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# Political Culture, Governance and Democracy in Honduras, 2008

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**Movimiento Cívico para la Democracia**  
**HONDURAS**



**aliciación para el**  
**Fortalecimiento de la Justicia**



**FOPRIDEH**  
Federación de Organizaciones  
para el Desarrollo de Honduras



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## Prologue: Background to the Study

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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website [www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital,



the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.<sup>1</sup> Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into

<sup>1</sup> With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting<sup>2</sup> in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the

<sup>2</sup> All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador.


2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Mexico and Central America Group	
<b>Mexico</b>	 
<b>Guatemala</b>	
<b>El Salvador</b>	 
<b>Honduras</b>	 
<b>Nicaragua</b>	 
<b>Costa Rica</b>	 
<b>Panama</b>	

Andean/Southern cone Group		
Colombia	 Universidad de los Andes	 observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Bolivia	 Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	
Paraguay	 CIR Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Chile		
Uruguay		 UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Brazil	 Universidade de Brasília	
Venezuela		

Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	  
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p><b>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES</b> AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	<p>VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY</p>

## Aknowledgements

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Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
July, 2008

## Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

*AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer’s* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez  
*AmericasBarometer* Grant Manager at USAID

## Executive Summary

In the Preface readers will encounter a brief synopsis of current economic and political conditions in Honduras, as well as a general description of the population sampled, and how the 2008 AmericasBarometer sample compares to those drawn in 2004 and 2006.

To foreshadow details presented below in the Preface, readers should know that the sample consists of 1,522 selected interviews selected in multi-stage stratified sampling design to represent nine different geographic regions of Honduras and a random selection of those within households 18 years of age or more. The sample in each stratum closely approximates the underlying population distribution of Honduras, as is seen in Figure P.2. Major demographic categories, such as gender (Figure P.4), age (Figure P.5; Table P.3), and educational levels (Figure P.7) are representative of current population distributions. Assuming an actual population statistic of 50%, the estimated sampling error for a survey of this size would be  $\pm 2.5\%$ .

Chapter 1 offers a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set, highlighting the theoretical reasons for believing that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perceptions of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are defined not by a single dimension in this study, but by multiple dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. Those dimensions include: (i) support for the *right of public contestation*, including widespread political participation; (ii) support for the *right of citizen inclusiveness*, especially focusing on *political tolerance* of those holding unpopular views; (iii) support for national political institutions (Congress, Supreme Court, the justice system, the national government and political parties), or the *political legitimacy* of such institutions; and (iv) a key element of social capital, *interpersonal trust*, which is held to be important to democratic cultures. Additionally, attention is focused on a key indicator of a basic commitment to democracy, i.e., a sense that “democracy may have its problems, but it is better than other forms of government,” a view attributed to Winston Churchill, and, subsequently identified as a “Churchillian democracy.” On most of these dimensions by which we can compare political cultures, Honduras ranks toward the bottom of all countries in the hemisphere, reaching as high as seventh from the bottom only on the legitimacy of national political institutions. On two indicators – support for the Churchillian concept of democracy and support for the right of political contestation – Honduras ranks at the very bottom of the 21 or 22 cases for which data are available. This chapter provides initial evidence that the political culture of Honduras is less that fully consistent with or supportive of democratic institutions. At the same time, however, the political culture responds to the performance of such institutions, so that these values held by Hondurans are not engraved in stone for all time. Governance matters.

The picture that emerges from the analysis in Chapter 2 is that individuals who have been most frequently victimized by corruption (especially those exposed to three or more acts of corruption during the past year), or who *perceive* corruption to be more common, tend to view

the institutions of the state as less legitimate (less deserving of their trust), but nonetheless continue to prefer the democratic system itself (the Churchillian view of democracy). The fact that fourteen percent of Hondurans had at least one experience with corruption during the past twelve months suggests imperfection in governmental performance. The corrosive impact of corruption, however, may not occur until three or more such instances accrue in a given year. Still, Honduras already scores very low in democratic values and attitudes when compared to other countries in the hemisphere. Therefore, the results of this analysis highlight the possibility that, were corruption to grow, it could become a major factor endangering the consolidation of democracy in Honduras by virtue of eroding the already thin democratic culture. Starting from the existence of a political culture that is not fully supportive of democratic institutions, there is little room for further erosion of the attitude and belief patterns that would be most conducive to establishing Honduran democracy firmly.

Unexpected findings prevail in Chapter 3, in which it is found that there are few relationships between exposure to crime (13.7% report being victimized in 2008, down from 19.2% in 2006) and the elements of a democratic political culture. Despite the fact that only 13.7% of the AmericasBarometer respondents in Honduras reported that they were victimized in 2008, the percentage expressing a sense of personal insecurity grew from 37.4% in 2006 to 41.7% in 2008, a phenomenon particularly acute in large cities and among the most highly educated. Yet, the low level of crime victimization found among respondents might be due to the fact that crime in Honduras has increased mostly in the form of homicides hence the increasing number of victims can not be interviewed in our surveys. Perception of crime and crime levels are often not closely linked and sometimes run in opposite directions because of the strong impact of the media. But citizen preoccupations about crime, whether based on accurate or inaccurate perceptions of the incidence thereof, do have a detrimental effect on one pillar of a stable democracy, i.e., interpersonal trust. While those who have been victimized are *highly* trusting of other people, those who fear for their personal security tend to be *less* trusting of others. Curiously, the lack of certain statistical associations suggests that Hondurans do not necessarily blame their government (directly) for the insecurity they feel; criminals may be blamed or other attributions of culpability may occur.

In Chapter 4, the dynamics of local level participation – either via governmental institutions or via civil society organizations - are shown to play a very important role in generating a culture consistent with stable democracy. Features of democratic culture are strengthened not only by participation in local organizations of civil society, such as parent organizations or religious groups, but also by more direct involvement with local government via attendance at municipal meetings or by demand-making when one attends such meetings. The most important effect, however, flows from people’s satisfaction with the services provided by the local government. **Satisfaction with municipal services turns out to have a very strong and significant correlation with all five indicators of a culture supportive of stable democracy.** However, while local participation *per se* helps to increase support for *most* cultural conditions consistent a stable democracy, it does very little to increase belief in the legitimacy of the central government. Although trust in the *local* government is increased by greater satisfaction with local services, it may take enhanced performance by *national-level institutions*

to regenerate the confidence in them that recently has been eroding. **Emphasizing local level participation can make an important contribution to creating a democratic political culture in Honduras, especially if local governments are provided the resources with which to be effective,** but it will take improved performance by national institutions to address their own lack of legitimacy.

Chapter 5 argues that the Honduran population, like that of many other countries, attributes responsibility for the state of the economy to the national government. The main negative effect of low evaluations of the economic performance of the government of Honduras is that such poor evaluations erode the legitimacy of existing political institutions (Congress, presidency, courts, etc.), and the effect is statistically significant. Negative evaluations of economic performance exert less consistent impacts on the probability that Hondurans will hold democratic values and ideals. Hondurans regard democracy as a desirable political system and as the best available option but see the political institutions extant in the country as imperfect approximations of responsive democratic governance and, therefore, as responsible for the country's poor governance. The political institutions of the country remain, in the minds of most Hondurans, unable to address effectively the economic challenges confronting the country, as well as high levels of crime (generating personal insecurity), corruption, poverty, and unemployment which are seen in 2008 as the major national problems

In Chapter 6, data are presented that raise concerns about the state of Honduran political culture in 2008. The movement away from military governments of the 1970s toward a civilian regime in subsequent decades has offered an opportunity to rebuild (or perhaps to build) a democratic political culture. **Yet contemporary Honduran political culture has a very high number of persons in the low political support/low political tolerance category, a cultural combination that LAPOP argues might well put “democracy at risk.”** Only half as many Hondurans exhibit the opposite combination of high political support/high political tolerance, a cultural combination that would be conducive to “stable democracy.” Moreover, support for existing national-level political institutions is low, and in most cases, has been dropping since 2004. Mere electoral alternation appears not to be sufficient to satisfy Hondurans that “our democracy is working.” Poor economic performance (in the sense of alleviating poverty), inability to curb crime, and widespread petty corruption (as well as allegations of higher level corruption) are factors that may contribute to the cynicism exhibited by Hondurans about their polity. The quality of governance matters for political culture and for institutional legitimacy.

Partisan dealignment and the possibility of reconfiguration of the party spectrum are analyzed in Chapter 7. Starting in 2006 and continuing in 2008, the percentage of Hondurans expressing no party preference exceeded 50%. Meanwhile, third party identifications, with a party other than a traditional party (Liberal or Nacional), grew from 1.8% to 5.6% between 2006 and 2008. Three small parties are receiving more attention – PINU, PDCH and UD – but are yet far from able to compete effectively at the national level. Those significantly more likely than others to exhibit a party identification include individuals (i) who are currently employed; (ii) those with greater educational attainments; (iii) those who are attentive to radio or television news; and (iv) are residents of San Pedro Sula. Those least likely to have a party identification

(v) live in rural areas; (vi) exhibit a high sense of personal insecurity; or (vii) who read newspapers at a higher rate than do others. Party identification is found to be the single most important determinant of having voted in the 2005 presidential election; hence, the consequences of a process of partisan dealignment are examined. While party dealignment has negative consequences for voting turnout, it may also lead to the possibility of electoral turnover, which is necessary in the long run for democracies. Non-aligned voters are those most likely to switch their votes between elections. Presidential vote choice is also analyzed in this chapter, finding that Hondurans on the left were significantly more likely to have reported voting for Carlos Sosa of the PINU in 2005, while those on the right were significantly more likely to have voted for the winner, Manuel (Mel) Zelaya of the Partido Liberal.

In Chapter 8 we find that Hondurans tend to support an expansive view of the state. This desire for an activist state – which might help citizens to mitigate harsh economic conditions – is even shared by both the political left and the political right. **But, interestingly, this perspective may not necessarily be indicative of a desire for a strong role by the central government, it could equally well be indicative of a desire for effective local governance.** Programs by the central government to delegate power and funding authority to local governments, as well as programs by international funding agencies to enhance the capacity and transparency of local governing institutions, might well prove to be responsive to citizen desires in Honduras. The Washington Consensus among such international financial agencies favored both privatization and delegation of power to local governments. Hondurans appear to agree with the latter prescription, but not necessarily with the former.

The origins of support for or criticism of the presidency and the Zelaya administration are examined in Chapter 9. Expressions of confidence in the Honduran presidency, as an institution, were skewed toward the negative in early 2008, but strongly associated with partisanship, with those individuals most identified with the governing Partido Liberal tending to exhibit the highest degree of confidence in the presidency. As an institution, the presidency ranks lower than many other institutions, including the armed forces, the mass media and municipal governments, in terms of citizen confidence. Assessments of the performance of President Zelaya tend toward a statistically normal distribution, but are slightly biased toward negative assessments. Approval of Zelaya's performance has dropped five points, from 52.1% in 2006 to 47.5% in 2008, a common "post-honeymoon" political phenomenon for sitting presidents. Again, partisanship heavily influences assessment of the Zelaya presidency, with supporters of minor parties and the Partido Nacional being the most critical. With regard to specific dimensions of governmental performance, two efforts – that of combating unemployment and of combating corruption – yield improvements over assessments rendered in 2006, but both remain policy arenas in which governmental performance is judged harshly. A third arena for policy-making, the struggle to combat poverty, yields assessments that are stable (but low), while in two other areas – promoting citizen security and protecting democracy principles – there has been a decrease in citizen approval levels (from higher starting points in 2006). A multivariate analysis finds that approval of President Zelaya is significantly influenced, once the effects of other variables are held constant, by the perceived performance of the government in addressing unemployment, improving citizen security and in alleviating poverty, as well as by ideology

(with self-described those on the right favoring Zelaya), partisanship, place of residence, wealth (measured in terms of possessions), family income and attention paid to radio news.

One overarching theme in this report is that there are reasons for concern about contemporary Honduran political culture. Hondurans exhibit strikingly low levels of support for their political institutions and low levels of political tolerance compared to other countries in the AmericasBarometer of 2008. Indeed, confidence in most political institutions has declined between surveys taken in 2004, 2006 and 2008. Moreover, political dealignment has proceeded at a stunningly rapid pace since the year 2001 in the country, while electoral abstentionism reached a high of 44.8% in 2005. But at the same time a more positive theme emerges in Chapters 4, 7 and 8 – that participation in local civil society and local governmental institutions often leads to greater satisfaction with services rendered by local government, which in turn leads to engagement with the larger polity, reflected even in higher electoral turnout. If any one prescription seems implied by the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey in Honduras it would be that strenuous efforts to make resources available to improve the performance of local government and local civil society might pay off with a “rebound” in those attributes of a political culture supportive of democratic institutions. “Thinking globally” about the Honduran polity, the best route for enhancing Honduran democracy may well be “to act locally.”

While there is much to overcome in terms of doubt within Honduran society about all political institutions, including local government, the evidence from this study suggests that *those Hondurans who do participate* in local government and in local civic organizations tend to come away with views more in concert with a democratic political culture. While Hondurans remain reticent to fund local government with additional financial resources – perhaps because they are distrustful of all governmental institutions – those who do participate in local government tend to be more satisfied with its performance, and satisfaction with local government services has positive consequences for the larger political culture in various ways. Those satisfied with local services exhibit higher levels of support for democracy, higher levels of support for political contestation, higher levels of political tolerance, and accord greater legitimacy to national level political institutions, as well as exhibiting higher levels of interpersonal confidence.



**PART I:**  
**THEORY AND**  
**CROSS-NATIONAL**  
**COMPARISONS**

# Preface: Setting the Context of Democratic Development and Describing the Data

## Setting the Context

Honduras is an electoral democracy characterized by the dominance of the Liberal and National parties since the late 1870s, excepting periods of military rule the last of which ended in the early 1980s. From the late 1970s onward, Honduras has made great progress toward democratic governance. A measure of such progress is provided by Freedom House, as shown in Figure P.1 below.<sup>3</sup> Yet, progress toward greater political freedom stalled in the 1990s and 2000s, and was marked by the growth of partisan de-alignment and electoral abstention in the 2005 presidential election. The rating of 4 accorded to Honduras by Freedom House in 2007 is interpreted as “partially free,” which has been a consistent placement since 1997-1998, at which point Honduras dropped from a rating of 4.5, which it had held for nearly 15 years.<sup>4</sup> Freedom House sees Honduras as having moved toward greater political freedom since 1972, along with other Central American and Latin American countries, but neighboring countries have made additional progress toward consolidating democratic governance since 1993, while Honduras has stagnated.




Figure P.1. Evolution Toward Democracy: Honduras in Regional Perspective [Freedom House Average Ratings Over Time]

<sup>3</sup> Freedom House seeks to measure two key features of democracy: political rights and civil liberties. Since 1973, Freedom House has generated expert assessments of democracy in countries around the world, with ratings of 1 representing the highest level of political rights and/or civil liberties, while ratings of 7 represent the lowest level. In graph P.1, however, the scale was reversed so that higher scores mean greater freedom. An average is then taken of the two ratings to provide an overall characterization of each country. Those ratings are reversed, for ease of interpretation in the graph above, so that ratings of 7 are the highest and ratings of 1 are the lowest.

<sup>4</sup> Freedom House treats average ratings of 2.5 (4.5 in the reversed scale) as the threshold for polities rated as “free.”

Economically, Honduras is a poor country, exhibiting the third lowest GDP per capita in the region (see Figure P.2) and ranking 115<sup>th</sup> on the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) out of 177 countries. Economic growth exceeded 5% in 2006 and 2007, which is helpful, although such growth rates have been enhanced by remittances from Hondurans living abroad. By 2005, those remittances had reached US\$2.1 billion, or 21.2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and were the equivalent of 70% of export earnings (see Inter-American Development Bank, 2008).




Figure P.2. Gross Domestic Product: Honduras Among AmericasBarometer Countries

In 2005, a new president was elected, Manuel Zelaya of the Partido Liberal. In his first year in office, President Zelaya was buffeted by a ten-day teacher’s strike, among other protests waged, and, in 2007, became embroiled in conflict with media owners presumed to be “excessively critical.” The president ordered those executives to broadcast ten two-hour segments presenting governmental interpretations of its performance (*Noticen*, 2007). Later in his term, controversy erupted over Zelaya’s decision to participate in the Petrocaribe Initiative of

Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez, which offers discounted petroleum purchases, prompting some Hondurans to fear impaired relationships with the United States (*Noticen*, 2008)

A 38-day hunger strike began on April 3, 2008, among four district attorneys (*fiscales*) against the Honduran Attorney General’s office. The strike was motivated by what the *fiscales* called a “colluded, corrupt system that infiltrated the Attorney General’s office...” According to the attorneys on strike, Attorney General Leonidas Rosa Bautista and Assistant Attorney General Omar Cerna have been responsible for slowing down or completely overlooking several corruption cases in which many of their friends, members of the political and economic elites of the country are involved. Several organizations of civil society and some influential citizens supported the strike, which ended in a compromise to investigate the allegations, after President Zelaya indicated an interest in “knowing more” about the allegation (Morales Molina, May 2 and May 5, 2008). Given the concerns that average Hondurans have about corruption, detailed in Chapter 2 of this report, any visible conflict *among* government officials over allegations corruption holds the potential to deepen public concern and cynicism. While this strike occurred *after* the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey was concluded, it reveals an issue on the public mind

## Description of the Data

The final sample included 1,522 valid interviews. The margin of error for a sample of this size is  $\pm 2.5\%$  if estimating a population parameter with a true value of 50%. For data collection and recording of answers, interviewers were equipped with a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) commonly known on the market as a Palm.

Table P.1 shows the division of the national sample into nine strata (zones). As shown in the table, the 2008 sample distribution closely approximates the actual geographic distribution of the Honduran population by zone.

**Table P.I.1. Geographic Distribution of Honduran Population and Sample, 2008**

	Población		Muestra	
	N	%	N	%
Zona Norte A	1,202,510	18.4	271	17.8
Zona Norte B	1,056,221	16.2	259	17.0
Zona Norte C	38,073	0.6	20	1.3
Zona Central A	1,180,676	18.1	229	15.0
Zona Central B	509,441	7.8	130	8.5
Zona Sur	542,646	8.3	132	8.7
Zona Oriente A	769,615	11.8	187	12.3
Zona Oriente B	67,384	1.0	20	1.3
Zona Occidental	1,168,778	17.9	274	18.0
	6,535,344	100.1*	1522	99.9*

\* Total percentages may be greater or less than 100% due to rounding errors.

Table P.2 below shows the distribution of the sample by department and strata. It also shows how the departments were grouped into the strata of the national sample. However, it should be noted that the number of strata was reduced from 9 to 7 strata. Due to their very small number of cases –a reflection of their small populations, Zona Norte C was merged into Zona Norte B, and Zona Oriente B was merged with Zona Oriente A into one single Zona Oriental.

**Table P.I.2. Distribution of Sample by Honduran Department and Sampling Strata**

Departamento	CENTRAL A	CENTRAL B	NORTE A	NORTE B	OCCIDENTE	ORIENTAL	SUR	Total
Francisco Morazán	229							229
Comayagua		88						88
La Paz		42						42
Cortes			271					271
Atlantida				76				76
Colon				72				72
Yoro				111				111
Islas De La Bahia				20				20
Copan					69			69
Intibuca					44			44
Lempira					48			48
Ocotepeque					30			30
Santa Barbara					83			83
El Paraiso						84		84
Olancho						103		103
Gracias A Dios						20		20
Choluteca							94	94
Valle							38	38
<b>Total</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>1,522</b>

Figure P.3 displays the distribution of the total sample by stratum by year. No major change has occurred in the distribution of the sample between the three bi-annual surveys conducted by LAPOP for the Americas Barometer.




Figure P.3. Distribution of the Sample by Region

Some 50.1% of those interviewed are female, while the other 49.9% are male, as is seen in Figure P.4. These data correspond very closely to census data from the Sixteenth Census of Population and Housing. According to the Census, 51% of Hondurans are female and 49% are male. In the 2004 AmericasBarometer study, gender distribution was slightly different, as the percentage female reached 53%; nonetheless, this difference from the actual population figures does not reach statistical significance, and, for that reason, affords no real danger of having an impact on subsequent analyses.




Figure P.4. Distribution of the Sample by Gender

With regard to the age of the sample, the results of the 2008 survey reveal, as did those of 2006, a population that is quite young. Roughly 54% of those interviewed are 35 years of age or younger, while 23% fall between 36 y 45 years of age and the balance (another 23%) are 46 years of age or older. The age distribution in 2008 is similar to that found 2006, but, as can be seen in Figure P.5, the two most recent age profiles differ from that encountered in 2004 with the most recent samples being younger. These differences should be borne in mind in analyses where age is correlated with survey responses.




Figure P.5. Distribution of the Sample by Age

Since the distribution of the sample was based on census data, Table P.3 presents the distribution of the Honduran population by age and gender in 2008. One can see that there is a close relationship between the census data and the survey, even though the publish age cohorts do not overlap precisely with the survey cohorts.

**Table P.3. Census Data from Honduras by Age and Gender**

Age	Total	%	Male	%	Female	%
15-24	1626108	34.7%	828974	51.0%	797134	49.0%
25-34	1160111	24.8%	587963	50.7%	572148	49.3%
35-44	793705	16.9%	399922	50.4%	393783	49.6%
45-54	525352	11.2%	253096	48.2%	272256	51.8%
55-64	308531	6.6%	140232	45.5%	168299	54.5%
65+	270155	5.8%	121839	45.1%	148316	54.9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4683962</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2332026</b>	<b>49.8%</b>	<b>2351936</b>	<b>50.2%</b>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.

Some 43.5% of the sample interviewed resides in urban areas of the country, while 56.5% live in rural areas (see Figure P.6). These percentages correspond closely to those reported by the 16<sup>th</sup> Census. According to the Census, 43.2% of the population lives in urban settings while 56.8% live in rural areas.




Figure P.6. Distribution of the Sample by Urban and Rural Areas

With regard to education, 57.4% of individual interviewed have a grade school education or less, while 35.6% have experienced some level of junior high or high school education and 7.0% have experienced some form of post-secondary education, including technical, college or university study. The average number of years of formal education completed is 7.25 in the 2008 sample. One can observe change over time in the Honduran samples on the educational variable. As Figure P.7 shows, in 2006 and 2008 the percentage of Hondurans with a junior high school or high school education grows into the mid-30% range, and fewer people report having no education or a grade school education (partial or completed). Although the change in these results over time may have occasional impacts on subsequent data analyses, the more recent results are closer to the actual population distribution.




Figure P.7. Distribution of the Sample by Education Level

For those interested in a more detailed description of the sample design, please see Appendix I (Technical Description of Sample Design) at the end of the report.

# Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy<sup>5</sup>

## Theoretical framework

### Theory

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, et al. 1996; Przeworski, et al. 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, et al. 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term, they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, in achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).<sup>6</sup> Yet, generating national wealth, is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place over night. Can governments, international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly, attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago.

<sup>5</sup> This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

<sup>6</sup> This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *governabilidad, or more accurately, gobernanza*).<sup>8</sup> Good governance may well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

### *Working hypothesis*

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.<sup>9</sup> Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive

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<sup>7</sup> Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “governabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “governabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “governabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

<sup>8</sup> According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

<sup>9</sup> We emphasize *support for* stable democracy, recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).<sup>10</sup> Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.<sup>11</sup> The AmericasBarometer data allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

<sup>10</sup> Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

<sup>11</sup> For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999) :

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn<sup>12</sup>:

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<sup>12</sup> We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

### Support for the idea of democracy per se (ing4).

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillean concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In the AmericasBarometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

**ING4:** Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.<sup>13</sup> At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchillian notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

<sup>13</sup> Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure I.1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see [www.AmericasBarometer.org](http://www.AmericasBarometer.org) to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

### Support for core values on which democracy depends

In Robert Dahl's classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. An recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured them with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP these three items have been found to form a reliable scale.<sup>14</sup>

A scale based on the following three LAPOP items:

**E5.** Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?

**E8.** Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?

**E11.** Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in the figure I.2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In seven countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with real difference among these countries.

<sup>14</sup> Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7




Figure I.2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

B. Support for **Right of Citizen Inclusiveness** (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections

opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

A Scale based on the following four LAPOP items

**D1.** There are people who speak negatively of the (nationality) form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**?

**D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? **D3.** Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (nationality) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

**D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only four countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (d5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6<sup>th</sup> lowest in tolerance. In the case of Honduras, the overall level of tolerance fell significantly from a score of 56.1 in 2004 to the 47.1 in 2008.




Figure I.3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

### Belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index<sup>15</sup> based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:

- B14.** To what extent do you trust the national government?
- B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?
- B31.** To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
- B13.** To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
- B21.** To what extent do you trust the political parties?

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure I.4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g. Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative side. Indeed, only one country, Mexico, just barely has a score above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and

<sup>15</sup> This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.

Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.




Figure I.4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of President Performance)

The impact of excluding the measuring trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure I.5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings with the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.




Figure I.5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

### Social capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables

we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

**IT1.** Now, talking about the people from around here, would you say that the people are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I.6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1. Honduras is in third place from the bottom with a score of 51.8, a considerable fall from a score of 67.2 in 2006.




Figure I.6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

## Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

**PART II:**  
**GOVERNANCE**

## Chapter II. Corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy

### Theoretical framework<sup>16</sup>

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues in the international political agenda, as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. The problem, however, is that since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, it was a topic not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, reporting of and discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and distribution that corruption causes. **Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services.** More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing appreciation of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD plus representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February 1999 the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of only a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

<sup>16</sup> This section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”<sup>17</sup> Thus, effective initiatives should rely on “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

### *How might corruption affect support for stable democracy?*

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently been explored, there is already strong evidence that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Do we really know that corruption is greater in some places than others? If we do not know this, then we cannot really say much about variations in its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, but that measure does not purport to get at the *fact* of corruption, but only the *perception* of it.<sup>18</sup> And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Those who are victims could lower their belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy. It is far less likely, however to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

### **The measurement of corruption**

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because

<sup>17</sup> USAID, 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance ([www.usaid.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html](http://www.usaid.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html)) February.

<sup>18</sup> The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women). In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption victimization items is as follows:

Table II.1. Corruption Items Asked in LAPOP Surveys in 2008

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/ NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...				
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima) en el último año?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima) en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC16.</b> En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)?	9	0	1	8
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)?		0	1	8

### Corruption victimization in comparative perspective

In this chapter, we focus on three variables: corruption victimization (*corvic*), which is a dichotomous variable measuring whether people have been victimized by corruption or not, total number of ways of corruption victimization (*exctot*), and perceptions about corruption (*exc7r*). For reasons specified below, we interpret the the first variable as victimization by “low-level corruption.”

Figure 11.1 below shows the extent of corruption victimization across countries in the continent. According to this graph, Hondurans have a low-mid level of victimization by corruption (e.g. bribes by police and other public servants). In fact, the percentage of Hondurans that reported having been victimized by (low-level) corruption (13.8%) within the past twelve months is modest in comparison to countries like Haiti, Bolivia, and Mexico.




Figure II.1. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

Additionally, the 2008 survey also asked the following question pertaining to how widespread perceptions of corruption are in the countries surveyed.

**EXC7.** Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: **[LEER]**  
 (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR

Unlike actual victimization by corruption, perceptions of corruption in the government are relatively high among Hondurans. Figure II.2 shows Honduras as being located in the 7<sup>th</sup> position from the top in terms of the frequency with which corruption is perceived to be “very” or “somewhat” widespread. Yet, it is also important to note that perceptions of the level of corruption do not vary much between countries. Note again the case of Honduras, for which confidence intervals of the estimate overlap with estimates of how widespread corruption is for several adjacent countries in the ranking, ranging from Guatemala to Colombia. This means that Honduras is not significantly different from such countries.




Figure II.2. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective

An effort to explain this apparent contradiction between the perception of widespread corruption among Hondurans and a relatively low actual incidence thereof needs to highlight some important observations. First, actual levels of corruption victimization may greatly differ from perceptions of corruption, as in the case of Haiti where perceptions are quite low but the empirical reality of corruption is widespread. We hypothesize that one reason for this is that there are two major forms of corruption: low-level corruption (i.e. bribes paid to low-level public officials) and high-level corruption (i.e. that involving malfeasance by high-level officials such as Ministers, Deputies, etc.). Low-level (or petty) corruption may be more prevalent and more 'visible', and its victims may be more willing and likely to report it in a country such as Honduras. High-level corruption, on the other hand, is less 'visible' and its victims are less willing and likely to report it.<sup>19</sup> This form of corruption may be less prevalent (e.g. there are fewer Ministers than police officials) and in many cases can only be learned of by the general public when reported by the media, for example, after investigative work regarding high-level public officials' activities.

Second, the relationship between victimization by corruption and perception of corruption may be a complex one, impacted by several other factors (Seligson, 2006). For example, one very important factor determining the breadth of perception of corruption is whether, or not, a country has a free press able to conduct effective investigative work. Another factor may include the degree of transparency and access to government archives for those choosing to examine governmental behavior. Hence, even though actual corruption victimization may significantly increase perceptions of corruption in the government, several other factors may make a greater contribution to such perceptions.

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<sup>19</sup> For example, a high-level government official who receives a bribe by a large company so as to issue a permit that should not have been issued will not report it for fear of losing his/her job or even of going to jail. And neither will the company receiving the permit report it for fear to losing the permit. Since high-level corruption acts tend to be win-win situations, the actors involved will be unlikely to deviate from the implicit « contract » and report it. Low-level corruption acts, on the other hand, are win-lose situations. Therefore, the losers (those victimized) are more willing and likely to report such actions. Exceptions to this rule may occur in cases like Haiti, where low-level corruption is so widespread that it is no longer « seen » by citizens.

**The case of Honduras: Institutions where corruption is most frequent**

This section examines the instances in which Hondurans have been *directly* victimized by corruption, in any of the settings listed above in Table II.1. Figure II.3 below shows that corruption (i.e. employees asking for bribes) is much more prevalent in offices of the municipal government and those of the Judiciary (and increasing!), *when citizens have contact with such institutions*. It is important to understand, however, that not all citizens have contact with these various types of offices, so that the total percentage of citizens paying a bribe in offices of the judiciary may be far less common than people paying bribes to police, with whom contact is more frequent.




Figure II.3. Institutions Where Corruption Occurs in Honduras, IF Citizens Had Contact

Yet, citizens can be victimized by more than one source of corruption. Figure II.4 below shows that most Hondurans (86.2%) have *not* had a direct experience with corruption in the past twelve months. Moreover, among those who have had such an experience, most have been victimized only once (8.6%), a few have been victimized in two ways (3.2%), and even fewer (2%) have been victimized in three or more ways. So, actual exposure to situations where a bribe was expected is infrequent, in spite of the widespread perception of (and appropriate distaste for) such experiences.




Figure II.4. Total Index of Corruption Victimization, 2008

The rate of (petty) corruption victimization in Honduras (13.8%) is relatively low and has decreased systematically since 2004, the year of our first AmericasBarometer survey. Figure II.5 shows that corruption victimization has followed a decreasing trend, but one for which the inter-year differences are not statistically significant (as can be seen by the overlapping confidence interval bars). Hence, while the trend is suggestive, it does not yet provide definitive evidence of a decline in citizen exposure to acts of corruption.




Figure II.5. Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption by Year

Yet, it is also important to know who is more likely to be a victim of corruption in Honduras. For that purpose, a logistic regression has been run with the dichotomous variable “corruption victimization” (corvic) as the dependent variable, and several relevant demographic variables as independent variables. Figure II.6 shows, graphically, the results of the regression.<sup>20</sup> Four variables prove to be significant predictors of victimization by corruption: race or ethnicity, region of residence [entered as a series of dichotomous variables], size of population, and gender.




Figure II.6. Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption

<sup>20</sup> In the regression charts, we standardize all variables and indicate the zero mean as a vertical line. Each predictor that does not intersect with that line is a significant predictor ( $p < 0.05$ ). Notice that any coefficient to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect of that variable on the dependent variable. In contrast, any coefficient to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.

According to the regression results presented in Figure II.7, individuals who identify themselves as “mestizos” are victimized by corruption significantly more than those who identify themselves as “whites” (reference category). This finding is a little puzzling but it might be explained by the fact that the larger concentrations of “whites” are found in the western region of the country, with a much lower level of corruption, rather than in the “Central A” region.




Figure II.7. Corruption Victimization by Race

Hondurans are significantly less likely to be victimized by corruption if they reside in a number of regions other than “Central A” (reference region), specifically in “Central B,” “Norte B,” and “Oriental,” while the difference with Occidente also is at the margins of statistical significance, as displayed in Figure II.8. “Central A” includes the Department of Francisco Morazán, where the capital city is located. Since Tegucigalpa is located in this department, it makes sense to attribute the high incidence of corruption victimization found here to the higher level of bureaucratic activity that characterizes a capital city.




Figure II.8. Corruption Victimization by Region of Honduras

Figure II.9 below shows the rate of corruption victimization by size of population settings. It evidences the fact that Tegucigalpa exhibits rates that are much higher than those found in the other large city in the country (San Pedro Sula), in middle and small size cities, and in the rural areas of Honduras. This figure also shows that, except for San Pedro Sula, corruption victimization increases as settings become more urbanized. But most strikingly, the rate of corruption victimization in the capital city, Tegucigalpa, is simply quite high when compared to other environments.




Figure II.9. Corruption Victimization by City Size

Next, Figure II.10 shows that females are less likely to be victimized by corruption than males (the reference category in multivariate analyses). It should be noted, however, that most Honduran women interviewed do not have a job outside their homes. Consequently, males may be victimized more than are women not because they are males but because they are more likely to work outside their homes, thus becoming more exposed to victimization. The graph also shows a steady decline in the percent of people, both males and females, who have been victimized by corruption. Nonetheless the differences are not statistically significant, indicating that no meaningful change has occurred between 2004 and 2008.




Figure II.10. Corruption Victimization by Gender

*Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy*

We now turn to the ultimate goal of the chapter, namely to determine the effect of corruption on support for stable democracy. We look at the impact of corruption victimization (number of times being victimized) and perception of corruption on the Churchillian preference for democracy, on democratic values (e.g. political tolerance and support for the right of contestation), on the political legitimacy of institutions, and on interpersonal trust.

*Relationship between corruption victimization and political legitimacy*

The results of a linear regression (see table in Appendix II) reveal that corruption victimization (i.e. number of times victimized) is significantly correlated with only one of our five indicators of support for a stable democracy; that is, corruption victimization is significantly predictive of the legitimacy accorded to political institutions. Figure II.11 shows that Hondurans might have a relatively high level of tolerance of corruption experiences before their support for democratic institutions begins to be eroded, but those who have been victimized by corruption in three or more ways tend to experience a dramatic decrease in their perception of the legitimacy of core political institutions (i.e. executive, legislature, judiciary, political parties). Yet, corruption victimization does not seem to affect people’s democratic values or their preference for the democratic system as the best of available systemic options.




Figure II.11. Impact of Corruption Victimization on Political Legitimacy

### *Impact of perception of corruption on support for stable democracy*

The *perception of* corruption in the system, as opposed to actual victimization by corrupt officials, also affects belief in the legitimacy of political institutions and one's preference for democracy, in the Churchillian sense (regression results in Appendix II). As can be seen in Figure II.12, those who *perceive* corruption to be more common also tend to see the political institutions as less legitimate than do those who perceive corruption to be less common.




Figure II.12. Impact of Perception of Corruption on Political Legitimacy

Yet, as shown in Figure II.13, there is also an inverse relationship between the *perception of* corruption and one's preference for democracy. That is, those who perceive corruption to be more common tend to support the Churchillian notion of democracy more strongly. This might seem contradictory at first sight but it could well suggest that Hondurans tend to view access to a properly-functioning democracy as a way to fight corruption. In contrast, those who *perceive* corruption as less widespread might believe that the Honduran democracy works reasonably well and needs no "upgrading." But those who perceive corruption as common might believe just the opposite- that Honduran democracy needs to be improved so as to be able to curb corruption more effectively, and their very high levels of support entail a commitment to levels of democracy not yet attained.




Figure II.13. Impact of Perception of Corruption on Support for Democracy

The picture that emerges from this analysis is that individuals who have been most frequently victimized by corruption (especially those exposed to three or more acts of corruption during the past year), or who *perceive* corruption to be more common, tend to view the institutions of the state as less legitimate (less deserving of their trust) but nonetheless continue to prefer the democratic system itself (Churchillian view of democracy). As Lipset (1961) argues, the *performance* of regimes is a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. The fact that fourteen percent of Hondurans had at least one experience with corruption during the past twelve months suggests imperfection in governmental performance. Corrosive exposure to corruption may not occur until three or more such instances accrue. Still,

Honduras already scores very low in democratic values and attitudes when compared to other countries in the hemisphere. Therefore, the results of this analysis highlight the possibility that, were corruption to grow, it could become a major factor endangering the consolidation of democracy in Honduras. Starting from the existence of a political culture that is not fully supportive of democratic institutions, there is little room for erosion of the attitude and belief patterns that would be most conducive to establishing Honduran democracy firmly.

Perhaps the best indication of how much damage corruption can cause to the Honduran political system was a hunger strike by district attorneys (fiscales) and other citizens against the Honduran Attorney General's Office (AGO) and the political elites that they see the AGO as protecting from prosecution in corruption cases. This protest happened in 2008 shortly after the LAPOP survey was completed. More than a demonstration against the leadership of the Attorney General's Office, the strike movement seemed to be aimed at structural reforms that could more effectively fight the high level of corruption perceived, whether accurately or inaccurately, to exist by Hondurans. The very existence of visible allegations by some public officials against others makes the erosion of public trust in political institutions more likely. This kind of protest may help to explain the discrepancy between perceptions of widespread corruption among Hondurans, based on their beliefs about high-level acts of corruption, and the actual number of corrupt demands to which they have been subject in the past twelve months via their encounters with lower level public officials, numbers which rank toward the bottom of the spectrum seen among countries covered by the Barometer of the Americas.

## Appendix

Appendix II.1. Probabilidad de Ser Víctima de la Corrupción

VARIABLES INDEPENDIENTES	COEFICIENTES	(t)
Educación	-0.008	(-0.06)
Mujer	0.065	(0.88)
Edad	0.032	(0.22)
Riqueza	<b>0.361*</b>	(3.17)
No trabaja	<b>-0.566*</b>	(-8.44)
Percepción economía familiar	0.170	(1.47)
Número de hijos	0.148	(1.30)
Raza/Etnia (ref. = Blanca)		
Mestiza	<b>0.195*</b>	(2.65)
Otra raza	0.105	(1.04)
Región (Ref. = Región Central A)		
Región Central B	<b>-0.377*</b>	(-3.63)
Región Norte A	<b>-0.392*</b>	(-3.35)
Región Norte B	<b>-0.615*</b>	(-6.07)
Región Occidental	<b>-0.272*</b>	(-2.81)
Región Oriental A	<b>-0.520*</b>	(-5.94)
Región Oriental B	0.046	(0.51)
Región Sur	<b>-0.212*</b>	(-2.36)
Constante	<b>-2.083*</b>	(-24.16)
F = 14.32		
N. de casos = 1386		
* p<0.05		

Appendix II.2. Impacto de la Victimización por Corrupción en el Apoyo para una Democracia Estable

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.
Victimización por corrupción	-2.065	(2.31)	0.264	(1.39)	-0.575	(1.72)	-3.140*	(1.51)	-1.131	(2.09)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.017	(0.04)	0.042	(0.03)	-0.043	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	-0.055*	(0.03)	0.001	(0.03)	0.024	(0.03)	0.115*	(0.03)		
Años aprobados de educación	0.296	(0.27)	0.366	(0.26)	-0.045	(0.20)	0.158	(0.21)	0.430	(0.27)
Mujer	-0.961	(1.14)	-0.214	(1.00)	0.428	(0.92)	0.554	(0.69)	-1.186	(1.03)
Edad	0.536*	(0.26)	0.953*	(0.23)	-0.044	(0.22)	0.104	(0.18)	0.785*	(0.27)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.005	(0.00)	-0.010*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.008*	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.640	(0.71)	-0.146	(0.52)	0.768	(0.45)	0.235	(0.41)	-1.053	(0.71)
Percepción Economía familiar	-5.188*	(1.02)	-1.947*	(0.88)	-2.125*	(1.05)	-0.452	(0.91)	-0.956	(1.17)
Tamaño del lugar	1.587*	(0.61)	0.809	(0.57)	-0.289	(0.49)	1.038*	(0.50)	0.958	(0.89)
Constante	50.884*	(6.93)	35.728*	(6.13)	51.910*	(5.80)	28.746*	(4.99)	34.700*	(6.52)
R-cuadrado	0.034		0.021		0.011		0.051		0.016	
N. de casos	1330		1390		1312		1391		1448	

\* p<0.05

Appendix II.3. Impacto de la Percepción de Corrupción en el Apoyo para una Democracia Estable

Variables Independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.
Percepción de la corrupción	0.136*	(0.03)	0.046	(0.03)	-0.019	(0.02)	-0.139*	(0.02)	-0.004	(0.05)
Aprobación trabajo del presidente	0.011	(0.04)	0.056	(0.04)	-0.059	(0.04)				
Interés en política	-0.050	(0.03)	0.012	(0.03)	0.033	(0.03)	0.102*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.265	(0.25)	0.350	(0.25)	-0.014	(0.19)	0.205	(0.24)	0.398	(0.26)
Mujer	-0.835	(1.05)	-0.053	(1.03)	0.110	(0.89)	0.675	(0.66)	-0.982	(1.02)
Edad	0.528	(0.27)	0.867*	(0.25)	-0.072	(0.23)	0.159	(0.17)	0.826*	(0.29)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.005	(0.00)	-0.009*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.008*	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.384	(0.71)	-0.168	(0.55)	0.757	(0.47)	0.410	(0.45)	-0.908	(0.76)
Percepción economía familiar	-4.477*	(0.98)	-1.699	(0.90)	-2.256*	(1.06)	-0.610	(0.94)	-1.370	(1.29)
Tamaño	1.775*	(0.63)	0.797	(0.56)	-0.119	(0.54)	1.201*	(0.49)	1.256	(0.69)
Constante	39.353*	(7.16)	32.297*	(6.70)	53.321*	(6.48)	36.485*	(4.22)	33.298*	(6.02)
R-cuadrado	0.042		0.021		0.014		0.079		0.017	
N. de casos	1282		1331		1257		1330		1377	

\* p<0.05

## Chapter III. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

### Theoretical framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4) , states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report goes on to state that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among those respondents who say that they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country, do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study goes on to stress that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. That is because: “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since often their records cover only public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only

with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, make it difficult to know what to make of reports of this kind of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example is that in Guatemala, those who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides, whereas in most other countries they are not. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if those who die in car accidents would be included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the rate of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon the household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable kind of data. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to an exaggeration of crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data, in part because the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and in part because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims often do not die, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would, if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is variation in its concentration or dispersion. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, there was an increasing level of crime, but that increase was large an urban phenomenon linked to gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, the cities increased their weight in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, in a number of countries the same phenomenon has emerged. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed when it comes to corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have attitudes toward democracy significantly different from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.

While it is an aphorism that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of their impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and talk of lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times that for a number of years, and in some regions, like the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.<sup>21</sup> According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States, and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,<sup>22</sup> says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”<sup>23</sup> In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.<sup>24</sup> According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five

<sup>21</sup>In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

<sup>22</sup>According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

<sup>23</sup>Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 ([www.paho.org/english/DPI/rl970717.htm](http://www.paho.org/english/DPI/rl970717.htm)).

<sup>24</sup>Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.<sup>25</sup>

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

### *How might crime victimization affect support for stable democracy?*

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about it in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our four dimensions of support for stable democracy.

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<sup>25</sup>The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

## *The Measurement of Crime Victimization*

In this chapter, we will focus on two variables: crime victimization (**vic1r**) and perceptions of personal security (**aoj11r**).

**VIC1.** Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?

**AOJ11.** Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo **inseguro** o muy **inseguro**?  
(1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR

### **Crime victimization in Honduras**

The perception of insecurity in Honduras is among the highest in Latin America, but the underlying empirical reality may be otherwise, as indicated below.<sup>26</sup> Illustrative of this preoccupation, crime and insecurity have been identified by Hondurans as the country's main problem, even above of economic problems (see Appendix III.1). However, the level of crime victimization in Honduras seem to have varied inconsistently during the last four years. Figure III.1 shows that self-reported levels of crime rose from 13.7% of citizens having reported a crime happening to a member of their family during the past twelve months to 19.2% in 2006, but then dropping to 13.7% once again in 2008. Note, however, that these differences are not statistically significant, as show in the figure. To the best of our knowledge, there is no official documentation of an actual spike in the incidence of crime in 2006, nor any corresponding account of the reasons for such a spike, if it occurred. Nonetheless, for specialists on the subject, it might be instructive to conduct further research about the conditions that led to an apparent surge in crimes committed during the period 2005-2006 and to a subsequent decline in 2007-2008.

<sup>26</sup> The main reason for the low levels of crime victimization reported might be the fact that a lot of criminal activity in Honduras is in the form of murder, and since the dead can not be interviewed, the reported level must be lower than the actual level of crime victimization. The variable used for crime victimization asked only about crime experienced by the interviewed individuals themselves, not by their relatives or other people they knew. No question asked whether a relative or household member had been murdered.




Figure III.1. Crime Victimization in Honduras: 2004-2008

The level of insecurity perceived by Hondurans has remained (statistically) unchanged during the last four years (2004-2008), yet it is relatively high, as shown in Figure III.2. Indeed, the level of insecurity because of the perceived ubiquity of criminality is close to 40 (on our 0-100 scale) in each of the three national surveys.




Figure III.2. Perception of Insecurity in Honduras: 2004-2008

Who is more likely to be a victim of crime? Figure III.3 depicts the results of a logistic regression, where the dependent variable is whether a person has been victim of crime during the past 12 months (vic1r). It shows that crime victimization is significantly greater in Tegucigalpa and other large cities and among the more educated individuals. Perhaps surprisingly, wealth, age, and gender were not factors significantly affecting the probability of being victims of crime. In other words, crime affects the younger as well as the older, and males and females indiscriminately, and tends toward a greater, but not significant, incidence among the poor.




Figure III.3. Determinants of the Probability of Being Victimized by A Crime

Figure III.4 shows that rural areas have the lowest levels of crime while Tegucigalpa, the largest city in the country, has the highest, followed by other large cities such as San Pedro Sula. Yet, the bar graph also shows that crime in Tegucigalpa is ten percentage points higher than elsewhere. One reason for this phenomenon might be the lower levels of income reported in Tegucigalpa, in comparison with other large cities, and the greater inequality in the distribution of income in the capital city. Since poorer people are marginally more exposed to crime (as shown in Figure III.3), a large aggregation of poor people may contribute to an environment where the conditions to prevent crime may be less extant and the temptation to engage in it are great.




Figure III.4. Crime Victimization by Size of Community

Regarding education, Figure III.5 shows that crime victimization is highest among those with higher education (21.5% have been subject to a crime in the past twelve months) and lowest among those with only a primary education or less (11.0% have been subject to a crime in the same time frame). This makes sense because those with higher education will tend to have higher levels of income and will, therefore, be targeted more frequently by criminals.




Figure III.5. Crime Victimization by Educational Level

### The impact of perception of personal security on support for stable democracy

We now look at the impact of crime victimization (vic1r) and perceptions of personal security (aoj11r) on the Churchillian preference for democracy per se, on democratic values, on the legitimacy of political institutions, and on interpersonal trust.

When we analyze the effect of the perception of insecurity, rather than actual victimization, in a multivariate regression (see Appendix 3.3), we find that those who perceive their neighborhood as less secure tend to display lower levels of interpersonal trust, which is the expected finding.

Indeed, as can be seen in Figure III.7, the perception of insecurity is a significant factor affecting people’s interpersonal trust (IP). People who feel the most secure about the place where they reside tend to be more trustful of people, with close to a level of 70 on the 0-100 scale exhibiting interpersonal trust. In turn, those who feel more insecure tend to report lower levels of interpersonal trust (under 50 on the scale).




Figure III.6. Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Interpersonal Trust

The causal linkages between these two variables might go both ways but it is reasonable to believe that the perception of high levels of insecurity bears some indirect relationship to levels of crime actually experienced in Honduras. Certainly, preoccupation about crime, whether based on accurate or inaccurate perceptions of the incidence of crime, is having a detrimental effect on one of the pillars of a stable democracy, interpersonal trust. However, an unexpected result is the lack of a statistically significant relation between the perception of insecurity and people's attitude regarding the legitimacy of political institutions. This lack of association might indicate that Hondurans do not blame their government (directly) for the insecurity they feel.

## Appendix

Appendix III.1. Victimización por crimen

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Edad	0.032	(0.42)
Sexo (Mujer)	-0.019	(-0.25)
Riqueza	-0.161	(-1.52)
Educación	0.233*	(2.07)
Tamaño del lugar	0.340*	(3.70)
Constante	-1.905*	(-26.07)
F = 14.62		
N. de casos = 1497		
* p<0.05		

Appendix III.2. Impacto de la Victimización por Crimen en el Apoyo para una Democracia Estable

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.
Victimización por crimen	0.043	(0.03)	0.042	(0.03)	0.044	(0.02)	-0.000	(0.01)	0.092*	(0.03)
Aprobación del trabajo presidente	0.015	(0.04)	0.040	(0.03)	-0.048	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	-0.056*	(0.03)	0.001	(0.03)	0.024	(0.03)	0.107*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.232	(0.27)	0.336	(0.26)	-0.072	(0.19)	0.123	(0.23)	0.335	(0.25)
Mujer	-0.867	(1.16)	-0.162	(0.98)	0.384	(0.91)	0.843	(0.66)	-1.109	(1.03)
Edad	0.457	(0.25)	0.930*	(0.23)	-0.055	(0.22)	0.066	(0.18)	0.677*	(0.27)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.010*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)	-0.006	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.797	(0.72)	-0.086	(0.52)	0.832	(0.45)	0.320	(0.44)	-0.873	(0.73)
Percep. economía familiar	-5.225*	(1.05)	-1.950*	(0.86)	-2.103	(1.06)	-0.524	(0.94)	-1.239	(1.21)
Tamaño	2.031*	(0.62)	0.925	(0.54)	-0.058	(0.58)	1.397*	(0.61)	1.419	(0.83)
Constante	49.542*	(7.14)	35.201*	(6.09)	50.529*	(5.94)	27.604*	(5.13)	34.209*	(6.28)
R-cuadrado	0.035		0.024		0.016		0.040		0.026	
N. de casos	1323		1383		1303		1385		1439	

\* p<0.05

Appendix III.3. Impacto de la Percepción de Inseguridad en el Apoyo para una Democracia Estable

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.	Coefficiente	Error est.
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.047	(0.04)	-0.050	(0.03)	0.004	(0.03)	0.007	(0.02)	-0.306*	(0.04)
Aprobación trabajo presidente	0.007	(0.04)	0.032	(0.03)	-0.042	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	-0.059*	(0.03)	0.007	(0.03)	0.026	(0.03)	0.111*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.233	(0.27)	0.396	(0.25)	-0.027	(0.20)	0.136	(0.23)	0.355	(0.25)
Mujer	-0.580	(1.16)	-0.036	(0.99)	0.581	(0.89)	0.877	(0.67)	-0.700	(1.06)
Edad	0.512*	(0.26)	0.937*	(0.23)	-0.065	(0.21)	0.052	(0.17)	0.776*	(0.29)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.005	(0.00)	-0.010*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)	-0.008*	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.783	(0.74)	-0.090	(0.52)	0.760	(0.46)	0.251	(0.44)	-0.710	(0.65)
Percepción economía familiar	-5.390*	(1.02)	-2.215*	(0.88)	-2.058	(1.08)	-0.400	(0.95)	-2.593*	(1.14)
Tamaño	1.645*	(0.63)	0.709	(0.54)	-0.155	(0.60)	1.435*	(0.60)	0.058	(0.69)
Constante	53.723*	(7.37)	38.901*	(6.47)	50.875*	(6.16)	26.978*	(5.39)	54.198*	(6.42)
R-cuadrado	0.033		0.024		0.011		0.042		0.091	
N. de casos	1320		1378		1301		1379		1436	
* p<0.05										

# Chapter IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance and Civil Society Participation on the Support for Stable Democracy

## Theoretical framework

What role, if any, do local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. Moreover, while in Latin America (and in many other regions of the world) citizens participate actively in local civil society organizations, their participation in national organizations is far more limited. Thus, while many citizens participate in their local parent-teacher associations, and community development associations, a much smaller proportion participate in national-level education or development organizations. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local civil society organizations and local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the exception of perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, with many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that powerfully determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America, Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has

traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government. In a similar way, civil society organizations at the national level have often been elite centered, excluding much of the public, especially those beyond the national capitals. Yet, citizens have been very active in local civil society organizations, sometimes at levels rivaling the advanced industrial democracies (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Paxton 1999; Paxton 2002).

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falleti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007).

Delegation of authority to a centralized party in the international arena is often believed to provide a better way to design and implement rules in an anarchic world. In contrast, one of the most important advantages of decentralization at the national level consists in bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Alburquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).<sup>27</sup>

Is decentralization a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase on the competence for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cálix and Alcázar forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views on democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

Equally important in the democracy equation can be civil society participation level. For many years it was thought that only in the advanced industrial democracies was there an active civil society. This thinking was crystalized in the well-known book *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba 1963). That view was disputed, however, by subsequent studies (Booth and Seligson 1978; Verba, *et al.* 1978; Seligson and Booth 1979; Almond and Verba 1980). Citizens played an active role in civil society, even during the period of dictatorship that rules in much of Latin America prior to the 1980s.

<sup>27</sup> There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

When governance is very restrictive, citizens can be discouraged from joining associations and thus civil society can atrophy. On the other hand, does participation in civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy? There are many arguments that it should and does, the best known of which is Robert Putnam's classic work on Italy (Putnam 1993). The theory is that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work with and eventually trust each other. This should mean that interpersonal trust, one of our four measures of support for stable democracy, will be higher among those who participate in civil society (Edwards and Foley 1997; Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999a; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000; Richard and Booth 2000; Gibson 2001; Putnam 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). It may also mean that civil society participation will increase tolerance for others, as citizens of different walks of life come to deal with each other, but it could also lead to growing animosity (Armony 2004). In recent work, it has been shown cross nationally for 31 nations, that citizens active in multiple association express higher levels of interpersonal trust (Paxton 2007).

### *How Might Civil Society Participation and Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?*

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of "outsiders." There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy.

### **Measuring Local Government Participation and Perceptions**

In this chapter, we will focus on five variables: trust in the local government (**b32r**), support of decentralization of national government's responsibilities (**lg12a**), support for decentralization of economic resources (**lg12b**), satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality (**sg11r**), and civic participation at the local level (**civpart**). The ultimate goal is to assess the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government (**sg11r**) and local civic participation, our two governance variables in this chapter on support for stable democracy.

**B32.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su (municipalidad)?

**LGL2A.** Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Mucho más al gobierno central
- (2) Algo más al gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más a la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad
- (88) NS/NR

**LGL2B.** Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Mucho más el gobierno central
- (2) Algo más el gobierno central
- (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad
- (4) Algo más la municipalidad
- (5) Mucho más la municipalidad
- (88) NS/NR

**SGL1.** ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR

### Measuring civil society participation

For many years, LAPOP has measured civil society participation with a standard battery of questions. This series, known as the CP (as in “community participation”) is shown below. In order to provide a comprehensive scale of these items, LAPOP has created an overall scale of civil society participation that incorporates the community-level civil society organizations in our survey.<sup>28</sup> The overall index is based on the degree of participation each respondent has in the organizations listed below.<sup>29</sup>

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]					
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK/DR
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents’ association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	8

### Honduran views on local government in comparative perspective

The first variable to analyze is *trust in local government* (B32r). Figure IV.1 shows how Honduras ranks among other countries of the region. Even though there is not much difference between countries, Hondurans do exhibit relatively low levels of trust in their local governments, with a score of 45.5 on the 0-100 scale exhibiting such trust versus five countries that exceeded 57(Dominican Republic, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and El Salvador). Trust among Hondurans is significantly higher only than among Haitians, the country with the very lowest ranking (38.3 on trust in municipal governments).

<sup>28</sup> This analysis does not include civil society participation in political parties, which are examined in the chapter on elections. It also does not include non-locally based organizations, such as professional organizations.

<sup>29</sup> The scale is computed by converting the four response categories into a 0-100 basis, and to take the average of the four. If a respondent provides a “don’t know” to more than two of the four items, the respondent is given a missing score for the series.




Figure IV.1. Trust in the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.2 indicates that on *satisfaction with local services* (sg11r) the rank order of countries is very similar to that for *trust in one's local government*, which suggests a strong correlation between the two. In fact both variables are strongly correlated ( $r=.54$ ;  $p<.0001$ ). Note that in both Figures IV.1 and IV.2, Haiti, Jamaica, Panamá, Paraguay, and Perú rank in the bottom five, Honduras ranks just above these countries, and the top five includes the Dominican Republic and Colombia.




Figure IV.2. Satisfaction with Local Services in Comparative Perspective

In terms of support for decentralization of responsibilities from the central government to local governments (lgl2ar), Hondurans rank at the very bottom of the list of hemiperic countries, as seen in Figure IV.3. In fact, Honduras was significantly lower than all other countries in the Barometer of the Americas, with the single exception of Haiti, the second-lowest ranking country, where the difference between Honduras and Haiti is not statistically significant.




Figure IV.3. Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities in Comparative Perspective

Support for decentralization of economic resources, i.e., for making more tax revenues available to local governments (lgl2br), was also the lowest among Hondurans. As with the case of decentralization of responsibilities, the level of support for decentralization of economic resources was significantly lower in Honduras than in all other AmericasBarometer countries, except for Haiti. Obviously, the relatively low levels of satisfaction with and trust in the local government seen in Honduras do not provide a foundation from which Hondurans might seek decentralization of local government. The contrast with other countries in the hemisphere could scarcely be more striking in terms of the disinclination of Hondurans to provide local governments with the fiscal tools to address service provision – on a 0-100 scale, Honduras scores 35 on providing more money to local governments than to the central government. In contrast, in Colombia, Bolivia, Paraguay and Costa Rica the comparable scores are in the range of 56-61.




Figure IV.4. Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources in Comparative Perspective

### Honduras: The nature of experience with local government

In the case of Honduras, people exhibit relatively low levels of trust in the municipal government, but these levels, however, are higher than those of other state institutions, as can be seen in Figure VI.30. Although the level of confidence in local governments is marginally greater than that exhibited in the central government (45.5 versus 42.8 on the 0-100 scale), there is, in fact, no statistically significant difference between the two. Therefore, Hondurans would not automatically see local government as the obvious “fix” for an unresponsive central government. Nonetheless, the level of trust in local government is higher than those regarding Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, which makes it among the more plausible, among a list of not-very-plausible, agents for leading reform efforts.




Figure IV.5. Comparison of Trust Exhibited in Local Government and Other National Institutions, Honduras – 2008.

Figure IV.6 shows that Hondurans are not very inclined to participate in meetings of their municipal governments. Only 1 in 10 citizens reported having attended at least one of these meetings during the past year.




Figure IV.6. Participation at the local level

Further, Figure IV.7 shows that the level of participation in municipal meetings by Hondurans has decreased significantly from 18.5% in 2006 to 10.3% in 2008, although it should be noted that during this time frame a new type of meeting, *Poder Ciudadano*, was introduced at the local level which may have supplanted some attendance at local government meetings. Analysis of attendance at *Poder Ciudadano* meetings with the President of the Republic appears in Chapter VIII.




Figure IV.7. Participation in Local Government Meetings: 2004-2008

Yet, participation in local government cannot be discarded as a tool with which to recoup some faith in the political system. When we examine the levels of trust in the local government between those who have attended municipal meetings and those who have not, the difference is very marked. Figure IV.8 shows that those who have attended municipal meetings are inclined to express higher levels of satisfaction with their local government than are those who did not attend such meetings, and by a significant margin of 58.5 to 43.9 on the 0-100 scale.




Figure IV.8. Effect on Trust in Local Government of Attendance at Meetings

Another measure of citizen participation is whether people make demands on their local government. Invoking this criterion, the level of participation of Hondurans is even lower. Only 1 of every 13 Hondurans (7.8%) has made a demand on or presented a petition to their local government during the past twelve months, as is displayed in Figure IV.9.




Figure IV.9. Demand-Making Directed Toward the Local Government

Just as attendance at municipal meetings has decreased in the last two years, so too has demand-making vis à vis the local government declined, from 13.5% having presented petitions or made demands in 2006 to the 7.8% previously mentioned who did so in 2008. And this drop is also statistically significant, as can be seen from the non-overlapping confidence intervals in Figure IV.10. Yet, as in the case of attendance at meetings, those who made demands also show higher levels of trust in their local government (data not shown). Hence, in order for local governments to gain their citizens' trust, they should encourage greater attendance and involvement by the populace in discussions and decision-making processes of municipalities. That would not only help to increase trust in local institutions but perhaps might also enhance the quality of services provided by the municipal government and popular satisfaction with them.




Figure IV.10. Demand-Making to the Local Government: 2006-2008

Not surprisingly, satisfaction with services provided by the municipal government is also an important factor in determining the degree of trust in local government institutions, as shown in Figure IV.11 below. Those who are more satisfied with the municipal services are also more inclined to trust their local government, with confidence in local government growing from under 35 at the lowest levels of service satisfaction to nearly 70 at the highest levels.




Figure IV.11. Satisfaction with Local Services and Trust in Local Government

In summary, attendance at meetings of the local government, petition-presenting or demand-making at those meetings, and satisfaction with local services all seem significantly to increase overall trust in local government, when examined in bivariate relationships. Such increased trust does, in turn, increase the support of citizens for a hypothetical decentralization of responsibilities to the local government (analysis not shown). Yet, when we examine the individual impact of each of the three factors mentioned above in a multivariate analysis, only attendance at meetings and satisfaction with local services come close to being statistically significant (positive) predictors of support for decentralization, as can be seen in Figure IV.12. In other words, the more Honduran citizens attend municipal meetings and are satisfied with the services provided by their municipal government, the more they support giving their local government greater decision-making power.




Figure IV.12. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to Local Governments

Figure IV.13 shows that those who reported having attended municipal meetings were more likely to support decentralization of responsibilities to this level of government.




Figure IV.13. Local Government Meeting Attendance and Support for Decentralization of Governmental Responsibilities

Similarly, those who were more satisfied with the services provided by local government are also more likely to support decentralization (see Figure IV.14). Support for decentralization increases from about 29 among those most dissatisfied with the services of local government to over 39 among those most satisfied.




Figure IV.14. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities

When, in Figure IV.15, we examine the impact of satisfaction with local services (and of other possible causal variables) on support for decentralization of economic resources, we find, however, that there is no significant association between any independent variables and support for decentralization of resources. No matter how satisfied citizens might be with the services provided by their municipality, they are neither significantly more nor less inclined to support a greater allocation of funds to local governing institutions. This finding is somewhat surprising but might simply be the result of people’s unwillingness to pay more taxes either to their municipality or to *any* level of government.




Figure IV.15. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources: I

Notwithstanding the lack of a direct association between individual experiences with local government (such as attendance at meetings, demand-making, and satisfaction with local government services) and support for a greater allocation of funds to local government, trust in the local government does have an impact on support for decentralization of resources. Figure IV.16 shows that trust in the municipality, which can be increased by greater attendance at meetings, demand-making experiences, and satisfaction with local government services, does significantly increase support for more funds being directed to local governments. So the impact of attendance at meetings, demand-making experiences, and satisfaction with local government on support for decentralization is indirect, via producing greater trust in local government, which in turn generates support for decentralization.




Figure IV.16. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources: II

Figure IV.17 shows that at a bivariate level of analysis, those who have a higher level of trust in the local governments are more likely to support greater decentralization of fiscal resources.




Figure IV.17. Satisfaction with Services of Local Government and Support for Decentralization

This finding suggests that trust in local governments is crucial to generating public support for decentralization. Among the variables that increase trust in local governmental institutions are attendance at their meetings, petitioning and demand-making experiences at the local level, and satisfaction with the services that they render, but these determinants of trust in local governance are not exclusive. Obviously, additional factors do affect people's trust in their local government, and might be identified in future research. But for policy-makers and activists interested in building support for decentralization, paying attention to how citizens are treated in local institutions may be crucial to building support for moving revenue streams downward to local institutions.

## The impact of satisfaction with local services (sgl1r) on support for stable democracy

As noted in the analysis above, satisfaction with services provided by local governments is an important factor in increasing trust for municipal governments. Perhaps even more importantly, satisfaction with municipal services turns out also to have a very strong correlation with all five indicators of support for stable democracy, particularly with interpersonal trust and the Churchillian preference for democracy (see regression results in the appendix).

### *Relationship between Satisfaction with Local Services and Preference for Democracy*

Figure IV.18 below clearly shows that citizens who are satisfied with the services provided by their municipal government are also inclined to report higher levels of preference for democracy, conceived in the Churchillian sense of “being better than all the alternatives.” Those who see services at the local level as “bad” or “very bad” exhibit preferences for democracy in the range of 50 to 55 while those who see local services as being “good” display a preference for democracy over other forms of government that exceeds 70.




Figure IV.18. Satisfaction with Local Government Services and Preference for Democracy

*Relationship between satisfaction with local services and the right to political contestation*

Although a bit more curvilinear, there is a comparable relationship between citizens who are more satisfied with the services of their local government and the reporting of higher levels of respect for the rights of political opposition, another important condition for the consolidation of democracy. Figure IV.19 indicates that those who see local services as “bad” or “very bad” do not exceed 58 on the 0-100 scale support for the right of political contestation, while those who see local government services as “good” offer a higher level of support for the right of expressing political opposition, i.e., 70.




Figure IV.19. Satisfaction with Local Government Services and the Right of Political Opposition

*Relationship between satisfaction with local services and political tolerance*

Even more curvilinear is the relationship between levels of satisfaction with the services of local government and political tolerance, as seen in Figure IV.20. Those most satisfied with the services of local government express higher levels of political tolerance, while those who are neutral about municipal services or see them as “bad” express much lower levels of tolerance. Those who see such services as “very bad” express slightly higher levels of tolerance. Yet, overall, there is a significant increment in political tolerance as one moves from Honduran citizens dissatisfied with the services provided by local governments to those satisfied with such services.




Figure IV.20. Satisfaction with Local Government Services and Political Tolerance

*Relationship between satisfaction with local services and political legitimacy*

Believing in the legitimacy of political institutions is also influenced significantly by one’s degree of satisfaction with local services. Figure IV.21 shows that, overall, the levels attained by Hondurans on the LAPOP political legitimacy scale are very low, even among those who are most satisfied with the quality of local services, which means that there are other factors affecting the political legitimacy of institutions in Honduras. And, once again, the relationship between satisfaction with local level services and an indicator of democratic political culture is curvilinear, with the greatest gap coming between the value on the legitimacy scale (45) for those assessing municipal services as “good” and those evaluating such services as “bad” (35). So, for belief in the political legitimacy of (national) institutions to increase further, it would be somewhat helpful for citizens to be satisfied with the services provided by the institutions of their local governments.




Figure IV.21. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Political Legitimacy

### *Relationship between satisfaction with local services and interpersonal trust*

Finally, satisfaction with local services has its most dramatic effect on interpersonal trust, another critical component in a democratic culture. As people become more satisfied with the services they receive from municipal authorities, they are more inclined to report higher levels of interpersonal trust. Figure IV.22 illustrates that such trust grows from an index value of only 35 among those who see local government services as “very bad” to over 65 among those who see such services as “good.”




Figure IV.22. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust

The analysis above has clearly shown that trust in the local government, and, particularly, satisfaction with the services provided by the local government, or *municipalidad*, have strong effects on people's attitudes and support, not only for their local government but also for the development of a stable democracy. These findings are very important for Honduras, whose democracy may presently be at risk, as will be explained in Chapter VI ahead. They imply that one important tool which Hondurans might deploy to save their democratic system would be to enable a better provision of services by the municipalities. Obviously, doing so would require not only the decentralization of decision-making power, from the central government to the municipalities, but, most importantly, would also require providing the financial resources needed for local governments to enhance their record of service delivery.

## The level and effects of local civic participation in Honduras

Another important form of local participation is through local organizations of the civil society (e.g. neighborhood associations, parent organizations, etc.). Does participation in the local civil society play a role in increasing support for stable democracy, just like attending municipal meetings does? Even though there are many arguments that it should (e.g., Putnam 1993), this section examines such relation in Honduras. The general hypotheses are that citizens who participate in civil society organizations will have higher levels of interpersonal trust, of political tolerance, and ultimately, of support for a stable democracy.

### *The Level of Local Civic Participation in Comparative Perspective*

A comparative analysis of all countries in the LAPOP series shows that Hondurans have a relatively high rate of participation in meetings of religious groups, ranking 6<sup>th</sup> among countries studied in 2008. As shown in Figure IV.23, almost two-thirds of Hondurans (63.1%) report attending religious meetings of some type. At the low end of the hemispheric spectrum, only 26% report such attendance in Uruguay, while some 81.6% report participation in religious activities in Haiti, representing the maximum in the AmericasBarometer.




Figure IV.23. Participation in Meetings of Any Religious Group [Catholic, Protestant or Other] in Comparative Perspective

Hondurans' rate of participation in meetings of a parents association at school was not as high as was their rate of participation in religious groups. Figure IV.24 shows that roughly two out of five Hondurans (38.9%) report attending this type of meeting, which places Honduras close to the median ranking (Costa Rica at 39.3% attendance). Interestingly, in both the United States and Canada, each a seeming paragon of democratic life, participation in such organizations is very low (23.6% and 24.7%), much lower than in Honduras, although low-ranking countries may be so in part because of having an older demographic profile.




Figure IV.24. Participation in Meetings of a Parents Association in Comparative Perspective

In terms of participation in meetings of committees for community improvement, the absolute level of participation is even lower. Only about one in four Hondurans (26.3%) report participation in this kind of community organization. However, as is seen in Figure IV.25, Honduras again ranks just below the median value of 26.7% (between Ecuador and El Salvador) among AmericasBarometer countries, which range from only 13.3% participation (in otherwise democratic Uruguay) to 50.0% in Canada.




Figure IV.25. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements in Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.26 shows an even lower absolute level of participation in meetings of women’s associations among Hondurans. Slightly more than 10 percent reported participating in meetings of this type of organization, placing Honduras somewhat further below the median hemispheric score, i.e., Chile’s 11.9% participation rate.




Figure IV.26. Participation in Meetings of Women’s Associations or Groups in Comparative Perspective

### *The Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for Stable Democracy*

As shown in the comparative analysis above, Hondurans tend to have levels of participation just under the median in many of the organizations of civil society, with the exception of participation in religious organizations on which Hondurans rank relatively high. The following analysis examines the extent to which such civil society participation might influence various indexes relevant to support for a stable democracy.

The multivariate analysis presented in Figure IV.27 shows that there is, in fact, a significant positive association between attending parents' meetings at schools, attending meetings of religious organizations and expressing a preference for the Churchillian notion of democracy (see regression results in the Appendix). Those who participate in such organizations are more likely to be supportive of the idea that democracy is the best political system, regardless its imperfections. The relationship between attending community improvement meetings and support for the Churchillian view of democracy, however, is not only non-significant, but almost non-existent.




Figure IV.27. Impact of Local Civil Society Participation on Support for Churchillian Democracy

An almost identical pattern results when the dependent variable becomes support for the right of public contestation. As seen in Figure IV.28, those who attend meetings of parents or religious organizations most frequently are more likely to be supportive of the right to express opposition to policy choices made by public officials than are persons who attend such meetings rarely (regression results are found in the Appendix)




Figure IV.28. Impact of Local Civil Society Participation on Support for the Right of Public Contestation

The pattern changes, however, when the dependent variable changes to political tolerance, as is revealed clearly in Figure IV.29. Participation in religious organizations does not exhibit significant association with political tolerance, but participation in neighborhood and parent organizations are both significant predictors of such tolerance (regression results will be found in the Appendix).




Figure IV.29. Impact of Local Civil Participation on Political Tolerance

Participation in none of these three types of local organizations representative of civil society has any significant effect, however, on popular views of the political legitimacy of institutions of the state. As can be seen in Figure IV.30, all three lines intersect with the 0 axis, indicating that none of these three participation variables has a significant effect on political legitimacy.




Figure IV.30. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Belief in the Political Legitimacy

Yet, participation in these three types of local civil society organizations *does* influence interpersonal trust, a crucial component of democratic political culture. As is apparent in Figure IV.31, the more people participate in these three types of organizations, the higher their level of interpersonal trust.




Figure IV.31. Impact of Local Civil Society Participation on Interpersonal Trust

Hence, participation in local organizations does increase support for all pillars of a stable democracy but one, i.e., political legitimacy. In other words, participation in the organizations of civil society is likely to increase beliefs and attitudes consistent with and supportive of a democratic system (i.e. preference for the idea of democracy per se, support for the right to political contestation, political tolerance, and interpersonal trust). However, such participation does not generate supportive attitudes toward the state apparatus, or *the government* (executive, legislature, judiciary, and the organizations that purport to guide the government, i.e., political parties), at least not in Honduras. Such a finding suggests that Hondurans support democracy and the values associated with democracy more than they support the particular manifestation of democracy that recent national governments and their performance represent.

In summary, the dynamics of participation in both governmental institutions and civil society at the local level seem to play a very important role in generating a culture supportive of a stable democracy. A supportive culture is not only engendered by participation in local organizations of the civil society, such as parent organizations or religious groups, but also by more direct involvement with local government simply via attending municipal meetings or by

demand-making when one attends such meetings. The most important effect, however, flows from people's satisfaction with the services provided by the local government. Satisfaction with municipal services turns out to have a very strong and significant correlation with all five indicators of a culture supportive of stable democracy. Yet, while local participation, in general, helps to increase support for most conditions conducive to establishing a stable democracy, it does very little to increase belief in the legitimacy of the central government. It seems that, just as trust in the local government is increased by greater satisfaction with local services, so might belief in the political legitimacy of state institutions increase with greater satisfaction being taken in the performance of the national government, particularly where greater success is attained in curbing corruption (as shown in Chapter 2).

## Appendix

**Appendix IV.1. Pronosticadores del apoyo a la descentralización de las responsabilidades**

<b>VARIABLES INDEPENDIENTES</b>	<b>COEFICIENTES</b>	<b>t</b>
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.050	(1.95)
Presentó petición a municipalidad	-0.024	(-0.78)
Asistió a reunión municipal	0.054	(1.79)
Educación	0.008	(0.20)
Mujer	0.025	(0.99)
Edad	-0.006	(-0.18)
Riqueza	-0.099	(-1.81)
Tamaño	-0.055	(-0.95)
Constante	0.008	(0.21)
R-cuadrado = 0.013		
N. de casos = 1341		

**Appendix IV.1. Pronosticadores del apoyo a la descentralización de los recursos económicos**

<b>VARIABLES INDEPENDIENTES</b>	<b>COEFICIENTES</b>	<b>t</b>
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.021	(0.66)
Presentó petición a municipalidad	0.004	(0.14)
Asistió a reunión municipal	0.023	(0.72)
Educación	0.038	(0.88)
Mujer	0.016	(0.80)
Edad	0.035	(1.02)
Riqueza	-0.072	(-1.48)
Tamaño	-0.005	(-0.10)
Constante	0.021	(0.63)
R-cuadrado = 0.006		
N. de casos = 1335		

## Appendix IV.2. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.364*	(0.04)	0.245*	(0.03)	0.140*	(0.03)	0.157*	(0.04)	0.479*	(0.04)
Aprobación trabajo presidente	-0.059	(0.04)	-0.008	(0.03)	-0.075*	(0.03)				
Interés en la política	-0.070*	(0.03)	-0.005	(0.03)	0.033	(0.03)	0.099*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.275	(0.24)	0.318	(0.28)	-0.061	(0.19)	0.077	(0.24)	0.370	(0.25)
Mujer	-0.116	(1.16)	0.270	(1.04)	0.651	(1.01)	0.909	(0.69)	-0.302	(1.17)
Edad	0.453	(0.28)	0.934*	(0.25)	-0.049	(0.23)	0.106	(0.19)	0.577*	(0.26)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.010*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.005	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.544	(0.61)	-0.039	(0.53)	0.818	(0.44)	0.375	(0.42)	-0.997	(0.64)
Percepción economía familiar	-4.877*	(0.94)	-1.794	(0.93)	-1.959	(1.01)	-0.264	(0.91)	-1.894	(1.18)
Tamaño	1.866*	(0.54)	0.928	(0.54)	0.054	(0.51)	1.405*	(0.53)	1.206	(0.65)
Constante	35.829*	(7.55)	25.555*	(6.42)	44.058*	(5.81)	18.375*	(5.65)	15.289*	(5.47)
R-cuadrado	0.090		0.061		0.029		0.072		0.125	
N. de casos	1263		1317		1247		1314		1361	
* p<0.05										

**Appendix IV.4. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the idea of democracy per se**

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	0.207*	(6.91)
Asociación padres de familia	0.177*	(4.87)
Comité de mejoras	0.006	(0.23)
Aprobación trabajo del presidente	-0.043	(-1.54)
Interés en la política	-0.071*	(-2.76)
Educación	0.008	(0.21)
Mujer	-0.087*	(-4.10)
Edad	-0.179	(-1.25)
Edad al cuadrado	0.213	(1.45)
Riqueza	0.109*	(2.51)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.122*	(-4.01)
Tamaño	0.109*	(3.57)
Constante	0.013	(0.36)
R-cuadrado = 0.110		
N. de casos = 1266		
* p<0.05		

**Appendix IV.3. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Support for the right of Public Contestation**

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	0.204*	(6.52)
Asociación padres de familia	0.136*	(4.69)
Comité o junta de mejoras	-0.010	(-0.32)
Aprobación trabajo del presidente	-0.014	(-0.50)
Interés en la política	-0.000	(-0.01)
Educación	0.032	(0.71)
Mujer	-0.070*	(-3.03)
Edad	0.250	(1.62)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.191	(-1.24)
Riqueza	0.032	(0.79)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.036	(-1.09)
Tamaño	0.061	(1.74)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.07)
R-cuadrado= 0.085		
N. de casos= 1327		
* p<0.05		

**Appendix IV.4. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Political Tolerance**

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	-0.055	(-1.50)
Asociación padres de familia	0.128*	(4.42)
Comité o junta de mejoras	0.090*	(2.06)
Aprobación trabajo del Presidente	-0.067*	(-2.23)
Interés en la política	0.013	(0.35)
Educación	-0.041	(-1.00)
Mujer	0.005	(0.19)
Edad	-0.231	(-1.52)
Edad al cuadrado	0.220	(1.43)
Riqueza	0.086	(1.93)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.080	(-1.70)
Tamaño	-0.024	(-0.56)
Constante	-0.024	(-0.58)
R-cuadrado = 0.036		
N. de casos = 1247		
* p<0.05		

**Appendix IV.5. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Belief in the Political Legitimacy**

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	-0.027	(-0.81)
Asociación padres de familia	0.032	(0.85)
Comité de mejoras	0.024	(0.91)
Interés en la política	0.174*	(3.65)
Educación	0.026	(0.51)
Mujer	0.026	(1.23)
Edad	-0.044	(-0.29)
Edad al cuadrado	0.055	(0.38)
Riqueza	0.043	(0.80)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.029	(-0.63)
Tamaño	0.112*	(2.19)
Constante	-0.006	(-0.13)
R-cuadrado = 0.047		
N. de casos = 1325		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV.6. Impact of Local Civic Participation on Interpersonal Trust

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Organización religiosa	0.234*	(7.70)
Asociación padres de familia	0.091*	(3.41)
Comité de mejoras	0.074*	(2.10)
Educación	0.030	(0.77)
Mujer	-0.076*	(-4.03)
Edad	-0.015	(-0.11)
Edad al cuadrado	0.046	(0.33)
Riqueza	-0.017	(-0.35)
Percepción economía familiar	-0.010	(-0.29)
Tamaño	0.066*	(2.16)
Constante	0.010	(0.22)
R-cuadrado = 0.091		
N. de casos = 1377		
N. de casos = 1359		
* p<0.05		

# Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy

## Theoretical framework<sup>30</sup>

The final chapter in Part II of this study deals with the question on the impact of the perception of government performance on support for a stable democracy. It has become common place in the field of democratic governance, and talking about election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often because the economy is not performing well. Citizens directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the central state. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perception of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges, and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s when researchers began to take note. During this time in mostly the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a large drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events, but, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were tending to fall more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion—as perceptions of economic conditions, both sociotropic and isotropic, improved, so to did one’s opinion of their political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support, being political community, the regime and political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukman and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical

<sup>30</sup> This theoretical framework was prepared by Brian Faughnan.

principles about what is right in the political sphere” (241) while specific support is support for the current incumbents within the political system.

Despite the fact that early research focused on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between either Easton’s three tiers or diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, bad economic outlooks and perceptions affected “peoples’ feelings about their leaders and institutions” (2) and that “the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions” (5).

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed somewhat into doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which according to Dalton “offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies” (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society’s economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of determining support of the system within that society.

In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observed a moderate correlation with a person’s financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, those citizens who were more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tended to be more trustful of government, however according to Dalton, “perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker. In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government accountable for the state of the national economy, they are less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall” (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton’s conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones, that “the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous” (127) within the OECD nations.

Turning now toward a government’s economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions, which according to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the authors preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58), however they caution that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed. Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one’s individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system, those citizens who hold higher evaluations of both the national as well as their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those citizens

who hold lower perceptions. Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data will be used to examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

### *How might perception of government economic performance affect support for stable democracy?*

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic performance, may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time might have a more negative sense of social capital, but we do not see the relationship as being particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.

### *Measuring perception of government economic performance*

A new index (**econperf**), which stands for “Perception of Government Economic Performance” was created using N1, how well does the government fight poverty, and N12, how well does the government fight unemployment. The syntax can be found in the appendix.

**N1.** ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?

**N12.** ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?

### *Honduran evaluations of government performance in comparative perspective*

Figure V.1 shows that Hondurans exhibit one of the lowest average evaluations of their government’s economic performance in Latin America, exceeding only those accorded by Haitians and Paraguayans. Such a finding is not surprising at all, however, considering the prevalent poverty in the country, which would take decades to overcome even with a rapid pace of economic growth.




Figure V.1. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

*The Effects of Honduran Evaluations of Governmental Performance*

Despite the deep poverty of their country, when Hondurans were asked about the problem they perceive as the main problem of the country (Question A4), 34% cited economic problems, behind 39% who cited security problems. This is not to say that Hondurans are not preoccupied with their economic problems but simply that crime and insecurity are perceived by a plurality as the most pressing problem at present, as previously shown in Chapter 3. Figure V.2 shows how responses to A4 were distributed, when, in early 2008, Hondurans were asked to identify the “major national problem” they saw (see how specific answers are allocated to categories in Appendix 5.1).<sup>31</sup>




Figure V.2. The Most Important Problems in the Country

<sup>31</sup> The answers to QA4 (Which is the main problem of the country?) referenced many different issues and were therefore recoded into a finite number of categories (i.e. economic, security, services, political, others). Economic issues specified by Hondurans include poverty, unemployment, economic crisis, inflation, lack of credit and land, among others.

When we look only at the individual problems that were cited with the highest frequency (Figure V.3), instead of the larger categories used in the prior figure, we can see that *delinquency and crime* are certainly Hondurans' main concern (35.9%), followed by *corruption* (11.4%), and then by specific economic concerns such as *the state of the national economy* (9.7%), *poverty* (9.1%), and *unemployment* (8.7%). Nonetheless, even though crime is the most immediate concern, for the purpose of understanding political culture, it should be noted that the causes of violence in Honduras are not political, as was the case in Colombia or El Salvador in the 1990s, but seem to result from economic causes. Most of the crimes involve burglary, kidnapping, and even murder for purely economic reasons, among other crimes. There is also increasing concern with organized crime, particularly as related to drug trafficking.<sup>32</sup>




Figure V.3. Disaggregated View of the Most Important Problems in the Country

<sup>32</sup> Oversea Security Advisory Council (<https://www.osac.gov/Regions/country.cfm?country=124> ; accessed on June, 25, 2008) and US Department of State ([http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis\\_pa\\_tw/cis/cis\\_1135.html](http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1135.html) ; accessed on June 25, 2008)

In spite of the obvious preoccupation of Hondurans with crime and personal security issues, this chapter focuses on their perceptions of the relative success or failure of the government in dealing with the very substantial economic challenges faced by the country, and the impact of such perceptions on support for a stable democracy. There are two main ways in which people view the state of the economy: 1) through their perceptions of the condition of the national economy (e.g. inflation, unemployment, etc.) and, 2) through perceptions of their own personal economic performance. In academic literature, these are labeled, respectively the “sociotropic” and “ideotropic” views of the economy. In the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey, we measure the first with SOCT1 and the second with IDIO1.

**SOCT1.** Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8

**IDIO1.** ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

Muy buena.....	1
Buena.....	2
Ni buena, ni mala.....	3
Mala.....	4
Muy mala.....	5
NS/NR.....	8

It is important to note that these items measure citizen perception of the *state of the economy*, either in general terms or as citizens personally experience economic conditions, but do not seek to elicit any direct mental association between such perceptions and the role that the government may have had in producing economic outcomes. Generally speaking, people do blame or praise their incumbent government for the performance of the national economy (a sociotropic evaluation), and are more likely to do that than to attribute their own personal economic situation to governmental performance in economic management (an ideotropic evaluation). Citizens may be inclined to believe that their personal economic circumstances have something to do with their own efforts. Yet, such is not always the case and for that reason we believe it is appropriate to use both of these items as predictors of citizen evaluations of regime economic performance.

Figure V.4 displays the results of a regression analysis in which the dependent variable to be explained is each citizen's perception of the economic performance of the Honduran government (econperf) and the independent variables include the sociotropic (soct1r) and idiotropic (idio1r) items, as well as standard socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of individuals. From this figure, we can observe that only the sociotropic variable, in addition to age, are statistically significant predictors of variation in citizen evaluations of governmental economic performance. The lack of significance of the idiotropic variable seems to suggest that people might well consider other factors, such as their own skills or the entrepreneurship displayed by some individuals, but not by all, as additional features accounting for their personal economic situation.




Figure V.4. Predictors of the Perception of Government Economic Performance

Individuals who exhibit positive perceptions of the current national economic situation are also likely to exhibit a positive view of the economic performance of the government, as can be seen in Figure V.6. The index value on governmental economic performance moves from about 23 among those thinking that the national economic situation is “very bad” to a value of 40 among those seeing the national economy as “very good.”




Figure V.5. Impact of Perceptions of National Economic Situation on Perception of Government Economic Performance

Similarly, older individuals (60+) are more likely to approve of the economic performance of the government than are those in younger age cohorts, with the index value on evaluations of governmental economic performance increasing from under 28 among the younger age groups to over 31 among those 60 and up, as seen in Figure V.6. However, it should be noted that most Hondurans evaluate the economic performance of the government as “poor” (clearly in the lower half of a 0-100 scale), particularly among those in “working age” cohorts.




Figure V.6. Impact of the Perception of Personal Economic Situation on Perception of Government Economic Performance

### *The perception of Government Economic Performance and Its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy*

How does the perception of the economic performance of the government affect the support of Hondurans for stable democracy? The results of five different linear regressions show that perceptions of the economic performance of the government do affect people’s preference for democracy, their beliefs in the right of political contestation, and their perception of the legitimacy of political institutions (see regression results in Appendix 5.3).<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> The dependent variables were each of the five requirements for a stable democracy and the independent variables included the variable *econperf* and demographic variables.

Figure V.7 shows that people who perceive the economic performance of the government to be very poor (0-25 index values) or very good (75-100 index values) report higher levels of (a Churchillian) preference for democracy than do those rating the government performance as average (in the 25-50 range). The difference ranges from average scores of 51 at the low point on support for democracy to scores of 63-67 at the two opposite ends of the governmental performance index. This finding may look contradictory at first glance but might well indicate dual interpretations of and responses to the question of preference for democracy (ing4). While those who perceive their government to perform well on economic issues might believe, consequently, that Honduran democracy is working well and would therefore support it, via contrasting logic those who disapprove of the economic performance of the government might infer that the system is “not democratic enough” yet might be more supportive of “more democracy” as a way to improve national economic performance.




Figure V.7. Perception of Economic Performance and Support for Democracy (Churchillian)

A similar pattern emerges regarding the support to the right to engage in political contestation. As can be seen in Figure V.8, those who approve most strongly of the economic performance of the government are among those most likely to support the right to contestation, when compared to those with “average” levels of approval. Yet, those who disapprove of the economic performance of the government also report high levels of support for the right of political contestation. The variance ranges from “support for political contestation” scores of 51 in the mid-range of economic performance evaluations to scores of roughly 63 on “support for political contestation” at the upper and lower evaluations of the government’s economic performance. Again, political contestation may be (correctly) perceived as a way to demand better economic performance by the government.




Figure V.8. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Right to Opposition

The pattern changes completely when considering the effect of evaluations of economic performance by the government on belief in the legitimacy of political institutions. There is a very strong positive correlation between the two variables. The more people approve of the economic performance of the government, the greater their belief in the legitimacy of state institutions. This is by far the most significant effect of the perceived economic performance of the Honduran government on a political culture that would be supportive of and consistent with stable democracy. In Figure V.9 one can see a consistent (monotonic) upward trend, with legitimacy scores increasing from 32 among those least satisfied with governmental economic performance to above 65 among those most satisfied with economic performance.




Figure V.9. Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Political legitimacy

The findings in this chapter clearly reveal that, unlike the policy-making arena of crime, people seem to assign the government much more responsibility for the state of the economy. This chapter, and the preceding ones, have shown that the perception of extensive corruption, dissatisfaction with the quality of services rendered by local governments, and dissatisfaction with what is perceived, generally, as a very poor economic performance by the national government is having a detrimental effect on creating a political culture supportive of stable democracy. Yet, our analysis has also revealed that the main negative effect of low evaluations of governmental economic performance is on the belief in the legitimacy of existing political institutions, rather than on democratic values and ideals. In other words, Hondurans seem to regard democracy as a desirable political system but see the political institutions extant as imperfect approximations of responsive democratic governance and, therefore, as responsible for the country's poor governance, and which remain unable to address effectively high levels of corruption, poverty, unemployment, crime, and many other problems that plague Honduras.

## Appendix

Appendix V.1. Principal problema del país de acuerdo a los ciudadanos (A4), recodificado en categorías

Economía (34%)		Seguridad (39%)		Servicios Básicos (12%)		Política (13%)		Otros (2%)	
Falta de crédito	27	Delincuencia, crimen	547	Falta de agua	66	Conflicto armado	2	Desigualdad	5
Desempleo/falta de empleo	132	Pandillas	21	Caminos/vías en mal estado	96	Corrupción	174	Desplazamiento forzado	0
Problemas de la economía / crisis económica	148	Secuestros	2	Falta de educación, mala calidad	10	Violaciones de derechos humanos	2	Discriminación	1
Inflación, altos precios	63	Falta de seguridad	12	Falta de electricidad	3	Los politicos	14	Drogadicción	1
Pobreza	139	Violencia	10	Falta de servicios de salud	2	Mal gobierno	10	Explosión demográfica	1
Falta de tierras para cultivar	6	Guerra contra terrorismo	0	Problemas con el transporte	2			Medio ambiente	2
Deuda Externa	1	Terrorismo	0	Vivienda	1			Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	0
				Desnutrición	5			Narcotráfico	8
								Migración	1
								Narcoterrorismo	0
								Otro	4
<b>Totales</b>	<b>516</b>		<b>592</b>		<b>185</b>		<b>202</b>		<b>23</b>

Appendix V.2. Percepción del desempeño económico del gobierno

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>t</b>
Educación	0.055	(1.17)
Mujer	0.024	(1.25)
Edad	0.078*	(2.04)
Riqueza	0.058	(1.33)
Tamaño	0.033	(0.79)
Situación económica nacional	0.195*	(6.41)
Situación económica personal	-0.054	(-1.25)
Constante	0.006	(0.20)
R-cuadrado = 0.042		
N. de casos = 1469		
* p<0.05		

Appendix V.3. Impacto de la Percepción del Desempeño Económico del Gobierno en el Apoyo para una Democracia Estable

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Desempeño económico	-0.306*	(0.05)	-0.226*	(0.04)	-0.053	(0.03)	0.371*	(0.02)	-0.033	(0.05)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.099*	(0.04)	0.099*	(0.04)	-0.029	(0.04)				
Interés en la política	-0.017	(0.03)	0.038	(0.03)	0.028	(0.03)	0.047	(0.03)		
Educación	0.214	(0.26)	0.362	(0.24)	-0.047	(0.20)	0.148	(0.19)	0.422	(0.27)
Mujer	-0.491	(1.15)	0.177	(1.04)	0.597	(0.89)	0.118	(0.63)	-1.109	(1.08)
Edad	0.350	(0.24)	0.862*	(0.23)	-0.057	(0.21)	0.244	(0.14)	0.769*	(0.29)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.009*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	-0.007	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.838	(0.66)	-0.061	(0.48)	0.761	(0.46)	0.251	(0.40)	-1.062	(0.75)
Percepción economía familiar	-4.579*	(0.97)	-1.631	(0.95)	-2.051*	(1.02)	-1.236	(0.91)	-0.893	(1.17)
Tamaño	1.997*	(0.69)	0.884	(0.57)	-0.193	(0.63)	1.351*	(0.45)	1.141	(0.76)
Constante	53.744*	(7.41)	38.158*	(6.40)	52.137*	(6.17)	18.802*	(4.65)	34.831*	(6.55)
R-cuadrado	0.079		0.060		0.013		0.234		0.017	
N. de casos	1327		1384		1307		1386		1441	
* p<0.05										

**PART III:**  
**BEYOND**  
**GOVERNANCE**

# Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political Legitimacy

## Theoretical background

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.<sup>34</sup> New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion project, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach, or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

### *The legitimacy/tolerance equation*

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in Table VI.1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

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<sup>34</sup> Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:

<b>B1.</b> To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
<b>B2.</b> To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
<b>B3.</b> To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
<b>B4.</b> To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
<b>B6.</b> To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

The items used for creating the “political tolerance” index are the same we used before for creating the support for rights of citizens’ inclusiveness.

**Table VI.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities**

System support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, which incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza regime. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

*Support for stable democracy in Honduras*

Does Honduras enjoy a political culture conducive to a stable democracy? Table VI.2 shows the distribution among the four categories described above of all individuals in the sample according to their expressed support for the system and their relative level of political tolerance. The results are clearly alarming. Over four in ten Hondurans exhibit attitudes associated with a «democracy at risk,» a polity prone to breakdown. Only one out of five individuals exhibited that combination of attitudes most characteristic of a stable democracy.

**Table VI.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Honduras**

System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 21.1%	Authoritarian Stability 18.5%
Low	Unstable Democracy 17.2%	Democracy at Risk 43.2%

In fact, Hondurans ranks relatively low in comparative terms with regard to having that combination of attitudes most consistent with a stable democracy, i.e., high political support and high political tolerance. On the other hand, the highest rankings in Table VI.1 are attained by stable democracies like the United States, Canada, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. It is worthy of note that twice as many Hondurans as Paraguayans exhibited in early 2008 attitudes consistent with a stable democracy (21.1% versus 9.8%), but twice as many Costa Ricans (42.0%) and nearly three times as many Canadians (61.0%) exhibited the appropriately democratic combination of political tolerance and political support.




Figure VI.1. Political Cultures Most Consistent With Stable Democracy [High Political Support and High Political Tolerance]

At the other end of the spectrum, the picture is even gloomier when we examine the percent of Hondurans exhibiting the characteristics of a political culture [low support, low tolerance] that could put *democracy at risk*, as Honduras ranks second only to Haiti, with 43.2% versus 45.7% exhibiting such traits in these systems, respectively. As depicted in Figure VI.2, that combination of attitudes, which could easily put a polity at a high risk of collapse is twice as frequent in Haiti, a country with grave current political problems, and in Honduras, than in countries such as Costa Rica, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Colombia and Dominican Republic, all of which have fewer than 20% of their citizens falling into the low support/low tolerance quadrant of our typology of political cultures.




Figure VI.2. Political Cultures Most Likely to Put Democracy at Risk [Low Political Support and Low Political Tolerance]

### Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

The AmericasBarometer series of surveys has tracked citizen confidence in a wide variety of democratic institutions. In Chapter I of this study we have already explored some of them (e.g., the courts, political parties, etc.). And in this chapter, we have previously examined the generalized “system support” items. In the final section of this chapter, we provide an overall comparison of the legitimacy of the entire range of institutions covered in the 2008 survey. We do this by measuring “trust” in each of the key institutions, using a 1-7 scale, converted to the familiar 0-100 scale used throughout this study.

Figure VI.3 shows that the most trusted institutions in Honduras are the Church (both Catholic and Evangelical), the Armed Forces, and the mass media. At the least-trusted end of the institutional spectrum are the Consejo Nacional Anti-corrupción (CNA), political parties, the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas (TSC), the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and the elections they are mandated to oversee. However, considering that elections in Honduras have always been relatively just and clean, the low trust in elections and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal seen in 2008 might be uncovering a generalized dissatisfaction with the system, a kind of “negative halo effect” via which even those things done well get rated poorly by citizens due to their intense discontent with things the government does not do well.




Figure VI.3. Confidence in Major Institutions in Honduran Society

Political parties are the only institution that has registered an increase in trust (of five index points) during the period of 2004-2008, as seen in Figure VI.4, which might be an indication of progress on one institutional front. More troublesome are systematic declines in support for institutions like the police, which is down to a value of 44 from nearly 57 in 2004, and for the justice system, which eroded from 51 in 2004 to 41 in 2008. Additional analysis is done in the next chapter regarding the party system.




Figure VI.4. Legitimacy of Institutions: Honduras 2004-2008

The results above reiterate the main finding of prior chapters, specifically - the very low esteem in which the political institutions of Honduras are held in 2008. All political institutions, for example, turn out to be much less trusted than is the Honduran military currently, which was one of the least trusted institutions during the 1980s. This finding might make some people to worry about the possibility of a return to military rule. However, as shown in Figure VI.5, greater trust in the military does not necessarily mean support for change toward a military regime. Quite the opposite - those who trust the military the most tend to believe somewhat more firmly in democracy as the preferred political system, regardless of the shortcomings of any existing government.




Figure VI.5. Confidence in the Armed Forces and Support for Democracy

In the same way, trust in the military as an institution is essentially unrelated to the preference for an authoritarian leader, as shown in Figure VI.6. No matter how high or low the level of trust in the military as an institution, fewer people prefer to have a non-elected authoritarian leader than a democratic government. Note that no bar in this figure exceeds the .5 level, which would indicate support from half of all Hondurans.




Figure VI.6. Confidence in the Armed Forces and preference for an authoritarian leader

## Conclusion

There are ample reasons for concern about the political culture that exists in Honduras today. Political cultures change primarily by population replacement or by major political or economic events. The movement away from military governments of the 1970s and back toward a civilian regime in the 1980s and beyond presented an opportunity to rebuild (or perhaps to build) a democratic political culture. Yet the existing institutional framework does not produce results that Hondurans can see in their lives in 2008. The country remains poor and poverty remains widespread. Hondurans may well ask themselves, with justification, “how has my life changed since the reinstatement of electoral democracy?” and may fail to find a convincing answer. For that reason, as late as 2008 the political culture has very high number of persons in the low political support/low political tolerance category, a cultural combination that is seen as putting “democracy at risk.” Only half as many Hondurans exhibit the opposite combination of high political support/high political tolerance, a cultural combination that would be conducive to “stable democracy.” Moreover, support for political institutions is low, and in most cases, has been dropping since 2004. Governance matters for political culture and for institutional legitimacy. Mere electoral alternation appears not to be sufficient to satisfy Hondurans that “our democracy is working.”

Of course, there are no simple solutions to the development dilemmas confronting Honduras. There are no magic wands to be waved to automatically produce 12% annual growth rates in GDP or to eliminate poverty rapidly and visibly. But this chapter has identified institutions whose credibility is eroding (the police, justice system, Supreme Court and National Congress), for which renewed efforts to document and demonstrate probity would be in order. Earlier chapters have suggested that local participation efforts – either in civil society or via municipal government – could be tools with which to begin to reverse the emergence of a dangerous political culture in Honduras. There is no immediate danger of an “authoritarian temptation” among the populace at large, but one has to ask “who, other than politicians committed to the existing system, would defend Honduran democracy, when threatened?”

## Chapter VII. Voting Behavior and Political Parties

The most recent presidential elections held in Honduras occurred in November of 2005. The 2005 presidential election was won by the Partido Liberal (PL) and its candidate Manuel (*Mel*) Zelaya. The victory of the PL signified the fourth party turnover since the return to democracy in the early 1980s. In January of 2006, the allegedly more liberal Zelaya replaced a seemingly more conservative Ricardo Maduro of the Partido Nacional as President of Honduras. Yet, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” carry very little substantive connotation in Honduras. As noted by Argueta (2007), *Liberales* and *Nacionalistas* do not differ in terms of ideology.<sup>35</sup> Figure VII.1 shows that was the case among supporters of both major parties during the 2005 elections, as only two of five candidates prove to be significantly different from each other in terms of how their supporters rated on a ten-point ideology scale (on which higher numbers indicate “conservatism” and lower number numbers indicate “liberalism).” The Liberal and Nacional candidates show no statistically significant difference in terms of the ideology of their supporters but instead compete for the middle ideological ground among Honduran voters, which is toward the right of center. Voter ideological preferences deviate most strongly from the center for the presidential candidates of small parties (PDCH, PINU, UD). However, the very small number of supporters of such parties in the survey does not allow for the uncovering of significant differences, except for the PINU which is statistically significantly to the left of the major parties. The very wide error bars for the candidates of the PDCH and the UD are a reflection of the small number of individuals who voted for such parties in 2005, which makes estimation of the central ideological tendencies of such voters less precise.

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<sup>35</sup> In this regard, the traditional Honduran parties bear a resemblance to Liberal and Conservative parties elsewhere in Latin America. These parties were among the first to emerge in the 1800s, in large measure in response to conflict over the proper role of church and state. By the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the issues originally dividing Liberal and Conservative parties had disappeared, and in many polities, such as the Chilean system, both had been superceded by the emergence of a variety of reformist parties, such as the Christian Democrats, or potentially revolutionary parties, such as the Socialists or Communists, even further to the left. The “default value” in the year 2000 and beyond would be for Liberal and Conservative parties to have “little ideological content” in most countries of the Americas.




Figure VII.1. Ideological Disposition and Presidential Vote Choice

In general, however, most Honduran voters gravitate around the ideological middle. As can be seen in Figure VII.2, even those who did not vote for a party during the 2005 elections reported an average ideology of around 6, as was the case with PL and PN voters. Only those voting for the the PINU and UD scored, on average, left of center.




Figure VII.2. Ideological Disposition and Presidential Vote Choice: Honduras

Our prior report “The Political Culture of Honduras: 2006” offered a thorough analysis of the voting behavior of Hondurans during the last presidential election of 2005. Perhaps the main finding in that report was the considerable degree of party de-alignment experienced by Hondurans between the 2001 and 2005 presidential elections. In 2001, approximately 15% of the individuals interviewed reported no party identification, as can be seen in Figure VII.3, which refers to that year.<sup>36</sup> *By contrast, in 2006, the percent of individuals without party identification grew to 55%; an astounding increase of 360 percent in only five years.* This chapter will, therefore, reexamine this phenomenon in an effort to corroborate the prior findings of 2006 and to extend the prior analysis to examine the potential effects of party de-alignment on creating a culture supportive of stable democracy.




Figure VII.3. The Distribution of Party Identification, 2001

<sup>36</sup> Note that the 15% estimate includes 4.7% who explicitly indicate the lack of a party identification and 10.9% who say that they “do not know” what their party identification is or who refused to respond to the question.

Figure VII.4 reveals that the pattern has changed little between 2006 and 2008. In each year, the percentage of Hondurans reporting no party identification was higher than the total of Hondurans who do identify with a party. Hence, it is undeniable that Honduras has experienced extensive partisan dealignment, a phenomenon extending beyond the 2006 election year, at which point it reached its maximum.

Nevertheless, Figure VII.4 also shows some variation in party identification between 2006 and 2008. The percent of sympathizers with the Partido Liberal (PL) has decreased marginally in 2008, and the percentage of sympathizers of the Partido Nacional (PN) increased by 2.4%. This might be the result of a decrease in support that most administrations experience by the middle of their four-year period of government. Even with such mid-term disaffection, however, the percentage of sympathizers of the PN in 2008 remains lower than that of sympathizers of the governing PL.




Figure VII.4. Distribution of Party Identification, 2006-2008.

The real winners of partisan realignment are the small parties (PINU, PDCH, UD), for which party identifications (collectively) have grown from 1.8% to 5.6% over the past two years, as seen above in Figure VII.4. This level of affiliation is still far too small to indicate any real chance to win the next presidential election, even were they all working in alliance together. Nonetheless, small parties have benefitted from a steady increase in votes received for deputies to the Legislature. As shown in Figure VII.5 below, Hondurans have been increasingly voting for the small parties since the legislative elections of 1997.




Figure VII.5. Change in Votes for the House of Deputies, 1981-2005

As a matter of fact, the increase in vote-splitting is causing the Honduran party system to fracture. As shown in Table VII.1, Honduras traditionally would have been characterized as a two-party system with an average Effective Number of Parties (ENP) of 2.1 during the period 1957-1993.<sup>37</sup> Beginning in 1997, however, the year of the first election with separate ballots, the ENP increased to 2.2, which it has continued to do in subsequent elections, reaching a value of 2.4 in the 2005 election. In other words, Honduras is no longer a two-party system but is trending toward a two-and-a-half party system, and one which is likely to experience further splintering in the future, given the large pool of recently de-aligned individuals (see Argueta, 2007, from which Table VII.1 is taken).

**Table VII.1. Effective Number of Parties, 1957-2005**

Characteristics	1957 [AC]	1965 [AC]	1971 [P/L]	1980 [AC]	1981 [P/L]	1985 [P/L]	1989 [P/L]	1993 [P/L]	1997 [Leg.]	2001 [Leg.]	2005 [Leg.]
Number of political parties at the level of candidates	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	5	5	5
Cumulative percent of votes for the largest parties (PL&PN)	91.5	100	100	95.9	95.5	96.3	96.6	96	91.1	87.3	85.1
Effective Number of Parties (ENP)	2.1	2	2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4

Such extensive partisan dealignment (and the beginnings of a potential partisan realignment) calls for an examination of other potential consequences, besides the fragmentation of the Honduran political system. Among other possible consequences of party dealignment would be voting abstention. Traditionally, political parties have been vehicles for mobilizing voters to participate on election day. If the numbers of aligned partisan are down – and down dramatically – one might expect voting turnout also to decline. As we will show below in our analysis of Figure VII.10, this is clearly the case in Honduras, as the single most important predictor of having voted in 2005 is whether one has a party identification or not.

Although vehicles for channeling political conflict, political scientists have long argued that stable party systems are an important component of stable democracies. Renewal of party systems – via the replacement of certain parties with others – may also be essential to the long-term stability of democracies. Honduras appears to sit poised on a threshold of change in its party system, and it is unclear whether a newly reconstituted party system will emerge, whether the country will devolve into a far less structured party system, or whether the traditional parties can reassert their hold on the psychological loyalties of Honduran citizens.

Related to these questions is the issue of how much recent partisan dealignment may influence the various dimensions of a political culture supportive of stable democracy? What is the relationship between party membership and trust in other human beings? Or, between party

<sup>37</sup> Computation of the ENP was done using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) equation.

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^I \Pi_i^2}; \quad \text{where } \Pi_i = \text{proportion of votes or seats acquired by party } i$$

membership and confidence in the workings of national level political institutions? The answers to these questions may influence whether all those recently dealigned choose to reengage with a new political organization, simply to « drop out » of Honduran democracy, or to become available to those seeking wider systemic change or to movements rejecting democracy entirely.

But before we begin to address such questions, however, let us examine the forces driving of partisan dealignment. Figure VII.6 displays the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is whether or not a person identifies with any political party.

Several variables prove to be significantly associated with party identification in our analysis. Identification with any political party is more likely among those who have a higher level of political knowledge, who reside in San Pedro Sula, instead of Tegucigalpa (reference category), as well as those who have a job, are older, and are more educated. By contrast, a lack of party identification was more likely among those who have a higher perception of personal insecurity.




Figure VII.6. Predictors of Party Identification

The higher level of party affiliation in San Pedro Sula is evident in Figure VII.7. Additional analysis reveals that such high levels of party affiliation appear to reflect higher levels of identification with the PL, which won the 2005 elections.




Figure VII.7. Geographic Distribution of Partisan Alignment

Party identification is higher among individuals who are currently employed, as is seen in Figure VII.8. Among those with a job, almost 60% report that they identify with a political party. Among those not having a job, only 41% reported having a party ID.




Figure VII.8. Party Identification by Employment Status

Party ID is also less frequent among younger Hondurans. That party identification is lower among the young, however, is no surprise, since young adults tend not to be much involved in party politics in most countries around the world (Egerton, 2002). Figure VII.9 illustrates that point among Hondurans. However, as noted elsewhere in this report, a crucial mechanism of cultural change is population replacement, as younger generations replace older generations. So monitoring whether the current youth of Honduras acquire “traditional” party affiliations (with either the Partido Nacional or Partido Liberal), acquire affiliations with new parties (including the current minor parties) or remain unaffiliated and electorally more “volatile” will provide important clues as to the future of Honduran political culture.




Figure VII.9. Age Cohorts and Party Identification

Party identification is also higher among the more educated, as shown in Figure VII.10, which is also a common feature in many political environments, as educated individuals are more likely to draw inferences about which parties best serve their interests over time, and are less likely to be “diverted” by factors specific to a given electoral campaign or political moment.




Figure VII.10. Geographic Distribution of Partisan Alignment

Of work status and educational levels, however, work status seems to have the larger effect. Even though age and education each appears to have a significant effect by itself in bivariate analyses, it is evident that working status is the major determinant of party identification, as is seen in Figure VII.11. Those who have a job are much more likely to identify with a party than those who do not have a job, at almost every level of education except for the lowest level. Considering the high rate of unemployment in Honduras, it should perhaps be no surprise that political dealignment is now very high. Yet Figure VII.9 also shows us that engagement with the political system happens very much through workplace experiences. There is a link between unemployment and political withdrawal, as well as between employment and political engagement.




Figure VII.11. The Effects of Education and Work Status on Partisan Identification

Does the lack of identification with a party contribute to voting abstentionism? The results of a logistic regression, shown in Figure VII.12, where the dependent variable is whether individuals voted in 2005, reveal that to be the case. In fact, party identification is the single most important variable affecting voting turnout. A second variable having a strong effect is satisfaction with local services, a finding that supports observations made earlier about the importance of experiences citizens have with local government. Voting turnout was also highly likely among those employed, among residents of San Pedro Sula (who tend to have party affiliations more than do residents of other regions), and among older adults.




Figure VII.12. Predictors of Voting in 2005

As shown in Figure VII.13, lacking a no party ID voted in 2005, while more than 90% voted in the same year among those identifying with a party. Yet, it should be emphasized that lacking a party ID does not necessarily mean that a person will not vote. Nearly half of those with no party ID did, in fact, vote in 2005. In fact, within limits, the lack of party ID may not necessarily be a bad thing for democracy. Those who have no party ID but do vote are much more likely to vote for different parties in successive elections, thus making possible a change of party in power (electoral accountability) (Argueta, 2007).




Figure VII.13. Party Identification as a Determinant of Voting in 2005.

Figure VII.14 below shows that satisfaction with the services provided by the local government is also a significant determinant of voting turnout. The more satisfied citizens are with the local governmental services, the more likely they are to have voted in 2005. Note the very significant difference between both extremes of the scale, with almost twice the voting turnout occurring as one moves between the least satisfied with the quality of local services (roughly 47% voting turnout) and the most satisfied (circa 85% voting turnout). This finding reiterates the importance, indicated in Chapter 4, of local government as a vehicle for restoring faith in the Honduran political system.




Figure VII.14. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of Voting in 2005.

Figure VII.15 shows the relationship between voting turnout, age and employment status. Voting turnout is higher among older adults but it is even higher if people have a job. Yet, of these two variables having a significant impact on voting turnout in 2005, age probably has the great impact, in that the increase from the youngest cohort (ages 16-25) to the older cohort that votes most heavily (46-55 year olds) is from 42% to 80% voting participation in 2005). In contrast, the largest gap between the working and the non-working is from 42% to 63% among those 16-25 years of age and the total effect of employment is an increment from 63% among the youngest to 87% among those in the 46-55 age cohorts. So the net effect of age is greater than that of employment – although, clearly, age is related to employment as older individuals are more likely to be employed.




Figure VII.15. The Effect of Age and Employment Status on Partisan Identification

In summary, political dealignment seems to be a very important driver of the increasingly lower voting turnout recently experienced in Honduras. Yet, satisfaction with the services provided by the local government can play an important countervailing role. When Honduran citizens participate in local government, they often have positive experiences, and, when that happens, they are likely to vote in national elections. Moreover, as pointed out in other research by Argueta (2007) on the Honduran political system, party dealignment may permit “voting dealignment”, which in turn makes electoral accountability possible. Thus, party dealignment is undesirable *only when* it causes people not to vote at all – but it may be desirable if it leads to electoral rotation and the possibility for new parties emerging as players on the political scene.

Nonetheless, in large part because of the increasing political dealignment, Honduras seems to be experiencing a progressive increase in the rate of voting abstention. Figure VII.16 displays the increasing number of registered voters in the electoral census (dashed line and squares) in each election year since 1981. It also shows a less steep increase in the number of valid votes (dashed line and triangles), and a tailing off of that number in 2005. The widening gap between the total of registered voters and the actual number of voters casting their votes is the rate of abstention (solid line), which increased to an unprecedented level during the 2005 elections (44.8%).




Figure VII.16. Total Registration, Voting and Abstention Rates (1981-2005)

Nevertheless, the increasing rate of voting abstention has been questioned by Honduras’s Tribunal Superior Electoral (TSE).<sup>38</sup> Their argument is that the high rate of abstention is in part the result of the tens of thousands of Hondurans, mostly young adults, who have migrated to other countries, such as the United States, during the last couple of decades.<sup>39</sup> Yet, they continue to be listed in the electoral census, even though they reside abroad and hence do not vote in the Honduran elections. As a result, the difference between the electoral census and the number of valid votes, according to the TSE, tends to increase.

Our analysis may lend some support to the TSE’s argument. Figure VII.17 shows that the percent of individuals reporting not voting in 2005 was only 28%, instead of the 44.8% resulting from official statistics (valid votes/electoral census). Further, since the percent of Hondurans with no party ID is about 50% and 56% of those with no party ID did not vote in 2005, the net percent of Hondurans that do not identify with a party and did not vote is, according to the AmericasBarometer survey once again, 28% of all interviewees. Therefore, even though political dealignment is high in Honduras, real voting abstention, discounting émigrés, may still be relatively low (under 30%), compared to other democracies around the world.




Figure VII.17. AmericasBarometer estimates of Voter Turnout and Vote Direction

<sup>38</sup> “Temen que crezca el abstencionismo”, La Prensa, Junio 16 2008.

[http://www.laprensahn.com/ediciones/2008/06/16/temen\\_que\\_crezca\\_el\\_abstencionismo](http://www.laprensahn.com/ediciones/2008/06/16/temen_que_crezca_el_abstencionismo)

<sup>39</sup> The TSE has also reported about 70,000 Hondurans who have passed away but remain listed in the electoral census. La Prensa, July, 2008 [http://www.laprensahn.com/ediciones/2008/07/31/setenta\\_mil\\_muertos\\_inscritos\\_como\\_vivos](http://www.laprensahn.com/ediciones/2008/07/31/setenta_mil_muertos_inscritos_como_vivos).

## Effect of political dealignment on support for a stable democracy

What do political dealignment and voting abstention imply for those cultural features supportive of stable democracy in Honduras? Very little, according to the results of several regressions where the dependent variables are the different dimensions of a political culture supportive of stable democracy, as can be seen in Appendix VII.3. Party identification exhibits no significant association whatsoever with any of these five dimensions. Voting abstention displays a modest, but statistically significant association, only with the Churchillian preference for democracy. Those who did vote in 2005 were more likely to report preference for a democratic political system, conceived as Churchill conceived democracy. Therefore, the high level of political dealignment and voting abstention being experienced in Honduras do not necessarily represent factors impelling the low system support found among Hondurans in 2008.

The results in Table VII.4 instead support findings by Argueta (2007) who found party dealignment and voting abstention in Honduras to be principal mechanisms through which electoral accountability can occur. Thus, rather than a hindrance, political de-alignment and voting abstention may ultimately provide the flexibility required for party turnover and the emergence of a new party system, therefore contributing to the continuation of democracy in Honduras. While it is not at all clear if one or more of the existing minor parties may emerge to replace either the Partido Liberal or Partido Nacional as major parties in Honduras or possibly even replace both, the existing situation would permit such an evolution.

## Appendix

### Appendix VII.1. Regresión logística: Simpatiza con un partido

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Educación	0.213*	(2.09)
Mujer	0.014	(0.21)
Edad	0.528*	(7.62)
Trabaja empleo	0.345*	(4.55)
Riqueza	0.110	(1.11)
San Pedro Sula	0.239*	(2.73)
Ciudad mediana	0.013	(0.15)
Ciudad pequeña	0.032	(0.35)
Área rural	0.062	(0.54)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.114	(1.72)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.144*	(-2.36)
Índice de conocimiento político	0.188*	(2.08)
Ingreso familiar ajusta	0.032	(0.42)
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.139*	(2.10)
Constante	-0.040	(-0.66)
F = 8.24		
N. de casos = 1263		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VII.2. Regresión logística: Votaron en 2005

<b>Variables independientes</b>	<b>Coefficientes</b>	<b>(t)</b>
Simpatiza con un partido	1.131*	(11.21)
Educación	0.005	(0.04)
Mujer	0.236*	(2.36)
Edad	0.483*	(4.99)
Trabaja empleo	0.290*	(2.66)
Riqueza	-0.210	(-1.65)
San Pedro Sula	0.104	(0.95)
Ciudad mediana	0.084	(0.68)
Ciudad pequeña	0.065	(0.51)
Área rural	0.038	(0.26)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.071	(0.89)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.078	(-0.77)
Índice de conocimiento político	0.255*	(2.31)
Ingreso familiar ajusta	0.056	(0.58)
Satisfacción con servicios locales	0.347*	(3.77)
Constante	1.144*	(11.72)
F = 13.74		
N. de casos = 1057		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VII.3. Effect of political de-alignment and voting abstention on support for stable democracy

Variables independientes	Preferencia por democracia	Derecho a protestar		Tolerancia política	Legitimidad de instituciones	Confianza interpersonal
	Coef. Error Std.	Coef. Error Std.	Error Std.	Coef. Error Std.	Coef. Error Std.	Coef. Error Std.
Simpatizan con un partido	0.008 -0.02	0.015 -0.02		0.019 -0.01	0.001 -0.01	-0.034 -0.02
Votaron en 2005	<b>0.063*</b> <b>-0.02</b>	0.015 -0.02		-0.02 -0.02	0.008 -0.01	0.034 -0.03
Desempeño económico del gobierno	-0.276* -0.05	-0.249* -0.05		-0.070* -0.03	0.354* -0.03	-0.114* -0.04
Aprobación trabajo del presidente	0.037 -0.05	0.084* -0.04		-0.045 -0.04	0.091* -0.02	0.234* -0.05
Interés en la política	-0.035 -0.03	0.032 -0.04		0.027 -0.04	0.054 -0.03	0.067 -0.05
Educación	0.193 -0.27	0.362 -0.3		-0.204 -0.19	0.192 -0.18	0.459 -0.36
Mujer	-0.607 -1.33	1.19 -1.25		0.703 -0.99	0.986 -0.72	-0.809 -1.28
Edad	-0.141 -0.3	0.744* -0.28		-0.155 -0.3	0.629* -0.2	0.984* -0.41
Edad al cuadrado	0.003 0	-0.007* 0		0.002 0	-0.007* 0	-0.009* 0
Riqueza	0.791 -0.68	0.049 -0.52		1.071* -0.45	0.142 -0.45	-1.209 -0.91
Ingreso familiar ajusta	-4.362* -0.96	-1.185 -0.97		-1.406 -1.05	-0.847 -0.8	-0.985 -1.28
Tamaño	1.939* -0.77	1.563* -0.56		0.159 -0.65	1.471* -0.48	0.619 -0.74
Constante	61.726* -8.5	35.071* -7.8		52.689* -7.6	3.399 -5.33	20.347* -9.67
R-cuadrado	0.078	0.07		0.02	0.256	0.048
N. de casos	1075	1122		1057	1112	1133

# Chapter VIII. Public Aspirations for the Role of the State in Honduras and Additional Forms of Participation

## Envisioning the Role of the State

Privatization of public enterprises and the shrinking of the state was part of the policy package known as “the Washington Consensus” promoted widely from the early 1980s onward. Many countries sold off para-statal enterprises developed during three or more decades of post-World War II import-substitution industrialization. For example, between 1983 and 1993, Mexico’s public enterprise total dropped from 1,058 to 209, that of Chile dropped from 596 in 1973 (the year that Augusto Pinochet took power) to 45 in 1989 (the year that democracy returned), while in Costa Rica the decline was more modest, from 77 in 1980 to 50 in 1989. Honduras was exposed to the same environment, and while we have no data about the total number of state enterprises sold off, it was clear that a very visible effort at privatization affecting the lives of most Hondurans was that of Hondutel, the telephone company once ran by the Honduran military, over which debate about privatization stretched beyond the year 2000, ultimately leading to the establishment of Hondutel as a quasi-autonomous state agency, rather than as a private enterprise.

Yet the opening of economies throughout the Americas created winners and losers, and can be expected to generate diverse opinions. Indeed, the resurgence of the left throughout South America in the 1990s and 2000s is often interpreted as a function, at least in part, of the fact that open economies and the shrinking of the state often expose some citizens to risks which they are ill-prepared to confront. In some cases, that has entailed victories by the moderate left, such as Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Lula in Brazil, or Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, or the more assertively populist and sometimes authoritarian left, illustrated most dramatically by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and by Evo Morales in Bolivia.

Analysts should not, however, assume that the winners and losers of the last quarter century are the only source of divergent opinions on the role of the state. In one of the classic analyses of Latin American politics, Charles Anderson made this observation in 1967:

Despite the assumed ‘interventionist’ tradition of the Hispanic state, there has in fact in Latin America a historic bias toward the substantial delimitation of the government’s capacity to mobilize the resources of society. That is in part due to the prevalence of classical liberal ideas among many prominent in the economy.... The formal norms governing the distribution of resources between public and private parties have never

been as straightforward or as clear-cut in Latin America as they have been in some Western nations. The residues of the Spanish conception of the absolutist state (particularly with regard to property rights), eclectic borrowings from a variety of foreign ideologies, and the heritage of such indigenous experiences as the Mexican Revolution, have given a cast of ambiguity to the question and made more plausible heterodox formulations of the way resources are to be divided between the state and private society than are possible in nations where a ready answer to the problem is contained in the political culture. However, the absence of a cultural commitment on this matter complicates, rather than simplifies, the task of governance. Cultural ambivalence here implies not so much tolerance or indifference as dissensus (Anderson, 1967: 71-72).

One purpose of this chapter will be to analyze which Hondurans favor a more expansive role for the state and which favor a less expansive role. In undertaking such an analysis, we are not bereft of empirically and theoretically-grounded expectations. Coleman (2001: 195-196) has reported, for example, that age, ideological orientation and one's assessment of one's personal economic circumstances determine whether individuals in Mexico, Costa Rica and Chile favor a traditional state role in the provision of services like schooling and potable water, or would be willing to consider more extensive privatization of such services, with older people, those on the left and those assessing their own economic circumstances as difficult being those least willing to endorse privatization. By way of contrast, certain additional variables predict who favors privatization of a different set services not so frequently construed to be the province of the state, such as who should own airlines or provide telephone service. Income, education, and Protestantism predicted favorable attitudes toward private provision of these services, with higher-income and highly-educated persons favoring private service provision, as did Protestants. Once again, ideology predicted these attitudes, with those on the right favoring private service provision, as did assessments of one's current economic condition (same direction, those in poor conditions opposing private provision), but age no longer predicted attitudes

In the AmericasBarometer survey of 2008, a battery of four questions was included seeking to assess how expansive a role do citizens seek from their state. In Honduras, the answers tended toward preference for an expansive state. Table VIII.1 illustrates that for each individual measure, more Hondurans gave an answer above the midpoint on a seven point scale than below the midpoint.

**Table VIII.1. Four Measures of the Degree of Support for an Expansive Honduran State**

Response Categories	The Honduran state, rather than the private sector, should be the owner of the most important companies and industries in the country [ROS1]	The Honduran state, rather than individuals, should be the principal agent for guaranteeing the welfare of people [ROS2].	The Honduran state, rather than private enterprise, should be the principal agent for creating jobs [ROS3].	The Honduran state should implement strong policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor [ROS4].
Strongly Disagree (1)*	12.4%	4.1%	5.2%	3.8%
(2)	7.0%	3.8%	4.4%	4.1%
(3)	14.1%	17.3%	15.3%	15.8%
(4)	26.8%	25.2%	23.7%	21.1%
(5)	16.0%	14.7%	14.0%	16.2%
(6)	6.0%	6.4%	6.6%	7.0%
Strongly Agree (7)	17.7%	28.5%	30.8%	32.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

\* The scale was anchored at each end, but the midpoint (4) was not identified as such.

Those responses were combined into an index that initially ranged from 4 to 28, but then was standardized into a scale that varies between 0-100, as with most other scales in this study. The overall scale produces a mean value of 61.0 and a standard deviation of 23.8, which implies that 68% of the scores are within the range of 37.2 to 84.8, but that most scores are toward the “statist” end of the spectrum, with citizens tending to prefer that the state play a leading role in the economy, in providing for the welfare of citizens, and even in leveling out income differences. Efforts were then made to predict variation in that standardized version of the scale, which taps the degree of statist orientations and is known hereafter as *rolestado*.

The following hypotheses were assumed:

- (i) Hondurans of lower income levels will favor a more expansive role for the state;
- (ii) Hondurans who judge that their personal economic situation is poor (idiotropic economic evaluations) will favor a more expansive role for the state;
- (iii) Hondurans who judge that the economic situation of the country is poor (sociotropic economic evaluations) will favor a more expansive role for the state;
- (iv) Hondurans with more education will favor a less expansive role for the state;
- (v) Hondurans in the most urban environments will favor a less expansive role for the state than will those in rural or less urban environments;
- (vi) Hondurans evaluating President Zelaya’s performance in office favorably will favor a more expansive role for the state.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> While membership in/support for the Partido Liberal could have been used, few individuals profess affiliation with any party, as noted in the previous chapter. Hence, too many cases would be discarded to include this variable

- (vii) Hondurans with ideological affiliation on the left will favor a more expansive role for the state.

Building on the prior research of Coleman (2001) the essential theoretical underpinning of the first four hypotheses is that the poor, economically vulnerable or less well educated will be more likely to favor an expansive role for the state. Less able to *defenderse* in a competitive environment, they look to the state for help. By contrast, the highly educated will have more tools with which to function in a market-driven economy and will be sympathetic to a shrinking of the Honduran state. Davis and Coleman (2001: 562-564) refer to this as the *economic cuing model*. By extension, those living in urban environments will have access to a wider array of opportunities – many in the private or non-profit sectors – and will also feel that an expansive state is unnecessary. The fundamental theoretical underpinning of the latter two hypotheses comes from what Davis and Coleman refer to as the *political cuing model*, which can obtain in situations, where power can be transferred from incumbent to opposition parties. In those circumstances, if political parties have staked out differentiated positions on the extent of privatization or on the role of the state, one's partisan affiliation may determine what one "sees" about the issue. In the Honduran case, President Zelaya has taken on issues like the provision of petroleum in an aggressive manner, signing a Petrocaribe accord with Venezuela, which signifies his intent to use the powers of the state expansively to address what he sees as an issue fundamental to the economy. Hence, one might assume that those who approve of his behavior might well prefer an expansive state role. Finally, following the earlier findings of Coleman (op cit.), Hondurans who classify themselves as on the political left will be hypothesized to be more supportive of an expansive role for the state.

In order to examine these hypotheses a multiple regression analysis was conducted to identify which variables would be the best predictors of observable variation in a variable labeled as *rolestado*. All the standard variables explored as predictors in earlier chapters were included (age, number of children, gender, etc.) as additional predictive variables to those implied by the seven hypotheses above.

The results of the regression equation are found in an appendix to this chapter, but can be seen graphically below in Figure VIII.1. As in earlier chapters, bars representing the confidence interval around a regression coefficient that **do not** intersect with the vertical axis in the center represent statistically significant relationships. In this case, there are seven clearly significant relationships, and one more is at the margins of statistical significance. The seven clearly significant relationships are these: (i) placement on an ideological self-identification scale, with rightists (not leftists) more likely to prefer an expansive state;<sup>41</sup> (ii) those living in larger communities are less likely to prefer an expansive state; (iii) the better the perception of the family's economic situation, the greater the desire for an expansive state; but (iv) the worse the perception of the national economy, the greater the desire for an expansive state, while (v) those from large families prefer an expansive state, and (vi) younger people prefer a more expansive

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in a multivariate analysis. However, the degree of support for President Zelaya can be taken as a partial proxy of Liberal Party affiliation ( $r=+.29$ ).

<sup>41</sup> This somewhat unexpected finding will be explored in more detail below.

state, as do (vii) women. At the margins of statistical significance is (viii) wealth, in that households with more possessions tend to favor a less expansive state role ( $p = .071$ ). The evidence is clearly mixed for both the economic cuing and the political cuing hypotheses. Overall, however, these even predictors account for 12% of the variation in evaluations of the role of the state ( $R = .35$ ;  $R^2 = .123$ ), which is a typical percentage of variance explained in political surveys.




Figure VIII.1. Determinants of Desire for an Expansive State Role

Returning to the seven original hypotheses, we find some supported, some not, and two relationships being significant, but in an opposite direction from that expected.

- (i) Hondurans of lower income levels will favor an expansive role for the state [significant at  $p = .07$  level];
- (ii) Hondurans who judge their personal economic situation to be good (idiotropic economic evaluations) will favor an expansive role for the state [significant outcome, unexpected direction];
- (iii) Hondurans who judge that the economic situation of the country is poor (sociotropic economic evaluations) will favor an expansive role for the state [significant];
- (iv) Hondurans with more advanced educations will favor a less expansive role for the state [not significant];

- (v) Hondurans in more urban environments will favor a less expansive role for the state than will those in less urban environments [**significant**];
- (vi) Hondurans evaluating President Mel Zelaya's performance in office favorably will favor a more expansive role for the state [not significant];
- (vii) Hondurans with ideological affiliation on the right will favor a more expansive role for the state [**significant outcome, unexpected direction**].

Additionally, we find that:

- (viii) Hondurans from large families are more likely to favor an expansive role for the state [**significant**];
- (ix) Younger Hondurans are more likely than their older compatriots to favor an expansive role for the state [**significant**];
- (x) Females in Honduras are more likely than males to favor an expansive role for the state [**significant**].

Some of these findings differ from those in earlier research on similar issues – for example, among the demographic variables, only gender predicts support for or opposition to an expansive state in Honduras significantly, while education does not have an impact, and income is not quite significant. Especially surprising is that positive *idiotropic* evaluations of the economy, or the belief that one's personal economic situation is good, are associated with a preference for an expansive state role, while negative *sociotropic* evaluations, or the belief that the national economy is in a poor condition, are also associated with a preference for an expansive state role. Even more surprising is that ideological affiliations on the political right are associated with a preference for an expansive state role.

Yet there are also some expected findings, such as that those in more rural environments favor an expansive state role – since poverty is extreme in rural areas, the desire for an activist state might be predicted. That relationship – statistically significant – is seen in Figure VIII.2. The desire for an expansive state grows from a 51.8 index score (on a scale of 100) in Tegucigalpa (the metropolitan area) to an index value of 68.2 in small cities, then drops off slightly to a score of 62.7 in rural areas, so the relationship is slightly curvilinear. Examining what it is that Hondurans in small cities seek from state authorizes might be a productive focus for future research.




Figure VIII.2. Desired Role of State by Size of Locality

Additionally, an unsurprising finding is that as family size grows, the desire for help from state authorities would also grow, as can be seen in Figure VIII.3, in which the index value for the desired role of the state grows from 55.9 in family settings with no children to 68.5 among those with ten or more children.




Figure VIII.3. Desired Role of State by Number of Children

Another significant finding is that as age increases, so does support for an expansive state role, as can be seen in Figure VIII.4. However, this finding is a function primarily of those 46-55 years of age, who average a score of 68.4 on the *rolestado* index, and to a lesser extent of those 66 and up, who average a rating of 62.5. Those in the three youngest age cohorts (16-25, 26-35, and 36-45) exhibit average ratings in the 60-61 range. Curiously, those in the range of 56-65 years exhibit the lowest preference for an expansive state.




Figure VIII.4. Desired Role of State by Age Groups

Another relationship that proves to be statistically significant because of a large sample size is that of gender, but, as seen in Figure VIII.5, is probably not worthy of great attention, since the index differs only by two points.




Figure VIII.5. Desired Role of State by Gender

Surprisingly, positive *idiotropic* evaluations of one's [personal] economic situation tend to increase one's desire for an expansive state – especially among that group offering the most positive idiotropic assessments. As can be seen in Figure VIII.6, the change in index values is somewhat irregular between the lowest average score 60.6% at 0 to 63.5 at 50, but then dropping to 59.6 at 75. But at 100 on the personal economic situation variable, the index for *rolestado* jumps to 67.4. So, while the increase is not monotonic (or a perfect linear increase) – a relationship between perceived personal welfare and willingness to endorse state protectionism for the vulnerable does exist in Honduras, as in other countries.<sup>42</sup>




Figure VIII.6. Desired Role of State by Personal Economic Situation (*Idiotropic* Evaluations)

<sup>42</sup> It is a commonplace, for example, that “affluent liberals” are a constituency of the Democratic Party in the US. Indeed, they were seen as an early and important building block of the coalition that generated the nomination for president of the Democratic Party to Senator Barack Obama in 2008.

By way of contrast, however, there is another non-monotonic trend between evaluations of the national economy (*sociotropic* evaluations) and decreases in the desire for an expansive state, displayed in Figure VIII.7. That is, the better the evaluation of the national economy, the less need is perceived for an expansive state, but the worse the perception of the national economy, the greater the perceived need for an expansive state. In sum, when Hondurans perceive their economy to be in dire shape, their tendency is to look to the state to “do something.” That can be seen in the decreasing index values for *rolestado*, which drops from 66.7 at the 0 rating on the *sociotropic* evaluations scale to 53.3 at the 75 level, before rebounding to 59.6 at the 100 level.




Figure VIII.7. Rolestado and Perceptions of National Economy (*Sociotropic* Evaluations)

Perhaps the most intriguing of these results is that there is a very curvilinear relationship between ideological self-identification and preference for an expansive state role, as seen in Figure VIII.8. Those on the far left (mean index score of 73.3) and those on the far right (mean index score of 72.3) exhibit stronger preferences for an expansive state. While holding such views on the left is not unexpected, it is noteworthy that even those with scores substantially to the left on the ten point scale (such as values of 2, 3 and 4) exhibit much lower index values (50.8%, 59.2%, and 49.4%) than do those with leftism values of 1. And the high preference for an expansive state among those receiving a value of 10 on the left-right scale is particularly surprising. However, given a strain of nationalism on the political right – which can certainly co-exist with the desire for an expansive state role – these results are perhaps not totally inexplicable. These results also warrant further examination in future studies. Just what KIND of strong state might these Honduran self-described rightists prefer?




Figure VIII.8. Desired Role of State by Ideological Self-Identification

## Other Forms of Citizen Participation

In addition to the more conventional forms of political participation addressed in earlier chapters, a number of special items were included in the Honduran version of the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey to address forms of participation unique to the last two years in the country.

*Poder Ciudadano:*

One of the initiatives of President Zelaya has been his series of *Poder Ciudadano* (“Citizen Power”) meetings with citizens around the country. About 9% of the citizens in this sample claims that they or a family member have attended a meeting of *Poder Ciudadano*. While there may be some “social desirability distortion effects” leading to an over-reporting of such attendance – as often happens with self-reports of voting – the over-reporting may not be extraordinary if one considers that the question refers to family members, which could be interpreted as encompassing the extended family. The item used was:

**HONM3.** ¿Ha asistido usted o algún miembro de su familia a alguna reunion del “Poder Ciudadano”?

Another item was used to examine levels of satisfaction, specifically this question:

**HONM3A.** ¿Qué tan satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) se siente o se sentía su familiar con la efectividad de la reunión del *Poder Ciudadano* en transmitir las preferencias del pueblo al gobierno?

Figure VIII.9 reveals that among the nine percent reporting that they personally or a family member have attended a meeting of *Poder Ciudadano*, nearly four in five report that they were either “very satisfied” with the experience (23.5%) or “somewhat satisfied” (54.4%) while slightly over a fifth report that they were “somewhat dissatisfied” (18.4%) or “very dissatisfied” (3.7%). Therefore, it appears that the very appearance of the President among a group of citizens might tend to produce a positive impression of the interaction. However, it also may be that the appearance of the President attracts supportive citizens. In fact, the correlation between reported attendance (by respondent or family member) and system support is +.10, but that between satisfaction with the meeting itself and system support is +.23 (among the 9% who attended). Since most attendees are at least somewhat satisfied with *Poder Ciudadano* meetings, there may be a reinforcement function going on – those somewhat more predisposed to be system supportive attend such meetings, and once there, their propensity to become supportive may even grow. It will be useful to monitor reports of the next two years of participation in *Poder Ciudadano* meetings.




Figure VIII.9. Participation of Self or of Family Member in Poder Ciudadano

As another question of special interest, given the strong electoral traditions of Honduras, respondents to the survey were asked about participation as election officials or as election observers, as in HONPP3 below.

**HONPP3.** Hay personas que trabajan en las mesas electorales o en grupos de observadores cívicos de las elecciones. ¿Trabaja usted o en una mesa electoral o como observador electoral cívico en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2005?

Again, there may be a social desirability distortion effect leading to over-reporting of such behavior, but 11% of Hondurans claim to have participated in one of these activities in 2005. Of that 11%, 2.4% indicated having played a role in the primary elections, 3.2% in the general elections, and the balance of 5.5% in both. In this case there was no attempt to measure satisfaction with the participatory experience. However, when examining those who have participated in such activities, there is no correlation above  $r = \pm .05$  with any of the confidence in political institutions measures – for example, confidence in elections correlates at only the +.025 level with having served as an election official or observer, while confidence in political parties correlates at only the +.03 level. Moreover, the correlation with the scale of system support is only +.02. Clearly, the effects on of such “participation in electoral process” on larger issues of support are minuscule. It will be useful to monitor reports of participation in future Honduran elections via the AmericasBarometer surveys, and to see if the effects change.

Recently in Honduras, USAID and other agencies have supported civic education efforts in parents' associations. Roughly four in ten Hondurans report attending at least one parents association meeting in the past year, with the most common frequencies being once or twice a month (19.5%) or once or twice a year (17.7%), as can be seen in Figure VIII.10. Among those who attend such meetings, 50% recall some "civics education" content being discussed.




Figure VIII.10. Attendance at Parents Association Meetings

Moreover, among those who recall such content being discussed, the overwhelming tendency is to recall the discussion of civics education positively, as is seen in Figure VIII.11 in which 24% characterize what they heard as “very good” and 55% as “good.” Among correlates of a positive evaluation of civic education curricula are family income, residency in locations *other than* San Pedro Sula, having some university education, and (male) gender.<sup>43</sup> Of these correlates, family income is the strongest.




Figure VIII.11. Evaluation of Civics Education Curriculum

<sup>43</sup>From data analyses not presented textually. Additionally, those residing in Norte B, Occidental A and the Sur are also more likely than those residing elsewhere to give high evaluations to the content of civic education materials to which they were exposed in parents association meetings.

Another recent organizational innovation in Honduras is that of the community health organization. The AmericasBarometer survey of 2008 asked Honduran about their frequency of attending meetings of such organization. As can be seen in Figure VIII.12, just below 16% of citizens reported having attended one or more such meetings in the past year. The most common frequency reported was one or two meetings in the past year (11.3%), while fewer citizens (3.5) reported attending one or two meetings monthly, and very few (0.5%) reported weekly attendance.




Figure VIII.12. Attendance at Meetings of Community Health Association

## Correlates of the Desire for an Expansive State

It is not necessarily that case that the desire for an expansive governmental role in protecting citizens is associated with the desire for a strong central government. In point of fact, there is reasonably strong evidence from the Honduran survey to suggest that an important portion of what citizens may be seeking via an expansive state role could be delivered via especially effective municipal governance structures. For example, there are moderately strong correlations between *roleestado* and confidence in local government institutions as well as between *roleestado* and satisfaction with the services of local government ( $r = +.32$  and  $+ .28$ , respectively). Figures VIII.13 and VIII.14 reflect those correlations.

In Figure VIII.13, one sees that as confidence in one's municipal government increases from "no confidence" or next lowest level of confidence ('1' or '2' on a seven point scale), at which point *roleestado* values are well below 60 (54.2 – 55.3), toward 100% confidence, *roleestado* index values begin to approach 70, reaching 67.9 at '5,' 69.6 at '6' and dropping off only slightly to 68.2 at '7.' So this evidence suggests that the way in which an expansive state role might be conceived could well entail strong performance by local governments.




Figure VIII.13. *Roleestado* by Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Similarly, in Figure VIII.14 one sees that when satisfaction with local government services is low (at the 0 or 25 mark), the desired role for the state is well below 60 (57.0 at 0; 54.5 at 25), while when satisfaction with local government services reaches the upper end of that index then *rolestado* scores reach 65.0 at 75 and 68.6 at 100. The relationships in both Figures VIII.13 and VIII.14 are statistically significant. And both point in the same direction, i.e., that satisfaction with the performance of local government can be a reasonably strong correlate of the desire for an expansive state role in protecting citizens economically.




Figure VIII.14. Satisfaction with Local Government Services and *Rolestado*

*To summarize, then, it is not necessarily the central government that Hondurans are looking toward to provide the array of welfare services that they envision as part of an expansive state.* It could well be that more effective municipal government services could assuage some of the pent-up demand for a protectionist state. Until such time as local governments are well-funded and transparent, however, that demand will remain partially unfulfilled.

Yet Hondurans who are supportive of the existing political structures are clearly more likely to favor an expansive state role, as is indicated in Figure VIII.15, in which those in the lower range of system support are less supportive of an expansive state (mean *rolestado* index value of 55.6) while those exhibiting higher degrees of system support are much more supportive of an expansive state (mean *rolestado* index value of 67.0). Similarly, Hondurans who are more politically tolerant are more likely to support an expansive state, while those who are less tolerant tend to be less supportive of an expansive state, as can be seen in Figure VIII.16, in which as one moves from the bottom quartile of political tolerance to the top quartile, support for an expansive state role increases from an index value on *rolestado* of 53.2 to 73.8. The relationships seen in Figures VIII.15 and VIII.16 are both statistically significant.




Figure VIII.15. *Rolestado* by System Support




Figure VIII.16. *Rolestado* by Political Tolerance

## Conclusion

Hondurans tend to support an expansive view of the state, in large part because many are poor and look to the state for solutions to their personal dilemmas. This desire for an activist state – which would help citizens to mitigate harsh economic conditions – is even shared by both the political left and the political right. **But, interestingly, this perspective may not necessarily be indicative of a desire for a strong role by the central government, it could equally well be indicative of a desire for effective local governance.** Programs by the central government to delegate power and funding authority to local governments, as well as programs by international funding agencies to enhance the capacity and transparency of local governing institutions, might well prove to be responsive to citizen desires in Honduras. The Washington Consensus among such international financial agencies favored both privatization and delegation of power to local governments. Hondurans appear to agree with the latter prescription, but not necessarily with the former.

## Appendix

### Appendix VIII.1. Regression Equation

<b>Table VIII.2: Determinants of Variation in <i>Rolestado</i></b>		
<b>VARIABLES INDEPENDIENTES</b>	<b>COEFICIENTES</b>	<b>t</b>
Mujer	-0.074*	(-3.81)
Riqueza	-0.087	(-1.83)
Edad	-0.112*	(-2.41)
Educación	0.015	(0.46)
Número de hijos	0.186*	(4.09)
Situación económica nacional	-0.144*	(-3.65)
Situación económica personal	0.176*	(4.17)
Tamaño (Tegucigalpa = valor mayor; Rural = valor menor)	-0.086*	(-3.12)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente Zelaya	0.032	(1.06)
Left-Right scale	0.212*	(7.03)
Constante	-0.110*	(-3.75)
R-cuadrado= 0.122		
N. de casos = 1196		
* p<0.05		

# Chapter IX. Performance of the Zelaya Administration

## Trust in the President

This final chapter examines how much Hondurans trust President José Manuel “Mel” Zelaya R. and to what extent they approve of his work. Item B21a of the survey asked about the extent to which people have confidence in the presidency, but without specifically mentioning President Zelaya himself.<sup>44</sup> Nonetheless, the presidency is a sufficiently salient institution in Honduras, that one can assume citizens to be well aware of who is the incumbent and that views of the current president will be reflected in their assessments of the office of the president (see below). As shown in Figure IX.1, most people report levels of confidence in the presidency somewhere in the middle of a seven-point continuum but skewed toward more distrust (lower end) than of trust (higher end).




Figure IX.1. Confidence in the Honduran Presidency, 2008

<sup>44</sup> The actual text refers to ‘confidence in’ the president, but for purposes of stylistic variation, we will sometimes refer to ‘trust in’ the president.

As in nearly all countries, levels of confidence in the presidency are heavily influenced by one's party identification, as can be seen in Figure IX.2. While sympathizers of the president's party, the Partido Liberal (PL), are more inclined to trust the presidency, sympathizers of the opposition parties are just the opposite, i.e., they tend to be distrustful. Individuals with no party identification, however, report a level of confidence somewhere in-between the PL supporters and identifiers with other political parties. Thus, while levels of confidence exhibited in the presidency by PL supporters and by opposition parties supporters may be influenced by their party identification, the more 'moderate' levels of confidence in the presidency reported by non-partisans, or "independents" might reflect a lack of partisan identification and therefore indicate somewhat more 'objective' political views, a point supported in Argueta (2007). Those Hondurans lacking a firm party identification are individuals who are easily able to switch their votes from one party to another in successive elections, thereby contributing to the possibility of electoral accountability. In effect, these independents can well determine the outcome of elections.




Figure IX.2. Confidence in the Honduran Presidency by Party Identification

Figure IX.3 reveals even more clearly the impact of party identification in people’s confidence in the presidency. PL sympathizers tend to lean strongly toward the positive end of the confidence scale, with 62% of individuals exhibiting “much” confidence in the presidency being PL identifiers, while those who sympathize with the main opposition party, the Partido Nacional (PN), tend in the opposite direction, with 30% of those who say they have “no” confidence in the presidency being PN identifiers and 29% of those at the next lowest level of confidence being PN supporters. Non-partisans (i.e., independents) display a much more even distribution of confidence, with over 50% of those in levels 1-6 of the presidential confidence scale being non-partisans; it is only when one reaches the very highest level (7) of confidence in the presidency that non-partisans drop to 26% of the total.




Figure IX.3. Relative Degrees of Confidence in the Honduran Presidency by Party Identification

Figure IX.4 displays a similar picture of partisan bias, with PL supporters being those most likely to display “much confidence” (13.0%) or “some confidence” (71.5%) in the presidency. However, the same figure also reveals that there are many Hondurans who have very low levels of confidence in the Presidency, with that phenomenon being most common (48.3%) among those sympathizing with a party other than the PL or PN. However, even 15.3 percent of PL sympathizers report having little or no confidence in the presidency, as do 24.6% of those lacking a partisan preference and 33.0% of PN identifiers. So, while the dependent variable refers to the presidency in the abstract, partisanship (and the party of the incumbent) appears to influence ratings of the institution in the abstract.




Figure IX.4. Distribution of Relative Degrees of Confidence in the Honduran Presidency

But, is the level of trust in the presidency relatively high or low? This can best be judged by comparing levels of confidence in the presidency with that accorded to other institutions. Figure IX.5 shows that, when compared to other institutions of the Honduran state, the level of trust accorded to the presidency is, indeed, lower than that extended to other branches of government or to other institutions (such as the mass media). Trust in the presidency is even lower than trust in the executive branch (*gobierno central*) as a whole.




Figure IX.5. Confidence in the Honduran Institutions, Including the Presidency

## Approval of the President's Performance

Why are levels of trust in the presidency so low? The likely response is that it they are linked to the performance of the current incumbent as president. Item M1 of the survey asked how much people approved of President Zelaya's performance as president. About two years into Zelaya's four-year term, his approval ratings clustered heavily in the middle of a five-point range, as depicted in Figure IX.6. Yet, even though more than half of those surveyed (55.4%) rated Zelaya's performance as *'regular'* (*ni bueno ni malo*), there is a skewness in the distribution indicating that more negative views predominate than positive assessments of Zelaya's performance.




Figure IX.6. Public Assessments of President Zelaya's Performance in 2008

Figure IX.7 shows that the level of approval of the incumbent president in 2008 has decreased almost 5 points (on a 100-point scale) since the prior AmericasBarometer survey completed in 2006, when President Zelaya was only a few months into his presidential period. The 2006 survey was taken during the early “honeymoon” phase of the Zelaya presidency, while the 2008 survey captures an expected erosion of public support after two years of governance. The 2008 level of approval remains slightly higher, but closely approximates the level of approval of Zelaya’s predecessor, President Ricardo Maduro, at a comparable point in Maduro’s presidency in 2004.




Figure IX.7. Presidential Approval Ratings Over Time

As expected, approval of presidential performance also changes with party identification. As Figure IX.8 indicates, Hondurans who identify with the PL, President Zelaya’s party, exhibit the highest levels of approval of the Zelaya presidency, while those who identify with the PN, the main opposition party, report the lowest levels of approval of Zelaya’s performance (and sympathizers of “other parties” and of “no party” exhibiting levels somewhere in between). Yet, as the same figure also reveals, approval of Zelaya’s performance has decreased between 2006 and 2008, regardless of party identification. Approval of Zelaya’s performance fell by 3%-4% among sympathizers of the two major parties between 2006 and 2008, by 5% among those lacking a party identification, and by 8% among those favoring a minor party.




Figure IX.8. Presidential Approval Ratings by Party Identification Over Time

Figure IX.9 suggests that some component of the explanation of Zelaya’s relatively low approval rating resides in the president’s perceived inability to solve some of Honduras’ most pressing problems. Hondurans perceive the government of President Zelaya to have done little, as measured by a 0-100 scale where 0 means “not at all” and 100 means “a lot”, in fighting unemployment, poverty, corruption, and to improve security. A series of questions encompassing items N1-12 refers to efforts of “the current government” to address certain issues, with most items in the series having been asked in each AmericasBarometer survey. In early 2008 at the time of the current survey, improvements over 2006 are apparent in public approval of presidential actions to fight unemployment (up from 22.2 to 25.5) and to combat corruption, (up from 26.9 to 29.9, although still down from 39.6 in 2005). But two other indicators exhibit decreased levels of public approval from those seen in 2006, including a decline from 40.5 to 36.5 in “protecting and promoting democratic principles” and from 34.0 to 32.9 on “improving citizen security.” Approval of efforts of the current government to “combat poverty” stayed essentially constant (29.6% in 2006; 29.4% in 2008).




Figure IX.9. Governmental Performance Ratings Over Time in Key Policy Arenas

A more rigorous multivariate examination via linear regression reveals that approval of the President’s performance (the dependent variable) is a function of several political and demographic variables. Figure IX.10 reveals that the approval rates of President Zelaya are in fact significantly influenced by the perceived performance of the current government in fighting unemployment, improving citizen security, and alleviating poverty. Other factors proving to be statistically significant predictors of presidential approval include ideology, partisanship, place of residence, wealth (measured in terms of possessions), family income and attention paid to radio news.




Figure IX.10. Predictors of Presidential Approval in 2008

Figure IX.11 shows that approval of the President’s performance increases when people perceive his government as doing a good job in addressing unemployment. The increase is from an average presidential approval score in the range of 43 at the low end of ratings of efforts by the current government to combat unemployment to an average presidential approval score of just under 60 at the upper end of the “combating unemployment” scale.




Figure IX11. Efforts of Current Government to Combat Unemployment as a Determinant of Presidential Approval

Similarly, the more people perceive the current government as having improved citizen security in the country, the higher their approval of the current President's performance, as can be seen in Figure IX.12 in which average approval ratings jump from under 45 among those believing that the current government has done nothing to improve citizen security to over 60 among those believing that the government has done much to improve security. Further, note from Figure IX.10 that perceived improvement in security is clearly one of the factors that contribute most heavily to the positive ratings of the incumbent President's performance.




Figure IX.12. Efforts of Current Government to Improve Citizen Security as a Determinant of Presidential Approval

Figure IX.13 reveals a similar relationship between approval of Zelaya’s performance and perceptions of the current government’s success in fighting poverty. Those who believe the current government does a lot to reduce poverty are more likely to report higher approval ratings of President Zelaya than those who believe the government does little or nothing to fight poverty. The jump is from average approval ratings of under 45 among those believing that the current government has done nothing to combat poverty to over 60 among those who believe it to have done a lot.




Figure IX.13. Efforts of Current Government to Fight Poverty as a Determinant of Presidential Approval

Figure IX.14 depicts a negative relationship seen earlier in the regression analysis. This graph shows how a perception of insecurity in the country will affect approval ratings of the President negatively. That is, the more people perceive insecurity to be widespread, the lower their approval rating of President Zelaya, with average approval ratings dropping from over 54 among those who do not see insecurity as a problem to the range of 44 to 48 among those who seen insecurity as more of a problem.




Figure IX14. Perception of Citizen Insecurity as a Determinant of Presidential Approval

Information obtained through radio news, in contrast to that obtained via newspapers and television, also influences people's approval of the incumbent President. As shown in Figure IX.15, the more people listen to radio news, the higher their approval ratings of President Zelaya. A likely explanation for this finding is that government-sponsored programs are presented on the radio to inform citizens about government actions and achievements. While this policy has been criticized by some as an expensive propaganda campaign of the Executive, it appears to produce one desired effect, i.e., higher average presidential approval ratings, which increase from under 42 among those who never listen to radio news to over 48 among those who listen one or more times weekly.




Figure IX.15. Radio News Listening as a Determinant of Presidential Approval

Another variable significantly associated with presidential approval is ideology. Individuals who identify themselves on the right are much more likely to approve President Zelaya’s performance than are those on the left. This finding might seem puzzling for some people who focus on President Zelaya’s friendly relationships with Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, two self-proclaimed leftist presidents. However, as Argueta (2007:57) has argued, ideology in Honduras seems to be more associated with support, or lack thereof, for the traditional two-party political system. Those self-described as “leftists” are more likely to reject the two-party system, while those who describe themselves as “rightists” are more likely to support that system, be they identifiers with either the PL or the PN.




Figure IX16. Ideology as a Determinant of Presidential Approval

Not surprisingly, however, the regression results presented earlier also reveal that approval of President Zelaya’s performance is significantly higher among sympathizers of the PL (the reference category in the regression), among whom the average approval rating reaches 56.3 (on a 100 point scale), as seen in Figure IX.17. Conversely, not being a Liberal, or not being partisan at all, reduces the approval ratings by more than 10 percent points to average scores of 44.0 to 45.4.




Figure IX17. Party Identification as a Determinant of Presidential Approval

Finally, Figure IX.18 shows two seemingly contradictory relationships among determinants of presidential approval. Approval ratings for President Zelaya are higher both among those with higher income levels and among individuals with less wealth (measured in terms of household possessions). Yet, these two contrasting trends should not necessarily be incompatible given that wealth and income do not necessarily go hand-to-hand, particularly in rural areas where access to land may have been a source of wealth (over time) or among unemployed urban residents, among whom household possessions may have been accumulated even though current income is low.




Figure IX18. Wealth and Income as Determinants of Presidential Approval

Approval of presidential performance might also influence the results of the next round of presidential elections, as well as electoral abstentionism. As shown in Figure IX.19, should the elections have been held at the time when this survey was conducted (January, 2008), more Hondurans would have voted for the PN or for the candidate of another party (36.5%) than for the PL (27.1%). In addition, such a hypothetical election would have exhibited a rate of abstention (33.8%) five percent points higher than during the past presidential elections (28%), perhaps eroding the legitimacy of the Honduran political system even further.

Nonetheless, these estimates are far from conclusive. Much can happen during the balance of 2008 and late 2009. The next presidential elections are scheduled for November of 2009 and the events that will occur during the interim will likely have a strong effect on the voting behavior of Hondurans.




Figure IX19. Tentative Presidential Vote Intention for 2009

## Approval of Performance and Support for Stable Democracy

Approval ratings of a president may affect not only his/her own administration but also may influence key components of broader support for stable democracy. As shown in Appendix IX.1, approval ratings for the current president are significantly correlated in a multivariate analysis with people's perceived legitimacy of Honduran political institutions. Therefore, perceptions of a strong performance of any given president should cause people to see the institutions of the state as more legitimate. Perceptions of poor performance by any given president, on the other hand, may well erode perceptions of the legitimacy of political institutions among Hondurans.

So, rather than focusing on “horse-race” accounts of presidential performance and the potential impact of approval ratings on the next election, analysts might do well to look at longer-range effects of presidential performance on institutional legitimacy. A series of presidencies evaluated unfavorably may well have contributed to the current low level of political legitimacy in Honduras. Presidential performance is not the only determinant of the low level of political support existing in Honduras. But, given the difficulty of addressing some public policy issues – such as unemployment, poverty and crime – and the recurrent hope that “a new president” will prove more successful at addressing such issues, assessments of presidential performance could further erode or begin to counteract the low levels of political legitimacy currently encountered in Honduras.

Approval of the presidential performance is also significantly associated with interpersonal trust. However, the causal relationship between these two variables may work in the opposite direction. In other words, individuals with higher levels of interpersonal trust may be more likely to trust a president and to approve of his/her performance, rather than the other way around.

## Appendix

Appendix IX.1

Variables independientes	Apoyo a la democracia		Derecho a la oposición		Tolerancia política		Legitimidad de las instituciones		Confianza interpersonal	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.017	(0.04)	0.042	(0.03)	-0.044	(0.03)	0.204*	(0.02)	0.215*	(0.04)
Interés en la política	-0.060*	(0.03)	0.002	(0.03)	0.023	(0.03)	0.095*	(0.03)		
Educación	0.271	(0.27)	0.368	(0.25)	-0.051	(0.20)	0.048	(0.20)	0.367	(0.27)
Mujer	-0.770	(1.16)	-0.237	(0.98)	0.475	(0.89)	0.735	(0.68)	-1.185	(1.02)
Edad	0.493*	(0.25)	0.958*	(0.23)	-0.055	(0.21)	0.126	(0.19)	0.807*	(0.28)
Edad al cuadrado	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.010*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.008*	(0.00)
Riqueza	0.689	(0.75)	-0.152	(0.53)	0.783	(0.46)	0.484	(0.43)	-0.839	(0.73)
Perc. Economía familiar	-5.202*	(1.04)	-1.944*	(0.87)	-2.132*	(1.04)	-0.578	(0.97)	-1.295	(1.21)
Tamaño	1.813*	(0.64)	0.781	(0.55)	-0.226	(0.61)	1.628*	(0.64)	1.345	(0.83)
Constante	50.519*	(6.98)	35.786*	(6.18)	51.779*	(5.99)	16.753*	(6.00)	23.293*	(6.87)
R-cuadrado	0.032		0.021		0.011		0.086		0.034	
N. de casos	1330		1390		1312		1373		1427	
* p<0.05										

# Appendixes

## Appendix I: Technical Description of Sample Design

### Methodological description

The fieldwork for the survey on the political culture of democracy in Honduras 2008 was conducted between the months of February and March 2008. The fieldwork was entrusted to the company Borge and Associates, which designed the sampling frame and implemented the surveys on the basis of criteria stipulated by Professor Seligson. The methodological details of the survey are as follows:

### Sample design

#### Universe

The adult population (above 18 years of age) inhabiting the urban and rural areas of the 18 departments and 299 municipalities of the Republic of Honduras was taken as the universe. The country was divided into nine strata for sampling purposes:

1. **Norte A:** Comprising the municipalities of Cortés department.
2. **Norte B:** Comprising the departments of Atlántida, Colón and Yoro
3. **Norte C:** Comprising the department of Islas de la Bahía.
4. **Oriental A:** Comprising the departments of El Paraíso and Olancho
5. **Oriental B:** Comprising the department of Gracias a Dios.
6. **Sur:** Comprising the departments of Choluteca and Valle
7. **Central A:** Comprising the department of Francisco Morazán
8. **Central B:** Comprising the departments of Comayagua and La Paz
9. **Occidental:** Comprising the departments of Copán, Intibucá, Lempira, Ocotepeque, and Santa Bárbara

### Population

The units which were the object of the study were persons above 18 years who inhabit the houses reported in the census cartography of 2002 on a permanent basis. The population residing in collective housing, such as hospitals, asylums, orphanages, barracks, convents, monasteries, was excluded from the study. However, private households situated in these places, such as wardens' quarters which were continuously inhabited were included as long as they appeared as housing units on the census maps.

### Units of observation and final units of selection

The study includes variables referring to the respondent, the head of household, its members and the housing unit. For this reason, the household identified in the census was chosen as the unit of

observation. Given that every census household is located in a housing unit, the housing unit was selected as the final unit of selection. The housing unit can be easily identified in the countryside and its existence is permanent from the time the census cartography was undertaken, with the exception of localities where natural disasters have occurred recently.

### Sampling method

As part of the contractual requirements, a complex design (stratified and in groups) with selection in stages was selected. It fulfilled the following requirements:

- Represent 100% of the adult population of the Republic of Honduras
- Possess a stratification that permits the utilization of each one of the strata as study domain
- Permit analysis at the urban and rural level
- Be self-weighted within each stratum and at the national level.

The following goals were established to satisfy the above conditions:

- Obtain representative samples for the following strata, levels and study domains:
  1. The whole country
  2. First stage strata (coinciding with the domains of study)
    - Norte A.
    - Norte B
    - Norte C
    - Oriental A
    - Oriental B
    - Sur
    - Central A
    - Central B
    - Occidental
  3. Second stage strata
    - a. Urban
    - b. Rural
- Calculate sampling errors for the estimates obtained at each level.
- Assign interviews in a way that permits a reasonable balance between budget, sample size and degree of error in results.
- Utilize the most up to date sampling frame for each locality.

Under these conditions and goals, probabilistic, multi-stage, stratified sampling in groups was selected. Random selection was used at all stages and quotas were used only in the selection of the adult to be interviewed in the housing unit.

In order to achieve adequate representation of each region, some additional parameters were included, relating to proportions of urbanness and ruralness, small areas which were occasionally heavily populated with characteristics different from those of the surrounding population and the need for self-weighting.

In view of the differences present between and within the municipalities constituting the country, in some cases in which there was no clear urban-rural division we proceeded to define some types of physical criteria, such as the type of services available and the economic activities taking place in each one, in order to reduce the large variations in proportions of ruralness in the municipalities. For this we did a prior classification of urban and rural areas, in order to obtain adequate representation of the urban and rural population of the region, without a need for applying special weights to the data to be obtained.

Considering the possible combinations for the nine study domains (strata) and two areas, we would have a total of 18 divisions in which the population of interest could be classified. It should be noted that the sample for two domains, Norte C and Oriental B, is very small owing to their small size. As a result, the estimates obtained need to be analyzed with caution since they are very vulnerable to measurement error. We assign an adequate number of interviews to each division and then we proceed to select where the secondary sampling units will be located with probabilities proportional to the population of each locality. For practical reasons, we work with blocks of 12 housing units in urban areas and in rural areas. The assignment of a greater or smaller number of cases due to rounding off is adjusted through random procedures.

The sample design is stratified by regions and is multi-stage. In the first stage, the municipalities are selected according to their population; in the second stage the neighborhoods or localities, next the census sectors, and finally the private housing units. In each census sector, from the corresponding map a block of 12 housing units is selected and in each household an adult person is chosen. The resulting design allows us to calculate results by strata, domains, and some aggregates for the main variables being studied.

### **Sampling frame**

The sampling frame comprises the population registered in the National Censuses of Honduras carried out in 2001, for the first stage, and, later, the Electoral Register, which shows the number of voters registered for each Junta Receptora de Votos. This, in turn, is linked to the neighborhoods or localities for which there are census maps, created by National Institute of Statistics. This information is sufficiently up to date, and allows us to work with confidence in the estimation of the results of interest.

Honduras is divided into 18 departments and 299 municipalities. For each one of the municipalities, the 2001 Census of Population gives us the number of urban inhabitants and the number of rural inhabitants. The Elections Tribunal has divided the country into 5,250 localities, in each one of which there is a Voting Center. In Honduras people vote near their place of residence (domiciliary vote) and, at least in theory, it is compulsory for all adults appear in the Electoral Register.

We have distributed the population of each municipality in localities or Voting Centers, utilizing the proportions in the Electoral Register. Each locality is indicated as urban or rural.

In the national sample frame the urban and rural localities of each one of the 9 regions of study have been clearly identified. We used this to do a random selection of localities. We found the map for each locality and selected a census segment. The group of 8 or 12 housing units was marked in the field by the supervisor.

### Sample size

For contractual reasons and based on previous experience, the sample size was fixed at 1,500 effective interviews, for which the corresponding estimation errors could be calculated with 95% confidence, given the characteristics of the design utilized.

### Estimation of design effect and sampling error

The sampling error was estimated using the size of the sample and the design effects typically associated with the questions found in the questionnaire. These effects, understood as the quotient between the variance obtained from a simple random sample and a complex design, differ for each variable, and can be expressed through the following equation:

$$Deff = \frac{V_{comp}(\theta)}{V_{sa}(\theta)}$$

where  $V_{sa}(\theta)$  is the variance for an indicator  $\theta$  using a simple random sample and  $V_{comp}(\theta)$  is the variance for the same indicator using a complex sample. For this particular case, we expect that the effect of stratification produces small design effects in the estimation of the variables of interest. In this respect, it should be kept in mind that it is estimated that the national level data for those variables that are expressed in terms of proportions or percentages have a sampling error of around 2.5%.

### Sampling distribution

In the details of the sample, we applied a distribution proportional to the size of each stratum or study domain.

The selection of persons in each household was done through the application of a quota, controlling the variables sex and age, according to the distribution obtained in the 2001 National Population Censuses. Only one person was interviewed per household. The interview was conducted face-to-face, following the acceptance of a letter of notice by the respondent

**Table IX.1**  
**Population and sample by regions and domains**

<b>NORTE A ZONE</b>	<b>POPULATION</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>SAMPLE</b>
San Pedro Sula	483,384	40.2%	111
More than 100,000	126,402	10.5%	29
25-100,000	133,376	11.1%	31
2-25,000	48,899	4.1%	11
Rural area	410,449	34.1%	94
Sub-total	1,202,510	100.0%	276
<b>NORTE B ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	126,721	12.0%	29
25-100,000	179,800	17.0%	41
2-25,000	111,009	10.5%	25
Rural area	638,691	60.5%	147
Sub-total	1,056,221	100.0%	242
<b>NORTE C ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	0	0.0%	0
2-25,000	10,560	27.7%	2
Rural area	27,513	72.3%	7
Sub-total	38,073	100.0%	9
<b>CENTRAL A ZONE</b>			
Tegucigalpa	819,867	69.4%	188
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	0	0.0%	0
2-25,000	61,503	5.2%	14
Rural area	299,306	25.4%	69
Sub-total	1,180,676	100.0%	271
<b>CENTRAL B ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	102,931	20.2%	24
2-25,000	62,115	12.2%	14
Rural area	344,395	67.6%	79
Sub-total	509,441	100.0%	117

**Table II.1**  
(continued)

<b>SUR ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	76,135	14.0%	18
2-25,000	65,481	12.1%	15
Rural area	401,030	73.9%	92
Sub-total	542,646	100.0%	125
<b>ORIENTAL A ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	117,003	15.2%	27
2-25,000	77,239	10.0%	18
Rural area	575,373	74.8%	132
Sub-total	769,615	100.0%	177
<b>ORIENTAL B ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	0	0.0%	0
2-25,000	9,217	13.7%	2
Rural area	58,167	86.3%	13
Sub-total	67,384	100.0%	15.0
<b>OCCIDENTAL ZONE</b>			
More than 100,000	0	0.0%	0
25-100,000	28,292	2.4%	6
2-25,000	181,546	15.5%	42
Rural area	958,940	82.0%	220
Sub-total	1,168,778	100.0%	268
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,535,344</b>		

### Final sample and sampling error

The final sample included 1,522 valid surveys. The margin of error estimated is +/- 0.025 (2.5%). The following table shows the distribution of the sample by the country zones.

**Distribution of the population and the sample by zones of the country**

	Population		Sample
	N	%	N
Norte A Zone	1,202,510	18.4	229
Norte B Zone	1,056,221	16.2	130
Norte C Zone	38,073	0.6	271
Central A Zone	1,180,676	18.1	259
Central B Zone	509,441	7.8	20
Sur Zone	542,646	8.3	274
Oriental A Zone	769,615	11.8	187
Oriental B Zone	67,384	1.0	20
Occidental Zone	1,168,778	17.9	132
Total	6,535,344	100.0	1,522

## Appendix II: The IRB “informed consent” document



Enero, 2008

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública. Vengo por encargo de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. El proyecto esta financiado por la AID de los Estados Unidos. La entrevista durará de 30 a 35 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Honduras.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a **Borge y Asociados**, al teléfono 265 6860 ó 378 3932 con la Sra. Mara Miranda

¿Desea participar?

## Appendix III: The Questionnaire

Honduras Versión # 18Q IRB Approval: #071086

 <p><b>USAID</b> DEL PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA</p>	 <p><b>Movimiento Cívico para la Democracia HONDURAS</b></p>
<p>Latin American Public Opinion Project</p>  <p><b>LAPOP</b> Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina</p>	 <p><b>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</b></p>

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: Honduras, 2008

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<p><b>País:</b> 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador <b>4. Honduras</b> 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá</p>	<p><b>PAIS</b></p>	<p><b>4</b></p>
<p><b>IDNUM.</b> Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____</p>	<p><b>IDNUM</b></p>	
<p><b>ESTRATOPRI:</b> (401) Central A (Francisco Morazán) (402) Central B (Comayagua /La Paz) (403) Norte A (Cortés) (404) Norte B (Yoro/Atlántida/Colón) (405) Norte C (Islas de la Bahía) (406) Occidental (Ocotepeque/Copán/Santa Bárbara/ Lempira/ Intibucá) (407) Oriental A (Olancho y El Paraíso) (408) Oriental B (Gracias a Dios) (409) Sur (Choluteca y Valle)</p>	<p><b>ESTRATOPRI</b></p>	<p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>UPM.</b> _____</p>	<p><b>UPM</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Departamento :</b> _____</p>	<p><b>PROV</b></p>	<p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Municipio</b> _____</p>	<p><b>MUNICIPIO</b></p>	<p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>DISTRITO</b> _____</p>	<p><b>HONDISTRITO</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>SEGMENTO CENSAL</b> _____</p>	<p><b>HONSEGMENTO</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Sector</b> _____</p>	<p><b>HONSEC</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>CLUSTER.</b> (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]</p>	<p><b>CLUSTER</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>UR</b> (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]</p>	<p><b>UR</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Tamaño del lugar:</b> (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural</p>	<p><b>TAMANO</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Idioma del cuestionario:</b> (1) Español</p>	<p><b>IDIOMA Q</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>Hora de inicio:</b> ____:____ [no digitar]</p>		<p>-----</p>
<p><b>Fecha de la entrevista día:</b> ____ mes: ____ año: 2008</p>	<p><b>FECHA</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR</b></p>		
<p><b>Q1.</b> Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer</p>	<p><b>Q1</b></p>	

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			A4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios			02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos			59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno			15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente/deforestación			10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración			16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico			12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas/Maras			14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza			04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)			06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio			22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro			31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)			27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo			33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de			07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el			60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia			57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda			55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro			70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR			88

Ahora, cambiando de tema... [Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días [Acepte también casi todos los días]	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los diarios	1	2	3	4	8	A3	
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i	

<b>SOCT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT1</b>	
<b>SOCT2.</b> ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT2</b>	
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	<b>IDIO1</b>	

<b>IDIO2.</b> ¿Considera usted que <b>su</b> situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>IDIO2</b>
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Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS/NR</b>	
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> Alcalde?	1	2	8	<b>CP4A</b>
<b>CP4.</b> Algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	<b>CP4</b>

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...				
<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>NP1</b>			
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [ <b>Siga</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Pase a SGL1</b> ] (8) NS/NR	<b>NP2</b>			
<b>MUNI9.</b> ¿Cómo fue atendido? [ <b>Leer alternativas</b> ] (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (Regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (Pésimo) (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.	<b>MUNI9</b>			
<b>MUNI10.</b> ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	<b>MUNI10</b>			
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [ <b>Leer alternativas</b> ] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	<b>SGL1</b>			
<b>LGL2A.</b> Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar <b>más responsabilidades</b> ? [ <b>Leer alternativas</b> ] (1) Mucho más al gobierno central (2) Algo más al gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad (4) Algo más a la municipalidad (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL2A</b>			
<b>LGL2B.</b> Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería <b>administrar más dinero</b> ? [ <b>Leer alternativas</b> ] (1) Mucho más el gobierno central (2) Algo más el gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad (4) Algo más la municipalidad (5) Mucho más la municipalidad (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL2B</b>			

<b>LGL3.</b> ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL3</b>
<b>MUNI6.</b> ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? [Leer alternativas] 3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Nada de confianza (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI6</b>
<b>MUNI11.</b> [Preguntar a todos] ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? (1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>MUNI11</b>

<b>HONMUN30.</b> En su opinión, ¿quién debería ser el responsable de proveer (dar) los servicios de salud para la gente de esta comunidad. ¿El gobierno central o la municipalidad? (1) El gobierno central (2) La municipalidad (8) NS/NR	<b>HONMUN30</b>
<b>HONMUN31.</b> ¿Y quién debería ser el responsable de proveer (dar) educación para la gente de esta comunidad? [Leer alternativas] (1) El gobierno central (2) La municipalidad (8) NS/NR	<b>HONMUN31</b>
Ahora le voy a preguntar sobre ciertos servicios municipales. Le voy a pedir que para cada uno de ellos me diga si ha mejorado, ha seguido igual o ha empeorado en los últimos dos años. [Luego de cada servicio, pregunte: <b>ha mejorado, ha seguido igual, o ha empeorado?</b> ]	
<b>HONMUN32.</b> Recolección de basura (1) Ha mejorado (2) Ha seguido igual (3) Ha empeorado (8) NS	<b>HONMUN32</b>
<b>HONMUN33.</b> Administración de los mercados (1) Ha mejorado (2) Ha seguido igual (3) Ha empeorado (8) NS	<b>HONMUN33</b>
<b>HONMUN36.</b> Agua y alcantarillado (1) Ha mejorado (2) Ha seguido igual (3) Ha empeorado (8) NS	<b>HONMUN36</b>
<b>HONMUN37.</b> ¿La alcaldía del municipio en donde usted vive informa a los ciudadanos sobre la forma en que invierte los recursos de la municipalidad? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a CP5] (8) NS [Pase a CP5]	<b>HONMUN37</b>

Dígame por favor, ¿de cuáles de las siguientes maneras esta municipalidad suele informar a los ciudadanos sobre su gestión y la utilización de recursos?

<b>HONMUN38.</b> Mediante cabildos abiertos	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS/NR	(9) Inap	<b>HONMUN38</b>
<b>HONMUN39.</b> Sesiones abiertas de la corporación	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS/NR	(9) Inap	<b>HONMUN39</b>
<b>HONMUN40.</b> Publicación en algún medio de prensa	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS/NR	(9) Inap	<b>HONMUN40</b>
<b>HONMUN41.</b> Reunión con el alcalde municipal o delegado municipal	(1) Sí	(2) No	(8) NS/NR	(9) Inap	<b>HONMUN41</b>

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR		
<b>CP5.</b> Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP5</b>
Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. <b>[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]</b>							
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR		
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>CP13</b>
<b>CP20. [Solo mujeres]</b> ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	9 (HOMBRE)	<b>CP20</b>
<b>HONCP21.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación para promover la salud de la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8		<b>HONCP21</b>
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4 [Pase a LS3]	8		<b>CP7</b>
<b>HONQ12A2.</b> ¿En esta reunión de la Asociación de Padres había mención de la educación cívica o de la educación sobre como ser ciudadano en Honduras? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a LS3] (8) NS/NR [Pase a LS3]							<b>HONDQ12A2</b>  (9) Inap

<b>HON12QA3.</b> ¿Y Usted piensa que la educación cívica que se brinda en esas reuniones es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala, o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena ni mala (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	<b>HONDQ12A3</b>	
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<b>LS3.</b> Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>LS3</b>	
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<b>IT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	<b>IT1</b>	
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<b>IT1A.</b> ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR	<b>IT1A</b>	
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<b>IT1B.</b> Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? (1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás (8) NS/NR	<b>IT1B</b>	
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**[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1**

**L1.** (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>L1</b>	
<b>Izquierda</b>					<b>Derecha</b>					(NS/NR=88)	

**[RECOGER TARJETA # 1]**

<b>PROT2.</b> ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	<b>PROT2</b>
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Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias **[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC1</b>
<b>JC4.</b> Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC4</b>

<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC10</b>
<b>JC12.</b> Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC12</b>
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	<b>JC13</b>

<b>JC15.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso Nacional, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	<b>JC15</b>
<b>JC16.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	<b>JC16</b>

<b>VIC1.</b> Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a VIC20] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]		<b>VIC1</b>
<b>VIC10.</b> [SOLO SI FUE VICTIMA DE ALGUN DELITO] ¿El delincuente o los delincuentes usaron violencia en contra de usted? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap		<b>VIC10</b>
<b>AOJ1.</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a VIC20] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a VIC20]		<b>AOJ1</b>
<b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (6) Otro (8) NS/NR (9) INAP		<b>AOJ1B</b>

<b>[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]:</b> Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas [Si contesta “Sí,” preguntar ¿Cuántas veces? y anotar el número de veces; si contesta “No” anotar “0” cero]	<b>¿Cuántas veces?</b> NO = 0, NS/NR=88	
<b>VIC20.</b> Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		<b>VIC20</b>
<b>VIC21.</b> ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		<b>VIC21</b>
<b>VIC22.</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o actos de vandalismo en contra de su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?		<b>VIC22</b>

<b>VIC23.</b> ¿Tiene usted vehículo o motocicleta? <b>No → Marcar 99 [PASAR A VIC24]</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de un robo total de vehículo o motocicleta en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC23</b>
<b>VIC23A. [Solo si tiene vehículo o motocicleta]</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de daños o de un robo de una parte o partes de vehículo o motocicleta? ¿Cuántas veces? 99. Inap			<b>VIC23A</b>
<b>[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]. VIC24.</b> ¿Ha sido usted víctima de alguna estafa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC24</b>
<b>VIC25.</b> ¿Alguien le amenazó de/a muerte, por cualquier motivo, en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC25</b>
<b>VIC26</b> ¿Fue usted golpeado por alguien en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC26</b>
<b>VIC27.</b> ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC27</b>
<b>VIC28.</b> ¿Fue usted herido con un arma de fuego en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC28</b>
<b>VIC29.</b> ¿Fue usted herido con un arma blanca en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC29</b>
<b>VIC30.</b> ¿Ha sido víctima de algún delito de tipo sexual en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC30</b>
<b>VIC31.</b> ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha sido usted víctima de un chantaje, extorsión o renta o impuesto de guerra? ¿Cuántas veces?			<b>VIC31</b>

<b>VIC32.</b> ¿Fue usted o algún pariente que vive en su hogar víctima de un secuestro en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas y cuántas veces? <b>[Considere total de veces y total de personas para escribir el total]</b>			<b>VIC32</b>
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<b>VIC33.</b> ¿Algún pariente o persona que vivía en la casa con usted fue asesinada en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas personas?			<b>VIC33</b>
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<b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8)NS/NR			<b>AOJ8</b>
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR			<b>AOJ11</b>

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...	Sí	No	NS/NR		
<b>VIC40.</b> ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1)	(0)	8	<b>VIC40</b>	
<b>VIC41.</b> ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1)	(0)	8	<b>VIC41</b>	
<b>VIC42.</b> ¿Ha cerrado su negocio a causa de la delincuencia? <b>[Si no tiene negocio marque 9]</b>	(1)	(0)	8	9	<b>VIC42</b>
<b>VIC43.</b> ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio, colonia, por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”]	(1)	(0)	8	<b>VIC43</b>	

<b>VIC44.</b> Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1)	(0)	8		<b>VIC44</b>
<b>VIC45.</b> ¿Ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia? <b>[Si está desempleado marque 9]</b>	(1)	(0)	8	9	<b>VIC45</b>
<b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					<b>AOJ11A</b>
<b>VIC11.</b> ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? <b>[No leer]</b> <b>[Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?]</b> (0) No denunciaría (1) Municipalidad (2) Policía (posta policial) (3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría etc) (4) Iglesia (5) Medio de comunicación (7) Derechos Humanos (6) Otros (8) NS/NR					<b>VIC11</b>
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					<b>AOJ12</b>
<b>AOJ12a.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					<b>AOJ12a</b>
<b>AOJ16A.</b> En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR					<b>AOJ16A</b>
<b>AOJ17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas/maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR					<b>AOJ17</b>
<b>AOJ18.</b> Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) La policía protege, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) <b>[No leer]</b> No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada (8) NS/NR					<b>AOJ18</b>
<b>VIC50.</b> Hablando de la ciudad o el pueblo en donde usted vive, ¿cree que los niveles de violencia son en general altos, medios o bajos? (1) Altos (2) Medios (3) Bajos (8) NS/NR					<b>VIC50</b>
<b>VIC51.</b> ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha tomado usted en su vivienda alguna medida de seguridad para protegerse de la delincuencia? (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a VIC53]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a VIC53]</b>					<b>VIC51</b>

¿Qué medida de seguridad ha tomado usted en su vivienda para protegerse de la delincuencia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera respuesta preguntar, “Algo más?”]. Aceptar hasta dos respuestas.		
	1ª Respuesta VIC52A	2ª Respuesta VIC52B
Ha construido muros, rejas o paredes exteriores adicionales en su casa	1	1
Ha puesto alambre de púas, “razor”, malla electrificada o vidrio roto alrededor de su casa	2	2
Ha instalado alarmas en su casa	3	3
Le ha puesto más candados o chapas a las puertas de su casa	4	4
Ha adquirido o ha comprado un arma	5	5
Ha contratado un servicio de seguridad privada o a un vigilante privado	6	6
Otras medidas	7	7
NS/NR	8	8
INAP	9	9

<p><b>VIC53.</b> ¿Hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un seguro que le compense o le reembolse las pérdidas o los daños causados por delitos contra usted o algún miembro de su hogar? ¿Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar?  <b>[Coloque la cantidad]</b> _____                      [No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa                      (8888) NS/NR</p>	<b>VIC53</b>	
<p><b>VIC54.</b> Si existiera un mecanismo efectivo, hasta cuánto estaría dispuesto a pagar al año por un servicio que le garantizara que usted NO será víctima de ningún acto violento o robo? ¿Me podría decir la cantidad de dinero que estaría dispuesto a pagar?  <b>[Coloque la cantidad]</b> _____                      [No leer] (0) No pagaría nada, no tiene dinero, no le interesa                      (8888) NS/NR</p>	<b>VIC54</b>	
<p><b>VIC55.</b> De las siguientes opciones, ¿cuál considera usted que es la <b>principal</b> causa de la inseguridad en su lugar de residencia? <b>[Leer opciones]:</b>                      (1) Falta de policía                      (2) Falta de justicia                      (3) Pobreza                      (4) Falta de programas para los jóvenes                      (8) <b>[No leer]</b> NS/NR                      (9) <b>[No leer]</b> No hay inseguridad en mi lugar de residencia</p>	<b>VIC55</b>	
<p><b>VIC56.</b> ¿Y qué tanto cree usted que los políticos se preocupan por mejorar la seguridad de su ciudad o comunidad: mucho, algo, poco o nada?                      (1) Mucho      (2) Algo      (3) Poco      (4) Nada      (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>VIC56</b>	

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con... [REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA]

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia. Se siente...	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía . Se siente...	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3

[ENTREGAR TARJETA A]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada			Mucho			NS/NR	

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Honduras garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio )	B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Honduras?	B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político hondureño?	B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político hondureño?	B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político hondureño?	B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Central?	B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ministerio Público?	B15
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la policía?	B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	B21
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	B21A
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	B32

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser hondureño?		B43
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos?		B17
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Superior de Cuentas?		B19
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción?		B46
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		B48
HONB18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las iglesias evangélicas?		HON DB18

Usando la misma escala...	NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?		N1
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?		N3
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?		N10
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?		N9
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?		N11
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?		N12

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Honduras y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos hondureños representan bien a sus votantes?	EPP1
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos hondureños?	EPP2
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?	EPP3
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso Nacional. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional estorba la labor del presidente?	EC1
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados del Congreso Nacional discutiendo y debatiendo?	EC2
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Congreso Nacional?	EC3
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso Nacional cumple con lo que usted espera de él?	EC4

[RECOGER TARJETA A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente José Manuel Zelaya Rosales es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1
M2. Y hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados del Congreso hondureño están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? 1) Muy bien 2) Bien 3) Ni bien ni mal 4) Mal 5) Muy Mal 8) NSNR	M2

<p><b>HONM3.</b> ¿Ha asistido usted o algún miembro de su familia a alguna reunion del "Poder Ciudadano"? 1) Sí 2) No 3) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>HONM3</b></p>
<p><b>HONM3A.</b> ¿Qué tan satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) se siente o se sentía su familiar con la efectividad de la reunión del Poder Ciudadano en transmitir las preferencias del pueblo al gobierno? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>HONM3A</b></p>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

**Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	NS/NR
							<p><b>Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR</b></p>

<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga -siempre usando la tarjeta- hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.</p>	
<p><b>POP101.</b> Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP101</b></p>
<p><b>POP102.</b> Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP102</b></p>
<p><b>POP103.</b> Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP103</b></p>
<p><b>POP106.</b> Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP106</b></p>
<p><b>POP107.</b> El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y <b>no</b> a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP107</b></p>
<p><b>POP109.</b> En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal? (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP109</b></p>
<p><b>POP110.</b> Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP110</b></p>

<b>POP112.</b> El <b>mayor</b> obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	<b>POP112</b>
<b>POP113.</b> Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	<b>POP113</b>

<b>EFF1.</b> A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	<b>EFF1</b>
<b>EFF2.</b> Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	<b>EFF2</b>

<b>ING4.</b> Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ING4</b>
<b>PN2.</b> A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los hondureños tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>PN2</b>
<b>DEM23.</b> Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>DEM23</b>

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7. **NS/NR = 8**

<b>ROS1.</b> El Estado hondureño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS1</b>
<b>ROS2.</b> El Estado hondureño, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS2</b>
<b>ROS3.</b> El Estado hondureño, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS3</b>
<b>ROS4.</b> El Estado hondureño debe implementar políticas <b>firmes</b> para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	<b>ROS4</b>

**[RECOGER TARJETA B]**

<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, <b>insatisfecho</b> o muy <b>insatisfecho</b> con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Honduras? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) <b>Insatisfecho</b> (4) Muy <b>insatisfecho</b> (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>
<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión, ¿Honduras es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	<b>PN5</b>

**[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desapruueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprubaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E5</b>
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E8</b>
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E11</b>
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E15</b>
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E14</b>
<b>E2.</b> Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E2</b>
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E3</b>
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	<b>E16</b>
<b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	<b>D34</b>
<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	<b>D37</b>

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Honduras. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]	<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?	<b>D3</b>
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?	<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas <b>puedan postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?	<b>D5</b>

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

<p><b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:                  (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno <b>no</b> democrático, o                  (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o                  (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>DEM2</b></p>
<p><b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?                  (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>DEM11</b></p>
<p><b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o                  (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AUT1</b></p>
<p><b>AUT2.</b> ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o                  (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AUT2</b></p>
<p><b>PP1.</b> Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PP1</b></p>
<p><b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2005?                  (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PP2</b></p>
<p><b>HONPP3.</b> Hay personas que trabajan en las mesas electorales o en grupos de observadores cívicos de las elecciones. ¿Trabajó usted en una mesa electoral o como observador electoral cívico en el último proceso electoral de 2005? <b>[No leer, sondee en qué tipo de elección]</b>                  Sí, sólo en las internas                  Sí, sólo en las generales                  Sí, en las internas y en las generales                  No trabajó                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>HON PP3</b></p>
<p>Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.</p>	
<p><b>DC10.</b> Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga 100 lempiras de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada                  (2) Es corrupto pero justificado                  (3) No es corrupto                  (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>DC10</b></p>
<p><b>DC13.</b> Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que lo que hizo el político: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p>	<p><b>DC13</b></p>

- (1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado
- (2) Es corrupto pero justificado
- (3) No es corrupto
- (8) NS/NR

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en el último año?		0	1	8	<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida en el último año?		0	1	8	<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para tramitar algo en el municipio (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en el último año?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida)?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? <b>No → Marcar 9</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida?	9	0	1	8	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	8	<b>EXC18</b>

<p><b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: <b>[LEER]</b> (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>EXC7</b></p>	
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<p>Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...  <b>GI1.</b> ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <b>[NO LEER: George Bush]</b>          (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde</p>	<p><b>GI1</b></p>	
<p><b>GI2.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso Nacional de Honduras? <b>[NO LEER: Roberto Micheletti Bain]</b>          (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde</p>	<p><b>GI2</b></p>	
<p><b>GI3.</b> ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene el país? <b>[NO LEER: 18]</b>          (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde</p>	<p><b>GI3</b></p>	
<p><b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Honduras? <b>[NO LEER: 4 años]</b>          (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde</p>	<p><b>GI4</b></p>	
<p><b>GI5.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <b>[NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"]</b>          (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde</p>	<p><b>GI5</b></p>	

<p><b>VB1.</b> ¿Tiene tarjeta de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>VB1</b></p>	
<p><b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2005?          (1) Sí votó <b>[Siga]</b>          (2) No votó <b>[Pasar a VB50]</b>          (8) NS/NR <b>[Pasar a VB50]</b></p>	<p><b>VB2</b></p>	

<p><b>VB3.</b> ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2005? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b></p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) <b>[Pase a VB50]</b></p> <p>(401) Manuel (Mel) Zelaya; Partido Liberal <b>[Pase a VB100]</b></p> <p>(402) Porfirio (Pepe) Lobo; Partido Nacional <b>[Pase a VB100]</b></p> <p>(403) Carlos Sosa Coello; Partido Innovación y Unidad-Social Demócrata (PINU-SD) <b>[Pase a VB100]</b></p> <p>(404) Juan Ramón Martínez; Democracia Cristiana (PDCH) <b>[Pase a VB100]</b></p> <p>(405) Juan Almendarez; Unificación Democrática (UD) <b>[Pase a VB100]</b></p> <p>(77) Otro <b>[Pase a VB100]</b></p> <p>(88) NS/NR <b>[Pase a VB50]</b></p> <p>(99) Inap (No votó)</p>	<p><b>VB3</b></p>	
<p><b>VB100.</b> ¿Qué lo motivó para votar por su candidato en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2005? <b>[Leer opciones]</b></p> <p>(1) La personalidad del candidato</p> <p>(2) El partido del candidato</p> <p>(3) Su plan de gobierno</p> <p>(4) Su equipo de trabajo</p> <p>(5) Tiene amigos o familiares en ese partido</p> <p>(6) Le dieron algo a cambio de votar por ese candidato (algún regalo o dinero)</p> <p>(7) Le ofrecieron trabajo si ganaba ese candidato</p> <p>(8) <b>[No leer]</b> Otra razón</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p><b>VB100</b></p>	
<p><b>VB101.</b> ¿Por qué voto usted nulo o blanco en la primera o en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Porque no sabía por quién votar, estaba confundido(a)</p> <p>(2) Porque quería demostrar su descontento con todos los candidatos</p> <p>(3) Porque quería protestar contra el sistema político</p> <p>(4) Porque quería protestar por la forma en que se dio la campaña</p> <p>(5) Otro</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) Inap</p>		
<p><b>VB50. [Preguntar a todos]</b> En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo    (2) De acuerdo    (3) En desacuerdo    (4) Muy en desacuerdo</p> <p>(8) NSNR</p>	<p><b>VB50</b></p>	
<p><b>VB10.</b> ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b></p> <p>(2) No <b>[Pase a POL1]</b></p> <p>(8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a POL1]</b></p>	<p><b>VB10</b></p>	

<p><b>VB11.</b> ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b>.</p> <p>(401) Partido Liberal  (402) Partido Nacional  (403) Partido Innovación y Unidad-Social Demócrata (PINU-SD)  (404) Democracia Cristiana (PDCH)  (405) Unificación Democrática (UD)  (77) Otro  (88) NS/NR <b>[Pase A POL1]</b>  (99) INAP <b>[Pase A POL1]</b></p>	<b>VB11</b>	
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<p><b>VB12</b> Y Usted diría que esa simpatía por el partido <b>[partido que mencionó en VB11]</b> es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?</p> <p>(1) Muy débil      (2) Débil      (3) Ni débil ni fuerte      (4) Fuerte      (5) Muy fuerte      (8)NS/NR  (9) INAP</p>	<b>VB12</b>	
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<p><b>POL1.</b> ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho      (2) Algo      (3) Poco      (4) Nada      (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>POL1</b>	
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<p><b>POL2.</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) A diario      (2) Algunas veces por semana      (3) Algunas veces por mes      (4) Rara vez      (5) Nunca      (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>POL2</b>	
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<p><b>VB20.</b>¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? <b>[No leer]</b></p> <p>(1) No votaría  (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (Partido Liberal)  (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno.  (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía  (8) NS/NR</p>	<b>VB20</b>	
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<p><b>VB21.</b> ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición  (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente  (3) Influir de otras maneras  (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga  (8) <b>[No leer]</b> NS/NR</p>	<b>VB21</b>	
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**[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]**

**LS6.** Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted.

...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible							Mejor vida posible				NS/NR

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con... [Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/N R o No Utiliza	
<b>SD1.</b> El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	<b>SD1</b>
<b>SD2.</b> Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	<b>SD2</b>
<b>SD3.</b> El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	<b>SD3</b>
<b>SD4.</b> La calidad del aire	1	2	8	<b>SD4</b>
<b>SD5.</b> La calidad del agua	1	2	8	<b>SD5</b>
<b>SD6.</b> La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	<b>SD6</b>
<b>SD7.</b> La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	<b>SD7</b>
<b>SD8.</b> La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	<b>SD8</b>
<b>SD9.</b> El flujo del tráfico	1	2	8	<b>SD9</b>
<b>SD10.</b> Las aceras o vías peatonales	1	2	8	<b>SD10</b>
<b>SD11.</b> La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	<b>SD11</b>
<b>SD12.</b> La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8	<b>SD12</b>

**LS4.** Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive?  
(1) Satisfecho (2) insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

	1 <sup>o</sup>	2 <sup>o</sup>	3 <sup>o</sup>	4 <sup>o</sup>	5 <sup>o</sup>	6 <sup>o</sup>	
Ninguno	0						<b>ED</b>
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16			
NS/NR/	88						

**Q2.** ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? \_\_\_\_\_ años (0= NS/NR)

**Q2**

**Q3.** ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas]

- (1) Católica
- (2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).
- (3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)
- (5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).
- (6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día
- (7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).
- (4) Ninguna
- (8) NS/NR

**Q3**

**Q5A.** ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Más de una vez por semana
- (2) Una vez por semana
- (3) Una vez al mes
- (4) Una o dos veces al año
- (5) Nunca o casi nunca
- (8) NS/NR

**Q5**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA E]

**Q10.** ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de L.475
- (02) Entre L. 476 - L. 950
- (03) Entre L.951 - L.1900
- (04) Entre L.1.901 - L.2.850
- (05) Entre L. 2.851 - L. 3.800

**Q10**

<p>(06) Entre L. 3.801 - L. 5.700                  (07) Entre L. 5.701 - L. 7.600                  (08) Entre L. 7.601- L.9.500                  (09) Entre L. 9.501 - L.14.250                  (10) Entre L. 14.251 - y más                  (88) NS/NR  <b>[RECOGER TARJETA E]</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior?</b>                  (1) Sí 2. No <b>[Pase a Q10c]</b> 8. NS <b>[Pase a Q10c]</b></p>	<p><b>Q10A</b></p>
<p><b>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En que utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer]</b>                  (1) Consumo (alimento, vestido)                  (2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación)                  (3) Gastos en educación                  (4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias)                  (5) Gastos médicos                  (6) Ahorro/Inversión                  (7) Otro                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>Q10a1</b></p>
<p><b>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>Q10B</b></p>
<p><b>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí,” preguntar ¿dónde?] [No leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente                  (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países                  (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos)                  (4) No <b>[Pase a Q14]</b>                  (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a Q14]</b></p>	<p><b>Q10C</b></p>
<p><b>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con que frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Todos los días                  (2) Una o dos veces por semana                  (3) Una o dos veces por mes                  (4) Rara vez                  (5) Nunca                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>Q16</b></p>
<p><b>Q14. [Preguntar a todos]¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?</b>                  1) Sí                  2) No                  8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q14</b></p>
<p><b>Q10D. [Preguntar a todos] El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar (4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades                  (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades                  (3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades (8) <b>[No leer]</b> NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q10D</b></p>

<b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	<b>Q11</b>	
<b>Q12.</b> ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR 88.	<b>Q12</b>	<input type="text"/>
<b>Q12A.</b> [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (00) = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)	<b>Q12A</b>	<input type="text"/>

<b>ETID.</b> ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (trigueña) (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-hondureña (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	<b>ETID</b>	
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<b>WWW1.</b> Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días o casi todos los días (2) Por lo menos una vez por semana (3) Por lo menos una vez al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR [No leer]	<b>WWW1</b>	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [Leer todos]

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R1</b>	
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>	
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional/fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>	
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>	
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo. Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	<b>R5</b>	
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R6</b>	
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R7</b>	
<b>R8.</b> Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>	
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>	
<b>R14.</b> Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>	
<b>R15.</b> Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R15</b>	

<b>OCUP4A.</b> ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas] (1) Trabajando? [Siga] (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a TI] (4) Es estudiante? [Pase a TI] (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a TI] (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a TI] (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a TI] (8) NS/NR	<b>OCUP4</b>	
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<p><b>OCUPI.</b> ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (<b>Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?</b>) [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)</p> <p>(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)</p> <p>(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados</p> <p>(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)</p> <p>(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)</p> <p>(12) Artesano</p> <p>(13) Servicio doméstico</p> <p>(14) Obrero (obrero en maquiladoras, barrendero municipal)</p> <p>(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUPI</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/><input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>OCUPIA.</b> En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUPIA</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP 12A</b> ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal?                  _____ [Anotar número de horas] (88) NS/NR (99) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP 12A</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP12.</b> ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas?</p> <p>(1) Menos                      (2) Igual                      (3) Más                      (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP12</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1C.</b> ¿Tiene seguro de salud a través de su empresa o su empleador?</p> <p>(1) Sí    (2) No    (8) NS/NR    (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1C</b></p>	

<b>Ahora nos gustaria hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situacion laboral en diciembre de 2005</b>		
<b>OCUP27.</b> -En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora? (1) Sí [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Siga</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Siga</b> ] (9) INAP		<b>OCUP27</b>
<b>OCUP28.</b> En esa fecha estaba usted:[ <b>Leer alternativas</b> ] (1) Desempleado? [ <b>Siga</b> ] (2) Trabajando? [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (3) Estudiando? [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar? [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (5) Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (9) INAP		<b>OCUP28</b>
<b>OCUP29.</b> ¿Cuál era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? [ <b>No leer alternativas</b> ] (1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (2) Fin de empleo temporal [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [ <b>Siga</b> ] (5) Despido o cese [ <b>Siga</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a OCUP31</b> ] (9) INAP		<b>OCUP29</b>
<b>OCUP30.</b> ¿Recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba? (1) Sí [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (9) INAP		<b>OCUP30</b>
<b>OCUP31.</b> ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? (1) Sí [ <b>Siga</b> ] (2) No [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (8) NS/NR [ <b>Pase a TI</b> ] (9) INAP		<b>OCUP31</b>
<b>OCUP31A</b> ¿En esa fecha, cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo? (1) Menos de un mes (2) Entre un mes y tres meses (3) Entre tres meses y seis meses (4) Más de seis meses (8) NS/NR (9) INAP		<b>OCUP31A</b>

Hora terminada la entrevista \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

**TI.** Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] \_\_\_\_\_

**TI**

**Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.**

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_


Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_

Comentarios:


\_\_\_\_\_  
Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

## Tarjeta #1




## Tarjeta A



## Tarjeta B


Muy de Acuerdo



Muy en Desacuerdo


## Tarjeta C

**Aprueba  
firmemente**



**Desaprueba  
firmemente**

## Tarjeta D



## Tarjeta E

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de L.475
- (02) Entre L. 476 - L. 950
- (03) Entre L.951 - L.1900
- (04) Entre L.1.901 - L.2.850
- (05) Entre L. 2.851 - L. 3.800
- (06) Entre L. 3.801 - L. 5.700
- (07) Entre L. 5.701 - L. 7.600
- (08) Entre L. 7.601- L.9.500
- (09) Entre L. 9.501 - L.14.250
- (10) Entre L. 14.251 - y más

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