

Democracy Audit

Bolivia 2004 Report

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Introduction

This report is part of a series of studies on citizens' values and attitudes, which the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out in Bolivia since 1998 with the support of USAID. The project functioned initially under the institutional aegis of the University of Pittsburgh, which sponsored the previous studies in the series; now it is part of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The first of the studies was published in 1999, on the basis of the results of a survey carried out using a sample similar to that used in this report. It was one of the first investigations into the political culture of Bolivians based on real and nationally representative data. It was followed by the reports on the national surveys done in 2000, published in 2001, and in 2002, which was published a year later; in addition, there was a report on the survey on members of Congress and the Judiciary, published in 2004.

This report provides an overall picture of Bolivian political culture at the end of 2004, laying emphasis on a set of topics that we consider central to the historical moment through which Bolivia is passing. The document is organized in the following way: The first chapter presents information on how the sample was designed and on the national context in which the study was done. The second chapter presents the most important results of the survey related to the identities of Bolivians, touching on aspects dealing with their common identity and their individual identities. The third and fifth chapters deal with Bolivians' support for national political institutions, in both aggregate and individual terms. In the fourth, we discuss attitudes related to social conflict and protest. Chapter Six evaluates citizens' relationship with their local governments 10 years into the implementation of the Popular Participation Law. Chapter VII probes political tolerance among Bolivians, a topic that has been studied in detail by the LAPOP team. The eighth and final chapter provides evidence about the stability of democracy in Bolivia that is cause for both concern and hope.

Dinorah Azpuru of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt University in Nashville collaborated in the final draft of this report, and the administrative personnel of the Department of Political Science and the Center for the Americas of the university provided crucial assistance. The support of the team of the USAID Mission in La Paz, in particular that of Maggy Morales, was very valuable for carrying out this study. The survey firm Encuestas y Estudios once again displayed its quality and reliability in the collection of data for this study, and the Bolivian Catholic University helped in the publication and dissemination of the report. The organization Ciudadanía, with which two members of the research team are associated, was the academic counterpart in the city of Cochabamba. To all of them, we express our profound gratitude.

We are especially grateful to the more than three thousand women and men who gave their time and the sincerity of their responses to the realization of this study. They, the citizens of Bolivia, are the main protagonists of the process of constructing a more democratic and just country.

Chapter I: The National Political Context and the 2004 Study

1. A Summary of the Events of the 2002 – 2004 Period

In this chapter we briefly review the most important political events in Bolivia since the publication of the last study of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) on Bolivian political culture in July 2002 and the new survey in October 2004. The 2004 study is the fourth report on political culture in Bolivia, which LAPOP – now associated with Vanderbilt University – is publishing with support from USAID Bolivia. This report is the first to be done by Vanderbilt University, since LAPOP was transferred to that university in August 2003.¹

The 2002-2004 period was a period during which the weaknesses of the Bolivian state were more evident and important than its strengths. For the first time in 22 years, democratic continuity was interrupted by the resignation of a constitutionally elected president.

The efforts to modernize the State and strengthen democratic institutions have been overshadowed by the strengthening of social and political movements that have altered the Bolivian political scenario, taking the deliberation at the negotiating tables and the traditional channels of participation to the streets. This change seems to be accompanied by an increase in the levels of radicality and aggressiveness of political demonstrations, the extension of conflict-ridden scenes and sectors into regions hitherto distant from national political protests, such as Santa Cruz and, to some extent, the department of Tarija.

The period of conflict seems to have permitted an intense dynamic of reorganization of Bolivian civil society and has brought politics back to the center of public life. This change is reflected in the reappearance of some actors and in the arrival of new political actors on the national scene, such as civic committees, citizens' associations, private entrepreneurs, and in the renewal and strengthening of social movements, such as the Landless Movement (*Movimiento Sin Tierra*), the transporters' union and the movement of retired persons, among others.

Paradoxically, this high degree of political conflict occurred during a period of relative economic stability in the country. 2004 was a year of considerable economic growth for Bolivia, after a period of recession and instability.

This report or audit of Bolivian democracy is done every two years with the aim of “taking the pulse” of democracy through the gathering of high quality data on the perceptions and attitudes of Bolivian citizens regarding different elements of democracy. The periodic collection of these data provides elements of comparison for following the evolutionary dynamic of the Bolivian democratic process.

¹ Initially, the report was produced by the University of Pittsburgh, which published the three previous editions on Bolivia, in 1998, 2000 and 2002 (Seligson 1999, 2001, 2003).

At the end of this chapter there is a detailed description of the characteristics of the sample and of the methodology employed in the collection of the data that made this report possible.

The Political Situation before 2002

Although Bolivian democracy has maintained uninterrupted electoral continuity since the recuperation of democracy at the beginning of the 1980s, the Bolivian state has been unable to construct an efficient institutional apparatus, or to control state or private corruption, facing various moments of crisis and social and political conflict throughout the period of construction of the democratic state.

Several important political reforms in all the sectors of the state have been introduced by different governments with the aim of modernizing the state, making it more efficient and improving participative processes, broadening the public decision making spaces in order to integrate sectors of the population that had so far been marginalized or ignored in the political process. Laws such as those relating to Popular Participation and to Decentralization promulgated in 1994 are clear examples of these attempts, and the reform of the procedural code has been very important. Bolivia has made perhaps more significant reforms than any other country in Latin America. In another study, we have discussed in detail the impact of some of those reforms (Ames *et al.* 2004).

The reforms of the state in the last two decades may be considered successful in areas such as education, the implementation of participative political processes, changes in political representation, political decentralization, and to some extent, the modernization of tax policies, even though they may not have been implemented efficiently in all the regions of the country.

The work of modernizing the Bolivian state in the area of recognizing citizens' rights and human rights was especially intense, but at the same time largely unknown to the public.² Institutions such as the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*), the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights (*Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos*), the Office of the Defender of Children and Adolescents (*Defensoría de la Niñez y la Adolescencia*), the Women's and Family Defense Brigade (*Brigada de Defensa de la Mujer y la Familia*) are some of the institutions which have gained an increasingly visible profile in the public arena and have become more accessible to citizens in the past few years.

In the recent past, a large part of government policies has been directed toward the restoration and strengthening of the Bolivian economy, mainly through a reform of the tax system, the reform of the customs system, the fight against contraband and the introduction of incentives to exports and small industry.

² Source: www.congreso.gov.bo/11leyes/index.html

For their part, social movements have become stronger and have diversified in the past few years. The Water War³ in April 2000 was the decisive moment after which social movements in Bolivia seem to have recovered a part of their strength during the first half of the 1980s. They have shown signs of radicalism in their demand-making, with a greater susceptibility to imposition than to negotiation and dialogue and with clear elements of aggressiveness as a strategy of political expression. From that moment, the Coordinator for the Defense of Water has united diverse social sectors around the defense of water and natural resources, and became one of the principal representatives before the government.

The Political Situation between 2002 and 2004

During the period 2002 – 2004, Bolivian politics was marked by increasing conflict, reflected mainly in violent clashes between civil society groups and the Bolivian state and in the highest number of political demonstrations (marches, strikes, blockages) in Bolivian democratic history.

The events of February and October 2003 are a clear manifestation of the profound crisis of legitimacy and efficiency of the Bolivian political system, and are the result of two long parallel processes: the strengthening of social movements and the weakening of the state and its institutions.

After the discovery of enormous reserves of natural gas in Bolivia, their exploitation and commercialization became one of the major public interest issues on the Bolivian agenda. For a weak economy, the potential for development that such reserves imply is as great as the opportunities for interest groups linked to the hydrocarbons sector and for social sectors that hope to benefit from the exploitation of those resources.

The public debate on the gas issue quickly turned into a confrontation between regional economic interests over the possibility of commercializing the natural gas reserves. The need to decide a route for exporting the gas, either through the south, via Chile, or through the north, via Peru, led to rising regional pressures on the central government because the exportation route would be a fundamental decision for the future development of both the regions.

The competition between regions extended to all levels, and in government spheres pressure exerted by regional interest groups, economic elites and pressure groups on the Executive and the Legislature began to rise. Within civil society, the justifications and arguments for the selection of one region over another shifted from the economic sphere to that of regional identities related to ethnic identities, and toward a call for reasserting the national identity based

³ The popular movement, which started a series of protests in the streets of Cochabamba in April 2000, demanding the withdrawal of the multinational company that had won the rights for supplying drinking water in the city in a fraudulent process of public tender, and which had raised the price of supplying drinking water by as much as 200 percent was called the “Water War.” The movement was formed almost spontaneously as a result of the violent repression of public demonstrations by the government, and it gained an international reputation as the “anti-globalization” movement par excellence. On the Water War see, among others, Vargas and Kruse (2000) and Laserna (2001).

on the rejection of the alternative of exportation via Chile in retaliation for Bolivia's loss of access to the sea in the War of the Pacific. Leaders of social movements and civic organizations, aided by the media, played an important role in the polarization of public opinion and in the formation of regional interests.

In spite of the increasing pressure, the government of the Nationalist Democratic Action party (ADN in Spanish), managed to complete its term without making a definite decision on the gas issue. In 2002, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada assumed the presidency and inherited the gas problem from the previous government. At that point, the regional pressures were already so strong that any decision the government would have taken would have meant virtual political suicide with respect to the group not favored by the decision.

The first months of the Sánchez de Lozada government were marked by inefficiency, delays, extreme politicization of decision making, lack of leadership, and clear institutional weakness. In February 2003, the institutional crisis was manifested in an unexpected way: police forces that had mutinied clashed with national army troops on the streets of La Paz.

The Sánchez de Lozada government finally collapsed during the October 2003 crisis.⁴ On 17 October 2003, Vice-President Carlos Mesa took over as head of government with a commitment to eliminate state violence, combat corruption, stabilize the country, and convene a Constituent Assembly that would reform the Bolivian Constitution and democracy.

The high degree of conflict in 2004 is a result of the presence of social movements exceptionally strengthened by a four year process of evolution beginning with the events of the Water War in 2000, the inclusion of new regional actors in the public arena by means of public confrontations with the government – the case of Santa Cruz and the movement for regional autonomy – and a government severely weakened through political inefficiency and stagnation.

In 2003 the Coordinator of Water and Life (*Coordinadora del Agua y de la Vida*) became the People's General Staff (*Estado Mayor del Pueblo*), bringing together more than 20 social organizations representing different sectors, from peasants to teachers, coca growers and retired persons. Organized initially to protest against the new tax measures, it was based later on the defense of gas and other natural resources. Among these social organizations, the Bolivian Workers' Union (*Central Obrera Boliviana*, COB) and the Neighborhood Councils took on an increasingly high profile and regained some of their past influence. The convening power of the People's General Staff is reminiscent of the COB during the 1980s and represents a significant revitalization of the social movement in Bolivia, which had been greatly weakened in the 1990s.

⁴ During the October 2003 crisis, the social and political tension, which has been growing since the crisis of the Water War in 2000, exploded in the form of violent protests in the streets of La Paz in mid-October that year. The tension was the result of a combination of failed government policies, the February 2003 crisis, the low level of governability and the inability of the Sanchez de Lozada government to make decisions vital to Bolivia's future, especially in the areas of hydrocarbons and tax policy. The violence of the demonstrations and of the repression escalated daily and the crisis culminated – as is known – in Sanchez de Lozada's resignation from the Presidency of the Republic and his fleeing from the country. On the events of October 2003, see Gamarra (2003) and Suárez (2003).

The Landless Movement, for its part, was also greatly strengthened in that period, and extended its influence almost nationally, and opened a new important battle front on the issue of land ownership, which remains unresolved till today.

The Movement toward Socialism (MAS) played a dual role during this period. Thanks to its strong presence in the Bolivian Congress, it had an important stabilizing role during the conflicts of October 2003, preventing the participation of the coca growers movement. In the second stage of this cycle, however, the MAS has been openly opposed to President Mesa's policy on hydrocarbons and has once again become an agent of open confrontation with the government at the head of the Bolivian coca cultivators' movement.

Finally, the Civic Committees of the gas and oil producing departments began the movement initially called the "half moon," which culminated in the demand for regional autonomy and introduced into the public arena of the conflict a powerful, non-traditional political actor: the local elites of those departments.

The year 2004 also witnessed a profound internal division between the practically immobilized government and a mobilized civil society, which could well be described by the word "crisis": the crisis of the government's inability to tackle all the fronts and resolve conflicts which remained indefinitely on the negotiating table; the resulting crisis of the increasing irrationality and radicality of the demands of social sectors; the crisis resulting from the pressure tactics, which are growing daily; the crisis of an Executive without legislative support, and the crisis of a country with profound fissures between the political society and civil society.

The 2002 – 2004 period was a defining moment in Bolivia's democratic history because it marked the resurgence of politics in Bolivia. For the first time since the recuperation of democracy, politics has once again become the center and engine of Bolivian public life; the political subject is replacing its civil counterpart, and even economic and market interests will be resolved in the political arena, in the redefinition of political alignments in the Constituent Assembly, and in the conciliation of rights, interests and powers.

In 2005, the political crisis in Bolivia continued deepening and public demonstrations of dissatisfaction were growing in different regions of the country, right up to the moment this report was drafted. Blockages and demonstrations are daily strategies of political combat; President Mesa⁵ offered his resignation to the Bolivian Congress and proposed calling for elections in August the same year as the only way to resolve the inviability of the current government. The problem of the promulgation of a new hydrocarbons law, which would satisfy different social sectors, still has not been resolved, and has led to a public confrontation between the Executive and the Legislature.

⁵ At the time of his resignation, President Mesa enjoyed 68% public support, according to information provided by the Bolivian media.

The Economic Situation in the 2002 – 2004 Period

In 2004 economic conditions in Bolivia improved relative to 2002. According to data from the Economic and Social Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE) of the Ministry of Economic Development, the external economic environment was favorable to the Bolivian economy, which was positively impacted by the 5.5 percent growth rate of the Latin American economy.

Bolivia's real GDP grew by 3.6 percent in 2004⁶, which is the highest rate of growth of the Bolivian economy since 1999. The growth of the per capita GDP this year was 1.3 percent, reversing the negative growth rates since 1999.

The most dynamic sectors of the economy in 2004 were oil and natural gas production, transportation, storage and manufacturing, while the most sluggish sectors were agriculture and construction. The sectors experiencing negative growth in 2004 were minerals and financial services.

According to data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), the 2004 annual rate of inflation was 4.62 percent⁷, lower than the 7 percent inflation rate for Latin America for the same year. This rate represents the best combination of inflation and growth since 1999 (p. 4).⁸

The rate of depreciation of the Bolivian currency against the dollar was 2.6 percent, less than the depreciation of the exchange rate in 2003 and less than the rate of inflation, which raised earnings in the export sector.

2004 was also a good year in terms of the rates of unemployment and poverty compared to 2003. The following figures show the decrease in both rates from 2003 to 2004.⁹

⁶ Source: UDAPE. By the estimates of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Bolivian economy grew by 3.8 percent in 2004.

⁷ According to UDAPE, the inflation rate in December 2004 was 4.4 percent.

⁸ Source: UDAPE (Economic and Social Policy Analysis Unit), Ministry of Economic Development. Information Bulletin UDAPE 01/2004. Economic and Social Performance during 2004. www.udape.gov.bo

⁹ Source: UDAPE (Economic and Social Policy Analysis Unit), Ministry of Economic Development. Information Bulletin UDAPE 01/2004. Economic and Social Performance during 2004. www.udape.gov.bo

Figure I. 1. Reduction in the Rate of Unemployment between 2003 and 2004 (in Percent)





Figure I. 2. Decrease in the Rate of Poverty between 2003 and 2004 (in Percent)




The 2004 study of democratic culture included various questions about Bolivians' perceptions of the economic situation in the country. The respondents in the LAPOP survey answered the following questions:

SOCT1. Overall, how would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, average, bad or very bad?

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was a year ago?

SOCT3. And in one year, do you think that the country's current economic situation will be better than, the same as, or worse than it is now?

Figure I. 3. Perception of the Current Economic Situation: 2004




As Figure I.3 shows, most respondents rated the country's prevailing economic condition between average and bad, while only 3.46 percent of the respondents thought that the economic situation was good or very good.

In 2004, 15.7 percent of the respondents thought that the prevailing economic situation was better than it had been 12 months earlier. In 2002, 10 percent of the respondents thought that the prevailing economic situation was better than it had been the previous year, and in 2000, 6 percent felt that the economy had improved compared to the previous year.


On the other hand, although 45.7 percent of the respondents in 2004 thought that the economic situation was worse than the previous year, this negative perception has declined compared to 2002 and the reduction is even greater if the basis of comparison is 2000, when 67 percent of the respondents thought that the economic situation was worse than it had been the previous year. The following figure depicts the perceptions of economic conditions compared to a year earlier for the 2000, 2002 and 2004 samples.

Figure I. 4. Do You Think That the Country's Current Economic Situation Is Better than, the Same as, or Worse than It Was a Year Ago?



The perception of future economic conditions in 2004 is more optimistic than in 2000 and 2002. In 2004, 28 percent of the respondents thought that the economic situation in the future would be better than the prevailing one, which was an increase of 15 percentage points over the perception in 2000.

**Figure I. 5. Perception of the Future Economic Situation
Comparative Perspective, 2000–2004**



Overall, the data from the 2004 survey reflect a positive and optimistic tendency in Bolivians' assessment of the economic situation in the country when the survey was carried out. There is a steady improvement from 2000 to 2004, which coincides with the improvement in the economic situation revealed by data from government agencies.

2. Sample Design

This report on Bolivian political culture presents the results of the October 2004 survey, but it also draws on data from previous years' surveys to do comparative analyses in those cases where such comparisons are appropriate. Earlier editions of this study provided a description of the design of the samples. That description is included here – now updated for the 2004 sample – for readers who have not had access to the previous studies.

The 2004 sample was designed paying special attention to maintaining a high degree of representativeness of the characteristics of the population in the selected sample. This means that the sample should have the same proportion of males and females as in the Bolivian population; it should accurately reflect the distribution of the population in urban and rural areas, and it should reflect the diversity in the educational, ethnic and cultural characteristics of the population.

A sample design that is representative of the population characteristics significantly reduces the possibility of distortion in the gathering and interpretation of data obtained through public opinion surveys. Consequently, LAPOP lays great emphasis on the design of a sample that represents the characteristics of the populations with which it works, because characteristics such as level of education and gender can influence some of the attitudes and behaviors that this study analyzes in Bolivia.

The 2004 sample comprised a total of 3,070 persons, who were interviewed in urban and rural areas in all the departments of the country, men and women above the age of 18 years, of different ethnic identities, different educational levels, and with different occupations.

In order to obtain the most accurate results, the interviews for the LAPOP study were done in Castillian, Quechua and Aymara, depending on the respondents' area of residence and their maternal language. Therefore, the questionnaire that forms the basis of the interviews was translated entirely into Quechua and Aymara.

A Sample Design That Represents All Voting Age Bolivians

A study of democratic values needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically important one, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the main advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is under-represented in an election.¹⁰ Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens are often based on samples that systematically under-represent certain sectors of the population. Often, the biases that crop up in the samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over large areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of

¹⁰ This point is argued forcefully by Sidney Verba, former President of the American Political Science Association (Verba 1996).

the national population makes it difficult and expensive to do interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

Any serious study of democratic values in Bolivia confronts two problems in sample design: 1) the wide dispersal of the population, and 2) a multi-lingual population. Comparisons with other countries help put these problems in perspective. Consider Germany, the country with the largest population in Western Europe, with 82 million inhabitants and 357,000 square kilometers of territory. Bolivia, in contrast, has a population of only 8 million dispersed over a vast territory of 1.1 million square kilometers.¹¹ It is the 29th largest country on the planet but it has a population similar to that of the Dominican Republic, a country that is only 4 percent the size of Bolivia. All of Japan, with its 125 million inhabitants, could doubtless fit into the department of Santa Cruz. In short, Bolivia has a relatively small population that lives on a large land mass. This generates complications from the point of view of sample design, which are exacerbated because the Bolivian population is unevenly distributed. For example, La Paz has a population density of almost 17 inhabitants per square kilometer, while the department of Pando, with an area considerably larger than that of Costa Rica (but with an estimated population of 554,201 in July 2001), has a density of less than 0.5 inhabitants per square kilometer. The population density of Bolivia as a whole is only 8 persons per square kilometer, compared to 20 for Brazil and 312 for Belgium.¹²

In a multilingual country it is important to avoid excluding linguistic minorities. Unfortunately, it has not been easy to obtain relevant and up-to-date information on the languages. We need to know more about the proportion of Bolivians who do not speak Spanish and who, as a result, may be incapable of responding to the questions they are asked in that language. If we use the data from the recently published 2001 national population census, we can see that only 63.5 percent of the population speaks Spanish (see the web-page of the INE), but we know that this information is incorrect since it does not match the question that was asked in the 2001 census, which asked for a listing of all the languages spoken by the respondents, not just their main language. The information on the web-page for 2002 shows a total of 100 percent, even when the question should give results totaling more than a 100 percent since many Bolivians speak more than one language. It should be noted that those figures include 20 percent that speaks Quechua, and 13.5 percent that speaks Aymara.


Although many languages are spoken in Bolivia, Spanish is the predominant language. According to the National Institute of Statistics, in 1992 only 8.1 percent of the population above the age of six spoke only Quechua and 3.2 percent spoke only Aymara (CNPV 1992). Data from the 2001 National Population and Housing Census (CNPV) show that around 11 percent of the population speaks only the native language, and Quechua and Aymara are the predominant ones. In order not to exclude the opinions of these persons it was necessary to prepare questionnaires in Quechua and Aymara and include bilingual interviewers in our survey teams. In the 2004 national sample, we obtained the following results in response to our question about the language

¹¹ These data are from the World Bank (World Bank 2000, 274).

¹² World Bank (op. cit., p. 232)

which the respondents spoke at home when they were growing up.

Figure I. 6. Respondents' Maternal Language, 2004



This question is useful but it does not tell us if, at the time of the interview, the respondent understood more than one language (including Spanish) and could also have answered in that other language. Indeed, we found that a large proportion of the respondents who spoke a language other than Spanish also understood Spanish. For this reason, only 31 respondents (weighted) were interviewed in Quechua or Aymara.

Representing the Departments in the National Sample: Stratification

In designing the sample, it was necessary to consider the size of the population and its distribution. In addition, Bolivia's departments, which vary widely in population and geographic area, each have their own political and social profiles, and a study that attempts to represent the country should make sure to include each of its departments. In order to achieve this objective, it was decided to design the sample to represent each one of Bolivia's nine departments, at the same time ensuring that country as a whole would be accurately represented.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology used in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are nine schools in a school district and that the district has decided to hold a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to ensure that there is at least one winner in each of the nine schools. If each ticket were drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. To avoid such an outcome, instead of placing all the raffle tickets in one bowl and having nine tickets drawn at random, the tickets from each school need to be placed in separate bowls, and one ticket is drawn from each.

In Bolivia, if we want to be sure that citizens from each of the nine departments are interviewed, we have to divide the sample into nine “bowls.”

We call these bowls “strata.” Thus, we have nine separate strata in the Bolivia survey, one for each department. If we do not divide the country into separate strata, it is quite likely that most of those to be interviewed would come from the most populous departments of Bolivia (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba) and that few, if any, interviews would be conducted in the department of Pando, the least populous department. By stratifying the sample, we guarantee a distribution of interviews across all nine departments.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we wanted to guarantee one raffle winner in each grade within each school? We would follow the same procedure and use one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total raffle tickets to be drawn in order to achieve this objective. For example, if each school had three grades (10th, 11th and 12th), then a total of 27 tickets would have to be drawn (3 grades x 9 schools).

In Bolivia it is important to further sub-divide the the departments into cities, towns and villagesg of varying population sizes. Here again, if we did not put the names of all the residents in each department into separate pots, most likely in several departments we would draw most of the names from the largest cities since those cities account for the bulk of the population. To avoid this situation, it is necessary to stratify each department by population size. It is a common practice in Bolivia to divide the population into four groups: 1) cities larger than 20,000 inhabitants; 2) citizens and towns of between 2,000 and 20,000 inhabitants; 3) “compact rural” zones with 500-1,999 inhabitants, and 4) “dispersed rural” zones of fewer than 500 inhabitants. Our sample for each department was stratified in this fashion.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, first at the departmental level and then within each department, we have what is called a “multi-stage stratified sample design.” The question that now arises is, how large should a sample be and how should it be distributed among the strata? It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as in the case of Bolivia. That is because the departments with the smallest populations would have such a small sample that it would be impossible to say something about them with some degree of confidence, unless the overall national sample were

very large. For example, Pando has only 0.6 percent of the Bolivian population, and if we had a national sample of 3,000 respondents, only around 18 would be likely to be drawn from Pando.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a sample of 300 respondents per department, which means that 95 percent of the time, our sample would be no more than ± 5.8 percent away from the true departmental view for a given question in the survey. This interval of ± 5.8 percent is calculated using standard formulas of sampling error. Thus, in the worst case scenario,¹³ at the level of the department the sample would be a reasonably accurate representation of citizens' views, erring by no more than ± 5.8 percent (95 percent of the time) from the results we would obtain if we interviewed all the adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions,¹⁴ the results could be as accurate as ± 3.5 percent at the level of the department. Since the three departments of Bolivia that form the so-called "central axis" (La Paz, Santa Cruz y Cochabamba), are very important politically, it was decided to increase the accuracy of the sample in those departments by interviewing an additional 100 respondents in each of them, for a total of 400 in each. In those three departments, our "confidence interval" for the sample is no more than ± 5.0 percent, or almost 1 percent more accurate than for the other departments.

The samples of 300 and 400 per department were designed to provide approximately equal confidence intervals for each one. But once we try to generalize beyond the level of the department to the country as a whole, it is vital to adjust the sample size so that it accurately reflects the relative population size of each department. For example, referring again to Pando and comparing it to La Paz, it is necessary to reduce the relative weight of Pando in the national sample, and increase the relative weight of La Paz in order to obtain an overall picture of public opinion in Bolivia. In order to do this, the sample, once drawn, was assigned post-hoc weights so that each department correctly reflected its contribution to the total of the national population. A more detailed discussion of the weighting scheme appears in a later section.

The sample design for the nine departments as a whole, with 300 interviews in six departments and 400 in three departments, called for a total sample of 3,000. A sample of this size is accurate at no worse than ± 1.7 percent. Technically, our sampling error is ± 1.7 percent. This means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Bolivia, 95 percent of them would reflect the views of the population with an inaccuracy no greater than ± 1.7 percent. Of course, other factors, apart from sampling error, can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, and poor comprehension of the question. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of ± 1.7 percent is very good.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a "simple random sample" of each stratum in the study. Doing this would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each one of the nine departments. But to do so would mean survey costs that would be astronomically high

¹³ The worst case arises when opinion is divided in half and, in a given question, 50 percent express one opinion and 50 percent another.

¹⁴ For example, if the result is a division of 90/10 in an item.

because of the very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research, costs are lowered by drawing what are known as “cluster samples,” that is, we cluster groups of interviews together in a relatively compact area, such as a block or a row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically reduces costs, especially in a country such as Bolivia in which the density of population nation-wide is so low. Yet, clustering normally increases the confidence interval of the sample, and thus lowers its precision.

It is not possible to know precisely how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have in common. For example, if all the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, the impact of clustering the interviews on salary would be greater than for age, which would presumably vary much more than income and come close to approximating the variation in age within the country as a whole. Experience suggests that the confidence interval of a clustered stratified sample design of 3,000 Bolivians would rise to around ± 2.0 percent from the ± 1.7 percent interval stated above. For the purposes of this study, we will assume an interval of ± 2.0 percent. It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of sample selection, until the household itself was reached. The individual respondent within a household was selected using quota criteria for both gender and age in order to overcome the common problem of having the sample incorporate too many females or too many very young or very old people. That household bias results from a higher probability of finding females, the very young or the very old at home more often than respondents. Quotas at the level of the household is an economically efficient way to overcome this problem.


The survey itself was carried out efficiently and professionally by Encuestas & Estudios, one of the premier research survey firms in Bolivia. Founded in 1984, this firm is affiliated with Gallup International. Over the past 21 years, Encuestas & Estudios has carried out more than 1,657 surveys for more than 300 clients. It currently employs 116 persons full-time and utilizes 83 part-time interviewers, of whom 40 are bilingual (Quechua or Aymara). The firm implemented the sample design described above, and was also responsible for multiple pre-tests of the survey instrument as well as the translation of the instrument into Quechua and Aymara. In addition, the firm was responsible for all data-entry.

The actual number of interviews obtained by Encuestas & Estudios in the 2004 national sample was 3,070, or 70 more than the goal of 3,000. In 1998, a total of 2,997 persons were interviewed, and in 2000 the sample size was 3,006. This is a remarkably high level of completion of the survey, and speaks well of the dedication of the interviewers and their supervisors.

LAPOP also places special emphasis on maintaining the comparability between the samples of the different years in which the study conducted in Bolivia. In 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004, the interviews were conducted in the same departments and geographic areas of the country, and they have maintained the same proportionality of the population in all the years.

Age is an important characteristic in determining citizens' attitudes and behaviors with respect to democracy, so the interviews were administered to persons of all age groups. In spite of this, as the following figure shows, the average age of the respondents does not vary across the different studies.


Figure I. 7. Mean Age of Respondents Interviewed between 1998 and 2004



As we indicated above, gender can be very important in determining political attitudes and behaviors. The LAPOP sample has kept constant the proportion of men and women interviewed for the study in the four surveys conducted till now, so any variation in attitudes due


to gender differences is not a result of a higher or lower proportion of men or women interviewed but due to a variation in the population itself.

Figure I. 8. Sample Distribution, by Gender, 1998 – 2004



A third important factor in studies of this kind is to have a representation of the population by area of residence proportional to the actual distribution of the population. For 2004, the population distribution of the sample by area of residence is shown in the figure that follows.

Figure I. 9. Distribution of the 2004 Sample by Area of Residence: Urban – Rural



The distribution of the population by area of residence has stayed the same across the four studies done by LAPOP in Bolivia. The variations, although small, reflect the natural increase of the Bolivian population in the past few years, and may be influenced slightly by internal migratory movements, above all from rural to urban areas.

The subject of sample distribution with respect to ethnic identification and the representation of Bolivia's ethnic diversity in the sample will be discussed in a separate chapter devoted to themes of identity in this report.

3. Methodological Notes for the 2004 Report

Comparison with other countries of the region. Almost all the chapters present information, in the form of figures or tables, that compares the results of the 2004 survey with other countries. LAPOP has been carrying out these surveys of this type in different countries of the continent, seeking to draw comparisons which would facilitate a better understanding of the political processes and the evolution of democracy in each individual country and in the region as a whole.¹⁵ The advantage of the project lies in the application of the same questions in surveys executed according to the highest standards of scientific quality in different countries of the region, thereby generating information useful for comparative analysis.

The data from the other countries that are compared in this report come from surveys done in 2004 in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia and Ecuador. The sample for each of the first eight countries consisted of a representative national sample of 1,500 observations stratified at multiple levels; the Ecuador sample was similar to that of Bolivia with a little more than 3,000 cases.

Problems of measurement in the variable Education. The measurement of the variable Education in this survey presents two technical problems, which, however, do not seem to seriously affect the relationship of our measure with the "true" parameters of the Bolivian population. The first problem is related to the way in which the question is worded in the questionnaire (see the appendices), which groups respondents with a few years of university education with persons who only completed primary school and received some technical education. The second problem is related to the sample, which seems to have a level of education slightly higher than that estimated for the national population using data from the 2001 CNPV. This factor appears to be related to a higher interview non-response rate among illiterate persons (persons who do not have any education often do not want to respond to surveyors or mostly respond "I don't know," which invalidates the questionnaire).

These problems have been partially resolved in the data analysis by using levels of education (primary, secondary, and university or technical) instead of using the continuous variable that represents the years of education. The data show that education measured at these three levels is related to other factors as predicted by theory and previous research in Bolivia.

Confidence intervals. Many of the figures based on columns that compare means in this report have a bar in the form of an "I" in the upper portion of the columns. The bar refers to the confidence intervals for that mean; that is, given the sample characteristics and taking into account the respondents' answers to that question, the "true value" may be slightly above or

¹⁵ More information on the LAPOP project may be found on the web page <http://www.lapopsurveys.org/>.

below the mean calculated and presented by the column. The larger the sample and the more concentrated the responses, the smaller will be the “I,” or the lower the confidence interval, and the more certain we can be that the mean displayed is very close to the “true value” for the population. When we say that the error bars represent the 95 percent confidence intervals, we want to say if 100 identical surveys were done at the same time using a similar sample, in 95 of the 100 the mean would lie between the upper and lower horizontal bars of the “I.”

The practical utility of these error bars, or “I”s, at the top of the columns is that they enable us to verify easily if the differences between the means of two or more groups represented by the columns are the result of stable statistical patterns or are solely due to chance. If the “I” error bars overlap, we can say that statistically one mean is no different from the other. If they do not overlap, we may assume that the differences in the mean estimates correspond to the groups selected for comparison, and that one group is different and more or less than another with respect to the question being examined.

Establishing relationships between variables. In order to facilitate the reader’s comprehension, most of the data that are presented are shown in bivariate relationships: for example, the effect of a variable such as gender or age on another selected variable, such as political tolerance. To identify the groups that should be compared, that is, to decide if the data to be presented should compare the results for men to those for women, or those of older persons versus younger persons, we did two things. At a theoretical level, we tried to establish which were the factors that the scholarly literature indicated were important or that the national context suggested were important. At an empirical level, we took the main demographic variables (gender, age, income, education, ethnic identity, area of residence) and “made them compete” in successive linear regression models. This statistical technique, when applied appropriately, allows us to identify which factors have an impact on the factor – or variable – that is being analyzed, independent of the other variables in the model.

The combinations of variables that are presented in this report are those that were found to be theoretically important, and also as indicated by the statistical tests that were run during the data analysis. In some cases, we present figures in which the groups being compared do not have significant differences; this is done with the aim of demonstrating that the theory or commonsense regarding the hypothesized relationship is mistaken.

Conclusions

This chapter has described the design of the 2004 sample and some of its characteristics. The sample size is large by commonly used standards, which allows us to have a much slimmer margin of sampling error than is the norm.

The sample for the Bolivia study not only allows us to analyze the country as a whole, but also provides information for analyzing smaller units such as departments, and differences between regions.

The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the samples used in the four studies conducted in Bolivia maintain some parameters constant through the years but also allow us to control for other types of characteristics such as education and income, which exhibit small variations.

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Chapter II: Bolivians and Their Identity

1. The National Political Community

One of the factors necessary for the functioning of democracy is the existence of a relatively strong and cohesive national political community (Norris 1999). A national political community implies that citizens feel part of the community that brings them together; that they understand that their destinies are linked through this bond of national belonging. To feel part of the country is important to the extent that it reveals a certain level of citizens' commitment to the nation, and at the same time it is a condition for the legitimacy of the State and of the laws that shape it and regulate life in society.

It is important to point out that, in theoretical terms, we are not referring here to the idea of nation as a culturally homogeneous community (as the process of national construction within the Revolutionary Nationalism movement in Bolivia was usually understood). On the contrary, when we speak of a national political community we are referring to political identity, to the feeling of belonging that citizens as individuals have toward citizens as a collective (the community), which is managed and represented through the Bolivian State (which introduces the political dimension). This theoretical understanding implies stating that under this national political identity (the identity of Bolivians), there may exist other regional and cultural identities that are distinct, that have their own peculiarities, but that are not in conflict with the identity-linked belonging to the national political community.

The strength of the political community is particularly important in the historical juncture through which the country is passing. The recent emergence of movements demanding autonomy in the east and the west of the country, the discussion on regional autonomy in the process of the Constituent Assembly, and the climate of accentuating peculiarities (ethnic, cultural or regional) in the face of the logic of the unitary state and society, make the analysis of this subject important for the present and future of the country. The separatist discourses which appear from time to time thanks to extremist leaders also may be considered a sign of the timeliness of the study of the strength of political community in the country.

Figure II.1., below, compares the national means obtained on some measures of national and individual identity used in this survey. Respondents were asked the following questions:

BETID1. To what extent do you feel you are a Bolivian citizen?


BETID2. To what extent do you feel you are... [Paceño, Cruceño, Cochabambino, Orureño, Chuquisaqueño, Potosino, Pandino, Tarijeño, Beniano]?

B43. To what extent do you feel proud of being Bolivian?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the Bolivian political system?

All the questions were based on a scale from 1 to 7 in which 1 means "Not at all" and 7 means "A lot." For a better understanding of the results, the figures are depicted on a modified scale from 0 to 100, on which 0 represents "Not at all" and 100 "A lot."

Figure II. 1. Intensity of the Measures of National Identity




The national mean for the question on the extent to which the respondents feels a Bolivian citizen is 87 out of a possible 100. This shows that, without being complete, Bolivians' identification with their citizenship is high; the same is the case with pride in being Bolivian, which registers a mean value of 85 out of a 100 point maximum. One can say, then, that the degree to which Bolivians feel proud of being Bolivian is somewhat proportional to their sense national identity.

It is worth noting that the national mean for identification with the department, the third column from the left, is very high, almost as high as the mean level of national identification (82 out of a possible 100 points), although the differences in the mean values are statistically significant, as indicated by the I-shaped bars at the top of each column (in this case, they do not overlap, which confirms the statistical difference between the two means).

In contrast, pride in the country’s political system is markedly lower than the means for the more abstract measures of national identification. This difference was expected since the question sharpens the respondent’s critical capacity by referring to the country’s political system. This variable will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this report on system support.

How does the intensity of Bolivians’ national identity compare to that in other countries in Latin America? Question B43 (Pride in belonging to the country) was asked in the LAPOP surveys in similar studies conducted in 2004 in other Latin American countries. The results of that comparison are shown in Figure II.2.

Figure II. 2. Pride in Being from This Country: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective




The above figure is eloquent, and represents statistically significant differences between the mean for Bolivia and that for each of the other countries (the error bars show confidence intervals that do not overlap). Bolivians’ pride in being Bolivian is lower than the pride of the citizens of all the other countries in their respective nationalities; it is the lowest of all the

countries in the region covered in the study. The Bolivian mean is around 7 points lower on the national pride scale than the Ecuadorean mean, and almost 12 points lower than that of Panama.

However, as we can see in Figure II.3., below, the differences in the proportion of persons who have a low level of national pride are less sharp. Three percent of Bolivians have a very low level of pride (replies of 1 or 2 on the original scale for the question), a proportion similar to that in Mexico and Honduras, and statistically indistinct from those of other countries in the region.

Figure II. 3. Percentage of Respondents with Little Pride in Being from That Country: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective




Comparing the two figures, we can say that the proportion of persons who have very little pride in being Bolivian is not much greater than in the other countries; however, the difference is that, overall, mean responses on pride are lower in Bolivia than in the rest of the region.

How does Bolivians' pride in their political system compare to the other countries in the region? Let us return to the question on pride in the political system described above. The question allows us to measure and compare the level of individuals' identification with their political system, something more concrete than national pride.

Figure II.4 compares the Bolivian mean to those of the other countries included in the LAPOP survey.

Figure II. 4. Pride in the National Political System: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective



As we can see, there are large differences within the region. From a level of pride of 74 out of 100 in Costa Rica to 41 in Ecuador, Latin Americans' pride in the political system of their

respective countries varies widely. In relation to preceding results, Bolivia leaves the last place but continues to be in the group of countries with the lowest pride in the national political system. The Bolivian mean is not very different from those of Panama, Guatemala and Nicaragua, and it is barely higher than that of Ecuador (a statistically significant difference, as the confidence interval bars indicate).

The levels of Bolivians' national pride are low when compared to those in other countries in the region. This result clearly stands out, and should be considered in future research, which explores the differences between Bolivia and other countries in the region in a systematic and comparative manner.

2. The Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia: Redefining Commonsense

Since the publication of the results of the 2001 National Population and Housing Census (CNPV 2001), it has become commonsensical to think that the Bolivian population is largely indigenous. However, as the debate between various authors reveals¹, this proportion is linked to the technical definition of the instrument used to measure the proportion of persons in one or the other group, and, what is even more important, to the definition of highly political criteria used to establish the limits between one ethnic group and another.

The reports of previous studies presented by the LAPOP with the support of USAID in Bolivia were criticized in regard to the proportion of "indigenous" persons in the survey sample (around 10 percent of the persons identified themselves as indigenous inhabitants in the three previous editions of the survey.² The 2001 CNPV data, on the other hand, estimated the proportion of indigenous persons at approximately 62 percent. The large difference, of course, drew our attention: Was the LAPOP sample biased? Did we have data that were so far from the reality of the population?

In order to resolve these doubts, we decided to include in the 2004 survey the question used by the INE exactly as it was worded in the 2001 CNPV. That would work, in practice, as a measure of the validity of our survey. If the discrepancy in the proportion of persons identifying themselves as indigenous stayed as large, it would be necessary for the project to seriously rethink the sample design and ponder the accuracy of the results. The INE question is worded as follows:


ETID2. Do you think you belong to any of the following indigenous groups? Quechua [1] Aymara [2] Guarani [3] Chiquitano [4] Mojeño [5] Other native [6] None [7] Others

¹ Lavaud and Lestage (2002) emphasize the political nature of this measuring instrument; Roberto Laserna, among other researchers, notes the fragility of this instrument for making political decisions (2004a), while Xavier Albó takes the contrary position (2004). For a more qualitative discussion of the subject, see the work of Ricardo Calla (1993) and Thomas Abercrombie (1991).

² This information is used in the previously published reports of national studies (Seligson 1999; Seligson 2001; Seligson 2003).

As the following figure shows (Figure II.5.) shows, the proportion of persons in the survey who identified themselves with one of the original peoples listed (74 percent) is even higher than that recorded by the INE three years earlier in the Census. This shows that the survey does not have a biased sample, that it does not interview fewer “indigenous” persons than it should according to the parameters of the national population.


Figure II. 5. Bolivia 2004: Ethnic Self-Identification (Question CNPV 2001*)



Let us compare these results with those obtained with the question used by LAPOP (Figure II.6):

ETID. Do you consider yourself a person of the white, cholo, mestizo, indigenous, or black race?

Figure II. 6. Bolivia 2004: Ethnic Self-Identification (LAPOP Question*)




It is clear that the differences in the results obtained from the two different instruments are very important. The proportion of persons that can be classified as indigenous varies widely depending on the instrument used. Methodologically, two main differences between the INE and LAPOP questions are conspicuous: first, the Census question does not include the option “mestizo” (nor “white”) among the answers; this, as the results show, is the most attractive option for most of the population. Second, the INE question seems to be oriented more to the identification of a cultural type, while the LAPOP question is explicit regarding its racial basis.

The definition of ethnicity is complex; in the case of the study of the role of ethnic identity in the political culture of Bolivians, it is unclear which of the two measures should be preferred. Consequently, when ethnicity is theoretically or empirically relevant, in the following chapters of this study we present the two classifications alternatively, noting both and their differences when appropriate.

One final topic related to ethnicity in Bolivia deserves attention in this section: the growing identification with an indigenous group. This seems to be a common theme in the measurements carried out: Leaving aside the methodological difficulties of the comparison, the percentage of respondents who feel that they belong to an indigenous group, as measured by the INE, has increased from 62 percent in the 2001 CNPV to 74 percent in the 2004 survey. At the same time, as Figure II.7. illustrates, the percentage of respondents identified as indigenous by the LAPOP question has remained constant around 10 percent in 1998, 2000 and 2002 (as can be seen from the “I”s of the confidence intervals, there is no difference between 1998, 2000 and 2000); in 2004, this proportion rises to 16 percent, and the differences are significant in statistical terms.

Figure II. 7. Proportion of Persons Who Identify Themselves as Indigenous, by Year



If what the above findings suggest is correct, that is, if the percentage of people who identify themselves as belonging to an indigenous group has risen during the past two years in Bolivia, it is necessary to restate at the theoretical level the subjective nature of the construction

of identities (counter to primordial or essentialist theoretical conceptions of ethnicity); going further, it is not enough to think only that identities are changing, but it is necessary to consider that their dynamic may be greater than what is usually thought, and that the changes in identities can occur faster than one supposes.

3. Regional Identities, Ethnic Identities and Bolivian-ness (*bolivianidad*)

How does the feeling of belonging to the national community affect the sense of belonging to a specific group? Are there differences between regions or between ethnic groups with respect to the feeling of national identity? Do those hailing from the west identify more with Bolivia than those from the east? Do indigenous people feel more or less a part of the national community compared to the rest of the population? These are some arguments used frequently with different ends but generally without any empirical evidence to support them.

An important contribution of this report lies in the finding that the differences attributed by commonsense (or by political interests) to one or the other social groups with respect to identification with the national community are minimal or non-existent. In other words, the sense of national identification is relatively solid and stable between regions and between ethnic groups.

Ethnicity and Identification with Bolivia

First, we examined the effect of ethnicity on overall identification with the national community, pride in being Bolivian, and pride in the Bolivian political system, which we already discussed in the previous section. Figure II.8 compares the mean for each of those three scales, according to respondents' ethnic self-identification.


The question initially used for establishing ethnic groups was the question that LAPOP had already utilized in previous studies in Bolivia:

ETID. Do you consider yourself a person of the white, cholo, mestizo, indigenous, black or original race?

The groups were recoded so that there was one category for "White," another for "Cholo or mestizo," and another for "Indigenous." Owing to their small number in the sample, the cases of respondents who identified themselves as "Black" or did not respond to the question were excluded.³

³ In the following section we discuss the topic of indigenous categorization in greater detail.


Figure II. 8. National Identity by Ethnic Self-Identification



The differences shown in the above figure are very small, and in most of the cases they are not significant. The figures in the form of an “I” in the upper portion of each column show the 95 percent confidence intervals; that means that the true mean falls between the lower and upper horizontal bars of the “I”. If the “I”s of two columns overlap, we cannot state with certainty that one mean is different from the other. In this case, the columns for “White” and “Indigenous” are different for national identification and for pride in being Bolivian, but the “Mestizo” column is not statistically different from the other two. In the last set of columns (pride in the political system), the differences between the three groups are insignificant.

Supporting the above finding, the difference between the ethnic groups disappears completely when we separate the ethnic groups according to the question that INE included in the 2001 CNPV (Figure II.9). In order to facilitate the presentation, we divided the responses into two groups, those who feel part of any of the listed indigenous groups, and those who do not feel a part of any of the groups.

Figure II. 9. National Identity by Ethnic Self-Identification



As the figure shows, the “I”s in the light columns (representing indigenous category) and dark columns (representing those who do not belong to any indigenous group) overlap on all the three variables. Therefore, using this classification of indigenous and non-indigenous groups we can conclude that belonging to an indigenous group does not make any difference to the level of identification with the national community, and to pride in nationality and in the political system.

Figure II.9. suggests a general pattern, though not always significant and very small in absolute terms, that those who define themselves as indigenous have a smaller mean on national identification. A multivariate regression analysis can help us establish if this pattern, however small it may be, of a weaker sense of belonging to the national community among those who define themselves as indigenous is a product of their ethnic identity or of other factors such as education or wealth. Table 1 shows the regression coefficients for each of the variables included

in the model as statistical controls⁴ when identification as Bolivian (BETID1) is taken as the dependent variable.

Table II. 1. Predictors of a Sense of Belonging to the National Community

Observations	=	2510					
Strata	=	9					
PSUs	=	152					
				F(16, 128)	=	7.72	
				Prob > F	=	0.0000	
				R2	=	0.0594	

betidlr	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Wealth	.222465	.216433	1.03	0.306	-.2053564	.6502864
Education	1.498042	.7481772	2.00	0.047	.0191257	2.976958
Type of school	-6.795377	4.503913	-1.51	0.134	-15.69823	2.107473
Int tipo edr	1.974596	1.762671	1.12	0.264	-1.509662	5.458855
Income	-.3940632	.4071317	-0.97	0.335	-1.198837	.4107109
Gender	-.2436999	.6720485	-0.36	0.717	-1.572133	1.084733
Age	.6149352	.3736959	1.65	0.102	-.1237466	1.353617
El Alto	-3.082519	4.541284	-0.68	0.498	-12.05924	5.894202
East region	-.07194	1.897751	-0.04	0.970	-3.82321	3.67933
Urbanization	.522695	.5292343	0.99	0.325	-.5234383	1.568828
Satisf. with life	-1.480602	.745862	-1.99	0.049	-2.954941	-.0062621
Indigenous	-.8271757	1.401037	-0.59	0.556	-3.596595	1.942244
White	1.087075	1.202686	0.90	0.368	-1.290265	3.464415
Aymara culture	-.0215209	.2286034	-0.09	0.925	-.4733995	.4303576
Quechua culture	1.203158	.2090186	5.76	0.000	.7899929	1.616324
Camba culture	1.098613	.2175538	5.05	0.000	.6685762	1.52865
_cons	77.56289	3.380893	22.94	0.000	70.87991	84.24588

The results presented in Table II.1. indicate that once we control for the effects of the degree of urbanization, age, gender, level of income, education and type of school attended, and ethnic identity, the factors that prove to be good independent predictors of the sense of belonging to the national community are education (the higher people’s educational level, the more they feel a part of the national political community), and satisfaction with life⁵ (the more satisfied people feel with their lives, the greater their identification with the country).

What immediately draws attention is that, counter to what is frequently assumed, the sense of belonging to particular cultures raises the level of identification with the national

⁴ This test was run using the *svyreg* command of the statistical program STATA. This command estimates standard errors taking into account the stratification criteria and the Primary Sampling Units, in addition to using “robust” standard errors. These two characteristics make the test for establishing relationship between variables even more stringent than in the typical OLS regression model. In other words, the results presented here have been subjected to very rigorous tests of statistical reliability.


⁵ The question used to measure satisfaction with life is LS3 (see the appendices).

community.⁶ Identifying oneself with the “Quechua culture” tends to raise the intensity of the sense of belonging to the national community; the same happens with the “Camba culture,” but not with the “Aymara culture,” which does not seem to have any impact on the level of national identification.

The results of the same statistical analysis for the variable drawn from the question on pride in being Bolivian (B43) are very similar to those presented in the above table, so we have omitted them here for reasons of space.

Figure II.10 shows us the impact of life satisfaction as a psychological condition that influences national pride.

Figure II. 10. Pride in Being Bolivian, by Satisfaction with One’s Own Life




⁶ The questions measuring identification with the Quechua, Aymara and Camba cultures are BETID4, 3 and 5, respectively, in the questionnaire (they are similar in wording to the question on national identification; see the appendices).

Regional Identities and the Nation

Are there differences between regions regarding the level of intensity of national identification? Figure II.11 compares the three variables discussed earlier according to three regions of the country: the West, which covers the surveys done in La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba; the East, which includes the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando; and the South, which covers the respondents in Tarija, Chuquisaca and Potosí.

Figure II. 11. National Identity, by Region



Region does not make any difference to identification with the national community, represented in the first set of columns from the left; statistically, the means for the three regions are the same. In the three columns in the center, corresponding to pride in being Bolivian, the mean for the East is lower than that for the West, but no different from that for South. In

contrast, those from the East, who were slightly less proud of being Bolivian, are significantly more proud of being a part of the Bolivian political system than those from the West.

Generally speaking, we can say that the region in which a person lives does not generate important differences in regard to identification with the national political community. Table 2, below, presents the correlations between the most relevant variables for our analysis.

Table II. 2. Simple Correlation between Variables Measuring Identity

Variables	betid1r You feel you are a Bolivian citizen	betid2r You feel part of your departme nt	betid3r You feel part of the Aymara culture	betid4r You feel part of the Quechua culture	betid5r You feel part of the Camba culture	betid6r2 You feel part of the “half- moon” region	b43r Pride in being Bolivian
betid1r You feel you are a Bolivian citizen	1						
betid2r You feel part of your department	.417(**)	1					
betid3r You feel part of the Aymara culture	.018	.109(**)	1				
betid4r You feel part of the Quechua culture	.128(**)	.141(**)	.198(**)	1			
betid5r You feel part of the Camba culture	.117(**)	.130(**)	-.013	-.113(**)	1		
betid6r2 You feel part of the “half-moon” region	.026	.067(*)	-.250(**)	-.212(**)	.493(**)	1	
b43r Pride in being Bolivian	.460(**)	.280(**)	.078(**)	.149(**)	.086(**)	-.167(**)	1
b4r Pride in the Bolivian political system	.132(**)	.094(**)	-.068(**)	.063(**)	.118(**)	.145(**)	.170(**)

** Correlation is statistically significant at 99 percent level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is statistically significant at 95 percent level (2-tailed).

The table above shows us that there is a positive relationship between the feeling of belonging to the national community and some specific identities, something that we had already pointed out in the multivariate regression model: To have a sense of belonging to one’s department is strongly associated with feeling that one is Bolivian; the same occurs with pride in the Bolivian political system. There are also positive and significant relationships, albeit weaker than those previously cited, between the sense of national identity and the feeling of belonging to the Quechua and Camba cultures.

There is a positive and relatively strong relationship between identification with the Aymara culture and identification with the Quechua culture; these two identities have a negative relationship with the sense of belonging to the “half moon.” That means that the more persons identify with the Quechua or the Aymara culture, the less they identify with the half moon. At the same time, there is a negative relationship between the intensity of belonging to the half moon and the feeling of pride in being Bolivian: the stronger the sense of belonging to the half moon, the lower the pride in being Bolivian. It is important to stress that, in contrast, the sense of

Camba identity is positively associated with national pride, although the relationship is small in quantitative terms.


Separatism and National Integration

Recently discussions (and accusations) have arisen once more in the country about the possibility of some regions of Bolivia separating themselves from the country, or that national unity itself is disintegrating into new, smaller “countries.” How much support do citizens give to these separatist ideas? The 2004 survey recorded the patterns of public opinion on this subject through the following question:

NEWTOL7. 1) Come what may, the country should stay united or ... 2) The divisions in the country are very large; the country should be divided.


In general, the preference for the separatist option (option 2 in the question) is very low across the country (only 5.5 percent of the respondents agreed with that option). Nevertheless, it is important to note that there are some differences at the regional level that are related to this preference, even though in none of the regions does the percentage of respondents supporting the separatist option reach even 10 percent. Figure II.12 shows the percentage of respondents who preferred alternative 2 in the three regions of the country.

Figure II. 12. Percentage Agreeing That "The Country Should Be Divided," by Region, Bolivia 2004



The same perspective is obtained in Figure II.13. below: the proportion of persons in the East, in this case in the department of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, who prefer the separatist option is slightly higher to that in the rest of the country, but it continues to be a minority.

Figure II. 13. Percentage of Respondents Who Accept the Division of the Country, Department of Santa Cruz vs. the Rest of the Country




The separatist option seems to be more popular in the South and in the East of the country than in the West. This result is linked to the recent regional mobilizations in Santa Cruz and Tarija in favor of autonomy; however, it is worth emphasizing that this evidence suggests that the kind of autonomy sought by the population, even in the East and the South of Bolivia, is largely framed within a conception of national unity, and is not by itself separatist.

There are other factors that explain the variations in citizens' perceptions of the country's unity. One of them is the level of education. Education can strengthen the values of national unity through at least three causal mechanisms: first, students grasp the objective advantages of life in a national community and the interdependence between regions and social groups that exists and that has existed historically in Bolivia. Second, it is possible that in school, students forge bonds with schoolmates of different origins, thereby strengthening the sense of community.

Finally, the contents of formal education, especially in social science subjects, may be explicitly oriented towards reinforcing the sense of belonging to the national community.

The figure shows the proportion of persons who prefer the separatist option at different levels of education. It is clear that the more educated a person, the less likely that he will prefer a separatist solution for the country.

Figure II. 14. Percentage of Respondents Who Agree That “The Country Should Be Divided,” by Educational Level, 2004




Education also has an impact on another measure of integration that the 2004 questionnaire included through the following question:

PN2. In spite of our differences, we Bolivians have many things and values that unite us as a country.

The response options are on the 1-7 scale explained earlier, and the variable was recoded into a 0 to 100 scale to facilitate comprehension. Figure II.15 depicts the effect of education on this measure.

Figure II. 15. Agreement with: “We Bolivians Are United by Values” by Educational Level, 2004



As we can see, level of education has a strong impact on the responses to this question. The more educated an individual, the more likely that he will understand that there are cultural characteristics that unite Bolivians in spite of their differences. However, it is necessary to note that although the differences are statistically significant and remain so even if we include other factors in a multivariate analysis, the impact of education is relatively small: the increase in the level of agreement with the proposition advanced in the question is only 6 percent.

Conclusions

This chapter presents new findings, which are very important for the contemporary political debate in the country. The data analyzed here point to an urgent need for rethinking the relationships between ethnic, regional and national identities in Bolivia, and also the political

actions that start off from wrong assumptions about the national reality. Three sets of results deserve special attention:

First, the idea that the Bolivian population is mostly indigenous, assumed with little discussion from the presentation of data from the 2001 census, needs to be put up for debate. The use of different instruments to measure ethnicity in the country generates diametrically opposite results, such that the conclusion that is reached with the INE data (that Bolivia is mostly indigenous) is nothing more than a product of a specific measuring instrument. Therefore, the use of census data to make political decisions is, at the very least, highly risky and deserves an in-depth discussion.

Second, ethnic identities do not decrease the sense of belonging to the national community in the country. Whichever the method used, those who identify themselves as indigenous do not have a lower level of identification with the Bolivian nation than those who feel that they belong to other ethnic groups. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that those who feel part of the Quechua and Camba “cultures” tend to have a higher level of national identification.

Finally, while it is true that support for separatist proposals is greater in the East and the South of the country, in no case does the proportion cover even one out of every ten Bolivians.

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Chapter III: System Support

The legitimacy of the Bolivian political system has been a constant focus of concern at LAPOP. As a consequence, a careful examination of citizens' support for the system was done in each of the earlier studies in this series. In Bolivia, it has been found that system support is relatively low in comparison with other countries in the LAPOP database. Previous research on system support and citizens' attitudes toward democracy treated these values as if they were formed over long periods of time, and therefore it was thought that they were very resistant to change in the short term.

Starting with Almond and Verba's pioneering study of civic culture (1963), scholars focused on the connection between cultural values, which were supposedly rooted deeply in society, and support for a particular political regime. The basic thesis of this research was that the political system of a country was, in the long-run, highly congruent with the society's deeply rooted cultural values. Defenders of this thesis argue, for example, that Latin American society is "authoritarian, hierarchical, paternalistic and semi-feudal at its roots, and therefore it should generally produce authoritarian political regimes (Wiarda 1974; Inglehart 1997). However, Inglehart later suggested that such values can change over relatively short periods of time, reacting in part to the changing conditions in the system (Inglehart 1999). Similarly, research conducted by Booth and Seligson has shown a surprising incongruence between political culture and regime type in Mexico (Booth and Seligson 1984). Further, if it was true that systems and values are congruent in the long run, what could explain the extended period of authoritarian government in most of Latin America, followed by the current period of widespread democratization?

In contrast to the static vision of cultural attitudes and system support, there has emerged a much more dynamic perspective of the determinants of support for the democratic system, focusing on the connection between government performance and citizens' opinions about their political system. Beginning with economic performance, there is abundant evidence that citizens base their support for the incumbent government at least partly on prevailing economic conditions (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Lewis-Beck 1985). Others have taken this investigation a step further and have connected the economic performance of the incumbent government to support for the political system overall. It has been found that when a government's macroeconomic performance is poor, the levels of system support decline (Weatherford 1987; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Pharr and Putnam 2000). A study of the attitudes of South Koreans toward their political system found that system support is also a function of the "political performance" of the system's institutions. Similarly, Anderson and Tverdova found a significant relationship between levels of corruption and system support in 15 European democracies (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). In addition, in the report on the 2002 Bolivian survey, it was clearly shown that system support is closely related to corruption. This result has been published recently in an academic journal (Seligson 2002).

More recently, scholars have begun to explore the thesis that the design of a system's institutions can affect citizens' levels of system support. Anderson and Guillory found that the

way in which the institutional framework of a system treats the winners and losers in elections, that is, if the system is majoritarian or consensual, has a significant impact on how citizens evaluate their political system. They concluded that “the study of what citizens think about the political system requires the combination of information about political institutions and about citizens and their attitudes” (Anderson and Guillory 1997). According to this view, levels of system support are not only a function of individual characteristics, cultural values and/or economic conditions, but also depend on the institutional framework of a democratic regime.

1. System Support in Bolivia

As part of its research program on political culture in Bolivia, LAPOP has been placing special emphasis on investigating the problems of the legitimacy of the Bolivian political system since 1998. The crises of February and October 2003, the resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada, and the high degree of conflict in the government of President Mesa¹ point to a possible weakening of system legitimacy in the period 2002 – 2004, whose levels were already weak in preceding years. This chapter explores the effect this weakening of legitimacy could have on the level of support for the system in Bolivia.

The measurement and the notion of system support that LAPOP investigates is “how well the political system and political institutions conform to a person’s general sense of what is right and proper, and how well the system and institutions uphold the basic political values of importance to citizens” (Muller, Jukam and Seligson 1982).

While the debates on the measurement and use of system support continue (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004), our method for measuring the levels of support in Bolivia is based on a group of survey items that have been thoroughly researched and established, and which try to discover respondents’ opinions about their political system in general (Muller, Jukam and Seligson 1982; Seligson and Muller 1987; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). The variable of support, as we show below, is based on a five item index, with each item employing a scale from 1 to 7. This scale has been used in many of the earlier studies in this series on Bolivian political culture. For the purposes of interpretation, the response scales were recalibrated into a 0-100 scale. The five items included in the index are as follows:

- B1. To what extent do you think the justice tribunals in Bolivia guarantee a fair trial?*
- B2. To what extent do you respect political institutions in Bolivia?*
- B3. To what extent do you think citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the Bolivian political system?*
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the Bolivian political system?*
- B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the Bolivian political system?*

In our opinion, these five items, when combined into an index, provide a good idea of the

¹ As this report was being drafted, President Mesa resigned from office once and threatened to call elections before the completion of his term – all in a period of 10 days and in an atmosphere of social and political upheaval.

degree of support Bolivians give to their political system (Muller, Jukam and Seligson 1982; Seligson and Muller 1987; Finkel, Muller and Seligson 1989).

If the level of support for the system can be determined in part by a reaction to changing conditions in the system, it is logical to think that the events of February and October 2003, which were described in Chapter I, affected the level of system support in Bolivia. This chapter investigates the existence of a change in the levels of system support reported for the period 2002 – 2004 (in the comparative perspective for the period 1998 – 2004), which may be caused by the context of acute political conflict that the country experienced in that period.


The basic assumption underlying this analysis is that a political crisis of system legitimacy such as the resignation of a constitutionally elected president, and the high number of protests and political clashes occurring in the country since President Carlos Mesa took office is a sufficiently strong factor for impacting the levels of system support in the short term. At the same time, it is possible that the general public will be strongly opposed to the protests of a minority and therefore may extend greater levels of support to the system with the aim of shielding it from the demonstrators. That is why it is very important to examine not only the general levels of system support but also the support expressed by various sub-sectors of the Bolivian population.

For our analysis of the current level of system support, we will use the socio-demographic variables age, income level, place of residence, a dummy variable for gender, a number of dummy variables that measure respondents' ethnicity (self-defined), dividing them into three basic groups, White, Mestizo and Indigenous (with Mestizo as the reference category), a dummy variable for respondents that identify themselves as Quechua, and another for those who identify themselves as Aymara. We study the independent impact of each of these variables on levels of system support.

The analysis will also explore the bi-variate relationship between place of residence and levels of system support, under the assumption that places of greater political conflict should present lower levels of system support.

To begin the analysis, we can compare the level of system support in Bolivia to those in other Latin American countries that are covered by LAPOP. The figure that follows shows the national means for system support for each one of the countries listed.

Figure III. 1. System Support: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, 2004



In general, the level of system support in Bolivia has never been very high. If we compare it to the levels of support in other Latin American countries, the mean level of system support in Bolivia has always been among the lowest if not the lowest. 2004 is no exception, as the above figure shows. This analysis enables us to place the Bolivian situation in international perspective and indirectly allows to have an idea of the international context and the influence that can have on the level of system support manifested by Bolivian citizens. Given that the levels of system support in Latin America are generally higher than in Bolivia, we can deduce that the low levels in our country are caused not by a regional trend but are largely caused by internal factors.

Following this logic, we show below the changes in the system support variable over time, using the data from surveys conducted in Bolivia by LAPOP in 1998, 2000, 2002, and now in 2004.

Figure III. 2. System Support in Bolivia from a Comparative Perspective: 1998 – 2004




Figure III.2 clearly shows that, although the overall level of system support in Bolivia has declined by 3 percentage points since 2002, the fall in the overall level of system support is neither dramatic nor the lowest recorded in the period 1998-2004 since it is slightly higher than the level of system support recorded in the year 2000. We can conclude from this that system support in Bolivia has neither risen nor declined at a constant rate; rather, it has fluctuated over time. It is also important to note that the level of system support has declined considerably from its maximum point in 2002. This can be determined by looking carefully at the “I” symbol in the upper part of each of the bars in the charts. This symbol represents the confidence interval for the sample. In non-technical terms, this means that the true value of the mean levels of system support for any of the years in the sample may be found somewhere within the range indicated by the horizontal bars of the “I.” One cannot achieve greater precision than this; all samples have a range of values (indicated by the confidence interval) because not all adult Bolivians were interviewed.

So, even though there is no general trend, the more positive findings of 2002 have been weakened by the events that have occurred since this survey was conducted, which has also resulted in a fall in system support.

In order to determine the reasons why the values on this variable have fluctuated over time, we focused first on the 2004 sample for Bolivia and analyzed the factors that can generate variations in the level of system support. We began the analysis by placing the socio-demographic variables mentioned above in a linear regression model using the 2004 data to identify any variation in the level of system support caused by any of those variables.

Next, we added the variables to be investigated in this chapter. The linear regression points to the presence or absence of a relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. In our case, system support is the dependent variable and the independent variables are the various conditions that may account for the variation in system support. The results of the regression are shown in the table below.

Table III. 1. System Support in Bolivia: 2004 Sample

		Coefficients ^a				
Model		Unstandardized		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	37.074	2.784		13.318	.000
	q1 Gender	1.193	.738	.033	1.617	.106
	q2r Age groups	-.775	.281	-.057	-2.758	.006
	q10 Household income	.500	.326	.035	1.530	.126
	East (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando)	6.780	.951	.166	7.130	.000
	South (Tarija, Chuquisaca Potosi)	1.288	.999	.029	1.289	.197
	Municipality of El Alto	-5.692	1.436	-.084	-3.963	.000
	etid2r Do you feel part of any ethnic group	1.765	.890	.042	1.982	.048
	etid2rec					
	etidr2	-.131	.309	-.009	-.425	.671
	m1r Evaluation of the president 0-100	.124	.022	.115	5.533	.000
	l1 Ideological position	.709	.192	.074	3.688	.000
	gi4 Number of deputies in Congress	3.574	1.123	.066	3.181	.001
	edr2 Education rec	-1.560	.598	-.062	-2.607	.009
	urbano Urban > 2,000	-5.423	.891	-.135	-6.088	.000

a. Dep: PSA5 Support mean.3(b1r,b2r,b3r,b4r,b6r)

In the above table, the numbers to the right in bold letters indicate the presence of a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and system support at the

95 percent confidence level. All the variables that are statistically significant predictors are discussed individually in this chapter. The variables that are not treated in this chapter have been omitted because, although they were significant in the multivariate model, they ceased to be significant in the bivariate model.

For a detailed analysis, we have decided to examine the levels of system support in smaller geographic units, regions and departments. In this analysis we have found clear differences between the levels of system support in different departments and regions of the country, as the following figure shows.

Figure III. 3. System Support, by Department in 2004





Figure III.3 clearly reveals intra-national differences in levels of system support. The departments in the eastern region of the country have higher levels of system support than in the other departments. The high level of support in Pando exceeds the national average for the past 6

years. But Beni and Santa Cruz also record high levels of system support, from which we may assume that the East as a region has the highest level of system support, without running the risk of making this inference only from the high level of support recorded in Pando.

The lowest levels of system support are in La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba, which are the departments with the highest rate of conflict and clashes in the past few years. The exception is the department of Santa Cruz, in which the number of manifestations of conflict in the streets has risen in the period 2002 – 2004. These findings are intriguing, but we need to know more. Is the discovery of low levels of system support a widespread problem in the region of La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba or does it reflect instead a division between the population and some sectors – those that participate in the protests – that have a higher tendency to have low levels of system support? It is necessary to examine this possibility and that is what we will now do.


Following the logic of the rate of political demonstrations in the street, we have extended the investigation by including as variables the three main satellite cities of the departments of the El Alto – Montero – Quillacollo axis. The results indicate that only El Alto has levels of system support significantly lower than in the rest of the country, as the following figure shows.

Figure III. 4. Level of System Support in El Alto Compared to the Rest of the Country



The above results are even more dramatic when they are placed in the national context, as shown in Figure III.5, below. We can see clearly that the level of system support in El Alto is much lower than in any other municipality or department in the country.


Figure III. 5. Level of System Support by Department Compared to the Level of Support in El Alto



Looking for reasons that can account for the large difference in system support between El Alto and the other departments of the country, we examined the relationship between system support and respondents' ethnic identification. In all the statistical models we ran with different measures of ethnicity, the statistical relationships between ethnic identification and system support are not significant at the 95 percent confidence level. In other words, we cannot establish a causal relationship between ethnic identification and system support; in other words, belonging to an ethnic group does not account for the variation in the levels of system support manifested by citizens.

Figure III.6, below, depicts the distribution of the El Alto population across the various categories of ethnic identification.

Figure III. 6. Distribution of the Population of El Alto by Ethnic Identification



As the figure shows, the population of El Alto is composed mostly of persons who identify themselves as “Mestizo or Cholo”; they account for 71.3 percent of the population. The population identifying itself as “Indigenous” is the second largest population group in El Alto, accounting for 17.4 percent of the city’s population. The measurement of the population’s ethnic identification has been done using the following two questions of the LAPOP questionnaire:


ETID. Do you consider yourself a person of the white, mestizo, indigenous, or black race?

ETID2. Do you think you belong to any of the following indigenous groups? Quechua, Aymara, Guarani, Chiquitano, Mojeño, Other native.

The first question is the measure of ethnicity created by LAPOP and the second question is taken from the CNPV. The combination of both variables enables a more accurate and detailed measurement of the ethnic identification of Bolivians. After taking into consideration the results of indigenous identification in El Alto, and the results of statistical models, we can conclude that the levels of system support in the different departments and regions of Bolivia are unrelated to the ethnic identification of their inhabitants.

Apart from the occurrence of political conflicts and clashes in the streets, and citizens' ethnic identification, we probed further to identify the factors that account for lower levels of system support in some departments compared to others. In the process, we found that age was a variable that impacted the level of system support in Bolivia, as the following figure shows:


Figure III. 7. System Support by Age Groups, 2004



Theoretically, in conditions of constant political instability over long periods of time, one would expect the level of system support to drop as the age and experience of people within the system increase. Figure III.7 partly confirms this theoretical assumption, since the 56-88 years age group shows one of the lowest levels of system support among all the age groups present in the sample. However, Figure III.7 also reveals a variation from the expected result since the 26-35 years age group has the same low level of system support as the older age group. This means that the level of system support is particularly low among the young population in the 26-35 years age group. That could be linked to a high level of dissatisfaction with the political system among those who have relatively little experience with its functioning, and to ideological tendencies that are generally stronger during the years of youth, factors that have already been shown to affect respondents' opinions of the political system (Seligson 2003). There we rejected age as a factor that plays an important role in determining levels of system support.


On the other hand, people's place of residence can also impact their level of system support. In the previous LAPOP studies, it was found that rural areas tend to have higher levels of system support than the urban areas of the country. In 2004, this situation did not change. Figure III.8, below, shows that in 2004 there was also a clear and consistent tendency in all the regions of the country for rural areas to have higher levels of system support than in urban centers and large cities of the country. The means shown in the figure represent the national means for 2004 in both areas of residence.

Figure III. 8. System Support by Area of Residence (Urban – Rural)



Another possible explanation for the variations in the levels of system support across the country is related to Bolivian citizens' evaluation of President Mesa's performance after the October 2003 crisis. The effect of this variable is hypothesized from the observation that the overall level of system support declined relative to the level recorded in 2002, as we indicated at the beginning of this chapter. The measurement of the level of system support as a function of President Mesa's performance can be recommended because the survey that forms the basis of this report was done almost a year after Mesa became President of the Republic. Consequently, the citizens interviewed in the survey also considered the experience of this president's administration when they answered the survey questions. In the survey they were asked to evaluate the president's performance on a 1-100 scale, where 1 means a poor performance and 100 means an excellent performance.


Figure III. 9. Level of System Support as a Function of the Evaluation of the President's Performance



As Figure III.9 clearly shows, the level of system support is positively related to the evaluation of President Mesa's performance. That is, the more positive the evaluation of the president's performance, the greater the level of system support reported by citizens. But that also means that those who rate the president negatively have lower levels of system support.

Citizens' ideological self-placement was shown in previous studies to have an impact on their levels of system support. The following figure displays the respondents' ideological self-placement.


Figure III. 10. Ideological Self-Placement by Department



The instrument for measuring ideological position is a scale that goes from 1 to 10. Respondents are asked to place themselves on the scale according to their political position, keeping in mind that 1 means a position on the “left,” and 10 means a position on the “right.” The results shown in Figure III.10 indicate that the respondents tend to place themselves at a central position on the scale, given that the value farthest to the left is 4.7 points (represented by the shortest bar) and that farthest to the right is less than 6 points on the scale (represented by the tallest bar). Bolivians’ ideological self-placement reveals little variation, and it does not indicate extreme positions among any of the population groups. This may be interpreted as a general trend towards greater moderation and the relative ideological homogeneity of Bolivians.


The results also reveal a positive relationship between respondents’ political identification and their level of system support, as shown in the figure below.

Figure III. 11. System Support and Ideological Position by Department



In this figure, we can clearly see that respondents who place themselves more toward the right side of the scale (closer to point 10 on the scale) tend to express higher levels of system support than those who place themselves more toward the left (closer to point 1 on the scale). Nonetheless, the variations in the level of system support caused by ideological position are not drastic, nor do they reflect extreme tendencies toward any of the two sides of the latter.


Figure III. 12. Ideological Position in El Alto Compared to the Rest of the Country



In the case of El Alto, mean ideological position is slightly further to the left than the mean for the rest of the country, but it is not an outlier in the overall national context since it is slightly greater than the mean for the department of Cochabamba (the one that is most to the left). Therefore, one cannot argue that the low level of system support in El Alto is caused by an extreme ideological position on the left or on the right.

Finally, we also found that the level or the lack of information that citizens have about the functioning of the political system or about political issues in general may be related to the levels of system support that they manifest. In other words, better-informed citizens, or those with greater access to information, express higher levels of system support, and those with lower levels of information in general express lower levels of system support.

Figure III. 13. Do You Remember How Many Deputies There Are in Congress?



In this particular case, respondents were asked if they had any knowledge of the number of deputies there were in the Bolivian Congress. The low level of knowledge regarding this aspect in the population in general is an important piece of information. Only 13.6 percent of the respondents knew the right answer. This leads us to confirm the assumption that low levels of information, especially about such basic and important topics as the number of representatives in the congress, are associated with low levels of system support.

Conclusions

We began this chapter by referring to the low level of system support among Bolivians in general, compared both to other Latin American countries and to previous LAPOP studies.

Throughout the chapter, we investigated the possible causes of this low level of system support and found a variety of factors that can strengthen or weaken system support. In general, it may be said that there is no single specific cause that can by itself explain the low system support among Bolivians. On the contrary, what we have seen is that a combination of different conditions, both permanent (such as age and ideological position) as well as transitory (such as

the evaluation of the president's performance or the degree of information possessed by citizens about topics related to the political system), clearly influence citizens' levels of system support at a given moment in the life of a country.

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Chapter IV: Social Protests in Bolivia

Bolivia is a country in which public protests are a central element of the strategies for political participation of many social actors. Strikes, demonstrations, marches, and other public manifestations are part of the tradition of Bolivian political culture, as are other less peaceful measures, such as street and road blockades, the take-over of public institutions and the seizure of private property.

People make use of these mechanisms not only to protest against something that they consider an injustice committed by the State; the demonstrations and other forms of non-conventional participation (at least non-conventional within the framework of the institutions of the Bolivian State) form part of the strategies of negotiation, political growth, and acquisition of social notoriety of different social actors.

Various studies have focused on the recurrence of conflict as a form of political participation in Bolivia. Of particular interest is the valuable work by Laserna and Villarroel (Laserna and Villarroel 1999; Villarroel 2002), and by Calderon and Szmukler (1999), which reveal the recurrence and diversity of these political phenomena, as well as their place in the social and political context in which they occurred.

The existing studies approach this subject from the perspective of the conflicts and their meaning in the national reality. As far as we know, there are no studies that deal with the topic of conflicts from the perspective of citizens, of public opinion examined scientifically. This chapter seeks to contribute to the knowledge of social conflicts in Bolivia by studying citizens' attitudes and opinions.

1. Citizens' Participation in Social Protests


What is the level of participation of citizens in social protests in Bolivia? One aspect to consider in responding to this question is the comparison of the country to other nations of the region with social and political characteristics more or less similar to those of Bolivia. Figure IV.1, below, compares the percentage of individuals who indicate having participated at least once in a public protest in Bolivia and in eight other countries in Latin America.

The question in the survey was as follows:

PROT1. Have you ever participated in a demonstration or public protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never?

Responses 1 (Sometimes) and 2 (Almost never) were grouped together as an affirmative response to participation in protests, while option 3 (Never) was considered a negative response. It is worth noting that the question was worded in exactly the same way in all the countries shown here.


Figure IV. 1. Percentage of Persons Who Had Participated in a Public Protest



The level of participation in protests by Bolivians is much higher than that in any other country in which LAPOP asked the question. Though it is possible that one explanation may lie in Bolivians' memory of participation in recent conflicts, in which citizens' participation was high, and which did not occur in other countries, the differences are too large to be attributed only to that factor. Thirty-seven percent of Bolivians admitted having participated at some time in a public protest, while only 26 percent did so in the country occupying second place (Colombia). The differences with the 6 percent that participated in El Salvador or with the 1 in every 10 citizens that participated in protests in Honduras or Guatemala are large and, therefore, important.

Figure IV.2, below, presents the information from this variable, separating the responses by frequency. As it shows, the values for Bolivia are much higher in the two positive responses (sometimes and almost never) compared to the other countries.

Figure IV. 2. Frequency of Participation in Public Protests, by Country




The level of participation in public protests by Bolivians is very high compared to the other countries in the region, both at the aggregate level and when we consider the frequencies of participation. Are there any differences between the different social groups with respect to

participation in this type of event? The statistical tests that we conducted² suggest that once we control for the effects of other factors, there are no important differences between urban and rural dwellers, or between ethnic groups, whichever measure is used to define them. Nor are income level, the region in which a person resides, and the level of personal life satisfaction of any importance.

The factors that seem to be most significant are gender and education. Women tend to participate much less than men in social protests, as Figure IV.3, below, shows. The difference of almost 10 percentage points between men and women is statistically significant. There is no reason to think that these differences apply only to social protests; rather, they reflect a political scenario dominated in general by men.

Figure IV. 3. Percentage of Respondents Who Had Participated in a Public Protest, by Gender




Education has a paradoxical impact on social protests: the more educated a person, the higher the probability he will participate at least once in a public protest; that is, education has a

² We ran a series of logistic regression models, with “participating in a protest” as the dependent variable. This statistical technique estimates the increase (or decrease) in the probability that an event will occur, in this case, that a person will participate in a protest, on the basis of the explanatory variables selected for the analysis.

positive impact on the level of participation in public protests. It is possible that education in the country's public universities, with their high levels of participation in protests as a way of increasing the budget, is related to this phenomenon. However, this relationship seem to be constant in all the countries covered by LAPOP. The causal mechanisms underlying this relationship should be explored in future research.

Figure IV.4 shows the relationship between education and public protest.

Figure IV. 4. Participation in Public Protests, by Educational Level (%)



2. Targeting protests

The question on people's participation in public protests is useful, but it is very general; using this broad question we can get an idea of the degree and frequency at which Bolivians participate in protests in general, but we cannot distinguish the object of the protests. The 2004 survey included questions about people's participation in social protests against the governments of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa.

Protests against the Government of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada

The last administration of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (2002-2003) was marked by a series of social conflicts that resulted in the overthrow of a government that had been democratically elected but had lost the capacity to handle and resolve the social conflicts it faced in a legitimate manner.³ The survey asked respondents specifically if they had participated in the protests against Sanchez de Lozada. The question was as follows:

PROT2. Did you participate in the protests in October last year against the government of Sanchez de Lozada? Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]


Around 14 percent of the respondents in the national sample answered that they had participated in the events of October 2003. Unlike what happens to protests in general, in this case the social conditions that determine the probability that a person participated in the events of October are easily identified with the statistical technique of logistic regression (see the first footnote of this chapter). There are 4 factors that affect citizens' participation in these specific acts of protest: ethnic self-identification, the region in which a person resides, income level and if a person lives in the municipality of El Alto.

As Figure IV.5 shows, individuals who identify with any of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia tended to participate more in the October protests. Figure IV.5 shows the impact of ethnic identification on participation in the protests. In that figure, the groups (identification with an ethnic group) were defined using the question from the CNPV.⁴ However, the differences remain regardless of the criteria used to define ethnic groups: overall, the group of those who identify with indigenous people have significantly higher participation in the protests against Sanchez de Lozada than the rest of the population.

³ For more information about the series of conflicts the country experienced from 2000 see Gamarra (2002; 2003); Ames *et al.* (2004), and Laserna (2004b). On the events of October 2003 and their repercussions, see, among others, Suarez (2003).


⁴ The question was as follows: ETID2. *Do you think you belong to any of the following indigenous groups? (Read all the options:)* Quechua [1] Aymara [2] Guarani [3] Chiquitano [4] Mojeno [5] Other native [6] None [7] Others.

Figure IV. 5. Percentage of Respondents Who Participated in the Protests against Sanchez de Lozada, by Ethnic Self-Identification




Region is also an important factor in relation to participation in the protests against President Sanchez de Lozada. The mean level of participation in those events in the departments in the West (La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba) is significantly higher – double – than in the South (Tarija, Chuquisaca and Potosi) and in the East (Beni, Pando and Santa Cruz). Figure IV.6, below, depicts those differences.

Figure IV. 6. Percentage of Participation in Protests against Sánchez de Lozada, by Region



Finally, living in the municipality of El Alto is an additional factor that raises the probability of having participated in the protests against Sanchez de Lozada, even after controlling for other factors. The percentage of participation in the protests in the municipality of El Alto is 30 percent, double that in the rest of the Department of La Paz (15 percent). Figure IV.7, below, depicts the differences.

Figure IV. 7. Percentage of Participation in Protests against Sanchez de Lozada, Municipality of El Alto vs. the Rest of La Paz



It is worth pointing out that these factors (region, ethnicity, and living in El Alto) are significant even after controlling for their joint effect. For example, living in El Alto has an effect over and above that of income level and ethnic identification on participation in the events of October. The same applies to the other factors considered in the analysis.

Income level, the last factor impacting participation in the protests against Sanchez de Lozada, is discussed in the section on President Mesa.

Protests against the Government of Carlos Mesa

President Carlos Mesa inherited a highly unstable political situation following the resignation of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. The levels of social conflict rose during his administration; the number of new conflicts per month that Mesa had to face is the highest since the UDP government in the 1980s (Laserna 2004b). Nevertheless, the percentage of persons who until December 2004 claimed to have participated in a protest against President Mesa was a little less than 5 percent, significantly lower than the 14 percent that claimed to have participated in


the October 2003 protests against Sanchez de Lozada during his administration. The differences between different social groups are also much less noticeable.

The question used to measure participation in the protests against Carlos Mesa was as follows:

PROT3. Have you participated in any march or protest against the government of Carlos Mesa? Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

Apart from the already noted gender-related differences with respect to participation in this type of political event, there are no important differences related to regions, ethnic groups, area of residence or education. The only factor having an independent impact on participation in protests against the Mesa administration seems to be income. Figure IV.8, below, shows the mean level of participation in protests against the governments of Carlos Mesa and Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada by respondents' income levels.

Figure IV. 8. Participation in Public Protests against Sanchez de Lozada and against Mesa, by Family Income



The figure above is highly revealing regarding the characteristics of the mobilization against the two governments. While the percentages of participation in the protests against Sanchez de Lozada are much higher among low income groups, the protests against Mesa are much more uniform across income groups, and tend to be higher in the middle and upper sections of the scale. In other words, the participants in the protests against Sanchez de Lozada were mostly citizens of low economic means, while those who protested against Mesa are mainly from middle income groups. This seems to be consistent with the hypothesis that the support of the middle and upper classes was important for Sanchez de Lozada, while Mesa receives social support from the popular sectors, but also that his support is more evenly distributed across the country's social groups.

3. Attitudes Related to Public Protest

There are certain attitudes that are related to participation in public protests. One of them is acceptance of aggressive or unconventional forms of political participation. LAPOP has

developed an indicator that allows us to assess the level of people's acceptance of other citizens' participation through mechanisms that could be considered aggressive: blocking streets, invasion of private property, capture of offices and factories, and participation in groups that seek to overthrow the elected government.

Respondents were asked about their degree of approval of each one of the following possibilities:

E15. People participating in the closing or blocking of streets?

E14. People invading private properties?

E2. People taking over factories, offices or other buildings?

E3. People participating in a group that wants engage in the violent overthrow an elected government?


The responses were measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "Strongly disapprove" and 10 means "Strongly approve." The questions were combined into an indicator which represents the mean of the four responses⁵; the index of approval of aggressive forms of political participation yielded satisfactory results in the technical tests associated with its construction.⁶

Figure IV.9, below, shows how this index is related to the probability of participating in a public protest. The center line shows the probability, while the shaded area marked off by the thinner lines show the 95 percent confidence interval. It is clear that the higher a respondent's score on the index of aggressive political participation, the higher the probability that the person will participate in a protest. While those who have very low levels of acceptance of such forms of aggressive political participation have a probability of participating in protests of around 3 in every 10, the probability rises in the upper sections of the scale to 8 in 10.

⁵ In case a person does not respond to one of the 4 questions, a mean calculated in the conventional manner would generate a missing case, that is, the case would be excluded from the analysis. In order to avoid "losing" the cases which do not have responses on one or a maximum of two of the 4 variables of the series, the mean values of the other questions are imputed to the missing response(s); if fewer than 2 responses in the series are valid, the case is excluded from the analysis. This procedure for imputing values to missing cases is recognized as valid in the quantitative social sciences, and the high alpha coefficient for the index (see the following note) indicates that this is a reliable procedure.


⁶ Cronbach's Alpha is a statistic that is used to determine whether the components of an index are sufficiently compatible to be combined; the value of this statistic for our index is 0.806 out of a maximum possible of 1. This suggests that the components of the index are sufficiently compatible to be part of a single indicator.

Figure IV. 9. Probability of Participating in a Protest by Acceptance of Aggressive Political Participation



The acceptance of such non-conventional forms of political participation has decreased significantly in the country during the past few years. This is the case with each one of the 4 variables considered in this indicator, whose mean national values declined steadily between 1998 and 2004, when the data were collected. Figure IV.10 shows this effect over time.


Figure IV. 10. Acceptance of Aggressive Forms of Political Participation, Bolivia 1998-2004



It is worth noting that the acceptance of blocking streets and roads as a form of political participation is the “non-conventional” strategy that has greatest acceptance in the country. It is also the only one that has registered an increase in any period between surveys (between 1998 and 2000 the national mean for support for this political strategy rose by 6 points on a scale from 0 to 100). However, since the year 2000, the acceptance of blockages as a form of political participation has been steadily declining, the same as the other variables.

A comparison of the Bolivian mean index of aggressive political participation for 2004 with those of other Latin American countries reinforces the idea that mean acceptance of such participation strategies among Bolivians is low. Figure IV.11, below, shows this comparison.

Figure IV. 11. Acceptance of Aggressive Political Participation, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective



Bolivians and Costa Ricans appear in the lowest positions of acceptance of non-conventional forms of political participation. This suggests that, in comparative terms, Bolivians' disposition toward aggressive political participation is lower than that in most of the other countries covered by LAPOP. But if we compare this information to the very high levels of participation in public protests noted above, we have a highly conflictive situation, in which a large part of the Bolivian population participates in political activities that are disapproved by the majority of the population.

The low acceptance among Bolivians of aggressive forms of participation does not seem to be limited only to these non-conventional forms of political expression. The acceptance of

other completely legitimate and institutional forms of participation, recognized by the Political Constitution of the State and central to Bolivian democracy, is also very low.

In the questionnaire, respondents were asked about their acceptance of the following ideas. The possible responses go from 1, meaning “Strongly disapprove,” to 10, meaning “Strongly approve.”


E5. Should people participate in lawful demonstrations?

E8. Should people participate in an organization or group to try to resolve community problems?

E11. Should people work in electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate?

The responses were recoded into a scale from 0 to 100 to facilitate comprehension. Figure IV.12, below, shows the mean values for the 3 questions for Bolivia and for 9 other Latin American countries to which it is compared.

Figure IV. 12. Acceptance of Conventional Forms of Political Participation



The mean values for Bolivia on the three variables displayed in the figure are significantly lower than those for any other country. It is notable that Bolivia is the only country in which the mean acceptance of participation in the electoral campaigns of political parties falls below the mid-point of the scale (the mid-point of the scale is 50; the Bolivian mean is 45). In general, political participation in Bolivia, and not just that which may be considered aggressive, has low levels of acceptance among citizens. This gives rise to the hypothesis regarding the existence of an acute process of de-legitimization of the political system and of the channels of participation established in it.

Conclusions

The levels of participation in public protests in Bolivia are remarkably high. Conflict is an important part of Bolivians' strategies for political participation. The proportion of persons that participate in protests as a form of political participation is high even in a region such as Latin America, which is considered to be a region in which the political participation of social actors has historically exceeded the institutional mechanisms available for it.

However, the level of acceptance of non-conventional forms of political participation among Bolivians is one of the lowest in the region. Bolivians participate in large numbers in protests and social conflicts, much more than other Latin American societies, but the level of acceptance of these strategies of participation is one of the lowest. Further, the level of acceptance of any type of political participation among Bolivians, including those recognized as legitimate and necessary by the Political Constitution of the State, is very low. It seems that Bolivian society is to some extent weary of political participation; this reflects an erosion of the legitimacy of the political system that may endanger the country's democratic stability.

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Chapter V: Institutions and Citizens

This chapter explores Bolivian citizens' levels of trust in political institutions and other institutions belonging to the State or to civil society, which are related to the country's political arena.

In the last decade, the Bolivian State has been deeply involved in a process of change and of institutional reforms aimed at its modernization, to the point that has earned worldwide recognition as one of the developing countries in the vanguard of modernization and reform of state institutions. In spite of that, the weakness of Bolivian institutions and the conflicts resulting from it continue to be "vox populi" in Bolivia and, apparently, offers an explanation for the problems of Bolivian democracy, which is widely accepted by Bolivian citizens.

Institutions are the executive arm of the State. They are the instrument through which policies and rules of the game are implemented; through which the constitution is applied and the general dynamic of the State regulated. Owing to this function, institutions constitute the "face," the image of the State. It is also due to these characteristics that when a citizen or a group of citizens interact with the State, in reality they interact with one of its institutions. That is also why the evaluation of the performance of the State is in reality the evaluation of its institutions.

In works such as this audit of Bolivian democracy, when it is necessary to know if citizens are satisfied with the performance of democracy in their country or if they support their political system, institutions are key objects of research as what is measured is the level of trust citizens have in them, and the type of interaction that they have with them in their daily lives.

Twenty-two Bolivian political institutions are included in the LAPOP survey. Most of them are state institutions and some are those of civil society. Respondents are asked to what extent they trust a specific institution and they are asked to indicate their level of trust on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "no trust" and 7 means "a lot of trust." In order to facilitate the measurement and interpretation of these variables, the scale has been converted into one from 1 to 100, where 0 means "very little trust" and 100 means "a lot of trust."

The questions on which this chapter is based are presented in the following table:

Table V. 1. List of Institutions Evaluated¹

List of Institutions
B31A. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?
B30. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B11. To what extent do you trust the National Electoral Court?
B12. To what extent do you trust the the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the Congress?
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust journalists?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
B22. To what extent do you trust the Municipal Government?
B33. To what extent do you trust the Prefecture?
B22B. To what extent do you trust the indigenous authorities?
B22C. To what extent do you trust the municipal Vigilance Committee?
B23. To what extent do you trust the trade unions?
B23A. To what extent do you trust the Public Ministry or public prosecutors?
B23C. To what extent do you trust the Human Rights Ombudsman?
B23BNR. To what extent do you trust the Tribunals of Justice?
B23E. To what extent do you trust the Constitutional Tribunal?
B23B. To what extent do you trust the lawyers who works as Public Defenders?
B31. To what extent do you trust the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work in the community?
B42. To what extent do you trust the Conciliation Centers?
B44. Have you heard of the presidential anti-corruption delegation? To what extent do you trust that the presidential anti-corruption delegation is combating corruption in Bolivia?

The question on the presidential anti-corruption delegation is a special one with a filter. Because it is a new institution, the respondents were first asked if they had heard of it and only if they had were they asked to what extent the trusted it. As a result, the total number of respondents varies for this last question compared to that for the other institutions, for which the number of respondents is equal to the total number in the 2004 sample (that is, a total of 3,070 respondents answered, or said “don’t know” to these questions).

¹ The order in which the institutions are presented has no special meaning or significance. The numbering of the variables follows the internal structure of the survey rather than any stratification or ranking of the institutions.

In order to do a good job of evaluating the level of citizens' trust in the institutions, we decided to divide them into 5 groups according to the functions they perform. The groups of institutions with which this chapter deals are as follows:

1. Institutions belonging to the **Executive** power of the State, including the president, the Armed Forces, the Police, and the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation.
2. **Representative** institutions, including the Congress, political parties and the National Electoral Court.
3. Institutions belonging to the Judicial power of the State, including the Supreme Court of Justice, the Public Ministry, the Public Defender, the Tribunals of Justice (Courts), the Constitutional Tribunal, the Public Defenders, and the Conciliation Centers.
4. **Local** institutions, including Prefectures, Municipal Governments, and Vigilance Committees.
5. **Civil** institutions, including the Catholic Church, journalists, indigenous authorities, trade unions, and NGOs.


As we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the Bolivian State has carried out a series of reforms in its institutions and has introduced a series of new institutions in the course of the past decade. Because of this, on the basis of the initial classification of the types of institutions, and in order to do a more detailed analysis of institutional performance in Bolivia, the analysis of the data on institutional performance will concentrate on comparing the levels of performance and trust between the old institutions, the ones subject to reform, and the new institutions, and attempt to trace changes in or differences between institutions due to their period of existence or the reforms they underwent.

We begin the analysis with a comparative glance at the overall level of trust in all the institutions included in this study. Figure V.1, below, shows the 22 institutions included in LAPOP surveys in descending order of the mean level of trust expressed in them by respondents on a scale from 0 to 100.

The figure includes a line representing the mean overall level of trust in all the institutions taken together. The line will be shown in all figures in the chapter as a reference for analyzing the different groups of institutions.

The mean trust in all the institutions combined is 43.75 points (on a scale from 1 to 100) for the year 2004. This gives us an initial idea that the overall level of trust in institutions tends to be low in Bolivia since the mean does not even reach the mid-point of the scale (50 points).

Figure V. 1. Level of Trust in Bolivian Institutions



As the above figure clearly shows, the institution in which Bolivians have the highest level of trust is the Catholic Church, with a mean of 68 points on a 0-100 scale. The Church is the only institution in Bolivia that receives a mean score above 60 points on the scale of trust, with a difference of almost 10 points with the institution immediately following it on the list, and of more than 40 points with the institution with the lowest level of trust reported by respondents. With this score, the Church is in a considerably better position compared to the other institutions.


There are various institutions whose mean level of trust surpasses the mean level of trust in Bolivian institutions overall. Among them, the President (as the central institution of Executive power), the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, journalists, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) receive scores above 50 points on the scale, which can be interpreted as a high level of trust compared to the remaining institutions and to the mean overall institutional trust in Bolivia.

Political parties are the institution that receives the lowest score on the trust scale, with a mean of 23.4 points. The other institutions with low levels of trust are the police, the congress and the tribunals of justice (courts), which receive mean scores between 30 and 40 points on the scale.

The remaining institutions receive scores closer to the overall national mean, between 40 and 50 points on the trust scale. All the institutions included in the index are discussed separately below, within the categories created for each one.

Compared to the rest of the Latin American countries, the level of trust in institutions in Bolivia varies depending on the institution, but in general it tends to be low. The following figure compares the mean level of trust in the Bolivian Congress to those in the other Latin American countries in the LAPOP sample. The sample for Figure V.2 is from 2004.

Figure V. 2. Trust in Congress: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, 2004



As the above figure shows, the level of trust Bolivians express in Congress is low compared to that in the rest of the Latin American countries covered by LAPOP, though it is not the lowest in the region. In substantive terms, the level of trust in the Congress is low in Bolivia because it does not even touch 40 points on the trust scale.

Figure V. 3. Trust in the Police: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective, 2004




Figure V.3 offers another example of Bolivia’s situation in regard to trust in institutions compared to other Latin American countries. In this case, Bolivia has the lowest level of trust in the police of all the Latin American countries covered by LAPOP, with an average of 32 points on the trust scale and with a difference of 32 points from the highest level of trust in Latin America, which is found in El Salvador. The level of trust in the police in Ecuador remains among the lowest in the Latin American sample.

These data tell us that there are difference not only between countries, but possibly also between regions within Latin America. The low levels of trust in Congress and in the police found in the only two South American countries included in the sample (Bolivia and Ecuador) may be considered a sign of a political difference between Central America and South America, although Nicaragua and Panama have levels of trust lower than those in Bolivia. A comparative analysis of the two regions could perhaps provide new elements to better understand Latin American political trends and intra-regional differences. But to draw a more valid comparison between Central America and South America it will be necessary to include more South American countries in the LAPOP sample in the future.


1. Institutions of the Executive

The institutions included in this category are the President, as the principal representative of Executive power, the Armed Forces and the Police, as representatives of the coercive authority of the Executive, and the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation, created by President Mesa to combat corruption within government institutions.

For the purposes of this analysis, the Presidency of the Republic, the Armed Forces, and the Police are considered old institutions of the Bolivian state, while the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation is considered a new one.

The figure below offers a comparative perspective on the levels of trust in these institutions, and the mean level of trust in all the institutions taken together. To facilitate comparison, the bar that represents the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation is highlighted by a darker color since it is a relatively new institution.

Figure V. 4. Level of Trust in Institutions of the Executive



As Figure V.4 shows, for three of the four Executive institutions the levels of trust expressed by respondents rise above the national mean for all the institutions.

The level of trust in the President stands out among all the institutions because it is the only one that exceeds 50 points on the trust scale and because it is one of the few institutions in the country to receive such a high score. This result is even more significant if it is placed in the context of the highly conflictive situation in which President Mesa has been performing his duties since October 2003.

As this survey was being carried out, President Mesa had been in office for 10 months, and a short period in office tends to generate high levels of support or trust perhaps due to the so called “honeymoon” period between a new president and the citizens. However, in this case the high level of trust manifested by citizens toward President Mesa is scarcely attributable to such a factor owing to the political context of the country, because he assumed office at a critical

moment, and because he has had to face an unending series of conflicts from the beginning of his term.

It is also interesting to observe that the level of trust in the Armed Forces is substantially higher than that in the Police, considering that both institutions have been involved in the 2003 conflicts and even before that in the conflicts related to the Water War in April 2000.

The Police is the only institution linked to the Executive whose level of trust falls below the overall mean for all the institutions; the level is also lower than that in any other country covered by LAPOP. The low level of trust shown in the Police may be related to citizens' perception and experience of corruption because the Police maybe more frequently linked to acts of corruption, and because it is generally the Police that is called on to maintain order during conflicts and clashes that occur during the street protests and demonstrations, which have been so common during the period.

The case of the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation is special. Since it is a very new institution, created by President Mesa at the beginning of his term in 2003, respondents were first asked if they knew of the institution, and only those who knew it were asked the extent to which they trusted it. Roughly 50 percent of the respondents knew of the existence of the institution.

The level of trust shown in the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation is slightly above the mean for all the institutions and, among the institutions linked to the Executive, lower than that in the President and in the Armed Forces.

In seeking the causes due to which citizens place greater trust in some institutions, it may be argued that one should expect higher levels of trust in new institutions compared to old ones since the short life of new institutions generates expectations of their performance and not necessarily negative opinions in the beginning. In this case, we cannot say that trust in the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation is substantially lower than that in the other institutions, nor can we confirm the expectation that because it is a new institution it receives greater trust than do other institutions of the Executive or those in other areas.

2. Institutions of Representation


The institutions included in this category are the political parties, which exist with the aim of representing the collective interests of different sectors of the population or of interest groups, and the Congress, which is the example *par excellence* of a representative of civil society in any democratic system. We have also included in this section the National Electoral Court, which is the institution that regulates and controls all the electoral processes in the political system.

The three institutions in this category have been subject to partial reform in the past decade. The political parties have experienced changes in their internal structure, in the proportions of representation based on a gender criterion, and in the financing of their

campaigns. The structure of Congress, too, has been changed with the creation of uninominal deputies (those elected from single-member districts).

Figure V.5, below, shows the levels of trust placed in these institutions by the respondents in the 2004 sample. These mean levels of trust may be compared to the mean level of trust for all the institutions, represented by the horizontal line that crosses the figure at 43.75 points on the trust scale.

Figure V. 5. Level of Trust in Institutions of Representation



Of the institutions of representations shown in the preceding figure, only the National Electoral Court has a mean level of trust that is slightly above the mean for all the institutions. Both the Congress and political parties receive scores substantially below that of the National Electoral Court, with political parties the institution least trusted by Bolivians.

What do these data tell us about representation in Bolivia? First, these data are especially noteworthy considering that both the Congress and the political parties are the main channels for representing the citizenry before the institutions of the State; in other words, they are the citizens' "voice" before the State. In the Bolivian case, both channels receive the lowest levels of trust from citizens, which practically amounts to a voice-less society.

However, the data need to be examined carefully because the levels of citizens' trust in the institutions not only are a direct reflection of the performance of the institutions but can also be influenced by many other factors such as currents of political opposition, isolated and momentary events, lack of information and prejudice, among others.

In order to enhance our understanding of changes in the levels of trust in these institutions we first examined them over time. The institutional reforms in the Congress and the political parties do not appear to have helped in raising the levels of confidence in the institutions over time. Between 1998 and 2004, political parties have maintained low levels of trust with a slight increase in 2002; however, the level of trust expressed in these institutions has never come even close to the overall mean for all the institutions recorded for each of the years of the survey.


In the case of the Congress, its performance from a temporal perspective has been a little more stable than that of the political parties, because in spite of being deeply involved in the October 2003 clashes and the high levels of politicization that prevent it from performing its functions efficiently,² it has managed to keep its level of trust stable in the period between 2002 and 2004. However, the Congress has also been unable to attain a level of trust close to the mean for all the institutions in any of the years of the LAPOP survey.

The National Electoral Court is going through a process of clear ascendance with regard to the trust that the people have in the institution. Part of this increase may be because the Court has been modernized in the area of personal services and with respect to database management, and because it is becoming increasingly more "public" in the sense that it appears more frequently in the mass media, generates and distributes more information, and communicates better with citizens.

Below, in Figure V.6, we show the levels of trust for these three institutions in temporal perspective for the period 1998 – 2004.

² It should also be kept in mind that the Congress was highly discredited publicly in the national press in the period 2000 – 2002 in connection with the increases in the deputies' allowances and the payments to stand-in deputies (*suplentes*), and the refusal of the Congress to participate in the "policy of austerity," which other Bolivian institutions were following at the time.

**Figure V. 6. Level of Trust in Institutions of Representation
Temporal Perspective, 1998 – 2004**




As we have noted in the preceding explanation, the levels of trust in political parties are not very stable over time, though they are always very low. For a better grasp of this problem, it may be suitable to include some variables that could help identify the factors influencing the fluctuation in the levels of trust in this particular institution.

We ran a linear regression model, controlling for the impact of a series of socio-demographic variables on the level of trust in political parties in Bolivia. By doing so, we discovered that women tend to express greater levels of trust (25 points on the scale) in political

parties than do men (22 points on the scale), and that with respect to the variable Age, older persons are likely to have lower levels of trust in political parties.

Among the factors that can influence the level of trust in political parties, the region³ in which a person resides proved to be an important predictor. As Figure V.7, below, shows, the level of trust in the West is significantly lower than that in the East, in which the mean level of trust is 10 points higher than the national mean for political parties in 2004. On the basis of this information, we would infer that the inhabitants of the East feel better represented by political parties than those in the West and those in the South. If this is indeed the case, the “alternatives of representation” should receive greater support than the political parties by themselves and in the West and South.

Figure V. 7. Level of Trust in Political Parties by Region



The 2004 LAPOP survey includes the following questions about the alternatives for representation in Bolivia:

³ For the purposes of this analysis, the regions have been classified in terms of the departmental demands for autonomy and of regional interests that have been repeatedly expressed in the national press. Thus, we the **western** region that comprises the departments of La Paz, Oruro, and Cochabamba; the **southern** region, comprising the departments of Tarija, Chuquisaca and Potosi, and the **eastern** region, which consists of the departments of Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz.

VB7. In your opinion, who represents you better 1) the congress deputy from the party list in a multi-member district (“diputado plurinominal”), or 2) the single-member district congress deputy (“diputado uninominal”) from your district?

VB8. Which of the following do you think can represent your interests better, a political party or a citizens’ association?

These questions provide more information about citizens’ evaluations of their alternatives for representation⁴ before the State. Though they are not the only two alternatives of representation, we focus on these two institutions because both are nationally important and participate in mass electoral processes.

The uninominal deputies are included in this study because they resulted from a reform of the model of representation and because although they are linked to political parties, they retain some independence and their own identity since they are the only representatives of a single district. The comparison between deputies from single-member districts (“uninominal”) and those from multi-member districts (“plurinominal”) may be understood as a comparison between the degree of representativeness of uninominal deputies and of the plurinominal deputies chosen by the parties.

The citizens’ groups are very new institutions, created with the explicit aim of offering a new alternative of representation to citizens in order to compensate in some way for the low level of representativeness of the political parties. These associations were included for the first time in a national electoral process (for Municipal Governments) in December 2004. For this reason, the evaluation of these associations may be a little premature in terms of performance, although their evaluation in terms of their acceptance as an alternative is no less valuable because of it.

⁴ The alternatives of representation at the local level are analyzed in the section on local institutions, and another alternative of interest, the union, is analyzed in the section on civil associations. Unfortunately, the 2004 LAPOP survey does not include information on the Civic Committees, consequently they are excluded from this study.

Figure V. 8. Who Represents You Better? Uninominal Congress Deputies





Figure V.8 reveals a clear preference among citizens for uninominal deputies over political parties with respect to the degree of representativeness of the two institutions. 46.3 percent of the respondents think that uninominal deputies represent their interests best, while only 10.9 percent believes in political parties. It is very interesting to note that the proportion of respondents who think that neither of these institutions satisfactorily represents their interests and even the proportion of the population which is unable to recognize the difference between political parties and uninominal deputies (shown by the last bar on the right) is higher than the proportion of the population that thinks that political parties represent their interests best.

We cannot ignore the fact that the proportion of respondents who do not trust the ability of either of the two institutions to represent their interests satisfactorily is considerably high, constituting almost 30 percent of the respondents who do not feel that they are represented. It is also very important to realize that 13.5 percent of the respondents admit to not knowing the difference between political parties and uninominal deputies. This finding should draw attention

to the lack of vital information among citizens regarding the basic functions of the political system.

Figure V. 9. Who Represents You Better? Citizens' Groups



In the case of citizens' groups, Bolivian citizens' preferences are clearer than in the case of the uninominal deputies. Sixty-nine point seven percent of the respondents feel that they are better represented by citizens' associations than by political parties. The difference between those who do not feel represented by either of these institutions and those who think they are better represented by political parties is much smaller than in the preceding case, which underscores the degree of trust citizens place in citizens' groups. However, this information should be treated with care since citizens' groups have still not had time to demonstrate their performance and their evaluation, therefore, is based more on their potential for representation than on their true assessment as an alternative channel for citizens.

It is worth noting in this case that a larger number of citizens can distinguish between citizens' groups and political parties than those that can distinguish between uninominal deputies and political parties, considering that citizens' groups are a much more recent institution than uninominal deputies. The implications of this information for electoral behavior and the logic of citizens' representation cannot be treated in-depth in this chapter, but they certainly merit a specific study that examines the logic of citizens' search for representation.

3. Institutions of the Judiciary


The institutions included in this category are the Supreme Court of Justice, the tribunals of justice, the public prosecutors and public defenders, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Conciliation Centers.

The office of the Ombudsman, the Constitutional Tribunal and the Conciliation Centers are considered new institutions. The remaining institutions are old but they have been indirectly subjected⁵ to reforms, in particular procedural ones, for example, through the implementation of the new Penal Procedure Code in Bolivia.

Assessing the levels of trust in judicial institutions is important because those institutions are part of the administration of justice and of the guarantee of citizens' rights, and as such are very close to citizens.

⁵ They have been subject to reforms, which, though not aimed specifically at reforming that institution, affect their performance or some of their functions.

Figure V. 10. Level of Trust in the Institutions of the Judiciary



In this case, there are only two institutions that equal or surpass the mean level of trust for all the institutions, the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Conciliation Centers. The office of the Ombudsman is the state institution that receives the largest vote of confidence of all the State institutions, coming in second place after the Catholic Church. The institution undoubtedly owes this result to its performance and to the publicity it has given to its activities from the moment it was created.

The public association of the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman with institutions such as the Permanent Assembly on Human Rights and the Catholic Church, its conciliatory intervention in national level conflicts and its intense campaign to publicize its work and to defend citizens' human rights, on one hand, and its rapid decentralization and establishment in the various departments and regions of the country have resulted in a high level of trust placed in the institution by the Bolivian people.

In the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, the fact that it is a new institution does not seem to contribute toward a positive note in respondents' evaluations of the institution. This result may be affected by respondents' lack of knowledge of its function and responsibilities, since around 11 percent of the respondents did not answer the question related to the institution and we may safely assume that they did not do so mainly due to a lack of information about it.

It seems that Bolivians have lower levels of trust in the courts in general. As Figure V.10 shows, neither the courts or tribunals nor the officials related to those institutions come close to the mean level of trust in all Bolivian institutions. However, the relative levels of trust in these institutions do not vary greatly, perhaps because they are considered by citizens more as a unit than as separate institutions.

Even so, the low level of trust that respondents place in the Supreme Court of Justice should draw special attention since it is the highest institution, which guarantees the processes of the administration of justice in the country. These results should also emphasize the need to probe further the causes of the lack of trust and to study in greater depth the reasons for such a low level of trust in the system of justice overall.

Without a doubt, a part of this lack of trust may be caused by the lack of efficiency of these institutions in administering justice and by the excessive bureaucracy and long duration of the judicial processes, which, while improved in large part with the Penal Procedural Code, have not been eliminated from the practices of the system. It may also be that this reform has generated high expectations, which the judicial system so far has been unable to fulfill, and that there exists a perception among citizens, strengthened by the wide coverage given in the last two years to the corruption scandals in the system, that corruption within the judicial system has not been significantly reduced.

Finally, the civil branch of the judicial system has still not been reformed and continues to be highly inefficient and corrupt, and perhaps the perception of corruption and inefficiency in this branch of the system may have spread to all the branches.


4. Local Institutions

The institutions included in this category are the Prefecture, the Municipal Government and the Vigilance Committee. The importance of separately analyzing each state institution at the local levels is based on the assumption that because these institutions carry out their functions in smaller, local political spaces, they develop a different type of relationship with citizens.

In the 2002 LAPOP study on political culture in Bolivia, it was observed that there is a difference between citizens' perceptions of local institutions and national institutions, and that this difference in perceptions has an impact on the levels of system support expressed by citizens.

The results of the evaluation of local level institutions are as follows:

Figure V. 11. Level of Trust in Local Institutions



In the results presented in Figure V.11 one can clearly see that though only trust in Municipal Government surpasses the mean for all the institutions in Bolivia, neither the Prefecture nor the Vigilance Committees have especially low scores, giving the general impression that local level institutions inspire greater trust among Bolivian citizens than, for example, the institutions of the judiciary.

It is interesting to note that the citizens seem to have less trust in the Vigilance Committees than in the Municipal Government itself, with a statistically significant difference of 6 points on the scale of trust in institutions. Once more, this difference may be due to the perception and direct experience with the acts of corruption linked to the Vigilance Committees to a larger extent than to Municipal Governments. This is especially interesting if one considers that, by law, the Vigilance Committees should be directed by civil society representatives elected from among the leaders of the Territorial Base Organizations.


The fact that this is a new institution, aimed, among other things, at preventing acts of corruption by municipal government officials does not seem to have a large impact on the citizens' evaluation of this institution.

From these results, we can restate that in general terms, local institutions seem to inspire greater trust than do national institutions. To explore this possibility in greater detail, we examined the data from an additional variable, which provides information about the degree of trust citizens have in the institutions as reflected in their willingness to give them greater responsibilities and more money. The respondents were asked the following question:

LGL2M. In your opinion, should more responsibilities and money be given to the mayor's office, the prefecture, or to the central government?

The results are presented in the following figure:

Figure V. 12. Institution That Should Be Given More Responsibilities



The results presented in this figure clearly confirm that 60 percent of the respondents prefer to give more responsibilities and more money to mayors' offices, while only 13 percent would opt for the central government and only 10 percent the prefectures. Though the respondents do not directly express greater trust in mayors' offices compared to prefectures or the central government, the fact that more than half prefer to give more money and responsibilities to the mayors' offices can easily be associated with the level of trust placed in these institutions.

If we look from the opposing perspective, this could also mean that respondents place less trust in the prefectures and the central government than in the mayors' office, even though they do not fully trust the latter.

The most significant aspect of this figure is the fact that a very low percentage of the population is inclined to give more responsibilities and resources to the prefectures, especially at a moment in which the demands for regional autonomy are giving cause to reconsider the role of the prefectures in the future. The percentage of the population that would opt for giving more responsibilities to the prefectures is even smaller than the percentage that would prefer to not give resources to any of the institutions.

Perhaps the low predisposition to giving more responsibilities to the prefectures is because historically their role has not been outstanding and their performance has not been efficient. Prefectures have been seen by many as highly bureaucratic institutions, consumers of scarce resources, and as dens of nepotism. Apparently, decentralization has not succeeded in strengthening these institutions in such a way that citizens think of them as more efficient or useful, but it has contributed towards modernizing them and even making them more visible in the public arena.⁶

With respect to trust in local institutions, the data once again confirm that it is municipal governments that receive the largest vote of support from Bolivians, and that while the mean level of trust in the institution surpasses the national mean only by a slim margin, the score of 47 points on the scale is significant in a context in which the overall level of trust in institutions is rather low and very few institutions manage to cross the mid-point of the scale.

5. Civil Institutions

The institutions included in this category are the Catholic Church, journalists, unions, the indigenous authorities, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These institutions have the distinctive characteristic of not depending on the State to exist or to function, although their existence is as important for the State and society as that of state institutions. Civil institutions are made up of citizens, or groups or associations of citizens, which perform specific functions within a community or region, or at the national level and which generally provide a space and a function that the State does not cover or is not expected to cover, as in the case of religion.


These institutions are deeply involved in the social and political dynamic of society; they form part of the institutional environment of the State and often have great influence on the stability or fragmentation of the political field and of the rules of the game in the country's political system.

⁶ This is particularly true for the prefectures of Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Tarija, which have become more visible and important in regional processes, at least in the past two years.

We cannot undertake a comparative analysis of old, reformed and new civil institutions because if there has been reform in these institutions, it has been carried out by each one independently; the information on the reforms is not always available, and the reforms respond not a logic or policy of civil sector reform but to the needs and development of each institution.

The figure below shows the levels of trust in all the civil institutions mentioned above.

Figure V. 13. Level of Trust in Civil Institutions



The mean levels of trust for the civil institutions shown in Figure V.13 are among the highest in the entire set of institutions examined in this chapter. All the institutions in this group, with the exception of unions, receive scores that are higher than the mean level of trust in all the institutions in Bolivia. Respondents clearly express greater trust in this category of civil institutions than in any other category of institutions in the country.

One inference from this information is that citizens tend to place greater trust in institutions that they consider relatively distant from the field of politics, or at least do not seem to have a direct connection to the political sphere. This assumption is supported by citizens' evaluation of unions. This is the only civil institution in the group that falls below the mean level of trust for all the institutions in Bolivia and it is the only one in the group that is directly related to politics and whose basic function is political.

It could be argued, however, that the indigenous authorities are also essentially a political institution. That is correct. But this institution restricts its field of manoeuvre to the indigenous communities in which it still exists. The indigenous authorities in some case may possess greater authority than the mayor, however, in most cases they do not compete with the mayor but exist in autonomous indigenous communities.

The level of trust in the Catholic Church is the highest among all the institutions in the country, the same as in almost all the countries covered by LAPOP. In spite of being an apolitical institution, in the past decade the Church has been increasing its participation as a mediator in the country's political events, above all in moments of conflict and crisis. It seems that citizens approve of this role of the Church, and place great confidence in the institution's capacity for mediation. The figure, however, does not explain to what extent respondents' religious affiliation influences their trust in the institution, given that 80.3 percent of the respondents identify themselves as Catholics, both practicing and non-practicing.⁷

Both NGOs and journalists receive high levels of support from respondents. In the case of journalists, the level of trust may be linked to the fact it is they who make different types of information more accessible and publicize the matters that should be public and the matters that at some times are sought to be kept outside the public realm. Journalists play a central role in a democratic political system because the publicity given to affairs of the State is vital to the proper functioning of a democracy. This implies a great responsibility for journalists because they are also responsible for the quality of the information they publish. From our data we can deduce that citizens not only value the role of journalists in society but also tend to have considerable faith in their performance.

Finally, the results for the level of trust in NGOs indicate that the Bolivian population understands the important of the role of these institutions, especially with respect to the provision of services and the coverage of areas of work the State fails to cover. In general, NGOs in Bolivia are considered organizations that "work with the people," and even though in many cases they have clearly defined political positions, it does not imply a negative evaluation for these institutions.

⁷ The group of respondents that identifies itself as Catholic may be divided in the following manner: 56 percent of the total sample identifies itself as "practicing Catholic" and 24.3 percent of the total sample identifies itself as "non-practicing Catholic," thus bringing the total percentage of Catholics to 80.3 percent of the sample.

6. Factors That Influence Trust in Institutions

Throughout this chapter, we have analyzed the differences in the levels of trust that Bolivian citizens place in different types of institutions. Trust in institutions, or the lack of it, cannot be determined by the arbitrary feelings or reasoning of the individual citizen. Rather, it tends to depend on the influence of factors such as a respondent's age, the region of residence, level of income and educational level.

We have therefore analyzed the levels of trust that Bolivians have in their institutions in terms of respondents' demographic, social and economic characteristics, in order to determine which of those factors has greater impact on level of trust.

We ran a linear regression model for each one of the categories of institutions analyzed in this chapter. To do this, we constructed a single index for all the institutions in each category, which we then used as a dependent variable. As independent variables we used gender, educational level, age, region and area (rural or urban) of residence, ethnic self-identification, and respondents' religious affiliation. We split the variable Age into 5 dummy variables, in order to examine in greater detail the variations in the dependent variable caused by the age factor.

The results of the regression for the category Institutions of the Executive are presented below, in Table 5.2. The statistically significant results are highlighted with bold lettering in the column on the right. Variables "ag 2" through "ag5" represent the age groups into which the sample was divided.

Table V. 2. Linear Regression Coefficients for “Institutions of the Executive”

		Coefficients ^a				
Model		Unstandardized		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	42.449	2.101		20.208	.000
	q1 Sex	-.923	.728	-.024	-1.269	.204
	q10 Family income	1.116	.320	.076	3.492	.000
	Urban Urban > 2,000	-.140	.877	-.003	-.159	.874
	East Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando	6.363	.869	.151	7.323	.000
	South Tarija, Chuquisaca, Potosi	2.658	.966	.056	2.753	.006
	Edr2 Education rec	-.180	.585	-.007	-.308	.758
	White etid=1	.246	.944	.005	.260	.795
	Indigenous etid=4,6	-1.534	1.050	-.029	-1.461	.144
	Catholic % Catholic	1.508	.928	.031	1.625	.104
	ag2 26-35	-4.992	.983	-.115	-5.079	.000
	ag3 36-45	-4.246	1.075	-.087	-3.948	.000
	ag4 46-55	-4.724	1.167	-.088	-4.049	.000
	ag5 55-88	-5.807	1.260	-.101	-4.608	.000

a. Dep Variable: execinstitution

As the above table shows, there are various factors that impact the levels of trust that Bolivians have in their institutions. The results were consistent for all the categories of institutions analyzed in this chapter, so the results for the category Institutions of the Executive may be generalized to all the other institutions. Therefore we present this table of regression results as an example of all the regression analyses done in this chapter.

The first factor that consistently and significantly affects respondents’ levels of trust is age, which is inversely related to trust in institutions. The data suggest that as their age rises, the level of trust respondents place in institutions falls. This result holds for all the groups and for all the institutions. The dummy variables for all of the five age groups are statistically significant predictors at the 95 percent confidence level.

The geographic region (West, South, East) in which respondents reside is also a factor that has great influence on the levels of trust in the institutions. We have already noted their impact on the level of trust in political parties in this chapter. The same pattern is found across the country. The inhabitants of the East place considerably greater trust in the institutions compared to the inhabitants of the South, and even more compared to the inhabitants of the West.

The area of residence is another factor that consistently affects citizens' levels of trust in their institutions. In urban areas, and large and medium sized cities the levels of trust in institutions are considerably lower than in compact or scattered rural areas. The only exception is in the case of the institutions of the Executive, whose levels of trust are not affected by the rural or urban factor. This may be due to a combination of factors such as the greater support for the Armed Forces in the rural areas, which contribute the larger proportion of recruits for military service. In addition, the police usually does not have confrontations or conflictive situations with the inhabitants of rural areas, but it does have them in urban areas. Further, President Mesa has high levels of support in both rural as well as urban areas and the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation is still not well known in rural areas.

Finally, the respondents' income level also affects their levels of trust in the institutions, with the single exception of civil institutions. In their case, as the income level rises, so does the level of trust expressed by respondents towards the institutions.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we have attempted to make an overall examination of the situation of political institutions in Bolivia with respect to the level of trust they inspire in Bolivians. We have grouped these institutions into 5 categories according to the sector in which they carry out their core functions. We have also probed whether the fact that an institution is old, reformed or new has any influence on the level of trust that citizens have in it.

The results of our examination of the data do not offer any evidence that the fact that an institution is new, reformed or old has an impact on the levels of citizens' trust in institutions. Though there may be a difference between old and new institutions in some categories, we did not note any pattern of this type across all the categories of institutions.

The overall mean level of trust in all the institutions is 43.75 on a scale from 0 to 100. The fact that the mean score does not even reach the 50 point on the trust scale is a clear indicator that the level of trust in the institutions in Bolivia tends to be low rather than high, although it does not fall to drastically low levels. In comparison to other Latin American countries, Bolivia has a rather low level of trust in its institutions, similar to the cases of Ecuador, Panama and Nicaragua.

The institution that inspires the greatest trust is the Catholic Church and the one that inspires the least, political parties. The range of difference in the scores of these two institutions is 44 points on the scale.

In terms of categories, we find that civil institutions are the ones in which citizens have the greatest trust, because virtually all of them surpass the national mean score for all the institutions. The category with the lowest levels of trust is the Executive in spite of a high level of trust in the president. Among the institutions of representation the levels of trust in Congress and in political parties are very low. In contrast, although the institutions of the Judiciary do not

have very low levels of trust, they consistently fall below the mean for all of the country's institutions, with the exception of the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman.

Regarding the factors that cause variations in the levels of trust in the institutions, we found that the most important ones are age, income level, geographic region and respondents' area of residence.

Chapter VI: Local Governments 10 Years Later

As we mentioned in the preceding chapter, in the past decade Bolivia has been at the forefront of Latin American countries with respect to institutional reforms to modernize the State. Probably one of the principal reforms of Bolivian institutions and one of the most significant ones has been the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP), which led to the reconstruction of the geopolitical map of Bolivia, initially creating 314 municipalities as the community based political unit in local areas.

The year 2004 marked the anniversary of the first decade of the implementation of the LPP and the tenth anniversary of the municipalities and Municipal Governments in Bolivia. Many things changed in those 10 years: more municipalities were created; municipal associations were created and strengthened; some municipal processes were modified; Municipal Governments were given greater administrative responsibilities; corruption scandals arose in relation to Municipal Governments and Vigilance Committees, and the effectiveness of Municipal Governments and the utility of the LPP was questioned.

What is certain is that 10 years later, the dynamic of Bolivian politics absorbed the municipalities into its structure to the point that they are now considered a “natural” part of the political system and are already on the verge of no longer being considered a reform or an innovation.

In this chapter, we will analyze the performance of the Municipal Governments and of politics in municipal areas in the period 1998-2004, as a way of assessing local level politics since their creation in 1994. The LAPOP surveys provide data on Bolivian politics only from 1998, so the period of the first four years of the implementation of the LPP cannot be evaluated with those data.

Despite the lack of data for the initial period of the implementation of the LPP, the analysis of the performance of local level politics using the LAPOP data has two advantages: first, they are data on respondents’ perceptions of the performance of Municipal Governments and other municipal institutions. The availability of data on individual perceptions provide details that other types of data cannot provide, therefore our analysis complements those done by other institutions.

Second, in order to evaluate perceptions of the performance of a new institution or process, it is necessary to take into account an initial period of implementation of the new policy, in which perceptions of the institution’s performance may still be inchoate. Instead, they may be formed on the basis of other factors such as support or opposition to the new measure. Therefore, the fact that our data are available only from 1998 does not affect the assessment as much as one would think since it they began at a moment in which the institution had been functioning for a sufficient period of time to become familiar to respondents and to be evaluated.

In previous reports it was noted that citizens’ levels of participation in activities of the Municipal Governments and of other municipal institutions had still not presented a clear pattern.

The 2000 report recorded a drop in the levels of participation compared to those in 1998, but in 2002 a rise was noted in the levels of participation compared to those in 2000.

The level of participation in municipal activities has traditionally been measured by attendance at meetings called by the Mayor's Office or by the municipal council, through the following question:

NP1. Now we are going to talk about the Mayor's Office in this municipality. Have you had the opportunity to attend a municipal session or any other meeting called by the Mayor's office or the municipal council in the past 12 months?


In this report, the level of participation is measured through a combination of two variables, that of the question above and second complementary one from a series of questions about the level of participation in meetings of organizations that function especially in local and community spheres.

Now I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings frequently, from time to time, rarely, or if you never attend.

<i>Do you attend the meetings of.....</i>
<i>CP6. A church or temple committee or group?</i>
<i>CP7. A parents' association at school?</i>
<i>CP8. A committee for improvements in the community?</i>
<i>CP9. An association of professionals, traders, farmers or producers?</i>
<i>CP13. Neighborhood committees?</i>
<i>CP14. Territorial Base Organizations (TBO's)?</i>
<i>CP15. Meetings of a political party?</i>

The figure below shows citizens' levels of participation in the activities of Municipal Governments between 2003 and 2004.

Figure VI. 1. Level of Participation in Municipal Meetings in the Past 12 Months



Attendance at municipal meetings and sessions is one of the most important ways in which citizens can participate in and influence the decisions made by the local authorities on matters of interest to the community. For many years, the municipal meetings in Latin American countries were closed to the public, but now it is required by the law of participation that these meetings be open and that they allow the participation of any citizen or member of the community.

The objective of these measures is to attract citizens to the public arena and make them active political actors, both in local areas and in other larger ones. The expectation is that an active citizen should be a citizen who is more involved in political processes, more responsible, and more beneficial to the community at large. In addition, it is hoped that greater participation will also generate higher levels of satisfaction with the services and performance of the Municipal Governments and of the institutions of the State in general.

As Figure VI.1 clearly shows, the level of citizen participation in municipal meetings in the period 2003 – 2004 was very low: only 16 percent of the respondents claimed to have

participated in a meeting in that period. Figure VI.2, below, shows the levels of participation in municipal meetings during the period 1998 – 2004.

**Figure VI. 2. Levels of Participation in Municipal Meetings
Comparative Temporal Perspective, 1998 – 2004**





Figure VI.2 clearly shows that in the last four samples between 1998 and 2004, there was no clear pattern of levels of participation in municipal meetings. On the contrary, the levels of participation rose and fell in all the samples available since 1998. In none of the cases did the levels of participation cover even 20 percent of the respondents.

However, the levels of participation in municipal areas in Bolivia are considerably higher if they are compared to those in the other countries covered by LAPOP, as the figure below shows. The data for all the countries are from the 2004 sample.

Figure VI. 3. Levels of Participation in Municipal Meetings
Comparisons with Other Latin American Countries




As we can see in the above figure, the levels of participation in municipal meetings in Bolivia are among the highest in Latin America, even though the level of participation in 2004 is among the lowest recorded in Bolivia. The level of participation in Bolivia exceeds that in countries such as Costa Rica and Mexico, which have democratic systems that are more stable than the Bolivian system, and which also surpass Bolivia in terms of citizens' support for the system and their trust in institutions.

This finding is important because it shows that even in a context of low support for and trust in institutions, citizens consider it important to take part in municipal activities and continue to do so at relatively high levels compared to other countries in the region.

Another very important aspect of participation in local government and of citizens' possibilities of participating directly in the making of decisions that affect their most immediate

political contexts are the meetings for formulating the Annual Operation Plans (AOP), in which the areas of investment and the distribution of resources are decided for each municipality. Therefore, we also asked respondents if they attended those planning meetings. The results are presented in the figure that follows.

**Figure VI. 4. Participation in Meetings for Planning the AOP
Temporal Perspective, 1998 – 2004**




The data on participation in the planning of the AOP follow the same pattern as those for participation in municipal meetings. They do not show a stable pattern, but fluctuate in a manner similar to the participation in municipal meetings. The levels of participation in meetings for planning the AOP are slightly lower than those of participation in municipal meetings in general, and at no point did they reach 15 percent of the population participating in those meetings.

The LPP requires and permits representatives of citizens' organization and associations of all types to participate in these meetings, but the political, economic and social context may be

creating obstacles to people's participation in the meetings. Some of those obstacles will be analyzed in detail later in this chapter.

Finally, another area of participation of great importance for citizens and for the implementation of the LPP are the Vigilance Committees. According to the law and the functions of the Committees, one would expect higher levels of citizens' participation in this area since it is of interest to citizens to have access to the information that the Committees can provide, or to demand through the Committees important information regarding the activities of the Municipal Governments. The Vigilance Committee allows citizens to supervise and even to penalize the activities and financial movements of the Municipal Governments and to control, to an extent, the levels of corruption in the Municipal Governments. The figure below reflects the levels of participation by Bolivians in the Vigilance Committees. Those levels are measured by the number of complaints presented to the Vigilance Committees by citizens, as this is considered the most frequent type of interaction between citizens and the Committees.

Figure VI. 5. Levels of Participation in Vigilance Committees
Temporal Perspective, 1998 – 2004




Once again, we can see that the levels of participation in Vigilance Committees do not form a pattern, but fluctuate in a manner similar to that of attendance at municipal meetings and at planning meetings of the AOP. In this case, the levels of participation are lower than those of participation in municipal meetings in general, but they are similar to the levels of participation in the meetings for planning the AOP.

In order to understand better the factors that influence citizens' participation in municipal activities, we did logistic regressions, which measure the influence of various factors on the variables of participation. In the regressions, we found that there are three factors that always impact the variables of participation in municipal activities: gender, age and area of residence (whether urban or rural).

In this analysis we need to distinguish participation in municipal meetings in general from participation in the planning of the AOP. According to the regression results for each of these variables, only gender, age and area of residence act as limiting factors for participation in municipal meetings, while for participation in the planning of the AOP, the limiting factors are more, and include educational level, ethnic identification and the geographic region of the country.

Gender is restrictive in the sense that women have lower levels of participation than men. This could be due to a culture that still privileges masculine participation in the public arena in general. In the case of age, older persons tend to participate less than younger ones, and, regarding the area of residence, participation in rural areas is greater than participation in urban areas, as the following figure indicates:


Figure VI. 6. Participation in the Planning of the AOP by Area of Residence



The difference in the levels of participation between urban areas and rural areas may be influenced by the larger size of the population in urban areas, and the possibly greater availability of time and sense of belonging to the community in rural areas.

Figure VI.7, below, illustrates the differences in the levels of participation in the planning of the AOP by geographic area of the country.


Figure VI. 7. Participation in Planning the A.O.P., by Geographic Region



In the above figure, we can see a clear difference in the levels of participation in the different regions of the country. Participation in the planning of the AOP in the South is twice as high as the level of participation in the East. This is surprising because the levels of system support and trust in institutions (analyzed in previous chapters) tend to be higher in the eastern region of the country and give reasons to expect higher levels of participation in the political processes in this region.

Citizens' participation in local activities can also be measured through participation in social organizations other than the government organizations created through the Law of Popular Participation. This measure allows us to see if the levels of participation in the local arena are generally low or if they are low only for the institutions linked to the LPP.

Figure VI. 8. Levels of Participation in Local Organizations




As Figure VI.8 clearly shows, the levels of participation in institutions other than those linked to Municipal Governments are considerably higher than those that are. Only the levels of participation in meetings of the TBOs and political parties are similar to those of participation in municipal meetings or in planning the AOP, but even these surpass the mean levels for the municipal activities.

What do these results tell us? Basically, that citizens are probably more interested in devoting time to and participating in organizations and associations that address their specific interests and which probably bring them more visible and immediate benefits than do municipal institutions. In these organizations we also found limiting factors, mainly gender, which accounts

for the lower participation of women in these organizations compared to men, with the exception of their participation in the activities of the church and of parents' associations, linked to schools.

Figure VI. 9. Levels of Participation in Local Organizations, by Gender




Note: This figure includes the overall mean for participation in all the institutions, which is 32.25 points on a participation scale from 0 to 100. The overall mean level is represented by the horizontal black line that runs across the figure.

We have examined citizens' behavior related to their participation in municipal institutions and other institutions in the local arena. Now we will analyze the levels of citizens' satisfaction with the services they received from municipal institutions.

The LAPOP survey includes a series of questions that measure satisfaction with municipal services. First, we asked a general question in which we asked respondents to classify the services in terms of quality: excellent, good, average, bad or very bad.

**Figure VI. 10. Satisfaction with Municipal Services
Temporal Perspective, 1998 – 2004**




We saw in Chapter 5 that the level of trust manifested by respondents toward the Municipal Government exceeded 47 points on a scale from 0 to 100, and that the general opinion was that it was the institution that should receive most resources and responsibilities, compared to the Prefecture and the central government. In this case, we see that the level of satisfaction with the services that the mayors' offices provide to local residents has remained the same

throughout the past six years and that it has not crossed the 50 point mark on the satisfaction scale in any of the rounds of surveys.

We also saw that the highest level of satisfaction with the services provided to citizens by Municipal Governments was recorded in 1998, and that a process of decline seemed to have begun from that point. However, the 2004 data suggest that the decline has been reversed for the period, and that, although it does not reach the 1998 levels, there is clearly an improvement within the range of this institution.

However, if we compare the levels of satisfaction with municipal services in Bolivia with those in other Latin American countries, we find the following:

Figure VI. 11. Mean Level of Satisfaction with the Quality of Municipal Services Comparison with Other Latin American Countries



As Figure VI. 11 clearly shows, the levels of satisfaction with the quality of municipal services in Bolivia are the lowest in Latin America. This result may be surprising and seem contradictory if one considers that the level of participation in municipal institutions in Bolivia is among the highest in the region and that one would expect higher levels of satisfaction from high levels of participation. What factors could be responsible for this apparently contradictory result?

One of the answers could be that citizens feel that the Municipal Governments are not responding to the demands of the community. We examine this hypothesis below.

Figure VI. 12. Institutions That Best Respond to the Demands of the Community




Figure VI.12 clearly contradicts the preceding hypothesis. Even though the evaluation of the services provided to citizens by the mayor's offices does not cross the mid-point (50) of the satisfaction scale, most respondents continue to think that this is the institution that best responds to the needs of the community.


Even when most citizens consider that the institution that best responds to the needs of the community is the Municipal Government, there are few citizens who effectively request its services, and of those, few who are satisfied with the services received. In order to analyze respondents' relationship with Municipal Governments and their level of satisfaction with the services received, they were asked to answer the following questions:

NP2. Have you requested any help or presented a petition to a public office, employee, or councilor in the Mayor's Office in the past 12 months?

NP2A. If the respondent requested any type of help => Were you satisfied with their response?

The responses to the questions indicate that 2004 was historically the year with the fewest requests for services from the public offices linked to the Municipal Government. This finding is more significant considering that the year with the highest number of requests for services from Municipal Governments was 2002. This means that something happened between 2002 and 2004 at the local level that caused a large drop in the citizens' interest in obtaining public services from the Mayor's Office.


Figure VI. 13. Mean Number of Requests for Services from Public Agencies
Temporal Perspective, 1998 – 2004



In 2004, only 15 percent of the respondents indicated having requested a service from a public office, employee or councilor in the Mayor's Office in the preceding year. The mean for 2004 is the lowest for the period 1998 – 2004, indicating a clear decline in citizens' interest in obtaining services from municipal institutions, which is even more important when compared to the mean for 2002, which was the highest for the period.

Of the 15 percent of citizens who presented a demand for service to municipal institutions between 2003 and 2005, only a third were satisfied with the service received and more than half were dissatisfied, as the figure below shows.


Figure VI. 14. Level of Satisfaction with the Municipal Response, of Those Who Presented a Demand to the Municipality



In the figure above we analyze the level of satisfaction with the municipal response only for the group of persons who presented a demand to municipal institutions between 2003 and 2004. Those who responded "yes" were satisfied with the service received; those who responded

“no” were dissatisfied with the service received, and the rest represents the persons who presented a demand and still had not received a response by the time the survey was done.

**Figure VI. 15. Satisfaction with the Municipal Response
Comparative Perspective 1998 – 2004**



If we examine the level of satisfaction with services received from the Municipal Governments from a temporal perspective, as shown in Figure VI.15, we see that in 2004 the level of satisfaction with the services received has risen in comparison to the levels in 2000 and 2002, and that the level of dissatisfaction has decreased in comparison to both samples.

On the basis of this information we can conclude that even though the levels of participation in municipal politics are high in Bolivia compared to those in other Latin American countries, the levels of satisfaction with the services received are very low. The level of demand for municipal services is also low, although the levels of satisfaction with the services received among those citizens who presented demands rose in the 2004 sample.


Two assumptions can explain the decrease in the demand for municipal services if we leave aside the level of satisfaction with the services received. On one hand, the perception of corruption in the country in general, and in particular within municipal institutions, may affect demand for services. To test this assumption we asked respondents the following question:

EXC7. Considering your experience or what you have heard, is corruption among public employees very widespread, widespread, not widespread or not at all widespread?

The perception of corruption among public employees is measured on a scale from 0 to 100, in which 1 means that corruption is not at all widespread and 100 means that corruption is very widespread.

The level of perception of corruption among public employees has always been high in Bolivia. The annual averages for all the surveys analyzed here vary between 60 and 70 points on the scale, but in the 1998 – 2004 period, the perception of corruption was clearly on the rise, as the figure below indicates.

Figure VI. 16. Perception of Corruption among Public Employees
Temporal Perspective 1998 – 2004




It may be the case, then, that corruption among public employees in municipal institutions is one of the main reasons why the demand for services fell in 2004. To clarify this point, we asked respondents the following question:

EXC7B. And would you say that corruption among public employees is greatest in the central government, the prefecture, or in the municipality?

The results are presented in the figure below.

Figure VI. 17. Perception of Corruption among Public Employees, by Type of Institution



As we can see in Figure V.17, only 22 percent of the respondents think that corruption among public employees is greater in the municipalities than in other public institutions in Bolivia.

What, then, might be the causes for the low levels of demand for municipal services? Even though the widespread perception is that levels of corruption among public employees are high and have been increasing constantly since 1998 to reach their maximum level in 2004, only a small section of the population thinks that corruption is concentrated in municipal institutions. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that corruption by public officials is the main reason for the contradiction between the levels of participation and levels of satisfaction with public services.

On the other hand, a second assumption leads us to think that in spite of a period of implementation of 10 years, municipal level politics may still be considered a new phenomenon, and the expectations generated by its newness are much greater than the actual capacity of municipal institutions to respond to citizens' demands.

In many cases, the municipal institutions' actual response capacity is decreased by the scarcity of human and financial resources in those institutions, which is caused, in turn, by the country's macroeconomic situation and not by lack of political will or the inefficiency of the institutions. If this is the case, citizens' frustration with the services provided will be alleviated only by improving the poor national macroeconomic situation.

Conclusions

The most likely reason is that 10 years after their creation, municipal institutions are still in a period of adaptation, and are improving and strengthening the political processes at the local level.

Levels of political participation have undoubtedly risen notably in Bolivia in the past decade thanks to the existence of municipal institutions and to the strengthening of local level politics, bringing the State closer to citizens in regions and areas in which the State had been hitherto absent.

However, the existence of factors that restrict citizens' participation in meetings and activities of Municipal Governments, even when those factors are not a direct result of state policy, can cause frustration with the political system and reduce the demand for municipal services together with the satisfaction with municipal services.

Two factors that have a negative impact on the evaluation of municipal services and a positive impact on the evaluation of the performance of municipal institutions are the widespread perception of high levels of corruption among public employees and the low response capacity of municipal institutions to citizens' demands and expectations. Both factors have important implications for future state policies.

Chapter VII: Political Tolerance in Bolivia

1. The Concept of Tolerance¹

Tolerance is one of the fundamental values of modern societies. Tolerance makes us respect the rights of others to express their opinions and to participate in the life of the community, even when we believe that their points of view are mistaken. Tolerance may be understood as a set of values that fosters respect for that with which we disagree; respect for what we do not like, and for that which is different.

The value of tolerance exists in different spheres of social life, and that is a characteristic of modernity. In the religious sphere (from which the concept also originates), one accepts the religious faith of another, however different it may be from one's own, and even if it goes against one's religious principles. In most cities of the modern world, one accepts living with persons who have different interests and view points, and different cultural values that may come in conflict with ours, but in general we do not do anything to impose our own rationality on others; that is a form of tolerance that is expressed in social life.

The identity of a person is also relevant when we speak of tolerance, not because we consciously clash with the identity of the other, but because this element can become a distinguishing factor among social groups. Intolerance toward persons with an identity different from our own arises from ignorance of the customs, visions and interests of other groups and from a fear of difference.² An example of tolerance at this level of identities is to send one's children to schools where there are people of other races or from cultures other than one's own.

In the sphere of politics, tolerance refers to not interfering in the participation of other persons, whose interests and ideologies are contrary to our own, in the discussions and decision-making regarding the country or the community. Political tolerance is one of the central values of modern democracies, together with the idea of political community (Wolff 1965); without tolerance of diversity one cannot think of democracy.³ Since this study deals with the political culture of Bolivians, this chapter focuses on the political sphere of tolerance, although it also mentions other areas in which the concept is applied. Readers interested in tolerance as a social value in the country should consult the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2004) and the recent study of political culture in Bolivia conducted by the National Electoral Court which addresses the concept of tolerance not only in the political sphere but also in the social (Corte Nacional Electoral de Bolivia 2004).

Tolerance does not have an unbounded character in any of these areas. Not everything can be tolerated; there are limits between what can and cannot be accepted as a legitimate

¹ This chapter draws on some of the results from the research project, *Educación y tolerancia en Bolivia*, funded by USAID and conducted by LAPOP.

² On the subject of tolerance and identity see, among others, Adorno *et al.* (1950); Salmerón (1998); Ignatieff (1999); Galeotti (2002), and Creppell (2003).

³ The importance of tolerance in modern democracies has been underscored by authors such as Dahl (1956) and Schumpeter (1975 [1950]).

difference⁴; the existence of crime, a type of action that is both disapproved and censured at the same time, is the clearest expression of the illegitimate nature of some human actions, which cannot be tolerated. The boundaries between what should and should not be tolerated are not universal, and should be defined by each society in accordance with its own scale of values (MacIntyre 1999).

2. Political Tolerance in Bolivia

One of the indicators developed by LAPOP for measuring different aspects of political culture in Latin America is a measure of tolerance consisting of an index constructed from four questions in the survey questionnaire. The index is based on disapproval of persons who permanently manifest their disagreement with the country's political system. The questions are as follows:

D1. There are persons who only speak badly of Bolivian governments, not only of the current government but also of the Bolivian system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the right to vote of such persons?

D2. Still thinking of those persons who only speak badly of the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such persons being able to carry out peaceful demonstrations in order to express their points of view?

D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of persons who only speak badly of the Bolivian system of government being allowed to run for public office?

D4. Still thinking of those persons who only speak badly of the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of their making speeches on television?


Each of these questions had a scale of response options from 1 to 10, where 1 means "Strongly disapprove" and 10 means "Strongly approve." The resulting index was recoded into a scale from 0 to 100 for easier comprehension.⁵

Figure VII.1 shows the national means for the four components of the index.

⁴ On this subject, in addition to Schumpeter, see MacIntyre (1999), Forst (2003) and McKinnon and Castiglione 2003.

⁵ Cronbach's Alpha is a statistic that is used to determine if the components of an index are sufficiently compatible to be aggregated. The value of this statistic for our index is 0.842 out of a maximum possible of 1. This suggests that the components of the index are sufficiently compatible for use in a single indicator.

Figure VII. 1. National Means for the Variables of Tolerance




At the national level, the mean value of none of the index items crosses the midpoint of the scale (50 points), which suggests that there is low acceptance of the activities the items measure. The right to vote and the right to peaceful demonstration receive slightly greater approval than the right to use a broadcast medium to make a speech and the right to run for public office (recall that we are speaking of persons who are against the Bolivian political system). The fifth bar shows the index of tolerance, which is simply an average of the other four variables.⁶

⁶ In the case in which a person did not respond to one of the four questions, a mean calculated by the usual method would generate the loss of one case, that is, the case would be excluded from the analysis. To avoid the “loss” of cases for which the responses to one or a maximum of two questions from the 4 variables in the series were missing, the method used imputes the mean values of the other questions to the missing response; however, if fewer than 2 responses in the series are valid, the case is dropped from the analysis. This procedure for imputing values of

The levels of political tolerance do not seem to have risen in the country between 1998 and 2004, at least not in a way that can be measured by this instrument. Figure VII.2, below, shows that the mean level of tolerance of Bolivians has been relatively stable at the four points of measurement by LAPOP.

Figure VII. 2. Evolution of Political Tolerance in Bolivia, 1998-2004




The levels of tolerance of Bolivian political elites are higher than those of the general public. When data from the 2004 survey are compared to those of another survey of almost all the members of parliament and hundreds of judges in the country conducted by LAPOP in

missing cases is considered valid in the quantitative social sciences, and the high value of the Alpha coefficient for the index (see the preceding note) indicates that this a reliable procedure.

2003,⁷ the political elites have higher levels of tolerance than the general public on all components of the index. The differences are most notable in regard to the right to vote and smallest with respect to the right to make public speeches of those who permanently manifest their rejection of the Bolivian political system. The comparison between the means for elites and for the general public are shown in Figure VII.3 below.


Figure VII. 3. National Means for the Variables of Tolerance, Elites vs. the Public



The results of the tolerance indicators for the Bolivian public are low. How low are these results? One way of determining if the approval of these rights is really low in the country is to compare the results to those from other countries in the region. Figure VII.4 shows the level of political tolerance among Bolivians compared to other countries in Latin America.

⁷The results of the study were published by USAID in Bolivia. Readers interested in the attitudes of Bolivian political elites should consult Ames *et al.* (2004).

Figure VII. 4. Political Tolerance, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective



It is clear that Bolivians' level of tolerance overall is notably low in comparison to other Latin American countries. The difference with the country that has the highest results, Panama, is more than 20 points. And while the difference with other low tolerance countries (Guatemala and Ecuador) is smaller, it is still statistically significant, as the error bars or confidence intervals at the top of each column indicate (the "T" for Bolivia does not overlap those of the columns to the left, which shows that the differences are very reliable in statistical terms).


Education and Political Tolerance

There are various factors that influence people's tolerance levels. The scholarly literature suggests that, apart from the characteristics of the political culture and general context of each

country, the most important factors are people's ages (the older the persons, the less tolerant they tend to be), and the education they receive.⁸

Education has proved to be a factor that significantly increases the level of political tolerance among persons; data on Latin America from LAPOP support this hypothesis. However, as we can see in Figure VII.5, this does not happen in Bolivia: the educational system in Bolivia does not succeed in raising the level of tolerance among citizens, at least when the measure described above is used.

Figure VII. 5. Relationship between Political Tolerance and Education



What factors can explain why education does not contribute to raising the level of political tolerance among Bolivians? The most important factor seems to be the lack of a

⁸ On this topic, see the studies by Dynes (1967), Mueller (1988), Bobo and Licari (1989), and Gibson (1992).

program of basic curricular content aimed at promoting democratic values in students in the Bolivian educational system. The failure to implement the Educational Reform at the secondary school level has resulted in gaps in the definition of curricular content for social science subjects. At the same time, the State does not seem to have clear mechanisms to impose a uniform curricular content (which does not even exist) on all the schools. This discretionary power to tailor curricular content regarding democratic education creates wide variation in curricula across schools, thereby distorting the expected relationship between the two variables. In some schools, both private and public, there seem to be some teachers and educational establishments keen on promoting students' civic education, but in many others that is not a priority.

However, it is necessary to note that not all the positive impact of education on political tolerance can be attributed to the formal transmission of values through the educational process in subjects such as the social sciences or civic education. The very experience of attending school, and mixing with students and teachers of different origins and opinions should have a positive effect on the degree of broad-mindedness of individuals, of which political tolerance is only one aspect. Apparently, the Bolivian educational system is not contributing toward raising the level of tolerance via these other causal mechanisms either.

It is important to point out another factor that could account for the absence of a positive impact of education on political tolerance for those who disagree with the political system: the high degree of intransigence and the radical posture that teachers, in particular the leaders of the teachers' association, have displayed. The leaders have resorted to pressure and protest tactics that clearly violate the rights conferred by the Political Constitution of the State (the kidnapping of the Deputy Minister of Education by the leaders of the teachers' association, and their refusal to attend the National Education Congress are signs of their anti-democratic attitudes). The lack of desire for constructive dialogue among these leaders may be having a negative impact both on the formal and informal transmission of democratic values through the educational process.

Finally, we also need to mention as a possible cause of this distorted relationship between education and tolerance the error associated with the measure of education discussed earlier in this report. However, as other sections of this report show, education is indeed related as hypothesized to the other variables studied, which weakens this argument considerably.

Tolerance and Public Protest

The questions in the series on tolerance refer to persons who are permanently opposed to the Bolivian political system. One hypothesis for explaining Bolivia's low level of tolerance relative to that of other countries in the region suggests that intolerance is related to excessive use of the right to protest as part of the political culture. In other words, it is possible that this intolerance stems from people's saturation or fatigue from the public demonstrations organized by those who oppose the Bolivian system of government in general.

Figure VII. 6. Tolerance and the Proportion of Persons Who Participate in Protests, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective





Figure VII.6 shows that not only is Bolivians' political tolerance different from that of the other countries in the region, but the proportion of persons who state having participated at least once in a public protest is also greater in that country. (Chapter IV of this report discusses the subject of social protests in greater detail.) Of the 10 countries between which we draw comparisons in this report, Bolivia is not only the least tolerant toward those who are opposed to the system of government, it is also the country in which most persons state having participated in a public protest. Though the relationship between tolerance and the number of persons that protest does not seem to be constant in all the countries, when the mean for Bolivia is compared to that of the other nations, the difference speaks for itself.

Tolerance, Age and Gender

Age and gender are two other factors that impact political tolerance. The specialist literature suggests that women tend to be slightly less tolerant than men (Golebiowska 1999), while older persons tend to be less tolerant than younger ones. These tendencies already had been reported in Bolivia in the LAPOP study that compares the values and attitudes of congressional deputies and judges to those of the population at large (Ames *et al.* 2004). Figure VII.7 confirms these general tendencies in the 2004 Bolivian survey.

Figure VII. 7. Mean Tolerance, by Age and Gender




The dark line, which represents the mean tolerance for women, lies below the line representing men for all age groups, with the exception of those above 56 years. This indicates that, in general, women tend to be less tolerant than men in Bolivia. It is also clear that, in general, the mean levels of tolerance for men and women decline with age.

Tolerance and Ethnic Group

How is political tolerance related to individuals' identities? Is there any relationship between the level of tolerance and the ethnic groups with which people identify? The data from the 2004 survey suggest that there are notable differences in the tolerance levels of ethnic groups, although they are small in absolute terms. Figure VII.8, below, depicts the differences in the mean tolerance of those who identify with some indigenous group and those who do not.

Figure VII. 8. Mean Tolerance, by Ethnic Group




Using the question from the 2001 Census (see Chapter II of this report), those who identify with any of the listed indigenous groups are, on average, slightly more tolerant than those who do not identify with any indigenous group. The differences, though small, are statistically significant.

It is possible that the higher level of tolerance among those who feel a part of an indigenous group is linked to the stratification of Bolivian society by categories linked to ethnicity.⁹ It is logical that people who feel that the alternatives for participation through the institutions of the political system are limited in some way, and who feel greater sympathy for groups that manifest their disagreement with those institutions, show greater tolerance toward them. This hypothesis deserves more attention in future research.

⁹ On the ethnic stratification of Bolivian society see, among others, Rivera (1993) and Moreno (2001).

Are there differences in the mean tolerance of the different ethnic groups included in the question? Apparently so. Those who define themselves as Quechuas are less tolerant using this scale than those who identify with other ethnic categories, such as Aymara or Guarani. The differences are statistically significant, and they are not small in absolute terms. Figure VII.9, below, shows the differences in the mean tolerance of the different ethnic categories listed in the INE question.

Figure VII. 9. Mean Tolerance by Ethnic Group



3. Other Measures of Tolerance

Respect for Sexual Rights


Let's look now at the results of other measures of the concept of tolerance, which, as we saw earlier, has many dimensions. One of the dimensions is respect for people's sexual rights. Two questions on this topic were included in the 2004 questionnaire.

One of the questions asked respondents to indicate with which of the following options they agreed most:

NEWTOL5. 1) Homosexuals should have the right to organize and dress as they want or 2) homosexuals are bad role models for our children and therefore they should be controlled by the government.


In 2004, around a third of the respondents favored the first option. This indicates a 10 percentage point drop in the level of tolerance toward homosexuals compared to the previous measurement. The change in pattern is also noteworthy: between 1998 and 2000 and between 2000 and 2002 the proportion of responses indicating tolerance grew steadily, but in 2004 the proportion fell significantly. Figure VII.10 shows the proportion of tolerant responses to this question between 1998 and 2004.

Figure VII. 10. Percentage of Persons Supporting Homosexual Rights, 1998 - 2004



It is important to point out that this measure of tolerance yields the expected results when it is analyzed by educational level: more education results in greater tolerance Figure VII.11 displays the mean for this variable for each level of education.

Figure VII. 11. Proportion of Persons Supporting Homosexual Rights, by Educational Level




While the proportion of persons who acknowledge the rights of homosexuals constitutes a minority in the three groups (less than 50 percent chose the first option), the percentage that acknowledges this right is twice as large among those who received university or technical education compared to those who had only primary education.

In another question to measure this dimension of tolerance, respondents were asked to give their opinion on the same 1-10 scale used for the 4 main tolerance questions. The question was as follows:

D5. And now, changing the subject and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such persons being able to run for public office?

This question has a purely political content (it asks about the political participation of a minority), but it uses as reference group a sexual minority that is frequently the target of discrimination and intolerance in the country. The results were recoded into a scale from 0 to 100, and are shown below in Figure VII.12.

Figure VII. 12. Approval of Participation by Homosexuals in Politics, by Type of School




As the figure shows, education also has considerable impact on this variable, although the main effect seems to lie in the type of education a person receives. The mean level of support for the political participation rights of homosexuals is significantly higher among those who were educated in private schools than among those received a public school education. As one would expect, the mean tolerance of those who were educated in the two systems (who went to both public and private schools) lies between the means of the other two groups and is no different from them, as the overlapping “I”s of the confidence intervals indicate.

This finding, which is not altered when statistical controls are introduced, should draw close attention to the differences in the quality of the contents of public and private education in Bolivia. Those involved in formulating public policies on education in the country should consider the substantial differences in the quality of public education and private education with respect to civic values such as tolerance.

If we use this measure of tolerance, Bolivia leaves the last place in comparison with other Latin American countries, as Figure VII.13 shows. Political tolerance toward homosexuals, though low in the country in absolute terms (only 31 out of a possible 100 points on the scale), is higher than in some other Latin American countries. This shows that Bolivians are not intolerant in general, rather that intolerance is directed specifically at some political groups.

Figure VII. 13. Tolerance for Political Participation by Homosexuals, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective



Tolerance and Indigenous Peoples

Let us now consider some questions directed at measuring tolerance toward the country's indigenous groups. Two questions on this topic were included in the 2004 questionnaire, one measuring intolerance *toward* indigenous persons, the other measuring the intolerance *of* indigenous persons. The first juxtaposes two alternatives, one tapping tolerance toward indigenous persons and the other tapping intolerance toward them. It is worded as follows:

BTOL2. Some people say that it worries them that in the next national elections an indigenous citizen may be elected President of the Republic, while others say that a person's identity is not important in politics. With which of these options do you agree more?

As we understand it, the option that states that a person's identity should not matter in politics is more tolerant than the one which expresses concern about the possible election of an indigenous candidate as President of the Republic.


The other question on this topic is focused less directly on the political system and refers to access to the country's natural resources. The two alternatives that this question contrasts are different from those in the preceding question. The first of these taps what could be considered as intolerance among indigenous groups toward those who are not indigenous; the second alternative is broader and acknowledges the right of all Bolivians to benefit from the country's territory.

BTOL5. 1) The territory of Bolivia belongs to the country's indigenous people or ... 2) All Bolivians have equal right to own land.

The figure below shows the results of the two questions by region.¹⁰ The columns in the figure represent the percentage of tolerant responses to each question.

¹⁰ The regions included here are the East, which comprises the respondents in the departments of Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz; the West, which includes those who live in Cochabamba, Oruro and La Paz; and the South, which consists of Tarija, Chuquisaca and Potosí. Although this division of the country into "regions" is, as in any other case, relatively arbitrary, it is a methodological decision that allows us to group departments under a useful and logical criterion in terms of presentation.

Figure VII. 14. Tolerant Responses with Respect to Indigenous Peoples, by Region



The respondents in the East are more concerned than those in the West and South about the possibility of a citizen of indigenous descent being elected President of the Republic. This suggests that inhabitants of the East are significantly less tolerant than the citizens in the rest of the country. It is worth noting that the idea that “all Bolivians have a right to the country’s natural resources” is also less widely accepted in the East. That is, the proposition that “Bolivian territory belongs to the country’s indigenous peoples” was more widely accepted (16 percent) in the East than in the South (7 percent) and the West (4 percent). In both questions, the East appears less tolerant than the other regions.

Conclusions

Bolivians are more intolerant than the inhabitants of other countries of the region toward groups that permanently manifest their rejection of the country’s political system. However,

political tolerance rises when the reference group is a sexual minority. This suggests that intolerance is targeted at specific political actors; it is not a generalized phenomenon.

Education does not raise Bolivians' level of tolerance when we consider the rights of persons who are opposed to the Bolivian political system. However, education seems to raise the level of tolerance with respect to groups such as sexual minorities. Both the educational level and the type of school attended (public or private) have an impact on this dimension of tolerance.

Those who identify themselves as part of an indigenous group manifest greater tolerance toward citizens who permanently reject the country's political system than those who do not feel part of any such ethnic group. But there are important differences between the categories of ethnic groups that were used in the question, therefore one cannot assume that indigenous people have a specific attitude with respect to political tolerance in Bolivia.

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Chapter VIII: By Way of Conclusion: Challenges and Opportunities for Bolivian Democracy

The growing tensions that the Bolivian political system has been experiencing recently seem to arise from the confluence of two fundamental factors. First, the more or less widespread perception that the country's economic situation is not improving and does not seem to show any signs of improving under the existing political conditions fuels citizens' discontent with the State and with their form of government.¹ The second factor is a moment of political effervescence resulting from the process of deepening and broadening of the country's democracy, which creates a scenario in which the real participation, and the expectation of and desire for participation overwhelm the existing institutional channels.

This combination of discontent and active participation has two edges: on one hand, this historic moment represents an opportunity for Bolivian democracy, because it offers the potential of contributing to the deepening of democracy and the perfecting of the institutional mechanisms for participation and social representation in the country. On the other hand, the current circumstances reveal a scenario of crisis of political institutions, which till now have proved to be incapable of resolving the tensions in a satisfactory manner and with social legitimacy. The search for solutions in this scenario endangers the continuity of democracy in Bolivia.

This chapter analyzes Bolivians' perceptions of some topics that are relevant to the country's democratic stability, taking into account the critical reality and the fragility of the Bolivian political system, but also visualizing the opportunities offered by this juncture for deepening democracy in the country. It examines cross-temporal changes in important indicators of democratic stability in the country, such as support for a possible coup d'état or the preference for democracy over more authoritarian forms of government.

1. Preference for Democratic Government

The stability of democracy depends on a number of factors, such as the attitudes of elites and political leaders, the international context, the level of consolidation of existing institutions, and the opinions and attitudes of citizens. In this section we refer to different measures related to citizens' attitudes and opinions as a basis for democratic stability.

In a context of institutional weakness and crisis such as the one that Bolivia is currently experiencing, the measurement of the levels of system support and of preference for democracy among the Bolivian people has important implications for the design of policies for

¹ This does not mean to say that Bolivians' living conditions have not been improving in objective terms; rather, citizens are unhappy with the advances either because they do not benefit from them or because they feel that they are occurring very slowly (Laserna 2004b).

strengthening the legitimacy of the system and for more clearly identifying the possibilities and the needs of the democratic system in the immediate future.

High System Support and High Political Tolerance

In previous chapters we examined two factors, system support and tolerance, which together form our overall measure of support for stable democracy. Both attitudes are necessary for the democratic stability of any system in the long run. Citizens need to believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and should also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In a system such as this, there may be a majority government accompanied by respect for the rights of minorities, a combination of characteristics that is commonly viewed as the quintessence of the definition of democracy.

In previous studies resulting from LAPOP’s research, the relationship between system support and tolerance was explored in an effort to develop a model to predict democratic stability. The framework shown in Table VIII.1 depicts all the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are split into two categories, high and low.² It also includes the percentages of the Bolivian sample falling into each cell.

Table VIII. 1. Relationship between Tolerance and System Support

System Support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy 14%	Stable authoritarianism 18%
Low	Unstable democracy 23%	Democratic collapse 45%


Political systems in which the majority of citizens have a high level of support for the system and high political tolerance are the systems that we can predict as being more stable. This prediction is based on the logic that a high level of support is necessary in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. When system support is high but tolerance is low, the system should remain stable (owing to the high support) but the democratic government could ultimately be threatened.

Low system support is a situation characterized by the two lower cells of the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. In a situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will lead to greater democratization or to an extended period of instability, perhaps marked by high levels of violence. In situations of low support and low tolerance, there is serious risk of democratic collapse; it is in this last cell that we find the largest percentage of respondents in the 2004 Bolivian sample.

² The “high” category of each variable includes those respondents who scored more than 50 points on the scale of tolerance and on the scale of trust discussed in the preceding chapters.

Table VIII.1, below, shows that the percentage of respondents who have high political tolerance and high support for the system is relatively small in Bolivia, compared to the percentage falling in the same category in other countries in Latin America.

Figure VIII. 1. Percentage of Respondents with High Tolerance and High System Support, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective



As we have seen so far, the stability of a democratic system requires a high level of support for democracy from citizens. Given that our data places Bolivia in a very low position in terms of system support compared to the other Latin American countries included in the LAPOP sample, in the following sections we will examine the levels of support and preference for democracy among Bolivians today and, from a temporal perspective, in the immediate past.


We begin by analyzing the level of support Bolivians express for the possibility of a coup d'état in the country. This measure may be interpreted as a clearly antidemocratic tendency among citizens, given that the coup d'état contradicts the basic logic of democratic continuity

through the passing of governmental authority from one set of representatives to another by means of regular and free elections. Our measure is based on the following question:

JC13A. Do you think that there can ever be sufficient motive for a coup d'etat or do you think that are never sufficient motives for a coup?

Yes, there could be a motive [1] Never [2] DK/DA [8]

Figure VIII. 2 Percentage of Respondents Who Think That a Coup d'Etat May Be Justifiable, Bolivia in Comparative Perspective



The above figure, in which the dotted line represents 50 percent of the cases, clearly shows that the majority (60 percent) of Bolivians think that a coup d'etat would be justifiable in the country. Support for a possible coup d'etat is greater than in Colombia, a country marked by high levels of conflict and violence, and also greater than in Guatemala and Honduras, countries with high levels of poverty and social inequality. Only in El Salvador is there a higher level of support for a possible coup d'etat than in Bolivia. These results reinforce the impression of a

strong anti-democratic pre-disposition among Bolivians, independently of the reasons leading to this type of situation.

This measure is not the only available indicator of the democratic or anti-democratic pre-disposition of a population. The perception changes when we examine a second measure of this concept, one that reflects a more qualitative aspect of democracy instead of an “absolute” perception such as that used in the previous section. Our alternative measure probes Bolivians’ preference for democratic attitudes in the government over its authoritarian attitudes, in particular, those of the president. The data for the second measure come from the following question, asked only in the 2002 and 2004 samples:

AUT10. With which of the following statements do you agree more?

[1] What Bolivia need most is a strong and decisive President who imposes order with an iron hand, or

[2] What the country needs most is a President who knows how to engage in dialogue and to reach agreement with all the sectors of the population?

Figure VIII. 3. Preference for a President Who Seeks Dialogue vs. a President with an “Iron Hand”




Figure VIII.3 presents the results for this variable, and shows the percentage of respondents who preferred the option of dialogue to that of an “iron hand” in 2002 and in 2004, respectively. While in 2002 there were no significant differences between the three income groups (the confidence intervals overlap), in 2004 respondents in the high income category were much more inclined to accept the “iron hand” option than were middle income respondents. Though the general tendency is toward a slight decline in the preference for dialogue option, this decrease in favor of a more authoritarian perspective has been much more drastic among higher income groups: the proportion of responses in favor of a government that seeks dialogue among those with a high monthly income decreased from 63 percent in 2002 to 48 percent in 2004.


The evidence presented here suggests that the higher income groups have been impacted differently from the rest of the population by the events of October 2003 and the current

institutional crisis, leading to a more drastic tendency for accepting an authoritarian position by the government.

Finally, we use an additional variable to evaluate in greater depth the level of preference for democracy over an authoritarian government. This measure is based on the following question:

JC15. Some people prefer to live under a democracy because it protects individual and human rights, even though at times it can be inefficient and disorderly. Others prefer to live under a dictatorship because of its order and efficiency. What do you prefer, a democracy or a dictatorship?

Figure VIII.4. Preference for Democracy over Dictatorship, by Year (in Percent)



The figure above illustrates the national trend for this variable since 1998, showing the percentage of respondents who chose the democratic option. 2004 reflects a break in the declining long term trend of preference for democracy over dictatorship. This difference is statistically significant. However, in absolute terms the difference is quite small – the rise in the preference for democracy is only around 1 percent. In other words, Bolivians’ preference for


democracy over other forms of government seems to have risen slightly for the first time in 2004, after declining continuously since 1998.

The different measures of the degree of preference for democracy over authoritarian positions and alternatives yield results that are not always consistent with each other, which suggests the presence of contradictory feelings about democracy among Bolivians. It seems that there is a preference for democracy when it is contrasted with an “absolute” or conceptual alternative of a democracy, but the preference for authoritarian attitudes or for governments willing to act in an authoritarian manner prevails over the alternative of governments inclined to take “soft” measures, such as an inclination toward dialogue and negotiation.

2. The Constituent Assembly: A Perspective on the Future

There is an additional factor that we believe is important in the scenario outlined by the results presented in the previous sections: support for the Constituent Assembly. The acceptance of the need to change the Constitution, as Figure VIII.6, below, indicates has grown in all the regions of the country. But the increase has been considerably greater in the East, where the people agree more with the idea that the Constitution should be changed. It is very important to note that the East was the region with the lowest support for this idea two years ago, but in 2004 it seems to be the region that is most convinced of the need for constitutional change.

Figure VIII.5. Perception of the Need for Constitutional Change, by Year and by Region



The Constituent Assembly provides an almost ideal space for the establishment of new rules for the democratic game and currently represents the best opportunity for Bolivians to recover the legitimacy of the decision-making process within a democratic framework, with the inclusion of actors representing all social sectors and interests in the country. The ability to be able to count on a popular president (one with high levels of support) as the leader of this process may prove to be crucial for its success.

However, we should not lose sight of the fact that there are also risks in this process, concentrated mainly in the struggle between interest groups for winning political positions, influence and visibility, a goal that could prove to be of greater importance for these groups than the real opportunity for improving Bolivian democracy. Therefore, the process needs to be confronted carefully and responsibly, since it basically represents a new beginning and the elimination of the achievements of previous democratizing processes.

The growing polarization of the country over issues such as regional autonomy and the hydrocarbons law may also pose a particularly serious obstacle for the success of the Assembly, because it affects the possibility of a real process of deliberation, a condition that has been identified as highly important for processes of this kind (Elster 1998).

Conclusions

In this final chapter of this Democracy Audit for Bolivia, we have discussed the findings regarding citizens' opinions of factors related to the political stability of Bolivian democracy. The reality appears to be contradictory, combining potentially dangerous results for the country's democratic stability with more optimistic signs, at the same time. On one hand, we see the profound crisis of people's confidence in the institutions of Bolivian democracy; on the other hand, Bolivians' preference for democracy as a form of government over other alternatives remains high and stable.

The evidence of these two tendencies shows us that Bolivians' support for the democracy is a complex subject, which casts a wide blanket of uncertainty over the future. To this uncertain situation, we need to add the need for finding a solution to two urgent issues on the national political agenda: the definition of a national policy on the use of the country's oil resources, and the holding of the Constituent Assembly.

Every situation of crisis is also a moment of opportunity; the current Bolivian situation represents a serious danger to the country and its democracy; but at the same time it is an opportunity to recover the legitimacy of political institutions and to construct a more democratic and just country.

The decisions that are now taken in crucial political processes, such as the Constituent Assembly, or the decisions regarding natural gas are of great importance for the country and for the future of democracy in Bolivia. The content and quality of those decisions depends on Bolivians' intelligence and the positions they take during those processes. This scenario highlights the historical importance of the moment for the country's future, and should force all Bolivians to think, individually and collectively, of their responsibility in the process of political construction of the present and the future of the nation.

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Appendix: Questionnaires

Appendix A: Questionnaire in English

QUESTIONNAIRE 1603: **Governability** **September**
2004

City _____ Locality _____ Bar./UV _____ Mnz. _____ Viv. _____
Address _____

Stratum: Public [1] [5] Alternative development

UR.: Urban > 20.000 [1] Urban 2-20 mil [2] Compact rural [3] Dispersed rural, less 500 [4]

Province _____ Municipality _____ Canton _____
Electoral District _____

UPM _____ Department La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro
[4] Chuquisaca [5] Potosi [6] Pando [7]

Tarija [8] Beni [9] **Q1. Gender** (*don't ask*) Male [1]
Female [2] **Age** _____

Day of attempt: Mo [1] Tu [2] We [3] Th [4] Fr [5] Sa [6] Su [7] **Start** **time:**
_____:____ **Date** ____/____/ 2004

My name is and we are doing a study all over the country on behalf of Vanderbilt University and Encuestas y Estudios with the aim of finding out people's opinions about different aspects of the national and local situation. This study is aimed at helping to improve foreign aid and to benefit the country in general. Your opinion is completely voluntary and confidential. You have been selected at random, and the interview will take between 30 and 40 minutes. If you have any doubts, please call the firm Encuestas y Estudios at 2-2786616 in the city of La Paz.

To begin, do you usually listen to any news program... (*read out the alternatives and wait for the response to each part*)

A1. On the radio Yes [1] No [0] DA [8]

A2. On television Yes [1] No [0] DA [8]

A3. Read the news in the paper Yes [1] No [0] DA [8]

A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem the country is facing? And what is the second problem? (*Two responses, mark 1 in the bracket for the first choice and 2 in the bracket for the second choice*)

Unemployment [1] Inflation, high prices, cost of living [2] Poverty [3] Crime [4] Danger of a coup d'etat [5]
Lack of land for cultivation [6] Lack of credit [7] Corruption [8] Ecological problems [9] Drug addiction [10]
Domestic violence [11] Narco-trafficking [12] Social conflicts [13] Regional conflicts [14] Injustice [15]
Others (*specify*) _____ There aren't any problems [50] DK [88]

AD1. I am going to read you two statements. Please tell me with which one you agree more.

[1] Drug-trafficking represents a problem for Bolivia DK/DA [8]

[2] Drug-trafficking is NOT a problem for Bolivia but for the United States and other countries

Sometimes people and communities have problems they cannot resolve by themselves. Some try to resolve such problems by seeking help from a government official or office. Have you requested help or cooperation at any time ... (*read out the alternatives and wait for the response to each option*)

CP2. From a congress deputy or a senator

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

CP3. From the Mayor or a councilor

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

CP3A. From the authorities of the indigenous community

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

CP4A. From the prefecture

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

CP4B. From the police

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

SOCT1. How would you describe the country's overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, average, bad, or very bad?

Very good [1] Good [2] Average [3] Bad [4] Very bad [5] Don't know [8]

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was a year ago?

Better [1] Same [2] Worse [3] Don't know [8]

SOCT3. And within a year, do you think the country's current economic situation will be better, the same as, or worse than it is now?

Better [1] Same [2] Worse [3] Don't know [8]

Now I am going to read you a few questions about this community and the problems it has.

CP5. Have you ever attempted to resolve a problem in the community or locality?

Yes [1] No [2] =>CP6

CP5A. If the answer is Yes to, CP5 => Have you contributed material or money to help with some problem or improvement?

Yes [1] No [2]
DK [8] NDR [9]

CP5B. If the answer is Yes to CP5 => Have you contributed your own work or labor?

Yes [1] No [2]
DK [8] NDR [9]

CP5C. If the answer is Yes to CP5 => Have you attended meetings about a problem or about an improvement?

Yes [1] No [2]
DK [8] NDR [9]

CP5D. If the answer is Yes to CP5 => Have you tried to organize a new group to resolve a local problem or to bring about an improvement?

Yes [1] No [2]
DK [8] NDR [9]

Now I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings frequently, attend from time to time, almost never attend or never attend their meetings.

Do you attend the meetings of.....	Frequently	From time to time	Almost never	Never	DK/DA

CP6. A church or temple committee or group?	1	2	3	4	8
CP7. A parents' association at school?	1	2	3	4	8
CP8. A committee for improvements in the community?	1	2	3	4	8
CP9. An association of professionals, traders, farmers or producers?	1	2	3	4	8
CP13. Neighborhood committees?	1	2	3	4	8
CP14. Territorial Base Organizations (TBO's)?	1	2	3	4	8
CP15. [CAMCP13] Meetings of a political party?	1	2	3	4	8

L1. On this table (*show table no. 1*) there is a scale that goes from left to right, where 1 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right. When one speaks of political tendencies, one speaks of a person being on the left or on the right. When describing a person, you yourself say that this person is on the left and that one is on the right. On this scale, where would you place yourself politically?

Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right
DK [88]

LS3. Now, some opinions. To what extent are you satisfied with your life? Would you say you are 1) very satisfied, 2) somewhat satisfied, 3) somewhat dissatisfied, or 4) very dissatisfied?

Very satisfied [1] Somewhat satisfied [2] Somewhat dissatisfied [3] Very dissatisfied [4] DK [8]

<p>IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that the people from your community are ...? (<i>read alternatives</i>)</p> <p>Very trustworthy [1] Somewhat trustworthy [2] Not very trustworthy [3] Not at all trustworthy [4] DK [8]</p>
<p>IT2. Do you think that most of the time people care only about themselves, or do you believe that most of the time people try to help others?</p> <p>They care only about themselves [1] They try to help others [2] DK [8]</p>
<p>IT3. Do you think that, if they were given the chance, most people would try to take advantage of you, or do you think that they would not take advantage of you?</p> <p>Yes, they would take advantage [1] They would not take advantage [2] DK [8]</p>

VBPRS02 [VB2]. Did you vote in the 2002 presidential elections?

Yes [1] Registered but did not vote [2] Was not registered [3] Below voting age [4] DK/DA [8]

VBPTY02 [VB3]. *If the respondent voted in the 2002 elections => For which party or candidate did you vote for president? (Don't read the alternatives)*

ADN (Ronald MacLean)[1] MNR (Sanchez de Lozada)[2] MIR (Paz Zamora)[3] Condepa (Valdivia)[4]
 UCS (Jhonny Fernández)[5] Libertad y Justicia (Costa Obregón) [6] MAS (Evo Morales) [7]
 MCC (Blattmann)[10]
 MIP (F.Quispe Mallku) [11] NFR (Reyes Villa)[12] PS (Rolando Morales)[13] Null, blank vote [88] DK / Don't remember, DA [92] NDR [99]

VB7. In your opinion, who represents you better 1) the congress deputy from the party list in a multi-member district (“diputado plurinominal”), or 2) the single-member district congress deputy (“diputado uninominal”) from your district?

Party [1] Uninominal [2] Doesn't know which is which [3] Neither [4]
 DK [8]

VB8. Which of the following do you think can represent your interests better, a political party or a citizens' association?

Political party [1] Citizens' association [2] Doesn't know which is which [3]
 Neither [4] DK [8]

There are different means by which the uninominal deputies can find out about the people's demands. I am going to read them to you one by one. Please tell me if you have heard of the alternative or not..... (read one by one)

	Has heard of it	Hasn't heard of it	DK/DA
UNIN3. Public hearings with the deputy	1	2	8
UNIN4. Meetings of the departmental brigade	1	2	8
UNIN6. Citizens' fora with deputies	1	2	8

UNIN7. In the past year, have you listened to any radio program in which people call up to speak to their representative and the representative answers their questions?

Has listened [1] Hasn't listened [2] [8] DK/DA

REFM1. Changing the topic, with which of these two statements do you agree more? 1) The issue of gas is very complex and we should let the government resolve it, or 2) we can understand the gas issue and we should participate in the decision-making.

It is very complex [1] We should participate [2] DK [8]

REFM3. Did you vote in the 18 July referendum?

Yes [1] Was registered but didn't vote [2] Wasn't registered [3] Below voting age [4] DK/DA [8] → Interviewer: *If the respondent did not vote, go to CA1.*

REFM4.- I would like to know what was your position on each of the following points in the referendum: *Interviewer, give the card with the questions in the referendum to the respondent, don't read the options.*

	Voted YES	Voted NO	Blank or null vote	DA
REFMQ1. How did you vote in Question No. 1?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ2. In Question No. 2...?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ3. In Question No. 3...?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ4. In Question No. 4...?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ5. In Question No. 5...?	1	2	3	8

CA1. A constituent assembly will be held the coming year. Do you think that it is important to change the Constitution in various respects, or do you think that, in spite of its faults, we should leave the Constitution just as it is?

Change the constitution [1] Leave it as it is [2] DK [8]

M1. Speaking in general about the current government, would you say that the work that President Mesa is doing is: very good, good, average, bad, or very bad?

Very good [1] Good [2] Average [3] Bad [4] Very bad [5]
DK/DA [8]

NP1 [NP1A]. Now we are going to talk about the Mayor's Office in this municipality. Have you had the opportunity to attend a municipal session or other meeting called by the Mayor's Office or the municipal council in the past 12 months?

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

NP2. Have you requested help or presented a petition to any public office, employee or councilor of the Mayor's Office in the past 12 months?

Yes [1] No [2] => Go to NP4 DK/DA [8]

NP2A. If the respondent requested any type of help => Were you satisfied with the response they gave you?

Yes [1] No [2] They still have not responded [90]
DK/DA [8] NDR [9]

NP4. Have you participated in a meeting to discuss or plan the budget or to plan the AOP (Annual Operation Plan) of the municipality?

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

NP5. Have you submitted any complaint to the Vigilance Committee of the Municipality?

Si [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

SGL1. Would you say that the services the mayor's office is providing people are excellent, good, average, bad or very bad?

Excellent [1] Good [2] Average [3] Bad [4] Very Bad [5] DK [8]

SGL1P. Would you say that the work done by the prefecture is excellent, good, average, bad or very bad?

Excellent [1] Good [2] Average [3] Bad [4] Very bad [5] DK [8]

LGL1A. Of the institutions I will now mention to you, which has responded best to resolve the problems of this community? The central government, the Congress, the mayor's office or the prefecture?

The central government [1] The Congress [2] The mayor's office [3] The prefecture [4] None [5] They are all the same [6] DK/DA [8]

LGL2M In your opinion, should more responsibilities and more money to the mayor's office, the prefecture, or to the central government?

The mayor's office [1] The prefecture [2] The central government [3] *Don't read: None [4] They are all the same [5] DK/DA [8]*

LGL3M. In order that the country develops further, where would you say it is better to pay taxes: to the mayor's office, the prefecture, or to the central government?

The mayor's office [1] The prefecture [2] The central government [3] *Don't read: None [4] They are all the same [5] DK/DA [8]*

Moving to a different topic, some people say that a coup d'Etat – that is, when the military takes over power – would be justified under certain circumstances. In your opinion, a

military coup d'Etat is justified or is not justified.... (read out the options and wait for the response).

JC1. If unemployment is very high?

It is justified [1] It is not justified [2] DK/DA [8]

JC11 [JC10]. If there is a lot of crime?
not justified [2] DK/DA [8]

It is justified [1] It is

JC12 [JC13]. If there is a lot of corruption?
[1] It is not justified [2] DK/DA [8]

It is justified

JC16. If social disorder is too high?
not justified [2] DK/DA [8]

It is justified [1] It is

JC13A. Do you think that there can ever be sufficient motive for a coup d'etat or do you think that are never sufficient motives for a coup?

Yes, there could be a motive [1] Never [2] DK/DA [8]

JC15. Some people prefer to live under a democracy because it protects human and individual rights, even though at times it can be inefficient or disorderly. Others prefer to live under a dictatorship because of its order and efficiency. What do you prefer, a democracy or a dictatorship?

A democracy [1]

A dictatorship [2]

DK/DA [8]

JC20. Some people say that we would be better off without political parties. Others say that we need parties to represent people's interests. Which view do you agree with more?

Without parties [1]

With parties [2]

DK/DA [8]

ACR1. I am going to read you three statements. Please tell me which of the three best describe your view.

DK/DA [8]

[1] The way in which our society is organized should be completely and radically changed by revolutionary means.

[2] Our society should be gradually improved through reforms.

[3] Our society should be valiantly defended from revolutionary movements.

AUT10. With which of the following statements do you agree more?

DK/DA [8]

[1] What Bolivia need most is a strong and decisive President who imposes order with an iron hand, or

[2] What the country needs most is a President who knows how to engage in dialogue and to reach agreement with all the sectors of the population?

AUT14. What kind of president of the Republic do you prefer?

[8] DK/DA

[1] One who tries to solve problems through laws passed by the Congress, although that takes a lot of time, or...

[2] One who tries to solve problems quickly, avoiding Congress if necessary

AUT15. Sometimes there are protests that create difficulties because the roads are blocked. What should the government do in such cases?

[8] DK/DA

[1] Negotiate with the demonstrators although that may take days or weeks, affecting the country's economy, or

[2] Order the police to open up the roads.

Now (give the respondent table # 2) we are going to use this table... This table has a 7 point scale, which goes from 1 to 7, where 1 means Not at all and 7 mean A lot. For example, if I ask you: "to what extent do you like watching TV?" if you don't like it at all, you would choose 1; if, on the contrary, you like watching TV a lot, you would choose 7. If your opinion is between Not at all and A lot, you would choose an intermediate point. Let's do a test: To what extent do you like watching TV?" Read me the number, please. (MAKE SURE THE RESPONDENT UNDERSTANDS.) Using this table.....

	Scale							DK /D A	Does not know
	Not at all						A lot		
B1. To what extent do you think the justice tribunals in Bolivia guarantee a fair trial?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions in Bolivia?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the Bolivian political system?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the Bolivian political system?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the Bolivian political system?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B10A. To what extent do you trust in the system of justice?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B31A. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B30. [B21] To what extent do you trust political	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	

parties?									
B11. To what extent do you trust the National Electoral Court?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B13. To what extent do you trust the Congress?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B18. To what extent do you trust the police?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B21 [B37]. To what extent do you trust journalists?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B22. [B32] To what extent do you trust the Municipal Government?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B33. To what extent do you trust the Prefecture?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B22B. To what extent do you trust the indigenous authorities?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B22C. To what extent do you trust the municipal Vigilance Committee?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23. To what extent do you trust the unions?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23A. To what extent do you trust the Public Ministry or public prosecutors?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23C. [B17] To what extent do you trust in Human Rights Ombudsman?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23BNR. To what extent do you trust the Tribunals of Justice?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23E. To what extent do you trust the Constitutional Tribunal?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23B. [B44] To what extent do you trust the lawyers who work as Public Defenders?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B31. To what extent do you trust the non-governmental organizations, the NGOs, that work in the community?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B42. To what extent do you trust the Conciliation Centers?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B43. To what extent do you feel proud of being Bolivian?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B44. [B46] Have you heard of the Presidential Anti-Corruption Delegation? (Interviewer: If the respondent hasn't heard of it, mark 9 and go to N1) To what extent do you trust that the presidential	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

anti-corruption delegation is fighting corruption in Bolivia?			
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(continue with table 2)	Scale							DK/DA
	Not at all			A lot				
N1. On the same scale, to what extent would you say that the government of President Carlos Mesa is combating poverty?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
N3. To what extent is it promoting and protecting democratic principles?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
N9. To what extent is it fighting corruption in the Government?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

(continue with table 2) To what extent do you agree with each one of the following statements:	Scale						sDK/DA	
	Not at all			A lot				
ING4. Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PN2. In spite of our differences, we Bolivians have many things and values that unite us as a country.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

(continue with table 2)	Scale							DK/DA
	Not at all			A lot				
LENG10. To what extent do you agree that the radio and television broadcast stations increase their programming in indigenous languages.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
LENG11. To what extent do you agree that an indigenous language should be taught in schools.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
LENG12. To what extent do you agree that all official employees who attend to the public should speak an indigenous language.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Bolivia is a very diverse country and therefore each one of us can identify with different aspects of our culture. For example, one may identify oneself as Bolivian and at the same time as Paceño or as Camba. On the same scale, where 1 means “Not at all” and 7 means “A lot”....

(continue with table 2)	Scale							DK/DA
	Not at all			A lot				
BETID1. To what extent do you feel you are a Bolivian citizen?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<i>Interviewer: For the following question, use the reference</i>								

according to the department in which the interview is carried out: BETID2. To what extent do you feel... [<i>Paceño, Cruceño, Cochabambino, Orureño, Chuquisaqueño, Potosino, Pandino, Tarijeño, Beniano</i>]?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BETID3. To what extent do you feel part of the Aymara culture?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BETID4. To what extent do you feel part of the Quechua culture?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BETID5. To what extent do you feel part of the Camba culture?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
BETID6. Some journalists refer to the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Chuquisaca and Tarija as the “region of the Half Moon”. Have you heard of this idea? <i>Interviewer: if the answer is NO mark [9] and go to the following question.</i>	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	[9] 8
To what extent do you feel part of the Half Moon?		

Now we are going to change the table (give table # 4). This new table has a scale from 1 to 10, on which 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. The questions that follow are to know your opinion about the different ideas that people who live in Bolivia have. (Interviewer: Don't forget to change the scale).

	Scale										DK/DA
	Disapprove									Approve	
D1. There are people who only speak badly of Bolivian governments, not only the current Government, but the Bolivian system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the right to vote of such persons? Please answer with a number. PROBE: To what extent?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D2. Still thinking of those persons who only speak badly of the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such persons being able to carry out peaceful demonstrations with the aim of expressing their points of view?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of persons who only speak badly of the Bolivian system of government being allowed to run for public office?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

D4. Still thinking of those persons who only speak badly of the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of their making speeches on television?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such persons being able to run for public office?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

Let's put aside the persons who speak badly of the Bolivian system of government. Let's talk now about people in general. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of ...
(interviewer: ask each question part by part, show table #4).

	Disapprove	Scale	Approve	DK/DA
E5. People participating in lawful demonstrations?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88
E8. People participating in an organization or group to try to resolve community problems?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88
E11. People working in electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88
E15. People participating in the closure or blocking of streets?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88
E14. People invading private property?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88
E2. People taking over factories, offices, or other buildings?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88
E3. People participating in a group that wants to overthrow an elected government by violent means.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88
E16. People doing justice by their own hands when the State does not punish the criminals.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88

Now we are going to talk about some actions that the State can take. How strongly would you approve or disapprove of ... (interviewer: ask each question part by part, show table #4).

	Disapprove	Scale	Approve	DK/DA
C3 [D32]. A law prohibiting public demonstrations?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			88

C5. [D33] How strongly would you approve or disapprove of prohibiting the meetings of any groups that criticize the Bolivian political system?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
C6. How strongly would you approve or disapprove of the Government censoring the propaganda of its political enemies?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

<p>PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy functions in Bolivia?</p> <p>Very satisfied [1] Satisfied [2] Dissatisfied [3] Very dissatisfied [4] DK/DA [8]</p>
<p>PN5. In your opinion, is Bolivia very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?</p> <p>Very democratic [1] Somewhat democratic [2] Not very democratic [3] Not at all democratic [4] DK [8]</p>

Let's talk about some policies that the government could adopt on the issue of gas. Using this scale from 1 to 10

<i>(interviewer: ask each question, part by part, show table #4).</i>	Scale										DK/DA
	Disapprove					Approve					
REFM41. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of Bolivia exporting gas to Chile?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM42. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of Bolivia exporting gas to the United States?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM43. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of Bolivia ceding a piece of territory to Chile in exchange for access to the sea?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM31. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales once again manages the country's oil resources?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM32. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the government nationalizing the oil companies so that YPFB takes over all their activities?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

REFM33. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the government nationalizing oil and gas, but contracting oil companies for their transport and commercialization?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM34. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the Bonosol no longer being paid and those resources being sent to YPFB?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM51. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the oil companies paying more taxes on their production?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

REFM 35. In your opinion, who should administer the business of gas?

[1] Private companies

[2] Mixed companies with the joint participation of the State and of private capital

[3] Only the State

DK/DA [8]

REFM52. In what do you think the money obtained from gas exports should be invested mainly? (read the alternatives except Others and DK/DA)

Education [1] Health [2] Roads [3] Jobs [4] Fight against corruption [5] Others [6]
DK/DA [8]

With which of the following statements do you agree more?

NEWTOL4A. 1) The State should have the right to prohibit opposing views that can hurt Bolivia or 2) the State should not have the right to prohibit opposing views even at a high cost.

Prohibit expression [1]

Not prohibit expression [2]

DK [8]

NEWTOL5. 1) Homosexuals should have the right to organize and dress as they want or 2) homosexuals set a bad example for our children and so they should be controlled by the government.

They have the right [1]

They should be controlled [2]

DK [8]

NEWTOL7. 1) Come what may, the country should stay united or ... 2) The differences in the country are very large, the country should be divided.

The country should stay united [1]

The country should be divided [2]

DK [8]

NEWTOL8: 1) It would be better for the country if there were a single national culture for everyone or ... 2) The indigenous peoples should preserve their values, culture and language.

A single national culture [1] Preserve their values [2] DK [8]

BTOL1. 1). In the political life of this country, educated people should participate mainly, or 2) All people should be able to participate in the country's politics regardless of their level of education.

Educated people [1] All people [2] DK [8]

BTOL2. Some people say that it worries them that in the next national elections an indigenous citizen may be elected President of the Republic, while others say that a person's identity is not important in politics. With which of these alternatives do you agree more?

It is worrying that an indigenous person may become president [1] People's identity doesn't matter [2] DK [8]

BTOL3. 1) When one discusses things with others, one has to stick to one's views till the end, or ... 2) Sometimes it is better to yield a little to reach an agreement.

Stick to one's views till the end [1] Yield in order to reach an agreement [2] DK [8]

BTOL4. 1) When we make a demand to the government, we should try to achieve our objectives always "till the final consequences," or ... 2) We should accept an offer negotiated with the government although it may not completely satisfy our expectations.

Till the final consequences [1] Accept the offer [2] DK [8]

BTOL5. 1) The territory of Bolivia belongs to the country's indigeous people, or ... 2) All Bolivians have equal right to own land.

It belongs to the indigenous people [1] Everyone has an equal right [2] DK [8]

ECREG1. 1) In Bolivia, the savings of a few departments fuel the country's development, or 2) The country's development is a result of the efforts of all Bolivians.

A few departments [1] The efforts of all Bolivians [2] DK [8]

ECREG2. Within Bolivia, there are some regions or departments that are richer than others. I am going to read you a series of possible causes of this inequality. I would like you

to tell me which of these factors is the main cause of the differences in wealth between the regions. (read the alternatives, except “none of the above”)

DK/DA [8]

- [1] Some departments have more natural resources than others.
- [2] In some departments, the people are more hardworking than in others.
- [3] The centralism of La Paz does not allow the growth of all departments.
- [4] The economic policies do not permit the growth of all the departments.
- [5] *Don't read:* None of the above

As you must know, the different social sectors and groups in the country have some influence on the decisions made by the government and on the country's direction; of course, some have more influence and others have less. In order for the country's situation to improve, how much influence should each one of the following sectors or groups have?

	A lot of influence	Little influence	No influence	DK/DA
BPOD1. Private businessmen	1	2	3	9
BPOD2. Farmers	1	2	3	9
BPOD3. Civic Committees and regional representatives	1	2	3	9
BPOD4. Indigenous organizations	1	2	3	9
BPOD5. Transportation representatives	1	2	3	9
BPOD6. The COB and the unions	1	2	3	9

PROT1. Have you ever participated in a demonstration or public protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never, or never?

Sometimes [1] Almost never [2] Never [3] DK [8]

PROT2. Did you participate in the protests in October last year against the government of Sánchez de Lozada?

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

PROT3. Have you participated in any march or protest against the government of Carlos Mesa?

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

PROT4. In the past year, have you participated in any march or protest against the municipal government?

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

PROT5. Do you think it was worth it doing those protests or that it didn't achieve anything?

It was worth it [1] It didn't achieve anything [2] DK/DA [8] NDR (said "no" to Prot1 a Prot4) [9]

AOJ1. Changing the subject, do you think that reporting a crime to the police is easy, difficult, or very difficult?

Easy [1] Difficult [2] Very difficult [3] DK/DA [8]

AOJ3 [VIC1]. During the past year, have you been a victim of robbery or aggression?

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

AOJ3B. [VIC1A] During the past year, has any member of your family been victim of robbery or aggression?

Yes [1] No [2] DK/DA [8]

AOJ3A [AOJ1A]. If the respondent or the respondent's family has been a victim => Have you reported the robbery or aggression to the police or to the PTJ?

Police [1] Community authority [2] Did not report it [3] DK/DA [8] NDR [9]

AOJ4 [ST1].- Regarding the dealings you have had with the nacional police, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

Very satisfied [1] Somewhat satisfied [2] Somewhat dissatisfied [3] Very dissatisfied [4] Didn't have any dealings [9] DK/DA [8]

AOJ6 [ST2].- Regarding the dealings you have had with the courts or tribunals of justice, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

Very satisfied [1] Somewhat satisfied [2] Somewhat dissatisfied [3] Very dissatisfied [4] Didn't have any dealings [9] DK/DA [8]

AOJ8a. A new penal procedural code came into effect on 31 May 2001. Have you heard or read about this new code?

Yes [1] No [2] DK [91]

AOJ17c. The new code has varous important provisions. One of them is respect for the presumption of innocence, which allows the release of allegad criminals while their guilt or

innocence is being determined. In your opinión, do you think that this provision is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Very good [1] Somewhat good [2] Somewhat bad [3] Very bad [4] DK [8]

AOJ13. [AOJ11] How safe do you feel about walking alone at night in your neighborhood? Do you feel very safe, more or less safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

Very safe [1] More or less safe [2] Somewhat unsafe [3] Very unsafe [4] DK/DA [8]

AOJ12. If you were a victim of robbery or assault, how much would you trust the judicial system to punish the guilty?

A lot [1] Somewhat [2] Little [3] Not at all [4] DK/DA [8]

AOJ14. [DEM2] With which of the following three statements do you agree the most?

- [1] For people like me, a democratic regime and a non-democratic regime are all the same.
- [2] Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
- [3] In some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.

Now we would like to talk about your personal experiences with things that happen in life...	No	Yes	DK	
EXC2. During the past year, has any police agent asked you for a bribe ?	0	1	8	
EXC6. During the past year has a public employee asked you for a bribe?	0	1	8	
EXC11. Have you done any transaction in the municipality in the past year? [If the respondent says “no,” mark 9, if the respondent says “yes” ask the following question] In order to do a transaction in the municipality (such as obtaining a permit, for example) in the past year, have you had to pay any money other than that required by law?	0	1	8	9
EXC13. Have they asked you for any improper payment at work in the past year?	0	1	8	
EXC14. In the past year, have you any dealings with the courts? [If the respondent says “no,” mark 9, if the respondent says “yes” ask the following question] ¿Have you had to pay a bribe in the courts in the past year?	0	1	8	9

<p>EXC15. Have you used the public medical services in the past year? [If the respondent says “no,” mark 9, if the respondent says “yes” ask the following question]</p> <p>In order to be attended in a hospital or in a health clinic in the past year, have you had to pay a bribe?</p>	0	1	8	9
<p>EXC16. Have you had a child at school in the past year? [If the respondent says “no,” mark 9, if the respondent says “yes” ask the following question]</p> <p>Have you had to pay a bribe in your children’s school in the past year?</p>	0	1	8	9

EXC7. Considering your experience or what you have heard, is corruption among public employees very widespread, widespread, not very widespread or not at all widespread?

Very widespread [1] Widespread [2] Not very widespread [3] Not at all widespread [4] DK/DA [8]

EXC7B. And would you say that corruption among public employees is greatest in the central government, in the prefecture, or in the municipality?

Central government [1] Prefecture [2] Municipality [3] *Don’t read: They are all the same* [4] DK/DA [8]

If a person constantly criticizes the government of Bolivia, not only this government but Bolivian democracy, to what extent do you think such a person should have the following rights: [Give table # 4]	Scale	
	Disapprove	Approve
DN1. To what extent should he have the right to vote?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [DK=88]	
DN2. To what extent should he have the right to hold peaceful demonstrations to Express his views?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [DK=88]	
DN3. To what extent should he have the right to run for public office?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [DK =88]	
DN4. To what extent should he have the right to go on televisión to give a speech?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [DK =88]	

	Answer	
GI1. Do you remember the name of the President of the United States? [Bush]	[0] Incorrect, DK	[1]Correct
GI2 [GI5]. Do you remember the name of the President of Brazil? [Lula]	[0] Incorrect, DK	[1]Correct
GI3. Do you remember the name of the President of Argentina? [Kirchner]	[0] Incorrect, DK	[1]Correct
GI4. Do you remember how many deputies there are in Congress? [130]	[0] Incorrect, DK	[1]Correct
GI5. Do you remember the name of the uninominal deputy from this district?	[0] DK	
GI6. Do you know if one can be a candidate in the elections without belonging to a political party? How? [Yes, one can with the citizens' associations]	[0] Incorrect, DK	[1]Correct

Q3. What is your religion?

Catholic (practising) [1] Catholic (non-practising) [2] Evangelical [3] Christian [4] None [6] Other _____ DK/DA [8]

Q4. How many times have you attended church (place of worship or temple) during the past month? _____ times (88= DK/DA)

Now to end, some questions only for statistical purposes. In your house, do you have a...

	No	One	Two or +	DK/DA
R1. Color television	0	1	2	8
R2. B&W television	0	1	2	8

	NO	YES	DA		NO	YES	DA
R3. Freezer/refrigerator	0	1	8	R8. Motorcycle	0	1	8
R4. Telephone	0	1	8	R9. Tractor	0	1	8
R5. Car or truck	0	1	8	R10. Electrical energy	0	1	8
R6. Washing machine	0	1	8	R11 [R12]. Drinking water	0	1	8
R7. Microwave	0	1	8	R13. Bicycle	0	1	8
				R14. Sewage	0	1	8

Public school [1] Private school [2] Studied in both systems [3]

Q10. Into which of the following ranges (show the income card) would you place the TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME of all the persons in your household?

Nothing [0] Less than Bs. 250 [1] From Bs. 251 to Bs. 500 [2] From Bs. 501 to Bs. 1000 [3] From Bs. 1001 to Bs. 2000 [4]
From Bs. 2001 to Bs. 5000 [5] From Bs. 5001 to Bs.10.000 [6] From Bs. 10.001 to Bs.20.000 [7] More than Bs. 20.000 [8] DK/DA [88]

Q11. What is your civil status (*Don't read the alternatives*)

Single [1] Married [2] Free union, common-law marriage [3] Divorced [4]
Separated [5] Widow(er) [6] DK/DA [8]

Q12. How many children do you have _____ **children** Doesn't have any children [0]

ETID. Do you consider yourself a person of the white, cholo, mestizo, indigenous or black race?

White [1] Cholo [2] Mestizo [3] Indigenous [4] Black [5] Other _____
DK/DA [8]

ETID2. [Census] Do you you think you belong to any of the following indigenous groups? (*read all the options*)

Quechua [1] Aymara [2] Guarani[3]Chiquitano[4] Mojeno[5] Other native[6] None [7] Others _____ (specify)

LENG1. What language did you speak at home as a child? (*accept one alternative*)

Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aimara [3] Other (native) [4] _____ Other foreign [5]_____ DK/DA [8]

LENG2. Currently, do you speak that language, or do you understand it but not speak it, or do you no longer understand it?

Speaks [1] Understands but doesn't speak [2] No longer understands [3]
DK/DA [8]

MIG1. Where were you born?

Same place as the interview [1] Another place [2] *(If the respondent was born in the same place, end the interview)*

MIG2. In which department were you born?

La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4] Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6] Pando [7] Tarija [8] Beni [9]

MIG3. Were you born in the capital city of the department or in one of the provinces?

Capital city [1] Province [2]

THANK YOU, WE HAVE ENDED.

LCUEST. Language of the interview: Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aimara [3]

VEST. The respondent was wearing: Indigenous/native dress [1]
Modern/western dress [2]

TI. Time ended ____ : ____ Duration of the interview ____ minutes

I SWEAR THAT THIS INTERVIEW WAS CARRIED OUT WITH THE SELECTED PERSON

_____ (interviewer's signature)

Signature and code Supervisor _____ **Cod.** _____ **Signature and code Verifier** _____ **Cod.** _____

TABLE # 1

Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right

TABLE #2

A lot	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Not at all	1

TABLE "4"

Approve	10
	9
	8
	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Disapprove	1

TABLE OF INCOME

- 0. Nothing***
- 1. Less than Bs. 250***
- 2. From Bs. 251 to Bs.500***
- 3. From Bs. 501 to Bs. 1000***
- 4. From Bs. 1001 to Bs. 2000***
- 5. From Bs. 2001 to Bs. 5000***
- 6. From Bs. 5000 to Bs. 10,000***
- 7. From Bs. 10,001 to Bs. 20,000***
- 8. More than Bs. 20,001***

Appendix B: Questionnaire in Quechua

CUESTIONARIO 1603: Gobernabilidad
Septiembre 2004

Ciudad _____ Localidad _____ Bar./UV _____ Mnz. _____ Viv. _____
Dirección _____

Estrato: Público [1] [5] Desarrollo alternativo

UR.: Urbano > 20.000 [1] Urbano 2-20 mil [2] Rural compacto [3] Rural disperso, menos 500 [4]

Provincia _____ Municipio _____ Cantón _____ Distrito electoral _____

UPM _____ Departamento La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4] Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6] Pando [7]

Tarija [8] Beni [9] **Q1. Sexo** (no pregunte) Hombre [1]
Mujer [2] **Edad** _____

Día del intento: Lu [1] Ma [2] Mi [3] Ju [4] Vi [5] Sa [6] Do [7] Hora de inicio: _____: _____ Fecha ____/____/2004

Noqhaxta sutiyqhakunanqha ruwasayku uj estudiuta tukuy ladupi Universidad de Pittsburg y encuestas y estudios

Sutinpi jinamanta yachanaykupaj imaynatachus runakuna umallirikunku kay phutiy kausaymanta tukuy ladupi (llajtaspi y ranchuspi . Kay estudiuwancha allinchasun waj ladumanta yanapaykunasta jinamanta yanapaspalla janchista. Kay rimariyniykiqha kanmanta kaytaqha nipi yachanqhachu . Qhan kanki ajllasqha kay tapuykunaqha quinsachunka y tawa chunka minuto kanqha sichus qhan mancharisqharaj kanki chayqha atiwas

Tapuriyta kay empresa encuestas y estudios nisqhaman kay 22786616 telefonuman kay La Paz llajtapi

Qhallarinapaj Qhan uyariyta yachanquichu noticiasta (lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)

A1. Radiunejta Ari Mana Ni ima ninchu

A2. Televisiunejta Ari Mana Ni ima ninchu

A3. Qhan ñawirinquichu noticiasta periudikupi Ari Mana Ni ima ninchu

A4. Mayqhentaj astawan phutiy kasan kay llajtanchispi? Y qhepankajtaj mayqhentaj kasan. (Dos respuestas,

marque con 1 sobre el corchete la primera preferencia y con 2 sobre el corchete la segunda preferencia)

Mana trabaju kanchu (1) Inflaciun nisqha tukuy ima valesqha (2) Pobreza(3) Suwa runas (4) Golpe de estado nisqha (5)

Mana jallp'as kanchu llank' anapaj (6) Mana kanchu creditus nisqha (7) Corrupcion (8) Problemas ecologicos nisqha (9)

Tomajkuna (10) Maqhanakujkuna (11) narcotrafico (12) marchas yaraqhay huelgas (13) maqhanakuykunas nuqhanchis pura (14)

Mana justicia kanchu (15)

Wajkuna (especifique)..... Mana kanchu phutiykunas (50) Mana yachanichu (88)

ADI. Uj frases nisqhata ñawirisqhayki, niway kan mayqhenwan de acuerdo kanki:

(1) Kay narcotrafico nisqhaqha kasanchu uj phutiy Bolivia suyupaj Mana yachanichu/ Ni ima ninchu (8)

(2) Narcotrafikuqha man phutiychu kasan Bolivia suyupaj , si no Estados Unidospaj y waj llajtakunapaj

Avesninqha tian phutiykunas kay comunidadespi y runakunapi que mana jalleh'ay atinkuchu. Avesninqha jalleh'anku chaykunataqha mañaspa yanapakunata uj funcionaru nisqhapi kay gobiernuj oficinanpi. Kan avesninqha mañankichu yanapanasunkuta...(ñawiriy kay opciones nisqhata y suyariy kutichinasunta tapuyta sapa incisupaj)

CP2. Uj diputaduta o uj senadorta Ari(1) Mana [2]
Mana yachanichu/ Ni ima ninchu (8)

CP3. Alcaldeta o concejalta Ari(1) Mana [2]
Mana yachanichu/ Ni ima ninchu (8)

CP3A. Autoridad originaria nisqhata o autoridad comunidadmanta Ari(1) Mana [2]
Mana yachanichu/ Ni ima ninchu (8)

CP4A. Prefectura nisqhata Ari(1) Mana [2]
Mana yachanichu/ Ni ima ninchu (8)

CP4B. Policia nisqhata Ari(1) Mana [2] Mana
yachanichu/ Ni ima ninchu (8)

SOCT1. ¿ imaynata khan rikunqhi llajtanchista kanchu qulqhe manachu? Qhan niwajchu sumaj kasqhanta, kanchu , avecesnin tian , avecesqha mana kanchu , manakanchu?

Sumaj tian (1) Tian (2) Avecesnin tian (3) mana kanchu (4) Nipuni kanchu (5) Mana yachanichu

SOCT2. ¿ Qhan ima niwataj kayna wata llajtanchipi karqhachu manachu qulqheqa?

Karqha (1) Kikillan kasan (2) Kunan mana kanchu (3) Mana yachanichu (8)

SOCT3. Y Kaymanta uj watamanri ¿ Qhan creenquichu que allinchakunanta chay phutiykunas kay llajtapi o kikillanpunichu kanqha o astawan phutiychu kanqha?

Allinyanqha (1) Kikillanpuni kanqha (2) sinchichaykukunqha (3) Mana yachanichu(8)

Kunanqha ñawirisaj uj tapuykunasta kay comunidadmanta y ima phutiykunaschus tian.

CP5. Kay comunidadniyquipi kan allinchayta munanquichu ima phutiykunastapis?

Ari (1) Mana (2) CP6

CP5A.Sichus ari nisunqui chayqha entonces ninki Qhan yachanquichu qhoyta qholqheta o materiales nisqhata jallchanapaj ima phutiytapis?

Ari (1) Mana (2)
Mana yachanichu (8) NDR (9)

CP5B Sichus ari nin kay CP5 ninki qhan yanapanquichu llank'aspa o mano de obra nisqhawan?

Ari (1) Mana (2)
Mana yachanichu (8) NDR (9)

CP5C. Sichus ari nin kay CP5 Sichus parlarinku phutiykunasta jallch'anapaj uj tantaypi qhan chinpaykuyta yachankichu

Ari (1) Mana (2)
Mana yachanichu (8) NDR (9)

CP5C. Sichus ari nin kay CP5 Qhan tantaykunquichu runakunata atinankupaj jallchayta phutiykunasta

Ari (1) Mana (2)
Mana yachanichu (8) NDR (9)

Kunanqha ñawirisqhayki uj listata maypichus kasanku grupos y organizaciones .
Willariwanki sichus qhan chinpaykunki kay tantaykunasman sapa kuti, avesnillan, mana ni jayk'ay chinpaykunquichu

Qhan chinpaykuy yachanquichu	sapakuti	Avecesnin	Nijayik'ay	Ni jayk'aj	Mana yachanichu ni ima ninchu
CP6. Ima Comité o sociedad iglesiamanta o templomanta?	1	2	3	4	8
CP7. Tantakuymanta tatasmanta escuelamanta?	1	2	3	4	8
CP8. Comité o junta de mejoras comunidadmanta?	1	2	3	4	8
CP9. Uj asociación profesionalesmanta, comerciantesmanta, campesinos o productoresmanta?	1	2	3	4	8
CP13. Juntas vecinalesmanta?	1	2	3	4	8
CP14. Organización territorial de base (OTB's)?	1	2	3	4	8
CP15(CAMCP13) ¿tantaykunas partidos politicsmanta?	1	2	3	4	8

L1. Kay tablapiqha kasan uj numeros llok'emanta pañaman, ujqha kasan llok'e y chunkataj paña

Politicamanta parlarispaqha ninchis que kasqhanta izquierdamanta y wajkunatataj derechamanta jinata noqhanchis rajsinchis
Qhantaj maymanta kanki izquierdamanta o derechamanta

Llok'e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 paña NS
[88]

LS3 Kunanqha rimarinki contentuchus kanki manachu kay kausaywan 1) sumay contenido, 2) tcontento, 3)ni contentuchu
4) manapuni contentuchu

Sumaj contenido (1) contenido (2) Ni contentuchu (3) manapuni
contentuchu (4) mana yachanichu (8)

IT1. Parlaspa tukuy runasmanta kay lugarmanta, gan niwajchu tukuy runas kanku sumaj confiable, algo confiable, uqhika confiable o ni ima confiable?
Sumaj confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Uqhika confiable [3] Ni ima confiable [4]

NY/MNIN [8]
IT2. Yanapanakunkuchu runakunaqha o nichu yanapanku runamasitaqha? trata de ayudar al prójimo? Paykunallamanta llakiyniyuj kanku (1) Yanapayta munanku runamasinkuta (2) Mana yachanichu (8)
IT3. Runakuna kay comunidadpi aprovechakunkuchu runamasinkunamanta kanmanta aprovechakunkumanchu manachu Ari aprovechakunkuman (1) Mana Mana aprovechakunkumanchu (2) Mana yachanichu (8)

VBPRSO2(VB2) Qhan chhijllarqhankichu kay elecciones presidenciales nisqhapi kay iskay waranqha iskay niyuy watapi

Ari (1) inscribisqha karqhani pero mana chhijllanichu (2) Mana inscribisqhachu karqhani (3) niraj junt'achasanichu chunka pusaj niyuy watata (4) Mana yachanichu / ni ima ninchu (8)

VBPTYO2 (VB3) Si votó en las elecciones de 2002=> Mayqhen partidupaj o mayqhen candidato nisqhapi chhijllarqhanki? (No lea las alternativas)

ADN (Ronald MacLean)[1] MNR (Sanchez de Lozada)[2] MIR (Paz Zamora)[3] Condepa (Valdivia)[4]
UCS (Jhonny Fernández)[5] Libertad y Justicia (Costa Obregón) [6] MAS (Evo Morales) [7]
MCC (Blattmann)[10]
MIP (F.Quispe Mallku) [11] NFR (Reyes Villa)[12] PS (Rolando Morales)[13] Nulo, blanco[88] NS / No recuerda, NR[92] NDR [99]

VB7. Según umallirikusqhaykiman jina mayqhenta qosa 1) Kay diputado plurinomial kay kista de partidos nisqhamanta, o 2) diputado uninominalchu circunscripcion niykimanta?

Partido (1) Diputado uninominal (2) Mana yachanichu mayqhenchus kasan (3) Ni mayqhen (4) mana yachanichu (8)

VB8. Mayqhentaj nuqhanchismanta astawan parlarinman uj partido politico o uj asociacion ciudadana nisqhachu?

Partido politico (1) Asociación ciudadana (2) mana yachanichu mayqhenchus kasan (3) ni mayqhen (4) mana yachanichu (8)

Diputados rajsinankupaj mayqhenchus kasan demandasnincheshqa paykunaqha yachanku kay jinamanta. Nuqha ñawirisqhaykichus ujmanda uj.

Qhan niwanqui uyarinkichus manachus chaymanta:	Uyarinkichu	Mana uyarinichu	Mana yachanic hu / NI IMA NINCH U
UNIN3. Audiencias públicas nisqha diputaduwan	1	2	8
UNIN4. Tantaykunas kay brigada departamental nisqhamanta	1	2	8
UNIN6. Foros llajtamasikunawan y diputados nisqhawan	1	2	8

UNIN7. Wayra simi nejta uyarinkichu ima huakichiytapis maypichus runakuna parlarinku kay telefono nisqhamanta parlarinankupaj diputadunkuwan y kaytaj kutichinchu tapuykunansta

Ari uyarini (1) Mana uyarinichu (2) (8) Mana yachanichu / ni ima ninchu

REFMI. Wajmanta parlarispa ¿ mayqhenwam de acuerdo kanki? 1) Gasmanta parlarispa nuqhanchis nichu metekunanchis tian dejananchischu gobierno jallch'ananta o 2) o tukuy runakunachu parlarinanchis tian y jallch'ananchis tian.

Mana entiendena jina (1) Tukuy participananchis tian (2) Mana yachanichu (8)

REFM3. ¿Qhan chhijllarqhankichu kay referendum nisqhapi kay chunka pusay niyuy p'unchayta kay julio killamanta

Ari (1) Inscrisbisqha kaqhani pero mana chhijllanichu (2) Mana inscristbisqhachu karqhani (3) Niraj junt'achasanichu chunka pusaj niyuy watata (4) Mana yachanichu / ni ima ninchu (8)

REFM4. Kunan niway imaynata umallirikunki kay referendum tapuykunasmanta:

Encuestador, entregue tarjeta no lea las opciones:

	Ari	mana	ni mayqhenta	NR M ana yachanic hu
REFMQ1. ¿Imaynata chhijllarqhanki ñaupakaj tapuypi 1?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ2. Iskaykaj tapuypi...?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ3. Quinsakaj tapuypi....?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ4 tawakaj tapuypi?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ5. pisqhaqhaj tapuypiri...?	1	2	3	8

CAI. Kay wata jamusan chaypiqha ruwakunqa uj asamblea constituyente nisqha. ¿ Qhanman imayna rijch´asunqui , qhan khawarisqhaykiman jinaqha kay constitución nisqhata cambianachu kasan tukuy imapi, o jinallatachu saquena, mana t´ojpirispa ni imata?

Watejmanta ruwana kay constituciónta (1) Saqhena mana t´ojpirinachu (2) Mana yachanichu (8)

M1. Parlaspa tukuyki kunan gobiernomanta, gan niwajchu ruasqan llank´ayninta Presidente Mesa. Sumaj Allin, allin , allillan, ni ima allin, ni imapaj allin?

Sumaj allin [1] Allin [2] Allillan [3] Ni ima allin [4] Ni imapaj allin [5] MY/MNIN [8]

NPI (NPIA). Kunanqha parlarisun kay alcaldiamanta . Kan chinpariy yachankichu kay sesion municipal nisqhaman

O waj tantaykuymán kay alcaldía o concejo municipal wajyachhijtin kay watapi?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana yachanichu / Ni ima ninchu (8)

NP2. ¿ Qhan yanapaway nispa chinpaykunkichu kay oficina publica nisqhaman o uj funcionario o concejal nisqhaman kay alcaldiamanta kay watapi?

Ari (1) Mana (2) => Pase a NP4 Mana yachanichu / Ni ima ninchu (8)

NP2A. Si solicitó algún tipo de ayuda => ontentuchu kanqui yanapayninwanqha?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Niraj yanapasawankuchu [90] Mana yachanichu / Ni
ima ninchu (8) NDR [9]

NP4. ¿ Qhan chinpaykurqhankichu kay POA (Plan Operativo Anual) nisqhata ruwanapaj kay alcaldiamanta?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana yachanichu / Ni
ima ninchu (8)

NP5. Qhan apankichu ima quejatapis kay comité de vigilancia nisqhaman kay municipiumanta?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana yachanichu/Ni
ima ninchu (8)

SGLI. Alcaldiaqha imaynata runata atienden Manchay sumajchu, sumaj, mana sumajchu?

Manchay sumaj (1) Sumaj (2) Regulares [3 Mana sumajchu (4) Pésimas [5] Mana
yachanichu(8)

SGLIP. Kay prefectura imaynata llank'asan manchay sumajchu, sumaj , mana sumajchu?

Manchay sumaj (1) Sumaj (2) Regulares [3 Mana sumajchu (4) Pésimas [5] Mana
yachanichu(8)

LGLIA. Kay instituciones mayqhenkunatachus ñawirisaj kunanqha mayqhentaj astawan yanapasunkichus jallch'anaykichajpaj phutiykunasta comunidadniykupi? ¿ Kay gobierno centralchu , kay congreso, alcaldia o prefectura nisqhachu?

El gobierno central (1) El congreso (2) Alcladia (3) prefectura (4) Ni mayqhen (5) tukuy kikinmanta(6) Mana yachanichu(8)

LGL2M ¿ Según umallikusaykiman jinaqha mayqhenman astawan qhona qholqheta y astawan tukuy ima runata kay alcaldiaman, prefecturaman o kay gobierno central nisqhamancho?

Alcaldiaman (1) prefecturaman (2) kay gobiernuman (3) Ni mayqhen(4) tukuy kikinmanta kikin (5) Mana yachanichu / ni ima ninchu (8)

LGL3M. Llajtanchis ñaupajman llojsinanpaj mayman pagananchis tian impuestutsta, ¿Alcaldiaman, prefecturaman, o kay gobierno central nisqhamancho?

Alcaldiaman (1) prefecturaman (2) Gobierno centralman (3) Ni mayqhenman(4) tukuyman kikinmanta kikin (5) Mana yachanichu / ni ima ninchu (8)

Wajkunamanta parlarispa runakunaqha ninku justicakunman uj golpe de estado nisqha kay militaresmanta o sea cuando kay militares yaykunkuman gobiernuman , chay walejchu kanman manachu... (lea los incisos y espere la respuesta).

JCI. Ari mana kanchu empleo ni pipaj walej kanman (1) mana walejchu (2)
Manayachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8)

JC11 (JC10). Ari sinchi suwa tian walej kanman (1) mana walejchu (2)
Manayachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8)

JC12 (JC13). Ari tian sinchi corrupción walej kanman (1) mana walejchu (2)
Manayachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8)

JC16. Ari tian sinchi bloqueos , paros,y tukuy ima walej kanman (1) mana walejchu (2)
Manayachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8)

JC13A. ¿Qhan rikuskaykiman jinaqha allinchu kanman uj golpe de estado nisqhaqha o ni ima kajtín kananchu tian golpeqha

Ari kanman razon (1) NI jayk´aj kanmanchu (2) Mana yachanichu/ Ni ima ninchu (8)

JC15. avesnin runakunaqha kausayta munanku democracia ukhupi imaraykuchus paykunaqha ninku que kayqha jalch´an derechos humanos nisqhata runakunamanta, pero avesninqha mana jinachu . Chayrayku wajkunaqha kausayta munanku dictadura ukhupi por que chaywanqha ninku tian seguridad. Qhan imata munanki democraciatachu o dictaduratachu?

Democraciata (1) Dictadurata (2) Mana yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

JC20. Waj runakunaqha ninku que astawan qosa kasunman mana partidos politicoswan. Ujknataj ninku que necesitanchis Kay partidusta parlarinankupaj phutiyninchismanta. ¿ mayqhenwan de acuerdu kanki?

Mana partiduswan (1) Partiduswan (2) Mana yachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8)

ACRI. Kunanqha ñawirisqhayki quinsa frase. Niway mayqhen jinata kan umallirikunki:

Mana yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

(1) Cambiakunan tian imaynatachus organizakunchis chay kay revolucionnejta

(2) kausayninchisqha tijrakunan tian kay reformas nisqhawan

(3)Mana kausayninchis ukhuphiqha kananchu tian movimientos revolucionarios nisqha

AUT10. ¿ Mayqhen tapuykunawan kan de acuerdo kasanqui? Mana yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

(1) Bolivia suyuqha necesitan uj presidenteta sumaj kallpayuyta, y churananta orden nisqhata thuru maqhiwan

(2) O Llajtanchis necesitanchu uj presidenteta pichus parlariy y uyariy tukuy kay sectores nisqhakunata kay llajtamanta?

ATU14. Ima clase presidentetataj kan munanki?
yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

Mana

(1)Jallchay munajta tukuy kay phutiykunasta, kay leyes nijta maykhenkunatachus aprueban kay congreso nisqha, aunque avesninqha kayqha sinchi unaypaj

(2) o Jallch'ay munajtachu uskayllata kay phutiykunasta. Ni congresuta kasuspa

AUTI 5. Avesnin protestas nisqhawanqha wisk'anku callista chay kajtin imata ruwanan kasan gobiernuqha?

Mana

yachanichu/ni ima ninchu(8)

(1)Parlarinanchu manifestanteswan, aunque kayqha kanman unay tiempupaj, jinamanta qhepachaspa kay economia nisqhata kay llajtamanta o

(2) O kachananchu tian policiata kichananpaj ñankunata

Ahora (entregue tabla # 2) vamos a usar esta tabla... Esta tabla contiene una escalera de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje

Kunanqha(entregue tabla # 2) apaykachasun uj tablata...Kay tablaqha tian uj escalera qanchis gradayuy, sapa ujqha niwasun uj puntaje nisqhata Ujqha niyta munan ni ima, qanchistaj tukuy ima. A ver sichus nuqha tapuyqui,gustasunquichu kaway televisiunqha, sichus kanman mana gustasunki chayqha entoncesqha kanqha ajllanki ujniyuj numeruta, pero sichus gustasunki chayqha niwanki qanchis kaj numeruta. Pero sichus kan ni ima niyta atinkichu chayqha entonces ajllariwaj chaupikay numeruta a ver prueba ruwarina. "gustasunkichu khaway television" ñawiriy numeruta por favor.(ENTIENDENASUN TIAN) TABLATA KHAWARISPA.....

	Escala							NS/NR	No conoce
	Nada					Mucho			
B1. Qhan crenkichu que kay tribunales de justicia nisqhakuna Bolivia suyupiqha Sumajtachu apaykachanku justicia nisqhata?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B2. respeto kanchu kay instituciones politicas nisqhaman kay Bolivia suyumanta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B3. Jallch'asqhachu derechos nisqha tukuy runakunajta ,kay sistema politico Nejta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B4. ¿ Qhan kusiqhachu kanki kay sistema politico ukhupi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	

B6. ¿Maykamataj yanapananchis tian kay sistema politico boliviano nisqhata?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B10A. ¿ Kanpata tianchu confiansa kay justicia nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B31A. Qhan confiankichu kay Corte Suprema de justicia nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B30.(B21) ¿ confiansayki kanchu kay partidos politicos nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B11. ¿ Confianza kanchu kay Corte Nacional Electoral nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B12 ¿Qhan confiankichu kay fuerzas armadas nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B13.¿ Confiankichu kay congreso nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B18. ¿ Confiankichu policia nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B20. ¿Confiankichu kay iglesia catolica nisqhapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B21 (B37). ¿ Confiankichu periodistas nisqhakunapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B21A. ¿Confiankichu kay llajtamanta presidentepiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B22. (B32) ¿Qhan confiankichu Gobierno municipal nisqhapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B33. ¿Confianza kanchu kay prefectura nisqhapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B22B.¿Kay autoridad originariapi kanchu confianzayqui?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B22C. ¿Confiankichu kay comité de vigilancia municipal nisqhapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23. maykamataj qhan confianqui kay sindicatos nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23A. ¿ Confiankichu kay ministerio Publico o kay fiscales nisqha kunapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23C.(B17) ¿ Maykamataj qhan confianqui kay defensor del pueblo nisqhapi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23BNR. ¿ confiankichu kay tribunales de justicia nisqhapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23E. ¿ Maykama confianki kay tribunal constitucional nisqhapiqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23B. (B44) ¿confianza kanchu kay abogados nisqhapiqha piskunachus llank'anku	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Defensores publicos jina?			
B31. ¿Qhan confiankichu kay ONG's nisqhakunawan piskunachus llank'aku Comunidadninchis ukhupi?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	
B42. ¿Confianchischu kay centros de conciliación nisqhapiqha?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	9
B43. ¿ Qhan orgullusuchu kanki kay llajtamanta kaspá?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	
B44. (B46) ¿ Qhan uyarinkichu kay delegacion presidencial anticorrupción nisqhamanta? <i>(Encuestador: Si no ha oído, anote 9 y pase a N1)</i> Qhan confiankichu kay delegación presidencial anticorrupción nisqhapiqha Piskunachus ninku que maqghanakusaskhankuta kay corrupción nisqhawan kay Bolivia suyupi?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8	9

<i>(seguir con tabla 2)</i>	Escala		NS/NR
	Nada	Mucho	
NI. Ñaupajta jina, nillawaytaj kay gobierno Carlos Mesa nisqhaqha maqghanakusanchu Kay pobreza nisqhawan.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
N3 Payqha willahuanchischu y jallch'anchu kay principio democráticos nisqhata	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
N9 . Kay Gobiernuqha maqghanakusanchu kay corrupción nisqhawan.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8

<i>(seguir con tabla 2)</i>	Escala		NS/NR
	Nada	Mucho	
Maykama qhan de acuerdo kanki kay niykunaswan.			
ING4. Kay democracia nisqhapataqha tian phutiykunas, pero kunanqha astawan kosa ima gobiernumantapis	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8
PN2. Mana ujllachu kanchis avesninqha tukuy piensanchi wajjinata, pero uj llajtamanta kaspqha tian waj valores nisqha piskunachus ujllapi tantaykuwanchis Uj llajtata jina.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7		8

<i>(seguir con tabla 2)</i>	Escala		NS/NR
	Nada	Mucho	

LENG10. Kan de acuerduchu kawaj que kay wayra simispi y televisiunkunaspi kananta Wakichiykunas khallunchispi	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
LENG11. Qhan de acuerduchu kanki que yachay huasispi yachachinankuta khallunchaj'pi	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8
LENG12. Qhan de acuerduchu kanki que kay funcionarius nisqhakunaqha parlanankuta khallunchajta	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	8

Bolivia suyuqha manchay chajru, chayraykutaj sapa uj nuqhanchisqha yachanchis maymantachus jamunchis chayta Avesninqha ninchis boliviano kani nispa , pero nillanchistaj paceño kani nispa o cambia kani nispa. Jinamanta kay escala nisqhapiqha ujqha kasan ni ima y qhanchistaj assqhha.....

(seguir con tabla 2)	Escala							NS/NR
	Nada	Mucho						
BETIDI. ¿ imaynapi qhan sientekunki boliviano runa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<i>Encuestador: Para la siguiente pregunta utilice la referencia de acuerdo al departamento donde realiza la encuesta:</i>								
BETID2. Imaynapi qhan kanki [Paceño, Cruceño, Cochabambino, Orureño, Chuquisaqueño, Potosino, Pandino, Tarijeño, Beniano]?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID3. ¿Imaynapi qhan kanki kay cultura aymaramanta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID4. ¿ Imaynapi qhan kanki kay cultura Quechua nisqhamanta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID5. ¿Imaynapi qhan kanki kay cultura Camba nisqhamanta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID6. Periodistas nisqhakunaqha avesninqha parlanku kay Santa Cruz ,Beni, Pando, chuquisaca y tarija llajtasmanda , “region media luna nisqhamanta”. ¿qhan uyarinkichu parlajta kaymantaqha? Encuestador: si responde NO anote [9] y pase a la siguiente ¿Qhan partechu kanki kay media luna nisqhamantaqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	[9] 8

Kunanqha waj tabla cambiasun (entregue tabla 4) kay mosoj tablapiqha tian uj escalera chunka gradayuj, ñaupajwanqha kanqha que kanqha mana de acuerduchu kanki y chunka huantaj de acuerdo kanki. Tapuykunaqha kasan yachanapaj imaynata

umallirikunku piskunachus kay Bolivia suyupi kausanku. (Encuestador: No olvide cambiar de escala).

	Escalera										NS/NR
	Desaprueba					Aprueba					
D1. Tian uj runakunaqha que mana sumajtachu parlanku kay gobiernumanta, mana kay gobiernullamantachu sino tukuy kay sistema de gobierno Boliviano nisqhamanta. ¿qhan de acuerduchu manachu kanki, choqhanankupaj manachu kay runakunaqha? Por favor kutichiwaj chay tapuyta uj numeruwan. SONDEE: Maykamataj chay kasan?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D2. Piensallasapuni tukuy chay runakunapi piskunachus mana sumaj parlankuchu kay gobiernumata ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu kanki manachu kay manifestaciones pacificas nisqhawan jinamanta uyarichinankupaj imatachus munanku y umallirikunku chayta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D3. ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu kanki kay runakunawan piskunachus mana sumajtachu parlanku kay gobiernumanta, chaykuna atinkumanchu yaykuyta kay cargos publicos nisqhaman.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D4. ¿Qhan de acuerduchu manachu kanki , piskunachus parlanku mana sumajtachu kay gobierno nisqhamanta llojsinankuta televisionpi uj discursuwan?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
D5. kunanqha parlaspa kay homosexuales nisqhakunamanta paykuna atinkumanchu yaykuyta kay cargos publicos nisqhaman?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

Kunanqha manaña parlanachu chay runasmanta piskunachus mana sumajta parlankuchu kay gobiernumanta . Kunanqha parlarisun tukuy runakunamanta. Imayna qhanman rijchasunki walejchu manachu.....(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #4).

	Escala										NS/NR
	Desaprueba					Aprueba					
E5. Tukuy runakunaqha chinpaykunankuta kay manifestaciones nisqhaman mayqhenchus jalch'asqha kasan uj kamachiy rayku?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E8.Tukuy runakunaqha chinpaykunankuta uj organización nisqhapi, Jinamanta atinankupaj jalch'ayta phutiykunasta kay comunidadespi?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E11.Quekay runakuna llank'anakuta campañas electorales nisqhapi uj partido politikupaj o uj candidatupaj?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E15.Que runakunaqha chinpaykunankuta kay callista bloqueaj?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E14. Runakuna yaykunankuta kay propiedades privadasman?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E2. Runakuna qhhechunankuta kay fabricas, oficinas o waj edifiiciusta ima?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E3. Que runakuna participananta uj grupu nisqhapi, piskunachus orqhoymunanku gobiernu ajllasqhaa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E16 Que runakunaqha ruwanankuta justiciata makisninkuwan,mana estadu castigajtin juchayujkunata	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

Kanqha parlarisun imata ruwanman kay estado nisqhaqha.Pay aproban manchu manachu...(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #4).

	Escala										NS/NR
	Desaprueba					Aprueba					
C3 (D32). ¿Imayna kanman sichus kanman uj kamachiy,manaña kananpaj manifestaciones publicas nisqha?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
C5. (D33) ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu kanki manachu sichus manaña	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

dejankumanchu tantakunankuta runakuna piskunachus mana de acuerduchu kanku kay sistema político boliviano nisqhawan?		
C6. ¿Qhan de acuerduchu kaway sichus gobiernuqha mana dejanmanchu kananta propagandas politicas uj ladumanta?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

<p>PN4. Kunan qhan contentuchu kanki manachu kay democracia nisqhawan kay Bolivia suyupi?</p> <p>Manchay contentu kani(1) Contento kani (2) Mana contentuchu kani(3) Manchay mana contentucho kani(4) Mana yachanichu /ni ima ninchu (8)</p>
<p>PN5. Según rijch´asunki jina Bolivia suyuqha sinchi democraticachu, ujchhikan democraticachu o manachu democratica?</p> <p>suyuqha sinchi democraticachu(1) sinchi democraticachu(2), ujchhikan democraticachu(3) manachu democratica(4) Mana yachanichu /ni ima ninchu (8)</p>

Kunanqha parlarina ima politicas nisqhata ruwanman kay gobiernu kay gas parlaymanta. Uj escalata apaykachaspa ujmanata asta chunka.....

<i>(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #4).</i>	Escalera										NS/NR
	Desaprueba					Aprueba					
REFM41. ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu kanki manachu gasta vendenapaj Chile llajtaman?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM42. ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu manachu kanki gasta vendenapaj Estados Unidos llajtaman?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM43. ¿Qhan de acuerduchu manachu kanki que Bolivia suyuqha qonanta un pedazo jallp´ata Chile llajtaman , jinamanta atinanchispaj Llojsiyta mar nisqhaman?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM31. ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu kanki manachu que kay yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales nisqhaqha apaykachananta kay actividad petrolera Nisqhata kay Llajtamanta	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM32. ¿Qhan de acuerduchu kanki que kay gobiernuqha nacionalizananta kay	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

empresas petroleras nisqhata, jinamanta carguchakunakupaj YPFB?		
REFM33. ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu manachu kanki que kay gobiernuqha nacializananta kay petroleo y gas nisqhata,pero contrataspa empresas petrolerasta apananpaj y vendenanpaj?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
REFM34. ¿Qhan de acuerduchu kanki manachu manaña pagakunapaj Bonosol nisqha, y chay qulqhetaj rinanta kay YPFB?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
REFM51. ¿ Qhan de acuerduchu kanki que kay compañías petroleras nisqhakunaqha paganankuta impuestusta poqhoyinmanta?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

REFM35. ¿ Kanman jina pitaj qhawan tian kay gas negociota?

- (1) Kay empresas privadas
 - (2) empresas maypichus tian participacion kay estaduyta y kay capital privado nisqhata
 - (3) Estado saphitallan
- Mana yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

REFM52. ¿ Chay qolqhe chay exportaciones nisqhamantaqha imapi gastasunman? (lea las alternativas excepto otros y NS/NR)

- Educacionpi(1) Saludpi(2) ñankunapi (3) Empleospi(4) manaña corrupción kananpaj (5) wajkunapi(6) Mana yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

¿Kay afirmaciones nisqhamanta mayqhenwan de acuerdu kanki?

NEWTOL4A.1) Estaduqha mana dejananchu kananta waj uyaykunas maykunachus mana dejankuchu Bolivia suyu ñaupajman llojsinanta 2) staduqha mana derechun kananchu tian mana dejananpaj waj uyaykunasta.

Mana dejajta parlayta (1) Dejajta parlayta (2) Mana yachanichu (8)

NEWTOL5. 1) Tukuy homosexuales nisqhakunaqha tiananku karqha derechuyuy organizakunakupaj , vistikunakupaj munasqhankuman jina 2) homosexuales nisqhakunaqha qhonku mal ejempluta wawasman, chayraykutaj chaytaka qhawan tian gobiernu

Tiyan derechunku (1) Controlasqha kananku tian (2) Mana yachanichu (8)

NEWTOL7.1)Llajtanchisqha ujlla kanan tian imapis kachu 2) Manachu kikin piensanchis chayraykutaj bolivia suyuqha p'itinakunan tian

Llajtanchisqha ujlla kanan tian (1) Llajtanchisqha mana p'itinakunanchu tian (2) mana yachanichu(8)

NEWTOL8: 1) kosachu kanman sichus llajtanchispiqha kanman uj culturalla2) Kay pueblos indigenas nisqhakunaqha, jallch'anankuchu tian kay valores, cultura y parlayninchista ima

Uj cultura nacionalla kanman (1) Jallch'anankuta valores nisqhata (2) mana yachanichu (8)

BTOL1. 1) Politica nisqhapiqha educacionniyuy runakunallachu participayta atinkuman o....2) o tukuychu atisunman participayta kay politica nisqhapi educacion niyuypis manapis kachun.

Educacion niyuy runas (1) Tukuy runakuna (2) Mana yachanichu(8)

BTOL2Waj runakunaqha phutisqha kasanku que kay qhepan elecciones nisqhapiqha chhijllasqha kanman uj llajtamasi campumanta presidente jina kay llajtamanta. Pero ujrunaqha ninku que kayqha, mana importantechu kasqhanta politica ukhupiqha, mayqhenwan de acuerdu kanki?

Phutiychu que campumanta runa kananta presidente(1) Mana chay importancho (2) Mana yachanichu(8)

BTOL3.1) wajkunawan rimarinchis chayqha uyayninchisqha ultimo camachu kanan tian o.....2) o avesninqha ya ninachu Uj acuerduman chayanapaj.

Uyaykunasta ultimu kama apayqhachana (1) Avesninqha ya nina uj acuerduman chayanapaj (2) Mana yachanichu(8)

BTOL4. 1) Uj mañay kajtin kay gobiernumantqha, junt'achakunan kamachu makanakunanchis tian o....2) Aceptallasunchu oferta nisqhata kay gobiernumanta amapis junt'achunchu mañasqhanchista.

Ultimu kama (1) Aceptanalla oferta nisqhata(2) Mana yachanichu (8)

BTOL5. 1) Bolivia suyu jallp'aqha pueblos originariuspatachu ...2) Tukuy bolivianuchu kanchis derechuyuj jallp'ayuy kanaman

Pueblos originariuspata (1) Tukuy kikin derechuyuy kanchis (2) Mana yachanichu (8)

ECREGI. 1) Bolivia suyupiqha ,uj chhiqha departamentos nisqhamanta jallch'ayqha ñaupajman llajtanchista thasquichin

2) Tukuy yanapanchis ñaupajman llojsinanpaj llajtanchis.

Ujchhiqha depatamentulla (1) Tukuy yanapanchis ñaupajman llojsinanpaj llajtanchis
(2) Mana yachanichu(8)

ECREG2. Bolivia suyupiqha tian qhapaj llajtas. Kunanqha ñawirisqhayki imarayku tian chay. Noqhaqha sinchi kusikusaj sichus niwanki mayqhentaj kasan qhapaj kanakupaj waj llajtas: (leer alternativas excepto "ninguna de las anteriores"))

Mana yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

- (1) Waj llajtaspiqha tian astawan recursos naturales nisqha
- (2) Waj llajtaspiqha runaqha sumajta llank'an
- (3) Kay La Paz llajtallapi tukuy ima chayqha centralismo sutikun chayqha mana dejanchu nin waj llajtakuna llojsinankuta ñaupajman (4) Kay politicas económicas nisqhaqha mana dejanchu waj llajtakuna llojsinankuta ñaupajman
- (5) Ama ñawiriychu ñaupakunata

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Yachanqui jinaqha kay sectores y grupos sociales nisqhakunaqha manchay atiyiniyuj gobierno imatachus ninqha chaypi y jinallataj imatachus ruwasun llajtanchis ukhupi ,ujkunaqha astawan y ujkunataj mana. Ñaupajman llojsinanpaj llajtanchisqha Sapa kay sectores imayna atiyiniyujtaj kananku karqha kay sectores o grupos nisqhakunaqha?

	Mancha y atiyiniyuj	Ujchhiqha atiyiniyuj	Mana atiyiniyuj	NS/NR
BPOD1. Empresarios privados	1	2	3	9
BPOD2. campumanta runakuna	1	2	3	9
BPOD3. Comités Cívicos y representantes regionales	1	2	3	9
BPOD4. Organizaciones indígenas	1	2	3	9
BPOD5. Transportistas	1	2	3	9
BPOD6. La COB y los sindicatos	1	2	3	9

PROT1. ¿Qhan manifestacionespi participayta yachanquichu? Avesninchu chinpaykunki, ni jayk'aj?

Participayta[1]Avesnin (2) ni jayk'aj(3)]=> salte a AOJI Mana yachanichu(8)

PROT2 Protestas karqha kay octubre killapi kay gobierno Sanchez de Lozada contranpi Qhan chayman chinpaykurqhankichu?

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Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana yachanichu / ni ima ninchu (8)

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PROT3. ¿Kay gobierno Carlos Mesa marchas contranpi chayman qhan chinpaykunquichu?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana yachanichu / ni ima ninchu (8)

PROT4. ¿Kay ultimu wataspi qhan chinpaykunkichu kay gobierno municipal marchaj contranpi?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana Yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

PROT5. khhasillachu karqha kay protestas nisqha o atiyuniyuchu karqha(*Referido a cualquier protesta*)

Atiyuniyuy karqha (1) Khhasilla karqha (2) Mana yachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8) NDR (dijo “nunca/no” a Prot1 a Prot4) [9]

AOJ1. Wajkunamanta parlarispa ¿Willanachu kanman uj delito nisqhata policiaman o autoridades nisqhakunaman chayqha facilchu manachu kasan?

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Facillla (1) Mana facilchu (2) Mana yachanichu/ ni ima ninchu (8)

AOJ3 (VICI). Kay wataspi kan makhhanakunkichu o suwasunkuchu imatapis?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana yachanichu ni ima ninchu (8)

AOJ3B. [VIC1A] kkay wataspi mayqhen parienteykitapis makhhankuchu o suwankuchu imatapis?

Ari (1) Mana (2) Mana yachanichu ni ima ninchu (8)

AOJ3A [AOJ1A]. Si ha sido víctima el o su familia => Willankichu chanta policiaman o PTJtaman o ima autoridadmanpis comunidadniykimanta suwasuskanmanta?

Policiaman (1) Autoridad comunidadmanta (2) Mana willanichu (3) Mana yachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8) NDR (9)

AOJ4 (STI).- Tramites ruwaskaykimanta policiawan contentuchu kanki manachu?

Manchay contentu(1) contentulla (2) Mana contentuchu (3) Manchay mana conentuchu(4) Mana ruwanichu tramites nisqhata(9) mana yachanichu/ni imaninchu (8)

AOJ6 (ST2). Qhan contentuchallu kanki tramites ruwaskaykimanta kay juzgados o tribunales de justicia nisqhapi?

Manchay contentu(1) contentulla (2) Mana contentuchu (3) Manchay mana conentuchu(4)
 Mana ruwanichu tramites nisqhata(9) mana yachanichu/ni imaninchu (8)

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AOJ8a kay quinsa ujniyuymanta pacha kay mayo killamanta kay iskay waranqha ujniyuw watanapacha yaykupa kan kay mossoj codigo de procedimiento penal. ¿qhan uyarinkichu o ñawirinkichu kay codigo nisqhataqha?

Ari (1)

Mana (2)

Mana yachanichu (91)

AOJ17 c. Kay codigo nisqhapiqha tian disposiciones nisqhakuna. Juchayujtaqha ni juchachasunmanchu chay ratuqha asta demostrananchis kama sumajta juchayujchus manachus kasan chayta. Qhanman imayna kay rijch'asunki

sumaj allin [1] allillan [2] imayna malas [3] ancha malas [4]

AOJ13. (AOJ11) ¿Seguruchu kanki tuta purispa tiakunki chaypiqha? Qhan imayna sientekunki?

Sumaj allin (1) Uchhika allin (2) uchhika mana allin (3) ni uchhikita allin (4) Mana yachanchu/mana ima ninchu (8)

AOJ12 Sichus suwasunkuman chayqha ¿ Qhan confiawajchu kay sitema judicial nisqhapi castiganapaj juchayujta?

Sumaj confiani (1) confiallani (2) ujchhikallata(3) Mana konfianichu(4) Mana yachanichu/ni ima ninchu(8)

AOJ14. (DEM2) ¿ Kay quinsakay frasesmanta mayqhenwan de acuerdu kanki?

- (1) Waj runakunamanqha importan kananqha uj regimen democratico nisqha o mana democratico nisqha
- (2) Democracia nisqhaqha walej pacha waj jina gobiernumanka
- (3) Wajkunapiqha uj gobierno autoritario nisqhaqha walej pacha uj gobierno democratico nisqhamanqha

Kunanqha parlarisun imaynatachus kan kausanki ...	No	Sí	NS
EXC2. ¿Policia nisqhaqha mañasunkichu uj coima nisqhata kay watpiqha?	0	1	8
EXC6. ¿Mañasunkichu uj coima nisqhata empleado publico nisqhaqha?	0	1	8

<p>EXC11 ¿ Trámites nisqhata ruwankichu alcaldíapi kay watasqha?[Si dice no marcar 9 si dice"si" preguntar lo siguiente] Sichus mana nisunki chayka marcanayki tian jisk'un kaj numeruta pero sichus nisunki ari nispa entoncesqha tapuriy kayta]</p> <p>Trámites ruwanapajqha alcaldíapiqha pagankichu assitutawan kamachiyman jinaqha?</p>	0	1	8	9
<p>EXC13. Llankanayki ukhupi mañasunkuchu ima pagutapis?</p>	0	1	8	
<p>EXC14.¿ kay wataspi chinpaykunkichu juzgatusman? [sichus mana nisunki chayqha jisk'un numeru raqhaykuj,pero sichus ari nisunka chayqha tapuriy kayta]</p> <p>¿ Pagankichu coima nisqhata juzgatusman kay watasqha?</p>	0	1	8	9
<p>EXC15. ¿ Rinkichu hospitalesman kay wataqha? [Sichus mana nisunki chayqha raqhaykuy jisk'un kaj numeruta, sichus ari nisunki chayqha tapuriy kayta]</p> <p>Atiendenasukupaj hospitalpi o centros de salud nisqhapiqha pagankichu coima nisqhata?</p>	0	1	8	9
<p>EXC16 ¿ tianrajchu wawasninki yachay wasipi? [Sichus mana nisunki chayqha raqhaykuy jisk'un kaj numeruta, sichus ari nisunki chayqha tapuriy kayta]</p> <p>Yachay wasikunapiqha pagankichu uj coima nisqhataqha?</p>	0	1	8	9

EXC7 Kay corrupción nisqhamanta uyarinkichu kanman jinaqha kayqha tukuy funcionarios públicos ukhupi generalizada, generalizada, poco generalizada o nada generalizada?

Ancha generalizasqa (1) Generalizasqa (2) Uchhika geberalizasqa (3) Ni ima generalizasqa (4) MY/MNIN(8)

EXC7B. Corrupción nisqhaqha kuraj kay funcionarios públicos ukhupi kay gobiernumanta,prefecturapi,alcaldíapi?

Gob. central [1] Prefectura [2] Municipalidad [3] *No lea: Todos igual* [4] mana yachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8)

<p>Sichus uj runaqha siga gobiernuta critican chayqha, mana gobiernullatachu jinallataj kay democracia nisqhata kanman jinaqha kay runaqha kay derechusniyuychu kanman karqha: [Entregar Tabla # 4]</p>	
	<p>Escala</p> <p>Desaprueba Aprueba</p>
DNI. ¿ Maykanataj chhijllanan karqha?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]
DN2. ¿Derechuyujchu kanan karqha manifestaciones ruwananman, rimarinanpaj imatachus munan chayta?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]
DN3. ¿Maykamataj derechun tian yaykunanpaj uj cargo publico nisqhaman?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]
DN4. ¿Maykamataj derechun tian llojsinanpaj televisionpi, discursuta qhospa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]

	Respuesta	
G11. ¿Yachankichu imachus sutichakun presidente kay Estados unidos nisqhamanta? (Busch)	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correcto
G12 (G15). Yachankichu sutinta presidente del Brasil llajtamanta? [Lula]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correcto
G213 Yachankichu imachus sutingha kay Argentinamanta presidente [Kirchner]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correcto
G14. ¿ yachankichu masqha diputaduchus tian congreso nisqhapi? (130)	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correcto
G15. ¿yachankichu imachus sutin diputadujta kay circunscripción nisqhamata?	[0] NS	
G16. Qhan mana ni mayqhen partidumanta kaspata atinki candidatu kayta chayta yachankichu?¿Cómo? [Sí se puede con las asociaciones ciudadanas]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correcto

Q3. ¿ Ima religionmanta kanki

Católico (participante) [1] Católico (no participante) [2] Evangélica [3] Cristiano [4]
 Ninguna [6] Otro _____ NS/NR [8]

Q4.¿Kay ultimo killapi masqha kutita rinki iglesiaman _____ veces (88= NS/NR)

Kunanqha tukuchinapajqha tapurisqhayki chayqha yachanapaj imaynachus kasanki .Wasiykipi kanchu

	Mana	Uj	Iskay, manta kuraj	Mana yachanic hu ni ima ninchu	Masqhha
R1. Televisor a color	0	1	2	8	
R2. Televisor en Bco/negro	0	1	2	8	

	mana	ari	Mana imaninchu		Mana	ari	Mana ima ninchu		man		
R3. Heladera/refrigerador	0	1	8	R10. Energía eléctrica	0	1	8	R18. Tarjeta de crédito	0		
R4. Teléfono	0	1	8	R11 [R12]. Agua potable	0	1	8	R19. Computadora casa	0		
R5. Automóvil o camión	0	1	8	R13. Bicicleta	0	1	8	R20. Microondas	0		
R6. Lavaropa	0	1	8	R14. Alcantarillado	0	1	8	R21 Fax	0		
R7. Microondas	0	1	8	R15. Video Grabadora	0	1	8	R22 Aire Acod/chimene	0		
R8. Motocicleta	0	1	8	R16. Celular	0	1	8	R23 Antena parabólica	0		
R9. Tractor	0	1	8	R17. TV cable	0	1	8	R 24 Auto Cuántos _____ Año _____ año _____ año _____	0		

R12 Anotajkuy Mana Tapurisapalla Imaynachus Pampa Wasinmanta

Jalp'amanta (1) Madera [2] Cemento, ladrillo, terrazo, baldosa [4] cerámica o mosaico [5] no se pudo ver [90]

OCUPI. ¿ Imapi qhan llank'anki?. (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)

1.- Auto Empleados		2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:		3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remun	
Pay kikin dueño jatun o mediano empresario	1	Mana dueñuchu llank'aqlla	6	Wasillapi	12
Juchuy empresario	2	Maychus chaylla empresario	7	Yachay wasiman chinpaykuj	13
Jalp'api llank'ajkuna duenus,inquilinos	3	Empleada jinalla llank'an	8	Manaña llankànchu	14
uywata uywajkuna	4	Fabricapi llankàq	9	Mayàchustiyàn llankày chay llankàn	15

sumaq yachaq profesional	5	Campeños empleados en faenas agrícolas	10
		Uq tiendapi llankàq artesano jina	11

OCUP2 kay tapuyqha dueñuspaj y inquilinuspaj Masqhha hectarea jallp´amantataj dueño kanki o masqha hectareatataj alquilakunki?

.....(use decimales si es necesario) NDR (99)

DESOCI Tukuypaj=> ¿ kay watapi llank´ankichu manachu?

Ari (1) Mana (2)=> pase a ED estudiante, ama de casa jubilado (9)

DESOC2 *sichus ari nin chayqha*=> **masqha semanata kay watapi mana llank´ayniyui kanki?** _____ semanas NDR [9]

OCUP3. ¿imapi trabajan qusayki _____ (describe si es empleado o autoempleado).

ED. Ima watakama chinpaykunki yachay wasiman?

- Ninguna : 0 - Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 => Primaria - Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8 => Primaria
 - Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 => Secundaria - Técnica o Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18

EDI. Qusaykiri ima watakama chinpaykun yachay wasiman qhusaykiri?

- Ninguna : 0 - Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 => Primaria - Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8 => Primaria
 - Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 => Secundaria - Técnica o Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18

ED2 Yachay wasi maypichus => Estudianki chayqha fiscalchu o particularchu karqha?

Escuela fiscal [1] Escuela privada [2] Estudió en los dos sistemas [3]

Q10.masqhhata ganankichis (muestre la tarjeta de ingresos) tukuy piskunachus kaypi kausankichis chaykunaqha?

Nada [0] Menos de 250 Bs. [1] De 251 a 500 Bs. [2] De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3] De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4]
 De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5] De 5001 a 10.000 Bs. [6] De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7]
 más de 20.000 [8] NS/NR [88]

Q11. Imataj estado civilniyquiha (No lea las alternativas)

Soltero [1] Casado [2] Unión libre, concubinato [3] Divorciado [4] Separado [5]
Viudo [6] NS/NR [8]

Q12. masqhataj wawasniykiha _____ **wawas** _____ **mana wawasnin**
kanchu(0)

ETID. Qhan imayna kanki yuraj runa , cholachu,metizuchu,indigenachu o yanarunachu o originariuchu?

Blanca [1] Chola [2] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] originario [6] Otra
_____ NS/NR [8]

ETID2. [Census] ¿ Ñaupata tatasniyki imataj karqhanku? (leer todas las opciones)

Quechua [1] Aymará[2] Guarani[3]Chiquitano[4] Mojeno[5] Otro nativo[6] ninguno [7] otros
_____ (especificar)

LENGI. Juch'uy manta pacha ima qhalluta parlarqhanki?

Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymarará [3] Otro (nativo) [4] _____ Otro extranjero
[5]_____ NS/NR [8]

LENG2. Kunan parlankichu chay qhalluykita o manañachu parlanqui?

Parlani (1) Entiendeni pero mana parlanichu (2) manaña entiendenichu (3) mana yachanichu/ni ima ninchu (8)

MIGI. ¿ Maypi qhan turirinki)

Kaypi (1) wajladupi (2) (Si nació en el mismo lugar,
termine la entrevista)

MIG2. ¿ ima llajtapi jurikunkii?

La Paz [1]Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4]Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6]Pando [7] Tarija
[8] Beni [9]

MIG3. ¿ juch'uy llajtaspihu jurikunki provincias nisqhapichu?

Ciudad capital [1] Provincia [2]

Pachi tukuchinchis

LCUEST. Idioma de la entrevista: Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymará [3]

VEST. El entrevistado vestía: Traje indígena/nativo [1] Traje moderno/occidental [2]

TI. Hora terminada ____:____ **tiempo de duración de la entrevista** ____ minutos

YO JURO QUE ESTA ENTREVISTA FUE LLEVADA A CABO CON LA PERSONA SELECCIONADA

_____ (firma del encuestador)

Firma y código Supervisor _____ Cod. _____ Firma y código Validador
_____ Cod. _____

Appendix C: Questionnaire in Aymará

CUESTIONARIO 1603: Gobernabilidad Septiembre 2004

Ciudad _____ Localidad _____ Bar./UV _____ Mnz. _____ Viv. _____ Dirección _____

Estrato: Público [1] [5] Desarrollo alternativo

UR.: Urbano > 20.000 [1] Urbano 2-20 mil [2] Rural compacto [3] Rural disperso, menos 500 [4]

Provincia _____ Municipio _____ Cantón _____ Distrito electoral _____

UPM _____ Departamento La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4] Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6] Pando [7]

Tarija [8] Beni [9] **Q1. Sexo** (no pregunte) Hombre [1] Mujer [2]

Edad _____

Día del intento: Lu [1] Ma [2] Mi [3] Ju [4] Vi [5] Sa [6] Do [7] Hora de inicio: _____:_____

Fecha ____/____/2004

Nayan sutijaxa Aka estudio lurastanwa taqi Bolivia uraqina Universidad de Pittsburgh y Encuestas Y Estudios ufana sutipxaru kunjamakisa situación nacional y local ukanakax uka yatiñataki. Aka estudios wakichistaniwa narrar sarntañataki yamakís yanapt'awi anqa markata mayiñataki, ukhamata taqinis askinaka katuqañataki. Amuyunakamax voluntaria ukast confidencial ukjamawa. Jumawa chijllatata aka parlaw lurañataki 30 y 40 minutonakaw aruskipt'añani. Jumaxa payachasta ukawsaxa empresa Encuestas y Estudios uka tiliphunuruw jawsasma 2-2786616 ukax La Paz jach'a markankiwa.

Qalltañatakixa jichuntatati programa de noticias yatiyaw ist'irixa.. (lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)

A1. Radio tuqi Si [1] No [0] NR [8]

A2. Televisión tuqi Si [1] No [0] NR [8]

A3. Noticias periódicochoch ullta Si [1] No [0] NR [8]

A4. Smuyumatakixa, kawneris ancha jan walt'aws pais uñkatixa? Payiristi kawnerirakisa? (Dos respuestas, marque con 1 sobre el corchete la primera preferencia y con 2 sobre el corchete la segunda preferencia)

Jani imaqaq utjatapa [1] Inflación, precios altos, costo de vida [2] Psin sarnaqaña [3] Delincuencia [4] Peligro de golpe de estado [5]

Jani uraq utjata yapuchañataki [6] Falta de crédito [7] Corrupción [8] Problemas ecológicos [9] drogadicción [10]

Violencia doméstica [11] narcotráfico [12] Conflictos Sociales [13] Conflictos Regionales [14] Injusticia [15]

Otros (*especifique*) _____ No hay problemas [50] NS [88]

AD1. Jichhax ullart'arapimawa aka qilqanaka, uka sitataw kawnirimpis jan akututta:

[1] Narcotráficox Boliviatqix ancjha jan walt'aw apani NS/NR [8]

[2] Narcotráficox janiwa Boliviatqix jan walt'awiki antisas Estados Unidos ukat yaqha paísanakatakiwa jan walikiti.

Yaqhipacha pachaxa jabniwa ayllunakaxa jupapacha askichañ jan waltáwinaka atipkiti. Yaqhipa pacha gobierno oficianan ukan irnaqirinakapampiwa askichapxi. Mä kunawsas yanapa maytati...(*lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso*)

CP2. Mä diputado jan ukasax senadoraru Jisa [1]Janiwa [2]
NS/NR [8]

CP3. Mä Alcalde jan ukasaxa concejalaru Jisa [1]janiwa [2]
NS/NR [8]

CP3A. Mä autoridad originaria jan ukasax autoridad de la comunidad indígenaru Jisa [1]
Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

CP4A. Mä prefecturaru Jisa [1]Janiwa [2]
NS/NR [8]

CP4B. Mä policía utaru Jisa [1]Janiwa[2]
NS/NR [8]

SOCT1. ¿kunjamsa taqi tuqita uñtasaxa Boliviana qullqi ecomia apnaqawipa uñntaxa? wali sumati, walikiti, tantiyucha; jan walicha ancha jan walicha?
Wali sumati [1] walikiti [2] tantuyucha [3] jan walicha [4] Ancha jan walicha [5] janiw yatkiti [8]

SOCT2. ¿Kunjamsa amuyta Jumaxa. Boliviana situación economicapaxa, kusati, maymar kikipacha jan ukax juk'ampi jan walicha?
Kusa [1] kikipa[2] juk'amp jan wali [3] janiw yatkiti [8]

SOCT3. Akata mä mararu, ¿jumatakixa kunjamaspas jichhaxa paisan situación económicapaxa, kikipa.antis juk'ampi jan walicha?
Kusa [1] kikipa[2] juk'amp jan wali [3] janiw yatkiti [8]

Jichhaxa aka comunidan jan jiskt'awinakapa ja n walt'awinakapa ullart'arapima.

CP5. ¿ yaqhip pachaxa comunidadaman o barrioman irnaqtati askichtacha jan walt'awinaka?
Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] =>CP6

CP5A. Si responde si CP5 => materiales u qullqimpichao mä jan walt'awinaka askichañataki u sumaptayañataki?

LS3. Jichhaxa. Juman amut'awinakama: Jakawimanxa kuna puntukamas satisfecho kusisitata? Sasmati kunjamsa jikxatata 1) ancha satisfecho, 2) turpa satisfecho, 3) mä juk'a jani satisfecho o 4) ancha jani satisfecho?

Ancha satisfecho [1] Mä juk'a satisfecho [2] Jani insatisfecho [3] Ancha jani insatisfecho [4]
NS [8]

<p>IT1. Jichhaxa, akankiri jakirinakampi parl'tasaxa, ¿ Sasmati comunidaman jakirinakamaxa ..? (<i>lea alternativas</i>)</p> <p>Ancha confiable [1] Turpa confiable [2] Juk'a confiable [3] janiwa confiable [4] NS [8]</p>
<p>IT2. ¿Amuytati jilpacha jakirinakaxa jupan kikipa jan walt'awinakapata preocupasixa, u amuyamatakixa jilpachanixa nayniru jan walt'awimpi ukaru yanapaña amticha?</p> <p>Jupapachatwa preocupasiski [1] Nayniru yanapt'aña amtarakiwa [2] NS [8]</p>
<p>IT3. ¿ Amuytati jilpachanixc jakirinakaxa, mä oportunidad utjaspa ukawsaxa, Jumata aprovechasiña munaspati, jan ukasaxa amuyumatakixa janich jumat aprovechasiña munkaspaxa?</p> <p>Jisa aprovechaspawa [1] Janiwaaprovechaskaspati [2] NS [8]</p>

VBPRS02 [VB2]. Jumax elecciones presidenciales de 2002 ukana votompi chijlltati?

Jisa [1] Qiqatakasinwa jan voto uskti[2] janiwa qilqatakayatti[3] Menor de edadatwa[4]
NS/NR [8]

VBPTY02 [VB3]. Si votó en las elecciones de 2002= Kawnir partidotaki khiti candidatotakis presidenteñapatakis voto uskuntaxa? (No lea las alternativas)

ADN (Ronald MacLean)[1] MNR (Sanchez de Lozada)[2] MIR (Paz Zamora)[3] Condepa (Valdivia)[4] UCS (Jhonny Fernández)[5] Libertad y Justicia (Costa Obregón) [6] MAS (Evo Morales) [7] MCC (Blattmann)[10] MIP (F.Quispe Mallku) [11] NFR (Reyes Villa)[12] PS (Rolando Morales)[13] Nulo, Janq'u[88] NS / janiw amtaskti NR[92] NDR [99]

VB7. Amuyumatakixa, khitis mejor representatixa1) diputado plurinominal de la lista de partidos, o 2) diputado uninominal de su circunscripción?

Partido [1] Uninominal [2] janiw kawnirist amuykti[3] janiw khititsa[4] NS [8]

VB8. Jichhax jumatakixa kawnirisa interesanakama sumana ñastayaspa, mä partido político u jan ukasax mä asociación ciudadanacha?

Partido político [1] Asociación ciudadana [2] janiw amuyti kawnirsa [3] Janiw khitisa[4]
NS [8]

Diputados uninominalanakana markan kuntix mayipki uka uñt'añatakixa utjiwa akhma medionaka. Nayax ullart'arapima mayata mayata . Ukat jumaw sitata ist'iritaki uka medionakata parliri..... (leer uno a uno)

	Ist'iritwa	Janiw ist'irikti	NS/NR
--	------------	------------------	-------

UNIN3. Audiencias públicas con el diputado	1	2	8
UNIN4. Reuniones de la brigada departamental	1	2	8
UNIN6. Foros ciudadanos con diputados	1	2	8

UNIN7. ¿Jicha qhipa maranakanxa, mä programa de radio tuqi ist'ati markachiri diputatupampi telefono ukxa aruskipt'iri, yamakis diputadox jisk'awinakrus jaysarakiti?

Iskwa[1] Janiw isktti[2] [8] NS/NR

REFM1. Turkañani temasa. ¿Jumax kawñiri aka paya afirmacionampis acuerdotaxa? 1) gas tuqita arsuñaxa wali jach'awa uklatx complejorakiwa, antisas ukxa gobiernoaskichasisklañapaxa 2) Antisasa gas tuqi suma yatiñasawa ukat jiwawax participasipañasaxa uka decisionanakana.

Ancha jach'a aruskipañawa [1] Jiwawax participasipañasawa [2] NS [8]

REFM3. ¿Jumax referendum del 18 de julio ukan voto usktati?

Jis [1] qilqatasinx jani voto uskti[2] Janiw qilqatakayatti[3] Menor de edad[4] NS/NR [8] → Encuestador: Si no votó, pase CA1.

REFM4.- Jichhax yatiñ munasmati kunjamansa posicionamaxa sapa maya referendum

jiskt'awinakaruxa: Encuestador, entregue tarjeta con las preguntas del referendun al entrevistado, no lea las opciones:

	Votó JISA	Votó JANIWA	Janq'u unulo	NR
REFMQ1. ¿Cómo votó en la Pregunta no. 1?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ2. En la Pregunta No. 2...?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ3. En la Pregunta No. 3...?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ4. En la Pregunta No. 4...?	1	2	3	8
REFMQ5. En la Pregunta No. 5...?	1	2	3	8

CA1. Jutiri maraxa apasiniwa asamblea constituyente. ¿Jumatakixa importante Constitución maymaya aspectonakapana turkaña wakisiti, jan ukasaxa ukhama fallanakanisa, ukhampachakiskañapa Constitucionaxa?

Constitución turkaña [1] ukhampachaskañapakiwa [2] NS [8]

M1. Jicha gobierno tuqit parlkasaxa, Presidente Mesana irnaqawipatxa kamstaxa : ancha kusa, waliki, rijulara, jan wali ancha jan wali ?

Ancha kusa [1] Waliki [2] Rijulara [3] Jan wali [4] Ancha jan wali[5] NS/NR [8]

NP1 [NP1A]. Jichhaxa alcaldía aka municipiota parl'tañani. Jumaxa. Mä sesión municipal tantachawiru asistati u yaqa tantachawiruch Alcaldía tuqit o concejo municipal tuqit jawsatar sarta aka qhipa 12 phaxsina?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

NP2. ¿Maytacha u presentacha ma solicitud aka oficina públicaru, Alcaldíyan irnaqiriparu, concejal de la Alcaldíaru aka qhipa 12 phaxsina?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] => *Pase a NP4* NS/NR [8]

NP2A. Si solicitó algún tipo de ayuda => ¿Jaysawinakampixa kusistati qhiparta?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] jichhakan janiw jaysapkiti [90] NS/NR [8]
NDR [9]

NP4. ¿Jumax mä tantachawina wakichaptati parlakipaptati POA (Plan Operativo Anual) de la municipalidad lurañataki?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

NP5. ¿ Comité de Vigilancia del Municipio ukaru mä kija aptati?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

SGL1. Jumax sasmati. alcaldíyaa servicionakapaxa churiwa resultadonaka, waliki, rijulara, jan wali o janiw kusakiti?

Kusawa [1] walikiwa [2] Rijulara [3] Jan wali [4] Ancha jan wali [5] NS [8]

SGL1P. Diría Ud. que las tareas que realiza la prefectura son excelentes, buenas, regulares, malas o pésimas?

Kusawa [1] walikiwa [2] Rijulara [3] Jan wali [4] Ancha jan wali [5] NS [8]

LGL1A. Aka institucionanakat arskaxa ukata, ¿Juman comunidad kawneris askin jan walt'awinaka askichi? ¿ Gobierno centralati, Congresoti, alcaldiyacha o prefecturacha?

El gobierno central [1] El congreso [2] La alcaldía [3] La prefectura [4] Ninguno [5] Todos por igual [6] NS/NR [8]

LGL2M ¿Amuyumanxa, juk'amp obligacionacha jan ukasax qullqicha alcaldíaru, prefecturaru, algobierno centralaru churañaspa?

La alcaldía [1] La prefectura [2] El gobierno central [3] *No lea: Ninguno [4] Todos por igual [5]*
NS/NR [8]

LGL3M. Boliviax nayrar sarantañapatakixa wakispawa, Sasmati kawkharus impuesto pajañax wakispaxa:¿ alcaldíaru, prefecturaru, gobierno centralaru?

La alcaldía [1] La prefectura [2] El gobierno central [3] *No lea: Ninguno [4] Todos por igual [5]*
NS/NR [8]

Yaqha temar pasasaxa, yaqhipa jakirinakax sapxiw wakiskiriwa, kuna circunstancia tuqixa, Mä Golpe de Estado milikunakan wakicvhaña, kunawsatix militaranakax poder katupki ukawsaxa. Amuyumatakixa,

mä Golpede Estado militaranakan luratax justificasispati u janich justificaskaspa... (*lea los incisos y espere la respuesta*).

JC1. Kunawsatixa irnaqawix wali jilaki ukapacha?

Jis justifikasiwa [1]Janiw justifikpiti [2]
NS/NR [8]

JC11 [JC10]. Ancha delincuencia utji ukawsa?
NS/NR [8]

Jis justifikasiwa (1) Janiw justifikpiti [2]

JC12 [JC13]. Ancha wali corrupción utjipana?
NS/NR [8]

Jis justifikasiwa [1] Janiw justifikpiti [2]

JC16. Social jan walt'awi waljaki ukawsa?
NS/NR [8]

Jis justifikasiwa [1] Janiw justifikpiti [2]

JC13A. ¿Jumatakixa wakiskiriti utjañapaxa mä kunawsasa Mä golpe de estado, Janipinicha justificatakaspa mä golpe de Estado utjañapaxa?

Jis razonax

utjaspawa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

JC15. Yaqhipa jakirinakaxa democraciana jakañ munapxi derechos humanos e individuales uka waqaychayi ukata, ukampis akax ineficiente y desordenada ukhamaspawa. Yaqhipasti dictadura ukan jakañmunapxi, orden y eficiencia ukaw utji sasina. Jumax kunsu muntax democracia u dictadura?

Mä democracia [1] Mä dictadura [2]

NS/NR [8]

JC20. Yaqhip jakirinakax jan partidos políticonakampix kusaw sarnaqsna sapxiwa. Yaqhanakasti partidonakapuniw munasi jakirinakan interesapa uñast'ayi sapxiwa. ¿Jumax kawwirimpis akurtutaxa?

jan partidompi [1] Partidotumpi [2]

NS/NR [8]

ACR1. Kimsa frasenaka ullart'arapima. Mira aka kimsatx kawwirinakas amuyumaruxa wali prxt'ayixa:

NS/NR [8]

[1] Jiwasan sociedad ukax suma organizada ukatxa medios revolucionarios ukampi turkatañapawa.

[2] Jiwasan sociedad ukax gradualmente askichatañapawa o reformanakamp perfeccionada.

[3] Jiwasan sociedad ukax movimientos revolucionarios ukatx jan asxaras arxatatañapawa.

AUT10. ¿Kawwiri afirmacionanakampis acuerdotaxa?

NS/NR [8]

[1] Boliviax mä Presidente fuerte y decidido munixa qhuru amparampi orden uskuñapataki, o

[2] Boliviax mä Presidente taqi sector markachirinakampi aruskipt'ir munixa?

AUT14. Kunjama presidente de la República juma wali munasmaxa?

[8]

NS/NR

[1] Jan walt'awinaka askichiri Congreso kamachinaka aprobatampi, ukax janisay jank'ak jankàchaspa, o...

[2]Mayni jank'aki jan walt'awinaka askichiri, jani Congresox munasina

AUT15. Yaqhip pachaxa waliw protestanakampix callinaka jark'antapxi. Ukhamasipanxa, ¿Kunsa gobiernox lurañapaxa?

[8]

NS/NR

[1] Manifestantinakampi aruskipt'asa awanki urunakas semanakas tartpana , Bolivian economíayap aynacht'ayasa, o
 [2] Policíayar khitasa thakhinas jist'arañapataki

Jichhaxa (entregue tabla # 2) aka tabla apnaqañani... Aka tablaxa 7 gradanakani iskaliripaxas, sapa mayawa mä puntaji indique, ukaxa 1 ni kuna saña muni, 7kamawa ukax wali aski saña munaraki. Ejemplo naya pacha jiskt'así:"Kuna puntukamaa TV uñtañax munastama?", Sítitixa jumar jan munastamaxa ukjaxa 1 uskuñamaya; sítitixa maysa tuqita, TV wali munastama ukawsaxa 7 uskuñamarakiya. Sítitixa uka taypinak jach'anchaytaxa, Jumaxa puntaje intermedio uskuñamaya. Hawir yant'añani. **"Kuna puntukamas TV uñtañax munastama?"** Jakhunaka ulñlart'arapita ampi. (ASEGURESE QUE ENTIENDA) Aka tabla apnaqañani.....

	Escala						NS/ NR	No cono ce
	Ni	kuna		Ancha				
B1. ¿Jumatakixa kuna puntukamasa. Tribunales de justicia de Bolivia ukax garantiai mä chiqpacha juicio justo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B2. ¿Kuna puntukamasa instituciones políticas de Bolivia ukatx respeto utji?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B3. Amuyumatakixa kuna puntokamas derechos básicos del ciudadano ukax wali arxatata sistema político boliviano ukata?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B4. ¿Kuna puntukamas wali orgullosox aka sistema político boliviano ukanx jakastaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B6. ¿Kuna puntokamas sistema político boliviano ukar apoyaña lup'taxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B10A. ¿Kuna puntukamas sistema de justicia ukar confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B31A. ¿Kuna puntukamas Corte Suprema de Justicia ukarux confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B30. [B21] ¿Kuna puntokamas partidos políticos ukanakarux confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B11. ¿Kuna puntukamas Corte Nacional Electoral ukar confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B12. ¿Kuna puntukamas Fuerzas Armadas ukarux confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B13. ¿Kuna puntukamas Congreso ukarux confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B18. ¿Kuna puntukamas policía ukarux confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B20. ¿Kuna puntokamas Iglesia Católica ukarux confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B21 [B37]. ¿Kuna puntukamas periodistanakarux confianza churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					
B21A. ¿Kuna puntukamas confianza Presidenteru churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	
			7					

B22. [B32] ¿Kuna puntukamas confianza Gobierno Municipalaru churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B33. ¿Kuna puntukamas confianza Prefecturaru churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B22B. ¿Kuna puntukamas confianza autoridad originariaru churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B22C. ¿Kuna puntukamas confianza comité de vigilancia municipalaru churtaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23. ¿Kuna puntukamas sindicatunakax confianzani?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23A. ¿Kuna puntukamas Ministerio Público o fiscales ukax confianzani?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23C. [B17] ¿Kuna puntukamas Defensor del Pueblo confianzani?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23BNR. ¿Kuna puntukamas Tribunales de Justicia ukax confianzani?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B23E. ¿Kuna puntukamas Tribunal Constitucional ukax confianzani?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B23B. [B44] ¿Kuna puntukamas confianzani Defensores Públicos ukan irnaqir abogadonakaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B31. ¿Kuna puntukamas organizaciones no gubernamentales, Comunitadatan irnaqir ONGs, ukanakax confianzani?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B42. ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los Centros de Conciliación?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
B43. ¿Kuna puntukamas orgullasota boliviano jakiritamata?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
B44. [B46] ¿Ist'ati delegación presidencial anti corrupción ukat parliri? (Encuestador: Si no ha oído, anote 9 y pase a N1) ¿Kuna puntukamas delegación presidencial anti corrupción ukax corrupción Boliviana chaqayañataki irnaqatap yatta?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

(seguir con tabla 2)	Escala		NS/ NR
	Ni kuna	Ancha	
N1. Aka pachpa escalana, Kuna puntukams Presidente Carlos Mesa gobiernopàxa pobreza atipañatakix chaxwi.	1	2 3 4 5 6	7 8
N3. Kuna puntukamas principios democráticos uka unxtayi.	1	2 3 4 5 6	7 8
N9. Kuna puntukams la corrupción Gobierno pachpan chhaqayañatak ch'axwi.	1	2 3 4 5 6	7 8

(seguir con tabla 2) Kuna puntukamaxa aka jaysawinakampi acuerdota	Escala		NS/ NR
	Ni kuna	Ancha	

ING4. Democraciax jan walt'awinakanispaw ukampis askiwa cualquier akhama forma de Gobierno.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PN2. Niyakijay maymayjatanxa, bolivianonakax wali yänakan y valore chaninakanitanwa ukaw paísasanxa mayachistuxa.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

(seguir con tabla 2)	Escala							NS/ NR
	Nada					Mucho		
LENG10. Jumaxa kuna puntukamas acuerdotaxa, emisoras de radio y televisión kikipa originario arusata wakichawinaka lurapxañapataki.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
LENG11. Jumaxa kuna puntukamas acuerdotaxa colegionakan lengua originaria kikipa arusa yatichasiñapatakixa.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
LENG12. Jumax kuna puntukamas e acuerdotaxa taqi funcionario oficial irnaqirixa público markaru kikip arusata (lengua originaria) atintiñapataki.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Boliviax wali diverso paisawa, sapa mayniwa identificasna maymaya cultura sarwinaka jach'anchayasa. Ejemplo sañani, maynixa bolivianota idintificasispa ukapachparakiwa paceño u jan ukasax cambata. Aka escalana, 1 uñanchayiwá “ni kuna” ukastí 7 chimpuchiwa “ancha”...

(seguir con tabla 2)	Escala							NS/ NR
	Nada					Mucho		
BETID1. ¿Kuna tupunsa ciudadano Bolivianotaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<i>Encuestador: Para la siguiente pregunta utilice la referencia de acuerdo al departamento donde realiza la encuesta:</i>								
BETID2. ¿Kuna tupunsa jumax amuyastasa.. [Paceño, Cruceño, Cochabambino, Orureño, Chuquisaqueño, Potosino, Pandino, Tarijeño, Beniano]?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID3. ¿Kuna tuputsa jumax cultura Aymarankiritaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID4. ¿Kuna tuputsa jumax cultura Quechwankiritaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID5. ¿Kuna tuputsa jumax cultura Cambankiritaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BETID6. Yaqhipa periodistanakax qhananchiwa departamentos de: Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Chuquisaca y Tarija ukanakaruxa “región de la Media Luna”sas. ¿Uka amuyu ist'iritati? Encuestador: si responde NO anote [9] y pase a la siguiente								[9]
¿Kuna tuputsa jumax “Media Lunakirita” amuyastaxa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Jichhax tabla turkañani. (entregue tabla # 4). Aka machaq tablan escalerapax 1ta a-10 gradakamawa, 1 chimpuwa Jumax janiw kuns iyawstati, 10 chimpuwa jumax iyawstawa. Jist'awinakaxa jumax kunjams lupt'axa Bolivia markan jakirinakan amuyapatawa. (Encuestador: No olvide cambiar de escala).

	Escalera									NS/N R
	Desaprueba					Aprueba				
D1. Utjiw gobiernos bolivianos utjata jan wali parlirinak	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	88

jakirinaka, janiw jichha Gubernotakti, jan ukasax taqi sistema de gobierno boliviana. ¿Jumatakix uka jakirinakax kamachinini voto uskuñapatakixa? Miira ampi mä jakhmp jaysatxita <i>SONDEE</i> : Kuna puntukama?	10	
D2. Kawnir jakirinakatix sistema de gobierno boliviano jan wal parlapki ukata amuyasaxa. ¿kuna firmisampis apruehta jan ukasax desapruehta aka jakirinakax manifestaciones pacíficas uka lurapxañapataki, jupanakan amuyunakaop uñastayañapatakixa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D3. ¿ Kuna firmesampis apruehta jan ukasax desapruehta khiti jakirinakatix sistema de gobierno boliviano ukat jan wali parlapki ukanakaxles cargos públiconakar maqhatañatak pustulasipx ukata	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D4. Kawnir jakirinakatix sistema de gobierno boliviano jan wal parlapki ukata amuyasaxa. ¿kuna firmisampis apruehta jan ukasax desapruehta televisiónan mä discurso churasa mistuñapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
D5. Jichhax tema turkañani, homosexuales ukata amuyasaxa, ¿kuna firmesampis apruehta o desapruehta aka jakirinakax cargos públicos ukar maqhatañatak pustulasiañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

Khitinakatix sistema de gobierno boliviano jan wal parlinakaruxa maysar jaytañani. Jichhax aruskipañani taqi jakirinakata. Jumax kuna puntukamas. apruehta o desapruehta ... (*encuestador: pregunta inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #4*).

	Escala									NS/NR	
	Desaprueba						Aprueba				
E5. Jakirinakax manifestaciones permitidas por la ley ukan participañapataki?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E8. Jakirinakax Mä organización o grupo comunidadan jan walt'awip askichañapataki ukana partisipañapataki?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E11. Jakirinakax campañas electorales mä partido político o candidato uka layku irnaqañapataki?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E15. Jakirinakax bloqueo de las calles ukana partisipañapataki?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E14. Jakirinakax propiedades privadas jan kunaki mantañapataki?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E2. Jakirinakax fábricas, oficinas u edificios ukanak katuntañapataki?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E3. Jakirinakax chijllat gubernor cHãmampi jan waltawimpi jaquqañapataki.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
E16. Jakirinakax justicia lurapxañapatak kikip amparapampi, kunawsatix Estadox jani juchan criminalanakar juchank ukawsa	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

Jichhax Estadox kuns luraspa ukatwa aruskipañani. Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma ...

(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #4).

	Escala Desaprueba Aprueba	NS/N R
C3 [D32]. ¿Mä kamachi manifestaciones públicas prohibispa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
C5. [D33] ¿ Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma sistema político boliviano ukar k'umir tantachawi prohibisp ukawsa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
C6. ¿Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasm Gobierno censuraspa awqa políticos propagandapa?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

PN4. Taqi tuqita, ¿Samati satisfehotati, kusa satisfecho, jan satisfecho o ancha insatisfechocha , kunjamatixa democracia Bolivian irnaqki ukampi? Kusa satisfecho [1] satisfecho [2] jani satisfecho [3] ancha insatisfecho [4] NS/NR [8]
PN5. Amuyumatakix Boliviaxa ¿kusa democráticoti, turpa democrática, juk'a democrática, janiw kuna democraticakisa? kusa democrática [1] Turpa democrática[2] juk'a democrática [3] janiw kuna democrática [4] NS [8]

Jichhax políticas del gobierno kikiparakiw tema del gas tuqit aruskipt'añani. 1 ta 10 kama escala apnaqasina...

(encuestador: pregunte inciso por inciso, mostrar tabla #4).

	Escalera Desaprueba Aprueba	NS/N R
REFM41. ¿Kuna firmesapis aprobasma o desaprobasma Boliviax Chileru gas exportañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
REFM42. ¿Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma Boliviax Estados Unidos jach'a nacionar gas exportañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
REFM43. ¿kuna firmesampis aprobasma Boliviax Chileru mä jisk'a uraqi churañapataki la marquta mistuña layku?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
REFM31. ¿Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales wasitat petroleranaka paísasan apnaqañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
REFM32. ¿Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma gobiernox empresas petroleras nacionalisañapataki ukat YPFB ukax irnaqayjañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88
REFM33. ¿Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma gobiernox petróleo gas uka nacionalisañapataki, empresas petroleras transporte ukata comercialización lurañapatak contratañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	88

REFM34. ¿Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma Bonosol ukax jan pajasiñapataki, antisas uka recursonakax YPFB ukatakispa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
REFM51. ¿Kuna firmesampis aprobasma o desaprobasma compañías petroleras impuestos sobre su producción uka pajañapatakixa?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

REFM 35. ¿Amuyumanxa khitisa, negocio del gas ukxa apnaqañapaxa?

[1] Empresas privadanaka

[2] Empresas mixtas ukax participación conjunta del Estado ukampi , ukhmarak capital privado ukampi kuna

[3] Estadokipuni

NS/NR [8]

REFM52. ¿Amuyumanxa exportaciones de gas luratata qullqix kunanas inwirtsisiñapaxa? (lea las alternativas excepto otros y NS/NR)

Educación [1] Salud [2] Thakhinaka [3] Irnaqawinakana [4] Lucha contra la corrupción ukana [5] Yaqhanaka[6] NS/NR[8]

¿Kawnir jaysawimpis jumax walide acuerdotaxa?

NEWTOL4A. 1) Estadox derechoninapaw opiniones contrarias uka jan arsuyaña Bolivia uñtap jan qañuchañataki o 2) el Estado janiw kuns kamsañapakiti opiniones contrarias ukanakaruxa, kunasay kunaspana.

Amuyunaka prohibiña [1]

Jani amuyunak prohibiña [2]

NS [8]

NEWTOL5. 1) Homosexuales derechoniti tantachasiri isisiri kunjamtix munapki jalla ukhama o 2) l homosexuales ukanakax wawanakasarux jan wali ejemplo ukcha churi, ukhamsipanx gobierno controlañapawa.

Derechonipxiwa [1]

Controladañapawa [2]

NS [8]

NEWTOL7. 1) kunas kunapana paisasaxa mayacht'ataw permanisiñapa... 2) Mayjmaytawinakaxa paisanx wali jach'anakawa, el paisasax jalxtañapawa.

Paisasax mayacht'ataw permaneceñapa [1]

Paisasax jalxtañapawa [2]

NS [8]

NEWTOL8: 1) Paísanx wakiskirispaw mä sapa cultura nacional taqiniotak utjañapa... 2) Pueblos indígenas ukanakaxa: valores, cultura ukatsti aru ukanak mantiniñapawa.

Mä sapa cultura nacional [1]

Valoranakapa manteniña [2]

NS [8]

BTOL1. 1). Paisasax política jakawinxä educaciónäni jakirinakaw partisipañapaspaxa o... 2) Política del país taqiniw partisipañapaxa janiw kuna educación ukas wakisiskirikiti.

Educaciónani jakirinaka [1]

Taqi jakirinaka [2]

NS [8]

BTOL2. Jutiri elecciones nacionales ukanx munapxiw mä ciudadano indígena presidente de la República chijllataña, Yaqhipanakatakixa identidad de las personas política thakhin janiw kunakisa. ¿ Jumax amuyumpis acuerdotaxa?

Preocupastawa mä indígena presidenteña [1] Jakirinakan identidadapax janiw kunakisa [2]
NS [8]

BTOL3. 1) Kunawsatix mayni jakirimp discutita ukawsaxa Maynix amuyupa khipakamawa apnaqaña...o 2) Yaqhip pachax kunarus iyawsañaki arunaka mayniru churasa.

Qhipakama amuyunak apnaqaña [1] Aru churaña iyawsasina [2] NS [8]

BTOL4. 1) Kunawsatixa mä demanda gobiernor planteamiento lurtana ukawsaxa, objetivonakasa“qhipa jan walt'awinakkama ” ñast'ayañasawa o... 2) Iyawsañasawa gobiernon oferta negociadapa janisay jiwasataki ancha kusakpa ukasaxca.

Qhpa jan walt'awinakkama [1] oferta iyawsaña [2] NS [8]

BTOL5. 1) El territorio de Bolivia paisan utjir originarios markankirinakankiwa ... 2) Taqi bolivianonakaw kikipa derechoniptana uraqiniñasataki.

Pueblos originarios ukankiwa [1] Taqiniw derechoniptana [2] NS [8]

ECREG1. 1) Boliviana, ahorroxmä qhawqha departamentonakatakiwa ukaw paísasar jach'anchayi, o 2) Paisan desarrollopaxa taqi bolivianonakan ch'amapawa.

Mä qhawqa departamentonaka [1] Taqi bolivianonakan ch'amapawa [2] NS [8]

ECREG2. Bolivia Taypinx utjiwa regiones o departamentos wali qamirinak maynit sipansa. Aka desigualdad kawsa ullart'arapima. Jichhax sitasma aka diferencias de riqueza regiones tuqi utjañapatakix kunas kamachi: (leer alternativas excepto “ninguna de las anteriores”))

NS/NR [8]

[1] Yaqhip departamentonakax walja recursos naturales ukanakaniwa maynit sipansa.

[2] Yaqhip departamentonakan jakirinakapax wali irnaqiriw maynit sipansa

[3] La Paz ukan centralismopaxano janiw departamentos nayrar sarantaykiti.

[4] Políticas económicas ukax janiw yaqha departamentonakar nayrar sarntaykiti.

[5] *Jani ullamti, nayraqata qilqatanaka*

Kunjans jumax yatisma, maymaya sectoranaka tamanakaw Bolivia munatapar apnaqapxi gobiernox ukhamaw akhamw sañapataki paisan thakhipa, yaphia wali influenciawiwa, yaqhipasti juk;akiraki, ukax askichasiñapatakixa, Tamanakaxa qhawqa influenciawinakis kunjama wakichatañapasa?

	Ancha Influencia	Juk'a influencia	Ni kuna influencia	NS/NR
	a	a	a	

BPOD1. Empresario privadonaka	1	2	3	9
BPOD2. Campesinonaka	1	2	3	9
BPOD3. Comités Cívicos y representantes regionales	1	2	3	9
BPOD4. Organizaciones indígenas tantachawinaka	1	2	3	9
BPOD5. Transportistanaka	1	2	3	9
BPOD6. La COB ukasti sindicatonakampi	1	2	3	9

PROT1. Jumax manifestación o protesta pública ukan partsiptati? Yaqhipapachakich lurta, janipunicha lurkta?

Yaqhip pacha [1] janiwa [2] janipuniwa [3]=> *salte a AOJI* NS [8]

PROT2. ¿M aymarax octubre phaxsinx gobierno de Sánchez de Lozada uka contrax protesta lurtati?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

PROT3. ¿Gobierno de Carlos Mesa uka contrax mawsax protesta lurtati?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

PROT4. ¿Jichha qhipa marana, gobierno municipal contrax protesta lurtati?

Jisa [1] Janiwa [2] NS/NR [8]

PROT5. Jumatakix walikiti protestas lurañaxa, ukampis kuns jiktanxa, jan ukasax janich kuns jiktäna? (Referido a cualquier protesta) Wakiskiriwa [1] janiw kuns jiktanti [2] NS/NR [8] NDR (dijo “nunca/no” a Prot1 a Prot4) [9]

AOJ1. Tema turkañani ¿Jumatakixa mä jucha denunciayañax policíyaru o autoridadarux es fácilakiti ch'amacha u ancha ch'amacha?

Fácilaki [1] ch'amawa [2] sinti ch'amawa difícil [3] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3 [VIC1]. Jichha qhipa marax jumarux lunthataptanti u muwjaptancha chhuxrinchasa?

Jisa [1] Janiwa[2] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3B. [VIC1A] Jichha qhipa marax phamilyamaruxrux lunthataptanti u muwjaptancha chhuxrinchasa?

Jisa [1] Janiwa[2] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3A [AOJ1A]. Si ha sido víctima el o su familia => Ukata denuncia usktat policia o PTJ o a la autoridad de la comunidad ukaru aka lunthatawipa chhuxrinchawita.

Policíaru [1] Autoridad de la comunidad ukaru [2] denuncia jani uskutakiti [3] NS/NR [8] NDR [9]

AOJ4 [ST1].- Jumax policia nacional ukana trámiti lurasaxa. ¿ satisfehotati, turpa satisfechoki, juk'a jansatisfechoki, o ancha jani satisfechocha?

Kusa satisfecho [1] Turpa satisfecho [2] Juk'a insatisfecho [3] Sinti jani satisfecho [4] janiw tramite lurti [9] NS/NR [8]

AOJ6 [ST2].- Jumax trámites lurtawa, juzgados o tribunales de justicia tuqina. ¿Jichhax satisfehotati, juk'a satisfecho, turpa jan satisfecho, sinti jan satisfecho?

Kusa satisfecho [1] Turpa satisfecho [2] Juk'a insatisfecho [3] Sinti jani satisfecho [4] janiw tramite lurti [9] NS/NR [8]

AOJ8a. Machaqa código de procedimiento penal ukax 31 de mayo de 2001 utjata apnaqatawa. ¿Jumax ist'ati ulltacha aka machaqa código?

Jísa [1] Janiwa [2] NS [91]

AOJ17c. Aka machaq códigox walja aski jaysañanakaniwa. Mayaxa respeto por la presunción de inocencia, Ukaw juchaninakaruru amtutatapana sixa janira culpabilidad o inocencia uñtkasaxa. amuyumanxa, jumatakix aka disposiciónaxa: kusati, walicha, jan walicha, ancha jan walipunicha.

Kusawa [1] turpa waliwa [2] turpa jan waliwa [3] ancha jan waliwa [4] NS [8]

AOJ13. [AOJ11] ¿Jumax vecindariomayjan aruma sarnaqasaxa wali seguruti amuyasta? Jumax kunjams amuyasta, kusa seguro, tantiyu seguro, juk'a inseguro o ancha jan seguro

kusa seguro [1] tantiyu seguro [2] juk'a jan seguro [3] ancha jan seguro [4] Jani yatkiti janiw jayskiti [8]

AOJ12. Jumax asaltatasma lunthatatasma ukawsaxa, ¿Sistema judicial ukax juchanirux kulpanirux jucha uñt'ayaspati?

Wali [1] Turpa [2] Juk'a [3] Ni kuna [4] NS/NR [8]

AOJ14. [DEM2] ¿Kawniri kimsa qilqatanakampis acuerdotaxa?

[1] Jakiritakixa régimen democráticos kikiparakiw régimen jan democráticos jakañax kikipakiwa.

[2] La democracia kuna kasta gobiernotakis walikiwa

[3] Yaqhip pachaxa, mä gobierno autoritario ukax wakiskiriw democráticosipansa

Jichhax juman kikip jakawimat aruskipt'añ munapxta	Jisa	Janiw	NS
EXC2. ¿Jichha qhipa maranxa, mayni agente de policía muñika coima maytanti?	0	1	8
EXC6. ¿jichha qhipa maranxa mayni empleado públicox munika coima maytanti?	0	1	8
EXC11. ¿Jichha qhipa maranxa tramiti lurtati municipalidad utana ? [Si	0	1	8

dice no marcar 9, si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente] Uka tramiti municipalidad lurañatakixa (como un permiso, por ejemplo) Jichha qhipa maranxa ¿Kamachis siski ukat juk'ampi qullqi churtata?				9
EXC13. Inaqawimana, ¿Qhipa maranxa mayipxtanti mä pago no correcto ?	0	1	8	
EXC14. ¿Jichha qhipa maranxa, kuna trato juzgadompi lurtati? [Si dice "no," marcar 9, si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente] ¿Jichha qhipa marana muñika coima s juzgadona churtati ?	0	1	8	9
EXC15. ¿Qhipa marana servicios médicos públicos ukar sartati uñjayasiri ? [Si dice "no," marcar 9, si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente] Mä hospitalsn o puesto de salud ukan uñjayasiñatakixa ¿Jamasata muñika coima churtati?	0	1	8	9
EXC16. ¿Qhipa maran escuelan u colegion wawamax ukankiti? [Si dice "no" marcar 9 si dice "si" preguntar lo siguiente] Wawaman escuelapana o colegiopana Jichha qhipa maraxa . ¿Jumax coima churtati?	0	1	8	9

EXC7. Sarnaqawimarjamaxa uñjatamarjamsa, corrupción ukax funcionarios públicos utjxatxa:wali uñt'atawa,juk'a uñt'atakiwa, janiw uñt'atakiti?

Inti uñt'atawa [1] Uñt'atawa [2] Juk'a uñt'atakiwa [3] Janiw uñt'takiti [4] NS/NR [8]

EXC7B. Sasmati corrupción de los funcionarios públicos jipachaxa: gobierno centralana, prefecturana, ukhamarakiw municipalidad tuqinati?

Gob. central [1] Prefectura [2] Municipalidad [3] Jan ullanti, kunas kikipakiwa/ [4] NS/NR [8]

Sititix mä jakirix wiñapun gobierno de Boliviari anchapun k'umixa, jani aka gobiernoruki antisa democracia bolivianaru, Jumatakix uka personax kuna puntukakamas akanakata derechonina: [Entregar Tabla # 4]	
	Escala Desaprueba Aprueba
DN1. ¿Kuna puntukamas voto chijllañatakix derechonina?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]
DN2. ¿Kuna puntukamas manifestaciones pacificas lurañatakix derechonina, ukhamat amuyupa jach'anchayañapataki?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]
DN3. ¿Kuna puntukamas mä cargo público mantañatakix derechonina?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]
DN4. ¿Kuna puntukamas televisiónan mä discurso churas misktañatakix derechonina?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 [NS=88]

	Respuesta	
GI1. ¿Kamsatas Presidente de los Estados Unidos uka amtati? [Bush]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correct o
GI2 [GI5]. ¿Kamstas presidente de Brasil uka amtati? [Lula]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correct o
GI3. ¿Kamsatas Presidente de Argentina uka amtati? [Kirchner]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correct o
GI4. ¿Qhawqha diputadonakas Congreson utji uka amatati? [130]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correct o
GI5. ¿Kamsatas diputado uninominalax circunscripcionamat amtati?	[0] NS	
GI6. ¿Yatiyatat jumax candidatosmaw aka elecciones ukanxsin jan mä partido político qilqatasa? ¿kunjama? [Sí se puede con las asociaciones ciudadanas]	[0] Incorrecto, NS	[1]Correct o

Q3. ¿Kawniris religionamaxa?

Católico (participante) [1] Católico (no participante) [2] Evangélica [3] Cristiano [4] janiw kawniris [6]
Yaqha _____ NS/NR [8]

Q4. ¿Qhawqha kutis asista iglesiaru (culto o templo) pasir phaxsinxa? _____ kuti (88= NS/NR)

Jichhax tukayañataki, aka jist'anakax jakhawinak lurañatakikiwa. Juman utamanx utjtanti...

	Janiwa	Maya	Paya +	NS/NR	Qhawqha
R1. Televisor a color	0	1	2	8	
R2. Televisor en Bco/negro	0	1	2	8	

	JIS A	JAN W		JIS A	JAN W	N R		JIS A	JAN W	NR	
R3. Heladera/refrigerador	0	1	8	R10. Energía eléctrica	0	1	8	R18. Tarjeta de crédito	0	1	8
R4. Teléfono	0	1	8	R11 [R12]. Agua potable	0	1	8	R19. Computadora casa	0	1	8
R5. Automóvil o camión	0	1	8	R13. Bicicleta	0	1	8	R20. Microondas	0	1	8
R6. Lavaropa	0	1	8	R14. Alcantarillado	0	1	8	R.21 Fax	0	1	8
R7. Microondas	0	1	8	R15. Video Grabadora	0	1	8	R.22 Aire Acod/chimene	0	1	8
R8. Motocicleta	0	1	8	R16. Celular	0	1	8	R.23 Antena parabólica	0	1	8
R9. Tractor	0	1	8	R17. TV cable	0	1	8	R 24 Auto Cuántos _____ Año _____ año _____ año _____	0	1	8

R12. Anote si es posible, sin preguntar. Piso de las habitaciones de la casa

Laq'a uraqi [1] Madera [2] Cemento, ladrillo, terrazo, baldosa [4] cerámica o mosaico [5] janiw uñjañjamakanti [90]

OCUP1. ¿Jumax kunans irnaqtaxa? (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)

1.- jumatacak irnaqiri		2- Tiempo Completo irnaqiri:		3.- Tiempo parcial u jan sueldon irnaqiri	
Propietarios o socios de negocios o jach'a empresanaka o tantiyu empresanaka	1	Empresas o negociona jilir irpiripa	6	Uta apthapiri	12
Propietarios o socios de negocios o jisk'a empresanaka	2	Empresas o negocio ukan tantiy irpiripa	7	Estudiante (yatiqiri)	13
Dueño uraqi yapuchiri u uraqit inquilino.	3	Personal de Plantata irnaqiri	8	Jubilado u Rentista	14
ganaderos walja uynakan dueño	4	Obrero	9	Trabajador ocasional (mawsak irnaqiri)	15
profesionales independientes	5	Faenas agrícolas ukatati campesinot irnaqiri	10		
		Comerciante y artesanos empleado	11		

OCUP2. Sólo para agricultores dueños de tierra o inquilinos => Qhawqa ura hectareanakats dueñota u alkilastaxa?

_____.____ (Use decimales si es necesario). NDR[99]

DESOC1. Para todos => ¿Qhipa maranakax jan irnaqawiniyataki?

Jisa [1] Janiwa[2] => Pase a ED Estudiante, Ama de casa,
Jubilado [9]

DESOC2. Si responde Si => ¿Qhipa maranx qhawqa semanankas jan rnaqawniyataxa? _____
semanas NDR [9]

OCUP3. ¿Familia irpirix kunansa irnaqi? _____ (describa si es empleado o autoempleado).

ED. Yatiqawinx kuna kursu qhipa marax .aprobabaytaxa (encierre en un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevisdo(a))

- Janiwa maysa : 0 - Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 => Primaria - Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8
=> Primaria
- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 => Secundaria - Técnica o Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 -
17 - 18

ED1. Juma familia irpirix kuna kursu qhipa maranxa aprobabaytaxa?

- Ninguna : 0 - Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 => Primaria - Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8 =>
Primaria
- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 => Secundaria - Técnica o Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 -
17 - 18

ED2: Si tuvo alguna educación = Escuela o colegio, fiscalancha u particularancha yatiqawayta?

Escuela fiscal [1] Escuela privada [2] Paypacha sistemana yatiqawayta [3]

Q10. Kawniri ranjunakansa jikxatsta(muestra la tarjeta de ingresos) **sasmati PHAXSINX TOTALAX QHAWQA QULLQIS MANTIXA taqi uka utjawin jakirinakatxa?**

Ni kuna [0] 250 Bs. ukat juk'aki [1] De 251 a 500 Bs. [2] De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3] De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4]
De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5] De 5001 a 10.000 Bs. [6] De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7] 20.000 Bs ukat juk'amp [8] NS/NR [88]

Q11. Kawniris estado civilamaxa (No lea las alternativas)

Soltero [1] Casado [2] Unión libre, concubinato [3] Divorciado [4] Jaltata [5] Ikjma [6] NS/NR [8]

Q12. Jumas qhawqa wawanakanitasa _____ wawanaka janiw wawanikiti [0]

ETID. Jumax jakirikasinxa kuna razanis amuyasta. Janq'u, chola, mestiza, indígena, ch'iyara u originario?

Janq'u [1] Chola [2] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Ch'iyara [5] originario [6] Yaqha _____
NS/NR [8]

ETID2. [Census] ¿Amumanxa kawwir markarus pertenestax originario o indígena kunkinxax? (leer todas las opciones)

Quechua [1] Aymará [2] Guarani [3] Chiquitano [4] Mojeno [5] Yaqha nativo [6] Janiw kawwirsa [7] yaqha _____ (especificar)

LENG1. Jisk'atpachax kuna arsa arsuwaytaxa? (acepte una alternativa)

Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymará [3] Yaqha (nativo) [4] _____ Yaqha extranjero [5] _____ NS/NR [8]

LENG2. Jichhakamaxa, ¿aka aru parlastati, janich parltaxa intintiktacha, u janikich intintaxa?

Parliwa [1] Parliw janiw intinkiti [2] Janiw intinxiti [3] NS/NR [8]

MIG1. ¿Jumax kawkins yurtaxa?

Khawkantix parltan utjana [1] Yaqha chiqawjana [2] (Si nació en el mismo lugar, termine la entrevista)

MIG2. ¿Kuna departamentons yurtaxa?

La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4] Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6] Pando [7] Tarija [8] Beni [9]

MIG3. ¿Ciudad capital del departamentont u kawwir provinciancha yurtaxa?

Ciudad capital [1] Provincia [2]

YUSPAJARKATAMA JALLALLA, TUKUYTANWA

LCUEST. Idioma de la entrevista: Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymará [3]

VEST. El entrevistado x isitanwa: Traje indígena/nativo [1] Traje moderno/occidental [2]

TI. Hora terminada ____:____ tiempo de duración de la entrevista ____ minutos

YO JURO QUE ESTA ENTREVISTA FUE LLEVADA A CABO CON LA PERSONA SELECCIONADA

_____ (firma del encuestador)

Firma y código Supervisor _____ **Cod.** _____ **Firma y código Validador** _____
Cod. _____