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Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala and in the Americas

Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala and in the Americas, 2012:

Towards Equality of Opportunity

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AmericaBarometer
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LAPOP

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala and the Americas, 2012:

Towards Equality of Opportunity

TENTH STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE OF GUATEMALANS

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This study was conducted with support from the Program in Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

December, 2012

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Centennial Professor of Political Science, Professor of Sociology
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
and
Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science
and Associate Director of LAPOP,
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The "Marginalization in the Americas Conference" was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we

had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the AmericasBarometer *Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and

requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate Figures. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the Figures are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common Figureical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate Figures which present confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample.[1] Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.[2]

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the AmericasBarometer project.

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[1] The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

[2] All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica	UNIVERSIDAD DE COSTA RICA LUCEM ADPICIO; CCP; Estado de la Nación EN DESARROLLO HUMANO SOSTENIBLE	
El Salvador	FUNDAUNGO	
Guatemala	asies	
Honduras	FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras	Hagamos Democracia
Mexico	data Opinión Publica y Mercados	ITAM INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO
Nicaragua	RED NICARAGUENSE POR LA DEMOCRACIA Y EL DESARROLLO LOCAL	
Panama	CIDEM Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas	

Caribbean		
Belize	B&A Borge y Asociados	
Dominican Republic	Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.	UNIVERSIDAD intec Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo
Guyana	DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS DP	
Haiti	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	
Jamaica	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA	
Suriname	ANTON DE KOM UNIVERSITEIT VAN SURINAME	
Trinidad & Tobago	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	CIPPEC
Bolivia	Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	Universidade de Brasília	CNPq Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Chile	Instituto de Ciencia Política	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	FLACSO ECUADOR	UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO / PRIME CONSULTING
Paraguay	IRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	***IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos***	
Uruguay	CIFRA	UM UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Venezuela	CISOR	ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Canada and United States	
Canada	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL; YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE; THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY; MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES; PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of many institutions, foremost among them the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. We are very grateful to the Tinker Foundation, and especially to Ms. Rente Rene for ongoing support for the entire LAPOP endeavor. At the UNDP, we thank Heraldo Muñoz, Rafael Fernández de Castro, and Freddy Justiano for their strong support of the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Fabiana Machado for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. At the World Bank, thanks go to Norbert Feiss for enthusiastic and insightful contributions. We are deeply grateful to Nat Stone at Algonquin College for securing the financing for the Canadian survey, for providing research assistants to help with the production of the Canadian country report, and for helping us with the French translation for Canada. Thanks also to François Gélineau for important help with the translation of the French questionnaire. Great thanks also go to Keith Neuman and the Environics Institute for generous support of and partnership in the 2012 round in Canada. We want to take special note of the support that the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia provided to our Bolivia team, and to thank Daniel Moreno for writing the grant proposal and obtaining the funding.

Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K.

Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

Description of the 2012 Study in Guatemala

This report contains the Tenth Study of Democratic Culture in Guatemala. Similar studies have been published regularly every two years since 1993. These studies, based on representative public opinion surveys, are intended to provide insights into the different aspects of the political culture of Guatemalans.

The first six chapters of this report are structured in the same manner as similar reports published in other Latin American countries. As is explained in the Prologue, Part I of this report addresses the issues of economic and political inequality from the perspective of citizens. Part II covers topics regularly included in studies of democratic culture: the rule of law, the legitimacy of the political system, and local government. Given that this report represents the tenth study, Part III is devoted to the longitudinal analysis of the democratic culture of Guatemalans.

Chapter One

This chapter demonstrates that while economic and social inequality have recently declined in many countries in the Americas, there persist important differences in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and on their places in their respective countries' social hierarchies.

In the case of Guatemala, inequality as measured by the Gini Index has changed little in recent decades. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the values for the index in Guatemala in 1989 and 2006 were 0.582 and 0.585, respectively. On the other hand, the quality of life in Guatemala as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) has actually improved in recent decades, notwithstanding the fact that after Haiti, Guatemala remains the Latin American country with the worst result. In 1995, Guatemala obtained an HDI score of 0.490, a result that placed it 112th among the 174 countries measured. In 2011, Guatemala was given a 0.574, placing it 131st out of 187 countries. When adjusted for inequality, the 2011 HDI score falls at 0.393. Guatemala's Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index score (IHDI) for 2011 is lower than that of other Central American countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras and is significantly below both the regional and global averages.

There is a marked inequality in human development levels between different regions of Guatemala. The country's rural areas receive much lower HDI scores than their urban counterparts, particularly in comparison to Guatemala City. The inequality is also noticeable between the different municipalities in the country. These differences between urban and rural areas are maintained in most social and political indicators used in this report. Guatemalans living in urban areas, and in particular the metropolitan area, have more resources and opportunities than those who live in rural parts of the country. It is worth noting that Guatemala is one of the few countries in Latin America in which there remains a significant percentage of rural population.

Among the predictors of educational level in Guatemala, the area of residence stands out given that inhabitants of rural areas have significantly lower levels. It is not surprising to find that those with

higher levels of wealth also have higher levels of education. It has also been observed that being indigenous, having darker skin, and being a housewife are determinants of lower levels of education. Additionally, the educational level of a respondent is closely correlated to the educational level of his or her mother. Whereas respondents whose mothers have no prior education average only 4.1 years of education, those whose mothers have completed primary education tend to average 9 years of education. This difference increases even further when the mother has earned some form of higher education.

In terms of the predictors of a higher or lower income in Guatemala (among those respondents who work), women and those who self-identify as indigenous tend to have lower incomes. Higher levels of education and older age, as may be expected, are also factors correlated with higher income.

There are only two variables that are statistically related to food insecurity: respondents with darker skin and those with lower levels of wealth suffer from higher levels of insecurity.

With regard to the views about the causes of poverty, Guatemala is one of three countries in the region in which more than 30% of respondents indicate that the "culture" of dark-skinned people is a cause of poverty. Along that same line of thought, Guatemalan respondents obtained an average of 46.9 points (on a scale of 0 to 100) on the question of whether or not they see welfare recipients as lazy.

Finally, with respect to policies to address inequality, Guatemala is among the countries in which a low percentage of respondents (7.9%) indicate that someone in their households receives public assistance. On the other hand, the average score (on the same 0-100 scale) in agreement with the idea that the state should reduce inequality is high (73.0 points), much as in the rest of Latin America. Finally, the average score in agreement with the statement that universities should reserve quotas for students with darker skin, even if it means excluding other students, is 51.2 points, an intermediate-level result when compared with other countries in the Americas.

Chapter Two

Despite the reduction in inequality in recent decades, this chapter shows that in the Americas, inequality persists in certain important aspects of political participation.

In terms of electoral participation, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position for the Americas, although there is a significant statistical difference in turnout between men and women: 82.2% of men indicated that they voted, compared to only 75.2% of women. The level of electoral participation of Guatemalan women is very similar to the 75.5% turnout rate of women in the rest of Latin America. In Guatemala, the indicated level of electoral participation rises in tandem with increasing levels of wealth and education of respondents. It is also observed that there is minimal difference between the electoral participation of citizens who reside in urban areas and those who live in rural parts of the country.

Guatemala is among the countries with the highest levels of participation in groups (community participation), and it is also among the countries with the highest percentage of individuals in leadership positions within those groups. Community participation in Guatemala reaches an average of 40.5 points and is statistically higher than that of most countries in the hemisphere, with the exception

of Haiti. Furthermore, the 17.5% of Guatemalans involved in leadership positions is greater than comparable measurements in other countries. The average community participation is significantly higher among rural citizens in Guatemala, as is the involvement with leadership positions: in urban areas, 12% of respondents are involved in leadership, compared to 17.9% in rural ones. In terms of leadership, there is also a significant difference between male and female involvement, as a higher percentage of men tend to participate in these positions. Another significant difference is that people with a lack of education are less likely to hold a leadership position.

Regarding political participation beyond casting a vote, 15.2% of Guatemalans indicated that they tried to convince others to vote for a certain party or candidate in the 2011 elections. A smaller percentage, 7.6% of respondents, said they had either participated or worked on the electoral campaign. Both results place Guatemala in an intermediate position for its region.

The skin color of the respondent influences some of the various forms of participation within Guatemala: the most noticeable difference occurs when exercising the right to vote, given that people of darker skin color are less likely to vote than those with lighter skin. It is also noticeable that dark-skinned people are less involved in leadership activities.

Regarding opinions about the political participation of groups frequently discriminated against, in Guatemala the average agreement to the idea that "men are better political leaders" is low, at 31.8, and it places Guatemala at an intermediate level for the region. As for opinion concerning homosexuals serving in public office, Guatemala receives an average of 29.8 points on the 0-to-100 scale, placing the country among the countries with the lowest levels of acceptance of this idea. The regional average agreement of homosexuals serving in public office is 41.3, and is much higher in South American countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, in which support reaches 60 points. Guatemala also finds itself in a low position with regards to the acceptance of having people with physical disabilities run for public office. Guatemala's national average in this area is 56 points, a considerably lower score than most countries and well below the regional average of 67.4 points.

Finally, regarding the approval of policies that could reduce inequality in political participation, the support of Guatemalans towards the adoption of gender quotas in political parties is relatively high, averaging 59.9 points. However, even with this result, Guatemala differentiates itself statistically from other countries where there is greater acceptance of this issue. The regional average approval for gender quotas is 68.1 points.

Chapter Three

This chapter analyzes citizens' perception regarding their relationship with the political system. On the issue of internal efficacy—the understanding of the political system—Guatemalans receive an average of 42.5 points on the 0-to-100 scale, among the lowest in the continent. Sociodemographic factors such as wealth, education and age are associated with greater perceived internal efficacy. The perception of internal efficacy increases as the levels of these three variables increase. In addition, those who express higher levels of political interest also possess a greater sense of internal efficacy.

Another related issue has to do with citizens' perception of whether those who govern listen and represent them well. Once again on the 0-to-100 scale, Guatemalans obtain an average of 31.7 points in this external efficacy measure. This result places Guatemala in a relatively low position on

the continent. The average is even lower in relation to the perception that political parties listen to the average citizen. The 29.8 points obtained by Guatemalans in this regard place the country at the bottom of the regional list, although it is worth noting that in a majority of countries, the average that measures the perception of party representation is lower than the average measuring external efficacy. The level of political interest appears as a predictor of external efficacy and of the perception that political parties relate to the average citizen: people with higher levels of interest in political issues are more likely to believe that their government is interested in them and are thus more likely to feel represented by political parties.

This chapter also seeks to establish whether belonging to a group usually discriminated against (being female, being indigenous, or having darker skin) affects the level of support for the political system or for democracy. It is also found that respondents who self-identify as indigenous show higher levels of support for the system. Additionally, respondents with higher education and those living in rural areas are also more likely to support the system. The level of political interest of a respondent also reappears as a predictor. With regard to the level of support for democracy, it is observed that women and those who reside in urban areas indicate slightly lower support. In addition, respondents with more years of formal study and those interested in politics are more likely to support democracy.

Finally, this chapter addresses the issue of participation in protests in several countries in the Americas. Seven percent of Guatemalans reported having participated in protests during the past year. This result places Guatemala at an intermediate level for the region. In Guatemala, the predictors of protest participation are ethnic self-identification, education, and wealth: those who identify themselves as indigenous, and those with lower levels of wealth are more likely to participate in protests. There is a linear relationship between education level and participation in protests.

Chapter Four

This chapter analyzes diverse issues related to the rule of law, including the magnitude and impact of victimization by crime and corruption, as well as perception of insecurity and corruption, and levels of support for the political system and the rule of law itself. The survey shows that in general, the citizens of the Americas tend to perceive high levels of corruption. Guatemala is located in an intermediate position with a corruption perception average of 69 points. In terms of victimization by corruption, 23.5% of the Guatemalan population was victim of an act of corruption in the 12 months preceding the survey. The only feature associated with victimization by corruption is gender: women are less likely to experience it.

Comparisons using perception of insecurity and victimization by crime are made solely at the capital city level for the countries of the Americas. Guatemala City ranks as one of the capitals with higher levels of both perception of insecurity and direct victimization by crime. In both cases, the Guatemalan capital ranks third out of the 26 cities included in the 2012 survey. In terms of victimization of a family member living in the respondent's home, however, Guatemala holds an intermediate position.

Detailed analysis in the case of Guatemala shows that the metropolitan area has the highest average perception of insecurity (50.7 points) and is followed by those living in urban areas (44.4) and those living in rural areas (32.7). This chapter also includes multilevel analysis in order to determine the extent to which certain municipal characteristics are associated with varying perception of

insecurity. It is found that a relationship exists between the municipal Human Development Index at the municipal level in Guatemala and perception of insecurity. Although the relationship is not linear, it is observed that in municipalities with a higher HDI score there tends to exist a greater perception of insecurity as compared to those municipalities with low HDI scores. With regard to total victimization by crime (the sum of direct victimization plus the victimization suffered by relatives in the home), there is variance according to the area of residence of respondents. In the metropolitan area, nearly half of the population (46.3%) indicated having been a victim. The percentages are drastically reduced in other regions of the country. With respect to direct victimization (common crime experienced solely by the respondent), 28.6% of the population of urban areas indicated having been a victim of common crime. In contrast, in rural parts of the country, only 14.1% of the population experienced direct victimization.

An analysis of the impact of the perception of victimization by corruption or common crime in the political system shows that the only variable statistically associated with a decrease in support for the political system is the perception of corruption.

Finally, this chapter addresses the issue of support for the rule of law as measured by the belief that authorities should never act above the law. Guatemala falls at an intermediate level, given that in 2012, 66.4% of respondents felt that the authorities should always respect the law. The only factors that relate to support for the rule of law are the size of a respondent's residence, a respondent's age, and his or her level of wealth. Support for rule of law is lower in the metropolitan area, where support only reaches 42%. Form there, support gradually increases until peaking at 73.6% in rural areas.

Chapter Five

This chapter discusses the issue of legitimacy, an issue central to political science. Legitimacy in this study is also referred to as "support for the political system" and is measured through a series developed by LAPOP several years prior. The average system support on the 0-100 scale varies across the continent, hitting its lowest point in Honduras (41.4 points) and reaching its highest in Belize (61.7 points). Guatemala scores 52.3 points, a low-to-intermediate level score placing the country above 9 others but below another 16.

Political tolerance was also discussed in this chapter. It is noted that the Latin American country showing the highest level of tolerance is Uruguay with 64.4 points. At the other end, the country with the lowest level of support is Honduras with only 36.6 points. Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Haiti, and Bolivia also receive low scores but all of which are statistically higher than the one obtained by Honduras. Guatemala is located just above these countries at a low-to-intermediate tolerance average of 47.3 points.

Among the variables associated as much with system support as with tolerance, there stand out the education level and the ethnic self-identification of a respondent. Education level produces mixed results, as respondents with higher levels of education are more tolerant yet are also the least supportive of the political system. In the case of ethnic self-identification, there is a clearer relationship: indigenous Guatemalans show both greater tolerance and greater support for the political system.

Adding the level of tolerance and the support for the political system can be to determine the attitudes conducive to a stable democracy. Guatemala falls on a middle-low level in terms of support for a stable democracy, with 24.7% of respondents indicating such support. In 2012, the percentage of Guatemalan citizens located in said category increased slightly form 2010, although the difference is not statistically significant—the percentage has been increasing since 2008, when support had fallen to 18.5% of the population.

This chapter also measures the legitimacy of various institutions, asking respondents how much confidence they had in their respective countries' institutions. On the scale of 0-100, the only political institutions that obtained results in the range of 50 points were the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Army, and the respective municipality of a respondent. Most institutions experienced an average confidence in the range of 40 points. The only exceptions were the National Civil Police and the political parties, which received averages of 34 and 36 points, respectively. Other non-political institutions such as churches and the media did receive averages above 50 points.

Finally, this chapter measures the support for democracy in the Americas through a question that asks a respondent whether or not democracy, despite its shortcomings, is the best possible system. A majority of countries with the exception of Honduras have levels of support for democracy well above 60 points on the 0-100 point scale. Guatemala falls near the bottom of the list of countries with a score of 61.7 points.

Chapter Six

This chapter focuses on analyzing the relationship between citizens and their local government. One of the questions in the survey asked citizens in each country in the Americas to indicate whether they had attended a town meeting within the past year. In Guatemala, 15.2% of citizens indicated that they participated. In analyzing the participation in municipal meetings since 2004, it becomes evident that the percentage of attendance has not changed in any statistically significant manner. Among the predictors of participation in municipal meetings, it appears that there are significant differences between urban and rural areas of the country. Rural areas, with a 17.6% participation rate, have higher levels of municipal involvement than urban areas, where only 12.1% of the population reported participation. In any event, even when taking into account only the population of the urban areas, the participation rate in Guatemala is higher than in many countries in the Americas.

14.3% of Guatemalans indicated that they had presented requests to their municipality. This percentage does not vary significantly from the other countries on the continent. There is a marked difference in the percentage of men and women who requested help from the local government, with 18.6% of men submitting an application, but only 9.9% of women doing so. There is also an observable difference between those who attended a meeting of the local government and those who did not. Among respondents who attended a municipal meeting, 40% submitted an application, whereas only 9.7% of non-attendees indicated having done so.

Another question related to the issue of local government asked respondents to indicate their level of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government. Guatemala falls at a mid-to-high level for the region, with a satisfaction average of 53.9 points that can be considered positive but not ideal. Guatemalans' satisfaction with local government did not change significantly in 2012 and has remained stable over the last eight years.

Finally, this chapter discusses the level of trust towards local government. Guatemala averaged 53.9 points in this category and fell at a mid-to-high level relative the other countries in the Americas. A regression analysis allowed us to determine that the evaluation of a local government's performance does not influence support for the political system in any significant manner, although confidence in the local government does correlate strongly to the level system support: those respondents with greater confidence in local government have significantly higher levels of support for the political system.

The last three chapters of this report include a longitudinal analysis of various aspects of the political culture of Guatemalans.

Chapter Seven

In this chapter we present longitudinal results related to the support and evaluation or democracy, perception of freedom, and civic participation among Guatemalans. The following summarizes some of the key findings of the longitudinal analysis:

- With respect to the preference for democracy (rather than preference for an authoritarian regime or indifference), there was been little variation between 1999, the first year the question was asked, and 2012. In 1999, 63.8% of respondents said they preferred democracy, while in 2012 the percentage in favor was 65.6%. This preference increased by several percentage points between 2006 and 2010, peaking at over 70%, but it returned to previous levels by 2012.

- From 2004 onwards, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they believe that democracy is preferable to other forms of government. In 2004, the average support for democracy in Guatemala was 57.4 points on the 0-100 scale. Thereafter, the average has remained relatively stable, within the range of 60 points and with no statistically significant changes. Only in 2006 was there a statistically significant increase in support for democracy—the average reached nearly 70 points.

- Beginning in 2004, respondents were also asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Guatemala. The highest percentage of satisfaction came in 2004 with 58.5%, and the lowest occurred in 2006 with 40.6%. In 2012, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they were either very or somewhat satisfied with the performance of democracy reached 46.7%.

- A related question asks respondents to assess how democratic Guatemala is. The percentage of those who believe that the country is very or somewhat democratic matches the percentage that is satisfied with democracy. The year in which the highest percentage of Guatemalans viewed Guatemalan democracy positively was 2004, when 59.3% did so. Since then, such a high positive evaluation has not been reached again. In 2010 and 2012, approximately 46% of respondents considered Guatemala to be very or somewhat democratic.

- A series of questions since 1995 has asked Guatemalans to indicate how free they feel about exercising their political rights (doing so without fear), and specifically how they feel about voting in a national election, participating in community improvement groups, participating in demonstrations, and running for popular elections. Longitudinal results indicate the following:

- Every year, over 70% of Guatemalans have said they feel free to vote. The only exception to this pattern is 2012, in which the percentage dropped to 69.8%. The year in which the largest percentage of Guatemalans felt free to vote was 1997, when 82.4% of them felt so.

- In most years, the percentage of citizens who said they feel free to participate in community improvement groups has remained in the range of 60%. The exceptions were 1995 and once again 2012, when less than 60% of respondents felt freedom to engage in such activities.

- A greater fluctuation is observed in the period between 1995 and 2012. In 1995, only 31.5% of respondents felt free to participate, although said percentage subsequently increased by several points and eventually decreased slightly in 2012.

- The political rights in which Guatemalans feel more restricted in their personal freedom is related to running for elected office. Fluctuation has also been observed with regard to this right: in 1995, only 26.1% of respondents felt free to run for office, although by 2008 this number had reached 48.9%. In 2012, the percentage once again dropped to 31.2%, the lowest number throughout this entire period.

➢ Participation of Guatemalans in groups of various kinds has been stable in the period under study. Since 1993, there has been increased participation in religion-related groups, followed by school-related groups. The level of participation in community groups and occupation-related groups is much smaller, although it has remained stable over the years.

Chapter Eight

This chapter addresses the issue of the legitimacy of political institutions, as well deepens analysis of the relationship between citizens and political parties in Guatemala in recent years. It also addresses certain aspect related to the voting behavior of Guatemalans.

In general, we find that social support in Guatemalan political institutions (confidence in these institutions) has not changed substantially over the years.

➢ Congress and political parties in Guatemala are the only institutions that have been included in studies of democratic culture since 1993. Changes to the measurement scale were made in 2004, but the changes notwithstanding, there remains data related to public trust in both Congress and political parties for the entire period in question.

- In 1993, confidence in the Congress was 39.1 points on the same 0-100 scale used in other studies. Confidence in the Congress experienced minimal changes over the past two decades. The highest average was obtained in 2012, at 41.9, and the lowest came in 1997, at 35.9.

- Confidence in political parties has not remained stable over the past two decades. In 1993, confidence in the parties was at 19.3 points, the lowest score during the period

under study. Over the years, there has been a general increase in levels in confidence, although there have been fluctuations to this pattern as well. The highest score, 40.6 points, was attained in 2012, while the lowest (other than 1993) came in 2010, when the average was 29.1 points.

- The municipality, or the local government of the respondent, has been one of the institutions with the highest levels of public trust. The first measurement of trust in this institution was taken in 1997, when it averaged 59.0 points—the highest score on record. With the exception of 2001, when the average dropped to 49.2 points, the scores have remained within the range of 50 points. In 2012, the average obtained by the municipality was 54.4 points, greater than the 51.3 points obtained in 2010.

- The Army is one of the few institutions that has maintained an average score above 50 points throughout most of the period under analysis. The only score below 50 was 49.1 and came in 2004, the first year such a measurement was taken. The highest score given to the Army was given in 2012, when the average was 59.5 points. The 2012 score represented a statistically significant improvement from 2010, when the Army scored 55.9 points.

- The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has also maintained a relatively high average trust in relation to other institutions, although with the exception of 2010, when it obtained 50.9 points, it has failed to break the 50-point mark. The score for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal remained stable at around 49 points throughout most of the period under study. The only year when there was a larger drop was 2008, when the score fell to 47.5 points.

- Since 2004, the level of confidence in national elections has also been measured. The score in this category has also remained relatively stable. The lowest and highest confidence levels came in 2006 and 2004, when they were 42.8 and 48.6 points, respectively. In 2012, the average trust in elections was 48.2 points.

- Confidence in the national government itself has undergone fluctuations but has on average remained within the range of 43 to 50 points. In 2006 and 2010 said confidence reached 43.9 and 43.0 points, respectively, while in 2004 it reached 49.4 points. In 2008 and 2012 it surpassed the 50-point mark, with 50.1 and 50.8 points, respectively.

- This chapter also explores certain aspects related to political parties.

    - Since 2006, respondents have been asked if they identify with a specific political party. The percentage of respondents who said they do sympathize has been smaller than 20% in all years. The lowest percentage was given in 2012 with 12.9%. The highest came in 2010 with 18.3%. In any case, the results place Guatemala as one of the countries on the continent with the lowest percentage of citizens who sympathize with a specific political party.

    - Guatemalans' participation in political parties was also measured. Since 1995, less than 10% of respondents said they had participated in meetings of political parties. The highest percentage of participation was 8.9% in 1999. In 2012, 5.6% indicated participation, a slight increase from 2010, when the participation rate was 4.8%.

Participation in political parties is significantly lower in than other organizations in Guatemala.

- In a modern political party system, citizens should identify with a political party based on whether the citizens' ideas align with those promulgated by the political party. As such, measures of ideology are highly relevant. Since 1999, Guatemala has asked respondents to self-identify ideologically on a scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right). The ideology average of Guatemalans has remained close to five points in all years except 2012, when it dropped to 4.8. In all cases, the average shows that Guatemalans tend to favor the ideological center.

- Whether or not Guatemalan citizens have attempted to convince others to vote for certain political choices is a factor that has also been measured. Less than 20% of respondents indicated having done so. The percentage was highest in 2004 at 17.6% and lowest in 2006 at 10.1%. Temporal distance from an election year can also influence these results. In 2012, 15.8% of Guatemalans indicated having tried to convince others to vote in a certain way during the 2011 elections.

- Finally, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they believe that democracy can exist without political parties. When this question was first posed in 2006, the average score was 59.6 on the 0-100-point scale, a result indicating high support for ideas contrary to representative democracy. The average score has fallen since then and was 46.6 in 2012, a relatively high result yet an improvement from 2006.

Chapter Nine

This chapter addresses several issues related to the rule of law in Guatemala, including the legitimacy of institutions related to the justice system, Guatemalans' support for principles and measures related to the rule of law, and specific issues related to corruption and crime.

- Over the years, a majority of institutions within the justice sector have received average confidence scores close to 40 points. The only exceptions are the Human Rights Ombudsman, scoring close to 50 points, and the Civil National Police, which scored in the range of 30 points.

  - The only institution within the justice system for which there is data dating back to 1993 is the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). The level of confidence in the SCJ has remained in the 40s throughout the last two decades, notwithstanding the changes to the scale in 2004. The highest score obtained by the SCJ during the period under study came in 1997, while the lowest score was acquired in 2010. In 2012, the SCJ obtained a score of 44.9 points.

  - Courts receive similar levels of confidence as the SCJ since measurements began in 2006. The lowest score for courts was 42.7 points in 2010 and the highest was 45.8 in 2012.

- Measurements of confidence in the Public Ministry (PM) began in 2005 and have since remained stable. The highest average score obtained by that institution was 47.8 points in 2012 and the lowest was 44.8 in 2010.

- The Constitutional Court (CC) has also maintained stable results since 2004. The best outcome for this institution was 47.6 in 2010, the year in which various justice sector institutions received their lowest levels of the period under study. The worst result for the CC was a score of 41.0 points in 2008, and the result in 2012 was 46.0 points.

- The Human Rights Ombudsman (HRO) is the only institution within the justice system that has consistently obtained confidence levels above 50 points. The exception to this pattern came in 2008, when the HRO received 48.0 points. The highest score was given in 2004, when the HRO received 56.9 points. In 2012, the average trust for the HRO was 51.2 points, a result statistically below the 54.9 points in 2010.

- The Civil National Police (CNP) is the only institution that has consistently obtained average confidence levels below 40 points, with the exceptions of 2006 and 2008, when it scored 42.4 and 40.3 points, respectively. The lowest score was given in 2010 with 31.0 points, and the score for 2012 was 34.9 points.

- One of the questions asks respondents to indicate how much confidence they have in the "justice system" in general. The averages in trust in the justice system between 2004 and 2012 are similar to those of most institutions within the justice sector, ranging throughout the 40. In 2010, the average trust in the justice system was 46.2 points—the highest during the entire period.

➢ This chapter also analyzes changes through the years in public support of certain principles and basic standards of rule of law.

- One of the questions asks respondents to provide an opinion on the following statement: "In order to capture criminals, authorities should a) always respect the law b) occasionally break the law." The option offering that authorities should "always respect the law" is considered tantamount to support for the rule of law. The highest degree of support for the rule of law occurred in 2004 when the question was asked for the first time: 75.9% of Guatemalans said that the law should always be respected. Said percentage has declined significantly since then. The lowest levels of support for the rule of law came in 2006 and 2008, when only 56.9% and 57.6% of Guatemalans indicated support, respectively. In 2012, 66% of respondents gave a positive response in support of the rule of law.

- A question directly related to compliance with the standards of a country's rule of law asks respondents to indicate how much they agree with vigilante justice. In 2010, Guatemalans gave the highest score in support of such measures, averaging 43.2 points on the 0-100 scale. The lowest score for measures of vigilante justice was given in 2008 with 22.9 points. In 2012, the average number of support measures for vigilantism was 39.4 points.

- Since 1993, respondents have been asked if they consider the country to have a strong-hand government or one that promotes participation. The preference for a strong hand in Guatemala has changed substantially over the years. The year that gave the greatest support to a strong-handed government was 1999, when 67.6% of respondents indicated such a preference. 2008 was the year with the lowest level, when 33.7% expressed support. In 2012, 42.0% of Guatemalans said that they preferred a heavy-handed government.

- The maintenance of rules of democracy is an essential component of the rule of law. It is therefore important to measure public support for measures or actions contrary to the maintenance of democracy. One question that has been asked over the years is whether citizens believe that we need a strong leader who is not necessarily popularly elected, or whether electoral democracy is always best. The percentage of Guatemalans in support of an unelected leader has stayed relatively low, but at a level that remains worrying. The lowest percentage of support for such a leader came in 2010 with 17.2% of the population. In contrast, the highest percentage for an unelected leader came in 2012 at 29.1%.

- Another related question asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they sympathize with others who participate in a group that seeks to violently overthrow an elected government. Respondents could choose a response on a scale of 1 to 10 points, which was converted to a 0-100 scale for illustrative purposes. Over the years, the average in sympathy with overthrow-minded groups has been relatively low, within the range of 20 to 23 points. The only year in which the average was lower was in 2008, when the average fell to 12.4 points.

- Corruption is one of the dangers that put democracy at risk and undermines the rule of law. This chapter also includes a longitudinal analysis of issues related to corruption in Guatemala in recent years.

  - On the scale of 0-100 points, the perception of corruption in Guatemala has remained relatively high during the period from 2004 to 2012. The year in which the average perception of corruption was highest was 2006, with 81.2 points, and the lowest average occurred in 2012, with 69.0 points.

  - The survey asks respondents to indicate if they have been victims of corruption of various public institutions—based on the responses provided, it is possible to construct an index of victimization by corruption. In Guatemala, the percentage of citizens who report having been victims of corruption has remained in the 20s. The year with the highest rate of victimization was 2012 with 24.1% and the lowest was 2006 with 18.1%.

- Crime has become a major problem in Guatemala, and high rates of violent crime indicate weaknesses in the rule of law. Surveys of democratic culture through the years have asked a number of questions related to the topic.

- A question commonly used to measure perception of insecurity is how safe respondents walking in their neighborhoods. On the scale of 0-100 points, the perception of insecurity in Guatemala has remained in the range of 39-45 points. The year reporting the largest increase in perception of insecurity was 2004, with an average of 45.5 points. The year with the lowest reported perception of insecurity was 2012, with 38.2 points on average.

- In recent years, victimization by crime has also been measured. However, because the question underwent significant changes in 2010, comparative results are not reliable. In 2010, 38.9% of respondents reported that either they or someone in their household had been the victim of a crime. The percentage in 2012 decreased slightly to 33.5%.

- A related question asked respondents to indicate if gangs affect their neighborhood. The percentage of those who indicated that their neighborhood was very or somewhat affected in such a manner has remained stable between 26% and 35%. In 2012, 33% of Guatemalans indicated that their neighborhoods were affected by the presence of gangs.

- Finally, since 2004 respondents have been asked, if they were to become victims of crime, whether they would trust the justice system to punish those guilty. The percentage of those who said they had a high or somewhat high level of confidence in the system has fluctuated throughout the period under study. The lowest percentage was in 200, when only 29% of respondents indicated confidence. In contrast, the highest percentage of confidence occurred in 2012, when 44% did so.

➢ One final question in this chapter is related to the perception of the Peace Accords of 1996. This question has not been asked every year, but it was posed in 2001 and 2012. Whereas in 2001, 76% of Guatemalans said the peace accords were either good or very good, by 2012 the percentage had risen to 81%.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most Figures in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., stratified and clustered). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Figures that show regressions also include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is statistically significant when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

The reader must take into account that the data and analysis presented in this report is based on a earlier version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, slightly different to the one that was made available to the public.

Part I:
Equality of Opportunity and Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

Dinorah Azpuru with Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira, and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.[1] More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.[2]

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.[3] Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime.[4]

Inequality is a not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

[1] Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.
[2] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.
[3] De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.
[4] Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,[5] promotes political instability and violence,[6] and diminishes confidence in democracy.[7] LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic "glue" that holds together democratic societies. Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that some political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of "perfect" equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.[8] However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers' educational attainment alone.[9] Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Guatemala and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After assessing objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about

[5] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*
[6] Uslaner, Eric. M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement." American Politics Research 33: 868-894.
[7] Córdova, Abby B. 2008. "Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies." Doctoral Thesis, Vanderbilt University.
[8] Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press
[9] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Social and Economic Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Guatemala and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.[10] The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.



Figure 1. Gini Index by World Region

[10] Milanovic, Branko y Shlomo Yithaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.[11] It can be observed that levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.



Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).[12] The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution.

[11] The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000

[12] Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research *Working Paper* 3865.



Figure 3. Positions of Citizens in Four Countries in the Global Index Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.[13] In Figure 4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

In the case of Guatemala, inequality measured by the Gini Index has changed little in recent decades. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), in 1989 the Gini Index was 0.582. Ten years later it had diminished a little, reaching 0.560. However, by 2006 it had increased again to previous levels with 0.585.[14]

[13] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press y United Nations Development Program.

[14] The Executive Summary of the Regional Report on Human Development for Latin America and the Caribbean 2010 reports a different index. According to that publication the Gini Index in Guatemala was 53.6 around 2006.



Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries in the Americas

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.[15]

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).[16] Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which "discounts" each dimension of the HDI based on a country's level of inequality. Figure 5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the average IHDI is the largest in the world.

For Guatemala the HDI in 2011 was 0.574, which ranks Guatemala 131 out of 187 countries included in the index. That result places Guatemala among the countries with medium human development, but it is not far from the results for countries with low human development. In the Americas only Haiti ranks below Guatemala.[17] The situation is even more sombering when looking at

[15] Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

[16] The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country's average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).

[17] The HDI for Guatemala improved between 1980 and 2011, going from 0.428 a 0.574. However, given that all other countries also improved their HDI, Guatemala's ranking has not improved. In fact, in 1995 Guatemala had an HDI of 0.490, which places the country in position 112 (among 174 countires), while in 2000 Guatemala positioned itself as 120 (out of 74) with an HDI of 0.525.

the Adjusted Human Development Index. In 2011 the Adjusted Human Development Index for Guatemala was only 0.393.



Figure 5. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

Figure 6 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality. In the case of Guatemala there was a loss 31.6%, which is above the regional average and much higher than the global average. Table 1 shows in detail the areas where Guatemala suffers the highest loss for inequality.



Figure 6. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

Table 1. Detailed Loss of Human Development Due to Inequality

COUNTRY	IHDI	GENERAL LOSS (%)	LOSS DUE TO INEQUALITY N LIFE EXPECTANCY (%)	LOSS DUE TO INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION (%)	LOSS DUE TO INEQUALITY IN INCOME (%)
Guatemala	**0.393**	**31.6**	**18.6**	**36.1**	**38.5**
Nicaragua	0.427	27.5	13.9	33.3	33.6
Honduras	0.427	31.7	17.4	31.8	43.4
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.540	26.1	13.4	23.2	39.3

Source: Explanatory note on 2011 HDR composite indices, Guatemala, HDI values and rank changes in the 2011 Human Development Report

Table 1 shows that the IHDI for Guatemala is lower than other Central American countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras, and that Guatemala is far below the regional average. With regards to the loss of human development as a result of inequality, the greatest loss happens as a result of income inequality, followed by inequality in education.

These measures, however, mask the great variation that exists in the HDI and the IHDI within Guatemala. With regards to the general HDI, the rural areas of the country show much lower numbers than the urban areas, particularly Guatemala City. Table 2 shows the HDI by department in 2011. While the HDI for the department of Guatemala is above the regional average for Latin America, the HDI for some departments such as Quiché y Huehuetenango is much lower.

Table 2. Human Development Index for Guatemala, 2011

DEPARTAMENT	IDH
Guatemala	0.697
El Progreso	0.593
Sacatepéquez	0.623
Chimaltenango	0.559
Escuintla	0.615
Santa Rosa	0.547
Sololá	0.514
Totonicapán	0.502
Quetzaltenango	0.566
Suchitepéquez	0.539
Retalhuleu	0.540
San Marcos	0.512
Huehuetenango	0.498
Quiché	0.470
Baja Verapaz	0.556
Alta Verapaz	0.507
Petén	0.524
Izabal	0.568
Zacapa	0.572
Chiquimula	0.541
Jalapa	0.526
Jutiapa	0.579

Source: Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Guatemala: ¿Un país de oportunidades para la juventud? Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, 2011/2012

The Municipality Human Development Index reveals that the municipalities of Guatemala have huge differences in their levels of development. The municipality of Guatemala has the highest HDI, with 0.826, which is as high as that found in many developed countries. For instance, Poland had a national HDI of 0.813 in 2011. On the contrary, other municipalities such as Santa María Chiquimula (in the department of Totonicapán) has an extremely low HDI (0.388), similar to that of many less developed countries such as Zimbabwe, whose national HDI in 2011 was 0.376.[18]

Figure 7 allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with advantaged (dark green bar) and disadvantaged (light green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.[19] For example, the Figure shows that the odds for a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica of completing sixth grade on time is just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the odds are close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of achievement. At the same time, most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal.

[18] A table with the HDI for the municipalities of Guatemala is included in Chapter 4.

[19] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.



Source: Barros, et al. (2009)

Figure 7. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

III. Equality of Social and Economic Opportunities in Guatemala: A Perspective from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent citizens perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies citizens might endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently

or have different employment opportunities.[20] Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of "statistical discrimination," meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.[21] Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.[22]

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labor force participation among men and women has become more equal.[23] Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.[24]. Furthermore, a gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.[25] Therefore, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social situations, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.[26] Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development. Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas.[27]

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[20] For an overview of this literature, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

[21] Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. "Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil." *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. "Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. "The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach." *Económica* L (1-2).

[22] Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. "Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile." En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong y Andrea Moro*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, y Urzúa. 2009b. "An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, y Rajiv Sethi. 2009. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study." En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan y Máximo Torero. 2009. "Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru." En *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

[23] Abramo, Laís and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. "Women's Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America." *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

[24] Hite, Amy Bellone and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005. "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure." *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

[25] Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. "The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean." SSRN eLibrary (April). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

[26] De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

[27] Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.[28]

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paraFigures, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.[29]

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 by examining what Guatemalans of different racial, gender, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The AmericasBarometer's 2010 and 2012 questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. We assessed respondents' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.[30] The question **ETID** simply asks respondents whether they identify as *ladinos*, indigenous or other (which would include *garifunas*). In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a color palette.[31] At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin color of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see Figure 8). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the color palette in 2012.[32] In the case of Guatemala, even though the respondents who self-identified as indigenous tend to have darker skin, there were no cases in the color categories from number 9 onwards.[33]

[28] Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[29] For example Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[30] The text for all questions in the questionnaire can be found in Annex C.

[31] Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid.*

[32] In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.

[33] In the case of respondents who identified themselves as indigenous 68% falls in the colors from 5 to 8, while 14% falls in the categories 2 and 3. In the case of the respondents who identified themselves as ladinos, 24% falls in the 2 and 3 color categories, while 50% falls in the 5 to 8 categories. None of the respondents, indigenous or ladino, fell in the colors 9, 10 or 11. See Figure in the Annex for more details.

Figure 8. Skin Color Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. The latter group of questions, found in the **R series**, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.[34]

Additionally, we included a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we also asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question **GEN10**.

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**
(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
(2) You earn less than your spouse;
(3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
(4) You earn more than your spouse;
(5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
(6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
(88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP

[34] This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is measured in question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.[35]

In the case of Guatemala, the place of residence of the respondent makes a big difference. Guatemalans who live in urban areas, particularly in a metropolitan area, have more resources and opportunities than Guatemalans who live in rural areas. Guatemala is one of the few countries of Latin America with an important percentage of rural population. In the 2012 survey 53.6% of the respondents live in rural areas, while 46.4% live in urban areas. Of the other 25 countries included in the 2012 study, only Haiti has a similar percentage of rural population, with 50.4%. In the remaining countries, especially those in the Southern Cone, the rural population accounts for less than 15% of the total.

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.[36] Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

We first assess how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect educational status in Guatemala using linear regression analysis.[37] Figure 9 shows that several of the sociodemographic characteristics are predictors of the educational level of the respondents. It is evident that having higher levels of wealth and living in an urban area are related to higher levels of education. This can be observed from the corresponding horizontal line which falls to the right of the "0" vertical line without overlapping, signifying a positive, statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. On the contrary, respondents who self-identified as indigenous, who have darker skin color and are younger, tend to have lower education. Being a housewife is also associated with lower levels of education.

[35] Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. Forthcoming. Class Perception in Latin America. The cases of Colombia and Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[36] These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

[37] In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses Figureically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. In other words, it is not a random relationship.



Figure 9. Determinants of Educational Level in Guatemala

Figure 10 shows the differences in educational levels among Guatemalans living in urban and rural areas. The average level of education of a Guatemalan living in urban areas is 8.8 years, while the average level of education of a respondent living in rural areas is only 5.3 years.



Figure 10. Education Level by Area of Residence (Urban-Rural)

Figure 11 shows the difference in education level among males and females in Guatemala. Among men, the average education is 7.3 years, while among women it is only 6.5 years. In this case the difference is not statistically significant.



Figure 11. Education Level and Gender in Guatemala

If one takes a more in-depth look at the differences between males and females, Figure 12 shows that Guatemalan women living in rural areas have the lowest level of education. However, even in urban areas women have lower education levels than men.



Figure 12. Differences in Education Level in Guatemala, by Gender and Residence

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects educational level in Guatemala. We did not include our measure of family background, **ED2**, in the multivariate regression model above because the question was only asked of half the sample.[38] Limiting analysis to half the sample would reduce inferential power regarding the effects of the other variables. Nonetheless, Figure 13, which shows the respondent's years of schooling (y-axis) according to the level of education of his/her mother (x-axis), indicates that the education level of the mother is highly correlated with the education attained by the respondent. Whereas respondents whose mother did not attain any formal education only have an average of 4.1 years of education; those whose mother completed primary school have an average of 9 years of education, and the average education level is even higher when the mother has some college education.

[38] In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.



Figure 13. Mother's Education Level as a Determinant of Respondent's Education Level in Guatemala

Are the same factors associated with education also associated with income? How do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, urban-rural residence, and family background in Guatemala? In Figure 14 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of personal income among respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.[39] As can be observed, the variables that are related to income are the following: gender, ethnic self-identification, age and education. The correct interpretation of Figure 14 should be that male respondents who have more education, are older and non-indigenous, tend to have higher income. The variable that is most positively associated with the level of income is education: it is clear that the higher the level of education the higher the income. With regards to age, respondents between 36 and 55 years old are likely to have higher income than other age groups.

[39] Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.



Figure 14. Predictors of Personal Income in Guatemala, among Respondents Who Work

Figure 14 also reveals that women have lower income levels than men. As explained above item GEN10 asks married respondents (or those who live with a partner) about their personal income compared that that of their partner. Figure 15 shows the differences in income, only among those who indicated that they were employed. It can be observed that 75.5% of Guatemalan men indicated that they had higher income than their spouse, while only 12.3% of women were in that situation. On the contrary, 53.4% of women said that they earn less than their partner, while only 2.7% of men indicated earning less than their spouse.



Figure 15. Respondent's versus Spouse's Income in Guatemala, among Respondents Who Work

Figure 16 shows the relationship between income and skin color of the respondent. It can be seen that both in the case of males and females, those who have lighter skin color tend to have higher levels of income. In the case of lighter skin respondents, women have a slightly higher income vis-a-vis men, but in general men have higher income in Guatemala.[40]

[40] See footnote in page 16 for more information about the income scale.



Figure 16. Gender, Skin Color and Income in Guatemala, among Respondents Who Work

Finally, we evaluate to what extent family origins affect personal income in Guatemala. Figure 17 clearly shows that the income level of the respondent increases as the education level of the mother increases.



Figure 17. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of own Income in Guatemala, among Respondents Who Work

Arguably the most critical basic resource to which citizens need access is food. We have seen that personal income is not distributed in a perfectly egalitarian fashion across Guatemala. Does access to food follow similar patterns? In Figure 18 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of food insecurity, based on the two questions described above. Questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food insecurity that runs from 0 to 2, where respondents who report higher values have higher levels of food insecurity.[41] When a variable separates from the central vertical line it indicates that it is statistically related to food insecurity. It can be observed that respondents who have darker skin and lower levels of wealth suffer from greater food insecurity. Children are obviously not included here since the sample only includes adults, but it is known that Guatemala has the highest rate of child malnutrition on the whole continent.[42]



Figure 18. Predictors of Food Insecurity in Guatemala

Figure 19 shows again the impact of skin color on the results associated to inequality. It is evident that respondents with darker skin have higher levels of food insecurity.

[41] Recall that these questions were asked of a split sample (that is, of only half of respondents).
[42] See "Guatemala supera a Haití en desnutrición crónica", *Siglo 21*, March 1, 2012. http://www.s21.com.gt/nacionales/2012/03/01/guatemala-supera-haiti-desnutricion-cronica



Figure 19. Differences in the Levels of Food Insecurity by Skin Color

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among Guatemalans in different groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. They have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The 2012 AmericasBarometer included several questions that provide a look at how social and economic inequalities are related to general attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that support different roles for men and women in the labor force.[43] In 2012 respondents were asked, on a scale from 1 to 7, if they agreed with the following statement:

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

[43] Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presentado en la conferencia *Marginalization in the Americas*, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, y Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Figure 20 shows the average level of acceptance for this idea in the Americas. The answers were recoded to a 0-100 scale for better understanding. In the case of Guatemala the acceptance of this idea reaches 39.5 points. That result places Guatemala in an intermediate high position, since most countries average between 30 and 39 points. This suggests that support for the idea that men should have priority in the labor market in Guatemala is relatively low (on the 100 point scale), but it is higher than other Latin American countries such as Uruguay and Brazil and even slightly higher than in other Central American countries such as Costa Rica and Panama. The countries with less favorable attitudes toward income inequality for men and women are the Dominican Republic and Guyana.



Figure 20. Agreement that Men Should Have Labor Market Priority in the Americas

The average level of agreement with this statement does not show differences among Guatemalans. Figure 21 examines responses in greater detail, using the original scale from 1 to 7.



Figure 21. Agreement that Men Should Have Labor Market Priority in Guatemala

It is interesting to see if the respondent's opinion changes according to his or her gender. In Figure 22 we see that there are differences between men and women. As could be expected, the average level of support towards the idea that men should have priority in the labor market is lower among women than men.



Figure 22. Agreement that Men Should Have Labor Market Priority in Guatemala, by Gender

The 2012 Americas Barometer also asked citizens in the Americas about their perception of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. In this round, we included the following question in every country of the Americas.[44]

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
[Read alternatives, just one answer]
(1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
(3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 23 shows the percentage of respondents who indicated that they agreed with the statement that poverty was due to the culture of people with 'dark skin'. The highest percentage of agreement with this answer was found in Guatemala with 33.3%. Guatemala, together with the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago are the only countries where the percentage of the population that agrees exceeds 30%. In the remaining countries there is great variation, but in 11 of the countries where this question was asked, less than 20% of respondents answered that the culture of people with dark skin is the cause of poverty.

[44] This question was made to only half of the sample.



Figure 23. Percentage in Agreement with the Statement that Poverty is Due to Culture in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Public Policy Proposals

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the major social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report and answering this question with precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions on important normative and ideological debates that are the purview of citizens and politicians, rather than the authors of this study. Nonetheless, we outline here some common policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens across the region what they thought the role of the state is in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

ROS4. The Guatemalan government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which citizens agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. We present here the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. As always, we have recoded responses to run from 0 ("Strongly disagree") to 100 ("Strongly agree.").

Figure 24 shows that in general, in the Americas, citizens agree with government involvement in the reduction of inequality. The average in all countries, except the United States, is above 60 points. Furthermore, in the majority of countries the average is above 75 points on the 100-point scale used in this report. Guatemala's average is 73 points, lower than in most other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Only Bolivia, Venezuela, Honduras and Haiti have averages lower than Guatemala (not counting Canada and the United States).



Figure 24. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality in the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many of the region's governments have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their children in school.[45] The most well-known and largest of these programs include *Oportunidades* in

[45] Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177;

Mexico, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, "CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest".[46] However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depend, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.[47] These social assistance and CCT programs are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region's most historically unequal contexts.

In 2012, we measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programs across the region, using question CCT1NEW:

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

The levels of receipt of social assistance and CCTs vary greatly across the region. Figure 25 shows the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance. Guatemala is among the countries with lower percentage: only 7.9% said that they receive some kind of public assistance. This percentage is similar to those found in Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Honduras. In Guatemala the answers are likely related to the program called *Mi familia progresa*, which was implemented during the Álvaro Colom administration (January 2008-January 2012). The program was modified in 2012 under the administration of President Otto Pérez Molina.[48]

Fiszbein, Ariel, y Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[46] Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490

[47] Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. "Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean." Social Protection Working Paper #0605. The World Bank

[48] The original program was criticized by opposition politicians and the topic was debated during the 2011 electoral campaign. It was modified according to the 'acuerdo gubernativo 150-2012'. Modifications include changes in structure and functioning. See "Gobierno modifica programa Mi Familia Progresa", *Prensa Libre*, July 20, 2012.



Figure 25. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas

The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about CCT and other public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.[49]

> **CCT3.** Changing the topic…Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

Responses were coded on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and 7 represents "Strongly agree." Figure 26 presents levels of agreement with this statement across the

[49] Una muestra dividida de entrevistados contestó esta pregunta.

countries of the Americas; responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items. The average for Guatemala is 46.9 points, which is an intermediate result. Most countries have averages between 40 and 60 points, with Argentina obtaining the highest average.



Figure 26. Belief that Public Assistance Recipients are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

Affirmative Action

Another possible policy solution that has very recently attracted attention in some places within Latin America is affirmative action. While in the United States affirmative action has a history of several decades, in Latin America it is a very recent phenomenon, and has only been seriously considered in a handful of countries with the largest populations of Afro-descendants.[50]

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked about support for affirmative action in every country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was administered to a split sample of respondents, who were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a 1 to 7 scale.

> **RAC2A.** Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 27 we examine the support for affirmative action in the countries of the Americas.[51] The answers were recoded in a 0 to 100 scale to facilitate comparisons. The average agreement with this statement in Guatemala is 51.2 points, an intermediate level. The result for Guatemala is similar to that of the majority of countries in the Americas. The difference with most countries is not statistically significant, except for Paraguay, Honduras and Argentina, which show higher levels of agreement, and on the other extreme El Salvador, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada and the United States, in which there average agreement with affirmative action is lower.

[50] For further information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Amy Erica. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (49).).

[51] At the end of 2012, Brazil's president, Dilma Rousseff, signed and affirmative action law that requires public universities to reserve quotas for students from low-income schools, thus increasing the number of students of African descent in that country. See Romero, Simon "Brazil Enacts Affirmative Action Law for Universities", *New York Times*, August 30, 2012.



Figure 27. Support for Affirmative Action in the Countries of the Americas

V. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that while economic and social inequality have recently declined in many countries in the Americas, there persists important differences in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and on their places in their respective countries' social hierarchies.

In the case of Guatemala, inequality as measured by the Gini Index has changed little in recent decades. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the values for the index in Guatemala in 1989 and 2006 were 0.582 and 0.585, respectively. On the other hand, the quality of life in Guatemala as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) has actually improved in recent decades, notwithstanding the fact that after Haiti, Guatemala remains the

Latin American country with the worst result. In 1995, Guatemala obtained an HDI score of 0.490, a result that placed it 112th among the 174 countries measured. In 2011, Guatemala was given a 0.574, placing it 131st out of 187 countries. When adjusted for inequality, the 2011 HDI score falls at 0.393. Guatemala's Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index score (IHDI) for 2011 is lower than that of other Central American countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras and is significantly below both the regional and global averages.

There is a marked inequality in human development levels between different regions of Guatemala. The country's rural areas receive much lower HDI scores than their urban counterparts, particularly in comparison to Guatemala City. Inequality is also noticeable between the different municipalities in the country. These differences between urban and rural areas are maintained in most social and political indicators used in this report. Guatemalans living in urban areas, and in particular the metropolitan area, have more resources and opportunities than those who live in rural parts of the country. It is worth noting that Guatemala is one of the few countries in Latin America in which there remains a significant percentage of rural population.

Among the predictors of education level in Guatemala, the area of residence stands out given that inhabitants of rural areas have significantly lower levels of education. It is not surprising to find that those with higher levels of wealth also have higher levels of education. It has also been observed that being indigenous, having darker skin, and being a housewife are determinants of lower levels of education. Additionally, the educational level of a respondent is closely correlated to the educational level of his or her mother. Whereas respondents whose mothers have no prior education average only 4.1 years of education, those whose mothers have completed primary education tend to average 9 years of education. This difference increases even further when the mother has earned some form of higher education.

In terms of the predictors of a higher or lower income in Guatemala (among those respondents who work), women and those who self-identify as indigenous tend to have lower incomes. Higher levels of education and older age, as may be expected, are also factors correlated with higher income.

There are only two variables that are statistically related to food insecurity: respondents with darker skin and those with lower levels of wealth suffer from higher levels of insecurity.

In regard to the views about the causes of poverty, Guatemala is one of three countries in the region where more than 30% of respondents indicate that the "culture" of dark-skinned people is a cause of poverty. Along that same line of thought, Guatemalan respondents obtained an average of 46.9 points (on a scale of 0 to 100) on the question of whether or not they see welfare recipients as lazy.

Finally, with respect to policies to address inequality, Guatemala is among the countries in which a low percentage of respondents (7.9%) indicate that someone in their households receives public assistance. On the other hand, the average score (on the same 0-100 scale) in agreement with the idea that the state should reduce inequality is high (73.0 points), much as in the rest of Latin America. Finally, the average score in agreement with the statement that universities should reserve quotas for students with darker skin, even if it means excluding other students, is 51.2 points, an intermediate-level result when compared with other countries in the Americas.

Table 3 summarizes the results of the main questions raised in this chapter, showing a comparison of the results for Guatemala with the average result obtained in Latin America as a region.[52]

Table 3. Comparison between Guatemala and Latin America in Issues of Economic and Social Inequality

MEASURE	VARIABLE	REGION	GUATEMALA	
Index	Human Development Index (2011)	0.731	0.574	Lower
Index	Human Development Index adjusted by Inequality	0.540	0.393	Lower
Average*	Agreement with statement "Men should have priority in labor market."	38.2	39.8	Higher
Average*	Agreement with statement "Poverty is due to culture."	21.6	33.3	Much higher
Average*	Agreement with statement "People who get government help are lazy."	47.9	46.9	Similar
Average*	Agreement with statement "The government should reduce inequality."	79.4	73.0	Lower
Average*	Support for "affirmative action" policies	53.2	51.2	Lower
Percentage	Someone at home receives government help	15.2%	7.9%	Much lower

***Scale 0-100**

[52] This comparison includes 19 countries of the Americas only, those normally considered as Latin America.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.[1] This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.



[1] The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.

Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.[1] While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

Percepciones de una crisis muy grave, color de piel y riqueza en el hogar, Barómetro de las Américas 2010



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

[1] The variable measuring economic crisis perception is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.[1] The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.

The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Apoyo al matrimonio con indígenas en cuatro países de las Américas, y sus determinantes



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

[1] The variable that measures support for interethnic marriage is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

Dinorah Azpuru with Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.[1] An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.[2] Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.[3]

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[1] Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

[2] Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

[3] Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting can be actually *more* biased against certain groups.[4] For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.[5] Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.[6] Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.[7] Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.[8]

Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.[9]

Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

[4] For the United States see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. y Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. Para América Latina véase Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

[5] Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, y Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[6] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press; Desposato, Scott, y Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218.

[7] Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1.pp. 156-173.

[8] Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

[9] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities existing for different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.[10] In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.[11] Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.[12]

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.[13] In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also produce high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more equitable processes of development.[14]

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.[15] Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.[16] Thus, the effects of unequal participation on

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[10] Leighley and Vedlitz. 2000, *Ibid*. Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

[11] Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, y Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[12] Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

[13] Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129–2155

[14] Véase también Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.

[15] Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

[16] Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura y Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge how unequal political participation actually is in the Americas, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exists in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind vis-à-vis participatory inequality in the Americas. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the possibility remains that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Turnout

First, we examine inequalities in turnout in Guatemala and across the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2011? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]**
(1) Voted **[Continue]**
(2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**
(88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

Figure 28 shows turnout by gender across the Americas. Two points are clear from this figure. First, there are great inequalities *across* the countries of the Americas in turnout. On the one hand there is high participation and little difference between men and women in countries such as Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador. In the other extreme, countries such as Honduras, Paraguay and Colombia show relatively low levels of turnout but not marked differences between men and women.[17] Guatemala is in the middle position: 82.2% of men and 75.2% of women reported going to the polls. The difference between genders is statistically significant.

[17] It is important to note that in Figure 28 the United States is a peculiar case where men report higher rates of turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies. First, in the last elections in the United States more women than men voted (66% and 62%, respectively), and in the survey much higher levels of turnout (18%) were reported vis-à-vis the actual turnout. This overreporting is not unusual in recent presidential elections in the U.S. See the U.S. Census Report Véase "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," July 20, 2009, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html, consultado el 21 de julio de 2012, and the article by Allyson L. Holbrook y Jon A. Krosnick, "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," de febrero de 2009, http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2012.

Figure 28. Gender and Turnout in the Americas

It is important to note that voting is compulsory in some countries of the region while it is voluntary in others. There are institutional differences such as this that can contribute to partially explain national variation in turnout. In the case of Guatemala the constitutional norm is not clear; article 135 of the 1985 Constitution indicates the following:

ARTICLE 136.- Political duties and rights. Citizens have the following duties and rights:

a) To register in the Registro de Ciudadanos;
b) To elect and be elected;
c) To oversee the freedom and effectiveness of the vote and the transparency of the electoral process;
d) Run for public office;
e) Participate in political activities; and
f) Defend the principle of alternability of power and no reelection to the Presidency of the Republic.

While there is a tacit duty to vote in the 1985 Constitution there is no penalty and that is why in practice many consider it to be optional. Second, compiling data from all twenty-six countries included in the AmericasBarometer surveys, it appears that men and women participate in elections at similar rates—in fact women across the region actually boast *higher* turnout rates than men. This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men.

Now we examine more carefully the inequalities in turnout in Guatemala. Figure 29 shows the relationship between several sociodemographic factors and turnout in the first round of the 2011 elections. The difference between men and women can be seen again. Additionally, it is clear that the turnout rates increase as the levels of wealth and education of the respondent increase. It is also observable that there is minimal difference between citizens who reside in rural and in urban areas.



Figure 29. Sociodemographic Factors and Electoral Participation in Guatemala in 2011

Aside from the predictors of turnout, the 2012 survey asked Guatemalans for the first time if they had voted in the second round of the 2011 election. The results indicate that overall, 78.8% of Guatemalans reported voting in the first round on September 11, while 72.2% indicated they had voted in the second round on November 6.[18]

Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not tell the whole story. Certainly there are myriad ways that citizens can engage their democratic system besides just voting, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer surveys include an extensive battery of questions on other political participation besides voting. Among numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often citizens contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

[18] These results show a higher turnout tan the actual turnout reported by the Supreme Electorl Tribunal, which is common in post-election surveys. Some people report having voted even if they did not for several reasons. The TSE reported that 77% of registered Guatemalans participated in the first round (including casted votes, blank and null votes), while 62.9% participated in the second round. See *Memoria Electoral 2011*, Tribunal Supremo Electoral, Guatemala.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently citizens participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the **CP** battery is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**

Based on these questions we examined to what extent do citizens in the Americas participate in community groups. Figures 30 and 31 show the results. The right figure shows the levels of community participation in each country in the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average response to CP6, CP7, and CP8, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents in each country who said they had a leadership role in any community group.

It can be observed that Guatemala has some of the highest levels of community participation and also some of the highest levels of participation in leadership positions. Community participation in Guatemala reaches an average of 40.5 points and the difference with countries other than Haiti and Bolivia is statistically significant. In addition, the participation in leadership positions in Guatemala reaches 17.5% which is higher than most countries.



Figure 30. Community Participation in the Americas



Figure 31. Participation in Leadership Positions in the Americas

Figures 32 and 33 examine the results for Guatemala in more detail, showing the average in the levels of participation of Guatemalans and its relationship with different sociodemographic factors. Figure 32 shows that there is not a statistically significant relationship between community participation and most of these variables. In other words, there is no difference in community participation with regards to levels of wealth, education or gender. The only significant difference is between urban and rural areas. The levels of participation are higher among citizens who live in rural areas.



Figure 32. Sociodemographic Factors and Community Participation in Guatemala

Figure 33 shows the relationship between sociodemographic factors and participation in leadership positions. In this case there are differences once again between rural and urban areas: in urban areas 12% of respondents indicated that they were involved in leadership positions, but the percentage increases to 17.9% in the rural areas. With regards to this particular topic there are differences between men and women: while 11.8% of women participate in leadership positions, 19.5% of men do so. The other significant difference is that respondents with no education are less likely to hold leadership positions.



Figure 33. Sociodemographic Factors and Community Leadership in Guatemala

In addition to voting during elections, many citizens also participate in political campaigns. Questions PP1 and PP2 measure citizens' participation in this type of activities.

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]** (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

In Figures 34 and 35 we examine participation in campaign activities across the Americas. The left side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens who say they have "tried to persuade others" either "frequently" or "occasionally." The right side presents the percentage that said they had worked for a campaign. It is evident that there is great variation among countries in the region. 15.2% of Guatemalans indicated that they tried to convince others to vote for a certain party or candidate in the 2011 elections. A smaller percentage, only 7.6, indicated that they participated in the electoral campaign. Both results place Guatemala in the middle of the regional results.



Figure 34. Percent of Citizens Trying to Persuade Others



Figure 35. Percent Who Worked for a Candidate or Campaign

We now analyze the results obtained in Guatemala in more detail. Figure 36 shows the positive answers, those who indicated that they "frequently" or "every once in a while" tried to convince someone to vote in a certain way. There is not a statistically significant difference among Guatemalans. Regardless of their level of education, wealth, residence and gender, about 15% of the respondents tried to convince others.



Figure 36. Sociodemographic Factors and Attempts to Persuade Others to Vote in a Certain Way in Guatemala

Figure 37 shows the percentage of respondents of different groups that indicated that they had participated in the 2011 electoral campaign in Guatemala. In this case we do not find many statistically significant differences either. The level of participation in campaigns is rather low overall. The only statistically significant difference is between men and women. While only 5.8 percent of women indicated that they participated in a campaign, 9.4 percent of men did.



Figure 37. Socidemographic Factors and Participation in Electoral Campaign in Guatemala

It is important to evaluate if the observed difference between males and females in terms of participation in electoral campaigns also exists in other political activities. It is likely that the rates of participation vary according to women's position in the labor market and family.[19] Figure 38 presents levels of participation by gender and, for women, by family and labor market status. Overall there are few differences among the three groups analyzed: married women with no income, other women and men. With regards to community participation, however, it is interesting to see that married women with no income are more likely to participate in community activities, significantly more than other women and even more than men. The other statistically significant difference shown in Figure 38 is that men participate more in leadership positions.

[19] See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, y Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.



Figure 38. Gender and Political Participation in Guatemala

These results have not told us much about the association between race and participation in Guatemala. Figure 39 shows the rates or levels of each form of participation across the spectrum of skin color. The most relevant difference is with regards to turnout: Guatemalans with darker skin are less likely to vote than people of lighter skin in Guatemala. It is also evident that dark-skinned people participate less in leadership positions. Aside from that there are not many differences according to skin color. The results for community participation, trying to convince others to vote a certain way or the participation in political campaigns are very similar, regardless of the respondent's skin color.



Figure 39. Skin Color and Political Participation in Guatemala

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of the majority group of society support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that a woman's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

Note that responses to these questions are likely subject to what public opinion scholars call "social desirability bias," meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.[20] This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give the "socially desirable," non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions will likely be lower than their actual levels in the population.

[20]Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

Public Opinion towards Women's Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions tapping attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.[21] The questions are the following:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Figure 40 shows that in the majority of countries in the hemisphere there seems to be low support towards the idea that men are better leaders tan women. On the 0-100 scale that we use in this report, the majority of countries obtain an average result ranging from 30 to 39 points. In Guatemala the average level of support is only 31.8 points, which seems to show that there is acceptance with regard to the political participation of women. It is important to remember that in the 2011 elections several women participated as candidates in the presidential campaign, and that, in fact, one of them was elected as vice president of the country. In the rest of Latin America women have also been elected to important political offices. The countries where there is lower support towards political participation of women are Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago. At the opposite end, the countries where there exist the highest average levels of support are Uruguay and Brazil.

[21] VB51 and VB52 were administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 40. Belief that Men are Better Political Leaders than Women in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included one question on attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**.[22]

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.
VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country), "non-whites" in general]
(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Figure 41 shows the average result for each country of the Americas included in the AmericasBarometer. While Guatemala's average is not high (30.7 in the 0-100 scale), and is similar to the average obtained in the previous question related to women's participation, it is worth noting that it is one of the highest averages in the region. In other countries in the hemisphere there seems to be more acceptance regarding the leadership qualities of people with dark skin. In Chile, Honduras and Bolivia there are even higher levels of non-acceptance than in Guatemala, but the differences are not statistically significant. In fact, Guatemala's average is significantly different from the Dominican Republic and the countries below.

[22] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 41. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Political Participation of Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included question D5 on attitudes towards homosexuals running for public office.

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

Figure 42 shows the average level of opinion among respondents across the region with regards to this question. Marked differences emerge. It must be noted that unlike the two previous questions, which asked respondents to evaluate if women or people of dark skin are good leaders, in this case the question asks about the approval for the idea that homosexuals should be allowed to run for public

office. Guatemala obtains an average of 29.8 points in the 0-100 scale, which places the country as one of the least accepting societies in regards to this idea. The Central American countries (except Nicaragua and Costa Rica) as well as the countries in the Caribbean display lower average levels of acceptance than South American countries and Mexico. In fact, the differences among the Central American and Caribbean countries and the rest are statistically significant. Aside from Canada and the United States where there is a high level of acceptance, the Latin American countries where there is more openness towards this topic are Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Argentina.



Figure 42. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards Political Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.[23]

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A

This question is similar to the previous one and assesses the acceptance towards the participation of certain groups in the political process. Figure 43 shows that overall there is generally high levels of acceptance towards the idea that people who are physically handicapped be permitted to run for public office. In the case of Guatemala, the average result is 56.0 points (on the 0-100 scale), which is relatively high, but still lower than in most countries. Guatemala's average level is significantly lower than countries whose average equals or exceeds 63 points on the 0-100 scale (beginning with Bolivia). Only four countries obtain lower averages than Guatemala for this issue. In the majority of the countries of the Americas the average level of acceptance ranges from 60 to 70 points.

[23] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 43. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Public Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, for at least some indicators of political engagement, there seems to exist nontrivial discrepancies in rates of participation between men and women, different racial groups, and social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as democracies in the Americas have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.[24] The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like themselves on the ballot and in office, they are more motivated to participate in politics than they otherwise would be. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.[25]

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure 44 shows the support towards gender quotas in the Americas. In the case of Guatemala support is relatively high, an average of 59.9 points on the 0-100 scale. Nonetheless, even with this result, Guatemala is statistically lower than many countries in the region. Guatemala has an average that is significantly lower than those countries in the figure beginning with Mexico. Overall, average levels of support in most countries exceeds 65 points, and in certain countries such as El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Uruguay support for gender quotas is above 75 points.

[24] Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." British Journal of Political Science; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf.

[25] This question was administered to a split (half) sample of respondents.



Figure 44. Support for Gender Quotas in the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.[26] While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public

[26] Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

services.[27] One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.[28]

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.[29] While the relationship between socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,[30] material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.[31] While the relationship between socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,[32] material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

Despite the reduction in inequality in recent decades, this chapter shows that in the Americas, inequality persists in certain important aspects of political participation.

In terms of electoral participation, Guatemala finds itself in an intermediate position for the Americas, although there is a significant statistical difference in turnout between men and women: 82.2% of men indicated that they voted, compared to only 75.2% of women. The level of electoral

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[27] Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

[28] Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

[29] Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.

[30] Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[31] Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.

[32] Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

participation of Guatemalan women is similar to the 75.5% turnout rate of women in the rest of Latin America. In Guatemala, the indicated level of electoral participation rises in tandem with increasing levels of wealth and education of respondents. It is also observed that there is minimal difference between the electoral participation of citizens who reside in urban areas and those who live in rural parts of the country.

Guatemala is among the countries with the highest levels of participation in groups (community participation), and it is also among the countries with the highest percentage of individuals in leadership positions within those groups. Community participation in Guatemala reaches an average of 40.5 points and is statistically higher than that of most countries in the hemisphere, with the exception of Haiti. Furthermore, the 17.5% of Guatemalans involved in leadership positions is greater than comparable measurements in other countries. The average community participation is significantly higher among rural citizens in Guatemala, as is the involvement with leadership positions: in urban areas, 12% of respondents that are civically engaged are involved in leadership, compared to 17.9% in rural parts of the country. In terms of leadership, there is also a significant difference between male and female involvement, as a higher percentage of men tend to participate in these positions. Another significant difference is that people with a lack of education are less likely to hold a leadership position.

Regarding political participation beyond casting a vote, 15.2% of Guatemalans indicated that they tried to convince others to vote for a certain party or candidate in the 2011 elections. A smaller percentage, 7.6% of respondents, said they had either participated or worked on the electoral campaign. Both results place Guatemala in an intermediate position for its region.

The skin color of the respondent influences some of the various forms of participation within Guatemala: the most noticeable difference occurs when exercising the right to vote, given that people of darker skin color are less likely to vote than those with lighter skin tones. It is also noticeable that dark-skinned people are less involved in leadership activities.

Regarding opinions toward the political participation of groups frequently discriminated against, in Guatemala the average level of agreement to the idea that “men are better political leaders” is low, at 31.8, and it places Guatemala at an intermediate level for the region. As for opinion concerning homosexuals running for public office, Guatemala receives an average of 29.8 points on the 0-to-100 scale, placing the country among the countries with the lowest levels of acceptance to this idea. The regional average level of agreement for homosexuals serving in public office is 41.3, and is much higher in South American countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, where support reaches and exceeds 60 points. Guatemala also finds itself in a low position with regards to the acceptance of allowing people with physical disabilities to run for public office. Guatemala’s national average in this area is 56 points, considerably lower than most countries and well below the regional average of 67.4 points.

Finally, regarding the approval of policies that could reduce inequality in political participation, the support of Guatemalans towards the adoption of gender quotas in political parties is relatively high, averaging 59.9 points. However, even with this result, Guatemala differentiates itself statistically from other countries where there is greater acceptance of this issue. The regional average approval for gender quotas is 68.1 points.

A summary of the comparisons between Guatemala and the other countries of Latin America related to political participation can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4. Comparison between Guatemala and Latin America in Issues of Political Inequality

MEASURE	VARIABLE	REGIONAL	GUATEMALA	
Percentage	Turnout by gender	H: 75.3 % M: 75.5 %	H: 82.2 % M: 75.2 %	Higher Similar
Average*	Participation in different groups	27.4	40.5	Much higher
Percentage	Participation in leadership positions in groups	13.5%	17.5%	Much higher
Percentage	Tried to convince someone to vote in a certain way	15.2 %	15.2%	Similar
Percentage	Collaborated in a political campaign	8.6 %	7.6 %	Similar
Average*	Agreement with the phrase "Men are better political leaders."	34.5	31.8	Lower
Average*	Agreement with the phrase "Dark skin people can be good leaders."	26.6	30.7	Higher
Average*	Agreement with the phrase "Homosexuals can run for political office"	41.3	29.8	Much lower
Average*	Agreement with the phrase "People with disabilities can run for political office."	67.5	56.0	Much lower
Average*	Agreement with gender quotas	68.2	59.9	Much lower

*Scale 0-100

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.[1] In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?

The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[1] To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.

Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation

This box summarizes the findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full report can be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?



Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.[1]

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas in that country in 2009.[2] There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation. The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

[1] The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women's group meetings, CP20.

[2] In 2014 there will be quotas to elect legislators.

Special Box Report 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequality in Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.

Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

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The Impact of Socioeconomic and Political Variables on Turnout



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

Dinorah Azpuru with Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perception of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perception of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.[1] Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.[2] On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perception of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.[3] If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own experiences, leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy. In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group– may well

[1] Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

[2] Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65.

[3] Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

base their judgments of political leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.[4]

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.[5] Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders' ineffectiveness. All of this could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.[6] When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.[7]

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.[8] However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.[9]

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.[10] However,

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[4] Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality." *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

[5] Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. New York: Columbia University Press; Booth, John, y Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation." In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

[6] Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." British Journal of Political Science 5 (October): 435-7.

[7] Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

[8] Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perception of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?" *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

[9] Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005."The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perception of Discrimination," *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

[10] Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights protesta.[11]

Nonetheless, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.[12] Scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as "important rallying cries" during democratization,[13] and increase "the possibility that at least some groups may be capable of organizing themselves for collective action."[14] But it seems that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.[15]

In this chapter we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Lastly, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

II. Inequality, Efficacy and Perception of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perception of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7-point scale running from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the

[11] Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[12] Cleary, Matthew. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid*.
[13] Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women's Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.
[14] Muller, Edward N. y Mitchell Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.
[15] Nagengast, Carole y Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethinicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, y D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

following question, **EPP3**, on a 7-point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.[16]

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, class, household wealth, and intra-household inequalities by gender.

We begin the analysis with the description of the results of the question related to internal efficacy, question EFF2, in the countries of the Americas. Figure 45 shows that the average of 42.5 points obtained in Guatemala is among the lowest in the continent. The differences are significant between Guatemala and the countries that are above Panama. Only three countries (Honduras, Brazil and Paraguay) have lower averages than Guatemala. This means that unlike other countries in the region, many Guatemalans believe that they do not understand well the most important political issues in the country. On the other hand, in addition to those countries considered to be developed democracies such as the United States and Canada, there are also countries like Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Nicaragua, where citizens feel that they understand well the political issues that are relevant in their country.

[16] This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.



Figure 45. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? Figure 46 shows the results for Guatemala of a linear regression analysis, and more specifically, the association between internal efficacy and personal traits and experiences. The sociodemographic factors associated with a greater perception of internal efficacy (the understanding of political issues) are wealth, education and age. The perception of internal efficacy increases as wealth, education and age also increase. It is not surprising to find that those who have greater interest in politics also have an increased perception of internal efficacy.



Figure 46. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Guatemala

Figure 47 shows how personal characteristics are related to the ability of Guatemalan citizens to understand their political system. In the figures at the top we can see the factors that are statistically related: as wealth and education increases so does the perception of internal efficacy.



Figure 47. Sociodemographic Factors and Perception of Internal Efficacy in Guatemala

Now we examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described at the beginning of this section. In Figures 48 and 49 we present the distribution of these two variables across the countries of the Americas. Figure 48, to the left, shows that on the 0-100 scale Guatemala obtains an average of 32.7 points on the external efficacy measure which places the country in a relatively low position vis-a-vis the 26 countries included in the study. In other words, the perception that those who govern are interested in the common citizen is lower in Guatemala than in the majority of countries in the region. The average is even lower with regards to the representativeness of the political parties (29.8 points), where Guatemala also obtains one of the lowest averages, but it is notable that in most countries the perception of representativeness of political parties is lower than that of external efficacy. In both cases, countries such as Venezuela, Suriname and Nicaragua have the highest averages.



Figure 48. Perceptions of External Efficacy in the Americas



Figure 49. Perceptions of Representativeness of Political Parties

Who in Guatemala believes that those who govern the country are interested in people like them? And who agrees with the idea that political parties represent them well? Figures 50 and 51 show the linear regressions that look at the personal characteristics that make citizens more likely to hold a higher level of external efficacy and to have a more positive view of the representativeness of the political parties. No sociodemographic factor was found to be associated with external efficacy (the belief that those who govern are interested in people like them). The only predictor is political interest: respondents with more interest in politics are more likely to believe that those who govern them are interested in the common citizen.



Figure 50. Determinants of External Efficacy in Guatemala

Figure 51 shows that the only variable associated with the perception that political parties represent people is ethnic self-identification. Respondents who self-identified as indigenous are more likely to believe in political parties. Once again, the level of political interest turns out to be statistically significant: Guatemalans who display more interest in politics tend to feel better represented by political parties.



Figure 51. Determinants of the Belief in the Representativeness of Political Parties in Guatemala

III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination may also affect more abstract political attitudes. As discussed above, discrimination could be seen as a failure of the political system, and could lower support for the general political system. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we tap a number of more general political attitudes; the most important of these are support for the political system and support for democracy in the abstract. In Chapter Five we describe in detail how these are measured, as well as the levels of these attitudes across the region and over time within Guatemala. In the present section, we consider how personal characteristics and experiences of discrimination shape these attitudes that are so critical for democratic stability.

In Figure 52 we use linear regression analysis to assess what individual traits and reported experiences predict levels of support for the political system in Guatemala. In this case, the sociodemographic variables are statistically significant; respondents with higher education, those with darker skin and those who live in rural areas are more likely to support the political system. The level of interest in politics is also a predictor.



Figure 52. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Guatemala

Figure 53 shows a more detailed assessment of the factors that are related to the support for the political system in Guatemala. It can be observed that citizens with secondary education have higher levels of support, as well as those who live in rural areas. It can also be seen that respondents who self-identified as indigenous show higher levels of support. The relation between system support and skin color is rather uneven.



Figure 53. Factors Related to Support for the Political System in Guatemala

Having experiences of marginalization and discrimination might also have spillover effects on support for democracy in the abstract. In Figure 54 we use linear regression analysis to assess how the set of personal traits we reported above are associated with the belief that "democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government." Figure 54 shows the variables associated with more support for democracy in Guatemala. It can be seen that respondents who live in smaller cities or in the rural areas have higher support towards democracy. Additionally, women have slightly lower support. Citizens with more years of formal education and those who are interested in politics are more likely to support democracy. Those details are shown in Figure 55.



Figure 54. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Guatemala

Figure 55 shows in greater detail the variables that have been identified as significant in the previous linear regression analysis. Women are slightly less supportive of democracy than men; while the average support for democracy among women (in the 0-100 scale) is 59.7 points, the average support among men reaches 63.3 points. Education is another factor associated with higher support for democracy: as education increases so does support for democracy. Figure 55 also shows that the level of wealth of the individual does not seem to have an effect on the support for democracy.



Figure 55. Sociodemographic Factors Associated with Democracy in Guatemala

IV. Participation in Protests

Finally, as was discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups – at least those that are highly politicized – to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting may be becoming a more "normalized' method of political participation: "individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest."[17] The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked a series of questions about citizens' participation in political protests, the most important being question **PROT3**.

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]**
(88) DK **[Go to PROT6]** (98) DA **[Go to PROT6]**

Figure 56 shows the levels of participation in protests across several countries of the Americas. Seven percent of Guatemalans indicated that they participated in a protest in the past year. This result places Guatemala in an intermediate position in the region. While there are countries, particularly Bolivia and Haiti, where the level of participation is much higher, there are countries such as El

[17] Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. "The Normalization of Protest in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Salvador, Venezuela or even Mexico, in which the percentage of the population that participated in protests is smaller.



Figure 56. Participation in Protests in the Americas

Who participates in protests in Guatemala? Figure 57 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis used to determine the factors associated with the participation in protests. It can be seen that, again, education turns out to be a predictor, as well as ethnic self-identificacion and wealth. The level of political interest is also related in this type of political participation. Further details about these relationships between variables are discussed in Figure 58.



Figure 57. Determinants of Participation in Protests in Guatemala

Figure 58 illustrates the relationship between the participation in protests and some of the predictors shown in Figure 57. Respondents who self-identify as indigenous are more likely to participate in protests. The relationships between education and protests and level of wealth and protests are not clear in the figure. While the average participation in protests of those with more education is higher, the difference with other levels of education is not statistically significant. In the case of wealth, those with lower levels of wealth show higher levels of participation in protests, but the differences with other levels of wealth do not seem to be statistically significant in the figure. This can be related to the fact that only around 7% of the respondents indicated that they participated in protests.



Figure 58. Sociodemographic Factors and Participation in Protests in Guatemala

V. Conclusions

This chapter analyzes citizens' perception regarding their relationship with the political system. On the issue of internal efficacy—the understanding of the political system—Guatemalans receive an average of 42.5 points on the 0 to100 scale, among the lowest in the continent. Sociodemographic factors such as wealth, education and age are associated with greater perceived internal efficacy. The perception of internal efficacy increases as the levels of these three variables increase. In addition, those who express higher levels of political interest also possess a greater sense of internal efficacy.

Another related issue has to do with citizens' perception of whether those who govern listen and represent them well. Once again on the 0 to 100 scale, Guatemalans obtain an average of 31.7 points in this external efficacy measure. This result places Guatemala in a relatively low position on the continent. The average is even lower in relation to the perception that political parties listen to the average citizen. The 29.8 points obtained by Guatemalans in this regard place the country at the bottom of the regional list, although it is worth noting that in a majority of countries, the average that measures the perception of party representation is lower than the average measuring external efficacy. The level of political interest appears as a predictor of external efficacy and of the perception that political parties relate to the average citizen; people with higher levels of interest in political issues are more likely to believe that their government is interested in them and are thus more likely to feel represented by political parties.

This chapter also seeks to establish whether belonging to a group usually discriminated against (being female, being indigenous, or having darker skin) affects the level of support for the political

system or for democracy. It is also found that respondents who self-identify as indigenous show higher levels of support for the system. Additionally, respondents with higher education and those living in rural areas are also more likely to support the system. The level of political interest of a respondent also reappears as a predictor. With regard to the level of support for democracy, it is observed that women and those who reside in urban areas indicate slightly lower support. In addition, respondents with more years of formal study and those interested in politics are more likely to support democracy.

Finally, this chapter addresses the issue of participation in protests in several countries in the Americas. Seven percent of Guatemalans reported having participated in protests during the past year. This result places Guatemala at an intermediate level for the region. In Guatemala, the predictors of protest participation are ethnic self-identification, education, and wealth: those who identify themselves as indigenous and those with lower levels of wealth are more likely to participate in protests. There is a linear relationship between education level and participation in protests.

Table 5 shows a summary of the results obtained in Guatemala vis-a-vis other countries in Latin America.

Table 5. Comparison between Guatemala and Latin America in Issues of Political Efficacy and Representativeness

MEASURE	VARIABLE	REGION	GUATEMALA	
Average*	Perception of internal efficacy (feels that he/she understands the most important political issues in the country)	46.7	42.5	Lower
Average*	Perception of external efficacy (feels that those who govern are interested in common citizens)	38.3	32.7	Lower
Average*	Agreement with the statement "Political parties understand people like you"	33.7	29.8	Lower
Percentage	Participated in protests in the past 12 months	8.2 %	7.3 %	Lower

*0-100 scale

Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?[1]

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.



[1] For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support

This box reviews findings from the paper "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America," by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.[1] The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.[2] Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries





Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2010

[1] The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

[2] The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information

This box reviews findings from the 2012 report "Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results," by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.

The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.[1] As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.





Source: Baseline and Follow-Up Surveys

[1] This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement and Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime and Democracy

Dinorah Azpuru with Mollie Cohen y Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Two of the major challenges facing many countries in the Americas today are high crime rates and persistent public sector corruption. Since the 1990's, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.[1] Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres it was more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.[2]

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.[3] Others show, however, that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally.[4] Other scholars have also suggested that

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[1] See for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

[2] Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. En *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume y Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perception in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, y Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

[3] Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations.* New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

[4] Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perception of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political*

corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perception of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.[5] However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perception of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perception.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).[6] While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.[7] Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to immigrate to other countries.[8] Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who

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Studies; McCann, James A, and Jorge I. Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

[5] Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perception in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

[6] Global Study on Homicide. 2011. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html

[7] Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presentado en Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

[8] Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, y Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* (64). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996,[9] these items have been refined and improved. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).[10] This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

[9] Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates, y Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates.

[10] La pregunta **EXC20**, que trata de los sobornos pagados a los oficiales militares, su usó por primera vez en 2012.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[**DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]** **EXC20**. In the last twelve months, did any **soldier or military officer** ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Another item that taps perception of rather than experiences with corruption is also included in the questionnaire. The question reads as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

We recode this variable from 0-100, where 0 represents a perception that corruption is very uncommon, and 100 a perception that corruption is very common.

Perception of Corruption

Figure 59 shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas. The countries with the highest average levels of perceived corruption are Colombia and Trinidad & Tobago, with levels in the 80-point range; the lowest perceived corruption is in Suriname y Canada, where the average is 38.8 and 58.3, respectively. Guatemala is in an intermediate position with 69 points.



Figure 59. Perception of Corruption in the Americas

It is important to note that high levels of perceived corruption might not always correspond to high (or even rising) levels of corruption. Citizens' perception of corruption will depend, partially, on

whether governments attempt to raise public awareness campaigns about corruption, and on the media focus on anti-corruption measures, as well as on the existence of particular high-profile corruption cases. Thus, although perception of corruption might be high, actual victimization might be low. We turn to actual experiences with corruption victimization in the next section**.**

Corruption Victimization

This section addresses the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. To this end, we present in Figure 60 the percentage of respondents who report that they have been asked for a bribe in at least one location in the last year. The listing of specific questions can be seen above. The figure shows that in terms of corruption victimization Guatemala ranks among the first seven countries (out of 26). Twenty-four percent of Guatemalans, according to the data, were victims of corruption in the 12 months that preceded the survey (which was conducted between February and March of 2012). This means that almost one quarter of the population has been victimized. It is a high percentage, although much lower than the percentage of victimization in Haiti, Bolivia, Ecuador and even Mexico. But it is significantly higher than in most countries in the region.



Figure 60. Corruption Victimization in the Americas

The following figures show more details about corruption victimization in Guatemala. Some respondents were requested a bribe in more than one place, while others were only asked for a bribe in one place. Figure 61 shows that 75.9% of the respondents were not asked for a bribe in the past 12 months. Eighteen percent were asked for a bribe once. Thereafter, the percentage of those who were victimized decreases considerably. All in all 24.1% of the respondents were victimized.



Figure 61. Number of Instances of Corruption Victimization in Guatemala

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model to identify those socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that were positively and negatively associated with corruption victimization. Figure 62 displays the results of this regression for 2012 in Guatemala. The only characteristic that is associated with corruption is gender: women are less prone to be victims of corruption.



Figure 62. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Guatemala

To better grasp the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that an individual has been victimized by corruption, we present bivariate results in Figure 63. It is clear that gender influences victimization: 17.8% of female respondents indicated that they were victims of corruption, while 30.3% of male respondents reported being victims. Even though some differences can be observed with regards to education, age and wealth levels, those differences are not statistically significant.



Figure 63. Sociodemographic Factors Associated with Corruption Victimization in Guatemala

III. Perception of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The Americas Barometer measures citizens' perception of their safety by asking question **AOJ11**:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **un**safe?
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe
(4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

Since most of the crimes take place in urban areas, particularly in the capital cities, we decided to present the data about crime for 24 capitals in the region (the U.S. and Canada are not included due to sampling issues). Following LAPOP standard practices, responses were recoded on a 0-100 point scale, where higher values mean greater perceived insecurity. Figure 64 shows the results for perception of insecurity in the 24 capitals included in the 2012 survey. As can be seen, the levels of perceived insecurity are particularly high in Mexico City, Lima and Guatemala City, with averages above 50 points. Nonetheless, the differences between Guatemala City with cities such as Mexico City, Lima, Caracas, Port-au-Prince and La Paz are not statistically significant.



Figure 64. Perception of Insecurity in the Capital Cities of the Americas

In previous years, particularly in the case of Guatemala, we have found that important differences in terms of crime exist between urban and rural areas. Citizens who live in rural areas have a lower perception of insecurity, while Guatemalans who live in the metropolitan areas have the highest perception of insecurity. Figures 65 and 66 show the differences between the various regions of the country, as well as the difference between rural and urban areas. In the first figure it is clear that the metropolitan area has the highest average perception of insecurity (50.7) vis-a-vis the other regions of the country. In the second figure we can see that respondents who live in rural areas have a much lower perception of insecurity (32.7) in comparison with those who live in urban areas (44.4).



Figure 65. Perception of Insecurity by Region in Guatemala



Figure 66. Perception of Insecurity in Rural and Urban Areas in Guatemala

Once again, as it was mentioned in reference to corruption, it is important to take into account that high levels of perceived insecurity might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of crime. Thus, although perception of insecurity might be high, actual victimization might be low. We turn to a discussion of crime victimization in the next section.

IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare to individuals' experiences with crime? Since 2010, the Americas Barometer has used an updated series of items to measure crime victimization, which reads as follows:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?**[Read options]** (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality/canton (4) In another municipality/canton (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Figure 67 combines responses from **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR**. It can be seen that Quito and Tegucigalpa are the capitals with a higher level of crime victimization. On the other extreme, respondents in Panama, Belmopan, Kingston and Georgetown reported the lowest levels of victimization: less than 15% said that they were direct victims or that someone in their family was victimized by crime. In Guatemala City, 36.4% of the respondents reported being a direct victim, which places Guatemala as the third city with highest levels of direct victimization. A similar percentage (30.1%) reported that someone else in their household was a victim, which places Guatemala City in an intermediate position. It is important to remember, however, that our survey is only administered to adults of voting age or older, making it possible for youth crime victimization that family members do not know about to go underreported. It is also important to remember that responses are individuals' self-reported crime victimizations. In some contexts, certain crimes (particularly those that are perpetrated almost exclusively against particular marginalized groups) might be normalized and thus reported with less frequency than that with which they occur.



Figure 67. Direct Crime Victimization in the Capital Cities of the Americas



Figure 68. Household Crime Victimization in the Capital Cities of the Americas

With regards to where did the crimes take place, around a quarter of them (26.5%) happened in the neighborhood where the respondent lives. Most of them (34.5%) happened in the municipality where the respondent lives, and around 26.2% happened in other municipalities. Only 12.1% of the crimes took place in the respondent's house.

Figure 69 shows the differences in the levels of victimization by region in Guatemala. The results include the total victimization (the sum of direct victimization plus that suffered by the relatives of the respondent). In the metropolitan area almost half of the population (46.3%) was victimized. The percentages decrease sharply in other regions of the country.



Figure 69. Total Crime Victimization, by Region in Guatemala

As discussed in the previous section about insecurity, there are also marked differences in the levels of crime victimization between urban and rural areas. Figure 70 shows that 43% of the respondents who live in urban areas reported being direct victims of crime in the past 12 months or had a relative who was victimized. The percentage drops to 25.2% in rural areas.



Figure 70. Total Crime Victimization in Guatemala: Urban vs. Rural Areas

With regards to only direct victimization (that suffered by the respondent), Figure 71 shows that, again, there are differences between urban and rural areas. In the urban areas around 28.6% of the population reported being a victim. In contrast, only 14.1% of the population of rural areas were victimized.



Figure 71. Crime Victimization in Guatemala in 2012 (Only the Respondent)

It is also relevant to understand how crime victimization changed over time. This can be seen in the two following figures. Figure 72 shows the difference in self-reported crime victimization in 2010 and 2012. The results include direct victimization and victimization suffered by a relative in the household of the respondent. There were no statistically significant changes in Guatemala between 2010 and 2012. The decrease in crime victimization (from 38.9% to 33.5%) can be a product of other statistical factors and not necessarily a real decrease in victimization. Figure 73 shows only the reported direct victimization in 2010 and 2012. Once again, we can observe a slight decrease (from 23.3% to 20.8%), but this difference is not statistically significant either.

We must note that the text of the questions measuring crime victimization changed in 2010. Between 2004 and 2008, LAPOP used **VIC1**, which read: "Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?" In 2010 and 2012, this was replaced with **VIC1EXT**, which provided more detail on the types of crimes that may have occurred. This modification was intended to increase the validity of responses. The change in wording of the crime victimization questions might produce changes that are not really comparable and for that reason the results for previous years are not presented.



Figure 72. Total Crime Victimization in Guatemala: 2010 vs. 2012



Figure 73. Direct Crime Victimization in Guatemala (Only the Respondent): 2010 vs. 2012

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

Figure 74 shows the results of a logistic regression model assessing who is likely to be a victim of crime in Guatemala. Only those who indicated that they were direct victims are taken into account in this analysis. In this and all other regression charts, we standardize all variables. As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical green line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.

It is evident that in the case of Guatemala only the place of residence of the respondent is statistically significant: those who live in rural areas or in smaller cities are less likely to be victimized.



Figure 74. Determinants of Crime Victimization in Guatemala, 2012

To better understand the effect of the size of the residence of the respondent on crime victimization, Figure 75 shows the bivariate relation between victimization and size of place of residence. It is clear that the metropolitan area as well as large and medium size cities have significantly higher victimization rates than smaller cities and rural areas.



Figure 75. Direct Crime Victimization and Size of Place of Residence in Guatemala, 2012

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high rates of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perception of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in Guatemala? We now turn to a multivariate linear regression which estimates the impacts victimization and insecurity have on support for the political system. Figure 76 depicts the impacts of perception of and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.[11] As it can be seen there is a statistically significant relationship between the perception of corruption and the support for the system. Additionally, the size of the place of residence, the skin tone of the respondent, as well as his/her ethnic self-identification are also associated with system support. The direction of these relationships will be discussed ahead.

[11] System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.



Figure 76. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2012

Figure 77 goes into detail presenting the effects of certain independent variables on political system support. We can see a relationship between the perception of insecurity and system support: respondents who feel more unsafe have lower levels of support for the political system, although the relationship is not statistically significant. In the case of perception of corruption the relationship goes in the opposite direction: those who perceive more corruption grant more support to the system. This may be due to the fact that the survey was administered a few months after the change of government administration in Guatemala and therefore respondents may have been thinking of corruption in the former administration. Something similar may be happening with the perception of the national economy: those who feel that the economy is doing well give less support to the system. The only relationship that is statistically significant is the size of the place of residence of the respondent: those who live in rural areas have higher levels of support for the system than those who live in the metropolitan area. There is little difference between the rural areas and other cities that are not the capital. In general, those who live in other cities, beyond the metropolitan area, have higher levels of support towards the political system.



Figure 77. Variables Related to System Support in Guatemala, 2012

Figure 78 shows the relationship between system support and other variables. It can be observed that neither crime victimization nor corruption victimization seem to have an effect on the support for the political system. The gender of the respondent is not relevant either. However, the level of education is related, but in an uneven way. Guatemalans with secondary education show significantly higher support for the system.



Figure 78. Variables Related to Support for the System in Guatemala, 2012

Finally Figures 79 and 80 show the variation in system support according to skin tone and ethnic self-identification. In the first figure we can see that respondents with darker skin have lower levels of system support. Figure 80 shows that Guatemalans who self-identified as indigenous have higher levels of support for the system. This leads us to think that *ladino* Guatemalans with dark skin are the ones more likely to have low support for the system.



Figure 79. Skin Color and System Support in Guatemala



Figure 80. Ethnic Self-Identification and System Support in Guatemala

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section addresses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is often conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.[12] Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, those that perceive higher levels of crime and those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.[13] To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
(1) Should always abide by the law
(2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

[12] Véase, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.
[13] Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBaromenter Insights Series, 19*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Figure 81 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in each country of the Americas who express support for the rule of law, versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other authorities may act above the law. The highest support for the rule of law is found in countries in where over 70% of the population agrees with the statement that authorities should always respect the law. Among these countries are Jamaica, Venezuela and Panama. A second group falls in an intermediate category; in those countries over 60% of the respondents support the rule of law. Guatemala falls in this intermediate group since 66.4% of respondents said that authorities should always respect the law. The respondents felt that the authorities should always respect the laws. Among the countries where 55% or less of the population support the rule of law are Trinidad & Tobago, Bolivia and Ecuador.



Figure 81. Support for the Rule of Law in the Americas

Finally, this section examines the determinants of support for the rule of law in Guatemala. Figure 82 represents the results of a logistic regression used to identify those factors. It can be observed that the only variables associated with support for the rule of law in Guatemala are the size of the place of residence of the respondent, his/her age and the level of wealth.



Figure 82. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Guatemala, 2012

Figure 83 shows the detail of the relationship between the size of the place of residence of the respondent and his/her support for the rule of law. It is evident that support for the rule of law is lower in the metropolitan area, where it only reaches 42%. Support increases gradually, until it gets to 73.6% in rural areas. Generally speaking, the metropolitan area shows significantly lower support for the rule of law vis-a-vis the rest of the country. With regards to the other two variables associated with support for the rule of law we can see that respondents who are older are more supportive and, in addition, as levels of wealth decrease the support for the rule of law increases.



Figure 83. Support for the Rule of Law and Place of Residence, Guatemala 2012

VII. An Approximation at the Municipal Level

Studies conducted by CABI indicate that there are big differences in the levels of violence in the municipalities of Guatemala.[14] Using the homicide rate as a parameter, CABI created categories of more violent and less violent municipalities in the country. A study carried out by the Small Armas Survey and CERAC indicates that homicides have increased in certain municipalities in recent years, particularly in those with higher populations and those located in bordering and costal areas.[15]

Previous democratic culture reports could not include municipal level analysis because of the type of sample that was used. In 2012 some adjustments were made to the sample design, so that now it is possible to conduct analysis at the municipal level (of the municipalities included in the sample). Additionally, to find out if the characteristics of certain municipalities have an influence on the individual-level results obtained through the survey, it is necessary to use a technique called multi-level analysis. In 2012 a municipal-level indicator was added to the survey database in order to be able to conduct this type of analysis.

Figure 84 shows that there is great variation in the perception of insecurity in the municipalities included in the simple. While municipalities such as Villa Nueva, Guatemala, Chicacao, Mixco and

[14] Mendoza, Carlos A. 2012. *Tasas de Violencia Homicida a nivel Municipal, Guatemala 2011*. Central American Business Intelligence. http://ca-bi.com/blackbox/?p=6256, accesed el 28 de agosto, 2012.

[15] The study mentions that this distribution shows the transformation of violence during the armed conflicto into violence derived from organized crime, gangs and narcotraffick nowadays. See *Guatemala en la encrucijada: panorama de una violencia transformada*, Jorge A. Restrepo and Alonso Tobón García, Editors. Secretariado de la Declaración de Ginebra, Small Arms Survey, Ginebra: 2011.

Mazatenango have an average perception in the range of 60 points (on the 0-100 scale), municipalities such as Comapa and Jalapa have perceptions of insecurity barely reaching 20 points.[16]



Figure 84. Perception of Insecurity in Guatemala in 2012, by Municipality

[16] It is important to take into acount that given the size of the ssample at the municipal level, the possibility of error increases to +/- 20%. Therefore these results must be considered as an approximation.

The table shown in the appendix indicates that there is a significant variation in the perception of insecurity among municipalities. When the correlation coefficient is estimated, the analysis shows that 9% of the variance in the levels of insecurity can be explained by the differences between municipalities.

Finally, we discuss the multilevel analysis that allows us to identify the variables associated with the differences in the perception of insecurity in the municipalities of Guatemala. In addition to variables such as education, age and other characteristics of the individuals (level 1 variables), we include in the model a level 2 variable, the municipal Human Development Index provided by the United Nations Development Program in Guatemala. Table 6 shows first the HDI for the municipalities included in the AmericasBarometer sample.

Table 6. Human Development Index by Municipality in Guatemala, 2011

MUNICIPIO	IDH
Petapa	.8280
Guatemala	.8260
Mixco	.8260
Villa Nueva	.8040
Quetzaltenango	.7840
Antigua Guatemala	.7790
Chinautla	.7730
Huehuetenango	.7560
Panajachel	.7540
San Pedro Ayampuc	.7190
San Juan Sacatepéquez	.7160
Villa Canales	.7050
Chimaltenango	.6980
Mazatenango	.6800
Coatepeque	.6790
Escuintla	.6470
El Progreso	.6450
San José	.6420
Alotenango	.6360
Sololá	.6350
Siquinalá	.6330
Santa Criz del Quiché	.6320
San Martín Zapotitlán	.6310
Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa	.6190
Taxisco	.6180
San Andrés Itzapa	.6070
Jutiapa	.6000
San Agustín Acasaguastlán	.5970
Cobán	.5970
Nuevo Progreso	.5960
Barberena	.5960
Jalapa	.5890
El Palmar	.5860
La Libertad (Petén)	.5830
La Libertad (Huehuetenango)	.5740
Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez	.5670
Dolores	.5670
Cuilco	.5620
Los Amates	.5610
El Estor	.5500
El Tumbador	.5460
Chicacao	.5450
San Pedro Carchá	.5240
Cubulco	.5220
Concepción Chiquirichapa	.5190
Colotenango	.5130
Chahal	.4970
Zacualpa	.4940
Tucurú	.4610
San Pedro Pinula	.4420
Nebaj	.4390
Comapa	.4360
Jocotán	.4000
Comitancillo	.3980
Santa María Chiquimula .	.3800

Includes only the municipalities that are part of the AmericasBarometer Sample in 2012.
Source: UNDP

The following table shows the results of the level I and level II predictors. It shows that the municipal HDI has a statistically significant relation with the perception of insecurity. Other variables that have an incidence of the perception of insecurity are ethnic self-identification, the level of wealth and the size of the place of residence of the respondent.

Log likelihood		-7030.1138		Prob > chi2 =		0.0000
Percepción de inseguridad	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>z	95% Conf.	Interval
IDH municipio	24.2259	11.76847	2.06	**0.040**	1.160115	47.29168
Educación	-.2861257	.2035412	-1.41	0.160	-.6850591	.1128078
Edad	-.0432397	.0515685	-0.84	0.402	-.1443121	.0578328
Género (mujer)	2.249535	1.425229	1.58	0.114	-.5438627	5.042933
Autoidentificación étnica (Indigenous)	1.171395	1.852553	0.63	**0.527**	-2.459543	4.802333
Riqueza	-.7842244	.6086407	-1.29	**0.198**	-1.977138	.4086894
Tamaño de la ciudad	3.11838	.7876671	3.96	**0.000**	1.574581	4.662179
constante	22.35769	7.572756	2.95	0.003	7.515363	37.20002

Figure 85 shows the relationship between the Human Development Index at the municipal level and the perception of insecurity. Although the relationship is not linear, it can be seen that the perception of insecurity is higher in the municipalities with higher HDI vis-à-vis the municipalities with lower HDI.



Figure 85. Perception of Insecurity and Human Development Index in Guatemala

VIII. Conclusions

This chapter analyzes diverse issues related to the rule of law, including the magnitude and impact of victimization by crime and corruption, as well as perception of insecurity and corruption, and levels of support for the political system and the rule of law itself. The survey shows that in general, the citizens of the Americas tend to perceive high levels of corruption. Guatemala is located in an intermediate position with a corruption perception average of 69 points. In terms of victimization by corruption, 23.5% of the Guatemalan population self-identified as a victim of an act of corruption in the 12 months preceding the survey. The only feature associated with victimization by corruption is gender: women are less likely to experience it.

Comparisons using perception of insecurity and victimization by crime are made solely at the capital city level for the countries of the Americas. Guatemala City ranks as one of the capitals with higher levels of both perception of insecurity and direct victimization by crime. In both cases, the Guatemalan capital ranks third out of the 26 cities included in the 2012 survey. In terms of victimization of a family member living in the respondent's home, however, Guatemala holds an intermediate position.

Detailed analysis in the case of Guatemala shows that the metropolitan area has the highest average perception of insecurity (50.7 points) and is followed by those living in urban areas (44.4) and those living in rural areas (32.7). This chapter also includes multilevel analysis in order to determine

the extent to which certain municipal characteristics are associated with varying perception of insecurity. It is found that a relationship exists between the municipal Human Development Index at the municipal level in Guatemala and perception of insecurity. Although the relationship is not linear, it is observed that in municipalities with a higher HDI score, there is a greater perception of insecurity as compared to those municipalities with low HDI scores. With regards to total victimization by crime (the sum of direct victimization plus the victimization suffered by relatives in the home), there is variance according to the area of residence of respondents. In the metropolitan area, nearly half of the population (46.3%) indicated having been a victim. The percentages are drastically reduced in other regions of the country. With respect to direct victimization (common crime experienced solely by the respondent), 28.6% of the population of urban areas indicated having been a victim of common crime. In contrast, in rural parts of the country, only 14.1% of the population experienced direct victimization.

An analysis of the impact of the perception of victimization by corruption or common crime in the political system shows that the only variable statistically associated with a decrease in support for the political system is the perception of corruption.

Finally, this chapter addresses the issue of support for the rule of law as measured by the belief that authorities should never act above the law. Guatemala falls at an intermediate level, given that in 2012, 66.4% of respondents felt that the authorities should always respect the law. The only factors that relate to support for the rule of law are the size of a respondent's residence, a respondent's age, and his or her level of wealth. Support for rule of law is lower in the metropolitan area, where support only reaches 42%. Form there, support gradually increases until peaking at 73.6% in rural areas.

Table 7 shows the results obtained in Guatemala in comparison with other countries in Latin America.

Table 7. Comparison between Guatemala and Latin America in Issues Related to the Rule of Law

MEDICIÓN	VARIABLE	REGION	GUATEMALA	
Average*	Perception of corruption	71.8	69.0	Lower
Percentage	Corruption victimization	23.0 %	23.5 %	Similar
Average*	Perception of insecurity	39.4	38.2	Similar
Percentage	Crime victimization (direct, only the respondent), national level	19.4 %	20.8 %	Similar
Percentage	Crime victimization (someone else in the household), country level	20.5 %	20.7 %	Similar
Percentage	Total crime victimization (respondent and someone else in the household)	31.8 %	33.5 %	Higher
Percentage	Support for rule of law	64.3%	66.4%	Higher

***Scale 0-100**

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

Dinorah Azpuru with Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,[1] others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.[2] Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.[3]

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.[4] While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.[5] This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians' proximity to citizens' policy preferences have an important effect on citizens' attitudes about the political system.[6] Institutional variables have also been

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[1] Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial; Przeworski Adam. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense," en Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P.1991., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

[2] Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America". *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[3] Also see Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Sidney Verba. 1963 *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

[4] Easton, David. 1975."A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29.

[5] Booth and Seligson. 2009.*The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

[6] Almond and Verba *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski, Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008 "Income and Democracy," *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 : 808-842; Kotzian, Peter, 2011 "Public

shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.[7]

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.[8] In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.[9]

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."[10] Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.[11] Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perception of high levels of threat,[12] an authoritarian personality,[13] or religion.[14] At the

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support for liberal democracy," *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1: 23 -41. Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4 : 485-514.

[7] Anderson, Christopher. 2007., *Losers' consent : elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

[8] Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[9] Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[10] Seligson, Mitchell. 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, 2.

[11] Gibson, James L. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L.2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L.1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3: 819-850; Gibson, James L.1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual freedom," *Political GeoFigurey* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

[12] Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al. 2005 "Threat,

macro level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.[15] Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.[16] LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.[17]

Research by Golebiouwska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.[18] It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in Table 8. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 : 593-608; Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, y Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978.

[13] Altemeyer Bob. 2007., *The Authoritarians*.

[14] Postic, Robert K.2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest, 2007); Stouffer, Samuel A.1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc,).

[15] Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[16] Peffley, Mark y Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257.

[17] Lodola, Germán and Margarita Corral.2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[18] Golebiouwska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" en Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

Table 8. Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High tolerance	Low tolerance
High system support	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low system support	Unstable democracy	Democracy at risk

It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 AmericasBarometer data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.[19]

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's "system support" index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. **B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read*:*** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas? In Figure 86, we present the levels of political support in 2012. The average support varies from 41.4 points in Honduras to 61.7 in Belize. Guatemala obtains 52.3 points, a result on the intermediate-lower range, which places Guatemala above nine countries.

[19] Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Also see Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).



Figure 86. Support for the Political System in the Americas

As it was explained earlier, the index of system support is formed by several individual dimensions. Support for the political system is typically higher on some of the individual dimensions of the index than on others. In Figure 87, we present the levels of agreement in Guatemala with each of the five components of system support. The component that obtains highest support is the one related to the respect for institutions with 59.6 points, while the component with the lowest support is the one that asks if institutions protect the basic rights of Guatemalans, which only gets an average of 45.4 points.



Figure 87. Components of System Support in Guatemala, 2012

The predictors of system support were discussed in Chapter 4. In summary, the following variables are associated with support for the political system in Guatemala: the perception of corruption as well as the size of the place of residence, the ethnic self-identification and skin tone of the respondents. With regards to the perception of corruption, those who perceive more corruption are more supportive of the system. The relationship between the size of the place of residence is more clear; those who live in rural areas have higher levels of system support than those who live in the metropolitan area. Respondents with darker skin color have lower levels of system support and Guatemalans who self-identified as indigenous have higher levels of support. This can lead us to think that ladino Guatemalans with darker skin are the ones who show lower support towards the political system.[20]

The support for the system has been measured for several years in Guatemala. Figure 88 shows the results obtained since 2004. In 2012 the support for the system increased slightly in Guatemala vis-à-vis previous years and reached the levels of support of 2006.

[20] The figures that show these relationships between the different independent variables and political system support are displayed in Chapter 4.



Figure 88. Support for the Political System in Guatemala 2004-2012

III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the Americas Barometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Belizean form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Belizean form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all LAPOP indices, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance

Figure 89 shows the results for political tolerance across the Americas. The average tolerance varies greatly in the different countries. In the Americas, the country with highest average tolerance is the United States, followed by Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana and Canada. The Latin American country with the highest average tolerance is Uruguay. At the other extreme, the country with lowest tolerance is Honduras, whose average is only 36.6 points. Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Haiti and Bolivia also get low average tolerance, but all get better results than Honduras. Just above those countries is Guatemala, in an intermediate-lower position with 47.3 points.



Figure 89. Political Tolerance in the Americas

Figure 90 shows the results for Guatemala in each of the components of political tolerance. In two of the dimensions Guatemalans show more tolerance: the right of others to vote and the right to participate in peaceful demonstrations, with 50.8 and 51.1 points respectively. The difference with the other two dimensions is statistically significant: Guatemalans are less open to the idea of others having freedom of expression (43.1 points) or running for public office (43.6 points).



Figure 90. Components of Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2012

How has tolerance evolved over time in Guatemala? Figure 91 shows the average levels of political tolerance in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Tolerance in 2012 decreases slightly (47.3) vis-à-vis 2010 (50.2), but the difference is not statistically significant. The year with highest average tolerance was 2006, while the year with lowest tolerance was 2008.



Figure 91. Political Tolerance in Guatemala 2004-2012

What factors influence political tolerance in Guatemala? Figure 92 shows the results of a linear regression model to answer this question. The variables that are associated with tolerance according to this model are education, the size of the place of residence, skin tone and the self-identification of the respondent. Other factors that are not sociodemographic characteristics, but also turned out to be associated with tolerance are support for democracy and the perception of the personal economic situation. The direction of these relationships will be discussed ahead.



Figure 92. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2012

In the following figures we examine in detail the results discussed earlier, showing the relationships between political tolerance and the variables that turned out to be predictors of tolerance. Figure 93 shows that higher levels of education are correlated with more tolerance among Guatemalans. It can also be seen that in the metropolitan area the average tolerance is higher and that it diminishes as the size of the place of residence becomes smaller; in rural areas the average tolerance is significantly lower than in the metropolitan area. Another relationship that becomes evident in Figure 93 is that those who have higher levels of support for democracy also show more tolerance. Additionally, respondents who perceive their personal economic situation as good are more likely to be tolerant.



Figure 93. Variables Related to Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2012

Figure 94 shows the relationship between tolerance and skin tone and Figure 95 shows the relationship between tolerance and ethnic self-identification. Respondents with lighter skin tone have lower levels of tolerance vis-à-vis those with darker skin. There is a less marked difference between those who self-identified as indigenous, whose average tolerance is 48.4 and those who identified themselves as ladinos, whose average tolerance is 46.3 points.



Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Figure 94. Tolerance and Skin Color in Guatemala



Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Figure 95. Tolerance and Ethnic Self-Identification in Guatemala

IV. Democratic Stability

As explained in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are critical for democratic stability. The ideal combination for democratic stability is to have citizens who show support for the system, at the same time that they have high levels of political tolerance. Figure 96 shows the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes. The most stable country in the region is, according to this figure, Canada, where 51.5% of its citizens have attitudes conducive to stable democracy. Guyana and the United States are next, although the difference between Canada and the United States is statistically significant. It is worth noting, however, that even in these two countries that are considered advanced democracies, only about half of the population have the correct attitudes leading to a stable democracy as previously mentioned. Among Latin American countries Uruguay is at the top with 42.6% of the respondents having the correct combination leading to stable democracy. At the other extreme are Honduras and Haiti, where only 7.2% and 10.7% of the respondents have the desired combination. Bolivia and Peru also have results that can be a cause for concern: only 15.6% and 15.8% respectively. Guatemala falls in an intermediate-low position with 24.7% of the respondents supporting a stable democracy, a result that is similar to that of Dominican Republic, Venezuela and Mexico.



Figure 96. Citizens with Attitudes Conducive to Stable Democracy in the Americas

How has the percentage of Guatemalans with the combination of attitudes that is most compatible with stable democracy evolved over time? In Figure 97, we present the percent of citizens with high levels of both system support and tolerance since 2004. It can be observed that in 2012 the percentage of citizens in the stable democracy category increased slightly, but the differences with 2010 are not statistically significant. In any case, the percentage has been increasing since 2008, when it had fallen to 18.5%.



Figure 97. Citizens with Attitudes Conducive to Stable Democracy in Guatemala: 2004-2012

What factors make a difference with regards to citizens who have attitudes that are conducive to a stable democracy? Figure 98 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis. If a respondent has a higher level of education and if he/her identifies as an indigenous Guatemalan the respondent is more likely to have the right attitudes. The perception of corruption is also related.



Figure 98. Determinants of Attitudes Conducive to Stable Democracy in Guatemala, 2012

To explore in greater detail the determinants of support for stable democracy in Guatemala, we prepared Figure 99. We can see that Guatemalans with higher levels of education are more likely to have attitudes that are conducive to stable democracy. In addition, we observe that respondents who self-identified as indigenous have higher levels of support for stable democracy vis-à-vis those who self-identified as ladinos; the difference between both is statistically significant. These results seem to show that those who are less likely to have the right attitudes conducive towards stable democracy are ladinos with lower levels of education.



Figure 99. Variables Related to Attitudes towards Stable Democracy in Guatemala, 2012

V. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in Guatemala support major political and social institutions? In the AmericasBarometer's 2012 round, we asked about attitudes towards many specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," we asked citizens to respond to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?

The next four figures show the levels of citizen trust (support). We examine support for several institutions included in the 2012 survey. As usual in the reports of AmericasBarometer, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Figure 100 includes the non-political institutions, which are evaluated to be able to use them as parameters of comparison with political institutions. We can see that the Catholic and Evangelical churches obtain high levels of support. Mass media and the private sector obtain lower averages of support vis-à-vis the churches.



Figure 100. Trust in Non-Political Institutions in Guatemala, 2012

Figure 101 shows the results for the institutions that are considered part of the justice sector, in addition to a generic question that asks the respondents to indicate how much trust they have in the justice sector in general. It can be seen that the Ombudsman office generates the highest level of trust with 51.2 points on the 0-100 scale. Most of the justice sector institutions obtain similar results, in the range of 40 points. The only institiution that is statistically lower than the rest is the National Civil Police, which obtains an average trust of 34.9.



Figure 101. Trust in the Justice Sector Institutions in Guatemala, 2012

Figure 102 includes other political institutions. It can be observed that the Armed Forces (Ejército) obtain the highest levels of citizens' trust, followed by the municipality of the respondent and the current president of the country (Otto Pérez Molina when the survey was conductd in the first semester of 2012). The average trust for all of them is over 50 points. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the elections, as well as Congress, are in the range of 40 points. Political parties get 36.1 points.



Figure 102. Trust in Political Institutions in Guatemala, 2012

Finally, Figure 103 shows the results for all institutions together, in order to have a global perspective. It is clear that only the Catholic church, the Evangelical church and the Army obtain averages that are significantly higher than the rest. At the other extreme, only the political parties and the National Civilian Police are, in statistical terms, significantly below other institutions, with results in the range of 30 points on the 0-100 point scale used in this study. It is important to recall that generally, in this scale, it is considered that positive results are those above 50 points.



Figure 103. Confidence in Institutions in Guatemala in 2012

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, we measure support for democracy by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,[21] and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Miller.[22] The "Churchillian" question again uses a 7 point response scale, this time running from 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 7 ("Strongly agree"):

[21] Churchill actually referred to democracy as "the worst form of government except for all the others."
[22] Rose, Richard and William Mishler 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy andIts Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In Figure 104, we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. The majority of countries, with the exception of Honduras, show support levels above 60 points on the 0-100 point scale, which means that in general there is positive opinion towards democracy in the region. However there are differences that are statistically significant between countries. The countries where support for democracy is highest are Uruguay, Venezuela and Argentina, which obtain results in the range of 80 points. A relatively large group of 13 countries obtain positive results in the range of 60 points. Finally, nine countries fall in the range of 60 points, among them is Guatemala, which is almost at the end of the list with 61.7 points. It is important to note that there are differences that are statistically significant, even among this latter group of countries, Guatemala and El Salvador for instance.



Figure 104. Support for Democracy in the Americas in 2012

VII. Conclusions

This chapter discusses the issue of legitimacy, an issue central to political science. Legitimacy in this study is also referred to as "support for the political system" and is measured through a series developed by LAPOP several years prior. The average system support on the 0-100 point scale varies across the continent, hitting its lowest point in Honduras (41.4 points) and reaching its highest point in Belize (61.7 points). Guatemala scores 52.3 points, a low-to-intermediate level score placing the country above 9 others, but below another 16.

Political tolerance was also discussed in this chapter. It is noted that the Latin American country showing the highest level of tolerance is Uruguay with 64.4 points. At the other end, the country with the lowest level of support is Honduras with only 36.6 points. Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Haiti, and Bolivia also receive low scores but all of which are statistically higher than the one obtained by Honduras. Guatemala is located just above these countries at a low-to-intermediate tolerance average of 47.3 points.

Among the variables associated as much with system support as with tolerance are education level and ethnic self-identification of a respondent. Education level produces mixed results, as respondents with higher levels of education are more tolerant yet are also the least supportive of the political system. In the case of ethnic self-identification, there is a clearer relationship: indigenous Guatemalans show both greater tolerance and greater support for the political system.

Adding the level of tolerance and the support for the political system can determine the attitudes conducive to a stable democracy. Guatemala falls on a middle-low level in terms of support for a stable democracy, with 24.7% of respondents indicating such support. In 2012, the percentage of Guatemalan citizens located in said category increased slightly from 2010, although the difference is not statistically significant—the percentage has been increasing since 2008, when support had fallen to 18.5% of the population.

This chapter also measures the legitimacy of various institutions, asking respondents how much confidence they had in their respective countries' institutions. On the scale of 0-100, the only political institutions that obtained results in the range of 50 points were the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Army, and the respective municipality of a respondent. Most institutions experienced an average confidence in the range of 40 points. The only exceptions were the National Civil Police and the political parties, which received averages of 34 and 36 points, respectively. Other non-political institutions such as churches and the media did receive averages above 50 points.

Finally, this chapter measures the support for democracy in the Americas through a question that asks a respondent whether or not democracy, despite its shortcomings, is the best possible system. A majority of countries with the exception of Honduras have levels of support for democracy well above 60 points on the 0-100 point scale. Guatemala falls near the bottom of the list of countries with a score of 61.7 points.

A summary of the results obtained in Guatemala in comparison with other countries in Latin America is presented in Table 9.

Table 9. Comparison between Guatemala and Latin America in Issues Related to Democracy

MEASUREMENT	VARIABLE	REGION	GUATEMALA	
Average*	Support for the political system	51.9	52.3	Higher
Average*	Political tolerance	50.7	47.3	Lower
Percentage	Citizens whose attitudes are conducive to stable democracy	23.8 %	24.7 %	Higher
Average*	Support for democracy	70.5	61.7	Lower

***Scale 0-100**

Chapter Six: Local Government

Dinorah Azpuru with Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.[1] This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.[2] Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.[3] Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.[4] Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.[5] However, others argue that local politics do not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take

[1] Rondinelli, Dennis, Nellis, John, and Cheema, Shabbir (1983). *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience.* World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.
[2] Huntington, Samuel (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
[3] Faguet, Jean-Paul (2004). Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.
[4] Akain, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo (2002). "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.
[5] Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta (2002). "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.[6] Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.[7] Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.[8]

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.[9] Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.[10] Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities. Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.[11] Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.[12] So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.[13]

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.[14] Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women

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[6] Bardhan, Pranab (2002). "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

[7] Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen (1999). "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

[8] Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto (2005). "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

[9] Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell (2003). "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

[10] Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca (2008). "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

[11] Hirschmann, Albert (1970). Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[12] Hayek, Friedrich (1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

[13] West, *ibid*; p. 4.

[14] West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. (2008). "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. (2009). "Indigenous

participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.[15] West uses the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.[16] In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region.

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years. We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Lastly, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.[17] Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.[18] In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perception of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.[19] Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.[20]

II. Participation at the Local Level

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

[15] Patterson, Amy (2002). "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

[16] West, *ibid*.

[17] Montalvo, Daniel (2009a). "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10.

[18] Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

[19] Montalvo, Daniel (2009b). "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14.

[20] Montalvo, Daniel (2010). "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35.

Local Meeting Attendance

In Figure 105 we examine the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who say they have attended a local meeting in the past year. We can see that the percentage of citizens who have attended meetings of their local government is relatively low. Haiti is the country with the highest attendance (21.2%). Guatemala is also among the countries with high levels of attendance (15.2%), although the difference with Haiti is statistically significant. Several countries fall in the range of Guatemala; the significant differences begin with Nicaragua, where less than 10.5% of the population indicated that they attend these meetings. The country with the lowest levels of attendance is Chile with 4.1%.



Figure 105. Participation in Municipal Meetings in the Americas

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years in Guatemala? Figure 106 shows the levels of participation since 2004. The percentage is basically the same in 2012 as it was in 2010; both are slightly higher than in 2004, but the difference is not statistically significant.



Figure 106. Participation in Municipal Meetings in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Figure 107 shows the difference in participation in urban and rural areas in Guatemala in 2012. In the rural areas there is a higher level of participation with 17.6%, whereas in urban areas only 12.1% of the population participates in municipal meetings. In any case, even taking into account only the participation in urban areas, the percentage is higher than in many countries in the Americas.



Figure 107. Participation in Municipal Meetings in Guatemala in 2012, by Residence

Requests Presented to Local Governments

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who makes requests or demands of their local government. In Figure 108 we analyze question **NP2** to present the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have made a request or demand of some person or agency in local government in the past year. In Guatemala, 14.3% of the population indicated that they had presented demands or requests to their municipality. The percentage is not significantly different from the rest of the Americas, with the exception of Haiti, where the percentage is significantly higher (21.3%). At the other end, some countries do have significantly lower percentages, even lower than 10%. It is interesting that in Chile, as in Guatemala, around 14.2% of the respondents indicated that they presented requests to their municipality, although in Chile a significantly lower percentage indicated that they attended local government meetings.



Figure 108. Requests Made to Local Governments in the Americas in 2012

How has local demand making evolved over time? In Figure 109 we examine the percentage of citizens making demands since 2004. As can be observed, the percentage of Guatemalans who made requests in 2012 is slightly lower than in 2010, but the differences with 2010 or previous years are not statistically significant.



Figure 109. Requests Made to Local Governments in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Finally, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens' demands and requests were satisfied. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said that they had made a demand or request. These responses can provide an important window on the quality of services municipalities provide, at least from citizens' perspectives. In Figure 110 we examine responses to question **MUNI10** in Guatemala.



Figure 110. Resolution of Demands Made to Local Governments in Guatemala, 2012

Who chooses to make demands of local government? In Figure 111 we develop a logistic regression model to examine some of the factors that may affect local demand-making in Guatemala. We see that several sociodemographic factors (age, gender and education) play a role in whether citizens make more or less requests. The size of the place of residence of the respondents and whether or not he/she attended municipal meetings are also variables that turn out to be related to demand-making towards local governments. More details about these relationships will be discussed ahead.



Figure 111. Determinants of Demand-Making to Local Governments in Guatemala, 2012

In Figure 112 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand-making to local governments and a number of important factors assessed in the logistic regression analysis. There is an important difference in the percentage of men and women who made requests to their municipal government: while 18.6% of men made a request, only 9.9% of women did. There is also a marked difference between those who attended a meeting of the local government and those who didn't. Around 40% of respondents who reported attending a government meeting made a request to the municipality, whereas only 9.7% of those who did not attend a meeting made a request. This relationship can have two explanations: those who present requests attend meetings in order to follow up with their requests, or those who attend meetings are more motivated to make requests.



Figure 112. Factors Associated with Demand-Making on Local Government in Guatemala, 2012

Finally, in this section, we present the bivariate relation among demand-making and age as well as education in Guatemala in 2012 (Figure 113). It is clear that middle-age respondents (particularly the group between 35 and 55 years old), as well as respondents with higher levels of education, are more likely to make demands on their local government. In both cases there is a linear relationship.



Figure 113. Sociodemographic Factors and Demand-Making on Local Government in Guatemala, 2012

III. Satisfaction and Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2012 round featured three new questions that tapped satisfaction with particular services typically delivered by local governments.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dis**satisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA

Finally, the last question, which measures trust, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot."

B32. To what extent do you trust the municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Figure 114 we examine citizens' average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question **SGL1**. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses been recoded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Guatemala ranks in an intermediate-high position with an average of 53.9 points, which can be considered as positive, although not ideal. The country in the region where people are more satisfied with the services to their local goverment is Canada, with 59.5, followed closely by Argentina with an average of 59.1 points. The country where satisfaction is the lowest is Haiti with an average of 37.6 points.



Figure 114. Satisfaction with Municipal Government Services in the Americas

Figure 115 provides more information about the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with their local government in Guatemala. We can see that 33% of the respondents have a good or very good opinion about the services provided and only 17% consider them bad or very bad. Half of the population, exactly 50.1%, considers that the services provided are fair (nor good nor bad).



Figure 115. Assessment of Local Government Services in Guatemala, 2012

How has the satisfaction with the services of the municipal government evolved in Guatemala in recent years? Figure 116 shows the trend since 2004. In 2012 the satisfaction of Guatemalans with the services of their local government did not vary in a significant way. Satisfaction has in fact, remained very stable in the past eight years.



Figure 116. Assessment of Local Government Services in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with their local government, but also whether they trusted that government. This question may tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 117 we present average levels of trust in local government across the Americas. Guatemala gets 54.6 average points, a result that again places the country in an intermediate-high position. There are two countries that statistically obtain better results than Guatemala: Venezuela and Chile. The countries with 49 or less average points are statistically below Guatemala. The country with the lowest average trust in the local government is Haiti with only 35.3 points.



Figure 117. Trust in Local Government in the Americas, 2012

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on System Support

As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government except for local government. As a result, perception of local government may have an important impact on attitudes towards the political system more generally. In Figure 118 we develop a linear regression model to examine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in Guatemala, while controlling for many other factors that may affect system support. It is evident that the assessment of the services provided by the local government has a slight impact on the levels of support for the political system; however the trust in the local government has greater incidence. Respondents who have more trust in their municipal government have significantly higher support for the political system, Figure 119 shows that relationship. There are other factors that also contribute to system support, such as education and the size of the place of residence, but those factors were discussed in previous chapters.



Figure 118. Trust in the Local Government and Support for the Political System in Guatemala

Figure 119 shows the bivariate relationship between trust in the local government and support for the political system in Guatemala. There is a clear linear relationship: more trust in the local government is associated with higher support for the system.



Figure 119. Trust in the Municipal Government and Support for the Political System in Guatemala

The 2012 AmericasBarometer survey includes three questions to determine the level of satisfaction with different specific services.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dis**satisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA

The following figures show the levels of satisfaction with the condition of the highways, the quality of public schools and health services in the Americas.[21] In the case of Guatemala, the local government is not involved in the provision of health or education services, and it is only partially involved in the maintenance of the streets and highways.[22]

[21] The responsibility for the provision of this type of services can vary across the countries of the Americas. In the case of Guatemala these services are provided by the national government and not by the local government.

[22] In general, the municipalities as well as the Ministerio de Comunicaciones, Infraestructura y Vivienda (MICIVI) are involved, because there are different categories of routes, and the Central American routes, the national routes and the departament roads are a responsibility of the Ministry of Communications, but thre are smaller roads that are the responsibility of the municipality. There is a gray zone when the highways go across urban areas, because the MICIVI is

Figure 120 shows the satisfaction with "vías, carreteras y autopistas" (roads, highways and freeways) according to the answers to question **SD2NEW2**. As usual in this report, the answers have been recoded to a 0-100 point scale in which 0 means low satisfaction and 100 very high satisfaction. Guatemala gets 47.3 average points in that scale, which places the country in an intermediate-low position. The country with the lowest average satisfaction is Jamaica (with an average of 34.9 points), while Ecuador gets the highest average satisfaction with the state of the roads (60.8 points).



Figure 120. Satisfaction with the State of the Roads in the Americas

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not involved, even if they are major highways. In order to talk specifically about the roads that are the responsibility of the municipality the question should ask about "calles, avenidas y otras vías municipales". In regard to education, this is not a responsibility of the municipal goverments, although some invest in infrastructure, but they are managed by the Ministry of Education. Finally, in regard to health services, the Ministry of Health is responsible for the hospitals and health centers, but some municipalities manage pharmacies and "dispensarios municipales". Interview with arquitect Rodolfo Azpuru, Urban Consultant.

Figure 121 shows the level of satisfaction with the public schools, which derives from the answers provided by respondents to question **SD3NEW2**. Guatemala gets an average of 48.9 points, which places the country among those with lowest satisfaction (in the range of 40 points).[23] The country where citizens are most satisfied with the public schools is Costa Rica, with an average of 64.1 average points and the lowest is Chile with an average of 42.8.



Figure 121. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Americas

Finally, Figure 122 shows the satisfaction with the health services provided by the government, derived from the answers to question **SD6NEW2**. Guatemala obtains an average of 44.6 points, which ranks the country in an intermediate-low position, under countries with averages in the range of 60

[23] It is important to remember that in Guatemala, particularly in the Metropolitan area, there are options of private education that are used by the middle and upper class. The same happens with health services.

points, but above countries whose averages are in the range of 30 points. Once again Costa Rica is ahead with regards to the provision of these services in the Americas, although Panama and Ecuador obtain similar results.



Figure 122. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Americas

V. Conclusions

This chapter focuses on analyzing the relationship between citizens and their local government. One of the questions in the survey asked citizens in each country in the Americas to indicate whether they had attended a town meeting within the past year. In Guatemala, 15.2% of citizens indicated that they participated. In analyzing the participation in municipal meetings since 2004, it becomes evident that the percentage of attendance has not changed in any statistically significant manner. Among the predictors of participation in municipal meetings, it appears that there are significant differences between urban and rural areas of the country. Rural areas, with a 17.6% participation rate, have higher

levels of municipal involvement than urban areas, where only 12.1% of the population reported participation. In any event, even when taking into account only the population of the urban areas, the participation rate in Guatemala is higher than in many countries in the Americas.

Fourteen percent of Guatemalans indicated that they had presented requests to their municipality. This percentage does not vary significantly from the other countries on the continent. There is a marked difference in the percentage of men and women who requested help from the local government, with 18.6% of men submitting an application, but only 9.9% of women doing so. There is also an observable difference between those who attended a meeting of the local government and those who did not. Among respondents who attended a municipal meeting, 40% submitted an application, whereas only 9.7% of non-attendees indicated having done so.

Another question related to the issue of local government asked respondents to indicate their level of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government. Guatemala falls at a mid-to-high level for the region, with a satisfaction average of 53.9 points that can be considered positive, but not ideal. Guatemalans' satisfaction with local government did not change significantly in 2012 and has remained stable over the last eight years.

Finally, this chapter discusses the level of trust towards local government. Guatemala averaged 53.9 points in this category and fell at a mid-to-high level relative to the other countries in the Americas. A regression analysis allowed us to determine that the evaluation of a local government's performance does not influence support for the political system in any significant manner; although confidence in the local government does correlate strongly to the level system support: those respondents with greater confidence in local government have significantly higher levels of support for the political system.

Table 10 contains a summary of the results for Guatemala vis-à-vis other countries of Latin America.

Table 10. Comparison between Guatemala and Latin America in Issues Related to Local Government

MEASUREMENT	VARIABLE	REGION	GUATEMALA	
Percentage	Attendance to municipal meetings	10.4 %	15.2 %	Higher
Percentage	Demand-making to local governments	12.5 %	14.3 %	Higher
Average*	Satisfaction with services provided by the local government	51.4	53.9	Higher
Average*	Trust in municipal government (of the municipality where the respondent lives)	50.2	54.6	Higher

***Scale 0-100**

Part III:
Twenty Years of Democratic Culture

Chapter Seven: Twenty Years of Democracy and Democratic Culture in Guatemala

I. Introduction

This report contains the results of the Tenth Study of Democratic Culture in Guatemala. The first study was published in 1993 and since then such studies have been conducted on a regular basis every two years. In the nearly 20-year period covered by these studies, important events have occurred in the political development of Guatemala. Two events are particularly relevant. First, the democratic process that began in 1985 has continued and has become, in fact, the longest period of democracy in Guatemalan history. Moreover, during this period—specifically, 1996—peace accords were signed that ended a long and bloody armed conflict in the country. Certainly, not every development during this period has been a positive one, and the peace and democratization processes have thus faced obstacles that have not allowed for the full development of either process. There are numerous aspects of the Guatemalan political system in which it is necessary to deepen and strengthen the effects of democracy for the democratic process itself to become truly stable and inclusive.

The analysis of the development of democracy and the implementation of the peace agreements is beyond the scope of this study, whose main purpose is to present facets of the Guatemalan democratic development from the perspective of public opinion. To this end, the chapters in Part III of this study provide a retrospective analysis of the data obtained since 1993 through public opinion polls conducted in the framework of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The project currently conducts surveys in 26 countries in the Americas, but Guatemala is the country in which this study has been conducted regularly.[1] Studies have been standardized in all countries since 2004, when substantive changes were made to both the respondent sample population and the questionnaire used. The questions used in the survey have varied with respect to the conditions present in a given country during a specific year, although in the case of Guatemala, there are several questions that have been maintained over time and have been asked since 1993.[2]

The chapters in Part III cover various topics related to democracy in Guatemala. They analyze temporal changes in support for democracy and political institutions but also examine any changes that may have occurred in terms of Guatemalans' levels of political and communal participation. Additionally, an entire chapter is dedicated specifically to the analysis of issues related to the rule of law such as support for institutions within the justice sector, corruption, and insecurity and crime.

II. The Theoretical Framework of Democratization

Democracy has become a popular term in Latin America since the region adopted democratic regimes in the mid-1980s, as part of the so-called third wave of democracy. Democracy itself has existed for centuries in other parts of the world and remains one of the most debated concepts in the

[1] All of the studies have been sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), although in recent years, diverse international institutions have also contributed to the regional project. The LAPOP Project includes the Americas Barometer as one of its components.
[2] The first survey in Guatemala was conducted in 1992 but included only the country's urban areas.

real of social science. Despite the various current definitions of democracy, political science theorists agree that there are certain minimum conditions that need to be met for a country to be considered democratic.

For the purposes of this study, it is useful to lay out certain definitions and baseline conditions for democracy as recognized by prominent political science theorists:[3]

- The Spanish political scientist Juan Linz, along with American political scientists Larry Diamond and Seymour Lipset, said in 1989 that democracy is a system in which three basic conditions are met: competitive elections, broad participation, and the presence of civil and political liberties.[4]

- Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan expanded on this definition by proposing a fourth baseline condition: the presence of social support for democratic rules and procedures, both on the part the masses and the elite. Taken together, these four conditions are now viewed by political science as the basic definition of democratic legitimacy.[5]

- Larry Diamond considers that a liberal democracy—the generally accepted concept of democracy within the Western World—must exhibit ten basic characteristics:[6]

    - Governmental control of the state and decisions made by elected representatives, as opposed to local subgroups or the armed forces.
    - Restrictions on the executive by other levels of government.
    - Uncertain election results, with a significant number of votes favoring the opposition.
    - Freedom to both disadvantaged and minority groups insofar as they can freely express their interests or practice their distinct languages and cultures.
    - Presence of channels of communication for citizens beyond those provided by political parties.
    - Existence of alternative sources of information easily accessible by citizens.
    - Freedom of opinion, discussion, speech, publication, demonstration, assembly, and petition for all citizens.
    - Political equality for all citizens.
    - Effective protection of freedoms by an independent and non-discriminatory judiciary.

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[3] A broader discussion about the conceptualization of democracy and the rule of law can be found in Azpuru Dinorah, Ligia Blanco, Richard Córdova, Nayelly Loya Marín, Carlos G. Ramos, and Adrián Zapata. *Construyendo la democracia en sociedades posconflicto: Guatemala y El Salvador, un enfoque conparado.* 2007. Ottowa and Guatemala: International Development Research Center and F&G Editors.

[4] Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.). *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America,* Volume Four. 1989. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner and London: Adamantine Press.

[5] Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. 1996. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

[6] Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation.* 1999. Baltimore y London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Rule of law that protects citizens from unwarranted detention, terror, torture, or interference in their personal lives.

This brief review of various conceptualizations of democracy shows that a democratic regime goes beyond the formal aspects of simply conducting regular and fair elections. The existence of an environment that promotes and respects citizens' rights, insofar as citizens' participation in the democratic process is itself a fundamental component of democracy. Similarly, democracy requires legitimacy, or citizen support, in order to sustain itself through economic or other crises that may arise.

The longitudinal analysis of public opinion data that is performed in the chapters in Part III of this report shows the extent to which progress has been made in some of these aspects in Guatemala over the last two decades. Some relevant questions for this longitudinal analysis were not included in the original questionnaires. In these cases, we present the results from the oldest year for which they are available.

Before discussing the results, it is important to address the context in which democracy has developed from the viewpoint of citizens. One way of doing so is analyzing the problems that Guatemalan citizens consider to be the most important for the country to address. Since 1993, the survey has asked respondents to identify such issues using the following options:

A4. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country? **[DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]**			**|___|___|**
Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98
N/A	99		

Table 11 shows the responses divided into four categories: economic problems, violence and security-related problems, social problems, and others.[7] As shown by the table, economic problems were the most important for a series of years, although they began to diminish in importance starting in the year 2004, when violence and security-related problems started to be mentioned with increasing frequency. The year with the greatest increase in perception of security-related problems was 2008, when 62.5% of respondents cited these types of problems. However, it is worth noticing that in every year since 2004 there has been an important increase in this category.

Table 11. Main Problem in Guatemala: 1993-2012

Percentages

YEAR	ECONOMIC PROBLEMS	SECURITY AND VIOLENCE PROBLEMS	SOCIAL PROBLEMS	OTHERS	TOTAL
1993	69.4	8.1	15.7	6.8	100 %
1995	60.5	4.1	26.2	9.2	100%
1997	61.2	1.5	30.0	7.3	100%
1999	58.1	3.8	6.3	31.8*	100%
2001	66.5	17.8	5.9	9.0	100%
2004	39.4	39.3	14.5	6.8	100%
2006	19.1	51.4	22.0	7.5	100%
2008	17.9	62.5	13.2	6.4	100%
2010	31.8	48.5	13.3	6.4	100%
2012	22.9	41.8	24.4	10.9	100%

*28.8% of the respondents this year identified the lack of organization as a problem

III. Citizens' Perception of Democracy

First, we analyze whether Guatemalans' support for democracy has changed, and how Guatemalans feel with respect to the emergence of democracy in their country. One general question that has been asked for several years seeks to evaluate the degree to which citizens prefer democracy over other kinds of regimes, or whether they are indifferent between the two.

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most:
(1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or
(2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or
(3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.
(88) DK (98) DA

Figure 123 shows the time progression for preferences of democracy in Guatemala since 1999. In the early years, approximately 65% of Guatemalans indicated either indifference or a strict preference of democracy over authoritarian government. Said level of preference increased by various percentage points between 2006 and 2010, reaching 70% by the latter. In 2012, however, the level of preference had returned to where it had been previously.

[7] The category of economic problems includes responses such as inflation, unemployment, lack of credit, foreign debt, the economy, crisis, etc. The category of violence and security-related problems includes responses such as crime, delinquency, gangs, lack of security, narcotrafficking, etc. The category of social problems includes responses such as living standars, poverty, quality and availability of education, road conditions, inequality, etc. The category of "other" includes the remaining problems. The responses available to the question have varied slightly since 1993, but all can be grouped within the aforementioned categories.



Figure 123. Preference for Democracy in Guatemala: 1999-2012

It is important to analyze the case of one-third of Guatemalans who indicated that they do not prefer democracy. Do Guatemalans prefer the opposite option to democracy, that of an authoritarian government, or are they rather indifferent towards the type of regime that exists in their country? Figure 124 shows the percentage of the population that continues to prefer an authoritarian government. Said percentage has varied from year to year but has never surpassed 17.8% of the population. In fact, the percentage of the population that indicated preference for an authoritarian government fell in 2012 to only 10.7%, a level comparable to the one obtained in 2001. This implies that in 2012, close to one-fourth of the population was indifferent towards the kind of governing regime, having indicated that either kind ultimately "means the same."



Figure 124. Preference for an Authoritarian Government in Guatemala: 1999-2012

Another question included in surveys around the world as a way of measuring support for democracy was discussed in chapter five of this study. The question, ING4, reads as follows: Changing the topic once more, it is acknowledged that democracy may have some problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree with this phrase? Figure 125 shows the results obtained in Guatemala from 2004 onwards, when the question was first included in the survey. This question relies on a scale of 0-100 points and thus it is only possible to draw an average, rather than a set percentage in support. The Figure shows that the average support for democracy in Guatemala has remained relatively stable—within the range of 60 points—and without significant statistical changes. Regardless, in the year 2006 there was indeed a statistically significant increase in support for democracy, when support reached almost 70 points on average.



Figure 125. Support for Democracy in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Since 2004, the questionnaires have also included a question that asks the respondent to indicate his or her degree of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Guatemala. The question gives four answers: very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, and very unsatisfied. Figure 126 shows the percentage of citizens that indicated feeling very satisfied or satisfied with democracy in Guatemala. In 2010 and 2012, close to 46% felt very satisfied with democracy. The lowest percentage of satisfaction during the time period in question occurred in 2006 with 40.6%. In any case, it has not been possible to again reach the 58.5% level of satisfaction that was attained in 2004.



Figure 126. Satisfaction with Democracy in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Finally, another related question asks respondents to evaluate the degree to which they consider Guatemala a truly democratic country. Figure 127 shows the results. The Figure includes respondents who said that Guatemala was either "very democratic" or "somewhat democratic" but excludes those who indicated "not very democratic" or "not democratic at all." The percentage of respondents who considered the country to be very or somewhat democratic coincides with the percentage satisfied with democracy. 2004 was the year in which the highest percentage of Guatemalans viewed Guatemalan democracy in a positive light, with 58.5% doing so. Since then, the same level of positive views on Guatemalan democracy has not been reached again. In 2010 and 2012, close to 46% of respondents considered Guatemala very or somewhat democratic.



Figure 127. Assessment of How Democratic is Guatemala: 2004-2012

IV. Civil Liberties and Political Rights of Guatemalans

One commonly used way to classify human rights is that proposed by British sociologist T.H. Marshall, who divides human rights into three areas: civil rights, political rights, and social rights.[8] Civil rights include those rights which guarantee fair treatment on the part of the state, individual human freedom, and equality under the law, as well as concepts such as habeas corpus, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion. Political rights include those which are related to political participation such as the right to vote, right of assembly, the right to combat public charges, and in general the freedom to participate in activities of political nature. Social rights include those rights associated with basic wellness and socioeconomic equality, as well as public education.[9]

Since the time of Guatemala's independence, civil rights in particular have been historically limited within the country. During the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s, Guatemala was questioned at the international level for flagrant violations of these and other human rights. The advent of liberal democracy in 1985, as well as the end of armed conflict in 1996, should have generated greater respect towards human rights, and in particular civil rights.

One way of measuring advances with respect to political rights and civil liberties is to observe the score given to Guatemala by the Freedom House organization, whose purpose is precisely to measure the extent to which political rights and civil liberties are respected around the world. Table 12

[8] See Humprey, Thomas Marshall.1964, *Class, citizenship and social development: Essays.* Greenwood Press.
[9] See Drogus, Carol Ann y Stephen Orvis.2012 *Introducing Comparative Politics,* Sage CQ Press.

shows the results of the Freedom House Index for Guatemala for the years since 1993 during which the Study of Democratic Culture has been conducted. It uses as a baseline the score given to Guatemala in 1980, when the country was experiencing one of the most extreme periods of repression and restriction of liberties in its history, during the military government of Fernando Romeo Lucas García. Freedom House uses a scale of 1 to 7 points, with 1 indicating the highest level of freedom and 7 indicating the highest level of restrictions. The countries of the world are broken down into three categories: free, partly free, and not free. Evidently, the countries in which there is the most freedom are also those in which there is a greater degree of democracy.

The results for Guatemala show a substantial improvement in 1993 compared to the results obtained in 1980, when the country was considered "not free" and the score given to political rights and civil liberties was close to the negative point of 7 on the scale. By 1993, Guatemala had moved to the "partly free" category. Status change notwithstanding, the scores given to political rights (4) and in particular civil liberties (5) remained far from optimal. In 1997 there was another important improvement in the score of political rights and human liberties, when the two categories switched to 3 and 4 points, respectively. The country, however, continued to fall in the "partly free" category. Guatemala again obtained its 1997 scores in 1999 and 2001. In 2004, however, there was deterioration in human rights, with the score falling to 4 points. The same percentage held in 2006 but improved again in 2008 by returning to 1997 levels. The same cycle was once again repeated for the 2010-2012 time frame, with the score rising in the prior and falling to 3 again in the latter year.

In general terms, according to this index, Guatemala improved substantially since the time of its authoritarian governments. The country has improved as much in political rights as in civil liberties, although improvement has stagnated since 1997. Guatemala has remained in the category of "partly free" countries since 1993 but has not managed to receive designation as "free," a reality reflecting the fact that there remain weaknesses in the development of democracy within the country.[10]

[10] For reference it is interesting to also analyze the results obtained by El Salvador, a country that similarly to Guatemala experienced a bloody armed conflict followed by the signing of peace accords and the process of democratization. El Salvador passed into the category of free countries in 1997, when it obtained a score of 2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties. It has remained in this category since then, and its scores in both political rights and civil liberties have also remained the same.

Table 12. Freedom House Index for Guatemala: 1993-2012

YEAR	POLITICAL RIGHTS SCORE	CIVIL LIBERTIES SCORE	CHANGE	CLASSIFICATION
1980	*6*	*6*	--	*Not Free*
1993	4	5	Substantial improvement in political rights and civil liberties	Partly Free
1995	4	5	Same as 1993	Partly Free
1997	3	4	Improvement in political rights and civil liberties	Partly Free
1999	3	4	Same as 1997	Partly Free
2001	3	4	Same as 1997	Partly Free
2004	4	4	Deterioration in political rights	Partly Free
2006	4	4	Same as 2004	Partly Free
2008	3	4	Improvement in political rights	Partly Free
2010	4	4	Deterioration in political rights	Partly Free
2012	3	4	Improvement in political rights	Partly free

Source: prepared by authors with information from Freedom House

Another perspective regarding the state of political rights within the country can be obtained via a series that has been included in the Barometer of the Americas since its inception. The series analyses the perception of freedom among Guatemalans with regards to four basic political activities: exercising the right to vote, participating in protests, participating in community-based groups, and running for public office. Unfortunately the series does not have data from the 1970s or 1980s, when it was practically impossible to conduct public opinion surveys given the repression imposed by the authoritarian governments. It is obvious that during the 1970s and 1980s there was no respect towards the aforementioned political rights, as indicated in national and international reports regarding human rights during the same period.

The series in the Barometer of the Americas includes the following questions, which ask the respondent to name the degree of fear that he or she would have to participate in the described activities. It is evident that lower fear implies a higher perception of freedom and vice versa.

	WITHOUT FEAR	A LITTLE FEAR	A LOT OF FEAR
DER1. Participate in solving community problems?	1	2	3
DER2. Voting in a national election?	1	2	3
DER3. Participate in a peaceful demonstration?	1	2	3
DER4. Run for public office?	1	2	3

Figure 128 presents a summary of the progression in the perception of freedom from 1995 to 2012. The answers have been coded along the 0-100 scale for greater clarity. As is observed in the figure, since 1995 there has been an increase in the perception of freedom to participate in all the described activities. Even though there have been reductions in all of these rights during this period, they have not reached the low levels shown in 1995. Another aspect that is worth highlighting is that Guatemalans have perceived greater levels of freedom to vote and participate in community-based problem solving groups than they have to participate in protests or run for office.



Figure 128. Perception of Freedom in Guatemala: 1995-2012

The following figures analyze in greater detail the perception of freedom that Guatemalans feel in exercising each of the political rights discussed earlier. Figure 129 shows the percentage of

Guatemalans that indicated feeling free (without fear) to vote in a national election. In each of the years included in the analysis, over 70% of Guatemalans indicated feeling such freedom, with the exception of 2012, when the level dropped to 69.8%. The year in which the greatest number of Guatemalans reported feeling free to vote was 1997, when 82.4% did so.



Figure 129. Perception of Freedom to Vote in Guatemala: 1995-2012

Figure 130 shows the percentage of citizens that indicated feeling free to participate in groups aimed at resolving problems within the community. The percentage has remained within the range of 60% in most years, with the exceptions of 1995 and 2012, when less than 60% of respondents indicated feeling free to do so.



Figure 130. Perception of Freedom to Participate in Community Groups in Guatemala: 1995-2012

Figure 131 shows the percentage of citizens who said that they felt free to participate in peaceful demonstrations during the period under analysis. Of all the questions, the greatest fluctuation was observed in this case. Whereas only 31.5% of respondents indicated feeling free to protest in 1995, said percentage increased by several points in subsequent years, with the exception of 2001. The percentage fell slightly in 2012, but never to the levels of 1995 or 2001.



Figure 131. Perception of Freedom to Demonstrate in Guatemala: 1995-2012

Finally, Figure 132 shows the percentage of Guatemalans that reported feeling free to run for public office. In this particular case, wide fluctuation was also observed, from 26.1% of respondents in 1995 to 48.9% in 2008. In 2012, the percentage dropped to 31.2%, the second-lowest score throughout the entire period under analysis.



Figure 132. Perception of Freedom to Run for Office in Guatemala: 1995-2012

Given that in 2012 there was an observed reduction in Guatemalans' perception of freedom to exercise their political rights, it is important to analyze the potential causes. Although there are factors in the political context of the country that are difficult to measure through public opinion surveys such as this one, it is indeed possible to determine certain characteristics of respondents who reported feeling reduced freedom to vote, protest, participate in groups, and run for office. To simplify the analysis, in this study we constructed an index of perception of freedom that aggregates the four aforementioned specific liberties. Figure 133 shows the reductions in the index in 2012, although it is worth noting that the level never dropped to the levels observed in the mid-1990s.



Figure 133. Index of Perception of Freedom in Guatemala: 1995-2012

Figure 134 shows the results of a regression analysis that allows us to identify some of the factors related to perception of freedom in 2012. The regression analysis shows that both greater education and age are associated with greater perception of freedom, while being a women and having darker skin are associated with reduced perception of freedom.



Figure 134. Factor Associated with the Perception of Freedom in Guatemala in 2012

Figure 135 shows in greater detail the aforementioned relationships. The 200-point mark can be used as a guide. In general terms, Guatemalan women report lower perception of freedom than Guatemalan men, a dynamic that is particularly acute among women of darker skin who live in rural areas. It is interesting to observe that men of darker skin who live in rural areas also display lower perception of freedom, either as low as or lower than those reported by dark-skinned women in rural areas.



Figure 135. Perception of Freedom by Dender, Skin Color and Residence in Guatemala, 2012

Although comparison of insecurity-related factors does not at first glance appear to be a predictor of perception of freedom, Figure 136 shows that this is not the case. Insecurity does affect perception of political freedom among Guatemalan males. The greater the reported perception of insecurity among men, the lower their perceived level of freedom to exercise their political rights. The same dynamic is not observed among Guatemalan women, who in general terms, independent of their perception of insecurity, already possess lower perception of freedom than Guatemalan men.



Figure 136. Perception of Freedom by Gender and Insecurity, Guatemala, 2012

Finally, in this section, Figure 137 shows the relationship between the index measuring perception of freedom and the level of education of respondents. As much as among indigenous Guatemalans as those who self-identified themselves as ladinos, those who possess lower levels of education also report significantly lower perception of freedom to exercise their political rights.



Figure 137. Perception of Freedom by Education and Ethnic Self-Identification in Guatemala, 2012

V. The Civic Participation of Citizens

One final section in this chapter shows Guatemalans' levels of civic participation in recent years. Figures 138 and 139 show the percentages for respondents who indicated participation in religious groups, groups related to their children's school, community groups, and profession-related groups. Two different figures are presented given that the responses available to choose from changed over the years.[11] Percentages were relatively stable between 1993 and 2001. Respectively, 49% and 56% of respondents indicated participation in religious groups, with participation in such groups generating the largest percentage of group participation in each of the years under analysis. Between 39% and 44% of respondents indicated participation in groups related to their children's education. Additionally, between 22% and 28% participated in community groups, and between 15% and 24% did so for profession-related groups.



Figure 138. Guatemalans' Participation in Groups: 1993-2001

[11] Between 1993 and 2001 respondents answering this question were given three options: frequently, ocasionally, and never. From 2004 onwards, there were four such options: once a week, once or twice per month, once or twice per year, and never.

Figure 139 is similar to the earlier figure, the only difference being that this one displays the level of participation reported between 2004 and 2012. The percentages during this period were also relatively stable. Between 64% and 75% of respondents indicated participation in religious groups, this one again being the category that generated the highest participation rate of all the years under analysis. Between 42% and 51% of respondents said that they had participated in groups related to the education of their children, while 15% and 28% indicated participation in community groups. Finally, between 9% and 16% indicated participation with groups related to the occupation or profession of the respondent. It is problematic to make comparisons between these two periods given that the response options were changed between the two.



Figure 139. Participation of Guatemalan Groups: 2004-2012

VI. Conclusions

In this chapter we present longitudinal results related to the support and evaluation or democracy, perception of freedom, and civic participation among Guatemalans. The following summarizes some of the key findings of the longitudinal analysis:

- With respect to the preference for democracy (rather than preference for an authoritarian regime or indifference), there was been little variation between 1999, the first year the question

was asked, and 2012. In 1999, 63.8% of respondents said they preferred democracy, while in 2012 the percentage in favor was 65.6%. This preference increased by several percentage points between 2006 and 2010, peaking at over 70%, but it returned to previous levels by 2012.

- From 2004 onwards, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they believe that democracy is preferable to other forms of government. In 2004, the average support for democracy in Guatemala was 57.4 points on the 0-100 scale. Thereafter, the average has remained relatively stable, within the range of 60 points and with no statistically significant changes. Only in 2006 was there a statistically significant increase in support for democracy—the average reached nearly 70 points.

- Beginning in 2004, respondents were also asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Guatemala. The highest percentage of satisfaction came in 2004 with 58.5%, and the lowest occurred in 2006 with 40.6%. In 2012, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they were either very or somewhat satisfied with the performance of democracy reached 46.7%.

- A related question asks respondents to assess how democratic Guatemala is. The percentage of those who believe that the country is very or somewhat democratic matches the percentage that is satisfied with democracy. The year in which the highest percentage of Guatemalans viewed Guatemalan democracy positively was 2004, when 59.3% did so. Since then, such a high positive evaluation has not been reached again. In 2010 and 2012, approximately 46% of respondents considered Guatemala to be very or somewhat democratic.

- A series of questions since 1995 has asked Guatemalans to indicate how free they feel about exercising their political rights (doing so without fear), and specifically how they feel about voting in a national election, participating in community improvement groups, participating in demonstrations, and running for popular elections. Longitudinal results indicate the following:

    - Every year, over 70% of Guatemalans have said they feel free to vote. The only exception to this pattern is 2012, in which the percentage dropped to 69.8%. The year in which the largest percentage of Guatemalans felt free to vote was 1997, when 82.4% of them felt so.

    - In most years, the percentage of citizens who said they feel free to participate in community improvement groups has remained in the range of 60%. The exceptions were 1995 and once again 2012, when less than 60% of respondents felt freedom to engage in such activities.

    - A greater fluctuation is observed in the period between 1995 and 2012. In 1995, only 31.5% of respondents felt free to participate, although said percentage subsequently increased by several points and eventually decreased slightly in 2012.

    - The political rights in which Guatemalans feel more restricted in their personal freedom is related to running for elected office. Fluctuation has also been observed with regard to this right: in 1995, only 26.1% of respondents felt free to run for office, although by

2008 this number had reached 48.9%. In 2012, the percentage once again dropped to 31.2%, the lowest number throughout this entire period.

- Participation of Guatemalans in groups of various kinds has been stable in the period under study. Since 1993, there has been increased participation in religion-related groups, followed by school-related groups. The level of participation in community groups and occupation-related groups is much smaller, although it has remained stable over the years.

Chapter Eight: The Legitimacy of Political Institutions in Guatemala: A View in Retrospect

I. Introduction

The concept of legitimacy, a concept central to the field of political science, was discussed in Chapter Five. Spanish political scientist Juan Linz defines legitimacy as the belief that despite the imperfections and shortcomings of a country's existing political institutions, said institutions are the best ones attainable within their respective countries.[1] For this reason, the existing institutions must be respected by citizens and their established rules observed. The idea of legitimacy can be viewed as a synonym for levels of social support. North American political scientists David Easton and Pippa Norris propose the existence of three and five levels of legitimacy, respectively. Table 13 shows such levels.[2] It is worth noting that said levels are only attainable within a democratic regime, given that authoritarian regimes remain in power through force and not through popular support.

Table 13. Levels of Legitimacy in a Democratic System

	Easton	Norris
Diffuse support	**-Support for the political community** (support for the established borders)	
	-Support for the political regime	**-Support for the idea of democracy and the principles of the democratic regime** (support for democracy as a value, respect for democratic rules, rejection of authoritarian options) **-Support for the performance of the democratic regime** (satisfaction with the performance of democracy) **-Support for the institutions of the democratic regime** (trust in institutions)
Specific support	**-Support for political actors and authorities** (trust in political actors, approval of incumbent authorities)	

Chapter Seven discussed Guatemalans' support for the concept of democracy in Guatemala and their satisfaction with the expansion of the same. Chapter 9 will discuss the level of support for the principles of a democratic regime. This chapter focuses specifically on the support for political

[1] In English, the legitimacy is the following: "the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established (Linz, 1978; 16). Linz, Juan. 1978. "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

[2] This table was originally presented in Azpuru, Dinorah, "Los jóvenes y la democracia en Guatemala," 2004, in *Con la herencia de la paz: cultura política de la juventud centroamericana*, Florisabel Rodríguez, Silvia Castro and Johnnny Madrigal, eds. Heredia, Costa Rica: UNA Editorial. Discussion of the legitimacy levels proposed by Norris can be found in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, 2009. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999).

institutions, with the notable exception of institutions related to the justice system, which are analyzed in Chapter Nine.

II. Citizen's Trust in Political Institutions through the Years

The studies of democratic culture measure the legitimacy of institutions through questions that ask respondents to indicate their levels of confidence in those institutions. Chapter Five discussed the results obtained in the 2012 study in Guatemala. A longitudinal perspective of that analysis is presented in the following pages. In the first years of the study, respondents were asked to indicate whether they had high, low, or no confidence in their political institutions. From 2004 onwards, the question was improved by giving respondents a seven-point scale. Although it is possible to scale the results of both the triple-choice version and the seven-point version along the 0-100 point scale, given the difference in the measurement scale, it is not truly appropriate to directly compare the results from 1993-2001 to those from 2004-2012. For this reason, two separate figures are presented for each period. One final issue in the first time period is the fact that respondents were only asked questions about a limited number of institutions.

Figure 140 shows the respondent's trust in two of democracy's basic institutions, the national legislature and political parties, between 1993 and 2001. Throughout the entire period, the legislature obtained better results than the political parties, with the difference between the two being statistically significant. In each year, the legislature averaged confidence levels that hovered around 30 points. The notable exception was 1999, when confidence rose to 40.7 points. Political parties received support levels within the range of 20 average points in most years, with the exception of 1993, when said level reached only 19.3 points, a lower and statistically significant difference from other years. The highest level of confidence reached by political parties was 29 points, a score attained in 1999.



Figure 140. Trust in Congress and Political Parties in Guatemala: 1993-2001

Figures 141 and 142 show the results for the same institutions between the years of 2004 and 2012. The first bar shows that in 2012, average trust in Congress increased in a significant manner, reaching 41.9 points. This is a particularly notable increase in comparison to 2010, when said confidence reached only 36.6, the lowest level of the entire period. In general, the average confidence level for Congress has remained within the range of 40 points.



Figure 141. Trust in Congress in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Figure 142 shows the level of trust in political parties between 2006 and 2012. The question was not asked in 2004. The year with the highest average trust in political parties was 2006 with 40 points, a statistically significant difference from prior years. The year with the lowest average trust was 2010 with a score of 29.1 points. In 2012 there was a noticeable uptick in trust. The level in 2012 reached 36.1 points; although it did not equal the high point attained in 2006.



Figure 142. Trust in Political Parties in Guatemala: 2006-2012

The other institution that was also evaluated in the first studies was the municipal government. Figure 143 displays citizen trust in this institution for the years between 1997 and 2001. As evident in the Figure, citizen levels of support for local government are noticeably higher than those for the national Congress or the political parties. With the exception of 2001, when average municipal-level support was 49.2 points, the municipal government received scores of over fifty points—the minimum benchmark used by this study to indicate positive results. Figure 144 shows the results for 2004-2012, a period in which the municipal government also obtained higher scores than the national Congress and the political parties. The only year in which there was a statistically significant reduction in municipal-level confidence was 2010, although even this average was above the 50-point mark.



Figure 143. Trust in Local Government in Guatemala: 1997-2001



Figure 144. Trust in Local Government in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Finally, Figure 145 shows the results for some institutions that were evaluated only during the 2004-2012 period. As was indicated previously, institutions linked to the justice sector will be discussed in the following chapter. In the case of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the average level of citizens' trust remained relatively stable, with the exception of 2010, the only year in which the score

surpassed the 50-point threshold. Trust in the army has been increasing throughout the years, nearly reaching 60 points in 2012—a statistically significant difference in relation to years previous of 2010.

In the case of the national government and the President, there were major fluctuations observed due to the time that the study was conducted. It is worth noting that in 2004, 2008 and 2012, the survey was conducted a few months after the governments of Oscar Berger, Álvaro Colom, and Otto Pérez Molina had taken power, respectively. As such, the trust levels in the authorities in each of these years were higher than the levels reached in non-presidential election years.



Figure 145. Trust in Other Political Institutions in Guatemala: 2004-2011

III. Guatemalans and Political Parties

Insofar as political parties are an essential institution in any democracy, and given the fact that in Guatemala parties receive the lowest score out of all institutions, it is worth exploring further aspects related to citizens' perception about political parties. Guatemala is one of the countries in Latin America with the greatest fragmentation and instability within its system of political parties.[3]

[3] Sánchez published an article relating to Guatemalan political parties in which it is indicated that Guatemala has a highly incoherent party structure: there is no stability in citizen identification with the main parties, the internal strucutre itself is weak, and parties tend to disappear or lose relevance within short periods of time. The study indicates that political parities

Figures 146 and 147 show the levels of participation in political parties. It is worth noting that the slate of available responses was modified after 2004, a fact that makes absolute comparison difficult. It is observed that less than 10% of the population indicated frequent or sporadic participation in meetings of such kinds. In 2012, 5.6% of the population reported participation in meetings affiliated with a political party. This level of participation is low if compared to the level of participation with other kinds of organizations within Guatemala (see Chapter 7).



Figure 146. Attendance of Meetings of Political Parties: 1995-2001

"meet Sartori's minimum defnition of being organizations that provide candidates for public service, but they do not offer anything else more substantive than that." See Sánchez, Omar, "Guatemala's Party Universe: A Case Study in Underinstitutionalization," 2008. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Volume 50, Issue 1, pp. 123-151, Spring. ASIES, for its part, indicates that Guatemalan political parties practically enter into periods of hibernation between one election and another. See *Monografía: los partidos politicos guatemaltecos en el proceso electoral*, ASIES, Guatemala: 2011.



Figure 147. Attendance of Meetings of Political Parties: 2004-2012

Another important aspect is citizen identification with a political party. Beyond citizen involvement in political party meetings, it is desirable that citizens in a democracy identify with a certain political denomination that best represents their way of thinking. From 2006 onwards, the survey included a question that asked respondents to indicate whether or not they sympathize with a political party. Figure 148 shows the results. Less than 20% of the Guatemalan population sympathizes with a political party; the percentage of 12.9% is the lowest since 2006. The highest percentage of respondents that identified with a political party was observed in 2010, when 18.3% indicated doing so.



Figure 148. Identification with a Political Party in Guatemala: 2006-2012

In order to determine whether the percentage of citizens that sympathizes with a political party is high or low, it is important to utilize a baseline comparison parameter. Table 14 shows the percentage of citizens in Latin America that reported identifying with a political party in 2012. Guatemala is clearly located at the bottom of the list and is one of only four countries with percentages below 20%, the other three being Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. In comparison to Guatemala, large numbers of citizens throughout the rest of Latin America identify with political parties within their respective countries. This can be seen as evidence that further highlights the weakness of the political party system in Guatemala—a worrying dynamic for the development of democracy within the country.

Table 14. Identification with Political Parties in Latin America

Country	Percentage
República Dominicana	63.4
Nicaragua	54.8
Uruguay	53.5
Venezuela	46.9
Paraguay	45.4
Honduras	39.2
México	36.2
Haití	31.0
El Salvador	30.9
Brasil	30.3
Argentina	27.0
Costa Rica	26.2
Panamá	26.0
Colombia	25.5
Ecuador	22.0
Perú	16.4
Bolivia	15.8
Chile	14.1
Guatemala	12.9

One of the reasons generally associated with identification with a specific political party, not only in Latin American, but throughout the rest of the world—is ideology. As such, citizens identify with the ideology of a certain political party. That is to say, the ideas held or promulgated by a political party make it more viable for citizens to sympathize with it. It has been indicated that political parties in Guatemala do not have defined ideologies. Up next we examine the ideology of citizens and the evolution of such ideology in recent years. Ideology is determined by asking respondents the following question:

L1. Changing topics, on this card we have a scale of 1 to 10 that goes from left to right, with 1 meaning left and 10 meaning right. In today's society, when people speak of political tendencies they often speak of those who sympathize with either the left or the right. Insofar as these labels represent your own political viewpoints, where do you find yourself on this scale? Please say the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**NS 88**	**NR 98**
Left									**Right**		

Using this scale, citizens reporting the lowest numerical scores (between 1 and 3) are located to the left of the ideological spectrum, whereas citizens with the highest scores (between 8 and 10) are located to the right. The rest of the scale can be considered a middle-of-the-road or moderate political position. Figure 149 shows the average ideology of Guatemalans for the period between 1999 and 2012. As is evident in the figure, the average ideology has not fluctuated much throughout this period, although in 2012 it did move slightly to the left in a statistically significant manner.



Figure 149. Ideology of Guatemalans: 1999-2012

Table 15 shows the percentage of Guatemalans that is located on the left, at the center, and on the right of the ideological spectrum for the year 2012. A near-majority of Guatemalans, 48.6% of citizens, self-places along the center of the scale, although 22.6% and 11.3% fall on the left and right ends, respectively. It is worth noting that a relatively high percentage, 17.5%, did not respond the question.

Table 15. Distribution of Ideology in Guatemala in 2012

Ideology	Percentage
Left (1, 2, 3)	22.6
Center (4, 5, 6, 7)	48.6
Right (8, 9, 10)	11.3
No answer	17.5
Total	100 %

Source: AmericasBarometer 2012

Finally, with respect to ideology, Table 16 shows the average ideology of survey respondents in 2008 and 2012 who reported having voted for political parties or specific candidates in the elections immediately prior (the 2007 and 2011 elections, respectively). Given that previous surveys did not ask respondents for whom they had voted, there are no statistics to conduct similar analyses for years further back.

In 2007, the candidates and parties who were victorious in the first round of voting (Álvaro Colom and Otto Pérez Molina) drew their support from a group of voters with a very similar ideology, implying that ideology did not play a large role in determining the ultimate vote share received by the candidate and parties. The ideological consistency of voters who supported other parties appears to fluctuate. The only case in which a party's specific ideology can be associated with the ideology of its supporters is the 2007 campaign of Miguel Ángel Sandoval under the URNG party banner, in which case the ideology of his supporters was clearly located on the left (1.56).

In 2011 there was a clear difference between the two candidates who passed to the second round of voting (Otto Pérez Molina and Manuel Baldizón), yet the supporters of each candidate were located along the center of the political spectrum. It is interesting to note that supporters of Eduardo Suger maintained their ideological consistency between 2007 and 2011, but the voters who supported Rigoberta Menchú moved to the left in 2011.

Table 16. Average Ideology of Guatemalan Voters

CANDIDATE	PARTY	AVERAGE IDEOLOGY OF VOTERS
2007 Elections		
Álvaro Colom	UNE	5.62
Otto Pérez Molina	PP	5.87
Alejandro Giammattei	GANA	5.38
Eduardo Suger	CASA	4.84
Luis Rabbé	FRG	4.69
Rigoberta Menchú	EG	5.32
Fritz García Gallont	PU	3.59
Mario Estrada	UCN	4.59
Miguel Ángel Sandoval	URNG	1.56
2011 Elections		
Otto Pérez Molina	PP	5.40
Manuel Baldizón	Líder	4.84
Eduardo Suger	CREO	4.73
Rigoberta Menchú	Frente Amplio	3.06
Harold Caballeros	VIVA	3.75
Mario Estrada	UCN	4.79

The final two figures associated with the concept of political parties are presented in the following pages. Figure 150 shows the average response to a question asking respondents to identify the extent to which they agree that democracy can exist without political parties. In relation to other countries, Guatemala falls on a mid-to-high position on this question, receiving a score of 46.6 points on the 0-100 scale. Haiti receives the highest score at 65.5 points, while Costa Ricans reported the lowest level of agreement at 30.4 points.



Figure 150. Belief that Democracy Can Exist without Political Parties in Latin America, 2012

Figure 151 shows the same results for Guatemala for the period between 2006 and 2012. The average level of agreement with the idea that democracy can exist without political parties has steadily decreased from the level observed in 2006.



Figure 151. Belief that Democracy Can Exist without Political Parties: Guatemala 2006-2012

IV. Guatemalans and Elections

The last section of this chapter deals with the participation of Guatemalans in political activities essential to a democracy such as voting and participating in campaign-related activities. Figure 152 shows the percentage of respondents who reported registering to vote. The percentage is relatively high in each year under analysis, within the range of 70%. In 2008 and 2012, this number increased to 85.1% and 86.7%, respectively.



Figure 152. Guatemalans Who Reported Being Registered to Vote

Figure 153, through the use of a logistical regression analysis, shows the demographic breakdown of Guatemalans who tend to be registered voters. Respondents with darker skin and those who identify as women display lower registration levels. On the other hand, both those who were older and had greater interest in politics were registered in higher numbers.



Figure 153. Factors Associated with Voter Registration in Guatemala

Figure 154 better displays the relationship between levels of voter registration, skin color, and gender in Guatemala. It is observed that among women or respondents with darker skin, there is a lower tendency to be registered to vote.



Figure 154. Voter Registration, Gender and Skin-Color in Guatemala, 2012

Finally, Figure 155 shows the percentage of Guatemalans who reported having voted in the previous presidential election. The figure only includes the years immediately following a presidential election. According to the figure, there is variation in the percentage that reported voting year after year, albeit not a substantial variation. It is important to clarify that due to a variety of factors, the percentages reported in the survey do not necessarily coincide with the percentages counted by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Examples of this deviation are the "social desirability" of the vote (respondents who claimed to have voted despite having not actually done so), and also the fact that the electoral registry may include citizens living abroad yet who were not included in the survey.



Figure 155. Percentage Who Reported Voting in the Last Presidential Election in Guatemala

Figures 156 and 157 show the percentage of Guatemalans who indicated having participated in electoral campaigns, as well as the percentage of those who indicated that they had tried to convince others to vote in a certain way. Between 10% and 17% of Guatemalans reported having tried to convince others to vote in some manner, with 2004 being the year in which the lowest percentage reported having done so.



Figure 156. Guatemalans Who Tried to Convince Others to Vote in a Certain Way: 2004-2012

Figure 157 shows that less than 10% of Guatemalans participated actively in an electoral campaign.



Figure 157. Participation in Electoral Campaigns in Guatemala: 2004-2012

As was discussed earlier in both this chapter and Chapter 7, elections are not the only requisite of a democracy, although few will argue that they are not an essential element. The last figure of this chapter, Figure 158, shows the results of citizen confidence in elections. It shows that citizens' levels of confidence have remained stable since 2004, within the range of 45 and 48 points on the 0-100 scale. The only year in which confidence dropped below these values was 2006, when the level reached only 42.8 points, a statistically significant difference from prior years.



Figure 158. Trust in Elections in Guatemala: 2004-2012

V. Conclusions

This chapter addresses the issue of the legitimacy of political institutions, as well as deepens the analysis of the relationship between citizens and political parties in Guatemala in recent years. It also addresses certain aspects related to the voting behavior of Guatemalans.

In general, we find that social support in Guatemalan political institutions (confidence in these institutions) has not changed substantially over the years.

- Congress and political parties in Guatemala are the only institutions that have been included in studies of democratic culture since 1993. Changes to the measurement scale were made in 2004, but data are available about public trust in both Congress and political parties for the entire period in question.

- In 1993, confidence in the Congress was 39.1 points on the same 0-100 scale used in other studies. Confidence in the Congress experienced minimal changes over the past two decades. The highest average was obtained in 2012, at 41.9, and the lowest came in 1997, at 35.9.

- Confidence in political parties has not remained stable over the past two decades. In 1993, confidence in the parties was at 19.3 points, the lowest score during the period under study. Over the years, there has been a general increase in levels of confidence, although there have been fluctuations to this pattern as well. The highest score, 40.6 points, was attained in 2012, while the lowest (other than 1993) came in 2010, when the average was 29.1 points.

- The municipality, or the local government of the respondent, has been one of the institutions with the highest levels of public trust. The first measurement of trust in this institution was taken in 1997, when it averaged 59.0 points—the highest score on record. With the exception of 2001, when the average dropped to 49.2 points, the scores have remained within the range of 50 points. In 2012, the average obtained by the municipality was 54.4 points, which is greater than the 51.3 points obtained in 2010.

- The Army is one of the few institutions that has maintained an average score above 50 points throughout most of the period under analysis. The only score below 50 was 49.1 and came in 2004, the first year that such a measurement was taken. The highest score given to the Army was given in 2012, when the average was 59.5 points. The 2012 score represented a statistically significant improvement from 2010, when the Army scored 55.9 points.

- The Supreme Electoral Tribunal has also maintained a relatively high average trust in relation to other institutions; although with the exception of 2010, when it obtained 50.9 points, it has failed to break the 50-point mark. The score for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal remained stable at around 49 points throughout most of the period under study. The only year when there was a larger drop was 2008, when the score fell to 47.5 points.

- Since 2004, the level of confidence in national elections has also been measured. The score in this category has also remained relatively stable. The lowest and highest confidence levels came in 2006 and 2004, when they were 42.8 and 48.6 points, respectively. In 2012, the average trust in elections was 48.2 points.

- Confidence in the national government itself has undergone fluctuations, but has on average remained within the range of 43 to 50 points. In 2006 and 2010 said confidence reached 43.9 and 43.0 points, respectively, while in 2004 it reached 49.4 points. In 2008 and 2012 it surpassed the 50-point mark, with 50.1 and 50.8 points, respectively.

- This chapter also explores certain aspects related to political parties.

    - Since 2006, respondents have been asked if they identify with a specific political party. The percentage of respondents who said they do sympathize has been smaller than 20% in all years. The lowest percentage was given in 2012 with 12.9%. The highest came in 2010 with 18.3%. In any case, the results place Guatemala as one of the countries on the

continent with the lowest percentage of citizens who sympathize with a specific political party.

- Guatemalans' participation in political parties was also measured. Since 1995, less than 10% of respondents said they had participated in meetings of political parties. The highest percentage of participation was 8.9% in 1999. In 2012, 5.6% indicated participation, a slight increase from 2010, when the participation rate was 4.8%. Participation in political parties is significantly lower than in other organizations in Guatemala.

- In a modern political party system, citizens should identify with a political party based on whether the citizens' ideas align with those promulgated by the political party. As such, measures of ideology are highly relevant. Since 1999, Guatemala has asked respondents to self-identify ideologically on a scale of 1 (left) to 10 (right). The ideology average of Guatemalans has remained close to five points in all years except 2012, when it dropped to 4.8. In all cases, the average shows that Guatemalans tend to favor the ideological center.

- Whether or not Guatemalan citizens have attempted to convince others to vote for certain political choices is a factor that has also been measured. Less than 20% of respondents indicated having done so. The percentage was highest in 2004 at 17.6% and lowest in 2006 at 10.1%. Temporal distance from an election year can also influence these results. In 2012, 15.8% of Guatemalans indicated having tried to convince others to vote in a certain way during the 2011 elections.

Finally, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they believe that democracy can exist without political parties. When this question was first posed in 2006, the average score was 59.6 on the 0-100 point scale, a result indicating high support for ideas contrary to a representative democracy. The average score has fallen since then and was 46.6 in 2012, a relatively high result yet an improvement from 2006.

Chapter Nine: Rule of Law in Guatemala: a View in Retrospect

I. Introduction

Renowned Argentinian political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell signaled that democracy also requires a legal system that allows in practice and not simply on paper, political rights and liberties to be exercised that does not allow members of society to be above the law. O'Donnell also highlighted the importance of accountability as an important component of rule of law.[1] O'Donnell's proposed minimum definition for state of law is the following: any law that exists in writing and whose enforcement and promulgation is undertaken by an appropriate authority, as well as one that is applied justly by state institutions, including judicial powers."[2] Andrade argues that the concept of rule of law has evolved in tandem along with the evolution of the concept of democracy.[3]

Therefore, rule of law can include a wide variety of related issues within the judicial system itself, as well as other terms such as delinquency and corruption. The empirical measurement of these terms can be complex. Among other indicators are statistics on homicide, human rights violations, conviction records, the budgets assigned to justice-sector institutions, and approved legislation. This study analyzes some of these topics from the perspective of public opinion. First, it presents an evaluation of justice-sector institutions. It then examines Guatemalans' level of support for certain basic principles of rule of law, and it proceeds to present certain indicators related to corruption. Finally, the study deals with the issues of delinquency and insecurity, ending with the Peace Accords.

II. Trust in the Justice Sector Institutions

The institutions of the so called justice sector include, aside from the Supreme Court and the lower courts (tribunals), other institutions in charge of supervising the application of the law. The legitimacy of said institutions is essential for democracy since a lack of citizens' trust may impact the legitimacy of the whole political system. Figures 157 and 158 show the levels of trust in several institutions of the justice sector throughout the years. In 1993-2001 the only institution that was included in the questionnaire was the Supreme Court. It is important to remember that up to 2001 LAPOP used a 3-point scale to measure trust, instead of the 7-point scale that has been used since 2004, which is more reliable.

Figure 159 shows that the Supreme Court obtained stable results in terms of citizens' trust, in the range of 46 to 48 points, until 2001, when the level of trust decreased significantly, falling to 43.7 points.

[1] O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. "Why the Rule of Law Matters", *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 15, Number 4, pp. 32-46.
[2] O'Donnell, op. cit.
[3] Andrade, Larry. 2005. "Estado de Derecho, Informe sobre Guatemala, Parte I", *Cuadernos de Estudio*, No. 60, Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landívar, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas.



Figure 159. Trust in the Supreme Court in Guatemala: 1993-2001

Figure 160 shows the levels of trust in justice sector institutions between 2004 and 2012. The institution with higher average trust is the Corte de Constitucionalidad (CC), which reached its highest score in 2010 with 47.6 points. The lowest year for the CC was 2008 with 41.0 points. The Ministerio Público (MP) is next: it received an average trust of 47.8 points in 2012, while in 2006 received the lowest with 45 points. The average trust in the Supreme Court (CSJ) between 2004-2012 was similar to that of the period 1993-2001, in the range of 40 points; the lowest average was obtained in 2010 with 41.3 points. The courts (tribunales) obtain similar averages to those of the CSJ, and in the same fashion as the CSJ obtain the lower trust in 2010 with 42.7 points. The only institution that registered levels of confidence in the range of 30 points was the police (Policía Nacional Civil, PNC), whose lowest average was in 2010 with 31.0 points; we must note that the police did obtain averages in the range of 40 points in 2006 and 2008, but trust in that institution suffered a setback beginning in 2010.



Figure 160. Trust in Justice Sector Institutions in Guatemala: 2004-2012

The only justice sector institution that is not included in Figure 160 is the Ombudsman office (Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos, PDH). The results for that institution are presented in Figure 161. The PDH is the only institution whose averages are above 50 points in most years, which is considered a positive result in the scale used in this study. The lowest average trust in the Ombudsman office was in 2008, when it obtained 48 points; and the highest average trust in the period occurred in 2004 with 56.9 points.



Figure 161. Trust in the Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos: 2004-2012

III. Guatemalans and their Support for the Rule of Law

In order for a country to have a strong rule of law it is necessary to have institutions and authorities that comply with the law and enforce the established laws, but it is also necessary to have citizens who respect the law. In this section we analyze citizens' support towards certain actions and measures related to the rule of law. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the basic question that measures the conviction with regards to the rule of law is one that asks the respondent to choose between the following options: In order to capture criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? The answer supportive of the rule of law is: authorities should always abide by the law.

Figure 162 shows the percentage of Guatemalans who chose the 'abide by the law' answer between 2004 and 2012. We observe that the level of support for the rule of law has decreased since this question was first asked in 2004. The most drastic decrease occurred in 2004 and 2006 when it went down almost ten points. However support for the rule of law has been slowly increasing in recent years. The level of support in 2012 (66%) is higher than in previous years, except 2004, but the difference is not statistically significant. The predictors of support for the rule of law in 2012 are discussed in Chapter 4.



Figure 162. Support for the Rule of Law in Guatemala: 2004-2012

Other questions that have been asked throughout the years can also provide a perspective on the support for the rule of law in Guatemala. In the following figures we show the support for measures that go against the rule of law. Figure 163 shows the positive answers to the following question:

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? **[Read the options]**
(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected
(2) Electoral democracy is the best (88) DK (98)DA

As can be observed in the figure, the percentage of Guatemalans who agreed with the option that is contrary to the rule of law increased considerably in 2012, when 29.1% indicated that they prefer a strong leader who does not have to be elected. This number represents the valid percentage, but if those who did not provide an answer are taken into account (7.6% of the respondents), the actual percentage of support for a non-elected leaders drops to 26.9%, which in any case represents a high percentage.



Figure 163. Preference for a Non-Elected Leader in Guatemala: 2004-2012

A related question asks respondents to what extent they are in agreement with the participation of others in groups that seek to violently overthrow an elected government. Respondents can select an answer in a scale that goes from 1 to 10, which was recoded into a 0-100 point scale. Table 17 shows the results since 2004, the first year in which this question was asked. The average agreement with the overthrow of an elected government is relatively low, in the range of 20-23 points. The only year when it was lower was in 2008, when it went dropped to 12.4 points.

Table 17. Agreement with Groups that Want to Overthrow an Elected Government, Guatemala: 2004-2012

Average (scale 0-100)

YEAR	AVERAGE
2004	20.6
2006	20.9
2008	12.4
2010	22.3
2012	23.1

Figure 164 shows the distribution of answers to another question that measures the respondents' commitment with the rule of law. Respondents were asked to what extent they approve of people taking justice in their own hands when the government does not punish those responsible of a crime. A picture of a stair with 10 points is presented to the respondent (in which 10 means that he/she strongly approves and 1 that he/she strongly disapproves). For better understanding during the analysis

the results were recoded onto a 0-100 point scale. We can see in the figure that the level of support for self-justice actions is high, although it has fluctuated since 2004. The highest approval occurred in 2010 with an average of 43.2 points, whereas the lowest happened in 2006, when the average was 22.9 points. In 2012 the level of approval of self-justice actions was 39.4 points.



Figure 164. Approval of Vigilante Justice

Figure 165 shows in greater detail what type of citizens approve self-justice actions. Indigenous women have the highest level of approval with 45.2 points on the 0-100 point scale. Men who self-identified as indigenous also show more support (42.4) than non-indigenous men (37.0). Of the four groups, the ones that show lower support for self-justice actions are women who self-identified as ladinas (non-indigenous), with 36.0 points. Nonetheless, the average support for this type of action can be considered high and worrisome for any country that tries to establish the rule of law.



Figure 165. Factors Related to the Support of Self-Justice in Guatemala, 2012

Finally, in this section we examine the answers to a question that has been included in the democratic culture surveys since 1993:

DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?
(1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA

The use of "strong-hand" policies to fight crime has been a topic of debate in Central America in recent years; some argue that the use of said policies by governments in the region can result in actions that go against the law. In our case the only thing we attempt to do is to show how public opinion on this issue has evolved in the past 19 years. Figure 166 shows that important changes have occurred throughout the years with regards to the preference for strong-hand policies among Guatemalans. While two decades ago about half of the population preferred the strong-hand option, by 2012 the percentage had gone down to 42%. The highest support for a strong-hand government occurred in 1999, when 67.6% of respondents selected that option. That year coincides with the general elections in which Alfonso Portillo through the FRG party gained power, to a great extent because of his speeches in support of this kind of policies. The lowest support for the strong-hand option was in 2008, after the election of Álvaro Colom. In any case, the percentage of Guatemalans who prefer a strong-hand government continues to be high nowadays.



Figure 166. Preference for Strong-Hand in Guatemala: 1993-2012

In order to have a parameter to compare the results of Guatemala, Figure 167 shows the preference for strong-hand government in Latin America in 2012. We can see that Guatemala is one of the countries where there is more preference for a strong-hand government instead of a government that promotes participation. However, the percentage is even higher in Costa Rica and Honduras. In most countries less than 40% of citizens indicated that they preferred the strong-hand option. Citizens of Haiti, Venezuela and Nicaragua show the lowest support for this type of option (less than 20% of the respondents).



Figure 167. Preference for Strong-Hand in Latin America, 2012

The factors that are associated with a higher preference for a strong-hand government are shown in Figure 168. Respondents who self-identified as indigenous show the lowest support for this option, whereas those who have darker skin color and who live in bigger cities are more likely to prefer the strong-hand option. In other words, the logistic regression analysis shows that ladino Guatemalans, with dark skin and who live in bigger cities, are more prone to prefer a strong-hand government.



Figure 168. Variables Related to the Support for Strong-Hand Government in Guatemala, 2012

Figure 169 shows the detail on the variables associated with the preference for strong-hand in Guatemala. The respondents who self-identified as ladinos (non-indigenous) have a higher support for a strong-hand government (45.6% in 2012) vis-à-vis indigenous respondents (36.5%). It is also clear that women have a slightly higher preference for strong-hand than Guatemalan men.



Figure 169. Preference for Strong-Hand by Self-Identification and Gender, Guatemala 2012

IV. Corruption and the Rule of Law

As mentioned earlier, the weakness of the rule of law in any country becomes evident when corruption among public officials is not controlled and ultimately sanctioned by the courts. In Chapter 4 of this report, we discuss the topic of corruption in-depth. This section presents the longitudinal analysis of the perception of corruption and corruption victimization in Guatemala in recent years.

Figure 170 shows the evolution of the perception of corruption in Guatemala since 2004. The question was not asked in earlier years. Once again, as it is usual in this study, the results are shown on a 0-100 point scale. It can be seen that the perception of corruption in 2012 is lower than in previous years and only comparable to the levels of 2004. When comparing the difference of 2012 with 2006, 2008 and 2010, the differences are statistically significant.



Figure 170. Perception of Corruption in Guatemala: 2004-2012

The other issue that the survey allows us to measure is victimization by corruption. The detail about the questions that are used in order to construct the corruption index is discussed in Chapter 4. What has been the variation in the levels of victimization by corruption in Guatemala throughout time? Figure 171 shows the percentage of citizens who reported having been victims of corruption thourhgout 2004-2012. Unlike the previous figure, which shows that the perception of corruption had decreased in 2012, this figure shows that the percentage of the population who reported having been victimized by corruption in the previous 12 months increased in 2012; in 2012 almost a quarter of the population (24.1%) reported having been victimized.



Figure 171. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption, Guatemala (2004-2012)

V. The Rule of Law, Insecurity and Crime

Finally, in this section about the rule of law we discuss the issues of insecurity and crime. In Chapter 7, we indicated that crime and violence have increasingly become a major problem for Guatemalans. The topic, from the perspective of the perception of insecurity and crime victimization was also examined in detail in Chapter 4. We present here a brief cross-time analysis.

Figure 172 shows the changes over time in the perception of insecurity in Guatemala, using the question included in the AmericasBarometer surveys throughout the years. It can be seen that the perception of insecurity has decreased since 2004, when this question was included for the first time. The difference between 2004 and 2006 vis-á-vis 2012 is statistically significant. Thereafter the average perception of insecurity has remained without statistical change.



Figure 172. Perception of Insecurity in Guatemala (2004-2012)

In view of the changes made to the question about crime victimization since 2010, it is not possible to have a reliable comparison since 2004 and for that reason we cannot present longitudinal results. A figure that presents the comparison between 2010 and 2012 is included in Chapter 4. In 2010 38.9% of the respondents indicated that themselves or someone else in their household had been victims of crime. That percentage decreased slightly in 2012 to 33.5%.

The format of other questions related to crime has been maintained over the years and cross-time comparisons can be made. Figure 173 shows the variation in the percentage of Guatemalans who reported that their neighborhood is affected by gangs or maras. We can see that in 2004, 31.2% of the respondents said that their neighborhood was very or somewhat affected. The percentage increased to 35% in 2006, it decreased slightly in 2008 and 2010, but increased again to 32.7% in 2012.



Figure 173. Percentage Who Said that their Neighborhood is Affected by Gangs, Guatemala: 2004-2012

The next figure shows the results of a question that asks if the respondents believe that the justice system would punish someone who is responsible for a crime. The exact question asks: if you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? Figure 174 shows that the average in 2004 was 40.1 points (on the 0-100 scale). The average remained in the range of 30 points between 2006 and 2010, but increased to 44.9 in 2012, which can be considered a positive result.



Figure 174. Belief that the System Would Punish Someone Responsible for a Crime, Guatemala: 2004-2012

VI. Opinions about the Peace Accords

An important issue for Guatemala, related to the rule of law, is the perception that Guatemalans have about the Peace Accords that were signed in December of 2006. In 2001 and again in 2012, the survey included a question asking respondents to provide an opinion about the accords, giving them four options: very good, good, bad or very bad. Table 18 shows the comparative results for both years. As it can be seen, even though the question was made eleven years apart, the percentages are similar. In general it is positive that the percentage who consider the accords to be very good increased by 10 points, at the same time that the percentage of those who consider them bad decreased by five points. The percentage of Guatemalans who consider them very bad remained basically the same with three percent.

Table 18. Opinion about the Peace Accords: 2001 and 2012
Percentages

The peace accords are…	2001	2012
Very good	9	19
Good	67	62
Bad	21	16
Very bad	3	3
TOTAL	100%	100%

The final figure in this report, Figure 175, shows the distribution of the opinion about the accords in 2012 by ethnic self-identification of the respondents. It shows that there are not marked differences between indigenous and non-indigenous (ladino) Guatemalans. The percentage of those who consider the accords to be bad or very bad is similar. Where there is some variation, albeit minimal, on the positive side of the figure: whereas 17.1% of non-indigenous consider the accords as very good, the percentage increases to 23.2% among indigenous Guatemalans. Consequently, the percentage of those who consider them simply good is higher (63.1%) among ladinos than among indigenous (58.6%).



Figure 175. Opinion about the Peace Accords by Ethnic Self-Identification

VII. Conclusions

This chapter addresses several issues related to the rule of law in Guatemala, including the legitimacy of institutions related to the justice system, Guatemalans' support for principles and measures related to the rule of law, and specific issues related to corruption and crime.

- Over the years, a majority of institutions within the justice sector have received average confidence scores close to 40 points. The only exceptions are the Human Rights Ombudsman, scoring close to 50 points, and the Civil National Police, which scored in the range of 30 points.

    - The only institution within the justice system for which there is data dating back to 1993 is the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). The level of confidence in the SCJ has remained in the 40s throughout the last two decades, notwithstanding the changes to the scale in 2004. The highest score obtained by the SCJ during the period under study came in 1997, while the lowest score was acquired in 2010. In 2012, the SCJ obtained a score of 44.9 points.

    - Courts receive similar levels of confidence as the SCJ since measurements began in 2006. The lowest score for courts was 42.7 points in 2010 and the highest was 45.8 in 2012.

    - Measurements of confidence in the Public Ministry (PM) began in 2005 and have since remained stable. The highest average score obtained by that institution was 47.8 points in 2012 and the lowest was 44.8 in 2010.

    - The Constitutional Court (CC) has also maintained stable results since 2004. The best outcome for this institution was 47.6 in 2010, the year in which various justice sector institutions received their lowest levels of the period under study. The worst result for the CC was a score of 41.0 points in 2008, and the result in 2012 was 46.0 points.

    - The Human Rights Ombudsman (HRO) is the only institution within the justice system that has consistently obtained confidence levels above 50 points. The exception to this pattern came in 2008, when the HRO received 48.0 points. The highest score was given in 2004, when the HRO received 56.9 points. In 2012, the average trust for the HRO was 51.2 points, a result statistically below the 54.9 points in 2010.

    - The Civil National Police (CNP) is the only institution that has consistently obtained average confidence levels below 40 points, with the exceptions of 2006 and 2008, when it scored 42.4 and 40.3 points, respectively. The lowest score was given in 2010 with 31.0 points, and the score for 2012 was 34.9 points.

    - One of the questions asks respondents to indicate how much confidence they have in the "justice system" in general. The averages in trust in the justice system between 2004 and 2012 are similar to those of most institutions within the justice sector, ranging throughout the 40s. In 2010, the average trust in the justice system was 46.2 points—the highest during the entire period.

- This chapter also analyzes changes through the years in public support of certain principles and basic standards of rule of law.

  - One of the questions asks respondents to provide an opinion on the following statement: "In order to capture criminals, authorities should a) always respect the law b) occasionally break the law." The option offering that authorities should "always respect the law" is considered tantamount to support for the rule of law. The highest degree of support for the rule of law occurred in 2004 when the question was asked for the first time: 75.9% of Guatemalans said that the law should always be respected. Said percentage has declined significantly since then. The lowest levels of support for the rule of law came in 2006 and 2008, when only 56.9% and 57.6% of Guatemalans indicated support, respectively. In 2012, 66% of respondents gave a positive response in support of the rule of law.

  - A question directly related to compliance with the standards of a country's rule of law asks respondents to indicate how much they agree with vigilante justice. In 2010, Guatemalans gave the highest score in support of such measures, averaging 43.2 points on the 0-100 scale. The lowest score for measures of vigilante justice was given in 2008 with 22.9 points. In 2012, the average number of support measures for vigilantism was 39.4 points.

  - Since 1993, respondents have been asked if they consider the country to have a strong-hand government or one that promotes participation. The preference for a strong hand in Guatemala has changed substantially over the years. The year that gave the greatest support to a strong-handed government was 1999, when 67.6% of respondents indicated such a preference. The year with the lowest level was 2008, when 33.7% expressed support. In 2012, 42.0% of Guatemalans said that they preferred a heavy-handed government.

  - The maintenance of rules of democracy is an essential component of the rule of law. It is therefore important to measure public support for measures or actions contrary to the maintenance of democracy. One question that has been asked over the years is whether citizens believe that we need a strong leader who is not necessarily popularly elected, or whether electoral democracy is always best. The percentage of Guatemalans in support of an unelected leader has stayed relatively low, but at a level that remains worrying. The lowest percentage of support for such a leader came in 2010 with 17.2% of the population. In contrast, the highest percentage for an unelected leader came in 2012 at 29.1%.

  - Another related question asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they sympathize with others who participate in a group that seeks to violently overthrow an elected government. Respondents could choose a response on a scale of 1 to 10 points, which was converted to a 0-100 scale for illustrative purposes. Over the years, the average in sympathy with overthrow-minded groups has been relatively low, within the range of 20 to 23 points. The only year in which the average was lower was in 2008, when the average fell to 12.4 points.

- Corruption is one of the dangers that puts democracy at risk and undermines the rule of law. This chapter also includes a longitudinal analysis of issues related to corruption in Guatemala in recent years.

    - On the scale of 0-100 points, the perception of corruption in Guatemala has remained relatively high during the period from 2004 to 2012. The year in which the average perception of corruption was highest was 2006, with 81.2 points, and the lowest average occurred in 2012, with 69.0 points.

    - The survey asks respondents to indicate if they have been victims of corruption of various public institutions—based on the responses provided, it is possible to construct an index of victimization by corruption. In Guatemala, the percentage of citizens who report having been victims of corruption has remained in the 20s. The year with the highest rate of victimization was 2012 with 24.1% and the lowest was 2006 with 18.1%.

- Crime has become a major problem in Guatemala, and high rates of violent crime indicate weaknesses in the rule of law. Surveys of democratic culture through the years have asked a number of questions related to the topic.

    - A question commonly used to measure perception of insecurity is how safe respondents are walking in their neighborhoods. On the scale of 0-100 points, the perception of insecurity in Guatemala has remained in the range of 39-45 points. The year reporting the largest increase in perception of insecurity was 2004, with an average of 45.5 points. The year with the lowest reported perception of insecurity was 2012 with 38.2 points on average.

    - In recent years, victimization by crime has also been measured. However, because the question underwent significant changes in 2010, comparative results are not reliable. In 2010, 38.9% of respondents reported that either they or someone in their household had been the victim of a crime. The percentage in 2012 decreased slightly to 33.5%.

    - A related question asked respondents to indicate if gangs affect their neighborhood. The percentage of those who indicated that their neighborhood was very or somewhat affected in such a manner has remained stable between 26% and 35%. In 2012, 33% of Guatemalans indicated that their neighborhoods were affected by the presence of gangs.

    - Finally, since 2004 respondents were asked, if they were to become victims of crime, whether they would trust the justice system to punish those guilty. The percentage of those who said they had a high or somewhat high level of confidence in the system has fluctuated throughout the period under study. The lowest percentage was in 2010, when only 35.4% of respondents indicated confidence. In contrast, the highest percentage of confidence occurred in 2012, when 45% said so.

One final question in this chapter is related to the perception of the Peace Accords of 1996. This question has not been asked every year, but it was posed in 2001 and 2012. Whereas in 2001, 76% of Guatemalans said the peace accords were either good or very good, by 2012 the percentage had risen to 81%.

Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

Guatemala, marzo de 2012

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido(a) al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública. Vengo por encargo la Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES) y de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. El proyecto está financiado desde los Estados Unidos. La entrevista durará de 30 a 45 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Guatemala.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio puede comunicarse a ASIES al teléfono 2201-6300 (ext. 250) con Juan Pablo Pira.

¿Desea Participar?

Appendix B. Sample design 2012

By: Juan Pablo Pira

This sample is prepared by ASIES for application in the year 2012 and other years. The most recent census data (Censo 2002) is used, not the projections.

1. General Characteristics

   a. Universe:

   The universe for this study are all voting-age adults, 18 years or older, who live in the homes included in the census in urban and rural areas in different municipalities of Guatemala[1]. The sample excludes people in hospitals, jails, monasteries, and other similar institutions.

   b. Regions:

   This study uses the regions that were defined for the application of the first democratic culture surveys 1993. A slight difference is that the Suroriente and Suroccidente regions are combined in one general region called Sur. These regions were merged in order to comply with the requirement to have at least 200 interviews per region. It must be kept in mind that these regions are not those defined by the Ley Preliminar de Regionalización of 1985.

   The regions used in this study are both the strata and the domains of study. These strata have been used in all past applications of the DIMS, CAMS and LAPOP projects and are identified by the variable ESTRATOPRI that has been previously used.

2. Sampling units, selection and information

   a. Sampling units. The primary sampling unit is the municipio (municipality) as reported in the Census of 2002[2]. The secondary sampling unit is the "sector censal" or census tract (that is identified by a number and name of the locality). The tertiary unit is the block (manzana) and the quaternary unit is the household.
   b. The unit of selection is the household because it is permanent in the field and easy to identify.

[1] Since the last census four new municipalities have been created: Unión Cantinil in Huehuetenango, Raxruhá y La Tinta in Alta Verapaz and Las Cruces in Petén. Residents of those municipalities are eligible for our simple given that the population that lives in those municipalities was already considered by the Census as part of another municipality.
[2] Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) had planned a Census for 2012 but it was postponed.

c. The unit of information (respondent) is the selected adult to be interviewed according to the established quotas following LAPOP's sampling guidelines.

Sample Frame

The simple frame includes all the people living in the previously described universe. For that reason, all individuals in any ethnic or geographic group have the chance to be selected. For all sampling purposes, the listings of departments, municipalities, towns, as well as census tracts and maps created by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) during the last Census were used.

Guatemala is divided into 22 departments, which in turn are divided in municipios (municipalities). To date, Guatemala has 334 municipalities, although there were 331 at the time of the 2012 Census. Within each municipality, INE identifies different dwelling categories such as pueblo, villa, aldea, ciudad, paraje, etc.

Table 1 Distribution of the Population 18 and over by Department, by Gender, Aage and Area of Residence							
	Urban			**Rural**			
Departamentos	Masculino	Femenino	Total Urbana	Masculino	Femenino	Total Rural	Total
Guatemala	612,190	712,385	1,324,575	87,388	91,486	178,874	1,503,449
El Progreso	13,279	15,179	28,458	22,772	23,520	46,292	74,750
Sacatepéquez	55,752	59,841	115,593	9,511	9,777	19,288	134,881
Chimaltenango	54,891	60,564	115,455	49,358	53,410	102,768	218,223
Escuintla	70,105	74,560	144,665	73,439	68,743	142,182	286,847
Santa Rosa	27,486	30,152	57,638	48,700	49,077	97,777	155,415
Sololá	36,965	39,613	76,578	36,035	37,710	73,745	150,323
Totonicapán	26,256	33,179	59,435	44,637	55,585	100,222	159,657
Quetzaltenango[3]	85,389	101,589	186,978	59,828	69,052	128,880	315,858
Quetzaltenango Costa			*40,245*			*62,648*	*102,283*
Quetzaltenango Altiplano			*146,733*			*66,232*	*212,965*
Suchitepéquez	41,462	47,686	89,148	55,103	57,172	112,275	201,423
Retalhuleu	22,445	25,843	48,288	35,126	37,779	72,905	121,193
San Marcos[4]	43,215	48,932	92,147	136,590	146,280	282,870	375,017
San Marcos Costa			*22,381*			*56,415*	*78,796*
San Marcos Altiplano			*69,766*			*226,455*	*336,221*
Huehuetenango	46,026	53,942	99,968	136,766	152,479	289,245	389,213
Quiche	36,662	42,858	79,520	99,044	114,816	213,860	293,380
Baja Verapaz	14,213	16,533	30,746	33,584	37,922	71,506	102,252
Alta Verapaz	40,020	43,825	83,845	136,376	138,653	275,029	358,874
Petén	28,105	28,450	56,555	56,962	51,799	108,761	165,316
Izabal	24,262	27,207	51,469	52,889	53,160	106,049	157,518
Zacapa	21,069	24,296	45,365	30,576	31,349	61,925	107,290
Chiquimula	20,081	25,556	45,637	51,454	55,263	106,717	152,354
Jalapa	18,212	22,586	40,798	36,007	38,791	74,798	115,596
Jutiapa	27,493	32,178	59,671	65,282	71,425	136,707	196,378
Total	1,365,578	1,566,954	2,932,532	1,357,427	1,445,248	2,802,675	5,735,207

Fuente: Censo de Población INE, 2002

[3] The departments of San Marcos and Quetzaltenango were divided to reflect in the distribution by regions two very different realities. Both departments have municipalities in the highlands and in the coastal areas. The municipalities of the coastal areas resemble those of Suchitepéquez and Escuintla more than those of the municipalities of the highlands (Altiplano). Quetzaltenango-Costa includes the municipalities of Colomba, Coatepeque, El Palmar, Flores Costa Cuca and Génova.

[4] In the department of San Marcos the coastal municipalities include La Reforma, El Quetzal, Nuevo Progreso, Catarina, Ocós, Ayutla, Catarina and Pajapita.

3. Sampling Method

The sampling method takes into account the conditions established by LAPOP for national samples. Some of the main requirements are:

a. To obtain representative samples for the following domains of study:

   i. Size of municipalities (by population):
      - Less than 25,000 inhabitants
      - More than 25,000 and less than 100,000 inhabitants
      - More than 100,000 inhabitants

   ii. First stage strata:
      - Metropolitan region
      - Región Nororiental (Northeast region)
      - Región Suroriental (Southeast region)
      - Región Noroccidental (Northwest region)
      - Región Suroccidental (Southwest region)

   iii. Area:
      - Urban
      - Rural

b. Estimate the sampling errors for each of those strata.
c. Optimize the time used in data collection.
d. Optimize the resources to attain a balance between cost, size of the sample and precision of results.
e. Use the most recent and best quality sample frame available.
f. Administer a total of 24 interviews in each primary sampling unit.
g. A total of six interviews in each final segment.

4. Description of the sampling procedure

The sampling procedure follows a multi-stage process, as follows:

a. In the first stage municipalities were selected with probability proportional to population. In this case only the population over 18 years of age is included. Since each municipality includes exactly 24 interviews, 63 groups of 24 are distributed in all municipalities.
b. In the case of larger urban areas, if they get more than one unit they are not assigned to the municipality instead they are assigned to the neighborhood (barrio or colonia).

5. Stratification

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided in several subgroups. The purpose is to diminish the variance taking advantage of the fact that some groups have different variances. Additionally, stratification guarantees the inclusion of regions or interest groups. In a non-stratified sample, it is possible that some large groups (such as the capital) could be excluded because of chance.

The sampling is conducted separately within each stratum. For that reason, the strata used to report, also known as domains of study, have enough cases to allow for proper analysis. A requirement of LAPOP samples is that they should have a minimum of 200 cases in each stratum.

Table 2
Distribution of the Sample by Regional Strata and Size of the Municipality

Population	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	124,907	326,393	1,052,149	**1,503,449**
Sur	1,095,546	569,975	0	**1,665,521**
Noroccidente	1,158,463	441,774	0	**1,781,923**
Nororiente	617,243	348,757	0	**966,000**
Total	**2,996,159**	**1,686,899**	**1,052,149**	**5,735,207**
% respondents	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	4%	19%	100%	**26%**
Sur	37%	34%	0%	**29%**
Noroccidente	39%	26%	0%	**31%**
Nororiente	21%	21%	0%	**17%**
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
Number of interviews	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	24	96	264	**384**
Sur	288	144	0	**432**
Noroccidente	312	120	0	**432**
Nororiente	168	96	0	**264**
Total	**792**	**456**	**276**	**1512**

6. Sample selection

a. First stage: primary sampling units

The primary sampling units (PSUs) are assigned to each strata using probability proportional to the size of the population. The PSUs are the 334 municipalities in the country classified by size following LAPOP's guidelines.

All municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants are self-selected, which means that they are selected with a probability equal to one. In other words, they are necessarily included in the sample.

For the rest of municipalities in each stratum, the selection is done with probability proportional to population (over 18). In order to make this selection, the municipalities are ordered according to the code provided by the INE, a random start is chosen and a constant skip is used to choose the municipalities to be sampled. This procedure is not strictly random, since in a truly random selection a small community with population less than one skip could be chosen more than once. However, the equations that guide the calculation of the estimators for a sample obtained that way are essentially the same.

Table 3
Municipalities Selected by Region

Number of municipios	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	8	6	3	17
Sur	84	8	0	92
Noroccidente	137	16	0	153
Nororiente	63	9	0	72
Total	**292**	**39**	**3**	**334**
Interviews	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	24	96	264	**384**
Sur	288	144	0	**432**
Noroccidente	312	120	0	**432**
Nororiente	168	96	0	**264**
Total	**792**	**456**	**276**	**1512**
Selected municipalities	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	1	4	3	**8**
Sur	12	6	0	**18**
Noroccidente	13	5	0	**18**
Nororiente	7	4	0	**11**
Total	**33**	**19**	**3**	**55**

For the three large municipalities in Guatemala (Ciudad de Guatemala, Villa Nueva and Mixco) localities rather than municipalities are selected. In this case the localities are neighborhoods, which may be classed into different descriptions in the listing of INE such as barrios, colonias, asentamientos, and lotificaciones. Unlike the selection method used for other municipalities, in these cases only two segments are included in each locality, with only 12 interviews per neighborhood because many neighborhoods are too small to conduct 24 interviews without making proximity excessive.

Table 4 Primary Sampling Units in the Larger Municipalities				
Municipios	**Inhab.**	**Percentage**	**Interviews**	**UPMs**
Guatemala	600,632	57.09	156	13
Mixco	248,815	23.65	60	5
Villa Nueva	202,702	19.27	48	4
Total	***1,052,149***	***100***	264	22

All in all, 77 PSUs are selected, out of which 54 are or 24 interviews and 22 of 12. Visits are made to thirty three small municipalities, seventeen medium size municipalities and three large ones. The result of this selection is shown in Table 8.

b. Second stage: secondary sampling units – census segments

In the second stage, after the stratification by urban and rural areas, the required census segments in each PSU are selected with a proportional probability to the population. The following table shows the distribution of the interviews and segments by area in each of the strata defined by region and by size of the municipality.

Table 5 Distribution of the Sampling Points by Area and Region (Inhabitants 18 years or older)						
	Interviews			**Selected Census tracts**		
Región	**Urbanas**	**Rurales**	**Total**	**Urbanos**	**Rurales**	**total**
Metropolitana						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	12	12	24	2	2	4
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	72	24	96	12	4	16
Más de 100 000 habitantes	252	12	264	42	2	44
Total Metropolitana	**336**	**48**	**384**	**56**	**8**	**64**
Sur						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	102	210	312	17	35	52
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	54	66	120	9	11	20
Más de 100 000 habitantes						
Total Sur	**156**	**276**	**432**	**26**	**46**	**72**
Noroccidente						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	108	204	312	18	34	52
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	48	72	120	8	12	20
Más de 100 000 habitantes						
Total Noroccidente	**156**	**276**	**432**	**26**	**46**	**72**
Nororiente						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	48	120	168	8	20	28
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	24	72	96	4	12	16
Más de 100 000 habitantes						
Total Nororiente	**72**	**192**	**264**	**12**	**32**	**44**
Total País	**720**	**792**	**1512**	**120**	**132**	**252**

c. Third stage: tertiary sampling units – Manzanas (blocks) or groups of households

This stage is done on the maps of the census tracts. In each census tract a randomly selected block is selected as the final sampling point. Within each block, six people will be interviewed.

d. Fourth stage: quaternary sampling units – households

Beginning at a central point the interviewer will walk from a corner to identify the households to be included. In each household only one person who is a permanent resident can be interviewed. The respondent cannot be a temporary resident or the servant (empleada doméstica). Once an interview is fulfilled in a house, at least three houses must be left in between before selecting the next household. If it is not possible to complete the six interviews in that block, the next block in the same sector will be selected.

e. Fifth stage: final sampling units – Respondents

The last selection is done using the quotas presented below. In case there is more than one person who fulfills the quota, the person whose birthday was celebrated most recently will be selected.

Table 6
Gender and Age Quotas

Gender and age groups	**18- 29**	**30- 45**	**45 y más**	**Total**
Male	1	1	1	3
Female	1	1	1	3
Total	2	2	2	6

7. Confidence levels and sampling error

As a general approximation, a sample from a large population with these characteristics has a maximum error of 2.5% with a 95% confidence level assuming a Bernoulli random variable with a parameter of p=0.50. This may be an underestimation of the true error, as design effects are likely to alter this measurement. However, it is not possible to provide more precise data before collecting the information.

This kind of sampling is known as a stratified multi-stage cluster sample. As the name implies, this is a sample that uses both clustering and stratification. Since some of the assignations are affected by the need to obtain six interviews by segment, there are some slight non-proportionalities. Non proportional assignation leads design effects larger than 1.00. Nonetheless, for reference purposes, the following table contains the errors for the required domains of study. These numbers are likely smaller than the actual values.

Table 7
Sample Size and Margin of Error (95% Confidence)

Region	**Sample size**	**Sampling error (%)**
Metropolitana	408	5.10
Sur	432	4.81
Noroccidente	432	4.81
Noreste	264	6.33
Areas		
Urbana	720	3.73
Rural	792	3.55
Total Country	1512	2.50

8. Municipalities selected by region, stratum and size.

Table 8 Selected Municipalities				
Región	**Tamaño**	**INE Code**	**Departamento**	**Municipio**
Metropolitana	More than 100 000 inhab.	101	Guatemala	Guatemala
		108	Guatemala	Mixco
		115	Guatemala	Villa Nueva
	Less than 25 000 inhab.	107	Guatemala	San Pedro Ayampuc
	Between 25 000 and 100 000 inhab.	106	Guatemala	Chinautla
		110	Guatemala	San Juan Sacatepéquez
		116	Guatemala	Villa Canales
		117	Guatemala	Petapa
Noroccidente	Less than 25 000 inhab.	301	Sacatepéquez	Antigua Guatemala
		314	Sacatepéquez	Alotenango
		413	Chimaltenango	San Andrés Itzapa
		710	Sololá	Panajachel
		806	Totonicapán	Santa María Chiquimula
		911	Quetzaltenango	Concepción Chiquirichapa
		1204	San Marcos	Comitancillo
		1213	San Marcos	El Tumbador
		1304	Huehuetenango	Cuilco
		1311	Huehuetenango	La Libertad
		1319	Huehuetenango	Colotenango
		1404	Quiché	Zacualpa
		1413	Quiché	Nebaj
	Between 25 000 and 100 000 inhab.	401	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango
		701	Sololá	Sololá
		901	Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango
		1301	Huehuetenango	Huehuetenango
		1401	Quiché	Santa Cruz del Quiché
Nororiente	Less than 25 000 inhab.	203	El Progreso	San Agustín Acasaguastlán
		1504	Baja Verapaz	Cubulco
		1606	Alta Verapaz	Tucurú
		1614	Alta Verapaz	Chahal
		1708	Petén	Dolores
		1803	Izabal	El Estor
		2004	Chiquimula	Jocotán
	Between 25 000 and 100 000 inhab.	1601	Alta Verapaz	Cobán
		1609	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá
		1705	Petén	La Libertad

		1805	Izabal	Los Amates
Sur	Less than 25 000 inhab.	504	Escuintla	Siquinalá
		509	Escuintla	San José
		602	Santa Rosa	Barberena
		609	Santa Rosa	Taxisco
		919	Quetzaltenango	El Palmar
		1006	Suchitepéquez	Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez
		1013	Suchitepéquez	Chicacao
		1104	Retalhuleu	San Martín Zapotitlán
		1212	San Marcos	Nuevo Progreso
		2102	Jalapa	San Pedro Pinula
		2202	Jutiapa	El Progreso
		2211	Jutiapa	Comapa
	Less than 25 000 inhab.	501	Escuintla	Escuintla
		502	Escuintla	Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa
		920	Quetzaltenango	Coatepeque
		1001	Suchitepéquez	Mazatenango
		2101	Jalapa	Jalapa
		2201	Jutiapa	Jutiapa

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Guatemela 2012, Versión # 10.0.2.0 IRB ***Approval:110627***

El Barómetro de las Américas: Guatemala, 2012

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PAIS. País:

01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá
27. Surinam				

02

IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____ |__|__|__|__|

ESTRATOPRI. (201). Zona metropolitana (202). Suroccidente (203) Noroccidente (204) Suroriente (205) Nororiente |__|__|__|

ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad: (1) Grande (más de 100,000) (2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 y 100,000) (3) Pequeña (menos de 25,000) |__|

UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo)_____ |__|__|__|__|

PROV. Departamento: _____ **2**|__|__|

MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____ **2**|__|__|

GUADISTRITO. Lugar poblado: _____ |__|__|

GUASEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL: _____ |__|__|__|

GUASEC. Sector: _____ |__|__|__|

CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral): _____ [El cluster debe de tener 6 entrevistas] |__|__|

UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] |__|__|

TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural |__|

IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Mam (3) K´iche´ (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q´eqchí´ (6) Achí (7) Ixil |__|

Hora de inicio: _____:_____ |__|__|__|__|

FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ Mes:_____ año: 2012 |__|__|__|__|

¿Vive usted en esta casa?
Si → continúe
No →Agradezca y termine la entrevista
¿Es usted ciudadano guatemalteco o residente permanente de Guatemala?
Si → continúe
No →Agradezca y termine la entrevista

¿Tiene por lo menos 18 años? Si → continúe No →Agradezca y termine la entrevista	
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA	

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género : (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo **in**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")] |___|___|

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98
INAP	99		

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía… ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace **doce meses**? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría **en general su** situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.					
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... **[Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]**	**Sí**	**No**	**NS**	**NR**	
CP2. ¿A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, municipalidad/corporación municipal, concejal, alcalde auxiliar?	1	2	88	98	
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del Estado?	1	2	88	98	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a SGL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a SGL1]** (98) No responde **[Pase a SGL1]**	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	

	Una vez a la semana	**Una o dos veces al mes**	**Una o dos veces al año**	**Nunca**	**NS**	**NR**	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]**	

	Una vez a la semana	**Una o dos veces al mes**	**Una o dos veces al año**	**Nunca**	**Asistente/ Miembro**	**Líder/ Directivo**	**NS**	**NR**	**INAP**	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4 **[ir a CP7]**			88	98		
CP6L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? **[Si dice "ambos", marcar "líder"]**					1	2	88	98	99	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	Asistente/ Miembro	Líder/ Directivo	NS	NR	INAP	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…	1	2	3	4 **[ir a CP8]**			88	98		
CP7L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? **[Si dice "ambos", marcar "líder"]**					1	2	88	98	99	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4 **[ir a CP9]**			88	98		
CP8L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple o participa en la dirección del grupo? **[Si dice "ambos", marcar "líder"]**					1	2	88	98	99	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste…	1	2	3	4			88	98		
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste…	1	2	3	4			88	98		
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4			88	98	99	
CP21. ¿Reuniones de grupos deportivos o recreativos?	1	2	3	4			88	98		

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

MIL6. Ahora, cambiando de tema, ¿qué tan orgulloso(a) está del Ejército de Guatemala? **[Leer las opciones]**
(1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a)
(4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR

MIL5. ¿Qué tan orgulloso(a) se siente de ser guatemalteco(a) cuando escucha el himno nacional? **[Leer las opciones]**
(1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a)
(4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98
Izquierda									**Derecha**		

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los **últimos 12 meses** ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a PROT6]** (88) NS **[Pase a PROT6]** (98) NR **[Pase a PROT6]**	
PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los **últimos 12 meses**? _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PROT7. Y ¿en los últimos doce meses, ha participado en el bloqueo de alguna calle o espacio público como forma de protesta? (1) Sí, ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PROT6. ¿En los **últimos 12 meses** ha firmado alguna petición? (1) Sí ha firmado (2) No ha firmado (88) NS (98) NR	
PROT8. En los últimos doce meses, usted leyó o compartió información política por alguna red social de la web como Twitter, Facebook u Orkut? (1) Sí, ha hecho (2) No ha hecho (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
GUAJC15. Frente a la amenaza del narcotráfico.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (88) NS **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? _____**[Marcar el número]**_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? **[Leer alternativas]** (01) Robo sin arma **sin** agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma **con** agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)	

ARM2. Si usted pudiera, ¿tendría un arma de fuego para su protección? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los **últimos doce meses** usted...

	Sí	**No**	**NS**	**NR**	**INAP**	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? **[en zona rural utilizar "caserío" o "comunidad"]**	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC45. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia? **[Si no trabaja marque 99]**	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	

Voy a leerle una serie de frases que se oyen en la calle o en los medios de comunicación cuando se habla de formas para combatir la delincuencia. Me gustaría que usted me dijera si está muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con cada una de ellas. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia...

	Muy de acuerdo	**Algo de acuerdo**	**Algo en desacuerdo**	**Muy en desacuerdo**	**NS**	**NR**	
VIC101. es crear programas de prevención. Está usted: **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

VIC102. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es hacer leyes más duras	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC103. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es contratar seguridad privada	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.

	Aprobaría	**No aprobaría pero entendería**	**No aprobaría ni entendería**	**NS**	**NR**	
VOL207. Suponga que para corregirlo y educarlo un padre le pega a su hijo cada vez que este le desobedece. ¿Usted aprobaría que el padre le pegue a su hijo, **ó** no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, **ó** no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL206. Suponga que un hombre le pega a su esposa porque ésta le ha sido infiel con otro hombre. ¿Usted aprobaría que el hombre le pegue a su esposa, **ó** no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, **ó** no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a un**/**a hija/o. ¿Usted aprobaría que mate al violador, **ó** no aprobaría que lo mate pero lo entendería, **ó** no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a esa persona que mantiene asustada a la comunidad, **ó** no aprobaría que lo maten pero lo entendería, **ó** no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente que algunos consideran indeseable. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a gente considerada indeseable, **ó** no aprobaría que la maten pero lo entendería, **ó** no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL205. Si la policía tortura a un delincuente para conseguir información sobre un grupo de crimen organizado muy peligroso. ¿Usted aprobaría que la policía torture a un delincuente, **ó** no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, **ó** no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR						
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo **in**seguro(a) o muy **in**seguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR						

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría… (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
GUAAOJ17A. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por el narcotráfico? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía en este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) La policía protege a la gente frente a la delincuencia, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) **[No leer]** Ninguna, o ambas (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ20. Y pensando en su seguridad y la de su familia, ¿usted se siente más seguro(a), igual de seguro(a), o menos seguro(a) que hace **cinco** años? (1) Más seguro(a) (2) Igual de seguro(a) (3) Menos seguro(a) (88) NS (98)NR	
AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad? **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]** (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas/maras (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) **[NO LEER]** Otros (8) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes (3) **[No leer]** Ambas (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. ***[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]***.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						**Mucho**	**No sabe**	**No responde**

	Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR
Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. **B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Guatemala garantizan un juicio justo? *(**Sondee:** Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Guatemala?	

	Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político guatemalteco?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político guatemalteco?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político guatemalteco?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ejército?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso?	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser guatemalteco(a)?	
B17 [B45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Ministerio Público?	
B24 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los tribunales de justicia?	
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte de Constitucionalidad?	
B60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la CICIG (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala)?	
B70. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el sector privado?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera ***[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]*** **NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO**	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR**
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES **[LAS PREGUNTAS EPP1 Y EPP3 SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]** Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta, **NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO**	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR 99 = INAP**
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos guatemaltecos representan bien a sus votantes? (99) INAP	
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted? (99) INAP	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera ***[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]*** **NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO**	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR**
MIL1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el Ejército guatemalteco está bien entrenado y organizado?	
MIL2. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el Ejército de Guatemala ha hecho un buen trabajo cuando ha ayudado a enfrentar desastres naturales?	
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el Ejército guatemalteco respeta los derechos humanos de los guatemaltecos hoy en día?	

MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América?	
MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el Ejército de Estados Unidos de América debería trabajar junto con el Ejército de Guatemala para mejorar la seguridad nacional?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Otto Pérez Molina es...?: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados del Congreso guatemalteco están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR	

SD2NEW2. Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a), o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	
SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? **[Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	
SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? **[Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo						**Muy de acuerdo**	**NS**	**NR**

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones **POP101.** Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar **directamente** y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7. **NS = 88, NR = 98**	
ROS1. El Estado guatemalteco, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado guatemalteco, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado guatemalteco, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado guatemalteco debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado guatemalteco, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

MIL7. El Ejército guatemalteco debe participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en Guatemala**.** ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES **[LAS PREGUNTAS CCT3 – RAC2A SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]** **CCT3.** Cambiando de tema… Algunas personas dicen que la gente que recibe ayuda de los programas sociales del gobierno es haragana. ¿Hasta qué punto usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP	
GEN1. Cambiando de tema de nuevo, se dice que cuando no hay suficientes trabajos, los hombres deben tener más derecho a los trabajos que las mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP	
Ahora quisiera saber hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con algunas medidas que le voy a mencionar. Quisiera que usted responda pensando en lo que cree que se debería hacer sin importar si se están aplicando o no actualmente. **[Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR]**	
GEN6. El Estado debe exigir que los partidos políticos reserven algunos espacios para mujeres en sus listas de candidatos, aunque tengan que dejar afuera a algunos hombres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP	
RAC2A. Las universidades deberían reservar espacios para los alumnos de piel más oscura, aunque tengan que excluir a otros alumnos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP **[Encuestador: piel más oscura refiere a negros, indígenas, no personas ladinas de piel más clara]**	

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES **[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (W14A-PN5) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]** **W14A.** Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre? (1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PN4. Cambiando de tema, en general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a) o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Guatemala? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) **In**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PN5*.* En su opinión, ¿Guatemala es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 **NS**	98 **NR**
Desaprueba firmemente								**Aprueba firmemente**			

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Guatemala. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: ***[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]***	
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?	
D5 Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (D6-D8) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse? (99) INAP	
D7. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que se permita que las personas con discapacidad física se postulen para cargos públicos? (99) INAP	
D8. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que el Estado tenga el derecho de prohibir que los periódicos publiquen noticias que le puedan producir **daño político**? (99) INAP	

[Recoger tarjeta "D"]

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: **(1)** A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático, o **(2)** La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o **(3)** En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	

Cambiando de tema…

GUAPAZ1A. ¿Alguna vez ha oído Ud. hablar acerca de los acuerdos de paz? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasa a EXC2]** (88) NS **[Pasa a EXC2]** (98) NR **[Pasa a EXC2]**	
GUAPAZ1. ¿Considera Ud. que los acuerdos de paz han sido muy buenos, buenos, malos o muy malos para el país? (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Malos (4) Muy malos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	**No**	**Sí**	**NS**	**NR**	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida ?		0	1	88	98	
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado una mordida?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: **[LEER]**
(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada
(88) NS (98) NR

EXC7MIL. Teniendo en cuenta su propia experiencia o lo que ha escuchado, la corrupción en el **Ejército** guatemalteco está… **[Leer opciones]**
(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada o
(4) Nada generalizada? (88) NS (98) NR

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted **sin temor, con un poco de temor o con mucho temor**?**[VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]**

	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	CON MUCHO TEMOR	NS	NR	
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	88	98	
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	88	98	
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	88	98	
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	88	98	

GUADIS10. ¿Votaría por una persona indígena para presidente?
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

VB1. ¿Está empadronado para votar?
(1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR

INF1. ¿Tiene usted documento personal de identificación?
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

VB2. ¿Votó usted en la primera vuelta de las **elecciones presidenciales** de 2011?
(1) Sí votó **[Siga]**
(2) No votó **[Pasar a GUAVB2]**
(88) NS **[Pasar a GUAVB2]** (98) NR **[Pasar a GUAVB2]**

VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? **[NO LEER LISTA]**
(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto)
(201) CENTRO DE ACCION SOCIAL – CASA - Alejandro Giammattei
(202) COMPROMISO RENOVACION Y ORDEN – CREO – Eduardo Suger
(203) LIBERTAD DEMOCRATICA RENOVADA – LÍDER- Manuel Baldizón
(204) PARTIDO ACCION DE DESARROLLO NACIONAL – ADN- Adela de Torrebiarte
(205) PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL – PAN- Juan Guillermo Gutiérrez
(206) PARTIDO PATRIOTA – PP - Otto Pérez Molina
(207) PARTIDO UNIONISTA – PU- Patricia Escobar de Arzú
(208) UNION DEL CAMBIO NACIONAL -UCN - Mario Estrada
(209) VISION CON VALORES /ENCUENTRO POR GUATEMALA- EG-VIVA- Harold Caballeros
(210) WINAQ/URNG/ANN - Frente Amplio - Rigoberta Menchú
(77) Otro
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP (No votó)

GUAVB2. ¿Votó usted en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de 2011?
(1) Sí votó **[Siga]**
(2) No votó **[Pasar a VB10]**
(88) NS **[Pasar a VB10]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VB10]**

GUAVB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la segunda vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? **[NO LEER LISTA]**
(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto)
(203) LIBERTAD DEMOCRATICA RENOVADA – LÍDER- Manuel Baldizón
(206) PARTIDO PATRIOTA – PP - Otto Pérez Molina
(77) Otro
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP (No votó)

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a POL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a POL1]** (98) NR **[Pase a POL1]**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]**
(201) CENTRO DE ACCION SOCIAL - CASA
(202) COMPROMISO RENOVACION Y ORDEN - CREO
(203) LIBERTAD DEMOCRATICA RENOVADA - LIDER
(204) PARTIDO ACCION DE DESARROLLO NACIONAL - ADN
(205) PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL - PAN
(206) PARTIDO PATRIOTA - PP
(207) PARTIDO UNIONISTA - PU
(208) UNION DEL CAMBIO NACIONAL - UCN
(209) VISION CON VALORES - VIVA
(210) ENCUENTRO POR GUATEMALA- EG
(211) WINAQ
(212) UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA - URNG
(213) ANN
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?
(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones]**
(1) No votaría
(2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente
(3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno
(4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía
(88) NS (98) NR

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otros para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	
VB50. Algunos dicen que en general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR	

GUAPOL10. ¿Cuál considera es la característica más importante de un buen político? **[LEER OPCIONES. MARCAR SOLO UNA].** (1) Su calidad moral y ética (2) Trayectoria profesional (3) Ideología (4) Liderazgo (5) Carisma o personalidad (6) Otro (88) NS (98) NR	

CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente (2) Rara vez (3) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES **[LAS PREGUNTAS VB51-RAC1CA SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]**	
VB51. ¿Quién cree usted que sería más corrupto como político: un hombre, una mujer, o ambos por igual? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) Ambos por igual (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VB52. Y si le toca a un político o una política manejar la economía nacional, ¿quién va a hacer el mejor trabajo; un hombre, una mujer o no importa? (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer (3) No importa (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Ahora vamos a hablar sobre la raza o color de piel de los políticos. **VB53.** Algunos dicen que, en general, las personas de piel oscura no son buenos líderes políticos. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? **[Encuestador: "piel oscura" refiere a negros, indígenas, "no blancos" en general]** (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
RAC1CA. Según varios estudios, las personas de piel oscura son más pobres que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS, SÓLO UNA RESPUESTA]** (1) Por su cultura, o (2) Porque han sido tratadas de manera injusta (3) **[No leer]** Otra respuesta (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (AB1-AB5) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

Cambiando de tema y hablando de las cualidades que los niños deben tener, le voy a mencionar varias características y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para un niño o niña:

AB1. (1) Independencia; o (2) Respeto a los mayores
(3) **[No leer]** Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

AB2. (1) Obediencia, o (2) Autosuficiencia (valerse por sí mismo)
(3) **[No leer]** Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

AB5. (1) Creatividad; o (2) Disciplina
(3) **[No leer]** Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (SOC1 – SOC12B) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

SOC1. Por cada 100 quetzales que gana una persona rica y 100 que gana una persona pobre, en su opinión, cuánto debería pagar cada una en impuestos? **[LEER OPCIONES]**
(1) La persona rica debería pagar 50 quetzales y la persona pobre 20,o
(2) La persona rica debería pagar 40 y la persona pobre 30, o
(3) La persona rica debería pagar 30 y la persona pobre 30 también
(4) **[NO LEER]** Otra combinación
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC2A. Dígame, por favor, ¿en cuáles de las siguientes áreas debe invertir más dinero el gobierno? **[LEER OPCIONES]**
(1) Educación
(2) Infraestructura, obras (carreteras, agua, desagüe /alcantarillado/saneamiento)
(3) Vivienda (4) Jubilación
(5) Ayuda a los pobres (6) Medio ambiente
(7) Salud (8) Seguridad
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC2B. ¿Y en segundo lugar? **[LEER OPCIONES SOLO SI LA PERSONA ENTREVISTADA NO RECUERDA LAS OPCIONES DE LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR]**
(1) Educación
(2) Infraestructura, obras (carreteras, agua, desagüe /alcantarillado/saneamiento)
(3) Vivienda (4) Jubilación
(5) Ayuda a los pobres (6) Medio ambiente
(7) Salud (8) Seguridad
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC3. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre algunas de las formas en que el gobierno gasta el dinero de los impuestos. Vamos a comenzar con educación. ¿Qué piensa usted acerca de la calidad de la educación pública primaria y secundaria en Guatemala? **[Leer opciones]**
(1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC4. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de la educación primaria y secundaria en Guatemala ¿qué debe hacer el gobierno? **[Leer opciones]**
(1) Usar mejor el dinero que gasta actualmente en educación, o
(2) Destinar más dinero a la educación, aún si se tiene que subir los impuestos, o
(3) Las dos cosas (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC5. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en educación primaria y secundaria?
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC6. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de las escuelas, ¿quién debe decidir cómo gastar el dinero que va para las escuelas? **[LEER OPCIONES]**
(1) Las escuelas (2) Los gobiernos locales
(3) La Gobernación Departamental (4) El gobierno central
(5) **[No leer]** Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC7. Ahora vamos a hablar de los servicios de salud. ¿Qué piensa usted de la calidad del servicio público de salud en Guatemala? Es…**[Leer opciones]**
(1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC8. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de los servicios de salud públicos en Guatemala, ¿qué debería hacer el gobierno? **[Leer opciones]** (1) Usar mejor el dinero que gasta actualmente en salud, o (2) Invertir más dinero en salud, aún si se tiene que subir los impuestos, o (3) Las dos cosas (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SOC9. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en el servicio público de salud? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SOC10. En su opinión, ¿qué tienen que hacer los gobiernos para reducir la pobreza y desigualdad en Guatemala? **[No leer]** (1) Crear empleos/mejorar la economía (2) Promover la reforma agraria (3) Mejorar los servicios de educación pública (4) Ofrecer ayuda pública a los pobres (5) Incrementar los impuestos a los ricos (6) Mejorar la infraestructura (carreteras, agua, desagüe /alcantarillado/saneamiento) (9) **[NO LEER]** Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SOC11. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda invertir más en el programa "Mi Familia Progresa"? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
[ENTREGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "E"] **SOC12A**. En esta escala de 1 a10, donde 1 significa que defiende a los ricos y 10 que defiende a los pobres, dónde **se ubican** los políticos guatemaltecos? **[Anotar un número de 1 a 10, 88 para aquellos que no saben y 98 para aquellos que no responden]** (99) INAP	
SOC12B. Y usando la misma escala, donde 1 significa que defiende a los ricos y 10 que defiende a los pobres, dónde **le gustaría** a usted que se ubicaran los políticos guatemaltecos? **[Anotar un número de 1 a 10, 88 para aquellos que no saben y 98 para aquellos que no responden]** (99) INAP **[RECOGER TARJETA "E"]**	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES **[LAS PREGUNTAS SNW1A – SNW1B SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]**	
SNW1A. ¿Usted conoce personalmente a algún funcionario electo o a alguna persona que fue candidato en las últimas elecciones nacionales, departamentales o locales? (1) Sí (2) No **[Pasar a FOR1]** (88) NS **[Pasar a FOR1]** (98) NR **[Pasar a FOR1]** (99) INAP	
SNW1B. ¿Y ese cargo es a nivel local, a nivel departamental, o a nivel nacional? (1) Local (2) Departamental (3) Nacional (4) Candidatos en más de un nivel (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR1 - FOR8) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

FOR1. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre sus opiniones respecto de algunos países. Cuando hablamos de "China" en esta entrevista, estamos hablando de China continental, la República Popular de China, y no de la isla Taiwán.
¿Cuál de los siguientes países es el que tiene **más influencia** en **América Latina**? **[Leer opciones]**

(1) China (2) Japón
(3) India (4) Estados Unidos
(5) Brasil (6) Venezuela
(7) México (10) España
(11) **[No leer]** Otro país, o (12) **[No leer]** Ninguno **[Pasa a FOR4]**
(88) **[No leer]** NS **[Pasa a FOR4]** (98) **[No leer]** NR **[Pasa a FOR4]**
(99) INAP

FOR2. Y pensando en **[país mencionado en FOR1],** ¿Cree usted que su influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa?

(1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva
(3) **[No leer]** Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa (6) **[No leer]** No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR (99) INAP

FOR3. [Preguntar SOLO si país mencionado en FOR1 NO fue China] Y pensando en China y la influencia que tiene en **América Latina**. ¿Cree usted que esa influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa?

(1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva
(3) **[No leer]** Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa (6) **[No leer]** No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

FOR4. Y **dentro de 10 años,** en su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países tendrá más influencia en **América Latina**? **[Leer opciones]**

(1) China (2) Japón
(3) India (4) Estados Unidos
(5) Brasil (6) Venezuela
(7) México (10) España
(11) **[No leer]** Otro país (12) **[No leer]** Ninguno
(88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR (99) INAP

FOR5. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro **de nuestro país**? **[Leer opciones]**

(1) China (2) Japón
(3) India (4) Estados Unidos
(5) Singapur (6) Rusia
(7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil
(11) Venezuela, o (12) México
(13) **[No leer]** Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo
(14) **[No leer]** Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

FOR6.Y pensando ahora **sólo en nuestro país,** ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en **nuestro país**? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Mucha (2) Algo
(3) Poca (4) Nada **[Pasar a FOR8]**
(88) NS **[Pasar a FOR8]** (98) NR **[Pasar a FOR8]** (99) INAP

FOR7. En general, la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es **[leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva
(3) **[No leer]** Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa (6) **[No leer]** No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

FOR8. Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con la siguiente afirmación: "Los negocios chinos contribuyen al desarrollo económico de Guatemala"? ¿Está usted **[leer alternativas]**…

(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo
(3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) En desacuerdo
(5) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR9A – FOR9D) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

¿Según lo que usted sabe o ha oído, los negocios chinos que están instalados en Guatemala sufren algunos de los siguientes problemas? **[Leer alternativas]**

	Es problema	No es problema	No sabe/ No tiene opinión	NR	INAP	
FOR9A. Relaciones laborales, tales como disputas con los empleados o con los sindicatos ¿Cree usted que es un problema o que no lo es, o no tiene opinión al respecto?	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9B. Problemas que surgen de la falta de entendimiento de la cultura o de las costumbres de Guatemala.	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9C. Falta de conocimiento de las normas políticas, legales o reglas y valores sociales de Guatemala.	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9D. Falta de comunicación con los medios de comunicación locales y con los residentes.	1	2	88	98	99	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL10A – MIL10E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ No tiene opinión	NR	INAP	
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10B. El de Rusia. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10D. Israel. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL11A – MIL11E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

Ahora me gustaría preguntarle sobre las relaciones en general de nuestro país con otras naciones del mundo. Cuando usted piensa en las relaciones de nuestro país con **China**, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?

	Más cercana	**Más o menos igual**	**Más lejana**	**No sabe/ No tiene opinión**	**NR**	**INAP**	
MIL11A. China	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11B. Y la relación de nuestro país con Rusia, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11C. Y con Irán, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11D. Con Israel, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11E. Finalmente, con Estados Unidos, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	

Pasando a otro tema…

CCT1NEW. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno?
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total
[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]

	1⁰	**2⁰**	**3⁰**	**4⁰**	**5⁰**	**6⁰**	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo básico, tercero básico)	7	8	9				
Bachillerato, Magisterio o Secretariado	10	11	12				
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Maestría o Doctorado	19	20	21	22			
NS	88						
NR	98						

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES
[LAS PREGUNTAS ED2 Y MOV1 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]
ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? **[NO LEER OPCIONES]**
(00) Ninguno
(01) Primaria incompleta
(02) Primaria completa
(03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto
(04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo
(05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta
(06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa
(07) Universitaria incompleta
(08) Universitaria completa
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

MOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase…? **[LEER OPCIONES]**
(1) Alta (2) Media alta (3) Media (4) Media baja (5) Baja
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Q2D-Y. ¿En qué día, mes y año nació usted? **[Si se niega a decir el día y mes, pedir solo el año o preguntar edad y calcular luego el año.]** Día: _____ Mes (01 = Enero): _____ Año: _____ (Para Q2D y Q2M: 88 = NS y 98 = NR) (Para Q2Y: 8888 = NS y 9888 = NR)	|_|_|Q2D Día |_|_|Q2M Mes |_|_|_|_|Q2Y año

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]
Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia?
[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice "el futuro" preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]
(1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral
(2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos
(3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras)
(4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación
(5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas
(6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros)
(7) Salud
(8) Medio ambiente
(9) Situación del país
(10) Nada, no le preocupa nada
(11) Otra respuesta
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]
Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada?
(1) Correcta (2) Equivocada
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]** **[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]** (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR	
Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR	

MIL8. ¿Usted o su pareja o algún hijo suyo actualmente está en servicio en el Ejército guatemalteco o ha servido alguna vez en el Ejército de Guatemala? (1) Sí, actualmente sirviendo (2) Servía en el pasado (3) Nunca ha servido (88) NS (98) NR	
OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]** (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]** (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (88) NS **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q10NEW]**	
OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]

Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?
[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 360 quetzales
(02) Entre 360 y 720 quetzales
(03) Entre 721 y 1080 quetzales
(04) Entre 1081 y 1440 quetzales
(05) Entre 1441 y 1800 quetzales
(06) Entre 1801 y 2160 quetzales
(07) Entre 2161 y 2530 quetzales
(08) Entre 2531 y 2870 quetzales
(09) Entre 2871 y 3240 quetzales
(10) Entre 3241 y 3780 quetzales
(11) Entre 3781 y 4320 quetzales
(12) Entre 4321 y 5400 quetzales
(13) Entre 5401 y 6480 quetzales
(14) Entre 6481 y 8640 quetzales
(15) Entre 8641 y 10810 quetzales
(16) Más de 10810 quetzales
(88) NS (98) NR

[PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]
Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted **personalmente** gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? **[Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]**
(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 360 quetzales
(02) Entre 360 y 720 quetzales
(03) Entre 721 y 1080 quetzales
(04) Entre 1081 y 1440 quetzales
(05) Entre 1441 y 1800 quetzales
(06) Entre 1801 y 2160 quetzales
(07) Entre 2161 y 2530 quetzales
(08) Entre 2531 y 2870 quetzales
(09) Entre 2871 y 3240 quetzales
(10) Entre 3241 y 3780 quetzales
(11) Entre 3781 y 4320 quetzales
(12) Entre 4321 y 5400 quetzales
(13) Entre 5401 y 6480 quetzales
(14) Entre 6481 y 8640 quetzales
(15) Entre 8641 y 10810 quetzales
(16) Más de 10810 quetzales
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)

[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a Q14]** (88) NS **[Pase a Q14]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q14]**	
Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer opciones]** (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR	
Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? **[Si dijo "Sí", preguntar ¿en dónde?]** **[No leer alternativas]** (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos)**]** (4) No (88) NS (98) NR	
GUAQ10D. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que vivían en el exterior y ahora estén residiendo en Guatemala? **[Si dijo "Sí", preguntar ¿en dónde vivían?]** **[No leer alternativas]** (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No (88) NS (98) NR	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[FS2 Y FS8 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.

	No	Sí	NS	NR	INAP	
FS1. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿Usted se preocupó de que los alimentos se acabaran en su hogar?	0	1	88	98	99	
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	88	98	99	
FS3. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar dejaron de tener una alimentación nutritiva y saludable?	0	1	88	98	99	
FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	88	98	99	

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Soltero **[Pasar a Q12C]** (2) Casado **[Siga]**
(3) Unión libre (acompañado) **[Siga]** (4) Divorciado **[Pasar a Q12C]**
(5) Separado **[Pasar a Q12C]** (6) Viudo **[Pasar a Q12C]**
(88) NS **[Pasar a Q12C]** (98) NR **[Pasar a Q12C]**

GEN10. Pensando solo en usted y su pareja y en los salarios que ganan, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor sus salarios? **[Leer opciones]**
(1) Usted no gana nada y su pareja gana todo;
(2) Usted gana menos que su pareja;
(3) Usted gana más o menos lo mismo que su pareja;
(4) Usted gana más que su pareja;
(5) Usted gana todos los ingresos y su pareja no gana nada
(6) **[NO LEER]** Ningún ingreso salarial
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____
(88) NS (98) NR

Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____
(00 = ninguno → Pasar a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR

Q12B. ¿Cuántos hijos menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____
00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona ladina, indígena u otra?
(2) Ladina (3) Indígena (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR

GUAETIDA. ¿Considera que su madre es o era una persona ladina o indígena?
(2) Ladina (3) Indígena (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]**
(201) Español (202) Mam (203) K'iche' (206) Kaqchiquel (207) Q'eqchi'
(204) Otro (nativo) (205) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR

LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban **[Leer alternativas]**:
(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.)
(1) Sólo castellano o español (2) Castellano - español e idioma nativo
(3) Sólo idioma nativo (4) Castellano - español e idioma extranjero
(88) NS (98) NR

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Diariamente
(2) Algunas veces a la semana
(3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Rara vez
(5) Nunca
(88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente…
GI0. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR

	Correcto	**Incorrecto**	**No Sabe**	**No Responde**
GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? **[NO LEER**: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama**]**	1	2	88	98
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Guatemala? **[NO LEER**: 4 años**]**	1	2	88	98
GI7. ¿Cuántos representantes tiene **el Congreso de la República**? **[ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE]**	Número: _____		8888	9888

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? **[Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]**	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R15. Computadora	(0) No **[Ir a R16]**			(1) Sí	
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí		(99) INAP	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de saneamiento/desagüe/drenaje?	(0) No			(1) Sí	

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar **[Marcar (97) *únicamente,* si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]**	**|___|___|**
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____ **TI**. Duración de la entrevista ***[minutos, ver página # 1*** _____	|__|__|__|
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	|__|__|__|
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo_____	**|___|___|**

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
*Firma del entrevistador*_____ *Fecha* ____ /_____ /_____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios:
_____
_____
[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Izquierda **Derecha**

Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D



Tarjeta E

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Defiende a los ricos — **Defiende a los pobres**

Tarjeta F

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 360 quetzales
(02) Entre 360 y 720 quetzales
(03) Entre 721 y 1080 quetzales
(04) Entre 1081 y 1440 quetzales
(05) Entre 1441 y 1800 quetzales
(06) Entre 1801 y 2160 quetzales
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(14) Entre 6481 y 8640 quetzales
(15) Entre 8641 y 10810 quetzales
(16) Más de 10810 quetzales

Paleta de Colores

Appendix D. Regression Tables

CHAPTER 1

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EDUCATION

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Quintiles of Wealth	.4077239	.0177859	22.92	0.000*
Woman	-.0158821	.0225402	-0.70	0.484
Age	-.2918954	.0145391	-20.08	0.000*
Housewife	-.1347316	.0214083	-6.29	0.000*
Indigenous	-.0819959	.0247897	-3.31	0.002*
Skin Color	-.0595038	.0225809	-2.64	0.011*
Urban	.3412938	.0223473	15.27	0.000*
constant	.0022011	.0260262	0.08	0.933
R-square=0.4866				
Cases=1494				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: WEALTH

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Age	.1181383	.0314825	3.75	0.000*
Education	.3762514	.0473639	7.94	0.000*
Woman	-.144065	.0296572	-4.86	0.000*
Indigenous	-.1993282	.0398409	-5.00	0.000*
Skin Color	-.0638932	.0403331	-1.58	0.119
Urban	.0591618	.0338257	1.75	0.086
constant	-.0733916	.0310198	-2.37	0.022
R-square= 0.2614				
Cases= 829				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOOD INSECURITY

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Quintiles of wealth	-.1658732	.0401918	-4.13	0.000*
Woman	.0491934	.0330721	1.49	0.143
Age	.065357	.0394566	1.66	0.104
educación	-.0651002	.0420707	-1.55	0.128
Indigenous	.0776762	.0411358	1.89	0.065
Skin Color	.191162	.0573965	3.33	0.002*
Urban	-.0703722	.0416925	-1.69	0.098
constant	-.0095631	.0503184	-0.19	0.850
R-square= 0.1441				
Cases= 736				
* p<0.05				

CHAPTER 2

No Regression Tables

CHAPTER 3

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INTERNAL EFFICACY

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Urban	-.0193204	.032722	-0.59	0.558
Woman	-.0009413	.0285048	-0.03	0.974
Housewife	-.0136871	.0331679	-0.41	0.682
Age	.0708741	.0239012	2.97	0.005*
Education	.1463884	.0337043	4.34	0.000*
Quintiles of wealth	.0908846	.0274626	3.31	0.002*
Skin Color	-.0187264	.0226433	-0.83	0.412
Indigenous	.0367083	.034451	1.07	0.292
Interest in politics	.2724044	.0294521	9.25	0.000*
constant	-.0178724	.0320289	-0.56	0.579
R-square= 0.1356				
Cases= 1,384				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EXTERNAL EFFICACY

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Urban	.0077722	.0286475	0.27	0.787
Woman	.0429565	.0340422	1.26	0.213
Housewife	-.0572202	.0381581	-1.50	0.140
Age	.0038127	.0321051	0.12	0.906
Education	-.0636956	.0472491	-1.35	0.184
Quintiles of wealth	.0505142	.0389764	1.30	0.201
Skin Color	-.015373	.0398654	-0.39	0.701
Indigenous	.0579643	.0364031	1.59	0.117
Interest in politics	.1328981	.0255596	5.20	0.000*
constant	.0018741	.0399041	0.05	0.963
R-square= 0.0250				
Cases= 1,437				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BELIEF THAT PARTIES REPRESENT PEOPLE

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Urban	.0287387	.0467772	0.61	0.542
Woman	.01194	.0454574	0.26	0.794
Housewife	-.0375553	.0564575	-0.67	0.509
Age	-.0185515	.0427524	-0.43	0.666
Education	-.0496639	.0546482	-0.91	0.368
Quintiles of wealth	.0507445	.0440631	1.15	0.255
Skin Color	-.0707624	.0435339	-1.63	0.110
Indigenous	.1283155	.0438198	2.93	0.005*
Interest in politics	.151935	.0393515	3.86	0.000*
constant	.000885	.0562956	0.02	0.988
R-square= 0.0439				
Cases= 731				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SYSTEM SUPPOT

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Urban	-.1441334	.0310898	-4.64	0.000*
Woman	-.0065708	.0272154	-0.24	0.810
Housewife	.0471159	.0315355	1.49	0.141
Age	.0222833	.0278333	0.80	0.427
Education	.140686	.0478888	2.94	0.005*
Quintiles of wealth	-.0026688	.0308625	-0.09	0.931
Skin Color	-.096332	.0339395	-2.84	0.006*
Indigenous	.107719	.0436395	2.47	0.017*
Interest in politics	.1647709	.0297125	5.55	0.000*
constant	-.0073818	.045085	-0.16	0.871
R-square= 0.0765				
Cases= 1,425				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Urban	-.1059748	.0272014	-3.90	0.000*
Woman	-.0606377	.0245813	-2.47	0.017*
Housewife	.0381027	.0335076	1.14	0.261
Age	.0262953	.0314691	0.84	0.407
Education	.1294391	.0428734	3.02	0.004*
Quintiles of wealth	-.0489151	.0384885	-1.27	0.210
Skin Color	.01744	.0369657	0.47	0.639
Indigenous	-.0419281	.0415422	-1.01	0.318
Interest in politics	.14003	.0318603	4.40	0.000*
constant	-.0078727	.0461949	-0.17	0.865
R-square= 0.0400				
Cases= 1,374				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARTICIPATION IN PROTESTS

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Urban	-.0303308	.038351	-0.79	0.433
Woman	-.0060662	.0303891	-0.20	0.843
Housewife	-.0321726	.0270408	-1.19	0.240
Age	.0335328	.0272604	1.23	0.224
Education	.1155894	.0432246	2.67	0.010*
Quintiles of wealth	-.0834029	.0291461	-2.86	0.006*
Skin Color	.0078457	.0227165	0.35	0.731
Indigenous	.0900602	.0361326	2.49	0.016*
Interest in politics	.0981926	.0236635	4.15	0.000*
constant	-.0029091	.0328172	-0.09	0.930
R-square= 0.0289				
Cases= 1,468				
* p<0.05				

CHAPTER 4

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CORRUPTION VICTIMIZATION

	COEFFICIENT	ERROR ESTÁNDAR	t	SIG.
Urban	.0311694	.0283732	1.10	0.277
Woman	-.1245449	.0298017	-4.18	0.000*
Age	.0584967	.0294122	1.99	0.052*
Education	.099208	.0375568	2.64	0.011*
Quintiles of wealth	.0513196	.0428207	1.20	0.236
Skin Color	.0408311	.033225	1.23	0.225
Indigenous	.038917	.0345539	1.13	0.265
constant	-.0037338	.0306729	-0.12	0.904
R-square= 0.0365				
Cases= 1,492				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CRIME VICTIMIZATION

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Size of place of residence	-.2046777	.0459459	-4.45	0.000*
Woman	-.0138347	.0199748	-0.69	0.492
Age	-.0220941	.0274551	-0.80	0.425
Education	.0373324	.0370461	1.01	0.318
Quintiles of wealth	-.0088075	.0422845	-0.21	0.836
Skin Color	-.0551156	.0318888	-1.73	0.090
Indigenous	-.0038851	.034543	-0.11	0.911
constant	-.000204	.0377734	-0.01	0.996
R-square= 0.0546				
Cases= 1,491				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IMPACT OF VICTIMIZATION ON SYSTEM SUPPORT

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Size of place of residence	-.1849746	.037783	-4.90	0.000*
Skin Color	-.1139695	.0380509	-3.00	0.004*
Woman	.0028202	.0181459	0.16	0.877
Age	.0138946	.0320165	0.43	0.666
Indigenous	.1089035	.043186	2.52	0.015*
Education	.0778218	.0383211	2.03	0.048*
Quintiles of wealth	.0391735	.0317283	1.23	0.223
Perception of insecurity	-.0521719	.0304311	-1.71	0.093
Crime victimization	.0234369	.0209196	1.12	0.268
Perception of corruption	.1054154	.0344721	3.06	0.004*
Corruption victimization	.0160463	.0269855	0.59	0.555
constant	.0517377	.044642	1.16	0.252
R-square= 0.0924				
Cases= 1,262				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUPPORT FOR THE RULE OF LAW

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Size of place of residence	-.2109462	.0457507	-4.61	0.000*
Skin Color	-.0385678	.0260487	-1.48	0.145
Woman	.0344414	.0278845	1.24	0.222
Age	.0566181	.0233954	2.42	0.019*
Indigenous	.0565767	.0331302	1.71	0.094
Education	-.0220948	.031469	-0.70	0.486
Quintiles of wealth	-.0762176	.0338241	-2.25	0.029*
Perception of insecurity	-.0427271	.040418	-1.06	0.295
Crime victimization	-.0118051	.0259096	-0.46	0.651
Perception of corruption	.0070676	.043417	0.16	0.871
Corruption victimization	.0228262	.0253428	0.90	0.372
constant	-.0200812	.0390707	-0.51	0.609
R-square= 0.0768				
Cases= 1,261				
* p<0.05				

MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS: HDI AND INSECURITY

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aoj11r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
_cons |   35.66726   1.416767    25.18   0.000     32.89044    38.44407
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Random-effects Parameters  |   Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------
                             municipio: Identity
var. (_cons) |   78.98831   19.78248      48.34827    129.0461
-----------------------------+------------------------------------------------
var(Residual) |    750.718   27.92441      697.9346    807.4933
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   137.29 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
```

CHAPTER 5

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: POLITICAL TOLERANCE

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Perception of national economy	-.0800168	.0310126	-2.58	0.013*
Perception of personal economy	.0323197	.0283954	1.14	0.260
Perception of insecurity	-.005533	.0303209	-0.18	0.856
Crime victimization	-.0359954	.0288118	-1.25	0.217
Religiosity	-.0729206	.0340536	-2.14	0.037*
Frequency of church attendance	-.0487885	.0403551	-1.21	0.232
Support for democracy	.2928214	.0391899	7.47	0.000*
Education	.1432798	.0357827	4.00	0.000*
Age	.0025454	.0246731	0.10	0.918
Quintiles of wealth	.0143323	.0343294	0.42	0.678
Skin Color	.1098827	.0375109	2.93	0.005*
Indigenous	.1452771	.0402296	3.61	0.001*
Woman	-.0180504	.0241667	-0.75	0.459
Housewife	.0331178	.0305687	1.08	0.284
Size of place of residence	-.1327908	.0375283	-3.54	0.001*
constant	.0123721	.0335568	0.37	0.714
R-square= 0.1543				
Cases= 1,279				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUPPORT FOR STABLE DEMCRACY

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Perception of national economy	.0048712	.0339163	0.14	0.886
Perception of personal economy	.040467	.024389	1.66	0.103
Perception of insecurity	.013089	.0372177	0.35	0.727
Crime victimization	.0066243	.0250721	0.26	0.793
Corruption victimization	.022878	.0289774	0.79	0.433
Perception of corruption	.1140586	.0325496	3.50	0.001*
Education	.0997528	.0346833	2.88	0.006*
Age	-.0092622	.0251587	-0.37	0.714
Quintiles of wealth	.0322543	.0303395	1.06	0.293
Skin Color	-.0015687	.0304681	-0.05	0.959
Indigenous	.1428648	.0485641	2.94	0.005*
Woman	-.0252413	.0389038	-0.65	0.519
Housewife	.0580226	.0401477	1.45	0.155
Size of place of residence	.0786394	.0419783	1.87	0.067
constant	.0349472	.043804	0.80	0.429
R-square= 0.0480				
Cases= 1,221				
* p<0.05				

CHAPTER 6

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REQUESTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Trust in local government	.0006561	.0030455	0.22	0.829
Attendance to municipal meetings	.0166897	.001796	9.29	0.000*
Perception of family economy	-.327901	.1216763	-2.69	0.007*
Education	.3776615	.1385186	2.73	0.006*
Woman	-.5172298	.1701512	-3.04	0.002*
Indigenous	.2359456	.184869	1.28	0.202
Age	.0196622	.0060166	3.27	0.001*
Quintiles of wealth	.1782922	.0702913	2.54	0.011*
Size of place of residence	.1868265	.065538	2.85	0.004*
constant	-3.952684	.564047	-7.01	0.000
Pseudo R-square= 0.1402				
Cases= 1,376				
* p<0.05				

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
TRUST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

	COEFFICIENT	ERROR ESTÁNDAR	t	SIG.
Satisfaction with local government	-.0715625	.0333948	-2.14	0.037*
President approval	.1052518	.0293436	3.59	0.001*
Interest in politics	.0800523	.0284346	2.82	0.007*
Perception of family economy	.0659519	.0300779	2.19	0.033*
Education	.1438602	.0439715	3.27	0.002*
Woman	.0304593	.0203665	1.50	0.141
Age	.0015293	.0249621	0.06	0.951
Quintiles of wealth	-.0371332	.0306401	-1.21	0.231
Size of place of residence	-.1912134	.0326066	-5.86	0.000*
Trust in the government	.3743511	.0422318	8.86	0.000*
constant	.0209641	.044623	0.47	0.640
Pseudo R-square= 0.2475				
Cases= 1,253				
* p<0.05				

CHAPTER 7

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
INDEX OF PERCEPTION OF FREEDOM

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	t	SIG.
Crime victimization	.0334153	.0292747	1.14	0.259
Neighborhood affected by gangs	-.0509246	.0270041	-1.89	0.065
Urban	.0157407	.031655	0.50	0.621
Age	.0898941	.0290797	3.09	0.003*
Education	.1763716	.0453356	3.89	0.000*
Skin Color	-.1325493	.0392041	-3.38	0.001*
Indigenous	.1101395	.0490225	2.25	0.029*
Housewife	.010159	.0390277	0.26	0.796
Woman	-.1441051	.0328602	-4.39	0.000*
Quintiles of wealth	.0615286	.0400569	1.54	0.131
constant	-.0115407	.037707	-0.31	0.761
R-square= 0.0901				
Cases= 1,245				
* p<0.05				

CHAPTER 8

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VOTER REGISTRATION

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	z	SIG.
Indigenous	.1890027	.1744497	1.08	0.279
Skin color	-.253901	.0654311	-3.88	0.000*
Interest in politics	.0160923	.0033209	4.85	0.000*
Quintiles of wealth	.0957542	.0653071	1.47	0.143
Education	.0384025	.0236482	1.62	0.104
Age	.2428192	.0634747	3.83	0.000*
Housewife	.4198604	.2260846	1.86	0.063
Woman	-.7538597	.1852908	-4.07	0.000*
Size of place of residence	-.1338667	.0597592	-2.24	0.025*
constant	2.332902	.5412341	4.31	0.000
Pseudo R-square= 0.0932				
Cases= 1,482				
* p<0.05				

CHAPTER 9

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUPPORT FOR STRONG-HAND

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	z	SIG.
Indigenous	-.4231864	.1259811	-3.36	0.001*
color	.1677953	.0450048	3.73	0.000*
Woman	.1516127	.1108682	1.37	0.171
Quintiles of wealth	.0187822	.0447192	0.42	0.674
Education	-.0536332	.0157167	-3.41	0.001*
Age	-.0629126	.0399641	-1.57	0.115
Size of place of residence	-.2086884	.0401103	-5.20	0.000*
Crime victimization	-.0016314	.0014135	-1.15	0.248
Perception of insecurity	.0001133	.0019706	0.06	0.954
constant	.2696228	.3788344	0.71	0.477
Pseudo R-square= 0.0369				
Cases= 1,436				
* p<0.05				

Appendix E. Figures Showing Distribution of the Surveyed Population





The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United Stated and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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