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The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas

Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

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
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THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES
AT MONA, JAMAICA



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The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica and in the Americas, 2012:

Towards Equality of Opportunity

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide programme design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important on-going support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
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Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
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and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
and
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviours in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous on-going funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University.

Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pre-tests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pre-tests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas.

We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Start-up Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Start-up, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Start-up Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central, planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Start-up Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector programme for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software programme using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January 2012, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin colour. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of colour palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights Report No. 73*, enable the interviewer to rate the skin colour of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally

recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programmes for STATA 10/12. These programmes generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample.¹ Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.²

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labour of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the

¹ The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.


² All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the AmericasBarometer project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		 
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Caribbean	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p><i>Balboa Republica Dominicana, S.A.</i></p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> </div>
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	
Trinidad & Tobago	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		CIPPEC ^{PP}
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador	 	
Paraguay		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		



Canada and United States			
Canada	 UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	YORK U UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.	THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY	 MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES	PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina  

Acknowledgements

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Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin colour again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K.

Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spread sheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Start-up Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data up loader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the PhD students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

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Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
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Caribbean Group	
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Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jack Menke, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Suriname
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Andean/Southern Cone Group	
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Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Germán Lodola, Assistant Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
 Summer 2012

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the fourth in a series of biennial cross-national, LAPOP-directed and USAID funded political culture studies, undertaken with the aim of broadening our understanding of the nature and dynamics of the political culture of the countries of the Americas and of Jamaica in particular. In **Part 1** of this document, we focus on a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendously wide gaps in opportunities and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are clearly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, our emphasis in this study is on inequalities within the countries of the region, with a focus on Jamaica. We attempted to answer questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? And, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? Also, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? And importantly, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

In **Part 2**, we examine the LAPOP-standard governance-related topics of corruption, crime and security, system legitimacy and issues relating to local government and varying forms of citizen participation. Also, in keeping with our focus on trends in system support, we examine how citizens' perceptions and experience of these phenomena affect their support for a democratic system of government in Jamaica.

In the final three chapters (**Part 3**) we focused our investigation on Jamaica, probing concerns relating gang prevalence; their influence and connections both at the community and national level, police-citizen relations, and issues of social tolerance and inclusive citizenship among the populace.

Consistent with previous studies, findings obtained from this sample survey are intended to be generalizable to all voting age residents of Jamaica. With this objective in mind, a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample was designed, in line with a framework proposed by the LAPOP organization for its collaborating countries. The obtained sample of 1500 persons is self-weighted and was determined to be representative of Jamaica's adult population in terms of its gender, age and geographical distribution, based on the composition of the 2001 Population Census.¹

The findings presented in this report are inclusive of comparative information on key democracy and governance variables, firstly from a cross-national perspective incorporating results from the other 25 countries participating in the 2012 study and then nationally, comparing the findings of the 2012 survey with those of previous rounds – 2006, 2008 and 2010.

The report is organized under the following parts and chapter headings. A summary of major findings follows the respective headings and sub-headings.

¹ Although this survey was conducted after the 2011 population census, the results of that study were not available for public use during the design phase of this 2012 LAPOP survey

Part I: Equality of Opportunity and Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

In this first chapter, we examine the extent to which factors such as gender, race, ethnicity, social class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas, and in turn, how such inequalities affect public attitude and opinion toward the political system.

It was observed that the great differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the region. Interestingly, it is found that inequality has recently been improving in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, but important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these will place them within their country's social milieu.

The Jamaican context exhibits some of the features and, in some respects, results of particular countries in the Americas, but it also exhibits its own peculiarities. The Gini Index, for example, points to marked inequality although for the earlier years of the 2000s, for which the index was done, it compared favourably with a number of Latin American countries. However, the Gini Index for 2011 points to deepening inequality. Explanations for this latest reading might rest partly in the current deepening economic crises. Of course, it might be useful to bear in mind that the Gini Index has its critics who refer, for example, to the choice as well as the number of variables that it utilizes.

Among the findings, it is noteworthy that education varies with location of residence, age and parent's level of education; skin colour impacts years of schooling and income; position on food security varies with age and gender; and there is substantial disagreement that men should have priority in the labour market, and so on. There are also notable insights that may be gained from results arising from, for example, perceptions of availability of government social assistance provisions and behaviour associated with recipients of such assistance.

The foregoing offers a substantial pillar in the platform on which issues regarding perceptions of Jamaica's political culture and specific aspects such as corruption can be examined and assessed.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

The chapter sets out to examine how race, gender and socioeconomic status impact political involvement and opportunities across the region. The 2012 AmericasBarometer survey was conducted against the background of data from prior studies that pointed to significant disparities in different forms of political participation in terms of these factors within countries and variations in participation in the political process across countries. It was found that despite reductions in inequality that have occurred over the past decades, important aspects of political participation remain unequal in the Americas.

In the case of Jamaica, the results indicate that its position has varied somewhat in relation to that suggested by earlier surveys. It could be said to occupy an approximate mid-point among the list of countries of the Americas in regard to levels of inequality in a context in which significant global

agencies continue to rank Latin America as the most unequal region of the world. Jamaica's participation rate of approximately 60 per cent in its last election was among the lowest for the countries considered, and female participation was almost five per cent higher than that for men, albeit a statistically insignificant difference. Education provided a statistically significant relationship with voter participation in that people who had not completed primary school were much more likely to vote than more highly educated fellow citizens (88% to 55%). Other elements such as community participation, in which Jamaica fared comparatively well, were also considered.

Other factors considered were support for equal opportunities based on perceptions of differences in capacity to lead in relation to gender and enjoyment of priority to access available work. Across the Caribbean, including Jamaica, there was a substantial perception that men tended to be better political leaders. Support for gender quotas for candidates in political parties across countries showed El Salvador (81%) and the Dominican Republic (79%), for example, heading the charts in terms of support, whereas Jamaica fell close to the bottom (58%) – above Trinidad and Tobago with 46 per cent.

Generally, based on the results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer and buttressed by studies of previous years, it could be said that inequality with regard to political participation is narrowing across the region, albeit slowly.

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

The results and discussion elsewhere have suggested that economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Notable proportions of citizens in the various countries report social and political attitudes that are opposed to the participation of some groups. These attitudes may reinforce unequal access to opportunities and resources, and this chapter was aimed at finding out how such attitudes impact on democracy in the Americas. We introduced the terms “internal political efficacy” and “external political efficacy” as part of our framework.

Respondents were asked, on a seven-point scale, adjusted in this publication to a 0 to 100 point scale, whether they understood the most important political issues of their country. The results ranged from Paraguay's 38.8 points at the bottom of the scale which indicates a tendency towards strongly disagreeing – to the USA's 67.6 at the top of the scale which tends towards the opposite sentiment of strong agreement. Of note is Trinidad and Tobago (56.8) that occupies fourth place from the top whereas Jamaica stands at an approximate mid-point among the countries (49.7). Jamaica's score implies fair or moderate understanding of the most important political issues.

Gender is a notable determinant of internal efficacy, with the results for men pointing to their gender as an advantage. Internal efficacy also increases as wealth increases, although the difference is not statistically significant across all quintiles. Greater political interest and increasing the level of schooling are shown to enhance internal efficacy. With regard to level of schooling, the difference due to educational attainment is statistically significant only at the post-secondary level. The findings regarding participation in political protest, for example, are also noteworthy. Generally, participation is low for all the countries in that only five of the twenty-six countries reported double-digit percentage-point participation rates in this activity. Bolivia (17.7 per cent) ranks at the top, followed by Haiti

(16.8), whereas Jamaica stands at the bottom (2.3%) of the list of countries which are ranked on the basis of their population's involvement in protest action in 2012.

Part II: Governance, Political Engagement, and Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

This chapter addressed the magnitude and the relationships between crime, perception of insecurity and corruption, and support for the political system and the rule of law in Jamaica. Our exploration of these issues was informed by the assumptions that crime victimization and perception of insecurity might negatively impact citizens' support for their democratic system of government and may weaken their embrace of key democratic values, particularly their belief in the right to due process and the supremacy of the rule of law. Also, we assumed that pervasive corruption should have the effect of undermining political legitimacy and, in turn, increasing the prospects for democratic instability. With these assumptions in mind, we created and analysed regression models designed to examine the likely impact of crime, sense of insecurity and corruption on citizens' support for a democratic system of government in Jamaica.

Corruption victimization has declined dramatically in Jamaica since the first study in 2006. The 2012 survey measured the lowest level of corruption since the surveys began. In comparative terms, Jamaica has fallen from one of the more corrupt countries in the Americas to one of the least. Moreover, the perception that corruption is widespread among elected and other public officials in Jamaica continues to be markedly high among the citizenry. However, the measure of 75.2 out of a maximum of 100 points obtained in this 2012 round is the lowest recorded since the first study in 2006. It is also the first year that there has been a statistically significant reduction in corruption perception by this measure and in line with the findings of Transparency International's (TI) 2012 survey of a small improvement in corruption over this period based on the ranking of Jamaica with other nations. Evidence of a marginal reduction in crime victimization is also consistent with police statistics.

With regard to system support, it was found that persons who were victims of a crime within the past twelve months are, indeed, less supportive of the political system than those who were not. Also, persons with the perception that corruption is widespread in society are likely to exhibit low support for their system of government.

It has been observed that Jamaica quite often shows a tendency for certain attitudes and practices deemed antithetical to the rule of law, particularly with regard to the respect for citizens' civil rights in areas such as law enforcement. A key finding, however, showed evidence of very high respect for the rule of law among Jamaicans. Seventy-five per cent of the populace support full compliance with law in all circumstances, the highest score on this measure among the countries participating in the 2012 round of surveys. Gender was the only factor with a statistically significant impact, with women more likely to support adherence to the rule of law. Importantly, it was found that citizens' exposure to crime significantly influence their support for the rule of law.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

As discussed in the theoretical sections of this chapter, pervasive society-wide attitudes and values reflecting citizens' propensity for political tolerance and the broad popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the system are critical for the maintenance of a stable democracy. In this section we examined selected attitudes, behaviours and values of Jamaicans that are presumed to influence these two dimensions of democratic stability. The ultimate objective was to establish, on the basis of these measures, the extent to which the country's democratic system is in the process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidating.

Importantly, the data showed a reversal in the trend of a progressive decline in the index of democratic stability between 2006 and 2010, with a statistically significant eight-point increase in this measure between 2010 and 2012. This positive change was influenced by an appreciable increase in the indicators of both political tolerance and system support in the latter period. Viewed with further findings of statistically significant improvement in citizens' trust in nearly all the key democratic institutions, and a measurable increase in the support for democracy per se, it is reasonable to conclude that the prospect for democratic stability in Jamaica is reasonably favourable, and notably improved since our earlier surveys, based on all these measures.

Chapter Six: Local Government

In this chapter, we examined questions relating to citizens' experiences with local government, their evaluation of the services offered by its departments and agencies, and, in turn, the effect that such experiences and evaluations have on support for the national political system. A key assumption was that citizens who participate in and evaluate local government positively are likely to exhibit greater belief in the legitimacy of national institutions and the political system as a whole.

When citizens' level of participation in the affairs of their parish council was examined in terms of meeting attendance and demand-making, Jamaica fared poorly, with declining levels of participation on these indicators both on a year-to-year basis and by cross-national comparison when ranked with other countries in the Americas. On the question of citizens' evaluation of the effectiveness of local government, measured in terms of their level of satisfaction with the services provided, it was found that among the countries studied in the 2012 survey, Jamaicans are among the most dissatisfied with the quality of services provided by their parish councils and municipal authorities. Despite a trend of incremental improvement on this measure over the years, Jamaica is ranked as the second weakest performer on this indicator in the 2012 survey.

Importantly, it was found that higher levels of satisfaction with the services of local authorities positively impact citizen's support for their system of government.

Part III: Beyond Equality of Opportunity

Chapter Seven. Surveying the Gang Problem in Jamaica: Citizens' Perceptions and Attitudes to Neighbourhood Gangs

In this chapter, we explore the problems posed by gangs in Jamaica by attempting to estimate insecurity - generating impact of these criminal groups across the Island via citizens' perceptions and

attitudes regarding their presence, activities and connections in their communities and beyond. Specifically, we explored citizens' perception of the threat that gangs present to the communities in which they operate and the country more generally. In addition, we examine the extent to which gangs are perceived to be significant actors in the political system and connected to the political parties, thus generating a lack of confidence in the political authorities and contribute to the insecurities of the population. Facilitatory or permissive attitudes to gangs are measured and reported, and their implications for gang control discussed. Finally, we gauged citizens' attitudes to anti-gang initiatives and queried their willingness to participate in efforts designed to reduce gang prevalence and mitigate their negative impact on the society.

It was observed that gangs have been a feature of the Jamaican socio-political landscape for decades, and that they continue to be a major source of crime and violence in the country. Scholarly and other sources have pointed to the increasing complexity of their organization, their growth and resilience, the dangers that they pose to the communities in which they operate, and society as a whole, their links to politics, and significantly, to noticeable signs of greater acceptance of these criminal entities in some communities.

Notably, respondents saw, not gangs, but rather common criminals as the biggest threat to their neighbourhoods and personal safety. This correlates to some extent with the higher percentages of respondents who stated that they did not know a gang member, and, had not been invited or encouraged to join a gang. This is made somewhat complicated by the overwhelming proportion of the actual respondents (92%) who felt that gangs made their neighbourhoods less safe.

The greater proportion of respondents (69.1%) said they would assist with gang reduction strategies and felt the police were doing at least a fair job (82.7% cumulative) in their effort to "dismantle" gangs. Despite the fact that some respondents in the sample might not have been exposed to gangs and their activities, it could be cautiously inferred that a fairly strong anti-gang sentiment prevails in the society. There is popular support for a robust and comprehensive gang reduction and control policy.

Chapter Eight. Trust as a Factor in Police-Citizen Relations in Jamaica

In this chapter, we centre trust and confidence as aspects of police-citizen relations in Jamaica. It is argued that the nature of police-citizen relations in Jamaica is somewhat complex and rests on elements such as the overall societal context, policing approaches and citizens' perceptions of and attitude to the police. Various strategies such as community policing have been directed at improving service, accountability and citizen-cooperation over the years. Community police holds much potential for building the confidence and trust of the people, transforming policing and making the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) more effective in controlling and preventing crime, but it was observed that these changes ought to be deepened.

Evidently, perceptions of the police are crucial in improving police-citizen relationships, and this study shows that much work remains to be done towards improving this element which has the potential to make Jamaica a more secure place. It was found, though, that the trend of a progressive decline in confidence in the Jamaican police over the first three rounds of this survey was broken in 2012, with a significant sixteen point increase in this measure between the 2010 and 2012. This is the highest level of trust enjoyed by the police in the six years of this study.

Also of significance are findings relating to citizens' propensity to work with the police. There is overall majority support for police efforts in Jamaica, accompanied by a general willingness to cooperate with the authorities in crime-fighting initiatives, if these can be meaningfully developed and implemented within communities. Critical to any such collaboration, however, is the need for the police to earn an appreciable level of trust in the communities they serve, as evidenced by the finding that trust in the police correlates positively with the more important dimensions of police-citizen cooperation.

Chapter Nine. Sense of Inclusiveness in Jamaica: Probing the Issue of Social Tolerance

At the start of this chapter it was cited that among the basic conditions for sustaining a representative democracy, such as that of Jamaica, are competitive elections, participation by a wide cross-section of citizens, and respect for as well as protection of the political and civil rights of all citizens. Related to this is inclusiveness, which involves support for, and assurance of minority rights which analysts have cited as being among the most basic elements of any form of political democracy. However, marginalized groups sometimes do not enjoy such rights because of factors varying from attitudes of the majority of the population through to official sanction. The focus of the chapter was on social tolerance and involved the examination of the attitudes and perceptions of Jamaicans to the right of selected individuals and groups to fully participate in some of society's important civil and political processes. The emphasis has been largely on attitudes to homosexuality.

The study found exceptionally low levels of support for the basic rights of homosexuals in the case of Jamaica. Only Haiti with 8.5 on a 100-point scale was more strongly opposed to homosexuals running for public office than Jamaica, with a score of 21. Of note, however, is the statistically significant 12-point incremental change in approval among Jamaicans between 2008 and 2012. Canada, Uruguay and the United States with scores ranging from 74 to 78 points were the most supportive of this particular right.

The AmericasBarometer also found Jamaicans to be the least supportive (5.1 on the 100-point scale) of same-sex marriage among the 26 participating countries. Canadian and Uruguayans were the most supportive, approximately sharing the top of the list with a score of 67 points. There was a marginal positive change in the support for same-sex marriage, as noted in the results for 2012 when compared with those for 2010.

In terms of other indicators of social tolerance, Jamaicans generally agreed with abortion if the mother's health was at risk. Jamaica stood just below Uruguay and the USA – the strongest supporters – on this measure but varied from the position of Honduras, which led those countries that indicated the least qualified support for abortion. Support for the rights of the physically-challenged enjoyed mixed support, as indicated by the 2012 survey.

Importantly, it was found that the more educated, measured in terms of level of schooling, those of high socioeconomic status (wealth) and those who are more aware of current affair issues are likely to be more supportive of equal rights for homosexuals.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

**Part I:
Equality of Opportunity and
Democracy in the Americas**

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira, and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive good quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy and so future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society because these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality rather than wealth inequality has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.¹ More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.²

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary. The recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.³ Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime.⁴

Inequality is not just a social or economic problem but also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behaviour and the stability of governments. Research shows that

¹ Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and then ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

² López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

³ De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

⁴ Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

inequality creates public discontent,⁵ fosters political instability and violence,⁶ and decreases trust in democracy.⁷ LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic “glue” that sustains democratic societies.⁸ Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of “perfect” equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.⁹ However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analysed, about ten per cent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.¹⁰ Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? Also, how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Jamaica and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After assessing objective

⁵ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

⁶ Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

⁷ Uslander, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

⁸ Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions and examine questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Jamaica and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.¹¹ The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region with regard to levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high – by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.




Figure 1. Gini Indices by World Regions

¹¹ See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. “Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?” World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.¹² As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.




Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the developed and developing world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).¹³ The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and are at the top percentile of the global income distribution.

¹² The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

¹³ Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.




Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

Table 1 offers available Gini Indices for selected years from 2002 to 2011 for Jamaica and selected Latin American countries. Of the countries listed in the table Jamaica could be said to have been the least unequal in 2002 (48.3) and also in 2004 (45.5); although figures were unavailable for the other listed countries for 2011, the island nation, with an index of 59.9 for 2011 could be said to have exhibited a trend toward an increased level of inequality when the figures for the three available years are considered.

Table 1. Gini Index for Jamaica and Selected Latin American Countries

Country Name	2002	2004	2005	2008	2009	2011
Colombia	60.7	58.3	56.9	57.2	56.7	
Costa Rica	50.7	48.7	47.6	48.9	50.7	
Dominican Rep.	50.1	52.0	51.1	49.0	48.9	
El Salvador	53.1	49.0	50.3	46.8	48.3	
Guatemala	59.2	54.5	-		-	
Honduras	58.9	58.5	59.7	61.3	57.0	
Jamaica	48.3	45.5	-	-		59.9
Mexico	49.7	46.1	-	48.3	-	
Venezuela, RB	49.0	47.5	49.5	-	-	

Source: World Bank and IMF data

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of

the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.¹⁴ In Figure 4, we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or substantially unchanging (Uruguay).




Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.¹⁵ “Latin America and the Caribbean is the most unequal region in the world,” states a 2010 comment from the UNDP. The UNDP adds that “10 of the 15 countries with the highest level of inequality are in the region.”¹⁶ Official government reports suggested that Jamaica began to experience the impact of the worldwide recession of recent years comparatively late. The new administration that began its substantive business in January 2012 pointed to difficult times ahead but also its commitment to take the country on a path of growth and development and in turn improve the nation’s social and economic wellbeing. However, the protracted delay in reaching an agreement with the IMF for an Extended Fund Facility has also meant delays in other expected inflows from multilateral agencies as well as in potential direct investments. This situation and the overall shortfall in revenues have seriously restricted the government’s ability to address social programmes and cater to its stated commitment to protect the

¹⁴ López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

¹⁵ Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

¹⁶ UNDP (Newsroom). Inequality stands in the way of human development in Latin America and the Caribbean but it can be reduced. Retrieved from <http://content.undp.org/go/newroom/2010/july>

most vulnerable in the Jamaican society in a context of increased levels of poverty reported among lower socio-economic strata during the economic recession and crisis in Jamaica.

The UNDP in its broad prescriptions for the region suggests the introduction of appropriate public policies that “have an impact on people,” are directed to the constraints that sustain “poverty and inequality,” and “empower people” to help themselves.¹⁷ Jamaica has directed substantial effort toward poverty alleviation and eradication over the years. The Programme for Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH), under which the overwhelming proportion of beneficiaries for 2011 were children (299,434) and the elderly (60,158) or 92.2%, is an initiative that has been buttressed partly by World Bank funding.¹⁸ In its 2012-13 budget presentation the government spoke of raising the tax threshold and introduced in 2012, for example, the controversial Jamaica Emergency Employment Programme (JEEP) to mitigate the social and economic fall-out arising from unemployment as the economic crisis persists. Indeed, as expressed in the latest edition of the *Planning Institute’s Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011* there is a political commitment to improving the broad quality of life of the nation’s citizens.¹⁹ In its commitment to the sustenance of a social safety net, the current administration apparently has IMF support as indicated, for instance, in a statement credited to the head of the Fund’s negotiating team: “The IMF stands ready to support the Jamaican authorities as they move forward with establishing an economic programme that will effectively create the conditions for sustained higher growth, achieve fiscal and debt sustainability, improve competitiveness, preserve financial sector stability, and foster social cohesion, including through an effective social safety net.”²⁰

Indeed, the extent to which inequality will be reduced depends on whether Jamaica makes a sustained recovery from its prevailing economic crisis, how effectively it adjusts some or all of its various poverty alleviation and related programmes within the changing national and global environment, adheres to its official commitment to raise the quality of life of the most needy, and so on. Success in ‘closing the gap’ will depend on various elements such as increased productivity levels, the level of inflows from external sources, political will, regional cooperation, and the extent to which potential disruption and relief efforts from, say, natural disasters are addressed. Much of what may be achieved also relates to time and space considerations. State and private sector led efforts need to be cognizant of the timing of their efforts and how these efforts are distributed. *The Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions*, based on 2009 data, referred again in part to the nature and persistence of rural poverty, noting a marginal increase in the overall national poverty rate to 17.6%²¹ and the UNDP’s *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*, based on 2010 data, refers to “substantial populations of excluded poor” in some urban centres of the region, especially in the bigger countries²². So, the future depends on several variables that can influence success or failure but the structure of measures that are in place in Jamaica bodes well for potentially reduced inequality in the years ahead.

¹⁷ UNDP (Newsroom), 2012.

¹⁸ See Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2012). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*. Kingston: Author.

¹⁹ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2012).

²⁰ IMF ignores Phillips’ political comments. (2012, December 31). *Daily Observer*, p. 1.

²¹ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2010). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*. Kingston

²² United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Typically, Latin America and the Caribbean have been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).²³ Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI based on a country’s level of inequality. Figure 5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the average IHDI is the largest in the world. As the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2010 suggests, those countries “with less human development tend to have greater inequality in more dimensions – and thus larger losses in human development.” More specifically, it adds, for example, that “countries with unequal distribution of human development also experience high inequality between women and men.”²⁴ The 2011 Human Development Report notes that “income distribution has worsened in most of the world, with Latin America remaining the most unequal region in income terms, even though several countries including Brazil and Chile are narrowing internal income gaps” but that “in overall IHDI terms, including life expectancy and schooling,” the region displayed more equity “than sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia.”

In the most recently available HDI, Jamaica was ranked 79th (reading 7.27) among 187 countries listed and ensured a place among the category ‘high human development’. However, the country ranked substantially below the highest ranked Caribbean country, Barbados (47), which was at the lower end of the countries with ‘very high human development’ as well as below several other CARICOM countries and Cuba. Chile, at 44, was the highest ranked Latin American country.




Figure 5. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

²³ The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country’s average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).

²⁴ UNDP. (2010). *Human Development Report 2010*. New York: Author, p. 7.

Figure 6 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality. As the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 reiterates, the “human development potential forgone because of inequality is indicated by the difference between the HDI.” In 2011, for Jamaica the IHDI was 0.610, equivalent to “a reading overall loss of 16.2%.” The equivalent for Trinidad and Tobago, for example, was “0.644 and an overall loss of 15.3 per cent.”²⁵




Figure 6. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

These measures, however, of the HDI and the IHDI obscure major differences in levels of human development across the country.

Figure 7 allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with disadvantaged (dark green bar) and advantaged (light green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.²⁶ For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has odds of completing sixth grade on time of just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the odds are close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have the lowest probabilities of achievement. Most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal.

The relatively favourable results for Jamaica, when compared to these other countries, is partly related to the introduction of a Compulsory Education Programme (CEP) “which is to ensure that all children ages 3-18 years old attend” and “participate in a structured education and training setting

²⁵ See UNDP. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*.

²⁶ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

consistent with the objectives of the “*Vision 2030 Jamaica – National Development Plan* for the creation of a world-class education and training system.” As stated elsewhere in the *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*, the Plan remained the guiding framework for government, with a view to social inclusion, empowering citizens, protecting the rights of vulnerable populations, and enhancing the quality of life of disadvantaged families and communities.”²⁷ Also significant among many endeavours have been the removal of tuition fees up to the secondary stage and the implementation of a number of welfare programmes including the School Feeding Programme under which 397,000 students accessed benefits in 2011 and the Programme of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH) programme.




Figure 7. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

²⁷ See Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2012). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*. Kingston: Author, pp. 22.1 & 25.1.

III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in Jamaica: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent citizens perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies citizens might endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently or have different employment opportunities.²⁸ Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of "statistical discrimination," meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.²⁹ Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labour market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.³⁰

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labour force participation among men and women has become more equal.³¹ Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.³² Furthermore, a gender gap in

²⁸ For an overview of this literature, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

²⁹ Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. "Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil." *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. "Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. "The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach." *Económica L* (1-2).

³⁰ Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. "Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzúa. 2009b. "An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan and Máximo Torero. 2009. "Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

³¹ Abramo, Laís, and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. "Women's Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America." *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

³² Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure." *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50-82.

educational levels has also shrunk significantly.³³ So, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive, according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social situations, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.³⁴ Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development.³⁵ Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas.³⁶ Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.³⁷

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have been long considered the driving force behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.³⁸

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 by examining what citizens of Jamaica of different racial, gender, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The AmericasBarometer's 2010 and 2012 questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. We assessed respondents' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.³⁹ Question **ETID** simply asks respondents whether they identify as [Black, Indian, White, Chinese, Mixed]. In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a colour palette.⁴⁰ At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin colour of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see Figure 8). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the region (see, for

³³ Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. "The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean." SSRN eLibrary (April).

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

³⁴ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

³⁵ Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

³⁶ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

³⁷ Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁸ See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁹ The full text of all questions is provided in the questionnaire in Appendix C.

⁴⁰ Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid*.

instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' on-going sponsorship, we again included the colour palette in 2012.⁴¹



**Figure 8. Skin Colour Palette
Used in the AmericasBarometer**

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles in 2012. The latter group of questions, found in the **R series**, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.⁴²

We also included a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we also asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question **GEN10**.

⁴¹ In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.

⁴² This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *AmericasBarometer Insights 6*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
- (88) DK (98) DA

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is measured in question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.⁴³

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.⁴⁴ Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

We first assess how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect educational status in Jamaica, using linear regression analysis.⁴⁵ Figure 9 indicates that generally age and skin colour are negatively related to education, both factors having a statistically significant impact. Level of education is, however, positively impacted by gender and area of residence, but only urban status is statistically significant.

⁴³ Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. 2013. Inequality Matters: The Role of Education in Defining Social Class in Colombia vs. Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 86. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

⁴⁴ These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

⁴⁵ In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page 10.




Figure 9. Determinants of Educational Level in Jamaica

Figure 10 indicates a significant variation in years of schooling by age as well as by skin colour. As the chart to the left illustrates a progressive reduction in the number of years of schooling from the 18-25 to the 66 and over age category, indicating that there is a tendency for younger persons to have more schooling. The statistically significant effect of skin colour on education is shown in the chart to the right of Figure 10. There is a significant tendency for lighter-skinned persons to have more years of schooling than darker-skinned counterparts.




Figure 10. Years of Schooling by Age and Skin Colour

Figure 11 shows the relationship between area of residence and educational attainment. Urban dwellers are likely to have more years of formal schooling than those residing in rural areas. The difference is less than a year but statistically significant, nonetheless. Trends in data arising in the *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions*⁴⁶ and the *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica*,⁴⁷ for example, suggest that greater density of educational institutions, proximity of institutions, the implications of these elements for travel cost, and the tendency for the level of poverty to be less profound in urban areas could offer partial explanations for the more extended period of schooling in urban areas.




Figure 11. Years of Schooling by Area of Residence

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects educational level in Jamaica. We did not include our measure of family background, **ED2**, in the multivariate regression model because the question was only asked of half the sample.⁴⁸ Limiting analysis to half the sample would reduce inferential power regarding the effects of the other variables. Nonetheless Figure 12, which shows the respondent’s years of schooling (y-axis) according to the level of education his/her mother obtained (x-axis), indicates that mother’s educational level is significantly related to the respondent’s level of education. As the figure illustrates, the higher the mother’s education, the higher the respondent’s education tends to be. The impact of a mother completing higher education is markedly strong, ensuring the likelihood that the child will also achieve higher education. In addition, at the lowest level, where the mother did not complete primary school (“None”), it is unlikely that her children will do so.

⁴⁶ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2010). *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2010*. Kingston

⁴⁷ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2011). *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2011*. Kingston

⁴⁸ In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.




Figure 12. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Respondent's Educational Level in Jamaica

Are the same factors associated with education also associated with income? How do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, urban-rural residence, and family background in Jamaica? In Figure 13 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of personal income among respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.⁴⁹ Figure 13 indicates that the 66 years or more age category, when compared to the youngest (18-25 years), and skin colour are likely to have a negative and statistically significant impact on income level. Of somewhat less consequence for respondents who had a job at the time of the interview were inclusions in the female category and the 56-65 age group. The three other age groups and the area of residence of the respondent are positively and statistically significantly associated with income.

⁴⁹ Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.




Figure 13. Determinants of Personal Income in Jamaica, Among Respondents Who Work

The previous figure suggests that women have lower personal incomes than men in Jamaica. As discussed above, in question **GEN10** we asked respondents who were married or who had an unmarried partner about their income versus their spouse's incomes. In Figure 14 we examine differences between men and women in responses to **GEN10**, only among those who also said that they were employed. The relationship that emerged in the case of gender and income differentials, though not statistically significant, still merit some elaboration. Men were found to earn more than their spouses among respondents who work. More than a half (57.8%) of male respondents admitted to earning more than their spouses whereas just under a third (30.6%) said they earned about the same as their spouses. Although gender roles in Jamaica have been adjusted over the years and women have made significant strides in terms of occupational mobility and income levels, many of them continue to occupy low-paid jobs (e.g., domestic help) and these factors could help to explain the structure of the responses. It is noteworthy that the *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* states that “the global financial crisis has deepened the economic crisis in the Caribbean and undercut the well-being of women in the region” and that the economic elements as well as “other outcomes of gender inequality, such as the gender employment gap, the gender pay gap, occupational segregation, and the burden of unpaid work, are contributing to the marginality of Caribbean women.”⁵⁰

⁵⁰ United Nations Development Programme. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*. (New York: Author, 2012), 19.




Figure 14. Respondent's Versus Spouse's Income in Jamaica, Among Respondents Who Work

Skin colour is shown in Figure 15 to have a significant relationship to personal income, both in terms of females and males. The diagram illustrates the tendency for income to decline as skin colour darkens. The situation is not unambiguous though as indicated on the female curve (points 3 and 10) as well as on the male curve (say, 4 to 7) on the x-axis. Variables such as the notion of the traditional 'glass ceiling' and education might be among explanations for marked gender variations at the higher income/ lighter skin tone intersections.




Figure 15. Skin Colour and Personal Income in Jamaica, Among Respondents Who Work

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects personal income in Jamaica. The strength of the positive association between mother’s educational level and respondents’ own income in Jamaica is depicted in Figure 16. The higher level of schooling obtained by the mother, the stronger the earning potential of offsprings.




Figure 16. Mother’s Educational Level as a Determinant of Own Income in Jamaica, Among Respondents Who Work

Arguably the most critical basic resource to which citizens need access is food. We have seen that personal income is not distributed in a perfectly egalitarian fashion across Jamaica. Does access to food follow similar patterns? In Figure 17, we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of food insecurity, based on the two questions described above. Questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food insecurity that runs from 0 to 2, where respondents who report higher values have higher levels of food insecurity.⁵¹ With regard to age, compared to the youngest age cohort, those between 26–35 years are more likely to have higher levels of food insecurity. Gender and skin colour also have a positive net impact on food insecurity; women and individuals with darker skin colour are more likely to have higher levels of food insecurity.

⁵¹ Recall that these questions were asked of a split sample (that is, of only half of respondents).




Figure 17. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Jamaica

As Figure 18 illustrates, a higher percentage of females (34.6%) than males (28.0%) were associated with high food insecurity and the converse was the case for low food security with males accounting for 60.7% and females for 51.5%.




Figure 18. Gender and Food Insecurity in Jamaica

Age, as the bar chart in Figure 19 shows, is also a notable discriminating factor in food insecurity. The proportion of respondents determined to have high food insecurity tended to decline from the younger age groups towards the older. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the claim of lower food security assumes the reverse tendency. For example, for the 26-35 age group the proportion relating to high food insecurity is 37.7% whereas for the 66+ age group, only a quarter or 25% were associated with this level of food insecurity. The range for low food security spanned 46.7% (26-35 age cohort) to 62.7% (66 and over). Among the five age categories, the highest proportion (15.6%) that referred to medium food insecurity were in the 26-35 age group and the lowest proportion (6.7%) in the 56-65 age group.




Figure 19. Age and Food Insecurity in Jamaica

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among Jamaicans in different groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. They have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The AmericasBarometer 2012 included several questions that provide a look at how social and economic inequalities are related to general attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labour force.⁵² In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following question, on a 7-point scale:

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure 20 presents average levels of agreement with this statement across the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison with other variables. The Dominican Republic stands atop the scale in terms of the strongest tendency towards the position that men should have priority in the labour market, but with only approximately two points above the 50-marker on the scale. Jamaica, at 37.7 on this metric scale, stands at the approximate mid-point between the Dominican Republic that heads the list and the United States at the bottom. Jamaicans thereby seem to be moderately in agreement that men should have priority for employment. In some respects, the range roughly parallels the apparent gradation between the less developed and the more developed countries, highlighted even further by the fact that citizens of the United States and Canada are in least agreement with this notion.

⁵² Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the *Marginalization in the Americas* Conference, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.




Figure 20. Agreement that Men Should Have Labour Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas

The average levels of agreement with this statement obscure substantial variation among Jamaicans in their responses. In Figure 21 we examine their responses in further detail, returning to the original 1-7 scale of the question. Figure 21 indicates that approximately 30% strongly disagreed that men should have priority whereas only approximately 12% strongly agreed. Broadly, over a half (the total of points 1-3 or 58.7%) of the respondents taken together tend to disagree that men should have priority. The results may point to growth in consciousness in a more liberalized Jamaican context in which legislation and civil society action, for example, have contributed to forging advances for women in the labour market as well as in shifting perceptions on women’s role in the society.




Figure 21. Agreement and Disagreement that Men Should Have Labour Market Priority in Jamaica

The AmericasBarometer 2012 also asked citizens across the Americas about their perceptions of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. This round, we included the following question in every country of the Americas.⁵³

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
 [Read alternatives, just one answer]
 (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
 (3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 22 we present the percentage of respondents who agreed that inequality was due to the “culture” of “people with dark skin.” Most noticeable is at the uppermost section of the list, occupying the three top ranks are Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Dominican Republic, respectively. At the bottom of the list is Uruguay which is immediately preceded by Venezuela which is in turn just preceded by Panama. Jamaica emerged at approximately the top of the bottom third of the list of Latin American and Caribbean countries in terms of responses that agreed with the notion that people with dark skin are poorer because of their culture. This suggests partly a degree of ambiguity but with a notable tendency towards acceptance of the postulate. Suriname stands one place higher on the list than Jamaica.

⁵³ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.




Figure 22. Percentage Agreeing that Poverty is Due to “Culture” in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the major social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report and answering this question with precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions on important normative and ideological debates that are the purview of citizens and politicians, rather than the authors of this study. Nonetheless, we outline here some common policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens across the region what they thought the role of the state is in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

ROS4. The Jamaica government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which citizens agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. In Figure 23 we present the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. As always, we have recoded responses to run from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 100 (“Strongly agree”). Responses for the United States to this item, averaging a relatively low 47.2 points on this scale, reflected the least commitment to support for the introduction of policies to combat inequality. Haiti and Honduras are the other countries at the bottom of the list scoring in the upper 60-point range. Results for Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic jointly indicated the firmest advocacy of strong government policies (both at 88.3 on the 100-point scale).

Jamaica fell below the mid-point on this continuum of averages of responses to this question. Its score of 77.8 was below, for example Guyana, (80.8) which stood close to mid-point on the chart. This result for Jamaica, taken in isolation as well as against that for the USA (at the bottom of the chart with a score of less than 50 points) could be interpreted as a general preference for ‘big government’ among the populace. Indeed, with virtually all participating countries registering above 60 points on this indicator, most with scores close to 80 and above, it might also be concluded that this tendency in favour of a strong involvement of the state is characteristic of the region.




Figure 23. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programmes

In the past two decades, many of the region’s governments have transformed their social assistance programmes, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programmes and keeping their

children in school.⁵⁴ The most well-known and largest of these programmes include *Oportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programmes. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrolment and attendance, “CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centres and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest.”⁵⁵ However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programmes depend, in large part, on how such programmes are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programmes.⁵⁶ These social assistance and CCT programmes are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region’s most historically unequal contexts.

In 2012, we measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programmes across the region, using question CCT1NEW.

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Levels of receipt of social assistance and CCTs vary greatly across the region. In Figure 24, we present the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance. The results in the chart show that just over a half (54.9%) of Bolivians stated that some member of their household received public assistance. This is much more than twice those admitting for the cluster of five Caribbean countries assembled immediately below Bolivia. These five countries are the Dominican Republic (22.8%), Suriname (22.3%), Jamaica (20.2%), Guyana (19.9%) and Trinidad and Tobago (19.5%). Significantly, Hondurans, with 4.9% admitting to a member of their household receiving assistance occupies the lowest rung of the chart. A closer look at AmericasBarometer country data could probably offer explanations regarding whether elements such as greater availability of public support, consistent with tendencies in the political culture and economic directions might underpin some of the distinctions illustrated in the chart.

Jamaica’s ranking at fourth from the top and among the tight cluster of Caribbean nations might be an indication of the strength of the country’s social safety net that has evolved in Jamaica

⁵⁴ Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. “New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. “Social Spending and Political Support: The ‘Lessons’ of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico.” *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. “Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁵⁵ Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

⁵⁶ Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. “Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Social Protection Working Paper #0605. The World Bank.

over the years. Reference has been made earlier in this chapter to substantial programmes including, for example, the PATH initiative. These programmes are largely state-funded but also receive assistance from multilateral agencies and NGOs. Much of what generally prevails for Jamaica might find approximate parallels in the other four Caribbean nations highlighted above. Of course, there are variables such as Trinidad and Tobago’s oil-based wealth and relative industrial leadership and Guyana’s level of poverty that would impact on the extent, structure, and sustainability of their safety net offerings vis-à-vis Jamaica’s.




Figure 24. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas



The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about CCT and other public assistance programmes. Whereas the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programmes, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.⁵⁷

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

Responses were coded on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents “Strongly disagree” and 7 represents “Strongly agree.” Figure 25 presents levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas; responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items.

Responses from Jamaica tend towards disagreement or strong disagreement with the notion that “people who get help from government social assistance programmes are lazy” (**CCT3**) as indicated in the country’s location towards the lower end of the AmericasBarometer chart at 40.5 on the 100-point scale. Only five countries, including three of its immediate Caribbean colleagues (Suriname, Haiti and Guyana) lie below Jamaica on the scale. Indeed, Guyana’s position at the bottom of the scale is noticeably pronounced, at 28.3 – dipping somewhat dramatically below the penultimate country from the bottom, Haiti at 39.2. Brazil shares similar results, but some of its South and Central American counterparts – Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela and Honduras – and Canada account for places ranging downwards sequentially from 63.7 to 50.2; thereby indicating the main tendency towards agreeing with the notion that laziness has resonance.

⁵⁷ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.




Figure 25. Belief that Public Assistance Recipients are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

V. Conclusion

The great differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. Whereas inequality has been improving recently in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country's social milieu.

The Jamaican context exhibits some of the features and in some respects, results of particular countries in the Americas, but it also exhibits its own peculiarities. The Gini Index, for example, points to marked inequality, although for earlier years of the 2000s for which the Index was done, Jamaica compared favourably with a number of Latin American countries. However, the Index for 2011 points to deepening inequality. Explanations for this latest reading might rest partly in the current deepening economic crisis. Of course, it should be borne in mind that the Index has its critics who refer, for example, to the choice as well as the number of variables that it utilizes.

Among the findings, it is noteworthy that education varies with location of residence, age and parent's level of education; skin colour impacts years of schooling and income; position on food security varies with age and gender; and that there is substantial disagreement that men should have priority in the labour market, and so on. There are also notable insights that may be gained from results arising from, for example, perceptions of availability of government social assistance provisions and behaviour associated with recipients of such assistance.

The foregoing offers a substantial pillar in the platform on which issues regarding perceptions of Jamaica's political culture and specific aspects such as corruption can be examined and assessed.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Colour


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.¹ This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant socio-demographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

Differences in Educational Achievement by Skin Tone in the Americas



95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.


Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Colour, and Household Wealth

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.¹ While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.



¹ The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Inter-ethnic Marriage


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child’s hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.¹ The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.


The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent’s ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child’s hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent’s gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent’s place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.¹ An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.² Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.³

¹ Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

² Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

³ Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some ominous implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al., not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.⁴ For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.⁵ Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along lines of gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.⁶ Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.⁷ Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labour.⁸ Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.⁹

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and

Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

⁴ In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

⁵ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁶ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218.

⁷ Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 156-173.

⁸ Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

⁹ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.¹⁰ In Latin America, while the indigenous populations have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.¹¹ Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.¹²

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.¹³ In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programmes). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.¹⁴

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.¹⁵ Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.¹⁶ Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

¹⁰ Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid.* Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

¹¹ Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹² Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

¹³ Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155

¹⁴ See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

¹⁵ Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

¹⁶ Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge how unequal political participation actually is in the Americas, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exist in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind vis-à-vis participatory inequality in the Americas. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the possibility remains that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Turnout

First, we examine inequalities in turnout in Jamaica and across the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last **general election** in 2011?
 (1) Voted [**Continue**]
 (2) Did not vote [**Go to VB10**]
 (88) DK [**Go to VB10**] (98) DA [**Go to VB10**]

In Figure 26, we present turnout by gender across the Americas. Two points are clear from this figure. First, there are great inequalities *across* the countries of the Americas in turnout, such that overall turnout in Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador is approximately 90 per cent whereas in Honduras the rate is just about 50 per cent. It is important to note, though, that voting is compulsory in the three aforementioned countries at the top of the chart, but voluntary in others; these institutional differences certainly contribute to part of the cross-national variation in turnout. In the case of Jamaica, the voter participation rate in the last General Elections was comparatively low with a turnout of about 60 per cent; it was ranked at the bottom of the chart as the third weakest performer on this indicator. Second, compiling data from all twenty-six countries included in the AmericasBarometer surveys, it appears that men and women participate in elections at similar rates, with only the United States showing a statistically significant difference in voter participation based on sex.¹⁷ This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men. In Jamaica, turnout rate for women is nearly five-percentage points higher than that for men. This is, however, a statistically insignificant difference in gender participation, as is typical throughout the region.

¹⁷ Note that the one anomalous case in Figure 28 is the United States, where men self-report higher turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies here. First, more women voted in the last U.S. election than men (66% to 62%), and second, there is substantial over-reporting of voting in the survey by about 18%. This over-report percentage is not unusual for recent U.S. presidential elections. See United States Census Bureau, "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," July, 20, 2009, <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>, accessed July 21, 2012, and Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," February 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>, accessed July 21, 2012




Figure 26. Gender and Turnout in the Countries of the Americas

We now turn to explore inequalities in turnout in Jamaica in greater detail. As illustrated in Figure 27, four socio-demographic factors – wealth, respondent’s own educational achievement, gender and mother’s level of education – were cross-tabulated with percentage of voter turnout to

determine possible differences in voting behaviour in terms of these voters' characteristics. As explained in the prefatory section of this report (p. xxxvii), statistically significant differences between/among categories of a particular variable exist when confidence intervals (indicated by grey blocks at top of bars) do not overlap.

An examination of the charts indicates that statistically significant inequality in voter turnout is manifested only in terms of voters' own level of education. Generally, persons with higher levels of education are less likely to vote when compared with those who reported educational attainment of less than primary school completion. Among electorates with post-secondary education, for example, turnout is a mere 55 per cent, compared to about 88 per cent among those reporting less than primary school education.




Figure 27. Socio-demographics and Turnout in Jamaica

Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not tell the whole story. Certainly there are myriad ways that citizens can engage their democratic system besides just voting, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer surveys include an extensive battery of questions on other political participation besides voting. Among numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often citizens contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently citizens participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the CP battery is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]

To what extent do citizens across the Americas participate in community groups? In Figure 28 we examine this question. The chart on the left side of the figure presents levels of community participation in each country of the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average response to CP6, CP7, and CP8, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups. The one on the right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents in each country who said they had a leadership role in any community group.

As illustrated in the first chart, level of participation in meetings of community organizations varies widely among countries of the Americas. The top performing nations on this indicator are Haiti and Guatemala with scores of little above 40 points on the 100-point scale, more than three times the level of participation reported by citizens of countries at the bottom of the chart, Uruguay and Canada, both with scores of less than 13 points. Jamaica was among the top-ten performers on this community participation measure with a score of nearly 29 points.

Country-to-country variation in citizens' participation at a leadership level is pronounced. As depicted in the adjoining chart, Haiti and El Salvador are highest performers on this indicator, with per cents of roughly 30 and 24, respectively. Argentina and Belize have very low percentages of about 6 and 7 points each. On this index, Jamaica is ranked 9th from the bottom of the chart, with a score of about 10 points.




Figure 28. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas

In Figures 29 and 30, we explore the results within Jamaica further, presenting the average levels of participation among Jamaicans by selected socio-demographic and economic characteristics. As illustrated by the overlaps in the shaded portions of the bars of the categories of wealth and level of education (both own and mother’s), there is no appreciable difference in the influence that these factors have on community participation. There is, however, a statistically significant 10-point gender difference in community participation in Jamaica in this 2012 survey.

We probed further to determine the extent to which leadership roles are evenly distributed among those indicating they have been involved in community-related initiatives. As illustrated by Figure 30, socio-economic status and respondents’ own educational attainment were statistically significant explanatory factors of differences in community engagement as leaders at the community level. Persons categorised in the fifth quintile on the wealth index are more likely to participate as leaders than those in all other quintiles. The difference is, however, statistically significant only among those in the third quintile and below. With regard to educational attainment, those having less than primary level of schooling are highly unlikely to ever participate as leaders in meetings of their community organizations.




Figure 29. Socio-demographics and Community Participation in Jamaica




Figure 30. Socio-demographics and Percentage Taking a Leadership Role in a Community Group in Jamaica

Many citizens also participate in campaign related activities beyond simply voting. To gauge involvement in elections, we asked respondents questions **PP1** and **PP2**.

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**

(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?

(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 31, we examine participation in campaign activities across the Americas. The left side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens who say they have “tried to persuade others” either “frequently” or “occasionally.” The right side presents the percentage who said they had worked for a campaign.

As indicated, political participation measured in terms trying to convince others to participate in the political process or working to promote the vote, and usually to channel it in a particular direction, is quite low across the region. Firstly, on the question of persuading others to vote for a particular candidate, about 45 per cent of the citizenry of the United States reported that they had participated at this level, followed distantly by the Dominican Republic and Guyana with 32 and 26 per cent participation rate, respectively. At the other end of the continuum are Bolivia, Mexico and Paraguay, all with less than 10 per cent of their population having indicated their involvement in politics of this sort.

Participation at a more public and partisan level, that of getting involved in the actual campaign of a particular candidate is even less common. None of the countries in the 2012 survey received a participation rate of as much as 20 per cent on this indicator; most obtaining rates of less than 10 per cent.

Viewed comparatively, participation levels in Jamaica on both of these measures fall the in mid-range when ranked among the 26 countries participating in the 2012 survey.




Figure 31. Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas

Next, we explore results for Jamaica in further depth. In our analysis, we recoded all those who report that they tried to persuade others either frequently or occasionally as having attempted to persuade others. As the charts in Figure 32 show, none of the observed characteristics turned out to be significant indicators of the likelihood that a person will try to convince others to exercise the franchise in a particular way.




Figure 32. Socio-demographics and Attempts to Persuade Others in Jamaica

In Figure 33, we present the percentage of respondents in different groups who said they worked for a candidate or party in the most recent elections. Only with regard to education was there some evidence of a statistically significant difference in level of participation in this form of electioneering activity. Persons with educational attainment of less than primary school completion are totally excluded from this activity, both with respect to own education and mother's level of schooling.




Figure 33. Socio-demographics and Campaign Work in Jamaica

In the preceding analysis, we have found evidence for some participatory inequalities by gender. However, it is quite likely that rates of participation vary by women's positions in the labour market and family.¹⁸ Figure 34 presents rates or levels of participation by gender and, for woman, by family and labour market status. The statistically significant influence of labour market status in gender inequality is evident only with regard to community participation in a leadership capacity. Specifically, married women who do not earn an income are more likely to perform a leadership role in their community than other females.




Figure 34. Gender Roles and Participation in Jamaica

¹⁸ See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

These results have not told us much about the association between race and ethnicity and participation in Jamaica. In Figure 35, we present the rates or levels of each form of participation across the spectrum of skin colour. The community participation indicator with the most noticeable variation is turnout, with persons of darker skin showing a tendency for greater engagement with the vote. Average participation on all the other measures are essentially equal across skin colour, except for marked negative or positive spikes at both extremes of the continuum, due probably to the very small sub-samples of persons with these skin tones.




Figure 35. Skin Colour and Participation in Jamaica

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of the majority or society as a whole support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that women’s place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups’ participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

Note that responses to these questions are likely to be subject to what public opinion scholars call “social desirability bias,” meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.¹⁹ This means that even respondents

¹⁹ Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad

who privately harbour discriminatory attitudes may give the “socially desirable,” non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions are likely to be lower than their actual levels in the population.

Public Opinion towards Women’s Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions tapping attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.²⁰ The text of these questions is as follows:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?		
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree
(4) Strongly disagree	(88) DK	(98) DA
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) Both the same
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) It does not matter
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A

Figure 36 displays the ranking of countries in the Americas based on citizens’ belief that, in general, men make better leaders than women. The prevalence of this view among citizens of the Caribbean countries participating in the 2012 survey is evidenced by the five countries being positioned at the top of the chart. Guyana is the only country with an average score of greater than 50 on the 100-point scale, followed by the Dominican Republic and Haiti with scores of approximately 48 and 42 points respectively.

Interestingly, Jamaica’s survey was conducted three months after the December 2011 General Election in which 8 out of 19 female candidates elected to the Parliament, and a political party headed by a female president won a landslide victory, resulting in the appointment of the country’s first nationally elected female Prime Minister. Yet, some 40 per cent of Jamaicans have expressed the view that men are better political leaders.

Uruguay and Brazil are at the bottom of the chart with less than 30 points each on this measure.

K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

²⁰ VB51 and VB52 were administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




Figure 36. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Leadership of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included one question on attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**.²¹

²¹ This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.
VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
 [Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, “non-whites” in general]
 (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Figure 37 shows level of support for the view that, generally, persons with darker skin colour do not make good leaders. The countries in which agreement with this belief was most strongly expressed are Chile, Bolivia, Honduras and Guatemala, all with average scores of higher than 30 points on this measure. Ranked at the lower end of the chart are Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil with scores falling below the 20-point mark; Jamaica is situated just above these countries with an average of 21.3 points.




Figure 37. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.²²

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office




Figure 38. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

²² This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

Support for the right of the physically challenged to participate in the political process as candidates for public office was found to be relatively high in the United States and Uruguay with both countries scoring close to 90 points on this measure, followed by Canada and Brazil with scores of over 80 points. Citizens of Haiti and Guyana expressed very low support, both with approval ratings of less than 50 points on the 100-pointing scale. Jamaica's score of about 58 points positions it at the lower end of this chart and in the company of countries scoring less than 60 points on this measure.

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, for at least some indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist non-trivial discrepancies in rates of participation between men and women, different racial groups, and social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as American democracies have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.²³ The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. However, as described in Special Report Box 5, unfortunately, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.²⁴

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

²³ Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

²⁴ This question was administered to a split (half) sample of respondents.

In Figure 39, we find support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. Support for quotas is strongest among citizens of El Salvador, Dominican Republic and Paraguay; these countries express average support of close to 80 out of a maximum of 100 points. Trinidad and Tobago and Canada indicated comparatively weak support with scores of less than 50 points. Jamaica, with 58.2 points, is ranked fifth from the bottom of the chart on this indicator.




Figure 39. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.²⁵ While a number of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.²⁶ One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.²⁷

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.²⁸ While the relationship between socioeconomic statuses certainly differs across political contexts,²⁹ material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities but also participatory ones.

V. Conclusion

The chapter set out to examine how race, gender and socioeconomic status impact political involvement and opportunities across the region. The 2012 AmericasBarometer survey was conducted against the background of data from past studies that pointed to significant disparities in different forms of political participation in terms of these factors within countries and variations in participation in the political process across countries. It was found that despite reductions in inequality over the past decades, important aspects of political participation remain unequal in the Americas.

In the case of Jamaica, the results indicate that its position has varied somewhat in relation to that suggested by earlier surveys. It could be said to occupy an approximate mid-point among the list

²⁵ Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

²⁶ Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

²⁷ Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid.*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid.*

²⁸ Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid.*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.

²⁹ Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

of countries of the Americas as regard levels of inequality in a context in which significant global agencies continue to rank Latin America as the most unequal region of the world. Jamaica's participation rate of approximately 60 per cent in its last election was among the lowest for the countries considered and female participation was almost five per cent higher than that for men, albeit a statistically insignificant difference. Education provided a statistically significant relationship with voter participation in that people who had not completed primary school were much more likely to vote than more highly educated fellow citizens (88% to 55%). Other elements such as community participation, in which Jamaica fared comparatively well, were also considered.

Support for equal opportunities based on perceptions of differences in capacity to lead in relation to gender and enjoyment of priority to access available work, for example, were other factors considered. Across the Caribbean, including Jamaica, there was a substantial perception that men tended to be better political leaders. We saw notable variations in support for gender quotas for candidates in political parties across countries, with El Salvador (81%) and the Dominican Republic (79%), for example, heading the list of those indicating strongest levels of support whereas Jamaica returned a lower level of support (58%) and Trinidad and Tobago (46%), the lowest.

Generally, based on the results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer and buttresses from previous studies it could be said that inequality with regard to voter participation is slowly narrowing across the region.

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.¹ In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?


The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.


Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php>.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women’s group meetings.¹

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation²The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official



than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

¹ The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women’s group meetings, CP20.

² In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.


Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavour the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.¹ Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.² On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favourable or unfavourable, with specific politicians.³ If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own

¹ Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

² Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³ Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

experiences, leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy.⁴ In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group – may well base their judgments of political leaders’ receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.⁵

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.⁶ Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. However, discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders’ ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents’ performance and what is often called “specific political support”: support for the particular people in office.⁷ When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing “diffuse support,” or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.⁸

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.⁹ However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.¹⁰

⁴ For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. “Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America.” *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

⁵ Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. “An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality.” *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

⁶ Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. “Politics as a Vocation.” In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁷ Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

⁸ Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. “Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?” *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

¹⁰ Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America.” Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. “The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination,” *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.¹¹ However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyses protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.¹²

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary, on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.¹³ And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as “important rallying cries” during democratization,¹⁴ and raise “the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action.”¹⁵ It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.¹⁶

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

¹¹ Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

¹² Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹³ Cleary, Matthew. 2000. “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women’s Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

¹⁵ Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

¹⁶ Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“A lot”). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.¹⁷

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin colour, class, household wealth, and intra-household inequalities by gender.

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy, **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas. Figure 40 illustrates citizens' responses to the question of whether they understood the most important political issues of their country. On the seven-point scale, recalibrated to a 100-point scale, responses ranged from Paraguay's 38.8 points which tended towards strongly disagree to the USA's 67.6 points which tended towards strong agreement at the upper end of the scale. Of note, is that Brazil (39.4) falls barely above Paraguay whereas Canada (60.0) lies in second place from the top on the agreement side of the scale. The stances for Venezuela and Jamaica's CARICOM partner, Trinidad and Tobago, which occupy third and fourth places from top respectively, are notable. Jamaica scores approximately 50 (49.7) which places the country substantially below the top, suggesting fair or moderate understanding of the most important political issues. In any event, that expressed or perceived level of understanding places it above most of the other Latin American and Caribbean countries listed.

¹⁷ This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.




Figure 40. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? In Figure 41 we use linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences. Among the indicators shown in Figure 41, political interest and level of education, and wealth and age to a lesser extent, are positively associated with respondents' perception of their political capability. Interest in politics and education were, however, the only statistically significant factors. Internal efficacy is negatively impacted by gender, meaning that women are more likely to have a lower sense of political capability.




Figure 41. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Jamaica

In Figure 42, we explore in greater depth how personal characteristics and discrimination are related to citizens' belief in their ability to understand the political system in Jamaica. Clearly illustrated by the first in the cluster of charts below is that gender is a notable determinant of internal efficacy, with the results for men pointing to their gender advantage. Internal efficacy also increases as wealth increases, although the difference is not statistically significant among all quintiles. There is a statistically significant difference in efficacy only when those in quintile 5 are compared with those in the first quintile on this indicator. Also, greater political interest and increasing level of schooling are shown to enhance internal efficacy.




Figure 42. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Jamaica

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens’ perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described at the beginning of this section. In Figure 43, we present the distribution of these two variables across the countries of the Americas. The two charts in this figure indicated a somewhat close correspondence between the results for each country on the respective measures - external efficacy and perception of party representation, respectively. The results suggest a close link on a country by country basis in that citizens’ belief that leaders had an interest in their views or that parties listened. Venezuela scores about 49 points at the top of both charts and Costa Rica scores in the 20-point range, at the bottom of the 100-point scale. There are evident variations in the results for countries such as Guyana (38 and 45 respectively) and, to a lesser extent, Panama in terms of their positions in the charts. Results for Jamaica show its location at about mid-point in both lists. The results for the island, nevertheless, show a five-point difference between the measures on these scales (39 and 34 points).




Figure 43. External Efficacy and Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas

Who within Jamaica thinks that “those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think”? And who agrees with the notion that “political parties represent people like you”? In Figure 44, we use linear regression analysis to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report higher external efficacy and stronger perceptions of representation. In terms of external efficacy, Figure 44 shows that an individual’s skin colour and level of interest in politics are likely to have a positive impact.




Figure 44. Determinants of External Efficacy in Jamaica

Figure 45 illustrates the strong positive effect of political interest on external efficacy. As depicted, the greater a person’s interest in politics, the more likely that the person will entertain the belief that those who govern are interested in what he or she, as a constituent thinks.




Figure 45. Relationship between External Efficacy and Interest in Politics in Jamaica

Figure 46 exhibits the relationship between external efficacy and skin colour. As the frequency polygon shows, persons classified as white in Jamaica are highly likely to believe that leaders are interested in their well-being. However, external efficacy tends to decline sharply as skin colour tans slightly. Among people with brown to darker skin colour, though, the impact of skin colour on external efficacy is generally positive.




Figure 46. The Relationship between External Efficacy and Skin Colour in Jamaica

Figure 47 shows regression outcomes in relation to **EPP3**. Of the variables included in this model, only interest in politics worked out to be a statistically significant predictor of the extent to which citizens believe their political parties listen to their concerns.




Figure 47. Determinants of Belief in Party Representation in Jamaica

Figure 48 further illustrates the nature of the relationship between interest in politics and citizens’ belief in the extent to which their party listens their concerns. As citizens’ interest in politics increases, their belief that their political party is effectively representing their interest should also increase.




Figure 48. Factors Associated with Belief in Party Representation in Jamaica

III. Protest Participation

Last, as we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups – at least those that are highly politicized – to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that points to at least some countries in the Americas where the act of protesting may be becoming a more “normalized” method of political participation: “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest.”¹⁸ In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including most importantly **PROT3**.

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to PROT6]
(88) DK [Go to PROT6] (98) DA [Go to PROT6]

In Figure 49, we examine the levels of political protest throughout the Americas. Political engagement by way of protest participation is generally low across the Americas; only 5 of the 26 countries report double-digit percentage-point participation rates in this activity. Heading the list on this measure are Bolivia, Haiti and Peru with rates ranging between 13 and 18 per cent, and at the bottom is Jamaica, with a mere 2 per cent of the population reporting to have been involved in any protest action within a year of this 2012 survey. The 5 countries ranked immediately above Jamaica all have participation rates less than 4 per cent.

¹⁸ Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 49. Participation in Protests in the Countries of the Americas

Who protests in Jamaica? In Figure 50, we now use logistic regression analysis to consider whether and how experiences of marginalization and discrimination affect whether Jamaicans participate in protest politics. In a situation where such a negligible portion of the sample acknowledged being recently involved in a public demonstration, it is not surprising that this small group is differentiated only by a single factor. As shown in the figure, the only statistically significant predictor of protest involvement is socioeconomic status (wealth).




Figure 50. Determinants of Protest Participation in Jamaica

Figure 51 shows graphically how protest participation is related to wealth (socioeconomic status) and interest in politics. As the shape of the line in the chart to the left of the figure indicates, persons in the first quintile, and to a lesser extent those in the second, are significantly more likely to engage in protest actions than those in the other higher quintiles. And generally, as interest in politics increases, the greater the likelihood of being involved in a protest action.




Figure 51. Protest Participation by Wealth in Jamaica

IV. Conclusion

The results and discussion elsewhere have suggested that economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Notable proportions of citizens in the various countries report social and political attitudes that are opposed to the participation of some groups. These attitudes may reinforce unequal access to opportunities and resources. This chapter was aimed at finding out how such attitudes impact on democracy in the Americas. We introduced the terms “internal political efficacy” and “external political efficacy”, for example, as part of our framework.

Respondents were asked on a seven-point scale, adjusted to 100 points, whether they understood the most important political issues of their country. The results range from Paraguay’s 38.8 points at the bottom of the scale which indicates a tendency towards strongly disagreeing – to the USA’s 67.6 at the top of the scale which tends towards the opposing sentiment, which is strong agreement. Of note is that of Trinidad and Tobago (56.8), who occupies fourth place from the top; whereas Jamaica stands at an approximate mid-point among the countries (49.7). Jamaica’s score implies fair or moderate understanding of the most important political issues.

Gender is a notable determinant of internal efficacy, with the results for men pointing to their gender advantage. Internal efficacy also increases as wealth increases, although the difference is not statistically significant across all quintiles. Greater political interest and increasing level of schooling are shown to enhance internal efficacy. The findings regarding participation in political protest are also noteworthy. Generally, participation is low for all the countries in that only five of the twenty-six countries reported double-digit percentage-point participation rate in this activity. Bolivia (17.7%) ranks at the top, followed by Haiti (16.8%), whereas Jamaica (2.3%) stands at the bottom of the list of countries which are ranked on the basis of their population’s involvement in protest action in the year of this 2012 survey.

Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?¹


The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.

Urban/Rural Knowledge Divide and Motivational Versus Opportunity Explanations



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support



This box reviews findings from the paper “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America,” by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.¹ The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.² Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries



¹ The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

² The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information


This box reviews findings from the 2012 report “Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Programme: Descriptive and Comparative Results,” by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) programme, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.


The most salient point of the programme results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.¹ As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP programme because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the programme among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the programme intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the programme intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

Average support for democracy, by year and survey



Per centage who have received information about candidates, by gender and year



Source: Baseline and Follow-Up Surveys by AmericasBarometer, 2010-2012

¹ This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.”

**Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement
and Civil Society in the Americas**

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.¹ Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas. However, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.²

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.³ However, others show that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally.⁴ Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even *help* specific governments

¹ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

² Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

³ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

⁴ Canache, Damaris, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

maintain public support.⁵ Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.⁶ However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to gather data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).⁷ While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime rates, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.⁸ Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization might also lead citizens to choose to emigrate.⁹ Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.¹⁰

⁵ Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

⁶ Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

⁷ Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>.

⁸ Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

⁹ Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁰ Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3).

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996,¹¹ these items have been refined and improved. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).¹² This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98

¹¹ Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates, y Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates

¹² Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the Parish Council? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98

Another item that taps perceptions of rather than experiences with corruption is also included in the questionnaire. The question reads as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

We rescale this variable from 0-100, where 0 represents a perception that corruption is very uncommon, and 100 a perception that corruption is very common.

Perception of Corruption

The data show that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas. As depicted by Figure 52, countries with the highest levels of perceived corruption are Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Argentina with average reported levels of corruption ranging from about 80 to 82 on the 100-point scale. Countries considered to be the least corrupt are Suriname, recording a very low score of roughly 39 with Canada and Uruguay obtaining somewhat higher scores of approximately 58 and 62 points, respectively. Among the twenty-six countries that participated in this 2012 round of surveys, Jamaica is ranked eleventh, with a relatively high score of 75 points.




Figure 52. Perceptions of Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

As with the other indicators throughout this report, we present the changes in perceptions of corruption over time. Figure 53 reports trends in perception of corruption in Jamaica for the years in which these data were collected. As depicted, the perception that corruption is widespread among elected and other public officials in Jamaica was high and markedly stable in the studies between 2006 and 2010. In the 2012 round, however, there is a small but statistically significant reduction in this corruption measure.




Figure 53. Perceptions of Corruption over Time in Jamaica

High levels of perceived corruption might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of corruption. It is quite possible that, given the highly publicized attempts of government and civil society organizations such as the National Integrity Action Forum (NIAF) to raise public awareness about corruption, and the focus of the media on allegations of corruption and on concerns such as Parliament’s delay in passing proposed anti-corruption measures, citizen awareness of corruption would have been heightened. Thus, although perceptions of corruption might be high, actual victimization might be low. We turn to actual experiences with corruption or corruption victimization in the next section.

Corruption Victimization

Corruption victimization measures are useful in determining the actual state of corruption in the different sectors of society. They are created on ‘experience based indicators’; thus seeking to capture “citizens’ firm actual participation in corruption, such as bribe giving or bribe taking”¹³. This section

¹³ UNDP (2008). A User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption.

addresses the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. To this end, we present the percentage of respondents who report that they have been asked for a bribe in at least one location in the last year.

Figure 54 shows wide variation in rates of corruption in different countries across the region. Rates of victimization range from an exceptionally high of 67 per cent in Haiti to a very low 3.4 per cent among Canadians. Other countries with high reported victimization are Bolivia and Ecuador, with rates of 45 and 41 per cent, respectively; while Jamaica has a rate of 7.5 per cent and Chile and the United States with 5.8 and 5.3 are at the lower end of the chart.




Figure 54. Percentage Victimized by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

With regard to frequency of exposure, some citizens received requests for a bribe in many instances while others received requests in one or none. We assess the number of instances in which citizens reported being victimized by corruption in Jamaica in 2012. In light of the foregoing evidence of consistently high levels of corruption perception among Jamaicans over many years, it is apt to assume the existence of a comparably high number of individuals acknowledging direct personal experience with corrupt acts or proposals in the population. However, as can be seen in Figure 55, less than eight per cent of those observed reported that they were exposed to some form of corruption. Ninety-two per cent reported no experience with corruption in the past 12 months. Only five per cent reported being victimized in one instance, while less than three per cent reported being approached in two or more instances.




Figure 55. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in Jamaica

How have levels of corruption victimization varied in Jamaica over time? As Figure 56 shows, the percentage of citizens who report any corruption victimization in 2012 is essentially the same as in 2010 but significantly less than in the two rounds preceding 2010.

The AmericasBarometer over the years has indicated that citizens perceive comparatively high levels of corruption in Jamaican society. However, citizens have been reluctant – perhaps increasingly so – to report on actual corruption occurrence or more so, on their own involvement in corruption. Indeed, anti-corruption lobby organizations, and the National Integrity Action Forum in particular, have been quite visible in their efforts aimed at sensitizing the public as to the seriousness of the problem in Jamaica. Their on-going campaign has, at least, kept the issue ever current in the public realm. More substantively, such efforts have served to promote greater awareness, intolerance, vigilance and activism on the part of the public, which in turn have forced the authorities to respond with meaningful corruption control mechanisms, including some important legislative and administrative reform measures.

Noteworthy are some anti-corruption-related developments in the Jamaica Constabulary Force's (JCF's) drive. According to a Ministry of National Security report, the JCF's Anti-Corruption Branch arrested 87 persons including 64 police personnel and 23 civilians in 2011. Police personnel in the dragnet ranged from constables to inspectors. Twenty-four convictions were made. "During the year, the Inspectorate also dealt with 295 cases of professional misconduct, 202 cases of criminal conduct and 784 complaints".¹⁴ The Ministry also reported that for 2011 its focus on anti-corruption which emphasized "education, awareness and prevention, instead of detection, as well as identifying measures to deal with offending behaviour" resulted in "improvement in a number of key indicators." There were some notable variations between the years 2010 and 2011. For example, among the indicators, the number of police officers "not permitted to re-enlist" fell to 72 in 2011 from 137 in 2010; the number "dismissed as a result of corruption" fell to 11 from 23; arrests by the anti-corruption branch fell to 87 from 106; and the number of "civilians charged for corrupting JCF staff" fell to 19 in 2011 from 35 in 2010. However, the number of "JCF members charged for corruption" increased to 42 in 2011 from 36 in the preceding year.¹⁵

So the dramatic decline in actual cases of corruption in recent years, as reported in the last two rounds of this survey might indeed be partly attributed to citizen's increasing unwillingness to acknowledge corruption involvement. However, these results of declining incidence of petty corruption in many sectors are consistent with popular perception and buttressed by other reputable sources such as the Transparency International 2012 survey findings, which reported an improved global ranking, albeit a similar score for three years in a row.




Figure 56. Percentage Victimized by Corruption over Time in Jamaica

¹⁴ (ESSJ 2011, PIOJ, 2012, p. 24.10-11).

¹⁵ (ESSJ 2011, PIOJ, 2012, p. 24.11).

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model to identify those socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that were positively and negatively associated with corruption victimization. Results of this analysis are presented in Figure 57. Again, independent variables that are statistically significant predictors are identified by confidence intervals (the horizontal “I”s) that do not intersect the green zero line at the centre of the chart. In this regard, two factors were found to be significant predictors at a $p < 0.05$ level of significance – wealth with a positive coefficient, and gender with a net negative potential impact.




Figure 57. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Jamaica

To better grasp the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that an individual has been victimized by corruption, we present bivariate results of these findings. As illustrated by Figure 58, persons with higher education are much more likely to be victims of corruption than those in all other categories. As illustrated, as years of formal schooling increases, so is the probability of being victimized. The victimization rate for those with tertiary education is three times the rate of those reporting to have completed secondary school and six times that of those with only primary level schooling. Also, wealthier persons are generally more likely to have direct personal experience with corrupt acts or proposals than the less wealthy. Persons of the fifth quintiles are at least two times more likely to be victimized than those in the first to the third quintiles. With regard to gender, men are two times more likely to be victimized than women.




Figure 58. Demographics and Corruption Victimization in Jamaica

III. Perceptions of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The AmericasBarometer measures citizens' perception of their safety by asking question AOJ11:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe
 (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

Following LAPOP standard practices, responses were recalibrated on a 0-100 scale, where higher values mean greater perceived insecurity. Given that the majority of criminal acts occur in urban areas, and especially in national capitals, we opted to present crime victimization data for the 24 national capitals included in the sample (for sampling reasons, the United States and Canada are excluded). Figure 59 shows the results for the capitals of countries participating in the 2012 survey. From a comparative perspective, sense of insecurity in these cities is less variable than might be expected, given the reputation of some of these national capitals as high-crime areas in the region. Only in five countries were the averages above the 50-point mark on this index of insecurity. Citizens in Mexico City, Lima and Guatemala City topped the chart with scores between 52 and 55 points; while Kingston, with a curiously low score of 29 points, was ranked below Port of Spain and Georgetown with averages of 33 and 37 points, respectively.




Figure 59. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 60 shows how perceived levels of insecurity have changed over time in Jamaica, using data from past waves of LAPOP surveys in which respondents were asked the same question. The data indicate a net 10-point decline in citizens’ sense of insecurity between 2006 and 2012. Notable also is the statistically significant improvement in feelings of safety among the citizenry over the two years, since the 2010 survey.




Figure 60. Perceptions of Insecurity over Time in Jamaica

In what regions of the country are perceptions of insecurity most severe? In Figure 61, we examine the spatial distribution of the problem by counties. As seen in this chart, the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) was separated from the respective counties in order to facilitate the comparison of the capital city with other regions in terms of important social, economic and political indicators. Insecurity in the KMR is marginally higher than other areas; but this difference is not statistically significant.




Figure 61. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Regions of Jamaica

Once again, in the same way as we previously discussed the issue of corruption, it is important to note that high levels of perceived insecurity might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of crime. It is quite possible that, given government attempts to raise public awareness campaigns about crime, and the media focus on anti-crime measures, citizen perceptions of insecurity will have been heightened while these measures take effect. So, although perceptions of insecurity might be high, actual victimization might be low. We turn to a discussion of crime victimization in the next section.

IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare to individuals' experiences with crime? Since 2010, the AmericasBarometer has used an updated series of items to measure crime victimization, which reads as follows:

<p>VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]</p>
<p>VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options] (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this Parish (4) In another Parish (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>
<p>VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)</p>

As in the case of insecurity in the region, we start our cross-national analysis on crime data by focusing on victimization rates in the national capitals of countries in the region. Figure 62 presents comparative information relating to personal victimization (**VICIEXT**). At the top end of the chart are Quito (Ecuador), Tegucigalpa (Honduras) and Guatemala City (Guatemala), all with rates in the range of 36 percentage points. Ranked at the lower end of the continuum are Georgetown (Guyana) and Kingston (Jamaica), where citizens reported single digit victimization rates.




Figure 62. Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 63, we present findings on household victimization (**VIC1HOGAR**) in national capitals. Forty-five per cent of those observed in (Quito) Ecuador reported that they and another family member had been crime victims within the twelve months prior this survey; along with Tegucigalpa (Honduras) and La Paz (Bolivia), they are featured in the top three on this measure.




Figure 63. Household Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas

It is important to remember, however, that our survey is only administered to adults of voting age or older, making it possible for youth crime victimization that family members do not know about to go underreported. It is also important to remember that responses are individuals' self-reported crime victimizations. In some contexts, certain crimes (particularly those that are perpetrated almost exclusively against particular marginalized groups) might be normalized and thus reported with less frequency than those with which they occur.

We further examine the crime problem in Jamaica by analysing responses to item **VIC1EXT**. When asked if they have personally been the victim of any criminal act (named in the preceding

question) in the past 12 months, only 8.5 per cent of those interviewed answered affirmatively (chart 1, Figure 64). The adjoining chart shows results relating to the item on household victimization. Level of exposure to crime on this measure is also relatively low. Roughly 14 per cent of respondents reported being affected by crime either personally or having someone in their household being victimized. It is noteworthy that whereas Jamaica ranks high in the world's top tier and atop at least the rest of the insular Caribbean in terms of the murder rate, it has tended to rank below many other countries, including major liberal democracies such as the US and the UK with regard to overall crime rate.¹⁶




Figure 64. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in Jamaica

¹⁶ (World Crime and Murder Trends [WCMT], 2010).

Figure 65 illustrates where most crimes in Jamaica occurred, according to respondents. When asked to denote the place of victimization, the plurality of victims, 41.3 per cent, reported that they experienced the criminal act at home. Twenty-seven per cent reported that the incident took place in neighbourhood.




Figure 65. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization in Jamaica

The extent to which location of residence explains differences in the probability of being criminally victimized is illustrated graphically in Figure 65. The Kingston Metropolitan Region is featured prominently as a crime ‘hotspot’ in all previous AmericasBarometer surveys. The apparent ‘re-distribution’ reported incidence of crime victimization seems to confirm the claim of the police that their effort to contain the crime problem in the national capital has resulted in the migration of criminals to other sections of the Island. The evidence now points to the emergence of the County of Cornwall as the ‘crime capital’ of Jamaica. Based on findings from the 2006 AmericasBarometer survey, it was reported that:

... the results have confirmed the widely held view that although crime is becoming much more widespread in Jamaica, it is still predominantly restricted to certain ‘hotspots’. As depicted, persons living in the County of Cornwall, which include the tourist city of Montego Bay and the other resort areas along the west and sections of the North Coast, are much less likely to be victimized when compared to those living all other areas. Not surprisingly, the county of Surrey which includes the Kingston Metropolitan Region records the highest rate of victimization, nearly three times that of Cornwall.¹⁷

As illustrated by Figure 66, there has been a substantial change in Jamaica’s regional crime victimization profile over the six years of this study. Residents of the County of Cornwall now report

¹⁷ Boxill, I. et al. (2007) *The Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica*, 2006. p.202.

the highest level of exposure to acts of crime. Official statistics support previous LAPOP studies that traditionally, the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) – mainly Kingston, St. Andrew and southern St. Catherine parish areas – accounted for not only the overwhelming number of major crimes, but also the highest rate. The rise of the notorious lotto scam in Montego Bay and the wider St. James parish of which Montego Bay is the capital has been cited as a central reason for St. James’ rise to the top of the major crime and murder rates lists. Figures published for 2011 in *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011* show that St. James stood at the top of the major crime rate list with 565 per 100,000 persons, ahead of Kingston and St. Andrew (540) and St. Ann (432). The margin of St. James’ lead was even greater in the case of the murder rate (85 per 100,000) where it was followed by St. Catherine (60 per 100,000) and Kingston and St. Andrew (49 per 100,000); the parish of Portland stood at the bottom with 12 per 100,000.¹⁸ Besides the lotto scam, other explanations such as the migration of criminals have been advanced for the changed status of St. James.

According to a *Gleaner* newspaper report on September 26, 2012, in an address to the St. James Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Montego Bay, the minister of national security, Peter Bunting, promised the introduction of lotto scam legislation in 2014 and an expansion of the security presence there in light of the threat to life and the economy.¹⁹ In fact, enactment of the legislation was fast-tracked to early 2013, partly in the light of public pressure from US scam victims and associated US senate hearings and the perceived potentially negative consequences for Jamaica’s image and economy.




Figure 66. Crime Victimization by Region in Jamaica

¹⁸ (see *ESSJ 2011*, PIOJ, 2012, p. 24.4).

¹⁹ Titus, M. (2012, September 26). Montego Bay under serious threat – Bunting. *The Gleaner*. Retrieved from <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120926/lead/lead93.html>

Finally, it might be of interest to know how experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure 67 illustrates trends in self-reported crime victimization in Jamaica between 2006 and 2012. Note, however, that the text of the questions measuring crime victimization changed in 2010. Between 2004 and 2008, LAPOP used **VIC1**, which read: “Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?” In 2010 and 2012, this was replaced with **VIC1EXT**, which provided more detail on the types of crimes that may have occurred. This modification was intended to increase the validity of responses. The change in wording of the crime victimization questions might account for the jump in victimization reported between 2008 and 2010.

Figure 67 shows that in spite of the various anti-crime measures, the victimization rate for 2012 was virtually at the same level as that reported in the 2010 survey.




Figure 67. Crime Victimization over Time in Jamaica

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

It has been argued that Jamaica’s crime problem is predominantly an inner-city phenomenon, a possible explanation for reports of historically low national victimization rates in LAPOP and other studies of the problem over the years. We examined the extent to which this data set supports this and some other hypotheses on crime in Jamaica by creating a regression model, comprising the independent variables shown in Figure 68. This logistic regression model assesses who is likely to be a victim of crime in Jamaica. In this and all other regression charts, we standardize all variables. As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable’s effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to

the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.

Interestingly, none of the socio-economic, demographic or perception variables included in the model worked out to be statistically significant factors in predicting the likelihood of being a victim of crime in Jamaica. Gender and perception of family economic situation are found to have the strongest net, albeit statistically insignificant effect.




Figure 68. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Jamaica

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high rates of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perceptions of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in Jamaica? We now turn to a multivariate linear regression which estimates the impacts victimization and insecurity have on support for the political system. More precisely, we examine the impacts of perceptions of and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.²⁰ As Figure 69 shows, crime victimization and perception of corruption were found to be negatively related to support for the political system.

²⁰ System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.




Figure 69. Determinants of System Support in Jamaica

Figure 70 delves further into the effects of the independent variables on system support, depicting the bivariate relationships between crime victimization, perception of corruption and size of the area of residence; and system support. As shown, persons who were victims of a crime within the past twelve months are likely to be less supportive of the political system than those who were not. Also with a statistically significant impact is the level of urbanization of the area in which the respondent resides. Persons living in rural areas were found to be generally more supportive of the system than those living in larger cities. However, the difference in level of support is of statistical significance only when those living in parish capitals are compared with those living in rural areas.




Figure 70. Crime and Size of Area and System Support in Jamaica

Figure 71 illustrates that, in general, increasing perception that corruption is widespread among society’s elected and other public officials is likely to be associated with declining levels of support for the system.




Figure 71. Perception of Corruption and System Support in Jamaica

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section addresses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is often conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.²¹ Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, those that perceive higher levels of crime and those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.²² To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law
 (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 72 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in each country of the Americas who express support for the rule of law, versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other authorities may act with impunity. The highest support for the rule of law is found in Jamaica, Venezuela and Panama with three out of four respondents expressing support for the right to due process in these countries. At the other end of the chart are Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador and Bolivia with little over 50 per cent of their population supporting complete compliance with the laws in all circumstances.

In Jamaica, in the context of the serious crime problem, there have been reports of increasing incidents of vigilante attacks, and the excessive and sometimes deadly use of force by the police in treating with alleged offenders. These developments have led many to question the level of commitment of Jamaicans to the principles of rule of law and the right to due process. It is evident, however, that respect for this principle remains comparatively high, given Jamaica's position at the top end of the chart, as has been the case in previous LAPOP studies.

²¹ See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

²² Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)




Figure 72. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 73 shows statistically significant fluctuations in levels of support for the rule of law in Jamaica between 2006 and 2010. However, the marginal two percentage points decline between 2010 and the current study was statistically insignificant.




Figure 73. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law over Time in Jamaica

Finally, we conclude this section by attempting to clarify the determinants of support for the rule of law in Jamaica. Results of a logistic regression model designed to establish the factors that determine the likelihood that an individual might support the rule of law are graphically presented in Figure 74. As depicted, none of the factors considered were statistically significant predictors of support for the rule of law. Noteworthy though is the relatively strong and net negative effect of crime victimization. This indicates that persons who reported to have been the victim of a crime recently would be less inclined to be supportive of the principle of due process in dealing with alleged perpetrators.




Figure 74. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Jamaica

VII. Conclusion

This chapter addressed the magnitude and the relationships between crime, perception of insecurity and corruption; and support for the political system and the rule of law in Jamaica. Our exploration of these issues was informed by the assumptions that crime victimization and perception of insecurity might negatively impact citizens' support for their democratic system of government and may weaken their embrace of key democratic values, particularly their belief in the right to due process and the supremacy of the rule of law. Also, we assumed that pervasive corruption should have the effect of undermining political legitimacy and, in turn, increasing the prospect for democratic instability. With these assumptions in mind, we created and analysed regression models designed to examine likely impact of crime, sense of insecurity and corruption on citizens' support for a democratic system of government in Jamaica.

The perception that corruption is widespread among elected and other public officials in Jamaica continues to be markedly high among the citizenry. However, the measure of 75.2 out of a maximum of 100 points obtained in this 2012 round is the lowest reported since the first study in 2006. It is also the first year that there has been a statistically significant reduction in corruption by this measure and in line with the findings of Transparency International's (TI) 2012 survey of a small improvement in the CPI index for Jamaica over this period. Evidence of a marginal reduction in crime victimization is also consistent with police statistics.

With regard to system support, it was found that persons who were victims of a crime within the past twelve months were, indeed, less supportive of the political system than those who were not. Also, persons with the perception that corruption is widespread in society were likely to exhibit low support for their system of government.

It has been observed quite often that Jamaica shows a tendency for certain attitudes and practices deemed antithetical to the rule of law, particularly with regard to the respect for citizens' civil rights in areas such as law enforcement. A key finding, however, was evidence of very high respect for the rule of law among Jamaicans. Seventy-five per cent of the populace support full compliance with law in all circumstances, the highest score on this measure among the countries participating in the 2012 round of surveys. Gender was the only factor with a statistically significant coefficient, with women more likely to support adherence to the rule of law. Importantly, it was found that citizens' exposure to crime significantly influence their support for the rule of law.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked, what makes democracy tick? The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,¹ others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.² Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.³

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.⁴ While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP’s measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.⁵ This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians’ proximity to citizens’ policy preferences have an important effect on citizens’ attitudes about the political system.⁶ Institutional variables have also been

¹ Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial, ; Przeworski Adam. 1999. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P.1991., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press..

² Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A.2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America”. *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³ See also Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

⁴ Easton, David. 1975.“A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America.” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29

⁵ Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

⁶ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008. “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian, 2011. “Public support for liberal democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and

shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems incorporating features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.⁷

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.⁸ In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.⁹

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."¹⁰ Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.¹¹ Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,¹² authoritarian personality,¹³ and religion.¹⁴ At the

Stephen Whitefield, 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

⁷ Anderson, Christopher. 2007., *Losers' consent: elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

⁸ Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 20*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 2*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 36*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁹ Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 4*: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights, 19*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights, 63*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

¹⁰ Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," 5.

¹¹ Gibson, James L.. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L.2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L.1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L.1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599..

¹² Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al..2005 "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 : 593-608; Brader, Ted,

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.¹⁵ Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.¹⁶ LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination, but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.¹⁷

Research by Golebiowska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.¹⁸ It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP's previous studies, are summarized in Table 2. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 2. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978.

¹³ Altemeyer Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians*.

¹⁴ Postic, Robert K. 2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest, 2007); Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc,).

¹⁵ Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶ Peffley, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257..

¹⁷ Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁸ Golebiowska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiowska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 AmericasBarometer data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.¹⁹

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's "system support" index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas? Figure 75 shows comparative system support information for Latin American and Caribbean countries that participated in the 2012 study. At the top of the chart is Belize with a score of roughly 62 points followed by Suriname and Nicaragua, both with scores of roughly 61 points on this measure. Hondurans reported the lowest level of support for their political system (41.4 points), behind Panama and Haiti with scores of 44 and 44.5 points, respectively. Jamaica's score of 53.6 points places it close to the centre of the chart, on this indicator.

¹⁹ Booth, John and Mitchell Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 75. Support for the Political System in the Countries of the Americas

Support for the political system is typically higher on some of the individual dimensions of the index than on others. In Figure 76 we present the levels of agreement in Jamaica with each of the five components of system support. Looking at the items individually, respondents' support for the idea that citizens should support the nation's political system was an average score of more than 60 and confidence in the country's political institutions received average scores of 55 points. Their evaluations of the extent to which basic rights are protected and their pride in the political system obtained scores of below 50 on this 100-point scale. The very low score of less than 45 points on the issue of citizens' rights protection raises questions about the efficacy of the nation's human rights instruments and institutions in guaranteeing citizens' basic rights and privileges.




Figure 76. Components of Support for the Political System in Jamaica

As presented in Figure 77, Jamaica's index of 53.6 in 2012 represents a moderate but statistically significant increase in citizens' support for the political system since the 2010 study. It is also the highest level of system legitimacy reported by Jamaicans since the 2006 study.




Figure 77. Support for the Political System over Time in Jamaica

III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the AmericasBarometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: **[Probe: To what degree?]**

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all LAPOP indexes, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance.

As illustrated in Figure 78, the United States obtained a very high score of 72.6 points on this measure of political tolerance. Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Canada in that order, all have scores in the high 60-point range. Honduras was accorded an extremely low score of about 37 points, behind Ecuador, El Salvador and Peru, all with scores in the lower 40-point range.

Of note is Jamaica’s ranking in the region on this measure. Despite a substantial decline in the level of political tolerance among the citizenry over the past six years, level of tolerance in Jamaica remains moderately high when compared to the other Latin American and Caribbean countries. Among the countries participating in the 2012 series of surveys, Jamaica was one of the top seven performers, scoring 60 points on this scale.




Figure 78. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas

Respondents' levels of agreement with each of the four dimensions of political tolerance are summarized in Figure 79. Analysed on an item-by-item basis, it is evident that Jamaicans are generally tolerant in each, with each indicator obtaining average support of greater than 50 points. As the values on the respective bars indicate, the right to protest received the highest level of approval, approximately 69 out of the possible 100 points, followed closely by the right to vote with just over 66 points. Respondents were less supportive of those who are openly critical of Jamaica's system of government as far as their right to seek public office is concerned. This is evident by a comparatively low national average of 50 points on this indicator.




Figure 79. Components of Political Tolerance in Jamaica

How has political tolerance evolved over time in Jamaica? In Figure 80 we display the average levels of political tolerance in Jamaica in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2006. Compared to the remarkably high index of 72.7 reported in the 2006 survey, the 2012 score of 60.1 points is a seemingly substantial decline in political tolerance among Jamaicans over a six-year period. As depicted, however, the tolerance score for 2012 closely corresponds to levels for 2008 and 2010, and seems to imply a levelling-off.




Figure 80. Political Tolerance over Time in Jamaica

What affects levels of tolerance in Jamaica? To help make this determination, we developed and tested a linear regression model, comprising the variables listed in Figure 81. As the results indicate, gender, wealth, level of education, support for democracy and frequency of church attendance emerged as statistically significant determinants of political tolerance.




Figure 81. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Jamaica

In Figures 82 and 83, we further examine the results from Figure 81 by graphical representation of the statistically significant variables. As shown in Figure 82, a person's level of tolerance is positively impacted by the extent of that person's support for democracy and degree of wealth. So persons who are more supportive of democracy are generally more likely to exhibit greater levels of tolerance than those with weak support; and as wealth increases, so should the individual's level of tolerance.




Figure 82. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Jamaica

And as shown in Figure 83, frequency of church attendance is negatively related to level of political tolerance. Regular church goers are generally more intolerant than those who attend church infrequently. There is a statistically significant difference in the level of tolerance when those who attend church at least once per week compared with those who do not attend or attend once or twice per year.




Figure 83. Political Tolerance by Frequency of Church Attendance in Jamaica

Also, the notion that men tend to be more tolerant than women²⁰ has been corroborated by the findings of this study. As shown in Figure 84, the average of the tolerance scores for men is six points higher than for women.




Figure 84. Political Tolerance by Gender

²⁰ Golebiowska, Ewa A. 1999 “Gender Gap in Political Tolerance” *Political Behavior* 21 no. 1: 43-51

IV. Democratic Stability

As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are critical for democratic stability. We now examine the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes. Figure 85 shows that, ranked on the basis of the proportion of citizens exhibiting the values and attitudes that are presumed to be supportive of a stable democracy, Canada is at the top of the list with 51.5 per cent, followed Guyana and the United States with roughly 46 and 45 points, respectively. Of note is the precipitous fall of Costa Rica on this measure. Along with Uruguay, this country was among the top three performers since the 2008 survey. At the bottom of the chart, with historically low scores are Bolivia, Haiti and Honduras.

Jamaica's score of 37.3 per cent is the highest since 2006. Its current seventh place ranking is, however, two places lower than in 2008 when it registered its best performance.




Figure 85. Stable Democratic Attitudes in the Countries of the Americas

How has the percentage of Jamaicans with the combination of attitudes that is most compatible with stable democracy evolved over time? In Figure 86, we present the percentages of citizens with high levels of both system support and tolerance since 2006. The concurrent increase in the number of individuals with high levels of tolerance and those with high levels of support for the political system in the 2012 survey, has resulted in an eight percentage point increase in the support for a stable democracy index, compared to the 2010 measure on this indicator. As depicted, 37.3 per cent of citizens were found to harbour values and attitudes that are indicative of their strong support of a stable democracy. This is the highest proportion of citizens to have shown this inclination since the first study in 2006.




Figure 86. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in Jamaica

In an attempt at deepening our understanding of this issue of democratic stability, we did additional analysis to determine the distinguishing characteristics of the group whose attitudes were established to be conducive to the support of a stable democracy. Here the dependent variable is binary – the recoded ‘support for a stable democracy’ indicator – where category ‘1’ is comprised of those who support stability and category ‘0’ of those classified in the other three groups who are not strong supporters of a stable democracy. In the analysis, we utilized a logistic regression model made up of the independent variables displayed in Figure 87 below. The factors found to have the greatest influence on support for a stable democracy are interest in politics, satisfaction with the performance of the current Prime Minister and perception of corruption.




Figure 87. Determinants of Stable Democratic Attitudes in Jamaica

To further explore the determinants of support for the political system, we examine the bivariate relationships between system support and the most important variables from the regression analysis.

Citizens who believe that their government and its officials are performing well are assumed to have a stronger belief in their system of government. As the chart at the upper left corner of Figure 88 shows, those evaluating the Prime Minister's performance positively are more likely to exhibit the values and attitudes that are supportive of a stable democracy than those with negative evaluations.

Also, the chart to the left shows that the higher a person's level of interest in politics, the higher the probability that such an individual will support democratic stability. The chart at the bottom of the figure indicates that persons who perceive corruption to be widespread in society are less likely to have the combination of attitudes that is most compatible with stable democracy.




Figure 88. Factors Associated with Stable Democratic Attitudes in Jamaica

V. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in Jamaica support major political and social institutions? In the AmericasBarometer 2012 round, we asked about attitudes towards many specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented “not at all,” and 7 represented “a lot,” we asked citizens to respond to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Electoral Office?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Jamaica Defence Force?
B13. To what extent do you trust Parliament?
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Court?
B43. To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican?
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

In Figure 89, we examine support for each of these items. As usual in the AmericasBarometer report, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. As the chart shows, a sense of trust in public institutions among Jamaicans is generally low. Of the eleven organizations observed in 2012’s survey, only seven received average support above 50 on the 100-point scale. The army enjoys the highest

level of trust, scoring approximately 68 points, followed by the church with 60 points. The institutions in which citizens expressed the least amount of trust are political parties and the Catholic Church, both institutions receiving a score of about 40 points.




Figure 89. Trust in Institutions in Jamaica

Further analysis of the issue of trust in institutions involved the tracking of changes over time, from the 2006 to this 2012 wave of surveys. As Figure 90 shows, citizens' trust in all the key institutions, except the media, has increased in 2012, with a statistically significant change in all instances but the army. Most notable is the nearly 20-point increase in trust in the Prime Minister in 2012, compared to the 14-point decline between the 2008 and the 2010 study. The nearly 12-point increase in level of confidence in the police is also noteworthy.




Figure 90. Trust in Institutions by Year in Jamaica

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, we measure support for democracy by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,²¹ and a question inspired by the

²¹ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

work of Rose and Miller.²² The “Churchillian” question again uses a seven point response scale, this time running from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In Figure 91, we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. At the high end of the chart are Uruguay, Venezuela and Argentina in which support for this Churchillian notion of democracy is more than 80 on the 100-point scale. Honduras is the only country receiving a score of less than 60 points on this index.




Figure 91. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas

²² Rose, Richard and William Mishler 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.

How has support for democracy evolved in recent years in Jamaica? In Figure 92, we examine changes in this support for democracy measure since 2006. As illustrated, the trend of a progressive decline in support for democracy in Jamaica over the first three rounds of this survey was broken in 2012 with a statistically insignificant four-point increase since 2010.




Figure 92. Support for Democracy over Time in Jamaica

VII. Conclusion

As discussed in the theoretical sections of this chapter, pervasive society-wide attitudes and values reflecting citizens’ propensity for political tolerance and the broad popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the system are critical for the maintenance of a stable democracy. In this section we examined selected attitudes, behaviours and values of Jamaicans that are presumed to influence these two dimensions of democratic stability. The ultimate objective was to establish, on the basis of these measures, the extent to which the country’s democratic system is in the process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidating.

Importantly, the data showed a reversal in the trend of a progressive decline in the index of democratic stability between 2006 and 2010, with a statistically significant eight-point increase in this measure between 2010 and 2012. This positive change was influenced by an appreciable increase in the indicators of both political tolerance and system support in the latter period. Viewed with further findings of statistically significant improvement in citizens’ trust in nearly all the key democratic institutions, and a measurable increase in the support for democracy per se, it is reasonable to conclude that the prospect for democratic stability in Jamaica is somewhat favourable, based on all these measures.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.² Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and sceptical views. Some authors argue that local politics have generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.³ Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.⁴ Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.⁵

¹ Rondinelli, Dennis, Nellis, John, and Cheema, Shabbir 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

² Huntington, Samuel 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

³ Faguet, Jean-Paul 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

⁴ Akai, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

⁵ Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta (2002). "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

However, others argue that local politics do not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.⁶ Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.⁷ Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.⁸

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. A significant proportion of citizens may, therefore, rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.⁹ Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.¹⁰ Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance. Whereas perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. Using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.¹¹ Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of historically marginalized groups, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.¹² Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.¹³ So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.¹⁴

⁶ Bardhan, Pranab 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

⁷ Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

⁸ Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrotsky, Ernesto 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

⁹ Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

¹⁰ Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

¹¹ West, Karleen 2011. *The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America*. Papers from the AmericasBarometer. Vanderbilt University.

¹² Hirschmann, Albert 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹³ Hayek, Friedrich 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

¹⁴ West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.¹⁵ Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.¹⁶ West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.¹⁷ In this chapter, we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region.

In the next section of this chapter we will examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare the extent to which citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years (2006, 2008, 2010). We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such as education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.¹⁸ Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.¹⁹ In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.²⁰ Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.²¹

¹⁵ West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women?: The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

¹⁶ Patterson, Amy 2002. "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

¹⁷ West, *ibid*.

¹⁸ Montalvo, Daniel 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁹ Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

²⁰ Montalvo, Daniel 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

²¹ Montalvo, Daniel 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your Parish Councils...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, parish council or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or parish councilor within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Local Meeting Attendance

In Figure 93 we examine the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who say they have attended a local meeting in the past year. As depicted, Jamaica assumes a median position on this democracy indicator in the 2012 survey. Ranked at the top of the chart on this measure is Haiti, the only country reporting an attendance rate higher than 20 per cent, followed closely by the United States and then the Dominican Republic. Countries at the bottom of the chart, with extremely low levels of participation, are Chile and Argentina with rates of roughly four per cent and just above them is Costa Rica with a five per cent attendance rate.




Figure 93. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas

How has participation in parish council meetings evolved in recent years? Figure 94 shows very small, statistically insignificant, period-to-period changes in level of participation in local government since 2006.





Figure 94. Municipal Meeting Participation over Time in Jamaica

Demand-Making on Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who makes requests or demands of their local *government*. Here we analyse question **NP2** to illustrate the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have made a request or demand of some person or agency in local government in the past year. As presented in Figure 95, Haitians again reported the highest level of participation on the basis of this measure.



**Figure 95. Demand Making on Local Government
in the Countries of the Americas**

How has local demand making evolved over time? Figure 96 depicts the level of participation in local government according to this indicator since 2006. Reported demand making was lowest in 2012. However, percentage change in participation by this measure over these four rounds of surveys is statistically insignificant.




Figure 96. Demand Making on Local Government over Time in Jamaica

Finally, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens’ demands and requests were satisfied. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said that they had made a demand or request. These responses can provide an important window on the quality of services parish councils provide, at least from citizens’ perspectives. In Figure 97, we examine responses to question **MUNI10** in Jamaica. Of those making a request of their parish council, only about 30 per cent reported having had their problem or request resolved.




Figure 97. Resolution of Demands Made on Local Government in Jamaica

How has parish council effectiveness evolved in recent years? As illustrated by Figure 98, on the basis of this performance measure, the Parish Councils' effectiveness has declined marginally since 2010, but significantly over the observed six-year period. This, of course, is consistent with popular views on the performance of the Island's local government authorities, especially since the onset of the current economic crisis. Indeed, it is widely believed that resource constraint is a real, though not the main cause of the less than expected standard of performance in the delivery of local services; hence, current effort to improve governance capabilities at this level through the on-going Local Government Reform Programme.




Figure 98. Resolution of Demands Made on Local Government over Time in Jamaica

Our attempt to determine the individuals who are most likely to seek assistance or present a request to their Parish Councils involved the development and testing of a logistic regression model with independent variables shown in Figure 99. The results show that the factor with the most significant influence on citizens' demand-seeking behaviour is attendance at parish council meetings. Other statistically significant predictors are trust in local government and wealth.




Figure 99. Determinants of Demand Making on Local Government in Jamaica

As Figure 100 shows, those who attend meetings of Parish Councils are four times more likely to seek the assistance of their local authorities than those who do not attend. The data seem to support the widely held view that participation in parish council affairs by the ordinary citizen is manifested mostly in terms of help-seeking, purportedly a key dimension of Jamaica’s political culture of ‘spoils and patronage.’




Figure 100. Demand Making on Local Government by Attendance at Parish Council in Jamaica

Figure 101 illustrates the relationship between demand making and the other statistically significant factors. As shown in the chart to the left, wealthier persons, that is, those in the upper quintiles, are less likely to make demands on their parish council than those in the lower quintiles. The chart to the right shows a positive relationship between demand seeking behaviour and trust in local government. Those exhibiting greater trust in their local authorities are generally more likely to make demands on their parish council.




Figure 101. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government in Jamaica

III. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the parish council is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2012 round featured three new questions that tapped satisfaction with particular services typically delivered by local governments.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

Finally, the last question, which measures trust, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a seven point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the Parish Council?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Figure 102, we examine citizens’ average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question **SGL1**. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been recoded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Nearly one half of the 26 countries participating in the 2012 survey obtained less than 50 points on this indicator. The best performers are Canada and Argentina with nearly 60 points each and Nicaragua with 56 points.

The extent of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the performance of their local authorities in Jamaica is emphasised in the cross-national comparative presentation. The 42.3 point rating obtained by Jamaica is the second lowest among the 26 countries participating in this 2012 study. Haiti is ranked at the bottom of the chart with 37.6 points and Suriname is ranked in third place from the bottom with 44.5 points.




Figure 102. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 103, we further explore the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with local government in Jamaica. In evaluating the quality of service provided by their parish council, the majority of respondents rated the services to be ‘neither good nor bad’ or ‘poor’. Only about 18 per cent offered positive assessments of ‘Good’ or ‘Very Good’. Nearly 38 per cent of the respondents expressed their outright dissatisfaction with the performance of their Parish Council by assessing the quality of service to be ‘Poor’ (25.2%) or ‘Very Poor’ (12.6%).




Figure 103. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Jamaica

How has satisfaction with local government services evolved in recent years? Figure 104 shows that despite the on-going programmes of local government reform, and the promise of eventual enhancement in the efficiency of service delivery, citizens' level of satisfaction with the quality of services provided by the Island's Parish Councils continues to be low with only a five point incremental change in satisfaction levels over the past six years.




Figure 104. Evaluation of Local Government Services over Time in Jamaica

Citizens may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction with the state of the roads and schools, and the provision of health care across the Americas.²² To begin, in Figure 105 we examine satisfaction with roads and highways. As always, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia reported the highest levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of local authorities in the delivery of road-related services. Citizens of Ecuador, Panama and Mexico expressed the highest levels of satisfaction on this indicator.




Figure 105. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas

²² We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.

In Figure 106, we turn to satisfaction with public schools. Jamaica achieved close to a median-point ranking on this indicator. Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama are at the upper end with just over 60 points each and at the lower end are Chile, Haiti and Brazil, each with scores in the low 40-point range.




Figure 106. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas

Finally, in Figure 107 we assess satisfaction with public health services. The top four performing countries on this measure are, as in the case of satisfaction with public schools services, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador and Nicaragua. The worst performing countries on this measure are Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Haiti and Chile, with scores of less than 40 points each.




Figure 107. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas

Trust in Local Government

In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted that government. This question may tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 108 we present average levels of trust in local government across the Americas. Jamaica is positioned at the lower end of the list of twenty-six countries participating in the LAPOP 2012 survey, being one of the thirteen countries with an average trust score falling below the 50-point mark on the metric scale. At the bottom of the chart is Haiti with 35.3 points, the only country obtaining a score of less than 40. The highest ranked nation and the only one scoring above 60 points, is El Salvador with nearly 61 points.




Figure 108. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As we argued in the introduction of this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government except for local government. As a result, perceptions of local government may have an important impact on attitudes towards the political system more generally. In Figure 109, we develop a linear regression model to examine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in Jamaica, while controlling for many other factors that may affect system support.




Figure 109. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of System Support in Jamaica

In Figure 110, we present the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and support for the political system. As indicated, citizens' level of satisfaction with local services is positively related to support for the political system. More specifically, as satisfaction with the performance of local public service providers increases, system support will also increase.




Figure 110. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Jamaica

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined questions relating to citizens' experiences with local government, their evaluation of the services offered by its departments and agencies, and, in turn, the effect that such experiences and evaluations have on support for the national political system. A key assumption was that citizens who participate in and evaluate local government positively are likely to exhibit greater belief in the legitimacy of national institutions and the political system as a whole.

When citizens' level of participation in the affairs of their parish council was examined in terms of meeting attendance and demand-making, Jamaica fared poorly, with declining levels of participation on these indicators both on a year-to-year basis and by cross-national comparison when ranked among other countries in the Americas. On the question of citizens' evaluation of the effectiveness of local government, measured in terms of their level of satisfaction with the services provided, it was found that, among the countries studied in the 2012 survey, Jamaicans are among the most dissatisfied with the quality of services provided by their parish councils and municipal authorities. Despite a trend of incremental improvement on this measure over the years, Jamaica is ranked as the second weakest performer on this indicator in the 2012 survey.

Importantly, it was found that higher levels of satisfaction with the services of local authorities positively impact citizen's support for their system of government.

**Part III:
Beyond Equality of Opportunity**

Chapter Seven: Surveying the Jamaican Gang Problem

I. Introduction

Gangs are widely viewed as a hindrance to social stability, citizen security and economic development. Jamaica, like many other countries, including some of its Caribbean neighbours, has a serious gang problem. A major dimension of current government security strategy is to reduce the number of gangs as a means of reducing the level of violent crimes. State officials have rightly claimed some success in this effort. Since 2010, the rates of violent crimes including murder, shootings, and robberies have been steadily declining. Despite success in these areas, many gangs remain intact and others are in the process of trying to adapt to the new effort of law enforcement. The gang problem remains a central issue in any crime reduction strategy for Jamaica. Any effort to better understand this phenomenon is thus a worthwhile endeavour.

In this chapter, we further explore the problems posed by gangs in Jamaica by attempting to estimate the insecurity-generating impact of these criminal groups across the Island via citizens' perceptions and attitudes regarding their presence, activities and connections in their communities and beyond. Specifically, we explore citizens' perception of the threat that gangs present to the communities in which they operate and the country more generally. In addition, we examine the extent to which gangs are perceived to be significant actors in the political system and connected to the political parties and thus generate a lack of confidence in the political authorities and contribute to the insecurities of the population. Facilitatory or permissive attitudes to gangs are measured and reported, and their implications for gang control discussed.

There has previously been little or no evidence that situates the substantive origin of gangs in Jamaica. Some recent studies have however attempted to clarify this issue and have traced the emergence of the gang problem to the colonial era¹. What can be argued is that from the advent of Jamaica's modern political history in the mid-1940s, gangs were urban-centred and comprised largely of males. Gray notes that "in the highly politicized environment of post-war Jamaica, a number of gangs and notorious figures flourished in Kingston."²

There has been much debate on the appropriate social and legal definitions of the term gang. These debates have led to what appears to be a developing consensus among researchers on gangs. The *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* notes that generally, there is agreement that street gangs are categorized as "any durable, street oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity"³. More problematic are the legal definitions. Here the issue is not just one of achieving conceptual clarity and power, but rather of the consequences of the definition for its

¹ Sives, A. Elections, 2010. Violence and the Democratic Process in Jamaica 1944-2007. Kingston: IRP; Gray, O. (2003). Rogue culture or avatar of liberation: The Jamaican lumpenproletariat. *Social and Economic Studies* 52(1), 1-33; Harriott, A. (2011). The Emergence and Evolution of Organized Crime in Jamaica. *West Indian Law Journal*. (36) 2: 3-28.

² Gray, O. (2003). Rogue culture or avatar of liberation: The Jamaican lumpenproletariat. *Social and Economic Studies* 52(1), 1-33.

³ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

targets and for how power is used. Advocacy groups have rightly argued that the consequences of not definitionally differentiating between organized crime groupings and youth gangs, and what are called “corner crews” may compound the human rights problems of the country, and perhaps even make the crime problem worse⁴. These definitions accompany anti-gang legislation; the purposes of such legislation include sentencing enhancement. There is also the risk of abuse of the new powers given to the police and prosecutors. Gang suppression then becomes a major human rights issue and makes the actions of law enforcement a continuing source of contention and division within the society on how to appropriately respond to the gang/violence problem.

Considerable work has been done on the structural sources of the gang problem and violent crime more generally⁵ but very little on the risk factors associated with joining youth gangs. Findings from recent studies on this issue in the context of Trinidad and Tobago indicate that delinquent peers or friendships and personal protection were the most prevalent reason given for joining youth gangs⁶. These studies are consistent with the general state of knowledge regarding this issue. In Jamaica, much has been left to theoretically informed speculation. Of note is the comment by a former Jamaican Minister of National Security that he was “tempted to speculate” that a parenting problem and “social alienation” led “one gang of youthful criminals to” adopt the name, ‘The Fatherless Crew’, and that such factors also explained “why as many as seventy-five per cent of the victims as well as the perpetrators of violent crimes are young men between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five years”⁷.

With reference to the existing academic literature, the *CHDR 2012* states that “organizational characteristics of Caribbean street gangs vary by nation...Gangs in Jamaica exhibit several typologies that range from small, loosely organized...to large highly organized gangs” but “lack defined territories and do not use identifying signs such as tattoos or gang colours.”⁸ Some “organized crime groups... led by ‘dons’...may be involved in a gang or criminal lifestyle.” ‘Dons’ or area leaders head ‘garrison’ communities and exercise some influence on political decisions partly through ensuring votes for the party to which they are linked, through the choice of political candidates and so on. They tend to provide their communities with security, food, children’s school needs and jobs. Policing such communities can be a dangerous activity, sometimes marked by the exchange of gunfire between police and armed activists^{9,10,11} as can be graphically illustrated by the major social unrest and death of over 70 persons in the ‘garrison’ community of Tivoli Gardens in the May 2010 effort to capture

⁴ Levy, H. (2009). *Killing Streets and Community Revival – “Community Stories” (1970s-1980s)*. Kingston: Arawak publications.

⁵ Francis, A., Gibbison, G., Harriott, A., Kirton, C. 2009. *Crime and Development – The Jamaican Experience*. Mona: SALISES (University of the West Indies.)

⁶ Katz, C., Choate, D. and Fox, A. (2010). *Understanding and Preventing Gang Membership in Trinidad and Tobago*. (Report). Phoenix: Arizona State University.

⁷ University of the West Indies. *Jamaica: The way forward* (Presentations at the political leadership forum 2005). Presentation of Dr. The Hon. Peter Phillips, Vice President, People’s National Party and Minister of National Security, UWI, Kingston.

⁸ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

⁹ Mogensen, M. (2005). Corner and area gangs in inner city Jamaica: In L. Dowdney, (Ed.), *In neither war nor peace: International comparisons of children and youth in organized armed violence*. Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio.

¹⁰ Harriott, A. (2008). *Organized crime and politics in Jamaica: Breaking the nexus*. Kingston: Canoe Press.

¹¹ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, the leader of a major organized crime network. Situations such as these reinforce the conclusion that gangs are the primary source of Jamaica’s insecurity problem.

II. Gang-Indicted Threats and Insecurity

Gangs of different types are active in many communities in Jamaica. Some are national in their reach as well as in the nature of their rackets, influence and impact. The insecurity-generating impact of gangs is largely due to the violence that they generate, but is also associated with their geographic distribution. Gangs are primarily an urban phenomenon. They are most prevalent in the cities and some of the larger towns. It is estimated that most of them operate in Kingston.¹² They therefore have access to various types of illegal opportunities and tend to receive considerable media attention.

In Jamaica and elsewhere in the Caribbean, the measurement of gang prevalence and insecurity-generating activity is typically done using citizens’ perception (and experience) data, self-reported information, and police reports. In the 2010 UNDP Citizen Security Survey, 10.8% of Jamaican residents reported that they believed that gangs are present in their neighbourhoods, and 41% of these persons indicated that gangs were “a big problem” in their community. The study also cites official police data indicating that there are approximately 268 gangs in Jamaica with approximately 3,900 gang members.¹³ This is a five-fold increase in gang prevalence compared to the 1998 estimate of 49 active gangs^{14,15}. Also noted is a self-report study conducted by Wilks et al.¹⁶ on a 1,185 Jamaican community-based sample of youths which found that 6.4% reported ever being in gangs. Fox and Gordon-Strachan found similar results using a school-based sample (6%)¹⁷.

“Student gangsters,” read the somewhat sensational front page banner headline in the Jamaica *Gleaner* of December 4, 2012¹⁸, hinting that these school delinquents were a potential recruitment pool for gangs. The subheading, “Hundreds of knives, machetes, ice picks seized at schools,” led to the initial paragraph of the article which mentioned that over 600 weapons were seized “from students at educational institutions island-wide” during the year. The association of gangs with schools also resonates in research on Trinidad and Tobago as does the involvement of females^{19,20}.

¹² Ellington, Owen. 2009. ‘Gangs and Organized Crime in Jamaica: A Law Enforcement Perspective.’

Paper presented at the seminar ‘Fight against Organized Crime in Jamaica: Challenge to Traditional Law enforcement, Threat to security and Governance’. Kingston.

¹³ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

¹⁴ Hall, A. 2010a. ‘Monster Ammo Find in Mountain View.’ *The Jamaica Gleaner*. 5 February. 2010b. ‘Gang Buster, Security Minister Vows to Disrupt Criminal Networks.’ *Jamaica Gleaner*. 23 January.

¹⁵ Moncrieffe, D. 1998. ‘Gang Study: The Jamaican Crime Scene.’ Kingston: Criminal Justice Research Unit, Ministry of National Security and Justice.

¹⁶ Wilks, R. et al. (2007). Community-based survey on risk and resiliency behaviours of 15-19 year olds. Report. University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.

¹⁷ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

¹⁸ Gilpin, J. (2012, December 4). Student gangsters. *The Gleaner*, p. A1 & A3

¹⁹ Katz, C., Choate, D. and Fox, A. (2010). *Understanding and Preventing Gang Membership in Trinidad and Tobago*. (Report). Phoenix: Arizona State University

²⁰ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

In attempting to estimate the insecurity-generating impact of gangs nationally, we posed the following question:

AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighbourhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?

(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

While the question asks the extent to which the neighbourhood is affected by gang activity, it should be noted that it does not seek to measure gang presence in the neighbourhood or prevalence more generally. Some gangs are national in their impact and therefore need not be present in a community to generate insecurity among the population of any community.

Responses to this item are summarized in Figure 111. Approximately 41 per cent of respondents indicated that their neighbourhoods are affected by gangs; with only 9 per cent in that percentage expressing the view that they are seriously impacted. This finding may be taken to mean that gangs tend to generate considerable insecurity nationally regardless of whether they are present in a particular community or not.




Figure 111. Citizens' Perception of the Extent of to which their Neighbourhood is Affected by Gangs

In order to facilitate easy comparison over time, and with other countries of the Americas, the results depicted in Figure 112 below were reconfigured on a 0 to 100 point scale, in which 0 indicates gang activity has no impact and 100 means there is high impact in (or on) the neighbourhood. As Figure 112 shows, based on this measure there has been marginal, but statistically insignificant²¹ change in the perceived impact of gang activity in Jamaica between 2006 and 2012.




Figure 112. Perception of the Extent of to which Neighbourhood is Affected by Gangs over Time

²¹ As explained in the prefatory section of this report (p. xxxi), statistically significant differences between/among categories (represented by the different bars) exist when confidence intervals (indicated by grey blocks at top of bars) do not overlap.

Jamaica is ranked in the company of the United States, Canada and a number of other Caribbean countries at the lower end of the chart among the twenty-six countries participating in the LAPOP 2012 survey on this gang prevalence indicator (Figure 113).




Figure 113. Percentage of Neighbourhood Affected by Gangs in the Americas



Further attempts at estimating the experiential basis of the above described measures of gang-driven insecurity in Jamaica involved the analysis of responses to the following items:

JAMGANG1. Do you personally know anyone who is a member of a gang?			
(1) Yes	(2) No	(88) DK	(98) DA
JAMGANG2. Have you ever been invited or encouraged to join a gang?			
(1)Yes	(2) No	(88) DK	(98) DA

Figure 114 depicts a summary of responses to the question about knowing someone affiliated with a gang. Some 12 per cent of persons admitted knowing a gang member. The other 88 per cent denied knowing any persons belonging to a gang. As a percentage of the sample, 12 per cent seems to be small, but as a proportion knowing gang members, this number represents a significant proportion of the sample and the population.




Figure 114. Citizens' Account of Personal Knowledge of Gang Member

Understandably, fewer persons would be invited to join gangs and Figure 115 shows exactly this. Five per cent of persons indicated being asked to join a gang. Five per cent, however, is 42% of those who know a gang member. If we assume that the candidates for gang membership would be predominantly male and young, then 5% represents most of the available population. This suggests an aggressive recruitment effort by gangs.




Figure 115. Extent of the Recruitment Effort of Gang Members

III. Experience and Threat Perceptions

People's experiences are formed not just by direct contact with gangs but also by observation of their activities and the consequences of these activities for the direct victims as well as the general population. Street gangs and other organized criminal enterprises have contributed significantly to the violence that has been inflicted on people and communities across the Island over the years.

It is generally accepted that gang presence increases the rates of violent crimes in a community and in society. Gangs are a major contributor to Jamaica's murder rate. In 2009, the police reported 1,680 homicides of which 52 per cent were categorized as gang-related. This decreased in 2010 to 28 per cent of 1,443 murders, but rose again in 2011, when gang-related murders accounted for 50 per cent of 1,133 murders²². Notwithstanding these official statistics, the government maintains that an even higher proportion of murders in Jamaica are gang-related^{23, 24, 25}.

²² United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

²³ Spaulding, Gary. 2009. 'One-on-One with Dwight Nelson: Taming the Crime Monster.' *Jamaica Gleaner*. 13 September.

²⁴ Jamaica Observer (2009). "'Gangs Must Be Crushed" – Security Minister Announces New Assault on Organised Crime Networks.' 11 May

²⁵ Ministry of National Security. 2008. 'Developing an Integrated Approach to Gang Prevention and Intervention in Jamaican Communities and Schools.' Summary document of the Symposium on Criminal Gangs in Jamaica. Kingston: MNS

Gang presence and activities are also known to weaken the local economies, undermine the rule of law and negatively affect the development of human and social capital. Most importantly, they are assumed to increase sense of insecurity among members of impacted communities, especially when violence is associated with their operations.

IV. The Challenge of Citizen Permissiveness

If gangs generate insecurity, in some settings, they are also taken as providers of security. Defending territory is part of gangs' *raison d'être*, an integral part of their identity, survival and control. It is usual for neighbourhood gangs to convey the impression that their way of operating is in the interest of the community, and in particular, that their presence ensures the safety of their respective territories. We solicited citizens' opinion on this issue of neighbourhood protection by posing the following question:

JAMGANG3. Some say that gangs provide protection for the neighbourhoods in which they operate. Do you believe gangs make these neighbourhoods safer or less safe?
 (1) Safer (2) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA

As shown in Figure 116, while some in fact believe that gangs provide protection for the people in their communities, this survey found that an overwhelming majority of persons, 92 per cent, disagree with this stance. Only about eight per cent of respondents stated that gangs make their neighbourhoods safer.




Figure 116. Perceptions of the Influence of Gangs on Community Safety

In addition to the claim of being protectors of the neighbourhoods in which they operate, gangs promote supportive relationships with the communities in which they operate by routinely participating in certain community activities - such as helping with 'back to school' supplies and other welfare projects. It has been asserted that from as early as the late 1970s, urban gangsters for both the political and criminal underworlds had become "a growing source of patronage with which politicians had to compete".²⁶ Key to their survival strategy is convincing the community that they, the gangs, care about community members' welfare.

We sought to gauge citizens' tolerance and support for gangs by posing the following two questions:

JAMGANG4. Speaking about persons who are members of gangs in your neighbourhood, are they liked or disliked by residents of the neighbourhood?

(1) Liked (2) Disliked (3) Other
(88) DK (98) DA (99) NA [there are not gang members in the neighbourhood]

JAMGANG6. In your area, who do you believe care most about the problems of persons in the neighbourhood? **[Read options]**

(01) The Churches in the area
(02) The Community Don
(03) The Parish Councillor
(04) The Member of Parliament
(05) Citizens Associations
(06) The police
(07) **[Do not read]** Other
(10) **[Do not read]** None
(88) DK
(98) DA

On the issue of tolerance of gangs, there was a somewhat muted response to the question as to whether gang members were liked or disliked, with only a 35% overall response rate to this item. In Figure 117 it is seen that 80.3% of those who responded to this item indicated that gang members were disliked, while only 15.6% indicated that gangs were liked.

²⁶ Gray, O. (2003). Rogue culture or avatar of liberation: The Jamaican lumpenproletariat. *Social and Economic Studies* 52(1), 1-33.




Figure 117. Citizens' Perception of the Attitude of their Community to Neighbourhood Gangs

This issue was further probed comparatively. Figure 118 displays the distribution of citizens' responses to the question of which group or person is perceived to care most about the problems in their neighbourhood. 'Churches in the area' were seen by Jamaicans as the group that cares most about the problems in the community (43%). Twenty-two per cent of respondents believed that 'Citizens Associations' cared about the neighbourhood. Other groups noted were the police (14%), and the members of parliament (4%). The parish councillor and community don (2%) were seen as the least likely to care about the problems of the community.




Figure 118. Citizens' Perception of Person or Organization Exhibiting Greatest Care for their Community

V. Community and Politics

The findings presented above suggest that a permissive attitude towards gangs may be restricted to a small proportion of the population of the country. In some urban communities, however, gangs may find significant support. Any such support makes it easier for them to form alliances with the political parties.

A major concern expressed in scholarly inquiry, civil society forums and public debate is what has been viewed as the persistence of alliances and or patron-client type relationships between political parties and individual political actors within the political system on the one hand, and, criminal networks including gangs on the other^{27,28,29,30}. These alliances persist even as gangs and other

²⁷ Gunst, L. (1996). *Born fi' Dead: A Journey through the Jamaican Posse Underworld*. New York: Owl Books.

²⁸ Figueroa, M. and Sives, A. (2003). Garrison Politics and Criminality in Jamaica: Does the 1997 Election Represent a Turning Point. In *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy*, ed. Anthony Harriott. UWI Press, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago: 63-88.

²⁹ Harriott, A. (2008). *Organized crime and politics in Jamaica: Breaking the nexus*. Kingston: Canoe Press.

³⁰ Levy, H. (2009). *Killing Streets and Community Revival – "Community Stories" (1970s-1980s)*. Kingston: Arawak publications.

criminal networks have become more independent actors and have more independent sources of income such as extortion and protection rackets, and international drug-trafficking.³¹

Previous studies of the gang problem in Jamaica have highlighted a presumed symbiotic relationship between politics and gangs and the attendant challenges of such an association. It has been observed that ‘Gangsters’ capacity to inspire social unrest “and their political connections make some residents afraid of reporting gang-related crimes to the police.”³² The involvement of gangs in the political process is thought to be fostered by their hold on the communities of the urban poor which are aligned to either one of the two major political parties. Historically, these gangs benefitted and survived from profits garnered through control of government contracts. Gangs are known to reinforce party loyalty in inner-city areas and politicians depended on them to deliver key votes. In return, dons depended on the politicians for patronage, such as jobs via public works programmes and public housing.³³ As government resources dwindled over recent decades, however, politicians’ control over these area gangs also diminished. The National Committee on Political Tribalism has suggested, nevertheless, that many gangs tend to maintain strong ties with politicians with the hope that “political protection will insulate them from the reach of the security forces.”

In probing the extent of citizens’ beliefs regarding this link between political actors and gangs, we asked the following question:

JAMGANG5. These persons who are members of gangs, are they closely connected, slightly connected, or not connected to political parties or politicians in the area?

- (1) Closely connected
- (2) Slightly connected
- (3) Not connected
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

Perceptions regarding associations between gangs and politics were notable. Figure 119 shows that over 60 per cent of Jamaicans believe that members of gangs are either closely or slightly connected to political parties or politicians. A little over a third of persons believe there is a close connection, while 38 per cent believe there is only a slight connection.

³¹ Harriott, A. (2011). The Emergence and Evolution of Organized Crime in Jamaica. *West Indian Law Journal*. (36) 2: 3-28.

³² Charles, C. A. D. (2004). Political identity and criminal violence in Jamaica. The garrison community of August Town and the 2002 election. *Social and Economic Studies* 53(2), 31-73.

³³ Mogensen, M. (2005). Corner and area gangs in inner city Jamaica: In L. Dowdney, (Ed.), *In neither war nor peace: International comparisons of children and youth in organized armed violence*. Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio.




Figure 119. Citizens' Perception of Link between Politicians and Gangs

VI. Citizens Tolerance of Gangs

The linkages between gangs and politicians help to make the former more acceptable to citizens who live in highly mobilized communities. Here, we explore the issue of citizens' permissiveness towards gangs and gang activities in their communities. Our goal is to identify the location and development profile of neighbourhoods in which gangs are more likely to be tolerated, and the key socio-economic and demographic characteristics of community members who will likely support their presence and activities. Presumably, persons who are inclined to approve of community gangs and their activities are more likely to become involved with gangs.

To achieve this, we firstly operationalize the notion of gang permissiveness by creating an additive scale comprising survey items **JAMGANG3** (perception of the extent to which gangs protect/make neighbourhoods safe) and **JAMGANG4** (extent to which gangs are liked by the communities in which they operate). Responses to these two items were added and then recoded into the easily interpretable 0 to 100 point index³⁴ of gang permissiveness. This measure averages and, presumably, captures tolerance for gangs both at the individual level (**JAMGANG3**) and at the level of the community (**JAMGANG4**). We then designed a regression model comprised of selected perception, socio-economic and demographic variables that we assumed, based on prior research, might have some impact on the support for neighbourhood gangs.

³⁴ On this continuum, 0 represents absolutely no tolerance for gangs and 100 means total acceptance of and support for community gangs.

Figure 120 provides a graphical presentation of the statistical outcomes of this analysis. The horizontal green line on this chart indicates the points at which variables with a mean of zero would be located. Each 'dot' indicates the value of the regression coefficient of the respective independent variable, and the 95 per cent confidence interval around each mean is shown by an "I" placed horizontally across the dot. Those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal "I"s) that intersect the green line are not significant predictors ($p < 0.05$) of citizens' permissiveness towards gangs.

In this case, the coefficient for gender (women), age and social status (quintiles of wealth) are located completely to the left of the zero line, signifying their negative and statistically significant impact on citizens' tolerance for gangs. More precisely, women are less likely than men to be tolerant of gangs and their activities. Younger persons and those of lower socio-economic status are likely to be more supportive of neighbourhood gangs. In contrast, those factors that are completely to the right of the line point to individuals who personally know a gang member or have had previous contact (been invited to join) with a gang member; and these two types are typically more likely to be receptive towards gangs. In terms of differences in regions, only within the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) was there a statistically significant indication of strong support for gangs. The variable 'size of place' measures both the level of urbanization and the size of city. This factor has a positive impact, but is statistically insignificant.




Figure 120. Socio-economic and Demographic Determinants of Tolerance for Gangs and Gang Activities

VII. Attitudes to Existing State and Police Responses to Gangs

The relationships between gangs and the political parties, and permissiveness of citizens complicate and make more difficult the responses of law enforcement to gangs. Against this backdrop, we may now discuss how citizens evaluate the performance of law enforcement.

Among the series of questions included in the LAPOP 2012 survey to study the gang problem in Jamaica are the three items below. **JAMGANG9** sought citizens' evaluation of performance of the police in their mandate to "investigate and prosecute top criminal gang leaders, seize their assets, and identify transnational linkages of gang operations," and essentially to lead the charge of disrupting, "dismantling" and suppressing gangs in Jamaica. Indeed, gang control will necessarily involve more than enforcement activities. Jamaica's gang suppression strategy also involves provision of economic opportunity, community mobilization and development. The other two items asked respondents for their views as to who might best implement these measures and to indicate their willingness to participate in these programmes.

JAMGANG9. How would you rate the performance of the police in their effort to dismantle gangs in your neighbourhood? Would you say they are doing a good job, a fair job or a poor job?

- (1) A good job (2) A fair job (3) A poor job
(88) DK (98) DA

JAMGANG8. Who do you believe is best suited to implement these programmes to reduce gang activities? **[Read options]**

- (01) The Churches in the area
(02) The Community Don
(03) The Parish Councillor
(04) The Member of Parliament
(05) Citizens Associations
(06) The Police
(07) **[Do not read]** Other
(10) **[Do not read]** None
(88) DK
(98) DA

JAMGANG7. If some programmes are developed to reduce gang activities in your area, would you be willing or unwilling to participate in these programmes?

- (1) Yes, willing (2) No, unwilling
(3) **[DO NOT READ]** Maybe/depends. (88) DK (98) DA



Figure 121 shows the breakdown of responses relating to JAMGANG9. Overall most Jamaicans seem to believe that the police are making some effort to alleviate gang activities in communities. In rating the efforts by the police in dismantling gangs, about 38 per cent of Jamaicans indicated that the police were doing a good job. Forty-four per cent expressed that the police were doing a fair job while just about 17 per cent indicated that the police were doing a poor job.




Figure 121. Citizens' Evaluation of the Performance of the Police in Dismantling Neighbourhood Gangs

Responses to **JAMGANG8** is shown in Figure 122. Perhaps in keeping with respondents' perception of who cares most about problems in the community (Figure 118), most Jamaicans believe that the Churches in the area (35 per cent) would be most suited to implement programmes to reduce gang activities in their communities. They were followed by the police, 26 per cent, citizens' associations, 23 per cent, and the Member of Parliament, 8.3 per cent. The community don was the least favoured option, with a mere one per cent endorsement.




Figure 122. Citizens' Account of Person or Organization Best Suited to Implement Anti-Gang Programmes

On the question of working with the police to suppress gang activities, Jamaicans appear to want to be involved in protecting their communities from gangs. As depicted in Figure 123, approximately 69 per cent of respondents indicated that they would be willing to participate in programmes aimed at reducing gang activities in their area. Fifteen per cent expressed their unwillingness to participate in any such activities.




Figure 123. Citizens' Account of their Willingness to Work with the Police in Dismantling Neighbourhood Gangs

VIII. Gang Reduction and Control

For 2011, the Ministry of National Security and Justice reported that the “Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) maintained its focus on the disruption and dismantling of criminal gangs” and that the “Jamaica Defence force (JDF) continued to provide crucial operational support”³⁵. Significantly, under the School Suspension Intervention Programme, 1,658 adolescents including 984 males were processed and one category of infringement was “formation of gangs in schools and gang related activities usually stemming from the communities.” Among relevant pieces of legislation “considered” in 2011 was the Criminal Justice (Suppression of gangs and organized criminal groups) Bill³⁶ which at the time of the writing of this report was yet to be introduced in the Parliament for consideration. In 2012 the Ministry of National Security and the police high command stressed that the dismantling of gangs remained a central plank in their drive to reduce serious crime (particularly the murder rate) to ‘First World’ levels by 2017, and that the effort had so far attained notable success.

The UNDP report on seven Caribbean nations including Jamaica notes that domestic response to street gangs and organized crime groups has five prongs, namely: suppression, provision of economic and social support, social intervention, community mobilization, and organizational change and development whereas international attention leans towards treaties, inter-agency cooperation, and

³⁵ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2012). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*. Kingston: Author.

³⁶ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2011). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*. 24-26

capacity building³⁷. Several, if not all of these elements of a comprehensive response to gangs have been attempted in Jamaica – with some positive results. Gang prevalence however remains fairly high.

IX. Implications of Findings for Policy

The findings of this study reinforce what was already known, which is that the major challenges for gang control include: the gang-politics nexus that offers a measure of protection for the gangs; and the permissive or at least ambivalent attitudes of sections of the population toward gangs and violence more generally.³⁸ Effective policy responses must take into account these two things.

If Jamaica is to have further reduction in the rates of serious crimes, then public policy and the state agencies must continue to target gangs, especially the most violent and powerful ones. The state must seek to deepen its response by elaborating and effectively implementing a more comprehensive policy. The elements of such a response are already present but there is a need for systematization and greater coordination of effort – in order to achieve increased effectiveness.

In order to achieve the desired outcome (lower rates of serious crimes), the evidence suggests that the crime-politics nexus must be broken. Some measures for accomplishing this include election campaign finance reform, strengthening the anti-corruption agencies of the state, and other good governance measures.

Permissiveness may be tackled by community-based gang reduction programmes that foster greater inclusion of the communities of the urban poor. Given the hold off gangs on communities, a community development approach makes much sense in Jamaica. Accompanying such an approach should be consistent effort to build public awareness of the problem of permissiveness in its various manifestations. By seriously tackling the problem of permissiveness, social control may be strengthened, thereby creating better conditions for gang reduction.

X. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the problems posed by gangs in Jamaica by attempting to estimate the insecurity-generating impact of these criminal groups across the Island via citizens' perceptions and attitudes regarding their presence, activities and connections in their communities and beyond. Specifically, we explored citizens' perception of the threat that gangs present to the communities in which they operate and in the country more generally. In addition, we examine the extent to which gangs are perceived to be significant actors in the political system and connected to the political parties, thereby generating a lack of confidence in the political authorities and contributing to insecurity within the population. Facilitatory or permissive attitudes to gangs are measured and reported, and their implications for gang control discussed. Finally, we gauged citizens' attitudes to anti-gang initiatives and queried their willingness to participate in efforts designed to reduce gang prevalence and mitigate their negative impact on the society.

³⁷ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

³⁸ Harriott, A. (2008). *Organized crime and politics in Jamaica: Breaking the nexus*. Kingston: Canoe Press.

It was observed that gangs have been a feature of the Jamaican socio-political landscape for decades and they continue to be a major source of crime and violence in the country. Scholarly and other sources have pointed to the increasing complexity of their organization, their growth and resilience, the dangers that they pose to the communities in which they operate and society on a whole, their links to politics; and significantly, to noticeable signs of greater acceptance of these criminal entities in some communities.

Notably, respondents saw, not gangs, but rather common criminals as the biggest threat to their neighbourhoods and personal safety. This correlates to some extent with the higher percentages of respondents who stated that they did not know a gang member, and, had not been invited or encouraged to join a gang. This is made somewhat complicated by the overwhelming proportion of the actual respondents (92%) who felt that gangs made their neighbourhoods less safe.

The greater proportion of respondents (69.1%) said they would assist with gang reduction strategies and felt the police were doing at least a fair job (82.7% cumulative) in their effort to “dismantle” gangs. Despite the fact that some respondents in the sample might not have been exposed to gangs and their activities, it could be cautiously inferred that a fairly strong anti-gang sentiment prevails in the society. There is popular support for a robust and comprehensive gang reduction and control policy.

Chapter Eight: Trust as a Factor in Police-Citizen Relations in Jamaica

I. Introduction

Concerns about police-citizen relations in Jamaica have persisted over many years despite the growing number of initiatives aimed at reducing “misunderstanding and tension between law enforcement officials and the communities they serve”, and enhancing police-citizen cooperation in the nation’s crime prevention and control efforts. Some argue that the prominence of a somewhat militaristic and “authoritarian approach” to policing¹, evidenced by a tendency for the use of ‘special forces’, ‘raids’, ‘detentions’ and curfews as crime fighting strategies, has widened the police-citizen divide in many communities across the Island. In “Crime and Drug-Related Issues in Jamaica” Chevannes observed that the “widespread resentment of police, especially among youth, is in part due to the excesses that often accompany interventions and arrests.”² Likewise, it has been argued that the longstanding practice of the police in treating citizens of different socio-economic groups, communities, ages and lifestyles unequally has further served to increase tension and mistrust, especially in inner city communities.³

Indeed, the rise in serious crimes and the use of what is perceived as excessive force by the police are closely related. Jamaica’s violent crime rate is comparatively high by any standard, and its murder rate in particular places is in the category of one of the world’s most violence-prone nations. Closely related is the issue of police killings, which continues to be a highly-publicized source of concern at the level of impacted communities and beyond. Media reports quite frequently point to contradictory accounts on the part of the police, on the one hand, and citizens calling for ‘justice’, on the other, in an increasing number of cases involving police use of lethal force. Given these factors, and other tension-creating situations that emerge from time to time, efforts at achieving a sustainable improvement in police-citizen relations have remained a seemingly daunting task for the local and international entities that have been involved in the process.

The widely accepted view is that there is a ‘crisis of confidence’ that must be resolved for any meaningful improvement in relationship to occur. Trust is an essential element for a ‘good working relationship’ between police and citizens.⁴ A number of studies elsewhere in the Region have shown that successful government-directed reform efforts aimed at improving police-citizen relations have led to more favourable impressions of the police and greater sense of security in the targeted communities.⁵ With regard to Jamaica, Harriott has presented data pointing to increased confidence in the police following “the reform project of 1993, which reduced the use of lethal violence and induced greater political impartiality in the conduct of police operations”⁶.

¹ Meeks, B. (2001). Reinventing the Jamaican political system. *Souls*, 3(4), 9-21.

² Chevannes, B. (2001). Crime and drug-related issues in Jamaica. *Souls*, 3(4), 32-38.

³ (see, e.g., Chevannes, 2001), (Chevannes, B. (2001). Crime and drug-related issues in Jamaica. *Souls*, 3(4), 32-38.

⁴ Loader, I. (2006). Policing, recognition and belonging. *The Annals*, 605, 202-221.

⁵ Bailey, J., & Dammert, L. (Eds.). (2006). *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006. Pp. xiii, 322.

⁶ Harriott, A. (2001). The crisis of public safety in Jamaica and the prospects for change. *Souls*, 3 (4), 56-65.

Major government-supported reform initiatives drafted or implemented in recent years have been aimed broadly at enhancing trust through the creation of a more ‘citizen-friendly force that is highly trained, professional and accountable’. One such programme of police reform that embraces this ‘citizen-friendly approach’ and substantively involves community policing was introduced several years ago under the Community Safety and Security Branch (CSSB) of the Force. In 2011, the CSSB is reported to have “trained a total of 1885 police personnel in Community Based Policing and sought to build partnerships with a number of key stakeholders by participating in or facilitating over 3667 meetings with Citizens’ Associations, Parish and Community Development Committees, Parent Teachers’ Associations, Parish Councils and other community groups.” Efforts at strengthening relations with citizens also target youths through, for example, the formation and servicing of police youth clubs of which there were 331 active ones remaining in 2011.⁷

Critical to these reform initiatives have been the support of international development partners such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the USAID Country Assistance Strategy Plan for 2012-2014, for example, Jamaica has been receiving on-going support for its community policing programmes, support directed at ‘buttressing the efforts of civil society in changing communities in partnership with the police in order to minimize conflict and crime.’ This programme is aimed, importantly, at “building public trust in the police and increasing community involvement” in the on-going effort to contain crime and enhance citizen security. The *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* acknowledges the significance of this bilateral effort in improving police-citizen cooperation and the accompanying “strides towards police reform, with the intent of increasing the transparency, effectiveness and legitimacy of the police.”⁸

Further, there are institutions such as the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) which investigates allegations of police abuse or excesses against citizens, an Anti-Corruption Branch, and the Office of the Public Defender. Notable also is the response of private sector companies, civil society organizations and individual citizens that often participate in initiatives such as refurbishing police stations and sponsoring police youth club activities. And the role of trade organizations such as the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce, which was responsible for the development of a Code of Conduct aimed at ensuring ‘that appropriate conduct and behaviour guide all interactions between citizens and members of the security forces’.

Indeed, the emerging consensus is that citizens’ security is a ‘shared responsibility’. However, it is the police who are ultimately responsible for the enforcement of prescribed measures to ensure public safety. As aptly observed, the respect for and protection of citizen rights are “preconditions for the police being able to contribute positively to citizen security in a democratic society.”⁹ These guarantees are critical to any effort aimed at building trust and facilitating a cooperative police-citizen working relationship.¹⁰ In this chapter, we centre trust and confidence as aspects of police-citizen relations in Jamaica.

⁷ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2012). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica – 2011*. Kingston: Author.

⁸ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.

⁹ Loader, I. (2006). Policing, recognition and belonging. *The Annals*, 605, 202-221.

¹⁰ Jackson and Bradford. (2010) What is Trust and Confidence in the Police? *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*. 4 (3), 241-248.

As in previous AmericasBarometer series of surveys, the 2012 study tracks citizens' level of trust in key national institutions, including the police. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of questions requiring respondents to indicate their trust in particular institutions by selecting a number on a 1-7 scale on which '1' indicates no trust at all and '7' a lot of trust.¹¹ We begin our examination in this section by analysing answers to the following item:

B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?

Figure 124 shows the distribution of responses on this scale. Fifteen per cent of those interviewed indicated that they have absolutely no confidence in the police. However, more than 60 per cent of respondents located their sense of trust between 4 and 7 on the scale.




Figure 124. Citizens' Trust in the Police in Jamaica, 2012

In order to facilitate easy comparative analysis of the data, both on a year-to-year and a cross-national basis, we reconfigured the information in Figure 124 on a 0-100 point scale in which 0 signifies no trust at all in the police and 100 represents a lot of trust. Figure 125 shows trust in the police as calculated on this continuum from 2006 to 2012. As illustrated in this chart, the trend of a progressive decline in confidence over the first three rounds of this survey was broken in 2012, with a significant sixteen point increase in this measure between the 2010 and 2012. This is the highest level of trust enjoyed by the police in the six years of this study.

¹¹ Please see other institutions on page 128




Figure 125. Citizens' Trust in Police over Time in Jamaica

Examined comparatively from a cross-national perspective (Figure 126), Jamaica is positioned at the middle of the list of twenty-six countries participating in the 2012 survey. It is one of the thirteen nations scoring less than 50 points on this indicator.




Figure 126. Trust in the Police in the Countries of the Americas

The significant positive change in the trust and confidence enjoyed by the police may be largely due to the significant reductions in crime, particularly serious crime that they have reported since 2010. Reductions in the rates of serious crimes have been reported for the three consecutive years. These results are, presumably, attributable to the performance of the police. Effectiveness tends to generate confidence in any endeavour.

For the sustainability of these outcomes, however, among other things, more robust systems of internal and external accountability may be required. The plan of the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) for the transformation of the JCF and policing includes a merger of the oversight bodies. Having one effective police oversight body ought to ensure improved accountability if such a body undertakes the

responsibility to advance the process of transforming the JCF so that it may serve the Jamaican public more effectively. Such a process may be aided by greater police transparency. The management approach of the present Commissioner has contributed greatly to the considerable progress that has been made in this regard. The JCF has become more open and Force Orders are used to transparently convey the thinking and instructions of the High Command. Such practices provide a stronger foundation of improved internal accountability and the implementation of plans for transformation of ineffective and confidence-lowering practices.

II. Trust in the Police and Military in Comparative Perspective

The military also participates in police operations. It is therefore useful to compare and contrast the attitudes of citizens to these two institutions. The data for the period 2008-2012 reveal that there is a pattern of significantly greater confidence and trust in the military. As shown in Figure 127, there was a 30 point difference, in favour of the military in the 2010 study. This was narrowed by 10 points in 2012, due to marked improvement in citizens' attitude to the police over that two-year period.

Historically, the military has enjoyed greater public trust than the police. This is true for the entire period since surveys have been methodically used to explore and measure these issues in the very early 1990s.¹² The Jamaican military has not been as intensely involved in day-to-day involuntary contact with citizens, and it has a record of being more restrained in its use of lethal force. These factors among others may explain the differences in the respective levels of confidence and trust in both institutions over the years.




Figure 127. Comparative Perspective on Trust in Police and Military Over Time in Jamaica

¹² See Stone, C. 1991. *Survey of Public Opinion on the Jamaican Justice System*. Mimeo. Report to USAID (Kingston).

III. Trust in the Justice System

The police and criminal courts carry out important functions in a democratic society. They ought to ensure unbiased law enforcement and justice for all. We expect them to be fair, impartial, efficient and effective. Trust in the justice system is the belief that the police and criminal courts can be relied upon to act competently, to wield their authority in a fair way, and to provide equal justice and protection across society. “To say we trust you means we recognize that you have the right intentions and behaviour toward us and that you are competent to do what we expect of you.”¹³ We gauged citizens’ confidence in the justice system in Jamaica by posing the following question:

AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? **[Read the options]**
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 128 summarizes respondents’ assessment of the efficacy of the Justice System in terms of this important aspect of its mandate. About one in ten Jamaicans reported that they have absolutely no faith in the system while about 18 per cent indicated having a lot of confidence.




Figure 128. Citizens’ Belief in the Justice System in Jamaica, 2012

¹³ Hardin (2006). Trust. Poliy Press. NY.

IV. Trust in the Police, the Courts and the Justice System in General in Comparative Perspective

Indeed, the police are a part of a larger justice system that is normally taken to include prosecutions, courts and corrections. In this report, though, “Justice System” is taken to mean the police and courts only. In Figure 129, we compare the trust in these institutions’ justice. Consistent with earlier surveys, the courts enjoy greater trust and confidence than the police.




Figure 129. Trust in the Police, Courts and the Justice System in General in Jamaica, 2012

V. Trust in the Courts and the Justice System in the Americas

Courts and more specifically the judiciary have evidently been¹⁴ and are seen as independent and competent.¹⁵ There are, however, problems with the processing of cases, lengthy trial delays and poor treatment of users of the system including victims of crimes, individuals and businesses involved in civic matters. Justice sector reform is supposed to fix these problems, but progress has been slow. There may be some impatience with the delays in fixing some of these problems which are increasingly being associated with unintended but nevertheless unjust outcomes. Despite these difficulties, Jamaica’s courts and justice system currently enjoy greater public trust than most of the countries of the Americas, participating in this 2012 survey (Figure 130).

¹⁴ Stone, C. 1991. *Survey of Public Opinion on the Jamaican Justice System*. Mimeo. Report to USAID (Kingston).

¹⁵ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.




Figure 130. Comparative Perspective on Trust in the Courts in Countries of the Americas




Figure 131. Comparative Perspective on Trust in the Justice System in Countries of the Americas

VI. Determinants of Trust in the Police

Further investigation of the issue of citizens' trust in the police involved the design of a linear regression model aimed at determining the factors that best explain differences in level of confidence in the police among Jamaicans. Our goal is to identify the characteristics of community members that might be used to identify those who are more likely to trust the police. In selecting control variables for this model, we assumed that the variables on the left of the chart below should have some impact on citizens' attitude.

Figure 132 provides a graphical presentation of the outcome of the analysis. The horizontal green line on this chart indicates the points at which variables with a mean of zero (gender [woman], in this case) would be located. Each 'dot' indicates the value of the regression coefficient of the respective independent variable, and the 95 per cent confidence interval around each mean is shown by an "I" placed horizontally across the dot. Those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal "I"s) that intersect the green line are not statistically significant predictors ($p < 0.05$) of citizens' perception of the police. In this case, those who participate regularly in solving community problems, the less educated, those who have been victims of a crime, and those who are more supportive of the rule of law, are likely to have low levels of trust in the police. In contrast, persons expressing the belief that the Justice System can be depended upon to punish the guilty, those who trust the courts and older persons are likely to exhibit greater confidence in members of the Police Force.




Figure 132. Determinants of Trust in the Jamaican Police, 2012

To further illustrate the relationships discussed above, we generate bivariate charts showing how the statistically significant variables relate to trust in the police. As depicted in Figure 133, as age and confidence in the courts increase, trust in the police will also increase. Also, as the belief that the justice system will punish those who break the law strengthens, citizens' confidence in the police is also likely to strengthen. The question of how citizens' level of participation in their community affects the extent to which they trust in the police is somewhat more complicated. The positive relationship between the two factors exists only among persons with lower level of community participation and those reporting very high levels of involvement.




Figure 133. Correlates of Trust in the Police

Figure 134 shows that persons who reported that they have recently been the victim of a crime are less likely to trust the police.




Figure 134. Trust in the Police by Crime Victimization

VII. Police Performance

Our effort to clarify the factors that influence police-citizen relations in Jamaica included analyses to establish the relationship between citizens' perception of the performance of the police and their level of trust in members of the force. When asked to rate the performance of the police in terms of one of the three categories displayed in Figure 135 (see question JAMGANG9) approximately 18 per cent of the respondents rated the police as performing poorly while about 37 per cent appraised their job performance to be good. In other words, most Jamaicans believe the police are performing in a mediocre way.




Figure 135. Citizens' Evaluation of Performance of the Police in Jamaica

Using the average positive evaluation (that is, the mean of 'fair' and 'good' job) as the dependent variable, we used the multi-variate analysis technique to determine the role of trust in how citizens evaluate the performance of the police. As indicated by Figure 136, persons of lower socio-economic status, younger individuals, persons who have recently been a victim of a crime and those expressing a high sense of insecurity are likely to negatively evaluate the performance of the police. However, none of these factors are statistically significant predictors. Factors located on the other side of the horizontal green line indicate net positive impact on the evaluation of the police. Of note is the very strong influence of trust.




Figure 136. Determinants of Positive Evaluation of Police Performance in Jamaica

The nature of the relation between trust in the police and assessment of police performance is illustrated in Figure 137. As the direction of the line indicates, as citizens' confidence in the police increases, their positive impression of the police also increases in a nearly linear manner. Conversely, it may also be inferred, that as trust in the police increases, citizens' evaluation of the way they perform their duties is likely to be more positive.




Figure 137. Trust in the Police by Evaluation of Police Performance

Sources point to the potential for greater cooperation between citizens and police if the police act humanely and citizens' respect is thereby encouraged.¹⁶ Previous LAPOP surveys have also found that if specifically confronted with the prospect of a government programme or allied non-government agencies' intervention for a police-citizen cooperation, most Jamaicans would be willing to collaborate in such efforts. In Figure 138 we present findings on the question of citizens' willingness to work with the police (see question **JAMGANG7**). As the summary of responses indicates, about one in three Jamaicans would be very willing to cooperate in some form of police-citizen partnership, with another 16 per cent being somewhat supportive of such collaboration.




Figure 138. Citizens' Willingness to Work with the Police in Jamaica

Also, we use multivariate analysis techniques to determine the characteristics of persons who are more likely to work with the police in crime control and community safety efforts. A logistic regression model with variables shown in Figure 139 as independent variables and the category of those who are resolute in their willingness to work with the police as dependent variable was solved. As indicated, gender was the only statistically significant distinguishing factor in this model, with women more likely than men to collaborate with the police.

¹⁶ United Nations Development Programme. (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012* (Human development and the shift to better citizen security). New York: Author.




Figure 139. Determinants of Willingness to Work with the Police in Jamaica

VIII. Conclusion

In this chapter, we centred trust and confidence as aspects of police-citizen relations in Jamaica. It is argued that the nature of police-citizen relations in Jamaica is somewhat complex and rests on elements such as the overall societal context, policing approaches and citizens' perceptions of and attitude toward the police. Various strategies such as community policing have been directed at improving service, accountability and citizen-cooperation over the years. Community policing offers much potential for building the confidence and trust of the people, transforming policing and making the JCF more effective in controlling and preventing crime, but it was observed that these changes ought to be deepened.

Evidently, perceptions of the police are crucial in improving police-citizen relationships, and this study shows that much work remains to be done towards improving this element which has the potential to make Jamaica a more secure place. It was found, though, that the trend of a progressive decline in confidence in the Jamaican police over the first three rounds of this survey was broken in 2012, with a significant sixteen point increase in this measure between the 2010 and 2012. This is the highest level of trust enjoyed by the police in the six years of LAPOP studies in Jamaica.

Of significance also are findings relating to citizens' propensity to work with the police. There is overall majority support for police efforts in Jamaica, accompanied by a general willingness to cooperate with the authorities in crime-fighting initiatives, if these can be meaningfully developed and implemented within communities. Critical to any such collaboration, however, is the need for the police to earn an appreciable level of trust in the communities they serve, as evidenced by the finding that trust in the police correlates positively with the more important dimensions of police-citizen cooperation.

Chapter Nine: Sense of Inclusiveness in Jamaica: Probing the Issue of Social Tolerance

I. Introduction

It is generally acknowledged in comparative political science discourse that the term democracy can be quite elastic and as a consequence, “can mean all things to all people”¹. It is widely accepted, however, that some basic conditions for a representative democracy, as practised in Jamaica, are competitive elections, broad citizen participation, and the respect for and protection of the political and civil rights of all members of society.² Indeed, the principle of inclusive citizenship, that is, the recognition of, support for and assurance of basic citizens’ rights, particularly those of minorities and vulnerable groups, has been historically considered to be among the most basic elements of any form of political democracy.³ Whereas efforts to ensure the other democratic imperatives such as the right to vote are essentially periodic events, the assurance of the civil and political rights of typically marginalized groups is an on-going and sometimes difficult undertaking. This is because, even in instances where the requisite undertakings exist in principle, the unsupportive attitudes of the majority, on the one hand, and the related lack of political will to enforce the rules by the authorities, on the other, sometimes result in the effective denial of certain minority rights. In this chapter, we examine the perceptions and attitudes of Jamaicans toward the rights of selected individuals and groups to fully participate in some of society’s important civil and political processes.

II. Political and Social Tolerance

By definition, tolerance is the willingness to recognize and respect the civil liberties of fellow citizens, including those with whom there is strong disagreement or disapproval. Citizens must exhibit a sufficiently high level of tolerance for a democracy to function harmoniously and remain as a cohesive political community. This does not mean that tolerance is a prerequisite for social or political stability. In fact, many societies have remained stable for an extended period of time albeit a high degree of intolerance in the population.⁴ Rather, tolerance is a useful measure of the strength of a democracy, especially in highly diverse societies, both in terms of cultural and political variations. It is according to Seligson:

... indispensable (in) socially, economically, culturally, and politically diverse and plural societies: while in the political sphere persons belong to the same community of citizens – all with equal rights – in the rest of their social life individuals belong to very different, unequal

¹ Bratton, M. (2002) *Democracy And Elections in Africa*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,

² Diamond, Linz & Lipset, (1989) "Introduction: Politics, Society and Democracy in Latin America," *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*

³ Benavides B, X. Ortiz, C. Silva and L. Vega. (2003). *¿Pueden las Remesas Comprar el Futuro?*. Universidad CentroAmericana: San Salvador.

⁴ Peffley, M., & Rohrschneider, R. (2003). “Democratization and political tolerance in seventeen countries: A multi-level model of democratic learning”. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56(3).

and even disconnected worlds. Tolerance is, to a certain extent, the adhesive that binds society to the political community.⁵

As a central pillar in the maintenance of a democracy, tolerance is also an important tool in resolving issues that arise in the context of contending views that are normal in a vibrant democracy. In a democracy, the rights of those with differing positions, interests and personal choices ought to be entertained and consciously protected. Indeed, this helps to reinforce the democratic process and the overarching democratic profile. In this chapter, our attention is on social tolerance, with a focus on the attitudes and opinions of Jamaicans on some indicators of this ‘cultural disposition.’

III. Social Tolerance

Social tolerance focuses on respect for the personal choices and lifestyles of others even when those choices and lifestyle preferences are different from those of the majority of the population. It is the manifestation of a sense of inclusiveness.

Of course, social tolerance is multi-dimensional and the extent of its presence or absence has been illustrated in various ways. The *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*, which is based on the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010, cites the level of violent crime in the Caribbean and elaborates that “citizen support for punishment is also manifested in social tolerance for violations of the rights of others, as well as public opinion about the treatment of criminals by governments.”⁶ The level of tolerance varies to some extent by category or group of persons. A relatively high level of focus on the rights and needs of the physically disabled, for example, is reflected not only in the breadth of public debate, but also in the extent to which policies and programmes aimed at enhancing their lifestyles and life chances are introduced. So, for example, the “National Policy for Persons with Disabilities, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and the Vision 2030 Jamaica – National Development Plan continued to guide programmes and initiatives geared towards greater inclusion and support of persons with disabilities in the society,” according to the *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*. In addition, work on a disability bill was well advanced.⁷ It is notable, though, that the issue of homosexual rights has attracted a somewhat different response in Jamaica.

Some citizen rights activists have ensured that the issue of rights for homosexuals has remained a prominent agenda item in Jamaica and internationally. Firm sentiments have been expressed in opposition to inclusion and for inclusion. Vinson points to four indicators of social exclusion that can be applied to the Jamaican context: legal and institutional measures or systemic discrimination; exclusion from social goods such as housing and denial of sanctions to deter discrimination; denial of opportunities to contribute to and participate actively in society; and economic exclusion that connotes

⁵ Seligson.M. A. (2000) “Towards a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America,” *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe*, 11 (2), 36. (See also Latin American Public Opinion Project <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala.php>)

⁶ UNDP. (2012). Human development and the shift to better citizen security. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*. New York: Author.

⁷ Planning Institute of Jamaica. (2012). *Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011*. Kingston: Author.

unequal access or lack of access to normal forms of livelihood.⁸ Somewhat relevant to the Jamaican context is Kinsman's observation – in his discussion of governance from the standpoint of his focus on Ontario, Canada – that “social regulations regarding AIDS” and “struggles over spousal/family benefits and recognition for lesbian and gay couples...are developing at roughly the same time and they bring together shifts in public health, criminal law, sexual and social policy regulatory practices.”⁹

Against this background Jamaica has been widely perceived as exclusionary towards gays. It has been argued that Jamaica's antipathy towards homosexuality has foundations at the top of the Jamaican body politic as exemplified by former prime minister Bruce Golding's anti-gay comments on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) *Hardtalk* programme in 2008, and, legal sanctions as expressed, for example, in the Offence Against the Person Act which speaks to “the abominable crime of buggery.”¹⁰ Norms that sanction some modes of sexuality “may include active proscription of alternative forms of sexual expression, as in countries where same-sex sexual expression is stigmatized and illegal.”¹¹

The Jamaican government promised, via the inaugural address by the new prime minister early in 2012, that it would consider a repeal of the longstanding ‘buggery law’. Substantial debate has been associated with this promise. The law remained on the books during the period of the present LAPOP study. Homosexual acts, even between consenting adults, remain illegal in Jamaica but there is an often-stated perspective that whereas public display is to be denounced, such behaviour pursued outside the public glare in the privacy of homosexuals' own home or other such quarters is tolerable.

Civic groups such as the church have explicitly and implicitly contributed to the marginalization of homosexuals by citing the lifestyle as an affront to the teachings of the bible and as otherwise immoral. Lazarus, in writing of constitutional reform and the efforts to exclude gay and related rights, notes that “in nationalist projects, it is not simply the reality that certain (conservative) interpretations of Christian teachings are used loosely but just anyone to further their hetero-patriarchal agendas; rather so-called Christians with various ideological and political viewpoints also actively participate in these processes.”¹² Some opponents of the homosexual lifestyle also point to increased dangers related to the spread of HIV/AIDS via the lifestyles of men who have sex with men. Restricted access to health care, as such care relates to HIV/AIDS, for example, further emphasizes exclusion.¹³

⁸ Vinson, T. (2009). Social exclusion: The origins, meanings, definition and economic implications the concept social inclusion/exclusion. Australian Government Department of Education, Employment and Work Place Relations. Retrieved from <http://www.socialinclusion.gov.au/sites/www.socialinclusion.gov.au/files/publications/pdf/economic-implications.pdf>

⁹ Kinsman, G. (1996). ‘Responsibility’ as a strategy of governance: Regulating people living with AIDS and lesbian and gay man in Ontario. *Economy and Society*, 25(3), 393-409.

¹⁰ Green, R. (2010). Oppression in paradise: Homosexuality and Homophobia in Jamaica. Retrieved from https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent?id=uuid:f8cf3f1a-d3e7-4ed6-b831-45dced454c1&ds=DATA_FILE

¹¹ Cornwall, A., & Jolly, S. (2009). Sexuality and the development industry. *Development*, 52(1), 5-12. doi:10.1057/dev.2008.91

¹² Lazarus, L. (2012). This is a Christian nation: Gender and sexuality in processes of constitutional and legal reform in Jamaica. *Social and Economic Studies*, 61(3), 117-144.

¹³ Green, R. (2010). Oppression in paradise: Homosexuality and Homophobia in Jamaica. Retrieved from https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent?id=uuid:f8cf3f1a-d3e7-4ed6-b831-45dced454c1&ds=DATA_FILE

In Jamaica, the issue of homosexuality and the discourse about rights and tolerance gained resonance partly as a result of agitation within the wider global context in which, for example, the USA's President Barack Obama expressed, as part of his re-election campaign platform, support for gay marriage. Prior to that the British prime minister issued a threat regarding linking rights including gay rights to the granting of aid to countries such as Jamaica thereby inspiring considerable controversy within civil society and other spheres.

As emphasized earlier, social tolerance is an overarching concept that relates, generally, to respect for the personal preferences and lifestyle choice of fellow citizens. In the USA, the issue of abortion rights, for example, tends to feature high as a "rights issue" on political campaign agendas. In Jamaica, it has some resonance in public debates, but it is less prominent in the political sphere. Feminist theorists and some gender analysts argue for women's rights over the use of their bodies.¹⁴ (Such rights are not necessarily tolerated across the board, even in circumstances when the mother's health is at risk.)

LAPOP has included a series of questions over the years to gauge citizens' attitudes in support of or rejection of some of these rights.

IV. Support for the Rights of Homosexuals

The issues and attitudes to homosexuals may have varying implications for governance and democracy. The following item focusing on this topic was included in the 2012 survey instrument as an indicator of social tolerance in Jamaica and in other countries involved in the survey:

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

As indicated in the chart below (Figure 140), an overwhelming majority of the Jamaicans are strongly opposed to allowing homosexuals to enjoy this basic democratic right of the freedom to run for public office. The values on the bars of this 10-point scale emphasize this stance in that approximately 57 per cent indicated the most extreme level of disapproval whereas only 3.5 per cent expressed the extremely opposite sentiment.

¹⁴ See, e.g., Lazarus, p. 134 (Lazarus, L. (2012). This is a Christian nation: Gender and sexuality in processes of constitutional and legal reform in Jamaica. *Social and Economic Studies*, 61(3), 117-144.)




Figure 140. Level of Support for Basic Rights of Homosexuals in Jamaica, 2012

In order to facilitate easy comparison over time, we reconfigured the information in Figure 140 to a 0 to 100 point scale in which 0 signifies absolutely no support for the right to run for office and 100 indicates unreserved support. Figure 141 offers an interesting contrast between the results from AmericasBarometer surveys for the years 2006-2012. For 2006 and 2012, the levels of support for basic democratic rights for homosexuals are virtually similar, but for 2008 there is a significantly lower level of support. Of note, however, is the statistically significant incremental change in attitude since 2008.




Figure 141. Level of Support for Basic Rights of Homosexuals over Time in Jamaica

In the 2012 LAPOP survey, respondents were also asked to indicate the extent to which they support the rights of fellow citizens with whom they disagree, politically, to run for office and to enjoy some other basic democratic rights. Responses to these items are summarized in Figure 142 below. Evident is the strong variation between the comparatively low public support for the rights of homosexuals in relation to the level of support for similar rights of others in society. Only approximately 21 per cent of those surveyed felt that homosexuals should enjoy basic democratic rights such as the freedom to run for public office.




Figure 142. Citizens’ Attitudes to the Enjoyment of Basic Democratic Rights by Fellow Citizens

In Figure 143, we examine the issue of support for homosexual rights cross-nationally among countries participating in the 2012 survey. The low level of approval among Jamaicans for the right of homosexuals to run for public office is emphasized, when compared with other Latin American and Caribbean countries, in that the Island ranks virtually at the bottom of the list and above its neighbour, Haiti, only on this measure of social tolerance. Among other Caribbean countries, Trinidad and Tobago stands at 37 points, about the mid-point of the list, which is headed by Canada with a score of 78, as well as Uruguay and the USA with 78 and 74 points, respectively.




Figure 143. Support for the Rights of Homosexuals across the Americas.

V. Support for Same Sex Marriage

Questions relating to the right of homosexuals to marry have not been widely raised in Jamaica; albeit a popular topic elsewhere in the Americas. Further probing of the issue of the rights of homosexuals includes the analysis of responses to the following item:

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?

The data point to an unequivocal rejection by Jamaicans of same-sex marriage (see figure 144). Approximately 84 per cent selected the strongest level of disapproval on the 10-point scale. When this figure is added to levels two and three on the scale, a total of approximately 95 per cent is calculated, the level of opposition suggested would be even more emphatic. This stance is significantly more than even that against homosexuals being permitted to run for public office.




Figure 144. Level of Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Jamaica, 2012

Again, for easy comparison, we reconfigured the information in Figure 144 to a 0 to 100 point scale in which 0 signifies absolutely no support for gay marriage and 100 indicates unambiguous support. When compared to the AmericasBarometer results for 2010, there is evidence of a marginally less hard-line position in 2012 regarding same-sex marriage on the part of Jamaica, as illustrated below in Figure 145.




Figure 145. Level of Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Jamaica, 2010-2012

On the 100-point scale Jamaica (point 5) emerges with the strongest opposition to same-sex marriages when compared to the other AmericasBarometer countries. CARICOM partners Haiti, Belize and Guyana joined Jamaica among those countries that are most strongly opposed. Canada and Uruguay (each at point 67) reflect the most favourable attitude towards same-sex marriage (see figure 146).




Figure 146. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in the Americas

VI. Support for Abortion Rights

Whereas legislation in Jamaica prescribes that the intentional termination of a pregnancy is illegal, in practice abortions are usually performed in instances where a physician deems it essential in order to save the life of a pregnant woman. Maxwell observes that in the 1970s the government efforts that sought to liberalize regulations to allow for justifiable abortion “were never allowed...fruition as religious fundamentalists on the island galvanized support and used moral persuasion to redirect the

outcome” and consequently “no action towards legal reform was taken and the proposed policy in effect died.”¹⁵ Abortion has been identified as a leading cause of death among women, but threat to life, rape, incest and “their inability to negotiate safe sex practices,” among other factors, have forced Jamaican women to seek abortions, nonetheless. Maxwell adds that as a response to a statement by the ministry of health in 2004 which “recognised the risks posed to women’s reproductive health by unsafe abortions and the high” related “public health costs...” the government “formed the Abortion Policy Review Group (APRG).” When announced a few years later, the recommendations of the APRG attracted dramatically increased “religious opposition to legislative changes” partly via “the Coalition for the Defense of Life, which allegedly received major funding from the Catholic Church”¹⁶

The foregoing offers evidence on some debate on the abortion issue, its actual and potential relationship to other issues and the social and political tolerance-related concerns that it invokes. In this light the LAPOP 2012 survey asked respondents’ views on possible justification for abortion. We sought answers to the following question:

W14A. Do you think it’s justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother’s health is in danger?
 (1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

As Figure 147 shows, Jamaicans largely agree with abortion when the mother’s health is at risk as indicated in the pie chart. Nearly seven out of ten Jamaicans are in agreement with the view that an abortion might be justified in such circumstances.




Figure 147. Qualified Support for Abortion in Jamaica

¹⁵ Maxwell, S. (2012). Fighting a losing battle? Defending women’s reproductive rights in twenty-first century Jamaica. *Social and Economic Studies*, 61(3), 95-116. (2012, p. 99) (Maxwell, 2012, p. 101)

¹⁶ Maxwell, S. (2012). (pp. 107-108; see also WHO et al., 2011, on abortion issues).

As illustrated in Figure 148, qualified support for abortion is relatively strong in Jamaica, having ranked third among the 26 countries participating in the 2012 survey on this tolerance indicator. Strongest approval was found in the case of Uruguay in which 82 per cent of the respondents approve of qualified abortion, followed immediately by the United States and Jamaica with 80 and 69 per cent, respectively. Support is least among Hondurans with 33 percentage points.




Figure 148. Qualified Support for Abortion in the Americas

VII. Support for the Rights of the Physically Challenged

It was mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that concerns about the rights and needs of persons with disabilities have been receiving greater attention in recent years. We solicited citizens' views on the issue of the right that the physically disabled may seek public office by posing the following question:

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?

The AmericasBarometer for 2012 indicates varying attitudes towards the idea of persons who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for office. However, there is a more pronounced tendency in terms of approval than disapproval among Jamaicans (see figure 149).




Figure 149. Level of Support for Basic Rights of the Physically Challenged in Jamaica, 2012

VIII. Determinants of Support for the Rights of Homosexuals

As elsewhere in this report, we sought to deepen our understanding of issues associated with social tolerance by designing and testing a regression model, with the aim, in this instance, to determine the factors that best explain differences in level of support for the rights of homosexuals among Jamaicans.

Figure 150 provides a graphical summary of the outcome of the analysis. The horizontal green line on this chart indicates the points at which variables with a mean of zero (gender [woman], in this

case) would be located. Each ‘dot’ indicates the value of the regression coefficient of the respective independent variable, and the 95 per cent confidence interval around each mean is shown by an “I” placed horizontally across the dot. Those factors with confidence intervals (horizontal “I”s) that intersect the green line are not statistically significant predictors ($p < 0.05$) of support of the rights of homosexuals. As is indicated, current affairs awareness, wealth and education positively impact citizens’ level of support for homosexual rights.




Figure 150. Determinants of Support for the Rights of Homosexuals in Jamaica

It has been argued that “the adamant recommendations for the exclusion of ‘transgressive’ sexual and reproductive practices, specifically abortion and homosexuality, from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is not just a matter of preserving ‘respectable’ heterosexuality and ensuring continuous biological reproduction of the nation, but rather, reinforces the idea that Jamaica is a ‘Christian nation.’”¹⁷ Hence the inclusion of ‘religiosity’ as a factor in the above model. This is a composite variable, defined in terms of frequency in church attendance and respondents’ self-assessment of the importance of religion to their lives. The expectation was that this factor would be a significant determinant, given the popularity of biblical teachings as a justification for the suppression of the rights of homosexuals. However, as seen in Figure 150 above, persons who are defined as highly religious are less likely to support homosexual rights, but the relationship is not statistically significant.

¹⁷ Lazarus, L. (2012). This is a Christian nation: Gender and sexuality in processes of constitutional and legal reform in Jamaica. *Social and Economic Studies*, 61(3), 117-144.

IX. Education and Social Tolerance in Jamaica

The most frequently mentioned determinant of tolerance is, by far, education. The connection between the two has become so established that today education is first and foremost treated as a control variable.¹⁸ The more educated a person, the greater that person's appreciation of the notion of diversity and the stronger the capacity to respect and tolerate those with different political preferences or lifestyle choices. Figure 151 illustrates the very strong positive relationship between social tolerance and level of schooling in Jamaica.




Figure 151. Social Tolerance and Education in Jamaica

In fact, level of education has featured prominently as a statistically significant predictor of social tolerance in all four rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey in which Jamaica has participated since it's first in 2006. Partly associated with education is "current affairs awareness" which is measured in terms of citizens' knowledge of some, presumably, commonly-known political facts and issues. Like education, such awareness is an important determinant of social tolerance.

Indeed, there is more than merely a passing relationship between these two factors and tolerance. Education of all sorts, formally or informally obtained, offer exposure to knowledge and sense of awareness which together are likely to lead to greater open-mindedness and, in turn, increased tolerance. Implicit is the important role of education, and by extension, the use of educational campaigns to impact social tolerance among the citizenry.

¹⁸ Hazama, Y, 2010, Determinats of political tolerance:A literature review. Institute of Developing Economies. JETRO. Japan.

X. Conclusion

At the start of this chapter, we noted that among the basic conditions for sustaining a representative democracy such as that of Jamaica are competitive elections, participation by a wide cross-section of citizens, and respect for as well as protection of, the political and civil rights of all citizens. Related to this is inclusiveness which involves support for, and assurance of minority rights which analysts have cited as being among the most basic elements of any form of political democracy. However, marginalized groups sometimes do not enjoy such rights because of factors varying from attitudes of the majority of the population through to official sanction. The focus was on social tolerance and involved the examination of the attitudes and perceptions of Jamaicans to the right of selected individuals and groups to fully participate in some of society's important civil and political processes. The emphasis has been largely on attitudes to homosexuality but attention has also been devoted to the disabled and the abortion issue.

The study found exceptionally low level of support for the basic rights of homosexuals in the case of Jamaica. Only Haiti with 8.5 on a 100-point scale was more strongly opposed to homosexuals running for public office than Jamaica, with a score of 21. Of note, however, is the statistically significant 12-point incremental change in approval among Jamaicans between 2008 and 2012. Canada, Uruguay and the United States, with scores ranging from 74 to 78 points were the most supportive of this particular right.

The AmericasBarometer also found Jamaicans to be the least supportive (5.1 on the 100-point scale) of same-sex marriage among the 26 participating countries. Canadians and Uruguayans were the most supportive, sharing the top of the list with a score of approximately 67 points. There was a marginal positive change in the support for same-sex marriage, as noted in the results for 2012 when compared to those for 2010.

Importantly, it was found that the more educated, measured in terms of level of schooling, those of high socioeconomic status (wealth) and those who are more aware of current affairs are likely to be more supportive of equal rights for homosexuals.

In terms of other indicators of social tolerance, Jamaicans generally agreed with abortion if the mother's health was at risk. Jamaica stood just below Uruguay and the USA – the strongest supporters – on this measure, but somewhat opposed was Honduras, which led those countries that indicated the least qualified support for abortion.

Support for the rights of the physically challenged enjoyed mixed support, as indicated by the 2012 survey.

Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

Centre for Leadership & Governance,
University of the West Indies, Mona



Dear Sir/Madam:

You have been randomly selected to participate in a public opinion survey which is sponsored by Vanderbilt University of the USA and being undertaken by the University of the West Indies at Mona. The aim of this study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of some local and national issues.

If you agree to participate, this survey interview will take 35 to 45 minutes to complete.

Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. Your answers will be kept confidential. We will not ask for your name and no one will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Balford Lewis whose phone number is 977-3565 or 322-7089.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix B. Sample Design

I. Universe, Population, Unit of Observation

Universe: The survey targeted all voting age adults, living in private dwellings in the three counties and all fourteen parishes in the Island of Jamaica.

Population: The survey is designed to reflect the key demographic characteristics of the adult population of Jamaica based on the distribution of these factors in the 1991 Population Census.¹ The sample is self-weighted and is configured to be representative of all residents, eighteen years and older, who live permanently in Jamaica and reside in private dwellings. Persons with the following living arrangements at the time of the survey were excluded from the population:

- members of the military who reside in non-private households
- trainees for the police force who reside temporarily in the police academy and other facilities
- persons who are incarcerated
- students 18 years of age or older and who reside in boarding institutions
- persons who at the time of the survey were in hospitals (including the psychiatric hospitals)
- fishermen and others who at the time of the survey were residing on the cays of Jamaica, including Pedro Cays, Lime Cays and Morant Cays
- homeless persons
- persons staying in hotels and other places of temporary lodging

Unit of Observation: The study contains topics that refer not only to the individual, but also to other members of the household. Thus, the statistical unit of observation is the household.² However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some respondents live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. For this reason, it is more convenient to consider the dwelling as the final unit of analysis. Additionally, the dwelling is an easily identifiable unit in the field, with relative permanence over time, a characteristic that allows it to be considered as the final unit of selection.

II. Sample frame

The sampling frame covers 100% of the eligible population in Jamaica. This means that every eligible Jamaican, as defined above, had an equal and known chance of being included in the sample. The obtained multi-stage, stratified area probability sample was designed with the objective of accomplishing the highest level of representativeness and dispersion of selected sampling units, and in turn, the respondents for this study.

¹ Although this survey was conducted after the 2011 population census, the results of that study were not available for use during the design phase of this 2012 LAPOP survey.

² In this survey, a household (private) is defined as a group of persons who live together and who share common utilities and facilities. A household may consist of persons who are related (e.g. members of a family) or unrelated persons. A household must be separate and independent of other households.

Jamaica is divided into three counties – Cornwall, Middlesex and Surrey. In this sample design, the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR), which is comprised of the capital city, Kingston, Urban St. Andrew, Portmore and Spanish Town were separated from the respective parishes and treated as a separate stratum.

Table 1 shows the aforementioned strata with related sub-strata, and the urban/rural distribution of the population and enumeration districts in the different strata.

Table 1 – Urban/Rural Distribution of Adult Population and EDs by Region

STRATUM		Urban		Rural		Total	
No.	Area/Parish	Population	ED*	Population	ED (PSU)	Population	ED (PSU)
1	KMR [Kingston, Urban St. Andrew; Portmore, Spanish Town]	867,121	1524	-	-	867,121	1524
2	SURREY Rural St. Andrew, St. Thomas, Portland	44,599	97	99,316	485	143,915	582
3	MIDDLESEX St. Catherine [exclude Spanish Town and Portmore] St. Mary, St. Ann, Manchester, Clarendon,	269,585	492	111,740	1298	381,325	1,790
4	CORNWALL (Trelawny, St. James, Hanover, Westmoreland, St. Elizabeth)	173,786	344	87,759	961	261,545	1305
JAMAICA		1,355,091	2,457	298,815	2,744	1,653,906	5,201

* ED = Enumeration District

III. Sampling Method

The sampling method employed takes into consideration a series of elements pre-established by LAPOP. As shown in Table 2 the stages in the sample design involved stratification on the bases of:

1. Counties
2. Parishes
3. Urban/Rural classification

Other design requirements are summarized as follows:

- The possibility of calculating sampling errors corresponding to these strata
- Minimize travel time in survey operations

- Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results
- Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available
- Expectation of 24 interviews by Primary sampling unit (PSU)
- Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in each urban and rural cluster

In order to obtain a sample with the aforementioned properties, a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample (with household level quotas) was designed, in line with a framework proposed by LAPOP for its collaborating countries. As the term multi-stage implies, sample selection was done in a number of phases. In the first stage of the process, the country was divided or **stratified** into four regions or strata. Stratification is the process by which the population is divided into subgroups. Sampling is then conducted separately in each subgroup. Stratification allows subgroups of interest to be included in the sample whereas in a non-stratified sample some may have been left out due to the random nature of the selection process. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample. It reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on population variance within strata and not between them.

Since sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that there are a sufficient number of people in each subgroup to allow meaningful analysis. For this study, Jamaica was divided into the following four strata identified in Table 1 above:

- Stratum 1 – This is comprised of the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) which is the country's main commercial and administrative centre and the most densely populated area in Jamaica. It is comprised of Kingston, Urban St. Andrew, Spanish Town and the Municipality of Portmore
- Stratum 2 – This is county Surrey excluding Kingston and urban St. Andrew. This stratum includes areas which are involved in both large- and small-scale farming of sugarcane, bananas, coconuts and livestock
- Stratum 3 – This is the county of Middlesex, excluding Spanish Town and Portmore. Manufacturing and agricultural activities include bauxite mining and sugar cane and poultry farming
- Stratum 4 – This is the county of Cornwall which includes the City of Montego Bay and the main tourist areas along the west, and sections of the north coast

These strata were selected with the aim of maximizing the degree of representativeness and dispersion of the units that were selected in the sample. The underlying assumption is that sampling units within each of these strata are basically homogeneous whereas, there are marked differences that distinguish the four regions from one other. Such strata features enhance sample reliability and, in turn, reduce variance in the estimates calculated from the data.

The next step in the stratification process involved the division of these four strata into the 14 parishes that are located in the respective region – five each, in Cornwall and Middlesex and four in Surrey (Table 2). Each parish was further divided into Urban and Rural Areas, with the aim of ensuring that sampling units were selected in the proportion that they are distributed in rural and urban

neighbourhoods across the Island. The following step-by-step procedures were then followed in completion of the sampling process:

- Each parish is further stratified into constituencies. With one exception, the population in each constituency in 2001 ranged between 25,000 and 75,000 persons. Only in St. Catherine South did the population exceed 75,000 (This was 79,692.).
- Within parishes, a simple random sample of constituencies was selected (see table 2). Thirty-four (34) constituencies were selected from the (60) constituencies. A minimum of two constituencies were selected from each parish. This was done to facilitate the calculation of sampling errors between as well as within constituencies within parishes.
- Within selected constituencies enumeration districts (EDs)³ were identified and stratified into urban and rural areas. These were the primary sampling units (PSU) in this study. The average size of urban and rural EDs is 150 and 100 households respectively. These, however, vary in size significantly. In extreme cases, EDs may vary from less than 50 households to more than 300 households.
- Against the background of significant variation in size between rural as well as between urban ED's the selection of EDs was done with probability proportional to size (PPS). This sampling method gave a larger probability of selection to the larger EDs, while at the same time the probability of selection of households will be the same, irrespective of the ED from which they are selected. More specifically, they were randomly selected in proportions reflecting the urban/rural distribution of EDs within each stratum and also, according to the distribution of these localities among the four regions.

³ EDs are relatively small localities that are demarcated and diagrammed by the **Statistical Institute of Jamaica** for sampling purposes. The **Statistical Institute of Jamaica** is the Government agency 'invested with powers to collect, compile, analyse, abstract and publish statistical information in relation to commercial, industrial, social, economic and general activities and condition of the people'.

Table 2. Selected Statistics by Parish and Constituency

Parish	Constituency Code	Population			ED Distribution Of Selected Constituency			ED's Selected		
		Under 5,000	5000- <75,000	75,000 and over	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Kingston	1	-	40,599	-	-	84	84	-	7	7
	2	-	28,359	-	-	81	81	-	7	7
	3	-	25,852	-	-			-	-	-
St. Andrew	1	-	61,054	-				-	-	-
	2	-	38,012	-	-	73	73		6	6
	3	-	34,146	-	-			-	-	-
	4	-	42,926	-	-			-	-	-
	5	-	35,128	-	-	71	71	-	6	6
	6	-	34,964	-	-	103	103	-	8	8
	7	-	44,672	-	49	29	78	4	2	6
	8	-	49,946	-	-			-	-	-
	9	-	42,683	-	-			-	-	-
	10	-	63,893	-	-	107	107	-	6	6
	11	-	45,302	-	-			-	-	-
	12	-	60,315	-	-			-	-	-
St. Thomas	1	-	43,156	-	56	54	110	5	4	9
	2	-	48,142	-	65	49	114	5	4	9
Portland	1	-	49,738	-	62	46	108	5	4	9
	2	-	30,287	-	64	15	79	5	1	6
St. Mary	1	-	32,660	-				-	-	-
	2	-	34,700	-	55	36	91	4	3	7
	3	-	43,733	-	68	25	93	5	2	7
St. Ann	1	-	53,642	-	41	40	81	4	3	7
	2	-	42,605	-	47	39	86	4	3	7
	3	-	36,507	-				-	-	-
	4	-	33,393	-				-	-	-
Trelawny	1	-	45,682	-	64	41	105	5	4	9
	2	-	27,154	-	52	21	73	4	2	6
St. James	1	-	60,193	-	-	126	126	-	10	10
	2	-	38,388	-				-	-	-
	3	-	42,650	-	11	70	81	1	6	7
	4	-	38,400	-				-	-	-

Table 2. Selected Statistics by Parish and Constituency (Continued)

Parish	Constituency Code	Population			ED Distribution Of Selected Constituency			ED's Selected		
					No. of ED's					
		Under 5,000	5000- <75,000	75,000 and over	Rural	Urban	Total	Rural	Urban	Total
Hanover	1	-	28,964	-	43	23	66	3	2	5
	2	-	37,861	-	70	23	93	6	2	8
Westmoreland	1	-	38,171	-				-	-	-
	2	-	56,469	-	41	42	83	3	4	7
	3	-	43,812	-	51	26	77	4	2	6
St. Elizabeth	1	-	39,345	-	53	29	82	5	2	7
	2	-	39,234	-				-	-	-
	3	-	29,723	-				-	-	-
	4	-	37,561	-	59	15	74	4	2	6
Manchester	1	-	41,580	-				-	-	-
	2	-	43,615	-	49	36	85	4	3	7
	3	-	52,621	-	29	62	91	3	4	7
	4	-	47,451	-				-	-	-
Clarendon	1	-	33,419	-				-	-	-
	2	-	37,002	-	54	20	74	4	2	6
	3	-	35,648	-				-	-	-
	4	-	42,188	-	14	65	79	1	5	6
	5	-	54,479	-	55	42	97	5	3	8
	6	-	33,414	-				-	-	-
St. Catherine	1	-	28,803	-				-	-	-
	2	-	48,157	-	33	56	89	3	4	7
	3	-	43,704	-				-	-	-
	4	-	48,711	-				-	-	-
	5	-	64,882	-	-	114	114	-	9	9
	6	-	47,064	-				-	-	-
	7	-	61,641	-	-	110	110	-	9	9
	8	-		79,672	19	143	162	1	12	13
	9	-	58,023	-				-	-	-
Total			2,522,423	79,672	1,204	1,916	3,120	97	153	250

Selection of Clusters

The next stage in the sampling process involved the creation of clusters within the selected EDs. An average of three clusters, each with a size of approximately 30 households was created. A sample of *one* of these clusters was selected at random. Clustering significantly reduces survey cost by arranging groups of interviews in relatively compact areas such as a particular block, avenue or row of dwellings. And more importantly, when quotas are established in advance, it is easy to ensure that the sexes and the different age groups are proportionately represented in the final sample of respondents.

Selection of Households within the Selected Cluster

Households within a selected cluster were selected systematically (systematic sampling). Having defined and selected a cluster within a selected ED, a starting point was determined. The first household selected was determined by a random number between 1 and 3. If the random number selected for example was 2, then every 3rd household thereafter was selected in the simple, that is, households 2,5,8,11, etc. Specifically, interviews should be carried out at every third household. In other words, each time an interview is completed, the next interview cannot be carried out in the following two households.

In case of rejection, empty dwelling, or nobody at home, the interviewer selects the adjacent dwelling. In those cases in which the interviewer reaches the end of the block without completing the quota of six interviews, he or she can proceed to the next cluster follow the same routine as in the first cluster.

Selection of Persons within Selected Households

A single respondent will be selected in each household, following a quota sampling based on sex and age (as shown in Table 3 below). The quota for each age group and sex was estimated based on the 2001 population census. The respondent should be a permanent household member, neither a domestic employee nor a visitor. If there are two or more persons of the same sex and age group in the household, the questionnaire should be applied to the person with the next birthday.

Table 3: Quota by Sex and Age Group

Sex/Age group	18- 29	30- 45	45 and over	Total
Male	1	1	1	3
Female	1	1	1	3
Total	2	2	2	6

Estimation of Design Effect and Sampling Error

Further analysis of the sample involved the estimation of the sampling error based on the size of the sample and the design effects associated with items in the questionnaire. Basically, the estimation of the sampling error of a given statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio) involves the calculation of the standard error, taking the design effect of the sample into consideration. The

standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the respective statistic, permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar conditions. The Design Effect (DEFT) on the other hand, indicates the efficiency of a given design relative to one obtained using a simple random sampling (SRS) technique. These effects, understood as the quotient between the variance obtained from a simple random sample (SRS) and a complex design, differ for each variable, and can be represented by the equation: $DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$.

As Table 4 indicates, the size of the obtained sample (effective interviews) was 1,500. Given the characteristics of the design utilized, the sampling error of the survey is ± 2.52 , assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design, a 50-50% distribution for a dichotomous variable, and a 95% confidence interval. That is, 95% of the time the true value of an answer will be within the $\pm 2.52\%$ of the estimate produced by this sample. Since the survey is based on a stratified and clustered sample, for the analysis of the data we took into account the “complex” sample design to accurately estimate the precision of the results presented in this study.

Sample Characteristics

As previously explained, the sample was designed to be representative of the voting age population in terms of its gender, age and geographical distribution. As shown in Table 4, with regard to these key demographic factors, the obtained sample is virtually identical to the adult population of Jamaica when matched with the 2001 Population Census data.

Table 4: Selected Descriptive Statistics from Population Census (2001) and LAPOP (2012) Survey

Selected Population Characteristics	2001 Population Census	LAPOP 2012 Survey
N(n) – Voting age Jamaicans	1,653,906	(1500)
Area		
% Urban	61.4	62.1
Gender		
% Males	48.4	50.0
Age		
Average age (years)	40.3	39.2

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Questionnaire number

Jamaica 2012, Version # 10.0.2.1 IRB Approval: 110627

Centre for Leadership & Governance,
University of the West Indies, MonaAmericasBarometer: Jamaica, 2012
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PAIS. Country:					23
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Suriname					
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]					□□□□
ESTRATOPRI:					
(2301) KMR		(2302) Surrey (except Urban St Andrews and Kingston)			□□□□
(2303) Middlesex		(2304) Cornwall			
ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality: (1) Large (more than 100,000)					
(2) Medium (25,000-100,000)		(3) Small (< 25,000)			□
UPM (ED) (Primary Sampling Unit) _____					□□□□
PROV. Parish:					
(2301) Kingston	(2306) St. Ann	(2311) St. Elizabeth			
(2302) St. Andrew	(2307) Trelawny	(2312) Manchester			
(2303) St. Thomas	(2308) St. James	(2313) Clarendon			□□□□
(2304) Portland	(2309) Hanover	(2314) St. Catherine			
(2305) St. Mary	(2310) Westmoreland				
MUNICIPIO. CONSTITUENCY: _____					23 □□
JAMDISTRITO. District (or parish, etc.): _____					□□
JAMSEGMENTO. E.D. (Census Segment) _____					□□□□
CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: _____					□□
[A cluster must have 6 interviews]					
UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural [Use country's definition]					□□

TAMANO. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area	_
IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (11) English	_
Start time: ____:____	_ _ _ _
FECHA. Date Day: ____ Month:____ Year: 2012	_ _ _ _
<p>Do you live in this home? Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview</p> <p>Are you a Jamaican citizen or permanent resident of Jamaica? Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview</p> <p>Are you at least 18 years old? Yes → continue No → Thank the respondent and end the interview</p>	
NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.	

Q1. [Note down; do not ask] Sex: (1) Male (2) Female	
LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... [Read options]? (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES			
[THE FOLLOWING QUESTION SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” OR “8”)]			
A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]			
Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98
N/A	99		

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad
(5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad
(5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO2. Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? **[Read the options and mark the response]**

Yes

No

DK

DA

CP2. A member of Parliament	1	2	88	98
CP4A. A local public official, for example, caretaker or Parish Councillor	1	2	88	98
CP4. Any ministry, state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	88	98

Now let's talk about your local government ...	
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, parish council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or Parish Councillor within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]	
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SGL1. Would you say that the services the Parish Council is providing to the people are...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in the last 12 months.	1	2	3	4	88	98

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a week, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat “once a week,” “once or twice a week,” “once or twice a year,” or “never” to help the interviewee]									
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Attend/member	Leader/Board member	DK	DA	INAP
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP7]			88	98	
CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says “both,” mark “leader”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP7. Meetings of a parents’ association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP8]			88	98	
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate on the board? [If the interviewee says “both,” mark “leader”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP9]			88	98	
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says “both,” mark “leader”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
CP21. Meetings of sports or recreation groups?	1	2	3	4			88	98	
IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? [Read options] (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA									

MIL6. Now, changing the subject, how proud are you of the Armed Forces of Jamaica? [Read options] (1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud (4) Not at all proud or (5) You do not care? (88) DK (98) DA
MIL5. How proud do you feel to be Jamaican when you hear the national anthem? [Read options] (1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud (4) Not at all proud or (5) You do not care? (88) DK (98) DA

[Give Card A]												
L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98	
Left										Right		

[Take back Card A]												
PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to PROT6] (88) DK [Go to PROT6] (98) DA [Go to PROT6]												
PROT4. How many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in the last 12 months? _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A												
PROT7. And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space as a form of protest? (1) Yes, participated (2) No, did not participate (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A												
PROT6. In the last 12 months have you signed any petition? (1) Yes, signed (2) No, has not signed (88) DK (98) DA												
PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut? (1) Yes, has done (2) No, has not done (88) DK (98) DA												

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? [Read the options after each question]:												
JC1. When there is high unemployment.				(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA					
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.				(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA					
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.				(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA					

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the Prime Minister of the country to close the Parliament and govern without Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC16A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the Prime Minister of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court and govern without the Supreme Court?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]	
VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? ____ [fill in number] (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
VIC2. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? [Read the options] (01) Unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threats (02) Unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats (03) Armed robbery (04) Assault but not robbery (05) Rape or sexual assault (06) Kidnapping (07) Vandalism (08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there) (10) Extortion (11) Other (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)	
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options] (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this Parish (4) In another Parish (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)	

ARM2. If you could, would you have your own firearm for protection? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	
--	--

Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the last 12 months					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
VIC40. Have you limited the places where you go to shop?	(1)Yes	(0) No	(88)DK	(98)DA	
VIC41. Have you limited the places where you go for recreation?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	
VIC43. Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	

VIC44. Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC45. In the last twelve months, have you changed your job or work out of fear of crime? [If does not work mark 99]	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	(99) INAP	

I am going to read you some things you hear on the street or in the media when people talk about ways to combat crime. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree somewhat, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each one of them. The best way to fight crime...

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK	DA
VIC101. is to create prevention programs. Do you: [Read alternatives]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)
VIC102. The best way to fight crime is to be tougher on criminals	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)
VIC103. The best way to fight crime is to contract private security	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)

Following, I am going to read you a series of situations that you could see at any time. I would like for you to indicate for each one if you would approve, would not approve but would understand, or would neither approve nor understand

	Would approve	Would not approve, but would understand	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA
VOL207. Suppose that in order to teach a child, a parent hits the child each time he or she disobeys. Would you approve of the parent hitting the child, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL206. Suppose that a man hits his wife because she has been unfaithful with another man. Would you approve of the man hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL202. Suppose that a person kills someone who has raped a son or daughter. Would you approve of killing him, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL203. If a person makes his community afraid and someone kills him, would you approve of killing the person, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)

	Would approve	Would not approve, but would understand	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA
VOL204. If a group of people begin to carry out social cleansing, that is, kill people that some people consider undesirable, would you approve of them killing people considered undesirable, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)
VOL205. If the police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized crime group, would you approve of the police torturing the criminal, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA					
AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA					
AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read the options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA					
AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA					
AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? [Read options] (1) Police protect people from crime or (2) Police are involved in crime (3) [Don't Read] Neither, or both (88) DK (98) DA					
AOJ20. And thinking about you and your family's security, do you feel safer, equally safe, or less safe than five years ago? (1) Safer (2) Equally safe (3) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA					
AOJ21. I am going to mention some groups to you, and I would like you to tell me which of them represents the biggest threat to your safety: [READ ALTERNATIVES. MARK JUST ONE RESPONSE] (1) People from your neighborhood or community (2) Gangs (3) The police or military (4) Organized crime and drug traffickers (5) People in your family (6) Common criminals (7) [DO NOT READ] Other (8) [DO NOT READ] None (88) DK (98) DA					

<p>AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: [read options] (1) Implement preventive measures (2) Increase punishment of criminals (3) [Don't read] Both (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG1. Do you personally know anyone who is a member of a gang? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG2. Have you ever been invited or encouraged to join a gang? (1)Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG3. Some say that gangs provide protection for the neighbourhoods in which they operate. Do you believe gangs make these neighbourhoods safer or less safe? (1) Safer (2) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG4. Speaking about persons who are members of gangs in your neighbourhood, are they liked or disliked by residents of the neighbourhood? (1) Liked (2) Disliked (3) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA [there are not gang members in the neighbourhood]</p>	
<p>JAMGANG5. These persons who are members of gangs, are they closely connected, slightly connected, or not connected to political parties or politicians in the area? (1) Closely connected (2) Slightly connected (3) Not connected (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG6. In your area, who do you believe care most about the problems of persons in the neighbourhood? [Read options] (01) The Churches in the area (02) The Community Don (03) The Parish Councillor (04) The Member of Parliament (05) Citizens Associations (06) The police (07) [Do not read] Other (10) [Do not read] None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG7. If some programmes are developed to reduce gang activities in your area, would you be willing or unwilling to participate in these programmes? (1) Yes, willing (2) No, unwilling (3) [DO NOT READ] Maybe/depends. (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG8. Who do you believe is best suited to implement these programmes to reduce gang activities? [Read options] (01) The Churches in the area (02) The Community Don (03) The Parish Councillor (04) The Member of Parliament (05) Citizens Associations (06) The Police (07) [Do not read] Other (10) [Do not read] None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>JAMGANG9 How would you rate the performance of the police in their effort to dismantle gangs in your neighbourhood? Would you say they are doing a good job, a fair job or a poor job? (1) A good job (2) A fair job (3) A poor job (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Not at all						A lot	Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer

Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?

B11. To what extent do you trust the National Electoral Commission?

B12. To what extent do you trust the Jamaica Defence Force?

B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?

B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?

B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?

B20A. To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

B21A. To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?

B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?

B32. To what extent do you trust the Parish Council or municipality?

B43. To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican?

B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

Now, using the same ladder, **[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]**

NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT

Note
1-7,
88 = DK,
98 = DA

N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?

N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?

N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?

N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?

N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES	Note
[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]	1-7,
And continuing to use the same card,	88 = DK,
NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	98 = DA
EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Jamaican political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A	99 = N/A
EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A	

Now, using the same ladder, [continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]	Note
NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	1-7,
	88 = DK,
	98 = DA
MIL1. To what extent do you believe that the Jamaican Armed Forces are well trained and organized?	
MIL2. To what extent do you think that the Armed Forces in Jamaica have done a good job when they have helped to deal with natural disasters?	
B3MILX. To what extent do you believe that the Jamaican Armed Forces respect Jamaican’s human rights nowadays?	
MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?	
MIL4. To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces of Jamaica to improve national security?	

[Take Back Card B]

M1. Speaking in general of the current government, how would you rate the job performance of the current government of the People’s National Party? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
M2. Now speaking of Parliament, and thinking of members of Parliament as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members of Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA	

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD C]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

Write a number 1-7, or 88 = Doesn't Know, 98 = Doesn't Answer

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Strongly disagree						Strongly agree		Doesn't know	Doesn't answer

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements

POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?

POP107. The people should govern directly **rather than** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

We are going to continue using the same ladder. Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98) DA**

ROS1. The Jamaican government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS2. The Jamaican government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS3. The Jamaican government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The Jamaican government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS6. The Jamaican government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

MIL7. The Army ought to participate in combatting crime and violence in **Jamaica**. How much do you agree or disagree?

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS CCT3-GEN6 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

Now I would like to know how much you are in agreement with some policies I am going to mention. I would like you to respond thinking about what should be done, regardless of whether the policies are being implemented currently. **[Write Down Number 1-7, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A.]**

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

[Take Back Card C]

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS W14-PN5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger?

(1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

PN4. And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Jamaica?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

PN5. In your opinion, is Jamaica very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?

(1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic
(4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

[Give the respondent Card D]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 Doesn't know	98 Doesn't Answer
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve						

**1-10,
88=DK,
98=DA**

E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?

E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?

E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in Jamaica. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?	
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS D6-D8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry? (99) N/A	
D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A	
D8. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the state/government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be politically damaging to it? (99) N/A	

[Take back Card D]

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most: (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (88) DK (98) DA	
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA	
AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? [Read the options] (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (88) DK (98) DA	

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the parish council office? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe at the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98
EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA					
EXC7MIL. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption in the Armed Forces is [Read options] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA					

<p>VB1. Are you registered to vote? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>INF1. Do you have a voter identification card? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections of 2011? [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.] (1) Voted [Continue] (2) Did not vote [Go to VB10] (88) DK [Go to VB10] (98) DA [Go to VB10]</p>	
<p>VB3. Who did you vote for in the last general elections of 2011? [DON'T READ THE LIST] [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.] (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot) (2301) PNP (2302) JLP (2303) NDM (77) Other _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)</p>	
<p>VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1] (98) DA [Skip to POL1]</p>	
<p>VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DON'T READ THE LIST] (2301) PNP (2302) JLP (2303) NDM (77) Other _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA</p>	
<p>POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>VB20. If the next general elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Read options] (1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the options] (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2011? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS VB51-RAC1CA SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?

- (1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?

- (1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.

VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

[Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, “non-whites” in general]

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?

[Read alternatives, just one answer]

- (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
 (3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA
 (99) N/A

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS AB1-AB5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

Changing the subject, and talking about the qualities that children ought to have, I am going to mention various characteristics and I would like you to tell me which one is the most important for a child:

- AB1.** (1) Independence, or (2) Respect for adults
 (3) **[Don’t read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

- AB2.** (1) Obedience, or (2) Autonomy (self-sufficiency, taking care of oneself)
 (3) **[Don’t read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

- AB5.** (1) Creativity, or (2) Discipline
 (3) **[Don’t read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES	
[QUESTIONS SNW1A-SNW1B SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” OR “8”)]	
SNW1A. Do you personally know an elected official or some person who was a candidate in the most recent general elections?	
(1) Yes	(2) No [Go to FOR1]
(88) DK [Go to FOR1]	(98) DA [Go to FOR1] (99) N/A
SNW1B. And is this position at the local or national level?	
(1) Local	(3) National
(88) DK	(98) DA (99) N/A

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES	
[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (FOR1-FOR8) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”)]	
FOR1. Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. When we talk about “China” in this interview, we are talking about mainland China, the People’s Republic of China, and not the island of Taiwan. Which of the following countries has the most influence in the Caribbean? [READ CHOICES]	
(1) China	(2) Japan
(3) India	(4) United States
(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela
(7) Mexico	(10) Spain
(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or	(12) [Don’t read] None [Go to FOR4] (88)
[Don’t read] DK [Go to FOR4]	(98) [Do not read] DA [Go to FOR4]
(99) N/A	
FOR2. And thinking of [country mentioned in FOR1] do you think that its influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?	
(1) Very positive	(2) Positive
(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative
(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence
(88) [Do not read] DK	(98) [Do not read] DA (99) N/A
FOR3. [Ask ONLY if the country mentioned in FOR1 was NOT China] And thinking of China and the influence it has in the Caribbean, do you think that this influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?	
(1) Very positive	(2) Positive
(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative
(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence
(88) DK	(98) DA (99) N/A
FOR4. And within 10 years , in your opinion, which of the following countries will have the most influence in the Caribbean? [Read options]	
(1) China	(2) Japan
(3) India	(4) United States
(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela
(7) Mexico	(10) Spain
(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or	(12) [Don’t read] None
(88) DK	(98) DA
(99) N/A	

FOR5. In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be a model for the future development of **our country**? **[Read options]**

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| (1) China | (2) Japan |
| (3) India | (4) United States |
| (5) Singapore | (6) Russia |
| (7) South Korea | (10) Brazil |
| (11) Venezuela, or | (12) Mexico |
| (13) [Do not read] None/We ought to follow our own model | |
| (14) [Do not read] Other | (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A |

FOR6. And thinking now **only of our country**, how much influence do you think that China has in **our country**? **[Read options]**

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|------------------------------|
| (1) A lot | (2) Some | (3) A little | (4) None [Go to FOR8] |
| (88) DK [Go to FOR8] | (98) DA [Go to FOR8] | (99) N/A | |

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

FOR7. In general, the influence that China has on our country is **[Read alternatives]**

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1) Very positive | (2) Positive |
| (3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative | (4) Negative |
| (5) Very negative | (6) [Do not read] Has no influence |
| (88) DK | (98) DA (99) N/A |

FOR8. How much do you agree with the following statement: "Chinese business contributes to the economic development of Jamaica? Do you **[Read alternatives]**...

- | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| (1) Strongly agree | (2) Agree | (3) Neither agree nor disagree |
| (4) Disagree | (5) Strongly disagree | (88) DK |
| (98) DA | (99) N/A | |

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (FOR9A-FOR9D) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]

According to what you have heard, do Chinese businesses operating in **Jamaica** suffer from any of the following problems? **[Read alternatives.]**

	It is a problem	It is not a problem	No opinion/ DK	DA	N/A
FOR9A. Labor relations, such as disputes with workers or unions. Do you think that it is a problem, or that it is not, or do you not have an opinion on the matter?	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9B. Problems that arise from failure to understand the culture and customs of Jamaica.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9C. Lack of knowledge of the political, legal, and social values and rules in Jamaica.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9D. Lack of communication with the media and residents.	1	2	88	98	99

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (MIL10A-MIL10E) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”).]

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust the governments of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trustworthy	Somewhat trustworthy	Not very trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	DK/No opinion	DA	N/A
MIL10A. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

	Very trustworthy	Somewhat trustworthy	Not very trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	DK/No opinion	DA	N/A
MIL10B. That of Russia. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10C. Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10D. Israel. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES						
[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (MIL11A-MIL11E) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”).]						
Now I would like to ask you about the relations in general of our country with other nations around the world. When you think of our country’s relationship with China , would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?						
	Closer	About the same	More distant	No opinion/ DK	DA	N/A
MIL11A. China.	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11B. And our country’s relationship with Russia. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES						
	Closer	About the same	More distant	No opinion/ DK	DA	N/A
MIL11C. And with Iran. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11D. And with Israel. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11E. Finally, with the United States. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99

On a different subject...

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?
 _____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1 ⁰	2 ⁰	3 ⁰	4 ⁰	5 ⁰	6 ⁰
None	0					
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	
6th form/ "A" level	12	13				
University/Tertiary If UWI	14	15	16	17+		
University/Tertiary if other universities	12	13	14	15	16+	
Doesn't know	88					
Doesn't respond	98					

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS ED2 AND MOV1 SHOULD ONLY BE ASKED FOR INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? **[DO NOT READ OPTIONS]**

- (00) None
- (01) Primary incomplete
- (02) Primary complete
- (03) Secondary incomplete
- (04) Secondary complete
- (05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
- (06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
- (07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
- (08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

MOV1. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the ...? **[READ OPTIONS]**

- (1) Upper class
- (2) Upper middle class
- (3) Middle class
- (4) Lower middle class, or
- (5) Lower class?
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

Q2D-Y. On what day, month and year were you born? **[If respondent refuses to say the day and month, ask for only the year, or ask for the age and then calculate the year.]**

_____ Day _____ Month (01 = January) _____ Year

(For Q2D and Q2M: 88 =DK and 98 = DR)

(For Q2Y: 8888 = DK and 9888 = DR)

||_|Q2D
Day

||_|Q2M
Month

||_|_|Q2Y
Year

<p>Q3C. What is your religion, if any? [Do not read options] [If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]</p> <p>(1) Catholic (2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian). (3) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i). (4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion) (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra). (6) LDS (Mormon). (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform). (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God). (12) Jehovah's Witness. (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once a month (4) Once or twice a year (5) Never or almost never (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q5B. Please, could you tell me how important is religion in your life? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>MIL8. Do you or your spouse or partner or one of your children currently serve in the Armed Forces, or have one of you ever served in the Armed Forces?</p> <p>(1) Yes, currently serving (2) Previously served (3) Never served (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Working? [Continue] (2) Not working, but have a job? [Continue] (3) Actively looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW] (4) A student? [Go to Q10NEW] (5) Taking care of the home? [Go to Q10NEW] (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work [Go to Q10NEW] (7) Not working and not looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW] (88) DK [Go to Q10NEW] (98) DA [Go to Q10NEW]</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise? (2) A salaried employee in the private sector? (3) Owner or partner in a business (4) Self-employed (5) Unpaid worker (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	

[GIVE CARD F]

Q10NEW. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?"]

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$6,000
- (02) \$6,000 - \$9,000
- (03) \$9,001 - \$12,000
- (04) \$12,001 - \$18,000
- (05) \$18,001 - \$22,500
- (06) \$22,501 - \$27,000
- (07) \$27,001 - \$31,500
- (08) \$31,501 - \$36,000
- (09) \$36,001 - \$45,000
- (10) \$45,001 - \$54,000
- (11) \$54,001 - \$72,000
- (12) \$72,001 - \$90,000
- (13) \$90,001 - \$126,000
- (14) \$126,001 - \$162,000
- (15) \$162,001 - \$216,000
- (16) More than \$216,000
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]

Q10G. How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension?
[If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$6,000
- (02) \$6,000 - \$9,000
- (03) \$9,001 - \$12,000
- (04) \$12,001 - \$18,000
- (05) \$18,001 - \$22,500
- (06) \$22,501 - \$27,000
- (07) \$27,001 - \$31,500
- (08) \$31,501 - \$36,000
- (09) \$36,001 - \$45,000
- (10) \$45,001 - \$54,000
- (11) \$54,001 - \$72,000
- (12) \$72,001 - \$90,000
- (13) \$90,001 - \$126,000
- (14) \$126,001 - \$162,000
- (15) \$162,001 - \$216,000
- (16) More than \$216,000
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A (Not working and not retired)

[TAKE BACK CARD F]

<p>Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p> <p>Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: [Read the options] (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA</p>	
<p>Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [Read options] (1) Increased? (2) Remained the same? (3) Decreased? (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES					
[FS2 AND FS8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]					
Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

<p>Q11. What is your marital status? [Read options] (1) Single [Go to Q12C] (2) Married [CONTINUE] (3) Living together but not married [CONTINUE] (4) Divorced [Go to Q12C] (5) Separated [Go to Q12C] (6) Widowed [Go to Q12C] (88) DK [Go to Q12C] (98) DA [Go to Q12C]</p>	
<p>GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries [Read alternatives] (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all; (2) You earn less than your spouse; (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse; (4) You earn more than your spouse; (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing. (6) [DON'T READ] No salary income (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q12C. How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____ (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q12. Do you have children? How many? _____ (00 = none → Skip to ETID) (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q12B. How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household? _____ 00 = none, (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (no children)</p>	

<p>ETID. Do you consider yourself black, Indian, white, Chinese, mixed or of another race? [If respondent says Afro-Jamaican, mark (4) Black]</p> <p>(1) White (4) Black (5) Mixed (6) Indian (9) Chinese (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA</p> <p>LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? [Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options]</p> <p>(2201) English only (2202) Patois only (2303) Both English and Patois (2204) Other (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
---	--

<p>WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Daily [skip to JAMNET4] (2) A few times a week [go to JAMNET2] (3) A few times a month [skip to JAMNET4] (4) Rarely [skip to JAMNET4] (5) Never [skip to JAMNET4] (88) [Don't read] DK [skip to JAMNET4] (98) [Don't read] DA [skip to JAMNET4]</p> <p>JAMNET2. About how many days per week do you have access to the internet?</p> <p>(1) Everyday (2) Six days per week (3) Five days per week (4) Four days per week (5) Three days per week (6) Two days per week (7) One day per week (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP</p> <p>JAMNET4. Where do you access the internet from most often? [READ OPTIONS]</p> <p>(1) My home or someone's home (2) Any educational institution (School) (3) My phone (4) My office or someone's Office (5) A public place (Library, Cybercentre, Church, etc.) (6) Other - _____ (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
--	--

<p>For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country...</p> <p>G10. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]:</p> <p>(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA</p>					
	Correct	Incorrect	Don't know	Don't answer	
G11. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? [Don't read: Barack Obama, accept Obama]	1	2	88	98	
G14. How long is the government's term of office in Jamaica? [Don't read: 5 years]	1	2	88	98	
G17. How many representatives does the House of Representative have? [NOTE EXACT NUMBER. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]	Number: _____		88	98	

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R1. Television	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two
			(3) Three or more
R6. Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R15. Computer	(0) No [GO TO R16]	(1) Yes	
R18. Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes	(99) N/A
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?	(0) No	(1) Yes	

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____	_ _
(97) Could not be classified [Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]	
Time interview ended _____ : _____	_ _
TI. Duration of interview <i>[minutes, see page # 1]</i> _____	
INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____	_ _
SEXI. Note your own sex: (1) Male (2) Female	
COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.	_ _

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature _____ Date ____/____/____

Field supervisor's signature _____

Comments:

 [Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____


 [Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who verified the data _____



Card A


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Left					Right				

Card B






Card C



Card D





Card F

- (00) No income**
- (01) Less than \$6,000**
- (02) \$6,000 - \$9,000**
- (03) \$9,001 - \$12,000**
- (04) \$12,001 - \$18,000**
- (05) \$18,001 - \$22,500**
- (06) \$22,501 - \$27,000**
- (07) \$27,001 - \$31,500**
- (08) \$31,501 - \$36,000**
- (09) \$36,001 - \$45,000**
- (10) \$45,001 - \$54,000**
- (11) \$54,001 - \$72,000**
- (12) \$72,001 - \$90,000**
- (13) \$90,001 - \$126,000**
- (14) \$126,001 - \$162,000**
- (15) \$162,001 - \$216,000**
- (16) More than \$216,000**

Color Palette



Appendix D. Regression Tables

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

Table 3. Determinants of Educational Level in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Urban	0.090*	(2.92)
Female	0.016	(0.86)
Skin Colour	-0.173*	(-5.90)
26-35 years	-0.022	(-0.99)
36-45 years	-0.107*	(-4.36)
46-55 years	-0.186*	(-8.15)
56-65 years	-0.273*	(-8.07)
66 years or more	-0.492*	(-14.26)
Constant	0.018	(0.44)
R-Squared	0.321	
Number of Observations	1348	
* p<0.05		

Table 4. Determinants of Personal Income in Jamaica, Among Respondents Who Work

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Urban	0.129*	(2.66)
Woman	-0.055	(-1.71)
Skin Colour	-0.245*	(-6.27)
26-35 years	0.149*	(3.41)
36-45 years	0.200*	(4.90)
46-55 years	0.112*	(2.40)
56-65 years	-0.057	(-1.69)
66 years or more	-0.139*	(-3.79)
Constant	-0.023	(-0.40)
R-Squared	0.191	
Number of Observations	790	
* p<0.05		

Table 5. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Urban	0.071	(1.52)
Skin Colour	0.172*	(4.20)
Woman	0.106*	(2.40)
26-35 years	0.136*	(2.97)
36-45 years	0.065	(1.48)
46-55 years	0.044	(1.24)
56-65 years	0.023	(0.47)
66 years or more	-0.008	(-0.21)
Constant	-0.008	(-0.16)
R-Squared	0.052	
Number of Observations	694	
* p<0.05		

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

Table 6. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Size of place	-0.051	(-1.24)
Female	-0.151*	(-5.65)
Female Homemaker	-0.040	(-1.48)
Age	0.053*	(2.09)
Level of Education	0.121*	(3.85)
Quintiles of wealth	0.066*	(2.07)
Political Interest	0.232*	(8.52)
Skin Colour	-0.016	(-0.55)
Black	0.003	(0.13)
Constant	-0.027	(-0.71)
R-Squared	0.112	
Number of Observations	1288	
* p<0.05		

Table 7. Determinants of External Efficacy in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Size of place	0.018	(0.52)
Woman	0.034	(1.14)
Female Homemaker	-0.034	(-1.14)
Age	0.015	(0.43)
Level of Education	-0.027	(-0.86)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.051	(-1.72)
Political Interest	0.147*	(4.33)
Skin Colour	0.070*	(3.39)
Black	-0.045*	(-2.19)
Constant	0.013	(0.36)
R-Squared	0.033	
Number of Observations	1278	
* p<0.05		

Table 8. Determinants of Belief in Party Representation in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Size of place	-0.067	(-1.74)
Woman	0.041	(1.16)
Female Homemaker	0.012	(0.37)
Age	0.040	(0.83)
Level of Education	-0.054	(-1.03)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.007	(-0.16)
Political Interest	0.228*	(5.23)
Skin Colour	0.025	(0.56)
Black	0.092	(1.70)
Constant	-0.009	(-0.25)
R-Squared	0.072	
Number of Observations	702	
* p<0.05		

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

Table 9. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Victimization by Corruption		
Educational Level	-0.005	(-0.04)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.077	(-0.68)
Perception Family Economic Situation	0.077	(0.67)
Woman	-0.400*	(-3.79)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.539*	(4.05)
Skin Colour	-0.107	(-1.09)
Constant	-2.627*	(-19.66)
F	4.97	
Number of Observations	1227	
* p<0.05		

Table 10. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Crime Victimization		
Education Level	0.015	(0.13)
Size of place	-0.105	(-1.08)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.196	(2.00)
Female	-0.143	(-1.32)
Age	0.008	(0.07)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.121	(-1.34)
Skin Colour	0.003	(0.05)
Constant	-2.370*	(-22.09)
F	1.12	
Number of Observations	1223	
* p<0.05		

Table 11. Determinants of System Support in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Educational Level	-0.033	(-0.91)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.113*	(-2.84)
Skin Colour	-0.020	(-0.56)
Woman	-0.005	(-0.13)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.001	(-0.04)
Crime Victimization	-0.070*	(-2.33)
Perception of Corruption	-0.175*	(-5.89)
Victimization by Corruption	0.009	(0.45)
Constant	-0.001	(-0.02)
R-Squared	0.053	
Number of Observations	1292	
* p<0.05		

Table 12. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Per cent of Population Victimized by Corruption	-0.047	(-0.73)
Level of Education	0.013	(0.16)
Size of place	0.006	(0.06)
Skin Colour	0.095	(1.19)
Female	0.089	(1.61)
Interpersonal Trust	0.031	(0.40)
Ideology	0.024	(0.36)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.007	(-0.11)
Crime Victimization	-0.129	(-1.89)
Perception of Corruption	-0.009	(-0.13)
Constant	1.109*	(10.44)
F	0.98	
Number of Observations	1137	
* p<0.05		

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

Table 13. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Perception of National Economic Situation	-0.041	(-1.61)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	-0.003	(-0.09)
Perception of Insecurity	0.041	(1.28)
Crime Victimization	0.006	(0.25)
Frequency of Church Attendance	-0.115*	(-3.89)
Importance of Religion	0.001	(0.04)
Support for Democracy	0.162*	(5.15)
Educational Level	0.047	(1.73)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.132*	(4.03)
Skin Colour	-0.043	(-1.35)
Woman	-0.107*	(-3.48)
Constant	0.002	(0.03)
R-Squared	0.089	
Number of Observations	1255	
* p<0.05		

Table 14. Determinants of Stable Democratic Attitudes in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
High System Support and High Tolerance		
Crime Victimization	-0.093	(-1.73)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.048	(-0.70)
Per cent of Population Victimized by Corruption	0.061	(1.13)
Perception of Corruption	-0.312*	(-4.30)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.088	(1.08)
Female	-0.076	(-1.10)
Quintiles of wealth	0.131	(1.75)
Size of place	-0.015	(-0.18)
Satisfaction with Performance Current Prime Minister	0.252*	(4.04)
Political Interest	0.178*	(2.66)
Constant	-0.575*	(-6.58)
F	5.26	
Number of Observations	1215	
* p<0.05		

Chapter Six: Local Government

Table 15. Determinants of Demand Making on Local Government in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Trust in Local Government	0.241*	(2.34)
Attended a Local Government Meeting	0.519*	(6.28)
Perception Family Economic Situation	-0.007	(-0.07)
Educational Level	0.044	(0.32)
Woman	-0.077	(-0.70)
Age	-0.046	(-0.44)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.223*	(-2.45)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.214	(-1.66)
Constant	-2.464*	(-18.04)
F	7.16	
Number of Observations	1156	
* p<0.05		

Table 16. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of System Support in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Evaluation of Local Services	0.227*	(6.27)
Approval of President's Job Performance	0.197*	(5.94)
Political Interest	0.115*	(4.13)
Perception Family Economic Situation	-0.001	(-0.03)
Educational Level	0.038	(1.17)
Woman	-0.003	(-0.09)
Age	0.091*	(3.37)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.015	(0.45)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.130*	(-3.11)
Constant	-0.015	(-0.36)
R-Squared	0.151	
Number of Observations	991	
* p<0.05		

Table 17. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of System Support in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Evaluation of Local Services	0.227*	(6.27)
Approval of Prime Minister's Job Performance	0.197*	(5.94)
Political Interest	0.115*	(4.13)
Perception Family Economic Situation	-0.001	(-0.03)
Educational Level	0.038	(1.17)
Woman	-0.003	(-0.09)
Age	0.091*	(3.37)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.015	(0.45)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.130*	(-3.11)
Constant	-0.015	(-0.36)
R-Squared	0.151	
Number of Observations	991	
* p<0.05		

Chapter Seven. Surveying the Jamaican Gang Problem

Table 18. Socio-economic and demographic determinants of Tolerance for Gangs and Gang Activities

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Has been invited to join a gang	0.290*	(6.28)
Wealth	-0.057*	(-2.32)
Not willing to work with police	0.045	(1.83)
Police doing a good job	0.047	(1.30)
Age	-0.037*	(-3.10)
Woman	-0.140*	(-3.85)
Size of Place	0.023	(0.83)
Middlesex	0.029	(0.91)
Cornwall	0.041	(1.49)
KMR	0.085*	(2.10)
Personally knows a gang member	0.289*	(8.42)
Constant	-0.043	(-0.88)
R-Squared	0.272	
Number of Observations	1051	
* p<0.05		

Chapter Eight. Trust as a Factor in Police-Citizen Relations in Jamaica

Table 19. Determinants of Trust in the Jamaican Police, 2012

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Support for the Rule of Law	-0.060*	(-2.21)
Perception of Insecurity	0.017	(0.58)
Crime Victimization	-0.052*	(-2.20)
Education Level	-0.026	(-0.85)
Female	-0.004	(-0.16)
Age	0.123*	(4.35)
Quintiles of wealth	0.032	(1.08)
Supreme Court	0.415*	(13.59)
Participation to Solve Community Problem	-0.008	(-0.31)
Confidence that Justice System Would Punish the Guilty	0.147*	(4.57)
Constant	0.007	(0.19)
R-Squared	0.260	
Number of Observations	1182	
* p<0.05		

Table 20. Determinants of Positive Evaluation of Police Performance in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Willingness to Work with Police	0.057	(1.59)
Support for the Rule of Law	0.004	(0.14)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.016	(-0.49)
Crime Victimization	-0.043	(-1.54)
Education Level	-0.004	(-0.13)
Sex	0.017	(0.61)
Age	0.109*	(2.76)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.034	(-0.90)
Urban	0.025	(0.60)
National Police	0.301*	(9.40)
Constant	0.066	(1.62)
R-Squared	0.135	
Number of Observations	893	
* p<0.05		

Table 21. Determinants of Willingness to Work with the Police in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Evaluation of Police Performance	0.059	(1.57)
Support for the Rule of Law	0.056	(1.59)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.028	(-0.94)
Crime Victimization	0.017	(0.42)
Education Level	-0.016	(-0.40)
Sex	-0.078*	(-3.25)
Age	-0.048	(-1.30)
Quintiles of wealth	-0.040	(-1.04)
Urban	-0.017	(-0.44)
National Police	-0.060	(-1.53)
Constant	0.058	(1.10)
R-Squared	0.023	
Number of Observations	893	
* p<0.05		

Chapter Nine. Sense of Inclusiveness in Jamaica: Probing the Issue of Social Tolerance

Table 22. Determinants of Support for Gay Rights in Jamaica

Independent Variables	Coefficient	t
Education Level	0.110*	(3.87)
Woman	0.042	(1.68)
Age	-0.034	(-1.28)
Quintiles of wealth	0.073*	(2.60)
Urban	-0.010	(-0.29)
Current Affairs Awareness	0.106*	(2.96)
Religiosity	-0.072	(-1.90)
Support for the Rule of Law	-0.032	(-0.99)
Constant	-0.039	(-0.92)
R-Squared	0.054	
Number of Observations	1262	
* p<0.05		

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life.

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The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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