



Final Evaluation Report

Program Evaluation of USAID/East Africa's Activities in
Somalia

COVER PHOTO

MOGADISHU, 2014, BY LEYLA JEYTE

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PROGRAM EVALUATION OF USAID/EAST AFRICA'S ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA:

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

March 17, 2015

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ACRONYMS

AFREC	Africa Rescue Committee
AI	Appreciative Inquiry
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
AO	Assistance Objective
AOR	Agreement Officer's Representative
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CMM	(USAID) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CRD	Center for Research and Dialogue
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSO	(DOS Bureau of) Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DCs	(Somali) District Commissioners
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DGs	(Somali) Director Generals
DOS	(U.S.) Department of State
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
IBTCI	International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc.
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy (for Somalia)
IP	Implementing Partner
IPTT	Indicator Performance Tracking Table
IR	Intermediate Result
JHNP	Joint Health and Nutrition Programme
KII	Key Informant Interview
MEPS	Monitoring and Evaluation Program for Somalia
MIS	Management Information System
MSC	Most Significant Change
MUDAN	Mudug Development Association Network
NSC	National Security Council
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PAD	(Somalia) Project Appraisal Document
PEG	Partnership for Economic Growth
PMP	Performance Management Plan
SATG	Somali Agriculture Technical Group
SONYO	Somaliland National Youth Organization
SOW	Scope of Work
SSG	Strengthening Somali Governance
SYLI	Somali Youth Leaders' Initiative
TIS	Transition Initiatives for Stabilization

TL	Team Leader
TOC	Theory of Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/W	United States Agency for International Development, Washington
USG	United States Government
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION PURPOSE

This evaluation report was prepared by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc., (IBTCI) as part of the Monitoring & Evaluation Program for Somalia (MEPS), under the IQC Number AID-RAN-I-00-09-00016, Task Order Number AID-623-TO-11-00002, and in response to the USAID Scope of Work (SOW) dated July 11, 2014 (Annex I).

The Somalia Program Evaluation aims to inform the new USAID/EA/Somalia Office's (hereafter USAID Somalia) development strategy by thoroughly and rigorously reviewing its programming since 2010/2011, and evaluating its outcomes and impacts relative to its strategic goal, objectives and Theory of Change (TOC). The evaluation also seeks to produce *actionable recommendations* to USAID on how perceived and actual outputs, outcomes and relative impacts of its programming can inform future programming in Somalia.

The primary audience for this evaluation is the USAID Somalia Office. Additional recipients of this report are the USAID/Washington Africa Bureau, the State Department and other relevant U.S. Government (USG) stakeholders.

The evaluation applied a meta-evaluation approach, looking retrospectively and at enormous data sets. These included four years of partner annual and quarterly reports; performance evaluations, reviews and assessments; verifications analyses; annual and quarterly indicator data derived from the USAID Somalia web-based Management Information System (MIS) "Clearinghouse" and the annual Plan and Performance Reports (PPRs); Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with USG and Somali stakeholders, and USAID and normative literature associated with strategy and TOC development in stabilization and/or transitioning environments. Although the breadth and scope of the data meant that it could be considered "imprecise" and "noisy," it nevertheless provided the Evaluation Team with patterned inferences of USAID's activities, based on close analyses of these data. The focus was on identifying "noticeable change" over time, with the evaluation being conducted in three concurrent and intertwined tasks: a normative review; the core evaluation; and a normative projection from which findings could be used to inform a USAID Somalia strategy refinement session.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation sought to answer the following five questions:

1. To what extent have USAID Somalia-funded activities contributed, in a measurable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2013 Project Appraisal Document?
2. To what extent was the Theory of Change (TOC) used by USAID Somalia valid?
3. Was USAID Somalia's conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling stability and instability in Somalia?
4. How well did the activities funded by USAID Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons)?

5. To what extent did USAID Somalia's activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?

CONCLUSIONS

Based on an analysis of the data and the findings, the Evaluation Team came to the following conclusions, which are aligned to the aforementioned Evaluation Questions (Q1-5):

Q1. To what extent have USAID Somalia-funded activities contributed, in a measurable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2013 Project Appraisal Document?

1. There is evidence that USAID-funded activities have resulted in a noticeable change in Somalia over time, and that this change may have contributed to perceived increased stability in key areas. There is a universal perception of noticeable change at the community and district levels, i.e., across all USG and Somali respondents, with this noticeable change supported by findings that emerged from the KIIs, USAID Somalia assessments and evaluations, in addition to annual and quarterly reports. Despite this conclusion, there is no real universal understanding of a) stability strategy, as there are several iterations of strategic guidance documents; b) how to implement stabilization programs as part of a USAID stabilization strategy; and, c) how to measure progress along a stability continuum as per this USAID stabilization strategy.
2. There is evidence that USAID Somalia faced challenges when attempting to measure contribution within a stabilization context such as Somalia.
3. USG KIIs suggest that there is a perception of limited inter- and intra-agency joint planning and implementation in Somalia, and this in turn affected the Evaluation Team's ability to determine the discrete contribution of USAID-specific activities.
4. Within the international donor community in Mogadishu, DOS (and in particular DOS CSO) is seen as the visible face of USG stabilization and reconstruction activity in the country.
5. There were inadequate means in place to measure the achievement of USAID Somalia's activities over time. A critical sub-theme to Question 1 relates to the subject of measurability, and whether the Evaluation Team can rigorously and defensibly state from the evidence that USAID-funded activities contributed in a *measurable way* to increased stability in Somalia. Here also the conclusion is inconclusive at best.
6. USAID Somalia's regularly reported performance data cannot answer the Evaluation Question, and in particular the extent to which USAID Somalia's activities have contributed *in a measurable way* to stability. While anecdotal data suggests that USAID Somalia has contributed to stability in Somalia in a measurable way, indicator data based on IP targets does not support this, in some cases suggesting downward trend lines in certain Intermediate Results.

Q2. To what extent was the Theory of Change (TOC) used by USAID Somalia valid?

1. There is no evidence to support the claim that the USAID Somalia TOC was either valid or invalid. However, USAID and normative literature suggests that the TOC was overly simplistic and overly assumptive.
2. According to the literature, the USAID Somalia TOC is poorly defined and wholly assumption-based. The TOC does not demonstrate an understanding of the underlying causes and conditions that can lead to, or derail, the TOC.
3. There is a simplistic conflation of symptoms, causes and “triggers” that lead to and/or define change within the USAID Somalia TOC.
4. There is an overall neglect of local systems and cultural conditions as key determinants of cause and effect in the TOC (the “me” principle).
5. The TOC is missing links in the cause and effect logic chain (1+1=3).
6. There are implicit and untested assumptions driving the causal logic of the TOC - and of the hexagon model.
7. In general, USAID’s IPs have poorly defined TOCs – this prevents “nesting” within the USAID TOC.

Q3. Was USAID Somalia’s conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling stability and instability in Somalia?

1. USAID Somalia’s conceptual model was, and remains, valid in modeling stability, but it is assumptive and not operational. The model is also benign in that it is valid for virtually all stabilization and/or transitioning environments.

Q4. How well did the activities funded by USAID Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons)?

1. Many of USAID Somalia’s activities align to the hexagon model, but this alignment is neither logical, nor reflects USAID Somalia’s strategy/strategies or the USAID Results Framework. This alignment is also *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this,” a logical fallacy.
2. The lack of a universally approved and accepted USAID Somalia strategy and a well-grounded TOC meant that almost all of the USAID partner activities were in large part conceptually, logically, and in some cases operationally, disconnected from each other.

Q5. To what extent did USAID Somalia’s activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?

1. In some significant cases, USAID Somalia’s activities show evidence of successfully adapting to the contextual changes in Somalia.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the conclusions, the Evaluation Team presents the following key recommendations.

PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Evaluation Team recommends a comprehensive approach to better understand stabilization in the context of Somalia, how better to implement stabilization programs and activities as contributing and enabling parts of an overarching (but integrated) set of USG and USAID goals; and how to measure the achievement of stabilization outputs, outcomes and impacts. The Evaluation Team recognizes that USAID Somalia is in the process of redefining and redeveloping its strategy, and so this approach can include a) implementing a series of consultative sessions with key stakeholders to better understand how best to facilitate stability, transition and development in Somalia, and, b) commissioning an independent study to better understand the current political, security, and cultural context within which USAID programming in Somalia will operate.
2. The Evaluation Team recognizes that Somalia is a complex, and evolving environment. Overwhelming evidence from both the document review and interviews with USAID Somalia, USAID/Washington (USAID/W), Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DOS CSO), Somalia/Somaliland Ministries and Somalia Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), suggests that Somalia is still in a stabilization context, and not in a transition environment. Therefore the Team strongly recommends that USAID Somalia take this evidence into account as it redefines its strategy.
3. The Evaluation Team recommends that any future refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy consist of a single clearly defined USG goal, with objectives that then support this goal, noting that *both* the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the local communities are inextricably intertwined precursors to stability and therefore should *both* be addressed within these objectives.
4. Any refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy will by necessity – and to ensure its survival – require input and advocacy from the wider USG. The Evaluation Team recommends that the current informational relationship between DOS and USAID Somalia be maintained and indeed strengthened to better facilitate the strategy's development.
5. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID incorporate operationalization criteria as part of any future refinement and redevelopment of a USAID Somalia's strategy. These criteria should include practical steps on *how* to implement the guidance set forth in the strategy, to include for example, decomposing the strategic objectives down to the process, program and activity levels; translating the strategy into an execution framework with discrete planning and operational tasks; proposed means to monitor and measure progress toward the achievement of the strategic objectives, e.g. with the development of a Results Framework and Performance Management Plan (PMP); and, means to learn from the monitoring and measurement findings and to adapt the strategy, as needed. Based on the evidence, the operationalization criteria should include USAID Somalia having a regular, visible presence in Somalia.
6. The Evaluation Team recommends closer alignment to the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) as USAID Somalia moves forward with the refinement of its own office strategy. This is significant both in terms of the implied importance of USG inter-agency involvement in any Somalia strategy, and an increased, and essential, conceptual and operational integration in Somalia between DOD, DOS and USAID.

7. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia consider a complete revision of its TOC as a part of any future refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy, and that resources be specifically dedicated to this revision.
8. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia consider abandoning the hexagon model in favor of systematically, analytically and intuitively developing a fresh conceptual model that is relevant to the Somalia of 2014 and beyond, and to a USAID Somalia portfolio that now includes the Strengthening Somali Governance (SSG) and TIS+ activities. This model would inform any future refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy.
9. The Evaluation Team recommends that this new conceptual model accurately reflect a stabilization intervention strategy in line with, and in support of, the FGS and the local communities that have been newly liberated.

M&E AND LEARNING RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As a critical component of the USAID Program Cycle, the Evaluation Team recommends that ongoing program assessments, periodic evaluations and strategic learning exercises be included as mandatory into the annual USAID program calendar. These are means to ensure that there is practical and operational alignment with any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID Somalia's strategy.
2. The Evaluation Team recommends a complete overhaul of the Results Framework and its IRs and indicators to better – and more logically and correlatively – align to any future USAID Somalia's strategy.
3. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia consider a return to incorporating meaningful output-based measurements of success. The indicators are not meant to replace the many outcome and impact indicators on which the partners currently report, but to more accurately reflect the “art of the possible” in stabilization environments. Stabilization programming is output-based, with the near-term objectives of providing tangible results to communities in an effort to appease, neutralize and acquiesce, and to stabilize quickly and efficiently. Therefore, it seems that success in stabilization environments can best be measured by outputs rather than by outcomes or indeed long-term development impacts.
4. The Evaluation Team strongly recommends that any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID Somalia's strategy be conducted in tandem with the development of a clear, cogent, logical and practical M&E strategy that allows USAID Somalia to monitor its and its partners' performance over time, and to measure its and its partners' achievement (or non-achievement) of intended intervention goals and results over time.

INTRODUCTION

EVALUATION PURPOSE

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BACKGROUND

Understanding the background, context, and rationale of USAID Somalia's approach is crucial to understanding the intellectual and programmatic motivations for the Evaluation Questions themselves. This understanding plays a key role in the structuring of, and approaches to answering these questions during the course of the evaluation.

This section aims to both set the conceptual foundations for the evaluation, and provide some context and historical background for the reader. In so doing, it introduces some of the key USAID Somalia conceptual models, as well as the Results Framework. It concludes with the proposed structure for the analysis section of the report: "Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations."

In presenting the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, the evaluation often refers to a USAID Somalia "strategy", or at times, "strategies." This is because there was no universal – or unifying - strategy guiding USAID Somalia, but rather several key documents that have informed the programming and planning of activities since 2009.


In support of USG goals, USAID's primary emphasis in Somalia has been to strengthen stabilization efforts that contribute to the broader USG goals – which were outlined in the National Security Council's (NSC) Somalia strategy, adopted in July 2009, and updated in October 2010 to include the State Department's "dual-track" strategy. While the official "dual-track" strategy has lapsed with the transition to a recognized federal government in Somalia, the principles of the strategy, i.e., support for multiple levels of stabilizing governance bodies, remained relevant for USAID programming.

Building on the NSC strategy, the more critical of the strategy documents provided to the Evaluation Team were the *Interim Strategic Update: USAID Post-transition Support in Somalia* (2012); the *Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document (PAD)* (2013); and the *Integrated Country Strategy: Somalia FY 2015-2017* (2013). The Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) is the most recent and most relevant of the strategy documents. It is an interagency document that outlines the USG's planned strategy in Somalia for 2015-2017. The ICS calls for a more coordinated response by international donors that should focus on priorities identified by the Somalia Government and People, and hails the September 2016 "New Deal" compact as an opportunity to coordinate such efforts to reinforce the relevance and importance of long-absent government institutions in the daily lives of Somali citizens. To achieve this, the USG has made the defeat of al-Shabaab a top-priority, followed by developing rule of law, improving livelihoods, increasing Somali government capacity to deliver services, establishing representative governance, and improving accountability and transparency. These objectives culminate in three goals: a) a secure and stable Somalia; b) economic recovery and growth; and, c) inclusive accountable governance.

In addition to the guidance provided in the several strategic documents, the Evaluation Team found that USAID Somalia and its Implementing Partners (IPs) were guided far more by a) the concepts underlying the so-called "hexagon model" first developed in a stakeholder workshop in Mombasa in 2011 and subsequently modified in 2012; and/or, b) the USAID Somalia Results Framework and its Stabilization Objectives (SOs).

In all, the guidance provided in the USG and USAID strategy documents supports overall USG goals in Somalia, but also explicitly focuses on stability as an objective to respond to the complex realities of Somalia’s rapidly changing and unpredictable environment. USAID Somalia has defined stabilization as the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to a resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced while efforts are made to support successful long-term development and increased institutional capacity. Although there is no evidence of this, the strategy was presumably derived from an internal analysis of the causes of Somalia’s stability and instability, and of entry points identified by USAID through which it could most effectively support stability while also addressing USG goals. USAID identified multiple sources of both stability and instability, which are represented within the hexagon model depicting drivers of stability and instability as dichotomous. This model will be further referred to below, and in Questions 1 and 3 in particular (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1: SOMALIA STABILITY / INSTABILITY “HEXAGON” MODEL



The strategy purports to blend short- and medium-term programming within a unified vision – short-term programming to provide visible, short-term gains, and investment in the medium-to long-term goals of governance and sustainable development. When associated with the relevant governing administrations in Somalia, short-term gains are designed to boost perceptions of government legitimacy and effectiveness, and demonstrate how governance works best, thereby creating a demand for longer-term good governance programming. Geographically, the strategy focuses on supporting continued progress in Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu, and more recently an expansion of activities into South Central Somalia that commenced with the provision of quick-impact peace dividends.

USAID Somalia designed each of its two primary objectives – (1) strengthening local and national capacity to promote good governance; and (2) improving social services delivery and economic growth – to directly address each of these instability sources. The strategy’s TOC was similarly derived from the identification of these two sources. It states:


By supporting a legitimate governance framework through inclusive processes, and improving access to service delivery and economic opportunity, public confidence is increased and the appeal of extremists is reduced.

This TOC was used to establish a goal, objectives and intermediate results for the 2013 Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document (PAD). According to the PAD, USAID’s goal in Somalia is to increase stability through targeted interventions that foster good governance, promote economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism. USAID Somalia’s two primary objectives under the overall goal over the four-year life of the PAD are to: (1) strengthen local and national capacity to promote good governance; and (2) improve social service delivery and economic growth. These are highlighted in the Results Framework. The Results Framework also represents a development hypothesis, or a TOC, about how intended change is expected to occur. It shows how the achievement of lower level Intermediate Results (IRs) leads to the achievement of the next higher order of objectives, ultimately resulting in the Assistance Objective (AO).

The Results Framework for USAID Somalia is below, with an assumption that there is a conceptual – and logical – inter-relationship between the achievement of intended IRs and the achievement of the objectives. There is also an assumption that through the periodic collection and analysis of a series of indicators, these data can inform USAID on progress toward the achievement of the IRs and objectives. These assumptions are reviewed and tested during the course of evaluation, and recommendations made on more flexible, illustrative, and indicative means to measure, or observe, progress toward the achievement of USAID’s IRs and objectives.

The Results Framework is designed in such a way that each mission’s programs should directly contribute to the achievement of the IRs and therefore to the objectives, with the indicators serving as the means to demonstrate and prove this causal – or contributed – linkage. One or more of the programs and activities can contribute to each of the IRs. Below is a table illustrating which USAID activities correspond to the IRs, based on an initial review of their respective theories of change, or development hypotheses. For the purposes of performance monitoring and management, the IRs developed and collected are sustained by indicator data

FIGURE 2: USAID SOMALIA RESULTS FRAMEWORK



The Results Framework is designed in such a way that each mission’s programs should directly contribute to the achievement of the IRs and therefore to the objectives, with the indicators serving as the means to demonstrate and prove this causal – or contributed – linkage. One or more of the programs and activities can contribute to each of the IRs. Below is a table illustrating which USAID activities correspond to the IRs, based on an initial review of their respective theories of change, or development hypotheses. For the purposes of performance monitoring and management, the IRs developed and collected are sustained by indicator data collected by the programs, and can be augmented by survey data (e.g., the USAID stabilization survey); performance evaluation data; and special studies and existing indicator index data (e.g., from AMISOM, WHO, FSNAU, etc.).

TABLE I: USAID SOMALIA IRS BY PRIMARY ACTIVITY

Intermediate Results (IRs)	Activities
IR 1.1 <i>Capacity of key government institutions to perform essential functions improved</i>	Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) ¹
IR 1.2 <i>Participatory political process promoted</i>	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) ²
IR 2.1 <i>Access to quality basic social services increased</i>	Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI) ³ ; Joint Health and Nutrition (JHNP) Programme
IR 2.2 <i>Economic opportunities increased</i>	Partnership for Economic Growth (PEG) ⁴

It should be noted that the People to People (P2P) activity is not in this table, as it appears not to have had a TOC.

¹ <http://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/transition-initiatives-stabilization-tis-somalia>

² <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Somalia%20CEPPS%2006-10-13.pdf>

³ <http://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/somali-youth-leaders-initiative>

⁴ <http://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/partnership-economic-growth>

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report opens with background and methodology and design sections. The analysis section of the report follows the structure below, and adheres to USAID guidelines as per ADS 203 and to the “criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report,” as per the 2011 USAID Evaluation Policy. The Evaluation Team segmented the section by Evaluation Question, and therein by conclusion(s), with supporting findings complemented by references to critical data, KIs, etc. For example:

Evaluation Question I: Why is the sky blue?

Conclusion: The sky is blue because of the presence of fairy dust.

Findings: According to Oxford University, there are several chemical, atmospheric and geo-physical reasons why the Earth’s sky is blue. For example, in the following research on fairy-dust... As KIs with Mr. X and Ms. Y suggest...

Programmatic and M&E recommendations close-out the report.

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

USAID Somalia’s portfolio is comprehensive and covers a wide range of sectors. Along with its partners it plans for and manages hundreds of short- and long-term activities in a fluid, and often volatile operating environment. This evaluation, therefore, is equally comprehensive in that it serves to answer the Evaluation Questions as fully, completely, and objectively as possible given the complexity of the portfolio. In doing so, it also analyzes the conceptual, causal, and correlative assumptions that have guided the implementation of USAID’s programs and activities since 2010. As a result it has sought to develop additional normative findings on the overall measurability and evaluability of stabilization programming for USAID in Somalia. This is based on a series of concurrent, thematic evaluation data collection and analysis activities, each of which informs the other, and all of which, in aggregate, provide a more holistic set of actionable findings, conclusions and recommendations for USAID. As stated above, this evaluation used a non-experimental, time series design spanning the period 2010 to 2014. On the one hand, it looked back to examine changes from 2010, which marked the beginning of some of USAID Somalia’s current programming, to 2014. On the other hand, it looked forward to allow learning for future programming. The comprehensive Evaluation Design can be found in Annex 3, along with specific details on approach, methods, analysis techniques, and limitations and constraints.

DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The Evaluation Team used two primary data collection methods: document review and KIIs. A third method was also included, namely having the Evaluation Team compile, review and subsequently analyze all of the partner indicator data from the Management Information System (MIS) “Clearinghouse,” the PPR reports from 2010-2014, and the annual and quarterly reports. These data were critical for the indicator analysis exercise that informed Question I.

Document Review

The Evaluation Team conducted a comprehensive review of USG, USAID and academic/operational literature relating to stabilization; violent extremism; the “theory and practice” of theories of change; USG planning and assessment strategies; and, above all, logic in planning and assessment cycles. It also conducted a review and analysis of program documents, e.g., contracts and cooperative agreements; annual and quarterly reports; special studies; USAID Somalia assessments and evaluations; and in particular the USAID TIS Stabilization Survey.⁵

⁵ USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC): Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) Survey Synthesis Report.

KIIs

The team conducted 105 KIIs in Washington, Nairobi, Hargeisa, Garowe, and Mogadishu, and via remote connection with respondents across the globe. The complete KII respondent list can be found in Annex 4.

Indicator Data

As mentioned above, the team also compiled all of the partner indicator data from the MIS “Clearinghouse,” PPR reports from 2010-2014, and annual and quarterly reports. This data was critical for the indicator analysis exercise which informed Question 1, and allowed the team to conduct:

- Analyses of data within the Clearinghouse: a) All USAID targets and actuals; b) targets and actuals for each activity by quarter; c) comparison of program achievements of targets and actuals, by quarter;
- Analyses of data within the IP Reports: a) All IP targets and actuals; b) targets and actuals for each activity, by quarter; c) comparison of program achievements of targets and actuals, by quarter;
- Analyses of data, as aligned to each IR within the USAID Results Framework, normalized and/or scaled and in aggregate

It should be noted that while the team analyzed documentation data and indicator data aggregated by gender, the holistic – program-level – nature of the evaluation did not lend itself to such a disaggregation.

DATA ANALYSIS

The Evaluation Team designed a data analysis plan as part of the Evaluation Design deliverable. See Annex 3. The main data analysis methods used are described below:

Comparison Analysis

The team compared targets against actuals to assess the extent to which the USAID Somalia intermediate results, objectives and goal have been achieved.

Summary Statistics

The team used summary statistics to analyze quantitative data obtained from the indicator data, using frequency analysis and cross-tabulation analysis.

Content, Pattern and Trend Analysis

For data from KIIs, the team documented narrative responses to allow for a systematic content analysis of these data, and of the frequency of responses to questions.

Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis

The team reviewed the data collected to determine where there was significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders. When divergence was found, the team reviewed the data to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts, perceptions or opinions.

LIMITATIONS

There were two primary methodological limitations to the evaluation:

Document Review:

- Limitation/Weakness: Initially, information resources were not optimally organized, applicable, available or up-to-date. The Evaluation Team was also challenged by the fact that many of the documents were pre-selected and therefore subject to selection bias.
- How it was mitigated: The Evaluation Team provided USAID Somalia with periodic, supplemental lists of the relevant types of documents required to conduct the desk review. As the material was received, the team reviewed the documentation to ensure that it was organized, current, and complete. If any gaps were found, the team communicated this to USAID Somalia to determine how to fill the gaps and/or alternatives to collecting the necessary information. To ensure that all files were managed and available at all times to the Team, a Google Docs folder was created which was accessible to the team and to USAID Somalia.

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs):

- Limitation/Weakness: Findings can be biased if the informants are not carefully, or purposively, selected. When only a few people are interviewed, it may be difficult to demonstrate any general, let alone statistically significant, validity of the findings. It is difficult to prove that the interviewees are, in fact, knowledgeable and informed and that they are representative of their peers in their information and recommendations. The Findings could have been susceptible to limitation. Also, sample and recall bias was a significant limitation. Some USAID Somalia KII respondents were not part of the office during the critical early strategy development and implementation phases of the program, and so in some cases presented incomplete responses or non-responses, or even conjecture.
- How it was mitigated: The team managed this limitation by working with USAID Somalia and IPs to confirm that all KIIs were purposive. The team used a sample based on those respondents most likely to provide rich, comprehensive responses to questions and therefore contribute significantly to Findings. The team interviewed as many relevant key informants as necessary within the allotted evaluation period to increase confidence in the validity of the evaluation Findings. Furthermore, the team developed an objective, rigorous set of KII guides to mitigate recall bias.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

QUESTION 1: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE USAID SOMALIA-FUNDED ACTIVITIES CONTRIBUTED, IN A MEASURABLE WAY, TO INCREASED STABILITY IN SOMALIA, AS DEFINED BY THE USAID SOMALIA GOAL AND THE LOGIC OF THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK STATED IN THE 2013 PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT?

Conclusion: There is evidence that USAID-funded activities have resulted in noticeable change in Somalia over time, and that this change may have contributed to perceived increased stability in key geographical areas.

While the aforementioned conclusion holds, assigning contribution is challenging as there is no universal understanding of the definition of stabilization. There is a universal perception of noticeable change at the community and district levels, i.e., across all USG and Somali respondents. This noticeable change is supported by findings which emerged from the USAID Somalia assessments and evaluations, in addition to annual and quarterly reports. Somalia District Commissioners (DCs) interviewed also emphasized noticeable changes in their districts, including improved relations with the community and a general trend toward a more stable environment. However, it is important to note that these perceived changes are derived disproportionately from self-reported findings and “feel good” stories. As discussed below, too, this noticeable change is not supported by the Evaluation Team’s quantitative data analysis of the IR indicator data, and consequently calls into question claims of *measurable*, increased stability in Somalia. Nonetheless, there is no real universal understanding of a) stability or indeed of USAID’s stabilization strategy; b) how to implement stabilization activities as part of this USAID stabilization strategy; and, c) how to measure progress along a stability continuum as per this USAID stabilization strategy. The Evaluation Team found that there was no clear definition of “stabilization,” let alone of a “stabilization strategy,” both of which could have provided the necessary guidance to activity implementation teams funded by USAID Somalia.

Defining “stabilization” is no easy task. Applying any one specific definition and reaching a consensus regarding the definition of stabilization is even more challenging given the contextual complexities in the geographical areas where the programming is being implemented. Differing historical contexts, cultures, languages, norms, as well as organizational cultures among international civil society groups, governmental organizations, and multilateral organizations also influence defining stabilization. USAID Somalia’s definition as per the Performance Management Plan (PMP) is “the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to a resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support successful long-term development and increased institutional capacity.” Stabilization has become a prevalent theme in USAID’s narrative, with the underlying recognition that stabilization programs play a vital role in supporting counterinsurgency efforts, and that “the development response is one part of a broader USG effort to address national security concerns.”⁶ While USAID believes stabilization is a necessary precursor to achieving long-term development goals, this notion is caveated by the fact that stabilization programming must

⁶ The *Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency*. Washington, DC: USAID, 2011.

reflect both the differences and the linkages between the two, in terms of objectives, beneficiaries, modalities and metrics.⁷

Conclusion: There is evidence that USAID Somalia faced challenges when attempting to measure contribution within a stabilization context such as Somalia.

Given the lack of a precise, universal, definition of stabilization, as well as there being a broad-encompassing, contextually-driven scope of “stabilization” projects within USG, developing a clear set of metrics for stabilization is also challenging. Nonetheless, using some key commonalities, as well as the normative stabilization literature, can help to identify benchmarking, or measurability, tools.

There are several stabilization measurement tool-kits in existence, none of which USAID Somalia appears to have incorporated as it developed its Results Framework as part of its strategy. For example, the OECD and UNDP have excellent approaches. The USG *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments* (MPICE) project has developed a summary description of stable end-states, which include (1) Safe and Secure Environment (the ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence); (2) Rule of Law (ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security); (3) Stable governance (Ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state); (4) Sustainable economy (Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law); (5) Social well-being (Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement).

In terms of USAID Somalia’s conceptualization of stabilization, 100% of USAID Somalia KII respondents identified the hexagon model (see Figure 1 above) as being the defining model of stabilization and thus as the key defining principle of USAID stabilization in Somalia. This model has, in fact, become the driver of much of USAID’s stabilization programming and implementation since its inception at a partner event in Mombasa in 2011. This event was designed primarily to support TIS, but more broadly to explore plausible stabilization principles for Somalia’s future. It also incorporated participatory approaches to defining the key stability and instability triggers in Somalia, and more so on the associations and/or linkages between these triggers as they contribute to stability or instability.⁸ Interestingly, 85% of USAID Somalia KII respondents also had other definitions of stability that were not definitions within USAID Somalia strategic documentation, or aligned to the theory of the hexagon model. They simply had other – sometimes more cogent – interpretations of what stabilization can be – or could be – in the context of Somalia. When prompted by the interviewer, 100% of USAID Somalia KII respondents identified the hexagon model as being the defining model of stabilization, but then 100% focused solely on the drivers of stability (the right side of the model) as being key to implementing stabilization programs, i.e., those mitigating institutional or capacity drivers that when affected through intervention may lead to greater stability, e.g., improved social services or increased confidence in governance. Nevertheless, only 30% of USAID Somalia KII

⁷ Shah, Rajiv. *Administrator’s Stabilization Guidance*. Washington, DC: USAID, 2011.

⁸ USAID Somalia, TIS, *Future of Stability in Somalia*, 2011.

respondents addressed, mentioned, or thought important the inclusion of the drivers of instability (the left side of the model). This is a key finding as presumably a) both the drivers of instability would need to be addressed in a stabilization context; and b) USAID Somalia believes – rightly or wrongly – that it only has influence on drivers of stability and not on the drivers of instability. In terms of what constitutes stability, or what factors best contribute to stability, the majority of KII respondents, including those from USAID Somalia, DOS CSO, “interested parties” in Somalia and the respective ministries included governance and economic growth as key, albeit only when prompted. That said, there is evidence of a universal understanding that stability in Somalia can only be achieved if and when governance issues (however defined) and economic growth issues are addressed fully and resolutely.

When discussing the USAID strategy, several themes emerged from the data analysis. Firstly, there was clearly confusion on the part of USAID Somalia KII respondents about the definition of stabilization, as discussed above. There was also confusion about the definition, provenance and indeed location of a single, guiding USAID Somalia strategy such as that described in the PAD. Indeed, when asked whether s/he was familiar with the USAID Somalia strategy, one USAID staff member replied: “What strategy?” leading the Evaluation Team into a further series of questions to determine whether or not this answer referred to the respondent not being aware of a USAID strategy *per se*, or, in fact, whether this answer implied the respondent not knowing *which* strategy the evaluation was referring to, i.e., that there was more than one.

Secondly, the lack of a consistent understanding of a single, guiding USAID strategy is apparent in the majority of USAID/W, USAID Somalia and DOS KII respondents. This is not surprising given the number of existing USG strategies relevant to Somalia and more so to the lack of a single, guiding USAID Somalia strategy. As mentioned above, the hexagon model is perceived by 100% of USAID Somalia KII respondents as the defining model of stabilization and thus as the key defining principle of USAID stabilization in Somalia, but it is not the only strategy relevant to the USAID stabilization, transition, or development context in Somalia. In addition to the hexagon model, the USG Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) in particular appears more relevant to (and indeed embracing of) USAID Somalia’s inherent goals.

Thirdly, while 100% of USAID Somalia KII respondents assumed that the hexagon model was the strategy, none of these 100% could claim how it was – or should be – implemented. No one suggested how best the USAID stabilization strategy – no matter how defined, be it the hexagon model or otherwise – could be implemented. It is important to note that there was also a clear difference between how DOS and USAID Somalia interpreted stabilization, and moreover, the necessary and sufficient factors, hexagons, or triggers to facilitate progress along this continuum. According to the KIIs, DOS considered, for example, good governance and economic growth as necessary and sufficient precursors to stabilization at the federal level, and as integral strategic factors to the FGS as it develops, maintains and sustains its presence outside of Mogadishu. For USAID, the perception of the hexagons was again, natural, given the provenance of the hexagons in a 2011 TIS exercise, and the focus on good governance and economic growth primarily at the community- or district-level with the assumption that progress would compound to the regional and federal levels.

Finally, despite there being unclear understanding of the concept of stabilization itself, the overwhelming majority of KIIs with USAID Somalia, USAID/W, DOS, Somalia/Somaliland

Ministries and Somali CSOs suggested that Somalia is in a stabilization context, and not in a transition environment. Therefore aid and development programming with short- to medium-term stabilization objectives should remain as the focus.

Conclusion: USG KIIs suggest that there is a perception of limited inter- and intra-agency joint planning and implementation in Somalia, and this in turn affected the Evaluation Team’s ability to determine the discrete contribution of USAID-specific activities.

Based on the KIIs with USAID/W, DOS/W, USAID Somalia and the DOS Somalia Unit, there is undeniable evidence that there is a functioning, collaborative relationship between the Somalia Unit and USAID Somalia, and that this relationship has resulted in increased planning and information-sharing meetings. There are also strong perceptions from within USAID and/or within some international donors of a potentially debilitating discordance in the desire of a) DOS CSO and USAID to jointly implement USG strategic goals in Somalia, and, b) the USAID Somalia activities themselves to jointly plan and/or implement USG strategic goals in Somalia. In the case of the DOS CSO/USAID Somalia collaboration issue, all of the USG KIIs revealed either some outlying personality or programmatic hurdles to be overcome before any substantive joint approach to planning, programming, or implementation can occur.

Within USAID Somalia itself, KIIs suggested there was limited joint activity programming aimed at “operationalizing” USAID Somalia’s stabilization strategy, or that there was limited inter-USAID activity collaboration that might have led to more holistic outcomes and impacts. Despite the presumption that all activities are integrating and contributing parts to the overall strategy, and that each of the partners actively report on indicators associated with the Results Framework (a Framework that itself is disconnected from the hexagon model, and thus to the conceptual foundations of the strategy), there is no evidence of joint or collaborative approaches to implementation at the activity level. This disconnect is not necessarily a critical flaw, but it does imply that partners who do not have individual programmatic linkages with the “triggers” within the hexagon model (which is a conceptual and causal flaw) can establish such linkages through collaborative planning and implementation. During KIIs with USAID Somalia staff, there was universal interest in developing increased collaboration across activities, and especially those with conceptual synergies, e.g., SYLI and PEG; TIS and SYLI; SSG and TIS, etc. However, in interviews with the partners there was some evidence of reluctance to partner, or even inter- and intra-activity competitiveness. In one joint interview respondents mentioned that while there was clear operational coordination when necessary between TIS IOM and TIS DAI, or indeed with other activities, there was a sense of betterment or competition for attention between TIS IOM and TIS DAI over the effect of their activities relative to their stabilization objectives.

Finally, KIIs revealed that USAID Somalia – and indeed the wider USG – can better incorporate operationalization criteria as part of any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID Somalia’s strategy. These operationalization criteria should include USAID Somalia having a regular, visible presence in Somalia. Better USAID presence was overwhelmingly advocated not just by USAID Somalia KII respondents, but by other donors and the FGS as an absolute precondition to establishing USAID Somalia as a strong donor implementer in the country.

Conclusion: Within the international donor community in Mogadishu, DOS (and in particular DOS CSO) is seen as the visible face of USG stabilization and reconstruction activity in the country.

Unattributed sources indicated that there was, and is, a perception among the international donor community and the FGS in Mogadishu that CSO is the visible face of stabilization and reconstruction efforts in the country. Sources also suggested that there was a divergent, if not competitive, perception on how best to implement (and therefore measure) USG strategy in Somalia; who should take the lead in representing USG in Mogadishu; and, how the USG can and should be represented in Mogadishu at inter-donor meetings and New Deal Working Group meetings. Assuming that some of these perceptions are based on there being historically different philosophical and operational perspectives between development and diplomacy, this particular discordance appears to be based primarily on organizational differences and on personalities.

Conclusion: There were inadequate means in place to measure the achievement of USAID Somalia's activities over time.

A critical sub-theme to Question I relates to the subject of measurability, and whether the Evaluation Team can rigorously and defensibly state from the evidence that USAID-funded activities contributed in a *measurable* way to increased stability in Somalia. Here too the conclusion is inconclusive at best. This is not due to the efficacy or potential impact of USAID Somalia's activities over time, but rather due to the simple fact that USAID had no measurability systems in place in 2010/2011 to allow for the measurement of change in the environment over time. This changed in 2011 with the development of a more robust monitoring and evaluation capability, one that has matured since. When the Evaluation Team asked USAID Somalia KII respondents whether they thought they contributed measurably to noticeable change in Somalia since 2010/2011, 90% stated that they "did not know." Ultimately, 100% of USAID Somalia partners indicated that they had contributed to positive change over time, but that they could not prove this to be the case, relying instead on anecdotal evidence and "feel good" stories as evidence of positive change. If USAID had wished to measure progress using the Results Framework as an analytical tool, this was hampered by there being a) insufficient IP indicators in place to passably aggregate to indicate progress toward an IR; b) many non-correlative IP indicators, i.e., indicators that did not logically correlate to the achievement of a particular IR; or c) unrealistic or ill-informed indicator targets that would be misleading when used as data to determine progress toward the achievement of an IR.

Additionally, although the USAID Somalia assessments and evaluations are effective at highlighting specific program performance and effect to date, they do not explicitly provide any evidence or measurement data supporting indications of achievement toward the USAID goal or the USAID stabilization strategy, let alone the achievement of measurable change in Somalia. In the case of the evaluations, the Evaluation Questions were understandably focused on the respective programs and not on USAID holistic outcomes and impacts. However, this is a deficit when analyzing at the strategy level. For example, some of the evaluations have been good programmatic evaluations, but they do not necessarily reflect the comprehensiveness of USAID's stabilization strategy, e.g., in the SYLI Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Final Report, there is the suggestion that "SYLI answers directly to the 2011 USAID Education Strategy

which promotes the concept of *opportunity through learning*, and specifically to Goal 2, but not to the USAID strategy.” Alternatively, some performance Evaluation Questions imply a connection to the stabilization strategy, but there is little supporting evidence to answer the question one way or the other. An illustrative example comes from the PEG Final Performance Evaluation Report:

- PEG Evaluation Question: “Has ‘The Partnership for Economic Growth Program’ achieved the objectives as prescribed in the program’s PMP and in the 2011 contract and subsequent three modifications?”
- PEG Evaluation Answer: “There is no evidence that PEG made a substantial contribution to improved stability in Somaliland or Puntland. The program’s scale/outreach was too small and there is no qualitative evidence that stability (security) is a salient issue among the PEG beneficiaries.”

As noted above, the vast majority of evidence of perceived “contributed” outcome, impact and indeed success over time has been derived from anecdotal evidence and “feel good” stories. The Evaluation Team sees immense value in the emotive evidence that suggests positive change in the environment, and having interviewed successive DCs and Director Generals (DGs) in Somalia there are clear perceptions that some very noticeable personal, social and community-based changes have occurred in Somalia since 2010/2011.

Nonetheless, the official indicators suggest no such corresponding trend lines. There is an assumption in the USAID Somalia PMP (a correct assumption at that, assuming the Theory of Change is valid) that the collection and analysis of indicator data down to the activity level can inform the achievement of the USAID IRs, the Objectives and thus the USAID Somalia strategy as defined in the PMP. This is a valid assumption, and corresponds to ADS 200, 201 and 203. There is also, then, and as a result, the logical assumption that this being the case, progress toward the targets as identified in the PMP will illustrate progress toward the USAID strategy, as defined in the PMP:

- Assumption 1: Indicators > IRs > Objectives > Goal > Strategy
- Assumption 2: Progress toward targets = Progress toward the Strategy

The assumptions hold at least logically, but the evidence does not fully support the assumptions. As part of the evaluation, the Evaluation Team conducted a rigorous analysis of both a) activity achievement of targets over time, as per their respective self-reported data; and, b) activity achievement toward the IRs over time. This analysis was conducted to balance, corroborate, and/or verify the very qualitative “feel good” stories of achievement presented by the partners, and to further answer the Evaluation Question using performance data.


Conclusion: USAID Somalia’s regularly reported performance data cannot answer the Evaluation Question, and in particular the extent to which USAID Somalia’s activities have contributed *in a measurable way* to stability.

In order to provide a measurement of USAID’s overall performance in Somalia over the course of its presence in the country, the Evaluation Team compared indicator targets and actuals, and then aggregated the data in order to create a success rate of the mission as a whole. The

narrative here is important, but paradoxical. It illustrates that in the absence of ongoing assessments, evaluations, surveys, and other perception-based data collection and analysis efforts, the USAID IR data is the only “standard,” evaluative data set from which to measure USAID Somalia’s effect on change and/or achievement. In spite of this fact, an analysis of this data also suggests that one of the reasons it is difficult to measure progress in Somalia is that the performance data is spotty and the targets are at times unrealistic at the outset. As a recent USAID Data Quality Assurance (DQA) study has demonstrated, the collection of the data itself has been problematic. It should also be noted that this analysis assumes that the targets accurately reflect partner implementation ambitions in the first place.

In order to analyze the performance data, the Evaluation Team first exported a report from the USAID Somalia Clearinghouse that mapped each indicator to an Intermediate Result (IR), and each IR to an Assistance Objective (AO).⁹ Secondly, each indicator was scaled so that all data was uniform. This was achieved by looking at the “% achieved” of each indicator. This is a measurement that has already been established in the Clearinghouse as a metric of performance success on the indicator level. It is calculated by dividing the target number of each indicator by the actual measurement that was recorded for that indicator in a particular year. Third, because “% achieved” has already been established as a measurement of performance on the indicator level, the Evaluation Team extended it to the IR and AO levels in order to depict USAID Somalia’s mission-wide performance based on the results framework put forth in the 2014 USAID Somalia PMP.¹⁰ This was performed for each IR by taking an

FIGURE 3: % OF TARGETS ACHIEVED UNDER MISSION-WIDE ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES FROM 2011-2014



⁹ *Mission Frame*. <https://www.mepsinfo.net/reporting/> 2014.


¹⁰ *USAID/Somalia Performance Management Plan (2014-2017)*. USAID, 2014.

average “% achieved” from all indicators pertaining to each IR.¹¹

In order to create a complete overview of the mission’s performance over the course of its presence in Somalia, it was necessary to look at all levels of measurement, e.g., indicator, IRs, and overall AOs (See Figure 4 below). What is clear in this analysis is that USAID Somalia struggled to meet its overall assistance objectives for AO I.

Figure 4 below displays success rates of IRs in a different view, that of a spider diagram, allowing for the illustration of multivariate data, and in this case, targets achieved over time. Through this graphical representation, one can see from a better perspective the areas in which USAID Somalia has had the most reported “success.” In 2012 and 2013, the graph shows that USAID Somalia had greater success in IR 2.2, *Economic opportunities increased*, while in 2014 USAID Somalia performed better in *Promoting the participatory political process* (IR1.2). Also, based on the size of the objects, the bigger the shape, the better the overall performance of USAID. One can see that *USAID Somalia achieved a great deal of success in 2013, while its success rates in 2012 and 2014 were uneven.*


FIGURE 4: USAID MISSION-WIDE PERFORMANCE BASED ON % OF TARGETS ACHIEVED OF INTERMEDIATE RESULTS FROM 2011-2014



¹¹ It should be noted that indicators that did not have targets set for a given year were not included in the average for that year. Also, indicators that were officially dropped in a given year from USAID’s framework were not included in the average of the following year, despite being reported on by some Implementing Partners (IPs). Note also that at the time of this report, not all indicator data had been reported for 2014. Thus, the evaluation team left indicators with missing data out of the 2014 “% achieved” IR and AO averages, and that these averages are likely to change as IPs input the remaining indicator data from 2014.

Areas of success may be explained in part by the changing type of activities that USAID Somalia focused on from year to year. Based on data derived from the Clearinghouse, also displayed in detail under Annex 5, the infographic below Figure 5 illustrates the breakdown by sector of activities that were implemented in each region from 2012-2014. There are clear indications of dominant economic growth activities in Somaliland; education activities in Puntland, and peace and security activities in Mogadishu. Thus the substantial success of achievement of IR 2.2 “Economic opportunities increased” can partly be explained by the high percentage of activities relating to economic growth that were implemented in the relatively stable cluster region of Somaliland, for example.

FIGURE 5: BREAKDOWN OF ACTIVITIES BY REGION FROM 2012-2014



Perhaps more revealing is that when one analyzes the program indicator data – self-reported program indicator data - there appears to be some disconnect between the anecdotal claims of overall success and achievement and those represented by the programs respective indicators. The full program indicator analysis graphs are in Annex 5, noting that all the data informing the graphs was drawn from the Clearinghouse. The Evaluation Team found that across the board, programs were largely inconsistent in their achievement of agreed-upon targets and in turn, of achievement toward their goals. Each activity in the USAID Somalia portfolio faced achievement challenges that also imply that there are measurable means to identify activity “success” toward the achievement of objectives over time. Of course, and as mentioned above, an alternative explanation is that the targets themselves were unrealistically developed and even worded at the outset of an activity.

QUESTION 2: TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE THEORY OF CHANGE (TOC) USED BY USAID SOMALIA VALID?

Conclusion: There is no evidence to support the claim that the USAID Somalia TOC was either valid or invalid.

Instead, USAID and normative literature suggests that the TOC was overly simplistic and overly assumptive. The findings for this question emerged almost exclusively from literature due in part to the nature – and structure – of the posed question, coupled with the fact that no USG KII respondent was aware of the full provenance of the TOC, or of its logic, assumptions, structure, or rationale. This is significant given the fact that the TOC, at least normatively, should be shaping and guiding the focus, nature and evaluability of a USAID intervention, or interventions. Without a coherent, and indeed a coherently subscribed to TOC, there is no rationale for an intervention.

According to ADS 200, a TOC is a description of the logical causal relationships between multiple levels of conditions or interim results needed to achieve a long-term objective. It may be visualized as a roadmap of change, and outlines pathways or steps to get from an initial set of conditions to a desired end result. A Theory of Change is analogous to a USAID development hypothesis or project hypothesis. It is a program design and evaluation concept that has gained pervasive traction within international development theory and practice. It generates a “description of a sequence of events that is expected to lead to a particular desired outcome.”¹² TOCs identify the ‘problem’ that is to be addressed through an intervention, with an attendant analysis of the causes or contributing contextual factors that condition the problem, and then delineates a series of “if-then” statements, which trace the various activities, outputs, and intended outcomes to a final program outcome. A robust TOC also makes explicit any critical assumptions that are necessary to ensure, or that may possibly undermine, program success.

The ‘problem’ that USAID Somalia has sought to address has been to progress along the stability/instability continuum through program activities designed to improve stability.¹³ TOC is then used to inform decision-making, and ideally it serves to inform the design of reflective and adaptive program learning processes throughout the USAID Program Cycle, for USAID and all implementing partners.¹⁴ This is done through encouraging both ongoing questioning and an ongoing review of what may influence change in the project context.¹⁵

Conclusion: According to the literature, the USAID Somalia TOC is poorly defined and wholly assumption-based. The TOC does not demonstrate an understanding of the underlying causes and conditions that can lead to, or derail, the TOC.

In defining validity there are several principles that are applicable in critiquing a TOC: relevance, sound logic, and effectiveness. These same general principles are echoed in the wider literature of TOC, and are characteristics specifically mentioned when it comes to the evaluability of a

¹² “Review of the Use of ‘Theory of Change’ in International Development.” By Isabel Vogel. DfID: April, 2012. P.4.

¹³ See “Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document: Bringing Stability and Hope.” USAID: Undated.

¹⁴ For more clarity related to the project cycle, see “Program Cycle Overview.” USAID: December 9, 2011.

¹⁵ “Review of the Use of ‘Theory of Change’ in International Development.” By Isabel Vogel. DfID: April, 2012. Pp. 3-5.

TOC.¹⁶ If it is possible to demonstrate that USAID's TOC contains these three essential characteristics, the TOC can be considered 'valid.'

Without concrete evidence from either the literature or the KIs, the Evaluation Team assumed that the brainstorming technique used by USAID to identify the various factors related to instability met the standard of relevance, i.e., that USAID correctly identified the issues that should be focused on, and the reasons why. These various factors are further identified in numerous context analyses that discuss underlying issues and contextual factors driving assorted instability triggers in Somalia. In this regard, then, *relevance* is a key criteria¹⁷ for determining validity, and according to this standard, the TOC is valid. As discussed above, validity may also be determined as contingent upon the principles of logical correctness and effectiveness. A logically correct TOC should be justifiable with evidence supporting the sequence of cause-and-effect events from past projects and/or objective context studies, situational analyses or baseline studies. A TOC should also be plausible, i.e., if there is no prior evidence supporting the sequence of events, it should be nested logically within what is known about the intervention and context, and specifically, all of the underlying assumptions should be made explicit with key constraining or enabling contextual factors identified.

According to the literature, a well-grounded, justifiable, meaningful, logical, and appropriate TOC must have the following parts:¹⁸

1. A "problem statement," with detailed, sensitive, and correct analysis of the underlying causes and conditions which drive the problem;
2. Clarity about the long-term change envisioned, and also a detailed process or sequence of changes, that lead from project inputs/outputs to long-term outcomes;
3. An articulation of critical operating assumptions that condition the ultimate achievement of results;
4. A diagram (typically in the form of a results framework) and a narrative that describes the process by which change will occur.

According to USAID PPL, a development hypothesis is expressed in a narrative statement that describes a TOC, i.e., the logical explanation of how the development results are expected to be achieved. If the results at one level are achieved, the results at the next level above can also be achieved if the critical assumptions hold.¹⁹ Here, change is hypothesized with an emphasis on the CDCS. Specifically, and according to ADS 201, the TOC should explain "why" and "how" the proposed investments from USAID and others collectively lead to achieving the Development Objectives and the CDCS. This being the case, the very fact that USAID Somalia does not have a CDCS with an overarching, high-level objective from which the DOs, IRs and sub-IRs logically stem, certainly presents a challenge in justifying the TOC's validity.

¹⁶ April 2012: Blog post on the criteria for assessing the evaluability of a Theory of Change. By Rick Davies. <http://mandenews.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/criteria-for-assessing-evaluability-of.html>


¹⁷ "Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security, and Justice Programmes. Part II. Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation." By Vanessa Corlazzoli and Jonathan White. DfID: 28 January, 2013. P. 8.

¹⁸ "Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development. Review Report." By Isabel Vogel. DfID: April, 2012. P. 4.

¹⁹ http://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/RF_Technical_Note_Final_2013_0722.pdf

Given the lack of evidence of strong analysis underpinning USAID’s identification of factors of instability and associated program areas, as well as lack of careful identification of assumptions and overly simplistic descriptions of cause and effect, it is difficult to assess TOCs against these criteria. This is the case with USAID Somalia’s TOC. The lack of evidence is itself evidence of weakness. This allows us to conclude that USAID Somalia and its projects did not adequately adhere to the TOC model as described above, but instead focused predominantly on the IF and THEN sequencing of logic without well-considered assumptions and contextual factors (see Figure 6 below). Similarly, there are numerous gaps in the cause and effect logic, with activity A leading directly to result D rather than progressing through a logical series of events. This is a logical fallacy and a programmatic design flaw. In the end, in defining USAID Somalia Office’s TOC validity, the principles of logical correctness and logical effectiveness are not met.

FIGURE 6: SEQUENCING OF THEORY OF CHANGE LOGIC



Conclusion: There is a simplistic conflation of symptoms and causes that lead to and/or define change within the USAID TOC.

A TOC is by nature a simplification of a complex reality; a tool for program design and management that necessarily reduces complexity to allow people to conceptualize intricate social systems and operationalize program responses suited to the context, but USAID Somalia’s TOC is overly simplistic – and overly assumption driven – to be effective and guiding.

The USAID Somalia TOC captured in the PMP²⁰ and in the PAD²¹, with alternative reiterations, suggests that through USAID Somalia’s support, IF Somali people are engaged in inclusive political processes and IF they have improved service delivery and economic opportunity, and IF

²⁰ USAID/Somalia Performance Management Plan (2014 – 2017). August, 2014. P. 3.

²¹ Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document: Bringing Stability and Hope. USAID: undated.


these improved services and economic opportunities are associated with local government, THEN they will perceive government as legitimate and effective and will better understand government function, which will THEN increase public confidence in the government and reduce the influence of extremists, ultimately leading to stability (see stylized Figure 7 below). Although this TOC is fairly detailed in terms of the logic of cause and effect, almost all of the assumptions embedded within it are implicit, meaning they have not been clearly identified or described by USAID Somalia. Furthermore, based upon the extensive normative evidence available, these assumptions are likely to be substantially wrong.²² Although the USAID Somalia PAD does provide some contextual detail to offer to this TOC, the discussion is heavily skewed toward policy priorities and the operational approach, and not “social, political and environmental conditions, the current state of the problem the project is seeking to influence, and other actors able to influence change.”²³ The identified assumptions listed are all operationally focused, and not “[a]ssumptions about how...changes might happen, [and] whether the activities and outputs are appropriate for influencing change in the desired direction in this context.”²⁴ In effect, the assumptions are not causal, or even attributional. Coupled with this, there is no detailed, sensitive, locally grounded, and evidence-based discussion of how the Somalia context matters, or how project activities were, or will be, responsive to this complexity.

²² For specific analysis on the drivers of instability and/or violent extremism in Somalia, see, for example, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping.” By Ken Menkhaus. *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 74–106; see also “Somalia’s Islamists” Africa Report No. 100. International Crisis Group: 12 December 2005 and “Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War” Africa Briefing No. 99. International Crisis Group: 26 June 2014. Additionally, some useful USAID documents which bear on this are “Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism” USAID: February, 2009 and “Tribalism, Governance and Development.” USAID: September, 2010.

²³ “Review of the use of ‘Theory of Change’ in international development. Review Report.” By Isabel Vogel. DFID: April, 2012. P. 4.

²⁴ Ibid.

FIGURE 7: USAID SOMALIA'S THEORY OF CHANGE



Conclusion: There is an overall neglect of local systems and cultural conditions as key determinants of cause and effect in the TOC (the “me” principle).

There is a frail linkage between local context and the TOC. The specific causal linkages or drivers between, for example, improved economic opportunity and confidence in the government, or, service delivery and reducing the influence of extremists, are not explicitly defined in adequate detail to be considered credible. For example, from various contexts, most notably and recently in Iraq²⁵ and Afghanistan,²⁶ but also including data from Kenya²⁷ and the Philippines,²⁸ it has been demonstrated that “improved service delivery” does not necessarily result in an increase in public confidence in government. This cause and effect logic is sometimes true, but perhaps only when certain other conditions are met – most notably for the purposes of this portfolio, a stable security environment. Although USAID is focusing on the correct approach to achieve this public confidence result – namely, small-scale service delivery based on a consultative process at local level – it also requires strong capacity from the

²⁵ “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq.” By Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. In *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 119, No. 4 (August 2011), pp. 766-819. Published by: The University of Chicago Press.

²⁶ “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan.” By Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder. The Feinstein International Center, Tufts University: January, 2012.

²⁷ Ibid.


²⁸ “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Iraq and the Philippines.” By Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. (2009). Non-published Research Reports. Paper 169. http://research.create.usc.edu/nonpublished_reports/169

government to deliver a sound security environment through “robust policing capacity.”²⁹ The challenge, however, is that the FGS has neither the presence nor capacity to deliver on security. The closest thing to this enforcement institution defaults to clans,³⁰ which may further suggest that any confidence-building that would actually occur may be transferred to clans and not government.³¹

Conclusion: The TOC is missing links in the cause and effect logic chain.

There are missing pieces in the cause and effect results chain. For example, the TOC assumes that in order for increased confidence in governance to result in improved stability, something needs to occur after this confidence is increased in order for it to be sustainable. It is also clear from the TOC that there is an assumptive logic in the IF, THEN statements, or steps, that lead toward stability. The TOC can be considered as the reasoning that connects the intervention to the changes it is expected to cause. In Figure 8 below, this reasoning, or assumed causality, is represented by arrows.³²

FIGURE 8: THEORY OF CHANGE CONNECTING PROGRAM CHANGES



In reading the TOC, or indeed in visualizing it in the stylization, one assumes that each of the steps is *necessary and sufficient* for the follow-on steps to occur and for there to be some sense of enhanced or increased stability. This is not logically supported, as there is no indication from any contextual analysis that USAID Somalia has conducted that a) the steps do indeed causally lead to one another, or, b) that the steps themselves include and then constitute necessary and sufficient means to ensure advancement to the next step.

Conclusion: There are implicit and untested assumptions driving the causal logic of the TOC – and of the hexagon model.

Further problems relate to the simplistic and assumption-driven understanding of the instability factor within the TOC of *who* constitutes “extremists” (or “extremism” in some KII respondent definitions), and whether it can be addressed through improved service delivery

²⁹ Effective aid in conflict zones, web article by Eli Berman, Joe Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro, Erin Troland 26 May 2013 From: <http://www.voxeu.org/article/effective-aid-conflict-zones> (accessed 9/23/2014)

³⁰ See, for example, “Mogadishu Rising: Conflict and Governance Dynamics in the Somali Capital.” SaferWorld: August, 2012. See also: “Mogadishu: An Economy without a State.” By Christian Webersik. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 8 (2006), pp. 1463-1480; and “Governance without Government in Somalia. Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping.” By Ken Menkhaus. International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 74–106. © 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

³¹ Clans have provided governance, ensured protection of persons and property, pursued locally legitimate legal remedies when transgressions have occurred, and ensured the delivery of basic social services to individuals.

³² http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf “Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation”

and/or improved grassroots economic opportunity. For example, Al-Shabaab, the most visible and arguably most problematic “extremist” group from a stabilization perspective, gains legitimacy in some areas due to its provision of law and order, and articulation of and perceived willingness to align itself against very real clan-based and/or Somali-nationalistic and anti-internationalist grievances.³³ In other cases, there are assumptions that specific governance and economic growth interventions can *actually* mitigate or lessen the effects of extremism. This may be true, but there is no tested assumption in the current TOC to lead one to believe that this is logically sound, e.g., that improved access to service delivery AND economic opportunities can definitely lead – and without doubt – to stability.

Conclusion: USAID’s IPs have poorly defined TOCs – this prevents “nesting” within the USAID TOC.

In many cases the TOCs of implementing partners neither closely reflect nor are they strategically nested within the USAID stabilization strategy or TOC³⁴. For example, while SYLI’s TOC is lucid and linear, it suffers from a lack of appropriate TOC content, clear definition of the development problem and its causes. The cause and effect logic is relatively detailed, but is still disjointed, and suffers from some lack of clarity about how activities will cause sought-after changes to the development problem. SYLI’s TOC is articulated using an “IF-THEN” logic, stating that “IF Somali youth are provided with increased education, economic and civic participation opportunities with the aim of increasing stability in targeted areas, THEN Somali youth will be empowered, the appeal of joining extremist groups and piracy networks will be reduced, Somali youth will be helped to contribute more positively and productively to society, and a future generation of Somali leaders will be built.”³⁵ Though this is a clear IF-THEN statement, how exactly “empowerment” contributes to the reduced appeal of extremism or piracy is unclear.³⁶ It is also not clear how empowerment results in a more positive and productive contribution to society, or in producing a future generation of Somali leaders. There is also no working definition of empowerment stated, nor is it explained how a “lack of empowerment” contributes to the problem of “youth joining extremist groups or piracy networks.” Furthermore, it is assumed that with “increased education, economic and civic participation opportunities” youth will be incentivized to not join these groups. The emphasis on civic participation may also speak to an assumed alternative driver – “grievances.” If so, by participating, youth will feel included and empowered, which will reduce perceptions of marginalization and feelings of disaffection, thus leading to unwillingness to participate in piracy or extremism.

³³“Somalia: Al-Shabaab– It Will Be a Long War.” Policy Briefing: Africa Briefing N°99. International Crisis Group: 26 June 2014. P. 20; and “A Window of Opportunity for Somalia: Will External Actors’ Peace building Frameworks Help or Hinder the Effort?” Project Brief. Sarah Hearn and Thomas Zimmerman. NYU Center on International Cooperation: May 2014. P.13

³⁴ There are a number of individual project TOCs nested within USAID’s larger stabilization portfolio; however, time and resource constraints, as well as page limits for the study, impose limitations to an attempt to make this analysis comprehensive and inclusive of each of these.

³⁵ Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the USAID Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI). P. vi.

³⁶ It should be noted here that the evidence strongly supports an argument that extremism is in fact a radical form of youth empowerment, providing an organizational structure and a thought-system that allows youth to act against perceived injustice or redress grievances.

QUESTION 3: WAS USAID SOMALIA'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (ALSO KNOWN AS THE HEXAGON MODEL) VALID IN MODELING STABILITY AND INSTABILITY IN SOMALIA?

Conclusion: USAID Somalia's conceptual model was, and remains, valid in modeling stability, but it is assumptive and not operational. The model is also benign in that it is valid for virtually all stabilization and/or transitioning environments.

Data collected primarily from the document review and KIs with USAID Somalia and Somali stakeholders such as those in Somaliland National Youth Organization (SONYO), Shaqodoon, MUDUG and the Ministries, as well as DCs in South Central, confirmed that the hexagon model is overly generic, lacking the inclusion of key Somalia-specific contextual triggers, e.g., crime; gender; youth; disillusionment; recidivism; (re) integration of youth; community engagement, and a distinction between the descriptions of triggers at the local, regional/state and FGS levels.

According to the literature, the hexagon model certainly identified many of the “right things” to affect in a stabilization environment, and it represents a generally accurate model of the various “problems” that require attention in order to affect change in Somalia, e.g., the lack of social fabric; disaffected youth and exclusion; extreme ideologies and militancy; weak governance, corruption, and impunity; clanism, power struggles, and resource conflict; etc., and this finding was supported by 100% of USAID Somalia, USAID/W and DOS respondents. In spite of this fact, and whether intentional or otherwise, there is a notably muddled cause and effect logic associated when one assumes that there is *some degree* of alignment between one hexagon “trigger” and a neighboring one, and therefore an overarching lack of clarity about *what* in that hexagon may cause *what* in a neighboring one, and more importantly *why*. As per the Evaluation Team's suggestions regarding the TOC, USAID Somalia is recommended to more explicitly and defensibly identify a supporting analysis of the problem it is attempting to address with its interventions in Somalia. It is also advised to couple this with a detailed and sensitive analysis of the local systems that may both constitute the underlying causes and conditions of Somalia's problems, as well as being a source of mitigating the country's problems. For example, a reading of the literature suggests that the model oversimplifies the overriding significance of clanism as both a positive organizing principle which can reflect and respond to social, political, and economic behavior in Somalia, as well as being itself a source of the conflicts which underpin and permeate all factors of instability in Somalia.

The hexagon model, then, is valid, albeit overly assumptive and perhaps oversimplified in that it does not fully incorporate key contextual triggers or supporting analyses. It is also outdated, being the product of specifically two TIS stakeholder planning meetings in 2011, and later in 2012, and a product that reflects an environment that is pre-FGS, pre-Battle of Kismayo and comparable AMISOM operations; and, pre-New Deal. It is important to note that several significant social, security, and economic changes have occurred in Somalia since the development of the hexagon model, and these changes are not at all reflected in the model. These contextual changes include, for example, the formation of an internationally recognized federal government and the evolution of a civil service and parliamentary system; the international recognition of the principles as outlined in the “New Deal;” the growing migration

of educated and entrepreneurial diaspora back to Somalia; and, the reduced presence of Al-Shabaab in rural communities in South Central Somalia.

The model was also prepared primarily as a TIS stabilization model, relevant to the TIS environments in which it was proposed to operate in 2011/2012 and to the nature of the activities it was proposed to support, i.e., small grants; peace dividends; community and social cohesion projects, etc. Unfortunately, and based on a review of the event reports and on partner KIIs, the model was also developed almost exclusively by USAID and its partner staff at the two events, with only some small input from Somali stakeholders. During the Mombasa planning event in April 2011, Somali representation was purportedly only from a small number of Nairobi-affiliated organizations, e.g., Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) and Africa Rescue Committee (AFREC). During the Entebbe planning event in 2012, there were purportedly some Somalia civil-society members in attendance, but the majority of KII respondents aware of and/or in attendance at the event suggested that this representation was still insufficient for the model to adequately reflect Somalis and the Somalia perspective. Of course, given the time-lag, the Evaluation Team suffered some recall challenges, as less than 20% of USAID Somalia KII respondents and none of the USAID/W respondents were even aware of the provenance of the model.

Finally, the model, while valid, is not operational and therefore is not a strategic model for planning and implementation, despite what many of the USAID KII respondents have suggested. In its current form, it provides no guidance as to “how” USAID can affect the triggers; how actions on the triggers should be sequenced, if at all; which of the triggers is of a higher priority, and therefore which of the triggers should be affected first; and, whether at all any of the triggers carries more importance or weighting relative to the others. Very few of the USAID Somalia Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs), Agreement Officer Representatives (AORs) and partners could determine how best the model could be operationalized. Interestingly, when asked during the KIIs: “Does your program support USAID’s stabilization strategy?” 100% of respondents stated, “Yes.” When asked during the KIIs: “Does your program support USAID’s stabilization strategy?” 100% of respondents were able to suggest which of the triggers in the model their program best supported. But when asked “How do you, or how does one, operationalize the model to best influence the triggers?” 100% of the respondents were unsure. Ultimately, while 100% of USAID Somalia and IP respondents thought that they were supporting positive change in Somalia, none could answer *how* this change aligned to specific triggers within the hexagon model, a model that 100% thought was a key strategic document.

By mistake or by design, the hexagon model lacks an implementation plan for “how” it can be put into action, and how its triggers can be affected through USAID Somalia-funded interventions. On a related note, there is also no explicit logical, conceptual, contributory or causal connection between the hexagon model and the USAID Stabilization Strategy, the PAD and importantly the PMP, Results Framework, IRs and indicators. This suggests to the Evaluation Team that if the existing hexagon model was augmented with an implementation or operational plan, the apparent divide between this plan and USAID Somalia’s performance monitoring or evaluative capabilities would mean that any proposed achievement within the model would not be visible. As it stands now, there is no tangible or logical evaluative connection between the hexagon model and the current PMP, Results Framework, IRs and

indicators. In the context of 2014 and beyond, the model is, to quote one USAID staff member, nothing more than a “nice visual.”

QUESTION 4: HOW WELL DID THE ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY USAID SOMALIA LOGICALLY ALIGN TO THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (HEXAGONS)?

Conclusion: Many of USAID Somalia’s activities align to the hexagon model, but this alignment is neither logical, nor reflects USAID Somalia’s strategy/strategies or the USAID Results Framework. This alignment is also *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this,” a logical fallacy.

The process of developing a strategy and articulating well-grounded, justifiable, logical, and appropriate TOCs by individual partner activities is designed in accordance with the USAID Mission Results Framework, the Mission TOC and the overall USAID Mission (or in this case, office) strategy. This guidance is defined in ADS 201, 202 and 203, and more broadly in the USAID *Evaluation Policy*. In the case of USAID Somalia, there was some discordance.³⁷

As determined by the KIIs and document review of the quarterly and annual reports, the lack of a universally approved and accepted USAID Somalia strategy and a well-grounded TOC meant that almost all of the USAID partner activities were in large part conceptually, logically and in some cases operationally, divorced from a principal set of office strategic goals and objectives that should have guided the activities. This is not necessarily a rare event: partner activity planning can tend to evolve independently of a Mission’s Program Cycle, and as was the case with USAID Somalia, there was also a sequencing challenge. Both the 2010 NSC strategy and the 2013 Stabilization PAD (and the Results Framework within it) respond well to the significant challenges and opportunities inherent in operating in Somalia. However, it is the 2011 hexagon model that appears to be the strategic model “of choice,” with most USAID Somalia and IP staff perceiving it as the key strategy document. The hexagon model was initiated internally at TIS planning sessions in 2010, and then evolved throughout the course of 2011. By reviewing the individual activity start and end dates (See Annex 8), some activities (e.g., SYLP and SEEDS), were initiated prior to the 2010 NSC strategy and were completed – or near-completed – prior to the finalization of the 2011 hexagon model, which itself was timed intentionally or otherwise to the TIS DAI start date. This implies that these activities would, of course, not reflect, or be reflected in, the USAID Somalia strategic documents and specifically not in the hexagon model. TIS IOM was also launched one year prior to the hexagon model being developed. Somewhat ironically, despite it being a TIS partner, TIS IOM’s own TOC and objectives will not have initially reflected, or been reflected in, the hexagon model.

³⁷ It should be noted, however, that this discordance is in part due to timing, i.e., the initial USAID Somalia strategy development and planning for implementation actually predated seminal guidance from USAID Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL), itself only created in 2010, and the transition of the PPC capacity for performance measurement into the DOS F Bureau. Therefore any discussion on the normative placement of USAID Somalia within a larger context of USAID is incomplete without an acknowledgement that, at the time USAID Somalia was creating the strategy, the Agency was undergoing a renewed push for strategic coherence, but that this push was not yet mature.

All other programs and activities do indeed reflect – or align with – many of the factors within the hexagon model, but this reflection is entirely “after that fact,” artificial and with little conceptual or planning forethought. As above, and as per the USAID Program Cycle, a more logical approach would have been to include clear and logical planning, coordination and integration between the activities and the USAID Somalia strategy, which, given the sporadic nature of activity start and end dates, would see each informing the other in a coherent, logical and indeed practical way.

The alignment was conducted in an *ad hoc* manner during informal and unstructured meetings and partner events in 2012 - after the development of the hexagon model - and was comprised of exercises in which the respective partners selected which of the individual factors, or hexagons, best aligned with their activity objectives, and inversely, which of the activities best aligned with the individual factors, or hexagons, in the model. In other words, IPs “retrofitted” their activities, or proposed activities, to the hexagon model, rather than serving as proposed outcomes intended to address the triggers in the model.

Interestingly, although all USAID Somalia and partner KII respondents were easily able to suggest that their activities affected certain drivers of stability in the hexagon their activity best influences, they all found it challenging, except those who attended the Mombasa and Entebbe events, or pointed with “best guess” confidence when it came to situating where exactly their activity best fit into the model, i.e., which exact triggers their respective activities affected. More than 60% of that sample asked for clarifications on the model, e.g., what it represented, what abbreviations stood for, and in some instances even made suggestions of what they felt were still missing elements.

What is perhaps more illustrative is a comparison of which partner activities align to the hexagons to how the activities align to the hexagons as per their indicators, i.e., what the partners are measuring in their respective activities compared to the activities themselves. On the one hand, partners purport that their activities directly reflect or affect the “triggers” within the hexagon model, and this claim is readily supported by evidence within the quarterly and annual reports. On the other hand, what is being measured by the partners (and thus by USAID Somalia) does not seem to reflect the hexagons at all.

To determine this, the Evaluation Team conducted a content analysis by reviewing all of USAID Somalia’s larger activities. This analysis included an extensive review of the indicators, the PMP, the respective activity TOCs, and quarterly and annual reports to explore existing data patterns within the data sources, and to identify convergence of those patterns to determine the existence of alignment.

The analysis resulted in the development of two tables (Figure 9 below and Annex 6), each of which reflects indicator and IR alignment of activities to the hexagons. These tables can be used a) reflectively, i.e., to better understand activity alignment to the hexagons, and b) proactively, i.e., to better understand how to model activities to strategic triggers for future USAID strategy refinement exercises.

HEXAGON MODEL TO ACTIVITIES MAP

A review of the data indicates that while there is strong alignment between activities and the hexagons, at least those affecting stability, there are also disparities and inconsistencies in how these activities are being measured and thus poor alignment to the Results Framework. In Figure 9, core USAID Somalia activities³⁸ are along the horizontal axis, at the top of the table, while the hexagons are along the vertical axis, separated by their characterization as either stability or instability “triggers” or factors. The “X(g)” annotation implies the presence of gender indicators, in addition to there being alignment. A cell with “X, X(g)” indicates that there are both general indicators as well as gender specific indicators in alignment with the hexagon.

FIGURE 9: MAP OF HEXAGONS TO ACTIVITY BY INDICATORS

BASED ON IMPLEMENTING PARTNER F AND CUSTOM INDICATORS								
Program	SYLI (MC)	SEEDS (MC)	TIS (IOM)	TIS (DAI)	CEPPS (NDI)	CEPPS (IRI)	PEG (DAI)	P2P (Internews)
STABILITY								
Countering Violent Extremism	X	X	X	X				
Create Opportunities for Youth	X,X(g)	X						
Create an Enabling Environment for Business	X	X					X	
Improve Social Services	X	X						
Strengthen Regional Administration			X	X				
Support Peace and Reconciliation	X		X,X(g)	X,X(g)	X			X
Support Political Processes					X,X(g)	X		X
Strategic Communication					X			X
Basic Safety								
Economic Growth	X		X,X(g)	X,X(g)			X,X(g)	
Public Confidence in Government	X		X	X			X	
Partnership (CS, PS, Gov.)					X	X		
Somali Ownership			X	X	X			
INSTABILITY								
Insecurity						X(g)	X	
Extreme Ideologies								
Clanism								
Power Struggle								
Weak Government Structure			X	X				
War Economy								
Resource Conflict								
Breakdown of Social Fabric								
Exclusion	X		X(g)	X(g)	X(g)		X(g)	
Impunity								
Nairobi Mafia								
Poverty								

The analysis illustrates that partner activities may be aligned to the hexagons, but that this alignment is not necessarily what is being measured by the indicators. According to the analysis, not all activities are being measured relative to the hexagons.

³⁸ JHNP was not included in this analysis as this program was never involved in an alignment exercise, and does not in its documentation, suggest any alignment to the hexagon model.

The analysis also shows that TIS was the only activity whose indicators are most closely aligned to the hexagons, and both stability *and* instability factors. However, given the intimate, if not seemingly nepotistic relationship between TIS and the hexagon model, this is not a particularly revealing finding. What is more revealing is that an activity such as SYLI has a comparable level of indicator alignment to the hexagon model (at least on the stability side) and that it can therefore accurately claim to be affecting the stability factors within the model. Furthermore, none of the activities adequately address the drivers of instability. Be this by nature or design, as mentioned above, there is an assumption, both in the model and the USAID Somalia TOC, that both the drivers of stability and instability require influencing to reach a desired level of stabilization. Nonetheless, and as noted during a KII, when it comes to directly addressing the hexagon’s drivers of instability, TIS explicitly tried to address “exclusion” through their activities by requiring 40% of the participants in planning sessions to be representatives from women, youth and minority clans.³⁹ ⁴⁰ Other activities align to the hexagons with expected patterns, e.g., PEG to economic growth factors.

Finally, what is also noticeable in this analysis is that USAID Somalia assumes that by addressing the hexagons adequately and resolutely through its planned activity interventions, stability will be achieved. However, there are a significant number of factors not being measured by the partners and USAID Somalia such “Somali Ownership,” and “Basic Safety,” for example, as well as the vast majority of instability factors. While there is no need for USAID Somalia to have 100% indicator coverage of the hexagons, there should be some rationale as to why not.

HEGAXON MODEL TO IR MAP

In what is hoped to be of comparable use to USAID Somalia, the Evaluation Team conducted a similar exercise of mapping the hexagons to the activity IRs and indicators. The analysis was supported primarily by data within the Clearinghouse and the PPRs, against the backdrop of the logical structure of the IRs and indicators as they align to the USAID Somalia Results Framework as per the PMP. Due to the size of the map, it is in Annex 6. Along the horizontal axis at the top of the table are the hexagon “triggers” or factors, while core USAID Somalia activities are placed along the vertical axis,⁴¹ including an identification of which IR they support. An analysis of the data in this tool indicates one key finding: key hexagon triggers or factors are a) not aligned to the Results Framework, and b) not being reported on. This finding is underpinned by two assumptions – that the Results Framework is the official reporting framework of Objectives to IRs to Indicators into which all IPs report success and achievement, and that the hexagons are what most activities associate having conceptual, strategic alignment to. This implies that there is a disconnect between what is considered strategically important, i.e., the hexagons, and what is being tracked and reported on, i.e., the indicators and IRs. It also implies that there is no alignment between the hexagons and the activities, or at least those activities tracked and reported on through the official Results Framework.

³⁹ KII with TIS DAI September 1, 2014

⁴⁰ KII with TIS DAI September 25, 2014

⁴¹ JHNP was not included in this analysis as this activity was never involved in an alignment exercise, and does not in its documentation, suggest any alignment to the hexagon model.

QUESTION 5: TO WHAT EXTENT DID USAID SOMALIA'S ACTIVITIES ADAPT TO CHANGES, SUCH AS THOSE IN SECURITY AND FORMATION OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, SO AS TO REMAIN RELEVANT TO USG PRIORITIES FOR SOMALIA?

Conclusion: In some significant cases, USAID Somalia's activities show evidence of successfully adapting to the contextual changes in Somalia.

Across and within the portfolio, USAID Somalia's activities were, for the most part, operationally responsive, adaptive and flexible to the shifting contextual situation in Somalia from 2010 to 2014. These shifts were critical; some of the pivotal moments⁴² which USAID Somalia's various activities responded to directly or indirectly include the following:

- 2010 - Increasing international focus on piracy and the establishment of a political roadmap that would see the end of the transitional government;
- 2011 - Withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, which subsequently led to improved security in the capital and a successful offensive to recover key towns in the countryside by the African Union peacekeepers. The driving force to ensure political reform also grew more urgent;
- 2012 - Somalia's first formal parliament in more than 20 years is sworn in at Mogadishu airport, ending the eight-year transitional period. The international community comes together at the London Conference to pledge support for ongoing peace efforts and federal system of governance for the country. The USG pledges \$64 million to ongoing aid and development efforts in the country. Further gains are made in recovering key towns formerly held by Al-Shabaab forces. Pirate attacks fall sharply in 2012, with only 70 reported so compared with 233 in 2011;
- 2013 - The USG formally recognizes the new FGS administration. International donors promise 2.4 billion dollars in reconstruction aid in a three-year "New Deal" to strengthen the economy, security and services of the country to ensure the adoption of a new constitution and popular election by 2016;
- 2014 - The federalism process continues to gain momentum with the establishment of federal member states in Jubbaland, South Western State, Central State and others ongoing. Joint offensives by African Union and Somali national forces further drive Al-Shabaab from major urban centers under Operation Eagle and Indian Ocean. The latest summer offensive takes control of the group's stronghold of Barawe.

Although most of the USAID-funded activities were not explicitly required to align their programming and implementation strategies to the hexagon model (except for TIS, which is considered to have inspired and driven the hexagon model), evidence shows that activities were largely able to adapt to changes in context through implementation, albeit some more successfully than others. USAID Somalia's program from 2011 to 2014 consisted of ten projects with twelve implementing partners with activities across the three zones – Somaliland, Puntland

⁴² Somalia Profile: A chronology of key events <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632>

and South Central (including Mogadishu). On a larger scale, activities focused on stabilization, economic growth, and education and youth livelihoods, while medium to smaller scale activities covered the governance, media and health sectors. These activities, in one form or another, were assumed to be able to respond to the changing environment of Somalia as part of USAID Somalia's stabilization strategy. Indeed many of the activity staff themselves have suggested that their respective activities successfully adapted to these contextual changes from 2011-2014.

USAID guidance suggests the importance of programmatic flexibility and adaptability. The *USAID Guide to Programming for Development Assistance and Counter Extremism*, for example, highlights that as programs learn more during implementation, "[t]he environment should be tracked so that adaptations can be made in the program in response to a changed situation or a deepened understanding of how drivers work in concert."⁴³ USAID Somalia explicitly states in the PAD that "USAID's stabilization strategy and Stabilization Project will continue to adapt to the fluid context."⁴⁴ Therefore the Evaluation Team focused much of its analysis for this question on understanding whether USAID activities have actually been able to adapt to the fluid context of Somalia, and to what degree of success, whilst simultaneously remaining relevant to the USG priorities for the country.

KII and document evidence support a claim that operationally, USAID Somalia's activities have successfully adapted to contextual changes. The evaluation has uncovered the following about some of the activities:

- TIS was flexible by design. As part of its provenance to respond to community needs in different contexts and regions of the country, it had to be flexible to be successful;
- SYLI was flexible through the move to Mogadishu;
- PEG was flexible in its implementation approach as a pilot activity combining in-depth due diligence and flexibility;
- The CEPPS mechanism was not inherently flexible within the context of Somalia

Furthermore, KIIs in Puntland and South Central zones identified that supporting reconciliation and peace-building activities is necessary, as these activities continue to be seen as essential precursors to stability. The Evaluation Team therefore suggests that USAID Somalia consider peace-building an integral part of future activities.

TIS was, and is, flexible by nature, as part of its provenance

TIS was designed to "reach the unreachable"⁴⁵ by being flexibly responsive to local community needs and wants. Almost tautologically, TIS has become successful because it has been flexible when it needed to be, and it has been flexible because if it were not, it would not have been successful. Over the past three years, TIS has developed and implemented "creative and flexible programs to address the needs of communities."⁴⁶ The TIS Mid-term Review's⁴⁷ findings

⁴³ USAID Guide to Programming for Development Assistance and Counter Extremism October, 2009 Pg. 33

⁴⁴ Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document: Bringing Stability and Hope. USAID: undated. Pg. 3

⁴⁵ KII with Implementing partner staff September 25, 2014

⁴⁶ Scenario Building –Mombasa April, 2011 Pg. 3

indicated that TIS is “appropriately responsive and targeted” because it has been able to evolve in addressing “strategic and emergent issues.” To illustrate this point, the review team highlighted the example of TIS’s anti-piracy activities, which “demonstrate[ed] TIS’s ability to identify challenges and to respond when opportunities present themselves.” As one of the former Senior Project Advisors the Evaluation Team interviewed for this evaluation pointed out, if the activity was rigid, then it would not be able to achieve its goals. Although TIS has been able to change and adapt through “learning and changing circumstances,” one shortcoming discussed in the Mid-term Review was the fact that this very flexibility created a sense of sometimes meandering or “confusing goals and objectives,” a sense that is repeatedly illustrated in the activity’s documentation and reports.⁴⁸

SYLI was flexible in adapting to new context priorities through the move to Mogadishu

In the *USAID Administrator’s Stabilization Guidance*, USAID programs implementing stabilization initiatives are encouraged to have “contingency resources to rapidly expand or shift programming as opportunities arise.”⁴⁹ Although not in its initial plan as per its CoAG, SYLI has tried to be increasingly flexible by expanding its programming to Mogadishu, in response to a more recent desire to be more actively engaged with the FGS. Although responsive to changing priorities, priorities which were targeted in a manner that was relevant and timely, SYLI suffered the trade-off from the high costs associated with the expansion to Mogadishu, which in turn became a hindering factor to SYLI’s program achievements⁵⁰ and caused delays in implementation due to budget constraints.⁵¹ As noted in the *SYLI Mid-term Evaluation*, there was “no contract modification to confirm the scale-up to Mogadishu, nor an indication of additional funding for office set-up, security, and the implementation of all components under each Intermediate Result. Accordingly, the consortium moved funding from other budget lines to support Mogadishu.”⁵² Nonetheless, SYLI adapted to the changing context of Somalia that required more support to the FGS in delivering services.

PEG was flexible in its implementation approach as a pilot

PEG is seen by its implementers and beneficiaries alike as a pioneering activity for USAID Somalia, focusing on targeted areas of economic growth, and public and private partnership initiatives in regions that had not seen growth in twenty years.^{53 54} It was designed as a means to pilot economic interventions “in a variety of important economic sectors intended to test the feasibility and results of the private sector development approach in Somalia.”⁵⁵ As the mid-term performance evaluation concluded, at the output level, PEG was able to “pursue a flexible implementation strategy that allowed it [to] adapt to circumstances it encountered in the field and this flexible approach enabled it to produce better results than it might have done

⁴⁷ Complex Crisis Fund Transition Initiatives For Stabilization December, 2012 Pg. 10

⁴⁸ Complex Crisis Fund Transition Initiatives For Stabilization December, 2012 Pg. 12

⁴⁹ USAID Administrator’s Stabilization Guidance November, 2011 Pg. 2

⁵⁰ SYLI Midterm Evaluation September 17, 2014 Pg. vi

⁵¹ Ibid. Pg. 12

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ KII with Implementing Partner Staff September 3, 2014

⁵⁴ Final Performance Evaluation for Partnership for Economic Growth July, 2014 Pg. 9

⁵⁵ Ibid.

otherwise.”⁵⁶ According to the evidence, PEG was exceptionally flexible in developing activities in regions where the immediate relative impact would be most visibly produced. In many respects this flexible approach was key to its many successes; it also set very high expectations from partners and beneficiaries. A review of KII responses in Somaliland and Puntland depict PEG’s interventions as key enablers to economic growth, but it is also evident that through its interventions PEG set high expectations of continued – or indeed expanded – programming, and that these expectations were not seen as being met by the majority of KII respondents in Somaliland.^{57 58 59}

The CEPPS mechanism was inflexible for the Somalia context

According to the final performance evaluation of the CEPPS activity, the CEPPS mechanism was not considered flexible for the Somalia context in part because it involved two sometimes conceptually divergent IPs, in addition to being contractually difficult to maneuver.⁶⁰ Others felt that CEPPS needed to be reviewed again as an activity because “it was not very clear and much of what it was doing was not the priority of the parliament,” and it was not fully aligned to the needs of the government.⁶¹ In some cases, KII respondents in Somaliland noted that CEPPS was training parliamentarians in procedure – an admirable task in and of itself – but that this training was done at the expense of their responding to more immediate, tangible, and visible needs such as being responsive to their respective constituents. Similarly, the Evaluation Team for the CEPPS final performance evaluation concluded that the IPs found it more difficult to identify high priority activities because they did not have a clear, and consistently coherent, hypothesis and that their activities objectives were vague.⁶² Having a clear development hypothesis and objectives is important in a fluid political context because it means having “a clear statement of what the program is trying to accomplish with individual activities.”⁶³ Nonetheless, as one of USAID Somalia’s activities, CEPPS adapted to support the newly formed formal parliament that ended the transition.

Need for USAID shift in focus: in recent years there has been limited to no engagement in reconciliation and peace-building activities, activities considered essential for ongoing stabilization efforts

Despite the decrease in activities within USAID Somalia’s portfolio aimed at social reconciliation⁶⁴, peace-building and trauma healing, these very social, emotive, and connective communal activities were identified by Somali KIIs in Puntland and the South Central – Galgaduud region as absolutely critical to achieving stability. KII respondents in these regions universally stated that they felt that community and/or individual trauma healing and social reconciliation activities were paramount precursor processes for stabilizing their communities⁶⁵

⁵⁶ Ibid. Pg. 32

⁵⁷ KII with Amoud University September 4, 2014

⁵⁸ KII with Minister of Agriculture Somaliland September 6, 2014

⁵⁹ KII with Civil Society Member Puntland September 14, 2014

⁶⁰ KII with USAID Somalia August 27, 2014

⁶¹ KII with Civil Society Member Somaliland September 3, 2014

⁶² Somalia Legislative Strengthening Program Evaluation December, 2013 Pg. 20

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ As of the timing of this report TIS and SYLI each had only a few activities, with the latter aimed more at civic engagement and integration rather than at traditional social reconciliation and peace-building activities.

⁶⁵ KII with Federal Government of Somalia September 18, 2014

and for reconstructing the country under the FGS.⁶⁶ For Somaliland KII, there was an expressed concern with regards to the Eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag and the need for dialogue, as often the Somaliland government is perceived as neglecting these two regions.⁶⁷ Activities meant to engage in reconciliation, peace-building and, to an extent, civic engagement such as TIS and SYLI have either done limited initiatives or were not able to achieve the desired results they had sought out to achieve in these sector areas. Additionally, for TIS, the emphasis has more recently been on local governance and on “peace dividend” activities, rather than on soft programming such as social cohesion, civic dialogue and trauma healing activities.⁶⁸ Ironically, the TIS Mid-term Review suggested that TIS expand its social activities, and in particular its trauma healing program, which had exceptional value as TIS expanded to new program areas.⁶⁹ For SYLI, the civic engagement component was not able to achieve its desired results because it was neither well-articulated, nor was there sufficient funding for it to have any lasting, relative effect. In the case of SYLI, KII also revealed that the activity’s civic engagement initiatives were often viewed as too prescriptive for youth organizations to take ownership.⁷⁰ Reconciliation and peace-building in different forms were then seen by some KII to be a key missing component of USAID Somalia’s activities since early programming. The Evaluation Team suggests a renewed focus be placed here for all of Somalia, with particular emphasis in South Central where there is greater need. This new focus can be on reconciliation activities for communities with long-standing conflicts⁷¹, as well as efforts to support peace education and raise awareness of peace, particularly in remote areas.⁷²

Need for USAID shift in focus: limited activities focusing on productive sectors (e.g., agriculture, fisheries) associated with slow reach in stability

90% of Somali KII across all regions identified the need to invest in productive sectors as a means to create employment, especially for youth, and to achieve visible stability and development. For them, peace and stability were linked with job creation and general means of livelihood.⁷³ Although activities like PEG were designed to focus on the economy, it was clear that the need is greater than what the activities can provide. Similarly, investing in infrastructure such as roads and ports was also thought to greatly contribute toward achieving success in the productive sectors, fuel economic growth, and in turn, stability.⁷⁴ The Minister of National Planning in Somaliland believed that stabilization cannot be disassociated from development, and there is a need to focus on long-term development in productive sectors and areas from USAID.⁷⁵ This emphasis is also implied in the 2014 USAID Somalia Economic Growth Assessment.

⁶⁶ KII with Women Umbrella Organization Member Puntland September 14, 2014

⁶⁷ KII with Civil Society Member Somaliland

⁶⁸ KII with Implementing partner staff September 25, 2014

⁶⁹ Complex Crisis Fund Transition Initiatives For Stabilization December, 2012 Pg. 3

⁷⁰ KII with Implementing partner staff September 10, 2014

⁷¹ KII with SFG Deputy District Commissioner Balanbale Galgaduud September 15, 2014

⁷² KII with Ministry of Education Director of Programs Puntland September 14, 2014

⁷³ KII with Program Manager at Amoud University September 4, 2014

⁷⁴ KII with Minister of Education – Galmudug September 15, 2014

⁷⁵ KII with Minister of National Planning and Development – Somaliland September 8, 2014

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations are divided thematically in two sections: Programmatic Recommendations and M&E and Learning Recommendations. The Programmatic Recommendations follow each evaluation conclusion.

PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS

There is evidence that USAID-funded activities have resulted in noticeable change in Somalia over time, and that this change may have contributed to perceived increased stability in key geographical areas. However assigning contribution is challenging as there is no universal understanding of the definition of stabilization or of USAID’s stabilization strategy as defined within the PAD

1. The Evaluation Team recommends a comprehensive approach to better understand stabilization in the context of Somalia; how better to implement stabilization programs and activities as contributing and enabling parts of an overarching (but integrated) set of USG and USAID goals; and how to measure the achievement of stabilization outputs, outcomes and impacts. This approach need not be time-consuming or exhaustive, but should include consultations with stabilization and/or transition experts; stabilization M&E experts, and regional experts. It is also recommended that USAID consider including CMM and Somalia Unit experts in this review process. This latter recommendation is based on the need for more strategic, coherent – and indeed consistently coordinated – inter-agency approaches to intervention success in Somalia.
2. The Evaluation Team recognizes that USAID Somalia is in the process of redefining and redeveloping its strategy. Overwhelming evidence from both the document review and from interviews with USAID Somalia, USAID/W, the Somalia Unit, Somalia/Somaliland Ministries and Somali CSOs suggests that Somalia is in a stabilization context, and not in a transition environment.⁷⁶ Therefore, the team strongly recommends that USAID Somalia takes this evidence into account as it redefines its strategy with a focus on stabilization programming.
3. The Evaluation Team recognizes that progress along the stabilization continuum of instability to stability is variable in Somaliland, Puntland, South Central and Mogadishu. It is also variable at the local, regional/state and federal levels. Based on the evidence, this level of invariability suggests that it is possible for USAID Somalia to consider multiple “tailored” strategies for each of these variables, e.g., a strategy for South Central, for

⁷⁶ According to USAID’s Transition Strategy Guidance referred to in ADS 201, an environment is considered in transition when a) USAID is able to have a mission presence on the ground; b) there is evidence that a viable transition process from one set of conditions to another is underway or may be catalyzed by USAID assistance; c) a strategic planning time horizon exists whereby a Transition Strategy – which is the basis for project design and budgeting – can be implemented; d) USG and international policy is defined and allows for USAID to proceed in developing a meaningful Transition Goal that can be advanced or achieved. An environment of stabilization exists when a) the political, social, or economic environment remains so fluid that strategic planning for [a] minimum 12-month time frame would not be feasible; b) critical macro policy and security issues remain unresolved; c) USAID has no mission presence on the ground due to security issues or other concerns. (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacx050.pdf)

Somaliland, for Puntland, etc. The Evaluation Team then recommends that any future refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy consist of a single clearly defined USG goal, with objectives that then support this goal, noting that *both* the FGS and the local communities are inextricably intertwined precursors to stability and as such, should *both* be addressed within these objectives. Given the federal to local linkages in this recommendation, this approach will require increased coordination with DOS.

4. Any refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy will by necessity – and to ensure its survival – require input and advocacy from the wider USG. The Evaluation Team recommends that the current informational relationship between DOS and USAID Somalia be maintained and indeed strengthened to better facilitate the strategy's development.
5. Based on evidence that suggests that the USAID Somalia stabilization strategy/strategies, the ICS, the PAD, and in particular the hexagon model, are weak strategic and implementation guiding tools, the Evaluation Team recommends that USAID incorporate operationalization and implementation criteria as part of any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID Somalia's strategy. Based on the evidence, these implementation criteria should include USAID Somalia having a regular, visible presence in Somalia. This presence was overwhelmingly advocated during KII's with USAID Somalia and with other donors as an absolute precondition to establishing USAID Somalia as a strong donor implementer in Somalia.
6. The Evaluation Team recommends closer alignment to the ICS as USAID Somalia moves forward with the refinement of its own office strategy. This is significant both in terms of the implied importance of USG inter-agency involvement in any Somalia strategy, and an increased, and essential, conceptual and operational integration in Somalia between DOD, DOS and USAID.
7. The Evaluation Team recommends that any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID Somalia's strategy include a rigorous, yet operationally flexible and responsive monitoring and evaluation plan. This plan would ensure that measurements toward the achievement of all strategic goals and objectives are in place, and that they are analyzed as part of an accountability, performance monitoring and lessons learned plan.
8. There are several stabilization measurement tool-kits in existence, and the Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia review and use these tool-kits where feasible to better measure progress. The OECD and UNDP have excellent approaches, and MPICE includes a framework of generic – yet tailorable – stabilization indicators that USAID Somalia and its partners can review and “pick and choose” from to better measure the degrees of progress along the stabilization continuum of conflict to stability in the country.

There is no evidence to support the claim that the USAID Somalia Theory of Change (TOC) was either valid or invalid. USAID and normative literature suggest instead that the TOC was overly simplistic and overly assumptive

1. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia consider a complete revision of its TOC as a part of any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID Somalia's strategy.
2. Given the complexity of developing a rigorous TOC, and one that is adherent to the literature and to USAID standards, the Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia set up a small “tiger team” of two-three individuals who would be responsible

for the TOC's development. The team would ensure that standardized development steps are maintained throughout this development process and that the TOC remains integral to the revised USAID Somalia strategy.

USAID Somalia's conceptual "hexagon model" for stabilization was, and remains, valid in modeling stability, but it is assumptive and not operational. The model is also benign in that it is valid for virtually all stabilization and/or transitioning environments

1. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia consider abandoning the hexagon model in favor of systematically, analytically and intuitively developing a fresh conceptual model that is relevant to the Somalia of 2014 and beyond, and to a USAID Somalia portfolio that now includes the nascent Strengthening Somali Governance (SSG) and TIS+ activities. This model would inform any future refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy.
2. As discussed in the findings for Questions 1 and 2, there is a significant benefit to USAID Somalia in better preparing itself for its strategy refinement sessions by more comprehensively reviewing the contextual "triggers" that affect change in Somalia.

Many of USAID Somalia's activities align to the hexagon model, but this alignment is neither logical, nor reflects USAID Somalia's strategy/strategies or the USAID Results Framework. This alignment is also *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, i.e., "after this, therefore because of this," a logical fallacy

1. The Evaluation Team recommends that the hexagon model be abandoned, and that a more current and relevant model be developed in its place. The new model would accurately reflect and support a stabilization intervention strategy in line with, and in support of the FGS and the local communities that have been newly liberated.
2. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia, and in particular the M&E component of that office, consider identifying resources appropriate to allow for a) a complete conceptual and structural overhaul of the hexagon model; b) any existent USAID Somalia strategy that reflects the contextual and sensitive social contingencies and dependencies in the model; and more importantly, c) the office's ability to track and measure results that would rigorously and defensibly illustrate any expected and intended progress toward the achievement of the goals and results in the new model.

In some significant cases, USAID Somalia's activities show evidence of successfully adapting to the contextual changes in Somalia

1. The Evaluation Team recommends that current and future USAID Somalia programs and activities incorporate means in their respective SOWs and Work Plans that enable responsive, contextually-based, programming and implementation strategies. However, these strategies also include requirements to measure their achievement and success.

M&E AND LEARNING RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As a critical component of the USAID Program Cycle, the Evaluation Team recommends that ongoing program assessments, periodic evaluations and strategic learning exercises be included as mandatory requirements within the annual USAID Somalia program calendar. These M&E and learning activities are the best means to ensure that there is practical and operational alignment with any future refinement and redevelopment of USAID Somalia's strategy.
2. The Evaluation Team recommends a complete overhaul of the Results Framework and its IRs and indicators to better – and logically and correlatively – align to any future USAID Somalia strategy.
3. The Evaluation Team recommends that USAID Somalia consider a return to incorporating some very meaningful output-based measurements of success. These output indicators are not meant to replace the many critical outcome and impact indicators on which the partners currently report. They are proposed as a means to more accurately reflect the “art of the possible” and the “art of the achievable” in stabilization environments. Stabilization programming is output-based, with the near-term objectives of providing tangible results to communities in an effort to appease, acquiesce and stabilize quickly and efficiently. Therefore, it seems that success in stabilization environments can in some cases, and very arguably, best be measured by outputs rather than by outcomes or indeed long-term development impacts.
4. The Evaluation Team recommends that any future refinement of USAID Somalia's strategy be conducted in tandem with the development of a clear, cogent, logical and practical M&E strategy that allows USAID Somalia to monitor its and its partners' performance over time, and to measure its and its partners' achievement (or non-achievement) of intended intervention goals and results over time.

ANNEX I: EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

**Final Scope of Work for
Program Evaluation of the USAID/East Africa's Activities in Somalia
July 11, 2014**

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Background Information and Development Hypothesis

Identifying Information

1. Program: USAID/EA/Somalia Office
2. Type of Evaluation: Performance Evaluation
3. Period to be evaluated: 2010 - 2014

Development Context

Problem or Opportunity Addressed

Throughout 2011 and 2012, the United States Government (USG) and its international partners helped the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other Somali leaders make progress toward greater security and political stability. The AMISOM and other military forces successfully ousted militant extremists from large parts of South Central Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu, which helped pave the way for the TFG to meet key milestones to end the transition. This included the finalization and adoption of the constitution, the selection and vetting of 825 constituent assembly members and 275 new members of Parliament, and the selection of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud by the new Parliament on September 10, 2012.

After more than 20 years of conflict, the USG formally recognized the new Federal Government of Somali (FGS) in January 2013. Following USG recognition, USAID's Administrator, Dr. Rajiv Shah, traveled to Mogadishu in February 2013 to meet the new government. During this visit, Dr. Shah committed to a partnership between the Somali and the American people and pledged to provide additional technical and financial resources. At this optimistic turning point in its history, however, much remains to be done to ensure the continued stability of this nascent government.

Target Areas and Groups

In 2010, USG announced a Dual Track Policy in Somalia whereby it would support the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions and work with the administrations of Somaliland, Puntland, and other established regional or clan authorities. The policy was concluded with the successful completion of the Djibouti Peace Process and the recognition of the FGS by the USG. In October 2013, Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield said that: "The United States has underscored the importance of outreach and engagement with the regional administrations to form the federal framework. We will continue to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society programs in Somaliland and Puntland, with an objective of improving regional collaboration towards federalism."




Thus, USAID-funded activities are supporting continued progress in Somaliland and Puntland, and, as the security situation improves, are expanding into South Central Somalia.

Intended Results

Program Goal and Objectives

The 2010 USAID Stabilization Strategy marked a shift in USAID programming in Somalia. The new strategy was based on the Theory of Change (TOC) that: *By supporting a legitimate governance framework, through inclusive processes, and improving access to service delivery and economic opportunity, public confidence is increased and the appeal of extremists is reduced.*

This TOC was used to establish a goal, objectives and intermediate results for the 2013 Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document (PAD).



In the first half of 2011, as part of initiating the Transition Initiative for Stabilization (TIS) activity, a conceptual framework was developed to ensure a common understanding of the term stabilization among USAID, its implementing partners and key Somali stakeholders. The framework, represented as hexagons, also mapped factors of instability in Somalia, as shown in the graphic below.



Approach and Implementation

Both the 2010 USAID Stabilization Strategy and the 2013 Stabilization PAD respond to the significant challenges and opportunities inherent in operating in Somalia. USAID’s current strategy represents an explicit focus on stability as an objective in order to respond to the complex realities of the rapidly changing and unpredictable environment in Somalia. It also blends short and medium-term programming implemented through a variety of mechanisms, as listed in the table that follows.

Activity Title	Implementing Partner	Start Date	Completion date	Funding (Total Estimated Cost) US. \$
Somali Youth and Livelihood Program	Education Development Center (EDC)	9/30/2008	9/30/2011	10,208,795
School Environment and Education Development for Somalia (SEEDS)	Mercy Corps	9/30/2008	9/30/2011	15,549,395
Transition Initiative for Stabilization (TIS-IOM)	IOM	2/8/2010	9/30/2015	50,000,000
Somalia Legislative Strengthening & Political Processes Program (CEPPS III)	CEPPS (NDI/IRI)	8/1/2010	9/30/2014	12,200,000
Transition Initiative for Stabilization (TIS-DAI)	Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)	3/22/11	3/21/2016	57,435,291
Monitoring & Evaluation Program (MEPS)	International Business & Technical Consultants Inc. (IBTCI)	4/13/2011	9/29/2014	9,924,891
Partnership for Economic Growth (PEG)	PEG - Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) - Nathan Group GBTI II, LLC	4/15/2011	8/31/2015	20,989,232
Architecture & Engineering Services	ECOTECH Ltd.	9/29/2011	9/29/2014	242,503
Somali Youth Leaders Initiative	Mercy Corps	9/30/2011	9/29/2016	18,000,000
People-to-People Radio (PPR)	Internews	2/8/2012	11/7/2013	1,199,851
Joint Health & Nutrition Programme (JHNP)	UNICEF	9/27/2012	3/26/2015	2,649,963

Existing Data

USAID will provide the following USAID documents to the evaluation team before the start of the evaluation.

- Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document, 2013 (public version);
- USAID/Somalia PMP, FY 2011;
- Draft USAID/Somalia PMP, FY 2013;
- The Future of Stability in Somalia Report, 2011;
- Data from the Performance Plan Report, FY 2010, FY 2011, FY 2012, FY 2013;
- One pagers on each activity;
- Progress Reports for each activity, 2010-2014;
- Current Activity M&E Plans;
- SYLP Evaluation Report, 2012; (available on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse)
- Gender Assessment Report, 2014; (available on DEC)
- CEPPS Evaluation Report, 2014; (available on DEC)
- Verification reports, via the MEPS Clearinghouse;

IBTCI will provide access to the MEPS Clearing house, or the data housed within the Clearinghouse, to the evaluation team. This will allow the team to review data on activities entered by the partners as well as data on verifications entered by third party monitors.

Additional documents can be provided to the evaluation team, as needed. The evaluation team will also be expected to collect and review documents from other, non-USAID, sources.

Evaluation Rationale

Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the Somalia Program Evaluation is to inform the development of a new USAID Somalia Strategy by examining the Somalia Office's programming since 2010. It is expected that the evaluation will also be used to make course corrections for ongoing activities.

Audience and Intended Use

The primary audience for this evaluation will be the USAID/East Africa/Somalia Office. Additional recipients of the report will be USAID/Washington Africa Bureau, the State Department and other relevant USG stakeholders.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation seeks to answer the five following questions:

- To what extent have USAID/Somalia funded activities contributed, in a measurable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID/Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2012 Project Appraisal Document?
- To what extent was the Theory of Change used by USAID/Somalia valid?
- Was USAID/Somalia's conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling stability and instability in Somalia?

- How well did the activities funded by USAID/Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons)?
- To what extent did USAID/Somalia's activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?

When answering Question 1, the evaluation team may choose to look at both measurable and non-measurable contributions made by USAID-funded activities. However, the bulk of the focus should be on measurable contributions so as to allow USAID to make definitive, evidence-based statements about its contribution. It is also important that, where possible, the evaluation team look at the factors that may have facilitated or hindered the achievement of USAID/Somalia's goal. The evaluation team should also look at whether there are missed opportunities for measuring contributions. This may include a review of partner monitoring and evaluation systems, indicators in use, and USAID's Performance Management Plan.

For Question 2, the evaluation team should look at the validity of the Theory of Change (TOC) by examining evidence generated globally and evidence generated during the implementation of USAID/Somalia activities. This will allow the evaluators to separate any threats to the TOC validity that are solely based on the way in which USAID's activities have been implemented in Somalia. Evaluators should also look at contextual factors, specific to Somalia, that may affect the validity of the TOC.

Given that promoting stability is a large focus of USAID's work in Somalia, USAID would like the evaluation team to look at re-validating the conceptual framework, for Question 3, by looking at research conducted previously and by collecting new data. USAID would like to understand any limitations or strengths in using this conceptual model for future programming, such as, but not limited to, the ability to define factors and the possibility of measuring progress against each factor. USAID would also like a clear understanding of the alignment between the conceptual framework and the TOC.

Question 4 seeks to understand whether the USAID/Somalia's current programming responds to the areas identified in the hexagons. The evaluators may want to examine how well USAID's current activities map onto the hexagons so as to identify gaps or determine relevance or significance of interventions.

In order to answer Question 5, the evaluation team will need to: (i) clearly identify the most significant changes in Somalia along with a timeline; (ii) identify USG priorities across this timeline; and (iii) understand the changes in programming that would have been appropriate and establish a possible response time necessary for these changes to be instituted. Once these initial parameters have been established, the evaluation team will be able to map actual changes made in programming over this timeline.

Gender should be viewed as a cross-cutting theme to be explored where appropriate throughout answering the evaluation questions. The evaluation team is expected to be responsive to USAID's dual expectations for treating gender appropriately: (a) gathering sex disaggregated data and (b) identifying gender differential participation, in terms of access and benefits, where differences on this basis are possible.

Evaluation Design and Methodology

Evaluation Design

This performance evaluation shall use a non-experimental, time series design spanning the period 2010 to 2014. The evaluation will be both retrospective and prospective. On the one hand, it will look back

to examine changes from 2010, which marked the beginning of some of USAID/EA/Somalia's current programming, to 2014. On the other hand, it will look forward to allow learning for future programming.

The evaluation team is expected to use well-developed data collection and analysis methods to address each of USAID's evaluation questions. A preliminary version of a matrix for associating data collection and analysis methods with evaluations questions is provided in Annex 2. This matrix shares the initial thinking about appropriate methods that can be used by the evaluation team. However, the evaluation team is expected to review and refine this methodology, or suggest higher quality alternatives that could be employed. A detailed plan for gathering and analyzing data on each evaluation question shall be submitted to USAID for approval as part of the evaluation team's Methodology and Workplan.

Data Collection Methods

Given the scope of the evaluation, the evaluation team will use two primary data collection methods.

Document Review

The evaluation team shall review both documentation provided by USAID and other relevant secondary data team members collect. Given the large amount of documents that will need to be reviewed, the document review should take place in two phases. In the first phase, the initial document review, the evaluation team should review documents that give them an overview of USAID's strategy and programming in Somalia. The team will then need to identify a plan to identify and review key documents for the second phase. It is vital that the evaluation team establish clear guidelines for the type of information that will be extracted from various documents. The evaluation team should also develop an instrument to codify and organize data from the document review for analysis according to the evaluation questions. For example, since events will need to be charted on a timeline for question 5, the team may choose to organize the data for that question by year.

Key Informant Interviews

The evaluation team will conduct a large number of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). At minimum, interviews must be held with key USAID staff, both in Nairobi and Washington DC, USAID partners in Nairobi and Somalia, and key Somali stakeholders. The selection of key informants should be purposive based on factors that may include: (i) knowledge of or involvement in USAID's activities in Somalia; (ii) expertise in the field of stabilization / post-conflict development; (iii) shared vision or goals for stability in Somalia. The team is expected to use a semi-structured interview tool that should be developed as part of the Methodology and Workplan. The team should propose an initial list of KIIs to USAID for approval, prior to data collection. Once in the field, the evaluation team can add to the list based on suggestions from partners and stakeholders.

Data Analysis Methods

The evaluation team will design a data analysis plan as part of the Methodology and Workplan deliverable. This will ensure that the data collection methods, including tools, feed into the data analysis and synthesis of findings to allow for quick reporting. The main data analysis methods that the team is likely to use are described below.

Comparison Analysis

The team will compare targets against actuals to assess the extent to which the intermediate results, objectives and goal have been achieved. In order to gather this evidence, the team will need to rely on project documents, secondary sources and primary data collected during interviews.

Summary Statistics

The team should use summary statistics to analyze quantitative data obtained from key documents. The two main analytical tools that the team could use include frequency analysis and cross-tabulation analysis.

Content, Pattern and Trend Analysis

For data from Key Informant Interviews, which will be qualitative in nature, the team is expected to document narrative responses at a sufficient level of detail to permit a systematic content analysis of these data. Narrative reviews of interview and discussion responses are expected to provide an in-depth understanding of the experiences and opinions of stakeholders. The team will also examine written documentation of interview for patterns, using content analysis and other relevant approaches, to determine whether some responses received appear to be correlated with variables, such as organizational affiliation of the respondent, gender, level of engagement with USAID activities etc. Looking at trends over time will also allow the team to consider changes in implementation that may have occurred over time.

Mixed Methods Data Integration

Since the team is using a mixed methods approach, data collected from the different methods should be integrated to arrive at findings. Where different methods converge yielding a finding that is supported by multiple types of data, this should be noted. When different methods produce conflicting evidence, the evaluation team will, to the extent possible, double back to examine the degree to which findings from different methods on the same question diverged to determine why these data are in conflict. If the team decides to weight data from various methods to express the strength (validity/reliability) of various lines of evidence, the weighting approach should be documented and explained as USAID will need to understand why one method was given precedence over others in reaching conclusions.

Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis

The team will review data collected to determine where there is significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders. Where divergence is found, the team will follow-up to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts, perceptions or opinions.

Methodological Strengths and Limitations

The use of mixed methods will allow the team to triangulate data and obtain a greater insight into the data collected during this evaluation. However, the sampling for all data collection methods will be purposive so findings will not be generalizable.

The team will need to rely on documents produced by partners and USAID to understand the extent of the contribution made by USAID-funded activities, if any. Any missing baseline data, measurement errors or data quality issues that exist in the data reported by the partners will affect the team's findings. Where baseline data is not available, the evaluation team may need to recreate data by relying on people's recollection. Given the evaluation spans a four year period, this may be challenging.

The evaluation team will be expected to mitigate these limitations and any others identified by evaluation team members and/or USAID during the development of the detailed methodology.

Evaluation Products

Deliverables

The response to this Scope of Work is due to USAID by July 9, 2014. USAID would like to start this evaluation no later than July 14, 2014. The evaluation team will be responsible for delivering the following products on the due dates below.

Deliverable	Due Date
Draft Methodology & Workplan	July 24, 2014
Initial Meeting (In-brief) with USAID	July 29, 2014 ⁷⁷
Final Methodology & Workplan	August 1, 2014
Validation Workshop / Discussion of top line findings	September 26, 2014
Presentation on initial findings to USAID	October 14, 2014
Draft Evaluation Report	October 24, 2014
Final Evaluation Report	November 25, 2014
Infographic highlighting evaluation findings and recommendations	November 25, 2014
Submission of approved report to DEC, if requested by USAID	December 12, 2014

Evaluation Design and Methodology Guidelines

The evaluation team is expected to review and refine the design and methodology proposed in this Scope of Work and, if appropriate, suggest higher quality alternatives. Thus, the Methodology and Workplan should, at minimum, contain:

- Data collection and analysis plan, for each question;
- Tools for data collection and data organization;
- List of data sources;
- Roles and responsibilities of the team members; and
- Detailed schedule

Presentation Guidelines

The presentation should follow the outline of the evaluation report and should include an introduction to the evaluation before discussing findings. The introduction should, at minimum, include a list of evaluation questions and the methodology used by evaluators to collect data. Findings, conclusions and recommendations should be presented by evaluation question so as to allow the audience to confirm that conclusions and recommendations are evidence-based.

An electronic copy of the presentation, in MS PowerPoint, should be submitted to USAID at least one day prior to the presentation.

Report Guidelines

The evaluation report must adhere to the USAID Evaluation Policy. Special attention should be paid to ensure that the report meets the quality criteria presented in Annex I. The report, written in plain English, should be a maximum of 30 pages not including annexes and the format should be restricted to Microsoft products. A 12-point font should be used throughout the body of the report, with 1" page

⁷⁷ If Tuesday, July 29, is declared a public holiday by the Government of Kenya, then this deliverable is due on Monday, June 28, a day earlier.

margins. An electronic copy in MS Word should be submitted to USAID. In addition, all data collected by the evaluation shall be provided to USAID in an electronic file in an easily readable format; organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with either the activities of USAID in Somalia or this evaluation. If the report contains any potentially political and/or procurement sensitive information, USAID shall request that a second version of the report excluding sensitive information be submitted. The draft report should be clearly marked "For internal USG use only." Both the draft and final reports are expected to be well edited and formatted.

The report structure should follow the guidelines below:

- **Executive Summary** - concisely state the most salient findings and recommendations (3 pg);
- Table of Contents (1 pg);
- **Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions** - purpose, audience, and synopsis of task (1 pg);
- **Project Background** - brief overview of development problem, USAID project strategy and activities implemented to address the problem (2-3 pg);
- **Evaluation Design, Methods, Limitations** - describe evaluation methods, including constraints and gaps (1 pg);
- **Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations** – to be presented for each evaluation question (10-15 pp);
- **Lessons Learned** - any pertinent lessons for the overall purpose and audience (1-2 pp);

Annexes that document the evaluation methods, schedules, interview lists and tables should be succinct, pertinent and readable. These include evaluation SOW, references to bibliographical documentation and summaries of meetings, interviews and group discussions.

Team Composition

The evaluation team will be composed of three evaluators. The team leader will be responsible for guiding this evaluation and must, therefore, have a strong background in evaluation methods. The second team member, a subject matter expert, will be responsible for providing technical expertise and should have experience in planning, implementing or evaluating stabilization programs. The third member will be a junior member of the team and serve as a research assistant to the team leader and the subject matter expert. S/he should be should be fluent in the Somali language, be able to manage logistics efficiently and have some research or evaluation skills. When possible, gender representation should be considered during team selection. Suggested qualifications for each of these individuals are stated below.

International Evaluation Team Leader

- Advanced degree, particularly Masters, in International Development, Economics, Political Science, Statistics or related social science field.
- Expert knowledge and experience in evaluation design, including the selection of data collection methods on a question-specific basis and development of a detailed data analysis plan.
- Some knowledge of USAID projects
- Field experience with qualitative data collection methods
- Excellent writing ability, including evidence of an ability to structure evaluation reports in a way that logically and transparently lays out empirical findings, conclusions and recommendations in relation to evaluation questions.

- Familiarity with USAID Forward quality evaluation standards and requirements.
- Prior experience as evaluation team leader

Technical Team Member

- Masters in International Development, Economics, Political Science, Statistics or related social science field preferred.
- Expert knowledge and experience with stabilization projects.
- Experience with USAID is preferred but not necessary
- Some experience in planning, implementing, monitoring or evaluating activities in post-conflict situations like Somalia.
- Demonstrated written communications skills, especially in drafting evaluations, assessments and reports, required.

Somali Speaking Research Assistant

- Bachelors in International Development, Economics, Political Science, Statistics or related social science field
- Fluency in the Somali language, both oral and written
- Some skills in data organization and other related research or evaluation skills
- Demonstrated skills in managing logistics

In addition to this core evaluation team, IBTCI may choose to include additional individuals for specific tasks, such as editing, to support the work of the core team.

Evaluation Management

Logistics

The USAID/EA/Somalia office will provide input through an initial in-briefing to the evaluation team, identify key documents, and assist in introducing the evaluation team to the implementing partners. It will also be available for consultations regarding sources and technical issues with the evaluation team during the evaluation process. While USAID will provide the necessary links to key stakeholders, the evaluation team shall have the final responsibility for arranging any meetings identified during the course of the evaluation.

IBTCI will also be responsible for making transport and accommodation arrangements and for providing hotel arrangements, office space, internet access, printing, and photocopied for the evaluation team.

Scheduling

Work is expected to be carried out over a period of approximately 18 weeks. USAID would like the work to begin no later than July 14, 2014. The draft report should be submitted to USAID no later than October 27, 2014.

Time	Task
July 14 to 25, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial Literature Review • Development of Detailed Methodology and Workplan
July 24, 2014	Submission of draft Methodology and Workplan to USAID
July 29, 2014 ⁷⁸	Initial Meeting with USAID (in-brief) – teleconference
August 1, 2014	Submission of final Methodology and Workplan to USAID
August 4 to 8, 2014	Detailed Literature Review
August 4 to 8, 2014	Detailed Literature Review DC-based KIIs
August 25 to September 1, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation team travels to Nairobi • Nairobi-based KIIs
September 2 to 23, 2014	KIIs in Somalia (Hargeisa, Mogadishu & Garowe)
September 26, 2014	Validation Workshop with USAID / Sharing top-line findings
September 27 to October 10, 2014	Data Analysis Preparation for presentation to USAID
October 14, 2014	Presentation of initial findings to USAID
October 15 to 23, 2014	Formulation of draft report
October 24, 2014	Submission of draft report to USAID
November 7, 2014	Comments provided by USAID
November 25, 2014	Final report & infographic submitted to USAID
December 10, 2014	Approval provided by USAID
December 12, 2014	Report submitted to DEC

IBTCI should present an initial schedule, with dates, in its response to the Scope of Work. A final, more detailed, schedule should be presented by the evaluation team in the Methodology and Workplan.

Budget

In its response to this Scope of Work, IBTCI will provide a detailed budget for conducting the evaluation outlined in this document.

⁷⁸ If Tuesday, July 29, is declared a public holiday by the Government of Kenya, then this deliverable is due on Monday, June 28, a day earlier.

Annex I: Criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report

The following extract is from the USAID Evaluation Policy, which sets the criteria that each evaluation report should meet.

APPENDIX I
CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched and well organized effort to objectively evaluate what worked in the project, what did not and why.
- Evaluation reports shall address all evaluation questions included in the scope of work.
- The evaluation report should include the scope of work as an annex. All modifications to the scope of work, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline need to be agreed upon in writing by the technical officer.
- Evaluation methodology shall be explained in detail and all tools used in conducting the evaluation such as questionnaires, checklists and discussion guides will be included in an Annex in the final report.
- Evaluation findings will assess outcomes and impact on males and females.
- Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay or the compilation of people's opinions. Findings should be specific, concise and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- Sources of information need to be properly identified and listed in an annex.
- Recommendations need to be supported by a specific set of findings.
- Recommendations should be action-oriented, practical and specific, with defined responsibility for the action.

Annex 2: Data Collection and Analysis Methods, by Question

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling or Selection Approach	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
1. To what extent have USAID/Somalia funded activities contributed, in a measurable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID/Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2012 Project Appraisal Document?		Yes/No	Activity documents, such as M&E Plans, work plans and reports;	Document Review	Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review	Frequency Distributions; Cross-Tabulations; Comparison; Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; Convergence/ Divergence Analysis; Mixed Methods Integration;
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison ⁷⁹				
	X	Explanation ⁸⁰	USAID documents, such as the 2013 Project Appraisal Document;	KIIs		
			USAID staff;			
			Implementing partners;			
			Somali stakeholders;			
			Other donors;			

⁷⁹ Comparison – to baselines, plans/targets, or to other standards or norms

⁸⁰ Explanation – for questions that ask “why” or about the attribution of an effect to a specific intervention (causality)

2.To what extent was the Theory of Change used by USAID/Somalia valid?		Yes/No	USAID documents, such as the 2013 Project Appraisal Document; Secondary Source Documents USAID staff; Implementing partners; Somali stakeholders ; Other donors	Document Review	Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors	Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; Convergence/ Divergence Analysis; Mixed Methods Integration;
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation		KIIs		

3. Was USAID/Somalia's conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling measureable stability and instability in Somalia?		Yes/No	USAID documents, such as the 2011 Future of Stability in Somalia Report; Secondary Source Documents USAID staff; Implementing partners; Somali stakeholders ; Other donors	Document Review	Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors	Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; Convergence/ Divergence Analysis; Mixed Methods Integration;
	X	Description		KIs		
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

4.How well did the activities funded by USAID/Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons), based on the results frameworks of the activities?		Yes/No	<p>Activity documents, such as M&E Plans, work plans and reports;</p> <p>USAID documents, such as the 2013 Project Appraisal Document;</p> <p>USAID staff;</p> <p>Implementing partners;</p> <p>Somali stakeholders ;</p> <p>Other donors;</p>	Document Review	<p>Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review</p> <p>Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors</p>	<p>Comparison;</p> <p>Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis;</p> <p>Convergence/ Divergence Analysis;</p> <p>Mixed Methods Integration;</p>
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation		KIIs		

5.To what extent did USAID/Somalia’s activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?		Yes/No	<p>Activity documents, such as M&E Plans, work plans and reports;</p> <p>USAID documents, such as the 2013 Project Appraisal Document;</p> <p>USAID staff;</p> <p>Implementing partners;</p> <p>Somali stakeholders</p> <p>Other donors;</p>	Document Review	<p>Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review</p> <p>Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors</p>	<p>Comparison;</p> <p>Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis;</p> <p>Convergence/Divergence Analysis;</p> <p>Mixed Methods Integration;</p>
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation		KIIs		

ANNEX 2: DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Name	Robert Grossman-Vermaas
Title	Principal
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Team Leader / <input type="radio"/> Team member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-623-TO-11-00002
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID/East Africa-Somalia portfolio
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input checked="" type="radio"/>
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:	
<p>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature:	
Date:	October 29, 2014

Name	Ladan Affi
Title	Consultant
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	Team Member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-RAN-I-00-09-00016 / Task Order Number: AID-623-TO-11-00002
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID Somalia Portfolio
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	Yes X No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	N/A

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature: Date:	<i>Ladan affi</i>	12/8/2014
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Name:	Leyla Jeyte
Title:	Consultant
Organization:	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	Team Leader / <u>Team member</u>
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-623-TO-11-00002
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID/East Africa-Somalia portfolio
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	Yes <input type="radio"/> <u>No</u> <input checked="" type="radio"/>
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:	
<p>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature:	
Date:	October 27, 2014

Name	Lee Briggs
Title	M&E Director
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	Team Member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-RAN-I-00-09-00016 / Task Order Number: AID-623-TO-11-00002
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID Somalia Portfolio
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	Yes X No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	N/A

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature: Date:		12/8/2014
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Name	Lea Antic
Title	Program Associate
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	Team Member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-RAN-I-00-09-00016 / Task Order Number: AID-623-TO-11-00002
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID Somalia Portfolio
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	Yes X No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	N/A

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature: Date:		12/8/2014
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Name	Sam Malmberg
Title	Program Associate
Organization	IBTCI
Evaluation Position?	Team Member
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument, if applicable)	AID-RAN-I-00-09-00016 / Task Order Number: AID-623-TO-11-00002
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	USAID Somalia Portfolio
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.	Yes X No
If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts: Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 	N/A

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change.

Signature: Date:		12/8/2014
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ANNEX 3: EVALUATION DESIGN (APPROVED BY USAID ON AUGUST 1, 2014)

ACRONYMS

AI	Appreciative Inquiry
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
AO	Achieved Objective
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
IBTCI	International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc.
IPTT	Indicator Performance Tracking Table
IR	Intermediate Result
JHNP	Joint Health and Nutrition Programme
KII	Key Informant Interview
MEPS	Monitoring and Evaluation Program for Somalia
MSC	Most Significant Change
NSC	National Security Council
PAD	(Somalia) Project Appraisal Document
PEG	Partnership for Economic Growth
PMP	Performance Management Plan
SOW	Scope of Work
SYLI	Somali Youth Leaders' Initiative
TIS	Transition Initiatives for Stabilization
TL	Team Leader
TOC	Theory of Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EVALUATION PURPOSE

This evaluation design document is prepared by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc., (IBTCI) as part of the Monitoring & Evaluation Program for Somalia (MEPS), under the IQC Number AID-RAN-I-OO-09-00016, Task Order Number AID-623-TO-11-00002, and in response to the USAID Scope of Work (SOW) dated July 11, 2014 (Annex I).

The purpose of the Somalia Program Evaluation is to inform the development of a new USAID/EA/Somalia Office (hereafter USAID Somalia) Strategy by reviewing thoroughly and rigorously its programming since 2010, and evaluating its outcomes and impacts relative to its strategic goal, objectives and Theory of Change (TOC). The evaluation will also produce *actionable recommendations* to USAID on how perceived and actual outputs, outcomes and relative impacts of its programming can inform future programming in Somalia.

The primary audience for this evaluation will be the USAID Somalia Office. Additional recipients of the report will be the USAID/Washington Africa Bureau, the State Department and other relevant USG stakeholders.

The evaluation seeks to answer the following five questions:

1. To what extent have USAID Somalia funded activities contributed, in a measurable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2013 Project Appraisal Document?
2. To what extent was the Theory of Change (TOC) used by USAID Somalia valid?
3. Was USAID Somalia's conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling stability and instability in Somalia?
4. How well did the activities funded by USAID Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons)?
5. To what extent did USAID Somalia's activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?

Gender will be viewed as a cross-cutting theme to be explored where appropriate when answering the Evaluation Questions. The evaluation team will be responsive to USAID's dual expectations for treating gender appropriately: (a) gathering sex disaggregated data and (b) identifying gender differential participation, in terms of access and benefits, where differences on this basis are possible. For example, in analyzing the TIS stabilization survey findings, there were clear and statistically significant response differences relating to essential services satisfaction, political inclusion, social cohesion and reconciliation, and these differences can be further explored in preparation for follow-on USAID programming. Additionally, the conclusions and recommendations to emerge from the 2014 USAID Gender Assessment will help to provide a critical contextual frame to this evaluation's analysis.


The evaluation will be conducted in three concurrent and intertwined tasks: a normative review; the core evaluation; and a normative projection.

BACKGROUND

USAID Somalia’s Stabilization Strategy (“the Strategy”), which was initially launched in October 2010 and updated in both 2012 and 2013, has been developed to support overall USG policy in Somalia, as well as to respond to the significant challenges and opportunities inherent in operating in that country today. In support of USG goals, USAID’s primary emphasis in Somalia is to strengthen stabilization efforts that contribute to broader USG goals as articulated in the National Security Council’s (NSC) Somalia strategy, adopted in July 2009, and updated in October 2010 to include the State Department’s “dual-track” strategy. While the official “dual-track” strategy has lapsed with the transition to a recognized federal government in Somalia, the principles of the strategy, i.e., support for multiple levels of stabilizing governance bodies, remains relevant for USAID programming. The NSC Strategy consists of four inter-related goals: (1) ensuring that Somalia is not a safe haven for international terrorists; (2) preventing Somalia from destabilizing the region; (3) responding to and mitigating the humanitarian crisis; and (4) combating piracy.

The Strategy supports overall USG goals in Somalia, but it also explicitly focuses on stability as an objective to respond to the complex realities of Somalia’s rapidly changing and unpredictable environment. The Mission has defined stabilization as the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support successful long term development and increased institutional capacity. The Strategy derived from an internal analysis of the causes of Somalia’s stability and instability, and of entry points identified by USAID through which it could most effectively support stability while also addressing USG goals. USAID identified multiple sources of both stability and instability, which are represented within the two hexagon diagrams below, and in particular those TOC hexagons closest to the centers, and form the basis for this Strategy:

FIGURE 10: SOMALIA STABILITY / INSTABILITY FRAMEWORK



The Strategy blends short- and medium-term programming within a unified vision – short-term programming to provide visible, short-term gains, and investment in the medium-to long-term goals of governance and sustainable development. When associated with the relevant governing administrations in Somalia, short-term gains will serve to boost perceptions of government legitimacy and effectiveness, and demonstrate how governance works, thereby creating a demand for longer-term good governance programming. Geographically, the strategy focuses on supporting continued progress in Somaliland and Puntland, and as the security situation improves, an expansion into South Central Somalia that commenced with provision of peace dividends.


USAID Somalia designed each of its two primary objectives – (1) strengthening local and national capacity to promote good governance; and (2) improving social services delivery and economic growth – to directly address each of these instability sources. The Strategy’s TOC was similarly derived from the identification of these two sources. It states:

By supporting a legitimate governance framework, through inclusive processes, and improving access to service delivery and economic opportunity, public confidence is increased and the appeal of extremists is reduced.

This TOC was used to establish a goal, objectives and intermediate results for the 2013 Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document (PAD). According to the PAD and the Strategy, USAID’s goal in Somalia is to increase stability through targeted interventions that foster good governance, promote economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism. USAID Somalia’s two primary objectives under the overall goal over the four-year life of the PAD are to: (1) strengthen local and national capacity to promote good governance; and (2) improve social service delivery and economic growth. These are highlighted in the Results Framework. The Results Framework also represents a development hypothesis - or a Theory of Change - about how intended change is expected to occur. It shows how the achievement of lower level Intermediate Results (IRs) leads to the achievement of the next higher order of objectives, ultimately resulting in the AO.

The Results Framework for USAID Somalia is below, with an assumption that there is a conceptual – and logical – inter-relationship between the achievement of intended IRs and the achievement of the objectives. There is also an assumption that through the periodic collection and analysis of a series of indicators, these data can inform USAID on progress toward the achievement of the IRs and objectives. These assumptions will be reviewed and tested during the course of evaluation, and recommendations made on more flexible, illustrative, and indicative means to measure – or observe - progress toward the achievement of USAID’s IRs and objectives.

FIGURE 11: USAID SOMALIA RESULTS FRAMEWORK



The logic of any Results Framework is such that, by design, each of a mission's programs should directly contribute to the achievement of the IRs and therefore to the objectives, with the indicators serving as the means to demonstrate and prove this causal - or contributed - linkage. One or more of the programs and activities can contribute to each of the IRs. Below is a table illustrating which USAID programs correspond to the IRs, based on an initial review of their respective theories of change or development hypotheses. For the purposes of performance monitoring and management, the IRs developed and collected are sustained by indicator data collected by the programs, and can be augmented by survey data (e.g., the USAID stabilization survey); performance evaluation data; and, special studies and existing indicator index data (e.g., from AMISOM, WHO, FSNAU, etc.).

FIGURE 12: USAID SOMALIA IRs BY PROGRAM

Intermediate Results (IRs)	Programs
IR 1.1 <i>Capacity of key government institutions to perform essential functions improved</i>	Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) ⁸¹
IR 1.2 <i>Participatory political process promoted</i>	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) ⁸²
IR 2.1 <i>Access to quality basic social services increased</i>	Somali Youth Leaders Initiative (SYLI) ⁸³ ; Joint Health and Nutrition (JHNP) Programme
IR 2.2 <i>Economic opportunities increased</i>	Partnership for Economic Growth (PEG) ⁸⁴

One should note that the People to People (P2P) program is not in this table, as it appears not to have had a TOC. As part of its mandate to answer the Evaluation Questions, the evaluation team will conduct an extensive review the logic, structure and description of the TOC, the Results Framework (including the IRs and objectives), and the indicators, to determine:

1. Evidence of any logical correlation between the USG Strategy in Somalia and the “feeder” TOC and Results Framework;
2. Evidence of any logical correlation between the TOC and the Results Framework;
3. Evidence of any logical and measurable correlation between the indicators, the IRs, the objectives and the USAID Goal, and if none, why?
4. Evidence of any logical correlation between the indicators, the IRs, the objectives and the TOC;
5. Evidence of the logic of the Results Framework itself – is it an effective, practical, means to measure stability? Is it comprehensive, and does it reflect the notion of measurable stability?
6. Evidence of both conceptual and logical “nesting” of program TOCs and the USAID TOC;
7. Evidence of the validity of the TOC;
8. Evidence of any correlation – or level of contribution - between USAID’s funded activities and its IRs, Goal and TOC.

⁸¹ <http://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/transition-initiatives-stabilization-tis-somalia>

⁸² <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Somalia%20CEPPS%2006-10-13.pdf>

⁸³ <http://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/somali-youth-leaders-initiative>

⁸⁴ <http://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/partnership-economic-growth>

DESIGN

USAID/EA/Somalia Office's portfolio is comprehensive and multi-sector focused. Together with its partners it plans for and manages hundreds of short- and long-term activities in a fluid, and often volatile, operating environment. This evaluation therefore is equally comprehensive in that it will serve to answer the Evaluation Questions fully, completely, and objectively. In doing so it will also analyze the conceptual causal and correlative assumptions that have guided the implementation of USAID's programs and activities since 2010, and then throughout the course of the evaluation, develop and present additional normative findings on the overall measurability and evaluability of stabilization programming for USAID in Somalia. This will be based on a series of concurrent – thematic - evaluation data collection and analysis activities, each of which will inform the other, and all of which, in aggregate, will provide a more holistic set of actionable findings, conclusions and recommendations to USAID.

THEMATIC APPROACH

The thematic approach activities are below, with a concise description. The activities will also align to the Evaluation Questions, and indeed will inform them. Of particular note, the evaluation team will explore the assumption that stabilization programs in complex adaptive fluid environments such as Somalia can – or should – be measured using traditional tools such as output and outcome indicators. Such indicators, either in aggregate or individually, tend not to be the best means to illustrate societal, contextual, attitudinal or behavioral progress in stabilization environments; they can actually be misleading or inappropriate. Adhering to the spirit of the SOW, however, the evaluation team will seek to answer Evaluation Question I on the measurability of USAID's programming, but in doing so will also focus on the ability not to measure, but to observe “appreciable change” in Somalia from 2010 to 2014, i.e., the team will seek to collect evidence that supports the hypothesis that USAID contributed, in some way, to a noticeable, palpable change(s) through its interventions, noting that the changes may not be based on evidence collected from traditionally measurable datasets such as indicators.

TABLE 2: USAID/EAST AFRICA - SOMALIA PROGRAM EVALUATION APPROACH

Thematic Activity	Description	Evaluation Question
Normative Review of Key Principles	This activity will include a normative review of the literature from a variety of sources including USG, other governments and international organizations, donors, including USAID, on the principles of stabilization (implementation and measurement), Theory of Change, and causal logic in observing appreciable change in stabilization environments. This review will both inform the evaluation and provide normative recommendations on how to better design monitoring and evaluation tools for stabilization programs based on this review. It will also ‘map’ and situate the USAID TOC, and the partner TOCs, within the literature so as to better identify its conceptual strengths and weaknesses.	1, 2, 3, 4
Core Evaluation	This activity will include data collection methods and analysis techniques, as per the Evaluation Policy, ADS 203, and the evaluation methods matrix in Annex 2 to ensure that all SOW Evaluation Questions are answered with defensible evidence, and that actionable recommendations are provided to USAID based on this evidence. Data collection methods will include document reviews of existing USAID and partner M&E plans, indicators, reports; KIs with USAID/W and USAID Somalia personnel, Somali stakeholders at the district level; and, if suitable and subject to availability, statistical analyses of reported indicator data. Inferential analytical methods to be used to evaluate potential outcomes and impacts are trend analyses; frequency distributions and regression/multivariate analysis.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Normative Projection	This activity will include the development of a series of fundamental programmatic recommendations to USAID based on the Conceptual Review and the Evaluation Activities, and will notionally include conducting moderated participatory Appreciative Inquiry and/or Most Significant Change sessions with USAID and Somali stakeholders to more informatively map future programming to current and future joint interests; conducting TOC development and appreciable change capacity-building sessions with USAID to develop correlative techniques to observe contributable change over time. This activity will also include the development of a graphical histogram, depicting key Somalia contextual and USG policy events and “triggers” from 2010 to 2014 alongside a purposive “case-study” series of USAID activities. This histogram will provide a sensory analytical support tool to USAID, and will aid the evaluation team in uncovering examples, if any, of USAID’s adaptation to contextual changes.	2, 3, 5


NORMATIVE REVIEW

This will be an ongoing activity, initiated in the first week of the evaluation, and will include a thorough review of the *normative, suggestive*, literature relating to stabilization and Theory of Change. The review will include, for example:

1. “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” United States Institute of Peace, and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute: 2009.
2. “Foreign Policy Challenges in 3D: Diplomacy, Democracy and Development.” (for SCUSA 64: Leading in Lean Times): November 2012.
3. “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan.” David Kilcullen: December 2009.
4. “Conflict and Fragility: International Engagement in Fragile States: Can We Do Better?” OECD: 2011.
5. “Post-conflict Rehabilitation: from Aid to Development.” Mladen Stanicic: 2005.
6. “A Guide to Nation-building.” (Rand National Security Research Division): 2007.
7. “Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level: The Integration of Special Operation Forces and USAID in Afghanistan.” Sloan Mann: 2008.
8. “Administrator’s Stabilization Guidance.” Rajiv Shah (for USAID): 29 January 2011.
9. “The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crises and Post-Conflict Countries.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the UNDP: 29 June 2007.
10. “Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery: A Guidance Note.” The UNDP: 2009
11. “Local Governance, Peace Building and State Building in Post-conflict Settings: A UNDP Discussion Paper.” UNDP
12. “Fragile States Strategy.” USAID: January 2005.
13. “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.” Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter (for USAID): February 2009.
14. “Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming.” Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter (for USAID) October 2009.
15. “US Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century.” Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination USAID: January 2004
16. “Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document: Bringing Stability and Hope.” USAID.

As the stylized flow-chart of the USAID Somalia TOC suggests, there are not only a number of unstated and implicit assumptions one would need to make before attempting to operationalize the TOC, there are also multiple cases of compounded “if-then” assumptions, making any the observation or indeed measurement of such operationalization challenging. There are too many causal *dependent* variables leading toward “stability” for one to effectively measure any successful progression.

FIGURE 13: USAID/SOMALIA TOC



That said, following the initial stabilization document review, the evaluation team will conduct a more comprehensive TOC review based on a document review and KIIs to inform Evaluation Questions 2 and 3. It will occur in four stages of tasks.

Stage One: Review of the current literature related to theories of change in development and post-conflict programs to establish the normative standards that will be used to inform the analysis. This review will establish the key components of a TOC and map the spread of TOCs and associated indicators for these. Key reference documents will include:

1. "JSRP Paper I. Understanding Theory of Change in International Development." Danielle Stein and Craig Valters (for The Asia Foundation): August 2012.
2. "Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development." Isabel Vogel (for DFID): April 2012.
3. "USAID Theories and Indicators of Change- Concepts and Primers for Conflict Management and Mitigation." Eileen Babbitt, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson: March 2013.
4. "USAID Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation." Susan Allen Nan, with Mary Mulvihill: June 2010.
5. "Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security & Justice Programmes. Part I: What they are, different types, how to develop and use them." Peter Woodrow with Nick Oatley: March 2013.
6. "Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security & Justice Programmes. Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation." Vanessa Corlazzoli and Jonathan White (Search for Common Ground): 28 January 2013.

Stage Two: Mission and program document review. This review will extract explicit TOCs where these exist and attempt to construct explicit TOCs where they may be implicit, as

associated with each project. This will include production of a revised graphical results framework which captures the correlative relationships between desired results levels and, to the degree possible, captures the “what else” of operating assumptions. In addition, a narrative will be constructed that captures the original “development problem” with associated summary analysis of underlying causes and conditions, and the set of “if-then” statements that progresses from project inputs and activities through to ultimate, highest-order outcomes and impacts. TOCs will then be located within the various “families” of TOCs mapped out in the various reference documents cited above.

Stage Three: Simple TOCs will be extracted from the conceptual hexagon model and explicit program TOCs as discussed above will be compared to the hexagon TOCs for alignment. All TOCs will then be compared to the USAID TOC.

Stage Four: Once all TOCs are explicit, these will then be critiqued for:

- A. Verifiability (or, measurability/observability), i.e., are the intermediate and final results described in such a way that these could be verified, given the data and other operating constraints in Somalia?
- B. Testability - are there identifiable correlative, or causal, links between the levels of results? Are the linked levels of results parts of an identifiable cause-and-effect pathway?
- C. Completeness - have all cause and effect linkages been appropriately delineated? Are there missing pieces? Are all assumptions explicit?
- D. Plausibility – what is the likelihood of the result occurring given the project inputs and modes of operation, and contextual factors?
- E. Suitability - given the underlying assumptions and the actual state of the drivers of stability and instability in Somalia, is the USAID TOC appropriate to Somalia?

CORE EVALUATION

The core evaluation activities will be conducted in accordance with the 2011 USAID Evaluation Policy⁸⁵ to ensure that reliable data will be produced to support evidence-based findings, and be a sound basis for analysis that will lead to conclusions and recommendations that are both useful for assessing the progress to date and capable of providing *actionable* recommendations relevant to USAID future programming. In line with the policy, the evaluation will combine qualitative and quantitative methods, including key informant interviews (KIIs) and an extensive document review and indicator data analysis. This approach allows for the verification of the findings through *triangulation*. The team understands triangulation as a method used during the evaluation process to check and establish validity of conclusions by analyzing the responses to Evaluation Questions from multiple perspectives, such as when conducting the desk review, interviews, surveys, and focus groups. Triangulation of data enables evaluators to ensure validity

⁸⁵ The evaluation will meet or exceed the USAID 2011 Evaluation Policy, USAID’s Performance Monitoring & Evaluation TIPS: Data Quality Standards, relevant chapters of the USAID Automated Directive System (ADS), the performance standards outlined in the RFTOP Task Order SOW, as well as with the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects or “Common Rule” [ADS Chapter 200 - <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mbe.pdf>]. The IBTCI team is also apprised of the July, 2012 supplement to ADS 203 on current good practice in preparing evaluation reports and the main deliverables expected in evaluation reports.

of conclusions, i.e. that the findings are true (and accurately reflecting the situation) and certain (supported by the evidence).

The team will triangulate data findings to determine program outcomes and cumulative impact. While not a data collection method, analytical triangulation approaches will be employed to verify and validate the findings from different methods, data sources and/or team members, and to identify correlations between findings to determine programmatic impact. These triangulation approaches will likely include:

- **Methodological triangulation** – At least three methods (document review, indicator analysis, and key informant interviews) for data collection will be used for the set Evaluation Questions. It should be noted that the document review will be extensive, and includes a comprehensive review of the partner and USAID Somalia indicators for trend, content/meaning and relevance to the measurability of USAID’s goal and TOC.
- **Data source triangulation** – The team will collect data about the program through its own primary and secondary sources, but also from Mission-recommended KIIs and other relevant sources.
- **Investigator triangulation** – The team will have four core members with complimentary experiences and skill-sets, which will allow analysis of the data from different – richer - perspectives. During the normative projection, it is anticipated that the evaluation will involve additional contextual and interpretive inputs from a Somalia expert.

It is important that due to the operating context, this evaluation will necessarily be flexible and adaptive in nature, evolving as opportunities arise and managing risks and constraints in a pragmatic and sensible manner. The evaluation team will work together to maximize the collection of data and understanding of the project and its impacts through a collaborative and synergistic approach that may entail ‘tag-teaming’, i.e., taking on and sharing multiple roles throughout the assignment.

This evaluation will use a non-experimental, time series design spanning the period 2010 to 2014. The evaluation will be both retrospective and prospective, and as such is designed using the three-pronged thematic approach. It will look back to examine changes from 2010, which marked the beginning of some of USAID Somalia’s current programming, to 2014. It will also look forward to allow for learning and adaptation for future programming.

The evaluation team will use well-developed data collection and analysis methods to address each of USAID’s Evaluation Questions. A notional matrix for associating data collection and analysis methods with evaluations questions is provided in Annex 2.

When answering Question I, the evaluation team will choose to look at both measurable and non-measurable, i.e., observable, recognizable and appreciable, contributions made by USAID-funded activities. To the degree possible, the data collection and analysis for will be on measurable contributions so as to allow USAID to make definitive, evidence-based statements about its contributions, or indeed about its lack of evidential contribution. The evaluation team will also explore the factors that may have facilitated or hindered the achievement of USAID Somalia’s goal. The evaluation team will also review whether there are missed opportunities for

measuring contributions, and will include a review of USAID and partner monitoring and evaluation systems, indicators in use, and USAID's Performance Management Plan. Naturally, this form of analysis will also be *informed by the normative review* and will *inform the normative projection*, to include, for example, providing USAID with recommendations on how better to gather, interpret and understand data that may identify appreciable change in Somalia.

As described above, when answering Question 2, the evaluation team will assess validity of the USAID TOC by reviewing the normative principles in developing TOCs in stabilization contexts, and comparing these principles to those that shaped USAID's TOC. As such it will analyze evidence generated globally as well as evidence generated during the implementation of USAID Somalia activities. This will allow the evaluation team to separate any threats to the TOC validity that are solely based on the way in which USAID's activities have been implemented in Somalia. The evaluation team, and in particular the Subject Matter Expert, will examine the contextual factors specific to Somalia that may affected the validity of the TOC.

Given that promoting stability is a large focus of USAID's work in Somalia, the evaluation team will review and validate the conceptual framework for Question 3 by examining the research conducted during the normative review, and by conducting KIIs with USAID staff and stabilization experts to better understand the strengths and limitations of the current model, to include the relevance of the individual hexagons themselves and their role in the aggregate definition of "stability" and "instability." USAID would like to understand any limitations or strengths in using this conceptual model for future programming, such as, but not limited to, the ability to define factors and the possibility of measuring progress against each factor. USAID would also like a clear understanding of the alignment between the conceptual framework and the TOC.

When answering Question 4, the evaluation team will examine this from two intertwined perspectives:

1. Whether USAID Somalia's current programming *actually* responds to the areas identified in the hexagons, as opposed to *purportedly* responding to the areas identified in the hexagons. In doing this the evaluation team will examine how well (or indeed if) USAID's current activities map onto the hexagons so as to identify gaps or determine relevance or significance of interventions;
2. Whether USAID Somalia's current programming *reports adequately and logically* to the areas identified in the hexagons. As such, and in addition to conducting an analysis of USAID's actual activities relative to the hexagons, the evaluation team will map the current reported portfolio indicators, as per the IRs and objectives in the Results Framework, to the hexagons to better understand the logical connection between the indicators and the conceptual framework.

This level of analysis will undoubtedly result in the identification of gaps between a) actual activities as they relate to the hexagons, and b) reported indicators as they related to the hexagons. An initial analysis of the reported indicators as they related to the hexagons is in the below table, and it is worth noting that, for example only, while TIS has a purportedly clear and

identifiable role in countering violent extremism and in creating opportunities for youth, and as such has targeted activities to support this, the program’s indicators do not adequately reflect this. Note too that while PEG has a clear and identifiable role in creating opportunities for youth, and as such has targeted activities to support this, its indicators do not reflect this.

FIGURE 14: MAPPING OF PROGRAM INDICATORS AS THEY RELATE TO USAID/SOMALIA'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK⁸⁶

Program	SYLI (MC)	SEEDS (MC)	TIS (IOM)	TIS (DAI)	CEPPS (NDI)	CEPPS (IRI)	PEG (DAI)	P2P (Internews)
STABILITY								
Countering Violent Extremism	x							
Create Opportunities for Youth	x	x						
Create an Enabling Environment for Business	x		x(g)	x(g)			x	
Improve Social Services	x, x(g)	x	x					
Strengthen Regional Administration				x	x			
Support Peace and Reconciliation	x		x	x				x
Support Political Processes	x		x	x	x	x		x
Strategic Communication								x
Basic Safety					x(g)			
Economic Growth	x	x	x	x			x	
Public Confidence in Government		x	x	x		x		
Partnership (CS, PS, Gov)				x		x		
Somali Ownership				x				
INSTABILITY								
Insecurity								
Extreme Ideologies								
Clanism								
Power Struggle								
Weak Government Structures		x	x					
War Economy								
Resource Conflict								
Breakdown of Social Fabric								
Exclusion			x(g)	x(g)	x(g)	x(g)		
Impunity								
Nairobi Mafia								
Poverty								

The data sources to support answering Question 4 are comprehensive, and include the indicators, as housed in the MEPS Clearinghouse and the Indicator Performance Tracking Table (IPTT); the partner annual and quarterly reports; the USAID performance evaluations; and KII responses to verify and clarify findings to emerge from the indicators.

When answering Question 5, the evaluation team will include the development of a graphical histogram, depicting key Somalia contextual and USG policy events and “triggers” from 2010 to 2014 alongside a purposive “case-study” series of USAID activities. This histogram will, it is hoped, provide a sensory analytical support tool to USAID, and will aid the evaluation team in uncovering examples, if any, of USAID’s adaptation to contextual changes. In answering Question 5, the evaluation team will attempt to identify the most significant changes in Somalia

⁸⁶ Table depicting an initial representation of USAID/Somalia reported indicators as per IRs relative to the conceptual framework “hexagons.” The annotation (g) indicates gender indicators.

along with the histogram; identify – with USAID – some shared themes across this timeline; and, as a result, recommend to USAID possible changes in programming that may reflect greater anticipation of, and adaptation to, future contextual changes in the environment. More critically, the histogram may also illustrate contextual events or “triggers” e.g., the capture of Kismayo by AMISOM forces, that that may have resulted in captured or lost opportunities for programming adaptation and shift, or may indeed identify cases of stability or instability for which USAID played no role.

DATA COLLECTION

Given the scope of the evaluation, the evaluation team will use two primary data collection methods, and one corollary method.

DOCUMENT REVIEW

The evaluation team will review documentation provided by USAID and other relevant secondary data the evaluation team collects, including the secondary sources outlined above. Given the large amount of documents that will need to be reviewed, the document review will be undertaken in three phases. In the first phase, the initial document review, the evaluation team will review documents that give them an overview of USAID’s strategy and programming in Somalia, and to aid in the development of the final Design document. During the second phase the evaluation team will undertake a more thorough triage of the documentation for relevance and content, and map these documents according to their application to the Evaluation Questions. Next, the team will draw-out the relevant information by content and analyze this data. To aid in this final phase, the team may develop an instrument to codify and organize data from the document review for analysis according to the Evaluation Questions. For example, since events will need to be charted on a timeline for question 5, the team may choose to organize the data for that question by year and by geographical area.

USAID will provide the following USAID documents to the evaluation team before the start of the evaluation.

- Somalia Stabilization Project Appraisal Document, 2013 (public version);
- USAID/Somalia PMP, FY 2011;
- Draft USAID/Somalia PMP, FY 2013;
- The Future of Stability in Somalia Report, 2011;
- Data from the Performance Plan Report, FY 2010, FY 2011, FY 2012, FY 2013;
- One pagers on each activity;
- Progress Reports for each activity, 2010-2014;
- Current Activity M&E Plans;
- SYLP Evaluation Report, 2012; (available on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse)
- Gender Assessment Report, 2014; (available on DEC)

- CEPPS Evaluation Report, 2014; (available on DEC)
- Verification reports, via the MEPS Clearinghouse;

IBTCI will provide access to the MEPS Clearinghouse, or the data housed within the Clearinghouse, to the evaluation team.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

The evaluation team will conduct a large number of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). At minimum, interviews will be held with key USAID staff, both in Nairobi and Washington DC; USAID partners in Nairobi and Somalia, and key Somali stakeholders. The selection of key informants will be purposive based on factors that may include: a) knowledge of or involvement in USAID's activities in Somalia; b) expertise in the field of stabilization / post-conflict development; c) shared vision or goals for stability in Somalia. The team will use the semi-structured interview guides in Annex 3, which are tailored to the sets of respondents, one for USAID and partners, and one for Somali stakeholders. It should be noted that the Somalia stakeholder respondents will include by necessity those stakeholders who *did not* directly benefit from USAID's interventions, and *who may or who may not* be aware of USAID's interventions, 2010-2014. This will provide a more balanced set of responses, and mitigate some degree of donor bias. The questions are aligned directly to the Evaluation Questions they seek to inform. It should be noted that the guides are iterative, and will be refined throughout the course of the evaluation based on suggestions from partners and stakeholders. An illustrative list of KIIs is in Annex 4.

INDICATOR DATA

As a sub-set of the document review, and in response to Questions 1, 2 and 4, primarily, the evaluation team will review the indicator data resident in the Clearinghouse, and in the partner quarterly reports, for two primary purposes: a) to inform the TOC assessment of validity relative to the Results Framework data; b) to uncover whether there are appreciable or recognizable patterns of progress toward stated USAID objectives and IRs. A superficial review of the indicator data in the Clearinghouse suggests that this form of analysis may not be performed with any accuracy or validity, but it is expected that additional indicator data (actuals, targets) is extant in partner quarterly reports, and therefore that there may be a sufficient data sample to conduct cross-tabs, frequency analysis, or perhaps linear regressions.

DATA ANALYSIS

The evaluation team proposes a series of analysis techniques. These techniques will be applied in two forms: a) during the course of the core evaluation and, b) during the course of the normative projection. The analysis during the course of the core evaluation will ensure that the data collection methods, including tools, inform the relevant findings and conclusions. The main data analysis methods that the team will apply are described below.

CONTENT, PATTERN AND TREND ANALYSIS

For data derived from the KIIs, the evaluation team will document narrative responses at a sufficient level of detail to permit a systematic content and pattern analysis of these data. As described above, the team will also examine the written documentation, e.g., reports, proposals, activity reviews, to determine whether the KII responses received appear to be correlated with variables derived from the documentation. Looking at trends over time will also allow the team to consider changes in implementation that may have occurred over time. It will also allow the team to examine areas in which there are clear corroborative convergence or competing divergence “stories” between the KIIs and the documentation.

COMPARISON ANALYSIS

The team will compare indicator targets against actuals to assess the extent to which the intermediate results, objectives and goal have been achieved. In order to gather this evidence, the team will rely on project documents, secondary sources and indicator data collected from the Clearinghouse.

SUMMARY STATISTICS AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Should the quantitative indicator data be sufficient, the evaluation team may use summary statistics to analyze quantitative data obtained from key documents, and in particular the indicator data. The two main analytical tools that the team will use include frequency analysis and cross-tabulation analysis. In the event that there are sufficient data sets for more complex linear regressions, the evaluation team may be able to generate patterns of “success” across the indicators (and thus across the programs) reviewing several variables, e.g., all actuals to all targets across the portfolio so as to identify clusters according to program, for example, and patterns of “success.” This form of analysis is dependent on being able to obtain large, multivariate, data sets.

RESPONSE CONVERGENCE/DIVERGENCE ANALYSIS

The team will review data collected to determine where there is significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders. Where divergence is found, the team will follow-up to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts, perceptions or opinions.

NORMATIVE PROJECTION

For the normative projection, the evaluation team proposes using two qualitative analysis techniques, both of which are dependent on a session with USAID involvement tentatively scheduled for Oct 15 2014. The techniques are participatory, and should be conducted in a joint setting, with a facilitator familiar with USAID and Somalia, and ideally with stabilization principles and monitoring & evaluation techniques. These sessions are proposed as being tentative, subject to timing and to participant availability, and assume that there are sufficient findings to emerge from the data so as to inform the sessions.

Most Significant Change

The Most Significant Change (MSC) model is an approach to evaluations which involves assessing the changes and, in turn, the impacts that people experience as a result of a program from the perspective of program participants. The evaluation team proposes to conduct a facilitated MSC session as a corollary to the Findings briefing in Nairobi on October 15. Program evaluations can be informed by the MSC technique since it focuses on impact monitoring by supplying information at impact and outcome levels- rather than activity or indicator levels- thus allowing the review of program performance as a whole. This also implies that MSC is a useful methodology for evaluations of interventions that have undefined outcomes or face a shortage in monitoring data due to obstacles to data collection, such as the operating environment. Furthermore, the very structure of the MSC approach directly contributes to capacity building efforts in several ways. MSC can help identify unexpected changes – both positive and negative – and deliver a more intricate and rich picture of what is happening, since the pool of stories from stakeholders is as wide as the experiences that the respondents have had throughout the duration of the project. Through the compilation of experiences and storytelling, the approach engages participants in the analysis of information, as there is need to provide a compelling argument when developing criteria for significance.⁸⁷ The process involves stakeholders discussing stories which revolve around the perceived changes that have taken place as a result of the intervention, and then selecting the stories they consider *most significant on the basis of a series of criteria defined by the group during discussions*. The MSC methodology is sometimes referred to as **monitoring-without-indicators**, because it does not make use of indicators that can be tracked, or as **the ‘story’ approach**, given that the data collected is in the format of stories which describe the change which occurred, when it occurred and the reasoning behind it⁸⁸. The Most Significant Change technique is not meant to be used as a stand-alone methodology, and as such will be used in combination with the other evaluation methods to inform the normative projection.

Appreciative Inquiry

⁸⁷ Further, the MSC process can be used as a tool for community empowerment through the creation of mechanisms for dialoguing about diverse ideas, fostering a shared vision, and conceptualizing impact.

⁸⁸ Davies, R. and Dart, J. (2005) “The ‘Most Significant Change’ (MSC) Technique: A Guide to its Use.”

As part of the Findings session(s) in October, the evaluation team suggests too that the MSC session include some Appreciative Inquiry (AI) techniques. AI is an organizational development tool and change process technique that inquires into, identifies and further develops the best of “what is” in order to create a better future, and can be utilized as a means of addressing issues, challenges, changes and concerns in ways that build on the successful experiences of members or participants⁸⁹. In a participatory session using an appreciative framework the first question will be to focus on stories of best practices, positive moments, greatest learnings, successful processes and generative partnerships. The Appreciative Inquiry approach to evaluation is learning-oriented and views inquiry as ongoing, iterative, and integrated into community life.⁹⁰ Rather than ask participants to list problems that they are facing in relation to the intervention at hand, they are asked to explain what is going well, why it is going well, and what they want more of, essentially reframing problem statements into a focus on strengths and successes. The AI tools for evaluation work extremely well in contexts where previous evaluation efforts have failed; within hostile or volatile environments; where there is fear of or skepticism about evaluation; when change needs to be accelerated and when relationships among individuals and groups have deteriorated. AI is beneficial in programs that are highly complex, where the technique can serve to reinstate what is valuable, useful, and important. Finally, AI is particularly useful in program evaluations by helping to identify and make explicit areas of good performance and to communicate and institutionalize what is already known about good performance so that it is furthered and replicated in future programming. Similar to the MSC approach, AI offers the opportunity for capacity building, because it fosters an optimistic co-construction of the future and emphasizes building on past successes, valuing inquiry, dialogue and reflection.

⁸⁹ Fraser, D. and Rogers, P. (2003) “Appreciating Appreciative Inquiry” *New Directions for Evaluation*.

⁹⁰ Preskill, H. and Tzavaras Castambas, T. (2006). “Introducing Appreciative Inquiry” *Reframing Evaluation through Appreciative Inquiry*.

KNOWN LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION DESIGN

Below are potential limitations of the evaluation's implementation and strategies on how the evaluation team will manage them.

DOCUMENT REVIEW

- **LIMITATION/WEAKNESS:** Information resources may not be optimally organized, applicable, available or up-to-date; it may be biased because of selective emphasis or survival of information; incomplete or inaccurate; and time consuming to collect and review.
- **HOW IT WILL BE MANAGED:** As the material is received, the evaluation team will review the documentation to ensure that it is organized, current, and complete. If any gaps are found, the evaluation team will communicate this to USAID to determine how to fill the gaps and/or alternatives to collecting the necessary information. To ensure that all files are managed and available at all times to the team, a Google Docs folder has been created and will be accessible to the team and to USAID.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (KIIS)

- **LIMITATION/WEAKNESS:** Findings can be biased if the informants are not carefully, or purposively, selected. When only a few people are interviewed, it may be difficult to demonstrate any general, let alone statistically significant, validity of the findings. It is difficult to prove that the interviewees are, in fact, knowledgeable and informed and that they are representative of their peers in their information and recommendations. Findings could be susceptible to interviewer bias.
- **HOW IT WILL BE MANAGED:** The evaluation team will manage the potential limitations and weaknesses of the KIIs by working with USAID to confirm that all key informants selected are relevant to the evaluation. The evaluation team will develop a purposive sample, i.e., a qualitative sample based on those respondents most likely to provide rich, comprehensive responses to questions and therefore contribute significantly to findings. The evaluation team will interview as many relevant key informants as necessary within the allotted evaluation period to increase confidence in the validity of the evaluation findings. Furthermore, all data received will be triangulated through ongoing desk review and situational analysis, while findings will be validated through interviews and the analysis of project reports, for example. The team will provide an objective, rigorous, set of interview guides and findings to prevent interviewer bias.

THE VALIDATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THE THEORY OF CHANGE (TOC)

- **LIMITATION/WEAKNESS:** The evaluation team’s approach reflects its awareness that the USAID TOC may not have had (and was not intended to have) a significant impact on the overall state of Somalia, and therefore this TOC cannot be invalidated because of its influence, or lack of influence, on Somalia holistically.
- **HOW IT WILL BE MANAGED:** The evaluation team recognizes that changes in attitudes, perceptions and/or behavior from USAID activities will occur incrementally and at varying levels in specific communities. It will therefore design “scaled” techniques that will allow it to ask program proponents about the level and degree of program impact. It will evaluate the incremental progress, rather than overall nation-wide progress, as associated with the principles in the Conceptual Framework and the TOC.

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGE

- **LIMITATION/WEAKNESS:** Lack of security and resultant inaccessibility may prevent the evaluation team from conducting the planned KIIs in Somalia.
- **HOW IT WILL BE MANAGED:** The proposed approach assumes that the level of security in the evaluation collection areas will be sufficient to allow the evaluation team to conduct data collection activities. If security prevents visits to the most desirable sites from a methodological perspective, the evaluation team will prioritize available locations – and respondents - and choose the most appropriate sites to obtain the widest and deepest range of data on the effectiveness of the program.

EVALUATION TEAM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The evaluation will be led by Rob Grossman-Vermaas, Principal for the Crisis, Conflict and Governance Practice at IBTCI, and Project Director for the USAID Monitoring & Evaluation Program for Somalia (MEPS). Mr. Grossman is a conflict and stabilization assessment, monitoring and evaluation expert and will provide overall technical and operational oversight to the evaluation, ensuring that all tasks and deliverables adhere to USAID ADS 200, 201 and 203, and the USAID Evaluation Policy. As Team Leader (TL), he will be the direct liaison between the evaluation team and USAID, and will coordinate directly with the USAID MEPS COR on all activities. Mr. Grossman will lead the evaluation design, planning, implementation/fielding, analysis and dissemination, and will coordinate the activities of the core team. Mr. Grossman will be supported by Lee Briggs, the evaluation’s stabilization and M&E expert. Mr. Briggs will coordinate with the TL on all technical issues, and will provide critical support to the evaluation, and in particular in the document cull and review, including the analysis of the validation of the conceptual framework and Theory of Change and the report-writing. Leyla Jeyte is the evaluation’s Research Assistant (RA). Ms. Jeyte will support the evaluation team’s

review and analysis of the literature, and will support the TL during the field-based work in Nairobi, Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu. She will also support the analysis and report-writing phase. Subject to USAID approval, the core team will also include Dr. Ladan Affi, as the evaluation’s contextual subject matter expert. Dr. Affi is a comparative politics scholar and an expert on Somalia, specializing in international development, conflict, governance and fragile states. She will provide critical contextual and interpretive inputs to the analysis phase, and in particular those relating to the stability and instability “triggers,” gender, local community politics and culture. The core team will be supported in all administrative and logistics functions by the IBTCI home office and the MEPS field office, with the latter coordinating all field-based logistics and security.

The composition of the core evaluation team includes an intentional complement of skill-sets and expertise. This will allow the team to conduct the many of the evaluation’s tasks concurrently, and thus more effectively. The below table illustrates this strategy. The evaluation can be segmented into six steps: planning; review and preliminary analysis; data collection (US-based KIIs and document review); fieldwork; analysis; and reporting, to which each member contributes when best required.

TABLE 3: TEAM COMPOSITION AND DIVISION OF TASKS

Evaluation Steps	Grossman	Briggs	Jeyte	Affi	IBTCI/MEPS Support
Planning	•				•
Review and Preliminary Analysis	•	•	•	•	
Data Collection	•	•			•
Fieldwork	•		•		
Analysis	•	•	•	•	•
Reporting	•		•		•

WORKPLAN

The evaluation team will adhere to the Workplan in Annex 5 to conduct its evaluation, and will modify the plan as needed in consultation with USAID. The approximate timeframe for the evaluation will be from July 14, 2014 to December 12, 2014. As per the above section on roles and responsibilities, several of the tasks within the Workplan will be conducted concurrently, with members of the core evaluation team ‘tag-teaming’ efforts.

Work is expected to be carried out over a period of approximately 18 weeks. USAID would like the work to begin no later than July 14, 2014. The draft report should be submitted to USAID no later than October 27, 2014.

TABLE 4: EVALUATION SCHEDULE

Time	Task
July 14 to 25, 2014	Initial Literature Review Development of Design and Workplan
July 24, 2014	Submission of draft Design and Workplan to USAID
July 29, 2014 ⁹¹	Initial Meeting with USAID (in-brief) – teleconference
August 1, 2014	Submission of final Design and Workplan to USAID
August 4 to 8, 2014	Detailed Literature Review
August 4 to 8, 2014	Detailed Literature Review DC-based KIIs
August 25 to September 1, 2014	Evaluation team travels to Nairobi Nairobi-based KIIs
September 2 to 23, 2014	KIIs in Somalia (Hargeisa, Mogadishu & Garowe)
September 26, 2014	Top-Line Findings
September 27 to October 10, 2014	Data Analysis Preparation for presentation to USAID
October 14, 2014	Presentation of initial findings to USAID
October 15, 2014	Validation Workshop
October 15 to 23, 2014	Formulation of draft report
October 24, 2014	Submission of draft report to USAID
November 7, 2014	Comments provided by USAID
November 25, 2014	Final report & infographic submitted to USAID
December 10, 2014	Approval provided by USAID
December 12, 2014	Report submitted to DEC

⁹¹ If Tuesday, July 29, is declared a public holiday by the Government of Kenya, then this deliverable is due on Monday, June 28, a day earlier.

DELIVERABLES

TABLE 5: EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

Deliverable	Due Date
Draft Design & Workplan	July 24, 2014
Initial Meeting (In-brief) with USAID	July 29, 2014 ⁹²
Final Design & Workplan	August 1, 2014
Discussion of Top-Line findings	September 26, 2014
Presentation on initial findings to USAID	October 14 -15, 2014
Draft Evaluation Report	October 24, 2014
Final Evaluation Report	November 25, 2014
Infographic highlighting evaluation findings and recommendations	November 25, 2014
Submission of approved report to DEC, if requested by USAID	December 12, 2014

Presentation

The presentation will follow the outline of the evaluation report and will include an introduction to the evaluation before discussing findings. The introduction will, at minimum, include a list of Evaluation Questions and the methodology used by evaluators to collect data. Findings, conclusions and recommendations will be presented by Evaluation Question so as to allow the audience to confirm that conclusions and recommendations are evidence-based.

An electronic copy of the presentation, in MS PowerPoint, should be submitted to USAID at least one day prior to the presentation.

Report

The evaluation report will adhere to the USAID Evaluation Policy. Special attention will be paid to ensure that the report meets the quality criteria presented ADS 203 and the USAID Evaluation Report Checklist. The report will be a maximum of 30 pages not including annexes and the format will be restricted to Microsoft products. In addition, all data collected by the evaluation team will be provided to USAID in an electronic file in an easily readable format; organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with either the activities of USAID in Somalia or this evaluation. If the report contains any potentially political and/or procurement sensitive information, USAID may request that a second version of the report excluding sensitive information be submitted. The draft report will be clearly marked “For Internal USG Use Only.”

⁹² If Tuesday, July 29, is declared a public holiday by the Government of Kenya, then this deliverable is due on Monday, June 28, a day earlier.

ANNEX I: EVALUATION MATRIX

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed	Methods for Data Collection		Sampling/ Selection Approach	Data Analysis Methods	
		Data Source(s)	Method			
I. To what extent have USAID/Somalia funded activities contributed, in a measureable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID/Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2013 Project Appraisal Document	X	Yes/No Binaries on understanding and recognition of outcomes and impacts Binaries on the definition of stabilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activity documents, such as M&E work plans and reports; • USAID documents, such as the 2013 project Appraisal Document; • USAID Staff; • Implementing Partners; • Somali stakeholders; • Other donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review • KIIs • Indicator Analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review • Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frequency Distributions; • Cross-Tabulations; • Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; • Regression Analysis • Normative Projection (MSC and AI)
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison ⁹³				
	X	Explanation ⁹⁴				

⁹³ Comparison – to baselines, plans / targets, or to other standards or norms

⁹⁴ Explanation – for questions that ask “why: or about the attribution of an effect to a specific intervention (causality)

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed	Methods for Data Collection		Sampling/ Selection Approach	Data Analysis Methods
		Data Source(s)	Method		
2.To what extent was the Theory of Change used by USAID/Somalia valid?	X Yes/No Binaries on understanding and/or recognition of TOC(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID documents, such as the 2013 Project Appraisal Document; • Secondary Source Documents, such as normative research; • USAID staff; • Implementing partners; • Somali stakeholders; • Other donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review • KIIs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review • Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; • Normative Projection (MSC and AI)
	X Description				
	X Comparison				
	X Explanation				

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling/ Selection Approach	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
3. Was USAID/ Somalia's conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling measurable stability and instability in Somalia?		Yes/No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID documents, such as the 2011 Future of Stability in Somalia Report; • Secondary Source Documents; • USAID staff; • Implementing Partners; • Somali Stakeholders; • Other Donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review • KIIs • Indicator Analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review • Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; • Normative Projection (MSC and AI)
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed	Methods for Data Collection		Sampling/ Selection Approach	Data Analysis Methods	
		Data Source(s)	Method			
4. How well did the activities funded by USAID/Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons), based on the results frameworks of the activities?	X	Yes/No Binaries on understanding and/or recognition of the Conceptual Framework and TOC(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activity documents, such as M&E work plans and reports; • USAID documents, such as the 2013 Project Appraisal Document; • USAID staff; • Implementing Partners; • Somali Stakeholders; • Other Donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review • KIIs • Indicator Analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review • Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison; • Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; • Normative Projection (MSC and AI)
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed		Methods for Data Collection		Sampling/ Selection Approach	Data Analysis Methods
			Data Source(s)	Method		
5.To what extent did USAID/ Somalia's activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?		Yes/No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activity documents, such as M&E Plans, work plans and reports; • USAID documents, such as the 2013 Project Appraisal Document; • USAID staff; • Implementing Partners; • Somali Stakeholders; • Other Donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review • KIIs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed review of key documents identified through initial document review • Identified by partners and USAID as essential points of contact; identified through desk review and/or fieldwork as key actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison; • Content/Pattern/Trend Analysis; • Normative Projection (MSC and AI)
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison				
	X	Explanation				

ANNEX 2: ILLUSTRATIVE KII GUIDES

KII Interview Guide for USAID and Partners

Date/Location:	
Name of Interviewee:	
Organization/Title:	

Background (Generic)

USAID has commissioned this evaluation of USAID assistance to Somalia from 2010 to 2014. The aim of this evaluation is to evaluate USAID's contributions in Somalia and its contributions to a Theory of Change in Somalia (EXPLAIN) that suggests that if one were to support a legitimate governance framework, through inclusive processes, and by improving access to service delivery and economic opportunity, public confidence would increase and the appeal of extremism would be reduced. We'd like to better understand your thoughts on this, and whether you feel this is/was a feasible, achievable, and/or a measurable approach. We'd also like to hear about your observations, lessons learned and overall recommendations. Unless you approve, we will not identify you by your name in the transcript nor in the main report that will be written. You will only be identified by your position and the level of government at which you work. We take this opportunity to request that you participate in the discussion which should last no more than one hour. We thank you very much for your willingness to participate in the study.

The evaluation seeks to answer the following questions **(DO NOT READ OUT)**:

1. To what extent have USAID/Somalia funded activities contributed, in a measurable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID/Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2013 Project Appraisal Document?
2. To what extent was the Theory of Change (TOC) used by USAID/Somalia valid?
3. Was USAID/Somalia's conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling stability and instability in Somalia?
4. How well did the activities funded by USAID/Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons)?
5. To what extent did USAID/Somalia's activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?

1. **What has been your role with USAID Somalia?**
 2. **How long have you worked for, or been in partnership with, USAID?**
 3. **Are you familiar with the USAID Somalia Stabilization Strategy and Theory of Change?**
 4. **Were you involved in the development of its stabilization strategy/strategies?**
 5. **What is ‘stabilization’ from your perspective?**
 - a. What are its characteristics?
 - b. How can it be measured?
 6. **Can Somalia Stabilize?**
 7. **What would you suggest are the best means to stabilize Somalia?**
 8. **What were the major events that have defined stability/instability in Somalia?**
 - a. Are there characteristics or “triggers” that signify stability occurring?
- Probe: major timelines, events and phases of the conflict, post-conflict and transition phases?
- PROVIDE THE ATTACHED LIKERT QUESTIONNAIRE TO INTERVIEWEE.**
9. (MAY be reviewed as part of the KII). **Given your definition of stabilization as given above, please assess the importance of the following list of factors related to stabilization programming.**
10. **Are you familiar with the X Program?**

EQ
1,2,3
4
4,5
4
N/C

a. What was your role in this program?	1,3,5
b. Tell me your opinion about the program, and its successes, challenges	2
c. Did you help to work on the project's TOC	1,4
d. Did you help to work on the M&E plan?	1,2,3,4
e. Does the M&E plan align to the Results Framework? The TOCs?	
11. What was the purpose of the X Program?	N/C
a. What was the intended outcome(s)?	1,3
b. Where they aligned to a TOC?	2,3
c. Were they aligned to USAID's TOC	
d. Were they aligned to the USAID Results Framework?	1,2,3
e. Were the stated goals achieved?	
f. Were the goals achievable? Why/why not?	1,2,3,4
g. Were activities planned based upon an accurate understanding developed through careful, thorough analysis?	1,4
12. What activities were in place to lead to that outcome?	1,4
a. Were these adequate?	
b. What was missing? What other activities/approaches should have been included?	
13. Tell me your opinion about effectiveness of the program...did it achieve its desired results?	1
a. Are there stories/evidence that you can you provide that this is the case?	
14. Tell me your opinion about the focus of the program.	N/C
a. Did it focus on the real problem, e.g., the hexagon "triggers?"	4
b. If not, what are the actual root causes of the problem?	2,4
c. What root causes should have been the focus?	2,4,5
15. What assumptions were made?	2,3,4,5
a. Did these prove true?	
b. What incorrect assumptions were made?	
16. What additional factors should have been considered? Especially	5

complexity/interdependence or contextual factors

- a. What unanticipated constraints should have been addressed?

17. Has the program been able to adapt to contextual changes effectively?

- a. What are some examples of this?
- b. Were these changes a result of, or in anticipation of, contextual shifts?
- c. Were these changes a result of, or in anticipation of, USG and/or USAID shifts in strategy, policy?
- d. Were the program changes effective? Did they result in positive outcomes?

18. How would you recommend that USAID move forward in Somalia?

- a. Where should the focus areas be? On what triggers? What can be leveraged?
- b. How would we observe any appreciable change(s)?
- c. How do you recommend USAID and its partners plan for the future in Somalia?

19. Follow-on

- a. *Scope*: are we doing the right things?
- b. *Scale*: are we doing enough of the right things? Do the resources match the scale and complexity of the objectives?
- c. *Sequence*: are we doing things in the right order? First things first?
- d. *Synergies*: are all the required parts being developed together and in harmony? If the result is dependent on multiple actors or multiple contextual factors, are all appropriately engaged?
- e. *Sustained Engagement*: Have we been involved long enough to ensure the achievement of desired results? The TOC?

5
5
1,2,3,4
1-5

KII Interview Guide for Stakeholders

Date/Location:	
Name of Interviewee:	
Organization/Title:	

Background (Generic)

USAID has commissioned this evaluation of USAID assistance to Somalia from 2010 to 2014. The aim of this evaluation is to evaluate USAID's contributions in Somalia and its contributions to a Theory of Change in Somalia (EXPLAIN) that suggests that if one were to support a legitimate governance framework, through inclusive processes, and by improving access to service delivery and economic opportunity, public confidence would increase and the appeal of extremism would be reduced. We'd like to better understand your thoughts on this, and whether you feel this is/was a feasible, achievable, and/or a measurable approach. We'd also like to hear about your observations, lessons learned and overall recommendations. Unless you approve, we will not identify you by your name in the transcript nor in the main report that will be written. You will only be identified by your position and the level of government at which you work. We take this opportunity to request that you participate in the discussion which should last no more than one hour. We thank you very much for your willingness to participate in the study.

The evaluation seeks to answer the following questions **(DO NOT READ OUT)**:

1. To what extent have USAID/Somalia funded activities contributed, in a measurable way, to increased stability in Somalia, as defined by the USAID/Somalia Goal and the logic of the Results Framework stated in the 2013 Project Appraisal Document?
2. To what extent was the Theory of Change (TOC) used by USAID/Somalia valid?
3. Was USAID/Somalia's conceptual framework (also known as the hexagon model) valid in modeling stability and instability in Somalia?
4. How well did the activities funded by USAID/Somalia logically align to the conceptual framework (hexagons)?
5. To what extent did USAID/Somalia's activities adapt to changes, such as those in security and formation of a federal government structure, so as to remain relevant to USG priorities for Somalia?

1. **What has been your role with USAID Somalia?**
2. **How long have you worked for, or been in partnership with, USAID?**
3. **What is ‘stabilization’ from your perspective?**
 - a. What are its characteristics?
 - b. How can it be measured?

4. **Can Somalia stabilize?**

5. **What would you suggest are the best means to stabilize Somalia?**

6. **What were the major events that have defined stability/instability in Somalia?**

- a. Are there characteristics or “triggers” that signify stability occurring?

Probe: major timelines, events and phases of the conflict, post-conflict and transition phases?

PROVIDE THE ATTACHED LIKERT QUESTIONNAIRE TO INTERVIEWEE.

7. (To be asked in concert with the questionnaire). **Given your definition of stabilization as given above, please assess the importance of the following list of factors related to stabilization programming.**

8. **Are you familiar with the X Program?**

- a. What was your role in this program?
- b. Tell me your opinion about the program, and its successes, challenges
- c. Were the stated goals achieved?
- d. Were the goals achievable? Why/why not?
- e. Were the activities planned based upon an accurate understanding developed through careful, thorough understanding of Somali’s needs?

9. **What activities were in place to lead to that outcome?**


- a. Were these adequate?

EQ
1,2,3
4
4,5
4
N/C
1,3,5
2
1,4
1,2,3,4
1,4
1,3

<p>b. What was missing? What other activities/approaches should have been included?</p>	1
<p>10. Tell me your opinion about the effectiveness of the program...did it achieve its desired results?</p> <p>a. Are there stories/evidence that you can provide that this is the case?</p>	1,2,3,4,5
<p>11. Tell me your opinion about the focus of the program.</p> <p>a. Did it focus on the real problem, e.g., the hexagon “triggers?” b. If not, what are the actual root causes of the problem? c. What root causes should have been the focus?</p>	2,3
<p>12. Has the program been able to adapt to contextual changes effectively?</p> <p>a. What are some examples of this? b. Were these changes a result of, or in anticipation of, contextual shifts? c. Were these changes a result of, or in anticipation of, USG and/or USAID shifts in strategy, policy? d. Were the program changes effective? Did they result in positive outcomes?</p>	5
<p>13. How would you recommend that USAID move forward in Somalia?</p> <p>a. Where should the focus areas be? On what triggers? What can be leveraged? b. How would we observe any appreciable change(s)? c. How do you recommend USAID and its partners plan for the future in Somalia?</p>	1,2,3,4
<p>14. Follow-on</p> <p>a. <i>Scope</i>: are we doing the right things? b. <i>Scale</i>: are we doing enough of the right things? Do the resources match the scale and complexity of the objectives? c. <i>Sequence</i>: are we doing things in the right order? First things first? d. <i>Synergies</i>: are all the required parts being developed together and</p>	1-5

in harmony? If the result is dependent on multiple actors or multiple contextual factors, are all appropriately engaged?

- e. *Sustained Engagement*: Have we been involved long enough to ensure the achievement of desired results? The TOC?



ANNEX 3: ILLUSTRATIVE KII LIST

Name	Organization/ Position	Location	E-mail	Phone	Notes	Status	Date/Time of Interview
Pete Mohan	OFDA-FFP	DC	pmohan@ofda.gov				
Surekha Khandagle	OFDA		skhandagle@usaid.gov		On maternity leave; Munira is finding personal contact info		
Anne Shaw	FFP	Nairobi	ashaw@usaid.gov		Moving to Nairobi in August		
Pamela Fierst	Former Somali State Dept. Desk		fierstpd@state.gov				
Abdullahi Mohammed	OFDA		abmohamed@usaid.gov		Former CEPPS AOR		
Tyler Beckelman	Somalia Office Director USAID (Starting in July)		tbeckelman@usaid.gov		Formerly based in DC (USAID/AFR/E A)		
Alicia (Lacy) Carra	Former TIS AOR		lacycarra@yahoo.com		No longer with USG		
Nasri Hussein	Former TIS AOR		nasriadam@yahoo.com		No longer with USG		
Juan M Domenech-Clar	State Dept. Somalia	Nairobi	Domenech-ClarJM@state.gov				
Julie M Limoges	State Dept. Somalia	Nairobi	LimogesJM@state.gov				
Brian Phipps	State Dept. Somalia	Nairobi	phippsbh@state.gov				
Edward Johns	State Dept. Somalia	Nairobi	JohnsEH@state.gov				
Safia Mohamoud	State Dept. Somalia Desk Officer	DC	mohamouds@state.gov				

Jeremy Meadows	Democracy Specialist (AFR/SD)	DC	jmeadows@usaid.gov				
Marissa Lemargie Lavaque	USAID Team Lead for Somalia, East Africa Regional, and Djibouti	DC	mlemargie@usaid.gov	202-712-1738			
Brittany Brown	Country Development Officer USAID	DC	brbrown@usaid.gov		Served as DC backstop for Somalia for almost a year when Marissa was on leave		
Angela Martin	Senior Counter Terrorism Advisor USAID/AFR/SD	DC	amartin@usaid.gov		in case there's need to talk about CVE		
Linda Etim	DAA for Africa	DC	N/A		go through Marissa		
Hodan Hassan			hohassan@usaid.gov				
Helene Carlson			ncarlson@usaid.gov				
Cael Savage			csavage@usaid.gov				
Marybeth McKeever			mmckeever@usaid.gov				
Leslie Schafer			lschafer@usaid.gov				
Sarah Atwood			satwood@usaid.gov				
Mohamed Heban Awale	Amoud University	Borama, Somaliland	Heben447@yahoo.com	+252-63-447-4422	PEG (DAI)		
Suleiman Ahmed Gulaid	Amoud University	Borama, Somaliland		+252-63-445-4004	PEG (DAI)		
Farah Elmi	Minister of Agriculture	Hargeisa, Somaliland		+252-63-424-0042	PEG (DAI)		
Hussein Abdi Dualeh	Minister of Energy & Minerals	Hargeisa, Somaliland	Hussein.abdi3@gmail.com	+252-63-424-0056	PEG (DAI)		

Mohamed Awale	Ministry of Commerce and Investment (Director of Planning and Development)	Hargeisa, Somaliland	awale@somalilandinvest.net	+252-63-424-0083	PEG (DAI)		
Rima Das Pradhan-Blach	Ministry of National Planning & Development (Special Advisor to Minister)	Hargeisa, Somaliland	rdpb@me.com	+252-63-400-0961	PEG (DAI)		
Sa'ad Ali Shire	Ministry of National Planning & Development (Minister)	Hargeisa, Somaliland		+252-63-424-0045	PEG (DAI)		
Abdi Ahmed Mohamed (Baffo)	Minister of Agriculture, FGS	Mogadishu, Somalia	aahmed@somalia.gov.so		PEG (DAI)		
Abdirashid Haji Nur	Concern International (Country Director)	Mogadishu, Somalia	Abdirashid.haji@concern.net		PEG (DAI)		
Abdirisak Dalmar	Benadir University (President)	Mogadishu, Somalia	drdalmar@yahoo.co.uk		PEG (DAI)		
Abdulkadir Hassan Shirwa	Consultant (Agronomist)	Mogadishu, Somalia	Samatar.matan@gmail.com		PEG (DAI)		
Fatima Jibrell	Africa Development Solutions (Senior Advisor/ Founder)	Nairobi, Kenya	fjibrell@gmail.com	+254-717-444-448	PEG (DAI)		
Hussein Haji	Somali Agricultural Technical Group (Director)	Nairobi, Kenya	hhaji@satg.org	+254-713-970-354	PEG (DAI)		
Jose Lopez	FAO-Somalia (Agriculture Coordinator)	Nairobi, Kenya	jose.lopez@fao.org	+254-713-970-354	PEG (DAI)		
Mohamood Abdi Noor	Retired World Bank	DC	Noor.Mohamood@gmail.com		Peg (DAI) Former Vice Minister of Agriculture		

					(FGS)		
Mohamed Hassan	Ministry of Education (Director General)	Hargeisa		+25263 424107 1	SYLI (MC)		
Dr. Khadar Bashir-Ali	Ministry of Education (ESC Coordinator, Somalia)	Hargeisa		+252634071735 /616559945	SYLI (MC)		
Ahmed Warsame	Ministry of Education (Ag. Director General)	Garowe		+252907794506	SYLI (MC)		
Mohamed Ali Farah	Ministry of Education (Director of Programs)	Garowe		+252907796450	SYLI (MC)		
Mohamed Nur Abdikadir	Ministry of Education (Director General)	Mogadishu		+252615506650	SYLI (MC)		
Mohamed Adulkadir Hashi	Ministry of Education (Director General)	Galkayo		+252- 617029998/907 917482	SYLI (MC)		
Abdurahman Sh. Ali	Garowe Teachers Education College (Principal)	Garowe		+252907794777	SYLI (MC)		
Omer Ali Abdi	Ministry of Youth Sports and Tourism (Director of Youth)	Hargeisa		+252634429701	SYLI (MC)		
Ahmed Abdalla Mohamed (Tigana)	Ministry of Labor Youth and Sports (Director General)	Garowe		+252907386084	SYLI (MC)		
Aweis Hadad	Ministry of Labor (Director General)	Mogadishu		+252618278946	SYLI (MC)		
Mr. Saeed M. Ahmed	Somaliland National Youth Organization (Executive Director)	Hargeisa		+252634427327	SYLI (MC)		
Na'ima Muse Elmi	Women Council for	Garowe		+252907773062	SYLI (MC)		

	Girl Child Education (Chairperson)						
Mohamed Musse Mohamed	MUDAN (Chairperson)	Garowe		+25290742228	SYLI (MC)		
Ibrahim Hussein	CARE (Former Youth Development Specialist)	Garowe		+254722176211 +25290794394	SYLI (MC)		

ANNEX 4: EVALUATION WORKPLAN

	WEEKS																																																																												
	1					2					3					4					7					8					9					10					11																																				
	July 14-20					July 21-27					July 28-Aug 3					Aug 4-10					Aug 25-31					Sep 1-7					Sep 8-14					Sep 15-21					Sep 22-28																																				
	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S	M	T	W	R	F	S	S
Planning & Review	█	█	█	█	█		█	█	█																																																																				
DEL IA: Draft Design & Workplan																																																																													
Review																																																																													
Remote In-Brief																																																																													
Review																																																																													
DEL IB: Submission of Final Methodology & Workplan																																																																													
Detailed Review & DC Kils (Revisions)																																																																													
Travel to Nairobi																																																																													
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Data Analysis & NBO Kils																																																																													
Meeting with USAID- sharing top line findings																																																																													
Travel to US																																																																													
Data Analysis & Report Writing																																																																													
Travel to NBO																																																																													
DEL 2: Presentation of Initial Findings																																																																													
Joint Session on Findings (AI and MSC)																																																																													
Travel																																																																													
Report Drafting																																																																													
DEL 3- Submission of draft report																																																																													
USAID Review																																																																													
Finalization of Report																																																																													
DEL 4: Final Report																																																																													
DEL 5: Report on DEC																																																																													

ANNEX 4: LIST OF KIIS

NO	SOURCE OF INFORMATION	
Nairobi, Kenya		
1.	Abdullahi Mohammed	OFDA
2.	Ali Ibrahim Ali	TIS IOM
3.	Alicia (Lacy) Carra	Former TIS AOR
4.	Brian Phipps	State Department Somalia
5.	Cael Savage	USAID
6.	Cherry Gumapas	USAID
7.	Craig Berkenpas	Operations Manager
8.	Craig Davis	Former TIS IOM COP
9.	Edmond Efendija	Country Director
10.	Erica Berkenpas	MEPS DcoP
11.	Francis Butichi	MC SYLI CoP
12.	Gaëlle Le Pottier	MEPS CoP
13.	Helene Carlson	USAID
14.	Himish Mohamoud	TIS DAI
15.	Hodan Hassan	USAID
16.	Ian Noble	Internews Regional Manager
17.	Ivan Parks	DfID
18.	John Pennell	USAID
19.	Juan M Domenech-Clar	State Department Somalia
20.	Julie M Limoges	State Department Somalia
21.	Keir Prince	Adam's Smith International
22.	Leo Thomas	DfID
23.	Leslie Schafer	USAID

24.	Liz McBride	State Department Somalia
25.	Marybeth McKeever	USAID
26.	Mohamed Adow	TIS DAI
27.	Nasri Hussein	Former TIS AOR
28.	Omar Hanif	TIS IOM
29.	Rita Njau	TIS IOM
30.	Sarah Atwood	USAID
31.	Sean Brooks	State Department CSO
32.	Sirat Ali	TIS DAI
33.	Tyler Beckelman	USAID
34.	Vishalini Lawrence	TIS DAI
35.	Yussuf Abdullahi	USAID
Hargeisa, Somaliland		
36.	Abdirahman Abdillahi Irro	Speaker of the House of Representatives
37.	Ali Said Raygal	Minister of Youth, Sports and Tourism
38.	Amal Ibrahim	Former TIS IOM Program Advisor SL
39.	Amal Ibrahim	Former TIS PM in SL
40.	Asha Ali Warsame	Ali Warsame Constr. Co. (Manager)
41.	Dr. Khadar Bashir-Ali	Ministry of Education (ESC Coordinator, Somalia)
42.	Farah Elmi	Minister of Agriculture
43.	Hon. Sa'ad Ali Shire	MNP&D (Minister)
44.	Hussein Haji	SATG Executive Director
45.	Ibrahim Arab Elabe	Consultant MoA
46.	Ibrahim Hussein	CARE (Former Youth Development Specialist)
47.	Ibrahim Omar Kahin	Director of Crop Production MoA
48.	Khadar Osman	SORADI Civil Society
49.	Mohamed Fadal	SORADI Civil Society


50.	Mohamed Hassan Nur	Executive Director Shaqodoon NGO
51.	Mohamed Heban Awale	Amoud University
52.	Mohamed Hussein	DG of Ministry of Youth Sports and Tourism
53.	Mohamed Said Mohamed	Director of Plant Protection MoA
54.	Mohamood Abdi Noor	Agriculturist
55.	Mubarak Taani	PEG (DAI) Senior M&E Officer
56.	Mustafa Awad	Former TIS PM in SL
57.	Mustafa Othman	Shaqodoon NGO
58.	Olad Farah	MC SYLI DCoP
59.	Omar Ali Abdi	Ministry of Youth Sports and Tourism (Director of Youth)
60.	Paul Odhiambo	M&E Specialist
61.	Prof. Seleban Ahmed Guleid	Amoud University (President)
62.	Stephanie Shackelford	IRI
Galgaduud, Somalia		
63.	Abdirizak Ali Cowl	SFG (DC Abudwaaq)
64.	Hawa Abdidoon Kediye	Adaado Women Association (Member)
65.	Hussein Ali Weheliye (Cirfo)	SFG (Governor Galgaduud)
66.	Mohamud Mohamed	SFG (Deputy DC Balanbale)
67.	Mumina Elmi Arus	Guriceel Women Association (Member)
68.	Noor Yarrow Haile	Himan & Heeb Administration (Deputy DC Adaado)
69.	Yussuf Hassan Ali	SFG (Program Manager Galgaduud)
Garowe, Puntland		
70.	Abdirahman Mohamed	KAALO Project Coordinator
71.	Abdirhman Shikh Doone	Garowe Teachers Education College (Principal)
72.	Abdiwali Abdulle	KAALO Program Manager
73.	Ahmed Abdullahi Tigana	Ministry of Labor Youth and Sports (Director General)
74.	Ahmed Mohamed Yusuf	Baargaal municipality (Ex-Mayor)
75.	Ahmed Shire Ahmed	KAALO Deputy Director
76.	Faadumo Maxamuud Yuusuf	Women organization (Chairwoman)

77.	Fatuma Abdisalam Mohamed	Gender Education Officer Ministry of Education PL
78.	Fatuma Shukri Abdi Hersi	Head of Gender Unit Ministry of Education PL
79.	Hawa Ali Jamac	Women Umbrella (Chairwoman)*
80.	Kule Abubaicar	KAALO Technical Program Officer
81.	Mohamed Abdikadir Hashi	Minster of Education Galmudug*
82.	Mohamed Ali Farah	Ministry of Education Director of Programs (Former DG) PL
83.	Mohamed Musse Mohamed	MUDAN (Chairperson)
84.	Na'ima Muse Elmi	Women Council for Girl Child Education (Chairperson)
Mogadishu, Somalia		
85.	Abdi Ahmed Mohamed (Baffo)	Minister of Agriculture, FGS
86.	Abdi Mohamad Siyad	Former DC Hodan
87.	Abdirahman Dahir	Ministry of Education
88.	Abdirisak Dalmar	Benadir University (President)
89.	Ahmed Makaraan Former	DC Wabari
90.	Ahmed Mohamed Gurase	Minister of Education
91.	Aways Haddadi	DG Ministry of Labor
92.	Hassan Ali	Ministry of Education
93.	Jibril Abdulle	Center for Research and Dialogue
94.	Mohamed Abdulkadir Ali	Deputy DC Dayniile (Former Dan Guud Youth)
95.	Mohamed Mumin Mohamed	DC Waberi
96.	Samatar Matan	Consultant (Agronomist)
97.	Arabow Ibrahim	Ministry of Education (Acting DG)
Washington, DC		
98.	Brittany Brown	Country Development Officer USAID
99.	Elizabeth Lewis	IRI
100.	Jeremy Meadows	USAID Democracy Specialist (AFR/SD)
101.	Linda Etim	DAA for Africa
102.	Marissa Lemargie Lavaque	USAID Team Lead for Somalia, East Africa Regional, and Djibouti
103.	Pamela Fierst	Former Somali State Dept. Desk
104.	Safia Mohamoud	State Dept. Somalia Desk Officer
105.	Zaki Raheem	DAI

ANNEX 5: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE


As depicted in the graph, IRI performed successfully in 2013, meeting and substantially exceeding the targets set. However, they performed poorly in other years, and only achieved a single objective in the other three years that the program was active.

CEPPS IRI PERFORMANCE 2011-2014
(UNITS: % OF TARGETS ACHIEVED)




NDI also struggled to meet its goals over the life of the CEPPS program. In the four years that data was collected on indicators, it was only able to meet one target in 2013.

CEPPS NDI PERFORMANCE 2011-2014 (UNITS: % OF TARGETS ACHIEVED)




Internews met many of its targets over the course of the People to People program. The program was able to reach and exceed many of its goals focused on improving the capacity and quality of news dissemination, but was unable to train the target number of journalists in safety and security, and struggled to improve CSOs' organizational capacity.

P2P INTERNEWS PERFORMANCE 2012-2013
(UNITS: % OF TARGETS ACHIEVED)




DAI succeeded in meeting many of the goals over the course of the PEG program. DAI significantly exceeded its targets in one indicator in particular, 3.1-3 Number of participants who have completed trainings supported by the USG. As mentioned in the report, this was due to DAI opening up the trainings to include sectors outside of agriculture.




The SEEDS program, implemented by Mercy Corps, focused its attention on more tangible outcomes. While the program executed activities to improve opportunities for youth, its successes came from the construction and rehabilitation of structures and classrooms.

SEEDS MERCY CORPS PERFORMANCE 2012
(UNITS:% OF TARGETS ACHIEVED)




The graph of the performance of the SYLI program appears successful, with many lines exceeding the 100% of target met line. But, it only met 7 targets of the 24 indicators measured in 2013, its most successful year.




The TIS program, implemented by both DAI and IOM, recorded some degree of success in bringing coordination and reconciliation to Somalia. Both succeeded in conducting trainings and events designed to build support for peace. Each also did well reaching people with the events and trainings. IOM met its targets for this indicator in both 2012 and 2013, and DAI reached its goal in 2013. Both IOM and DAI also fulfilled their objectives for assisting in consensus-building processes that resulted in agreements on multiple years. While the IPs struggled to meet certain targets, its success in aiding the reconciliation process should be noted.

TIS DAI PERFORMANCE 2011-2014
(UNITS: % OF TARGETS ACHIEVED)



TIS IOM PERFORMANCE 2011-2014
(UNIT: % OF TARGETS ACHIEVED)



ANNEX 6: STRATEGY/ MODEL TO IR AND INDICATOR MAPPING

Program/Indicators	STABILIZATION												Program/Indicators	INSTABILITY												
	Countering Violent Extremism	Create Opportunities for Youth	Create an Enabling Environment for Business	Improve Social Services	Strengthen Regional Administration	Support Peace and Reconciliation	Support Political Processes	Strategic Communication	Basic Safety	Economic Growth	Public Institutions in Government	Partnership (CS, PS, Gov)		Small Ownership	Small Culture and Values	Insecurity	Extreme Ideologies	Clanism	Power Struggle	Weak Government Structures	War Economy	Resource Conflict	Breakdown of Social Fabric	Exclusion	Impunity	Nairobi Mafia
SYLI (MC) goals														SYLI (MC) goals												
IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted														IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted												
IR 2.1 Access to Basic Social Services Increased														IR 2.1 Access to Basic Social Services Increased												
IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased														IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased												
IR Gender other														IR Gender other												
SEEDS (MC)														SEEDS (MC)												
IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved														IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved												
IR 2.1 Access to Basic Social Services Increased														IR 2.1 Access to Basic Social Services Increased												
IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased														IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased												
TIS (DM)														TIS (DM)												
IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved														IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved												
IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted														IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted												
IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased														IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased												
IR Gender														IR Gender												
TIS (DM)														TIS (DM)												
IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved														IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved												
IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted														IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted												
IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased														IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased												
IR Gender														IR Gender												
CEPPS (ND)														CEPPS (ND)												
IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved														IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved												
IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted														IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted												
IR Gender														IR Gender												
CEPPS (IR)														CEPPS (IR)												
IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved														IR 1.1 Capacity of Key Government Institutions to Perform Essential Functions Improved												
IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted														IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted												
IR Gender														IR Gender												
PEG (DA)														PEG (DA)												
IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased														IR 2.2 Economic Opportunities Increased												
IR Gender														IR Gender												
P2P (Intraneus)														P2P (Intraneus)												
IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted														IR 1.2 Participatory Political Process Promoted												

ANNEX 7: BREAKDOWN OF ACTIVITIES BY SECTOR, REGION, AND FISCAL YEAR

Cluster Region / Sector	2012	2013	2014	2012-2014
	Number of Activities	Number of Activities	Number of Activities	Total Number of Activities
Mogadishu				
Eco Growth	9	58	78	145
Education		12	10	22
Governance	38	37	54	129
Peace & Security	25	232	143	400
Total	72	339	285	696
Puntland				
Cross cutting		8	2	10
Eco Growth		71	45	116
Education	54	51	33	138
Governance	1	19	19	39
Peace & Security		50	33	83
Total	55	199	132	386
Somaliland				
Cross cutting	5	11	2	18
Eco Growth	107	362	135	604
Education	85	73	56	214
Governance	18	195	46	259
Peace & Security	27	71	67	165
Total	242	712	306	1260
South Central (excluding Mogadishu)				
Eco Growth		2	46	48
Governance		19	21	40
Peace & Security		65	91	156
Total	0	86	158	244

ANNEX 8: USAID SOMALIA ACTIVITIES

Activity Title	Implementing Partner	Start Date	Completion date
Somali Youth and Livelihood Program	Education Development Center (EDC)	9/30/2008	9/30/2011
School Environment and Education Development for Somalia (SEEDS)	Mercy Corps	9/30/2008	9/30/2011
Transition Initiative for Stabilization (TIS-IOM)	IOM	2/8/2010	9/30/2015
Somalia Legislative Strengthening & Political Processes Program (CEPPS III)	CEPPS (NDI/IRI)	8/1/2010	9/30/2014
Transition Initiative for Stabilization (TIS-DAI)	Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)	3/22/11	3/21/2016
Monitoring & Evaluation Program (MEPS)	International Business & Technical Consultants Inc. (IBTCI)	4/13/2011	9/29/2014
Partnership for Economic Growth (PEG)	PEG - Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) - Nathan Group GBTI II, LLC	4/15/2011	8/31/2015
Architecture & Engineering Services	ECOTECH Ltd.	9/29/2011	9/29/2014
Somali Youth Leaders Initiative	Mercy Corps	9/30/2011	9/29/2016
People-to-People Radio (PPR)	Internews	2/8/2012	11/7/2013
Joint Health & Nutrition Programme (JHNP)	UNICEF	9/27/2012	3/26/2015