Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras, 2010

Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers**.** The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

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Prologue: Background to the Study

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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: www.LapopSurveys.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University and Université Laval in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on- a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic down might influence democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009, and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior **AmericasBarometer** surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.[1] Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are cantered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in

[1] With the exception in 2010 of larger samples in Bolivia (N=3,000), Brazil (N = 2,500), Chile (N = 1,965), and Ecuador (N=3,000).

that rule was when we were using "count variables," to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent's choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project's lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.[2] In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.[3] Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common "informed consent" form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

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[2] The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

[3] All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted expect for Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer**.** The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers using the system. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.

In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Surname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica	CCP	Universidad de Costa Rica
El Salvador	UCA iudop	FundaUngo
Guatemala	asies	
Honduras	FOPRIDEH Federacion de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo de Honduras	Hagamos Democracia
Mexico	data Opinión Publica y Mercados	ITAM INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO
Nicaragua	B&A Borge y Asociados	
Panama	CIDEM Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas	

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	
Bolivia	Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	
Brazil	Universidade de Brasília	
Chile	Instituto de Ciencia Política	PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	FLACSO ECUADOR	CEDATOS Gallup INTERNATIONAL
Paraguay	IRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	*IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*	
Uruguay	CIFRA	UM UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Venezuela	CISOR	

Caribbean		
Dominican Republic	GALLUP REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA	intec INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO DE SANTO DOMINGO
Guyana	DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS DP	
Haiti	Groupe de Recherche GRESS En Sciences Sociales	
Jamaica	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA	
Suriname	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	
Trinidad & Tobago	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	

Canada and United States	
Canada	YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.
United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

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The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. Margaret Sarles, formerly of USAID, was one of those who helped the project get off the ground in its early phases, and helped out again this round with the Haiti survey. At the UNDP, we thank Rebecca Grynspan, Luis Felipe López Calva and Juan Pablo Corlazzoli for their strong support. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Suzanne Duryea for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton helped introduce us to the complexities of ethnicity and provided strong support from his grant from the Ford Foundation to enhance that aspect of the project. We also thank François Gélineau at Université Laval in Canada for providing support from the Canadian SSHRC for the module on federalism. Simone Bohn of York University was able to find support for aspects of the Canadian version of the survey, and Nat Stone helped us with the French translation for Canada. Lucio Renno provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Scott Mainwaring at Notre Dame University was able to provide support for the Uruguay component of the research.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efren Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bembry, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the data bases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Mexico and Central America Group	
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Guatemala	●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	●Dr. Miguel Cruz, Visiting Professor, Florida International University ,USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	●Dr. José Rene Argueta, USA ●Dr. Orlando J. Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, United Nations
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Caribbean Group	
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Guyana	●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
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Canada	●Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2010

Executive Summary

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe world-wide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place during 1920's. This crisis affected most nations in the world; the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in the Americas seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, no doubt mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In the particular case of Honduras, the current global crisis also caused a contraction of exports, FDI, remittances, and revenues from tourism, which led to the decline in GDP. GDP grew almost at an increasing rate from 2001 to 2006 to reach a peak growth rate of about 6.6%. However, growth started to decline sharply once the global financial crisis developed, to 4% in 2008 and to -1.9% in 2009.

In fact, the last two years have been particularly bad for the country. In addition to the effect of the global financial crisis, the Honduran economy has also suffered the effects of mismanagement during the Zelaya administration, previous administrations, and the de facto regime post-coup), the freezing of external financing and cooperation from the international community in response to the ouster of Zelaya in June of 2009, structural economic difficulties, and the devastating effects of natural phenomena (i.e. dengue-fever breakouts, drought and floods) during 2010.

The global financial crisis has certainly hit the Honduran economy with a *double-punch*. First, the slowdown of the economic activity in the United States, which is the main market for Honduran exports, signified a decline in exports and further increase in the deficit. Second, the higher rate of unemployment in the US, as well as tightening anti-immigration stance in some states of the union have affected the ability of Hondurans residing in the US to continue sending remittances back home. According to our data, the percent of households receiving remittances has decreased from 20% in 2006 and 2008 to less than 15% in 2010; a reduction of about 25 percent (see Figure I.8). Among those who still receive remittances, about 40% reported receiving less money than before the crisis. The total amount of the remittances was reduced in about 11% between 2008 and 2009.

According to Freedom House, Honduras is the country in Central America that experienced the greatest setback in democracy, due almost entirely to the ouster of former President Zelaya in June of 2009. In the latest edition of the Freedom House's annual survey of global political rights and civil liberties: *Freedom in the World 2010*, Honduras was removed from the list of electoral democracies and its scores for political rights and civil liberties reduced to 4 each, considering the country as "partly free."

In Honduras, people overwhelmingly blamed the previous administration for the economic crisis. Only 1.7% blamed the current administration. This is of course expected since the current administration had been installed only a couple of months before the survey was conducted. Yet, like in the rest of the region, people were also inclined to blame themselves, rich and non-rich Hondurans, for the crisis (18.2% and 7.4%, respectively). Only 3.4% of those who perceived an economic crisis blamed the rich countries for it.

In the case of Honduras, the percent of people reporting a decrease in income is similar across different levels of urbanization, except for the large city of San Pedro Sula, which reported a significantly lower decline in income than the rest of the country (see Figure II.14). In addition, similar to the pattern of the region as a whole, the lower the level of wealth (quintiles) the higher the percentage of people who saw their household income decreased. In other words, the crisis seems to have affected more the poor

and less the rich, which will certainly exacerbate the already high level of economic inequality in the country.

Our analysis found that support for democracy did not decline substantially as a result of the economic crisis, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. Perception of government economic performance is a significant indicator of support for democracy and system support. The results for Honduras parallel those for the rest of the hemisphere with perception of the government economic performance as the most significant factor in determining support for the system, along with satisfaction with the performance of the current administration. In the case of satisfaction with democracy, individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the president's performance during hard economic times are also highly important.

The results presented here show that insecurity has a particularly strong relationship to democratic values and system support. In Honduras, the key variables determining perception of insecurity is the extent of gang activity in respondents' neighborhood, and crime victimization. The evidence suggests a perception that corruption among public officials is widespread in the region. About 1 in 6 Hondurans say they have been a victim of corruption in the past year. Perception of corruption significantly affects support for democracy. Perception of insecurity is a key factor in determining variation in system support and satisfaction with democracy. Individuals who perceive greater levels of insecurity in their neighborhood are significantly less likely to express support for the political system or satisfaction with democracy.

Honduras exhibits the third highest level of system support among the countries surveyed; with higher system support than Canada and the United States; a dramatic increase in system support in 2010. Hondurans are well below the mid-point of 0-100 scale, and are the fourth from the bottom on political tolerance. Regression analysis reveals that support for coups and ideology are the two most significant factors in determining levels of political tolerance. Unfortunately, a majority of Hondurans exhibit attitudes that place them in the "un-democratic" cells. Particularly disturbing is the fact that a large plurality of Hondurans express attitudes conducive to "authoritarian stability," thus perhaps explaining some of the consequences of the political crisis of 2009. The two factors that seemed to be weakly connected to attitudes supportive of stable democracy are satisfaction with the performance of the current president and corruption victimization. All institutions benefitted from an increase in levels of trust between 2008 and 2010.

Hondurans continue to rank relatively high in terms of interpersonal trust, an important element in democratic societies, even though the levels of participation in some organizations of civil society seem to have declined over the last few years. Hondurans reported a lower level of turnout in 2009 than in 2005. Hondurans report low and decreasing levels of participation in local government, either by attending municipal meetings or by making demands to government officials.

Regarding the political crisis of 2009, our study found that a large majority of Hondurans did not support the political plans of former President Zelaya, but also did not support the manner in which he was removed from office. Most Hondurans are satisfied with the outcome of the crisis. Ideology is the most significant factor in determining attitudes toward the political crisis. Hondurans who classify themselves as on the "right" in the ideological spectrum are more supportive of the removal of Zelaya,

and less supportive of the political plans the former president was pursuing. The political crisis generated by the ouster of President Zelaya had a very considerable effect in the outcome of the past elections and in the Honduran party system. The ouster of Zelaya divided, almost by half, the supporters of the *Partido Liberal* (PL) and thus caused its dramatic defeat in 2009, mostly due to the electoral abstention of many of Zelaya's supporters.

Part I: Hard Times and Their Effects on Democracy

Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

Introduction

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe world-wide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place. This crisis affected most nations in the world; the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in the Americas seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, no doubt mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In this study, we first briefly examine the data on the economic downturn, but then we turn to the core of our analysis, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the largest survey of democratic public opinion ever conducted in the Americas. We look at the 2008 round, which was conducted before the full weight of the crisis had been experienced, and the 2010 round, when most countries were recovering.

Sparked by a massive set of financial problems in the United States, the problem reached crisis proportions in September, 2008; several months after the 2008 AmericasBarometer fieldwork had been completed. The upshot was a near-universal decline in economic growth, increased unemployment, and increased poverty levels that are still felt unequally around the globe.

In the prior study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas, we examined the impact of various governance indicators on support for stable democracy. In this round of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we report on the characteristics of those affected by the crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and those who state that their personal economies have deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizens' support for democracy and democratic principles? And ultimately, does the economic crisis threaten support for democracy?

In this chapter, we begin with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment, and poverty levels, followed by a regional and specific country assessment. We then document a global, as well as a regional, "democracy recession," and then discuss democracy at the country level. We conclude by identifying the important relationships scholars have theorized and found between economic and democratic decline.

Economic Overview

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, world real GDP growth showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3 percent by the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to a negative 1.4 percent (sees Figure I.1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections estimating a recovery was underway.[4] Moreover, while some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were not and were even able to sustain growth in the context of a world-wide slowdown. Indeed, it appears that unlike the severe crises of the past that sharply weakened Latin American and Caribbean economies, careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

[4] IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2009: Crisis and Recovery* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).

While by the time the 2010 round of surveys began, the world economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in a variety of countries, the effects of the crisis were still being suffered across the globe. Forty-three poor countries in 2009 suffered serious consequences of the economic crisis, with many facing underperformance in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people will be living in extreme poverty than in 2009, that is, on less than $1.25 per day. Moreover, more than 1 billion people are expected to go chronically hungry reversing many benefits that had been obtained from successful anti-poverty programs implemented in the previous decade.[5]



Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth estimates and Projections
(Source IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010)[6]

Crisis-related unemployment increases were substantial and widely felt. According to the International Labour Organization, the global unemployment rate for 2009 is estimated at 6.6 percent, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007, with most of this increment taking place in 2009. In addition, many workers fell into more vulnerable forms of employment and this, in turn, has worsened work benefits, swollen precarious employment conditions and elevated the number of the working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable employment increased by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009.[7] Furthermore, even though "the extreme working poor," that is, individuals living on less than $1.25 per day, was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 to 2008, by the end of 2008, the extreme working poor remained at a total of 21.2 percent of all employment, implying that around 633 million workers were living with their families on less than $1.25 a day worldwide.[8]

All these figures point to the severity of the effects of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to

[5] See /www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm; and http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html
[6] IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2010: Rebalancing Growth* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010).
[7] ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2010), 42.
[8] Ibid., 22.

name a few, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was not as severe.[9] Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%).[10] Economic recovery seems to be underway based on the latest projections available as of this writing, and show that real GDP growth may increase from 3.1 and 3.6 percent by 2010 and 2011, respectively.[11] On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank also suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate, as the prices of primary commodities have fallen.[12]

The financial turmoil also clearly had a negative impact on the Latin American labor market. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8 percent during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010). Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e., those living on less than $2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal took place in 2009.[13] Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than $1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9 percent in 2009.[14] These are just some examples of the serious "side-effects" that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations also affected the level of remittances on which so many families in Latin America depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30 percent of recipient families, helping to keep these families out of poverty.[15] Remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the region's nations receive 12 percent or more of GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). As early as 2008 the growth rates of remittances declined considerably across Latin America, even becoming negative in some countries (see Figure I.2).

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[9] Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%).
See http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf
[10] World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).
[11] Ibid.
[12] Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel, "Crisis Response in Latin America: Is the "Rainy Day" at Hand?," (Inter-American Development Bank, 2009).
[13] World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).
[14] ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010*, 30.
[15] See http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986
http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm



Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009 as reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout the year 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4 percent in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent remittance growth rate of over 25 percent in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.[16]

The most recent data available as of the writing of this report shows that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010 recovery was underway.[17] As shown in Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study, which is based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region's GDP), the growth decline in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate.[18]

[16] See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAnd DevelopmentBrief11.pdf

[17] Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010).

[18] These data are based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region's GDP).



Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010
(Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4 percent in 2007 to -6.5 percent in 2009. The general economic problems world-wide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the relatively least affected countries in the region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.2 percent between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9 percent in 2010-2011. The change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but eleven of the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer suffered declines in GDP.

The changes in the growth rates between 2008 and 2009 varied from country to country. For example, in Ecuador the rate of economic growth in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was 0.4%. The change in Mexico went from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009.[19]

[19] Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.



Figure I.4. Change in real GDP, 2008-2009

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors. As the IDB's latest analysis states:

> "…even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable….[20]

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems make the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

[20] Izquierdo and Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1.

Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Honduras

In the particular case of Honduras, the current global crisis also caused a contraction of exports, Foreign Direct Investment, remittances, and revenues from tourism, which led to the decline in GDP.[21] Figure I.5 shows that Honduras had been recovering from the last economic decline caused by Hurricane Mitch in October of 1998. GDP grew almost at an increasing rate from 2001 to 2006 to reach a peak growth rate of about 6.6%. However, growth started to decline sharply once the global financial crisis developed, to 4% in 2008 and to -1.9% in 2009. In 2010, the Honduran economy is expected to grow at about 2.8 percent, according to the IMF.[22]



Figure I.5. GDP Growth, Honduras 1961-2010
Source of data: The World Bank, IMF and ECLAC[23]

Indeed, the last two years have been particularly bad for the country. In addition to the effect of the global financial crisis, the Honduran economy have also suffered the effects of mismanagement during the Zelaya administration, previous administrations, and the de facto regime post-coup; the freezing of external financing and cooperation from the international community in response to the ouster of Zelaya in June of 2009: structural economic difficulties; and the devastating effects of natural phenomena (i.e. dengue-fever breakouts, drought and floods) during 2010.[24]

Regarding the national finances, the situation deteriorated quickly. The public sector deficit increased from 1.7% of GDP in 2008 to 4.6% in 2009.[25] There was also a sharper increase in the deficit of the Current Account, which was more the result of structural deficiencies rather than micro-management. As shown in Figure I.6, an ever larger portion of the Current Account deficit is caused by the huge trade deficit in goods, even though Honduras was supposed to benefit from membership in the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) between Central America, Dominican Republic, and United States, signed in 2005.

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[21] Preliminary overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC, 2009 http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/3/38063/P38063.xml&xsl=/de/tpl-i/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl-i/top-bottom.xslt
[22] http://www.laprensa.hn/Pa%C3%ADs/Ediciones/2010/07/17/Noticias/FMI-pide-mayor-control-del-gasto-publico
[23] ECLAC Statistical Annex, December 2009; http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas&idioma=i
[24] IMF Executive Board Concludes 2010 Article IV Consultation with Honduras. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 10/84; July 16, 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1084.htm
[25] IMF Executive Board Concludes 2010 Article IV Consultation with Honduras. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 10/84; July 16, 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1084.htm



Figure I.6. Structure of Current Account Deficit
Source of data: Banco Central de Honduras

Fortunately, remittances from Hondurans living abroad, mostly in the US, steadily increased since the 1990s, to reach about US$3 billion in 2008. However a decrease in remittances was recorded in 2009.[26] The impact of the remittances on the national economy is very significant, representing more than 25% of GDP prior to the crisis.[27] The remittances have also been crucial to offset the current account deficit, offsetting up to 80% of the deficit in 2005 and 2006 (Figure I.7).



Figure I.7. Current Account and Remittances
Source of data: Banco Central de Honduras

The global financial crisis has certainly hit the Honduran economy with a *double-punch*. First, the slowdown of the economic activity in the United States, which is the main market for Honduran exports, signified a decline in exports and further increase in the deficit.[28] Second, the higher rate of

[26] Banco Central de Honduras; Estadísticas del Sector Externo. http://www.bch.hn/sector_externo.php
[27] Gabriela Núñez de Reyes. 2007. El Rostro de las Remesas: Su Impacto y Sostenibilidad. Banco Central de Honduras, Tegucigalpa, DC. http://www.bch.hn/download/trabajos_investigacion/remesas_impacto.pdf.
[28] Fix, Michael, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Jeanne Batalova, Aaron Terrazas, Serena Yi-Ying Lin, and Michelle Mittelstadt. 2009. *Migration and the Global Recession.* Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-BBCreport-Sept09.pdf

unemployment in the US, as well as tightening anti-immigration stance in some states of the Union have affected the ability of Hondurans residing in the US to continue sending remittances back home.

Our survey covered the issue asking the following questions:

Q10A. Do you or someone else in your household receive remittances (economic aid) from abroad? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA
Q10A3. During the last year, has the amount of economic aid (remittances) that you receive from abroad, diminished, increased, or remained the same? (1) Increased (2) Remained the same (3) Decreased (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP

According to our surveys data, the percent of households receiving remittances has decreased from 20% in 2006 and 2008 to less than 15% in 2010; a reduction of about 25 percent (see Figure I.8). Among those who still receive remittances, about 40% reported receiving less money than before the crisis. The total amount of the remittances was reduced in about 11% between 2008 and 2009.[29]



Figure I.8. Percent of Household Receiving Remittances

The economic crisis has also had a negative effect on employment in Honduras. The decrease in the exports has caused many businesses to reduce personnel or to close operations, at least temporarily. For instance, one of the main exporting industries in the country, the "maquilas," lost about 80,000 jobs due to a sharp decline in exports since 2008.[30] In the 2010 survey, only 50 percent of Hondurans 15 years and older reported working, a 6 percent decline with respect to the 2007 level reported by the World Bank.

[29] Ibid.
[30] See http://www.laprensa.hn/Pa%C3%ADs/Ediciones/2009/10/15/Noticias/Maquilas-recuperaran-30-mil-empleos-directos



Figure I.9. Unemployment in Honduras
Source of data: The World Bank

Yet, nationwide studies have revealed that the real problem in Honduras is not the rate of unemployment but the so called "invisible under-employment," which affects at least ten times more people than unemployment.[31] All of these economic setbacks may have contributed to an increase in the already very high levels of poverty and indigence in Honduras, which are certainly much higher than the average for the region (Figure I.10).



Figure I.10. Poverty in Honduras

At of the writing this report, however, the negative effects of the global economic crisis seem to be receding. Economic growth has resumed and is expected to reach almost 3% for the year 2010. A summary of the prospects for the Honduran economy is provided in the IMF Public Information Notice of July 16, 2010:

[31] "Invisible unemployment" is a low productivity job associated with low wages (underemployment).

> "A gradual recovery in economic activity is expected in 2010. A pickup in foreign direct investment (mostly in the maquila and telecommunications sectors) and a rebound in agriculture are expected to result in real GDP growth of 2¾ percent. Headline inflation is projected to increase to about 6 percent, mostly reflecting rising international oil prices and domestic utility tariff adjustments. Meanwhile, the economic recovery and rising oil prices are expected to widen the external current account deficit to about 6 percent of GDP. The overall deficit of the public sector is expected to narrow slightly to about 4 percent of GDP, as revenue gains from tax measures approved earlier in the year would be partially offset by higher domestic expenditure."[32]

Yet, the country is also bound to swallow some not-very-sweet medicine for recovery. Among the FMI recommendations included in a recently crafted agreement in principle (on a Stand-by Agreement) are the reduction of the public sector deficit, the strengthening of tax administration and expenditure management (including effective control of the public sector wage bill and subsidies), gradual increase in exchange rate flexibility, and more reforms aimed at strengthening the public finances and the climate for business and private investment.[33] These economic readjustments will certainly present a test to the present Lobo administration, more so considering the country's ongoing social and political circumstances.

Trends in Democratic Development

While the economic recession was a major event in many countries, politically, it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world.[34] According to the Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom,* for the fourth consecutive year, freedom declines offset gains in 2009 (Figure I.11). This is the longest uninterrupted period of democracy's decline in the 40 year history of the Freedom House series.[35] Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations, at the same time as non-democratic nations (e.g., Iran, Russia) became even more repressive. Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years now have undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).

[32] See http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1084.htm
[33] IMF Executive Board Concludes 2010 Article IV Consultation with Honduras. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 10/84; July 16, 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1084.htm
[34] Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2009: The Erosion Accelerates," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).
[35] Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties.* Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free."



Figure I.11. Freedom in the World: Global Gains minus Declines from 2003-2010, by reporting year

When looking at Freedom House's specific classification of countries (Table I.1), 89 countries continue to belong to the "free" category, representing 46 percent of the world's 194 countries as well as 46 percent of the global population. The number of countries that are considered "partly free" decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of "not free" nations rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24 percent of the world's population, respectively. More specifically, in the "not free" category, more than 2.3 billion individuals reside in countries where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China makes up 50 percent of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and among those nations considered not free, nine of the 47 countries in this category scored the lowest possible ratings in both indicators.[36]

Table I.1. Global Trends in Freedom 1979-2009

Year	TOTAL COUNTRIES	FREE		PARTLY FREE		NOT FREE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24
Source: Freedom House 2010							

In the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development, according to Freedom House, in the 2008-2010 period, highlighted by the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the "electoral democracy" category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and

[36] See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

Venezuela.[37] Figure I.12 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered "free" by Freedom House, that is, 26% of Latin American nations are rated "partly free" because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures point to a current "democracy recession" in the Americas, much as there is a "democracy recession" in the world as whole.



Figure I.12. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas

While Freedom House registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. Rather, the Freedom House measure focuses on institutions, not political culture, which is the focus of the present study. It is central to the theory of political culture that over the long term culture and institutions should be congruous with each other, but over the short term significant incongruities can emerge.[38] For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, political culture there exhibited strong support for democracy.[39] So, too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be "corrected" over the long term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes might only serve to strengthen anti-democratic political cultures.

Dimensions of Democracy in Honduras

According to Freedom House, Honduras is the country in Central America that experienced the greatest setback in democracy, due almost entirely to the ouster of former President Zelaya in June of 2009. In the latest edition of the Freedom House's annual survey of global political rights and civil liberties: *Freedom in the World 2010*, Honduras was removed from the list of electoral democracies and its scores for political rights and civil liberties reduced to 4 each, but still considering the country as a

[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
[39] John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1994), Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993).

"partly free" society.[40] Yet, the scores in the 2010 edition refer to the events occurred in 2009 and does not fully take into consideration the legitimacy of the general elections of November of that year, nor the steps taken by the newly elected government to improve the political situation in the country.

As mentioned above, rankings like that of Freedom House try to assess the level of "institutionalized" democracy, as perceived by national and foreign "experts," and do not consider the views of ordinary citizens. This section examines those other views, expressed through our 2010 survey of public opinion across Honduras. The first question for this analysis asked:

HONPN6. In your opinion, the political crisis of 2009 contributed to make Honduras more democratic, less democratic, or remain the same?
(1) More democratic (2) Less democratic (3) Equally democratic (88) DK (98) DA

Figure I.13. Effect of Political Crisis on Perception of How Democratic is Honduras reveals that a greater number of Hondurans (34.7%) think that the political crisis of 2009 made Honduras less democratic, rather than more (27.4%). Yet, a plurality (37.9%) considered that the crisis did not change how democratic the country was. This pattern may reflect the seemingly generalized disagreement with the way President Zelaya was ousted, an issue that will be examined in more detail in Chapter VIII of this report.



Figure I.13. Effect of Political Crisis on Perception of How Democratic is Honduras

Nonetheless, by the time the survey was conducted (March of 2010), Hondurans considered the country to be more democratic (Figure I.14), and were also more satisfied with the working of their democracy (Figure I.15) than they did at the time of the two prior surveys (2006 and 2008).[41] The levels in 2010, however, were similar to those expressed in the 2004 survey, which suggest that Honduran considered their country to be less democratic during the Zelaya Administration.

[40] See http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=505
[41] The questions involved were PN4 (In general, would you say that you are 1) very unsatisfied, 2) unsatisfied, 3) satisfied or 4) very satisfied with the way democracy works in Honduras?). And PN5 (In your opinion, Honduras is a country that is 1) not democratic, 2) a little democratic, 3) somewhat democratic, or 4) very democratic?)



Figure I.14. How Democratic is Honduras



Figure I.15. Satisfaction with Democracy in Honduras

The explanation to the rebound in the perception of democracy among Hondurans might also be the belief that the political crisis was resolved democratically through the general elections of November of 2009, which elected Mr. Lobo as the new president. This could also explain the boost in the trust in elections (Figure I.16) by Hondurans to unprecedented levels, as well as their increased sense that their basic rights are protected (Figure I.17).[42] In that sense, the political crisis seems to have strengthened the political culture of Hondurans in terms of their renewed appreciation for democracy and elections. In our 2010 survey, 70% of those interviewed said that the elections of 2009 were free and fair, and 80% believed the country is going in the right direction.



Figure I.16. Trust in Elections



Figure I.17. Protection of Basic Rights

[42] The questions involved were: B3 (To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are protected by the Honduran political system?) and B47 (To what extent do you trust the elections in Honduras?). These questions were answered using a 7-point scale (1=none at al; 7=very much).

The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that economic crisis could be spilling over and affecting democracy, and are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles, or can we find evidence in the AmericasBarometer of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability, approaching the problem from two schools of thought. The first has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-democratic alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of "democracy's fickle friends"[43], as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic crises. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al. found that no democracy had collapsed where the country's per capita income exceeded $6,055.[44] In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current economic crisis without the "inoculation" protection of historically adequate levels of economic development.[45]

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al. also found that "democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow." [46] As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most countries placing most nations in Przeworski et al.'s danger zone. Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies.[47] Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and the continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability?[48] In this round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-six countries, we have the data to explore that very question.

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[43] Nancy Gina Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).
[44] Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996).
[45] Abby Córdova and Mitchell Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010).
[46] Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.
[47] Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Insurgency and Inequality," *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987).
[48] Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2009), Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010).

Following a discussion of the economic crisis' impact on the region and Honduras, the present chapter looked at how democracy has fared during the economic crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and more specifically in Honduras. It also analyzed the trends in democratic development in the last few years and concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy. In the following chapter, we will focus on citizen perceptions of the economic downturn as measured by the AmericasBarometer 2010. In Chapter III of this study we will examine how well the political culture of democracy has fared under economically difficult times. In that chapter we will look at three main variables (as well as others), namely, support for democracy, system support, and life satisfaction as three key variables that will help us understand how the region as a whole, as well as Honduras have fared since 2008.

Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences during Hard Times in the Americas

Introduction

In the previous chapter we presented a general overview of the economic crisis on the world, on the Americas, and on the Honduran economy, followed by a summary of the trends in democracy since the 2008 AmericasBarometer study was conducted. In this chapter we concentrate on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times by attempting to answer the questions: 1) how did citizens perceive the crisis, 2) who did they blame for it and 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas*?* We present first a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis as well as where Honduras is located in relation to the other countries in the Americas. We then assess citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the AmericasBarometer survey in 2010.

Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed two new survey items. This is the first time that these items have been used in the AmericasBarometer, and they were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. The two items represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceive an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was, we ask who is to blame for it. The following is the text of the items themselves:

CRISIS1. Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis; others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**
(1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
(2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
(3) No economic crisis

CRISIS2. Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**
(01) The previous administration
(02) The current administration
(03) Ourselves, the Belizeans
(04) The rich people of our country
(05) The problems of democracy
(06) The rich countries **[Accept also Unites States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
(07) The economic system of the country, or
(08) Never have thought about it
(77) **[Don't read]** Other

Looking at the Americas as a whole, including all 25 countries in the AmericasBarometer, we can see in Figure II.1 that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceive an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.



Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in Latin American and the Caribbean (Percentage of Total Population)

Among all these countries, we see in Figure II.2 that Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua, the United States, and El Salvador have the highest percentages with respect to citizens' perceptions of a crisis, although in all of the countries a very high percentage perceive a crisis.



Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population that Perceived There is an Economic Crisis

In fact, as shown in Figure II.3, almost three out of every four Hondurans consider that the country is under a very serious economic crisis, while the fourth person beliefs that the country is in a crisis but one that is not very serious. Very few Hondurans (<1%) believe that there is no crisis at all.



Figure II.3. Perception of Magnitude of Economic Crisis, Honduras 2010

Who is to blame for the economic crisis?

In this section we examine to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. The results for the Americas as a whole are provided first.



Figure II.4 Who is to blame for the economic crisis? (Percentage of Total Population)

The majority of citizens who perceive a crisis in the Americas blame either the current or previous administration for the economic crisis (Figure II.4). Fewer than 10 percent of Latin Americans who

perceive a crisis blame the rich countries or the advanced industrial countries, contrary to what one might have expected, especially in the Latin American context. Many individuals in these countries, instead, blame themselves for the economic crisis. We examine these results by the major regions in the Americas, with the results shown in Figure II.5.



Figure II.5. Who is to blame for the economic crisis? Regional Overview

The graph for the Central American region, and Mexico, shows a marked inclination to blame the previous administrations, perhaps as a reflection of the fact that most governments in the region have been elected very recently, after the onset of the crisis.

Country specific analysis

In Honduras, people overwhelmingly blamed the previous administration for the crisis. Only 2.1% blamed the current administration. This is of course expected since the current administration had been installed only a couple of months before this survey was conducted. Yet, like in the rest of the region, people were also inclined to blame themselves, rich and non-rich Hondurans, for the crisis. Only 3.4% of those who perceived an economic crisis blamed the rich countries for it, perhaps reflecting little information about of the origins of the crisis.



Figure II.6. Who is to blame for the crisis in Honduras?

Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

In the previous section, we analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is to blame for it. Here, we explore how citizens experience the crisis.

Jobs Loss

The questions used in this section are the following:

OCUP1B1. Have you lost your job in the past two years? **[Read options]**
(1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one.
(2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one
(3) No did not lose your job
(4) Did not work because you decided not to work or disabilities

OCUP1B2. Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? **[Read options]**
(1) Yes (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.7 below. While three- quarters of the population did not report having lost a job in the last 2 years, about 7% did, but found a new one, whereas about 8% of the respondents lost jobs but did not find a new one. Looking at the households as a whole, over 16% of respondents report lost jobs.



Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items, which shows that in 16.2% of households at least one household member lost his or her job in the past two years. Figure II.8 below shows that the loss of jobs has been pervasive in many countries in the region. Yet, Hondurans reported a relatively low percent (19.8%) of households where at least one member had lost his or her job during the past two years (either the person interviewed or another member of the household).



Figure II.8. Percentage of households with least one family member who lost his or her job in the past two years

When the two variables are examined separately, in Figure II.9 below, it is also clear that only 8.3% of those interviewed reported having lost their job in the past two years. However, when considering all people in the household, the number of those who lost their job increased. Almost one in every seven households witnessed the loss of the job of one of its members.



Figure II.9. Percentage of Hondurans Who Lost Jobs

The series of graphs below shows what are the demographic characteristics of those who lost their job during the past two years (Figure II.10). In terms of gender, most of those who lost their job were males; perhaps as a consequence of the fact that many females choose not to have a paid job, most likely to stay home as housewives.

They also tend to be young adults (e.g. 26-35), with adults in the bracket 36-45 being less likely to find a new job. Those with secondary education are also less likely to find a new job than those with only primary education or college degree. Last, loss of employment in Honduras seems to have affected more those residing in the rural areas and in the capital city, Tegucigalpa. San Pedro Sula (large city) was the region that reported the lowest percent of those who lost their jobs.



Figure II.10. Percentage of Hondurans Who Lost Jobs by Sex, Age, Education, Area

Reported Decrease in Household Income

We now examine reports by our respondents about changes in their household incomes. We asked the following question:

> **Q10E.** Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**
> (1) Increased? **[Go to Q11]**
> (2) Remained the same? **[Go to Q11]**
> (3) Decreased? **[Go to Q10F]**

The results for the Americas as a whole (see Figure II.11) show that about half of the respondents say that their incomes have remained the same, with nearly 30% saying that their incomes have declined, and one-fifth saying that it has increased.



Figure II.11. Reported Household Income Changes, 2008-2010 in the Americas

Figure II.12 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentage who says that their incomes have declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, whereas in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase income.

These findings reinforce our argument that the economic slide has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas. Honduras is indeed one of the countries affected the most by the crisis; it not only ranks sixth in terms of the percent of those who have seen their income decreased but it is also the country with the lowest percent of people who saw their income increase.



Figure II.12. Has your household income decrease, remain the same, or increase over the past two years? (Percentage of Total Population)

Who was affected the most by economic hardship?

As shown in Figure II.13 a greater percentage of individuals living in rural areas reported that their household income decreased over the past two years in the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole. Moreover, Figure II.13 shows that as family wealth declines, the degree percentage of individuals reporting a decline in income increases; the poorest individuals in the region are most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income.

While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on a different methodology for measuring relative wealth, one based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The methodology allows ranking individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.[49]

[49] For more information on how this indicator was computed and its reliability, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators." *In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSe*ries).



Figure II.13. Percentage of individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean reporting a decrease in their household income by area of residence and level of wealth

In the case of Honduras, the percent of people reporting a decrease in income is similar across different levels of urbanization, except for the large city of San Pedro Sula, which reported a significantly lower percentage than the rest of the country (see Figure II.14). In addition, similar to the pattern of the region as a whole, the lower the level of wealth (quintiles) the higher the percentage of people who saw their household income decreased. In other words, the crisis seems to have affected more the poor and less the rich, which will certainly exacerbate the already high level of economic inequality in the country.



Figure II.14. Percent Who Reported Decreased Income by Urbanization and Wealth

Perceptions of Both the Personal and National Economy

The AmericasBarometer traditionally reports on respondent perception of their personal and national economic situation. We ask respondents to consider their personal and national economic situations currently and as compared to a year prior to the interviews. Below are the items used in the survey:

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer
SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer
IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Don't know (98) Doesn't answer
IDIO2. Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

We now couple these items to the one analyzed above asking about reports of decreases in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.15, those who perceive their personal or economic situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced a loss of household income when compared to those who are reporting that their personal economic situation is very good. The same

findings hold, a bit less sharply, for the perception of the national economy, and also hold for perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to a year earlier.



Figure II.15. Relationship between citizens' experiences and perceptions of the economy during hard times in Latin America and the Caribbean

A similar pattern emerges when we analyze the particular case of Honduras (see Figure II.16). Those who have seen their household income decrease over the past two years are more likely to believe that their personal and national economic situation is bad of very bad. The decrease in household income has also increased the sense of a worsening in the economic situation of the country and of individuals. More generally, the patterns in the charts below suggest that people tend to equate their personal economic situation with that of the country.



Figure II.16. Relationship between citizens' experiences and perceptions of the economy during hard times in Honduras

Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008 in relation to their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. In this chapter, our objective is to go a step further and see how key attitudes toward democracy have fared during hard times.

Bad economic times have often been linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor individuals, whom we have seen above were hard hit by income declines in the current crisis afflicting wide swaths of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during hard economic times.[50] Others suggest that national economic underdevelopment and low growth rates also affect democracy, while others show how poor national economic indicators may affect individuals support for key components of democracy.[51]

Given the severity of the impact of the most recent economic recession on many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined when times got tough, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in the previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects on different regions in the Americas. Through the analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we will take a more detailed look into these conundrums by examining the results by region and focus on Honduras.

Under hard economic conditions worldwide, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by looking at the most general of all measures that of subjective well-being, commonly referred to as "life satisfaction," but also referred to as "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well-being, while those individuals who enjoy better economic conditions expressing greater happiness.[52] On the other hand, the same research takes note of contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction/happiness.[53]

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[50]But see the work of Bermeo, who reviews this thesis and ultimately rejects it: Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*.

[51] Córdova and Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean.", Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*.

[52] Frey S. Bruno and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness," in *Culture and Subjective Well-Being*, ed. Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (Cambridge, Mass MIT Press, 2000).

[53] Carol Graham, *Happiness Around the World : The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Carol Graham, Eduardo Lora, and Inter-American Development Bank., *Paradox and Perception : Measuring Quality of Life in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank : Brookings

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, how satisfied with their lives are Latin Americans now in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we examine two survey items, one which asks people about their current happiness and the other asks them how happy they were in 2008, the period before the crisis had become full-blown. We subtract from their reports of their current happiness their reported level of happiness in 2008 and compute national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are shown below:

[GIVE CARD "A"]
LS6. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.
On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment**? **Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**
[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible". Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Worst life possible										**Best life possible**	**DK**	**DA**

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that, on average, there is an even split in the Americas, with about half the countries having citizens who report, on average, that they are happier today than they were in 2008, while about half of the countries have citizens who report, on average, that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III.1, we see Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, Surinamese, Colombians, Panamanians, Colombians and Paraguayans on average say that they are more satisfied with their lives in 2010 than they report that they were in 2008. In stark contrast, Jamaicans report that their happiness in 2010 is sharply lower than they report it was in 2008. Other countries in which average reported happiness in 2010 is lower than respondents said they had in 2008 are Belize, El Salvador, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.[54] Thus, we have our first hint that even though the economic crisis affected the Americas in many ways, it was not associated with a hemisphere-wide decline in life satisfaction. But this item is very general, and in the following section we examine a set of items specifically designed to measure citizens' perceptions of the economic recession.

Institution Press, 2009), Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

[54] To be clear, we are not comparing here the 2008 and 2010 survey, but two items from the 2010 survey that report on current (2010) and prior (2008) happiness. We do not have a panel design in this survey (we have repeated cross-sections) and do not know the actual level of happiness reported in 2008 for those interviewed in 2010.



Figure III.1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008

A different view of these data looks a bit more carefully at each segment of the survey population to show the percentages that expressed declines or increases in life satisfaction, and those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010. The results are shown in Figure III.2. Some countries, Jamaica for example, had over half of its population expressing a decline in life satisfaction, whereas in Suriname, in contrast, less than one-fifth expressed a decline, and just under one-half expressed an increase.



Figure III.2. Perceptions of changes in life satisfaction in 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of Total Population)

We now examine how life satisfaction changes relate to the respondents' evaluation of his/her personal retrospective economic situation. That is, in the prior chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own (and also national) economic situation at the moment of the interview and then looking back a year.



Figure III.3. Percentage of the population who perceived a decline in life satisfaction by perceptions of the personal retrospective economic situation

Looking now only at those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III.3, that there is a systematic link to the perception of respondent retrospective personal economic situation. Figure III.3 shows this is the pattern for each country in the study. The overall conclusion is that nearly everywhere in the Americas, life satisfaction declines when individuals report that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated.

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart Figure III.4. We need to emphasize that we are not explaining levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when we compare the level of such satisfaction that they reported possessing at the time of the interview to that they reported having possessed two years earlier.[55] To this regression equation, we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, sex, education, residence (urban vs. rural) area, and wealth quintiles. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on relative wealth.[56] Also included in the regression are variables measuring economic evaluations, and government economic performance.

The results shown in the regression plot (Figure III.4) are controlled for variation by country (the "country fixed effects"), the variation that was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 in this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on the change in life satisfaction is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical "0" line indicates a positive contribution, and if to the left of the "0" line a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot; only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical "0" line is the factor significant (at .05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. "beta weights").

The results show that basic socio-economic characteristics such as education and wealth have no significant effect on satisfaction. We do see that the demographic characteristics of age and sex matter to some degree; females report a positive change over the 2008-2010 period, while older respondents report just the opposite, namely that they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. This result, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people on average suffer from more health afflictions and limitations and as such have more reason to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

A block of economic variables, however, has a consistent and in most cases far stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far, has already been shown in Figure III.3; respondents who have a negative retrospective perception of their own personal economic situation have a strongly diminished sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent's evaluation that his country is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one's economic situation matter, but the objective information (drawn from the survey reporting) of a decline in household income over that same period of time (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household in which at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

Yet, of all of the variables in the regression that point to changes in perceived life satisfaction 2008-2010, the one that has the greatest significance is the *very strong positive impact of the perception of government economic performance.*[57] Since satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and it also has a positive effect), this means

[55] We stress that this is not a panel design and therefore we do not have data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are relying on self reports of current and previous levels of satisfaction.

[56] For more information on this indicator, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators." In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries).

[57] This was measured by two survey items, N1 and N12, which measure respondent evaluation of the government's effectiveness in fighting poverty and unemployment.

that even though individuals may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may also have lived in a household that has suffered unemployment, when the government is perceived as managing the economy well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of stress.



Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

In the case of Honduras, we find that perception of personal economic situation is significantly associated with perceived change in life satisfaction. Individuals who perceive their personal economic situation as good and improving exhibit greater satisfaction with their lives. As expected, decrease in income and loss of employment are negatively associated with life satisfaction. Additionally, we find that wealth is positively associated with change in life satisfaction. Wealthier Hondurans express greater satisfaction than their compatriots.



Figure III.5 Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in Honduras, 2010

Figure III.6 illustrates the relation between perceptions of personal economic situation and perceived change in life satisfaction. Both in the case of retrospective and present economic situations, individuals who perceive their own economies as bad or worse than 12 months ago express significantly lower life satisfaction. Additionally, wealthy Hondurans are more satisfied with their life and those who approve of the economic performance of the government also express greater improvement in their life satisfaction.



Figure III.6 Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Perception of Personal Economic Situation in Honduras

Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 with those in 2010 are shown in Figure III.7.[58] The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy found in 2010 whereas the light blue bar shows the average levels found in 2008.[59] The reader should note that whenever the two grey areas overlap, there is no statistically significant difference between the two years. For example, support for democracy declined in Mexico from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. Indeed, what we find is that in many countries the change is not significant in either direction. The only countries that experienced a significant decline in support for democracy in 2010 compared to 2008 are Canada, Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Canada suffered the sharpest decline. On the other hand, just in Chile, support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010. No other country experienced a statistically significant increase.

[58] Support for democracy was measured by the following question: **ING4.** Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements (1-7 scale)? This item, like most other LAPOP items, was recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparisons.

[59] Note that in some countries (Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname), we do not have 2008 survey data, so only one bar is shown.



Figure III.7. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a minority of countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself did not take its toll. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, with the economic crisis being only one of them. A given country may have been seriously buffeted by the economic decline, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, citizens are not likely to have lost faith in their systems. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis (See Figure III.8).



Figure III.8. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Figure III.8 shows that age and education are among the most powerful predictors, second to age, of support for democracy. This result is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we take note of the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. We also find that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding we have also reported before. Females are often found to be less supportive of democracy, and we find this here, even when controlling for education and other variables. While there is much dispute in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer, looking at the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the "country fixed effects") we find that higher wealth levels are positively associated with greater support for democracy.[60]

What is striking about the results presented in Figure III.8 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Respondents who live in households in which a member has lost his/her job, there is a small reduction in support for democracy, but economic perceptions play no significant role one way or the other. On the other hand, there is a weak *positive* impact of a reduction in income with increased support for democracy. But far more important is the very strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.

[60] John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth on Political Participation," in *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, ed. Anirudh Krishna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted. It also suggests that the democracy recession observed by Freedom House does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the region. We now analyze the case of Honduras.



Figure III.9 Determinants of Support for Democracy in Honduras, 2010

Figure III.9 shows the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of support for democracy in Honduras. We found that perception of government economic performance is the strongest predictor of support for democracy. Perception of the national economic situation also is a significant factor on support for democracy. Satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent president also has a strong influence on support for democracy. The latter result lends support for the connection between evaluations of the extant administration and support for democracy.



Figure III.10 Statistically Significant Factors of Support for Democracy

Hondurans who believe the current administration is doing a very good job and those who are most approving of the economic performance of the government are those most supportive of democracy.

System Support

Belief in the legitimacy of one's government (i.e., system support) is a key requisite for political stability. In an extensive investigation based on LAPOP survey data John Booth and Mitchell Seligson found that legitimacy emerges from multiple sources, but that the performance of government in satisfying citizen needs and demands is central.[61] Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies over the past 30 years.[62] Does this decline mean that low levels of system support place democracy at risk? Thus far, there is no indication of that for the advanced industrial democracies. But what of the consolidating democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean? This subject was treated in depth for the 2006 round of the AmericasBarometer data, but we look at it in this year's report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

[61] Political Support is an index created from 5 questions. A more detailed explanation of how this index was created, see Chapter V in Part II of this study. See John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

[62] Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

For many years LAPOP has utilized a system support index based on five variables, each scored on a 1-7 based, but converted to the traditional 0-100 LAPOP system for better understanding of the results:

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read*:*** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

To understand the dynamics of "system support," we compare the levels from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III.11 some countries experience important changes in system support. For example, Honduras, in the aftermath of the coup and the elections that restored democracy to the country, support soared from its pre-coup low of 46.4 to 60.4. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was taken only one month after the inauguration of a new administration, and thus the level of support may be elevated by the well-known "honeymoon effect" that new government usually get. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay also saw statistically significant increases in support for the political system, despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, Belize, Canada, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic saw statistically significant (albeit quantitatively small) decreases in system support between 2008-2010. The rest of the countries remained statistically without changes.



Figure III.11. Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Turning now to the determinants of system support, we see that, indeed, perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with Latin Americans' system support, illustrated in Figure III.12. Further, as we saw with support for democracy, low system support is present among those who hold a pessimistic view of their household and national incomes. Older people and women have significantly higher system support, but the effect is quite small. Surprisingly, unemployment does not have a significant impact on system support.

The major impact on system support, as in the case with support for democracy, is perception of government economic performance. Once again, then, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. Clearly we also see that

satisfaction with the incumbent president matters, but what matters most is their views of government performance. This finding once again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis was mitigated by governments that are perceived to have responded effectively to the challenge.



Figure III.12. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Evidence that in many countries citizens did in fact perceive improved government economic performance appears in Figure III.13. Note that in Uruguay, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Venezuela and Peru significant increases were found. On the other hand, only in Guatemala, Costa Rica and Belize were significant declines recorded by the two surveys.



Figure III.13. Perception of Government Economic Performance, 2008 vs. 2010

Direct evidence at the national level that improvements in the perception of government economic performance is actually driving levels of system support is shown in Figure III.14. In this chart, country averages are presented for both the variation in average perception of government performance and the 2008-2010 variations in system support. The results are very clear: the greater the change in satisfaction with government management of the economy, the greater the change in system support.



Figure III.14. Change in perceptions of government economic performance as predictor of change in system support (2008-2010), country level analysis.

Not only is this result found at the national level, we find it regionally as well. In Figure III.15 we examine these same items of change in perception of government performance and change in system support, but using the sub national strata of each sample. For example, in Bolivia, each department is a separate sample stratum, whereas in other countries regions are used for the strata. Details of the sample designs are contained in the appendix of each country report. What we see is that even at the sub national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is perceived as shifting in a more positive direction, average system support increases.



Figure III.15. Change in perceptions of government economic performance as predictor of change in system support (2008-2010), regional level analysis.



Figure III.16. Determinants of System Support in Honduras, 2010

The results for Honduras parallel those for the rest of the hemisphere with perception of the government economic performance as the most significant factor in determining support for the system, followed by perception of the performance of the president. As shown below, Figure III.17, respondents who perceive the performance of the government more positively are more likely to express support for the political system.



Figure III.17. System Support by Perception of Government Economic Performance and Presidential Approval

System support climbs from less than 55 on the 0-100 scale to just fewer than 75, an increase of more than 20 points. Additionally, strong approval of the president increases system support by more than 10 points. Such results emphasize the close connection between government performance and support for the political system. We turn now to consider the determinants of satisfaction with the way democracy works.

Satisfaction with Democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what about satisfaction with democracy, another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world? Research in the advanced industrial democracies has found that satisfaction with democracy has been in long-term decline, a process that began some decades ago and continues, indicating that this is a process not directly linked to economic downturns.[63] During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what the classical hypotheses, based on considerable social science literature suggest, as we noted in Chapter I. Put differently, citizens may continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government, but in practice, they may feel that democracy has not delivered. The question thus becomes: Are Latin American citizens less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy when they are living in hard economic conditions? Evidence from the AmericasBarometer suggests that this may be in fact the case, at least in some countries.

[63] Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*.

An examination of Figure III.18 shows that in a number of countries average satisfaction with democracy declined between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for example, a country especially hard hit by the economic crisis, satisfaction dropped from 50.4 on our 0-100 scale to 44.6, a decline that is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered by far the sharpest decline, dropping from 58.8 to 46.3. Other statistically significant decline occurred in Argentina, Canada, Guatemala, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic. Likewise, in the United States, where the effects of the crisis were heavily felt by most citizens, there is a statistically significant decrease in the levels of satisfaction with democracy from 57.3 to 50.6 during this period.

On the other hand, there were some countries in which satisfaction with democracy increased sharply. Consider Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009.[64] In that country, satisfaction increased from 44.8 to 57.8. Also, Panama experienced a statistically significant increase in satisfaction. The largest shift occurred in Paraguay, a country at the very bottom of satisfaction in 2008, with a score of 30.2, leaping to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey was conducted just prior to the April 2008 election that brought the decades long dominant party rule to an end in that country; no doubt this was a factor in the robust increase in democratic satisfaction measured in the 2010 survey.

Other significant increases occurred in El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (in this case the FMLN) won power in the presidential election for the first time prior to the survey. We also observe significant increases in the 2008-2010 period in Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay. In many countries, however, there was no statistically significant shift in satisfaction with democracy in spite of the severe economic crisis that has left its imprint world-wide.

[64] Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Trouble in Central America: Crime, Hard Times and Discontent," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).



Figure III.18. Satisfaction with Democracy, 2008 vs. 2010, AmericasBarometer Survey

Moving on to the determinants of democratic satisfaction, we see that, indeed, perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with this satisfaction among Latin Americans, shown in Figure III.19. We also see that negative perceptions of personal and national economic situations as well as negative perceptions of retrospective personal and national economic situations are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. In addition, older people have significantly higher democratic satisfaction, while more educated individuals, and those who live in urban areas show lower levels of this satisfaction. Yet these effects are quite small.



Figure III.19. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

More interestingly, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the major impact on satisfaction with democracy is perception of government economic performance *in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president.* Once again, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the president's performance during hard economic times are also highly important.



Figure III.20. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Honduras, 2010

In the case of Honduras, as shown in Figure III.20, satisfaction with the performance of the president and perception of government economic performance are the most significant determinants. Decrease in household income and retrospective evaluations of personal economic situation also are significant factors, but their relation is weaker than for presidential approval rates.



Figure III.21 Statistically Significant Factors Determining Satisfaction with Democracy

Hondurans who express greater approval of the president's job and economic performance of the government, plus have not experienced a decrease in household income are more likely to express satisfaction with democracy. The gap in satisfaction with democracy is over 15 points between those individuals who believe the president's job is very good and those who believe it is bad. The latter result clearly demonstrates the connection between satisfaction with democracy and the performance of the extant administration.

Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction to hard times is for the military to take over in a coup. Historically in Latin America a number of such coups have been attributed to economic crises, but militaries have also been forced from power when economic crises broke out during their period of authoritarian rule. The Honduran coup of 2009 heightened interest in military coups that many had thought were a thing of the dark past of Latin America's history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizens' support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three distinct conditions: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption.[65]

[65] The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état



Figure III.22. Justification of A Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

The comparisons 2008-2010 are shown in Figure III.22. We do not have comparative data for all countries since three countries that do not have an army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti) were not asked these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, for those three countries we did ask about a take-over of the country by their police forces, in order to create some sort of hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the question on a military coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.

(military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified, later recoded into 100= a military coup is justified, 0=a military coup is not justified**.**

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries and especially low in Panama and Argentina. On our 0-100 scale, there is no country with a score over 50 in 2010. On the other hand, such support was very high in Honduras in 2008, perhaps not surprisingly, a coup occurred there in 2009. Post-coup, support for such illegal take-overs of a democratic system dropped sharply in Honduras. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and now they saw no reason for it; or, it could be that the experience with the coup itself lessened support for this type of action. However, in Guyana coup support declined 20 points for 2010. We also note that coup support increased significantly only in one country for which we have data, Guatemala, between 2008 and 2010.

Returning to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies, is support for military coups higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed? We see in Figure III.23 that unfortunately this is the case. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups among Latin Americans. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups, suggesting that Latin Americans, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk.



Figure III.23. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Total Sample)

Interestingly, older, wealthier, and more educated individuals show lower pro-coup tendencies. An interesting finding and consistent with previous results is the positive effect of the satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Those who evaluate the president positively show lower levels of support for coups, indicating the significant role that the president plays in reducing the support for authoritarian alternatives. Perception of government efficacy did not yield any significant results when related to support for military coups.



Figure III.24. Determinants of Support for Military Coup in Honduras, 2010

The results for Honduras indicate that wealth and education, plus negative perceptions of the national economy and satisfaction with the performance of the president are significant predictors of support for military coups. Hondurans with low education and high levels of wealth are more supportive of a military coup. Additionally, individuals who are more positive about the performance of the president and the national economy are more supportive of coups.



Figure III.25. Support for Military Coup by Economic Performance in Honduras, 2010

Support for coups increases to the extent that respondents evaluate the national economic situation as bad and believe that Honduras has undergone a very serious economic crisis. Interestingly, the results indicate that those individuals who believe the economy is better than 12 months ago express greater support for coups. While the differences in support for coups between individuals who believe the economy has remained the same or gotten worse seems to be statistically significant, the confidence interval of those who express a positive retrospective evaluation is relatively wide and thus the variance in those responses is less reliable. Nonetheless, these results merit further analysis beyond the purview of this study at this time.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the impact of the global economic crisis on democratic values. The evidence suggests that the impact varies across the region. Some countries such as Mexico and Jamaica were more affected than others. The chapter found that support for democracy did not decline substantially as a result of the economic crisis, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. Perception of government economic performance is a significant indicator of support for democracy and system support. The results for Honduras parallel those for the rest of the hemisphere with perception of the government economic performance as the most significant factor in determining support for the system, along with satisfaction with the performance of the current administration. In the case of satisfaction with democracy individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters more when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the president's performance during hard economic times are also highly important.

Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups among Latin Americans. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups, suggesting that Latin Americans, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk. In the case of Honduras, education and wealth are significant factors in determining support for coups, but they behave in contrary fashion. That is, lower educational level and higher wealth are associated with greater support for coups.

Part II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society

Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime, and Corruption

Introduction

In Part I of this study, we presented a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development. We also focused on citizens' perceptions of the economic crisis by answering the question: *who are those most likely affected by the crisis?* We presented a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal economic welfare. We concluded Part I with a general assessment of the extent to which those who report being affected by the crisis may express lower democratic support. In Part II of this study, we attempt to test key hypotheses that relate to rule of law, crime, and corruption. The objective of this section is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption influence support for democracy. The variables used in Part I that measure the economic crisis are used as additional control or predictor variables in this part, but are not the central focus.

Theoretical Background

Crime and insecurity have emerged as critical issues in Latin America and the rest of the developing world. Studies have shown that citizens view crime as one of the most pressing problems facing their nation.[66] Despite the significance of the issue the link between crime and democracy has not been examined extensively in a comparative perspective.[67]

Table IV.1 presents data from the World Health Organization's Report on Violence and Health that shows that Latin America has the dubious distinction of having the highest rates of crime and violence in the world. Violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world.[68] Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the differences with the rest of the world are growing larger.[69]

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[66] Quann, Nathalie and Kwing Hung. 2002. "Victimization Experience and the Fear of Crime: A Cross-National Study." In *Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective: Results from the International Crime Victims Survey, 1989-2000*, ed. Paul Nieuwbeerta. Den Haag, Netherlands: Boom Juridische uitgevers.

[67] Among the few studies, see Beirne, Piers. 1997. *Issues in Comparative Criminology*. Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company; Howard, Gregory J., Graeme Newman, and William Alex Pridemore. 2000. "Theory, Method, and Data in Comparative Criminology." In *Criminal Justice 2000*, Volume 4 (July), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice; Pérez, Orlando J. 2003. "Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 118, No. 4: 627-644; Prillaman, William C. 2003. "Crime, Democracy, and Development in Latin America," *Policy Papers on the Americas* Volume XIV, Study 6, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C.

[68] See Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales CIEN, "Carta Económica," (CIEN, 1998); P. Fajinzylber, D. Lederman, and N. Loayza, *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World; Diagnóstico de la Violencia en Guatemala* (Guatemala: CIEN, 1999).

[69] Alejandro Gaviria and Carmen Pagés, "Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America," Inter-American Bank Conference on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America," (Washington D.C.: 1999).

Table IV.1. Comparison of Homicide Rates around the World

Region	No. of Homicides per 100,000 persons (2000)
Latin America and Caribbean	**27.5**
United States	6.9
Africa	22.2
Europe*	1.0
Southeast Asia	5.8
Western Pacific	3.4
World	**8.8**

*Includes only Western European countries
Source: World Report on Violence and Health (statistical annex), World Health Organization (WHO), 2002.

Coinciding with the recent wave of crime in Latin America, the last two decades have seen the rise of a new form of repressive policing called *mano dura,* or "strong hand," as well as relative high levels of support for authoritarian measures. As Orlando J. Pérez explains:

> *Crime undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime rates increase, pressure mounts for "strong" government action which in many instances results in highly repressive and undemocratic measures.*[70]

At its core, *mano dura* necessitates curtailing individual rights and re-empowering the military and police. These sets of policies normally include deploying the military for internal policing, in addition to lengthening prison sentences, suspending due process guarantees and other protections for alleged criminals, and aggressively arresting youths suspected of gang membership.

Central America is the sub-region with the highest level of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Latin America. The recently published Human Development Report for Central America provides aggregate data for homicide rates between 2000-2008 that indicates a significant increase. Table IV.2 illustrates the evolution of homicide rates. In the case of Honduras, the data show a reduction from 69 per 100,000 persons in 2002 to 58 in 2008. Nevertheless, this reduction is little comfort when the country still has the second highest homicide rate in Central America, and among the highest in Latin America.

Table IV.2. Central America Homicide Rates, 2000-2008

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Belize	19	25	30	24	27	28	31	30	32
Costa Rica	6	6	6	7	7	8	8	8	11
El Salvador	45	40	39	40	49	62	65	57	52
Guatemala	28	30	32	37	38	44	47	45	48
Honduras	-	-	69	65	35	37	46	50	58
Nicaragua	9	10	10	12	12	13	13	13	13
Panama	10	10	12	11	10	11	11	13	19

Source: HDRCA, 2009-2010, cuadro 3.1.

[70] Pérez, "Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala" 638.

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline as citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor.

Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about in the newspapers, and are often inundated with macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on support for stable democracy.

A. Perception of Insecurity and Crime

The AmericasBarometer studies insecurity and crime in two ways. The first has to do with the perceptions of citizens with regard to their own safety in their neighborhood. The question used to measure the perception of insecurity among citizens is as follows:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat **un**safe or very **un**safe?

a) Comparative Perspective

Figure IV-1 shows the perception of insecurity in a comparative perspective. The question was recoded into a scale between 0-100, where 0 means "very secure" and 100 "very insecure." The Figure indicates that Canada and the United States are the two countries with the lowest levels of insecurity, while Peru, Argentina and El Salvador are the nations with the highest levels. Honduras finds itself in a low intermediate place, below the mid-point of the scale, with an average perception of insecurity of 34.



Figure IV.1. Perception of Insecurity across Latin America

b) Perception of Insecurity Overtime

Figure IV.2 shows that perception of insecurity in Honduras has diminished since 2004 from an average on the 0-100 scale of 39.1 to 34 in 2010. Additionally, the data shows significant decline between 2008 and 2010.



Figure IV.2. Perception of Insecurity in Honduras: 2004-2010

In order to investigate the determinants of perception of insecurity, we turn to Ordinary Least Squared regression. Below we observe the results of the regression analysis with insecurity as dependent variable and the key socio-demographic variables as independent variables.



Figure IV.3. Determinants of Perception of Insecurity in Honduras, 2010

The results of the regression analysis indicate that the presence of gang related activity in the neighborhood is the most significant factor explaining perceptions of insecurity. Respondents living in

neighborhoods with significant gang activity express greater levels of insecurity. Gang activity has become a major problem in Central America, with countries such as El Salvador and Honduras experiencing significant levels of gang related violence. Moreover, the regression analysis shows that, as expected, crime victims also are more likely to perceive greater insecurity. Individuals living in larger cities also are more likely to perceive higher levels of insecurity.



Figure IV.4. Perception of Insecurity and Gang Activity

In Honduras, perceptions of insecurity more than double between communities that have no reported gang activity, to those where gangs constitute a major problem. Figure IV.5 shows that only 10.2% of respondents say that there is a lot of gang activity in their neighborhood, with an additional 17.8% saying there is some activity. A plurality of over 43% said that their neighborhood has no gang activity.



Figure IV.5. Neighborhood Affected by Gangs in Honduras, 2010

Figure IV.6 illustrates the relationship between crime victimization and perception of insecurity. As expected from the regression analysis, those respondents who indicated they were victims of crime express significantly higher levels of insecurity than those who were not victims.



Figure IV.6. Perception of Insecurity by Crime Victimization in Honduras, 2010

Crime Victimization

a) The Measurement of Crime Victimization

The second way the AmericasBarometer examines crime and insecurity is by measuring direct personal experiences with such phenomena. For this round, the Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a new item to measure crime victimization more accurately to obtain more precise responses. While in previous surveys crime victimization was asked by: *have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?* In this round, this question was slightly modified and is now accompanied by some examples of criminal acts. The following items are:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?**[Read options]** (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this Parish (4) In another Parish (5) In another country (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA



Figure IV.7. Individual and Household Crime Victimization in Honduras, 2010

In 2010, 10.4% indicated that a member of their household, but not the person interviewed, was a victim of crime. An additional 14% of Hondurans surveyed reported being victims of crime. Of those, 4.4% reported that members of their family along with themselves were victims, 9.6% said only the respondent was a victim of crime.



Figure IV.8. Place of respondent's Crime Victimization in Honduras

A majority of crimes occurred in the neighborhood or municipality of the respondent. Almost a third of victims reported that the crime occurred in their neighborhood, with another 37.4% saying it happened in their municipality.

Figure IV.9 shows the type of crimes identified by respondents. Unarmed robbery with threat or physical assault is the most prevalent crime, 37.6% of those who were victims of crime chose this type. Next were armed robberies with 28.1% of victims choosing this type of crime.



Figure IV.9. Type of Crimes Reported by Hondurans, 2010

b) Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective

The comparative results indicate that the percentages of people that report being victims of crime are highest in Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, with 31.1%, 29.1%, and 26.2% respectively. Honduras exhibits one of the lowest rates of victimization, with only 14% of respondents reporting being a victim of crime in the last 12 months.



Figure IV.10. Percentage of People Victimized by Crime across Latin America

c) Crime victimization overtime

Figure IV.11 indicates a sharp decline in reported crime victimization in Honduras since 2006. There is no significant difference between 2008 and 2010.



Figure IV.11. Crime Victimization in Honduras, 2004-2010

The next section examines who are more likely to be victims of crime.

d) Who is more likely to be a victim of crime?

Logistic regression is used to determine the demographic characteristics that distinguish crime victims from the rest of the population. Figure IV.12 shows that Hondurans living in the "Oriental A" and Western regions are more likely to be victims of crime. The analysis reveals that gender, age, education and wealth are not statistically significant factors in explaining who victims of crime are.



Figure IV.12. Who is more likely to be a victim of crime in Honduras? (2010)

B. Corruption

Theoretical Background

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it. And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Those who are victims could lower their belief in the Churchillean notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

Honduras was ranked #26 in the region by Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, with a score of 2.5 on the 0-10 point scale. Honduras is ranked 130 among the 180 countries globally that were included in the 2009 survey. These rankings are indicative of widespread corruption.

Table IV.3. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2009

Rank	Regional Rank	Country / Territory	CPI 2009 Score	Confidence Interval		Surveys Used
				Lower bound	Upper bound	
8	1	Canada	**8.7**	8.5	9.0	6
19	2	United States	**7.5**	6.9	8.0	8
20	3	Barbados	**7.4**	6.6	8.2	4
22	4	Saint Lucia	**7.0**	6.7	7.5	3
25	5	Chile	**6.7**	6.5	6.9	7
25	5	Uruguay	**6.7**	6.4	7.1	5
31	7	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	**6.4**	4.9	7.5	3
34	8	Dominica	**5.9**	4.9	6.7	3
35	9	Puerto Rico	**5.8**	5.2	6.3	4
43	10	Costa Rica	**5.3**	4.7	5.9	5
61	11	Cuba	**4.4**	3.5	5.1	3
75	12	Brazil	**3.7**	3.3	4.3	7
75	12	Colombia	**3.7**	3.1	4.3	7
75	12	Peru	**3.7**	3.4	4.1	7
75	12	Suriname	**3.7**	3.0	4.7	3
79	16	Trinidad and Tobago	**3.6**	3.0	4.3	4
84	17	El Salvador	**3.4**	3.0	3.8	5
84	17	Guatemala	**3.4**	3.0	3.9	5
84	17	Panama	**3.4**	3.1	3.7	5
89	20	Mexico	**3.3**	3.2	3.5	7
99	21	Dominican Republic	**3.0**	2.9	3.2	5
99	21	Jamaica	**3.0**	2.8	3.3	5
106	23	Argentina	**2.9**	2.6	3.1	7
120	24	Bolivia	**2.7**	2.4	3.1	6
126	25	Guyana	**2.6**	2.5	2.7	4
130	26	Honduras	**2.5**	2.2	2.8	6
130	26	Nicaragua	**2.5**	2.3	2.7	6
146	28	Ecuador	**2.2**	2.0	2.5	5
154	29	Paraguay	**2.1**	1.7	2.5	5
162	30	Venezuela	**1.9**	1.8	2.0	7
168	31	Haiti	**1.8**	1.4	2.3	3

The Measurement of Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua (Seligson, 1999, Seligson, 1997) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: "Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have directly faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption items is as follows:

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	**No**	**Yes**	**DK**	**DA**
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the city/town /Village council office? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

An item that is related to the topic but that taps on the perception of corruption (rather than victimization), is also included in the questionnaire:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is **[Read]**
(1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Perception of Corruption

a) Comparative Perspective



Figure IV.13. Perception of Corruption across Latin America

The evidence suggests a perception that corruption among public officials is widespread in the region. Every country's average on the 0-100 scale is above 50. The greatest level of perceived corruption among public officials is found in Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica and Peru. The lowest levels are found in Suriname, Canada and Uruguay. Hondurans, while ranked in the lower third of the countries in the survey, still perceive relatively high levels of corruption among public officials, with a score of 70.4 on the 0-100 scale.

b) Perception of Corruption Overtime



Figure IV.14. Perception of Corruption in Honduras, 2004-2010

Hondurans' perception of corruption among public officials decreased significantly in 2010; although substantial majorities still believe corruption among public officials to be widespread.

The next section measures the extent to which Hondurans are victims of corruption. While perception is important, actual victimization by corrupt officials might have a greater impact on citizens' attitudes toward the political system and democracy.

Corruption Victimization

a) Comparative charts (2010 data)

In this section, we focus on two variables: corruption victimization (**corvic**), which is a dichotomous variable measuring whether people have been victimized by corruption or not, and total number of ways (*not times)* respondents have been victimized by corruption (**exctot)**.



Figure IV.15. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

Corruption victimization varies widely across the region. Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru are the countries with the highest level of corruption victimization. In each of these countries over a third of the population says they suffered from corruption. At the other extreme, with the lowest levels of corruption victimization, are Canada, Chile and the United States. Hondurans are ranked in the middle among the countries surveyed, ranked 12th among 25 countries, with 16.2% of respondents saying they have been victims of corruption.

b) Corruption Victimization Overtime



Figure IV.16. Percentage of Corruption Victimization in Honduras, 2010

In 2010, over 80% of Hondurans interviewed said they had not been a victim of corruption. Only 2.2% were victims three or more times. Figure IV.17 shows that while corruption victimization has gone up-and-down since 2004, the differences do not seem to be statistically significant as evidenced by the overlapping confidence intervals.



Figure IV.17. Percent of Population Victimized by Year in Honduras

The next section explores who is more likely to be a victim of corruption.

c) Who is more likely to be a victim of corruption?

The results of the regression analysis in Figure IV.18 indicate that age, gender, size of place of residence, and numbers of children are the most important factors in determining who is a victim of crime. Younger males with more education, larger families and living in bigger cities exhibit greater levels of corruption victimization.



Figure IV.18. Who is more likely to be a victim of corruption in Honduras? (2010)



Figure IV.19. Corruption Victimization by Age, Education, Size of City and Perception of Family Economic Situation in Honduras, 2010

Figure IV.19 demonstrates that education has the strongest impact on corruption victimization. Respondents with a university education are eight times more likely to be victims of corruption than those with no formal education, and twice as likely to be victims as those with a secondary education. Additionally, individuals living in large cities or the national capital are twice more likely to be victims of corruption than those living in medium or smaller cities. Finally, respondents whose family economic situation is the best and their income is sufficient for them to save are significantly more likely to be victims of corruption.

C. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy

We now look at the impact of crime victimization, perception of insecurity, perception of corruption and corruption victimization on system support, support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy. Crime, insecurity and corruption erode citizens' trust in democracy by undermining the belief that state institutions function in an efficient and effective manner to solve national problems. That is when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well they lose faith in democracy. To the extent that individuals view the job performed by democratic governments as effective, they will be less inclined to support extra-constitutional measures. However, when legitimacy declines, citizens may be receptive to new political alternatives even those that would undermine democracy.



Figure IV.20. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on System Support in Honduras (2010)

The results of the regression analysis in Figure IV.20 indicate that of the variables studied in this chapter only perception of insecurity is a statistically significant factor in determining support for the system.[71] The perception of corruption is slightly significant.



Figure IV.21. Impact of Perception of Insecurity on System Support in Honduras (2010)

[71] We observe that the most robust coefficient is the one for approval of the president's job. However, this variable was analyzed in Chapter III.

Figure IV.21 shows the decline in system support as respondents' perception of insecurity increases. There is close to a 10 point drop in system support between respondents who feel very safe in their neighborhood and those who feel very unsafe. The results point to the importance that the issue of crime and violence play in determining support for the political system. Clearly, failure to stem the tide of violence will jeopardize public confidence in state institutions.



Figure IV.22. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for Democracy in Honduras (2010)

Perception of corruption is the only factor studied in this chapter that is a significant factor in explaining variation in support for democracy. Support for democracy increases as perception of corruption decreases. The relationship is illustrated clearly in Figure IV.23. Support for democracy increases significantly for those respondents who believe that corruption among public officials is uncommon.



Figure IV.23. Impact of Perception of Corruption Victimization on Support for Democracy in Honduras, 2010

Finally, we explore the impact of crime and corruption on satisfaction with democracy. Figure IV.24 presents the results of the regression analysis. Perception of insecurity is the most robust statistically significant factor. Perception of corruption is weakly associated with satisfaction with democracy. Another robust coefficient is for evaluation of the performance of the current president. In Chapter III we discussed the significant impact that evaluations of the extant administration have on a number of key democratic values, including satisfaction with democracy and support for military coups.



Figure IV.24. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Satisfaction with Democracy in Honduras (2010)



Figure IV.25. Perception of Insecurity and Satisfaction with Democracy

Figure IV.25 illustrates that relation between insecurity and satisfaction with democracy. Those respondents who feel the least safe in their neighborhood are more than 15 points less satisfied with democracy than individuals who feel "very safe" in their community.

D. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

In this section we explore the impact of crime and insecurity on the rule of law. While the rule of law often does not have a precise definition, and its meaning can vary between different nations and legal traditions it can be understood, however, as a legal-political regime under which the law restrains the government by promoting certain liberties and creating order and predictability regarding how a country functions. In the most basic sense, the rule of law is a system that attempts to protect the rights of citizens from arbitrary and abusive use of government power. An often cited component of the rule of law is the maxim of equality under the law. That is, the precept that everyone regardless of economic, social or political condition should receive the same treatment when confronting legal challenges. The United Nations has defined the rule of law as a "principle of governance which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and adjudicated…"[72] The rule of law is important to democracy because it establishes the foundation for certain conditions on which democracy depends, such a expression of the collective will, monopoly on force, equal rights and social order.

The AmericasBarometer survey asked a particularly relevant question regarding the rule of law:

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88)DK (98) DA

The question seeks to examine the extent to which respondents are willing to employ extra-judicial means to deal with the problem of crime. We would expect individuals that have experienced crime directly or feel insecure in their neighborhoods to be more likely to support the idea that authorities can act beyond the legal parameters.



Figure IV.26. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Honduras (2010)

[72] United Nations Security Council, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies*: *Report of the Secretary General,* August 23, 2004, pg. 4 - 6.

A majority of Hondurans, 54%, believe that authorities should always abide by the law. However, a substantial minority of 46% agree with the notion that on occasion the government may act beyond the law in order to fight criminals as show in Figure IV.26.

a) Support for the Rule of Law Comparative Chart



Figure IV.27. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective

The highest level of support for abiding by the rule of law is found in Belize, Jamaica and Venezuela. An interesting result is the ranking of Uruguay, a country that consistently ranks among the most democratic and stable, but yet is the fourth from the bottom on rule of law (Figure IV.27). Hondurans are ranked 18th of 23 countries with an average score of 54 on the 0-100 scale.

b) Impact of Crime Victimization and Perception of Insecurity on Respect for the Rule of Law



Figure IV.28. Determinants of Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Honduras

The regression analysis in Figure IV.28 demonstrates that crime victimization is the only factor that is statistically significant. Individuals who are not victims of crime are more likely to support the rule of law. In this case, perception of insecurity is not a significant factor.



Figure IV.29. Crime Victimization and Support for the Rule of Law in Honduras, 2010

Figure IV.29 illustrates the relationship between crime victimization and support for the rule of law. Support for the rule of law is significantly higher for those individuals that have not been victims of a crime in the past 12 months. Non-victims exhibit a 12 point increase in support for the rule of law versus respondents who said they had suffered a criminal incident.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the connection between crime, the rule of law, corruption and democratic values. Crime, insecurity and corruption are among the most critical issues confronting Latin America. All three have the potential to undermine support for democracy by eroding trust in key State institutions and in the ability of the government to confront effectively the challenges facing citizens on a day-to-day basis. The results presented here show that insecurity has a particularly strong relationship to democratic values and system support.

In Honduras, the key variables determining perception of insecurity is the extent of gang activity in respondents' neighborhood, and crime victimization.

The evidence suggests a perception that corruption among public officials is widespread in the region. About 1 in 6 Hondurans say they have been a victim of corruption in the past year. Perception of corruption significantly affects support for democracy.

Perception of insecurity is a key factor in determining variation in system support and satisfaction with democracy. Individuals who perceive greater levels of insecurity in their neighborhood are significantly less likely to express support for the political system or satisfaction with democracy.

Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

Theoretical Background

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.[73] New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, et al., 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson, 2009, Gilley, 2009). In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. In this sense, greater legitimacy and political tolerance are conceived as scenarios more favorable to the development of a stable democracy.

The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of "system support" along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes (support for the system and political tolerance) are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson, 2000). Ideally, a political system should have high levels of support for the system and also with high levels of political tolerance, however, different combinations may take place, as a function of the degree to which a society confers legitimacy on its institutions and guarantees the right of opposition to the minority. The framework shown in Table V.1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

Before focusing on the results, it is necessary to explain the way that the indicators of support for the system and tolerance are built. Support for the system is a summary measure which indicates the degree to which individuals trust the country's political institutions, respect them and feel protected by them. It is the result of the average of the responses given to the following questions:

[73] Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. **B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in Honduras guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Honduras?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Honduras?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Honduras?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Honduras?

Following the usual procedure, the original scale of one to seven was transformed into a new scale of zero to 100, in which zero indicates the least possible support to the system, and 100 the maximum possible support.

The index of political tolerance is constructed by asking citizens to what extent they are willing to extend a series of political rights to those who are against the system of government in the country. The questions used were as follows:

D1. There are people who always speak badly of Honduras's form of government, not only the current administration, but the kind of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these peoples' **right to vote**? Please read me the number on the scale: ***[Probe: Up to what point?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their points of view? Please read me the number.
D3. Always thinking of the people who speak badly of Honduras's form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can **run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people appear on television to **give speeches**?

The original answers were provided on a scale of 1 to 10, in which one indicated strong disapproval, and 10 indicated strong approval. Thus, low values indicate low tolerance to the political rights of those who do not agree with the form of government or low political tolerance. The original values for each question were recoded in the usual scale of 0 to 100, and to create the index we took a simple average of responses to the four questions.

Table V.1. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	Tolerance	
System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	**High**	**Low**
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

From a theoretical point of view, we intend to analyze the interrelationship between system support or legitimacy and tolerance, to which it is necessary to dichotomize both scales into "high" and "low."[74] Table V-1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance.

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl, 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence, but this is described as *unstable democracy*.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown, so this situations are described as democracy at risk.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been

[74] Each of these scales goes from 0 to 100, so that the median point which has been selected is 50. Values of support for the political system less than 50 have been classified as “low” and values of support for the system above 50 are considered “high”. Similarly, for political tolerance, values less than 50 are considered “low” and above 50 are “high”.

used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson, 1991, Booth and Seligson, 1994, Seligson and Booth, 1993).

A. System Support

Theoretical Background

In large measure, the legitimacy of the system depends on how citizens view it. Juan Linz, in his work on the breakdown of a democratic system, says that legitimacy depends largely on the public believing that existing institutions, despite their problems, are better than the alternatives.[75] We are talking about the political institutions here, not the administration in power. Seymour Martin Lipset defines legitimacy as "the capacity of a system to generate and maintain the belief that the existing institutions are the most appropriate for the society." Lipset's theory is based on the premise that political systems which receive the public's support, and therefore legitimacy, can survive even in the face of an economic or political crisis.[76]

The North American political scientist David Easton, in turn, talks about two important types of support: "specific" support and "diffuse" support. The first refers to the public's support for the ruling government. Although this kind of support is important for those who govern, since it can influence the government's capacity to implement its policies, it is not as important as the second type of support. "Diffuse" support refers to support for institutions, that is the political system and the institutions that constitute it. The political system can survive when the administration or ruler in power is unpopular, but it is in danger when the institutions lose support and, therefore, legitimacy.[77] More recently, John Booth and Mitchell Seligson studied the sources of legitimacy by analyzing the AmericasBarometer data for 2004 in Mesoamerica. Booth and Seligson reveal six dimensions of legitimacy: identification with a political community, support for regime principles, approval of regime performance, support for regime institutions, support for political actors, and support for governmental institutions and local authorities.[78]

[75] See Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
[76] See Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, expanded edition, 1981; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994): 1-22.
[77] David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975), pp. 435-457.
[78] John A. Booth. and Mitchell A. Seligson. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

a) Components of System Support



Figure V.1. Components of System Support in Honduras (2010)

Confidence that the political system protects basic rights is the weakest of the components of system support in 2010, and trust in the courts the highest.

b) System Support in Comparative Perspective

How does Honduras compare with the rest of the Americas? Figure V.2 shows results for all the countries in the survey.



Figure V.2. System Support in Comparative Perspective

Honduras exhibits the third highest level of system support among the countries surveyed. Uruguay and Costa Rica exhibit the highest rates of system support and Argentina and Trinidad & Tobago the lowest.

c) System Support Overtime



Figure V.3. System Support in Honduras by Year

Figure V.3 shows a dramatic increase in system support in 2010. We have noted that support for the current administration is a key factor in determining support for the system, and Hondurans expressed substantially greater support for the current president than the last; thus partially explaining the rise in system support. Another factor is the perception of government economic performance which has improved and is significantly linked to system support.

B. Political Tolerance

Theoretical Background

In this section, we turn to investigate the levels of political tolerance in Honduras and compare them with those of the other countries in the study. Political tolerance is one of the most important democratic values. In the previous section, we analyzed political system support. Support for the system is important for political stability, but it does not guarantee the survival of democracy. Therefore, political tolerance, defined as an individual's acceptance of the rights of others to express varied opinions, is key to establish a stable democratic regime. There is an extensive literature on political tolerance.[79] One of the

[79] See Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Toward and Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica," *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; and Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (in Hebrew)," *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53; John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982); James L. Gibson, 1993, "Perceived Political Freedom in the Soviet Union." *Journal of Politics* 55:4 November 936-974; James L. Gibson, 1992a, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least Liked'?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36:2 May 560-577; James L. Gibson, 1992b, "The

most debated topics is how to measure tolerance.[80] This study measures tolerance through an index based on the responses to a series of questions (the D series) in the questionnaire. The original scale of these variables goes from 1-to-10. Below, we present the questions related to political tolerance in the LAPOP questionnaire.

The following questions were used for this analysis:

D1. There are people who always speak badly of Honduras's form of government, not only the current administration, but the kind of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these peoples' **right to vote**? Please read me the number on the scale: ***[Probe: Up to what point?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their points of view? Please read me the number.
D3. Always thinking of the people who speak badly of Honduras's form of government How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can **run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people appear on television to **give speeches**?

Answers were measured on a 1-10 point scale, where 1 meant "strongly disagree" and 10 "strongly agree." However, for our analysis, we re-codified the variables to a scale of 0-to-100.[81]

a) Components of Political Tolerance



Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance in Honduras (2010)

Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom" *American Political Science Review* 86:2, 338-356; James L. Gibson, 1988, "Political Tolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare." *American Political Science Review* 82, June, 511-529; James L. Gibson, 1989, "The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression during the Vietnam War Era." *Journal of Politics* 51:13-35; James L. Gibson and R. Bingham, 1985, "The Behavioral Consequences of Political Tolerance." In Gibson and Bingham, *Civil Liberties and Nazis: The Skokie Free-Speech Controversy*. New York: Praeger.

[80] For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see the section on political tolerance in Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*, University of Pittsburgh and CEDATOS, 2002, 45-46.

[81] The conversion is made by subtracting 1 from each score. Then each score is divided by nine, so that each one is located in a range from 0-to-1. Finally, this score is multiplied by 100.

Tolerance levels in Honduras are highest for allowing opponents of the political system to protests peaceably. Support for opponents running for office, making a speech on TV or vote are below the mid-point of the scale.

b) Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective



Figure V.5. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

Figure V.5 shows that political tolerance is highest in the United States, Argentina and Costa Rica, and lowest in El Salvador, Bolivia, Peru, and Honduras. Hondurans are well below the mid-point of 0-100 scale, and are the fourth from the bottom on political tolerance.

c) Political Tolerance Overtime

Political tolerance declined between 2004 and 2006 and has not recovered yet (Figure V.6).



Figure V.6. Political Tolerance in Honduras by Year

The regression analysis in Figure V.7 reveals that support for coups and ideology are the two most significant factors in determining levels of political tolerance. Those individuals who express less support for coups tend to exhibit higher levels of political tolerance. Conversely, respondents who self-identify with the Right ideologically express higher levels of political tolerance.

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

Figure V.7. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Honduras, 2010

C. Support for Stable Democracy

Table V.2. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance: The Case of (Honduras), 2010

	Tolerance	
System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	**High**	**Low**
High	Stable Democracy 27%	Authoritarian Stability 46.5%
Low	Unstable Democracy 8.1%	Democracy at Risk 18.4%

As explained earlier in this chapter, the categories presented in this framework are not predictive of regime outcomes. Instead, they represent attitudinal syndromes that reflect support for political tolerance and levels of system legitimacy. At most, we find a population in 2010 with low levels of political tolerance but increasing system support (Table V.2). Unfortunately, a majority of Hondurans exhibit attitudes that place them in the "un-democratic" cells. Particularly disturbing is the fact that a large plurality of Hondurans express attitudes conducive to "authoritarian stability," thus perhaps explaining some of the consequences of the political crisis of 2009.

a) Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective

Below in Figure V.8 we compare all countries on the stable democracy cell. We find that Uruguay, Costa Rica, Suriname and Canada exhibit the highest combination of tolerance and system support. Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay are the lowest. Honduras is in the lower half of the countries surveyed, with only 27% of respondents in the "stable democracy" cell.



Figure V.8. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective

b) Support for Stable Democracy by Year

Figure V.9 demonstrates a decline in support for stable democracy attitudes between 2004 and 2008, and an increase in 2010. We can be fairly certain that most, if not all the increase in 2010, is due to a rise in system support. In turn, the rise in system support is linked to evaluations of the president's performance and the perception of government economic performance. If either of these indicators falters we can expect a decline in attitudes supportive of stable democracy.



Figure V.9. Support for Stable Democracy by Year, Honduras 2004-2010

c) Who is more likely to Support Stable Democracy?



Figure V.10. Who is more likely to Support Stable Democracy in Honduras?

Figure V.11 demonstrates the two factors that seemed to be weakly connected to attitudes supportive of stable democracy are satisfaction with the performance of the current president and

corruption victimization. The more satisfaction with the job done by the president the greater support for stable democratic attitudes, and those respondents who experienced greater corruption victimization express less support for stable democracy.



Figure V.11. Stable Democratic Attitudes and Corruption Victimization and Presidential Job Approval in Honduras

D. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

In this section, we examine the level of trust for other institutions. According to the results presented in Figure V.12, the Catholic Church is the most trusted institution with a score of 70.5 on the 0-100 scale. The Church's rating is well above any of the State institutions. The most trusted State institution is the President with an average score of 62.6 followed by the Army and the national government with 60.9 and 60.2, respectively. The least trusted institutions are the political parties with a score of 49.4, close to, but below, the mid-point of the scale, and the police with a score of 54.1. It is worth noting that with the exception of the political parties, all other institutions receive levels of trust on the positive side of the scale.



Figure V.12. Trust in Institutions in Honduras, 2010

As shown in Figure V.13, all institutions benefitted from an increase in levels of trust between 2008 and 2010. Some, like the president, political parties, and elections witnessed a dramatic increase. For some institutions, such as the Army and police, the increase in trust represents a return to 2004 levels. For others, such as the national government and Congress the increases correspond to a dramatic positive shift in levels of confidence. Increases in the job approval of the president, coupled with increased confidence in the economic performance of the government, have combined to boost other State institutions. A caveat to this rosy scenario, however, is in order. Presidential approval is subject to wide swings based on political conditions, and so just as it can promote support for the system, it can decline rapidly precipitating a parallel decline in trust in other institutions.



Figure V.13. Trust in Institutions by Year in Honduras

E. Attitudes toward Democracy

The next section takes a look at support and satisfaction with democracy. Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. The AmericasBarometer measure support for democracy by using an item that focuses on the "Churchillean" view of democracy, named after British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who is quoted as saying: "Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

(ING4): Democracy may have problems, but is better than any other type of government.

a. Support for Democracy

The comparative analysis in Figure V.14 indicates that Uruguay, Costa Rica and Argentina exhibit the highest levels of support for democracy, even higher than Canada and the United States. The least supportive of democracy are Peru, Honduras, and Guatemala. The relative ranking of Honduras is troubling for the Central American nation. While the score is on the positive side of the scale, meaning that a majority of Hondurans support democracy as the best system, compared to the rest of the region Hondurans' support for democracy is low.



Figure V.14. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective



Figure V.15. Support for Democracy in Honduras by Year

Figure V.15 shows that support for democracy declined between 2006 and 2008; and while up in 2010, the increase seems not to be statistically significant. The decline witnessed in 2008 could have portended the political crisis that engulfed the country in 2009.

b. Satisfaction with Democracy

The survey asked the following question:

PN4. In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Honduras?

As seen in Figure V.16, over 53% of Hondurans express satisfaction with democracy in 2010, and 12% express great satisfaction. Only a small percentage, 2.9%, expressed great dissatisfaction. About a third of Hondurans interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the way their democracy is functioning. If we add those who are "very satisfied" to the "satisfied" we get a majority of 65.6% that are satisfied to some degree with the country's democracy.



Figure V.16. Satisfaction with Democracy in Honduras (2010)

The comparative analysis in Figure V.17 shows that Honduras ranks fourth among the 25 countries in satisfaction with democracy; only Uruguayan, Panamanians, and Costa Ricans are more satisfied.



Figure V.17. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We can observe a decrease in levels of satisfaction with how Honduras's democracy functions between 2004 and 2008. Figure V.18 shows that the low point was in 2008, with satisfaction levels then jumping significantly in 2010 to the levels seen in 2004. We suspect that again, as with support for democracy and system support, a combination of perceived good economic performance by the government and presidential approval ratings, are the factors that help explain the rise in levels of satisfaction with democracy.



Figure V.18. Satisfaction with Democracy in Honduras by Year

Conclusion

This chapter has explored various components of legitimacy and stable democratic values, including the connection between system support and tolerance. In 2010 Honduras exhibits the third highest level of system support among the countries surveyed; with higher system support than Canada and the United States. We observe a dramatic increase in system support in 2010. Hondurans are well below the mid-point of 0-100 scale on political tolerance. Regression analysis reveals that support for coups and ideology are the two most significant factors in determining levels of political tolerance. Unfortunately, a majority of Hondurans exhibit attitudes that place them in the "un-democratic" cells. Particularly disturbing is the fact that large pluralities of Hondurans express attitudes conducive to "authoritarian stability," thus perhaps explaining some of the consequences of the political crisis of 2009. The two factors that seemed to be weakly connected to attitudes supportive of stable democracy are satisfaction with the performance of the current president and corruption victimization. All institutions benefitted from an increase in levels of trust between 2008 and 2010. Some, like the president, political parties, and elections witnessed a dramatic increase. For some institutions, such as the Army and police, the increase in trust represents a return to 2004 levels. For others, such as the national government and Congress the increases correspond to a dramatic positive shift in levels of confidence. Increases in the job approval of the president, coupled with increased confidence in the economic performance of the government, have combined to boost other State institutions.

Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

Introduction

Since long ago, the participation of citizens in organizations of the Civil Society has been hailed as an important force in the democratization of societies all over the world. After the democratization of most Latin Americans countries, citizens have seen more spaces open and more organizations available for them to participate without the restrictions that they may have had during former authoritarian regimes. And so, this chapter has the purpose of uncovering such levels of participation and whether there have been changes over time. It also examines participation in different organizations and forms (e.g. religious meetings, political protests, elections, etc.) and whether there is any association between participation and the political attitudes of the participants, among other variables.

Theoretical Background

The so called "second wave of democratization" that has swept Latin America, and other parts of the world, in the 1980s and 1990s was arguably advanced by the active participation of ordinary citizens through organizations of the *Civil Society* (Keane 1988b). The idea that greater participation in civil society organizations lead to a more democratic government is certainly an old notion, pioneered by Tocqueville who considered Civil Society organizations as *schools of democracy* (Brady *et al.* 1995). The *neo-Tocquevillean* school now claims that participation in Civil Society organizations, when horizontal and pluralistic, induces the formation of *social capital* (Putnam, 1995) which in turn leads to the formation of more democratic societies (Cohen and Arato 1992; Putnam 1993) and even economic development (Zak and Knack 1998). This thesis has been argued to explain cases of democratization in Eastern Europe (e.g. Di Palma 1991; Bernhard 1993), Latin America (e.g. Mainwaring and Viola 1985; Pearce 1997), and other parts of the world (e.g. Makumbe 1998; Kubba 2000).

In Latin America, for instance, the concept of Civil Society has been identified in the past with the struggle against military dictatorships (e.g. Argentina's *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo*) and as society in place of political parties (Fals Borda 1992; Garreton 1989). In the Latin American democracies of the present, Civil Society organizations more commonly play the role of organizing citizens in their articulation of demands (Seligson 1998; Avritzer 1998). Thus, organizations such as Human Rights groups may have played a role in the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, while other types of Civil Society organizations, such as community development groups or civic groups, may at present play a role in deepening and consolidating democracy. But, regardless the type of organization or the form of their contribution, the important point is the alleged connection between participation in organizations of the Civil Society and democratization. The more citizens participate in organizations of the Civil Society, the more democratic their country will be.

It is widely believed that participation in organizations of the Civil Society increases Social Capital (Putnam 1993)[82] as well as Political Capital (Booth and Richard 1998), which in turn may lead to

[82] For a more detailed analysis of the concept of "Social Capital" see Coleman, J. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *American Journal of Sociology, 94*, S95-S120. Issue Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure.

greater levels of democracy. Like Putnam, Stolle and Rochon (1998) underscore interpersonal trust as perhaps the most immediate and important feature of social capital, which is increased by the interaction with others members. Thus, the causal relationship goes from increased participation in Civil Society organizations through the formation of social capital (primarily *trust*), which is a key aspect of stable democratic rule.

A. Interpersonal Trust

Hence, this section examines the level of interpersonal trust that exists among Hondurans as well as the factors that may influence its formation, or lack thereof. For this purpose, item IT1, in our survey, asked the following question:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy
(4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98)DA

Figure VI.1 below reveals that Hondurans are more inclined to trust their neighbors than not. Only about 35% of Hondurans reported to have little or no trust at all in their neighbors. However, almost one-third reported to somewhat trust others and another third to trust them very much.



Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust among Hondurans

a) Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

In Figure VI.2, it becomes clear that Hondurans are among those most trusting of their neighbors in the Americas. This is a big change with respect to the prior report (2008), when Honduras was third from the bottom up in terms of interpersonal trust, surpassing only Haiti and Peru.



Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

b) Interpersonal Trust Overtime

Nonetheless, if we review the levels of interpersonal trust farther back in time, it becomes clear that Honduras is in fact a country where people are inclined to trust others. Figure VI.3 shows how interpersonal trust has been consistently high, except for the year 2008. These high levels of trust are a little bit puzzling, considering the country's very high levels of crime and the polarizing political crisis of 2009, which still lingers in the society.



Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Trust in Honduras by Year

c) Determinants of Interpersonal Trust

It is important, therefore, to do a little more research to uncover the factors that might contribute to this very high level of interpersonal trust among Honduras. For this purpose, a lineal regression was run (with Interpersonal trust as the dependent variable), which reveals that in fact, the perception of insecurity does reduce very significantly the interpersonal trust among neighbors (see Figure VI.4). Interpersonal trust is also affected by age and education; those who are older and more educated are more inclined to trust their neighbors than younger or less educated Hondurans. Perception of household economic situation is also –though marginally- associated with interpersonal trust; those who perceive their household economic situation as better off are most likely to trust their neighbors more. This association may not be a surprise since crime may be higher in economically worse off areas, and therefore neighbors may be less trustful.

Also, some regions of the country report higher levels of interpersonal trust than the Central A Region (i.e. *Departamento* of Francisco Morazán; where the capital Tegucigalpa is located), which was the reference region. The regression results report higher level of interpersonal trust (as compared to those in Francisco Morazán) in the *departamentos* of Gracias a Dios (Oriente B), Olancho and El Paraiso (Oriente B), and Islas de la Bahia (Norte C).



Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Honduras (2010)

When comparing each of the regions to the reference region (Francisco Morazán), it can be observed that residents of Olancho and El Paraiso (region Oriental A) are about 9 points more trusting than those residing in Francisco Morazán (see Figure VI.5).

Also, interpersonal trust among those who reside in Gracias a Dios (region Oriental B) and Islas de la Bahia (Norte C) is about 28 and 35 points higher than those residing in the department of Francisco Morazán (region Central A).



Figure VI.5. Regions with Greater Interpersonal Trust

When examining the level of interpersonal trust across levels of urbanization, it can be seen that trust is much higher among neighbors residing in the rural areas than in more urbanized settings, particularly in the capital city, Tegucigalpa (Figure VI.6). The perception of insecurity also reduces the level of interpersonal trust among neighbors. Figure VI.6 also reveals that the difference in having a perception of security or insecurity can be a resulting 30-point difference in interpersonal trust. Age is another factor having an effect on interpersonal trust. Much older adults seem to have higher levels of interpersonal trust than their younger nationals. Finally, the higher the level of education, the higher the level of interpersonal trust among neighbors.



Figure VI.6. Interpersonal Trust by Various Determinants

B. Civic Participation

As stated above, citizen participation in different kinds of organization may play different roles in the deepening and consolidation of democracy. Therefore, in this section, we examine the level of citizen participation in a variety of civil society organizations, which may be the most common in the country.

The Measurement of Civil Society's Participation

Perhaps the best way to measure the degree of participation in Civil Society organization is by determining the frequency with which citizens attend meeting of such organizations. With that purpose, our survey included the following questions:

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat for each question "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year" or "never" to help the respondent]**							
	Once a week	**Once or twice a month**	**Once or twice a year**	**Never**	**DK**	**DA**	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	88	DA 98	N/A 99

a) Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations

Figure VI.7 below shows that Hondurans are by far more inclined to participate in meeting of religious groups than in any other type of organization. This should not be a surprise if we consider not only the high level of religiosity of Hondurans but also the fact that churches usually have more than one meeting a week throughout the year, which is a much higher frequency that meetings of, say, parents or professional associations, which might meet only a few times during the year.



Figure VI.7. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations

b) Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations Overtime

Nevertheless, participation in Civil Society Organizations, including religious group, have decline over the past few years (Figure VI.8). The exceptions seem to be attending meetings of women and professional organizations, which have maintained the same level of attendance over time but are, nonetheless, the organizations reporting the lowest levels of attendance.



Figure VI.8. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Honduras, by Year

C. Protest Participation

Another important form of (political) participation is protesting. This seems to be particularly true during the political crisis that ensued during the second half of 2009.

The Measurement of Political Participation

Our survey included several questions that attempted to gauge the level of participation in protests during the 12 months prior to the time the survey was conducted (roughly March 2009 to March 2010). The first question to consider is:

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to JC1]** (88) DK**[Go to JC1]** (98) DA **[Go to JC1]**

a) Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective

Figure VI.9 below reveals that only 6.6% of those interviewed reported to have participated in a demonstration or protest march during the prior 12 months. Although Figure VI.9 also shows that Honduras scored at mid-range in the list of countries in the region, the level could be considered as very low, taking into account the almost daily and crowed demonstrations that occurred during the crisis of 2009.



Figure VI.9. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective

D. Electoral Participation

Another form of (political) participation is through elections of political authorities (e.g. President, Deputies, and Mayors). Our survey included questions such as:

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2009?
(1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]** (88) DK**[Go to VB10]**
(98) DA**[Go to VB10]**

a) Electoral Turnout in Comparative Perspective

Figure VI.10 below shows that Hondurans reported a turnout level that is relatively very low, when compared to the other countries in the region. The main reason for this is the high level of electoral abstention that was registered during the general elections in 2009 in protest for the ouster of then President Zelaya. Yet, more than 60% of those interviewed reported voting.



Figure VI.10. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in Last Elections

b) Electoral Turnout Overtime

Figure VI.11 below shows that, in effect, the level of turnout during the 2009 elections (reported in 2010) was much lower than that during the 2005 elections (reported in 2006). More detailed research, however, is presented in Chapter IX of this report, in consideration to the importance of the events involved.



Figure VI.11. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in Last Elections, by Year

c) Predictors of Turnout in Honduras

Figure VI.12 below shows the graphic results of a logistic regression using turnout as the (binomial) dependent variable, which was run in order to uncover the factors that may be having an effect on whether or not people vote. The variable with the strongest positive association with turnout was Political Interest, followed by age, satisfaction with the performance of current president, and wealth. Other variables reported a negative association with turnout, including female gender, level of urbanization, and residence in the regions Central B (Comayagua and La Paz), Norte A (Cortes), Norte B (Atlántida, Yoro, Colon), and Occidental (Santa Barbara, Copan, Ocotepeque, Lempira, and Intibucá), when compared to those residing in region Central A (Francisco Morazán), where the capital city, Tegucigalpa, is located.



Figure VI.12. Predictors of Election Turnout in Honduras

Differences in participation among the regions are shown more clearly in Figure VI.13. Several regions (departments) reported lower levels of participation than in the Central A region (Department of Francisco Morazán), the region used as a reference. No region reported higher levels of participation than Francisco Morazán. The reason is, perhaps, that the capital, Tegucigalpa, is located in this Department and therefore has very high levels of political participation. It is pertinent to note that there are 11 departments that reported levels of participation lower than Francisco Morazán, including the most populous. And the differences are significant: the residents of Comayagua and La Paz (Central B) reported a level of participation about 11 points lower than that of Francisco Morazán, Cortes (North A) 18 points less; Atlántida, Yoro and Colón (North B) 5 points less, and Santa Bárbara, Copán, Ocotepeque, Lempira and Intibucá (West) about 7 points less.



Figure VI.13. Participation by Regions

Figure VI.14 displays more clearly the differences in turnout between some demographic characteristic. Besides Tegucigalpa, the capital city, turnout was also higher in less urbanized settings (rural areas and small cities) than in more urban centers (medium-sized and large cities). Turnout was also higher among those better off (in terms of wealth), among males, and among older Hondurans.



Figure VI.14. Turnout by Urban, Wealth, Gender, and Age

Last, the level of turnout was more than 40 points higher among those reporting a high level of political interest than those with little or no interest. Also higher was the level of turnout among those with the perception of a good or very good performance of the current president, Porfirio Lobo, about a 10-point difference. However, this association may be more the result of the fact that those who voted the most were those who supported and voted for then candidate Lobo, who won the election by a very large margin.



Figure VI.15. Turnout by Political Interest and President Performance

E. Interest in Politics and Activism

a) Interest in politics

Since political interest was by far the main predictor of turnout, it is appropriate to examine this variable more closely. The relevant question asked:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

Figure VI.166 below reveals that most Hondurans have little or no political interest (61.8%). Conversely, only about four of every ten Hondurans reported having some or a lot of political interest. This low level is a little worrisome since, as shown above, political interest seems to be the main driver of turnout.



Figure VI.16. Political Interest among Hondurans

b) Interest in politics Overtime

Fortunately, political interest seems to have been rising over the last few years (see Figure VI.177). And very rapidly! In fact, after ranking close to the bottom in the region four years ago, Honduras's current level of political interest is higher than that of most countries in the region (analysis not shown). Yet, it is possible that the surge in political interest among Hondurans was a result of the political crisis of the last year and could, therefore, fade away in the next few years.



Figure VI.17. Political Interest among Hondurans by Year

F. Political Activism

Political interest may be important not only for the interested person to vote in the elections but also to participate as a formal or informal political activist working to convince others to vote for a particular party. To uncover the level of political activism among Hondurans, the following questions were asked:

PP1. During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]** (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2008? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

Figure VI.188 shows that few Hondurans (about 27%) reported trying to convince others to vote for a particular party or candidate, and even less (11.7%) worked as an activist for a candidate or party.



Figure VI.18. Political Activism among Honduras

Conclusion

Hondurans continue to rank relatively high in terms of interpersonal trust, an important element in democratic societies, even though the levels of participation in some organizations of the Civil Society seem to have declined over the last few years. This might be the result of an increasing perception of insecurity in the country, which certainly contribute to reduce interpersonal trust. Another form of participation, protesting, was also reportedly relatively low. Even though there seems to have occurred several protests and demonstrations during the political crisis of 2009, the number of those participating, on both sides of the conflict, seems not to have been large enough as to move the country among those countries on the continent with high levels of protesting.

Participation during the elections was also reviewed in this section. Hondurans reported a lower level of turnout in 2009 than in 2005. This was most likely the result of the prevalent insecure environment during the elections and the high level of abstention among supporters of ousted president Zelaya in retaliation for the support to the ouster by all political parties but the UD, the smallest party.

Last, political interest was found to have risen consistently during the past few years. This is good news since political interest is an important driver for participation. And although this increase in political interest may be a positive consequence of the political crisis of 2009, the hope is that Hondurans will continue to grow in interest and participation in the political system and organizations of the Civil Society as a way to deepen and consolidate democracy in Honduras.

Chapter VII. Local Government

Introduction

Just as citizen participation in organizations of the Civil Society is important to foster interpersonal trust and social capital, participation in the local government may help increase political capital and improve the local government and services. In addition, as uncovered in our report of 2008, citizens who have more involvement in the business of local governments (e.g. attending municipal meetings, etc.) are more likely to report higher levels of system support, another important contributor to stable democracies. Thus, this section examines the extent to which Hondurans are involved in the business of local governments.

Theoretical Background

It has been long argued that one characteristic of most Latin American societies is the centralization of the decision-making power in the central government, perhaps as a result of centuries of Spanish colonization (Nickson 1995). Yet, as we pointed it out in the prior chapter, the decentralization of decision-making power, including finances, has long been considered to help bring about more participation of citizens in local issues and governance and, with that, greater transparency and accountability of the local government, or municipalities (Oates, 1972; Seabright, 1996; Tabellini, 2000; Carrión 2007; Kyriacou et al, 2009).

However, as we pointed out in our prior report (2008), there is considerable debate over the right degree, form, and conditions for decentralization, as well as the potential negative consequences of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falleti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007). Some have argued that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism, and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other, however, have shown a mix of both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003;).

Notwithstanding the ongoing debate, it has been shown in our prior report that the participation of citizens in local governance issues does seem to foster more trust in the local government and more satisfaction with the services provided by it. Furthermore, it was also shown that those who are more trustful of and satisfied with the local government are also more likely to exhibit political attitudes considered as more supportive of a democratic system. Therefore, this chapter will examine, once more, the degree to which Hondurans are participating in the issues of local governance and how the economic crisis might have affected it.

A. Participation in Local Government Meeting

In order to assess the level of participation in the local government, our survey asked several relevant questions, including:

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or village meeting in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

a) Participation at the local level in Comparative Perspective

Figure VII.1 below reveals that Hondurans have low level of attendance to meetings of the municipal or local government. Only 8.8% of those interviewed reported attending this kind of meeting, well below the level of citizens in the Dominican Republic or the United States where about one-quarter of those interviewed reported attending.



Figure VII.1. Participation in Local Meetings in Comparative Perspective

b) Participation at the local level overtime

Incidentally, the level of participation in Honduras is not only low but it has also been declining over the past few years (Figure VII.2). The high level of participation reported in 2006 may have been the result of the, so called, *Asambleas Ciudadanas*, that the newly elected president Zelaya had introduced throughout the country at the beginning of his period. Yet, the decreasing levels of participation in the

successive years may have been result of the growing desilusion with the results of such program, which in turn made the project stall and disappear. Thus, the program helped boost participation in local meetings in the short run, but its failure seems to have discouraged participation in the longer run.



Figure VII.2. Participation in Local Government Meetings in Honduras, by Year

B. Demand-Making on Municipal Government

Another form of participation is by making demands on local government officials for, say, help for a neighborhood particular need, even personal. Yet, many demands made to the local government could go unanswered, hence voiding the demands of any meaningful effect on the local government. Therefore, our survey asked the two following questions:

NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the city/town/village within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

The composed Figure VII.3 below shows that only a very small minority (6.5%) of Hondurans contacted their local government officials for assistance during the past year. An even lower number of Hondurans reported actually receiving any assistance from the local government, or only one-quarter of those who did ask for assistance.



Figure VII.3. Demand-Making on Municipal Government (2010)

a) Demand-Making on Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective

When comparing that level of demand-making to that of the rest of countries in the Americas (Figure VII.4), it becomes evident that Hondurans report the second lowest level, after Panama. It also becomes evident that most countries reported levels of demand-making that were more than double, even triple, that of Hondurans.



Figure VII.4. Demand-Making on Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective

b) Demand-Making on Municipal Government Overtime

Like in the case of participation in municipal meetings, Hondurans also report declining levels of demand-making over the past few years, perhaps also as a consequence of the failure of the *Asambleas Ciudadanas*, where citizen not only discussed their problems with representatives of the government but also asked for and expected to receive assistance, which they often did not receive.



Figure VII.5. Demand-Making on Municipal Government in Honduras

c) Who is more likely to seek assistance or present a request to the local government?

The declining levels of participation in the local level by Hondurans call for an examination of the factors that might be influencing people's decision to participate or not. Figure VII.6 reveals that there are several variables that are associated significantly.



Figure VII.6. Who is more likely to seek assistance or present a request to the local Government?

Perhaps the most revealing result is that business owners and party activists are among those who make more demands on their local governments (see Figure VII.7). This is actually a well-known occurrence in Honduras. Usually, people who ask for assistance (favors) from government authorities are either those with economic and/or political influence (or leverage). Besides business owners, it is party activists those who are more likely to ask local officials for assistance, or some form of compensation for their work during the latest political campaign.



Figure VII.7. Demand-Making by Business Owners and Party Activists

Figure VII.66 above also revealed differences in participation across regions in the country. When compared to the reference region, Central A, where the capital city is located, most regions report lower levels of demand-making. Specifically, demand-making is lower, than in Francisco Morazán, in the *departamentos* of Cortes (Norte A); Atlántida, Yoro and Colon (Norte B); Olancho and El Paraiso (Oriental A); and in Santa Barbara, Copan, Ocotepeque, Lempira, and Intibucá (Occidental). These differences, however, are to be expected considering that it is in the capital of the country where most "lobbying" is conducted.

Nonetheless, Figure VII.6.6 also reveals that demand-making is higher in rural areas and small cities, where there may be a much closer contact between citizens and their local governments (see Figure VII.8). Those with a higher number of children also reported higher levels of demand-making, maybe reflecting their greater age or a greater need for assistance. Finally, those with higher levels of interpersonal trust and political tolerance were also more likely to make demands, although the causal relationship might also go in the opposite direction: from greater participation in the business and political spheres to more interpersonal trust and political tolerance.



Figure VII.8. Demand-Making by Demographic Characteristics and Political Attitudes

C. Satisfaction with Local Government Services

An importantly related question to citizen participation in their local government is their perception of the quality of, and resulting satisfaction with the services provided by their local government. The following question was asked with that purpose in mind:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the city/town/village is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]**
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

The responses shown in Figure VII.9 indicate that half of Hondurans seem to be a little indifferent to the quality of the services, with the other half divided between those who consider them as good or very good and bad or very bad.



Figure VII.9. Satisfaction with Local Government Services (2010)

a) Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective

Perhaps a little bit surprising is the pattern shown in Figure VII.10Figure VII.10, where Honduras ranks among the countries in the region with higher levels of satisfaction, even above the United States and other countries with much better local services. Perhaps the best explanation for this paradox is that most citizens in the country lack a basis for comparison (e.g. have not traveled to countries with better services) but rate the services using, perhaps, their past quality as reference.



Figure VII.10. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective

b) Satisfaction with Local Government Services over Time

Yet, as Figure VII.11 shows, the quality, and therefore satisfaction with the local services has not changed much over time.



Figure VII.11. Satisfaction with Local Government Services, by Year

c) Determinants of Satisfaction With Local Government Services

Figure VII.12 below shows the result of a regression and uncovers some variables associated with satisfaction with local services (the dependent variable).



Figure VII.12. Who are More Likely to be Satisfied with Local Government Services

As shown in Figure VII.13, satisfaction with the local services is low among those who have made demands on the local government. Most likely, their low levels of satisfaction may have driven them to make such demands in the first place, rather than the other way around. Also, satisfaction is likely to decrease with age (deteriorating quality of services?) but to increase among those who trust the municipal government and attend its meetings. As argued in the report of 2008, those who attend municipal meeting are more likely to trust the local government and to be more satisfied with the services provided, perhaps in consideration to the limitation of resources available to most municipal governments. Satisfaction with local government services, however, is most likely to be the cause of a higher level of trust in the local government, instead of the other way around.



Figure VII.13. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Age and Other Variables

Considering the varying levels of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government, it is reasonable to expect varying levels of support for giving the local government (or the central government), more responsibility in providing local level services. The next figure shows that, while a plurality seems to be indifferent, a greater number of Hondurans preferred to give more responsibilities to the central government rather than the Municipality.



Figure VII.14. Who should have more responsibility for services?

The same pattern emerges when Hondurans were asked to whom should be allocated more financial resources. Although the preference for the central government persists, more than 40% of the respondents reported to be indifferent to which level of government should have more resources.



Figure VII.15. Who should be given more resources?

The reason for such preference for the central government, over the Municipality, might be the tendency of Hondurans to distrust the Municipality in the handling of funds, more than they trust it. However, when the support for assigning more responsibilities or financial resources to the Municipality is examined vis-à-vis the respondents' trust in the handling of the finances by the Municipality, no significant association emerges whatsoever (analysis not shown).



Figure VII.16. Trust in the handling of financial resources by the Municipality

Yet, a significant association does emerge when the support for more responsibility or funds for the Municipality is examined considering the level of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government. As shown below, the higher the level of satisfaction with the services, the higher the support for the Municipality to have more responsibilities or financial resources.



Figure VII.17. More financial resources for municipality



Figure VII.18. More responsibility to Municipality

D. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services on Political Attitudes

Figure VII.19 shows that satisfaction with local services may also be linked to higher levels of satisfaction with the performance of the government as well as higher levels of system support and preference for democracy, despite its limitations.



Figure VII.19. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Conclusion

In summary, Hondurans report low and decreasing levels of participation in the local government, either by attending municipal meetings or by making demands to government officials. One likely explanation is the failure of the program of meetings of the *Poder Ciudadano*, which may have discouraged participation in the long run, despite its short term boost. Yet, participation continues to be significantly higher among business owners and political activists who have historically lobbied government for benefits, in a rather *clientelistic* approach. Consequentially, participation is the highest in the Francisco Morazán region, where the capital city is located, although rural areas and small towns also reported high levels of participation.

As argued in the report of 2008, those who participate more in local governance are more likely to trust the local government and to be more satisfied with the services provided. Moreover, those who are more satisfied with the local services reported to have higher levels of preference for democracy and other political attitudes akin to system support.

Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis

Chapter VIII. The Political Crisis of 2009

Honduras' political system experienced a severe political crisis that began as a showdown between the elected president, Manuel Zelaya, and the Honduran Army, courts, and Congress. On June 28, 2009 the military removed Zelaya from office and forcibly exiled him to Costa Rica. The crisis stemmed from a political clash over Zelaya's attempt to survey Hondurans on support for a referendum on convening a constituent assembly to reform the national constitution. Defying a court order, Congress, the business community and elements in his own party in pursuit of his objectives, Zelaya tried to conduct the referendum. Allegedly acting under orders from the Supreme Court, the Army entered the president's private residence on the morning of June 28 and detained him. Rather than bringing President Zelaya to court to stand charges, however, the Army instead acted in violation of the Honduran Constitution, which explicitly prohibits expatriation, by exiling him to Costa Rica.[83] The National Congress then ratified Zelaya's removal and installed Roberto Micheletti as interim President.

The events leading up to President Zelaya's ouster, and those of June 28, 2009 have divided Honduran society and generated intense debate about the constitutionality of Zelaya's policies and the actions taken by the military, Congress, and the courts. In this chapter we look at the Honduran public's reaction to the June 28, 2009 events and their aftermath.

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey in Honduras asked a series of questions related to the political crisis. First, we explore responses to a series of questions that measure attitudes directly related to the political crisis: Did Hondurans in our survey conducted in early 2010 support the ouster of President Zelaya? Did they express support for the policies Zelaya wanted to implement? Did they believe that either president or the Army behaved unconstitutionally?

[83] President Zelaya returned to Honduras clandestinely on September 21, 2009 and stayed at the Brazilian embassy until an agreement and a general amnesty were brokered that led to Zelaya's departure to the Dominican Republic in January 2010.



¿Did you favor the removal from office of President Zelaya?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



¿Did you favor sending President Zelaya into exile in Costa Rica?

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Figure VIII.1 Support for Removal and Exile of President Zelaya

In response to our first question, we find that 58% of voting age Hondurans *opposed* the removal from office of President Zelaya.[84] We also wanted to know how Hondurans reacted to the Zelaya's exile, an action that is explicitly prohibited by the constitution.[85] Probing more deeply, we found that opposition to the exile was even greater, with 72% of voting aged respondents in the AmericasBarometer 2010 survey expressing *opposition.*

Opponents of President Zelaya and some constitutional scholars have argued that the actions of the military did not in fact constitute a *coup d'état.* President Zelaya's supporters and others say that this was a clear case of an unconstitutional and unjustifiable coup. How did the average Honduran weigh these two positions? The results of the AmericasBarometer survey for 2010 reveal that a majority of Hondurans believe that Zelaya's removal was indeed a coup. Over 61% said the actions taken by the military on June 28 constituted a *coup d'état*.[86] They held to this position even though large majorities also expressed opposition to Zelaya's intended reforms.

[84] Respondents were asked: Did you agreed with the destitution of President Zelaya?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) NR
[85] Respondents were asked: "Were you in agreement with the sending into exile of President Zelaya?"
[86] The question asked was: "Do you think that the removal from office of President Zelaya, in June, 2009, was a coup d'etat?"



Figure VIII.2. Removal of President Zelaya a Coup d'état?

Indeed, as seen in Figure VIII.3, more than 70% of Hondurans were opposed to his proposed constituent assembly (at least in early 2010) and over 75% were against the "*consulta*" that Zelaya had wished to carry out. President Zelaya repeatedly and forcefully denied that his reforms would have included presidential reelection.[87]

[87] Note that the constitution itself absolutely prohibits changing the no-reelection provision, one of the "inviolable" clauses (*artículos pétreos*).



Figure VIII.3. Support for June 28, 2009 survey and formation of a Constituent Assembly

However, the opposition claimed that reelection was the key constitutional change sought by Zelaya and his supporters. This debate between Zelaya and those who supported his ouster notwithstanding, the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey reveals, however, that almost three quarters of Hondurans *opposed* changing the Honduran constitution to allow for presidential re-election.[88]

Who Favored Zelaya's Removal?

We use logistic regression to examine the determinants of support for the removal of Zelaya s president. Figure VIII.4 presents the result of the regression analysis.

[88] The question read: ¿Está usted de acuerdo con reformar la Constitución para permitir la re-elección presidencial? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR, which in English means: "Are you in agreement to amend the constitution to permit presidential re-elections?"



Figure VIII.4. Determinants of Support for the Removal of Zelaya from Office

The regression analysis indicates that ideology is the strongest predictor of support for the removal of Zelaya. Support for removing Zelaya from office increases as ideological self-identification moves to the right. Additionally, respondents living in the Norte A (Cortez) and Occidental region are less likely to support the removal of Zelaya.



Figure VIII.5. Support for Removal of Zelaya and Ideology

The differences between respondents who identify themselves on the left, center-left, center and center-right, do not seem to be statistically significant. However, support for the removal of Zelaya increases dramatically for those identified with the right.

Who Believed Zelaya's Removal was a Coup D'état?

Again, logistic regression is used to analyze the determinants of belief that the removal of Zelaya was a coup. The results indicate that ideology again is a significant factor, but in this case those on the right are less supportive of the idea that Zelaya's removal was a coup. Respondents living in the Occidental and Norte B regions are less likely to believe that Zelaya's removal was a coup d'état. Additionally, wealth is a significant factor. Wealthier Hondurans are less supportive of the idea that Zelaya's removal was a coup.



Figure VIII.6. Determinants of Perception that Removal of Zelaya was a Coup



Figure VIII.7. Removal of Zelaya a Coup by Ideology

Respondents who identify with the right are significantly less likely to believe that Zelaya's removal was a coup than Hondurans who are ideological to the left of the spectrum. This finding, along with the earlier one for supporting the removal of President Zelaya, confirms the ideological polarization among Hondurans regarding the political crisis of 2009.

Support for Constituent Assembly

Figure VIII.8 demonstrates that ideology, education, and gender are significant factors in determining support for a Constituent Assembly.



Figure VIII.8. Determinants of Support for Constituent Assembly



Figure VIII.9. Support for Constituent Assembly by Age, Sex, Education and Ideology

Left-oriented, males with higher educational achievement are more supportive of the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to reform the Constitution.

How do Hondurans Evaluate the Solution to the Crisis?

Ultimately, the crisis was settled with the holding of national elections on November 29, 2009, an agreement for the departure of President Zelaya form the country, a general amnesty and the establishment of a truth commission to investigate the actions leading, during, and subsequent to Zelaya's removal from office. The Americas Barometer survey asked respondents how satisfied they were with the outcome of the crisis. Figure VIII.10 shows that a majority of Hondurans, 59.6%, express some level of satisfaction with the outcome.



Figure VIII.10. Satisfaction with Outcome of Crisis



Figure VIII.11. Preferred Outcome of Crisis

The option with the most support, 31.2%, is the restoration of President Zelaya until January 2010. Next with 29.8% was the option closest to the ultimate outcome, Roberto Micheletti in power until the new president was inaugurated in January. Eleven percent of Hondurans interviewed chose to support the return of Zelaya for one additional term of office, and 1% chose a military government as the best solution.



Figure VIII.12. Determinants of Satisfaction with Outcome of the Crisis

Ideology, perception of family economic situation and residents of the Oriental B and Norte C regions are the significant factors determining satisfaction with the outcome of the political crisis. Respondents who are ideologically to the right, whose family income is sufficient for them to b able to save, and who live in the Oriental B and Norte C regions exhibit greater satisfaction with the results of the crisis.



Figure VIII.13. Satisfaction with Outcome of Political Crisis by Ideology and Perception of Family Income

Conclusion

This chapter has examined attitudes related to the political crisis that engulfed Honduras in 2009. We find that a large majority of Hondurans do not support the political plans of former President Zelaya, but also do not support the manner in which he was removed from office. Most Hondurans are satisfied with the outcome of the crisis. Ideology is the most significant factor in determining attitudes toward the crisis. Hondurans who classify themselves as on the "right" in the ideological spectrum are more supportive of the removal of Zelaya, and less supportive of the political plans the former president was pursuing.

Chapter IX. Partisanship and Electoral Behavior

On November 29 of 2009, Honduras held national elections to elect a new president of the country and three *Designados Presidenciales* (vice-presidents), 128 members of the National Congress, and hundreds of mayors. The AmericasBarometer survey included several items to explore the political attitudes and electoral behavior of Hondurans in regard to these elections. This section examines such items, just as in prior reports, in an attempt to learn more about the participation of Hondurans in the electoral process.

Turnout and Partisanship in the 2009 Elections

Perhaps the most basic question asked in our survey was whether the interviewed voted or not in the elections of 2009. Yet, another question was made to ensure that those who had no *Tarjeta de Identidad* (a national ID required to register to vote) were counted out of the total eligible for voting. The questions were the following:

VB1. . Are you registered to vote?
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2009?
(1) Voted (2) Did not vote (88) DK (98) DA

Table IX.1 below shows that only 59.6% (cell) of all persons interviewed reported voting in the general elections of 2009. However, when considering only individuals who did have ID (1,441 in total), required to vote, the percent jumps to 65.7% (row), with a corresponding rate of abstention of 34.3%.

Table IX.1. Percentage That Voted in 2009

Have ID?	Voted in 2009?		
	Yes	No	Total
Yes	947	494	1441
% cell	59.6	31.1	90.7
% row	65.7	34.3	100.0
No	14	92	106
% cell	0.9	5.8	6.7
% row	13.2	86.8	100.0
In process	7	35	42
% cell	0.4	2.2	2.6
% row	16.7	83.3	100.0
Total	**968**	**621**	**1589**
% cell	**60.9**	**39.1**	**100.0**

In fact, turnout in Honduras was the second lowest in the Latin American region, surpassing only Costa Rica. Nonetheless, turnout in Honduras cannot be considered low, in absolute terms, since almost two-thirds of those eligible to vote did so.



Figure IX.1. Turnout in Comparative Perspective

As shown in Figure IX.2 below, the rate of abstention during the 2009 elections (34.3%) was higher than that in the 2005 elections (28%).[89] This result may not be surprising since the elections occurred in the midst of serious political crisis in which supporters of ousted president Zelaya vowed not to participate in the elections of 2009.

[89] Coleman, K. and R. Argueta. Political Culture, Governance and Democracy in Honduras, 2008; p.174



Figure IX.2. Voter Turnout, 2005 and 2009

Item HONVB4 in our survey asked those who reported no voting in 2009, why they did not vote?[90] Figure IX.3 below shows the frequency of responses. Surprisingly, *protesting the ouster of Zelaya* was not a major reason (only 6.2% of those who did not vote). In fact, more than 50% of those who did not vote reported non-political reasons for doing so, such as lack of national ID or having to work. Thus, the rate of abstention could have been reduced drastically with better planning and logistics of the elections. If considering only political reasons (i.e. "don't care" and "protest ouster of Zelaya"), the *true* rate of abstention would have been as low as 15%.



Figure IX.3. Reasons for not Voting

[90] **HONVB4.** ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales del 2009?

The finding above is certainly surprising. It is widely believed that the overwhelming victory of the opposition party -the PN- in the past elections, was the result of the abstention from voting by those who disagreed with the ouster of Zelaya, mostly sympathizers of the PL. Yet, that seems to be the picture that emerges when examining item VB3 that asked which party candidate did the individual being interviewed voted for in the past election.[91]

As Figure IX.4 shows below, the 2009 elections did experience a dramatic shift in the electoral preferences of Hondurans, as compared to the prior elections in 2005 or any other election year before. In 2009, the percent of those who reported voting for the PL (*Partido Liberal*) decreased by almost 12 percent points with respect to that in 2005, while the percent of those who reported voting for the PN (*Partido Nacional*) increased by more than 10 percent points. The percent of those who did not vote increased by 7 percent points. The small parties, combined, received more votes than ever before, surpassing the 5% threshold for the first time. Nevertheless, they continued to receive only a very small portion of the total valid votes: 5.4%.[92]



	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009
PL	53.9%	50.9%	44.3%	53.0%	52.7%	44.3%	49.9%	38.1%
PN	41.6%	45.4%	52.3%	43.0%	42.8%	52.2%	46.2%	56.6%
PINU-PDCH-UD	4.5%	3.7%	3.4%	4.0%	4.6%	3.5%	3.9%	5.4%

Figure IX.4. Participation in Honduran elections (1981 - 2009
Source of Data: Tribunal Supremo Electoral de Honduras[93]

Table IX.2 below compares the electoral behavior of our interviewees, both in 2005 and 2009, to help explain how such shift occurred between these two past elections (items VB3 and HONVB5).[94] Among those who voted for the PL in 2005, only 41% voted for the PL in 2009; a considerable number voted blank or did not vote at all (39.7%), and even some voted for the PN (14.7%). However, among those who voted for the PN in 2005, most continued to vote for the PN (83.1%) and only few voted blank or did not vote (14.3%). These results do show a high rate of abstention among former voters for the PL, but also suggest a somewhat generalized preference for the candidate of the PN (Porfirio Lobo) over that

[91] **VB3.** ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2009?)
[92] The small parties are the Partido Innovación y Unidad – Social Demócrata (PINU-SD), Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDCH), and the Unificación Democrática (UD).
[93] http://www.tse.hn/web/documentos/DECLARATORIA%20FINAL%202009.pdf
[94] **VB3.** ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2009?).
HONVB5. ¿Y ahora pensando en las anteriores elecciones presidenciales del 2005 por cuál partido votó para Presidente? (Now, thinking of the prior presidential elections in 2005, which party did you vote for president?)

of the PL (Elvin Santos). In fact, among those who voted for "none" in 2005, almost a fifth (19%) voted for the PN in 2009. A similar pattern is also shown among those who were too young (<18) to vote in 2005; a fifth (20.8%) voted for the PN in 2009 while most (67.2%) voted blank or did not vote.

Thus, the victory of the PN during the 2009 elections was the result of a considerable level of abstention among former (2005) PL voters and the across-the-board appeal of the PN candidate, who attracted more new voters than any other candidate. New voters, however, turn out to be less engaged in party politics since they also reported a very high level of electoral abstention.

Table IX.2. Choice of Vote, 2005 and 2009

Who did you vote for in 2009?	Which party did you vote for in 2005?							Total
	PL	PN	PINU	PDCH	UD	None	Too Young	
Elvin Santos (PL)	174	6	0	0	0	**22**	**30**	**232**
%	41.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	**7.1**	**9.5**	**15.2**
Porfirio Lobo (PN)	**62**	373	5	1	0	59	66	**566**
%	**14.7**	83.1	35.7	12.5	0.0	19.0	20.8	**37.1**
Bernard Martinez (PIN	2	2	7	0	0	1	4	16
%	0.5	0.5	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.3	1.1
Felicito Avila (PDCH)	7	3	2	5	1	0	3	21
%	1.7	0.7	14.3	62.5	16.7	0.0	1.0	1.4
Cesar Ham (UD)	7	1	0	0	3	2	0	13
%	1.7	0.2	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.7	0.0	0.9
Carlos Resyes (Ind.)	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	5
%	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
None	168	64	0	2	2	225	213	**674**
%	39.7	14.3	0.0	25.0	33.3	72.6	67.2	**44.1**
Total	423	449	14	8	6	310	317	1,527
%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The shift in party preferences for vote is also reflected in the responses for question VB11 of our survey, which asked "Which party do you sympathize with?"[95] Figure IX.5 below shows that the percent of those who said to sympathize with the PL have significantly decreased over time, with a corresponding increase for the PN and those who identify with no party at all.

[95] **VB11.** ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? (Which party do you sympathize more with?)



Figure IX.5. Party Identification, 2006-2010

The Political Crisis and the Elections of 2009

Yet, the PL and PN have been such resilient political parties in the Honduran political system, with arguably firm loyalties, that such a sudden shift in preference seems unlikely to occur without a powerful cause. And the best hypothesis for such cause that one can think of is certainly the political crisis that occurred during the second semester of 2009, generated by the ouster of then President Zelaya on June 28. Therefore, other variables (questions), particularly those that ask about opinions regarding the crisis, need to be examined vis-à-vis electoral behavior. The first group of "crisis" questions to be examined asked:

HONCRSPOL1. ¿Considera usted que la destitución del Presidente Zelaya, en Junio del 2009, fue un golpe de estado? (Do you consider the ouster of President Zelaya, on June of 2009, as a coup d'état?) (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR
HONCRSPOL2. ¿Estuvo usted de acuerdo con el envío al exilio del Presidente Zelaya? {Did you agree with sending President Zelaya into exile?) (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR
HONCRSPOL3. ¿Estuvo usted de acuerdo con la destitución del Presidente Zelaya? (Did you agree with the removal of President Zelaya?) (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR
HONCRSPOL4. ¿Estuvo usted de acuerdo con que se llevara a cabo la consulta popular que el Presidente Zelaya quería realizar el 28 de Junio de 2009, sobre la cuarta urna? (Did you agree with the national survey, about a fourth ballot box, that President Zelaya wanted to conduct on June 28, 2009?) (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR
HONCRSPOL5. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la formación de una Asamblea Constituyente? (Do you agree with the installation of a Constituent Assembly?) (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR
HONCRSPOL6. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con reformar la Constitución para permitir la re-elección presidencial? (Do you agree with reforming the constitution to allow the re-election of the president?)

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Figure IX.6 depicts the differences in opinion between three groups: 2005 PL voters who voted instead for the PN in 2009, those who continued to vote for the PL, and those who voted for "None" (see Table IX.2 above).[96] Among those who did not continue to vote for the PL but rather voted blank or did not vote in 2009 ("None"), there are significantly higher percentage of people who considered the ouster of Zelaya as a Coup, or supported the plebiscite that Zelaya intended to conduct. They also reported significantly lower percentage of people who agreed with the removal of Zelaya, or his exile.

Among those who voted for the PN in 2009 -but had voted PL in 2005, the percentage that supported a Constitutive Assembly or supported re-electing the President was the lowest of the three groups; yet, it reported the highest percentage agreeing with the removal of Zelaya. Most differences, though, were not statistically significant.



Figure IX.6. Attitudes toward Crisis Issues by Vote Choice

A second group of "crisis" questions are those who asked who, among the main actors in the crisis, were considered to have violated the constitution by their actions during the crisis.

HONCRSPOL7. ¿Quién cree usted que violó la constitución durante la crisis política del 2009? **(Who do you think violated the constitution during the political crisis of 2009?)**
(1) Mel Zelaya (2) Micheletti (3) Los Militares
(4) El Congreso (5) La Corte Suprema de Justicia
(88) NS (98) NR

[96] Voters for the small parties (i.e. PINU, PDCH, UD) are not included in this analysis due to the very small numbers of supporters in the survey.

A similar picture is depicted by Figure IX.7 below. Among 2005 PL voters who did not continue to vote for the PL in 2009 but rather abstained from voting, there was a significantly lower percentage who believed that Zelaya had violated the constitution, as compared to those who did vote PL in 2009. Conversely, "None" voters reported significantly higher percentages of people who believed that Micheletti, the Military, Congress, or the Supreme Court had violated the constitution, as compared to those who did vote PL in 2009. Also, 2005 PL voters who voted for the PN in 2009 continued to report perceptions more dramatically aligned with the side that opposed Zelaya during the crisis.



Figure IX.7. Who Violated the Constitution by Vote Choice

Determinants of Voting Abstention in 2009

The associations shown above, however, need to be examined in the context of other factors that could have also affected the electoral behavior of Hondurans. Figure IX.8 Below shows the results of a logistic regression where the (dichotomous) dependent variable is whether former PL voters (as of 2005) abstained from voting in 2009 (value = 1) or voted for any of the contending political parties in 2009 (value = 0). Several (independent) variables related to the political crisis turned out to have statistically significant associations ($p<.05$), which seem to confirm the hypothesis that the PL lost the elections to the PN because a considerable number of former supporters of the PL (as in 2005) did abstain from continuing to vote for the PL in 2009 as a consequence of their pro-Zelaya views during the political crisis.

It is widely believed that the supporters of former President Zelaya (PL) abstained from voting for the PL again in 2009 in retaliation for the active participation of the PL establishment in the ouster of then President Zelaya. In fact, the PL itself was considered to be the main political force behind Zelaya's

removal since they controlled Congress and had appointed 8 of the 15 judges of the Supreme Court, including its President, which ordered Zelaya's ouster. In addition, it was the PL leader in Congress, Roberto Micheletti, who succeeded Zelaya as President, becoming his nemesis. Furthermore, the PL candidate for 2009, Elvin Santos, had, long before the crisis, become a prominent political opponent of Zelaya, renouncing as his Vice-President, denouncing his administration, and supporting his removal from office. For all of these, Zelaya's supporters seem to have perceived the PL as the party to punish (in the 2009 elections) for the ouster of their leader. As a consequence, those who had pro-Zelaya views were more likely to abstain from voting in 2009, since all other political parties, except UD, had also opposed Zelaya.



Figure IX.8. Determinants of Voting Abstention in 2009

Figure IX.9 below shows how abstention relates to each of the variables that resulted to have a significant association with it. First, abstention among 2005 PL voters resulted to be higher among residents of more urbanized centers. In other words, there were higher levels of abstention in the larger cities than in small cities and the rural areas. Also, those who abstained from voting were significantly less likely to agree with the removal of President Zelaya in June of 2009, than those who did vote. The percent of people who agreed with the removal of Zelaya was, among those who voted PL again in 2009, more than double than that among those who abstained. Nonetheless, the level of support for Zelaya's removal was low, in general terms, since it involved his exile, which constituted a violation of the constitution.



Figure IX.9. Abstention in 2009 by Degree of Urbanization and Crisis Related Issues

In addition, those who abstained from voting were significantly less likely to be satisfied with the solution to the political crisis than the ones that did vote. This is to be expected since the "solution" to the crisis did not involve reinstating Zelaya as president, as his supporters demanded. Another determinant of abstention among 2005 PL voters was the belief that the President (Executive Branch) should have more power than Congress (Legislative Branch) and the Courts (Judicial Branch), instead of sharing power as equals and independent branches of government.[97] A higher percentage held this belief among those who abstained than among those who voted in 2009. This is also an expected result since Zelaya advocated political changes that were mostly opposed by Congress and the Courts, which eventually led to his demise.

Among PL ex-voters, perhaps the main determinant for abstention in 2009 was having a "leftist" ideology.[98] Those with a self-proclaimed "leftist" ideology were more likely to abstain from voting in 2009. Figure IX.10 below shows that those who abstained from voting in 2009, but had voted PL in 2005, reported a significantly higher percent of left-wingers than those who did vote. This is also an expected result since Zelaya wanted to promote the so called "Socialism of the 21st Century" that was also being promoted by other leftist leaders in the region.

[97] **HONDEM12.** Which branch of government should have more power, the executive, legislature, or judiciary; or should they have equal power? (1) President (2) Congress (3) Judiciary (4) All equal power (88) DK (98) DA

[98] The "Left" variable was recoded from the 10-points ideology variable (l1). Values on the left (1 to 4) were recoded as having a "left" ideology (value = 1), while the remaining values (5 to 10) were recoded as "otherwise" (value=0).



Figure IX.10. Abstention in 2009 and Leftist Ideology

Hence, the results of the logistic regression lead us to conclude that the PL lost the 2009 elections because of the pro-Zelaya views of a considerable portion of Hondurans who had voted for the PL in 2005 but abstained from voting for the PL again in 2009. Almost half of 2005 PL voters abstained from voting in 2009, thus allowing the main opposition party, the PN, to seize power.

Who Voted for the *Partido Nacional*?

Notwithstanding pro-Zelaya views help explain the high level of abstention among former PL voters, the reasons why a larger number of Hondurans voted for the PN have not yet been explored. Therefore, this section examines mostly the same variables used for PL abstention, in an attempt to test whether PN voters were those who had opposite views regarding the political crisis of 2009.

When considering all 2009 voters, regardless of which party they voted for in 2005, the "anti-Zelaya" attitudes of PN voters become evident. For instance, in Figure IX.11, PN voters were significantly more inclined to believe that Zelaya had violated the constitution than both PL voters and "None" voters. The opposite is true for their views about Zelaya's political enemies (e.g. Micheletti). Yet, equally striking is the similarity in the views reported by PL voters and "None" voters.[99] What this pattern seems to reveal is that, nonetheless the fractioning of former (2005) PL voters, some 2009 PL voters may have had pro-Zelaya views but voted PL anyway. On the other hand, some 2009 "None" voters may have had anti-Zelaya views but did not vote because of other reasons.

[99] The reader should note that the group of PL voters in this new analysis is different from that of former (2005) PL voters. Some PL voters in 2009 did not vote PL in 2005 but PN or "None".



Figure IX.11. Who Violated the Constitution by Choice of Vote in 2009

The figure below shows the results of a logistic regression where the (dichotomous) dependent variable is whether a person voted PN (value = 1) or either abstained or voted PL in 2009 (value = 0).[100] Several (independent) variables related to the political crisis also turned out to have statistically significant associations ($p<.05$), which seem to support the belief that the PN benefited from the "anti-Zelaya" views of a considerable portion of Hondurans.

[100] Voters for the PL and those who abstained from voting in 2009 were grouped together since they seem to share, in average, some similar views regarding the crisis. Another reason for this coding is that the purpose of this analysis is to uncover the variables associated with voting for the PN in 2009, rather than voting for any other party or abstaining from voting altogether.



Figure IX.12. Determinants of Voting for the PN in 2009

There were, however, some non-political variables also associated with voting for the PN in 2009 (see Figure IX.13). The first variable is gender. Voters for the PN were less likely to be females (46.1%) than those who did not vote (54.9%). Yet, rather than being the result of cross-gender political views, this difference in participation could also be the result of some form of gender-related difficulties for political participation in the context of the Honduran society (e.g. females staying home to take care of children, or being afraid of criminal or political violence).

Age is the other demographic variable influencing the choice of vote in 2009. PN voters reported a higher average age than those who abstained or voted PL. The differences, although statistically significant, are not great. Yet, it may be seen as underscoring the trend exposed above that new voters are becoming less engaged with the Honduran party system, in particular, and with elections in general.

There was only one economic variable that reported a significant, albeit small, association with the choice of vote in 2009: change in household income.[101] Even though household incomes reported an average between staying the same (value = 2) and diminishing (value = 1), those who voted for the PN reported a little more negative change in their income than those who voted PL or abstained. This result makes sense since Honduras has been affected not only by the international economic environment but also by the economic sanctions imposed by international lenders and donors as a consequence of what was perceived as a military coup and a breach of the democratic regime.

[101] **Q10E.** During the last two years, your household income: (3) Increased (2) Remained the same (1) Decreased (88) DK (98) DA



Figure IX.13. Vote for the PN in 2009 by Demographics

More important than demographic variables, are the variables pertaining the political crisis. Figure IX.14 shows that the percent of those who supported the establishment of a Constitutive Assembly, as Zelaya had pretended, was significantly lower among PN voters than among others. Yet, the percentage of those who supported such initiative turned out to be low even among those who voted PL or abstained from voting (less than a third). Conversely, people who voted PN in 2009 were more likely to support the removal of Zelaya than those who voted PL or did not vote. This graph shows additionally that supporting Zelaya was not the only reason to abstain from voting, or voting PL. Among this group, almost a third (32.1%) supported the removal of Zelaya.



Figure IX.14. Vote for the PN in 2009 and Crisis-Related Issues

Similarly, PN voters were more likely to be satisfied with the solution to the crisis (whatever it was) than the other group. Yet, it is surprising to see that the level of satisfaction with the solution was not low, even among those who abstained or voted PL (49.4%). It seems that, in total, more than half of Hondurans were satisfied with the solution to (or the end of) the crisis. Finally, those who voted for the PN in 2009 reported to be more inclined to prefer Democracy over any other political system. Notwithstanding the levels of preference are not as high as one might prefer, they are not too low either. Even among those who abstained from voting, the percent of those who prefer Democracy was higher than 50%.

In summary, the political crisis generated by the ouster of President Zelaya had a very considerable effect in the outcome of the past elections and in the Honduran party system. The ouster of Zelaya divided, almost by half, the supporters of the *Partido Liberal* (PL) and thus caused its dramatic defeat in 2009, mostly due to the electoral abstention of many of Zelaya's supporters. It is not clear yet if Zelaya supporters will return to the PL, create a new political party, or join a more leftist party, such as the UD. Perhaps, the most likely scenario will be a combination of all. What is clear is that, at least during the current period, Honduras is no longer a two-party system but one dominated by a single party –the PN.

Chapter X. Ideology and Political Attitudes

Introduction

It has been argued that the political crisis of 2009, and in particular the ouster of former president Zelaya, was in response to Zelaya's intention of installing a socialist regime in Honduras, with the support of Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez and other leftist leaders in the region. It has also been argued that the reason for their failure was the conservative political ideology of Hondurans. Therefore, this last chapter examines the issue of ideology in Honduras in order to provide a clearer picture of its distribution among Honduras political parties and people, as well as the social, economic, and demographic factors associated with it.

Theoretical Background

During the past decade, several countries in Latin America have elected leftist populist presidents, some of whom have tried to extend their tenures through Constitutional and other changes. These leaders have not only managed to prolong their stay in power but also to promote the spreading of the so called "Socialism of the XXI Century" in the region. According to some analysts, the proliferation of left-wing populist regimes in the region seems to be mostly the result of two factors. The first factor is the exacerbation of income inequalities that resulted from the process of globalization and neo-liberal policies promoted by the so called "Washington Consensus" (Cardoso 2006, Wiard, 2005). The second main factor may have been the failure of democratic institutions to provide good governance, particularly curbing rampant corruption and crime in the region (Hawkins 2010, Sabatini 2002). Lupu (2009) has listed other argued reasons such as the electoral awakening of poor majorities, including indigenous populations, or simply an ideological shift to the left resulting from voter disenchantment with years of centrist and rightist governments.

Whatever the explanation, the reality is that ideology seems to have become an important factor in elections in several Latin American countries, including in neighboring Nicaragua and El Salvador (Seligson 2007, Azpuru 2010). In the case of Honduras, the past elections of November 2009 also witnessed ideology play a role in the support for former President Zelaya and in voting abstention, which could be considered as the main reason for the victory of the *Partido Nacional*.

In fact, ideology (left-right) is perhaps the "cleavage" that has been most commonly associated to partisanship (Kim and Fording 2003). In the United States, as well as in most democracies in the world, parties are primarily categorized as parties of the *left* or the *right*, or variations resulting from their positioning along that continuum. Tocqueville first classified American parties by their emphasis on either ideology or interests (Lipset 2000). Other authors have lately claimed that ideology reinforces partisanship (e.g. Wayne 2003) or that it is ideology that causes partisanship (e.g. Smith 1997).

This has also been argued to be the case in Latin America where party competition is considered to be commonly structured around the left-right ideological dimension (Coppedge 1998). In the case of Honduras, the two major political parties have also been thought of as *liberals* and *conservative* (e.g. Ropp and Morris 1984; Payne *et al*., 2002). However, while some authors have claimed a significant role

of the left-right ideology in differentiating political parties in Honduras (e.g. Zoco 2006), others have claimed a complete lack of ideological difference (Bendell 1995; Bowman 1999; Argueta 2008).

Ideology in Honduras

The Honduran Political Parties

The analysis in this chapter begins by defining the ideological leaning of the Honduran political parties. That can be done by asking either party leaders or regular party supporters to place themselves at a point along the left-right continuum. The self-placement of a number of political leaders (i.e. legislators) is provided in Table X.1, which shows how Honduran legislators place themselves, their own party, and the other parties along the 10-points ideology scale.[102] The PDCH has been placed at the center-left of the ideological spectrum (mean=4.2) by other parties' legislators, the PINU-SD have been placed in the center (mean=5.2), *Partido Liberal* (PL) at the center-right (mean=5.7), and the *Partido Nacional* (PN) farther to the right (mean=8.3).[103] Yet, these mean values are not statistically different.

Table X.1. Party Ideology as Determined by Legislators

Party	Self-placement			Party placement (by party's own legislators)			Party placement (by other party's legislators)		
	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.
PDCH	2	4.5	3.958	2	5	3.167	69	4.201	1.74
PINU-SD	2	4.5	0.792	2	5	1.583	69	5.172	1.78
PL	37	5.649	1.653	37	5.73	1.427	34	5.705	2.11
PN	31	7.033	1.938	31	7.867	1.479	40	8.347	1.48

Source: Zoco (2006,265)

Another way of measuring the ideology of political parties is by the average self-determined ideology of those citizens that voted for them during the election prior to the survey. The LAPOP surveys have normally included the item "L1" in an attempt to assess the ideological leaning of the people interviewed. It asked:

L1. Changing of subject, in this card we have a scale from 1 to 10 that goes from left to right, in which number 1 means left and the 10 means right. Nowadays, when people talks of political tendencies, some talk about those who sympathize more with the left or the right. According to the sense that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, when you thinks of your political point of view, where would you be in this scale

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**(NS=88)** **(NR=98)**
Left									**Right**	

Figure X.1 below shows the average ideology self-placement of voters by party. Contrary to the traditional belief, there is no significant difference between the average ideology of voters for the PN and the PL. This lack of ideological difference between *Liberales* and *Nacionalistas,* which had been uncovered before in other prior studies (e.g. Argueta 2008), makes Honduras perhaps the least ideologically fragmented party system in the region, since both parties have historically received more

[102] From Zoco, 2006.
[103] Leaders of the UD were not included in this study.

than 95% of all valid votes.[104] Therefore, the PN and PL parties may be seen more properly as typical "Catch-All" parties, gravitating around the ideology mean.



Figure X.1. Ideology of Voters by Party, 2010

The small parties also failed to show any statistically significant difference in the average ideological self-placement of their voters, in large part because of the small number of voters for these parties that a national survey this size would be able to capture. Nonetheless, the *Partido Unificacion Democratica* (UD) and the *Partido Innovation y Unidad-Social Democrata* (PINU-SD) are considered to be "left" parties. The only significant difference in ideology is that between voters for the traditional parties (PN and PL) and non-voters ("None"), with the later having a lower ideology average (6.4) than the former (6.8, 6.9). Also important to note is that all party averages fall on the right side of the ideology continuum (5.5<), around the ideology mean of 6.7 points.

The Ideology of Voters

As depicted in Figure X.1 above, the average ideological self-placement of Hondurans is about 6.7 points, on the center-right region of the ideology spectrum. This is, obviously, because most Hondurans reported their ideological self-positioning to lay on the right side of the scale, in spite of the mode being at 5. In other words, few Hondurans (<15%) consider themselves as leftists. Figure X.2 below shows that such pattern of ideological distribution has not changed much during the past several years.

[104] See Coleman and Argueta 2008 and Argueta 2001.



Figure X.2. Distribution of Ideology among Hondurans, 2004-2010

Yet, Figure X.3 below does reveal that Hondurans may have moved their ideological views a little to the right. While ideological self-placement averaged 5.8 points in 2008, it jumped to 6.7 points in 2010, even above the averages of 2004 and 2006 (6.2 and 6.3 points, respectively). The timing of such changes may suggest that such shift in ideology self-positioning could be a result of the political crisis of 2009. As argued by Argueta (2008), and as we will see ahead, ideology is highly associated with system support in Honduras, which may have been the main political attitude defining support for Zelaya or Micheletti during the crisis. Considering Zelaya's alleged intentions of changing the constitution and, arguably, the political system, most Hondurans seem to have revised their ideological self-placement to reflect their reasserted support for the existing system, or their rejection for the kind of changes alleged to have been promoted by Zelaya.



Figure X.3. Ideology Average over Time

Table X.2 below shows how, between 2008 and 2010, Hondurans shifted their ideological self-positioning to the right. This shift occurred at every single ideological grouping, with a decline in several percent points among those on the left and center and a corresponding gain for the center-right and right groups.

Table X.2. Ideology Distribution, 2008-2010

Ideology		2008	2010	change
Left	(1-2)	5.5	3.2	-2.3
Center-Left	(3-4)	15.8	11.3	-4.5
Center	(5-6)	43.5	37.9	-5.6
center-Right	(7-8)	15.3	21.5	6.2
Right	(9-10)	20.0	26.1	6.1
Total		100.0	100.0	

Unfortunately, we do not have available any panel data that had recorded the ideological self-positioning of individuals both in 2008 and 2010. Such data could have allowed us to uncover the factors that influenced such shift in ideology, just as in the case of electoral preferences in the prior chapter. However, we can uncover the factors that are associated with ideology in 2010 and attempt to derive conclusions from such results, which will be done ahead in the chapter.

Ideology in Comparative Perspective

How do Hondurans rank, in terms of ideology, among the rest of countries in the region? Figure X.4 shows that Honduras is the most "conservative" country in the Latin America, with an average ideology score of 6.7.[105] Other right-wing countries include Suriname, Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Panama. On the other end of the ideological spectrum are Uruguay, Argentina, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

[105] The term "conservative" should be understood simply as a synonym of "rightist."



Figure X.4. Ideology in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Yet, the average ideology score may not be the best statistics to apply to countries. Perhaps, the most practical way to measure a country ideological leaning is the ratio between the percent of the population on the left (1 to 4) and those on the right (7 to 10). This may be particularly true for electoral democracies were governments are elected by majority or plurality vote. In these countries, the winners may be largely determined by which of the usually antagonistic left and right wings is larger, particularly when the differences are considerable, and the ideological center (5 to 6) is smaller. As shown in Table X.3. Left/Right Ratios by Country, 2008, the Left/Right ratio may reflect better the ideological leaning of a country's government. It may also indicate that leftist governments are a reflection of the ideological inclinations of the population that had democratically elected them.

Table X.3. Left/Right Ratios by Country, 2008

Country	Partition 4-2-4		
	%L	L/R	Rank
Uruguay	39%	1.50	1
Belice	45%	1.36	2
Bolivia	29%	1.21	3
Ecuador	31%	1.14	4
El Salvador	36%	1.13	5
Venezuela	29%	1.04	6
Haití	33%	1.02	7
Argentina	26%	0.93	8
Perú	25%	0.89	9
Chile	23%	0.88	10
Paraguay	24%	0.87	11
Nicaragua	30%	0.83	12
Guatemala	23%	0.76	14
Brasil	24%	0.70	15
Honduras	21%	0.60	16
México	24%	0.60	17
Jamaica	20%	0.53	18
Panamá	14%	0.47	19
Colombia	20%	0.46	20
Dominican Rep.	21%	0.33	21
Costa Rica	15%	0.32	22

Figure X.5 shows the 2010 ranking of the countries in the region in terms of their left/right ratios, instead of the ideology mean. Under this criterion, several countries have moved their ranking, including Honduras, which moved to the second place, after Suriname. A country's Left/Right ratio may also have very important implications for the country's political system. This seems to have been the case in Honduras, whose "conservative" (right-wing) majority (i.e. Left/Right ratio < 1) may have been an insurmountable obstacle for Zelaya, and the supportive left, to overcome. In other words, the conservative character of most Hondurans would have made Zelaya's alleged intentions of moving the country toward the ideological left, to eventually fail, if not by the coup, most likely by a subsequent unfavorable vote.



Figure X.5. Distribution Left-Center-Right in Latin America, 2010

Yet, the measure of personal ideology, which is self-determined by each individual, seems to be not very stable over time. National averages (and ratios) may change as a reflection of the apparently changing nature of a person's ideological leaning, most likely in response to national realities and/or events. In the case of Honduras, the political crisis of 2009 seems to be the main culprit for Hondurans's ideological shift further to the right. Perhaps, the shift reflects a re-affirmation of support of Hondurans to the democratic system, however flawed, and/or a rejection to a change similar to that experienced by the countries in the ALBA alliance.

However, Figure X.6 shows that not only Honduras experienced a considerable shift in ideology but several other countries in the region. Perhaps the most striking shift toward the right (positive values) is that of Venezuela, which in 2008 had a left/right ratio of 1.04 (29% left, 28% right) but in 2010 reported a ratio of only 0.623 (22% left, 36% right). Such shift may certainly be an indication of a greater possibility of setbacks for the government of Hugo Chavez in future elections.

Other countries have moved in the opposite direction, like Uruguay and Argentina, which moved considerably to the left (negative values). However, the causes for such shifts in the ideological arragement of societies, and their political consecuences, is not to be addressed in this report.



Figure X.6. Shift in Left/Right Ratios in Latin America, 2008-2010

Determinants of Ideology in Honduras

When addressing the topic of ideology, however, is very important to note that ideology positions, be it left, center, or right, may have different meaning not only for different individuals living within a particular country but also to people living in different countries (and political realities). Therefore, it is also important to find out, empirically, what ideology may mean for the citizens of a particular country.

Figure X.7 below shows the results of a regression with ideology as the dependent variable. Several demographic and political variables turned out to be significantly associated with ideology, including system support, which reported the highest level of association (even when controlling for other relevant variables). The R-squared statistics indicates that almost a 20% of the variance in ideology is explained by the regression model.



Figure X.7. Determinants of Ideology, 2010

Regarding socio-demographic variables, ideology is significantly but negatively associated with education; Hondurans with secondary education are more inclined to report a lower score in the ideology scale than their less educated co-nationals. However, the ideology score increases among those with higher levels of education but still below the levels of those with the lowest levels of education. Similarly, Hondurans with lower household incomes were also more likely to be right-wingers than those with higher levels of household income. In general, Hondurans with more humble backgrounds (the less educated and lower household incomes, or lower socio-economic status) are more likely to be on the right than their co-nationals with higher SES. Hence, SES may not be a factor for leftist ideology in Honduras.

On the other hand, Hondurans residing in more urban settings (in particular, San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa) and those who think their personal economic situation is good or very good are more likely to report higher ideology scores than those residing in less urban environments or less satisfied with their personal income. Satisfaction with one's income was the factor more strongly associated with a more right-wing ideology.

Last, Hondurans residing in the Norte C (Islas de la Bahia) region reported significantly lower ideological scores than those residing in Francisco Morazán, the reference region.



Figure X.8. Ideology by Socio-Economic Variables

In addition to the socio-demographic variables above, ideology was significantly associated to other social and political variables (see Figure X.9). Ideology scores were lower among Hondurans with a perception of greater insecurity and less trust in their neighbors. The perception of high levels of corruption in the country and the perhaps consequential lower levels of satisfaction with the performance of the Honduran democracy were also strongly associated to lower ideology scores. In other words, a greater perception of insecurity and corruption in the country may cause a person to be less supportive of the system and lean more toward the left.



Figure X.9. Ideology by Political Variables

Yet, the variable most strongly associated with ideology was system support. Figure X.10 reveals that there is a very considerable difference in ideology scores between Hondurans with high and low levels of system support. As it had been argued before by Argueta (2008), ideology in Hondurans is not defined in terms of issues (as in the US) but rather by the Cold-War related developments in the region. During that time (70s and 80s mostly) the terms *izquierdista* and *derechista* (leftist and rightist) where normally used to refer to those who were pro-revolution or pro-socialism and those who were against it, respectively. Therefore, ideology, among Hondurans, may be defined more by their support, or opposition to the political system as a whole.



Figure X.10. Ideology and System Support

Ideology and the Political Crisis of 2009

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, ideology has been playing an increasingly important role in the Latin American region, as well as in Honduras. This section shows that ideology also had an important role during the political crisis of 2009, which ended up having, in turn, an effect on the general elections of November of that year, as shown in our prior chapter on electoral behavior.

As Figure X.11 shows below, ideology was perhaps the variable that mainly defined the perceptions of, and attitudes toward the main events of the political crisis.[106] While most Hondurans considered the ouster of Zelaya a *coup d'état*, people on the far left were much more inclined to believe so than those on the far right. The same pattern is shown when people responded to whether they supported the plebiscite that Zelaya intended to conduct to gauge the level of support for a Constituent Assembly, which could have arguably eliminated the constitutional ban on re-election. As shown in the graph, those on the left had much higher levels of support for such propositions than those on the right. Conversely, those on the left agreed with Zelaya's removal and exile much less than those on the right.

[106] When the *ideology* variable was substituted by the *system support* variable, almost identical patterns emerged, reaffirming the very high correlation between these two variables (r = .2979; p<.0001).



Figure X.11. Ideology and Opinions about Zelaya Ouster

In a similar fashion, Figure X.12 below shows that ideology was also the prism through which Hondurans perceived who, among the main actors in the political crisis, were considered to have violated the constitution with their actions or decisions. When asked whether Zelaya had violated the constitution, those of the right were much more likely to answer affirmatively than those on the left. However, when asked whether those on the other side of the conflict (i.e. Micheletti, the Military, Congress and the Supreme Court) had violated the constitution, those on the left were much more likely to answer affirmatively than those on the right.



Figure X.12. Ideology and the Violation of the Constitution during the Crisis

Hondurans were also asked about which would have been their preferred solution to the crisis, and given several options, which were the most popular by the end of the crisis. Figure X.13 shows how those on the left favored much more than those on the right, the restitution of Zelaya. In turn, those on the right were more likely than those on the left to favor the continuation of Micheletti in power and/or the application of the law to all of those involved in the crisis. Last, those on the ideological center (including center-right) were more inclined that the rest to favor a third person (other than Zelaya or Micheletti) or a reconciliation cabinet (with members from both factions) to be put in power until the newly elected government could be sworn in.



Figure X.13. Ideology and the Preferred Solution to the Crisis

Yet, by the time of our survey, the crisis had been mostly overcome as a result of the election of a new government, and other measure. Yet, as Figure X.14 below shows, the "solution" to the crisis was likely to satisfy more those on the right than those on the left since Zelaya was never reinstated, Micheletti remained in power practically until the new president, Porfirio Lobo, swore in, and those responsible for sending Zelaya into exile were never punished but given amnesty.



Figure X.14. Ideology and Satisfaction with the Solution to the Crisis

Association between Ideology and Political Attitudes

As shown in the prior chapter, on partisanship and electoral behavior, ideology played an important role during the past elections of 2009. Its main effect was the abstention from voting for the PL by former PL voters with a leftist ideology, who were more likely to be supporters of Zelaya. Figure X.15**Error! Reference source not found.** shows once again the tendency of those on the left to have lower levels of turnout, as compared to those in the ideological center or the right.[107]



Figure X.15. Percentage who voted by Ideology

The prior chapter also argued that abstention among the left was mostly in retaliation for the PL support for Zelaya's destitution. Yet, Figure X.16 below shows that the left was also twice more likely to participate in protests, during the 12 months prior to this survey (i.e. March 2009-March 2010), than those on the ideological center and right. This is of course expected since it was those on the left who saw their leader ousted by what many considered a *military* coup, which they opposed overwhelmingly (see Figure X.17). Not expected, however, is to see that those on the right were almost as opposed to a military coup as those on the left, and that those on the center (and center-right) were more supportive of a military coup.

Nonetheless, as shown in Figure X.18, people in the left (and the center!) were more likely than those on the right to prefer an unelected, "strong leader" to take power in Honduras. This apparent paradox is of course a result of the left's support for Zelaya and the opposition to the coup that overthrew him. Yet, people on the left may not be very pleased with the democratic election of the country's leaders since they also report lower levels of political tolerance (Figure X.19). Therefore, their higher support for an unelected strong leader may be the result of the realization that it is very unlikely that Hondurans, most of them conservative and supportive of the system, will democratically elect and support a leftist leader

[107] This analysis has merged the "Left" (1-2) and "Center-Left" (3-4) into just "Left" (1-4) since the number of cases was very small as to produce smaller confidence intervals.

wanting to change the system. Even though Zelaya was democratically elected, few Hondurans (<30%) supported his plans for changing the constitution.



Figure X.16. Ideology and Participation in Protests



Figure X.17. Ideology and Support for Coups



Figure X.18. Ideology and Support for a Strong Leader



Figure X.19. Ideology and Political Tolerance

Clearly, as shown above, ideology is strongly correlated to system support, or lack thereof, with the left being less supportive of the system as a whole. Yet, we also need to know which particular aspects of the system are less supported by the left in order to have a more comprehensive picture of how ideology relates to institutions and attitudes important to democracy.

Figure X.20 below shows that no matter the component of system support, those on the left are consistently more critical and less supportive of it than those on the right. Hondurans on the left are less likely than those in the center and right to believe that the courts guarantee fair trials, to respect the country's political institutions, to believe that the basic rights of Hondurans are protected and, therefore, to be proud and to support the Honduran political system.



Figure X.20. Ideology and System Support

Since Hondurans on the left are less satisfied with the Honduran political system, they also report significantly lower levels of satisfaction with democracy and, therefore, preference (support) for it (see Figure X.21). The more critical political perceptions and attitudes of those on the left are also likely to play a significant role in the political future of Honduras. Hondurans on the ideological left are not only as interested in politics as anybody else but are also more likely to engage in political activism than those on the right, in an attempt to promote their more critical views.



Figure X.21. Ideology and Support for Democracy

Conclusions

The analysis in this chapter has revealed that ideology (left-right) was a central factor in the political crisis that upset Honduras during the second half of 2009. Those on the left were more supportive of ousted president Zelaya, while those on the right were more likely to oppose him and his plans of systemic change. As a matter of fact, ideology in Honduras was very highly associated with our measure of system support (discussed in Chapter 5). While those on the left are very critical of the Honduran political system and, therefore, less supportive of it, those on the right are much more supportive of it, despite its shortcomings.

The distribution of ideology, among the Honduran population, was not only instrumental in the onset of the crisis but also in its conclusion. Allegedly, Zelaya sought to move the country toward the left with the support of regional leftist leaders and the Honduran left. Only 1 in 5 Hondurans considered themselves as leftists in 2008. Most Hondurans place themselves on the ideological right. As a result, the Zelaya's political plans presumably would be rejected in future elections, due to the overwhelming right-wing majority, as happened in the last general election in November 2009. Therefore, it is unlikely that Honduras would take a turn to the left.

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Appendixes

Appendix I: Technical Description of Sample Design

HONDURAS
LAPOP 2006-2008-2010
Methodology and distribution of the sample

As part of the agreement requirements, a complex sample design was gathered (stratified and by clusters) with selection in each stage, that has the following characteristics:

- it represents 100% of the Honduras population who are 18 years old or older.
- It has a stratification that allows using strata as study domain.
- It allows analysis at urban and rural level.
- It is self-weighted in each stratum and at national level.

In order to satisfy the mentioned conditions, the following goals were considered:

- Get representative samples for the following strata, levels and study domains:
  1. Country.(as a whole)
  2. First stage strata (study domains).
     a. **North A:** formed by the municipalities of Cortés department.
     b. **North B:** formed by the Atlántida, Colón and Yoro departments.
     c. **North C:** formed by Islas de la Bahía department.
     d. **Eastern A:** formed by El Paraíso and Olancho departments.
     e. **Eastern B:** formed by Gracias a Dios department.
     f. **South:** formed by Choluteca and Valle departments.
     g. **Central A:** formed by Francisco Morazán department.
     h. **Central B:** formed by Comayagua and La Paz departments.
     i. **Western:** formed by Copán, Intibucá, Lempira, Ocotepeque and Santa Bárbara departments.

  3. Second stage strata
     a. Urban
     b. Rural

- Calculate sampling error for estimates in each level.
- Assign the interviews to get a balance between budget, sample size and error level of the results.
- Use the most updated sampling frame available for each locality.

With theses conditions and objectives, a probabilistic, multilevel, stratified and by clusters sample was selected. It was randomly selected in each stage and quotas were used just to select the adults to be interviewed in the household.

In order to get a suitable representation of each region, some additional considerations were taken into account, those considerations were related to urban and rural proportions, small areas -but often very populated and with different population characteristics-, and the requirement of self-weighted.

Given the differences between and within the country municipalities, in some cases where the division urban-rural was not clear, some physical criteria were defined, such as type of available services and the economic activities developed in each of them, with the purpose to reduce the large rural areas proportions variations. So, a previous classification of rural and urban areas was made, to get a suitable representation of the rural and urban population in the region, with no need to apply an especial weighting to the data.

Taking into account the possible combinations for the 9 study domains (strata) and 2 areas, 18 divisions would form in which the target population could be classified.

In this regard, we should keep in mind that 2 domains - North C and Eastern B-, have a small sample because of their small size, so the estimates should be analyzed cautiously because of their high measuring errors.

An adequate number of interviews was assigned in each division and then the sampling secondary units will be gathered, with probabilities proportionally from the population of each locality.

The sample design is multistage and stratified by regions. On the first stage, the municipalities are selected based on their population; on the second stage, the neighborhoods or localities are selected, then the census sectors and finally the households.

Sample Frame:

The sample frame is made up by the population registered in the Honduras National Census, carried out in 2001, for the first selection, and then the Voter Registration List that shows the quantity of registered electors for each polling station, which, at the same time, is associated with the neighborhoods and localities for which census maps exist, that are produced by the Statistics National Institute. This information shows a satisfactory updated level, which allows a confident work for the estimates of the results of interest.

Sample Distribution:

Geographic Area	
North A	18%
North B	16%
North C	1%
Eastern A	12%
Eastern B	1%
South	8%
Central A	18%
Central B	8%
Western	18%

Source: Population and Household Census 2002.

HONDURAS MASTER TABLE - LAPOP PROJECT CENSUS 2002

REGION	DEPARTAMENT	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL		% urban	% rural	Urban	Rural	URBAN SAMPLE	RURAL SAMPLE	TOTAL SAMPLE	URBAN SEGMENTS	RURAL SEGMENTS	TOTAL SEGMENTS
CENTRAL A	FRANCISCO MORAZAN	891810	288866	1180676											
	SUBTOTAL	**891810**	**288866**	**1180676**	**18%**	**30%**	**8%**	**205**	**66**	205	66	271	26	6	32
CENTRAL B	COMAYAGUA	148140	204741	352881											
CENTRAL B	LA PAZ	39241	117319	156560											
	SUBTOTAL	**187381**	**322060**	**509441**	**8%**	**6%**	**9%**	**43**	**74**	43	74	117	6	7	13
NORTH A	CORTES	793979	408531	1202510											
	SUBTOTAL	**793979**	**408531**	**1202510**	**18%**	**27%**	**11%**	**182**	**94**	182	94	276	23	8	31
NORTH B	ATLANTIDA	174013	170086	344099											
NORTE B	COLON	72033	174675	246708											
NORTH B	YORO	179469	285945	465414											
	SUBTOTAL	**425515**	**630706**	**1056221**	**16%**	**14%**	**18%**	**98**	**145**	98	145	243	13	13	26
NORTH C	ISLAS DE LA BAHIA	14390	23683	38073											
	SUBTOTAL	**14390**	**23683**	**38073**	**1%**	**0%**	**1%**	**3**	**5**	3	5	8	1	1	2
WESTERN	COPAN	93020	195746	288766											
WESTERN	INTIBUCA	34554	145308	179862											
WESTERN	LEMPIRA	30049	220018	250067											
WESTERN	OCOTEPEQUE	32288	75741	108029											
WESTERN	STA BARBARA	87752	254302	342054											
	SUBTOTAL	**277663**	**891115**	**1168778**	**18%**	**9%**	**25%**	**64**	**204**	64	205	269	8	18	26
EASTERN A	EL PARAISO	96322	253732	350054											
EASTERN A	OLANCHO	118419	301142	419561											
	SUBTOTAL	**214741**	**554874**	**769615**	**12%**	**7%**	**16%**	**49**	**127**	49	127	176	7	11	18
EASTERN B	GRACIAS A DIOS	13418	53966	67384											
	SUBTOTAL	**13418**	**53966**	**67384**	**1%**	**0%**	**2%**	**3**	**12**	3	12	15	1	1	2
SOUTH	CHOLUTECA	109960	280845	390805											
SOUTH	VALLE	49849	101992	151841											
	SUBTOTAL	**159809**	**382837**	**542646**	**8%**	**5%**	**11%**	**37**	**88**	37	88	125	5	8	13
TOTAL		**2978706**	**3556638**	**6535344**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**684**	**816**	**684**	**816**	**1500**	**90**	**73**	**163**
%		**45,6%**	**54,4%**	**100,0%**											
TOTAL		**684**	**816**	**1500**									**720**	**876**	**1596**

Appendix II: The IRB "informed consent" document

March 2010.

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been randomly selected to participate in a study of public opinion, which is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. I come on behalf of Vanderbilt University to request an interview lasting 30 to 45 minutes.

The main objective of this study is to find out people's opinions about various aspects of Honduras current situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You can leave questions unanswered or end the interview at any time. The answers you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous. You will not be paid for your participation, but your participation will not cause you to incur any expenses

If you have questions about the study, you may contact Borge y Asociados at phone number 9463-3832 and ask for Norwin Zepeda or Feodor Orellana.

Would you like to participate?

Appendix III: The Questionnaire

Honduras, Versión # .10.1c ***IRB Approval***: **#090103**

El Barómetro de las Américas: Honduras, 2010

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PAIS.

01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	**04. Honduras**	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica
24.Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá
27. Surinam				

4

IDNUM. Número de cuestionario **[asignado en la oficina]**_____ ☐☐☐☐

ESTRATOPRI: (401) Central A (Francisco Morazán)
(402) Central B (Comayagua /La Paz) (403) Norte A (Cortés)
(404) Norte B (Yoro/Atlántida/Colón) (405) Norte C (Islas de la Bahía)
(406) Occidental (Ocotepeque/Copán/Santa Bárbara/ Lempira/ Intibucá)
(407) Oriental A (Olancho y El Paraíso) (408) Oriental B (Gracias a Dios)
(409) Sur (Choluteca y Valle)
4☐☐

UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____ ☐☐☐

PROV. Departamento:_____ **4** ☐☐

MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____ **4**☐☐

HONDISTRITO. DISTRITO: _____ ☐☐

HONSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL_____ ☐☐☐

HONSEC. Sector_____ ☐☐☐

CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral)
[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales] ☐☐

UR (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] ☐☐

TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:
(1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande
(3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural
☐

IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español ☐

Hora de inicio: _____:_____ ☐☐☐☐

FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ **mes:**_____ año: 2010 ☐☐☐☐

ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA

Q1. **[Anotar, no preguntar]** Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo **in**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**			☐☐
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98
Estado de derecho/imperio de la ley, falta de	701	Violaciones a las leyes, constitución	702
Constitución/leyes, inadecuadas	703	Divisiones políticas/ideológicas	704

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía… ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica **del país** será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
HONSOCT3. ¿Considera usted que la crisis política del 2009 afectó la situación económica **del país**? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría **en general su** situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses **su** situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
HONIDIO4. Cree usted que la crisis política del 2009 afectó **su** situación económica? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora, ¿me puede decir hasta qué punto usted fue afectado(a) por la crisis política del 2009 en las siguientes circunstancias?	
HONIDIO5. ¿Hasta qué punto fue afectado su **ingreso familiar** durante la crisis política del 2009? … (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	
HONIDIO6. ¿Hasta qué punto fue usted afectado por el **cierre de las escuelas** durante la crisis política del 2009? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) No tiene hijos en las escuelas **[PASE a HONIDIO8]**	
HONIDIO7. ¿Hasta qué punto fue afectada su **relación con los maestros en las escuelas** durante la crisis política del 2009? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
HONIDIO8. ¿Hasta qué punto fue afectado su acceso a servicios de salud por la crisis política del 2009? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	
HONIDIO9. ¿Hasta qué punto fue afectada su seguridad personal por la crisis política del 2009? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	
HONIDIO10. ¿Hasta qué punto fue usted afectado para transitar o moverse libremente por la crisis política del 2009? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	
HONIDIO13. ¿Hasta qué punto fue afectada su relación con amigos y/o parientes por la crisis política del 2009… (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	

HONIDIO14. ¿Cual fue su principal fuente de noticias durante la crisis política del 2009? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Abriendo Brecha (2) Hoy Mismo (3) Radio Globo (4) TV Maya (5) Canal 36 (6) Canal 8 (7) Canal 9 (8) Canal 6 (9) Canal 11 (10) Canal 5 (11) CNN (12) Radio América (13) HRN (14) La Prensa (15) La Tribuna (16) El Heraldo (17) El Tiempo (18) Radio Progreso (19) Tele Progreso (20) Tele Sur (77) Otro: _____ (88) NS (98) NR	
HONIDIO15. ¿Cree Usted que en Honduras la libertad de expresión se respeta mucho, algo, poco, o nada? (1) mucho (2) algo (3) poco (4) nada (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.					
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... **[Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]**	**Sí**	**No**	**NS**	**NR**	
CP2. ¿A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, municipalidad/corporación municipal?	1	2	88	98	
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a SGL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a SGL1]** (98) No responde **[Pase a SGL1]**	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.	

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	
LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar ***más responsabilidades***? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho más al gobierno central (2) Algo más al gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad (4) Algo más a la municipalidad (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (88) NS (98) NR	
LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería ***administrar más dinero***? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho más el gobierno central (2) Algo más el gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad (4) Algo más la municipalidad (5) Mucho más la municipalidad (88) NS (98) NR	
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la municipalidad? **[Leer alternativas]** (3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Nada de confianza (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora le voy a preguntar sobre ciertos servicios municipales. Le voy a pedir que para cada uno de ellos me diga si ha mejorado, ha seguido igual o ha empeorado en los últimos dos años. **[Luego de cada servicio, pregunte: ha mejorado, ha seguido igual, o ha empeorado?]**

HONMUN32. Recolección de basura	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	**[NO LEER]** (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR	
HONMUN33. Administración de los mercados	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	**[NO LEER]** (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR	
HONMUN36. Agua y alcantarillado	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	**[NO LEER]** (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR	

HONMUN37. ¿La alcaldía del municipio en donde usted vive informa a los ciudadanos sobre la forma en que invierte los recursos de la municipalidad?
(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a CP5]** (88) NS**[Pase a CP5]** (98) NR **[Pase a CP5]**

Dígame por favor, ¿de cuáles de las siguientes maneras esta municipalidad suele informar a los ciudadanos sobre su gestión y la utilización de recursos?						
HONMUN38. Mediante cabildos abiertos	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	
HONMUN39. Sesiones abiertas de la corporación	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	
HONMUN40. Publicación en algún medio de prensa o radio	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	
HONMUN41. Reunión con el alcalde municipal o delegado municipal	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	
HONMUN42. Rótulo fijo o murales	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	

	Una vez a la semana	**Una o dos veces al mes**	**Una o dos veces al año**	**Nunca**	**NS**	**NR**	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
HONCP21. ¿Reuniones de una asociación para promover la salud de la comunidad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	NS 88 / NR 98	INAP 99	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del cero al diez. El cero es la grada más baja y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es la grada más alta y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué grada de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja la grada que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la "peor vida posible" y el que representa "la mejor vida posible". Indíquele a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98	
La peor vida posible										**La mejor vida posible**	**NS**	**NR**	

LS6A. ¿En qué grada diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**(NS=88)** **(NR=98)**	
Izquierda									**Derecha**		

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

PROT3. ¿En los **últimos 12 meses** ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]** (88) NS **[Pase a JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**	

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los **últimos 12 meses**? _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? **[NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]** (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades) (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa) (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción) (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas) (5) Derechos humanos (6) Temas ambientales (7) Falta de Servicios públicos (8) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)	

HONPROT5. ¿Participó usted en manifestaciones o protestas públicas en los últimos 12 meses? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) A favor de Zelaya **[Siga]** (2) En contra de Zelaya **[Siga]** (3) Otra razón **[Pase JC1]** (88) NS **[Pase JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase JC1]** (99) INAP **[Pase a JC1]**	
HONPROT6. ¿Cuántas veces participó en manifestaciones o protestas a favor o en contra de Zelaya en el último año? _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
HONJC14. Frente al "Socialismo del Siglo XXI"	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
HONJC15. Frente a una grave crisis política	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso Nacional y gobierne sin Congreso Nacional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
HONJC17. ¿Cree usted que se justifica que la Corte Suprema de Justicia remueva o quite al presidente si éste desobedece las cortes o las leyes?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
HONJC18. ¿Cree usted que se justifica que el Congreso Nacional remueva o quite al presidente si éste desobedece las cortes o las leyes?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (88) NS **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? _____[Marcar el número]_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
AOJ1. La última vez, ¿denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí (2) No lo denunció (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	

VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer,¿qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? **[Leer alternativas]** (01) Robo sin arma **sin** agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma **con** agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión o chantaje (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo **in**seguro(a) o muy **in**seguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...	**Sí**	**No**	**NS**	**NR**	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1)	(0)	**88**	**98**	
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1)	(0)	**88**	**98**	

VIC42. ¿Tiene usted un negocio? **No → Marcar 99** **Sí → Preguntar:** ¿Ha cerrado su negocio a causa de la delincuencia?	(1)	(0)	**88**	**98**	**INAP 99**	
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o vecindario por temor a la delincuencia?	(1)	(0)	**88**	**98**		
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1)	(0)	**88**	**98**		
VIC45.¿Usted trabaja? **No → Marcar 99** **Sí → Preguntar:** ¿Ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia?	(1)	(0)	**88**	**98**	**INAP 99**	

AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría… (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría… (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98)NR	
AOJ16A. En su barrio (o aldea), ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98)NR	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada con delincuencia (3) **[No leer]** No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada (88) NS (98)NR	
VIC50. Hablando de la ciudad o el pueblo en donde usted vive, ¿cree que los niveles de violencia son en general alto, medios o bajos? (1) Altos (2) Medios (3) Bajos (88) NS (98)NR	

VIC56. ¿Y qué tanto cree usted que los políticos se preocupan por mejorar la seguridad de su ciudad o comunidad: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98)NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. ***[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]***.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						**Mucho**	**NS**	**NR**

	Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR
Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. **B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Honduras garantizan un juicio justo? *(**Sondee:** Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Honduras?	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político hondureño?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político hondureño?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político hondureño?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Central?	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ministerio Público?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser hondureño(a)?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Superior de Cuentas?	
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción?	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?	
HONB51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Comité de Derechos Humanos?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera ***[continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7]*** **NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO**	**Anotar 1-7,** **88 = NS,** **98 = NR**
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases y voy a pedirle su opinión. Vamos a seguir usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional estorba la labor del presidente?	
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados del Congreso Nacional discutiendo y debatiendo?	
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Congreso Nacional?	

EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional cumple con lo que usted espera de él?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

WT1. ¿Qué tan preocupado(a) está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en Honduras en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado(a), o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo es...?: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados del Congreso hondureño están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NS
Muy en desacuerdo						**Muy de acuerdo**	**88**	**98**

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones **POP101.** Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema de Justicia debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar **directamente** y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
HONPOP114. Cuando el Presidente no respeta las decisiones de los tribunales de justicia, debe ser removido de su cargo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7. **NS = 88, NR = 98**	
ROS1. El Estado hondureño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado hondureño, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado hondureño, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado hondureño debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS5. El Estado hondureño, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado hondureño, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a) o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Honduras? (1) Muy satisfecho (a) (2) Satisfecho (a) (3) **In**satisfecho (a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho (a) (88) NS (98) NR	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Honduras es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
HONPN6. En su opinión, ¿la crisis política del 2009 contribuyó para que Honduras sea más democrática, menos democrática, o igual de democrática? (1) Mas democrática (2) Menos democrática (3) Igual de democrática (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "E"]
Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente									**Aprueba firmemente**	**88**	**98**

	1-10, 88, 98
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	

[No recoja tarjeta "E"]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Honduras. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente									**Aprueba firmemente**	**88**	**98**

	1-10, 88, 98
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: ***[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]***	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

[Recoger tarjeta "E"]

Ahora cambiando de tema…

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático, **O** (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, **O** (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	
HONDEM12. ¿Quién debería tener más poder en Honduras, el Presidente, el Congreso, la Corte Suprema de Justicia o todos igual? (1) Presidente (2) Congreso (3) Corte Suprema de Justicia (4) todos igual (88) NS (98) NR	

PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales del 2009? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	
HONPP3. Hay personas que trabajan en las mesas electorales o en grupos de observadores cívicos de las elecciones. ¿Trabajó usted en una mesa electoral o como observador electoral cívico en el último proceso electoral del 2009? **[Sondee en qué tipo de elección]** (1) Sólo en las internas (2) Sólo en las generales (3) En ambas elecciones (las internas y generales) (4) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: **[LEER]** (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada	

(4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR	

CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave (2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o (3) No hay crisis económica **[Pase a VB1]** (88) NS **[Pase a VB1]** (98) NR **[Pase a VB1]**	
CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: **[LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]** (01) El gobierno anterior (02) El gobierno actual (03) Nosotros, los hondureños (04) Los ricos de nuestro país (05) Los problemas de la democracia (06) Los países ricos **[Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón]** (07) El sistema económico del país, o (08) Nunca ha pensado en esto (77) **[NO LEER]** Otro (88) **[NO LEER]** NS (98) **[NO LEER]** NR (99) INAP	

VB1. ¿Tiene tarjeta de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas **elecciones presidenciales** de 2009? (1) Sí votó **[Siga]** (2) No votó **[Pasar a HONVB4]** (88) NS **[Pasar a HONVB5]** (98) NR **[Pasar a HONVB5]**	
VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (401) Felícito Avila (DC) (402) César Ham (UD) (403) Bernard Martínez (PINU) (404) Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo Sosa (Partido Nacional) (405) Carlos H. Reyes (Independiente Popular) (406) Elvin Santos (Partido Liberal) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)	

HONVB3a. ¿Y para Diputados, votó usted por los candidatos del mismo partido del candidato que votó para Presidente, o cruzó usted su voto? (1) Votó por candidatos del mismo partido (2) Cruzó el voto (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó) **[En cualquier caso pasar a HONVB5]**	
HONVB4. ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales del 2009? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (1) Menor de edad (2) No tenía cedula de identidad (3) No me encontraron en los listados del censo electoral (4) No pude ir a votar debido a trabajo/salud/otro inconveniente (5) No me interesa votar (6) No voté en protesta por la destitución de Zelaya (7) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
HONVB5. ¿Y ahora pensando en las anteriores elecciones presidenciales del 2005 por cuál partido votó para Presidente? (1) Partido Liberal (2) Partido Nacional (3) PINU-SD (4) PDCH (5) UD (6) Ninguno (7) No votó (88)NS (98) NR	
HONVB6. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que las pasadas elecciones del 2009 fueron libres y honestas? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

HONVB9. ¿En este momento, pertenece a algún partido político? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a VB10]** (88) NS **[Pase a VB10]** (98) NR **[Pase a VB10]**	
HONVB9a. ¿A cuál partido político pertenece usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (401) Partido Nacional (402) Partido Liberal (403) Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDCH) (404) Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU-SD) (405) Unificación Democrática (UD) (77) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a POL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a POL1]** (98) NR **[Pase a POL1]**	

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (401) Partido Nacional (402) Partido Liberal (403) Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDCH) (404) Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU-SD) (405) Unificación Democrática (UD) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones]** (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía, (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora hablemos acerca de la crisis política que vivió Honduras durante la segunda mitad del 2009, en la cual el Presidente Zelaya fue destituido y exiliado a Costa Rica. …	
HONCRSPOL1. ¿Considera usted que la destitución del Presidente Zelaya, en Junio del 2009, fue un golpe de estado? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL2. ¿Estuvo usted de acuerdo con el envío al exilio del Presidente Zelaya? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL3. ¿Estuvo usted de acuerdo con la destitución del Presidente Zelaya? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL4. ¿Estaba usted de acuerdo con que se llevara acabo la consulta popular que el Presidente Zelaya quería realizar el 28 de Junio de 2009, sobre la cuarta urna? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL5. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con la formación de una Asamblea Constituyente? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL6. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con reformar la Constitución para permitir la re-elección presidencial? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL7. ¿Qué tan satisfecho quedó usted con la solución a la crisis política del 2009? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (88) NS (98) NR	

HONCRSPOL8. ¿Cuál hubiera sido la solución preferible para usted? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Haber restituido a Zelaya en el poder hasta enero del 2010 (2) Haber restituido a Zelaya y haberlo re-elegido al menos para un período más (3) Haber mantenido a Micheletti en el poder hasta Enero del 2010 (4) Haber elegido a una tercera persona como presidente hasta enero del 2010 (5) Haber creado un gobierno conjunto con seguidores de Zelaya y Micheletti (6) Haber juzgado y aplicado la ley a los que violaron las leyes (7) Que los militares hubieran tomado el poder (8) No haber tenido elecciones pero si una Asamblea Constituyente (77) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL8A. ¿Qué tan satisfecho esta Usted con la amnistía política promulgada por el Congreso Nacional? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL8B. Y ¿a quién cree Usted que deba aplicar la amnistía? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) A todos los involucrados en la crisis por igual (2) Solo a Roberto Micheletti (3) Solo a Manuel Zelaya (4) Solo a los militares (5) A ninguno (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL9. ¿Cree usted que la Comunidad Internacional jugó un papel en la solución a la crisis que fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno Ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL10. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó los Estados Unidos durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL11. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó Brasil durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL12. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó Costa Rica durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL13. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó Venezuela durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL14. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó la OEA durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	

HONCRSPOL15. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó la Corte Suprema de Justicia durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL16. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó las Fuerzas Armadas durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL17. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugaron los gremios magisteriales durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL18. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugó el Congreso nacional durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	
HONCRSPOL20. ¿Cree usted que el papel que jugo la Policía durante la crisis fue muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo, malo, o muy malo? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni Bueno Ni Malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (88) NS (98) NR	

Para cada una de las siguientes personas o instituciones, dígame cree usted que violó la constitución durante la crisis política del 2009?	**Sí**	**No**	**NS**	**NR**	
HONCRSPOL21. Mel Zelaya violó la constitución	(1)	(0)	88	98	
HONCRSPOL22. Roberto Micheletti violó la constitución	(1)	(0)	88	98	
HONCRSPOL23. Los Militares violaron la constitución	(1)	(0)	88	98	
HONCRSPOL24. El Congreso violó la constitución	(1)	(0)	88	98	
HONCRSPOL25. La Corte Suprema de Justicia violó la constitución	(1)	(0)	88	98	

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1⁰	**2⁰**	**3⁰**	**4⁰**	**5⁰**	**6⁰**
Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16		
NS	88					
NR	98					

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888 = NS 988 = NR)	☐☐

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C] **Y1.** Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo… **[Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]** (1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario (4) Ninguna de estas (5) **[NO LEER]** Otra (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] **Y2.** ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia? **[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice "el futuro" preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]** (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras) (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas (6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros) (7) Salud (8) Medio ambiente (9) Situación del país (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada (11) Otra respuesta (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] **Y3.** En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada? (1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] **HAICR1.** Podría decirme, ¿ cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? **[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]** (01) TV (02) Diario (03) Radio (04) Iglesia (05) Centro comunitario (06) Escuela (07) Familiares (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio (09) Amigos (10) Vecinos (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]** **[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]** (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR	
Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR	

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR	
[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"] **Q10**. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? **[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]** (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de L.1.000 (02) Entre L. 1.001 - L. 2.500 (03) Entre L.2.501 - L.4.500 (04) Entre L.4.501 - L.6.500 (05) Entre L. 6.501 - L. 8,500 (06) Entre L. 8.501 - L. 12.500 (07) Entre L. 12.501 - L. 14.500 (08) Entre L. 14.501- L.17.500 (09) Entre L. 17.501 - L.20.500 (10) Entre L. 20.501 - y más (88) NS (98) NR **[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]**	
Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a Q10C]** (88) NS **[Pase a Q10C]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q10C]**	
Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doces meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses? (1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? **[Si dijo "Sí", preguntar ¿en dónde?]** **[No leer alternativas]** (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente **[Siga]** (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países **[Siga]** (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) **[Siga]** (4) No **[Pase a Q14]** (88) NS **[Pase a Q14]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q14]**	
Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer opciones]** (1) ¿Aumentó? **[Pase a HONQ10D]** (2) ¿Permaneció igual? **[Pase a HONQ10D]** (3) ¿Disminuyó? **[Pase a Q10F]** (88) NS **[Pase a HONQ10D]** (98) NR **[Pase a HONQ10D]**	

Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien (4) El negocio familiar se quebró (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar (7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo (9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos (8) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP ("Aumentó", "Permaneció igual" o NS/NR en Q10E)	
HONQ10D. ¿Alguno de los que viven en esta casa ha sido deportado de los EE.UU. u otro país? (0) No (1) Sí, de los Estados Unidos (2) Sí, de otro país (3) Sí, de los Estados Unidos y de otro país (88) NS (98) NR	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[No leer alternativas]** (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ **(00= ninguno → Pase a ETID)** (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ **00 = ninguno,** (88) NS (98) NR **(99) INAP (no tiene hijos)**	

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-hondureña, codificar como (4) Negra]** (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (trigueña) (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]** (401) Castellano/Español (402) Lenca (403) Garifuna (406) Misquito (407) Xicaque (408) Paya (404) Otro (nativo) (405) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR	
WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted la Internet? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS **[No leer]** (98) NR **[No leer]**	

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente… **GI0.** ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]:** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[NO LEER**: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama**]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde	
GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Honduras? **[NO LEER**: 18**]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Honduras? **[NO LEER**: 4 años**]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[L*eer* todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R15. Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana (LCD, Plasma, LED)	(0) No			(1) Sí	
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No			(1) Sí	

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]** (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]** (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]** (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]** (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]** (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]** (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]** (88) NS **[Pase a OCUP1B1]** (98) NR **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**	
OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo. (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo. (3) No, no perdió su trabajo (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo (88) NS (98) NR	
OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98)NR	

PEN1. ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones [jubilación/previsión social]? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a SAL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a SAL1]** (98) NR **[Pase a SAL1]**	
PEN3. ¿A qué sistema de pensiones está usted afiliado? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Fondo de Pensión Privado o AFP (Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones) (2) Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social (3) Instituto de Prevención Militar (IPM) (4) Instituto Nacional de Previsión del Magisterio (Inprema) (5) Instituto Nacional de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de los Empleados y Funcionarios del Poder Ejecutivo (INJUPEMP) (7) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

PEN4. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted cotizó a su fondo de pensión? **[Leer alternativas]:** (1) Todos los meses (2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o (3) No cotizó (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[Preguntar a todos]

SAL1. Tiene usted seguro médico? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Finalizar]** (88) NS **[Finalizar]** (98) NR **[Finalizar]**	
SAL2. Es su seguro médico… **[Leer opciones]** (1) Del gobierno, parte del seguro social (2) De otro plan del Estado (3) Es un plan privado **[No leer]:** (4) Tiene ambos, del gobierno y un plan privado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene seguro médico)	
SAL4. ¿En su plan de seguro médico, es usted titular o beneficiario? (1) Titular (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap	

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] ____ (97) No se pudo clasificar **[Marcar (97) *únicamente,* si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]**	|__|__|
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____ **TI.** Duración de la entrevista ***[minutos, ver página # 1]*** _____	☐☐☐☐
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	|__|__|__|__|__|
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo_____	|__|__|

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
*Firma del entrevistador*_____ *Fecha* ____ /_____ /_____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios:
_____
_____
[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta "A"

¿En qué escalón [grada] de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?



Tarjeta "B"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Izquierda **Derecha**

Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta "D"



Tarjeta "E"



Tarjeta "F"

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de L.1.000
(02) Entre L. 1.001 - L. 2.500
(03) Entre L.2.501 - L.4.500
(04) Entre L.4.501 - L.6.500
(05) Entre L. 6.501 - L. 8,500
(06) Entre L. 8.501 - L. 12.500
(07) Entre L. 12.501 - L. 14.500
(08) Entre L. 14.501- L.17.500
(09) Entre L. 17.501 - L.20.500
(10) Entre L. 20.501 - y más