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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SCALE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE OUT-OF-SCHOOL YOUTH LIVELIHOODS INITIATIVE IN HAITI (IDEJEN)

*IDEJEN: INITIATIVE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DES JEUNES EN DEHORS DU
MILIEU SCOLAIRE*

DRAFT 4.0

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASEC	Assemblée de Section communale
CASEC	Conseil d'Administration de la Section communale
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CDCJ	Centre du Développement de Carrières des Jeunes (Youth Career Development Center)
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
DAC	Development Assistance Countries
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
EA	Ecole Atelier (Trade School)
EDC	Education Development Center
EFA	Education for All
GAO	General Accountability Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GOH	Government of Haiti
HYRA	Haiti Youth Reconstruction Academy
IDB/MIF	Inter-American Development Bank/Multilateral Investment Fund
IDEJEN	L'Initiative pour le Développement des Jeunes en dehors du Milieu Scolaire
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IGA	Income-Generating Activity
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
INDEPCO	Institut National pour le Développement et la Promotion de la Couture (Tailoring)
INFP	Institut National de la Formation Professionnelle (National Institute for Vocational Training)
JENKA	<i>Jèn Nan Konstriksyon Ayiti</i> (Acronym in Kréyol for HYRA/YHRA)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MARNDR	Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural
MENFP	Ministère de l'Education National et la Formation Professionnelle (Ministry of National Education and Technical Training)
MJSAC	Ministry of Youth, Sports and Civic Action
MSI	Management Systems International
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NFBE	Non-Formal Basic Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
S&S	Scale and Sustainability
SOW	Scope of Work
SSA	Scale and Sustainability Assessment
TA	Technical Assistance
TOT	Training of Trainers
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
YBI	YouthBuild International
YHRA	YouthBuild Haiti Reconstruction Academy (<i>same as HYRA but names vary among documents</i>)

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LOCATIONS OF IDEJEN/JENKA ECOLES ATELIERS (MAP)



GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Accompaniment: Activities intended to provide on-going support to youth program participants following a period of non-formal basic education; they include practical training (internships and apprenticeships), coaching for micro-enterprise start-ups, career counseling, and any other activities designed to facilitate the transition from learning to earning.

Capacity Building: The process of strengthening local institutions, transferring technical skills, and promoting appropriate policies. (USAID; 2011b, p. 2)

Community Mapping: “Community youth mapping is a youth-centered, participatory development strategy that engages young people and adults in canvassing their communities to document community-based resources, needs, and opportunities... The resulting information describes the youth’s living conditions and economic situations as seen by youth ... and members of their communities... Youth mapping has been used ...to address a variety of issues that include education reform, livelihood development, anti-trafficking, community strengthening, and peace and security” (Kaufman, 2011). The results can affect the design and priorities of development interventions and can suggest optimal types and methods of support for community development goals.

Cost-Benefit Analyses: Studies of the relationship between project costs and outcomes, with both costs and outcomes expressed in monetary terms. (Rossi & Freeman, 1993, p. 2)

Cost-Effectiveness Analyses: Studies of the relationship between project costs and outcomes, expressed as costs per unit of outcome achieved. (Rossi & Freeman, 1993, p. 2)

Entrepreneurship: The capacity and willingness to undertake conception, organization, and management of a productive venture with all attendant risks, while seeking profit as a reward. (Weidemann Associates, Inc., 2011, p. 7)

Gini Index: “Measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution” (World Bank, n.d.).

Impact Evaluation: An evaluation design that measures the change in a development outcome that is attributable to a defined intervention. Impact evaluations are based on models of cause and effect, and require a credible and rigorously defined counterfactual to control for factors other than the intervention that might account for the observed change. Impact evaluations in which comparisons are made between beneficiaries that are randomly assigned to either a treatment or a control group provide the strongest evidence of a relationship between the intervention under study and the outcome measured. (USAID, 2011a, p. 1)

Kréyol: Kréyol, which is derived mostly from French, is one of several Creole languages worldwide.

Life Skills: These skills fall into three basic categories: (1) social or inter-personal, (2) cognitive and (3) emotional coping skills. (Naudeau, Cunningham, Lundberg, McGinnis 2008, p. 81) They are among the building blocks of social capital.

Outcome: A higher level or end result, an impact. Development objectives should be outcomes. An outcome results from a combination of outputs; therefore, it is expected to have a positive impact on and lead to change in the development situation of the host country. (USAID 2011, p. 71)

Outputs: Intermediate results and results that are a means to a higher end. Delivery of training, for example, is an output since it is a means to an end that, when reached, will have an impact. Outputs include things like number of tools delivered or number of workshops held, while an outcome is the effect of the use of the tools or the knowledge gained in the workshop.

Performance Evaluation: Focuses on descriptive and normative questions such as what a particular project or program has achieved (either at an intermediate point in implementation or at the conclusion of an implementation period); how it is being implemented; how it is perceived and valued; whether expected results are occurring. (USAID, 2011a, p. 1)

Reintegration: For IDEJEN, reintegration refers to the process of social and economic inclusion of at-risk and marginalized youth into Haitian communities where they attain higher social status and improved economic conditions or at least an improved capacity to seek better livelihoods.

Scale: The relative measurement of the size of a response in comparison to a size of a problem area or area of need

Scaling Up: Hartmann and Linn (2008) define scaling up as “expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs or projects in different places and over time to reach a greater number of people.” Scaling up refers to the capacity of a project, as designed, to increase the quantity of outputs over time.

Social Capital: The network of interpersonal relationships and community bonds that facilitates cooperative behavior and expands the potential for mutually beneficial activities that foster more harmonious societal interactions. Higher levels of social capital facilitate development.

Sustainability: The ability to continue to deliver activities or services over an indefinite time period as a result of capacity to generate the necessary resources (human, financial, etc.) for these purposes.

Work Readiness Skills: Skills that help youth to find and obtain employment, such as the ability to describe skills and interests, set career goals, write a resume, search for a job, and contact employers, as well as “soft skills” such as problem-solving and teamwork. (USAID, 2012a, p. 23)

Youth Mapping: See "community mapping" listing in this Glossary.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A decade ago the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) made a commitment to the poorest people in the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere; a commitment that would endure through multiple phases, multiple cyclones, multiple political crises and an epic earthquake. The commitment was simple: to help young people whose lives had been afflicted by poverty and despair to regain hope; whose expectations for a better life were frustrated by the realities of inequality and exploitation to gain a skill and a better future. This commitment was made to Haiti's most marginalized, least educated and most vulnerable youth. USAID staff in 2003 understood that they could not impose a solution; indeed, they did not even have a solution or grasp the intricacies of youth survival in Haiti. Therefore, they started small and engaged local people to participate in a shared journey to mutual understanding and action. The pilot phase of The Haiti Out-of-School Youth Livelihoods Project (IDEJEN) tested ideas, experimented with different approaches, mapped local communities and engaged local people as advocates for at-risk out-of-school youth. These people became champions of the most significant effort in all of Haiti to reintegrate marginalized youth into their communities, to deliver skills training and to improve livelihoods.

IDEJEN confronted the frustrations of the nation's 15–24-year-olds, the limitations of a stagnant economy, the cynicism of many employers about the comportment of such marginalized youth, and the incapacity of a national government burdened by political crises and a history of indifference. Despite these prodigious constraints, IDEJEN managed to build the capacities of community-based organizations (CBOs), improve curricula, train youth in bankable skills, and help some toward economic self-sufficiency. While the record is mixed, the results for those who benefited were transformational: new incomes were generated and new lives were built.

This Scale and Sustainability Assessment (SSA) attempts to understand the journey of IDEJEN from 2003 to the present in order to determine to what extent the model achieved scale and sustainability and which key factors contributed to this outcome. It examines the project's activities and results; the project's institutional, technical, socio-cultural and financial features; and how the project has evolved since the end of USAID funding. It then makes recommendations to improve youth livelihoods' projects and highlights lessons learned. The purpose of the study is both to inform future project design and to plan for continued work in this area in Haiti and possibly elsewhere. The goal is also to understand the interactions of the project's many stakeholders in order to enable them to use available resources more deftly and sustainably to benefit at-risk and marginalized out-of-school youth. The participation of these stakeholders in the analysis has been critical to the assessment, and their insights are reflected throughout this report.

The IDEJEN model began in 2003 as a pilot project. By 2005, the project design had been tested, staff recruited, community leaders engaged, CBOs vetted, youth selection criteria developed, initial youth community mapping completed, and the delivery of youth services begun. IDEJEN was expected to achieve four results: the reintegration of marginalized youth into society; a strengthened CBO community better able to deliver quality training; strengthened Government of Haiti (GOH) institutions better able to facilitate and monitor the delivery of skills and the effective dissemination of HIV/AIDS messages. The target was at-risk and marginalized out-of-school youth who had from 0 to 4 or 5 years of education and were located in 8 of Haiti's 10 geographic Departments. The Education Development Center (EDC) received a cooperative agreement from USAID to implement IDEJEN and was the lead partner throughout the duration of USAID funding.

By 2006, 13 CBOs had trained 650 youth. By 2008, that number increased to 2,100 youth, and by 2010 to 10,300 youth served by up to 180 CBOs. Initially, IDEJEN provided 6 months of employability training in basic education and life skills followed by 6 months of vocational training. Early project evaluations pinpointed problems with retention of trainees and the limited results from training of this duration. Therefore, the model was modified to integrate and deliver employability and vocational training contemporaneously, while also extending the duration from 12 to 18 months in order to add 6 months of accompaniment. Accompaniment refers to initiatives to help youth gain entrepreneurship skills, experience

with micro-enterprise start up and development, coaching to secure jobs and internships and, for those who qualify, help with the transition back to school to attend fifth or sixth grade. IDEJEN set up career development centers at local Chambers of Commerce to deliver these services.

IDEJEN built CBO capacity by providing financial and material aid and training. It strengthened the GOH Ministry of Youth, Sports and Civic Action (MJSAC) and the National Institute for Vocational Training (INFP) by funding four key staff and by providing computer equipment and materials to enable the government to develop new and standardized curricula. This made it possible for the INFP to test and certify IDEJEN-trained youth—a key achievement because government vocational training schools require a ninth-grade education for admission. Before IDEJEN, no certification had been available to those with less education, even if they were trained in a vocation, making it difficult to be recognized and find work in a society that values paper credentials highly.

In April 2010, IDEJEN was incorporated as a Haitian non-governmental organization (NGO) in anticipation of the eventual end of USAID funding. In late 2010, other donors, led by the Inter-American Development Bank/Multilateral Investment Fund (IDB/MIF), decided to fund a vocational training effort in response to the massive earthquake of January of that year. The 5-year project was called *Jèn Nan Konstriksyon Ayiti* (JENKA) and implemented by YouthBuild International, which provided a sub-grant to IDEJEN. The program model and implementation approach that IDEJEN had developed under USAID funding shifted. The youth cohort eligible for training was changed from the youth ages 15–24 with less than a sixth-grade education to those with a grade 6 to grade 8 educational level, though in both cases disadvantaged youth were served. For budgetary reasons, the duration of training was reduced from 18 months to 12 months. The shorter training period is consistent with the global YBI training model as adapted for Haiti, though at a later date, an evaluation of the USAID/IDEJEN model found that even 18 months was too short to ensure optimal project results. IDEJEN/JENKA also moved away from using CBOs as training vehicles and, instead, supported the creation of 11 trade schools (Ecoles Ateliers), most in capitals of Departments (Haitian jurisdictions similar to states or provinces). This reduced IDEJEN's presence from 96 local districts (communes) to about 15. The goal was to build the long-term physical capacity of IDEJEN by constructing trade schools with funds initially from USAID and later mostly from smaller funding partners. This would improve the physical space for training and enable IDEJEN to operate the sites directly and in fewer locations, thereby reducing logistics, monitoring and other problems. In a few cases, IDEJEN still uses CBOs periodically as satellite training centers.

Out-of-school youth who already have a sixth- to eighth-grade education are thought to be more trainable and more likely to achieve better results on standardized INFP tests. By operating its own trade schools directly, IDEJEN staff believe they can better ensure outcomes and monitor activities and results.

For IDEJEN during both the USAID/EDC (2003–2011) and JENKA/YBI (2010–2015) periods, the most difficult challenge has been to ensure that training leads to sustainable improvements in livelihoods through income generation. The EDC Final Project Report stated that its least successful initiative was the promotion of entrepreneurship and micro-business. JENKA's experience mirrors that of EDC with income generation remaining the most difficult challenge, apparently despite the higher but still modest education levels of JENKA's trainees. Both models have had to operate in a challenging environment: a macro-economic environment characterized by a very small formal sector, a saturated informal sector, and a regulatory environment ranked by The World Bank as among the least conducive worldwide to business success. The socio-cultural and political environment was marked by acute fragility, where high-income inequality, pervasive violence, corruption and weak governance have combined to exacerbate economic constraints. And there were the physical and psychological consequences and challenges arising from repeated natural disasters.

Although sustained income generation is the key objective of the great majority of youth trained by IDEJEN and an objective of IDEJEN itself, the designs of the USAID-funded model and the JENKA model also define project success in broader terms. Other USAID objectives included building the capacity of the CBOs and ministries, using basic and life skills training to foster employment readiness, and delivering HIV/AIDS

messages. Such design elements were essential to help the project achieve its livelihoods objectives optimally. There have been notable successes: The MJSAC has internalized the IDEJEN concept of pro-active engagement with the most at-risk out-of-school youth and has set up its own schools targeting this youth cohort using GOH funds. The INFP continues to develop curricula and test youth who have less than a ninth-grade education. Many CBOs have proved resilient and have carried on with training activities using new capacities built with IDEJEN support. Thousands of youth are now more aware of the risks of HIV/AIDS and know how to protect themselves.

The short-term project outputs (training for youth) have been largely achieved, but the desired end result of enhanced and sustainable incomes supported by self-sustaining Haitian institutions remains the greatest challenge. In view of this, the overall strategy to improve livelihoods for the targeted cohort may need to be reconsidered.

The challenge is to design and execute a livelihoods project that first and foremost leads to increased income. To achieve this, project implementers need to have specific labor market information that is updated frequently and supported by youth community mapping that pinpoints opportunities. Next, they need the capacity to translate such knowledge rapidly and flexibly into relevant and high-quality training activities linked to likely and identified income sources such as paid jobs and micro-enterprises. IDEJEN now has some capacity to respond to this type of information (when it is available) and has engaged in some community mapping. However, if USAID or other donors are considering new or expanded support for out-of-school youth, especially for those with less than a sixth-grade education, a systems rather than a project approach may be more effective. This would require a more strategic, proactive, and comprehensive approach to building interest in the Haitian private sector and engaging it as a source of labor market information, as potential employers, as funding partners, and as intellectual partners having a say in an optimal and sustainable livelihoods strategy. The new USAID Local Enterprise and Value Chain Enhancement (LEVE) Project offers a framework for this type of engagement, and the USAID Annual Program Statement (APS) funding mechanism offers the flexibility needed to support a range of Haitian stakeholders able to deliver results. IDEJEN has an important and continuing role to play in the delivery of services to out-of-school youth, but it should not be viewed as the privileged partner or central institution mandated to address such a broad challenge.

In the attempt to build scale and sustainability at IDEJEN and in institutions in general, the temptation is sometimes to respond to each challenge by creating a new initiative or conducting another study. Institutions over time can take on too much and then find that they are unable to cope with the workload. For example, EDC reported that this was an issue during IDEJEN's scale up in 2008–2010. Therefore, given its current staff size and resource levels, it would be a lot to expect IDEJEN to manage 11 trade schools throughout Haiti, engage and provide capacity-building for CBOs, conduct labor market assessments and multiple youth mapping activities, raise funds, prepare strategic plans and reports for multiple donors, cultivate local advocates, and launch micro-enterprises. For this reason, it is recommended that if USAID decides to work with IDEJEN, that it does so in the context of a systems approach—one that reflects a national strategy and a decentralized approach to meet the livelihoods needs of out-of-school youth with tasks assigned to multiple stakeholders based on comparative advantage, specialized expertise, and technical and management capacity. However, due to structural obstacles in Haiti's operating environment, expectations will need to be managed and the timeframe for achieving a system-wide approach carefully negotiated. Since many youth did return to the formal education system after completing the IDEJEN training, this strategy should also reconsider how out-of-school youth who want to return to school can best be accommodated, and whether a livelihoods framework should be part of that effort.

Experience with the IDEJEN model offers several lessons that lead to recommendations for development practitioners—regardless of how out-of-school youth livelihoods' needs are addressed going forward. These include:

- Sustainability planning should be an integral part of the project design process if sustainability is a desired outcome. In the case of IDEJEN, sustainability planning did not keep up with the expansion of the initiative, that is, initial exploration of income-generating models for CBOs were not fully developed as service delivery expanded.
- A plan and methodology to assess and determine cost-effectiveness should be integrated throughout the project design, which includes baseline indicators, and project monitoring and reporting (including financial systems). While intimate knowledge of the project, financial landscape, and operating environment is helpful for such studies, data systems are also needed to provide the information necessary for analysis and planning. IDEJEN/EDC discussed cost-effectiveness internally, but did not conduct formal studies; a formalized approach is needed.
- An explicit and actionable gender equality plan should be included in the design and be a specific required element of project monitoring and reporting. Gender equality was an IDEJEN project goal, but both IDEJEN/EDC and IDEJEN/JENKA have had female participation rates well below 50 percent.
- A detailed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan, conceptualized during project design, adequately funded, and supported by effective capacity building in areas such as data collection and analysis is an element critical for developing eventual sustainability and scaling a model's elements. IDEJEN experienced difficulty developing and maintaining M&E capacity with an appropriate level of rigor for the project.
- Whether via IDEJEN and/or other institutions and approaches, the largest youth cohort in Haiti—out-of-school youth with less than a fifth-grade education—must be engaged on a long-term basis regardless of the difficulties in doing so. Members of the workforce development ecosystem (including government, quasi-government institutions, donors, TVET institutions, youth-serving organizations, and the private sector) would need to work together to ensure sustained engagement and develop a continuum of performance levels (e.g., benchmarks, compensation) for working with the marginalized. This would include building more flexibility into the formal education system in order to prevent youth from dropping out and building an NGO sector better prepared to undertake safety-net work that successfully returns out-of-school youth to the formal education system or provides an equivalent certificate.
- Performance-based standards are recommended for outcome-oriented results (e.g., number of youth gaining incomes after training), rather than outputs (e.g., number of youth trained). Such standards can form part of the basis of payment for entities that provide multiple pathways for youth, and a more aggressively negotiated basis of payment for specialized training providers. Too many youth involved with IDEJEN expressed frustration with receiving certificates that did not lead to incomes. Such standards would provide incentives to link the certification offerings to real-world needs, practical internships and hands-on training.
- Focus early and often on the private sector with a clear eye toward opportunities and constraints. If improved livelihoods are the goal, the private sector is the main driver for income generation. It is important to minimize the number of objectives and activities in order to enhance institutional effectiveness.
- A strong grasp of socio-cultural norms and expectations and a thorough understanding of environmental challenges facing out-of-school youth from their own perspectives are invaluable assets needed from the outset to help ensure greater project success. IDEJEN, which has had a Haitian director since the outset and has promoted youth participation, has these strengths.

- Some training for out-of-school youth could be separated from INFP standardized testing, especially for remote rural communities where an expanded skills menu and more immediate links to income generation may be appealing, especially to youth who have never attended school.
- In the long term, sustainability planning must include the entire technical and vocational ecosystem, especially local and national governments. The encouraging progress at MJSAC and INFP are examples of what can be achieved. Some local government officials, committees, and councils have mainly played the role of champions for IDEJEN, securing land and serving as advocates for assistance to out-of-school youth. While donors remain a key partner, support for out-of-school youth cannot rely solely on their presence. Doing so ignores the history of aid suspensions during periods of political crisis, the rise and fall of donor budgets, and changes in donor priorities as new crises demand urgent responses around the globe. An innovation to consider are incentives at the local government level for engagement and support to increase its base of champions and encourage their efforts.
- Expatriate technical and management expertise in countries with weak indigenous human capacity is essential for effective development outcomes, but capacity-building plans for local staff, benchmarks, and timelines for transition is critical and should be explicitly included in the original project design.
- Resilience and leadership by Haitians has been and is critical to the successes that IDEJEN has achieved. Despite cyclones and a devastating earthquake, social and economic constraints and attendant frustrations, IDEJEN's Haitian staff persevered where others might have despaired. Their example has in itself given hope to out-of-school youth and provided the vital ingredient of human will in the face of adversity.

I. INTRODUCTION

This report provides an assessment of the extent to which the Haiti Out-of-School Youth Livelihoods Initiative (IDEJEN),¹ funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), achieved scale and sustainability by the end of its project life in 2011 and the key factors contributing to this outcome. It examines whether the project generated a set of activities or services with a reach sufficient to achieve meaningful impact. It also examines how IDEJEN has evolved since the end of USAID funding. The report scrutinizes factors related to the project's institutional, technical, socio-cultural and financial features to determine their effects on and implications for scalability and sustainability after USAID funding ceased in July 2011. The assessment then makes recommendations to improve youth livelihoods projects and highlights lessons learned.

The study aims to shed light on what factors and actions promoted or constrained sustainability and the scale-up of activities to inform future project design and to plan for continued work in Haiti or possibly elsewhere, whether through IDEJEN or other modalities.

The purpose of the Scale and Sustainability Assessment (SSA) is also to understand the inter-actions of a plethora of stakeholders—national and local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), bilateral and multilateral donors, the private sector and other partners, as well as Haitian youth, their families and community leaders—in order to enhance the capacity of USAID and these others to implement activities that improve livelihoods for out-of-school youth. The assessment offers ideas based on its review of the IDEJEN and JENKA models to empower stakeholders to better use available resources to benefit at-risk and marginalized out-of-school youth. The participation of these stakeholders in the analysis has been critical to the assessment, and their insights are reflected throughout this report.

The SSA is not a project evaluation. Multiple internal and external evaluations of IDEJEN were completed during and at the end of the project.² However, the SSA uses these evaluations to assess IDEJEN's experience with and potential for greater scale and sustainability (S&S) and to compare these findings with those from the SSA field visit and two scale and sustainability studies.³ The SSA team used a variety of research methods including document review, key informant interviews, focus groups, site visits, and a short survey of CBOs. (See Annex I for the methodology.)

For this assessment, the term scale is defined as the relative measurement of the size of a response in comparison to a size of a problem area or area of need. “Scaling up means expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs or projects in different places and over time to reach a greater number of people” (Hartmann & Linn, 2008).⁴ Sustainability refers to the ability to continue to deliver a set of activities or services over an indefinite period of time as a result of capacity to generate resources for these purposes.

The analytical framework used for this study, which was

Box I: Analytical Factors*

1. Vision, values and priorities
2. Leadership
3. Constituencies for out-of-school youth
4. Policies, programs and projects
5. Institution building & exogenous factors
6. Incentives and accountability
7. Monitoring & evaluation
8. Evolution and approach

* From the USAID SA SOW based on Hartmann and Linn

1. IDEJEN, the “*Initiative pour le Développement des Jeunes en dehors du Milieu Scolaire*” is the French acronym for the project and is used throughout this report.

2. See Camoëns, R., & Morton, A. (2011, November). *Final External Assessment, Haiti Out-of-School Youth Livelihood Initiative*. Washington, DC: LTL Strategies; Janke, C., Kratzig, S., & Hershkowitz, A. (2012, February). *IDEJEN Final Report*. Boston: EDC and other evaluations listed in the bibliography.

3. See Hartmann, A., & Linn, J. (2008). *Scaling up: A Framework and Lessons for Development Effectiveness from Literature and Practice* [Working paper]. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; Cooley, L. & Kohl, R. (2006). *Scaling Up - From Vision to Large-Scale Change: A Management Framework for Practitioners*. Washington, DC: MSI.

4. See the Glossary of Terms for a further definition of scale and scaling up.

adapted mainly from the Hartmann and Linn Working Paper (2008), identifies eight factors that affect S&S. These are further defined by key questions, topics and points of inquiry linked to these factors. (See Annex 2.) Collectively, these are referred to as the variables or factors that have affected IDEJEN.

2. IDEJEN PROJECT SUMMARY

THE IDEJEN MODEL AND ITS EVOLUTION

In 2003, education and training opportunities for out-of-school youth in Haiti were largely unavailable. Government policies did not focus on at-risk and marginalized youth; youth education in low-income and often isolated rural areas was neglected; vocational education was available only to the 15 percent of youth completing a ninth-grade education; and other major donors⁵ were focused on other sectors.⁶ Many small NGOs and CBOs provided *ad hoc* non-formal skills training through apprenticeships and as ancillary activities linked to projects with other priorities, but these were not credentialed and, especially in a culture that values paper credentials, they were undervalued by trainees and employers. The USAID-funded IDEJEN model was an innovative and overdue response to a critical need. The distinguishing contribution of USAID at that time was to put the issue forward and then to work collaboratively and incrementally toward a workable model with full Haitian participation.

IDEJEN grew out of a visit to Haiti in September 2003 by a USAID team that had access to basic education funds for possible use in support of out-of-school youth. In November, a pre-launch workshop was held to consider options. At this stage, the current IDEJEN director had already been recruited, and she attended the workshop. During the workshop, a decision was made to assess the prospects for a pilot basic education project and to conduct a limited analysis of the labor market to provide context. Youth mapping—a practice in which young people are engaged in canvassing their communities to document community-based resources, needs, and opportunities available to youth—was undertaken. The Education Development Center (EDC) received a cooperative agreement through the EQUIP3 Leader With Associates mechanism to implement the project, and it remained the lead partner through the duration of USAID funding. By June 2004, the initial assessment and youth mapping had revealed that “out-of-school youth were more interested in technical and vocational training than basic education, so USAID provided an initial US\$100,000 of Economic Growth funds to complement available basic education funds.”⁷

Box 2: IDEJEN Timeline

Dates	Phase	No. Youth	No. CBOs
2003-04	Research	0	0
2004-06	Pilot	650	13
2006-08	Phase 1	2,100	31
2008-10	Phase 2	10,300	180*
2011-12	JENKA	2,613	12**
2012-14	JENKA	8,399***	10**

* 180 were involved for a very brief time; 110 became implementing partners as non-performing CBOs were dropped.
 ** Estimate. A few CBOs used as EA satellites. Number varies.
 ***Data from YouthBuild International

By March 2005, the IDEJEN initiative in Haiti had launched with staff recruited; community leaders engaged; CBOs vetted; criteria developed for selecting youth ages 15 to 24; and youth services begun. By the end of the pilot phase in 2006, 650 youth had been trained (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012).


5. The World Bank focused on water and sanitation, economic governance, electrification and the environment while the IDB approved three soft loans in November 2003 (US\$176.9m total) for transport infrastructure, irrigation and drainage for rice production and the Haiti Economic and Social Assistance Fund (US\$65m) to finance small social and productive projects in poor and isolated communities.

6. In 2003 the Annual OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Report (Paris: 2004) stated that DAC countries provided US\$163.63 million to Haiti of which US\$94.74 million was from the United States (58 percent), putting USAID in a strong position to alter the programming landscape in favor of out-of-school youth. USAID proceeded cautiously to test the model, but vigorously to modify the programming landscape in favor of the most disadvantaged youth. Other major bilateral donors in 2003 were France (US\$19.4m); Canada (US\$15.8m); the European Union (US\$10m) and the Netherlands (US\$4.5m). This was the immediate post-Aristide period when aid began to flow again (after suspensions) into a shrinking economy (GDP growth in 2002-03 was a negative 1.6 percent). In comparison, US\$70 million was budgeted for FY 2002, but the Mission spent just US\$30 million (poverty reduction \$7.1 million; health \$17.9 million, capacity development and governance at US\$2.5 million each).

7. Personal Communication, Melanie Sany, 2013.

The timeline in Box 2 shows the subsequent program expansion through two phases funded by USAID. It also shows the post-USAID period, which started on August 1, 2011 when the MasterCard Foundation, the Inter-American Development Bank/Multilateral Investment Fund (IDB/MIF) and others began funding a modified approach to out-of-school youth livelihoods programming with technical assistance from Youth Build International (YBI).⁸ See Box 8 (page 8) for more information on this time period.

IDEJEN continued to evolve in response to changing circumstances, lessons learned, and new opportunities until it became the model shown in Box 3. This model emerged through the efforts of the Haitian IDEJEN leadership with the support of EDC. However, in order to evaluate the role of USAID funds on scale and sustainability, this report assesses the USAID-funded model as it existed in 2010–11, when the focus was still on using CBOs to reach the least educated youth.



By the end of the pilot phase, IDEJEN had learned three key lessons:

- Youth needed evidence that their participation in basic education classes would lead to improvements in their lives as an incentive for continuing in the program.
- Many youth forfeited activities providing basic subsistence income to find time to attend IDEJEN classes, causing some to drop out.
- Youth who completed the pilot program continued to have difficulty finding work (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, p. 12).

8. USAID funding ended on March 31, 2011 but a no-cost extension was authorized through July 31, 2011. In anticipation of the end of USAID funding, IDEJEN was incorporated as an NGO in April 2010, four months after applying to the GOH for NGO status.

In response, the model was changed from 12 months (6 months of basic education followed by 6 months of technical training) to 18 months (12 months of integrated and simultaneous basic and technical training followed by 6 months of accompaniment) to improve employment outcomes. Accompaniment refers to activities that follow non-formal basic education and includes internships and apprenticeships, coaching for micro-enterprise start-ups, career counseling, etc., to facilitate the transition from learning to earning. IDEJEN also introduced hot meals to promote retention.⁹

From 2005 through 2011, IDEJEN delivered training through sub-grants to CBOs. The number of participating CBOs grew rapidly. (See Box 2.) IDEJEN looked for CBOs with demonstrated experience in community leadership and engagement rather than those with built technical capacity, reasoning that the latter was easier to build than the former. The CBOs' responsibilities included identifying an equal number of female and male youth with less than a fifth-grade education and finding a site for training. In many cases, training occurred at the CBOs' own facilities. Groups of 50 youths together received non-formal basic education (NFBE) training: basic literacy and numeracy, life skills in Kréyol (a Creole language), and level 1 technical training. The National Institute for Vocational Training (INFP) developed technical curricula with support from IDEJEN, backstopped by EDC. The CBOs, with IDEJEN's input, identified trainers who were skilled in active learning methodologies. Haiti is divided into 10 administrative Departments (similar to states or provinces), and trainers were drawn mostly from communities within 8 Departments, which were targeted on the basis of need, population size, and accessibility. Communities were selected based on whether a viable CBO was present that could cooperate with IDEJEN, and whether IDEJEN was able to identify local advocates. To avoid saturating small labor markets, IDEJEN asked youth to choose between two technical fields, which had been identified through community mapping.

IDEJEN opened 10 youth career development centers (CDCJs), located mostly in local Chambers of Commerce, that supported the follow-on accompaniment phase. CDCJ representatives met with youth at IDEJEN training sites in the final month of employability training to explain options for the accompaniment period. (See Box 4.) During the first expansion phase, IDEJEN also began referring to specialized training sites as Ecoles Ateliers (EAs) or trade schools offering additional technical preparation leading to level 2 INFP certification¹⁰. After the end of USAID funding, people started using the term EA for schools developed and managed in most cases directly by IDEJEN.

The designers of the IDEJEN model included substantial support for capacity building, which was eventually delivered to 183 CBOs and the Government of Haiti (GOH). Support for CBOs included financial and material aid and training (e.g., wages for trainers and staff accountants, equipment, curricula guides, and workshops on leadership and management). Although these interventions aimed to enable CBOs to deliver training, the project's focus was "on youth service delivery, not CBO sustainability" (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, pp. 16 & 27).

Box 4: Accompaniment Options

- Enter or return to primary school with IDEJEN providing a one-year scholarship (about US\$100).
- Continue technical training, mostly in construction or agriculture at one of 9 training sites set up by IDEJEN.
- Obtain an internship that might lead to a job.
- Attend entrepreneurship training for two weeks, develop a business plan and receive an IDEJEN grant of US\$100 per person within groups of 5-6 trainees starting a business. Support for six months from a CDCJ "entrepreneurship coach."

9. Feeding at the training sites was supported by the World Food Program, Catholic Relief Services and the NGO Food for the Poor.

¹⁰ Certification criteria vary by skill area with level 1 being the lowest certification level.

IDEJEN's primary capacity-building initiatives with the GOH were with the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Civic Action (MJSAC) and the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MENFP), particularly the National Institute for Technical Training (INFP). IDEJEN funded four key MENFP staff positions (two of which were at the INFP) and provided computer equipment and materials. This support enabled the INFP to develop 22 new curricula and adapt 5 more so that 27 curricula became available to IDEJEN-supported trainers at the CBOs by the end of USAID funding in 2011; this enabled INFP to test and certify IDEJEN-trained youth at level 1. INFP also worked with IDEJEN to prepare and test level 2 curricula for use at the EAs, and to create an accreditation process so these trade schools could be recognized officially as training institutions (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, pp. 19). This is noteworthy because INFP state vocational schools only admit trainees with a ninth-grade or higher education level. The new training process opened access for less educated youth not only to skills training but also to legitimized and certified training that is recognized by employers and society.

Effective implementation also required engagement with local stakeholders, especially community leaders of local CBOs, faith-based groups, government agencies, businesses, and other influential people. IDEJEN acted as an advocate for out-of-school youth and worked to understand the underlying socio-cultural barriers as well as the economic realities hampering youth reintegration. It convened national conferences on youth issues, held 20 youth regional consultation forums with the MJSAC, and disseminated messages on HIV/AIDS awareness to the out-of-school youth it trained.

The post-pilot phase evaluation of IDEJEN carried out in 2007 stated that IDEJEN had by then created a "holistic program aimed at facilitating the social and economic reintegration of out-of-school youth" (Beauvy & Dart-Lincoln, 2007, p.2). When interviewed for the study, "youth participants stated most frequently that they would like IDEJEN to help them get jobs (income), offer loans to start businesses and provide more technical skill development and business training" (Beauvy & Dart-Lincoln, 2007, p.2). This emphasis on jobs and income is consistent with the June 2004 pilot assessment as well as the EDC Final Report, which recommends future workforce development components that "explicitly set aside on-the-job training slots." SSA focus group meetings with youth beneficiaries confirmed the findings in the 2007 post-pilot phase evaluation as some of whom were clearly frustrated by their experiences in the formal and non-formal job markets (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, pp. 42).

IDEJEN'S SELF-ASSESSMENT

To paraphrase the EDC Final Report, the USAID IDEJEN model was expected to achieve four results: (1) reintegrate marginalized youth into society; (2) improve the capacity of CBOs to address the needs of out-of-school youth; (3) strengthen GOH institutions to provide for and/or oversee improved services to out-of-school youth; and (4) disseminate HIV/AIDS awareness messages.

The report states, "IDEJEN was successful in achieving all four of its planned results" (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, p.2). The objective of the SSA is to consider whether the model, as designed, could benefit more youth if it were

Box 5: Summary of USAID-Funded IDEJEN Project Results*

- Provided 13,050 minimally-educated 15–24-year olds with a package of basic education, life skills & technical training.
- Provided this in 96 of Haiti's 142 communes and 8 of 10 Departments.
- Built capacity of 183 CBOs.
- Built capacity of GOH, MENFP & MJSAC
- Facilitated return to school for 49 percent of participating youth
- Helped 53 percent of youth find short-, medium-, or long-term work.
- More than 300 peer educators provided HIV/AIDS information and referrals to more than 60,000 people.
- INFP added 22 curricula for new course offerings.
- Numerous training workshops and advocacy initiatives completed.
- A successful model developed for use with future initiatives targeting out-of-school youth.

* Excerpted from the IDEJEN Final Report

scaled up and sustained. Answering this question requires an understanding of how success was defined; what was achieved specifically as a result of which project components; and how modifications to the model might affect future performance.



Youth Receive Training Certificates in Pt. Salud.

The EDC Final Report presents 29 findings. Box 5 summarizes the most relevant of these for understanding the EDC's conclusions regarding IDEJEN's success (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, pp. 23–49). The following findings also provide background and context for the subsequent discussion of S&S factors:

1. CBOs enhanced their capabilities, but 75 percent were unable to continue their operations in the absence of further support.
2. IDEJEN helped build INFP capacity and engaged that institution as a partner.
3. Employability training improved youth self-confidence and status, but was too short for the less-educated youth who participated.
4. IDEJEN staff and many youth said that training did not provide enough practical experience and that private companies need to be more involved.
5. Accompaniment phase should have been “longer and stronger.”
6. Return to school was the most popular track, but the school completion rate is unknown.
7. Targeted level 2 training should respond directly to market demand.
8. None of the EAs was self-sustaining at the end of USAID-funding.
9. Future workforce activities need work placement with better tracking.
10. Periodic labor demand studies are needed to ensure skill area relevance of training.
11. Training opportunities should be linked to labor demand, with memorandums of understanding (MOUs) signed with work providers (e.g., GOH, donor projects, companies) for job placement.
12. Entrepreneurship was the least successful track due to weak business skills, limited market demand, and other factors.
13. Local leadership and local champions are key success elements.

14. IDEJEN’s well-developed network of local CBO training centers provided reach, resilience, and relevance to youth.
15. Demand for IDEJEN services was high.
16. IDEJEN’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system “did not facilitate rigorous impact evaluation.”

Furthermore, partnerships with the private sector did not solidify due to different end goals (that is, providing youth opportunities and development versus maintaining a healthy bottom line); difficulty negotiating common goals and vocabulary; and limited interest on the part of the private sector in working with out-of-school youth’s relatively limited skill base and greater need for supervision and training.¹¹

IDEJEN TRANSITION TO AND POST-USAID FUNDING

In the months before USAID funding ended, the project was working with about 110 CBOs and still targeting at-risk, out-of-school youth with a mix of less-educated and uneducated youth. Following the devastating January 2010 earthquake USAID reassessed its funding strategy in response to conditions on the ground. In the context of winding down its support, USAID directed IDEJEN to use its remaining funding to incorporate as a Haitian NGO and subsequently provided construction funds of US\$325,000 for the building of five EAs (USAID/Haiti, 2011). IDEJEN incorporated as a NGO in April 2010 (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, pp. 11). EDC convened a committee of stakeholders to develop strategies to sustain the IDEJEN program and to identify potential funding sources to continue the program.

During this period of ongoing discussions with multiple funders and other stakeholders, the IDB/MIF approached YBI to propose a program for youth in response to the earthquake.¹² In October 2010, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) decided that it wanted to fund a 5-year follow-on project called JENKA¹³ targeting the same youth cohort and using IDEJEN as the implementing agency. IDB noted that the IDEJEN model “targeted a group of beneficiaries not sufficiently targeted [by] many other projects that work with those with more education.” IDB also cited as a major advantage of its proposed project that “CBOs will benefit from intensive capacity building, including staff development, facilities upgrades, improved curricula and new tools and equipment” (IDB/MIF, n.d.)

YBI worked with IDB/MIF to bring other donors on board with the effort. Together they recruited The MasterCard Foundation; the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund; the Intel Foundation; the W.K. Kellogg Foundation; and other stakeholders into a consortium of donors that wanted to invest in a collaborative response to the earthquake that ensured young people had an opportunity to receive training and secure productive livelihoods.

Box 6: Donor Funding for JENKA 2010-2015

	US\$ (millions)
MasterCard Foundation	4.0
IDB/MIF	3.8
Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund	1.6
W.H. Kellogg Foundation	0.375
USAID (construction)	0.325
Diageo (liquor co./construction)	0.300
Stop Hunger Now (in kind/meals)	0.213
Digicell (construction)	0.200
TOTAL (pledged)	US\$10.813

11. Personal communication, Cornelia Janke, April 1, 2014.

12. YBI served as a subcontractor to EDC in support of capacity-building efforts for INFP and developed hands-on vocational training modules for IDEJEN students.

13. JENKA - *Jèn Nan Konstriksyon Ayiti* in Kréyol is translated as “Young People Building Haiti” and is the French acronym for HYRA, the Haiti Youth Reconstruction Academy project. It has slightly different names in English depending on the donor so the French acronym is used throughout to avoid confusion.

Consequently, the MasterCard Foundation, the IDB, and the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund became the largest funders of JENKA, with MasterCard and IDB as the “primary grantors” of the consortium of funding agencies. (See Box 6.) Including the US\$325,000 USAID provided for construction out of funds from EDC’s cooperative agreement with USAID for the IDEJEN project, the total pledged was US\$11,048,491 over 5 years for 9,000 beneficiaries (US\$1,050 per capita) to be served through 12 *Ecoles Atelier* (EA) (training centers). Of this total, US\$1,600,666 was to be used for construction or supplemental program costs, so the per-student operational cost was approximately US\$1,050. The JENKA initiative was launched in October 2010, and the IDB’s major funding of the program started in June 2011.

Box 7: HYRA (JENKA) Project Purpose*

“HYRA (2011-2015) aims to “build a system...that will address livelihood...needs...improve livelihood opportunities...by improving knowledge, skills and attitudes.” Among the three project components, component two is referred to as “youth training and employment readiness,” adding that it is “a project to “improve livelihood prospects...” so beneficiaries can “compete for jobs...” (emphasis added)

*Excerpt from IDB/MIF. *Donors Memorandum*, (HYRA) *op. cit.*

As a result of subsequent deliberations among the consortium, IDEJEN and YouthBuild International (YBI),¹⁴ the IDEJEN model was considerably altered for implementation under JENKA. (See Box 7.) The JENKA project includes an intensive six-month training program (classroom and hands-on technical learning as well as basic education, life and leadership skills) followed by a six-month accompaniment phase to support job and internship placement as well as further technical training, and follow-up support (IDB/MIF, 2013). According to YBI, its approach, which added building community assets¹⁵, leadership, community service,

and citizenship training as well as a stipend and savings program was integrated with IDEJEN’s model of delivering NFBE and vocational skills to youth through training, including an accompaniment phase, reintegration (see glossary), life skills training, and continued partnership with the INFP.

The vision and approach of JENKA differed from the original approach introduced through IDEJEN/EDC. IDEJEN supported by YBI shifted away from service delivery through a network of CBOs and capacity-building of these CBOs toward the establishment of a smaller set of training centers. It was thought that developing dedicated infrastructure was a more promising strategy for sustaining this new training program, and that potential supporters would be more interested in providing funding if more attractive infrastructure, *Ecoles Ateliers* (EAs), existed. YBI and IDEJEN decided to hire staff directly to serve youth in the training centers. These decisions resulted from concern about: 1) maintaining high quality and standardized training across IDEJEN’s many partner CBOs; 2) the lack of IDEJEN control over training at CBO facilities; 3) the long-term

Box 8: IDEJEN after USAID Funding: The Current Model (2011-15)

The standardized IDEJEN *Ecole Atelier* (EA) model is expected to deliver training for up to 300 youth per school in 2 sessions of 6 months with up to 150 trainees in the morning and another 150 in the afternoon. The initial plan was for 12 EAs but the target is now 8 plus 3 partner EAs training on behalf of IDEJEN.

At capacity, 11 schools could train 6,600 per year (300 per session x 2 sessions x 11 schools). Schools are not yet at capacity for budgetary reasons. Half of the training delivery time is for NFBE and half for vocational training, with that divided about equally between theory and practical experience. IDEJEN stated that EAs train for 48 weeks a year so the maximum total training delivered per trainee is 480 hours (4 x 5 x 24) with about 120 hours for practical experience. INFP requires 450 hours of instruction before a trainee can take its certification exam.

14. YBI is a U.S.-based NGO that has worked in Haiti since 2004, initially to help build capacity at IDEJEN and at the INFP. As the lead partner for JENKA, YBI offers a youth community service and remedial education program that is widely replicated in the United States that it adapts to each country’s environment.

15. Community assets involve infrastructure development through youth service work; infrastructure includes: “housing, community centers, schools, playgrounds, and essential environmental infrastructure” (YouthBuild U.S.A., n.d.).

sustainability of the CBO partner organizations; and 4) the adequacy of CBO facilities for vocational and other training.

With regard to the targeted youth population, the JENKA project refined its criteria with a focus on out-of-school youth possessing at least a sixth grade education to enable INFP training to be provided during a six-month period. Previously, IDEJEN targeted out-of-school youth who had not completed the sixth grade, which they estimated to be more than 60 percent of the population aged 15-24. The shift from CBOs to EAs decreased the geographic range from which students could be drawn. With an eye toward student attendance, recruitment was restricted to those within a 15-kilometer radius of each EA, resulting in most beneficiaries being drawn from about 15 districts in eight of Haiti's ten Departments in contrast to the 96 districts that participated during the USAID-funded period.¹⁶ These constraints have been somewhat mitigated by training offered by a few of what IDEJEN calls "satellites" which operate as occasional extensions of select EAs.¹⁷

The shift from more than 180 CBOs to a smaller number of EAs, the reduction in training duration (from 12 to 6 months), and the change in those targeted under the former IDEJEN model represent significant changes to the program model.

At the time this report was drafted, stakeholders' and participants' perceived that the advantages of the current (2011-15) JENKA model that would enable its scaling and sustainability were:¹⁸

- Despite higher recurrent costs, IDEJEN/JENKA may be able to become more sustainable by constructing its own schools where the needs of the targeted youth cohort can be met, thereby helping to fill a training gap for these youth. Partners aspire to building a permanent national delivery system.
- Replacing CBOs with schools owned and operated by IDEJEN makes it easier for IDEJEN to control, monitor, and ensure the quality of training if they have adequate funding.
- IDEJEN is able to hire and fire staff at the EAs, rather than being compelled to work with existing staff at many CBOs even when they are poorly qualified.
- Concentrating in fewer geographical areas is expected to make recruitment, monitoring, and follow up easier.

Youth who participate are more literate and, therefore, more likely to be able to pass the INFP exams and be certified.

Box 9: Snapshot of JENKA results to date

- 90.0 percent of youth who enrolled completed training.
- The overall placement rate of youth is 67.6 percent
- 86.5 percent of the youth have passed their INFP technical training exams and earned a market-recognized credential
- 2,357 students received stipends (61.8% of enrollees), and most of these youth received match payments for meeting the required savings goal.
- 1,371 students completed the accompaniment phase.
- 302 students started micro-enterprises, 429 students financed their continuing education, and 76 students pursued further technical training by using their stipends and savings

Source: YouthBuild International

16. The August 2013 Mid-Term Evaluation of the MasterCard-funded portion of JENKA notes that the education system in Haiti "suffers from rural neglect. It is highly geographically centralized, with only 20 percent of education-related expenditures reaching rural areas, which account for 70 percent of Haiti's population" (p.11). Focusing JENKA on urban areas would seem to exacerbate this by limiting access by rural out-of-school youth.

17. For example, as of October 2013, 5 EAs had 8 satellites with 7 CBOs training 540 youth in all. These are counted by the IDEJEN M&E unit as part of the totals for their respective EA. The unit explained that CBOs doing the training as EA satellites change depending on funding, skill areas and intake sizes.

18. These bulleted comments synthesize ideas put forward in discussions held with IDEJEN, YBI and IDB staff and also noted in part in the opinions collected by researchers who carried out the recent Mid-Term Evaluation of JENKA.

JENKA AT THE MIDTERM

In terms of its infrastructure, since the launch of the JENKA program, eight EAs have been built and three CBO centers adapted. Each training center has a functioning youth central committee. In terms of programming, IDEJEN began implementing its new youth leadership programming, and partnered with INFP and the MoE to offer a new entry-level skill work certification to out-of-school youth. IDEJEN established the first stipend and savings program for unemployed and out-of-school youth in Haiti and created a structure to administer the stipends.

In terms of youth served, IDEJEN has served 8,399 youth and 5,689 youth have completed their training. The overall retention rate for students in all three completed cohorts of students at all training centers has averaged 89 percent, with 85 percent of the students passing their INFP test and receiving certification, and IDEJEN reports that 62 percent of students have been placed into jobs, internships, continuing education/further technical training, and/or micro-enterprises. IDEJEN is on track to serve over 9,000 youth in Year 4 of the program.

The mid-term evaluation of JENKA revealed findings that have implications for scaling and sustaining the work:

- JENKA retained and strengthened the partnership began with INFP when IDEJEN was USAID-funded.
- Value was added to IDEJEN by the construction of the EAs, the implementation of the youth leadership development program, and the establishment of the stipend and savings program. The EAs also serve as community centers.
- JENKA students at every training center engaged in voluntary service activities to support, give back to, and benefit their communities. These include carrying out repairs, helping build kitchens at primary schools, cleaning public areas, participating in arts and cultural events, promoting non-violence, and organizing events for children.
- Each site established a youth committee at each EA which allowed students to take on leadership roles in JENKA and plan service activities in their communities.
- IDEJEN formed the JENKA National Youth Council (KNJL), a national committee comprised of one elected student representative from each of the JENKA training centers, who meet three times a year with the Executive Director and senior management of IDEJEN.
- IDEJEN created a national structure to administer stipends and savings payments to youth.

The stipend and savings program--adapted by IDEJEN to the Haitian environment--appeared to offer value-added for sustainability of the model. Participants are paid US\$25 per month in stipends during the six-month intensive training phase of the program, for a total payment of US\$150, and participants are supposed to save 60 percent of their stipend payments (US\$90) to receive a match payment of \$25 in their individual development account (IDA). IDA savings are permitted to be used for: (1) supporting students' livelihood development goals, which includes purchasing tools, business start-up supplies, and clothes needed for new employment; (2) funding additional training and education; and (3) launching or expanding a micro-enterprise. IDEJEN established criteria for young people to receive stipends (including attendance, performance in class, behavior/attitude, and leadership in training center activities). According to the mid-term evaluation, the stipends provide graduates with seed money to fund their path forward (Advisem Services, Inc., 2013).

IDEJEN also established an administrative structure to oversee the payment of stipends and IDA matching funds. This included establishing auditing procedures such as having both the cashier and the director of the microfinance institutions sign off on all bank transactions and having IDEJEN staff approve the use of the savings for livelihood purposes by students. IDEJEN implemented the first pilot program for 50 students to receive stipends in 2011 and then expanded the IDA and stipend program to all 12 JENKA programs then in operation throughout the country. To support the IDA program, IDEJEN developed partnerships and execute MOUs with nine financial institutions, all of which are on the Inter-American Development Bank's list of approved microfinance institutions. These partnerships enabled IDEJEN to open savings accounts for the JENKA students – for most students, this represented their first savings accounts.

To illustrate 3,950 students to date have qualified for stipends, and 2,293 students and have met or exceeded the savings goal of 60 percent and have received IDA matching fund payments of \$25. Six-hundred students used their IDA funds to start 118 micro-enterprise, most in the services sector, with most in retail, but others include motorcycle repair shops, beauty shops, and animal husbandry operations. Almost all students used the IDA funds as their sole source of start-up capital. Most of these enterprises continue and allow small groups of youth to supplement their family income. “The stipends, although they are modest, are an important complement to the training. These funds provide graduates with seed money to carry out their future plans” (Advisem Services, Inc., 2013. P. 17).

Recommendations in the mid-term evaluation that could enhance IDEJEN's sustainability if enacted were: (1) improving training, support, and compensation for the technical monitors and instructors; (2) providing enhanced business development support for students and access to loans and micro-enterprise start-up capital; (3) improving follow-up on private sector partnerships and strengthening engagement techniques; (4) improving the accompaniment phase of the program by involving businesses, parents, and community members in collaborative decision making; (5) generating value through finding parties interested in purchasing services or products from the EAs, and (6) automating data collection and entry in order to improve data quality.¹⁹

IDB performance monitoring of Jenka. The IDB uses 14 milestones to monitor JENKA project performance. The language of the JENKA project description focuses on systems and process. For example, most milestones refer to the number of trainees trained, curricula developed, tests passed, etc. However, the last milestone stands out. It states that IDB disbursements will “be based on the achievement of the milestones” with milestone 14 requiring that “60 percent of program graduates [are] placed in jobs, internships, apprenticeships, self-employment or continuing education or technical training.”

Under the model funded by USAID, the most challenging aspects were entrepreneurship training and income-generating activities. With the current model, more trainees may be more successful since they have better literacy and numeracy skills, but this remains to be seen. USAID, IDEJEN, EDC, the IDB/MIF, and YBI have all noted that “finding job opportunities at the end of training has been the main difficulty” (Hereadero & Persson, n.d., p. 4).²⁰

The cumulative average INFP pass rate of JENKA trainees as of June 2013 was 85 percent (IDB/MIF, 2013, p.2). Therefore, IDB expects that IDEJEN will place at least 4,590 youth (60 percent of 9,000 minus the 15 percent that dropped out) but the pace of placements is well below target. Therefore, under the JENKA model, there remains a need to strengthen public and private sector partnership development to support the training and placement of graduates; enhance the accompaniment phase of

19. Advisem Mid-term Evaluation of the YouthBuild Haiti Rebuilding Academy: Final Report, page, pp. vii-viii.

20. Referring to lessons learned by IDB/MIF and YBI in Haiti.

training, which IDEJEN has begun; and to invest in more robust micro-enterprise development and coaching support for students.

In June 2013, IDB stated that key risks to the current IDEJEN model are “the lack of cost recovery mechanisms or external financial sources...once IDB/MIF resources are expended; ...the lack of a sustainability plan...and the absence of a market for the project’s services” (IDB/MIF, 2013, p.4). This statement implies that the project would be unable to continue beyond the period of external donor funding which is not surprising given that the Haitian economy is dependent on donor funds for the delivery of basic services. IDEJEN is now starting the fourth year of JENKA implementation. It needs another US\$1.5 million to complete EA construction plus new funds in the future to assure operational costs for 12 schools and to cover wages for staff and teachers and other recurrent costs.²¹ IDEJEN is considering sustaining seven to eight centers in the future, with these centers serving as base sites for further expansion and scaling of the program.²² IDEJEN has requested an external consultant to help develop a sustainability plan, but no funds for this were included in the IDB or other budgets. In collaboration with IDEJEN, YBI is seeking potential funding for a business development and sustainability plan for the organization. The IDB project Milestones Table includes, as an expected result by the end of the third year (October 2013), that 10 EAs will have established social enterprises providing “sufficient revenue to cover 60 percent of operating costs and provide a margin of contribution to core training center operational costs.” A few attempts have been made (e.g., an internet café at Gressier), but this milestone has clearly not been met.

3. ASSESSING SCALE AND SUSTAINABILITY

This section considers factors from the SSA analytical framework in order to determine whether, how and to what extent the IDEJEN model achieved scale and sustainability and which factors contributed most significantly to this outcome. In light of the changes in the IDEJEN model, Haitian stakeholders and donors such as USAID will need to grapple with the questions of which program areas should be scaled up and sustained, with which model or combination of models, and toward what end. This question goes beyond the SSA scope of work, but the report draws conclusions from the assessment with these broader questions in mind.

3.1 NATIONAL FACTORS

The ability to scale up and sustain initiatives that support out-of-school low-income youth in Haiti depends on factors that are both external and internal to the project itself. Therefore, the assessment must be placed in the larger Haitian context if the reasons for the project’s design, decisions, achievements, and challenges are to be understood.

The Haitian Context

In March 2013, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index ranked Haiti 161 out of 187 countries, a worsening by three places since 2011. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was US\$656 in 2009, but the average income ratio of the richest 10 percent compared to the poorest 10 percent that year was 54.4—worse than for all but 5 of the 125 countries assessed worldwide and more than double that of the Dominican Republic (25.3). Extreme income inequality has been a longstanding feature of the Haitian economy with a Gini coefficient in 2011 of 0.59 compared to one in 1986 of 0.53 (UNDP, 2013).²³ About 4.5 million people (more than 40 percent) are food insecure (World Bank, 2012). Nearly one-third of children under 5 years of age suffer from stunted growth; 75 percent ages 6–24 months are anemic; and almost 60 percent of school-age children are

21. In 2011 construction costs were estimated at US\$210,000 per school, but this has since risen to US\$400,000. Interview with G. Prévilon.

22. Personal communication, YouthBuild International

23. For comparison, in the OECD countries, in the late 2000s the Gini coefficient ranged from 0.24 to 0.49. South Africa (2009) had the world’s highest at 0.7 (UNDP, 2013).

iodine deficient. While the economy is likely to sustain annual GDP growth of more than 6 percent in 2013–2014, the structural features of the economy are likely to continue to produce inequitable growth (World Bank, 2012; IMF, 2012. Pp. 3 & 56–58). Thus, it will be more difficult to ameliorate these conditions without targeted support for income generation to at-risk youth such as that provided by IDEJEN.

The January 2010 earthquake killed about 230,000 people, injured 300,000 and displaced 1.5 million (World Bank, 2012). Economic losses are estimated at US\$7.9 billion (120 percent of GDP) with reconstruction needs estimated at US\$11.3 billion. The earthquake destroyed 4,200 schools and killed 1,200 teachers and staff at the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MENFP). The year before, three major hurricanes cost US\$900 million (15 percent of GDP), while a cholera outbreak in 2011–2012 killed over 3,500 people. Deadly floods and mudslides are also frequent.²⁴

Youth ages 15–24 represent about 21.4 percent of the total Haitian population of about 10 million. Of these, approximately 2 million youth—well over half—are out-of-school. According to IDEJEN youth mapping surveys, About 60 percent of this cohort has never attended school or has from 1–5 years of primary school education, while about 15 percent has completed grades 6, 7 or 8 (Prévilon, n.d.).²⁵ The balance has some secondary schooling or above with enrollment rates at about 76 percent at primary, 22 percent at secondary and 23 percent at pre-school levels.

The implications of these shocking conditions and events for out-of-school youth are profound. They are disproportionately represented among those at the bottom of the economic and social ladder, have few or no skills, low or no incomes, are concentrated in the informal sector, have high levels of frustration and a higher than average propensity to join gangs engaged in criminal activities²⁶. The relationship between exclusion and structural income inequality, alienation, and attendant anti-social acts is a reality in many countries. In Haiti, these circumstances had a direct effect on the design of the IDEJEN model: its first objective was reintegration of at-risk youth into society using a strong life skills component to help address behavioral and compartment issues. Many of the success stories quoted in multiple IDEJEN periodic reports point not only to skills obtained, but also to a transformation in attitudes and the replacement of despair with hope²⁷.

The key constraint to accessing education is cost. More than 90 percent of schools are private, and school fees average around US\$70 per year. This is a prohibitive figure for most poor families, especially in rural areas (poverty rate: 82 percent with 78 percent in extreme poverty). “Rural areas (60 percent of the population lives in small isolated villages) have a large number of small schools but this masks the fact that only about 25 percent of villages have a school, with average school size of 225 students. The quality is shockingly low, and the chronic lack of support renders them unsustainable, resulting in “skeleton’ schools” (World Bank, 2011, p. 2).

Many school buildings have been rebuilt, temporary schools set up, and teacher training accelerated. Donors now finance tuition for 230,000 children for 6 years each (grades 1–6), and the GOH funds 900,000 children from a National Education Fund paid for by levies on phone calls and international financial transfers. Many small NGOs operate schools, and some offer non-formal vocational training throughout Haiti.

24. See especially Annexes 5 and 6.

25. These estimates are drawn from IDEJEN community mapping surveys of youth ages 15-24.

26. Interview with Maryse Pénette-Kedar, President PRODEV, October 17, 2013. PRODEV works extensively with gang members in Port-au-Prince.

27. See, for example, success stories in IDEJEN Annual Reports for 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.



Young women and men learn to install tile together

The INFP establishes vocational training standards and develops curricula. Some schools are still poorly equipped, staffed, and funded despite progress as a result of substantial support from the IDB and INFP. With World Bank support, the Ministry of Agriculture is re-launching agricultural training schools to build local capacity to support rural sector farm and off-farm initiatives. If successful, a reinvigorated extension service combined with IDEJEN-like rural vocational skills initiatives could generate important synergies for productive and service-based rural income generation. Many youth in rural and urban areas learn by doing through informal apprenticeships, often with family members already engaged in the skill in question. The IDEJEN model has evolved in response to this larger reality, which is part of the context for any vocational project design targeting the least educated and most at-risk youth.

The prevalence of traditional gender roles affects female educational attainment and workforce participation. While Haiti has achieved near gender parity in education at the primary and secondary levels, tertiary female attendance is lower. Almost half of households are female-headed, and these are more likely to be poor than male-headed households. Given the direct correlation between cost and access to education, children of female-headed households are, therefore, more likely to be out-of-school. A greater proportion of females work in the informal sector (83 percent), and there is some resistance to taking on work in non-traditional skill areas (e.g., construction and welding).²⁸ These factors are relevant to the IDEJEN model in terms of the types of skills of interest to young women and the market context in which many already operate.

Government Education and Livelihoods Policy

The GOH has strongly supported efforts to improve formal and non-formal education and has developed a policy framework within which donors may deploy resources to help promote national goals. The immediate post-earthquake March 2010 Action Plan for the National Recovery and Development of Haiti had four pillars. The third pillar asked development partners to “prioritize a system of education guaranteeing access for all children and offering vocational and university education to meet the demands of economic modernization” (International Monetary Fund, 2012, p. 4). In May 2013, the government’s Strategic Development Action Plan for 2014–2016 had as one of five priorities to “improve access to secondary education and vocational/technical education and to plan the rehabilitation and construction of technical training centers and professional schools.”²⁹

28. See the *Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement (FY 2010-2015)* and *World Bank Interim Strategy Statement*, Annex 15.

29. GOH. (2013, May). *Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe. Priorités d’Intervention du Gouvernement pour la Période 2014-2016*.

The National Youth Policy developed by the MJSAC with IDEJEN technical support (but never adopted due to political crises) stated: “the socio-economic integration of youth poses serious problems for Haiti. Training provided by vocational centers is inadequate. For every thousand workers engaged, only six have benefitted from technical training in large measure because the educational level required for entry excludes 80 percent of the economically active population. The situation is alarming since more than 50 percent of youth are unemployed and the few opportunities offered to them are isolated and insignificant” (MJSAC, 2011, p. 12, p. 24). The MJSAC policy statement concludes by urging development partners to “put in place training mechanisms to strengthen the quality of their interventions.” All of these policy statements (and the MJSAC’s own training activities) signal the intense interest of the GOH in mobilizing continued support for education and, especially, for out-of-school youth. The IDEJEN model responds directly to these policy priorities and goals.

Development Partner Stakeholder Perspectives and Programming

There is a shared perspective among major donor stakeholders that formal and non-formal education are among the highest priorities and a key to Haiti’s future.³⁰ More specifically, there is great concern about the implications of large and growing numbers of out-of-school, unskilled, under-employed, and idle youth for political and social stability. Stakeholder perspectives are reflected in the support of USAID, IDB/MIF, and others for IDEJEN’s NFBE and vocational training initiatives, as well as by the presence of numerous other projects targeting youth with education, training, and income-generating activities. (See Box 7.) The funding actions of donors clearly are evidence of responsiveness to the GOH’s education and livelihoods policies and priorities. The following summarizes programming activities of key donor stakeholders that affect out-of-school youth:

World Bank. The World Bank’s perspective is that “there is a general consensus that Haiti’s growth prospects are tightly linked to the country’s ability to make significant improvements in the development of its human capital” (2011, p. 1). Therefore, the Bank is helping to co-finance the implementation of Haiti’s national strategy for rebuilding the education system.³¹ The Bank (2012) also recognizes that as long as Haiti is one of the least competitive countries in the world and one of the most difficult in which to do business,³² NFBE and vocational training initiatives will continue to face enormous obstacles trying to generate improved sustainable livelihoods. For this reason, the Bank is funding the US\$20 million Business Development and Investment Project (July 2013–May 2018). The Bank is not directly involved in income generating projects that seek to train and place out-of-school youth in Haiti; their strategic approach is oriented to the macro-economic level to create an enabling environment for faster and more equitable economic growth, thereby improving the environment and prospects for success for initiatives like IDEJEN.³³

Education for All (EFA). This US\$70 million, 4-year, follow-on project aims to build on EFA phase I to improve access to quality primary education by strengthening the Tuition Waiver Program; improving basic educational services in selected rural communities, and strengthening school health programs. It will also expand the number of certified teachers and build the institutional capacity of MENFP to improve educational governance and public-private partnerships. In 2012, the World Bank provided US\$31 million for poor children living in peri-urban areas via the GOH Tuition Waiver Program so about 100,000 students per year in approximately 1,200 schools could attend free of charge from grades I to grade 6.

30 See, *inter alia*, World Bank. (2012, Sept.). *Haiti Interim Strategy Note for FY 2013-14*; USAID. (2012, April). *Lessons Learned: Experiences in Livelihoods, Literacy and Leadership in Youth Programs in 26 countries, 2003-2012* and IDB (2011, Nov.) *Support for Haiti Education Reform Project*.

Profile and interview on October 23, 2013 with Julien Magnard, Principal Technical Advisor, ILO.

31. The national strategy is referred to as the Operational Plan for Education (OPE) and has nine pillars, four of which are supported by Education for All and relate to primary school education.

32 Haiti ranks 141 out of 142 in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index, and 174 out of 185 countries on the Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index.

33. Interview with Mr. P. Ramanantoanina, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank/Haiti, 23 Oct. 2013.

Business Development and Investment. The direct project beneficiaries are domestic and foreign private-sector operators, especially micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), and their owners and employees. At present, business start-up procedures cost 286 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, and take 105 days. This presents a huge barrier to micro and small entrepreneurs entering the formal sector economy where economic growth could stimulate demand for the types of skills offered by IDEJEN.

Adolescent Girls' Initiative (AGI). Partnering with the Nike Foundation, The World Bank has prioritized school-to-work transition for young women ages 17–21, emphasizing non-traditional skill areas and life skills. In June 2013, the first 421 AGI female beneficiaries graduated from public and private training centers. IDEJEN/EDC had an average of 60 percent or more male beneficiaries, and JENKA in the first three years has averaged 38.5 percent female trainees compared to a targeted 50 percent. The Bank approach is an example of a way to increase training for females, an issue that will remain relevant for any model USAID may want to scale up.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB disbursed US\$22 million from 2005–2012 to strengthen technical and vocational education and training schools (TVET) schools by improving their quality and management. (See Box 9.) According to the IDB, 70 training centers became certified by INFP, training of trainers (TOT) was provided for 30 individuals, 12 training centers were rebuilt and equipped, and 30,000 youth were trained (IDB, 2013a, pp. 1-4). This activity strengthens the formal vocational training sub-sector into which some JENKA graduates can move once they complete the ninth grade; it also provides IDB with substantial TVET expertise as it works through JENKA to support the next lower echelon of youth during the last 2 years of the JENKA project.

Educational Reform Project. The third component of this US\$50 million project aims to increase opportunities for “more than 600 trainees per year” in TVET and provide technical assistance to the MENFP/INFP to develop a national TVET policy; create a national TVET council with GOH and private sector participation; and strengthen INFP capacity to regulate and supervise the sector. Resources will also be used to construct two training centers, equip workshops in four centers, and design and implement a skills certification system for key occupations with private sector input. As of May 2013, US\$7.3 million had been disbursed, primarily for primary school tuition waivers (reducing costs for 75,000 pupils) and school equipment (IDB, 2013b, pp. 1-5). In addition, US\$5 million was provided in co-financing for TVET under a separate agreement to support this project.

International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO has championed its Start and Improve Your Business Program (SIYB) in Haiti and has included IDEJEN staff in some of its training. ILO is helping INFP to develop shorter and better-targeted training modules based on needs identified by the Association of Haitian Industries and others. It aims to train trainers at critical points in value chains who will then be able to work inside small informal-sector enterprises where they will help people to upgrade their skills and productivity and obtain additional contract work. The ILO vision and priorities strongly support IDEJEN's focus on out-of-school youth, and ILO representatives endorsed IDEJEN's work with those who are least educated and most at risk.³⁴

Private Sector Stakeholder Perspectives

Private companies are vital stakeholders because they can offer financial and technical support to IDEJEN as they are “consumers” of IDEJEN's “product,” i.e., youth with skills ready to enter the workforce. Many private companies have expressed an interest in the IDEJEN model, and some have helped to fund its activities. (See Box 6.) IDEJEN staff reported that many businesses initially expressed skepticism about the suitability of out-of-school and marginalized youth for wage sector jobs, citing behavioral problems.³⁵ The strong life skills curricula have helped mitigate behavioral issues, and many

34. Interview (23 Oct. 2013) with Julien Magnard, Principal Technical Advisor and Sylvie Dupuy, ILO SME Specialist.

35. Interviews with the IDEJEN Director and Director of Operations and comments from staff at the Mirebalais EA.

IDEJEN graduates have projected a positive image that has reassured some employers.³⁶ IDEJEN's focus on the construction trades during and after USAID funding and its special efforts in this sector after the earthquake helped fill the enormous need for artisans during the intense reconstruction period when a massive amount of short-term donor aid was channeled into shelter projects.

Interviews with business people also confirmed that there is untapped potential for greater synergy with companies and associations that have the capacity to train youth in their sectors and employ some of them.³⁷ In the apparel sector, the National Institute for the Development of Tailoring (INDEPCO) trained 2,155 youth from 2010–2013 with funding from the IFC, IDB, USAID and others. INDEPCO works with scores of small, affiliated tailor shops, placing orders with them, monitoring quality, and consolidating what is produced to satisfy its local and export market partners. As INDEPCO identifies more export markets, it will need more trained tailors, bead work specialists, and others with clothing sector-related skills. IDEJEN offers tailoring in some EAs, but has too few sewing machines and inadequate supplies of training materials. Therefore, new and stronger partnerships in this sector would seem to have great potential.

Caribbean Harvest is another example of a private firm willing and able to offer training to youth.³⁸ Led by a Haitian with a doctorate in aquaculture, this 8-year-old firm distributed 2 million tilapia fish fingerlings in 2013 to 154 fish farmers in 7 locations; it expects to more than double this figure in 2014. Caribbean Harvest provides the fish food and buys back the adult fish so the fish farmers have a guaranteed market. Farmers earn US\$400 per cage and can have 2–3 harvests per year and several cages. The company now serves 7 percent of the local market and plans to boost sales to 30 percent in 2 years. IDEJEN contacted Caribbean Harvest in 2009, but the relationship did not develop. This dynamic company has won awards for innovation (solar-powered hatcheries), is expanding rapidly, and offers training and income generation potential. These apparel and fisheries businesses are among those that illustrate possible missed opportunities for out-of-school youth.

YBI says that “it will be critical for IDEJEN to develop national-level partnerships with the biggest employers and INGOs [international non-governmental organizations] in Haiti to help sustain the JENKA program...the overall sustainability of the organization and the program will be determined in large part by its ability to form long-term, mutually beneficial, and strategic private and public sector partnerships.”³⁹

Fragility and Out-of-School Youth

A fragile state has been defined as one where “governments and state structures lack capacity and/or political will to deliver safety and security, good governance and poverty reduction to their citizens” (OECD, 2007).⁴⁰ By any measure, Haiti fits this definition. (See Box 10.) USAID defines domains through which fragility may be assessed, including economic, governance, security, social, public sector disengagement, corruption, capacity to deliver education, organized violence, and exclusion. Haiti faces challenges in most of these categories, given the existence of high levels of economic stress, weak governance, poor implementation capacity in the education sector, powerful elite capture mechanisms that tend

Box 10: Fragility in Haiti

“Haiti shows many of the classic signs of fragility discussed by the 2011 World Development Report. Deep social and economic inequities, a strong concentration of wealth and power, lack of participation in economic and political life, the lack of social justice, and the absence of the rule of law. These have led to spikes in violence and instability which, in combination with weak government capacity, have been critical obstacles to investment and development.”

-World Bank, World Development Report, 2011

36. See success stories in IDEJEN Annual Reports for 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.

37. Interviews with Hans Garoute, Board Chairman and Jean-Robert Le Brun, National Coordinator of INDEPCO (October 18, 2013) and Abe Valentin, Director-General of Caribbean Harvest (October 22, 2013).

38. Interview with Dr. Abe Valentin, Director-General of Caribbean Harvest (October 22, 2013)

39. YBI (2012). *Discussion of topics related to increasing IDEJEN's sustainability and impact*, internal memo, p.1.

40. See USAID's *Fragile States Strategy* (2005) and USAID's 2006 publication, *Education and Fragility: An Assessment Tool*. Also see Save the Children's 2007 *The Education and Fragility Barometer*.

to entrench economic inequities and corruption. However, Haiti also has several strengths that can provide part of the foundation needed for sustainable development including:

- Absence of ethnic tension
- Absence of war and its aftermath
- Minimal religious tension
- A higher level of social capital than found in many post-war societies
- A resilient indigenous culture
- Gender parity in education at the primary and secondary school levels
- A large Haitian diaspora providing significant levels of remittances that act as a safety net for many
- Proximity to major markets and favorable export trade agreements
- Significant tourist potential and proximity to tourist sender markets

Education and training can help mitigate fragility, especially if it arms youth with sustainable livelihoods, since poverty is a key source of fragility and an underlying threat that education must confront (Tebbe et al., n.d.). Box 11 briefly summarizes those fragility factors likely to affect efforts to scale up and sustain an IDEJEN model.

Box 11: IDEJEN in the Context of Fragility	
Fragility Domains (USAID 2006)	Characteristics, Effects, and Potential Effects of Fragility Factors on Prospects for Achieving Scale and Sustainability
Economic	Pervasive low incomes; high income inequality; low teacher salaries; a dominant private sector fee-based education system at all levels; weak to non-existent integration of livelihoods skills training into the primary system; minimal public sector investment in education; and a vocational system that excludes youth with less than a 9 th -grade education combine to create an environment of high fragility. Prospects for sustainability of IDEJEN via fee for service are minimal; absorption of trained youth into the tiny formal sector or saturated informal sector job markets at current levels, let alone scaled-up levels, has been a major economic issue.

Box 11: IDEJEN in the Context of Fragility	
Fragility Domains (USAID 2006)	Characteristics, Effects, and Potential Effects of Fragility Factors on Prospects for Achieving Scale and Sustainability
Governance	Political instability and class rigidity; historically weak capacity for governance in the education and TVET sectors (currently improving with the support of The World Bank, IDB and others via Education for All); emerging pockets of quality Haitian governance (INFP and MJSAC); and fragility fueled by inequitable access to quality basic education (especially rural vs. urban and urban elite districts vs. urban slums). IDEJEN played a strong positive role in building local participation and identifying local government “champions” to advocate for new vocational opportunities for out-of-school youth. IDEJEN has continued its leadership role in partnership with local communities at JENKA’s EAs. However, this consolidation reduced IDEJEN’s reach. The USAID IDEJEN model was engaged with more CBOs and other local stakeholders and had a more decentralized approach. ⁴¹
Security	Gang violence affects school attendance; natural disasters have cost many teachers their lives; gender-based violence is high and political instability causes periodic violent clashes, but security in most parts of Haiti is adequate at present to allow school attendance. Most EAs are not walled and do not have armed guards. On balance, security is an ongoing and fluctuating concern, but not a major constraint to scale up out-of-school youth initiatives in Haiti. Security would not represent a major cost factor aside from extra building costs associated with the need to build hurricane-proof and earthquake-resistant structures.
Social	Other fragility factors affect student performance. Many schools and CBO training sites are in poor physical shape, which can act as a disincentive to youth and their families. IDEJEN has worked hard to reduce the social stigma associated with school drop-out and HIV/AIDS, but these remain issues. Many awareness campaigns over the past 20 or more years have lessened AIDS as a stand-alone issue, but poor and unequal access to health care is a fragility factor.
Public Sector Disengagement	NGOs and churches provide many normally public sector functions in education. Access to information outside of the capital is limited, but radio is prevalent, and there is access to some local newspapers in major towns. Donors have overwhelmingly worked around rather than through government, but this has been changing slowly, especially in the education sector. Therefore, prospects are improving for IDEJEN to strengthen its collaboration with government (MENFP/INFP and MJSAC in particular). Engagement with the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) is also vital for any scaling up involving re-engagement with rural out-of-school youth.

41. For example, IDEJEN’s Business Plan for 2011-2014 states: “Ecoles Ateliers are wholly integrated into the program and cost structures of IDEJEN and do not need separate business plans,” whereas CBOs governed themselves and had roots in their communities.

Box 11: IDEJEN in the Context of Fragility	
Fragility Domains (USAID 2006)	Characteristics, Effects, and Potential Effects of Fragility Factors on Prospects for Achieving Scale and Sustainability
Corruption	EDC reported high levels of financial probity and was able to account for more than 99 percent of disbursements. IDEJEN indicated that vigilance is required at all times, but that this has not been a major constraint on its activities. ⁴² Nonetheless, reports of rampant corruption are common, but often hard to verify. Sustainability in Haiti could be affected by corruption, which can also increase the risk of elite capture of resources. EDC has shown that effective financial and procurement procedures and careful vetting and monitoring of staff can reduce this risk so that it should not be a key impediment to scaling up. Ghost students do not appear to be a problem.
Capacity Deficiencies	Human capacity is a continuing challenge due to the poor quality of educational institutions, net brain drain abroad, the death of 1,200 teachers in the 2010 earthquake, and competition from the private sector for the most skilled people. Capacity of IDEJEN instructors has also been an issue, as has a salary gap between amounts paid to IDEJEN teachers and headquarters staff, a possible contributing factor in staff turnover. IDEJEN's remuneration levels would be a factor in any sustainability plan.
Organized Violence	Haitians have a major problem with organized violence due to the prevalence of gangs, but they do not confront well-armed militias, threats of foreign invasion, or terrorist groups as in some countries (e.g., Iraq, Somalia, Congo). However, everyday violence does impede IDEJEN's work intermittently, and there has been a spate of kidnappings for ransom over the past few years. Thus, the fragility emanating from violence is significant, but not insurmountable as a factor for scaling up and sustaining out-of-school youth initiatives.
Exclusion	Out-of-school youth are not excluded from education or training based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, but those in rural areas have less access and fewer options. The use of Kréyol in IDEJEN NFBE and vocational training is a major positive factor for inclusion, retention, and learning. Participatory pedagogy taught by IDEJEN also promotes inclusion. IDEJEN has worked to include young women in all aspects of its activities with the active support of its female Haitian executive director, but rates for female participation remain too low. Systematic exclusion would not be a barrier to scaling up and is unlikely to undermine sustainability of project activities.

3.2 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

This section of the report examines factors that were internal to IDEJEN as an institution, examining how institutional capacity was built, what elements affected that capacity over time, and what characteristics of IDEJEN's approach were favorable to long-term scale and sustainability. It also considers how the end of USAID funding affected IDEJEN's institutional structure and capacity.

42. Interview with the IDEJEN Director, October 8, 2013.

Organizational Structure

IDEJEN is an NGO and currently has a 9-person board of directors that governs the organization.⁴³ It has 8 professional staff positions at headquarters (as of November 2013 2 of these positions were vacant—the program director and business development director), 4 professional staff at each EA (currently 11 EAs with 44 positions⁴⁴), and 11 headquarters support staff. During the USAID/IDEJEN period, all training was delivered through partner CBOs, and youth were identified by them; there were no EAs with staff employed directly by IDEJEN. The role of EDC as the USAID implementing awardee ended in mid-2011 after which the board of directors took on the advisory, monitoring, and support role played by EDC.

Management and Administration

IDEJEN's leadership is drawn from the non-profit world. IDEJEN is led by a visionary leader with strongly held views on the practical and moral imperative to transform the lives of the poorest and most marginalized Haitians. IDEJEN recognizes that it needs a strong internal “entrepreneurial” orientation and capacity to promote its own sustainability as well as to promote youth entrepreneurship.⁴⁵ However, its modest professional staff size and heavy workload often translates into a focus on more immediate challenges. IDEJEN competes with a number of international non- and for-profit organizations for qualified staff.

Planning

The JENKA Mid-Term Evaluation noted, “While IDEJEN copes with managing [its] funds and related demands, a strategic focus on sustainability tends to become less of a priority” (Advisem Services, 2013, p.37). In IDEJEN's case, such planning did not occur during the pilot or subsequent phases because large scale programming was not initially envisioned.⁴⁶ Therefore, when IDEJEN did plan for sustainability, it targeted individual CBOs with strategies for income generating activities. Over time, as part of a broader network that developed, IDEJEN registered as a NGO and established Ecoles Ateliers. At that time, attention turned to ensuring the viability of IDEJEN as a NGO and seeking continued donor funding. Sustainability planning did not keep pace with the changing implementation situation. Even when the USAID cooperative agreement ended in 2011, the perception on the ground was that “there was no strategic planning about how to sustain IDEJEN institutionally beyond establishing it as a local NGO and seeking more donor funding.”⁴⁷ A variety of factors contributed to this, with the contextual fragility (e.g., earthquake, hurricanes, governance, and security) affecting the perceived attainability of sustainability and therefore its prioritization. A business plan that included a range of products, services, and income streams was developed in the early stages of IDEJEN/EDC project but it was not acted on. It could be that the need to expand services to more youth overshadowed careful sustainability planning and implementation that kept pace with expanded service delivery.⁴⁸

Monitoring & Evaluation Capacity

IDEJEN's initial M&E system was weak; during the pilot phase, M&E evolved in response to data requests. As EDC noted, “the EDC/IDEJEN system did not facilitate rigorous impact evaluation, did not know the school completion rate, and did not have adequate resources for post-project participant tracking” (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, p. 49). Later, EDC helped IDEJEN to improve the M&E system but it proved “too sophisticated” and had to be abandoned (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012, p. 49). In May 2011, IDEJEN produced a Performance Monitoring Plan. Its application has been uneven, in part because the project recently appointed its fifth M&E officer in less than 3 years. The currently

43. The nine board members include the IDEJEN director and one IDEJEN staff member, one each from INFP and MJSAC, one from the private sector and four educators, including the lead consultant for the final external evaluation of the IDEJEN/EDC project (R. Camoëns).

44. Staff at those EAs now managed by partner institutions are drawn from those institutions.

45. Interview with IDEJEN Director, October 8, 2013.

46. Personal communication, M. Sany, April 3, 2014.

47. Interview with Guerda Prévilon, Port-au-Prince, October 6, 2013.

48. Personal Communication, C. Janke, April 1, 2014.

operating EAs do count the number of youth trained by skill area, sex, etc., and have records about placements and continuing education. IDEJEN produces monthly reports for some donors, 6-monthly reports for others, and annual reports for the government. The annual reports describe output statistics, include profiles of successful youth, and have many photographs. They could be strengthened by more quantitative and qualitative analysis. JENKA's M&E system appears to have improved quantitative reporting with planned trainee output numbers, processes and systems, but as the recent mid-term evaluation of JENKA notes, its M&E system needs "to automate data entry and include more qualitative indicators" (Advisem Services, Inc., 2013, p. viii).

Physical Premises

The final external evaluation of IDEJEN concluded that many NFBE classes were held in poorly equipped schools after regular school hours, adding that many sites lacked furniture, lighting, and a stimulating educational atmosphere. IDEJEN "should encourage participating CBOs to have their own space or otherwise make centers more conducive to learning" (Camoëns & Morton, 2011, p. 23). These poor physical conditions are common, especially in much of rural Haiti. In response, IDEJEN launched a major building campaign that began with CBHF funding in November 2010, and that was supplemented by USAID funding in 2011, as well as funding from the W.H. Kellogg Foundation and the Intel Foundation, construction materials from Digicel, and support from other supported. At present, IDEJEN also works intermittently with a few CBOs that operate satellite centers. These are among the stronger CBOs so physical conditions, while not ideal, are above average in terms of classroom space. However, well-equipped on-site workshops for practical training were not observed at those CBOs visited by the SSA team, and only a couple had modest amounts of tools.



Exterior view of EA construction



Interior view of EA under construction

Institutional Partnerships

IDEJEN worked to build partnerships during the pilot and scaling-up phases. The most successful were with CBOs, the INFP, the MJSAC, and some local government entities and community organizations whose leaders helped advocate for more support for out-of-school youth. IDEJEN also tried to build partnerships with the private sector. IDEJEN set up career counseling services centers (CDCJs) at local Chambers of Commerce to facilitate job placement. However, after the end of USAID funding, the CDCJs ceased to operate. Their functions were reassigned to a direct-hire placement counselor now located at each EA. IDEJEN has also worked with hundreds of micro- and small businesses and met with various business associations to try to facilitate the absorption of IDEJEN graduates into the private sector. The SSA team found that partners recognize that the heavy workload on the director, the relatively small number of professional program staff at IDEJEN headquarters, and the need to deal with immediate tasks and near-term deadlines limits IDEJEN's capacity to meet with partners, cultivate, and sustain new partnerships. However, more robust engagement with private sector partners will be critical to the sustainability of any scaling up of IDEJEN or other IDEJEN-like initiatives to place out-of-school youth in jobs.

Institutional Changes after USAID Funding Ended

IDEJEN became an NGO in 2010. After USAID funding ended at the end of July 2011, IDEJEN's institutional capacity was affected by staff downsizing and, especially in 2012–2013, high staff turnover. Although IDEJEN had to adapt to the requirements of multiple donors, it did experience some continuity thanks to the ongoing role of YBI, which had also worked with IDEJEN as a sub-awardee to EDC. After USAID funding ceased, YBI continued via its grants from the MasterCard Foundation, The Clinton Bush Haiti Fund, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, the Intel Foundation, Stop Hunger Now, and others to enable the implementation of JENKA. The transition of the IDEJEN model to an independent Haitian organization provided its leadership the opportunity to survive and develop independently of USAID. The attractiveness of the USAID-funded model served as an important source of leverage for the fledgling NGO and led to its success in finding new donors and adapting to their priorities and requirements.

However, like other NGOs, institutional functions have been challenged by the constant need to balance IDEJEN's priorities with those of various donors. Following the end of USAID funding, IDEJEN received three major grants and several smaller ones, each with particular objectives, different timelines, different budget amounts, and various reporting requirements and restrictions.

3.3 TECHNICAL FACTORS

IDEJEN used several methods to build its technical capacity to deliver project outputs. This enhanced ability provides a foundation for greater sustainability and creates pre-conditions for scaling up, especially whenever adequate non-technical inputs (e.g., financial and institutional) are also in place and planned project results remain the same or similar.

Throughout the 2003–2010 period of USAID funding, the many technical inputs from EDC were critical to the success the project achieved. During IDEJEN's entire evolution from an idea to a major delivery mechanism, EDC provided technical expertise through short-term consultants and by organizing and delivering workshops to build the technical knowledge of IDEJEN's staff. They shared experience from other basic and non-formal education projects that EDC supported elsewhere; arranged study tours; built and backstopped IDEJEN's finance and procurement systems; worked with INFP on curricula content; and introduced pedagogies specific to NFBE and participatory learning. They also engaged out-of-school youth to better understand their needs, capacities and priorities.

The following summarizes the major technical capacities built with EDC support. Many are still available at IDEJEN and via stakeholder partners, but some have eroded since the end of USAID funding and the curtailment of cooperation between IDEJEN and the CBOs that it engaged 2005-11.

Youth/community mapping. This was a key technical approach used to ensure that IDEJEN had adequate information about targeted communities to enable sound decisions about youth recruitment, selection of skills development areas, post-program placement, micro-enterprise prospects, potential instructors, etc. The youth community maps from IDEJEN's peak implementation period were of good quality. They can serve as models for youth mapping in the event of project scale up, but they must be updated regularly.

Training of trainers for NFBE. Before launching the NFBE curriculum, EDC and Street Kids International adapted and broadened curricula in French and introduced new interactive teaching and learning techniques to trainers so that basic education and life skills training could be delivered more effectively.

Feasibility studies and labor market surveys. Early studies that focused on the construction sector led to an emphasis on such trades as masonry and carpentry, while market studies sought to identify other areas for possible expansion of the skills training menu. The involvement of IDEJEN staff and local consultants also built staff technical knowledge of content and methodologies. Labor market surveys would benefit from being more specific on location and type of skills needed by the private sector so IDEJEN staff, especially at the EA level, would be able to target training more precisely.

Delivery of CBO capacity building. IDEJEN built its technical capacity to deliver training in leadership, management, finance, accounting, procurement, proposal writing, and project design. It now has a roster of trainers able to deliver these skills, and a record of accomplishment verified by EDC post-training surveys and the SSA's own brief sampling of CBOs views on the value of the training. (See Box 12.)

Curricula in Kréyol. Kréyol is Haiti's language, and IDEJEN has built its technical capacity to deliver training in a language that out-of-school youth understand and can read. Life skills workbooks, vocational guides, posters, etc., are available in Kréyol, and classes are held in Kréyol and French. This will facilitate any scaling-up initiatives.

Expansion and improvement of curricula. INFP now has a greatly improved capacity to develop curricula, test trainees, and support the accreditation process for new EAs. This technical capacity was built during USAID funding and remains available for any scaling-up effort.

Entrepreneurship training. IDEJEN built technical capacity to support youth entrepreneurship by training trainers, developing training materials, and using role-play and the development of mock business plans in training workshops. However, the transfer of entrepreneurial skills takes time, requires regular coaching, and is just one element of successful enterprise development. Projects focused on NFBE and vocational skill training sometimes do better when business development skills are outsourced to organizations dedicated entirely to promoting entrepreneurship.⁴⁹ However, organizations dedicated to promoting entrepreneurship do often build 1-2 years of long-term mentoring and guidance into their models after initial training and perhaps seed capital.⁵⁰

In each of the technical activities summarized above, the quality of results varied. Since the SSA is not a project evaluation, it does not provide details about the relative success of each activity.⁵¹ However, in general, the NFBE phase seems to have had fewer implementation issues than the accompaniment phase. The latter had particular difficulties in ensuring that technical trainers were adequately skilled in their fields (e.g., master plumbers or masons),⁵² that the menu of skills options expanded at a pace sufficient to avoid labor market saturation, that entrepreneurship training was of high quality and internalized by the trainees, and that income-generating activities succeeded.

Box 12: Key Findings from SSA Questionnaire on CBO Technical Capacity*

Following meetings with the SSA team, 14 CBOs that were part of the IDEJEN network answered questionnaires that asked them to specify which factors they credited with sustaining their organization after the end of USAID funding and how IDEJEN capacity building affected their organization's ability to deliver technical training and services.

- For financial sustainability, being a membership organization with paid-up members was cited most often, followed by having leaders that carried out strategic planning.
- Of 14 CBOs, 5 have submitted unsolicited proposals; 6 have responded to requests for proposals; 4 have been approached by donors; 2 benefitted from family funds, and 1 engages in business activities to support the CBO. Six do none of the above, surviving only on membership dues since the end of USAID funding.
- All 14 CBOs stated that they had benefited from IDEJEN training in leadership, management, financial management, procurement, and accounting. All of them also received equipment and training materials (e.g., curricula and training guides). Four received advice on how to establish their CBO as a legal entity, and 10 were helped with training in proposal writing and project design. This buttresses what the SSA team noted throughout: IDEJEN's technical ability to strengthen CBOs was greatly appreciated and, according to all respondents, had an important effect on their ability to run their organizations more successfully.
- When asked to rank services from IDEJEN in terms of their value to the CBO, leadership and financial management were the top responses, followed closely by management training. Training in proposal writing and project design came in fourth, then procurement training. All CBOs ranked the provision of equipment and materials as less important than the training they received.

49. For example, this was the experience of the Liberia Literacy and Training and Employment Project, as noted by its former Chief of Party. Personal communication, C. Janke, April 1, 2014.

50. For such evaluations, see the Bibliography.

52. An illustration of the implications of this is that in FY 2009–2010, 450 youth started and 299 completed training for a level 2 certificate. Of these, 190 youth were evaluated by INFP of whom 170 achieved a level 2 certification. The dropout rate was 37 percent.

Box 12: Key Findings from SSA Questionnaire on CBO Technical Capacity, Cont'd

- CBO respondents were asked to assess their capacity to scale up their activities and what they would need to be able to do so. The answers to this open-ended question were varied and enlightening. They said they would need
 - A “nice, well-equipped building like those IDEJEN is building for itself.” (3 respondents)
 - More equipment and a practical workshop, not classrooms.
 - More staff training.
 - A supply of work tools sufficient to empower youth to increase the goods and services they are able to sell to their communities.
 - A waste recycling center to generate income and help the environment.
 - A serious study of youth needs in our community so we do not waste resources and opportunities.
 - Office equipment and money.
 - “More FREEDOM [emphasis in original] to take our own initiatives, and IDEJEN should help us to be self-sufficient rather than depend on them.”
 - More training in proposal writing and how to add value to products to broaden the range of prospects for youth incomes.
- Significantly, the CBO representatives were asked how they saw their organizations’ prospects for survival and growth over the next five years. Of those who answered, eight saw excellent potential based on their pre- and post-IDEJEN experiences locally, four saw good potential and one said there was a high risk of near-term collapse.

* See Annex 4.

3.4 SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS, ADVOCACY, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT

The socio-cultural context and the human dimension within IDEJEN and nationally are important variables that affect scale and sustainability.

The Demand for IDEJEN Services

There has been heavy demand for IDEJEN services since inception, with the project reporting that demand has always exceeded the number of slots available for participants.⁵³ While many youth are drawn to the opportunity to improve their basic literacy skills, more have been motivated by the offer of vocational training, which is expected to lead to income, and by the financial incentives offered by IDEJEN. A hot meal every day, stipends for school fees, funds to start micro-enterprises, a chance to improve one’s self-identity and change one’s status from idle youth to “student,” and to “be part of something positive⁵⁴” were all mentioned as incentives by youth interviewed for the S&S assessment. Formerly, CBOs handled recruitment and selection of trainees using criteria established by IDEJEN, but now EA staff performs these functions directly. There are now fewer recruiters, but demand has continued to be strong.

53. Interview with Forbes Magene, IDEJEN M&E Officer, Port-au-Prince, November 2013.

54. For young Haitians, the importance of being recognized, joining a group of peers, feeling empowered and gaining the respect of elders is a key demand driver. The use of identifying T-shirts and caps, provision of certificates of “completion” even for a one-day workshop and other similar techniques helped ensure enthusiasm, retention, and fidelity to the project. T-shirts were a great investment in building pride.



Masons gain practical skills at MJSAC's Ecole d'Espoir in Port-au-Prince

The Role of “Champions”

IDEJEN has benefitted from multiple local champions and, together, they have made a crucial difference in the project’s ability to deliver training and build itself as an institution.

- *IDEJEN’s Director.* From the beginning of IDEJEN’s pilot phase, the project has been fortunate to have a strong and articulate Haitian leader. Her now 10-year stewardship of IDEJEN has made the organization a household name. She has built a strong social network of Haitians who share the transformative vision of IDEJEN as a force for generating sustainable livelihoods and, equally important, for changing the behavior of at-risk youth and how they are perceived and treated by society.
- *Institut National de la Formation Professionnelle (INFP).* For 10 years, the INFP has been the principal government agency that has worked with and supported IDEJEN’s development. The INFP is legally responsible for accreditation of vocational training schools; developing, standardizing, and updating curricula; issuing licenses to operate; and monitoring, testing and certification. The IDEJEN-INFP partnership enabled IDEJEN to help build INFP’s capacity by providing two staff, computer equipment and materials. This allowed INFP to develop new curricula, to help train vocational trainers, and to evaluate and test youth for their level 1 and 2 certificates. A 2009 study tour to the United States also helped key INFP staff learn about management approaches for schools that target at-risk youth. During the SSA field visit, INFP staff were praised for their dedication not only to the technical side of their work, but also for advocating the social reintegration of youth and for championing efforts to link vocational training more closely to market demand and to translate such training into livelihoods.⁵⁵
- *Local government officials including mayors, parliamentarians, members of the CASECS (executive committees of the rural districts) and ASECS (rural district assemblies).* Each rural district (*section communale*) is administered by an administrative council (CASEC) and a deliberative assembly that is elected every 4 years (ASEC). Each CASEC is based in a rural district capital; the ASEC is co-located there and has a small secretariat. The district community leaders are responsible for a wide range of local issues. Some have been strong champions of IDEJEN, helping to secure land for the construction of the EAs, serving as local advocates for assistance to out-of-school

55. Interviews with Guerda Prévilon, IDEJEN Director; Yves Villefranche, Deputy Director for Operations, INFP, and several staff at EAs.

youth, and helping to change negative attitudes towards marginalized youth within their communities. These champions have been cultivated over time through the patient and persistent work of the IDEJEN director and her staff who have built many effective relationships. Not all of those approached have been helpful but, over time, IDEJEN identified those most able and willing to be supportive. In addition, in some communities, IDEJEN has also gained the support of mayors and members of the national legislature representing areas where IDEJEN is active.

- *Ministry of Youth, Sports and Civic Action (MJSAC).* The Ministry has been supportive of IDEJEN, and IDEJEN assisted the Ministry by providing equipment and materials for four regional offices and help in drafting a guide to youth programming and a national youth policy. The MJSAC has continued to champion the IDEJEN approach through its own Ecole d'Espoir (School of Hope) where the Ministry offers training in auto mechanics, masonry, and other trade areas. Their new training facility in Port-au-Prince includes classrooms, a cafeteria, an auto mechanics work-space, and equipment. This is entirely funded from the Ministry's own budget. These activities demonstrate that the Ministry has internalized the IDEJEN concept of proactive engagement with the most at-risk youth.



Recycled shipping containers and a metal roof provide shelter and office space for MJSAC's training center in Port-au-Prince.

- *CBO leaders.* IDEJEN was involved with up to 183 CBOs over almost 8 years. IDEJEN worked to identify the best performing CBOs and focused on the quality of leadership, level of integrity, evidence of an effective relationship with community members, and prior experience. IDEJEN's capacity building of CBOs empowered many to strengthen their organizations. (See Box 12.) Some were dropped for a variety of reasons, but about 110 had long-term partnerships with IDEJEN and served as local champions for the project. Although EDC reported in 2011 that about 75 percent of the CBOs could not continue out-of-school training without IDEJEN funding, many CBOs proved resilient and carried on with other activities, many predating IDEJEN's intervention. Thus, much of the capacity built by IDEJEN was applied to other activities benefiting Haiti.

Scale, Sustainability and Gender

IDEJEN has faced challenges throughout its history in recruiting young women to participate. It appears that cultural norms that do not support women learning a trade and hold that young women hold responsibilities in their households were taken into account during project design, and therefore their participation has been less than that of males (Advisem Services, Inc., 2013). Under JENKA, since project inception, 38.5 percent of beneficiaries have been female, and the results during USAID funding were

similar (32–40 percent). IDEJEN found that its efforts to encourage young women to enter traditionally male-dominated trades had “mixed results.” Retention rates for young women in such trades as construction and auto mechanics were lower than rates for more traditional female occupations like food preparation. However, those who did complete the program “enjoyed notable successes” and became role models.

Social Capital

As terrible as the earthquake was for Haiti, with a loss of life in minutes that took 14 years of war in Liberia to surpass,⁵⁶ the effect on social capital was dramatically different. A natural calamity brought people together in Haiti because everyone faced a common threat. In Liberia and many other war-affected countries, much social capital is destroyed as ethnic, religious, factional and other rivalries generate bloodshed and hatred (Richards, et al., 2005). Haiti has not suffered from the consequences of forcibly drugged child soldiers, amputation and rape as a tactic of war, or the deliberate destruction of religious sites. As a positive result of its indigenous culture and its good fortune to escape war, a recent study found that “Haitian teens, especially those in rural areas, are poor economically but rich in family relationships and strongly rooted in their own culture” (Ferguson, Desir, & Bornstein, 2013). It also found that “teens, especially boys, believe very strongly that they should respect and obey their parents and assist them without being paid” (Ferguson, Desir, & Bornstein, 2013). Unfortunately, in urban areas and especially in Port-au-Prince, social capital has eroded and the levels of gang violence, illegal drugs, prostitution, and other manifestations of poverty, frustration, and despair are more prevalent.⁵⁷

IDEJEN is a national entity and, despite recent consolidation via JENKA into more urban areas, has considerable experience in harnessing rural social capital to promote social reintegration and economic betterment. If USAID decides to try to scale up its assistance to out-of-school youth and to target the same least-educated groups, then there are opportunities for IDEJEN to build on available social capital and its achievements via CBOs with marginalized youth.

3.5 FINANCIAL FACTORS

COST EFFECTIVENESS

IDEJEN documents use the word “successful” to describe the model,⁵⁸ but do not analyze success in terms of cost effectiveness.⁵⁹ It is not clear what the actual cost of success per youth is, and whether knowing that cost would result in classifying IDEJEN’s model as successful in terms of cost effectiveness. . Donors wanting to invest in programming for out-of-school youth do not know if the IDEJEN model is cost effective as designed, and IDEJEN staff do not have data that would demonstrate this or that would suggest a need to modify the design. It is difficult to expect scaling up without evidence of the actual possible return on investment (cost per output and outcome) and without the ability to assess the relative cost effectiveness of different versions of the model.

Box 13: Cost Effectiveness & Scale

If USAID decided to replicate the USAID-funded IDEJEN model and wanted to scale up and target 25,000 beneficiaries per year for 3 years using the US\$1,284 IDEJEN cost figure, would a budget of US\$96.3 million be feasible and sustainable? The point is not that the gross per capita cost can be straight lined in this manner, but that a cost-effectiveness analysis is essential to determine one-time fixed costs, recurrent costs, and whether these costs can be reduced to benefit more youth at the same funding level. At that point an informed decision on scaling up could be made.

56. Haiti is estimated to have lost 231,000 people in the earthquake compared to 270,000 in the Liberian civil war from 1989-2003.

57 Interview with Pénette-Kedar, Maryse and Léonie Harmantin, PRODEV; Ferguson, Gail et al., 2013. .

58. For example: the *Final Assessment of IDEJEN’s Pilot Phase* (Beauvy & Dart-Lincoln 2007), the report “*Lessons learned from moving the Haitian out-of-school youth livelihood initiative (IDEJEN) beyond the pilot phase*” by Beauvy et. al. (2008) and the IDEJEN Final Report (2012) are all silent on cost effectiveness.

59. The May 2009 IDEJEN workshop included a presentation by an EDC consultant on cost effectiveness; other presentations were made about how to scale up and on methods to promote financial sustainability. IDEJEN staff are aware of these issues and understand the concepts of cost effectiveness and cost-benefit ratios. As is often the case, the challenge is to translate good ideas into effective actions.

There is information available on broadly-defined per capita costs that are not localized. USAID-funded IDEJEN offered training to 13,050 youth (of which 15 percent dropped out) and spent US\$16,757,556 (2003-2011) for a per capita cost of US\$1,284 (Sany, J., 2013). For JENKA, the goal is 9,000 trained youth at a cost of US\$11,048,000 for a per capita cost of US\$1,050. These per capita figures do not account for economies of scale, and the difference between “start-up costs” and maintenance or continuation of an established project. Owing to a general lack of analysis of interventions that are directly comparable, or interventions that are comparable, it is not clear whether these costs are reasonable. Also, the per capita numbers could change when analyzing the data to find out different costs, such as by the relative cost per training hour delivered or expenditure category. The financial data that was shared with the study team was not detailed enough to conduct such analyses. For the CBO capacity-building component, IDEJEN noted that “almost 200” CBOs received support, but 75 percent could not carry on after the end of IDEJEN funding. This raises questions related to sustainability of the model. It also raises the question of whether capacity-building costs would have decreased over time as a result of continuing to work with the same CBOS. There is a need to assess the costs incurred for capacity building as part of an overall cost-effectiveness assessment.

In terms of expenditure categories, the percentage of the US\$28.8 million spent by IDEJEN/EDC and IDEJEN/JENKA directly on training or provided as cash or in-kind benefits (food, tools) directly to youth versus the share was used for overhead, airfares, staff wages, and other costs is not known. For IDEJEN/JENKA, the budget shows that 49 percent was allocated to home office wages and professional fees, 37 percent on project-specific expenses, 10 percent on the non-profit contractor’s fee, and 4 percent on other items (Advisem Associates, Inc., p. 116-121). A cost-effectiveness assessment (overall and component-level) would break these figures down, relate them to impact, and consider design implications for enhanced effectiveness to facilitate optimal scale within the total budget envelope. USAID would benefit by knowing if average per capita delivery costs rose or fell during teach phase of IDEJEN what factors drove changes in per capita and component costs over time; which components became more or less cost-effective over time and why; and which project components could become financially sustainable and how.

KEY FINANCIAL VARIABLES

Box 14: Financial Scale and Sustainability Variables	
Variables	Observations
I Access to and level of funding	Initially USAID funds were limited to those earmarked for basic education. As it became evident that NFBE must be linked to vocational training to promote retention and livelihoods, USAID tapped into its Economic Growth funds. When internal political conditions improved after 2003, levels of USAID funding to Haiti rose, as did that of most other major donors. By phase 2 (2008-2010) the increased workload outpaced IDEJEN’s implementation capacity; more activities were added and more funds provided for training while few additional resources were made available for management, M&E or tracer studies. ⁶⁰ While EDC reported having drafted some cost analysis in 2008, the analysis was not finalized and could not be shared with the authors of this report. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the relationship between levels of funds disbursed from USAID to IDEJEN/EDC by category of expenditure and the changing workload of specific IDEJEN management units or activity categories (e.g., finance, M&E, CBO capacity building, equipment/tools procurement/delivery). ⁶¹

60. Interview with Guerda Prévilon, IDEJEN Director. See also IDEJEN Final Report (2012), op. cit.

61. This was noted by Cornelia Janke, EDC, in a November 2013 telephone conversation with the SSA consultant.

Box 14: Financial Scale and Sustainability Variables	
Variables	Observations
2 Funding criteria and its effect on the model	IDEJEN in 2003–2005 was developed on an iterative and participatory basis. The IDEJEN model was tested, and the design evolved through large and small changes over the period of USAID funding. With USAID’s withdrawal, a new set of donors agreed to fund IDEJEN’s work under JENKA, but each had different ideas and criteria for success. Therefore, IDEJEN and YBI modified the model. New funders’ criteria resulted in the model taking new directions.
3 Diversity of funding sources	IDEJEN depended entirely on USAID funding from 2003–2011. Diversification was considered in 2010 when it became clear that USAID funding would soon end. IDEJEN and YBI were successful in attracting other donors for a modified implementation model, including national private sector sources, and developing more diversified funding streams (Digicel and Diageo). Even in Haiti, where donor partners will be present for a very long time, financial sustainability needs to be examined strategically with medium-term plans to diversify and reduce the share of external donor funding, while also building sustainable institution-based funding. This might be accomplished by comprehensively examining user fees paid by trainees and/or future employers; a dedicated vocational training tax; income-generating activities set up by the EAs; competing for training contracts with overhead fees included; and/or partnering with INGOs, foundations or others willing to provide some funds for core costs in exchange for management, representation or other services in Haiti. IDEJEN has tried some of these approaches; one EA just opened an internet café and a few others have tried gardening. However, IDEJEN has not had the capacity or funding to approach the issue strategically. Only now—the third year of the JENKA project—is IDEJEN soliciting the support of a consultant to help develop an institutional sustainability plan with financing at its center.
4 Duration of funding by source	Multiple short funding periods make sustainability planning very difficult. Staff are unsure if or when they should look elsewhere for jobs; funds cannot be programmed for longer-term objectives if all funds must be spent by an end-of-project date even if there may be an extension with an unknown funding level. In the end, USAID funded IDEJEN for 8 years, but the project’s time horizon and financial envelope were uncertain and changed several times based on the evolving content and the vagaries of USAID funding mechanisms and processes.
5 Capacity to show evidence of cost effectiveness	The global amount and types of expenditures from 2003–2011 are known, however, cost effectiveness analysis was not a priority for either donors or partners at the time, and funding was not allocated for such work. There was little or no financial sustainability planning during the pilot phase since the pilot was focused on implementation capacity including means for reaching at-risk youth. Lessons from the pilot helped IDEJEN to scale up during 2006–2010, but they focused more on the design of service delivery rather than its financial or institutional sustainability.

Box 14: Financial Scale and Sustainability Variables	
Variables	Observations
6 Financial & procurement management	Financial and procurement irregularities related to donor aid in Haiti may be less of a problem than is sometimes assumed. ⁶² From this perspective, the landscape for scaling up provides some encouragement. Documents reviewed and interviews held with USAID staff or others did not indicate any issues with financial probity and accountability when working through the CBOs. This is a positive sustainability variable since it gives donors more confidence in an otherwise challenging environment. It also underscores the viability of the USAID Forward Strategy, specifically on implementation and procurement reform which emphasizes empowerment of local institutions so they can receive and manage USAID funds directly and eventually become sustainable. IDEJEN has financial and procurement policy manuals and needs to follow its own rules diligently to maintain donor confidence.
7 Financial planning for S&S	<p>In June 2011, IDEJEN produced a business plan for 2011–2014. The plan would have benefitted from the advice of a financial planner. It was produced well after the May 2009 IDEJEN workshop where a consultant led a discussion about financial sustainability and offered more than 15 options and approaches.⁶³ Nevertheless, the 2011 business plan never mentioned these and stated, “As an NGO, IDEJEN will continue to depend on donor support—it will never be sustained totally by service fees.” This was borne out of a desire to ramp up fee-for service while recognizing that donors will always be a part of the funding equation. The business plan then set as a goal that each EA work toward generating US\$1,000 per year in fees for services, reaching US\$5,000 per year by the fourth year of the business plan (2014/2015). The JENKA expectation is that EAs would be 60 percent self-financing by project end (in 2 years’ time). This is unrealistic and even the US\$5,000 per year figure set back in 2011 now seems ambitious, especially if fees are paid by participants rather than government, companies, and donors.</p> <p>The business plan also noted that EAs are “an integral part of IDEJEN,”⁶⁴ which owns and operates them, and as such, they do not need their own business plans. Yet, IDEJEN’s leadership feels that the EAs must undertake income-generating activities to help defray some of the costs of the training. A more decentralized approach with each EA viewed as a cost center could motivate EA leaders to broaden their efforts to generate revenue and help move IDEJEN as a whole toward being an “entrepreneurial institution.”</p> <p>IDEJEN has either relied on its major donor (USAID 2003–2011) or sought funding (successfully) from other donors. Relying on external donors is a key part of any strategy. However, IDEJEN and donors have financial and, therefore, institutional sustainability as an objective, and this requires adequate financial planning</p> <p>IDEJEN supports major recurrent costs for wages, building maintenance, etc. This reduces flexibility in the case of a reduction in external funding. In addition, it is important to increase wages for the monitors and the teachers at the EAs to attract and retain qualified personnel. However, the current wage structure is also problematic in</p>

62. See Clinton, W.J., & Farmer, P. (2011, November). *Can More Aid Stay in Haiti and Other Fragile Settings?* New York: UN Office of the Special Envoy. This report quotes the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) and other donors that assert that very little aid was unaccounted for during the period in question. Criticism tends to focus less on outright misuse of funds and more on the share of aid that remains outside the country (absorbed as overheads) and the avoidance by donors of more than symbolic GOH involvement. See also, Johnston, Jake and Main, Alexander. (2013, April). *Breaking Open the Black Box: Increasing Aid Transparency and Accountability in Haiti* which quotes several OIG and GAO reports that focus on lack of clarity of benchmarks and poor performance indicators, implementation delays, inadequate involvement of local communities, and inadequate financial oversight but no outright misuse of funds is alleged.

63. See Witter, G. 2009 IDEJEN/EDC Workshop Report, Appendix 9 Some Revenue Generation Methods for Vocational Training Institutions and Appendix 11, *Socio-Economic Role for TVET Institutions: Towards an Entrepreneurial Institution.*

64. IDEJEN (2011, June). *IDEJEN Business Plan for 2011-2014*, p. 12 and 19.

Box 14: Financial Scale and Sustainability Variables	
Variables	Observations
	that the recent MasterCard mid-term evaluation points out that IDEJEN’s difficulties hiring qualified staff are tied to uncompetitive wage levels, trainers at different EAs being paid at different rates depending on the donor source and a large difference between salaries paid at headquarters and in the field. ⁶⁵
8 Prospects for financial sustainability over next 5 years	IDEJEN could survive by continuing to solicit and obtain donor funding. Its likelihood of success should depend on evidence-based outcomes defined as changes in livelihoods—although donors differ in their insistence on demonstration of measurable outcomes. IDEJEN/JENKA has also been successful in obtaining funds from a local source (see Box 6) and its dynamic leader may be able to keep IDEJEN functioning as long as she is there, retains her energy, and uses her considerable range of contacts and influence to generate more funds. However, effectively managing a large, complex organization plus constant fundraising is a serious challenge for anyone. Financial sustainability should be examined not only from the perspective of how much can be raised, but also by how effectively it is disbursed—both from an outcomes perspective and from the perspective of whether such funds are helping structurally to build sustainability in the future.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCALING UP AND SUSTAINING THE IDEJEN MODEL

This section presents recommendations that USAID might apply to strengthen planning for sustainability and scale in project design. More specifically, it discusses how USAID might apply insights from the IDEJEN experience in any new initiatives to adapt, scale up, and sustain the model to support the most at-risk out-of-school youth. Taken together, these recommendations make the case that USAID should support the goal and process of out-of-school youth livelihoods improvement as a long-term strategic objective.

- It is not necessary for IDEJEN or IDEJEN/JENKA to go to scale as a single project; rather the goal of youth livelihoods could be met through a series of coordinated over-lapping efforts could spiral and build on one another. Because the need for donor support within the Haiti country context will not be resolved in the near term, USAID could work more diligently at helping to identify sources of financial support and investment in youth programming. USAID’s Local Enterprise and Value Chain Enhancement (LEVE) Project and the Mission’s Annual Program Statement (APS) mechanism appear to offer this opportunity. LEVE funding IDEJEN is not part of LEVE’s design, but the project offers potential capacity-building funding that IDEJEN could access with a successful application. Before embarking on a renewed partnership with IDEJEN, USAID would need to assess whether IDEJEN or other local organizations would be the most promising choice in terms of sustainability as well as existing and potential capacity to coordinate multiple local training providers and work in partnership with the private sector (formal and informal), financing institutions, government, and the education system.
- Include broad sustainability planning as an integral part of the project design process for any new IDEJEN-like initiatives. Cooley and Kohl (2006) recommend planning backwards; that is, starting to plan for scaling up and ensuring sustainability from early in the pilot phase. Among the most common gaps in sustainability planning are: “assessment of (comparative) cost

65.The precise differences are included in the MasterCard Mid-Term Evaluation (Advisem Services, Inc., 2013, p. 25).

effectiveness...refinement and simplification of the model and analysis of institutional and financial requirements for operating at scale.” Early in the project design process, ask questions: Is sustainability to be an outcome? What does sustainability mean in the project design context? Which project elements should be sustained, why, is that feasible and at what cost? If sustainability is a desired outcome, it needs to be planned for from the outset. Even in contexts where donor partners will be present for a very long time, financial sustainability must be examined strategically with medium-term plans to diversify and reduce the share of external donor funding while also building sustainable institution-based funding. This includes looking at a variety of sources of revenue, including: user fees, taxes, income-generation activities, fee-for-service training for private and public sector organizations willing to pay overhead, and other mechanisms.

- Reconsider doubling back to provide education and training services to the larger and less educated out-of-school youth cohort. If the current IDEJEN/JENKA model is to be sustained, funds needs to be found to provide for the completion of the anticipated school buildings, ongoing operating costs and staff salaries, and the substantial cost of adding satellite centers in order to reach more youth in more communities.⁶⁶ This approach has advantages, but will require major donor financing indefinitely, not unlike other educational and training efforts in Haiti. It is not clear whether the substantial recurrent costs of operating the centers have been fully accounted for. The modality that will be used to serve less educated out-of-school youth cohort requires a cost-effectiveness analysis that includes assumptions about the training needs and expectations for their success after program completion. The rationale for budgeting should be made clear and should be done using a broader frame of reference of other sources or potential sources of support for satellite sub-cohorts.
- If the evolved IDEJEN/USAID model is to be scaled up, retain the most at-risk youth as the target, including remote districts, and continue to strengthen local CBO capacity. Its key strength was that it focused on the largest youth cohort that is most in need and hardest to reach, so to retain that, it will be necessary to develop a comprehensive implementation strategy. The IDEJEN/USAID model has several strengths, one of which is greater impact on the most vulnerable and least educated, broader geographic reach, and greater local control by CBOs. However, it also had challenges: (1) providing the least educated youth with adequate time and assistance, (2) managing over 100 partners with sometimes insufficient facilities, and (3) ensuring consistency in the quality of training. Therefore, strengthening of CBO capacity would need to include investing in training facilities and developing improved management training and monitoring structures.
- Create a new unit within IDEJEN to support a greater emphasis on community mapping to improve targeting of skill areas, placement, entrepreneurship, business coaching, and public-private partnerships. This is necessary to implement IDEJEN/USAID or IDEJEN/JENKA. The unit director would support strategic planning and operational management at IDEJEN headquarters. Without such a unit, staffing constraints at IDEJEN might limit its ability to absorb USAID funds prudently and efficiently.⁶⁷ The drawbacks of this approach are that it was essentially tried from 2005-2011 with mixed results, and it could place further stress on IDEJEN’s management capacities, which are now focused on JENKA through 2015.
- Explore using a performance-based strategy to provide training for demand-driven clients, including businesses. This approach includes identifying EAs and CBOs as valuable service providers. Revenue earned in this way would help reduce some recurrent costs for EAs, create synergies with associations representing the private sector, broaden the menu of skills options, and directly match

66. IDEJEN has stated that they would like to have more satellites but there is no budget for this.

67. USAID Pre-Award Survey of IDEJEN’s Capabilities to Manage Activities under USAID Funds (Dec. 2011) and a 2013 Youthbuild internal memo, “Discussion on IDEJEN Sustainability and Impact.”

the skill delivery and training content to market demand.⁶⁸ Tracking results might require planning and capacity building to track outcomes over medium and longer terms. Also, comparative cohort analyses might be needed to more clearly identify which training components and delivery mechanisms are more sustainable or associated with increased income. USAID's LEVE Project and the Mission's new flexibility to fund local organizations through its APS mechanism lend themselves to greater competition and decentralization and therefore open an opportunity to consider this approach.

Help EAs enhance their sustainability and reduce the management burden on IDEJEN by:

- ✓ Transforming them into independent cost centers affiliated with IDEJEN that retain some autonomy. This would require hiring staff with relevant business management expertise and capacity or building that capacity through training and exposure to the business environment. Each EA coordinator could become responsible for developing and managing a financial sustainability strategy and a scaling-up plan to reach more youth within a market-driven framework.
 - ✓ Negotiating fee-based training contracts with private entities for current and future workers. EAs would have the tools, trainers, and equipment they need, and recruitment would occur after a threshold number of placements had been identified. The difficulty of negotiating such agreements should not be underestimated. In such a scenario, employers would need to be willing to partner in the training of the most marginalized young people, many of who come to the program lacking basic technical, academic, or soft skills. The feasibility of such a venture would need to be further explored.
 - ✓ Becoming more flexible and allowing for options such as specialization by geographic Department (e.g., the EA in Les Cayes might focus on the fishing sector while the Cap Haitian EA might work more with the northern-based apparel industry).
 - ✓ Competing and/or cooperating with other technical training providers such as the CBOs, INDEPCO (tailoring), and Caribbean Harvest (fisheries), depending on comparative advantage, and varying the duration of training according to the needed technical skills. At present, regardless of the skill area, the same number of training hours is required in the current program.⁶⁹
- Shift results measurement from output measures (e.g., number of youth trained) to outcome measures (e.g., increase in youth income, signed youth employment contracts, improved employment, etc.) This will require more sophisticated tracking approaches.
 - Build flexibility into skills training offerings by expanding beyond those certified by the INFP This would free the EAs and CBOs to vary training duration by type; expand the skills menu by adding new types of training that offer more immediate income-generating potential; and facilitate scaling up at lower cost, especially in remote areas. It would also help the EAs and CBOs to respond to niches in value chains as they are identified. However, a downside could be an inability to formally certify

68. For example, the EA at Corail offers training in sewing. INDEPCO offers training in the same skill area. During the SSA team's visit, eight sewing machines were observed, including two rusted and broken ones, as well as a pile of chairs heaped in a corner, some broken. INDEPCO, a non-profit that has 600 member tailor shops in 32 locations also has a warehouse building near Cité Soleil. That building is larger than any of the EAs with about 150 sewing machines plus other types of training in beadwork and labeling. USAID has used INDEPCO for training in the past. There are other sector and sub-sector associations engaged in specialized training that could also be engaged directly or in partnership with IDEJEN or one of its affiliates rather than through wholly dependent satellites.

69. This is inherently inefficient since, for example, an auto mechanic trainee needs more training hours than a bartender trainee. The assessment team was told by IDEJEN that 6 months is the uniform duration because (1) this is the Youthbuild USA model and (2) this conforms with the 6-month curricula developed together with INFP. Neither reason is demand-driven. Varied durations could lower cost, increase the number of trainees or both.

competency in skills. Such offerings, and means to certify quality, would need to be designed in consultation with expert practitioners.

- Re-engage CBOs that demonstrated capacity. Pair a project design and management expert with CBOs to allow them to bid directly for income generation training contracts in response to requests for proposals that include evidence of market demand, pre-identified post-training job placement opportunities, and persuasive and specific evidence of feasible income streams. CBOs that are selected would need to receive training in managing USAID funds.
- Consider providing a conduit for out-of-school youth who only wish to reenroll in school to do so directly. Some out-of-school youth in the IDEJEN/JENKA model receive training for 6 months and then go back into the regular school system. In the IDEJEN/USAID approach, the NFBE duration was 12 months after which some youth returned to the formal school system. This “return-to-school track” should be re-examined. If a quarter of the trainees simply want to return to school, it might be more cost effective to award them school stipends at the outset and then work with more of those committed to the employability/incomes track, providing them with NFBE linked more directly to livelihoods. However, those who return to school would need to be directed toward education that is appropriate for their needs and not back to the type of education they decided to leave or were compelled to leave (unless it was strictly for financial reasons). The GOH, The World Bank, IDB and others already provide large numbers of primary school stipends; therefore, youth could be redirected to benefit from these stipends and then re-enrolled in school. This would lead to a more streamlined project design and free some current staff resources to focus on the model’s greatest challenge: sustained post-training income generation.
- Assess how best to work with MJSAC to promote alignment and integration of youth initiatives. The MJSAC’s Ecole d’Espoir, funded by the Ministry and offering training, offers an important opportunity for IDEJEN to consider: can it more closely align, coordinate and, perhaps eventually, integrate its activities with those of the GOH? A partnership with the GOH may enhance prospects for the long-term sustainability of IDEJEN’s activities and outcomes nationwide. If USAID decides to scale up youth workforce development activities in Haiti, it should assess whether and how to proceed to engage MJSAC as an actor, promote alignment with other initiatives and partners (including IDEJEN), and ensure that such initiatives do not undermine the positive efforts of the government to fund activities for out-of-school youth from its own budget.
- Be more pro-active to improve and sustain gender equality and female empowerment among participants. IDEJEN could:
 - ✓ Identify ways to recruit female trainees proactively, including by seeking to hire more female trainers who can serve as role models. Identify any gender-specific barriers to entry, such as personal security, especially in trades and environments where young males predominate. Consider any special transport needs to address security issues.
 - ✓ Consider women's responsibilities and special needs, for example, by adding access to day care for infants and be sure that bathroom facilities are adequate. Examine schedules from the perspective of the time management needs of women who have the majority of childcare and domestic responsibilities.
 - ✓ Examine other projects to gain new ideas about how to organize training that is as welcoming as possible to young women. Is there a need to consider all female classes in construction or welding, for example? Do girls report that mixed classes have not been a disincentive? If so, has IDEJEN verified this and made sure it is not a disincentive for all EAs and all trades?

- ✓ Adjust course calendars so training starts when the numerical target for young women is reached or with fewer trainees so funds are reserved for young women.
- Hire staff with private sector expertise in order to improve the quality and relevance of training. This will involve seeking additional funding in order to compensate them accordingly. To scale up and, especially, to become sustainable, the senior professional staff at IDEJEN should include more people with strong private sector expertise. To build increasingly more effective public-private partnerships, IDEJEN needs to communicate with business people in their own language and more vigorously seek out economically viable and profitable ways to expand post-training job opportunities for out-of-school youth.
- Budget for cost-effectiveness analyses. If USAID re-engages with IDEJEN or seeks to address the needs of out-of-school youth in other ways, it should include funds for cost effectiveness analyses to be performed at regular intervals. Such analysis improves a project's ability to attract and retain diverse funding and to attract new partners. It would enable IDEJEN and/or other implementing agencies can adjust strategies and components to maximize impact per unit of cost. USAID could learn whether average per capita delivery costs rose or fell across time, which factors drove changes in per capita, which components became more or less cost effective over time and why. A cost-effectiveness review would break expenditure categories down, relate them to impact, and consider design implications for enhanced effectiveness to facilitate optimal scale within the total budget envelope. Key financial issues for scale and sustainability are related to economies of scale—where to find them, how to achieve them, how to know when they are achieved. Part of this analysis involves distinguishing between fixed capital costs and recurrent costs per unit and by type. With such information, it would be possible to assess the sustainability of each component by looking at improvements in outcomes and cost-benefit ratios over time.
- Strive for diversified funding sources. The USAID/IDEJEN model depended on USAID as the sole source of funds from 2003–2011. To sustain IDEJEN or any project, the management team needs to try to maximize alternatives and minimize risks from the outset to build a long-term financial base. It could be useful to look at IDEJEN's efforts over the years and see what did and did not work in terms of seeking non-USAID funding. It may also be helpful for IDEJEN to study the experience of YBIs domestic network to see how it built diverse funding arrangements in dozens of localities that move far beyond relying solely on U.S. federal funds.
- Carry out an external management performance assessment. This could help IDEJEN to pinpoint changes that would allow for a reallocation of tasks to improve current staff efficiency, highlight the need for and justify new staff, profile the kinds of skills that would be required, and enable IDEJEN's leadership to work with its donor partners to improve its capacity.⁷⁰ The assessment could consider the need for a chief financial officer, especially with financial planning and analytical capacity expertise, and a professional manager able to streamline procedures and improve administrative efficiencies. Job descriptions would also need to be re-examined in light of current and/or scaled-up IDEJEN priorities, especially the relationship between how available work time is allocated by priority. This could free more time for the executive director to think strategically and to develop sustainability plans and options.
- Improve M&E capacity. To scale up significantly, the IDEJEN model needs to improve its M&E capacity so that the quality of reporting improves and impact and performance evaluations can

⁷⁰ Hartmann and Linn (2008) note that “organizations that pilot innovations may not be good at scaling up or at running large scale programs. With exceptions, this tends to be true for NGOs. Therefore, a readiness to hand off to institutions that are able to manage the scaling up process is key” (p.38). Thus, IDEJEN needs to decide what it does best and consider these options.

be performed, yielding qualitative and timely outcome assessments with actionable feedback for IDEJEN management. IDEJEN needs donors to prioritize and budget adequately for M&E activities.

5. LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons learned can contribute to the design and implementation of other similar youth education and livelihoods projects:

Lesson 1: It is not necessary for a single project to go to scale; rather a series of over-lapping efforts toward a key high-level impact could spiral and build on one another. Taken together, these recommendations make the case that USAID needs country-level strategies for supporting out-of-school youth livelihoods improvement in cooperation with other donors, foundations, and governments. This would translate into continuous, flexible and complementary initiatives, seeding and nurturing activities nationwide rather than trying to address out-of-school youth issues with a single project or via a single NGO.

Lesson 2: Resilience and leadership are keys to success, especially in countries that have experienced conflict or crisis. Despite hurricanes and earthquakes, political upheaval and cholera, poverty and gang violence, Haitians are a determined people. Their own efforts ensured that the USAID-funded IDEJEN/EDC project achieved solid gains for thousands of youth who seized new opportunities, hundreds of CBOs that developed their capacities when help was offered, and key ministries whose staffs worked hard to gain new skills and improve their performance. The many caveats in this assessment do not detract from that basic achievement. The JENKA project also is delivering important benefits to Haiti by providing opportunities for those it targets. The lesson is that development assistance can succeed for many in even the most difficult environments.

Lesson 3: Sometimes external technical and management expertise is needed in countries with weak human capacity is essential to development. Expertise contributed by EDC to the financial and performance reporting, training workshops, and everyday implementation make it clear that seasoned, capable project managers are needed. In addition, to organizing and leading staff and partners, ensuring collaboration and compliance are also necessary skills.

Lesson 4: Be clear about intended project outcomes. Clearly define means (training) and ends (incomes). Manage beneficiaries' expected outcomes. For example, improved livelihoods are normally the expected outcome of livelihoods projects, and income is essential. The phrasing of JENKA and IDEJEN project goals allows "success" to be defined in terms of intermediate goals and processes, which are likely to be different from what youth expect. Of course, both IDEJEN/USAID and IDEJEN/JENKA intend and work toward post-training placement. This should be the primary measure of success, and it should be stated clearly in terms of benchmarks for outcome measurement.

Lesson 5: Youth want to use the skills they gain to earn an income. Many youth expressed their frustration with activities that lead to technical certificates but too often not to jobs, and workforce readiness skills that make them "ready" or "employable" but not employed or self-employed. The unmistakable message from Haiti's youth during the SSA focus groups was that they want to use the skills they acquire to better their economic condition. The IDEJEN director was very clear that IDEJEN was foremost a training project to reintegrate youth into society, that incomes were a secondary goal, and only for some since others return to school. The risk in primarily providing "employability" training with a secondary focus on employment, entrepreneurship, and incomes is that rising expectations have been dashed and frustrations have mounted. The JENKA Mid-Term Evaluation also made this point: "YouthBuild International has to think beyond the mere training phase...JENKA should perhaps view

and track youth progress in regards to changes in income and assets over a longer period” (Advisem Services, 2013, p.38)

Lesson 6: Training efficiency. The IDEJEN Final Report and subsequent evaluations offer recommendations for enhancing future program models. For example, lessons regarding the length of training and accompaniment have been learned which indicate that longer time in training (for some subjects) and “longer and stronger” accompaniment is needed (Janke, Kratzig, & Hershkowitz, 2012; Advisem Services, Inc., 2013). However there is a trade-off between intensity of programming and number of youth served, assuming resources do not increase. Therefore, more rigorous evaluation data is needed in order to determine how to provide training more effectively so that youth outcomes are reached without requiring more or longer training.

Lesson 7: Favor institutional simplicity and limit the number of activities to be managed. As Hartmann and Linn (2008) said, “The simpler the institutional framework and the less complex the relationships between actors, the swifter and more successful the initiative is likely to be (Binswanger and Aiyer, 2003). However, the tendency is to stick with the initial often complex approaches and add bells and whistles to perfect the model, even though this may actually get in the way of scaling up” (p. 35). Management weaknesses at IDEJEN are, in part, caused by having multiple donors with multiple reporting requirements, multiple EA training sites plus multiple intermittent satellites, and multiple deliverables (NFBE, vocational training, entrepreneurship, curricula development, micro-enterprise activities, paying stipends, building public-private partnerships, managing community mapping, overseeing the M&E function, etc.). If IDEJEN is to scale up, it may need to outsource some activities and/or work in partnership with other groups that can specialize in some functions that IDEJEN could spin off.⁷¹

Lesson 8: Draw the private sector into the workforce development ecosystem and engage them early and often. The major challenge to IDEJEN throughout its life has been the sustainable placement of graduates in situations where they can earn income. At the same time, EDC, YBI, and IDEJEN's own staff have pointed out the need for a more robust engagement with private sector stakeholders. These needs are related of course. As a part of a systems approach, more investment of time and resources building strategic partnerships with public and private sector actors (e.g., with the apparel and fishery sectors) should lead to not only to improved youth employment outcomes but better financial sustainability for youth training mechanisms.

Lesson 9: During the initial project design period, assess physical capacity (premises, tools availability, utilities etc.) and management capacity of local service providers as a factor affecting output capacity (number trained) and outcome potential (likely quality of training and consequent results). Assess physical capacity at all current and possible future sites from the perspective of the potential for scaling up and sustainability. Such assessment will provide data that can be analyzed to build individualized roadmaps for each CBO's capacity building, as well as allow planning to achieve scale in service delivery and ultimately youth outcomes.

Lesson 10: In-depth understanding of the cultural context and nature of fragility is a solid advantage. Haitian project leadership and the full participation of Haitian staff and other Haitian stakeholders has been a key to IDEJEN's success in reintegrating youth, promoting behavioral change via life skills instruction, building capacity of CBOs in local communities, campaigning for HIV/AIDS awareness and related behavioral changes, and cultivating “champions” able to advocate for out-of-school youth. However this factor did not necessarily affect the ability of the effort to be locally sustainable from a financial point of view.

71. See the IDEJEN Pilot Evaluation (2006) and Final Reports (2012) that refer to identifying constraints and trying to overcome them by adding new activities; also see the JENKA Mid-Term Evaluation that notes the challenge IDEJEN faces with so many activities and a reduced staff size (unfilled vacancies and high staff turnover are cited) (Advisem Services, 2013).

Lesson 11: Monitoring and evaluation is vital to project success. A recurrent theme in this report is the effect of insufficient M&E capacity on the evolution of IDEJEN. An effective M&E unit is one that thinks strategically and that plans and conducts analyses that help management understand constraints and opportunities so it can make adjustments to improve outcomes. If IDEJEN is to be scaled up and made sustainable, M&E capacity must be strengthened. IDEJEN must be able to provide evidence-based analyses of cost effectiveness; to track trainees after graduation to determine whether training led to raised incomes; and to prove that it has and is applying solid data from community mapping to determine market-based skill needs. It must also be able to integrate such data into a compelling narrative that allows future donors to fund IDEJEN with confidence. These analytical requirements are precursors for sustainable scaling up.

6. CONCLUSION

A decade ago, USAID made a commitment to the people of Haiti, a commitment that would endure through multiple phases, multiple cyclones, multiple political crises and an epic earthquake. The commitment was simple: to help young people whose lives had been afflicted by poverty and despair to regain hope; whose expectations for a better life were aborted by the realities of inequality and exploitation to gain a skill and a better future. USAID made this commitment to Haiti's most marginalized, least educated, and most vulnerable youth. Sensitive and committed USAID staff in 2003 understood that they could not impose a solution; indeed, they did not have a solution or even a grasp of the intricacies of youth survival in Haiti. So they started small and engaged local people to participate in a shared journey to mutual understanding and action. The pilot phase of IDEJEN tested ideas, experimented with different approaches, mapped local communities, and engaged local people as advocates for at-risk, out-of-school youth. These people became champions for the most significant effort in all of Haiti—to reintegrate marginalized youth into their communities, to deliver skills training, and to improve livelihoods.

IDEJEN confronted the frustrations of the nation's 15 to 24-year-olds, the limitations of a stagnant economy, the cynicism of many employers about the comportment of such marginalized youth, and the incapacity of a national government burdened by political crises and a history of indifference. Despite these prodigious constraints, IDEJEN managed to build CBO capacities, improve curricula, train youth in skills that can help them earn a living, and help some toward economic self-sufficiency. While the record is mixed, the results for those who benefited were transformational: new incomes were generated and new lives were built. IDEJEN engaged more than 13,000 youth, and hundreds of CBOs expanded their capacity to train youth in their communities. No, conditions were not ideal. Yes, some youth dropped out or failed. Not every enterprise succeeded, but the target was appropriate and the needs were overwhelming. IDEJEN grew and evolved from 2003-2011 after which USAID funding ended and other donors took up the challenge to educate and engage at-risk youth.

In 2010, a consortium of new stakeholders came together to build on the IDEJEN model through the JENKA project by sustaining support to the least educated out-of-school youth and by continuing to build local capacities to deliver training to those at the bottom of Haitian society. With an additional focus on leadership development and community service, the midterm evaluation showed promising developments for future sustainability and scalability: young people became engaged in their communities, youth training centers were constructed that are also used by community members, and a stipend and savings program was added, enabling youth to save and use matching payments to start new businesses. While the conditions remain challenging and there are opportunities to strengthen components of the JENKA program, IDEJEN appears to be well-positioned for its next stage of development.

However, with the participation of a different set of donors, cost constraints, and the urgent need to respond to the earthquake emergency, the IDEJEN model shifted considerably, including a shift away from long-term development of local CBO capacity. Also IDEJEN's training duration was shortened and it moved away from recruitment of the less educated youth cohort. Now only those with a sixth grade or higher education living within 15 kilometers of a trade school are accepted, and community-based training largely has been replaced with more formal school structures in Haiti's largest communities. This means that the least educated and most marginalized are not receiving assistance and those who are participating may not be receiving sufficient training and accompaniment to successfully transition from being unskilled (and sometimes anti-social) to productive members of society. IDEJEN/JENKA benefits the youth it serves, but it suffers from most of the same challenges experienced by IDEJEN during the USAID funding period.

In terms of IDEJEN's potential to scale up and sustain its activities, USAID must first decide what to scale up. If it is opportunities for the *least educated* and empowerment of local organizations to deliver training where such youth live, then the current IDEJEN model does not offer an optimal approach. In principle, IDEJEN could restructure itself to accommodate a renewed commitment to the least educated of the out-of-school youth population, but it is already straining to implement JENKA. However, this approach is one of a local organization contorting itself for donor funding rather than implementing its vision with donor support. Consequently, this assessment concludes that USAID should use a systems rather than a project approach in order to bring all of its available resources to bear on services in support of the target groups. IDEJEN may well have an important role to play in the overall effort, but it need not be the only partner when there are multiple pathways that can also lead to the desired results, some of which may be more cost effective.

The IDEJEN model's financial sustainability will most likely depend on external donors for a very long time, as would other development interventions in Haiti. This dilemma has been exacerbated by a lack of comprehensive planning for sustainability by all involved, in part, due to the immediate demands of implementation and reporting. Although IDEJEN was not considered to be a pilot project after 2005, it reached a small fraction of the population. A rigorous cohort-level analysis is needed to determine cost effectiveness. Depending on donors imperils the potential for IDEJEN to improve service delivery and target out-of-school youth with less than a sixth grade education. In the long run, sustainability requires serious attention to determining the role of the Government of Haiti can play, and more emphasis on generating training levies and other scenarios to secure financial sustainability.

In the end, what needs sustaining is not a particular model derived from a single project, but a systemic capacity for actors in the workforce development ecosystem to work together to deliver effective support indefinitely to a large population group.

ANNEX I: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH PLAN

1. Introduction

The purpose of the IDEJEN Scale and Sustainability Assessment (SSA) is to learn whether and to what degree the IDEJEN model succeeded in achieving scale and is sustainable over the medium term, and what key factors contributed to this outcome. It is also intended to identify lessons learned that can be applied to out-of-school youth development projects elsewhere that may wish to replicate and/or modify and build on the IDEJEN experience. The SSA will use the analytical framework in the scope of work (SOW). The analytical framework is based on studies⁷² of scaling up and sustainability that will provide context for the analysis. For ease of reference the revised analytical framework is presented in the next annex.

2. Data Collection Methods

Document review. The assessment team will review the documentation available from IDEJEN from 2003 to the present. This will include periodic reports and the project final report, external assessments, operations guides, youth mapping guides, consultant reports, etc. The SSA team will also review key relevant documents published by USAID, other development partners, the Government of Haiti (GOH) and academic sources. A matrix of findings from the document desk review, identifying key variables for analysis during the field mission, will be completed and submitted to USAID in September. A revised version of the matrix will be included as an annex to the final report.

Qualitative data. This will be collected through semi-structured interviews with key IDEJEN stakeholders using the interview protocols described in Section 4 and Annex I. The questions in the protocols provide a basis for discussion and help ensure the comprehensiveness and comparability of responses by different individuals and categories of respondents (stakeholders).

Languages Used. Meetings will be conducted in English, French or Kréyol as warranted. Interpreters will be used when needed. In most cases interpreting will be done by the local research assistant and the logistics facilitator. Interpretation will be needed especially to/from Kréyol. The lead consultant is fluent in French so some interviews will be held directly in French. All interview protocols in this DRP are provided in English and some will be translated into French.

Data Sets. The SSA is not a project evaluation. Therefore, the data that is collected will not replicate that collected by the external final evaluation of IDEJEN or other IDEJEN reports. Data will be gathered to help answer the questions in the analytical framework of the SOW.

CBO Questionnaire. Data will also be collected from CBOs that participated in IDEJEN using a questionnaire that will seek to capture data 2 years after the end of USAID funding so that they can be aggregated to develop a profile of the current capacities of CBOs still active with IDEJEN. See Annex 2 below for details. The replies to the questionnaire will be analyzed together with the results from extended interviews with selected CBO directors.

3. Methods of Analysis

Analysis will be primarily qualitative. The analysis will benefit from the experience of the SSA team with out-of-school youth support projects in Haiti, Rwanda, Liberia, Senegal and elsewhere, providing a basis for comparison in terms of project design, costs, implementation processes, components, M&E, outputs and outcomes.

72. Hartmann and Linn (2008); Cooley and Kohl (2006); Cooley (July 2012).

The analysis will refer often to the academic studies of scaling up and sustainability (see footnote 1) and use their conceptual frameworks as a prism and basis for analysis both of the scaling up and sustainability achieved by IDEJEN and of the potential for further expansion in Haiti and elsewhere.

The matrix of findings from the document review referred to in Section 2 will serve as a basis for assessment of additional documentation obtained after submission of the desk review and during the field mission. The matrix will enable the SSA team to add other relevant documents as they become available and to compare the information from those new documents with the key documents already reviewed in the initial matrix. This comparative analysis will increase the team's ability to identify relevant variables, identify commonalities and inconsistencies and pinpoint analytical or data gaps. This structured review of the documentation will increase confidence in the assessment's findings and recommendations.

During internal meetings of the SSA team, especially during the third week of the field mission, the method of analysis will involve a rigorous review of findings; testing and challenging assumptions. Haitian team members will be involved substantively to ensure a local perspective during the analysis to complement findings from focus group sessions and interviews. The lead consultant will use a workshop format with a flip chart to facilitate and structure the discussion and build a consensus around major findings that will be presented to USAID/Haiti on October 24 or 25 before the departure of the SSA team.

4. Interview and Focus Group Protocols

Please see Annex 3 for the lists of questions developed for stakeholders.

5. Orientation of Research Staff

The lead consultant will be in frequent contact with the local research assistant (LRA). They will jointly develop a local research plan setting out specific tasks, deliverables and deadlines for the LRA. This will include a list of documents to be obtained locally; a set of parameters for site visits and priorities among them; an explanation of what data is needed and why; and clarification about the role, responsibilities and inputs expected from the LRA. The local research consultant was also given the opportunity to review and have input into the desk review report (DRP) and will also be involved with the Desk Review.

6. Implementation Timeline

Note 1: To make the timeline easier to read, deadlines for the Desk Review Report (DRR) are in gray highlight.

Table 1: Implementation Timeline	
Date	Activity
9/3/13	DRP: Draft Detailed Research Plan submitted to JBS by Lead Consultant (LC)
9/6/13	DRP: JBS sends comments to LC about the DRP
9/9/13	DRP: Revised DRP send to JBS for final review
9/10/13	DRP: sent to USAID by JBS
9/10/13	DRR: LC submits Desk Review Report to JBS
9/13/13	DRR: JBS sends comments to LC
9/13/13	DRP: USAID sends comments to JBS and LC
9/16/13	DRP: LC submits final revised version to JBS
9/17/13	DRP: JBS sends final version to USAID
9/17/13	DRR: LC sends revised DRR to JBS
9/18/13	DRR: JBS sends draft DRR to USAID
9/23/13	DRR: USAID sends comments to JBS and LC

Table 1: Implementation Timeline	
Date	Activity
9/25/13	DRR: JBS submits final DRR to USAID
10/3/13	Meeting of Scale & Sustainability Assessment (SSA) team in Washington, DC with USAID and JBS International team members.
10/6/13	Depart for Haiti by LC
10/7/13	Begin work in Haiti – a detailed schedule for the Haiti visit is being drafted to include field trips, meetings, youth focus groups, etc.
10/20/13	Arrival in Haiti of USAID Assessment team members and briefing for them on findings
10/25/13	Field presentation of preliminary results to USAID/Haiti and participatory analysis meeting
10/26/13	Departure from Haiti of LC and USAID team members
12/04/13	Submission of SSA draft by LC to JBS
12/06/13	JBS sends comments to LC on draft SSA
12/09/13	LC sends revised draft back to JBS
12/09/13	JBS sends SSA final report to USAID
12/18/13	USAID submit comments to LC and JBS
12/20/13	LC submit final revised report to JBS for final submission to USAID
12/23/13	JBS sends final SSA report to USAID (<i>all tasks completed before Christmas holiday</i>)

The exact dates and appointment times for the three-week field mission to Haiti (October 7-26, 2013) are being finalized by the lead consultant with support from Haitian-based team members. Meetings will be held with a wide range of stakeholders, including staff from USAID/Haiti, the IDEJEN NGO, CBOs, trade schools, career counseling centers, the GOH and youth that benefitted from the project. Field visits will include visits to the following locations and entities. The exact schedule will be completed by October 1, 2013 since appointments cannot always be made far in advance.

Table 2: Probable Field Site Visits (recommendations from Haiti team)			
No.	Sites	Type of Institution	Rationale
1	Gressier	Ecole Atelier	One of the oldest with good M&E system, not far from Port-au-Prince, closer to sites where opportunities for the graduates exist.
2	Corail	Ecole Atelier	Located close to the biggest IDP camp where vulnerable youth live, very important in terms of size and value chain, great opportunities for assessment of sustainability.
3	Delmas	Ecole Atelier	Mostly for its location
4	Cap-Haitian	Ecole Atelier and CBOs	Mostly for the location of the Ecole Atelier in the Northern Department of Haiti which offers a broad perspective on scaling up for the department.
5	Gonaives	Ecole Atelier and CBOs	Location and size of the Ecole Atelier which explains the conditions of the Upper Artibonite.
6	Hinche	Ecole Atelier	It allows meetings with CBOs and Ecole Atelier
7	Mirebalais	Ecole Atelier, CBOs	Help understand challenges of the lower Central Plateau
8	Saint Marc	CBOs, CDCJs, Ecole Atelier	Help better assess scale and sustainability of such programs for the lower Artibonite
9	Les Cayes	Ecole Atelier, CDCJs, CBOs	For its location in the Southern Department of Haiti which allows broader analysis of out-of-school youth in the South.

7. Possible Limitations of the Research Design

The research design will be limited by the absence of baseline data from before project start-up and for some components during the project life. Some beneficiaries will be difficult to locate or reach, and the selection of beneficiaries will be done based on availability rather than any quantitatively valid random sample. Interview questions often refer to events that occurred several years ago so the memories of respondents may be imprecise in some areas. Also, some areas of Haiti, referred to as “hot spots,” will not be visited due to security concerns.

In order to consider prospects for replication of the model in other countries and to examine trade-offs from a cost perspective, the SSA team will need access to financial data. If sufficient financial data is not shared, the SSA team would not be able to calculate the relative beneficiary cost per type of assistance (e.g., NFBE, income-generating activities, stipends for continuing education) or by phase or year.

ANNEX 2: REVISED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Factors	Key Questions and Topics	Key Points of Inquiry
<p>I. Sustainability and scale definitions and parameters</p>	<p>1. The analysis should examine scale and sustainability using the definition in the column on the right and as it pertains to the IDEJEN experience and model.</p> <p>2. Sustainability and scale taken together is a key lens through which the variables (below) related to the IDEJEN experience may be assessed.</p> <p>3. Various types of sustainability will be examined in relationship to the IDEJEN experience (e.g., financial, institutional, technical and socio-cultural).</p> <p>4. How has scale and sustainability of youth programming, especially IDEJEN, been defined by USAID and other donors in Haiti, especially in the light of factors such as political instability, fragility, poverty, crime and natural disaster?</p>	<p>Scale is defined by USAID as the achievement of a program or a set of activities or services with a “reach” sufficient to achieve meaningful impact. (“Set of activities,” “reach,” and “meaningful impact” all need to be defined as terms of negotiated expectations and, if available, require the use of local demographic and socio-economic data, e.g., a percentage of the out-of-school, unemployed youth cohort aged 15-24 in key at-risk neighborhoods that have access to employment training and services.)</p> <p>Sustainability is the continuation of a set of activities/services after USAID funding is complete. Sustainability includes financial, institutional, technical and socio-cultural sustainability. Some may exist without the others or to different degrees and over different periods of time.</p> <p>The primary focus of this assessment is sustainability, but with the definition and achievement of scale also considered as an interlocking factor.</p>
<p>2. Vision, values and priorities</p>	<p>5. What visions, values and priorities concerning the engagement and support of out-of-school, unemployed youth have been dominant among key stakeholders in Haiti?</p>	<p>Institutionalization of these visions, values and priorities into the policies and programs of other donors or other organizations</p>

Factors	Key Questions and Topics	Key Points of Inquiry
3. Leadership	<p>6. What kind of program leadership and leadership strategy has been in place over the years and is in place now.</p> <p>7. How does this relate to the current and future status and prospects of IDEJEN?</p> <p>8. Who have been and are currently the main stakeholders of the program?</p> <p>9. What are their perspectives, roles and interests, and what have been their contributions?</p>	<p>Leadership in place</p> <p>Leadership strategy</p> <p>Leadership vision and values</p> <p>Analysis of stakeholders</p>
4. Constituencies for out-of-school and under-educated youth	<p>10. What has been the demand for IDEJEN or IDEJEN-like services/activities among various stakeholders?</p> <p>11. What champions exist? What actions have they taken to strengthen IDEJEN? How have both advantaged and disadvantaged constituencies been drawn into and valued by IDEJEN?</p>	<p>Community</p> <p>Youth engagement</p> <p>Government</p> <p>Private sector via labor demand and</p> <p>Possible work force investment</p>
5. Mutually supportive policies, programs and projects	<p>12. What was the landscape in Haiti for youth programming (e.g., policy, government initiatives, investment in youth approaches, activities of other donors) when IDEJEN was first introduced and piloted?</p> <p>13. How has this evolved (relevant to IDEJEN) over time?</p> <p>14. How have conditions of fragility, conflict and crisis affected IDEJEN, and how have they helped to define the parameters and context for the prospects for achieving scale and sustainability?</p>	<p>Supportive government and/or other policies</p> <p>Social, cultural, economic environment</p> <p>Enablers and potential obstacles for scaling up</p>

Factors	Key Questions and Topics	Key Points of Inquiry
<p>6. Institution building and exogenous factors affecting change</p>	<p>15. How has the IDEJEN project built institutional and human capacity to deliver and expand youth programming and advocacy?</p> <p>16. What extra-project efforts or factors have affected institutional capacity and will in the future—either positively or negatively?</p>	
<p>7. Incentives and accountability</p>	<p>17. What, if any, incentives have there been for scaling and sustaining IDEJEN? Disincentives?</p> <p>18. What, if any, accountability metrics have been put in place that explicitly measure outcomes of IDEJEN?</p> <p>19. How and how effectively has IDEJEN been navigating the changing and diverse incentive and accountability regimes imposed by different donors, by government partners and oversight agencies?</p>	<p>Role of international NGOs (EDC & YouthBuild) and their management of IDEJEN.</p> <p>Role of donor funding, reporting and management practices.</p> <p>Role of government in oversight of and willingness to continue support of IDEJEN or IDEJEN-like services.</p>
<p>8. Effective monitoring and evaluation</p>	<p>20. Has IDEJEN’s M & E system contributed to achieving scale and sustainability and, if so, how?</p> <p>21. Are there opportunities for it to make a greater contribution? In what ways?</p>	<p>Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems; Learning and feedback systems; documented success of the program; sharing of success and lessons learned with key stakeholders</p>

Factors	Key Questions and Topics	Key Points of Inquiry
<p>9. Implications of IDEJEN's evolution and approach relative to the potential for greater scale and sustainability</p>	<p>22. What were the main characteristics of IDEJEN's approach to scaling up and sustaining itself and its outcomes over time?</p> <p>23. Specifically, what did IDEJEN do or put in place while supported by USAID that was favorable to longer-term scale and sustainability?</p> <p>24. Were there any missed opportunities and, if so, why were they missed (e.g., USAID operating practices)?</p> <p>25. How might USAID apply these insights to strengthen planning for sustainability and scale in project design?</p> <p>26. Is the environment in Haiti such that scaling up would be orderly and gradual?</p> <p>27. What is the likelihood of IDEJEN being able to continue at the same or similar level of service as that achieved as of the end of the USAID-funding (March 2011) and/or currently (October 2013) and in the short (2013-15), medium, and long-term? What factors enable or inhibit this?</p> <p>28. Has or how has the Haiti environment for youth programming been changed as a result of the IDEJEN project? Can this be captured or measured and, if so, how?</p> <p>29. What gender dimensions or other dimensions of equality or equity, if any, can be seen in the changes in the youth programming environment?</p>	<p>Scale achieved to date</p> <p>Preparation completed for future scaling up</p>

ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS

A. IDEJEN (NGO)

Current situation and funding

How would you describe the overall state of IDEJEN 2 years after the end of USAID funding?

1. Have you been able to attract new sources of funds since 2011?
2. If yes, from where? If not, why not?
3. If yes, how have these new funds been used? Specifically, what proportion of the new funds has been applied to which IDEJEN objectives or phases and why?
4. Do you calculate the cost of services per beneficiary and, if so, in what ways?
5. Have you compared the cost of services per beneficiary with those of other entities delivering similar services using the same or different approaches? If yes, what was the result?
6. Do you use periodic cost per beneficiary assessments to track project cost effectiveness and then to modify phases or components to increase impact and improve the cost/benefit ratio?
7. Hypothetically, if you received a new grant tomorrow and could scale up, how could you spend it most effectively?
8. In what ways would the allocation you propose of this grant serve to enhance long-term project sustainability as opposed to just increasing the number of beneficiaries?

Project components/phases and NGO governance

9. Have you made any changes to the program since 2011 in terms of its components?
10. If yes, what changes have been made and why? Specifically, describe changes in (a) the employability phase, (b) the accompaniment phase—education and employment tracks.
11. Without regard to the hypothetical extra grant already discussed or the costs generally, what additional changes do you think should be made and/or new components added if the project was scaled up further, and why?
12. How is the IDEJEN NGO is structured and governed? Please let us have a copy of your staff list (names and titles); your by-laws and copies of minutes from board meetings if you have a board so we can understand the leadership and management structure.
13. Are you satisfied with the current organizational structure of the IDEJEN NGO?
14. If not, what changes are you considering and why?
15. How would you rate the effectiveness of the IDEJEN leadership and governance structure?
16. How would you describe your leadership strategy and approach?
17. During the transitional period from IDEJEN the project to IDEJEN the NGO, what did USAID do to facilitate a successful transition and, in your view, were there other things that could have been done to make the transition more effective?
18. What kind of buy-in was there from stakeholders for the transition?

Government relations

19. Describe your current relationship with the Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et la Formation Professionnelle (Ministry of National Education and Technical Training, or MENPF).
20. Describe your ongoing relationship with any other ministries (e.g., MJSAC)?
21. How do you interact with local government agencies in the Departments?
22. Do you see scope for closer collaboration with the GOH and, if so, how?
23. Specifically, what reports do you share with which parts of the GOH?
24. Do you ever get comments from the GOH on the reports you share with them?
25. Do GOH civil servants ever visit or inspect IDEJEN activities?
26. Is IDEJEN a member of any government-supported entity designed to enhance NGO collaboration in the sector or over all?
27. Is IDEJEN a member of other coordination entities sponsored by the NGO community, development partners, or others?
28. If yes, and were IDEJEN to scale up, are there mechanisms in place that would help prevent inter-NGO overlap and overlap with major bilateral and multilateral development partners?

Working with CBOs and the écoles ateliers

29. How many CBOs were active participants in IDEJEN at the end of USAID funding in 2011?
30. How many CBOs are active IDEJEN participants as of October 2013?
31. How many of these are continuations (that is, the same CBOs) from the IDEJEN project under USAID funding?
32. Which of these have been added or dropped since 2011 and why?
33. What criteria do you use to add or drop CBO partners?
34. May we have a copy of whatever document you use that contains these written criteria?
35. Is there an application form for CBOs and, if yes, may we see a copy?
36. What criteria do you use to measure CBO performance?
37. What examples do you have of recent CBO performance assessment and improvement?
38. If IDEJEN were to scale up further, what further capacity building of CBOs would be needed?
39. Do you have evidence that the capacity building done by IDEJEN under the USAID-funding period has been internalized into the CBOs so that new capacity building would start at a higher level?
40. If yes, please provide such evidence, including details and indicate how it was obtained.
41. EDC indicated that as of the end of project funds (July 2011), none of the écoles ateliers were sustainable. How many are you now working with and how have they managed to survive, if they did?
42. Do you have any recommendations about how to improve sustainability of the écoles ateliers?
43. Are you now actively working with CDJC's? If yes, which ones?

44. In your view, how effective have they been?

45. Should they be strengthened and, if so, how?

Other stakeholders and advocacy

46. Aside from the CBOs, who do you view as the other major project stakeholders?

47. For each of these categories, describe their relationships to IDEJEN: out-of-school youth, the trade schools, the career development centers, local training providers, GOH, other.

48. Do you now cope with excess demand for your services or do you need to recruit youth, use advocacy campaigns, or link with local “champions” to interest others in the program? In other words, if the project were scaled up to twice its size or to 10 times its size would demand be there or would IDEJEN be competing with other youth priorities or NGOs or the GOH?

Looking ahead

49. What do you see as the prospects for IDEJEN’s success over the next five years?

50. What factors or events support your conclusions?

51. Do you see any changes in the overall environment for youth programming in Haiti as a result of the IDEJEN project and experience?

52. As you look ahead, what do you think the IDEJEN project (USAID) put into place that was favorable to scaling up and long-term sustainability?

53. Were there any missed opportunities?

B. CBOs

1. Do you have a current and ongoing relationship with the IDEJEN NGO?

2. If yes, how would you describe its nature and extent?

3. How satisfied are you with this relationship and why?

4. If you no longer work with IDEJEN, why not?

5. Has your relationship with IDEJEN changed since the end of USAID funding?

6. If yes, in what ways?

7. What benefit did you derive from IDEJEN in terms of capacity building? Please be specific.

a. Was there improved leadership capacity? If yes, in what ways?

b. Was there improved CBO governance capacity (e.g., a board)? If yes, in what ways?

c. Was there improved management capacity? If yes, in what ways?

d. Was there improved financial and administrative capacity? If yes, in what ways?

e. Was there improved technical delivery capacity? If yes, in what ways?

f. Were there other benefits to IDEJEN capacity building not already explained?

8. Does the strengthened capacity you describe still exist inside your CBO?

9. If yes, what elements can be sustained in the future?
10. What has been the impact of this improved capacity in your CBO's performance?
11. Specifically, in what ways are you now more efficient (time and money management) and effective (outcomes), and how do you know this to be true?
12. Can you train and manage more youth at the same time as a direct result of the support you received from IDEJEN, and is there evidence of better outcomes?
13. If IDEJEN were to be scaled up in the future and to ask you to double or triple your trainee load, would you need additional capacity-building support or only additional funding?
14. If you would need more capacity-building support, what are the three most critical needs in priority order and why are these the most important areas?
15. If IDEJEN were just beginning, what would you recommend that it do to build the capacity of your CBO and others that is either different from or in addition to what it did?
16. What are your CBO's prospects for success over the next 5 years?
17. Specifically, do you have a solid source or sources of income for the CBO?
18. If yes, can you describe the sources (e.g., other donors, user fees, GOH, other)?
19. Are you a member of one or more associations of CBOs? If yes, which ones?
20. Are they effective advocates for CBO interests with donors and the GOH? If yes, in what ways? If not, why not?
21. How would you evaluate the quality of the training that you provided to IDEJEN youth?
22. How could such training be improved in the future?
23. Do you keep track of youth helped by your CBO to know how they applied their skills after they entered the workforce?
24. If yes, do you have any written tracer records and may we see an example?
25. Are there any lessons you and your CBO have learned from the IDEJEN experience that we have not already discussed?
26. Do you have any final recommendations for the SSA team about how to facilitate further scaling up of the IDEJEN model and to sustain its outcomes?

C. Trade Schools (Ecoles Ateliers)

1. Please describe the current legal status and activities of your school.
2. In what skill areas do you currently offer training, and what is the duration of each course?
3. Have you added training areas since the end of IDEJEN?
4. If yes, what areas and how do you cover costs for these?
5. How many youth are now being trained, in what subjects, and for what duration?
6. Have the numbers gone up or down since the end of the IDEJEN project, and in what ways has the mix of skills being offered changed?

7. On what basis do you admit trainees, DEJEN only or have you expanded to other youth?
8. How do you recruit teachers, and what qualifications do you require?
9. Under IDEJEN's "accompaniment phase," all training was for 6 months yet some skills require more than 6 months to learn and others less than 6 months. How did you adjust to the fixed 6-month period for level 2 certification and this reality?
10. What is your current capacity to serve your trainees in terms of numbers and skill offerings?
11. Is your capacity greater or less than, or about the same as when USAID funding for IDEJEN ended?
12. What factors contributed to these changes in capacity?
13. How great is the demand for the types of training you offer? (*Schools offering both construction and agricultural training will be visited*)
14. In what ways have your school's operations changed since the end of USAID IDEJEN funding?
15. Do you think your school has become more sustainable, less sustainable, or is in more or less the same situation as when USAID funding ended?
16. Has the IDEJEN NGO helped your school to sustain itself after the end of USAID funding? If yes, how?
17. Are there other things IDEJEN could have done when USAID was funding the project to increase your school's sustainability prospects?
18. What is your relationship to the MENPF?
19. What is your current primary source of income for the school?
20. What other sources do you have?
21. What capacity does your school have to scale up and what are the likely limitations?
22. If the number of youth admitted for training were to double or triple or increase 10-fold what would be the needs and implications for teachers, training materials, classroom space, etc.?
23. Are there economies of scale you can realize, and have you calculated the optimal intake size in terms of per capita cost? (For example, eight trainees may require one teacher and two sets of tools, but nine trainees may require splitting into two sections with additional tools and more space.)
24. What are your school's prospects for sustainability over the next 5 years?
25. Are there any lessons you have learned about setting up, leading, and managing a trade school that we have not already discussed, especially related to scaling up and sustaining your activities?

D. CDCJs (Youth Career Development Centers)

1. Please describe the current legal status and activities of your center.
2. What is your current capacity to serve your clients?
3. Is your capacity greater or less than, or about the same as when USAID funding for IDEJEN ended?
4. What factors contributed to these changes in capacity?

5. In what ways have your center's operations changed because of the end of USAID IDEJEN funding?
6. Who delivers the services of your CDCJ, and what is the source of funds for payment of the career advisors and center management?
7. Have you identified any new funding sources since the end of the IDEJEN project?
8. If yes, how did you identify them and what are they?
9. Do you ever charge user fees or have you considered this? Why?
10. If you are still located in a Chamber of Commerce, what is the relationship between the CDCJ and the Chamber? For example, do you receive funds, advice, support for placements, etc.?
11. What is your current connection to the IDEJEN NGO?
12. How great is the demand for the types of services you offer?
13. How many youth did you serve in the past month? Past year?
14. How do you define services in terms of number of contact hours and specific counseling?
15. What have been the results (outcomes) of your activities?
16. Do you think your center has become more sustainable, less sustainable, or is in more or less the same situation as when USAID funding ended?
17. What would it take for you to scale up your activities in terms of funds, staffing, materials, etc., to a level that would meet or exceed current demand for services —(a) for IDEJEN youth, and (b) for all out-of-school youth in your area who might need such services?
18. What relationship does your center have with the GOH, especially the MENFP and MJSAC?
19. What is your expectation for your CDCJ over the next 5 years?
20. What lessons have you learned from your experiences thus far that might not have been discussed already in this interview?

E. Institut National de la Formation Professionnelle (INFP)

Initial questions

1. How would you describe your overall relationship with IDEJEN?
2. What specific assistance have you rendered to IDEJEN?
3. How has IDEJEN assisted INFP?
4. How does INFP work with Youthbuild?
5. Is that work completely within the IDEJEN framework?
6. IDEJEN is now targeting youth in the sixth to eighth grade, whereas during the USAID-funded period youth were at a fourth grade level and after literacy training would move into the "accompaniment" phase at the fifth and sixth grade levels.
7. What is your view about how to address the needs of out-of-school youth whose education level is from zero (no schooling) to fourth grade?
8. Is or should there be a role for IDEJEN with the grade 4 or under cohort?

9. If yes, how might INFP support this cohort?
10. Youthbuild helped INFP to develop the out-of-school youth curriculum called “Working Hands, Working Minds.”
11. Since the adoption of this curriculum have you evaluated its effectiveness and, if so, with what results?
12. May we see a copy of the curriculum?
13. Did INFP itself conduct any training at the Ecoles Ateliers? If yes, what type?
14. Reports indicate that INFP with the support of Youthbuild:
 - developed an orientation guide for the Ecoles Ateliers (EAs);
 - developed an M&E system to manage the EAs;
 - developed pedagogical materials for the training;
 - introduced a guide for leadership;
 - developed pocket guides for youth in five technical fields in construction.Are all of these still in use, and may we have a copy of each?

Questions related to sustainability

1. Which IDEJEN-related activities were sustained after the end of USAID support for IDEJEN?
2. Were there any financial implications for INFP from the end of USAID funding that affected any of your activities?
3. What financial capacity does INFP have to continue and to expand its IDEJEN-related activities?
4. What is the institutional capacity and/or constraints that affect INFP’s ability to sustain and increase its role in support of out-of-school youth programs?
5. Have you encountered socio-cultural factors that complicate attempts to deliver training to youth admitted to the EAs?
6. Do any of these factors relate to gender? If so, which ones?
7. Does INFP have an explicit gender policy?
8. In 2011, only about one-third of youth beneficiaries were female. Do you have any comments or recommendations regarding this?

Questions related to scale

1. How many senior staff now work at INFP?
2. How is INFP organized? May we have a copy of your organization chart?
3. Is your staff size adequate to sustain current activities?
4. At its peak in 2009-2011, IDEJEN helped train 5,500 youth. If IDEJEN completes construction of the planned Ecoles Ateliers and engages more CBOs as satellites to scale up the number of youth

beneficiaries, what would be the implications for INFP in terms of its capacity to support such an expansion?

5. Would INFP need external assistance to backstop such an expansion effectively? If so, what type of assistance?

The certification process

We would like to understand how your certification process works at levels 1 & 2. Specifically:

1. Do you have a list you can share with us of the technical fields where a trainee can receive certification at each level?
2. How are the technical certification criteria for each of these areas developed? For example, are they written by INFP or adapted from international standard curricula or outsourced within Haiti?
3. Are there skill areas without certification standards that INFP is developing or wants to develop?
4. Can you describe the evaluation process leading to certification?
5. INFP also accredits the Ecoles Ateliers. Three were accredited as of early 2012. What are the criteria for accreditation?

Non-formal basic education (NFBE) policy

1. As of 2012, the NFBE policy for Haiti was completed with IDEJEN's support, but not ratified by the government. Has the policy since been ratified? If not, why not?
2. What gender-related policies were adopted, and has IDEJEN applied these?
3. May we have a copy of the NFBE policy document?

The future

In light of your experience with IDEJEN and the NFBE policy just discussed, what is your understanding of Haiti's future technical and vocational education and training challenges and opportunities, and how do you think IDEJEN could best respond to them?

F. Interview Questions: USAID

1. IDEJEN began as a research initiative in September 2003 to aid out-of-school youth. Is it correct to assume that USAID intended at that time to scale up and try to sustain positive outcomes?
2. If yes, did USAID consider conducting any baseline surveys or developing a scaling-up and sustainability plan using scenarios to help inform IDEJEN of options and possible consequences of different approaches to the out-of-school youth challenge?
3. IDEJEN began by targeting youth with less than a fifth-grade education, providing them with NFBE (literacy and life skills) followed by an option of vocational and education tracks. The latter helped these youth to complete fifth and sixth grade and obtain the CEP. Since the end of USAID funding, IDEJEN has decided to target only those with sixth-grade to eighth-grade educational levels.
4. What is USAID's view of this change?
5. Is USAID seeking to aid youth with zero to a 4th-grade education via the LEVE project or other initiatives? If yes, does USAID have any view on whether IDEJEN should or is able to address needs at this lower level, or whether this cohort would be better served via other service providers?

6. IDEJEN is focused heavily on construction and does not now work with any CBOs. IDEJEN's initial budget of US\$210,000 per Ecole Atelier has risen to US\$400,000, and it now has in hand about 25percent of the funds it needs to complete construction. Other donors may provide the balance, and how recurrent costs will be paid is a major issue. In view of this, what types of support would USAID consider through LEVE and other initiatives, e.g., teacher's salaries and benefits; budget support to IDEJEN's main office; tools and materials; other?
7. What has been the extent of contact with IDEJEN since the project ended in 2011? Has USAID provided any support to the IDEJEN NGO since 2011? If so, what?
8. Were there any reasons for the early termination of financial support to IDEJEN in March 2011 (rather than September) other than a lack of available funds?
9. Has USAID been satisfied with financial audits of IDEJEN?
10. Has USAID tried to carry out any cost-benefit analysis of IDEJEN over time to estimate the cost per beneficiary under different scenarios and beneficiary cohort sizes?

G. Youth Beneficiaries (Focus Groups)

Each focus group begins with introductions, an explanation of the objectives of the discussion, a statement that no one will be quoted by name in the report, and an expression of gratitude for their time and willingness to participate. The focus groups are being held in Kréyol and interpreted into English.

- Number of focus groups: 4
- Estimated number of participants: 12 to 15
- Gender: balanced
- Planned duration of each session: 2 hours
- Locations: one each in Port-au-Prince; Pt. Salud; Cap-Haïtien and Mirebalais
- Facilitator: Jean Fanfan Jourdain, research assistant (supported by lead consultant)

Introduction by the facilitator

Each of you has completed the IDEJEN training program and has benefitted from the 12-month employability phase with literacy, numeracy, and life skills training and the subsequent accompaniment phase. In the second phase you either continued your education or entered the employment track in order to obtain a level two certification in a technical trade and career development support. We have a number of specific questions, but do not want to use our limited time only by asking question after question and then having you respond. We prefer to explain what we are trying to learn from you, why your inputs are important, and then have you discuss your experiences and give us your ideas with respect to the following topics:

Topics (Topic headings or summaries to be written on a blackboard or flip chart in Kréyol, or the facilitator may use graphic representations of the topics to guide the discussion.)

1. **Topic 1: Employability Training.** What comments do you have about the employability phase? In your view, what were its strengths and weaknesses? What did you personally gain from the experience, and how have you used what you learned? (30 minutes)

2. **Topic 2: Phase 2 Education and Training.** What comments do you have about the second phase—the support for continued primary-school education and/or the technical trade-school experience? In your view, what were its strengths and weaknesses? What did you personally gain from the experience, and how have you used what you learned? (30 minutes)
3. **Topic 3: Internships.** Some of you were placed in on-the-job internships to gain practical experience. For those who had an internship, what was your experience? How long did it last? Was it helpful in providing you with new skills or access to income and a job? (15 minutes)
4. **Topic 4: Business skills.** Now, which of you received and can comment on the business skills training offered by IDEJEN? Can you explain whether and how this helped you, whether there were any problems with the training, and what you would recommend for the future? Related to this, a few of you may have engaged in an income-generating activity (IGA) with IDEJEN's support. We would like those of you with such experience to tell us if your business is still operating and the factors that led to your success or otherwise. (20 minutes)
5. **Topic 5: The Future.** A key goal of our work is to help USAID understand how to increase the effectiveness and impact of its programs to help out-of-school youth. If you were in charge of USAID, what would you do to help others like yourself in Haiti, and do you have ideas about how larger numbers of youth could be helped at reasonable costs? (25 minutes)

ANNEX 4: CBO QUESTIONNAIRE

The interviewer will ask each question and enter the response below.

Name of CBO _____

Location _____

Name of Director _____

Name of Person Interviewed (if not the Director) _____

Title of Person Interviewed if not the Director _____

Tel. Number: _____

Interviewer: Thank you for agreeing to this interview. Support for IDEJEN from USAID ended over two years ago. During that time, many CBOs have either stopped operations entirely or no longer work with IDEJEN. We would like to understand specifically what factors have allowed your organization to continue its activities with IDEJEN and overall. We would also like to understand which of these factors was the most important and why.

I am now going to ask you several questions and give you a choice of answers. I will then ask you to comment on your answer so we understand the reasons for your response. I am now going to provide you with a copy of the questionnaire so we can complete it together.

I. Reasons for current sustainability. In July 2011 USAID ended its financial support to IDEJEN. Your CBO continued to operate. Please rank the following possible reasons why you were able to continue with number one being the most important reason, number 2 the second most important, etc., and rank all items that apply to you.

_____ Our leaders engaged in long-term strategic planning to ensure our sustainability

_____ Our organization is linked to a parent organization that covers our fixed costs
(rent, wages, etc.)

_____ We obtained funds from other donors prior to the end of IDEJEN support

_____ We are able to charge user fees to our trainees to cover all or some of our costs

_____ We are a membership organization with annual fees that cover basic costs.

_____ We receive regular transfer payments from relatives abroad to support our work.

_____ Other factor(s), please describe _____

2. Funding as a sustainability factor. If your success resulted from obtaining financial support from other donors, please indicate how that support was acquired. If more than one method was used, please rank your response in priority order as before.

_____ We submitted unsolicited proposals to donors and obtained funding. Please indicate here which donors by name: _____

_____ We responded to one or more requests for proposals and were awarded contracts
Please indicate here which donors by name: _____

_____ We were approached by one or more donors and asked to carry out training in the
areas we already offered. Please indicate which donors by name: _____

_____ We obtained small grants through family members and personal contacts.

_____ We used other methods. Describe: _____

3. Types of capacity-building received. During the time when USAID supported IDEJEN, your CBO received capacity-building support. Please indicate the kind(s) of support you received. I will tick all that

apply.

- _____ Leadership training
- _____ Management training
- _____ Training in financial management and accounting
- _____ Financial support (for wages, etc.)
- _____ Provision of equipment
- _____ Provision of training materials (e.g., curricula and training guides)
- _____ Advice on establishing our CBO as a legal entity
- _____ Proposal writing and project design training
- _____ Training in procurement procedures
- _____ Other training or assistance. Please describe: _____

4. Perceived relative importance of capacity building by type. Now please rank the types of capacity building you received in terms of its importance to your organization's ability to scale up and sustain its activities. Please rank these with No. 1 the most important. (Choose no more than three.)

- _____ Leadership training
- _____ Management training
- _____ Training in financial management and accounting
- _____ Financial support (for wages, etc.)
- _____ Provision of equipment
- _____ Provision of training materials (e.g., curricula and training guides)
- _____ Advice on establishing our CBO as a legal entity
- _____ Proposal writing and project design training
- _____ Training in procurement procedures
- _____ Other training or assistance. Please describe: _____

5. Perceived scaling-up potential. If IDEJEN or another organization were to invite you to scale up your activities (for example, to increase the number of trainees by two times or five times or another number), aside from money needed to pay for direct costs for the additional activities (e.g., feeding trainees, hiring more teachers), what additional capacity-building needs do you think you would need for your CBO and why? *This is an open-ended question so as not to prompt a particular response. The interviewer should record the response below.*

6. Sustainability prospects. Your organization is operating more than two years after support from USAID IDEJEN ended. How do you see prospects for the growth and development of your CBO over the next 5 years and why? Please select one of the following responses.

- _____ Excellent potential for substantial growth and institutional development
- _____ Good potential for regular growth and further institutional development
- _____ Likely to remain at around our current size with existing capacities
- _____ Low to medium risk that our CBO will struggle unless there are changes from our current situat
- _____ High risk that we will not exist in 5 years or less

Please explain the reasons for your answer to question six so I can make a few notes.

Thank you for your time. Name of Interviewer: _____ Date: _____

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PEOPLE MET

Name	Position
Government of Haiti	
Merisier, Georges Gaston	Ex-Minister, MENFP; Team leader, Mid-Term Evaluation of JENKA Project.
Michel, Jean Daniel	Director of the DFPEA (Direction de la Formation et de la Promotion de l'Entreprenariat Agricole, Ministry of Agriculture
Simon, Woodly	Directeur de Jeunesse et Insertion, MJSAC
Villefranche, Yves	Deputy Director, Office for the Coordination of Operations, INFP
USAID/Washington, USAID/Haiti, IDEJEN Staff and SSA Team/Haiti & DC	
Beggs, Christine	Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, USAID/Washington
Blum, Rachel	Workforce Development Technical Specialist, USAID/Washington
Calixte, Carole	USAID/Haiti
Delorg, Devon	Education Specialist, USAID/Washington
Garden, Loretta	Education Sector Specialist, USAID/Haiti
Ignatowski, Clare	Senior Advisor, Youth & Workforce Development, USAID/Washington
Isma, Frednel	Consultant, IDB/MIF
Jean Charles, Hervé	Senior Education Advisor, USAID/Haiti
Jean-Louis, Jerry	Security and Logistics Assistant
Jourdain, Jean Fanfan	Research Assistant
Kerns, Jean	Financial Analyst, USAID/Haiti
Kim, Joyce	Program Officer, USAID/Haiti
Lahate, Caleb	Director of Operations, IDEJEN
Magene, Forbes	M&E at IDEJEN Headquarters
Michel, Isaac	Workforce Development/Job Creation Advisor, Economic Growth and Agricultural Development (EGAD) USAID/Haiti
Olenik, Christine	Senior Research Associate, JBS International, Inc.
Pierre, Fristzner	Financial Manager, IDEJEN
Point du Jour, Rulx	IDEJEN
Prévilon, Guerda	Executive Director, IDEJEN
Sylney, Hubert	Program Specialist, USAID/Haiti
Tatem, Lewis	Chief, Economic Growth and Agricultural Development Office, USAID/Haiti
Zdrowjewski, Nicole	JBS International, Inc.
CBOs, Ecoles Ateliers, CDCJs	
Antoine, Peterson	Centre d'Intégration pour le Développement des Enfants (CIDE I)
Beauchamp, Ernst	CREDOP Vice President
Belotte, Blood	Croisade des Jeunes Chrétiens (CJC)
Cauvin, Ralph Pierre	Ecole Atelier IDEJEN Saint Marc, Coordonnateur Administratif
Charles, Emmanuel	Groupement Progressiste de l'Avenue Maurepas (GPAM)
Desinord, Tony	Coordonnateur Technique de Comité d'Organisation pour la Rénovation de l'Avenue de Maurepas (CORAM)
Devert, Claude	MODES (Mouvement pour le développement Économique et social)
Duperval, Yves	CREDOP President
Duverge, Pierre	Association de la Jeunesse de l'Eglise Baptiste de Jérémie (AJEJER I), Administrateur Comptable
Edouard, Fréro	Organisation des Penseurs pour le Développement d'Haïti (OPEDHA)
Eliazar, Jean David	Association de la Jeunesse de l'Eglise Baptiste de Jérémie (AJEJER I)
Emiziot, Joseph	OJSC (Organisation des jeunes de la Savanne des Cayes)
Fleurimond, Gesner	GIDEHP (Action on Berger Cap Haïtien)
Auguste, Jean Daniel	M&E Officer, EA Jérémie
Casimir, Jude	Accompagnement Officer EA Jérémie

Name	Position
Delorme, Marie Claudette	Technical Coordinator, EA Les Cayes
Dérismé, Frantzès	Administrative Officer, EA Les Cayes
Exavier, Sander	Administrative Officer, EA Corail
François, Florence	Accompagnement Officer, EA Corail
Jean Beauplan, Eliette Jeanite	AFPROG (Association des Femmes Progressistes des Gonaïves)
Jean Louis, Junior	Ecole Atelier IDEJEN Saint Marc, Responsable Accompagnement
Jean Marie, Mackendy	Foyer Maurice Sixto, Carrefour Feuilles
Jean, Rony	École Atelier des Gonaïves
Joachim, Yves	M&E Officer, EA Cap-Haitien
Joseph Jean P.	CREDOP Treasurer
Julot, Emilon	Comité d'Organisation pour la Rénovation de l'Avenue de Maurepas (CORAM)
La fleur, Emmanuel	Corps National des Enseignants Haitiens (CONEH)
Léonard Martin, Bernabé	UJDEC (Union des jeunes pour le Développement et la Culture)
Louis Ulysse, Ezna	Catholic Youth Group (KIRO) at Jeremie
Louis, Archille	ODEM (Oganizasyon Devlopman Espwa Moun)
Louis, Junior	Accompagnement Officer, EA Delmas
Marcelus, Roosevelt	Action Bon Berger (ABB)
Marie, Mite	AJEBER I
Mervil, Martine	Association des Jeunes commercantes de la deuxième section de Saint-Marc (AFECOSSAM)
Mésidor, Johnson	Technical Coordinador, EA Cap-Haïtien
Nazaire, Ezechiel	Technical Coordinator, EA Corail
Piercin, Marc Peterson	M&E Officer, EA Corail
Pierre, Louis Frantz	Technical Coordinator, EA Jérémie
Pierre, Marie Lunie	Administrative Officer, EA Les Cayes
Samson, Mirline	CODAHM (Comité d'Action Humanitaire de Milot)
Studer, Mc Jude	Commissaire des Scouts
Sylvestre, Roger	ODFV (Organisation de Développement de Fragneau Ville)
Valentin, Ernsó	CREDOP (Comité de Recherche pour le Développement et l'Organisation de Port-Salut)
Vincent, Jean Frenel	Administrative Officer, EA Jérémie
Youth Beneficiaries and Local Government (Focus Group Participants)	
Mirebalais Local Government Representatives	
Bernavil, Lenel	CASEC, member, 3ème Section Grand Boucan
Denyers, Fenel	Coordonateur, ASEC
Jean Baptiste, Berthony	CASEC Adjoint Sarazin
Joseph Louis, Joralus	Coordonateur 4ème Section Crète Brulé
Louis, Ulrick	CASEC Coordonnateur 2ème Section Sarazin
Simon, Lyonel	Chargé de Mission
Sinelus, Archange	ASEC
Youths from GREDEVE	
Baptiste, Maudeline	GREDEVE, Electricité batiment
Barois, Gary	GREDEVE, Electricité
Bouchette, Loobens	GREDEVE, Mecanique
Gede, Julienne	GREDEVE, Plomberie
Jeanty, Philo	GREDEVE, Mecanique

Name	Position
Marc, Magdala	GREDEVE, Informatique Bureautique & Poterie
Normil, Noel	GREDEVE, Ceramique-Poterie
Paul, Tonio	GREDEVE, Electricité Auto
Rose, Erlande	GREDEVE, Marketing & relations publiques
Saint-Eloi, M.	GREDEVE, Couture
Sévère, Widlande	GREDEVE, Couture
Sévère, Wilmide	GREDEVE, Couture
Youths from GIDEHP-Action Bon-Berger (ABB)	
Cesaire Evens	GIDEHP-(ABB) Electricité
Dartilus Judline	GIDEHP-(ABB) Electricité
Destin Nadine	GIDEHP-(ABB) Electricité
Dorvil Mani	GIDEHP-(ABB) Patisserie
Ducatel Junior	GIDEHP-(ABB) Mecanique
Etienne Dadi	GIDEHP-(ABB) Patisserie
Francisco Lucas	GIDEHP-(ABB) Mecanique
Joseph Thelusca	GIDEHP-(ABB) Electricité
Julesca Mamoune	GIDEHP-(ABB) Patisserie
Louis Jacqueline	GIDEHP-(ABB) Electromécanique
Youths from CREDOP Port-Salut	
Aubrin Claudin	CREDOP Carrelage (tiling)
Cyril Solange	CREDOP Patisserie, Cuisine
Florestal Elder	CREDOP Carrelage
Jackson Rouché	CREDOP Carrelage
Jean Juste Pharel	CREDOP Carrelage
Jeudi Herbi	CREDOP Carrelage
Joseph Rose Andre	CREDOP Carrelage
Luders Pierre	CREDOP Carrelage
Pierre Lebrun	CREDOP Carrelage
Simon Derosier	CREDOP Carrelage
Valcourt Angena	CREDOP Carrelage
Viedaz Mona	CREDOP Patisserie
Youths from Ecole Atelier Cap-Haitien	
Archelus, Benou	Focus group participant
Dorestin, Erns	Focus group participant
Dosou, Vedeliu	Focus group participant
Emboise, Emmanuel	Focus group participant
Francisco, Dulce	Focus group participant
Jean, Guesnau	Focus group participant
Siliane, Prospère	Focus group participant
Jules, Richelus	Focus group participant
Laurent, Gilles Jr	Focus group participant
Louis, Joselin	Focus group participant
Monpremier, Cherly	Focus group participant
Pierre, Jacob	Focus group participant
Prophète, Wilnige	Focus group participant
Registe, Livenson	Focus group participant
St-Juste, Teveneau	Focus group participant
Other Institutions	
Bennett, Laurie	YouthBuild International
Denizé, Ralph	MIF Lead Specialist. IDB
Dupuy, Sylvie	ILO Specialist for SMEs
Garoute, Hans P.	Président, Conseil d'Administration, Chambres de Métiers et de l'Artisanat

Name	Position
	d'Haïti (& INDEPCO)
Hermantin, Léonie	Special Projects Coordinator, PRODEV
Labissière Claudia,	Executive Director. PRODEV
LeBrun, Jean Robert	Coordinateur Nationale, INDEPCO
Magnat, Julien	ILO Principal Technical Advisor
Pénette-Kedar, Maryse	President, PRODEV
Ramanantoanina, Patrick	Senior Operations Officer, World Bank
Valentin, Abe	Director General, Caribbean Harvest (fisheries sector association)

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ANNEX 7: SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS: OCTOBER 6-27, 2013

Sunday, October 6, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 1)

16:05 Arrival of the Lead Consultant at Port-au-Prince (PAP) on American Airlines flight 201.

Monday, October 7, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 2)

08:00-10:00 Meeting at Royal Best Western Hotel with Jean Fanfan Jourdain and Frednel Isma to review schedule, research tasks and local travel plans.

10:00-10:30 Meeting with Jerry Jean-Louis to review security and safety issues.

10:30-12:30 Administrative and other matters

14:00-15:30 Meeting at Fondation Immaculée Conception with Jean Robert Charles. Tel. 37918738
Kenscoff- Fort Jacques Rue A. Vieux, Thomasin 25.

17:00-18:30 Meeting with Isaac Michel, USAID/Haiti

Tuesday, October 8, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 3)

09:00-13:00 Meeting at IDEJEN Office in Pétionville with Ms. Guerda Prévilon, IDEJEN Director, Tel: 34740266, Rue Gregoire Pétionville and Rulx Point du Jour rulxpdj@hotmail.com.

14:00-17:00 Meeting with local team to revise schedules in light of USG shutdown and the cancellation of travel for the other team members, Team Leader, Clare Igotowski and Devon Mclorg, USAID/DC. Review analytical framework.

Wednesday, October 9, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 4)

09:00-10:00 Conference call between USAID/DC, USAID/Haiti and consultant.

10 :30-11:30 Meeting at ODFV (Organisation de Développement de Fragneau Ville) with Roger Sylvestre, Tel. 3702-8623 / 36296974, Fragneau Ville/Delmas, Fragnau -Ville après l'Hôpital Espoir

11 :30-12 :30 Return to hotel and hold IDEJEN follow up meetings

13:30-15:00 Meeting at INFP with M. Yves Villefranche, Deputy Director, Office for the Coordination of Operations, Institut Nationale de Formation Professionnelle. Rue Mercier Laham, Delmas 60.

15:45-18:00 IDEJEN meeting: Caleb Lahate, Director of Operations and Fristzner Pierre, Financial Manager

Thursday, October 10, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 5)

08:00-08:30 Security procedures at US Embassy

08:30-10:30 Meeting at USAID with Isaac Michel (tel: 2229-8861 or 3702-3690), Lewis Tatum, Chief, Economic Growth and Agricultural Development Office; Jean Kerns, Financial Analyst; Hubert Sylney, Program Specialist; Carole Calixte; Joyce Kim, Program Office and other relevant USAID staff. (Loretta Garden, Educ. Sector Specialist, email address:lgarden@usaid.gov was out of town)

- 12:00-14:00 Meeting with former Minister of Education, Mr. Georges Gaston Merisier; Tel & email: 3733-8016/ ggmerisier@yahoo.fr . He is the team leader for the mid-term evaluation of Youthbuild-supported JENKA project.
- 15 :00-15:45 Meeting with Mr. Jacques Jerome and two other instructors at CBO GREDEVE (Groupe d'Entraide pour le Développement de l'Enfant) at Angle rue Achille et Honorat Nazon.
- 16:00-19:00 **Focus Group #1** meeting at Jobs Haiti office with twelve youth trained by GREDEVE.

Friday, October 11, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 6)

- 09:30-11:00 Visit to the Ecole Atelier of Corail in Croix-des-Bouquets
- 11:00-12:30 Travel to US Embassy (USAID)
- 12:30-15:00 Meeting and lunch with Dr. Hervé Jean-Charles, ex-COR at USAID for IDEJEN
- 16:00-17:30 Meeting at IDB with Ralph Denizé, MIF Lead Specialist. IDB Office, Carrefour Djoumbala, Route de Frères, PAP.

Saturday, October 12, 2013 Jérémie (Day 7)

- 7:30-8:30 Travel to Jérémie: Tortugair flight 171 departs PAP at 7:30; arrival at 8:30.
- 8:30-9:15 Travel to hotel & check in at **Hotel Le Bon Temps**, Jérémie
- 10:00-11:30 Meeting at Association de la Jeunesse de l'Eglise Baptiste de Jérémie (AJEJER I) with Jean David Eliazar IDEJEN Contact, Tel. 284-5700/704-4650/747-2954509), 42 Rue Dr. Hypollite, Route de Caracolie, Jérémie
- 12:00-13:00 Meeting at KIRO (Catholic Youth Group), College Saint-Louis with Jean LouisAlta/Ulysse Ezna, IDEJEN Contacts, Tel. 284-6161; 56, Rue Abbé Huet.
- 14:00-16:30 Visite Ecole Atelier de Jérémie

Sunday, October 13, 2013 Les Cayes (Day 8)

- 8:00-13:00 Leave Jérémie for Les Cayes by road; check in to the **Hôtel Jardin sur Mer**

Monday, October 14, 2013 Les Cayes (Day 9)

- 08:00-09:00 Meeting at the CBO ORAC-Foyer Miséricorde with Rev. Pere Benoit Tulce & Emma Doxant, IDEJEN Contacts, Tel: 34855321, Rte Nationale #298, Bergeau/ Faugace.
- 09 :30-10:30 Meeting at the CBO Union des Jeunes pour le Développement de l'Education et de la Culture (UJDEC), Les Cayes with Mr. Martin Bernabé Léonard, IDEJEN Contact Tel. 791-5315/769-4840 Rue Capitale, Derrière-Fort, Aux Cayes.
- 10 :45-13:00 Visit the Ecole Atelier des Cayes
- 14:00-15:15 Meeting at Organisation des Jeunes de la Savane des Cayes (OJSC), Les Cayes with Mr. Chamblain Edouard, Contact, Tel: 769-0801, 74, Rue Duvivier Hall, La Savane aux Cayes.

15:45-16:30 Meeting at the CBO, Comité de Recherche pour le Développement et l'Organisation de Port-Salud (CREDOP), Les Cayes with Mr. Ernsó Valentín, IDEJEN Contact, Tel: 636-8220/ 727-0987, 3, Rue François Capois Port-Salut.

16:30-18:00 **Focus Group #2** meeting conducted on site at CREDOP.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Travel from Les Cayes to Port-au-Prince (Day 10)

9:00-14:00 Check out from the hotel in Les Cayes and return by road to Jérémie. (Meetings in Miragôane and Petit Gôave cancelled due to security issues.)

Wednesday, October 16, 2013 Mirebalais and Hinche (Day 11)

09:00 Depart to airport (flight was delayed)

12:00 Arrive in Port-au-Prince

15:00 Arrive in Mirebalais (delays due to flat tire, traffic and rain)

15:00-16:15 Meetings with Simon Lyonel and six CASECs and ASECs (local government heads of the "sections communales") from the area around Mirebalais.

16:15-18:00 Visit Ecole Atelier of Mirebalais (Gary Walker); and departure of Jean Fanfan Jourdain to Hinche.

18:00-20:30 Returned to Port-au-Prince. (Meeting at CBO Eglise St Joseph de Marché Canard with Père Faublais Louis cancelled for security reasons). Tel:4275-5207.

Jean Fanfan Jourdain	Gary Walker
Thursday, October 17, 2013 (Hinche to Cap Haïtien) (Day 12) (October 17 th was a national holiday – some meetings were cancelled as a result)	
08:00-11:30 Travel to Milot Meeting at CODAHM (Comité d'Action Humanitaire de Milot) Milot, "Rue Républicaine Milot-Crudem" with Madame Mirline Samson, Director. Tel: 36523281/ 37883948. Meeting with the CBOs GIDEHP & Action Bon Berger Cap-Haïtien 132, Rte de l'EDH, Ste Philomène, Cap-Haïtien with Mr. Roosevelt Marcelus (Phone: 37674257), M. Fleurimond Gesner (33253217; 37177209) and focus group meeting also conducted with 12 youth	Laurie Bennett, JENKA, lbennett@youthbuild.org lunch Meeting with Hans P. Garoute, Director, Chambres de Métiers et de l'Artisanat d'Haïti Meeting with Ralph Denizé and Frednel Isma of IDB (Confirmed at Hotel Oasis)
Friday, October 18, 2013 Cap Haïtien to Port-au-Prince (Day 13)	
Visit to Ecole Atelier du Cap Haïtien at Rue Abattoir and meeting with Johnson Mesidor, Director, Tel: 36404297. Focus group meeting conducted with 12 Youths Visit to the Ecole Atelier in Gonaïves and meeting with Jean Rony Lima Meeting at the Ecole Atelier with CBO MODES (Mouvement pour le Développement Economique et	Meeting Mr. Jean-Robert Le Brun, INDEPCO for vocational training (apparel industry) Separate meetings with Guerda Prévillon, IDEJEN and then with Mr. Rulx Point-du-Jour, Coordinator of JENKA for IDEJEN and Forbes Majene, M&E Officer.

Jean Fanfan Jourdain	Gary Walker
Social), Gonaïves with Mr. Claude Devert. Contact. Tel: 36093280, 50 Avenue des Dattes.	

Monday, October 21, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 16)

- 10 :00-10:45 Meeting with Mr. Woodley Simon, Directeur de Jeunesse et Insertion
- 10:45-11:30 Visit to the Ecole d'Espoir workshops and classrooms at MJSAC
- 11:30-14:00 Travel to ProDev in Pétionville
- 14:00-16:00 Meeting with Claudia Labissière, Executive Director; Maryse Pénette-Kedar, President and Leonie M. Hermantin, Special Projects Coordinator and tour of the ProDev facility.

Tuesday, October 22, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 17)

Jean Fanfan Jourdain	Gary Walker
07 :00-08 :00 Travel to site	
08 :00-09 :00 Meeting at Organisation des Penseurs pour le Développement d'Haïti (OPEDHA) with Fréro Edouard, IDEJEN Contact Tel : 716-3244, Institution Béthel Rue d'Ault, Imp. Hébéx, Carrefour Feuilles.	
09:30-10:30 Meeting at the CBO Foyer Maurice Sixto, Carrefour Feuilles with Mr. Mackendy Jean Marie, IDEJEN Contact. Tel: 3410-0839	
11:00-12:00 Meeting at Centre d'Intégration pour le Développement des Enfants (CIDE I) 67, Rue Fouchard, Carrefour-Feuilles with Mr. Peterson Antoine IDEJEN Contact Tel: 3747-6600.	14:00 Meeting with Mr. Julien Magnat, ILO Principal Technical Advisor and Ms. Sylvie Dupuy, ILO Specialist for SMEs Tel: 4744-7178/ dupuis@ilo.org
14 :00-15 :15 Meeting at ILO (see entry at right)	16:00 Follow up meeting with Isaac Michel
16 :00-17 :30 Visit to Ecole Atelier in Delmas 64 Mme. Mombayard, tel: 2910-1001 and Mme. Sanda 4042-1596	18:00 Meeting with Mr. Valentin Abe, DG of Caribbean Harvest (acquaculture) Tel: 3752-9540 valentin_abe@yahoo.com

Wednesday, October 23, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 18)

- 10:00-11:00 Meeting with Mr. Patrick Ramanantoanina, Human Resources Development Officer, World Bank

Thursday, October 24, 2013 Port-au-Prince (Day 19)

- 09:00-10 :00 Meeting at the CBO Aimer=Servir de Village Solidarité with Mr. Claude Pean, IDEJEN Contact, Tel:3454-0314. Collège de Fraternelle 15, Impasse Colon & Nicausse, rue Léonard Delmas 19
- 11:00-12:00 Ministry of Agriculture, meeting with Mr. Daniel Michel, Director of the DFPEA (Direction de la Formation professionnelle des Entreprises agricoles)
- 12:30-14:00 Travel to USAID office and clear security

14:00-16:30 Debriefing of key USAID staff on preliminary findings of the SSA

Friday, October 25 & Saturday, October 26, 2013 in Port-au-Prince (Days 20 & 21)

11:00-13:00 Meeting with Technical Coordinator and staff, St. Marc Ecole Atelier

Wrap up meetings with Frednel Isma and Jean Fanfan Jourdain.