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## RAPID ASSESSMENT

# ASSESSMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN'S MONITORING SYSTEMS

SEPTEMBER 2014

This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared under contract with Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. for USAID's Afghanistan "Services under Program and Project Office for Results Tracking Phase II" (SUPPORT II) project.

## **Activity Signature Page**

This report was contracted under USAID Contract Number: AID-306- C-12-00012.  
Afghanistan Services Under Program and Project Office for Results Tracking Phase II  
(SUPPORT II).

This Activity was initiated by the Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD)  
through Ms. Belien Tadesse, COR/SUPPORT II.

**Assignment Title:** Rapid Assessment of the Government of the Islamic Republic of  
Afghanistan's Monitoring Systems

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**Activity Start Date:** June 16, 2014

**Completion Date:** September 25, 2014

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Kabul, Afghanistan

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## ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADS	Automated Directives System
ACE	Agriculture Credit Enhancement Project
AADA	Agency for Assistance and Development of Afghanistan
ADF	Afghanistan Development Fund
AKDN	Aga Khan Development Network
ANC	Antenatal Care
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
BPMU	Budget Performance Monitoring Unit
BPRD	Budget Policy and Reforms Directorate
BSC	Balanced Score Card
BU	Budgetary Unit
CBR	Capacity Building for Results Facility
CCO	Chief Commercial Officer
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CMU	Credit Management Unit
CPC	Department of Corporate Planning and Controlling
CSC	Civil Service Commission
CSO	Central Statistics Organization
CSP	Corporate Support Program
CYP	Couple Years Protection
DABS	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
DAFA III	Development Assistance Facility for Afghanistan
DAI	Development Associates Incorporated
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DEWS	Disease Early Warning System
DGB	Director General Budget
DID	Directorate of Integration and Design
DM	Deputy Minister
DPP/RBM	Directorate of Policy Planning and Results-Based Monitoring
DPPP	Directorate of Policy, Planning and Programs
DQA	Data Quality Assessment
EPHS	Essential Package of Hospital Services
EU	European Union
FY	Fiscal Year
GCMU	Grants and Services Contracts Management Unit
GDO	Gas Development Office
GIRoA	The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HHS	Household Survey
HMIS	Health Management Information System
HR	Human Resources
HSS	Health Systems Strengthening Project
IARSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
IP	Implementing Partner
IT	Information Technology
IL	Implementation Letter

KESIP	Kabul Electricity Service Improvement Program
LM	Line Ministry
LQAS	Lot Quality Assurance Sampling
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MIAR	Monthly Integrated Activity Report
MIS	Management Information System
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoEc	Ministry of Economy
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoMP	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoUD	Ministry of Urban Development
MoWE	Ministry of Water and Energy
MSH	Management Sciences for Health
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NMC	National Monitoring Checklist
NMES	National Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy
NPP	National Priority Program
OBA	On Budget Assistance
OBM	On Budget Monitor
OPPD	Office of Program and Project Development
OSSD	Office of Social Sector Development
PCH	Partnership Contracts for Health
PFM	Public Financial Management
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PIRS	Performance Indicator Reference Sheet
PHO	Provincial Health Officer
PPHO	Provincial Public Health Office
PPR	Performance Plan and Report
RIMU	Reform Implementation and Management Unit
SDGP	Sheberghan Gas Development Program
SEHAT	System Enhancement for Health in Transition Project
SGGA	Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound
SMG	Senior Management Group
SoW	Statement of Work
SwAP	Sector-wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TB	Tuberculosis
TO	Technical Officer
ToR	Terms of Reference
WB	The World Bank

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the 2010 London Conference, the United States and other members of the international community stated their commitment to providing 50 percent of development aid to Afghanistan through on-budget assistance (OBA); donors reaffirmed this commitment at both the 2010 Kabul and 2012 Tokyo Conferences. In line with these commitments, and a major component of the U.S. Government's approach to reconstruction in Afghanistan, USAID awards OBA in Afghanistan by either buying into multi-donor trust funds or through direct bilateral agreements. There is a pressing need, both articulated in Agency guidance as well as identified by the Mission, to have a greater understanding of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIRoA) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacities. The M&E and On-Budget Mission Orders, as well as Automated Directives System (ADS) 220, require that all on-budget programs have an M&E plan that takes into account GIRoA's internal M&E systems. In addition, Tier 3 of USAID/Afghanistan's multi-tiered monitoring strategy relies on GIRoA's internal M&E systems to provide monitoring data on USAID projects. As part of a broader effort to meet this need, USAID's Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD) commissioned an assessment of GIRoA's Monitoring Systems, carried out by a team of four consultants from June to August 2014.

The purpose of this assessment is to document the capacity of existing monitoring systems in selected GIRoA Ministries and Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS)<sup>1</sup> with which USAID has or will have direct on-budget Bilateral Project Agreements. Based on the maximum number of entities that could be assessed within the 10-week Scope of Work (SoW), USAID selected four ministries in addition to DABS: Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP), and Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). The Ministry of Economy (MoEc) was also included based on its mandate to monitor and evaluate development programs in Afghanistan.

Based on the mapping of USAID's topics of interest and the assessment team's own analysis of the situation, the following seven performance domains were assessed in each institution relative to the monitoring systems: 1) Organizational Structure, 2) Human Capacity, 3) Monitoring Plans and Procedures, 4) Data Management Systems and Practices, 5) Data Utilization and Dissemination, 6) Partnerships and Coordination, and 7) Advocacy and Culture. Data were collected on each domain and analyzed against a four-point Likert scale to arrive at performance scores for each institution. The units of analysis are the institutions and two active on-budget projects linked to the institutions-- MAIL's Afghanistan Development Fund (ADF) and the MoPH's Partnership Contract for Health (PCH) Project. Data collection methods included: 1) in-depth interviews with key informants, 2) observation of physical systems, such as the management information system(s), and 3) review of data, records, reports, and tools. Mean performance scores for each domain were plotted in graphs to provide a snapshot of

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<sup>1</sup>DABS is Afghanistan's national electricity utility company, which has been privatized, though GIRoA is its primary shareholder.

performance overall and by domain for each of the seven units of analysis. The table below shows the mean overall performance scores of institutions and projects.

Table 1. Mean performance scores of monitoring systems by institution and project assessed

Institutions and Projects Assessed (Units of Analysis)	Mean Performance Scores (of a possible 4.0)
Ministry of Economy	2.20
Ministry of Finance	2.57
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock	1.20
Afghanistan Development Fund	3.12
Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat	3.60
Ministry of Public Health	2.70
Partnership Contracts for Health	2.94
Ministry of Mines and Petroleum	0.00

Based on a possible performance score of 4.0, the highest performing entities are DABS (3.6), ADF (3.1) and PCH (2.9). Factors of performance shared by all three include the ability to operate semi-autonomously (although not always a positive factor), derived benefits from past USAID-financed systems, and leadership that recognizes and supports the monitoring function.

- DABS is an independent and autonomous company whose owners are GIRoA shareholders. Monitoring performance and data quality are motivated by its commercial and financial interests. Senior management has fostered an M&E culture and, having capitalized on previous USAID program experience, DABS has adopted the use of the results framework and performance management plans (PMP).
- ADF is one of MAIL’s 37 projects and a recent creation modeled on its predecessor (off-budget) project, ACE. The ADF is the only public financial institution in Afghanistan that provides rural credit. As a profit-making entity, data collection and processing are conventional to the industry and compliance to reporting requirements has been straightforward. ADF has a Chief Executive Officer and operates independently from MAIL. It is linked to MAIL only through periodic reports required for OBA disbursements, which are channeled through MAIL.
- PCH is in its fifth and final year of a second (five-year) project cycle. It supports delivery of health services in over 600 health facilities and approximately 6,000 health posts in 13 provinces. The monitoring system is well established, streamlined and integrated into the overall health system. PCH has taken full ownership of its PMP and maximizes its management utility. Project leadership is fully engaged in ensuring quality monitoring processes and meeting planned project targets.

MoMP, MAIL and MoEc are the lowest performing entities, based on mean performance scores of 0.0, 1.2 and 2.2, respectively:

- **MoMP:** The assessment team discovered during interviews at MoMP and USAID that the MoMP has no monitoring system.<sup>2</sup> Each performance domain, therefore, received a score of zero. The corresponding USAID on-budget project, the Sheberghan Gas Development project, is only in the earliest stages.
- **MAIL:** Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and subsistence for roughly 75 percent of the Afghan population and a crucial component to enhance food security and drive economic growth for the entire country. However, there is little institutional monitoring capacity at MAIL, and data quality is often poor. The ministry has over 1,000 indicators, most of which are not well-defined. MAIL collects data on 32 indicators that are mostly at the output level and not included in USAID’s current or previous PMP.
- **MoEc:** Part of the MoEc’s mandate is to monitor progress in meeting development priorities. The ministry has not performed this function to the fullest for several reasons. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) ended in 2013. The sheer number of expected outcomes (86) and development indicators (276) significantly impeded the MoEc’s ability to monitor the performance of line ministries. Responsibility for monitoring national development outcomes and outputs is split between the MoEc and MoF, respectively, defying the need for a coherent national “results chain”. Strained relations and poor coordination between the two parties further complicates the matter. While the MoEc is responsible for monitoring achievement toward outcomes, national programs focus on outputs that are tied to annual budget allocations. The MoEc Directorates responsible for monitoring are unable to influence monitoring and reporting practices of line ministries.

There are common findings across the institutions and projects in *organizational structure*, *human capacity* and *monitoring plans and procedures*:

- Except in the case of MoMP, where there is no monitoring system, performance is consistently high in *organizational structure*. Provincial and district level monitoring structures vary by ministry, but at all levels, monitoring staff are clear about their roles and responsibilities, data needs of internal and external clients, and lines of supervision. Most monitoring staff report directly to a decision-maker, which is especially important in the GIRoA system since most monitoring staff themselves are not in the position to act on the information they collect. However, in at least half of the ministries, strengths of the organizational structure are compromised by fragmented monitoring systems and overly complex data flows that result in redundancies and inefficiencies. Information may not flow to the decision-maker in practice, as it should in theory, for example. It is not uncommon that responsibility for monitoring is ineffectively spread across a combination of directorates, departments, donor projects, and staff. In other cases, there

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<sup>2</sup> The assessment team found no monitoring system, a fact reportedly confirmed by USAID’s 2011-2012 Institutional Assessment (as the document itself is confidential, the assessment team did not have direct access to it, but were advised by interviewees that it contains this observation).

are gaps in organizational structures. DABS's results framework and PMP are not linked to any GIRoA ministry strategic plan or monitoring system; and ADF's monitoring systems is not linked to MAIL's and, thus, not directly contributing to the sector's economic development strategy.

Weak *human capacity* in the public sector is one of the most critical and time sensitive issues in Afghanistan and a central theme which GIRoA and donors are struggling to resolve. Findings from this assessment only confirm the pervasiveness of the issue as it relates to GIRoA's monitoring systems.

- In all ministries assessed, there are relatively few qualified staff in positions specifically dedicated to monitoring and the system of education and training does not meet relevant M&E learning needs. There is dependence on short-term donor-financed advisors and consultants, most prevalent within the MoF, MoPH, PCH, and ADF. At the provincial level, there is high turnover, chronic shortages, and poor performance of staff, particularly in the provinces, that is associated with low paying government jobs, ineffective bureaucracies, and little recognition of the importance of monitoring from management and leadership.
- Inputs to monitoring systems (salaries, per diem, hardware/software, materials, etc.) are highly subsidized by donors and monitoring performance of systems relies heavily on the relatively few consultants and advisors. Their salaries are financed through donors and received on time, and their monitoring visits are facilitated with per diem which is provided up-front or reimbursed expeditiously. Characteristically, consultants/advisors are well-paid, in middle and senior management and technical positions, trained and experienced in donor-financed project systems, professionally motivated, but frustrated and disempowered. They are unable to influence systemic changes and improvement and require more recognition from government leadership and clients (line ministries). The tashkeel staff, which forms the majority, have lower salaries with fewer incentives, and lower capacity and motivation. They face delays in getting their salaries and "endless" waiting period for reimbursements processed through the government system.

Ministries lack clear, measurable strategic plans that should provide the necessary framework for *monitoring plans and procedures* and to which monitoring systems should be aligned. The Afghan Government as a whole does not have a clear strategic document with well-defined development policies, programs, and M&E plans. The MoEc does not have a strategic or monitoring plan in place to track its own performance; and MoF, MAIL and MoPH strategic plans are unknown to most staff, not clearly designed, and not widely used. As a result, existing monitoring plans and procedures don't conform to a ministry standard and are individually designed for short-lived donor projects. In all ministries, a low level of capacity to develop and implement monitoring plans and procedures adds to the problem.

**Conclusions and Recommendations:** Findings suggest that these and other factors that affect the performance of GIRoA monitoring systems will continue to pose significant challenges to building monitoring capacity in the ministries. Development of the monitoring system in Afghanistan requires a gradual, but planned and comprehensive approach championed internally by a central directorate and financial commitment (on- and off-budget) for the next three to five years, and keeping in mind that investment in the monitoring system promises a high benefit-to-cost in return. Capacity development efforts and funds to strengthen monitoring systems must be aligned to a common explicit goal, channeled and applied broadly rather than piece meal, and factor in the more complex issues of human capacity and sustainability. Plans should be phased from short-to-longer term (within 18 and 48 months and beyond) and be coordinated and implemented jointly with GIRoA and other donors. Selected recommendations for USAID support toward strengthening GIRoA’s monitoring systems include the following (please refer to the main report for recommendations on ministry-specific support):

- Consider requesting that USAID’s contribution to the World Bank’s Capacity Building for Results (CBR) Facility cover strengthening of GIRoA’s monitoring systems, initially targeting CBR Tier 1 ministries. Alternatively, consider developing a contract for off-budget capacity development to run in parallel and to complement the CBR. A priority for capacity building should be Ministry of Economy, as its mandate in monitoring government-wide progress is substantial and its capacity limited.
- Identify potential synergies to improve GIRoA’s monitoring systems aimed at tripartite common benefit (Ministry, USAID, other donors). With the exception of the CBR Facility, the rapid assessment did not identify any major broad-based efforts in M&E capacity building. However, identification of potential efforts should continue. Specifically, develop and maintain an inventory of multilateral, bilateral, GIRoA, and NGO capacity-building efforts, starting with a comprehensive desk review of all relevant assessments conducted in the past two years. Approach other bilateral and multilateral agencies to further understand capacity needs of individual ministries and potentially join or establish capacity-building activities with these donors.
- Consider championing a donor technical working group to share information, lessons learned and to address M&E issues of mutual donor (and GIRoA) interest. GIRoA performance-based monitoring systems is a high priority of GIRoA and donors and could serve as a first agenda item around which a group could rally.

Facilitate ministry compliance with M&E standards and best practices during the on-budget project design stage to require quality M&E deliverables as a pre-requisite to the IL or, as a first benchmark that is enforced by USAID (suggested deliverables are included in the main report).

## I. INTRODUCTION

### 1. Background

At the 2010 London Conference, the United States and other members of the international community stated their commitment to providing 50 percent of development aid to Afghanistan through on-budget assistance (OBA). They reaffirmed this commitment at both the 2010 Kabul and 2012 Tokyo Conferences. In line with these commitments, a major component of the U.S. Government's approach to reconstruction in Afghanistan involves supporting the Afghan Government's increasing ownership for development and sustaining gains made over the past decade. OBA channeled through the national budget improves the government's capacity to manage public finances. USAID awards OBA in Afghanistan either by buying into multi-donor trust funds or through direct bilateral agreements.<sup>3</sup>

USAID/Afghanistan has previously identified "measuring the performance of on-budget mechanisms" as a significant issue and noted that most on-budget mechanisms rely on benchmarks designed to measure performance of the recipient Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) entities. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and On-Budget Mission Orders, as well as Automated Directives System (ADS) 220, require that all on-budget programs have an M&E plan that takes into account GIROA's internal M&E systems. Furthermore, ADS 220 highlights the importance of conducting a gap analysis of government M&E systems, integrating findings into project designs to mitigate any risks, and ensuring that M&E plans are an integral part of Implementation Letters (Bilateral Project Agreements).<sup>4</sup>

In addition, Tier 3 of USAID/Afghanistan's multi-tiered monitoring strategy identifies using GIROA's internal M&E systems to provide monitoring data on USAID projects (both on- and off-budget). This necessitates identification of what type of indicators USAID can rely on GIROA to monitor.<sup>5</sup>

There is a pressing need, both articulated in Agency guidance as well as identified by the Mission, to have a greater understanding of GIROA's M&E capacities. As part of a broader effort to meet this need, USAID's Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD) commissioned this assessment of GIROA's monitoring systems. The assessment was carried out by a team of four consultants from June to August 2014.

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<sup>3</sup>USAID/Afghanistan, Office of Program and Project Development, *Assessment of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Monitoring and Evaluation Systems, Statement of Work (SoW)*, July 2014, pp.1-2, (Annex 1 of this report) .

<sup>4</sup>Op. cit., *SoW*.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid

## 2. Assessment Purpose

The purpose of this assessment is to document the capacity of existing monitoring systems in GIROA ministries (as well as Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS)<sup>6</sup>) with which USAID has or will have direct on-budget Bilateral Project Agreements. USAID initially selected six ministries, in addition to DABS, to be included in the assessment: Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP), Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Communication Information and Technology (MoCIT) and Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). In the assessment planning period USAID agreed to drop the Ministry of Communication Information and Technology (MoCIT) because it receives considerably less OBA from USAID than the other ministries and therefore was not as high a priority for this assessment. Discussions with the Ministry of Education (MoE) prompted USAID to plan a separate, more in-depth assessment as part of the current Basic Education and Literacy and Vocational Education and Training (BELT) Bilateral Agreement and it was not covered in this assessment. The Ministry of Economy (MoEc) was added to the assessment because it plays a role in and affects the data collection, management, analysis, and reporting functions of line ministries (LM) as per its mandate to monitor and evaluate development programs in Afghanistan.

Table 1 lists the institutions (ministries and DABS) included in the assessment and the associated on-budget projects. Two of the four active on-budget projects were selected for inclusion in the assessment, the MoPH’s Partnership Contracts for Health (PCH) and MAIL’s Afghanistan Development Fund (ADF). The assessment team examined the monitoring systems of both of these projects at central, provincial and district levels. The two other active projects, DABS’s Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) and the Kajaki Unit 2 Project, were not specifically included in the assessment due to time constraints and security concerns.

**Table 1 Current and expected USAID financed on-budget projects by institution**

Institution	On-Budget Projects	Life of Project	
		Start Date	End Date
<b>MoF</b>	Public Financial Management (PFM) – Planned	2015	2019
<b>MAIL</b>	Agriculture Development Fund (ADF)	2014	2018
<b>MoMP</b>	Sheberghan Gas Development Project (SGDP)	2012	2015
<b>MoPH</b>	Partnership Contracts for Health Services (PCH)	2008	2015
<b>DABS</b>	Power Transmission Expansion & Connectivity (PTEC)	2012	2016
	Kajaki Unit 2 Project/Dam Hydropower Plant	2013	2015

<sup>6</sup>DABS is Afghanistan’s national electricity utility company, which has been privatized, though GIROA is its primary shareholder.

USAID/Afghanistan's OPPD and Technical Offices (TOs) will use findings of this assessment to:

- Ensure OBA M&E requirements are being met as per the ADS 220, OBA and M&E Mission Orders, and specific OBA financing mechanisms;
- Inform the design of a potential M&E capacity building activity; and
- Respond to any identified gaps or barriers that may affect a ministry's ability to provide high-quality data.

### 3. Key Assessment Questions

To the extent possible, the assessment team examined and answered the following key questions:

1. How integrated are monitoring systems for routine Ministry programs that are supported by USAID?
2. Are there any on-going donor efforts to support the general monitoring functions of the Ministry? If so, what are the activities and expected results of such efforts? For how long are they projected to run?
3. What types of indicators can this Ministry reliably collect and report on using its current system? From which reporting units (district, province, national)? Which indicators from USAID/Afghanistan's (2014-2024) Performance Management Plan (PMP) are of joint interest to GIRoA and USAID Technical Offices (TOs)?
4. Given findings of this assessment, what particular approach or tool can USAID use to monitor GIRoA's monitoring capacity?

In addition to these questions, the SoW includes the following monitoring topics and specific aspects that are of interest to USAID and were to be addressed by the assessment (please refer to Annex 1 for the SoW):

- **Staffing:** Capacity, organization, presence in the field, lines of reporting, reliance on external technical support, and balance of long-term tashkeel staff and short-term donor supported project staff.
- **Plans, Tools and Analysis:** Indicators monitored and linkages with objectives (donor and GIRoA), sources of data, tools, and quality assurance processes.
- **Management Information Systems:** Design, functionality, and utility.
- **Utilization of Data:** Flow of data back to staff and use of data by management and leadership for decision-making.
- **Gender:** Disaggregation of data by sex as appropriate; and any influence gender might have on the design and implementation of existing monitoring practices and systems.


## II. METHODOLOGY

### 1. Problem and situational analysis

The monitoring topics listed in the SOW guided the assessment, but the assessment team needed to understand them in context. Building from these topics, the team conducted a problem tree analysis to understand GIRoA’s monitoring systems in terms of problems and likely causes. After developing the problem tree, the team reformulated problem statements into statements of desired performance or conditions (the inverse of the problems) to help draft standards against which GIRoA’s monitoring systems could be assessed. The problem tree served as a theoretical framework to identify the focal problem, its causal relationships and direct effects (Figure 1). The results of this analysis allowed the team to define the parameters and content of the Institutional Analysis.

In developing the problem tree and performance statements, the team drew from: 1) local consultants’ intimate understanding of the government culture in general and in-depth knowledge of monitoring systems, practices, and capacity in GIRoA ministries not included in this assessment; 2) information from the team’s review of documents and briefings with Checchi and USAID (please refer to Annex II for the Bibliography of Documents Reviewed); and 3) expatriate consultants’ previous experience working in Afghanistan. The team made slight adjustments to the tree following further review of available documents and discussions with key informants (e.g., USAID on-budget monitors and technical officers, and donor and ministry performance monitoring specialists).

**Figure 1** Problem tree analysis of GIRoA's monitoring systems



## 1. Institutional analysis methodology

Based on the mapping of USAID’s monitoring topics of interest and results of the problem tree analysis, the team arrived at the following seven domains in which performance would be analyzed relative to the monitoring system(s) of each institution: 1) Organizational Structure, 2) Human Capacity, 3) Monitoring Plans and Procedures, 4) Data Management Systems and Practices, 5) Data Utilization and Dissemination, 6) Partnerships and Coordination, and 7) Advocacy and Culture. These performance domains capture all of the monitoring topics and specific aspects of interest to USAID, and include additional areas and aspects identified in the problem tree analysis (e.g., Partnership and Coordination). Table 2 shows how the seven performance domains and USAID’s monitoring topics of interest align.

**Table 2** Alignment of the seven performance domains and USAID’s monitoring topics of interest

Institutional Analysis Performance Domains	USAID’s Topics of Interest
1. Organizational Structure	Staffing
2. Human Capacity	Staffing, Gender
3. Monitoring Plans and Procedures	Plans, Tools, & Analysis Utilization of Data, Gender
4. Data Management Systems and Practices	Plans, Tools, & Analysis Management Information Systems
5. Data Utilization and Dissemination	Utilization of Data
6. Partnerships and Coordination	-
7. Advocacy and Culture	Gender

The Institutional Analysis sought to measure the performance of the monitoring system(s) at each selected ministry and DABS. The *primary unit of analysis* is the institution itself. In the case of the MAIL and MoPH, the ADF and PCH projects each represent a *secondary unit of analysis*, respectively. These on-budget project monitoring systems are distinct enough from the ministry monitoring systems to allow a secondary unit of analysis, while also allowing for more in-depth analysis on monitoring systems directly supported by USAID OBA. The different entities involved in monitoring at the institution and project levels represent the *units of observation*. These are the units that the data describe (e.g., M&E departments, management information system units, policy and planning directorates, etc.) and from which conclusions have been drawn about the overall monitoring systems. Units of observation represent an integral part of the monitoring system(s) and the principal sources of information.

**Table 3** Institutions and projects assessed by number and affiliation of interview respondents

Institutions and Projects Assessed	No. Interview Respondents	Affiliations of Interview Respondents
Ministry of Economy	5	Central Ministry, Donor (ASI)
Ministry of Finance	6	Central Ministry, Donors (ASI, AusAid)

<b>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock</b>	3	Central Ministry
<b>Afghanistan Development Fund</b>	5	Implementing Partner (DAI), selected projects in Kabul and Herat
<b>Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat</b>	4	Central Office
<b>Ministry of Public Health</b>	6	Central Ministry, Donor (USAID)
<b>Partnership Contracts for Health</b>	7	Central Ministry/Project Office, Bamyan Public Health Office, Bamyan NGO Contractors, Donor (USAID)
<b>Total</b>	34	

Data collection methods included: 1) in-depth interviews with key staff, mostly in advisory roles and at the senior management level (please refer to Annex III for the Schedule of Meetings), 2) observation of physical systems, such as the management information system(s), and 3) review of data, records, reports, and tools. To the extent possible, the team used these methods to triangulate the information received and collected, particularly where inconsistencies were evident.

The data collection instrument covered the seven performance domains and a total of 41 performance statements, with four to eight performance statements per domain (see Table 3 above and Annex IV for the Data Collection Instrument). The instrument was used to capture data collected through all three methods, although it served primarily as the interviewers' discussion guide and checklist during in-depth interviews. A corresponding list of questions and probes was used in some cases to facilitate the discussion.

For each institution, data were collected on all applicable performance statements and entered into a customized Excel spreadsheet. Based on these supporting data, interviewers ranked each performance statement using a four-point Likert scale. Once rankings were entered into the Excel spreadsheet, mean performance scores for each domain were automatically generated and plotted in a spider graph linked to a corresponding spreadsheet. A spider graph is one way to display data and provides a snapshot of the overall situation studied and of the individual variables that define the situation. A spider graph has been constructed for each unit of analysis (institution and project) depicting performance of the institution's or project's monitoring system (overall situation) defined by the individual performance domains (variables). The mean performance scores of each domain are plotted onto the graph and a line is drawn connecting these data points, giving the plot a web-like appearance. The graph shows the system's strengths and weaknesses and allows comparison and contrast of the domains and identification of any outliers. The graphs serve as the basis for the team's analysis of each institution and project reviewed. Interpretation of each graph is discussed in the Findings section (please refer to Excel Workbooks in Annexes V through XI for the detailed and graphed findings on each institution and project).

The first assessment was conducted at the MoEc by the full team in order to practice applying the instrument, estimate time needed to complete the instrument, and ensure consistency in

interviewing techniques and administering the instrument at the other ministries (in teams of two). Based on this pilot test, the team determined that each assessment required a minimum of two visits per ministry/on-budget project (lasting one to four hours). Assessment team members contacted respondents and requested documents until the required information needs were satisfied to the extent possible. The assessment team members were able to validate preliminary findings to the extent that respondents were available and willing to review the information and, thus, preliminary findings were validated for the MoEc and PCH project.

Finally, the team made visits to selected ADF and PCH project sites for purposes of assessing monitoring systems at the provincial level and triangulating information from the central level. The visit to the PCH project in Bamyan included interviews with key staff of the Provincial Public Health Office (PPHO) and the Agency for Assistance and Development of Afghanistan (AADA), the NGO contractor for health service delivery in Bamyan. The ADF site visit covered the following four project sites: 1) Almond Industry Development Organization (AAIDO), 2) Afghanistan National Seed Organization (ANSOR) in Kabul, 3) Herat Ice Cream Company, and 4) Morvarid Food Industries in the Herat area.

## **2. Limitations**

The assessment team experienced difficulties in reaching representatives at several ministries and donor agencies throughout the assessment period. To some extent, this was due to the timing of the assessment, which coincided with the holy month of Ramadan during which ministry office hours are limited, officials are less available, and several donor representatives are on leave. However, the general unavailability of key stakeholders limited the number of overall respondents and the assessment team's ability to effectively triangulate data sources. This resulted in under-representation from the ministries and lack of representation from the donor community.

## **III. FINDINGS**

### **1. Overview**

Findings in this section are presented by institution in six main subsections. In subsection 2, findings are presented for MAIL and ADF, respectively; and in subsection 7, findings are presented for the MoPH followed by PCH. Each subsection provides a description of the unit(s) of analysis (institutions and projects as applicable) and the organizational structure and flow of data relative to this structure, followed by key findings on the performance of the monitoring system(s). The discussion of findings is largely based on interpretation of scores for the various performance domains illustrated in the corresponding spider graph (Figures V to XI).

The key parts of the spider graph are the radii and concentric circles. Each radius corresponds to one of the seven performance domains and each circle represents one of the four performance ratings (derived from the Likert scale), arranged from lowest (1) in the center to highest (4) at the perimeter. Each data point (mean performance score) is plotted on the graph at the intersection of the radius and circle. The radial distance, from the center to its intersection,

reflects the score for the performance domain; in other words, the longer the radius, the better the performance. The resulting shaded area shows the relative strengths and weakness of performance domains, as well as general overall performance of the monitoring system. Findings discuss the relative values of individual data points, similar and dissimilar data points, and outliers.

Overall mean performance scores for the five institutions and two on-budget projects are summarized in Table 4 below. Finally, in response to Question 3 in the SoW, this report presents a brief analysis on the integrity of each institution’s/project’s existing indicators and its ability to satisfy data needs required by the USAID PMP 2014-2024.

**Table 4 Mean performance scores of monitoring systems by institution and project assessed**

<b>Institutions and Projects Assessed (Units of Analysis)</b>	<b>Mean Performance Scores (out of a possible 4.0)</b>
<b>Ministry of Economy</b>	2.20
<b>Ministry of Finance</b>	2.57
<b>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock</b>	1.20
<b>Afghanistan Development Fund</b>	3.12
<b>Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat</b>	3.60
<b>Ministry of Public Health</b>	2.70
<b>Partnership Contracts for Health</b>	2.94
<b>Ministry of Mines and Petroleum</b>	0.00

## **2. Ministry of Economy**

The MoEc’s mandate is to formulate economic policy, monitor and evaluate the national development strategy, and coordinate development efforts in Afghanistan. However, the Ministry has not been able to perform its functions to the fullest for a variety of reasons both internal and external to the Ministry. This assessment focused on the second of the three general mandates - monitoring.

There is a sense of deep frustration within the MoEc owing mainly to its self-acknowledged limited institutional capacity and eroded political power. Over the course of the assessment, several themes emerged as being root causes for the MoEc’s low capacity. First, the Afghan government as a whole does not have a clear strategic document with well-defined development policies, programs, and M&E plans. While the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS, 2008-2013) appears to have played this role, its framework was too broad to implement. Monitoring progress across its 86 expected outcomes and 276 development indicators significantly impedes the MoEc’s ability to monitor the performance of LMs.

In addition, the MoF and MoEc have had overlapping mandates to monitor development programs/projects, which includes competing for the mandate to monitor implementation of ANDS. During the early period of implementation (late 2008), a compromise was made to split responsibilities for monitoring ANDS outcomes and outputs between the MoEc and MoF, respectively, which continues to be a problematic arrangement.

The National Priority Programs (NPPs) were established in large part to operationalize broad outcomes of ANDS, though in practice NPP deliverables do not synchronize to ANDS outcomes. For the most part, the NPPs were crafted and introduced by the MoF and donor community with little buy-in from the MoEc and line ministries. With the vast majority of NPPs funded off-budget, this funding stream created a separate data flow and overlap between the MoEc and MoF over responsibility for monitoring. Currently, this responsibility resides with the MoEc.

Finally, the MoEc has little leverage with LMs in terms of reporting. Because reporting is tied to the annual budget, program funding is the prime motivation for reporting and, thus, submission of quarterly reports to the MoF on outputs is the LMs' reporting priority. The MoEc signs-off on LM reports and the annual operational plans to ensure alignment with ANDS. The MoF is the main signatory to off-budget funded projects and the interface agency for donor cooperation, further increasing its leverage and control compared to that of the MoEc.

There are two directorates in the MoEc responsible for monitoring progress towards the achievement of the country's development objectives: the Directorate of Integration and Design (DID) and the Directorate of Policy Planning and Results-Based Monitoring (DPP/RBM). These directorates represent the units of observation in the MoEc Institutional Analysis. DID is in charge of monitoring activities and outputs, while the DPP/RBM is in charge of outcome level indicators (Figure 2). Although the M&E Department is physically located in the DPP/RBM, the monitoring function cuts across directorates and departments.

Two other directorates are tangentially involved in monitoring: the Directorate of NGOs and the Regional Development Directorate, which manages a US\$100 million Indian Fund exclusively targeted to small projects in impoverished frontier districts of the country.

Figure 3 shows a somewhat unfavorable picture of the MoEc monitoring system (see Annex V, Table 1 for detailed performance findings). Under the *Organizational Structure* of the Ministry, the DID and DPP/RBM are almost exclusively responsible for covering the monitoring function, from outputs to outcomes (which contributes to its highest performance ranking of 3.3), but both directorates are constrained by several factors that are discussed below. Furthermore, the focus is on outputs rather than outcomes, which is perpetuated by the absence of a current government strategic plan (ANDS ended in 2013) and performance monitoring framework.

Figure 2 MoEc organizational structure and data flow for monitoring<sup>7</sup>





Figure 3 Graphic presentation of the MoEc monitoring system



*Monitoring Plans and Procedures* has the lowest score (1.6) of all performance domains, in large part a result of not having results frameworks and performance management plans in place for government LMs. Additionally, there is no strategic or monitoring plan in place for MoEc to track its own performance. Without these plans and procedures, monitoring staff do not have the necessary tools to coordinate or establish relationships with LMs, let alone have any influence over their compliance with monitoring and reporting requirements. Similarly, MoEc performance in *Data Management Systems and Practices* (1.8) reflects the Ministry's

<sup>7</sup>Figures 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13 have been developed by the assessment team based on information obtained through interviews and available documents.

inability to collect quality data from the LMs and provinces, or to efficiently manage and process data, the basic and core functions of any monitoring system.

*Partnership and Coordination* is also amongst the lowest scoring domains (1.8), which reflects the Ministry's isolated position within the government and with donors in relation to monitoring. This apparent lack of leadership is also reflected in the *Advocacy and Culture* domain (2.2). Monitoring is not understood as a management practice at any level and there is limited knowledge of basic monitoring concepts at all levels. However, the MoEc's institutional isolation dramatically contrasts with a strong sense of commitment on the part of MoEc monitoring staff, who are highly engaged in their work.

*Data Utilization and Dissemination* receives one of the higher scores (2.3) reflecting straightforward procedures for internal and external dissemination of reports including the annual Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Poverty Reports to governors, media, universities, and embassies (in addition to central government, provinces, and donors). However, performance also reflects duplication in LM reporting, poor quality of data and, thus, unreliability of reports. Ministry officials recognize that not even the annual ANDS/NPP report is used in any significant decision making process.

**Box 1: Illustration of inter-relationship of performance domains**

“Right now, I have a one month delay on [report] data from six of 22 NPPs. The balance [of NPPs] don't even report. *First*, they prefer to report to the MoF to get money. *Second*, [reports] are supposed to be signed by the ministers, which means they have to go all the way up and then come back down and then get sent to the MoEc – it takes a long time. *Third*, most LMs don't have an M&E Unit and officers are not skilled. Most officers in government are Grade 4 [equivalent to secondary school graduates/diploma]. *Fourth*, there is no proper feedback mechanism. Ministers don't know they are late in submitting data, so nothing moves.”

-Ministry Official

Finally, *Human Capacity* is on a par with the ministry's overall mean performance score (2.1). In both directorates, skills of at least some of the staff are weak, a possible consequence of several factors, including: lack of clarity in regards to the

national strategy; lack of documented protocols and procedures within the Ministry that affects staff efficiency and effectiveness; and insufficient recognition of the monitoring function from higher Ministry levels and LMs, which exacerbates staff turnover and difficulty in consolidating a solid cadre of technical personnel.

MoEc Alignment with USAID PMP 2014-2024 Indicators: USAID does not have any project or program with this Ministry. At this point, it is difficult to envision the type of data from which USAID could directly benefit.

### 3. Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance houses the directorate in charge of monitoring performance of GIRoA's annual budget, including operational and development budgets. The Budget Policy and Reforms Directorate (BPRD) within the MoF is led by a Director of General Budget (DGB) under the Deputy Minister (DM) of Finance, one of three DMs. The BPRD, through the Budget

Performance and Monitoring Unit (BPMU), is the major government body responsible for monitoring performance of the annual budget and serves as the front line. The BPMU represents the unit of observation in this Institutional Analysis of the MoF (please refer to Appendix VI.a. and b. for overall and DGB organizational charts, respectively).

While the MoF hierarchical structure promotes clear lines of reporting and supervision (*Organizational Structure*), its limitations may outweigh its strengths. BPMU representatives interviewed believe that the hierarchy puts too much distance between its leaders and managers of reform and, at the same time, they routinely experience bottlenecks in using the chain of command. When the BPMU and other units make a recommendation, any kind of response to it depends on a functional chain of command, but communication that is sent up the chain requesting or informing decisions often gets delayed and sometimes reaches a point of no return.

Each of the country's eight sectors (Security, Infrastructure, Agriculture and Rural Development, Education, Health, Economic Governance, Rule of Law, and Social Protection) comprises a variable number of budget units (BU), mostly line ministries. A single BU is responsible for up to five medium- to long-term programs (at least five years) financed by the annual budget (linked to the NPPs and ANDS). The BU allocates program funds to a maximum of five subprograms. Approximately 42 percent of the budget goes to programs in four sectors (Agriculture, Health, Education, and Public Works). Quarterly reporting is required for the 25 ministries that make up these sectors and account for most of the annual budget. The BPMU monitors fiscal performance and outputs of the LM subprograms, while the MoEc is responsible for monitoring program outcomes (see MoEC Findings).

Established reporting processes form the basis of a clear and dependable flow of data (Figure 4). Over a four-week period each quarter, LMs prepare reports (through formal directive) and the BPMU checks, aggregates, analyzes, compiles, and reports data to leadership (via the chain of command). After providing feedback and approval, the report passes to MoEc for review. Every six months, reporting (data flow) extends to the Cabinet and Parliament.

The MoF has a relatively good system in place for monitoring fiscal and program performances of LMs (Figure 5). Established monitoring and reporting processes and procedures are in place and managed well by the BPMU. Although the BPMU is grossly understaffed (four staff to about 60 BUs), it is technically strong, operating as a self-directed and professionally motivated unit. The score for *Human Capacity* (2.8) is amongst the highest, largely owing to the technical strength of the BPMU. However, DGB salaries and systems overall (BPMU included) rely on an unsustainable level of external funding.

Figure 4 MoF organizational structure and data flow for monitoring





Figure 5 Graphic presentation of the MoF monitoring system



*Data Utilization and Dissemination* (2.8) also ranks amongst the highest scores, and mostly reflects the Ministry’s clear plan for dissemination of quarterly, semi-annual, and annual budget performance reports, which are widely circulated within and outside government. These reports are also made public on the MoF website, further promoting the principles of transparency. However, the Ministry does not comply with its own budget reporting requirements, which brings the score down and means that information reported to the Cabinet and Parliament is incomplete. The BPMU uses performance monitoring data for continuous

improvement of the budget reporting system and, although limited in its decisionmaking power, makes recommendations to senior management and leadership (please refer to Annex VI for detailed performance findings).

“Ministry of Finance is one of the budgetary units included in reporting, but was not able to provide a quality and on time report in the past two quarters.”

- 2013 Annual Budget Performance Report

The BPMU scores relatively high in *Monitoring Plans and Procedures* (2.7) owing to the level of support it provides to the BUs, with clear procedural guidance, instructions and tools for reporting quarterly fiscal performance and progress on outputs. However, despite the BPMU’s efforts, development budgets are underspent every quarter due to a host of reasons that include poor planning and forecasting, and possibly the inability of BUs to make midstream adjustments to subprograms that are too large to be flexible. An illustrative FY2013 budget report shows that of the approximately 2.5 billion (development) dollars approved and planned for the Electronic Afghanistan Program<sup>8</sup>, its subprograms were underspent by an estimated 1.2 billion dollars without adequate justification.

The quality of the LM’s budget work remains a concern.<sup>9</sup> Budgeted programs are focused on outputs and activities due to a lack of skills in planning and results-based programming. Performance data is poorly used for program-based budgeting, while performance monitoring remains an abstract concept. These situations imply that monitoring is not having an impact on fiscal performance, and that this is likely a result of even more systemic problems within the Ministry.

*Advocacy and Culture* scores lowest (2.0), attributed to the perceived weaknesses in MoF leadership. Of course, rapid assessment findings on the Ministry’s budget monitoring system must be put into context, considering the MoF mandate to steward the country’s economy. Nevertheless, leadership’s lack of scrutiny and engagement in budget reforms is fairly well documented - even in its own reports: “...there are challenges in political support including a lack of required awareness in high ranking government officials, (Directors, General Directors, and deputy ministers), cabinet and national assembly members”.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, LM programs continue to be funded despite shortfalls in their fiscal and program performance. Finally, the Ministry’s strategic plan is not being used as a tool to harness collective contribution toward realizing envisaged goals. In fact, within the directorates there is not much knowledge at all about the Ministry’s strategic plan.

Clearly, the mandate of the MoF depends on a high level of *Partnerships and Coordination*. However, the relatively low score in this domain (2.3) is based on the seemingly poor quality of performance, rather than on the quantity of partnerships and frequency of coordination, which are both impressive. Coordination within government and amongst all stakeholders

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<sup>8</sup>Ministry of Communications, Information and Technology (MoCIT) – one of its three programs financed by the national budget

<sup>9</sup>Ministry of Finance, Directorate General Budget, *Strategic Plan 1393-1397, Strengths and Weaknesses with Current Systems and Practices*, no date or page numbers assigned [Draft, not for circulation].

<sup>10</sup>Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economy, *Government Performance Report for the FY 1392 (1<sup>st</sup> Jadi to 30<sup>th</sup> Qaws)*, 2013, p.12, available from Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

(MoF, BUs, donors) peaks during the budget period and has been facilitated greatly by the introduction and circulation of a budget calendar. Various other coordination meetings are regularly scheduled throughout the year, as would be expected. However, despite all of the meetings, intergovernmental and donor coordination is generally perceived and documented as poor. The quality of partnership between the MoF and donors varies by donor, but there is general acknowledgment that donor agendas are unaligned with one another and misaligned with Ministry priorities and approaches.

Finally, the performance score is affected by deep division and lack of cooperation between the MoF and MoEc. Moreover, the arrangement to split up the monitoring of outputs and outcomes between the two parties further convolutes LMs' understanding of program-based budgeting and runs counter to the purpose of performance-based monitoring.

MoF Alignment with USAID PMP 2014-2024 Indicators: There is no reason the MoF would not be able to report on the indicators under Sub-IR 3.2.4: PFM Capacity Strengthened (in the next PFM project). However, a defined index is needed for the following outcome indicator: *Number of public sector organizations with improved PFM system as a result of USG assistance.* See also Recommendations.

#### **4. Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock**

Agriculture accounts for about 75 percent of employment in Afghanistan and provides most of the food security to the population. Needless to say, MAIL is a critical ministry in the government<sup>11</sup> and yet, from a monitoring standpoint, MAIL is weak in almost all aspects.

Within MAIL's organizational structure, the M&E Department and the Directorate of Policy, Planning and Programs (DPPP) are responsible for monitoring, and both report directly to the Minister (Figure 6). The specific role of the M&E Department is to verify the status of projects in the field (physical monitoring), once implementing contractors submit reports for payments on progress made. Data are collected for the purpose of monitoring budget execution and delivery of outputs, which triggers further MoF disbursements for project execution. The DPPP, through the Management Information Systems (MIS) Unit, is solely responsible for the preparation of reports.

As reflected in Figure 7 below, MAIL's *Organizational Structure* scores highest amongst performance domains (2.7), owing to direct lines of reporting (between M&E and leadership), clear (but few) internal clients to support with data, and staff who are exclusively devoted to monitoring. While the monitoring function is adequately staffed, monitoring skills of staff are generally weak, including limited familiarity with concepts of the results chain and M&E plans in general (*Human Capacity*, 2.1).

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<sup>11</sup>Afghanistan National Development Strategy document, 2008-2013.

Figure 6 MAIL organizational structure and data flow for monitoring





Figure 7 Graphic presentation of the MAIL monitoring system



MAIL’s MIS is exceptional by government standards. It is an on-line system accessible to staff 24/7 and equipped with the necessary security features to protect the integrity of data. Customized reports can be made available as needed. However, data are of poor quality and incomplete (*Data Management Systems and Practices*, 2.5). Furthermore, reports prepared by the M&E Department and MIS Unit and “passed-on” to senior management appear to be of little use other than to request financial disbursements from the MoF (*Utilization and*

*Dissemination*, 2.0). Finally, MAIL has more than 1,000 indicators in its inventory and most are not clearly defined. The MIS unit closely monitors 32 of these indicators (*Monitoring Plan and Procedures*, 1.9). The critical weaknesses in MAIL’s monitoring seem to reflect senior management’s lack of understanding of M&E and little to no support to monitoring activities (*Partnerships and Coordination*, 1.0).

“The Minister has eagerness and willingness to support monitoring in the Ministry. Some Deputy Ministries care about monitoring, others not. Heads of Directorates are not interested. Most of them read the first page of the reports and use them ‘politically’, not for development purposes. Senior managers do not take advantage of training/coaching sessions when organized, but instead send representatives who are not interested in the subject matter”.

-MAIL Official

Alignment with USAID PMP 2014-2024 Indicators: USAID’s 2014-2024 PMP contains 11 indicators on which MAIL is expected to report. MAIL tracks 32 indicators (selected from more than 1,000), of which the large majority is at the output level and would not be useful to USAID. Furthermore, MAIL data is observed to be of poor quality (please refer to Appendix VII.a. for MAIL Indicators).

**The Agriculture Credit Enhancement (ACE) Project**, funded (off-budget) by USAID, is one of 37 donor-funded projects shown on the MAIL website. The project is expected to end in January 2015, but both USAID and MAIL have decided to institutionalize the programmatic efforts of ACE through the creation of the **Afghanistan Development Fund (ADF)**, which has been operating since April 2014. To date, a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and a significant number of former ACE personnel have been transferred officially to ADF as permanent staff on the payroll. The ADF is the only public financial institution in Afghanistan that provides rural credit. ACE will continue supporting ADF until project completion in February 2015.

ADF and MAIL have different monitoring systems and generate different data that are both relevant to USAID. To date, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), the Implementing Partner (IP), has largely satisfied USAID’s information needs through the ACE project. For an international IP such as DAI, data collection and processing are conventional and the system complies with reporting requirements as expected.

ADF has a single monitoring system in its Kabul offices and, as expected in any financial institution, it focuses on monitoring loan performance. Characteristic of a second-tier activity, ADF does not conduct financial transactions directly with individual customers, but rather works with producer associations, NGOs, and other sector groups. Data are collected when a loan or grant is approved and entered into ADF’s single monitoring system, which is shared by the M&E and Administration and Finance Departments, and the Credit Management Unit (CMU) (Figure 8). The M&E Department monitors non-financial and aggregate financial data, whereas the other two departments monitor individual financial transactions. In addition, the M&E Department processes and analyzes the data required for reporting. The CMUs are ADF’s operating branches and the main mechanism to reach targeted clientele, such as Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). At the time of this writing, only three of ADF’s six

decentralized CMUs (three in nearby areas within Kabul, one in Herat and two in Mazar-al-Sharif) were operating. Loan performance is monitored by the CMUs on a quarterly basis, but there is no mechanism to systematically monitor project performance.





Figure 9 Graphic presentation of the ADF monitoring system



As shown in Figure 9, ADF’s monitoring system is generally strong in six of the seven domains (*Partnerships and Coordination* is not applicable). *Utilization and Dissemination* has the lowest score (3.3), owing mainly to underutilization of ADF’s robust database, which could be generating more useful data (e.g., agricultural product by type, size of SME, region/location, etc.) to strategically target ADF’s potential customers, improve its operational efficiency, and expand its impact. Moreover, ADF shares its quarterly reports to MAIL only when it requires the Ministry’s approval for USAID funding, which is channeled through MAIL. Key factors bring down ADF’s performance scores: weak oversight of decentralized CMUs (*Human Capacity*, 3.4), and a monitoring system that is not linked with MAIL or any other system (*Data Management Systems and Practice*, 3.5). In general, ADF would benefit greatly from explicitly aligning its strategy and operating plans to MAIL’s.

Alignment with USAID PMP 2014-2024 Indicators: ACE/ADF tracks fifteen indicators aligned to USAID's PMP 2010-2014 and reports progress to USAID/Afghanistan on a quarterly basis. Eight of the fifteen indicators are reported to ADF's Board of Directors on a monthly basis. A Data Quality Assessment (DQA) was conducted by DAI staff on the eight indicators reported to the Board of Directors and MAIL (please refer to Annex VIII.a. for Comments on ACE Data Quality Assessment). It is recommended that indicators used by ACE/ADF be identical to the description as stated in the PIRS and to avoid customized indicators to the extent possible. Measurement on increase in net income should be analyzed closer since the main data for its estimation (i.e. harvest and income), are rather weak as acknowledged in the DQA.

## **5. Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat**

DABS is an independent and autonomous company established under the Corporations and Limited Liabilities Law of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The company was incorporated on May 4, 2008 and replaces Da Afghanistan Breshna Moassassa as the national power utility provider. DABS operates and manages electric power generation, importation, transmission, and distribution throughout Afghanistan on a commercial basis. Its service territory covers the 34 provinces, combined into nine regional hubs. The hubs are in turn consolidated by the corporate headquarters of DABS. The company has four governing bodies. GIRoA shareholders own DABS (MoF, 45%; MoWE, 35%; MoUD, 10% and MoEc 10%). The Board of Directors is responsible for the oversight of DABS management, which is composed mainly of the shareholders. The Audit Committee is responsible for the oversight of the Board of Directors. The Senior Management Group (SMG) is responsible for daily management of DABS operations and comprises the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Chief Commercial Officer (CCO), the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and the Chief Operations Officer (COO).

The Department of Corporate Planning and Controlling (CPC) reports to the CEO and is predominantly engaged in forecasting the country's energy balance, tracking annual energy imports, budgeting, analyzing high level tariffs, preparing corporate plans, and developing executive reports, summaries and presentations for SMG and other ministries on DABS performance (Figure 10).

The CPC focuses on monitoring DABS's commercial and financial performance. Reports contain data compiled from different offices that in turn collect data from the nine regional hubs. These reports are prepared as needed by management and include the following statistics, amongst others: growth in generation of domestic power plants, revenues and expenditures, transmission losses, growth in number of consumers, and growth in per capita consumption.

Figure 10 DABS organizational structure and data flow for monitoring





Figure 11 Graphic presentation of the DABS Monitoring System



DABS’s overall monitoring system is strong on most fronts (Figure 11). However, its monitoring plan and results framework are not aligned to any ministry’s strategic plan, nor does it monitor the entire results chain, and it is not linked to any national or ministerial monitoring system (*Monitoring Plans and Procedures*, 3.3). Although DABS is an autonomous state company, it should still explicitly contribute to the strategic plan of a sector/ministry. (Please refer to Appendix IX, Table 1 for detailed findings on performance.)

According to the CFO, the company also capitalized on the previous experience with the Kabul Electricity Service Improvement Program (KESIP), which followed USAID’s M&E requirements and practices, such as preparation of the PMP (*Advocacy and Culture*, 3.6). The

company scores high on *Human Capacity* (3.8), mainly because its monitoring activities are straightforward, from data collection to reporting to use of information.

Alignment with USAID PMP 2014-2024 Indicators: DABS collects data under *Sub-IR 1.1.1. Access to Electricity Increased*. Reports submitted to the Board of Directors contain monthly data on revenues and costs, production in megawatt-hours (MWhrs), number of meters (proxy for number of customers), and number of participants/clients with increased access to electricity. These data are sufficient to calculate the three outcome indicators under Sub-IR 1.1.1, namely: *DABS collected revenue as a percentage of total costs (Custom)*, *number of MWhrs supplied to customers (Custom)*, and *number of beneficiaries with improved energy services due to USG assistance (Standard/F)*. The Performance Indicator Reference Sheets (PIRS) of the latter indicator states, “DABS contractor, funded by USAID, is to provide both the methodology and plan.” Although DABS stated that it has complied, this statement was not confirmed by USAID/Afghanistan.

“We are so committed to monitoring our indicators that as part of the ‘annual summits’, senior management selects and provides awards to the staff in provinces for the best data management and monitoring practices.”

-DABS Senior Official

## 6. Ministry of Mines and Petroleum

USAID initiated the Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity (SGGA) to assist GIRoA in developing a sustainable electric supply for Afghan consumption and revenue production. The activity aims to estimate gas reserves and develop a framework for public-private partnership between the Afghan government and a private firm for gas processing. These objectives are in line with the Sheberghan Gas Development Project (SGDP), led by the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP). The first phase of the project began in December 2013 when MoMP awarded the contract to the Turkish National Petroleum Corporation. Work is significantly behind schedule; the project is starting initial drilling/re-entry procedures.

The MoMP has planned to have an M&E Committee that comprises (amongst others): the Deputy Ministry of Policy and Planning, the Directorate General of the Afghan Petroleum Authority, the Legal Director, and the Contract Management Director (Figure 12). The MoMP has assigned a person to the preparation of reports, which to date has been mainly on construction work prior to drilling operations. As each Committee member has a host of other responsibilities, the M&E Committee is yet to meet. Therefore, the MoMP has been submitting reports individually to members for feedback and approval before submitting them to the Minister. There is an overall perception in the Ministry that senior management is not well aware of the role and importance of M&E.

Figure 12 MoMP organizational structure and data flow for monitoring





Figure 13: Graphic presentation of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum’s monitoring system

Given the incipient status of SGGA and the lack of monitoring system in the Ministry the team did not conduct a full institutional analysis. The MoMP's Gas Development Office (GDO) was created about a year ago and other gas projects are expected to be managed by this office as well. Neither the Ministry nor the GDO have a monitoring system as noted by USAID's 2011-2012 Institutional Assessment. However, USAID should note that the Ministry is currently preparing its Master Strategy Plan.

Alignment with USAID PMP 2014-2024 Indicators: The project does not collect any data that is of relevance to USAID’s PMP. At the time of data collection, the Ministry has been

monitoring progress on the infrastructure to initiate well drilling. Nevertheless, the monitoring matrix in the project description provided by USAID includes seven output and two outcome level indicators. According to the project's OBM, the project has executed capacity-building activities that satisfy output indicators 1 and 2 in the matrix, but the assessment team was not able to obtain data on the number of personnel trained. In this early phase of the project, staff do not collect or report data on any other indicators.

## **7. Ministry of Public Health**

The MoPH has a complex structure of health service delivery built on more than a decade of external financing. Although aligned to priority programs, service delivery is implemented and managed through an array of on- and off-budget programs and projects. The Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) is the foundation of the Afghan primary health care system and its complement, the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), defines the priority elements of hospital services and the referral system. BPHS and EPHS are delivered by the Ministry in three provinces and contracted out to NGOs in 31 provinces, with support from the World Bank (WB) and European Union (EU) (21 provinces) and USAID (13 provinces). The MoPH coordinates donor support in the different provinces and manages NGO contracts through its Procurement Department (specifically, the Grants and Services Contracts Management Unit - GCMU). USAID's performance-based contracting and third party monitoring help to ensure accountability of NGO contractors and quality of service delivery, respectively.


The monitoring function cuts across several directorates under the ministry's three major programs (Health Services, Policy and Planning, and Finance and Administration) and the M&E Directorate (the main unit of observation in this Institutional Analysis of the MoPH). Several departments, units, and projects within directorates assume monitoring responsibilities (e.g., disease surveillance, research, the GCMU, the Health Management Information System Unit, technical units, project offices, etc.). In addition, the PPHO and NGO contractors are also responsible for monitoring.

Within this overall structure, monitoring systems are aligned to the BPHS/EPHS and other major health project/intervention areas (e.g., HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, nutrition, reproductive health, etc.). Monitoring systems are implemented with varying degrees of organization and capability. The Health Management Information System (HMIS), physically located in the Directorate of Policy and Planning, mainly captures BPHS/EPHS data, although its coverage has been expanded in recent years to incorporate data from several other monitoring systems into a single data flow (please refer to Annex X.a. and b. for overall and M&E Directorate organizational charts). The BPHS/EPHS monitoring system is the most established system and is supported with on-budget funding by USAID through the PCH Project (\$236 million, 2009-2014) and by the WB and EU through the System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition (SEHAT) Project (\$307 million, 2013-2018). USAID OBA is scheduled to shift to SEHAT in FY 2015.

The MoPH has well-established systems and tools for monitoring NGO management and delivery of the BPHS and EPHS, namely the HMIS, National Monitoring Checklist (NMC), and Balanced Score Card (BSC).

The HMIS provides quarterly health facility service statistics and output data on a subset of (about 140) BPHS and EPHS indicators. Data flow systematically from community health posts and health facilities to the central HMIS Unit, (via the PPHO) where data are readily available and reports are regularly developed and widely disseminated within and outside the MoPH (Figure 13). The HMIS 2013 Annual Report shows 91 percent of health facilities submitting Monthly Integrated Activity Reports (MIAR), a main data source, while PCH supported facilities have maintained close to 100 percent submission record each year. HMIS data are used by health providers, project implementers and MoPH staff for tracking BPHS and EPHS delivery, remedial action, and planning purposes.

Figure 14 MoPH organizational structure and data flow for monitoring




The HMIS has been key to stimulating interest in and facilitating learning about the use of data for evidence-based decision-making, perhaps one of its biggest contributions so far. However, data utilization training needs to continue, and threats to data quality posed by self-reporting need to be examined vis-à-vis required HMIS procedures. Preliminary findings of a MoPH DQA tool field-test conducted earlier this year confirm that use (e.g., analysis, interpretation, and decision-making versus reporting) and quality of data at the health facility level need to be strengthened and health providers need HMIS training (please refer to Annex II for the Bibliography of Documents Reviewed).

The NMC (currently being updated) has been used for over a decade to monitor performance of BPHS delivery and to spot check HMIS data at each health facility. It is administered at least once per quarter by different actors at each level of the health system: MoPH (M&E Directorate and GCMU), PPHO, and NGOs. However, each actor has a separate use for the data and few take advantage of the existing NMC database designed to centralize analysis, management and reporting of (aggregate) performance data - a service provided by the M&E Directorate. Since 2004, the BSC has been administered annually by a third party in a national sample of BPHS-providing health facilities to assess and manage performance (across six domains and 22 indicators) and verify HMIS data quality. The framework is designed to provide managers and policy makers with a snapshot of performance at the provincial level (its unit of analysis) and national level trends over time.

MoPH and PCH project performance scores and interpretation of scores are presented below in separate sections, respectively.

Figure 15 Graphic presentation of the MoPH monitoring system



It is important to understand the inter-relationship between the MoPH's performance domains (Figure 14). Several areas of identified strength contrast or even mask underlying limitations. For example, the relatively high score for *Organizational Structure* (2.8) is weighted by three factors: clear lines of supervision within and between central and provincial levels of monitoring, direct line of reporting from the M&E Directorate to the Minister of Public Health, and clear internal and external clients supported by the M&E Directorate. However, these strengths are in contrast to a fragmented overall monitoring system and poorly functioning M&E Directorate owing at least partly to the lack of a clear ministry strategic plan (*Monitoring Plans and Procedures*, 2.3) and inadequate support/recognition from senior management and leadership (*Advocacy and Culture*, 2.4).

The M&E Directorate serves as a coordinating and technical consultative body. It oversees quality standards and covers (through oversight, coordination or actual implementation)

routine functions, such as collection, management, analysis, reporting and dissemination of health sector data. Although the directorate is uniquely positioned to play a leadership role, it is not recognized in this capacity and most departments are unclear as to the role it does or should play. Its own staff finds it difficult to carry out any discrete mandate, as there is overlap within the directorate and across MoPH departments. Of the M&E Directorate's three departments, the Monitoring Department absorbs most of the work, while the Evaluation Department is underutilized, and the Private Sector Regulation Department is still emerging.

*Data Utilization and Dissemination* is one of two performance domains that scored highest (3.0), owing to a clear and established plan of data dissemination through reports, meetings, and presentations at each level of the health system. However, dissemination tends to focus on outputs and "data" more than results, which does not drive substantive decision-making. Moreover, the use of data is not nearly in proportion to the volume being collected.


The lack of human capacity within GIRoA (reflected in a score of 2.4) is well documented: dependence upon donor-financed technical advisors; weak technical capacity of tashkeel staff at the central level; and even weaker capacity, staff shortages, and poor morale and performance at the provincial level. Unavailability of female staff to monitor and collect data in the provinces is an ongoing problem and gap in the monitoring system. Per Diem for central and provincial staff is fully financed through the GAVI Alliance Health Systems Strengthening (HSS) project, jeopardizing sustainability of the monitoring system. Finally, there is general consensus on the lack of motivation and competence in the MoPH Human Resources (HR) Department, specifically with respect to recruitment and hiring, which impacts capacity of the monitoring system.

*Monitoring Plans and Procedures* is scored the lowest (2.3). The Ministry lacks clear strategic and monitoring plans, which would greatly facilitate coordination of donor assistance (on- and off-budget) and make explicit the linkages between project resources and desired results. The current strategic plan (2011-2015) includes 10 important, but vertical, strategic directions rather than a results chain. Several of the strategic directions are at the output level and those that are more ambitious are compromised by incompatible measures. Most indicators in the Performance Measurement Framework are insufficient, indirect, immeasurable or formulated as results or activities. For example, the Strategic Direction *to enhance evidence-based decision-making by establishing a culture that uses data for improvement* has the following two indicators: 1) integrated HIS data warehouse established and 2) culture of data use strengthened. The strategic plan is more symbolic than functional, but is used by the ministry's directorates in the development of annual operating plans.

A National Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NMES) was drafted for 2013-2016 and links to the aforementioned MoPH strategic directions. It has seven strategic objectives, but no measures. The NMES is premised on the need for greater harmonization of existing M&E systems within the MoPH and the imperative for a high level of coordination between the M&E Directorate and related initiatives and systems, including the HMIS, Disease Early Warning System (DEWS), the human resources database, the research department system and many

initiatives within various technical departments.<sup>12</sup> However, for the M&E Directorate to coordinate monitoring throughout the ministry as expected, it needs more support from leadership, buy-in from departments, coordination of its own roles and responsibilities (reflected in the *Advocacy and Culture* score of 2.4), and increased technical capacity to reduce dependence on donor-funded senior advisors (reflected in *Human Capacity*, 2.4).

Figure 16 Graphic Presentation of the GCMU/PCH monitoring system



**The Partnership Contracts for Health Project** supports delivery of the BPHS and EPHS in over 600 health facilities, including provincial and district hospitals, basic and comprehensive health centers, and approximately 6,000 health posts in 13 provinces. Strong programming capacity is inextricably linked to an established monitoring system that demonstrates relatively high capacity and is reflected in the overall mean performance score of 2.9 of a possible 4.0 (mean performance is not specifically shown in Figure 15). The vast majority of PCH’s 28 performance indicator targets (sufficiently ambitious yet reasonable) are met or exceeded each year and all 10 NGO contractors are now performing to standards in contract management and health service delivery, with NMC performance scores of 50 percent or higher. Contributing to these apparent achievements is a streamlined *Organizational Structure* (score of 3.5) that facilitates a multidisciplinary team approach to monitoring. Finance, M&E, and contract consultants comprise monitoring teams that respond to performance needs of the program and health system.

*Monitoring Plans and Procedures* (3.4) are clear and well documented. PCH has taken full ownership of the PMP and maximizes its management utility. The HMIS is the source of data for 19 of the project’s 28 performance indicators, reflecting an integrated monitoring and reporting system. PCH teams are part of the health system network that monitors progress against these indicator targets and toward the achievement of results. Monthly joint monitoring

<sup>12</sup>Ministry of Public Health, General Directorate of Monitoring and Evaluation, *National Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy 2013-2106*, no date, p.6, available from Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

missions by PCH, PPHO, and NGOs are considered by PCH and the MoPH to be a model. NMC checklists are administered in a pre-selected sample of health facilities and at NGO provincial and central offices and, based on quick turnaround of findings, NGO performance is scored (a score below 50 percent has implications and triggers closer scrutiny by PCH). NGO action plans are jointly updated with corrective actions followed-up by PCH teams in subsequent missions.

Limitations to this model include over-reliance on action plans that become long lists and manual analysis of checklist data that fails to make use of the centralized NMC database (*Data Management Systems and Practices* - 2.3). A more fundamental weakness is the focus on outputs.

The considerable difference between MoPH and PCH performance scores in *Organizational Structure and Monitoring Plans and Procedures* reflects the GCMU's relative autonomy in the MoPH. While a certain level of autonomy enables performance, some findings suggest PCH is operating too independently from other relevant departments, thereby perpetuating fragmentation of the central monitoring system. Furthermore, there is some concern that GCMU's dual role in assessing NGO performance and disbursing NGO funds is a conflict of interest.

In comparison, both PCH and MoPH score 3.0 in *Data Utilization and Dissemination*, reflect a strong and unified system of dissemination (more so than for *utilization*). Clear procedures are consistently implemented at each level of the health system and the HMIS plays a central role. However, underutilization of data brings the score down. Too much data are being collected, though without a robust level of interpretation the data cannot be effectively used for decision-making.

Finally, *Human Capacity* of the GCMU/PCH (score of 2.6) presents the same issues pervasive throughout the Ministry. PCH maintains a highly qualified staff who have clearly benefited from USAID-financed systems and technical assistance under the previous program. However, the monitoring system is still dependent on consultant salaries and per diem provided by Management Sciences for Health (MSH), to the extent that monthly monitoring would not be possible if dependent upon the MoPH Finance and Administration to process per diem.

PCH Alignment with USAID PMP 2014-2024 Indicators: Under SEHAT, there is one results chain to which all donor assistance contributes. Most USAID/OSSD Standard indicators in the 2014-2024 PMP are incorporated into this results chain (please refer to Annex II for Bibliography of Documents Reviewed) and will continue to be reported by the MoPH. Discussions are being held between USAID and WB on the accommodation of additional key measures (e.g., quality of family planning service delivery). Coordination is also needed on the following (see also Recommendations):

- Inclusion of USAID's outcome indicator: *Number of children under five reached by USG-supported nutrition programs.*

- The WB reports on *TB treatment success rate* and not *TB case notification rate* as does USAID. However, as the latter indicator constitutes the denominator of the former indicator, the data are obviously available for USAID’s PMP requirements.
- Under SEHAT, reporting frequency for the other four USAID Standard (OSSD) indicators should occur every two years as per third party implementation of the sample household survey. Currently, annual reporting of these indicators to USAID relies upon the MoPH HMIS and Central Statistics Organization (for denominators), but data quality is questionable.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

### 1. General

Preliminary findings from the Draft ANDS Completion Report show more than \$15.6 billion have been spent to achieve ANDS outcomes over the five-year implementation period. About \$4.9 billion were invested through the government budget (on-budget) and the remaining \$10.7 billion have been spent outside the regular budget (off-budget). The vast difference between off- and on-budget executions indicates that the Afghan Government played a relatively small role in the management of ANDS implementation as compared to international donors. Furthermore, only 44 percent of the invested development budget was executed on average by all budget entities, indicating a crucial lack of capacity to conduct development activity within budgetary institutions.<sup>13</sup>

ANDS data suggest what international experience already shows - that capacity development in the context of a national framework is an endeavor that takes at least ten years with a long-term commitment to political support, funding, and human resources development from all stakeholders. Moreover, implementing and monitoring medium to long-term strategy plans is a more difficult endeavor in a conflict-affected country like Afghanistan, where economic, social and political stability is precarious. In this context, ministries are mainly focused on day-to-day activities and operations where reporting on results (usually outputs) to obtain funding is critical just to make the economy function.

Moving from off- to on-budget must be carefully planned, and some of the underlying causes of unfavorable findings on ANDS implementation must be addressed. Meanwhile, the greater proportion of off-budget financing must be integral to the government’s planned outcomes (as part of a coherent results chain) and cease to create parallel structures within and across ministries.

Within this overall context, development of monitoring systems in Afghanistan requires a gradual, but planned and comprehensive approach, championed internally by a central directorate and financial commitment (on- and off-budget) for the next three to five years,

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<sup>13</sup>op. cit., Ministry of Economy, *ANDS Final Report*.

keeping in mind that investment in the monitoring system promises a high benefit-to-cost in return. GIRoA monitoring capacity will also be determined by the effectiveness and efficiency of human resources, finance and administration, and other support systems in which there are significant capacity needs. Needless to say, M&E capacity development efforts and funds must be aligned to a common explicit goal (such as an inter-ministerial monitoring system) and channeled and applied broadly rather than piece meal. The CBR Facility and SwAP Platform serve as entry points for providing this critical support and a coordinated response to the more complex issues of human capacity and sustainability.

## 2. Ministry-specific

**MoEC:** Officials interviewed expressed deep frustration owing mainly to the Ministry's inability to comply fully with its mandate. The government in general, and the MoEc in particular, do not have sufficient institutional capacity or human resources to ensure that the country's Strategy (with all its limitations) is being followed. Part of its mandate is to account for achievements in ANDS outcomes, yet programs are focused on outputs and LMs are focused on keeping their programs funded each budget cycle. The MoEc requires technical assistance in evaluation methodology and the resources to evaluate and learn from implementation, achievements and effectiveness of on-budget projects. While capacity is low, staff morale is even lower and leadership is squandering existing and potential talents of current staff. The Directorates are unable to influence LM monitoring and reporting practices and overall political power is eroded. "ANDS II" might provide an opportunity for change. The MoEc has completed development of the next five-year national plan (to begin in 2015), which has been approved in principal, but most likely awaits review and approval by the new government administration.

**MoF:** The BPMU has limited influence and institutional support to have a larger impact on the fiscal and program performance of BUs. On the one hand, its relative position in the chain of command impedes its potential influence, and advocacy on its behalf must come from above. On the other hand, the BPMU is responsible for only a proportion of the whole PFM monitoring system, which leadership might consider a relatively small role.

There is no single cohesive system specifically responsible for monitoring fiscal and program performance of BUs. The strategic plan objectives are monitored by the Reform Implementation and Management Unit (RIMU)/Deputy Minister of Administration; macroeconomic progress is tracked against IMF benchmarks by the Fiscal Policy Unit/DGB; and the NPPs are monitored by the Deputy Minister's Office and the MoEc (and monitoring further broken down within the MoEC). The separate flow of data for which the BPMU is responsible is also not a complete picture, as it excludes any data that does not go through the PFM system (e.g., unregistered programs and projects).

As with the vast majority of ministries, the MoF's current capacity has been built on donor-financed systems and salaries that must be transferred, maintained, and expanded on the government budget. The MoF leadership can build on existing capacity and improve the

effectiveness of PFM performance monitoring systems. For example, relations and coordination between the MoF and MoEc must improve to jointly steward the nation's economy and effectively monitor progress in meeting development priorities; a clear Ministry results chain is a first step in aligning work and fund streams (on-budget, off-budget, NPP).

**MAIL:** MAIL's overall institutional capacity is weak, while its mission is vitally important for the economy. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and subsistence for roughly 75 percent of the Afghan population<sup>14</sup> and a crucial component to enhance food security and drive economic growth for the entire country.

The low priority given to monitoring and limited support from management levels are major constraints. On the other hand, MAIL's on-line IT system is possibly its main asset.

**DABS:** DABS's monitoring system is functional and operates adequately. This is in large part due to the company's nature as an autonomous entity and the business area in which it operates. Furthermore, the company has benefitted from a previous USAID-supported experience through the KESIP. In this regard, it is important to recognize the role of DABS's senior management, who enabled the company to have clear concepts of M&E. DABS is currently receiving technical assistance in several areas of management, including monitoring, from an Indian consulting firm – Phoenix – under its Corporate Support Program (CSP).

On the other hand, DABS's focus on the expansion of its services and its financial sustainability may leave little room to measure and monitor its development impact. Although the company measures the number of clients served, this is not sufficient. DABS is such an important state company that it should be more aware of the key role it plays from a development point of view and should not be too isolated institutionally. At present, Afghanistan's economy and population are highly dependent on energy imports from neighboring countries. Decades of warfare have left the country's power grid badly damaged. As of 2012, approximately 33 percent of the Afghan population had access to electricity.<sup>15</sup> The country generates around 600 megawatts of electricity and DABS estimates a demand of around 3,000 megawatts to meet its needs by 2020.<sup>16</sup>

**MoMP:** The Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity is in its early stages of implementation. The MoMP expects well drilling to begin in late 2014, although it will not be able to estimate the chemical composition and estimated volumes of gas for exploitation before the first quarter of 2015. In this regard, the MoMP is only monitoring construction work for the drilling operations and it does not have a systematic mechanism to monitor results. It is not expected that this development project will be operational and producing gas until 2017-2018. Therefore, any development results will take at least this period of time to yield. On the other hand, USAID's 2014-2024 PMP does not include any indicator to be reported exclusively by the SGGA.

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<sup>14</sup>Op. cit., ANDS document

<sup>15</sup>Corporate Support Program, Phoenix Corporation, 2014.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid

**MoPH:** The MoPH has demonstrated its capacity to strengthen the BPHS/EPHS monitoring system through OBA. Selected examples include: full integration of BPHS/EPHS monitoring into the health system; experience at each level of the health system to implement NMC and other BPHS monitoring tools; a functioning HMIS with established flow of BPHS/EPHS data; emergent know-how for data driven decision-making; and existing tools and processes to verify HMIS data quality and to improve data collection practices.

At the same time, the monitoring system has limitations that could potentially slow momentum on an impressive trajectory to date. Limitations include: the M&E Directorate appears weak and its Evaluation Department nearly non-existent; there is a lack of a clear MoPH strategic plan and appropriate performance monitoring framework; the health sector emphasis is on outputs, while critical processes are not well documented; there are insufficient evaluations and special studies to know best practices and cost-effectiveness of key initiatives; the MoPH and donors have been slow to address data quality issues systematically; and data are underutilized for systemic (provincial/national) improvements.

USAID's move to the SwAP in FY 2015 is an excellent next step toward a strong national BPHS/EPHS monitoring system. SEHAT supports unified donor contribution to a single results chain with more focus on outcomes, and collective stakeholder commitment to realize mutual priorities, such as a DQA system and data warehouse. It is anticipated that PCH lessons learned in monitoring will be built upon and applied under SEHAT - for example, using the comparative advantage of Lot Quality Assurance Sampling methodology as a management and supervision tool in all provinces. In addition, a key improvement planned through SEHAT includes streamlined HMIS functions and responsibilities, which are currently spread among multiple departments with limited coordination.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The World Bank, *Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Grant for the System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition (SEHAT) Project*, February 13, 2013, available from Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. Sector wide approach – GIROA/USAID and donor community

A gradual approach may be the most appropriate way to develop GIROA's monitoring systems. The assessment team recommends that priority be given to strengthening monitoring efforts in the next few years until the system is operational. Capacity for evaluation is important, but can be introduced over time while particular evaluation tasks are contracted out. One exception, where evaluation capacity is needed more urgently, might be the Ministry of Economy, given its mandate to monitor development outcomes.

The World Bank's CBR (Capacity Building for Results) Facility may constitute the most promising entry point for USAID to provide this critical support. CBR Component 4 – Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, states in paragraph 149: "A survey firm will be hired to assist ministries in the development of methodologies for and implementation of monitoring and evaluation processes." Paragraph 150 states: "A performance monitoring firm will be contracted to conduct annual performance monitoring reports." Alternatively, USAID could offer assistance through its own mechanisms.

Two key actions, one from the part of the government and one from the donor community, are indispensable: the identification of a "champion" – a directorate of a central ministry, and available funding for three to five years. Following is a list of sequential potential actions that the entire donor community, with a strong buy-in from GIROA, could help implement.

#### **In the short term, within a 18-month period:**

- Increase interest of key MoF and/or MoEc officials for developing a monitoring system as part of the WB's CBR Facility.
- Take advantage of the "window of opportunity" provided with the change in government. Support the government transition with knowledge and experience to build momentum and develop a strategy to engage the donor community in supporting the establishment of a government-wide monitoring system linked directly to ANDS and the NPPs.
- Conduct an in-depth assessment of the monitoring systems of three to five selected ministries in CBR's Tier 1.
- Initiate an awareness campaign within government and other key stakeholders.
- Consider a tour to one or two countries for selected officials to have exposure to well-run monitoring systems.
- Review and strengthen the country's Strategy Plan to include clear monitoring plans and results frameworks for each selected ministry and/or cluster sector.
- Deliver comprehensive training in the use and appropriate utilization of monitoring to a cadre of local government and non-government personnel.
- Initiate a training of trainers approach to promoting the use and appropriate utilization of monitoring.

#### **In the medium term, within 18 to 48 months:**

- Support GIRoA in drafting a ministerial decree or cabinet requirement for systematic monitoring, indicating the date of compliance for the three to five selected ministries in CBR's Tier 1.
- Advocate for any needed reorganization of the selected ministries at the central, provincial and district levels as needed to support the plans.
- Define roles and responsibilities of staff directly or indirectly engaged in monitoring in the selected ministries at the central, provincial and district levels.
- Develop procedures, processes, protocols and tools for the operation of an efficient and effective results chain monitoring system in the selected ministries at the central, provincial and district levels.
- Develop any necessary IT support systems in the selected ministries at the central, provincial and district levels.
- Operationalize the government's single monitoring system on a pilot basis for six months and make necessary adjustments at the central, provincial, and district levels.
- Closely follow the functioning of one single monitoring system comprised of the three to five selected ministries at the central, provincial and district levels.
- Assist ministries in designing, contracting out, and managing any evaluations they need but cannot carry out independently.

#### **Beyond 18 months:**

- Gradually replicate and improve achievements in other ministries and selected decentralized and autonomous national entities.
- Introduce evaluation as a tandem function of the monitoring system.

## **2. General approach by USAID**

**Plan for dissemination of assessment findings.** It is highly recommended that, once USAID has had time to process the assessment findings internally, a comprehensive plan be developed for the use of findings, starting with a dissemination meeting among ministry stakeholders. USAID should select a few recommendations (e.g., low hanging fruit) on which action can begin to be coordinated with ministries at the dissemination meeting. Finally, it will be important that USAID be able to articulate how some of the concerns raised in the findings can be addressed.

**Advocate for the World Bank's CBR Facility, to which USAID contributes, to cover monitoring support.** The CBR entails institutional reform activities to improve GIRoA capacity for delivering results. Its Project Development Objective is "to assist the [Afghan] government in improving the capacity and performance of select line ministries in carrying out their mandate and delivering services to the Afghan people". Although the CBR Midterm Review (January-February 2014) responded to and confirmed implementation challenges during the first two years, the next major steps include early dialogue with the new government administration on restructuring the CBR (e.g., simplifying processes for ministry participation

and procurement and increasing focus on results).<sup>18</sup> USAID should be a part of this dialogue, with deliberate intention to support the improvement of GIRoA's monitoring systems.

The assessment team supports and reiterates two recommendations already made by USAID's Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARSC) Final Evaluation report: 1) "USAID should target assistance to CBR Tier 1 Ministries which have proven commitment to achieving their objectives and invite other ministries as they qualify for higher levels of CBR assistance"; and 2) "as an alternative, USAID could develop a contract for off-budget capacity development to run in parallel and to complement the CBR. It would be necessary to establish close coordination and cooperation with the CBR in order to achieve what should be complementary objectives..."<sup>19</sup>

**Identify potential synergies to improve GIRoA's monitoring systems.** With the exception of the CBR Facility, the assessment did not identify any major broad-based efforts in M&E capacity building. However, findings are not exhaustive and should be followed up with a specific inventory of current M&E capacity building efforts (multilateral, bilateral, GIRoA, NGO). In building this inventory, include a desk review of all assessments conducted in the past two years.

**Join donor efforts for specific projects.** Consider approaching bilateral and multilateral development organizations that may have projects under implementation in the ministry of interest to (a) get information on the actual ministry's monitoring capacities and (b) to assess the possibility of joining efforts aimed to a tri-partite common benefit (e.g. the ministry, USAID and the other donor agency).

**Champion a donor technical working group.** There is not a functional donor coordinating body or technical node to advance the M&E agenda, yet there is a huge need, and potentially dozens of agenda items to address, if such a group were established. The assessment team recommends that USAID representatives from OPPD take the lead in establishing this type of technical forum. GIRoA performance-based monitoring systems is a high priority of GIRoA and donors and could serve as a first item around which a group could rally.

**Support regular implementation of DQAs.** Because of the significant concerns about data quality in all GIRoA ministries/sectors, DQAs should be conducted more regularly, allowing for flexibility to include Standard, Custom, and ministry/project-specific indicators. For purposes of capacity building and increasing ownership of the data, it is worth considering a hybrid approach on a trial basis that involves third party and internal counterparts, similar to the recommendation in the USAID 2012 DQA Report of Findings.

**Facilitate compliance with M&E standards and best practices.** The on-budget project design stage should require quality M&E deliverables as a pre-requisite to the IL, or as a first

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<sup>18</sup>The World Bank, *Implementation Status and Results, Afghanistan Capacity Building for Results Facility*, March 22, 2014, pp.1-2, available from Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

<sup>19</sup>USAID/SUPPORT II Project, *Final Performance Evaluation of the Cash Transfer Assistance Agreement for Civil Service Reform*, June 2014, p.10, available from Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.

benchmark that is enforced by USAID. A third party contractor could facilitate the development of deliverables through workshops. Proposed deliverables are listed below:

- Clear and simple results framework and M&E plan prepared in close collaboration with ministry's main counterpart(s) and USAID to ensure data are of mutual interest.
- Any M&E project should include two components to: (1) monitor project performance and (2) build internal M&E capacity within a well-defined scope. The latter should be clearly reflected in the project results framework and integrated into the project M&E plan and final evaluation design. In some cases, an additional results framework and monitoring plan might be developed for the M&E capacity building component.
- Above M&E components sufficiently budgeted. Consider an M&E earmark.
- Verbal defense of the M&E plan and/or documented evidence that ensures routine data will be of reasonable quality.
- M&E resource persons within ministries should be engaged in the project design stage focusing on results and indicators that are technically sound (SMART), contribute to the ministry's strategic plan or priorities, and meet the data needs of key stakeholders.

### 3. Ministry-specific

**MoEc:** Several key issues and challenges faced by the Ministry are not within its control to address. The Draft ANDS Completion Report represents the end of a strategy cycle and a new five-year national plan (2015-2019) is pending. The following recommendations should be considered in the context of this new strategy cycle.

- Capitalize on the opportunity to re-position the Ministry in a way that it is empowered to fulfill its mandate.
- Advocate that "ANDS II" have ownership by all ministries and private sector entities.
- Take leadership to ensure that the Development Budget finances key initiatives other than infrastructure/construction (e.g., national surveys).
- Equip MoEc M&E units to conduct performance evaluations to generate documented evidence on OBA project performance, effectiveness and lessons learned; and to help MoEc fulfill this mandate. Build on any assistance being provided through AusAid's DAFA III project.
- Coordinate with other donors on the following:
  - Support the Ministry in developing its strategic plan, results framework, and performance indicators that include M&E capacity building measures.
  - In sequence with the above recommendation, support efforts to strengthen government strategic planning capacity. Efforts should be led by the MoEc and conducted jointly with MoF (in this context, support proposed outputs in the MoF DGB Strategic Plan - please refer to MoF recommendations below).
  - Work with selected ministries on the use of logical frameworks, indicator development and target setting, and other technical needs across the monitoring continuum; identify simple formats and procedures that will facilitate reporting indicator data to the MoEc; and establish simple tools for results-based planning and forecasting so that targets are not projected solely on past performance.

**MoF:** The following recommendations are to be considered by USAID as part of the design and planning of the on-budget PFM Project. At present, MoF planning efforts appear to be on hold pending the transition of the new government. However, USAID can still use this window for initial discussion with the MoF and be poised to move ahead as soon as possible.

- **Ensure PFM OBA is strategically aligned with MoF priorities.** The MoF strategic plan has been updated twice since its development in 2008, but it is not the product of an inclusive strategic planning process, it does not have a proper results chain, and it appears to be of little use to directorates. Furthermore, the strategic plan is updated from a desk in the RIMU and the objectives “listed” in the strategic plan are also monitored from the same desk. First, the MoF strategic plan needs a clear results chain and performance monitoring framework based on a substantive stakeholder planning process. This product should be a prerequisite to PFM OBA, not a benchmark written into the IL. Second, the PFM OBA must strategically align with MoF’s planned results and priorities. It is recommended that USAID use this opportunity for synergy to coordinate with the MoF to address both of these needs.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the MoF strategic plan is a well-written and extremely informative document; the team’s suggestion is that it be updated through a process that engages directorates and departments so that it can be used as intended. The MoF leadership is justifiably proud of its work, which needs to be taken into consideration if USAID is to act on this recommendation.

- **Feed into and build on the DGB Strategic Plan (once finalized/approved).** For at least the past year, there has been a strong push by MoF leadership for directorate strategic plans. The DGB has recently completed its draft strategic plan – a solid product based on a fully participative and consultative process. The plan is still considered a work in progress as it will need to be integrated with the second phases of the Ministry’s Program Budgeting Reform strategy and the PFM Roadmap – more than likely pending the new government. In concert with the above recommendation, USAID should feed into and build upon the DGB Strategic Plan, specifically as it pertains to strengthening program-based planning, budgeting and performance monitoring within the BUs (addressed in this plan). In addition, USAID should consider supporting capacity building in this area through parallel, but tightly aligned, off-budget funding in coordination with other donors. The DGB Strategic Plan is an excellent vehicle for maximizing this fund base.
- **Consider revising/adding output indicator(s) in USAID 2014-2024 PMP.** In the PMP, there are three measures of strengthened PFM capacity including the following output indicator: *number of days of USG funded TA in the financial sector capacity provided to counterparts or stakeholders*. The team can appreciate USAID’s need to deliver frequent measures of progress to the U.S. Congress. However, the indicator is not particularly useful to USAID either for purposes of program management or

accountability. MoF and BU capacity needs in PFM are already known. Presumably, interventions will be designed to target competencies such as program-based planning and budgeting and performance monitoring, and therefore a more direct and relevant measure of the capacity building process is suggested. It will be critical to track, document and learn from these processes. This might be achieved equally as well through monitoring benchmarks in the IL. However, an alternative or additional process/output indicator would not require much additional effort in data collection to be cost-effective.

**MAIL:** The MAIL is a participating (Tier 1) ministry in the CBR Facility, which is expected to address the institutional M&E function. Although the pace, depth, scope and timing of these efforts are not currently known, it is recommended that any future actions be taken in coordination with other bilateral and multilateral development organizations to avoid duplication of efforts and diversion of very limited MAIL staff capacity. Short of an overhaul of MAIL's monitoring system, recommendations are provided below.

- Coordinate with the Minister before signing an IL to encourage the inclusion of a limited number of project benchmarks that require application of M&E concepts and practices.
- Conduct a joint assessment between USAID and the M&E Director, the Policy, Planning and Program Director and the MIS Manager to identify specific deficiencies that would need to be addressed to satisfy USAID minimum M&E requirements.
- Jointly review and update the list of indicators with the help of a logical model and in the context of the Ministry's current five-year Master Plan. This may entail the selection and simplification of key priority indicators from MAIL's 32 indicators and USAID's 11 indicators (2014-2024 PMP), as well as identification of proxy indicators.
- Ensure that indicators identified/selected are SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-Bound) and that collection of indicator data is feasible.
- Review and revise/simplify as needed MAIL's methodologies, templates and processes, taking into account the on-line system.
- Design a limited number of M&E workshops that are competency-based and applied for staff directly involved in monitoring.
- Draft a budget of estimated costs to upgrade MAIL's monitoring unit, including new local hires as needed.
- Support MAIL in a gap analysis of its monitoring system. Key elements include: its Strategic Plan and Results Framework (currently separate), roles and responsibilities, and standards, guidelines and protocols (across the monitoring continuum).

**DABS:** The main purpose of DABS's CSP is to strengthen the company institutionally in preparation for a rapid expansion of its activities and delivery of efficient services. This effort will go a long way in absorbing additional demands or responsibilities, including in its monitoring function. In this regard, USAID will not have any major issues in receiving data for the three indicators included in its 2014-2024 PMP. Nevertheless, there is always room for improvement as per the below recommendations.

- USAID may consider paying more attention to the development impact of DABS. To this end, it is suggested that DABS include two to three outcome level indicators to be monitored and reported systematically to USAID, and plan for impact evaluations ranging from simple and qualitative to quantitative and rigorous experimental methodologies.
- Encourage DABS to use this information for decision making from a development point of view. For example, which types of clients (i.e. residential, industrial, commercial) generate more economic and social benefits to the households and the economy in general? The ultimate objective is to encourage DABS to report on a “double bottom line” that is financial and developmental.
- Disseminate DABS results to trigger a demonstration effect with other state-owned enterprises. Use its reputation as a development agent to enable it to have access to loans in the international markets. Identify synergies with other related ministries, such as Water and Energy, Mines and Petroleum, and Public Works, to increase the development impact in the economy.

**MoMP:** At present, Afghanistan has a considerable deficit in energy production. By the same token, it has important prospects for gas production with the potential to export to neighboring countries in the future. This puts the importance of the SGGA into perspective. It is suggested that USAID collect, monitor and store in a more systematic fashion any project output data (e.g. number of participants trained). Recommendations take into account the fact that the Ministry does not have an operational monitoring system.

- Discuss monitoring and evaluation with senior leaders to foster understanding and enthusiasm about being able to track the potential economic impact of the SGGA and Ministry.
- Coordinate and possibly collaborate with any other donor/s providing support to the Ministry to avoid duplication of efforts and build synergies.
- Encourage and support, through regular processes, the development of an M&E plan and results framework for the Project.
- Jointly identify a minimum set of SMART indicators to be monitored and reported in a cost-effective manner by SGGA/Ministry that satisfies the requirements of the 2014-2024 PMP. Indicators must be relevant to the Ministry.
- Support MoMP in developing a monitoring system. Key elements include: its Strategic Plan and Results Framework (currently separate), roles and responsibilities, and standards, guidelines and protocols (across the monitoring continuum).

**MoPH:** The below recommendations take into account the Ministry’s already high bar of performance.

- **Consider more rational implementation of the NMC.** For over a decade, the NMC has been implemented on a regular basis, which would seem to cause assessment fatigue by health facility staff and those conducting the assessment. Furthermore, frequent implementation and some duplication of efforts put unnecessary burden on

already overburdened health workers. The M&E Directorate or PCH should convene a meeting amongst PPHO and NGO staff to consider ways to streamline implementation of the NMC.

- **Support inclusion of qualitative indicators in the HMIS and PMPs.** Suggested action items: 1) develop and institute qualitative indicators to better understand the complexities and enabling factors in achieving planned results; 2) budget adequate resources and time to build capacity in selected qualitative methods; 3) include the community as one data source through which members can more systematically report and MoPH can more consistently document findings across provinces; and 4) use findings to inform health facility quality assurance plans.
- **OBM's play a more hands-on role to improve selected PCH competencies.** Presumably, the 2012-2013 BSC and 2013 HHS data have been used for planning. As soon as possible, PCH staff should document their interpretation of these findings and implications for the final year of PCH activity; and ensure that this documentation is included in the next annual report to USAID (October 2013 – September 2014), (assuming it is not yet completed). In addition, PCH should consider budgeting for a capacity-building workshop in *using data for decision-making* amongst a limited number of stakeholders within MoPH, PPHO, NGOs and PCH as well as OBM's. The format should be as applied as possible, using the most recent (2013) HHS, BSC and other provincial level data. Two external M&E consultants with content expertise and intimate knowledge of relevant tools and models applied in other countries should facilitate the workshop.
- **Finalize PCH indicator targets for FY 2015-2016:**
  - USAID and PCH need to agree upon and finalize the target for Couple Years Protection (CYP). It is recommended that the current target of 20% be reduced based on PCH past performance.
  - Targets for indicators of Pentavalent vaccine (Penta3) and antenatal care (ANC) coverage need to be double-checked with PCH staff, as HHS findings are considerably lower than HMIS estimates/denominators for these two indicators (both data sources are used by PCH in projecting targets).
  - Performance of 100% of pregnant woman reaching the health facility in their first trimester should be double-checked to ensure that health providers, NGO staff and even PCH staff are complying with HMIS definitions of ANC1 (ANC in the first trimester), disaggregating by trimester and reporting only those in their first trimester.
- **Ensure the 2014 DQA is conducted on PCH indicators.** According to the PIRS, a DQA for Penta3 and ANC indicators is scheduled for 2014. This should remain a priority, with as much pressure as possible from USAID/Afghanistan to ensure its timely implementation.
- **OBM's should ensure complete and standardized PIRS documentation.** USAID and PCH should have one common set of PIRS using the same source for indicator

definitions (e.g., HMIS or USAID). The definitions should be based on global standards to the extent possible and, ideally, referenced in the PIRS. Definitions need to be clear, complete and more detailed, including the unit of analysis and calculation. Clear, complete and detailed definitions and data collection methods are still needed for composite indicators developed by PCH. In addition, the four indicators for which HHS is the data source/method of collection need to be appropriately defined to include denominators/coverage and target and actual values documented according to the definition. Finally, consider adding a PIRS section on *Plan for Data Utilization*, and monitor and assist staff in optimal use of data.

## **ANNEX I: SCOPE OF WORK**

### **ASSESSMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN'S MONITORING SYSTEMS**

#### **OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENT**

#### **STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW)**

##### **I. INTRODUCTION**

There is a pressing need, both articulated in Agency guidance as well as identified by the Mission, to have a greater understanding of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIROA) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacities. USAID/Afghanistan's November 2013 portfolio reviews identified "Measuring the performance of on-budget mechanisms" as a significant issue and noted that most on-budget mechanisms rely on benchmarks to measure performance of target GIROA entities. The M&E and On-Budget Mission Orders, as well as ADS 220, require that all on-budget programs have an M&E plan that takes into account GIROA's internal M&E systems. Furthermore, ADS 220 highlights the importance of conducting a gap analysis of government M&E systems, integrating findings into project designs to mitigate any risks, and ensuring that M&E plans are an integral part of Implementation Letters (Bilateral Project Agreements).

USAID's Office of Program and Project Development (OPPD) has initiated an internal review of USAID/Afghanistan's on-budget M&E processes and, when necessary, drafting M&E plans for on-budget projects consistent with the Mission's 10-year strategy results framework (and using GIROA's M&E systems). In addition, Tier 3 of USAID/Afghanistan's multi-tiered monitoring strategy identifies using GIROA's internal monitoring systems to provide monitoring data on USAID projects (both on and off-budget). This necessitates identification of precise information on what type of indicators USAID can rely on GIROA to monitor.

The purpose of this Assessment is to document the strengths and weaknesses of the monitoring systems of key GIROA ministries and provide recommendations for USAID to strengthen its monitoring efforts of on-budget projects. This assessment will focus exclusively on GIROA's systems for monitoring and not on evaluation.

## **II. BACKGROUND**

At the 2010 London Conference, the United States and other members of the international community stated their commitment to providing 50 percent of development aid to Afghanistan through on-budget assistance and reaffirmed this commitment at the 2010 Kabul and 2012 Tokyo Conferences.<sup>20</sup>

In line with these commitments, a major component of the U.S. Government's approach to reconstruction in Afghanistan involves supporting the Afghan Government, as appropriate, so it can take increasing ownership for development and sustain the reconstruction gains over the past decade. USAID awards on-budget assistance in Afghanistan by either buying into multi-donor trust funds or through direct bilateral agreements.

## **III. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES**

As per the SoW, the purpose of the Assessment is to study and document the existing monitoring systems in the following six (out of seven) GIRoA Ministries with which USAID has direct Bilateral Project Agreements: Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS, the national electricity company), Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Education (MoE), and Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). In addition, the Ministry of Economy (MoEc) will be assessed to the extent that it plays a role in or affects the data collection, management and analysis, and reporting functions of line ministries.

The main objectives are:

1. To understand GIRoA's monitoring structure. For example, the Ministry of Economy has the mandate to monitor and evaluate development programs in Afghanistan. It is important to understand the relationship between the Ministry of Economy and other GIRoA ministries in monitoring progress against the NPP's and Afghanistan's Development Strategic Plan.
2. To assess the current capabilities of each ministry's monitoring system(s) to report on different types of indicators, at national and sub-national levels, and the strength of the quality assurance processes;
3. To identify any critical gaps or barriers which may affect a ministry's ability to provide high-quality data; and
4. To suggest actions that USAID may take when entering into Bilateral Project Agreements or when managing such Agreements to draw on GIRoA capabilities and mitigate any critical gaps or barriers that may affect the quality or completeness of reporting.

## **IV. PROPOSED ASSESSMENT TOPICS**

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<sup>20</sup> SIGAR 14-32 Audit Report

In order to understand the monitoring structure, capacity and gaps of the selected ministries, the assessment team will conduct a rapid analysis of each ministry's monitoring system(s), covering the following topics:

1. Staff: Capacity, organization, presence in the field, lines of reporting, reliance on external technical support, and balance of long-term *tashkeel* staff and short-term donor supported project staff.
2. Plans, Tools & Analysis: Indicators monitored and linkages with objectives (donor and GIROA), sources of data, tools, and quality assurance processes.
3. Management Information Systems (MIS): Design, functionality, and utility.
4. Utilization of data: Flow of data back to staff, and use of data by management and leadership for decision-making.
5. Gender: As a crosscutting theme, gender will be considered in the other aspects of the Assessment. For example, whether or not data are appropriately disaggregated by sex and, to the extent possible, the influence gender might have on the design and implementation of existing monitoring practices and systems.

In addition, the team will answer the following questions for each Ministry examined:

1. How integrated are monitoring systems for routine Ministry programs that are supported by USAID?
2. Are there any on-going donor efforts to support the general monitoring functions of the Ministry? If so, what are the activities and expected results of such efforts? For how long are they projected to run?
3. What types of indicators can this Ministry reliably collect and report on using its current system? From which reporting units (district, province, national)? Based on the answer to this question, the team will recommend a limited number of indicators from USAID/Afghanistan's (2014-2024) Performance Management Plan (PMP) that are of joint interest to GIROA and USAID/Afghanistan Technical Offices (TOs). The team should include in its selection those indicators for which data are currently or planned to be provided by Implementation Partners (IPs). This is the only activity where the team will include off-budget project information during this assessment.
4. USAID may wish to track ministry monitoring capacity in the future. Has the experience of this assessment led the team to recommend a particular approach or tool?

## **V. ASSESSMENT METHODS**

The assessment team will be responsible for developing a methodology that may include both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis, as needed, to answer the questions listed under Section IV. It is assumed that methods will include document review and interviews with Ministry officials, and USAID staff, including USAID on-budget monitors. One possible approach is to conduct a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis. Any data should be disaggregated by gender, grade level, and geographic

location, at a minimum. Data collection should be systematic, and all findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be evidence-based. Within data limitations, the team will be expected to present strong analysis. Methodology will be presented as an integral part of the team's work plan and final report, as outlined in the Deliverables section below.

Depending on interest of the ministries and USAID's approval, the assessment team may be available to present findings to the ministries directly.

Travel to selected provinces and districts may be necessary to understand the reporting relationship from the districts to the national level. Final decision on the selection of provinces and districts, if not documented in the work plan, will be made as soon as possible in the initial planning stage.

## **VI. EXISTING INFORMATION SOURCES**

Prior to arrival, the assessment team will obtain key documents related to on-budget activities with the selected ministries. These may include, but are not limited to:

- USAID's Results Framework;
- Implementation Letters;
- Monitoring plans (if they exist);
- Milestone plans (if they exist);
- Quarterly and annual reports for the last two years; and
- Any relevant assessments and evaluations.

Once in Afghanistan, the team members will be introduced to Afghan Info to aide them in identification and recommendation of a limited number of indicators on which each sector/ministry (included in the assessed) can and should report to USAID Afghanistan.

## **VII. IMPLEMENTATION**

### **A. Assessment Team Composition and Qualifications**

The assessment team shall include two (2) expatriate and two (2) Afghan professionals with strong interpersonal and writing skills, and cultural awareness. The expat consultants should have experience working in a conflict/post-conflict country. One of the Afghan consultants should be an MIS specialist to assess the technical aspects of any existing information management systems.

One or both of the expatriate team members must have the following qualifications:

- Experience with monitoring systems in Afghanistan, preferably with GIRA;
- Experience assessing monitoring systems, preferably with a developing country government;
- Experience developing and reporting on performance monitoring plans; and

- Ability to produce a high quality report, with excellent written English, in a timely manner.

Team composition:

- *Assessment Team Leader (Expat)*. The Team Leader shall possess strong leadership and management skills and be an M&E specialist with at least 8 years of relevant experience. Experience working with USAID programs is preferred. The Team Leader shall possess at least a Master’s degree in management, international development, social studies or a related discipline. Preference will be given to previous experience of working in Afghanistan. English fluency is required, Dari or Pashto a plus.
- *M&E Specialist (Expat)*. The M&E Specialist shall have relevant experience of at least 5 years, designing, assessing, and/or implementing complex monitoring systems. Experience working with USAID programs is preferred. The M&E Specialist shall possess at least a Master’s degree in management, international development, social studies or related discipline. Preference will be given to previous experience of working in Afghanistan. English fluency is required, Dari or Pashto a plus.
- *M&E Specialist (Afghan)*. The M&E Specialist shall possess at least a Bachelor’s degree and at least five years of experience in designing, assessing and/or implementing monitoring systems for projects, programs, or organizations in Afghanistan. Experience working with GIROA is preferred. English and Pashto/Dari fluency is required.
- *MIS Specialist (Afghan)*. The MIS Specialist shall possess at least a Bachelor’s degree and have at least five years of applied MIS experience. Experience in designing, implementing and managing Management Information Systems is required. Experience working with GIROA is preferred. Fluency in English and Pashto/Dari is required.

## B. Level of Effort

An illustrative example of the level of effort (LOE) in days is provided below:

Table 5 Level of effort (LOE) in days

Position	Remote Prep Work	Travel	In-brief/ Work Plan	Field Work, Analysis, Report	Exit Briefing	Remote Report Finalization	Total
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Expat Team Leader	3	4	4	52	1	3	67
Expat M&E Specialist	3	4	4	39	1	9	60
Afghan M&E Specialist	-	-	4	49	1	1	55
Afghan MIS Specialist	-	-	4	49	1	1	55
<b>Totals</b>	6	8	16	189	4	14	237

### C. Schedule

The Assessment Team shall complete this assessment, including the final report, within ten weeks of the start of the assignment. Once USAID approves the personnel to comprise the team, and provides the documents for pre-arrival review listed above, the Assessment Team will begin work remotely. A six-day workweek is authorized for this activity. This assessment is proposed to start on June 15, 2014.

### D. Management

Checchi will identify and hire the Assessment Team and will also be responsible for arranging accommodation, security, office space, computers, internet access, printing, communication and transportation.

USAID is responsible to supply all key documents necessary for this assessment, provide introduction letters to the appropriate counterpart at each Ministry, and provide contact information for suggested interviewees at the Mission and other donor agencies (if applicable).

The Assessment Team will report directly to Checchi SUPPORT II management. The assessment must be conducted under coordination with Ms. Belien Tadesse, Contracting Officer Representative/SUPPORT II Project & Monitoring & Evaluation Officer/OPPD. Contact details – [btadesse@state.gov](mailto:btadesse@state.gov).

## VIII. MEETINGS, BRIEFINGS, AND DELIVERABLES

1. **In-briefing Meeting** with USAID/OPPD (within three days of arrival in-country). The Assessment Team will discuss their initial understanding of the assignment and ask questions as needed. USAID and the team will discuss access to the ministries, contact information needed and documents for review, etc.
2. **Draft Work Plan** submitted to USAID/OPPD for comment/approval (within 10 days of arrival).
3. **Final/USAID-approved Work Plan** (a revised version of the draft based on USAID comments).

4. **Additional Interim Briefings to USAID:** The Team Leader will be available as often as weekly to brief OPPD on progress and constraints. Briefing may be done in person or by telephone. The plan for such meetings will be discussed and agreed upon at the In-briefing Meeting.
5. **Post-Fieldwork Briefing:** The Team Lead will present a brief PowerPoint presentation post-fieldwork covering assessment findings, conclusions and preliminary recommendations. This presentation will be held at USAID's main office and will be no more than one hour. GIRoA officials may be asked to attend.
6. **Draft Assessment Report** submitted for OPPD comment/approval. The draft report shall be submitted no more than five days after the departure of the Assessment Team Leader from Kabul. The report shall be no more than 25 pages (excluding Appendices), and follow USAID reporting format and branding guidelines (per ADS 320). An outline of the Assessment Report is provided below:
  - Title page
  - Table of Contents
  - List of any acronyms, tables, or charts (if any)
  - Acknowledgements or preface (optional)
  - Executive summary (not to exceed 3 pages)
  - Introductory chapter (not to exceed 3 pages)
    - a) A description of the assessment, including objectives and focus.
    - b) A description of the methods used in the assessment such as document review, interviews, site visits, etc.
  - Findings – Findings will be organized by ministry assessed. Under each ministry's section, the report will provide findings on each topic and question listed in section IV.
  - Conclusions – This section will offer overall conclusions based on the facts and evidence presented.
  - Recommendations – This section will include actionable statements for USAID.
  - Annex
    - a) Statement of Work
    - b) List of document consulted
    - c) List of individuals and agencies contacted
    - d) Copies of all tools
    - e) Assessment Team CVs

All reports must be submitted in English to OPPD. The final version of the assessment report shall be submitted to USAID/Afghanistan both electronically and in hard copy. The format should be restricted to Microsoft products, 12-point type font in the body, with 1" page margins top/bottom and right and 1.25" for left. The team must submit five hard copies of the Final Report to USAID.

USAID will provide comments to the draft report to the Assessment Team Leader for further action within 10 business days.

7. **Final/USAID-approved Assessment Report** (a revised version of the draft based on USAID comments): The Team Leader shall submit the final/USAID-approved Assessment Report within five (5) days upon receipt of USAID comments. All data and findings will be submitted in electronic form, in easily readable format; organized and fully document for use by those that they are not fully familiar with the project or assessment.

## ANNEX II: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- Bryski Patrick - USAID/Afghanistan, *Economic Growth & Governance Initiative Final Report August 2009 - August 2013*, December 2013.
- Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. *Data Quality Assessment (DQA) Of foreign Assistance Funded Program Indicators*, January 2012.
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### ANNEX III: SCHEDULE OF MEETING

<i>No</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Phone</i>	<i>Email</i>
1	June – August, 2014	Checchi SUPPORT II Project	Aimee Rose	Technical Director	0729 001 671	<a href="mailto:arose@checciconsulting.com">arose@checciconsulting.com</a>
2	June – August, 2014	Checchi SUPPORT II Project	Hoppy Mazier	Chief of Party	No longer available	No longer available
3	June 19, 2014	Checchi SUPPORT II Project	Noor ul-Huda Atel	Senior M&E Specialist	0707 939 394	<a href="mailto:natel@checciconsulting.com">natel@checciconsulting.com</a>
4	June 21, 29, Aug 31, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Belien Tadesse	COR SUPPORT II, OPPD	0702 323 245	<a href="mailto:btadesse@state.gov">btadesse@state.gov</a>
5	June 21 & 29, July 17, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Amy Tohill-Stull	Office Director, OPPD	Not available	<a href="mailto:Atohill-stull@state.gov">Atohill-stull@state.gov</a>
6	June 25, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Rasekh Khalilullah	GIRoA-Donor Coordination, OPPD	0799 405 717	<a href="mailto:krasekh@state.gov">krasekh@state.gov</a>
7	June 25, 2014	Ministry of Finance	Dr. Mohammad Ayub “Ayubi”	Project M&E Officer, Project Support Unit for CBR Project	0799 395 151	<a href="mailto:Drayub.ayubi@gmail.com">Drayub.ayubi@gmail.com</a>
8	June 25 & 28, 2014	Ministry of Finance	Allawdin Zalmai	Performance Evaluation and Reporting Unit Manager	0752 052 413	<a href="mailto:azalmai@gmail.com">azalmai@gmail.com</a>
9	June 25, 28, July 10, Aug 16, 2014	Adam Smith International	Tony Curran	Advisor, Ministry of Finance	No longer available	<a href="mailto:Tony.curran@asi.org.af">Tony.curran@asi.org.af</a>
10	June 29 & July 17, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Paige Miller	ACOR SUPPORT II & M&E Team Lead, OPPD	0702 626 272	<a href="mailto:pmiller@state.gov">pmiller@state.gov</a>
11	June 29, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Khalil Wardak	M&E Officer, OPPD	0700 276 313	<a href="mailto:kwardak@state.gov">kwardak@state.gov</a>

12	June 29, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Khalid Rahman	On-budget Team, OPPD	0707 626 314	<a href="mailto:mkrahman@state.gov">mkrahman@state.gov</a>
13	July 6, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Adel Khaksar	Ob-budget Monitor, OEGI/AWDP	0707 626 361	<a href="mailto:kadel@state.gov">kadel@state.gov</a>
14	July 6 & 10, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Jannie Kwok	Ob-budget Monitor, OSSD-ED/MoE Textbooks	0702 636 309	<a href="mailto:jknok@usaid.gov">jknok@usaid.gov</a>
15	July 6 & 10, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Abdul Ghafary	Alternate On-budget Monitor, OSSD-ED/BELT CBE	0700 234 230	<a href="mailto:aghafary@state.gov">aghafary@state.gov</a>
16	July 6 & 15, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Amber Betchel	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, OSSD	0702 636 316	<a href="mailto:abechtel@state.gov">abechtel@state.gov</a>
17	July 8, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Jason DuPont	Manager, Afghan Info		<a href="mailto:JDuDont@state.gov">JDuDont@state.gov</a>
18	July 9, 2014	Ministry of Economy	Hokum Khan Habibi	Deputy Minister for Professional Affairs	0787 872 990	<a href="mailto:Hk.habibi@moec.gov.af">Hk.habibi@moec.gov.af</a>
19	July 9, 15, 16, 19, August 4, 2014	Ministry of Economy	Mohammad Ismail Rahimi	Director General of Policy and Result Based Monitoring	0799 291 700	<a href="mailto:rahimi.ismail@gmail.com">rahimi.ismail@gmail.com</a> <a href="mailto:ismail.rahimi@moec.gov.af">ismail.rahimi@moec.gov.af</a>
20	July 14, 2014	DAI	Juan Estrada	Chief Of Party (COP)	0793 141 486	<a href="mailto:juan_estrada-valle@dai.com">juan_estrada-valle@dai.com</a> <a href="mailto:jestrada@adf-af.org">jestrada@adf-af.org</a>
21	July 14, 2014	DAI	Fahim Safi	M&E Manager	0799 335 023	<a href="mailto:ahmadfahim_safi@adf-af.org">ahmadfahim_safi@adf-af.org</a>
22	July 15, 2014	Ministry of Economy	Nabi Sorosh	Head of Monitoring and Evaluation	0707 645 790	<a href="mailto:Nabi.sroosh@gmail.com">Nabi.sroosh@gmail.com</a>
23	July 15, 22, 2014	Ministry of Economy	Sayed Arif Nazif	Director, Directorate of Design and Integration	0700 081 183	<a href="mailto:sayedarifnazif@yahoo.com">sayedarifnazif@yahoo.com</a>
24	July 15, 2014	Ministry of Education	Abdul Wassay Arian	Senior Advisor and General Director Policy and Planning	0799 332 015	<a href="mailto:Awassay.arian@moe.gov.af">Awassay.arian@moe.gov.af</a>

25	July 15, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Xerses Sidhwa	Alternate On-budget Monitor, OSSD-Health/PCH	0702 626 217	<a href="mailto:xsidhwa@state.gov">xsidhwa@state.gov</a>
26	July 15, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Ziar Naqeebullah	On-budget Monitor, OSSD-Health/PCH	Don't have	<a href="mailto:nziar@state.gov">nziar@state.gov</a>
27	July 15 & 24 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Dr. Sher Shah Amin	Project Management Specialist, OSSD/Health	0702 323 247	<a href="mailto:SAmin@state.gov">SAmin@state.gov</a>
28	July 16, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Ahmad Jan Naeem	Deputy Minister Technical Affairs	0700 207 826	<a href="mailto:anaeem@moph.gov.af">anaeem@moph.gov.af</a>
29	July 16, 22, 23, 27, August 9, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Abdul Naser Ikram	M&E Senior Advisor, Monitoring Department, M&E Directorate	0780 798 735	<a href="mailto:Naserikram2003@yahoo.com">Naserikram2003@yahoo.com</a>
30	July 16, August 2 & 9, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Abdul Qadir Qadir	Director, General Directorate Policy and Planning	0799 131 689	<a href="mailto:qadir62@yahoo.com">qadir62@yahoo.com</a>
31	July 22, 2014	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock	Nasrullah Bakhtani	Director for Monitoring and Evaluation Department (MED)	0700 206 070 0796 206 070	<a href="mailto:nbakhtani_kh@yahoo.com">nbakhtani_kh@yahoo.com</a>
32	July 22, 2014	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock	Abdul Munir	Management Information Systems (MIS) Manager		
33	July 22, 2014	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock	Abdul Ghani Taj	MIS Data Management Team Leader		
34	July 22, 2014	DAI	Khalid Sarwary	Credit Management Supervisor	0795 739 628	<a href="mailto:Khalid_sarwary@adf-af.org">Khalid_sarwary@adf-af.org</a>
35	July 22, 2014	DAI	Wafiullah Dehzad	Internal Audit Manager	0799 300 527	<a href="mailto:wafiullah_dehzad@adf-af.org">wafiullah_dehzad@adf-af.org</a>
36	July 22, 2014	DABS	Ahmad Shah Sahil	Chief Financial Officer	0770 121 212 0780 121 212	<a href="mailto:ahmadsha.sahil@dabs.af">ahmadsha.sahil@dabs.af</a>

37	July 22, 2014	DABS	Masood Sediqyar	Head of Corporate Planning and Controlling	0729 002 600	<a href="mailto:masood.khwaja@dabs.af">masood.khwaja@dabs.af</a>
38	July 22, 2014	DABS	Arindam Gosh	Team Leader CMS	0729 935 301	<a href="mailto:arindam.g@phoenix.in">arindam.g@phoenix.in</a>
39	July 22, 2014	DABS	Wahidullah Popalzai	PMO Director	0700 279 767	<a href="mailto:waheedullah.popalzai@pmo.dabs.af">waheedullah.popalzai@pmo.dabs.af</a>
40	July 22 & Aug 12, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Sayed Yaqoob Azimi	Head of HMIS Unit, General Directorate Policy and Planning	0700 432 646	<a href="mailto:drazimi56@googlemail.com">drazimi56@googlemail.com</a>
41	July 23 & August 2, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Mohammad Asif Nazir	M&E Consultant, PCH, GCMU	0700 668 395	<a href="mailto:Nazir.gcmu@moph.gove.af">Nazir.gcmu@moph.gove.af</a>
42	July 23, August 2 & 12, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Massoud Mehrzad	Project Manager PCH, GCMU	0799 628 641	<a href="mailto:mehrzad.gcmu@gmail.com">mehrzad.gcmu@gmail.com</a>
43	July 23, August 2 & 12, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Fraidoon Farzad	Reporting Specialist and Data Analyst, PCH. GCMU	0775 233 124	<a href="mailto:farzad.gcmu@moph.gov.af">farzad.gcmu@moph.gov.af</a>
44	July 29, 2014	USAID/Afghanistan	Pnina Levermore	On-budget Monitor, OEGI/APFM	0793 370 932	<a href="mailto:plevermore@usaid.gov">plevermore@usaid.gov</a>
45	July 27, 2014	The World Bank	Azada Hussaini	Operations Officer, Afghanistan Country Management Unit	0070 852 3135 0070 113 3421	<a href="mailto:ahussaini@worldbank.org">ahussaini@worldbank.org</a>
46	August 3, 2014	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum	Zabihullah Sarwari	Project Manager, Sheberghan Gas Development Project (SGDP)		
47	August 3, 2014	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum	Farid Karimi	SGDP Coordinator		
48	August 5, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Raihana	Director, Provincial Public Health Office, Bamyan	0799 409 670	<a href="mailto:mophbamyang@gmail.com">mophbamyang@gmail.com</a>
49	August 6, 2014	AADA	Dr. Ali khan Saha	Health Project Manager, Bamyan Office	0799 409 582	

50	August 6, 2014	Ministry of Finance	Arif Sahar	Advisor, Budget Performance Monitoring Unit (BPMU)	Contacts not available	Contacts not available
51	August 6, 10, 11, 2014	Ministry of Finance	Ehsan Ullah	Performance Based Budget Reporting Specialist, BPMU	0786 677 663	<a href="mailto:ehsanullah@budgetmof.gov.af">ehsanullah@budgetmof.gov.af</a>
52	August 8, 2014	Aga Khan Foundation	Dr. Inamudin Adili	Health Project Manager, Bamyan Office	0799 849 950	
53	August 11, 2014	Ministry of Finance	Shahenshah Sherzai	Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant, Reform Implementation Management	0799 311 282	<a href="mailto:Shahensah.sherzai@gmail.com">Shahensah.sherzai@gmail.com</a>
54	August 11, 2014	Ministry of Finance	Hafizullah	Senior Fiscal Policy Analyst, Directorate General Budget, Fiscal Policy Unit	0775 575 063	<a href="mailto:hafizim@yahoo.com">hafizim@yahoo.com</a>
55	August 12, 2014	Ministry of Public Health	Dr. Abdul Hakim Azizi	Director, Provincial Liaison Office, Provincial Health Directorates		
56	August 14, 2014	Australian Aid	Asif Shah	Manager, Development Assistance Facility for Afghanistan (DAFA) III		<a href="mailto:ashah@dafard.com">ashah@dafard.com</a>



1.1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain						0	
1.2	Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker						0	
1.3	Adequate structure/units to cover the monitoring function						0	
1.4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff						0	
1.5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff						0	
1.6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support						0	

<b>2</b>	<b>Human capacity</b>						<b>#DIV/0!</b>				
2.1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities.						<b>0</b>				
2.2	Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts						<b>0</b>				
2.3	Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities						<b>0</b>				
2.4	Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and qualitative methods						<b>0</b>				
2.5	Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for procesing and managing data						<b>0</b>				

2.6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)						0	
2.7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data						0	
2.8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)						0	
<b>3</b>	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>						<b>#DIV/0!</b>	
3.1	Ministry has well-defined data flow process						0	
3.2	Clear monitoring plan exists for the ministry (sector) <u>and</u> is built into the ministry's strategic plan						0	
3.3	GIROA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector M&E plan						0	


3.4	Indicators for each level of result chain (output, outcome, impact)						0	
3.5	Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives						0	
3.6	Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources, frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks						0	
3.7	Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed						0	
3.8	All reporting requirements and procedures are clear						0	
<b>4</b>	<b>Data Management Systems and Practices</b>						<b>#DIV/0!</b>	

4.1	Ministry has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis						0	
4.2	Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)						0	
4.3	Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality, passwords, back-up, virus protection)						0	
4.4	Data available when needed						0	
4.5	Linkage to other national data reporting systems						0	
4.6	Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness						0	
<b>5</b>	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						<b>#DIV/0!</b>	
5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool						0	

5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action						0	
5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis						0	
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders						0	
<b>6</b>	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>						<b>#DIV/0!</b>	
6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )						0	
6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )						0	
6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors						0	
6.4	Donor and GIROA monitoring capacity development efforts are coordinated <u>and</u> implemented						0	

<b>7</b>	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						<b>#DIV/0!</b>				
7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels						<b>0</b>				
7.2	Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data						<b>0</b>				
7.3	Senior management understands and supports monitoring system						<b>0</b>				
7.4	Monitoring function recognized by senior leadership						<b>0</b>				
7.5	Budget allocation to monitoring <u>and</u> sufficient to support the monitoring function						<b>0</b>				

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!
Human Capacity	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!
Data Management Systems and Practices	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!
Utilization and Dissemination	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!
Partnerships and Coordination	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!
Advocacy and Culture	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!



## ANNEX V. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS

### MINISTRY OF ECONOMY

Primary interviewer: Oscar Antezana and Susan Gearon

Alternate interviewer: Nasrullah Ahmadzai and Mussarat Arif

Date: July 25, 19, 24, 2014

Names and position titles of persons interviewed:

Ismail Rahimi, Director, Directorate of Policy Planning and Results-Based Monitoring

Sayef Arid Nazif, Director, Directorate of Integration and Design

MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE		Non applicable (0)	Completely (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	COMMENTS
<b>1</b>	<b>Organizational structure</b>						<b>3.3</b>	
1.1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain			X			<b>3</b>	The Ministry has two Directorates responsible for monitoring the results chain - the Directorate of Integration and Design (DID), headed by Mr. Sayed Arif Nazif, and the Directorate of Policy Planning and Results-based Monitoring (DPP & RBM), headed by Ismail Rahimi. The first is responsible for monitoring inputs, activities and output indicators and the latter for outcome indicators. <b>Score = 3 since outcomes are not monitored systematically owing mainly to the paucity of data.</b>
1.2	Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker		X				<b>4</b>	Both Directorates report directly to the Minister and the Technical Deputy Ministry of Economy and their main deliverables are submitted to the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA). <b>Score = 4.</b>

1.3	Adequate structure/units to cover all functions of Monitoring			X		3	<p>Monitoring of the results chain is divided in two separate Directorates - DID and DPP &amp; RBM. The first is mostly aligned to the BC1 (Budget Circular) and BC2 which are the main instruments for monitoring expenditures, expenditures and outputs aligned to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The latter tracks ANDS's outcome expected results, and the NPPs. Note that the NPPs are not integrated in the budget process as they are stand-alone documents. DID has five independent sectoral/cluster directorates that collect output and NPP data from all ministries on quarterly basis at the national level. The DID also collects data from the field from the Ministry's provincial Directorates. In addition, there are four departments under the structure of DID which deal with the integration of reports and budget, economic analysis, coordination of economic activities at the province level and maintenance of technical projects. The DP &amp; RBM has two Directorates: one of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&amp;E) and one of Policy &amp; Planning (P&amp;P). The M&amp;E (RBM) Directorate has 3 departments: Monitoring, Evaluation and MIS. The P&amp;P has two departments: Economic Policy Analysis and Poverty Analysis. The M&amp;E/RBM prepares the NPP/ANDs, the MDGs and the Poverty reports, among others, all on an annual basis. The P&amp;P second prepares the MDGs and Poverty reports, among others, on an annual basis, and also deals with the formulation of policy based on the reports prepared. <b>Score = 3 since the two Directorates are responsible for monitoring, partially, the results chain, a function that is also, partially duplicate efforts with line ministries and the MoF.</b></p>
1.4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff			X		3	<p>The DID manages and supervises all 34 MoEc directorates at the provincial level, including the Provincial Monitoring officers, one in each province. <b>Score = 3 since it is not clear whether oversight is effective or not.</b></p>
1.5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff			X		3	<p>Although it is a less than optimum organizational structure, the roles and responsibilities between the two Directorates and the five sectoral directorates seem relatively clearly defined. DID is responsible for monitoring activities and outputs against the annual line ministries' BC2 submissions and DP &amp; RBM is responsible for reporting (less so monitoring) on outcome. The sectoral directorates (SC) are mainly responsible for collecting data on project implementation progress, including expenditure data, and output indicators of each ministry on a quarterly basis. Data processing and analyses is done collaboratively between DID, DPP &amp; RBM and five SDs. Under the DID, the roles of the provincial directorates, seem also clearly defined. Under DPP &amp; RBM, the monitoring and evaluation functions are also clear in principle. The staff working under the M&amp;E department is not performing fully the functions since evaluations are hardly done for on-budget projects and programs. Ministers do not have this function in their priority. Thus, staff in the Evaluation Unit collaborate with the monitoring function and in the preparation of reports. This assessment did not reveal</p>

								roles and responsibilities within each cluster group or within each unit. <b>Score = 3, the organizational structure and the apparent difficulty in monitoring the ANDS under separate Directorates and stand alone NPPs do not help in having clear roles and responsibilities.</b>
1.6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support		X				4	The OAA is the main direct and external formal client of both the DID and the DPP & R. The Activities and Outputs report and the Outcome report are submitted to this Office quarterly and annually, respectively. Although line ministries should also be interested in both reports, these are shared when the OAA submits the approved reports to the Ca. Both Directorates do not collect, process or analyze any other data explicitly for the line ministries or for the MoF. The reports are not shared systematically to the line ministries, the MoF, but is available upon request. On the other hand, the UNDP and the World Bank are their two important external clients. The MDGs report is prepared for the former and the Poverty report for the latter, both on an annual basis. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2	Human capacity						2.1	

2.1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities. <i>To what extent do they rely on external advisors?</i>				X		2	<p>At the national level, DID has four departments with 23 staff including the Director. Each technical staff is responsible for two sector Directorates. DID officials requested to have 23 staff per cluster which was rejected. The number of staff in the provincial directorates varies according to the size and amount of work. <i>Grade 1</i> provinces have 12 positions of which 10 are technical (e.g. Director, Unit managers, technical staff) and the remaining are support staff (e.g. driver, security, janitor). <i>Grade 2</i> provinces can have between 6-9 positions and <i>Grade 3</i> about 6 positions, of which approximately half at technical in both cases. This assessment did not verify whether the above numbers are sufficient due to time constraints. However, the Ministry officials made some minor remarks indicating the insufficiency of staff.</p> <p>At present, the DPP &amp; RBM has 28 positions, half of them still being recruited, including the Director General and his two Directorates. Under M&amp;E there are 17 people including the Department Manager - eight are assigned to monitoring and evaluation of results/output of the ANDS and NPPs and six work in the data base in the MIS section. The PP department has ten staff including the Department Manager. The Director states that the number of staff is not sufficient since each person has to address all issues under one area, to report, from information gathering from the different lines ministries to analysis and reporting. This is exacerbated by the contractual arrangement under the Pay and Gratuity scheme which results in high staff turnover. New staff are trained in key areas such as planning and results chain management which are then attracted by line ministries, NGOs and other organizations either because they are paid higher salaries or they have a better development perspective. At present, there is one long term (1.5 yrs.) advisor from GIZ which has been tasked with the preparation of an M&amp;E manual or guidebook which is used to provide training to in-house training and capacity building in other ministries. <b>Score = 2, staff is still being recruited and high staff turnover is a critical issue.</b></p>
2.2	Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts				X		1	The 34 provincial directorates have mostly male data collectors. <b>Score = 1.</b>
2.3	Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities				X		2	Oversight of data collection in provinces are particularly limited by budget and security constraints. Usually, each Director in the province has a vehicle but with a limited budget the purchase of gasoline equivalent to up to 200 liters per month of driving. Needless to say, security is relative and varies from one province to another. At the national level there seems to be an adequate level of supervision from the part of both Directors. However, it does not necessarily warrant proper data gathering and monitoring since these functions are mostly under the responsibility of ministries. <b>Score = 2.</b>

2.4	Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and qualitative methods				X		2	Although data collected from the line ministries and DID should be the same, Ministry officials acknowledge that there are differences. This assessment did not review the professional skills nor the methods applied for data collection. Moreover, the Ministry recognizes that data quality is a chronic problem. New recruited staff has generally low skills. Once they are trained and gain some experience, it is difficult to keep the staff; leave for better positions within or outside the government. <b>Score = 2.</b>
2.5	Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for procesing and managing data				X		2	Staff from both Directorates have the skills to process data in commercial off-the-shelf software such as Excel and are able to prepare reports in Word. <b>Score = 2. This Rapid Assessment did not evaluate the computer skills of the relevant staff. However, there is no evidence from report or any other means to state that staff has more skills than minimally reasonable to use Microsoft Office. Moreover, given the role it plays, the Ministry should have a capacity equal or better than MAIL's.</b>
2.6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)			X			3	There seems to be a clear understanding of the results chain at least from the people who were interviewed in both Directorates. Some of them are also aware of the nuances of different jargon used by diferent donors. <b>Score = 3 since there is a high staff turnover in the Ministry does not have necessarily the capacity to train personnel continuously. Moreover, DID staff deal almost exclusively with outputs.</b>
2.7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data				X		2	Both DID and DPP&RBM staff seem to have the capacity to analyze basic data as evidenced in their reports. <b>Score = 2 since there is no evidence of highly processed and revealing data.</b>
2.8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)			X			3	The DID report is very simple. Since neither the OAA nor the Cabinet seems to provide significant feedback to the reports that both Directorates submit the reports seems of reasonable quality. On the other hand, this could be a signal that the reports are not necessarily useful. <b>Score = 3 since the main issue seems to be the quality and timeliness of the data which either delay or affect the accuracy of the reports.</b>
3	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>						1.6	



								government at large have not been able to put together and adopt a clear and comp continuous results at the national level.
3.5	Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives					X	1	The MoEc does not have a Results Framework nor indicators to monitor its performan <b>Score = 1.</b>
3.6	Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources, frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks					X	1	According to the MoEc, its M&E plan is basically to "collecting quarterly and annually progress reports." See 3.2. The Ministry states that there are differences between the expected outcomes and ANDS sector strategies which inhibits the Ministry in linking th expected outcomes to reported projects' outputs. Nevertheless, the MoEc has not developed relevant standards and guidelines for line ministries and efforts to develop monitoring capacity have not been effective across the board. Standard definitions are established in most cases. <b>Score = 1.</b>
3.7	Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed				X		2	The DIS and DPP&RBM Directorates regularly collect data and gather reports from line ministries which serve as main inputs for the preparation of their reports. In this regard activities are programmed. However, the Ministry does not have its own results frame indicators and targets. <b>Score = 2.</b>
3.8	All reporting requirements and procedures are clear			X			3	Reporting requirements and procedures are clear for output data (BC2) but not for NF outcome data. Reporting functions are well established and the reporting process organized. MoEc produces three principal reports: the quarterly BC2 progress report, annual ANDS/NPP report, and other reports such as the Poverty and MDG reports in j collaboration with relevant donor agencies. There is coordination between MoEc directorates in the production of each report. In addition, there is coordination with th in producing the national statistical reports. <b>Score = 3 since no reports are shared wit ministries.</b>
4	<b>Data Management Systems and Practices</b>						1.8	


4.1	Ministry has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis			X			3	There are specific tools used for collecting data both at the national and provincial level. Collation and analysis are carried out by both Directorates i.e. DID and DPP&RBM. <b>Score = 3 since its systems are basic and performed in paper. In addition, the Ministry has not been able to make line ministries comply with basic monitoring requirements.</b>
4.2	Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)				X		2	Data are currently meeting most reporting requirements, schedules and, presumably, information needs. However, management of data is seen as problematic. Several independent databases are used at each level primarily for reporting. Disparate databases exacerbates an already cumbersome process of quarterly reporting (of BC2 data), which often results in up to one month delays in reporting to OAA. There is no database linking BC2 "project" and "province" data. There is a lack of data management tools. A results framework is needed first which would serve as the platform for a database system. The MoEc is not interested in pursuing development of any additional ad hoc databases, but rather wants to see long term and visionary donor commitment in this area. <b>Score = 2, since there is lack of data management tools. MAIL's on-line monitoring system can be used at least partially as a benchmark to GIRoA's current institutional capacity in this area.</b>
4.3	Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality, passwords, back-up, virus protection)					X	1	It is claimed that a skilled IT professional has been difficult to recruit through the government's Pay and Grade scheme. The Ministry is trying to hire an IT and Database programmer for a short term contract to train and build the capacity of the current six staff (which all of them young and recruited recently) to manage the MIS system in appropriate manner. <b>There is lack of IT general controls and absence of physical controls over data access. Score = 1.</b>
4.4	Data available when needed				X		2	Reported data are readily available. However, the data set managed by the Ministry is not completely updated and disaggregated data is not readily available. <b>Score = 2 (at most)</b>
4.5	Linkage to other national data reporting systems					X	1	No, electronically or otherwise, except when data is shared with line ministries and the Central Statistics Office (CSO) for specific tasks. <b>Score = 1.</b>
4.6	Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness				X		2	Most of the data are verified by the SDs in the DID. However, this does not imply necessarily that discrepancies between data collected directly by the MoEc and reported by the line ministries are reconciled to reflect actual performance. There are also serious concerns about quality of the data that most line ministries collect and report. In addition, verification of outcome data is difficult since line ministries are not familiar with the concepts. <b>Score = 2 at most.</b>
5	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						<b>2.3</b>	

5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool					X	1	There is little to no demonstrative use of data for decision making. <b>Score = 1.</b>
5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action					X	1	There is little to no demonstrative use of data for corrective action. <b>Score = 1.</b>
5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis			X			3	Reports produced by the Ministry are generally of good quality. However, contents of reports are generally basic and do not entail detailed analyses that may lead to significant strategic or operational decisions owing mainly to the paucity of data as well as to the capacity. Quarterly reports are mostly prepared in Dari. Annual reports and the MDG and Poverty reports are prepared in close collaboration with relevant donors which tend to be of better quality. These are translated into English. <b>Score = 3.</b>
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders		X				4	Data are disseminated in the form of reports to the Technical DM, the Minister of Eco and DM (internal) and OAA (external). Annual MDG and Poverty reports are shared with the central government, governors, provincial departments of MoEc, media, universities, all donors and Embassies in Kabul. <b>Score = 4.</b>
6	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>						1.8	
6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders?					X	1	The MoEc does not hold regular meetings with donors. Coordination and work meetings are held for the preparation of some reports such as the MDGs and the Poverty reports. <b>Score = 1.</b>
6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings?					X	1	There is no regular coordination meetings related to M&E. Meetings take place as needed, for example, in the reconciliation of data, preparation of reports, among others. <b>Score = 1.</b>
6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors		X				4	The DID and DPP&RBM do not prepare any reports specifically for the donors. The Ministry tries to disseminate widely some reports such as the MDGs and Poverty reports to government entities, media, parliament, academia, private sector, civil society organizations and donors and embassies. See 5.3 also. In particular, the MDGs and Poverty Reports are submitted to the OAA. These reports are intended to assist ministries in policy formulation and specific interventions. <b>Score = 4.</b>
6.4	Donor and GIRoA M&E capacity development efforts are coordinated and implemented					X	1	There has been very few capacity building activities with the MoEc. Reportedly, none are coordinated or systematically implemented. The Ministry provides M&E training to line ministries but not in a systematic way. <b>Score = 1.</b>
7	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						2.2	

7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels				X		2	Female staff represent a very small proportion of total staff. For example, two of 16 to staff in the DPP&RBM Directorate and four of 23 in DID. Both, well under 20% of staff. <b>Score = 2.</b>
7.2	Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data		X				4	Yes. On the one hand, it is ensuring that the current monitoring system doesn't break despite all the challenges and, on the other hand, it is trying to advocate strategies to improve/re-engineer the system. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.3	Ministry senior management understands and supports monitoring system				X		2	In theory. In practice, not a strong advocate. It seems to be mostly satisfied with reports. Data are not used for decisionmaking and/or communicated back to MoEc leadership and/or Directorates. <b>Score = 2 (at most).</b>
7.4	Monitoring function recognized by Ministry leadership					X	1	Historically, no. Insufficient budget (operational budget and allocation within MoEc) is indicative of leadership priorities. Monitoring function is not recognized at higher decisionmaking levels (i.e., ministry councils, OAA). <b>Score = 1.</b>
7.5	Budget allocation to M&E and sufficient to support the Monitoring function				X		2	It seems that the minimum budget allocation to both Directorates for monitoring function results in a low to moderately functioning unit. Budget does not support performance needs identified by senior management. <b>Score = 2.</b>

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	3.3	3.3
Human Capacity	2.1	2.1
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	1.6	1.6
Data Management Systems and Practices	1.8	1.8
Utilization and Dissemination	2.3	2.3
Partnerships and Coordination	1.8	1.8
Advocacy and Culture	2.2	2.2

## ANNEX V. Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the MoEc monitoring system



**ANNEX VI. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS**

**MINISTRY OF FINANCE**

Primary interviewer:  
Susan Gearon

Alternate interviewer:  
Institution: Ministry of Finance, Directorate  
General Budget

Date(s): August, 6, 10, 11,  
2014

Names and position titles  
of persons interviewed:

Ehsan UllaH, Performance Based Budget Reporting Specialist, Budget Performance Monitoring Unit (BPMU)

Arif Sahar, Advisor, BPMU

MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE		Non applicable (0)	Complete-ly (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	COMMENTS
1	Organizational structure						2.8	

1.1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain					X	1	<p>The Budget Policy and Reforms Directorate (BPRD) through the Budget Performance and Monitoring Unit (BPMU) is the major government body responsible for monitoring performance of the annual budget. Each of the country's eight sectors (Security, Infrastructure, Agriculture and Rural Development, Education, Health, Economic Governance, Rule of Law, and Social Protection) comprises a variable number of budget units (BU), mostly line ministries (LM). A single budget unit (BU) is responsible for up to five medium- to long-term programs (at least five years) that are financed by the annual budget. The BU allocates program funds to a maximum of five subprograms (up to billions of dollars). Approximately 42% of the budget goes to programs in four sectors (agriculture, health, education, public works). Quarterly reporting is required for the 25 ministries that make up these sectors and account for most of the annual budget. The BPMU monitors fiscal performance and outputs of the LM subprograms. The MoEc is responsible for monitoring program outcomes (see MoEC Institutional Analysis). <b>Reason for score (1): The BPMU is solely responsible for monitoring outputs, but not a continuous results chain</b></p>
1.2	Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker			X			3	<p>The BPMU reports directly to the Acting Head of BPRD who has decision-making authority, but relative to the chain of command and his role as Acting Head. The Head of BPRD reports to the Directorate of General Budget (DGB) under the DM of Finance <b>Reason for Score (3): The Head</b></p>

								<b>of BPRD makes most decisions concerning the BPMU.</b>
1.3	Adequate structure/units to cover the monitoring function				X			<b>2</b> Although the work is getting done, the current structure is inadequate to support the BPRD in fulfilling its role in national budget reform. The hierarchical structure of the ministry does not facilitate needed coordination or two-way communication between the Deputy Minister and the BPRD. Communication, reports and information (sometimes sensitive), and decision-making must pass up and down the chain of command, which results in long delays, lost communication and is oftentimes a point of no return. In addition, the BPMU is grossly understaffed (see 2.1) and its composition unusual: A Manager, M&E Advisor, Budget Specialist, one representative from the government tashkeel, and one expat (soon departing). <b>Reason for Score (2): More direct contact is needed between the BPRD and Deputy Minister of Finance.</b>
1.4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff			X				<b>3</b> Lines of supervision are clear within and between Directorates of the DGB, which includes the BPRD and monitoring unit itself. Lines of supervision follow the hierarchy shown in the organizational chart. The Mustofiats (Provincial Finance Departments) report to Finance Minister. <b>Reason for Score (3): There are clear lines of supervision within the BPRD and BPMU.</b>

1.5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff		X					<b>4</b>	Current BPRU members are clear on their roles and responsibilities. Each has Terms of Reference (ToR), which are updated annually and used for annual performance reviews. <b>Reason for Score (4): Clear roles and responsibilities for BPRD/BPMU staff.</b>
1.6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support		X					<b>4</b>	The BPMU provides technical support to line ministries during development of the quarterly budget report. The LMs, DGB Directorates, and DM of Finance receive the compiled quarterly report on the state of annual budgets and subprogram implementation. The MoEC, Parliament and Cabinet receive the status report on a semi-annual basis. <b>Reason for Score (4): BPMU has clear internal and external clients to support</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Human capacity</b>							<b>2.8</b>	
2.1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities.						X	<b>1</b>	The BPMU is insufficiently staffed and reliant on donor funding. There are a total of five staff members. A team of four is responsible for monitoring and reporting of about 26 LMs and several other BUs on a quarterly basis (there are about 60 BUs, but it is unclear how many the BPMU work with regularly). Three positions, Manager, Advisor and Specialist are donor-supported and one Officer is government employed. One expatriate Advisor is responsible for leading the development of the Government Performance Monitoring and Evaluation System (GPMES). The unit has additional projects and activities, such as the recent development of the

								DGB strategic plan. Turnover has been not an issue, but the three donor-funded contracts are scheduled to expire by the end of the year. <b>Reason for Score (1): The unit is insufficiently staffed in proportion to the workload.</b>
2.2	Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts	X					0	<b>Not applicable (N/A)</b>
2.3	Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities	X					0	<b>N/A.</b> The MoF is a highly centralized system. Line ministries are responsible for monitoring provincial activity.
2.4	Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and qualitative methods	X					0	<b>N/A.</b> The Unit does not actively collect data.
2.5	Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for procesing and managing data			X			3	All staff member are proficient in Microsoft Excel, which meets the unit’s data processing and management needs. The unit does not use databases for this purpose. <b>Reason for Score (3): Staff members are proficient in required software, but would need some training if database management were introduced.</b>
2.6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)		X				4	All BPMU staff members have experience in developing logic models/frames, work with these tools on a routine basis, and transfer this learning to line ministry staff as needed (i.e., formulating outputs and planning relevant activities). <b>Reason for Score (4): All staff fully understands logic</b>

								<b>models and uses conceptual frameworks regularly.</b>
2.7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data			X				<b>3</b> Staff capacity is high in describing and interpreting data with which they routinely work and in transferring these skills to line ministries. However, data are relatively simple (output indicator values and budget expenditures and variances). Data are well presented as per the FY2013 annual narrative report to the Cabinet. Skills in oral presentation to an audience appear to be seldom used, although this capacity was not assessed. <b>Reason for Score (3): BPMU staff members are skilled in describing, interpreting and presenting data with which they routinely work.</b>
2.8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)			X				<b>3</b> Based on review of one annual budget report to the Cabinet, it appears the Unit has at least adequate capacity in writing technical reports. Quarterly and semi-annual reports (which are not submitted to the Cabinet) were not available to review. <b>Reason for Score (3): There is currently adequate capacity in report writing based on review of a standard annual budget report, but questionable if</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>							<b>2.7</b>

3.1	Ministry has well-defined data flow process			X			<p>The data flow follows a quarterly reporting cycle. Budget monitoring and reporting are conducted over a four-week period each quarter. During the first two weeks, LMs submit reports to the BPMU and in the subsequent two weeks the budget specialists work with their select budgetary units (10-12 each) to assess the quarter's expenditures against the budget and planned program outputs, follow-up and/or approve justification for any variance, and provide guidance in planning the next quarter based on technical need/capacity of the individual LM. Within this two-week period, the specialists analyze, interpret, compile and present reports to the MoF (via the chain of command) for feedback and approval before passing to the MoEC for its review. On a semi-annual and annual basis, the MoF submits the government performance report to the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, which sends the report to the Parliament Budget Committee and Cabinet and a copy to the MoEC. However, there are limitations. While the flow of existing data is well defined, it excludes data. First, the data flow represents only on-budget assistance. Second, the MoF system can only record financial data that go through the Public Financial Management (PFM) system, which means there are unregistered projects not included in reports to government. <b>Reason for Score (3): Ministry has a well-defined data flow process</b></p>
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3.2	Clear monitoring plan exists for the ministry (sector) <u>and</u> is built into the ministry's strategic plan				X		2	<p>The Reform Implementation and Management Unit (RIMU) recently updated (tweaked) the current ministry strategic plan (2014-18). It is still in draft and not yet circulated, pending the newly elected government. The plan has an M&amp;E Framework, but was not available for review. The strategic plan is an informative and well-written document, but needs to be organized around a clear chain of measureable outputs, outcomes and, ideally, impact. On the one hand, this revision could be easily achieved as much of the ingredients are in the document. On the other hand, the fact that there is not a proper logical framework in this second update implies these concepts are not fully grasped. More importantly, the plan is not the product of an inclusive ministry-wide strategic planning process and without these contributions appears not to have sufficient buy-in or relevance. Since its development in 2005, it has only been updated for the successive five-year period. The DGB has recently completed a draft five-year strategic plan (2015-19), which is linked to the MoF strategic plan. The BPMU had a significant role in its development process, one that appears to be highly recognized by leadership. However, because it is still a work in progress, the assessment focuses on the MoF Strategic Plan (2014-18). <b>Reason for Score (2): The strategic has not been well developed both in process and structure/technical content.</b></p>
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3.3	GIRoA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector M&E plan					X	1	The MoF does not have an operational monitoring plan to which off-budget projects would link (see 3.2). The previous EGGI project design was implicitly linked to MoF priorities, but still very USAID-focused. Donor on-budget commitments to BC2 programs and subprograms are automatically linked to the monitoring and reporting system that is the focus of this assessment and, thus, not applicable to item 3.3. <b>Reason for Score (1): MoF does not have an operational monitoring plan to which off-budget projects would link.</b>
3.4	Indicators for each level of result chain (output, outcome, impact)				X		2	The MoF strategic plan has output and outcome indicators that are mostly SMART, but the overall results chain needs to be further developed before indicators are incorporated. Impact, or macroeconomic measures, are not included in the strategic plan, but are tracked against IMF benchmarks by the Fiscal Policy Unit under the DGB. <b>Reason for Score (2): Strategic plans include output and outcome indicators, but need refining.</b>
3.5	Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives	X					0	<b>N/A.</b> The MoF strategic plan M&E framework was not available for review. The DGB strategic plan is technically solid and still a work in progress (indicator definitions need to be established including units of disaggregation).
3.6	Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources,	X					0	<b>N/A.</b> The MoF strategic plan M&E framework was not available for review. The DGB strategic plan is still a work in progress.

	frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks						
3.7	Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed		X				4 BPMU monitoring activities are clearly programmed and linked to the annual budget calendar and quarterly reporting process. Program outcomes are reported to the MoEC at the fiscal year end and subprogram outputs are reported quarterly to the MoF. <b>Reason for Score (4): The BPMU already has a clear routine schedule and systematic process for monitoring performance of annual budgets</b>
3.8	All reporting requirements and procedures are clear		X				4 Quarterly reporting requirements and procedures are documented and clear to line ministries and BPMU staff, the two parties responsible for producing and submitting reports for internal and external stakeholders. A small proportion of line ministries has some difficulty in completing and/or submitting reports in a given quarter and require additional assistance from BPMU to which staff responds. <b>Reason for Score (4): Quarterly reporting requirements are clear to all involved in the process.</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Data Management Systems and Practices</b>						<b>2.7</b>

4.1	Ministry has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis			X			3	<p>The BPMU is the nodal point of reporting and has an established system for requisite gathering, collation and analysis of report data. Simple reporting templates include the previous quarter's financial and subprogram (non-financial) activity and planned activity for the following quarter. The reporting formats and process are well established, but also reflect inadequacies of the planning process. For example, one of five programs is always devoted to Program Administration and Management, and its subprograms used as miscellaneous line items that do not correspond with outputs, which makes financial reconciliation unnecessarily difficult. A second challenge is that line ministries are planning quarter-by-quarter without reference to the overall year's plan. The BPMU has recently incorporated a simple worksheet into the report template that includes four quarters. If the tool becomes a reporting requirement it might facilitate line ministries to adopt a more effective way of planning. <b>Reason for Score (3): System and tools are established and are currently being improved.</b></p>
4.2	Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)				X		2	<p>A traditional paper-based system is slowly being replaced by an emerging electronic culture and available technology. Management and storage of documents and data are both manual and electronic. Microsoft Excel and Word are used, which is less efficient than a database. Communication with ministries is paper-based. The current system will eventually be replaced by</p>

								the GPMEs. <b>Reason for Score (2): The current system is less than adequate.</b>
4.3	Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality, passwords, back-up, virus protection)			X				<b>3</b> The DGB has its own IT department supported by UNDP. All servers, backup, hardware and software are adequately maintained. Anti-virus software is up-to-date. Internal communication through Microsoft Outlook and shared drives are password protected. <b>Reason for Score (3): Integrity of systems and data are maintained, but through 100% donor financing which is not sustainable.</b>
4.4	Data available when needed				X			<b>2</b> Data that are generated or retrieved electronically are available when needed. Accessing data manually is time consuming. <b>Reason for Score (2): Not all data is available when needed.</b>
4.5	Linkage to other national data reporting systems			X				<b>3</b> Through AFMIS, BPMU staff can track budget execution of line ministries and access current data on all budgets. National and subnational data can be accessed through CSO online, but data are not too reliable for planning purposes. <b>Reason for Score (3): Linkage to the main national reporting systems.</b>
4.6	Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness			X				<b>3</b> Verification of data quality and completeness is inherently the role of the BPMU staff. Data are reviewed against checklists and benchmarks and with BU representatives directly or via sector focal points. Checks and balances are built into the review process through triangulation of sources (AFMIS and documented data history

								and trends) and sound judgment given staff's familiarity with BU subprogram data. Source data still needs to be verified at the subnational level or through independent audit. <b>Reason for Score (3): BPMU verifies data quality to the extent that it can from central level.</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						<b>2.8</b>	
5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool				X		<b>2</b>	There are many examples of monitoring information used to improve the reporting process. This quarter BPMU has instituted a mechanism, endorsed by the minister, to keep LM leadership better informed of poor budget performance and to solve outstanding problems and mitigate future ones. It will submit a general report and a one-page summary addressed to each deputy minister of key problems encountered and lessons learned from other ministries over the given period (annually or more frequently as needed). Other examples include establishing the budget calendar and revising or eliminating tools and procedures that don't add value to reporting. Decisions go through minister for approval. No examples of data driven policy decisions were identified in the assessment. <b>Reason for Score (2): There is limited use of monitoring data for key decision-making outside the BPRD.</b>
5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action			X			<b>3</b>	Information is used for corrective action and will involve ministers or deputy ministers when warranted. LMs that do not keep up with reforms might risk a budget deduction. <b>Score (3)</b>

5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis					X	2	Two reports were made available for review: The annual strategic plan performance report for FY 2012 (developed by RIMU) and the annual budget performance report for FY 2013 (developed by BPRD and MoEC). Quality is fair to good, respectively. The latter report includes comprehensive information on performance (expenditure rate and achieving development goals) of 25 budgetary units covered by budget performance pilot. Based on findings, MoF is one of the BUs “not able to provide quality and on time reports in the past two quarters”. Nor had it submitted the third quarter report at the time of this performance review. <b>Reason for Score (2): Based solely on the 2013 annual budget performance review, MoF does not regularly produce high quality reports or timely reports.</b>
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders		X				4	The BPMU supports the DGB, the DM of Finance, Minister, Cabinet , Parliament, MoEC and BUs with routine reports of BU budget performance. Before the report goes to the above hierarch, it is shared within the BPRD and BED. In addition, annual budget reports are posted on the MoF website for the general public. <b>Reason for Score (4): All MoF departments have clear clients to support.</b>
6	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>						2.3	

6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )			X		3	<p>All departments in the MoF convene and attend several regular meetings throughout the year - some useful and some not. Budget season is the busiest time of year when donors, LMs and various ministry technical teams meet frequently. BPMU is busiest just before Budget Committee Meetings when staff meets with all 63 BUs to finalize submissions. Otherwise, there are meetings with JCMB, donors, and all other once or twice a year to review budget performance and regular coordination meetings. <b>Reason for Score (3): There are regular coordination meetings with donors and stakeholders throughout the year.</b></p>
6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )				X	2	<p>As noted in 6.1, Coordination within government and amongst all stakeholders (MoF, BUs, donors) is best at budget time. The introduction and circulation of a budget calendar has been highly instrumental in the coordination of all players and in their individual preparation for BC1 and BC2 windows of activity. The role of the BPMU at this time is to review and check the integrity of BC1s from each ministry (i.e., inclusion of appropriate outputs, baselines, targets and linkages to the NPPs and ANDS) and work in close coordination with the Program Budgeting Unit to ensure completeness and integrity of the whole circular. Apart from routine meetings during budget season, there are monthly meetings with MoEC and monthly to quarterly sector Standing Committee meetings. However, the quality of coordination with the MoEC is poor given their joint stewardship role. <b>Reason for Score (2):</b></p>

								Meetings outside the budget preparation are conducted regularly, but necessary and productive coordination between the MoF and MoEC is happening.
6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors	X					0	N/A
6.4	Donor and GIRoA monitoring capacity development efforts are coordinated <u>and</u> implemented				X		2	The lack of coordination in capacity building efforts among donors is well documented (2014 IARSC Final Evaluation Report, 2012 USAID EGGI Final Report, 2013 WB PFM and Accountability Assessment, implied in MoF and DGB strategic plans, and others) whether targeted to MoF or other ministries. The USAID EGGI final report of findings discuss that “several donors and implementing partners were addressing the same areas, but coordination was limited or impeded by competing donor or ministry priorities”. MoF representatives describe previous capacity building efforts of donors as ineffective due to donor agendas that poor recruitment by Human Resources (HR). Examples given include: unqualified, uninformed and disinterested advisors imbedded in LMs and assistance prematurely stopped and without any follow-on plan. It is felt that M&E capacity

								building of LMs needs to target teams that include Directors of Finance, Policy and Planning, M&E, and Budget Implementation. That being said, a few individual capacity building efforts are currently being implemented. AusAid is working with four LMs in four thematic areas of which one is reporting. While the MoF does not receive direct technical assistance, the DG is involved in coordination and meetings (which is critical) and the general consensus is that AusAid is doing a great job. The CBR is contributing to M&E capacity development of LMs and the CSC might include M&E in its training program. HR coordinates other efforts, such as overseas training and education, but is unlikely to be a viable response to M&E learning needs. <b>Reason for Score (2): There are no broad M&amp;E capacity development efforts directly targeting the MoF or that are coordinated across LMs, although there are a few individual donor efforts (the reason for not scoring 1)</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						<b>2.0</b>	
7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels				X		<b>2</b>	The MoF has a better track record of mainstreaming gender than most ministries. There are several examples of women holding directorships and in leadership and senior positions. However, these are still only examples. None of the five BPMU staff members are female. <b>Reason for Score (2): BPMU not staffed by females, but women are in</b>

								senior/leadership roles in other directorates and departments.
7.2	Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data			X				3 The BPMU fully understands the importance of monitoring data. The only question raised by the assessment team is whether or not an appreciation for monitoring data is sufficient to understand the operational complexities of implementing multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects in the provinces. <b>Reason for Score (3): Staff understands the importance of monitoring data.</b>
7.3	Senior management understands and supports monitoring system				X			2 Each quarter, the BPMU assesses BU expenditure rate and achievement of planned results (outputs), analyze variances and justifications, and address findings with BUs. Still, at the end of the year, development budgets are typically underspent due to several factors that include poor planning and forecasting and an apparent inability to make midstream adjustments to subprograms that are too large to be flexible. The Team's review of an illustrative budget report from the Ministry of Communication Information and Technology (MoCIT) shows three subprograms for the Electronic Afghanistan Program. Of the approximate 2.5 billion dollars approved and planned from the development budget for FY2013, these subprograms were underspent by an estimated 1.2 billion dollars and without adequate justification. The Team did not check if/how this issue was followed-up, but




								<b>(2): The monitoring function is not fully recognized by leadership</b>
7.5	Budget allocation to monitoring <u>and</u> sufficient to support the monitoring function					X	<b>1</b>	The BPMU is financed by two donors. At present there is no budget allocation or donor commitment to improve the quality of the unit or increase staff, which is needed to cover monitoring across the government as per the current mandate. <b>Reason for Score (1): Current funding is unsustainable and still falls short of supporting the monitoring function</b>

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	0.0	0.0
Human Capacity	0.0	0.0
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	0.0	0.0


Data Management Systems and Practices	0.0	0.0
Utilization and Dissemination	0.0	0.0
Partnerships and Coordination	0.0	0.0
Advocacy and Culture	0.0	0.0

**ANNEX VI. Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the MoF monitoring system**




# ANNEX VIA: OVER ALL DGA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

MoF Organization Chart:



# ANNEX VIB: DGA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



**ANNEX VII. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS**

**MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, IRRIGATION, AND LIVESTOCK**

**Primary interviewer: Oscar Antezana**

**Alternate interviewer: Mussarat Arif**

**Date: July 22, 2014**

**Names and position titles of persons interviewed:**

**Nasrullah, Bakhtani, Evaluation Director, MAIL**

**Abdul Munir, MIS Manager, MAIL**

**Abdul Ghani Taj, MIS Data Management Team Leader, MAIL**

MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE		Non applicable (0)	Completely (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	COMMENTS
<b>1</b>	<b>Organizational structure</b>						<b>2.7</b>	

1.1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain				X		<p>2</p> <p>Although MAIL has an M&amp;E department which, in theory is solely responsible for monitoring, it actually devotes most of its time and effort to verify projects' implementation status aimed at accessing funds to the MoF for the payment of external contractors in charge of project implementation. Although the M&amp;E Department states that it gathers data and monitors performance with the assistance of the Provincial Directorates, this is carried out if funds are available. In addition, the Directorate of Policy, Planning and Programs (DPPP) which reports directly to the Minister as well and houses the MIS Unit, is mostly devoted to other activities and plays a rather passive role in monitoring. <b>Score = 2 because monitoring is marginally performed and the M&amp;E Department and the DPPP also dedicate their time to other functions.</b></p>
1.2	Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker		X				<p>4</p> <p>Until 2009, the M&amp;E department was under the Planning Policy department. Given the importance of project implementation, budget execution and data quality reporting, the M&amp;E department was separated. See the organizational chart which was available and is not totally updated. At present, both the M&amp;E and PPP report</p>

								directly to the Minister. <b>Score = 4 since both report directly to the Ministry.</b>
1.3	Adequate structure/units to cover all functions of Monitoring						X	2 The current M&E Director believes that the structure prior to 2009 was more efficient and functional since the scope of work of the M&E and the former PP departments are very interdependent. (According to the MIS Manager, the origins of it is a former USAID project called National Information System). Given that the M&E department has limited staff, actually project staff of the close to 40 on-budget projects in the Ministry is assigned to collect the output data, along with a M&E staff and a Ministry staff from the Provincial Directorate. Staff from each project enter the data to th Ministry's on-line system and the M&E department staff prepares a brief report which is signed by all three members of the Ministry. Apparently, however, some projects deviate from this process and have only the staff at the province collect the data. <b>Score = 2 mainly because the structure does not cover all monitoring functions.</b>
1.4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff						X	2 The organizational structure has changed a few times since it was established as part of the 5-year Strategy Plan. Some departments have

								officially established written and updated supervision roles and some not. No major issues have been mentioned by the staff interviewed. <b>Score = 2 since not all departments have official supervision and oversight responsibilities.</b>	
1.5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff					X		2	The 5-yr Master Plan contains roles and responsibilities for both the M&E and PPP departments. In practice, however, the Master Plan has not been updated and organizational structures did. To a large extent, roles and responsibilities are stated in the staff's terms of reference that may or may not be fully consistent with the Master Plan. This rapid assessment did not have the chance to review each staff's terms of reference but answers to questions to Ministry officials in this regard made believe that staff's roles and responsibilities are clear. <b>Score = 2 because there isn't a strong reason to have 2-3 staff, in some instances to collect data rather than only one.</b> See also 4.6.
1.6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support		X					4	The reports on project execution for payment to contractors jointly prepared by the M&E department, a technical department and the field staff are submitted to the three Deputy Ministers (DMs) of Agriculture and Livestock, Irrigation and Natural

								Resource Management, and Administration and Planning and to the PPP department. In addition, the M&E department submits reports brief progress reports three times a year to the DMs. No external clients have been reported. The MIS unit under PPP supports all MAIL staff on a permanent basis on an ad hoc basis. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Human capacity</b>						<b>2.1</b>	
2.1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities. <i>To what extent do they rely on external advisors?</i>				<b>X</b>		<b>3</b>	The M&E department has 40 permanent staff, 10 in Kabul and 30 in the provinces, including administrative staff. Staff is assigned based on the number and size of the projects. Their time is not dedicated exclusively to monitoring activities. There isn't a high turnover since most of the staff are mid level agricultural technicians with limited options for employment. <b>Score = 3, it seems to be sufficient staff but not necessarily fully dedicated to monitoring.</b>
2.2	Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts					<b>X</b>	<b>2</b>	The M&E department has five female personnel, all in Kabul. Given the type of work and for security reasons, female staff is asked to go to the field for data collection when needed. <b>Score = 2, there is no female staff in the provinces and no special efforts were undertaken nor seems to be the need.</b>



								data as needed. <b>Score = 3</b> since the <b>MIS has the sufficient capacity to process the data in several formats and the use of filters. For example, there is historical and provincial data for each of the 1,100 output indicators, although not complete because staff does not always comply with entering data.</b>	
2.6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)						X	1	Only very few staff in the M&E department somewhat understands M&E concepts in general. <b>Score = 1, the few people with limited understanding doesn't do much difference.</b>
2.7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data						X	2	Most data is updated and is presented in a rather simple fashion. <b>Score = 2.</b>
2.8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)						X	2	Given that data is not always complete and updated a staff skills are limited, reports are basic in format and content. <b>Score = 2.</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>							<b>1.9</b>	

3.1	Ministry has well-defined data flow process ( <i>verify if possible</i> )				X		<p>Relevant staff that are involved in data gathering and management in general have a clear understanding of the data flow within the Ministry. However, there isn't anything explicitly stated in written form. There are two main data flow processes. Contractors responsible for project implementation submit their report to the M&amp;E department three times during the life cycle of the project (called 3 phrases monitoring). Before payment of each phase, M&amp;E, technical and field (PP) staff visit the site in the field to verify progress. A report is then prepared by these staff which is submitted to the M&amp;E department and to the department of Finance and Administration for the appropriate payment. These reports are also submitted to the respective technical department. The other data flow process begins with the projects themselves when they collect the data and it is entered in the Ministry's on-line database. The M&amp;E department verifies the data at random three times a year, unless the Finance department does not have the necessary funding (which seems to be very seldom). It then prepares reports that are submitted to the DMs and the Minister.</p> <p><b>Score = 2 since it seems to be a system</b></p>
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								that is working (not to say that it is the optimal) but not all projects comply and there are delays. These processes are not documented.	
3.2	Clear monitoring plan exists for the Ministry (sector) <u>and</u> is built into the ministry's strategic plan					X		2	The Ministry's 5-yr. Master Plan is a strategic document that contains four pillars: natural resource management and irrigation, production and productivity, economic regeneration and capacity building. The document contains strategic lines for each pillar and general overall M&E plans for each technical department that seldom are used for the design or monitoring of projects. <b>Score = 2 since the Ministry has strategic lines that are looked by project managers only when it has to present its annual plan to the MoF.</b>
3.3	GIRoA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector M&E plan						X	1	In practice, the objectives under each pillar are used only as a reference for the identification, design and implementation of projects. The technical offices design projects and are engaged in preparing project progress reports on an annual basis through the BC2 process. Very seldom

								do projects have M&E plans. Projects are mainly output driven. <b>Score = 1.</b>
3.4	Indicators for each level of result chain (output, outcome, impact)					X	1	Most projects do not have M&E plans and data collection and monitoring is around outputs particularly for purpose of payment to contractors. <b>Score = 1.</b>
3.5	Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives					X	1	In general, data collection is "projectized". The ministry has about 1,100 output level indicators for about 35 on-budget projects - about 31 output indicators per project! However, this number includes indicators for completed projects. By definition of an output indicator, no indicator measures project objectives. <b>Score = 1.</b>
3.6	Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources, frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks					X	2	As stated earlier, most projects do not have monitoring plans or are seldom used. Indicators are generally defined but they are output level. Therefore, the source and the geographic coverage are rather clear. The frequency is mostly determined by the "three-phases" process. On the other hand, the large majority of the projects do not have benchmarks. Payment to contractors are based on progress made but it does not necessarily means that there are targets or benchmarks. <b>Score = 2 (at most) since monitoring is done only for outputs.</b>

3.7	Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed			X			3	Project data gathering and monitoring takes place every time prior to the payment to the Contractor. In addition, the M&E department is programmed to collect and verify data every four months upon funding available. <b>Score = 3 since project implementation progress is carried out before payments are made although sometimes they are not depending of the availability of funds.</b>
3.8	All reporting requirements and procedures are clear			X			3	There are no specific or written reporting requirements. The M&E department prepares reports after a field visit and submitted to the DMs and the Finance department if appropriate. The MIS Unit submits reports to the Minister usually on a monthly basis in a pre determined format instructed by the Minister. <b>Score = 3 since reports seem to flow to the right people although there are no clear and written rules. The Minister and DMs in charge usually instruct verbally the type and expected contents of the reports.</b>
4	<b>Data Management Systems and Practices</b>						<b>2.5</b>	

4.1	Ministry has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis				X		<p>2</p> <p>Data collection is mainly carried out by the projects themselves and by the M&amp;E department at the provincial level. Although they have their tools and procedures, they are not unified nor are there established in writing. Collation and analysis of the data is done by the Data Management Manager under the MIS Unit of the Ministry. <b>Score = 2 since there are not standard data collection procedures needless to say significant data analysis.</b></p>
4.2	Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)		X				<p>4</p> <p>The Ministry does have an electronic and automated data base managed by the MIS Unit. All projects are expected to enter project data on-line. It is run in Excel and MIS Unit staff is capable of processing data through filters, dynamic tables and the like. This same unit storages the data base which is said to contain more than 47,000 data entries. The M&amp;E and technical departments have their own data bases in Excel sheets but analysis is basically absent. The system functioning in the MIS Unit is basically underutilized. <b>Score = 4.</b></p>
4.3	Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality,		X				<p>4</p> <p>The MIS manager administers the accessibility to the system through passwords and access levels to different staff. The data base has a back up storage separately. <b>Score = 4.</b></p>


	passwords, back-up, virus protection)							
4.4	Data available when needed				X		2	Most data is available upon request for Ministry staff; graphs have limited dissemination. Data is available to outsiders if approved by project manager. <b>Score = 2, since data is mostly available internally and then it only contains mostly output data which is of relative usefulness to people outside the Ministry.</b>
4.5	Linkage to other national data reporting systems					X	1	No. <b>Score = 1.</b>
4.6	Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness				X		2	Although most of the project data is gathered by more than one person at the same time (i.e. under the "three phases" mode), it does not necessarily mean that data is of good quality. In fact, there are some MAIL reports that imply some complicity between the project staff and the contractors. <b>Score = 2 (at most), data collection is the responsibility of project staff and there is no systematic data quality verification. The M&amp;E department staff does some random quality check and the MIS Unit does very little.</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						<b>2.0</b>	

5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool				X		2	Reports made under the "three phases" mode is used for payment to contractors. These reports may include observations related to the overall performance and quality of implementation. No major use of reports at high levels other than for information purposes. <b>Score = 2, data collected is basically used to decide the amount that is due for payment to contractors.</b>
5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action					X	1	Interviewed staff stated that this is rarely the case. <b>Score = 1.</b>
5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis				X		2	Reports are basic. Although most of the times they are seem to be timely, most of the time not all data is completed. <b>Score = 2.</b>
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders			X			3	The MIS Unit is the single responsible for providing reports that along with a relevant department. These are submitted to the DMs and the Minister in the agreed format. No systematics reports are prepared for external stakeholders. <b>Score = 3 since the internal needs seem to be satisfied.</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>						<b>1.0</b>	
6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )					X	1	None. <b>Score = 1.</b>

6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )					X	1	None. <b>Score = 1.</b>
6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors					X	1	None. Staff of donor-funded projects monitor and report separate from the Ministry's systems and procedures. <b>Score = 1.</b>
6.4	Donor and GIRoA M&E capacity development efforts are coordinated <u>and</u> implemented					X	1	None. <b>Score =1.</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						<b>1.8</b>	
7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels				X		2	Half of the ten staff in Kabul are female. There are no females in province owing mainly to the type of job and the need to take field visits. <b>Score = 2 although 50% of staff in Kabul is female, most of them are support staff.</b>
7.2	Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data				X		2	The M&E Director and few staff in the PPP department partly do. <b>Score = 2.</b>
7.3	Ministry senior management understands and supports monitoring system					X	1	Senior management would be interested if they see a political benefit. Staff at directorate levels are not interested. <b>Score = 1.</b>
7.4	Monitoring function recognized by Ministry leadership					X	1	No. <b>Score = 1.</b>
7.5	Budget allocation to M&E and sufficient to support the Monitoring function			X			3	All the staff involved in any monitoring activity is paid from the central government. Budget is allocated for site visits most of the times. <b>Score =3.</b>

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	0.0	0.0
Human Capacity	0.0	0.0
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	0.0	0.0
Data Management Systems and Practices	0.0	0.0
Utilization and Dissemination	0.0	0.0
Partnerships and Coordination	0.0	0.0
Advocacy and Culture	0.0	0.0

**ANNEX VII. Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the MAIL monitoring system**



## **ANNEX VII.A. MAIL INDICATORS**

### **MAIL Indicators for Routine Reporting**

1. Number of trained staff in agriculture
2. Number of production sites, process and agricultural services construction
3. Total acres of gardens, fruit trees constructed
4. Number of acres of productive and non-productive nursery seedlings established
5. Number of irrigation water (canal, irrigation system, fountain, etc.) constructed
6. Construction of irrigation infrastructure (dams, siphons, bridges and water supply)
7. Number of kilometers of irrigation channels that are rehabilitated or established
8. Number of display parts constructed
9. Number of research forms that are rehabilitated or established
10. Number of tones of seeds distributed
11. Number of tons of chemical fertilizer distributed
12. Number of animal clinics built
13. Number of surrounding security walls constructed
14. Number of cold rooms and green rooms constructed
15. Number of green rooms constructed
16. Number of storage sites built for grain and fodder crops
17. Number of agricultural offices rehabilitated or constructed
18. Number of agricultural equipment and goods distributed
19. Number of areas in hectares that were contented against agricultural disease and pests
20. Number of agricultural associations constructed (saffron growers, etc.)
21. Number of agricultural associations and agricultural livestock established
22. Number of processing companies established
23. Number of agricultural loans disbursed
24. Number of poultry and season honey farms constructed
25. Number of domestic animals (cows, goats) distributed
26. Number of chickens (chickens that lay egg, and for meat) distributed
27. Number of domestic animals (cows, goats, and sheep) that were cured and treated
28. Number of hectares of natural and industrial forests rehabilitated and constructed
29. Number of vehicles for transportation (motorcycle, office vehicle, tankers) distributed
30. Number of agricultural machinery (tractor, thresher, etc.) distributed
31. Number of agricultural tools (water pump, cocks machine, etc.) distributed
32. Number of farmers trained

### **Relevant Indicators From USAID’S PMP 2014-2024 for OAG/MAIL**

1. Number of households benefitted by agriculture
2. Number of hectares under improved technologies or management practices
3. Number of farmers or others who applied technologies or management practices

4. Number of farmers growing high value crops
5. Number of hectares with increased high value crops production
6. Number of farmers receiving public/private sector training
7. Number of hectares of biological significance and/or natural resources under improved natural resource management
8. Number of hectares with new or improved irrigation and drainage services
9. Number of people with increased economic benefits derived from sustainable natural resource management and conservation
10. Number of persons with new jobs
11. Number of farmers benefitting from financial institutions

ANNEX VIII. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS

**AGRICULTURE CREDIT ENHANCEMENT/AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT FUND**

Primary interviewer: Oscar Antezana

Alternate interviewer: Mussarat Arif

Institution: AGRICULTURE CREDIT ENHANCEMENT/AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT FUND

Date: July 22, 2014

Names and position titles of persons interviewed:

Juan Estrada, ACE Chief of Party

Ahmad Fahim Safi, M&E Manager

Khalid Sarwary, Credit Management Units Supervisor

Wafiullah Dehzad, Internal Audit Manager

MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE		Non applicable (0)	Complete-ly (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	COMMENTS
<b>1</b>	<b>Organizational structure</b>						<b>3.8</b>	
1.1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain		X				4	ACE/ADF has been following USAID approved M&E Plan. The M&E unit has the main data base that tracks financial data related to the business as well as data reported to USAID and to its Board of

							Directors. It also coordinates and leads field surveys when needed. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.2	Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker		X				4 ACE has had an expatriate M&E advisor for the last four years until three weeks at the time of this assessment. At present, the M&E Manager, who is an Afghan, reports to the ACE Chief of Party. It is planned that this person will report to the CEO after the ACE project is completed in January 15, 2015. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.3	Adequate structure/units to cover all functions of Monitoring		X				4 Yes. The M&E unit includes GIS functions which is extremely helpful to analyze coverage in the country since ADF is the only financial entity that provides loans in the rural area of Afghanistan. The Internal Audit Unit complements the M&E Unit in the verification of data. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff			X			3 At the time a loan is taking place, CMU staff located in a few provinces record the data pertinent to the transaction. CMUs monitor the transactions and report to the central office on Kabul. <b>Score = 3 since monitoring of the loan performance is permanently and the M&amp;E unit does not necessarily need to have provincial presence.</b>
1.5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff		X				4 Yes. Evidence was submitted. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support		X				4 The M&E unit has two internal clients and two external clients. At present, the former includes ACE Chief of Party and the Board of Directors through the COP. The latter includes USAID and the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock. It is important to note that the Ministry is a client insofar that it disburses USAID funds when progress

								reports are submitted by ADF in a quarterly basis. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Human capacity</b>						<b>3.4</b>	
2.1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities. <i>To what extent do they rely on external advisors?</i>		X				<b>4</b>	At present, the M&E Unit has five staff - the M&E manager, one senior M&E specialist, two M&E officers and one senior GIS manager. The existing staff in M&E have been working in the ACE project and are now part of ADF's permanent staff. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.2	Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts	X					<b>0</b>	<b>N/A.</b> CMUs provide raw data on the characteristics of the loan and loan performance. Given the type of business, ADF does not collect data directly from the field where gender sensitivity is an issue. Data is collected from on-lending institutions and financial intermediaries at the time of contract signing for the loan.
2.3	Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities				X		<b>2</b>	CMUs are the main operation units that oversee activities in the provinces. CMUs provide list of end borrowers to ACE/ADF. However, there are only three out of six operational at the time of this rapid assessment. <b>Score = 2.</b>
2.4	Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and qualitative methods		X				<b>4</b>	Financial data is basically collected from grant and loan agreements from the CMUs and no specialized monitoring skills are needed. Non-financial data is collected through surveys led by the M&E team who sub-contracts enumerators. This rapid assessment has not evaluated thoroughly the skills of the M&E staff but evidence shows that they have

								the necessary skills to collect reliable data. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.5	Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for processing and managing data		X				4	Yes. Staff from the M&E Unit and other units closely related to the functions of the former such as the CMUs and the Internal Audit department have the sufficient skills to work with spreadsheets and the like. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)			X			3	Only selected staff who should know these concepts, such as the COP and the M&E staff, do understand. Most of the rest of ADF staff that works closely with the M and E staff (e.g. Internal Audit) has not being exposed to them. <b>Score = 3.</b>
2.7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data		X				4	In close collaboration with other departments, the M&E staff is mainly responsible for the preparation of the reports submitted to USAID and/ or made public to other stakeholders. However, these reports are mostly informative and contain little analysis. According to ADF, the content of the current reports is what USAID and the Board of Directors require. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)			X			3	Reports are clear and accesible for non-technical audiences. However, these are mainly descriptive and not analytical. Sometimes USAID requests tables with different types of analysis but nothing rigorous or in-depth. <b>Score = 3. ADF could provide richer analyses to its main stakeholders that might lead to improved decision making strategically and operationally.</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>						<b>3.9</b>	

3.1	Ministry has well-defined data flow process ( <i>verify if possible</i> )		X				4	The data flow process is relatively simple. CMUs provide data to the central office in Kabul and non-financial data is collected by the M&E unit itself. <b>Score = 4.</b>
3.2	Clear monitoring plan exists for the Ministry (sector) <u>and</u> is built into the ministry's strategic plan			X			3	ACE has a clear Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) as shown in its latest 6th edition and both its annual work plan and ADF business plan are aligned to it. However, there is no evidence that this is built into the Ministry's strategic plan. <b>Score = 3.</b>
3.3	GIRoA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector M&E plan	X					0	<b>N/A.</b> Although the Ministry has its Master Plan which to a large extent is not used even by its staff, there is no documented evidence that ACE/ADF is directly and explicitly aligned to it or to any other GIRoA M&E plan. However, it can be safely assumed that ACE/ADF contribute in a positive manner to the Ministry's general objective of improving the functioning of the Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock sectors and to population that base their livelihoods in these activities.
3.4	Indicators for each level of result chain (output, outcome, impact)		X				4	ACE/ADF follows the current 2003-2013 USAID's PMP.
3.5	Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives		X				4	ACE/ADF follows the current 2003-2013 USAID's PMP.
3.6	Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources, frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks		X				4	ACE/ADF follows the current 2003-2013 USAID's PMP.

3.7	Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed		X				4	Loans performance are monitored as per loan contracts. Non-loans indicators are regularly monitored as evidenced in ACE/ADF quarterly reports. <b>Score = 4.</b>
3.8	All reporting requirements and procedures are clear		X				4	Yes. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Data Management Systems and Practices</b>						<b>3.5</b>	
4.1	Ministry has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis		X				4	ACE/ADF has the necessary systems and tools for data collection, aggregation or segmentation of data, to report relevant data in a timely manner. <b>Score = 4.</b>
4.2	Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)		X				4	Databases are mostly stored and managed in Excel spreadsheets which is adequate for current needs. These are readily available and updated. <b>Score = 4.</b>
4.3	Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality, passwords, back-up, virus protection)		X				4	Monthly back ups of all data, including M&E data. Tapes are stored in a different location. Commercial anti-virus software are installed in the IT network. There are different levels of access to data. <b>Score = 4.</b>
4.4	Data available when needed		X				4	Simple data is readily available from the updated database. More complex data can be made available within relative short notice. <b>Score = 4.</b>
4.5	Linkage to other national data reporting systems					X	1	ACE/ADF is not connected to any other monitoring system or database such as the MAIL, Central Bank or any other financial institution. <b>Score = 1.</b>
4.6	Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness		X				4	The Credit and Risk Department shares the lending data with the M&E team which verifies its accuracy, validity and reliability. The Internal Audit

								department conducts independent audits which constitute a second mechanism to ensure data reliability. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						<b>3.3</b>	
5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool			X			<b>3</b>	Quarterly reports and other ad hoc data are reported to the CEO and the Board of Directors which is comprised of MAIL and USAID representatives, among others. These stakeholders may not necessarily make decisions based on the quarterly reports but there is also additional internal information that are used for decision making. <b>Score = 3.</b>
5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action			X			<b>3</b>	Quarterly reports and other ad hoc data is reported to the CEO and the Board of Directors which is comprised of MAIL and USAID representatives, among others. There is little evidence that these reports are used for corrective actions but other internal data is used for those purposes. <b>Score = 3.</b>
5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis			X			<b>3</b>	ACE/ADF prepares good reports that are particularly informative and not targeted to a technical audience. There is no evidence of high quality analytical reports that can provide some insights into the impact of the institution or the challenges and corrective actions made. ACE/ADF conducted at least one mid-term impact assessment but none applying rigorous quantitative methodologies. <b>Score = 3.</b>
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders		X				<b>4</b>	Yes, particularly through the quarterly reports. <b>Score = 4.</b>


<b>6</b>	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>						<b>0.0</b>	
6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )	X					0	N/A
6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )	X					0	N/A
6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors	X					0	N/A
6.4	Donor and GIRoA M&E capacity development efforts are coordinated <u>and</u> implemented	X					0	N/A
<b>7</b>	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						<b>4.0</b>	
7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels		X				4	There are 65 people working in ADF, 39 already in ADF payroll and 26 to be transferred in October 2014. ADF in the Kabul office has 13 females employed - 4 technical, 3 administrative and 6 support staff - and 2 support staff in the regional offices for a total of 15 personnel. According high level officials in ACE/ADF, job opportunities are offered to women but, unfortunately, very few are able to work in technical roles mainly because most of the work requires interaction with clients as well

								as travel. To a large extent, this type of functions run against social norms. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.2	Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data		X				4	As a financial institution, staff are aware of the importance of monitoring loan performance. The M and E Unit and relevant departments also consider monitoring as a key function for the sustainability and the impact of poor people. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.3	Senior management understands and supports monitoring system		X				4	Yes. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.4	Monitoring function recognized by senior leadership		X				4	Yes, senior management and the Board of Directors recognize the important of a good and reliable monitoring system. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.5	Budget allocation to M&E and sufficient to support the Monitoring function		X				4	Yes. All M and E staff are under ADF payroll and monitoring activities are budgeted annually. <b>Score = 4.</b>

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	0.0	0.0
Human Capacity	0.0	0.0
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	0.0	0.0

Data Management Systems and Practices	0.0	0.0
Utilization and Dissemination	0.0	0.0
Partnerships and Coordination	0.0	0.0
Advocacy and Culture	0.0	0.0

**ANNEX VIII. Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the ACE/ADF monitoring system**



## ANNEX VIIIA. DQA COMMENTS

1. ACE contributes to Sub IR 1.1.2 “Equitable Access to Financial Services Increased” of the new PMP 2014-2024. All three indicators “*number of farmers benefitting from financial instruments*”, “*total number of clients (households and/or microenterprises) benefitting from financial services provided through USG-assisted financial intermediaries*”, and “*number of SMEs that have received loans from financial institutions*” are measured and reported by ACE. These are Output level indicators; the second is also an F indicator.

### Comments.

(a) Data for all three indicators are being provided by ACE under slightly different indicator descriptions. It is recommended that these be identical when the new PMP is approved. (1) To the extent possible, the indicators should be more clearly defined to avoid confusion and double counting. According to the PIRS, “financial instruments” includes loans, vouchers and grants. The second indicator includes micro-insurance and non-financial institutions. Why doesn’t the first indicator include micro-insurance if it is explicitly mentions “financial instruments”? In addition, it is not clear why the second indicator includes training, technical assistance and others as financial services. (2) Unless the suppliers of financial services do not have records for farmer loans and SME loans separately, data could be gathered from the financial institution directly and not a survey as described in the PIRS. It should be quicker, more reliable and more cost effective.

(b) Similar clarity may be required when referring to beneficiaries – “farmers”, “clients (household and/or microenterprises)”, and “SMEs” as to avoid confusion and double counting.

2. ACE provides data for 15-19 indicators that are aligned to the current/previous PMP. ACE’s PMP (6<sup>th</sup> edition) includes 15 indicators.

### Comments.

(a) It is assumed that four have been added for valid reasons. However, it is important to note that gathering, processing and analyzing data is not free of financial and human resources and time.

(b) In addition, it is recommended that PIRS are clear and explicit as was noted earlier and, to the extent possible, use the exact same description for the same metrics. For example, result 1.1. – Value of Finance Accessed through Lending – is stated to be an F indicator. According to the PIRS, the actual F indicator is Value of Agricultural and Rural Loans (F.4.5.2-29). Moreover, the PIRS includes loans provided to agribusiness, which may or may not be considered as rural. It is important to stick strictly to definitions to avoid confusion, ambiguity and the proliferation of indicators. Does the F indicator refers only to farmers and thus to the rural sector? If so, may be it is appropriate to have a different indicator (F or custom) that refers to financial support to agribusinesses. Approval of PMP 2014-2024 would be an excellent opportunity to review these issues.

(c) There are three indicators, among the 15, that are measured in percentages. One of them, indicator #3.1 – Percentage Change in Value of Exports of Afghanistan Agricultural

Products for Firms Supported by ACE – intends to measure “the percentage increase in total valued (US\$) of export sales of agricultural products...” but does not provide the magnitude of exports generated by the project which would be more meaningful. Obviously, the data is available since the calculation of percentages requires absolute values. Moreover, the project should also get credit and track the value of total sales as well. The other two indicators measured as percentages are discussed below.

3. ACE has performed DQAs for eight indicators, mostly related to the financial activities of the project, under IR “Increased Commercial Viability of Small and Medium Farms and Agribusinesses” submitted to USAID on May 7, 2014 which is similar in language to PMP 2014-2024 Sub IR 1.2.2 “Commercial Viability of Agribusiness Increased”.

#### Comments.

(a) Unlike the Sub IR 1.2.2 indicator in the new PMP, the indicators currently used under this IR includes financial, commercial and other type of indicators. In this regard, it is clearer to separate the financial from the commercial indicators as shown in the new PMP (Sub IR 1.1.2 and Sub IR 1.2.2).

(b) In general, the eight indicators could be described more clearly and along with the financial industry’s definitions. For instance, indicator #1.1 Value of Finance Accessed is basically value of loans disbursed (as stated under Validity) and it the conventional description in the financial industry. Moreover, given the clarification under “reliability”, what is intended to measure is “value of outstanding loans disbursed” which measures ADF/ACE outstanding portfolio. Therefore, it appears to be an inconsistency between the contents under Validity and under Reliability.

(c) In the case of indicator #1.2, the statement made under Validity:”... who do not engage in on-lending” seems to be somewhat contradictory with the description of the indicator: Number of individuals benefiting from on-lending activities through ADF. Furthermore, although the contents under Precision seem to be correct, it reflects some confusion as to what this indicator intends to measure. It is normal for a financial intermediary to provide more than one loan to the same person particularly when the first loan was repaid. If the intention is to measure number of individuals/ persons as the indicator is described, then the project could retrieve data from the financial institution’s client database and not from its loan database. This procedure would make the indicator more reliable. This issue could have been avoided had the indicator been correctly interpreted.

(d) The definition of indicator #1.3 states that “... [the increase in income is] caused by ADF lending intervention.” Unless ADF/ACE and/or its on-lending financial intermediaries are the sole provider(s) of loans in a respective area of influence, indicator #1.3 Percent Annual Increase in Household Income by Assisted Direct Beneficiaries is difficult to measure. (1) If the project is not the only loan supplier, this indicator is not reporting accurately because attribution can only be estimated through a rigorous experimental evaluation with panel controls, which is technically difficult and costly. The DQA is not explicit in this regard. (2) If the project is the only financial intermediary providing loans in its area of influence, then the statements made under Reliability are more accurate. However, this needs to be analyzed closer since the main data for estimating this indicator i.e. harvest and income, are rather weak as acknowledged in the DQA. It is positive though that the methodology has been used consistently. (3) It needs

to be clearly stated in the description of the indicator that this indicator only estimates at the farm level and does not include any potential increase in salaries of the employed people of an agribusiness that receives loans from ADF/ACE. (4) Finally, the F indicator according to the PIRS is Percent Change in Rural Income of Targeted Population (4.5.8) which is not quite the same as the indicator's current description. The definition may be adjusted without compromising the substantive meaning of what is intended to measure and it is recommended the use of the F indicator description to avoid the proliferation of indicators.

(e) The DQA of indicator #1.4 Net Total Increase in Private Sector Employment for Farms and Agribusinesses in Targeted Areas (FTE) does not state explicitly how the data is collected to assess its reliability. Is it from copies of loan contracts as stated in the PIRS? Any other reports from agribusinesses?

(f) Indicator #2.4 Percentage of Loan Losses Resulting from ACE Lending Recommendations "...is intended to capture the quality of ADF loan portfolio...". Although this is not an F indicator, it is suggested to use the conventional description of the financial industry, which is Percentage of Loans in Arrears. This description discourages the use of custom indicators and their proliferation and many of them can facilitate aggregation to show results beyond a project.

Since the present SoW does not include a detailed revision of the indicators and data collected by current Off-Budget projects, the above are illustrative specific cases to be aware that USAID may wish to review the proposed PMP 2014-2024 in view of the data that has been collected by current Off-Budget projects and the expected data to be collected from On-Budget projects.

**ANNEX IX. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS**

**DA AFGHANISTAN BRESHNA SHERKA (DABS)**

**Primary interviewer: Oscar**

**Antezana**

**Alternate interviewer:**

**Mussarat Arif**

**Date: July 22, 2014**

**Names and position titles**

**of persons interviewed:**

**Ahmad Shah Sahil, CFO**

**Khwaja Mohammad Masood, Head of Corporate**

**Planning and Controlling**

**Arindam Ghosh, Team Leader, Corporate Management Support**

**(CMS) - Phoenix**

MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE		Non applicable (0)	Complete-ly (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	COMMENTS
1	Organizational structure						3.7	

1.1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain			X				3	The M&E unit is part of the Corporate Planning and Controlling (CPC) department. It gathers data from different departments related to the commercial and financial performance of the company such as power distribution, sales, expenditures, profits, etc. on a monthly basis. Thus the monitoring function is based mostly linked to the activities and financial health of DABS. Other teams in DABS monitor donor funded construction activities and financials (i.e. USAID, World Bank, ADB) until the infrastructure is completed at which point monitoring of commercial information is passed to the CPC department. No one department monitors a results chain since monitoring is basically used for commercial/ business purposes. <b>Score = 3 since DABS does not monitor the entire results chain.</b>
1.2	Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker		X					4	The CPC formal line of report is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) but also work closely with the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Commercial Officer (CCO) and the Chief Operations Officer (COO) who monitor the main indicators related to energy distribution, sales and profits. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.3	Adequate structure/units to cover all functions of Monitoring		X					4	The structure of the CPC which monitors data is set up to perform monitoring and reporting activities. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff		X					4	Yes. The CPC department oversees offices in each of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff			X				3	Monitoring roles and responsibilities in this type of business is relatively simple and clearly defined. <b>Score = 4.</b>
1.6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support		X					4	The CPC's monitoring unit has the three Chief Officers (3Cs) as direct internal clients which in turn report to the CEO and to the Board of Directors which is composed of the MoF, the MoEc, MoEW, MoUD and AISA. The first four are also DABS' shareholders. Units that manage donor projects within DABS and which perform its own monitoring, have the corresponding donor as their main client. <b>Score = 4.</b>

2	Human capacity					3.8	
2.1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities. <i>To what extent do they rely on external advisors?</i>		X			4	The CPC has seven staff, including its head, and about 3-4 staff in each of the 34 provinces which perform planning, commercial, monitoring and other functions. There is no issue with staff turnover. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.2	Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts			X		3	DABS has female staff in Kabul. DABS does not seem to need females for data collection given its business nature. The CPC head felt that ladies are not best suited to perform the work of data collection in the provinces which may not be necessarily true. <b>Score = 3.</b>
2.3	Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities		X			4	The CPC has adequate oversight at the provincial level for data reliability and accuracy. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.4	Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and qualitative methods		X			4	Staff are quite aware of the importance of monitoring and have received training courses at different points in time. They understand of the importance of data reliability and have the sufficient capacity to perform their jobs well. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.5	Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for procesing and managing data		X			4	DABS has the necessary and sufficient capacity to manage its data. At present, DABS has an internet portal with access to selected data, only the accounting system is automated. An Indian consulting firm - Phoenix - is providing support to improve DABS' entire monitoring system and plan to have it automated in the next 9-12 months in Kabul and in the next 24 months at the national level. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)			X		3	Yes. The CFO stated that senior management and relevant staff review DABS' log frame and indicators periodically. This has been, to some extent, one of the legacies of the KESIP project. <b>Score = 3 since it is not clear whether DABS reviews a log frame than includes the entire results chain.</b>

2.7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data		X				4	DABS mainly reports business/ commercial data such as revenues, number of clients, among others in a clear and concise manner. <b>Score = 4.</b>
2.8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)		X				4	CPC made a PPT presentation with rich and well processed data to the Assessment Team. This information is also in text format. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>						<b>3.3</b>	
3.1	Ministry has well-defined data flow process ( <i>verify if possible</i> )		X				4	Yes, the data comes directly from the provincial monitors to CDC where it is processed reports are prepared. <b>Score = 4.</b>
3.2	Clear monitoring plan exists for the Ministry (sector) <u>and</u> is built into the ministry's strategic plan				X		2	DABS' has a monitoring plan but it is not linked to any strategic plan of any ministry Although it is an autonomous state enterprise, there is still no reason why it shouldn't be part of a sector strategic. <b>Score = 2.</b>
3.3	GIRoA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector Monitoring plan					X	1	Donor projects are exclusively engaged in the construction of infrastructure which are managed by self-contained teams within DABS, including any monitoring functions. DABS' monitoring plan is not linked to any other ministry either. <b>Score = 1.</b>
3.4	Indicators for each level of result chain (output, outcome, impact)			X			3	DABS collects selected indicators and reports them to the 3Cs, the Board of Directors and USAID. Some outcome indicators reported to USAID require the implementation of surveys which is sub-contracted by DABS. <b>Score = 3 since it does not measure impact indicators which could be quite important for DABS.</b>
3.5	Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives		X				4	DABS indicators are defined in USAID's PMP. <b>Score = 4.</b>
3.6	Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources,		X				4	DABS senior management determine "achievable and measurable" objectives every year. DABS also follows USAID monitoring guidelines and requirements. <b>Score = 4.</b>


	frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks						
3.7	Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed		X				4 Yes, data collection and monitoring takes place on a monthly basis for the large majority of the indicators which is then reported to the 3Cs, the Board of Directors and USAID. 1-2 indicators are estimated annually. <b>Score = 4.</b>
3.8	All reporting requirements and procedures are clear		X				4 Yes. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Data Management Systems and Practices</b>						<b>3.2</b>
4.1	Ministry has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis		X				4 Yes. Only one template for data collection is used by all provincial departments which is sent to CDC for collation and analysis. <b>Score = 4.</b>
4.2	Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)		X				4 DABS manages its data on Excel spreadsheets. These are scanned and then sent physically to Kabul. At present, DABS is being supported by a USAID financed Indian consulting firm to upgrade and consolidate all of its management functions (e.g. accounting, human resources, IT) as part of their future growth plan. This consultancy contemplates potential organizational structure reform. <b>Score = 4.</b>
4.3	Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality, passwords, back-up, virus protection)		X				4 Yes, the CPC unit controls access to the data and does monthly back ups. <b>Score = 4.</b>
4.4	Data available when needed				X		2 DABS has data constantly updated which is only for internal use. Its web page does not provide access to any data other than audit reports from previous years. <b>Score = 2.</b>

4.5	Linkage to other national data reporting systems					x	1	No. The fact that it is an autonomous state company data does not automatically mean that its database cannot be linked totally or partially to a ministry or any other national organization like the CSO. <b>Score = 1.</b>
4.6	Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness		x				4	DABS staff verifies the data in province and in Kabul. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						<b>3.8</b>	
5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool		x				4	Monthly reports with relevant data are submitted to the 3Cs and the CEO for policy decision making, among others. For example, the real value of tariffs (as opposed to nominal) is monitored for inflation and foreign exchange fluctuations. Other uses are related to loss identification, power purchased, among others. <b>Score = 4.</b>
5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action		x				4	Current operations are monitored closely and corrections are made when necessary (e.g. purchase of power). <b>Score = 4.</b>
5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis			x			3	DABS prepares good quality reports. Company officials recognized that sometimes there are delays. <b>Score = 3.</b>
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders		x				4	Data is disseminated to relevant staff internally. It also disseminates reports to its Board of Directors and shareholders on a regular basis. <b>Score = 4.</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>						<b>4.0</b>	
6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )		x				4	Yes. Meetings with the Board of Directors and shareholders are scheduled every month. Meetings with donor agencies take place as needed. <b>Score = 4.</b>
6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )		x				4	Monthly meetings are held with DABS's shareholder ministries. <b>Score = 4.</b>

6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors		X				4	With the exception of USAID, reports are not shared with other donors on a regular basis. Donor funded project teams within DABS submit reports on a monthly basis to the respective donors. <b>Score = 4.</b>
6.4	Donor and GIROA M&E capacity development efforts are coordinated <u>and</u> implemented	X					0	N/A
<b>7</b>	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						<b>3.6</b>	
7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels				X		2	The Kabul central office has a few female staff. There isn't any specific policy to mainstream gender. <b>Score = 2.</b>
7.2	Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data		X				4	Yes. CDC staff are permanent witnesses of the use of its reports and data by senior management. They do not only understand the importance of monitoring but they seem to be proud of the use that make of it. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.3	Senior management understands and supports monitoring system		X				4	Yes. DABS' CFO stated that USAID's financed KESIP project introduced good monitoring practices that were followed by the institution. This served to introduce an institutional culture that values data. In addition, the nature of the business (profit making) obliges DABS to give high importance to data quality. Both factors, donor support and commercial nature of the business, helped mainstream the use and value of data monitoring. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.4	Monitoring function recognized by senior leadership		X				4	As part of the "annual summits", senior management select and provide awards to the staff in provinces for the best data management and monitoring practices in general. <b>Score = 4.</b>
7.5	Budget allocation to M&E and sufficient to support the Monitoring function		X				4	Yes. <b>Score = 4.</b>

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	0.0	0.0
Human Capacity	0.0	0.0
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	0.0	0.0
Data Management Systems and Practices	0.0	0.0
Utilization and Dissemination	0.0	0.0
Partnerships and Coordination	0.0	0.0
Advocacy and Culture	0.0	0.0

**ANNEX IX. Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the DABS monitoring system**



**ANNEX X. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS**

**MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH**

**Primary interviewer:** Susan Gearon

**Alternate interviewer:** Nasruallah Ahmadzai

**Institution:** Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)

**Date(s):** July 16, 22, 23, 27; August 2, 9, 12

**Names and position titles of persons interviewed:**

Dr. Qadir, Director, Policy and Planning

Dr. Nasir Ikram, Senior Advisor, Monitoring Department

Dr. Yaqoob Azimi, Head of HMIS Department

MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE		Non applicable (0)	Complete-ly (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	COMMENTS
<b>1</b>	<b>Organizational structure</b>						<b>2.8</b>	
1.1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain					X	<b>1</b>	Monitoring is not the exclusive responsibility of the M&E Directorate or any other single directorate, but rather a function that cuts across several MoPH directorates and departments and involves many actors. Monitoring is a major function of the following entities: M&E Directorate, Grants and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU) of the Directorate of Procurement (under the Deputy Minister of Finance and Administration), HMIS Department (Policy and Planning Directorate), Surveillance Department (Health Services Directorate), and NGO BPHS/EPHS contractors. The assessment focused on the M&E Directorate and, where relevant, the HMIS Department. <b>Reason for Score (1): Monitoring is not the exclusive responsibility of the M&amp;E Department.</b>
1.2	Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker		X				<b>4</b>	The M&E Directorate reports directly to the Minister of Public Health. The HMIS Department reports to the Director of Policy and Planning. <b>Reason for Score (4): Monitoring units report to decision makers.</b>

1.3	Adequate structure/units to cover the monitoring function				X		<p data-bbox="1547 196 2134 903"> <b>2</b>            The M&amp;E Directorate comprises three departments: Monitoring, Evaluation and Private Sector. It serves as the ministry's hub for M&amp;E consultation, oversight of quality standards, and technical support and covers (oversees, conducts or coordinates) routine functions, such as collection, management, analysis and reporting and dissemination of health sector data. The Monitoring Department takes on most of this work. The Evaluation Department is underutilized and least functional and the Private Sector Department is still emerging. The HMIS is located in the General Directorate of Policy and Planning. The desired structure is M&amp;E and research functions (HMIS, sentinel surveillance, research and M&amp;E) in one directorate rather than throughout the ministry as within the current structure. <b>Reason for Score (2): The monitoring function is covered, but through a fragmented structure.</b> </p>
1.4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff		X				<p data-bbox="1547 919 2134 1366"> <b>4</b>            Lines of supervision follow the reporting structure. The M&amp;E Director is supervised by the Minister and supervises heads of the monitoring, evaluation and private sector departments. Each department head supervises their respective department staff. The Provincial Health Director reports to the central Provincial Liaison Office (PLO) and supervises Provincial Health Officers (PHOs). The M&amp;E Directorate informally assists with supervision of provincial staff. See GCMU/PCH IA for lines of supervision at the facility level. <b>Reason for Score (4): Lines of supervision are clear.</b> </p>

1.5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff				X		<p>2</p> <p>There are clear ToRs for all positions in the M&amp;E Directorate, but representatives feel there is overlap as well as gaps in responsibilities. For example, there are tasks that are completed by both the Private Sector and Legislation and Implementation Directorate; and Evaluation staff members are mostly involved in monitoring since the MoPH contracts evaluation to a third party. The Monitoring Department appears to focus exclusively on BPHS and EPHS, although the ToR is more comprehensive. There is notable overlap in monitoring BPHS and EPHS delivery by the M&amp;E Directorate and GCMU. Both take ownership of this role. The compromise has been joint monitoring missions to mitigate duplication of efforts and unnecessary burden on already-overburdened health facility staff. This way, the NMC is administered at a health facility only once during a given period and the work is shared. Joint monitoring is a more efficient approach if both parties continue to own this role. However, it does not address the main issue of duplicative roles and responsibilities and separate uses of the data. Roles and responsibilities for monitoring appear to be clear at the provincial level. In each province, a PHO serves as a technical specialist with monitoring responsibilities for one of the (seven) BPHS intervention areas and for the HMIS, respectively. <b>Reason for Score (2): There is clear ToR for all positions, but overlap and redundancy in practice.</b></p>
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1.6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support		X					4	The M&E Directorate produces quarterly and annual monitoring reports for MoPH (Executive Board, minister, deputy ministers and several departments) and the MoF provides technical support to internal and external clients on an as needed basis. <b>Reason for Score (4): MoPH has clear clients to support.</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Human capacity</b>							<b>2.4</b>	
2.1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities.			X				3	The M&E Directorate is sufficiently staffed with 35 members. Ten technical staff are supported by donors and 25 are tashkeel staff, some having been recruited by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Six staff are administrative and the rest are M&E Officers distributed evenly amongst the three departments. The HMIS Department is staffed (about 20) in the same way. Salary, benefits (per diem) and security influence staff continuity. There is low staff turnover at the central level with a prime motivation being per diem (considered a benefit at about \$500 USD/month), which is financed by GAVI. Reportedly, MoPH staff has higher per diem and a lower rate of turnover compared to other line ministries. PPHOs are budgeted for nine PHOs and turnover is high. Doctors rarely stay at remote posts for long and most PHOs, once well trained, will move on to higher paying positions with NGOs. Lack of staff motivation and poor performance is as much a problem as insufficient staff. <b>Reason for Score (3): The M&amp;E Directorate is sufficiently staff, but</b>

									heavily dependent on donor-financed technical advisors.
2.2	Sufficient monitoring staff, including female data collectors, in the provinces and districts					X		1	There is a chronic shortage of PHOs and hiring and retaining females is an ongoing challenge. The majority of females will not travel to provinces without a male companion, which the government does not cover as the NGOs and donors do. <b>Reason for Score (1): Shortage of provincial government staff, particularly females, is a chronic problem in the country.</b>
2.3	Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities				X			2	Monitoring oversight is primarily the responsibility of the M&E Directorate and GCMU. However, there is overlap. <b>Score (2)</b>
2.4	Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and qualitative methods	X						0	<b>N/A</b> The Monitoring and HMIS Departments are responsible for BPHS/EPHS data, which are self-reported by facilities.
2.5	Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for procesing and managing data			X				3	Central and provincial staff is adequately equipped to manage and process data using MS Access and Excel. <b>Score (3)</b>
2.6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)				X			2	Advisors and consultants who have worked on donor-funded projects understand logical frameworks and results chains. Most other technical staff is not proficient in using these

								tools for designing or monitoring programs. <b>Reason for Score (2): Only selected staff members understand and use logic models.</b>
2.7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data			X			<b>3</b>	All technical staff are skilled in summarizing and analyzing routine data, including running basic descriptive statistics in Excel. At the same time, there are reportedly several staff who cannot/do not adequately complete the ministry-required template for calculating indicators and performing basic descriptive analysis. Oral presentation of data is usually made by senior technical staff members. <b>Reason for Score (3): Most staff has at least the basic skills.</b>
2.8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)			X			<b>3</b>	There is adequate technical capacity in the directorate to produce reports that describes and summarize monitoring data. There is fewer staff with skills to develop more technical analytical reports. <b>Reason for Score (3): There is capacity to write routine reports, but few staff with skills to develop more technical reports.</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>						<b>2.3</b>	

3.1	Ministry has well-defined data flow process		X				<p>4</p> <p>BPBS and EPHS data flow from health posts and facilities to the PPHO HMIS to the central MoPH HMIS to internal and external stakeholders. The data are reported or presented to stakeholders at each level on a routine basis (which should include Community Health Committees, but was not verified). The HMIS Department generates standard reports for relevant departments and annual progress reports and newsletters for internal and external stakeholders. All health facilities follow the same reporting procedures. At the end of each month, each facility aggregates tallied data on health post activity, outpatient services and in-patient services (for hospitals) and send the completed forms to the PPHO where data are checked, corrected and consolidated. Data flow from the provincial to central level one of a few different ways. For example, contracted-out facilities send the same reports to the provincial NGO HMIS who also checks and consolidates the data and sends to the PPHO HMIS or directly to the central HMIS as well as to the central NGO HMIS. Databases are provided to the provinces for data entry. All provinces have basic IT to enter the data and most can transmit the data electronically. At the central level, data from all provinces (and NGOs) are checked for quality and completeness and aggregated in a master database. Updated copies of the master (replicas) are distributed back to NGOs and PPHOs for their use and analysis. Any NGO or IP that collects data from a minimum of six</p>
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							facilities qualify for a replica. Data from vertical off budget programs must be integrated through separate modules. HMIS has separate databases/reports for training, grants, and human resources. Copies of data sets are shared with other departments by converting from Access to Excel, although there has been limited training in how to extract and use the data. <b>Reason for Score (4): The data flow is well defined.</b>
3.2	Clear monitoring plan exists for the ministry <u>and</u> is built into the ministry's strategic plan				X		2 The MoPH Strategic Plan (2011-15) includes a performance measurement framework based on the plan's 10 strategic directions. However, it is not a well-developed document and seems more symbolic than functional, although it is one of several documents developed to guide and operationalize health sector planning and strategic management. Each of the three general directorates (Technical Affairs, Health Services Delivery and Administrative Affairs) also has a strategic plan from which annual operational plans are developed by the respective directorates and departments. Policy and Planning compiles these documents each year into one annual plan for the ministry (none of these documents were available during the

								assessment). This process reportedly extends to the provinces. The ministry also developed a National Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NMES) in 2012 premised on the need for greater harmonization of existing M&E systems within the MoPH. It is supposed to be linked to one of 10 strategic directions: To enhance evidence-based decision-making by establishing a culture that uses data for improvement. The NMES does not include performance measures. <b>Reason for Score (2): The Strategic plan is not well developed for performance monitoring, but serves to coordinate development of directorate strategic plans and the ministry annual operational plan.</b>
3.3	GIRoA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector M&E plan				X		2	There is an extensive paper trail of strategic linkages: Directorate strategic plans link to the overall ministry strategic plan to the NPPs to the HNSS to the previous ANDS and to the MDGs. Over the past decade, on and off budget assistance has supported the development and documentation of these strategies and, thus, there are implicit linkages between donor-supported projects and the MoPH strategic plan. However, the ministry's strategic plan Performance Measurement Framework is a general document that does not make these linkages explicit. <b>Reason for Score (2): Project-sector linkages are implicit, rather than clearly documented.</b>
3.4	Indicators for each level of result chain (output, outcome, impact)					X	1	The ministry's strategic plan is not designed as per a results chain. Some staff interviewed lean



4	Data Management Systems and Practices						2.8	
4.1	Organization/project has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis			X			3	<p>The HMIS has standardized reporting forms for collection and collation of the following data: community/health post activity, facility service statistics, and facility status/viability, an annual community census (but not regularly conducted), and disease surveillance. Off-budget (vertical) program data is not yet fully integrated into the HMIS. Analysis of HMIS data seems to be standardized, whether manually at health facilities or by Excel. It does not much deviate from charts and graphs of frequency distributions and comparisons of indicator performance against the previous period (usually quarterly) and annual targets. The NMC has been used since 2004 (currently being updated) by the MoPH, PPHO, NGOs and GCMU to monitor performance at health facilities including spot checks of data quality. Data collection is standardized, although collation and analysis vary by end user and capacity to process the data. There is a database at the MoPH to centralize NMC data and a designated M&amp;E Consultant to facilitate this process. The database is designed to automate outcome measures on data entered for each NMC domain and subsection, thus user-friendly and minimizes errors. The consultant is tasked with entering the data, which can be sent by e-mail, and producing aggregate performance data for leadership. However, the system is not being</p>





									routine and ad hoc data spot checks performed by designates, but no quality control system.
<b>5</b>	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>							<b>3.0</b>	
5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool						X	<b>3</b>	Data are mostly used to plan for health care services (contracts) in different provinces and, reportedly, assess progress against MDGs. The annual workshop/results conference is a main venue for dissemination of data. M&E, HMIS, and GCMU all present, although presentations are reportedly more focused on the data than results. At the same time, the venue is used to discuss recommendations. When asked, an example of a recommendation: To avoid overlap, establish an HMIS department in which current data collection departments would be functionally and structurally integrated. A plan was made and needs an order from the Minister. In summary, the recommendation was on the agenda and discussed and it changed mindsets, but now needs to materialize. Two factors that would seem to affect data driven decision-making is the questionable quality of some data (i.e., particularly census and self-reported facility-based data) and the relatively limited data from research and evaluative studies. <b>Reason for Score (3): Monitoring data</b>

								are used to make decisions, but there is room for improvement.
5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action			X				3 Monitoring data are used to identify and rectify deviations in BPHS and EPHS contracts implemented and managed by NGOs. However, it is unclear to what extent the use of these data are coordinated with project implementers and if collecting monitoring data is the role of the M&E Directorate. <b>Reason for Score (3): Monitoring information is used for corrective action.</b>
5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis				X			2 The M&E Directorate produces annual reports on key performance indicators, mission reports, and internal quarterly progress reports against its annual operating plan. The HMIS Department annual progress report on health status against BPHS indicators and health information newsletters (Facts), occasional situational analysis reports, and standard routine reports (quarterly and sometimes monthly) for use by other departments and NGOs. Reports are produced on a timely basis, but generally lack interpretation of data findings and updates on how data have been used to address priority problems. <b>Reason for Score (2): Reports are</b>

								generally timely and informative, but coming from the national level should provide more than facts and figures.
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders		X					4 The M&E Directorate, HMIS Department and PPHOs disseminate BPHS and EPHS monitoring data to internal and external stakeholders through quarterly and annual reports and regular meetings and presentations. Reports are widely shared with deputy ministers, key departments, the GCMU/PCH team, provincial health offices, and stakeholders including BPHS and EPHS implementing NGOs. Key venues for dissemination include: annual results conference convened by M&E Directorate and HMIS Department for all central and provincial stakeholders; and monthly meetings convened by the PPHO Director among internal and external stakeholders in the provinces. Dissemination of data from off budget/vertical programs (i.e., TB, HIV/AIDS, Malaria, EPI) appears to bypass the M&E Directorate. <b>Reasons for Score (4): There is clear dissemination of BPHS/EPHS monitoring data at central and provincial levels.</b>
6	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>							<b>3.0</b>

6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders		X				4	There appear to be at least adequate coordination mechanisms at the central level including a Steering Committee of Directors, Deputy Ministers, and donor agencies chaired by the Minister, and at provincial level including an intersectoral Public Health Coordination Committee (PHCC) that includes donor representation. See also 5.4. <b>Reason for Score (4): There appears to be regular coordination meetings with donors and stakeholders at central and provincial levels.</b>
6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings			X			3	There appears to be regular coordination with relevant line ministries, including MoEC and MoF. All are included in MoPH key coordination efforts. It does not appear that M&E Directorate spearheads coordination with line ministries (seems to be the role of Policy and Planning). <b>Score (3)</b>
6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors	X					0	<b>NA</b> The M&E Directorate is not directly responsible for reports to donors.
6.4	Donor and GIRoA monitoring capacity development efforts are coordinated <u>and</u> implemented				X		2	There is not an overall coordinated M&E capacity development effort implemented within the Ministry. The assessment identified a few ongoing M&E capacity building efforts implemented through off budget projects. Through the Health System Strengthening (HSS) budget, GAVI and the Global Fund have supported five staff from the M&E Directorate in the past three years to earn a Masters of Public Health (MPH) at programs in England and India. The MSH-supported LMG project has

								provided various technical assistance to HMIS and M&E staff in several departments. The MoPH HR Department is responsible for a four-year trainee program in several potential areas of specialization potentially including M&E. However, it does not appear to be well managed. There could be larger scale M&E capacity building efforts in the near future through the CBR and SEHAT. <b>Reason for Score (2): Few identified capacity building efforts.</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						<b>2.4</b>	


7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels					X	1	<p>Two of 35 staff members working in the M&amp;E Directorate are female. One is a 12th grade graduate. Both positions are administrative. Two of 20 HMIS staff are female and also in administrative positions. The lack of females in the workplace is recognized as a problem that stems from the larger inequity of females in the workforce. The ratio of female to male secondary school graduates is highly skewed male and even fewer women go on to graduate from higher education. Furthermore, a female job applicant who has a diploma or university degree, might not be more qualified for the job than her male competitor/s. On the other hand, if she is as or more qualified, an employment equity policy that would ensure she filled the position, is not in place. HMIS data show that approximately 40% of health facilities have no female staff (more than likely an underreported statistic). Needless to say, a shortage of female staff is even more problematic given the high priority to increase utilization of MCH services in Afghanistan. Females are required to fill the position of RH Officer (men are not allowed in delivery room even if it is vacant). If the position is vacant, only in exceptional and rare situations might there be a male serve in this capacity. Reportedly, females would be hired for other PHO positions, but the problem is supply side. Lack of female staff is a barrier to women's accessing services and receiving quality care and was suggested to justify positive discrimination</p>
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								leadership’s attention and action. The M&E Directorate could play a much more substantial role. <b>Reason for Score (3): Monitoring recognized by leadership, but needed improvements should be a higher priority.</b>
7.5	Budget allocation to monitoring <u>and</u> sufficient to support the monitoring function			X			3	Each directorate is allocated funds for monitoring. Budget allocation is made based on expected activity for each year/annual plan. The M&E Directorate has a budget for monitoring implementation of BPHS/EPHS activity and is also funded through the development budget, which subsidizes monitoring costs (i.e., per diem) and system strengthening/enhancements (i.e., software). There is no other line item for M&E. While there appear no major budgetary issues, not all planned activities are covered as per the last quarterly report (i.e., NMC training and database enhancements scheduled last quarter). <b>Reason for Score (3): The budget allocation generally covers the monitoring function.</b>

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	0.0	0.0
Human Capacity	0.0	0.0
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	0.0	0.0
Data Management Systems and Practices	0.0	0.0
Utilization and Dissemination	0.0	0.0
Partnerships and Coordination	0.0	0.0
Advocacy and Culture	0.0	0.0



**ANNEX X. Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the MoPH monitoring system**






# ANNEX XA: MOPH (OVERALL) ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

ANNEX X.a. MOPH (OVERALL) ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



ANNEX X.B. MOPH MONITORING & EVALUATION DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



**ANNEX XI. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS**

**GRANTS AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS UNIT/PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS FOR HEALTH (GCMU/PCH)**

**Primary interviewer:** Susan Gearon

**Alternate interviewer:** Nasruallah Ahmadzai

**Institution:** Partnership Contracts for Health (PCH)

**Date(s):** July 23; August 2, 12, 2014

**Names and position titles of persons interviewed:**

Dr. Massoud Mehrzad, Manager (Head of Project)

Dr. Fraidoon Farzad, Reporting Specialist and Data Analyst

Dr. Mohammad Asif Nazir, M&E Consultant

	Non applicable (0)	Complete-ly (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	COMMENTS
<b>Organizational structure</b>						<b>3.5</b>	
Monitoring unit(s) at national level with			X			<b>3</b>	As part of the government’s strategy to contract-out BPHS and EPHS, NGO contractors are responsible for increasing coverage and quality of these services in 31 provinces. Their performance is monitored not

<p><u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain</p>						<p>only by GCMU, but also PHOs, NGO technical officers and, to a lesser extent, MoPH M&amp;E officers. The GCMU is MoPH's authorized entity for the procurement and contract management in the 31 provinces and therefore monitoring is a cross cutting function carried out by its M&amp;E, Contract and Finance units. As per this system, PCH monitors progress toward achievement of the following outcomes in 13 provinces: better MoPH stewardship, improved BPHS and EPHS access and quality, and improved health behaviors. Impact, or change in health status, will be measured through the next national population-based survey/s (AMS and DHS) and the national nutrition survey. <b>Reason for Score (3): While monitoring is not exclusive to the M&amp;E unit, the GCMU's multi-disciplinary team approach is more responsive to the health sector's overall strategy.</b></p>
<p>Monitoring unit(s) at national level <u>reports directly</u> to a decision maker</p>			X			<p><b>3</b> maker PCH has a simple hierarchy whereby junior staff report to senior staff who report to the Project Manager. Senior staff do not have full decision-making authority, but bring the needs of junior staff to the Project Manager for decisions. <b>Score (3)</b></p>
<p>Adequate structure/units to cover the monitoring function</p>			X			<p><b>3</b> Of 30 PCH staff, about half are M&amp;E, Contract and Finance Consultants responsible for monitoring. Others include CME staff (not covered in the assessment), Data Analyst/Reporting Specialist, and support staff in IT, procurement, human resources, and finance and administration. Consultant teams manage 18 NGO contracts (13 BPHS, 3 BPHS/EPHS and 2 EPHS) implemented by 10 NGOs in 13 provinces. The project structure at the central level facilitates a multi-disciplinary monitoring approach and adequately covers the monitoring function. Coverage in insecure areas remains a challenge, although mechanisms are being tried/established (i.e., contacting health facilities and Shura via mobile, HF staff training of local monitors/Shura, NGOs hire and build monitoring capacity of community members; lower level HFs are monitored by higher level facilities if capable). <b>Reason for Score: (3) Structure is adequate to cover monitoring except in insecure areas.</b></p>

Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff		X				4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff At the central project level, there are clear lines of supervision. Senior staff members serve as supervisors to junior staff and are supervised by the Project Manager who reports to the GCMU Director who reports to the head of the Procurement Directorate. NGOs maintain their own lines of supervision within and between central and provincial offices. The in-charge/head of facility is the direct supervisor within health facilities. The NGO supervisor is the direct supervisor of facility in-charges and indirectly supervises the rest of the facility staff. CHWs at health posts report to supervisors at the health facility (BHC, CHC, CHC+ and occasionally DHs). HPs are normally distributed three to five kilometers beyond the health facility. The number of HP per facility supervisor varies based on the size of the catchment area. All lines of supervision are made explicit in ToRs. <b>Reason for Score (4): Lines of supervisions are clear at each level of the health system</b>
Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff		X				4	All GCMU PCH, NGO and facility staff has clear Terms of Reference (ToR). <b>Score (4)</b>
Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support		X				4	PCH has clear internal and external clients to support with data and information. The M&E unit contributes to this support together with Contract and Finance colleagues and the Reporting Specialist/Data Analyst. For example, PCH monitoring teams support NGO contractors through a continuous process of monitoring and action planning to address identified performance gaps. Monthly monitoring reports and action plans are shared internally and widely distributed to external clients. An example distribution list includes: Offices of the Administrative Minister, office of the Deputy minister for Health Services Provision, office of the Deputy Minister of Policy & Planning, GD Preventive Medicine, GD Curative Medicine, GDHR, GD Policy & Planning, Directorate of Procurement, GCMU, Monitoring & Evaluation Directorate, Provincial Liaison Office, Herat PPHO, Reproductive Health Directorate, HMIS, CBHC, NTP, HIV, Disability, Mental Health and National EPI departments of MoPH,

							Herat PHSSC, USAID and LMG, BASISCS, TB-CARE I, SPS programs of MSH, PCH Project Manager and team members. In addition, PCH provides USAID, its primary client, with two reports a year and supports various high-level government officials and donors with data and reports on a continuous basis (see 3.8). <b>Reason for Score (4): The monitoring unit does not support clients directly, but contributes as part of the monitoring team.</b>
<b>Human capacity</b>						<b>2.6</b>	
Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities.				X		<b>2</b>	Five consultants can adequately manage the scope of monitoring. Several ad hoc requests put a greater demand on their time, but it appears that as a team the work is managed. In the next project cycle, PCH will create and fill a position that is specifically responsible for meeting demand for ad hoc reports. Staff turnover has not been a problem. Key staff positions are continuously filled for at least two years. Reasons for leaving are usually professional growth/advancement (including educational opportunities) and/or higher salary. PCH has not received external technical assistance since 2011 and does not feel it is needed given its internal technical capacity. At the same time, key technical positions including the five M&E Consultants are financed by MSH. <b>Reason for Score (2): Monitoring unit is sufficiently staffed, but financed by donor funds, which is not sustainable.</b>
Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts					X	<b>1</b>	Shortage of female data collectors is a chronic problem.

Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities		X				<p>There are over 600 health facilities and more than 6,000 health posts reportedly active in the 13 provinces. While it is impossible and impractical to oversee monitoring at all health facilities, PCH has a sound system in place to oversee NGO performance in delivering and monitoring BPHS and EPHS. Key to PCH oversight is joint monitoring missions (see 3.7) and review of quarterly HMIS (BPHS/EPHS) data and NGO reports. Based on previous (2012) need to strengthen oversight of NGO management, PCH has instituted a transparent system of continuous NGO performance review, similar to a scorecard approach. Following each joint monitoring mission, NGO performance is reviewed and scored against progress on respective action plans. A performance score of less than 50 percent results in a notice of warning to the NGO and closer scrutiny by PCH. If the score has not increased by the second follow-up visit (which is within a year's time) disciplinary action is taken. This system is reportedly working, although current and previous standing of NGOs was not assessed. At present, scores are reported to be above 50% for all NGOs. Other sources suggest that PCH monitoring coverage is limited and that the same provinces are continuously selected. However, this report was not confirmed. In most districts, there is a District Health Officer (DHO) responsible for the oversight of all health facilities. In larger districts with several health facilities the higher-level health facility (i.e., district hospital) is authorized to oversee activity. <b>Reason for Score (4): PCH has a strong performance monitoring system through which it oversees NGO monitoring in the provinces.</b></p>
Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and qualitative methods				X		<p>The vast majority of primary data collected by PCH is quantitative and used for monitoring purposes. PCH Consultants, NGO technical officers and PHOs are the principal data collection cadres. On the whole, there is adequate capacity to collect performance monitoring data and technical support for collecting household survey data. M&amp;E Consultants are experienced in administering the BPHS National Monitoring Checklist (NMC) and other supplementary</p>

						<p>performance checklists at health facilities. PCH Contract Consultants are well versed in applying the NGO Contract Compliance Checklist (CCC). Although EPHS performance data are collected less frequently and the process is more arduous (recently revised checklist is 29 pages long and take up to 3 days to complete per hospital), PCH consultants have no apparent limitations in collecting these data. Checklist data quality was not verified during the assessment. However, there is some concern by MoPH Monitoring Department that GCMU's dual role in assessing NGO performance and disbursing NGO funds is a conflict of interest. Annual household surveys (HHS), using LQAS methodology, are conducted by the NGOs (since 2003) to track performance on key performance indicators. PCH and MoPH HMIS provide training to NGOs focal points and, while NGO focal points are capable of cascading the training, need initial and refresher training (i.e., staff turnover, etc). Conventional quality assurance measures are built-into the survey process: data collection teams include a field supervisor per two data collectors, return visits are made to households for any questionnaire not completed to standard, and one randomly selected household (five percent of lot) will be resurveyed if questionnaires cannot be validated. In addition, because of the potential for bias amongst NGOs conducting the surveys (versus third party), HMIS data are used as a reference point. However, this is not the best data quality measure. <b>Reason for score (2): Capacity in collection of routine performance and HHS data, but quality is a question. Qualitative methods are seldom used if at all.</b></p>
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Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for processing and managing data			X		3	There is high capacity in using Excel spreadsheets for management, data analysis and, graphs and charts. However, Excel is not the most efficient or appropriate data management tool, particularly given a regular frequency of incoming data from several different checklists. PCH does not use databases to manage checklist data, but uses for HMIS and HHS data. There appears to be adequate capacity at the NGO and PPHO level given the frequency of HMIS reporting. <b>Reason for Score (3): Overall, adequate capacity in MS Excel and Access</b>
Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)		X			4	All staff members understand, develop and use results frameworks.
Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data				X	2	Capacity exists, but is not consistently demonstrated at least in reports reviewed by the assessment team. For example, in semi-annual and annual reports to USAID, data are adequately described and presented, but there is less interpretation of data and findings than expected. In some cases, there is no interpretation of the data presented. This observed gap could be due to other reasons than technical capacity, such as time constraints or difficulty in writing-up interpretation in a second language. <b>Reason for Score (2): There is capacity to describe and present data, but data interpretation is not sufficiently demonstrated.</b>

Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)			X			<b>3</b>	Two different types of reports were reviewed (USAID routine reports and field monitoring report). Both demonstrate fluency and proficiency in written English, which is commendable. The report on a joint monitoring mission is more informative than the USAID reports. While the latter are not intended to be highly technical, reporting guidelines encourage interpretation and even discussion of data being presented. However, of the four reviewed, data are mostly listed or displayed without adequate interpretation or discussion. Overall, NGO narrative reports seem to satisfy reporting guidelines. <b>Reason for Score (3): Based on solely on the reports reviewed, there is adequate capacity to write reports in English and for different audiences, although less capacity in technical report writing (see 2.7)</b>
<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures</b>						<b>3.4</b>	
Organization/Project has well-defined data flow process		X				<b>4</b>	There are 28 indicators on which data are reported. The main reporting sources are the HMIS only (14) indicators, HMIS and NGO quarterly (aka technical) reports (5 indicators), NGO reports only (4 indicators), HHS (4 indicators) and PCH monitoring documents (1 indicator). All health facilities in all provinces follow the same reporting procedures. At the end of each month, facilities aggregate tallied data on health post activity, facility outpatient services and hospital in-patient services and send completed HMIS report forms to the PPHO at the beginning of the following month. PPHO HMIS officers check, correct/complete, and consolidate the data. The data flow from the provincial to central level a few different ways depending upon whether the facility services are contracted in or out and based on the capability of its IT infrastructure. Contracted-out facilities send the same reports to their provincial NGO HMIS officer who also checks and consolidates the data and sends a replica to the PPHO HMIS or directly to the central HMIS as well as to the central NGO

						<p>HMIS. At the central level, data from all provinces (and NGOs) are again checked for quality and completeness and synchronized. These data are returned to the PPHO and NGOs in a database format (as per IT capability of the provincial offices) for their use and analysis. The central HMIS officer produces reports for its internal and external clients, including the GCMU/PCH. While central HMIS data can be requested as needed, the GCMU/PCH typically receives quarterly HMIS reports that are used to track progress against indicators and report to USAID and stakeholders. The data flow varies only slightly for the remaining indicators. For the four NGO performance measures, NGOs report directly to GCMU/PCH quarterly. For the four population-based measures, primary data are collected in a sample of households by NGOs and PCH annually. The GCMU/PCH reports to USAID on a minimum of five (required) indicators semi-annually. <b>Reason for Score (4): The data flow is well defined.</b></p>
Clear monitoring plan exists for the organization/project <u>and</u> is built into the ministry's strategic plan			X			<p>3</p> <p>The PCH results framework is linked to USAID Afghanistan's 2010-14 health sector results framework and selected MoPH 2011-2015 strategic directions, although the latter linkage is more symbolic than functional as the MoPH strategic plan is not a well designed or highly utilized document. The PCH performance monitoring plan (PMP) is an operational document aligned to the PCH results framework. The PMP includes 28 indicators on which five are reported to USAID annually, thus, the link between the two results frameworks. Purely from a design perspective, the PMP has a couple minor limitations. The current practice is to generate a new PMP template each year for the current year's targets and achievements. It would be more useful to maintain and report on one version of the PMP that clearly shows annual (or semi-annual) targets and achievements over the life-of-project (LoP). In addition, each NGO's PDS should more clearly reconcile to the PMP indicators. <b>Reason for Score (4): The PCH PMP is clear. Its link to the MoPH strategic plan is not applicable since the strategic plan was developed after the PCH project started.</b></p>

GIRoA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector M&E plan	X					0	N/A
Indicators for each level of result chain (output, outcome, impact)			X			3	The PCH results chain comprises sub results (outputs) and intermediate results (outcomes), which contribute to impact. The PMP includes output and outcome measures, but all are aligned to the sub results. The concept behind results-based project design is that each result represents a discrete and progressively more advanced state that is desired. If higher-level (intermediate) results merely represent a sum of the parts, the measures will be identical to lower level (sub) results. As per typical of health sector project design, PCH outcome measures serve as proxies in gauging health status of the target population. Sector-wide impact will be measured through the next national population-based survey (AMS, AHS, or DHS). <b>Reason for Score (3): There are output and outcome indicators, although the latter are not properly aligned to the corresponding (intermediate) results.</b>
Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives			X			3	Indicators are not sufficiently defined in the PMP. Some indicator definitions are not clearly documented in the PMP Performance Indicator Reference Sheets (PIRS), but are found in the MoPH HMIS guidance. Definitions are not documented for composite indicators. A few indicators of BPHS/EPHS coverage are not disaggregated by sex. <b>Reason for Score (3): Clear indicator definitions should be documented or referenced in the PMP/PIRS.</b>
Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources,			X			3	Data collection processes are outlined in the PMP and described in other planning documents. Geographic coverage is not included/described in the PMP or indicator definitions. Typically, targets are set over the life of project following analysis of baseline indicator

frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks						data and adjusted annually as needed. This project planning method is helpful for allocating sufficient funds over the LoP. The assessment team did not confirm the reason for setting targets year-to-year, but it is likely based on GIRoA's annual budget process. <b>Reason for Score (3): The PMP satisfies most of these criteria.</b>
Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed		X			4	PCH follows an annual workplan, in line with the MoPH operational plan, broken down into consultant annual plans and micro (monthly) plans that include all monitoring activities. NGO contracts are the focal point. A total of 18 contracts are split amongst teams of three (M&E, Contract and Finance) consultants. Each consultant is responsible for three to five contracts. PCH and MoPH monitoring staff conduct joint monitoring on a monthly basis and PCH M&E, Contract and Finance Consultants conduct monitoring missions on a quarterly basis. Each NGO is visited three to four times per year. A single mission lasts up to 10 days. During this time, visits are made to at least one NGO contractor (provincial and central offices) and a sample of affiliated health facilities. Visits might be announced or unannounced to the NGO and health facilities. Missions are joined by the PHO and/or NGO provincial technical officer. Monitoring missions involve a four-stage process: 1) Planning: Cluster of health facilities selected, HMIS data and NGO quarterly reports reviewed, itinerary prepared, shared and approved by senior management/leadership. 2) Implementation: Meeting held with head of Provincial Public Health Office (PPHO), itinerary shared/ revised, monitoring team assembled, performance checklists completed at NGO office/s (lead and sub-grantee) and health facilities, findings presented/ displayed at health facilities, immediate feedback provided to NGO staff, preliminary findings shared at PPHO. 3) Feedback and Reporting: PCH colleagues debriefed during team meeting, report/action plan drafted, circulated internally and shared with NGO/s for feedback and sign-off, follow-up meeting scheduled with NGO/s and technical officers as needed, final report/action plan disseminated to key stakeholders

						and donors. 4) Follow-up: NGO progress against action plan monitored, disciplinary action taken as needed (see 2.3) <b>Reason for Score (4): Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly programmed. However, this system is dependent upon timely processing of per diem on which MSH is able to deliver (unlike the MoPH).</b>
All reporting requirements and procedures are clear		X				<b>4</b> Requirements and procedures for reporting to USAID are clear and include semi-annual and annual reports with updated PMP and NGO Progress Data Sheets (PDS). PCH follows its own internal requirements and procedures for monitoring reports. Other reports for which PCH is responsible include: Annual HHS report to GCMU, Facility Monthly Report (FMR) to GCMU, quarterly and annual progress reports on operational plan to General Directorate of Policy and Planning, procurement plan and report to Procurement Directorate, and financial report to GCMU's Health Economic and Financing Directorate. All reporting requirements are clear. None of these reports were reviewed during the assessment. NGOs have clear reporting requirements and procedures for quarterly reports to PCH, which include: activity narrative, financial report, soft copies of the HMIS replica and CHW database, PDS, postpartum family planning (PPFP) PDS, semi-annual inventory, project profile, AfghanInfo report, Aid effectiveness matrices, and quarterly expenditure by district. <b>Reason for Score (4): All reporting requirements and procedures are clear</b>
<b>Data Management Systems and Practices</b>						<b>2.3</b>

<p>Organization/project has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis</p>			X			<p><b>3</b></p> <p>The system for data collection is well established. Key data collection tools include: National Monitoring Checklist (NMC), a donor requirement initially used to establish health facility readiness, Checklist for [NGO] Contract Compliance (CCC), other supplementary checklists for FP compliance, EPI supportive supervision, and drug and supply availability/ inventory, and a checklist for assessing health post performance. PCH Consultants also rely on quarterly data from HMIS and NGO reports. Monitoring data and information are manually compiled and entered into various Excel spreadsheets for basic processing, analysis and presentation. There is no database system to manage checklist data, which make monthly compilation and management unnecessarily laborious. The Data Analyst and Reporting Specialist is primarily responsible for compiling consultants' monitoring reports and action plans for monthly dissemination and for quarterly analysis and reporting to USAID. <b>Reason for Score (3): Systems and tools are well established for collection, collation and basic analysis. However, NMC checklists are analyzed manually.</b></p>
<p>Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)</p>				X		<p><b>2</b></p> <p>adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software) PCH data are managed in electronic files and folders, which meets current needs, but databases and statistical software are required for efficient management and more rigorous analysis of data, respectively. <b>Reason for Score (2): PCH has outgrown its current data management system.</b></p>
<p>Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality, passwords, back-up, virus protection)</p>			X			<p><b>3</b></p> <p>The GCMU/PCH appears to have adequate data security controls. At the time of the assessment, it was waiting to receive a backup system procured and approved by MSH. <b>Score (3)</b></p>

Data available when needed			X			<b>3</b>	PCH can generate data from electronic files and archives on an as needed basis, while other data are available via reports. <b>Reason for Score (3): Data are available when needed, but could be accessed and generated more efficiently by database.</b>
Linkage to other national data reporting systems					X	<b>1</b>	PCH is not linked to CSO or any other existing data reporting system. The HMIS is not a web-based reporting system. <b>Score (1)</b>
Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness				X		<b>2</b>	The data flow has procedures and designated staff (NGO, PPHO, MoPH HMIS officers) to check accuracy and completeness of data (see 3.1). In addition, concerted effort is made by GCMU/PCH to identify and rectify gaps in the data workshops, roundtables, etc. However, alone, these checks and venues are not adequate for ensuring high quality data particularly given the threats that self-reporting poses to data quality coupled with general limited capacity of health providers in reporting and verifying data. A more rigorous/consistent system needs to be in place and learning needs met at the provincial level through more/continuous HMIS training. <b>Reason for Score (2): There are procedures and staff in place to verify data, but this mechanism is not enough to ensure quality of routine data.</b>
<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						<b>3.0</b>	

Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool			X		2	<p>PCH data and information are systematically used for planning resources and annual targets. Data and information are shared at various coordination meetings and used to coordinate/facilitate response to needs (of varying levels of priority) or to support decisions that keep the program running smoothly. Many times the data simply confirm that there are ongoing issues (i.e., chronic staffing shortage in the provinces), but for which a solution is outside the scope of the project (that being said, GCMU was instrumental in its contribution to a large job fair in trying to address the persistent gap in chronic staff shortages). Overall, there are a lot of data being collected, but the focus seems to be collection more than utilization.</p> <p>Reportedly, in one province HMIS data show that 40 percent of facilities had no deliveries for over six months and this gap either not picked up or identified, but not explored (this report was not verified by the assessment team). Similarly, PDS of one NGO show that in the past five quarters attendance at community-based growth monitoring programs (not a USAID reported indicator) is significantly under the target, which is already conservative. Based solely on the data trend, there is no indication that these findings necessitate action in either increasing CBGMP attendance or verifying data quality (action plan for this NGO was not reviewed). <b>Reason for Score (2): Data and information are mostly used for planning purposes and corrective action.</b></p>
Monitoring information is used for corrective action			X		3	<p>Findings from monitoring missions are systematically used to update comprehensive plans of corrective action to be addressed by the NGO (see 2.3). Action plans address issues identified at the NGO provincial office and each health facility visited. Quick turnaround of monitoring/ checklist data is important to this process. PCH continues to monitor progress against the action plan and in the subsequent visit it is again updated. Overall, the system reflects excellent monitoring and</p>


							attention to detail and might be contributing to targets that are mostly on track. However, there are some observed limitations. The action plan reviewed has almost 200 corrective actions for a universe of six health facilities, one health post, and the provincial NGO office. Although about a quarter of actions have been completed, it seems an excessive number of tasks to manage let alone prioritize. About a third of actions have a “continuous” due date, which would seem to make prioritization even more difficult. The remaining actions are to be addressed within the quarter. A majority of corrective actions are vague and merely the reciprocal of the finding, which further de-emphasizes any priority. <b>Reason for Score (3): Monitoring information is systematically used for corrective action, but there might be limitations that need to be addressed for a more effective system.</b>
Organization/project regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis			X				<b>3</b> All reports are produced on a timely basis or within a reasonable timeframe. See 2.7 and 2.8 for discussion on quality. <b>Score (3)</b>
Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (organization/project) and external stakeholders			X				<b>4</b> Data are widely disseminated to government, non-government and donor stakeholders through reports, meetings and other coordination forums as per schedule. <b>Reason for Score (4): Dissemination appears to be clear and consistent.</b>
<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>							<b>2.7</b>
Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )			X				<b>3</b> There are an abundance of meetings (too many to count) at the MoPH and GCMU/PCH level in which PCH leadership, management and technical teams participate: high level policy meetings, routine/special donor coordination meetings, several

						stakeholder meetings, technical meetings, etc. Two forums which seem to be of particular importance and utility: 1) GCMU-managed quarterly HMIS presentation on the status of BPHS/EPHS attended by NGO and stakeholder representatives from all provinces and central level; and 2) technical working forum/committee on data use led by the Deputy Minister and convened by representatives from all relevant MoPH directorates and departments, including Health Services, Gender, Policy and Planning, M&E etc. <b>Reason for Score (4): There is a long list of coordination meetings with USAID and its implementing partners as well as other key stakeholders.</b>
Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )			X			<b>3</b> There appears to be regular coordination within the MoPH and periodic coordination with other government agencies/ministries as needed. <b>Score (3)</b>
Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors	X					<b>0</b> N/A (duplicative)
Donor and GIRoA monitoring capacity development efforts are coordinated <u>and</u> implemented				X		<b>2</b> There are no current capacity building efforts. Past efforts were mostly provided by MSH and were coordinated with MoPH.
<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>						<b>3.0</b>

Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels					X	1	Of the 30 PCH staff members, four are female: one CME Technical Officer, one Finance Consultant, one Admin/Finance Officer, and one Contract Assistant. Senior management recognizes a lack of female staff members, specifically, in technical and senior level positions as a limitation, but claims these positions attract few if any female applicants. ACBAR is the primary mechanism through which vacancy announcements are circulated. <b>Reason for Score (1): There are only four of 30 female staff.</b>
Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data		X				4	M&E staff and other Consultants responsible fully understand the importance of monitoring data <b>Score (4)</b>
Senior management understands and supports monitoring system		X				4	Senior management fully understands and supports monitoring system. <b>Score (4)</b>
Monitoring function recognized by senior leadership			X			3	Monitoring function appears to be recognized by GCMU leadership. <b>Score (3)</b>
Budget allocation to monitoring <u>and</u> sufficient to support the monitoring function			X			3	Although, the budget is tight, allocation to monitoring function appears to be sufficient. Reportedly, there has not been any budgetary limitation which affects the frequency or quality of monitoring in PCH project. <b>Score (3)</b>

Summary	Score (0-4)	Signal
Organizational Structure	0.0	0.0
Human Capacity	0.0	0.0
Monitoring Plans and Procedures	0.0	0.0
Data Management Systems and Practices	0.0	0.0
Utilization and Dissemination	0.0	0.0
Partnerships and Coordination	0.0	0.0
Advocacy and Culture	0.0	0.0

**ANNEX XI. Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the GCMU/PCH monitoring system**



**ANNEX XI.A. TABLE 1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - DETAILED FINDINGS**

**PROVINCIAL PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICE - BAMYAN**

**Primary interviewer:**

Nasruallah Ahmadzai

**Primary note taker:** Nasruallah

Ahmadzai

**Institution:** Bamyán Provincial Public Health Office; AKF and AADA

NGO Contractors, Bamyán

**Date(s):** August 5, 6, 8, 2014

**Names and position titles of**

**persons interviewed:**

Director, Provincial Public Health Office,

Bamyán

Dr. Ali khan Saha, Health Project Manager,

AADA Bamyán Office

Dr. Inamudin Adili, Health Project

Manager, AKF Bamyán Office

**FOR REFERENCE/NOTES ONLY.  
RANKINGS FACTORED INTO MoPH  
PERFORMANCE SCORES**

**Instructions:** Based on discussion with key respondents, identify the status of each performance statement. Verify with physical documentation/evidence as applicable. Once the status of the statement is identified, mark an X in the corresponding box to the right of the statement. The score column can be filled in during the visit or afterwards. Use the comment space generously. In the last column, indicate ( ✓ ) if statement is verified with supporting documentation.

MONITORING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE						COMMENTS
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	No n applicabl e (0)	Compl ete-ly (4)	Mostly (3)	Partly (2)	No at all (1)	SCORE (0-4)	
<b>1</b>	<b>Organizational structure (be prepared to develop social network diagram)</b>						
1. 1	Monitoring unit(s) at national level with <u>exclusive</u> responsibility to monitor results chain						MoPH has the M&E department in its structure to monitor all health activities for the ministry including the PCH health project. they use NMC to monitor all the EPHS and BPHS activities. this format is used by the PPHO staff mainly PHOs to monitor each clinic once in a quarter and they are doing mostly joint monitoring from the health facility to verify the HMIS data coming from NGOs. The data to be collected through this format is mainly quantitative one on ten indicators determining the availability of equipment and medicine, staffing, availability of clinic registration and number of patients admitted and treated including mother and child health. NGOs also have almost the same structure of officers who are mainly doing the supervision of health activities and ensuring the quality of these activities using either NMC or their own



1. 3	Adequate structure/units to cover all functions of M&E													<p>There are in total 45 staff at PPHO out of which ten PHOs responsible for monitoring and verification of data and currently 6 were on board to do the monitoring of all health interventions at the provincial level. Also there are 21 staff at NGO provincial office out of which 7 of them are involved in supervision and monitoring and in addition to that there is one HMIS and one M&amp;E officer</p>
1. 4	Clear lines of supervision within and between national, provincial and district monitoring staff ( <u>verify up-to-date organizational chart</u> )												<p>There are two line of supervision at provincial level by PHOs at PPHO and the NGOs staff. once the data is coming from the clinics to NGO provincial office then the supervision teams look at their areas and plan their supervision mission and visit from the clinic to verify the data and check the quality of data. the NGO provincial manager is also performing supervision visits from the clinics. the PPHO staff mainly PHOs also planning their mission when they receive the HMIS data from NGO and verify the progress and achievements.</p>	
1. 5	Clear roles and responsibilities for all staff ( <u>try to verify a manual of functions</u> )												<p>Each staff at the HMIS and Dir. Of policy and planning have their own ToR and clear role and responsibilities such for technical and administrative staff</p>	

1. 6	Monitoring unit has clear internal and/or external clients to support						the Provincial Public Health Director presents and key findings of monitoring mission in a meeting with key stakeholders at the provincial level on monthly bases and report to PLD on quarterly bases. The NGOs also prepare their report on supervision reports to their HQ office as well as monthly HMIS report to their HQ office and PPHO.
2	<b>Human capacity</b>						
2. 1	Monitoring unit(s) sufficiently staffed based on number <u>and</u> continuity of personnel dedicated to monitoring responsibilities. <i>To what extent do they rely on external advisors? (Identify number and positions of LT/ST Tashkeel &amp; donor-supported staff)</i>						There are currently 6 staff PHOs present at the PPHO out of ten and the remaining four positions have not been filled due to unavailability of qualified staff and low salary paid by PPHO. Although they can NMC for monitoring purposes but sometime they collect wrong figures and this is due to low capacity and lack training to be provided by M&ED on how to use the NMC. They do not enter use the NMC database for preparing the report and just enter the data and there is not proper report from all monitoring checklists filled in each month or quarter, just they get main finding such gaps or low number of staffing or equipment to present. at NGO level they have adequate staff and they can do their supervision and monitoring but they also say that do not use NMC in

								all the cases instead they introduced and use their own supervision checklist. The NGO HMIS officer just enters the data and produce report and are not technical database officers. both NGO and PPHO staff need further capacity building.
2.	Sufficient monitoring staff, <u>including female data collectors</u> , in the provinces and districts							at PPHO level there is no specific position of M&E but each PHO is responsible to monitor his/her own area. There 2 female technical PHOs at PPHO. At the NGO level there is only one male M&E officer at Provincial level and one male HMIS officer. But at the technical staff for the purpose of supervision there is two female staff.
2. 3	Adequate oversight of provincial and district monitoring activities							the Provincial PH Director and the technical manager are doing the oversight of monitoring activities on random bases. The NGO provincial manager is also overseeing from the health activities.
2. 4	Data collectors are skilled in obtaining valid data through quantitative and <u>qualitative</u> methods							The PHOs are collecting the data but have problems in data collection, the same the NMC is not comprehensive tool for monitoring of these activities and scoring. This checklist is mainly focusing on quantitative data at input, activities and output level and verifying the availability of clinic staff and the

								equipment and medicine. the HMIS data is also mostly quantitative one and showing the progress and staffing, etc. there are mistakes in HMIS data collection therefore the supervision visit help NGOs to verify data and correct the mistakes.
2. 5	Adequate capacity in databases and spreadsheets for procesing and managing data							both the PPHO and NGOs HMIS staff are not technical database but can enter the data and generate reports it means they have the capacity to process and manage the data and using the database.
2. 6	Staff understand logic models and log frames (i.e., results chain)							NO one knows at the NGO and PPHO staff on the RF or logical framework but they know that they have to report on the ten indicators determined in NMC. They say the purpose of monitoring is to find the gaps and compare it with the targets as well as take corrective actions for improvement.
2. 7	Adequate capacity in describing, interpreting and presenting data							There is low capacity in presenting and interpreting the data and just few figures are presented needs further capacity building
2. 8	Capacity in report writing (i.e., monitoring, other technical)							In general there is no narrative monitoring report at the PPHO and NGO offices but mainly illustrate the issues through graph and charts. This is due to lack of capacity.

<b>3</b>	<b>Monitoring Plans and Procedures (Verify for 3.1 through 3.5)</b>							
3. 1	Ministry has well-defined data flow process ( <i>verify if possible</i> )							<p>Although there is no specific monitoring plan for PHOs but there is flow of data at PPHO level. The data are collected by PHOs from the health facilities and then they compile and send it to technical manager and they together analysis the data and prepare a presentation and quarterly report to be submitted to PH Director. she presents the key findings in coordination meeting held with the government line ministries directors, NGOs and other stakeholders at provincial level. the PPHO reports on quarterly bases to MoPH PLD. The NGOs get the HMIS data from the clinics starting from tally sheet then to registration of each clinic and then each clinic submits the hard copy to HMIS of provincial office. the HMIS officer enters the data into the database and submits the monthly HMIS report and data to PPHO HMIS officer and their own HQ office at Kabul.</p>

3.2	Clear monitoring plan exists for the Ministry (sector) and is built into the ministry's strategic plan ( <i>verify for 3.1 through 3.5</i> )							There is no proper monitoring plan but for both NGOs and PPHO the monitoring visits are part of activity plan.
3.3	GIRoA and donor-supported project M&E plans are directly linked to ministry/sector M&E plan							NA
3.4	Indicators for each levels of result chain (output, outcome, impact)							According to PPHO there are ten indicators that the PPHO staff (PHOs) collects the data through NMC but these are mostly focusing on staffing, equipment, laboratory, medicine, number or patients and the treatments, and the reports of clinic etc (input, activities and outputs or deliverables.
3.5	Indicators are clearly-defined, can be disaggregated as appropriate, and sufficient and necessary to measure objectives							NA and no idea at the PPHO but the NGO staff say the NMC should be revised and not comprehensive and the main problem is that they can not get the adequate information.
3.6	Monitoring plan(s) clearly describe(s) data collection processes, including sources, frequency, geographic coverage, benchmarks							
3.7	Monitoring activities are clearly and regularly (defined frequency) programmed							Each clinic or health facility should be monitored once in a quarter both by NGO and PPHO staff
3.8	All reporting requirements and procedures are clear ( <i>verify if possible</i> )							There is no and proper monitoring report just send the HMIS data and key findings of each monitoring and supervision mission.

4 Data Management Systems and Practices							
4.1	Ministry has established systems and tools for data collection, collation, and analysis						The HMIS designed specific format for data collection which are used by NGO staff, the PPHO staff mainly PHOs use the NMC for monitoring purposes. the database is designed in MS. Access and the HMIS officers at the NGOs send the HMIS data to PPHO through e mails and their Kabul HQ office. The PPHO HMIS Officer send the data to MoPH HMIS unit.
4.2	Database(s) (paper or electronic) adequate for current needs (i.e., design, functionality, hardware and software)						The database currently fullfils the requirement for data entry and collection of data on specific number of indicators. The database is functional both the national and provincial levels as well as NGO staff can have access to this database.
4.3	Appropriate security controls and backup in place to maintain integrity of data (i.e., access levels, data confidentiality, passwords, back-up, virus protection)						There is regular backup of the data at PPHO and NGOs into CD . The data base is protected from anti virus
4.4	Data available when needed ( <i>verify if archived data is easily accessible/retrievable</i> )						Report data are available for the recipients on the set frequency as well as HMIS produces on demand reports.
4.5	Linkage to other national data reporting systems						NA

4.6	Designated staff to verify data quality and completeness						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PPHO staff mainly PHOs verify the data while they conduct their monitoring visit from health facilities;</li> <li>• Using NMC by provincial staff and monitoring by HQ staff;</li> <li>• DQA data quality assurance ;</li> <li>• verification of report by HMIS and validation role applied in the database;</li> </ul>
<b>5</b>	<b>Utilization and Dissemination</b>						
5.1	Monitoring information is used as a decision-making tool ( <i>identify examples at different levels</i> )						The PPHO shares the monitoring information with key stakeholders at provincial level as well as they send their monitoring report to PLD (to be verified).
5.2	Monitoring information is used for corrective action ( <i>identify examples at each level</i> )						NMC at the PPHO staff and NGO staff use for verification and corrective actions whenever require;
5.3	Ministry regularly produces high quality reports on timely basis						NA
5.4	Clear dissemination of monitoring data for internal (ministry) and external stakeholders						NA
<b>6</b>	<b>Partnerships and Coordination</b>						
6.1	Regular coordination meetings with counterpart donor institutions and stakeholders ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )						There is monthly coordination meeting between PPHO, NGOs, government line ministries directorates and available donor agencies to present the health activities and progress or achievements and how to improve them.


6.2	Regular intergovernmental coordination meetings ( <i>How useful are meetings?</i> )							NA only as mentioned in Q6.1
6.3	Monitoring unit(s) at national level produces quality and timely reports required by different donors							NA
6.4	Donor and GIROA M&E capacity development efforts are coordinated and implemented							NA
<b>7</b>	<b>Advocacy and Culture</b>							
7.1	Monitoring unit at national level staffed by females at different levels [ <i>or ask and verify if gender is mainstreamed into hiring policies/practices for M&amp;E Unit(s)</i> ]							
7.2	Monitoring unit at national level understands the importance of monitoring data							THE PPHO staff and NGOs understand the importance and need of monitoring to ensure the performance of each facility, quality of interventions and know the progress and achievements of health projects;
7.3	Ministry senior management understands and supports monitoring system							NA
7.4	Monitoring function recognized by Ministry leadership							NA
7.5	Budget allocation to M&E and sufficient to support the M&E function							No specific budget for monitoring at PPHO

**ANNEX XII. DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

<b>Name</b>	Susan Gearon
<b>Title</b>	Consultant
<b>Organization</b>	Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <b>X <u>Team Leader</u></b> <input type="checkbox"/> Team member
<b>Evaluation Award Number</b> <i>(contract or other instrument)</i>	Contract No. AID-306-C-12-0012
<b>USAID Project(s) Evaluated</b> <i>(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</i>	Assessment of GIRoA Monitoring Systems
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>X <u>No</u></b>
<p><b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b>  <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</i></li> <li><i>2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</i></li> <li><i>3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</i></li> <li><i>4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</i></li> </ol>	

<p><i>project(s) are being evaluated.</i></p> <p>5. <i>Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</i></p> <p>6. <i>Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</i></p>	
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
I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

<b>Signature</b>	
<b>Date</b>	August 18, 2014

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

<b>Name</b>	Oscar Antezana
<b>Title</b>	Consultant
<b>Organization</b>	Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X Team member
<b>Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)</b>	Contract No. AID-306-C-12-0012
<b>USAID Project to be Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</b>	
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X No
<b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b> <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</i></li> <li>2. <i>Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</i></li> <li>3. <i>Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</i></li> <li>4. <i>Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</i></li> <li>5. <i>Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</i></li> <li>6. <i>Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</i></li> </ol>	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

<b>Signature</b>	
<b>Date</b>	May 26, 2014

**Cecchi and Company Consulting, Inc.**  
**Afghanistan SUPPORT-II Project**  
**Wazir Akbar Khan**  
**Kabul, Afghanistan**