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# MISTI STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY

ANALYTICAL REPORT, WAVE 3: NOV 16, 2013 – JAN 30, 2014

**JULY 11, 2014**

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International.

# MISTI STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY

ANALYTICAL REPORT

WAVE 3: NOV 16, 2013 – JAN30, 2014



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Contracted under AID–OAA–I–10–00002, Task Order 306–TO–12–00004

Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)

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## ACRONYMS

AAPOR	American Association of Public Opinion Researchers
ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research
Afs	Afghanis (local currency)
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
ASF	Afghan Security Forces
AYC	Afghan Youth Consulting
CCI	Community Cohesion Initiatives
CDC	Community Development Council
CDP	Community Development Program
DDA	District Development Assembly
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MISTI	Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
RC	Regional Command
SIKA	Stability in Key Areas
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Introduction

The USAID/Afghanistan Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives project (MISTI) Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey (Wave 3) seeks to identify trends in stability and measure stabilization programming impact across USAID’s stabilization program districts. Data collection for the Wave 3 survey was conducted in 93 districts of Afghanistan between November 16, 2013 and January 30, 2014 and builds upon the Baseline Survey (Wave 1), which was conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012, and the Wave 2 Survey, which was conducted between May 18 and August 7, 2013. The intent of the MISTI project (the Project) is to provide USAID and implementing partner managers with information for evidence-based decisionmaking about how, where and when to invest increasingly scarce resources to promote stability and set the stage for transition to Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) led security and longer-term development.

## Limitations

The report identifies several limitations associated with the impact evaluation and survey experiments. The most significant limitation affecting the impact evaluation is that the number of treated observations (villages) covered by the Wave 3 impact evaluation (N=108 villages and 280 project activities) is small.<sup>1</sup> Due to reasons beyond the control of the Project, a delay in beginning the implementation of the main nationwide USAID stabilization program, “Stability in Key Areas” (SIKA), resulted in far fewer completed activities at the time of the Wave 3 survey than USAID had anticipated. The other significant stabilization project, the “Community Cohesion Initiative” (CCI) while more advanced in its programming, also had not progressed as far as originally planned. The result is that the MISTI Wave 3 survey could only evaluate the impact of stabilization programming at the overall level, due to the low number of treatment villages (108 total) and project activities (280) included in both Waves 1 and 3 of the survey.

It should also be noted that districts included in the survey sample varied by wave and some control villages sampled in W2 were not included in W3. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave individual component analysis at the overall level as changes in the composition of program districts can have significant impact on trend analysis at this level. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so overall changes in individual components from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts and villages were included or excluded from the analysis. For this reason, we recommend examining trends at the district level.

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<sup>1</sup> The Impact Evaluation in Wave 2 of the MISTI Survey included 76 treatment villages and 219 project activities. The small increase in the number of treatment villages between Waves 2 and 3 can be explained by the intervening winter season which sees a significant decrease in project activity.

As the number of ongoing and completed project activities increases, so too does the MISTI survey's precision and the reliability of the findings concerning the stabilization program's impacts. MISTI will revisit the initial impact evaluation findings available from the Wave 3 survey as the number of treated villages increases in subsequent survey waves.<sup>2</sup>

It is also to be expected that over the life of the MISTI project and USAID stabilization programming there will be a steady stream of events in Afghanistan (e.g., 2014 Presidential election, the Bilateral Security Agreement decision, etc.) that may be reflected in survey findings. That said, it is important for USAID to understand citizen stability perceptions associated with these types of events.

## Stability Trends

Between the Fall of 2012 (Wave 1) and late-Fall of 2013 (Wave 3), the overall stability trend across the 53 districts surveyed in all three survey waves shows the average stability index score dropping from 3.31 to 3.19 between Fall (Wave 1) and early-Summer (Wave 2) 2013, and then increasing to 3.26 in fall 2013 (Wave 3). Findings indicate that 24 districts experienced a perceived increase in stability between Waves 1 and 3 while 29 experienced a perceived decrease. Sangin and Kajaki districts (Helmand province) and Pusht-e Rod district (Farah province) recorded the greatest decline in stability between fall 2012 and fall 2013. In terms of ranking, we can see that these two districts have declined by two quartiles in our rank listing, showing the greatest decrease in overall stability relative to all other districts surveyed in Waves 1 and 3. Districts that experienced the greatest drops in the stability scores between Waves 2 and 3 (early-Summer 2013 to late-Fall 2013) included Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatau) (Ghazni province), Ahmadabad (Paktiya province) and Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province).

Eight dimensions of stability are explored in our stability trends analysis using a stability index (see Appendix D): optimism (is the area moving in the right or wrong direction?), change in local area security, presence of Armed Opposition Groups (AOG), confidence in local government, local government corruption, local government services delivery, local area resilience, and quality of life. There has been a decline in perceptions of **local security**, and this trend may correspond with a reported increase in the presence of Armed Opposition Groups (AOG). Geographic areas of local security concern include: Wardak province; southern Paktiya; the Route 1 corridor including most districts in Wardak, Logar, Ghazni and Zabul provinces; the rural districts of Kandahar province (especially those through which Route 1 does not run); northern Helmand province; and, Farah province (Bala Boluk and Pusht-e Rod districts) and the neighboring district of Shindand (Herat province).

Of the eight dimensions of stability explored, all dimensions improved upon their Wave 2 scores with the exception of “**improvement in government services**”, which had a marginal decrease, and “**corruption**” which had a noticeable decrease. With few exceptions, local government corruption is perceived as pervasive and getting worse. “Confidence in local government” registered a score greater than its baseline, as did “presence of armed opposition groups,” while scores for the other six dimensions all fell between their Wave 1 and Wave 3 scores.

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<sup>2</sup>It is important to note, that the other Wave 3 survey findings regarding stability trends and the endorsement experiment (although endorsement experiment results are not reported in the Wave 3 analytical report, the questions were asked in the survey and the data is available for future analysis and reporting) are not affected by the low number of activities in the sample.

“Confidence in local government” has generally improved along the Route 1 corridor between Wardak/Logar and Zabul provinces. The only exceptions to this are in Deh Yak (Ghazni province) and Shah Joy (Zabul province). Other areas showing improvement include the districts surveyed in Kunar, Herat, Kunduz and Baghdis provinces. Districts surveyed in northern Helmand, Farah, Baghlan and northwest Kandahar provinces (Zharay, Arghandab and Shah Wali Kot districts) all show a decline in confidence in local government. The remaining provinces surveyed showed mixed results at the district level.

## Impact Evaluation

The net difference for the Aggregate Stability Index is a 0.11 increase in perceived stability, suggesting that villages with USAID assistance witness a net increase in perceived stability compared with control villages when comparing values across the two MISTI survey waves used (Waves 1 and 3).

Six of the nine indicators show modest improvements in perceived stability, though only one (Improved GIRoA-delivery of basic services) reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. Two indicators, “Local Resilience Has Improved?” and “Presence of Armed Opposition Groups”, depict a modest downturn, neither of which is statistically significant.

There are seven main findings that emerge from this mid-term impact evaluation:

- (1) USAID programming is associated with a modest increase in perceived stability between Waves 1 and 3 of the MISTI survey for nearly all stability indicators. These increases are typically modest, however, and only one reached conventional levels of statistical significance
- (2) The most robust finding is a positive relationship between USAID programming and improvements in perceptions of GIRoA’s delivery of services
- (3) There is also evidence of a robust relationship between USAID programming and perceptions that the respondent’s area is growing more stable, though these results only achieve weaker levels of statistical significance
- (4) At present, perceptions of stability do not appear to hinge on whether a program favored “hard” (i.e. infrastructure) or “soft” (i.e. training) assistance. There is some evidence suggesting that increasing the numbers of programs in a given village has little affect on perceptions of stability, and may even be associated with decreased perceptions of stability<sup>3</sup>
- (5) We observe a small but statistically significant uptick in the amount of insurgent attacks in the immediate 30-60 period after the beginning of USAID programming, both relative to the baseline patterns of violence in the treated villages and the comparable (control) villages without USAID programming. Interestingly, there is also some evidence to suggest that the relative number of IEDs that detonate in these treated villages is decreasing between the pre-and post-aid intervention period. The decrease is modest, but it nonetheless points to the possibility that the programming is increasing the flow of information from local citizens to ISAF/ANSF about the

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<sup>3</sup> The number of cases included in this wave of analysis precludes us from making conclusive statements regarding this finding. This will be further explored as the number of cases increases in Waves 4 and 5 of the survey.

location of the devices. And thus may be playing a role in influencing “hearts and minds” in a pro-government (or at least anti-AOG) direction

- (6) CCI- Creative and SIKA have been implementing aid projects in villages with very different characteristics, raising questions about whether each program should have its own impact evaluation rather than “pooling” findings across these programs
- (7) The CCI-Creative and SIKA villages used in the impact evaluation differ significantly from remaining villages in the MISTI survey sample frame. Recipient villages are more populous, at lower elevation, and closer to the district center than the “average” village in our sample. Beginning in Wave 3, recipient villages are also on average one full point higher (on a five point scale) of ISAF/government control, suggesting that they are in more contested areas than the “average” village in our sample<sup>4</sup>

***In stating these findings, it is important to acknowledge the continuing small size of the sample used in this initial impact evaluation.*** Due to the ramping-up stage of programming by the four SIKA projects at the time of the Wave 3 survey, MISTI was able to identify a relatively small number of project activities (280<sup>5</sup>) in 108 treated villages to include in the impact analysis. This means that MISTI is unable as a result of the Wave 3 survey to break the results down by stabilization program<sup>6</sup> and other factors. As a result of the still-small sample size, treatments included in the Wave 3 survey may be unrepresentative of the broader array of (planned) project activities, as well as the impact they may have when they fully materialize. Another caveat is that the effects of stabilization program activities will develop slowly over time, such that later MISTI survey waves will pick up a larger impact than was the case for Wave 3. In this early round of impact evaluation, MISTI was only able to examine the *near term effects* of these (limited) program/project activities. Waves 4 and 5 of the MISTI Survey will deliver increasingly larger samples of treated villages and findings related to impact may be quite different using this more significant and geographically distributed sample.

Unlike the analytical reports prepared after the Wave 1 (baseline) and Wave 2 surveys, this report does not cover the endorsement experiment component of the MISTI program. Instead, this Wave 3 analytical report highlights other MISTI elements such as the differentiation between the SIKA and CCI programs, and adds analysis of the new KFZ and CCI-IOM projects. However, like for the first two waves the endorsement experiment survey questions were asked and the response data recorded for future analysis. This will continue in the remaining survey waves, with full analysis at least in the Wave 5 analytical report.

## Recommendations Resulting from the Wave 3 Survey

Three recommendations emerge from these mid-term stability trends and impact evaluation findings.

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<sup>4</sup> All of these differences are significant at the  $p=.05$  level or greater.

<sup>5</sup> Total number of project activities 280 including 144 CCI-Creative (51%), 1 CCI-IOM, 14 Sika-E (5%), 38 SIKA-N (14%), 11 SIKA-S (4%) and 72 SIKA-W (26%).

<sup>6</sup> It is important to distinguish between stabilization “program” and “project.” MISTI concerns USAID/Afghanistan’s entire stabilization portfolio, within which there are multiple programs and projects. SIKA and CCI are both defined as “programs,” as they have multiple projects (4 and 2, respectively). KFZ is defined for the purpose of MISTI and this report as a project.

**First**, it remains important for the implementing partners and respective USAID stabilization programs and project (CCI, SIKA and KFZ) to integrate their data efforts with MISTI. This includes converging on MISTI’s shared standards for data quality and reporting to prevent dramatic revisions to programming data “on the fly” as well as missing villages due to imprecise geospatial locations.

**Second**, it remains imperative to maximize the “catchment” of treated villages in MISTI Survey Waves 4 and 5. Any treated villages that are not surveyed in Wave 4 will be lost to analysis given the need to have at least a baseline and endline survey if perceptions are to be measured. Similarly, it is important to continue to work to identify control villages that more closely mirror the characteristics of CCI and SIKA villages.

**Third**, once sufficient data has been collected, subset analysis should take place. For example, the average treatment results presented here could be broken down by CCI/SIKA programs or by various geographic regions of Afghanistan. They could also be divided along ethnic (Pashtun/non-Pashtun) or settlement characteristics (population size, elevation) to fine-tune estimates of treatment effects under more precise scope conditions.

An important follow-on would consist of decomposing the composite stability indicators into smaller clusters of questions—or even using a single question—to have more sensitive measures of perceived stability. While the composite indicators are useful for measuring broad changes across a “basket” of items, more subtle changes in any one indicator are often lost. It may be that USAID programming is having differential effects within these composite indicators, suggesting the need to unpack these bundled measures into their constituent parts.

# MISTI STABILITY TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY

## Introduction

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) project is tasked with providing quantified and scientifically rigorous measures of stability trends and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) stabilization programming impacts across selected districts of Afghanistan. In order to achieve this, Management Systems International (MSI) developed a data-rich and geographically detailed systematized approach to data collection and analysis. This included combining existing sources of data with innovative methods for the collection of reliable raw data and their analysis. In doing so, MSI took care to ensure consistency with ADS 203 Assessing and Learning<sup>7</sup>, and USAID/Afghanistan Mission Order 201.03 on Gender Analysis and Integration, issued Sept. 24, 2011.

USAID/Afghanistan has invested considerable thought, time and resources to the design and implementation of stabilization projects and activities. This has included involving a range of stakeholders to: identify and assess local sources of instability (SOI); design and implement activities to mitigate identified SOI; assess stabilization trends at the district level; and, evaluate programming impacts at the village level.

Prior to MISTI, difficulties in sharing and comparing information and the lack of uniform systems for the collection, analysis and reporting of data complicated attempts to understand stabilization trends and measure the impacts of programming in the complex environment of Afghanistan. Attempts to do so were also hampered at times by no formal USAID requirement for uniform data standards of implementing partners and, in many instances, environmental factors, not the least of which is insecurity.

To meet these challenges MSI took stock of existing data, analysis and knowledge management systems to ensure that MISTI built on best practices and lessons learned. Where existing data proved unreliable, MSI developed tools and systems for the collection of new data and its analysis. This included the semi-annual MISTI survey, for which the baseline (Wave 1) was conducted in fall 2012. This Wave 3 report documents the findings of the second of four follow-up surveys, and provides a basis to better understand stability trends and USAID stabilization programming impacts.

The report is organized as follows. First, it briefly describes the survey methodology before presenting a brief analysis of general trends and key findings. Next it presents a stability trends analysis by comparing the Waves 1 (baseline) and 2 stability index<sup>8</sup> scores with scores from Wave 3.<sup>9</sup> The stability index is also broken down by its component parts, allowing a deeper exploration of stability across several dimensions including security, optimism, governance, corruption, quality of life, resilience, the provision of government services, and the presence of armed groups opposed to the government. The analysis is reported in narrative form using charts to graphically illustrate results and maps to provide a

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/203.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> The Stability Index components, variables and how they are weighted, rescaled and the index score calculated is attached to this report as Appendix D.

<sup>9</sup> The Wave 3 Stability Index scores and component indicator scores are provided in Appendix C.

geographically detailed presentation of the data. Last, the report describes the main findings about the impacts of SIKA and CCI<sup>10</sup> programming on nine different stability indicators. These findings provide a basis for an assessment of why certain emerging patterns involving the impact of USAID programming can be observed.

Unlike the analytical reports prepared after the Wave 1 (baseline) and Wave 2 surveys, this report does not cover the endorsement experiment component of the MISTI program. Instead, this Wave 3 analytical report highlights other MISTI elements such as the differentiation between the SIKA and CCI programs, and adds analysis of the new KFZ and CCI-IOM projects. However, like for the first two waves the endorsement experiment survey questions were asked and the response data recorded for future analysis. This will continue in the remaining survey waves, with full analysis at least in the Wave 5 analytical report.

## Methodology Overview<sup>11</sup>

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 3 survey is a public opinion study that, among other things, seeks to identify trends in stabilization indicators throughout Afghanistan. The Wave 3 survey built upon the Wave 1 baseline survey, conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012 and the Wave 2 survey, conducted between May 18 and August 7, 2013. Wave 3 was conducted between November 16, 2013 and January 30, 2014. The intent of the stability analysis is to inform USAID decisionmakers and implementing partner managers of changes in stability occurring in the districts where USAID stabilization programming is taking place across Afghanistan, and control districts, and help identify improvements and declines in stabilization in their areas of responsibility.

There were six stabilization projects included in Waves 1 and 2 of the survey: Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) (Creative), Community Development Program (CDP), and four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) projects covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E) and West (SIKA-W) regions of Afghanistan. In Wave 3, the CDP project was dropped and the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) project was added, as was the new CCI project in the north and west of Afghanistan under the management of IOM, so there are now seven projects being measured in Wave 3. This number will remain through the remaining survey waves. The districts where each of these programs/projects was active in the fall of 2013 are illustrated in the map below, as are the six selected impact evaluation control districts.

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<sup>10</sup> The CCI districts included in the impact evaluation are drawn only from CCI Creative in the East and South, as CCI IOM (North and West) had not implemented sufficient programming at the time of survey to be included.

<sup>11</sup> The complete Methodology Report is attached to this report as Appendix B.



The sample design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience are summarized in the full methodology report. Some highlights are presented below.

1. The target population was Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 93 pre-selected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan. Eighty seven of these districts were selected because they were locations where at least one of the seven stabilization programs were either operating or planning to operate in the future. The final six districts<sup>12</sup> were identified as relatively stable districts<sup>13</sup> and served as control districts for analytical purposes.
2. The target N size for the survey wave was 41,486 interviews. The achieved N size was 40,405 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. The target n size for each district ranged between 320 and 512 interviews with the average size per district being 446 interviews.
3. Sampling was conducted across 93 districts specified by MISTI. These districts were located in the following 21 provinces: Parwan, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Khost, Kunar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Badghis, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzghan and Ghor. Nineteen of these provinces were included in the Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys; in Wave 3, districts in Balkh and Jawzjan were added to cover the new CCI-IOM project.
4. Primary sampling units were villages within each district. Each of the settlements, like the districts, were selected by MISTI. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups or NATO forces) or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected by MISTI. All replacements are notated in the Achieved Sample Plans for each of the 93 districts surveyed and are summarized in Appendix 1 of the Methodology Report.
5. The sampling methodology differs slightly from previous waves. All identifiable treatment villages from W2, and those villages that had received treatments between W2 and W3, were purposely included in the W3 sample to ensure a sufficient number of treatment villages for the impact evaluation.
6. Furthermore, this report presents aggregated data results and analysis at the district and program level. This requires the assumption that the data collected within each district or program is representative of the population of a district or a program. The reader should keep in mind that:
  - Due to security and weather conditions, the accessibility of villages differs at the time of each survey. As a result, some treatment villages sampled in W1 and W2 that were intended to be resampled in W3 could not be included.

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<sup>12</sup> Charikar and Salang districts (Parwan province); Doshi district (Baghlan province); Aybak district (Samangan province); Ab-e Kamari district (Badghis province); and, Farah district (Farah province).

<sup>13</sup> MISTI used the ACSOR District Accessibility Tracker to identify six relatively stable districts as “control districts”. The ACSOR accessibility tracker considers such factors as security and whether or not it is safe for women interviewers to work there.

- There are no accurate measures of size associated with villages. The assumption that is made is that all villages are of approximately equal size, as any random selection was done by way of simple random sampling.
  - The AYC household level selection is not always random. AYC operates in the most insecure districts and may use a snowball sampling technique<sup>14</sup> if applying a random walk/skip interval procedure is too risky for interviewers.
7. Assuming a simple random sample with  $P=0.5$  and a 95% confidence interval, the margin of sampling error for the aggregated data set of 40,405 interviews would be  $\pm 0.49\%$ . Although this statistic is presented for reference, we do not recommend analysis for these data at an aggregate level with all cases being analyzed simultaneously as the definition of the target population is difficult to interpret with 87 districts with USAID activity (which we refer to as treatment areas) and six control districts chosen for their relative stability.
  8. Additional statistics presented for practical analysis are the design effects and the resulting complex margin of error calculations generated for each individual district. The cautions presented above regarding the sampling limitations and resulting limitations on statistical calculations for these data also apply to the sample aggregation and analysis at the district and program level. A chart showing each district's resulting margins of error can be found at the start of each program chapter. In addition to the individual district results, design effect and margin of error calculations were also generated for each of the seven project areas. These were derived using an average design effect for all districts covered by a project and then using the aggregated sample for each project to calculate the estimates. It should be noted that there is also overlap between the compositions of each project. In other words, projects are not mutually exclusive. The project level results can also be found in each project chart at the start of each report section and additional information on the calculation and recommended use of these statistics can be found in the full Methodology Report.
  9. The MISTI Wave 3 survey was conducted face to face by 1,309 ACSOR interviewers and 41 AYC interviewers. Some districts are inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers because it is difficult to enter and exit certain areas without attracting the attention of insurgent elements and endangering the safety of the ACSOR staff. Certain districts are also accessible only to male interviewers due to cultural and security concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in eight districts were conducted completely by AYC and another seven districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 3 field work.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> When AYC interviewers enter a village the team supervisor typically introduces them to the village elder and explains what they are there to do. If the elder indicates that certain compounds will likely be hostile to being selected for interview, the supervisor may adjust the household selection procedure and not include those compounds in his/her selection routine. Likewise, if another knowledgeable person from the village informs the team during their work that choosing certain compounds for interview would put them at heightened risk of physical harm, the supervisor may choose to remove those compounds from their selection routine.

<sup>15</sup> It should be noted that AYC field supervisors and interviewers receive the same training as ACSOR interviewers but are told they may remove compounds from their selection routine if they are informed by the elder or another knowledgeable person from the village that choosing certain compounds for interview would put them at heightened risk of physical harm.

10. The ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of 804 male and 505 female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households.<sup>16</sup> These interviewers were all from the province where they conducted interviews and in most instances they were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewing teams were overseen by a supervisory team from their province. The supervisory team consisted of 21 lead supervisors (one for each province) and one or two assistant supervisors in each province who helped with back checks, field monitoring and general field logistics throughout the field period. ACSOR's field work began on November 16, 2013 and concluded on January 22, 2014.
11. The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who are from the districts where the interviews were conducted. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages so as to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since the AYC interviewers were all male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were selected by either asking for the male head of household or interviewing another male member of the household who was available at the time. The AYC interviewers were overseen by a team of supervisors who were responsible for back checking, direct observations and all field logistics. AYC began field work on December 21, 2013 and concluded on January 30, 2014.
12. Contact sheets were completed by both ACSOR and AYC interviewers throughout the field period. ACSOR used standard AAPOR calculation standards to derive the following field performance and disposition rates:
  - Response Rate 3 = 87.77%
  - Cooperation Rate 3 = 95.96%
  - Refusal Rate 2 = 2.80%
  - Contact Rate 2 = 91.46%
13. AAPOR offers a variety of formulas to calculate disposition rates depending on the circumstances for which they are being used. ACSOR typically uses the rates reported above as they most logically fit the face to face field methodology used in Afghanistan.
14. The questionnaire consisted of 39 management and quality control variables, 85 substantive questions and 19 demographic questions. The CCI module added to the questionnaire only in districts where the CCI program is operating contained 8 questions. The KFZ module added to the questionnaire for the districts in Kandahar where that program is operating contained 54 questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable.

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<sup>16</sup> See Appendix C for a more thorough explanation of the random walk and Kish grid routines used.

15. The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 48 minutes with the shortest interview taking 21 minutes and the longest interview taking 1 hours and 30 minutes.
16. Districts were selected for inclusion in the sample based on the evaluation needs of the various programs being implemented and evaluated. The sample was never intended to be a representative sample of all of Afghanistan. Due to this sampling process for the MISTI Wave 3 survey and the lack of reliable demographic targets available in Afghanistan at the district level, there are no weights used on these data.

## General Survey Findings

### Introduction

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 3 survey is a public opinion study conducted in Afghanistan between November 16, 2013 and January 30, 2014, which includes a sample size of 40,405 male and female respondents, ages 18 and above. The survey seeks to identify trends in stabilization and development indicators throughout Afghanistan. This Wave 3 report builds upon results from the Wave 1 baseline survey (September 13-December 23, 2012) and Wave 2 survey (May 18-August 7, 2013). The intent of the project is to inform leaders from USAID stabilization programs being run across Afghanistan and help identify improvements and declines in stabilization within their areas of responsibility.

There are seven stabilization programs areas included in the Waves 1-3 projects: Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the North and West by Creative (CCI - Creative), Community Cohesion Initiative implemented in the South and East by IOM (CCI - IOM) Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ), and four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) programs covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E) and West (SIKA-W) regions of Afghanistan. While the four SIKA programs are comprised of districts which are mutually exclusive to each other, the districts which comprise the CCI and KFZ program areas sometimes overlap with each other and with the SIKA districts. Detailed lists of program compositions by district can be found in the methodology report under Section II: Sample Design.

The questionnaire and each section of this report are broken out by 10 modules covering the following topics:

- Security and crime
- Governance
- Service provision and development
- Rule of law
- Corruption
- Quality of life
- Economic activity
- Community cohesion and resilience
- Grievances
- Media

This overview chapter discusses some of the overall trends and key findings, and compares all stabilization districts (i.e. Wave 3 total) to the five Regional Commands (RCs) outside of RC Capital where no interviews were conducted. The report also compares findings across three waves. The RCs covered in this section include:

**TABLE 2.1: REGIONAL COMMANDS**

Regional Command	Sample size	Provinces
RC North	n=9,402	Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e Pul and Takhar
RC South	n=8,174	Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and Daykundi
RC Southwest	n=3,905	Helmand and Nimroz
RC East	n=12,487	Bamyan, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Panjshayr, Parwan and Wardak
RC West	n=4,582	Badghis, Farah, Ghor and Herat

It is important to note that results presented for regional commands are not statistically representative of either the populations living in each regional command or of the population of Afghanistan as a whole. The sample was designed to capture opinions from Afghans living in districts where USAID stabilization programs and projects are working or plan to work and was not derived from a probability sample. Results have been grouped into regional commands only to provide a geographic indicator of opinions expressed from the sampled districts, including the controls, located within each regional command.

Consistent with results in Waves 1 and 2, the majority of respondents (59%) in Wave 3 believe things in their district are heading in the right direction. Respondents living in RC North and RC Southwest are the most likely to say things are headed in the right direction (71%). Such optimism from respondents in RC North and RC Southwest is reflected in the data, as respondents in these provinces tend to have more positive opinions about security, governance, government services, and their overall quality of life.

## Key Findings

The major takeaways from Wave 3 are summarized below:

- Perceptions of security have improved since Wave 2—more closely reflecting results of the Wave 1 baseline survey. A majority of respondents perceive their local security as “good,” and believe their local area is more secure than a year ago. Respondents in RC North and RC Southwest are more likely to report positive perceptions of security compared to those in other RCs.
- The perceived presence of security forces and armed opposition groups has consistently declined over each wave of research. Although respondents report less presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), confidence in the ANA and ANP remains high.

- The majority of respondents say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Confidence levels in district governors, the district government, local village/ neighborhood leaders and provincial governors have all increased since last wave. Wave 3 results more closely reflect results from Wave 1. A majority of respondents have heard of a District Development Assembly (DDA) and Community Development Council (CDC) in their area and have confidence in them.
- Nearly half of respondents believe government services have improved in the past year. Overall, the percentage of those who have seen or heard about development projects (47%) has increased since Wave 2 (44%), although the percentage is not quite as high as it was in the Wave 1 survey (50%).
- Respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders for justice if they are involved in a dispute concerning land, water, or theft. If respondents or their family members are involved in a more serious dispute (assault, murder, kidnapping) they are more likely to turn to government courts for justice.
- Confidence in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes has increased in each wave. Confidence in armed opposition groups for the same purpose has significantly decreased each wave.
- Eight out of every ten respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area.
- All things considered, the majority of respondents say they are satisfied with the quality of their life as a whole.
- Respondents believe their access to local markets has improved over the past year; however, prices for basic goods in local markets have reportedly increased.
- Respondents in Wave 3 say there are less paid jobs available in their area compared to those in Waves 1 and 2.
- Respondents believe people in their area are able to solve problems that come from inside their village more often than problems that come from outside their village. In each wave, respondents have become more likely to report that villages/neighborhoods in their area work together to solve problems.
- Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their area. In RCs where respondents are generally more positive (RC North and RC Southwest), respondents did not mention “insecurity” as a top problem, while respondents in RC South, RC East, and RC West all mention insecurity as the biggest problem. Across all five RCs, “unemployment” was the most frequently mentioned problem.
- Respondents most commonly use radio and word of mouth (through the Mosque, friends, family, and elders) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Respondents are less likely to use television, cell phones, print media (posters, billboards, newspapers). Respondents do not rely on the internet or e-mail to communicate or receive news.

## Security and Crime

Overall, perceptions of security are more positive in Wave 3 than Wave 2—more closely reflecting the results of the Wave 1 baseline survey. More than half of respondents (53%, up from 50% in Wave 2 and similar to 54% in Wave 1) perceive their local security as “good” or “very good.” Compared to last wave, respondents are more likely to say their local area is more secure than it was a year ago (46%, up from 43% in Wave 2). Respondents in RC North districts and RC Southwest districts are most likely to

say security in their local area is good (64% and 59%, respectively), and are also more likely to say security has improved since last year (54% and 64% respectively).

Sixty-two percent of respondents in all stabilization districts (up from 58% in Wave 2) say security on their local roads is “somewhat good” or “very good.” In RC East, however, nearly half (46%) say security on local roads is “somewhat bad” or “very bad.” Those who say security on their local roads has improved (“improved a lot” or “improved a little”) in the past year has increased 5 percentage points since last wave (47%, up from 42%). More improvement was reported from respondents in RC North (57%) and RC Southwest (62%).


Respondents feel most secure when they are in their home during the day (90% “somewhat secure” or “very secure”), and much less secure when they are in their home during the night (74% “somewhat secure” or “very secure”). Respondents report feeling least secure when traveling to a neighboring village (68% “somewhat secure” or “very secure”) or traveling to the district or provincial capital (55% “somewhat secure” or “very secure”).

About one-quarter (26%) of respondents overall say there are “a lot” of petty crime and offenses in their area, compared to 47% who say there are “a little” and 26% who say “none at all.” Respondents in RC South are most likely to say there are a lot of petty crime and offenses (40%), while those in RC North are most likely to say there is none at all (43%). The percentage of respondents who say there is no petty crime in their area has increased steadily since Wave 1 (20% in Wave 1, 23% in Wave 2, 26% in Wave 3). Much smaller percentages of respondents reported there are “a lot” of serious, non-violent crimes, such as theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs (18%), and “a lot” of serious, violent crimes, such as murder or kidnapping (16%).

The perceived presence of security forces in Afghanistan has significantly decreased since Wave 1. There has also been a consistent decline in the perceived presence of armed opposition groups over each wave of research. The following graph shows respondents who say there are “some” or “a lot” of the following groups present in their area:

**FIGURE 2.2: PRESENCE OF GROUPS**

**Q6.1. Respondents who say there are "some" or "a lot" of the following groups in their area (Waves 1-3)\***



\*Wave 1: n=32,722; Wave 2: n=34,556; Wave 3: n=38,500

Although respondents report less presence of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area, confidence in the ANA and ANP has not changed since Wave 1. Eight of ten respondents (80%) say they have “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in the ANA, while 66% say the same about the ANP. The majority of respondents say the ability for the ANA (66%) and ANP (56%) to provide security has improved (“improved a lot” or “improved a little”) in the past year.


## Governance

More than seven of ten respondents (71%, up from 66% in Wave 2) say the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Respondents living in RC North (74%) and RC Southwest (77%) are most likely to believe the Afghan government is well regarded.

Confidence levels in the district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor have all increased since the last wave of data collection. These Wave 3 findings more closely reflect results from the baseline survey. Respondents in RC North are more likely to report confidence in the district governor and district government; those in RC Southwest are more likely to report confidence in local leaders and the provincial governor.

It is possible that increased levels of confidence reflect increased responsiveness to the needs of local people. Since the baseline survey, respondents believe the district governor, district government, local leaders, and provincial governor have become more responsive (“very responsive” or “somewhat responsive”) to the needs of local people in Wave 3.

**FIGURE 2.3: RESPONSIVENESS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT**



Compared to those surveyed in Waves 1 and 2, respondents in Wave 3 are more likely to believe the ability of the district governor, district government, local leaders, and provincial governor to get things done in their area has improved (“improved a lot” or “improved a little”) in the past year. Around one-third of respondents believe their ability to get things done has stayed the same.

Sixty-two percent of respondents have heard of a District Development Assembly (DDA) in their district. Of those who said they have heard of the DDA, 77% overall say they have “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in it. Respondents living in RC North (84%) and RC Southwest (82%) are most likely to express confidence. Similarly, those in RC North (64%) and RC South (70%) are more likely to believe the DDA’s ability to get things done has improved since last year (compared to 56% overall). Since the baseline study, respondents believe the DDA has become more responsive to the needs of local people in their area. In Wave 3, 72% say the DDA is “somewhat” or “very responsive,” compared to 70% in Wave 2 and 69% in Wave 1.

The majority of respondents (63%) have also heard of a Community Development Council (CDC) established in their district. Of those who have heard of the CDC, 76% say they have “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in it, and 74% believe it is “somewhat responsive” or “very responsive” to the needs of local people. Similar to perceptions of the DDA, respondents living in RC North and RC Southwest are more positive about the CDC than those living in other RCs. Respondents in Wave 3 (61%) are more likely to say the CDC’s ability to get things done has improved (“a lot” or “a little”) compared to those in Waves 1 and 2 (56%).


The majority of respondents mention that district government officials are from their district (64%); while one-third (33%) say they are not from their district. Respondents from RC East (39%) are most likely to say district government officials are from somewhere else. When asked about the characteristics of their district government, respondents across RCs were somewhat divided in their responses. Overall, respondents in RC Southwest are the most positive about their district government, saying their district government understands the people of their area (73%), cares about the people of their area (70%), does not abuse their authority (69%), visits the area (73%), does their job honestly (67%), and delivers services in a fair manner (65%). However, those living in RC Southwest are also most likely to say it is unacceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government (66%, compared to 47% of total respondents). In this context, it is likely respondents in RC Southwest may have overstated their true levels of favorability towards their district governments.

## **Service Provision and Development**

Overall, nearly half of respondents (47%) believe government services have improved (“a lot” or “a little”) in the past year, while one-third (33%) believe they have not changed, and 20% say they have worsened (“a lot” or “a little”). Respondents in RC West and RC Southwest are most likely to report improvement.

## FIGURE 2.4: IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Q15. Overall, do you think that government services have improved (a lot or a little), stayed the same, or worsened (a lot or a little) in the past year?




Level of satisfaction varies when respondents are asked about specific government provisions. Respondents living in RC East are most satisfied with the district government’s provision of clean drinking water (72%, compared to 62% of total respondents). Although respondents in RC North are generally optimistic, they are the least satisfied (50%) with the government’s provision of clean drinking water. Respondents in RC North are most satisfied with schooling for girls (46%, compared to 36% of total). Respondents in RC Southwest report the most satisfaction with water for irrigation (67%, compared to 46% of total), agricultural assistance (51%, compared to 22% of total), roads and bridges (59%, compared to 39% of total), medical care (54%, compared to 36% of total), schooling for boys (79%, compared to 57% of total), and electricity (41%, compared to 17% of total). Those living in RC South are the most satisfied with the government’s provision of retaining and flood walls (43%, compared to 30% of total).

By a narrow margin, the majority of respondents (52%) in Wave 3 have not seen or heard about any development projects in their local area. The percentage of those who have seen or heard about development projects (47%) has increased since Wave 2 (44%), although it is not quite as high as it was in the baseline survey (50%).

Of those who have seen or heard about development projects in their area, majorities are aware of projects for drinking water (76%), schools (62%), roads and bridges (54%), and irrigation/water maintenance (51%).

## FIGURE 2.5: AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Q17. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area? (Wave 3, n=18,097)



Looking forward to the next year, respondents most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:<sup>17</sup>

<b>Road construction</b>	<b>38%</b>
<b>Electricity</b>	<b>29%</b>
<b>Education and School</b>	<b>24%</b>
<b>Clinics</b>	<b>23%</b>
<b>Water</b>	<b>17%</b>

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include:<sup>18</sup>

<b>Lack of clinics/hospitals</b>	<b>39%</b>
<b>Lack of professional doctors</b>	<b>30%</b>
<b>Lack of medicines</b>	<b>29%</b>
<b>Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads</b>	<b>22%</b>
<b>Cost of health care or medicine</b>	<b>20%</b>

### Rule of Law

Across all stabilization districts, respondents say they are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders for justice if they are involved in a dispute concerning land, water, or theft. If respondents or their family

<sup>17</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.


<sup>18</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

members are involved in a more serious dispute, concerning assault, murder, or kidnapping, they are more likely to turn to the government courts for justice. Respondents living in RC Southwest and RC West report seeking justice from their local/tribal elders more than respondents from other RCs.

Confidence in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes has risen since the baseline survey (52% say “a lot of confidence” in Wave 3, compared to 51% in Wave 2 and 47% in Wave 1). This compares to only 27% who say they have “a lot of confidence” in government courts. Respondents have expressed less confidence in armed opposition groups to fairly resolve disputes in each subsequent wave of research. More than half (52%) now say they have “no confidence at all” in armed opposition groups, compared to 48% in Wave 2 and 39% in Wave 1.

A plurality of respondents (45%) say the people in their village/neighborhood “always” respect decisions made by their local/tribal elders. Compared to respondents living in other RCs, those in RC Southwest are the more likely to say respondents “always” respect decisions made by their local/tribal elders. Fewer respondents think people in their village/neighborhood “always” (24%) respect decisions made by government courts; 44% say people “mostly” respect them. Similar to their views of confidence, respondents in Wave 3 (56%) are much more likely to say they “never” respect decisions made by armed opposition groups, compared to those surveyed in Wave 2 (49%) and Wave 1 (41%). Respondents living in RC Southwest (83%) and RC North (76%) are most likely to say people in their area “never” respect decisions made by armed opposition groups.

**FIGURE 2.6: REGARD FOR DECISIONS**



## Corruption


Eight out of every ten Afghans (80%) admit corruption is a problem in their area. Although respondents in RC Southwest are generally more positive on other measures, respondents in this area report the most corruption (93%) compared to the other RCs. This is a somewhat surprising result, as respondents in RC Southwest were also the most likely to report that it is unacceptable for people to criticize the government. While still a majority, respondents from RC North were the least likely to say corruption is a problem (68%).

When asked which department or sector of the local government people complain about most regarding corruption, respondents from RC Southwest mostly mention: municipality (11%), district/office of attorney (14%), district office (14%). Respondents from RC East mention courts (14%) and police (11%). Majorities of respondents from RC North, RC West, and RC South said they “did not know.” Nearly half (49%) of all respondents believe the level of corruption in their area has increased (“a lot” or “a little”) in the past year.

## Quality of Life

All things considered, the majority of respondents (68%) say they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their life as a whole (up from 63% in Wave 2, yet slightly less than the 71% who felt this way in Wave 1). As expected, the RCs with more respondents who believe things in their district are going in the “right direction” (RC North and RC Southwest) also have more respondents who report satisfaction with their life as a whole:

**FIGURE 2.7: OUTLOOK AND SATISFACTION**



More than six out of every ten respondents (61%) say they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their household’s current financial situation. Forty-two percent believe their ability to meet basic needs has increased (“a little” or “a lot”), while 37% say it has stayed the same. Nearly half (49%) of respondents say they are “a little worried” about being able to meet their basic needs over the next year, while 20% say they are “not worried” and 24% are “very worried.” Respondents in RC East (30%) are most likely to say they are “very worried.”

Overall, respondents are divided when asked if the situation in their area is certain enough to make plans for the future, with 47% saying “it is certain enough” and 50% saying it is “too uncertain.” When comparing responses across RCs, however, respondents in RC Southwest are more positive about the certainty of their area (65%), while a majority of those in RC South (57%) say their area is “too uncertain.”

## Economic Activity


When asked to compare their ability to access markets now to last year, 45% of respondents believe their ability to get to local markets has gotten better (“a little better” or “much better”), about one-third (34%) say it is about the same, and 21% believe it has gotten worse (“a little worse” or “much worse”).

Although many respondents believe local markets are more accessible, more than half (58%) believe prices for basic goods in their local markets have increased in the past year.

Overall, more respondents surveyed in Wave 3 (37%) say there are less paid jobs available in their area compared to those surveyed in Waves 1 (29%) and 2 (32%).

**FIGURE 2.8: AVAILABILITY OF PAID JOBS**

**Q33. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your area?**



Respondents have generally viewed the availability of paid jobs less favorably in each wave of research. Respondents in RC South are the most likely to say there are more (“a little more” or “a lot more”) paid jobs in their local area compared to last year (45%, compared to 34% overall), while pluralities in RC North (42%) and RC Southwest (45%) say there are less (compared to 37% overall).

## Community Cohesion and Resilience

More than half of Afghans surveyed (53%, up from 47% in Wave 2) say things from outside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems in their area. Respondents in RC Southwest are most likely to say external factors “sometimes” or “often” create problems in their area (44%, compared to 33% overall). However, respondents in RC Southwest are also most likely to say they can deal with such problems; 80% report that people in their area are “sometimes” or “often” able to solve problems that originate from outside the village (compared to 59% overall). Respondents in RC North are most likely to say things from outside their village/neighborhood “rarely” or “never” create problems in their area (77%, compared to 63% overall).

When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include:<sup>19</sup>

<b>Existence/presence of Taliban</b>	<b>15%</b>
<b>Small crimes/thefts</b>	<b>12%</b>
<b>Road-side bombs/suicide attacks</b>	<b>13%</b>
<b>Disputes over water</b>	<b>11%</b>
<b>Ethnic disputes</b>	<b>11%</b>
<b>Land disputes</b>	<b>11%</b>
<b>Insecurity</b>	<b>10%</b>

“Insecurity” and the “Existence/presence of foreign forces” were major interferences mentioned in Wave 2 (12%) that were mentioned less frequently in Wave 3 (7% and 9%, respectively).

Respondents were also asked about internal issues that cause problems in their area. Fifty-one percent of respondents say things from inside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems, 12% say “rarely,” 26% say “often,” and 9% say internal issues “always” create problems in their area. Respondents in RC North are most likely to say “never.”

When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention:<sup>20</sup>

<b>Land disputes</b>	<b>24%</b>
<b>Ethnic disputes</b>	<b>23%</b>
<b>Disputes over water</b>	<b>22%</b>
<b>Family problems</b>	<b>17%</b>

Overall, Afghans believe people in their area are able to solve problems that come from inside their village more often than problems that come from outside their village.

### FIGURE 2.9: ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS

**Q34-Q35. How often are the people in your area able to solve problems from outside and inside your village/neighborhood? (Wave 3, N=38,550)**



<sup>19</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

<sup>20</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

Respondents have consistently increased their likelihood to report that villages/neighborhoods in their area work together to solve problems. In Wave 3, 72% say villages/neighborhoods “sometimes” and “often” work together, compared to 68% in Wave 2 and 66% in Wave 1.

Two-thirds of respondents believe local elders “sometimes” or “often” consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. Another third (32%) say they “rarely” or “never” do. Respondents in RC West report the least efficacy, with 40% saying local elders “rarely” or “never” consider their interests when making decisions that will affect them. Overall, respondents perceive their local elders as effective (“somewhat effective” or “very effective”) at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their village/neighborhood’s needs.

Most respondents (81%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such social groups (n=12,634), respondents say they belong to: farmers unions (35%, up from 27% in Wave 2), development councils (27%, up from 19% in Wave 2), and business companies (17%, down from 19% in Wave 2).<sup>21</sup>

## Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The top three responses in each RC are listed in the table below:<sup>22</sup>

**TABLE I.2: TOP PROBLEMS BY RC**

RC North	RC South	RC Southwest
Unemployment (35%)	Insecurity (32%)	Unemployment (31%)
Lack of electricity (28%)	Unemployment (29%)	Corruption (18%)
Lack of paved roads (18%)	Illiteracy (14%)	Ethnic Disputes (18%)

RC East	RC West
Insecurity (36%)	Insecurity (31%)
Unemployment (33%)	Unemployment (24%)
Illiteracy (15%)	Lack of electricity (20%)

It is interesting to note that in RCs where respondents are generally more positive (RC North and RC Southwest), respondents did not mention “insecurity” as a top problem, while respondents living in RC South, RC East, and RC West all most commonly mention insecurity as the biggest problem causing stress and tension in their area. Across all five RCs, “unemployment” was the most frequently mentioned problem. It is also interesting to note that only in RC Southwest is corruption ranked among respondents’ top three mentions. Overall, the percentage of respondents who mention “unemployment” (31%) has steadily increased since the baseline survey (25% in Wave 1, 27% in Wave 2).

<sup>21</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

<sup>22</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

## Media

Respondents use radio (88%, down from 91% in Wave 2), the Mosque/Mullah (63%), friends and family (89%), and elders (76%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. They are less likely to use television (29%), cell phones (39%), posters/billboards (9%), and newspapers (4%).

Respondents in RC South (46%), RC East (45%), and RC North (42%) are much more likely to use cell phones compared to those in RC Southwest and RC West (15% and 30%, respectively). Those living in RC East and RC South are also more likely to utilize print media (posters/billboards and newspapers).

Almost all of those surveyed (98%) say they do not use the Internet or e-mail to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (68%), friends/family (43%), and elders (31%).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

## Stability in Key Areas North

### Introduction

Stability in Key Areas-North (SIKA-N) targets a core group of provinces in the northern part of Afghanistan:

**TABLE 3.1: SIKA-N WAVE 3 DISTRICTS**

District	Sample size	Complex MOE <sup>24</sup>
Aliabad	n=444	8.61%
Archi	n=256	16.11%
Baghlani Jadid	n=496	6.14%
Chahar Darah	n=453	10.00%
Imam Sahib	n=461	10.03%
Khanabad	n=428	6.83%
Kunduz	n=426	6.70%
Pul-e Khumri	n=487	3.47%
<b>SIKA-N Overall</b>	<b>n=3,451</b>	<b>2.92%</b>

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-N programs. The report compares findings across three waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

It should be noted that interviews in Archi were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). Interviews in Baghlani Jadid, Chahar Darah, and Imam Sahib were conducted in part by AYC and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The remaining districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 3.

It should also be noted that districts included in SIKA-N varied by wave and some control villages sampled in W2 were not included in W3. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave individual component analysis at the overall level as changes in the composition of program districts can have significant impact on trend analysis at this level. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so overall changes in individual components from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts and villages were included or excluded from the analysis. For this

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<sup>24</sup>The complex MOE takes into account the added variance of the cluster design through a design effect estimate. This estimate is then factored into the standard simple random sample MOE estimate by assuming  $p=.5$  at the 95% CI level for a binary variable and multiplying it by the square root of the design effect.

reason, we recommend examining trends at the district level and present the following list of districts by wave and their sample sizes:

**TABLE 3.2: SIK-A-N DISTRICTS BY WAVE**

SIKA-N Districts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Pul-e Khumri	630	490	487
Baghlani Jadid	651	491	496
Imam Sahib	603	478	461
Kunduz	646	490	426
Khanabad	639	490	428
Archi	0	318	256
Chahar Darah	633	495	453
Aliabad	637	494	444
Qaisar	594	0	0
Almar	565	0	0
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>5598</b>	<b>3746</b>	<b>3451</b>

## Key Findings

The main takeaways from SIK-A-N districts are summarized below:

- Most security and development indicators have moved in a positive direction since Wave 2, and tend to be at levels similar to those found in Wave 1.
- The presence of Afghan Security Forces and ISAF has dropped since Wave 1, while the presence of armed opposition groups has remained relatively constant.
- Local government continues to be perceived as responsive.
- Knowledge of DDAs and CDCs has increased since Wave 1. Respondents' opinions of CDC's responsiveness have improved in each wave of research thus far.
- Many respondents have not heard of development projects in their communities, but those who have believe that they are having a positive impact on peoples' lives.
- Respondents are split as to whether they prefer to seek dispute resolution from government courts or local and tribal elders. Relatively few prefer to seek resolution from armed groups opposing the government.
- Satisfaction with district governors' effectiveness varies widely by district within the SIK-A-N program area: respondents in Imam Sahib and Chahar Darah were most likely to say that their district governor was effective at getting things done, while those in Baghlani Jadid were least likely to say so.
- SIK-A-N respondents continue to perceive corruption as a severe problem, and name the Ministry of Education as the most corrupt government office.

- Problems are perceived as coming both from within the community and from without: the largest external problems are armed people and Taliban, while the largest internal problem is crime.
- Unemployment was the most common grievance cited followed by lack of electricity and insecurity.


## Security and Crime

Overall, perceptions of security in SIKA-N districts have improved slightly since Wave 2, but still fall just short of those found in Wave 1. The percentage of respondents in SIKA-N districts saying that security in their local area is “good” or “very good” was 59%, a slight increase since Wave 2, when 54% said it was “good” or “very good”. Respondents in Archi were most likely to rate security in their area as “poor” (16%) or “very poor” (4%), while those in Aliabad were most likely to rate it as “good” (42%) or “very good” (27%).

The percentage of respondents saying that security on the roads in their area was “very good” or “somewhat good” saw a noticeable increase, from 63% in Wave 2 to 71% in Wave 3, higher than the level observed of satisfaction in Wave 1 (67%). Meanwhile, the percentage saying that security on the roads had improved “a little” or “a lot” in the past year had increased back to the same level seen in Wave 1 (56%), after dropping to 48% in Wave 2. The percentage saying that security on the roads had worsened dropped by nearly half, from 19% in Wave 2 to 10% in Wave 3.

Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents saying that they feel “very” or “somewhat” secure in their homes during the day remained high and ticked slightly upward, from 93% in Wave 2 to 95% in Wave 3. However, respondents are much less likely to say that they feel secure in their homes at night: 79% stated that they felt “very” or “somewhat” secure. This result is in line with the 77% seen in Wave 2, as well as the 78% found in Wave 1.

**FIGURE 3.1: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY**



Respondents were split over whether or not security had improved in the previous year: 49% felt their local area was “much” or “somewhat” more secure than it had been one year ago, while 38% said it was “about the same,” and 14% reported that their area was “somewhat” or “much” less secure. Respondents in Kunduz were most likely to say that their local area was “somewhat” or “much” less secure than it had been a year ago (21%), while respondents in Pul-e Khumri and Aliabad were least likely to say that their local area was less secure.


When asked to rate the level of crime in their area, 53% of respondents in SIKa-N districts said that there was “a little” petty crime, an increase from the 50% found in Wave 2, but the same level which was found in Wave 1.

The level of violence crime reported in SIKa-N districts in Wave 3 was in line with the level reported in the overall sample: 15% of SIKa-N respondents said that there was “a lot” of violent crime in their area, similar to the 16% reported overall. The percentage of SIKa-N respondents saying that there was no serious violent crime in their area dropped from 44% in Wave 2 to 40% in Wave 3, but was still above the overall level of 37%.

The perceived presence of Afghan security forces in SIKa-N districts has dropped slightly since Wave 1, while the level of presence of ISAF forces has dropped by a much larger factor. The perceived presence of armed opposition groups in SIKa-N districts has seen relatively little change from wave to wave of research. The following graph shows respondents who say there are “none” of the following groups<sup>25</sup> present in their area:

**FIGURE 3.2: PRESENCE OF GROUPS**

**Q6.1. Respondents who say there are "none" of the following security forces in their area, SIKa-N Districts (Waves 1-3\*)**



\*Wave 1: n=5,598; Wave 2: n=3,746; Wave 3: n=3,451

Respondents in Baghlani Jadid (66%), Kunduz (57%), and Khanabad (56%) were most likely to report “a lot” or “some” presence of armed opposition groups, while those in Archi (31%) were least likely. Respondents in Chahar Darah were most likely to report “a lot” or “some” presence of Arbakis (94%), while those in Pul-e Khumri were least likely (38%).

<sup>25</sup> Arbaki is a tribal based community policing system grounded in volunteer grassroots initiatives and guided by the tribal Jirga (a decision making assembly of male elders). The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was approved by the Afghan government in July 2010 and established by presidential decree on August 16, 2010. The ALP is intended to defend rural communities in areas where there is limited Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police presence and while the national security forces strengthen their capabilities.

Although respondents report less presence of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in their area, confidence in the ANA and ANP is at roughly the same levels it was at in Wave 1 after a slight drop in Wave 2. Ninety percent of respondents say that they have “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in the ANA, while 81% express confidence in the ANP. In addition, 74% of SIKA-N respondents say that the ANA’s ability to provide security in their area has improved in the past year, continuing a steady increase from 61% in Wave 1 to 71% in Wave 2. Sixty-nine percent of Wave 3 SIKA-N respondents say that the ability of the ANP to provide security in their area has improved in the past year, similar to the 70% found in Wave 2 and slightly above the 66% observed in Wave 1.

## Governance


Just over three-fourths of SIKA-N respondents (76%) say that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area. This figure has continued to rise since Wave 1, when 68% of SIKA-N respondents held this view.

Confidence levels in the district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor have all increased since the last wave of data collection. These Wave 3 findings more closely reflect results from Wave 1, and in most cases the level of satisfaction found in Wave 3 are at a similar level to those found in Wave 1. Eighty-five percent of SIKA-N respondents expressed “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in the district governor, up from 76% in Wave 2, while 77% expressed “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in the district government, up from 69% in Wave 2.

Despite the finding that confidence in some local government officials and offices has increased, perceptions of their responsiveness have changed little since Wave 1 survey: while local leaders are seen as slightly more responsive (77% in Wave 3 vs. 74% in Wave 1), the provincial governor is seen as equally responsive (62% in both Wave 3 and Wave 1), and perceptions of the district governor’s responsiveness have actually declined (from 80% in Wave 1 to 75% in Wave 3).

**FIGURE 3.3: RESPONSIVENESS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT**


**Q9. Respondents who think the following governing bodies are responsive to the needs of local people in their area**



Although few respondents in any district felt that government services had worsened in the past year, those in Baghlani Jadid were most likely to say that they had not improved, while those in Chahar Darah were most likely to say that they had. This suggests that not all district governors are seen as equally effective, and perceptions of an individual district governor’s effectiveness can make a large difference in terms of impacting the total results for the program area.

**FIGURE 3.4: DISTRICT GOVERNOR’S EFFECTIVENESS**

**Q11a. Over the past year, has the District Governor's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?**




Knowledge of the District Development Assembly (DDA) has increased from 58% in Wave 2 to 64% in Wave 3, surpassing slightly the 62% found in Wave 1. Confidence in the DDA among respondents who have heard of it also saw a slight increase, with 86% expressing “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in it, up from 79% in Wave 2. Perceptions of the responsiveness of the DDA have changed little since Wave 1, as have opinions of the DDA’s ability to get things done.

Fifty-eight percent of respondents say that a Community Development Council (CDC) has been established in their area. As might be expected, figures varied widely by district: 73% in Pul-e Khumri and 72% in Baghlani Jadid said that a CDC had been established in their area, compared with only 23% in Archi. Seventy-seven percent of respondents who said that a CDC had been established in their area said that they had “some” or “a lot” of confidence in it. Perceptions of the responsiveness of the CDC saw some improvement since Wave 1 survey, climbing to 78% in Wave 3 from 72% in Wave 2, and 73% in Wave 1. Sixty-seven percent of respondents said that the CDC’s ability to get things done had improved “a lot” or “a little” in the past year, similar to the findings of the two previous waves of the survey.

Majorities of respondents believed that their district government officials were actually from their district. However, figures varied widely among districts: in Baghlani Jadid, 84% believed their district government officials were from the district, compared with only 53% in Archi. Relatively fewer respondents felt that the government understood the problems of people in their area, and these figures are more consistent at the district level.

**FIGURE 3.5: PERCEPTIONS OF THE DISTRICT GOVERNMENT, SIKA-N BY DISTRICT**



A majority of SIKA-N respondents (62%) feel that the government cares about people in their area, up slightly from Wave 2 (54%), and in line with the Wave 1 results (57%). Forty-four percent believe that district government officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves, and respondents are evenly split on whether or not they think district government officials are doing their jobs honestly: 49% say that they are, while 49% say they are not. SIKA-N respondents are also split on whether or not the district government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner, and whether or not it is acceptable to criticize the Afghan government in public, with 55% saying it is acceptable and 43% saying it is not acceptable.

### Service Provision and Development

Overall, just over half of respondents (55%) believe government services have improved “a lot” or “a little” in the past year, about one-third (32%) believe they have not changed, and 13% say they have worsened. The percentage reporting improvement has increased in each wave of research, from 48% in Wave 1 to 51% in Wave 2 to 55% in the current wave.

Level of satisfaction varies when respondents are asked about specific government services. A majority of respondents say that they are satisfied with the district government’s provision of clean drinking water (56%), a result that shows little change from the previous wave (55%). Satisfaction with the district government’s provision of irrigation water is lower (44% in Wave 3), and has dropped slightly since Wave 2 (46%). Only one-quarter (25%) were satisfied with the district government’s provision of agricultural assistance. While only 24% are satisfied with the district government’s provision of retaining and flood walls, this figure still represents a noticeable improvement from Wave 1, when it was 14%.

The survey recorded satisfaction with the district government’s provision of roads and bridges at 35%, up from 28% in Wave 2, and up slightly from Wave 1, when it was 33%. Satisfaction with the district

government’s provision of medical care also saw a noticeable increase from Wave 2 (28%) to Wave 3 (39%). Forty-five percent of SIKA-N respondents say that they are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with the district government’s provision of schooling for girls, up from 38% in Wave 2, but still below the level found in Wave 1. Satisfaction with schooling for boys has also increased, from 50% in Wave 2 to 58% in Wave 3, the same level as was recorded in Wave 1. Finally, while the percentage saying that they are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with the district government’s provision of electricity remains low at 22%, this percentage has nevertheless seen a steady increase from 14% in Wave 1 and 19% in Wave 2. Also, the percentage reporting that the service is not provided has fallen from 28% in Wave 1 to 12% in Wave 3.

The percentage of respondents who have seen or heard about development projects in their area has increased from 29% in Wave 2 to 40% in Wave 3. Respondents who had heard about projects overwhelmingly believed that the projects had improved life for people in their local area.

**TABLE 3.3: VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

Q17ba-i. Respondents who have seen or heard about the following development projects in their area...		Q17ca-i. [If yes] Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area?
<b>Drinking Water</b>	64%	91%
<b>Irrigation/water maintenance systems</b>	36%	93%
<b>Agricultural assistance (seed fertilizer, equipment)</b>	28%	87%
<b>Farm produce processing or storage facilities</b>	19%	91%
<b>Retaining and flood walls</b>	19%	93%
<b>Roads and bridges</b>	46%	90%
<b>Medical facilities</b>	36%	88%
<b>Schools</b>	52%	91%
<b>Electricity</b>	28%	91%

Looking forward to the next year, respondents most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:<sup>26</sup>

Electricity	38%
Road construction	32%
Clinics	22%
Water	21%
Education and School	18%
Tailoring/embroidery	10%

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining healthcare or medicine. The most frequently-mentioned responses were lack of clinics/hospitals (49%), lack of medicines (27%),

<sup>26</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

distance to facilities and lack of transportation (25%), lack of professional doctors (25%), and cost of healthcare or medicine (22%).<sup>27</sup>

## Rule of Law

In general, respondents are split as to whether they will seek resolution for disputes from government courts or local and tribal elders. Government courts are preferred for cases of assault, kidnapping, and murder, while local and tribal elders are preferred for disputes involving theft, land, or water. Although relatively few SIKa-N respondents would seek resolution from armed opposition groups for any type of dispute, they are most likely to refer to armed opposition groups in cases of theft.

**TABLE 3.4: JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

<b>Q20. If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [Insert Item], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice?</b>				
	<b>Government Court</b>	<b>Local/Tribal Elders</b>	<b>Armed Opposition</b>	<b>Police</b>
<b>Land or water</b>	43%	51%	1%	4%
<b>Assault, murder, or kidnapping</b>	53%	34%	3%	9%
<b>Theft</b>	37%	41%	9%	12%

Respondents report the highest confidence in the ability of local and tribal leaders to resolve disputes fairly, with 95% saying that they have “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence”. This figure has seen little change since Wave 1. Eighty-five percent say that they have “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in government courts to resolve disputes fairly, while 21% of SIKa-N respondents have confidence in the ability of armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly.

SIKaN respondents are most likely to say that people in their village or neighborhood “always” or “mostly” respect the decisions of tribal or local elders, in line with the findings from Wave 1 and Wave 2. Government courts are also likely to have their decisions respected, with 80% of respondents saying that people in their village or neighborhood “always” or “mostly” respect their decisions. Seventeen percent of respondents say that people in their community “always” or “mostly” respect the decisions made by armed opposition groups.


## Corruption

More than eight out of ten SIKa-N respondents (82%) report corruption is a problem in their area, a figure which has risen in each wave of research so far. Respondents named the Ministry of Education as the department or sector of the government where people complain about corruption most. The percentage naming it as most corrupt has increased steadily in each wave of research, from 9% in Wave 1 to 16% in Wave 2, to 21% in Wave 3. The courts are next most likely to be viewed as corrupt.

<sup>27</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

**FIGURE 3.6: PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION BY DISTRICT**

**Q25. In the last year, has the level of corruption in this area increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Is that increased/decreased a little or a lot?**



Among SIKA-N districts, respondents in Chahar Darah were most likely to say that corruption had decreased, while those in Pul-e Khumri were most likely to say that it had increased.

### Quality of Life

Seventy-four percent of respondents state that they are “very satisfied” or “somewhat satisfied” with their life as a whole, up from 70% in Wave 2. Sixty-five percent of respondents report that they are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with their household’s current financial situation. Thirty-nine percent of respondents report that their ability to meet their basic needs has increased in the previous year, a decrease since Wave 1, when it was 43%. However, the percentage saying their ability to meet basic needs has decreased in the past year is unchanged from the 20% found in Wave 1.

Only 17% of respondents say they are “not worried” about being able to meet basic needs in the next year, a decrease from the 24% found in Wave 1 and the 22% found in Wave 2. The percentage saying they are “very worried” has seen little change, while the percentage reporting that they are “a little worried” has increased. The percentage of respondents who agree with the statement that, “situation in this area is too uncertain for me to make plans for my future” has dropped slightly since Wave 2, largely due to an increase in respondents saying that they do not know if the situation is certain enough to allow them to plan for the future or not.

### Economic Activity

When asked to compare their ability to access markets now to last year, 48% report that it is “much better” or “a little better”. While there remains a general sense that prices are increasing, with 66% of


respondents saying that prices in the last year have increased “a little” or “a lot”, this perception seems weaker than it did in Wave 1, when 66% believed so. The percentage of respondents reporting that there are more (“a lot more” or “a little more”) paid jobs in their area (37%) has changed little since Wave 2, after an increase from Wave 1 (30%).

## Community Cohesion and Resilience

More than half of all SIKA-N respondents (58%) say that things from outside of their village or neighborhood “never” create problems in the area, a slight increase from Wave 1 but a decline from the level found in Wave 2.

**FIGURE 3.7: PROBLEMS FROM THE OUTSIDE**

**Q34a. How often do things from outside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?**



When respondents were asked what types of external interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include:<sup>28</sup>

Armed people <sup>29</sup>	17%
Existence/presence of Taliban	16%
Ethnic disputes	16%
Small crimes/theft	13%
Criminals	8%
Insecurity	8%

“Ethnic disputes” and the “Existence/presence of Taliban” were mentioned less frequently as major external interferences in Wave 3 (16% for both) than in Wave 2 (19% and 18% respectively).


<sup>28</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported. “Armed people” (or Afrad Mosalah/Zorgoyan) is separate category, because it doesn't specify belonging to a particular group. In many instances respondents couldn't or were not willing to identify to which groups these people belonged.

<sup>29</sup> “Armed people” (or Afrad Mosalah/Zorgoyan) is separate category, because it doesn't specify belonging to a particular group. In many instances respondents couldn't or were not willing to identify to which groups these people belonged.

When asked how often people in their area were able to work together to solve problems that came from outside their village or neighborhood, 19% said that they were “often” able to solve them, an increase from the 12% found in Wave 2. However, the percentage for respondents saying that people were “sometimes” able to solve problems that came from the outside dropped from 50% to 45%, those saying they could “rarely” solve these problems remained unchanged at 25%, and the share saying that they could “never” solve such problems declined slightly, from 10% to 8%.

Respondents were also asked about internal issues that cause problems in their area. The answers suggest that internal interferences cause problems about as frequently as external ones.

**FIGURE 3.8: PROBLEMS FROM THE INSIDE**



When respondents were also asked what types of internal issues cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include:<sup>30</sup>

Small crimes	21%
Ethnic disputes	17%
Land disputes	13%
Armed people	11%
Family problems	9%

Respondents state that people in their area are able to work together to solve problems that come from within the community slightly more often than they are able to come together to resolve problems that come from the outside: 25% say that they are “often” able to do so, 47% say they are “sometimes” able, 18% say “rarely”, and 10% say “never”. The last percentage has fallen by 4 percentage points since Wave 1.


Two-thirds (66%) of SIKa-N respondents believe local elders “sometimes” or “often” consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. The other third (33%)

<sup>30</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

say they “rarely” or “never” do. Sixty-four percent of respondents believe that local leaders consider the interests of women when making decisions, and 73% say that their local leaders are “very” or “somewhat” effective at securing funds for the community’s needs from the district or provincial government.

**FIGURE 3.9: ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS**

**Q34-Q35. How often are the people in your area able to solve problems from outside and inside your village/neighborhood? (Wave 3 SIKA-N, n=3,451)**



Most respondents (83%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such social groups (n=538), respondents say they belong to: farmers unions (41%, up from 39% in Wave 2), development councils (23%, up from 21% in Wave 2), and welfare foundations (19%, up from 10% in Wave 2).<sup>31</sup>

**Grievances**

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The largest problems that create stress or tension in SIKA-N districts are unemployment (35%, up from 28% in Wave 2), lack of electricity (24%, down from 27% in Wave 2), and insecurity (21%, unchanged from Wave 2).

<sup>31</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

**TABLE 3.5: MAIN GRIEVANCES BY DISTRICT**

	Unemployment	Weak economy	Lack of electricity	Lack of clinics	Lack of paved roads	Insecurity	Illiteracy
<b>Pul-e Khumri</b>	36%	5%	24%	10%	13%	13%	5%
<b>Baghlani Jadid</b>	33%	3%	27%	16%	8%	33%	3%
<b>Imam Sahib</b>	36%	14%	26%	11%	21%	20%	9%
<b>Kunduz</b>	39%	4%	17%	7%	14%	25%	13%
<b>Khanabad</b>	32%	5%	32%	13%	13%	22%	9%
<b>Archi</b>	20%	11%	25%	10%	20%	13%	2%
<b>Chahar Darah</b>	42%	12%	19%	8%	12%	25%	12%
<b>Aliabad</b>	37%	7%	24%	13%	10%	15%	12%

As can be seen in the figure above, large variances in terms of major grievances were observed at the district level in SIKa-N. While unemployment was cited as the main source of stress and tension in most districts, residents in Archi named lack of electricity as their largest source. The share of answers citing lack of paved roads varied from 8% in Baghlani Jadid to 21% in Imam Sahib.

### Media

A majority of SIKa-N respondents get their information from friends and family (90%), the radio (86%), elders (84%), or mosques and mullahs (60%). A minority (35%) get information through television. Very few respondents use posters and billboards (4%) or newspapers (3%), and barely any (1%) use internet or email.

## Stability in Key Areas South

### Introduction

Stability in Key Areas-South (SIKA-S) targets a core group of provinces in the southern part of Afghanistan:

**TABLE 4.1: SIKA-S WAVE 3 DISTRICTS**

District	Sample size	Complex MOE
Arghandab	n=479	8.69%
Chorah	n=334	11.33%
Daman	n=480	8.26%
Deh Rawud	n=420	8.31%
Garmser	n=332	12.69%
Kang	n=495	8.57%
Lashkar Gah	n=491	9.00%
Nad 'Ali	n=495	10.04%
Nahr-e Saraj	n=472	9.59%
Qalat	n=496	7.28%
Shah Joy	n=496	7.13%
Tarin Kot	n=457	9.81%
Tarnak wa Jaldak	n=471	9.02%
Zaranj	n=494	6.00%
<b>SIKA-S Overall</b>	<b>n=6,412</b>	<b>2.09%</b>

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-S programs. The report compares findings across three waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

It should be noted that interviews in Tarnak wa Jaldak were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). The remaining districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 3.

It should also be noted that districts included in SIKA-S varied by wave and some control villages sampled in W2 were not included in W3. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave individual component analysis at the overall level as changes in the composition of program districts can have significant impact on trend analysis at this level. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so overall changes in individual components from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor

of which districts and villages were included or excluded from the analysis. For this reason, we recommend examining trends at the district level and present the following list of districts by wave and their sample sizes:

**TABLE 4.2: SIKA-S DISTRICTS BY WAVE**

SIKA-S Districts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Zaranj	0	407	494
Kang	0	0	495
Nad 'Ali	652	476	495
Nahr-e Saraj	0	0	472
Garmser	643	495	332
Lashkar Gah	0	0	491
Panjwa'i	640	0	0
Arghandab (1)	638	483	479
Shah Wali Kot	652	0	0
Daman	642	489	480
Shah Joy	0	494	496
Qalat	623	484	496
Tarnak wa Jaldak	0	399	471
Tarin Kot	0	467	457
Chorah	0	478	334
Deh Rawud	0	414	420
Marjah	335	0	0
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>4825</b>	<b>5086</b>	<b>6412</b>

## Key Findings

The major takeaways from SIKA-S districts are summarized below:

- Sixty-seven percent of SIKA-S respondents say that things in their district are generally moving in the right direction, up from 64% in Wave 2 and 60% in Wave 1
- Perceptions of security vary widely by district. Confidence in the ability of the ANSF to provide security has increased since Wave 1 rubs
- 
- Respondents report less presence of both international forces and insurgents
- Respondents prefer to refer disputes over land and water to village and neighborhood elders for resolution, while they prefer to resolve disputes over murder, kidnapping, assault, and theft through the government court system
- Although views of government courts have improved over the course of this study, elders remain the most respected and trusted source of dispute resolution
- The districts of Qalat and Shah Joy consistently demonstrate the lowest level of satisfaction with security and governance indicators, while Lashkar Gah, Nad 'Ali, and Daman generally have higher levels of satisfaction. Qalat and Shah Joy also report high levels of presence of armed opposition groups and Arbakis


- Corruption continues to be a major problem
- Respondents perceive rising prices and a decline in the availability of paid jobs compared with one year ago. This may be impacting negative perceptions of the quality of life in SIKa-S districts
- Respondents see the main problems emanating from outside their community as disputes over water, presence of foreign forces, disputes over land, and the presence of Taliban
- Respondents perceive the main problems coming from within their community to be disputes over water, ethnic disputes, and disputes over land
- The main sources of grievance in SIKa-S are unemployment and insecurity

## Security and Crime

Overall, perceptions of security in SIKa-S districts have faltered since Wave 1: 56% of SIKa-S respondents report that the security situation in their area is “good” or “very good.” While this is the same overall level of satisfaction found in Wave 1, the percentage of respondents who rate the security in their area as “very good” has declined from 30% in Wave 1 to 27% in Wave 2 to 20% in Wave 3. Perceptions of security in districts targeted by the SIKa-S program vary across districts. Respondents in Qalat and Shah Joy report the worst security, while those in Arghandab and Lashkar Gah report the best security.

**FIGURE 4.1: OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION**

**Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that ‘very good/poor’?**




Despite a decline in the share of respondents saying that security in their area was good, a majority of residents still reported that their local area was “somewhat” or “much” more secure than it had been one year earlier. This figure has changed little since Wave 1.

The percentage of respondents saying that security on the roads in their area was “very good” or “somewhat good” saw little change from Wave 1 (66%) to Wave 2 (64%), to Wave 3 (65%). The percentage saying that security on the roads had improved “a little” or “a lot” in the past year decreased

from Wave 1 to Wave 2, but saw little change from Wave 2 to Wave 3. Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents saying that they feel “very” or “somewhat” secure in their homes during the day remained relatively high at 84%, but was down from the Wave 1 result at 92%. However, respondents are much less likely to say that they feel secure in their homes at night: 75% stated that they felt “very” or “somewhat” secure. However, this figure has increased substantially since Wave 1, when it was 54%. Sixty-seven percent of SIKa-S respondents said they felt “very” or “somewhat” secure travelling to a neighboring village, up from 63% in Wave 2 and 58% in Wave 1. By contrast, the percentage of respondents who say they feel “very” or “somewhat” secure travelling to the district or provincial center was 49%, the same level observed in the Wave 1, after ticking upward slightly to 53% in Wave 2.

**FIGURE 4.2: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY**

**Q4a. Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are ...? (n=6,412)**




When asked to rate the level of crime in their area, 29% of respondents in SIKa-S districts said that there was “a lot” of petty crime, a decrease from the 36% found in Wave 1, but similar to the level found in Wave 2. Seventeen percent of respondents said there was “a lot” of violent crime, continuing a decline from 27% in Wave 1 and 22% in Wave 2.

The level of violent crime reported in SIKa-S districts in Wave 3 was in line with the level reported in the overall sample: 17% of SIKa-S respondents said that there was “a lot” of violent crime in their area, similar to the 16% reported overall. The percentage of SIKa-S respondents saying that there was no serious violent crime in their area dropped slightly from 32% in Wave 2 to 29% in Wave 3, compared with an overall level of 37% found for all districts in Wave 3.

The perceived presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in SIKa-S districts has declined since the Wave 1, while the perceived presence of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has seen relatively little change since Wave 1, while the level of presence of ISAF forces and armed opposition groups has dropped by a much larger factor. The percentage of respondents reporting the presence of Arbakis increased. The following graph shows respondents who say there are “none” of the following groups present in their area:

### FIGURE 4.3: PRESENCE OF GROUPS

Q6.1. Respondents who say there are "none" of the following security forces in their area




Respondents in Shah Joy (93%), Qalat (92%), and Nad ‘Ali (92%) were most likely to report “a lot” or “some” presence of armed opposition groups, while those in Zarnaj (16%) and Kang (20%) were least likely. Respondents in Nahr-e Saraj, Nad ‘Ali, and Garmser were most likely to report “a lot” or ‘some’ presence of Arbakis (99%, 98%, and 98% respectively), while those in Zarnaj and Kang were least likely (1% and 3% were least likely).

Confidence in the ANA’s ability to provide security has seen notable improvement since Wave 1. Confidence in the ANP’s performance has also improved, albeit by a lesser factor.

### FIGURE 4.4: ANA AND ANP IMPROVEMENT

Q7. Respondents who believe the ANA/ANP’s ability to provide security has improved in the past year (Waves 1-3, N=16,323)




Wave 1 n=4825 | Wave 2 n=5086 | Wave 3 n=6412

## Governance


Seven out of ten SIKA-S respondents (70%) say that the Afghan government is well-regarded in their area. While this figure represents an improvement from Wave 2 (67%), it still falls short of the level observed in Wave 1(74%). However, this figure varied widely by district in SIKA-S: respondents in Zaranj were most likely to say that the government was well-regarded in their area (90%), while those in Deh Rawud were least likely to say so (34%).

**FIGURE 4.5: OPINION OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT BY DISTRICT, SIKA-S**



Confidence in the district governor in SIKA-S districts has seen a continued decline since the baseline, from 77% in Wave 1 to 68% in Wave 3. By contrast, confidence in the district government has actually risen, from 63% in Wave 1 to 69% in Wave 3.


**FIGURE 4.6: CONFIDENCE IN DISTRICT GOVERNOR VS. CONFIDENCE IN DISTRICT GOVERNMENT, SIKA-S BY WAVE**



Confidence in local and neighborhood leaders has improved since Wave 2, from 81% to 88%. While confidence in the provincial governor (64% in Wave 3) has seen little change since Wave 2, it has improved since Wave 1 (58%).

These results may be related to perceptions of the responsiveness of various local government organs. Perceptions of the responsiveness of the district government have changed little since Wave 1. The district governor’s perceived responsiveness also saw little change. However, perceptions of the responsiveness of local village and neighborhood leaders have improved more noticeably, from 81% in Wave 1 to 88% in Wave 3.

**FIGURE 4.7: RESPONSIVENESS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT**



While a majority of respondents reported that the district governor’s ability to get things done had improved “a lot” or “a little” over the previous year, the percentage reporting improvement had dropped somewhat since Wave 1, when it was recorded at 67%. A majority also feel that the district government has become more responsive, but the percentage feeling this way has remained more or less constant since the beginning of the study. Respondents’ view of the responsiveness of their provincial governor has also seen little change. The responsiveness of local and community leaders has seen a slight improvement, from 69% in Wave 2 (the same level recorded in Wave 1) to 75% in Wave 3.

Knowledge of the District Development Assembly (DDA) has declined since Wave 1 (72%), but remained relatively flat from Wave 2 (68%) to Wave 3 (69%). Confidence in the DDA among respondents who have heard of it has seen a slight increase since Wave 2: the percentage of respondents expressing “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in it rose from 72% in Wave 2 to 78% in Wave 3, but this finding still falls short of the 80% observed in Wave 1 of the study. Perceptions of the responsiveness of the DDA have improved slightly since Wave 1: 80% of respondents in Wave 3 say that it is “somewhat” or “very” responsive, compared with 71% in Wave 1 and 72% in Wave 2. Sixty-five percent of SIKAS respondents believe that the DDA’s ability to get things done has improved “a lot” or “a little” over the past year.

Sixty-eight percent of respondents reported that a Community Development Council (CDC) had been established in their area. This figure varied widely by district: 92% of respondents in Nahr-e Saraj said that a CDC had been established in their area, compared with only 48% in Qalat. Eighty percent of SIKAS respondents report “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in the CDC, a figure which has seen little change since Wave 1. The percentage of respondents who view the CDC as responsive has increased in each wave of research, from 72% in Wave 1 to 81% in Wave 3. Perceptions of the CDC’s ability to get things done have also seen slow but steady improvement, from 62% in Wave 1 to 70% in Wave 3.

A majority of SIKA-S respondents (63%) believed that their district government officials were from their district. However, figures varied widely among districts: in Chorah, 87% believed their district government officials were from the district, compared with only 17% in Qalat and 20% in Shah Joy. Although a similar share of respondents (62%) felt that the district government understood the problems of people in their area, this figure was more consistent at the district level.

A majority of SIKA-S respondents (64%) feel that the district government cares about people in their area, up slightly from Wave 2 (61%), but still short of the Wave 1 results (69%). Thirty-seven percent believe that district government officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves, but this figure has seen a noticeable decline from the 50% seen in Wave 1 and the 42% found in Wave 2. A majority (60%) of SIKA-S respondents think that district government officials are doing their jobs honestly, and a similar percentage believes that the district government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner. However, a majority (53%) of respondents say that it is not acceptable to criticize the government in public, a figure which has risen from the 44% found in Wave 2 when the question was first asked.

### **Service Provision & Development**

Overall, 59% of SIKA-S respondents believe that government services have improved in the past year, compared with 56% who felt that way in Wave 2 and 50% who said services had improved in Wave 1.

Levels of satisfaction vary when respondents are asked about specific government services. Sixty-five percent of respondents said that they were “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with the district government’s provision of clean drinking water - down from 75% in Wave 2. The level of satisfaction with the provision of irrigation water was 54%, a level similar to that found in previous waves. The level of satisfaction with agricultural assistance was 50% in Wave 3, another result which showed slight change from previous waves. Satisfaction with the provision of retaining and flood walls was 38%. Fifty-six percent reported satisfaction with the district government’s provision of roads and bridges.

Fifty-seven percent of SIKA-S respondents said that they were “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with the district government’s provision of medical care, up from 51% in Wave 1. Satisfaction with schooling for girls was 43%, little changed from the 41% found in Wave 2 or the 40% reported in Wave 1. However, satisfaction with the provision of schooling for boys has seen substantial improvement, from 52% in Wave 1 to 68% in Wave 3. The lowest level of satisfaction was with the provision of electricity, with only 19% of SIKA-S respondents saying they were very or somewhat satisfied. In addition, the percentage of respondents reporting that electricity was not provided at all rose from 11% in Wave 1 to 29% in Wave 3.

The percentage of respondents who have seen or heard about development projects in their area has increased from 62% in Wave 2 to 68% in Wave 3. Respondents who had heard about projects overwhelmingly believed that the projects had improved life for people in their local area.

**TABLE 4.3: VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

Q17ba-i. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?		Q17ca-i. [If yes] Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area?
<b>Drinking Water</b>	80%	89%
<b>Irrigation/water maintenance systems</b>	60%	88%
<b>Agricultural assistance (seed fertilizer, equipment)</b>	58%	84%
<b>Farm produce processing or storage facilities</b>	19%	71%
<b>Retaining and flood walls</b>	40%	86%
<b>Roads and bridges</b>	68%	88%
<b>Medical facilities</b>	69%	85%
<b>Schools</b>	74%	90%
<b>Electricity</b>	16%	74%

Looking forward to the next year, respondents most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:<sup>32</sup>

Road construction	37%
Clinics	25%
Education and School	22%
Electricity	19%

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining healthcare or medicine. The most frequently-mentioned responses were lack of lack of medicines (34%), lack of professional doctors (33%), clinics/hospitals (31%), distance to facilities and lack of medical equipment (22%).<sup>33</sup>

### Rule of Law

In general, respondents are split as to whether they will seek resolution for disputes from government courts or local and tribal elders. Government courts are preferred for cases of theft, assault, kidnapping, and murder, while local and tribal elders are preferred for disputes involving theft, land, or water. Relatively few SIKAS respondents would seek resolution from armed opposition groups for any type of dispute, and the percentage who would has generally been in decline.

It is important to note here that while the percentage of respondents who would seek resolution for land or water disputes in a government court has fallen from 39% in Wave 1 and 40% in Wave 2 to 34% in Wave 3, the share of respondents who would seek resolution for a case of assault, kidnapping, or murder in a government court has risen substantially, from 39% in Wave 1 to 56% in Wave 3. The share of

<sup>32</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>33</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

respondents who would seek resolution for a case of theft in a government court has increased from 29% in Wave 1 to 47% in Wave 3 (in Wave 2, it was 42%), while the percentage who would seek resolution from armed opposition groups for such a case has fallen from 13% in Wave 2 to 8% in Wave 3.

<b>Q20. If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [Insert Item], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice?...</b>			
	<b>Government Court</b>	<b>Local/Tribal Elders</b>	<b>Armed Opposition</b>
<b>Land or water</b>	34%	58%	7%
<b>Assault, murder, or kidnapping</b>	56%	34%	9%
<b>Theft</b>	47%	42%	8%

**TABLE 4.4: JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION**

Although reliance on local and tribal leaders to resolve some types of disputes seems to be decreasing in SIKA-S districts, they still command the highest confidence to resolve disputes fairly, with 95% saying that they have “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence”. This figure has seen little change since Wave 1. Seventy-six percent say that they have “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” in government courts to resolve disputes fairly, while 27% have confidence in the ability of armed opposition groups.

SIKA-S respondents are most likely to say that people in their village or neighborhood “always” or “mostly” respect the decisions of tribal or local elders. The percentage of respondents who say that elders’ decisions are respected has increased in each wave of research so far, and was 86% in Wave 3.

Government courts are somewhat less likely to have their decisions respected, with 70% of respondents saying that people in their village or neighborhood “always” or “mostly” respect their decisions. Twenty-four percent of respondents say that people in their community “always” or “mostly” respect the decisions made by armed opposition groups.

### **Corruption**

Almost nine out of ten (87%) of SIKA-S respondents said that corruption was a problem in their area, a figure which has risen in each wave of research so far. Nearly all respondents in Nad ‘Ali (100%) and Lashkar Gah (99%) said that there was corruption in their area. Forty-eight percent of SIKA-S respondents say that corruption in their area has increased “a lot” or “a little” in the past year. This share has risen from 37% in Wave 1 to 40% in Wave 2.

SIKA-S respondents name the District/Office of Attorney (12%) and the courts (10%) as the sectors of government that people complain about most regarding corruption.

### **Quality of Life**

Satisfaction with life as a whole in SIKA-S districts has decreased since Wave 1. Seventy percent of respondents say they are satisfied (“somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”) with their life in general, compared to 66% in Wave 2 and 75% in Wave 1. However, since Wave 1, respondents have become more likely to say they are satisfied with their household’s current financial situation (68% in Wave 3, compared with 67% in Wave 2 and 57% in Wave 1).

The districts of Shah Joy and Qalat stand out as negative outliers on most of the stabilization and development indicators, though high levels of dissatisfaction were also found in Tarnak Wa Jaldak, and Daman. Sixty-three percent of those in Shah Joy and 55% in Qalat say they are dissatisfied with their life as a whole. Respondents in districts with high dissatisfaction as to quality of life were also most likely to say the ability to meet their basic needs has decreased (“decreased a little” or “decreased a lot”) in the past year, and that they are “very worried” about meeting their basic needs over the next year. Tarnak Wa Jaldak had the highest level of worry about whether or not respondents would be able to meet their basic needs in the coming year: 43% said they were “very worried” and another 48% said they were “a little worried”. This compares to an average of 23% “very worried” and 42% “a little worried” for all SIKA-S districts.

Overall, respondents in SIKA-S districts are divided when asked about their ability to plan for the future. A slight majority (52%) say that the situation in their area is certain enough for them to make plans for their future, while 46% say that things in their area are too uncertain for them to make plans.

### **Economic Activity**

When asked to compare their ability to access markets now to last year, 51% said that access to markets had gotten “much better” or “a little better”. This was the same level found in Wave 2, but it still represents a decline from Wave 1, when it was recorded at 64%. A majority of respondents report that prices for basic goods in local markets have increased, the percentage saying so dropped slightly from Wave 2 to Wave 3 after experiencing a sharp rise from Wave 1 to Wave 2.


When asked about the availability of paid jobs, the percentage of respondents saying that there are more paid jobs than one year ago has seen a precipitous decline over the past three waves of research, from 51% in Wave 1 to 41% in Wave 2, down to 31% in Wave 3. However, in a few districts such as Lashkar Gah, Daman, and Arghandab, respondents reported more paid jobs available.

### **Community Cohesion and Resilience**

A plurality of SIKA-S respondents (43%) say that things from outside of their village or neighborhood “never” create problems in the area, a slight decrease from Wave 1, but an increase from the level found in Wave 2.

## FIGURE 4.8: PROBLEMS FROM THE OUTSIDE

Q34a. How often do things from outside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?



When respondents were also asked what types of external interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include:<sup>34</sup>

Disputes over water	16%
Existence/presence of foreign forces	15%
Land disputes	14%
Existence/presence of Taliban	12%
Ethnic disputes	12%
Roadside bombs/Suicide attacks	10%

Roadside bombs and suicide attacks were mentioned less frequently in Wave 3 than in Wave 2, when they were 17%.


When asked how often people in their area were able to work together to solve problems that came from outside their village or neighborhood, 65% said that they were “often” or “sometimes” able to work together to solve these problems. Although the percentage who said that people were “rarely” able to come together to resolve problems decreased, the share of respondents who said that people were “never” able to resolve these types of problems by working together increased from 8% in Wave 2 to 15% in Wave 3.

Respondents were also asked about internal interferences that cause problems in their area. The answers suggest that internal interferences cause problems about as frequently as external ones.

<sup>34</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## FIGURE 4.9: PROBLEMS FROM THE INSIDE

**Q35a. How often do things from inside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?**



When respondents were also asked what types of internal interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include:<sup>35</sup>

Disputes over water	21%
Ethnic disputes	20%
Land disputes	18%
Family problems	13%
Small crimes/theft	9%


Respondents state that people in their area are able to work together to solve problems that come from within the community slightly more often than they are able to come together to resolve problems that come from the outside: 20% say that they are “often” able to do so, 57% say they are “sometimes” able, 19% say “rarely”, and 3% say “never”.

Over three-fourths (77%) of SIKAS respondents believe local elders “sometimes” or “often” consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. The remaining quarter (23%) say they “rarely” or “never” do. Seventy-two percent of respondents believe that local leaders consider the interests of women when making decisions, and 74% say that their local leaders are “very” or “somewhat” effective at securing funds for the community’s needs from the district or provincial government.

<sup>35</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## FIGURE 4.10: ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS

Q34-Q35. How often are the people in your area able to solve problems from outside and inside your village/neighborhood? (Wave 3 SIKa-S, n=6,412)



Most respondents (76%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Those who do belong to groups are most likely to belong to farmers' unions (42%), business companies (28%), and development councils (22%).

### Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include<sup>36</sup>

Unemployment	30%
Insecurity	23%
Illiteracy	15%
Lack of electricity	11%
Corruption	11%

Large variances in terms of major grievances were observed at the district level in SIKa-S. For example, 54% of respondents in Tarnak Wa Jaldak mentioned unemployment as their main grievance, compared with only 7% in Chorah.

### Media

A majority of SIKa-S respondents get their information from friends and family (88%), the radio (91%), elders (69%), or mosques and mullahs (57%). A minority (19%) get information through television. Very few respondents use posters and billboards (4%) or newspapers (3%), and barely any (1%) use internet or email.

<sup>36</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## Stability in Key Areas East

### Introduction

Stability in Key Areas-East (SIKA-E) targets a core group of provinces in the eastern part of Afghanistan:

**TABLE 5.1: SIKA-E WAVE 3 DISTRICTS**

District	Sample size	Complex MOE
Sayyidabad	n=480	5.88%
Chak-e Wardak	n=496	8.45%
Nerkh	n=494	11.06%
Jalrayz	n=496	5.51%
Baraki Barak	n=335	10.19%
Muhammad Aghah	n=495	10.82%
Khoshi	n=427	24.98%
Qarah Bagh	n=467	8.35%
Andar	n=334	11.65%
Deh Yak	n=327	15.16%
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghathu)	n=420	8.34%
Khwajah Omari	n=464	7.00%
Zurmat	n=336	13.40%
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	n=352	6.27%
Dzadran	n=336	10.14%
Ahmadabad	n=446	9.96%
Tanai	n=493	4.17%
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	n=488	5.71%
Gurbuz	n=493	4.44%
Jaji Maidan	n=414	2.79%
Lajah-Mangal	n=336	8.12%
<b>SIKA-E Overall</b>	<b>n=8929</b>	<b>2.55%</b>

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-E programs. The report compares findings across three waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

It should be noted that interviews in Baraki Barak, Andar, Zurmat, and Dzadran were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). Interviews in Nerkh and Khoshi were conducted in part by AYC and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The remaining districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 3.

It should also be noted that districts included in SIKA-E varied by wave and settlements sampled in W2 were purposefully excluded from selection in W3. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave analysis at the overall level as changes in the composition of program districts

can have significant impact on trend analysis at this level. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so overall changes from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts were included or excluded from the analysis. For this reason, we recommend examining trends at the district level and present the following list of districts by wave and their sample sizes:

**TABLE 5.2: SIKA-E DISTRICTS BY WAVE**

SIKA-E Districts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Sayyidabad	333	496	480
Chak-e Wardak	654	496	496
Nerkh	655	496	494
Jalrayz	0	496	496
Baraki Barak	332	303	335
Muhammad Aghah	650	496	495
Khoshi	0	494	427
Qarah Bagh (1)	0	469	467
Andar	72	316	334
Deh Yak	176	496	327
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghathu)	0	492	420
Khwajah Omari	0	466	464
Zurmat	293	304	336
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	0	407	352
Dzadran	244	317	336
Ahmadabad	0	491	446
Tanai	0	489	493
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	0	488	488
Gurbuz	0	493	493
Jaji Maidan	0	492	414
Lajah-Mangal	0	472	336
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>3409</b>	<b>9469</b>	<b>8929</b>

## Key Findings

The major takeaways from SIKA-E districts are summarized below:


- Consistent with Wave 2, respondents living in SIKA-E districts are evenly divided between those who believe their district is headed in the right direction and those who believe it is headed in the wrong direction. However, it is important to note that the districts vary greatly across the stabilization and development measures.
- Perceptions of security in SIKA-E districts have not changed much since Wave 1. Those living in Chak-Wardak and Sayyidabad report feeling most secure, while respondents in Andar and Dzadran report feeling least secure. With each wave of research, respondents overall say there have been fewer petty offenses or serious crimes in their district.

- While the presence of the ANA, ANP, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) has either increased or stayed the same in SIKA-E districts, the presence of Arbaki, armed opposition groups, and ISAF has decreased each wave.
- Most respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Increased positivity towards the Afghan government reflects respondents’ opinions about local governing bodies.
- In SIKA-E districts, confidence in the district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor has increased each wave.
- Fewer respondents in Wave 3 say government services in their area have improved compared with previous waves. Respondents mention road construction, education, clinics, electricity, and building bridges as being the most-needed development projects.
- Overall, there has been a shift towards seeking justice from government courts rather than local/tribal elders. Increasing percentages of respondents say they “no confidence” in armed opposition groups to fairly resolve disputes.
- The majority of respondents in SIKA-E districts admit that a corruption is a problem in their area. Over half believe corruption has increased since last year.
- The two biggest problems that create stress or tension in SIKA-E districts are insecurity and unemployment.
- Respondents most commonly use radio and word of mouth (through the Mosque, friends, family, and elders) to communicate with others and get news and information.

## Security and Crime

Security in the SIKA-E region varies across districts. Overall, a plurality of respondents (43%) say security in their local area is either “good” or “very good,” 35% believe it is “fair,” and 21% believe it is “poor” or “very poor.” Those living in Chak-Wardak and Sayyidabad report feeling most secure, while respondents in Andar and Dzadran report feeling least secure.

**FIGURE 5.1: LOCAL SECURITY BY DISTRICTS**



Respondents are divided when asked about security on their local roads. Half of respondents in SIKA-E districts say security on their local roads is good (“somewhat good” and “very good”), while the other half (49%) say it is bad (“somewhat bad” and “very bad”). In Andar (99%) and Dzadran (88%), nearly all respondents say security on their roads is bad. As a whole, more than one-third of respondents (37%)


believe the security on their roads has stayed the same in the past year, and there has been little change in opinion since Wave 1. However, those in Andar (72%) and Zurmat (54%) are the most likely to believe security on their roads has gotten worse (“worsened a little” and “worsened a lot”, compared to 28% overall). Respondents in Jalrayz are most likely to believe security on their roads has improved (57% say “improved a lot” and “improved a little,” compared to 25% overall).

Respondents living in SIKa-E districts report feeling most secure when they are at home during the day (89% “somewhat secure” and “very secure”), and much less secure when they are at home during the night (66% “somewhat secure” and “very secure”). Although respondents from Andar report feeling insecure on most measures of security, 88% say they feel secure when traveling to neighboring villages (compared to 62% overall). Fifty-five percent of respondents (and 98% of those in Andar) say they feel insecure when traveling to the district or provincial capital.

Interestingly, the level of crime in each district does not necessarily correspond with respondents’ overall perceptions of security. Majorities in Sayyidabad and Chak-e Wardak believe security in their area is good; however, they are also more likely to say there are “a lot” of petty offenses, non-violent serious crimes, and violent serious crimes in their area compared to respondents overall. In Andar, respondents are more likely to believe security in their area is “poor,” but the vast majority of respondents say there are “a little” petty offenses, non-violent serious crimes, and violent serious crimes. With each wave of research, respondents overall say there have been less (“a little less” and “much less”) petty offenses and serious crimes compared to respondents in the past year.

**FIGURE 5.2: RATE OF CRIMES BY WAVE**

**Q5. Respondents who say there is less ("much less" and "a little less") of the following crimes in their area compared to last year**



The perceived presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has stayed constant in SIKa-E districts, and respondents increasingly report confidence in the ANA to keep their area safe (82% say they have “some confidence” and “a lot of confidence, up from 79% in Wave 2 and 73% in Wave 1). The perceived presence of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has steadily increased since Wave 1 (48% say there are “a lot,” compared to 43% in Wave 2 and 33% in Wave 1) and 55% report having confidence (“some

confidence” and “a lot of confidence”) in them. Confidence in the ANA and ANP may be linked to perceptions of improvement. Each wave, more respondents living in SIKA-E districts report the ANA and ANP have improved (“improved a lot” and “improved a little”) in their ability to provide security.

**FIGURE 5.3: ANA AND ANP IMPROVEMENT**

**Q7. Respondents who believe the ANA/ANP's ability to provide security has improved in the past year**



Wave 1: n=3409 | Wave 2: n =9469 | Wave 3: n=8929


The reported presence of the ANA, ANP, and Afghan Local Police (ALP) has either increased or stayed the same in SIKA-E districts, whereas the reported presence of Arbaki, armed opposition groups, and ISAF has decreased each wave. The presence of armed opposition groups is most prevalent in Sayyidabad and Andar, where respondents are most likely to say there are “a lot” (50% and 77% respectively, compared to 25% overall). Nearly three-quarters (72%) of those in Jaji Maidan say there are no armed opposition groups in their district.

## Governance

Seven out of ten respondents living in SIKA-E districts believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area (70%, up from 63% in Wave 2 and 54% in Wave 1). It is interesting to note that respondents in Zurmat (88%) and Andar (87%) are most likely to believe the government is well regarded, although respondents in Andar are negative on most other measures. The majority of respondents living in Muhammad Aghah (65%) say the government is not well regarded in their area.

Increased positivity towards the Afghan government reflects respondents’ opinions about local governing bodies. In SIKA-E districts, confidence in the district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor has increased each wave. Respondents in Wave 3 are more likely to believe their district governor, district government, local village/neighborhood leaders, and provincial governor are responsive (“somewhat responsive” and “very responsive”) to the needs of the local people.

**FIGURE 5.4: CONFIDENCE AND RESPONSIVENESS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE**



Wave 1: n=3,409 | Wave 2: n=9,469 | Wave 3: n=8,929

Although respondents in SIKa-E districts report increased levels of confidence and responsiveness of local governing bodies, there has been little change in their ability to get things done. Respondents living in Jalrayz are most likely to believe the ability of their district governor (77%, compared to 35% overall), district government (70%, compared to 32% overall), and provincial governor (65%, compared to 28% overall) to get things done has improved in the past year (“improved a lot” and “improved a little”).

Just over half (55%) of respondents living in SIKa-E districts say a District Development Assembly (DDA) is established in their district (up from 49% in Wave 2 and 43% in Wave 1). Almost all respondents from Zurmat (97%) say there is a DDA in their area, while very few respondents (2%) from Andar say the same. The majority of those who have heard of the DDA (72%, n=4921) say they have “some confidence” or “a lot of confidence” in it, and more than three-fourths (76%) believe it is responsive (“somewhat responsive” and “very responsive”) to the needs of local people. Both confidence in the DDA and perceptions of its responsiveness have increased since Wave 1.

Respondents in Wave 3 are also more likely to be aware of a Community Development Council (CDC) in their area (58%, compared to 52% in Wave 2 and 49% in Wave 1). Respondents in Zurmat are most familiar with the CDC, with 96% saying it is established in their area. Ninety-six percent of respondents in Andar say the CDC is not established in their area. Similar to the DDA, respondents report increased levels of confidence and more respondents in Wave 3 believe the CDC is responsive to the needs of local people.

With each wave of research, respondents have been more likely to say that the district government understands the problems of the people (53%), cares about the people in their area (53%), and delivers basic services in a fair manner (48%). It is important to note, however, that respondents may experience social desirability bias when sharing opinions about the government. Forty-eight percent of respondents say it is not acceptable for people to criticize the Afghan government, while 49% say it is acceptable. By a narrow margin, the majority of respondents (51%) believe the district government officials are not doing

their jobs honestly. Respondents in Zurmat (69%) and Bahram-e Shahid (69%) are most likely to believe district government officials in their area abuse their authority to make money for themselves (compared to 49% of respondents overall).


### Service Provision and Development

Respondents were asked a series of questions about the services and development programs offered by their district government. In Wave 3, respondents are less likely to believe government services in their area have improved (36% “improved a lot” and “improved a little”) compared to respondents subsequent waves (40% in Wave 2 and 39% Wave 1). More than one-fourth of respondents (27%, up from 21%) believe government services have “worsened a little” or “worsened a lot.”

In SIKA-E districts, the majority of respondents are satisfied (“somewhat satisfied” and “very satisfied”) with the district government’s provision of clean drinking water (73%). Half of respondents (50%) say they are satisfied with the provision of water for irrigation and uses other than drinking. About one-third of respondents are satisfied with the district government’s provision of roads and bridges (36%), agricultural assistance (33%), medical care (33%), and retaining and flood walls (32%). Only 11% of those surveyed are satisfied with the government’s provision of electricity. When it comes to education, respondents are increasingly satisfied with the provision of schools for boys (63% in Wave 3, up from 56% in Wave 2 and 37% in Wave 1). However, 64% are dissatisfied with the provision of schools for girls.

Respondents are split when asked if they have heard or seen about any development projects in their area; 51% say “yes,” while 48% say “no.” The vast majority of those living in Nerkh (92%) and Jalrayz (91%) say they have seen or heard about development projects, while only 17% of those in Muhammad Aghah say the same. No respondents in D zadran report being aware of any development projects in their district.

**FIGURE 5.5: AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**



Overall, among respondents who have seen or heard about development projects in their area, majorities are aware of projects for drinking water (82%), irrigation/water maintenance systems (54%), roads and bridges (52%), and schools (66%). Less than half have heard of projects for retaining and flood walls (49%), agricultural assistance (49%), medical facilities (49%), farm produce processing (38%), and

electricity (15%). Sayyidabad is the only district where the majority of respondents (63%) have heard of electricity projects in their area.

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in SIK-A-E districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:<sup>37</sup>

Road construction	37%
Education and School	29%
Clinics	25%
Electricity	24%
Building bridges	20%

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include:<sup>38</sup>

Lack of clinics/hospitals	32%
Lack of professional doctors	32%
Lack of medicines	23%
Distance to facilities	23%
Cost of health care or medicine	22%

## Rule of Law

When respondents or their family members are involved in disputes (concerning land or water, assault, murder, kidnapping, or even serious violent crimes), their reliance on government courts has increased each wave, and reliance on local/tribal elders continues to decrease.


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<sup>37</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>38</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## FIGURE 5.6: SOURCES OF JUSTICE


**Q20b. If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning assault, murder, or kidnapping, who or where would you go to get justice?**



Although there has been a shift towards seeking justice from government courts, respondents still have the most confidence in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes. Ninety-two percent of respondents have confidence (“some confidence” and “a lot of confidence”) in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes, and 84% say people in their village/neighborhood “mostly” or “always” respect decisions made by elders. Much smaller percentages say the same about government courts: 68% percent say they have confidence in government courts to fairly resolve disputes, and 61% say people “mostly” or “always” respect decisions made by them.

Regardless of the type of dispute, very few respondents turn to armed opposition groups for justice. Increasing percentages of respondents say they have “no confidence” in armed opposition groups to fairly resolve disputes and people in their area “never” respect decisions made by them. Respondents living in Chak-e Wardak and Sayyidabad are much more likely to say they “always” or “mostly” respect decisions made by armed opposition groups.

**FIGURE 5.7: RESPECT DECISIONS OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS**



### Corruption

The majority of respondents in SIKa-E districts (84%) admit that corruption is a problem in their area. Nearly all respondents in Andar (99%) and Zurmat (100%) say it is a problem in their districts. The majority of those in Andar (82%) say corruption has stayed consistent over the past year, while 88% of those in Zurmat say it has increased (“increased a lot” and “increased a little”). Overall, just over half (51%) of respondents believe corruption has increased, 36% believe it has stayed the same, and only 12% say it decreased.

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people most complain about corruption; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: courts (15%), police (12%), the district office (12%), and the Ministry of Education (9%).

### Quality of Life

Satisfaction with life as a whole continues to decrease in SIKa-E districts. Fifty-five percent of respondents say they are satisfied (“somewhat satisfied” and “very satisfied”) with their life in general, compared to 59% in Wave 2 and 63% in Wave 1. Respondents are also less likely to say they are satisfied with their household’s current financial situation (54% in Wave 3, compared to 57% in Wave 2).

The districts of Andar and Dzadran stand out as negative outliers on most of the stabilization and development indicators. Ninety-one percent of those in Andar and 80% in Dzadran say they are dissatisfied with their life as a whole. Respondents in these districts are also most likely to say the ability to meet their basic needs has decreased (“decreased a little” and “decreased a lot”) in the past year, and that they are “very worried” about meeting their basic needs over the next year.

Overall, respondents in SIKa-E districts are somewhat divided when asked about their ability to plan for the future. Forty-three percent say their area is certain enough for them to make plans about their future, while 54% say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future. Not surprisingly, almost all of

those in Andar (98%) say it is too uncertain. Respondents are more positive in Jajai Maidan and Jalrayz, where majorities say their district is certain enough to make future plans (54% and 62% respectively)


### Economic Activity

When asked to compare their ability to access markets now to last year, nearly one-third of respondents (32%) say it has gotten better (“a little better” or “much better”), 40% say it is about the same, and 27% (up from 22% in Wave 2) say it has gotten worse (“a little worse” or “much worse”). Although a third believe markets are more accessible, almost two-thirds (63%, up from 57% in Wave 2) believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased (“increased a lot” or “increased a little”) over the past year.

Overall, more respondents surveyed in Wave 3 (43%) say there are less paid jobs available in their area compared to those surveyed in Waves 1 and 2 (30%).

**FIGURE 5.8: AVAILABILITY OF JOBS**

**Q33. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs**



Respondents living in Chak-e Wardak (71%), Sayyidabad (68%), and Jalrayz (53%) are most likely to say there are more paid jobs available in their area compared to last year, while almost none of the respondents in Andar (1%) and Dzadran (0%) say the same.

### Community Cohesion and Resilience

A plurality of respondents living in SIKa-E districts (41%) say things from outside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems in their area, 30% say “sometimes,” 13% say “rarely,” and 11% say “often.” When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include:<sup>39</sup>

Existence/presence of Taliban	20%
Road-side bombs/suicide attacks	17%

<sup>39</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<b>Kidnappings</b>	<b>14%</b>
<b>Land disputes</b>	<b>12%</b>
<b>Existence/Presence of foreign forces</b>	<b>12%</b>
<b>Small crimes/theft</b>	<b>11%</b>

“Insecurity” (15%), “Pakistani interference (15%), and “Interference by Iran” (11%) were major external issues mentioned in Wave 2 that were mentioned less frequently in Wave 3 (6%, 2%, and 0% respectively).

Respondents were also asked about internal issues that cause problems in their area. Thirty-nine percent of respondents say things from inside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems. Fifteen say “rarely,” 33% say “often,” and 11% say internal issues “always” create problems in their area. When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood, respondents most frequently mention:<sup>40</sup>

<b>Land disputes</b>	<b>34%</b>
<b>Disputes over water</b>	<b>25%</b>
<b>Ethnic disputes</b>	<b>22%</b>
<b>Family problems</b>	<b>19%</b>

Problems are most likely to arise in Sayyidabad, where majorities of respondents say things from both outside (69%) and inside (76%) their village/neighborhood “sometimes” or “often” create problems in their area. Those living in Khoshi are most likely to say things from outside (75%) and inside (78%) their village “never” cause problems for them.

Overall, respondents in SIKa-E districts believe their local people are able to solve problems that come from inside their village more often than problems that come from outside their village.

### FIGURE 5.9: ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS

Q34-Q35. How often are the people in your area able to solve problems from outside and inside your village/neighborhood? (n=8,929)



<sup>40</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents have consistently increased their likelihood to report that villages/neighborhoods in their area work together to solve problems. In Wave 3, 72% say villages/neighborhoods “sometimes” and “often” work together, compared to 69% in Wave 2 and 62% in Wave 1.

More than two thirds of respondents (68%) believe local elders “sometimes” or “often” consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. Another third (31%) say they “rarely” or “never” do. Respondents in Jalrayz report the least efficacy, with 45% saying local elders “rarely” or “never” consider their interests when making decisions that will affect them. Overall, respondents perceive their local elders as effective (70% say “somewhat effective” or “very effective”) at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their village/neighborhood’s needs.

Most respondents in SIKa-E districts (86%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such social groups (n=1,134), respondents say they belong to: farmers unions (21%), development councils (26%, up from 13% in Wave 2), sports union (18%), and business companies (10%, down from 17% in Wave 2).<sup>41</sup>

## Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include:<sup>42</sup>

<b>Insecurity</b>	<b>39%</b>
<b>Unemployment</b>	<b>32%</b>
<b>Illiteracy</b>	<b>15%</b>
<b>High prices</b>	<b>13%</b>
<b>Poverty</b>	<b>11%</b>
<b>Corruption</b>	<b>11%</b>

In areas where poverty is mentioned less, respondents more frequently mention corruption. It is interesting to note that respondents who live in Andar (who tend to be more negative compared to respondents from other districts) are most likely to agree on open-ended questions. When asked to list the top two grievances in their area, 97% in Andar say “insecurity” and 94% say “unemployment.”

## Media

Respondents in SIKa-E districts use radio (95%), the Mosque/Mullah (59%), friends and family (81%), and elders (66%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. They are less likely to use television (32%), cell phones (48%), posters/billboards (19%), and newspapers (6%). Respondents living in Chak-e Wardak (90%), Zurmat (83%), and Jalrayz (82%) are much more likely to use cell phones compared to those living in other districts. Almost all of those surveyed (98%) say they do not use the Internet or e-mail to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

<sup>41</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>42</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (70%), friends/family (42%), and elders (25%).<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## Stability in Key Areas West

### Introduction

Stability in Key Areas-West (SIKA-W) targets a core group of provinces in the western part of Afghanistan:

**TABLE 6.1: SIKA-W WAVE 3 DISTRICTS**

District	Sample size	Complex MOE
Qadis	n=466	8.42%
Muqur	n=457	17.00%
Shindand	n=485	13.80%
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	n=484	6.07%
Pashtun Zarghun	n=481	8.01%
Bala Boluk	n=496	10.07%
Pusht-e Rod	n=495	10.29%
Khak-e-Safayd	n=477	11.06%
Chaghcharan	n=408	6.53%
Shahrak	n=333	5.03%
<b>SIKA-W Overall</b>	<b>n=4582</b>	<b>3.54%</b>

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-W programs. The report compares findings across three waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

It should be noted that interviews in Shindand were conducted in part by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The other districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 3.

It should also be noted that districts included in SIKA-W varied by wave and some control villages sampled in W2 were not included in W3. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave individual component analysis at the overall level as changes in the composition of program districts can have significant impact on trend analysis at this level. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so overall changes in individual components from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts and villages were included or excluded from the analysis. For this reason, we recommend examining trends at the district level and present the following list of districts by wave and their sample sizes:

**TABLE 6.2: SIKA-W DISTRICTS BY WAVE**

SIKA-W Districts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Qadis	577	465	466
Muqur	589	463	457
Shindand	612	482	485
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	590	486	484
Pashtun Zarghun	0	469	481
Bala Boluk	650	433	496
Pusht-e Rod	634	493	495
Khak-e-Safayd	0	495	477
Chaghcharan	0	483	408
Shahrak	0	495	333
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>3652</b>	<b>4764</b>	<b>4582</b>

## Key Findings

The major takeaways from SIKA-W districts are summarized below:


- Just over half of respondents living in SIKA-W districts say things in their area are going in the right direction. Respondents are most optimistic in Muqur and Qadis, while those in Bala Boluk were most pessimistic.
- Security in SIKA-W districts continues to improve each wave.
- While the presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) has been consistent since Wave 1, the presence of Arbaki, armed opposition groups, Afghan Local Police, and ISAF has decreased in each wave.
- Confidence in local governance has gone up since Wave 2, although it is not as high as Wave 1. Majorities of respondents have confidence in their district governor, district government, local village leaders, and provincial governor. However, half of respondents in SIKA-W districts believe it is not acceptable for people to publicly criticize the government.
- Respondents in Wave 3 are more likely to believe government services in their area have improved compared with Wave 2.
- When respondents or their family members are involved in a dispute, they are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice. For more serious disputes, respondents are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts. Respondents are much less likely to turn to armed opposition groups when seeking justice in a dispute.
- Most respondents admit corruption is a problem in their area. About half believe that corruption has increased in the past year.
- All things considered, respondents in SIKA-W districts are satisfied with life as a whole. About half say they are satisfied with their current financial situation, and a plurality says their ability to meet basic needs has increased in the past year.
- Respondents believe people in their area are “sometimes” or “often” able to solve both problems that originate from outside their village/area and problems that originate from inside their village/area. Respondents increasingly see their communities as being able to work together to solve problems.

- The biggest problems causing stress or tension include: insecurity, unemployment, the lack of electricity, the lack of paved roads, the lack of drinking water, and the lack of clinics.
- Respondents most commonly use radio and word of mouth (through the Mosque, friends, family, and elders) to communicate with others and get news and information.

## Security and Crime

Security in the SIKA-W region continues to improve each wave. Half of respondents living in SIKA-W districts say their local security is “good” or “very good” (50%, up from 41% in Wave 2 and 39% in Wave 1). Four out of every ten respondents (41%) say their area is more secure (“much more secure” and “somewhat more secure”) than it was a year ago.

**FIGURE 6.1: SIKA-W SECURITY BY WAVE**



Respondents living in Qadis and Muqur report feeling most secure, with a majority saying their local security is good (“good” and “very good”) and more secure than last year (“somewhat more secure” and “much more secure”). Respondents in Qadis and Muqur are also most likely to say the security on their local roads is good and has improved (“improved a lot” and “improved a little”) since last year. Overall, perceptions of security on local roads are higher than in Wave 2, but are not quite as high as Wave 1. Sixty-percent of respondents say security on local roads is “good” or “very good,” compared to 51% in Wave 2 and 63% in Wave 1.


In SIKA-W districts, respondents report feeling most secure when they are at home during the day (88%, “somewhat secure” and “very secure”), and less secure when they are at home during the night (73% “somewhat secure” and “very secure”). Over half of respondents (59%) say they feel secure traveling to a neighboring village, and slightly less than half (48%) say the same about traveling to the district or provincial capital. Overall, feelings of security, both at home and while traveling, have increased substantially since Wave 2.

Interestingly, the level of crime in each district does not necessarily correspond with respondents’ overall perceptions of security. Majorities in Qadis, Muqur, and Shahrak believe security in their area is good; however, they are also more likely to say there are “a lot” of petty offenses, non-violent serious crimes,

and violent series crimes in their area compared to respondents overall. Respondents living in Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi) are most likely to say there are no petty offenses or serious crimes in their district.

The reported presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in SIKA-W districts has stayed consistent in Wave 3. About one-third of respondents say there are “a lot” of ANA and ANP in their area (34% and 35% respectively). Although the majority of respondents report confidence in the ANA and ANP (“some confidence” and “a lot of confidence”), levels of confidence have decreased each wave.

**FIGURE 6.2: LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ANA AND ANP**



Wave 1: n=3652 | Wave 2: n=4764 | Wave 3: n=4582

The reported presence of Arbaki, armed opposition groups, Afghan Local Police, and ISAF continues to drop, with increasing pluralities saying there are “none” in their area.

## Governance

Overall, opinions of governance in SIKA-W districts are more positive in Wave 3 than Wave 2—more closely reflecting the results of the Wave 1 baseline study. The majority of respondents in SIKA-W districts (62%, up from 54% in Wave 2 and similar to 63% in Wave 1) believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Respondents are most divided in Chaghacharan, where 51% of respondents believe the Afghan government is well regarded, but 48% say it is not.

Confidence in local governance has gone up since Wave 2, although it is not as high as Wave 1. Majorities of respondents have confidence (“some confidence” and “a lot of confidence”) in their district governor (72%, up from 67%), district government (66%, up from 60%), local village leaders (69%, up from 67%), and provincial governor (58%, up from 55%). A similar trend is seen when respondents describe the responsiveness of their local government. Majorities believe their district governor (68%, up from 63%), district government (63%, up from 58%), local village leaders (68%, up from 66%), and provincial governor (54%, up from 51%) are responsive to the needs of local people. Respondents living in Qadis and Muqur are most positive about their local governance, with vast majorities saying their district governor, district government, local village leaders, and provincial governor have improved in the past year (“improved a lot” and “improved a little”).


Respondents in Wave 3 are more likely to have heard of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their area (61%, up from 51% in Wave 2). Of those who have heard of it, 73% have confidence in their DDA and 65% believe it is responsive to local needs. More than half (57%, up from 52% in Wave 2) believe the DDA has improved in its ability to get things done over the past year. Similarly, respondents in Wave 3 are also more likely to have heard of the Community Development Council (CDC) in their area (63%, up from 54% in Wave 2). Of those who have heard of it, 65% have confidence in their CDC and 71% believe it is responsive to local needs. Fifty-nine percent of respondents believe the CDC has improved in its ability to get things done over the past year.

It is important to note that favorability towards local governing bodies may be attributed to social desirability bias. Half of respondents in SIKa-W districts believe it is not acceptable for people to publicly criticize the government. Although the majority of respondents reported positive opinions about their district government as a whole, opinions have become more negative when asked about specific characteristics of their district government. Increasing percentages of respondents say their district government officials are not from their district, do not understand the problems of the people in their area, do not care about local people, and do not visit their area. Majorities also say district government officials are not doing their jobs honestly and do not deliver basic services to their area in a fair manner.

### Service Provision and Development

Respondents were asked a series of questions about the services and development programs offered by their district government. In Wave 3, more respondents believe government services in their area have improved (52% say “improved a lot” and “improved a little”) compared to respondents in Wave 2 (42%). Although respondents believe government services have improved, majorities say they are dissatisfied with the district government’s provisions of agricultural assistance, retaining and flood walls, roads and bridges, medical care, and water for irrigation. The majority of respondents, however, are satisfied with the provision of clean drinking water. When it comes to education, 40% say they are satisfied with schooling for boys, while a much smaller percentage (28%) says the same about schooling for girls.

**FIGURE 6.3: SATISFACTION OF GOVERNMENT PROVISIONS**



The majority of respondents (54%) say they have not seen or heard about any development projects in their local area. Respondents living in Shahrak are most likely (70%) and respondents in Bala Boluk are least likely (14%) to have seen or heard about development projects. Among those who have heard about development projects, 73% say they are aware of projects for drinking water in their area. Much smaller percentages of respondents say they have seen or heard about projects for schools (49%), roads and bridges (47%), irrigation/water agricultural assistance (41%), maintenance systems (33%), retaining and flood walls (31%), medical facilities (30%), farm produce (25%), and electricity (11%). One third of respondents (33%) say services for electricity are not provided at all in their area.

Looking forward to the next year, respondents in SIKAW districts most frequently mention the following development projects as being needed in their area:<sup>44</sup>

<b>Road construction</b>	<b>33%</b>
<b>Electricity</b>	<b>33%</b>
<b>Education and School</b>	<b>26%</b>
<b>Clinics</b>	<b>18%</b>
<b>Water</b>	<b>17%</b>

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include:<sup>45</sup>

<b>Lack of clinics/hospitals</b>	<b>47%</b>
<b>Lack of medicines</b>	<b>33%</b>
<b>Lack of professional doctors</b>	<b>25%</b>
<b>Lack of medicines</b>	<b>23%</b>
<b>Poor security</b>	<b>22%</b>
<b>Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads</b>	<b>21%</b>

## **Rule of Law**

Respondents are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice when they are involved in a dispute. As disputes get more serious, respondents are slightly more inclined to turn to government courts. For example, 33% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved in a dispute concerning land or water, 34% says the same about disputes concerning theft, and 38% say they would turn to government courts if they were involved with assault, murder, or kidnapping. Respondents are least likely to seek justice from armed opposition groups; however, 14% say they would turn to armed opposition groups for cases of theft. More respondents from Bala Boluk rely on armed opposition groups compared to the other districts served by SIKAW. The majority of respondents in Bala Boluk say they have confidence (“some confidence” and “a lot of confidence”) in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly (52%, compared to 29% overall).


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<sup>44</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>45</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

When respondents discuss how to resolve disputes fairly, 89% of respondents report having confidence in local/tribal elders and 72% report having confidence in government courts. Compared to those who believe decisions made by government courts are “always” respected (21%), twice as many respondents believe decisions made by local elders are “always” respected (40%). Forty-four percent of respondents believe decisions made by armed opposition groups are “never” respected.

**FIGURE 6.4: RESPECT OF DECISIONS MADE BY ELDERS, COURTS, AND OPPOSITION GROUPS**



## Corruption

Nearly three out of four respondents (74%) admit corruption is a problem in their area. Respondents in Qadis are most likely to say corruption is a problem (93%), while just half of those in Kushk (49%) say the same. About half of respondents overall (49%) say corruption has increased (“increased a lot” and “increased a little”) in their area, and 36% say it has stayed the same.

Respondents were asked to name the department or sector of the local government that people most complain about corruption; in an open-ended format, the top mentions include: courts (13%), District/Office of Attorney (11%), the municipality (6%), and police (5%).

## Quality of Life

Satisfaction with life has gone up in SIKa-W districts, with 66% saying they are “somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied” (compared to 62% in Wave 2). Respondents are generally most positive in Muqur and Qadis, where the vast majority says they are satisfied with their life as a whole (87% and 81% respectively). Nearly half (49%) say they are satisfied with their household’s current financial situation, and 45% (up from 40% in Wave 2) say their ability to meet their basic needs has increased (“increased a lot” and “increased a little”) in the past year. Looking forward, 52% say they are “a little worried” about meeting their basic needs over the next year.

Respondents in SIKa-W districts are divided when asked about their ability to plan for the future. Fifty-one percent say their area is too uncertain to make plans about their future, while 48% say their area is

certain enough for them to make plans about their future. As expected, districts where more respondents report satisfaction with their life (Muqur and Qadis) also have more respondents who say their area is certain enough to make future plans (68% and 58% respectively).

## Economic Activity

When asked to think about their access to local markets, four of ten respondents (40%) say their ability to get to local markets has gotten better (“a little better” and “much better”) over the past year, 37% say it has stayed about the same, and 22% say it has gotten worse (“a little worse” and “much worse”). Although 40% of respondents believe markets are more accessible, the majority of respondents (59%, up from 54%) believe prices for basic goods in local markets have increased (“increased a lot” and “increased a little”) over the past year.

An increasing plurality of respondents believe there have been more (“a little more” and “a lot more”) paid jobs in their local area in the past year (41%, compared to 34% in Wave 2 and 33% in Wave 1). Respondents in Muqur are most likely (62%) and respondents in Kushk are least likely (20%) to agree that there are more paid jobs in their area.

## Community Cohesion and Resilience

By a narrow margin, the majority of respondents in SIKAW districts say things from outside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems in their area, 10% say “rarely,” 21% say “sometimes,” and 13% say “always.” When respondents were asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include: <sup>46</sup>

<b>Small crimes/theft</b>	<b>27% (up from 13% in Wave 2)</b>
<b>Armed people<sup>47</sup></b>	<b>19% (up from 11% in Wave 2)</b>
<b>Existence/Presence of Taliban</b>	<b>18%</b>
<b>Ethnic disputes</b>	<b>15%</b>
<b>Road-side bombs/Suicide attacks</b>	<b>10% (up from 4% in Wave 2)</b>
<b>Insecurity</b>	<b>9%</b>

“Existence/Presence of foreign forces” was a common external interference mentioned in Wave 2 (12%), but was mentioned much less frequently in Wave 3 (2%).

Respondents were also asked about internal interferences that cause problems in their area. Fifty-seven percent say things from inside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems. Twelve percent say “rarely,” 21% say “sometimes,” and 8% say internal issues “always” create problems in their area. When asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood,

<sup>46</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>47</sup> “Armed people” (or Afrad Mosalah/Zorgoyan) is separate category, because it doesn't specify belonging to a particular group. In many instances respondents couldn't or were not willing to identify to which groups these people belonged.

respondents most frequently mention ethnic disputes (41%, up from 30), small crimes/theft (16%, down from 21%), and land disputes (13%, up from 4%).<sup>48</sup>

The likelihood of villages/neighborhoods working together to solve problems has consistently increased. In Wave 3, 66% say villages/neighborhoods “sometimes” or “often” work together, compared to 64% in Wave 2 and 59% in Wave 1.

More than half of respondents (58%) believe local elders “sometimes” or “often” consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. Forty percent believe they “rarely” or “never” do. Respondents in Bala Boluk report the least efficacy, with a majority (57%) saying local elders “rarely” or “never” consider their interests when making decisions that will affect them. Overall, respondents perceive their local elders to be effective (61% say “somewhat effective” and “very effective”) at securing funds from the district or provincial government for their local needs.

Most respondents in SIKAW districts (77%) do not belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss common interests or do certain activities together. Of those who do belong to such groups (n=992), respondents mostly belong to: development councils (39%), farmers unions (26%), people councils (15%), welfare foundations (13%), business companies (10%), and women solidarity unions (10%, down from 18% in Wave 2).<sup>49</sup>

## Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include:<sup>50</sup>

<b>Insecurity</b>	<b>31%</b>
<b>Unemployment</b>	<b>24%</b>
<b>Lack of electricity</b>	<b>20%</b>
<b>Lack of paved roads</b>	<b>14%</b>
<b>Lack of drinking water</b>	<b>9%</b>
<b>Lack of clinics</b>	<b>9%</b>

It is interesting to note that districts where respondents are generally more positive on stabilization and development indicators (Qadis and Muqur), “unemployment” is not mentioned as a top problem.

## Media

Respondents usually use radio (79%), the Mosque/Mullah (84%), friends and family (92%), and elders (87%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. They are less likely to use television (44%) and cell phones (30%). Very few respondents mention using posters/billboards (3%) and

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<sup>48</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

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<sup>50</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

newspapers (1%) as a means of communication. Almost all of those surveyed (98%) say they do not use the Internet or e-mail to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio and through word of mouth (friends/family, elders, the Mosque/Mullah).

## Kandahar Food Zone

### Introduction

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) program targets seven districts in the Kandahar province of Afghanistan:

**TABLE 7.1: KFZ WAVE 3 DISTRICTS**

District	Sample size	Complex MOE
Dand	n = 496	8.14%
Maiwand	n = 509	12.68%
Panjwai	n = 479	7.76%
Zharay	n = 478	11.85%
Shah Wali Kot	n = 439	11.94%
Argistan	n = 400	14.68%
Takhtapol	n = 320	8.55%
<b>KFZ Overall</b>	<b>n=5951</b>	<b>2.79%</b>

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by the KFZ program. The KFZ program was newly added to the MISTI project for Wave 3. Unlike the other programs in MISTI Wave 3, there are no trends to examine over time for this program. As such, this report serves as a baseline assessment of stabilization and development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media. In addition to the topics which were asked in all MISTI districts, the KFZ districts were administered a tailored module of questions specific to farmers and agriculture; the results of this module are presented at the end of this chapter.

It should be noted that interviews in Shah Wali Kot were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). Interviews in Maiwand were conducted in part by AYC and in part by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). The remaining districts were conducted entirely by ACSOR. Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 3.

### Key Findings

The major takeaways from KFZ districts are summarized below:


- Respondents in Shah Wali Kot report the lowest overall perceptions of security; however, they consistently report the highest levels of personal safety while in their homes and traveling
- The ANA enjoys the strongest perceptions of both presence and measures of confidence among respondents in KFZ districts
- As would be expected during draw down, very few respondents believe there are “a lot” of ISAF troops remaining in their area, however majorities in every district still believe there are “some” ISAF troops around

- Perceived presence of Armed Opposition Groups varies significantly between districts: Shah Wali Kot, Maiwand, and Dand enjoy the lowest perceived levels while Arghistan reports the highest levels
- Over two thirds of respondents are aware of both the DDA and CDC in their area; respondents who are aware of these groups tend to have more confidence in the CDC than the DDA
- Majorities have at least some confidence in all of the governmental officials and offices, but a majority also believes each is at least somewhat responsive to public needs
- Although a majority of respondents believe district government leaders care about the people, a majority also believe they do not understand the needs of the people, they are not doing their jobs honestly and are not delivering services fairly
- Most of the respondents say provision of services has either remained the same or improved over the past year, however when asked about specific services, only clean drinking water receives a satisfactory rating
- The existence of corruption is widely acknowledged by KFZ respondents and very few believe corruption has decreased over the past year
- Respondents are generally optimistic about their life as a whole; however, they are evenly split on satisfaction with their financial situations
- KFZ respondents believe access to markets has improved and are split evenly on whether prices have increased, remained the same, or decreased this past year
- Respondents in KFZ districts generally do not think problems originate from either outside or, even less frequently, from inside of their villages very often
- Also, they believe local leaders at least sometimes take the needs of ordinary people into account when making decisions and are at least somewhat effective in securing funds for their local area
- Insecurity and unemployment are the most common grievances cited by respondents
- Respondents almost exclusively use the radio and word of mouth when getting news and information, both in general and about government services in particular

## **Security and Crime**

Overall, respondents living in KFZ districts have a fairly positive outlook on security. Sixty percent say security is “good” (33%) or “very good” (27%) in their area. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are least likely to provide a positive assessment of security in their area with only 34% who say security is “good” (28%) or “very good” (6%). Respondents in Arghistan are as likely as those in Shah Wali Kot to say security is poor with 20% in each district sharing this attitude.

**FIGURE 7.1: KFZ SECURITY BY DISTRICT**



Respondents in KFZ districts generally view security as either improving (42%) or remaining the same (34%) over the past year. While there is less variance among districts on this measure, respondents in Dand are most likely to report that their local area is “somewhat more secure” (37% compared to 26% for all KFZ) or “much more secure” (22%, compared to 15% for all KFZ) than it was a year ago.

When asked to evaluate the security of the roads in their area, respondents in Shah Wali Kot again stand out as the least optimistic with a majority (54%) who say road security is “somewhat bad” (44%) or “very bad” (10%). This compares to 38% in all KFZ districts who hold a negative assessment of road security. Not surprisingly, respondents in Shah Wali Kot are also least likely to report improvements in road security over the past year. Only 34% say road security has improved compared to 50% who say it has stayed the same in all KFZ districts.

When asked to evaluate how safe they feel in four specific scenarios respondents in Shah Wali Kot are more optimistic than those in other KFZ districts; they report the highest levels of security in each of four situations evaluated.

**TABLE 7.2: SENSE OF SECURITY IN SPECIFIC SCENARIOS**

Q4. Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are... (net "very" and "somewhat" secure)								
	Total KFZ	Panjwa' i	Zharay	Maiwand	Shah Wali Kot	Arghistan	Dand	Takhtapol
<b>...in your home during the day?</b>	<b>90%</b>	82%	86%	91%	99%	89%	94%	88%
<b>...in your home during the night?</b>	<b>65%</b>	60%	58%	66%	95%	59%	61%	53%
<b>...traveling to a neighboring village?</b>	<b>74%</b>	71%	70%	71%	85%	81%	74%	52%
<b>...traveling to the district or provincial capital?</b>	<b>58%</b>	48%	55%	62%	75%	53%	57%	54%
<i>n sizes</i>	<i>3121</i>	<i>479</i>	<i>478</i>	<i>509</i>	<i>439</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>496</i>	<i>320</i>

These results may indicate that overall assessments of security are not always correlated to daily activities and that broad perceptions of security in an area do not always align with personal security assessments for respondents.

Respondents in KFZ districts report relatively high levels of petty crime (theft of good worth less than 1000 Afs): 49% in KFZ districts saying there is “a lot” and another 39% who say there is “a little.” Serious crimes appear less prevalent: only 28% report “a lot” of serious non-violent crime (theft of goods worth over 5000 Afs) and 51% report “a little.” Similar percentages of respondents report serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping): 24% say this type of crime happens “a lot” and 51% say it happens “a little” in their area.

The perceived presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in KFZ districts varies. Seventy two percent in Maiwand report “a lot” of ANA in their area compared to just 39% in Arghistan and 53% overall. Maiwand also reports the highest levels of confidence in the ANA. Over three-fourths (77%) say they have at least “some” (36%) or “a lot” (41%) of confidence the ANA can keep their area safe. Overall, 59% of respondents report having “some” (30%) or “a lot” (29%) of confidence in the ANA. Respondents are generally optimistic about improvements made by the ANA in the past year. A majority of respondents overall (59%) believe the ANA has improved “a lot” (28%) or “a little” (31%) in the past year. Maiwand has 41% who believe the ANA have improved “a lot” and 33% who believe they have improved “a little.”

Perceived levels of Afghan National Police (ANP) presence are more consistent throughout the districts with 55% overall who say there are “a lot” of ANP in their area. Arghistan reports the highest level of ANP presence with 67% who say there are “a lot.” In Shah Wali Kot 43% say there are “a lot” of ANP, which is the lowest of any district and the only district where less than a majority believe there are “a lot” of ANP are in their area. Confidence in the ANP to keep their area safe is much lower than confidence in the ANA. Only 11% overall have “a lot” of confidence and another 38% have “some” confidence. Takhtapol reports the lowest level of confidence (10% “a lot” and 31% “some”) while Maiwand reports

the highest level (21% “a lot” and 48% “some”). Nearly half of respondents overall believe the ANA has improved “a lot” (17%) or “a little” (32%) over the past year.

Perceptions of Afghan Local Police (ALP) presence are the lowest of any of the Afghan security force measured; just 28% overall say there are “a lot” of ALP in their area. The strongest ALP presence is reported in Shah Wali Kot where just over one third (35%) say there are “a lot” of ALP in their area.

Overall, 46% of respondents living in KFZ districts say there are “a lot” and 32% say there are “some” Arbaki in their area. Arghistan reports the highest levels of Arbaki presence with 67% who believe “a lot” are in their area compared to just 22% in Shah Wali Kot.

Not surprisingly, ISAF presence is the lowest of any security force measured with just 12% who say there are “a lot” of ISAF in their area. Respondents do not generally believe there has been a complete withdraw of ISAF troops from their areas, however, as majorities in each district and 59% overall still report “some” ISAF presence in their area.

Perceived presence of Armed Opposition Groups varies significantly among districts. While 27% overall believe there are “a lot” in their area, only 5% agree in Shah Wali Kot and half (50%) agree in Arghistan. Majorities in Maiwand (53%) and Dand (50%) say there are “none” in their areas.

## Governance

The Afghan government is generally well regarded in KFZ districts with about three-fourths (76%) agreeing with that “the Afghan government is well regarded in this area.” Shah Wali Kot is the outlier with only 38% agreeing with that statement. All other districts report at least 72% agreement.

Next respondents were asked to evaluate a variety of government offices and leaders. Overall, respondents in KFZ districts had the least amount of confidence in their provincial governor and greater levels of confidence in their district governors.

**TABLE 7.3: CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES**

<b>Q9. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]?</b>				
<i>(n = 3121)</i>	<b>A lot of confidence</b>	<b>Some Confidence</b>	<b>Not much confidence</b>	<b>No confidence</b>
<b>Provincial Governor</b>	17%	36%	42%	4%
<b>District Governor</b>	26%	49%	23%	2%
<b>District Government</b>	22%	42%	33%	3%
<b>Local Village/ Neighborhood Leaders</b>	22%	45%	30%	3%

Respondents were then asked to rate the responsiveness of each of these leaders or offices; responses closely mirror the previously stated levels of confidence.

**TABLE 7.4: RESPONSIVENESS OF LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES**

<b>Q10. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area?</b>				
<i>(n = 3121)</i>	<b>Very responsive</b>	<b>Somewhat responsive</b>	<b>Somewhat unresponsive</b>	<b>Very unresponsive</b>
<b>Provincial Governor</b>	19%	38%	37%	5%
<b>District Governor</b>	19%	48%	29%	4%
<b>District Government</b>	19%	42%	34%	5%
<b>Local Village/ Neighborhood Leaders</b>	23%	45%	28%	3%

Respondents were also asked to rate these same leaders or offices on the perceived level of improvements over the past year.

**TABLE 7.5: IMPROVEMENTS IN LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES**

<b>Q11. Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?</b>					
<i>(n = 3121)</i>	<b>Improved a little</b>	<b>Improved a lot</b>	<b>Stayed the same</b>	<b>Worsened a little</b>	<b>Worsened a lot</b>
<b>Provincial Governor</b>	17%	26%	41%	14%	2%
<b>District Governor</b>	27%	42%	25%	5%	1%
<b>District Government</b>	21%	33%	34%	11%	1%
<b>Local Village/ Neighborhood Leaders</b>	22%	33%	31%	14%	1%

Most respondents living in KFZ districts have heard of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their district: 67% overall say they have. Majorities in all districts report awareness with the exception of Shah Wali Kot where only 21% say they have heard of the DDA.

Those who were aware of the DDA were also asked about their confidence. Of that group, only 28% say they have “a lot” of confidence while 49% say they have “some” confidence. This varied significantly by district as 40% have “a lot” of confidence in Panjwa’i while only 18% in Arghistan and Dand hold this view. Those who were aware of the DDA were also asked how responsive the DDA has been to the needs of the people. Respondents are less enthusiastic about this measure with less than half saying they are “very” (18%) or “somewhat” (29%) responsive to needs. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot perceive the highest level of responsiveness; here, 73% say the DDA is at least “somewhat” responsive. Most of those who say they are aware of the DDA unfortunately believe its ability to get things done is getting worse. A full 56% say it has worsened “a little” (29%) or “a lot” (26%) while only 25% say it has become “a little” (14%) or “a lot” (11%) better.

Awareness of a Community Development Council (CDC) in their area follows the same pattern as DDA awareness. Sixty-nine percent overall say a CDC has been established in their area but only 13% in Shah Wali Kot are aware of a CDC.

Of those who are aware of a CDC in their area, 44% have “a lot” and 42% have “some” confidence in their CDC. Responsiveness to the needs of the people is much lower with only 13% saying it is “very” and 21% saying it is “somewhat” responsive to peoples’ needs. Shah Wali Kot is again the outlier with

77% who say it is at least “somewhat” responsive. Respondents are more likely to report improvements in the CDC than they were with the DDA with 41% saying they have seen improvement and only 31% saying it has become worse.

Large majorities in nearly all KFZ districts believe district government officials are from their district; 73% overall share this assessment. Only in Shah Wali Kot do a majority (54%) believe district government officials are not from their district.

Most respondents do not believe that the district government understands the needs of the people (69% overall). Majorities in all districts, aside from Dand (49%), agree. Despite this, most respondents still believe the district government cares about the people in their district. Sixty percent of respondents share this with majorities in all districts except Shah Wali Kot (45%) agreeing. A slight majority (54%) believe the district government does not abuse their authority to make money for themselves while a similar majority (58%) says representatives from the district government visit their area. Despite these mildly positive assessments, a majority (55%) still do not believe district officials are doing their jobs honestly and 57% say district government services are not delivered in a fair manner.


All of these results should be taken in with the context that 51% of respondents believe it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the government. If respondents are being truthful in expressing that belief, some opinions shared on previous survey items could be artificially inflated due to social desirability bias among respondents.

### Service Provision and Development

Thinking about the past year, a majority of respondents in KFZ districts believe service provision by the government has either not changed (40%) or has improved (40%). Only 18% perceive services as having worsened.

When asked about satisfaction with specific services, however, KFZ respondents tend to be dissatisfied or ratios are close to evenly split between satisfied and dissatisfied.

**FIGURE 7.2: SATISFACTION OF GOVERNMENT PROVISIONS**



The majority of respondents (63%) say they have not seen or heard about any development projects in their local area. Of those who say they have heard of development projects in their area, the most common projects reported are for drinking water (81%), irrigation/water maintenance (67%) and agricultural assistance (67%). Very few respondents (13%) have heard of electricity projects in their area. When asked in an open ended manner which projects they would most like to see in their area next year, out of two possible mentions, 30% cite road construction projects, 28% mention education and schools, 24% would like electricity projects, 20% say clinics, and 14% say security.<sup>51</sup>

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. Again, out of two possible mentions, 48% say lack of clinics/hospitals, 30% cite a lack of professional doctors, 28% mention the distance to medical facilities and 25% mention a lack of medicine.<sup>52</sup>

## **Rule of Law**

When KFZ respondents or their family members are involved in a dispute, they are most likely to turn to local/tribal elders to seek justice but nearly as many prefer government courts. For disputes over land or water, 48% would turn to local/tribal elders and 44% would go to government courts. For serious disputes such as murder, assault or kidnapping, 51% would go to local/tribal elders and 41% would seek justice from government courts. For thefts, 52% would go to local/tribal elders and 40% would turn to government courts. For each of these three types of disputes, only 7% would seek justice from armed opposition groups.

When it comes to levels of confidence in these sources of justice, however, the preference for local/tribal elders is clearly preferred with 45% of respondents expressing “a lot” and another 47% saying they have “some” confidence in their ability to fairly resolve disputes. This compares to 27% who have “a lot” and 47% who have “some” confidence in government courts to fairly resolve disputes. Not surprisingly, confidence in armed opposition groups lags well behind both of the previous two sources of justice with only 15% expressing “a lot” of confidence and 33% who say they have “some” confidence. When asked how well respected the decisions of these sources of justice are, 76% say they “always” (31%) or “mostly” (45%) local/tribal elder decisions while 70% “always” (28%) or “mostly” (42%) respect decisions made by government courts. Disturbingly, 44% “always” (13%) or “sometimes” (30%) respect the decisions of armed opposition groups.

## **Corruption**

Over three out of four respondents (79%) say corruption is a problem in their area and majorities in every district share this opinion. A full 91% of respondents in Shah Wali Kot say it is a problem and the lowest level of agreement was in Panjwa’I where 59% still agree. When asked about changes in corruption over the past year, 45% say it has increased, 38% believe it has stayed the same and only 15% observe a decrease.

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<sup>51</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>52</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

When asked which department or sector of the local government people complain about regarding corruption, there is little consensus among respondents in KFZ districts. Most common mentions of corrupt institutions include: the district office (9%), police (8%), municipality (7%), courts (7%) and all government offices (7%).

## **Quality of Life**

Respondents are largely optimistic about their lives on the whole with 70% who say they are “very” (31%) or “somewhat” (39%) satisfied with their lives. Twenty-four percent are “somewhat” and 6% are “very” dissatisfied with their lives. Respondents in Shah Wali Kot are least optimistic with only 8% who say they are “very” satisfied with their lives.

When it comes to satisfaction with their household’s current financial situation, respondents are evenly split with 49% expressing satisfaction and 51% expressing dissatisfaction. Most (54%) respondents believe their ability to meet basic needs has improved (26% “a lot”; 27% “a little”) over the past year while 34% believe this ability has remained the same and only 12% say it has decreased (10% “a lot”; 2% “a little”). When it comes to the future, most respondents have at least some concern about meeting basic needs: 22% are “very worried” while 46% are “a little worried” and only 31% say they are “not worried” about this. Along similar lines, a majority (59%) believe the situation in their area is too uncertain to plan for the future, a problematic mentality for an economy hoping to transition from current levels of development assistance.

## **Economic Activity**

Thinking about their access to local markets, a majority (54%) say access has gotten better (“a little better” and “much better”) over the past year, 31% say it has stayed about the same and 14% say it has gotten worse (“a little worse” or “much worse”). When asked about prices for goods at local markets, about a third overall (31%) say they have increased, another third (34%) say they have stayed the same and the remaining third (34%) report decreasing prices.

A majority (56%) of respondents believe there are more (27% “a little”; 29% “a lot”) paid jobs in their local area in the past year. Respondents in Panjwa’i (68%) are most likely and respondents in Shah Wali Kot are least likely (32%) to agree that there are more paid jobs in their area.

## **Community Cohesion and Resilience**

Respondents in KFZ districts largely believe they are immune from disruptions originating from outside their village or neighborhood with 65% saying this “never” happens, 10% who say it “rarely” happens, 17% who say it happens “sometimes” and 6% believe it happens “often.” Those who believe these disruptions happens at least “rarely” say these can “always” (7%), “sometimes” (40%), “rarely” (35%) or “never” (15%) be solved by the people in their village.

The perception that problems from inside the village disrupt life is even less prevalent with 68% saying this “never” happens (10% “rarely,” 15% “sometimes” 4% “often”). Respondents are a bit more optimistic about being able to solve internal problems. A majority of those who say these problems happen at least “rarely” say they can “often” (17%) or “sometimes” (50%) be solved by the people in their area while 29% say this happens “rarely” and only 2% believe this “never” happens. By similar

proportions, respondents believe people work together to solve problems in their area. Nineteen percent say working together happens “often,” 45% say “sometimes,” 30% say “rarely” and 6% say it “never” happens.

More than half of respondents (57%) believe local elders “sometimes” or “often” consider the interests of ordinary people in their village/neighborhood when making decisions. Forty-three percent believe they “rarely” or “never” do. Only in Arghistan do a majority of respondents believe this “rarely” (35%) or “never” (20%) happens. The majority (60%) believes local leaders are at least “somewhat” effective in securing funds for their area from the district or provincial government.

Hardly any respondents in KFZ districts belong to social groups (7%) where they discuss common interests or do activities together. Those who belong to social groups most commonly say they belong to: business/companies (29%), development councils (25%), welfare foundations (18%) and farmers unions (19%).<sup>53</sup>

## Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses (out of two possible mentions)<sup>54</sup> include:

<b>Insecurity</b>	<b>33%</b>
<b>Unemployment</b>	<b>31%</b>
<b>Lack of electricity</b>	<b>22%</b>
<b>Illiteracy</b>	<b>16%</b>
<b>Lack of schools</b>	<b>11%</b>

These findings are consistent with most survey research in Afghanistan which has shown over the past few years that insecurity and unemployment are typically the two most commonly listed problems when presented to a respondent in an open ended format.

## Media

Respondents in KFZ districts most commonly use the radio (95%), friends and family (87%), elders (78%) and the Mosque/Mullah (63%) to communicate with others and/or get news and information. They are less likely to use cell phones (43%) and television (26%). Very few respondents mention using posters/billboards (12%) and newspapers (4%) as a means of communication. Hardly any of those surveyed (2%) say they use the internet or e-mail to communicate with others and/or get news and information.

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (78%) or from various word of mouth sources: friends/family (50%), elders (29%), the Mosque/Mullah (12%).<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>54</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## KFZ Module

Respondents who answered “yes” to the question “Does this household farm any land?” were asked a series of questions about their farming activities. A total of 73% of respondents (n=2263) answered affirmatively and were taken through the rest of this module.


Over half (57%) of farming respondents say they own 100% of the land they farm. Of those who own land, 69% say they inherited their land. Another 22% say they purchased it and 7% say it was given to them by the village.

Leasing farm land is not very common among respondents with 61% saying they do not lease any land. Sharecropping is even less common with 79% saying they do not sharecrop any land. Of those who lease or sharecrop land, respondents reported a very wide range of payments made everywhere from 1,000 Afs to 800,000 Afs per year for use of the land they farm with 17% saying they do not make any financial payments for the land.<sup>56</sup> Of those who lease, rent or sharecrop land, a majority (70%) give half or less to the landlord for use of the land, including 17% who give no portion of their crops to the landlord. Another 22% say they give more than half of their crop to the landlord each year.

Consistent with the high levels of reported land ownership, the majority of farmers in KFZ districts have either a title document or sales agreement securing their land use.

**FIGURE 7.3: TYPES OF LAND AGREEMENTS**

**K6. What kind of written or recorded agreement, legal title, or ownership rights do you have for this plot of land? (n=2263)**



In terms of the number of jeribs<sup>57</sup> farmed per household, nearly all households (94%) farm 50 jeribs or fewer with over half (58%) farming between 3 and 10 jeribs.

<sup>55</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>56</sup> These reported amounts should be taken in context; financial questions posed to farmers often are misunderstood despite efforts by interviewers to clarify such questions. Low levels of education, lack of accounting or recording keeping, unfamiliarity with mathematical concepts and infrequency of thinking about financial matters within year spans can all contribute to respondent misunderstanding of such questions.

<sup>57</sup> One jerib is the equivalent of 0.4942 of an acre and 0.2 of a hectare.

**TABLE 7.6: SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD FARMS**

<b>K7. What is the size in jeribs of all of the land that this household farms? (n=2263)</b>	
Less than 1 jerib	2%
1 to 2 jeribs	8%
3 to 5 jeribs	25%
6 to 10 jeribs	33%
11 to 20 jeribs	19%
21 to 50 jeribs	8%
51 to 100 jeribs	4%
101 to 150 jeribs	1%
Over 150 jeribs	0%

Nearly all farmers (91%) say their land is irrigated. These farmers report a wide variety of irrigation sources used for their land. Out of a possible two mentions, the most commonly cited sources of irrigation are: river (38%), dam (29%), bore well (31%), rain (30%), karez (16%) and canal (17%).<sup>58</sup>

Wheat is the most commonly reported crop being grown by respondents in all districts (70% overall). Corn is the next most popular crop with 48% of respondents.

In terms of illicit crops which are grown by farmers, 28% say they grow poppy while 14% say they grow marijuana. There is likely a high degree of social desirability bias impacting responses to these two items. This is due to anti-poppy campaigns which have been launched over the past decade and the fact that growing and using these crops has been publicly classified as Haram in Islam by many Mullahs. Respondents are being asked to openly admit to violating Afghan and Islamic law if they provide an affirmative response and many may not be willing to do so with an interviewer they do not know.

Sheep are the most popular animals among KFZ district farmers interviewed; 22% say they raise sheep, 14% raise cattle and another 14% raise goats.

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<sup>58</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

**TABLE 7.7: CROPS GROWN AND ANIMALS RAISED**

K11. Please tell me if you grow any of these crops or raise any of these animals on your land...								
	Total KFZ	Panjwa'i	Zharay	Maiwand	Shah Wali Kot	Arghistan	Dand	Takhtapol
Wheat	70%	78%	74%	73%	69%	62%	63%	65%
Rice	4%	3%	4%	3%	1%	1%	11%	5%
Maize	15%	20%	32%	7%	1%	6%	19%	20%
Corn	48%	63%	60%	56%	42%	36%	31%	47%
Safflower	8%	13%	12%	4%	1%	9%	4%	14%
Barley	24%	27%	27%	27%	12%	28%	21%	26%
Poppy	28%	27%	25%	44%	33%	29%	15%	26%
Cotton	10%	16%	16%	9%	1%	16%	5%	9%
Soya	8%	16%	11%	9%	0%	12%	2%	6%
Potato	17%	20%	24%	16%	3%	28%	17%	13%
Onion	31%	25%	40%	32%	36%	32%	24%	26%
Cumin	21%	20%	26%	18%	32%	20%	13%	20%
Sunflower	9%	15%	12%	7%	2%	14%	4%	11%
Okra	13%	14%	19%	11%	1%	14%	15%	15%
Green gram (Mung beans)	6%	8%	8%	5%	1%	10%	4%	10%
Other pulses (lentils, peas, beans)	6%	10%	6%	3%	5%	7%	4%	8%
Marijuana (Chaars)	14%	22%	15%	18%	5%	14%	8%	16%
Alfalfa	14%	18%	16%	20%	6%	7%	15%	13%
Clover	13%	18%	17%	10%	5%	12%	13%	15%
Melon	29%	32%	31%	29%	20%	29%	30%	34%
Water melon	31%	30%	36%	32%	17%	28%	35%	40%
Pomegranates	24%	24%	31%	23%	6%	31%	35%	17%
Grapes	24%	25%	33%	26%	2%	22%	36%	17%
Apricots	9%	10%	11%	10%	0%	5%	11%	12%
Palms	2%	4%	3%	1%	0%	0%	1%	8%
Apples	3%	5%	4%	1%	0%	1%	4%	7%
Pears	3%	4%	3%	1%	0%	1%	2%	11%
Peaches	4%	4%	2%	4%	0%	1%	7%	6%
Cows (Cattle)	14%	11%	5%	18%	19%	16%	13%	15%
Chickens (Poultry)	12%	9%	5%	8%	17%	16%	14%	18%
Oxen	7%	5%	2%	14%	10%	5%	6%	11%
Donkeys	3%	3%	1%	4%	1%	3%	3%	7%
Horses	3%	3%	1%	3%	1%	2%	5%	8%
Camels	4%	3%	2%	5%	5%	3%	5%	8%
Sheep	22%	9%	20%	27%	38%	15%	23%	25%
Goats	14%	5%	7%	17%	30%	8%	14%	15%
<i>n sizes</i>	3121	479	478	509	439	400	496	320

Farmers were also asked to name the most important crop for their household's economic status. Wheat was named by 30% of respondents followed by corn with 13% and poppy was named by 10%. All other crops were named by 5% or fewer of respondents. When asked for the second most important crop to their household income, 17% cite wheat, 8% say corn, 6% name grapes, 5% say poppy, and another 5% list onions.

A majority (58%) say they sell their crops within a few days of harvest while 41% say they store their crops after harvest and before selling them. Of those who say they store at least some of their crops, 77% say they use a "farm bin, shelter or other type of temporary storage unit on [their] farm" and 46% say they use a "cold storage facility."

When asked what percentage of crops they sold or traded at a market in the past year, 13% say they sold all of the crops they grew and 60% say they sold half or less. Farmers report high levels of satisfaction with the price they receive for their crops sold at market with three-fourths reporting that they receive a "very" (32%) or "somewhat" (44%) fair price for their crops.

When asked what percentage of other farm products they sold or traded at a market, 11% say they did not sell any products and 54% say they sold half or less. A plurality (15%) said they "do not know," indicating they may not have produced any farm products. Farmers are slightly less satisfied with the price they receive for farm products than they were with crop prices. Sixty-six percent say they receive a "very" (23%) or "somewhat" (43%) good price for their farm products.


When asked what percentage of animals raised were sold at a market, 50% said they sold "half" or fewer while 22% indicate they sold "none." Twenty-seven percent say they "do not know," which may again indicate these farmers did not raise any animals. Farmers are least satisfied with the price they get for animals sold at market, but still over half (58%) say they receive a "very" (22%) or "somewhat" (37%) good price for their animals sold.

Of the farmers who sold products, they most commonly say they sold them at a market in the district center (22%), at a local market in the Howsa (21%), at a local market in their village (20%) or at a market in the provincial center (19%). In order to transport these products, they primarily say they use a tractor and cart (20%), a Zaranj / rickshaw (18%), a passenger car (14%), a van (9%) or an animal drawn cart with a basket (9%).

Just over half (57%) of farmers say they used items they buy or receive, such as seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, feed or paid labor, in order to produce what did from their farm last year. Of those who pay for or receive physical items, most report those items serve at least a "medium role" in their economic success and less than half say paid labor serves at least a "medium role" in their economic success.

### FIGURE 7.4: ROLE OF ITEMS TO ECONOMIC SUCCESS


K20. How much does your economic success depend on the following ...  
(n=1284)



However, farmers also report insufficient access to some of the items they say they need to be economically successful. Seeds are most accessible of the items tested with 20% of farmers saying they can access all they need and another 36% saying they can access some of what they need. Access to paid labor is the largest obstacle that farmers report with 62% saying they have either insufficient access or no access to paid farm labor.

### FIGURE 7.5: ACCESS TO ITEMS NEEDED FOR ECONOMIC SUCCESS

K21. For the following items, please tell me if you are able to access them... (n=1284)




Under half (43%) of farmers say they received assistance in the past year for their farming activities. Of those who say they received assistance, 52% say they received assistance from the government, 49% say they received assistance from an international organization or NGO and 5% say they received assistance from friends. In terms of the types of assistance, 67% of these farmers say they received fertilizer, 59%

say they received pesticides, 60% say they received seeds, 29% say they received feed and 17% say they were helped with storage of their crops.

Few farmers (28%) report having applied for credit or a loan in the past year, but of those who applied, 76% were successful in obtaining a line of credit or a loan. Of those who were successful in obtaining a loan or credit, 65% obtained this help from friends or family, 53% received help from a landlord, 36% went to a wealthy lender, 10% went to a bank, 9% received their loan or credit from the Afghan government, 8% received it from an international organization or NGO and 8% received a loan through a lending group. These farmers say they borrowed anywhere between 1000 Afs and 2,000,000 Afs. Interestingly, only 35% report having had to provide collateral for their loan; of those who did provide collateral, 85% used their land.

When asked in an open ended manner what type of assistance would be most useful in helping them farm in the coming year, out of a total of three possible mentions, 83% mention seeds, 79% cite fertilizer, 41% would like pesticide, 24% need herbicide and 17% say feed.<sup>59</sup> Farmers were also asked to rate the relative usefulness of a variety of potential types of assistance:

**FIGURE 7.6: USEFULNESS OF VARIOUS FORMS OF ASSISTANCE**



All respondents in KFZ districts were asked a series of questions about other types of work their household does. Thirty-six percent say their household operates some type of non-farming business. Of those who say yes, the most common businesses, with a possible two mentions allowed, are: a trading shop (54%), driver (16%) and mechanic (12%).<sup>60</sup> Again, of those who say their household operates a non-farming business, 30% say they get “all” of their income from that business, 16% say it accounts for

<sup>59</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to three responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>60</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

“nearly all” of their income, 17% say “just over half,” 19% say “about half,” 11% say “just under half,” and 4% say “just a little.”

All respondents in KFZ districts were also asked what the two biggest problems the household faces are in earning a livelihood. Out of two possible mentions, the most common responses are insecurity (22%) and unemployment (15%), lack of water (10%), high prices (10%), lack of electricity (9%) and bad roads (9%). This result is consistent with the findings reported earlier from a similar question in the main body of the survey.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## Community Cohesion Initiative – Creative

### Introduction

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) program is implemented throughout Afghanistan by two partner organizations which target different districts. Creative Associates International is the implementing partner for CCI districts in southern and eastern provinces in Afghanistan. For disambiguation purposes, this program is referred to as CCI-C throughout the report. CCI-C targets the following districts in Afghanistan:

**TABLE 8.1: CCI-C WAVE 3 DISTRICTS**

District	Sample size	Complex MOE
Qarah Bagh	n=467	8.35%
Gelan	n=474	13.43%
Muqer	n=495	13.25%
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	n=495	7.84%
Bak	n=496	5.57%
Shamul (Dzadran)	n=416	8.43%
Khas Kunar	n=494	10.18%
Sar Kani	n=352	7.97%
Marawarah	n=336	16.29%
Nahr-e Saraj	n=472	9.59%
Kajaki	n=319	20.59%
Sangin	n=397	15.32%
Musa Qal'ah	n=410	11.24%
Spin Boldak	n=463	9.07%
Panjwa'i	n=479	7.76%
Zharay	n=478	11.85%
Qalat	n=496	7.28%
Khas Uruzgan	n=495	9.24%
Shahid-e Hasas	n=462	7.91%
Dand	n=496	8.14%
<b>CCI-C Overall</b>	<b>n=8992</b>	<b>3.09%</b>

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by CCI-C programs. The report compares findings across three waves of research to examine trends in stabilization and shifts in development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

Respondents in CCI districts were also asked a specialized set of questions designed for the CCI program. These questions all relate to voting and elections and results from which are summarized at the end of this chapter.

It should also be noted that districts included in CCI-C varied by wave and some control villages sampled in W2 were not included in W3. This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering wave to wave individual component analysis at the overall level as changes in the composition of program

districts can have significant impact on trend analysis at this level. The addition or removal of particular districts can shift the overall results within any particular wave of research, so overall changes in individual components from wave to wave may not, in fact, be changes in the trend but may be a factor of which districts and villages were included or excluded from the analysis. For this reason, we recommend examining trends at the district level and present the following list of districts by wave and their sample sizes:

**TABLE 8.2: CCI-C DISTRICTS BY WAVE**

CCI-C Districts	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Qarah Bagh (1)	644	469	467
Ghazni	0	484	0
Gelan	655	489	474
Muqer	622	492	495
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	0	492	0
Orgun	650	0	0
Bermal	147	0	0
Sar Rowzah	336	0	0
Sabari (Ya qubi)	0	298	0
Tanai	0	489	0
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	616	488	495
Gurbuz	0	493	0
Bak	328	492	496
Shamul (Dzadran)	0	494	416
Tsowkey	654	495	0
Khas Kunar	654	494	494
Narang	0	481	0
Shigal wa Sheltan	0	495	0
Sar Kani	334	496	352
Marawarah	280	496	336
Nahr-e Saraj	654	450	472
Kajaki	0	0	319
Lashkar Gah	0	491	0
Sangin	656	309	397
Musa Qal'ah	655	286	410
Spin Boldak	655	493	463
Panjwa'i	640	496	479
Zharay	651	493	478
Shah Wali Kot	0	496	0
Shah Joy	0	494	0
Qalat	623	0	496
Tarnak wa Jaldak	0	399	0
Tarin Kot	0	467	0
Khas Uruzgan	647	0	495
Shahid-e Hasas	653	0	462
Dand	643	493	496
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>12397</b>	<b>13504</b>	<b>8992</b>

## Key Findings

The major takeaways from CCI-C districts are summarized below:

- Several items in the survey saw declines from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and then increases in Wave 3; while this may appear as a trend, it may also be the result of the inclusion of different districts between waves
- Overall perceptions of security remain consistent over the past three waves
- Respondents in Kajaki<sup>62</sup>, Sangin and Qalat<sup>63</sup> are consistently among the lowest on most security measures
- Respondents in Spin Boldak, Panjwa'i and Shahid-e Hasas tend to evaluate current levels of crime as being higher in their area than respondents in other districts
- Respondents in Qalat are most likely to say serious crime (both violent and non-violent) is on the rise in their area
- Reported presence of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces has increased consistently each wave; however, this has not led to an increase in confidence in their abilities or a perception that either force has improved their capabilities
- Increasing numbers report there are no Armed Opposition Groups in their area
- Respondents in Qalat and Nahr-e Saraj consistently express the lowest ratings of their district governor and district government
- Local leaders are rated most highly of any governmental leaders or officials; district governors, district government and provincial governors share similar positive approval
- Awareness of both District Development Assemblies (DDAs) and Community Development Councils (CDCs) have been consistent and in the low 60% range in all three waves of research
- Respondents in Kajaki, Panjwa'i, and Zharay tend to hold the most critical opinions of both their DDAs and CDCs
- Despite nearly half of respondents being aware of development projects in their area, most satisfaction measures of goods and services have remained relatively flat
- Preferences toward government courts have decreased in favor of tribal and local elders
- Satisfaction levels remain positive with government courts, but still lag behind those of tribal and local elders
- Fewer respondents seek out and trust armed opposition groups for justice
- Corruption remains a major problem with large majorities throughout the CCI-C program area acknowledging that it is widespread in their area
- Qalat respondents consistently rate their quality of life among the lowest of any district
- Respondents are less likely to report problems with access to markets and are slightly less likely to report increasing prices at the markets
- Respondents are less likely to believe local leaders take concerns of both ordinary people and women in particular into consideration when making decisions
- Unemployment remains the primary grievance mentioned by respondents
- Respondents are unlikely to believe that more than half of the people living in their area or surrounding areas voted in the election five years ago

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<sup>62</sup> CCI had complete very few, if any, activities in Kajaki by the time of this survey.

<sup>63</sup> CCI had not conducted programming activities in Qalat in the last year at the time of this survey.

- Respondents remain concerned about security when it comes to voting

## Security and Crime


Nearly half (47%) of respondents in CCI-C districts believe their area has become “somewhat” or “much” more secure in the past year and this assessment has remained relatively unchanged in all three waves of research. Despite these consistent perceptions of improvement, respondents’ overall assessment of the current security in their area has declined slightly over each of three waves. Fifty-two percent of respondents in Wave 3 say security in their area is “very good” or “good” compared to 53% in Wave 2 and 58% in Wave 1 who share this opinion. By district, CCI-C respondent opinions can vary substantially as in Kajaki where 52% say security in their area is “poor” or “very poor” compared to 75% of those in Spin Boldak who say their security is “good” or “very good.”

The assessment of road security in CCI-C districts overall has remained largely positive over time; currently 60% say it is “somewhat” or “very” good. However, majorities in Kajaki (79%), Qalat (62%), Gelan (55%) and Sangin (54%) express significant concern, evaluating security on their roads as either “somewhat” or “very” bad. Respondents in CCI-C districts are also more than twice as likely to say road security has improved (46%) rather than worsened (20%) with 33% saying it stayed the same over the past year. Not surprisingly, respondents in Kajaki (49%) and Qalat (45%) are the most likely to say road conditions worsened either “a little” or “a lot” in the past year.

Respondents are asked to evaluate their personal security in four different situations. Most respondents in CCI-C districts report feeling safe at home during the day, although, as shown in table 8.2, the trend has slightly worsened over each of the past three waves. For the remaining scenerios, the trend has either improved or remained relatively stable over time.

**FIGURE 8.1: PERSONAL SENSE OF SECURITY**

**Q4. Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are...  
(% "somewhat" or "very" insecure)**



Wave 1: n=12,397 | Wave 2: n=13,504 | Wave 3: n=8,992

Overall evaluations of the frequency of petty offenses and serious crime have remained stable over all three waves when averaging respondents from CCI-C districts. When looking at individual districts in Wave 3, 60% of respondents in Spin Boldak say there is “a lot” of petty crime (theft of food or goods worth less than 1000 Afs) in their area while 53% of those in Panjwa’i agree with this assessment. For

serious, non-violent crime (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 Afs), 40% of respondents in Gelan say this happens “a lot” while 38% in Panjwa’i and 36% in Spin Boldak also say this happens “a lot.” When considering serious, violent crime (murder, assault and kidnapping), 35% of Shahid-e Hasas respondents, 34% in Qarah Bagh and 32% in Spin Boldak say this happens “a lot.”

Interestingly, although Panjwa’i respondents rate current levels of petty crime more critically than those in most other districts, they are also most likely to say this type of crime is decreasing in their area with 70% who say there is “a little” or “much” less petty crime now compared to a year ago. This compares to a 56% average in all Wave 3 CCI-C districts. Respondents in Qalat are most likely to believe there has been an increase in serious, non-violent crime with 31% who say is “a little” or “much” more now. Qalat respondents are also most likely to report an increase in serious, violent crime, again with 31% who say there is “a little” or “much” more serious crime in their area now. Overall, when averaging all CCI-C respondents, none of these evaluations have changed substantially over time.

Overall, the perception that there are “a lot” of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops in their area has increased from 48% to 53% to 58% of respondents agreeing in each wave. This has not translated to an increase in confidence in the ANA; the proportion saying they have “a lot” of confidence in the ANA in Wave 1 (38%), Wave 2 (50%) and Wave 3 (42%) does not show the same consistent, upward trend. Evaluations of ANA improvements in their ability to provide security in the area have followed the same trend. The proportions of respondents in CCI-C districts who believe the ANA has “improved a lot” over the past year are 32% (Wave 1), 37% (Wave 2) and 33% (Wave 3).

Similar to evaluations of the ANA, the perception that there are “a lot” of Afghan National Police (ANP) forces in their area has progressively increased among respondents from 40% to 47% to 54%. Again, this has not translated to an increase in overall confidence; only 21%, 24% and 23% in each wave say they have “a lot” of confidence in the ANP. The same holds true for CCI-C respondent evaluations of ANP improvements in their ability to maintain security with only 22% (Wave 1), 19% (Wave 2) and 20% (Wave 3) who say they have improved “a lot” in the past year.

CCI-C district respondents report a large increase in the number of Arbaki in their area with 34% in Wave 3 saying there are “a lot” compared to 28% in Wave 1 and only 17% in Wave 2. Respondents do not say the same about the Afghan Local Police (ALP), with 32% of respondents who say there are “a lot” of them in their area compared to 34% who agree in Wave 1 and 30% who say the same in Wave 2. Not surprisingly, the proportion who say there are “a lot” of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in their area has consistently declined among CCI-C respondents with 20% who say there are “a lot” in Wave 1, 15% in Wave 2 and only 10% in Wave 3; the percent who say there are “none” in their area has increased from 26% (Wave 1) to 36% (Wave 2) and now half (50%) agree in Wave 3. As ISAF continues to draw down, this trend of Afghans seeing fewer ISAF troops will continue.

The proportion of CCI-C respondents who report that there are no Armed Opposition Groups in their areas has consistently increased over each wave from 24% in Wave 1, to 33% in Wave 2 and now 39% in Wave 3. The lowest reported presence of Armed Opposition Groups is in Shamul, where 67% say there are “none” in their area. Other districts where a majority reports there are no Armed Opposition Groups in their area include: Terayzai (63%), Sar Kani (61%), Khas Kunar (58%), Bak (56%) and Dand (50%).

## Governance

Just over seven out of ten respondents (72%) living in CCI-C districts believe the Afghan government is well regarded in their area (up from 70% in Wave 2 and 68% in Wave 1). In evaluating respondents' openness in answering this question it should be noted that 51% of Wave 3 respondents also say "it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the Afghan government," an increase from 42% in Wave 2. While it is not clear if respondents viewed the interview process as a "public" format, this indicates there could be a social desirability bias impacting measures of governance and that actual evaluations of government performance could perhaps be lower than reported.

While overall confidence in district governors has not changed much over time, respondents in Qalat stand out as having the lowest confidence in their governor with 48% who say they have "no confidence." That is over twice as high as the next closest district, Nahr-e Saraj, where 22% give a "no confidence" evaluation of their governor. Opinions of responsiveness closely follow those of confidence; 49% in Qalat say their district governor is "very unresponsive" to the needs of local people and 22% in Nahr-e Saraj agree. Not surprisingly, respondents in these districts are also most likely to say their district governor's ability to get things done has "worsened a lot" in the past year; 41% in Qalat and 22% in Nahr-e Saraj share this assessment.

Respondents in Qalat also give the lowest rating of their district government overall with 33% sharing a "no confidence" evaluation. Interestingly, respondents in Nahr-e Saraj do not evaluate the district government harshly at all: 91% say they have either "some" (20%) or "a lot" (71%) of confidence in the district government, the highest rating of any district. This trend continues for measures of responsiveness and improvement with respondents in Qalat rating their district government lowest of all CCI-C districts and those in Nahr-e Saraj rating their district government the highest.

Confidence levels in local village or neighborhood leaders are highest of all government officials or offices with 79% of CCI-C respondents overall saying they have "some" or "a lot" of confidence and only 2% who say they have "no confidence." As with their district government, Qalat respondents offer one of the highest evaluations of their local leaders: 63% say they have "a lot" and 28% say they have "some" confidence in their local leaders. Nahr-e Saraj respondents evaluate their local leaders even higher with 68% who say they have "a lot of confidence" and another 31% who say they have "some confidence" in their abilities. Respondents in CCI-C districts continue to share generally positive views of their local leaders when it comes to responsiveness with 46% who say they are "somewhat" and 33% who say they are "very" responsive to their needs. Qalat respondents continue to rate local leaders favorably when it comes to responsiveness with 64% who say they are "very" and 28% who say they are "somewhat" responsive to their needs. Nahr-e Saraj respondents are most likely to perceive improvements in their local leaders' abilities in the past year with 68% who say they have "improved a lot" and another 29% who say they have improved "a little" in the past year.

Respondents are asked to evaluate their provincial governors. Overall confidence among respondents in CCI-C districts improved in Wave 3 with 22% who say they have "a lot" and 41% who say they have "some" confidence – these 63% who have confidence in Wave 3 compare to 53% in Wave 2 and 52% in Wave 1 who express at least "some" confidence. Nearly identical trends are seen in overall evaluations of responsiveness and improvements among provincial governors by respondents in CCI-C districts. This positive assessment is not shared by respondents in Qalat, where 50% say their provincial governor is

“very unresponsive.” Not surprisingly, respondents in Qalat are also by far the most likely to say their provincial governor’s ability to get things done has “worsened a lot” (37%) in the past year.


Awareness of a District Development Assembly (DDA) in their area has changed little in three waves for CCI-C respondents (60% in Wave 3, 58% in Wave 2 and 63% in Wave 1). This measure varies significantly by district, however, as 94% in Musa Qal’ah say they have heard of a DDA compared to just under one-third (32%) in Qarah Bagh. Of those who have heard of a DDA (n=5411), majorities in every CCI-C district except for Kajaki (44%) report having “some” or “a lot” of confidence in the DDA in their area. It should be noted that confidence skews heavily toward “some” rather than “a lot” in these districts as pluralities or outright majorities report “some” confidence in each district aside from Kajaki, where a plurality (44%) report having “not much confidence.” A nearly identical trend exists when respondents who have heard of a DDA rate their responsiveness, with pluralities or majorities saying they are “somewhat responsive” except that Panjwa’i and Zharay join those in Kajaki where pluralities rate their DDA as “somewhat unresponsive.” In terms of observed improvements in their DDA over the past year, Panjawa’I and Zharay are the only districts where a majority of those who have heard of a DDA believes they have worsened either “a lot” or “a little” in the past year. Majorities in all other districts believe they have at least stayed the same or have improved over the past year.

Awareness of a Community Development Council (CDC) in CCI-C districts closely follows DDA awareness with 62% who say they are aware in Wave 3 compared to 60% in Wave 2 and 64% in Wave 1. Of those who have heard of a CDC in their area, confidence is high and majorities in every district report having “some” or “a lot” of confidence. Responsiveness ratings are also high; 22% overall rate them “very responsive” and 47% overall rate them as “somewhat responsive” to the needs of the local people. Respondents in Panjwa’i, Zharay and Dand are least likely to rate them as responsive with majorities rating them as unresponsive and pluralities saying they are “somewhat unresponsive” in all three districts. Perceived improvements among respondents who have heard of CDCs are more favorable with a majority overall (55%) who say CDCs have improved “a little” or “a lot” in the last year while 27% say CDCs have stayed the same. In no district do a majority say CDCs have worsened.

Respondents are asked to rate their level of agreement with several competing statements, all concerning their district government. Overall, majorities chose the positive assessment over the negative assessment for each set of statements.

## FIGURE 8.2: EVALUATIONS OF DISTRICT GOVERNMENT

Q14. Respondents who say "yes" the following characteristics describe their district government (n=8,992)




Responses varied by district, however, and not all districts shared positive assessments by the majority of respondents. Notable outliers include:

- 81% in Qalat believe district government officials are not from their district
- 80% in Panjwa'i 71% in Zharay and 67% in Spin Boldak who do not believe their district government understands the problems of the people in their area
- 62% in Kajaki and 60% in Qalat who do not believe the district government cares about people in their area
- 59% in Qalat and 58% in Kajaki who believe officials abuse their authority to make money for themselves
- 55% in Khas Uruzgan and 54% in Kajaki who say officials do not visit their area
- 64% in Kajaki and 59% in both Khas Uruzgan and Qalat who do not believe officials are doing their jobs honestly
- 66% in Kajaki and 65% in Panjwa'i who do not agree that the district government delivers services in a fair manner

### Service Provisions and Development


Respondents in CCI-C districts are slightly more likely to say services have improved in the past year in Wave 3 (46% "improved a little" and "improved a lot") compared to Waves 1 and 2 (44% in each wave). However, when asked about specific goods and services, most respondents report little or no improvement over time.

**FIGURE 8.3: SATISFACTION WITH PROVISION OF GOODS**



Respondents in Kajaki (36% “very dissatisfied”) and Sangin (33% “very dissatisfied”) are least satisfied with clean drinking water. When it comes to water for irrigation and other non-drinking purposes, 33% of respondents in Marawarah and 30% in Spin Boldak say they are “very dissatisfied.” When evaluating the provision of agricultural assistance, respondents in Sar Kani (32% “very dissatisfied,” 14% “not provided”), Marawarah (39% “very dissatisfied,” 7% not provided”), Qalat (31% “very dissatisfied,” 18% “not provided”) and Khas Kunar (36% “very dissatisfied,” 10% “not provided”) are among the least satisfied. The perceived provision of retaining and flood walls in Kajaki (67% “very dissatisfied,” 15% “not provided”), Qalat (48% “very dissatisfied,” 19% “not provided”) and Sangin (59% “very dissatisfied,” 5% “not provided”) are the most likely to express dissatisfaction. When rating the provision of roads and bridges, Gelan respondents (34% “very dissatisfied,” 10% “not provided”), Muqer (35% “very dissatisfied,” 6% “not provided”) and Khas Kunar (30% “very dissatisfied,” 11% “not provided”) stand out at the least satisfied.

**FIGURE 8.4: SATISFACTION WITH PROVISION OF SERVICES**



Khas Kunar respondents express the highest level of dissatisfaction with medical as 36% say they are “very dissatisfied” and 11% say the service is “not provided” while 38% in Sangin are “very dissatisfied” (1% say the service is “not provided”). Respondents in Sangin are extremely unhappy with schooling for girls with 79% who say they are “very dissatisfied” and 15% who say the service is “not provided.” Schooling for boys is rated lowest in Khas Kunar where 50% are “very dissatisfied” and 8% say it is “not provided.” Electricity is a major source of dissatisfaction in most CCI-C districts; however, those in Kajaki are uniquely satisfied with this service with a remarkable 84% who say they are “very satisfied.”

Respondents in CCI-C districts are more likely to say they have heard of development projects in their area in Wave 3 (47% compared to 42% in Wave 2). However, Wave 1 respondents (53%) remain the most likely to have heard of development projects. Only 23% of those in Khas Kunar and 19% of those in Khas Uruzgan claim to have heard of development projects. Respondents who say they have heard of development projects in general were asked a series of questions about specific development projects in their area.

Of those who say they have heard of development projects:

- 73% say they have heard of drinking water projects (down from 84% in Wave 1 and 76% in Wave 2); 87% of those who had heard of drinking water projects believe the project improved the lives of the people in their area
- 56% say they are aware of irrigation and other water projects in their area; 84% of those who are aware say the project has helped people in their area
- 47% say they are aware of agricultural assistance programs; 74% of those say they have helped people in their area
- 19% say they are aware of projects focused on storing farm produce (down from 27% in Wave 1 and 24% in Wave 2); 61% say these have helped people in their area
- 36% are aware of flood or retaining wall projects; 76% say they have helped people in their area
- 52% say they have heard of road and bridge projects; 81% of those believe the projects have helped local people
- 53% are aware of medical facilities projects; 79% believe those projects have helped local people
- 61% are aware of respondents are aware of school projects; 82% believe such projects have helped local people
- 25% (up from 14% in Wave 2 and 22% in Wave 1) are aware of electricity projects; 84% believe they have helped people in their area

When asked what types of projects are most needed in their area, road construction remains the most common type of project mentioned in an open ended format with 33% who list it out of a possible two mentions per respondent. Another 25% say education and school projects while 24% say clinics, again out of a possible two mentions.<sup>64</sup> Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The most frequent responses include:<sup>65</sup>

Lack of clinics/hospitals	33%
Lack of professional doctors	32%
Lack of medicines	30%
Lack of equipment	21%
Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads	18%
Cost of health care or medicine	17%


<sup>64</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>65</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

## Rule of Law

When respondents or their family members are involved in disputes (concerning land or water, assault, murder, kidnapping, or serious violent crimes), preferences for dispute resolution mechanisms vary based on the type of crime. Local and tribal elders are preferred for land or water disputes and theft, but respondents are evenly split between government courts and elders when it comes to serious crimes involving assault, murder or kidnapping. Armed opposition groups are seldom the preferred source of justice for any type of crime.

**FIGURE 8.5: SOURCES OF JUSTICE**



For assault, murder and kidnapping disputes, government courts were more strongly preferred in Wave 2 (52%) compared to Wave 3 (45%). Tribal elders were only preferred by 39% of respondents in CCI-C districts in Wave 2 compared to the 45% who prefer them in Wave 3. Government courts (44%) were evenly preferred to tribal elders (45%) in theft cases in Wave 2; in Wave 3, there is now a 16 percentage point disparity in favor of elders compared to government courts.

Confidence in tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes has slightly increased throughout all three waves of research with the proportion expressing either “some” or “a lot” of confidence increasing from 90% (Wave 1) to 92% (Wave 2) and now 93% (Wave 3). Belief that people in their area will “always” respect the decisions made by tribal elders has steadily increased from 32% (Wave 1), to 40% (Wave 2) and is now at 42% (Wave 3).

Majorities also have “some” or “a lot” of confidence in government courts, albeit to a lesser degree than those express confidence in elders. Wave 1 saw 68% express this level of confidence, which increased to 72% in Wave 2 but fell slightly to 71% in Wave 3. Belief that people will “always” trust decisions made by government courts is at 20% and has not significantly changed over three waves.

Few respondents express confidence in armed opposition groups with 39% in Wave 1, 27% in Wave 2 and 30% in Wave 3 who say they have “some” or “a lot” of confidence they will fairly resolve disputes. Those who share the opinion that armed opposition groups will “always” reach a fair decision is similarly low at 12% of respondents, up from 10% in Wave 2 and the same as the 10% who report the same in Wave 1.

## Corruption

The majority of respondents in CCI-C districts (86%) admit that corruption is a problem in their area and majorities in each district agree; the lowest proportion is found in Panjwa'i where 59% agree.

Respondents in CCI-C districts have become more likely in each wave to report that corruption has increased in the past year. In Wave 1, 39% say it has increased “a little” or “a lot” compared to 48% in Wave 2 and 52% in Wave 3.

When asked which department or sector of the local government is most corrupt, respondents most frequently mention: police / police headquarters (11%), courts (10%), the district office (9%), the Ministry of Education (8%) and the district attorney's office (8%).

## Quality of Life

Satisfaction with life as a whole increased from Wave 2 but has not quite reached the level measured in Wave 1. Seventy-one percent of respondents say they are satisfied (“somewhat satisfied” or “very satisfied”) with their life in general, compared to 64% in Wave 2 and 73% in Wave 1. Respondents are just as likely to say they are “somewhat” or “very” satisfied with their household's current financial situation (65% in Wave 3 and Wave 2).

Respondents in Qalat report the lowest level of satisfaction in general with a plurality (38%) who report being “very dissatisfied” and another 18% who say they are “somewhat dissatisfied.” In no other district do a majority of respondents report being more dissatisfied than satisfied with their lives. Qalat respondents also report low levels of satisfaction with their current economic situation with 54% who report being “somewhat” (21%) or “very” (33%) dissatisfied. Those in Zharay are even less satisfied with 32% who say they are “somewhat” and 33% saying they are “very” dissatisfied with their household's economic situation.

Overall, respondents in CCI-C districts are more likely to say their ability to meet basic needs has increased in the past year: 50% now say it has increased “a little” or “a lot” compared to 41% who say the same in Wave 2. Similarly, the proportion who say they are “very worried” about meeting basic needs in the next year has dropped from 28% in Wave 2 to 22% in Wave 3. A slight majority (51%) also believe the future is too uncertain to make plans with majorities in 14 of 21 CCI-C districts agreeing with that assessment.

## Economic Activity

When asked to compare their ability to access markets now to last year, over half of CCI-C district respondents (53%, up from 46% in Wave 2) say it has gotten better (“a little better” or “much better”), 30% say it is about the same, and 17% say it has gotten worse (“a little worse” or “much worse”). Notably, Qalat respondents are much more likely to say their ability to access markets has declined: 13% say this has become “a little worse” and a plurality (27%) say it has become “much worse.”

Respondents are also less likely to report increases in the cost of food at the markets over the past year. In Wave 2, 63% say prices either increased “a little” or “a lot” compared to 51% who say the same in Wave 3. Fifty-four percent in Qalat report that prices have “increased a lot” in the past year.

Overall, respondents are slightly more likely to believe there are “a lot” or “a little” more paid jobs in their areas than there were a year ago in Wave 3 by a margin of 34% to 40%. Nahr-e Saraj respondents are most likely to report less jobs in their area with 54% who say there is “a little” and 10% who say there is “a lot” less opportunity in their area. Respondents in Terayzai are also not optimistic about job growth with 28% who say there is “a little less” and 25% who say there is “a lot less” opportunity.

## Community Cohesion and Resilience

The majority of respondents living in CCI-C districts (52%) say things from outside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems in their area, up from 46% in Wave 1 and 47% in Wave 2. Respondents who say such problems happen “often,” “sometimes,” or “rarely” are asked what types of outside interferences causes problems in their village/neighborhood. The most common responses include:<sup>66</sup>

<b>Road-side bombs/suicide attacks</b>	<b>20%</b>
<b>Disputes over water</b>	<b>17%</b>
<b>Land disputes</b>	<b>13%</b>
<b>Small crimes/theft</b>	<b>10%</b>

Respondents overall have similar opinions on the frequency of disputes originating from inside their village/neighborhood with another 52% who say these things “never” create problems in their area (up from 45% in Wave 2 and similar to the 51% in Wave 1). Those who say such disputes happen at least “rarely” are asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood. Respondents most frequently mention:<sup>67</sup>

<b>Land disputes</b>	<b>30%</b>
<b>Family problems</b>	<b>28%</b>
<b>Disputes over water</b>	<b>28%</b>
<b>Ethnic disputes</b>	<b>15%</b>

Respondents in Qalat are most likely to say these types of disputes happen “often” with 24% who say this happens both from internal and external origins in their area. Respondents in Qalat are also the most likely to say the people in their area are able to solve disputes on their own with 83% who believe people in their area can “often” or “sometimes” resolve such disputes on their own. This compares to 69% of CCI-C respondents overall who share this assessment.

Overall, a majority of CCI-C respondents believe their local leaders take the concerns of ordinary people into account at least “sometimes” (43%) or “always” (21%). Respondents in Khas Uruzgan, however, stand out as being the least optimistic about this with 60% who say local leaders “never” take ordinary peoples’ concerns into account in decision making.


<sup>66</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>67</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

The trend over time has been that fewer respondents believe local leaders “often” and more believe they “never” take such concerns into consideration.

**FIGURE 8.6: LOCAL DECISION MAKING – “ORDINARY PEOPLE”**


**Q37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?**



While the overall trend is less clear, it appears to be the case that respondents in CCI-C districts generally feel that the concerns of women are taken into account less frequently than the interests of “ordinary people” in general. While the proportion who believes local leaders “never” take women’s concerns into account has remained basically static over time, the proportion who believes they “often” take such concerns into consideration has declined in Wave 3.

**FIGURE 8.7: LOCAL DECISION MAKING – “WOMEN”**

**Q37b. In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered?**



Overall, a majority of Wave 3 respondents (69%) believe their local leaders are “somewhat” (47%) or “very” (21%) effective in securing fund for their local area. This measure has remained relatively consistent over all three waves.

Most respondents (85%) do not belong to any “groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together.” Of those who do, out of a possible two mentions, the

most common types of groups mentioned are farmers unions (49%), business companies (29%) and development councils (12%).<sup>68</sup>

## Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include:<sup>69</sup>

<b>Unemployment</b>	<b>33%</b>
<b>Insecurity</b>	<b>28%</b>
<b>Illiteracy</b>	<b>14%</b>
<b>Corruption</b>	<b>12%</b>
<b>Lack of electricity</b>	<b>11%</b>

Unemployment has consistently increased as a spontaneous mention in each wave. It was 23% in Wave 1 and 28% in Wave 2.

## Media

Respondents in CCI-C districts increasingly use radio (97%, up from 95% in Wave 2 and 94% in Wave 1) and it remains the most popular method of getting news and information. Other popular methods of getting news and information include: friends and family (92%), elders (77%), and their Mosque/Mullah (63%). They are less likely to use cell phones (33%), television (18%), posters/billboards (8%), and newspapers (4%). Hardly any respondents use the internet/email (1%).

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (80%), friends/family (46%), and elders (32%).<sup>70</sup>

## CCI Module

A plurality of respondents (42%) believe only “some” of the people in their area voted in the last election five years ago while 21% say “hardly any” people voted in their area. Another 18% say “about half” voted, 15% say “a lot” voted and only 4% believe “almost all” of the people in their area voted. Respondents in Qalat (39%), Spin Boldak (37%) and Shahid-e Hasas (35%) are most likely to report “hardly any” people voted in their area. Respondents were asked to evaluate how many people in neighboring settlements in their area voted and these results mirrored assessments of voting in their own neighborhood. By district, one notable difference is that 44% of respondents in Kajaki believe “hardly any” of those in neighboring villages voted.

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<sup>68</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>69</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

<sup>70</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the percent of respondents that mentioned each response at least once are reported.

A majority (54%) believe most people in their community voted for different candidates in the last election. However, majorities in Panjwa'i (77%), Zharay (77%), Dand (58%) and Khas Uruzgan (54%) believe people voted for the same candidates.

Overall, 65% believe people in neighboring settlements voted for different candidates than those in their community. This belief is shared by a majority in all districts except Spin Boldak, where 58% believe they voted for the same candidates as those in neighboring settlements.

Two-thirds (66%) overall say they had discussions in their community about who to vote for prior to the election, a sentiment shared by a majority in each district. Most do not consider these "arguments" as 60% say they did not have arguments in their area about who to vote for prior to the last election. Even fewer say there were clashes or physical violence about which candidate to vote for – 71% say this did not happen. A similar proportion (74%) say there were no clashes or physical violence with those in neighboring villages about who to vote for prior to the last election five years ago; although, a slight majority (54%) in Panjwa'i say this did happen. Another 70% say there was no violence on Election Day between supporters of different candidates, a sentiment shared by a majority in each district. Nearly three quarters (74%) believe there were no disputes in their area about how polling stations were handled and the same proportion (74%) say there were no disputes in their area after the election about the final results.

Most respondents (82%) feel voting is a personal, individual responsibility rather than believing one cannot vote for whomever they want. Although 49% in Qalat say they cannot vote for whomever they want and another 11% refused to answer or said they do not know when given those two options.

Respondents more frequently (74%) agree that "obeying the laws of the Afghan government is necessary to achieve peace and prosperity" rather than "there may be times when it is necessary to take matters into your own hands, even if this means breaking the law." Qalat respondents are again the outlier with 49% who agree with the second statement and 14% saying they "don't know" or "refused" to answer.

More respondents chose local tribal elders (49%) if they needed to resolve an election dispute rather than government courts (30%) or the Afghan National Police (19%). If a family member was involved in an election related dispute, 48% would go to the local or tribal elders for justice. When asked to choose between "government leaders and officials" and "tribal and community leaders" to resolve election disputes, 48% choose local or tribal elders, 32% choose government courts, 13% say neither and 7% opt for both equally (the last two options were volunteered by respondents).

When asked to rate their level of concern with election violence, respondents are significantly more likely to express concern than to not. Sixty-five percent say they are "somewhat" (41%) or "very" (24%) concerned compared to 34% who say they are "not very" (23%) or "not at all" (11%) concerned about election violence.

## Community Cohesion Initiative – IOM

### Introduction

The Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) program is implemented throughout Afghanistan by two partner organizations which target different districts. International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the implementing partner for CCI districts in northern and western provinces in Afghanistan. For disambiguation purposes, this program is referred to as IOM throughout the report. IOM targets the following districts in Afghanistan:

**TABLE 9.1: IOM DISTRICTS**

District	Sample size	Complex MOE
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	n=496	9.20%
Ruy Do Ab	n=490	9.83%
Hazrat-e Sultan	n=481	7.86%
Fayroz Nakhchir	n=360	10.46%
Mazar-e Sharif	n=488	7.70%
Balkh	n=478	7.39%
Sholgarah	n=452	5.28%
Chimtal	n=490	6.05%
Chahar Bolak	n=491	5.12%
Shibirghan	n=493	10.49%
Faizabad (2)	n=477	9.32%
Khwaja Do Koh	n=428	8.34%
Qush Tepah	n=327	4.83%
<b>IOM Overall</b>	<b>n=5951</b>	<b>2.79%</b>

This chapter provides summary and detailed information about the attitudes and opinions of respondents living in districts targeted by IOM programs. The IOM program was newly added to the MISTI project for Wave 3. Unlike other programs in MISTI Wave 3, there are no trends to examine over time for this program. Therefore, this report serves as a baseline assessment of stabilization and development indicators on the following topics: security and crime, governance, service provision and development, rule of law, corruption, quality of life, economic activity, community cohesion and resilience, grievances, and media.

Respondents in all CCI districts were also asked a specialized set of questions specifically designed for the CCI program. These questions all relate to voting and elections; the results are summarized at the end of this chapter.

It should be noted that interviews in Qush Tepah were conducted by a field team from Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC). The remaining districts were conducted entirely by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic Research (ACSOR). Differences exist in the field implementation and quality control measures used for the AYC interviews which may impact some survey results. For detailed descriptions of these differences, refer to the full Methodology Report for MISTI Wave 3.

## Key Findings

The major takeaways from IOM districts are summarized below:

- In all measures of security, Qush Tepa respondents feel the least secure of those in any IOM district included in this evaluation—likely a result of the high levels of Armed Opposition Groups reported in the area
- Afghan National Army (ANA) presence is perceived to be fairly low, while confidence in ANA abilities is high, in IOM districts
- Confidence in the Afghan National Police (ANP) is high and their presence is perceived to be stronger than that of the ANA
- The more local the leader is to the respondent, the higher respondents tend to rate them; village/neighborhood leaders receive the highest ratings and provincial governors rate lowest amongst
- Respondents in Qush Tepa have the least favorable views of government on most measures and very few feel it is acceptable to publicly criticize the Afghan Government
- While respondents are more likely to believe services in general have improved than worsened over the past year, levels of satisfaction on specific services are generally low
- Only one-third of respondents have heard of development projects in their area
- Respondents prefer government courts for the resolution of the most serious crimes, but prefer local or tribal elders for less serious crimes
- Satisfaction with both life in general and household economic situations is high throughout IOM districts
- Access to markets has improved, however the cost of goods at markets has increased
- Respondents do not see problems originating from outside of their village, nor do they believe people within their village create problems for the local people
- Unemployment and lack of electricity are the most commonly mentioned problems
- All Mazar-e Sharif respondents use television, an uncommon finding in Afghanistan
- Radio and television are the most common sources of information for government services
- Perceptions that people voted in the last election are high throughout IOM districts
- Respondents did not perceive many problems or disputes as a result of the last election

## Security and Crime


Respondents in IOM districts enjoy very high levels of security. Two thirds (67%) of respondents in IOM districts say security in their area is “good” (41%) or “very good” (26%); and, just 5% say security is “poor,” while nobody rates security as “very poor.” A majority of respondents in every IOM district say security in their area is at least “fair.” Even in Qush Tepa—the district with the lowest security assessment—76% of the respondents report their level of security as “fair.”

Overall, 58% report their area is “somewhat” (32%) or “much” (25%) more secure than it was a year ago. Qush Tepa again stands out as an outlier with 50% who say security is “about the same” and 47% who say it is “somewhat less secure” than it was a year ago.

A majority of respondents (78%) in nearly every district say road security is “somewhat” or “very” good. Again, Qush Tepa is the only district with a negative assessment of road security: no respondents believe it is “very good” while 40% say “somewhat good” and 58% say it is “somewhat bad.” Qush Tepa respondents are unlikely to say road security has declined or improved in the past year, however, with 78% who say it has “stayed the same.”

Respondents are asked to evaluate their personal security in four different situations. Nearly all respondents say they feel secure in their homes and relatively few say they feel insecure while traveling outside of their village.

**TABLE 9.2: SENSE OF PERSONAL SECURITY**



A majority of respondents also believe they are at least “somewhat” secure when traveling to a neighboring village in all districts; Qush Tepa is an outlier where 55% report feeling “somewhat insecure.” Respondents in Qush Tepa feel least secure traveling to the district or provincial capital with 39% saying this is “somewhat insecure” and 45% who feel “very insecure.”

Petty crime (theft of goods or food worth less than 1000 Afs) is not prevalent in any IOM district and only 8% overall say this type of crime happens “a lot” in their area. More serious thefts (goods worth more than 5,000 Afs) are also uncommon with only 5% of the respondents reporting this happens “a lot.” Serious, violent crime (murder, kidnapping, assault) is even less common with only 4% who say this happens “a lot” in their area. There is no perception that these types of crimes are increasing in any IOM

district: only 2% overall on each measure saying there is “a little more” and 0% who say there is “much more” of each type of crime as compared to last year.

Respondents in IOM districts do not commonly see many Afghan National Army (ANA) troops in their areas. The exception are those respondents in Mazar-e Sharif (40% “a lot” and 39% “some”) and Shibirghan (33% “a lot” and 37% “some”). Confidence in the ANA is universally high at 88% overall who report having “some” or “a lot” of confidence in ANA abilities. This also corresponds with a perception among respondents in IOM districts of improvement with 58% overall saying their abilities have improved (“a lot” or “a little”) in the past year and another 28% who say they have stayed the same. Only 6% believe their abilities have gotten worse (by “a lot” or “a little”).

The Afghan National Police (ANP) is more commonly seen in IOM districts. Seventy-four percent overall say there are “a lot” (39%) or “some” (36%) ANP in their area; 80% in Mazar-e Sharif say there are “a lot” of ANP in their area. Confidence in the ANP is also high with 80% overall expressing at least “some” confidence in them. Respondents in Qush Tepa are least likely to say they have confidence in the ANP with 36% who say they have “a little” and another 12% who say they have “no” confidence. Majorities in each district say the ANP has at least “stayed the same” in terms of their capabilities compared to last year.

Arabki presence varies between districts. For example, in Qush Tepa, 98% say there are “a lot” but in five other IOM districts (Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in, Ruy Do Ab, Hazrat-e Sultan, Fayroz Nakhchir and Mazar-e Sharif) over 90% say there are “none.”

Perceived presence of Armed Opposition Groups is generally very low. Aside from the 86% in Qush Tepa who say there are “a lot” in their area, majorities in every other district say there are “none.”

ISAF presence is also believed to be low in all IOM districts with 88% overall who say there are “none” in their area—a view shared by a majority of respondents in each district.

## **Governance**

Nearly three-fourths (73%) of respondents in IOM districts say the government in general is well regarded in their area and there is little variance by district.

Local village and neighborhood leaders enjoy the highest confidence ratings of any government figures or groups. The results show 47% who say they have “a lot” and another 38% saying they have “some” confidence in these leaders. There are no IOM districts where a majority expresses less than “some” confidence in their local leaders. Village and neighborhood leaders are generally perceived to be responsive with 38% who say they are “very responsive” and 41% who say they are “somewhat responsive” to the needs of the local people in their area. Qush Tepa is an outlier where 49% say they are “somewhat” and 4% say they are “very” unresponsive; the only district where a majority rate local leaders as unresponsive.

Respondents also express a high level of confidence in their district governors. Overall, 33% say they have “a lot” of confidence and another 51% say they have “some” confidence. Only in Qush Tepa do respondents express less confidence with a plurality (43%) who say they have “not much confidence” in their district governor. Measures of responsiveness of district governors follow the same pattern with 25%

overall who say their governor is “very” and 50% who say he is “somewhat” responsive to the needs of local people. In Qush Tepa, 61% rate him as “somewhat unresponsive.”


Respondents share similar feelings about their district government as a whole to those expressed about their district governor: 29% say they have “a lot” and 48% say they have “some” confidence. Those in Qush Tepa rate the district government lower than respondents’ ratings of district government in other districts. Responsiveness measures show 24% overall who say their district government is “very responsive” and 47% saying they are “somewhat responsive.” Again, 61% in Qush Tepa say it is “somewhat unresponsive.”

Confidence in provincial governors is the lowest of all government figures or groups rated with 26% who have “a lot” and 43% who have “some” confidence in them. Respondents in Fayroz Nakhchir are most critical with 36% who have “not much confidence” and 16% who have “no confidence” in their provincial governor. A majority overall find their provincial governor to be responsive (21% “very” and 40% “somewhat”). Fayroz Nakhchir respondents are more critical with 38% who say he is “somewhat” and 14% who say he “very” unresponsive. Those in Chimtal are also critical (36% “somewhat” and 14% “very” unresponsive) and Qush Tepa respondents are most likely to say their provincial governor is unresponsive with 59% who say he is “somewhat” and 11% saying he is “very” unresponsive.

When asked about the ability of government leaders and offices to get things done over the past year, there are only minor differences reported by respondents for each entity. Large majorities in every district agree that local leaders, district governors, district government, and provincial governors have either “stayed the same” or improved “a little” or “a lot” over the past year. Respondents are slightly more likely to report improvements in local leaders and slightly more likely to say their provincial governor’s abilities have stayed the same.


A majority of respondents are aware of a District Development Assembly (DDA) in their area. Those who are aware are asked how much confidence they have in their DDA, how responsive their DDA is to the needs of local people in their area, and if they think the DDA’s ability to get things done in the past year has improved or worsened.

**TABLE 9.3: EVALUATIONS OF DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT ASSEMBLIES**



Awareness of a Community Development Council (CDC) in IOM districts is slightly higher than for DDA. Although confidence in DDAs is slightly higher than in CDCs, ratings of CDC responsiveness and improvement are slightly more positive than ratings for DDAs.

**TABLE 9.4: EVALUATIONS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS**



Respondents are asked to rate their level of agreement with several competing statements concerning their district government and district government officials. A majority of respondents chose the positive statement over the negative statement for each set of statements with the exception of officials abusing their authority to make money for themselves; for this set of statements, 48% say their district government officials do abuse their authority in this way.

**TABLE 9.5: EVALUATIONS OF DISTRICT GOVERNMENT AND OFFICIALS**


Positive Statement	% Agree
Officials in this district are from this district	66%
Understands the problems of people in this area	65%
Cares about the people in this area	57%
Officials do not abuse their authority to make money for themselves	46%
Officials visit this area	58%
Officials are doing their jobs honestly	52%
Delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner	52%

Most respondents (61%) feel it is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan Government, a view shared by a majority of respondents within each district. The exception is Qush Tepa where 53% say it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the government and 6% say it is acceptable. Another 41% in Qush Tepa declined to answer (5% refused; 36% don't know).

## Service Provisions and Development

Respondents in IOM districts are more likely to say services have improved in the past year (45%) than to say they have worsened (20%), and 34% say they have not changed. Qush Tepa respondents are most critical of changes in service provision with 40% who say they have “worsened a little” in the past year. However, when asked about specific services, some services enjoy much higher levels of satisfaction than others. Overall, a majority say they are dissatisfied with all services aside from schooling for boys and girls.

**TABLE 9.6: SATISFACTION WITH PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES**



Not surprisingly, respondents in Marar-e Sharif, the most urban district included in this assessment, are significantly more likely to say they are satisfied with nearly every service. Rural focused services such as “agricultural assistance” and “retaining and flood walls” received lower levels of reported satisfaction, and a majority of respondents in Mazar report that the service is “not provided.” Respondents in Qush Tepa are the least likely to express satisfaction on every service measured with net satisfaction ratings (“very” and “somewhat” satisfied combined) between 0% and 3% on each service rated.

Only about one-third (34%) say they have heard of development projects in their area over the past year. Only in Ruy Do Ab (60%) and Hazrat-e Sultan (51%) do majorities say they have heard of development projects; and, in Faizabad, 91% say they have not heard of any development projects in their area.

Those respondents who say they have heard of development projects are asked to elaborate on the types of development projects. Furthermore, each respondent who has heard of a particular project is asked if

that project helped the people in their area. Of those who have heard of a project, majorities say it has helped the local people.

**TABLE 9.7: AWARENESS AND BENEFIT OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

Type of Project	Heard of	Has helped
Drinking water	70%	81%
Schools	63%	79%
Roads and bridges	61%	72%
Irrigation/water maintenance	38%	67%
Agricultural assistance	35%	69%
Medical facilities	30%	69%
Electricity	20%	76%
Retaining and flood walls	17%	77%
Farm processing / storage facilities	16%	67%

When asked about the types of projects that are most needed in their area, road construction is the most commonly mentioned (in an open ended question format with 35% who list it out of a possible two mentions per respondent). Another 24% say clinics, while 19% say education and school projects again out of a possible two mentions.

Respondents were also asked about the obstacles preventing them from obtaining health care or medicine. The top three obstacles are lack of clinics/hospitals, lack of medicine, lack of professional doctors, and the cost of health care or medicine.

The top five most frequent responses include:<sup>71</sup>


Lack of clinics/hospitals	46%
Lack of medicines	28%
Lack of professional doctors	27%
Cost of health care or medicine	27%
Distance to facilities/lack of transportation/lack of good roads	26%
Lack of equipment	17%

### Rule of Law

When respondents or their family members are involved in disputes (concerning land or water, assault, murder, kidnapping, or serious violent crimes), a preference is shown for turning to local and tribal elders for land and water disputes and theft. Government courts are preferred when it comes to more serious crimes such as assault, murder and kidnapping. Armed opposition groups are rarely the preferred source of justice for any type of crime.

<sup>71</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

**FIGURE 9.8: SOURCES OF JUSTICE**



Only in Mazar-e Sharif do a majority prefer government courts to resolve all three types of disputes.

Not surprisingly, local and tribal elders enjoy high marks for confidence among respondents in IOM districts: 52% say they have “a lot” of confidence while 43% say they have “some” confidence. Fifty percent of respondents say they “always” respect the decisions of local and tribal elders.

Confidence in government courts is more tempered with 35% who say they have “a lot,” 44% who say they have “some” and 18% who say they have “not much” confidence in them. Respect for decisions is likewise tempered with 27% saying they “always” and 43% saying they “sometimes” respect their decisions.

Only a quarter of respondents have confidence in armed opposition groups; 73% report “no confidence” in armed opposition groups’ abilities to fairly resolve disputes. Eighty-two percent say they “never” respect decisions made by armed opposition groups.

### Corruption

The majority of respondents in IOM districts (60%) admit that corruption is a problem in their area. A majority of respondents in most districts agree with this assessment; however, 64% in Kwaha Do Koh and 58% in Faizabad say it is not a problem in their area.

When respondents were asked which department or sector of the local government receive the most complaints about corruption, respondents mention courts (11%) and “all government offices” (10%).

### Quality of Life

Seventy-nine percent of respondents in IOM districts say they are satisfied (“somewhat satisfied” and “very satisfied”) with their life in general; this result compares to the 21% who say they are dissatisfied (“somewhat dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied”). Slightly fewer (69%) report being satisfied with their household’s economic status, with 31% saying they are dissatisfied. These findings vary little by district and no district reports a majority dissatisfied on either measure.

Overall, respondents in IOM districts are most likely to say their ability to meet basic needs has stayed the same in the past year: 36% now say it has increased “a little” or “a lot” compared to 44% who say it has

“stayed the same,” and 20% say it has decreased “a little” or “a lot.” These results are quite consistent among the various districts included in the IOM assessment.

Overall, 57% of IOM district respondents say the situation in their area is certain enough for them to plan for the future. However, 61% in both Chintal and Qush Tapa, and 52% in Chahar Bolak, believe the situation is too uncertain for them to make plans for the future.

## **Economic Activity**

When asked to compare their ability to access markets in the last year, respondents are unlikely to say their access has gotten worse. Forty seven percent say it has gotten “a little” (13%) or “a lot” (34%) better, 31% say it is about the same and 21% say it has become “a little” (16%) or “a lot” (5%) worse. Based on their prior security and travel assessments, it is not surprising that those in Qush Tepah are most likely to say it has become “a little” (46%) or “a lot” (2%) worse in the past year.

Respondents have observed price increases at their markets in the past year. Thirty-four percent say prices have increased “a lot” and 32% say they have increased “a little” while 25% believe they have “stayed the same.” These results are quite consistent between districts.

Overall, respondents are not optimistic about job growth over the past year. While 28% report that the availability of paid jobs is about the same, another 24% say there are “a little less” and another 24% say there are “a lot less” paid jobs in their area. Qush Tepah respondents are least optimistic with 87% saying there are fewer jobs in their area.

## **Community Cohesion and Resilience**

The strong majority of respondents living in IOM districts (76%) report that factors from outside their village/neighborhood “never” create problems in their area. Respondents who say such problems happen “often,” “sometimes,” or “rarely” are asked what types of outside interferences cause problems in their village/neighborhood. The top two most common responses include ethnic disputes and insecurity:<sup>72</sup>

Ethnic disputes	27%
Insecurity	13%
Disputes over water	12%
Existence of Taliban	12%
Small crimes/theft	11%
Land disputes	10%

Of those who say problems from outside of their village happen at least “rarely,” 12% say they can “often,” 44% say “sometimes,” 30% say “rarely,” and 11% say they are “never” able to be solved.

Respondents overall have similar opinions on the frequency of disputes originating from inside their village/neighborhood with another 76% who say these things “never” create problems in their area. Those

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<sup>72</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

who say such disputes happen at least “rarely” are asked about the types of internal interferences that cause problems in their village/neighborhood. Respondents most frequently mention:<sup>73</sup>


Ethnic disputes	34%
Disputes over water	15%
Land disputes	13%

Of those who say problems from inside their village happen at least “rarely,” respondents are more likely to believe a resolution is possible than for disputes originating from outside of their village: 15% say they can “often” 51% say “sometimes” 27% say “rarely” and 5% say they are “never” able to be solved.

Respondents tend to believe their local leaders take the interests of ordinary people into account when making decisions. Those who say leaders at least “sometimes” take ordinary people’s interests into consideration are asked if they believe local leaders take the interests of women into consideration when making decisions. Of the 87% who believe ordinary peoples’ interests are taken into consideration. 91% say women’s interests are taken into consideration while 9% say women’s interests are not taken into consideration at all.

**FIGURE 9.9: LOCAL LEADERS CONSIDERING INTERESTS OF ORDINARY PEOPLE AND WOMEN**

**Q37. In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of \_\_\_\_\_ considered?**



Overall, 47% of IOM respondents believe their local leaders are “somewhat” (48%) or “very” (26%) effective in securing funds for their local area. This measure is also relatively consistent among all districts included in IOM analysis.

Most respondents (80%) do not belong to any “groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together.” Of those who do, out of a possible two mentions, the

<sup>73</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

most common types of groups mentioned are development councils (39%), farmers unions (38%) and business companies (11%).<sup>74</sup>

## Grievances

Grievances vary when respondents are asked to identify the biggest problems that create stress or tension in their areas. The most common responses include:<sup>75</sup>

Unemployment	34%
Lack of electricity	30%
Lack of drinking water	22%
Lack of paved roads	21%
Lack of clinics	15%

## Media

Respondents in IOM districts use friends and family (96%), elders (82%), radio (72%), their mosque/mullah (61%), cell phones (42%) and television (38%) to get news and information. The relatively high level of television usage is largely driven by those in Mazar-e Sharif where 100% of respondents say they use television. Respondents are least likely to use posters/billboards (4%) newspapers (3%) or internet/email (1%).

Respondents get most of their information about government services from the radio (50%), friends/family (45%), elders (38%) and television (27% overall and 85% in Mazar).<sup>76</sup>

## CCI Module

Respondents in IOM districts widely perceive that large numbers of those in their communities voted in the last election in 2009. Twenty five percent say “most/almost all” voted, and another 30% say “a lot” of people voted. Twenty percent believe about half of the population voted, 21% say “some,” and only 2% believe “hardly any” people voted in the last election. Those in Qush Tepah are most likely to claim high numbers voted in their community with 54% saying “most/nearly all” voted and another 27% saying “a lot” voted. Pluralities in Dara-ye Suf-e Pa’in (37%) and Ruy Do Ab (32%), however, say only “some” voted in their area. When asked about people in neighboring communities, similar proportions believe they voted in the last election.

When asked about who people in their area voted for, a majority (64%) believe most people in their community voted for different candidates in the last election. In Qush Tepah, however, 85% say they voted for the same candidate.

Overall, 68% believe the people in neighboring settlements voted for different candidates than those in their community. This sentiment was shared by the majority of respondents in all districts except for those

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<sup>74</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.


<sup>75</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

<sup>76</sup> Respondents were allowed to provide up to two responses; the total number of mentions are reported.

from Quosh Tepah where 69% believe those in neighboring settlements voted for the same candidates than people in their community did.

Respondents are asked a series of questions about things that may have happened in their area on or around Election Day. In general, respondents in IOM districts believe there were discussions that happened in their communities, however they were generally not confrontational. Violence related to the elections is not widely perceived to have happened prior to or during the last election.

**FIGURE 9.10: SITUATION IN COMMUNITIES AROUND ELECTIONS**



While majorities of respondents in Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in (54%), Ruy Do Ab (56%), Hazrat-e Sultan (54%) and Fayroz Nakhchir (56%) say there were arguments in their community about which candidate to vote for.

Most respondents (88%) feel voting is a personal and an individual's responsibility, rather than believing one cannot vote for whomever they want. Similar proportions agree with this ideology across all IOM districts.

Eighty percent of respondents agree that "obeying the laws of the Afghan government is necessary to achieve peace and prosperity" rather than "there may be times when it is necessary to take matters into your own hands, even if this means breaking the law." The results indicate no significant outliers among the different districts included in this analysis.

If the respondent or a family member was involved in an election related dispute, most respondents chose local tribal elders (53%) rather than government courts (30%) or the Afghan National Police (ANP) (15%) if they needed to resolve the dispute. If a family member was involved in election violence, 45% would turn to local or tribal elders while 29% would go to a government court and 23% would go to the ANP. When respondents are not given an open ended option and asked to choose between government leaders, officials, or tribal and community leaders in this area to resolve election disputes, 36% choose

local or tribal elders, 34% choose government courts, 8% say neither and 20% opt for both equally (both of the last two options were volunteered by respondents).

When asked to rate their level of concern with election violence, respondents are more likely to express concern than to not. Sixty percent say they are “somewhat” (40%) or “very” (10%) concerned compared to 48% who say they are “not very” (29%) or “not at all” (19%) concerned about election violence.

## **Stability Trends Analysis**

MISTI is tasked with surveying the Afghan population to improve the USG’s understanding of overall stability within USAID’s targeted stabilization districts. Part of this task is to provide a detailed description and analysis of stability trends.

### **Section Organization**

The section begins by detailing the analytical methodology. The report then describes the main findings, exploring stability and each of the eight dimensions used in its exploration: optimism (is the area moving in the right or wrong direction?), change in local area security, presence of Armed Opposition Groups (AOG), confidence in local government, local government corruption, local government services delivery, local area resilience, and quality of life.

### **Summary of Findings**

Between the fall of 2012 (Wave 1) and spring of 2014 (Wave 3), the overall stability trend across the 53 districts surveyed in all three survey waves shows the average stability index score dropping from 3.31 to 3.19 between fall (Wave 1) and spring (Wave 2) 2013, and then increasing to 3.26 in fall 2013 (Wave 3). Findings indicate that 24 districts experienced a perceived increase in stability between Waves 1 and 3 while 29 experienced a perceived decrease. Sangin and Kajaki districts (Helmand province) and Pusht-e Rod district (Farah province) recorded the greatest decline in stability between fall 2012 and fall 2013. In terms of ranking, we can see that these two districts show the greatest decrease in overall stability relative to all other districts surveyed in Waves 1 and 3. Districts that experienced the greatest drops in the stability scores between Waves 2 and 3 (Spring 2013 to Fall 2013) included Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghathu) (Ghazni province), Ahmadabad (Paktiya province) and Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province).

Of the eight dimensions of stability explored, all dimensions improved upon their Wave 2 scores with the exception of “improvement in government services”, which had a marginal decrease, and “corruption” which had a noticeable decrease. With few exceptions, local government corruption is perceived as pervasive and getting worse. “Confidence in local government” registered a score greater than its baseline, as did “presence of armed opposition groups”, while scores for the other six dimensions all fell between their Wave 1 and Wave 2 scores.

“Confidence in local government” has generally improved along the Route 1 corridor between Wardak/Logar and Zabul provinces. The only exceptions to this are in Deh Yak (Ghazni province) and Shah Joy (Zabul province). Other areas showing improvement include the districts surveyed in Kunar, Herat, Kunduz and Baghdis provinces. Districts surveyed in northern Helmand, Farah, Baghlan and northwest Kandahar provinces (Zharay, Arghandab and Shah Wali Kot districts) all show a decline in

confidence in local government. The remaining provinces surveyed showed mixed results at the district level.

## Methodology

To provide a stability score, the MISTI team created a Stability Index composed of several different sub-indices and indicators exploring different aspects of stabilization. Areas explored include: changes in local area security (in the last 12 months); the presence of armed opposition groups; the general direction the district is heading in (right/wrong); confidence in local government; perceptions of corruption in local government; local government provision of public services; local area resilience; and the quality of life.

Seventy-five percent of the Stability Index is drawn from data derived from the MISTI Survey, while ten percent is drawn from enumerators' assessments (observations) of the level of control by different groups (most notably the GIRA and the Taliban) in a given district. Ten percent is derived from the ACSOR District Accessibility Tracker, and five percent is drawn from the level of security incidents reported by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the British Embassy (see Table 1 below for a breakdown of district-level scores using these four data sources).

The Stability Index scores districts on a 1–5 scale, with 1 being “most unstable (very negative)” and 5 “most stable (very positive).” The index *does not present absolute or fixed measures of district stability* because stability is perceived differently from area to area and person-to-person. Stability is not like distance or weight that can be measured using commonly accepted units of measure such as meters or kilograms. The Stability Index's scores are relative, meaning that district scores should be compared relative to one another—for example, a district scoring 2.83 on the index is perceived by its inhabitants as less stable than one scoring 4.05. Table 1 provides the overall results for Wave 3. To simplify where districts rank, we have split the results into quartiles represented by different colors: red represents the lowest quartile, orange represents the second lowest, yellow the second highest, and green the highest quartile.

**TABLE 1: WAVE 3 STABILITY INDEX SCORES**

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (13/11/2013 - 14/1/2014)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Hazrat-e Sultan	4.25	4.97	5.00	5.00	4.43
Ruy Do Ab	4.34	5.00	4.00	5.00	4.41
Fayroz Nakhchir	4.21	4.89	5.00	5.00	4.40
Mazar-e Sharif	4.10	4.94	5.00	5.00	4.32
Shibirghan	4.08	4.25	5.00	5.00	4.24
Khwajah Do Koh	3.90	4.35	5.00	5.00	4.11
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	4.11	4.92	2.00	5.00	4.02
Zaranj	3.82	4.32	5.00	4.00	4.00
Kang	3.83	4.05	4.00	5.00	3.93

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (13/11/2013 - 14/1/2014)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Balkh	3.84	3.95	4.00	5.00	3.92
Imam Sahib	3.94	2.85	4.00	5.00	3.89
Qadis	4.03	2.66	4.00	4.00	3.89
Sholgarah	3.81	3.75	4.00	5.00	3.88
Chorah	4.09	2.99	3.00	4.00	3.86
Muqur	4.06	2.74	3.00	4.00	3.82
Jaji Maidan	3.58	3.81	5.00	5.00	3.81
Pul-e Khumri	3.69	3.26	5.00	4.00	3.79
Aliabad	3.89	3.15	3.00	5.00	3.78
Chahar Darah	3.87	2.79	4.00	4.00	3.78
Shahid-e Hasas	3.89	4.42	2.00	4.00	3.76
Lashkar Gah	4.06	4.02	2.00	2.00	3.75
Deh Rawud	3.89	3.05	3.00	4.00	3.73
Tarin Kot	3.84	2.91	4.00	3.00	3.72
Nahr-e Saraj	4.21	2.02	3.00	1.00	3.71
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	3.49	3.74	5.00	4.00	3.69
Faizabad (2)	3.65	3.90	3.00	5.00	3.68
Kunduz	3.59	3.37	5.00	3.00	3.68
Khanabad	3.80	2.89	3.00	4.00	3.64
Khas Kunar	3.70	3.18	3.00	5.00	3.64
Tanai	3.63	2.99	4.00	4.00	3.62
Chahar Bolak	3.75	3.46	2.00	5.00	3.61
Garmser	3.98	1.71	3.00	3.00	3.61
Pashtun Zarghun	3.57	3.78	3.00	5.00	3.61
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	3.56	4.30	3.00	4.00	3.60
Nad 'Ali	3.99	1.97	3.00	2.00	3.59
Gurbuz	3.54	3.14	4.00	4.00	3.57
Arghandab (1)	3.62	2.22	4.00	4.00	3.54
Chaghcharan	3.44	2.58	5.00	4.00	3.54
Spin Boldak	3.52	2.79	4.00	4.00	3.52
Khwajah Omari	3.26	3.10	5.00	5.00	3.51
Dand	3.71	2.65	4.00	1.00	3.50
Shamul (Dzadran)	3.48	3.27	3.00	5.00	3.48
Daman	3.43	2.42	4.00	5.00	3.46
Marawarah	3.70	3.38	2.00	3.00	3.46
Sar Kani	3.82	2.86	2.00	2.00	3.45
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	3.42	3.03	4.00	3.00	3.42
Jalrayz	3.49	2.32	3.00	5.00	3.40

1 = very negative 5 = very positive			ACSOR		
	Survey Index	M36	Accessibility Tracker (13/11/2013 - 14/1/2014)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
	<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>
Bak	3.42	3.23	3.00	4.00	3.39
Khas Uruzgan	3.56	2.97	2.00	4.00	3.37
Khoshi	3.47	2.11	3.00	5.00	3.37
Ahmadabad	3.24	2.64	4.00	5.00	3.35
Shahrak	3.50	2.54	2.00	5.00	3.33
Musa Qal'ah	3.82	1.10	2.00	3.00	3.32
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghathu)	3.26	2.88	3.00	5.00	3.28
Shindand	3.41	2.58	3.00	3.00	3.27
Archi	3.70	1.00	1.00	4.00	3.18
Deh Yak	3.17	3.05	3.00	4.00	3.18
Zharay	3.25	2.91	3.00	3.00	3.18
Muhammad Aghah	2.98	2.89	4.00	5.00	3.17
Qarah Bagh (1)	3.23	2.61	3.00	3.00	3.14
Sayyidabad	3.40	1.42	3.00	3.00	3.14
Chimtal	3.31	2.48	2.00	4.00	3.13
Lajah-Mangal	3.23	2.55	2.00	5.00	3.13
Muqer	3.19	3.29	2.00	4.00	3.12
Takhtapol	3.12	2.25	3.00	5.00	3.11
Baghlani Jadid	3.38	1.89	2.00	3.00	3.07
Chak-e Wardak	3.36	1.39	2.00	4.00	3.06
Maiwand	3.38	2.61	2.00	1.00	3.05
Panjwa'i	3.37	1.48	3.00	1.00	3.03
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.06	2.61	2.00	5.00	3.01
Pusht-e Rod	3.30	1.55	2.00	3.00	2.98
Khak-e-Safayd	3.10	1.90	2.00	5.00	2.97
Tarnak wa Jaldak	3.00	1.73	3.00	5.00	2.97
Arghistan	3.13	1.62	3.00	3.00	2.96
Shah Wali Kot	3.22	2.44	2.00	2.00	2.96
Gelan	3.09	2.63	2.00	3.00	2.93
Sangin	3.37	1.04	2.00	2.00	2.93
Nerkh	3.26	1.40	1.00	4.00	2.88
Baraki Barak	3.10	1.55	1.00	5.00	2.83
Qalat	2.77	2.81	3.00	3.00	2.81
Shah Joy	2.64	2.55	3.00	4.00	2.74
Bala Boluk	2.87	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.70
Zurmat	2.86	1.05	1.00	5.00	2.60
Kajaki	2.60	1.18	1.00	4.00	2.36
Dzadran	2.42	1.07	1.00	5.00	2.27

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (13/11/2013 - 14/1/2014)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Andar	2.55	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.21
Qush Tepah	2.31	1.34	1.00	5.00	2.21
<b>Overall Average</b>	<b>3.50</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>3.03</b>	<b>3.94</b>	<b>3.41</b>

## Findings


### Stability Index: Wave 3

The following chart ranks Wave 3 districts by their stability scores and divides them into quartiles.<sup>77</sup> The lowest ranking and least stable districts are hand Qush Tepah (Jawzjan Province), Andar (Ghazni Province) and Dzadran (Paktiya Province), while the highest ranking and most stable districts are Hazrat-e Sultan, Ruy Do Ab and Fayroz Nakhchir (Samangan Province).

<sup>77</sup> This chart, which includes 76 districts, does not include the six control districts listed above in Table I.


## STABILITY INDEX (COMPOSITE)

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 3 (Nov 2013-Jan 2014)




### Stability Trends: Waves 1 to 3

The overall stability trend across districts surveyed in Waves 1, 2 and 3 (53 districts were surveyed in all three survey waves) shows the average stability index score dropping from 3.31 to 3.19 between Fall (Wave 1) and Spring (Wave 2) 2013, and then increasing to 3.26 in Fall 2014 (Wave 3). When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below), one can see that the base of the Wave 3 curve is wider than the Wave 1 curve. This tells us that villages in Wave 3 are more varied in their perceptions of stability than they were in the baseline survey though less so than they were in Wave 2. Observation and fieldworker debriefs suggest that the initial decrease in the average stability score between Waves 1 and 2 was likely caused by the ISAF troop drawdowns and base closures that were taking place across Afghanistan at that time. By Wave 3, many of these concerns appear to have been allayed with the increasing deployment of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Hence the overall stability score has almost recovered to its baseline level.



After analyzing the individual districts surveyed, findings indicate that 24 districts experienced a perceived increase in stability between Waves 1 and 3 while 29 experienced a perceived decrease. Thirty-six districts experienced improved perceptions of stability between Waves 2 and 3 while only seventeen experienced worse perceptions. Stability scores have declined consistently across survey waves in five districts: Zahray (Kandahar province), Kajaki (Hilmand province), Andar (Ghazni province), Muhammad

Agha (Logar province) and Baghlani Jadid (Baghlan province). Stability scores have also increased consistently across survey waves in five districts: Dand (Kandahar province), Tanai (Khost province), and Marawarah, Sar Kani and Khas Kunar districts (Kunduz province).



The decline in overall stability is particularly concentrated in parts of Kandahar province, Kajaki in northern Helmand, the Route One corridor between Kandahar City and Kabul, Balkh, and districts along the routes used by Anti-Government Elements to infiltrate the Route One Corridor and Kabul from the Zadrans Arc<sup>78</sup>, most notably those in Logar and Paktiya provinces.

Using trendchart (see below), analysts are able to compare how districts' rankings relative to one-another have changed between Waves 1 and 3 and how far their stability scores have declined or improved since Wave 1. The circles indicate districts' scores from Wave 1 while the squares indicate their scores in Wave 2 and the bars their scores in Wave 3. The colors of the bars and squares represent the quartile in which

<sup>78</sup> The Zadrans Arc is a nine-district area encompassing portions of the Paktiya, Paktika and Khost provinces.


they are located in their respective survey waves. The bars are ordered according to the Wave 3 ranking of districts, with red (to the right) representing the lowest scores and green (to the left) representing the highest scores. One can get an indication of how far a district has fallen or advanced in ranked order by looking at the color of the bar relative to its corresponding square. Hence, a district with a red bar and green circle has deteriorated from the highest quartile to the lowest quartile between Waves 1 and 3, and a district with a yellow bar and red circle has improved two quartiles in ranking.

The chart is also designed to show the degree to which each district's stability has improved or declined between waves. Where a circle is above the top of its corresponding bar that district's stability has declined. Where the circle is lower than the top of its corresponding bar that district's stability has improved. The reader can get a sense of how far a district's stability may have declined or improved by looking at the distance between the top of the bar and its corresponding circle.

Looking at the chart, one can see that Sangin and Kajaki districts (Helmand province) and Pusht-e Rod district (Farah province) record the greatest decline in stability between Fall 2012 and Fall 2013. In terms of ranking, we can see that these two districts have declined by two quartiles and show the greatest decrease in overall stability relative to all other districts surveyed in Waves 1 and 3. Districts that experienced the greatest drops in the stability scores between Waves 2 and 3 (spring 2013 to fall 2013) include Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghata) (Ghazni province), Ahmadabad (Paktiya province) and Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province).

## STABILITY INDEX (COMPOSITE)


MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012) , Wave 2 (May-Sep 2013), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 -Jan 2014)



### Optimism: Right or Wrong Direction


The analysis now breaks down the Stability Index by its component parts, beginning with the direction people perceive their district to be headed in “right” or “wrong.” This helps the reader assess people’s sense of optimism about their future.

The overall optimism trend across districts surveyed in all three survey wave shows the average optimism score dropping from 3.36 to 3.23 between waves 1 and 2 and then rebounding back to 3.30 in Wave 3. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation of scores has broadened slightly between Waves 1 and 3.<sup>79</sup>




<sup>79</sup> Please note that the numbers on the Y Axis denotes the frequency (i.e. the number of districts) of each score.

When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in Waves 1 through 3, one finds that 28 districts experienced a positive change in perceived levels of optimism while 25 have experienced a negative change (see map below). A decline in optimism is indicated across all districts surveyed in the western region of Afghanistan, with the exception of Kushk district (Herat province). This negative change was also intensely reported in: northern Helmand province (Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qal'ah districts); Farah province (Shindand, Pusht-e Rod and Bala Boluk districts); northern Kandahar province (Shah Wali Kot, Daman and Tarnak wa Jaldak districts); the Route One corridor between northern Zabul and Ghazni provinces (Shah Joy (Zabul), Gelan, Muqer, Qarabagh and Andar districts (Ghazni); northern Wardak province (Muhammad Agha district); Lajah-Mangal (central Pakiya province); Bak (Khost province); Pul-e Khumri (Balkh province); and, Khanabad districts (Kunduz province) in the north. Eleven districts experienced positive changes in optimism across all survey waves, concentrated in central Kandahar and Helmand, Khost, Pakiya, Wardak, south-central Kunduz and Kunar provinces.




Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritative. No endorsement of the US Government or any other organization is implied.



When we look at the changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 3, we can immediately see that optimism has declined dramatically in Kajaki and Sangin (northeastern Helmand province), dropping from the top (green)


quartile all the way to the lowest (red) quartile. Zahray (Kandahar province), Andar, Muhammad Agha and Muqur (Ghazni province), Pusht-e Rod (Farah province), and Qadis (Badghis province) have also suffered large drops in their respective ranking. Marawara in Kunar province, on the other hand, has experienced a large improvement in optimism, moving from the lowest to the highest quartile between Waves 1 and 2, and sustaining its position in Wave 3. Other districts showing significant improvement in optimism include: Shahid-e Hasas and Khas Uruzgan (Uruzgan province); Arghandab (Kandahar province); Archi (Kunduz province); Lajah Ahmad Khel and Zurmat (Paktiya province); and, Baraki Barak and Khoshi (Logar province).

Such wide distributions of both negative and positive optimism scores indicate that optimism is highly variable and dependent on local conditions. This explains the wide variance in district-level results within provinces. Even within some districts there is likely to be high variation among communities.




### Change in Local Area Security


The overall trend in local area security across all districts surveyed in both Waves 1, 2 and 3 shows the average score dropping from 3.71 to 3.33 between waves 1 and 2, and then increasing to 3.50 in Wave 3. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation of scores has increased somewhat between waves 1 and 3, with the wave 3 curve having a slightly lower height and wider base.



When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in all three survey waves, one finds that 34 districts experienced a negative change in perceived levels of local area security while 19 experienced positive change (see map below). The decline is most intense in Ghazni province (Gelan, Muqer, Qarabagh and Andar districts), as well as in Daman district (Kandahar province), Kajaki district (Helmand province), Qadis district (Badghis province), and Pul-I Khumri and Baghlani Jadid districts in southern Baghlan province. In contrast, several areas experienced a significant positive change between Waves 1 and 3 including eastern Farah province (Bala Boluk and Shindand districts); the districts along the border between Wardak and Logar provinces (Sayyidabad, Chak-e Wardak and Nerkh districts); and, Kunar province (Sar Kani, Marawara and Khas Kunar districts).




Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritative. No endorsement of the US Government or any other organization is implied.



Looking at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 3, one can see that scores for “security in local area” dropped significantly in a large number of districts in Wave 2 but managed to recover somewhat in many districts between Waves 2 and 3. Districts where scores are significantly lower than in Wave 1 include Lajah Mangal, Sangin and Kajaki (Helmand province), Dzadran (Paktiya province), Khwajah Omari, Deh Yak (Gazni province), Muhammad Agha (Logar province), Arghandab, Panjwai, Daman, Zharay (Kandahar province), Pusht-e Rod (Farah province), Baghlan-i Jadid (Baghland province) and Qadis (Badghis province). Districts where scores in Wave 3 exceed the baseline include Khas Uruzgan and Shahid-e Hassas (Uruzgan province), Marawarah (Kunar province), Bola Boluk (Farah province) and Zurmat (Paktiya province).


Districts that were baselined in Wave 2 and experienced a large negative shift in perceptions about local security in Wave 3 include Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghata) (Ghazni province), Ahmadabad (Paktiya province) and Mando Zayi (Khost province). Districts that were baselined in Wave 2 and experienced a large positive shift in perceptions about local security include Lajah Ahmed Khel (Paktiya province), Khoshi (Logar

Province), Archi (Kunduz province), Pashtun Zargun (Herat province), Shahrak (Ghor province) and Jalrayz (Wardak province).




### Presence of Armed Opposition Groups

The score for presence of AOG across all districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 2 was virtually unchanged, with the average score only shifting from 3.13 to 3.16. Between Waves 2 and 3 the score noticeably increased to 3.27. When one observes this on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) it can be observed that the variation in scores has increased somewhat between Waves 1 and 3, with the Wave 3 curve having a slightly wider base that has spread to the right, indicating an increase in positive perceptions.




When the data looks at the presence of AOG across all the districts surveyed in Wave 3 one can see that presence has increased between Waves 2 and 3 in most districts surveyed in the the south, particularly in Kandahar, Helmand and Farah provinces. Likewise, the presence of AOG in the northern provinces of Balkh and Kunduz has increased across all the districts surveyed in Wave 3. Sayyidabad and Chak-e Wardak districts in Wardak province also report an increased presence of AOG. On a more positive note, the Route 1 corridor through Zabul and Ghazni provinces has experienced a decrease in the numbers of AOG, reversing the trend reported in Wave 2.



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- Positive change in all Waves (5)
- Negative change in Wave 2, but positive in Wave 3 and is above baseline (3)
- Positive change in Wave 2, but negative in Wave 3 and is above the baseline (11)
- Negative change in Wave 2, but positive in Wave 3 and is below the baseline (9)
- Positive change in Wave 2, but negative in Wave 3 and is below the baseline (7)
- Negative change in all Waves (18)

Observing trends between Waves 1 and 3, Deh Yak (Paktika province) has moved from green (relatively low presence of AOG) to red (very high presence of AOG). Zurmat (Paktiya province) has moved from green to yellow (relatively high presence of AOG), while Baghlan-i Jadid (Baghlan province) and Khanabad districts (Kunduz province) have also reported a notable increase in the presence of AOG. Districts reporting substantially less presence of AOG in Wave 3 than Wave 1 include: Arghandab, Maiwand and Shah Wali Kot (Kandahar province); Nahr-e Saraj, Sangin and Musa Qal'ah (Helmand province); Marawara (Kunar province); Bala Boluk (Farah province); and, Baraki Barak (Logar province).




### Confidence in Local Government


The overall trend for “confidence in local government” across all districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 3 shows the average score increasing somewhat from 3.58 to 3.62. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation of scores has increased only slightly between Waves 1 and 3.

## CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT


MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012), Wave 2 (May-Sep 2013), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 – Jan 2014)




When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 3, one finds that 34 experienced positive change in “confidence in local government” while 19 experience negative change (see map below). Confidence in local government has generally improved along the Route 1 corridor between Wardak/Logar and Zabul provinces. The only exceptions to this are in Deh Yak (Ghazni province) and Shah Joy (Zabul province). Other areas showing improvement include the districts surveyed in Kunar, Herat, Kunduz and Baghdis provinces. Districts surveyed in northern Helmand, Farah, Baghlan and northwest Kandahar provinces (Zharay, Arghandab and Shah Wali Kot districts) all show a decline in confidence in local government. The remaining provinces surveyed show mixed results at the district level.



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When looking more closely at changes between Waves 1 and 3, one can see that Kajaki district in northeastern Helmand province slipped from the highest quartile to the lowest quartile. Maiwand in Kandahar province also slipped between Waves 2 and 3 from the highest to lowest quartile. Other districts with noticeable declines in confidence in local government include Khwajah Omari and Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghathu) (Ghazni province). Districts with noticeable improvement in confidence in local government include Shahid-e Hassas, Andar (Ghazni province), Archi, Nerkh and Chak-e Wardak (Wardak province), Khas Uruzgan (Uruzgan), Zurmat (Paktiya province), Bala Boluk (Farah province) and Tarnak Wa Jaldak (Zabul province).




### Corruption in Local Government


The overall trend in perceptions of local government corruption shows the average score between Waves 1 and 3 dropping from 1.79 to 1.56. This is a low score and illustrates how pervasive and ubiquitous perception of local government corruption is across Afghanistan. What is interesting to note is that when one observes this on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) the variation in scores decreased significantly between Waves 1 and 2, with the Wave 2 curve having a much greater height and narrower base. This narrowed variation continued in Wave 3. Perceptions of corruption are much more intense and uniform in Waves 2 and 3 than they were in Wave 1, and continue to gravitate to the negative side of the index.

## CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT


MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012), Wave 2 (May-Sep 2013), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 – Jan 2014)



When analyzing the individual districts surveyed across all three survey waves, one finds that 38 districts reported worsening perceptions of corruption between waves 1 and 3 while only 15 reported an improvement (see map below). The perception of local government corruption generally increased across all geographic survey areas, especially along the Route 1 corridor in Ghazni and Zabul provinces. The same trend was also reported in across the north in Kunduz and Baghlan provinces (with the exception of Aliabad district), western Kandahar province (with the exception of Zharay district), central Helmand province, most of Kunar province (with the exception of Marawara district), and in the West in Farah, Herat and Badghis provinces (with the exception of Qadis and Kushk districts).



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


When one looks at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 3, it is evident that corruption scores for many districts have decreased dramatically, indicating higher perceptions of local government corruption. Mohammad Agha district in Logar province has dropped from the highest to lowest quartile. Qarabagh district in Ghazni province dropped from the highest to next to lowest quartile. Andar and Deh Yak (Ghazni province) and Tarnak wa Jaldak (Zabul province) have also dropped two quartiles.

Notable improvement in corruption scores are recorded for Dzadran (Paktiya province) and Panjwai (Kandahar province). Many other districts also register smaller declines though their initial corruption scores were so low that the subsequent declines simply reflect a worrying general belief that local government corruption is an endemic problem.

## CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012) , Wave 2 (May-Sep 2013), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 -Jan 2014)




### Government Services Delivery


The overall trend in government services delivery shows the average score between Waves 1 and 3 dropping from 3.88 to 3.65. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation in scores increased markedly between Waves 2 and 3, with the Wave 3 curve having a much lower height and wider base. The increased variation could be caused by increased expectations as the Afghan Government becomes much more active in some districts while others are still relatively poorly served.

### IMPROVEMENT IN SERVICES FROM THE GOVERNMENT

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012), Wave 2 (May-Sep 2013), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 – Jan 2014)



When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 3, one finds that 31 districts experienced negative change in perceived levels of government services delivery while 22 experienced positive change (see map below). Negative change is most intense in parts of the Zadran Arc and along the Route 1 corridor in Gahzni. Other areas reporting a negative change include Baghdis (Qadis and Muqur districts), as well as several districts in northern Kandahar (Maiwand, Zharay and Shah Wali Kot). Improvement in government service delivery is most strongly perceived in Kunduz province, southern Wardak province (Chak-e Wardak and Sayyidabad districts), and the southern districts in Kandahar province including Spin Boldak, Zharay, and Arghandab districts. Elsewhere, perceptions of government service delivery are mixed.




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- Positive change in all Waves (5)
- Negative change in Wave 2, but positive in Wave 3 and is above baseline (14)
- Positive change in Wave 2, but negative in Wave 3 and is above the baseline (5)
- Negative change in Wave 2, but positive in Wave 3 and is below the baseline (17)
- Positive change in Wave 2, but negative in Wave 3 and is below the baseline (7)
- Negative change in all Waves (5)


When looking at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 3, one can see that service delivery scores have decreased noticeably in several districts. Baraki Barak (Logar province) and Kajaki (Helmand province) scores have dropped from the highest to the lowest quartile while in Khwajah Omari (Ghazni province) between Waves 2 and 3 the service delivery score also dropped from the highest to lowest quartile. Baghlani Jadid (Baghlan province), Shah Wali Kot (Kandahar province), Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatsu) and Muqer (Ghazni province), Khak-e Safed (Farah province), Mando Zayi (Khost province) and Marawara (Kunar province) have dropped two quartiles.

Notable improvement in government services delivery scores are recorded for Archi (Kunduz province), Shadid-e Hassas and Khas Uruzgan (Uruzgan province), Shahrak (Ghor province), Khoshi (Logar province), Shindand and Pashtun Zarghun (Herat province), Sar Kani (Kunar province), and Chak-e Wardak and Sayyid Abad (Wardak province).




### Local Area Resilience

The overall trend in local area resilience shows the average score between Waves 1 and 3 increasing from 3.50 to 3.55 after having dipped in Wave 2 to 3.42. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation in scores has remained about the same.




When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 3, one finds that 24 districts record declines in local area resilience, while 29 show a positive change (see map below). Negative change is most intense in southern Ghazni province, Tarnak Wa Kaldak (Zabul province), and Mohammad Agha (Logar province), Pusht-e Rod (Farah province) and Pul-e Khumri (Baghlan province). Positive change is most intense in Wardak, Badghis and Khost provinces, where all districts surveyed showed improved local area resilience, as did all districts in Kunduz province (with the exception of Khanabad) and Kunar province (with the exception of Marawarah).



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
- Positive change in all Waves (5)
- Negative change in Wave 2, but positive in Wave 3 and is above baseline (14)
- Positive change in Wave 2, but negative in Wave 3 and is above the baseline (5)
- Negative change in Wave 2, but positive in Wave 3 and is below the baseline (17)
- Positive change in Wave 2, but negative in Wave 3 and is below the baseline (7)
- Negative change in all Waves (5)

When one looks at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 3, the data show that local area resilience scores have decreased significantly in several districts and increased significantly in several others. Kajaki (Helmand province) Lajah-Ahmad Khel and Lajah-Mangal (Paktiya province) districts have dropped from the highest to lowest quartile. Spin Boldak, Daman and Maiwand (Kandahar province), as well as Muqer (Ghazni province) and Pusht-e Rod (Farah province) have dropped two quartiles. Andar (Ghazni province), Muqur (Badghis Province), Shahid-e Hassas (Uruzgan province), Zurmat (Paktiya province), Tarnak wa Jaldak (Zabul province), and Chak-e Wardak and Nerkh (Wardak province) have all improved two or three quartiles.




### Quality of Life


The overall trend in quality of life shows the average score between Waves 1 and 3 dropping notably from 3.40 to 3.32 after dipping as low as 3.22 in Wave 2. When observed on a hyperbolic curve (see chart below) one can see that the variation in scores has increased, with the Wave 3 curve having a lower height and broader base.



When analyzing the individual districts surveyed in both Waves 1 and 3, one finds that 27 districts record a decrease in perceptions of the quality of life while 26 reflect an increase (see map below). Negative change is most intense in the Baglan-i Jadid (Baghlan province), Muhammad Agha (Logar province), Bak (Khost province), Qadis (Baghdis province), Deh Yak and Andar (Ghazni province) and Shah Wali Kot, and Daman (Kandahar province). Quality of life has improved in all districts of Kunar province, central Kunduz province (Aliabad and Pul-e Khumri districts), Zurmat district in Paktiya province, and Gurbuz (Khost province). The remaining areas report mixed results.




Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritative. No endorsement of the US Government or any other organization is implied.



When looking at changes in ranking between Waves 1 and 3, one can see that quality of life scores have decreased significantly in several districts and improved in several others. Kajaki and Khwajah Omari (Helmand province), as well as Deh Yak (Ghazni province) and Pusht-e Rod (Farah province) have all dropped from the highest to lowest quartile while Ahmadabad (Paktiya province) have each dropped two quartiles. Districts recording positive change include Marawara (Kunar province), Khas Uruzgan and Shahid-e Hassas (Uruzgan province) and Aliabad (Kunduz province), each of which improved its ranking by at least two quartiles.


### QUALITY OF LIFE

MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012) , Wave 2 (May-Sep 2013), Wave 3 (Nov 2013 -Jan 2014)




## Impact Evaluation

MISTI is tasked with providing a midterm impact evaluation of two key USAID stabilization programs in Afghanistan: the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) and the Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) program. This section of the Analytical Report details the methods, data, and results from an initial assessment of the relationship between USAID programming and nine indicators of perceived stability. These nine indicators (described earlier in this report) are themselves composite indicators that measure key concepts by integrating multiple questions from dedicated modules on Waves 1-3 of MISTI's Stabilization Survey. The following map presents the 53 districts included *in all three waves* of the MISTI Survey and used for our impact analysis.



Data Disclaimer: All boundaries and map features are approximate and should not be considered authoritative. No endorsement of the US Government or any other organization is implied.

We use a methodological technique known as "matching" to pair villages that have received USAID assistance from at least one program to villages that are similar in background characteristics but did not receive any assistance. These "control" observations act as counterfactual observations that enable us to compare attitudes in villages that received assistance (the "treated" cases) with control observations. In effect, the counterfactuals pose the question "what would have happened in these villages if programming had *not* been conducted?" and thus act as a baseline from which we can estimate the association between USAID programming and perceptions of stability at the village level.



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## Summary of Findings

There are seven main findings that emerge from this midterm impact evaluation.

- (1) USAID programming is associated with a modest increase in perceived stability between Waves 1 and 3 of the MISTI survey for nearly all stability indicators. These increases are typically slight, however, and only one reaches a conventional level of statistical significance
- (2) The most robust finding is a positive relationship between USAID programming and improvements in perceptions of GIROA’s delivery of services
- (3) There is also evidence of a robust relationship between USAID programming and perceptions that the respondent’s area is growing more stable, though these results only achieve weaker levels of statistical significance
- (4) At present, perceptions of stability do not appear to hinge on whether a program favored “hard” (i.e. infrastructure) or “soft” (i.e. training) assistance. There is some evidence suggesting that increasing the numbers of programs in a given village has little effect on perceptions of stability, and may even be associated with decreased perceptions of stability<sup>80</sup>

<sup>80</sup> The number of cases included in this analysis precludes us from making conclusive statements regarding this finding. This will be further explored as the number of cases increases in Waves 4 and 5 of the survey.

- (5) Multiple models and statistical tests confirm that villages with USAID programming have much higher rates of insurgent violence up to 90 days after programming begins than comparable villages without USAID programming
- (6) CCI and SIKA have been implementing aid projects in villages with very different characteristics, raising questions about whether each program should have its own impact evaluation rather than “pooling” findings across these programs

**The CCI-Creative and SIKA villages used in the impact evaluation differ significantly from remaining villages in the MISTI survey sample frame. Recipient villages are more populous, at lower elevation, and closer to the district center than the “average” village in our sample. Beginning in Wave 3, recipient villages are also on average one full point higher (on a five point scale) of ISAF/government control, suggesting that they are in more contested areas than the “average” village in our sample<sup>81</sup>**

**Organization**

This midterm evaluation is organized as follows. We briefly describe the sample and nine indicators used to assess trends in perceptions of stability over time. We then discuss the methodology used in this report. We then detail our main findings about the association between USAID programming and MISTI’s composite measures of perceived stability. In particular, we explore: (1) general patterns and trends; (2) how specific aspects of programming, including the nature and total number of projects implemented, might affect perceptions of stability; (3) the relationship between USAID programming and insurgent violence; and (4) robustness checks using an alternative methodology.

We then compare CCI and SIKA in terms of villages selected for programming. We also explore the question of whether we can generalize from these findings (and how far). Finally, we consider limitations to the data and methodology of this study before concluding with recommendations for future analysis, particularly for the end-line assessment.

### **Data, Sample, and Stability Indicators**

We draw on the most recent project data from CCI and the four SIKA programs (SIKA-North, SIKA-South, SIKA-East, and SIKA-West) to construct our sample of villages eligible for assessment. We identified 280 projects in 108 villages as eligible for our impact evaluation.<sup>82</sup> Both “hard” projects (e.g. infrastructure development, karez and irrigation programs, and roadway construction) and “soft” programs (e.g., education, training, etc.) are included in these project totals. At present, roughly two-thirds of these villages have at least one SIKA project, while 36% have CCI projects.


Eligibility is determined by several criteria. To be included in this impact evaluation, we required a project to have been started no earlier than December 2012 and no later than May 2013 to allow MISTI’s Wave 1 to serve as a pre-aid baseline for stability perceptions. This time window enables MISTI to use the Wave 3 survey as the post-aid follow-on for measuring any possible changes in stability perceptions.

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<sup>81</sup> All of these differences are significant at the  $p=0.05$  level or greater.

<sup>82</sup> Why 108 villages? We require that villages have (1) data from both Wave 1 and Wave 3 surveys and (2) that we are able to match USAID programming sites spatially to the list of MISTI villages. The MISTI village dataset contains key information about village population size, elevation, and other spatial characteristics that are used in the matching analysis to control for differences between villages with USAID programming (“treated”) and without programming (“controls”). We identified 108 villages that met these two criteria.

Second, we also required that the geo-coordinates for USAID programs fall close to a MISTI-identified village. This spatial requirement allows MISTI to correctly identify project locations and to utilize our spatial and demographic data for these villages in the impact evaluation. MISTI's GIS team utilized satellite and aerial imagery to improve the precision of IP-provided coordinates for program locations. These efforts resulted in a better match of IP coordinates with MISTI village data than previously possible, minimizing the loss of “treated” villages (those villages that received USAID programming) due to imprecise spatial coordinates.



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As detailed in other sections of this report, the biannual MISTI Stabilization Survey represents the principal means by which stability perceptions are measured over time. While the sample frame has grown to nearly 4,800 villages, we draw on the 974 villages that have Wave 3 *and* Wave 1 baseline data to assess changes over time. Our sample is thus divided into 108 “treated” villages and 866 villages that are eligible to act as “controls” (counterfactual observations).

We use nine different measures to track perceptions of stability across Waves 1 and 3. These metrics are described in detail elsewhere in this report. These nine measures are:

1. The composite stability index
2. The percentage of respondents reporting their area has become more secure
3. The percentage of respondents reporting their district is moving in the right direction
4. The percentage of respondents reporting increased confidence in their local government
5. The percentage of respondents reporting their quality of life has changed for the better

6. The percentage of respondents reporting that resilience has improved in their local area
7. The percentage of respondents reporting improved GIROA-delivery of basic services
8. The percentage of respondents reporting corruption in their local government
9. The percentage of respondents reporting the presence of armed opposition groups in their area.

## Methodology

A PostgreSQL relational database program was designed to implement the impact evaluation. In essence, this program implements a dynamic form of “matching.” The idea behind matching is simple: for each village that received USAID programming, identify at least one comparable village from the list of control villages to pair (or “match”) with it. These controls provide the baseline (“what would have happened had aid not been delivered?”) and are identified via an algorithm that attempts to find the closest match or matches for each village. The closer the fit between treated and control observations across important variables, the more robust our estimates of the effects of aid.

This matching approach is necessary because the villages selected for receiving USAID programming were not chosen randomly. Instead, they were chosen for specific reasons that must be controlled for statistically so that they do not bias our results. If, for example, the villages selected are among the most violent in a given area, we want to ensure that our control villages are similarly exposed to violence. Otherwise, we risk drawing mistaken inferences by comparing high violence “treated” locations to low violence “control” ones.

We match our treated and control villages on nine different variables. These include:

- Village population size (data source: MISTI)
- Village elevation (in meters) (data source: MISTI)
- Village’s dominant ethnicity (as measured by language) (data source: MISTI)
- Amount of insurgent-initiated violence 30-days, 60-days, and 90-days prior to aid disbursement in the two kilometers around a given village (data source: iMMAP)
- Amount of ISAF-initiated violence 30-days, 60-days, and 90-days prior to aid disbursement in the two kilometers around a given village (data source: iMMAP)
- The number of improvised explosive devices that detonated within 30-day, 60-day, and 90-days prior to aid disbursement in the two kilometers around a village (data source: iMMAP)
- The relevant Wave 1 stabilization index measure (data source: MISTI)
- A 7-fold index of which combatant controls that particular village and how strongly (data source: MISTI)
- A variable indicating whether the village had received a National Solidarity Program Community Development Council (NSP-CDC) grant (data source: NSP)

Once matching has been completed for as many treated cases as possible, we estimate the impact of aid programming using difference-in-difference estimation. In other words, we subtract the treated villages’ Wave 3 stabilization values from their Wave 1 values, and then subtract this total from the net difference (Wave 3 minus Wave 1) in stabilization values from the control villages. Since the treated and control cases are being measured at the same time – both have Wave 3 and Wave 1 stabilization values – matching

controls for seasonal patterns and other time trends that are not associated with receiving USAID assistance. This eliminates concerns that Wave 2 and Wave 1 stabilization values are not comparable.<sup>83</sup>

Some brief technical details also deserve highlighting. The PostgreSQL program used here is very flexible and has several features that enhance the matching process. First, the program dynamically generates counts of different types of violence from the start date of programming and does so for the controls, ensuring that the treated and control villages have identical start points for measuring effects. Second, the program ensures that control villages are selected a certain distance away from treated villages (here, at least 2km) to ensure that control villages do not experience “spillover” from treated locations. Third, the program randomly selects the control observation in cases where more than one match is available. This prevents “cheating” by selecting the same villages to act as controls.

Matching is not only important for creating baseline assessments. The procedure also enables us to control for observed differences—known as “imbalances”—between the treated and control villages. Using matching to adjust for these imbalances is especially important in our case because there are clear differences between treated and control villages in our survey sample.

For example, as Table 1 outlines below, there are important differences between the 299 aid recipients and the remaining 4,499 randomly selected control villages in the MISTI sample frame. Indeed, recipient villages are more populous, at lower elevation, and closer to the district center than the “average” village in our sample. Beginning in Wave3, recipient villages are also on average one full point higher (on a five point scale) of ISAF/government control, suggesting that they are in more contested areas than the “average” village in our sample. All of these differences are significant at the  $p=.05$  level or greater.

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<sup>83</sup> In addition, Waves 1 and 3 were both conducted in the fall, further reducing concern about non-comparability due to seasonality.

Table 1: Control versus Treated Villages, Waves 1-4 (planned)

Variables	Control	Treated	Net Difference	Statistically Significant?
Population	773	1,282	509	Yes
Elevation	1,326m	1,169m	157m	Yes
Pashtun?	68%	71%	3%	No
Distance to District Center	12.5km	11.2km	1.3km	Yes
Total NSP Projects	3.06	2.63	0.43	No
Control (Wave1)	2.92	3.03	0.11	No
Control (Wave2)	1.42	1.43	0.01	No
Control (Wave3)	1.47	2.56	1.09	Yes
<i>Baseline Values</i>				
Aggregate Stab Index	1.58	1.31	0.27	Yes
Area Become More Stable?	1.75	1.46	0.29	Yes
District Moving in Right Direction?	1.60	1.37	0.23	Yes
Increased Confidence in Local Govt?	1.69	1.41	0.28	Yes
Quality of Life changed for Better?	1.62	1.33	0.29	Yes
Local Resilience has Improved?	1.63	1.33	0.30	Yes
Improved GIROA-delivery of Basic Services?	1.49	1.78	0.29	Yes
Corruption in Local Govt?	0.67	0.85	0.18	Yes
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups?	1.49	1.30	0.19	Yes

*Note:* There are 4,798 villages in the sample (including projected Wave 4 villages). Of this total, 299 villages have received USAID assistance so far and have had at least one survey completed. “Control (Wave  $x$ )” refers to the 7-point scale MISTI uses to measure the relative level of control exercised by ISAF/GIROA over a given village versus insurgent groups (a “1” represents total government control). “Net difference” refers to the difference between the average of each program’s village values. “Statistical significance” here is measured at the  $p=0.05$  level or lower. All baseline values for the nine MISTI stability indicators are drawn from Wave 1. Note that if the current sampling plan holds for Wave 4, an additional 394 new “treated” villages will be incorporated into our sample. These villages are a welcome addition since it will boost the statistical power of the impact evaluation. These villages will not, however, yield a more representative sample: the statistical differences observed between “treated” and “control” village will persist even after Wave 4 are incorporated. Care must therefore be taken when generalizing these findings to the rest of the sample and to non-sampled villages in these selected districts.

In addition, the treated villages possess lower initial Wave1 values for all nine measures of perceived stability.<sup>84</sup> This suggests that villages selected for programming represent the “tough cases” given relatively lower baseline levels of perceived stability among survey respondents.

These statistically significant differences persist even when we restrict our sample to only those 974 recipient and control villages that were surveyed in all three Waves (Table 2). Once again, recipient villages are much more populous and at lower elevation than control villages (1,898 treated and 921 control). Moreover, recipient villages are less likely to be Pashtun-dominated than average surveyed villages (70% treated and 78% control), and had markedly higher levels of government/ISAF control in Wave2.<sup>85</sup> These

<sup>84</sup> All of these differences are statistically significant at the  $p=0.05$  level or greater.

<sup>85</sup> Wave2 overlaps significantly with substantial ISAF base closures and transfers. It is likely that USAID IPs and survey enumerators alike were selecting to work in villages with greater than average levels of security, as reflected by lower values in Wave2 compared to Waves1 and 3.

differences need to be born in mind when seeking to generalize the results of USAID programming efforts to (1) villages within these districts and (2) outside selected districts.

Table 2: Villages in MISTI Survey Waves 1-3, by Treatment Status

Variables	Treated	Control	Net Difference	Statistically Significant?
Population	1,898	921	977	Yes
Elevation	1,009m	1,248m	239m	Yes
Pashtun?	70%	78%	8%	Yes
Distance to District Center	9.2m	9.8km	0.8km	No
Prior NSP?	56%	56%	0	No
Control (Wave1)	3.10	2.93	0.17	No
Control (Wave2)	1.60	2.16	0.55	Yes
Control (Wave3)	2.75	2.72	0.03	No

*Note:* This table outlines the differences between villages that have (“treated”) and have not (“control”) received USAID programming between MISTI Survey Waves 1-3. A total of 974 villages have sampled for all three waves; 108 villages have received programming from at least one USAID program and have Wave 1 and Wave 3 survey data. “Control (Wave  $x$ )” refers to the 7-point scale MISTI uses to measure the relative level of control exercised by ISAF/GIRoA over a given village versus insurgent groups (a “1” represents total government control). “Net difference” refers to the difference between the average of each program’s village values. “Statistical significance” here is measured at the  $p=0.05$  level or lower. Of the 8 indicators used here, 4 demonstrate statistically significant differences across the two programs.

## Findings

We summarize our estimates of the effects of USAID programming on the nine specified indicators in Table 3 below.<sup>86</sup> For each stability indicator, the net difference between the treated and control villages between Wave 3 and Wave 1 is provided along with a 95% confidence interval. Each indicator is estimated three times using 30-day, 60-day, and 90-day thresholds for calculating pre- and post-assistance levels of violence (the start date of the programming is used as the anchor point for these calculations). Whether this net difference reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (at the  $p=0.05$ ) is indicated. Finally, the size of the sample, including the number of treated and control villages, is also noted.

<sup>86</sup> The files necessary to replicate these results are available from MISTI.

Table 3: Estimating the effects of USAID programming on perceptions of stability: Nine indicators with 30 day, 60 day and 90 day violence intervals

Stabilization Measure	Net Difference	95% CI	Statistically Significant?	Sample Size (Treated/Control)
Aggregate Stab Index	0.11	-0.04 to 0.24	No	140 (70/70)
Aggregate Stab Index (60day)	0.07	-0.08 to 0.22	No	128 (64/64)
Aggregate Stab Index (90day)	0.11	-0.04 to 0.26	No	124 (62/62)
Area Become More Stable?	0.25	-0.11 to 0.62	No	116 (58/58)
Area Become More Stable? (60day)	0.32	-0.12 to 0.77	No	104 (52/52)
Area Become More Stable? (90day)	0.26	-0.10 to 0.62	No	112 (56/56)
District Moving in Right Direction?	0.16	-0.16 to 0.49	No	106 (53/53)
District Moving in Right Direction? (60day)	0.22	-0.15 to 0.59	No	96 (48/48)
District Moving in Right Direction? (90day)	0.02	-0.35 to 0.40	No	94 (47/47)
Increased Confidence in Local Govt?	0.04	-0.17 to 0.26	No	120 (60/60)
Increased Confidence in Local Govt? (60day)	0.12	-0.12 to 0.36	No	110 (55/55)
Increased Confidence in Local Govt? (90day)	0.04	-0.20 to 0.29	No	108 (54/54)
Quality of Life Changed for Better?	0.21	-0.06 to 0.47	No	120 (60/60)
Quality of Life Changed for Better? (60day)	0.18	-0.06 to 0.42	No	108 (54/54)
Quality of Life Changed for Better? (90day)	0.21	-0.03 to 0.46	No	110 (55/55)
Local Resilience has Improved?	-0.09	-0.27 to 0.09	No	134 (67/67)
Local Resilience has Improved? (60day)	-0.02	-0.20 to 0.15	No	122 (61/61)
Local Resilience has Improved? (90day)	-0.04	-0.23 to 0.14	No	118 (59/59)
Improved GIROA-delivery of Basic Services?	0.05	-0.31 to 0.42	No	102 (66/66)
Improved GIROA-delivery of Basic Services? (60day)	0.38	-0.03 to 0.76	Yes	94 (47/47)
Improved GIROA-delivery of Basic Services? (90day)	0.50	0.09 to 0.91	Yes	90 (45/45)
Corruption in Local Govt?	0.18	-0.16 to 0.52	No	120 (60/60)
Corruption in Local Govt? (60day)	0.09	-0.23 to 0.42	No	116 (58/58)
Corruption in Local Govt? (90day)	0.09	-0.21 to 0.38	No	116 (58/58)
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups?	-0.05	-0.38 to 0.26	No	108 (54/54)
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups? (60day)	0.24	-0.10 to 0.58	No	100 (50/50)
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups? (90day)	0.17	-0.12 to 0.38	No	100 (50/50)

*Note:* All stability perception questions are scaled from 1-5, with a “1” representing the lowest possible level of stability and a “5” the highest. “Net differences” are interpreted as the difference between treated and control villages between Waves 1 and 3. A negative net difference therefore means a decrease in the stability score between Waves 1 and 3; and a positive net difference means an increase in the stabilization values from Wave 1 to 3. “Statistical significance” here is measured at the  $p=0.05$  level or lower. Each stability measure is estimated three times, with incident counts of ISAF and insurgent violence calculated at 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days before the start date of programming.

The net difference is straightforward to interpret: positive values indicate an increase in perceived stability for that indicator, while negative values indicate a decrease in perceived stability when moving from Wave 1 to Wave 3. All but one indicator are scaled from 1 (representing “least” stable outcomes) to 5 (representing “most” stable outcomes), and so the net difference should be interpreted as a move within this scale. Put differently, a “5” represents a belief that stability is being attained across these indicators, while a “1” value represents the opposite, namely, that perceived stability on that indicator is poor. The only exception is the last indicator, as reported by respondents, (Presence of Armed Opposition Groups), for which a “1” indicates “a lot” of presence while “5” denotes “none”, and so negative values actually denote a move toward greater insurgent presence.

For example, the net difference for the Aggregate Stability Index is a 0.11 increase in perceived stability, suggesting that villages with USAID assistance witness a net increase in perceived stability compared with

control villages when comparing values across the two MISTI survey waves (Waves 1 and 3). The 95% confidence interval for that estimate is -0.04 to 0.24, meaning that we are 95% confident that the point estimate for this difference is between -0.04 and 0.24. This difference is not statistically significant. 140 villages were used to estimate this net difference (70 treated, 70 control).<sup>87</sup>

What type of effects do we observe? Generally speaking, six of the nine indicators show modest improvements in perceived stability, though only one (Improved GIRA-delivery of basic services) reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. Two indicators (Local Resilience Has Improved? and presence of armed opposition groups) depict a modest downturn, neither of which is statistically significant.

Substantively, the largest programming effects are observed with delivery of services. Estimated difference between control and treated was recorded as high as .50 (.09 to .91 95% CI) or a 10% change on the 5-point scale (+2%, +18% with 95% CI). These difference-in-difference estimates are statistically significant in two of three models at the  $p=.05$  level. Attributing these particular changes will require qualitative evidence linking CCI/SIKA planning to GIRA attribution for service delivery.

We also note a weaker (in the statistical sense) relationship between USAID programming and perceptions that an area is becoming more secure. We observe, for example, that the estimated difference between treated and control villages between Waves 1 and 3 is between .25 and .32 (on a five point scale), or a modest 5-6% uptick in perceptions (-2% to 15% with 95% confidence interval). The result just reaches a  $p=0.10$  level of statistical significance and is strongest when we estimate models using violence counts from 30-60 days before aid implementation, suggesting that near term violence has more of an effect on perceived stability than more distant violence.

In general, though, the differences between treated and control villages, while positive, are typically small and not statistically significant. Notably, however, these results represent a marked shift in direction (though not necessarily magnitude) from those presented in the second Analytical Report, which found that USAID programming was associated with a net decrease across seven of these measures. What might account for this shift?

There are three plausible reasons for this shift. First, data from the implementing partners has changed radically between the second and third Analytical Reports. Indeed, there is little overlap in terms of location and programming from the data we used in the initial matching exercise for Analytical Report 2 and the current midterm assessment. In part this reflects additional programming on the part of CCI and especially SIKA. That said, however, these differences are not solely the result of increased programming. Instead, they arise from major revisions in the data on categorization and location of existing programs supplied by the implementing partners (i.e. those prior to Wave 3 survey). As always, the impact evaluation and its findings will hinge on data supplied by the IPs. These mid-program data revisions underscore the need to adopt and enforce a shared data standard for the recording of project location and metadata in a timely fashion to avoid major changes midstream.

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<sup>87</sup> It is worth emphasizing that while MISTI identified 108 villages as “treated,” not every village will be included in each analysis. The inclusion of a treated village hinges largely on whether sufficiently similar matches can be identified from the pool of “control” observations. Each time a new covariate is being introduced to the statistical analysis (that is, we change the measure for stability), a different set of control observations will be identified. In some cases, there may not be a close enough match for a “treated” village, and it is dropped from the analysis. As a result, the number of treated and control observations will vary across the different statistical analyses for each measure of stability used.

Second, MISTI has invested heavily in the correct identification of project locations. Given the lack of a shared village location dataset and protocol between MISTI and the IPs, the second MISTI Analytical Report was forced to rely on a less precise set of coordinates for each village. In practice, MISTI was only able to identify villages with a 3km radius given USAID's latitude and longitude coordinates. This resulted in measurement error and the loss of treated villages that we could not correctly locate spatially. For this report, USAID geographic coordinates for project locations was cross-referenced and verified using satellite and aerial imagery to confirm locations. The result is a more accurate identification of where treatment effects might be.

Third, the Wave 2 survey that served as the initial impact evaluation's endpoint was undertaken during a period of general instability stemming from the ISAF drawdown. In particular, the closure or transfer of nearly 300 bases in a compressed time window had a suppressive effect on nearly every indicator of stability. While the matching used did compensate for most of this drop, the combination of general instability and the small number of programming sites combined to produce estimates that suggested a negative effect for USAID programming. At present, these estimates have reversed themselves, owing to improvements in data collection (including expanded number of treated villages) and to a near return to pre-base closure levels of perceived stability.

In general, base closures can only account for the negative effect of USAID programming under very specific circumstances. Since the decrease in perceived stability is associated with the treated villages, but not the control ones, the base closures would need to differentially affect treated villages. For example, treated villages would need to be closer on average to closed bases than control villages if these closures are to affect perceived stability only near the treated villages. In point of fact, villages with USAID programming were closer to district centers, roads, and in less rugged terrain than control villages --precisely where these bases were located. As a result, USAID programming sites between Waves 1 and 2 were uniquely vulnerable to a downturn in stability perceptions caused by the exogenous shock of rapid base closures.

Two final points bear emphasizing. First, we want to be careful not to oversell these findings or the differences from Wave 2 estimates. Though Wave 3 findings are generally more positive, the bulk of these estimates are substantively modest and not statistically significant, a pattern we found in the second Analytical Report. Second, we need to be aware of the possibility of sample attrition. Increased instability in certain districts might skew these results in a positive direction if enumerators are only able to visit "safe" villages. This possible sample attrition will bear close scrutiny in Wave 4 as accessibility in a post-ISAF operating environment becomes more uncertain.

### **Does More Programming Yield More Perceived Stability?**

In a phrase, possibly not. Instead, it appears that increased programming, as measured by the total number of projects in a given village, is associated with *decreased* perceived stability across multiple measures. Though this negative relationship is not present in all measures, it is nonetheless common enough to suggest that increased programming does not yield greater perceived stability.

Why might this be the case? There are at least two plausible reasons. First, the increased project totals may reflect decisions by IPs on the ground to continue to program against instability after initial efforts failed. As a result, project totals would be increasing in the most difficult cases, where the odds of success are low.

This logic of “upping the ante” in these difficult cases would be sufficient to produce the negative relationship between increased programming and decreased perceptions of stability that we observe.

Second, a large number of projects in the same village may be indicative of more ambitious (and complicated) programming efforts that have a higher failure rate due to increased monitoring difficulties. Running multiple projects simultaneously may overtax limited monitoring capacities or, alternatively, these projects may work at cross-purposes, creating confusion and unintended (negative) effects among a village populace.

These issues will bear closer scrutiny during both the end-of-program performance reviews and the final impact evaluation. At this point, we must be careful not to overstate these findings given the small sample size and the relative shortage of villages with multiple projects.<sup>88</sup>

### **Do Effects Hinge on the Nature of Programming?**

At present, there is no evidence to suggest that “hard” and “soft” activity programming have different effects on perceived stability. Re-estimating these models with indicators for hard and soft activities, as well as an interactive term for “treatment” and “hard” activities, does not result in substantially different results than those presented above. Once again, as programming intensifies (particularly between Waves 3 and 5), these initial results will need to be revisited.

### **Does Programming Affect Insurgent Violence?**

It has often been suggested in consultations with USAID and IPs that programming might attract unwanted violence as insurgents maneuver to derail aid projects as they get underway. We can test this hypothesis using the PostgreSQL program, which generates counts of insurgent and ISAF violence, as well as IED detonations, in a 2km radius around a village in the period both before and after aid programming commences.

We observe a small but statistically significant uptick in the amount of insurgent attacks in the immediate 30-60 day period after the beginning of USAID programming. This increase is both relative to the baseline patterns of violence in the selected village and to the control village (which helps control for secular trends in insurgent attacks). These attacks may represent targeted efforts by insurgents to curtail or stop programming altogether in these villages. Note that we do not observe a similar increase in ISAF-related violence.

This same pattern of increased violence in the immediate aftermath of aid programming has also been observed with the KALAHI-CIDSS Community Driven Development (CDD) program in the Philippines.<sup>89</sup> In this case, the announcement and initial stages of programming were met with increased insurgent attacks as these actors sought to disrupt aid efforts that might undermine their political positions and popular support.

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<sup>88</sup> To maximize the number of observations with multiple projects, matching is not used in this subsection. Since control villages are often quite different than treated ones, there is a risk of model dependency in these findings.

<sup>89</sup> See, for example, Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter, and Patrick Johnston, “Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict,” *American Economic Review*, forthcoming (2014).

Interestingly, there is also some evidence to suggest that the relative number of IEDs that detonate in these villages is decreasing between the pre- and post-aid intervention period. The result is not significant in all models, but does appear with sufficient regularity to warrant closer inspection when all data have been received. And while the decrease in relative IED detonations is fairly modest, it nonetheless points to the possibility that these aid programs are increasing the flow of information from local citizens to ISAF/ANSF about the location of these devices. If so, then these aid programs may be playing a role in influencing “hearts and minds” in a pro-government (or at least anti-insurgent) direction.

### **Robustness: Alternative Forms of Matching**

Multiple forms of matching are possible, however, and there are numerous decisions about how to determine the closeness of “fit” between treated and control villages that can affect our results. As a robustness check, we therefore re-estimated these results for all nine indicators using a second form of matching known as Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) as the basis of our evaluation strategy.<sup>90</sup>

Implemented using a statistical package known as STATA, this form of matching uses a “nearest neighbor” approach and seeks to pair each treated village with multiple control observations. As a result, we draw on more of the existing data (particularly controls) when estimating the relationship between USAID programming and measures of stability. The downside is that we lose the flexibility of PostgreSQL: for technical reasons, we are only able to calculate violence totals from the start of the survey wave rather than the actual implementation of programming. This introduces some measurement error into our totals of insurgent violence.

On balance, the results obtained CEM are broadly similar to the PostgreSQL (Table 4). Once again, nearly all of the indicators suggested a modest improvement in stability scores, though few reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

As with the earlier PostgreSQL analysis, the “Improved GIRoA-Delivery of Basic Services” emerges as the indicator most affected by USAID programming, albeit to a statistically non-significant degree. We also find, unlike in the PostgreSQL results, that USAID programming is also associated with improved perceptions of local resilience. In each case, the results are fairly modest: the 0.04 improvement on “GIRoA Delivery of Basic Services” amounts to only a tiny increase given the 5-point scale in use, for example. Similarly, the 0.15 improvement in Local Resilience is only a 3% increase over the values observed in the control observations.

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<sup>90</sup> For Coarsened Exact Matching, see <http://gking.harvard.edu/cem>

Table 4: Robustness Check: Estimating the effects of USAID programming on perceptions of stability using Coarsened Exact Matching

Stabilization Measure	Net Difference	Statistically Significant?	Sample Size (Treated/Control)
Aggregate Stab Index	0.09	No	363 (79/284)
Area Become More Stable?	0.20	No	354 (80/274)
District Moving in Right Direction?	0.12	No	262 (76/186)
Increased Confidence in Local Govt?	0.08	No	323 (83/240)
Quality of Life changed for Better?	0.15	Yes	337 (74/263)
Local Resilience has Improved?	0.09	Yes	351 (78/273)
Improved GIRoA-delivery of Basic Services?	0.20	No	319 (83/236)
Corruption in Local Govt?	0.02	No	429 (88/341)
Presence of Armed Opposition Groups?	-0.00	No	279 (68/211)

*Note:* All stability perception questions are scaled from 1-5, with a “1” representing the lowest possible level of stability and a “5” the highest. “Net differences” are interpreted as the difference between treated and control villages between Waves 1 and 3. A negative net difference therefore means a decrease in the stability score between Waves 1 and 3; and a positive net difference means an increase in the stabilization values from Wave 1 to 3. “Statistical significance” here is measured at the  $p=0.10$  level or lower. Sample size refers to the number of treated and control villages used in the analysis, with “treated” and “control” villages refer to the number of villages that received (“treated”) and did not receive (“control”) USAID intervention between Waves 1 and 3. These villages are not the total number of villages with aid projects; in some cases, a corresponding match could not be found due to differences in socioeconomic or other characteristics.

## CCI/SIKA Comparison

It also bears emphasizing that the recipients of CCI<sup>91</sup> and SIKA programming differ from one another in dramatic fashion. As Table 5 illustrates, CCI and SIKA recipients are statistically different across 14 of 15 village-level measures. More specifically, CCI villages:

- (1) Have smaller populations — 191 fewer individuals on average— than SIKA villages
- (2) Are located at more rugged elevations (at 178 meters higher on average)
- (3) Are significantly more likely to be Pashtun dominated
- (4) Are over two kilometers closer to district centers
- (5) Are much less likely to have received a National Solidarity Program grant prior to USAID programming (39%) compared with SIKA villages (67%)
- (6) Have higher levels of government/ISAF control in Waves 1 and 2 (but not 3)
- (7) Have far higher incident counts of insurgent violence in the 30 and 90 days prior to the beginning of USAID programming
- (8) Have far higher incident counts of insurgent violence 30 and 90 days after programming has begun

<sup>91</sup> As CCI IOM (North and West) had only just started at the time of survey, the findings for this analysis are derived using data from CCI Creative (South and East).

- (9) Have a greater number of “hard” project and much higher “soft” project totals, as well as higher overall programs in a given village than SIKA counterparts

It is important to flag these differences since it is clear that CCI and SIKA are programming against different sources of instability in different locations. CCI programming, from these data, appear to more closely resemble CERP-style programming than SIKA does. CCI villages are typically much more violent than SIKA ones and more likely to draw on hard and soft programming initiatives in contested environments. SIKA, by contrast, appears to be following an NSP-style approach, with emphasis on more remote, less contested villages with more “traditional” development objectives.<sup>92</sup>

As a result, pooling the findings across these programs may be misleading. These findings may only apply to a subset of CCI (or SIKA) villages, for example. Similarly, these programs may be having different effects given their different scope conditions; pooling them into the same impact evaluation averages out these differences, thus obscuring the “true” impact of each program.

Two findings follow. First, care must be taken when generalizing these results given that we are identifying “average treatment effects” that may not apply exactly to each program. Second, there is insufficient data at this time to split the sample of villages (that is, to conduct CCI- and SIKA-specific impact evaluations). This is the desired impact evaluation strategy, however, and one that should be pursued in the final report if sufficient numbers of villages are present for both programs.

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<sup>92</sup> The high rate of SIKA overlap with prior NSP programming is especially illustrative in this case.

Table 5: CCI and SIKA Programs at a Glance

Variables	CCI	SIKA	Net Difference	Statistically Significant?
Population	934	1125	191	No
Elevation	1324m	1146m	178m	Yes
Pashtun?	98%	65%	33%	Yes
Distance to District Center	8.3km	10.6km	2.3km	Yes
Prior NSP?	39%	67%	28%	Yes
Control (Wave1)	2.36	3.37	0.91	Yes
Control (Wave2)	1.80	2.22	0.42	Yes
Control (Wave3)	2.78	2.64	0.14	Yes
Prior Violence (90 days)	17.1 attacks	5.9 attacks	11.2 attacks	Yes
Prior Violence (30 days)	5.9 attacks	2.2 attacks	3.7 attacks	Yes
Post Violence (90 days)	19.3 attacks	6.1 attacks	13.2 attacks	Yes
Post Violence (30 days)	5.8 attacks	2.0 attacks	3.8 attacks	Yes
Hard Projects	1.7 per site	1.3 per site	0.4 per site	Yes
Soft Projects	1.8 per site	0.4 per site	1.4 per site	Yes
Total Projects	3.48 per site	1.69 per site	1.79 per site	Yes

*Note:* This table outlines the differences between CCI and SIKA villages across Actual and Proposed Implementation Sites. There are 577 Actual/Intended SIKA sites and 261 Actual/Intended CCI sites captured by MISTI Survey Waves 1-3. “NSP” denotes whether a village has received a National Solidarity Program Community Development Council grant. “Control” refers to the 7-point scale MISTI uses to measure the relative level of control exercised by ISAF/GIRoA over a given village versus insurgent groups (a “1” represents total government control). Drawing on iMMAP sources, we calculate the number of violent incidents that occurred in a 90 day and 30 day time window before and after the initiation of programming in a 5 kilometer radius around a given village. “Hard” and “soft” projects largely refer to infrastructure and training programs, respectively, and are defined by the implementing partners. “Net difference” refers to the difference between the average of each program’s village values. “Statistical significance” here is measured at the  $p=0.05$  level or lower. Of the 15 indicators used here, 14 demonstrate statistically significant differences across the two programs. Differences between programs are further magnified if the 113 villages earmarked for both SIKA and CCI programming are dropped from this comparison.

## Limitations

Several limitations of this analysis should be noted here. Perhaps most importantly, matching can (by definition) only adjust for variables that MISTI can measure. Unlike randomized control trials (RCTs), which adjust for both observed and unobserved balances in treated and control villages through random assignment of aid, matching requires evaluators to possess data on the important variables that might (in this case) be driving perceptions of stability. Omitted variables are not necessarily problematic if they do not influence stability perceptions, of course. But factors such as private information about a village, including its local power brokers, will be excluded from our analysis until (and if) the relevant data exists.

Second, matching rests on a “parallel trends assumption” that can decay over time. In brief, the parallel trends assumption maintains that treated and control villages will have the same post-aid trajectory. This is likely to be the case in the short to medium term. As the time after an aid project has started (or completed)

lengthens, though, it is likely that events occur, e.g., an airstrike in a treated village or a military operation in a control village, that do not happen equally across both treated and control villages. As a result, difference-in-difference estimates decay over the long term in their accuracy as the parallel trends assumption becomes increasingly violated.

Finally, the number of treated observations here (N=108) is quite small. As the number of projects completed increases, so too does our precision and reliability in our estimates of aid's effects. As with all data analysis, the more observations the better, and MISTI will continue to revisit our initial impact assessments as the number of treated villages increases.

## **Recommendations**

Three recommendations emerge from these midterm findings.

First, it remains important for the implementing partners and respective USAID programs (CCI and SIKA) to integrate their data efforts with MISTI. This includes converging on MISTI's shared standards for data quality and reporting to prevent dramatic revisions to programming data “on the fly” as well as missing villages due to imprecise geospatial locations.

Second, it remains imperative to maximize the “catchment” of treated villages in MISTI Survey Waves 4 and 5. Any treated villages that are not surveyed in Wave 4 will be lost to analysis given the need to have at least a baseline and endline survey if attitudes are to be measured. Similarly, it is important to continue to work to identify control villages that more closely mirror the characteristics of CCI and SIKA villages. The absence of appropriate controls can be as detrimental to an impact evaluation that relies on matching as the failure to have sufficient number of treated villages.

Third, once sufficient data has been collected, subset analysis should take place. For example, the average treatment results presented here could be broken down by CCI/SIKA programs or by various geographic regions of Afghanistan. They could also be divided along ethnic (Pashtun/non-Pashtun) or settlement characteristics (population size, elevation) to fine-tune estimates of treatment effects under more precise scope conditions.

An important follow-on would consist of decomposing the composite stability indicators into smaller clusters of questions—or even using a single question—to have more sensitive measures of perceived stability. While the composite indicators are useful for measuring broad changes across a “basket” of items, more subtle changes in any one indicator are often lost. It may be that USAID programming is having differential effects within these composite indicators, suggesting the need to unpack these bundled measures into their constituent parts.

Fourth, evidence from the impact evaluation data suggests that increased programming in a specific village does not yield greater perceived stability, and indeed may have the opposite, unintended effect. Care should be taken to not overstate this finding; yet more careful consideration should be exercised when considering multi-activity programming within a single village site.

## APPENDIX A: WAVE 3 QUESTIONNAIRE

### MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Wave 3 -- MASTER VERSION

**M-1.** Respondent Identification Number \_\_\_\_\_

**M-2.** Wave Number 03

**M-2a.** Sample

1. Sample A
2. Sample B

**V-1.** Questionnaire Version

1. Base Questionnaire Only – No Modules Added
2. CCI Module Added
3. KFZ Module Added
4. CCI and KFZ Module added

**M-3.** Region

1. Central/Kabul
2. Eastern
3. South Central
4. South Western
5. Western
6. Northern
7. Central/Hazarjat

**M-4.** Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

**M-5.** Geographic Code

1. Villages
2. Towns
3. City
4. Metros (Kabul)

**M-6.** Province

- |           |                |               |              |              |
|-----------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Kabul  | 8. Paktika     | 15. Takhar    | 22. Faryab   | 29. Zabul    |
| 2. Kapisa | 9. Khost       | 16. Baghlan   | 23. Badghis  | 30. Uruzghan |
| 3. Parwan | 10. Nangarhar  | 17. Kunduz    | 24. Herat    | 31. Ghor     |
| 4. Wardak | 11. Laghman    | 18. Balkh     | 25. Farah    | 32. Bamyan   |
| 5. Logar  | 12. Kunar      | 19. Samangan  | 26. Nimroz   | 33. Panjshir |
| 6. Ghazni | 13. Nooristan  | 20. Juzjan    | 27. Helmand  | 34. Dehkondi |
| 7. Paktia | 14. Badakhshan | 21. Sar-I-Pul | 28. Kandahar |              |

**M-7.** Year of Interview: 2013

**M-8.** Month of Interview

- |             |          |              |              |
|-------------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. January  | 4. April | 7. July      | 10. October  |
| 2. February | 5. May   | 8. August    | 11. November |
| 3. March    | 6. June  | 9. September | 12. December |

**M-9. Date of Interview:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-10. Day of Week of Interview**

- |             |              |             |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Friday   | 4. Monday    | 7. Thursday |
| 2. Saturday | 5. Tuesday   |             |
| 3. Sunday   | 6. Wednesday |             |

**M-11. Interviewer Code:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-12. Interview Completed on the ...**

1. First Contact    2. Second Contact    3. Third Contact

**M-13. Supervisor Code:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-14. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Began:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ : \_\_\_ \_\_\_

(Record Time Began Starting With Q-1)

**M-15. Record Time (using 24 hour clock) Interview Ended:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ : \_\_\_ \_\_\_

(Fill in all four data positions)

**M-16. Record Length of Interview in Minutes:** \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-17. Date Formatted Field: NOV 2013**

**M-18. Keypuncher Code** \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-19. Language of Interview**

1. Pashto    2. Dari    3. Other    4. Uzbek

**M-20. Coder Code** \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-21. District Code** \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_

**M-22. Language of the questionnaire**

1. Pashto  
2. Dari

**M-23. Village name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-24. Sampling Point coordinates:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-25.** Field Provider

1. ACSOR
2. Afghan Youth Consulting

**Informed Consent**

**INTERVIEWER READ:** *Much work is being done in Afghanistan to create an environment where better government and development can flourish. The purpose of this survey is to ask people like yourself about how this might be better achieved in your local area.*

*We would like your views on this issue.*

*We will not ask for your name and the answers you and others provide will be held in strict confidence. Your responses to the survey questions are strictly voluntary. If we come to a question you do not wish to answer, please tell me and we'll move on. However your answers can be beneficial by providing information which may help to improve stability and minimize conflict in your area, so please answer as truthfully as you can.*

*Do you give your consent for me to proceed?"*

**M-25b.** Informed Consent \_\_\_\_\_ (tick)

**RECORD THE TIME THE ACTUAL INTERVIEW BEGAN (M-14)**  
**AND USE A 24 HOUR CLOCK (14:24, for 2:24 pm)**

**KFZ MODULE**

*First, I am going to ask you some questions about farming, the types of assistance available to farms in this area, and how this household earns its livelihood.*

**K-1.** When I say farming, this includes growing crops for your own use or to sell, and raising animals for your own use or to sell. Does this household farm any land?

- 1. Yes **(Go to K-2)**
- 2. No **(Skip to K-34)** \_\_\_\_\_
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-34)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-34)**

**K-2a-d.**(Ask if code 1 “Yes” in K1) Of all the land that this household farms, what percent does this household own, lease/rent (Ljara), sharecrop (Bazgari), or have access to through some other arrangement? **(The categories should add up to 100%. If none please enter 0%)**

- a. Own \_\_\_\_\_%
- b. Lease/rent (Ljara) \_\_\_\_\_%
- c. Sharecrop (Bazgari) \_\_\_\_\_%
- d. Other \_\_\_\_\_%
- Total Must Equal 100%**

- \_\_\_\_\_
- 997. Not Asked
- 998. Refused (vol.)
- 999. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-3.** (Ask only those who own land and said more than 0% in K-2a) How did your household acquire this land that you own?

- 1. Inherited
- 2. Purchased
- 3. Given by village
- 4. Firmams – decree of kings
- 96. Other: *(please specify)* \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-4.** For any land that you lease, rent, or sharecrop, how much money if any do you pay to the owner to use the land for one year?

Write Response Amount in Afghanis: \_\_\_\_\_

0. Do not make any money payments to owner

- \_\_\_\_\_  
95. Do not lease, rent or sharecrop  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-5.** For any land that you lease, rent, or sharecrop, how much of your crop if any do you give to the owner to use the land for one year?

0. Do not share any of my crop with owner  
1. A little (1-30%)  
2. Just under a half (31-40%)  
3. About half (41-60%)  
4. Just over a half (61-70%)  
5. Most (71-95%)  
6. All (96+%)

- \_\_\_\_\_  
95. Do not lease, rent or sharecrop  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-6.** What kind of written or recorded agreement, legal title, or ownership rights do you have for this plot of land? (**Interviewer: Allow multiple responses, select all that apply**)

1. Title document  
2. Sales agreement  
3. Lease agreement  
4. Sharecropping agreement  
5. Firmams – decree of kings  
6. Village ownership  
7. Do not have a written or recorded agreement

96. Other: *(please specify)* \_\_\_\_\_

- \_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-7.** What is the size in jeribs of all of the land that this household farms? Is it...

1. Less than 1 jerib
2. 1 to 2 jeribs
3. 3 to 5 jeribs
4. 6 to 10 jeribs
5. 11 to 20 jeribs
6. 21 to 50 jeribs
7. 51 to 100 jeribs
8. 101 to 150 jeribs
9. More than 150 jeribs

- \_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-8.** Is the land irrigated?

1. Yes **(Go to K-9)**
2. No **(Skip to K-11)**

- \_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-11)**  
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-11)**

**K-9a-b. (Ask only those who answered "Yes - irrigated" to K-8)** What is the main source of irrigation in use on the land? What is the next most used source of irrigation on the land?  
**[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down up to two sources)**

K-9a. Main Source: \_\_\_\_\_

K-9b. Next most used source: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Rain
2. River
3. Dam
4. Canal
5. Karez
6. Bore-well
96. Other: \_\_\_\_\_

[ACSOR: Add codes as needed]

- \_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-11.** Please tell me if you grow any of the crops or raise any of the animals on your land from the list I will read out. **(READ OUT and mark all that apply)**

**K-12a.** And, of all the items we discussed, which is the most important for you and the economic status of your household, which is to say which one do you make the most money from? **(MARK ONLY ONE)**

**K-12b.** And which is the next most important for you and the economic status of your household, which is to say which one do you make the next most money from?

**(MARK ONLY ONE)**

<b>Crop/Livestock</b>	<b>K-11. Grown, produced, or raised (read down the table and circle all that apply)</b>	<b>K-12a. Most important (circle only one)</b>	<b>K-12b. Next most important (circle only one)</b>
1. Wheat	1	1	1
2. Rice	1	2	2
3. Maize	1	3	3
4. Corn	1	4	4
5. Safflower	1	5	5
6. Barley	1	6	6
7. Poppy	1	7	7
8. Cotton	1	8	8
9. Soya	1	9	9
10. Potato	1	10	10
11. Onion	1	11	11
12. Cumin	1	12	12
13. Sunflower	1	13	13
14. Okra	1	14	14
15. Green gram (Mung beans)	1	15	15
16. Other pulses (lentils, peas, beans)	1	16	16
17. Marijuana (Chaars)	1	17	17
18. Alfalfa	1	18	18
19. Clover	1	19	19
20. Melon	1	20	20
21. Water melon	1	21	21
22. Pomegranates	1	22	22
23. Grapes	1	23	23
24. Apricots	1	24	24
25. Palms	1	25	25
26. Apples	1	26	26
27. Pears	1	27	27
28. Peaches	1	28	28
29. Cows (Cattle)	1	29	29
30. Chickens (Poultry)	1	30	30
31. Oxen	1	31	31
32. Donkeys	1	32	32
33. Horses	1	33	33
34. Camels	1	34	34
35. Sheep	1	35	35

<b>Crop/Livestock</b>	<b>K-11. Grown, produced, or raised (read down the table and circle all that apply)</b>	<b>K-12a. Most important (circle only one)</b>	<b>K-12b. Next most important (circle only one)</b>
36. Goats	1	36	36
96. Other (please specify) _____	1	96. Specify	96. Specify
97. Not Asked	1	97	97
98. Refused (vol.)	1	98	98
99. Don't Know (vol.)	1	99	99

**K-13. [ASK ONLY IF GROW ANY CROPS]** Thinking about the crops you grow, do you store the harvested crop/s or do you sell it/them within a few days?

- 1. Stored **(Go to K-14)**
- 2. Sold within a few days **(Skip to K-15)**
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-15)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-15)**

**K-14a-c. (Ask only those who answered "Stored", code 1 in K-13)** In what type of storage facility did you store the harvested crop/s?

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Not Asked</b>	<b>Refused (vol.)</b>	<b>DK (vol.)</b>
a. Farm bin, shelter or other temporary storage facility on the farm	1	2	97	98	99
b. Cold storage facility	1	2	97	98	99
c. Other (specify):	1	2	97	98	99

**K-15a-c.** Thinking about your household over the past year, what percentage of the crops you grew, the farm products you made, and the animals you raised did you sell or trade at the market? Please tell me for each category if you sold or traded 0% to 100% of the product:

- K-15a.** Crops \_\_\_\_\_% [enter 0 to 100]
- K-15b.** Products/Farm Supplies \_\_\_\_\_% [enter 0 to 100]
- K-15c.** Animals \_\_\_\_\_% [enter 0 to 100]

- \_\_\_\_\_
- 997. Not Asked
- 998. Refused (vol.)
- 999. Don't Know (vol.)

**SKIP TO Q19**  
**SKIP TO Q19**

**K-16a-c. [ASK IF SOLD ANY % IN K-15a-c]** Thinking again about the crops, products, or animals that you sold in the past year, would say you received a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad price for each of the following:

	Very Good	Somewhat Good	Somewhat Bad	Very Bad	Not Asked	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
<b>K-16a.</b> Crops	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
<b>K-16b.</b> Products / Farm Supplies	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
<b>K-16c.</b> Animals	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**K-17. [ASK IF SOLD ANY % IN K-15a-c]** What was the main location where you sold most of your crops/livestock/products? **(Single response, mark only main location)**

1. At the farm
2. Alongside the road
3. At a local market in my village
4. At a local market in the Howsa
5. At a market in the district center
6. At a market in the provincial center
7. To a cooperative

96. Other: *(please specify)* \_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-18. [ASK IF SOLD ANY % IN K15a-c]** How did you transport your goods to market?

1. Walked with cart or baskets
2. Donkey/horse/mule/camel with cart or baskets
3. Tractor and cart
4. Bicycle
5. Motorcycle
6. Zaranj / Rickshaw
7. Passenger Car
8. Van
9. Truck

96. Other: *(please specify)* \_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-19.** Did you use any fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, feed or paid labor on your farm during the last year?

1. Yes (Go to K-20a)  
 2. No (Skip to K-22)
- 
97. Not Asked  
 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to K-22)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to K-22)

**K-20a-e. [ASK IF code 1, "YES" IN K-19]** How much does your economic success depend on the following? Does [insert item] play a very large role, a medium size role, a small role, or no roll at all in the economic success of the activities on your land?

	Very large role	Medium size role	Small role	No role at all	Not Asked	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
<b>K-20a.</b> Fertilizers	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
<b>K-20b.</b> Pesticides	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
<b>K-20c.</b> Seeds	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
<b>K-20d.</b> Feed	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
<b>K-20e.</b> Paid labor	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**K-21a-e. [ASK IF CODE 1, "YES" IN K-19]** For the following items, please tell me if you are able to access the item. Do you have access to all you need, access to some of what you need, insufficient access, no access at all or do you not need these to be successful?

	Access to all you need	Access to some of what you need	Insufficient access to what you need	No access at all	Do not need to be successful	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Fertilizers	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
b. Pesticides	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
c. Seeds	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
d. Feed	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99
e. Paid labor	1	2	3	4	5	97	98	99

**K-22.** Have you received any assistance from outside of your household for the farming activities you conducted on your land over the past year?

1. Yes (Go to K-23)  
 2. No (Skip to K-25)
- 
97. Not Asked  
 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to K-25)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to K-25)

**K-23a-c. (Ask only those who answered CODE 1 “Yes” to K-22)** From where did you receive this assistance? Did you receive assistance from...

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Refused (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. The Afghan Government	1	2	97	98	99
b. International Organization / NGO	1	2	97	98	99
c. Another source (specify): _____	1	2	97	98	99

**K-24a-e. (Ask only those who answered Code 1 “Yes” to K-22)** What type of assistance did you receive? Did you receive assistance with...

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Fertilizers	1	2	97	98	99
b. Pesticides	1	2	97	98	99
c. Seeds	1	2	97	98	99
d. Feed	1	2	97	98	99
e. Storage of crops	1	2	97	98	99
e. Other: _____	1	2	97	98	99

**K-25.** In the past year, did you try to obtain credit or a loan from any source outside of your household?

- 1. Yes **(Go to K-26)**
- 2. No **(Skip to K-32)**
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**

**K-26.** (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-25) Were you successful in obtaining credit or a loan?

- 1. Yes **(Go to K-27)**
- 2. No **(Skip to K-31)**
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-32)**

**K-27. (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-26)** From what source/s did you obtain the credit/loan? Did you obtain a loan from...

	Yes	No	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Family and/or friends	1	2	97	98	99
b. Landlord	1	2	97	98	99
c. Wealthy lender	1	2	97	98	99
d. Bank	1	2	97	98	99
e. Afghan Government	1	2	97	98	99
f. International Organization / NGO	1	2	97	98	99
g. Lending group	1	2	97	98	99
h. Other: _____	1	2	97	98	99

**K-28. (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-26)** What was the total amount of credit or loans that you obtained in the past year? [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response in Afghani)

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_ Afs

- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**K-29. (Ask only those who responded code 1 “Yes” to K-26)** Did you have to offer collateral (an item you would lose if you did not repay the loan) to obtain the credit/loans?

- 1. Yes (Go to K-30)
- 2. No (Skip to K-32)

- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to K-32)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.) (Skip to K-32)

**K-30. (Ask only those who responded “Yes” to K-29)** What collateral did you have to offer? [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)

- 1. Land
- 96. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

[ACSOR: Add codes as needed]

- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**K-31. (Ask only those who responded code 2 “No” to K-26) Why did you not receive credit or a loan?  
[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)**

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-32a-c. What types of assistance would be most useful in helping you farm in the coming year?  
[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down top three responses)**

K-32a. First Response: \_\_\_\_\_

K-32b. Second Response: \_\_\_\_\_

K-32c. Third Response: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Seed

2. Fertilizer

3. Herbicide

4. Pesticide

5. Feed

96. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-33.** What types of facilities would be most useful in helping you prepare your crops/animals/products for market in the coming year? Please tell me for each of the following if it would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful:

Facility	Very helpful	Somewhat helpful	Not very helpful	Not at all helpful	Not Asked	Ref. (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Cold storage	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b. Grading facility	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c. Canning factory	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d. Drying facility	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e. Packaging factory	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f. Flour mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
g. Feed mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
h. Spinning mill	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
i. Other (please specify) _____	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**(ASK ALL)**

**K-34.** Apart from farming, does this household operate any other type of business?

- 1. Yes **(Go to K-35a)**
- 2. No **(Skip to K-37a)**
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to K-37a)**
- 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to K-37a)**

**K-35a-b.** (Ask only those who answered code 1 "Yes" to K-34) What type/s of business/es?  
**[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down all first two responses)**

- a. First Response: \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Second Response: \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- 97. Not Asked
- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**K-36.** (Ask only those who answered code 1 “Yes” to K-34) How much of the household income comes from this/these business/es?

1. All of it (96-100%)
2. Most of it but not all (71-95%)
3. Just over a half (61-70%)
4. About half (41-60%)
5. Just under a half (26-40%)
6. Just a little (6-25%)
7. None (0-5%)

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**(ASK ALL)**

**K-37a-b.** In terms of earning a livelihood, in order of priority, what are the two biggest problems facing this household in terms of earning a livelihood? [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)

Write Responses:

a. (Biggest problem) \_\_\_\_\_

b. (Next biggest problem) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**(ASK ALL)**

**Q-1.** Generally speaking, are things in [*name the district*] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction? Is that a lot or a little?

1. Right direction (a lot)
2. Right direction (a little)
3. Wrong direction (a little)
4. Wrong direction (a lot)

- 
97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)
  98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**MODULE 1: SECURITY & CRIME**

**Q-2a.** Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that 'very good/poor'?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Very Poor

- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-2b.** Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago? Is that 'much more/less secure' or 'somewhat more/less secure'?

1. Much more secure
2. Somewhat more secure
3. About the same
4. Somewhat less secure
5. Much less secure

- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't know (vol.)

**Q-3a.** I would like to know about security on the roads you use in this area. Overall, would you say that security on the roads you use in this area is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad

- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-3b.** Would you say that security on the roads you use in this area has improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that ‘improved/worsened a little or a lot’?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don’t know (vol.)

**Q-4a-d.** Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are ... [*insert situation*]? Is that very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?

	Very secure	Somewhat secure	Somewhat insecure	Very insecure	Ref. (vol.)	Don’t Know (vol.)
a) ...in your home during the day?	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) ...in your home during the night?	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) ...traveling to a neighboring village?	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) ... traveling to the district or provincial capital?	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q5.1a-c.** How would you rate the level of...[*insert item*] in your area? Is there a lot, a little, or none at all?

	A lot	A little	None at all	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	98	99
b) ...serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	98	99

**Q-5.2a-c.** Compared to last year, how would you rate the level of ...[Insert Item] in your area? Is it much less, a little less, the same, a little more or much more?

	Much less	A little less	The same	A little more	Much more	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) ...serious, non-violent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q-6.1a-f.** How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area?

	A lot	Some	None	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	98	99
b) Arbaki	1	2	3	98	99
c) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	98	99
d) Armed Opposition Groups	1	2	3	98	99
e) Afghan Local Police	1	2	3	98	99
f) ISAF	1	2	3	98	99

**Q-6.2a-b.** Overall, how much confidence do you have in ...[Insert Item] to make your area safe? Would you say you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence or no confidence at all? **(If respondent answered 3 “None” to an item in Q-6.1, please record the corresponding item in Q-6.2 as 97 “Not Applicable”)**

	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	A Little confidence	No confidence at all	Not Asked /Not Applicable (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...the Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) ...the Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**Q-7a-b.** Overall, has the ability of the [Insert Item] to provide security in your area improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that ‘improved/worsened a little or a lot’?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	Stayed the same	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

## MODULE 2: GOVERNANCE

**Q-8. [INTERVIEWER: Please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair]** I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.
2. The Afghan government is **not** well regarded in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-9a-d.** How much confidence do you have in your [*Insert Position/Organization*]? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-10a-d.** How responsive do you think your [*Insert Item*] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Is [*insert item*] very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-11a-d.** Over the past year, has the [*Insert Item*] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) District Government's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders'	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
d) Provincial Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q-12a.** Please, tell me, do you know of/have you heard of District Development Assembly in your district?

- 1. Yes **(Go to Q-12b)**
- 2. No **(Skip to Q-13a)**

- 
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-13a)**

**Q-12b.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a]** How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-12c.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a]** How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-12d.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q12a]** And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

**Q-13a. (ASK ALL)** Please, tell me, do you have Community Development Council established in your area?

- 1. Yes **(Go to Q-13b)**
- 2. No **(Skip to Q-14)**

- 
- 98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-14)**

**Q-13b.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a]** How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-13c.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a]** How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q-13d.[Filtered, if 'yes' to Q13a]** And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that 'improved/worsened a little or a lot'?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

**Q-14a-h.[ASK ALL][INTERVIEWER: For each of 14a-h, please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair]** I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

Q-14a.

1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.
2. The District Government officials in this district are **not** from this district.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14b.

1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** understand the problems of people in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14c.

1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.
2. The District Government **does not** care about the people in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14d.

1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.
2. District Government officials in this district **do not** abuse their authority to make money for themselves.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14e.

1. District Government officials visit this area.
2. District Government officials **do not** visit this area.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14f.

1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.
2. In general, the District Government officials are **not** doing their jobs honestly.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14g.

1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.
2. The District Government **does not** deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

Q-14h.

1. It is acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.
2. It is **not** acceptable for people to publicly criticize the Afghan government.

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

### MODULE 3: SERVICE PROVISION & DEVELOPMENT

**Q-15.** Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year? Is that ‘improved/worsened a lot or a little’?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Not changed
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q-16a-i.** Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the district government’s provision of [*Insert Item*]? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Service not provided (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Clean Drinking Water	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) Water for irrigation and uses other than drinking	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c) Agricultural assistance ( <i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i> )	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d) Retaining and flood walls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e) Roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f) Medical Care	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
g) Schooling for girls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
h) Schooling for boys	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
i) Electricity	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**Q-17a.** In the last year, have you seen or heard about any development projects in your local area, or not?

- 1. Yes **(Go to Q-17b)**
- 2. No **(Skip to Q-18)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-18)**

**Q-17b.** (Ask respondent if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-17a). What development projects have you seen or heard about in your local area?

**(INTERVIEWER: READ OUT PRECODES. Circle each response mentioned.)**

**Q-17c.** (Ask if respondent answered code 1 “Yes” in Q17b. If item is not circled in Q-17b, circle ‘97’) Did the project improve life for people in this local area?

<i>Q-17b. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?</i>				<i>Q-17c. If project type is mentioned in Q-17b, ask Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area? If project type is not mentioned in Q-17b, circle ‘97’.</i>		
	Not asked	Yes	No	Yes	No	Not Men'd
a) Drinking Water	97	1	2	1	2	97
b) Irrigation/water maintenance systems	97	1	2	1	2	97
c) Agricultural assistance ( <i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i> )	97	1	2	1	2	97
d) Farm produce processing or storage facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
e) Retaining and flood walls	97	1	2	1	2	97
f) Roads and Bridges	97	1	2	1	2	97
g) Medical Facilities	97	1	2	1	2	97
h) Schools	97	1	2	1	2	97
i) Electricity	97	1	2	1	2	97
j) Other (Specify)	97	1	2	1	2	97

**Q-18a-b. (ASK ALL)** Looking forward to the next year, what type of development projects are most needed in this area? You can mention two. Please start with the most needed, then the next most needed.

**[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-18a. (most needed): \_\_\_\_\_

Q-18b. (next most needed): \_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-19-a-b. (ASK ALL)** Which of the following are the two biggest obstacles to your obtaining health care or medicine? **(INTERVIEWER: READ OUT RESPONSES. Record up to two starting with the biggest and then second biggest obstacle)**

Q-19a. (biggest obstacle): \_\_\_\_\_

Q-19b. (second biggest obstacle): \_\_\_\_\_

1. Lack of clinics/hospitals
2. Distance to facilities, lack of transportation and/or good roads
3. Cost of health care or medicine
4. Corruption or need to pay bribes to receive treatment
5. Lack of professional doctors
6. No services for women or a lack of female healthcare workers
7. Lack of medicines
8. Lack of medical equipment
9. Poor security
96. Other
98. Refused
99. Don't Know

**MODULE 4: RULE OF LAW**

**Q-20a-c.** If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [*Insert Item*], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**

	Govt. Court	Local/Tribal Elder/s	Armed Opposition Groups	Other (write in)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Land or water	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
b) Assault, murder, or kidnapping	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
c) Theft	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99

**Q-21a-c.** How much confidence do you have in [*Insert Item*] to fairly resolve disputes? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q-22a-c.** Do you think that people in your village/neighborhood always, mostly, sometimes or never respect the decisions made by [*Insert Item*]?

	Always	Mostly	Sometimes	Never	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

## MODULE 5: CORRUPTION

**Q-23.** Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-24.** From what you know or have heard about, which department or sector of the local government do people most complain about corruption? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down one response)**

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-25.** In the last year has the level of corruption in this area increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Is that increased/decreased a little or a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

## MODULE 6: QUALITY OF LIFE (WELL-BEING & STANDARD OF LIVING)

**Q-26.** All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-27.** How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-28.** Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same? Is that 'increased/decreased a little or a lot'?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-29.** How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year? Are you not worried, a little worried, or very worried?

1. Not worried
2. A little worried
3. Very worried

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-30.** I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.
2. The situation in this area is **too uncertain** for me to make plans for my future.

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## MODULE 7: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

**Q-31.** Compared to a year ago, how would you describe your ability to get to your local markets? Is it much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse?

1. Much better
2. A little better
3. About the same
4. A little worse
5. Much worse

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-32.** Compared to a year ago, how have prices for basic goods changed in your local markets? Have they increased a lot, increased a little, stayed about the same, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-33.** Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your local area? Are there a lot more, a little more, about the same, a few less, or a lot less paid jobs available in your local area?

1. A lot more
2. A little more
3. About the same
4. A little less
5. A lot less

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**MODULE 8: COMMUNITY COHESION & RESILIENCE**

**Q-34a.** How often do things from outside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

- 1. Often (Go to Q-34b)
- 2. Sometimes (Go to Q-34b)
- 3. Rarely (Go to Q-34b)
- 4. Never (Skip to Q-35a)

- 
- 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q-35a)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to Q-35a)

**Q-34b.** (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a) What is the most common type of interference from outside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)

Q-34b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-34b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

- 
- 97. Not Asked
  - 98. Refused (vol.)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-34c.** (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-34a) How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

- 1. Often
- 2. Sometimes
- 3. Rarely
- 4. Never

- 
- 97. Not Asked
  - 98. Refused (vol.)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-35a.** (ASK ALL) How often do things from inside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

- 1. Often (Go to Q-35b)
- 2. Sometimes (Go to Q-35b)
- 3. Rarely (Go to Q-35b)
- 4. Never (Skip to Q-36)

- 
- 98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q-36)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to Q-36)

**Q-35b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a)** What is the most common type of interference from inside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-35b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-35b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-35c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2 or 3 to Q-35a)** How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often

2. Sometimes

3. Rarely

4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-36. (ASK ALL)** When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem? Is that often, sometimes, rarely or never?

1. Often

2. Sometimes

3. Rarely

4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-37a.** When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often **(Go to Q-37b)**

2. Sometimes **(Go to Q-37b)**

3. Rarely **(Go to Q-37b)**

4. Never **(Skip to Q-38)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-38)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-38)**

**Q-37b. (Ask if answered codes 1, 2 or 3 in Q-37a)** In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-38. (ASK ALL)** How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government? Are they very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective?

1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Somewhat ineffective
4. Very ineffective

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q-39a-b.** Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together? Examples may include sports clubs, women's groups, business associations, trade unions, farmers' associations, development councils, religious welfare organizations, or charities, etc.

**Q-39a.**

1. Yes **(Please list below in Q-39b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q-40)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q-40)**  
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q-40)**

**Q-39b.**(Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" to Q-39a) [INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down up to two responses) What type of group/s do you belong to?

Q-39b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-39b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**MODULE 9: GRIEVANCES**

**Q-40a-b. (ASK ALL)** Thinking about the different problems that people in this area talk about, what are the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in this area? Please try to be specific, starting with the biggest problem. **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Q-40a. Biggest problem: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-40b. Next biggest problem: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**MODULE 10: MEDIA**

**Q-41a-i.** Do you use any of the following to communicate with others and/or get news and information?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Television	1	2	98	99
b) Radio	1	2	98	99
c) Mosque/mullah	1	2	98	99
d) Friends and family	1	2	98	99
e) Elders	1	2	98	99
f) Cell phone	1	2	98	99
g) Posters & billboards	1	2	98	99
h) Newspapers	1	2	98	99
i) Internet/email	1	2	98	99

**Q-42a-b.** From where do you get most of your information about government services? From where do you next get your information about government services? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED] (Write down two responses)**

Write Response/s:

Q-42a. \_\_\_\_\_

Q-42b. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**CCI MODULE**

**C-1a.** On another subject, elections, tell me, to the best of your knowledge how many people *from your community* participated and voted in the in the last Presidential election five years ago? Would you say that it was...

**C-1b.** And, to your understanding, how many people *from the neighboring settlements* in your area participated and voted in the last Presidential election five years ago? Would say that it was...

	<b>Hardly any</b>	<b>Some</b>	<b>About half</b>	<b>A lot</b>	<b>Most/ Almost All</b>	<b>Refused (vol.)</b>	<b>Don't Know (vol.)</b>
a. In your community	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b. In neighboring settlements	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**C-2a.** From your memory, did people from your community mostly vote for the same candidate, or did people have different opinions and vote for different candidates during the last Presidential election five years ago?

**C-2b.** And to the best of your recollection, in the latest Presidential election five years ago did people from your community vote for the same candidate as the people in neighboring villages in your area? Or, did people in your community vote for one candidate, while those in neighboring villages voted for different candidates?

	<b>Same Candidate</b>	<b>Different Candidates</b>	<b>Ref. (vol.)</b>	<b>DK (vol.)</b>
a. Within your community	1	2	98	99
b. Your community and neighboring settlements	1	2	98	99

**C-3 a-g.** Still thinking of the last Presidential election five years ago, did you have any of the following in your community during the time before the election day?

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Ref. (vol.)</b>	<b>DK (vol.)</b>
a) Discussions in your community about which candidate to vote for	1	2	98	99
b) Arguments in your community about which of the candidates to vote for	1	2	98	99
c) Clashes/physical violence in your community about which of the candidates to vote for	1	2	98	99
d) Clashes/physical violence between your community and people from neighboring villages about which of the candidates to vote for	1	2	98	99
e) Violence on the election day between supporters of different candidates for President	1	2	98	99
f) Disputes after the elections about how voting stations were managed	1	2	98	99
g) Disputes after the elections about the final results	1	2	98	99

**READ:** “Now I will read some pairs of statements. There may be some truth in both, but please tell me which you agree with more.”

**C-4.** (READ STATEMENTS) Please tell me which statement you agree with more.

*Statement A: Voting is a personal, individual responsibility. Each person should vote for whomever he or she wants to regardless of what their community thinks.*

*Statement B: One cannot vote for whomever he or she wants to. We are all members of a community and should vote the way our community votes.*

1. Statement A
2. Statement B

- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**C-5.** (READ STATEMENTS) Please tell me which statement you agree with more.

*Statement A: Obeying the laws of the Afghan government is necessary to achieve peace and prosperity.*

*Statement B: There may be times when it is necessary to take matters into your own hands, even if this means breaking the law.*

1. Statement A
2. Statement B

- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**C-6 a-b.** If you or a family member was involved in the following [*Insert Item*], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**

	<b>Government Court</b>	<b>Local/ Tribal Elders</b>	<b>Afghan National Police (ANP)</b>	<b>Other (write in)</b>	<b>Ref (vol.)</b>	<b>DK (vol.)</b>
a) Disputes during the election process in your community	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
b) Violence during the election process in your community	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99

**C-7.** Which do you trust more to make the right decisions about managing voting on the election day for your community: government leaders and officials in this area, or tribal and community leaders in this area?

1. Government leaders and officials in this area
  2. Tribal and community leaders in the area
- 
3. Neither (vol.)
  4. Both equally (vol.)
  98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**C-8.** How concerned are people in your community about possible threats from anti-government elements against those who plan to participate in the election? Very concerned? Somewhat concerned? Not very concerned? Not at all concerned?

1. Very concerned
  2. Somewhat concerned
  3. Not very concerned
  4. Not at all concerned
- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

## MODULE 11: INDIRECT QUESTIONS

**Q-43a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-43b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-44a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support with this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-44b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-45a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose with this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-45b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Independent Election Commission (IEC) be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-46a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-46b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrong-doing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-47a.** Despite the possible risks, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan want the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-47b.** Despite the possible risks, the Karzai administration wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-48a.** Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-48b.** Despite the poor results of past anti-corruption campaigns, the Karzai administration wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-49a.** The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-49b.** The Karzai administration wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for Mullahs to preach anti-government messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support with such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-50a.** The democratically-elected government of Afghanistan has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q-50b.** The Karzai administration has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

- 
98. Refused
  99. Don't know

## DEMOGRAPHICS

**INTERVIEWER READ:** *“Now I would like to ask you some questions for statistical purposes.”*

**D-1.** Gender (**INTERVIEWER, Do Not Ask: code based on your observation of the person’s gender**)

1. Male
2. Female

**D-2a.** (**Ask All**) How old were you on your last birthday? (**Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate**)

\_\_\_\_

**D-2b.** In the previous question (D-2a) is this:

1. An estimated age
2. An actual age

**D-3.** How many years of formal education from primary school through university education have you completed?

Years (write in): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**D-4.** And, apologies to be asking this, but regardless of your attained level of education, can you fluently perform each of the following in your native language?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Read a letter	1	2	8	9
b. Write a letter	1	2	8	9
c. Read a book	1	2	8	9

**D-5a.** What is your job status now? Are you...

1. Full-time farmer
2. Working full-time
3. Working part-time
4. Unemployed-Looking For Work
5. Unemployed-Not Looking For Work
6. Housewife (not working outside of the home)
7. Student/Apprentice
8. Retired/ Disabled

- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-5b. (ASK IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING, UNEMPLOYED, OR RETIRED in D-5a codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 8):** What is/was your primary occupation? **(INTERVIEWER: FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERED UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED/DISABLED, ASK THE RESPONDENT WHAT THEIR OCCUPATION WAS WHEN THEY WERE WORKING. RECORD BELOW AND CODE).**

**INTERVIEWER WRITE OCCUPATION:** \_\_\_\_\_

1. Government Employee Support Staff
2. Government Employee Mid-Level (Supervisory)
3. Government Employee Senior Level Officer
4. Agricultural Laborer
5. Farming On Own Farm
6. Farm Owner Employing Laborers
7. Unskilled Worker
8. Semi-Skilled Worker
9. Skilled Worker
10. Private Employee Support Staff
11. Private Employee Mid-Level (Supervisory)
12. Private Employee Senior Officer
13. Private Business Sole Proprietor
14. Private Business Employing 1-5 Workers
15. Private Business Employing More Than 5 Workers
16. Military/Police
96. Other

- 
97. Not Asked
  98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-5c. (Ask if respondent answered code 5 “Farming on own land” in D-5b) What is the main crop that you grow? (CODE ONE RESPONSE)**

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

- \_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-6. Are you the head of household?**

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-7. How many people live in your household?**

Interviewer: (code response) \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-8. What is your marital status now? Are you currently...**

1. Married?
2. Widowed or Divorced?
3. Single?

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-9. What is your household's total monthly income in Afghanis from all sources, that is, all types of income for all the people living at this address?**

1. 1,000 Afghanis or less,
2. From 1,001 to 1,600
3. From 1,601 to 2,400
4. From 2,401 to 4,000
5. From 4,001 to 6,000
6. From 6,001 to 8,000
7. From 8,001 to 12,000
8. From 12,001 to 16,000
9. From 16,001 to 20,000
10. From 20,001 to 24,000
11. From 24,001 to 40,000
12. Greater than 40,000 Afghanis?

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-10.** When asked ‘Who are you?’ some people answer first by indicating their occupation, others state their nationality, others tell their ethnicity, others their Qawm, others religion, others the region/province they are from, etc. If asked this question, what would you indicate about yourself in the first place?

1. Occupation
2. Nationality
3. Ethnicity/Qawm
4. Religion
5. Province/region

\_\_\_\_\_

96. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-11.** Do you consider yourself to be...

1. Pashtun
2. Tajik
3. Uzbek
4. Turkmen
5. Hazara
6. Baloch
7. Kirghiz
8. Nuristani
9. Aimak
10. Arab
11. Kuchi
12. Other

- \_\_\_\_\_
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-12.** What is your religious affiliation? **(If Respondent Says Muslim Ask):** Do you consider yourself to be Shia or Sunni?

1. Shia Muslim
2. Sunni Muslim
3. Other

- \_\_\_\_\_
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-13.** What is your qawm?

Qawm: \_\_\_\_\_ (write in)

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-14.** Were you born in this district, or not?

1. Yes

2. No

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D-15a.** Have you or has any other member/s of this household been injured or killed as a result of the fighting since the Taliban was removed from power?

1. Yes

**(Go to D-15b)**

2. No

**(Skip to M-26)**

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

**(Skip to M-26)**

99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to M-26)**

**D-15b. (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” at D-15a) Which group/s was/were responsible for the injury/s or death/s? (Do not read PRECODES, code up to two responses)**

D-15b\_1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

D-15b\_2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Precodes:

1. Taliban
2. ISAF
3. ANSF
4. Haqqani
5. [intentional blank]
6. Armed people
7. Foreign forces
8. Thieves
9. Local disputes
10. Warlords
11. Criminals
12. Karzai's men
13. Jamyat-e-Islami
14. Pakistanis
15. AGE
16. Soviet Union
17. None
18. Hizb-e Islami
19. Wahdat political party
20. Arbakies
21. Suicide attacks
22. Personal enmity
96. Other (Specify: \_\_\_\_\_)
97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**M-26.** Have you previously participated in a public opinion survey?

1. Yes (Go to M-27)
  2. No (Skip to M-28)
- 
8. Refused (Vol.) (Skip to M-28)
  9. Don't Know (Vol.) (Skip to M-28)

**M-27.** (Ask if answered 'yes' to M-26) How long ago did you participate in the survey?

1. Less than 1 month
  2. 1-3 months ago
  3. 4-6 months ago
  4. 7-9 months ago
  5. 10-12 months ago
  6. More than 1 year ago
- 
7. Not Asked
  8. Refused (vol.)
  9. Don't Know (vol.)

**M-28.** (Ask All) Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys next year?

1. Yes
  2. No
- 
8. Refused (Vol.)
  9. Don't Know (Vol.)

**RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-15 AND M-16)**

**Read Closing Statement to the Respondent:**

“Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few hours or days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him/her do that, could I have your telephone number?”

Telephone number: \_\_\_\_\_

“If my supervisor calls you by telephone, he/she will begin by asking if you were surveyed in the last few hours/days. He/she will **not ask** you for your name or address. If someone you don’t know contacts you by telephone and asks for your name and/or address you should end the call and not talk to them.”

Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signed Date Interviewer Code

**M-29. Interviewer:** How many people were present for the interview? \_\_\_\_

**M-30. Interviewer:** Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

1. The respondent understood all of the questions
2. The respondent understood most of the questions
3. The respondent understood most of the questions but with some help.
4. The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me

**M-31. Interviewer:** Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

1. The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire
2. The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions
3. The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions
4. The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questionnaire

**M-32. Interviewer:** Please indicate which, if any, of the questions caused this respondent any uneasiness or decreased cooperation during the interview. **(Write down the number of the question numbers, in order of mention).**

- a. First Mention \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Second Mention \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Third Mention \_\_\_\_\_

**M-33. SES Level: INTERVIEWER:** Try to ask participant about access to water and electric (for electric it can be either municipal electric or a generator). Make your own decision about quality of the road. Select the code that is closest to the appearance and situation of the household. Code 1 represents the highest household economic situation and Code 5 the lowest household economic situation.

1. A/B [High quality road, access to water and electric 6 to 7 days]
2. C+ [Good road, access to water and electric 4 to 5 days per]
3. C, C- [Fair road, access to water and electric only a 1 to 3 days per week]
4. D [Poor road, access to water and electric 1 day a week, or less]
5. E [Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electric]

**M34a-** Was the interview controlled or back checked by MISTI?

1. It was back checked by MISTI
2. It was not back checked by MISTI

**To Be Completed By The Supervisor:**

**M-34b.** Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

1. Yes
2. No

**M-35.** Method of quality control/back-check

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check from the central office
4. Not applicable

**MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey**  
**M-36 Supplemental Question**

**INTERVIEWER Instructions:** The supplemental question (M-36) is to be completed by the interviewer after completing his/her interviews in the sampling point. Interview is to fill out one for each sampling point completed.

M-2. Wave Number 01

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

M-11. Interviewer Code: \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

**M-34. INTERVIEWER:** Please judge which situation best describes this village:

1. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported
2. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night
3. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly
4. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay
5. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all
6. Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all
7. There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village

## APPENDIX B: METHODS REPORT



Country: Afghanistan

Field Dates: November 16, 2013 –  
January 30, 2014

Research Provider: ACSOR Surveys and  
Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC)

D3 Project Manager: Brian Kirchoff

Study: Measuring the Impact of Stabilization  
Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 3

Sample Size: 40,405

Number of Interviewers: 1,309 from ACSOR  
41 from AYC

Date of Assessment: April 8, 2014

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# I. INTRODUCTION

The Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Wave 3 survey was a public opinion study that sought to identify trends in stabilization indicators throughout Afghanistan. The Wave 3 survey built upon the Wave 1 baseline survey, conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012 and the Wave 2 survey, conducted between May 18 and August 7, 2013. The intent of the project was to inform leaders from 6 stabilization programs being run across Afghanistan and help identify improvements and declines in stabilization in their areas of responsibility.

There were six stabilization programs included in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 projects: Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI), Community Development Program (CDP) and four Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) programs covering the North (SIKA-N), South (SIKA-S), East (SIKA-E) and West (SIKA-W) regions of Afghanistan. In Wave 3, the CDP program was dropped and the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) program was added, so there remains 6 programs being measured in Wave 3.

## I.1 Executive Summary

The sample design, field implementation, quality control, questionnaire design, and overall field experience are summarized in this methodology report. Some highlights are presented below.

1. The target population was Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older, living in 93 pre-selected districts throughout 21 provinces in Afghanistan. Eighty seven of these districts were selected because they were locations where at least one of the six stabilization programs were either operating or planning to operate in the future. The final six districts were identified as relatively stable districts and served as control districts for analytical purposes.
2. The target N size for the project was 41,486 interviews. The achieved N size was 40,405 interviews after all quality control measures were employed and unacceptable interviews were rejected. The target n size for each district ranged between 320 and 512 interviews with the average size per district being 446 interviews.
3. Sampling was conducted across 93 districts specified by MISTI. These districts were located in the following 21 provinces: Parwan, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Paktiya, Khost, Kunar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Badghis, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzghan and Ghor. Nineteen of these provinces were included in the Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys; in Wave 3, districts in Balkh and Jawzjan were added.
4. Primary sampling units were villages within each district. Each of the villages (also referred to as settlements), like the districts, were selected by MISTI. In some instances, villages were determined to be inaccessible to interviewing teams due to security concerns, travel restrictions (imposed by either insurgent groups or NATO forces) or weather. In these instances, a replacement village was selected by MISTI. All replacements are notated in the Achieved Sample Plans for each of the 93 districts surveyed and are summarized in Appendix 1 of this report.

5. The sampling methodology differs slightly from previous waves. This was done purposefully because the primary analytical goal of MISTI is to understand opinions from people living in USAID program intervention areas, but keeping in mind the budget for sample size has remained relatively consistent overall, there were limitations in purposefully selecting all accessible treatment villages sampled in W1 and W2. As a result, treatment villages previously drawn in W1 and W2 were sampled from to retain longitudinal analysis.
6. Furthermore, this report presents aggregated data results and analysis at the district and program level. This requires the assumption that the data collected within each district or program is representative of the population of a district or a program. The reader should keep in mind that:
  - Accessibility of villages differs at the time of each survey. Therefore, target treatment villages sampled in W1 and W2 intended to be resampled in W3 not have had a probability of inclusion.
  - There are no accurate measures of size associated with villages. The assumption that is made is that all villages are of approximately equal size, as any random selection was done by way of simple random sampling.
  - The AYC household level selection is not random, instead it was done through a snowball sampling technique.
7. Assuming a simple random sample with  $P=0.5$  and a 95% confidence interval, the margin of sampling error for the aggregated data set of 40,405 interviews would be  $\pm 0.49\%$ . Although this statistic is presented for reference, we do not recommend analysis for these data at an aggregate level with all cases being analyzed simultaneously as the definition of the target population is difficult to interpret with 87 settlements with USAID activity (which we refer to as treatment villages) and 6 subjectively chosen stable districts.
8. Complex margin of error was estimated at two levels: by district and by program. These sampling errors are estimated assuming a probability based sample took place at both these levels.

A chart showing each district's resulting statistics can be found in the "Sample Design" section of this report under sub-section "2.3 Margin of Error." In addition to the individual district results, design effect and margin of error calculations were also generated for each of the six program areas and the control districts. These were derived using an average design effect for all districts covered by a program and then using the aggregated sample for each program to calculate the estimates. The program level results can also be found in sub-section "2.3 Margin of Error."

9. The MISTI Wave 3 survey was conducted face to face by 1,309 ACSOR interviewers and 41 AYC interviewers. Some districts are inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers because it is difficult to enter and exit certain areas without attracting the attention of insurgent elements and endangering the safety of the ACSOR interviewers. Certain districts are also accessible only to male interviewers due to cultural and security concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes

frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in eight districts were conducted completely by AYC and another seven districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 3 field work.

10. The ACSOR interviewing teams consisted of male and female interviewers who were local residents of the areas where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewers utilized a random walk methodology to select households and a Kish grid to randomize respondent selection within households. These interviewers were all from the province where they conducted interviews and in most instances they were from the districts where the interviews were conducted. The ACSOR interviewing teams were overseen by a supervisory team from their province. The supervisory team consisted of 21 lead supervisors (one for each province) and one or two assistant supervisors in each province that helped with back checks, field monitoring and general field logistics throughout the field period. ACSOR's field work began on November 16, 2013 and concluded on January 22, 2014.
11. The AYC interviewing teams consisted of small groups of male interviewers who are from the districts where the interviews were conducted. Due to the poor security situation in the districts where they conducted field work, the AYC interviewing teams selected households through convenience sampling using their local knowledge of the villages and contacts they have within those villages so as to lessen the possibility of encountering insurgent elements that would result from employing a random walk. Since the AYC interviewers were all male and they selected households through convenience sampling, respondents were selected by either asking for the male head of household or interviewing another male member of the household who was available at the time. The AYC interviewers were overseen by a team of supervisors who were responsible for back checking, direct observations and all field logistics. AYC began field work on December 21, 2013 and concluded on January 30, 2014.
12. Contact sheets were completed by both ACSOR and AYC interviewers throughout the field period. ACSOR used standard AAPOR calculation standards to derive the following field performance and disposition rates:
  - Response Rate 3 = 87.77%
  - Cooperation Rate 3 = 95.96%
  - Refusal Rate 2 = 2.80%
  - Contact Rate 2 = 91.46%
13. AAPOR offers a variety of formulas to calculate disposition rates depending on the circumstances for which they are being used. ACSOR typically uses the rates reported above as they most logically fit the face to face field methodology used in Afghanistan.
14. The questionnaire consisted of 39 management and quality control variables, 85 substantive questions and 19 demographic questions. The CCI module added to the questionnaire only in districts where the CCI program is operating contained 8 questions. The KFZ module added to the questionnaire for the districts in Kandahar where that program is operating contained 54 questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable.

15. The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 48 minutes with the shortest interview taking 21 minutes and the longest interview taking 1 hours and 30 minutes.

*Table 1: Project Schedule*

Project Phases	Start Date	End Date	Comments
Translation	November 3, 2013	November 18, 2013	CCI and KFZ module additions caused delay in finalizing
ACSOR Briefings	November 15, 2013	December 24, 2013	Nov 28 – Thanksgiving
AYC Briefings	December 22, 2013	December 24, 2013	Dec 25 – Christmas
ACSOR Fieldwork	November 16, 2013	January 22, 2014	Jan 1 – New Year’s Day
AYC Fieldwork	December 21, 2013	January 30, 2014	Jan 14 – Prophet’s Birthday
Quality Control	November 15, 2013	March 3, 2014	Feb 15 – Soviet Forces Withdrawl Holiday
Data Processing	November 24, 2013	February 20, 2014	

## II. SAMPLE DESIGN

The following table shows the target and achieved sample for each district in the MISTI Wave 3 project. The target and achieved sample sizes differ due to post-field quality control measures which caused some cases to be removed from the data set. A complete list of reasons cases were removed listed by district can be found in section 4.6 of this report.

Table 2: Target and Achieved Sample by District and by Field Provider

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Ab-e Kamari	Badghis	CONTROL	336	291
Muqur	Badghis	SIKA-W	496	457
Qadis	Badghis	SIKA-W	496	466
Baghlan-e Jadid	Baghlan	SIKA-N	496	496
Doshi	Baghlan	CONTROL	336	323
Pul-e Khmri	Baghlan	SIKA-N	496	487
Balkh	Balkh	CCI-IOM	496	478
Chahar Bolak	Balkh	CCI-IOM	496	491
Chimtal	Balkh	CCI-IOM	496	490
Mazar-e Sharif	Balkh	CCI-IOM	496	488
Sholgarah	Balkh	CCI-IOM	464	452
Bala Boluk	Farah	SIKA-W	496	496
Farah	Farah	CONTROL	336	318
Khak-e Safayd	Farah	SIKA-W	480	477
Pusht-e Rod	Farah	SIKA-W	496	495
Andar	Ghazni	SIKA-E	336	334
Jaghatu	Ghazni	SIKA-E	448	420
Deh Yak	Ghazni	SIKA-E	336	327
Gelan	Ghazni	CCI-Creative	496	474
Khwajah Omari	Ghazni	SIKA-E	464	464
Muqer	Ghazni	CCI-Creative	496	495
Qarah Bagh	Ghazni	SIKA-E & CCI-Creative	480	467
Chaghcharan	Ghor	SIKA-W	448	408
Shahrak	Ghor	SIKA-W	368	333
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	Herat	SIKA-W	496	484
Pashtun Zarghun	Herat	SIKA-W	496	481
Shindand	Herat	SIKA-W	496	485
Garm Ser	Helmand	SIKA-S	336	332
Kajaki	Helmand	CCI-Creative	336	319
Lashkar Gah	Helmand	SIKA-S	496	491
Musa Qa'lah	Helmand	CCI-Creative	416	410
Nad Ali	Helmand	SIKA-S	496	495

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Nahr-e Saraj	Helmand	SIKA-S & CCI-Creative	480	472
Sangin	Helmand	CCI-Creative	400	397
Faizabad	Jowzjan	CCI-IOM	480	477
Khwajah Do Koh	Jowzjan	CCI-IOM	432	428
Qush Tepah	Jowzjan	CCI-IOM	336	327
Shibirghan	Jowzjan	CCI-IOM	496	493
Arghandab	Kandahar	SIKA-S	480	479
Daman	Kandahar	SIKA-S	480	480
Dand	Kandahar	CCI-Creative& KFZ	496	496
Maiwand	Kandahar	KFZ	512	509
Panjwai	Kandahar	CCI-Creative& KFZ	480	479
Spin Boldak	Kandahar	CCI-Creative	464	463
Zharay	Kandahar	CCI-Creative& KFZ	480	478
Shah Wali Kot	Kandahar	KFZ	496	439
Argistan	Kandahar	KFZ	400	400
Takhtapol	Kandahar	KFZ	320	320
Bak	Khost	CCI-Creative	496	496
Gurbuz	Khost	SIKA-E	496	493
Jaji Maidan	Khost	SIKA-E	416	414
Manduzai (Ismail Khel)	Khost	SIKA-E	496	488
Shamul (Dzadran)	Khost	CCI-Creative	416	416
Tanai	Khost	SIKA-E	496	493
Terayzai (Ali Sher)	Khost	CCI-Creative	496	495
Khas Kunar	Kunar	CCI-Creative	496	494
Marawarah	Kunar	CCI-Creative	336	336
Sar Kani	Kunar	CCI-Creative	352	352
Aliabad	Kunduz	SIKA-N	448	444
Chahar Darah	Kunduz	SIKA-N	496	453
Archi	Kunduz	SIKA-N	336	256
Imam Sahib	Kunduz	SIKA-N	496	461
Khanabad	Kunduz	SIKA-N	432	428
Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	Kunduz	SIKA-N	432	426
Baraki Barak	Logar	SIKA-E	336	335
Khoshi	Logar	SIKA-E	496	427
Muhammad Aghah	Logar	SIKA-E	496	495
Kang	Nimroz	SIKA-S	496	495
Zaranj	Nimroz	SIKA-S	496	494
Lajah Ahmad Khel	Paktiya	SIKA-E	352	352
Laja Mangel	Paktiya	SIKA-E	336	336
Dzadran	Paktiya	SIKA-E	336	336

District	Province	Program	Target	Achieved
Zurmat	Paktiya	SIKA-E	336	336
Ahmadabad	Paktiya	SIKA-E	448	446
Charikar	Parwan	CONTROL	336	287
Salang	Parwan	CONTROL	336	310
Aibak	Samangan	CONTROL	336	326
Darah-ye Suf ePain	Samangan	CCI-IOM	496	496
Faryroz Nakhchir	Samangan	CCI-IOM	368	360
Ruy Do Ab	Samangan	CCI-IOM	496	490
Hazrat eSultan	Samangan	CCI-IOM	496	481
Chorah	Uruzgan	SIKA-S	384	334
Deh Rawud	Uruzgan	SIKA-S	496	420
Khas Uruzgan	Uruzgan	CCI-Creative	496	495
Shahid eHasas	Uruzgan	CCI-Creative	464	462
Tarin Kot	Uruzgan	SIKA-S	494	457
Chak-e Wardak	Wardak	SIKA-E	496	496
Jalrayz	Wardak	SIKA-E	496	496
Nerkh	Wardak	SIKA-E	496	494
Sayyidabad	Wardak	SIKA-E	480	480
Qalat	Zabul	SIKA-S & CCI-Creative	496	496
Shah Joy	Zabul	SIKA-S	496	496
Tarneq wa Jaldak	Zabul	SIKA-S	480	471
<b>TOTALS</b>			<b>41486</b>	<b>40405</b>

\* The eight districts highlighted in grey were conducted entirely by Afghan Youth Consulting and the seven districts highlighted in blue were partially conducted by Afghan Youth Consulting.

## 2.1 Sampling methodology

The Wave 3 sampling was derived from a sample frame provided by MISTI to ACSOR Surveys. The sampling process was divided into four main steps:

### *Step One: Sampling Allocation by District*

Selection of districts for inclusion in the sample frame was driven primarily by stakeholder requests to MISTI. The preceding chart in the Sample Design section lists all districts selected for inclusion in the final sample frame and notes which province they are located in and which program(s) each district falls under. Although SIKA districts are all mutually exclusive and no district can fall under two different SIKA programs, the CCI and KFZ districts are not mutually exclusive. As such, some districts in Kandahar simultaneously fall under both the CCI and KFZ programs while other districts may fall under the CCI program and one of the SIKA programs. See Table Two above for a complete list of programs operating in each district included in the sample.

Sample size for each district was determined by MISTI in order to meet reporting needs for each program in

the final, aggregated data set. Of the 93 districts selected for inclusion in the Wave 3 sample frame:

- 1 was assigned 320 respondents
- 17 were assigned 336 respondents
- 2 were assigned 352 respondents
- 2 were assigned 368 respondents
- 1 was assigned 384 respondents
- 2 were assigned 400 respondents
- 3 were assigned 416 respondents
- 3 were assigned 432 respondents
- 4 were assigned 448 respondents
- 4 were assigned 464 respondents
- 10 were assigned 480 respondents
- 1 was assigned 494 respondents
- 42 were assigned 496 respondents
- 1 was assigned 512 respondents.

Targets for some districts had to be adjusted in field in some instances. A small number of sample points were initially evaluated as being secure enough for field work but destabilized after the initial assessment was made and before field work was to begin. A complete list of the 14 sample points where security required their elimination from the sample plan during field can be found in Appendix 2: Sample Points Not Visited.

No districts were replaced from the original sample frame. However, some districts were determined to be inaccessible to ACSOR interviewers due to safety concerns. ACSOR maintains an accessibility tracker to monitor the current status of each district in Afghanistan. This tracker is updated monthly as the security situation in Afghanistan changes frequently. As a result of ACSOR's inaccessibility assessment, the interviews in eight districts were conducted completely by AYC and another seven districts were interviewed using both ACSOR and AYC interviewers during the Wave 3 field work.

*Step Two: Primary Sampling Units (Settlements)*

After the districts were selected, MISTI selected the primary sampling units (in this case, villages within each district) to be sampled within each district. MISTI has created a master list of villages in Afghanistan by combining and cleaning six different lists of known villages: Yale POP\_MASTER, CSO AIMS Villages (provided by ACSOR to MISTI), USAID AID Village View, along with lists provided by the CCI field team, SIKAE field team and the MISTI GIS team. The villages were selected by the MISTI team based on which programs were being implemented (or were scheduled to have programs implemented in them in the future) by one of the USAID stabilization programs. Additionally, not all villages which were sampled in previous waves were included in the sample for Wave 3 so there is not an equal probability of selection for all villages in each district. It is important to note that the consequence of these sample decisions is that there is an unknown probability of selection for some settlements in the final sample frame which can undermine the assumptions of statistical calculations presented in this report.

MISTI also provided ACSOR with replacement villages for each district in the event that a particular village was deemed to be inaccessible due to transportation restrictions or other security concerns. In the event that a village needed to be replaced, a suitable replacement was selected from the list provided and approved by MISTI prior to fielding the survey in that district. In Wave 3, there were 426 sample points replaced. As there were two sample points per settlement (aside from one settlement where there were four), this means there were 212 settlements replaced in Wave 3. A complete list of replacements by sample point, province, district and settlement can be found in Appendix 1: Sample Points Replaced.

One notable difference in the replacement process between Waves 1 and 2 and the process in Wave 3 was that in previous waves of research, ACSOR was provided with a list of acceptable replacement villages for each district and made replacements accordingly when a particular village was reported to be inaccessible. In Wave 3, ACSOR worked closely with the MISTI team to first analyze the original village selection and then notified the MISTI team when a village from the initial sample draw was determined to be inaccessible. MISTI then provided a specific replacement for each village so as to ensure the replacement resembled the originally selected village as closely as possible. This process often took several rounds of review between ACSOR and MISTI to create the final sample plans which were sent to field.

Each selected village was then assigned two sample points of 8 interviews each, one for male interviews and one for female interviews. Due to the cultural norms in Afghanistan, it is necessary to assign female interviewers to sample points where they conduct interviews only with female respondents and assign male interviewers to conduct interviews only with male respondents.

In some instances, districts were determined to be accessible only to male interviewers at the time of the field work. This information is also tracked monthly by ACSOR for every district across the country and these assessments of gender accessibility change over time. For instances when a district or village was determined to be accessible only to male interviewers, both sample points in the village were assigned to male interviewers and no females were sampled in those districts or villages.

#### *Step Three: Household Selection*

For ACSOR: Households were selected for participation in the survey by interviewers conducting a systematized random walk within the village to which they were assigned. In order to further randomize household selection within sample points, each sample point was randomly pre assigned one of five geographic starting points within the village: north, south, east, west and center. This instructed each interviewer to start their random walk at the north, south, east, west or central most location within each village in order to ensure that locations directly surrounding common, prevalent landmarks (such as mosques, schools or markets) within villages were not oversampled.

For AYC: Due to the insecure nature of the areas they were assigned, supervisors instructed the interviewers on where the safest locations were in the selected sample points. The interviewers followed the supervisors' advice to select households.

#### *Step Four: Respondent Selection*

For ACSOR: Interviewers used a Kish grid to select individual respondents from households. Male interviewers listed all males 18 years of age or older living in the household on the Kish grid within each questionnaire and female interviewers listed all females 18 years of age or older living in the household.

For AYC: Interviewers were allowed to select any member of the household who was willing to participate in order to expedite fieldwork and to more easily abide by the cultural norms in Afghanistan. Heads of the household were most commonly interviewed as this creates the least amount of tension when interviewers visit households in less secure areas.

## **2.2 Weighting**

Districts were selected for inclusion in the sample based on the evaluation needs of the various programs being implemented and evaluated. The sample was never intended to be a representative sample of all of Afghanistan. Due to this sampling process for the MISTI Wave 3 survey and the lack of reliable demographic and population data available in Afghanistan at the settlement level, there are no weights used on these data.

## **2.3 Margin of Error and Design Effect**

The estimated design effect for the each district was computed by estimating a weighted average of the design effects for the responses to Q1: *Generally speaking, do you think things in [name the district] today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?* Taking into account the cluster design, the estimated design effect for each district is stated in the table below.

It must be noted that probability of selection weights were not used in the calculation of these estimates, a simple random sample equal probability of selection self weighting design is assumed. The reported margins of error and design effects for the districts that were sampled or partially sampled using non-probability methods (previously noted in Table 2) are reported as if the sampling was identical to the probability method districts for comparative purposes. These districts are highlighted in grey in Table 3.

It must also be noted that the limitations inherent to the chosen sampling methodology discussed throughout section 2.1 impact not only the ability to project results to the overall populations sampled but also impacts the ability to calculate statistically meaningful margins of error and design effects for each sample. As such, the following margins of error and design effects presented in Table 3 and Table 4 are for reference only as all of the calculations assume a probability sample. MISTI Wave 3 is not truly a probability sample either at the district or program levels due to the selection process employed.

Table 3: District Design Effect and Margin of Error

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Ab-e Kamari	2.31	0.04	291	7.81%	11.86%
Ahmadabad	2.62	0.03	446	6.15%	9.96%
Aliabad	2.07	0.03	444	5.99%	8.61%
Andar	2.38	0.04	334	7.54%	11.65%
Archi	3.08	0.05	256	9.18%	16.11%
Arghandab (1)	2.21	0.03	479	5.85%	8.69%
Arghistan	3.37	0.04	400	8.00%	14.68%
Aybak	1.75	0.03	326	6.55%	8.67%
Baghlani Jadid	1.71	0.02	496	4.70%	6.14%
Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	2.03	0.03	420	5.86%	8.34%
Bak	1.51	0.02	496	4.53%	5.57%
Bala Boluk	2.60	0.03	496	6.25%	10.07%
Balkh	1.90	0.03	478	5.36%	7.39%
Baraki Barak	2.51	0.03	335	6.43%	10.19%
Chaghcharan	1.56	0.03	408	5.22%	6.53%
Chahar Bolak	1.37	0.02	491	4.37%	5.12%
Chahar Darah	2.41	0.03	453	6.44%	10.00%
Chak-e Wardak	2.13	0.03	496	5.79%	8.45%
Charikar	3.23	0.05	287	8.93%	16.07%
Chimtal	1.71	0.02	490	4.62%	6.05%
Chorah	2.43	0.04	334	7.27%	11.33%
Daman	2.05	0.03	480	5.76%	8.26%
Dand	2.08	0.03	496	5.64%	8.14%
Dara-ye Suf-e Pa'in	2.35	0.03	496	6.00%	9.20%
Deh Rawud	2.19	0.03	420	5.61%	8.31%
Deh Yak	3.13	0.04	327	8.57%	15.16%
Doshi	0.91	0.02	323	4.27%	4.07%
Dzadran	2.20	0.03	336	6.83%	10.14%
Faizabad (2)	2.43	0.03	477	5.98%	9.32%
Farah	2.27	0.04	318	7.09%	10.67%
Fayroz Nakhchir	2.21	0.04	360	7.04%	10.46%
Garmser	2.60	0.04	332	7.87%	12.69%
Gelan	3.52	0.04	474	7.16%	13.43%
Gurbuz	1.17	0.02	493	4.10%	4.44%
Hazrat-e Sultan	1.95	0.03	481	5.64%	7.86%
Imam Sahib	2.48	0.03	461	6.38%	10.03%
Jaji Maidan	0.71	0.02	414	3.31%	2.79%

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Jalrayz	1.44	0.02	496	4.59%	5.51%
Kajaki	4.25	0.05	319	9.99%	20.59%
Kang	2.24	0.03	495	5.73%	8.57%
Khak-e-Safayd	2.89	0.03	477	6.50%	11.06%
Khanabad	1.70	0.03	428	5.23%	6.83%
Khas Kunar	2.57	0.03	494	6.35%	10.18%
Khas Uruzgan	2.41	0.03	495	5.95%	9.24%
Khoshi	5.96	0.05	427	10.23%	24.98%
Khwajah Do Koh	2.04	0.03	428	5.83%	8.34%
Khwajah Omari	1.87	0.03	464	5.12%	7.00%
Kunduz	1.67	0.03	426	5.17%	6.70%
Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	1.71	0.02	484	4.64%	6.07%
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	1.50	0.03	352	5.13%	6.27%
Lajah-Mangal	1.94	0.03	336	5.83%	8.12%
Lashkar Gah	2.26	0.03	491	5.99%	9.00%
Maiwand	3.27	0.04	509	7.01%	12.68%
Manduzai (Isma il Khel)	1.51	0.02	488	4.65%	5.71%
Marawarah	3.39	0.05	336	8.85%	16.29%
Mazar-e Sharif	1.91	0.03	488	5.57%	7.70%
Muhammad Aghah	2.86	0.03	495	6.40%	10.82%
Muqer	3.45	0.04	495	7.13%	13.25%
Muqur	4.09	0.04	457	8.40%	17.00%
Musa Qal'ah	2.81	0.03	410	6.70%	11.24%
Nad 'Ali	2.70	0.03	495	6.12%	10.04%
Nahr-e Saraj	2.68	0.03	472	5.85%	9.59%
Nerkh	2.88	0.03	494	6.52%	11.06%
Panjwa'i	1.95	0.03	479	5.55%	7.76%
Pashtun Zarghun	2.17	0.03	481	5.43%	8.01%
Pul-e Khumri	0.93	0.02	487	3.60%	3.47%
Pusht-e Rod	2.63	0.03	495	6.34%	10.29%
Qadis	2.09	0.03	466	5.82%	8.42%
Qalat	1.94	0.03	496	5.23%	7.28%
Qarah Bagh (1)	2.11	0.03	467	5.75%	8.35%
Qush Tepah	0.98	0.02	327	4.87%	4.83%
Ruy Do Ab	2.43	0.03	490	6.30%	9.83%
Salang	1.33	0.03	310	4.93%	5.70%
Sangin	3.39	0.04	397	8.32%	15.32%
Sar Kani	1.69	0.03	352	6.14%	7.97%
Sayyidabad	1.40	0.03	480	4.96%	5.88%

District	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
Shah Joy	1.93	0.03	496	5.13%	7.13%
Shah Wali Kot	2.84	0.04	439	7.08%	11.94%
Shahid-e Hasas	2.02	0.03	462	5.56%	7.91%
Shahrak	1.08	0.02	333	4.84%	5.03%
Shamul (Dzadran)	2.03	0.03	416	5.92%	8.43%
Shibirghan	2.77	0.03	493	6.31%	10.49%
Shindand	3.51	0.04	485	7.36%	13.80%
Sholgarah	1.35	0.02	452	4.55%	5.28%
Spin Boldak	2.26	0.03	463	6.03%	9.07%
Takhtapol	1.79	0.03	320	6.39%	8.55%
Tanai	1.10	0.02	493	3.97%	4.17%
Tarin Kot	2.47	0.03	457	6.24%	9.81%
Tarnak wa Jaldak	2.25	0.03	471	6.02%	9.02%
Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	2.05	0.03	495	5.48%	7.84%
Zaranj	1.56	0.02	494	4.80%	6.00%
Zharay	2.98	0.04	478	6.86%	11.85%
Zurmat	2.65	0.04	336	8.23%	13.40%

Design effect is also estimated by program. Each program was treated as an independent sample, disproportionately stratified by the selected districts, and clustered by settlement. The non-probability districts were included in this estimation as if they were sampled identical to the probability method districts.

Table 4: Program Design Effect and Margin of Error

Program	Design Effect	Standard Error	Sample Size	Margin of Error	Complex Margin of Error
SIKA North	2.03	0.01	3451	2.05%	2.92%
SIKA South	3.86	0.01	6412	2.09%	4.11%
SIKA East	2.85	0.01	8929	1.51%	2.55%
SIKA West	2.88	0.01	4582	2.08%	3.54%
CCI - Creative	3.45	0.01	8992	1.66%	3.09%
CCI - IOM	2.57	0.01	5951	1.74%	2.79%
KFZ	2.76	0.01	3121	2.59%	4.30%

## III. FIELD IMPLEMENTATION

### 3.1 Contact Procedures

For those interviews conducted by ACSOR, maps and available information about the settlements were used to identify a pre-assigned starting point (north, south, east, west or center) for random walks where the interviews were conducted. Interview teams used a random route procedure to select households.

In urban areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer headed in the assigned direction and stopped at the 2<sup>nd</sup> street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route. The first contacted household was pre-assigned as either the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> house on the right from the beginning of the street. From then on, the selected household was each 3<sup>rd</sup> inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer's route. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine was each 5<sup>th</sup> apartment. In buildings with more than one household, no more than two households were interviewed.

In rural areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer headed in the assigned direction. If they started in the north, south, east or west end of the village, they began walking toward the center of the village; if they started at the center, they headed in a randomly assigned direction. The first contacted household was pre-assigned as either the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> house on the right from the beginning of the street. From then on, the selected household was each 3<sup>rd</sup> inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer's route. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall were treated like detached houses, counting them counter-clock-wise from the gate to the compound.

For those interviews done by AYC, due to the insecure nature of the areas they were assigned, supervisors instructed the interviewers on where the safest locations were in the selected sample points. The interviewers followed the supervisors' advice to select households.

For interviews done by ACSOR, after selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and ages in descending order. Male interviewers listed all male household member living in the household who were 18 years of age or older and female interviewers listed all females 18 years of age or older.

Under no circumstances were ACSOR interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after two call-backs, the interviewer then moved on to the next household according to the random walk.

For those interviews done by AYC, interviewers were allowed to select any member of the household who was willing to participate in order to speed the fieldwork up and to more easily abide by the cultural norms in Afghanistan. Heads of the household were most commonly interviewed as this creates the least amount of tension when interviewers visit households in less secure areas.

Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the designated respondent. These call-backs are made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period, in order to provide a broader schedule in which to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force has had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substitution in many rural areas.

In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some call-backs, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt.\*

- First attempt = 98.8%
- Second attempt = 1.1%
- Third attempt = 0.1%

\*Due to the high rate of unemployment, the nature of rural life which makes it common that someone is always present in the household, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan.

### 3.2 Sample Disposition

The following tables contain the sample dispositions (Table 5) and resulting disposition rates (Table 6) for the MISTI Wave 3 survey. These figures combine the sample dispositions reported from the field for both the ACSOR and AYC field teams. As explained in section 3.2, variations exist in sampling methodologies between these two field teams, however the same disposition codes were used for both teams.

For the purposes of reporting disposition totals and the subsequent rate calculations, the total number of completed interviews includes all interviews received from the field (N=41,486). There are 1,081 interviews included in the completed interviews total which were later deleted for quality control purposes (see section 4.6). The final data set used for analysis contains only those 40,405 interviews which passed all of the quality control tests.

We use AAPOR's standard reporting rates when calculating the dispositions presented in this report. AAPOR offers a variety of rates to choose from. For face-to-face interviewing in Afghanistan, we have determined that the most logical rates to use are Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 1, Refusal Rate 2 and Contact Rate 2. The formulas for each calculation are provided in Table 6.

Table 5: Disposition Totals

MISTI Wave 3 Sample Disposition			
ACSOR Code	AAPOR Code	Description	Count
<b>Completed Interviews</b>			
1	1.0/1.10	Interview was successfully completed	41486
<b>Partial Interviews</b>			
10	1.200	During interview, selected respondent refused (General)	125
11	1.200	During interview, selected respondent was not feeling informed to answer the questions	28
12	1.200	During interview, selected respondent got angry because of a question	20

<b>MISTI Wave 3 Sample Disposition</b>			
<b>ACSOR Code</b>	<b>AAPOR Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Count</b>
13	1.200	During interview, selected respondent preferred head of household be interviewed	24
14	1.2	During interview, selected respondent was in a hurry/no time	45
		<b>Total Partials</b>	242
<b>Unknown Eligibility</b>			
20	3.130	No answer at door	1030
21	3.200	No adults (18+) after three visits	809
22	3.170	Unable to access building or house	268
23	3.210	Outright refusal at the door	960
		<b>Total Unknown Household</b>	3066
<b>Non-Contacts</b>			
24	2.210	Selected respondent never available for interview	430
25	2.250	Selected respondent long-term absence for the fieldwork period	606
		<b>Total Non-contacts</b>	1036
<b>Others</b>			
26	2.300	Selected respondent not allowed to participate in the survey	99
35	2.310	Selected respondent deceased	39
36	2.320	Selected respondent physically or mentally unable to complete the interview	39
37	2.332	Selected respondent unable to complete interview in languages available	4
		<b>Total Others</b>	181
<b>Refusals</b>			
30	2.11	Selected respondent refuses (General)	396
31	2.11	Selected respondent not feeling informed to answer the questions	244
32	2.11	Selected respondent got angry because of the subject matter	63
33	2.11	Selected respondent prefers head of household to be interviewed	307
34	2.11	Selected respondent in a hurry/no time	312
		<b>Total Refusals</b>	1322
<b>Not Eligible</b>			
40	4.7	Does not meet screening criteria/not eligible for interview	3
41	4.500	Non-residential (business)/abandoned home	993
		<b>Total Not Eligible</b>	996
<b>Total</b>		<b>Total Sampled Households</b>	48331

Table 6: Final Disposition Rates

<b>DISPOSITION RATES</b>		
<b>RATE</b>	<b>FORMULA/CALCULATION</b>	<b>PERCENT</b>
Value for e	estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible	0.978
Response Rate 3	$I / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$	87.77%
Cooperation Rate 1	$I / (I+P+R)$	95.96%
Refusal Rate 2	$R / (I+P)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$	2.80%

### 3.3 Field Outcomes

*Each ACSOR supervisor was asked to report any problems they encountered in the field while implementing the MISTI Wave 3 project to the ACSOR field management team in Kabul. Their reports are summarized here:*

#### **Province: Parwan**

The training was conducted on November 17, 2013 in Charikar city of this province. The field work started on November 18<sup>th</sup> in the Salang area and then we started the field work on the 21<sup>st</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> of November in Charikar city.

22 villages have been back checked and 4 other villages were controlled by the client. No difficulties or problems have been reported from the field. There were good security conditions during the field work.

#### **Province: Herat**

Training for this project was conducted on the same day for both male and female interviewers in Herat city. Mirwais, the ACSOR field manager, was also present during the training session. We conducted the interviews in Kesh Robat Sangi district and then started the field work in Pakhtun Zarghon and Shindand districts and completed the field work on November 13, 2013. We have done some back checks and controls as well.

No problems or difficulties have been reported from the mentioned districts during the field work.

#### **Province: Zabul**

The training for MISTI project was conducted on December 29, 2013. A total of 38 male and female interviewers participated in the training. There are still security problems in Zabul; US forces are still searching houses and killing innocent people.

The Taliban commander of the Trank and Jaldak district was killed in Kuwitta in Pakistan. The new commander and the members of his group came back to the district. He is a bad person; that's why he would not let people enter the district who are working for the government or other offices. That's why it delayed the field work in this district.

#### **Province: Kunduz**

The training was held for both male and female interviewers in Kunduz on November 22, 2013. The field work started right after the training. A major incident was reported in this province. A car that was taking the interviewers to the field came under the attack from the anti-government elements in the Qawi Guzar area. In the incident, a female interviewer was injured and captured by the gunmen. After some time, ANSF intervened and rescued the female interviewer. They took her to the hospital. That was a big problem we faced in this province during the MISTI field work. The female team wasn't able to visit the same area again, so that's why we do not have any GPS from these areas.

**Province: Kandahar**

We conducted the training for male interviewers on December 20, 2013 and for female interviewers on December 21, 2013. The trainings went very nicely and we also did mock interviews in the Kandahar office. The trainings were conducted in the presence of ACSOR field manager Habiburehman Ghafoori. No problems or difficulties have been reported in the field report. There were some road problems in Spinboldak. We waited for some period to interview these villages.

There were also 5 inaccessible villages in Arghistan district, because the Taliban control these areas and it's difficult for the field team to go and conduct their interviews.

**Province: Helmand**

The supervisor reported some security problems that made the area inaccessible. These security problems were in Sangin, Musa Qala and Nehri Saraj districts. The areas and villages where we were supposed to conduct interviews in was controlled by the Taliban. That's why it was difficult for the field team to go and conduct the interviews.

**Province: Khost**

We conducted the training on November 18, 2013 in Khost province. There were security problems in Gorbuz district and we couldn't conduct all of the interviews on time, but once the situation got better we completed the interviews in this district. Other than this district, we were not faced with any problems in the rest of the districts.

Unfortunately, we had one inaccessible village in Gurbuz( #SP 9105-9106) and Jaji Maidan ( 9145-9146)of Khost province. We were not able to conduct the interviews in these villages due to bad security conditions.

**Province: Ghazni**

We conducted the training on November 18, 2013. There were 34 male and 15 female interviewers present for the training. We started the field work on November 19<sup>th</sup> in Khwaja Omari district and completed the field work on December 30<sup>th</sup>. There were some security problems in some of the districts that prevented the teams from completing the field work on time.

# SP 6099, 6117, 6116 and 6121 are inaccessible in Ghazni- Deh Yak. The supervisor reported that the road to the mentioned sampling points was blocked due to roadside mines and there was also fighting between the ANSF and the Taliban; that's why these problems prevented our teams from conducting the field work in these sampling points, even when the fighting finished.

There were also some transportation and road problems that made the field work slow, especially in Deh Yak district.

**Province: Logar**

The training was conducted on December 23, 2013 in the ACSOR office in Logar. The training was very useful and we discussed each and every question. After that we distributed the packs to the interviewers. No problems or difficulties were reported during the field period.

**Province: Baghlan**

We held the training on November 16, 2013. We discussed all of the questions and the problems that we had in the previous wave.

There was a little bit of insecurity in Baghlan. The Taliban were commuting into the villages and their number is increasing day by day. The people of Baghlan have a lot of problems with them. People say that they cannot come out of their houses during the night because the Taliban are beating people when they see them late at night out of their houses.

Another case which was reported from the field was that the government forces found the dead body of the head of the Rural Development Directorate. A girl and a boy who wanted to escape and get married and were also killed by the people of village.

**Province: Farah**

We held the training on November 17, 2013. The training was very useful and we discussed a lot of important things during the training. We completed the field work on December 22<sup>nd</sup>. There were some security problems during the field period. A road side mine exploded that killed 2 students and injured 3 others.

**Province: Wardak**

There were some security issues in Wardak. Three insurgents were killed in a drone attack in Chak district.

**Province: Ghor**

The training was held in this province on November 15, 2013 in the presence of ACSOR field manager Qurban Shah. #SPs 31075, 31076, 31089, 31090, 31097 and 31098 of Shahrak were inaccessible for our team because of military operations, members of our team waited for few days, but the condition did not change.

**Province: Uruzgan**

No problems or difficulties have been reported from Uruzgan province.

**Province: Balkh**

The training was held in presence of ACSOR field manager Qurban Shah in the Mazar office. A representative from the MISTI office was also present during the training and he was also present during the back check process.

There are some villages that became inaccessible in Chimtal district of Balkh, because ISAF spread some leaflets that said if people see insurgents and Taliban activities in the area, they should contact ISAF and report them. Our teams tried hard to find a solution to this problem but they were not able to conduct the interviews.

**Province: Kunar**

No problems or difficulties have been reported from the field.

**Province: Badghis**

As supervisor reported the sampling points #23041 & 23042 Ab Kamari district of Badghis were not found and could not be conducted.

**Province: Samangan**

There was a heavy snow fall in Do Ab district. We waited for a long period to reach to the villages in this district. There were also some other transportation problems in some other districts and villages in this province, especially in Roy Do Ab district.

**Province: Paktia**

The field work in Paktia province was delayed because of the field for two additional projects. That's why it delayed the field work for MISTI in this province.

Appendix 3 lists newsworthy events that happened in the provinces during the field period.

## IV. QUALITY CONTROL

### 4.1 Field Team Composition

For the MISTI Wave 3 project, ACSOR used 21 supervisors and 21 assistant supervisors to oversee field work in 21 provinces. A description of the field team composition for both ACSOR and AYC is summarized in the following two tables:

Table 6: Description of Field Team (ACSOR)

	Female	Male	Total
Number of female/male interviewers	505	804	1309
Number of interviewers previously used in ACSOR/D3 project	488	765	1253
Number of interviewers new to a ACSOR/D3 project	17	39	56

Table 7: Description of Field Team (AYC)

	Female	Male	Total
Number of female/male interviewers	0	41	41
Number of interviewers previously used in MISTI fieldwork	0	41	41
Number of interviewers new to MISTI fieldwork	0	0	0

### 4.2 Field Level Quality Control

The quality of the data is assured during the field period by the following control procedures applied in various stages.

1. After the delivery of the questionnaires from field, the completed questionnaires were checked for proper administration as well as proper household and respondent selection.
2. Supervisors and assistant supervisors observed interviewers' work during field.
3. When there was no opportunity for direct supervision, a supervisor and assistant supervisor revisited selected houses after the completion of interviews or called back, if there was a working telephone at the household. The issues verified during in person back-checks were proper household and respondent selection, as well as the correct recording of answers to three randomly selected questions from the main body of the questionnaire.

At the end of the three procedures, 33% of the completed questionnaires were controlled by ACSOR and AYC supervisory staff (n=13,491); using the following methods:

- Direct supervision during interview (2%)
- Back-checked in person by supervisor (30%)
- Back-check in person or by telephone by supervisory team (1%)

Table 8 summarizes the interviews which were quality controlled in the field by district, broken down by the method through which they were back checked:

Table 8: Back Checks by District

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-check in person by supervisor	Back-check from the central office	Total Back Checked	Percent Back Checked
40 Charikar	9	78	0	87	26%
48 Salang	7	45	0	52	15%
52 Sayyidabad	0	134	0	134	28%
53 Chak-e Wardak	0	168	0	168	34%
54 Nerkh	39	191	0	230	46%
55 Jalrayz	0	158	0	158	32%
61 Baraki Barak	66	259	0	325	97%
62 Muhammad Aghah	0	142	0	142	29%
65 Khoshi	13	214	92	319	64%
68 Qarah Bagh	0	160	0	160	33%
69 Andar	72	258	0	330	98%
73 Gelan	0	188	0	188	38%
74 Muqer	0	183	0	183	37%
75 Deh Yak	0	110	0	110	33%
78 Bahram-e Shahid (Jaghatu)	0	60	0	60	13%
83 Khwajah 'Omari	0	65	0	65	14%
105 Zurmat	0	334	0	334	99%
110 Lajah - Ahmad Khel	0	85	0	85	24%
111 Dzadran	72	214	0	286	85%
113 Ahmadabad	0	113	0	113	25%
118 Tanai	0	140	0	140	28%
119 Manduzai (Isma'il Khel)	0	132	0	132	27%
120 Terayzai ('Ali Sher)	0	89	0	89	18%
123 Gurbuz	0	127	0	127	26%
125 Jaji Maidan	0	130	0	130	31%
126 Bak	0	89	0	89	18%
127 Shamul (Dzadran)	0	92	0	92	22%
153 Khas Kunar	0	147	0	147	30%
160 Sar Kani	0	102	0	102	29%
162 Marawarah	0	104	0	104	31%
224 Pul-e Khumri	0	150	0	150	30%
225 Baghlan-e Jadid	52	164	0	216	44%
226 Doshi	0	101	0	101	30%
239 Imam Sahib	13	220	44	277	56%
240 Kunduz	0	140	0	140	32%

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-check in person by supervisor	Back-check from the central office	Total Back Checked	Percent Back Checked
241 Khanabad	0	116	15	131	30%
242 Archi	163	144	20	327	97%
243 Chahar Darah	32	277	20	329	66%
245 Aliabad	0	148	0	148	33%
246 Aibak	0	113	0	113	34%
247 Darah-ye Suf-e Pa'in	3	137	0	140	28%
249 Ruy Do Ab	0	131	0	131	26%
250 Hazrat-e Sultan	0	145	0	145	29%
252 Fayroz Nakhchir	0	122	0	122	33%
253 Mazar-e Sharif	0	98	0	98	20%
254 Balkh	0	89	0	89	18%
255 Sholgarah	0	97	0	97	21%
257 Chimtal	0	92	0	92	19%
258 Chahar Bolak	0	82	0	82	17%
268 Shibirghan	2	119	0	121	24%
271 Faizabad	0	92	0	92	19%
275 Khwajah Do Koh	0	88	0	88	20%
276 Qush Tepah	56	112	0	168	50%
301 Qadis	0	119	0	119	24%
303 Ab-e Kamari	0	81	0	81	24%
306 Muqur	23	129	10	162	33%
309 Shindand	18	137	0	155	31%
311 Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	6	120	10	136	27%
312 Pashtun Zarghun	6	147	0	153	31%
323 Farah	0	89	0	89	26%
324 Bala Boluk	0	158	0	158	32%
327 Pusht-e Rod	0	102	0	102	21%
330 Khak-e Safayd	0	151	0	151	31%
335 Zaranj	4	123	0	127	26%
338 Kang	0	114	0	114	23%
339 Nad 'Ali	0	143	0	143	29%
340 Nahr-e Saraj	0	150	0	150	31%
342 Garm Ser	0	105	0	105	31%
344 Kajaki	0	92	0	92	27%
345 Lashkar Gah	0	84	50	134	27%
346 Sangin	0	125	0	125	31%
347 Musa Qal'ah	0	130	0	130	31%
353 Spin Boldak	0	136	0	136	29%

District (Code and Name)	Direct supervision during interview	Back-check in person by supervisor	Back-check from the central office	Total Back Checked	Percent Back Checked
354 Panjwa'i	0	145	0	145	30%
355 Zharay	0	118	0	118	25%
356 Arghandab	0	141	0	141	29%
357 Maiwand	0	131	0	131	26%
358 Shah Wali Kot	55	245	0	300	60%
359 Daman	0	142	0	142	30%
360 Arghistan	0	107	0	107	27%
368 Shah Joy	0	149	0	149	30%
373 Qalat	0	147	0	147	30%
376 Tarnek wa Jaldak	86	25	0	111	23%
379 Tarin Kot	0	152	0	152	31%
380 Chorah	16	118	0	134	35%
381 Khas Uruzgan	0	142	0	142	29%
382 Shahid-e Hasas	1	145	0	146	31%
383 Deh Rawud	0	149	0	149	30%
384 Chaghcharan	0	135	0	135	30%
388 Shahrak	0	117	0	117	32%
418 Dand	0	141	20	161	32%
422 Takhtapol	0	101	0	101	32%
424 Laja Mangel	0	123	0	123	37%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>814</b>	<b>12396</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>13491</b>	<b>33%</b>

### 4.3 Independent Field Validation

As an additional layer of quality control, in Wave 2 the MISTI client team developed an independent team to validate the field work throughout the field period. This process was similarly repeated throughout the Wave 3 field period. This team consisted of independent, third party monitors who randomly selected sample points for validations. The independent field monitors communicated with the ACSOR field supervisors to determine when and where interviews were to take place. Without informing the ACSOR team, the monitor would randomly select a sample point for validation. The interviewer would be notified by 0700 on the day they were planning to visit a location for interviewing that a monitor would be observing their work that day. The monitor and the interviewer would then arrange to meet within that sample point prior to the start of the first household selection. The monitor would validate whether:

- 1) Interviews are being conducted in the correct location
- 2) Random walk procedures were being followed as per the directions given during training
- 3) In some instances, validators were also able to directly observe some interviews to ensure proper interviewing protocols were being followed

Appendix 4 contains the Wave 3 Validation Protocols including a complete a list of differences in the Wave 2 and Wave 3 validation process, the training instructions used to inform the field teams of the process and the validation form used by the monitors in the field.

The following list shows the 309 sample points which were conducted by ACSOR interviewers and successfully validated by the independent validation team:

*Table 9: Validated ACSOR Sample Points*

<b>ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI</b>		
5107 TAJ KHAN QALA	18043 SAMAR QANDEYAN	28049 SAYIDAN KALACHA (2)
5119 LASHKARI KHAIL	18047 RAOUF MALIK	28056 MARANJAN
5133 AHMAD ZAI QALA	18055 HAJI KOT	28064 SAR JAKAN
5141 SOR KARAIZ	18057 KASHKAK	28065 KUCHNI KARAIZ
5145 NAZIR KALA	18063 NAUWARID (2)	28067 HIJRAN KALAY
5147 DAHI MANKA	18069 AB FROSH ARAB HA	28070 AHZAM KALAY
6047 SORKH DAHI (1)	18075 DARGHAN	28071 SPIN WAYA
6049 GODALI ALAMAJID	18087 MISGAR ZHANGORI	28075 SAHIB ZADA KALACHA
6050 GODALI ALAMAJID	18095 NOWARID QAZEL QALA	28082 NAWI DAHI (1)
6101 RABATE KUHNA	18107 SABZIKAR	28095 MANDISYAR
6103 BAR TASAN	18145 CHAMTAL	28105 MURGHANKICHA
6135 TASAN	18180 FOLADA KHALCHE	28108 ALI ABAD
6203 GUZARI GOBI	18185 PALO	28112 GARI KALAY
6205 KHAYRABAD	18227 KUSHANIHAH PANJSHIRI	28114 ANZIRGAY
6207 CHAHAR DIWALI PAYIN	18245 ALI CHAPAN SARIPUL SEMENTI	28124 PIR PAYMAL
6215 QALA NOW BALA	18247 ALI CHAPAN PUSHTI JOY	28127 MURGHAN
6219 NO BURJA	18271 NOW ABAD	28129 KOHE NEGAR DEH
6221 QOULA	18275 QESHLAQ PAHEN	28131 KOKARAN
9021	18281 SAR SANG	28134 SARPUZA
9029	18289 WAHDAT ABAD	28140 NOW DIH
9039	18303 QASHIM SAI	28144 ACHIKZAY QALACHA
9049	18305 TABAYQ KANGORI	28150 PUL QASIM
9059	19001 SHAREKYAR	28153 MUNARA
9243	19003 TAH HAQAN	28157 EJARAB
9251	19005 ZAHAR ABHI AQMAZAR	28171 MIRWAIS MINA
9252	19007 CHOUGHI	28176 CHAWNAY (Agha Sahib Kocha)
9254	19009 QOCHINAL JOY KARAIZ	28190 KHOGYANI
9255	19013 SAMANGAN (AYBAK)	28191 EASHQ ABAD
9277	19023 TAKHT-I-RUSTAM	28201 CHAHEL GAZI
9279	19029 KOHNNA AIBAK	28202 CHAHEL GAZI
9285	19037 DARA-E-ZHOWANDON PASS KANDA	28211 LOY KARAIZ

<b>ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI</b>		
9353	19039 HAZAR QADOQ	28212 LOY KARAIZ
9359	19053	28256 ASKICHA
9369	19054	28268 ZANGABAD
9373	19059	28278 SAYYID RUSTAM
9377	19065	28281 HAJI KAKAR
9395	19071	28282 HAJI KAKAR
9405	19107	28284 TOLOKAN
12004 LAGHMANO VILLAGE	19109	28285 BILANDI
12006 MARYAM BAGH	19111	28291 SALAWAT SUFLA
12008 TILAYI BANDA	19113	28293 NAKHONAY
12009 MALAKANO BANDA	19115	28294 NAKHONAY
12012 KOLALAN	19123	28299 KAMP MAHAJERIN MANDO ZAI
12013 JABAI KALAI	19131	28302 BALUCHAN
12015 ZARGARAN	19133	28306 ZA'FARANZI
12018 MANGOWAL	19159	28365 MIR HAZAR
12025 KOZA ARAZI	19169	28368 SENJARAY
12032 KOZ SARAI	19171	28371 ABDUL GHANI SANZARI
12034 TANAR	19173	28373 ABDUL GHANI SANZARI
12037 KALAY GARAM	19179	28376 NOOR MOHAMMAD KHAN FAZEL KALAY
12040 SHAIKHANO KALAY	19181	28382 MARKAZ WOLUSWALLY
12044 LOTAN	19193	28389 WAZER KALAY
12047 CHENCHEN	19204	28394 MULLHYAN
12049 ZOR KUNAR	24071 DAHI HAROON	28403 AGHAYGUL
12053 BAHR ABAD	24073 FASHKAN	28408 GHOLAM HASANKHAN
12055 AHANGARAN	24077 GUL MIR	28409 BEYABANAK
12067 ISARA DAG	24087 SEYA GAR	28412 GHUNDEY KALAY
12068 ISARA DAG	24091 KUSHK SYAIRWAN	28423 SALIM KARAIZ
12069 SAIDABAD	24093 LANGAR KHOJA	28426 Aka Khil
12070 SAIDABAD	24113 MIR ABAD SUFLA	28432 Ghi,Nabi
12075 LAHOR KALAY	24119 QALB YUSUF	28442 Khuday Noor
12076 LAHOR KALAY	24123 PARENJAN	29001
12085 SARYEE DAG	24141 FAKHIR ABAD SUFLA	29002
12086 SARYEE DAG	24143 SARAYAK	29003
12095 RASHID KALAY	24145 DAILRAG WASATI	29004
12096 RASHID KALAY	24151 MEYAN ROADI SUFLA	29007
12099 LOYA BACHA	24153 KARAIZ GARJE	29008
12100 LOYA BACHA	24155 TAHT BAZAR	29019
12101 KUMAKI BACHE	27025 LAKRAI (1)	29020
12109 TANGO	27041 HAJI NIHMATULLAH	29021

<b>ACSOR Sample Points Validated by MISTI</b>		
12110 TANGO	27055 KHAK JAHANOM	29022
12111 CHENGAY	27073 MAMON ZAE	29031
12112 CHENGAY	27075 KAJAKI HULYA	29032
12119 BARA BEALA	27077 KAMP KAJAKI	29039
12120 BARA BEALA	27083 ABDAR	29040
12129 NAWABAD	27161 SHARAGA	29063 KHAN KHEL KALAY
12130 NAWABAD	27162 SHARAGA	29064 KHAN KHEL KALAY
12137 SANGAR	27163 LASHKARAK	29065 MOHAMMAD ALI KALAY
12138 SANGAR	27164 LASHKARAK	29066 MOHAMMAD ALI KALAY
12139 BABURA	27187 MARKAZI WOLLUSWALY	29067 JAHANGIR KALAY
12140 BABURA	27191 DAHI ZOR HULYA	29069 KHAN KALAY (1)
12141 ADRAGAM	27273 SHAKH POPAL ZAI	29075 MANDA KALAY
12142 ADRAGAM	27281 LANGAR SHAH	29076 MANDA KALAY
12143 DONA'I	27291 KHASHO KALAY	29077 QALA SARWAR
12144 DONA'I	27295 KUNBAD	29078 QALA SARWAR
12145 DONAHI SERO DONAHI	27307 NAHER SARDAR	29079 LANDI KALAY
12146 DONAHI SERO DONAHI	27317 NOOR ZAYE JUNOBI	29080 LANDI KALAY
17029 KHAIL GADA	27329 DASHT	29081 HAJI TAJ MOHAMMAD KALAY
17031 HAJI-HUSAIN	27331 PAS AW	29082 HAJI TAJ MOHAMMAD KALAY
17041 Karz Maktab	27335 KUSHTA MULLA ZAYE	29083 HAJI SULTAN SHAH KALAY
17226 TAPA-SAFDAR ALI	27337 BALO ZAI	29084 HAJI SULTAN SHAH KALAY
17227 QUZI	27351 KSHATTA/MALAZAY	29093 JAMAL KHEL
17228 QUZI	28008 ALI KALA	29097 LALAY KALAY
17239 NEKPA-I-SUFLA	28020 MENARA	29103 BARAN CHINA
17243 NEKPA-I-ULYA	28023 KOHAK	29105 BAGHAGAY
17245 ANDARABI	28025 KOHAK	29106 BAGHAGAY
17246 ANDARABI	28027 NAGAHAN	29113 KUCHNI KHAKA
17250 SAID RAMAZAN	28032 DAHI SABZI	29115 KHANU KHEL
17254 KOBHI HULYA YA BALA	28034 RAJAN KALA	29117 LUY KHAKA
17273 QARAGHEZ-I-BALA	28038 MAZREHA HABAS	29119 ARAL
17274 QARAGHEZ-I-BALA	28039 MIYAN JOWI	29120 ARAL
18035 KHOWJA GHOLAK	28045 LANGAR	29121 AYKHEL
18039 NOW ABAD KOTAGI	28047 CHANGAL	29122 AYKHEL

The following list shows the 23 sample points which were conducted by AYC interviewers and successfully validated by the independent validation team:

Table 10: Validated AYC Sample Points

AYC Sample Points Validated by MISTI		
24171	28224 CHINA	29130
24181	28239 BAYDAK	29131
24182	28240 BAYDAK	29132
24183	28473 NIMAKAE	29137
24184	28474 NIMAKAE	29138
28221 CHINA	28502 MANSOR ABAD	29161
28222 CHINA	28503 MANSOR ABAD	29162
28223 CHINA	29129	

#### 4.4 Post Field Data Processing

Each district in the MISTI Wave 3 project was processed as an independent sample; the procedures which follow were replicated for all 93 districts contained in the final, merged data set.

After field work was completed, ACSOR’s field management team received the questionnaires from interviews at ACSOR’s main office in Kabul. Each sample point was delivered in an envelope containing all questionnaires and the contact sheet for that sample point, commonly referred to as a “pack.” Each pack of interviews was sorted by location and the questionnaires were then numbered sequentially.

In order to properly categorize responses from open ended questions, ACSOR employs a trained team of “coders” who are taught how to translate open ended responses to standard codes for data entry. This team of coders, under the supervision of ACSOR project managers, then went through each open ended question and, using a common typology list, assigned each open ended response with a numeric code. When new responses were found within questionnaires, the project manager reviewed the response to ensure it was mutually exclusive to all previous responses and then created a new code for all coders to begin using for all instances of that response.

After all questionnaires were coded, a team of keypunchers entered the data from all questionnaires into a computerized format which can be read by common analytical software such as SPSS. This process is completed on-site at ACSOR’s Kabul headquarters to protect the data and closely control the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the keypunching team utilized logic checks and verified any errors inadvertently committed by interviewers. The keypunchers use a proprietary data entry program, written specifically for ACSOR to use in Afghanistan, which simplifies processing, standardizes data formatting and ultimately decreases error rates.

## 4.5 Post Processing Quality Reviews

After the data set was processed into a usable, computerized format, experienced staff members from ACSOR's IT department began the initial review of the data. The initial review focused primarily on the management section of the survey. The goal of this phase is to ensure that all of the interviews match the anticipated management characteristics found in the achieved sample plan for that district. Throughout this phase, logic tests are enacted on the data to ensure that each interview is categorized as expected within the data set. For example, if a respondent reported at the onset of a survey that they farm land but later did not cite farming as their primary occupation, the interview was flagged for further review. When discrepancies such as this were found, the original questionnaire was located to determine if the error was a result of a keypunching error and, if so, the error is repaired in the data set.

After ACSOR's IT team completes their review, each data set was sent to an additional reviewer outside of Afghanistan for the next phase of review. Throughout this phase, further logic tests are employed throughout the management, substantive and demographic sections of the data set. When errors were found, the project management team at ACSOR was notified and consulted the original questionnaires to determine and, if appropriate, repair the source of the error in the data set. It is important to note that not all responses which fail a logic test are invalid and many are not changed in the final data set. There are often a number of legitimate reasons why a respondent may give an illogical set of responses and, as a result, not all illogical responses are deemed invalid. Using the farming example provided above, it could be the case that a respondent who says that they farm land may only do so in the summer and may legitimately provide a different primary occupation when asked this question in winter months than they would during summer months.

## 4.6 Hunter™ Quality Tests

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, ACSOR-Surveys uses a proprietary program called Hunter that searches for additional patterns and duplicates that may indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer.

The Hunter program includes four tests:

1. Time and Date test – compares interviews for overlapping times, grouped by interviewer. Interviews with overlapping times are flagged for review and reported times are compared in the original questionnaires.
2. Equality test – compares interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling point, province, or any other variable.
3. Non-Response test – determines the percentage of 'Don't Knows' for each interviewer's cases.
4. Duplicates test – compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other.

Any interview that fails on any of the Hunter quality control tests is pulled out for additional scrutiny. If the interview does not pass subsequent evaluation steps, it is removed from the final database before delivery. Table 11 summarizes the deletions that were made as a result of the aforementioned quality tests:

Table 11: Hunter Removals by District, by Reason for Removal

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Badghis	Ab-e Kamari	336	ACSOR				45	45	291
Badghis	Muqur	496	ACSOR				39	39	457
Badghis	Qadis	496	ACSOR				30	30	466
Baghlan	Baghlan-e Jadid	400	ACSOR					0	400
Baghlan	Baghlan-e Jadid	96	AYC					0	96
Baghlan	Doshi	336	ACSOR				13	13	323
Baghlan	Pul-e Khmri	496	ACSOR				9	9	487
Balkh	Balkh	496	ACSOR				18	18	478
Balkh	Chahar Bolak	496	ACSOR				5	5	491
Balkh	Chimtal	496	ACSOR				6	6	490
Balkh	Mazar-e Sharif	496	ACSOR				8	8	488
Balkh	Sholgarah	464	ACSOR				12	12	452
Farah	Bala Boluk	496	ACSOR					0	496
Farah	Farah	336	ACSOR				18	18	318
Farah	Khak-e Safayd	480	ACSOR				3	3	477
Farah	Pusht-e Rod	496	ACSOR			1		1	495
Ghazni	Andar	336	AYC	2				2	334
Ghazni	Deh Yak	336	ACSOR				9	9	327
Ghazni	Gelan	496	ACSOR		8		14	22	474
Ghazni	Jaghata	448	ACSOR		16		12	28	420
Ghazni	Khwajah Omari	464	ACSOR				0	0	464
Ghazni	Muqer	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Ghazni	Qarah Bagh	480	ACSOR				13	13	467
Ghor	Chaghcharan	448	ACSOR				40	40	408
Ghor	Shahrak	368	ACSOR				35	35	333
Helmand	Garm Ser	336	ACSOR				4	4	332
Helmand	Kajaki	336	ACSOR				17	17	319
Helmand	Lashkar Gah	496	ACSOR				5	5	491
Helmand	Musa Qa'lah	416	ACSOR				6	6	410
Helmand	Nad Ali	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	480	ACSOR				8	8	472
Helmand	Sangin	400	ACSOR				3	3	397
Herat	Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi)	496	ACSOR				12	12	484
Herat	Pashtun Zarghun	496	ACSOR				15	15	481
Herat	Shindand	384	ACSOR				9	9	375
Herat	Shindand	112	AYC	2				2	110
Jowzjan	Faizabad	480	ACSOR				3	3	477
Jowzjan	Khwajah Do Koh	432	ACSOR				4	4	428
Jowzjan	Qush Tepah	336	AYC	9				9	327
Jowzjan	Shibirghan	496	ACSOR				3	3	493
Kandahar	Arghandab	480	ACSOR				1	1	479
Kandahar	Argistan	400	ACSOR					0	400
Kandahar	Daman	480	ACSOR					0	480
Kandahar	Dand	496	ACSOR					0	496

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Kandahar	Maiwand	304	ACSOR					0	304
Kandahar	Maiwand	208	AYC	3				3	205
Kandahar	Panjwai	480	ACSOR				1	1	479
Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot	496	AYC	13		2	42	57	439
Kandahar	Spin Boldak	464	ACSOR				1	1	463
Kandahar	Takhtapol	320	ACSOR					0	320
Kandahar	Zharay	480	ACSOR				2	2	478
Khost	Bak	496	ACSOR					0	496
khost	Gurbuz	496	ACSOR			1	2	3	493
Khost	Jaji Maidan	416	ACSOR			1	1	2	414
Khost	Manduzai (Ismail Khel)	496	ACSOR				8	8	488
Khost	Shamul (Dzadran)	416	ACSOR					0	416
Khost	Tanai	496	ACSOR				3	3	493
Khost	Terayzai (Ali Sher)	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Kunar	Khas Kunar	496	ACSOR			1	1	2	494
Kunar	Marawarah	336	ACSOR					0	336
Kunar	Sar Kani	352	ACSOR					0	352
Kunduz	Aliabad	448	ACSOR				4	4	444
Kunduz	Archi	336	AYC	49			31	80	256
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	336	ACSOR				25	25	311
Kunduz	Chahar Darah	160	AYC	18			0	18	142
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	384	ACSOR				7	7	377
Kunduz	Imam Sahib	112	AYC	28				28	84
Kunduz	Khanabad	432	ACSOR				4	4	428
Kunduz	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	432	ACSOR				6	6	426
Logar	Baraki Barak	336	AYC	1				1	335
Logar	Khoshi	240	ACSOR					0	240
Logar	Khoshi	256	AYC	69				69	187
Logar	Muhammad Aghah	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Nimroz	Kang	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Nimroz	Zaranj	496	ACSOR				2	2	494
Paktiya	Ahmadabad	448	ACSOR			1	1	2	446
Paktiya	Dzadran	336	AYC					0	336
Paktiya	Laja Mangel	336	ACSOR					0	336
Paktiya	Lajah Ahmad Khel	352	ACSOR					0	352
Paktiya	Zurmat	336	AYC					0	336
Parwan	Charikar	336	ACSOR				49	49	287
Parwan	Salang	336	ACSOR				26	26	310
Samangan	Aibak	336	ACSOR			2	8	10	326
Samangan	Darah-ye Suf ePain	496	ACSOR					0	496
Samangan	Faryroz Nakhchir	368	ACSOR				8	8	360
Samangan	Hazrat eSultan	496	ACSOR			6	9	15	481
Samangan	Ruy Do Ab	496	ACSOR				6	6	490

Province	District	Cases in Original Data Set	Field Provider	Time & Date	Equality	Non-Response	Duplicates	Total Removed	Cases in Final Data Set
Uruzgan	Chorah	384	ACSOR		40		10	50	334
Uruzgan	Deh Rawud	496	ACSOR				76	76	420
Uruzgan	Tarin Kot	494	ACSOR		8	9	20	37	457
Uruzgan	Khas Uruzgan	496	ACSOR				1	1	495
Uruzgan	Shahid eHasas	464	ACSOR				2	2	462
Wardak	Chak-e Wardak	496	ACSOR					0	496
Wardak	Jalrayz	496	ACSOR					0	496
Wardak	Nerkh	384	ACSOR				1	1	383
Wardak	Nerkh	112	AYC	1				1	111
Wardak	Sayyidabad	480	ACSOR					0	480
Zabul	Qalat	496	ACSOR					0	496
Zabul	Shah Joy	496	ACSOR					0	496
Zabul	Tarek wa Jaldak	480	AYC	4			5	9	471
<b>Total</b>		<b>41486</b>		<b>199</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>786</b>	<b>1081</b>	<b>40405</b>

## V. QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire was designed by the MISTI team with input from stakeholders within each program area covered by the Wave 3 assessment. Although some questions were developed specifically for a particular program, the goal of the questionnaire is to gain an overall assessment of the stability picture and factors that impact the stability situation within each district covered by the project.

The substantive portion of the questionnaire was broken down into the following modules:

1. Security and Crime (Q2a – Q7b)
  2. Governance (Q8 – Q14h)
  3. Service Provision and Development (Q15 – Q19b)
  4. Rule of Law (Q20a – Q22c)
  5. Corruption (Q23 – Q25)
  6. Quality of Life (Q26 – Q30)
  7. Economic Activity (Q31 – Q33)
  8. Community Cohesion and Resilience (Q34a – Q39b)
  9. Grievances (Q40a/b)
  10. Media (Q41a – Q42b)
  11. Indirect Questions (Q43 – Q50)
- For districts where the KFZ program was operating, the KFZ modules were inserted after the management section, before Q1
  - For districts where the CCI program was operating, the CCI module was inserted between modules 10 and 11

The questionnaire consisted of 39 management and quality control variables, 85 substantive questions and 19 demographic questions. The CCI module contained 8 questions. The KFZ module contained 54 questions. For the purposes of this count, each item in a battery of questions was counted as 1/3 of a variable.

The average length of time it took for an interview to be conducted was 48 minutes with the shortest interview taking 21 minutes and the longest interview taking 90 minutes.

## APPENDIX I: SAMPLE POINTS REPLACED

The following table lists all sample points which were replaced prior to fielding the project. Each village typically contained two sample points, with the exception of one village which contained four sample points. As a result, a total of 426 individual sample points were replaced in 212 selected villages.

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
23037	23. Badghis	303	Ab Kamari	GANDAB BAIKOCHA	OMAR SAYED KHAN
23038	23. Badghis	303	Ab Kamari	GANDAB BAIKOCHA	OMAR SAYED KHAN
23039	23. Badghis	303	Ab Kamari	SENA MULLAH MANSOR	PADA NOKARAI
23040	23. Badghis	303	Ab Kamari	SENA MULLAH MANSOR	PADA NOKARAI
23041	23. Badghis	303	Ab Kamari	BARAS	KHALIFA
23042	23. Badghis	303	Ab Kamari	BARAS	KHALIFA
23095	23. Badghis	306	Moqur	AJRIM	FAROZI
23096	23. Badghis	306	Moqur	AJRIM	FAROZI
23097	23. Badghis	306	Moqur	JAEK HA KHOJA PESTA	AZIZAN
23098	23. Badghis	306	Moqur	JAEK HA KHOJA PESTA	AZIZAN
23099	23. Badghis	306	Moqur	KARGAZ KHAL TORAKE	KALAN ZAI
23100	23. Badghis	306	Moqur	KARGAZ KHAL TORAKE	KALAN ZAI
23163	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GONBAD JOMA KHAN	BAD RAWAK
23164	23. Badghis	301	Qadis	GONBAD JOMA KHAN	BAD RAWAK
16047	16. Baghlan	225	Baghlan-e Jadid	SHAHI KHAIL	QAZI
16048	16. Baghlan	225	Baghlan-e Jadid	SHAHI KHAIL	QAZI
16097	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	MARKAZ DAKA	KUNDA SANG
16098	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	MARKAZ DAKA	KUNDA SANG
16099	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	MAZAR DAHI KADO	AGHOR SANG
16100	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	MAZAR DAHI KADO	AGHOR SANG
16101	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	SEA POSHTA	POSHTA KUNDASANG
16102	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	SEA POSHTA	POSHTA KUNDASANG
16103	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	JOWLLAN	DAHAN KARO
16104	16. Baghlan	226	Doshi	JOWLLAN	DAHAN KARO
16163	16. Baghlan	224	Pul-e Khumri	DOWLAT ZAI HAJI MOHAMMAD DAIL	SHAMRAQ YA SHAMRAQ PAYEN CHAP DARYA
16164	16. Baghlan	224	Pul-e Khumri	DOWLAT ZAI HAJI MOHAMMAD DAIL	SHAMRAQ YA SHAMRAQ PAYEN CHAP DARYA
18119	18. Balkh	258	Chahar Bolak	GALA JOWI	DAHI NOW
18120	18. Balkh	258	Chahar Bolak	GALA JOWI	DAHI NOW
18121	18. Balkh	258	Chahar Bolak	NOWARID TABA KHASBAK	LOCHAK ARAQ
18122	18. Balkh	258	Chahar Bolak	NOWARID TABA KHASBAK	LOCHAK ARAQ
18135	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	ABFOROSHI GAZA SUFLA	FATEMA KHAIL IMAM SAHIB
18136	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	ABFOROSHI GAZA SUFLA	FATEMA KHAIL IMAM SAHIB
18137	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	ANJALE GAZA SUFLA	ARAB MAZARI IRAN
18138	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	ANJALE GAZA SUFLA	ARAB MAZARI IRAN
18141	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	SARYAKROYA HAJI SAFAR	CHASHMA GAZA SUFLA

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
18142	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	SARYAKROYA HAJI SAFAR	CHASHMA GAZA SUFLA
18147	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	HAID ALI YAKROYA	SAR ASIYAB IBRAHIM KHAN
18148	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	HAID ALI YAKROYA	SAR ASIYAB IBRAHIM KHAN
18159	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	BAWAR CHE	KAMSANI IMAM SAHIB
18160	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	BAWAR CHE	KAMSANI IMAM SAHIB
18169	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	NOWARID BAI TAIMOR	TAKABI IMAM SAHIB
18170	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	NOWARID BAI TAIMOR	TAKABI IMAM SAHIB
18175	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	QAMSHELY HALAM BAI	TARAKI IMAM SAHIB
18176	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	QAMSHELY HALAM BAI	TARAKI IMAM SAHIB
18183	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	QOUL KHAIL GAZA HULYA	JANGAL CHAMTAL
18184	18. Balkh	257	Chimtal	QOUL KHAIL GAZA HULYA	JANGAL CHAMTAL
18293	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	ARAB HA	BABA HAWAZ
18294	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	ARAB HA	BABA HAWAZ
18295	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	CHASHMA SHAFI	BAIRA KHALILY
18296	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	CHASHMA SHAFI	BAIRA KHALILY
18297	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	HAI KALAN DALAN	DAIMARK
18298	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	HAI KALAN DALAN	DAIMARK
18299	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	NOW ABAD DEWAN	KABULI
18300	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	NOW ABAD DEWAN	KABULI
18301	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	QALAND HULYA	NOW QESHLAQ
18302	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	QALAND HULYA	NOW QESHLAQ
18303	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	QOWLAND	QASHIM SAI
18304	18. Balkh	255	Sholgarah	QOWLAND	QASHIM SAI
25049	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	SHAHRAK (2)	DASHT SHEWAN
25050	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	SHAHRAK (2)	DASHT SHEWAN
25051	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	CU AB	KAL KALA
25052	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	CU AB	KAL KALA
25053	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	KARIZAK	MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY
25054	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	KARIZAK	MARKAZ WOLLUSWALY
25055	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	LUKHAK KALAN	SHEWAN HULYA
25056	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	LUKHAK KALAN	SHEWAN HULYA
25057	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	QARYA-I-KAREZ BED	TODANAK BALA
25058	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	QARYA-I-KAREZ BED	TODANAK BALA
25059	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	KHARAK	JAYE NAJARA
25060	25. Farah	324	Bala Boluk	KHARAK	JAYE NAJARA
25101	25. Farah	323	Farah	RANJ BALA	MAZAR
25102	25. Farah	323	Farah	RANJ BALA	MAZAR
25163	25. Farah	330	Khak-i-safed	RABAT	KARAIZ MENJE
25164	25. Farah	330	Khak-i-safed	RABAT	KARAIZ MENJE
25221	25. Farah	327	Pushtrud	NAR MAKI	GAJGEN BALA
25222	25. Farah	327	Pushtrud	NAR MAKI	GAJGEN BALA
25223	25. Farah	327	Pushtrud	BARANGAK PAYEN	QALA MULLAH AMAN
25224	25. Farah	327	Pushtrud	BARANGAK PAYEN	QALA MULLAH AMAN

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
6097	6. Ghazni	78	Jaghata (Bahram-e Shahid)	SHAKHA JALIL	SADRAY
6098	6. Ghazni	78	Jaghata (Bahram-e Shahid)	SHAKHA JALIL	SADRAY
6099	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	QALA BASHIR	DAR SANA KHOZI
6100	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	QALA BASHIR	DAR SANA KHOZI
6117	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	PAI LACH	QALA ALAM
6118	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	PAI LACH	QALA ALAM
6119	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	DAHIAK	QALA MULLAH
6120	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	DAHIAK	QALA MULLAH
6121	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	HABAD KALA	AWOLANGAR
6122	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	HABAD KALA	AWOLANGAR
6139	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	AWOLANGAR	DEH YAK
6140	6. Ghazni	75	Deh Yak	AWOLANGAR	DEH YAK
6189	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	JANGER KALAY	MASTANA KHONA
6190	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	JANGER KALAY	MASTANA KHONA
6191	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	SHERJAN	AKHTAR MOHAMMAD
6192	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	SHERJAN	AKHTAR MOHAMMAD
6193	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	QARY-BAKHTYAR	DAND KALAY
6194	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	QARY-BAKHTYAR	DAND KALAY
6195	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	ASHRAF KALAY	EASHAN QALA
6196	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	ASHRAF KALAY	EASHAN QALA
6197	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	CHERGANO KALAY	IBRAHIM KHAIL
6198	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	CHERGANO KALAY	IBRAHIM KHAIL
6199	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	GHULAM KHAIL	LOL KHAIL
6200	6. Ghazni	73	Gelan	GHULAM KHAIL	LOL KHAIL
6257	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	MACHAK KHAN	CHAHAR DIWALI BALA
6258	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	MACHAK KHAN	CHAHAR DIWALI BALA
6259	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	DAHI HAMZA	NAWABADI KAREZAK
6260	6. Ghazni	83	Khwajah Omari	DAHI HAMZA	NAWABADI KAREZAK
6299	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	CHAMBARAN AMRUDDIN	AHMAD KHAIL
6300	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	CHAMBARAN AMRUDDIN	AHMAD KHAIL
6301	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ANA KHAIL	CHAMBAR BAHADER
6302	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ANA KHAIL	CHAMBAR BAHADER
6303	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	AKHOUND KHAIL	DEWALAK
6304	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	AKHOUND KHAIL	DEWALAK
6305	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	SHALY KHAIL	HASTI
6306	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	SHALY KHAIL	HASTI
6307	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	MOMIN KHAIL	JUMJOMA
6308	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	MOMIN KHAIL	JUMJOMA
6309	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ABOL QALA JONOBI	LAL KHAN KHAIL
6310	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ABOL QALA JONOBI	LAL KHAN KHAIL
6311	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	SAMAND KALA	NELI
6312	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	SAMAND KALA	NELI
6313	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ABOL QALA SHAMALY	SALIM KHAIL
6314	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ABOL QALA SHAMALY	SALIM KHAIL

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
6315	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ZAR DAD QALA ZARA	CHAKA LOGA NAI YAK
6316	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	ZAR DAD QALA ZARA	CHAKA LOGA NAI YAK
6317	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	HALAM KHAIL	TOORNI CHAMBAR
6318	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	HALAM KHAIL	TOORNI CHAMBAR
6319	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	NOW KHANA	YAR BAIK QALA
6320	6. Ghazni	74	Muqur	NOW KHANA	YAR BAIK QALA
6365	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	LELE ZAI (1)	AHYEN
6366	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	LELE ZAI (1)	AHYEN
6367	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	IBRAHIM KHEL	CHERGI
6368	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	IBRAHIM KHEL	CHERGI
6369	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	SAFAR KHEL	GOR KASH
6370	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	SAFAR KHEL	GOR KASH
6371	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	MULLAH KHAIL BALA	MALOK PAYEN
6372	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	MULLAH KHAIL BALA	MALOK PAYEN
6373	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	ASKAR KOT	MIRAK
6374	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	ASKAR KOT	MIRAK
6375	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	DAFTANI GAD WAL	NASO KHAIL
6376	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	DAFTANI GAD WAL	NASO KHAIL
6377	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	SPEIN KARAIZ	BAZAR MOSHAKI
6378	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	SPEIN KARAIZ	BAZAR MOSHAKI
6379	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	TAR NOWA	GORG AB
6380	6. Ghazni	68	Qarabagh	TAR NOWA	GORG AB
31053	31. Ghor	384	Chighcheran	NAIK PAYEN	DESRAGHA (TASRAQAY)
31054	31. Ghor	384	Chighcheran	NAIK PAYEN	DESRAGHA (TASRAQAY)
31055	31. Ghor	384	Chighcheran	NAIK SAYIDAN	SEYA SANG (2)
31056	31. Ghor	384	Chighcheran	NAIK SAYIDAN	SEYA SANG (2)
27079	27. Helmand	344	Kajaki	JARYA	CHENA
27080	27. Helmand	344	Kajaki	JARYA	CHENA
27081	27. Helmand	344	Kajaki	LAB JOWI	PAI SANGI
27082	27. Helmand	344	Kajaki	LAB JOWI	PAI SANGI
27131	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	KURONDIH LASHKAR BAZARI	Nasari Square
27132	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	KURONDIH LASHKAR BAZARI	Nasari Square
27143	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	LACHMI	SOR GODAR
27144	27. Helmand	345	Lashkar Gah	LACHMI	SOR GODAR
27329	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-i-Saraj	ZAMBOLI	DASHT
27330	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-i-Saraj	ZAMBOLI	DASHT
27345	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	ZAFARANI	GARAM AB
27346	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	ZAFARANI	GARAM AB
27347	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	ZAFARANI	BOSTAN ZAY
27348	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	ZAFARANI	BOSTAN ZAY
27357	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	AHMAD ZAI	BOSTANZA'I
27358	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	AHMAD ZAI	BOSTANZA'I
27363	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	SAR KAILA KALAY	KANG
27364	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	SAR KAILA KALAY	KANG
27371	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	MOZAK	BANOZA'I
27372	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	MOZAK	BANOZA'I

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27373	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	NAIM SHAIR	BARUKZAI
27374	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	NAIM SHAIR	BARUKZAI
27375	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	NAKOR ZAI	BOSTAN QALA
27376	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	NAKOR ZAI	BOSTAN QALA
27377	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	RAIGI	LOWAR BOSTAN
27378	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	RAIGI	LOWAR BOSTAN
27379	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	FAIROZI	ZAHFARAN
27380	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	FAIROZI	ZAHFARAN
27381	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	TUGHAY	JAN KOTE ZAI
27382	27. Helmand	346	Sangin	TUGHAY	JAN KOTE ZAI
24055	24. Herat	311	Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	KHALIQ DAD MAOWLODI	KARAIZ KUNJAK
24056	24. Herat	311	Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	KHALIQ DAD MAOWLODI	KARAIZ KUNJAK
24057	24. Herat	311	Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	KHOWJA JER	KHOWJA MALAL
24058	24. Herat	311	Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	KHOWJA JER	KHOWJA MALAL
24059	24. Herat	311	Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	CHAHEL DUKHTAR WAKIL HASSAN	SAYID DAI KOTI HA
24060	24. Herat	311	Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	CHAHEL DUKHTAR WAKIL HASSAN	SAYID DAI KOTI HA
24111	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	DASHT BALA	KHOJA MOHAMMAD RASTA
24112	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	DASHT BALA	KHOJA MOHAMMAD RASTA
24113	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	GARO	MIR ABAD SUFLA
24114	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	GARO	MIR ABAD SUFLA
24115	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	RAWENDAN	MIYAN DAHI
24116	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	RAWENDAN	MIYAN DAHI
24117	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	KHAM-I-PETAU	QALA KARIM KHAN
24118	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	KHAM-I-PETAU	QALA KARIM KHAN
24119	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	KALAK	QALB YUSUF
24120	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	KALAK	QALB YUSUF
24121	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	KARAIZAK	RABAT SULIMAN
24122	24. Herat	312	Pashtun Zarghun	KARAIZAK	RABAT SULIMAN
20017	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	KOSHKAK	Haidar Abad Watani
20018	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	KOSHKAK	Haidar Abad Watani
20037	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	AMIR BAI GAZA SUFLA	QAMCHAQ AFGHANIYA
20038	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	AMIR BAI GAZA SUFLA	QAMCHAQ AFGHANIYA
20039	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	AWONPEKAL	SANIS
20040	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	AWONPEKAL	SANIS
20041	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	CHAKISHI SARBAND	CHAR BAGH YANDARK
20042	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	CHAKISHI SARBAND	CHAR BAGH YANDARK
20043	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	CHASHMA GOZARA	NOWA QOUL QANCHAQ
20044	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	CHASHMA GOZARA	NOWA QOUL QANCHAQ
20045	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	DARA GOK SEYA SHAKAR QOUL	JOWI WAZIR
20046	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	DARA GOK SEYA SHAKAR QOUL	JOWI WAZIR
20047	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	HAFT MAZAR SHAKAR QOUL	Haidar Abad

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
20048	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	HAFT MAZAR SHAKAR QOUL	Haidar Abad
20049	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	JAR SAI SHAKAR QOUL	FAZEL ABAD WATANI
20050	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	JAR SAI SHAKAR QOUL	FAZEL ABAD WATANI
20051	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	KHULMI HA SHAKAR	KHANUMI
20052	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	KHULMI HA SHAKAR	KHANUMI
20053	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	MARDEYAN WATANI PAYEN	NOW ABAD
20054	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	MARDEYAN WATANI PAYEN	NOW ABAD
20055	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	NASRAT ABAD	SHAIKH ABAD
20056	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	NASRAT ABAD	SHAIKH ABAD
20057	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	NOW ABAD JOWI WAZIR LAB BARYA	NOW DARAD NASRAT ABAD
20058	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	NOW ABAD JOWI WAZIR LAB BARYA	NOW DARAD NASRAT ABAD
20059	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	MULLAH JALAT GAZA SUFLA	KOKAL DASH
20060	20. Jowzjan	271	Faizabad	MULLAH JALAT GAZA SUFLA	KOKAL DASH
20111	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	CHOOB BASH KALAN	KHOJA DOKOH NOW ABAD
20112	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	CHOOB BASH KALAN	KHOJA DOKOH NOW ABAD
20113	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	JAR QUDUQ	QARBA QAROUGH
20114	20. Jowzjan	275	Khwajah Do Koh	JAR QUDUQ	QARBA QAROUGH
20195	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	ENOL MAL	MARANJAN
20196	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	ENOL MAL	MARANJAN
20197	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	AFGHAN TEPA AFGHANIYA	QANJOGHA
20198	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	AFGHAN TEPA AFGHANIYA	QANJOGHA
20199	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	DARA-I-AKHTA	ISLAM JOWI
20200	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	DARA-I-AKHTA	ISLAM JOWI
20201	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	JAGDAILAK	QAM SAI
20202	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	JAGDAILAK	QAM SAI
20203	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	KHOWJA BOLAN AFGHANIYA	ORA MAZ
20204	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	KHOWJA BOLAN AFGHANIYA	ORA MAZ
20205	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	MANGOTE AFGHANIYA	CHAR SHANBA
20206	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	MANGOTE AFGHANIYA	CHAR SHANBA
20207	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	MIR SHAKAR HULYA	ABSHAR KHANA
20208	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	MIR SHAKAR HULYA	ABSHAR KHANA
20209	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	QOUL BANDI	DEED WA MOOSH
20210	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	QOUL BANDI	DEED WA MOOSH
20211	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	SULTAN KOT	EED MAHALA
20212	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	SULTAN KOT	EED MAHALA
20213	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	TURKMANYA	YAKA CHINAR
20214	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	TURKMANYA	YAKA CHINAR
20215	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	AREQ AFGHANIYA	BABA ALI

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
20216	20. Jowzjan	268	Shibirghan	AREQ AFGHANIYA	BABA ALI
28543	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	SHIN CA	POTEY
28544	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	SHIN CA	POTEY
28551	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	QABUL	BAGHAKA
28552	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	QABUL	BAGHAKA
28553	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	BOLAN (1)	KHESHTA
28554	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	BOLAN (1)	KHESHTA
28555	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	TARAKI KALAY	YARZAY
28556	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	TARAKI KALAY	YARZAY
28575	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	KALACHA	QARYEH-I-KUGHI
28576	28. Kandahar	360	Arghistan	KALACHA	QARYEH-I-KUGHI
9061	9. Khost	126	Baak	HABIB KHAN KALAY	WOCH TOOTAK
9062	9. Khost	126	Baak	HABIB KHAN KALAY	WOCH TOOTAK
9105	9. Khost	123	Gurbuz	GULAK KAHIL	AKBARKHAN KALAY
9106	9. Khost	123	Gurbuz	GULAK KAHIL	AKBARKHAN KALAY
9145	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	TAINGAY	DAIRI MELA
9146	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	TAINGAY	DAIRI MELA
9175	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	SAKMAN (BAGINA)	MENJO KALAY
9176	9. Khost	125	Jaji Maidan	SAKMAN (BAGINA)	MENJO KALAY
9227	9. Khost	119	Manduzay (Esmayel khil)	ZHOR KHAIL	Zhori Kalai
9228	9. Khost	119	Manduzay (Esmayel khil)	ZHOR KHAIL	Zhori Kalai
9287	9. Khost	127	Shamul	DARA KAMAL KHAIL	GETE KHAIL
9288	9. Khost	127	Shamul	DARA KAMAL KHAIL	GETE KHAIL
9409	9. Khost	120	Tirzayee (Ali Sher)	SADAK	DARB KALAY
9410	9. Khost	120	Tirzayee (Ali Sher)	SADAK	DARB KALAY
9411	9. Khost	120	Tirzayee (Ali Sher)	LANDAR	ZARA GHONDI
9412	9. Khost	120	Tirzayee (Ali Sher)	LANDAR	ZARA GHONDI
12055	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	KOLAWUL	AHANGARAN
12056	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	KOLAWUL	AHANGARAN
12057	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	QALAWOL	BANDAI
12058	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	QALAWOL	BANDAI
12059	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	MULLAH GORO	SHAMKAR
12060	12. Kunar	153	Khas Kunar	MULLAH GORO	SHAMKAR
17041	17. Kunduz	245	Ali Abad	MARKAZ-ALI ABAD	Karz Maktab
17042	17. Kunduz	245	Ali Abad	MARKAZ-ALI ABAD	Karz Maktab
17053	17. Kunduz	245	Ali Abad	LALA MAYDAN (3)	ARZ-BAIGI
17054	17. Kunduz	245	Ali Abad	LALA MAYDAN (3)	ARZ-BAIGI
17063	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	SAJANI HULYA	TALGUZAR
17064	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	SAJANI HULYA	TALGUZAR
17067	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	NAQELIN ALUKUZAI	EISSA KHAIL
17068	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	NAQELIN ALUKUZAI	EISSA KHAIL
17081	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	QARA YATIM (1)	KHARUTI
17082	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	QARA YATIM (1)	KHARUTI
17085	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	KHAYR ABAD	QAZAQ TEPA
17086	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	KHAYR ABAD	QAZAQ TEPA
17093	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	PALOW KAMAR	DOBANDI

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
17094	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	PALOW KAMAR	DOBANDI
17095	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	QARA YATIM (2)	GHAROW QESHLAQ
17096	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	QARA YATIM (2)	GHAROW QESHLAQ
17117	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	MAMA KHAIL	HAJI SARDAR
17118	17. Kunduz	243	Char Darah	MAMA KHAIL	HAJI SARDAR
17189	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	WARTEEN	KHAROQI
17190	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	WARTEEN	KHAROQI
17191	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	NAQELEN CHAR SANGI	DURMAN UZBEKA
17192	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	NAQELEN CHAR SANGI	DURMAN UZBEKA
17193	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	GUNBAD	DURMAN SUFLA
17194	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	GUNBAD	DURMAN SUFLA
17195	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	QALAM GUZAR NASIRI	TOUT MAZAR KAFAR KUNJ
17196	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	QALAM GUZAR NASIRI	TOUT MAZAR KAFAR KUNJ
17197	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	HEACH KALAY HULYA	TOUGH AHLAM
17198	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	HEACH KALAY HULYA	TOUGH AHLAM
17199	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	KOULDAMAN	WARTAGAN TEPA
17200	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	KOULDAMAN	WARTAGAN TEPA
17201	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	DIL SHAHD	IMAM SAHIB
17202	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	DIL SHAHD	IMAM SAHIB
17203	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	DANG QESHLAQ	TURANI
17204	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	DANG QESHLAQ	TURANI
17205	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	MAJAR	QHARGHAN TEPA AQ MASJED
17206	17. Kunduz	239	Imam Sahib	MAJAR	QHARGHAN TEPA AQ MASJED
17255	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	SHAIKH-ALI	BAND-BARQ
17256	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	SHAIKH-ALI	BAND-BARQ
17257	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	AWLIYA-CHASHMA	KHOWJA-PESTA
17258	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	AWLIYA-CHASHMA	KHOWJA-PESTA
17259	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	HUSSAIN-KHAIL CHAR-TOOT	KUHNA-QALA
17260	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	HUSSAIN-KHAIL CHAR-TOOT	KUHNA-QALA
17261	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	BAHADUR-CHAR-TOOT	MAHFELI-CHAR-TOOT
17262	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	BAHADUR-CHAR-TOOT	MAHFELI-CHAR-TOOT
17263	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	TOOT-MAZAR	NOW ABAD BAND-BARQ
17264	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	TOOT-MAZAR	NOW ABAD BAND-BARQ
17265	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	DAHI-KALAN	QARSI
17266	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	DAHI-KALAN	QARSI
17267	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	LAR KHABI	KHWAJA PALAK
17268	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	LAR KHABI	KHWAJA PALAK
17269	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	DAHI KALAN	MAHAJERIN
17270	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	DAHI KALAN	MAHAJERIN
17271	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	SHOR DARA SOYEKA	MULLAH-FATEH
17272	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	SHOR DARA SOYEKA	MULLAH-FATEH
17273	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	LAGHMANI-ZARD KHMAR	QARAGHEZ-I-BALA
17274	17. Kunduz	241	Khan Abad	LAGHMANI-ZARD	QARAGHEZ-I-BALA

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
				KHMAR	
17277	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	QARIA LAQI	QACHAI KALAN
17278	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	QARIA LAQI	QACHAI KALAN
17281	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	QALACHA GUL ALAM WA YA HAIDARY BAHİ	TEPA BURİD DARMAN
17282	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	QALACHA GUL ALAM WA YA HAIDARY BAHİ	TEPA BURİD DARMAN
17315	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	LARKHABI	KHVAJEH MASHHAD
17316	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	LARKHABI	KHVAJEH MASHHAD
17325	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	CHEM TEPA	BOUZ KANDAHARI HAJI SHAH MUHAMMAD
17326	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	CHEM TEPA	BOUZ KANDAHARI HAJI SHAH MUHAMMAD
17327	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	AULUS ASQALAN	GUL TEPA AWAL
17328	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	AULUS ASQALAN	GUL TEPA AWAL
17329	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	ARAB CHAM TEPA	KOHNA QESHLAQ
17330	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	ARAB CHAM TEPA	KOHNA QESHLAQ
17331	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	ARBAB MANGALI LARKHABI	QAWI GUZAR ARBAB ABDULHAQ ASQALAN
17332	17. Kunduz	240	Kunduz (Gor Tepa)	ARBAB MANGALI LARKHABI	QAWI GUZAR ARBAB ABDULHAQ ASQALAN
5157	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	QALEH-YE DAWLAT	AKHOUNDZADA KHAIL
5158	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	QALEH-YE DAWLAT	AKHOUNDZADA KHAIL
5159	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	MAZGEEN	KAND WALA
5160	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	MAZGEEN	KAND WALA
5161	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	ADAM KHAIL	MALIK QA HAR
5162	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	ADAM KHAIL	MALIK QA HAR
5163	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	BAIKOH	MUGHUL KHAIL
5164	5. Logar	62	Muhammad Aghah	BAIKOH	MUGHUL KHAIL
26089	26. Nimroz	335	Zaranj	DAM	MOHAMMAD AHZAM
26090	26. Nimroz	335	Zaranj	DAM	MOHAMMAD AHZAM
7055	7. Paktiya	113	Ahmadaba	CHENO SAR	SHEKH-MASUR
7056	7. Paktiya	113	Ahmadaba	CHENO SAR	SHEKH-MASUR
7119	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	MAHRAM KALAY	KHORA KHOLA WA SAR KONI
7120	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	MAHRAM KALAY	KHORA KHOLA WA SAR KONI
7121	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	DARI KHON	FATEH KALAY
7122	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	DARI KHON	FATEH KALAY
7123	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	DARI KHON	FATEH KALAY
7124	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	DARI KHON	FATEH KALAY
7141	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	TARI	MOUSHKA
7142	7. Paktiya	424	Laja Mangel	TARI	MOUSHKA
3071	3. Parwan	48	Salang	WENAR WAY HULYA	LALMISABZAK
3072	3. Parwan	48	Salang	WENAR WAY HULYA	LALMISABZAK

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
3073	3. Parwan	48	Salang	LALMA SULTAN DAHI NOW CHAPARAQ	BINAWACH
3074	3. Parwan	48	Salang	LALMA SULTAN DAHI NOW CHAPARAQ	BINAWACH
3075	3. Parwan	48	Salang	SARQAI KACHA	KAFTARKHANA
3076	3. Parwan	48	Salang	SARQAI KACHA	KAFTARKHANA
3077	3. Parwan	48	Salang	ARZA WANAN	GOM ZAM
3078	3. Parwan	48	Salang	ARZA WANAN	GOM ZAM
3079	3. Parwan	48	Salang	GUL KANA	KHAM BAIYE
3080	3. Parwan	48	Salang	GUL KANA	KHAM BAIYE
3081	3. Parwan	48	Salang	KOTAH	TOOTAMAZAR
3082	3. Parwan	48	Salang	KOTAH	TOOTAMAZAR
19079	19. Samangan	247	Darah-ye Suf-e Pain	NOW AMAD BALA	BALOCH
19080	19. Samangan	247	Darah-ye Suf-e Pain	NOW AMAD BALA	BALOCH
19227	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	GHO JOUR TOUR	MADRAK
19228	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	GHO JOUR TOUR	MADRAK
19269	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	AKHUND MOLAJUM'A	JAW PALAL PAYEN
19270	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	AKHUND MOLAJUM'A	JAW PALAL PAYEN
19271	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	BABA HALEEM	SHOR TOUGH
19272	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	BABA HALEEM	SHOR TOUGH
19273	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	BALAH ALI BALA	SARTANGI
19274	19. Samangan	249	Ruy Do Ab	BALAH ALI BALA	SARTANGI
30047	30. Uruzgan	380	Chora	DENAR KHAIL	AGHAJAN (2)
30048	30. Uruzgan	380	Chora	DENAR KHAIL	AGHAJAN (2)
30221	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	KAREZAK	MEYAN DO
30222	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	KAREZAK	MEYAN DO
30223	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	BESHNAY	SAIR AB
30224	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	BESHNAY	SAIR AB
30225	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	SURKHAW	SAR SEENA
30226	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	SURKHAW	SAR SEENA
30227	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	LWAR GAWRGIN	YAKHDAN AKHCHARA
30228	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	LWAR GAWRGIN	YAKHDAN AKHCHARA
30229	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	LOWAR GORGEN	YAW KARYA
30230	30. Uruzgan	382	Shahid-e Hasas	LOWAR GORGEN	YAW KARYA
4161	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	KHAN JAN KHAIL (1)	ABDA KHAIL
4162	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	KHAN JAN KHAIL (1)	ABDA KHAIL
4163	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	QOUL MIRDAIL	DAHI YOCHI
4164	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	QOUL MIRDAIL	DAHI YOCHI
4165	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	MIR HAZARI	DURANI
4166	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	MIR HAZARI	DURANI
4167	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	TATAR KHAIL	KHAROTI
4168	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	TATAR KHAIL	KHAROTI
4169	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	HAZIMUDDIN KHAIL	KHUSRAW
4170	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	HAZIMUDDIN KHAIL	KHUSRAW
4171	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	AB KHANA	QALA PAYENDA
4172	4. Wardak	54	Nerkh	AB KHANA	QALA PAYENDA

SP#	Province	Dist. #	District Name	Original Village	Replacment Village
29057	29. Zabul	373	Qalat	MANDEH (2)	HAJI ALLAH DAD
29058	29. Zabul	373	Qalat	MANDEH (2)	HAJI ALLAH DAD
29059	29. Zabul	373	Qalat	ZAITU KHAN	HAZARI
29060	29. Zabul	373	Qalat	ZAITU KHAN	HAZARI
29117	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joi	ANGURI	LUY KHAKA
29118	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joi	ANGURI	LUY KHAKA
29119	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joi	BASU KHEL (1)	ARAL
29120	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joi	BASU KHEL (1)	ARAL
29121	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joi	BARA KHAN	AYKHEL
29122	29. Zabul	368	Shah Joi	BARA KHAN	AYKHEL

## APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE POINTS NOT VISITED

*The following sample points were included in the original sample plan but were unable to be conducted due to security concerns in each village. These sample points were not replaced and do not exist in the final data set.*

SP#	Province	District #	District	Village Name	Village UID
27151	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	KAREZE PI	MSQ-120
27152	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	KAREZE PI	MSQ-120
27167	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	KOGHKA	MSQ-101
27168	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	KOGHKA	MSQ-101
27175	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	QARYA-I-KAC SHARBAT	MSQ-015
27176	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	QARYA-I-KAC SHARBAT	MSQ-015
27183	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	MUSA QALEH (2)	MSQ-157
27184	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	MUSA QALEH (2)	MSQ-157
27185	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	KAS SARDAR	MSQ-091
27186	27. Helmand	347	Musa Qala	KAS SARDAR	MSQ-091
27325	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-i-Saraj	HAJI WAZEER KALAY	NIS-131
27326	27. Helmand	340	Nahr-i-Saraj	HAJI WAZEER KALAY	NIS-131
29133	29. Zabul	376	Tarang Wa Jaldak	ISAHAQ ZAY	TWJ-055
29134	29. Zabul	376	Tarang Wa Jaldak	ISAHAQ ZAY	TWJ-055

## **APPENDIX 3: NEWSWORTHY EVENTS DURING FIELD**

*The following is a list of news reports from each of the provinces included in MISTI Wave 3 during the field period of the project. These reports help contextualize the situations in each of the provinces where field work was conducted. While not all of these events directly impacted field work, it is important to understand the events that impacted each of these areas and the types of events that effected day to day life during this period of time.*

**16-Nov-2013**

### **Ghazni**

Three policemen harassing girls were beaten and their vehicle torched by residents in southern Ghazni province, an official said on Saturday. The incident took place in the Hyderabad area on the outskirts of Ghazni City, the provincial capital where the police tried to abuse four girls on Friday night. Deputy Governor Mohammad Ali Ahmadi said the policemen had been referred to the intelligence department. They are under investigation. Mohammad, a resident of area, said the policemen had to come to the village in a car. They allegedly asked four girls to get into their car. "After the girls entered the car willingly, residents captured arrested the police personnel and set fire to their vehicle," he added. Another villager, Mohammad Husain, said there were two policemen and a traffic official in the car. They informed the girls over the telephone to come out of homes as they arrived in Hyderabad. He said: "I saw them myself and informed the people who gathered in the mosque on the eve of Ashura before arresting the policemen."

### **Herat**

Eight militants and a policeman have been killed in Shindand and Ghoryan districts of western Herat province, an official said on Saturday. The fighters were killed during a daylong police-army operation against rebel hideouts in Zer Koh and Amarat areas of Shindand on Friday, the district police chief said. Col. Abdul Qayyum Noorzai told reporters that security personnel and civilians had suffered no harm during the offensive that forced the insurgents to flee the two areas. Elsewhere in the province, one policeman was killed and another wounded in an attack on their checkpoint in Ghoryan district. A local official, who did not want to be named, blamed Taliban commander Mullah Haider for masterminding the assault.

**17-Nov-2013**

### **Kandahar**

Militants have killed the six people they kidnapped in the Arghistan district of southern Kandahar province, officials said on Sunday. Zia Durrani, provincial police spokesman, said the victims were civilians looking for work. They had been kidnapped in Arghistan on their way from Atghar to Maroof district. He said the government had no information on the captives' whereabouts for the past few days. The victims' beheaded bodies were found in Safa district of Zabul province last night. Arghistan district chief, Haji Abdul Ghani Muslimyar, said the murdered men were army officers in civilian clothes and without guns. But the Kandahar governor's spokesman, Javed Fiasal, said the slain men were common labourers abducted by the militants between Arghistan and Seori district of Zabul.

### **Balkh**

The deputy governor of northern Balkh province on Sunday escaped unhurt in a suicide attack, which caused several civilian casualties, an official said. Provincial police chief, Brig. Gen. Abdur Rahman Rahimi, said the suicide bombing took place at 11.15am in Mazar-i-Sharif, the provincial capital. The bomber blew himself up near Deputy Governor Zahir Wahdat's vehicle in Kart-e-Ariana area. Zahir survived the assault but his vehicle was damaged and one of his guards wounded. At least one civilian was killed and three others

were wounded in the explosion, according to the police chief, who said the incident was being investigated. Giving an eyewitness account, resident Faizullah said the bomber on foot was standing in front of a school. "He ran toward the deputy governor's jeep but one of his feet got stuck in a drain and his explosives went off." As a result of the attacker's fumble, Wahdat escaped unhurt, the resident believed.

### **18-Nov-2013**

#### **Zabul**

Four civilians, including three children, were killed in two different bomb blasts in southern Kandahar and Zabul provinces on Monday, official said. Zabul Deputy Governor Mohammad Jan Rassoulyar said the explosion took place at around 7:00am between Barat and Gul villages on the outskirts of the provincial capital. Two children were killed and their sister and father injured in the explosion, he said, without blaming anyone for the bombing. Separately, a roadside bomb hit a car, killing a child and his father in Shurabak district of Kandahar, said the police spokesman, Zia Durrani. A third civilian was injured in the incident.

#### **Ghor**

Three people, including two women, were killed after being caught in crossfire between gunmen loyal to two illegal commanders in western Ghor province, police said on Monday. Police said the clash that left another seven people injured took place between gunmen loyal to commander Mustafa and Nadar in Awshan area situated between Dolinah and Shahrak district. Shahrak police chief Col. Habibullah said the dead included two women and a man. The injured people also included women, but he had no exact figure. The police official said mostly Nadar's supporters suffered casualties in the clash. Dolinah district chief Ahmad Hussain Danishyar confirmed three people had been killed in the incident, saying the two rival commanders had an old enmity. Earlier, Shahrak district residents accused Mustafa of involvement in killings, kidnappings and intimidating locals. The Independent Human Rights Commission released a report in September, saying 147 civilians have been killed and 128 injured this year as a result of roadside bomb blasts, armed clashes between illegal armed groups and attacks by anti-government forces said, Ghor governor Syed Anwar Rahmati said approximately 6,500 illegal armed individuals and 3,500 Taliban fighters had been operating in the province, posing threats to the security situation.

### **20-Nov-2013**

#### **Kandahar**

Police on Wednesday shot dead a suicide bomber trying to force his way into a government-run guesthouse in southern Kandahar province, an official said. Javed Faisal, the governor's spokesman, said police gunned down the bomber before he could enter the Mandigak Palace. The incident took place at 9:00am in Kandahar City. Provincial police spokesman Ziaur Rahman Durrani believed the Kandahar police chief, Gen. Abdul Raziq, who was inside the compound at the time, was the apparent target. He said the attacker, posing as a labourer, was trying to target the police chief at the under-construction site. The bomb disposal squad defused his explosive vest, he added. Gen. Raziq, who has survived a string of suicide assaults, was injured in one such incident. The Taliban have not yet commented the botched attack.

#### **Baghlan**

The director of rural development for northern Kunduz province has been found dead 11 days after being abducted by unidentified gunmen in Baghlan province, officials said on Wednesday. The body Eng. Shafiqullah Alamyar was recovered by police and locals in the Sharshar valley of Borika district on Tuesday evening, the town's administrative head, Abdul Jabar Islami, said. Alamyar was hit with several bullet

injuries in his head, he said, adding the director had been kidnapped and his brother killed in the Masjid Safid area of Baghlan-i-Markazi district 11 days ago. A relative of the victim, wishing not to be named, said the Taliban had demanded \$ 200,000 in ransom for the release of Alamyar. He would not give further details. Kunduz Deputy Governor Hamdullah Danish also blamed Taliban for capturing and the killing the director. However, the insurgent group is yet to comment on the incident.

### **Ghazni**

An explosives-laden vehicle was detonated prematurely before the suicide bomber could hit his intended target in the Maqur district of southern Ghazni province on Wednesday, an official said. The governor's spokesman, Shafiq Nang, said the bomber wanted to attack a police check-post but his vehicle exploded before reaching the target. He said there were no casualties among security forces or civilians. The incident took place at around 7:00am close to the district headquarters. Claiming responsibility for the attack, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said a Corolla car was used in the attack that left 35 policemen killed and injured. The check-post was damaged, he added.

### **22-Nov-2013**

#### **Uruzgan**

Six civilians were killed and 18 others injured during a bomb explosion in the Baraki Barak district of central Logar province on Thursday, a local official said. The bomb exploded in Baraki Rajan Bazaar at 4.00pm, Eng. Mohammad Rahim, the district's administrative head, said. Two women, a child and three men were among the dead, the official said, blaming the insurgents for planting the device in the crowded market. He said the device had been attached to a motorbike. Public Health Director Dr. Mohammad Zarif Naibkhel confirmed six dead bodies and 13 wounded people had been taken to the Pul-i-Alam Civil Hospital. Eyewitness Obaid said the powerful explosion, also confirmed by the governor's spokesman, had caused a large number of casualties. He added the small bazaar was full of people at the time of the explosion. No one has so far claimed responsibility for the assault, which came a week after six people, including two policemen, were killed during a blast in the provincial capital. President Hamid Karzai, meanwhile, denounced the bombing as an "unforgiveable act" against innocent civilians, including women and children. The perpetrators could not escape Allah's wrath, he said in a statement.

#### **Wardak**

A tribal elder was injured when unidentified gunmen opened fire at his home in the Daimirdad district of central Maidan Wardak province, an official said Friday. The governor's spokesman, Attaullah Khogyani, said in a statement Malik Hassan was a leading tribal elder of the area, having no government job. Last night, some armed men stormed his home and opened indiscriminate fire on Hassan, leaving him wounded. He was rushed to Kabul for medical treatment by his relatives. Governor Abdul Majeed Khogyani, condemning the attack, prayed for Hassan's swift recovery. He promised to bring the attackers to justice.

#### **Badghis**

At least nine security personnel were wounded during a clash with militants in the Bala Murghab district of western Badghis province, an official said on Friday. The overnight incident took place when militants attacked an Afghan National Army (ANA) convoy in the Akazi village of the district, the governor's spokesman said. Mirwais Mirzakwal said that eight ANA soldiers and a policeman were injured in the incident. The wounded were in stable condition. But an official, who did not want to be named, said two security personnel were also killed in the firefight. Militants also suffered casualties, he added, without giving exact figures. But Col. Najibullah Najibi, the 207th Zafar Military Corps spokesman, said the supply convoy had reached Bala Murghab unharmed

**26-Nov-2013**

**Farah**

Three football players were injured when a rocket hit a sports ground in the Pusht-i-road district of western Farah province, an official said on Tuesday. The incident took place at the Masaw Stadium on Monday evening, when a number of youth were playing football, the town's administrative head, Ghausuddin, said. He said two players were slightly injured. But a third had to be evacuated to hospital with severe injuries. The district chief blamed the Taliban for the attack.

**27-Nov-2013**

**Helmand**

Two women and a tribal elder have been killed in separate incidents of violence in southern Helmand province, officials said on Wednesday. The two women were killed on Tuesday night in the Taliban-controlled Charchob area of Barak-i-Barak district, the district chief, Mohammad Rahim Amin, said. One woman was found hanging from a tree and the second had been intentionally drowned, he said, adding the motive behind the deaths was yet to be known. The official said tribal elders in the insecure area had been tasked with investigating the killings. Meanwhile, unknown gunmen shot dead a tribal elder in Lashkargah, the provincial capital, late on Tuesday night, the governor's spokesman said. Omar Zwak identified the slain tribal elder as Abdul Sattar Khan, who was gunned down in the Kabaryan square. Khan, a son of Shah Nazar Khan, a former Helmand governor during Dr. Najibullah government, had no government job. The reason behind his murder remained unclear, said Zwak, who added police had launched an investigation into the incident. He said Khan had been once rescued by police from his kidnapers two years ago.

**2-Dec-2013**

**Jawzjan**

Unidentified armed men shot dead two members of Junbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan (JMIA) in northwestern Jawzjan province on Monday, an official said. Col. Faqir Mohammad Jawzjani, provincial police chief, said the pair was on way to Qara Kunt from Shiberghan, the provincial capital, when two motorcyclists opened indiscriminate fire on them, leaving both of them dead. However, motives behind their killing would yet be investigated, he added. Cap. Abdul Latif, crime branch chief, said the slain persons were Afghan Local Police (ALP) members who were on their way to their check post for duty. But another member of the Junbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan, wishing not to be named said both the victims were members of his party.

**5-Dec-2013**

**Kandahar**

At least 25 civilians and four American troops sustained injuries when a suicide bomber attacked a convoy of foreign forces in a bazaar in southern Kandahar province on Thursday, officials said. The convoy of American troops was passing through in Kashki Nakhod bazaar in Maiwand district when a suicide bomber attacked it around 1: 30pm, local security officials said. Eyewitnesses said the attack left many killed and wounded, including civilians and American troops, but exact figures were yet to be ascertained. The governor's spokesman, Javed Faisal, said at least seven people were injured in the attack that he confirmed targeted a convoy of American forces. He said primary information suggested seven civilians had been wounded in the explosion. He had no information about any fatalities as a result of the blast. Local security

officials put at 25 the number of civilians injured in the explosion that they said left four International Security Assistant Forces (ISAF) soldiers wounded. More details to follow soon.

### **Ghazni**

A tribal elder and former district chief of Maqur was killed by unidentified gunmen in southern Ghazni province, an official said on Thursday. The body of Abdul Manan Haibati was recovered from Mirzakhel area in the suburbs of Maqur district, said Sahib Khan, the town's administrative head. The elder was killed after gunmen took him out from his home on Wednesday night, he added. He said the slain elder had served for two years as district chief of Maqur some eight years back and had affiliation with Harakate Inqilab-i-Islami party during Jihad against soviet troops. Haibati was now a tribal elder but he had no links with the government, he added.

### **10-Dec-2013**

#### **Badghis**

Six civilians were killed when a rocket hit a house in western Badghis province, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) said in a statement on Tuesday. The statement said the incident took place in Balamarghab district of the province last night. The rocket fired by rebels landed in a residential area, which caused casualties. Condemning the attack, the ministry said armed rebels often target innocent people. However, Taliban have not comment on the incident.

### **11-Dec-2013**

#### **Ghazni**

Two children were died in an explosion in the Ander district of the southern Ghazni province, while three rebels were killed following a clash with security forces in Deh Yak district of the province, officials said on Wednesday. Mohammad Qasim Desiwal, administrative head of Ander district, said the explosion took place in Sepai area of the town last night, leaving two children--a brother and sister dead. The explosives were planted by the Taliban. Meanwhile, three armed rebels have been killed following a clash in the Laghbad area of Deh Yak district, the town's police chief, Faiz Mohammad Tofan said. He said police and civilians suffered no casualties in the assault. Taliban have not yet comment on the incident.

### **12-Dec-2013**

#### **Ghazni**

In two separate incidents, a shopkeeper was stabbed to death and a young girl committed suicide in southern Ghazni province, officials said on Wednesday. Director of provincial hospital, Dr. Baz Mohammad Himat, said they received the body of a 17-years-old girl who committed suicide in the Khak Ghariba area of Ghazni city. However, it could not be ascertained as why she took the extreme step, he added. Wishing anonymity, an employee of women affairs department, said the girl hanged herself as a result of family dispute. Governor's Spokesman Shafiq Nang while confirming the incident, said police had started investigating the case. Separately, Abdullah, a book seller in the provincial capital was stabbed to death by unidentified men before noon, Nang added. The killers managed to flee the scene after committing the crime, he said, adding police had started raids to nab the assassins. An eye witness said Abdullah was stabbed to death by two masked men riding a motorbike.

### **14-Dec-2013**

#### **Logar**

Five civilians were killed and a sixth injured in a roadside bomb explosion in the Shigal district of the eastern Kunar province, an official said on Sunday. The incident took place in Moni area, where a truck carrying civilians to the provincial capital hit the roadside bomb, Governor Shujaul Mulk Jalala, said. Meanwhile, a security check-post came under intense fire from the Nawabad area of Asadabad, according to Jalala, who said a doctor was killed in the incident. The security forces retaliated and targeted the positions of opponents with heavy gunfire.

### **15-Dec-2013**

#### **Kunar**

Five civilians were killed and a sixth injured in a roadside bomb explosion in the Shigal district of the eastern Kunar province, an official said on Sunday. The incident took place in Moni area, where a truck carrying civilians to the provincial capital hit the roadside bomb, Governor Shujaul Mulk Jalala, said. Meanwhile, a security check-post came under intense fire from the Nawabad area of Asadabad, according to Jalala, who said a doctor was killed in the incident. The security forces retaliated and targeted the positions of opponents with heavy gunfire.

#### **Logar**

Two school students were killed and five others injured in a rocket attack in central Logar province, an official said Sunday. Din Mohammad Darwesh, the governor spokesman, said the incident took place last evening in Baraki Barak district. A rocket fired from an unidentified location hit the area, leaving two students dead and five others injured, he added. Eng. Mohammad Rahim, the district chief, confirmed the rocket landed in the Zaqamkhel locality near the Ghazi Amanullah Khan High School, causing the casualties. Two more rockets landed in an uninhabited area and a farmland, he said, adding an investigation had been launched to ascertain where the rockets were fired from. Abdul Hamid, a schoolteacher, said two students had been killed and four others injured in the attack. The rocket fell when children were playing in the locality.

### **16-Dec-2013**

#### **Uruzgan**

A landmine explosion has left four children dead in the Dehrawood district in central Uruzgan province, an official said on Monday. The governor's spokesman, Abdullah Himat, said the explosion took place last evening, killing four children, aged between 6 and 8 years. The victims were playing in the area where the explosive device had been planted. He blamed militants for planting roadside bombs that often killed innocent civilians, including children. However, the Taliban have not yet commented on the incident. Landmine blasts have surged across the country, causing civilian casualties. Several people died in such incidents in Kunar Paktika, Logar and Nangarhar provinces yesterday.

### **17-Dec-2013**

#### **Zabul**

Six International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers were killed in a plane crash in southern Zabul province on Tuesday, officials said. The NATO-led force said the cause of the crash was under investigation, but initial reporting indicated there was no enemy activity in the area at the time of the incident. In line with its policy, ISAF neither gave the victims' nationalities nor the exact location of the crash. But Malik Ali Mohammad, the administrative head of the Shah Joi district of Zabul province, said the aircraft crashed in Ibrahimkhel area in the afternoon. Afghan and foreign forces had reached site to investigate the incident, he said, adding details of the cause and casualties were yet to be ascertained. As usual, the Taliban claimed

shooting down the aircraft. Without giving a specific figure, the group's spokesman Qari Yousaf Ahmadi said that all soldiers aboard the plane were killed.

### **Ghazni**

At least nine militants have been killed and 10 others wounded in an ongoing operation in southern Ghazni province, an official said Tuesday. Nazifullah Sultani, a spokesman for the 203rd Military Corps, said the Afghan National Army (ANA) was conducting the offensive codenamed Khyber in Andar, Deh Yak and Gilan districts. He said one soldier was injured during a clash with militants. The troops recovered a large quantity of weapons from the insurgents, he said. Shafiq Nang, the governor's spokesman, confirmed the ongoing operation and said several militants had either been killed or wounded. Meanwhile, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid claimed killing three ANA soldiers in Maqur district. But Nang rejected the claim as baseless. He acknowledged one soldier was injured in the incident. The Ministry of Defence said two soldiers were killed and four injured in the Chaparhar district of eastern Nangarhar province. Another soldier was killed in Gilan district of Ghazni. A source said an ANA soldier was killed in Rabatak Tunnel of Samangan and two others wounded in southern Helmand province.

### **Kandahar**

Two people were killed and six others wounded in a blast in the Spin Boldak border district of southern Kandahar province on Tuesday, an official said. Javed Faisal, the governor's spokesman, said the explosion occurred at 1pm in the Wesh bazaar of the district. The bomb tied to a motorbike exploded in the main bazaar, he said, adding mostly civilians were killed and wounded. Zia Durrani, the police spokesman, said a border police car was the target of the blast. A child and a policeman were killed while two police officials and four civilians wounded. The injured were evacuated to the Spin Boldak Hospital. They are said to be in stable condition.

## **20-Dec-2013**

### **Farah**

Police have detained eight suspected men, including two Taliban militants, in western Farah province, an official said Friday. Javed Kargar, the police spokesman, said that the arrests came during a clearing operation by local security forces in the Dranj village of Khak-i-Safid district. Rustam, a notorious Taliban commander, and his son Abdul Rahim were among the detainees, he said. Six others suspects had also been taken into custody. However, Taliban spokesman Qari Yousaf Ahmadi said the security forces had detained a local farmer, not a militant commander, during the operation in the district.

## **22-Dec-2013**

### **Ghazni**

The chief of Waghaz district has been injured along with his son in a bomb explosion in southern Ghazni province, an official said on Sunday. The remote-controlled bomb was planted in front of the house of Mohammad Azim, the administration chief of Waghaz district, Deputy Governor Mohammad Ali Ahmadi said. He said the bomb went off, leaving Azim and his son injured when they were coming out of their house. Azim had been receiving threatening phone calls from rebels, he added. The district chief suffered slight injuries but his son, who is also in the run for provincial council elections, sustained grievous wounds. A doctor on duty in the provincial hospital, Mohammad Anwar, confirmed received the two injured people. But the district chief was discharged after treatment. As usual, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, with the group's spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, saying the district chief had been wounded along with his deputy.

**23-Dec-2013**

**Ghazni**

Half a dozen insurgents have been killed and a targeted NATO airstrike destroyed an explosives-laden vehicle in southern Ghazni province, officials said on Monday. Three militants were killed and nine others captured alive during a joint Afghan-ISAF operation in the Gilan district on Sunday night, said Nazifullah Sultani, a spokesman for the Afghan army's 203rd Thunder Military Corps. The combined troops also conducted an operation in Chahar Qala area of Maqur district, killing two insurgents and injuring as many others, he said, claiming the troops stayed unhurt during the offensives. The same night, Sultani said, foreign troops hit an explosives-packed van from the air in Gero district and destroyed it. The Afghan military official said insurgents wanted to use the explosives-laden vehicle in an attack on the district headquarters. However, a Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, denied any fighter had been killed in Gilan and Maqur districts. He claimed those arrested by the joint forces were local residents. Mujahid claimed a commander was among three policemen killed in a bomb attack in Ghazni City, the provincial capital. However, his claim could not be officially confirmed.

**28-Dec-2013**

**Khost**

Three policemen were wounded in two back-to-back explosions in southeastern Khost City on Saturday, residents said. One blast rocked the Sargardan Square of the provincial capital at 11.00am, city dweller Abdul Rauf said. As policemen arrived at the scene, another bomb went off in the same area, wounding the police personnel, he said. Deputy police chief, Col. Mohammad Yaqub, confirmed the blasts. However, he had no information about the casualties. But Malik Noor, a private hospital doctor in Khost City, said they had received three injured policemen from the blast site.

**29-Dec-2013**

**Farah**

Five armed rebels and a policeman have been killed and more than 316 kilograms of opium seized in western Farah province, an official said on Sunday. Armed rebels stormed a check point in Purchaman district, triggering a gunbattle that lasted until late at night, the governor's spokesman, Abdul Rahman Zhwandai, said. Five attackers and a policeman were killed, while three more rebels and as many security personnel were injured in the clash. Four Kalashnikovs and a walkie-talkie seized by police. Purchaman is one of remote and restive district of Farah, located more than 300 kilometres from the provincial capital. It has witnessed occasional attacks in recent months. Separately, police said security personnel came under rebel ambush in Zan Talaq desert and Joi Aab area of the province. One rebel was injured, 316 kilograms of opium seized and a car torched.

**Herat**

One policeman has been killed and three others have been injured during a remote-controlled bombing in western Herat province, an official said on Sunday. Three policemen were injured when their vehicle struck the bomb in Shindand district late on Saturday, a border police commander, Gen. Mohammad Juma Adil, said. But a local official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said one police was also killed in the explosion. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, but Taliban are often blamed for such attacks. Separately, 150 weapons, including Kalashnikovs, rockets and explosives, were delivered to the

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) in Herat City. A statement from DIAG said the weapons had been recovered by security forces during operations over the past three months.

### **Kandahar**

Two civilians were killed and eight others wounded in a roadside bombing in southern Kandahar province, an official said on Sunday. The incident took place when a vehicle carrying wedding guests struck a roadside bomb in Sher Ali Karez area of Maiwand district on Saturday evening. Saleh Mohammad Noorzai, the district chief, said a man and a child were killed and eight others, including minors and women, were wounded in the incident. The injured were evacuated to hospital, some of them in critical condition, he said, accusing militants of planting the bomb. He added the device had been planted recently. An official, who did not want to be named, said that Taliban activities were on the rise in Sher Ali Karez area -- about 20 kilometres from the district centre. The governor's spokesman, Javed Faisal, confirmed the incident and blamed the insurgents for killing civilians by planting bombs on roads. Maiwand district is located on the Herat-Kandahar highway, 70 kilometres from Kandahar city.

### **31-Dec-2013**

#### **Samangan**

Two protestors were killed and more than a dozen others wounded during a clash with police in Aibak, the capital of northern Samangan province, officials said. The injured include five policemen. The incident happened at 8am when armed supporters of Senator Asif attacked the governor's office. Governor Khairullah Batash said the protestors were trying to stop him entering his office. But security forces helped him reach his office to meet a delegation that came from Kabul to probe recent demonstrations in the province, Batash said, adding around 20 armed supporter of Asif opened fire at his office around 11 am. Police fired in the air, but two protestors were killed and eight others wounded by the senator's supporters, he alleged. "They want to make a political issue out of it and create problems for me." Confirming the governor's view, Samangan police chief Gen. Mohammad Aslam Bekzad said they sprayed water at the protestors before firing in the air. The casualties resulted from gunfire by Asif's supporters, he added. He said the legislator was accused of killing two tribal elders, assassinating former MP Ahmad Samangani and planting a landmine targetting the governor. Asif has also been removed from the provincial council contenders' list by the election commission.

### **1-Jan-2014**

#### **Baghlan**

A Taliban commander accused of a rocket assault on Killagai prison in northeastern Baghlan province has been arrested, security officials said on Wednesday. Jawed Basharat, a police spokesman, said Mullah Kabir was detained along with two others from a house as a result of a clearance operation in Killagai locality of Doshi district on Tuesday night. Mullah Kabir, who recently returned from neighbouring Pakistan, had been under police observation, Basharat added. A number of rockets were fired at Killagai prison three months back, a police source said, recalling that the Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan had claimed responsibility for that attack. Killagai prison was built with US support near a coalition base, where hundreds of prisoners were shifted from Pul-i-Khumri prison early this year. Kabir was arrested with the cooperation of residents, said Mohammad Jan -- a tribal elder. Last year, all militants had fled town following a security offensive, but many have returned to disrupt security.

## **2-Jan-2013**

### **Logar**

Six civilians were killed and 18 others injured during a bomb explosion in the Baraki Barak district of central Logar province on Thursday, a local official said. The bomb exploded in Baraki Rajan Bazaar at 4.00pm, Eng. Mohammad Rahim, the district's administrative head, said. Two women, a child and three men were among the dead, the official said, blaming the insurgents for planting the device in the crowded market. He said the device had been attached to a motorbike. Public Health Director Dr. Mohammad Zarif Naibkhel confirmed six dead bodies and 13 wounded people had been taken to the Pul-i-Alam Civil Hospital. Eyewitness Obaid said the powerful explosion, also confirmed by the governor's spokesman, had caused a large number of casualties. He added the small bazaar was full of people at the time of the explosion. No one has so far claimed responsibility for the assault, which came a week after six people, including two policemen, were killed during a blast in the provincial capital. President Hamid Karzai, meanwhile, denounced the bombing as an "unforgiveable act" against innocent civilians, including women and children. The perpetrators could not escape Allah's wrath, he said in a statement.

### **Herat**

The administrative head for the fourth municipal district of western Herat City was shot dead by unidentified gunmen on Thursday, an official said. Naqibullah Erwin, the area's deputy administrative head, said the incident occurred at 2pm when Yalda Waziri was returning home from her office. Her dead body was shifted to a local hospital. Col. Abdul Rauf Ahmadi, the police spokesman, confirmed the attack and said the assailants managed to flee.

## **4-Jan-2014**

### **Khost**

A district intelligence branch chief was killed along with his three security guards during a roadside bombing in southeastern Khost province, an official said on Saturday. The incident took place in the Khalbisat area of Sabari Yaqubi district on Friday afternoon, when the town's intelligence head, Itbaruiddin's vehicle struck the roadside bomb, governor's spokesman, Baryalai Rawan, said. An area resident, Fathullah, said they heard a powerful explosion on Friday afternoon. Moments later, security forces reached the site and let nobody enter the area.

### **Farah**

Two employees of a private telecommunication firm have been killed in a roadside bombing in the Bala Baluk district of western Farah province, officials said on Saturday. The dead included a technician of the Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC) technical department and his driver, the company's provincial head, Dr. Aziz Ahmad Nawbahari, said. He said the bombing happened in Tuot area on way to Koh-i-Rabian Mountain, where the men were on their way to fix the telecom company's booster. The 207th Zafar Military Corps spokesman, Abdul Rauf Rahmani, confirmed the incident and casualties. The Taliban are yet to comment on the incident.

## **5-Jan-2014**

### **Ghazni**

Twelve armed rebels, including five Pakistanis, have been killed and several others injured during a clash with security forces in the Aab Band district of southern Ghazni province, an official said on Sunday. Lasting three hours, the gunbattle erupted in the Jangal area of Aab Band on Saturday afternoon, the town's administrative head, Allah Dad Halimi, said. Bodies of the rebels were still lying at the site, he said, adding

two commanders were among the dead. A number of weapons, ammunitions and motorbikes were recovered by security forces. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said six policemen had been killed and their vehicle seized by fighters. He confirmed the death of only two militants in the firefight.

#### **6-Jan-2014**

##### **Jawzjan**

A militant and a civilian were killed two gas enterprise employees wounded in an attack on a check-post in northern Jawzjan province, security officials said on Monday. Brig. Gen. Faqir Mohammad Jawzjani, the provincial police chief, said a group of Taliban attacked the check-post providing security for a gas pipeline in Shiberghan, the provincial capital, on Sunday night. None of the policemen sustained casualties, but a civilian from gas control room and two employees of the enterprise were wounded, Jawzjani said, adding the workers were controlling Mazar-i-Sharif gas system in the locality. Taliban commander Mullah Raziq was killed and two other rebels were wounded in the ensuing clash, the police chief said. Raziq's body along with his AK 47 lay at the site. Dr. Haroon Elbig, the provincial hospital director, confirmed receiving two bodies and as many wounded people. One of the wounded men was in critical condition, he said. An employee of the Afghan gas enterprise was kidnapped from the same locality last year. However, he was released after a month.

#### **8-Jan-2014**

##### **Herat**

Villagers once again blocked the busy Farah-Herat highway in the Bala Baluk district of western Farah province on Wednesday, saying their eight men remained in custody of Afghan Local Police (ALP) personnel. ALP members had arrested several residents of Shewan and other villages in connection with the abduction of their commander Ahmad Shah's son. The Taliban kidnapped Shah's son last Friday night from the Kanjabad area. The boy is yet to be freed by the insurgents. The ALP personnel released 36 villagers they had arrested in connection with the abduction after a protest by residents on Sunday, when the Farah-Herat highway was blocked for several hours. A resident of Shewan village, Sheikh Ahmad, who took part in the protest, said over the telephone that provincial officials had promised them all the detainees would be released. He said residents once again carried out the protest and blocked the highway because eight detainees were yet to be released. He claimed ALP members had confiscated many motorcycles belonging to local residents and had severely beaten the detainees. Ahmad said all those detained were innocent and had nothing to do with the abduction. He warned they would continue to protest until all the detainees were released. Gul Ahmad Azami, who represents Farah province in the Wolesi Jirga, said he had raised the issue with the provincial governor and had asked him to investigate the issue and release the detainees. But the provincial police spokesman, Javed Ahmad, said police did not release the remaining eight individuals because they had links with the Taliban. He said the protestors, whose number did not exceed 60 persons, had launched the protest at the behest of Taliban. But Sheikh Ahmad said nearly 1400 people took part in the protest, insisting those detained were innocent.

#### **9-Jan-2014**

##### **Farah**

A Taliban commander had sought half a dozen AK-47 rifles in return for releasing a schoolteacher he kidnapped a day earlier in western Farah province, an official said on Thursday. Nasir Ahmad was teaching students when Taliban commander, Fazal Rahman entered the class and took him away at gunpoint in Pusht Rud district, the district chief, Ghausuddin, said. After the incident, local elders approached the rebel

commander and requested him to free Ahmad, but he demanded six Kalashnikovs in exchange for his release, the official claimed. A youth council member, Tajmir, also confirmed the Taliban had kidnapped the 23-year-old teacher. But the insurgent movement has so far said nothing about the incident.

### **Helmand**

Three suicide bombers and one policeman were killed during a brazen attack on a police station in the capital of southern Helmand province late on Thursday, an official said. The three bombers stormed the police compound in Lashkargah around 7pm, when one of the attackers blew up his explosives-packed car at the entrance to the facility, Helmand police spokesman Col. Abdul Ahad Chopan said. A second attacker was shot dead by police and the third blew himself up inside the police station, he said, adding the police had also suffered casualties, but gave no details. But a doctor at the Emergency-run hospital in Lashkargah, wishing anonymity, told Pajhwok they had been delivered two dead bodies and five injured policemen. The police spokesman said the situation was now under control and the firing had ended. Earlier, the governor's spokesman, Omar Zwak, said police were fired upon from a nearby marketplace as the group attack continued. The Taliban have so far said nothing about the incident.

### **11-Jan-2014**

#### **Wardak**

Two militants were killed and six others wounded in separate clashes with security forces in central Maidan Wardak province, an official said on Saturday. Security forces seized hundreds of kilograms of explosives after a series of firefights with the insurgents in Bombay, Khair Khana and Madad localities of the province. Attaullah Khogyani, the governor's spokesman, said the security forces recovered 600 kilograms of explosives and a huge amount of ammunition. He said one of the slain militants was a leading commander known as Najeeb, alias Zaraqawi. But the Taliban have not yet commented on the incident.

### **14-Jan-2014**

#### **Uruzgan**

Taliban militants laced with daggers attacked a police post, in what appeared to be an insider attack, killing the post commander along with two policemen in central Uruzgan province, an official said on Tuesday. The pre-dawn attack took place in Dawan area of Charchino district, when the slain policemen were asleep in their post, the district police chief, Wali Dad, said. Of the total 10 policemen manning the post, three had gone on leave, two on beat duty and the remaining five, including the commander, were present at two rooms of the facility at the time of the attack, he said. Wali Dad said the two policemen on the patrol had links with the Taliban. The pair had invited insurgents to arrive at the post around 5am. With the help of the two, Walidad, said the insurgents laced with daggers entered one of the rooms and stabbed to death the post commander, Masoom, and another two policemen. As the policemen in the second room became aware of the attack, they opened fire at the assailants, including the two insider attackers, but all of them fled after a brief resistance. The Taliban have claimed responsibility for the attack, with the group's spokesman, Qari Yousaf Ahmadi, claiming five policemen were killed and their guns seized by the fighters. He confirmed the two policemen had connections with the movement.

## APPENDIX 4: WAVE 3 SURVEY VALIDATION PROTOCOLS

### Background and Purpose of Validation:

MISTI will conduct a validation exercise for the third round of the MISTI survey, in order to ensure high quality and adherence to protocol. The survey data will be collected by The Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) and Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC).

MISTI is committed to ensuring that data is reliable and the program methodology is robust. Therefore, we will continuously seek to improve quality of the survey data collection and our own validation exercise.

### Key Changes from Wave 2 Validations

After the experience of validating the Wave 2 MISTI Survey, MISTI decided to make the following changes to the protocol:

- MISTI will increase the number of provinces and districts validated
- Female Validators will be hired in order to validate some of the work done by female Surveyors
- MISTI Validators will inform ACSOR Supervisors of their arrival in the District 48 hours in advance. They will also tell them the days they will be conducting validations but not where or who they will be validating
- ACSOR's Supervisors, upon being informed of a Validator's arrival, should contact all ACSOR Surveyors to let them know a MISTI Validator is in the area for X number of days to conduct validations of the fieldwork. He should also let them know that if they are selected for validation then they will be contacted early on the morning of the validation by the Supervisor and MISTI Validator and asked to arrange a time and place to meet...either on the way to the village or in the village itself. Surveyors should also be reminded to cooperate fully with the Validator and to let them complete their work without interference, especially back-checks with respondents
- The day before each validation, the MISTI Validator will go over the following day's survey work – villages, interviewers, etc. – with the Supervisor. He/she will then select one village for validation but will not inform the Supervisor which village and Interviewer/s have been selected until early the following morning (NLT 07:00)
- The Supervisor and Validator will then contact the Interviewer/s to arrange a time and place to meet
- To ensure that Validators go to the locations, they will carry GPS devices and be required to take readings
- The communication plan will explain the types of critical findings that MISTI will share immediately and the types of concerns ACSOR and AYC should share immediately, so as to improve coordination and quality
- MISTI will observe more of the trainings, both in Kabul and in the field
- ACSOR/AYC should conduct training for at least 2 full days for Supervisors and Surveyors with group-work (e.g., role playing) included.

### Methodology:

#### Validator selection and training

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MISTI will attempt to hire male and female Validators in validation provinces. In general, MISTI will cover more districts and provinces than in the previous validation. MISTI's M&E department will conduct two full days of training of Validators to include group and field work. The training will take place in Kabul or in each of the regional provinces. The training will cover the following topics:

- A-Short information regarding MISTI project
- B-Short information about ACSOR/AYC work relative to MISTI
- C-Validation objectives
- D-Validation methodology
  - D.1- Coordination, planning with ACSOR/AYC provincial team
  - D.2- Communication and introduction with community, ACSOR team, MISTI
  - D.3- Validation forms (Annex B and C) use and submission process
  - D.4- Daily and final reporting
  - D.5- Observation of ACSOR/AYC Surveyors
  - D.6- ACSOR survey method: random walk, starting points, respondents selection, etc.
  - D.7-Short discussion of MISTI questionnaire
- E. Group work exercises
- F. How to use GPS devices
- G. Admin/finance issues

#### Observation of the ACSOR/AYC training

---

MISTI M&E and Validation staff will attend the ACSOR and AYC Wave 3 Survey training in Kabul and several provinces. In order to facilitate travel, ACSOR and AYC should notify MISTI of their training schedule as soon as possible; at a minimum, 3 days is required to plan for staff to observe the training. AYC and ACSOR will provide the training topics that they want to cover in their training. MISTI will develop a short form to guide observers.

#### Validation Planning

---

ACSOR and AYC Kabul offices will provide a survey schedule including the dates of fieldwork in each district and the contact details of their Supervisors and Surveyors (by district). MISTI will use this information to schedule district visits by Validators. MISTI's Validation Manager will inform ACSOR and the District Supervisor of a Validator's arrival in a district at least 48 hours prior to the Validator's arrival. AYC and ACSOR will update the Validation Manager regarding any changes in the scheduling of fieldwork.

The afternoon/evening before a validation the MISTI Validator and ACSOR Supervisor will meet to go over the following day's survey work. The MISTI Validator will select one village for validation but will not tell the ACSOR Supervisor until ca. 07:00 the following morning – the morning of the validation. The Supervisor and Validator will then contact the Surveyor to arrange a time and place to meet either on the way to the village or in the village itself.

## Coordination and Daily Reporting

---

Validators will provide a daily report of progress and major problems to the MISTI Validation Manager. The Validation Manager will share all major problems with ACSOR Survey Manager at the end of each day. Major problems include issues such as:

- Validator unable to locate Surveyor
- Surveyors filling in forms fraudulently
- Surveyors who take an abnormally short amount of time to complete interviews
- Surveyors who do not understand how to pick a starting point, how to do the random walk, or how to do the Kish Grid
- Surveyors who do not follow any other major guidelines.

ACSOR's and AYC's Survey Manager will share all problems or suggestions with the Validation Manager at the end of each day.

**ANNEX A**

**MONITORING FORM for ACSOR Survey**

Validator Name		Surveyor Name	
District			
Village			
Sampling point #		Direct observation <input type="checkbox"/>	Back check <input type="checkbox"/>
No. of interviews observed		House #	<input type="checkbox"/>
Date			

1. Was this sampling point scheduled? **Yes**  **No**

*If no, how was it chosen?*

2. Was the starting point chosen according to protocol? **Yes**  **No**

3. Was the random walk done according to protocol? **Yes**  **No**

4. Was the household selected according to protocol? **Yes**  **No**

*If no, explain:*

5. Was the respondent chosen using the Kish Grid? **Yes**  **No**

*If no, explain:*

6. Was the interviewee read the disclosure statement? **Yes**  **No**

*If no, explain (and go to next section):*

7. Were both versions of the questionnaire administered in equal numbers in the village?  
(Eight of each version) **Yes**  **No**

*If no, explain:*

8. Were you able to conduct a check with the respondent? **Yes**  **No**

**IF YES:**

g. Did the Surveyor complete the questionnaire form? **Yes**  **No**

h. Were the topics discussed survey topics? **Yes**  **No**

i. Did the respondent have any complaints? **Yes**  **No**

*If yes, explain:*

9. Did the Supervisor receive the questionnaires from the interviewers? **Yes**  **No**

*If no, explain:*

10. Did the Supervisor check the questionnaires for completeness/quality? **Yes**  **No**

*If no, explain:*

## APPENDIX C: STABILITY INDEX SCORES (WAVE 3)

1 = very negative 5 = very positive											ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
Weights	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index	M36	0.10	0.05	
Charikar*	4.92	3.54	3.82	4.01	3.68	3.20	1.18	4.95	3.76	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.07
Salang	4.96	3.69	4.06	3.95	3.86	3.07	1.29	4.98	3.85	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.13
Sayed Abad	2.44	2.95	3.22	2.68	3.11	3.60	2.28	2.18	2.98	1.45	3.00	1.00	2.73
Chak	1.97	2.49	3.05	2.62	3.06	3.07	2.25	2.69	2.83	1.52	2.00	4.00	2.68
Nerkh	2.42	3.16	3.13	2.84	3.02	3.59	2.44	2.70	3.03	1.26	3.00	3.00	2.85
Jalrez	3.31	3.00	3.33	3.27	3.12	3.99	2.23	3.12	3.29	1.52	3.00	4.00	3.12
Baraki Barak	2.57	2.48	3.85	2.54	3.68	4.11	1.05	2.31	3.24	1.23	1.00	4.00	2.85
Muhammad Aghah	2.55	2.91	3.62	2.96	3.22	3.70	1.28	3.57	3.26	2.89	4.00	3.00	3.28
Khushi	2.87	1.98	3.36	2.74	3.03	3.48	1.15	3.39	3.03	3.19	3.00	5.00	3.15
Qarabagh	3.74	3.30	3.48	3.48	3.48	4.00	1.75	2.69	3.40	3.24	3.00	2.00	3.27
Andar	1.38	1.57	3.49	2.45	3.74	2.26	1.08	1.26	2.64	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.23
Ghazni	3.60	3.92	3.81	3.48	3.64	4.43	1.43	3.23	3.65	4.23	5.00	1.00	3.71
Gelan	3.50	3.61	3.42	3.56	3.38	4.11	1.24	3.09	3.41	2.28	2.00	3.00	3.13
Muqur	3.27	2.89	3.50	3.20	3.29	3.38	1.71	2.75	3.20	2.80	2.00	2.00	2.98
Deh Yak	3.11	2.81	3.28	3.33	3.38	3.37	1.27	2.91	3.15	3.24	3.00	3.00	3.13
Jaghatu (Bahram-e Shahid)	3.93	4.14	4.06	3.60	3.75	4.28	1.37	3.72	3.81	4.22	3.00	5.00	3.83
Khwajah Omari	3.75	4.01	4.30	3.90	3.67	4.37	1.39	3.60	3.90	4.63	5.00	4.00	4.09
Zurmat	3.25	1.83	2.53	2.37	2.82	3.74	1.72	2.67	2.71	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.38
Sayed Karam	4.25	3.98	3.59	3.68	3.59	3.17	1.46	3.55	3.48	3.01	4.00	4.00	3.51
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	2.56	2.72	3.14	3.00	3.20	2.65	1.32	3.32	2.93	3.27	2.00	5.00	2.98
Waz Drazadran	2.57	2.13	2.49	2.29	3.12	3.09	1.27	2.72	2.59	1.05	1.00	5.00	2.40
Ahmad Abad	4.22	4.03	3.76	3.81	3.71	3.50	1.45	3.87	3.65	3.67	4.00	4.00	3.71
Shwak	3.08	3.25	3.32	2.97	3.28	3.36	1.28	2.99	3.12	2.07	2.00	5.00	3.00

1 = very negative 5 = very positive											ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
Weights	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index	M36	0.10	0.05	
Sabari (Ya qubi)	2.87	2.05	3.47	2.89	3.65	2.44	1.01	1.73	2.86	1.30	1.00	2.00	2.47
Tani	3.79	3.39	3.73	3.49	3.70	3.57	1.47	3.96	3.56	3.48	4.00	3.00	3.57
Mando Zayi	4.24	3.74	3.69	3.53	3.65	4.00	1.71	4.37	3.70	3.82	5.00	4.00	3.86
Terezayi	3.54	3.06	3.52	3.25	3.58	3.31	1.49	3.65	3.34	4.72	4.00	3.00	3.53
Gorbuz	3.75	3.33	3.59	3.41	3.58	3.73	1.47	3.96	3.51	2.65	4.00	4.00	3.50
Jaji Maidan	3.80	3.43	3.77	3.52	3.70	3.64	1.42	4.04	3.60	3.55	5.00	4.00	3.75
Bak	3.83	3.37	3.45	3.40	3.58	3.53	1.28	3.63	3.40	1.86	3.00	3.00	3.18
Shamal (Dwamunda)	3.93	3.45	3.62	3.46	3.63	3.57	1.34	3.80	3.50	4.06	3.00	5.00	3.58
Sawkai	4.09	3.97	3.65	3.72	3.47	3.30	1.14	3.70	3.50	2.51	3.00	3.00	3.33
Khas Kunar	4.26	4.21	3.73	3.74	3.46	3.17	1.16	4.15	3.57	3.76	3.00	4.00	3.56
Narang	3.79	3.55	3.97	3.75	3.68	3.73	1.15	3.53	3.64	4.04	3.00	4.00	3.64
Shigal wa Sheltan	4.48	4.08	3.70	4.02	3.55	3.76	1.39	3.91	3.70	2.71	2.00	3.00	3.39
Sarkani	4.28	4.12	3.90	3.86	3.50	3.28	1.16	3.60	3.60	3.21	2.00	2.00	3.32
Marawara	4.40	4.22	3.69	3.89	3.50	3.84	1.21	3.80	3.66	3.87	2.00	1.00	3.38
Puli Khumri	4.44	3.94	3.95	3.63	3.84	3.79	2.06	4.57	3.85	3.65	5.00	2.00	3.86
Baghlan i Jadid	3.96	3.90	3.83	3.44	3.80	3.98	1.62	3.83	3.69	3.08	2.00	2.00	3.38
Doshi	4.43	4.01	3.84	3.54	3.82	3.51	1.84	4.27	3.72	4.14	5.00	4.00	3.91
Imam Sahib	3.87	3.74	3.73	3.60	3.41	4.11	1.76	3.56	3.61	3.18	4.00	4.00	3.63
Kunduz	4.27	3.89	3.66	3.76	3.50	4.39	2.13	3.74	3.73	3.74	5.00	1.00	3.73
Khanabad	3.91	3.92	3.54	3.42	3.22	3.96	1.93	3.92	3.53	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.41
Dash Arche	1.86	1.59	2.77	2.40	3.44	3.63	1.04	2.58	2.73	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.40
Char Darah	3.78	3.76	3.68	3.41	3.39	4.26	1.74	3.54	3.58	2.87	4.00	2.00	3.47
Ali Abad	4.15	3.78	3.65	3.50	3.31	4.27	1.94	3.83	3.63	3.32	3.00	5.00	3.61
Aybak	4.68	4.61	4.03	3.94	3.85	4.28	2.06	4.78	4.07	4.81	5.00	5.00	4.28
Qadis	4.35	4.37	4.31	3.98	3.88	4.76	1.36	3.84	4.07	2.74	4.00	4.00	3.93
Ab-e Kamari	4.11	4.53	4.31	3.97	3.84	4.84	1.23	4.29	4.11	3.06	5.00	5.00	4.14
Moqur	3.68	3.73	4.07	3.32	3.61	4.45	1.08	3.16	3.67	2.97	3.00	4.00	3.55

1 = very negative 5 = very positive											ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
Weights	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index	M36	0.10	0.05	
Shindand	3.12	3.05	3.03	2.85	3.14	3.47	1.76	3.26	3.05	2.86	3.00	2.00	2.97
Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	2.96	3.46	3.28	2.75	3.34	3.12	1.96	3.98	3.18	4.22	3.00	4.00	3.31
Pashtun Zarghun	3.21	3.24	3.30	2.80	3.24	3.55	2.15	3.54	3.21	3.93	3.00	4.00	3.30
Farah	2.96	3.66	3.74	3.14	3.68	3.89	1.51	3.63	3.50	3.89	5.00	2.00	3.61
Bala Boluk	1.36	1.89	3.60	2.66	3.66	2.13	1.00	2.08	2.77	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.48
Pusht Rod	2.47	2.92	3.08	2.75	3.24	3.23	1.28	3.15	2.96	2.48	2.00	3.00	2.82
Khak-e-Safayd	3.09	2.52	3.30	3.08	2.70	4.31	1.80	2.81	3.15	2.22	2.00	4.00	2.99
Zaranj	3.91	3.72	3.57	3.82	3.38	4.24	1.91	4.53	3.72	4.49	5.00	4.00	3.94
Nad 'Ali	4.01	3.99	4.06	4.05	3.55	3.99	1.07	2.87	3.70	2.21	3.00	1.00	3.34
Nahr-i-Saraj	4.04	4.02	4.13	3.99	3.66	4.02	1.08	2.95	3.74	2.42	3.00	1.00	3.40
Garmser	4.59	4.60	4.51	4.49	4.01	4.51	1.02	3.73	4.19	2.32	3.00	3.00	3.82
Kajaki	2.22	2.09	2.73	2.40	3.13	2.47	1.46	2.53	2.56	1.79	2.00	4.00	2.50
Lash Kar Gah	4.12	4.01	4.05	3.92	3.81	4.00	1.11	3.84	3.82	3.92	2.00	2.00	3.56
Sangin	2.04	2.21	2.97	1.84	3.12	2.60	1.38	2.64	2.57	1.42	2.00	1.00	2.32
Musa Qala	2.32	2.21	3.28	2.29	3.23	3.02	1.65	3.17	2.89	1.72	2.00	1.00	2.59
Spin Boldak	3.81	3.62	3.72	3.28	3.44	4.25	2.01	2.91	3.53	2.06	4.00	4.00	3.45
Panjwai	3.10	2.97	3.34	3.10	3.14	4.35	1.74	2.79	3.26	2.06	3.00	1.00	3.00
Zhari	2.85	3.09	3.55	3.08	3.29	3.86	2.19	2.70	3.27	2.97	3.00	2.00	3.15
Arghandab	3.42	3.12	3.66	3.29	3.39	4.38	1.54	2.64	3.42	1.90	4.00	3.00	3.31
Maiwand	4.13	3.73	3.88	3.59	3.49	4.55	2.08	2.57	3.66	3.33	2.00	1.00	3.33
Shah Wali Kot	3.30	3.18	3.45	3.18	3.07	3.82	2.44	2.67	3.26	1.82	2.00	2.00	2.93
Daman	3.99	3.53	3.45	3.49	3.55	4.10	1.48	3.39	3.50	3.78	4.00	4.00	3.60
Shah Joy	2.39	2.47	2.58	2.44	3.60	2.37	2.18	2.12	2.60	2.09	3.00	4.00	2.66
Qalat	2.86	2.90	2.97	2.91	3.31	2.91	2.31	2.53	2.92	2.11	3.00	4.00	2.90
Tarnak Wa Jaldak	3.29	2.54	2.95	3.05	2.91	3.63	1.53	3.63	3.06	1.85	3.00	5.00	3.03
Tirin Kot	4.52	4.19	3.79	3.90	3.64	4.40	1.63	3.51	3.79	3.44	4.00	4.00	3.79
Chorah	4.36	4.26	4.18	3.96	3.82	4.43	1.64	3.26	3.92	3.26	3.00	4.00	3.77

1 = very negative 5 = very positive											ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (May-Aug 13)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index	M36			
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>1.50</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Dehrawud	4.59	4.43	4.37	4.14	3.99	4.59	1.50	3.56	4.10	3.34	3.00	5.00	3.96
Chaghcharan	3.73	3.20	3.10	3.28	3.25	3.91	2.44	3.35	3.30	2.83	5.00	3.00	3.41
Shahrak	3.54	3.32	3.01	3.17	3.03	3.65	2.01	3.19	3.14	1.69	2.00	5.00	2.98
Dand	3.94	3.41	3.67	3.52	3.54	4.26	1.60	3.05	3.55	2.99	4.00	5.00	3.61
Lajah-Mangal	2.19	2.45	3.08	3.00	3.28	3.62	1.39	2.55	2.96	2.72	2.00	5.00	2.95

\* Light blue indicates the seven control districts

## APPENDIX D: STABILITY INDEX COMPONENTS, VARIABLES, WEIGHTS AND RESCALING

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
<b>Component A. MISTI Survey Index (0.75% of Stability Index)</b>						
1	<b>7a. Percent of Afghans reporting their area has become more stable</b>	0.25				
			Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	5.000	1. Much more secure	5
					2. Somewhat more secure	5
					3. About the same	missing
					4. Somewhat less secure	1
					5. Much less secure	1
2	<b>7b. Percent of Afghans reporting their district is moving in the right direction</b>	0.25	Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	5.000	1. Right direction (a lot)	5
					2. Right direction (a little)	5
					3. Wrong direction (a little)	1
					4. Wrong direction (a lot)	1
					97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)	missing
3	<b>7c. Percent of Afghans reporting increased confidence in their local government</b>	1.50	Q8. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	0.500	1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.	5
					2. The Afghan government is not well regarded in this area.	1
			Q9b. How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? District Government	1.500	1. A lot of confidence	5
					2. Some confidence	5
					3. Not much confidence	1

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
					4. No confidence at all	1
			Q10b. How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? District Government	0.500	1. Very responsive	5
					2. Somewhat responsive	5
					3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
					4. Very unresponsive	1
			Q11b. Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? District Government	0.250	1. Improved a lot	5
					2. Improved a little	5
					3. No change	missing
					4. Worsened a little	1
					5. Worsened a lot	1
			(Filtered) Q12b. How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly?	0.125	1. A lot of confidence	5
					2. Some confidence	5
					3. Not much confidence	1
					4. No confidence at all	1
			(Filtered) Q12c. How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area?	0.125	1. Very responsive	5
					2. Somewhat responsive	5
					3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
					4. Very unresponsive	1
			(Filtered) Q12d. And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	0.125	1. Improved a lot	5

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
					2. Improved a little	5
					3. No change	missing
					4. Worsened a little	1
					5. Worsened a lot	1
			(Filtered) Q13b. How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council?	0.125	1. A lot of confidence	5
					2. Some confidence	5
					3. Not much confidence	1
					4. No confidence at all	1
			(Filtered) Q13c. How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area?	0.125	1. Very responsive	5
					2. Somewhat responsive	5
					3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
					4. Very unresponsive	1
			(Filtered) Q13d. And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	0.125	1. Improved a lot	5
					2. Improved a little	5
					3. No change	missing
					4. Worsened a little	1
					5. Worsened a lot	1
			Q14a-g. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion. (Averaged)	1.500		
			Q14a.		1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.	5

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
					2. The District Government officials in this district are <b>not</b> from this district.	1
			Q14b.		1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.	5
					2. The District Government does not understand the problems of people in this area.	1
			Q14c.		1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.	5
					2. The District Government does not care about the people in this area.	1
			Q14d.		1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	1
					2. District Government officials in this district do not abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	5
			Q14e.		1. District Government officials visit this area.	5
					2. District Government officials do not visit this area.	1
			Q14f.		1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.	5
					2. In general, the District Government officials are not doing their jobs honestly.	1
			Q14g.		1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.	5

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
					2. The District Government <b>does not</b> deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.	1
4	7d. Percent of Afghans reporting that their quality of life has changed for the better	0.75				
			Q26. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	0.750	1. Very satisfied	5
					2. Somewhat satisfied	5
					3. Somewhat dissatisfied	1
					4. Very dissatisfied	1
			Q27. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	0.750	1. Very satisfied	5
					2. Somewhat satisfied	5
					3. Somewhat dissatisfied	1
					4. Very dissatisfied	1
			Q28. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	0.500	1. Increased a lot	5
					2. Increased a little	5
					3. Stayed the same	missing
					4. Decreased a little	1
					5. Decreased a lot	1
			Q29. How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year?	0.500	1. Not worried	5
					2. A little worried	3
					3. Very worried	1
			Q30. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to	1.000	1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my	5

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			your opinion.		future.	
					2. The situation in this area is <b>too uncertain</b> for me to make plans for my future.	1
			Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1.500	1. Much more secure	5
					2. Somewhat more secure	5
					3. About the same	missing
					4. Somewhat less secure	1
					5. Much less secure	1
5	<b>7e. Percent of Afghans reporting that resilience has improved in their local area</b>	0.75				
			(Filtered) Q34c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village?	0.500	1. Often	5
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2
					4. Never	1
			(Filtered) Q35c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village?	0.375	1. Often	5
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2
					4. Never	1
			Q36. When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem?	1.000	1. Often	5
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
					4. Never	1
			Q37a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?	0.375	1. Often	5
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2
					4. Never	1
			Q38. How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government?	0.500	1. Very effective	5
					2. Somewhat effective	5
					3. Somewhat ineffective	1
					4. Very ineffective	1
			Q39a. Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together?	0.250	1. "Yes"	5
					2. "No"	1
			Q9. How much confidence do you have in your <i>[Insert Position/Organization]</i> ?		1. A lot of confidence	5
			a) District Governor	0.250	2. Some confidence	5
			b) District Government	0.250	3. Not much confidence	1
			c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	0.250	4. No confidence at all	1
			d) Provincial Governor	0.250		
			Q10. How responsive do you think your <i>[Insert Item]</i> is/are to the needs of the local people in this area?		1. Very responsive	5

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			a) District Governor	0.250	2. Somewhat responsive	5
			b) District Government	0.250	3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
			c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	0.250	4. Very unresponsive	1
			d) Provincial Governor	0.250		
6	7.2.1c. Percent of Afghans reporting improved GIROA-delivery of basic services	0.75				
			Q15. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year?	5.000	1. Improved a lot	5
					2. Improved a little	5
					3. Not changed	missing
					4. Worsened a little	1
					5. Worsened a lot	1
7	7.2.1d. Percent of Afghans reporting corruption in their local government	0.25				
			Q23. Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?	5.000	1. Yes	1
					2. "No"	5
8	Presence of Armed Opposition Groups	0.50	Q.6.1d. How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area? Armed Opposition Groups	5.000	1. A lot	1
					2. Some	3
					3. None	5
	<b>Total weight</b>	5.00				
<b>Component B. Area Control (0.10% of Stability Index) (observation by survey enumerators)</b>						
	<b>Area Control (M-36)</b>		ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported		1	5

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
			ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night		2	4
			ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly		3	2
			Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay		4	1
			Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all		5	1
			Local arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all		6	4
			There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or arbaki controlling this village		7	5
<b>Component C. ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (0.10% of Stability Index)</b>						
	<b>ACSOR Accessibility Tracker</b>		Completely safe		1	5
			Safe		2	4
			Somewhat safe but sometimes problems. Women enumerators can work here.		3	3
			Unsafe. Women enumerators cannot work here.		4	2
			Totally unsafe. Inaccessible.		5	1

	Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var weight	Values	Rescale 1=vn; 5=vp
<b>Component D. Security Incidents Score (0.05% of Stability Index)</b>						
	<b>Security Incidents</b>		Security incidents (May-Aug 2013)		0-10	5
					11-25	4
					26-50	3
					51-100	2
					101-150	1