



**Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement Market  
Expansion (PRIME)**



**Final Report  
Drought Emergency Response  
Areas: Afar and Liben  
October to November 2014**



**Report Submitted by: Mercy Corps  
Report submitted to: USAID/OFDA**



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## Overview

<b>Organization Name</b>	Mercy Corps
<b>USAID Development Program Title</b>	Pastoralists Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME)
<b>Program Title</b>	Fodder voucher interventions in drought affected woredas of Liben zone in Somali and Gebi Resu (zone 3) in Afar regional states
<b>Sector Name</b>	Agriculture and Food Security
<b>Objective</b>	To respond to deteriorated pasture conditions resulting from seasonal rainfall failure in target pastoralist areas, and prevent further decrease in productivity of livestock and losses of productive assets of pastoral households in target affected areas. To protect development gains of PRIME in the above areas.
<b>Indicators</b>	<u>Indicator 1:</u> <i>Number of animals benefiting from or affected by livestock activities</i> <b>20,588 livestock assisted</b> <u>Indicator 2:</u> <i>Total number of critical market actors (e.g., producers, suppliers, traders, processors) directly assisted</i> <b>309 small-scale fodder/feed suppliers, 2 wholesalers (commercial fodder supplier) and 4 local retailers participated</b> <u>Indicator 3.</u> <i>Number of people benefiting from livestock activities</i> <b>9543 HHs (66,801 persons) benefited</b> <sup>1</sup>
<b>Dollar Amount Financed</b>	USD 1,000,000
<b>Number of People and Livestock Targeted</b>	Target: 6,500 HHs (3,250 HHs in zone 3 of Afar and 3,250 HHs in Liben zone); 10,000 Livestock (5,000 in Afar and 5,000 in Liben) Achieved: 9,543 HH (2,310 HH in Afar and 7,233 in Liben Zone); 20,588 Livestock (10,603 in Afar and 9,985 in Liben)
<b>Geographic Areas</b>	Liben Zone (Dolo Ado, Filtu, Hudet, and Moyale woredas) in Somali region and Gebi Resu/zone 3 (Gewane, Gelealo, Amibara, and Awash Fentale woredas) in Afar region
<b>Key Words</b>	Vouchers, feed, fodder, Livestock, Pastoralists
<b>Sub-Sector</b>	Livestock

<sup>1</sup> Assumption: HH in pastoral areas in Ethiopia have an average family size of 7

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Failure of the 2014 seasonal rain locally known *Gu* and *Sugum* in Liben and Gebi Resu Zones respectively has created a shortage in livestock forage, feed, and fodder in most woredas threatening livestock, especially core breeding animals. Various multi-agency assessments conducted both at federal and regional level indicated that the drought situation was severe and getting worse calling for immediate action. In response to the drought, PRIME designed a voucher system to provide animal feed and fodder in line with Tufts previous research on protecting household milk supplies in emergencies, entitled *Milk Matters*<sup>2</sup>. This intervention was designed to link the emergency response required for protecting household nutrition and livelihoods, with the development objectives of strengthening the feed/fodder markets for the longer term and enabling resilience. The intervention aimed at protecting core breeding livestock and maintaining milk production of pastoral households in target affected areas. This final report summarizes PRIME Emergency Response activities undertaken and achievements made through this feed and fodder voucher intervention, implemented from September 25, 2015 to December 15, 2015 in Liben Zone of Somali region and Gebi Resu Zone in Afar region.

Despite the challenges linked with delayed funds approval and communication gaps, the PRIME feed and fodder voucher intervention reached 20,588 core breeding animals. The intervention geographically covered eight districts and 40 kebeles in the two regions and benefited 9,543 pastoral households. We believe this intervention ultimately contributed to protecting PRIME development gains and maintaining milk production at household level – an important nutrition contribution to the target group for this activity and for PRIME generally, households with children under 5. Reflecting back on the process followed, several opportunities for improvement in PRIME’s ability to respond to the emergency were identified. Major areas that need improvement include:

- Developing well written guideline clarifying crisis modifier activation procedures and anticipated timing, and protocols needed to ensure clarity on emergency response plan;
- Staffing for emergencies – including pre-identifying staff with emergency response competency.
- Ensuring that an effective communication strategy is incorporated into emergency response plans for both internal and external stakeholders.

These findings suggest that while PRIME has made considerable effort in responding to drought emergencies (in Liben zone of Somali and Gebi Resu zone in Afar regional state), there are some gaps which will need to be addressed as a priority to improve future emergency response effectiveness.

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<sup>2</sup> Sadler, K., Mitchard, E., Abdi, A., Shiferaw, Y., Bekele, G., and Catley, A. (2012). *Milk Matters: The impact of dry season livestock support on milk supply and child nutrition in Somali Region, Ethiopia*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Save the Children, Addis Ababa.

This paper will discuss the background and justification for fodder voucher intervention designed to protect the development gains of PRIME, achievements/impact, and challenges and lessons learned for the next similar intervention.

## **BACKGROUND**

The fodder voucher scheme is intended to use existing market structures, where available, to respond to the crisis. Unlike traditional emergency response in which humanitarian actors directly deliver relief items, PRIME's market-oriented approach is in line with the Minimum Economic Recovery Standards (SPHERE companion<sup>3</sup>) and uses the EMMA methodology in analyzing potential response options. Previous interventions during droughts generally used direct provision from the NGO to a central feeding location or home-based intervention, inadvertently disallowing fodder traders from participating in the process. Although these interventions did save the lives of many livestock, the sustainability of this type of intervention became an area of concern as it seemed to be eroding the coping capacity of the community and enhancing dependency syndrome. It effectively led to fodder traders being unaware of a market for their goods in these areas, and therefore did not regularly supply feed/fodder to these areas, further undermining resilience in the system. In 2008, an evaluation of USAID supported projects recommended a new approach which would involve facilitation of linkages between pastoral groups and commercial fodder/feed suppliers. This shift is also in line with PRIME's market-based facilitation approach.

The fodder voucher intervention is designed with the following objectives: leverage the existing commercial fodder supply market system, provide pastoralists with exposure to supplemental animal feeding, encourage pastoralist and agro-pastoralist households to provide supplemental feeding to livestock as a method for improving animal productivity, and attract new potential feed/fodder suppliers to establish permanent business presence to meet demand in crisis and normal times. The approach taken to voucher provision was to work through retailers in the target areas. Because PRIME seeks to build the demand and supply of fodder in its target areas through its development work, this was an opportunity to give retailers (who, for the most part, do not currently sell fodder) the opportunity to learn if it is a product that their customers would want (i.e. an opportunity to expand their available products). At the same time, fodder users could learn which retailers might have fodder for sale in non-emergency times.

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/handbook-companions/the-mers-handbook/>

## **MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS**

### **Preparatory Activities Undertaken in Collaboration with Partners**

Before entering into the actual implementation of the intervention, various preparatory activities were conducted. These include rapid market survey and a series of consultations with the relevant stakeholders including - implementing partners (CARE and SOS Sahel), government counterparts at different levels, and USAID/OFDA. In addition, internally in Mercy Corps considerable discussions were held with finance and procurement team to ensure that all activities would adhere with organizational finance policy and procedures, and fulfil donor compliance requirements. Further discussion with Mercy Corps HQ staff, specifically with the Global Economic Recovery Advisor, helped to incorporate lessons and best practices acquired through implementing similar activities in other areas.

During consultation with stakeholders, beneficiary selection criteria was discussed and agreed. The criteria included households with pregnant/lactating women, children under 2, and families with a disabled member, female-headed households, and family with aging or chronically sick person. These groups are deemed to be most at risk of malnutrition and most likely to suffer from reduced access to milk. Inclusive committees established at each kebele (comprising kebele administration, women and youth representative, persons with a disability, kebele level development agent and health extension workers, PRIME staff and woreda representative) in collaboration with community leaders played a key role in selection and verification of beneficiaries as well as coordination of fodder/feed implementation processes. The number of beneficiaries selected from each village per kebeles was also decided by the committee based on the severity of drought, socio-economic status and vulnerability criteria.

### **Stakeholder Consultations Held for Familiarization of Voucher Systems**

In addition to preparatory activities explained above, PRIME conducted a series of stakeholder consultations to create synergy with humanitarian actors in the regions. PRIME organized orientation sessions in each targeted kebele and clarified objective of the intervention and responsibilities expected from beneficiary community. For example, it was made clear that all management activities, including herding, watering, health care and feeding would continue to be the responsibility of the owners of the animals. In collaboration with the woreda Pastoralist and Agricultural Office, PRIME facilitated an orientation on the usage of concentrated feed through on-spot demonstration. Technical orientation was also provided for PRIME field-level program and finance teams for familiarization with the voucher systems, procedures for redeeming them and post distribution monitoring.

### **Fodder/Feed Distributed to Target Beneficiaries**

Vouchers were distributed to targeted households to be redeemed through local retailers. Vouchers were denominated in feed/fodder, and specific to the number and type of animals targeted in that household. Feed and fodder wholesalers/suppliers delivered to the retailers, and households were informed which retailers would redeem their vouchers. The amount of fodder per voucher was calculated based on the required amount intended to cover the maintenance and survival feeding requirement for pregnant and lactating cows, breeding cattle and shoats as defined in the national guidelines for livestock relief Interventions in pastoralist areas of Ethiopia. PRIME assigned vouchers the appropriate value to meet the needs of core breeding animals, initially for two months. Beneficiary households received two vouchers per household (one for concentrate and one for hay). Eligible households “bought” fodder/feed with their vouchers from pop-up shops opened in center of the kebele by local retailers. The suppliers were then paid for those vouchers based on their contracts and once they had fulfilled Mercy Corps and Donor compliances.

**Results: Gebi Resu Zone in Afar regional State**

In Zone 3 of Afar region (Gewane, Bure Modayto, Amibara and Awash Fentale) PRIME’s Fodder Voucher intervention distributed 9172 quintals of hay/grass and 4,362 quintals of concentrate to 10,603 core breeding animals in one round. *Table 1* summarizes livestock benefited and quantities of fodder/feed distributed in Afar.

*Table 1: Summary of Number of Livestock and Quantity of Fodder/Feed Distributed, Afar*

<b>Woreda</b>	<b>HH</b>	<b>Fodder (QT)</b>	<b>Concentrate (QT)</b>	<b># Livestock</b>
Amibera	785	2,502	1,164	3017
Awash Fentale	405	1,726	748	1989
Burimudayitu	500	2,194	1,166	2495
Gewane	620	2,750	1,284	3102
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,310</b>	<b>9,172</b>	<b>4,362</b>	<b>10603</b>

The reason for the reduction in number of households actually reached in Afar from the 3,250 households initially proposed to USAID/OFDA in August is that the targeting was redone at the request of the Afari Government due to accessibility issues. The number of livestock reached, however, was doubled from the originally proposed 5,000, also at the request of the local government. Although the original plan in Afar was to provide two months fodder/feed for core breeding animals, upon discussion with the Regional Livestock Bureau of the Afari Government, the distribution was revised to provide one month’s fodder feed for about double the number of originally intended livestock, due to the perspective of local authorities in Afar that the actual number of animals affected by drought was significantly higher than the PRIME target. Because the feed/fodder quantities are

mandated by the GoE, and due to budget limitations of the intervention, the only option for supporting more animals was by reducing the number of months for which the vouchers were provided. Based on these discussions, PRIME increased the target from 5000 head of livestock to 10,589; of this figure, roughly 83% were cows and 17% bulls, and all livestock fell within the selection criteria.

**Results: Liben Zone in Ethiopian Somali region**

In Liben zone of Somali Region (Dolo Ado, Filtu, Hudet and Moyale) 3879 quintals of concentrated feed and 8,127 quintals of fodder were distributed to 9,985 head of livestock with the same fodder voucher approach.

Similar to the situation in Afar, the Liben zone administration requested an increase in the number of targeted animals. With the “Deyr” rain approaching, local authorities also felt that the shorter time would be adequate to meet the goals of the project and protect household assets and milk supplies. As a result of these discussions, PRIME increased the targeted livestock from 5,000 to 9985. *Table 2* below summarizes livestock benefited and quantities of fodder/feed distributed in Liben zone, and *Table 3* provides an overview of livestock benefited and HH reached in both regions.

**Table 2: Summary of Number of Livestock and Quantity of Fodder/Feed distributed, Somali**

S.no	Affected woredas	# of HHs Benefited	# of Livestock Benefited			
			Milking Cows	Bulls	Shoats	Total
1	Filtu	999	2,000	0	0	2,000
2	Dollo Ado	1,249	1,285	713	1,002	3,000
3	Hudet	2,000	2,000	0	0	2,000
4	Moyale	2,985	2,985	0	0	2,985
<b>Total</b>		<b>7,233</b>	<b>8,270</b>	<b>713</b>	<b>1,002</b>	<b>9,985</b>

**Table 3: Summary of livestock targeted and HHs benefited in Liben and Gebi Resu zones**

Region	HH	Fodder (QT)	Concentrate (QT)	Livestock
Afar	2,310	9,172	4,362	10,603
Somali Region	7,233	8,127	3,879	9,985
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,793</b>	<b>29,449</b>	<b>14,316</b>	<b>25,088</b>

**Note:** The maintenance and survival feeding requirements for all animals are calculated as defined in the National Guidelines for Livestock Relief Interventions in pastoralist areas of Ethiopia.

### **After Action Review**

Following completion of fodder voucher interventions PRIME has organized an After Action Review (AAR) in which team who actively participated in the response activities came together to reflect on the processes. The primary purpose of the workshop was to explore ways in which PRIME could improve emergency performance and quality of work by reflecting back on the processes followed, activities and actions taken. It presented an opportunity for the PRIME team to discuss what happened and why, and how to build on strengths and improve on areas of weakness, as well as exploring ways in which staff prepared better, act timely and implement crisis modifier effectively.

During the workshop, participants discussed best practices and lessons learned across three key phases: planning and preparation, response operationalization, and post distribution monitoring and after- response work. Feedback from participants confirmed that the AAR workshop was fruitful in identifying the main strengths and areas that need improvement as well as key lessons relevant to PRIME Crisis modifier intervention. It was also anticipated that the outputs of this workshop will be a valuable input for designing and implementing effective response intervention through incorporating key lessons learned.

### **IMPACT**

While quantifiable impact of this intervention on livestock owners is difficult to obtain as a baseline study on milk production was not done prior to the emergency, preliminary qualitative observation indicates that this intervention did contribute to protecting PRIME development gains by the following:

#### *Protecting Livelihood assets and Maintaining Milk Production at Household Level*

The feed and fodder distributed to the 9,543 households in Afar and Somali regions was of higher quality than that which would have been provided to the beneficiaries via other (government) channels. In fact some households wondered if this feed and fodder was meant to put the government distributor out of business. Anecdotal observations are available for animals whose physical conditions were improved after receiving the feed and fodder, for example, from being unable to stand without human support to being able to stand. Improved physical conditions of livestock allowed households to maintain milk production. Additionally, field visits following the intervention noted that as a result of the intervention, the targeted pastoralists gained awareness on the importance of saving feed and fodder during dry season.

In Liben Zone, observations from a field visit conducted after distribution were that the feed and fodder enabled the livestock, which were originally weak and malnourished, to pass through the critical drought period and re-engage in milk production. Beneficiaries expressed gratitude to the distribution team and to PRIME for enabling their animals to survive the drought, produce milk and thus help their children.

Similar observations were made of the impact of the distribution in Afar. For example, Nesro Haleto, a pastoralist with a family size of eight, lost seven goats, out of her herd of 57 sheep/goats and three cows, and decreased daily milk production from eight liters to less than two. Her family was suffering from malnutrition and Nesro did not know how she and her family would be able to survive until the next rainy season. Upon receiving the feed and fodder distribution, however, Nesro's herd was able to survive the drought, enabling her family to survive as well, without loss of her assets.

“The project has helped my family to survive and keep my assets through this harsh time and I am much happier now. I acknowledge the worth of the project for this poor pastoral community. If we had not received the fodder support, there would be great problems, such as loss of our herd, migration, school dropouts and deterioration of the health of our children.”

- Nesro Haleto, Pastoralist, Gewane Kebele

#### *Initiating Linkages between Commercial Feed/Fodder Retailers and Wholesalers, Consumers and Retailers*

Previous to the intervention, commercial feed/fodder was not available at local retailers in these woredas. Three of the major market-side impacts of this intervention are that 1) wholesalers of commercial feed and fodder found retail outlets through which to distribute their products; 2) local retailers became aware that commercial feed and fodder was a product that could be sold; and 3) local consumers became aware of the impact of high quality feed and fodder on the physical health of their livestock, as well as the fact that they may be able to purchase it from local retailers.

For example, one of the wholesalers acknowledged that the fodder voucher intervention helped him to expand his understanding of available markets. Prior to the intervention, the company sold products for dairy farming and fattening businesses, and only to clients who went to their shops. As a result of the wholesaler's participation in the intervention, he realized the growing market for feed and fodder in pastoralist areas and has now opened three shops in Borena Zone and plans to open additional shops. Moreover, this wholesaler has started to engage in the live animal market and has signed a partnership agreement with a cooperative union in which the union would purchase livestock at fair prices, the wholesaler would supply fodder and feed on credit, and the parties would sell

livestock with a major slaughterhouse with whom an agreement has also already been signed. The wholesaler is also now exploring options for the export livestock market. The other wholesaler that participated in the intervention has also found that the experience has enabled him to expand his business networks; as a result, he is planning to open large feed and fodder shops outside of the regular feed and fodder market in Addis.

“Sometimes taking financial risk is important to expand your businesses – we have learned a lot working with local retailers.”

-Owner, Tesfaye Alemu Feed Suppliers

For these reasons, the intervention is indeed considered to have achieved impact in protecting development gains of PRIME, and should be considered for future crisis modifier interventions.

### **KEY CHALLENGES (REASONS FOR DELAY) AND LESSONS LEARNED**

Ultimately, the intervention for Afar and Liben was planned for August and September 2014 and implemented in October and November 2014. The reasons for the delays are delineated below along with how these challenges would be pre-empted and/or addressed in future interventions.

1. **Communication gaps:** Although the weekly trigger indicators update alerted the changing situation timely and PRIME senior leadership team decided to activate the emergency response back to June 2014, due to communication gaps between Addis and field teams, preparatory activities, such as beneficiary targeting, were not immediately initiated.

*Resolution:* An emergency communications structure delineating communications between Addis and field team, and between all PRIME implementing partners, will be a clear and agreed-upon component of the emergency response strategy.

2. **Lack of Clarity on Process for Receiving Full Funding** – The process for receiving approval of and full funds was ultimately delayed for about two months, largely due to lack of clarity between PRIME and OFDA, from the beginning of the process, on the following:
  - a. *Circumstances during for which a separate proposal for interventions should be submitted:* Shortly after calling on the Crisis Modifier mechanism for Borena, PRIME recognized the need to develop similar activities for Afar and Somali regions and consider including commercial destocking. After these activities were added to the original Crisis Modifier proposal, PRIME was informed that the activities for the latter two regions should be submitted under a standalone proposal due to the Crisis Modifier cap of \$500,000 USD. Additional time was then required to submit a standalone proposal

which needed to include documents including security plans, branding and marketing strategy and other documents that needed to be tailored specific to this proposal.

- b. *Circumstances under which PRIME could access sufficient funding to purchase the required amount of feed and fodder in the immediate term:* OFDA provided PRIME with a Pre-Authorization Letter (PAL) for \$200,000 as an attempt to allow PRIME to begin to make initial purchases and with the understanding that as the intervention involved voucher redemption at the end, full payment in any case would be required further down the road. PRIME, however, due to its own financial procedures, was unable to move forward with procurement of \$800,000 of feed and fodder with a \$200,000 PAL. Additionally, the bidding documents had already been released for \$800,000 worth of procurement and purchasing a reduced amount would increase the per QT pricing. Additionally, PRIME was not aware of approval to spend its own funding until the additional funds for the standalone proposal could be released. OFDA provided, as quickly as possible, authorization of the remainder of the amount, but the waiting time for this release did delay the overall timeline of the intervention.

Although wholesalers transported the product fairly quickly, these delays meant that the “*Deyr*” season had already started. That in turn posed a challenge to delivering the fodder/feed to some of the pop-up shops and distribution centers, because many of the rural kebeles were inaccessible due to heavy rain. It was clear that the fodder was still needed, as pasture had not recovered, but it was now logistically more difficult to provide.

*Resolution:* PRIME is now aware of circumstances under which a standalone proposal would be required, outside the Crisis Modifier, as well as its authorization to release internal funds while awaiting release of full funding. Clarification on these points will serve to greatly reduce the potential for delays on the funding side. The fact that the actual procurement and transport was done fairly quickly emphasizes that once these clarifications are noted, the actual implementation can take place more efficiently in the future.

3. **Emergency Staffing:** The rationale for not hiring staff particularly for the emergency (other than voucher monitors) was that the existing PRIME staff already had a deep knowledge of the targeted communities and the development gains that the intervention was designed to protect. In reality, however, the PRIME staff faced challenges responding to emergency needs without compromising their normal development activities.

*Resolution:* PRIME will review emergency staffing levels, seeking a more ideal mix of stand-by emergency staff, and seconding existing development staff to the emergency activities.

4. **Government requests:** As mentioned, originally the fodder voucher interventions for both regions were targeted for two months but ultimately provided sufficient fodder for one month due to requests from local authorities from both regions to increase the number of animals to be assisted. The need to target more than once caused delays in the process.

*Resolution:* PRIME will re-think how targeting conversations were held with government officials (who clearly have motivation to help *all* communities) and identify strategies for keeping responses more focused on the target populations, keeping in mind that PRIME's objective is to protect milk supply and livelihood assets rather than the full livestock population.

5. **Floods in Afar:** Immediately following the drought, the Awash River overflowed and flooded Amibara, Gewane and Burimodayto, target areas for the fodder response. As a result, beneficiary communities were displaced from their villages and PRIME had to rearrange the delivery schedule, further delaying the distribution of fodder/feed. Additionally, the delay raised questions as to whether the intervention was needed at all, as the rains had already started. Nonetheless, the PRIME team did believe that distributing the feed and fodder would still be important and impactful in protecting the livestock assets in the woredas.

*Resolution:* Although the intervention did positively impact the beneficiaries, a timelier intervention, via resolving the above issues, would indubitably have provided greater impact.

### **Additional Lessons Learned**

1. **Creating linkages between local entrepreneurs with commercial fodder suppliers is a successful method of increasing fodder availability in non-emergency times:** Although still anecdotal, there is evidence that small business owners who partnered with wholesalers during the emergency have established stronger market linkages with fodder wholesalers and are able to continue selling fodder/feed in the future on their own initiative. Moreover, as these linkages have been established, PRIME is positioned to make use of them to expedite subsequent fodder voucher crisis modifier interventions, if the need should arise.
2. **Integrated emergency response preferred:** The original PRIME response plan included de-stocking to reduce livestock population sizes, alongside the provision of fodder/feed. The strategy was to work either through financial institutions and larger traders, or through commercial slaughterhouses to increase purchase of live animals from areas where pasture and water levels were critical. Whilst PRIME made a continuous effort throughout the emergency intervention to implement destocking, it was blocked in Afar by the lack of

financial institutions (and the legal restrictions barring NGOs from providing these financial services directly), and in Liben by the lack of capital available to the financial institution. (Although an earlier pilot activity on trader loans with SMFI had been successful, SMFI did not have the capital to implement destocking loans at the volume required to be meaningful. NGOs are not allowed to provide capital directly to MFIs, and PRIME did not have official clearance to provide a term deposit that would have created the capital in the financial institution.) PRIME will continue to explore options for commercial destocking, as the need for this service is still present, and expected to be an issue in the next drought as well.

## FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE REPORT

No	Description of Expenditures	Amount in USD	Remark
1	Procurement of fodder/feed and distribution costs	833,864.38	These category includes procurement of items, transportation, market facilitation and related costs
2	Other Operational Running Costs	4,435.62	Administrative related expenses aggregated here
3	NICRA 16.17%	161,700.00	
4	Complementary funding from PRIME	570,755	Not match, but used to strengthen and support emergency activities (needs confirmation)
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,570,755.00</b>	

## CONCLUSION

The feed and fodder voucher intervention was the first of its kind within PRIME. In spite of the number of delays, some of which could have been pre-empted and all of which must be taken as part of the learning experience for future interventions, the impact of the intervention cannot be understated in protecting the development gains of PRIME, protecting the livelihood assets of its beneficiaries, increasing market linkages between feed/fodder retailers and wholesalers and increasing household awareness of a possible venue to purchase feed and fodder. Certainly feed and fodder voucher interventions will be taken into consideration as a potential interventions in the future, particularly if there is a need to activate the crisis modifier, particularly as PRIME is able to build on its learnings from this intervention, as well as on the networks of retailers and wholesalers that have already been formed.