zone 11 are similarly under widespread gang control, as well as Bethania in Zone 7.

In Mixco, gangs dominate in El Milagro in Zone 6; Carolingia; parts of the community known as the 1st of July (1° de Julio); Ciudad Quetzal, which borders the municipality of San Juan Sacatepéquez; San Ignacio; Lo de Fuentes; and Comunidad.

In Mixco, the gang situation appears more stable than in the other two municipalities because of a recent military detachment assigned to the area. There has also been a well-established police substation in Mixco for the last decade. The respondents explain that the grip the gangs have on the community is most commonly expressed through the extortion demands.

Despite the task forces and other efforts of law enforcement, the residents in all three municipalities continue to pay the gangs who threaten them with violence. According to the newspaper, *Plaza Pública*, in El Mezquital in Zone 12 in the capital city, members of the Barrio 18 gang extort money from “private residents, businesses, taxis, even the old ladies who sell out of their baskets on the streets,” (Baires, 2013). The gangs also enforce a strict code of silence and many neighbors are afraid to make complaints. According to respondents, neighbors claim that the soldiers and police set up “and just sit and wait as if they were looking for something or somebody” and they rarely make any arrests. Many neighbors do believe that these security outposts do generate a perception of greater security. Even so, the cumulative effects of these ongoing threats have a pervasive impact on the community. One researcher writes, “...extortion, an act which has a deep impact on the human psyche and undermines the heritage of the people, generally affects the poorest people, those already deeply impacted by economic exclusion and a lack of opportunities, and is a severe social scourge,” (Aguilar, 2010).

Several interviewees described similar accounts of how the gangs tend to operate their extortion schemes targeted toward business. Various strategies are employed. Sometimes gang members will arrange for a cell phone to be left at a local business, and later, the gang members will call and voice their demands. Another common approach is to send a woman, usually a family member or girlfriend, to deliver the threat in person to the target. Sometimes, the gang forces business owners to abandon their businesses, usually accomplished by demanding huge payoffs; in one documented case the owner was required to pay US\$5,000 or be killed. Eventually, the owner abandoned the business and the gang assigned a female family member to “take over.” Mothers, aunts, sisters, and girlfriends of gang members are often assigned to participate in the “legitimate” business activities of the gangs in these areas. In another example, researchers working in an area with a high concentration of gang members were forced to obtain approval from gang members in order to conduct community surveys. According to Aguilar (2010), for every extortion activity carried out by gang members, there are at least four beneficiaries of the crime.

Gang recruitment is another ongoing activity; teenagers, both males and females, are under a continuous threat as gang members work to draw them into the gang. One recent event occurred in Zone 5 in Guatemala in the neighborhood known as La Limonada where gang members killed a 15-year-old boy. The boy had been assigned to pick up money from a local business being extorted by the gang. After he retrieved the money, the boy took his mother and brother out to eat at a restaurant and used some of the money. A copy of the restaurant receipt was attached to his blood-soaked body. Gang leaders likely ordered this murder to send a message to the community, but also as a message to gang members as well. According to one researcher, many gang members, even assassins, wish to leave the gang, but they cannot because the gang members learn about each member's weaknesses and use threats against their families to prevent members from leaving (*Animal Político*, 2012).

Besides extortion, gangs in these areas are also heavily involved in drug distribution, primarily powder and rock cocaine and marijuana. Sometimes the gangs will use local businesses and residents as storage sites for their drugs. Additionally, many local gangs have ties to organized crime and higher-level drug distributors who supply their drugs. A considerable amount of the drugs handled by the gangs is eventually used by gang members.

Mapping Gang Activity and Homicides in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nuevo

Using data provided by Directorate of Strategic Planning and Institutional Development of the National Civilian Police (*Jefatura de Planificación Estratégica y Desarrollo Institucional de la PNC, JEPEDI*), appendices 3-5 include cumulative crime maps of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nuevo by zone beginning in 2008 and continuing through March of 2013.


A comparison of the homicide data in the municipality of Guatemala between 2008 and 2012 shows a sustained decrease in homicides, especially in colonias in Zones 6, 18, and 21. Similarly, in Trébol, where many of the most important transportation arteries in Guatemala City converge (i.e., Calzada Roosevelt, Avenida Bolívar, Boulevard Liberación and Calzada Raúl Aguilar Batres), and in Zone 4, where one of the main city markets is located, there has also been a slight decrease in incidents of homicide. In Zone 11, the number of homicide cases was less in 2012 but the overall rate has not shifted significantly since 2009.

In the municipality of Mixco, reductions in homicides have occurred in Colonia Carolingia (Zone 6) and Colonia 1° de Julio (Zone 5). It is interesting to note that the reduction in homicide rates have not necessarily coincided with those areas with higher levels of gang activity. Many of the respondents interviewed for this study mentioned that Colonia Carolingia is almost entirely under the control of local street gangs. The decrease in homicides in the downtown historic area and the urban center of the municipality (Zone 1), as well as along the main boulevard of Ciudad San Cristobal (Zone 8), are not matched by decreases in property crimes.

In the case of Villa Nueva, the wide variation and fluctuations in the homicide rates between 2009 and 2012 mentioned above are clearly visible in the crime maps. Homicides increased in 2011 in Mezquital, Villa Sol and in other areas in Zone 12 as well as in La Selva, the Aldea Bárcenas (Zone 3) and in Downtown Central District (Zone 1). These same areas showed decreases in 2010 and in 2012 and thus, the explanations of these variations are particularly challenging.

Figure 36 is a map built with information provided by CECOIN based on data from the National Civilian Police. The map shows hotspots for homicide and includes an overlay of data representing known gang cliques of the adversarial street gangs MS-13 and Barrio 18.

Figure 36: Homicide Density Analysis in Relation to Known Gang Cliques, 2012



Organized Crime

Areas Dominated by Drug Dealers

As previously mentioned, local gangs do have connections to larger drug operations, including national and international drug cartels. These drug dealers move their products quite often through the municipalities included in this study. One of the recurring issues noted by the respondents was the use of privately owned spaces to store drugs during transport. Drug traffickers exploit local residents and their businesses by forcing them to provide hiding places for their drugs in transit. Sometimes, local street gangs facilitate these practices, but not always. The social processes invoked by the drug traffickers have led to the “favelization” of some communities. A “*favela*” is a Brazilian Portuguese word that refers to a shanty town or slum. The process of favelization refers to a situation where drug cartels slowly replace the legitimate state government. The drug lords, “... assume control of the area, create parallel economies, make important decisions, and they offer ‘security’ in exchange for avoiding conflicts and new allegations,” (Security Forum, 2013).

Many of the areas in the municipalities studied have Neighborhood Committees that are used as outreach mechanisms for the municipal administration. However, according to some of the interviews, drug cartels also reach out to these same committees and share their priorities for the communities. One of the committee objectives is to communicate which areas are under the control of the drug traffickers. Thus, the institutional structure set up by the municipality is co-opted by the drug interests and used for their own goals to communicate directly to the residents. Messages from the cartel leaders are also passed along to municipal authorities.

Caught in the middle, residents choose the security that the cartels can provide. The cartel offers protection from extortion and other crimes committed by the street gangs. In exchange, local residents cooperate with, or at least do not disrupt, the business interests of the cartels. El Amparo in Zone 7 in Guatemala City is one such community. Municipal officials interviewed for this study are aware that neighborhood committees are forced to negotiate and serve as a communication mechanism for gang and cartel leaders. It is not uncommon, for example, for the drug leaders to be intimately involved in appointing members to serve on local committees and boards of directors for such things as the Water Authority and local markets.

In Mixco, some areas in the neighborhood known as the 1st of July are under the direct control of local gangs and drug traffickers. One evidence of this control is the lack of reported crimes in the area despite the fact that significant drug distribution is known to occur there. Another phenomenon that was observed in Mixco is that known groups of thieves organize to steal cell phones; however, they only steal in areas outside of their neighborhoods. These gangs get along very well with their neighbors and were even referred to as “very respectful” of their elders. A number of interviews carried out in this

study supported the fact that some gang members would not commit crimes in the communities where they live.

The issue of using local homes and businesses for temporary storage sites for drugs has already been mentioned, but it was a recurring theme. In some cases, especially in Santa Faz in Zone 18 of the capital and in the municipality of Villanueva, several of those interviewed referred to an event known as an "internal migration." Sometimes drug traffickers will "ask" residents to temporarily move out of their homes so that the homes can be used to store large quantities of cocaine bound for the United States. These forced internal migrations were mentioned frequently by members of organizations that work directly with impoverished populations in the three selected municipalities.

Some public officials who offered input under conditions of anonymity confirmed these accounts. They also reported that there was an understanding of mutual coexistence between these cartel leaders and some agents within the National Civilian Police, especially in Villa Nueva and Mixco, where the drug storage schemes are more common. One of the major findings of this study resulting from the interviews is that respondents perceive that the areas dominated by the drug traffickers offer better living conditions for residents. The cartels offer protection from local gangs and improved personal security safety and protection for their property. Through their relations with drug traffickers, some residents have been able to develop small and medium-sized businesses and even generate a more harmonious family environment. The attitudes toward drug traffickers and local gang members are vastly different.

Areas Dominated by Vigilante Groups

Vigilante groups also deserve mention. In Ciudad Peronia in the municipality of Villa Nueva and in Ciudad Quetzal located near Mixco in the municipality of San Juan Sacatepéquez, there are illegal groups of vigilantes, known locally as "Guardians of the Neighborhood." These hooded vigilantes patrol their neighborhoods at night and display their motto, which is to "keep the community free of criminals." In Ciudad Peronia, such a group (the Guardians) has been in existence for about 25 years, and they patrol a perimeter that extends for six blocks around their territory. A number of homicides have been attributed to the Guardians over the past decade, and their existence poses a unique challenge for law enforcement officials. A recent study done by University of Rafael Landivar found a direct link between the local vigilante groups and organized crime activities. At least 300 of these types of vigilante groups, with varying degrees of organization, exist in Guatemala, and many have ties to organized crime activities (Martínez Turcios, 2012).

Summary and Conclusions

Organized crime elements, including both gangs and drug cartels, have a tight hold on many areas of the three municipalities included in this study. This control parallels and in some cases supersedes the institutional control of local authorities and law enforcement

efforts. Despite intervention and prevention efforts by the Guatemalan government and others, there has been little or no noticeable improvement in reducing the strength of the gangs or the influence of the drug cartels in these areas. The decrease in homicide rates has occurred without significantly affecting organized crime patterns.

This research has identified the existence of at least three different types of organized crime elements within the areas studied during the past ten years: street gangs, drug cartels, and vigilante groups including the “Guardians of the Neighborhood.” All three groups have been implicated in homicides in these municipalities.

The areas under the control of gangs experience noticeable hardships stemming from the persistence of extortion. The quality of life in these areas is worsening and everyday life is increasingly precarious. Economic activities and entrepreneurship are declining steadily. Extortion persists despite the presence of police and military units.

In the areas under the heavy influence of drug dealers, cartel leaders use the institutional authority of the municipality, through such mechanisms as the auxiliary mayors and Neighborhood Committees, to reinforce their control which sends a strong message to the residents that they should not meddle in their criminal activities. One of the strategies used by the cartels (and gangs) is to offer the complicit community residents a guarantee of security, by protecting them from extortion demands, robberies, and home burglaries of local street gangs in return for their silence – a benefit that many neighbors embrace. There is also some evidence to suggest that the cartels can help sponsor economic success of some community residents by influencing public and private contracts and favorably leveraging hiring practices to favor those who do not cause problems for these organized criminals.

There have been examples of mediated resolutions between communities and organized crime elements. In most cases, the mediation occurs through a local pastor, priest, or other religious leader and not through an NGO or government agency. Unfortunately, the mediation efforts are not balanced and frequently the communities are forced to accept whatever terms the criminals offer.

Drug Markets

An unpublished study done by Cuevas and Demombynes (2009) used an econometric approach to study violent crime and drugs in Central America. Looking at drug seizure data, they identified drug-trafficking hotspots. An area was considered “hot” if more than 100 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana was seized per 100,000 in the population. In Guatemala, data were considered at the department level. That model also considered demographic factors, including the number of female-headed households and the proportion of younger-aged adults. The level of past armed conflict within each country was considered but found to be statistically irrelevant to current violent crime.


The study found that drug trafficking is an especially important factor affecting homicide rates. Controlling for years of education, income per capita, inequality indexes,

employment statistics, and urban population, the study showed that drug-trafficking hotspots have homicide rates more than double those in areas of low trafficking intensity. Areas with a larger percentage of young men between the ages of 15 and 34 have higher homicide rates as do areas with higher proportions of female-headed households. The study's main conclusion—that drug trafficking is far more important than the other factors considered—is useful for this study.

A map of cocaine and marijuana seizures within Guatemala shows that the department of Guatemala was a major hotspot for drug trafficking in 2009. The municipalities of Guatemala, Villa Nueva, and Mixco, while unable to be separated from the aggregate department-level data, comprise a major portion of the total area and population of the department. Based on interview data, there is significant evidence to support the fact that all three municipalities experience high levels of drug trafficking.

Drug seizure rates are not the best way to measure drug trafficking activity because seizure rates also are a reflection of the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement. Unfortunately, no agency systematically collects drug prevalence and use rates in Guatemala, and no other market variables are available either. While Cuevas and Demombynes (2009) provide convincing support for the importance of drug trafficking hotspots on homicide based on drug seizures, few other sources of data are available on the relationship between drugs and crime that can further inform this analysis. See Figure 37.

Figure 37: Total Cocaine and Cannabis Seizures in Guatemala, 2009



Source: Cuevas and Demombynes (2009)

Drug Use

The Executive Secretary of the Commission against Addiction and Drug Trafficking (*Secretaría Ejecutiva De La Comisión Contra Las Adicciones Y El Tráfico Ilícito De Drogas* - SECCATID) under the Office of the Vice President does operate a National Drug Observatory to consolidate research reports related to drugs, drug addiction, and drug treatment. Although there is clear evidence that substance abuse issues are present throughout Guatemala, there are no data sources for information on drug use or drug prevalence.

The Criminal Justice System Domain: Response to Homicide and Violence

Police Presence in the Community

The Guatemalan National Civilian Police are the most visible actors in crime prevention activities in the country. They not only enforce law and promote order; they also help to build legitimacy for the government. In Guatemala however, the police are also the most often criticized for corruption and in general, citizens do not trust that the police are doing enough to improve community security. People's perceptions of police involvement in criminal activities can be a good way to measure police misconduct as it not only picks up perceptions of criminal activities perpetrated by police officers but, as Chevigny (2003) argues, it can also reflect the degree of corruption and abuse that people face from their local police.


According to national data from the 2008, 2010 and 2012 LAPOP surveys, over half of citizens surveyed at random report having little or no trust in the police. Perhaps most importantly, these attitudes have not shifted significantly since 2008, the year before the decline in homicide rates began [$t(2,958)=-0.746, p>.05$]. However, the percentage of citizens who reported that an officer of the PNC had solicited a bribe directly from them in the past year has increased during each two-year cycle from 11.5% in 2008, 14.1% in 2010, and 18.0% in 2012. These data show that Guatemalan citizens' mistrust of the police is relatively high and has not changed and that corruption, as evidenced by experiences of bribery, during the same period is increasing. Moreover, experiences of bribery are not the only, or even the most important, factor affecting whether citizens have trust in the police. Based on interviews conducted by our research team with key respondents, citizens want to see the police working in the community arresting known criminals. The perception is that the police are not consistent in their approaches to dealing with criminals.

The Guatemalan National Civilian Police has made considerable progress towards improving hiring and training standards. The Director of the National Civilian Police has publicly criticized agency corruption and reinforced standards of ethical behavior. Top

administrators are participating in on-going professional development and many are embracing the principles of community policing which emphasize: citizen participation, interagency collaboration, crime prevention units in smaller geographical areas, and a proactive and preventative approach to crime based on quality crime data analysis.

When asked about recent homicide cases in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva, the PNC Director could talk about details of each case. Technological advancements, especially since the 2009 and the launching of the CECOIN, has changed the way the PNC allocates resources and assigns personnel. Figure 38 shows the allocation of PNC officers by municipality in 2013. The personnel assignments closely mirror the highest crime areas.

Figure 38: Assignment of PNC Officers by Municipality, 2013



While there continue to be organizational challenges, the PNC is steadily improving, especially in the Guatemala City Metropolitan Area. The gains made by the PNC have been further strengthened by the creation of Municipal Police. For example, in the previously mentioned *Transmetro* system in the municipality of Guatemala, Municipal Police provide security at the stops and sometimes ride the buses.

Additionally, the Guatemalan military has provided support to PNC security efforts in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva. In Mixco, two military detachments have been permanently assigned as part of the municipal *Mixco Seguro* initiative. In the municipality of Guatemala, military soldiers are assigned to various posts around the city on a somewhat random and sporadic pattern. President Pérez Molina, himself a former military leader, implemented Police/Military task forces after he took office in early 2012. The task forces include representatives from the National Civilian Police (PNC), the Public Ministry (MP), and the army of Guatemala. The Kaminal Task Force is currently active and focuses on Zone 7 in Guatemala and in El Mezquital, as well as Zone 12, and all of Villa Nueva. According to respondents interviewed for this report, these efforts to increase the visible presence of law enforcement and consolidate prevention efforts have not had a significant impact on criminal activities in these concentrated gang areas. More research is needed to determine whether the perceptions of residents are borne out in actual arrest and victimization data.

Interagency Collaboration

A national plan to promote interagency collaboration is already in place as a result of the 2008 National Security System Act (Legislative Decree 18-2008) to create a National Security Council CNS. This Council²¹ was designed to be led by the Guatemalan President and coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior with support from the Technical Secretary, a position that was envisioned under the Law.

The Center for Inter-institutional Coordination (CECOIN), under the Ministry of the Interior, has been in charge of bringing together all of the national institutions related to security since 2009. This includes the Secretary of Strategic Analysis, the General Administration for Civil Intelligence, the National Civilian Police, the National Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Public Ministry, which is responsible for the prosecution and investigation of all crimes in the country. As part of this charge, CECOIN has worked to prevent violence and crime through the Secure Neighborhoods Program and the Open Schools Program as well as the Crime Prevention Unit of the Vice Ministry for Community Support. These programs emphasize interventions with high-risk populations and promote alternative education programming as well as recreation and art activities for youth.

²¹ This Council, also known as the Peace, Security and Justice Cabinet, would be chaired by the Guatemalan President with participation from the Vice President and the Minister of Foreign Relations, the Minister of the Interior, and the Secretary of Strategic Intelligence. The National Security Council would include a Technical Secretary, a Commission for Assessment and Planning, an Institute for Strategic Studies, and an Inspector General for Security.

This shift in emphasis coincides with the declining homicides rates observed since 2009. Although it is not possible to say with statistical certainty that this policy shift toward improved inter-agency cooperation is responsible for the decline in homicide rates (correlation does not establish causality), it is noteworthy to consider the following situations that may have limited the potential success of the 2008 National Security System Act:

- The National Security Council does not yet function as it was planned and there have been delays in setting up the Peace, Security and Justice Cabinet.
- The Technical Secretary, who was supposed to support the coordination of the Cabinet, has not been established.
- The Crime Prevention Unit under the Vice-Ministry for Community Support was practically dismantled in early 2012 after many of the staff lost their jobs or were reassigned to other jobs within the Ministry of the Interior.
- The Secure Neighborhoods Program and the Open Schools Program were canceled in 2012.

New Legislation and Criminal Justice System Reform

Besides corruption and allegations of corruption, the modern Guatemalan criminal justice system has experienced a number of other challenges stemming from the lack of resources, inconsistent political will, inadequate laws and procedures, and general instability. Few realize, for example, that the Public Ministry had fewer than 50 prosecutors nationwide just 20 years ago (see Figure 39). Today, there are approximately 1,800. In addition, 20 years ago, there was essentially no public defender system. There were perhaps a dozen public defenders who were housed within the Judiciary (OJ). Before the Peace Accords, the entire criminal justice system was characterized as chaotic, based on interviewer feedback.


Beginning in 1996, the next decade was defined by the activities of the United Nations Mission in Guatemala (*Misión de Naciones Unidas de Guatemala – MINUGUA*). The implementation of the Peace Accords and the criminal justice system in Guatemala underwent a complete overhaul as the Public Ministry, the public defenders, and especially the current model of the National Civilian Police emerged. These “first generation” reforms were rooted in national legislation. There was considerable instability and irrational fluctuations during this time. During the last four presidencies, for example, there were 12 different Ministers of the Interior. Even so, the basic institutional structures of the modern criminal justice system were in place by the mid-2000s.

The “second generation” reforms built on the promises of the first and began to emphasize more transparent adversarial criminal procedures (Serrano-Berthet & Lopez, 2011). Since about 2006, the criminal justice system in Guatemala has been focusing on fine-tuning processes and procedures. The political will to confront the daunting

challenges of violent crime and homicide has evolved slowly. Interviews with prosecutors and law enforcement command staff demonstrate a consistent belief that their agencies are improving and that the “old guard” is passing. Skeptics continue to point out incidents of corruption and indeed, concerns continue, but more accountability seems to be apparent, as seen in the recent conviction and sentencing of former President Rios Montt.²²

Second generation criminal justice system reforms have also been fostered by a variety of programs supported by the United States Agency for International Development. These have strengthened rule of law and improved the delivery of justice. In 2006, USAID proposed the implementation of the first 24-hour court, a new model that broke away from the traditional court structure. Through this model, judges were available 24 hours a day to comply with the Constitutional mandate of presenting a detainee to a judge 6 hours after an arrest. Before these shifts in policy, detainees were often held in prisons for more than 3 days and, when judges eventually heard detainees, many cases were dismissed due to lack of merit. Prior to 2006, over three-fourths (77.3%) of criminal cases were dismissed for lack of merit in Guatemala City. In 2012, only 11.9% of criminal cases were dismissed for a lack of merit. Furthermore, as a result of the 24-hour court, the number of arbitrary arrests by police was reduced and there was an overall improvement in coordination and communication among all parties involved in the criminal process. Based on the success of the model, 24-hour courts were replicated in Villa Nueva, Mixco, Escuintla, and Sacatepéquez.

Figure 39: Milestones in USAID Assistance



²² Guatemala's top court has since thrown out the conviction for genocide and crimes against humanity and the prosecution is now regrouping.

Another key milestone to USAID assistance has been the support provided for the design and implementation of the high impact courts (HIC). USAID provided assistance in drafting the law which allows high impact court jurisdiction. HIC were implemented in 2009 to try cases that could not be held locally due to security risks. They were established to provide a secure environment for judges, prosecutors, lawyers, witnesses, forensic experts, victims, defendants and evidence preservation. HIC focus on combating serious crimes: organized crime, kidnappings, narcotics and trafficking in persons. Between 2009 and 2012, the High Impact Courts were assigned 174 cases including transitional justice cases such as the Dos Erres massacre case and the Rios Montt trial. Most of their caseload includes drug trafficking and organized crime, especially involving Zetas. USAID has supported remodeling to include hearing rooms and all security measures required for this type of court, including video-conferencing capabilities. USAID provides ongoing training to judges as well as monitoring and evaluating case management processes to ensure efficiency. Activities such as these have reduced impunity and reinforced the quality of rule of law in Guatemala.

Confidence in the integrity of individual actors, like Claudia Paz y Paz, is undergirding these changes. Paz y Paz was appointed to the position of National Attorney General in December 2011. As Chief Prosecutor, she has taken an especially tough stance on inefficiency in her office and promoted interagency collaboration; and the Public Ministry has participated in several task forces targeting violent criminals. Working with the PNC, INACIF and others, the Attorney General's office participated in the arrest and prosecution of several criminal investigations using ballistics from ten different crime scenes linked to the same weapon (*Diario de Centroamérica*, 2012). In another example, the Public Ministry participated in a task force that focused on a network of cell phone calls between criminals to make several arrests and successful prosecutions.

Analysis of Selected Key Events

As we began to consider some of the potential factors that may have impacted homicide rates, we decided to pursue a time series analysis to isolate the effects of specific events on shifts in homicide rates in Guatemala, Mixco and Villa Nueva. We used STATA 10 statistical software to examine trends in homicide over time by municipality using the homicide rate per 100,000 by month. We used the Prais-Winsten regression estimator to assess changes in homicide outcome during a time period associated with the implementation of a law, policy, or other event. We analyzed five different events to test their effects on the homicide rate: the 2008 Femicide Law, the 2008 National Security System Law, the 2009 Firearm Law, the 2010 Municipal Police Law, and the appointment of Claudia Paz y Paz in December 2010 to the position of Attorney General. The Prais-Winsten estimator was chosen because it accounts for potential autocorrelation in the regression errors.

In the municipality of Guatemala (Figure 1), the Prais-Winsten estimates of the coefficients associated with the Municipal Police Law and the appointment of Claudia

Paz y Paz were highly significant. The Municipal Police Law was associated with a 2 percentage-points reduction in the homicide rate, and Claudia Paz y Paz was associated with a 3 percentage-points reduction in the homicide rate. In Mixco, the Prais-Winsten estimates of the coefficients associated with the Firearm Law, the Municipal Police Law, and Claudia Paz y Paz were highly significant. The Firearm Law was associated with a 1.9 percentage-points reduction in the homicide rate, the Municipal Police Law was associated with a 1.9 percentage-points reduction in the homicide rate, and Claudia Paz y Paz was associated with a 2 percentage points reduction in the homicide rate. In Villa Nueva, the Prais-Winsten estimates were not significant.

Table 23: Prais-Winsten Estimates for Recent Events and the Effects on Monthly Homicide Rates

	Guatemala		Mixco		Villa Nueva	
	Unadjusted beta (SE)	Durbin-Watson	Unadjusted beta (SE)	Durbin-Watson	Unadjusted beta (SE)	Durbin-Watson
Femicide Law	.012 (.015)	2.5	-.019 (.014)	2.2	-.001 (.01)	1.9
National Security System	.012 (.015)	2.5	-.019 (.014)	2.2	-.001 (.006)	1.9
Firearm Law	-.012 (.01)	2.5	-.019* (.007)	2.1	-.003 (.003)	1.9
Municipal Police Law	-.02** (.01)	2.3	-.019** (.01)	2.03	-.003 (.003)	1.9
Claudia Paz y Paz	-.03*** (.005)	2.1	-.02*** (.01)	2.04	-.002 (.003)	1.9

*p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001

Administratively, criminal justice agencies are facing more and more scrutiny regarding impunity and corruption. The National Civilian Police is working to raise standards and improve on-the-job training opportunities for command staff. Conversations with several members of the top command staff within the National Civilian Police demonstrate a widespread commitment to improving the agency and to addressing corruption. Both agencies are dedicating human and financial resources to tackle the problems. The power of political will to direct reform is at the core of lasting changes.

International efforts to build an improved criminal justice system began after the Peace Accords and continue today. The Technical Office for Cooperation (OTC) of the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation for Development (AECID) is responsible for implementing programs and development projects funded by the Government of Spain in Guatemala. From 2005 to 2009, the Government of Spain provided financial and technical assistance to Guatemala to address three main areas: governance, sustainable economic development, and social cohesions. The Governance Project focused primarily on transparency and the reduction of corruption but also more generally on overall improvements in the criminal justice system. The project had four main objectives:


- Improve forensic capacity and technical capacity to conduct criminal investigations of violent crimes, especially gender-based violence.
- Promote improved inter-institutional coordination.
- Improve the professional quality of human resources in the court system.
- Strengthen the key agencies within the criminal justice system, including the prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and law enforcement.

By most accounts, the project led by the Spaniards was very successful, and they achieved several important accomplishments that may have had a direct impact on the decline in homicide rates since 2009. As part of this effort, the criminal investigational capacity of both the prosecutors and the National Civilian Police was improved through training and technical assistance, and a new model for investigations was implemented, including the creation of a new subdivision within the National Civilian Police to investigate homicides.

There was also a concerted effort to improve access to information within the Public Ministry to aid in prosecution efforts. The Spaniards implemented the new Information System for Cases in the Public Ministry (SICOMP). This database system simplified the tracking of defendants through the system, aided in scheduling, and generally improved prosecutors' ability to manage their cases.

The emphasis on system efficiency has led to a number of shifts in procedures among prosecutors. One of these important developments has been streamlining cases and expediting prosecution to reduce the amount of case-processing time. This program has had a noticeable impact, and the number of expedited cases nearly doubled from 30.7% in 2007 to 59.2% in 2011. See Figure 40.

Figure 40: Expedited Prosecution and Homicide Rates, 2007–2011



*Prosecution data are shown only through November 2011.
Source: Public Ministry

Emerging Police Technology

Technology in Policing

There are concerted efforts by top administrators to improve the level of professionalism and technical capacity of the command staff. For example, since 2012, most of the top police commanders have been taking part in a 10-month training curriculum on police management and administration, strategic planning, national security and regional security community policing, managing human resources, strategies for coordination with other agencies, and crime prevention. The courses are taught by the Universidad del Occidente as part of the newly inaugurated Police School for Higher Learning (*Escuela de Estudios Superiores de la Policía*). The School is exclusively aimed at the scientific and technical professionalization of the police and includes required training that will strengthen the criminal investigations and internal security.


The National Civilian Police (PNC) of Guatemala is embracing the use of technology, and there are several examples. In regard to crime reporting, the PNC has an improved 24-hour 110 dispatch center. Citizens who would like to report a crime or emergency in Guatemala dial 110. They also have the anonymous crime hotline number 1561 as part of the “Tell Waldemar” program that emphasizes organized crime activity and the 1577 line that is their anti-narcotics hotline. Individual officers are equipped with bulletproof vest and top-of-the-line equipment. Command staff have iPads to assist in their work. In the

communities, cameras are sometimes used for monitoring some areas of concern in Guatemala and Villa Nueva.

Criminalistics and Forensics

There is little doubt that the use of advanced technology in criminalistics and forensics has improved progressively over the last several years in Guatemala. The National Institute of Forensic Sciences (*Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses – INACIF*) is the agency that receives most criminal evidence and conducts most forensic investigations in the country. They also perform autopsies and do noncriminal investigations. Since 2008, the demand for certain types of forensic investigations has dramatically increased. A public statement released by INACIF in June 2013 reported that over 1,300 firearms had now been entered into their ballistics database and many of these have been used in the commission of multiple crimes. One weapon has been implicated in at least 38 suspected homicide cases (*Siglo 21*, 6/17/2013). Figure 41 shows the number of ballistics investigations requested as part of criminal cases.

Figure 41: Ballistic Analysis Requests Received by INACIF, 2008–2012



Ballistics analyses in Guatemala are not new, but the increased willingness of criminal investigators to gather evidence suitable for analysis and the increased number of ballistics analyses requested demonstrate an important shift in recent years. Increasingly, prosecutors and police are reinforcing the use of technology for criminal investigations. In 2008, INACIF did not receive any requests to conduct shot trajectory analyses. Interviews with crime lab scientists revealed that new types of evidence submitted to the lab often lead to the expansion of services that are available. Since 2009, the number of shot trajectory lab requests has increased more than fivefold (see Figure 42).

Some of the other lab analyses requested in recent years that did not exist in 2008 include linguistic and voice recognition analysis as well as highly specialized clinical lab tests. In addition, forensic professionals are being asked more frequently to prepare expert reports and to appear in court to offer testimony. Perhaps one of the most dramatic areas of increase has been in the number of requests to do DNA analyses (see Figure 43).

Lab analyses related to vehicle identification have also shown marked increases since 2008 (see Figure 44). Fingerprint analysis requests have also increased steadily but not as much as some of the other lab requests. Not all lab request types have increased. For example, other biological and trace analysis requests have fluctuated from year to year (see Table 24).

Figure 42: Shot Trajectory Analysis Requests Received by INACIF, 2008–2012




Figure 43: Shot Trajectory Analysis Requests Received by INACIF, 2008–2012




Figure 44: Vehicle Identification Requests Received by INACIF, 2008–2012





Table 24: Requests for Criminal Forensic and Lab Analysis Received by INACIF, 2008–2012

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Ballistics	11,436	14,614	16,037	17,964	19,124
Toxicology	8,749	11,638	12,685	13,134	12,625
Vehicle Analysis	6,705	8,949	9,299	9,743	9,663
Biological/Trace	5,025	8,719	5,364	6,778	6,985
Controlled Substances	2,061	1,788	2,029	1,809	2,870
Document Analysis	1,951	2,234	2,644	2,727	3,189
Fingerprint/Dactyloscopy	1,554	1,582	1,665	1,718	2,359
Physicochemical	1,116	2,096	1,602	1,116	1,065
DNA	149	418	1,590	2,392	3,817
Gun Shot Trajectory	0	78	460	500	459
Expert Technical Reports	0	30	117	60	3
Linguistics	0	0	9	29	52
Clinical Lab	0	0	0	2,338	511
Total Criminalistics Requests	38,746	52,146	53,501	59,646	62,722

Improvements in interagency cooperation are dependent upon high-quality forensic services. A backlog in forensic requests could negate some of the recent improvements identified in case processing and successful prosecutions. Because of the dramatic increase for criminal investigation forensic requests, INACIF is facing a serious budgetary crisis. INACIF cannot continue to handle all of the requests unless operating funds are increased to cover additional salaries, equipment, supplies, and storage and work space.

Figure 45: Municipal Homicides and Criminal Investigation Autopsies



A backlog in forensic requests could negate some of the recent improvements identified in case processing and successful prosecutions. As a result of the dramatic increase for criminal investigation forensic requests, INACIF is facing a serious budgetary crisis. INACIF cannot continue to handle all of the requests unless operating funds are increased to cover additional salaries, equipment, supplies, and storage and work space.

Punishment Severity and Incapacitation

As mentioned in section 6.3, a variety of criminal justice reforms in recent years has likely had an impact on lowering homicide rates. One of these is the improved efficiency in processing criminal court cases. Although correlation does not equal causation, in 2009 the number of expedited prosecution cases surpassed the number being tried normally. Simultaneously, the homicide rates also began to decline. According to prosecutors, the number of cases successfully prosecuted have also increased dramatically, and more criminals than ever are being convicted and sentenced to prison. Prosecutors can now resolve their caseloads more quickly and the court system is operating more efficiently. The more efficient processes have not compromised the delivery of justice.

The prison population in Guatemala is particularly young. It is possible that the present reduction in violent crime rates in Guatemala could be due more to incapacitation than to deterrence. Increases in the incarceration of large numbers of young, crime prone males are associated with decreases in violence and homicide. A 2012 randomized prison study found that the median age of incarcerated men in Guatemala is 31.0 years old with an interquartile range between 25 and 38. One-quarter of the population is under 25 years old and 75% are 38 years old or younger (Alvarez Rodríguez et al., 2013).

The number of people incarcerated in Guatemala has been steadily increasing over the last two decades while the overall incarceration rate remains low compared to the rest of Central America and most of the world. In fact, Guatemala has the lowest incarceration rate in Central America (see Table 25).

Table 25: Selected National Incarceration Rates²³


Select Countries	Incarceration rate per 100K
United States	716
Belize	476
El Salvador	425
Panama	401
Costa Rica	314
Mexico	209
Honduras	159
Nicaragua	122
Guatemala	87

Source: International Centre for Prison Studies, <http://www.prisonstudies.org>

Figure 46 compares the homicide rate to the number of persons incarcerated by year in Guatemala. Although there are several years of missing data, the trend between 2010 and 2013 clearly shows a sharp increase in the number of people incarcerated. Compare the decrease in homicide rates since 2009 and the increase in the number of people incarcerated since 2010, and a clear negative correlation is apparent. As the number of people incarcerated increases, homicide rates decrease. Again, correlation does not imply causation, but this trend is noteworthy. Moreover, it is interesting to note that 2007 marked the fewest number of people incarcerated in recent history while simultaneously, the homicide rate was increasing steadily.

²³ These data reflect the most recent incarceration rates available: United States (2011), Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua (2012), all others (2013).

Figure 46: Homicide Rate and the Number of Persons Incarcerated in Guatemala, 2001–2013*



*Several years of data are missing.

Source: ICCPG and International Centre for Prison Studies

There are a total of 22 prison facilities in Guatemala. Men make up the vast majority of prisoners although the percentage of females incarcerated is steadily increasing. In 2011, 7.3% of all prisoners were women and in 2012, this percentage had increased to 8.0%.

It is important to note that many people in prison in Guatemala are not yet sentenced. In fact, in 2012, the ICCPG reported that 48.3% of all prison inmates in Guatemalan prisons were awaiting trial (Samayoa, 2013).

Conclusions and Future Directions

Developing a homicide-prevention strategy can be intimidating and overwhelming for some participating stakeholders. Viewed from a very narrow context and considering the act of homicide itself, it is practically impossible to develop a strategy to prevent a willing perpetrator from killing an available victim. However, if we focus on the conditions that lead to a murder, breaking them down into manageable parts, it is possible to devise a strategy of how stakeholders may be able influence or eliminate one or more of those contributing conditions.

This report has taken a comprehensive look at homicide rates in three Guatemalan municipalities: Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva. Mixco and Guatemala have demonstrated consistent declines in their homicide rates since 2009 whereas Villa Nueva’s trend has been less clear. This study has considered a variety of factors in three domains based on criminological theory and observations from the field. We considered

factors in the Macro, Micro, and the Criminal Justice System Response domains. The data to support this research has come from a variety of sources including primary interviews with key stakeholders and secondary data analysis. Three prominent Guatemalan research agencies (*Incidencia Democrática* – iDem, the *Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales* – ASIES, and the *Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala* – ICCPG) made significant contributions to this report.

A number of important findings have been reported here and we have identified several opportunities to improve data availability and reliability. Many of the “results” of the study represent association and correlations only and do not definitively establish causal links between theoretical factors and homicides. Such is the nature of homicide research. Even so, this study serves as a benchmark in the study of homicide in Guatemala at this point in time.

Perhaps, the most compelling factors impacting the decline in homicide rates in Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva since 2009 include:

- Unprecedented levels of interagency cooperation between the National Civilian Police, the Public Ministry, and the National Institute of Forensic Sciences which has been supported Center for Inter-institutional Coordination (CECOIN).
- The influence of individual actors such as Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz and the overall realignment and stabilization that has occurred in the Public Ministry. Faster case processing and increasing successful prosecution rates have increased the number of people sentenced to prison.
- Increased reliance on INACIF to provide ballistics, fingerprint, DNA analysis and other forensics analyses to criminal investigations, especially since 2009, is noteworthy.
- Specific pieces of legislation such as the 2009 Firearm Law, the 2010 Municipal Police Law have statistically significant associations with declines in homicide rates in Guatemala and Mixco.
- Significant improvements in public transportation (i.e., *Transmetro*, *Transurbana*) and emergency response developments (i.e., paramedics, firefighters, emergency room trauma team responses) among agencies outside of the criminal justice system have reduced incidence of violence and allowed more violence victims to survive their injuries.
- The National Civilian Police are improving their levels of professionalism through advanced training and they have increased internal accountability standards. The agency had demonstrated an increased capacity to collect and preserve evidence and to incorporate technology into some areas of their work.
- The presence of the Municipal police and the military has helped to stabilize some areas – especially in Guatemala and Mixco.

Several other areas of research did not appear to have contributed to reduced homicide rates:

- Street gangs, organized crime members, and vigilante groups continue to have substantial involvement in violent crime. Besides the arrest of several Assassins (*sicarios*), these criminal elements have not been seriously disrupted.
- Firearms and ammunition continue to be widely available in Guatemala. Efforts to register weapons and gun owners have been largely ineffective. Individuals seeking to obtain a firearm in Guatemala would not have much difficulty in doing so.
- Evidence from other parts of Central America has shown a strong statistically significant relationship between large drug seizures and homicide rates. Unfortunately, this report does not include drug seizure data. We were unable to obtain any data related to drug use prevalence, market stability, or drug treatment programming.

More sophisticated and broader analyses of homicide in Guatemala are possible. This would require additional data. Perhaps it would also be possible to go backwards in time to obtain monthly homicide data before 2008. A broader study of the entire Department of Guatemala could be especially informative. As part of this current research project, we were able to collect and code several hundred homicide case files from 2013, but we did not include any of that analysis in this report. Future research could and should look at victimization and perpetrator characteristics. Understanding the dynamics that allow interagency collaboration to occur would also be helpful.

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
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
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Appendix 2: Monthly Homicides in the Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva

Appendix Figure 2-1: Monthly Homicide Rates in the Municipalities Being Studied, 2008-2013




Appendix Figure 2-2: Monthly Homicide Rates in the Municipalities Being Studied, 2008-2013




Appendix 3: Municipality of Guatemala


Appendix Figure 3-1: Accumulated Criminal Activity for 2008 - Guatemala




Appendix Figure 3-2: Accumulated Criminal Activity for 2009 - Guatemala




Appendix Figure 3-3: Accumulated Criminal Activity for 2010 - Guatemala




Appendix Figure 3-4: Accumulated Criminal Activity for 2011 - Guatemala



Appendix Figure 3-5: Accumulated Criminal Activity for 2012 - Guatemala




Appendix Figure3-6: Accumulated Criminal Activity for Jan-Mar, 2013 - Guatemala




Appendix 4: Municipality of Mixco


Appendix Figure 4-1: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2008 - Mixco




Appendix Figure 4-2: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2009 – Mixco




Appendix Figure 4-3: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2010 – Mixco




Appendix Figure 4-4: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2011 – Mixco



Appendix Figure 4-5: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2012 – Mixco




Appendix Figure 4-6: Accumulated Criminal Activity Jan-Mar, 2013 - Mixco




Appendix 5: Municipality of Villa Nueva


Appendix Figure 5-1: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2008 - Villa Nueva




Appendix Figure 5-2: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2009 - Villa Nueva




Appendix Figure 5-3: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2010 - Villa Nueva




Appendix Figure 5-4: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2011 - Villa Nueva



Appendix Figure 5-5: Accumulated Criminal Activity 2012 - Villa Nueva



Appendix Figure 5-6: Accumulated Criminal Activity Jan-Mar, 2013



Appendix 6: Directory of Authorized Firearm Dealers in the Municipalities Being Studied

Municipality of Guatemala	
Municipality of Guatemala	Zone 1
	<p>COMERCIAL LAKAPAN, S.A. 6a. AV. 12-51 , CENTRO CAPITOL, LOCALES 309 Y 311, ZONA 1, GUATEMALA TEL: 2253-8197 FAX NO. 2253-8268 CEL: 5206-1700 comerciallakapan@gmail.com</p> <p>LLAVINES HERNANDEZ AVENIDA ELENA 16-21, LOCAL "B" , ZONA 1, GUATEMALA TEL: 2232-2048 FAX NO.2238-0723 CEL: 5510-6524 egmm46@hotmail.com</p>
	Zone 2
	<p>BIORESA 9a. CALLE 3-63 ZONA 2, EL ZAPOTE, GUATEMALA TEL: 2254-3088, 2289-5173, FAX NO. 2289-5946 aurioste@bioresa.com</p>
Municipality of Guatemala	Zone 4
	<p>ALMACÉN EL BISONTE, S.A. EDIFICIO EL PORTALITO, LOCALES 17 Y 18, TERMINAL DE BUSES ZONA 4, GUATEMALA TEL: 2332-4239, 2244-4522 almacenelbisonte@gmail.com</p> <p>ARMERIA EL ÁGUILA 7a. AV. 8-20, ZONA 4, GUATEMALA TEL: 2362-5402 - 23312478 armeriaelaquila2010@hotmail.com</p>

Municipality of Guatemala	
Municipality of Guatemala	<p>ARMISAFARI 10 AVENIDA 3-06 ZONA 4, GUATEMALA TEL: 2361-4481 FAX NO.2361-4671 CEL: 5475-8675 armisafari@hotmail.com</p> <p>CEMSA RUTA 3, 2-16 ZONA 4, EDIFICIO ALTAMIRA SOTANO, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2205-4545 . jorgesini@grupoenerg.com</p> <p>MUNICIONES 6a. AV. 0-60 ZONA 4, LOCAL 254, PLANTA ALTA, C.C. GUATEMALA TEL: 2335-1735, FAX: 2335-1665 impomunz.4@gmail.com</p> <p>SHOOTING SYSTEMS 6a. AVENIDA 0-60 ZONA 4 GRAN CENTRO COMERCIAL ZONA 4, LOCAL 241, GUATEMALA TEL:2335-2230 safarishooting@gmail.com</p>
	Zone 5
	<p>ALTO IMPACTO GUNS 12 AVENIDA 31-16, ZONA 5 GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA TEL. 2361-8502 Y 2360-7938 CEL: 5318-4521 altoimpacto@intelnett.com</p> <p>GUN-MATE 12 AVENIDA 30-60, ZONA 5, GUATEMALA TEL: 23325757, CEL: 40153291 edwin_estuardo05@hotmail.com</p> <p>MULTIARMAS 12 AVENIDA 31-45, LOCAL # 1, ZONA 5 GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2362-3352, 5504-9465 Y 2362-8574 khrisleo@yahoo.com</p>

Municipality of Guatemala	
Municipality of Guatemala	<p>RANGER 5-7 ARMAS Y MUNICIONES 12 AVENIDA 31-33 ZONA 5, GUATEMALA CEL: 4029-3625 Y 4029-1705 rangerarmas5-7@hotmail.com</p> <p>IMPORTADORA Y ARMERIA TAURUS DE GUATEMALA. 12 AVENIDA 31-34 ZONA 5, GUATEMALA TEL: 2369-6843 verónica_ponce@hotmail.com</p>
	Zone 9
	<p>ALTO IMPACTO 6a. AV. 1-12 LOCAL NO. 1, PLAZA ORBIETO ZONA 9, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2361-7178 FAX NO. 2332-6330 altoimpacto@intelnett.com</p> <p>ARMAS DEFENSIVAS Y DEPORTIVAS 12 CALLE 7-42, ZONA 9, GUATEMALA TEL: 2332-0125, 2331-2535, 2385-1093 adefensivas@hotmail.com</p> <p>EL TRABUCO AV. REFORMA 16-30 INTERIOR, LOCAL # 1 Y 2, ZONA 9, GUATEMALA TEL: 2332-4092 FAX NO.2332-5527 eltrabucoguate@hotmail.com</p> <p>GEFAHR 3ra. AVENIDA 12-13, LOCAL NO. 11, 2DO. NIVEL. CENTRO COMERCIAL BONSAI ZONA 9, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2383-3906/28 info@quatearmas.com</p> <p>IMSA 12 CALLE 5-57, ZONA 9, PLAZA ESPAÑA MONTUFAR LOCAL 6, GUATEMALA TEL: 2361-2850 lobo.armas@gmail.com</p>

Municipality of Guatemala	
Municipality of Guatemala	<p>MUNICIONES 12 CALLE 5-13 ZONA 9, GUATEMALA TEL: 2331-5758 abolanos@intelnet.net.gt</p>
	<p>MUNICIONES LA TORRE 2a. CALLE 6-64 LOCAL 1-F ZONA 9, GUATEMALA. TEL: 7723-1472 fsolis_esquisport@yahoo.com</p>
	<p>NIVISA 0 AVENIDA "A" 11-30 ZONA 9, CENTRO COMERCIAL PLAZA TECUN, LOCAL 64, GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA. TELS: 2331-1675 Y FAX: 2360-5795 CEL: 5552-1045 juansett@gmail.com</p>
	<p>PUNTO DE MIRA 12 CALLE 4-09, ZONA 9, GUATEMALA TEL: 2413-6767 FAX NO.2361-6749 emazariegos@elpercutor.com</p>
Zone 10	
Municipality of Guatemala	<p>ALMACÉN EL BISONTE 19 AVENIDA "A" 20-51 ZONA 10, GUATEMALA TELS 2368-1626, 2244-4522 FAX. NO. 2368-3225 almacenelbisonte@gmail.com</p>
	<p>ALMACÉN EL BISONTE # 2 18 CALLE 2-21, LOCAL 321, 3er. NIVEL, GRAN CENTRO COMERCIAL LOS PROCERES, ZONA 10, GUATEMALA. TELS.2332-8544, 2332-8545, 2244-4522 FAX 2332-8546. almacenelbisonte2@hotmail.com</p>
	<p>ARESCO 19 CALLE 22-25 ZONA 10, GUATEMALA. TEL: 23886024 / 23373685 alvarado@seisa.com.gt</p>

Municipality of Guatemala	
	<p>ARMSA GUATEMALA 13 Calle 7-25 Local A, Zona 10 TEL: 2366-3737 / 2366-5337 FAX: 2366-3744 armsaguatemala@gmail.com</p>
	<p>CENTURIA AVENIDA REFORMA 15-25 ZONA 10, GUATEMALA. TELS, 2363-5247, 23635250 centuria_s@yahoo.es</p>
	<p>GUN DEPOT 2a. AVE 8-35, ZONA10 C.C. PLAZA SANTANA LOCAL # 2, GUATEMALA TELS. 2334-8082 2362-6855 CEL: 5201-6017 gundepot@turbonett.com</p>
	<p>MUNAR 10a. CALLE 0-68, ZONA 10, GUATEMALA TEL: 2331-0579, FAX 2360-1338 CEL: 5204-0320. munar@intelnett.com</p>
	<p>PROTECCIÓN Y DEFENSA 20 CALLE 19-24 ZONA 10, GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2333-6754 proteccion_defensa@hotmail.com</p>
	Zone 11
Municipality of Guatemala	<p>MAROX INTERNACIONAL CLZ. AGUILAR BATRES, 34-70 ZONA 11, LOCAL P19, 1ER. NIVEL C. C. GALERIAS DEL SUR, GUATEMALA TEL. 2442-5398 Y 2476-3720 marox.internacional@hotmail.com</p>
	Zone 12
	<p>CAMUFLAJE 24 AVENIDA 42-10, INTERIOR 1-C, PLAZA COMERCIAL TZUL, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2477-7227 Y 2479-3594 emazariegos@camuflaje.com.gt</p>

Municipality of Guatemala	
Municipality of Guatemala	<p>MAINLEY AV. PETAPA 7-78, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA TELS 2440-4981, 2472-2058, FAX: 2472-3852 mainley_2010@yahoo.com</p> <p>PUNTO 40 CALZ. R. AGUILAR BATREZ 34-77, LOCAL 108, PLAZA "LA CORUÑA" ZONA 12, GUATEMALA. TEL: 24425594, 24425595</p>
	Zone 13
	<p>BLACK DESERT AV. LAS AMERICAS 15-14 ZONA 13, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2254-2051, 2339-4007 Y 2339-3447</p> <p>COMBAT BOULEVARD LIBERACIÓN, 15-86 LOCAL "E", EDIFICIO EL OBELISCO, ZONA 13, GUATEMALA. TEL: 2385-4548/9 combatsa@yahoo.com</p>
	Zone 14
	<p>STI GUATEMALA 9a. CALLE 4-15 COLONIA CAMPO I, ZONA 14, GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA TEL: 2366-5002/04, 2366-1522 FAX: 2366-3993 zemog@zemog.com.gt tiropractico.semog@gmail.com info@zemog.com.gt</p>
Zone 15	
<p>AIRE LIBRE 2da. CALLE 22-65 ZONA 15, LOCAL 313 CENTRO COMERCIAL METRO 15 VISTA HERMOSA I, GUATEMALA TELS: 2369-2111, 2369-3114 alsa@itelgua.com</p> <p>MUNICAR 2da. CALLE 22-65 ZONA 15, LOCAL 313 CENTRO COMERCIAL METRO 15 VISTA HERMOSA I, GUATEMALA TEL: 2369-2111 FAX NO.2369-3114 municarsa@hotmail.com</p>	

Municipality of Guatemala	
	Zone 18
	<p>SU SEGURIDAD META TERMINAL DEL NORTE LOCAL 76, ZONA 18, COLONIA ATLÁNTIDA, GUATEMALA. TELS 2255-2299 maechesuseguridad@hotmail.es</p>

Municipality of Mixco	
	Zone 3
	<p>COMERCIAL AGRICOLA BOLAÑOS CALZADA SAN JUAN 4-34 COMERCIAL EL CASTAÑO, ZONA 3, MIXCO, GUATEMALA. TELS. 2434-0597, FAX: 2437-7106 agricola25@turbonett.com</p>
	Zone 8
	<p>ARMY NATION 3a. CALLE 8-22 CENTRO COMERCIAL PASEO SAN CRISTOBAL, LOCAL NO. 22, ZONA 8, MIXCO, GUATEMALA. CEL: 4277-0496 / 4028-6570. armynation25@gmail.com</p>
	<p>EL TIRO 6a. AVENIDA 5-32 PANORAMA, CIUDAD SAN CRISTOBAL, ZONA 8, MIXCO, GUATEMALA TEL: 2479-6366, FAX: 2478-2370 el tiro22@yahoo.com</p>
	<p>EL TIRO 22 6a. AVENIDA 5-32 PANORAMA, CIUDAD SAN CRISTOBAL, ZONA 8, MIXCO, GUATEMALA TEL: 2479-6366, FAX: 2478-2370 el tiro22@yahoo.com</p>
Mixco	

Municipality of Villa Nueva

Villa Nueva

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Appendix 7: Relevant Legislation Related to Violence and Violence Prevention

Type of Legislation	No.	Name	Objective	Related Legislation	Agencies Affected
Decree	97-1996	Law to Prevent, Punish and Eradicate Domestic Violence	To decrease and bring an end to domestic violence and contribute to the construction of families based on equality and respect for the dignity of men and women.		Public Ministry, National Civilian Police, Attorney General, Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights
Decree	40-2000	Law for the Support of Civil Security Forces	The civil security forces will be supported by units of the army of Guatemala in their functions to prevent and combat organized crime and ordinary crime for the protection of the people and ensure the security of the State. The Ministry of the Interior may solicit the support and cooperation of the Guatemalan Army, through the Ministry of National Defense.		Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of the Interior
Decree	11-2002	Law to Establish Urban and Rural Development Councils	The objective of the system of Development Councils is to organize and coordinate public administration through the formulation of development policies, plans and budgeting programs, and the momentum of inter-agency coordination, public and private. Some violence prevention programs have been launched through this organization.		CONADUR , CODEDE, COMUDE, COCODE, Department Governors, Civil Society, State Institutions
Decree	12-2002	Municipal Code	Desarrollar los principios constitucionales referentes a la organización, gobierno, administración, y funcionamiento de los municipios y demás entidades locales determinadas en el Código y el contenido de las competencias que correspondan a los municipios en cuanto a las materias que ésta regula. Por medio de esta ley se han impulsado algunos programas de prevención a nivel municipal.		Municipalities

Type of Legislation	No.	Name	Objective	Related Legislation	Agencies Affected
Decree	14-2002	Decentralization Act	To systematically promote the economic and administrative decentralization of the federal government to achieve the proper development of the country in a progressive manner and regulated to move the administrative, economic, and social power and policies of the Executive Branch to the municipality and other Departmental institutions.		Municipalities, Civil Society
Decree	27-2003	Law for the Comprehensive Protection for Children and Adolescents	To promote the comprehensive and sustainable development of the Guatemalan children and youth within a democratic framework and unconditional respect for human rights. This new law adopts the new paradigm of comprehensive protection inspired by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.		Secretary for social Wellbeing, the Judiciary, Public Ministry, Institute for the Public Penal Defense
Decree	15-2009 and the reform law 20-2012	Firearms and Ammunitions Act	Establish control over the different types of firearms imported into the country and the registrations and licenses necessary for its possession.	The 2012 reform modifying articles 26, concerning the DIGECAM database; and 146 continuing DIGECAM authority through 2014.	DIGECAM, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, National Armories, Private Security Agencies
Decree	22-2008	Law Against Femicide and Other Forms of Violence Against Women	To ensure the life, liberty, integrity, dignity, protection and equality for all women before the law. To provide equality under the law for those who experience discrimination on the basis of gender in the public or private domain. The purpose is to promote and implement provisions aimed at the Elimination of physical, psychological, sexual violence, or economic, or any type of coercion against women, guaranteeing them a life free of violence, as stipulated in the Constitution politics and international instruments on women's human rights ratified by Guatemala.	Article 4	Coordinadora Nacional para la Prevención de la Violencia Intrafamiliar, Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena, Secretaría Presidencial de la Mujer
Ministerial Agreement	542-2008	Creation of the Community Violence Prevention Unit	Development and implementation of plans, projects and programs for community prevention of violence, within the policies of public safety established by the Ministry of		UPCV of the Third Vice-Ministry of the Interior

Type of Legislation	No.	Name	Objective	Related Legislation	Agencies Affected
			the Interior.		
Ministerial Agreement	95-2013	Agreement to Extend the Community Violence Prevention Unit	Extending the duration of the Community Violence Prevention Unit from the February 22 2013 and authorizing that it can be continued as deemed necessary by the ministerial office. It also establishes its new internal structure of the Unit into 7 divisions and 6 operational departments.	Articles 1, 2 and 3	UPCV of the Third Vice Ministry of the Interior
Initiative	3969	Youth Violence Prevention Initiative	Initiative that seeks to create the legal framework for a model of educational, recreational, social and mental health practices to promote the construction of a culture of peace and prevent youth violence.	Since 2009, it has had the support and favorable opinion of the Extraordinary Commission for Youth of the Congress of the Republic.	CONJUVE, MINGOB, Ministry of culture and Sports
Initiative	4393	National System for the Prevention of Violence Initiative	It is intended to establish legal standards for the implementation of coordinated policies, plans, programs and projects of prevention of violence through the national system of prevention of violence.	Recognized by the plenary on 23 August 2011, the initiative moved to the Committee on Public Finance and of the Ministry of the Interior for a joint opinion.	

Appendix 8: Prevention/Intervention Programs

Name	Type of Activity	Responsible Agency	Years	Targeted Groups	Primary Objective	Impact	Any Evaluation?	Financing
University of the Streets (<i>Universidad de la Calle</i>)	Project	Grupo CEIBA	1992	Children and youth	Generating activities aimed at the prevention of violence by at-risk youth	No information available	No	USAID
Institutional Strengthening	Project	Movement for Peace	1996	CODEDEs and COMUDEs nationwide	Promotion of the Departmental Committee on Security and creating a public policy of preventive security	No information available	Yes	AECID
Citizen Participation	Project	Movement for Peace	1996	General Population	Improving community participation, especially women and youth, to improve security and justice issues and to create local policies of coexistence.	No information available	Yes	AECID
Addressing the problem of illicit arms trafficking from a regional perspective	Project	REDCEPAZ	2005	State institutions and civil society that make up the network	Dealing with the problem of illicit trafficking in Central America	No information available	No	AECID
Campaign against the Use of Firearms	Project	IEPADES	2006	General Population	Launch messages to the population on the consequences of the use of firearms	No information available	No	AECID
Community Organization	Program	UPCV MINGOB	2006-2013	Commissions for the Prevention of	Train public safety commissions about public policy of citizen security at	UPCV has delegates at the national level	No	MINGOB

Name	Type of Activity	Responsible Agency	Years	Targeted Groups	Primary Objective	Impact	Any Evaluation?	Financing
				Violence, COCODE, COMUDE	the municipal level and develop community violence prevention plans	(one per Department) and each delegate has between 8 and 15 committees of citizen security in 3 levels: community, municipal and departmental.		
90 activities to prevent violence	Project	Jóvenes contra la violencia	2009	General population of Guatemala City	Raise awareness among young people about reducing violence	No information available	No	
<i>Escuelas Seguras</i> (Secure Schools)	Program	UPCV MINGOB	2009-2013	Students from schools in Guatemala City	Identify, monitor and develop proposals to reduce violence in the public schools in Guatemala City	No information available	Unknown	MINGOB
<i>Barrios Seguros</i> (Secure Neighborhoods)	Program	MINGOB	2009-2013*	Community, Municipal and Departmental Commissions of Public Safety	Train public safety commissions, formulate and monitor policies, programs and plans of public safety and violence prevention using the law of the Councils on Urban and Rural Development	There are more than 100 Public Safety Commissions formed in the municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, and Villa Nueva.	Some outputs have been measured.	MINGOB
<i>Contra la Violencia Juvenil</i> (Against Juvenile Violence)	Program	MINGOB CONJUVE	2010-2013	At-risk youth nationwide	Formulate plans and local policies for the prevention of youth violence	17 Youth Participation Boards (Juntas) have been established in Guatemala City and there are another 25 San	No	MINGOB CONJUVE

Name	Type of Activity	Responsible Agency	Years	Targeted Groups	Primary Objective	Impact	Any Evaluation?	Financing
						Miguel Petapa, Villa Nueva and Mixco		
<i>Transurbano</i>	Project		2010-2013	Urban public transportation users in Guatemala City	To improve the conditions of urban transportation in the capital	No information available	No	
National Policy on Youth	Policy	CONJUVE MINGOB SEPREM CONAPREVI MICUDE MINEDUC MINTRAB Ministry of Health	2010-2013	Nationwide youth	Comprehensive activities to benefit youth	Coordination between the following three institutions on policies related to delinquency prevention: CONJUVE, MINGOB, and SEGEPLAN	No	CONJUVE MINGOB SEPREM CONAPREVI MICUDE MINEDUC MINTRAB Ministry of Health
Education for peace and life	Program	MINEDUC	2011?	Students in the federal education system	To promote participation of stakeholders in the educational community in the process of reflecting on	No information available	No	UNESCO

Name	Type of Activity	Responsible Agency	Years	Targeted Groups	Primary Objective	Impact	Any Evaluation?	Financing
					culture and pedagogical strategies to develop well-rounded students and to create new relationships of coexistence between schools, communities, and the State			
Protocol for the identification, care and referral of cases of violence within the national educational system	Product	Ministry of Education (MINEDUC)	2011-2013	Students in the federal education system	Ensure that the teachers, principals, and educational authorities are able to identify and address cases of violence in the national education system	No information available	Unknown	UNFPA, UNESCO, Fund for reaching the millennium objectives.
Guide to the identification and prevention of bullying	Product	Ministry of Education (MINEDUC)	2011-2013	Students in the federal education system	Ensure that the teachers, principals, and educational authorities are able to identify and address cases of bullying in the national education system	No information available	Unknown	UNFPA, UNESCO, Fund for reaching the millennium objectives.
Early Warning System for the management of conflict and violence	Product	MINGOB COPREDEH SAA SNDP	2011-2013	General Population	Identify and submit proposals for the appropriate treatment of the conflict at the local and national level	22 Situation Rooms (one for each Department) and delegates at the regional level	No	PNUD, Fund for reaching the millennium objectives.
A Life is a Life (Una vida es una vida)	Product	Claudia Méndez Arriaza	2012	General Population	Create geo-referenced maps of the homicides that occur daily in Guatemala City	Virtual platform	No	http://www.unavidaesu navida.org/
Observatory of security management and justice	Product	IEPADES	2012	General Population	Observe selected indicators of crime and violence	Indicadores a nivel nacional sobre estadísticas de PNC	No	AECID, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación

Name	Type of Activity	Responsible Agency	Years	Targeted Groups	Primary Objective	Impact	Any Evaluation?	Financing
								de España
Outreach Centers	Project	Alianza joven	2012	At-risk children and youth	Provide children and young people at risk, a healthy opportunities to occupy their free time, and aimed at the reduction of youth delinquency and violence	No information available	Unknown	USAID and the Municipality of Villa Nueva, local faith-based groups
Training Workshops	Project	Secretary of Well-being (SBS)	2012-2013	Youth in detention centers	To provide vocational training to youth in detention	More than 500 youth in detention have received training	No	SBS
Attention to the children and adolescents <i>(Atención a la niñez y adolescencia)</i>	Municipal Program	Villa Nueva with the support of PDH and ODHA	2012-2013	Youth in the general population and at-risk youth	Prevent, detect, and refer cases of young people at risk	No information available	No	UNICEF
Situational Prevention <i>(Prevención situacional)</i>	Project	Municipality of Villa Nueva and the UPCV	2012-2013	Residents and COCODE organizers from Ciudad del Sol, El Búcaro, Peronia and Alioto López	Strengthen protective factors and reduce risk factors for the communities involved.	Approximately 70 communities	No	Municipality of Villa Nueva and the Third Vice-Ministry of the Interior
Taking Advantage of Free Time <i>(Aprovechamiento de tiempo libre)</i>	Program	Municipality of Villa Nueva	2012-2013	Students in the municipality of Villa Nueva	Prevention and intervention such as the Children's Fire Brigades, the Municipal Athletic League and school reinforcement.	No information available	No	Municipality of Villa Nueva
National Agreement for the Advancement of Security and	Policy	State Institutions	2012-2013	General Population	To promote actions to reduce violence in Guatemala	Unknown	No	State Institutions

Name	Type of Activity	Responsible Agency	Years	Targeted Groups	Primary Objective	Impact	Any Evaluation?	Financing
Justice								
Program to prevent violence against women:	Program	CONAPREVI SEPREM	2013	Women in Guatemala, Chiquimula and Alta Verapaz	Prevent gender-based violence	No information available	No	USAID
24-0	Product	MINGOB	2013	General Population	Monitor and establish databases of prioritized indicators related to violence	Virtual platform at the National level	No	UNFPA MINGOB
Parliamentary Forum on security policies and prevention of violence	Project	Guatemalan Congress	2013	General Population	Establish a dialog between members of the Congress of the Republic of 3 countries: Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, for the implementation of policies in the areas of prevention of violence	No information available	No	National Endowment for Democracy and the National Democratic Institute